Migration in West Africa
IMISCOE Regional Reader
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Migration in West Africa
IMISCOE Regional Reader

Joseph Kofi Teye
Editor

Springer
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Part I
Changing Patterns and Governance of Migration
Chapter 1
Migration in West Africa: An Introduction

Joseph Kofi Teye

This book examines the dynamics and impacts of international migration within and from West Africa. Although population mobility is not a recent phenomenon in West Africa, the sub-region has become the focus of policy discussions on migration in recent years because it is characterised by high levels of labour migration (Olsen, 2011) and forced displacement (UNHCR, 2020a). West Africa is experiencing ‘mixed migration’, which refers to “cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities” (Mixed Migration Centre, 2021: 2). While media narratives suggest an exodus of Africans to the global North, intra-regional mobility is the dominant type of movement in West Africa, with more than 70% of migrants from West African countries moving to destinations within the sub-region (UNDESA, 2018). Although West Africans are among the most mobile people in the world, there is a general paucity of data on population mobility and its development impacts in the sub-region. Existing knowledge gaps make it difficult to integrate migration into development planning processes in the region. This book discusses theoretical perspectives and empirical findings on patterns, drivers, and socio-economic impacts of both voluntary and involuntary migration in West Africa. The authors raise key research questions and outline recommendations for improving migration governance, protecting migrants and harnessing the benefits of migration for socio-economic development for both countries of origin and destination of migrants.

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1.1 Trends and Patterns of Migration in West Africa

Current migration patterns in West Africa are deeply rooted in historical antecedents (Awumbila et al., 2014; Teye et al., 2015). During the precolonial era, population mobility, in the West African sub-region, was largely driven by economic factors, especially the search for fertile lands for farming, and trading in goods. The trading in various commodities crystallized into the famous trans-Saharan trade routes (Adepoju, 2003; Manuh, 2005). There were also population movements for religious activities and security reasons. Many of the ethnic groups of the sub-region are thought to have moved to the present locations in search of safe havens (Teye et al., 2015). Most of the population movements, in the pre-colonial period, were not regarded as cross-border movements because the sub-region was seen as a borderless area within which goods and people moved freely (Adepoju, 2003; Manuh, 2005). The economic policies adopted by the various colonial administrations and the establishment of national boundaries has significantly changed the patterns of migration from and within West Africa. The slave trade led to the forced migration of millions of West Africans to North America, Europe and the Caribbean. With specific reference to intra-regional mobility, the construction of railways and roads by the colonial administration facilitated large-scale, male dominated, seasonal and cross-border labour movements within the sub-region. Colonial economic and recruitment policies, such as contract and forced labour legislation and agreements, stimulated labour migration from countries in the northern savannah zone (e.g. Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali) to countries in the south (e.g. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire) where plantations and mining communities are located (Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003).

Intra-regional mobility patterns, in the early post-colonial era (in 1960s) continued to follow the north-south direction, with labour migrants largely moving from landlocked, Sahelian countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) to the plantation and mining communities in coastal countries, such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and The Gambia. Migration flows to these coastal countries were motivated by high demand for labour for the booming agricultural and mining sectors. For instance, in view of its prosperous cocoa and coffee plantations, Côte d’Ivoire received labour migrants from Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, and Mali (Teye et al., 2015). Ghana also attracted labour migrants from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria because of its booming mining and cocoa industries (Awumbila et al., 2014). Similarly, seasonal migration of farm labourers from Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and Mali to the groundnut fields in Senegal and The Gambia, which started in the colonial era, intensified during the early post-colonial period (Zachariah et al., 1980). As a result of dramatic increase in oil prices and a booming oil industry, Nigeria became a major destination of West African migrants in the 1970s. It attracted migrants from several countries including Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea (Teye et al., 2015).

Intra-regional migration flows since the 1980s have largely followed these historical patterns, where labour migrants tend to move from Sahelian countries (e.g
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) to mining and plantation communities in the coastal zone. The dominant typologies of migration in contemporary West Africa include permanent migration, seasonal migration, cross-border movements, and transit migration (Adepoju, 2005). Intra-regional migration in West Africa is largely facilitated by the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment which was adopted in 1979 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), made up of 15 of the 16 in countries in West Africa. The West African sub-region has also been experiencing large-scale forced displacements (UNHCR, 2020a), caused by civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s; political conflicts in Togo and Côte d’Ivoire as well as activities of religious extremists in Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria (UNHCR, 2020b). As a result of increasing conflicts, economic challenges, and social transformation, migration flows within and from West Africa have increased, in recent years (Awumbila et al., 2014). Males continue to dominate migration streams, but the flows are being feminised.

While intra-regional migration flows, in the contemporary era, continue to follow north-south direction, traditional migrants-receiving countries, such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Nigeria, have since 1980s been sending out several migrants, especially highly skilled professionals, such as doctors and nurses, to Europe and North America (Teye et al., 2015). It is, however, important to stress that while political narratives and media images suggest an ‘exodus’ of West Africans to Europe, a majority of migrants from the sub-region (about 72%) move intra-regionally (UNDESA, 2018). Olsen (2011) asserted that, with more than 3% of the sub-regional population circulating within West Africa, migration within the region is about six times higher than intra-European mobility. As shown in Table 1.1, all the West African countries receive migrants from neighbouring countries, while the popular destinations of emigrants are also the neighbouring countries. In absolute terms, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Ghana are major receiving countries (Table 1.1), while Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali are the major migrant sending countries (Table 1.2). The countries with the highest stock of international migrants as a share of total population are Côte d’Ivoire (9.72%) and the Gambia (8.92%). In most cases, the top countries of origin of a country’s immigrants are the same as the top countries of destination of a country’s emigrants. For instance, as shown in Table 1.1, Burkina Faso is the first most important country of origin of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire, while Côte d’Ivoire is also the most important (first) country of origin for immigrants in Burkina Faso. Similarly, Togo is the topmost (first) country of origin of immigrants in Ghana, while Ghana is the second most important country of origin of immigrants in Togo. The destination analysis of migrants shows similar patterns. For instance, as shown in Table 1.2, Côte d’Ivoire is the most popular destination of migrants from Burkina Faso, while Burkina Faso is also the most popular destination of migrants from Côte d’Ivoire.

Proximity appears to determine the choice of destination for many migrants, as in the case of migration flows between Togo and Ghana, as well as migration flows between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Colonial legacy and common official language also explain intra-regional mobility patterns, such as high level of migrant flows
Table 1.1  Stock of immigrants by country of destination and top five countries of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Immigration Frequency 2020</th>
<th>Percent 2020</th>
<th>Top five countries of origin</th>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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Sources: Immigration: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock
Top (5) countries of origin: https://www.knomad.org/data/migration/immigration

between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso as well as between Ghana and Nigeria. Ethnic ties also influence the choice of destination of migrants. For instance, some Ewes in Togo often move to stay and work with their relatives in the Volta Region of Ghana. The Kpelle ethnic group is also spread across Liberia and Guinea, with some members moving across the boundaries of Liberia and Guinea for economic and social reasons. Members of the Kissi ethnic group, found in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, have also been moving across the boundaries of these countries (Teye et al., 2015). These ethnic groups that spread across regions see the national
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Emigration Frequency 2020</th>
<th>Emigration Percent 2020</th>
<th>Top five destination countries</th>
<th>No. of</th>
<th>Frequency 2020</th>
<th>Percent 2020</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>681,800</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Gabon, France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>681,800</td>
<td>5.62</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Togo</td>
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<td>1,600,000</td>
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<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>187,600</td>
<td>33.74</td>
<td>Angola, Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands</td>
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Top (5) destination countries: [https://www.knomad.org/data/migration/emigration](https://www.knomad.org/data/migration/emigration)

Boundaries created during the colonial era as ‘artificial’ (Awumbila et al., 2014). The recent closure of land borders in West Africa since March 2020 to reduce the spread of Covid 19 has generally affected the intra-regional mobility in the West African region.

West African migrants have also been increasingly migration to other African sub-regions. Libya used to be a popular destination for those intending to enter Europe through the Mediterranean. However, the political crisis and insecurity in Libya have led to a reduction in the flow of migrants towards Libya. In recent years, many West Africans have been moving to oil-rich countries in Central Africa,
especially Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Increasing number of West Africans have also been migrating to South Africa.

Outside Africa, Europe is the most popular destination of migrants from West Africa. The migration flows from West Africa to Europe are also rooted in historical antecedents. There is some level of movement between the two regions during the colonial era. In the 1970s and 1980s, economic crisis and political conflicts contributed significantly to migration from West Africa to Europe. Since then, both highly skilled and unskilled migrants continue to migrate to Europe, either regularly or irregularly. Although irregular migration from West Africa to Europe is not a new phenomenon, it has recently received more attention in the media and policy circles. Data provided by IOM shows that West Africans constitute a significant proportion of irregular arrivals in Italy, Spain, Greece and Malta. The irregular migrants usually travel through the Sahara Desert and then enter Europe through the Mediterranean (IOM, 2020).

In view of recent strict visa regimes in popular European countries, many low skilled West African migrants have, in recent years, been recruited by private recruitment agencies and individual intermediaries for job placement in the Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, where they have been working as domestic workers in people’s homes and also in the construction sector. For instance, figures provided by Ghana Labour Department indicates that in 2015, about 1550 Ghanaians were recruited by private employment agencies for placement in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait. This figure increased to 2372 in 2016. Similarly, from January to May 2017 alone, private employment agencies in Ghana recruited about 1589 Ghanaians for job placement in these Middle East countries (Awumbila et al., 2019). It is estimated that more than this number are also recruited by informal intermediaries for job placement in the Middle East. A majority of these migrants are women who work as domestic workers. In response to reported cases of abuse of these migrants, a number of West African countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, banned recruitment of low skilled citizens for job placement abroad (Bisong, 2021).

1.2 Drivers of Migration Within and from West Africa

In the literature forces which lead to the inception and perpetuation of migration are collectively referred to as the ‘drivers’ of migration (Van Hear, 2012: 1). The drivers of migration in West Africa fall under the four categories of migration drivers identified by Van Hear (2012). These are predisposing or underlying factors/drivers, proximate factors/drivers, precipitating factors/drivers and mediating drivers. Predisposing drivers contribute to the creation of a unfavourable socio-economic context in which out-migration is likely. Such predisposing factors are outcomes of broad processes, such as globalization, unequal terms of trade and demographic transformation. For instance, the colonial economic policies (e.g. establishment of plantation in southern areas at the expense of northern communities) which created
the context for the north-south migration in West Africa can be seen as types of predisposing factors (Teye et al., 2019). Similarly, as a result of declining fertility in Europe and high fertility in Africa, surplus labour tends to move from West Africa to Europe which has high demand for labour.

The proximate drivers of migration directly cause migration and are products of the working out of the predisposing factors. At migrant sending areas, these factors include macro-economic challenges, security problems, and environmental change which cause migration (see Van Hear, 2012). At migrant destination areas, these factors include opportunities that open up as a result of economic upturn and peaceful communities.

The precipitating drivers of migration are the conditions that actually trigger departure. At migrants sending areas in West Africa, these are usually found in the economic sphere, including high level of unemployment, low incomes, poverty, and low prices of agricultural products (Van Hear, 2012). Other precipitating factors that drive migration in West Africa include the poor health, education, and other welfare services. In countries such as Mali, Niger and Nigeria, security problems created by Boko Haram, for instance, can be seen as precipitating driver as they contribute to out-migration (UNHCR, 2020b). The mediating drivers of migration are made up of factors which facilitate or constrain migration. These include the presence and quality of transport, improved communications, social networks and availability of resources needed for migration. While the earlier migration industry literature tends to emphasize the exploitative aspects of the relationship between brokers who facilitate migration and migrants (Salt & Stein, 1997), recent studies have shown that although migration brokers and other intermediaries sometimes play a key role in the precarisation of migrants, there are occasions where they freely help potential migrants to realise their migration dreams (Deshingkar et al., 2019).

The effect of various factors on migration flows is context-specific. For instance, while poverty is often blamed for irregular migration towards Europe, social transformation can also increase migration flows. Irregular migrants are not the poorest of the poor as some resources are needed to embark on irregular migration to the global north. Data on irregular migrants' arrivals in Europe shows that poorer Sahelian countries do not really send out many irregular migrants to Europe. In fact, Niger and Burkina Faso which are experiencing serious climate induced poverty and are located on the route towards Europe are not among the top 10 countries of origin of irregular migrants from the West African sub-region (IOM, 2020). Data provided by IOM (2020) indicates that from 2017 to June 2020, for instance, the nationalities and number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe were: Guinea Conakry (24,442), Côte d’Ivoire (20,838); Nigeria (20,348); Mali (17,864); The Gambia (11,101); Senegal (9845); Ghana (1284); Mauritania (1193). Irregular migrants coming from countries experiencing climate change tend to come from more ecologically favourable regions than dry regions.

While poverty is blamed for massive outmigration from certain West African countries, recent data shows that social transformation and facilitative drivers (e.g. social media and social networks) are the key drivers of migration. Many West Africans also migrate because of the cultural values attached to emigration. Indeed,
international migration is seen as a ‘status symbol’. Current and return migrants are highly respected in many West African societies. For instance, during funerals in Ghana, the number of the dead person’s children living abroad, as captured on the ‘obituary poster’, is used as a measure of the family’s economic and social status, and the importance that people in the community will attach to attending such funerals. Therefore, people sometimes migrate just to enhance the social status of their families.

1.3  Return Migration in West Africa

Although West Africans are highly mobile, many migrants from the region have been returning to their origins, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Although there is a paucity of data on return migration situation in West Africa, there is enough evidence to suggest that in view of strict visa regimes in many of the popular host countries, political conflicts, and increasing economic opportunities in a few West African countries, return migration to West Africa has been slightly increasing, in recent years. While some migrants have been returning to the West African sub-region voluntarily because they have achieved objectives of their migration projects, some migrants also return involuntarily as a result of failed migration projects, deportations, poor health conditions, Covid 19 pandemic, and insecurity in host countries, among others.

In the last decade, a significant proportion of the vulnerable migrants that returned to West Africa were supported by the EU-IOM Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program. Since 2016, thousands of vulnerable migrants have been assisted to return to West Africa by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration programme. A greater proportion of these returnees were migrants who were trapped in other African countries. In 2017, for instance, about 67% of vulnerable migrants assisted to return to their countries in West and Central Africa were persons trapped in other countries (mainly Niger) within the same region. Another 21% of vulnerable migrants assisted to return that year were persons brought from Middle East and North Africa (mainly Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan), while 10% were from the European Union (mainly Italy, Germany and the Netherlands) (IOM, 2021).

Additionally, the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) has, since 2017, been supporting vulnerable West Africans trapped in Libya and Niger to return. Many of the persons assisted to return from Niger, Libya and other North African countries were largely people trying to irregularly enter Europe but were trapped in Libya. The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN), established by 15 European partner countries to ensure that migrants return to their home countries in a dignified and humane manner, has also been facilitating the return of West African migrants. Unlike the IOM-EU return migration programs, which tend to support return of vulnerable migrants, GIZ implements a program that seeks to facilitate the voluntary return of highly skilled migrants under a ‘Migration for Development’ project (Teye et al., 2021).
1.4 Outline of the Book

The book is made up of 12 chapters organised into three main parts: Part I. Changing Patterns and Governance of Migration; Part II: Environmental and Forced Migration; Part III: Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development, and Part IV: Return Migration. The four papers in Part I discuss the continuity, changing patterns and governance of migration within and from the West African sub-region. The chapters in this part of the book highlight the uniqueness of West Africa as a region that experiences mixed migration flows and high level of intra-regional migration. After this introductory chapter which provides an overview of the trends, patterns and drivers of migration within and from West Africa, Faisal Garba and Thomas Yeboah, in Chap. 2, present a historical analysis of attempts at promoting free movement of persons and regional integration in West Africa. The authors argue that despite the progress made by ECOWAS to promote free movement within the region, a number of challenges, such as harassment at the borders and lack of coherence between the national laws of member states and the ECOWAS Protocols, affect free movement and regional integration in the ECOWAS region. In Chap. 3, Priya Deshingkar and Doudou Dièye Gueye offer a bottom up view on human smuggling facilitation and the rationale behind extremely high-risk and complex irregular migration journeys from Senegal across the Sahara and through the Atlantic sea. While high risk irregular migration from developing countries is often attributed to economic problems (e.g. unemployment and poverty) and ignorance of the dangers of irregular migration (Carling, 2007; Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014), the chapter highlights the role of religious beliefs in preparing for and interpreting the experiences of harrowing journeys with a high risk of harm and death. The study also sheds light on hitherto under-recognised gendered aspects of the infrastructure of migration facilitation, showing that while migration is male dominated, women play a critical role in mobilising religious and financial support. The fourth chapter by Nauja Kleist and Mary Setrana presents a historical analysis of the gendered dynamics of migration in West Africa. This is a significant contribution to the literature because although migration flows in the sub-region are being feminised (Adepoju, 2005; Awumbila et al., 2014), gendered differentials in migration experiences and outcomes are neither well understood nor adequately explored in both academic and policy circles.

The four chapters presented in Part II focus on environmental and forced migration. In Chap. 5, Joseph Kofi Teye and Ebenezer Nikoi discuss the trends of climate change and present case studies on how both rapid on-set climatic events (e.g. floods) and slow on-set processes (e.g. drought and rainfall variability) cause migration and displacement in West Africa. The chapter also discusses climate immobility in West Africa. The remaining papers in Part II focus on managing displacement and this is important because while West Africa is seriously affected by protracted displacement associated with ethnic conflicts, political instability, and disputes over control of natural resources (UNHCR, 2020a), forced displacement in the sub-region does not attract high level of humanitarian interest and concern. As a way of contributing to our understanding of the needs of refugees in the region, Heaven
Crawley and Veronica Fynn Bruey, in Chap. 6, examine the first-hand experience of Liberian ‘refugees’ living in Ghana and their struggle to secure national and international protection. The authors have argued that many of the refugees have been left living in extreme poverty, marginalised from mainstream development policies and planning, and unable to either contribute to, or benefit from, efforts to rebuild peace and security in their home country. The paper makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of why, given the end of the conflict in Liberia more than 15 years ago and the end of formal protection for Liberian refugees living in Ghana in 2012, so many Liberians remain in situations of protracted displacement. Most importantly, the paper discusses what can, and should, be done to address this and to ensure that “no-one is left behind” in the delivery of Agenda 2030. Chapter 7, written by Leander Kandilige and Geraldine Asiwome Ampah, examines the peculiar protection vulnerabilities that face voluntary migrants in times of crises in destination countries. It argues that while protection regimes broadly exist for involuntary migrants within the ambit of intergovernmental/international organisations, there is a yawning gap in national protection mechanisms for voluntary migrants in destination countries during episodes of crises situations. The chapter offers very good policy recommendations for protection of migrants during times of crisis.

Part III of the book contains four chapters on labour migration, diaspora and development. In Chap. 8, Olayinka Akanle and Olayinka Damilola Ola-Lawson contribute to the debates on the link between labour migration and socio-economic development, by analyzing the profile and developmental impacts of diaspora investments in Nigeria. Their findings suggest that the diaspora engages in many different investments for various reasons but not without nearly prohibitive challenges, created by unfavourable economic environment and social systems. Chapter 9, written by Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré, examine trends in the flow and development impacts of remittances in Burkina Faso. The chapter argues that remittances receiving households are economically better than those that do not receive remittances. However, a significant proportion of remittances is consumed rather than being invested in productive sectors. The chapter is very useful because while migrants’ remittances have been recognized as important tools for enhancing development and reducing poverty (Ratha et al., 2011), empirical studies on the actual developmental impacts of remittances in Africa are very few (Teye et al., 2019). Again, the paper contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of programs being implemented by West African governments and their development partners to leverage remittances for socio-economic development. Chapter 10, jointly authored by Nohoua Traoré and Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey, examines the historical trajectories of migration in Côte d’Ivoire. It situates the development of the cash crop economy in Côte d’Ivoire within the history of labour migrations into the country and the later crises that ensued as a result. It argues that whilst the implementation of an open migration policy from the 1960s to 1980s contributed to increased flow of labour migrants into the booming cocoa sector, economic crisis since 1990 and political conflicts since 2000 have influenced the Ivorian state to practice a less open migration policy. This has resulted in a
relative decline in migration flows. However, Côte d’Ivoire still remains a popular destination of migrants, because of the opportunities in its cocoa economy.

**Part IV** focuses on Return Migration. Chapter 11, authored by Amanda Bisong, discusses how return and reintegration programmes for forced internally displaced persons, failed irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers construct and create vulnerabilities. The paper argues that poorly implemented forced return migration management programmes may worsen the vulnerabilities of migrants instead of promoting their integration. The major contribution of this paper is its exposition on the role of local institutions in the reintegration of return migrants. While protection of vulnerable return migrants has been seen as a duty to be performed by the state, the chapter demonstrates that social and societal structures in the communities can help forced return migrants in coping with the vulnerabilities they are exposed to in their places of origin. Chapter 12, written by Joseph Mensah, Joseph Kofi Teye and Mary Setrana, examine the interconnections between immigrant integration, transnationalism, and return intentions, focusing primarily on Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants in the global North. The chapter fills a critical gap in the migration literature by analyzing the links between migrants’ integration processes at countries of destination and return migration decision-making processes. Chapter 13 presents the main conclusions drawn from the analyses in the different chapters.

### 1.5 Theoretical Contribution and Historical Perspectives

Apart from its relevance in terms of the geographical region it covers, the book’s relevance can be explained by its use of important theoretical and historical perspectives. With reference to contribution to theory, many of the chapters combine empirical findings with theoretical reflections and this makes the discussions in the book relevant to readers outside the West African region. For instance, while migration from labour-surplus areas to labour-scarce destinations is often explained from an economic perspective (de Haas, 2010; de Haas & Fransen, 2018), the papers by Joseph Teye (Chap. 1), Priya Deshingkar and Doudou Dièye Gueye (Chap. 3) and Nauja Kleist and Mary Setrana (Chap. 4) challenge such orthodox conceptualizations of drivers of migration by explaining how non-economic drivers (e.g. culture, social networks, and religion) also shape migration decisions. Heaven Crawley and Veronica Fynn Bruey (Chap. 6), Leander Kandilige (Chap. 7) and Amanda Bisong (Chap. 11) applied the concept of ‘vulnerability’ and models for managing displacement to discuss the specific needs of migrants and displaced populations. The book also contributes to theoretical debates on the relationship between migration and development. While migration is an important survival strategy, there are contesting views on its actual impacts on livelihoods and socio-economic development in migrant sending areas (Ratha et al., 2011; Teye et al., 2019). The papers by Olayinka Akanle and Olayinka Damilola Ola-Lawson (Chap. 8) and Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert (Chap. 9) makes significant contribution to our understanding of the factors that mediate migration and development.
Additionally, the historical perspective, adopted by many of the authors (see Chaps. 1, 2, 4, and 10) makes this book very relevant. For instance, the introductory paper by Joseph Teye (Chap. 1), shows how current mobility patterns are shaped by state formation processes and political administration in the pre-colonial and colonial periods as well as social transformation. Faisal Garba and Thomas Yeboah (Chap. 2) provides a temporal assessment of attempts at promoting free movement of persons and regional integration in West Africa. They have shown that the implementation of the free movement protocol has been affected by political changes and international conventions. Nohoua Traoré and Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey (Chap. 10) also provides a historical analysis of the flow of immigrants to the cocoa sector of Côte d’Ivoire. In Chap. 4, Nauja Kleist and Mary Setrana explain how feminization of migration is linked to broader social change occurring in the sub-region. As a result of the historical perspective adopted, the papers discuss broader socio-economic and political transformations beyond migration.

1.6 What This Book Does Differently from Other Books

While the few existing books on migration in the West African region focus on a few migration-related issues usually in one country at a time, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of several migration-related issues (e.g. labour migration, human trafficking, environmental migration, displacement, return migration, remittances) in the entire West African sub-region, by presenting case studies from a number of countries. Information on the various migration-related issues can therefore be obtained from this single book.

Unlike the existing books on migration which tend to provide a cross sectional analysis of migration-related issues within West Africa, this book provides a historical analysis of many migration-related issues. The historical approach employed by many of the authors to analyse their findings means that the papers discuss broader socio-economic and political transformations beyond migration. Additionally, the book clearly demonstrates the continuity and changing patterns of various migration-related issues. While some of the existing books only present empirical findings on mobility within the West African region, many of the authors of this book make efforts to combine empirical findings with theoretical reflections. This has been achieved by using different concepts and theoretical frameworks not only from migration studies, but also from the broader social science literature, to discuss the empirical findings. The theorisation of findings, where appropriate, makes the discussions in the book relevant to readers outside the West African region.

The book also discusses both the positive and negative development impacts of migration, and offers useful policy recommendations for dealing with some of the challenges and harnessing the benefits of migration. This is a departure from some existing books that only present either the positive or the negative outcomes of migration without offering recommendations for improving the status quo. The critical approach adopted by our authors who have in-depth knowledge on migration...
issues in the region will make this book useful to students, development practitioners and policy makers.

1.7 Target Market and Readership

Written in a very accessible way by researchers who either come from the West African region and or have worked extensively in the region over the years, this book offers comprehensive, first-hand information on migration issues in the sub-region. The book will be an interesting read to students, academics, researchers, migration experts, development practitioners and policy makers and media professionals. In writing the book, many of the concepts have been explained in plain English, and this will ensure that people from different academic background are able to use it. The book will particularly be useful to undergraduate and graduate students and teachers of subjects in the humanities, especially Migration Studies, Demography, African studies, Social Policy, Sociology, Political Science, History, and Economics. In the sub-field of Migration Studies, the topics covered will be useful to students offering many of the postgraduate migration courses offered by universities around the world.

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Joseph Teye has participated (either as a PI or Co-I) in large research projects funded by international organisations, including, UKRI, DFID, EU, ESRC, ACP Observatory on Migration, and IOM. He has also consulted widely for a number of international organisations and governments. He was the lead consultant for the development of the national labour migration policies for Sierra Leone, Ghana and Malawi.

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Chapter 2
Free Movement and Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Sub-Region

Faisal Garba and Thomas Yeboah

This chapter situates attempts at promoting free movement of persons and regional integration in West Africa in a historical perspective. Employing a combination of historical policy research, critical literature review, and an analysis of secondary data, the chapter provides a chronology of the development of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement. This is done within the context of how the implementation of the Protocol facilitate human mobility and regional integration. The chapter pays attention to how the provision of the Protocol enables citizens of the West African region to take advantage of the opportunities in member states, and further explores some of the major challenges in the implementation of the Protocol. The chapter shows that the protocol on free movement allows ECOWAS citizens to continue to travel without visas within the region. Free movement of persons in the region has yielded great economic benefits in terms of boosting intra-regional trade, supporting the livelihoods of Community citizens and increasing remittance flows within the region. Nevertheless, there are still challenges associated with extortion and harassment of migrants at border crossings, and a lack of coherence between the member state national laws and the ECOWAS Protocols has meant that protocol is yet to be fully realised. The chapter also presents analysis of the prospects of recent attempts at strengthening the protocol such as the proposal to lift the provision/restriction that allows/limits member states’ citizens to enter and stay for maximum of 90 days and the proposal for the establishment of a common social security across the region.

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2.1 Introduction

Attempts at promoting free movement of persons and regional integration in West Africa is a long-standing issue. This is partly a coming to terms with history and the result of efforts to steer the direction of the West African region towards economic prosperity from the aftermath of colonial rule. Historically, West Africa was a unit of intense human, material and ideational circulation (Manuh, 2005). In precolonial West Africa, migrant labourers moved from one part of the region to the other. Commodities like salt and gold were traded from one end of the region to the other, and travelling scholars brought about literacy by moving and teaching the Ajami script. This movement continued into the colonial period in spite of restrictions to movement by various colonizers (Manuh, 2005). The result was that the societies and economies of independent West African states were integrated from the bottom up as a result of the activities of migrants, traders and scholars. Different individual leaders and groupings of nationalist leaders in the region proposed some form of integration to give formal expression to the reality of integration from below with a view to maximizing economic development.

Accordingly, the Economic Commission of West African States was established in 1975 to among other things integrate the people and States of the region in order to ensure development. The flagship tool of regional integration was the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons that was brought into force in 1979. The Protocol has gone through a number of phases – from free movement of citizens of member states within the region, the right of citizens of member states to settle across the region and their right to establish economic ventures. All these are seen as important to the ultimate objective of integrating the region for development.

Employing a combination of historical policy research, critical literature review, and an analysis of secondary data, this chapter provides a chronology of the development of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement. This is done within the context of how the implementation of the Protocol facilitates human mobility and regional integration. The chapter pays particular attention to how the provision of the Protocol enables citizens of the West African region to take advantage of the opportunities in member states. The chapter goes on to explore some of the major challenges in the implementation of the Protocol and present an analysis of the prospects of recent attempts at strengthening the protocol such as the proposal to lift the provision/restriction that allows/limits member states’ citizens to enter and stay for maximum of 90 days and the proposal for the establishment of a common social security across the region. There are two key findings in the chapter. Firstly, the protocol on free movement allows ECOWAS citizens to continue to travel without visas within the region. Free movement of persons in the region has yielded great economic benefits in terms of boosting intra-regional trade, supporting the livelihood of Community citizens and increasing remittance flows within the region. There are, however, challenges associated with extortion and harassment of migrants at border crossings, and a lack of coherence between the member state national laws and the ECOWAS Protocols has meant that
protocol is yet to be fully realised. Secondly, the implementation of a portable social security system is likely to enable citizens of member states to have a certain measure of basic income wherever they maybe in the sub-region. This will protect the rights of labour and improve the working conditions of workers in the sub-region. It may also help to undo the contradictions between sub-regional protocols and individual national legislation on one hand, and contradictions in the legislations of individual states, on the other.

The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents a historical account of the free movement protocol. This is followed by analysis of the implementation and outcomes of Free Movement in the West African sub-region. The issues that confront the full operationalization of the Protocol are discussed under challenges in the implementation of the Protocol”. We then outline the prospects of the “Proposed changes to Protocol “such as the lifting of the 90-day rule and the introduction of a social security schemes the region and their prospects. The conclusion restates some of the key arguments in the chapter.

### 2.2 Historical Overview of Free Movement Protocol

The idea of the formation of the Economic Community of West African States was to create a uniform space for member states to thrive. The main aim of the treaty that established this sub-regional group was to facilitate easy movement of people and goods by eliminating all forms of barriers to human mobility and regional integration. This objective feeds into the Free Movement Protocol which was birthed 4 years after the establishment of ECOWAS to bolster regional integration through the easy mobility of citizens of member states within the sub-region. The protocol reiterated the need for a borderless region, where Community citizens would be able to tap into and enjoy opportunities as well as resources available in other West African countries (Adeniran, 2012; Adepoju, 2001; Awumbila et al., 2018; Yeboah et al., 2021). This Protocol (A/P.1/5/79) that relates to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment outlines the liberty of nationals of member states to enter, reside and establish within the boundaries of a member state, which was to be executed over 15 years in three different phases (Adeniran, 2012).

To facilitate and actualize the 1979 Protocol, other additional protocols have been adopted over the years. The first of such supplementary protocols is the 1985 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/85, which spelled out the code of conduct for implementing the Free Movement Protocol, enjoins states within the sub-region to give valid travel documents to their nationals. It also defines extra procedures for dealing with individuals being deported and for persons that entered a member state illegally. A year later, the 1986 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 that touched on the second phase of the Free Movement Protocol was formulated and it impressed on states to offer citizens of other member states within the region the opportunity to stay in their country to seek and pursue income-generating opportunities. It also impressed on the host member state to streamline the rules that govern the issuance
of the permits. It called on member states to specify that the same manner of treatment of citizens of a host country would be given to migrant workers who uphold the rules and regulations that govern their residence in areas such as job security, partaking in cultural and social events and re-employment in a situation of job loss (Bolarinwa, 2015; Yeboah et al., 2021).

The Supplementary Protocol of 1989 (A/SP.1/6/89) modified the provisions of Article 7 of the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement to establish the signatories’ obligation to settle in a peaceable manner dispute surrounding the interpretation and application of the Protocol (Article 2). The 1990 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/5/90 focused on the implementation of the third phase of the Free Movement Protocol which is the Right to Establishment. The protocol enumerates the right of community nationals to settle and partake in economic ventures, establish and manage businesses in other member states devoid of discriminatory treatment unless justified by security, public order, or health requirements (Articles 2–4). It also disallows expropriating or confiscating of assets or capital of community nationals on a discriminatory basis and demands reasonable compensation in situations where capital or assets are confiscated (Article 7) (Awumbila et al., 2018; Bolarinwa, 2015; Teye et al., 2019).

In 1992, the Decision C/DEC.3/12/92 in bringing into practice a unified immigration and emigration form in ECOWAS Member States was formulated. This was to simplify cross-border procedures by harmonizing immigration and emigration forms that community citizens used. Accordingly, this requires the establishment of the unified ‘Form’ by states within the sub-region (Article 1). Furthermore, the 1993 revision of the ECOWAS Treaty, which is consistent with the Protocol (A/P.1/5/79), firmly established at article 59 emphasise the need for member states to do away with all forms of barriers that mitigate against the free movement of persons, goods, and capital, as well as the right of residence and establishment as provided in Article 3 (1) (Adepoju et al., 2010). Also, the ECOWAS Common Approach to tackle the difficulties associated with the implementation of the 1979 Protocol was adopted by the sub-regional heads of State and Government, on 18 January 2008. Even though the agreement does not have a binding force, and as such does not have to be signed, it gives directives and plans of action to be implemented by member states to help manage migration processes in the sub-region (Awumbila et al., 2018).

In a fairly recent development, ECOWAS has put in place structures at the regional level to facilitate migration aside the mechanisms adopted to implement the Free Movement Protocol. For instance, in 2001, the Migration Dialogue in West Africa was formed to encourage member states to debate on migration issues and other common matters that are not easily resolved at national level and would need to be taken up at the regional level. There is also widespread consensus that more efforts and commitment are needed both at the regional and national levels to see to the full implementation and adoption of the Free Movement Protocol and to liberalize the cross-border movement envisaged in the past. In line with this, the regional economic community has recently ratified a labour migration policy, and it is hoped that the regional migration policy will soon be approved (Castillejo, 2019).
2.3 Implementation and Outcomes of Free Movement Protocol

Human mobility in the West African sub-region is an ancient phenomenon and it is predominantly intra-regional. It has been estimated that more than 70% of migrants that originate from countries in the sub-region are registered to dwell in other West African countries (UNDESA, 2018). To further build cohesion and foster development between member states and also deal with the effects of the imaginary international boundaries established by colonial authorities, countries in the West African sub-region came together to embrace a policy that was geared toward regional economic and cultural integration (Yeboah et al., 2020). The journey which began in May 1975 witnessed 16 nations sign a treaty that would bring ECOWAS into being in Lagos, Nigeria. This move was aimed at promoting development following the attainment of independence from colonial powers.

In 1979, 4 years after the birth of the ECOWAS treaty, the Free Movement Protocol was adopted by member countries (Balorinwa, 2015). The protocol sought to put in place the right of entry by nationals of member states and also ensure that community citizens could stay and set up viable business ventures in the boundary of member states, and by so doing nip in the bud barriers to free movement of people and goods across the region. It was forecasted to be a pivotal framework that would institutionalize an undivided regional socio-economic landscape and offer citizens of member states the privilege of having access to and also benefitting from opportunities available in member countries. These include but are not limited to: benefitting from human resources of other member countries; the ability of landlocked states within the community to access coastal zones; and enjoying natural resources by member states. It was also seen as an instrument capable of positively impacting economic, social, and cultural development activities in a harmonious manner within the sub-region (Adeniran, 2012; Awumbila et al., 2018; Bolarinwa, 2015; Yeboah et al., 2021).

Conceived and implemented through a phased approach, a critical examination of the level of progress of the protocol by member states in its adaptation depicts varied outcomes. The first phase of the protocol, that assured the right of entry to all community nationals, was approved by all member states in 1980. Thus, as part of the implementation of the first phase of the protocol, member countries were to allow a visa-free access window not exceeding 90 days to all citizens from the sub-region. This provision meant that all immigrants within the sub-region who possessed valid travel documentation had the right to enter through appropriate entry channels of other member states for not more than 90 days, and may apply for an extension if need be (Awumbila et al., 2014, 2018). However, Article 4 of the protocol enjoins the receiving country to deny access to an ECOWAS immigrant who may fall within the bracket of inadmissible immigrants based on its domestic migration laws. This ambiguity that surrounds the definition of persons that are labeled as inadmissible immigrants has given member states the leeway to cut back on the number of immigrants it receives from within the community (Balorinwa, 2015).
Nevertheless, it is remarkably clear that the general acceptability of all member states to the 90-day visa-free entry is refreshing. This meant that community nationals who possess valid travel documents and international health certificates are able to access and stay in other member states without applying for a visa. However while member countries such as Ghana and Sierra Leone have signed on to the supplementary protocols and approved the harmonized travel certificate for the community that is aimed at simplifying movement across borders, it has not been fully embraced by citizens and some state officials because of the little awareness. And citizens with a fair knowledge of its existence are less inclined to use the travel certificates as some border officials, which includes Ghana, do reject it (Adepoju et al., 2010; Awumbila et al., 2018).

Again, Yeboah et al. (2021) in their study argue that migrants’ experience of this provision in the protocol is shaped by issues of level of awareness, social standing, nationality, and gender. The authors further note that migrants who travelled by air into Ghana had a relatively smoother passage of entry and were less susceptible to harassment and extortion from state officials compared to those that made the journey by land. A further inquisition into land travels showed it was fraught with difficulties to the extent that relatively less educated migrants had to pay their way through or be turned back. Even though the protocol sought to promote a common goal, its success of implementation is viewed in the light of the extent to which it falls in line with migration policies of the different member countries (Bolarinwa, 2015).

The second phase of the protocol, right of residence, came into effect in 1986 as it was signed by all community member states. It entails the right of a community national to live in the confines of a member country within the sub-region. The community citizen is required to adhere to the laws established in that country and to take up or apply for a job in compliance with rules that govern employment in the country, and the right of community nationals to travel within the boundary of a member state in search of a job. Thus, community citizens who desire to stay and work in another member state beyond the 90 days have to apply for work and residence permits (Awumbila et al., 2018; Bolarinwa, 2015). Nonetheless, the supplementary protocol to the second phase made exemptions to the right of taking up a job as it does not include civil service jobs unless otherwise allowed by the member state (Akindele, 2011). Again, community immigrants could seek redress when their rights are violated and in an event of deportation of a community immigrant, it has to be done without infringing on the rights of the immigrant. This has slowed down the implementation and achievability of the second phase of the protocol (Bolarinwa, 2015). There are indications that the process for granting work and residence permit in some member states do not conform to the Right of Residence Protocol. For instance, there is no difference in the standards of granting work permits to community nationals and other foreign nationals. Thus, work permits are granted to foreigners including community nationals on the account that the skills possessed by the foreigner cannot be found locally but in reality, this requirement is not always complied with as some state officials note the difficulty in determining whether or not such skills do exist locally (Awumbila et al., 2018).
The third phase of the protocol which is the right of establishment was to give nationals of member states the ability to set up businesses in another state other than their own within the sub-region. Its actualization was supposed to be done without interruption after the years assigned to implementing the second phase. However, a lack of political will has delayed the implementation process of this provision in the sub-region. Indeed, it is believed that the slow pace of implementation of the second and third phases of the protocol could largely be attributed to the economic downturn in the sub-region during the 1980s and displacement resulting from conflicts in certain parts of the region in the 1990s and early 2000s.

It is important to note that phase one of the Free Movement Protocol which has been fully implemented by all community members has to some degree impacted nationals of member states (Bolarinwa, 2015). Generally, the coming into force of the Free Movement Protocol which guarantees easy mobility across the West African sub-region is noted to have had meaningful impact on the socio-economic advancement in member countries. For instance, implementing the 90 days visa-free window by ECOWAS member states has enhanced human mobility in the region. This in turn has positively impacted on trading activities, and thus yielding massive economic dividends (Castillejo, 2019). The volume of trade in West African sub-region averages around 208.1 billion US Dollars, with Nigeria as the dominant actor followed by Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana. In 2017 alone, intra-regional trade stood at 17.6 billion US Dollars which represented 8.4% of total trade for the region in 2017. The seemingly low proportion of intra-regional trade is mainly the result of the external orientation of the region’s trade flows. Thus, West Africa exports to and imports much more from the US, China, and the Europe Union. Exports and imports respectively were estimated at 43% and 57.9% in 2017. Intra-regional trade is mainly informal and remains mainly concentrated in retail trade and other low-productivity services (AfDB, 2020). Again, community citizens have been able to consolidate the already existing relationship in the ECOWAS community through their superior command of some Ivorian languages to enhance trading networks in the region. Thus, they are able to engage in direct sales of Ivorian and Nigerian goods to consumers in both countries.

In addition to trade, there is evidence to indicate favorable economic and social contributions brought forth by the free ease of movement across the ECOWAS sub-region particularly for individuals who engage in such processes and the states involved. Thus, the ECOWAS region has about two-thirds of its international migrants living elsewhere within the sub-region and that only a small percentage of migrants from the sub-region actually move to the western world (Lücke, 2015). West African migrants are six times more likely to travel within the sub-region that to travel to Europe (Olsen, 2011). It is therefore crucial to register the importance of migrant remittance across the region. Migrant remittances, an important source of income, help to cushion a sizeable number of West African households and communities and it is noted to contribute to the wellbeing of households and make them more resilient against financial uncertainties. Again, it has propelled the growth of many economies as it constitutes a source of investment (Maiyegun, 2015; Quartey, 2006; Yeboah et al., 2019).
Special mention could be made of some countries across the sub-region that are traditionally labour-sending countries. These include Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone. This phenomenon is particularly true of countries such as Sierra Leone that has about 88% of its migrant population residing in Guinea likewise Burkina Faso with nearly 93% living in Côte d’Ivoire as of 2010 (Bolarinwa, 2015; Teye et al., 2015). This trend is reflected in the soaring regional remittances that have in part contributed to increase average household incomes in many West African communities and served as a lifeline in the face of financial difficulties, and also helped to reduce poverty levels by way of investments. The World Bank data shows an increase inward migrants remittance inflow from US$ 47 million in 2016 to US$ 53 million in 2019 and US$ 397 million in 2016 to US$ 467 million in 2019 for Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso respectively. This shows the extent to which the free movement of people within the sub-region has to some degree fostered economic integration.

Moreover, free movement has enabled some ECOWAS nationals to set up businesses with or without the requisite documentation. It has to be said that migrants who work in the formal sectors are able to acquire the requisite permits that grant them rights of stay and work in member states unlike their counterparts (low-skilled workers), mostly in the informal sector who genuinely are not aware of such provisions, but are also able to function and operate without any major difficulties (Yeboah et al., 2021). For instance, Ghana registered about 460,000 foreign citizens in 2019. Out of this number, about 68% came from other parts of West Africa (UN DESA 2019). A large proportion of these migrants were low-skilled workers who took up jobs in the informal sector. Thus, Teye (2018) cited in IOM (2020) indicated that about 43% of these migrants were workers in the agricultural sector, 11% were employed in the manufacturing sector and 28% engaged in wholesale and retail trade. This situation is no different from the Gambia, which had about 215,000 foreign citizens in the country in 2019, out of which 93% were West African nationals. Available data indicates about 87% of foreign nationals present in the country were employed in low-skilled jobs with only 3% of foreigners in high-skilled employment. Within the same period in Senegal, 60% of 275,000 international migrants were from other countries in the sub-region who were mostly engaged in retail trade, handicrafts, and transport. Nationals from Togo and Cote D’Ivoire were, however, able to secure jobs in the telecommunications sector. But just like other states in the region, the jobs in non-governmental organizations and the private sector that require a high level of skills are mostly occupied by Americans and Europeans (UN DESA, 2019; IOM, 2020).
2.4 Challenges Associated with Implementation of the Free Movement Protocol

Regardless of the various protocols adopted over the years within the sub-region and the viewpoint of ECOWAS being a more formidable group on the African continent, member states have shown little commitment to the implementation and realization of the Free Movement Protocol which is seen as one of the advanced regional free movement regimes on the African continent (Bolarinwa, 2015; Castillejo, 2019). While the Protocol has enabled easier mobility by citizens of member states across the sub-region, and deepened regional integration in the form of informal trade, educational exchanges and the intermeshing of people, it has been beset by a number of challenges which range from contradiction between national policies and regional commitments, to differential enforcement of rules and class-based restrictions in the experience of mobility.

