This book explores the linkages between Southern Europe and South America in the post–World War II period, through organized migration and development policies.

In the post-war period, regulated migration was widely considered in the West as a route to development and modernization. Southern European and Latin American countries shared this hegemonic view and adopted similar policies, strategies, and patterns, which also served to promote their integration into the Western bloc. This book showcases how overpopulated Southern European countries viewed emigration as a solution for high unemployment and poverty, whereas huge and underpopulated South American developing countries such as Brazil and Argentina looked at skilled European immigrants as a solution to their deficiencies in qualified human resources. By investigating the transnational dynamics, range, and limitations of the ensuing migration flows between Southern Europe and Southern America during the 1950s and 1960s, this book sheds light on post–World War II migration-development nexus strategies and their impact in the peripheral areas of the Western bloc.

Whereas many migration studies focus on single countries, the impressive scope of this book will make it an invaluable resource for researchers of the history of migration, development, international relations, as well as Southern Europe and South America.

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Migration and Development in Southern Europe and South America
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Introduction

Maria Damilakou and Yannis G. S. Papadopoulos

Throughout the last two centuries population mobility between South America and Europe resulted in the development of a transnational space that joins the two regions. Millions of Europeans migrated to South America during the 19th and 20th centuries, while in recent decades we are witnessing a shift in course, a significant reversal of that phenomenon whereby South Americans are now moving to Europe. During the period of massive transatlantic migration from the middle of the 19th century until the end of World War I, 10 million to 15 million Europeans settled in South America. Although many hailed from Germany and Eastern Europe, the majority of the migrants were from the Southern European countries of Spain, Portugal and Italy and were to contribute greatly to the strengthening of links between the Mediterranean and South America and to have a deep impact on the economy, society and culture of both sending and receiving countries.

Southern European migrant flows to South America is an age-old topic, and while extensive literature is available on the subject, most of the focus has been on the period prior to World War II. Generally speaking, a plethora of important studies have explored the massive transatlantic migration flows to South America from the mid-19th century and up until the end of the 1920s. It is well known that Argentina and Brazil in particular, as well as Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay, extended a warm welcome to Southern European immigrants who were perceived as being not only a necessary workforce but also settlers whose role as “civilizing agents” would be a valuable influence for their “primitive” rural communities. Venezuela was to emerge as an attractive destination during the post–World War II period, while the Andine countries, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, received comparably few European immigrants. Immigration to South America was to diminish during the interwar period but gained new impetus after World War II. In contrast to the large body of literature that focuses on the period 1870–1920, relatively little research has been done on post–World War II migration movements from Southern Europe to South America and on their impact on economy and society from a global perspective.1

This book aims to fill this gap and offers a comparative approach on migration and development policies that goes beyond the perspective of the national

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state by taking into account the interactions between national strategies, international dynamics and transnational networks. As a whole, the present volume explores the linkage between Southern Europe and South America through human mobility and development strategies in the post–World War II period. This complex subject is approached from two perspectives that cross all chapters: national strategies and international policies within the framework of the so-called post–World War II Western world. The core concept around which the volume is organized is the migration–development nexus that constituted one of the main axes of the postwar Western world system and is still relevant today as fresh perspectives on migration consider it an integral part of broader development processes (Da Haas 2020). In the 1950s, the political planning and policy making of the so-called “Free World” placed great faith on regulated migration, believing it to be intrinsically linked to development and modernization and of great value to the labor market where it would have a transformative role to play in the economic and social restructuring of peripheral areas (Papadopoulos & Parsanoglou 2015: 49–51).

Already in the early 20th century, European sending countries were seriously examining the economic and social impacts of labor migration, and their governments oscillated between encouraging and discouraging emigration. During this period, bilateral agreements were used as tools, providing incentives to attract and direct labor forces from sending countries to destinations in need of manpower for their industrial centers and public works programs (Parsanoglou & Tsitselikis 2015: 14–16). In the aftermath of World War I, labor market policies, as related to controlled workers’ mobility, became an important aspect of international politics; while transnational organizations like the ILO considered the possibility of regulating the distribution of population and workforce worldwide (Bade 2003: 130; Böhning 2012; Thomas 1983). During the interwar period, whereas most major receiving countries were adopting restrictive migration policies in order to limit the entrance of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe – the case of the United States being the most emblematic following the enactment of the 1921 and 1924 immigration quota legislation – Latin America emerged as the continent that would absorb the “surplus population” from the Old World (Thomas, 1983: 708). At the same time, migration was considered a crucial factor that could generously contribute to the economic and demographic needs of the receiving countries of Latin America.

Following World War II, and according to the prevalent “development doctrine” in the Western world, “overpopulation” was considered to be one of the main causes of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment, all associated with political instability and the expansion of the “communist threat”. Poverty was therefore perceived as detrimental to the liberal world, and it needed to be confronted and managed through development (Damilakou & Venturas 2015: 296; Maccari–Clayton 2004: 587). In this context, the gospel of development spread throughout the Western bloc, and industrialization became a litmus test for ranking its countries, thus creating a division between an industrialized
center and an “underdeveloped” periphery that faced economic, social and political challenges and menaces (Escobar 1995).

In this sense, this book focuses on the periphery of the post-war Western world, interweaving socio-economic aspects, public debates and policies of the Southern European countries and South America, which were in a crucial period, a time when they were setting the parameters of their own economic development. By the end of World War II, the two regions had gone through different historical experiences. In Mediterranean Europe, Italy was in ruins, Greece was coming out of a ten-year war (World War II and civil war) and Spain was still recovering from its civil war (1936–1939). Portugal, the only country that had emerged unscathed from the conflict, was nonetheless undergoing a period of economic stagnation. The countries of the Iberian Peninsula were being governed by authoritarian regimes (Franco’s regime in Spain and Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal), Italy was in the process of stabilizing its democracy after a long period of fascist rule, and Greece was trying to maintain a democratic façade against a background of political persecution of the Left after the civil war. Another Southeastern European country, Yugoslavia – which is included in this volume – followed its proper path to socialism after its split from the Soviet Union in 1948. For both capitalist and communist Mediterranean countries alike, overcoming dependence on the primary sector and fostering industrial development was a priority.

Conditions in South America were the complete opposite of the sorry state of affairs in Europe. Brazil, in joining the side of the Allies, became a major exporter of raw materials during the war effort and expected to be rewarded with development aid for its contribution to victory. Similarly, a neutral Argentina, during and after World War II, managed to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves thanks to the massive export of grain and meat, whose international prices rose sharply in 1945. Both countries were governed by populist regimes (Vargas in Brazil and Peron in Argentina) that had adopted corporatist policies, promoting the mechanization of agriculture and the substitution of imported consumer goods through domestic industrialization and had set national development, under state control, as an absolute priority (Furtado 1976: 117). The structuralist economists of Latin America, whose theories gained momentum during this period, promoted the effectuation of development by increasing industrial productivity and overcoming dependence on primary production in order to achieve income growth, accumulate capital, close the gap with industrialized centers and improve living standards of the population (Devés Valdés 2008: 31–33; Prebisch 1950: 2; Love 1980; Love 2005).

Migration played a major role in the development strategies of the period: in general terms, migrants were considered a valuable development resource. In Southern Europe, despite several stabilization programs and the influx of American financial aid, economic hardship and high unemployment were to persist for many years after the war had ended. As a consequence, although official policies differed according to the political profile of national governments, during the 1950s almost all Southern European countries gradually
liberalized their once-restrictive emigration policies and viewed emigration as an escape valve that could release the tensions created by war, political strife, unemployment and underemployment. Moreover, remittances sent to homelands were regarded as an important infusion for local and national economies. Migration was also a market in itself that could foment economic activities, while transnational entrepreneurship was expected to activate networks and liberate the dynamics necessary for positive outcomes.

For their part, Latin American countries, under the influence of the hegemonic post–World War II development doctrine, perceived their shortages in human capital as a major obstacle to development. During this period, massive internal migration from rural areas to urban centers radically altered the distribution of population in Latin America and generated the labor force that was needed for the industrialization effort (Guizardi & Grimson 2020: 551). However, some experts and policy planners believed that local workers, due to their lack of education and racial or cultural background, did not have the necessary skills, and that their training would be a long-term process. Therefore, they favored the importation of qualified manpower from Europe with a view to accelerating the pace of growth and spread of skills and positive attitudes on development. Within this framework, they reinvented their profile as host countries and elevated the importance of a selective transfer of skilled European immigrants to their industrial centers and rural areas.

In such a context, the state’s interventionism in migration matters, which had already begun in the interwar period (Cook-Martin 2008), was accentuated after World War II. Migration planning became an area of growing government concern for both sending and receiving countries. The state was required to plan migratory flows, select emigrants or immigrants and channel them towards destinations and areas that were considered propitious for their settlement. In other words, migration policies were subordinated to the national interests as perceived by the governments of the sending and receiving regions. South American countries, according to their immigration policies, identified desirable immigrants as being skilled industrial or agricultural workers. This planning had a limited scope and did not consider the immigrants’ potential contribution to the service sector or the growth of the national market. In this respect, those governments underestimated the benefits that the immigrants’ social and educational capital, private consumption, and entrepreneurial spirit would bring to the economy. This strict interpretation was influenced by ideas on development that were circulating in different global fora of that period.

In any case, post–World War II migration policies transcended national strategies: new international organizations, which helped shape the Western bloc, attempted to regulate human mobility and link migration flows to the development of the countries and regions that were within its sphere of influence. For this purpose, these organizations mobilized policies and discourses pertinent to the countries of emigration and immigration, their aim being to integrate the peripheral areas of the Western world into a unified market, through the management of population mobility and development policies. With the creation
of a new intergovernmental agency that specialized on migration issues, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), the migration–development nexus was highlighted as a key political matter of the post-war period. A new era in international migration management started in February 1952, when PICMME was renamed, after some months, as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) and was made responsible for the transfer of refugees and displaced persons, as well as persons who wanted to emigrate from Europe (Venturas 2015: 5–7).

ICEM had the dual purpose of relieving Europe of its surplus population and contributing, through the regulated influx of workforce, to the development of countries in the periphery. This new body was appointed with the tasks of assisting sending countries with the selection and preparation of migrants, of offering information services and guidance generally, of streamlining the procedures before and after the journey and of ensuring financial assistance, which came mainly from the United States, the main architect and sponsor of the new organization. In addition, ICEM was also expected to collaborate with national authorities and voluntary organizations in labor market placement and to cater for the integration of assisted European immigrants in overseas receiving countries.

The participation of Southern European and Latin American countries in post–World War II international migration management promoted their integration into the capitalist bloc and contributed to the spread of common patterns of development and modernization among the countries of the “Free World”. These unifying perceptions competed, however, with the national strategies of sending and receiving countries, each of which had their own interpretations of the migration–development nexus, according to their particular set of national interests, social features, economic needs, historical background, traditions and cultural practices as well as their capacity to influence the international labor market (Betts 2013: 47). These complex matters are the main subject of the present volume.

This book is divided into two linked parts. The first part analyses the migration and development policies of Southern European and South American countries, as shaped into the political and economic context of the post-war Western world. In the first chapter, María José Fernández Vicente explores the role of migration in the Franco regime’s development strategies. She defines two clearly differentiated stages in Spanish post–World War II emigration, each with an individual socio-economic impact and different perceptions contingent upon Franco’s political priorities. The first waves, from 1945 until the end of the 1950s, moved mainly to Latin America, following the typical itineraries of the Spanish migratory flows since the end of the 19th century. During the second stage, which began at the beginning of the 1960s, overseas emigration was progressively overtaken by the continental migratory flow to the industrialized European countries. Spanish emigration to Latin America, which basically served as a bolster for Franco’s political purposes, was generally perceived
as a “national calamity” that provoked cracks in the country’s labor potential, whereas later emigration to Europe was viewed in a positive light, due to its temporary nature and regulated character, the inflow of remittances and the expectation that migrants would one day return to their homeland. Indeed, repatriation was considered a potentially important modernization factor and development resource thanks to the skills acquired in industrialized countries.

Giota Tourgeli examines the shaping of migration policies and development strategies in post-war Greece. Despite the rapid reconstruction and deep transformation of the national economy in the early post-war period, emigration remained for Greek governments an important means of relieving the unemployment problem, increasing the inflow of foreign exchange and improving the quality of the workforce. The map of Greek emigration presents similarities with the Spanish case: while the first post-war flows moved to overseas destinations, they would later, from the late 1950s onwards, be directed largely to Western European countries. Considered as an auxiliary measure which would help the country on its path to development, emigration officially became part of the political agenda of the Greek governments which were largely dependent on the political priorities of the leading powers of the post-war Western world. Initially in favor of the idea of multilateral organized migration, Greece would subsequently enter the European system of regulated temporary labor migration in an effort to undertake an active role in the management of the emigration of its surplus manpower, although the leeway to formulate a realistic migration agenda, along with an efficient development plan, was narrow and faced structural limitations.

The remaining chapters of Part I transfer us to the other side of the Atlantic. Maria Damilakou examines how Argentina’s post–World War II migration policies were shaped into a global context that prioritized development and explores the ways national strategies interacted with the political and economic priorities of the Western world. As a whole, post-war Argentinian migration policies aimed at promoting European immigration through selective standards that linked migration to the development of national industry and to rural colonization plans. Peron’s governments (1946–1955) paired European inflows to his development goals, in which industrialization was to play a major role. The migration–development nexus is clearly reflected in the industrialization and decentralization policies of Arturo Frondizi’s government (1958–1962), considered as Argentina’s “developmentalist” period per excellence. However, due to several structural factors, neither national policies nor Argentina’s participation in the post-war international migration management system, were able to reverse the downward tendencies in the European migrant inflows from the early 1950s onwards.

The next three chapters take us to neighboring Brazil. Roberto Goulart Menezes and Ana Teresa Reis da Silva examine the Brazilian economy between 1929 and 1979, with emphasis on the period 1930–1955, and discuss the role of immigrant labor in Brazil’s “development effort”. The “long exceptional period” of development (1929–1979) prompted a split in the agrarian-export
accumulation pattern and the industrialization process of the Vargas Era which transformed the face of the Brazilian economy. Since the 1930s, large contingents of workers, including immigrants, were incorporated into the national development effort which took off during the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, when a new pattern of accumulation marked by the internationalization of the economy became dominant. Despite achieved economic growth, the authors consider inequality and authoritarianism as key elements in the country’s development process between 1929 and 1979, factors which were also discernible in the national migration policies. A prominent feature of the Vargas and Dutra governments (1946–1954) was the use of restrictions as well as discrimination and selective criteria, shaped by racist categories and eugenicist theories, to create a profile of the ideal immigrant.

In continuation, Yannis Papadopoulos explores the profile of desirable migrants as outlined in Brazilian immigration policies. With the question of race being explicitly or implicitly present in all decisions concerning the selection of immigrants, Brazil, historically displayed a clear preference for white European immigrants that evolved during the 1930s into legislation of a quota system, whose main aim was to control the arrivals of “unassimilable” ethnic and religious groups as well as persons that professed dangerous political ideologies – all those considered unable to contribute to national development. Racial discrimination in Brazil persisted in the post-war years, although its participation in the war effort, and subsequently in the post-war international institutional system, resulted in the liberalization of its migration policy. This was expressed in the resettlement of refugees in its territory and the establishment of professional selective criteria for prospective immigrants. In the 1950s, the governments of Vargas and Kubitschek favored – with modest results, though – the admittance of farmers/settlers as well as skilled workers and technicians that were considered necessary for the national industrial development.

The last chapter of the Brazilian trio explores the interpretation of immigration to Brazil from a sociological perspective. These interpretations, analyzed by Tânia Tonhati, Márcio de Oliveira and Leonardo Cavalcanti, are in fact the reflection of strong national imaginaries, persistent collective self-images and how Brazilian society perceived its path to modernization and development. Following World War II, along with other topics, sociological debates revolved around the issue of industrial development and modernization, with its fundamental premise that the country needed to transcend its so-called agricultural and mineral vocation and chronic underdevelopment. Focusing on immigrants, seminal sociologist Florestan Fernandes studied the impact of immigration on the advent and consolidation of a capitalist society in Brazil. Advancing to more recent decades, the chapter shows how Brazil, from 1980 onwards as expressed in predominant sociological debates, started to consider itself as an emigration country; and more recently as a host country for immigrants coming from countries that form part of the so-called “Global South”.

Introduction
Part II of the book takes us from the sphere of policies to the reality of the migration movements that, following World War II, connected Southern European countries with South America. The chapters included in this part present the factors that engendered post-war mobility, taking into account the economic asymmetries between industrialized and peripheral countries (Massey et al. 1993) and the inability of the push-pull and neoclassical models to explain migration (Da Haas 2020). Also, the analysis poses questions about the relation between policies and their implementation, which was largely determined not only by structural factors but also by the expectations of the migrants themselves. Most of the chapters showcase the importance of family and social networks in stimulating or facilitating mobility, serving as intermediaries between the immigrant’s place of origin and destination (Kadushin 2012).

Bárbara Ortuño Martínez reconsiders the characteristics of the last migratory flow from Spain to the Southern Cone after World War II. Through a micro-historical approach and from a gender perspective, the author shows how migration reality questions the effectiveness of standards set by official interventionist policies designed on paper; especially, the preference for certain social profiles and professional categories viewed by the host countries, as expedient for their industrial development and rural colonization projects. Focusing on the case of Argentina, Bárbara Ortuño Martínez reminds us that post-war Spanish migrant groups were largely composed of women who, together with male migrants, managed to flee the controls imposed by Franco’s regime and make use of existing social networks that cleared their path to South America. Once there, settled in big cities or small provincial towns and inserted into an engendered labor market, they faced both social and personal challenges. These women became the “other” protagonists of post-war Spanish migration and underwent a different process of integration in the host countries.

In the next chapter, Beatriz Padilla and Thais França analyze, through a transnational and long-term perspective, Portuguese migration movements to South America, especially to Brazil. Portuguese migration to Brazil acquired a “natural”, constant and bidirectional character, due to the strong cultural links between the two peoples. In the post-war era, the restrictive policies of Salazar’s Estado Novo regime (1933–1974) were not able to discourage the decision of the Portuguese to emigrate. The Portuguese colonial war in Africa (1961–1974), the decolonization process and the Carnation Revolution in 1974 put an end to the Estado Novo regime and triggered new migrant flows from both Portugal and the former African colonies. In the last section, the authors explore the diasporic policies designed by the Portuguese state in recent decades and the expansion of what they call Portuguese post-national citizenship; namely, the development of different engagement policies including nationality, agreements to assist nationals abroad, the expansion of voting rights and a renewal of interest in the return of emigrants or their investment to their country of origin.
The next chapter, written by Sara Bernard and Agustin Cosovschi, takes us to socialist Yugoslavia, which had maintained a special relationship with the post-war Western world. After the split with Stalin in 1948, the country adopted a policy of neutrality and forged vital alliances with the “Third World” in order to make Yugoslav socialism a viable alternative to bloc politics. In that context, various forms of human mobility took shape and “alternative” development strategies were designed, which crossed the borders of the Iron Curtain and went beyond the center-periphery logic that was predominant in the post-war Western world. This chapter analyzes Yugoslav attempts to bolster cooperation with South American countries in the 1950s and 1960s and gives special attention to the role of migration in this project. It also examines official policies toward Yugoslav diasporas in South America by focusing on the cases of Chile and Argentina. Finally, the authors identify forms of human mobility that arose from the diverse forms of cooperation that Yugoslavia managed to establish in the Southern Cone in the early Cold War years, including academic exchange, political travels, and support for South American political refugees.

Staying in Southeastern Europe, Maria Damilakou and Yannis Papadopoulos study the post–World War II Greek migration to Argentina and Brazil and showcase the common features and differences between the flows to the two destination countries. The most important postwar Greek migration flow to Argentina took place spontaneously in the period 1948–1952 and was motivated by pre-war migrant social networks, while most of the Greeks who settled in Brazil in the 1950s migrated through organized ICEM schemes. The authors also problematize the results of assisted migration and substantiate the limitations of post-war international organizations’ strategies that sought to direct migrant flows from Southern European countries to developing South American countries, expecting to meet the needs of both sending and receiving countries. The results of these strategies were not as anticipated: in fact, none of the plans for agricultural settlement materialized, while assisted Greek urban workers faced serious difficulties in South American destinations. Despite not fitting the profile of the “ideal skilled workers” sought by the host countries, and realizing the futility of their expectations in the jobs they were placed in, most Greek immigrants found their own path for the fulfillment of their migration plans.

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris focuses on another aspect of the economic impact of migration in the post–World War II period, namely migrant transport, and demonstrates the close relationship that existed between government and private business interests regarding migration traffic. Focusing on the migrant routes that connected Southern Europe to South America, the author shows how politics and business went hand in hand in the transfer of migrants. The main emigration countries, operating towards South America, were also well-established maritime countries with developing public-owned airlines. On the other side of the Atlantic, some South American receiving countries owned public transport companies or had private ones operating under their flag.
Thus, governmental and private interests cooperated, since migration transport was a highly remunerative business not only for the companies involved, but also for the wider national interests. For this reason, countries with shipping and air companies operating under their flags endeavored to acquire the largest slice of this migrant transport business and ward off competition, often at the expense of the migrants’ safety and comfort.

Finally, in the last chapter of the volume, Antonis Masonidis offers a statistical and quantitative analysis on post–World War II migration from Southern Europe to South America and exhibits the interrelations between migration flows, gross national product, unemployment and remittances sent to the migrants’ countries of origin. The analysis reveals connections that raise interesting questions and invite further research on the complex relation between migration and development.

Closing the presentation of the chapters of this book, special mention must be made of the references to the “omnipresent” Italian migration to South American countries that are included in all chapters; Italian migrant flows and state policies, including legal regulations and the signing of bilateral migration agreements with Argentina, Brazil and other countries, had a major impact on the shaping of the transnational space that emerged between Southern Europe and South America, and were a defining influence on intraregional migration trends (Bertagna 2020; La Cava 1999).

Both parts of this volume give rise to questions that cross the whole book, such as: How can we evaluate the development strategies adopted by Southern European and South American states in the post–World War II period, and in what ways was migration linked to development and social modernization? What were the main characteristics of migration flows from Southern Europe to South America in the 1950s and 1960s, and what was their transnational impact on economy, society and culture? What forces shaped the perceptions and social representations of migration in both sending and receiving countries and how did they influence official policies? How were these migration policies put into practice, and what was the institutional framework that supported them?

Another set of questions springs from the complex relationship between national strategies, international dynamics and the structural characteristics of the post-war Western world: In what ways did the post–World War II international institutional framework, under the leadership of the United States, attempt to integrate semi-peripheral Southern Europe and Latin America in the labor market of the “Free World”? To what extent, if any, were the needs and interests of the sending and the receiving countries of the “Western South” complementary, as perceived within the post-war international migration management system? What possibilities and limitations conditioned the developing countries efforts to formulate and implement realistic migration policies and to influence the international labor market? The chapters that follow address these issues and offer hindsight and answers to the aforementioned questions.
Introduction

Note

1 Already in the 1960s, Fernando Bastos de Ávila published a study, in cooperation with the ICEM, on the population movements towards Latin America and their impact on development: F. Bastos de Ávila, *Immigration in Latin America*, Pan American Union, 1964. Later, Susana Torrado examined global migration policies in relation to Latin America: S. Torrado, “Las políticas de migraciones internacionales en América Latina”, *Cuadernos del Celade*, Santiago de Chile, 1979. More recently, some interesting studies have adopted a transnational perspective to examine migration movements between a specific Southern European sending country and a receiving country in Latin America (see the bibliographic references in the chapters of this volume). However, these studies study migration movements at a bilateral level and usually not from a global perspective.

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Part I

Development and migration policies in the periphery of the Western world
1 A stream of currency
The role of Spanish emigration in Franco’s development strategy

María José Fernández Vicente

During almost three decades between the end of the Second World War and the onset of the world energy crisis, Spain, under Franco’s dictatorship, underwent a transformation that few could have predicted. From a country ruined by three long years of civil war, suffocated by post-war autarchic policies, and completely isolated from the rest of the world, Spain, in the early 1970s, had become a country that was integrated into most international organisations and a centre of attraction for numerous foreign companies, and its beaches were being visited by millions of tourists every summer. From hardship and hunger, Spain was progressing to a phase of strong economic development and an increasingly all-important opening up to the outside world.

Indeed, after the recessionary cycle that had marked the latter years of the 1950s, Spain in the 1960s witnessed an unprecedented expansionary cycle, which lasted for the first half of the following decade. This expansionary cycle, although spectacular by all accounts, did nothing more than allow the Spanish economy to return to pre-civil-war levels. This development was characterised by strong growth in production (7.1%) and productivity (6%), the latter based above all on the industrial branch; investment increased significantly, and with it came a supply of credit and money. The processes of agrarian transition and urbanisation led to growth in per-capita private consumption during a period also marked by an increase in real wages. For its part, the opening up of trade generated a boom in imports and exports. Although the former grew more than the latter, the trade deficit resulting from this situation was largely offset by the positive balance of services, the significance acquired by the tourism sector, the positive balance of the capital account, and the transfers of remittances and foreign currency from migrant workers (Cárdenas del Rey 2019: 6–8).

This chapter attempts to explain the role played by emigration in Franco’s economic policy in general, and in particular during the period of developmentalism. First, we will examine the complexity of the migratory flows during these years. In order to understand the role that the two flows played in the regime’s policies during these decades, they will be divided into the traditional emigration to Latin America and that which was increasingly directed towards other parts of Europe. To this end, the first section of the chapter will deal with the characteristics and evolution of the Spanish migratory flow during these
years. The second section will focus on the characteristics of Franco’s migration policy during the post-war years, and the third and final section will analyse the opposing views and the different roles that Franco’s regime attributed to European and Latin American migratory flows.

X-ray of the Spanish migratory flow (1945–1975)

After the hiatus caused by the civil war and the World Wars, the Spanish migratory flow began to resume in 1945 and continued without interruption for almost four decades of Franco’s dictatorship. This resumption was not an isolated event, but rather an integral part of the process of reactivation of migration between the two continents that took place after the end of the Second World War, when, as Bade points out, the old migratory traditions resumed and generated a highly intensified flow between Europe and the Americas (Bade 2003: 245).

This foreign emigration had two distinctly defined stages. Until the end of the 1950s, Spanish emigration went mainly to Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) and resumed the classic direction of the Spanish migratory flow since when it had begun, in massive numbers, at the end of the 19th century. Of approximately one million Spaniards who emigrated to Latin America between 1940 and 1985 (Sanz Lafuente 2008: 85), half of them did so in the decade between 1946 and 1956 (Yáñez Gallardo 1994: 122; Palazón Ferrando 1991). From the late 1950s onwards, the transcontinental emigration cycle entered a phase of decline in Spain that can be explained, on the one hand, by the significant demographic growth of the Latin American area during those years, which allowed an abundant and cheap local workforce access to the labour market. This workforce reduced the demand for low-skilled and unskilled labour that had largely been met by the traditional profile of Spanish immigrants. On the other hand, the major economic crisis that affected these countries as a result of a fall in exports, and which would eventually lead to a decline in the Spanish migratory flow, was in turn aggravated by the discordance between the selective criteria of Spain and Latin American countries, with the latter increasingly favouring “quality over quantity”. This favoured the arrival of qualified personnel (e.g., industrial workers and technicians) who were as scarce as they were necessary for a Spanish economy in full development (Fernández Vicente and Kreienbrink 2009: 231; Vázquez Mateo 1968: 16).

This overseas emigration was progressively overtaken by the continental migratory flow to the industrialised countries of Europe (above all, France, Germany, and Switzerland) that began at the beginning of the decade. According to official statistics from the Spanish Institute of Emigration, one million Spaniards emigrated to Europe between 1960 and 1973, although if we also take into account those that did so illegally or irregularly, then the number of Spaniards who crossed the Pyrenees was actually two million, with a return of between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people (Sanz Lafuente 2008: 95). Highly
labour-related, the departures to Europe throughout these years were characterized by their temporary nature, both from the perspective of the host countries (for whom foreign workers came to cover a labour deficit that was thought to be temporary) and in the strategy of the emigrants themselves, who regarded their migratory project as a temporary stay abroad aimed at maximising savings and returning to Spain with this capital. Once again, this continental migratory current was not specific to the Spain of those years but was integrated into a broader framework of internal European movements which, between the 1950s and the early 1970s, led to the relocation of almost 15 million inhabitants within the Old Continent (Bade 2003: 256).

In the same way, these external migrations should be viewed in relation to the importance of internal mobility in post-war Spain. Both movements, internal and external, responded to a phenomenon of rural population transfer from the countryside to the city, and from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. This transfer, which began in the 1950s, took on enormous proportions in the following decade: between 1960 and 1973, 15% of the Spanish population changed their places of residence in the interior of Spain (Ródenas Calatayud 2008: 65). The enormous rural-urban and Spanish-foreign wage differential was one of the main reasons for this massive mobility of the Spanish labour force during these years (De la Torre Campo and Sanz Lafuente 2008: 56).

Together with the wage difference, other factors explain the change of direction and the significant percentage to be witnessed in Spanish continental migration. In the more developed countries of Europe, the levels of education and development achieved by their population had generated a significant shortage of labour willing to take on the hardest and lowest-paid tasks (Nadal

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*Figure 1.1 Spanish migratory movement (1945–1975)*

Source: Authors’ own based on data from official Spanish statistics collected from Carreras and Tafunell (2005: 140–141); and on Nadal (1991: 203, 207) for the figures of departures to Europe absent in the former reference (years 1956–1960).
Moreover, the low cost of displacement derived from physical proximity was also an incentive factor for many rural workers, as was the role of the migratory networks that were soon woven between localities of origin and destination; networks which, by reducing the uncertainty and risks inherent in any migratory project, facilitated the massive departure of workers during these years. Last but not least, these intra-European migratory flows were facilitated by the strong pragmatism of migratory policies that tended to facilitate the transfer of workers from regions of labour surpluses to those with labour shortages.

Emigration as a national calamity. The migratory policy of the first Franco regime (1945–1959)

The Franco regime that was imposed after the rebels’ victory during the civil war marked a break in the process of construction and consolidation of a liberal nation-state that had begun to move towards a social state model during the previous republican period. Francoism set out to break with the “enemy” republican Spain and to lay the foundations of a new state, and even a new society, on a radically different basis. Henceforth, Franco’s perception of the migration issue would be intimately linked and clearly subordinated to the demands that stemmed from this ambitious project of the national construction of Francoism.

During the post-civil-war years, the migration issue was subject to the demands of national reconstruction. Although the low number of departures during these years of stagnation of the international migratory flow meant that migration was not perceived as a real threat, various legal regulations underlined the negative aspect of migration and insisted on the need to involve the entire Spanish population in the task of reconstruction by stressing the harmful consequences of emigration for Spain. To this end, the authorities in power opted to retrieve the traditional binomial emigration/internal colonisation, according to which the best way to combat emigration was to promote internal colonisation aimed at providing a food autonomy that would make it unnecessary to go abroad (Rieucau 1997: 87). The prevention of emigration, which had traditionally been blamed for the depopulation of Spain, also became a measure used by the regime’s authorities to try to overcome the demographic debacle caused by the civil war and exile (Maluquer de Motes 2007: 150).

Circumstances changed when, with the end of the Second World War, Spanish emigrants began to leave for Latin America. It was then that the migration issue once again became part of Franco’s political agenda. By reaffirming the validity of the 1924 Emigration Law in force during the previous Republican period, Franco’s authorities seemed to prioritise the socio-labour idea of migration over a strictly political rationale. However, this continuity was a mere façade, since the migration policy of these years continued to confront different perceptions and attitudes towards the reality of these departures. The socio-labour rationale defended by representatives of the Ministry of Labour
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and the trade union sphere lost the battle, on numerous occasions, against the priorities that the political logic gave to the control of departures or that the diplomatic rationale gave to the use of emigration as an instrument to break the international isolation of the regime (Fernández Vicente 2003).

In order to rescue the 1924 legal framework, the recognition of the right to emigrate had to be combined, at least in theory, with the negative and pessimistic perception of the migratory phenomenon, of the emigrant, and of the role of the state in this respect, which had always characterised migration policy as a problem, together with the incorporation of the right to emigrate into the political agenda at the end of the 19th century (Fernández Vicente 2009). Thus, emigration continued to be considered a national calamity and emigrants were seen as victims of “emigration fever” that affected certain regions of Spain, instead of subjects capable of deciding their own fate. Due to their supposed ignorance, naivety, and lack of education, emigrants were pictured as being continuously exposed to the abuse and exploitation of con artists and shipping companies, and their migratory adventures were considered to be inevitably doomed to misery and failure (González-Rothvoss and Gil 1949a: 25–27).

In order to try to overcome the contradiction between a liberal migration framework and a negative perception of migration in a context of a progressive increase in the number of outflows, the competent agents of the Emigration section of the Ministry of Labour proposed the need to accentuate the Spanish state’s interventionism in migration matters. The state was required to: plan the migratory flow, matching its volume with Spain’s demographic possibilities; select emigrants in order to avoid the departure of those workers whose profiles were deemed necessary for the proper functioning of the Spanish economy; and channel this emigration towards destinations beneficial to the interests of the Spanish nation (González-Rothvoss and Gil 1949a; Borregón Ribes 1952; De Cristóforis 2014).

This intention to manage and regulate migratory flows also reflected the Franco regime’s wish to assert national interests in an international context marked by the desire of other states and even supranational organisations, such as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), to manage and regulate said migratory flows (Hollifield 1997; Redondo Carrero 2017). The major problem that Francoism had to solve involved ascertaining what the “national interests” were, to which migration policy should be subordinated. From the Emigration section of the Ministry of Labour, the authority responsible for migration matters, it was believed that the migratory flow could constitute a further tool in the fight against unemployment (Borregón Ribes 1952: 114). The idea was to recover the old metaphor that assimilated emigration into an “escape valve” aimed at relieving social tensions arising from rising unemployment and underemployment (Borregón Ribes 1952: 152). Similarly, the need to neutralise the selection carried out by the countries of immigration with their own selective processes was justified by the risk of losing those technicians and skilled workers who represented a necessary labour force in
post-war Spain. It was therefore proposed that the Spanish selection should favour the departure of workers with little or no professional qualifications and the unemployed who wished to emigrate. These two parameters failed to justify the government's encouragement of emigration to Latin America at a time when the unemployment figures for the working population as a whole remained low. It is evident that the government's attitude to emigration in essence remained negative, as it continued to be viewed by the authorities more as a national calamity than as an advantage for the ailing Spanish economy (Fernández Vicente 2005b: 89–90).

In contrast to this socio-labour rationale, the political logic inherited from the previous period was also continued, according to which the control of exiting and entering the national territory was under the authority of the state and was subject to the demands of the social control imposed by the dictatorship. The importance that Franco's regime attached to this control meant that requests for the transfer of powers to issue passports to emigrants were systematically rejected (González-Rothvoss and Gil 1949a: 100), which made it impossible to implement a process of selection of the migratory flow controlled by the competent bodies of the Ministry of Labour. Likewise, the priority given to breaking Franco's isolation meant that the diplomatic approach triumphed on numerous occasions over the two previous approaches. On the one hand, the ostracism of Franco’s Spain during those years was not conducive to the signing of emigration treaties with the host countries; these treaties were the main mechanism for planning, selecting, and channelling the Spanish migratory flow while taking into account the interests of both Spain and the countries of destination. On the other hand, the need to break the isolation and gradually integrate Spain into international organisations meant that in international negotiations on the channelling of the migratory flow, in which Spain was able to participate during these years, the criteria put forward by the Emigration section of the Ministry of Labour did not always prevail. In fact, in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Spanish–Argentine Emigration Treaty of 1947, the diplomatic rationale defended spontaneous emigration against the logic of control and selection of the migratory flow defended by the representatives of the Ministry of Labour.3


The decline in the migratory flow to Latin America and the progressive increase in outflows to Europe took place in a political context of change within the Franco regime. By taking advantage of the break in international isolation and Spain’s progressive insertion into the international arena, Franco’s government decided to change its survival strategy. The burden of the supposed legitimacy of a regime that continued to consider its own survival as its main objective was therefore moved to the economic sphere.
Having come into power in the late 1950s, the team of technocrats in charge of drawing up and implementing the modernisation and economic development plans that were to ensure the acceptance of the dictatorship inside and outside Spain realised that the growing emigration to Europe, considered as individual and markedly temporary, could be a major asset for the success of these plans (Kreienbrink 2009: 20–21; Fernández Vicente 2005a: 19–22). This flow of emigration, it was said, would not only cushion the negative effects of the stabilisation and economic development programmes, but would also contribute towards the actual success of these plans insofar as this outflow made it possible to evacuate part of the surplus labour force, especially those with few or no professional qualifications, in the hope of these same workers being welcomed back to Spain as professionally trained workers when later needed for the development of the Spanish economy. Moreover, these temporary outflows of workers would represent a significant injection of foreign currency, the scarcity of which constituted one of the main obstacles for the economic development projects designed by the technocratic elite. These departures could also help to create a space for dialogue and negotiation with the countries of developed Europe, especially with a view to Spain’s possible entry into the EEC (Fernández Vicente 2005a: 18).

The applying of the terms “modernity” and “progress” to migration and the perception of emigration as a key element for Spain’s economic development culminated in 1964 with the inclusion of emigration in the Development Plans (Kreienbrink 2008: 228). This formalised the idea that emigration was an essential part of labour market planning, as well as a major contributory factor to Spain’s development, thereby confirming the diagnosis made on several occasions during the 1950s that emigration was destined to become a type of Marshall Plan for the Spanish economy.

However, the need to take into account the double orientation (continental and overseas) of the migratory flow led to very different views of its usefulness in economic terms; the different conceptions of overseas and continental flows (in terms of the profile of the emigrant, the duration of emigration, the socio-economic conditions on arrival, the immigration policies of the destination countries, etc.) ended up generating a very different migration policy. A migration policy which, as will be shown, tended to favour the continental flow to the detriment of the overseas flow.

The first element that determined Francoist politicians’ preference for the continental flow was the markedly selective nature of Latin American migration policies, which, at that time, tended to favour almost exclusively the arrival of highly qualified workers necessary for the success of the economic modernisation projects that characterised Latin American governments (Hernández Borge 1999: 640). These workers continued to be as necessary, as they were scarce in this Spain of intense development. On the contrary, what was in surplus was what also abounded in the host countries: labourers, technically unskilled individuals.
For their part, the European industrialised powers, through their policies, sought above all, although not exclusively, unskilled, cheap, abundant, and rapidly available labour – in other words, strong arms with which to feed a booming economy. As another director of migration policy during these years stated,

the countries of [European] immigration do not ask us for Spanish workers because they favour us, they ask us for them because they need them. . . .

What they want is not preparation, they are only interested in the fact that in eight or ten days they can leave Spain to work.6

Similarly, the spontaneous nature of overseas emigration had been a second obstacle to the attempts of Franco’s politicians to encourage a migratory flow whose main driving force continued to be the calls of relatives and friends. This spontaneity was seen as a major obstacle to Franco’s migration policy, which continued to be based, at least in theory, on the desire to select, plan, and regulate migratory flows.7

Another element that distinguished one flow from the other, and that again seemed to work against the overseas flow, was the fact that the overseas flow seemed to attract Spaniards from a fairly restricted geographical area: the Atlantic coast, and especially the Galician provinces. Continental emigration, however, affected all regions and provinces of Spain, especially regions heavily affected by unemployment and underemployment, as was the case of Extremadura and Andalusia. Indeed, the implementation of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan led to a contraction of economic activity, as well as a sharp fall in household disposable income, which was above all linked to the drastic reduction of overtime, which until then had constituted an important part of workers’ and employees’ wages (Carreras and Tafunell 2004: 328–329). While labour market rigidities limited the impact of the recession on the unemployment rate, they failed to prevent the spectacular increase in emigrant outflows to the rest of Europe. These outflows were seen by Franco’s politicians as an escape valve that allowed tensions to be released in the regions most affected by unemployment and underemployment;8 such was the technocrats’ conception of the role of emigration, although their predictions remained largely unfulfilled. In fact, as Ródenas Calatayud’s work shows, the real effects of emigration on unemployment figures were minimal, insofar as not all emigrants were unemployed, and many of them returned to Spain. This meant that their departures were more a mechanism of labour turnover than of labour evacuation, and whose main consequence was the relief it brought to pressure on wages (Ródenas Calatayud 1994).

In addition to the spontaneous nature of the Latin American migratory flow, another element that appeared to be incompatible with the regime’s authorities involved its supposedly definitive nature, which reduced and even paralysed the emigrant’s remittances back to Spain.9 The definitive character associated with such overseas emigration was largely attributed to the geographical distance, with its markedly familiar character and with the policies of these countries.
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eager to definitively welcome these European immigrant settlers to their vast and unpopulated territories. In contrast, the mostly individual and male continental emigration was of a temporary nature, favoured by the reluctance of most host countries to allow family reunification.\textsuperscript{10} IEE officials estimated the return rate of continental emigration at approximately 90\%\textsuperscript{11}.

The possibility of channelling remittances from emigrants who went to Europe with the idea of returning to Spain in the not-too-distant future was in fact the aspect of migration most favoured by the development plans of Franco’s regime. As projected, by the end of the 1950s these remittances were a real source of foreign exchange that alleviated the balance of payments deficit and encouraged economic development (IEE 1959). In fact, emigration money was a key element in explaining the significant capitalisation of the Spanish economy during these years of developmentalism. Various studies on the issue estimate that emigrants’ transfers covered between 15\% and 30\% of the Spanish trade deficit during these years (De la Torre Campo and Sanz Lafuente 2008: 53); they were able to cover 22\% of the trade deficit between 1959 and 1983 (Oporto del Olmo 1992: 215–231).\textsuperscript{12}

Lastly, the technocrats of the IEE also put in the balance the fact that continental emigration favoured the insertion of Spanish workers into the European labour market. This element was seen as a tremendous opportunity to support the integration of Spain into the European economy and, therefore, into the world economy. One technocrat stated that

\begin{quote}
mobility in all the factors of production, except land, is leading to this incorporation of Spain into the world economy . . . But this incorporation fundamentally takes place, and will do so even more in the future, through [the] displacement of Spanish labour to European countries.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

For its part, the application of economic rationale to the Latin American migratory flow resulted in migration to Latin America being seen not only as a tool for foreign trade aimed at consolidating and opening new markets in the Americas, but also as a means for affirming and strengthening Spain’s presence and influence in Latin America (Kreienbrink 2008: 233).

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In short, the long years of Franco’s dictatorship saw the traditional migratory flow to Latin America, generally considered a problem for a Spain in the process of reconstruction, gradually replaced by an emigration of workers to Europe, which, by virtue of its temporary and unskilled nature, was considered essential for the success of the development and modernisation plans with which Franco’s regime endeavoured to obtain the social and international acceptance that would ensure its own survival. Despite the initial belief that this movement constituted a national calamity, Spanish emigration came to be seen as a Marshall Plan of which the Spanish economy had been deprived in the post-war period, especially thanks to the flood of foreign currency that this
labour force, highly sought after by European powers in full development, was willing to send to Spain.

Notes

1 This is a pragmatism with which migration policies tried to find a way out of what Hollifield has called “the liberal paradox”. According to the author, after the severe restrictions imposed on mobility during the 1930s, states opted to favour the channelling of the surpluses existing in developing economies towards those expanding economies in which the labour market was clearly in deficit, inspired by the principle of communicating vessels. However, this liberal logic in the economic sphere came into conflict with the maintenance, in the political sphere, of the principle of nation-state sovereignty, which translated into a political will on the part of the countries to control these migratory flows (Hollifield 1997: 9–10).

2 The possibility of hindering, or even prohibiting, the emigration of those workers who, because of their professional qualifications, might be necessary for the optimal economic development of Spain was even increased.

3 On this issue, see Fernández Vicente (2003: 193–198). Diplomatic criteria were equally preponderant in Spain’s ICEM membership negotiations (Redondo Carrero 2017: 165).

4 See, for example, the declarations of the Minister of Labour Licinio de la Fuente before the Labour Commission of the National Assembly during the debate on the new Emigration law of 1971. BOCE, Appendix no. 231 of July 1971, p. 5.

5 See the declarations of the deputy Fernández Villaverde before the National Assembly, BOCE, no. 538 of 14 July 1956, p. 10762, and the analysis by the migration official Martí Buffil (1955: 322).

6 See the work of the former director of the IEE between 1962 and 1964 (García-Trevijano and Fos 1963: 47).

7 See the speech by Álvaro Rengifo, director of the IEE between 1964 and 1966 (Instituto Español de Emigración 1966: 187).

8 See the speeches of two senior IEE officials: Carlos M. Rodríguez de Valcárcel (IEE 1960: 53–54) and Álvaro Rengifo (IEE 1966: 180).