The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the sub-region make it more challenging to successfully implement the Free Movement Protocol. This is because member states of ECOWAS exhibit varied socio-economic and demographic characteristics that have set the tone for the movement of their nationals across their territory. With a relatively younger population, West Africa is registered to have a population of 362.8 million in 2016, which is expected to increase in the coming decades. It is worth noting that the disparity in demographic features among member states is pronounced. For instance, while Nigeria has a population of about 180 million, the population of Cape Verde is less than a million.

Again, a significant number of countries within the sub-region still fall within the bracket of low-income countries even though most states have witnessed an improved economy since 2010. Such economic surge still persists as more economically advanced states are able to withstand external shocks than the less advanced ones. These economic and demographic characteristics have implications for human mobility in the sub-region which go on to affect the realization of the Free Movement Protocol (Awumbila et al., 2018). A classic example occurred during the 1980s when some member states suffered economic shocks and this situation triggered nationals of these countries to seek livelihoods in other countries within the Community. Thus, migrants mostly from Ghana, Chad, and Cameroon capitalized on the adoption of the Free Movement Protocol to move and work in Nigeria, whose economy proved resilient owing to the availability and production of oil in commercial quantities. But this was short-lived as conditions of work and standards of living began to plummet in tandem with currency devaluation occasioned by economic mismanagement. The economic woes that hit Nigeria compelled the government to revoke two articles of the Protocol, namely: Article 4 and 27, and deported about a million illegal migrants from the country. This affected confidence across the region and the chances of realizing the objectives of the Protocol. In a similar move, the Government of Cote D’Ivoire in the 1990s made changes in its immigration policy due to the increase in criminal activities and high youth unemployment which was blamed on the rising number of immigrants, who
were registered to be four million in a total population of 14 million in the country in 1995. This resulted in the cancellation of the liberal policy of the first president after independence to accommodate migrants from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo, and the physical attacks against migrants who have gained citizenship through marriage caused thousands of migrants to move back to their home countries (Adepoju, 2001).

A more prominent and recent challenge to the Protocol have been developments in Ghana and Nigeria aimed at limiting the space for migrants to engage in retail trade, in the case of Ghana, and the closure of borders (prior) to COVID-19, by the Nigerian, ostensibly to stop the importation of rice into the country in order to boost the consumption of locally produced rice. In Ghana, an alliance of local interest groups lead by the Ghana Union of Traders (GUTA) has been closing down Nigerian owned shops in protest at what they claim is the crowding out of locals from the retail sector. They justify their action by alluding to a law in Ghana (Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act 478 of 1994) that reserves certain trading activities to Ghanaian citizens (Yendaw, 2019). Occasionally these raids to close down shops are carried out by officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ghana Immigration Service (Citifm, 2020). Further the closing of the businesses of member state citizens has had a great deal of effect on the livelihood and wellbeing of affected persons. For example, some Nigerian traders who spoke to Deutsche Welle expressed their frustration at the impact of the shop closures on their lives and wellbeing (Deutsche Welle, 2020 https://www.dw.com/en/nigerian-traders-angered-by-ghana-shop-closures/av-54936773). It has left traders without income and their employees without jobs. In a country like Ghana with high unemployment and underemployment figures (World Bank, 2020) the loss of any avenue for employment increases the scale of social suffering.

In contravention of the Protocol’s provisions allowing citizens of member states to trade in goods within the sub-region, the Nigerian government closed its borders to goods from August 2019 until December 2020 (Kwarkye & Matongbada, 2021). Given that most of Nigeria’s borders are with other ECOWAS member states, the closure effectively suspended the Protocol.

In spite of the progress in the actual process of movement across the sub-region, citizens still encounter many barriers as they attempt to move. The barriers can be broadly categorized into two: firstly, there is the incoherence in the requirements for border crossing by member states, and secondly, structural factors that are common across the subregion. The incoherence in policy relates to differences in the documents that are required in order to cross a border. The Francophone countries in the region issue national identity cards that have bio-data equivalent to those in passports. These allow holders to cross borders upon presenting them. The Anglophone countries in the region are only beginning to roll out similar cards. In Anglophone member states, passports are the acceptable documents for crossing borders. Consequently, immigration officials in Anglophone countries reject the identity cards of border crossers from Francophone member states where identity cards allow a person to cross borders.
The structural barriers relate to different experiences in crossing borders due to social standing, in particular class (Yeboah et al., 2021). Middle class people and professionals experience border crossing in a smoother way compared to working class and poor people who often have no travel documents and are not fluent in the official languages of the countries that they are crossing into or through (ibid). Related to this is bribery – requested and provided by both border officials and travelers who either want to avoid harassment or do not have the required travel documents. The above challenges affect both ordinary citizens and the sub-region’s attempts to better integrate.

Closely linked to the crisis of employment is the effect of such policies on human integration and conviviality. As a longstanding migration confluence, West Africa has been integrated by mobility from far and near. The people-to-people links in the sub-region is very deep. This has been further strengthened by the Protocol. Ironically the breach of the Protocol in the form of shop closures has the potential of undoing the integration that has occurred before the Protocol and those that were occasioned by it. A study by Darkwah has demonstrated increases in anti-immigrant sentiments in Ghana (Darkwah, 2020).

While not achieving its intended aim of stopping the importation of rice, Nigeria’s closure of its borders to goods from the region has had serious effects on the livelihood of citizens across the sub-region. This is partly because of the size of the Nigerian economy and the important place of the Nigerian state in West African political economy (Kwarkye & Matongbada, 2021). Nigeria’s border closure has strengthened the anti-Nigerian business stands of GUTA in Ghana. Indeed, GUTA and its supporters have used Nigeria’s border closure as an alibi for its activities.

After close to four decades of incremental efforts to integrate the region through the Protocol, the above challenges have rolled back some of the gains made. For example, Nigeria’s border closures effectively suspended the Protocol by denying citizens of member states the right to move in the region with the purpose of engaging in livelihood generating activities. The difficulty experienced by some categories of migrants moving in the region directly challenges the trust that people have in the Protocol and leads to a situation where the Protocol is seen as being ineffective. This creates a drawback to the initial objectives of facilitating movement, settlement and establishment as envisaged in the formulation of the Protocol.

Notwithstanding, not much attention has been given to concerns raised of the institutional capacity of the regional body which is hampered by lack of leadership and overdependence on hierarchy and protocol, culminating in the belief that the ECOWAS commission typifies the dysfunctional civil services that exist in member states. Equally, there is a lack of commitment of member states which stems from the inability to align national priorities of member states to conform to set goals and targets of the ECOWAS body to provide a clear-cut pathway for effectively coordinating its activities (Castillejo, 2019). This has been seen as a key factor that inhibits the potential of fully implementing the Free Movement Protocol. Again, the ECOWAS commission is faced with budgetary constraints to support its quest to undertake set agendas such as implementing the Protocol. The institution, in the
light of this situation, has been subjected to enormous pressure to harmonize its operations and reduce its working staff which is around a 1000 (Castillejo, 2019).

2.5 Prospects of Recent Proposed Changes to the Free Movement Protocol

In view of the challenges and in furtherance of the original objectives of the Protocol, ECOWAS has proposed changes to the 90-day rule. The 90-day rule was meant to be a step in the progressive elimination of barriers to movement and trade and eventual integration of the region via the ceding of elements of sovereignty by individual member states to the supranational regional body – ECOWAS.

Following its establishment in 1975, ECOWAS set itself the task of an integrated future where citizens can move freely without hindrance. Accordingly, in 1980, the Protocol came into effect allowing people firstly to move for 90 days. The 90-days was seen as the beginning of a process towards a borderless sub-region, the rule was put in place with the intention of enabling citizens of member States. In 1986 the right to residency was added to the Protocol. As stated earlier, the 90-day rule has eased movement by doing away with visa requirements and facilitating informal trade between citizens of member States. However, it created a set of limitations in that citizens would have to leave or extend their stay in member countries. This creates another set of barrier as national process for regularization are not harmonised across the sub-region. Bureaucratic red neck, backlog and delays often set in and serve as limitations for people looking to extend their stay.

In view of the foregoing, Paragraph 11 of the communique of the forty fifth Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Accra and issues on 10 July 2014 states that…”the Authority approves the abolition of the residence permit and the introduction of the Biometric Identity Card for the Community citizens…” (ECOWAS, 2014: 2).

Although it has been over 6 years since the approval of its abolition, residence permits are still being issued across Member States. Nonetheless the commission is moving ahead with plans to ensure that all member states issue the biometric ID cards. In view of the foregoing, the proposal to lift the 90-day rule is aimed at facilitating settlement by citizens of member states across the region. The change will enable citizens of member states to overcome the tedious process of having to go through time and resource consuming return journeys after 90 days or bureaucratically mired extension processes.

To facilitate labour migration and harmonize labour standards and welfare in the region, The Convention on Social Security was introduced and proposes to provide disability benefits for citizens of Member States irrespective of what part of the sub-region they find themselves. Similarly, it seeks to guarantee old age benefits to all citizens of the subregion wherever they find themselves in the sub-region. Other benefits that it seeks to provide include Survivors’ benefits, Occupational diseases
and work-related accidents, family benefits; maternity benefits health care and sickness benefits, and unemployment benefits.

The proposal is guided by the need to integrate the sub-region as a condition for development. This is in furtherance of the Protocol on Free Movement which envisions establishment and economic engagement. For this to happen, the convention seeks to ensure that workers’ rights are accorded equal status irrespective of whether they are local or migrants. If the ECOWAS protocol is to be fully and effectively implemented, then Member States must harmonise their policies on social security to ensure the protection of all. The absence of the portability of social security means that citizens of member states residing outside their countries cannot change work environments and still have their social security. The lack of a regional social security system means that citizens of member states do not enjoy protraction in the form of unemployment benefits that can be moved.

The proposal envisages ensuring that workers are catered for in terms of social security while integrating the labour market of the subregion by encouraging labour migration without the loss of accumulated benefits. Key to this is the reduction of the likelihood of employers refusing to employ locals and instead engage non-locals due the lack of protection of the latter. It proposes to combat illicit activities, which will harmonise labour standard across social wage in the region.

2.6 Conclusion

Using a historical lens, this chapter looked at attempts at promoting free movement of persons and regional integration in West Africa. It employs a combination of historical policy research, critical literature review, and an analysis of secondary data, the chapter provided a chronology of the development of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement. This was done within the context of how the implementation of the Protocol facilitated and continues to facilitate human mobility and regional integration. The chapter paid particular attention to how the provision of the Protocol enables citizens of the West African region to take advantage of the opportunities in member states. It also explored some of the major challenges in the implementation of the Protocol and presented an analysis of the prospects of recent attempts at strengthening the protocol such as the proposal to lift the provision/restriction that allows/limits member states’ citizens to enter and stay for maximum of 90 days and the proposal for the establishment of a common social security across the region. Two key findings are presented. Firstly, the protocol on free movement is key to facilitating migration of ECOWAS citizens who travel without visas within the region. Free movement of persons in the region has yielded great economic benefits in terms of boosting intra-regional trade, supporting the livelihood of Community citizens and increasing remittance flows within the region. Nevertheless, there are still barriers to realising the full potential of the protocol. These challenges relate to extortion and harassment of migrants at border crossings particularly for low class citizens and migrants,
and a lack of coherence between the member state national laws and the ECOWAS Protocols has meant that phase 2 and 3 of the protocol is yet to be fully implemented. We have demonstrated that the proposal to lift the 90-day stay is likely to reduce the barriers to free movement and allow community citizens to take advantage of the opportunities in member states in a more sustainable way. It has the potential to further strengthen regional integration, increase mobility flows and foster regional development. We argue that the implementation of the portable social security system is likely to enable citizens of member states to have a certain measure of basic income wherever they may be in the sub-region. This will protect the rights of labour and improve the working conditions of workers in the sub-region. It may also help to undo the contradictions between sub-regional protocols and individual national legislation on one hand, and contradictions in the legislations of individual states, on the other.

Reference


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Chapter 3
It’s a Journey That Only God Knows: Understanding Irregular Migration in Senegal Through a Religious Lens

Priya Deshingkar and Doudou Dièye Gueye

The authors use the lens of religion to understand how migrants from Senegal embarking on high-risk journeys across the Sahara and the Atlantic conceptualise migration, cope with hardship and give meaning to their experiences. The paper aims to provide insights into religious belief systems and their intersection with the process of irregular migration and human smuggling from the impoverished Kolda region of Senegal. The research adds to the scant literature on how migrants draw on their spiritual beliefs in preparing for and enduring harrowing journeys with a high risk of harm and death. Migrants are aware of the risks as they receive information in real time from other migrants and also because many are returne migrants or deportees. But the risks do not deter them as they seek to fulfil their role as good family providers and heed the guidance of Marabout Islamic teachers rather than information campaigns to prevent irregular migration. The study also sheds light on hitherto under-recognised gendered aspects of the infrastructure of migration facilitation in Kolda: while migration is male dominated, women play a critical role in mobilising religious and financial support. The authors conclude that there is a mismatch between the way that migrants take decisions to migrate and the understanding of external agencies that continue efforts to dissuade them through risk information campaigns.

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3.1 Introduction

Senegalese nationals accounted for the largest proportion of irregular migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean in the early 2000s. They were mainly single young men aged 20–29, belonging to the Mouride brotherhood and the Wolof ethnic group which has a long history of migration (Mbow & Tamba, 2007). The main mode of transport in irregular migration journeys was in small dug out wooden boats known as pirogues (Mbaye, 2014). Since then, both the ethnicities and routes of migrants have diversified to include overland journeys via Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and onwards to Morocco or Libya (Fig. 3.1).

The IOM “Migration Profile” of Senegal shows that the Casamance together with the Tambacounda region, account for nearly a fifth of Senegalese migration. The research was conducted in the Casamance with a focus on the Kolda region by the University of Assane Seck in Ziguinchor in collaboration with the University of Sussex. Kolda is an important point of origin for migrants travelling towards Libya and also a transit point for migrants from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. The latest population and housing census shows 7.6% of the departures in Senegal are from the Kolda region. The intensification of border controls

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1 Irregular migration to Spain, via Morocco or the Atlantic, was recorded at 2506 people in 2002, increasing to 19,176 in 2003, of which 76.6% were Senegalese (Cross, 2009).
was in evidence through sea patrols as well as legislation such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Regional Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants in West and Central Africa (2015–2020). Information campaigns funded by the EU or its member states to dissuade migrants had also been implemented by the IOM since 2007. They were founded on the belief that migrants better informed by the risks of irregular migration would reconsider their plans. However, irregular migration has continued unabated and the research aimed to find out how irregular migration is organised against this backdrop of tightening controls on migration to Europe. Together with an increase in mobility into and out of Senegal, aspirations to migrate to Europe had grown and research by other scholars has shown that it was easier for aspiring migrants to pay smugglers than to wait for an official visa that may never be granted (Ngom, 2018). Consequently, there has been an increase in irregular migration from Senegal (Cross, 2009; Pian, 2009; Tandian, 2019) and intense surveillance along migration routes has forced smugglers to resort to dangerous transport solutions (Wihtol De Wenden, 2005).

In the Casamance, spiritual teachers or leaders known as Marabouts² play a very important role in shaping the migration decision in a context of extremely high-risk migration where the dangers are well known. The research team felt it was therefore important to consider mystico-religious influences on migrants’ imaginaries and how they understood and analysed risk, their own fate, luck and what actions needed to be taken to mitigate risk.

### 3.2 Conceptual Framework

The role of religion in migration has been examined from a variety of perspectives: as a focal point for diaspora communities to group around and acquire a sense of belonging in alien societies; providing assistance to irregular migrants en route where spaces for official assistance have shrunk due to migration policies; as a belief system to interpret and give meaning to risk, and as a source of solace and emotional support for migrants and their families embarking on journeys that can lead to death and suffering (Eppsteiner & Hagan, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2016; Hernandez-Carretero & Carling, 2012). It is the latter two areas of scholarship that are most relevant to the analysis here.

An analysis of religious beliefs in migration decision making and the migration process can also show the agency that is involved in high-risk migration decisions and situate those in everyday religious practices in particular social contexts. Hagan (2008) studied the religious practices of Central American migrants during

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²A Muslim religious teacher in West Africa who is a scholar of the Qur’an, devoting himself to prayer and study. In Senegal and Mali, Marabouts depend on donations for survival.
the hazardous 2000-mile journey to the USA and found that migrants relied on religion to cope with trauma, find meaning, and create order in times of crisis.

In Senegal, the Murides have a long history of migration that is part of their folklore and history as farmers who travelled in search of better work opportunities in the nineteenth century and it has now become inherent to the Muride identity (Tall, 2002). Prothmann’s (2017) research among Murides in the city of Dakar shows that theistic thinking and philosophy plays a pivotal role in shaping the aspirations of young men. Success in terms of material wealth and reaching one’s destination are believed to depend on wërséég (luck) and Ndogalu Yàlla (fate). He emphasises the importance of socio-cultural determinants of migration over economic drivers and argues that young men are prepared to die rather than remain in Senegal and they derive strength and direction from Islam. We extend this research to other ethnic groups from the Kolda region in the south and examine intersections of religion, mysticism and overland irregular migration through extremely dangerous territory crossing the Sahara Desert.

The significance of religion in irregular migration has been observed in other parts of West Africa as well as other religious belief systems. Among Ghanaian followers of Charismatic Christianity there is a belief that God supports migration and will enable one’s unique destiny if the aspiring migrant and their family practice fasting and months at prayer camps (Darkwah et al., 2019). Van Bemmel (2020) made similar observations, finding that people believed that a strong belief in God would minimize the probability of an adverse outcome. They reported attending church more often in the lead up to the departure of the migrant. The Muslims in the study deliberately planned to travel during Ramadan in the belief that the risks would be smaller at that time. Mazucato’s (2005) research in Ghana and the Netherlands found that Christian pastors are believed to possess powers to resolve document problems that migrants would encounter along the way or at destination. In her study, migrants carried spiritual symbols for their protection, such as holy images and engraved medallions which are similar to the artefacts given by the Marabout to Senegalese migrants in our study for their protection. In Nigeria, religious beliefs played a similarly important role where in addition to Christianity and Islam, local religions are also pervasive and have been shown to have a link to high risk migration. These local religious traditions invoke ancestral spirits and spirits related to certain places. Magic is an important part of the ritualistic tradition in Nigerian society and performed to influence the course of events in the world with the help of hidden forces (Carling, 2006).

Sara Hamood’s (2006) research on migration from West Africa through Libya to Europe is also very relevant for our analysis. She analysed the coping practices of migrants travelling on dangerous, overcrowded, and poor quality boats. These migrants relied on their faith to help them cope with the perils of crossing and to prepare for possible death. Gaibazzi (2015) examines the intermingling of economic concerns with religious and moral discourses related to the timing of migration and the risk of being tempted into immoral behaviour in the Gambia. Gambian society, where Gaibazzi’s research was located, is similar to Senegalese society: young men wait for an appropriate time to depart based on “God’s will”.

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This literature illustrates the salience of religion and spirituality across West African people’s lives and why it is so central to the way in which high-risk migration is conceptualised.

In this paper, we build on this literature to unpick the role of religion and spiritual beliefs in conditioning perceptions about high-risk irregular migration from southern Senegal through the Sahara Desert. We examine the role of the Marabout in particular and how they shape migration decisions and experiences. Although our focus is on the Marabout who have been described as Islamic leaders we are cognisant of Paul Gifford’s warning against interpreting the religious imaginations of Senegalese people through classical labels such as “Muslim” or “Sufi Brotherhoods”. Both Ndiaye (2013) and Gifford (2016) call for a broader understanding of the Senegalese religious imagination that sees spiritual forces at play everywhere, interpreting causality of life events in spiritual terms. In such a schema, those who are gifted with powers of spirituality such as Marabouts, can influence people’s fate and eliminate opponents and competitors.

Small fetish objects are an important part of mystico-religious representations in Senegal. The fetish is a transfer of affectivity to a single or compound symbolic object, attributing to it an efficacy greater than its own reality. Unlike fetishism, maraboutage is the use of knowledge of holy texts by the Marabout for magical purposes, for healing and divination, and the Marabout is socially integrated, more accessible to the community and less feared than a fetishist. In the past, magic, fetishism and witchcraft have been characterised as social practices and incoherent thinking, based on superstition, secret and profane procedures, at the limit of legality (Durkheim (1912). Religion, on the other hand, was presented as an organised, supportive and normative system, based on the sacred, and manifested in a public and official manner.

When mystico-religious beliefs are invoked to steer the course of clandestine migration, particularly by pirogue or by land to Europe, it is clear that the West African region largely shares this belief in intervening in the course of destiny, either to fulfil or to ‘force’ a situation. In the same way, when there are fears, mystico-religious processes are used to allay them. In West Africa, risk-taking such as sea or desert migration has always been associated with religious and spiritual beliefs. In a study on Cameroonians living in Paris, dealing with witchcraft and migration, Sophie Bouly (1994) shows that the discourse of witchcraft intervenes at different stages of the migratory journey, and engages variable and complex social relations according to the spaces of migration. Thus, the author shows that inequalities in economic and marital success in migration are linked to pacts made with invisible forces. Consequently, the pitfalls encountered by the migrant can be attributed to an evil action from a jealous entourage. Laye Camara (2018) demonstrates, with reference to the geographical framework of Senegal and Guinea, how crucial the use of beliefs and other rituals can be in interpreting the dynamics of mobility,

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3 This vast group of objects is used as a representation of Gods to protect those who carry or wear them.
the impact of which is rarely taken into account. In Senegal, Teixeira (2008), in his study on the Guinea-Bissau Manjak, shows how the sorcerer and counter-sorcerer arrangement has adapted to contemporary problems and offers a system for explaining and repairing the world. The magico-religious is a determinant of migration and occult practices, practices capable of triggering success, realising projects and achieving success, including migration, but also of delaying or even preventing it.

We are also guided by existing research that has examined the role of Marabouts in migration in Senegal. For example, Bava and Picard (2014) show how maraboutism and other traditional rituals are summoned by migrants in the migratory act with the aim of thwarting all the traps contained in migration. Nyamnjoh’s (2016) research on Marabout networks is also a good starting point as it shows how they have risen in Senegalese society to occupy critical positions in various illicit businesses. Detailed ethnographic research carried out by Ngom (2018) in the Kolda region where our study is based shows that divinatory practices are at the heart of the daily life of the people. They attach paramount importance to the Marabouts who are often consulted by individuals, either to formulate prayers or to fashion gris gris, to predict the fate of migrants or to protect them against curses. While our focus is on Marabouts as they were mentioned most frequently, there are other kinds of fortune tellers and spiritualists such as fetishists who are believed to possess the power of interpreting messages transmitted to them through their dreams or premonitory signs in nature that can foretell positive or negative outcomes for the migrants. There are also other ways of accessing religious teachings and predictions on migration. Laye Camara (2018) found that contact with the magico-religious world to fathom the future is achieved through initiation courses or mystical teachings at the dahira (traditional Koranic schools of the Mourides and Tidjiane brotherhoods, particularly in Senegal).

Another facet of our research touches on the role of women in facilitating the services of Marabouts. While migration from Senegal continues to be male-dominated, the role of women in such a context has been discussed only in a handful of studies. Melly (2011) observes that in contrast to the male members of the family who embarked on dangerous journeys, women played a supporting role as they mourned, worried, pleaded and waited (p. 363). Our research shows that women also play a critical role in finding and funding the services of Marabouts to facilitate their men’s migration and brings the details of this hitherto under-researched phenomenon to light.

### 3.3 Methodology

The fieldwork was conducted in 2018 at a critical time when irregular migration had continued despite the externalisation of EU borders and growing criminalisation of migration facilitation. A multi-sited qualitative research approach was followed to gain deeper insights into this phenomenon at origin and in transit. The research was conducted in four regions: the Kolda region (Medina Yoro Foulla, Vélingara, Kolda
departments). The Sédhiou region (Goudomp department, Tanaf locality). The Ziguinchor region (Oussouye department, Elinkine locality). Although not part of Casamance, the survey was also conducted in Tambacounda city as many brokers are located there. Interviews were conducted with aspiring (18), returned and deported migrants (26), the families of migrants (12), six smugglers and four civil society organisations. The criminalization of smuggling activity meant that smugglers and the people who used their services were very suspicious of our motives and how the information would be used. Probing on the role of Marabouts was also difficult because of their links with illicit activities that we detail in the paper. Consequently, the first six months were spent cultivating relationships that would open up conversations with smugglers and other actors involved in irregular migration and human smuggling.

3.4  The Context

Due to its geographical position, Senegal has a long history of migration. Indeed, located in the extreme west of the African continent, this country of the Sahel has common borders with Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east, Guinea Conakry and Guinea-Bissau in the south. This geographic position makes Senegal a hub that receives migrants from the sub-region while allowing them to migrate to the international destinations. In particular, the Casamance region is an important migration hub in the country receiving migrants in transit and also a point of origin for Senegalese travelling abroad.4

Casamance has remained poor due to the combination of deteriorating agriculture and the ongoing insurgency led by the Democratic Movement of the Forces of Casamance (MFDC) which opposes the State of Senegal. The conflict has resulted in the abandonment of villages, the displacement of populations and the presence of mines in fields and orchards which impact on agriculture. A majority of families in Kolda have a piece of land to cultivate for the subsistence needs of the family. In the past they migrated seasonally under the Rouwmougol system. This practice dates back to the colonial period and consists of being recruited as a seasonal worker in the groundnut basin of Senegal. The Fulani people of Kolda used it for a long time as an additional source of income. However, groundnut production has suffered in recent years and these days young men are keen on trying their fate to reach other countries, especially Libya or Europe.

It is said that migration to foreign lands is embedded in the culture of Senegal since colonial times when the leader of the Mourides, Cheikh Amadou Bamba was

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4 It should be emphasized, however, that not all those who leave are necessarily from the Kolda region, as there are transit migrants from Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau and nationals of Gambia, attracted by the geopolitical situation of the Kolda region. Generally, people in transit settle for a longer or shorter period in order to better prepare for their migration journeys. Such people present themselves as a native of Kolda in surveys.
exiled (Nyamnjoh, 2016, 196). Different explanations have been offered for the current patterns of high-risk irregular migration from West Africa including economic hardship imposed by structural adjustment programmes (Christiansen et al., 2006), ideas of masculinity, pride, honour and courage (Hernandez-Carretero & Carling, 2012, 411) and aspirations for a different way of living and wealth (De Boeck & Honwana, 2005). The research team noticed that houses with international migrants were better off and able to eat three meals a day as well as educate their children and invest in agriculture. Those families with more than one migrant look visibly wealthier than others - their homes are built with concrete and they have installed solar panels and bought durable goods.

Many of the men that we interviewed said that they were planning to migrate to improve the situation of the family. In Senegal sons are socialized to undertake supreme sacrifices for the well-being of their parents as Lamine’s account illustrates:

> My problem is that I can’t find a good job that allows me to take care of my family – otherwise I would never go to Libya. Because I know the difficulties I encountered once I left. And I have to succeed so that I can help my brother to take care of the family. But also, my neighbour who went to Italy and today his family is living well, he has built a big building in his house. He has bought agricultural equipment for his family and now his younger brothers are living well; their rice, millet and peanut crops alone provide for some of the family’s basic needs. So, it was a great inspiration for me. Today he comes back to Senegal every year, so I talk a lot with him, and it gave me an idea of the road and that’s how I decided to leave in my turn in the hope of changing things.

However, wrapped up with these explanations were also aspirations for to transition to a more modern lifestyle themselves. Take the case of Baba, a 24-year-old belonging to a large family of farmers and breeders. Baba was unable to complete primary school because his parents could not afford his school fees. He had completed advanced Qoranic studies like most of his age group in the villages around Saré Woudou. He did not have the chance to practice a trade despite the fact that he wanted to be a carpenter. He wanted to migrate to change his own prospects and the living standards of his family.

In Kolda the majority of inhabitants are under 20 years of age and the desire to migrate despite the risks involved seems to be widespread. The area has been targeted with radio broadcasts with programmes creating awareness about the risks of irregular migration and NGOs that previously worked on agriculture are now working on preventing irregular migration as there is more funding available in that area.

### 3.5 God’s Will in a Context of High-Risk Migration

The interviews with men at origin show that the dangers of being smuggled across borders and the points at which they occur are discussed all the time in day-to-day conversations in Kolda villages. Aspiring migrants and their families have up to date, often real time information, through their friends and relatives who send them
updates on WhatsApp, Facebook, Imo etc. sending photos and texts from various transit points along the way.

Religious tenets were repeatedly invoked during the interviews and attention to them has allowed us to gain insights into how migrants interpret life events and migration risks. They draw on religious beliefs to situate the migration decision in their cultural meaning system. They also turn to the teachings of God to be able to cope with extremely harsh conditions on the way and dealing with failed migrations.

Our interviews with aspiring and return migrants indicate that the way they conduct their lives is rooted in a sense of Islamic morality and identity. Islamic ideals of being good men to their families and to Allah for the day of reckoning were mentioned frequently in conversations. Their migration imaginaries are developed with these social and religious points of reference and this gives them a way of finding meaning in the decision to migrate despite known risks. When considering the likelihood of death at sea or in the desert during the preparatory stage before departing, such understandings of life, death and fate as well as being a “good” Muslim give them the emotional and psychological means to prepare for bad outcomes.

Although migrants are fatalistic, their actions are also full of hope and agency as they try to make the best of their lives within God’s plan. For Arfang a 38-year-old mechanic in Kolda, the success of his friends compared to his own life was due to God’s design and this was why he was considering migration.

It is God who wanted things to happen like this, if not me I never wanted a friend to go ahead of me in life, because one, I am proud of myself and two, I don’t want to be dependent on anyone. I have always dreamed of having a lot of money to help people and at the moment I have a piece of land that I want to build but I don’t have the means to do so, while my friends have passed this stage, so I too have decided to take this path.’ He was aware of the risks and was prepared to accept whatever God had in store for him as his fate. ‘This kind of journey is always difficult, and it is not easy to say that I will succeed, but since we are believers, I believe that I will succeed insha-Allah, but I may not succeed too and even die there it is possible. It’s the journey, but God is great, I’ll make it Insha-Allah.

Alpha’s interview also shows that he was well aware of the risks of migration but felt that success or failure in the migration project depended on God’s will.

I can say that dangers are numerous in illegal migration. At the borders, migrants are treated like animals by policemen because they asked us for money, and what is bad is that even if migrants give them money, they start to beat them. Besides in the ghettos⁴, the brokers also take any opportunity to take money off migrants. And also, when they’re on board, migrants are in a dilemma because they can be abandoned by a driver in the middle of the Sahara and they die of thirst and hunger. They can also be imprisoned in some countries. Therefore, illegal migration is a very dangerous phenomenon. It’s only with God’s help that you can succeed in migration.

Karfa, a 41-year-old aspiring migrant in Doumassou who was working as a mason locally at the time of the interview expresses his confidence in the success of his migration project because of his faith in God.

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⁴The functioning of ghettos is discussed in detail later in the paper.
I’m almost 42 and I do masonry. I want to migrate, and I’ve thought about it and now I’ve made the decision... I am very confident because I trust in God and I have the trust and blessing of my parents. The blessing of the parents is very important, that’s why I know I will succeed. I am certain that the day I leave, I will reach my destination. Here it is a matter of self-confidence and knowing what you want to leave for and especially what you have left behind. If you know what you have left behind, you have a thousand chances to succeed.

Another migrant Mamoudou believes that only God can know what is in fate for him and he derives optimism from this feeling.

It’s a journey that only God knows, but I think it won’t be too difficult, I’m optimistic. I don’t know why, but I’m optimistic. I’m sure that the day I put on my shoes and leave the house, I’m going to arrive, whatever the difficulties.

While God’s will was given importance, the need for blessings from one’s parents was upheld as extremely important and those who left without the support of their parents blame that omission for their failed migrations. Aspiring migrant Harouna thinks that his faith and blessings from his parents will see him through the journey safely

I am very confident because I have the trust in God, and I have the blessing of my parents. The blessing of my parents is very important, that’s why I know I will succeed. I am sure that the day I leave, I will reach my destination.

Seventeen-year-old Djiby also talks about the risks of irregular migration in great detail but makes light of them by referring to them as rumours. He too feels that the outcome depends on God’s will and whatever that is must be accepted.

According to the rumours I hear on this trip the probability that people will not reach the desired destination is very high because there are aggressors, one can get lost in the dessert or in the sea for days, that is what the repatriated migrant told me because he got lost for three days in the dessert and he also told me that when he got lost in the sea….Of course nothing can dissuade me from leaving! I have to leave in order to have a lot of money and to support my family, my parents in particular, and to build my house like my comrades who went away. If this (anything going wrong) is what God decides I would accept it. But at the moment I only think of going to Italy or Spain.

Leaving the area was also seen as a way of seeking redemption and atoning for one’s sins. 45-year-old Diawoula took the decision to migrate to seek God’s forgiveness for sins he had committed in Senegal. He interprets the events that led to his migration as God rescuing him from a life of crime and guiding him to seek redemption overseas

I was with Niantang (a rebel leader of the MFDC). We used to poach on the roads. We smuggled cashew nuts and took money from travellers by force. We had an entire night of face-to-face encounters with the Senegalese army. It is thanks to God that I got out and we withdrew to the border to Diattacounda. I lied to my family to tell them that I had found work at Cap-Skirring. I fed my family during this time with the blood and tears of others that I shed. I still look back east to ask God’s forgiveness for the crimes I have committed. What I’m telling you now, no one in the family knows. I’m a man from hell. With all the sins I’ve committed, to be forgiven by God, I have to leave this country. God has said it, repent sincerely and leave the land where you have done wrong and start a new life (he starts reciting litanies from the Koran).
What then are parents’ attitudes to the risks and dangers of irregular migration in its current form? How do families assess these risks? These questions are legitimate when we know that the number of victims of this migration is very high and awareness campaigns against clandestine migration by pirogue and by land are carried out by community radio stations and talks are also organised in many villages. These broadcasts are largely sponsored by the State of Senegal and by international organisations such as IOM and are carried out by local NGOs and the community movement. In parallel, awareness-raising sessions called “causeries” are also organised in village communities. The objective of these initiatives is not only to give voice to communities affected by irregular migration but also to call on communities to maintain their threads. The principle of these programmes is to invite an “expert” on migration while opening the airwaves to listeners who can intervene not to ask questions, but rather to reinforce, support and go into depth to consolidate the arguments of the invited “expert”. Most of the contributors to these programmes have been migrants who have been deported from Libya, Niger, and other countries.

When we look at these radio programmes, it appears that contrary to their intended objectives, which include raising awareness of the dangers of the road and the sea and deterring clandestine migration, they are used by listeners instead to gain information on the best strategies to put in place to avoid the dangers and obstacles that can result in deportation. However, it has been observed that information on clandestine migration is gathered by the family around the radio to try to decipher the testimonies of deported or returning migrants. Involved in his son’s journey, this father of a family of seventeen, who after two years of effort to raise the money to be used for his son’s emigration, tells us in these terms about the usefulness of radio awareness-raising programmes against clandestine migration:

Yes, first it was useful for myself, because when he first discussed his plan to migrate to support us, I also started listening to the programmes on migration on the community radio. One day, a gentleman was invited and he was a migrant who came back, the government brought him because he was in prison in Libya. That day, after the programme, I understood that on the road there are intermediaries, drivers, police officers, and crossing points. Above all, I learned that the success of the journey depends on the honesty of the smuggler. The migrant man on the radio explained well that if the smuggler is honest, the journey will be successful.

There is, so to speak, a kind of learning and appropriation by the community of the space in which irregular migration is discussed, as this interview extract reveals. Indeed, since it is supposed to be a clandestine journey and consequently carries the risk of seeing the project fail, potential migrants, helped and supported by their own families, rely on these radio broadcasts and on the “chat” sessions, as well as on migrants who have already left, to pre-identify their migratory path.

Parents’ willingness to send their son to face such high risks often stems from desperation to get them out of the area and protect the honour of the family. This can occur if they do not want their children to engage in illicit activities such as wood trafficking, drugs and delinquency which can lead to their imprisonment and damage the family’s honour. This happened in the case of the Imam of the village Pata, who feared that his 24-year-old son would engage in illegal wood trafficking or
smuggling of goods between Gambia and Senegal and go to prison. This would have been a disgrace to his social status. To prevent this from happening, the Imam supported his irregular migration by land:

Either he migrates, or he finds himself in complicated situations such as selling (wood) and trafficking between Senegal and Gambia. Imagine the shame I would have felt towards my relatives if he had fallen into delinquency. He had to leave.

Irregular migration can be supported by parents for other reasons as well. In the Ziguinchor region, to protect their children from being recruited by the MFDC independence movement, fathers have supported the departure of their children by pirogue from the islands off Casamance. The honour felt by parents who are respected and adulated by the community when they see the child returning with riches after migrating and the dishonour of the child’s imprisonment can explain the risk-taking in some families who commit to helping their children on such risky journeys. Both parents can support this decision and the role of women in the family is elaborated upon below.

### 3.5.1 The Role of Marabouts

Marabouts play a critical role in both delivering God’s message to migrants and their families and also engaging in prayers to higher cosmic forces to protect the migrant and shape their destiny. The importance of Marabouts in blessing migrants and offering migrants protection against risks and failure has been noted before (Nyamnjoh, 2016) but here, we provide more detail on their role and relations with the migrant as well as their family. In Kolda it is believed that Marabouts have spiritual powers that allow them to foresee the future and ward off obstacles. The journey is usually not undertaken without the blessing of a Marabout although those migrating without the knowledge of their families reported that they did not always go to Marabouts. If the Marabout says the travel should not be undertaken then the migrant must obey. On the other hand, if the Marabout ordains that there are obstacles that can be cleared away through rituals or sacrifices the migrant or their family are asked to arrange them. These include asking for offerings: a rooster or a goat which is killed to prepare a meal for the community in order to earn good fortune through good deeds. Marabout may write verses from the Holy Qur’an and attach them around the neck, waist, and arms placed inside “gris-gris” which are a type of Voodoo amulet popular in West Africa. Sometimes the scriptures are macerated in water (Safara) and the migrant is made to sprinkle the blessed water on himself or drink it every day. Through such rituals Marabout seek to ward off bad luck and attract luck and success. Their protection extends to preventing theft, scams and all the other hazards along the way. For migrants these rituals and amulets can be a source of comfort during the journey where they have few other sources of emotional or spiritual support. The highest form of protection that the Marabout
offers is a “Bain Mystique” or mystical bath where they will pray for the migrant all night.

Boubacar, a 17-year-old aspiring migrant from the Vélingara department thinks his migration will succeed because he consulted not one but two Marabouts who both gave him their blessings:

I think I have a good chance of succeeding because I went to see two Marabouts. They both told me the same thing about this trip; that I will succeed if I am patient during the trip. They have asked me to make sacrifices (three red colas plus two white chickens that I will give to two strangers) and I must give water as a sacrifice on the day of my departure. So, all that remains for the success of my journey depends on divine strength.

It also transpired during the discussions with migrants that fetishists were also consulted by migrants and their families before departure. Fetishists practice indigenous religions that predate the colonial period. The pejorative term fetishist was coined by Portuguese Christian traders when they encountered local belief systems and the figures that people made to worship certain deities. The term derives from the Portuguese word Fetisso, which signifies a divine, or oracular object, from the Latin root Fatum, Fanum, Fari (De Brosses, 1988 quoted in Latour, 2011). Fetishists were not approved of by the Marabout either as 34-year-old Moussa’s account shows. He was deported from Libya but was planning to travel again at the time of our study and had shunned fetishists and consulted Marabouts instead.

I prepared my first trip for a year before leaving and it cost me a total of 30 000 FCFA. But I never went to see fetishists because it is forbidden by the Muslim religion. On the other hand, I went to see Marabouts, I gave at the beginning 200, 300 or even 500 FCFA because everything depends on the Marabout. I was given bottles filled with potions; it was often intended to be used as a bath. Sometimes the Marabouts would recommend me to give cola as charity, candles, 5f coins which were difficult even to find.

3.5.2 Balancing Pragmatism with Spirituality

When preparing for the journey, migrants will consider both the practical challenges of the journey and the skill of smugglers to circumnavigate official restrictions and also what Allah has ordained for them, as communicated by the Marabout. Youssoupha, a 30-year-old who was working as a plumber in Kolda and hoping to migrate with the proceeds from the sale of his father’s land said,

I often go to the Marabouts. They often tell me that I will travel and I will succeed if God wills it, but also I intend to leave with a lot of money and also I have made a lot of inquiries about the road; if however the person does not do all this he risks not reaching his desired destination. But these are people who have learned the Qoran and they work on the basis of that. You know I’m not the one who told them I’m going to travel. They’re the ones who knew that, but how? I don’t know how. But one thing’s for sure, it’s God who comes down and tells them that this boy is going to travel, so I trust them.

Islamic Marabouts regard extreme-risk journeys as non-Islamic (Nyamnjoh, 2016, 197), but other soothsayers may tell aspiring migrants that death at sea should be
seen as martyrdom and an act of bravery. This explains one of the well-known mottoes of migrants embarking on high risk migration ‘Baca ou Bazrak’ or ‘Barcelona or death!’ (Thomson, 2014, Nyamnjoh, 2016; Ba, 2007).

### 3.5.3 Gendered Infrastructures of Migration

When we look more specifically at the category of mothers, wives and fiancées of migrants and potential migrants, they are deeply affected by or involved in facilitating irregular migration. In-depth interviews among family members of the migrant showed that when the migration is long and if the migrant does not send any news, his left behind wives, become vulnerable to abuse and violence. Such instances were brought to our attention during interviews with doctors and counsellors serving the community. Although such women suffer terrible violence they cannot easily confide in the community, as reported by a professional psychologist from a state institution in Senegal:

> There is another more serious problem, which is the cases of widows. Imagine a young man who marries a girl before leaving. If he dies, the woman can stay three or five years without any news of her husband and these women live in difficult conditions. We receive them here (office) but it is extraordinary. These women cannot get divorced and they are sometimes forced to commit adultery and society judges them. So they are between a rock and a hard place. Currently, we have eight cases that we are following up. But unfortunately, it is the distance that makes it difficult for us to follow them. They cannot divorce because they will be treated as traitors. In any case, these women are direct and indirect victims of immigration. Do they have to listen to a husband who is not sure whether he will return or not? Waiting for a husband who doesn’t show any sign of life?

These possible negative impacts of men’s migration lead some women them to oppose the migration of their husbands and if they cannot dissuade them, they seek mystical and religious protection for him from bad luck. Women thus play a key role in the search for a good Marabout with a reputation for religious merit and the search is usually undertaken by the mother, the fiancée or the sisters of the potential migrant. One migrant, B Balde, said ‘My mother had decided to support me mystically, and my brothers and sisters too had participated in the financing by visiting marabouts and making sacrifices.’ Another case was Hawa, who was married for just two months before her husband left. She now divides her time between domestic work and marabout consultations for the success of her husband’s trip. She and her mother-in-law are constantly consulting Marabouts. As soon as they are informed about a seer or a Marabout, they go there. For Hawa, if her husband’s migration fails, she will bear part of this failure herself because it will be said around her that she brings bad luck and she brought it to her husband. This can have serious consequences for her future in the village. She risks being stigmatized for the failure of her husband’s migration and is doing everything in her capacity to bring blessings to him. While searching for a Marabout, the women refrain from saying openly ‘I am looking for a clairvoyant or a fetishist for the emigration of my son’. Indeed,
as much as possible, the migratory project is kept secret so as not to bring bad omen, which could jeopardise the success of the migration.

Sometimes the search for a good fetishist or a good Marabout can lead to the most remote places, far from urban centres. As Aziz says finding a good Marabout is not easy ‘Yes, but you know that now to find a good Marabout is not easy: they will only eat your money and I only have 300,000 FCFA and I don’t know if that’s enough for me. Maybe I’ll see, but on this road only God can save the person’.

This search can bring them into the sub-region (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali border (Kedougou). In popular representation, it is generally accepted that “good seers and good fetishists” never leave their villages. The lead researcher had a chance meeting in a hotel in Kolda with the sister of a potential migrant who left the Louga region to meet a marabout who lives in Diambanouta, a remote village in the department of Vélingara. The trip took her just over eight hours of travel over a distance of about 580 km.

The costs of consulting a Marabout ranged from 100,000 to 150,000 FCFA at the time of the fieldwork. Mothers are often responsible for funding these expenses through the sale of gold (Ba, 2007). Sona, a housewife and the mother of a migrant, about 60 years old, says:

No dignified mother can let her child go under the conditions that are told on the radio without taking mother’s precautions. That’s right, only God kills, but a mother cannot stand still watching her child go to death without reacting.

3.5.4 Connections with Illicit Activities

Although performing religious and spiritual rituals, Marabout are locally known as “men of the shadows” because of their links with the world of illicit activities. They have become socially powerful since the ‘80s and ‘90s when their influence spread during the structural adjustment programmes and it was essential to have personal ties with influential people to get jobs. ‘Favours and corruption became omnipresent. Customs officials earned their money through smuggling goods and nepotism flourished, with ministers involving family members in construction projects, while trade union secretaries awarded their wives or friends catering contracts. A Marabout with a good network soon became a central figure in the Senegalese daily life of small and big favours.’ (Osmanovic, 2019, 230). The protection offered by Marabout is critical for illicit and criminal businesses (233). In Kolda, it is known that various migration intermediaries such as cokseurs and passeurs consult them to stay out of trouble. No doubt these connections are critical for placing migrants on certain trajectories within the irregular migration industry.

Marabouts support migrants throughout the journey and as a result, they have a steady income. Khalifa, a 52-year-old migrant from Sinthiou Sara in Kolda Department made two attempts at irregular migration by road and then by sea when he succeeded. A few years later, he took his son but by land. When asked about the nature of his communications with the Marabout, he replied:
In my case, the communication was about how to make sure I could obtain papers ... and now, since I received the papers, it is about how to pay for expenses, how to buy cows and how to build. And as far as my son is concerned, our communication often turns to money when he arrives in transit areas. But after his arrival in Italy, the communication has changed. Now we are talking about what we must do so that he can get papers.

Marabout are consulted by deported migrants after return to ask why their migration failed and the Marabout may claim that they were able to come home alive because of their protection, thereby maintaining their importance in the imaginations of the men. If the migration fails, migrants are more likely to blame fate, a lack of parents’ blessings or jealous relatives bringing them bad luck rather than barriers created by EU policies. One migrant who had left without his parents’ permission was found in Morocco with the help of his friends. He told the research team that his return was forced by the Marabout that his parents had consulted.

3.6 Experiences During the Journey

Migrants encounter a variety of actors who facilitate the crossing by land or sea. The type of intermediary encountered first by migrants are cokseurs or migrant recruiters. In southern Senegal, many cokseurs are based in Tambacounda and they operate in clandestine ways due to increased government surveillance. These actors then link up passeurs or smugglers and their drivers to facilitate the clandestine journey of migrants to certain ‘ghettos’ or safe houses at transit points. The passeur or smuggler is the overall coordinator of the journey across the Sahara. While most of the passeurs that we interviewed were keen to establish that they are honest, their reputation in Kolda indicates that they are seen in a less positive light than they would have us believe. Passeurs are locally known as “barbarians” because of their ruthless tactics, abandoning migrants in the desert to fend for themselves if they cannot pay. Details of the infrastructure and functioning of irregular migration facilitation can be found in Gueye and Deshingkar (2020).

The crossing of the desert is done in “combat” in overloaded pick-up trucks led by smugglers armed with Kalashnikovs who leave in the middle of the night. The guns are meant to protect the smugglers against robbers along the way but also protect themselves against revolt by the migrants they are carrying. Conditions in the desert are extremely dangerous and precarious.

In recounting their experiences, migrants talked about the extreme suffering and risk to their lives and repeatedly mentioned that migrants can survive such conditions only if God protects them.

So, we had four days in the desert, and we drove day and night, it was extremely hot during the day as it was cold at night. We were in 4 x 4 vehicles, the chairs at the back of the driver are dismantled. I was among those sitting there, inside. We were all scared since they took out their weapons. In fact, they bring out their weapons as soon as they have doubts, because they know that in case of misunderstanding, they are aware of the solidarity that exists between migrants ... This is how we have advanced until Gadroume, the border between
Libya and Niger. The crossing of the Sahara by combat cost me 250,000 FCFA. Even if a person falls off the vehicle during the trip, the combat does not stop. Only God can save people in the Sahara. It is only God who can save people in the Sahara.

Similar to the migrants from Central America in Hagan’s study who attributed their survival in perilous journeys to a miracle from God, the migrants from Kolda also refer to a higher force that can protect them in the desert. These beliefs gave migrants hope and the will to persevere. The passeurs take no responsibility for the safety of their passengers and more than one migrant mentioned that they did not stop to rescue anyone who lost their balance and fell out. The ability to withstand such conditions and reach the other side safely was again put down to protection from God as Moussa’s account shows:

First of all, its small vehicles and people are overloaded like sheep and the 4WDs drive at speed so often vehicles fall down, but the drivers don’t care. We don’t stop until the order is given by the head of the convoy in person. Often they have parking points which is a place where all cars will stop for a while to refuel because they have big barrels in each car. That’s when people will get out to eat and drink. People suffer during these fights because if a person is put in certain conditions, he may lose hope and that kills a lot of people because if he falls down while the vehicles are driving. Unfortunately, if that happens and drivers don’t stop, they continue even if they know someone has fallen. It’s a very difficult road so sometimes people die like that in the desert and another danger of this trip is that when the vehicles are driving, they raise the dust to a great height and people don’t see anything. Sometimes with the shaking, people also fall down, so it is only God who is able to protect a person from these dangers. In the past it used to be dump trucks that were used to transport the migrants during the fighting, but since the war started, people have stopped using these trucks because they were easy to track and chase, so now they use 4x4s for the journey.

3.7 Extreme Suffering and Risk Are Not a Deterrent

To our surprise migrants who had endured and survived extreme hardship through the dessert and the sea expressed the desire to migrate again if they were deported or had to return. They were preparing to depart again almost immediately partly due to unfulfilled goals, the social shame of failed migration and deportation and their belief in the Almighty will see them through the journey. Successful migration is seen as a mark of manhood and being a good son and provider for the family. There was also a sense of a poor outlook for making a living in rural Senegal due to deteriorating agricultural production and the departure of so many able-bodied men. Those who survived and succeeded in accumulating enough money to make the crossing to Europe were perceived to be the blessed and lucky ones. On the other hand, those who had failed or had been deported attributed these outcomes to fate, jealous relatives bringing bad luck or not having one’s parents’ blessings. EU policies and barriers to migration rarely figured in these interpretations of the successes and failures of migration.

Bécaye who sailed in a precarious pirogue all the way to Spain said he would go again but by land,
Yes. I acquired a cow today. I’ll try to build up a couple of animals and I’ll sell one to go back. I don’t know when, but I know I’ll go back. This time I’ll try the road. I don’t recommend the sea. At least not me. If you hear somewhere that I’ve had something to do with water, it’s because I’ve washed or drank it. But me and water is over now.

Aziz who had survived starvation in the Sahara and being robbed told the research teams that he was planning to remigrate because he saw no future in Kolda.

The difficulties that I met there are enormous and this time if it doesn’t work I will stop for good and come back to continue my business. I’m going back to try my luck again this time... But also, today many young people don’t want to stay in the village anymore and consequently the old people of the village don’t have any more support for the work in the fields. Even my family never agree to my trip. When I talked about it with my brother, he asked me to stay but I didn’t listen. But sometimes it is important because many people have succeeded in this trip. For example, some families in this village have now stopped farming because their sons have succeeded in this trip and they are covering the daily expenses of the family and they are starting to build big buildings in their families.

These accounts raise questions on how well policy makers are understanding migrant attitudes to risk and whether the heavy investments made in risk information campaigns are justified.

### 3.8 Conclusion

This study adds to the scant literature on the role of religion and spirituality in shaping perceptions of risk and giving meaning to extreme suffering during dangerous migration journeys. Light is shed on the modes of interaction between migrants, their families and Marabout Islamic religious leaders. Marabouts are extremely important in shaping the migration decision and mediating between God and migrants to help them cope with the risks and uncertainties that they encounter along the way.

In the absence of any legal protection and a completely mercenary environment, the outcomes of irregular migration depend on chance. Migrants must depend emotionally and psychologically on religious beliefs and prayers that give meaning to their adventures and offer succour during difficult times. It is hardly surprising then that migrants and their families were seen to place such faith in the Marabouts’ blessings and their destiny as ordained by God.

The findings visibilize the role of women in irregular migration and its religious dimensions and show how deeply they are involved in what was hitherto regarded mainly as a male activity. Although women make up only a fraction of irregular migrants, they are involved in facilitating, supporting, financing journeys and sourcing Marabouts. Such a gendered perspective helps us to elucidate a broader and more complex picture of migration where women are a critical part of the infrastructure of migration or the overall system which facilitates men’s journeys.

Irregular migrants derived spiritual and emotional comfort through the teachings of Islam when faced with numerous, severe and arbitrary risks including forced
labour, extortion, beatings, abandonment, starvation, theft and destitution. They sought protection from God by mobilising Marabouts and seeking strength in their potions and rituals. But at the same time, they were exercising agency in the way that they negotiated and worked with different actors in the smuggling industry who could help them achieve their dream in highly adverse circumstances in the sea and desert.

The research found that repeated deportations may force people to become temporarily immobile but that does not extinguish their desire to migrate. Experiences of extremely difficult journeys and a real risk to life did not deter migrants from wanting to leave again. This was due to a combination of the shame of failed migration, not seeing a viable future in rural areas and the belief that God would protect them.

Current policy approaches are focused on limiting irregular migration through information campaigns and the criminalisation of migration intermediaries. As this research has shown, these measures have had limited success for complex reasons including religious interpretations of risk; family needs and personal aspirations; as well as the lack of remunerative options locally.

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References


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Chapter 4
Gendered Dynamics in West African Migration

Mary Boatemaa Setrana and Nauja Kleist

Much of the discourse on West African migration ignores gender perspectives or tends to focus on women ‘as’ gender while men are portrayed as, perhaps unwittingly, neutral or un-gendered. On the contrary, both men and women migrate from their homes either permanently or temporarily with or without their families. These movements impact on the traditional family system of many countries within the region and the migrants themselves. The traditional notion of the male as a ‘bread winner’ and ‘mover’ has witnessed changes; remittances transferred by both males and female migrants are used to support and improve the wellbeing of households; gender division of labour and its associated roles are re-negotiated when females migrate independently; and some female migrants are abused and exploited at destination areas. The analysis in the chapter thus indicates that there are key gendered dynamics of the impacts of migration on migrants themselves and their households. Additionally, family relations are central in the gendered dynamics of remittances, migration aspirations, and return migration. In the process, masculinity and femininity ideals are negotiated and changed, even if patriarchal norms continue to affect notions of female migration in some settings.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses gendered dynamics in West African migration, with particular focus on practices and discourses concerning the migration and mobility of men and women, and how these relate to family relations and ideals. We examine the

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different migratory behaviours of men and women, the opportunities they face while migrating, the expectations they may be subjected to, and how they cope with different risks and challenges. Additionally, we are curious about how such experiences and the narratives thereof reflect – or challenge – ideals of femininity and masculinity.

Much of the literature on West African migration ignores gender perspectives or tends to focus on women ‘as’ gender while men are portrayed as, perhaps unwittingly, neutral or un-gendered. In contrast to this, we understand both men and women as gendered beings and pay attention to (changing) femininity and masculinity ideals, and how gender intersects with notions of social class, generation, and other categories of differentiation (Crenshaw, 1991). We further emphasize the pertinence of the family in migration. The various relations between migrants and their families may reproduce or challenge gender ideals. They form part of affective circuits, constituting “social formations that emerge from the sending, withholding, and receiving of goods, ideas, bodies and emotions” that link migrants and their family and peers (Cole & Groes, 2016: 2). Such an understanding thus accentuates relationality as well as negotiations and contestations across time and place. It also throws light on the differentiated positions of migrants and their families in transnational or translocal social fields (Levitt & Schiller, 2004), characterized by structural inequalities that shape opportunities and expectations.

The chapter draws on a variety of predominantly anglophone academic sources, including our own studies on various dimensions of Ghanaian migration. It has also benefited from work from the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), University of Ghana, and other local and international institutions. While we have strived to include examples and perspectives from across West Africa, the chapter gravitates towards Ghanaian migration; a bias reflecting our own research interests. However, reviewing the literature, we did find that the case of Ghanaian migration in a gender perspective tends to be particularly well studied.

We proceed in the following way. After an overview of the main patterns of West African migration in a gender perspective, we move on to discuss migration and the quest for a better future among the youth, followed by a section on changing migration aspirations and immobility. We then turn to the gendered dynamics of remittances, with discussion of different family types and expectations to and contestations of remittances. The penultimate section elaborates on planned and unplanned return before we highlight our main findings and identify gaps in the literature in the conclusion.

4.2 Gendered Migration Dynamics in West Africa – An Overview

Migration has been part of and parcel of West African life for centuries but mainly been portrayed as male-dominated until the 1980s. Female migrants were seen as persons who accompanied husbands, brothers and fathers on the migration journey
to work in cities and other neighbouring countries, though independent female migration has existed as well (e.g. Abdul-Korah, 2011; Awumbila & Torvikeh, 2018; Yaro, 2008). Male and female mobility patterns are and have been very varied, however, shaped by local and international developments that have facilitated or enforced the mobility of various groups and individuals. Likewise, women and men’s migration are shaped – but not determined – by gendered social norms concerning the acceptance of and expectations to their mobility as well as economic and political structures, concerning employment, wages, rights etc.

During the last decades, the share of female migrants in West African movements has continued to grow, including an increasing number of skilled and independent women migrating to fulfil their personal and autonomous economic wellbeing (Adepoju, 2006; Awumbila & Torvikeh, 2018), in line with the global feminization of migration. As shown in Table 4.1, the percentage of female migration from the West African sub-region has increased between 1960 and 1980, representing 42.1–45.4%, following the general trend of African migration. From 1980, the proportion has been relatively stable up to now, with slight decreases and increases, representing 45.1–45.7%, slightly below the average of female migrants from all over Africa.

Figure 4.1 breaks down the numbers of migrants from the different ECOWAS countries in 2019, out of the almost ten million West African migrants. The top five countries with high international migrants are Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Among these countries, only Côte d’Ivoire has a slightly higher number of female international migrants than males, possibly attributed to the political conflict in Côte d’Ivoire and following displacement of many women and children (Awumbila et al., 2014).

Both men and women migrate primarily within the West African region, but some also find themselves in Europe and North America, and more recently in Asia. This development may be due to the political and economic crisis that affected many West African countries in this period, prompting new migration patterns, including increased internal and long-distance migration in many contexts. Within the subregion, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment has played an important role. Agreed to by Member States in 1979, the protocol aimed

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Fig. 4.1 Gender distribution of West African migrants in 2019. (Source: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp)

at promoting development through free movement of persons, goods and services, facilitating residence and employment in the community. Since its implementation, the region has witnessed increasing labour migration of women, joining the already high numbers of migrating men, following infrastructural development, the increasing production of cash crops, such as coffee, cocoa and groundnut and the development of the mining sectors and oil discovery (Quartey et al., 2020).

4.2.1 Feminization of West African Migration?

The developments described above have contributed to changing patterns and trends of West African migration, moving it from a male-dominated experience to an almost equal gender composition, though there are still more male migrants from most countries. Increasing demand for services in e.g. care work across the various neighbouring countries and beyond, including domestic work should be mentioned as an important factor as well. In Ghana, for instance, domestic workers hail from other parts of Ghana as well as from neighbouring countries (Awumbila et al., 2017). Likewise, young Ghanaian women who engage in independent livelihood migration and find work in menial jobs such as kayayoo (head portage) in the urban centers have become a significant trend of contemporary female migration. A short historical perspective serves as an illustration of changing gender patterns (refer to Box 4.1).
Regional and international trade constitutes another important example. Women have been dominant in cross-border trading activities in West Africa for several decades (Awumbila & Torvikeh, 2018: 176), trading in food stuffs, cosmetics, jewelry and clothing etc. Further afield, the transnational trading of West African migrants with China and the recruitment of West African migrants to the Gulf and Middle East countries are significant trends. While earlier West African migrants moved to China for education, later movements include trading activities from Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal as well (Bodomo, 2020). These kinds of engagements have certain gendered dynamics. For the male and female traders plying the West Africa - China corridor, activities are structured along gendered lines, with females engaging in the import of soft commodities while males import hard ones (ibid. 2018a: 73; 2018). These differences seem to mirror gendered trading patterns within West Africa and are further attributed to the differences in capital and the time of entry into this transnational trading arena where men start earlier than women (ibid.).

A third significant trend of feminization is seen in temporary labour from West Africa to the Middle East and Gulf countries. Such migration took off in the 1980s, primarily consisting of male professionals to the petrochemical industry.
More recently, low-skilled labour migration has become prevalent in the domestic, construction and mining sectors. Young women without much formal education now constitute the large majority of West African migrants, reported to count 82% of Ghanaians in this region (Bisong, 2021; Kandilige et al., 2020). There is an increasing number of reported abuses especially among female domestic workers, attributed to a lack of rights and protection, low levels of formal education, migration status, and gender. As a result, first Nigeria and later Ghana banned low-skilled migration to several Gulf Countries in respectively 2014 and 2017, though the former has been reported to be unsuccessful as migrants would relocate to the neighbouring countries and go from there (Bisong, 2021: 8).

The emphasis on male migration as dominant until the 1980s, followed by increasing feminization, can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, we may see it as part of an overall global trend where destinations, modes of migration and types of migrants continue to diversify (de Haas et al., 2020). On the other hand, it can be perceived as an expression of gender-blind research, historically and today, that not only reflects a lack of gender-divided data (Awumbila & Torvikeh, 2018: 175) but also a lack of analytical attention and curiosity. Here we also note the tendency in some studies to portray female migrants as particularly vulnerable, “having little or no agency [while] their experiences as migrants have been constructed around ‘those left behind’, rather than as voluntary migrants” (Bisong, 2019: 4).

Our ambition in the remaining part of the chapter is to offer a more nuanced perspective through attention to gendered ideals and practices, how these intersect with other dimensions, and the challenges and experiences of both men and women.

4.3 Migration and the Quest for a Better Future

An important part of the literature on West African migration focuses on social becoming and migration as a (hoped-for) pathways of improvement and adulthood, especially for male youth. In contrast to the celebration of youth in Western countries, adulthood is generally perceived as desirable in West Africa, as the achievement of “a fully recognized position as an adult person in society”, generating status and respect (Prothmann, 2017: 96, Christensen, Utas, and Vigh, 2006). Adult (hegemonic) masculinity is related to strong family values, marriage and provision (e.g. McLean, 2020). The realization of such gender ideals is not necessarily linked to migration. However, in situations of dire living conditions, chronic crises and/or (post)conflict, however, some young men – and women we may add – find themselves caught in a discrepancy between their chronological and social age (Vigh, 2006: 32) where migration constitutes an (imagined) pathway towards proper adulthood.

In Francophone West Africa, aller en aventure – going on adventure – is a commonly used term for primarily male youth migration to ‘unknown places’ where the migrant does not have preexisting strong social networks (Jónson, 2008: 18, Bredeloup, 2017). Such migration has a (potentially) transformative dimension as
the migrant turns into a stranger, enabling him to take up work that would not be socially acceptable at home. In the Soninke context in Mali, for instance, this transformation is supposed to propel the young man towards mature manhood as a rite of passage where he detaches himself from his family and later re-attach himself as a matured adult man with a family of his own (Jónson, 2008). Young Malian women migrate as well, however, whether to bigger cities in Mali or further afield, in pursuit of less strenuous lives or the adventures of the city or abroad (Hertrich & Lesclingand, 2013; Konaté, 2010).

Going on adventure may also refer to a quest for more interesting, intense and dignified lives, even if this quest involves risks and suffering (cf. Dougnon, 2016). In Bredeloup’s words, such adventure is a moral experience where migrants seek “a particular lifestyle […] to escape their predictable, and possibly, gloomy everyday lives and pursue their dreams” (2017: 134). Other often-used expressions for similar kinds of migration projects include hustling and traveling in anglophone West Africa (Gaibazzi, 2015). Here, as in aventure, notions of luck and fate are often central.

While such journeys seem to focus on individual and existential life trajectories of young men, they are also related to the fulfilment of family obligations and the hope of establishing a better and dignified future back home after a successful migration experience. Several scholars have examined the link between breadwinning, caring and respectable adult masculinity in Senegalese contexts, where men are expected to be the main breadwinners despite unemployment and lack of opportunities. Focusing on male Wolof transnational migrants in Italy, Sinatti describes migration in the Wolof context as:

... a valuable avenue that can allow caring for parents and siblings, moving in an ideal progression of manhood, and more broadly advancing one’s social standing […] a means for men to restore their role as economic providers and principal breadwinners, and thus reaffirm their masculinity (Sinatti, 2014: 221).

In this perspective, care, affect, provision and social status and respect is interlinked and demonstrated through monetary and material support to family members. The exercise of this socially legitimized and dominant masculinity ideal – or hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005) – revolves around taking responsibility. First for one’s parents and then for one’s own household in “a transition to manhood and in later progression towards more mature visions of masculinity” (Sinatti, 2014: 220) that ideally ends in becoming the head of an extended family. Migration, then, might make these different steps of masculinity possible through exercising economic responsibility, demonstrating how local institutions and patriarchal norms shape migratory practices and aspirations.

The image of (masculine) success constitutes a transformation of social class realized through migration. This transformation, however, often hinges on migrants’ differentiated positions within transnational social fields where “individuals occupy different gender, racial, and class positions within different states at the same time (Levitt & Schiller, 2004: 1015). As Nieswand (2013) has suggested, migrants’ performance and consumption of a middleclass lifestyle in the country of origin is
often financed by a working-class life in the country of settlement, perhaps in what would be considered degrading or shameful employment ‘back home’ and/or marked by social and economic deprivation. The image of the successful migrant is upheld through an ‘economy of appearance’ (Cole, 2014) and couched in ‘collaborative silences’ (Nieswand, 2013), however, where disclosure of the harsh realities of migrant lives is evaded by migrants, families and peers alike.

We should be careful, in other words, not to reproduce – or romanticize – overly instrumental understandings of migration as a guaranteed pathway to male adulthood or reify hegemonic notions of masculinity. Amongst the many risks is to ignore women as breadwinners, within and without migration contexts. Indeed, male migration often intensifies women’s provision responsibilities as remittances may be delayed, insufficient or not materialize at all (Kleist, 2017a). Likewise, we may overlook the fact that West African women have been migrating independently for decades, aspiring to change their life and future. Sabar’s study on West African female migrants who came to Israel in the 1990s provides an example. In the words of a Ghanaian woman in Tel Aviv: “I’m just like my sister and my cousin… there are so many women back home that want change… they all want something else. They want to work, save and get away… What kind of future do we have?” (2008: 463). Hence, while most of the literature on migration as social becoming and a pathway to a better future tends to focus on men, this pertains to women as well.

### 4.4 Changing Migration Aspirations

In as much as male adulthood is associated with migration, especially to western countries, these beliefs systems are transforming due to the continuous frustrations that potential young migrants face in their attempt to reach Europe. Here we should remember the relatively high proportion of non-migrants compared to the smaller percentage – 3.5% as a proportion of the world’s population – of persons who are internationally mobile (UNDESA, 2020). Likewise, we should keep in mind that the vast majority of West African migrants travel to neighbouring countries or within the subregion, rather than to Europe. Emphasis on migration, especially intercontinental migration, as the only or primary means to adulthood or success thus offers a one-sided understanding (de Haas, 2014; Massey et al., 1999). Terms such as “the age of immobility” or as “mobility bias” indicate a growing critique of the lack of analytical attention to immobility in the literature. While media narratives mainly portray a desperate desire of West African youth to reach Europe, studies have shown that half of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa do not wish to move to another country (Esipova et al., 2011; Setrana, 2021; see Schewel, 2015 for a study on Senegal).

Focusing on Ghana, Setrana realized that some young men and women who initially had the desire to migrate, after several frustrations, including strict immigration policies in Europe and North America, made personal decisions not to travel. Rather they adjusted to the conditions at home, and later described their stay as a preferred decision. She found that the (im)mobility processes involved families
and not individuals. For females, their decisions were taken with their families because they wanted their freedom and keep their business while the males also considered the exhaustive family responsibilities. One of the female stayers explained that her decision not to migrate is because she has control over her life in Ghana compared to living abroad. She said:

*My brother receives monthly salary of about 1,440 pounds. He is able to save about 900 pounds every month. In Ghana, it is difficult to save. One advantage I have is that I run my own business, employing more than five workers, so, even if I am not at work, the job still progresses. Unlike me, my brother, goes to work at 6 AM and closes at 5:30 PM* (quoted in Setrana, 2021: 16-17).

Despite the higher wages abroad compared to what this woman earns in Ghana, the non-economic factors are stronger causing her to abandon her migration decisions. Factors influencing decisions to stay are thus also gendered, be they economic or social.

Changing notions of the desirability of migration are also found amongst parents of and left-behind wives to Ghanaian labour migrants working in Libya and wives to returnees. Migration from Ghana to Libya is dominated by young men from rural parts of Ghana without much formal education who travel to send money to their families and save up for their future, working in construction, masonry or as day labourers. A few Ghanaian women have migrated as well to work as domestics and/or join their husbands but have been exposed to gossip about doing sex work and being promiscuous (Kleist, 2020). Furthermore, Ghanaian women’s overland migration has generally been discouraged because of the high risk of sexual violence en route.

Discussing the social meanings of young men’s migration amongst migrants’ parents and wives, a recent study found that “parents aspire for their sons to migrate either to attain economic success or at the very least to engender a recognition of the need to pursue economic success” (Darkwah et al., 2019: 27). This is in continuation with the notion of migration as a means to becoming a respectable adult and establishing one’s own future that has been dominant in these migrant-sending areas. Left-behind wives and wives to returnees did not share this view, however. Whereas migrants used to be considered attractive spouses and boyfriends, Darkwah et al. show that women express disapproval and a sense of discomfort with their partners’ (potential) migration, explaining that living apart “breaks the affective ties between parents and children on one hand and spouses on the other” (2019: 27). These findings thus indicate changing gender and family ideals, with more emphasis on co-habitation, accentuating that gender relations and ideals are not static.

### 4.5 Gendered Dynamics of Remittances

West African migration is thus closely related to gendered family responsibilities, as indicated above. In this section, we discuss how such practices are embedded in – or change – gender relations and ideals, considering different family structures and
kinship models in West Africa and their repercussions for a key motivation for migration: remittances. Whether migration takes place in the context of matrilineal or patrilineal kinship organization, in monogamous or polygamous marriages, or in situations of extended or nuclear families living arrangements, these set-ups shape how the relationships between different migrant or ‘staying’ family members are organized, negotiated and understood, including in relation to sending and receiving remittances.

For poorer families and households, remittances are a central concern from both sending and receiving perspective, imbued with meaning beyond the merely economic aspect (Hannaford, 2016; Wong, 2006). Here we need to take different models of family organization into consideration (Teye et al., 2017). Dominant discourses of gender ideals in West Africa accentuate patriarchal societies, characterized by male heads of households (or heads of families), division of labour organized according to gender and age, often with emphasis on men as main breadwinners, and long-term cycles of reciprocity that might span across generations. Such patriarchal norms and narratives have strong resonance with notions of men migrating to provide for their families while their wives and children (or parents, sisters, cousins etc.) stay behind. Certainly, such migration exists and has been historically dominant in many contexts – and might still be in some localities. Migration patterns are very varied, however, and an idea of men sending money to women as the primary mode of remittances is problematic. Rather, remittance sending and spending tend to take place along gendered lines.

It is an overall trend that women send money to other women and only rarely to men, while men mainly remit to other men as well as to their mothers, wives and sisters. Focusing on northern Ghana, several studies describe how female migrants in the southern part of the country – the so-called kayayoo migrants – send food-stuff, household items, and clothes to their mothers (or other female relatives) and remit regularly, in smaller amounts, than sons who would send larger amounts but on an infrequent basis, if at all (Abdul-Korah, 2011; Pickbourn, 2011; Teye et al., 2017). Pickbourn found that households where women are primary remittance receivers spends the double on education than households with a male primary recipient (2011: 74). Conversely, men would spend remittances on investment in farming, housing, and for younger single men, saving up for a bride price and more generally establish themselves in the future. In the words of a woman from northern Ghana:

The females send home [more] remittances than the males. When daughters are there, they think about their parents and buy things to support them. They support the mother with ingredients and support the father too. So the females are supporting more than the males. For the males when they are there, they wait until they are coming home before bringing money, but the females, while they are there, think about the family back home and support” (quoted in Teye et al., 2017: 15).

Such gender-divided remittance flows reflect a division of labour where women are in charge of cooking and household reproduction and men of longer-term material investment. However, this is not the only overall pattern. In polygamous families, both sons and daughters tend to “send all types of remittance to their mothers
because of fears that their fathers may use the remittances on other wives or children” (Teye et al., 2017: 4–5). Likewise, few women send remittances to their husbands, as they worry that their husbands would use the money on girlfriends (or other wives) or think that the man has the responsibility to provide (Teye et al., 2017: 5). Migrant men, conversely, usually send remittances directly to their wives. Yet, a study from Senegal shows that migrant men may also choose to send the main bulk of remittances to their mother, or even a co-wife, for them to pass on the money to the (other) wife, rather than remitting directly, a choice that might be interpreted as reflecting who the migrant trusts or values the most (Hannaford, 2016: 98).

Furthermore, there is a strong cultural emphasis on motherhood in matrilineal kinship societies, such as the Akan in Ghana where both men and women are supposed to support and strengthen their own matrilineal lineage (Adjaye & Osei-Mensah, 2008; Clark, 1999). While migrant men do support their wives and children, Akan “couples [in Ghana] typically maintain separate incomes-dictated by their lineage membership and responsibility-and make separate financial decisions” (Wong, 2006: 373) and maternal uncles traditionally hold a special responsibility towards the well-being and education of their nephews and nieces (Fortes, 1963). Such kinship organization may also shape remittance patterns.

Hence, while it may be an overall pattern that migrant wives do not remit money to – or share their income with – their husbands ‘back home’, gendered responsibilities and practices might change during migration. This and other observations made here emphasize the need for attention to context, change and different kinds of family units and kinship organization. It also reminds us that family relations and remittances might be fraught with different interests and potential conflict. As Hannaford accentuates, remittances do not only constitute economic transfers but also expressions of care and affect, taking on “intensified properties of meaning” (2016: 97) that may range from expressions of love and pride to conflict. Migrants’ inability or decision not to remit to family members – whether parents, siblings or children – might cause a sense of disappointment and even betrayal amongst recipients while migrants themselves might be ashamed of not being able to send enough money or stressed about untenable or unrealistic expectations to them (Hannaford, 2016; Wong, 2006). Such situations might be experienced as gendered, reflecting socio-cultural practices and family ideals of masculinity and femininity as mothers, fathers, daughters, sons, sisters or brothers etc. Yet, the predicament of remittance expectations seems to be shared by migrant men and women alike though it seems to be common that younger unmarried men send fewer remittances and/or prioritize saving up for their own future first or simultaneously.

The ability for migrant women to mother their children from elsewhere is an important aspect of remittances and care. Through social and economic remittances, the traditional role of women as caregivers for their children has been transformed. Despite the fact that traditional childcare is mostly shared among family members and fosterage is common, mothers are generally seen as the most important caregiver. Parents with children living apart from them use technology to keep in touch and care from a distance. Ghanaian migrant women in China, for instance, use mobile phones, laptops and mediums such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Skype and
Zoom to carry on with their childcaring responsibilities and to avoid being accused of abandoning their motherly duties (Kwami, 2016). They remit to pay for their children’s school fees, feeding, hospital bills and daily expenses among others. International migration may thus pay for school enrolment – if parents send remittances, that is.

### 4.5.1 Contested Expectations

We may speculate that with the intensification and diversification of types of migrants, modes of migration and migration destinations, women and men may face many of the same conflicts, expectations, and challenges even though these might still be articulated and experienced through gender ideals and gendered notions of (im)mobility and responsibility. Social class, educational background and exposure to racialization in countries of transit or settlement may be other factors that shape migrant experiences and remittances. Wong writes about Ghanaian women in Canada who had migrated with “lofty expectations: to obtain rewarding jobs, to work hard to support family members in Ghana; to accrue capital; and, eventually, to return to establish a business or to construct a house in Ghana” (2006: 366). Their expectations of a temporary and successful stay were often disappointed, however, as they ended up in precarious and labour-intensive jobs in service, manufacturing or clerical sectors, suffering downward social mobility and status loss. Likewise, they often struggled to send money to their families in Ghana and were faced with unrealistic expectations. A Ghanaian woman in Toronto responded this way in response to the question about family expectations:

> I have one sister there [in Ghana] . . . she expects everything. Because I am here, she feels that I have a job, like here you have too much money... And I told her it's not something I can do [remit] because even with these two children, I'm struggling. So it's not possible that I can take on her children and look after them. They think we just pluck money (quoted in Wong, 2006: 367).

Such frustrations are common amongst migrants who feel that their families ‘back home’ do not understand the many challenges and high living expenses that they be exposed to (cf. Kringelbach, 2015). The situation of the migrant above often applies to men as well but, in this case, the expectation of sisters supporting sisters might be invoked. Or, in other words, it is articulated and experienced through gendered practices and ideals. In Sinatti’s study of Senegalese migration to Italy a young man complained about the widespread expectations to migrants as a “a reservoir of wealth […] I hand out the dough and beyond this, I don’t exist”, describing himself as a “milk-cow” (2014: 222). While Wolof migration is generally described as embedded in masculinity ideals of provision, this migrant used the feminized image of being a milk-cow, perhaps expressing his frustration with a situation where provision is delinked from other dimensions of adult manhood, such as responsibility and decision-making.
For migrants with big provision responsibilities or faced with family emergencies, remittance responsibilities are stressful and the inability to support money to family members in need may be experienced as shameful and potentially damaging important relationships. A West African migrant in the UK explained the kind of pressure that compels him to remit home. He said:

I saw it as a duty to cater for my mother and besides, everybody expected a lot from me, so no matter what, I had to send money home once I was abroad, if not regularly, at least, at Christmas. You see, people just start imagining your riches the very moment you travel to the West (quoted in Kyei, 2013: 118).

Finally, we should not forget that just as remittances cannot be reduced to mere economic exchanges but form part of expressions – or expectations – of affect and care, migrants and their families ‘back home’ are not necessarily distrusting or belittling the challenges that their family members abroad may face. Rather, the point is to neither instrumentalize nor romanticize remittance practices and pay attention to how such practices might be reflecting – or articulated as – gender relations and ideals.

### 4.6 Gendered Dimensions of Return Migration

Like other kinds of migratory movements, return migration and reintegration are embedded in family and gender relations. In Setrana’s study of Ghanaian returnees from North America and Europe, the motive to join family at home was strongest amongst female migrants. About 60% of the female returnees mentioned family as their main reason for return; and homesickness was equally expressed as the second motive for coming back home amongst both women and men (2018: 21). The nature of return migrants’ gender orientation further impacts on their experiences with regards to decision making and experiences upon return, including how they may navigate socially acceptable personal gender views and positions (Arhin-Sam, 2018: 293). Indeed, negotiation processes may result in tension and relationship problems, with female returnees of the view that their male counterparts find it easier to find suitable partners. Women in Arhin-Sam’s study indicated that the men the female returnees met in Ghana were usually backward and they expected them to solely engage in house chores and other reproductive roles. Meanwhile, male returnees felt that potential partners wanted to exploit them because they perceived them as rich.

Return may thus cause renegotiations of gender identities, roles and norms that are intersected with class differences (Wong, 2006). In some cases, migration empowers both men and women, as they might have acquired more flexible gender roles than in traditional and patriarchal societies and through migration experiences abroad. Setrana & Arhin-Sam (2021) provide an illustrative example:
Ama, the 30 years old lady migrated to the Netherlands in search of a better life. In 2009, she decided to return to Ghana permanently. Prior to her decision to return ... she discussed with some of her colleagues to trade in electrical accessories, especially the unused electrical gadgets. With this agreement, she returned to Ghana in 2009 and since then, her friends have supplied her shop with these accessories. ... The business has expanded and employs other Ghanaians as well (quoted in Setrana & Arhin-Sam, 2021: 146).

Female return migrants may also face challenges in ensuring that their values and norms are perpetuated and enjoyed in a male-dominated environment though. Studying Ghanaian migrants in Toronto, Manuh (2003) has argued that they were enjoying favourable conditions in Canada, feeling independent and empowered, and hence with little inclination to return to Ghana. Their male counterparts, however, were more willing to return because of the respect and prestige they would enjoy back home. Similarly, Kleist (2015) has shown how male elite men have become ‘big men’ in Ghana upon return with careers in politics, business or as traditional authorities, reflecting notions of hegemonic masculinity and expectations to successful return migrants.

4.6.1 Deportation and Unplanned Return

Not all migrants have the choice whether to return or stay though. In the case of deportation or evacuation from migration crisis, migrants are forced to relocate without sufficient preparation that may result in social stigmatization and a sense of shame and loss of social standing for returnees and their families alike, if migrants return empty-handed.

Writing on young male deportees in Mali, Schultz (2020) describes deportation as a serious disgrace that erodes the life chances of young men and disturbs hegemonic masculinity ideals. Their untimely return leaves them in a situation of potential social death rather than the hoped-for embodiment of respectable and dignified manhood, such as marriage. Such situations may constitute social, even existential, challenges of masculinity. How the deportee handles and performs his return and post-deportee life has repercussions for the evaluation of his masculinity, however. Deportees might develop and draw on ‘emergent masculinities’ (McLean, 2020), highlighting the endurance and ability to deal with suffering during their predicament, even learning and growing from it.

Similar findings have been found in Ghana in studies of primarily male deportation and large-scale evacuation from the civil war in Libya in 2011 (Kandilige & Adiku, 2020; Kleist, 2017a, b, 2020). While some of these returnees were young single men, many were (also) providing for their families as fathers, husbands, or brothers, and some were mature men with extensive family responsibilities. In their case, returning empty-handed precluded them from fulfilling provision responsibilities, causing intense distress for returnees and their families. A man who was
supported by his younger sister upon his return remarked that “my family was expecting more of me […] and I was expecting to do a lot for myself and my family. If I remember that, I become sad” (quoted in Kleist, 2017a: 335). In the same vein, a wife to a returned migrant explained that her husband has become “depressed because he can’t take care of his own family” (quoted in Kandilige & Adiku, 2020: 12). Such utterances may both be understood as expressions of affect and simultaneous worry about the economic predicament that migrant families face. They thus reflect broader expectations about masculinity as well as very concrete economic challenges.

While much literature on deportation focuses on men, the experience female deportees is described as at least as difficult in the literature. In Cape Verde, female deportees may be subjected to gossip about promiscuous behaviour and sex work and generally judged in harsher tones than men (Drothbohm, 2015) while deported female sex workers in Nigeria are seen as tainting Nigeria’s national image, having “failed as the symbolic bearers of the nation’s morality and image” (Plambech, 2017: 2214, cf. Ratia & Notermans, 2012). Conversely, male migrants’ sexuality is not seen as a theme of national interest, an observation we also recognize from the wider literature. This observation suggests that migratory practices change faster than gender ideals and, in particular, patriarchal norms.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine gendered dynamics of West African migration, with attention to differentiated practices and how gender interconnects with issues of generation, family relations, class and status among others. Based on a review of anglophone literature, we identified five overall themes where a gender perspective is prominent: Feminization of migration, migration as social becoming, changing migration aspirations, remittances, and return migration. We have also identified a few gaps, as we indicate below.

Although much of earlier discourse on West African migration has been male centered, the chapter shows that women have always been involved in migration and mobility. What has changed, perhaps, are the reasons for their engagement. Previously, women have mainly been described as joining the migration trail as wives, sisters and daughters but, for at least four decades now, women moving for education, work, and other purposes has become a prominent trend – the so-called feminization of migration. This development reflects changing practices, norms and gender ideals; likewise, it might reflect increased attention to women’s agency, rather than their relationships to men. Furthermore, it is embedded in the transformation of local and global structures, including changing labour markets and advanced telecommunication that facilitates transnational practices, such as long-distance parenting. Yet, we have also shown that women’s independent migration is
still confronted with concern and preoccupation with women’s sexual behaviour, an indication that migratory practices seem to develop and change faster than patriarchal norms.

Despite the growing emphasis on women’s migration, the literature on migration as social becoming and adventure primarily analyzes migration as a means of achieving and performing adult manhood in situations characterized by few opportunities. Living in such situations also concern young women, however, and women are and have been migrating to change their lives and future, and to support their families. This observation calls for studies on women going on adventure and the gender and family dynamics that such migration is embedded in or constrained by.

Immobility constitutes another important perspective. The literature on involuntary immobility – and disrupted high-risk migration – also focuses primarily on young men, frustrated with strict migration policies and the high cost of migration processes. While important, this is not the whole story. The chapter shows that migration aspirations are in transformation and that some women and men abandon migration plans because they anticipate better opportunities in their home country than abroad. Social class is important to factor in here. Likewise, the appreciation of migration is changing amongst some migrant spouses who express a growing discomfort with their husbands being or going abroad. The idea of an all-encompassing desire to migrate is thus problematic and needs to be nuanced, with attention to differentiated and transforming migration aspirations.

Family relations are thus central in the gendered dynamics of remittances, as we show, challenging the tendency of reducing remittances to economic exchanges. Inspired by the affective circuits approach, we explore how remittances form part of gendered expressions – or expectations – of affect and care in families. This means an accentuation of a rich variety of practices: from conflicts and tension between family members to compassion and understanding of the challenges that family members ‘back home’ or abroad may face. Here a central point is that remittance practices might be reflecting – or be articulated as embedded in – gender ideals, such as notions of dutiful sons and daughters or good mothers and fathers.

Finally, we have discussed how gender shapes the experiences of and expectations to return migrants, in the case of both prepared and unprepared – or enforced – return. Returnees have to navigate socially embedded masculinity and femininity ideals, often related to provision, responsibility and adulthood. While studies of male returnees suggest that deportation may be experienced as a masculinity crisis, the situation for female deportees is at least as difficult and may be further aggravated by pre-occupation of notions of women’s (imagined) sexual behaviour while abroad. More studies of female deportees and the experiences of the families of deportees would be a welcome and much needed addition to the literature.

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Part II

Environmental and Forced Migration
Chapter 5
Climate-Induced Migration in West Africa

Joseph Kofi Teye and Ebenezer G. A. Nikoi

Although West Africa’s contribution to global climate change is very minimal, its geographical location and weak adaptive capacity makes it highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and variability. The livelihoods of people in the dry regions of West Africa, in particular, are adversely affected by increased temperature and fluctuating rainfall patterns because they depend on rain-fed agriculture and ecosystem services. Flooding is also a common climate-induced hazard in some West African countries. However, only a few researchers have examined the nature of climate-induced migration in the sub-region. This chapter examines how migration is used as a strategy to deal with climate change and variability in West Africa. While it is difficult to separate climatic drivers from the socio-economic causes of migration, seasonal and permanent migration are increasingly used by households to deal with climate change and variability in some communities in West Africa. Floods have also caused population displacement in parts of West Africa. While human mobility occurs in response to changes in climatic variables, migration is not adequately incorporated into planned climate change adaptation strategies being implemented by governments in the sub-region. This chapter, therefore, recommends that migration should be incorporated into climate change adaptation and development policies and programs in the sub-region.

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5.1 Introduction

Climate change has, in recent years, engaged the attention of the global community, in view of its negative impacts on livelihoods and sustainable development, especially in developing countries (Afifi et al., 2014; Mbiyozo, 2020; Wilkinson et al., 2016). The emission of greenhouse gases is largely blamed for recent changes in climatic variables, especially rising temperature and fluctuating rainfall. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2018), from 1850–1900 to 2006–2015, mean land surface air temperature has increased by 1.53 °C. Such an increasing trend of temperature is predicted to continue, especially in the foreseeable future (Foresight, 2011). While some regions of the world have experienced increased precipitation, dryland areas, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, are experiencing fluctuating and decreased precipitation (IPCC, 2018). Although sub-Saharan Africa contributes only 7.1% to global greenhouse gas emissions, its poorest and most Marginalized people are the most exposed to the harsh impacts of climate change (Rigaud et al. 2018; Mbiyozo, 2020).