12 These figures must be treated with caution due to deficiencies in their accounting methods (Rengifo Calderón and Oporto del Olmo 2005: 160).

13 Speech by the technocrat Alberto Ullastres, Minister of Trade during these years (Martínez Cachero 1963: 29).

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2 Migration policies and development doctrine in Greece

Giota Tourgeli

The reconstruction of Greece in the immediate aftermath of World War II was further complicated by a period of civil war. The restoration of losses suffered during ten years of conflict was a huge challenge, as the country was confronted with a growing foreign trade deficit, low productivity and a high percentage of unemployed/underemployed workers, (approx. 1,000,000 people) as well as a serious refugee problem (Clogg 1992: 146; Liakos 2019: 337–338). Extensive international aid, including emergency relief (UNRRA), British loans, Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan funds, were made available to aid the country’s economic recovery and political stabilization. This funding also laid the foundations for the formation of an anti-communist state and fostered Greek dependency, primarily on Britain and secondarily on the United States, as well as the consolidation of its orientation towards the Western capitalist camp (Ifantis 2004: 77–78).

During the early post-war years (1945–1953), Greek governments endeavored to implement policies of recovery and reconstruction in order to lead the country into a new economic era. Economically, Greece was classified as a poor, agrarian, raw material–extracting, trade-dependent and externally indebted nation; in short, an underdeveloped state (Ifantis 2004: 76). Efforts aimed, therefore, not only to restore the country to its pre-war level, but to build an even more robust economy through economic diversification, as well as establishing institutions that would enable state control of economic activity. Following the announcement of the Marshall Plan, discussions concerning the reconstruction of the Greek economy revolved mainly around the future possibilities and means of development of heavy industry. The consensus of all political parties on the viability of the Greek economy through significant structural changes and state intervention in the economy (with the communist Left advocating a much more radical process of economic reform), was due to the fact that the Nazi occupation and the civil war had lowered the standard of living so much, and had deconstructed the previous rural-urban relations to such an extent, that the prospect of industrialization was seen as a way of overcoming the material basis of popular dissatisfaction without being a threat to the established social hierarchies (Hadziiossif 1994: 23–27). In fact, during the civil war, some 700,000 persons (the so-called ‘guerilla-stricken’ refugees) –

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10% of the population and 18% of the rural potential of Greece – were forced
to abandon their homes, the beginning of a flight from the Greek countryside
to the big cities which would characterize the whole post-war period (Chas-

Developmental discourse, confidence in state intervention, industrial ration-
alization, technocracy and growth were all elements of the influence exerted,
by the New Dealers of the American aid missions on Greek intellectuals and
policymakers, who would approach the availability of this abundant and low-
wage agricultural workforce as an asset for the creation of an industrial and,
more importantly, an energy sector. Apart from the economic concerns, fears
about the spread of the communist threat among a desperate population made
industrial expansion not only feasible and desirable, but also a social necessity

Nevertheless, the problem of industrial financing challenged the viability of
Greek development efforts. Given the Greek investor inertia, the announce-
ment of the Truman and Marshall aid to Greece in 1947–1948 was heralded
as the deus ex machina that would help the country pursue the path of indus-
trialization. But despite the expectation of right-wing politicians for favorable
treatment by the United States in exchange for the Greek contribution to the
anti-fascist (and later anti-communist) struggle, the distribution of US aid to
the economies of the periphery aimed at maintaining the status quo in Europe’s
economic hierarchy would be a disappointment. Priority was given instead
to the recovery of the major industrial powers of Europe, and Greece was
encouraged to align with Western Europe for its productive reconstruction and
cease to depend directly on the United States for purposes other than defense

In this context, the US missions administering financial aid, especially after
the outbreak of the Korean War and in view of the termination of the Marshall
Plan, put emphasis on stabilization, suggesting at the same time the reorienta-
tion of Greek development strategy towards the modernization of agriculture
and the development of touristic services. Taking into account the limited
potential of the Greek secondary sector for labor absorption, they believed that
the Greek stance on emigration should change. According to their suggestions,
government resistance should be curbed and bold measures should be adopted
to strengthen migration abroad (Laiou 1987: 102; Stathakis 2004: 420).

The idea of Greek emigration was nothing new to foreign advisory missions.
It had been articulated with favorable comments since the civil war, during
which emigration was prohibited. The missions of the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the International Labor Office (ILO) had proposed
the development of emigration along planned lines, to countries with man-
power shortages as a temporary expedient of alleviating the country’s current
economic difficulties. Recourse to emigration would help both to relieve the
unemployment problem at home and to increase remittances from Greeks liv-
ing abroad. Furthermore, technocrats pointed out the need for an expanded
program of vocational training for young persons and adults alike, which would help the Greek emigration movement to adapt, more closely, to the economic needs of the immigration countries (FAO 1947: 555–556; ILO 1949: 54–61; Thomadakis 1988: 35). Nevertheless, emigration did not become part of the mainstream conversation until the early 1950s.

Migration perspectives were explored by the Greek side too, even though a migration plan had not yet been elaborated. Throughout the 1940s, when emigration was impossible or prohibited, Greek authorities sought countries willing to accept Greek immigrants at the end of the conflict, in order to resolve the balance of payments deficit, unemployment, and to deal with the social and political consequences these problems engendered. They planned the ‘rational’ movement of ‘parasitic strata’ as a priority for the European colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, justifying their choice by putting forward arguments supporting the mediating economic and cultural role of Greeks in the region. Alternatively, they approached Greek American communities as a national asset for the political and economic future of Greece. The political developments in the Mediterranean colonies and the restrictive migration policies implemented by the United States forced them to accept that both destinations would present insurmountable obstacles. In any case, proposals were still quite tentative as regards the extent of emigration and the eligible categories. For Greek policymakers, the answer to the perceived overpopulation problem of the country was not to be found in emigration but in economic development (Hadziiossif 1987: 32, 34; Laiou 1987: 102; Thomadakis 1988: 35; Venturas 2013: 327–335)

In spite of all these adversities, Greece integrated with the Western economy during the Cold War and participated in the process of post-war global growth. The implementation of the European Recovery Plan offered both the financial and institutional means to redress the problem of Greece’s delayed development. After the 1953 devaluation, which was coupled with a tight monetary policy, the country experienced its own ‘economic miracle’ (Clogg 1992: 148). Nevertheless, this period of explosive growth and the transformation of the Greek economy – due largely to extensive public investment and the post-war building boom – coincided with the largest migration flow of the century, highlighting the complex interrelationship between migration and economic development. The limited rise in industrial employment did not manage to absorb the manpower surplus, which forced Greece to turn its attention to the expanding industrial economies of overseas countries and Western Europe (Glytsos and Katseli 2005: 338).

The combination of a low standard of living in the countryside with rising popular aspirations daunted by limited prospects for social mobility, along with a police-controlled state mechanism and constant coercion that followed the defeat of the Left in the civil war, as well as inefficient and over-bureaucratized administration, all contributed to conditions in the 1950s that favored the decision to emigrate (Lianos 1993: 253; Mahera 2003: 100). Initially, it was the US geopolitical interests that offered assisted overseas migration opportunities
to the desperate Greeks through the services of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Later, the Western European active recruitment and attractive working conditions persuaded more people to leave the country, to a large extent, temporarily.

The National Statistical Service of Greece reported that between 1955 and 1977, the number of ‘permanent emigrants’ was 1,236,280, constituting 13% of the Greek population and a quarter of the entire Greek labor force. It was an unprecedented migration wave characterized by pronounced mobility and high return rates. It absorbed the most dynamic and productive part of the population, mainly small-scale farmers and land workers and a rising number of women moving abroad to join the paid workforce. It is estimated that 758,351 emigrants (61%) headed to Western Europe, and of these, 638,141 (84%) left for Federal Germany (Mousourou 1991: 48). Emigration affected one out of every eight or nine Greeks, and net emigration in the 1951–1971 period reached 758,000. In relation to its population, Greece ranked second after Portugal among the emigration countries of Southern Europe (Kotzamanis 1987: 92–100, 103, 152–153; Mahera 2003: 99–100).

Espousing the international migration planning

Emigration had been a familiar means of material advancement for Greeks since the turn of the 19th century. The Greek state, remaining a passive observer of the phenomenon, neither prevented nor tried to control the spontaneous development of mass emigration to the United States. Overseas migration developed a momentum and dynamic of its own up to the American Acts on quotas of 1921 and 1924 with private interests (shipping companies) keeping control of movements and the Greek state approaching the exodus of about 415,000 Greeks as a safety valve alleviating its socioeconomic problems. The flow of remittances mitigated social dissatisfaction and political skepticism about the loss of soldiers and workers (Chassiotis 1993: 92).

In the immediate post–World War II period, the role of the state was de facto enlarged in Europe. Fascism and the war had strengthened faith in the ability (and not only the duty) of government to solve large-scale problems by mobilizing and directing people and resources to collectively useful ends. The urgent need for the organization of relief, stabilization, repairs to infrastructure and start-up of production reinforced the ideological justification of state intervention in economic and social spheres across the political spectrum (Judt 2005: 69; Thomadakis 1988: 36–37). In this framework, access to the new migration channels was withdrawn from individual choice and put under state control, directly or indirectly. Migration planning became an area of growing government action and coordination both within Greece and internationally.

The question of ‘overpopulation’ dominating the plans of post-war Western governments was also introduced to the agenda of Greek policymakers. In the 1930s, the Asia Minor refugee resettlement problem, along with the
consequences of the 1929 economic crisis and the lack of outlets for emigration, had led to the spread of Malthusian worries regarding the ‘narrowness of Greek land’ and its ‘surplus’ population. The demographic concern was intensified by the Nazi occupation, the dismemberment of the country and starvation (Ventura 2013: 327). In actual fact, it was the negative economic conditions and not demographic pressure that prevailed in Greece. The country had a population of only 7,646,000 in 1951 and weak demographic growth. What was seen as ‘overpopulation’ was a “structural superabundance of unskilled workers” (Holborn 1961: 7) due to labor market dysfunction and the growth model of the Greek economy: primary sector hypertrophy, low productivity, unequal distribution of income, deficient exploitation of national resources and absence of a state planning especially in the field of vocational education (Emke-Poulopoulou 1986:147–176).

Furthermore, in the early 1950s, despite the International Refugee Organization (IRO) resettlement operations, the country still encountered a significant refugee problem which it was unable to deal with by its own means. According to figures there were about 35,000 refugees (among them many ethnic Greeks) who had fled neighboring communist states and were considered an economic burden and a political threat (Marks 1957: 481). Thus, it soon became evident that a planned program for Greek emigration was essential, so that Greece could compete successfully with other countries for the employment opportunities offered by destination countries, and Greek emigrants could enjoy the protection of international arrangements with regards to their working and living conditions. But Greece encountered increased barriers when trying to plan its migration policy. In the interior, emigration was subordinated to ambitious reconstruction goals, serious security and demographic concerns and persistent ideological prejudices. This meant that even though it espoused the principle of free movement, the state strove to implement a strict control on the exodus of its migrant workers. Citizens thought to be ‘useful’ to the economy, members of minority groups and populations living in the northern regions of the country, family units and single women, as well as unrepentant Communists, for different reasons in each case, were hampered in their mobility by restrictive and selective measures (Tourgeli and Venturas 2015: 235–239). On the flip side, ‘international migration was slow to recover from inter-war strangulation’ (Hobsbawn 1995: 276). There were limited destination outlets for countries of the European South and practical difficulties with labor mobility. Apart from the scarcity and the high cost of means of transport, as well as the complexity of emigration and immigration formalities, migration was hampered by the interwar restrictive measures implemented by overseas receiving countries, and the limited migratory opportunities offered by the Western European bureaucratic migration regime. The latter refused to liberalize intra-European labor movement, favoring movement between the countries of Northwestern Europe (Comte 2018: 10–41). On their part, Greek migrants lacking in linguistic and occupational skills, but also deprived of the privilege of the label ‘preferred race’, were not competitive in the international labor arena. To this
end, Greek policymakers expressed interest for immediate international assistance to organize mass migration operations.

The Greek state began to explore opportunities for population mobility to countries ‘suitable’ for the Greek people by participating in international conferences and meetings organized in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The establishment in 1947 of a Migration Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the setting up of a special committee to lay down guiding principles for an emigration policy, indicate that the problem was already receiving the attention of the government (ILO 1949: 54). But, in contrast to the governments of Italy, Portugal, or Spain, which could draw on their experience in the management of migration processes and use their long-established emigration services, Greece lacked such a background. Despite its migration past, the Greek state had not developed a regulatory infrastructure when it integrated itself into the international migration system. It lacked an efficient administrative machinery, an experienced staff, a coherent legislation, a reliable data repository and, most importantly, an organizational culture to deal with the new requirements of migration. Reports of the period attest to an extended period marked by a lack of coordination and effectiveness among the various state services dealing with migration issues (Tourgeli and Venturas 2015: 221–223, 232–233).

Nevertheless, Greece tried to adapt to the new migration patterns through its representation at international forums, even though it had weak bargaining power and was without a coherent migration plan. It was one of the countries which agreed to take part in the meeting convened in Rome, in January–February 1948, to examine the manpower situation in connection with the Marshall Plan. In the midst of civil war, the Greek representative looked unfavorably upon the immediate emigration of Greek citizens, seeking to benefit as much as possible from the American fund for the country’s reconstruction. Fears that a massive outflow of laborers would curtail American aid made Greek policymakers very hesitant about full disclosure of the current emigration needs of the country, despite recommendations to the contrary. Nevertheless, they approved the proposal for the establishment of an organization for European migration, forecasting that after the end of the political and social unrest, the country would need an outlet for its demographic pressure, especially to non-European destinations.2

Greece also attended the ILO forum for the discussion of the migration issue in the late 1940s and was aware of the new international labor standards translated into several ILO conventions and recommendations (ILO 1949: 60; Rass 2012: 201–202). Recognizing that migration required political maneuvering at international forums as well as assistance by technocrats in the field, a Greek delegation participated in the discussions, which began after the decision to liquidate the IRO and establish a new institutional setting on migration regulation (Karatani 2005; Tourgeli and Venturas 2015: 220–223).3 Considered as an auxiliary measure towards the country’s development path, migration was officially put on the political agenda of Greek authorities.
Therefore, up to the early 1950s, the Greek government had ample opportunities in defining its attitude towards migration and of stating its desires in international negotiations. Urgently seeking a solution to the refugee problem and a temporary outlet for the manpower surplus, state officials resorted to a more liberal policy in order to reduce unemployment, acquire foreign currency and overcome the deficit of the balance of payments. At the same time, they would manage to control social conflict and promote rapid modernization without putting at risk the process of national reconstruction. Sharing the post-war conviction that labor mobility in the ‘Free World’ must be planned, coordinated and administered in an economically productive and mutually profitable way, Greece opted for a multilateral operational agency that would help, technically and financially, anyone who wanted to migrate but did not have the means to do so. The political profile of the country favored its integration into the labor market of the “Free World”: a European democratic state close to the border with Eastern Europe and, thus, entangled in early Cold War politics, friendly to the United States and with a demonstrated interest in the principle of free movement. The adherence of Greece to the North Atlantic Alliance in 1952 sealed its integration into the capitalist bloc which was built with its membership into a network of Euro/Atlantic institutions, migration and refugee organizations (Venturas 2015: 327).

In this framework, Greece became one of the sixteen founding members of ICEM established in December 1951 in the Brussels Migration Conference under the leadership of the United States. On the basis of an agreement of April 17, 1952, ICEM was mandated not only to alleviate the acute refugee and manpower problem that the Greek government faced, by providing overseas migration outlets, transportation facilities and accompanying migration services (some of them tailor-made), but also to modernize state administration and decision-making on migration. A liaison mission sent to Athens, and funded by the Greek state, undertook all the pre-embarkation services required until a specialized state agency was organized and was able to take over ICEM operations (Tourgelii and Venturas 2015: 225–233, 240–242).

Furthermore, since changes in migration patterns had given rise to new requirements, ICEM began to expand its activities and operate as an international development agency. Especially by 1956, it became necessary to adjust its function as the economies of Western European countries revived, attracting Southern European workers, and overseas countries became more selective in their demands for immigrants (Holborn 1961: 10). To this purpose it undertook the task of improving the qualifications of intending Greek emigrants (both men and women) through training programs so as to increase their acceptability and adaptability in Latin America and Commonwealth countries. For Greece, which sought to benefit in the field of vocational guidance of young people because of its low level of technical training, ICEM programs not only furthered emigration but also enhanced, in the long term, Greek technical education through the transfer of ICEM know-how and infrastructure to the

In the period 1952–1972, the ICEM Greek mission has assisted 141,945 Greek national emigrants and 48,186 refugees who settled in Australia, the United States, Canada and Latin America countries (Emke-Poulopoulou 1986: 29). These numbers were low in comparison to the annual target set by Greek governments, the rate of Greeks emigrating overseas individually and the overall Greek outflows. Nevertheless, ‘under the ICEM mandate the needs of migrants were viewed for the first time in virtually the same terms as those of refugees’ (Holborn 1961: 6). Indeed, ICEM schemes reduced migration barriers in the early post-war period and attenuated many of the risks of international labor migration (Tourgeli and Venturas 2015: 259–261). What is more, as with other post-war international institutions and foreign – mainly American – missions, ICEM became one more channel of transmission of Western/American cultural values and behavioral patterns to Greek bureaucracy (Kakridis 2009; Lialiouti 2019). It had an important role in shaping Greece’s post-war migration discourse and in managing its labor problem by using new organizational methods initiated in the ‘developed’ world (Tourgeli and Venturas 2015: 262, 291; Venturas 2015: 327–331).

Joining the European migration system

As long as Greece was taking advantage of ICEM assistance, Greek governments tried to grant potential migrants access to alternative migration channels, perceiving migration to overseas, distant, and powerful Anglo-Saxon countries as a permanent loss of human resources. In contrast, intra-European migration seemed more preferable, since there was a widespread belief that it would be temporary. On top of that, it was assumed that the expertise of repatriates, who had worked in the industries of developed countries, would ultimately benefit Greek development planning (Venturas 1999: 89). As a result, at the end of 1956, a year with a decrease in the number of ICEM-assisted Greek emigrants because of the Hungarian crisis, the Greek government called on the US government to help extend migratory outlets for Greeks, including towards European countries, by linking migratory and trade liberalization within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Nevertheless, the plan submitted by the US government to the OEEC in December 1956, for a ‘free market for labor extended to all of Western Europe’, was not accepted (Comte 2018: 70).

Greek demand for a European outlet for its manpower surplus was favored by the European regime change that had been shaped in the mid-1950s under German influence. With a spectacular economic growth and a predictable shortage of labor, but also with serious geopolitical interests in the unfolding of the Cold War, the new Federal Republic of Germany became the main migratory actor in an effort to enhance its international standing and create a cohesive environment around it. The new regime guaranteed a local labor force by
tailoring migration opportunities to meet labor needs, by favoring the circular movement of foreign workers and by maintaining their families in origin countries through financial incentives. Initially limited to the six European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) member states, the principle of free movement of persons was extended, after the creation of the new European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, to the geographically strategic Southern and Eastern European periphery (Comte 2018: 42–75).

Thus, as soon as the European migration system started to become more liberal for the Southern European workforce, Greece signed bilateral recruitment agreements with France in 1954, Belgium in 1957 and the Netherlands in 1966 (Mousourou 1991: 179). But this openness to labor immigration did not yield the expected results, and the numbers of people who emigrated under such agreements remained relatively small. On the contrary, the signing of an agreement with Germany on March 30, 1960, marked an important turning point of the Greek emigration stream: the number of emigrants, which in 1959 was 23,684, jumped to 100,000 in 1963 (Kotzamanis 1987: 95; Mahera 2003: 98).

The German–Greek Migration Agreement sealed an improvement of the two countries’ relations, which had been overshadowed by the Nazi occupation. In fact, after the curtailment of American aid, the importance of West Germany as a dynamic economic factor for the Greek policy of stabilization had become ever more evident. In this context, war criminals’ cases and reparation demands were sacrificed by the Greek government to secure Greek–German political and economic interests. The expansion of diplomatic ties between the two countries was indicated by the conclusion of a cultural cooperation agreement in 1956 and, especially, by economic negotiations which resulted in the granting of a DM200 million German state loan in 1958 and the signing of an agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Invested Funds in 1961. There is evidence that the conservative Greek government used the labor needs of Western European economies to promote some rather vague and short-term goals of attracting foreign capital and supporting its development plans. Nevertheless, immigration countries were in a far more powerful position to negotiate their need for a cheap and flexible labor force. Greece gained limited economic benefits but managed to secure support for its request for participation in the European economic integration (Comte 2018: 71; Ifantis 2004: 81; Liakos 2019: 259; Mahera 2003: 87, 103–104; Venturas 1999: 299).

The signing of the Association Agreement between Greece and the EEC on July 9, 1961, was indicative of the country’s political economic choice for a closer relationship with its Western European partners, driven by the need to attract foreign direct investment and foster the economy’s productive capacity and employment opportunities which would anchor Greece more firmly in the Western capitalist world (Ifantis 2004: 91). Defending, however, its European economic agenda, the right-wing government of Karamanlis saw the association with EEC as strengthening labor mobility and not as solving the country’s structural problem of unemployment. Even though the agreement did not set
a timetable, Greece was expected to be included in the Community’s open migration regime. However, the construction of the Berlin Wall, forcibly putting an end to the flow of hundreds of thousands of East Germans to the West, would have greater economic and social consequences for the overpopulated Mediterranean countries than the Association. In fact, the number of Greek migrants moving to Western Europe from the border regions of the country soared after this dramatic Cold War development (Franghiadis 2007: 179–180; Kotzamanis 1987: 400).

The policy stance towards emigration in the early 1960s represented a significant change in the government’s economic planning. By formulating an organized emigration program aimed at achieving short-term financial gains, it finally set aside the prospect of resolving its unemployment problem through industrial development, expecting to benefit from the return of a qualified workforce trained abroad. This policy shift fueled strong press criticism and ongoing opposition protests by center and left-wing parties, delaying the formal submission of migration agreements to Parliament for ratification (Mahera 2003: 101–107; Venturas 1999: 92–93, 156–157).

Bilateral recruitment treaties provided incentives for the temporary settlement of Greek emigrants, securing them equal treatment – at least theoretically – with other foreign and domestic workers regarding working conditions. As Greece had not managed to establish a designated migration service, despite its commitments to the ICEM, it arranged its labor administration to link up with foreign recruiting services – without, however, gaining control of the process. Consequently, Germany, which was the most important destination for Greek labor migration during the 1960s and was represented by a Commission that operated in Greece until 1973, enjoyed a great deal of leeway in tailoring the exportation of migrant workers to its own needs. Greek workers emigrated without vocational and language training to cover specific deficiencies within a particular production system (Kasimati 1984: 31–34; Lianos 1993: 256–258; Rass 2012: 204–218; Venturas 1999: 90–92).

Nevertheless, Greece managed, although belatedly, to improve the Greek immigrants’ social security rights by signing separate bilateral social security agreements with its counterparts (Venturas 1999: 92). Welfare support was something new for Greek migrants and, consequently, Northern European destinations were viewed even more positively. Within a decade, however, the Greek government’s liberal policy stance towards emigration changed considerably. The 1966–1970 Economic Development Plan identified emigration as a potentially serious problem and proposed short-term, and limited, annual quotas and intra-European movements, aimed at attracting worker remittances and skills for industrialization in Greece. It was, however, the freezing of Greece’s Association Agreement after the military coup d’état in April 1967, which coincided with an economic recession in West Germany, that challenged Greek plans for development through emigration. The oil crisis of 1973 and the adoption of restrictive immigration policies by the European countries put an end to the biggest emigration wave of modern Greek history. Between 1974
and 1985, almost half of the emigrants of the post-war period had returned to Greece (Comte 2018: 104; Glytsos and Katseli 2005: 354).

Conclusion

It is argued that sending countries can neither influence nor predict the migration phenomenon. As a consequence, they fail to formulate a specific and effective migration policy (Mousourou 1991: 173). It is true that Greece did not manage to designate a comprehensive migration agenda even though migration became a central political stake of post-war governments, an object of permanent negotiation at the level of both foreign and domestic economic policy. Such a policy would address the problem in its entirety and would incorporate the effects of migration and repatriation on the economy and society in the short and medium run. Greece’s response to pressing labor abundance was, on the contrary, somewhat ad hoc; that is, a low-aspirations policy aiming first and foremost at reducing its sizeable percentage of unemployed workers, alleviating social pressure and ensuring political stability in a period of intense anti-communism (Lianos 1993: 258). Following a strategy of rapid industrialization and modernization which, nevertheless, could not absorb the large supply of labor, Greece opted in the 1950s for the temporary exportation of workers aspiring to gain foreign currency and, in the long run, to benefit from the qualifications of returnees. The lack of destination outlets allowed Greece to accept ICEM-assisted overseas schemes as an emergency and ephemeral measure. Later, migration agreements were linked to the right-wing government plans for investments, European integration and economic development.

Migration policy thus had emerged as a component of development policy and functioned as a safeguard for the development process (Robolis, 1994, p. 489). Governments not only encouraged and facilitated the exodus of Greek citizens, but also regulated and guided their movement. Nevertheless, outmigration happened without planning. There was no common approach to overseeing the emigration process, since different ministries intervened on different terms, in movements taking place under the ICEM auspices, bilateral European agreements or spontaneously. Since governments tried but failed to control the volume of migration, the synthesis of migration flows and their points of origin, the exodus of workers acquired its own self-sustained dynamics with serious demographic effects and detrimental economic impact. Consequently, as early as in the mid-1960s, Greece shifted from a labor surplus to a labor shortage economy, following a policy of importation of foreign unskilled labor from Asian and African countries (Chassiotis 1993: 138; Mousourou 1991: 36–37, 104).

Migration policy did not change up to the early 1970s, when labor recruitment stopped in Western countries and repatriation started. In fact, in the period 1973–1980, about 390,000 people resettled in the Greek labor market, although conditions for employment in creative sectors were not encouraging (Emke-Pouloupolou 1986: 262). Even though policymakers aspired to the
return of most of the migrants, they had not planned for either their repatriation or their economic or social reintegration. There were neither guidelines for the skills needed at home nor provisions made for enticing workers to return or to channel migrant savings into productive sectors (Glytsos and Katseli 2005: 372–373; Mousourou 1991: 108–109).

It is interesting that the predominance of immediate economic needs made it difficult for the policymakers of the country to elaborate a cohesive migration policy. This is probably because no specific ministry was accorded the responsibility of developing migration policies, nor did any succeed in setting up a designated service to guide the process despite the experience and the technical assistance acquired during the operations of the ICEM mission in Greece. Greece relied on the costly services of ICEM for years, and especially on its training programs, instead of investing in the strengthening of its technical education. Besides, as it depended on the European recruitment commissions to monitor migration operations, it was unable to manage and implement a selection process in keeping with the national interests.

The difficulties of a peripheral state of the ‘Free World’ to formulate a realistic and efficient migration agenda arose from the power asymmetries in a competitive international labor market, the pressing post-war economic conjunctures, the dysfunctional structure of the Greek public administration, the political coercions and the ideological prejudices that influenced the selection process. Besides, domestic political actors did not agree on an emigration policy, while the press exploited a particularly sensitive and ideologically charged matter for Greek society. What is more, in many cases, migration planning was upset by the personal strategies and the alternative initiatives of migrants.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that emigration solved, albeit temporarily, the acute post-war unemployment problem. It reduced the rural population, thus helping it to move out of endemic poverty. It was considered, therefore, as an effective means of tackling social pressures and of securing the political and social status quo. Besides, remittances became a source of finance for the Greek economy even though they intensified the country’s dependence on the economic, social and foreign policies of immigration countries (Kasimati 1984: 37–38). Remittances raised, from $50.6 million in 1955 to $571.4 million in 1972, covered between 23.8% and 35.8% of the country’s trade deficit (Emke-Pouloupoulou 1986: 300–301, 310).

Remittances induced the mechanization of Greek agriculture and the sustainability of agricultural production but also stimulated internal migration and urbanization. Emigration opportunities guaranteed continuous and better-remunerated work with contracts, leading gradually to the convergence of living standards of Greece with the rest of Western Europe. It contributed to setting in motion a series of transformations that led the hitherto predominantly rural economy to an industrial process. In fact, emigration has been a major factor in shaping the economic and social landscape of Greece (Chassiotis 1993: 138; Glytsos and Katseli 2005: 376–377; Ifantis 2004: 76; Liakos 2019: 339).
Greece converged with the mainstream pattern of planned and organized migration, though with a cautious ambivalence and with serious administrative deficiencies. It competed for a place in the international migration market through multilateral collaboration or within the system of bilateral migration agreements. This reflects a seminal turn of events with regard to its migration past. The state’s involvement in the migration process extended beyond the mere control of the movement of its citizens by ensuring emigrants’ rights but also by effectuating the country’s alignment with the Western doctrine of development and modernization.

Notes
1 Australia absorbed about 176,000 migrants, the United States 142,000 and Canada 86,000 (Lianos 1993: 249).

Bibliography


3 The migration–development nexus in Argentina’s post–World War II policies
Shifts and continuities from Peron to Frondizi (1946–1962)

Maria Damilakou

Argentina has a rich history in matters of migration policies. Until the 1920s it was a “typical” receiving country, with an open-door migration policy: from 1870 to the beginning of World War I it had welcomed about 2.5 million European immigrants, mostly Italian and Spanish. In the 1930s the global crisis along with governmental restrictive policies on immigration, which were based on ethnic and racial considerations, resulted in a limited inflow of immigrants. In the immediate post–World War II era, Argentina once again became a desirable destination for large groups of European immigrants forced to abandon their countries due to economic strife and political upheaval. Between 1946 and 1951, the period of Peron’s first government, more than half a million immigrants arrived in the country.

As a whole, the Argentinian migration policies of the period 1946–1962 favoured European immigration, through the setting up of selective standards that contrasted with the open-door policies of the period of massive migrations from Europe to overseas destinations. Post-war policies were based on the conviction that external immigration could be an important factor for development. This attitude was in accordance with the global political and economic priorities established after the end of World War II. In the new Cold War context, the doctrine of development became one of the ruling principles of the new world system (Naz 2006: 77); and in the so-called “Western world”, manpower was a crucial factor for its countries in order to face the challenges of development that would protect them from the communist threat. In this context, international migration had a major role to play: organized migration flows would contribute to a more balanced distribution of human resources, thus freeing Europe of its unemployed masses while at the same time providing overseas developing regions like Latin America, with the skilled manpower they lacked in order to flourish (Damilakou / Venturas 2015: 298).

How Argentina’s migration policies were shaped in that context and the ways national strategies interacted with the political and economic priorities of the Western world is the subject of this chapter. The first section focuses on the migration policy of Peron’s governments (1946–1955), which marked a

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shift from a restrictive policy to a selective one that linked European inflows to his development plans, in which industrialization was to play a major role. The second section examines the role that Argentina, as a peripheral partner of the Western bloc, played in the post–World War II international migration management system, implemented through a new institutional framework that was established to manage human mobility in the “free world”. The final section explores Argentina’s migration policies in its “developmental” period per excellence – that is, during the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962), which fully embraced mainstream ideas on industrialization and social modernization.

Aiming to fill some gaps observed in the existing literature, which mostly treats the Peronist era separately from the following periods, this chapter extends the period under study to the early 1960s, considering migration policies as part of the overall development strategies implemented by the post–war Argentinian governments. Based on documentary material from both Argentina’s national archival collections and international archives, this text examines Argentina’s public migration policies from a global perspective that takes into account the post–World War II international political agendas as well as structural characteristics of the global system. All three sections focus mainly on the economic motivations of Argentina’s official migration policies – rather than on their more ideological aspects, already explored by other important studies – and examine not only their practical effects and limitations, but also their impact on the formation of long-lasting perceptions on development and public views on migration.

“Selected, assimilable and economically useful”: the migration policies of Peron’s governments

The end of World War II marked the beginning of the last wave of European immigration to Argentina. During the immediate post–war years, net migration rates were clearly positive for Argentina: from a positive balance of fewer than 4,000 people in 1946, it increased the following year to 46,000 and then to 138,000 immigrants in 1948. This upward trend continued in 1949, with a net migration of 157,000 people, and reached its peak in 1950, with 160,000 new inhabitants for Argentina. In that period, the country was an attractive prospect for European emigrants that desired to escape from poverty, unemployment and political turmoil: in 1945–1948 its economy experienced important rates of growth resulting mainly from the continuous expansion of light industry, the rise of real salaries and the capacity of the local labour market to absorb manpower. All of these factors created a favourable momentum for immigration from overseas countries.

From 1946 onwards, Peron launched a policy which favoured European immigration, based on selective criteria which linked migration with development but also included strong ethnic, ideological and national security considerations. According to his First Five–Year Plan (1947–1951), published in 1946, immigrants should be “selected, assimilable, morally and physically
It was a time when the major issue of development was dominating both national and international political agendas. In January 1949, US President Harry Truman, in the famous “Point Four” of his inaugural address, presented the “development doctrine” that was to exercise major influence on post–World War II global politics and inter-American relations (Truman 1949). Previous to that, Argentina’s populist leader had already set his own national targets: Peron understood development as a state-controlled process and linked it to economic independence, social justice and national sovereignty. He nationalized strategic economic sectors and promoted an inward-looking development model based on import substitution industrialization and protectionist policies as well as the transfer of resources from agriculture to the industrial sector (Bulner-Thomas 2003: 270–279).

The Bill of Law that accompanied the first Plan defined the principles of desirable immigration as “spontaneous, selected and directed according to the national needs”. By spontaneous, it was understood that the state would not directly subsidize immigration but would organize it and supply the necessary means in order to maintain or increase inflows. Spontaneity could also include an allusion to the voluntary character of “good” immigration, in contrast with forced mass movement of refugees. The principle of selectivity was defined by both ethnic and professional criteria, and it entailed a preference for immigrants “who by origin, customs and language could be easily assimilated into the ethnic, cultural and spiritual character of Argentina and who would dedicate themselves to agricultural and livestock activities or crafts”. Urban workers and technicians whose skills and experience “were convenient or necessary for the country”, were also included. Finally, channelling was understood as the desire “to combine national interests with the individual freedom of the immigrant”. According to this principle, immigration should be directed to productive areas and geographic regions that would create immediate economic and demographic benefits for the country.

Of the aforementioned criteria, the most problematic in practice proved to be that of selectivity, as it became a source of competing interpretations, tensions and conflicts among institutions and groups that represented different spheres of power and political tendencies (Devoto 2001; Galante 2005). It must be noted that Peron’s government created a complex map of institutions that administered migration matters. In parallel to the already-existing General Direction of Migration (DGM), Peron created in 1946 two brand-new official organizations for the promotion and the regulation of European migration: the Argentinian Delegation for the Immigration in Europe (DAIE) and the Commission of Reception and Placement of Immigrants (CREI). The former, whose headquarters were in Rome, had the duty to select the potential immigrants, whereas the latter was charged with their placement in the host country. The fact that DAIE and CREI depended on the Argentinian Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI), a powerful government agency founded to control
exports and imports and to develop national industry, indicates that in Peron’s migration agenda, immigration was intrinsically linked to development and to his industrialization plans.

The complicated mixture of ethnic and ideological with professional selective criteria, however, was to create “grey zones” in bureaucratic procedures and left room for a flexible legal interpretation and policy implementation that often gave rise to serious conflicts. Furthermore, DAIE in several instances was accused by Argentinian diplomatic staff of doing little to promote “good immigration” while “good people remain in Europe”. These problems persisted after the establishment in 1949 of a new body, the National Direction of Migrations (DNM), that was intended to have full control over procedures and simplify migration management. Generally speaking, the concept of assimilation, which was prominent in all legal texts during the Peronist period, created categories of undesirable immigrants that included Jews and communist ideology sympathizers, while identifying preferable immigrants as Italian or Spanish farmers and skilled workers.

This emphasis on rural immigration, although Peron’s development strategy prioritized the promotion of industrialization, shows that the correlation between European immigration and rural colonization, as established since 1876 by the Avellaneda Law, continued to inform Argentina’s migration policies even after its economic model changed (Fernández 2014). In Peron’s First Five-Year Plan, colonization was presented as the complement of immigration, primarily destined to populate Argentina’s immense lands; and in order to bolster this aim, farmers were granted a series of incentives. Along with this long-established idea, the Plan adopted a broader approach which considered colonization jointly with population policies, rational distribution of manpower and further integration of national territory. According to it, properly channelled immigration would contribute to urban decentralization and economic regeneration of rural areas, in conjunction with other public policies that would act as stimuli to local industries and encourage greater fluidity between primary production and markets.

Likewise, Peron’s industrialist ideas figured prominently in his migration policies. As outlined in the First Plan, immigration would be developed

\[\text{in accordance with the needs of our industry and large-scale public works plans, in order to secure the number of technicians and specialized workers whose knowledge can be of immediate application and serve as a blueprint for the preparation of our own workers.}\]

In 1948 the creation of a National Committee of Industrial Immigration was decided, with the purpose of facilitating the relocation in Argentina, with their staff, of European industrial enterprises that sought to abandon the old continent. The results of this agency were insignificant, however.

The connection between migration and industrialization was evident in the important bilateral treaties that the Argentine government signed with Italy
and Spain in 1947–1948. The Commercial and Financial Agreement signed between Argentina and Italy in October 1947 included a chapter on migration which established that the Italian government would facilitate the emigration of workers to Argentina. Technical courses were foreseen that would make immigrants suitable for the labour needs of the host country (Barbero / Cacopardo 1991). Peron also tried to promote the immigration of Spaniards: at the end of 1948 a Commercial Agreement was signed, whose articles 30 and 31 promoted the emigration of skilled workers to Argentina. These bilateral agreements, followed by others in the 1950s, created a favourable legal framework for the encouragement of Italian and Spanish immigration and contributed to the relative increase of skilled and semi-skilled urban manpower.

The decline of European migratory movements towards Argentina from 1951, along with the growth of internal migration from the northern provinces, as well as the acute economic problems the country started to face, produced certain changes in migration strategies. The economic crisis exposed the limits of Peron’s development model, and manifested with high inflation and successive devaluations that seriously affected the savings and remittance capacity of European immigrants. In this context, Peron’s Second Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), published in 1952, gave priority to natural population growth over immigration flows; it subordinated immigration to the ability of local society to absorb it and to the needs of underpopulated regions; and, finally, it gave external migration a secondary role in the development strategies that prioritized a more balanced distribution of population and productivity between urban and rural areas (Barbero / Cacopardo 1991; Biernat 2007: 71–72). Internal and external migration, without distinction, had to be regulated according to the needs of industrial decentralization and supportive of local industries that were of high importance for Peron’s government. These priorities would persist in Argentina’s migration policies during the whole of the 1950s and early 1960s.

In the Second Plan, references to manpower were general, concerned basically with local workers, and they focused on the role of the state in providing adequate technical training. Regarding decentralization, special mention was made of the region of Patagonia, while other parts of the Plan referred to the necessity of reactivating migration flows towards national ports other than Buenos Aires, such as Rosario and Bahia Blanca, and of establishing reception facilities in these areas. European migration was more directly linked to the rural policies of Peron that favoured official and private colonization plans. The encouragement of rural immigration was an important factor in Peron’s plan to increase land productivity and to partially modify his previous development model, that up until then had given priority to industry at the expense of the primary sector, which was the only source of foreign currency for Argentina.

Despite the differences that can be observed between 1946 and 1952, Peron’s migration policies were shaped into a dynamic international context that linked human mobility to development. In such a context, the concept of an international migration management emerged and a new organization, the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), was created in 1951 in order to promote and regulate migration from Europe to overseas countries. The next step in Peron’s migration agenda was the country’s entry into the ICEM. Argentina was therefore to become part of the post–World War II international migration management system that aspired to foster, coordinate and administer migration flows in the “Free World”.

Argentina and the post–World War II international migration management

Latin America played an important role in the migration policies of the post–World War II Western world. According to these policies, the countries of this continent could absorb part of Europe’s “surplus population” and contribute to the solution for the problems of unemployment and poverty in several European countries. In return, the selective transfer of immigrants from Europe to Latin America could meet in part the manpower needs of the latter and become a valuable component of development. Europe’s overpopulation and Latin America’s shortages in human resources were therefore perceived to be two facets of the same problem that could be partly addressed with regulated migration flows (Robbins 1958: 107; Bastos de Ávila 1964: 131). This perspective that linked migration to development was promoted by the new international institutional system that emerged in the aftermath of World War II, under the leadership of the United States. The aforementioned ICEM further expanded this idea and tried to make Latin America a laboratory by testing out several pilot programs in order to establish efficient international migration management (Damilakou / Venturas 2015: 293).

Argentina became a member of ICEM in February 1953, following earlier negotiations that had taken place in Buenos Aires in the final months of 1952. According to the operational plan of ICEM for 1953, the Committee would assist the transport of up to 50,000 migrants from Mediterranean ports to Argentina; that same year, an ICEM mission was opened in Buenos Aires, the fourth in Latin America. The agreement signed by Argentina and the Committee in 1953 had two main objectives: the selection of agricultural families willing to settle permanently in rural areas, and the reunification of the families of immigrants already established in Argentina. These objectives were in agreement with the targets of Peron’s Second Five-Year plan, especially with the aim to stimulate growth in the agricultural sector through colonization.

Peron’s populist rhetoric was present in the preamble of the agreement: according to it, Argentina’s entry to the Committee was “in full accordance with its humanitarian migration policy and its social doctrine”. It was obvious, though, that Peron’s government expected some political and economic gain from this agreement. In the first place, Argentina’s participation in ICEM was a means to continue “whitewashing” its international image, seriously stained during World War II and marred even more by its migration policy, which was often denounced as discriminatory by humanitarian and Jewish
organizations. It was also in harmony with the improvement of Argentina–United States relations after Dwight Eisenhower assumed the US presidency in January 1953 (Escudé 2007).

On an economic level, Peron expected some immediate economic benefits from ICEM’s programs in an arduous period of economic crisis for Argentina, during which the migration inflows had diminished and the economic possibilities of his government to exercise an energetic policy for attracting “desirable” immigrants were limited. As already mentioned, in 1951 migration inflows to Argentina were in decline, and this downward tendency was to persist over the coming years. For some months in 1953, the net migration rate was negative. In this context, it was hoped that ICEM’s family reunification programs would be constructive in reversing the high rates of returnees among the immigrants. Furthermore, Argentina’s entry to ICEM could also be a source of other secondary benefits. For example, the transport of immigrants was a major business that could contribute to the development of Argentina’s national merchant marine. According to the ICEM–Argentina agreement, half of the assisted immigrants had to be transported by Argentinian ships and the other half by vessels chosen by the ICEM (Devoto 2001; Biernat 2007: 100).

The decline of spontaneous immigration to Argentina increased the relative weight of ICEM as a complementary mechanism to its national migration policies. As a result, assisted immigration transferred to Argentina through the auspices of ICEM increased throughout the 1950s. In 1954, the percentage of assisted immigrants (about 30,000 persons) reached 50% of the total arrivals, while in other years it ranged around 30%. In the period 1952–1961, ICEM transferred some 110,000 immigrants to Argentina, of whom 92,655 were Italians. Additionally, about 14,000 Spaniards arrived during the period 1957–1961, after Spain became a member of ICEM in 1956. The vast majority of Italians and Spaniards was due to ICEM’s family reunification programs and to the traditional cultural bonds and migrant social networks that existed between Argentina and these Mediterranean countries. But it also reflected an informal division of the international migrant market with ethnic criteria: Commonwealth countries had a clear preference for immigrants from Britain and Northern Europe, whereas the “lower-ranked” immigrants from Southern Europe were encouraged, by ICEM and other international institutions, to settle in Latin American countries, considered as “second-class” destinations (Damilakou / Venturas 2015: 304).

A point of concurrence in Peron’s and ICEM’s migration policies was the importance given to rural migration. The Committee, along with other international agencies, put a special emphasis on Latin American rural structures and underlined the urgent need for the formation of rural middle classes. According to mainstream views of this period, industrialization in Latin America without a solid agricultural basis was unsustainable (Diegues 1963: 107–113; Bastos de Ávila 1964: 27–29, 96–115). Of course, the pressure to channel the “surplus” of European agricultural families towards overseas destinations conditioned this prioritization in ICEM’s strategies. Since its inception, the Committee called
on Latin American countries to present specific land settlement plans. At the end of the Fifth Session of ICEM in April 1953, some Latin American countries, including Argentina, announced their intention to commence work on land settlement projects in order to resettle European farmers.