While human mobility has, for centuries, been part of livelihoods in Africa (Mensah-Bonsu, 2003), it has become a major climate adaption strategy in recent years (Dreier & Sow, 2015; Teye & Owusu, 2015). There is enough evidence to suggest that migration is one of the most common and increasingly used strategies to cope with harsh climatic variations and natural disasters. Many of the environmental migrants (i.e. people who migrate in response to climate change and variability) in Africa are households whose livelihoods depend on rain-fed agriculture (Jarawura & Smith, 2015; Teye et al., 2015). Migration allows such households to modify their exposure to climatic and environmental stressors and thereby diversify their income sources when on-site adaptation is either impossible or undesirable (Bendandi & Venier, 2017). Thus, for families and communities that rely on livelihoods that are vulnerable to threats of climate change, migration forms a critical resilience strategy for diversifying income and spreading risk (Mbiyozo, 2020).

The West African sub-region has, particularly, been the focus of much of the recent academic and policy discussions on the effects of climate change on human mobility. The sub-region’s location, high dependency on rain-fed agriculture, poverty and weak governance systems, make it highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change/variability (Stan turf et al., 2011; IOM, 2021). Indeed, weak adaptive capacity in the face of recurrent drought has triggered low crop yields, food insecurity, poverty, and out-migration in the dry areas of West Africa (IOM, 2021). However, although West Africa’s population is considered one of the most mobile in the world (Romankiewicz & Doevenspeck, 2015), only a few researchers have examined climate-related migration in the sub-region (Van der Geest, 2011; Zickgraf et al., 2016). As a result, there is little understanding of the dynamics of climate-induced migration in West Africa and how migration is used to deal with climate change and variability (Afifi et al., 2016).

Against this background, this chapter relies on a review of the literature and recent studies to examine migration in the context of climate change and variability.
in West Africa. More specifically, the chapter discusses how migration is used as a strategy to deal with the ‘slow-onset’ climatic processes, especially rainfall variability and drought. It also discusses how ‘rapid on-set’ environmental processes, especially rainstorms and flooding, cause population displacement in West Africa. The chapter is divided into four sections. The next section is devoted to the conceptualization of the relationship between climate change and migration. Section 5.3 describes the climate change situation, while Sect. 5.4 presents climate adaptation strategies in West Africa. Section 5.5 presents empirical findings on climate-induced migration in West Africa. Section 5.6 discusses climate immobility, while Sect. 5.7 presents the conclusion and policy implications of the findings.

5.2 Theoretical Perspectives on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Migration

While it is generally acknowledged that climate change induces migration, there are opposing views on the number of people who actually migrate as a result of climate/environmental change. The IOM (2007: 1) defines ‘environmentally induced migrants’ as ‘persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad’. However, the relationship between environmental/climate change and migration is contested, with some scholars questioning the role of climate change in large-scale migration flows (Sow et al., 2014). For instance, Black (2001) argued that although climate change influences migration decision-making processes in the Sahel, it is not a major driver of migration in the region. Doevenspeck (2011), similarly, argued that environmental change is not a major cause of migration in Benin because, despite increased environmental change across the northwestern parts of the country, not all the affected households migrate. Some scholars have argued that while it is easier to attribute population mobility to ‘rapid onset’ climatic events (e.g., flooding, cyclones) which force people to flee, it is quite difficult to directly link large-scale migration to ‘slow-onset’ climatic processes, such as rising temperatures and declining rainfall (Renaud et al., 2011; Teye, 2017).

On the other hand, some scholars contend that a wave of environmental migrants may follow environmental degradation, including drought (van der Geest et al., 2010). According to Hugo (2011), environmental factors, including climate change, can be key drivers of migration, with their degree of significance being more often located along a continuum ranging from ‘not being significant at all’ to ‘being the dominant cause of migration’. Thus, the environment can mostly be considered a ‘proximate’ cause of migration, making it difficult to differentiate between ‘environmental migrants’ and others except at the extreme/forced end of the continuum. There is, however, ample evidence to suggest that the debates about the climate/
environment-migration nexus are not so much about whether environmental factors play a role in migration but the magnitude of their influences, given that several factors combine to precipitate migration (Black et al., 2011; Zickgraf et al., 2016). Recent scholarship has shown that a number of factors, including the type of climate shock, population characteristics, institutional capacity to ameliorate the adverse effects of climate change, largely determine whether or not migration will be adopted to deal with climate change and variability (Bendandi & Venier, 2017; Renaud et al., 2011; Teye, 2017).

5.2.1 Conceptual Framework

Based on insights from the literature, the conceptual framework used for the analysis in this chapter assumes that migration is a highly personal decision based on a range of complex and often overlapping reasons involving economic, environmental, social and political factors. This makes it difficult to isolate climatic drivers and accurately forecast levels of migration due to climate change (Mbiyozo, 2020). We, however, agree with the assertion of Hummel (2016: 220) that while it is almost impossible to isolate environmental factors from the complex interplay of ecological, economic, social and political factors that shape migration decisions, it is feasible to analyze the impacts of climate change on migration by considering the motive for migration.

Following Foresight (2011) and UN Environment (2017: 7), we assume that the decision to migrate is influenced by macro-level, meso-level and micro-level determinants (see Fig. 5.1). The five broad macro-level drivers are demographic factors (e.g. population density, population structure, disease prevalence), political factors (e.g. governance/freedom, policy incentives, conflict/insecurity), economic factors (e.g. employment opportunities, income and wage, producer prices), social factors (e.g. family/kin obligation, marriage, and seeking education) and environmental factors (e.g. land productivity, habitability, food and water resources). While these macro-level factors may create a context where migration is desirable, the final decision to migrate or stay is taken by individuals based on interaction of micro-level factors (e.g. age, gender, level of education) and meso-level factors (e.g. intervening obstacles such as cost of moving). The people who migrate can further be divided into two categories, namely those who voluntarily choose to leave and those who are forcefully displaced (not shown in figure). Those who stay can also be divided into two groups, namely those who voluntarily choose to stay (immobile) and those who are unable to move (trapped) (Foresight, 2011; Schraven et al., 2020).

The interaction between and among macro-level, meso-level and micro-level factors explain why, faced with the same climate change, some people may choose to migrate while others may choose to stay. The framework will predict that people who do not have the resources to pay the cost of migration may not move even if they are affected by environmental climate change. This group is said to be trapped. Relying on the entitlement framework, Teye and Owusu (2015) argue that, when
faced with slow-onset climatic processes, individual’s decision to migrate or remain are shaped by their endowments (rights and resources). They argue that persons who have the resources to adopt effective in-situ adaptation strategies, such as irrigation, may not migrate in the context of climate change. However, some level of endowments will also be required to embark on migration. We further assume that the nature of climatic process or event will determine migration trends. In the case of ‘rapid onset’ events such as floods, significant number of people in affected communities will be forcefully displaced but some will come back after successful recovery of the affected area. In the case of ‘slow on-set’ events, migration will depend on characteristics of individuals and ability to overcome intervening obstacles, such as cost of migration.

5.3 Climatic Zones and Climate Change in West Africa

While the climate of West Africa is largely tropical, it varies with location even within the same country. As shown in Fig. 5.2, there are four major climatic zones, namely the Sahelian zone, Sudano-Sahelian zone, Sudanian zone and Guinean zone. The Sahelian zone, which is located in the northern part of West Africa, is the driest part of the sub-region with precipitation ranging between 250 mm and 500 mm. The Sudano-Sahelian zone is also quite dry with average annual precipitation ranging between 500 mm and 900 mm. The Sudanian zone has an average annual precipitation between 900 mm and 1100 mm, while the Guinean zone has an average annual precipitation greater than 1100 mm (Emetere, 2017).
Generalizing about climate change and variability patterns in West Africa is quite problematic because important elements, such as rainfall and temperature, vary not only across the region but also within countries. Generally speaking, however, while a recovery of rainfall across the region has been experienced (Nicholson, 2005), most of the countries in the sub-region have witnessed fluctuating or unpredictable rainfall regimes (Heinrigs, 2010; Owusu & Teye, 2014). There have been prolonged intra-seasonal dry spells (Salack et al., 2016). The Sahel region is particularly very vulnerable to climate change and its weather patterns are highly unpredictable (Heinrigs, 2010). Indeed, high rainfall variability, declining rainfall and recurrent droughts are common features of the Sahelian climate, resulting in the arid and hyper-arid climate of the region. As shown in Fig. 5.3, the Sahel region experienced severe droughts in 1973, 1984, 1990 and 2012. The frequency of droughts in the Sahel, in recent years, has exceeded those predicted by climate models (Hulme et al., 2001). Within the Sahel, the Chad Basin is, particularly, experiencing drought. Countries that are outside the Sahel have also been witnessing declining rainfall. In Ghana, for instance, rainfall amount has declined by 20% since 1960, and it is further projected to decline between 9% and 27% by 2100 (Minia, 2004). On the other hand, since the 1960s, mean annual temperature has been on the ascendancy in the West African region. The Sahel region has, particularly, been witnessing increasing temperatures than any other part of the region. Fontaine et al. (2013) showed a significant warming of 1 °C– 3 °C for the Sahel for the period 1979–2011, which roughly corresponds with the trend we have established in Fig. 5.3. Since the mid 1990’s, temperatures have been above normal and increasing. Other estimates show that temperatures in the Sahel are increasing 1.5 times faster than the rest of the world (Gliessman, 2021).

The changes in climatic variables in West Africa are believed to be higher than that of global warming (Ezeife, 2014). The most concrete expression of climate
change in the sub-region, namely droughts, strong winds, floods, and heat waves, have impacted over 28 million people in the sub-region in 2010–2014 (Dreier & Sow, 2015; Zickgraf et al., 2016). Since 2000, high temperatures and drought, especially in the arid areas, have affected the livelihoods of millions of people who directly depend on natural resources (Gemenne et al., 2014). With the direct dependence of majority of its population on ecological resources for livelihoods, as well as decades of massive population growth, high level of poverty, food insecurity and chronic instability, predicted impacts of climate change could be dramatic for the Sahel (UNEP, 2011).

A livelihood security analysis, conducted by the United Nations Environment Programme identified 19 “climate hotspots” seriously affected by climate change (UNEP, 2011). These hotspots, which are located in Niger, Burkina Faso, northern and coastal Ghana, northern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, have significantly decimated livelihood security and exacerbated vulnerability among local populations (UNEP, 2011, Zickgraf et al., 2016). The effects of climate change in the sub-region include water shortage, crop failure and food insecurity (Mora et al., 2013; Sissoko et al., 2011). During our recent studies in the northern savannah zone of Ghana, farmers reported how unreliable rainfall is causing crop failure, food insecurity and water stress, as highlighted in the statement below by a farmer in the Wa West district of Ghana:

For some years now, unreliable rainfall has affected crop production in this community. Last year, we experienced serious crop failure as a result of unreliable rainfall. Many of us do not have adequate food to feed our families because of the poor harvest last year. Some of our streams also dried up and women have to travel long distances looking for water.
Consistent with the statement above, high rainfall variability and early cessation have caused increased food insecurity in Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal. Additionally, as a result of climate change/variability, coastal areas in the West African sub-region (i.e. from Mauritania to Nigeria) experience sea-level rise (Shukla et al., 2019), which sometimes trigger floods and erosion (Stringer et al., 2011). The IPCC (2012) attributes recent noticeable upsurge in natural disasters in West Africa to global warming. Rising temperatures, decreased rainfall, and sea-level rise are expected to continue to tremendously impact communities in West Africa (Bendandi & Venier, 2017) (Fig. 5.4).

Fig. 5.4  Annual temperature anomalies averaged over the Sahel region of Africa from 1970–2020 (data from the Climate Change Institute). Line equation $y = 0.027924x + (-55.519093)$. (Source: Authors’ construct based on data from the Climate Change Institute)

5.4 Climate Change Adaptation Strategies in West Africa

According to Afriyie et al. (2018), adaptation to climate change involves modifications to natural, societal, and economic structures in response to real or anticipated climatic inducements and their influences, which minimizes damage or exploits valuable prospects. In the literature, two fundamental forms of adaptation to climate change have been identified, and these are autonomous and planned adaptations (Bawakyillenuo et al., 2016). Whereas autonomous adaptation entails strategies independently adopted by households or individuals (usually farmers) to deal with climate change and variability, planned adaptation encompasses deliberate public agency strategies intended to reduce losses and or exploit benefits associated with climate change. Some of the documented in-situ climate adaptation strategies
adopted by farmers in West Africa include the cultivation of improved crop varieties; changing the planting date; irrigation; off-farm-economic activities; and new knowledge about early warning systems (Bawakyillenuo et al., 2016; Afriyie et al., 2018). In West Africa, many of these strategies are autonomously adapted by farmers.

The main reason why autonomous adaptation strategies are more pervasive in West Africa is the inability of governments to design and implement planned adaptation strategies (Gbetibouo, 2009; Teye et al., 2015). However, the rate of adoption of the autonomous climate change adaptation strategies is also very low, due to financial and technical constraints (Afriyie et al., 2018). For instance, while irrigation is one of the most effective strategies for dealing with declining and fluctuating rainfall regimes being experienced in West Africa (Bawakyillenuo et al., 2016), one European Union-funded study conducted in the very dry Upper West region of Ghana in 2019 indicates that only 0.8% of the over 2000 households surveyed used irrigation to deal with climate change and variability. The recent study shows that in some of the communities that clearly need irrigation for farming, unavailability of dams is a main barrier to adoption of irrigation. The lack of infrastructure for irrigation is a common challenge in various arid and semi-arid regions of all the various West African countries, including Nigeria, Mali, Niger. Our recent studies in Ghana indicate that, in the absence of dams in communities that are facing challenges of climate change, some farmers use diesel pumps to pump water from rivers, small streams or ponds to water crops. Some farmers also rely on small dug-outs with canals to cultivate crops. Farmers in our recent studies explained that both the use of pumps and construction of dug-outs are quite expensive and far beyond the economic resources of many households (see also Teye & Owusu, 2015). There are gendered dynamics of adoption of adaptation strategies induced by disparities in exposure, vulnerability, access to resources, capabilities and prospects, with existing peculiar communal conditions, forces and characteristics important for successful adaptation (Afriyie et al., 2018; Parsons, 2019). A research by Teye and Owusu (2015) in the dry coastal savannah zone of Ghana, for instance, showed that female farmers generally lack the endowments (e.g. financial resources, access to land) to adopt some of the effective climate change adaptation strategies, such as irrigation.

Recognizing the challenges faced by farmers in their efforts to adopt climate adaptation strategies, some West African governments and development partners have been designing and implementing a few planned adaptation schemes in some countries, including Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In Ghana, for instance, planned climate change adaptation strategies have been outlined by the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) (Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, 2012). The planned climate change adaptation strategies being implemented by the government of Ghana and its development partners include the introduction of improved crop varieties with short gestation periods, provision/rehabilitation of irrigation facilities in communities experiencing climate change, and training of farmers in off-farms income generation activities (see Teye & Owusu, 2015). The government of Ghana has recently completed the National Climate-Smart Agriculture and Food Security Action Plan of Ghana (2016–2020),
which provides a comprehensive framework for developing climate-smart agriculture in Ghana (Essegbey et al., 2015). In addition to the governments’ programmes, planned adaptation programmes are also implemented by international agencies in various communities in the dry regions of West Africa. For instance, UNDP has, since 2016, been implementing an Adaptation Fund Project, which aims to increase resilience to climate change in northern, Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana through the management of water resources and diversification of livelihoods. The European Union has also been funding the ‘Resilience Against Climate Change in Ghana project’, which aims to enhance infrastructure and technical knowledge for irrigation and other strategies needed to deal with declining rainfall and increasing temperature.

In situations where the in-situ adaptation strategies described above are unfeasible and or undesirable, migration is ‘autonomously’ used to deal with the effects of climate change. It is in light of this that some scholars such as Gemenne et al., (2014) and Zickgraf et al. (2016) have noted that climate change manifestations, such as drought, desertification, intense heat and winds, floods and rising sea level, significantly influence mobility patterns from and within West Africa. However, many of the West African governments do not see migration as an effective climate adaptation strategy. Consequently, planned migration has not been comprehensively incorporated into National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPAs). In fact, some governments even characterize migration as a maladaptation (Sward & Codjoe, 2012; Teye, 2017).

5.5  Evidence of Climate-Induced Migration in West Africa

There is enough evidence to suggest that, although it is difficult to isolate the role of climate change from other drivers of migration, both rapid- and slow-onset climatic processes have contributed to migration in many parts of West Africa. This section begins with an assessment of migration in response to rapid-onset climatic events in West Africa. This is followed by an analysis of the effects of slow on-set processes, namely drought and rainfall variability, on migration.

5.5.1  Effects of Rapid On-Set Climatic Events on Migration and Displacement

In West Africa, rainstorms and floods are the most common rapid-onset climatic events that drive people away from their usual places of residence. Floods are caused by interaction of climatic factors (e.g sea level rise and heavy rains) and human factors (e.g poor drainage systems and building structures in water ways).
Ironically, while drought is a serious developmental challenge in West Africa, *flooding caused by heavy rainfall* also continues to cause forced migration and displacement in the sub-region. Since the 1970s, drought events have been alternating with years of flooding (Schraven et al., 2020). The recent years of heavy rainfall (2007, 2009 and 2012) witnessed devastating cases of both flash and riverine floods which resulted in the loss of lives and property as well as displacement (Nka et al., 2015; Schraven et al., 2020). According to Schraven et al. (2020), the floods recorded in 2007 affected more than 500,000 in the 11 West African countries, namely Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Ghana. The rainfall-induced floods in 2009 also affected a total of 600,000 people in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone (Zickgraf et al., 2016), while the floods in 2012 caused serious damage to property and resulted in forced displacement in Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Ghana. More specifically, the 2012 floods affected about 260,000 people in Ghana, 35,000 in Burkina Faso and 20,389 in Togo (Schraven et al., 2020). In 2015, heavy rains caused serious flooding which led to the loss of lives, destruction of houses and displacement in West African countries of Togo, Benin and Ghana (Davies, 2015). Apart from floods caused by heavy rainfall, *floods caused by sea-level rise and associated coastal erosion* also leads to forced displacement in several West African coastal towns and villages, including, Dakar, Lagos, Lomé, Accra, Tema (Fagotto, 2016). Many of the West African countries continue to experience periodic flooding and displacement largely as a result of heavy rainfall and sea-level rise.

In Ghana, rainfall induced flooding has been causing displacement and forced migration in several parts of the country. The 2007 floods, for instance, caused serious damage to farmlands, livestock and houses in northern Ghana. The flooding in northern Ghana has now become an annual problem. Each year, the flooding situation is worsened by the spillage of water from the Bagre dam in Burkina Faso. As support provided by the government during these periods are inadequate, some of the affected persons tend to adopt both short and long-term migration to deal with the flooding. On the other hand, although government agencies sometimes issue early warning to communities about the possibility of flooding, many households are unable to move to safer areas because of lack of financial resources and social capital to do so. Further, as a result of lack of social support and social networks, some of the affected households who move initially tend to return to the flood prone areas, even when it was not safe to do so. An interview with an assembly member in northern Ghana clearly captures this:

> We need water to cultivate crops during the dry season…… [but] we are also sometimes affected by serious flooding during the rainy season…. When we get to the rainy season, the government sometimes gives warning that heavy rainfall may cause flooding. We [assembly members] also inform people about this but many of them don’t have any place to go… Even when people are evacuated from the lowlands experiencing serious floods, they return there shortly because that is where they have their farming lands. So unless the government is able to build houses for people living in flood prone areas, merely giving early warning to poor farmers to move to safer places does not solve the problem.
Periodic flooding, caused by heavy rains, has also been responsible for displacing people from some parts of the Volta, Greater Accra, and Central regions of Ghana. In April 2013, for instance, flooding caused by heavy rainfall destroyed property and farmlands in Agona East district in the Central region, affecting more than 1000 people. A majority of the affected people temporary migrated to nearby safer areas (Teye, 2017). In June 2015, the coastal regions, especially Accra and Central region, experienced heavy rainfall which led to loss of lives, destruction of some settlements and displacement in Accra.

In addition to flooding induced by heavy rainfall, some coastal regions of Ghana also experience flooding caused by sea-level rise. For instance, Keta, a fishing community in the Volta region of Ghana has been experiencing a sea-level rise of about 3 mm per year (Boatemaa et al., 2013). The coastline erosion associated with the sea-level rise has led to a 2.66 mm annual loss of the coastline (Schraven et al., 2020). In addition to implementation of the Keta sea defence project to reclaim land from the advancing shoreline, the government of Ghana has implemented a limited resettlement program which led to the relocation of a small number of households that were affected by the sea erosion. The sea water flooding and associated coastal erosion is responsible for internal migration in the Keta Municipal area (Hillmann & Ziegelmayer, 2016). Coastal flooding is also threatening the Senegalese, Togolese, Sierra Leonean, and Gambian coasts (UNESCO, 2012), with many port cities at risk of sea-level rise and displacements (Zickgraf et al., 2016).

Togo has also been experiencing increased rainfall-induced flooding which result in loss of lives, property and displacement. For instance, the 2007 torrential rain and floods led to loss of lives and the displacement of 13,764 persons especially in settlements close to the Mono River basin (Ntajal et al., 2016). Similarly, heavy rainfall in the northern part of the country, in 2017, resulted in flooding of villages bordering the Mono catchment and displaced 3612 people (Schraven et al., 2020). The floods, in June 2015, affected households in Lome and led to the displacement of 5000 persons (Davies, 2015). Togo’s coastal communities, such as the former capital city, Aneho, and dozens of surrounding villages, are also experiencing flooding caused by sea-level rise and associated erosion. The erosion which is currently eating away between 6 and 10 meters of coastal land each year has destroyed houses close to the sea and caused forced displacement (The New Humanitarian, 13th November, 2015).

Similar to the Ghanaian and Togolese situations, flooding induced by heavy rainfall periodically displaces people in Nigeria. The 2012 devastating floods, for instance, displaced over 6.1 million people (Zickgraf et al., 2016). In 2020, flooding killed 68 people and affected 35 states, 320 local government areas and over 129,000 people. Many of the affected persons have been forced to move from their homes (Ankara News, 2020). Key informants explained that while flooding, in Nigeria, causes short-term movement, some of the affected households also adopt long-term migration from flood prone communities.

Senegal has also witnessed periodic rainfall-induced flooding which forces people to migrate from the northern part of the country. In 2009, thousands of people were forced to flee their homes in villages in northern Senegal due to flooding
caused by heavy rains. Some of the affected households did not return after the recovery of the impacted communities. Other households were also assisted by the Senegalese government to resettle in safer areas (Schraven et al., 2020). In 2020, heavy rains caused flooding in 11 regions, resulting in the forced displacement of about 3285 people in the suburbs of Dakar and the department of Thiès (IFRC, 2020). Senegal also experiences serious coastal flooding caused by very strong sea waves. The serious flooding and coastal erosion have led to the forced displacement and migration of several households from the affected coastal communities.

Rainfall-induced flooding has also been responsible for population mobility in Côte d’Ivoire. In June 2018, for instance, heavy rains caused the flooding of some suburbs of the city of Abidjan. As many houses were submerged, 18 lives were lost and many people were forcibly displaced. Some people were forced to relocate to other suburbs (Schraven et al., 2020). Similarly, in October 2019, heavy rainfall resulted in flooding in six cities, namely Abidjan, Aboisso, Grand Bassam, Ayamé, and Man. About 12,900 persons were affected by the flooding which also caused 12 deaths. More than 612 people were made homeless and relocated to safer areas (IFRC, 2020). Sea-level rise and coastal erosion have also been responsible for displacement in coastal communities in the country. For instance, according to a report by Coulibaly (2019), the village of Lahou-Kpanda, which is located about 140 km southwest of the Ivorian capital Abidjan, is gradually sinking. In fact, its prison, hospital and school have already been subsumed by the waters. The advancing shoreline has forced some villagers to migrate from the village. The report noted that some villagers have even exhumed the bodies of relatives and moved them to other areas, for fear of their graves being lost to the sea, as captured in the statement below:

Today we live in anguish. What will happen tomorrow if no one comes to the help of the village? We will disappear.....In Africa, our parents, our ancestors are very important to us and to see them scattered in the sea is heartbreaking and every day that God brings to us we are haunted. (Daniel Loha, village elder, quoted by Coulibaly, 2019).

Benin has also occasionally experienced flooding associated with torrential rainfall. Flooding recorded in the country in 2010 led to the death of 43 persons and affected 360,000 persons. In 2010, more than 150,000 were displaced (Ferris & Stark, 2012). Benin has also experienced rising sea-level and erosion which cause displacement, especially in Cotonou and its surrounding coastal communities (Dossou & Gléhouenou-Dossou, 2007). Floods are also the most common hazards in the Gambia. In October 2020, for instance, about 32,952 people were affected by floods in the Gambia, with 13,751 of them being internally displaced (Tamba, 2020). Sierra Leone has also been experiencing flooding caused by heavy rainfall in recent years. On 1st August 2019, for instance, rainfall-induced floods and landslides in Freetown affected livelihoods of about 5381 people in Freetown. Some of these people were forcibly displaced while others migrated for short distances (IFRC, 2020).

Mali and Burkina Faso, which lie in dry zone, also occasionally experience flash floods which cause forced migration. For instance, in Mali, floods in 2010 and
2013 caused the destruction of property and forced displacement in Bamako. According to Floodlist News of 12 August 2020, the serious flooding recorded in July and August 2020 affected more than 13,200 people. About 5400 of the affected persons were internally displaced. The worst affected regions are Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso. Similarly, in 2017, floods which were accompanied by strong winds caused the displacement of about 30,862 people in the 12 of the 13 regions in Burkina Faso (Schraven et al., 2020).

It is important to state that while people displaced by floods and rainstorms could be said to be *environmental emergency migrants* who return to their usual places of residence once the affected areas recover physically and economically, there is evidence that some of the people affected by flooding do not return to their original homes. Most of the people displaced by flooding in West Africa tend to migrate over short distances within the same region.

Consistent with the predictions of our conceptual framework, key informants believe that increased incidence of flooding and displacements in West Africa are not only caused by climatic factors but rather an interaction of climatic factors (e.g. rainfall), weak system of urban planning, and poverty, as highlighted in the statement by a Nigerian researcher during an interview in 2021:

> In Nigeria it is true that climate change is causing population movements. Although people talk a lot about drought, flooding also causes forced displacement…. Flooding in Nigeria is caused by a combination of heavy rainfall and poor planning of our settlements……And when there is flooding, the state agencies do not promptly assist people to move from affected areas. So even if there is warning about more flooding, some poor people cannot move because they have no where to go.

As highlighted in the statement above, there are situations whereby some of the people affected by flooding are unable to move due to lack of endowments.

### 5.5.2 Effects of Slow On-Set Environmental Processes on Migration

Given that environmental stress produced by slow-onset climatic processes are gradual, migration in response to such changes tend to be voluntary (Hugo, 1996). As slow on-set climatic factors interact with several socio-economic, demographic, and political factors to shape migration, it is quite challenging to analyze their effects on migration decisions of people (Black et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011). Notwithstanding this methodological challenge, several researchers have reported cases whereby drought and rainfall variability have contributed to out-migration in West Africa.

Research has shown that as a result of weak adaptive capacity to effectively adopt in-situ climate adaptation strategies, such as irrigation and cultivation of high yielding and short-cycle crop varieties, rainfall variability and drought have been seriously affecting the production of climate sensitive staples including maize,
millet and sorghum especially in the Sudano- and Guinean-Saharan areas of countries such as Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Northern Togo and Benin (Schraven et al., 2020; Sultan et al., 2013). As a way of dealing with such climate-induced crop failures, food insecurity, and poverty, people in dry areas of West Africa have, historically, been migrating seasonally to other rural areas with more favorable climatic conditions and or to urban areas in the same country or nearby countries. As a result of increased rainfall variability, seasonal migration, which helps farmers to deal with lack of employment opportunities and food scarcity during the dry season (Romankiewicz & Doevespeck, 2015), has increased in many of the countries in West Africa (Afifi et al., 2014; Teye & Owusu, 2015). Permanent migration is also gradually increasing, due to worsening rainfall variability (Obour et al., 2017). In some cases, households send some of their members permanently to urban areas or areas with more favorable climate for work so that the migrants can send food and financial remittances back home to assist households left behind deal with food insecurity brought about by drought.

A number of country-level case studies have recently documented cases of climate-related human mobility in West Africa (Jarawura, 2013; Awumbila et al., 2015, 2019; Teye & Owusu, 2015). West African communities in the Sahel, which covers northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, Niger, and north of Nigeria particularly, experience drought-induced migration. The severe droughts recorded in West Africa in 1969–1974, for instance, resulted in mass migration from the Sahel region to areas with more favorable climate. Similarly, in 2010, about ten million people were affected by drought-induced hunger across West Africa, leading to mass migration from Sahelian countries such as Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Schraven et al., 2020). Studies have also shown that although transhumance of Fulani herdsmen from the Sahel to more favorable ecological regions has existed for centuries, the phenomenon has increased as a result of climate change (Teye, 2017; Tonah, 2000). Farming households are more likely to migrate due to climate change than non-farming households. For instance, using data from the Nigeria General Household Survey and the Ghana Living Standard Survey, Cattaneo and Massetti (2015) found that although climate change did not significantly impact the propensity for non-farm households to migrate, there was a relationship between dry season temperature at 23 °C and the tendency for farm households to migrate.

One of the most seriously affected areas in the Sahel is the Chad Basin (covering parts of Niger and Nigeria in West Africa and Chad and Cameroun in Central Africa). The Chad basin has since the early 1970s been marked by long period drought and rainfall variability, leading to crop failure, loss of livestock, water scarcity and migration (Schraven et al., 2020). The surface area of Lake Chad has shrunk from 25,000 square kilometers in the 1960s to about 2500 km². As a result of climate change, various resource users (e.g. farmers and herders) compete for resources, especially water. This has worsened farmer-herder tensions and interstate conflicts on the use of transboundary water resources (Williams, 2019). The combined effects of drought and conflicts lead to mass movement of people from parts of Niger and Nigeria as well as Chad and Cameroun which are located in
Central Africa. In a study by Afifi (2011), a return migrant explained how drought forced him to migrate from the Niger part of the Chad Basin as follows:

My family and I were farmers. Then the famine of 2005 took place. I used to have five cars for transportation, and I made my living from this. Due to the famine, I had to sell one car after the other till only one was left. I gave it to my son to work on it and left for Libya to earn money” (Quoted in Afifi, 2011, p. e114).

In a survey by IOM in 2021 in the Chad Basin, about 7% of forcibly displaced Nigerians and 3% Nigeriens cited reasons directly linked to climate change to explain their movement. The percentage of respondents attributing migration to climate change appears lower because, as Afifi noted in his study in Niger, most respondents tend to link their migration to poverty but climate change emerges as a cause of poverty only during follow-up interviews:

Most of the interviewees referred to economic factors, such as poverty and unemployment, as reasons for moving from one village / region to the other, or even moving abroad. However, when tracing the root causes for migration, results indicated that almost all of them have been influenced by environmental problems in their decision to migrate (Quoted by Afifi, 2011, p. e113).

After probing whether at any point in time environmental problems affected people’s decision to move, 90% of the interviewed migrants in Afifi’s study in 2011 had a positive answer. Similar findings have been reported elsewhere in West Africa where a significant number of survey respondents did not originally mention climate change as the cause of their migration. The respondents in those studies generally attributed migration to poverty and food security. However, when the researchers probed further the causes of such poverty and food security which influenced migration decisions, many respondents linked those challenges to climate change (See Awumbila et al., 2014).

Migration has also been historically used to adapt to rainfall variability in Mali and Senegal. Indeed, drawing on an interdisciplinary study in Mali and Senegal, Romankiewicz and Doevenspeck (2015) reported that temporary migration was one of several income generating activities being used as adaptation strategies to climate variability and economic hardship. Similarly, van der Land and Hummel (2013) observed in their study of Bandiagara in Mali and Linguère in Senegal that migration tends to constitute a key livelihood and climate adaptive strategy, especially for those with lower education. The researchers asserted that while increased rainfall resulted in the return of migrants to Linguère in Mali, its adverse effect on harvest increased the number of seasonal migrants in Bandiagara. Hummel (2016) further observed from a study of climate change and migration nexus in Mali and Senegal that 39% of respondents mentioned temporary migration during the dry season as a coping strategy. She noted that, although the manifold motive of migration cannot be reduced to climate change, there are indications that migration is an adaptive strategy for individuals and households coping with negative impacts of climate change. Hummel (2016) further demonstrated that in addition to other coping strategies, migration is adaptive strategy employed by individuals and households in both
Mali and Senegal to diversify income and minimize the effect of rainfall variability and associated crop failures.

In Burkina Faso, a majority of households and individuals have, historically, been adopting migration to deal with crop failure and food insecurity brought about by high inter-annual and seasonal rainfall variability (Schraven et al., 2020). An analysis of inter-provincial migrations revealed that although people were more likely to attribute migration to socio-demographic variables than climate change, climate-induced migration was pervasive (Henry et al., 2003). A recent study in Burkina Faso revealed that farmers generally perceived migration as a strategy for coping with increased temperature, wind speed and decreased rainfall in the last two to three decades (Sanfo et al., 2017). A significant proportion of respondents mentioned dry spells and drought as push factors of migration.

Rainfall variability also causes migration from northern Benin. For instance, a study of Bialaba migrants from Northern Benin to Nigeria revealed that a significant proportion of interviewees mentioned environmental factors, in the form of irregular rainfall, increased temperature, occurrence of strong destructive winds, and poor soils as drivers of emigration to Nigeria and other West African countries, such as Ghana and Ivory Coast, which have more favorable climatic conditions and soils (Dreier & Sow, 2015). A respondent in their study explained the economic importance of such climate-induced migration in the following words:

There are many people who emigrate. There are still more people who migrate in the dry season to work abroad and return afterwards. They go abroad to do agricultural work and return with motorcycles and building material. My children also went abroad, that’s why I have a zinc roof on my house. Many go to Nigeria at the moment. The Ivory Coast is a bit too far, but there are also people who go there. In recent years, many more people have gone to Nigeria in search of a better life, because the rain was not sufficient here (Quoted by Dreier & Sow, 2015, p. 3188).

The above statement shows that in some cases, climate induced migration contributes to improved welfare of household members left behind. Some studies have also shown that while three quarters of the reasons for migration mentioned by respondents in northwest Benin were related to environmental conditions for agricultural production, only half of the respondents directly linked their migration to environmental changes (Doevenspeck, 2011; Dreier & Sow, 2015).

Rainfall variability also causes migration in the northern and coastal Savannah zones of Ghana. For instance, Rademacher-Schulz et al. (2014) found that, in the Nadowli District of the Upper West Region of Ghana, a common livelihood strategy used by households with low capacity for economic diversification is dry-season migration to more suitable farming and mining areas. Although people from the Northern Savannah zone have, historically, migrated seasonally to the forest zone of Ghana in search of alternative livelihoods during the dry season (Jarawura, 2013; Van der Geest, 2011), human mobility has increased in scope and duration of absence as a result of a combination of climate change, population growth, improved transportation, social media and the role of social networks. About 24% of households in our recent study have at least one member who has migrated seasonally to urban areas.
Although relative to seasonal migration, permanent migration is not a very common strategy for dealing with climate change in many West African countries (Dreier & Sow, 2015; Jarawura, 2013), our recent studies in Ghana shows that increasing number of seasonal migrants are now staying permanently at their destinations as highlighted in the following statement by a farmer in the Upper West region of Ghana:

At first people used go to the Brong area to farm during the dry season, and then come back here during the wet season to farm here. However, as there is now longer period of dry season, some people don’t come back but rather stay there permanently.

The statement above clearly supports the findings of Obour et al. (2017) in the forest zone of Ghana where it was established that climate change is increasing the proportion of north-south migrants that stay permanently in the forest zone.

Despite the overwhelming evidence on how drought and rainfall variability cause migration, some researchers have argued that climate change is not a major driver of migration in some West African settlements. For instance, notwithstanding the peculiar patterns of migration in the Sahel, Black (2001) argued that it is logically flawed to conceptualize climate change as the primary driver of forced displacement, even if it features prominently in the decision-making process of migrants. Similarly, while van der Geest (2011) attributed the decision of people living in northern Ghana to migrate to southern Ghana to a combination of poor agro-ecological conditions at home and easy access to fertile lands in the more humid destination area, he still concluded that migration from northern Ghana is driven more by other socio-economic factors rather than climate change. His assertion is based on his analysis of data which indicated that, during the period of serious drought in the early 1980s, migration flows from the dry northern savannah zone did not increase significantly. Advancing similar arguments from a study of the Frafra of Northern Ghana and the Biali in Northern Benin, Sow, Adaawen and Scheffran (2014) concluded that mobility was used as a livelihood strategy when it could improve livelihood security, and that environmental factors (including climate change) may not be the most dominant drivers of migration.

Recent scholarship has shown, however, that wider socio-economic and political contexts may explain why climate change may not be a significant driver of migration in a few dry areas. Some researchers have argued, for instance, that the low level of out-migration from the dry northern Savanah zone of Ghana, during the period of serious drought in the 1980s, could be explained by the fact that the drought negatively affected both the northern savannah and popular destinations in southern Ghana. Further, as a result of the economic challenges and political instability in Ghana during the drought period in 1980, migration to southern was not appealing to people in northern Ghana (Jarawura & Smith, 2015). Additionally, political instability and poor economic conditions in southern Ghana did not make the place attractive to potential migrants. Migration flows from the dry zone to southern Ghana, however, increased in the 1990s when Ghana started witnessing political stability and southern Ghana became relatively more developed than northern Ghana (Gravesen et al., 2020).
5.6 Climate Immobility in West Africa

While the empirical findings presented in this paper clearly shows that several people have been moving from their usual places of residence in West Africa, in response to climate change and variability, there is enough evidence to suggest that some of the affected persons remain in the communities affected by both rapid on-set and slow on-set climatic events. For instance, as Doevenspeck (2011) noted, despite increased environmental/climate change across northwestern Benin, not all the affected households migrate. We have also demonstrated earlier that some households affected by flooding in Ghana and Nigeria are unable to move from affected regions because of the lack of endowments to embark on migration. While these situations of immobility have been neglected by researchers in many West African countries, there is a growing interest in understanding why some people do not migrate even when their livelihoods are seriously affected by climate change in the region (Walker, 2021).

In recent years, various terms, such as ‘immobile people’ ‘stayers’, ‘left behind’ and ‘trapped populations’ have been used to describe the persons who do not migrate from areas seriously affected by environmental/climate change (Carling, 2002; Mata-Codesal, 2018). Our analysis shows that the situation whereby people do not migrate from areas experiencing environmental stress fall under the two processes, namely involuntary immobility (i.e. the situation whereby vulnerable people are aspiring to escape environmental stress but lack the endowments to do so) and voluntary immobility (the situation whereby people choose to remain despite the risks posed by environmental stress) (see Foresight, 2011; Walker, 2021).

There is enough evidence to show that a number of vulnerable persons who want to escape environmental stress actually lack the resources to do so. These persons, who can be referred to as ‘trapped populations’ (see Black et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011) are usually the very poor, aged, and women who lack both financial and social capital to migrate from communities affected by serious flooding, erosion associated with sea-level rise and or drought. The case of 82 year old madam Ataala demonstrates this situation. She is a very poor woman whose one-bedroom house is located close to the sea at Keta, one of the Ghanaian villages experiencing sea-level rise, flooding and erosion. She explained how she is trapped in the following words:

I know where I stay is very dangerous and the water can, one day, wash both me and my house away. Some of the people who were living here have moved to other villages or higher grounds in Keta. I want to leave but where am I going to? I am very poor and even struggle to feed myself so I cannot buy another land to build a house in any community.

Some of the officials interviewed as key informants in West African countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ghana explained that each year, annual flooding affect a lot of people because they lack the resources to leave their houses built in flood prone area, as highlighted in the statement below by an official in Sierra Leone.

Early warning systems are ineffective for preventing casualties associated with flooding because people in flood prone areas know about the risks and some have expressed the desire to leave but they are constrained by lack of resources.
There is also evidence that during periods of extreme drought, some of the people who desire to migrate are unable to do so because they lack the resources and social networks. Some of the climate-induced migrants from Niger in the Chad Basin who were recently interviewed in Ghana reported that they left behind aged family members who could not migrate because of their ages. It also came out in some of our interviews that very poor households who lack resources and networks to migrate are trapped in areas facing serious climatic stress. In some communities in West Africa, such as northern Ghana, women are more likely to be among the immobile populations not only because of lack of resources but also because patriarchal norms generally do not encourage female migration.

There are also cases whereby people voluntarily decide to remain in areas affected by climate change because of spiritual attachment to the land. In the Keta area of Ghana, for instance, some of the individuals affected by sea-level rise and flooding reported that they would not want to migrate from these communities because their relatives (usually fathers and mothers) graves are in those communities, and they are spiritually attached to the land.

5.7 Conclusion

The discussion in this paper clearly shows that while it is difficult to provide figures on the number of people that are driven from their usual places of residence by climate change and variability (Foresight, 2011; Teye, 2017), there is enough evidence to conclude that flooding, rainfall variability and drought are contributing to increased migration flows and forced displacement in many of the countries in West Africa. Although the West African region is generally experiencing rainfall variability, episodes of torrential rainfall has been causing devastating flash and riverine floods (Schraven et al., 2020), which result in massive population mobility in almost all the countries in the sub-region. Additionally, coastal flooding and associated erosion caused by increasing sea-level rise have also been responsible for forced migration and displacement of people living in coastal settlements in countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire. Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Togo.

Flooding tends to produce short-term ‘environmental emergency migrants’ (see Renaud et al., 2011) who usually return to their places of origin once the affected places have recovered. In view of lack of endowments to permanently migrate from places affected by these rapid-onset climatic events (i.e. rainstorms and floods) and strong spiritual attachment to the land, only a few of the households displaced by flooding have migrated permanently from the affected areas. Many of the households who have migrated from areas experiencing serious flooding are those with financial and or social capital to do so. It is only in a few cases, such as in northern Senegal and Keta in Ghana, where governments have assisted a small proportion of poor households affected by flooding to relocate to safer lands.

The analysis further shows that while it is particularly difficult to separate climatic drivers from social, political, economic and demographic factors shaping
migration decision in areas affected by slow on-set climatic processes (Foresight, 2011), migration is a common strategy being adopted by households and individuals in dry areas to deal with the effects of drought and rainfall variability. We have demonstrated that in order to deal with climate-induced crop failure, food insecurity, water scarcity and poverty, many individuals and households in dry rural communities of countries, such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Benin, tend to adopt seasonal migration to rural areas with better ecological conditions to continue with their agricultural activities or to urban areas to engage in non-farm activities. In some cases, households have sent some of their members permanently to urban areas or other rural areas for work. Such migrants then send remittances back home to assist households left behind deal with food insecurity and poverty. We have demonstrated that although seasonal migration is more pervasive than permanent migration, many of the seasonal migrants are now staying longer at the destinations as rainfall variability continues to worsen.

Our assessment indicates that contrary to the general media narratives which suggest that climate change may be contributing to irregular migration towards Europe, many climate-induced migrants actually migrate over short distances to nearby rural communities where they can undertake their farming activities. A few can also undertake stepwise migration to urban areas. Interviews show that as a result of lack of financial resources and social networks, many of the climate-induced migrants cannot directly migrate to Europe and other developed countries. This explains why countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso, which are worst affected by climate change, are not among the top 10 countries of origin of irregular migrants arriving in Europe (IOM, 2020).

Despite the fact that some people migrate either temporary or permanently to deal with both rapid and slow on-set climatic events in West Africa, there are cases where some affected people stay behind. While policy makers tend to assume that people who do not migrate from places facing climatic stress have successfully adopted in-situ adaptation strategies (Teye, 2017), our analysis show that there are many cases where people are facing serious climate-induced challenges (e.g food insecurity and poverty) but are unable to migrate because they lack financial and social capital to do so. Consistent with the findings of Walker (2021), we have demonstrated that inequalities related to age, gender, and economic status interact with cultural norms to shape immobility. Women, the elderly, and poor people are more likely to be part of these ‘trapped populations’ that lack endowments to undertake migration.

While facilitation of migration will help to improve the wellbeing of such trapped populations, only a few National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) consider planned migration as a strategy to deal with climate change. This is because in view of their inability to plan for urban growth and provide infrastructure and services for the urban poor, policy prescriptions by West African governments focus on discouraging people from moving from rural to urban areas. In some West African countries, some NGOs have even provided financial incentives for young girls and boys who arrived in urban areas to go back to the rural areas. Although evidence suggests that a majority of climate-induced migrants move to rural areas to undertake
farming activities, governments are still reluctant to encourage out-migration from rural area facing climate change. In some countries, the governments and development partners even characterize climate-induced migration as ‘maladaptation’ (Sward & Codjoe, 2012; Teye, 2017). In view of these findings, policy makers in West Africa should be encouraged to incorporate planned migration into climate change adaptation programs.