Peron generally shared concerns about the rural structures of his country; in his official discourse the European rural immigrant could contribute, together with the native farmer, to the accomplishment of the “social function” of the land. The prioritization of rural immigration, in Argentina’s and ICEM’s common migration agenda, had intrinsic limitations, though. Until the mid-1950s, ICEM’s role in the colonization projects was rather limited: in most cases, it did not assume direct financial responsibility and simply acted as mediator, offering technical assistance and presenting the plans to international banking institutions. On the other hand, although Peron considered agrarian reforms as indispensable, the rural policies of his governments were in fact superficial, and he was reluctant to allocate substantial national capital to rural colonization programs for immigrants that would rather be financed by other, international sources. For Peron the real path to Argentina’s social and economic transformation was industrialization, and it was on this sector the emphasis was put.

Certain agricultural colonization plans elaborated jointly by ICEM and Peron’s government had limited results. The most well-known case was a pilot farm school created in 1953 in the locality of Lavallol, in the province of Buenos Aires, with the financial support of ICEM and the National Bank of Argentina. The agreement concerned the establishment of a centre for the reception, training and placement of rural migrants from Europe (De Marco 2013). The aim of the project was “to develop the technical knowledge of farmers from Western Europe and to help them adapt to their new rural surroundings with a view to resettling them in new colonies”. Initially, the school would accommodate 100 farming families; but operating at full capacity, this number could ideally reach a maximum of 700 families. The first group of farmer migrants would be selected in Italy. Upon completion of the course, trainees would be settled in two close colonies, set up in the green belt of Buenos Aires. Unfortunately, the project had a short life. Later, in 1954, ICEM assisted Argentina’s technical services in preparation of a “National Plan for Land Settlement” in two zones, one in the Rio Negro valley and the other in the province of Buenos Aires. Other matters that complicated assisted migration and reduced possible benefits to be gained from its ICEM membership was Argentina’s insistence on retaining sovereign control over the selection of immigrants through its national institutions. Of course, its budget problems and the late payment of its contributions for the transport of the selected immigrants did not facilitate assisted migrant inflows (Barbero / Cacopardo 1991). In general terms, as a result of both national and international political and economic factors, Argentina’s participation in the post-war international migration management apparatus was not able to reverse downward tendencies in the European migration flows it received. Despite this fact, international migration strategies had
a strong impact on the diffusion of specific perceptions of development and migration that permeated Argentina’s public policies, especially during the late 1950s and 1960s.

**Migration policies and the politics of developmentalism in Argentina**

The predominant migration-development debate of the 1950s and 1960s was based on a widespread and commonly held opinion on Latin America’s “under-development” and its urgent need for structural changes. The approaches ensuing from these discussions viewed the transfer of human resources from Europe as a fundamental requirement for development that would improve Latin America’s living standards (Bastos de Ávila 1964: 131). Despite its deficiencies, the countries of the region were believed to be on the road to development, and there was general optimism concerning their potential to increase their productivity and achieve economic growth.

Argentinian governments that followed Peron’s overthrow from power in 1955, and especially Arturo Frondizi’s government (1958–1962), largely shared these views. Argentina presented considerably better levels than the rest of Latin America in the indicators of health, education, infant mortality and life expectancy; furthermore, it had accumulated an important stock of scientific, technical and cultural skills (Aroskind 2003: 65–66). Despite these positive trends, there was a general consensus that the country still needed to proceed to an in-depth economic restructuring. In Frondizi’s term of office, the advancement of heavy industry and technological modernization was regarded as a prerequisite for development. These priorities echoed ECLA’s structuralist theories for Latin America that favoured a state-directed capitalism oriented towards industrialization (Love 2005). Frondizi’s government came up with its own version of these ideas that were to become mainstream in several Latin American countries. His developmental model was based on the attraction of international investment in strategic sectors of Argentina’s national economy, as well as on the development of national technology and an increase in energy production.

In the context of the expansion of Argentina’s industry during the late 1950s, national migration policies prioritized the need for highly qualified manpower from Europe. In a pragmatic approach and a rather technocratic narrative that distanced itself from the ethnic and ideological criteria of the Peronist era, immigrants were evaluated according to their skills and capacity to contribute to the national development agenda. Due to these priorities, Argentina’s representatives, in various migration fora, insisted on the need for international institutions to channel to their country skilled workers and farmers, and not only dependents who migrated as part of family reunification programs. Argentinian authorities prepared detailed lists of desirable trades of urban workers that would be welcome in the country while restricting other categories, such as certain construction trades that were suspended from the lists in 1959, due to a
crisis affecting that particular sector.\textsuperscript{23} Another pillar of the migration strategy of this period, already set up in Peron’s five-year plans, was the decentralization of Buenos Aires and its suburban zone towards rural areas and provincial cities whose industrial potential was already growing thanks to foreign investment.

Frondizi’s migration policies were part of an international context that had established development as a major political priority. By the mid-1950s, international migration policies concerning Latin America were intensified, reflecting the Western world’s, and in particular the United States’, concern about the developmental needs of its countries. During this time, Latin American economic problems had become a sensitive issue of growing importance due to the potential security threats they posed to the inter-American system. The Eisenhower administration initiated the Social Progress Trust Fund in response to the appeal made in 1958 by Brazilian President Kubitschek for an “Economic Pan-America” (Ataka / Caballero 2006: 9). The culmination of this cooperation was the launching by President John Kennedy in 1961, two years after the Cuban Revolution, of the Alliance for Progress, a program of economic aid to foster economic growth and strengthen representative democracy in Latin America.

During this time ICEM’s activity focused on more advanced land settlement programs for European immigrants, several of which concerned Argentina (Redondo Carrero 2017b). After the mid-1950s, the US decision to participate in the financing of colonization plans in Latin America with $15 million gave new life to these projects: in the period 1957–1960, the ICEM submitted several of them to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) of the US Department of State.\textsuperscript{24} The general idea behind these proposals was that agricultural colonies would function as “development cells” that would help to correct the imbalance between industrial and agricultural production and reduce the concentration of population in large cities.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, ICEM’s officials and experts underlined the need of the Latin American countries to diversify their agriculture and to increase their food production. These strategies not only echoed international debates that associated food shortage with political instability, but also structuralist economic theories that underlined the need for Latin American countries to reduce their dependency on the exports of specific primary products. Consistent with these views, the Argentinian colonization project “Estancia Chica”, in Melchor Romero, allowed for the creation of “green belts” to be established around urban agglomerations and semi-desert areas which could be easily irrigated and become centres for fruit, vegetables and other diversified farming produce for both home consumption and export.\textsuperscript{26}

Frondizi’s government adopted, in general lines, a more integrated approach to the development of the national economy, according to which agrarian issues would no longer be treated separately from other sectors of the national economy (Lázzaro 2012: 137–138). In Frondizi’s own words, “Rural and urban areas, agriculture and industry, are no longer incompatible units. Within a highly developed economic structure, agricultural activity is also an industrial
Later colonization plans were based on a more integrated approach that tried to connect agriculture with local industry and market. For example, the Argentinian pilot program for the establishment of a farm training and placement centre in the southern province of Rio Negro, elaborated with the assistance of ICEM in 1959, was based on the idea of the vital link between agriculture and industrial development: it was intended that this rural centre would provide food and other supplies to the constantly increasing number of workers’ settlements that, spurred on by Frondizi’s industrialization plans, were springing up in Patagonia around the new oil, mining and metallurgical plants.

Despite the optimism surrounding rural colonization projects, their results were once again rather limited. According to the economic models of the period, the cornerstone for Argentina’s development was industrialization. In the same spirit, from the late 1950s onwards, international migration policies were to become more focused on the industrialization of Latin America as the ICEM concentrated its efforts on migration programs designed to secure skilled workers. This shift in emphasis took place at a very different time when compared to the early 1950s: thanks to its rapid economic growth, Western Europe had started to absorb migrant manpower from Southern Europe; as a consequence, the old continent’s overpopulation problem had decreased markedly, thereby losing its previous significance and resulting in other continents’ problems coming to the forefront (Venturas / Damilakou 2013).

In this new context, by the end of the 1950s various international institutions like ICEM and ILO were putting greater emphasis on vocational training programs that could provide Latin America with larger numbers of skilled migrants. The vocational training meeting, held in Geneva in December 1957, recognized the need of Latin American countries for qualified workers. In 1958 it was decided to send a joint ILO-ICEM mission to Argentina and Brazil to study the possibilities of organizing vocational training for European immigrants in these two countries. The mission actually started in October 1959 and lasted for three months as it was scheduled. ILO’s and ICEM’s experts realized, in Brazil and Argentina, contacts with local authorities and enterprises and outlined plans for technical courses that concerned immigrant industrial workers. These courses would complete the training that the migrants had received in European emigration countries and which was often considered insufficient by the host countries.

In spite of these efforts, the number of highly skilled immigrants who moved to Argentina was not significant. This failure was attributed to many factors, including poor programming, distance between policies and practices and budget problems. But the failure was mainly due to the gap in working and living conditions between Argentina and other overseas destinations, such as Australia and Canada, that now had a greater capacity for absorption of qualified manpower. In 1960, when Western European countries threw open the doors of their factories to workers from Southern Europe, the inflows to Argentina fell dramatically, resulting in European immigration no longer being considered a feasible factor for fostering development.
In the aftermath of World War II, the last wave of European migration to Argentina started and lasted until the early 1960s. Most of the immigrants arrived in the period 1947–1951, attracted by the promising economic situation and high rates of growth that this large South American country presented. Public policies played a role in these inflows, creating a rather favourable legal framework. Argentina’s post-war migration policies promoted European immigration but were based on selective criteria that varied according to the political and ideological profile of its governments. Peron’s selective policy applied a combination of professional and ethnic filters, whereas Frondizi’s government emphasized the labour skills of potential immigrants. In spite of these differences, Argentina’s migration policies of the whole period 1946–1962 linked external migration to national development, and in particular to the needs of its rural areas and its expanding industry.

These polices were shaped in an international context in which strategies connecting human mobility to development became predominant. The post–World War II Western world embraced the development doctrine and regarded migration as an important factor for a more balanced distribution of manpower and for the growth of developing areas like Latin America. Argentina became part of the international institutional apparatus that emerged in the 1950s with the aim of optimizing the regulation and channelling of migration flows among the members of the Western bloc. The Argentinian governments’ expectations of ensuring flows of experienced European farmers to its immense lands and securing the skilled workforce so vital for its industry were not fulfilled, however. The structural characteristics of the world system, the international competition for skilled manpower in the 1950s and 1960s and the growing gap between developed and developing areas did not help in this direction. Despite this fact, the approximately 600,000 European immigrants who settled in Argentina in the period 1947–1960 had a strong impact on its social and economic characteristics on many levels in sharp contrast with other Latin American countries that did not attract significant migration flows from Europe.

Notes
1 Fernando Devoto (2001) has shown the existing continuities between Peron’s migration policies and those of preceding governments during the 1930s. For a thorough study on the migration policies of Peron’s governments, see C. Biernat (2007); also, M. A. Galante (2005).
2 A few recent studies have jointly studied Argentina’s migration policies during the first Peronism (1946–1955) and the governments that followed, and they have examined those policies in relation to international migration policies. See: N. A. De Cristóforis (2015); E. Redondo Carrero (2017a). The M. I. Barbero / M. C. Cacopardo article (1991) is an authoritative study of the whole post–World War II migration to Argentina.
3 Some important studies that focus on Spanish migration to Argentina have adopted a transnational approach that jointly examines Spanish and Argentinean migration policies. See: M. J. Fernández Vicente (2005) and her contribution to this volume; E. Redondo
Carrero (2017b; N. A. De Cristóforis (2015). There is still, however, plenty of room for study in the area of global and international parameters of Argentina’s migration policy.

An extensive bibliography has examined the ideological aspects of Peron’s migration policies, by focusing in particular on his attitude towards the arrival of refugees and fugitives (especially Jews and Nazis). See among others the studies of L. Senkman (1985, 1995) and I. Klich (1994, 1997), cited in the references of this chapter.

Some studies in reference to Argentina have stressed the disparity between migration policies and their implementation and have exposed the tensions that existed within the institutional mechanism that administered the migration process: F. Devoto (2001); M. A. Galante (2005); N. A. De Cristóforis (2015); E. Redondo Carrero (2018).

Regarding Argentina’s public opinion towards immigration, see: C. Biernat (1999); E. Redondo Carrero (2020).


Decrees No 20.707 and No. 23.112, File 547, Secretaría Técnica (ST), AGN.

In 1949 several irregularities in the selection process were denounced by members of the consular body, leading to judicial actions that ended with the indictment of the high-ranking officials of the DGM, including the dismissal of former head Pablo Diana: File 546, “Irregularidades cometidas en la visación de permisos de inmigración”, ST, AGN.

Memorandum of Senator Alejandro Mathus Hoyos to Enrique González, Head of DGM, February 18, 1949, File 546, ST, AGN.

Jewish immigration, often associated with the communist danger, was generally considered “bad immigration” and frequently described with humiliating expressions such as “human scum”: Memorandum of Hoyos to González, op. cit.

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4 Brazil

Development and immigration in the “long exceptional period” (1929–1979)

Roberto Goulart Menezes and Ana Tereza Reis da Silva

Introduction

Between the crisis of 1929 and the second oil shock in 1979, Brazil went through deep economic, political and social transformations. It was, in Cano’s (1999) words, “a long exceptional period” of development in which a split with the agrarian-exporter accumulation pattern in favor of the urban-industrial pattern took place. In the space of five decades, Brazil had been successful with its “industrialization effort” (esforço de desenvolvimento). This becomes immediately evident when we consider the period 1950–1980 alone: Brazil was among the countries that, on average, showed the strongest growth, reaching a rate of 14% in the last year of the so-called “Brazilian miracle,” in 1973.

The industrialization process “had its ‘launch’ in the transformations that took place throughout the 1930s” (Mendonça 2000: 327), during Getúlio Vargas’s first administration (1930–1945). It would change the face of the Brazilian economy in the following decades under the banner of national-developmentalism. The Brazilian state assumed the costs of industrialization and began to finance the creation of state-owned companies, to organize the domestic market and to offer incentives to entrepreneurs – many of them still linked to coffee exports – to invest in industry. This process gained decisive momentum in the post-war period, especially during the second Vargas administration (1951–1954).

In this chapter, we fix our attention on the period between 1929 and 1955, because of the deep industrial transformation, the urbanization process and the incorporation of large contingents of workers (including immigrants) – perceived in the national imagination as the “great waves of workers” – into the national development effort. These immigrants came mainly from the European continent, fleeing from the war (some of them had already arrived in Brazil after long journeys at the end of the 1930s) and from persecution by the Nazi-fascist regimes. In the second half of the 1950s, the strong-state strategy went through a period of relativization under the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961). Unlike the Vargas era, Kubitschek focused on attracting international capital, and the automobile industry was the industrial sector that received the most support from his government.

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Throughout this process, skilled labor to meet the demands of the emerging economic sectors became a pressing need, which they endeavored to cover with the luring and arrival of immigrant contingents. However, since the 1920s, although they had become a crucial element for the country’s economic development, immigrants “began to be classified as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable,’ selected according to political, ethnic, cultural, and religious criteria” (Carneiro 2018: 116). In the following decade, during the Vargas administration, Brazil adopted restrictive migration legislation in order to attract the ideal immigrant (Koifman 2012, 2020).

The concentration of income and authoritarianism were key elements in the process of development and economic growth that the country experienced at that time, reinforcing Brazilian economic and social disparity. In the 1970s, under the civil-military dictatorship’s (1964–1985) heavy repression and slashing of wages, Brazil became the eighth largest economy and one of the countries with the highest level of inequality in the world.

In view of this more general scenario, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the Brazilian economy with emphasis on the period 1929–1955, during which foreign labor, especially European, was integrated into Brazil’s “development effort.”

**Reaction to the 1929 crisis: the state and the shift in the accumulation pattern**

The crash of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929 initiated the Great Depression, which lasted throughout the 1930s. It created a ripple effect starting from the United States and spreading to other capitalist countries, it triggered bankruptcies, and it left a trail of mass unemployment and worsening poverty. The immediate effect of the crisis on the Brazilian economy was the fall in the price and volume of coffee exports – up to then the country’s main export product – as well as the loss of its markets. The situation worsened with the protectionist measures adopted in all countries in order to reduce the effects of the depression on domestic markets.

The crisis also had repercussions at the ballot box: the incumbent US president Herbert Hoover (1929–1933), who ran for reelection in November 1932, was defeated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the Democratic Party, who advocated a new regulatory role for the state in the economy as a means to overcome the Great Depression. The US economy was to recover throughout the 1930s under his administration, through a set of measures that included major public works, stimuli to job creation, and loan programs at subsidized interest rates, in addition to the emergency creation of a network of social assistance to support workers who had lost their jobs in the depression. Thus, the “New Deal proposed a wide range of regulatory measures, emergency employment and income programs, and a new distribution of national income” (Limoncic 2009: 21). In short, the reaction of the Roosevelt government to the economic crisis gradually brought about significant changes regarding the
conception of the state within US society, challenging the traditional view, which had prevailed until then, “of the defense of the individual against the action of the state” (Limoncic 2009: 27).

The implications of the 1929 crisis on Brazilian political reality were profound, among which the overthrow of the incumbent president Washington Luís (1926–1930) is foremost; it was instigated by a movement led by Getúlio Vargas that became known as the “Revolution of 1930.” It was, in fact, a coup, as historiographical and sociological studies of the period have shown. In November 1930, Getúlio Vargas took office under the “Provisional Government” and remained in power until 1945. Deposed after World War II, Vargas would be elected president in 1950. In August 1954, in the midst of a deep political crisis, the president took his own life. The Vargas era represented a watershed in the contemporary history of Brazil, for it was during this period, above all, that the centralization of political power and state-led initiatives aiming at industrialization were consolidated.

According to Mendonça, “the period 1930–37 can... be defined as one of open political crisis, without any of the involved class fractions managing to prevail as successors to the coffee bourgeoisie.” These clashes over the direction of the country created possibilities for state bureaucracy to act “with a relative margin of autonomy in relation to the interests in dispute” (Mendonça 2000: 322). It was in this context that the first movements for change emerged, both in the structure and the actions of the state, which set in motion “a long exceptional period” of development (Cano 1999) whose main consequence was the split with the agrarian–export accumulation pattern and its transition into the urban–industrial model. This rupture occurred due to the depth and long duration of the crisis that “did not allow a ‘return to the past,’ that is, the maintenance of the old pattern of consumption and investment, and forms of passive adjustment to face the depression” (Cano 2012: 130).

As stated in Cano (1999), Brazil’s political-economic reality, between 1929 and 1979, can be divided into five periods. The first, extending from 1929 to 1937, was marked by a greater degree of economic autonomy, despite the depth of the Depression; the second, from 1937 to 1945, was characterized by the instability of foreign supply that forced the acceleration of the industrialization process; the third, from 1945 to 1955, was dominated by the intervention of the United States in Latin American countries and by the advent of the Cold War in 1947; the fourth, from 1955 to 1973, circumscribed the peak and decline of the growth of world capitalism and is also the period of greatest economic growth in Brazil; the fifth and last, from 1973 to 1979, was marked by a slow development against a background of the 1970s oil crises.

State economic intervention in Brazil, specifically between 1930 and 1955, was guided by an accumulation pattern based on the outline of an industrialization project that had been marked by the international restrictions imposed by the 1929 crisis. According to Mendonça (2000: 329), the first major guideline of Brazilian state action consisted in “controlling production factors as an instrument of industrial accumulation.” For instance, the Vargas administration’s
regulation of the labor world imposed the unicity of unions, established a mini-
mum wage policy, and bonded unions to the state. The second major directive fell on agriculture, a crucial element to ensure in part the food supply of urban workers at low prices, thus reducing the reproduction cost of the labor force (Mendonça 2000).

The institution of the “Consolidation of Labor Laws” (CLT) in 1943 estab-
lished the state’s tutelage over the world of labor. The CLT recognized only the rights of urban workers and left all those who worked in the countryside out-
side the realm of social and labor rights. In Wanderley G. dos Santos’s masterly formulation in Citizenship and Justice, regulated citizenship makes explicit the domination mechanisms of the development project conceived by the ruling elites and the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie of that period, which marked the trajectory of the conception of citizenship in the country until the proclaiming of the 1988 Constitution: “citizenship is embedded in the profession and the rights of the citizen are restricted to the rights of the place he or she occupies in the productive process, as recognized by law” (1979: 68). It was against this narrow conception of citizenship, guided by the ideology of labor – in which the worker has access to rights only if he or she is formally inserted in the productive process – that the mobilizations of the working class and social movements in the 1950s and 1960s took place, challenging the status quo and claiming full citizenship with equality and for the right to have rights.

At an international level, the participation of developed countries in the war “made the expansion and a certain diversification of production possible, even expanding the national perception of the real possibility of advancing industrialization” (Cano 2012: 133). Notable in this “development effort” were the creation of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (1942), Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (1941) – still today the largest steel mill in Latin America – and Petrobras (1953). The creation and installation of industrial parks ended up benefiting the southeast region of the country more, particularly three of its states: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais.

But it was during a longer period, between 1929 and 1955, due to the industrial transformation and the incipient urbanization, that immigrants were incorporated into the national development effort, arriving here in what was perceived as “great waves of workers.” As we will discuss in the next section, this process took place during the second half of the 1930s and intensified with the beginning of the war in Europe.

In the mid-1950s, the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) adopted a different pattern of accumulation. Under the “Plano de Metas” (Plan of Goals), he articulated international capital, national private enterprise, and public enterprise, initiating the phase of the advanced industrial economy (Mendonça 2000). His administration was marked by the slogan “fifty years in five”; that is, he intended to develop sectors of the Brazilian economy rapidly, and in order to achieve this, he needed to “catch up” in areas such as transporta-
tion, agriculture, energy, and heavy industry.
The automobile industry was the sector benefiting the most in terms of government support. In a few years, the ABC region, adjacent to São Paulo, began to undergo a landscape transformation, with the arrival of the Ford, Volkswagen, and Chevrolet factories. Thousands of workers flocked from other regions of the country in search of jobs and the better – by Brazilian standards – salaries, being offered by the automobile industry. In parallel, as the complexity of the country’s economy intensified, the workers’ union organization also gained strength. However, the shortage of skilled labor persisted, since the available supply was insufficient in terms of that demanded by the new sectors of the economy.

Thus, over five decades, the country endeavored to industrialize and modernize its economy. From 1950 to 1980 Brazil was one of the world’s fastest-developing economies, attaining a growth rate of 14% in 1973; however, this was not reflected in income distribution, which remained outside of national development objectives. The majority of the population did not experience the benefits of this growth, since economic and social inequalities continued to be one of the greatest challenges still facing the country.

**Immigrants, racism, and national identity**

In the first three decades of the 20th century, the social and political debate surrounding the future of Brazil was notably blemished by the presence of racial theories developed in Europe and disseminated around the world between the 18th and 19th centuries. The belief in the superiority of whites and the inferiority of the nonwhite population (black, indigenous, mestizo), associated with the popularization of the eugenicist theories that ensued, not only took root in the Brazilian imagination but also resulted in the adoption of a whitening policy to save the nation (Dávila 2005).

It should be noted that although this essentialist association between physical traits and moral, cultural, and mental dispositions has been scientifically abandoned – since it never constituted a biological reality – the hierarchization between whites and nonwhites is the highest expression of the hegemonic vision that guided the construction of the country. For the political, economic, and intellectual elite of Brazil at the time, the “degeneration” of a significant part of the Brazilian population, embodied in black ancestry, was an inescapable reality that could, however, be mitigated through a kind of cultural conversion to whiteness. Or, as Dávila (2005: 117) suggests:

> At one extreme, the Negro signified the past. The Negro was posited, in Freudian language, as primitive, pre-rational and child-like. More broadly, white elites equated blackness with unhealthiness, laziness, and criminality. Racial mixing symbolized a historical process, envisioned as a trajectory from black to white and from the past toward the future.
From the racist and eugenicist perspective of the (ruling and intellectual) Brazilian elite, the challenge was basically to forge paths that would allow the country to escape a chronic backwardness resulting from a population that was mostly nonwhite and “naturally degenerated” by its belonging to slavery and black ancestry. The reasoning that guided the saving of the nation was relatively simple: if it was true that blacks could not strip themselves of their heritage (blackness and captivity), it was, however, possible to mitigate these negative traits through educational engineering focused on the diffusion of European habits and values. In the scope of this project:

Being white was a way to assert Europeanness, a characteristic that justified all the trappings of modernity, from urbanization to industrialization, rationalism, science, and civic virtue. Of course, the white element also passed on a racial sense of health, vigor, and Darwinian superiority.

(Dávila 2005: 118)

It was in this racist and eugenicist context that the arrival of European immigrants represented the possibility of implementing a whitening policy that aimed to pull the country out of its slave-owning past in order to set it on its path for a white and modern future. This direction would acquire a new contour starting in the 1930s, with Getúlio Vargas’s rise to power, setting in motion the diffusion of a narrative of enmity that considered the presence of certain types of immigrants as a threat to the national project that was underway and its corresponding notion of national identity.

As president since November 1930, Vargas established a dictatorial regime in 1937, which became known as the Estado Novo (New State). With this coup d’état, the president strengthened the centralization of power, closed the National Congress, censored the press, and adopted a nationalist and anti-communist discourse. This allowed him to rule with an iron fist until October 1945 and enjoy “a high degree of autonomy in his relations with society” (Fausto 2007: 95).

At an international level, with the outbreak of the Second World War (1939–1945), the Vargas administration did not hide its affinity for the Nazi-fascist regime in both Germany and Italy. However, with the United States entering the war in 1941, pressure increased on the Vargas administration to break with the Axis countries and join the so-called war effort to defeat Nazi-fascism. This shift represented a turning point in the foreign relations between Brazil and the United States.

In the second half of the 1930s, political persecution by the Nazi-fascist regimes forced millions of Europeans to migrate to other countries in Europe and then, with the outbreak of the war, to flee to other countries outside Europe, including Brazil. However, as Koifman (2012, 2015) shows, immigrants seeking to obtain a visa to enter the country faced a selective migration policy instituted by the Estado Novo. The goal of the new legislation was to “filter as best possible the type of immigrant considered ideal, as well as
to control any and all foreigners entering the country” (Koifman 2015: 239). With this purpose, during the Estado Novo, the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs took over the decision-making command of migration policy and the granting of visas for foreigners, which until then had been under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is important to note that it was not only a matter of establishing some kind of control over who could or could not enter the country. Between 1938 and early 1941, the search for the “ideal immigrant” was based on the ideology of the ruling elites who, since the second half of the 19th century, had been concerned about the ethnic composition of the country’s population.

Thus, according to Carneiro (2018: 116), “coexistence with immigrants by some segments of the Brazilian population was always limited by an intolerant discourse shaped by eugenicist theories and exclusionary policies,” most notably in the governments of Vargas and Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946–1951). In other words, the regime’s break with the Axis countries did not change the rationale of Brazilian migration policy of that time.

Another important dimension of the restrictive migration policies is their ideological grounding in labor and national security (Carneiro 2018). The imposition of severe restrictions on the entry of new immigrants was, however, attenuated by the government’s efforts not to completely close the country’s borders to those seeking to flee the horrors of war (Koifman 2015). With this, the government propagated the idea that all those who sought Brazil as their new home had to engage in the country’s “development effort.” Immigrants with academic training and technical knowledge were preferred by the regime. However, the stringent filtering and the use of ethnic criteria operated in order to prevent the “undesirables” or “indigestible” from entering Brazil: communists, socialists, liberal intellectuals, Jews, Japanese. This racist policy of the Vargas government, based on the “labeling theory,” was justified on the pretext that “they put the process of building race and Brazilanness at risk” (Carneiro 2018: 118).

On the other hand, it seems correct to say that undesirable foreigners were also useful to Vargas’s nationalist policy. The reason is that, while Vargas tried to get closer to workers by spreading a discourse of labor protection, his hostile stance to certain foreigners – to whom he often attributed the increase in unemployment, for instance – served as a smokescreen that diverted the focus from the crisis and conflicts that the country was going through.

Finally, it is important to note that although the racial issue has always been present in the formulation of national projects – especially when it came to considering the place of the black population in the construction of the country – the racism that affected immigrants can be interpreted as a reactivation of the discrimination that historically marked the experience of the Afro-Brazilian population with the specific purpose of establishing clear boundaries between desirable and undesirable immigrants, according to the nationalist, racist, and eugenicist ideology that guided the national project of the time.
National-developmentalism, accelerated industrialization, and inequality

Getúlio Vargas’s return to power occurred in January 1951, after winning the elections with almost half of the valid votes. During the presidential campaign, according to Skidmore (2010: 120–121), “Vargas had shown an understanding of the various ‘Brasils’ produced by the uneven economic development of the last twenty years.”

Consequently, Vargas’ second government (1951–1954) would be marked by the acceleration of industrialization and the pursuit of diversification of the Brazilian economy. To this end, his government created new institutions and instruments, foremost among which was the creation of the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) and a “new articulation between entrepreneurs and the state” that aimed “to make the large public company the definitive core of industrial investments” (Mendonça 2000: 333).

This shift in relations between the state and the business community was a reflection of the transformations the class structure of Brazilian society was undergoing. Unlike the Estado Novo period (1937–1945) – the designation adopted by politicians and intellectuals who participated in the government in order to express a supposed change – President Vargas had to recognize that three sectors were strengthened with the industrialization and urbanization processes – “the industrialists, the urban working class, and the urban middle class” (Skidmore 2010: 117).

In general terms, the second Vargas government was in tune with the strategy of the so-called national-developmentalism, which was characterized by a focus on industrialization and the modernization of agriculture. This was achieved through the granting of incentives to boost import substitution and to diversify the economy, prioritizing the domestic market (Fonseca 2013).

According to Gonçalves (2013: 38) “the central issue was the break with the Center-Periphery Model,” in which the center expressed “the dynamics of capital accumulation, technical progress and foreign trade (export)” focused on industrialization, while in the periphery the agrarian-export sector predominated. Thus, although Vargas exploited the nationalist sentiment in a context of greater political turmoil and increased political participation of workers, the rationale of national-developmentalism was not off limits to foreign capital.

It was with this national-developmentalist horizon that from the 1950s on, driven by state action, the framework of Brazilian production was diversified and began to produce goods with higher added value due to industrial sophistication. In 1979, the country’s foreign trade presented an unprecedented result when “the share of manufactured goods (43.6%) in the total value of exports was greater than the corresponding share of basic products (43%)” (Gonçalves 2013: 43). This result expresses the increase in productivity and the diversification of industry in Brazil.

However, it is important to note that during most of this period (1929–1979), the country lived under the political authoritarianism of dictatorial
regimes. The concentration of income and wealth was a striking feature of these five decades. Only during the democratic period – which took place between 1945 and 1964, known as the golden age of developmentalism – was there a slight drop in the concentration of income among the richest. This “mini-leveling” that occurred during the democratic period “was completely reversed in the first decade of the dictatorship” (Souza 2018: 312).

In this new phase of the industrialization process in Brazil, which transformed the country’s economy and ended up aggravating political disputes within society, the immigrant labor that arrived to work in the industries “was of a new type, now of skilled and professional workers” and “lasted only for about two and a half decades” (Klein 1999: 27). Between 1950 and 1972, some 838,000 Europeans were subsidized by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to emigrate to the Americas, of which 338,000 were assimilated into Latin America.

With the European economic recovery, the creation of better-paying jobs, and the establishment of the social welfare system, thousands of workers made their way back in the hope that they could finally enjoy a better life in their own countries, which were now trying to recover from the ruins of war. As Klein (1999) shows, gradually, and due to the acceleration of the industrialization process, countries like Brazil and Argentina experienced a transition from European migration to Asian and inter-American migration. From 1960 onwards, these two countries experienced “the end of European immigration, which was replaced by migration from Asia and neighboring countries” (Klein 1999: 27).

In the early years of the 1960s, Brazil was experiencing a political effervescence whose slogans included agrarian and urban reforms, the right to education (including higher education), the struggle for equality and health, and the defense of national sovereignty. Under the rhetoric that these demands represented the advance of communism in the country, reactionary sectors of the ruling classes, contrary to an agenda of social justice that was appearing on the horizon, staged a civil–military coup that deposed President João Goulart in April 1964, beginning a period of terror that lasted until 1985. Once again, capitalism sacrificed popular democracy. The very brief democratic period in which the Brazilian state (1945–1964) had recognized the victories of workers had come to an end.

Even with the intensifying of repression by the military regime, which manifested in the persecution, torture, and forced exile of intellectuals, political leaders, workers, and indigenous people, as well as in the curtailment of press freedom and the free political organization of social and student movements, these segments continued to resist. The 1968 strike in Osasco (São Paulo state) is an example of this stubborn resistance. At the end of the 1970s, the eruption of the strikes in the ABC Paulista region brought new actors to the stage and strengthened the new unionism that contested the state unionism of the Vargas era (Sader 1988). The collective action of the ABC metalworkers encouraged
other movements around the country and opened the way for new forms of contesting the civil-military dictatorship.

On the other hand, at the international level, neoliberalism started to gain ground in the economic and social agenda. The restructuring of production was unfolding in the developed countries, bringing new social risks: structural unemployment, outsourcing, and flexible capital accumulation. In this context, the welfare state began to be strongly questioned by capital and capitalists. The most promising period of inequality reduction between 1945 and 1973 seemed to be coming to an end in the Northern countries.

Final remarks

In this chapter we have examined the transformation process of the Brazilian economy between the 1929 crisis and the oil shocks of the 1970s. We have specifically focused on the historical course that began with the coup of 1930, led by Getúlio Vargas, which overthrew the incumbent President Washington Luís. As we have shown, the Vargas government (1930–1945) was marked by the split with the agrarian–export accumulation pattern and the reorientation of the economy toward the urban–industrial axis. This action of the state was crucial to the country’s “development effort” manifesting through the creation of public companies and new policies and institutions in order to make the import substitution process viable.

The industrialization process driven by the Vargas administration was coupled with the migration of workers from other regions of the country toward the new dynamic centers of the economy. This large wave of workers also included millions of Europeans who, fleeing Nazi-fascist persecution, migrated to the Americas. Many of these immigrants, however, found, in Brazil, a restrictive migration policy implemented by the Estado Novo (1937–1945), aimed at preserving the whitening policy envisioned by the Brazilian ruling and intellectual elite. The eugenicist and racial theories that guided the construction of the nation also idealized the immigrants, classifying them as “desirable” or “undesirable.” With this, the Vargas government intended to “ensure” the arrival of a specific type of immigrant to integrate into the development plans and, at the same time, safeguard “the process of building the race and Brazilianness” (Carneiro 2018: 118).

With the defeat of Nazi fascism in 1945, Vargas was deposed. However, in January 1951, he returned to power through an electoral victory, remaining in office until 1954, when his mandate was abruptly interrupted. The second Vargas administration was characterized by the acceleration of the industrialization and urbanization processes that, under the rationale of national developmentalism, sought to break with the center–periphery model.

In the second half of the 1950s, the internationalization of the economy shifted the route hitherto taken by the ruling elite. Commencing in 1956, the government of Juscelino Kubitschek adopted a new pattern of accumulation; centered on the Plan of Goals, the incumbent president sought to overcome
the country’s backwardness by investing in infrastructure, agriculture, and education. But, as the Brazilian social and economic indicators show, these tasks are still pending in many areas.

Between 1950 and 1970, the immigrants’ profile was that of skilled workers and professionals (Klein 1999). However, with Europe in the process of post-war reconstruction, the migratory flow from European countries began to lose momentum and, beginning in the 1960s, the origin of immigrants shifted from Europe to Asia and America.

After the civil-military coup of 1964, the possibility of building a democratic country was interrupted. With the military remaining in power until 1985, the country endured a long period of regression, marked by truculence (violence, torture, and terror), by the deepening of social and income inequalities, as well as by unemployment and recession. However, very little is known, still, about this period of terror in Brazilian history. Only with the National Truth Commission (2011–2014), installed in 2011 during the Dilma Rousseff administration (2011–2016), was the country able, albeit only partially, to remove the veil of taboo that shrouded the crimes committed by the military regime. Although the Commission has managed to advance very timidly in confronting the “inconvenient truths,” it has certainly represented an important contribution that reveals the rawness of this period of history. While it restores the right to memory, it also faces resistance from the sectors of Brazilian society aligned with the dictatorial legacy.

The international crisis of the 1970s culminated in being an insurmountable challenge to Brazil’s economic dynamic, which led to a deepening of the recession process in the country. So much so that the years that followed were branded as an “economically lost decade.” Taking all of these factors into consideration, there is irrefutable evidence that, although the country generated considerable wealth, between 1930 and 1979, the majority of the population neither experienced nor had access to its benefits.

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Bibliography


5 Skills, genes and politics
Creating a profile for desirable immigrants in Brazil

Yannis G. S. Papadopoulos

Immigrants from agents of civilization to seditious elements

During Brazil’s colonial era, slave labor supplied the necessary workforce for the plantation economy, making mass settlement less of a priority. It wasn’t until the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, and in particular Brazil’s gaining of independence in 1822, that the government initiated a policy of attracting European settlers. During a period of massive transatlantic mobility from 1881 until 1930, a total of 3,964,300 immigrants settled in Brazil (Sanchez-Alborenoz 2014: 135; Sánchez Alonso 2007: 397). For over three decades, from 1850 to 1885, the number of immigrants gradually increased, peaking in 1914, and undergoing a period of stagnation during the interwar period, only to gather momentum again from the end of World War II until the late 1950s. Two issues that were to dominate Brazilian migration policy were the types of desirable immigrants and the boundaries that existed between state and the federal authorities’ jurisdiction over migration legislation. The question of race was explicitly or implicitly factored into all decisions concerning the selection of immigrants. As was the case with other immigration countries, there was a clear preference for European immigrants. Following independence, the Brazilian government looked upon state lands as “empty” and was in favor of European settlers over local people of color and indigenous populations, which were considered as “nomads and uncivilized” (Seyferth 2002: 119).

In contrast with the United States, Brazil did not introduce a ban on immigrants from Asia. However, the 1891 constitution encouraged immigrants of Latin culture (Italians, Spanish, Portuguese) to settle in the country (Salles 2007: 191). People from Southern Europe that faced discrimination in the United States and Australia, being regarded as racially inferior and unassimilable, were welcomed in Brazil not only as a welcome boost to the workforce, but also as settlers that would increase the percentage of white citizens over descendants of Africans, Indigenous and mestizos. Migrants from Southern Europe would contribute to strengthening links between Mediterranean countries and Brazil and would have a deep impact on the economy, society and culture, especially in the Southeast and the South of the country.

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Although the federal government regulated the number of immigrants that each province could receive, states had relative autonomy in immigration policy during the “Old Republic”, from 1889 to 1930 (de Oliveira 2011: 11). The chief states that took initiatives to attract immigrants were São Paulo, where coffee plantations owners sought cheap labor to substitute slaves, and the states of the South (Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul) that favored the creation of agricultural settlements in the sparsely populated interior (Hensel 2011: 288).

At the beginning of the 20th century, immigrants began to be perceived as potential enemies of the state – a menace to social order – and Brazil was to pass legislation that permitted the expulsion of seditious foreigners (de Oliveira 2011: 13). This conceptual transition from “immigrants” that could be integrated in Brazil and contribute to its development to inassimilable and potentially dangerous “foreigners” (alienígenas) signaled the beginning of a period of restrictions in human mobility after World War I (Zago de Moraes 2014: 153). During the interwar period, the regulation of migration flows remained for the most part within the jurisdiction of the states’ administrations. At a time when most major receiving countries were adopting restrictive migration policies to curtail the entrance of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, South America was being presented in international forums as a continent that could absorb the “surplus population” from the Old World. Migration was viewed as a factor that could contribute to the overall development of Latin American receiving countries. It was in this fashion that the debate concerning the migration–development nexus was conducted at the international forums as the newly founded international organizations, such as ILO and the League of Nations, introduced ideas about the regulation of migration (Thomas 1927: 705). These ideas also reflected the priorities of the Brazilian federal government that favored organized land settlement instead of spontaneous migration (Ramos 2006: 91–98).

During the 1930s terms of office of Getúlio Vargas, which were initially democratic but would later become authoritarian, Brazil adopted a more restrictive migration policy that was reflected in the 1934 nationality quota system that mirrored the 1921 and 1924 US laws (Koifman 2002: 103–105; Truzzi 2003: 236–247). The main aim of its policy was to control the perceived menace by unassimilable racial (Japanese, German and Italian) clusters (quistos raciais) in Southern Brazil and exclude Jews, Roma and communists (Seyferth 1997: 95). Jews were considered not only racially inferior but also potentially seditious and essentially unwilling to adopt a national project, therefore making their assimilation impossible. These policies were justified as an effort to preserve order, enhance social and national cohesion as well as protect Brazilian urban workers that faced competition from immigrants (Ramos 2004: 166–172). In 1938 the Council of Immigration and Colonization (Conselho de Imigração e Colonização–CIC) was founded, an inter-ministerial agency with responsibility for coordinating state migration policy (Vainer 2000: 23). The priorities of the new policy, influenced by Nazi eugenics discourse, was
the exclusion of immigrants that would be of no value to national development (Carneiro 2001: 90).

**Eugenicist discourse and development priorities during the post–World War II period**

Brazil’s participation alongside the Allied powers in World War II and the liberalization that led to the elections of 1945 resulted in a relative change in the immigration policy. Although hoping to receive more immigrants, diplomats and civil servants applied the same restrictive racial criteria as during the previous period. During the post-war period the growing influence of the United States, the Cold War and Brazil’s participation in international organizations created a new context that would have an impact on human mobility. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America-ECLA advocated that mass displacements during and after the war, as well as unemployment in Western and Southern Europe, would provide overseas countries, Brazil among them, with the workforce that was deemed necessary for their economic development (La Cava 1999: 66). In public discourse, “underpopulation” and the inadequacy of local workers were presented as impediments to progress.

The xenophobic climate and the fear of “unmeltable ethnics” of the previous decade subsided and was replaced with the adoption of “noble eugenic principles” which viewed Europeans as a constructive element that would enhance the “racial perfectioning and ennoblement” of Brazil (Vianna 1946: 38). Until the early 1950s, the immigrants that were viewed as being ideal were “Latins, Nordics and Slavs . . . Italian, German, Polish and Dutch”, corresponding to the archetype of a “European of white race” (Poggi 1946: 165). A Brazilian diplomat allayed fears concerning ethnic clusters by noting that in the past, “these heterogeneous elements melted with a surprising rapidity” and stressed the importance of the contribution of European immigrants to the whitening of the population, observing that “it was a fortunate circumstance for Brazil that they came in sufficiently large numbers to counteract three centuries of African influence”. Advocates of the necessity of mass immigration underlined that “foreigners had a moral, social, economic and political function” and were supposed to serve as “an example and a stimulus for the large number of natives, that with apparent apathy, remain distant from the ideas of progress” (Mazzoni 1951: 117). The exclusion of “Asians”, “negros” and “mestizos” was justified by medical research in the United States and by the observation that most people hospitalized in Brazil were not white (Poggi 1946: 172–173). These declarations reflected an internal colonialist mentality that considered black and “mestizo” Brazilians as racially inferior and unable to contribute to national development. In this context, at least in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the racial profile of European immigrants was more important than their skills (La Cava 1999: 63–64; Peres 1997: 87). Nevertheless, the debate about the contribution of immigrants to racial improvement and
economic development and the dangers they could pose for public health, social cohesion and political stability continued.

The selection of immigrants by federal authorities, which was based more on racial criteria and less on specific skills, met with opposition from state government officials that had regained a relative liberty in advancing their own immigration policy in the early post-war period by giving priority to economic planning (La Cava 1999: 81). The governors of Paraná, Bento Munhoz da Rocha and Goiás, Jerônimo Coimbra Bueno concurred in efforts to attract agricultural settlers from Europe (Dutra e Silva & Bell 2018: 211). The purpose of their projects was twofold: develop “idle lands”, and substitute extensive agriculture, with a lower yield per hectare, with intensive agriculture and maximize productivity of basic food staples, such as wheat and dairy products. Although the size of the land parcels awarded to the settlers was relatively small, they were encouraged to form cooperatives in order to practice monoculture of market crops (Ramos 2016: 209). In the post-war modernization context, immigrant cooperatives were seen as a way to increase productivity and counteract the idleness and lack of innovative spirit of many traditional big landowners (Damilakou & Venturas 2015: 301).

After World War II, the ideas concerning global migration regulation, based on the priorities of both emigration and immigration countries that started to float during the interwar period, were consolidated with the founding of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1947 and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in 1951. ICEM, an initiative of the United States, was based on the premise that emigration should contribute not only to solving Europe’s “overpopulation” by facilitating the orderly migration of large numbers of displaced, unemployed or underemployed people from Western Europe, but also to the creation of new economic opportunities in developing countries, supposedly lacking human capital. Human mobility during the post-war period was an integral part of a new globalized economic system, under the hegemony of the United States, that favored investments and the installation of multinational companies in peripheral regions (da Cruz Paiva 2008: 3). Liberal economists such as Eugenio Gudin and the Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) shared this view and considered foreign investments as necessary for the acceleration of economic progress (Bielschowsky 2021: 64–66). Many policy planners in Brazil believed that skilled immigrants would play an important role in industrial growth.