References


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Chapter 6
‘Hanging in the Air’: The Experiences of Liberian Refugees in Ghana

Heaven Crawley and Veronica Fynn Bruey

The civil wars that devastated Liberia between 1989 and 2003 displaced an estimated 800,000 people internally, with more than a million people travelling to neighbouring countries in West Africa in search of protection and the opportunity to rebuild their lives. More than 15 years after the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, tens of thousands of Liberians continue to be displaced in Liberia, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire. Whilst some have been resettled – primarily to Canada, the US, Australia, and European countries – most have been left ‘hanging in the air’, living in extreme poverty, marginalised from mainstream development policies and planning, and unable to either contribute to, or benefit from, efforts to rebuild peace and security in their home country. Their needs, interests and aspirations have been largely ignored by academics and policymakers in the Global North whose focus, particularly over recent years, has been primarily on the drivers of migration from West Africa across the Mediterranean to Europe. At a regional level, there have been efforts by the Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) to provide alternative models of integration, particularly since the United Nations High Commissioner Refugees (UNHCR) announced the cessation of refugee status for Liberian refugees in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in June 2012. However, significant barriers to both local integration and Safe third-country resettlement remain. This chapter examines the experiences of Liberian refugees living in Ghana and their struggles to secure national and international protection in a context where returning to Liberia remains impossible for many.

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6.1 Introduction

Our lives are hanging in the air...no prospects, no peace, no hope.1

The overwhelming volume of voluntary and involuntary migration in or from West Africa is intra-regional (Awumbila et al., 2014; MMC, 2017). According to IOM, West Africa provides the strongest example of intraregional migration flows in sub-Saharan Africa, even in the context of increased migration to Europe, with 70% of migratory movements mainly linked to employment taking place within the sub-region.2 Voluntary migrations within the sub-region are largely informed by real or perceived poverty, poor access to employment opportunities and the desire for better livelihoods, structured along a North-South movement from landlocked countries of the Sahel region of West Africa (i.e., Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) to the relatively more prosperous plantations, mines, and cities of coastal West Africa (especially Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and the Gambia).

Whilst refugee movements in West Africa are not a new phenomenon, there has been a major increase in forced migration in the last 40 years with violent conflicts displacing millions of people in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Mauritania. The displacements arising from these conflicts are not always neatly aligned with specific countries but rather manifest in bi-directional ways. As a result, some countries are both source and destination for displaced persons. For instance, displaced Liberians live in Côte d’Ivoire and displaced Côte d’Ivorians live in Liberia.

For an increasing number of those forced to leave their homes, displacement has become protracted. The UNHCR (2020, 24) defines a protracted refugee situation as ‘one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country’. Based on this definition, it is estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (77% of the total global refugee population) were living in situations of protracted displacement at the end of 2019, with some populations displaced for several generations (UNHCR, 2020).3 Protracted displacement among Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is also a major phenomenon with at least 50% of IDPs displaced for more than three years (Crawford et al., 2015).4 Protracted displacement creates profound challenges for displaced individuals and families who struggle to survive, contribute to the development of their host communities, or send money to their families (Crisp, 2003;

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1Words of a Liberian refugee living at Buduburam Refugee Settlement for more than 25 years during a meeting with Crawley and Fynn Bruy, March 2019.
2See https://www.iom.int/west-and-central-africa
3The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given country.
4Unlike refugees, IDPs are displaced within their own countries and do not cross an international border. There were an estimated 45.7m IDPs in 2019, almost twice the number of refugees (UNHCR, 2020).
Long, 2011; Hyndman & Giles, 2016; Crawford et al., 2015; OCHA et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2018). It also undermines delivery of Agenda 2030, particularly efforts to ensure that ‘no-one is left behind’.5

Much of the academic and policy-orientated literature on the issues associated with protracted displacement emphasises the need for humanitarian assistance and/or ‘durable solutions’ – including through resettlement to the countries of Europe and North America. The focus has often been on those living in camp settings such as Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya, where the refugee population is particularly large, or from countries such as Lebanon and Turkey which are proximate to Europe and where there are political concerns and interests in preventing onward migration (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017). There has been much less research into the needs and aspirations of displaced populations living in contexts of limited economic or political interest to the international community, and/or those in which there are no immediate pressing humanitarian needs. The experiences of IDPs have been particularly neglected (IDMC & NRC, 2006, 2017a, b; Wyndham, 2006). The situation facing Liberians displaced in West Africa constitutes one such example. More than 15 years after the conflict officially ended, tens of thousands of Liberians continue to be displaced within Liberia, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and other countries in the region. Despite the peace agreements and arrangements for repatriation, a large proportion of Liberian refugees – including those living in Ghana – have been unwilling to repatriate or ‘go home’ (Essuman-Johnson, 2011). While the repatriation of Liberian refugees based in other West African countries have been relatively successful, the same cannot be said of Liberian refugees in Ghana (Dick, 2002). Whilst some have been resettled, primarily to the US – the country with whom the history of Liberia and the subsequent conflict in intricately entwined – most have been left ‘hanging in the air’, living in extreme poverty, marginalised from mainstream development policies and planning, increasingly dependent on remittances from those living elsewhere as humanitarian assistance has dwindled and ultimately been withdrawn. Those who remain in Ghana have been unable to either contribute to, or benefit from, efforts to rebuild peace and security in their home country. Those who have returned to Liberia have often struggled to re-establish their lives in one of the world’s poorest nations.

This chapter examines the experiences and prospects for Liberian refugees living in protracted displacement in Ghana. It draws upon a large body of research undertaken with Liberians living in Ghana for over three decades, much of which focuses on the Buduburam Refugee Camp, now the Buduburam Refugee Settlement (Dick, 2002; Omata, 2012, 2013, 2017). It was in Buduburam that one of the authors spent much of her childhood before being resettled with her family to Canada. Both authors subsequently made multiple visits to Buduburam during 2018/9 when they

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5The UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development – otherwise referred to as Agenda 30 – sets out 17 interconnected Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The aspiration is that the SDGs should be delivered by 2030. The principle of ‘Leave no one behind’ requires combating discrimination and rising inequalities, including those associated with forced migration.
met with members of the community to discuss the ongoing issues facing Liberians living in Ghana.

6.2 Conflict and the Protracted Displacement of Liberians in West Africa

The conflict that led Liberians to flee to Ghana and other West African countries began in December 1989 but had its roots in the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the formation of Liberia itself (Dick, 2002; Hampshire et al., 2008; Omata, 2012). The story begins in the early 1400s when the Portuguese erected the first European slave-trading post, Elmina Castle, in present-day Ghana (White, 1999). Between 1501 and 1875, an estimated 12.5 million Africans were forcibly migrated to Europe, the Caribbean, and the Americas. Liberia itself was birthed out of the need to address the perceived ‘problem’ of freed slaves being placed on the same legal equality with white people in the US following the abolition of slavery in 1819. Between 1820 and 1904 nearly 15,000 former slaves were returned from the US to the Colony of Liberia, marking a period of forced migration back to West Africa from the Americas. In 1847, the settlers signed a declaration of independence marking Liberia as the oldest republic in Africa. However, this did not mean that all people in the republic enjoyed the same rights and privileges. On the contrary, the former slave returnees – the so-called Americo-Liberians – who comprised less than 1% of Liberia’s population, ruled the nation as quasi-imperial masters until 1980, selectively manipulating the customs and traditions of the Indigenous Peoples to gain and reinforce their own control of Liberia’s land, resources, and people.

The consequences of this colonial legacy ripple through into its more recent history of conflict and displacement. The two civil wars that devastated Liberia between 1989 and 2003 were rooted in a power struggle between former slave returnees from the US and various Indigenous groups, most of which had been excluded from participating in the state-building and development after the country was founded. In 1980, Samuel Doe, a junior level Indigenous military officer, led a successful military coup and overthrew the Americo-Liberian regime. During his presidency, Doe gave virtually all positions of power to people from his own Krahn language group and maltreated most other Indigenous groups (Frontani et al., 2009), and several further coup d’état attempts in the 1980s led to widespread civil conflict throughout the country. In 1989, Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian formerly in Doe’s government, overthrew Doe from his base in Côte d’Ivoire. At the beginning of the civil war, Taylor’s regime targeted the Krahn and Mandingo Peoples who were viewed as Doe-supporters. This resulted in a civil war which lasted until 1996 when there was temporary peace that allowed for the 1997 elections. The elections resulted in

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*More at [http://www.slavevoyages.org](http://www.slavevoyages.org)*
Taylor’s victory but fighting continued until 2003 (Dick, 2002; Hampshire et al., 2008).

A peace agreement, Taylor’s resignation and exile to Nigeria in 2003, led to the United Nations declaring Liberia safe in 2004 and the onset of repatriation initiatives. However, the consequences of the conflict, as well as the longer history of forced migration, the violence, and the widespread inequalities with which the civil war was associated, linger on. By the official end of Liberia’s war in 2003, an estimated 250,000 people had been killed and around half of the country’s population of 2.8 million had been displaced. Approximately 800,000 – 1 million people were displaced within the country (Dick, 2002; UNHCR, 2006; Wyndham, 2006) and over a million people became refugees (Nmoma, 1997; UNHCR, 2006). The scale of displacement in Liberia reflects its use as a deliberate tactic during the conflict (Dabo, 2012). But the Liberian conflict is not only notable for the scale of the violence and the fact that the casualties were often civilians: there were also particular impacts for specific groups of civilians. Whilst its extent is contested (Cohen & Green, 2012), there is evidence that rates of rape and sexual violence against women and girls were very high. This violence was perpetrated by soldiers and fighters against women accused of belonging to a particular language group or fighting faction, or who were forced to cook for a soldier or fighter and were at increased risk of physical and sexual violence (Swiss et al., 1998). In addition, women experienced rape and sexual violence from within their families and communities. Stripped of their ability to protect or even feed their families in the war, and feeling emasculated, men routinely turned on women and girls, reasserting their dominance through the use of force. The sexual violence associated with the conflict ripples through into present day Liberia which has some of the highest incidences of sexual violence against women in the world (Jones et al., 2014).7

Meanwhile the UN has estimated that up to 20,000 children, some as young as six years old, were among both government and opposition forces during Liberia’s civil conflict (Child Soldiers International, 2001). Both opposition groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), as well as government forces which include militias and paramilitary groups, widely used children as soldiers. The use and abuse of children was a deliberate policy on the part of the highest levels of leadership in all warring factions (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Despite an extensive demobilization programme which began in 2004, the use of child soldiers has had long lasting impacts on the Liberian population, including refugees living outside the country for whom rehabilitation programmes are rarely available. These children, now adults, have ongoing fear, confusion and concern about their future, underlining the need for psychological and practical support to help them readjust to civilian life (Human Rights Watch, 2004). We return to these issues later in the chapter.

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Liberians began entering Ghana as refugees in mid- to late-1990, shortly after the outbreak of the civil war, choosing Ghana for its general stability, reasonable economy, and the widespread use of English. Others fled to different countries in the region including neighbouring Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, all of which experienced significant internal and external displacement due to conflicts occurring between 1991–2002, 2002–2004 and 2010–11. Liberians were initially brought to Ghana by air and sea, with navy ships and merchant vessels cooperating with the military branch of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring refugees *en masse* (Dick, 2002). As noted by Dick (2002), the majority of refugees represented the average Liberian, but a substantial number of the initial arrivals were younger, well-educated, urban-based professionals from Liberia’s capital of Monrovia or surrounding communities. By August 1990, the Ghanaian government had set up an ad hoc Committee on Refugees in response to the arrival of an increasing number of Liberian refugees, and agreed to use the abandoned church premises of Gomoa Buduburam in the Central Region of Ghana. Located in an agricultural settlement about an hour’s drive east of Accra, the Buduburam Refugee Camp served as a reception centre for accommodating the arrival of Liberian refugees. In September 1990, there were around 7,000 Liberians at Buduburam with a further 2,000 leaving the facility and self-settling in and around the Greater Accra region or communities nearby in the Central Region (Dick, 2002). A decade later, the number of Liberians living in Ghana had increased to around 42,000 living in three major refugee camps, the biggest of which was at Buduburam (Dick, 2002; Agblorti, 2011; Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017).

As noted above, the Liberian war ended in 2003 with the final ceasefire agreement between the warring parties and Taylor’s step down from power. Elections were held in October 2005 and, in January 2006, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as Liberia’s new president (and Africa’s first woman president). Since then, Liberia has been relatively peaceful but the task of reconstruction and the reintegration of refugees and IDPs remains considerable. The reluctance of Liberians displaced in West Africa to return to their home country needs to be situated within the wider context of peace-building in the region. This situational perspective includes the failure of civil society actors and international organisations to meaningfully engage displaced women and youth – for whom the war had particularly devastating consequences – into development and peace-building processes. Many Liberians living in Ghana simply to not believe it is safe for them to return (Agblorti, 2011; Dick, 2002; Omata, 2012). Other reasons given by Liberians for the decision to stay in Ghana include an unwillingness to leave their businesses or quit their studies in Ghana, a lack of capital to start life all over in Liberia, and the possibility of resettlement in US (Dick, 2002).

Moreover, despite the need for a multifaceted approach to protracted refugee situations, the overall response of policy makers remains compartmentalised with security, development and humanitarian issues approached in isolation. For example, when the *Accra Peace Accord* was signed in 2003, the Liberian government decided to close the IDP camps and to begin a national process of reconstruction and reconciliation. However, rather than considering the particular needs of IDPs
and returning refugees (many of whom became IDPs), the government prioritized
issues of youth employment and rural development (Shilue & Fagen, 2014). The
challenge of protracted refugee situations is therefore rooted in the dynamics of
fragile states: the prolonged exile of refugees is a manifestation of failures to end
conflict and promote peace-building whilst the prolonged presence of displaced
populations can itself frustrate peace-building efforts (Loescher et al., 2007).
‘Solving’ the problem of protracted displacement is therefore closely linked to
effective peace-building, yet those who are most directly affected by conflict – refu-
gees and IDPs – are often excluded from this process. The role of young people is
particularly neglected (Jones & Flemming, 2016).

6.3 Local Integration

A number of factors have undermined the local integration of Liberian refugees in
Ghana and help to explain why many still feel that their lives are ‘hanging in the air’
even after spending decades in the country. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly,
the Ghanaian government has never fully supported the local integration of Liberian
refugees, and indeed has actively encouraged and facilitated their return to Liberia
since the conflict ended, including forced repatriation in some cases (Agblorti &
Grant, 2019). According to Omata (2012), the Ghanaian administration believes
that any attempt by the government to integrate refugees will generate strong resent-
ment among the local population, especially if this involves the commitment of
resources from the host country. Because of these concerns, the Ghanaian
Government has been cautious about discussing the local integration of Liberian
refugees. Indeed, when refugees in Buduburam demonstrated against being com-
pelled to integrate locally against their wishes, the Minister of the Interior stated that
the ‘Government has not decided to integrate them [refugees] nor does it have any
intention to do so’ (Agblorti & Grant, 2019). UNHCR has also noted that ‘the main
challenges in Ghana are the absence hitherto of strong or indeed any government
support for local integration as a solution’ (Omata, 2012).

This approach is reflected in an emphasis on policies of repatriation and return. Although the gradual process of reducing humanitarian assistance to Liberians
began in 1997, UNHCR officially withdrew all assistance to Liberian refugees in
Ghana in 2000 (i.e., even before the end of the conflict) in the hope that this would
eourage Liberians to repatriate (Dick, 2002). Between 2004 and 2007, UNHCR
organised a large-scale repatriation promotion programme for remaining Liberians.
However, many Liberian refugees were unwilling to return to what was viewed as a
precarious political and economic situation in Liberia (also see Dick, 2002; Agblorti,
2011). Moreover, the resources on offer for the return to Liberia were very low.8 As

8 According to Holzer (2012), the repatriation package included a flight to Monrovia (the capital
city), a luggage allowance, some food and basic household goods and US$5 for transportation in
Liberia. Importantly, it did not include housing or substantial cash grants which would enable refu-
a result, the number of repatriates from Ghana reached only 7,000 during this three-year repatriation programme. Following threats to close down the Buduburam, again to ‘encourage’ return, a series of protests took place led by a group called Refugee Women with Refugee Concerns (Holzer, 2012). The movement grew over a five-month period, culminating in a sit-down protest and boycotts that closed the schools, food distribution centres and nightclubs across the camp. In March 2008, there were a series of raids and arrests by the Ghanaian police resulting in the deportation of 16 men to Liberia and produced a marked rise in tensions between Liberians and Ghanaians in both Ghana and Liberia (Essuman-Johnson, 2011; Holzer, 2012). Between 2008 and 2009 UNHCR launched another one-year repatriation programme for Liberians remaining in Ghana, followed by a further programme in 2012, this time coupled with the application of the cessation clause which meant that refugees who remained in Ghana lost their refugee status, the protection of UNHCR, and other privileges associated with being a refugee (Omata, 2012). Despite these efforts the pace of return has been slow and there are still thousands of Liberians living in the camp as well as smaller numbers from Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Togo, Chad, Rwanda, Eritrea, Sudan and the Congo.

It is against this policy backdrop that Liberian refugees living in Buduburam have attempted to rebuild their lives. Due to the presence of commercial activities undertaken by refugees, most notably small shops, and petty trading, UNHCR has described the Buduburam Refugee Settlement as an exemplary ‘self-reliant’ model (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018). The reality however is very different (Omata, 2017). Similar to other refugee-hosting countries in developing regions, Ghana virtually excluded refugees from formal labour markets and limited their engagement in commercial activities outside the camp (Hampshire et al., 2008). With little access to meaningful economic opportunities, refugees have survived by relying on mutual support networks and remittances from other refugees, in particular those who have been resettled to the US (Omata, 2012, 2017; Teye & Kai-dozi, 2015; Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018; Agblorti & Grant, 2019). Research by Codjoe et al. (2013) found that about 42% of the refugees interviewed receive remittances, mainly in the form of cash, from siblings, friends, and parents in the US, within Ghana, Germany, and Liberia. Around 20% of those interviewed by Hampshire et al. (2008) were receiving regular remittances from family abroad, particularly the US. In other words, refugee ‘self-reliance’ is completely dependent upon

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9 This time the refugees were promised a support package of US$300 for adults and US$200 for children upon repatriation, however there was an agreement among the refugees that the money was not enough to cover the costs associated with their return (Omata, 2012)

10 It is difficult to know exactly how many Liberians are living in Ghana because refugee status ended for Liberians in 2012 and the numbers are no longer recorded in the same way as previously. According to UNHCR, in 2020 around 2,000 Liberians were in the process of locally integrating in Ghana supported with renewal of passports and residence permits, however a much larger number have decided not to take this option for reasons explained in this chapter. More information at https://reporting.unhcr.org/ghana
remittances and has nothing to do with UNHCR’s initiatives to foster refugee self-reliance by withdrawing aid (Omata, 2017).

The consequences of this dependence on remittances are twofold. On the one hand there is a strong belief among Liberian refugees, particularly the young, that the only solution to their situation is resettlement elsewhere, the implications of which are discussed below. Secondly, the dependence on remittances have resulted in significant economic inequality between refugee households in the Buduburam Refugee Settlement (Omata, 2012, 2013, 2017). Whilst some have been able to eke out a precarious livelihood drawing on long-standing and highly developed social networks, there is evidence of deprivation and hardship emanating from high rates of unemployment and a lack of material support (Dick, 2002; Teye & Kai-doz, 2015; Omata, 2017; Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017). The situation has been exacerbated by the various repatriation exercises outlined above: the drastic reduction in the refugee population resulted in low sales of the household items that were the principal economic activities at the settlement (Hampshire et al., 2008). Those lacking access to remittances are therefore more likely to be pushed into risky and illegal livelihood strategies (Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017).

In addition to these economic inequalities, there are also inequalities between Liberian refugees associated with gender and age. These inequalities mirror the experiences of women and youth during the Liberian civil war outlined above. Gender-related violence and discrimination associated with conflict can undermine the ability of women to secure access to education, employment, and training and, in turn, their ability to integrate. As noted above, there is evidence of escalating violence against women and girls in Liberia (Jones et al., 2014). Rape, along with other forms of sexual violence, was often used during the war to terrorise, punish, and control the civilian population, thereby destroying the fabric of society and leaving its victims with enduring physical, emotional and social scars (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2011). But rape and sexual violence preceded the conflict and continues beyond it. It reflects the use of violence within Liberian society as a means of sustaining patriarchy, reflected in an intricate network of normative systems that reinforce the marginalisation of Liberian women, including those who now live in Ghana. In this context, it is critically important to understand how displacement transforms, or reinforces, existing gendered roles and identities and, in turn, the implications for access to education, training and employment for displaced Liberian women and girls (Boeteng, 2009, 2010; Yacob-Haliso, 2011; Omata, 2012, 2013).

Research on children and youth meanwhile suggests, in addition to the mental health impacts of the war on children forced to participate as soldiers, intergenerational relationships within the Liberian refugee community have been fundamentally ruptured by both the conflict and the experience of being displaced. Research by Hampshire et al. (2008) includes accounts of inter-generational role reversals within the household, in which children were now providing for parents, rather than the other way round, with elders becoming increasingly dependent on youth incomes for their own survival. According to the authors, it is not just perceived economic role reversals that have led, in the refugees’ view, to a breakdown of intergenerational relations of authority and respect. Experience of the conflict itself has
played an important role. Involvement of young people in the war (as described above) is seen to have contributed to changes in their relations with elders. ‘This has happened because of the war,’ said one old man, ‘The younger people don’t respect the older people. In the war, there were child soldiers commanding adults.’ This theme was echoed by other older people. ‘During the war, children had guns, so they had power over older people,’ explained one elderly man (Hampshire et al., 2008, 31).

Among Liberians living in Buduburam then, there is a sense that life is not as it should be, that the disruption and violence, poverty and marginalisation associated with the war in their home country continues even in Ghana. Liberians’ feelings of belonging and certainties about their future are further undermined by media framing of the issues, tensions with the local population and xenophobia (Frontani et al., 2009). The initial response of Ghanaians to the plight of the relatively well-educated Liberians was, according to Dick (2002), ‘quite warm and welcoming’, with Ghanaian churches, families, and concerned individuals offered food, clothing, transportation or rented rooms or leased properties for reduced fees to assist refugees. Over time, however, the ways in which the impacts of the arrival of the Liberians have come to be viewed by the host community in Buduburam is mixed (Codjoe et al., 2013). On the one hand, some people contend that refugees have increased the costs of goods and services, brought pressure on facilities, increased social vices and deteriorated environmental resources. At the same time however, refugees are viewed as a source of income and market, and trade partners, who have brought considerable infrastructural developments to the area which was previously remote from Accra and primarily agricultural.

That said, some Ghanaian sellers view Liberian traders as competitors and therefore do not allow them to trade without paying entry fees (Agblorti, 2011; Dick, 2002). Even refugees who manage to meet this condition are discriminated against as many Ghanaians do not buy from them (Omata, 2012). Additionally, the perception among some Ghanaians that the refugees are better-off than Ghanaians in the camp neighbourhood as a result of remittances sent from abroad has stimulated reluctance among the locals to purchase from the refugees (Omata, 2012). In this context it is perhaps not surprising that many Liberian refugees do not view local integration as a solution for their future, actively opposing it or refusing to engage with it, for example by not learning one of the main local languages (Twi) or developing relationships with Ghanaians. Moreover, according to Byrne (2013), the composition of Liberian identity also appears to play a prominent role in fostering opposition to local integration. Many Liberians define their identity in ethnocultural terms, placing heavy emphasis on nativity, bloodlines, and cultural practices as central to being a Liberian. These very exclusive conceptions of identity make it difficult for them to imagine how they would adapt to a different society, even with the proper legal documents and language skills, and lead many Liberians to believe that they can only rebuild their lives elsewhere.
6.4 Resettlement to the United States

The resettlement regime, a complex international framework which provides differential protection to individuals based on various categories, is rooted in the aftermath of the Second World War (Karatani, 2005). Like many United Nations agencies, the primary goal of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) created in 1943, which later transformed into the UNHCR in 1950, was to respond to displacement in Europe caused by the war (Elie, 2010). Thus, with the US taking the lead with the Displacement Act 1948, more than a million refugees were resettled from Europe (UNHCR, 2019). Yet, the challenges to the resettlement of displaced peoples remain visibly persistent with anything but durable solutions (Asgary, 2018; Esses et al., 2017). Over the years, the Bureau of Population Resettlement and the Office of Refugee Resettlement has expanded refugee resettlement to the US well beyond the boundaries of Europe to include Liberian refugees even with these challenges (Hadley & Sellen, 2006).

The history of the resettlement of Liberians to the US is incomplete without returning to the contextual twists and turns observed within the forced migration of Africans during the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the consequential transition of Liberia from a colonised nation to an independent state. Liberia, derived from the word Liberty, set out to be an asylum for refugees from the United States ‘…debarred by law from all rights and privileges…of a country which gave [them] no protection.’

On the contrary, the aim of the Liberia Declaration of Independence 1847 to welcome Africans fleeing prosecution from slave owners in the US is still thwarted by on-going challenges of violent conflict, political rift, and socio-economic problems.

As noted above, for nearly 400 years, a total of 34,087 deadly voyages forcibly displaced 12.5 million Africans to the Americas, Europe and the Caribbean (Fynn Bruey, 2016). This infamous migratory path provides the basis for the founding of the Republic of Liberia and subsequently influences the state of Liberian refugee resettlement to the US today. Since the creation of the Liberian state in 1847, Liberians have come to conceptualise and practicalise their existence as ‘small America’ or America’s stepchild (Bright, 2002). In the past 30 years, Liberian refugees in Ghana crystallised their protracted ‘hanging in the air’ displacement by believing that their resettlement to the US is their God-given right because of the unique historical connection between the two countries (Holzer, 2012; Fee, 2021).

The harsh reality however, is that both the annual refugee resettlement ceiling in the US and actual refugee admissions have fallen drastically over the last four decades (UNHCR, 2021; Rosenberg, 2018; Times, 2017; Goździak, 2021; Elacretaz et al., 2016).

For instance, the number of refugees admitted to the US in 1980 (i.e., 207,116) was 18 times higher than those granted admission in 2020 (i.e. 11,841) (Migration...
Policy Institute, 2013). For the year 2021, the refugee resettlement ceiling was set at 15,000, the lowest since the US refugee admissions program began in 1980 (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). With this reduction, it is only logical to see a corresponding decrease in the number of Liberian refugees resettled to the US within the same time. Between 1992 and 2004, an estimated 23,500 Liberian refugees who fled the civil war were resettled in the US (Weine et al., 2011; Browne, 2006). Although a meagre 2% of the approximately one million that were displaced in neighbouring countries across West Africa between 1990 and 2003, the number of Liberians resettled in the US in this time frame is nearly twice as much as the 14,996 African American settler-colonist returnees who sought asylum on the Grain Coast between 1807 and 1866 (Brown, 1980; Murdza Jr., 1975; Shick, 1971).

Tens of thousands of Liberians already living in the US prior to the inception of the civil war in 1989 who had temporary status (e.g. students and visitors) still do not have permanent status today (Kerwin & Nicholson, 2020). On 20 December 2019, the US Congress enacted the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, which provides an opportunity for Liberians with temporary status to obtain lawful permanent resident status (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2021). That being said, the sticky situation for displaced Liberians currently residing in Ghana, some without any legal protection, is that the chances of being resettled in the US are slimmer than ever (Ludwig, 2016). As such, the last 30 years of precarity accentuates the suspension of those ‘hanging in the air’, which compels them to either locally integrate or return to Liberia.

6.5 Returning to Liberia

For those displaced within, or returning to, Liberia, life is equally difficult. Whilst the situation has improved considerably since the peace agreement was signed in 2003, Liberia remains fragile (Essuman-Johnson, 2011; UNHCR, 2019). Many Liberian refugees do not believe that they will be economically secure in Liberia even whilst living in relative poverty and marginalisation in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. According to the World Food Programme, Liberia ranks 182nd of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2015). The country’s national infrastructure and basic social services were destroyed during the conflict and have not been rebuilt. An estimated 64% of Liberians live below the poverty line, of whom 1.3 million live in extreme poverty (Omata & Takahashi, 2016). Social safety nets are poorly developed. Agricultural production has improved since the end of the war, but the country still depends on food imports and is vulnerable to economic shocks. Agricultural markets are poorly integrated, especially in rural areas, exacerbating food insecurity, which affects 41% of the population.

At the same time, rural-urban displacement is on the rise. More than half of the country’s population lives in Monrovia with associated overcrowding. The high density of Monrovia’s population, in part, explains the disproportionate focus of a century-old, centralised government on public and private socio-political
development of the country’s urban capital whilst neglecting and depriving the remaining rural communities of similar investment. Access to basic amenities including health education, housing, and employment is limited for at least 60% of the population. Data compiled from the Liberia Population and Housing Census in 2008 shows that for the entire population of 4.3 million people at that time there were just 117 licensed medical doctors (upgraded to 298 for a 4.5 million population in 2016) (Fynn Bruey, 2019a) and 375 registered nurses, 24 hospitals, and 316 community health clinics (Fynn Bruey, 2019b).

This situation was exacerbated by the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic, which forced the Liberian government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus. Liberia was the Ebola outbreak’s hardest hit country with 10,666 cases and 4,806 deaths. There is evidence that women face additional hardships (Yacob-Haliso, 2011). The Global Fund for Women suggests 75% of those who died from Ebola were women, with past studies revealing that a mortality rate among pregnant women was probably as high as 93.3%. Of the 184 health workers who died, nurses and nursing aids (mostly females) accounted for the highest proportion (35%) of the 810 Ebola health worker cases reported by mid-August 2014 (Fynn Bruey, 2019a). For a country with relatively low number of health professionals, 35% is brutally high.

In addition to economic concerns, many Liberians do not feel that it is safe to return: the history of the conflict and the deep underlying tensions between different groups cannot easily be addressed and the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have yet to be implemented (Fynn Bruey, 2016, 2017). Other forms of violence and insecurity are also prevalent. As noted earlier in this chapter, women and girls were subject to gender-specific violations during the conflict (Liebling-Kalifani et al., 2011), and there is ongoing – and escalating – violence and discrimination against girls and women both within Liberia and within Liberian communities living elsewhere (Government of Liberia, 2011; Jones et al., 2014; Fynn Bruey, 2016).

Liberia is still in its post-war recovery state where, until 2017, there was no comprehensive mental health program established for survivors including hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants (Fynn Bruey, 2019b). Ex-combatants, many of whom were children when they were recruited into armed groups, have not been properly rehabilitated as the country has no mental or psychological institutions to deal with the trauma caused by the war, and the part they played within it. Warlords and alleged war criminals have not been prosecuted, with some having key roles in the national government, the judiciary, and the legislature. All of this continues to undermine genuine peace and stability in Liberia.

Whilst reintegration programmes were introduced in Liberia as early as 2004 in an effort to address these challenges, several studies point to underfunding, lack of sustainability, and limited impact (Yacob-Haliso, 2011). For example, a 2015 World Bank study underlines the failure to provide continued support to Liberian returnees after their repatriation (Harild et al., 2015). According to the authors, the level of support was already being phased out even as the number of returnees was increasing. An assessment of the economic reintegration of returnees in Liberia through
two training programmes in 2016 shows that the interventions were inadequate for enabling them to build successful economic livelihoods, mainly due to the limited access to financial capital (Omata & Takahashi, 2016). In practice, the process of reintegration, including the construction of new livelihoods, is largely influenced by returnees’ asset conditions, and in particular, access to social networks in Liberia (Omata, 2011).

Despite this, Liberia is one of the countries that has received a significant number of refugee returnees in recent years: 2012 witnessed a surge in the number of returnees with more than 155,000 Liberians returning through UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation programme after the cessation clause was invoked (Palmisano & Momodu, 2013, Omata, 2017; Omata & Takahashi, 2016). Since that time, however, the pace of return has slowed considerably, in part because the level of assistance to returnees has been extremely limited, mainly due to budgetary and capacity constraints. In addition to the limited capacity of the Liberian government and its economy noted above, returnees faced specific challenges in their economic reintegration. For example, while some returnees benefited from vocational training provided by aid organisations during their exile, these programmes were not necessarily designed for the demands of labour markets in Liberia (Omata & Takahashi, 2016). Meanwhile tens of thousands of Liberians continue to be internally displaced, many living in slums around Monrovia, a capital city built to house only a third of the country’s population.

These difficult living conditions for returnees to Liberia have now been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic (Grant, 2020; World Health Organization, 2020). Despite this, as the old adage goes, ‘home is home’ (Antwi-Boeteng & Braimah, 2020). It is seldom mentioned but is worth noting that Liberia is a country of immigrants. The three major linguistic groups found on the western coast of Africa, which now includes present day Liberia, migrated from the Niger River and Sudan at different times, prior to Europeans arrival (Beyan, 1995). Today, Liberia’s population is a mélange of indigenous Liberians originating from it three major linguistic groups; former slave settler-colonist returnees who sought refuge from the US in the 1800–1900s, Congo-recaptives (or Congoes) rescued by the American navy ships when they were *en route* from Africa to be sold as slaves (Fynn Bruery, 2016) and a host of other foreign nationals which make up 20% of the population, including refugees and undocumented migrants (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2017).

### 6.6 Conclusions

It is clear from the evidence presented in this chapter that more than 15 years after the *Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement* was signed, tens of thousands of Liberians continue to be left ‘hanging in the air’ in Ghana and other countries of West Africa. Whilst some have been resettled – primarily to Canada, the US, Australia and European countries – most live in extreme poverty, marginalised from
mainstream development policies and planning, and unable to either contribute to, or benefit from, efforts to rebuild peace and security in their home country. Local integration and return in the context of protracted displacement are often conceptualised as mutually exclusive. In reality, the ability of displaced populations to integrate into their host communities – or reintegrate in the context of return – is contingent upon the existence of opportunities for refugees to develop skills and capabilities to build sustainable livelihoods and deal with the emotional ‘fall out’ of conflict and displacement.

Ideally, the Liberian refugees who have chosen to stay in Ghana will eventually integrate into Ghanaian society. Indeed, many have already done so. Their arrival rapidly transformed Buduburam into an urban centre, with booming informal economic activities albeit with an inadequate socio-economic infrastructure, a key feature of urban slums. The boundary of the settlement has never been defined clearly. Over time, and especially with the end of formal service provision by UNHCR in 2012, refugees have moved beyond the original site and now co-exist with local villagers in these extended areas (Agblorti & Grant, 2019). Those visiting or travelling through Buduburam would not know it was a refugee camp were it not for the occasional faded UNHCR signs.

But the Liberians with whom we spoke, and whose views and perspectives have been captured by numerous research projects over the years, do not feel integrated. Many of them told us that they feel different from the communities among whom they live – culturally, linguistically and in terms of their shared history of conflict and violence. And, they are still waiting, for something, anything, that will improve the day-to-day quality of their lives and the longer-term prospects for them and their children. For some, the enduring hope remains resettlement to the US, even though that hope flies in the face or what is likely or possible given the reluctance on the part of the international community to step up to their obligations, despite deep and enduring connections between countries of origin and resettlement, in this case Liberia and the US. In this context, we conclude with three policy suggestions which we believe would go some way towards ensuring that Liberians are not left ‘hanging in the air’ for even longer than they have been already.

Firstly, and most importantly, Ghana government’s official policy on non-recognition of Liberian refugees requires reconsideration (Antwi-Boeteng & Braimah, 2020). To date, the Ghanaian government and the Liberian government have not developed a clear strategy or joint force in dealing with the situation (Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2015). In June 2012, nearly a decade after the ceasefire agreement in Liberia, the Cessation Clause was invoked for Liberian refugees which meant that they were effectively no longer able to avail themselves of international protection or access humanitarian assistance provided by UNHCR and other international organisations. Liberian refugees living in Ghana were left with two options: either to repatriate by the end of June 2012 before the invocation of the Cessation Clause, or to remain in Ghana through an agreement that existed among the member countries of ECOWAS to allowing them to live and work in the ECOWAS region, initially on a two-year basis (Omata, 2016). However, as Omata (2016, 11) suggests, ‘[s]ubstituting the label of “economic migrant” for that of “refugee” is not a real
alternative to a durable solution. It is a “quasi-solution” that serves to conceal the failure of the global refugee regime to deal with the challenges of former refugees who have been left with ambiguous migrant status and little attention from the international community’. Not only have Liberians been unable to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the ECOWAS passport because of their limited resources, but the structural barriers to their integration, including xenophobia, remain. Since it is apparent that many Liberian refugees will continue to live in Ghana, a new approach is needed (Antwi-Boeteng & Braimah, 2020). This should focus on ensuring that Liberians have the option of permanent residency or citizenship in order that they feel part of Ghanaian society. Whilst some may be unwilling to take this up because they wish to preserve their national identity (Byrne, 2013), or do not want to give up the possibility of resettlement, it should none the less be offered. This would reduce the perception of Liberian refugees that they have less opportunities than Ghanaians and help counter negative public attitudes by providing access to rights.

Secondly, it is important to develop a holistic assessment of the needs, interests and aspirations of displaced Liberians which includes an understanding of the cultural, emotional, and mental health consequences of both the Liberian civil war and the experience of protracted displacement. This assessment should be based on participatory research using innovative methods and engaging with issues of cultural heritage and identity. It should aim to build and strengthen partnerships between a broad range of local public and private actors able to provide a range of training, mentoring and development opportunities that are oriented towards building the resilience of Liberian refugees for example, through improving access to mental health support, providing mentoring support and leadership development opportunities. The Ghanaian government via the Ghana Refugee Board should also help to bridge and link social capital by implementing long-term vocational and educational projects within camps such as Buduburam and by providing capital for small scale investment (Boeteng, 2009, 2010). This would go a long way in preparing Liberians for jobs in Ghana, which would, in turn, contribute to both their self-sufficiency and sense of well-being. These approaches to self-reliance would not be driven by problematic linkages to neoliberalism and the notion of ‘dependency’ (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018). Nor would they be instrumentally orientated towards return. Rather they would be orientated towards providing refugees with the skills, opportunities and confidences needed to rebuild their lives in ways that are meaningful, however, and wherever that eventually takes place. Ideally such a strategy would take place within a broader developmental approach in which the needs of refugees and their host communities are dealt with together. This reduces the potential for such initiatives creating conflict between refugees and the host community, particularly where the host community is poor, as is the case in Buduburam.

Finally, it is important to situate solutions to the situation of Liberians living in Ghana within long term development and peace-building strategies which ensure that ‘no one is left behind’. This includes refugees and, in particular, women and young people for whom the conflict in Liberia has had consequences including
ongoing sexual violence, mental health issues and marginalisation. Addressing these issues requires co-ordination and collective thinking, both across policy domains and between the countries of West Africa. One option would be the creation of a joint Ghanaian and Liberian government task force to permanently resolve the issue (Antwi-Boeteng & Braimah, 2020). In the absence of a coordinated and holistic approach such as this, Liberian refugees living in Ghana will continue to feel that their lives are ‘hanging in the air’.

References


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Chapter 7
Gaps in Protection for West African Migrants in Times of Crisis: The Role of a Multi-Stakeholder Platform Within a Partnership in Preparedness Model?

Leander Kandilige and Geraldine Asiome Ampah

This quasi-theoretical chapter examines the peculiar protection vulnerabilities that face voluntary migrants in times of crises in destination countries. It argues that while protection regimes broadly exist for involuntary migrants (i.e. refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons) within the ambit of intergovernmental/international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Red Cross Society or even the International Organisation for Migration, there is a yawning gap in national protection mechanisms for voluntary migrants in destination countries during episodes of crises situations. Using Ghana in the West African sub-Region as a case study, the chapter evaluates the potential of a national protection platform to safeguard the rights of predominantly West African migrants in Ghana during crises situations. The chapter conceptualises protection preparedness as a continuous cyclical phenomenon within the three main phases in disaster management – pre-disaster phase (prevention, mitigation), the disaster phase (response), and the post disaster phase (recovery). It draws on data from three national inter-ministerial workshops held in Accra, Ghana in 2018 towards establishing a multi-stakeholder protection platform for voluntary migrants. The chapter concludes that existing generic national disaster management agencies are inadequate in providing specific support for voluntary migrants during disasters. It recommends a public-private partnership in preparedness as it pertains to migrants in destination countries.

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7.1 Introduction

The world’s stock of international migrants has continued to grow in real terms, even if as a percentage of the global population it amounts to less than 4% (IOM, 2020b). The opportunities for global movement have been enhanced by a conjunction of new technologies, more democratic means of communication that have tended to bridge class divides, more adaptable social networks, an exponential growth in the number of affordable transportation providers, greater sources of financial credit (economic capital) and a general sophistication of broader migration infrastructures. The majority of international movements are carried out by labour migrants and members of their families (IOM, 2020a). Considering that these cross-border movements are increasingly associated with financial remittance income as well as intangible social remittances, there has been a justifiable switch in perceptions of migrants and migrant collectives as agents of development rather than the previous negative focus on brain drain arguments especially by proponents of the Historical-Structuralist school of thought (de Haas, 2010). Globally, the volume of remittances has hiked from $325 billion in 2010 to $689 billion by the close of 2018 (World Bank, 2019; IOM, 2020a). Implicit in the positive reliance on labour migrants to support socio-economic livelihoods at the origin as well as to contribute to the development of countries of destination, is the need to safeguard the rights of these migrants. The rights protection needs of different typologies of migrants tend not to be dissimilar but the existence of institutional frameworks for guaranteeing these rights differ.

As victims of persecution owing to their race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinions, refugees’ rights have been protected through international conventions, protocols and compacts since the 1950s (Zamfir, 2015). Embedded in these international legal provisions are rights and obligations on all stakeholders throughout the forced migration trajectory – asylum seekers, countries of origin, countries of transit, migration intermediaries, host states and immigration control officials at the host society. An example includes the prohibition of wilful forced return of asylum seekers to places where they are likely to be subjected to torture or their lives are likely to be imperilled through persecution (the principle of non refoulement). Another example is the obligation on an asylum seeker who has been granted refugee status by a host state not to use that social sphere as a launch pad to organise destabilising activities against their country of origin (Shacknove, 1985).

The 2020 Africa Migration Report (2020) acknowledges the fact that Africa hosted 7.3 million refugees (including asylum seekers) or 25% of the global refugee population (28.7 million) in 2019. Overall, one in every four international migrants in Africa was a refugee, compared to one in every ten international migrants globally. This represents a significant number of vulnerable populations that are exposed to obvious challenges in host countries in times of national crisis. The Africa Migration Report points to the bulk of refugees on the continent being hosted by countries in Eastern Africa, with relatively smaller numbers in the rest of the regions.
Though comparatively smaller, Western Africa’s stock of about 383,000 refugees in 2019, has protection needs just as regions with larger populations (IOM, 2020b).

While protection regimes broadly exist for refugees, asylum seekers and other displaced people within the ambit of intergovernmental/international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Red Cross Society or even the International Organisation for Migration during peace times, there is a yawning gap in national protection mechanisms for voluntary (labour) migrants in host countries during episodes of crises situations. The following two central questions guide this chapter: in what ways do national statutory agencies that are responsible for coordinating disaster management adequately protect the rights of voluntary migrants during national crisis? How can a multi-stakeholder approach, in the form of a national platform dedicated to coordinating support specifically for migrants, better protect the rights of labour migrants during national crisis situations? To aid the analysis, we have adopted the conceptualisation of ‘crisis situations’ by the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative (2016). Within this context:

> crises may arise when social, political, economic, natural or environmental factors or events combine with structural vulnerabilities and/or when the magnitude of those events or factors overwhelm the resilience and response capacities of individuals, communities, or countries. This interpretation sees crises as events with such a severe intensity and magnitude that they can overwhelm the capacity of the government and population to cope with them. These are crises triggered by (1) natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and sudden and slow-onset floods); and by (2) conflict (e.g. civil unrest, generalised violence and/or international or non-international armed conflict)’ (MICIC, 2014:1).