Nevertheless, the efforts to stimulate immigration of skilled workers and farmers through ICEM did not produce the expected results. In 1954 the National Institute for Immigration and Colonization (Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização–INIC), an authority with increased autonomy, replaced the Council of Immigration and Colonization. INIC revised the idea of giving priority to attracting European agricultural settlers as a necessary measure to counteract the failure of previously established rural settlements. The newly founded institute assumed responsibility for selecting refugees and immigrants and creating mixed settlements of Brazilian and foreign farmers in
the interior, in order to avoid ethnic clusters (Azzi 1955: 5; Pereira Dos Santos 2017: 131).

Although policy that stimulated mass immigration and excluded specific groups based on eugenic criteria was gradually abandoned, prejudice continued to influence civil servants and diplomats even during the 1960s (La Cava 1999: 81). A foremost priority of the new national colonization program was to make agricultural settlements a financial success by placing greater emphasis on planning and efficient management (Castelo Branco 1955: 9). After 1953, the number of Japanese immigrants choosing Brazil as a destination began to grow. In contrast to Europeans, they quickly adapted to the tropical climate, making it easier for them to introduce new agricultural techniques to the arid Northeast and contribute to the settlement of the interior and Amazonia (Sakurai 2002: 8). At the same time, the necessity for skilled workers was partially covered through the National Service for Industrial Training (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial – SENAI) (Colistete 2001: 40). At the beginning of the 1960s, the new immigration policy favored recruiting, exclusively, highly skilled workers that were not available in Brazil (Damilakou & Venturas 2015: 306). As we will see, the Brazilian immigration policy after World War II was based on three pillars.

Resettlement of refugees in Brazil after World War II

The humanitarian crisis triggered by the massive displacement of populations during World War II led to the Allies creating the United Nations Administration for Assistance to Refugees (United Nations Refugee Relief Agency – UNRRA) in 1943. During the presidency of Enrico Gaspar Dutra (1946–1951), Brazil signed an agreement with UNRRA pledging to receive 5,000 families of displaced persons (Salles 2007: 201). In 1946 UNRRA was replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) that introduced a “global system of humanitarian-based population transfer” to relieve Western European countries of the burden of displaced persons and avert economic, social and political unrest from the continuing presence of those who were considered idle people (Von Holleuffer 2002: 133). Latin American countries decided to accept a share of those refugees in the hope that they would consequently contribute to their economic development by bringing new skills and agricultural techniques. These skills were also combined with a specific racial profile. The Brazilian Decree 7,967 of 1945 outlined the “need to preserve and develop in the ethnic composition of the population the most suitable characteristics of their European descent”.

But there was no agreement among politicians, civil servants, sociologists and doctors on the eventual impact of receiving refugees. A memorandum by CIC outlined the qualities of the Displaced Persons (DPs):

energy, strength of spirit, adaptability to new circumstances, rusticity and physical resistance, survival capacity, manual and mechanical ability, great
industriousness and application, cleanliness, habit of order and discipline, morality, strong feeling of attachment to the family, fervent religiosity, courage in the face of adversity and a fundamentally strong anticommunist spirit.5

This list incorporated desirable physical characteristics, skills and cultural habits that reflected the priorities of the immigration policy. Moreover, the settlement of refugees from Eastern Europe with the preferred political profile was considered a means of “inoculating” the population against communist ideas.

Enthusiastic diplomats endeavored to streamline the channeling process in the hope of securing the largest possible number of refugees, and later immigrants, for Brazil’s development needs, but their efforts were met with resistance from the federal and local authorities that not only questioned the selection criteria, (refugees’ skills and health condition) but also went on to set terms to control the increase of the flow, based on assessment of integration and the contribution of previous contingents.6 Maurício Campos de Medeiros, psychiatrist and health minister from 1955 to 1958, advocated that DPs were a “legion of dysfunctional, neuritics, beings emotionally traumatized that would never be able to readapt to the conditions of a mentally healthy life” (Medeiros 1947: 75). This shift in immigration policy, which hitherto had favored Italian or Spanish settlers, regarding them as being more easily assimilable, was to reverse the priorities of previous decades and cultivate a change in perception that would eventually lead to the DPs being perceived by many as a menace to social and cultural cohesion (Fischel de Andrade 2005: 88).

Those in favor of receiving refugees prevailed, and resulted in Brazil sending a delegation of the Council of Immigration and Colonization (CIC) to Europe in order to select the refugees and migrants that corresponded to the profile of the workforce required by the Brazilian economy. During IRO’s mandate Brazil received 29,000 Displaced Persons that were resettled mainly in the states of São Paulo, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul (Von Holleuffer 2002: 140–141; Fischel de Andrade 2005: 88; Pacífico 2010: 72). According to Geraldo de Menezes, director of the CIC, priority was given to farmers that would colonize the underpopulated regions of the interior as well as to qualified workers and technicians that would contribute to the industrialization project (Andrade 2011: 76; Von Holleuffer 2002: 154). The most highly desirable candidates were from the Baltics, followed by Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and Yugoslavs; while similar to the interwar period, Brazil was still unwilling to accept Jews (Andrade 2011: 78). Although officials rejected the Nazi racist discourse, they used political and economic arguments advocating that Jews “were obsessed with the problem of Palestine” and their “socio-economic value” justified their exclusion (Menezes Côrtes 1947: 6). Physicians, on the other hand, used a pseudo-scientific discourse suggesting that Jews “suffered from endogenous psychoses, dystonia and hereditary diseases” due to intermarriage (Araujo 1946: 108). Not until 1953, as a result of the participation in ICEM, did Brazil lift the restrictions on Jewish refugees and immigrants and sign an agreement with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) which regulated spontaneous
immigration with sufficient capital and skilled workers, and included provision for family reunification. In 1952 Brazil signed the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and was subsequently invited by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to join the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Advisory Committee. To execute their mandate of resettling refugees, UNHCR was assisted by “voluntary organizations” such as the refugee service of the World Council of Churches (WCC) (Bastos de Avila 1964) and international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). In South America the WCC refugee service had been operating since October 1952, with its Latin American headquarters based in Rio de Janeiro. Between 1952 and 1959, the CIC helped around 5,000 refugees to migrate to Brazil, giving priority to their settlement in agricultural colonies (Bastos de Avila 1964: 381).

**Migration through ICEM**

A distinguishing feature of the post-war period was the efforts made by the United States to regulate migration flows through intergovernmental cooperation. The Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICCME) was created in December 1951 as a new intergovernmental body, outside the UN framework. Within a few months, the organization was renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), and due to the Cold War priorities of the United States, its life was extended. ICEM’s mandate covered refugees and displaced persons, as well as persons who wanted to emigrate from Europe. ICEM was given responsibility over transporting refugees and migrants, but it also had to assist with health examinations, vocational courses, language training, streamlining of procedures before and after the journey, information services and guidance. The new organization had the dual aims of relieving Europe from its surplus population and contributing, through the influx of workforce, to the development of countries in the periphery. In this sense, it was a step forward in an effort to integrate center and periphery economies in the Western world (da Cruz Paiva 2008: 10). With the creation of PICMME/ICEM, the migration–development nexus was highlighted as a key political issue with a broader goal. The United States agreed to cover expenses for the transfer of immigrants to Brazil, in what was termed the “triangular scheme”, with the aim of diverting immigration to other countries. Within this framework, ICEM planned to settle massively displaced groups and “surplus population” in South America, although the projects that finally materialized did not match initial enthusiastic expectations (da Cruz Paiva 2008: 10). Immigrants from Southern Europe were encouraged to settle in South America, and indeed, Brazil was a member of the new organization since its inception. During the 1950s Getúlio Vargas and his successor as president Juscelino Kubitschek took advantage of the opportunities offered by ICEM to secure, among others, an increased and more streamlined flow of immigrants.
Between 1952 and 1959, ICEM transferred some 245,000 immigrants to South America, 80,000 of whom were workmen and the other 165,000 dependents (Bastos De Avila 1964: 238). Brazil received 89,000 immigrants through ICEM, the majority of whom (around 60%) were farmers, industrial and urban workers as well as refugees from Eastern Europe. However, ICEM plans for a mass immigration wave from Southern Europe to Brazil, based on “similar characteristics”, were not well grounded in a realistic assessment of either the immigrants’ skills or of working conditions and salaries in Brazil.9 It appears that ICEM and its main funder, the United States, set as a priority to relieve Europe of the burden of the unemployed and refugees – without, however, giving any real consideration to their reception and integration in South America (La Cava 1999: 81, 93). The United States, Canada and Australia, unlike South American and Southern European countries, did not wish to invest in what was termed “migration services”, that is, in projects whose purpose was to facilitate the reception, placement and integration of migrants (da Cruz Paiva 2008: 10; Parsanoglou & Tourgeli 2017). During the second half of the 1950s ICEM and Southern European governments invested in the training of technicians, and ICEM introduced the Pre-Placing Labor Program (Mão de Obra Pre-Colocada-MOPC) that would guarantee immigrants jobs in specific companies.10 Few were willing to participate in this scheme, as even semi-skilled workers had the option of settling in Northern Europe or the Commonwealth countries that offered better remuneration and living conditions. Despite their small number, foreign skilled immigrant workers still represented a considerable percentage in specific industrial sectors (Colistete 2001: 15, 43).

The number of refugees that ICEM transferred to Brazil was also small. From 1952 until 1969, about 5,000 Russian refugees from China had immigrated to Brazil. Many of them settled in the state of Paraná in lands purchased by the World Council of Churches (WCC) (Peterson 2012: 331; Ruseishvili 2018).11 After the suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, the Brazilian government received about 2,000 Hungarian refugees, giving priority to those who had family in Brazil.12 Voluntary organizations contributed to their integration, but refugees complained that the information they had received in Austria relating to salaries and the cost of living in Brazil did not correspond to reality, as was the case of immigrants from other countries.13

The question of bilateral migration agreements and the role of voluntary associations

Many diplomats and civil servants were skeptical about the benefits of Brazilian participation in ICEM and resented the loss of control in migration policy. Through bilateral agreements, Brazil aimed at maintaining some semblance of autonomy in the selection of immigrants. The federal government signed an immigration agreement with Italy but was reluctant to sign similar agreements with Greece and Portugal.14
Italy and Brazil signed a bilateral migration agreement in 1949, and it was ratified in 1950, but the ensuing increase in the flow of Italian immigrants resulted mainly from ICEM funding of the journey after 1952. The Brazilian authorities considered Italians, both farmers and skilled workers, as the ideal immigrants that would contribute to “national development” (Mazzoni 1951: 120). But this positive evaluation was based more on the impact of the massive migration wave at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, and on their racial profile, rather than on an assessment of a way they could be integrated in the post-war Brazilian economy (La Cava 1999: 81, 93). Without adequate training, many urban migrants lacked the skills required by Brazilian industry and could not be absorbed into the job market.

Projects for the mass settlement of Italian farmers in Brazil also failed to produce the expected results. The Italian government favored rural emigration as a measure for alleviating tensions that had the potential to generate social unrest, since the number of landless peasants had remained high after the limited post-war land reform. Brazil aimed at attracting both rural workers and farmers that would participate in organized colonization schemes. The coffee plantation owners favored the settlement of Italian farmers, but the low salaries and bad living conditions led the Italians to repatriate or resettle in São Paulo, just as had happened at the beginning of the twentieth century, (La Cava 1999: 75, 122–123).

Both farmers’ cooperatives and politicians in Italy were enthusiastic about the prospects being offered by Brazil, but the Italian Credit Institute for Italians Abroad (Istituto Nazionale di Credito per il Lavoro Italiano all’Estero; ICLE) warned that Brazil’s interior lacked the necessary infrastructure and that without funding by the United States, rural colonization was not advisable. ICLE carried out a number of surveys to investigate the possibility of land settlement in South America and participated in the founding of the Company of Migration and Colonization in Brazil (Companhia de Migração e Colonização no Brasil). With the exception of settlements in the states of Bahia and São Paulo, the projects failed due to poor planning, a lack in financial assistance and distances from transport hubs (La Cava 1999: 119). The Institute was to receive severe criticism in the press and during parliamentary debate over its financial mismanagement, amounting to accusations of corruption and lack of transparency in land acquisition and for the living conditions in São Paulo plantations.

The Brazilian government also had a positive opinion of the Dutch and, motivated by the relative success of previous settlements, hoped to attract more immigrants from the Netherlands after World War II. At that time many politicians and demographers in the Netherlands considered population growth as a potential source of social unrest and viewed migration as a safety valve for pressure relief. The Dutch government favored immigration to Canada and Australia and considered Brazil as an option only “should the countries of the Commonwealth become less accessible” (Haveman 1951: 4). A bilateral agreement was signed in 1951 and the Dutch government facilitated agricultural settlement in Brazil, while PICMME/ICEM was to cover travel expenses.
(Papadopoulos & Kourachanis 2015: 165; Acordo de Imigração 1952). Due to a successful selection of locations, detailed planning of the settlement, preparation of the immigrants, continuous funding by the Dutch government as well as support from earlier Dutch settlers to Brazil and solidarity between the settlers, the colonies in Paraná and São Paulo gradually managed to become self-sufficient. The funding came mainly from Dutch sources, since Brazilian authorities offered the land and covered the travel expenses; however, it did not provide the financial assistance promised. During the second half of the 1950s, the Dutch economy managed to absorb the available labor force and the need to seek, at any cost, available land to settle Dutch farmers was no longer a priority.

A third group of particular interest to Brazil were the Germans, whose unwillingness to assimilate was a major problem for the Brazilian authorities and was exacerbated by the severity of the wartime measures they were subjected to, the prohibition of the German language, appropriation of German firms and the expulsion of suspected members of the Nazi party. Brazil did, however, regard them as racially superior and admired their working ethos and their progressive spirit. Following World War II, Brazil prioritized attracting German skilled workers and farmers that would either obtain private plots of land, work as agricultural workers in estates or participate in the founding of colonies. But Brazil and West Germany had diverging priorities in migration policy.

Brazilian diplomats were frustrated that West German authorities were unwilling to facilitate the emigration of ethnic German refugees. Despite the difficulties that both Germans and ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe faced in war-ravaged Germany, few were willing to migrate to Brazil. The West German government did not encourage the migration of skilled workers, which they considered necessary for the reconstruction of their own country. Furthermore, technicians that were interested in migrating to Brazil were hesitant to do so due to the lack of a Brazilian service that would provide orientation and employment guarantees. Given the intransigence of the German government to encourage the emigration of skilled workers, the Brazilian embassy in Bonn repeatedly suggested selecting technicians from among the East European refugees stranded in camps across Germany with the help of UNHCR, but it appears that the Brazilian government was not overly enthusiastic about this scheme.

Moreover, the West German government considered that it would be more profitable to prioritize the absorption of unemployed refugee farmers in local industry than to finance land settlement in Brazil. They also believed that funding land settlement in Brazil would be a long-term endeavor and they were not willing to invest the funds necessary for the development of agricultural colonies. The government would accept only a reimbursement of the cost of agricultural machinery exported from Germany with products from the proposed German settlements in Brazil. West Germany, in this respect, favored the founding of agricultural settlements only if they would be oriented to
the demands of the German market, while Brazil gave precedence to gaining self-sufficiency in staple products that it was forced to import. Brazil hoped, at that same point in time, to attract the workforce it needed as well as foreign investment to guarantee the smooth integration and success of their land settlement projects. As the Brazilian ambassador in Bonn underlined, in contrast to the commonwealth countries, Brazil did not have at their disposal the funds to guarantee the “comfort and security” of German agricultural settlers. Due to incompatible views, West Germany acquiesced only to a family reunification program through ICEM.

Concluding remarks

Starting from the independence of Brazil and right up until the 1960s, a decade that marked a sharp decline in immigration numbers, there were three distinct phases in migration policy. During the century that followed independence, and especially after the abolition of slavery, the government favored mass migration of Europeans with the dual objective of acquiring the workforce necessary for coffee plantations and the establishment of new agricultural settlements and moreover to increase the percentage of white citizens. During the 1930s, the first Getúlio Vargas government reversed the liberal migration policy, resulting in a change in government and social perception of refugees and immigrants from specific groups that would view them as a menace to national security. In the post-war period, optimism concerning the prospects of the economy led the democratic governments of Getúlio Vargas and Juscelino Kubitschek to favor the settlement of agricultural workers and skilled technicians, deemed necessary to advance the “national development” strategy.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the natural increase of the population led the Brazilian government to reconsider the necessity of importing a workforce from Europe and to prioritize the immigration of a limited number of highly skilled workers for specific industrial sectors. The governments following the 1964 civil-military coup put an emphasis on prohibiting the entrance of seditious elements that would be a menace to social order (Hamid 2012: 97; Moreira 2012: 101). Nevertheless, they continued the policy of attracting highly skilled immigrants. In the 1960s, the increased demand of the Northern and Western European countries for workers, coupled with the adoption of a more liberal immigration policy by the United States, resulted in a reduction in the number of European immigrants choosing Brazil as a destination.

Brazilian authorities after World War II overestimated the capacity of the country’s economy to attract and absorb immigrants from a war-ravaged Europe. The priority given to skilled workers and farmers was not to be matched by the necessary infrastructure. Furthermore, the working and living conditions Brazil offered became a source of frustration to both refugees and immigrants. Although it did manage to attract a few highly skilled and well-remunerated workers, most of the desirable immigrants from Northern and Western Europe during the 1940s and 1950s preferred to settle in the British Commonwealth
countries and in the United States. Conversely, many of the immigrants, mainly from Southern Europe, who had immigrated to Brazil because they were not welcome in North America and Oceania, either returned to their homeland or migrated subsequently to countries that offered better working and living conditions, when migration legislation there became more liberal. Those who stayed in Brazil contributed to the development of the economy, but often in activities not envisaged by the local authorities. Indeed, in retrospect, there are many instances that pay testament to the value of spontaneous migration and the initiatives it generated, and consequently put into question the often-stringent selection criteria that were implemented and the ambitious post-war global migration management planning, as a whole.

Notes

1 The Decree No 528 (September 26, 1890) that founded the “Serviço de introdução e de localização dos imigrantes na República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil” (Immigrant Introduction and Localization Service of the United States of Brazil) established the rules for the selection of immigrants, excluding people from Asia and Africa (Schwarz 1993: 232). The ban was revoked by parliament in 1892, but the prejudice against specific groups, especially the Japanese, persisted in the following decades (Sakurai 2002: 6).


3 See Chapter 4 on Brazilian development policies in this volume.


9 See Chapters 1 and 2 in this volume on emigration from Spain and Greece, respectively.


11 Records relating to the IRO and the DPC 1944–1952–Box 4, NARA, Washington, D.C.


14 See Chapters 2 (Greece) and 8 (Portugal) on emigration from these countries in this volume.
Folder 45.187, Migration agreement, Archive of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Brasília.


Alves de Souza, Carlos. “Síntese das atividades do ICLE antes e depois da guerra”, May 12, 1951, Ref. No. COI/DPo/558(96), Folder 41.595 Italia, Archive of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Brasília.


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Yannis G. S. Papadopoulos


The role of sociology in the interpretation of migration to Brazil and its national impact in the postwar period

Tânia Tonhati, Márcio de Oliveira and Leonardo Cavalcanti

Introduction

The history of sociology in Brazil began in the 1940s. At that time, there is evidence of the institutionalization and systematization of the discipline, primarily in basic education, and later at higher education levels (Handfas 2011). Concurrently, the large flows of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese immigration to Brazil had diminished, while Japanese and Syrian-Lebanese immigration remained strong but without reaching the numbers of the aforementioned groups. During the Second World War (1939–1945), the arrival of immigrants in Brazil practically ceased, as was the case worldwide, and in the post-war period it never returned to previous levels. In the early 1950s, some groups were still arriving, but the number continuously decreased up until the end of the century. Only from 2010 onwards do we see a reversal of this trend, with Brazil receiving immigrants once again; however, this time the migratory flows were from countries of the so-called Global South. The sociological debates at a national level reflected the changes in Brazilian migratory contexts. The theme – migration – was constantly highlighted, initially, as an important component of the formation of Brazilian society, in the period before and after the war, and more recently as part of Brazilian diversity.

This chapter, then, seeks to contribute to the book’s discussion on migration and development in Southern Europe and South America, by shedding light on the historical development of migration inside and outside Brazil while focusing on the post-war period. To do so, we have relied on the contributions of Brazilian sociological debates on the theme. The chapter is divided into two general sections, as our purpose is to present two distinct periods in which migration was approached by Brazilian sociologists in a different manner. The first section covers the historical time span from 1940 to the end of the 1970s. Here, we address the consequences of European, Syrian-Lebanese and Asian immigration to Brazil, through two seminal Brazilian sociologists, Gilberto Freyre and Florestan Fernandes. They were both interested in the extent of the role of migration in the construction of Brazilian society. The former was more concerned about the impact of migration on the formation of the Brazilian identity, while the latter focused on the potential of migration in the context of
the advent and consolidation of a capitalist society in Brazil. While their works on migration are not the most well-known, they are especially important as they form the basis for the sociological discussion on migration, for the period mentioned.

In addition, the chapter briefly examines the changes in migration in Brazil, by focusing on a second period, the years 1980–2008 and from 2010 onwards. These periods represent two very distinct aspects of the topic in the sociological debate. The first one, 1980–2008, represents a period of increased emigration for Brazil, and the sociological debate was mainly conducted by Brazilian researchers living abroad, who in their everyday lives witnessed the increase and formation of Brazilian communities overseas. The sociological turn regarding migration issues at that time was to understand the motivations and social relations created by Brazilian migrants. More recently, from 2010 onwards, there has been another sociological shift regarding migration issues in Brazil. Nowadays, the concern is to comprehend the nature of the increase of Latin American flows to Brazil, particularly the arrival and settlement of Haitians and Venezuelans. Presently, several Brazilian sociologists, along with other social scientists, are researching for more clues regarding this new migration scenario. The debates are no longer about the interrelationship of migration and the construction of a national identity or capitalist society, but about how Brazil is involved in global mobility dynamics, and how it can include diversity in its policies and daily life.

The 1940–1970s: the ethnic-community studies (Gilberto Freyre) and the perspective of classes (Florestan Fernandes)

The series of decrees and resolutions enacted by Brazilian authorities between the end of the Second World War and the 1950s (some of them established with specific countries) that regulated the entry of foreigners indicates that migrant inflows to the country continued at this time. On the one hand, the Quotas Law of 1934 and Decree-Law n. 406/1938, whose purpose was to defend the interests of the national workers over the foreign ones, were still in place. On the other hand, at that time there was an abandonment of the old hygienist and population settlement policies (Stepan 1991), which had been promoted since the imperial period, in favor of new policies that aimed to attract skilled immigrant workers, in order to promote the economic development of specific sectors (Salles 2002). Brazil's involvement with international organizations such as ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration) was another significant element that shows how migration issues continued to be important to the country (Paiva 2000).

Moreover, in the 1950s, the Immigration and Colonization Council, through the 1676 Resolution (1950), abolished the entrance quotas for Spanish, Italian and Portuguese immigrants. In the early 1950s, Brazil had registered the entry of approximately 600,000 immigrants, a volume much higher than in the 1940s and equally higher than the number of entries in the 1930s (332,768).
However, this increased volume would decline over the course of the decade, year by year, from 72,248 in 1954 to 44,520 in 1958, indicating the trend for the coming decades (Azeredo 2008; IBGE 1960).

In parallel to this new migratory reality, the central themes for Brazilian social sciences at the end of the Second World War refer to the dilemmas inherited from the colonial period. On the one hand, it questions the degree of integration of the Afro-Brazilian population into national society and analyzes the processes of assimilation of indigenous populations and ethnic groups. On the other hand, the debate revolves around the issue of industrial development and modernization, whose background is the overcoming of the country’s so-called agricultural and mineral vocation and chronic underdevelopment. The issue of development (or underdevelopment) was largely discussed by sociologists in Brazil, who created the Theory of Dependency (Furtado 1966; Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

In order to analyze the way of life of Afro-Brazilian, indigenous and ethnic communities (including immigrant groups), the sociological approach relied on concepts such as assimilation, acculturation and integration. These parameters were largely employed by American sociologists, in the 1950s and 1960s and widely shared by Brazilian sociologists and anthropologists such as Freyre (1940), Emílio Willems (1946) and Queiroz (1950), among others.

Although the bulk of Brazilian sociological work, focused on issues of how Brazil could overcome its colonial shackles as well as its social, economic and cultural delays, debates on the impact of immigration on the country were still taking place. Two of Brazil’s most eminent sociologists, Freyre and Fernandes, have shed light on the topic of immigration and have provided us with important insights into it. Their analysis, even now, has an interesting and useful analytical potential for gaining an understanding of the dynamics that formed Brazilian society and especially of the role of migration within that context.

**Gilberto Freyre (1900–1981) and the ethnic-communities studies**

Gilberto Freyre was elected deputy in the Constitutional Assembly, assembled for the purpose of drafting the new and democratic Brazilian constitution, definitively putting an end to the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship (1930–1945).

Freyre addressed the issue of immigrants at various times during debates in the Constitutional Assembly between December 1945 and September 1946, when he defended the bill proposed by Deputy Aureliano Leite, in which the right for naturalization should be extended to Portuguese immigrant residents, differentiating them from other immigrants. Freyre went further and proposed extending Brazilian nationality to Portuguese immigrants, taking into account the cultural similarities and linguistic kinship between Brazil and Portugal and the importance of the arrival of 1.5 million Portuguese immigrants to Brazil in the 20th century. The idea was sensitive because, if implemented, it would totally change the sense of citizenship and nationality of the Portuguese immigrants. In fact, if it was transformed into a legal provision in the Constitution of
Brazil, the Portuguese residing in the country would no longer be immigrants but full citizens, solving an imbroglio that had arisen during the Second World War (Santos 2008).

The project of extension of Brazilian nationality was mainly aimed at immigrant Portuguese citizens because, as Freyre stated, they were not considered foreigners by the Brazilian people. In addition, they shared the same language and many cultural behaviors with Brazilians. Freyre had already imagined the creation of a “neo-Portuguese” community or “Luso-tropical civilization” that would spread from Asia to the Americas (Freyre *apud* Chacon 1994).

At that point in time, Freyre saw two of his most central sociological theses transformed into constitutional provisions, namely: (1) the Brazilian social formation with a demographic, linguistic and Portuguese cultural base; and (2) the “adaptive capacity of the Portuguese citizen”, whose greatest achievement was Brazilian society itself. He argued that the Portuguese had proved their adaptability around the world, as Portugal had created colonies in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The Portuguese immigrant could and should contain, in Brazil, the denationalizing advance of “neo-Brazilians”, that is, of citizens descending from other immigrant groups. It was not just a matter of privileging Portuguese immigrants with legal safeguards, but of setting the standard of Portuguese Brazilianness, in which a supposed threat was weighed due to the strong presence of other immigrants and their descendants living in small and isolated areas, mainly the Germanics.

The idea of extending Brazilian nationality only to Portuguese immigrants was not embraced by the Constitutional Assembly of 1946; only the bill proposed by Aureliano Leite was passed. In fact, it did not succeed because the profile of the Brazilian people had changed, especially in the states of so-called Southern Brazil, which effectively hosted approximately 70% of the entire flow of European migration which had arrived in Brazil between 1890 and 1920 (Oliveira 2017a).

Freyre’s belief in “Luso-tropical civilization” and his struggle against supposed threats to Luso-Brazilian culture, in particular from Germanic immigrant groups, were part of a vision of Brazilian cultural identity, in which all immigrants and their descendants should be assimilated to Luso-Brazilianity. Freyre (1940) had gathered evidence of the assimilative capacity of the Portuguese culture during his trip to the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where he had noticed the “Brazilianization of European colonists”. In addition, from his passage through the city of Blumenau (state of Santa Catarina), a settlement founded by German immigrants, Freyre (1940: 36) observed that the “walking of the people of Blumenau is no longer German: it is already Brazilian”. These findings led him to support the assimilation and integration theses, and even agree to the imposition of the Luso-Brazilian culture on immigrants.

The vision of assimilation adopted by Freyre can also be found in the work of other sociologists, for example, Oliveira Vianna (1973). Nevertheless, it was his work and political engagement that resulted in the legitimizing of the assimilation perspective and its impact on policymaking, which in some cases, forbid
German, Swiss and Polish, among other groups, to speak their language and to have their religion (Protestant) and their national dress. Therefore, by proposing the unrestricted extension of Brazilian citizenship rights to Portuguese citizens, Freyre encompassed the idea that Portuguese immigrants should be legally considered a special category of foreigners, totally distinct from nationals from countries like Italy, Spain, Germany and Poland. The constitutional bill supported by Freyre was not approved, but the assimilationist perspective of the ethnic-communities into a “Lusophone cultural Brazilian” society prevailed in the national imagination in reference to its own identity formation.

Thus, up to the middle 1950s, immigration in Brazil was analyzed through the lens of assimilation of the ethnic communities. It would change when Brazilian sociologists abandoned such ideas and turned their focus to understanding the country’s entry into the capitalist era. By that time, the mainstream sociological discussion was no longer concerned with identifying the elements which constituted the formation of the Brazilian identity but was anxiously sifting through the facts which aided the formation of the Brazilian capitalist society. Of course, immigration was considered part of this process. The work of Florestan Fernandes is essential for an understanding of such a marked shift in orientation.

Florestan Fernandes (1920–1995) and the perspective of classes

As we mentioned earlier, the movement of large spontaneous migrations to Brazil had been diminishing from the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, it was still relevant to understand what had happened to the immigrants and their descendants, who since the 1870s had arrived in Brazil and settled mainly in the southern states of the country, especially in the state of São Paulo (Oliveira 2017b).

It is precisely during this period, between the 1940s and early 1960s, that the most significant analytical shift in the history of Brazilian sociology took place, from ethnic–community studies to a class perspective and the general theme of development. The work of Florestan Fernandes reflects this epistemic shift. From the 1960s onwards, Fernandes abandoned his research on migration in favor of issues that seemed more fundamental to Brazilian society at the time – racial issues, class society and the bourgeois revolution – which effectively marked not only his career, but also the history of sociology in Brazil. Despite the author’s thematic choices, the abandonment of the ethnic perspective coincided with the growing significance that the racial and developmental issues were slowly assuming in the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, between an ethnic focus on Brazilian society or an approach from a class or racial standpoint, the second option was much more attractive. His focus was not only on the social and racial inequalities bequeathed by slavery and colonialism, but also on the trajectory of sociology in the Latin American continent and by institutions such as FLACSO (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) and CLACSO (Latin American Council of Social Sciences).
Regarding the epistemological shift made by Fernandes, it is important to consider three examples on his work: firstly, his two articles on Syrian-Lebanese immigration and, secondly, an article on immigration and race relationships. In 1956, Fernandes gave a conference at the Alepo club located in the city of São Paulo, and published in the same year. In this article, Fernandes states that emigrating does not mean cutting ties with the society of origin, whose reality follows the social practices of immigrants. However, these ties were not permanent. As a proof of this, he highlighted the value of remittances, which decreased as integration consolidated. This allows him to present the concept of acculturation, which he explains as the process of “Brazilianization of pioneer immigrants” (Fernandes 2010).

Ten years after this first article, Fernandes returned to the subject in another conference titled “Brazil and the Arab World”. He wrote, then, an article for the “Opening Week of Arab Studies”. At that moment, Fernandes mentioned a certain tendency in sociology to emphasize the “positive contribution of immigrants to national societies”. The novelty here is the mention of the urban and commercial traits of the Syrian-Lebanese immigration, very different from the Italian immigrant workers or small rural landowners. Syrians and Lebanese were actors “in the process of capitalist accumulation”. Behaving as a bourgeois class, they contributed to the “formation of modern Brazil”. There, Fernandes resumed the relationship between immigration, socioeconomic mobility and the formation of a class society. These elements were already featured in his book about the integration of afro-descendants in Brazilian class society, published in English as *The Negro in Brazilian Society* (Fernandes 1970).

A second important example of Fernandes’s contribution to migration studies is the article published also in 1966, named “Immigration and Racial Relations” (Fernandes 1966a). The article also resulted from a conference; in this case, it was held in New York City in the same year, and he attended in order to present his book *The Negro in Brazilian Society*. In the article, Fernandes explores the relationship between immigration and patterns of racial behavior, based on empirical research on the social relations between immigrants and Afro-Brazilian populations in the city of São Paulo.

Fernandes considered it as the main hub for the development of a competitive class society in Brazil. The thesis he presented was that immigrants would have experienced great difficulties in adapting when they arrived in Brazil. However, their trajectory was marked by a desire, which was often achieved, for professional and socioeconomic success. In fact, immigrants manifested the new ascending capitalist mentality of the country. The capitalist view, based on the idea of immigrants’ effort and even meritocracy, became dominant and was even put forward as an example that the Afro-descendant populations should follow to enable their participation in the new economic order that was being established. Fernandes warns that despite being an example of socioeconomic upward mobility, immigration had not contributed to modifying the preexisting pattern of social and racial relations in the country. On the contrary, many immigrants exercised certain practices of racial discrimination by economically
exploiting Afro-descendent workers (Fernandes 1966a). So, in fact, immigration had reinforced the racial prejudices and inequalities between whites and blacks existing in the country.

During the 1960s and 1970s, either due to the contribution of studies carried out within the scope of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), materialized in the form of the so-called Prebisch-CEPAL Doctrine, or due to the expansion of Marxist studies in Brazilian sociology, the class perspective would end up imposing itself as a reference in the sociological field, thus reducing the space for ethnic studies on immigrants. From that point onwards, descendants of immigrants would be considered and studied as Brazilian citizens, and analyzed in relation to their position in class society, whether as industrial workers, entrepreneurs or small or medium rural producers, and no longer as “homogeneous” ethnic groups. In the following decade, from 1980 to 1990, as we will present, migratory flows reversed and hundreds of thousands of Brazilians left the country, traveling towards the United States, Japan and European countries (especially Portugal, Italy, England, Spain, France and Germany). This has initiated a sociological shift in orientation regarding migration studies, as the focus is now centered on the phenomenon of emigration, representing a sharp departure from what had been the norm until now.

The years of 1980–2008 and 2010 onwards: new migrations, new sociological perspectives

The years of emigration (1980–2008)

From the mid-1980s onwards, international migratory movements changed course in South America. The countries in the region moved from being recipients of immigrants to becoming exporters of labor. In Brazil, a significant number of people emigrated to countries in the Global North, in search of better opportunities and living conditions. The increase of emigration by that time, was one of the consequences of the so-called “Lost decade” of 1980 in Latin America, and the growth in poverty and social inequality. It intensified in the 1990s and in the early years of the 21st century.

Brazilian emigration began with vast numbers in the second half of the 1980s, and gradually increased. There is a general consensus in literature on Brazilian migration that the first massive wave of emigration occurred from the mid-1980s to the 1990s (Margolis 2013). As suggested by Sales (2000), the numbers clearly indicate and confirm this trend. Carvalho (1996) has estimated that there was negative net migration in the 1980s of approximately 1.5 million Brazilians, who mainly went to the United States. In the 1990s, the balance remained negative, and Brazilian migration became more diverse, reaching countries other than the United States, such as Japan and European countries (McIlwaine et al. 2011; Padilla 2009; Solé et al. 2011; Tsuda 2003).
The persisting presence of a massive contingent of Brazilians sparked the interest of several researchers in the areas of social sciences. The novelty is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the field of migration studies has consolidated itself as an interdisciplinary space, in which perspectives and theoretical-empirical materials from various social scientific fields converge. Thus, the first studies focused on the processes of integration and maintenance of Brazilian cultural identity, especially with studies on Brazilians in the United States and Japan (for example, see Beserra 2005; Bógus 1995; Kitahara 1999; Margolis 1993; Martes 1999). Likewise, we can shortlist studies on the struggle for rights (Carvalho 2009; Feldman-Bianco 2016) and on migration policies of reception and expulsion in destination societies (Machado 2000).

The pioneer studies of Sales (1991, 1992) and Goza (1992), which focus on explaining Brazilian migration to the United States, for example, attach particular importance to the Brazilian economic and political crisis context to explain emigration. They argue that the 1980s and 1990s were very decisive decades in the transformation of Brazilian society. The rampant levels of inflation and the low salaries in Brazil added to the political disillusionment and the rise and fall of several governmental economic rescue plans can explain the large number of middle-class Brazilians in the United States. Sales refers to the late 1980s as the “triennium of disillusionment”, as it was a time when the hopes and expectations subsequent to the return of democracy were soon dispelled by the economic recession, unemployment and inflation. Certainly, the impact of the various economic and political crises that were widespread among Latin American countries in general, and Brazil in particular, encouraged Brazilians to leave the country.

Besides those macro-structural factors, Sales (2000) suggests that the impact of momentary political-economic crises and even the promotion of the American lifestyle affected the Brazilian population on different levels; however, only some people are going to make the decision to migrate, therefore, there must be something else that triggered the Brazilian migration in the 1980s and 1990s. She states, “in the genesis of migratory flows, there are always fortuitous, random and pioneering factors related to the migrations” (Sales 2000: 155). Scholars, then, focus their attention on meso-levels and consider the importance of social networks to the beginning of the migration process. This was clear in the case of Governador Valadares, a city in Minas Gerais state from which a high proportion of its population migrated to the United States.

Regarding two other important Brazilian migration destinations, Portugal and Japan, many theories have emerged about the reasons Brazilians migrated to these countries. The most prominent ones explain Brazilian migration as a returning or counter-current migration, as well as emphasizing the network of interpersonal connections. In the case of Portugal, the linguistic, cultural colonial legacies and networks of family and friends have been considered as the key explanations for the large number of Brazilians there (see Padilla 2009; Peixoto 2009). The first wave of Brazilians to Portugal was in the 1990s, comprising middle-class professionals (dentists, engineers, architects
and advertising executives, among others) and the second wave was in the later 1990s and 2000s, with the arrival of Brazilians from the lower middle class—a phenomenon which Padilla (2009) describes as the “proletarization” of Brazilian migration. Brazilian migration to Japan was described as a “returning” migration of the nikkeijin, descendants of those who migrated from Japan to Brazil in the early years of the 20th century. Brazilians in Japan became more visible in the 1990s, when the Japanese government revised and changed their restrictive policies towards low-skilled migrant workers, allowing the legal entry of dekasegi (temporary migrant workers) into the country. Along with the first dekasegi went their family members and friends (see Tsuda 2003).

The increase of Brazilian communities abroad and the visibility given to them by academic studies produced a series of seminars and meetings organized around the theme and aiming to protect the rights of Brazilian emigrants. Four of the various meetings had major repercussions due to their international and representative character. Called the “Meeting of the Brazilian Community Abroad”, it secured the participation of academics, community leaders, immigrants, trade union centrals, political parties and government representatives, among others. As emigration became a national issue, sociologists and social scientists analyzed its impacts.

Indeed, in order to understand the intense and prolific emigration of Brazilians, social science scholars have combined macro-structural economic, political and cultural factors and examined the meso- and micro-level factors, such as network connection of places and/or interpersonal connections of families and friends. In fact, the social phenomenon of Brazilian emigration has changed the methods of migration analysis. It became clear for sociologists that the debate could not be concerned only with Brazilian identity or class; the issue had to be treated through the lens of global mobility. Brazilian emigration was (re-)positioning the country in global geopolitics. The sociological debate was no longer limited to assimilation, integration and/or racial and class division but had widened to include equal rights, labor conditions, safety and freedom of mobility—in other words, “less borders and more rights”. Such “slogans” were to influence social science and political debates in relation to the new immigration flows to Brazil from 2010 onwards.

**New immigration flows to Brazil: renewed sociological challenges**

The importance that sociology attached to the issue of emigration in the last decades of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 2000s gradually diminished. The international economic crisis that had begun in 2007 in the United States, which also substantially affected Europe and Japan, added greater complexity to the axes of displacement of South American migrations, especially in Brazil. In fact, Brazilian emigration slowed down and the country entered a new migration phase, during which it was to welcome returnees and new arrivals.
Although in the 1990s and early 2000s the country had received immigrants from some neighboring countries, such as Bolivia, it was from 2010 onwards that there was an increase and diversification of migratory flows to Brazil. Immigrants from the Global South, such as Haitians, Senegalese, Congolese and, more recently, Venezuelans, established a permanent presence in contemporary immigration in Brazil.

Certain conjunctural factors of the world economy and geopolitics were decisive for the increase and consolidation of immigration from the Global South countries to Brazil. The first factor was, as mentioned earlier, the economic crisis that began in 2007 in the United States, and spread out through Europe and Japan. The second factor was the country’s economic and social development and its geopolitical repositioning in the first decade of the current century, driven by the logic of the “Commodities Consensus” (Svampa 2015), which made Brazil grow at high rates. The third factor was the country’s image as an emerging power that participates in BRICS and organizes major world events (Olympics and the World Cup).

This scenario differs from the immigration flows of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, in which immigrants from the Global North were encouraged and financed by the Brazilian government to come in order to occupy territories and whiten the country. The immigrants arriving in Brazil in the 2010s are mostly from poor countries, black, male and with a medium to low level of education (e.g., Haitians, Colombians, Senegalese, Bengalis and Venezuelans). The Haitians represent the most emblematic case of south–south immigration in Brazil. This ethnic group became the main nationality in the Brazilian formal labor market in 2013. Currently, in addition to being the main nationality in the labor market, along with Venezuelans it shares first place in the number of immigrants registered. From 2011 to 2019, 1,085,673 immigrants were registered in Brazil, considering all legal protections. Of this total, more than 660,000 long-term immigrants stand out (whose residence time is more than one year), a population composed mainly of people from Latin America, especially Haitians and Venezuelans (Cavalcanti and Oliveira 2020).

Therefore, unlike the sociological perspectives of Gilberto Freyre and Florestan Fernandes, current sociological studies are not focused on understanding the process of assimilation of these immigrants to the “Luso-Brazilian” culture. In fact, the idea of the existence of such a culture has already been strongly contested. Sociological debates no longer seek to study the potential of immigrants or their possible impact on the reproduction and permanence of the Brazilian capitalist system, as Fernandes did. The current sociological debate endeavors to understand how demographic, social and economic changes, both nationally and globally, are impacting current migratory processes and the insertion of immigrants in the country. These are new and pervading approaches to human mobility in the context of the Global South.

Thus, sociology, in dialogue with other social sciences, has sought to interpret the impact of these new flows, with publications and studies that address various topics, such as migration and a gender perspective; economic, social
and legal marginalization of immigrants; job market; migration policy; migrant mobilizations; immigrant business initiatives; Portuguese as a host language; the accessibility of immigrants in the areas of education and health, among other aspects (Cavalcanti and Oliveira 2020; Tonhati and Macêdo 2020). The current sociological debate on migrations in Brazil has analyzed it not as a uniform theme, but as an area that is diverse, with diffuse and interrelated issues. Sociologists, who presently study the new migratory flows in Brazil, were in some cases those who also experienced the impacts of Brazilian emigration, and, therefore, carry in their luggage a dialogue with a more immediate experience of immigration and a heightened sensitivity in analyzing the diversity of these migratory flows. The debate, therefore, is no longer about how integration or assimilation into a supposed national culture will transpire, but how differences will and should be respected, and incorporated into public policies.

Concluding remarks

The main objective guiding this chapter was to contribute to a discussion on migration and development in South America and its connection with Southern Europe. We have relied on the contributions of Brazilian sociological debates on the issue of migration, which are approached as having two distinct phases. The first phase covered the time span from the 1940s to the end of the 1970s, and it could be argued that these decades witnessed a steady decline in the once-massive migration flows of Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, German and even non-Europeans such as Japanese and Syrian-Lebanese. However, the impact that these groups had on the formation of Brazilian society was still very much part of the discussion. As already mentioned, two of Brazil’s most highly reputed sociologists, Gilberto Freyre and Florestan Fernandes, concentrated their attention on the extent of the role that migration played in the development of Brazilian society. Freyre highlighted the influence that migratory flows had on the formation of Brazilian identity, whereas Fernandes investigated the impact of migration on the arrival and consolidation of a capitalist society, as well as on the social and racial inequalities in Brazil at that time.