We provide a brief analysis of the relative availability of social protection benefits to migrants of the Global South compared with those of the Global North, after which we define and theorise the concept of ‘conflict’. The approach adopted is then outlined in order to situate the analysis in the rest of the chapter. We discuss the existing frameworks, protocols and conventions on the protection of migrants’ rights in the African context and identify gaps in the frameworks as they relate especially to voluntary migrants. We then propose the adoption of a public-private partnership model for migrants’ rights protection during crisis situations in host countries, relying on the Ghanaian example. The applicability of the model is examined before some conclusions are drawn from the discussion.

### 7.2 Migrants’ Access to Social Protection

Social protection includes health-care benefits, long-term social security benefits (such as old-age and disability benefits) and short-term benefits (such as social assistance, maternity and unemployment benefits, family allowances, as well as public housing and education). Access to social protection varies extensively among international migrants. Nonetheless, access to formal social protection is crucial for migrants as it impacts their level of vulnerability. While North-to-North migrants
enjoy social protection schemes that are more portable and tractable, migrants moving within low-income regions are disadvantaged (Avato et al., 2010). In these regions, formal social security provisions are less developed, and migration is characterized by high numbers of undocumented migrants which further increases their vulnerabilities.

An estimated 281 million people lived as international migrants in 2020 (UN DESA, 2020). In principle, access to social services by international migrants, such as health and education, is governed by the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990), which in 2007 was ratified by only 37 (mainly low- and middle-income) countries. This convention regulates the rights of migrant workers and members of their families including the rights to social security (Article 27) and access to services such as health (Article 28) and education (Article 30). High-income countries were reluctant to sign the Convention, perhaps because to them it provides (too) many entitlements for migrant workers (MacDonald & Cholewinski, 2007). Clearly, the issue of migrants’ access to social security is irrevocably linked to politics and the way that political opinions affect the interpretation of rules and rights. For instance, immigration hubs such as the United Kingdom and South Africa are concerned about extending social benefits to “foreigners” because it is thought that formally entitling migrants to benefits could further encourage migration, putting a greater strain on stretched public services or increasing competition with current residents for jobs. As such, governments are not predisposed to making specific provisions for the protection of migrants during crises. Compared with nationals who work all their lives in one country, migrants face enormous challenges in exercising their rights to social security. Challenges in accessing social security in host countries might revolve around migrants’ statuses, nationality or insufficient duration of the employment or residential periods.

Literature suggests that the issue of earnings-related contribution to social security programmes and their lack of portability across borders affects mostly South to South migrants (see Sabates-Wheeler & Koetti, 2010). There is also a lack of administrative capacity in many low-income countries in the operation of social security programmes. The inability of migrants to benefit, both from social security programmes that are in place in the country of origin and in the host country detracts significantly from the well-being and security of migrants and their families (Sabates-Wheeler & Koetti, 2010). Sabates-Wheeler and Koetti (2010) conclude that South-South migration must be understood as being significantly different from North-North migration, where social protection issues are much more tractable. The extent of migration between developing countries, and issues surrounding it, remain poorly understood, largely because data on such migration is sparse and unreliable. As Hatton and Williamson (2002) note, “South-South migration is not new. It is just ignored by economists”, as well as by many other social scientists. The vulnerabilities associated with weak or poor access to social protection only worsen in times of a crisis in the host country.
7.3 Theorising Conflict

Conflict is generally defined as presence of contrasting or mismatch with regards to needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals in society and among people or social groups (Kotia, 2017; Pia & Diez, 2007). In other words, conflict represents incompatibilities in the positions that individuals assume on an issue (Diez, 2006; Sulemana, 2009). Thus, at the heart of every conflict is discordancy in opinion and interest between individuals, groups or society (McKeown et al., 2016). Conflict is basically the absence of consensus and peace between differing entities (Gurr, 2000a, b). However, conflict does not necessarily produce violence. Conversely as Axt et al. (2006) reiterated, the absence of violence is not a convincing indication of the absence of conflict because conflicting interests may occur in the absence of violence or coercion. Mitchell (1989) simplified the reality of conflict as a structure containing three parts, including behaviour, attitude and situations, that interact and generate conflicts between social actors. Swanström and Weissmann (2005) further added differences in opinion to behaviour (violence) and attitudes (hostility) in their analysis of conflict. They are of the view that violence and hostility should not be the only key concepts in the definition of conflict but the difference embedded in people’s opinions and positions on issues. From a peace building perspective, Anderlini and Stanski, (2004) described conflict in general as a natural expression of social difference and also people’s perpetual struggle for justice and self-determination. Kotia (2017) defines conflict as resulting from discrimination in accessing resources and wealth, employment as well as unequal treatment, poverty, oppression and bad governance. This implies that conflict is born out of competition, unequal distribution of limited resources, opportunities and power. This claim thus, aligns with Marx’s Conflict theory that human institutions are often in a state of continuous conflict because of competition for limited resources (Burrowes, 1996). According to conflict theory as derived from the work of Karl Marx, social order is not preserved by consensus and conformity but domination and power struggle. As a result, conflict erupts when the poor and powerless resist the suppression of those with wealth and the powerful try to hold on to their status. Unresolved conflicts of interest and ideas tend to culminate into war (Francisco & Wood, 2014). In conflict theory, war is the result of a cumulative and growing conflict between individuals and groups, and between entire societies. However, conflict theorists understand war as either a unifier or as a “cleanser” of societies (Burrowes, 1996). Thus, people who have common interest and identity use conflict as a binding tool to seek their interest and liberation by coming together.

Pia and Diez (2007) also classified conflict into positive and negative conflicts contingent on their outcome, whilst ethno-political conflicts are often conceptualised as “domestic” conflicts. Ethno-political conflict is where there is incompatibility between different so-called ethnic groups and their political organisation. Conflict could also arise from a clash of ideas and interest between people of different identities as reflected in the work of Amutabi (1995) who defined this type of conflict as identity conflict. A common form of identity conflict is ethnic conflict.
which could be either inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic in nature (Sulemana, 2009). Analysing conflict from an inter-ethnic or tribal perspective, Gurr (2000a, b), explained ethnic conflict as the inclination of opposing groups to distinguish themselves using ethnic criteria such as: language, cultural elements, religion, territorial claim, nationality, the myth of common ancestry, racial ties, and using other but similar identity to claim equal status within a state or autonomy from it. In line with the concept of ethnic identity and conflict, Cederman et al. (2017), conceived ethnic civil conflict as those that may comprise rebels who recruit heavily from their ethnic groups to combat an opposing group which they consider belongs to a different ethnic identity. Roe (2005) is, therefore, of the view that conflict can be understood in terms of the self and the Other, which are inherent to the concept of incompatibility between groups. Invariably, the different dimensions or definitions of conflict have negative implications on migrants due to their ‘otherness’ within a majority host society.

Conflict has been explained differently because various academic disciplines have different approaches to understanding conflict. Whilst game-theory and decision-making are commonly used by economists in explaining conflict (Kreps, 1990), psychologists explain conflict from interpersonal conflicts perspectives (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1987). Again, political scientists look at conflict as either intra-national or international (Myerson, 1991) but the sociologist model conflict around status and class (Axt et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the theorisation of conflict within the migration discourse deserves more attention. A noted challenge to theorising conflict within the sub-discipline is the fact that the western literature conceptualisation of conflict is considered superior to non-Western literature’s conceptualisation (Burrowes, 1996). This narrow view of conflicts excludes the varying contextual situations that influence the conflict (Maill, 2004).

As much as conflicts transcend international boundaries, it is equally important to acknowledge the transboundary cultural variances in the theorising of conflict. All the same, scholars in the field of international relations and those in the field of conflict and peace studies have spilled enough ink in trying to model aspects of conflict such as the sources of identity-based conflicts and why protracted conflicts are difficult to resolve compared to identity (Burton & Sandole, 1986; Ross, 1993; Rothman & Olson, 2001). Based on an inductive historical analysis, Crighton’s (1991) theoretical model on the development and persistence of protracted ethnic or identity conflicts in the case of conflicts in Northern Ireland and Lebanon explained protracted conflicts as identity-driven which is mainly caused by fear of extinction due to perceived or existential threats of vulnerability.

In a slight departure from the prevalent assumptions of the causes of conflict, the Liberal Conflict Theorists according to Galtung and Jacobsen (2000) are also of the view that internal conflicts are not born by mere difference within people, groups, classes or ethnicity whose existence is denied but a result of underlying competing interests and goals or generated by underlying structures and social inequalities. Thus, the individual and the individual’s behaviour are at the centre of conflicts and not society. The liberals argue that, in understanding conflicts, responsibility therefore lies with the individual. Attention should be on the knot and not the wed.
The Marxists, however, assumed a critical path with regards to the views of the liberalist. They believe that conflict emerges out of structure and relations in society. Foucault (1991) argues that power is diffused and embodied in discourse. According to him power is tied to discourse and knowledge production. He uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to signify that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge and scientific understanding (Foucault, 1991). Each society has its ‘regime’ of knowledge which it accepts as a result of its structure and relations (Foucault, 1991). Hence these dual variables provide a good insight into society’s socio-economic inequalities influence the differences in wielding power to control the means of production resulting in conflict along class lines (Gopinath & Sewak, 2003). Marx emphasises the concepts of alienation, exploitation and inequality as structural causes of violence in most societies (Burrowes, 1996). The Ideological Hegemony Theory as introduced by the popular Marxian scholar, Antonio Gramsci, in his opus – the Prison Notebook – discusses tricks of the hegemony where the hegemon is able to get the lower class to do things that are outside its interest- in what he and Marx called the false consciousness by the class in itself (Gramsci, 1971). Also, Gramsci explained that conflict arises when the ruling class is challenged by the proletariats. The Ideological Hegemony Theory which downplays the importance of economic determinates posits that, the ruling class does not only control the factors of production but values, attitudes, beliefs, cultural norms, and legal principles in society (Gopinath & Sewak, 2003). Swanström and Weissmann (2005) explained the dynamic nature of conflict as cyclical hence, the life cycle of conflict should be understood before applying effective measures to deal with conflict as it often swings between stability and peace.

7.4 Approach

We draw on the National Platform for the Protection of Migrants in Crisis (NPPMC Platform) model that was initiated in Ghana, in 2018, under the Migrants in Countries in Crisis project to make propositions towards improving the efficacy of current frameworks, models and conventions on the protection of migrants’ rights during crisis. This we deem as critical in spite of the fact that the proposed model is yet to be fully implemented even in Ghana. Using Ghana as a case study, the Partners in Preparedness (PiP) initiative sought to address the lack of dedicated, inclusive and open structures to support dialogue, information-sharing and cooperation at the national level to implement migrant-sensitive responses in times of crisis, for migrants in Ghana. The model emerged from the adoption of participatory methodologies especially the multi-stakeholder dialogues (Künkel, 2016) among key stakeholders in Ghana. After three National Workshops held on 21–22 June 2018, 24–25 October 2018 and 13–14 December 2018 among representatives of relevant government ministries, departments and agencies, intergovernmental organisations, civil society organisations and academic/training institutions, a National Platform for the Protection of Migrants in Crisis (NPPMC Platform) was launched. Our analysis
point to the fact that this platform approach has broader applications across other regions in Africa and beyond because it complements existing international attempts through a public-private partnership approach.

### 7.5 Frameworks, Models and Action Plans on Protection of Migrants’ Rights in Africa

The African Union (AU) has outlined incremental steps in the governance of both voluntary and involuntary movements of people on the African continent. Achiume and Landau (2015) note that the frameworks that have been initiated by the AU on migration, mobility and displacement are focused on strengthening a closer integration among nation states on the continent as well as enabling the continent to harness the benefits associated with migration.

Nascent actions included the drafting of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 in order to foster self-reliance and interdependence on the continent (OAU, 1980). This initial attempt was largely unsuccessful due to low uptake by member states (ECOSOC and UNECA, 1990). The African Economic Community established through the 1991 Abuja Treaty further provided a staggered pathway to integration through the empowerment of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) where they existed and the creation of such communities where they did not already exist (Genge et al., 2000 as stated in IOM, 2020b). According to Mkwezalamba (2006), the African Union officially recognizes eight RECs as constitutive vehicles for Africa’s integration. These are as follows: (a) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); (b) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); (c) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); (d) Southern African Development Community (SADC); (e) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); (f) Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); (g) Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); and (h) East African Community (EAC). The 1991 Abuja Treaty encouraged the adoption of the necessary measures, in order to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of establishment by their nationals within the Community (AU, 1991). In addition, agreements in relation to free movement of persons across the continent were supposed to assist, at the regional and community levels, the bridging of the protection gaps for both displaced persons, asylum seekers and refugees and labour migrants, by facilitating the entry and residence in host states, allowing access to territory and possible protection, promoting the options for seeking livelihood opportunities and providing access to assistance from international and non-government organisations.

Later continental policies recognise that migration within the African context is an important livelihood strategy which has the potential to boost the socio-economic development of the entire continent. For example, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) which was adopted in 2006 and renewed in 2018, outlines
guidelines for African States and the eight recognised Regional Economic Communities to manage different aspects of migration, including topical issues on border management, irregular migration, labour migration, inter-state cooperation, forced displacement, internal migration, and cross-cutting issues around migration and poverty, conflict, health, environment, trade, gender, children, youth and the aged.

Similarly, the 2006 African Common Position on Migration and Development recognises the important linkages between migration and development. In cases of forced displacement and/or involuntary migration, member states are mandated to ensure that migrants are provided access to health care, education, accommodation among other rights that will enable them to contribute to both their host countries and countries of origin. This further reflects the overwhelming focus, at the continental level on positively exploiting the linkages between migration and development even in situations of displacement or involuntary migration. Specific protections of the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons and other involuntary migrants are encapsulated in the extensive provisions of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa (OAU Convention on refugees 1986) and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009) which offers protection to IDPs, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (article 12) which equally provides extensive protections for people on the move (Usro & Hakami, 2018). These continental conventions complement existing international conventions such as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) and its 1967 Optional Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Nonetheless, these frameworks are flexible, giving the necessary space for AU member states to adopt and adapt certain implementation steps at their pace (Hirsch, 2021). As a result, AU member states, bilaterally and as part of regional economic communities (RECs), have developed specific policies that align with the identified priorities of the AU and operationalise these policy frameworks.

Within the ECOWAS region, a number of attempts have been made to safeguard the rights of different cohorts of migrants. One notable attempt is the ECOWAS gender and migration framework and plan of action (2015–2020). This framework highlights contemporary global migration trends along gender lines, the regional context of migration of females and the inherent challenges that they tend to face relative to their male counterparts, the diverse initiatives by governments, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations and United Nations agencies on gender and migration issues and gaps in the efforts directed at gender-related challenges in migration. This framework then sets out its priority issues as well as the main goal and objectives of the plan of action it proposes.

The main goal of the Plan of Action was geared towards the usual promotion of the strategies to enable the harnessing of the socio-economic benefits associated with migration (i.e. of both males and females). The document notes that the main goal “is to encourage a regular and safe migration process for men and women in
order to enable them to contribute more effectively to the socio-economic development of the ECOWAS Region” (ECOWAS Commission, 2015).

The nine-point objectives of the gender and migration plan of action included:

1. To make available relevant data on Gender and Migration in ECOWAS Region.
2. To enlighten, sensitize and communicate with the citizens of West Africa on issues concerning Gender and Migration.
3. To train and enhance the capacity of state and non-state actors and the ECOWAS Commission on the challenges of gender, migration and development.
4. To put in place mechanism to discourage the irregular migration of young women and men from ECOWAS Region to other parts of the world.
5. To ensure that women and children in the sub-region are safe from human trafficking.
6. To put in place mechanisms that will eliminate absolute poverty in the region, thereby creating an enabling environment for youth to develop their full potentials.
7. To put in place mechanisms to address the corruption issues, eliminate harassment and constraints of women in cross-border trading.
8. To put in place mechanisms to address the needs of women migrants in conflict situations (refugees and internally displaced persons).
9. To put in place a Monitoring and Evaluation System that ensures an effective and efficient management and implementation of the plan of action.

Of the nine objectives set, only objective number eight touches on the needs of migrants in conflict situations but even here the focus is on refugees and internally displaced persons, with special mention of risks of sexual abuse and exploitation and inadequate access to potable water, good nutrition, good sanitation and health facilities in camps. There is no acknowledgement of challenges that could be faced by voluntary or labour migrants in host countries during crisis situations.

Another primary ECOWAS convention that specifically seeks to govern the protection of migrants’ rights is the “Social protection for migrant workers and their families in ECOWAS states: the ECOWAS general convention on social security” (ILO, 2019). This convention duly recognises that migrants have vulnerabilities around access to social security coverage in host country contexts as a result of their status, nationality or short duration of their employment or residence in that host country. The convention also appreciates the risk of migrants losing their social security entitlements in their country of origin because of the period of absence during their migration.

As a way of minimising these obstacles, the ECOWAS General Convention on Social Security was drafted in 1993. It was subsequently adopted by the ECOWAS Ministers of Labour and of Social Affairs in December 2012, and by the Authority of Heads of State as a Supplementary Act to the Revised ECOWAS Treaty in 2013 (ILO, 2019). The Convention is based on the principles of equal treatment between migrant workers and nationals of the host country and largely inspired by ILO Conventions, in particular: Social Security (Minimum Standard) Convention, 1952 (no. 102), Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (no. 118) and
The ECOWAS Convention on social security is applicable to a much broader category of migrants, thus covering workers who are nationals of ECOWAS countries and who have been working in an ECOWAS country, refugees or stateless persons who are working in and live in an ECOWAS country and who have paid contributions to a social security fund, family members and or beneficiaries of workers and workers who are contributing and or have contributed to a social security scheme in a host country. This convention focuses on a range of social security benefits including disability, family, surviving dependants, unemployment, maternity, occupational diseases and work-related accidents, old age and healthcare and sickness. The scope of coverage as well as the provision of portability of social security rights for migrant workers is the most relevant ECOWAS convention for the protection of rights including those of voluntary or labour migrants. However, the text of this convention is drafted to cover rights in peace times. The gap still remains in times of a crisis in the host state. Does this convention adequately guarantee the rights of migrants during a conflict or crisis situation? While it can be reasonably inferred that one’s access to social security protections during peace times might provide a buffer during crisis/conflict situations and also most likely fast-track one’s recovery post-crisis, the convention does not compel state and non-state actors to deliberately protect the rights of migrants as a unique category.

The ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration (2008) is another concrete step by the regional economic community to enhance protections to neglected categories of migrants as well as restate the groups’ commitment to harnessing the positives from migration while minimising the negative aspects of migration. The Common Approach is anchored on six main principles. These include the fact that:

1. Free movement of persons within the ECOWAS zone is one of the fundamental priorities the integration policy of ECOWAS Member States
2. Legal migration towards other regions of the world contributes to ECOWAS Member States’ development
3. Combating human trafficking and humanitarian assistance are moral imperatives of ECOWAS Member States
4. Harmonising policies
5. Protection of the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees
6. Recognising the gender dimension of migration policies

The fifth principle broadly recommends the formulation of active integration pathways for migrants from ECOWAS member states and to combat exclusions and incidents of xenophobia. It also encourages member states and their EU partners to ratify the UN Convention on the rights of migrants and members of their families. Specifically, the principle further recommends the establishment of a mechanism for extending rights of residence and establishment to refugees from ECOWAS countries. Much as the ECOWAS Common Approach (2008) constituted a much-needed clarification of the priorities of the regional block, it is equally silent on how the rights of migrants (especially voluntary migrants) are to be protected in times of crisis or conflict in ECOWAS host countries.
At a meeting of the committee on trade, customs and immigration in Accra, Ghana (25–27th September 2007), a memorandum of understanding was signed on “equality of treatment for refugees with other citizens of member states of ECOWAS in the exercise of Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment” (ECOWAS Commission, 2007). This memorandum acknowledged the increased number of ECOWAS citizens who have been displaced due to conflict situations in their home countries. It also noted the fact that most asylum seekers tend to seek refuge in neighbouring countries which sometimes share common ethnic and linguistic traits with displaced populations. The MOU emphasises the fact that the three phases of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol (i.e. freedom of movement, right of residence and right of establishment) should not be deemed to be applicable to only voluntary or economic migrants alone but should include asylum seekers and refugees too. The Committee concluded that refugees may enjoy rights under the Free Movement Protocols in addition to rights to which they are entitled under international refugee law. These rights extend to situations where refugees have voluntarily surrendered the refugee status and are no longer in need of international protection. The Committee (ECOWAS Commission, 2007: 5–6) recommended to the Council of ECOWAS Ministers that:

1. Refugees from ECOWAS member states continue to enjoy ECOWAS citizenship and are thus entitled to take full advantage of the ECOWAS protocols on free movement and the right of residence and establishment provided they reside in ECOWAS territories.
2. Requests the countries of origin of refugees to issue valid travel documents (ECOWAS passports and national identity cards) to those of their nationals who request such documents and are residing in other ECOWAS member states in the sub-region.
3. Requests host countries to issue residence cards or permits to refugees from ECOWAS member states residing in their territories at reduced cost.
4. Request that member states abide by the provisions of the Protocol on the three (3) years duration of the residence permit with the possibility of renewal. Non-renewal should be based only on the grounds prescribed in the Protocols (primarily, national security, public order or morality and public health) and adhere to the notice and process safeguards therein described.
5. Request UNHCR to establish a Regional Local Integration Management Unit (RLIMU) to, among other things:
   (a) facilitate the acquisition of ECOWAS residence status, including assisting member states where appropriate in verifying individuals’ possession of refugee status
   (b) Promote awareness of the ECOWAS Protocols and national laws and regulations pertaining to residence and employment
   (c) Ensure conformity between the residence and establishment provisions in the ECOWAS Protocols and national legislation on naturalization
   (d) Sensitize refugees on conditions for accessing relevant entitlements under the ECOWAS protocols
(e) Monitor the issuance and renewal of ECOWAS residence permits and passports for refugees in the sub-region
(f) Encourage referral of appropriate questions and cases to the Community Court of Justice

These detailed and focused recommendations seek to protect the rights of refugees both in host and origin countries, within the context of the free movement protocol. While the MOU is not directly intended to safeguard the rights of refugees during crisis situations in host countries, at least a policy, legal and institutional framework is envisaged to guarantee that optimal moral standing (Ruhs & Chang, 2004) is extended to refugees.

All these frameworks, protocols and conventions at the continental and sub-Regional spatial levels feed into global actions that seek to create coherent migration infrastructures for state practice in the area of migration governance and management. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018 (especially Objective 7 on addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration) and sections under Objective 2 on “natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation” and to “integrate displacement considerations into disaster preparedness strategies and promote cooperation with neighbouring and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, contingency planning, stockpiling, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance arrangements, and public information” is one prime example. In addition, the Global Compact on Refugees notes that the ‘thorough management of a refugee situation is often predicated on the resilience of the host community’. This alludes to the need for a public-private partnership model within host states in order to realise the protection of the rights of migrants.

7.6 The Public-Private Partnership Model

Though international cooperation and actions have positive and broad strategic impacts on the nature, severity and scope of crises, especially in economically underdeveloped countries, the need for localised state and multi-stakeholder action before, during and after a crisis situation is critical. There is mostly a trust deficit between state agencies/state officials and labour migrants due to the power asymmetries that exist between the two parties. The role of non-state actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith-based organisations and private sector actors therefore becomes important in coordinating services for migrants, especially during a crisis situation. Migrant-centred social protection initiatives could be channelled through impartial non-state private actors who tend to have a physical operational presence in local communities prior to the onset of crisis. This approach was also emphatically endorsed by the “Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC): Supporting an Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action” project, funded by the European Union (EU) and
implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). In this case, the central focus was on voluntary migrants but the guidelines and subsequent Partners in Preparedness (PiP) initiative that emerged from this broad project are equally instructive for state action even in the context of refugees and other involuntary migrants. Guideline number seven specifically recommends the need to build partnerships and establish routine coordination before a crisis breaks out and the maintenance of such coordination at all times, throughout the cycle of a crisis.

This is equally consistent with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Early Warning, Early Action and Readiness Report (2016) which proposes pre-disaster/emergency planning requirements in order to mitigate the severity of such phenomena. Existing approaches to protection of refugees during disasters and humanitarian emergencies such as the IASC’s Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP) therefore allow the international community to complement the efforts of individual states while acknowledging the fact that national governments ultimately are responsible for providing such reliefs to refugees. This statutory role is aptly captured in the UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 to the effect that ‘Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory’. Other initiatives such as the Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies (PPRE) and the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM) also stipulate approaches to preparing for refugee emergencies. Though states are obligated to provide protection for migrants (voluntary and involuntary), resource constraints compromise the ability of state agencies that are tasked with coordinating disaster responses from optimally protecting the rights of vulnerable persons. While these public-private models seem to be well embedded in the refugee humanitarian intervention scenarios, this is less so for voluntary migrants and thus, the NPPMC model is critical.

7.7 National Disaster Management and the NPPMC Model

Nationally, Ghana has a National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO), established in 1996, by an act of parliament (Act 517) in response to the Yokohama Strategy for a safer world and plan of action, which is the statutory agency mandated to coordinate all disasters in the country. The organisation coordinates all the relevant civil authorities at the national, regional and district levels to respond to disaster situations. Since its establishment, NADMO has depended on state subventions for funding and the organisation has not been permitted to attract funding from other sources. Though theoretically the situation changed with the passage of the NADMO Act of 2016 (Act 927) which now permits NADMO to source funding from bilateral and multilateral partners in addition to government subventions, in practice, funding shortages have constrained the ability of the organisation to take
pre-emptive steps prior to crises occurring in order to either avert them, minimise the impact or to hasten the restoration of normalcy after a crisis. While the mandate of NADMO encompasses the protection of all persons present in Ghana at any given time, peculiar challenges pertain to migrants (voluntary and involuntary). Challenges include lack of local language proficiency, poor appreciation for local support systems, unsettled social networks, suspicion and discrimination, poor access to accommodation facilities and welfare services and invisibility due to lack of consistent formal records on migrants. As such, a national platform with specific focus on the rights of migrants during crisis situations is critical. The limitations of the national disaster management organisation highlight the enduring benefit of a public-private partnership in preparedness prior to, during and after crisis situations.

The terms of reference of the NPPMC primarily focus on coordination of services specifically for migrants during crisis including: access to consular services, information (e.g. disseminating crisis information, alerts), documentation (e.g. interpretation/translation services), relief and humanitarian assistance (e.g. healthcare, shelter, food, clothing, dignity kits for women) counselling/psycho-social support. Other services provided by NPPMC are referrals to relevant service providers as well as support in the provision of temporary identity and travel documents (e.g. emergency travel certificates). The Platform aims at raising awareness among different stakeholders of the existence of the Platform and the specific needs of migrants in crisis situations. The Platform also seeks to provide a space and means for relevant actors to enhance their capacity to identify, implement and review migrant-sensitive responses in crisis situations, for instance, through simulations, drills and research. In addition, the Platform aims to strengthen collaboration among government ministries/departments/agencies and between governmental and non-governmental partners at different spatial levels (district, regional and national) through the identification of focal points. Furthermore, the Platform seeks to foster the sharing of information, knowledge, skills and resources among relevant stakeholders.

To succeed, the platform is grounded in and guided by some enduring principles. Three core principles adopted include: (a) ensuring inclusive and meaningful participation as well as engagement with all relevant and interested stakeholders, at appropriate levels (local, regional and national), in the protection of migrants in crisis situations (b) facilitating multi-stakeholder partnerships that are stimulated and kept engaged through ongoing interactions, i.e. through formal meetings and other means of communication but also informal interactions and spontaneous exchanges and (c) maintaining transparency and openness of its operations to ensure mutual accountability amongst all stakeholders, within and outside the Platform. Membership of NPPMC comprises of both primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders comprise all relevant government ministries/departments responsible for the management of disasters and crises while secondary stakeholders comprise of relevant institutions and agencies that do not necessarily play a continuous role in the functioning of the Platform but that are critical collaborators in times of crisis. Secondary Stakeholders are critical in the provision of logistics, information, rescue, relief and recovery support to migrants, in collaboration with
the primary stakeholders. Membership of the Primary Stakeholders category is based on the following criteria: (a) capacity/technical know-how in migration issues, (b) access to relevant information, possession of logistics and/or equipment that are relevant for the protection of migrants in crisis situations, (c) synergies between institution’s core mandate and that of the NPPMC Platform, and (d) availability of appropriate human resources/staffing and possession of expertise in dealing with the particular type of crisis/disaster in question.

7.8 Applicability of the Platform Model to the Protection of Migrants During Crisis

Migrants are predisposed to vulnerabilities due to resource constraints in host countries, restricted legal rights due to ‘minimal moral standing’ extended to them (Ruhs & Chang, 2004) and limited economic, cultural and social capitals they may have on their own. These could manifest in the form of poor sanitation, poor shelter, limited access to healthcare and educational facilities as well as poor nutrition. These vulnerabilities are amplified during crisis situations in host communities. Specific steps should therefore be taken to ameliorate the impact of national crisis situations on migrants. Protection of migrants should be considered a process rather than an event. In this regard, the phases in a full cycle of disaster management – pre-disaster phase (prevention, mitigation), the disaster phase (response), and the post disaster phase (recovery) – should be accorded equal attention. This suggests that prior to the actual occurrence of a disaster, the national platform must undertake prevention and mitigation activities that either prevent the disaster, minimise the effects or enhance the preparedness of agencies that need to be coordinated to respond to a disaster when it occurs. Practical activities within the pre-disaster phase should involve regular meetings by primary stakeholders to carry out emergency response planning. This should include an evaluation of existing plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and incident reports from previous disaster situations, with specific focus on how they protect the rights of migrants. In addition, the platform’s primary stakeholders should monitor the political climate and natural disaster risks as well as reviewing information and data on the stock of migrants in the country. There is also the need to device the platform’s emergency response plan, targeting migrant-populated communities such as migrant residential and employment enclaves. Awareness of the existence of the platform will need to be raised to allow migrants and entities that support migrants to sign-post migrants to the range of services that are coordinated by the platform. In a pre-disaster phase, there is also a critical need for training and simulation exercises to enhance the operational preparedness and capacity to respond to actual crisis should they happen. The platform should, therefore, coordinate simulation exercises involving migrants, the leadership of civil society organisations and non-governmental
organisations, state agencies responsible for emergency response actions and development partners.

During the actual crisis phase, stakeholders of the platform should coordinate services in support of migrants which should involve field visits, collection of information and data on where migrants live, identify and assess the immediate needs of migrants, activate the platform’s crisis mode and convene the platform’s emergency meetings with partners who might be able to support not only in the form of rescue but also the provision of immediate relief services such as temporary shelter, food and healthcare. Again, this should adopt a public-private partnership approach. The response plan for crisis which should have been drafted at the pre-crisis phase should be activated by the platform to guide the coordinated response processes.

Post-crisis, the platform should evaluate the level of collaboration among the various stakeholders – primary, secondary and other actors who offered services to migrants. There is also the need to evaluate and document the response operations to serve as a guide to future responses. Finally, there is the need to review the platform’s objectives periodically to amend them in light of gaps in the response, opportunities for better coordination and dynamics in vulnerabilities facing migrants. This acknowledges the fact that experiences of migrants are not static givens, that impacts on migrants are context-specific, and that the composition of coordinating partners should be subject to change.

7.9 Conclusion

The reflections in this chapter expose some gaps in existing protocols, conventions and frameworks within the West African context and the urgent need for a deliberate vehicle (national platform) that is specifically dedicated to the protection of voluntary migrants’ rights during crisis situations in host countries. As noted, the public-private platform model would be complementary to the fundamental object of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration especially Objective 7 on addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration. Under Objective 2 of the Global Compact on Migration, natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation are highlighted as imminent sources of crisis that could trigger involuntary movements of populations. Recommendations for the integration of displacement considerations into disaster preparedness strategies and the promotion of cooperation with neighbouring and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, contingency planning, stockpiling, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance arrangements, and public information all adopt a state-centred approach to crisis management. State-led approaches are important, but a public-private model complements the efficacy of these protocols, agreements and conventions. In addition, the NPPMC model is aligned with the Global Compact on Refugees that notes that the ‘thorough management of a refugee situation is often predicated on the resilience of the host community’. Resilience during national crisis situations is better attained through the
adoption of a ‘whole of society’ approach to the management of disaster situations. The agility, human resource capacity, outreach and scope, access to flexible funding, access to equipment and communication channels of the multi-stakeholders proposed in the platform model increase the potential to guarantee the protection of the rights of all typologies of migrants in crisis situations. The appreciation of crisis/disaster management, in this chapter, as a cyclical process allows for continuous engagement of stakeholders, including those from the private sector, civil society, non-governmental organisations, international/intergovernmental organisations, diplomatic missions, community groups as well as mainstream government ministries, departments and agencies. The early warning, preparedness and contingency planning propositions in the Global Compact on Refugees, aimed at shaping refugee reception by nation states, are consistent with the proposed national platform model in planning for, dealing with and evaluating crisis/disasters at the national spatial level.

The dedicated migration platform model avoids the neglect of migrants during national crisis. Resource constraints prevent national agencies that are responsible for managing disasters from deliberately focusing limited resources on marginalised communities. Existing generic national disaster management agencies are inadequate in providing specific support for voluntary migrants during disasters. We therefore recommend a public-private partnership in preparedness as it pertains to migrants in destination countries.

Advocacy by a migrant-centred platform highlights migrant-specific vulnerabilities that exist throughout the three main stages of the disaster management cycle and brings them into the limelight. Policies that target victims of a disaster as a homogenous group miss an important point and they need to be realigned to appreciate the diversity of needs that are embedded in the heterogenous backgrounds, experiences and life courses of migrants (voluntary and involuntary).

Ultimately, a move towards hybrid protection models is appropriate and effective. There is a critical need for hybrid of public-private efforts geared towards the forecasting of the likelihood and severity of crisis and a coherent response to both natural and man-made crises should they occur. Non-state actors have the potential to release complementary skills, technical expertise, equipment, enduring community relationships that are needed for collaborative activities as well as funding sources. Policy formulation and implementation should therefore privilege hybridity over unilateral and unifocal state actions.

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Part III
Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development
Chapter 8
International Migration, Diaspora Investments and Development in Nigeria

Olayinka Akanle and Olayinka Damilola Ola-Lawson

8.1 Introduction

Migration is core to human existences. Migration is triggered by many factors. These factors include; economy, security, family reunion, education and persecution among other reasons (Akanle & Adesina, 2017a). Hence, according to the reasons and factors behind migration can also be classified into economic factors, demographic factors, socio-cultural factors, political factors and miscellaneous factors. The drivers/causes of migration also fit into the push and pull factors frameworks (Akanle, 2018). This is against the backdrop of the motivations from pull factors of the booming economy at destination countries and the push factors of bad infrastructures, unemployment, poverty, political instability, insecurity, and so on at countries of origin. People may migrate as individuals, in family units or in large groups. This is why Akanle and Adesina (2017a) maintains while some migrations from Africa may be involuntary, significant proportions are voluntary and motivated by economic pressures. Even those which appear to be involuntary are often belied with voluntariness in the final analysis.

International migration is therefore very much more complicated, dynamic, sensitive and operating with critical multi-functionalities in the twenty-first century and this will most likely be so into the nearest foreseeable future in development terms and for development reasons. It is therefore very important and existential for key actors and stakeholders in the development spaces to constantly examine the existential development elements of international migrations within the remit of multi-dimensionality and functionalities in contexts of development across developing
and developed countries international and development praxes. Hence, international migration is increasingly of global interest and this interest is usually traceable to the development competences of international migration as commonly seen through remittances and general quality of life and investment enhancements at countries of origin especially poor nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

West Africa is among the sub-regions (of Africa) that fall seriously into the categories of poor migrants sending countries relying on international migrants for livelihood enhancement and development and Nigeria is top ranking in this context (Akanle, 2018). International migration is certainly defining character of the twenty-first century largely due to increasing poverty and underdevelopment in many nations and roles of international migrants in ameliorating human conditions in poor countries as well as large contributions to workforce in developed nations. The real and potential contributions of the diaspora and international migrants to developments at poor countries are particularly definitive and noteworthy in practical terms (Foresti et al., 2018; Hack-polay, 2018; Hack-Polay & Siwale, 2018; Sinatti & Horst, 2015; Ratha et al., 2011).

The remit of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the ligaments of migration and development through the case study of Nigeria as a key player in the international migration and development socioeconomic and development marketplace. The chapter examines the profiles of migrants’ investments, conceptualisations, challenges and coping mechanisms among others. The perspectives of this chapter are within the celebratory and cautious frameworks (Gamlen, 2014). The significance of the chapter can be seen from different dimensions. First, the chapter is justified because it profiles different migrants’ investments in the context of Nigeria, as lessons for West Africa, empirically in manners that can better inform policies and practices sustainably. Second, the chapter empirically demonstrates there are more to migration and development than conventional remittances as investments are also major forms of and more sustainable ways of contributing to national development beyond standard remittances (Akanle & Olutayo, 2009; Fleischer, 2007; Shinn, 2008).

International migrants have been subjects of bourgeoning studies and policies. Most existing researches and policies have however concentrated more on remittances as exemplars of development in international migration and development accountabilities. This chapter therefore expands empirical knowledge and offers new narratives as well as core and nuanced narratives on the interfaces and intermingling domains of international migration and inter/national development in poor countries. This chapter adds important case study, data, narratives and functionally relevant knowledge to the existing body of information complicated and evolving scenarios in international migration and development. This chapter interrogates the contours and ligaments of investments in terms of patterns and worldviews embedded in experiences and social relations of migrants and their kin and implications for development. This chapter is of benefits to stakeholders interested in understanding the relationships between migration and diaspora investments and development in poor countries now and into the future.
8.2 International Migration, Investments and Development in Africa

According to Ratha et al. (2011), migration is an important part of the agenda for regional economic integration that has made progress in the past years. The process of international migration across the globe is increasing daily and the impact of such migrations on destination and origin countries have become contentious, vexing and continuous (Adu, 2018; Shinn, 2008) needing fresh insights, knowledge and data. Africa is a continent on the move due to massive migrations of its people. Africa is origin, transit and destination for migrants (Akanle, 2018). The continent is however more popular in migration studies and policies because of its established status as migrant sending continent. This is usually due to the migration propelling huge poverty of Africa, political instability and insecurity on the continent. Thus, Africans are by nature and nurture migrants. It is possible to opine that the extant and contemporary history of Africa is the history of migration particularly internationally.

The number of people of African descent that live outside the continent is estimated at almost 140 million, most of them in the Western Hemisphere (Akanle, 2018; Fleischer, 2007). Fleischer (2007) added that many migration experts ascribe the large movement of people out of Africa to many uncomplimentary factors. These factors include; high unemployment rate, low salaries, low saving rates, sluggish economic growth, demographic growth and insecurity (Akanle, 2018; Fleischer, 2007; Ratha & Plaza, 2016).

For Martha et al. (2018), migration which is one of the prominent activities of the twenty-first century contributes largely to all aspects of socio-economic development giving positive light to achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Migrants and their families benefit from increased income and knowledge, which allows them to spend more on basic needs, more reliable and modern energy services, access education and health services, and make investments possible (Martha et al., 2018; Akanle, 2018; Siwale, 2018; Akanle & Adesina, 2017a; Boly et al., 2014; Ratha et al., 2011). According to Akanle (2018), livelihood enhancements through remittances, investments, chain migration and values sharing are core drivers and reasons for international migration Africa and Nigeria (See also Akanle & Adesina, 2017b). These are major positive outcomes ameliorating human conditions in Africa in the face of excruciating poverty, poor governance, corruption and generalized underdevelopment.

Against this background, De Haas (2006), UNCTAD (2009), opine that increased support for diaspora enterprises and investments is essential for sustainable development of their origin country and residence. This is because remittances, supports and investments from the diaspora play crucial roles in reducing poverty by creating job opportunities and improving livelihoods through harnessing innovation, technology, and capital creation thereby having and driving multiplier effects on income distribution (De Haas, 2006; UNCTAD, 2009). International migrants in the diaspora face many challenges when attempting to invest in home countries and these include hostile business climate, negative infrastructures, insecurity, and lack of
legal and policy frameworks to protect investments. Many also lack belief and trust in the system including lack of trust in social and kinship networks (Akanle & Adesina, 2017b).

Challenges international migrants in the diaspora face as they attempt to invest in home countries are massive and these challenges often make them uneasy when deciding whether or not to invest in countries of origin especially in Africa. When they do invest, they device innovative coping mechanisms to protect investments and reconnect them with homes. Researches have shown that most diasporas start businesses and investments in their home countries with the money saved from paid works overseas but while investing some diasporas face great challenges even as they struggle to save their investments (Chacko & Gebre, 2013; Ratha et al., 2011; Olatuyi et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2016; Chunda, 2018). Governments and states/non-states actors have to institute systems to make investment climates protective of the international migrants in the diaspora will sustainably invest in origin and contribute substantially to the very needed development. These investments are particularly very needed and are apparently important lifelines in the face of massive government failures and excruciating poverty, unemployment and sustained/aggravated underdevelopment in Africa.

8.3 Methodology

Nigeria is the national contexts and the city of Ibadan was the study area where data was collected for the study that informed this chapter. The city of Ibadan is the capital city of Oyo state. It is the largest city in West Africa and third largest city in Africa. It is the most populous city in Nigeria after Lagos and Kano. Ibadan is fast going through the process modernization fitting into the rate of growth and development of the twenty-first century due to its closeness to Lagos State which is the fastest evolving mega city in Africa (Akanle et al., 2014). Also, many people in the diaspora and even other cities in Nigeria are now re/settling their families and businesses in Ibadan due the relative calmness and peace of the city. Ibadan is comparatively cheaper in terms of cost of living and cost of setting up businesses and investments. It is also a stably and gradually modernizing providing more predictable setting for investment. The kinship trust thresholds and social coefficient of Ibadan are also, comparatively, largely higher than places like Lagos and Port Harcourt. Ibadan is historically known for agriculture, trading, warfare, administration and handiwork but has also evolved over the years to be known for civil service, private investments and tertiary education (Akanle et al., 2018).

Ibadan is located in south western region of Nigeria. The study that informed this chapter was a descriptive research with the use of primary and secondary methods of data collection. The study explored how migration and diaspora investment affect development. The primary method used was purely qualitative research design. In addition to the primary method, the secondary data was employed by reviewing relevant literature and data from business documents, conference documents,
academic journals, newspapers, books and reliable internet sites. Key-informant interviews (KII) and recording of life histories were also used. The target population for this study was international migrants who have investments in Nigeria. The choice of this category of people was because of their key and in-depth knowledge of the investments climate in context. The sample size for the KII was 10 international migrants who were purposively selected. This number of interviewees was chosen because of the focus of the study. The interviewees were hard to reach people for security and safety reasons in a very insecure country like Nigeria (Akanle & Olutayo, 2012).

When international migrants relate with Nigerians, it is usually with extreme care and they keep low profile. They often make themselves inaccessible and usually deny people access to them (Akanle & Olutayo, 2012). This building was of inaccessibility and protection by migrants was usually for two major reasons. First, to prevent themselves from criminal attacks. Second, to protect themselves from massive burdensome requests for financial assistances and chain migration requests from people in their social and kinship networks due to excruciating poverty in Nigeria. It was particularly difficult to recruit the 10 interviewees. Both formal and informal networks were leveraged upon to convince the interviewees to be involved in the study after repeatedly assuring them the study was purely for research/academic purposes and that no harm would come to them. They were also assured of anonymities and confidentialities. International migrants are hidden and relatively scarce and the fact that some of them were not willing to disclose any information based on their investments for safety and trust reasons was seriously a challenge to the study though this was overcome eventually due to continuous assurances, professional retooling and strategic engagements (Akanle & Olutayo, 2012).

Interviewees were conducted in safe environments and were very informative and useful. Interviews were tape recorded, transcribed and analysed with a qualitative data analysis software. Analysis patterns included 1. Content analysis 2. thematic analysis and 3. interpretive phenomenological analysis. Ethical considerations were observed within the benchmarks of global best practices in research these included confidentiality, anonymity, informed consent, beneficence, non-coercion and right of withdrawal. The research that informed this chapter was purely objective.

8.4 Data Presentation and Discussion

8.4.1 Profile of Diaspora Investment

Many existing researches have noted that diaspora investors mainly invest in housing projects (Boly et al., 2014). Boly et al. (2014) for example, find that in countries like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda, over 20% income
generated from international remittances was spent on physical capital investments such as buying land or improving a farm. In our study, it was discovered that most of the interviewees engage in farming while others invest in automobiles and other small ventures. This implies that Nigerians abroad prefer to venture into physical capital investments. The relativity of businesses in terms of sizes and scale depends on different perspectives. It was discovered that most interviewees engage in large scale businesses because it has been expanded overtime while only a few were into small businesses by owning small shops. This however means, international migrants are interested in sustaining their businesses and also expand it by venturing into more businesses in the country of origin.

The interviewees in this study were engaged on the nature of the investment they have. Prompts and probes during interviews included; type of business they run, the size of the business they are into, the factors or reasons for choosing the particular business. Other prompts and probes included; duration of the business in terms of short, medium or long term investment. and if they are interested in investing in other business. Every investment varies across interviewees. There are various types of investments that the interviewees are engaged in, as shown in Table 8.1.

An interviewee mentioned that he has two businesses and he is running them concurrently:

I have two businesses in Nigeria. No 1, farming and secondary, its management and financial and tax management. At the moment we planted plantain, pepper, all this tomato and the likes. We want to do it on a large scale; we want to start making tomato paste. But for now we are still testing. We did irrigation I think December. We are still testing before we go massively. But the other one, started seven years ago. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/RWANDA)

Going further, another interviewee revealed that he is into two businesses which he is also running concurrently. One of the businesses is not as tasking as the other, because one requires full concentration:

I’m into real estate and I’m also into farming. I’m more concentrated on the farm now. Basically we do live stock and we are going into milk production Real estate is the way I put to my friends and colleagues who are into it fully, depending on what you have. If you have money, for example, if you have money in real estate it is very lucrative. If you buy properties at cheap rate, some you will renovate and you will sell, it’s okay, it’s a good business if you have the capacity and the finance too. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/SPAIN)

International migrants engage in many investments in their home countries. Some of these investments are owned by the family not just the individual migrant. The type of international migrants’ investments in this finding include farming/agriculture, laundry, automobiles, betting centers, real estate, pharmaceutical company and tax management. Some interviewees explained why they decided to choose the type of investments they are into. An interviewee who captured modal views tried many businesses before he finally became successful in one:

The reason is that actually I’ve tried a couple of different businesses which I wouldn’t say it was successful because due to Nigeria and government policies and a lot of things because the reason why I’m doing what I’m doing now... because I’ve invested in different sectors or let’s say different kinds of businesses. Presently, what I’m doing I believe that I understand it more than what I’ve been doing before. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)
The profit derived from the business is another factor influencing investment choices of migrants in countries of origin particularly Nigeria. Another reason is influence from social and kinship networks including friends and kin in determining investment choices.

Table 8.1  Profiles of diaspora’s investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Types of investment</th>
<th>Place of investment</th>
<th>Year of investment</th>
<th>Reasons for choosing investment</th>
<th>Other proposed investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>Bashorun Ibadan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>To be in control of the business. The risk is minimal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Real estate and farming</td>
<td>Samonda and Akufo, Ibadan</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Inheritance It is lucrative</td>
<td>Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Automobiles, betting centre</td>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>It generates money. It is the most successful of all the business I have invested in.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Shares</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>For profit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Laundry business</td>
<td>Surulere, Lagos</td>
<td></td>
<td>Passion</td>
<td>Piggery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Shares</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td></td>
<td>To generate profit.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Fairly used laptops</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>To help people who are not capable to buy new gadgets. Nigeria is a good place for business.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where I work, I have a colleague who is a pharmacist and she told me how lucrative it is to invest in that sector. I have also seen for myself, I have a friend in Nigeria that is a pharmacist and one of the top directors at one of the biggest pharmaceutical industry in the country. Also, in the area of farming, as you know, agriculture is one of the fastest growing sectors in Nigeria. So it’s the fact that I know that I will make a huge profit from investing in agriculture for me. (KII/MALE/50YEARS/ENGLAND)

Control is another factor mentioned by interviewees. According to an interviewee who captured modal views:

My first reason is that it allows me to be in control of my business, so I go there buy it and be sure that this is what I bought and I ship it to Nigeria. When it gets up here, I’m with it, I can easily sell it repair it, whatever I want to do with it, I’m in charge. The risk there
minimal, it’s not like I’m not in control. Unlike abroad, you might not be there I tell you, it
doesn’t matter, you ask somebody to pick something for you, the law is protecting you. If
that person fails to do whatever he’s supposed to do you can sue him, he knows. So back to
the question, the reason is because I have much control. At least, let’s say 85%. (KII/
MALE/60YEARS/CANADA)

Many factors influence the choice and type of investments. The choices of the type
of investment as mentioned by the interviewees are based on profit, control, owners-
ship, passion and flexibility. Passion, provision for their family members, control
and flexibility that comes with the investments, influence from friends, state of pov-
erty of the country and the state of the economic crises like unemployment issues
are key determinants. The scale and sizes of investments vary. An interviewee exem-
plifying and capturing common opinions observe:

Well, when it comes to selling cars, I wouldn’t want to say it’s a small scale. It depends on
the way you can put it. The way you can put it is that if you can give me the amount maybe
you can put it in a way that okay, this business you’re into, from zero to so, so, and so
amount to this amount investment. Because like for example now, I have a client that wants
to buy car worth 16 million, I have client that wants to buy car worth 7 million. So it
depends on the business because I wouldn’t want to say it is a small investment. (KII/
MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)

Another interviewee was explicit about the size of his investment because he is
planning to expand it further.

The other businesses are long term definitely especially the farm because we are about start-
ing an expansion project. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/SPAIN)

The sizes and scale of investments are relative. However, it is noteworthy that
migrants are ambitious and are willing to expand their businesses largescale. This is
important for policies attempting to appropriate migrants’ investments for growth
and development. Investments climates, policies and security are however key in all
of these.

8.4.2 Challenges of Diaspora Relative to Investments

Most interviewees expressed the feelings it has not been easy to maintain their
investments. This is because, according to interviewees, migrants have to go extra
mile, uncomfortably, to ensure the sustainability of their investments. There are
many challenges that migrants face while investing back home. This is because of
the state of the country in terms of security, economic conditions, finances, register-
ing of the investments, summersault of government policies, environmental issues
and fiduciary (trust) issues. Most interviewees mentioned infrastructural deficits,
particularly, the state of energy/power supply in the country. According to an inter-
viewee who captured modal perspective:

Of course there are a lot of challenges that you face in Nigeria for example, I’ll give you
security wise, power and a lot of challenges but those are the few I can give you that is
affecting my business because I could remember like December 2017, my office was burgled by thieves and another thing there is when I run the business centre at least in a day, I use to buy fuel with of 1,000 naira in a day. To run the business every day because sometimes I don’t have electricity from morning to night because I always open by 9 am and I close by 9pm in the night. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)

Another interviewee opines there are no available loans to fund investments:

The first is money and that’s because I have just one stream of income which is my salary to sponsor my business and also cater for my family and it is reflecting on my business because the things that I need to do I don’t do them in time. For instance, if I have to buy fertilizers for my plants and I can’t afford it at that time, it will affect the growth and production of crops. I don’t have access to loans from Nigeria. Another problem is the security challenge we have in the country. (KII/MALE/50YEARS/ENGLAND)

Another interviewee maintains:

Take for instance, at the port, sometimes ago, I lost a very huge amount of money close to a million naira because of bad government policy. The day of the arrival of my container was given to me. The container arrived two weeks earlier and I was charged for a demurrage. I pushed against this but because we don’t have a good judicial system, I lost out on that. In the environment where you have well working policy I wouldn’t be made to pay what I’m not supposed to. (KII/MALE/50YEARS/CHINA)

From the above findings, international migrants face a lot of challenges while investing in Nigeria. The constrains include unfavourable government policies, financial constraint and unavailability of loans, environmental issues like security, and unavailability of social infrastructures like electricity, fraud and mismanagement and high tax rate. When the interviewees were asked if they were interested in any other business aside from the one they have invested in, some of them expressed their passion for other businesses but refrain from investing because of various reasons mentioned above. If the conditions improve, they are willing and ready to keep investing and expanding their businesses. According to an interviewee:

It would not stop me from investing but it will limit the extent I’m willing to. For instance, the issue of insecurity in Oyo state as we speak now is discouraging trust me. In fact, I had a call yesterday morning; there was this particular staff of mine who was worried about their security and all that. I just told them don’t worry, I also come here regularly so whoever will kidnap you will kidnap all of us. Not that I have anything (other powers) but you know you just have to inspire them. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/SPAIN)

Despite these challenges, interviewees stated their opinions on how businesses can thrive in Nigeria and also pointed out the limitations to be addressed by the government so as to make the country conducive enough for businesses to thrive and be successful. According to an interviewee:

Well, number 1 in the aspect of security, because for anybody to come from diaspora and anywhere and say they want to invest in Nigeria, everybody will look for a favourable place. If the environment is not secure...even now you see a lot people leaving Nigeria. I have a friend that is earning close to 1 million naira every month but despite that he still moved from Nigeria to Canada with his family and the reason is the security because you can’t guarantee what will happen tomorrow. And number 1 the security aspect, number 2 is power generation, source of power. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)
8.4.3 Coping Mechanisms of Diaspora Relative to Investment

To tackle financial and capital issues, Nigerians living abroad get mortgages in form of loans for buying properties in Nigeria, access international account-to-account remittance services and also get help for buying and selling shares on the Nigerian stock exchange (Chunda, 2018). International migrants have learnt to cope with the challenges they are facing when it comes to investment. This is mainly because of perseverance and love for the country and also the fact that they have spent a lot while investing and they cannot abandon their investments midways.

You have to make all your business work; you try all you can. Concerning the security, for instance we put our generator outside before, it was stolen. It was the biggest generator too, so we had to buy another one and we have to be locking it in the shop. (KII/FEMALE/39YEARS/AMERICA)

Another opinie:

Wherever you know you put money, you have this strong mind of money is in the air and you can’t allow it go down the drain. That’s the first motivation because money is very important. So when you put some money somewhere, you are motivated to keep trying to make sure it gets better. Then two, let me not shy away from the fact that uncles who are actually big farmers, so I kind of share ideas from them, I have the privilege of going into their farms to see what’s happening. Then privilege enough to make use of their equipment too. (KII/MALE/35YEAR/SPAIN)

Hence, it was found that the final consumer of the goods and services are made to suffer the consequences of government policies like high rate of tax and other expenses incurred when clearing goods from the port.

You see it’s about money right? When I’m talking about business, I’m restricting myself within my company. Whenever they force me to spend, maybe they tax me too much or maybe I want to clear my cars and they put too much on me, I don’t care about it anymore because I know at the end of the day the final consumer will suffer. So that gives me rest of mind, although it’s so sad, I know but I’m not part of the problem because the person that caused the problem in the first place made me to transfer my aggression to another person. (KII/MALE/60YEARS/CANADA)

Most interviewees emphasized they increase the prices of their goods so as to make up for incurred expenses during the cause of investing. This implies that the final consumer has to suffer the consequences. Some interviewees resort to taking alternatives to improve their investments- for instance, the use of generators to substitute for electricity. Others leverage on their kinship and social networks by getting supports/assistances from their friends and family members in terms of money, equipment and other intangible values.
Diaspora investments have a lot of impact on the development of Nigeria. Although many of the interviewees mentioned difficult investment climates and terrains they have to cope with while investing, they have several motivations and these motivations are keeping them going. Several reasons for investing in Nigeria include creation of employment, to gain more money, to help those in need, access to land, availability of capital and family/friends among others. The trajectories surrounding the starting up of investments have not really been easy for the international migrants but many are resolute:

Yeah, like you know to set up a business in Nigeria is not really a joke because you hardly see people that will help you because you need to try as much as possible to work hard on your own to try to source for capital and at the same time a lot of policies like…Okay let me give you an example. You can imagine in 2015 I was having almost 7 million naira that I invested in oil and gas like I tried to rent a fueling station whereby you can be selling Premium Motor Spirit (petrol/gas for vehicles) and other oil and gas thing. But at the end of the day sure to government policies and other things, that affected it like presently the rate of dollar to naira because that time I can tell you that it was one of my sisters that helped me and when she was sending me money dollar was 200 naira the same year and within 4 months that this business started and it went to add high as 400 naira. You can do the calculation and see the difference. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)

Migrants have motivations behind investing and these motivations sustain them. An interviewee, for instance explains his motivations for investing in Nigeria

Well, number 1, I believe Nigeria is my country, the country where I grew up especially the city I sell car that is where I grew up and I can tell you from a-z that this is how things were in those days because I’m used to the environment I can tell you this is where this is. If I need something I know where to get it unlike someone that is JJC (someone without experience) so that’s one of the reasons. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)

Some interviewees have investments just to create employment for people:

I just feel like, you can have a whole lot of money in the bank but it’s not going to increase even if there’s interest, it won’t be much. So instead of putting your money in bank, why can’t you just invest and be of help and take people out from the street and keep them busy. When I have money or if I have money, I’ll invest in my own country and keep people out of the street. So why not invest, why not help people. I also pay my tax. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/RWANDA)

An interviewee expresses his mind by saying it is profitable and it is better to invest in Nigeria than abroad,

Well maybe because I grew up in a political family, so I’ve always had that passion. And then secondary, let me say the first thing is I never saw myself working for anybody even right from my schooling days in UI (University of Ibadan). I never believed in working for somebody and I started little by little businesses while I was in school here. So we started little by little and it’s been well. No doubt, trust me. But one thing is we are interested in is the development of Nigeria. We’ll get there someday. (KII/MALE/35YEARS/SPAIN)

Migrants’ investments lead to development. Migrants’ investments are productive and lead to growth and development, for instance, in terms of employment
opportunities, infrastructural development of areas, generation of tax and revenue for the government and so on. Migrants’ investments have a lot of impacts on the development of Nigeria.

Migrants contribute to development in enormous ways and their contributions go beyond economic to include political, social and socialization. Even though remittances are the most profound contributions of the diaspora to development of homeland, findings suggest investments are becoming very common. This is against the background that many international migrants in the diaspora are increasingly aware that the only pathway to sustainably develop home countries is to reduce consumption funding and increase investment mobilization and this is key (Akanle and Adesina (2017a). Many migrants also fund investments because of the belief that they will experience return migration someday. Hence, many invest at home to increase sources of income as many of them are in the lower end of the economic systems at countries of destination. Migrants’ investments also contribute as ‘brain gain’ in home countries because of transfers of beneficial know-how, skills, competencies, businesses and education opportunities to homeland (De Haas, 2006, UNCTAD, 2009).

According to, therefore, increased support for diaspora enterprises and investments are fundamentally key and essential for sustainable development of countries of origin. Migrants’ investments play fundamentally important roles in reducing poverty by creating job opportunities and improving livelihoods through annexations of innovation, technology and capital. Migrants’ investments motivations have led to the sustainability of these investments. These investments have many impacts on growth and development of the Nigerian society. For instance, an interviewee that captured modal views on contributions to development of origin opines:

Well, you invest and you’re paying your tax so the government can easily get revenue from the tax you paid to do certain things so that’s the only contribution you can give to the government or to the society. Yeah, like at least presently now I have like 5 people working under me. And some are apprentice that came to learn. Do you understand me? So that’s how I give back to the society. (KII/MALE/44YEARS/CANADA)

Moreover, another interviewee observes:

Nigeria to a large extent it is still a virgin land in investment. Nigeria is a good place to invest. Take for instance; my business cannot flourish in America or in China or in Canada because they are fairly used. Not many people will like you patronize that but here I have the market. We are also giving back to the society as our CSR, Cooperate Social Responsibility. Students that can’t pay this, we help them. That’s also part of our responsibility. (KII/MALE/50YEARS/CHINA)

The investments have contributed greatly to the growth and development of Nigeria. These contributions include creation of employment opportunities, development of remote areas, generating revenue from tax and poverty alleviation among others.
8.5 Conclusion

Diaspora investments are very important to the development of Nigeria and West Africa. This is because the investments come with so many advantages than disadvantages. The physical capital investments are the most central forms of investment and this is evident in findings from the study that informed this chapter. These investments have been found to be in diverse scales but all very functional and celebratory. Some are small and some are large. More importantly, even the small scale has expansion outlooks which is good for sustainable development. International migrants are trying as much as possible to sustain their investments and also expand them by venturing into more investments in Nigeria. Choices of the types of investments are based on profit, ownership structure, competitiveness, passion and flexibility. The challenges faced by migrants investing in Nigeria are many and generally unfavourable.

The challenges are constraints to sustainable investments in Nigeria and the governments and key actors as well as strategic stakeholders have to address these if more investments will come to the country and if the current ones will survive into the nearest and distant futures. The challenges and constrains include unfavourable government policies, financial problems and unavailability of loans, security issues, and lack of supportive infrastructures like electricity, high import duties, frustrating ports processes when importing and exporting, complicated institutional arrangements, fraud and corruption and high tax rate among others. Despite these challenges, migrants adopt coping mechanisms for survival and sustainability. The investments have contributed greatly to the growth and development of Nigeria.

These contributions include creation of employment opportunities, rural urban renewal, technology transfers, capacity building, contribution to government revenue through payment of tax and poverty alleviation among others. However, to further encourage more investors in the country and Africa, governments should create more conducive investment environments and climates and institute specific protective nets for migrants who intent to invest in Nigeria and Africa. These may include, but not limited to, tax incentives, investment zones and special security and infrastructure architectures. There should also be availability of loans to diaspora investors whenever they face financial constraints and even when they are planning to invest in Nigeria.

References


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Remittances are one of the precious spin-offs of international migration in developing countries. They have been fast growing for the last decade, but like any other income, they fluctuate with economic conditions which are affected by several shocks, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, these transfers sometimes exceed Official Development Aid (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in some parts of the World such as Sub-Saharan Africa, demonstrating their importance for promoting socio-economic development. This chapter focuses on Burkina Faso, a West African country where more than 80% of the population practice subsistence agriculture, and bear heavily the consequences of poor climatic conditions, exacerbated by the ongoing climate change. The country also has a great history of migration mainly written by its colonial past. Using data from several sources such as the World Bank indicators and national surveys, this chapter aims firstly to understand the trends of remittances flows in the country for the last decade. Secondly, using a national survey on migration conducted in the country, we found that receiving international remittances increases the probability of setting up a non-agricultural business. This result suggests that remittances can help households to set up businesses and be less dependent on climatic conditions.
9.1 Introduction

The ongoing Covid 19 pandemic has undoubtedly affected the lives of millions of people whether directly or indirectly. From the economic point of view, projections are alarming for many sectors of the economy. According to the World Bank, a decline in the amount of remittances is expected, and stems from the fall in the incomes of migrant workers in their countries of destination, as they are usually the most vulnerable on the labor market (World Bank, 2020). These inflows however represent an important source of income for poorer households in developing countries. As a matter of fact, the 2030 development agenda emphasizes their importance in target 10c that aims to reduce to “less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%” (UNDP, 2020).

Regarding the current situation, the World Bank predicts a sharp decline by 20% of global remittances resulting from the impact of covid 19 and national shutdowns. This decline is projected to be 23.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Though SSA countries do not rank among the top remittance-receiving countries, worker’s remittances more than doubled between 2000 and 2006 (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2012). Remittances play a key role in reducing the negative impacts of a broad variety of shocks, (both before and after the shocks), but there is no unanimity in the direction of this impact.

Regarding the old scourge of poverty, Adams and Page (2005), working on developing countries, showed that remittances reduce poverty, by lowering the number of people living under the poverty threshold by 3.5%. For Acosta et al. (2006), if the share of remittances to GDP increases by 1%, it results in a decrease of 0.4% of poverty rates. For Moises and Donghun (2011), the dampening effect of international remittances on poverty is more noticeable for the 10% poorest countries. At the micro-level, similar results have been found in the case of Mexico (Lopez-Cordova, 2005), Nepal (Loskin & Bontch-Osmolovski, 2010), Mali (Gubert et al., 2010), and Ghana (Adams & Alfredo, 2013; Asiedu & Chimbar, 2020). Poverty put aside, empirical literature found that remittances have a dampening effect on consumption instability (Ebeke and Combes, 2011), climate shocks (Tapsoba et al., 2019), child labor (Boutin & Bargain, 2015) and income inequalities (Chauvet & Mesplé-Somps, 2007; Koechlin & Leon, 2007).

In the case of Burkina Faso, Lachaud (1999, 2005) showed that between 1999 and 2005, the country noted a poverty rise due to the decrease of remittances from Burkinabè migrants living in Ivory Coast. This period was marked by the political context between 1998 and 2003 that caused the fleeing of a large number of Burkinabè immigrants. Lachaud used two surveys conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography (INSD) of Burkina Faso to assess the impact of remittances on poverty. The first one conducted in May 1998 concerned 8478 households, the second one in April 2003 concerned 8500 households across the country. The latter had a specific module regarding the Ivorian crisis. Remittances were measured by a binary variable, with one representing households receiving...
remittances that constituted up to 75% of all transfers received, and poverty variables referring to poverty lines defined by INSD. Hence being poor was defined as inability to ensure basic needs, estimated at 72690 FCFA per capita per year in 1998 and 82,672 FCFA in 2003. The author found that remittances reduce poverty both in rural and urban areas. Regarding urban areas, the author argues that remittances help the most vulnerable such as inactive, jobless, independent workers, and mainly farmers, by relaxing their economic constraints in the short term. In the long term, remittances can help households set up activities and businesses to increase their income.

From a national development point of view, the literature shows that remittances have a significant impact on investment, particularly in transport. Migrants in their country of destination or return migrants bring their expertise in this sector, by renewing the vehicles and offering new services (Bredeloup & Kouraogo, 2007). In the short term, Sabo and Kouraogo (2013) state that remittances ease the financial constraint of recipients, enhance their ability to avoid poverty and hunger, and promote gender equity in education.

As stated earlier, the beneficial effect of remittances on people’s living conditions is not unanimously recognized in the literature. In the short term, they can dig the gap between households who can send a migrant abroad (in the end receive remittances), and others that cannot. However, as migrants leave the locality, they may establish networks that could be used by members of poorer households to migrate (Mouhoud, 2010). In the same vein, Stark et al. (1986) argue that the network resulting from the migration of people from the community may allow households with no migrants to also experience migration and remittances. Hence, remittances may initially increase inequalities, but decrease it later on, due to the network developed by primary migrants abroad. At the macro level, Ebeke (2010) found a nonlinear impact of remittances on inequalities. In the context of poor countries such as SSA countries, they exacerbate income inequalities and reduce them in North African countries. Social inequalities between migrant households and non-migrant households can also take the form of discrimination or stigmatization of migrant households. Some of these households might be stereotyped as more prone to leisure thanks to the remittances they receive (Gubert, 2007; Acosta et al., 2009).

In the case of Burkina Faso and according to Wourtese (2008), remittances contribute to increasing inequalities between households that receive remittances and households that do not. This point of view is somehow shared by Lachaud (1999) who also argues that the dampening effect of remittances on inequalities is only found in the rural areas. Hence, remittances tend to exacerbate inequalities in urban areas. Cazachevici et al. (2020), adding to the numerous empirical work on the effect of remittances, produced a meta-analysis of their impact on the growth of countries. Based on 538 estimates, the authors found that 40% of them report no effect, 20% a negative effect, and 40% found a positive effect. They suggest that remittances are growth enhancers in Asia, but not in Africa (Cazachevici et al., 2020).

The usage of remittances by households can somehow give an insight into why this inflow has or does not have an impact on people’s livelihood. In the case of Burkina Faso, Dabiré (2016) highlights the developmental impact of international
migration. Hence, the Center East region of Burkina Faso is according to the author, a testimony to the development impact of remittances. The diaspora input takes multiple modern forms and modern circuits such as banks, financial and governmental institutions. The remittances they send help families to improve their livelihood by modernizing their agricultural techniques, diversifying their sources of income, and building more resilience to climate shocks. It is therefore a matter of how remittances are used by receiving households to avoid poverty. A report of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests that households who receive remittances in urban areas mainly use them for education, health, and savings purposes. Rural areas rather use them for agricultural activities and health expenses (OCDE/ISSP, 2017).

In this chapter, we are taking advantage of a migration survey conducted in the country in 2014 to go further into understanding the developmental impact of remittances, by assessing the ability of adults to set up businesses when receiving remittances. There is an interesting and abundant literature regarding the role that remittances plays in explaining scourges such as food insecurity, income inequalities and poverty in Africa, and specially in Burkina Faso. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the link between remittances and enterprises in Burkina Faso. We aim to contribute to the discussion on the developmental effect of remittances, by assessing if receipt of remittances motivate people to set up non-agricultural businesses. By doing so, they become less dependent on climatic conditions, more capable of fulfilling their needs, and improving their living standards, which ultimately enables them to participate in national development.

### 9.2 Remittances and Development in Burkina Faso

#### 9.2.1 Migration and Remittances in the History of Burkina Faso

The current pattern of migration in Burkina Faso is intimately linked to the colonial history of the country. During the colonial times, the country was considered a labour force tank, where French people drew their labour force for the development of the West African French colony. Hence, during the twentieth century, 40% of Burkinabè male migration was towards international destinations. Ivory Coast was the first destination, because of French colonial interest, and Ghana came second, mainly because of geographical proximity and the less coercive character of British laws (Piché & Cordell, 2015).

Workers’ migration towards the neighboring countries had already at the time, financial spin-offs. Migration towards Ivory Coast for example was financially compensated in exchange for work in commercial agriculture, forestry, and the construction of the main railway linking Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso (Surret-Canale, 1964; Mandé, 1992; Piché & Cordell, 2015). In the case of Ghana, where the
migration was on a voluntary basis, Burkinabè’s surveyed between 1900 and 1931 declared that they went to Ghana to work in agriculture, and earn higher salaries.\(^1\)

Since the independence of the country, Gregory (1974) suggested that in the period 1968–1970, remittances in the country were estimated between 12,000 and 20,000 FCFA per capita per year. Specifically, on the migration towards Ivory Coast, a study by Kohler (1972) showed that short-term migration (between a year and two years) brings the most remittances with an estimated 32,500 FCFA per capita. This result is emphasized by Rémy (1968) who found that migration between 6 and 18 months is the most lucrative. Studies showed an important role of remittances on the national budget. Hence, Songré and Sawadogo (1972) using the West African Central Bank (BCEAO) data showed that in 1968 and 1970, Burkinabè in Ivory Coast sent between 3.2 and 5 billion FCFA home. The amounts gathered in 1968 could have represented according to Piché and Cordell (2015), 3.3% of the GDP and 3.5% of the receiving households’ income. A percentage which is underestimated according to Kohler (1972), who thinks that the numbers are 25 to 35% in reality. For Coulibaly (1987), the same year of 1968 recorded remittances worth 75% of the total value of exports, 52% of the national budget, and 7.6% of the GDP between 1968 and 1978. Lastly, for Blion (1990), remittances sent between 1970 and 1974 covered 43% of the commercial deficit of the country. Despite the amount, some authors suggest that their impact is very little on development. From the money sent back home, 1/3 was used to pay taxes, and the rest was sometimes used for prestigious consumption (clothes, jewelry, bikes, radios) (Kohler, 1972; Coulibaly, 1987).

9.2.2 Sources of Remittances Data and Their Impact on Development

9.2.2.1 The World Bank Indicators

The World Bank is one of the main global sources of information on remittances. They record personal remittances which are personal transfers and employee compensation. Personal transfers come from countries’ balance of payments. They are goods or financial assets sent by migrants to people in their countries of origin. They include according to BCEAO, personal transfers, and transfers from non-lucrative organizations in favor of households (BCEAO, 2013). Personal transfers also do not take into account the filiation link between the sender and the recipient.

Employee compensation are the seasonal income of nonresident employees, working in a foreign country. These data give an insight into the evolution of remittances, but the reason for sending and the utilization of these funds are not

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\(^1\)A study conducted at this time on return migrants show that the majority of them declared that they went to Ghana to earn more money and be able to pay the taxes in the French colony of Haute Volta at the time (Marchal, 1980).
recorded. These flows are generally rising for most of the recipient countries, however, the scientific community often thinks that they are underestimated. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005) argue that only banks and money sending operators are traceable. Informal channels such as “hand to hand” are difficult to monitor on a macro level. Clemens and Mckenzie (2014) argue that the common increase of remittances is mainly due to the improvement of tracking systems, rather than the rise in the amount sent or the rise in the stock of migrants abroad. Between 1990 and 2010, only 21% of the remittances’ growth is effectively due to a growth in the stock of migrants, and the improvement of their living conditions in destination countries (Clemens & Mckenzie, 2014). The remaining 79% are only the cause of more sophisticated ways of measuring remittances.

Figure 9.1 shows the evolution of personal remittances in Burkina Faso since 1974. When looking at the last 20 years, we can see that since 2000, remittances have been generally rising, with small declines, which can be explained by global challenges and political conditions in the main destination country of Burkinabè migrants. Ivory Coast’s political situation in the early 2000s caused the fleeing of hundreds of thousands of Burkinabè, resulting in a decline of remittances. In that situation, Lachaud (2005) argues that 21.1% of households were receiving remittances from Ivory Coast in 1998, and only 4.8% of them were receiving remittances in 2003. After this difficult period, the amounts of remittances started to grow again, thanks to the end of conflicts in Ivory Coast. Migrant workers were able to go back to the Ivory Coast, where a large number of them had their lands. The global financial crisis in 2007 caused a small decline in remittances in 2008, but in the following years, the amounts grew again. It is important to note that through the years, the destination of migrant workers diversified. Hence, Burkinabè began to broaden their horizon, and in absence of a national census, national surveys often showed that Burkinabè were now migrating towards countries like Italy, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and Guinea Conakry. Nevertheless, Ivory Coast remains the main destination, and the spinoff of this migration has been recorded by early national surveys on migration.

9.2.2.2 National Surveys and the Impact of Remittances on Development

Two main migration surveys have been conducted in Burkina Faso after the independence. The first one in 1974 was collecting retrospective data on the population’s movement and was gender-sensitive. Stories of 93,387 migrants were recorded (Coulibaly et al., 1975). The second one, conducted in 2000 recorded migration information of 8644 Burkinabè (Piché & Cordell, 2015).

According to Piché and Cordell (2015), studies using the first survey showed that labor migration had no impact on the development of Burkina Faso. Using remittances as an explanatory variable, they show that they had no significant impact on development measured by the setup of productive activity. For the second survey, the discussion mainly focused on the dampening effect of remittances on poverty. Living standards indicators designed by the INSD showed that the vast majority of remittances received by households were coming from the Ivory Coast. However, the flow started to decline around the 1990s. For Lachaud (1999), this reduction contributed to making households poorer. Sawadogo (2009) tried to explain this finding by arguing that people receiving remittances are more reluctant to work, and often abandon their jobs, relying on remittances sent by previous household members. On a macro level, using economic growth as a development indicator, Piché and Cordell (2015) show that indeed poverty did not go down with migration, but rather went up. On this matter, Ouedraogo (2009) thinks that development might not be centered only on the financial impact, but also on health, education, life expectancy, to understand the role of remittances and migration.

Since these two surveys, numerous surveys have been conducted in the country, addressing migration issues whether directly or indirectly. The INSD often conduct surveys that do not exclusively concern migration, but some questions give a view of what is going on in the migration scene. Examples are living standards surveys (INSD, 2018), Demography and Health surveys, and national censuses. Generally, for INSD, 46% of remittances are used for food consumption, 15.5% for economic activities, 12.4% for health, 6.1% for education. An analysis of the link between poverty and population using three series of data, namely living conditions standards survey, demography and health surveys, confirm that migration and remittances have a positive impact on children schooling and better housing conditions (Zoukaléini & Kaboré, 2007).

We chose to present here the results of a survey conducted by BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) in the West African Economic and

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2 The last national census conducted in 2019 results is yet to be published, but features interesting questions about migration and remittances.
Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries in 2011. This survey aimed to understand the pattern of workers’ remittances in the WAEMU area. The Central Bank emphasizes that remittances were fast-growing and ranked at the second position of inflows, surpassing ODA and behind FDI. They defined workers’ remittances as money sent from a former member of a household living in a foreign country. This money represents a fraction of what is earned by the migrant abroad, and have the following characteristics:

- They are transactions between individuals or households;
- They are rather sent from richer countries to less rich countries;
- They rise during festivities (religious and cultural events such as Ramadan Christmas...);
- They are usually small amounts sent frequently;
- They vary with economic conditions in countries of destination and shocks in countries of origin;
- They sent mainly through informal channels.

In Burkina Faso, 2281 households have been part of the survey. Results show that 74% of the remittances were sent via formal channels such as money sending operators. Obviously, 30.9% of the remittances were from Ivory Coast, with a total of 46.9% remittances coming from the rest of Africa.

Figure 9.2 suggests that 37% of remittances were used for consumption (CN), 25.7% for investments in property (IMM), 16.3% for other investments (INV), and 15% for education (EDU). The survey used in this work however do not give information about the usage of remittances by households. However, in the following lines, and given the availability of data, we try to understand if people who receive remittances in the context of this survey, use them for longer term purposes, which are setting up businesses.

### 9.3 Remittances and Enterprises

In a country where 80% of the population is living on subsistence agriculture, income diversification can be a good way of facing possible shocks. However, income and activities’ diversification highly depend on the financial capacity of households, their aversion to risks, and several other determinants related to their characteristics (Barrett et al., 2001). Financial barriers are however one of the main determinants. They can prevent poor households (that are the most vulnerable) from developing nonagricultural activities, especially when insurance and credit markets are deficient (Reardon, 2001). These barriers tend to leave poorer households into less diversified income activities, and higher risks of income variations. Therefore, when finances draw the investment patterns, asset poverty trap can emerge, causing the poor households to stay unable to break through a circle of low return activities, while wealthier households diversify in more remunerating activities (Barrett et al., 2001). Transfers such as remittances can act as barrier lifters. In fact, due to market
failures, agricultural households take part in non-farm activities in two steps (Reardon, 1997a, b). First, they can sell labour to the migratory market, and secondly, use remittances (assuming with the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), that migration decision is taken at the household level, and that migrants keep interactions with their families through remittances) to set up businesses and invest in other remunerated activities.

According to the INSD, an enterprise is an economic entity, that aims to produce goods and services for selling purposes (INSD, 2018). The literature linking remittances and entrepreneurship often measure entrepreneurship with self-employment variables. This literature is very global, and often find a positive impact of remittances on the probability of setting up businesses. Hence, in the case of Kosovo (Kotorri et al., 2020), Tunisia (Mesnard, 2004), Albania (Piracha & Vadean, 2010), Uzbekistan (Kakhkharov, 2018), El Salvador (Acosta, 2007), it was found that remittances have a positive and significant impact on the probability of being self-employed (setting up an enterprise). More precisely, using microdata in Mexico, Shapiro and Mandelman (2016) showed that remittances have a positive impact on

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Fig. 9.2 Remittances utilization. (Source 2: Report of the BCEAO survey on remittances)
self-employment, qualified as micro-enterprises by the authors. In the case of Ecuador, Vasco (2013) argues that there is no effect of remittances or migration on the probability of households owning businesses. However, education and access to services are correlated positively with the probability of owning an enterprise. Also in Latin America, Acosta (2007) underlines the importance of gender and living in an urban area in understanding the link between remittances and entrepreneurship in El Salvador. In the case of Africa, to the best of our knowledge, micro-level studies that seek to understand the impact of remittances on entrepreneurship are rare. However, examining 19 African countries, Ajide and Osinubi (2020) found that remittances and foreign aid are complementary, impacting positively the creation of small start-ups. In the case of Burkina Faso, we then propose to assess the impact of international remittances on the creation of nonagricultural businesses using the OECD/ISSP survey on migration and development.

### 9.3.1 Descriptive Statistics

The 2014 national migration survey conducted in Burkina Faso gives us a good insight of the development potential of remittances in Burkina Faso. Sponsored by OECD and conducted by ISSP, the IPPMD (Interractions entre politiques publiques migration et développement) survey which was conducted between April and May 2014 has both a quantitative and qualitative fieldwork components. The quantitative fieldwork of the study surveyed 2200 households, consisting of 63% non-migrant households and 38% migrant households. The study aimed to understand the relationship between migration and key sectors such as the labor market, agriculture, education, investment, and financial services (OCDE/ISSP, 2017).

The sampling in the survey considered two criteria which were urbanization and the intensity of international migration. Urbanization was chosen as a criterion given that cities are more attractive for international return migrants, and that rural areas are the departure areas for emigration. The international migration criterion was based on the 2006 national census of Burkina Faso, where the results show that the majority of international migration was towards Ivory Coast (INSD, 2009). In each district, the number of international emigrants plus the number of international returned migrants were divided by the total number of the population in the district.

The descriptive analysis gives us an insight of the migration, but also remittances pattern from Burkinabè abroad.

Figure 9.3 shows that the primary destination of Burkinabès is Ivory Coast at 76%, followed by Ghana at 4.4%, Gabon at 4.1%, Mali at 3.7%, and Equatorial Guinea at 2.5%. The remaining percentage is for numerous countries in Africa (Angola, Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Congo Brazaville, The Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo), Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands), Americas (USA, Brazil), and Asia (Taiwan, UAE). This shows the rather diverse destinations of Burkina Faso’s migrants, but the historical and colonial destinations remain.
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of households according to their migration status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Households with international migrants</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Households with no international migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food expenditures</td>
<td>22876.6</td>
<td>Food expenditures</td>
<td>24558.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen carburant</td>
<td>6987.5</td>
<td>Kitchen carburant</td>
<td>4899.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport expenditures</td>
<td>12770.81</td>
<td>Transport expenditures</td>
<td>13671.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water expenditures</td>
<td>3000.957</td>
<td>Water expenditures</td>
<td>3588.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity expenditures</td>
<td>8813.327</td>
<td>Electricity expenditures</td>
<td>8391.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditures</td>
<td>22480.14</td>
<td>Health expenditures</td>
<td>22479.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School expenditures</td>
<td>58313.64</td>
<td>School expenditures</td>
<td>73507.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing expenditures</td>
<td>32076.98</td>
<td>Clothing expenditures</td>
<td>33581.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural expenditures</td>
<td>45926.32</td>
<td>Agricultural expenditures</td>
<td>51392.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source 4: OECD/ISSP survey and author’s calculations

On a total of 2200 households, 13.77% have an international migrant and 86.23% do not. Table 9.1 shows different expenses with a distinction of their migration status. Regarding food, transport, water, school clothing, and agricultural expenditures, households with no migration experience spend more money. In the case of health expenditures, though the number of migrant households is lower than non-migrant households, their average expenditures in health are close to non-migrant households. Expenditures in carburant and electricity appear higher for migrant households.
9.3.2 Remittances and the Probability of Setting Up a Business

9.3.2.1 Baseline Specification

We are estimating the following model, where:

\[ Y_i = a_i + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \varepsilon_i \]

\( Y_i \): takes the value 1 if the individual owns an enterprise
\( a_i \): Constant term
\( X_i \): takes 1 if the individual received international remittances
\( Z_i \): other explanatory variables like age, gender, school levels, marital status and living in a rural/urban area.
\( \varepsilon_i \): error term

Table 9.2 presents the first results of the probit estimation. The results suggest that receiving remittances increases the probability of individuals setting up a nonagricultural business. Marital status also seems to explain very well this probability. When the individual is married, there is a higher probability to set up a business. This can be explained by the responsibility that comes with being married and having to provide for the family. Also, in many African countries, marriage is sometimes a matter of two families coming together, and with that, comes a huge financial responsibility.

Living in a rural area decreases the probability to set up a business. Rural areas are usually agricultural areas, where opportunities for income diversification are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>0.139*</td>
<td>0.142*</td>
<td>0.156**</td>
<td>0.190**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0751)</td>
<td>(0.0754)</td>
<td>(0.0758)</td>
<td>(0.0760)</td>
<td>(0.0771)</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.298****</td>
<td>0.358****</td>
<td>0.372****</td>
<td>0.409****</td>
<td>0.336****</td>
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<td>(0.0502)</td>
<td>(0.0513)</td>
<td>(0.0518)</td>
<td>(0.0570)</td>
<td>(0.0579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
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<td>−0.313***</td>
<td>−0.312***</td>
<td>−0.427***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td>(0.0485)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>−0.200***</td>
<td>−0.214***</td>
<td>−0.258***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td>(0.0456)</td>
<td>(0.0465)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.00410**</td>
<td>−0.00671***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00161)</td>
<td>(0.00162)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0661)</td>
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<td>R.Squared</td>
<td>0.0096</td>
<td>0.0214</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6335</td>
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<td>6335</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source 5: OECD/ISSP survey and author’s calculations

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
rare. The literature in fact argue that in order to cope with eventual shortages of income, individuals often engage themselves in non-agricultural activities for three main reasons. They may want to insure themselves against food or consumption shortages (Reardon et al., 1992), they may just want to survive when facing shocks (Islam, 1997), or they have an opportunity (Reardon, 1997a; Murdoch, 1995). This opportunity often comes with the development of markets, which create new activities, and opportunities for the population. Cities are usually the result of this development and therefore may explain for our estimation, the fact that living in a rural area hurt the probability of setting up a business.

Gender also plays a big role. Our results show that being a female decreases the probability to set up a business. The same result is found for age and having a secondary school level or more. Regarding gender, its fairly understandable given the fact that women are not often found in the entrepreneurial scene in Burkina Faso, especially in rural areas. Regarding schooling, it is important to note that surveys conducted by the INSD on employment and informal sector, showed that the majority of self-employed people have never been to school, or have a primary school level (INSD, 2016a, b). Hence, the result of our schooling variable is not surprising.

### 9.3.2.2 Heterogeneity

Given that Burkina Faso is mainly an agricultural country, we ascertained if there is any difference between agricultural households and non-agricultural households. To do so, we divided our sample into two, using a variable coming from the question “During the last 12 months, did your household exploited a farm”. This question sought to capture the information regarding the fact that the household worked in the agricultural sector during the last 12 months. From this question, we found that 66.68% of adults were living in agricultural households and 33.32% were living in non agricultural households. For the sub-sample of agricultural households, we introduced two additional control variables, which are the surface area of the crop field, and a binary variable that takes 1 if the household sells a part of its harvest. On average, individuals are living in households that have 4.57 ha of crop field. Also, 39.04% of individuals are living in households that sell a part of their harvest to the market. Results in Table 9.3 show that receiving remittances do not explain the probability of setting up a business in the case of agricultural households. Rural areas being mainly poorer, one can expect that remittances may not be enough to deal with immediate expenses such as food expenditures, and also contribute to setting up non agricultural businesses. In fact, living in a rural area reduces the probability of setting up a non agricultural business. Results are the same for characteristics such as gender (being a woman), age, and having a secondary school level or more. We can also see that if the total field area owned by the household increases, the probability of setting up a business decreases. This result suggests that bigger land owners might not be encouraged to set up non agricultural businesses, perhaps because their agricultural activity is enough for them. The same result is found for the variable that capture if the household is selling a part of its harvests. Hence,
### Table 9.3 Results for agricultural households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.0905</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.0733</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0954)</td>
<td>(0.0961)</td>
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<td>(0.0952)</td>
<td>(0.0957)</td>
<td>(0.0999)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>0.667***</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
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<td>0.420***</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
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<td>Rural area</td>
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<td>−0.353***</td>
<td>−0.359***</td>
<td>−0.396***</td>
<td>−0.279***</td>
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<td>Gender (Female)</td>
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<td>Total field area</td>
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<td>−0.0607***</td>
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<td>Harvest sold</td>
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<td>4203</td>
<td>3993</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source 6: OECD/ISSP survey and author’s calculations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 9.4  Results for non agricultural households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
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<td>0.249*</td>
<td>0.247*</td>
<td>0.229*</td>
<td>0.285**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>0.354***</td>
<td>0.356***</td>
<td>0.325***</td>
<td>0.263***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.0781)</td>
<td>(0.0831)</td>
<td>(0.0847)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>−0.0188</td>
<td>−0.0303</td>
<td>−0.0196</td>
<td>−0.172</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>−0.176**</td>
<td>−0.169**</td>
<td>−0.266***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0739)</td>
<td>(0.0742)</td>
<td>(0.0784)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00420</td>
<td>−0.000628</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00269)</td>
<td>(0.00277)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>school level</td>
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<td>−0.655***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0873)</td>
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<td>R.Squared</td>
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<td>0.0165</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.0666</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source 7: OECD/ISSP survey and author’s calculations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

selling a part of their harvest decreases the probability of setting up a non agricultural business. This result is understandable if we consider that households that sell the crops they harvest can be considered as a form of agricultural business. The conclusion here, might be that belonging to a household that has a type of agricultural business reduces the probability of an individual to set up a business.