The second section of this chapter traced the historical development of Brazil’s migration approaches by focusing on a second period, from 1980 to 2008 and from 2010 onwards. At this point in time, there is a departure from what had been the norm until then, as the sociological debate abandons the assimilation and integration thesis and the linkage between migration and the consolidation of capitalist society. During the first period between 1980 and 2008, Brazil experienced an increase in emigration, with sociological approaches focused on understanding why Brazilian migration began in the mid-1980s and continued into the 1990s and 2000s, and what aspects caused Brazilians to migrate to particular countries such as the United States, Japan and certain European countries. The sociological explanations revolved around a combination of macro-structural economic, political and cultural factors, alongside meso- and micro-level factors such as network connection of places and/or
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interpersonal connections of families and friends. In fact, the social phenomenon of Brazilian emigration was a turning point in the sociological analysis of migration and has even influenced the political view of the phenomenon.

This emergence of emigration altered the course of Brazilian migration study, with a change in orientation which would bring the perspective of global mobility to the forefront. Sociological and political debates were now interested in creating analytical and practical tools to increase migrants’ equal rights and to improve labor conditions, safety and freedom of mobility. The new immigration flows to Brazil were approached in a similar way. Nowadays, sociological debates seek to shed light on immigration to Brazil by focusing on issues related to the disparities among the flows, their uniqueness and the possibility of political agendas with a potential to improve their lives.

In summary, based on sociological literature in and about Brazil, it is possible to analyze the different migratory scenarios in which the country is involved. The social science analysis aimed to comprehend the multifaceted 20th-century immigration and emigration and, at this time, to interpret the new and diversified flows of immigrants, as well as the migrant return projects on the part of many emigrants. The migratory phenomenon represents a constant challenge to sociology, which has to reflect constantly on its theoretical, epistemological and empirical approaches in order to continue interpreting migration dynamics.

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Part II

Migration flows from South to South

Transnational impact and limits
The Spanish postwar emigration to the Southern Cone (1946–1960)

Reinterpretations from the perspective of gender and labor insertion

Bárbara Ortuño Martínez

Introduction

Between 1946 and 1960, more than half a million people emigrated from Spain to Latin America. The Argentinian Republic was their main destination, receiving more than 40% of the total official arrivals, which translated into some 200,000 people. Venezuela, which for the first time was to make its appearance among countries most preferred by Spanish migration, hosted 31% of the total number of immigrants; and Brazil, which was a secondary destination, received some 84,590 arrivals, which accounted for 15% of the total of this immigration wave. Lower on the list, we find other host countries such as Uruguay (6.61%), Cuba (3.55%), Dominican Republic (1%), Mexico (0.9%), Colombia (0.7%), Peru (0.27%) and Chile (0.23%), followed by Panama, Ecuador, Paraguay and Puerto Rico.

In general terms, the end of World War II contributed to the economic expansion of Latin America due to, among others, the demands of a Europe devastated by conflict, the need for supplies for US troops during the Korean War and the good prices achieved in international markets for regional products such as cereals, meat, coffee and oil. The influx of foreign currency due to the boom in agricultural exports and raw materials, combined with the economic and socio-political conditions of each country, led to, and in some cases accelerated, an intense industrialization process. Hence, the demand not only for specialized labor, technicians and engineers, but also for manual workers as well as potential consumers increased. Brazil and Argentina also required families to settle permanently in the cities and/or to be willing to settle in rural areas, which for a decade had suffered the effects of depopulation due to migration from rural to urban areas.

In the case of Argentina, the first Peronist government (1946–1951) perceived human resources as an indispensable factor for its economic growth plans and therefore promoted immigration (Biernat 2007). The implementation of the First Five-Year Plan necessitated abundant labor, especially in projects related to the construction of public works, industry, manufacturing and the rural sector. But it also concentrated its efforts on multiplying the number
of consumers, without which the development of an independent economy, especially from the United States, would be difficult.

For its part, Brazil tried to consolidate the industrialization process that had begun two decades previously, largely thanks to the high international prices for coffee. Its main objective was to expand its industry, and for this reason it needed to attract qualified foreign industrial workers and technicians. In contrast to what occurred during a period of massive immigration between 1888 and 1920, when following the abolition of slavery, workers were needed for the coffee and sugar plantations (González 2003; Cánovas 2005), in the 1950s, and in particular during the second term of office of Getúlio Vargas (1951–1954) and the first years of the Kubitschek government (1956–1961), the recruitment of skilled workers that the national-development project demanded, prevailed, although land settlement plans were not abandoned.

In short, the countries of the Southern Cone designed on paper a migration policy based on interventionism and selective immigration, reflecting the desires and aspirations of each country that were expressed as the requirements of certain economic and professional capacities as well as specific physical, ideological, religious and moral conditions (Devoto 2001). However, once again, a gap was revealed between migration policies and practices; in Koselleck’s terms, between “expectations”, as the result of the memory of what has been experienced in the past – in this case, the experience of mass immigration – and reality. As Erika Sarmiento pointed out, the Spanish and in particular the Galician immigration to Brazil, both at the end of the 19th century and during the post-war period, was spontaneous and nourished by kinship ties and migratory chains (Sarmiento 2013: 61). For this author, in the same way that mass emigration developed in parallel to the availability of subsidized tickets by the state of São Paulo, postwar Spanish immigration differed greatly from the technical profile to which the host country, and more specifically São Paulo’s industrialization, aspired to.

Between 1880 and 1970, Brazil received more than five million European and Japanese immigrants, most of whom were concentrated in the state of São Paulo, and secondarily in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador de Bahía and Belem de Pará. Galician immigration at the end of the 19th century, which was the most predominant group in the main American destinations, found its job niche in the service sector and, in particular, was involved in the development of small businesses in urban centers. In this sense, the labor dynamics developed by earlier immigration conditioned the trajectories of the new post-war immigration. In fact, post-war Galician immigrants were to become proprietors of bakeries, butcher shops, bars or shoe stores, or were engaged in construction, but almost never accessed the technical positions of the emerging industry sector or the administrative positions that demanded higher qualifications (Soutelo 2001: 51).

The migratory reality in Argentina, at least as far as the Spanish community is concerned, also proved to be very different from the requested technical profile – represented in the popular imagination by the figure of Italian ingi...
Spanish postwar emigration to the Southern Cone

and embodied in different agreements and conventions. Even so, early studies that defined the post-war flow, refer to the high composition of adult individuals, mostly men, who when embarking declared themselves, as industrial and agricultural workers; 41% and 42%, respectively (Palazón 1995: 304–305).

However, when studying postwar emigration from a transnational perspective, in bringing together studies on migration and exile conducted in both Europe and the Americas, and taking into account the contributions of social, cultural, political and women’s history from a gender perspective, we can verify that heterogeneity is the main peculiarity of the last migratory wave that was destined for the Southern Cone during the 20th century (Ortuño 2018).

When the first emigration measures were enacted in Spain in 1946, among which the reestablishment of the Emigration Law of 1924 was foremost, the Franco dictatorship, imposed after the end of the Civil War, had already been implementing a regime of violence and terror for more than five years (Casanova 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that within this flow, which was considered not only technical but also “apolitical” by the traditional bibliography, were included economic, political migrants and late exiles (Ortuño 2016; Núñez 2020). Despite the hackneyed argument that this migrant flow developed in a regular manner, we now know that anyone who had the opportunity to flee from a country devastated by poverty and political violence, did so. In order for this to happen, and disregarding whether it was legal or not, they resorted to whatever support and means was offered to them by the migratory chains.

Both men and women were part of this postwar flow, and if we look at the representation by gender, we see that the participation of the latter was much higher than in the first half of the 20th century. In total, Spanish women represented 43.5% of the total emigration to Argentina during the post-war period. Through their testimonies, presented in this chapter, it was revealed that due to gender issues, they experienced dissimilar integration to that of their male colleagues both in the public and private sector.

The reactivation of migratory chains; effects of the agreements with Argentina; the regions of origin of the new emigration

Following almost two decades of restrictive policies, the arrival to power of Juan Domingo Peron in June 1946 led to, among others, the reopening of Argentina to overseas immigration and the emergence of three novelties with respect to the previous period, between 1930 and 1946: an increase in annual arrivals; the simultaneous appearance of a wide variety of migratory typologies, including economic and political migrants, refugees, fugitives and war criminals; and the placing of migration under the auspices of bilateral agreements and international organizations (Devoto 2004). In this sense, it was not fortuitous that two Latin countries such as Spain and Italy, both very important to each of Peron’s mandates, were chosen to sign the most important migratory
agreements. If the objective was for the new immigration to merge with the “popular masses”, which consisted mostly of the Creole population and earlier immigration from Southern Europe, then it was necessary to select those who could integrate in a more expedient fashion.

On October 30, 1946, the precursor to the 1948 migration agreement with Spain was signed. The Commercial and Payment Agreement signed in 1946 in order to regulate commercial exchanges set out, in Chapter VI, a section on migration. According to this section, the Franco dictatorship would undertake not to erect obstacles that would hinder emigration to Argentina; and the Peron government would take the necessary measures so that Spanish emigration in general, and specialized emigration in particular, would enjoy the privileges granted to those of other countries and be equal to the national labor force, in terms of the labor regime and working conditions. Two years later, on October 18, 1948, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martín Artajo, and the Spanish Ambassador to Buenos Aires, José María de Areilza, ratified the Migration Agreement between Spain and Argentina. It authorized “free emigration” and established three types: first, one that required a “letter of invitation”; secondly, “contracted emigration”, which necessitated an individual or collective employment contract signed prior to the departure; thirdly, “collective migration for colonos and industrial workers”, who would work in rural areas or in industries, for which engineers, technicians and workers had to be hired by the government or by private companies.

Needless to say, the Francoist authorities were not exactly enthusiastic to receive plans for the resumption of emigration designed by the South American country. In fact, it is very common to find in historical documentation on the elaboration and management of migratory agreements, accusations leveled at the Peronist government, and in particular against the Argentinian delegation in charge of managing emigration from Europe (Ortuño 2018: 94). But Franco’s Spain, politically isolated following the outcome of World War II, ruined and with a mounting debt to Argentina, had few options. In fact, although the Ministry of Labor was in charge of managing a migration policy, which was often at odds with their social and labor expectations, for practical purposes it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, co-opted by the regime’s propagandists, which imposed the diplomatic vision of the agreements signed with Argentina in 1946 and 1948 (Fernández 2005).

However, faced with a criterion as interventionist and selective in immigration matters as that adopted by its South American counterpart, Spain would under no circumstances facilitate the departure of all those specialized workers, technicians and professionals that were necessary for General Peron’s plans for the industrialization process. Along with the bureaucratic obstacles imposed to control the population that wanted to leave Spain was the lack of control and coordination of the government agencies of both countries, the high price of tickets and the limited places on the boats. As a result, the migration agreements did not have the expected results. In fact, even though both countries attempted to regulate the migratory flows in accordance with their political
objectives and economic development needs, the process was largely carried out independently of government policies. Nevertheless, once signed, these agreements offered people who had the necessary material and intellectual resources the opportunity to face the migratory adventure, to leave Spain and move to a country where the largest Spanish community abroad was located.

Informal networks and migratory chains were the main routes to Argentina during the post-war period. The testimonies of those who immigrated to this country between 1946 and 1956 convey a rather confused understanding of the migratory agreements signed between Franco and Perón in 1946 and 1948. Almost all accounts refer to the relationship established between the two leaders, which was made popular by the shipment of food products – represented in wheat – and the visit to Spain of the First Lady and President of the Peronist Feminine Party, Eva Duarte. Not one account indicates reliable knowledge of the signed agreements but simply points out that, at that time, people returned to Argentina, as had been customary since the Civil War (Ortuño 2018: 94–95). This is explained because many people left Spain when very young, some in early childhood, and in most cases the procedures were carried out by third parties, returned relatives who knew the bureaucracy or had contacts with the emigration agents, but even more so, by the relatives or compatriots who were in Argentina and sent the “invitation letter”.

It is therefore not surprising that among the chief concerns of those wishing to emigrate, standing out from all the rest, was the obtaining of an invitation letter and finding a way to pay for the boat ticket, the price of which was between 3,000 and 7,000 pesetas at the time. This is corroborated by the testimony of Ysabel Caravera Orovio. This Asturian, born in Gijón in 1920 and who immigrated to Argentina in 1949, remembered – when she was 93 years old – that when she wanted to leave Spain, her biggest problem was finding the amount to pay for the ticket. She managed to achieve this through an informal agreement with “some wealthy friends” of her husband, who, in her words, “had land and the government was bothering them”. They would pay for the couple’s boat tickets in exchange for an invitation letter that Ysabel’s husband, Manuel Femenías, would send them from Argentina in the name of his uncle, inviting them to work as settlers on his lands in the province of Buenos Aires.5

The first figures referring to postwar Spanish immigration in Latin America indicate that the vast majority came from Galicia (45.84%), with a substantial difference from the Canary Islands (12.31%), Catalonia (9.32%), Andalusia (5.58%), Asturias (5.41%), Madrid (4.85%), Castilla y León (4.43%), the Basque Country (3.3%) and the Valencia Community (2.93%) (Palazón 1995: 294). It has been confirmed that certain regions such as Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha, which in past times had sent large migratory contingents to America and later to Europe, had barely participated in this wave, due to the extreme poverty of a large part of their population and the difficulty they had in accessing the most important ports. Not all host countries received immigrants from these regions, as was the case of Venezuela, where the majority of immigrants came from the Canary Islands (Banco 2019).
Brazil, for its part, continued the trend of massive immigration waves witnessed at the end of the 19th century, when at destinations such as São Paulo, the majority of the immigrants living in its capital and in the interior were from Andalusia; while in cities such as Santos and other urban enclaves, in Salvador de Bahía or Rio de Janeiro, Galician immigration was predominant (Sarmiento 2013: 64, 65). In fact, it is estimated that 91,500 Galicians settled in Brazil between 1950 and 1959, and some 62,296 people settled in the state of São Paulo. Of the 120,000 arrivals from Galicia between 1956 and 1960, an estimated 75,000 settled in São Paulo and about 45,000 were distributed between Rio, Bahia and Pará (Soutelo 2001: 54).

In Argentina, the figures referring to the 1950s indicate a composition similar to the immigration that went to Brazil, with Galicia and Andalusia being the main postwar sending regions. Although the origin of 15% of the total arrivals is unknown, 59,506 people came from Galicia (41.4%), mostly from the provinces of A Coruña and Pontevedra; and 15,559 (10.8%) came from Andalusia, with Almería topping the list, followed by Granada and Málaga (Cózar 2012: 90–91). If we look at other secondary destinations, we observe the same trend with slight variations. Thus, for example, in the city of Comodoro Rivadavia, postwar Andalusian immigration was predominant within the Spanish community. In this Central Patagonia enclave there was a particular phenomenon of attracting mainly Andalusian immigration, as a result of the influence of the migratory networks woven during the 1920s, and, above all, of the possibilities of labor insertion in oil extraction companies based in the area, in particular YPF (Dos Santos and Beleiro 2014).

For its part, Mar del Plata, a city in the province of Buenos Aires, presented a composition very similar to that of the federal capital, as it was home to a Galician community that doubled in number after the addition of the Republican exiles and post-war immigrants (Da Orden, Ortuño and Derbiz 2014: 48). But here we detect a curious phenomenon, related to the visibility or invisibility of certain migrant groups, and in particular the Asturian community, which, although it represented just over 10%, had acquired a conspicuous visibility within the group due to its workforce participation in the service sector. In this city, the proportion of merchants and employees of Asturian origin was higher than that of the rest of the community. The opening of its own shops, bars and hotels, with names such as “La Asturiana” or “Cabrales”, boasted of their origins and were proof of upward social mobility marked by hard work and sacrifice. But, as we know, such trajectories were rarely available to the bulk of immigrants, least of all women.

**Life experiences and labor insertion of Spanish immigration: the case of Mar del Plata (Buenos Aires province)**

The documents that Argentina demanded from prospective Spanish immigrants during the 1940s and 1950s were numerous and difficult to obtain. In order to leave Spain, it was necessary to have a departure visa and a passport, as
well as other papers such as an invitation letter or contract from the country of destination. To enter Argentina, it was necessary to present a disembarkation permit, an employment contract, a certificate of good health, good conduct and no begging, and a visa to enter the country. Of course, relatives and friends played a fundamental role in processing this documentation, as demonstrated especially in the case of social networks that played an important role in aiding their compatriots – the strength of “weak ties”, in Granovetter’s terms – and their importance for the opening of opportunities for individuals and for their integration into communities.

In regard to the help that was offered by the already-established immigrant families, it becomes evident through the testimonies collected that this aid was not always disinterested, particularly if we consider the economic and personal debts that resulted from contracts that condemned a portion of the new post-war immigration to a regime of “semi-slavery” with respect to their relatives, at least for the first few years. Many women experienced even more complex situations, because due to interpretations of traditional gender discourse, on the one hand, they were overprotected in terms of being considered “eternal minors”; but on the other hand, they were used as personal maids, often falling victim to harassment and sexual violence in the reception homes (Ortuño 2018: 133–135). This aspect, which deserves a thorough investigation, tended to be hidden by the immigrants themselves, both out of shame, since in many cases the perpetrators were men respected by the immigrant community and admired by the family that had remained in Spain; and due to the fact that there were no means available to seek redress. In particular, they pointed out shortcomings related to the lack of support networks other than that of the abuser’s environment and insufficient financial means to move elsewhere – in some cases not even to other neighborhoods, much less to return to the homeland, as expressed in deep pain by the daughter of Encarnación Valeiro, who arrived in Buenos Aires from A Coruña in September 1946.6

The habitation patterns of post-war Spanish immigration showed a general trend towards the peripheral neighborhoods of Buenos Aires and its municipalities, that together with the capital, made up Greater Buenos Aires. Many people settled in the Buenos Aires suburbs, especially in southern enclaves such as Avellaneda, Quilmes, Lanús or Lomas de Zamora, where the Galician community predominated (Farias 2010). The Peronist government’s rules also urged immigrants who arrived during the 1950s to settle in areas at a distance of at least 100 kilometers from the capital. However, once again, decisions made on arriving at destinations were conditioned by the human and material resources that each person possessed. In addition to migratory networks, the lower cost of rent in certain areas of the capital and the provinces exercised a strong influence on determining where people would live, and in particular concerning the settlement of postwar immigrants in slums. In fact, a fairly substantial portion of the testimonies collected agree on the precariousness of the houses that they had access to during their first years; houses located on dirt streets, built with rudimentary and improvised materials, without running
water or sewers, which made them feel like they were going backwards instead of forwards, in relation to the living conditions in their places of origin (Ortuño 2018: 136–138).

Joaquina Calo Gaciño, who was born in 1933 in a village in Porto do Son (A Coruña) and who arrived with her parents in Argentina in 1950, a few days before turning 17 years old, has good memories of her first days in her uncle and grandfather’s house in Avellaneda; she also fondly remembers the bus trip through the Buenos Aires plain and the natural spectacle of cows grazing in immense meadows under a shimmering sky. However, the evocation of her arrival is cut short by negative emotion when she remembers the port of Mar del Plata, her final destination; “There I got off a tram that was old and broken, and I started crying”. This situation experienced as real drama by an adolescent who did not consider herself either an emigrant or an exile, but rather as having been “kidnapped” by her parents, worsened when her aunt – a former immigrant, and the author of the invitation letter that had allowed them to enter the country – showed them the wooden and tin shack where they would live. In fact, the neighborhood of the port of Mar del Plata, inhabited since the beginning of the 20th century by immigrants from southern Italy and Andalusia, as well as by Syrian-Lebanese and internal migrants, was often conspicuous in the press of the 1940s and 1950s precisely due to its squalid housing, which contrasted with the splendor of the mansions and newly constructed buildings downtown (Favero 2011).

The fact that at the end of the 19th century the Argentinian upper classes chose this coastal enclave, located in the southeast of the province of Buenos Aires, about 400 kilometers from the federal capital, as a leisure resort, led to a notorious transformation of the environment. In general terms, what was once an area for the export of agricultural and fishing products was to be radically transformed into an area of economic diversity linked to the leisure of the elite, experiencing huge changes in infrastructure and building that demanded abundant labor. The democratization of this vacation destination at the end of the 1940s through “social tourism” promoted by the first Peronist government, whose ultimate objective was to extend the welfare state to the working and popular classes, exponentially increased its industrial and urban development, as well as the economic activities linked to the secondary and tertiary sectors (Da Orden 2011; Pastoriza Torre 2019).

The primary ties also influenced the labor insertion of new immigrants. The efforts of family and compatriot social networks contributed to reinforcing certain work sectors. At the beginning of the 20th century, more than half of the Spanish women employed in Buenos Aires, and in general in Argentina, were concentrated in the domestic service sector. A notable second on the list was manufacturing, with sewing, generally done at home, being the most important, followed by the tobacco and footwear industries. Beyond these sectors, we find them occupying positions as shop assistants or salespeople in their community. Both men and women tended to work in jobs that in some places were already considered typical of the Spanish community, with some regional variations. And although the participation of
Spanish female immigrants in the labor market was higher when compared to other groups, the gender division of labor, still present – and persistent – on a global scale restricted employment options and confined women to the lower rungs of the occupational ladder. This aspect, added to lower wages than those earned by men within the same employment category, determined their social mobility in the destination countries (Moya 2009: 111–112).

Likewise, married women with children, regardless of the migratory wave that had brought them to Argentina, were forced to combine paid work with family care, without which, among others, progress and integration of both first and second-generation immigrants would have been inconceivable. In fact, it was precisely during the transition between the 19th and 20th centuries that the ideal of female domesticity was established – which identified women as “the home angel” – and of male production and power, which decisively influenced the formation of ideas of complementarity – particularly the one that portrays women’s work as secondary, and leading to their receiving lower wages than men. Although it is true that this situation would continue to change throughout the 20th century, due to the political commitment and efforts of various women’s organizations and associations (Lobato 2007), the testimonies of post-war Spanish immigrants coincide in pointing out endless working days, in many cases without any payment. This was the case of Consuelo López de Álvarez, an Asturian from Luarca, who emigrated to Argentina in 1952 at the age of 21. After working as a seed seller, employee in a bar owned by relatives and in a kiosk in the Buenos Aires capital, along with her husband she decided to move to Mar del Plata and invest all their savings in a taxi and an old lodging house. In Consuelo’s own words:

Everything we earned was invested in it. We never had a vacation. . . . As I stayed there, I worked at the reception desk, and if they wanted a coffee, I immediately prepared it in the kitchen, the washing machine was always full . . . then, I was doing more things . . . Sometimes it was one in the morning . . . but there were sheets, towels, all upstairs on the 5th floor . . . and I would come through the annex, where the clients could not see me, because the first thing they would say is: “Just look at these Galicians! . . . they cannot even afford a maid!” . . . The truth is I broke my back working . . . Nothing came free in Argentina.8

The jobs held by Spanish immigrants in Mar del Plata, therefore, follow the same pattern as the capital, Buenos Aires. However, in regard to the former, an additional aspect is revealed: a labor insertion of women working in hotels, mostly as cleaning and cooking staff, and to a lesser extent as managers or owners.9 Additionally, many of them were employed in textile and fish canning factories, where they were the main workforce. In fact, within anarcho-syndicalism, which had a long tradition in this sector, the presence of women in the workers’ struggles of the 1940s was of crucial importance for the Mar del Plata labor movement (Laitano and Nieto 2019: 64).
The combined testimonies of post-war immigrants in Buenos Aires and Mar del Plata collected so far – especially of the youngest – focus, apart from the struggles in trade unions, on their own mothers’ strongly negative attitude against their working in the factories. Other grievances included difficult coexistence within the workplace, with specific reference to tensions with the native population, as well as the harassment they were subjected to. Instances of abuse, approached from an intersectional perspective, includes gender, class, age and ethnicity, as the words of Joaquina Calo testify; she stated that in the fish factory where she began to work a few days after her arrival, “The worst jobs were given to me, an Italian girl and a brunette girl from Santa Rosa la Pampa – an internal migrant”. According to her testimony, although the minors could not touch the fish, and the Peronist discourse spoke of the need to promote the well-being of the working class, the three of them spent their days scrubbing floors and tiles and ended up so wet and dirty that it was the same as if they had handled the fish. Faced with this situation, Joaquina denounced her situation and demanded to know why she was being given the worst jobs. In reply, the forewoman called her pretentious and described her as “a starving Galician”. That same day, Joaquina left her job at the factory of La Campañola and began to work as a clerk in different shops in the city, until she married and together with her husband managed to become owners of a kiosk.10

By way of conclusions

During the 1940s and 1950s, the main countries of South America, including Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, experienced industrial development that required an abundant national and foreign workforce. To this end, selective and interventionist migration plans were formulated that sought to attract, once again, the population of Southern Europe, which had been devastated after the Second World War. In the case of Spain, the content of Peron’s migratory plans for Argentina put the Franco dictatorship in a difficult position. On the one hand, the reactivating of emigration channels would involve opening the country’s borders, leading to a loss of a section of the working population vital for its own incipient development plans. But above all, it meant giving the enemies of the regime – that is, the militants of the left and sympathizers, or those suspected of being such, of the democratic principles of the Second Republic – who up until then had managed to survive repression, a chance to flee and be saved.

On the other hand, accepting the migratory agreements of 1946 and 1948 would allow an influx of capital in the form of remittances and compensation for debts incurred by Spain from contracts with Argentina, as well as population decongestion which would help alleviate possible social conflicts. In addition, and just as important, the signing of economic, commercial and migratory agreements with the South American country meant, in the eyes of the world, the gaining of an ally, which Franco believed would allow them to proceed with a “racial policy” that went hand in glove with the colonial imagery of their regime, and would permit them to continue the surveillance/
persecution of dissident voices at the main destinations of the Republican exiles in the Southern Cone.

However, beyond the ambitions which informed the planning and signing of these agreements, their main impact on the Spanish population was the reactivation of migratory chains. Participants of earlier migration flows, as well as those exiled after the Civil War, offered the necessary resources to their relatives and compatriots who wanted/needed to leave a Spain devastated by hunger and violence. As was the case for all migratory waves, from the moment they reached their country of destination, lifestyle and employment options were conditioned by class, ethnicity, age and gender.

In relation to the insertion of Spanish migrant women in the labor market, if we are referring to the physical space for the production of goods and/or the supplying of services in exchange for wages, then it should be noted that women tended to be studied outside of this area. This stems from the fact that studies on labor have been linked to the “male” sphere, due to the greater visibility of male presence in certain labor market segments, and to the association of immigrant women with reproductive functions in biological terms and naturalized domestic tasks. Furthermore, we should also take into account that women had no agency in the process of emigration (López 2014: 115–116).

In recent decades, the history of women and gender studies have grown exponentially in the Ibero-American space, especially through the work of historians committed to feminism, women’s movements and diversity. This has undoubtedly put the androcentrism of our discipline into question, demonstrating, in the words of Andrea Andújar and Débora D’Antonio, “the incidence of women and their agency in social development, the historicity of the meanings of the sexual division, the particularities that operate within that division, as well as its influence on the historical process” (Andújar and D’Antonio 2020: 94). In the case of postwar Spanish emigration to Latin America, and especially Argentina, by observing this phenomenon through focusing on its “other” protagonists – that is, the women involved – but also on alternative destinations other than the federal capital, it becomes easier to delve into the process with greater precision. It allows us to corroborate that postwar Spanish emigration was motivated not only by economic but also by political, psychological and social issues, foremost among which were the harsh living conditions women had to endure during the Franco dictatorship. Likewise, from additional sources, mainly the testimonies of the protagonists of the last migratory wave from Spain to the Southern Cone during the 20th century, we can verify that this wave had not only a distinct family structure but also an intergenerational imprint, due to its links with both earlier immigration and second-generation immigrants, as well as to the low rate of return.

In examining the issue of the postwar insertion of Spanish female immigrants into the labor market, special attention should be given not only to the factories of Greater Buenos Aires, but also to other provincial cities, taking into account their specificities. Although the transnational approaches have been very important for analyzing the migratory phenomena, the re-evaluation of
the role of micro-history can have only a positive influence on advancing our knowledge of immigration in the world of work. It is also important to revisit sources that have already been analyzed and to valorize those that, until now, have not been given the attention they deserve or were difficult to access. But such a contribution would be incomplete without incorporating a comparative and gender perspective that would allow us to continue dismantling clichés, such as the belief that postwar Spanish emigration consisted of a regulated flow of a masculine and economic nature. Only in this way will it be possible to reconstruct and disseminate the complete history of a country in which class, sexist and xenophobic discourses and attitudes have become sharpened, largely fueled by the lack of memory of a recent past deeply marked by emigration.

Notes
1 For graphs and gross figures that refer to the period 1946–1948: Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, (AMAE), R. 2318/ Exp. 51.
3 AMAE. R. 2434 / Files 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18.
5 Personal interview with Ysabel Orovio Caravera, Mar del Plata (Argentina), August 8, 2013.
6 Personal interview with María del Carmen Somoza Valerio, Buenos Aires (Argentina), October 23, 2008.
7 Personal interview with Joaquina Calo Gaciño, Mar del Plata (Argentina), November 5, 2012.
8 Personal interview with Consuelo López de Ávarez, Mar del Plata (Argentina), July 23, 2014.
9 For a further analysis of this aspect, see Garazi (2020).
10 Personal interview with Joaquina Calo Gaciño, Mar del Plata (Argentina), November 5, 2012.

Bibliographic references


8 Portuguese migrations to South America after World War II
Extending citizenship abroad

Beatriz Padilla and Thais França

Introduction
Portugal has historically been a country of emigration up until the turn of the 21st century; thus, the Portuguese diaspora is not only an old phenomenon but also part of how Portugal has constructed its presence around the world since the times of the early explorations, between 1415 and 1543, even before the Spaniards’ venture to the Americas. Back in time, Portuguese emigration began at the time of the so-called “Portuguese Discoveries”, reaching all continents, from Africa and Asia to the Americas. Portuguese were sailors who built forts and settled along the African coast, and later in Asia, before their incursion in the Americas. Their arrival to Porto Seguro, Brazil, in 1500 initiated a long process of conquest, colonization and evangelization of the native populations and later the enslavement of African peoples that lasted for centuries (Feldman-Bianco 2001). The relation, even if vertical, between Portugal and Brazil during colonial times has always been exceptional; thus, when Portugal fell under Napoleon's rule in the 19th century, the Portuguese Crown escaped, crossing the Atlantic, settling and ruling from their territories in Brazil. Hence, when considering the interactions between Portugal and its colonies, Brazil has occupied a central place, surviving even independence. Moreover, the Brazilian elite continued to study in Portugal even in the 20th century, as the first Brazilian university was funded only in 1920 (França et al. 2018). Thus, Portuguese presence and cultural influence in Brazil continued throughout emigration up to the 20th century.

In the larger context of immigration policies targeting Europeans in Brazil as well as in other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Portuguese emigration spread over the Southern Cone region, with ups and downs throughout the 20th century. Its oscillation can be explained by global factors such as the First and Second World Wars, the International Economic Crisis of 1930, as well as local contexts such as the Portuguese colonial war and the decolonization process in Africa (1961–1974), the end of the “Estado Novo” in Portugal in 1974, the blooming (or dearth) of Latin American economies at different periods (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela) and the entrance of Portugal into the European Union in 1986. Much later, as a consequence of the Great Recession or financial crisis of 2008, which hit Portugal and other Southern
European countries particularly hard (Moury & Freire 2013; Legido-Quigley et al. 2016), Portuguese emigration flows to South America gained strength again, mainly to destinations such as Brazil and Venezuela (Pires 2019). Recent studies, however, assert that the Portuguese who left during this period of austerity define themselves not as immigrants, but rather as “cosmopolitans or travelers in search of new life experiences and/or professional internationalization” (Rosales & Machado 2019: 206).

Overall, millions of people crossed the Atlantic in the 19th and 20th centuries, including Portuguese. In this chapter, we center on Portuguese emigration to Latin America in the 20th century, focusing on the most relevant countries in terms of flows: Brazil and Argentina, with Venezuela as a late comer. First, we briefly present Portuguese migration flows to the selected countries, using a long-term perspective that allows us to set the scenario where policies and legal frameworks were developed by the Portuguese state throughout towards its diaspora. Data inconsistency and complexity is one main obstacle to assessments of Portuguese emigration; however, its analysis suggests some relevant trends if read against the existing literature.

### The Portuguese in Latin America

When assessing Portuguese emigration, it should be stated from the beginning that Brazil has been a continuity and the main destination of Portuguese emigrants throughout history. Moreover, as Rosales and Machado stated, “contemporary transatlantic movements between Portugal and Brazil are, as they were in the past, characterized by bidirectional flows of people and things” (2019: 193). This particularity has had consequences in terms of bilateral relations, in migration policies and in keeping the flows alive throughout time.

Although statistics vary according to sources and elaboration, Table 8.1 illustrates the main trends of Portuguese presence in the three selected countries of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>229,348*</td>
<td>7,633*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910s</td>
<td>293,793*</td>
<td>17,570*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>233,655*</td>
<td>23,406*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>85,690*</td>
<td>10,310*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>60,700*</td>
<td>4,230*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>237,327*</td>
<td>12,033</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>62,737+</td>
<td>28,611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>26,915+</td>
<td>20,740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>13,285</td>
<td>93,029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

destination in Latin America. Despite these figures’ inconsistencies and missing data, their purpose is not to be exhaustive, but to illustrate both the significance and development of flows along time.

**Portuguese emigration to Brazil**

Portuguese emigration to Brazil has been a regular pattern, with ups and downs, a repetitive response to the lack of resolution of Portugal to its structural problems, including internal and external political, social and economic turbulence as well as to the lack of effective policies to the incorporation of the existing labor force in the domestic labor market (Pereira 2002). Baganha (2005) argue that in modern times, the first wave of Portuguese emigration “lasted throughout the nineteenth century and can even be said to have stretched all the way into the 1960s. During this cycle more than two million people left Portugal for the new world – principally Brazil” (418). Even if the country’s poor economic performance together with its authoritarian government under *Estado Novo* (New State) (1933–1974) pushed people to leave, the official policy was to ban emigration, to conform to its authoritarian ideology and safeguard the interests of the national labor market (Baganha 2003). Yet the incapacity of the government to offer viable alternatives to the labor force, and the arising social inequalities, made the enforcement of such restrictions difficult to apply (Pereira 2002).

Studies show that the most intense period of Portuguese emigration to Brazil was the first two decades of the 20th century, although statistics from Brazilian and Portuguese sources differ (Pereira 2007; Padilla & Xavier 2009; Padilla et al. 2009). Some fluctuations took place due to World Wars I and II, the Great Depression in 1929 as well as some restrictive policies put in place in both ends, by the Vargas (1937–1945) and Salazar (1933–1974) administrations in Brazil and Portugal respectively. In the case of Portugal, “a formally restrictive legal framework was trumped by a high degree of tolerance in practice, which favored the continuity of flows until the mid-twentieth century” (Carreiras et al. 2007).

The implementation of the Marshall Plan and reconstruction in Europe after World War II, in 1948, brought some changes for Portuguese emigration, as more people opted for closer destinations within Europe, such as Germany and France, both of which were in need of manual labor for the development of their industries (Baganha et al. 2005). However, Portuguese emigration to Brazil did not end; on the contrary, it was boosted by the Portuguese colonial war in Africa (1961–1974), when families from continental Portugal fled to Brazil, and Portuguese families that had settled in Angola and other former colonies ran away from Africa and moved to Brazil (Carreiras et al. 2007). Likewise, in the 1970s with the abrupt decolonization process taking place in Africa and the Carnation Revolution in 1974 overthrowing the *Estado Novo* regime in Portugal, many Portuguese sought refuge in Brazil (Padilla 2010; Graça 2009). In Rosales and Machado’s words, “emigration to Brazil
Portuguese migrations to South America

continued – both from Portugal and from the former African colonies – due to the radical political and economic changes imposed during the post-revolutionary period” (2019: 195).

Some qualitative changes characterized these flows; while previous emigrants were peasants and working classes, this post-revolution wave of political exiles “involved people from the middle classes and the elites who had been in favor of the ancient regime” (Rosales & Machado 2019: 195). However, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Portuguese emigration to Brazil decreased significantly (Baganha & Góis 1998), as the Brazilian economy was weak, inflation was extremely high and the political situation was unstable due to the military regime in place in the country between 1964 and 1985 (Pereira & Carlos 1989).

Moreover, Portugal’s admission to the European Union in 1986 brought some promise of prosperity, halting emigration temporarily (Baganha 1998). Feldman-Bianco (1992), however, identified a wave rarely acknowledged, which she coined “the return of the caravels”, from Portugal to Brazil, taking place in the 1990s during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In this period, privatizations were favored by the Brazilian government, translating into the investment of some of the large Portuguese corporations bringing along expatriates. A similar situation would take place during/after the 2008 international financial crisis; this time, Portuguese benefited from existing diplomatic agreements between the two countries (Padilla 2007; Santos & Pinho 2014).

Along politics and policies, migrations are shaped by migrants themselves. Since the mid-19th century, coming from a country with a long tradition of associations, Portuguese immigrants in Brazil founded their own organizations, named under the label of mutual aid or beneficence, to offer support to their co-ethnic fellows, creating solidarity links among themselves. These associations were key to the survival of Portuguese abroad, guaranteeing assistance during times of financial need, ill health and burial support so they would not have to turn to charity or to the state (Fonseca 2009).

Overall, Portuguese associativism was characterized by the existence of a great number of entities, of medium and small size, oriented more to national ties than to regional ones, some with the capacity to acquire a considerable patrimony (Fonseca 2009). While these associations were abundant along the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, later they declined due to political and policy changes of both the Brazilian and Portuguese states, as well as the decline of Portuguese emigration. Later on, some of them have been replaced by associations of Luso-descendants. At present, the official site of the Portuguese Communities’ list 127 Luso-Brazilian organizations spread across Brazil, ranging from Portuguese reading clubs (Clubes Portugués de Leitura), cultural clubs, Houses of Portugal in different cities as well as clubs from certain regions of emigration from Portugal (Minho, Azores, etc.) and Elos clubs, among many others. One active regional umbrella organization is the Portuguese and Luso-descendant Communities of the Southern Cone, involving organizations of
Southern Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. Its members have met periodically since 1988, usually with the participation of an official representative from the Secretary of State of the Portuguese Communities, which intends to keep Portuguese culture, language and history alive.

**Portuguese in Argentina**

Devoto (2003) divides the history of immigration to Argentina into three phases: early, mass and contemporary. Portuguese flows have been present in all three, but they were stronger during the first decades of the 20th century and after World War II (Padilla et al. 2009). In fact, up until 1952, Portuguese emigration to Argentina was constant, while flows from other European countries had almost ceased (Carreiras et al. 2007). During the last quarter of the 19th century, Portuguese emigrants were also enticed to cross the Atlantic towards Argentina, “attracted by the possibilities of work and settlement, and encouraged by migratory policies devised to attract European labor and population” (Borges 2009: 5). Therefore, they composed the multinationality flow that arrived in the country expecting to “make it in America”. According to the official data, from 1857 to 1959, almost 80,000 Portuguese arrived in Argentina (Borges 2009: 5). Despite its noticeable numbers during its peak in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Portuguese migration to Argentina was not widespread across the country; rather, it was strongly linked to family and local networks settled in port cities (Borges 2006). For instance, some of the main features of Portuguese emigration to Argentina include that it came predominantly from the Algarve (South) and Guarda (East, neighboring with Spain) regions, who settled mainly in Buenos Aires city and province, as well as in the city of Comodoro Rivadavia in Patagonia. Thus, the region of settlement shaped their incorporation into different labor and industrial sectors: construction, horticulture and flower farming in the Buenos Aires region, and in the oil exploitation and refinery in Patagonia.

The system of Portuguese migration to Argentina, based on social networks, prompted the creation of Portuguese associations from the late 1970s onwards, which played an important role in the integration of the newly arrived, shaping also their labor market entrance (Padilla et al. 2009). At present, there are about 23 Portuguese associations in Argentina, most of them located in the province of Buenos Aires, aiming at keeping Portuguese culture alive, through Portuguese clubs in the field of sports, culture and religion. From the governmental angle, the Council of the Portuguese Communities in Argentina was founded in 1996; later in 2002, it experienced some transformations, becoming more engaged in the region. Since then, it has been very active in the Portuguese and Luso–descendant communities of the Southern Cone, along their counterparts from Brazil and Uruguay, which organize frequent regional meetings. Even if there are still many associations, the Portuguese diaspora in Argentina is facing a fast-aging process.
Immigration in Venezuela was insignificant until 1935, when a new process of political opening and modernization of the country took place. At that time, the government created the Institute of Immigration and Colonization, which survived until 1948. In 1939 the first contingent of Portuguese workers was brought to Venezuela, given its reputation as “good workers” in the oil industry in Curaçao, created in 1918. Some of the main characteristics of this cohort was that most of them were originally from the Madeira Islands who came as a group of hired, selected and controlled workers by the Portuguese state to secure remittances, in agreement with the private companies who hired them (do Rego 2014).

In 1948 a new era that favored open immigration started, flourishing throughout the 1950s and 1960s, when an estimated 800,000 immigrants entered the country, including Portuguese (Gomes 2009), both from continental Portugal (Porto and Aveiro) and from Madeira. They were mainly attracted by the possibility of working and investing in the booming oil industry (Xavier 2009). At that time, Venezuelan migration policies would stimulate family reunification to ensure migrants’ settlement in the country, a measure that also contributed to boosting the growth of the Portuguese population in the country (Xavier 2009). Portuguese successful entrance in the Venezuelan labor market allowed them to enjoy the economic growth in different economic sectors, which enabled them to invest locally (Dinneen 2011). By the 1970s, 70% of the Portuguese emigrants were Madeirenses. Moreover, at that time, a large number of Luso-Venezuelans were already moving back and forth between Portugal and Venezuela, which translated into increasing work for the consulate. Thus, throughout time, Portuguese immigrants became a consolidated community in Venezuela, and according to Abreu Xavier (2009), the country witnessed an era of mass migration of Portuguese, having gone from 648 Portuguese in 1950 to 93,029 in 1981.

Abreu Xavier (2009) argues that since the 1980s, given the escalation of the economic crises in Venezuela, the Portuguese have considered returning, but that return has been delayed for multiple reasons – for instance, having descendants in Venezuela, or a desire to continue the successful family’s business (Dinneen 2011). At the same time, because Portuguese and Luso-Venezuelans travel back and forth from Venezuela to Portugal, it was difficult to identify these pendular movements and to catch their dynamics in the statistics. However, and more since the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela in 2015, more Portuguese and Luso-Venezuelans have fled to Portugal, as well as to Spain and Italy and other Latin American countries (Freitez 2019), taking advantage of their citizenship and family networks. Once there, they also get lost in the statistics, as many have Portuguese nationality.

At present, over 218,000 Portuguese are registered in the Portuguese consulates in Caracas and Valencia, not including Luso-Venezuelans, who have the right to access Portuguese nationality. The official site of the Council of Portuguese migrations to South America
Portuguese Communities in Venezuela argues that the Luso community in that country is the second largest in Latin America, after Brazil. A project named “Social Route around Venezuela”, carried out by the Portuguese embassy in the country, determined that Portuguese are located across all 23 states, with higher concentration in the capital, Caracas, and the cities of Valencia, Maracay, Maracaibo and Puerto Ordaz. Portuguese associations have been very active, not only maintaining links with Portugal but also building some emblematic geriatric centers in the country, illustrating the aging of the community, and a Luso-Venezuelan Association of Medical Doctors.

As in the cases of Brazil and Argentina, associativism is very strong in Venezuela. In almost all big cities, there is at least one Luso or Luso-Venezuelan association. Some examples include the centro Português de Caracas, the Casa de Portugal in Ciudad Bolívar and the Casa de Portugal de Maturín, among others. Venezuelan politicians and investors also tend to be involved in these associations, which not only contribute to maintaining socio-historical references but also serve as privileged spaces for the Portuguese community in Venezuela to lobby for their interests (Dinneen 2011; Gomes 2009).

From emigration policies to engagement

Emigration has been a structural constant in Portugal (Godinho 1978), even when immigration became a new feature of Portuguese demography in the late 1990s. However, another constant within emigration has been the centrality of Brazil as a main destination. In this context, because Portuguese transatlantic emigration to Brazil is a consequence of the deep socio-economic transformations at home and destination, Portuguese emigration policies have been historically ambiguous and contradictory throughout time.

Throughout the 20th century and to the present day, both emigration flows and emigration policies have changed, shifting from a liberal approach before Estado Novo, to restrictions during Salazar’s regime (1933–1974), to returning to a more liberal approach. It was only after the end of Estado Novo that Portuguese people were granted the right to freely emigrate again. After the decolonization process in Africa, re-democratization following the Carnation Revolution in 1974 and the admission of Portugal to the European Union in 1986, the focus from emigration shifted from controlling to finding a path to connect the state with the diaspora until the present day. This last phase has been mostly articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Secretary of Portuguese Communities (and its different denominations) and the extension of political rights and representation to the Portuguese living abroad.

During the 1980s changes in the statistical process to collect the number of Portuguese people leaving the country and a temporary decrease in emigration flows, partially due to the political, economic and social processes that Portugal experienced after joining the European Union, contributed to the erroneous idea that “the Portuguese emigration era” had ended (Marques 2009). Thus, after the mid-1980s, emigration has not been captured by the official statistics
as it became an “embarrassing fact” that could undermine Portugal’s image of a modern and developed nation (Marques & Góis 2014, 2017). Therefore, the dominant discourse on emigration since then has been of invisibilization because it is associated with poverty and low levels of development, inconsistent with the new image that Portugal promotes internationally (Marques & Góis 2017). However, because the diaspora is large, some policies have been crafted toward emigration, yet with a different focus: to support the return and investments of Portuguese living abroad. The Programa Nacional de Apoio ao Investidor da Diáspora (PNAID) and Programa Regressar are some examples, intentionally fostering a positive image of Portugal engaging with its nationals abroad and highlighting their potential in development and investments in the home country (Simões 2020).

In Portugal, most legislation regarding emigration until 1933 did not restrict departures and was aimed mainly at protecting emigrants from mistreatment or exploitation in the countries of destination (Baganha 2003). Later, during Estado Novo (1933–1974), Portugal enacted more conservative and restrictive policies; for instance, Article 31 of the 1933 constitution declares that emigration should respond to the “economic and imperial interests of the state” (Baganha 2003: 3). This put an end to the well-established right to emigrate by choice, favoring the settlement of white Portuguese in the African colonies, which went hand in hand with the indoctrination of those sent to live abroad in name of the Imperial State (Pereira 2002).

Moreover, in 1944 the emigration passport was issued for agricultural or industrial workers, prohibiting them to get a regular passport, as they were deemed essential to the national labor market (emigrant passports were only valid to travel to the country of destination where workers had a job offer). Because forbidding emigration was not an easy task, in 1947, Salazar created a new organization, the Junta da Emigração (Emigration Junta), by Decree 36.558/1947, responsible for all matters pertaining emigration regulation, centralizing all policies and actions and becoming the maximum authority on the matter (Galvanese 2013: 12). For instance, the Junta determined that all those between 14 and 45 years old who had not finished elementary education were not allow to leave; as at that time illiteracy rates were very high, a large portion of the population was banned from legally exiting the country (Baganha 1995). Coincidentally, this rule was also embraced by new policies in Brazil, when in the mid-1950s the entrance of illiterate immigrants was prohibited, limiting the entrance of many Portuguese. Once all these regulations were in place, illegal emigration became more generalized, illustrating that more regulations tend to translate into greater defiance.

During the 1960s in the context of reconstruction of Europe after World War II, emigration to closer destinations increased. Portugal signed bilateral treaties with some European states, allowing Portuguese citizens to move under specific conditions. Thus, during the 1960s, the role and the action of the Junta da Emigração began to be questioned mainly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an Inter-ministerial Commission was created to study emigration
problems and propose the necessary changes in the legislation, administrative practices and agreements that regulate the emigration of workers. The result of this assessment was that the emigration should be treated as a social problem and framed within employment policies, both for continental Portugal as well as for the African colonies. Hence, for a period of time, emigration matters were moved to the Ministry of Corporations and Social Provision (Galvanese 2013). From this time on, the Junta da Emigração lost centrality. However, it is worth mentioning that during the 1960s, due to the agreements signed by Portugal with other European countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had become a central interlocutor in the negotiations, gaining relevance despite the Junta. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its networks of consulates became active players in emigration matters and slowly began shifting the focus from emigration control to engaging with the diaspora.

While on the one hand, during the Salazar regime, policies were restrictive in legal terms, on the other hand, in practice they were permissive, allowing a certain degree of tolerance. At that time, clandestine emigration became the norm, either by “jumping the border” to France or other European destinations, or when people felt compelled to find a way out to Brazil to avoid sending their children to the colonial war in Africa (Padilla 2010; Pereira 2002). Additionally, up to the 1970s, due to the relevance of remittances, the state would close its eyes to emigration to secure resources. However, this ambiguous position did configure a conflict of interests, because it was the state’s duty to provide the necessary labor force for the economy, secure the territories in the former colonies in Africa while making use of the substantial remittances sent by emigrants (Carreiras et al. 2007; Baganha 2000).

Finally, in 1970, during the Caetano administration, the last phase of Estado Novo, Decreet-Law 420, created the Secretariado Nacional da Emigração to replace the controversial Junta. However, at this time, the government did not envision how close they were to the end of Portuguese rule in Africa.

After the restoration of democracy in 1974, the colonial war and decolonization ended, and the colonies declared independence. Thus, the Portuguese government focused on organizing the country’s internal affairs. Therefore, emigration temporarily lost centrality, even if specific agencies were created to deal with those living abroad. In 1974, the Secretaria da Emigração was created; it later became the Secretaria de Estado da Emigração e das Comunidades Portuguesas, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labour. Once the Constitution of 1976 was approved, then the right to emigrate and return to the country was officially established, putting an end to an era of emigration control.

In 1980, the Instituto de Apoio à Emigração e às Comunidades Portuguesas was created, taking responsibility for the centralization and coordination of all actions to be promoted with emigrants, their families and Portuguese communities abroad. Later, in 1994, this agency was replaced by the National General Direction of Consular Affairs and of the Portuguese Communities, in response to a change in approach which shifted towards Portuguese communities abroad. Thus, the state focused on their integration in the country of destination, and
such concern was articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, centralizing in
the same organizational structure consular issues as well as to support to those
living abroad.

Furthermore, in 1980 the Council of Portuguese Communities (Conselho
das Comunidades Portuguesas) was created (reformed in 1984 and 1990, by
Law 101/1990) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a consultative body
responsible for advising the government in matters related to emigration and
to represent the Portuguese communities abroad (Santos 2004). These ongo-
ing changes illustrated the increasing interest in improving responses to the
approximately four million Portuguese living abroad, finding a viable and oper-
tional solution in dealing with such a large number of entities spread around
the world and improving their representation. Maria Manuela Aguiar, its first
Secretary, contributed largely to improving emigration policy responses (pro-
tection, reinsertion, etc.) and promoting local support to communities in the
region of residence. The council was the first official channel created by the
Portuguese state to establish a dialogue with its community abroad (Marques &
Góis 2013). By the end of the 1980s references to “emigration” and “emi-
grants” were substituted by “Portuguese community” and “Portuguese resi-
dents abroad” with the intention of approximating the diaspora symbolically,
integrating and reconnecting the Portuguese living abroad with the country of
origin and its culture (Pereira & Horta 2017).

Engagement with the diaspora: a symbolic
and practical change

As the Portuguese colonial empire ended and Portugal was confined to a minor
corner on Europe’s periphery, a debate on the new national identity emerged
(Almeida 2008). Instead of the old discourse of Portugal as a nation that discov-
ered, colonized and civilized the native populations in other parts of the world,
the new official discourse embraced diasporic identity (Fernandes 2014),
highlighting the presence of Portuguese around the world. This new identity
strongly interweaves colonialism, immigration and emigration to construct a
new image of national belonging (Klimt & Lubkemann 2002), in which the
new Portuguese imagined political community embraces, on the one hand, Portu-
guese emigrants and, on the other hand, its former colonial subjects, to create
a global deterritorialized nation (Feldman-Bianco 1992), under the mandate of
Lusophony. The arguments to support the Portuguese community abroad as an
intrinsic part of the national whole resorts on the idea of Portugal as a single
nation, in which the value of ancestry is more relevant than cultural identity
(Rocha-Trindade 2012). In this context, the Portuguese abroad were seen not
as emigrants anymore, but as the “Portuguese spread around the world”
(Feldman-Bianco 1992), “new” Portuguese explorers who would share the
national culture globally (Fernandes 2014).

Moreover, Portugal intended to enhance its image as a country that cares
about its “community’s” well-being. Pereira and Horta (2017) identify this
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“diasporic turn” (Ragazzi 2014) as an effort to support the image of the Portuguese state as modern and committed to its “diasporic community” through a sense of common cultural and/or political heritage (Gamlen 2006). This view is central to building the official discourse of a state concerned with the equal protection of its citizens, extending their rights and recognizing their active contribution to the development of the nation independently of their whereabouts. Thus, Portugal projects itself as a country that fosters a sense of membership among its nationals transnationally (Levitt & Dehesa 2003).

The relation between the Portuguese state and its diaspora, however, has not always been linear, and this relation has been marked often with some tension, not always coordinated and influenced by the changes in policies instrumented by the Executive (Marques & Góis 2013). As in transition to becoming an immigration country in the 1990s, Portugal created a new official discourse as a developed and modern European country, sought after by others because of its culture, geopolitical importance and connections to Europe, Africa and Latin America (Araújo 2013). In becoming a country of immigration as opposed to emigration, experiencing increasing immigration flows and being admitted to the European Union, Portugal reinvented itself, portraying an image of being a “core country” in the world system (Santos 2004).

Thus, as expressed earlier, the policies regarding emigration during Estado Novo experienced a gradual transformation in which emigration evolved from being an issue of internal affairs, centralized in and by the Ministry of Interior through Junta da Emigração, to gain inter-ministerial status in the 1960s while transitioning to the Ministry of Labour, to finally be moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it is housed at present in the Direção dos Assuntos Consulares e das Comunidades Portuguesas (DGACCP). Hence, the “embarrassment” turned into a potential advantage that could be shown to the world, due not just to the remittances but to the success of the Portuguese diaspora in the world, thus occupying a place in Portuguese foreign policy.

In this context, it is interesting to note that some former policies set in the field of emigration, with a vocation of foreign affairs, have become diaspora policies serving both the country of origin and destination, the Brazilian case being emblematic. “Brazil and Portugal have a long history of bilateral relations, collaboration, and cooperation on different fronts that has evolved from the colonial times through independence to the contemporary times of globalization” (Padilla 2011: 19). Thus, “the old agreements signed with Portugal (at a time when Portuguese emigration to Brazil was intense) have provided Brazil with prosperous platforms through which to safeguard its citizens” (Padilla 2011: 19). The list is long, starting with the Accord on Friendship and Consultation, signed in 1957, which was updated in 2000 for the celebration of the 5th Centenary of the “Discovery” of Brazil, which would open new collaboration avenues for both countries. Also, in the 1990s, other relevant treaties were signed, namely the Accord on Consular Cooperation in 1995, which allows citizens of Portugal and Brazil to access each other’s consulates in third countries; and the Agreement on Social Security, signed in 1995 and replacing
the one signed in 1969, which became a model for the Ibero-American States’ Multiregional Cooperation Agreement on Social Security signed later in 2007.

One final step toward recognizing the relevance of the diaspora is granting the right to vote and to representation (Boccagni et al. 2016; Lisi et al. 2019). The political rights of Portuguese emigrants have been recognized for four decades, since the approval of the first electoral law in 1976. The reestablishment of democracy pushed Portugal to ensure equal political rights and to create channels to allow the effective political participation of all citizens (Lisi et al. 2019), including those abroad. Emigrants’ voting rights were approved based on the principle of promoting an effective participation and the inclusion of all citizens abroad (Lisi et al. 2019); thus, Portuguese emigrants gained the right to be represented in the Parliament by electing a representative from the emigration districts. Bauböck (1994, 2005) considers the extended electoral right as an expansion of citizenship and a strategy of the state to maintain political ties with its community abroad in a process of transnational citizenship. Although some efforts have been made to promote external vote, overall, emigrants’ affairs have not been a popular topic among the parties’ political debate in Portugal, and the approach to their plights and needs still focuses on old matters.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented Portuguese emigration flows with special attention to Latin America and discussed the transformations and evolution of Portuguese emigration policies, first targeting emigrants to later focusing on the diaspora. Despite some fluctuations, the constant flow of Portuguese citizens leaving the country has put emigration as a permanent topic in the national political and research agenda.

Although the reasons behind Portuguese emigration to Brazil could be deemed obvious due to the countries’ shared colonial past and their complementarity in terms of population surplus and needs, certain nuances require a deep analysis. First, there is the centrality of Brazil as a destination in the Portuguese emigration dynamics, not only in the Lusophone world but also in comparison with other destinations. Likewise, the role of diplomatic agreements in shaping this flow aim at the protection of emigrants abroad and, much later, the reciprocity of those agreements to safeguard Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. These negotiation strategies, over time, have opened unique opportunities in both countries, Portugal and Brazil, to work together and look after their citizens.

The presence of a Portuguese community in Argentina and Venezuela illustrates the complexity and transformations of Portuguese emigration in the 20th century. While the Argentinian case demonstrates the role of social networks in fostering new emigration paths, Venezuela is a classic example of manual labor migration which evolved to an investment destination. Therefore, if emigration can be considered a structural feature of Portuguese society, it does not
mean that the flows are either uniform or the same throughout the centuries. The changes, however, are not by chance. If the economic and political situation of the destination country plays a role, emigration or diaspora policies also play a part in the configuration of the emigration flows.

After long decades of restrictive and controlling migration policies during Estado Novo, Portuguese people were granted the right to freely migrate again in 1974. However, it does not mean that during this period people did not migrate. In fact, during the 1960s, Portugal registered its higher numbers of people leaving the country up until the austerity years from 2010 to 2014. The changes in the Portuguese migration dynamics also involve changes in the meanings that the state attributed to its diaspora. In the process of revamping its image as a modern country, Portuguese citizens abroad were portrayed as the countries’ “ambassadors”, and emigration policies transformed in diaspora policies aiming at building an international Portuguese community. Despite Portugal’s recent efforts in modernizing its policies towards the diaspora and intention to attract their investment, given the constant changes in the national political landscape, only the future will tell about the success of the actions.

Notes
1 https://portaldascomunidades.mne.gov.pt/pt/
2 Regarding voting rights, Portuguese emigrants are entitled to parliamentary representation, with four deputies elected for the Assembly of the Republic; they also participate in the European elections (for Eurodeputies), presidential elections and national referendums (Lisi et al. 2019).

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9 Cooperation, migration and development

Yugoslavia and the Southern Cone in the postwar period

Sara Bernard and Agustin Cosovschi

Introduction

This contribution offers new insights into Yugoslav attempts to bolster cooperation with South American countries in the 1950s and 1960s, a topic which remains largely underresearched. It analyses the reasons behind this cooperation, the expected results, and its actual achievements. It also gives special attention to the role of migration in this cooperation. Migration holds a special place in the foreign policies of socialist Yugoslavia: a large number of Yugoslavs abroad were economic migrants, and their support was a valuable asset to socialist Yugoslavia. At the same time, there were doubts about their loyalty to the state, not least because of a considerable number of political émigrés in the Yugoslav diaspora.

South America hosted great numbers of both economic and political migrants. Starting from the late 19th century, South Slavs left the Balkans for South America in great numbers. Until the 1930s, migrants left predominantly for economic reasons and were largely in favour of Yugoslav unity. But starting from the 1930s, migrations to the subcontinent were often politically driven, as both leftist and right-wing political activism radicalised globally. The Yugoslavs who left during and in the aftermath of the Second World War were mostly anti-communists, often also anti-Yugoslav-oriented, and remained active opponents of the country and its government abroad.

Drawing mainly on archival sources, economic press, and technical reports, this contribution investigates Yugoslav policies towards old and new diasporas in the country’s pursuit of cooperation in the Southern Cone. It charts changes in migration policies and patterns before and after the communist takeover to explore continuities and changes in the attitudes of the Yugoslav leadership towards its nationals abroad and vice versa. To show the complexity and ambivalence of these relations, it focuses on relations with two countries of the Southern Cone: Chile and Argentina. Home to wealthy Yugoslav colonies which remained largely pro-Yugoslav until the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991, Chile was also an important foothold for the Yugoslav communist regime due to strong connections with the Chilean Socialist Party since the early 1950s. Conversely, Argentina was the main economic partner...
in the region along with Brazil, and the country in which the large majority of Yugoslavs was concentrated. But it was also home to leading Croat émigré organisations, which represented a threat not only to Yugoslav cooperation in the region but to Yugoslav unity as well. Besides exploration of these two case studies, this chapter identifies migration patterns that arose directly out of the forms of cooperation that Yugoslavia managed to establish in the Southern Cone in the early Cold War.

The overall aim of this contribution is therefore to set the ground for further research on the transnational networks linking Yugoslavia and South America in the early post-war period and the role migration played in shaping these networks.

The ideological and economic underpinnings of the Yugoslav venture in South America

Yugoslav interest in South America was part of a shift in the positioning of socialist Yugoslavia in the Cold War. Dismembered and largely destroyed during World War II, Yugoslavia was re-established as the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945. Under the leadership of Marshal Tito, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) secured victory and sided with Moscow. However, divergences on different issues soon emerged, and tensions between Belgrade and Moscow became irreconcilable. In 1948, the KPJ was expelled from the Cominform. After that, Yugoslavia remained a socialist country, but it turned to the United States and Western Europe to secure financial and military support. Faced with the need to legitimise its independent position from the Eastern bloc, while also keeping a certain distance from the West, the Yugoslavs embarked on a mission to extend their network of allies beyond the European world. Thus, they started to develop stronger relations with newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, and with progressive parties and movements in the nascent “Third World”. As a result, and in partnership with other anti-imperialist leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru in India, Yugoslavia would promote some years later the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the Belgrade Conference of 1961.

Socialist Yugoslavia developed an interest in South America already in the 1940s. Belgrade sent three delegations to the region in 1946 and in 1948, the first one led by Ljubo Ilić and charged with re-establishing diplomatic relations with the countries of the region after World War II (Simić 2020b). Three missions followed in 1954, 1958 and 1959 with the aim of encouraging trade and better relations with the countries of the region and developing connections with local progressive parties and movements. By the early 1950s, Belgrade had established diplomatic representations in all the principal South American countries. Agreements in trade and other forms of cooperation were also launched. In some cases, diplomatic relations were established for the first time by the communist leadership (for instance, with Cuba), while in other cases they existed already in the interwar period and were restored after being
interrupted by the war, as in the case of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. The late 1950s were a period of intense Yugoslav activity in Latin America, with Belgrade constantly increasing its efforts to broaden its network of partners in the region, leading up to Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović visiting South America in 1962 in preparation for Tito’s visit to Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico the following year (Rubinstein 1970: 94–103; Cosovschi 2021).

Yugoslav undertakings in South America were shaped by Belgrade’s moderate positions within NAM. Among the five heads of states that founded NAM in 1961, Tito and Nehru soon came to the understanding that conciliation rather than confrontation with the superpowers was the path NAM should take (Rubinstein 1970: 100, 101; Jakovina 2011). Neutrality had broad consensus in the Yugoslav diplomatic body (Jazić 2011: 91–93; Mates 1970: Chapter 3) and was praised by the West, which saw Yugoslavia as an ally in international negotiations on West-South relations (Zaccaria 2016: 13, 36, 48, 69). On account of its moderate positions in NAM and its independence from the Soviet bloc, the integrity of the Yugoslav federation, to which Tito was committed, was a priority for the West. For that same reason, the initial sympathy, or even support, that the Yugoslav political emigration enjoyed in many Western countries faded away in the 1950s (Molnar 2018: chapters 1 and 2; Tokić 2020: 29–34).

It was precisely Belgrade’s conciliatory approach which rapidly became the bone of contention between Yugoslavia and a key actor in the development of Latin American Cold War politics: revolutionary Cuba. Yugoslavia was swift to recognise the success of the Cuban revolution. Diplomatic relations with Havana were established in 1960, and several protocols were signed for cooperation in sectors such as trade, education, science and culture (Pantelić & Jončić 2013). But relations became rapidly tarnished when Cuban authorities and media started to voice criticisms of Yugoslav socialism and even accused the Yugoslavs of revisionism. The conflict between Belgrade and Havana would only become more intense in following years: Cuba was the only Latin American country to participate in the first NAM Conference as a full member, and it would constantly push against Yugoslav conciliatory positions over the years, attempting to impose more radical and anti-American stances on the movement and pushing for NAM’s rapprochement with the socialist bloc. Havana’s radicalism and its active involvement in “Third World” struggles would render it a direct competitor to Yugoslavia, which led to growing tensions within NAM (Jakovina 2011: Chapter 4). This also had an impact on Yugoslav policies in Latin America, as Castro’s regime became a symbol of revolutionary zeal and anti-imperialism, while Yugoslavia’s more conciliatory policies lost ground and were often the object of criticism by local communist parties following Moscow’s guide.

Latin American perceptions of Yugoslavia were often entangled in the dynamics of local politics. In Chile, for instance, Tito’s policies were often defended by the Socialists and condemned by the Communists, who were allies in a common front in the late 1950s but remained divided over significant theoretical and political issues (Casals 2010). Chilean socialists fostered strong
relations with Belgrade, with socialist intellectual Oscar Waiss even writing a book in praise of Yugoslav socialism in his 1955 travel journal *Amanecer en Belgrado*, and with the Socialist Party’s publishing house editing Spanish versions of Yugoslav propaganda materials. In turn, the Communist Party of Chile would often attack Yugoslav positions, even publishing a book entitled *El problema Yugoslavo*, which accused Yugoslavia of revisionism. Thus, from the mid–1960s onwards, Yugoslav actions in the region faced a growingly difficult environment. Although the 1970s saw a strong commitment to NAM in Latin America with the inclusion of countries such as Chile and Peru, the increasing radicalization of politics in the region and the wave of military repression that was unleashed on the continent after Augusto Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973 significantly reduced Belgrade’s ability to extend its influence.

However, it would not be accurate to say that Yugoslav endeavours in South America were without results, nor that Yugoslav moderate positions in NAM curtailed all Yugoslav ambitions in the region. All these challenges notwithstanding, Yugoslav socialism was followed with great interest and inspired several left-wing and nationalist movements and leaders over the years (Bockman 2019; Cosovschi 2021). Moreover, as argued by several scholars of Yugoslav foreign policy, Yugoslavia understood pragmatism as best suited to safeguard Yugoslav national interests. Nonalignment should be primarily seen as functional to Yugoslavia’s domestic economic and political needs, mostly with the aim of ending Yugoslavia’s isolation after 1948 and affording it an important international role (Dimić 2018; Jakovina 2011; Rubinstein 1970). Hence, although political moderation effectively imposed limitations on Belgrade’s political activities in the region, it also allowed for a wider margin of action in the face of rising anti-communism in Latin America and best suited Yugoslav economic interests in the region.

Although political alliances and economic cooperation were connected, sources suggest that political compromises were often made to secure economic gains. Pressing economic needs might explain this approach. Yugoslavia sought to address the dramatic rise of its deficit in the balance of payments, largely due to its trade with Western European countries (Zaccaria 2016: 73–97; Dyker 1990: chapter 5). Trade with the Global South could help alleviate these needs, and in the case of Yugoslavia and South America, Yugoslav moderation could prove instrumental to expanding trade with the two major markets in South America, Brazil and Argentina, which covered 80% of all Yugoslav trade in the region (Rubinstein 1970: 94). During most of the period and since 1964, Brazil was under military administration, while Argentina experienced shifts of democratic governments and anti-communist dictatorships.

These developments came along with a strong influence of Washington in regional politics, which made Yugoslav moderation all the more suitable. The case of Yugoslav relations with Brazil is telling: after several years of failed attempts to increase cooperation in the 1950s, relations significantly improved during the years of Juscelino Kubitschek, Janio Quadros, and left-wing leader Joao Goulart between 1959 and 1964, with a new agreement in 1961 that
insured regular trade with Brazil for five years to amount to approximately $240 million in both directions (Teodosić 2019: 24, 25). Both countries agreed to rely on their complementarity and to cooperate economically for the best mutual interest, as well as to further develop programmes of industrial cooperation and specialisation and to optimise strategies of joint appearance in Third World markets. But after the 1964 coup in Brazil, the anti-communist stance of the military administration and close relations with Washington temporarily ended friendly relations with Yugoslavia. Cooperation resumed only in 1967, especially in the economic domain and in the framework of UNCTAD and NAM (Ibid: 26, 27).

Did Yugoslavia succeed in bolstering its economic development thanks to cooperation in Latin America? The available data suggests the response is mixed. Overall economic cooperation and trade between Yugoslavia and South America increased in the 1950s and 1960s and remained relevant afterwards, although not as much as Yugoslavia hoped (Cosovschi 2021; Rubinstein 1970: 95, 96). Trade with Latin America rose substantially during the 1960s, going from $25 million to $62 million in 1969. Yet, Latin America’s importance for Yugoslav foreign trade remained considerably low compared with Africa, and even more so when compared with Asia (Popović 1970). That being said, statistical data on trade might underestimate the extent of the economic cooperation and exchange between South America and Yugoslavia, as it does not account for indirect sources of economic cooperation which might have been very important in the long run. For example, South America was home to a number of enterprises which were owned or run by Yugoslavs or descendants of Yugoslav settlers in the region. New Yugoslav enterprises such as Enegoprojekt and Enegoinvest opened branches and established joint ventures in Latin American countries. Professional football was another sector in which Yugoslav–South American connections were relevant (with Brazil, for example). It is likely that part of the revenues of these businesses returned to Yugoslavia in different forms. More broadly, there are little data on the amount of remittances which Yugoslav migrants and settlers in South America sent to Yugoslavia or saved in Yugoslav bank accounts. Available sources suggest that saving and investing money and sending remittances was already widespread in the 1920s. This was followed with great interest by Yugoslav state authorities, postal services, and the bank sector, which saw in migrant savings opportunities for lucrative business opportunities (Miletić 2012: 133–136).

Unfortunately, little research and data are available on remittances sent by Yugoslavs from the Americas after the Second World War. Changes in migration patterns between Yugoslavia and South America suggest that during socialism, remittances sent by Yugoslavs from the region were inferior to those sent from Western Europe, where a great number of Yugoslav workers found employment from the early 1960s. On the one hand, the emigration in the post-war era to South America was largely political, and it is unlikely that political émigrés sent money to Yugoslavia as they left no family members behind. If they did send it, this was probably through unofficial channels and to support
the political opposition or political actions against the Yugoslav federal system, as happened in the late 1980s and 1990s, when overseas diasporas financed national leaders in their path towards independence from the Yugoslav federation (Hockenos 2003). However, South America’s diasporas remained in size and engagement far behind sister organisations in the United States (Đikanović 2012; Miletić 2012: 81).

Yet, Yugoslav cooperation with South America was also shaped by immigration to Yugoslavia, which was sponsored and established by the socialist state. This consisted in the repatriation of Yugoslavs who were forced to leave during the Second World War or left before that. Many of those returnees were shipped back from the Americas. Their return was meant to legitimise socialist Yugoslavia beyond its national borders and to reconnect with the Yugoslav diasporas, so as to gain support for socialism and Yugoslav unity. In addition, a number of students and workers from the Global South came to socialist Yugoslavia for training and study. These mobilities were sponsored by the state and were part of Yugoslav policies to promote technical and economic cooperation with the Global South. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of return migration and of the “socialist” mobilities on Yugoslav economic development, they certainly contributed to building Yugoslavia’s international prestige and to consolidating its soft power in the “Third World”.

Following migration patterns: the Yugoslav communities of Chile and Argentina

Yugoslav emigration to South America dated back to the 1870s and was mostly economically driven. The triggers were the crisis of shipbuilding and of winemaking, and population growth, which led to massive unemployment. Most migrants came from the coastal areas of Dalmatia and from Slavonia, then part of the Habsburg Empire, while the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro endorsed restricted migration policies and provided fewer migrants. In 1928, there were about 150,000 Yugoslav migrants throughout South America, mostly concentrated in southern Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (Antić 1988a). After reaching a halt during the First World War, emigration to the region resumed in the 1920s when visa restrictions were introduced in the United States, Canada, and Australia (Miletić 2012: 145, 146). Numbers sharply declined again in the 1930s when the Great Depression interrupted emigration to the Americas and return migration intensified. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav presence in the region remained strong. Sources suggest, for instance, that, in the late 1930s, there were about 150,000 Yugoslavs of Croat ethnicity in Argentina alone (Simić 2020a: 792).

Emigration heavily shaped diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and South American countries. The first Yugoslav diplomatic bodies were established where emigration was concentrated: Argentina (1922), Chile (1935), and Brazil (1938). The support of the Yugoslav communities in South America to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1918) first,
and to its transformation into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929) later, was of crucial importance for the Yugoslav political elite, not least because Yugoslavia had very poor knowledge and expertise on the American subcontinent. To secure the economic and political support of Yugoslavs overseas and to curb the spread of anti-Yugoslav ideas among them, interwar Yugoslavia invested many resources to create a Yugoslav transnational community which encompassed Yugoslavs in the homeland and overseas in one single transterritorial entity (Brunnbauer 2012). For example, expenditure for the opening of diplomatic representatives and cultural associations, as well as distribution of cultural material (propaganda), expanded greatly.

In many ways, the migration policies of socialist Yugoslavia towards its diasporas were in continuity with those of interwar Yugoslavia (Brunnbauer 2016: 259, 269). Much like interwar Yugoslavia, socialist Yugoslavia continued to perceive Yugoslavs abroad as an integral part of the Yugoslav national community. Fear of the activities of anti-Yugoslav émigrés abroad, as well as attempts to secure the flow of remittances to Yugoslavia, were common to both interwar and socialist Yugoslavia. Yet, important discontinuities exist too. Overall, migration patterns to South America and the relations between Yugoslavia and South American countries changed significantly, and they assumed a much greater strategic role for socialist Yugoslavia than they ever had for interwar Yugoslavia.

To begin with, the importance of South America in the Yugoslav worldview changed substantially. While in the interwar period Yugoslavia had mainly European ambitions, socialist Yugoslavia aspired to become a global player. This made relations with South American countries not only economically but also politically relevant. Second, for a country that built its legitimacy on notions of socialism and class belonging, the nature and pattern of emigration to South America before the Second World War was ideologically favourable: many of the migrants of Yugoslav origin who left for the Americas in the early 20th century found employment in industry, which was expanding in this period, and the fluidity of South Slav national identities conflated well with socialist ideals and with support for the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 (Brunnbauer 2016: 107). Socialist ideas and support to Yugoslav unity were stronger among Yugoslavs in the United States (where migrants’ employment in the industrial sector dominated earlier), but strongholds were present in South America too. In Antofagasta (Chile), the first newspaper in the Americas named after Yugoslavia was published in 1915. In 1912, Valparaiso (Chile) became a centre for the collection of help and resources for the Red Cross of Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, while Rosario (Argentina) was the set of the main support committee for Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers at the warfront (Perić 2005: 74–76). In Bolivia, several scattered communities joined the effort to support the creation of Yugoslavia. This network would be rebuilt during the Second World War and supported Tito’s partisans (Antić 1986).

Third, Yugoslav post-war emigration to South America was largely political. During the socialist period, the Ustasha movement, a fascist and ultra-nationalist
Yugoslavia and the Southern Cone

movement, and Croatian separatists more broadly, would constitute the most
dangerous political organisation in the diaspora, having important operational
bases in South America. During the Second World War, the Ustasha gov-
erned the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the puppet state established
by Hitler and Mussolini in occupied Yugoslavia. The Ustasha presence in
South America dated back to the 1930s when the Croatian Home Guard (the
paramilitary organisation of the Croatian separatist forces, disbanded in 1928)
was re-established in Buenos Aires in 1931 (Tokić 2020: 28, 29). The fervent
anti-communism and Catholicism shared by Croatian separatists and the con-
servative governments of the Argentine “Infamous Decade” provided a basis
for mutual support and cooperation. In the aftermath of World War II, many
leading figures of the Ustasha movement took refuge in Argentina, such as
the poglavnik Ante Pavelić, as well as Vinko Nikolić and Antun Bonifačić who
relaunched Hrvatska Revija (Croatian Review), a popular quarterly among Croats
abroad which was banned by the Yugoslav communists in 1945 (Grba 2019;
Jandrić 2003: 449–453). Leading figures of Serbian conservatism such as the
former Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović also settled in Buenos Aires (Tokić
2020: 43), making Argentina an important centre for Yugoslav anti-communist
activities abroad.

The Yugoslav leadership was highly concerned about these developments.
According to the Yugoslav ambassador in Buenos Aires, Slavoljub Petrović, Tito
explicitly charged him with preventing the activities of the Ustasha emigration
from hindering the development of good relations with the Argentine govern-
ment (Petrović 2007: 160, 161). Moreover, the Yugoslav leadership feared that
anti-Yugoslav propaganda could gain support among Yugoslav workers in South
America, especially in Argentina, where political emigrants were hosted by the
local authorities and provided legal protection and support to their activities
(Simić 2020b). Yet, partly the risks of the spread of anti-Yugoslav ideas among
Yugoslav communities in South America intensified as a result of the grandiose
programme of repatriation, which the communist regime launched after the
end of the war (Brunnbauer 2016: 266, 267; Hofgräff & Selnik 2021: 105–108;
Šegvić 1958). As those who made their way back to Yugoslavia were the most
loyal supporters of Tito’s Yugoslavia overseas, their return deprived Yugoslavia
of its most important allies to fight against political emigrants. This was in
particular the case of Argentina. According to available data, South America
contributed about 10% of the total returns sponsored by the state, which took
place between 1945 and 1951. Argentina recorded one of the highest numbers
of returns. With its 1,748 returnees, it was second only to France (3,914). In
terms of nationality, the large majority of returnees were Croats (52%) followed
by Slovenes (27.5%) and Serbs (10%) (Simić 2020a: 793).

Yet, Croats were not only political opponents of interwar and socialist Yugo-
slavia. Although Croatian national identity often entered into conflict with
Yugoslav and socialist ideas, many Croats were also at the forefront of politi-
cal support for Yugoslavism. Argentina and Chile provide an interesting con-
trast here. In both countries Croat nationals were overrepresented, but while
Argentina became one of the most important centres of Croatian separatism in the post-war period, the Croat communities of Chile were largely pro-Yugoslav and, to a large extent, remained so until 1991 (Martinić 2002). Antofagasta (Chile) would even become one of the centres of Yugoslavism in South America. While there are many possible explanations for this contrast, the diverse geographic provenience and the class belonging of Croat migrants in Chile and in Argentina are useful categories of analysis here, as they played a major role in shaping migrants’ relations with the Yugoslav state. For instance, Croats who left for Argentina came from different parts of the Habsburg Empire. Although all classes were represented, the large majority of first settlers were low-class peasants whose political party, the Croat Peasant Party, was against cooperation with Serbia for Yugoslav unity but in favour of a Croat nation-state within the Habsburg Empire. Class and political divisions within the Yugoslav communities in Argentina did strengthen as a result of the migration experience due to poor opportunities for social mobility offered to migrant workers, with the exception of the shipping sector, in which only a minor part of migrants of Yugoslav origin were employed.

Conversely, the progressive reforms implemented in the Chilean economy in the early 20th century offered stable jobs and opportunities for social mobility to migrant workers. Migrants of Yugoslav origin who could sustain the costs of the longer journey to Chile were usually better off and were a relatively more homogenous group than the much more numerous Croats directed to Argentina. Their large majority came from Dalmatia, where the idea of Yugoslav unity received great support among Croat intellectuals and politicians who promoted cooperation with the Kingdom of Serbia in the early 20th century and became part of the first Yugoslav government. Furthermore, the production of nitrate in Chile, which grew considerably in the early decades of the 20th century, benefited Croatian settlers who invested in this sector and became the founders of the Yugoslav Bank in Punta Arenas and branches in Valparaiso and Antofagasta, the first economic institution with “Yugoslavia” in its name (Perić Kaselj 2016: 252). Finally, Chile remained a fairly progressive country in the interwar period, with an important reform of agriculture in the late 1920s that aimed to improve productivity and to favour the establishment of agricultural colonies. Within this reformative process, migrants were offered the same legal rights as indigenous workers with the aim of facilitating the acquisition of plots by migrant workers (Rector 2003: chapter 6).3

Although class divisions and struggles existed in the Chilean Croat communities already during World War I (Antić 1988b), and despite the fact that successful economic integration was not always linked to support to and/or from the Yugoslav state (see, for instance, the case of Bolivia: Rajković 2015),4 the wealth generated by the Chilean Yugoslav community and the positive relation it enjoyed with the communist regime might have contributed to the popularity of Yugoslav ideas in the Chilean political spectrum, with important figures of different sectors of Chilean politics coming from a Yugoslav background, as in the case of Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic Romero or socialist
Pedro Vuskovic. Yet, some sources suggest that this pro–Yugoslav orientation was not total, nor should it be taken as a sign of a generalized left-wing trend within the Yugoslav diaspora. For instance, during a joint visit to Yugoslavia in 1963, socialist Raul Ampuero and communist Victor Contreras, both elected senators for the province of Antofagasta, declared that the Yugoslav community in Chile was “mostly right-wing” with a tendency to support Radicals and Liberals or “Christian Democrats in the best of cases”, and they did not hesitate to interpret this conservative political orientation as a result of their class belonging.5

Socialist mobilities from South America to Yugoslavia: a preliminary assessment

During the socialist period, new forms of mobility developed that brought South Americans to Yugoslav soil through various forms of academic and political exchange. Even though not necessarily tied to the classical patterns of migration between these regions, socialist mobilities (re)shaped connections between these distant geographies in many different ways which remain largely uncharted. The aim of this section is to offer a preliminary assessment on the rise and development of these mobilities within Yugoslav–South American relations on the basis of available studies and sources.

Following a trend which involved countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, socialist Yugoslavia developed an interest in attracting international students from the 1950s onwards. Although recent scholarship suggests that already in the late 1960s, logics of profit became an important component of the internationalisation of Yugoslav higher education (Wright 2021) and led to an important reduction in the number of scholarships offered. The logic of solidarity which underpinned these programmes in the 1950s and early 1960s at least, was one important tool used by socialist Yugoslavia in its endeavour to consolidate its soft power in the “Third World”. The Yugoslav state promoted student and worker mobility programmes targeting countries in the Global South with two main goals: to assist recently decolonized countries to staff themselves with technical cadres, and to ensure privileged relations with the countries of origin, as the cadres trained and educated in Yugoslavia would assume positions of power once they returned home.6 Hence, scholarships were offered to students to come to Yugoslavia for short periods of study, for acquiring a degree or a qualification in higher education. In the early 1950s applicants and beneficiaries of scholarships were almost exclusively students from Western European countries. But, by the late 1950s, the number of students and their nationalities had expanded greatly: while 23 students from seven different countries were enrolled in full-time studies in the academic year 1952–1953 in Yugoslav universities, by 1958–1959 they accounted for 249 students from 42 different countries, with students from Third World countries, and from Africa in particular, increasing considerably (Baker 2018: 59).
The presence of students from Latin America in socialist Yugoslavia was much smaller than numbers from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. For example, according to data of the Yugoslav Association of Students, in 1964, a total of 912 students received a scholarship to enrol in full-time studies (first or second year of study). Of those students, 348 were from Africa, 322 from Arabic countries, 131 from Asia, 83 from Latin America, 20 from European countries, and 8 from the United States, Canada, and Australia. Although the total number of scholarships granted to South American countries was lower also in the previous and following years, their distribution by country changed every year, making it difficult to speculate about their contribution to any specific Yugoslav strategy in South America. For example, in the period 1958–1966, the largest number of scholarships in Latin America were given to Chile and Bolivia, which might be the result of the manifold political, economic, and cultural connections with Chile and the general need for technical cadre in revolutionary Bolivia.

Further research will be needed to verify these hypotheses and provide a fuller picture of the trends and role of scholarships in these relations. Yet, a curious aspect which emerges in the records of the Yugoslav Association of Students is that, although it was one of the smallest societies of students, the society of students from Latin America was reported to be one of the most active, but also internally divided, in the early 1960s. Whether and how these developments were reasons of concern for the Yugoslav authorities does not emerge in the sources consulted. More broadly, the impact of international students on any aspect of Yugoslav youth culture and society remains unknown.

Finally, in the context of rising left-wing internationalism and as a result of the manifold political connections developed throughout the 1950s, Yugoslavia also became a frequent destination for many on the Latin American Left. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, left-wing and nationalist leaders, intellectuals, and militants came to Yugoslavia to familiarize themselves with the particulars of Yugoslav socialism, and among the many figures that visited the country during those decades were Bolivian former president Victor Paz Estenssoro, Argentine Marxist intellectual Silvio Frondizi, and Chilean socialist leaders Raúl Ampuero, Salomón Corbalán, and Salvador Allende (Cosovschi in press). In the early decades of the Cold War, these networks allowed for various forms of travel meant for political exchange and education. But they would also prove useful following the wave of military repression that swept over Latin America in the 1970s. As a result of violence targeting left-wing militants, many South American militants would take refuge in Yugoslavia under the sponsorship of Belgrade. Sources for these mobilities are still to be explored, but some initial hints suggest that connections with Chile were again of special importance here. For instance, a report from 1974 written by Luis Jérez Ramirez, representative of the Chilean Socialist Party in exile in Yugoslavia, describes the situation of more than 40 Chilean exiles who took refuge in Yugoslavia after Pinochet’s coup in September 1973. Among them were not only some who had a Yugoslav background, but also many who occupied important positions.
in the structures of Chilean socialism, being members of the Central Committee or even part of Salvador Allende’s personal guard. In his report, Jérez Ramirez describes the situation of these refugees with some regret, as their integration in Yugoslav society was taking much longer than expected, and their living conditions were still precarious many months after their arrival. But he especially took care to underline that the reason why so many Chilean socialists had demanded refuge there was precisely because of the special bond that they had developed with Yugoslavia over the years.10

All in all, we still know little about how socialist mobilities had an impact on the lives and professional trajectories of those who came to Yugoslavia to acquire academic and technical training, or to take refuge from violence and repression unleashed in their own countries. With this very preliminary assessment on the different mobilities promoted by the socialist state, nevertheless, we want to underline the need to explore these important but still neglected topics.

Conclusion

In this exploratory chapter, we have traced some of the main developments and trends in the relations of cooperation between socialist Yugoslavia and South America in the first decades of the Cold War. We have shown how old diasporas and new forms of mobilities, as well as the policies to regulate them, played an important and multifaceted role in shaping Yugoslav–South American relations. As we have seen, although relations with South American countries already existed in the interwar period, socialist Yugoslavia granted a renewed and greater attention to the region due to its ambitious foreign policy vis-à-vis the “Third World”. In this context, the presence of Yugoslav diasporas in the countries of the Southern Cone constituted a double-edged sword. While many of the Yugoslavs who came to the Americas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as economic migrants supported Tito’s Yugoslavia, the anti-communist political emigration that came to the continent following the Communist takeover was considerably active and, more often than not, more efficient and aggressive than the pro-Yugoslav emigration. Yet the relation of Yugoslavs abroad with the home country was shaped by many diverse factors, as shown by drawing some comparisons between the Yugoslav communities of Chile and Argentina. Finally, we have addressed some forms of political and academic mobility that were characteristic of the context of international solidarity and rising internationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, but also of the violent and radicalized context of the 1970s, which still remain largely underresearched.

Notes

2 AJ 784–1–2, examples of advertisement of saving services by Poštanka Stedionica Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Zadružna Gospodarska Banka, Jugoslavenska Banka D. D.
3 AJ 784–1–6, doc. 217/28, Santiago, November 14, 1928.
4 The Marinković family, a pro-Ustasha family that fled Croatia in the mid-1950s, has become one of the most wealthy and powerful families in Bolivia. In 2010, Branko Marinković, a member of this family, was convicted of organizing a coup against the socialist government of Evo Morales. In 2020, Branko Marinković also served as minister in the anti-socialist governments led by Jeanine Áñez.
7 AJ 145–32–90, Stanje i problemi školovanja stranih studenata u Jugoslaviji, p. 3.

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**Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ)**

Fond 145 Yugoslav Association of Students
Fond 784 Mission of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Buenos Aires
Fond 507 Commission for International Relations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
10 Ambitious plans with modest results

Greek migration flows to Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s

Maria Damilakou and Yannis G. S. Papadopoulos

Greece has a long tradition in emigration that has left an indelible mark on its history and society. During the period 1890–1920, about half a million Greeks were part of the massive overflows to the Americas, the United States being by and large their main destination. In the aftermath of World War II, Greece became, once again, an important source of migrant labor for overseas and Western European host countries. Many factors contributed to these migration flows: chronic fiscal deficits, poor living standards, low productivity in the primary sector, high unemployment as well as chain migration and strong cultural factors. Despite the influx of American financial aid from the Marshall Plan and several stabilization programs, economic hardship and high rates of unemployment persisted in the post–World War II period (Botsiou 2009; Kakridis 2009; Bechmann 2012). It was against this background that migrant social networks were reactivated while the Greek government favored emigration to improve and stabilize economic conditions and prevent social and political instability.

In the period 1946–1970, approximately one million Greek emigrants moved to overseas and European host countries. Of those, 400,000 traveled to transoceanic destinations, mainly to Australia, Canada, and the United States (Kitroeff 1992: 88, 94–95; Hasiotis 1993: 134). In the 1950s, Greece, as a member of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) – a new international organization created in 1951 in order to regulate migration flows – sought to encourage organized emigration to Australia and Canada, but also considered South American countries as potential destinations (Tourgeli & Venturas 2015: 228).

Latin America acting as host countries was something Greeks were already familiar with. A stable and numerically significant Greek community had been established in Argentina since the 1920s (Filippidis 1938; Katsomalos 1972; Ritacco 1992). As early as the beginning of the 20th century, Greek emigration flows to Argentina began to increase steadily, and by 1914, about 12,000 Greek emigrants had arrived in the country. Of course, these were times of tremendous mobility, and not all of them remained there. According to the 1914 national census, 5,907 Greeks lived in Argentina; that is, half of those who had arrived in the country (Damilakou 2004: 57, 64–65). These numbers,
although much lower compared to those for the United States, make Argentina the second most important transatlantic destination for Greek migrants in the era of mass immigration.

Brazil, on the other hand, had attracted relatively few immigrants from Greece before World War II, due to a lack of opportunities for urban workers and discouragement by Greek authorities (Kitroeff 1992: 64–65). However, a Greek community was founded in Florianópolis as early as 1883 (Katcipis 2014). In the early decades of the 20th century, around 1,000 Greek immigrants were hired to work in the construction of the Madeira-Mamoré railway line in the Amazon. Some of them subsequently married local women and settled in the city of Guajará-Mirim at the frontier with Bolivia (Constantinidou 2009: 70). In the interwar period, Greek communities in both Argentina and Brazil grew and acquired a more stable character, especially after the end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, the compulsory exchange of populations and the serious refugee problem that Greece faced. From 1922 to 1927, approximately 3,000 Greek immigrants arrived in Argentina, while in Brazil, a few hundred refugees from Asia Minor settled mainly in São Paulo (Constantinidou 2009: 134). Generally speaking, during the 1920s, South American countries functioned as alternative destinations for Greek migrants, when access to the United States became almost impossible after the introduction of a quota system which was passed as law in 1921 and 1924. At a time when most major receiving countries were adopting restrictive migration policies to limit the entrance of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, South America was becoming more appealing as a region that could easily absorb mass migration from the Old World.

In the new global context that emerged after World War II, the Greek state, international institutions, and prospective migrants themselves began to reconsider emigration to South American countries. These flows were part of the larger movement of Southern European migrants towards Latin America, although the number of Greeks who actually moved to Brazil and Argentina was relatively small. The stimulation and management of these flows, the national and transnational policies behind them, but also the disparity between plans and reality, can shed light on important aspects of the post-war “Western world”, namely human mobility, political priorities and development strategies as well as intra-periphery and center-periphery relations.

Spontaneous and organized migrant flows from Greece to South America

In the aftermath of World War II, Argentina and Brazil became, once again, destinations for thousands of European emigrants who were forced to abandon their countries driven by the post-war acute economic and political crisis. As discussed in other chapters of this volume, in the post–World War
II period both Argentina and Brazil followed a policy of attracting European immigrants which was based on the application of selective criteria. From 1945 to 1960, about 900,000 European immigrants arrived in Argentina, with a major concentration of numbers in the period 1947–1952. The absolute predominance of Italians and Spaniards among the immigrants is not unusual, if we take into account the long-established presence of large Italian and Spanish migrant communities in Argentina; but it was also the result of the migration agreements that Peron signed with Italy and Spain starting from 1947 and 1948 respectively (Barbero & Cacopardo 1991).

Post-war Greek immigration to Argentina followed the general European trends: the flows began in 1947 and peaked in 1948–1951, when President Peron loosened restrictions for the invitation of immigrants’ relatives; whereas, at the same time, access to other transatlantic destinations remained very difficult. About 4,500 immigrants emigrated from Greece to Argentina from the end of World War II until 1960. The most decisive factor in these flows were the ties between long-established immigrant social networks in Argentina and their regions of origin in Greece. Most of the migrants came from the Peloponnese but also from other Greek regions that had been sending people to Argentina since the beginning of the 20th century, such as the North and Northeastern Aegean islands as well as the Ionian and the Dodecanese islands. Others came from the traditional Greek diaspora communities of Istanbul, Egypt and Romania, which faced drastic political changes after World War II (Damilakou 2004: 72–79).

Contrary to the rather spontaneous migration flows from Greece to Argentina, the majority of those from post-war Greece who settled in Brazil were assisted migrants transferred by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration after its creation in 1951. Prior to that, 1,702 Greek immigrants had arrived in Brazil between 1946 and 1951, and from 1952 to 1964, there were 10,272 new arrivals. Around 90% came from southern Greece and the islands, and the rest came from Macedonia and Thrace.1 Others, as in the aforementioned case of Argentina, came from Istanbul as a result of the persecution of the Greek minority in Turkey, and from Egypt in the late 1950s and 1960s (Constantinidou 2009: 10, 182–188). Included in these numbers were many refugees from eastern Europe who emigrated under the auspices of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and then of ICEM. Finally, a number of Greek Jewish families also emigrated to Brazil during this period (Cordás 2007). Greeks were the eighth highest number of immigrants in Brazil after World War II, representing 1.5% of the total number of those that arrived in the country from 1945 to 1958 (Fernandes de Oliveira 2006: 270).

The fact that Greece did not have a bilateral migration agreement with either Argentina or Brazil had always been an impediment to the stimulation of larger flows from Greece to these big South American countries. A major issue was the matter of remittances, which were crucial for both the immigrants and
the Greek government.\textsuperscript{2} The migration agreements that Italy had signed with Argentina since the late 1940s, and with Brazil in 1960, included provision for a special remittances' exchange rate. Unlike Italians, Greek immigrants did not have this privilege. In 1953, the Greek ambassador to Argentina, convinced that under more favorable conditions many thousands of Greeks would emigrate to Argentina, undertook the task of preparing a draft for a Greek–Argentine migration agreement, which ultimately did not materialize.\textsuperscript{3} In the case of Brazil, a special body, the Council for Immigration and Colonization (CIC), as well as the Greek government favored signing a bilateral agreement, based on the previous Italian one of 1950. However, the central Brazilian government was reluctant to do so.\textsuperscript{4} Actually, Brazil wanted to postpone the relative discussions until the integration of small groups of Greeks could be evaluated.\textsuperscript{5} In this context, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration became a promoter of channeling Greek immigrants to Argentina, Brazil and some other South American countries. ICEM was supposed to serve as an intermediate mechanism by providing, at the request of and in agreement with the concerned governments, services in the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants (Venturas 2015). Both Greece and Brazil were founding members of the ICEM since its creation in 1951, whereas Argentina became a member in 1953. In 1956 Alexandra Ioannides, Deputy Chief of the

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Immigrants' Arrivals in Argentina and Brazil}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
 & Argentina & & Brazil & \\
 & Total European & Greeks & Total European & Greeks \\
\hline
1946 & & & 11,077 & 82 \\
1947 & 38,370 & 220 & 16,819 & 299 \\
1948 & 116,115 & 522 & 18,758 & 198 \\
1949 & 148,372 & 661 & 21,387 & 89 \\
1950 & 133,120 & 422 & 32,461 & 75 \\
1951 & 103,946 & 552 & 57,644 & 485 \\
1952 & 74,294 & 307 & 73,450 & 1,087 \\
1953 & 48,258 & 222 & 68,350 & 1,641 \\
1954 & 60,452 & 236 & 64,494 & 1,850 \\
1955 & 47,457 & 216 & 46,418 & 1,049 \\
1956 & 27,863 & 150 & 35,148 & 641 \\
1957 & 36,365 & 282 & 42,415 & 1,220 \\
1958 & 35,064 & 334 & 38,565 & 831 \\
1959 & 25,419 & 242 & 32,713 & 751 \\
1960 & 48* & & 28,235 & 687 \\
1961 & & & 29,553 & 725 \\
1962 & & & 21,827 & 595 \\
1963 & & & 15,829 & 340 \\
1964 & & & 6,809 & 103 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{*} Only permanent immigrants}
\footnotesize{Sources: For Argentina, proper elaboration based on Memorias Anuales, Dirección Nacional de Migra-
ciones (Argentina); for Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Conselho Nacional de Estatís-
\end{table}
ICEM Mission in Greece, visited Latin America to personally investigate the possibilities of increasing emigration from Greece. After having visited almost all South American countries, she concluded that at that time only Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela could offer Greek immigrants the possibility to settle successfully and requested that the Greek state focus all its attention on these countries. She also stressed the need for organized migration by referring to the underlying acute problems faced by 180 unaided Greek migrants who had moved to Venezuela “in order to hunt treasures”.6

Despite these plans, the impact of ICEM’s initiatives on stimulating migration flows from Greece to Argentina was limited, especially in relation to the mobilization of a workforce. Until 1956, all immigrants that traveled to Argentina did so within the framework of ICEM’s family reunification programs, which were easier to organize as no special agreements were necessary.7 As a result of Ioannides’s visit, the Argentinian government also considered the approval of a small scheme for Greek urban workers, both skilled and semi-skilled, to emigrate to Argentina. For her part, Ioannides, taking into account the wages and low cost-of-living ratio, believed that Argentina offered excellent prospects for Greek immigrants.8 Subsequently, in November 1956, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following a petition from ICEM, approved the migration of a small number (up to 500) of skilled workers and craftsmen. Prospective candidates had to be literate, have completed their military service, and be skilled in trades such as fitters, turners, engineers, heaters and carpenters. For semi-skilled prospective migrants, six-month technical training courses were also foreseen.

The success of these measures is reflected in the considerable increase in the numbers of Greek migrants that moved to Argentina through ICEM in 1957–1959. Most of the Greeks who arrived in Argentina as skilled labor in the period 1958–1963 through ICEM were distributed to provincial cities, such as the ports of Rosario and Bahia Blanca, as well as Mendoza and Cordoba, which was considered to be the “capital of the automobile industry” in Argentina. They were also sent to Comodoro Rivadavia, where several foreign oil companies had relocated due to the liberal economic policy of the then-president Arturo Frondizi in the energy sector.

ICEM’s results in channeling Greek immigrants to Brazil were comparatively better than Argentina’s, at least numerically. The Brazilian government had a much warmer attitude than Argentina in its encouragement of flows from countries other than its traditional immigrant providers. In October 1952, Nilo de Alvarenga, director of the Brazilian Council of Immigration and Colonization, during his visit in Athens, pointed out that Brazil welcomed both individual and family migration and advertised the possibilities for skilled workers and agricultural laborers in his country. Brazilian diplomats in Athens considered Greeks as “ideal elements, tall, strong, intelligent, able to adapt easily to skilled jobs” and underlined that they could introduce new cultures to Brazil.9 At the same time, Greek newspapers started to publish articles praising Brazil’s economic development and the possibilities it offered to prospective immigrants.10 In a period when migration to the United States was not possible, due
to restrictive regulations, Brazil was described as a “country of the future” in need of workers (Fernandes de Oliveira 2009: 135).

This optimism was not shared by everyone. In May 1952, the Greek ambassador to Rio de Janeiro suggested that the Greek government should only permit the migration to Brazil of people who already had relatives or contracts guaranteeing employment there. He was rather hesitant about the possibility of mass immigration schemes from Greece to Brazil, considering the “individualist character” of Greeks and the living conditions in the host country. Moreover, he suggested that a project for organized migration presupposed an efficient service with specialized agents that would prepare reports for settlement possibilities in various states, following the Italian example. At the same time, contradictory information was arriving in Greece from Greek immigrants in Brazil. Stories circulating about people who were unable to pay for their return ticket generated confusion and contributed to the decrease of migrant flows from Greece to the huge South American country after 1954. Despite these doubts, in the 1950s and early 1960s Brazil received more Greek migrants than any other Latin American country.

From 1952 until 1962, ICEM transported 7,606 Greeks to Brazil, whereas only 936 moved to Argentina through the Committee’s mechanisms. The numbers relating to Venezuela, although much lower, made it the third most important post-war destination in Latin America for Greek emigrants. It must also be noted that, even in Brazil, the numbers of workers gradually fell and the flows were composed mostly of family members of immigrants who had already resettled there. From 1958, ICEM, in order to deter the departures of Greek workers placed in jobs in Argentina and Brazil, put emphasis on the family reunification programs. In spite of these efforts, the flows gradually decreased, while it became increasingly difficult to maintain assisted migrants as a stable workforce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICEM Greece, Statistics.
From South to South: a difficult puzzle to solve

In a lively ICEM meeting in 1957, the Secretary-General of the Greek Ministry of the Interior recognized the importance of emigration for the Greek economy and admitted that “in the case of Greece, migrants’ remittances constituted a greater source of revenue than that obtained from shipping and tourism combined”. At the same time, South American countries regarded immigration as a factor of development: the main axis of Argentina’s and Brazil’s post–World War II selective migration policies was the attraction of skilled workers for their expanding industry and of farming families to colonize and cultivate their “unexploited lands”. Both South American countries saw their participation in the ICEM as a complementary tool for their migration policies.

Since its creation in 1951, the Committee assumed the difficult task of accommodating the interests of the sending and the receiving countries. Generally speaking, since the Commonwealth countries preferred immigrants from Britain and Northern Europe, ICEM encouraged emigrants from Southern Europe to settle in Latin American countries that were regarded as having a “similar mentality”. The purpose of these movements was twofold: on the one hand, they alleviated the overpopulated countries of Southern Europe, and on the other hand, through the transfer of adequate human resources, they would contribute to the development of the countries of South America (Venturas & Damilakou 2013; Damilakou & Venturas 2015: 297–298).

How did Greek migrants fit into these plans? Regarding rural immigration, it is known that most of the Greek immigrants were farmers or had, at least, come from rural areas. Many of them had a wealth of knowledge in viticulture, olive growing and horticulture. The problem was that Greek migrants had a rather negative attitude towards rural life, due to the difficult living conditions and inadequate services in the rural areas of their homeland. Most of them were reluctant to repeat the same experience in the host country. Add to this the lack of support from the Greek state, and it is quite understandable why the participation of Greeks in colonization projects in Latin America was minimal. The only known rural settlement of Greek immigrants in Argentina was in the northern province of Salta, where in 1938, some Greek families, on their own initiative, purchased land and settled in the colony of Santa Rosa, near the locality of Oran (Damilakou 2004: 196–226).

Despite this fact, the possibility of Greek farming families emigrating to South America was examined by the involved states’ authorities and international agencies. Following the 1953 visit to Athens by the Director of the Brazilian Council of Immigration and Colonization, an official responsible for the selection of Italian agricultural laborers, arrived in Greece. The purpose of his visit was to inspect the rural working conditions and evaluate the possibilities for increasing the number of rural settlers to Brazil. In his report, he concluded that “work contracts on offer in the Sao Paulo coffee plantations would provide in a year higher revenue for a four-working member family than most farmers could hope to earn in the best agricultural areas of Greece”. Nevertheless,
he underlined that Brazil could not “offer the kind of communal life found in small Greek villages” and noted that Greek farmers were not used to being “employed on a wage basis” and preferred to cultivate their own lands. Therefore, he suggested that the “immigration of Greek farmers to Brazil should only be conducted on an experimental basis of small groups, and only after they had been informed about working conditions”.

Furthermore, Greek diplomatic authorities examined the possibility of signing bilateral agreements for the transfer of Greek farmers to South America. The Greek ambassador to Argentina, K. Vatikiotis, advised the Greek government to secure an agreement similar to the one that existed between Argentina and Italy; in 1953 a special protocol was signed between Argentina and Italy concerning the settlements of Italian farmers. In his reports, he explained the advantages of Argentina’s soil and underlined that several of the country’s provinces had similar climatic conditions to those of Greece. However, the planning of rural projects for Greek farmers would not be easy. Italian colonization projects in Argentina had the necessary political and financial backing thanks to the previously signed Italo-Argentine Agreements which had already established the terms for the implementation and financing of rural colonization programs. The Greek ambassador declared himself ready to negotiate with the Argentinian authorities on the selection of immigrants, labor issues and remittances as long as the Greek rural settlement could be financed by an external source, looking mainly at the United States. He also requested, in 1954, the approval of the Greek government for the conducting of a study concerning an agricultural settlement of Greek farmers in Argentina that could attract the interest of Greek diaspora investors. However, his proposals were not successful, and soon the Greek state put an end to all these initiatives.

In the mid-1950s, ICEM took up the baton for the elaboration of land settlement projects which were considered of supreme importance for both Mediterranean and Latin American countries. Due to the decline in immigration to Latin America in 1956, ICEM gave special attention to these rural projects, and by the end of the same year, the Argentinian and Brazilian governments, in cooperation with ICEM, had prepared land settlement plans which would be jointly financed by the countries involved. It was also hoped that a financial contribution from the United States would be forthcoming. The first land settlement projects that concerned Italian migrants, commenced in 1957 and numbered two in Argentina and three in Brazil.

In 1957, the ICEM’s mission in Greece explored the possibility of including some Greek rural families in ongoing land settlements in Argentina and Brazil. A proposal was made to settle a few families in the Melchor Romero colony, in the province of Buenos Aires. The proposal was rejected by their ICEM counterparts in Argentina: without the financial participation of the Greek state, the inclusion of Greek farmer families in land settlement plans was considered not feasible. Similarly, projects for the settlement of Greek farmers in Brazil with the aim of introducing the cultivation of olives and increase viticulture, did not materialize. In 1957, apart from colonization projects, ICEM's
central authorities examined the placement of simple rural workers. However, the head of ICEM’s mission in Buenos Aires was not enthusiastic about the idea, as he was aware of the negative attitude of the president of the Greek community in Buenos Aires, who was not at all optimistic about the placement of Greek rural workers. According to him, rural life in Argentina was very isolated, no Greeks so far had been truly engaged in rural activities and any of those who had invested in rural properties lived in towns.23

Assisted migration of skilled urban workers was also very complex, and the relative plans did not provide the expected results. Just as the general trends with all overpopulated Mediterranean countries, a large proportion of migrants who wished to leave Greece were unskilled workers. The South American countries, however, insisted on skilled or at least semi–skilled workers with some experience. Conversely, the Greek state imposed restrictions on the emigration of skilled workers who were valuable for its own industrial development. This situation posed an intricate problem which could be only partially solved by ICEM, namely by setting up vocational training programs and implementing a thorough pre-selection process. As early as 1952, when ICEM started to channel Greek workers to Brazil, several problems emerged that not only exposed the immigrants’ inadequate training and lack of language proficiency but also the inefficient organization in matters of reception and placement services, harsh living conditions in the host country, and difficulty in sending remittances to Greece.24

ICEM was supposed to oversee the whole migration process, but it failed to properly coordinate the reception and job placement of immigrants, leading to a continuous stream of complaints by the authorities in both the sending and receiving countries, and indeed by the immigrants themselves. Many immigrants arriving in Brazil lacked the necessary skills to find a well-paid job and often requested to return to Greece. The Brazilian authorities repeatedly insisted that the ICEM mission should more thoroughly control the certificates that prospective immigrants provided to ensure that they fulfilled the criteria set out by Brazil’s government.25 They openly accused ICEM of sending loads of “undesirable refugees, unskilled workers, people who were susceptible to illness and family dependents”.26 ICEM officials repudiated the charges of inefficient control, noting that prospective immigrants had to pass a skills test and attend Portuguese-language classes before leaving for Brazil.27 They underlined that all candidates for vocational training were screened by a joint committee made up of representatives of the Greek Labor Ministry and ICEM, and they were tested intermittently during the course. It was also pointed out that the Brazilian consul in Athens gave visas only to those who satisfied the criteria, and that immigrants were informed about living and working conditions in Brazil and the difficulties they might encounter during the first months following their arrival.28

Similar difficulties and complaints existed in relation to Argentina. The recruitment of skilled workers was not easy, given that Greek applicants often had trades that were not desirable by the Argentine state, such as tailors,
shoemakers, book binders and leather workers. The first small groups of skilled workers arrived in Argentina in 1957, accompanied by an ICEM representative from Athens whose main concern was that the “blameless” behavior of the Greek immigrants arriving at their destination would help to keep the door open for future arrivals. The constant fear was that newcomers would abandon the jobs they were assigned to and escape to Buenos Aires, something that was prohibited by Argentina’s immigration policy. Job placement was quite difficult, especially for migrants without prior job contracts. Short of alternatives, the ICEM mission in Greece tried to secure jobs and help from distinguished members of the Greek communities in Argentina. Though her personal contacts, Alexandra Ioannides explored placement possibilities in Greek enterprises, such as textile industries. These contacts provoked tension between the Liaison Missions of Greece and Argentina. ICEM Argentina insisted that direct contacts with Greeks should be avoided; the chief Charles Wendling reminded that Buenos Aires and its suburban area were “taboo” for the Argentinean migration policy and insisted that the largest Greek communities had no role to play as they resided in Buenos Aires and therefore could only offer jobs there.

From 1963 onwards, the channeling of Greek immigrants to Argentina ceased, as they could not be absorbed in the local labor market. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that ICEM stop including any information on Argentina in its information leaflets, and it went on to approve the relocation to Brazil of immigrants who had been unable to find employment in Argentina. The first small groups of immigrants began moving to Brazil in July 1963. Those immigrants who did not accept moving to the neighboring country were registered by the Greek Embassy in Buenos Aires, which undertook their repatriation or alternatively their relocation to Rotterdam, Netherlands.

**The other path: self-employment and ethnic business**

Difficult working conditions led many Greek immigrants who had been transferred to Brazil and Argentina through organized schemes to abandon the jobs they had been allotted. In Brazil, most immigrants, without sufficient knowledge of Portuguese, felt abandoned in an alien environment. Moreover, as it was usual practice for them to be referred to factories unaccompanied by a placement officer, they quite often faced discrimination. Similarly, in Argentina, poor knowledge of basic Spanish and deficient technical training were a source of stress and created difficulties for many workers, while salaries were in many cases frustratingly low. Alexandra Ioannides, in her later reports, was compelled to comment that “it is understandable that our migrants find their earnings inadequate, so much since they translate their earnings into dollars. On the other hand, employers find our candidates inadequately skilled and therefore are unwilling to agree to higher wages”. In that context, many immigrants decided to abandon South America and
emigrate to Australia and the United States or to return to Greece. But what about those who stayed?

In Brazil, due to the difficulty in finding well-paid jobs in factories, many migrants preferred to work as peddlers or traveling vendors. Thus began the dispersal of Greek migrants in the Brazilian interior (Barbosa 2016: 189; Loureiro & Fattini 1999; Theodoridis 2002). In the 1950s many Greeks applied themselves to cloth production and commerce. During her visit to São Paolo in 1956, Ioannides remarked that Greeks had managed to dominate the shirt-making trade in collaboration with Greek Jews, an activity that proved to be more lucrative than working in factories. Moreover, she pointed out that many immigrants worked as peddlers until they could accumulate the necessary capital to open their own businesses and workshops. Therefore, according to her report, “the accusations of Brazilian authorities that Greeks were just exercising parasitical activities and were not contributing to the development of the country were not justified”. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, some Greek immigrants invested in the plastic, metal, leather and wood industries while others opened printing houses, restaurants and supermarkets (Tamis 2009: 107).

The construction of Brasília in the period 1956–1960 provided another outlet for Greek immigrants. ICEM tried, through the press, to portray in vivid colors the opportunities available in the future capital and other cities in the interior of the country. Greek technicians were part of a workforce of thousands who participated, as in the construction of Brazil’s new capital. Some opened stores in the Free City (Cidade Livre), the workers settlement, and about 250 of them stayed in Brasília after the inauguration of the capital (Constantinidou 2016: 9, 29). Their positive experience and upwardly mobile social status are proof that a considerable number of Greek immigrants managed to integrate successfully in Brazilian society (Fernandes de Oliveira 2009: 142–149).

In the Argentina of the 1950s and 1960s, the percentage of Greek merchants and entrepreneurs increased significantly. This is true not only for the long-established immigrants but also for the newcomers whose access to business was facilitated by ethnic social networks. Most Greek merchants were involved in the confectionery trade, the “ethnic” business since the 1930s, especially in Buenos Aires. In the late 1950s, there were dozens of wholesale candy stores whose owners were Greek immigrants (Damilakou 2001). Several of them were immigrants that had arrived in Argentina in the post–World War II period. Others had more modest, open kiosks and small candy stores whose products were supplied by compatriots who were wholesale merchants. The last link in this ethnic business chain were the Greek industrialists that were active in the area of confectionery. To mention a prime example, the Georgalos brothers’ business was in a class of its own: their famous “mantecol” became one of the most beloved Argentinian desserts. The maiden company named “La Greco-Argentina” was founded by the eldest brother Miguel, who changed its name to “Georgalos Hermanos S.R.L.” in the early 1950s once all the brothers had settled in Argentina. In the 1960s their company thrived: it
already owned three plants (in Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Mendoza) as well as lands for the cultivation of peanuts which was the basic raw material for their “mantecol”. The expansion of the confectionery industry in the 1950s and 1960s created great opportunities for Greek candy merchants: many of them founded important commercial companies, owned large stores with offices and warehouses, and employed numerous staff (Damilakou 2018: 13–15). These commercial and industrial activities, although not exactly the core of the development models that prioritized the expansion of heavy industry, undoubtedly contributed to the growth of Argentina’s gross domestic product.

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From the chapter’s analysis, it is obvious that matching the needs and priorities of Southern European countries like Greece with those of developing South American countries, through regulated and assisted migration flows, was not an easy task in the 1950s and early 1960s. Brazil during the 1950s was quite an attractive destination for Greek emigrants, in particular for those who did not have the choice of moving to the British Commonwealth countries or the United States due to the restrictive migration policies of said countries. Although Greek diplomats in Brazil were hesitant about increasing the migration flows, the Greek government favored the prospect, and ICEM played a crucial role in providing prospective urban workers with incentives. Nevertheless, even for skilled workers, the salaries did not match their expectations and the exchange rate made the sending of remittances to their families not worth their while; as a result, in the 1960s, many Greeks abandoned Brazil.

In the case of Argentina, it is clear that neither the Argentinian state nor the Greek state was willing to financially support organized programs for Greek migrants. From the viewpoint of the Argentinian authorities, the Greek farmer without the backing of his state of origin, as well as the skilled worker – often inadequately trained – was far from the ideal immigrant envisaged for Argentina’s development. And for Greece, Argentina was a second-class country in a far-flung New World, which could offer no guarantees that its migrants would be able to keep in contact with their homeland and send the so-desired remittances. The economic problems that burdened both countries hampered an effective implementation of the migration programs that ICEM had so ambitiously designed, without, however, ensuring their financing. It is clear that ICEM under the guidance of the United States, for various political and economic reasons, wished to see Southern European migrant flows channeled to countries other than its national territory, and tried to stimulate an artificial migration movement within the South of the “Western world” that did not actually correspond to any real demand.

On the other hand, the chosen paths of so many immigrants that integrated successfully in Argentina and Brazil nuanced long-established perceptions about “useful” immigrants. Brazilian authorities admitted that spontaneous immigrants often fared better since they had more knowledge of the conditions and the challenges they would face. In any case, from the early 1960s, Greek
immigration was to be directed to other transatlantic destinations, and mainly towards the countries of Western Europe, where the immigration conditions were more in line with the personal and familiar plans of the immigrants and the priorities of the Greek state.

Notes

1 Alexandra Ioannides, “Emigration from Northern Greece”, January 28, 1959, IOM Greece.

2 K. Rallis, General Secretary of the Greek Ministry of Interior to the Greek Embassy in Buenos Aires, “Migration to Argentina”, October 3, 1956, correspondence, ICEM, IOM Greece.

3 “Greek Immigration to Argentina”, Report by the Greek ambassador to Argentina, K. Vatikiotis, to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1953, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Service, 1955, 3/1, Section 1, “Argentina. Greeks Abroad. Migration. ICEM”.

4 The Brazilian ambassador in Athens was enthusiastic about the possibility of attracting immigrants to Brazil, considering Greeks as “a quality immigrant due to his ability to work and his intelligence” as well as “ethnically perfect (éticamente ótimo)”. Letter by Ildefonso Falcão to the Minister of Foreign Affairs João Neves de Fontoura, DPP/61/558(92), February 10, 1951. The Council for Immigration and Colonization shared his optimism. Letter by Armando V.P. de Vasconcellos, Vice-President of the CIC, to Mário de Pimental Brandão, Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 1393/200 (485), May 21, 1951, Arquivo do Itamaraty, Brasília.

5 Regarding the point of view of those who were more hesitant, see Letter by the Brazilian chargé d’affaires in Athens Antonio Houaiss to the Minister of Foreign Affairs João Neves de Fontoura, DPP/11/34/559 (92), October 25, 1952, F 71937, Arquivo do Itamaraty, Brasília.

6 Alexandra Ioannides to G. Kapsabelis, Greek Embassy in Buenos Aires, October 20, 1956, correspondence, ICEM, IOM Greece.

7 Letter by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ICEM, August 31, 1953, correspondence ICEM–Greek government, IOM Greece.

8 Peter Gibson, Chief of ICEM Liaison Mission in Athens, to the Greek Ministry of Interior, September 19, 1956, correspondence, IOM Greece.

9 Ildefonso Falcão to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hildebrando P.P. Accioly, 511.12/558, October 23, 1948.

10 A. de Magalhães, Chargé d’Affaires, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Fernandes, “Propaganda espontânea do Brasil na Grécia”, 591.7 (92), January 7, 1947.


13 Panos L. Psomopoulos, Greek Migration Officer in Rio de Janeiro, to Warren Graham Fuller, Chief of the Mission, April 14, 1958.

14 In the instructions disseminated to all Greek communities in Argentina and to the Greek press, one could read: “Not only will you be able to progress more comfortably because you will make significant savings, but you will also undertake your path to success without the heartbeats that always exist when you are separated from your loved ones”. ICEM, “Instructions for the Invitation of Your Family Members after Your Settlement in Argentina”, January 24, 1958.

15 Sixth session of the Council of ICEM. Summary record of the 49th meeting, Geneva, April 9, 1957, NARA, Washington, D.C.
Notes from Mr. Azzi’s Report, October 29–November 6, 1952, IOM Greece.

“Greek Immigration to Argentina”, Report by Greek ambassador to Argentina, K. Vatikiotis, to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1953, op. cit., p. 4.

Report by K. Vatikiotis to the Greek Ministry of Interior, op. cit., p. 16.


Sixth session of the Council of the ICEM. Summary record of the 50th meeting, Geneva, April 9, 1957, NARA, Washington, D.C.


Ch. Wendling to A. Ioannides, February 21, 1957, IOM Greece.

Ch. Wendling to A. Ioannides, May 31, 1957, IOM Greece.

In November 1952, the Greek Minister of Coordination Xenophon Zolotas wondered whether migrants departing for Brazil “are notified about their place of settlement, the climatic and sanitary conditions, the kind of work they will be employed in, the daily wages paid, its purchasing power and any information concerning living conditions”. Minister of Coordination Minister X. Zolotas to the Mission of ICEM in Athens, 42445/A10, November 5, 1952, correspondence, IOM Greece.

Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Argiropoulos to the ICEM Mission in Athens, March 27, 1953; Letter by the Director of the Migration Department at the Ministry of Interior to the ICEM Mission in Athens, May 27, 1953. Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AI/1/1/General issues.


Ibid.


Extracts from a personal letter of Mr. Psomopoulos to A. Ioannides, October 28, 1957, IOM Greece.

Pl. Vasiliou, President of the Greek Association in Buenos Aires, to A. Ioannides, December 26, 1956, IOM Greece.

Ch. Wendling to A. Ioannides, May 31, 1957, IOM Greece.


A. Ioannides to Warren Graham Fuller, Chief of Mission in Brazil, June 5, 1958, IOM Greece.


A. Ioannides to Mr. Corcos, March 31, 1958. An exception was Belo Horizonte, where as a result of higher salaries, the majority of Greek immigrants were workers in the steel industry.


A. Ioannides to G. Maselli, February 28, 1958, IOM Greece.

A. Ioannides to Mr. Corcos, March 17, 1958, IOM Greece.

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11  Migration as a business

Organizing the transport of migrants from South to South

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris

Preceding the decision of potential migrants to relocate is the necessity for the existence of an extensive support mechanism in order for the journey to begin; an infrastructure for the management of the several stages that the complex migration process entails. The concept of infrastructure was recently adopted for migration studies, creating the theory of migration infrastructure, which examines migration as a process requiring the mediation of various actors before its implementation (Xiang et al., 2014: S122–S148). The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of the operational stages of the migratory process, rather than of the behavioural attitude of migrants, or the migrant flows per se. It examines migration from the viewpoint of global influences rather than individual ones, including the role of the labour market, the international division of labour and the transport sector, among others.

An integral part of migration and its management were the significant economic incentives that existed not only for the migrating individual but also for the countries, companies and entrepreneurs involved in the process. For the migrants themselves, their relocation went hand in hand with expectations for increased income, and better working and living conditions for them and their families. The states involved (migrant sending/receiving) foresaw an improvement in unemployment/employment rates, and an increase in development, production and consumption, among others. The companies and entrepreneurs involved sought to extend their business cycle and increase the revenue resulting from a greatly enlarged pool of potential customers.

The subject of this chapter is the study of migration as a business in the aftermath of the Second World War by focusing on the aforementioned aspects. The main idea is to research the generation of revenue through the migration process. The means which generated this revenue were the migrants themselves; “human cargo” is the term used by the transport sector in reference to the individuals it carried. Thus, human mobility is examined as commerce and migrants as “goods”. Particular attention will be given to the participation of states and private companies. It should be noted that this perspective of migration as a business does not reflect how the migrants perceived themselves in this process, as commodities, but comments on how the procedural mechanism that managed the migratory process was handled; an approach which was carried

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out not under humanitarian terms, but under commercial ones (Spener, 2009: 11–12). Therefore, this chapter researches the mechanisms of migration, focusing on “how” rather than “why” the migrants moved, acknowledging a migration business which profits from the commercialization of the migratory process (Salt et al., 1997: 467).

The article is divided into four sections, starting from the historical context that shaped the restructuring of the transport sector, acknowledging a link between the Marshall Plan ideals and the reconstitution of Western economy and trade. The second section examines migration data between Southern Europe and South America as well as the contribution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to the organization of migrant traffic. The third and fourth sections discuss the migration policies of the player states (sending and receiving). They examine how these countries, with shipping and air companies operating under their flags, sought to generate revenue from the migration business and ward off competition, quite often at the expense of the migrants’ safety and comfort.

The context

Any discussion on post–World War II migration cannot omit the Cold War realities during which it took place. With the gradual division of the world into two blocs, the Western under the United States and the Eastern under the Soviet Union, different economic models were adopted for their allies’ development. The United States promoted the values of the capacity market, private ownership and entrepreneurial control, while the Soviet Union favoured public ownership and centralization. The geographical expansion of their sphere of influence constituted a priority for both superpowers and the key means to further such a cause were economic production and technological advancement (Engerman, 2010: 33–34; Maier, 2010: 46).

The population problems in Western European allied-countries after World War II have already been examined in previous chapters. The transportation sector also suffered, as railway lines, roads, bridges, canals, merchant fleet and airport bases were partially or completely destroyed in many countries. Thus, the strongly anticipated increase in trade rates after 1945 would not be feasible without prior reconstruction of the means to transport them. At the same time, the explosion of European commerce with the rest of the world, and more importantly with the United States, resulted in a lack of hard currency in Europe, which was unable to import the raw materials and machinery needed to boost its own production; consequently, the dollar crisis was more than critical (Judt, 2005: 15–17, 82–83, 86–87).

The financial supremacy of the United States after 1945 and its political prominence in the Western Bloc enabled, in early 1948, the implementation of the European Recovery Programme (ERP) or the “Marshall Plan” as it is more widely known. The goal was to restore the major trading partner of the United
States and to reset the balance of power in Europe and “refashion” it based on the American model.

The European states participating in ERP undertook commitments for the stabilization of their economies, exchange rates, liberalization, development and, ultimately, the reestablishment of the free world trading system. Collaboration between the public and private sectors was set as a prerequisite, and it was strengthened and promoted as the key to a successful European economic recovery (Hogan, 2005: 93, 101, 136, 205). The enhancement of the transport sector constituted a firm policy of the United States, which during the Harry Truman administration was orientating towards the fostering of “private ownership and [the] operation of [a] merchant marine” (Gibson et al., 2000: 191–121, 135, 169). An example of this is Italy, which under the auspices of the ERP was assisted in new shipbuildings and the purchase of American war-built vessels (Sturney, 2010: 159; Guilianelli, 2016: 348–349); the German shipping companies were funded by the United States, with $42 million in 1949, and three years later large loans were provided with extremely low interest rates for new shipbuilding (Hope, 1990: 397–398). Further south, the Greek port Piraeus was rebuilt through ERP funds (Sotiropoulos, 2014: 36), while a few years earlier, in 1946, Greek ship owners purchased war-built American cargo ships with advantageous terms (Harlaftis, 1996: 252–258).

The American interest in the reconstruction of transport and trade sectors did not exclude the nascent aviation industry. In this context, in 1948, Air France, the French national airline, secured long-term loans through ERP funds (Neiertz, 1998: 33). The Italian national airline, Alitalia, was also granted loans in 1949–1950 for the purchase of American aircraft by the Export Import Bank of the United States, a federal organ involved in Europe’s and the Western allies’ post-war reconstitution (Mantegazza, 1998: 167). As far as South American countries were concerned, the United States supported them with important financial and technical assistance for the development of their aviation industry (Dierikx, 2008: 46–47; Piglia, 2019: 50–56; Hagedorn, 2008).

On the other hand, the post–World War II transfer of European migrants overseas was mainly secured through funding provided by the United States to ICEM, which collaborated with publicly and privately owned shipping and airline companies and covered a great part of their costs overseas. These measures contributed to a decrease in social upheavals through a reduction of unemployment/underemployment rates, simultaneously increasing migrant remittances and enhancing development and trade rates. In overseas countries European migration was expected to solve the problem of the lack of manpower and/or underpopulation, to increase production and, as a consequence, to speed up the bilateral and world trade rates and effect a stabilization of the economy, among others.

The transport sector’s utilization by ICEM, however, can also be viewed as an opportunity for the support of existing routes and the development of new ones for the migrant public and eventually for tourists, alongside an increase in cargo traffic. It can also be seen as an alternative form of funding of the
merchant marine, especially at a time when state shipping subsidies were progressively diminishing. Furthermore, it was to serve as an opportunity for the support and development of the aviation sector, which, until the 1960s, was mainly state-owned and their pool of passengers comparatively restricted.

**The data**

Migration to Latin America in the 1950s was possible either through assisted migration schemes under ICEM or individually through invitation by a relative or friend. In the first case, ICEM financially subsidized the greatest part of the migrant cost, through a tripartite funding provided by the emigration and immigration countries and the United States, while the migrants contributed a relatively small amount. In the case of non-assisted migration, the migrants or their relatives had to undertake all costs involved. Both categories however, had access to the same means of transport. In the case of ICEM migrants, the Committee arranged transportation for the migrants under its auspices, while the non-assisted migrants made their choice based on their travel preferences, the availability of means of transport and their budget.

The route from Southern Europe to South and Central America was adequately served by regular commercial passenger ships and successfully absorbed the ICEM traffic. Therefore, shipping shortages were not as frequent as on other migrant routes since apart from inbound migrant traffic, shipping lines could also rely on a considerable outbound traffic with the returning to Europe of disappointed migrants, and simultaneously on the cargo trade that vessels of liner shipping companies could combine with passenger traffic from Latin America to Europe (e.g. meat and wool, among others).

During the 1950s, the most common and economical means of transport was by sea. The commercial passenger shipping lines operating between Southern Europe and South American ports were originating from Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. Since no such commercial passenger lines operated from Greece, the Greek migrants or trans-migrants through Greece heading to Latin America travelled from the Piraeus or Patra ports to a neighbouring Italian port so as to embark on a regular line.

The expansion of air travel to the Latin American migrant route during the 1960s was slow to develop. Evidence of this can be found in the ICEM traffic data in 1960–1968, insofar as the vast majority continued to use other means of transport. Chile and Colombia were the exceptions, with a considerable percentage for air travel during the same period. Nevertheless, Iberia, the Spanish airline, connected Spain with Brazil and Argentina even before 1950, and in the 1960s operated weekly flights to all the main Central and South American capitals (Olivares, 2019: 109–111); in the 1950s, Alitalia flew from Italy to Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay (Mantegazza, 1998: 173), and Aerolineas Argentinas purchased its first jet in 1959 and projected connections with European capitals (Hagedorn, 2008: 517).
In 1969–1978, though, the situation changed in favour of air travel following the wider technological changes in aviation with the introduction of wide-body aircraft, “jumbo jets” and the decrease of the corresponding cost.

The trend for non-assisted migration would not make a significant difference, since the migrant traffic to Latin America was mainly executed through ICEM, and non-assisted migration was of a considerably lower dynamic. In 1952, ICEM held 12% of Brazil–Argentina traffic from the Mediterranean countries, reaching 33% in 1953 and 71% within the first four months of 1954.2 In the case of Venezuela, ICEM traffic increased threefold in 1953 (from 1,021 in 1952 to 3,788 in 1953) and continued to increase during the following years (4,985 in 1954).3

| Argentina | 14,995 | 14,488 | 96.62 | 507 | 3.38 |
| Brazil | 28,910 | 27,088 | 93.70 | 1,822 | 6.30 |
| Chile | 2,329 | 1,596 | 68.53 | 733 | 31.47 |
| Colombia | 3,335 | 1,819 | 54.54 | 1,516 | 45.46 |
| Uruguay | 3,882 | 3,766 | 98.53 | 56 | 1.47 |
| Venezuela | 28,155 | 25,109 | 92.02 | 2,246 | 7.98 |
| **Total** | **81,546** | **74,666** | **91.56** | **6,880** | **8.44** |

Note: The data provided not only refers to migration from Southern European countries under ICEM, but also includes data from Northern European countries.
Sources: Personal elaboration based on IOM-GR/Council and Published documents

| Argentina | 4,981 | 2,854 | 57.30 | 2,126 | 42.68 |
| Bolivía | 1,020 | 150 | 14.71 | 870 | 85.29 |
| Brazil | 10,983 | 3,490 | 31.78 | 7,482 | 68.12 |
| Central America | 5096 | 281 | 5.51 | 4,807 | 94.33 |
| Panama & Caribbean | 2,819 | 625 | 22.17 | 2,182 | 77.40 |
| Chile | 3,302 | 549 | 16.63 | 2,753 | 83.37 |
| Colombia | 1,494 | 271 | 18.14 | 1,223 | 81.86 |
| Ecuador | 377 | 99 | 26.26 | 277 | 73.47 |
| Peru | 2,088 | 298 | 14.27 | 1,788 | 85.63 |
| Uruguay | 332 | 210 | 63.25 | 122 | 36.75 |
| Venezuela | 8,250 | 1,143 | 13.85 | 7,107 | 86.15 |
| **Total** | **40,742** | **9,970** | **24.47** | **30,737** | **75.44** |

Note: The data provided not only refers to migration from Southern European countries under ICEM, but also includes data from Northern European countries.
Sources: Personal elaboration based on IOM-GR/Council and Published documents
Indicative of the magnitude of ICEM traffic in these lines is the fact that due to its operation, two shipping conferences were organized. More specifically, the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo–Brasile/Plata* (APMBP) was founded in Genoa a few months after the establishment of ICEM, in August 1952. Six of the founding member-lines originated from Italy, and one line each representing the flags of Spain, France and Argentina. The purpose of the APMBP was the regulation of the third class category on this route, since within a few months of commencement of PICMME/ICEM's operation, “cut-throat” competition and a fare war erupted between the Italian shipping companies, endangering the financial viability of their sailings. The establishment of APMBP was requested by the Italian government, and a subsidized line of the state-owned group Finmare, the ITALIA Line, participated. The dominance of the Italian lines was undeniable, not only at the political level of the conference, but also at the management and operational levels, since they transported 80% of the total of migrants to Brazil/Plata while the non-Italian member-lines were left with the remaining 20%.

Likewise, when ICEM migrant traffic to Venezuela began growing considerably, the Italian lines with the support of the Rome government decided, in 1955, to form a new Conference in order to regulate the traffic and hence created the *Accordo Passageri Venezuela* (APV). Member-lines of the APV were all Italian shipping lines, and five out of the seven were also members of the APMBP, while both “Accordos” shared the same Secretary.

Taking into consideration the Accordos, the importance of ICEM traffic becomes immediately apparent, as does the “genuine link” that existed between government and business interests regarding migration traffic from Southern Europe to South America. Certainly this was not novel, but how it developed is a matter of interest in the sections that follow.

**Politics**

Politics and business went hand in hand in the case of migrant transport during the post–World War II period. The main emigration countries operating towards Latin America were also well-established maritime countries with steadily developing public-owned airlines. On the other side of the Atlantic, some Latin American immigration countries owned public transport companies or had private means of transport operating under their flag.

Thus, financial and governmental interests coincided since migration transport was a remunerative business not only for the transport companies involved, but also for the wider economy. The national governments participating in this traffic endeavoured to acquire the largest slice of this business for the transport companies under their flag. Therefore, the establishment of protective regulations for their migrant traffic was a practice followed by the majority of countries involved. Portugal for instance, heavily subsidized its shipping company *Companhia Colonial de Navegação* in order to increase its competitiveness in the migrant traffic market between itself and Brazil in the 1950s and 1960s.
(Santos, 2018:88). Whereas, Italy had agreed with ICEM on the priority given to Italian liner shipping companies over foreign ones. In its effort to protect the Italian shipping industry, Rome consistently denied the granting of landing rights to foreign airlines, and in 1954, it even instructed their airport officials to prohibit the boarding of aircraft to migrants holding Italian passports. Regarding the transportation of migrants from Italy to Latin American ports, the Italian government claimed 50% of those destined for Argentina to sail on Italian passenger ships and between 80% and 100% of the rest of the migrants bound for other Latin American destinations.

Along the same lines Argentina had agreed with ICEM on the allocation of at least 50% of the total migrants it received to travel through its public-owned shipping company *Flota Argentina de Navegación de Ultramar* (FANU). To make observance of the agreement more binding, Argentina had linked the payment of its financial contributions to ICEM budgets with the completion of the said percentage. Similarly, since 1956, Spain had also agreed with ICEM that shipping companies and airlines operating under its flag would have priority in the transport of Spaniard migrants. This priority resulted in 1956–1957 in the accumulation of 79% of the total ICEM traffic from Spain to Latin American destinations to be under its flagships, leaving 19.5% to the Argentinian flag, 0.80% to Italy and 0.62% to France. A claim for a 50% share was also submitted by Colombia in 1963, in favour of its airline Avianca, during a period when migration to Colombia was increasing considerably.

The Italian, Greek, Spaniard and French delegates cooperated during ICEM sessions for the achievement of mutual goals and occasionally met before the commencement of sessions in order to agree on a common policy line, or they exchanged letters requesting support in maritime matters. Forming binding policies with the ICEM for the execution of traffic under their flag was their way of accumulating revenue through migrant transport. When other transport companies competed for a larger share of the traffic, friction followed.

The case of Brazil presents particular interest. As a country with no representation of its flag in the commercial passenger sea route to Europe, in 1962 it sought the participation of the privately owned airline Panair do Brasil, at that time its only international airline, for the transport of migrant traffic. With the airline owners declaring their support for the new Brazilian president and having just purchased new aircraft, they had the necessary governmental support for the enlargement of their business. Thus, the Rio government requested that half of the country’s annual migrant intake under ICEM be transferred by Panair. In order to increase the airline’s competitiveness, the government decided to cover the fare difference between sea and air passage, and until the finalization of the agreement, Brazil put a halt to the advantageous fare rates assigned to other airlines.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian government intervened in the fare policy of Panair and requested that it lowered its fares. They in return, subsidized the airline with the cost difference for the migrants and refugees transported from Spain, Italy, Greece and other countries, and from July 1963 would double its ICEM
per capita contribution for every migrant transported. Conversely, the government would cease its contribution for the migrants transported by any company other than Panair,20 a policy in violation of the ICEM regulations for the tripartite subsidization of the migrant voyage.

The ICEM administration, having concluded agreements with Italy and Spain giving priority to their flags, advised Brazil on the difficulties of the implementation of its unilateral decision and arranged negotiations between the interested governments and authorities.21 Certainly, the agreements with Italy and Spain were not binding for Brazil, something highlighted to the ICEM administration, and as a concession, Brazil availed ICEM with a few more months for its bilateral discussions.22

The ICEM administration, in its effort not to confront the emigration countries, for a period of two months directed all migrants from Greece to Panair flights, since no Greek business interests were involved in this route.23 With the negotiations with Italy and Spain coming to a dead end, since they did not accept Brazilian abstention from contributions by sea transport means, Brazil revised its demands, clarifying that the 50% share requested referred to those who had previously travelled by sea. Until this percentage was reached, Brazil would not pay any contribution for those transported by sea, while for those air-transported, it would double its per-capita contribution.24

The discussions on Panair’s participation in ICEM traffic did not conclude in any agreement, since the coup of April 1964 changed the political balance in Brazil, resulting in the airline losing favour. The military government disbanded Panair do Brasil in February 1965, by withdrawing from the airline its operational certificate, and forced it into bankruptcy. Panair’s routes, fleet and other assets were shared with Varig and a domestic airline. As a result, the transport system that had existed prior to the negotiations with Panair was reinstated.25 Panair’s liquidation after the coup was the result of its shareholders’ support for the overthrown president, while Varig’s establishment as the main market leader in Brazilian aviation was the result of strategic partnerships with the military government (Castellitti, 2019:85–86).

The matter of Brazil aids an understanding of the dynamic relationship between governments and private business interests and reveals how susceptible this type of cooperation was to changes in a political climate. Panair do Brasil was promoted by the Brazilian government thanks to certain business and political ties established between them. The emergence of a new government, even a military one, resulted in a halt to competition on the Brazilian ICEM route, since the main Brazilian international airline was replaced.

To sum up, whether publicly or privately owned, governmental support for the flag remained unchanged. For both types of ownership the ultimate goal was an increase in profit through augmentation of their traffic load. However, in the case of privately owned companies, kinship and/or business alliances with members of the government were significant for the securing of governmental support; the opposite applied when control of parliament changed hands. Nevertheless, the state was in close contact with transport companies,
and in many instances, they requested that those companies lower their fares in order to increase their competitiveness – a direct intervention in the era of free markets.

**Transport companies and the voyage**

A 1959 voyage from a Mediterranean Sea port to a South Atlantic port lasted about 20 days and several days by air. Life on board ship was regulated by a routine, with scheduled meals, entertainment options (cinema shows, bar, lending library), language courses (Spanish and/or Portuguese), cultural orientation lectures and informative films about the receiving countries in order to equip the migrants with some basic knowledge before debarkation. Accommodation in the 1950s was catered for in dormitories, which gradually progressed to four- and six-bed cabins separated according to gender.

The post–World War II migrant voyage, especially up until the 1950s, was far from luxurious. International organizations (initially ILO, thereafter IMCO/IMO and ICEM) tried to set up a framework for the safe passage of migrant transport. The standards on board ship were set by international conventions which had been adopted since 1914 and amended by several others, like the London Convention of 1948 for the Safety of Life at Sea (Reiling, 2019: 41–43). National governments, for their part, took action in order to protect their migrants. Spain in particular, in 1956, ensured the accommodation of at least 25% of Spaniards in cabins. At the same time, it forbade the building of new passenger ships with dormitory accommodation, and by the second half of 1957, none of the Spanish passenger vessels offered dormitory accommodation. It was also expected that in the case of a migrant group of at least 75 Spaniards, they would be escorted by a Spanish doctor, nurse, cook, cook assistant and steward, in order to facilitate the needs of its emigrants. In addition, the shipping lines had to insure all the migrants for the trip and for at least three months after debarkation, as well as to provide free return tickets, under a tax called *bonus de repatriacion*, to the Spanish consulates in Latin American countries for every ten migrants transported from Spanish ports, this modality made some companies stop calling at Spanish ports.

Deviations from standards of safety especially on foreign passenger ships caused friction with the governments whose nationals travelled on these passenger ships. Recurring complaints received about conditions on passenger ships of the Dodero Line, an Argentinian private shipping company, which in the early 1950s was nationalized and formed FANU. The deficiencies on Dodero passenger vessels in 1953 forced the Italian authorities to threaten the company with withdrawal of the carrier’s licence for its passenger vessels, which would prohibit their use of Italian ports. Dodero was accused of not adhering to the required standards stipulated under Italian law and the 1948 Convention; thus, lacking essential safety and health standards. It’s worth mentioning that this warning came after five years of requests for improvement of the ship’s standards and was repeated twice in 1957 and 1959.
However, it was not necessary for Rome to carry out the threat made in 1953, as assurance was given by Dodero that accommodation standards would be improved; therefore, the carrier’s licence was “exceptionally granted” by the Italian government. In 1959, the improvement in standards of accommodation was termed a “request” and not a “warning”, for future authorizations of sailings, taking into consideration the political, diplomatic, commercial and financial costs such an action might have at the expense of the migrants’ safety. At the same time, ICEM continued using the Argentinian passenger ships, taking into account that their contribution to the Committee’s budgets was linked with the percentage of transportation under the Argentinian flag.

Reductions in services provided on board passenger ships increased profit; this was not a new practice for the lines participating in migrant passage. In the 1950s, World War II–built vessels served the need for carrying migrant traffic, often with repercussions in terms of comfort, hygiene and sometimes migrants’ safety. Overbooking and accommodating migrants even in crew’s quarters, lack of furniture in the cabins so as to increase berths’ space, disproportional rate of showers per passengers, complaints about the quantity and quality of food provision, unsatisfactory air distribution systems, underequipped hospital section, mechanical problems and insufficient recreation areas were only some of the deficiencies reported on passenger vessels operating on the Southern Europe–to–South America migrant route, confirming that migration was conducted as a business, based on profit-making and at the expense of the migrants’ safety and comfort.

The conditions offered on specific passenger vessels were well known. When ICEM migrants were booked on vessels notorious for their unsuitable conditions, important fall-offs of passengers occurred who falsely invoked health reasons, since they preferred to wait and be re-booked on a better passenger vessel. There were significant consequences which included increased operational difficulties for ICEM, loss of revenue for the shipping companies which sailed light and the need for a rescheduling of mechanisms in the receiving countries.

The 1960s witnessed a considerable improvement in the condition of passenger vessels, as shipping companies faced competition from rapidly developing airlines. Shipping companies renewed and reconverted their fleet, making them more adaptable to the preferences of passengers with increased purchasing power. Prominent shipping companies started operating cruises during the summer months, leaving the migrant traffic to the rest. Such a practice was followed by the Spanish AZNAR and Ybarra lines (Valdaliso, 2007: 29–30), with the latter fully devoting its fleet to the tourism market (Cerchiello, 2014), therefore improving the conditions enjoyed on board by the migrants but at the same time exacerbating the shipping shortages during high-tourist periods.

Conclusions

The circulation of people and goods after the end of World War II was of crucial importance for the United States, in order to foster the stabilization of Western economies, increase production and consumption and secure the development
and political stabilization of allied countries while maintaining American influence. Migration was one of the vital means for the achievement of these goals, and for this reason it was promoted and financed by the United States, the main political and financial power of the Western Bloc. Through migration, the development of the transport sector was supported, thus opening the way for an increase in production and subsequently the acceleration of bilateral and international trade rates. The commercialization of migrant traffic through ICEM offered new opportunities for the countries involved by opening new routes and producing important revenue at a time when other sources of income, such as tourist traffic, were still underdeveloped for Latin American destinations.

State protection was instrumental in increasing profit through migration for the transport businesses. The utilization of means of transport under the national flag mobilized larger parts of the national economy on a micro- and macroeconomic level. Thus, governmental support along with the adoption of restrictive measures for the benefit of their shipping and aviation industries, were vital for business interests and detrimental when that help was lost.

In the 1950s, the migrant traffic from Southern European to South American countries commenced almost exclusively in terms of commerce and business, with little or no consideration given to “humanitarian” aspects, as evidence of the degrading standards of living and safety on board passenger ships reveal. In several instances, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the national governments of the migrants in question were unable to impose the enforcement of safety regulations, since other political, diplomatic and financial interests were at stake.

Post–World War II migration for the transport sector can be examined as a “stepping stone” for the development of both passenger shipping companies and airlines. For the shipping lines, migration provided them with the necessary time and funding, especially in the 1950s, to carry out a restructuring of operations, a reconversion of their fleet and an upgrading of their services, until they would be forced to endeavour in more lucrative traffic, such as tourist traffic and cruises. As far as the airlines were concerned, assisted migration worked as an opportunity for this nascent means of transport to be introduced to a wider public, initially not within its financial spectrum, therefore presenting an opportunity to build a new clientele. It also provided a chance for the opening of new traffic routes, as well as an opportunity for the South American states to be financially developed and integrated within the Western political, economic and business systems, along with their Southern European counterparts.

Notes

1 IOM-Greece (hereafter IOM-GR)/OPS-20–012, Harry Truman, White House to James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, February 24, 1949.


7. Members of the APV in 1955 were Giacomo Costa fu Andrea; F. Lli Grimaldi Armatori; “Italia” SpAN; Achile Lauro Armatore; *Societa Italiana di Armamento* “Sidarma”; *Societa Italiana Transporti Marittimi* “SITMAR”; *Sicula Oceanica SA*, see IOM-GR/8/1/21/VEN/Shipping, Vol. I, F. Fiocchi, APV, Genoa to ICEM Geneva, November 09, 1955; ibid., F. Fiocchi, APMBP, Genoa to ICEM Geneve, February 7, 1955. Only the Grimaldi shipping line and *Sicula Oceanica SA* were not participating in the APMBP and the *Italnavi* and the three non-Italian lines in the APV.


11. Initially known as *Compania Argentina De Navegacion Dodero S.A.*, then renamed FANU and in 1960 to *La Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas* (ELMA).


16. AGFMA/1963/35/7/1, El. Γεωργαντόπουλος to Υπουργείον Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, Διεύθυνσιν Μελετών 1ον Διεύθυνσιν Διοικήσεως, May 6, 1963.


22. IOM-GR/8/1/6/Shipping, Vol. II, Milton Faria, for the Minister of State to B. W. Haveman, 558.(00), DIm/DCI/658.(00), July 22, 1963.
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12 Migration flows from Southern Europe to South America
Statistical data and analysis

Antonis Masonidis

In the aftermath of World War II and up until the late 1950s, Southern Europe and South America were to interface in the area of huge migration flows from the former to the latter. According to ILO (ILO 1959: 192–198), of the 1.5 million refugees and migrants that emigrated, Argentina received approximately 740,000, followed by Brazil with around 413,000 and Venezuela with 404,000.1

This chapter, based on archival and published statistical data,2 will provide an overview of the emigration flows from Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) to South America (mainly Argentina and Brazil) and examine the economic impacts on sending and receiving countries. It will also present some trends in the connections between unemployment and emigration for Italy, Spain and Greece during this period. Finally, it will investigate the remittances inflow data from the late 1940s to 1970 and will attempt some comparisons between the statistical correlations for each country.

The international economic environment and the European South

The end of World War II presented a harsh reality for Europe and many other parts of the world. Almost every country that had participated in the war was left in a state of social and economic upheaval, with collapsed economies and social and industrial infrastructures severely damaged. These appalling conditions forced governments to run budget deficits in order to find funds for necessary reconstruction. Furthermore, the impact of high inflation rates, as a consequence of the restrictions induced by a war economy, hindered private consumption and affected the possibility of investment.

It is indeed this bleak background of social and economic collapse that make the outcomes of the following period, up until the late 1960s, all the more astounding. This period has been characterized as the “Golden Age of Capitalism”. For many researchers, it was the first time in world economic history that prosperity (in any form) was enjoyed by so many, with a high economic growth, sustainable over a long period, accompanied by high employment and high productivity rates.3 Of course, not all countries had the same gainful
outcomes. Some weaker nations remained in a state of poverty which in many cases was exacerbated by acute overpopulation.

The GDP per capita for that period in all Southern European and South American countries under study increased, but not to the same extent (Figure 12.1). While the average increase of GDP per capita for the countries of the European South was almost 350%, the average increase for Argentina (whose GDP per capital was already very high at the beginning of the period under study) and Brazil was only at a third of the previous number, at a level of 113%. In absolute terms, the economic growth of Greece was of such magnitude that it led to the highest level of GDP per capita in 1970 if compared to all other Southern European countries, with the exception of Italy.\(^4\) Brazil’s GDP per capita was the lowest among the countries under consideration, in contrast with Argentina,\(^5\) which had the highest level until the end of the 1950s, when Italy took first place.

If the Argentina of the late 1940s and 1950s appeared as a “reasonable” choice for Southern Europeans that sought to escape poverty and political conflict, other factors drove European migrants to destinations less developed, such as Brazil. Apart from the push factors, the reasons for these migrations should be sought in: (1) the national and international policies that steered the migration waves from Europe to Latin America;\(^6\) (2) the attractive development prospects that countries like Brazil and Argentina had at that time, arising from the implementing of ambitious industrialization policies; (3) the migration tradition of specific destinations that had already existed in some Southern European countries as well as the decisive role of social migration networks, in particular, since the end of the 19th century, the emigration of Italians and Spaniards to Argentina was intense as was the emigration of the Portuguese to Brazil; (4) organized migration through ICEM\(^7\) for the best

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**Figure 12.1** Real GDP per capita in the two Souths

Note: In 2011 dollars.

Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from Maddison Project Database (2020).
possible distribution of the labor force in the post-war Western world. The case of Greek emigration to Brazil was largely the result of this type of assisted migration. According to ICEM, the problem of overpopulation in several European countries and the shortage of specialized human capital in many overseas countries were problems that could be resolved jointly by the optimal allocation of workforce through regulated migration movements (Damilakou and Venturas 2015: 297).

Migration flows from Southern Europe to South America

European migration to South America can be divided into two distinct types. Firstly, there were the spontaneous migration flows, which had been largely motivated by social and personal relationships, as well as historical bonds between the peoples of the sending and the receiving countries. Typical examples, as previously mentioned, are the cases of Italy (Figure 12.2) and Spain (Figure 12.3), whose emigration was directed mainly to Argentina (Figure 12.6), as well as the case of Portugal (Figure 12.5) that traditionally sent large contingents of migrants to Brazil (Figure 12.7). On the other hand, there was also organized migration, through international organizations or transnational agreements. A typical example of the second type of emigration is the case of the Greek migratory flows to Latin America after 1952, which were largely credited to ICEM programs (Figure 12.4).

The migratory flows that connected the two regions continued with fluctuations until the late 1950s, when it became clear that their intensity was decreasing. It is known that in the late 1950s the migration flows from Southern Europe were redirected to the rising economies of Western Europe. In Figure 12.2, for example, we can observe that from 1954 onwards, spontaneous Italian emigration to Argentina decreased, and the sizes of overall migrant flows almost coincided with ICEM organized emigration. Still, despite the contribution of assisted migration schemes to the flows, in the case of Italian migration to Argentina after the mid-1950s, absolute numbers were much lower than they had been in the past, and regulated migration was not able to reverse this declining trend.

Regarding Spain, since 1956 when the country became a member of ICEM, it seems that organized migration had played a role in maintaining the migration flows to Argentina and Brazil. However, we can see that in regard to Spanish migration, a third South American host country, namely Venezuela, had been firmly in the game since the mid-1950s. In relation to Greece, after 1952, when the remarkable post-war flow to Argentina had stopped, and for the rest of the decade, ICEM-organized migration schemes became the main migration mechanism for destinations in South America. Finally, in reference to Portuguese migration, the emigration flows to South America in the 1950s were largely spontaneous since the country had not yet become a member of ICEM (it became a member only in 1975).
The picture emerging of the destination countries is similar. The trend for Argentina (Figure 12.6) for the reception of immigrants from Southern Europe (mainly Italians and Spaniards) declines after a climax in 1949 for Italians and in 1950 for the Spanish. The organized migration schemes from 1952 onwards, seem to temporarily reverse the trend for Italians and to a lesser extent for Spaniards, but the tendency up to the early 1960s is negative, especially after 1957–1958. For Brazil, the main destination for Portuguese immigrants
Figure 12.4 Greek emigration to South America
Note: For Argentina in 1960 are considered only permanent immigrants.
Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from ICEM Handbook (1962, p. 42); Damilakou and Papadopoulos, Chapter 10, this volume.

(Figure 12.5), the trends are similar (Figure 12.7) in contrast to another host country Argentina, which received smaller numbers of immigrants. However, in the second half of the 1950s and until the early 1960s, the gap between the two host countries seemed to be closing.
Figure 12.6 Argentina: immigration from European South

Notes: In thousands. The figures refer to alien second- and third-class passengers traveling by sea.


Figure 12.7 Brazil: immigration from European South

Notes: In thousands.

Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from Levy (1974) and *ICEM Handbook* (1962, p. 45).
Migration and economic growth: a complex relationship

As mentioned before, the 1950s and 1960s were a period of economic growth for Southern European emigration countries. The GDP per capita presents in the case of certain Southern European countries a considerable and steady increase, although it remains much lower than that of industrialized countries. Despite a relative improvement in economic conditions, migratory outflows from Southern Europe to overseas destinations remained high throughout the 1950s, raising interesting questions about the complex relationship between migration and economic growth. In the 1960s, it is known that flows from Southern European regions were intensified and redirected to the industrialized European countries.

The total emigration from Italy (Figure 12.8) demonstrates a periodic circularity in its flows when compared to the other two countries of the European South, Spain and Greece (Figure 12.9 and Figure 12.10). As far as Greece is concerned, an intense upward cycle in migration outflows began in 1962 and ended in 1967, with the reinstatement of the dictatorship during the period 1967–1974. More specifically, Greek emigration presents three distinct cycles in its flows, the periods of 1952–1959, 1959–1962 and 1962–1967. Similar to other Southern European countries, from the end of the 1950s onwards, these flows were directed mainly to destinations within Europe.

And what about the impact of emigration on national economic growth? In the case of Italy, which was characterized by an increase in GDP per capita throughout the period 1945–1970, we can observe a negative relationship between migration and GDP per capita during the 1960s, which means that the two sizes follow opposite tendencies (Figure 12.8). In a deeper statistical analysis, the correlation between emigration and GDP per capita is weak, which means that the two sizes under consideration can hardly be related (Figure 12.12). This could be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, the improved economic indicators of the Italian economy gradually reduced the outflow of migrants, and on the other hand, the large increase in the size of the Italian economy in the 1960s significantly reduced the relative contribution of incoming remittances to GDP growth. In what concerns Spain, we can observe a high increase in GDP growth during the period under study, while Spanish migratory outflows were relatively stable with an intense cycle from 1959 to 1966 (Figure 12.9). The relationship between emigration and GDP per capita is relatively weak and positive (Figure 12.12) and the two sizes display a similar tendency in the 1950s and after the mid-1960s.

In contrast with the larger countries, there is a difference in the observed relationship between migration and GDP per capita in the smaller countries of the European South. Despite the cyclicity of the Greek migratory flows, the increase in Greek emigration seems to be strongly correlated with the continuous and steady increase in the national GDP per capita (Figure 12.10).
The relationship between the two variables is positive and their association strong. Portugal experienced the lowest growth rate of its GDP per capita in the period 1950–1970 when compared to other South European countries (Figure 12.1). The annual emigration rate was relatively stable until the early 1960s, when there was a sharp increase with a peak in 1966 that resulted in a flow of approximately 120,000 emigrants (Figure 12.11). The correlation between migration flows and GDP per capita is at about the same level as Greece – relatively strong – and the relationship is positive (Figure 12.11). In other words, as we can observe in Figure 12.12 in regard to the two smaller Southern European countries, Greece and Portugal, high levels of emigration.
correspond to high levels of GDP per capita, while in the Italian and Spanish cases, higher levels of GDP correspond to lower levels of emigration.

In reference to South American receiving countries, Argentina, whose GDP per capita was already very high at the beginning of the post–World
War II period, experienced the lowest GDP per-capita growth of all the countries studied. The decline in the migratory inflows it received throughout the 1950s and until the mid-1960s, when immigration from other Latin American countries started to replace the European migrant flows, is evident in Figure 12.13. From 128,000 immigrants in 1950, by the end of the decade it had reached fewer than 10,000, a size which remained almost stable until the end of the study period.
In the cases of Argentina (Figure 12.13) and Brazil (Figure 12.14) collectively, the increase of GDP is disconnected from the migration flows, which in both countries in the 1960s had fallen to very low levels (although in Brazil, migration declined at a slower pace).

**Unemployment**

The nexus between migration, unemployment and underemployment in Southern Europe traditionally occupied an important place in migration policies. If emigrants were unemployed before leaving their place of origin – or if employed emigrants left their positions to others – emigration could efficiently lower unemployment rates. In the statistical recording of the connection of the two phenomena, the actual figures of total emigration for Italy, Spain and Greece are correlated with the numbers of unemployed in the respective countries.

In respect to Italy, it took almost 20 years, starting from the end of World War II, for its unemployment rates to decrease significantly. Figure 12.15 presents an image of general emigration from as well as unemployment in Italy. As previously mentioned, despite the circular trend of Italian emigration, migrant outflows were constant. It is important to say that not even the sharp decline of unemployment after 1957 affected the numbers of emigrants. Therefore, the two sizes are not related. Figure 12.16 presents the unemployment and emigration numbers for Spain. In this case, the relationship between the two magnitudes is weak (Figure 12.18), meaning that emigration does not seem to impact seriously on unemployment. This observation raises an interesting question concerning the real profile of those who emigrated, and makes us
Figure 12.15 Italy: unemployment and emigration
Notes: Emigrants in thousands, unemployment in thousands.
Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from Mitchell (1998).

Figure 12.16 Spain: unemployment and emigration
Notes: Emigrants in thousands, unemployment in thousands.
Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from Mitchell (1998) and Fernández Vicente (Chapter 1, this volume).
question whether it was mostly unemployed persons who made the decision to migrate.

In the case of Greece, represented in Figure 12.18, the unemployment rate is relatively low (5%) and stable for the whole period under study (Lianos and Kavounidi 2012: 63), but it seems to be affected dynamically by the fluctuations of emigration. In Figure 12.16 this negative relationship (high emigration–low unemployment) is obvious and particularly strong. Greece seems therefore, to confirm the idea of emigration as a safety valve (ILO 1959: 372), at least in the short term.

Remittances

The phenomenon of migration is multifaceted, with the sending of remittances to the country of origin being an aspect of great significance.

The size of the remittances impacts positively not only on the income of the recipients, usually the remaining relatives of the emigrant, but also on the financial situation of the country of origin. However, despite its importance for the macroeconomic analysis, research on remittances faces a lot of difficulties. Firstly, there is a lack of analytical data, which makes it impossible to analyze the flow of remittances from the countries of origin, since they are recorded as totals. Secondly, in what concerns the particular countries we are studying, remittances coming from Latin American countries were simply not recorded (Swamy 1981).

Despite these difficulties, further research on the subject is essential, as remittances had constituted one of the major factors that shaped the migration
Figure 12.18 European South: unemployment and emigration

Notes: Emigrants in thousands, unemployment in thousands.

Source: Authors’ own design, based on data from Mitchell (1998) and Fernández Vicente (Chapter 1, this volume).
policies of that time. For instance, in a meeting between the Brazilian ambassador and ICEM agents in Greece, the latter pointed out that one of the reasons that such a small number of Greeks emigrated to Brazil were the difficulties migrants faced in order to remit money to their families in Greece.\textsuperscript{19} The main difficulties were: (a) the policy pursued by Latin American countries on hard currency exports; (b) inflation rates prevailing in the countries of destination, which reduced the value of remittances when converting them into home currency;\textsuperscript{20} (c) the fluctuation of the exchange rate of the dollar itself, making the sending of remittances problematic. These issues are outlined in a report addressed to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which states that, in the case of Greek immigrants in Brazil, the only possibility of gaining access to foreign exchange was through the free market (and not through official exchanges). The difference between the official and the unofficial price was almost eight times higher in favor of the latter, thus, explaining their difficulty in obtaining foreign currency and sending remittances back to Greece.\textsuperscript{21}

The inflow of migrant remittances depended mainly on the size of the migratory flows. The larger absolute levels of Italy’s migratory outflows, as compared to other countries of the European South, are also reflected in the correspondingly larger number of aggregate remittances during the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 12.19), with lower numbers for Greece and Portugal for the same period and for Spain during the 1960s. Although the data available do not include a breakdown of exactly what country of origin the remittances came from, we can say that the increase in remittances for all the countries mentioned, in the 1960s, can be explained to a large degree by the shift from transoceanic to continental migration.\textsuperscript{22} The European industrialized countries that opened their doors to unskilled migrants in the late 1950s were preferable destinations, as they were more easily accessible for emigrants who no longer needed to move with their entire family, and the duration of their stay was generally shorter. But above all, the higher growth rate of these European countries meant higher incomes for immigrants and, therefore, higher levels of remittances.

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The previous statistical analysis may provide the researcher with indications concerning the different behaviors of the critical sizes that have been studied; that is, emigration, GDP per capita, unemployment and remittances. However, although some interesting thoughts on the relationship between migration and development emerge from the statistical data presented in this analysis, the economic impact of migration movements cannot be interpreted in an absolute manner, since their results and consequences are very complex. Of course, it is well known that on the other side, migration waves are influenced by factors that are not always measurable. We are therefore compelled to assume that it is impossible to come to safe conclusions for such a complicated social issue based on any quantitative analysis. However, the clues and general trends provided by such an analysis allow the researcher to focus on issues that may not have been visible from the beginning. In conclusion, the statistical analysis of the research
variables does not unveil with certainty causal links between them, but rather calls for further investigation.

Notes

1 Other Latin American countries received much fewer immigrants from South Europe. Uruguay received a total of 56,400 for the same period, of which 55% were from Spain and 36% were from Italy.
2 The historical statistical data in some cases is incomplete and in others intermittent. In many cases data had to be merged from two or more sources. Nonetheless, we believe that the scope of presenting the general trends has been accomplished.
3 Local recessions took place during the period but not resulted in an extended crisis.
4 Greece, in the period 1945–1970, experienced the largest increase of GDP per capita with more than 560%; Italy had almost 450%. Spain, Portugal and Brazil follow with 180%, 200% and 160%, respectively. On the other hand, and by a wide margin from the rest, Argentina follows with a rate of 70% of total GDP growth per capita.
5 Argentina was one of the ten richest countries in the world in the beginning of the 20th century. The comparatively mild effect of the Great Depression on its economy, the fact that the country had not been affected by World War II as well as its abundant natural resources and good development perspectives, made Argentina one of the most important post–World War II immigration destinations until the early 1950s. After that, cyclical crisis and economic stagnation began. The GDP per capita of Argentina in 1988 was at the same level as it was in 1959 (Ferguson 2008: 109–110).
6 About the migration policies of different countries, see in the present volume the contributions of: María José Fernández Vicente for Spain (Chapter 1); Giota Tourgeli for Greece (Chapter 2); María Damilakou for Argentina (Chapter 3); Yannis Papadopoulos for Brazil (Chapter 5); Beatriz Padilla and Thais França for Portugal (Chapter 8).
7 The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), that was the successor of Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), was born in 1951 in order to assist, organize and regulate migration flows from Europe towards overseas destinations.
8 See Chapter 10 by María Damilakou and Yannis Papadopoulos in this volume.
9 In 1954 more than 70% of the Greek emigrants to Brazil moved through the ICEM mechanism. In 1956 the proportion was almost 100%.
10 The first post–World War II Greek migrant flows to Argentina relied mainly on pre-war migration networks.
11 The correlation coefficient is −0.34 and the coefficient of determination is 0.12. That is a low negative correlation.
12 The correlation coefficient is 0.44 and the coefficient of determination is 0.19. That is a relatively low correlation.
13 The correlation coefficient is 0.77 and the coefficient of determination is 0.60. That is a high positive correlation.
14 The correlation coefficient is 0.74 and the coefficient of determination is 0.55. That is a high positive correlation.
15 The statistical measure of correlation R expresses the extent to which two variables are related (linearly). A perfect positive correlation has a value of 1, and a perfect negative correlation has a value of −1. A size of 0 to ±0.29 implies a negligible to very low (positive or negative) correlation, a size of ±0.30 to ±0.49 implies a low (positive or negative) correlation, a size of ±0.50 to ±0.69 implies a moderate (positive or negative) correlation, a size of ±0.70 to ±0.79 implies a high (positive or negative) correlation and a size of ±0.80 to ±0.99 implies a very high (positive or negative) correlation. It is important to point out that the indicator of correlation does not explain why the relationship exists, only whether it exists. The R^2 (coefficient of determination) is a statistical measure used to analyze how differences in one variable can be explained by a difference in a second variable. The values can be between 0 and 1.
16 The correlation coefficient is −0.07 and the coefficient of determination is 0.005.
17 The correlation coefficient is 0.17 and the coefficient of determination is 0.03.
18 The correlation coefficient is −0.89 and the coefficient of determination is 0.79.
19 Alexandra Joannides, “Meeting with the Brazilian Ambassador”, March 8, 1960, IOM Greece.
22 The immigration of Italians and Greeks to Australia was also important in the 1960s period but in much smaller numbers.

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Concluding remarks

Maria Damilakou and Yannis G. S. Papadopoulou

The end of World War II, with Europe in ruins and huge population displacements, coincides with the ripening of ideas regarding the regulation of human mobility, a topic that had already been under discussion since the beginning of the 20th century. Restrictive migration policies that had been adopted during the interwar period by some overseas and European states were to continue in a more relaxed manner with the establishment, by both sending and receiving countries, of selective criteria that linked migration to their economic priorities and development needs. At the same time, in the early 1950s, the necessity of an inter-state regulation of population movements, as a vital addition to national policies and bilateral migration agreements, became obvious. Both sending and receiving countries adopted the view that in a globalized world, human mobility required transnational solutions. Furthermore, the Cold War had transformed Europe's refugee and “overpopulation” problem into an issue of international security, since unemployment and poverty were perceived as destabilizing factors for the nations of Western and Southern Europe that could pave the way for the expansion of Soviet influence in the continent. Parallelly, international policy planners considered the masses of displaced persons and unemployed or underemployed European migrants as an asset that could contribute to South American economic development.

From the chapters of this volume, it becomes clear that in the post–World War II period, Southern European and South American countries, as integral members of the Western world, adopted common ideas and strategies on development in which migration played a central role. Immigration policy became an increasingly complex area of governance, linked to issues of economic development, security and social cohesion. Thus, establishing comprehensive and effective migration strategies became a necessary complement to the ever-widening development policies of countries of the Western bloc periphery, which, despite their different theoretical models and degree of state intervention, prioritized in all cases industrialization as a cornerstone for national development and modernization. In this context, workforce was a valuable asset and labour migration became, in the 1950s and 1960s, a major issue in public debates and in broadly diffused images and stereotyped visions. Representations of human mobility as a “national calamity” or a “safety valve”

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for emigration countries, and as “infusion of resources” or “means to improve native population” for receiving countries, shaped durable social attitudes, national imaginaries and collective self-images.

In the aftermath of World War II, for Southern European sending countries going through a process of national reconstruction and economic recovery, emigration became once again an answer to their structural problems, especially the hypertrophy of their primary sector and the lack of effective policies for the utilization of the available domestic workforce. On the other side, South American countries, which had emerged unscathed from the global conflict, saw imported skilled manpower as an important complementary factor in order to proceed with their ambitious industrialization plans. These plans were part of further development strategies that sought to overcome their dependence on exports of primary products and raw materials, although the colonization of their immense lands by European immigrants remained a steadfast objective in their policies.

As we saw in several chapters of this book, during this period, the role of the state in the design and implementation of migration policies was strengthened, and for both sending and receiving countries, migration was contingent on the safeguarding of national interests as defined by development goals, demographic concerns, security considerations and ideological prejudices. In such a context, categories of “desirable” and “useful” migrants were created, and both sending and host countries set strict selective standards that linked migration to their development and modernization. National states had at their disposal various means to implement their policies, such as restrictive and discriminatory regulations, controls on the exodus or admission of migrant workers, the signing of bilateral agreements with other countries for the migration of specific social groups and professional categories or multilateral cooperation for the management of migrant flows.

Yet, in most of the cases, the migration policies of the countries under study were ambiguous and contradictory. In addition to the clashes between different levels of power, especially in large countries like Brazil, where federal and state bodies were often at odds, migration policies generally were not governed by a single unifying logic. Rather, they were subject to different social and labour criteria, expectations of immediate economic gain and political motivations that were often contradictory. Occasionally, as we saw, political priorities had a stronger impact on the formulation of official migration policies than the needs of the domestic labour market. This is obvious in the cases of the authoritarian regimes of Franco and Salazar in Spain and Portugal, respectively, who, in the 1950s, gradually liberalized their emigration policies in order to gain recognition and acceptance from the international community. For its part, post-war Yugoslavia promoted what Sara Bernand and Agustin Cosovschi refer to in Chapter 9 as “socialist mobilities”, in order to bolster multilateral relations and therefore reduce its dependence on the superpower blocs. Another important aspect that several authors have highlighted is the distance that existed between policy and practice: as the respective chapters of the book show, in the cases
Concluding remarks

of Spain, Portugal, Brazil and Argentina, restrictive legislation with selective
criteria coexisted with flexible interpretations and tolerant practices that per-
mitted the continuity of flows despite existing restrictions.2

In any case, the formulation and implementation of national policies was
largely conditioned by strong structural factors of the world system and inter-
national dynamics. It has become clear that migration policies transcended
national choices and became part of the design of the post-war Western system.
The system’s institutional apparatus, based on the idea of the complementarity
of the “two Souths” of the Western bloc, supported the integration of these
two developing areas through regulated, organized and subsidized migrant
flows from overpopulated Southern European countries to underpopulated
and short-in-skilled-manpower South American countries, in order to achieve
a better distribution of the workforce and meet the development needs of both
sending and receiving countries.

However, as this book shows, this complementarity designed on paper was
not to work in practice. The discordance between the selective criteria set
by Southern European and South American countries complicated the mat-
ter, as the latter favoured the arrival of qualified manpower while the former
considered it scarce and necessary for their own national development; emigra-
tion countries were generally unwilling to let skilled workers move to overseas
destinations and favoured, through their own selective processes, the departure
of unemployed persons or workers with little or no professional qualifications.
Short-term vocational training programs organized by the ICEM and ILO did
not offer a solution to this problem. In practice, matching the workforce needs
of sending Southern European and receiving South American countries, as
international organizations sought to do in the 1950s and 1960s, was a very
difficult task, as it did not respond to either the real demand or to what was on
offer in the transnational labour market that had been established between the
two regions.

In fact, post-war international strategies for the regulation of migration flows
between developing areas, implemented through organizations such as ICEM,
were based on a mechanistic push-and-pull approach that ignored the spe-
cific conditions in sending and receiving countries and the expectations of the
immigrants themselves. It is obvious that these strategies, designed under the
guidance of the United States, camouflaged, through use of convincing tech-
nocratic analyses, the true intentions and priorities of the leading powers of
the Western world that aimed to relieve Europe of its unemployed masses and
refugees in order to avert social unrest. This approach was to prove inconsistent,
as it was at odds with the lack of attention given by global planners to the inte-
gration of these immigrants in South America. As a consequence, the practical
results of these international strategies were poor, and South American expec-
tations of ensuring a skilled workforce and flows of experienced European
farmers ready to settle in their lands and work under adverse conditions were
not fulfilled.3 The comparison of living standards and salaries between South
America, on the one hand, and North America and Oceania on the other, as
well as the enormous difficulty for migrants to send remittances from South American host countries to their homeland due to unfavourable exchange rates, were critical factors for the important return migration, or remigration wave. On balance, given the limited contribution of international mechanisms to the management of population flows, the implementation of long-term migration policies on the part of the developing countries of the Western world – on the basis of selective criteria linked to their development and demographic needs – was hampered by their poor fiscal means, ineffective policies and limited capacity to influence and compete in the international labour market.

Nevertheless, despite the limited impact of organized and regulated migration movements, during the 1950s and 1960s, important migrant flows helped to establish a close connection between Southern Europe and South American countries. As several chapters of the book show, these flows were to a large extent spontaneous, supported by transnational social networks that helped migrants settle in South America and facilitated their adaptation and integration in the host country. The decision to migrate, the motivations behind it, the forms of labour insertion and the ascending social itineraries of so many immigrants that forged their own path and found a way to realize their migration plans and expectations, are proof of the discrepancy between policy and practice. They show the complexity of the migration phenomenon, challenge well-established concepts concerning the utility of certain categories of migrants and remind us that migration movements have their proper dynamics and are largely shaped by the migrants themselves, along with official policies and regulations.

These policies, as related to Southern European countries, reached a turning point in the late 1950s, when European industrialized countries, which had experienced their own economic miracle, opened their labour market to massive, available, unskilled and cheap manpower from peripheral countries. The temporary and regulated character of this migration, through bilateral agreements and, of course, the much shorter distance between homeland and destination, convinced all Mediterranean countries, and also socialist Yugoslavia, that this emigration choice was realistic and would ensure them remittance flows and function as a modernization factor upon the return of migrants to their country of origin, thanks to the skills, qualifications and habits acquired in the more advanced parts of Europe. As we saw in all the respective chapters, the agreements signed with industrialized countries of Europe signified a new era for South European emigration and practically put an end to European flows to Latin American countries.

As a result, after the mid-1960s, Southern Europe and South American countries followed, to a large extent, different paths and left behind the patterns of population mobility that had connected the two regions for almost a century. However, as some chapters of the book explain, in recent decades the migratory ties between the two regions have acquired new forms, through reverse migrant movements from South America to Southern Europe; in this context, transgenerational mobility – that is, the return of immigrants’ descendants to
Southern Europe – has grown in importance, due to economic and political instability in South America. Moreover, Southern European countries’ new diasporic policies have strengthened the transnational links between the home and host country and created new mobilities and interchanges. Despite this, as far as incoming migration flows are concerned, since the 1960s, Argentina has been largely “latinoamericanized” in many aspects, whereas Brazil, in recent decades, acts as a magnet for immigrants of several countries of the transcontinental Global South.

The long-term perspective of these analyses calls us to reflect on how these new migration realities, framed by revised migration and diasporic policies, relate to the place and role that the two areas under discussion currently have in the world system. Southern European countries, as members of the EE and Eurozone, have left behind their peripheral or semi-peripheral classification despite their recent economic crisis and the persistence of inequalities within the developed world; Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have become host countries to Latin American, Asian and African immigration while building new connections with their overseas diasporic communities. The same can be said for the states that until 1991 made up Yugoslavia, which no longer exists. At the same time, Argentina, emerging from the severe economic crisis that decimated its economy at the turn of the 21st century, feels more at home in its Latin American neighbourhood, whereas Brazil, up until recently, was seeking its leadership role in the Global South.

Meanwhile, perceptions of development have radically changed. Latin American countries have undergone strong neoliberal experiences that changed long-established structures and perceptions of the relationship between state and society; in several South European countries, nowadays, industry appears only as part of urban archaeology projects; and blue-collar factory jobs have been replaced by precarious, unimaginable until recently, forms of unskilled and flexible labour in the service sector. What is left to say, then? New forms of mobility, new modes of migration, new perceptions of development, new systems of labour, oblige us to problematize and interpret the post–World War II migration–development nexus within its historical context and dimension, as a phenomenon of a specific era that overestimated the capacity of planning; but also, to enrich our approach incorporating a global perspective that takes into account long-term dynamics and the broader population mobilities that characterize present times; mobilities that are creating fresh transnational spaces and restoring older ones, similar to the one that still joins Southern Europe to South America.

Notes

1 As we can read in the respective chapters of this book, in Brazil and Argentina, national development was primarily a state affair, at least until the early 1950s. During the 1950s and 1960s, although economic nationalism declined, the state and development remained largely linked. The influence of the structuralist theories of the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ELCA) was very strong on the development policies of Latin America countries. For the case of Brazil, see Chapter 4 by Roberto Goulart Menezes and Ana Tereza Reis da Silva in this volume.

2 María José Fernández Vicente, in Chapter 1 of this volume, has shown the different logics that sustained the migration policies of Franco’s regime in Spain, which were based on different and competing labour criteria and political priorities. Giota Tourgeli (Chapter 2) has remarked on similar tensions in the case of the Greek state’s migration policies. Yannis Papadopoulos, in Chapter 5, mentions the tensions between federal and regional migration policies, and Maria Damilakou includes in Chapter 3 references to the confrontations between different spheres of power and institutions that managed the migration issues during the Peronist period.

3 For the problems in the labour insertion and integration of Greek-assisted immigrants in Brazil and Argentina, see Chapter 10 by Damilakou and Papadopoulos in the present volume. For the difficulties of Argentina and Brazil to attract a skilled workforce from Europe, see their respective chapters in the book.

4 These matters are analysed in the Chapter 7 by Bárbara Ortuño Martínez and Chapter 10 by Damilakou and Papadopoulos in this volume.

5 Tânia Tonhati, Márcio de Oliveira and Leonardo Cavalcanti, in Chapter 6 of this volume, show how from 1980 onwards, Brazil became an emigration country and, as of lately, a host country for immigrants from countries of the “Global South”. Beatriz Padilla and Thais França analyse in Chapter 8 of this volume the diasporic policies designed by the Portuguese state in recent decades.
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