Table 9.4 shows the result for nonagricultural households, and the results are fairly different, but similar to the main specification results. People who receive remittances are more likely to set up businesses, and the coefficient is significant. This result is the same for married people, who are also more likely to set up businesses. Some characteristics however play negatively. Indeed, people living in rural areas, having at least secondary school education, and women are less likely to set up businesses.

9.4 Conclusion

The present work took advantage of the World Bank indicators, national living standards surveys, and latest 2014 migration survey conducted by ISSP to understand the remittances patterns and the role they play in development in Burkina Faso. Personal remittances recorded by the World Bank Group show that they have been rapidly growing for the past 20 years, with a few fluctuations due to political issues in the main destination country of Burkinabè migrants’ (Ivory Coast), as well as global issues such as the 2007 financial crisis. The living standards surveys that
measured indirectly some migration indicators show that remittances have been mainly used by households for consumption, and mainly nonproductive expenditures.

The survey sponsored by OECD and led by ISSP aimed to understand the links between migration and development. Descriptive statistics first showed that the historical migration pattern of Burkina Faso is still up to date. Hence the majority of migrant workers still have Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Mali as main destination countries. Descriptive statistics also showed that nonmigrant households do often engage more in nonproductive activities.

Secondly, focusing on remittances and adult people, we attempted to understand the role that remittances play regarding the probability of starting a business. The results show several interesting conclusions. When receiving remittances, people are more likely to set up businesses. Moreover, the responsibility that comes with marriage plays an important role as they increase the probability of setting up a business. Age, being a female, living in a rural area, and having a secondary school level decreases the probability of starting a business. Regarding the rurality, one can think that cities offer more opportunities than villages. Regarding school level, the national survey on employment and informal sector showed that most businesses are led by young male people, who have a maximum of primary school level. When dividing our sample in two according to the farming status of households, we found that remittances play no role in setting a business up.

Our results suggest that agricultural households do not use remittances they receive for new activities such as non agricultural businesses. We saw in Sect. 9.2.2.2 that national surveys conducted in the country suggest that remittances received by households are mainly used for short term consumption. For this subpopulation of agricultural households, that are usually the poorer, remittances might just not be enough for them to fulfill their basic needs, and develop other activities. Hence, remittances seem to help people who are not primarily living on agriculture to further develop enterprises. People who live in agricultural households however, might use them for short term purposes such as consumption.

Given the ongoing crisis and the conflict context of Burkina Faso, the horizon seems very gloomy for the development of the country. In fact, remittances are expected to drop significantly for receiving countries according to World Bank and may cause an impoverishment of households that were former recipients. In order to ensure that this precious source of income helps the population to avoid poverty durably, government, as well as development institutions should contribute to identifying productive sectors of the economy where households can invest remittances that they receive. As stated by Maphosa (2007) based on a study in Zimbabwe, countries such as Burkina Faso and international organizations should implement programs to encourage the flow of remittances, and channel them into sustainable investments, which can contribute significantly to poverty reduction and development. Also, following goal 10 of the sustainable development goals, efforts should be made to facilitate a safe transfer of remittances at lower costs.
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Reardon, T. (2001). *Rural non-farm income in developing countries.* FAO.


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Chapter 10
Migrants in the Plantation Economy in Côte d’Ivoire: A Historical Perspective

Nohoua Traoré and Gertrude Dzifa Torvikey

The chapter is a contribution to deepening knowledge on the historical trajectories of migration in Côte d’Ivoire. Based on a critical review of documents and literature, the chapter highlights the different waves of migration into Côte d’Ivoire. Both colonial and post-colonial coercive and attractive migration policies created the country as an important migration hub in West Africa. We situate the development of the cash crop economy in Côte d’Ivoire and its 20 years economic boom between 1960s and early 1980s, within the history of labour migrations into the country and the later crises that ensued as a result. While the development of the Ivorian economy was the driver for the policies during the period, the colonial era labour movements into the area hinged on repressive labour policies while the latter period was an attractive open door policy which included favourable land, citizenship and voting right grants to migrants. We reflected on how demographic growth and economic recession of the 1990s blurred this dynamic, thus leading to a change in the relationship between indigenes and migrants. The situation has led to a rigidity of Ivorian laws that cumulated in military, political and post electoral crises and civil strife thereby putting a brake on immigration. We reflected on the accentuation of migrant flows and transfers into the country in the recent Ivoirian migration and civic discourse and narratives which silence the contribution of migrants to the economic development of Côte d’Ivoire and the historical foundations of immigration and of a strong presence of foreign labour in the country. This we argue has ramifications for the management of migration in the country.

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Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire

G. D. Torvikey (✉)
Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
10.1 Introduction

Labour migration across the world has been increasing and a deepening of old migration patterns (IOM, 2020). In Africa, migration is an old phenomenon and remains relevant in the social, economic, cultural and political transformations on the continent. Generally, intra-African migration flows are directed towards forest regions at the expense of savannah regions which is also the cause of low growth in the sending areas (Administrative Censuses 1955, 1965; National Institute of Statistics 1975, 1988). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), region accounted for the highest rates (2.2%) of international migration followed by the East African Community (EAC) with an estimated rate of 2.1% in 2014 (African Union, 2015). Mobility in the region has been influenced by a number of factors including social networks and ethnic ties, ECOWAS’s free movement of persons and goods protocols and historical labour migration patterns. An important factor is the development imbalances within countries and among countries. Mobility has seen two main directions, from subsistent agricultural production regions to export crop agricultural regions.

The second is the out-migration from the subsistence agricultural regions to industrial zones (Velenchik, 1993). Environmental distress in the sahelian regions has also lead to mobility from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger towards the coastal and forest regions in West Africa particularly Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Most migrations are circular, seasonal and permanent. The chapter traced back the history of migration in Côte d’Ivoire by highlighting the relevant complexities. The introduction is followed by a discussion of the evolution of migration in the country. The next sections detailed the forced migration patterns in the colonial period, the voluntary migration trends in the post-independence era, the role of the military, political and electoral crises in the evolution of immigration flows and the investigation of the modes of access of migrants to land in Côte d’Ivoire. Child labour is discussed as a significant element of the migration history of the country. The concluding part presents a synthesis of the Ivorian migration history.

10.2 Trend and Patterns of Migration in Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire has been one of the main immigration countries in Africa since its independence. Indeed, since then, the annual growth rate of the number of immigrants has oscillated between 1.8% and 4.4% before dropping to 0.3% during the period 2000–2005 because of the politico-military crisis that took place there (UN-DESA, 2009). It is the second most important destination for international migrants on the continent with South Africa being the first while its city, Abidjan is among the top three migration hubs on the continent in addition to Johannesburg and Nairobi. In 2017, 2.1 million intra-African migrants lived in Côte d’Ivoire. Due to its changing nature of definition of migrants, a number of estimates have been
referred to show the extent of migration in the country historically. In 2015, the migrant estimates was 10% of the total population, 4 million or 25% in 1998 (Republique de Côte d’Ivoire, 2001), 15% in 1990 and 23% in 1970 (OCDE/CIRES, 2017). According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS, 2002: 45), the number of immigrants was 2,163,644 in the 1998 census. This represented 14.1% of the population. In 1988, 2% of immigrants were foreign-born Ivorians returning to the country, but most immigrants were foreigners (98%) from, in order of importance, Burkina Faso (54.3%), Mali (18.1%), Guinea (5.5%) and Ghana (4.9%).

In 1975, one-third of Ivorians lived in places other than their place of birth. These figures show both degree of internal migration and immigration flows. The immigrant population rates have shown significant decline since 1988 when the economic crisis and neoliberal development paradigm took the centre stage (Table 10.1). The development of the plantation economy has perpetuated and reinforced internal and external migration flows to the Ivorian forest zone. The implicit migration policy that prevailed in Côte d’Ivoire was characterized by an openness to the free movement of people and goods, and easy access to land ownership, enshrined in the famous expression “the land belongs to the person who develops it”.

The population census shows that the migrant population has always represented a significant proportion (over 41%) of the Ivorian population although it has been declining since 1988. The proportion was 47.2% in 1975; 42% in 1988; 41.4% in 1993; 42.7% in 1998 and 41.72 in 2014 (Table 10.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>548,242</td>
<td>866,547</td>
<td>1,152,189</td>
<td>1,408,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>235,683</td>
<td>379,401</td>
<td>387,493</td>
<td>398,581</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>66,522</td>
<td>120,147</td>
<td>117,886</td>
<td>107,662</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>44,021</td>
<td>137,340</td>
<td>97,444</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>27,685</td>
<td>45,987</td>
<td>54,199</td>
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<td>64,332</td>
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<td>49,619</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>65,626</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9975</td>
<td>14,609</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25,040</td>
<td>21,196</td>
<td>284,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not declared</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,049,184</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,742,664</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,120,459</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,290,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of immigrants in total population** 70.0 57.3 53.0 41.72

The Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina-Faso corridor is the second important migration corridor in Africa with 1.3 million flows in 2017. In 1975, there were 548,242 Burkinabé migrants in the country. This figure increased to 1,408,780 in 2014. Table 10.1 shows a constant increase in Burkinabe migrant population in Côte d’Ivoire since 1975. Similarly, the Burkinabe population in Côte d’Ivoire has continued to increase. There were 86,282 in 1960 and in 2014, this figure increased to 3,552,173 (Table 10.2).

The other corridors include Côte d’Ivoire- Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire- Mali both of which are mainly labour migration routes (UNCTAD, 2018). In 2019, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) (2019) estimated that 2,549,141 were living in Côte d’Ivoire. The statistics also show Côte d’Ivoire among the top 20 destinations of migrants in Africa with Côte d’Ivoire- Burkina Faso migration corridor the second most significant in Africa. Despite the various socio-political crises that marked the first decade of the 2000s, the percentage of immigrants in the total population is quite high. Among the ten countries analysed in the report, Côte d’Ivoire has the highest immigration rate, estimated at 9.6% in 2015 (OECD/ILO, 2018). According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), the high gross activity rate among immigrants (almost 60%) suggests that immigration to Côte d’Ivoire is mostly labour driven (INS, 2002).

Migrant flows into Côte d’Ivoire are an essential part of the socioeconomic formations of the country historically. Characterised by an impressive economic growth for 20 years between 1960 and early 1980s, and the leading cocoa producer in the world, migration into Côte d’Ivoire has shown some complexities important to note. The commercialisation of coffee and cocoa has resulted in land and labour induced migrations either through coercive policies or voluntary migration. Cocoa production expanded from the 1920s on the back of immigrants from Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso and Mali in particular.

The country like many other peasant economies was built on an outward and export-led agricultural commodity production. Cocoa and coffee were the crops that propelled the country’s consistent GDP growth of 7% for 20 years and an

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>86,282</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>155,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>774,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>2,238,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,552,173</td>
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unprecedented GDP per capita growth of US$3770 in 1988 (Lambert et al., 1991). Côte d’Ivoire was undoubtedly a middle income country. However, this growth was driven by migrant labour and keen participation in the economy due to open migration policies during the period. Compared to Ghana, its cocoa production grew faster recording a 13-fold growth. In 1970, the country produced 67,000 tonnes of cocoa. It saw a remarkable increase in production in 1988 with an astonishing 880,000 tonnes compared to its regional rival Ghana which used 25 years to achieve a marginal 500,000 tonnes in 1965 from 100,000 tonnes in 1920 (Crook, 2001). This is no mean feat and a veritable trigger of economic boom, migration and subsequent social upheaval linked to identity politics and struggles of local citizenship and growing inequality (Langer, 2008).

Agriculture continues to play its role as the “largest employer” in Côte d’Ivoire, although to a lesser extent than before. This sector employed 61.9% of active indigenes in 1995, 53.9% in 2008 and 41.8% in 2014. For immigrants, the percentage employed in this sector first increased from 34.2% in 1995 to 50.4% in 2008, before declining again to 47.7% in 2014. Thus, while immigrants were underrepresented in agriculture in 1995 and 2008, the opposite situation is observed in 2014 (OECD/ILO, 2018). In general, while the contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP declined overtime (21% in 2019), the sector employed 40% of the working population in 2019.

In a recent survey in the country, the dominance of migrants in the cocoa economy has been noted, where 17% of people sampled in cocoa households indicated they were born in a different region from where they were enumerated. The figure for their non-cocoa producing household counterparts was only 9%. Similarly, 9% of cocoa households compared to 3% of non-cocoa household members reported being born outside Côte d’Ivoire (Bymolt et al., 2018). The majority of migrants in the Ivorian economy work on plantations in the Ivorian forest zone. Thus, the plantation economy occupies a central place in the migration problematic of the country and its three northern neighbours namely Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. This is historically attributable to the massive call for labour from neighbouring colonies to exploit agricultural resources in the forest zone (UN-DESA, 2019). Thus, understanding rural migration in Côte d’Ivoire is primarily a matter of understanding the functioning of the coffee and cocoa economies. With agriculture being the most important employment sector in Côte d’Ivoire, it is not surprising that the most common occupations are farming and agricultural work in 2008, 46% of indigenes and 42% of immigrants were in these occupations.

Since independence, net immigration has been positive and increasing during periods of positive growth. During the three five-year periods from 1960 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of GDP was positive and the net migration rate increased from 10.4 to 13.5 per 1000 inhabitants. Thereafter, with the exception of the period from 1995 to 2000, growth is negative and the migration rate simultaneously declines to (−4.3) in 2000–05. In other words, more people are leaving Côte d’Ivoire than arriving in recent times. The National Institute of Statistics (INS) uses a definition based on nationality. It considers a person who does not have Ivorian nationality to be an immigrant. According to this definition and census data from the
country, immigrants represented 28% of the population in 1988, 26% in 1998, and 24% in 2014, suggesting a downward trend (INS, 2015).

The INS also provides the share of immigrants born in Côte d’Ivoire, and this share increases over time, from 43% in 1988, to 47% in 1998 and 59% in 2014. That is, about 2.3 million individuals living in Côte d’Ivoire, but not born in the country. The sex composition of the migrant population has remained stable over time as 56% of immigrants were men in 1988, 55% in 1998 and 2014.

According to the World Bank, which defines immigration by counting the number of people living in the country but born elsewhere, the number of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire increased from 750,000 in 1960 to over 2.4 million in 2010. However, this increase in the number of immigrants hides a decline in immigration as a percentage of the population. This percentage, which was nearly 23% in 1970, decreased to 12% in 2010. The latest World Bank figures still estimate the number of immigrants at about 2.4 million in 2013, but confirm the downward trend of this number as a percentage of the population at 11% (World Bank, 2017).

According to the United Nations, immigration increased from 1.8 million (15% of the population) in 1990 to 2.3 million in 2015, or 9.6% of the population (UN DAES, 2015). A large majority of immigrants to Côte d’Ivoire come from another African country, particularly from the ECOWAS region. Those born in Burkina Faso accounted for about 60% of immigrants in the country in 2013, followed by immigrants from Mali who represented 16% (Fig. 10.1).

Because of the relatively open immigration policy that was instituted in the 1960s, strong economic growth, and high demand for labour in the agricultural sector, countries with similar agricultural labour were attracted to the opportunities and better wages in Côte d’Ivoire. As a result, the majority of immigrants come from a large number of West African countries, and many of them are seasonal workers who work part of the year in Côte d’Ivoire and the rest of the time in their country of origin, depending on the demand for labour (Neya, 2010). These seasonal immigrants are not always taken into account in the statistics.

Fig. 10.1 Distribution of immigrants by country of origin. (Source: Banque Mondiale, 2017)
10.2.1 Beyond the Plantation Economy: Other Migrants

Migrants from the West African region did not only work on plantations in farming. Some migrants also work as gardeners, domestic workers, cleaners and in other precarious jobs (Bartolomei, 2010; Riester, 2011). The coastal areas are also attractive destinations for migrants particularly from other coastal areas in the sub-region. Delaunay (1995) notes that out of an estimated 10,000 small-scale fishermen enumerated in the coastal areas in the country in 1989, between 8000 and 9000 traced their source to Ghana among Fante, Ewe and Ga people. The author also indicated a community of Ga fishers existed in parts of Abidjan since 1970s. The three Ghanaian ethnic groups lie in the coastal parts of Southern Ghana and therefore continue their livelihoods along the coast. Other fishers in the area were reported to have come from Liberia and Senegal. Another important wave of migration is the movement of pastoralists into the region starting from the 1960s which has been attributed to environmental crisis in the sahel (Tonah, 2003). Also important is the Côte d’Ivoire- Nigeria corridor which is sustained through trade (UNCTAD, 2018).

While women have migrated across the West African region for trade historically, permanent independent migration has been recorded. The feminisation of migration has also been increasing (Comoe, 2005). In Core D’Ivoire, it is reported that by the end of the 1980s, women constituted 63% of migration flows and 69% of rural-urban migrants. Internal migration is also characterised by North-South movement due to imbalance in development between the two locations. The coastal and forest areas in the South remained attractive due to relative disparities in development compared to the North.

10.3 Historical Analysis of the Factors That Influence Labour Migration Flows in Côte d’Ivoire

Immigration to Côte d’Ivoire began with a migration policy established by the colonial administration. Indeed, it was a massive call for labour from neighbouring colonies for the exploitation of agricultural resources in the forest zone (UN-DESA, 2009). In fact, the numerous coffee and cocoa plantations built under the orders of the colonial authorities from the east of the forest zone to the southwest promoted the expansion of the village plantation economy in Côte d’Ivoire during the 1930s and 1980s (Colin & Ruf, 2011).

As early as the 1930s, under colonial rule, immigration to Côte d’Ivoire began. It is the colonial administration that had created and maintained these migrations towards Côte d’Ivoire during all this period for the maximum exploitation of the cultural and natural potentialities of the colonial era. The colonial period generated another forced labour migration flows. This period spanned from 1893 to 1960 and was marked by high immigration. Indeed, the objective of the colonial administration was to exploit migrant labour for infrastructural construction, agriculture and
other developmental projects. For example, for major construction works, skilled labour from colonies such as Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea and Senegal were recruited. Thus, during the period up to the end of the World War II, nearly 2200 skilled workers were sent to Côte d’Ivoire to work on infrastructural projects (Semi Bi, 1976). In addition, forced agricultural labour came from neighbouring colonies namely Guinea, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and French Sudan (now Mali). Overall, all of these different migration streams contributed to the rapid increase in the stock of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, according to the administrative records of this period, workers from present-day Burkina Faso were always the most numerous among the immigrants recruited each year. The evolution of immigrants during the colonial period before World War II is summarized in Fig. 10.2.

While immigration to Côte d’Ivoire, was forced prior to the Second World War period, it became more and more voluntary. Thus, despite abolition of forced labour in 1946, workers in what is now Burkina Faso were still immigrating in large numbers to Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, Merabet (2006) argues that since the end of the Second World War, the authoritarian power of the colonial administration had declined due to the gradual emancipation of the colonized people. A collaboration had thus been established between the colonizer and the colonized, particularly the best workers. This new situation, which no longer covered the employers, led them in 1951 to set up the Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l’Acheminement de la Main-d’œuvre (SIAMO) created in 1951. The purpose of this union was to ensure the labour supply from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire (Traoré, 2021). Some of the results of this union show that as early as 1951, 50,000 Voltaics were recruited for the colonists, according to Deniel (1967). In addition, from 1951 to 1959, 60% of the 247,710 workers recruited to work in Côte d’Ivoire were recruited through

![Number of Immigrants](image-url)

**Fig. 10.2** Migration trends. (Source: Authors based on data from Merabet, 2006)
SIAMO (Ministry of State, Ministry of Planning and Development 2007). From 1954 to 1959, 91% of this workforce was made up of Voltaic people (OECD/ILO, 2018).

In sum, during the colonial period, immigration was initially forced by the colonial administration in order to help with logging. In a second phase, after the end of the Second World War, immigration became voluntary. However, this period saw a strong increase in migration rates.

10.3.1 Labour Migration Laws and Agreements in Early Post-independence

The development model followed the colonial type of logging and development of cash crops during this period. In fact, the immigration policies in addition increase the need for foreign labour, propelled migration into the country during the 1960s. Migration into Côte d’Ivoire during the tenure of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first president was driven by an open door policy and an orthodoxy of migration. The president initiated several favourable policies to attract migrants for the economic development of the country. The policies were mainly based on the economic interest of Côte d’Ivoire. One of the most significant features is the liberal land ownership policies adopted which was popularized by its slogan “the land belongs to those that develop it” (Gonin, 1998: 174). To give impetus to this, customary land laws were abolished in so far as they stand in the way of development of the plantation economy (Heath, 1993). Another element is the citizenship and voting rights offered to immigrants. In addition, in 1961, the Ivorian Nationality Code allowed immigrants to obtain Ivorian nationality by a simple declaration before a civil register. However, this was repealed in 1972.

In 1960, Côte d’Ivoire signed a labour migration agreement with the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). This agreement stipulated that Ivorian employers who wanted to hire workers from Upper Volta had to hold work contracts drawn up in advance by the Ivorian Labour Service in collaboration with the Voltaic Labour Service (Burkina Faso). Under this agreement, approximately 3800 immigrants were recruited each year between 1961 and 1971 (compared to 20,000 Voltaic immigrants per year at the time of SIAMO). Thus, between 1961 and 1971, approximately 3800 immigrants were recruited each year. This labour force was essentially dedicated to agricultural and logging activities.

The independence of Côte d’Ivoire in 1960 had freed the country, and particularly the southwest, from colonial constraints. Subsequently, the end of the 1960s heralded a spectacular turning point in the history of this region with the launch in 1968 of a development plan to open up southwest part of the country. This plan included a proactive action by the state to create new agro-industrial poles (oil palm, citrus, rubber, etc.) and a viable communications network and a deep water port. These developments have led to a massive immigration of planters, in a vast
movement of land colonization of forest areas, which accompany the expansion of coffee and cocoa crops from the east of the country (Balac, 2002).

In addition, Côte d’Ivoire had played a relatively important role in the export of agricultural products when it gained its independence from France in 1960. Wishing to capitalize on Côte d’Ivoire’s relative agricultural wealth, its first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, turned to a rather open immigration system. The increase in the labour force was intended to boost the agricultural economy and make Côte d’Ivoire a major exporter. The change in policy led to an unprecedented influx of immigrants into the country. These were mainly employed in the cocoa sector and came mostly from neighbouring countries (OCDE/CIRES, 2017). The composition of the current immigrant population reflects historical developments and the country’s geographic location. In 2014, more than 60% of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire were thus born in Burkina Faso. In total, more than 85% of immigrants were born in neighbouring countries. Immigration from non-African countries is negligible, standing at 0.9% (INS, 2017).

During the first two decades of independence, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a strong period of economic growth, the ‘Ivorian miracle. From 1960 to 1979, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased by more than 90%. During this period, immigration evolved with the plantation economy as foreign labour was increasingly in demand. On the other hand, Côte d’Ivoire later experienced economic crises that reduced the immigration rate. In addition, several restrictions were put in place in order to not only regulate population growth but also to limit the acquisition of land by foreigners to the benefit of indigenes.

On 9th March 1960, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso signed a convention in respect of recruitment of labour migrants from the latter and their working conditions in the former. This was later abandoned in 1974 due to non-compliance on the part of the parties. Another labour migration convention was signed between the two countries in August 1973 but this also failed and Burkinabe immigrants migrated en masse to Côte d’Ivoire without recourse to the convention procedures.

In addition to agricultural labour, this newly independent country had educational needs. In fact, there was a lack of middle and high-level managers to design and implement programs for social development. Therefore, in 1961, Côte d’Ivoire signed a technical cooperation agreement with France in terms of staff. Between 2000 and 3000 foreign teachers joined the public sector in the early 1980s. Over time, the growth in demographics and the economic crisis from 1990 onwards led the Ivorian state to adopt a less open migration policy.

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1 Convention relative aux conditions d’engagement et d’emploi des travailleurs voltaïques en Côte d’Ivoire, signée le 9 mars.
10.3.2 The 1980s Economic Down Turn and Nationalistic Laws

Described as the *miracle Africain*, the Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed two decades of steady growth until the early 1980s when world commodity prices particularly cocoa tumbled and severely affecting the economy of the cocoa and coffee export-led country. Another significant stressor was the 1983 drought which lowered the country’s GDP by 8%. The country soon experienced a major recession which affected both rural and urban economies. In urban areas, thousands of formal workers lost their jobs while the rippling effect was also felt by informal workers. With the squeezing of the opportunity space, migrants were blamed for taking the jobs of indigenes. An important feature during the period was the return of urban youth to rural areas. Meanwhile, earlier land policies favoured migrant land ownership which had a significant effect on land relations between migrants and indigenes. The structure also gave migrants a considerable hold on the rural economy in cash crop producing areas. The struggle over land resources and jobs and the general economic crisis cumulated in identity politics after the death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. His successor, Henrie Konan Bédié introduced a new word – *ivoirité*, into the Ivorian national and civic discourse. The concept has been at the centre of criticism because it was deemed to target migrants who have lived and worked in the country for several decades.

From 1975 onwards, after several years of adopting a very liberal immigration policy, giving immigrants the “right” to access land, public jobs and participate in various elections, Côte d’Ivoire revised this policy considerably in response to demographic pressure, land scarcity, the economic crisis and the emerging multi-party system. More specifically, a series of measures have been taken to progressively restrict the rights of foreigners residing in Côte d’Ivoire.

These included the continuation of the policy of “ivoirisation” of certain senior administrative positions (1975), the identification of foreigners and the introduction of the residence permit (1990), the abolition of the right to vote for foreigners (1994) and the regulation of access to land ownership in 1998 (OCDE/CIRES, 2017: 57). In this context, three austerity policies were implemented in the 1990s. These were the introduction of the residence permit, the policy of “ivoirisation des cadres” and the law on rural land ownership.

The first text which, since independence, organizes the entry and stay of foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire is law n°90–437 of 29 May 1990. This law marks the beginning of a real migration policy by making the distinction between nationals and foreigners in its first article and introduces the foreigner’s residence permit in article 6. Indeed, the article stipulates that

Any foreigner over sixteen years of age must, if he or she stays in Côte d’Ivoire and after the expiration of a period of three months since his or her entry into the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, be provided with a residence permit…

This card is required for the performance and accomplishment of civil acts.
The latest text on migration management is Ordinance No. 2007-604 of November 8, 2007, which abolishes the residence permit. According to this ordinance, “foreigners who are nationals of ECOWAS countries living in Côte d’Ivoire must have identification documents issued by their country of origin or their consular representation” (art. 2), while foreigners from non-ECOWAS countries are required to have a residence permit if their stay is longer than 3 months.

The main motivation for migrants to Côte d’Ivoire between 1998 and 2006 was employment or job hunting (Konan, 2009; Merabet, 2006). Immigrants were said to have crowded out Ivorians in the labour market. As a matter of fact, in 1975, foreigners occupied 52.5% of jobs (Centrale des bilans en 1975, 1980, 1985, cited by Brou & Charbit, 1994). That same year, the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) created a commission to promote the Ivorianization of jobs. Two years later, the government created a ministry for the Ivorianisation of executives and promulgated a Charter for Ivorianisation in 1978. These measures were partly successful, with the rate of Ivorianisation rising from 58.4% in 1975 to 64.3% in 1985 (Brou & Charbit, 1994), but more in the administrative and commercial sectors than in industry (OECD/ILO, 2018: 45).

As a result of the Ivorianisation policy, foreigners were denied access to public employment in favour of nationals. This policy was followed by a process of identification of foreigners starting in 1990. Each foreigner was required to justify his or her stay in Côte d’Ivoire when it exceeded 3 months, by holding a residence permit. This identification facilitated the exclusion of foreigners from the electoral process (as candidates or voters) with the adoption of the new Electoral Code by Parliament in 1994, which recognized only nationals.

The emergence of the concept of “ivoirité” and its misuse have also crystallized the debates around immigrants. Ivoirité is a concept that promotes national preference, the privilege that should be given to nationals over immigrants in access to public jobs and rural land, among other things. Born under the regime of President Bédié, it has been abused and its mere mention during the armed crisis that broke out in 2002 was synonymous with xenophobia and exclusion. For some authors, one of the causes of the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire is to be found in the use and political exploitation of this concept, particularly as a means of excluding foreigners, and even of excluding political opponents in electoral processes (Dabalen & Paul, 2012).

In this context, the political tensions resulting from the introduction of a multi-party system (1990) will be revealed and will interfere with the debate on the concept of Ivorian identity. Finally, the adoption of the land law in 1998 prohibited non-nationals from owning a land title. This called into question previously acquired rights and generated a new market, replacing the one where transactions were often made symbolically and on the basis of trust. This situation became detrimental to social cohesion since foreigners, especially Burkinabè migrants who are concentrated in the forest areas, are robbed of the land they had already acquired customarily and cultivated. This began a series of land conflicts in the rural areas (OCDE/CIRES, 2017: 57).
10.3.3 Military-Political and Post-electoral Crises of 2000s

Recent conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly since the early 2000s, have changed the nature of migration flows to and from the country. Many immigrants and their children born in Côte d’Ivoire have returned to their country of origin. At the same time, emigration from Côte d’Ivoire is on the rise. This reinforces the role of remittances, return migration and the diaspora in the country’s development. According to the United Nations Population Division (UNPD), the net migration rate (per 1000 people) has been consistently positive since the 1950s. It has always been between 5 and 12 per 1000, despite a drop to 2.2 between 1995 and 2000. However, the period 2000–2005, the country recorded a negative rate estimated at (−3.7) and (−1.4), for the period 2005–2010.

The combined effects of the political and economic crises have resulted in legislative changes that have had a significant impact on the evolution of migration flows. The period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s was a particularly unstable phase in the political and military history of Côte d’Ivoire. It was marked by the military assault of December 1999, the politico-military crisis of 2002 and the post-electoral crisis of 2011.

These developments contributed to an acceleration of the decline in the net migration rate, which had already begun in the 1970s. This is not only a decline in the flow of immigrants, but also a significant return migration. Several nationals from countries in the sub-region particularly Burkina Faso and from France, in particular, left the country. The Burkina Faso authorities estimated the number of returnees at 600,000 during the period 2002–04 (Kabbanji, 2011). However, once the immediate shock was over, some of them probably returned to Côte d’Ivoire.

As part of the resolution of the socio-political crisis that the country has experienced since 2002 and in an effort to address one of the causes of the crisis related to the situation of foreigners, various decrees have been issued to allow for some reintegration of foreigners. For example, in the area of land, the 1998 law that reserved access to land ownership for Ivorians was amended in 2004, giving the right to transfer land titles to the heirs of the holders, even if they do not meet the conditions for access to ownership provided for by the law, i.e., being Ivorian. In addition, the law establishing the residence permit was repealed in 2007.

In the same vein, in August 2013, the Ivorian Parliament adopted the bill on the “special regime for the acquisition of nationality” which authorizes the Ivorian President to ratify the 1951 international convention on the protection of stateless people and the 1961 convention on the reduction of statelessness. This law allows people who lived in the territory of Côte d’Ivoire before 1961, those born in Côte d’Ivoire from 1961 to 1972, and their descendants born thereafter in the country to obtain Ivorian nationality by simple declaration (OCDE/CIRES, 2017: 58).

There are also political motivations linked to the relative stability of the country in a West African zone shaken by socio-political and sometimes military crises. The spontaneous nature and scale of refugee migration is also considered a destabilizing factor for host countries such as Côte d’Ivoire (Cissé & Fall, 2007). Despite the various crises, the country still attracts immigrants (De Vreyer et al., 2010).
10.4 Immigrants’ Access to Agricultural Land

The distribution of immigrants in the agricultural sector varies by country of birth. The majority of Burkinabés work in agriculture. In 2008, 68% were engaged in agriculture, animal husbandry or forestry. More specifically, 20% of them worked in food crops and 34% in cocoa farming. In contrast, only 11% were engaged in trade, and almost exclusively in retail trade. Ghanaians and Malians are almost equally divided between the agricultural and commercial sectors, with about one-third of their respective workforces working in each. Finally, immigrants from Guinea, Niger, and Nigeria are much more likely to work in the commerce sector (OECD/ILO, 2018: 105).

In the agricultural sector, the first waves of immigrants in the cocoa-producing areas enter agriculture in rural areas by benefiting from the hospitality of indigenous communities through a tutoring system. Tutoring is a mechanism based on a moral conception of the rights of foreigners (Koné, Ibo & Kouamé, 2005). In the Ivorian case, the tutor provides temporary or long-term accommodation to a stranger (someone who is not related to him or her). In the context of land tenure, the tutor is the one who hosts a stranger to whom he or she grants or transfers rights over a given space, a portion of forest or an old plantation, in exchange for remuneration in cash or in kind.

The village plantation economy in Côte d’Ivoire experienced its great pioneering phase between the 1930s and the 1980s, with increased clearing of the forest for coffee and cocoa plantations (Colin & Ruf, 2011). This clearing was deployed in the forest zone, from the east to the southwest. This dynamic was triggered by the arrival of migrants from regions that are ecologically unfavourable to these crops. These include people from the north and centre of Côte d’Ivoire as well as West Africans, mainly from the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), who gained access to land either through a tutor or through informal contracts.

Indeed, migrants once had access to land through the traditional institution of tutorship. In this “historical” approach, guardianship established a patronage relationship between indigenes and migrants, who were granted access to land on the basis of a principle of moral economy. According to this principle, every individual should have access to the resources necessary for his or her survival. The migrant had a duty of gratitude towards his guardian (passed on to his heirs) expressed through gifts of agricultural products, help with work hours and financial contributions at funerals among others (Chauveau, 2006).

Progressively, the monetization of the migrant’s “duty of recognition” has led to the significant development of informal land sales (Colin & Ayouz, 2006; Chauveau & Colin, 2010). In the history of events, the development of these sales can be situated at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a result of accelerated migration in the southwest of the country (Ruf, 1988; Schwartz, 1993).

Subsequently, new modes of access to land in forest areas emerged and developed with the scarcity of land. These modes involved renting and sharecropping as a land relationship and not as a simple labour relationship. This practice was very
dynamic for the cultivation of cassava (Colin, 2008) and, more recently, “Planter-Partager” (P&P) contracts. This type of contract, which is in full expansion, is known in West Africa and is practiced under various names depending on the country and ethnic group. Thus, through such a contract, a farmer gains access to a long-term right of use, or even a right of ownership of the land, by creating a perennial plantation and retaining part of it, the rest being returned to the landowner.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the abundant literature of the 1950s–1970s on the village plantation economy does not mention these contracts. According to Ruf (1988), the first observation of P&P cases dates from the early 1980s, but the author only mentions a few cases in the Centre-Ouest. Surveys conducted between 1990 and 1992 by De Fina (1995) identify such contracts in the southwest and centre-west, but characterize them as very marginal. The introduction of these contracts in the 1980s in the Southwest is confirmed by Léonard and Balac (2005). This practice re-emerged 20 years later. Indeed, since 2000, the monitoring of 700 farmers by the Centre for International Cooperation in Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD) has made it possible to analyse the evolution of P&P or sharecropping. The new institutional arrangement exploded in the 2000s. It was found that 83% of P&P plots (86% of the area) were planted between 2000 and 2007 (Colin, 2008). In 2008, cocoa dominated among the different crops grown in P&P, followed by rubber, palm and cashew.

The integration of migrants into the agricultural sector in Côte d’Ivoire has led to a stimulation of economic activity. For example, according to Audibert et al. (2003), data on cotton producers from 700 households in the north of the country in 1997 and 1998 showed that agricultural production was more efficient in regions where there were more migrants. However, despite this economic advantage, the informal nature of migrant’s land access later resulted in community conflicts.

### 10.5 Child Labour in Côte d’Ivoire

Labour is a critical part of the social formations in peripheral commodity production economies. In plantation economies, labour types take different forms. In farm households, where the family is the principal unit of organisation of agricultural production, unpaid family labour particularly drawn from women and children is a very dominant feature of agricultural production. Feminist agrarian political economists through analysis of division of labour in agrarian households have detailed women’s roles in commodity production in the periphery. The literature on children’s work in peripheral economies is also expanding in tandem with global discourse about decent work and human rights (Anker, 2000; Griek et al., 2010). The prevalence of children in economies is also associated with family poverty and prevailing economic crisis in the general peripheral economy. During times of crisis, children serve multiple functions in households. They can be sent out to earn income for the family, hired to work for other families or work on the families’ enterprises particularly as substitutes for hired labour. Children also migrate independently due
to poverty, to areas they can find work. The issue of independent child migration is a growing phenomenon.

In Côte d’Ivoire, where migrant labour is critical to the organisation of cocoa and coffee production, child labour is common. In 1998, a study in the country indicated that four in five children engaged in some form of work (Grootaert, 1999). The author linked this to the economic crisis in the 1980s which increased dependency on children’s labour for household production and in the planter economy. In urban areas, two-thirds of children between the ages of 7 and 17 were working in the survey year. However, the prevalence is high in Savannah regions in the country where poverty is higher and economic activity agrarian. Overall, the author found correlation between child work and poverty and gender where girls were found more often to be engaged in work than boys (Grootaert, 1999). An earlier study highlighted high child fosterage in the country where children live with families other than their own (World Bank, 1992). Migrant child labour was reported at the same time in Côte d’Ivoire. It was estimated that 15,000 Malian children were working on cocoa and coffee plantations in 1999 (USDOS, 1999). According to Schrage and Ewing (2005), a British Television station has documented the prevalence of child labour with children recruited from Burkina Faso, Togo and Mali to work on plantations. This has resulted in the signing of a bilateral agreement between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, one of the source regions of the migrant child labour in 2000.

10.6 Conclusion

Migration is a fundamental element in the history of Côte d’Ivoire. During the colonial period, immigration was initially forced by the colonial administration in order to develop the plantation economy. In a second phase, immigration became voluntary after the end of the Second World War before being self-sustained after independence by the Ivorian authorities.

Over time, the growth of the population and the economic crisis since 1990 have led the Ivorian state to practice a less open migration policy. Also, the recent conflicts that have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly since the early 2000s, have changed the nature of migration flows to the country. While the open immigration policy of the colonial period continued during the first three decades of independence, a tightening of the policy took place in the early 1990s, resulting in a relative decline in migration flows to Côte d’Ivoire.

Due to the relatively open immigration policy that was instituted in the 1960s, strong economic growth, and a high demand for labour in the agricultural sector, countries offering similar agricultural labour were attracted to Côte d’Ivoire by the better opportunities and wages.

Since its independence in 1960, its relatively open immigration policy has generated high levels of immigration to the country. Immigration continues to shape and define the country’s social and economic landscape. Despite the crisis, Côte d’Ivoire remains a place where immigrants have a higher probability of insertion, confirming
the immigrant enclave hypothesis (Piché, 2013). The work of migrants in the agricultural sector in Côte d’Ivoire has induced a stimulation of economic activity. However, land conflicts have arisen from traditional or informal modes of access to land due to the drastic disappearance of the Ivorian forest heritage. As a result, the development of an appropriate migration policy necessarily requires in-depth knowledge of the history of migration and its socio-economic implications.

References


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Part IV
Return Migration
Chapter 11
Return, Precarity and Vulnerability in West Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

Amanda Bisong

This chapter analyses how return and reintegration programmes for irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers construct and create vulnerabilities. The chapter analyses the lived experiences of returnees in Edo state, Nigeria. It examines the experiences of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers who were returned to their places of origin through AVRR programmes or other forms of return assistance programmes. First it examines the context of return migration in Nigeria and the legal-bureaucratic construction of vulnerability in the Nigerian context. Then it proceeds to analyse the efforts of the Nigerian state in implementing return and reintegration programmes. Based on 15 in-depth interviews with returnees, civil society organisations and government officials, it examines the experiences of returnees and their perspectives of vulnerability and precarity in returning to their communities of origin. The research finds that poorly implemented return programmes, may worsen the vulnerabilities of migrants instead of promoting their integration. However, migrants may reinforce their vulnerabilities in order to benefit from perceived advantages offered by the state or international organisations. Lastly, family and community efforts help migrants cope with the vulnerabilities they are exposed to in their communities of origin.

11.1 Introduction

In 2017, the CNN documentary ‘People for sale: exposing migrant slave auction in Libya was greeted with frenzy and disbelief by African and especially Nigerian leaders. Regional and continental organisations (such as the African Union – AU and the Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS) made plans to
dismantle trafficking and smuggling networks in Libya and their countries of origin or transit. The United Nations and the European Union (EU), working together with the African Union and African countries, including Nigeria, undertook measures to evacuate migrants from camps or detention centres in Libya. Migrants who opted to return to their countries of origin or other designated African countries were repatriated to their countries of origin or moved to other countries like Niger and Rwanda (Zanker & Jegen, 2019). African governments together with the EU and international organisations continue to provide support to migrants trapped in Libya (Amnesty International, 2020).

Although migration is a politically salient issue in Nigeria, deportation of migrants (forced return) from Europe and other African countries to Nigeria remains highly politicised (Isbell & Ojewale, 2018; Arhin-Sam, 2019). While the government is vocal on issues concerning anti-trafficking in persons and promoting remittance transfers, the discussion on returnees is greeted with mixed feelings in the public sphere (Arhin-Sam, 2019; Bisong, 2021). Return of migrants from African countries like Libya, where it is obvious that migrants have been mistreated or faced difficulty is widely discussed and accepted. But return of migrants from Europe is not met with similar enthusiasm. The reality remains that, every year, returns of Nigerian nationals from other African and European countries are conducted with the support of international/humanitarian organisations and the Nigerian government.

Return migration happens in different ways. It may be planned, spontaneous, initiated by the migrant, instigated by state authorities through voluntary means or coercion or organised and enforced by the state authorities of their representatives (Mensah, 2016). Policy and academic discussions around return migration have shifted from a voluntary decision of migrants to go back to their countries of origin, to focus on the deportation and reintegration of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants (Cassarino, 2020). But this new narrative which emphasises ‘sustainable return and reintegration’ focuses on the institutional requirements while paying little attention to the outcome of return of interrupted migrant journeys on the returned migrants themselves. This focus on sustainable return and reintegration of rejected asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation can be directly linked to the efforts of the European Union to stem irregular migration in especially in West and North Africa enabled by its approach on externalisation (Lücke et al., 2020; Zanker et al., 2019).

This paper examines how the process of return contributes to vulnerability and continued precarity in returnees in Benin city, Edo state, Nigeria. In the context of this chapter, precarity is not synonymous with vulnerability. It extends beyond the concept of vulnerability to uncover how practices and perception of return and reintegration programmes create and replicate uncertainties in the lives of returnees. From these perspectives, precarity is both a socio-economic condition and an ontological experience (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Five areas are identified through which vulnerability and precarity of migrants prior to and after migration are examined. These are the living conditions (changes in accommodation, feeding and personal safety); Employment/ work opportunities; Family support; Indebtedness;
Participation and access in communal activities and social settings. These areas span social, economic and political aspects of migrant reintegration (Arowolo, 2000). This study situates itself in the broader research on return and vulnerability, which argues that poorly implemented return programmes, may worsen the vulnerabilities of migrants instead of promoting their integration. Although, migrants may project and reinforce their vulnerabilities in order to benefit from perceived advantages offered by the state or international organisations. Lastly, family and community efforts help migrants cope with the vulnerabilities they are exposed to in their communities of origin. The major contribution of this paper is its exposition on the role of local institutions in the reintegration of returnees. While protection of migrants has been seen as a duty to be performed by the state (Boateng, 2010), the chapter finds that social and societal structures in the communities help returnees in coping with the vulnerabilities they are exposed to in their places of origin. Post-return life is characterised by uncertainty and migrants where possible seek to succeed either through re-migration or through exploring entrepreneurship options (Kleist, 2020). While some returnees are in a worse or similar economic situation prior to migrating, others have through support received established livelihoods for themselves. The latter category deemed as ‘successful’ by the larger society, the international organisation and governments, are used as posters to promote the narrative on sustainable return and reintegration.

11.2 Precarity, Vulnerability and Return Migration: Conceptual Clarifications

Butler defines precarity as the “specific ways that socio-economic and political institutions distribute the conditions of life unequally” (Butler 2011). Munck (2013) argues that the genealogy of precarity extends back to the “marginality” debates in Latin America in the 1960s, the “informality” literature that arose from research in Africa in the 1970s and the discourse of “social exclusion” that became popular in Europe (and to a lesser extent, the United States) in the 1980s. In migration research, precarity has gained prominence in the linkages between labour and citizenship (Banki, 2013; Schierup et al., 2015). In viewing precarity from the perspective of labour and citizenship, Schierup et al. focused on shrinking labour rights and informalisation of labour which may be addressed through the focus on human rights and civil society engagement (Schierup et al., 2015). However, precarity goes beyond the linkages between labour and citizenship and includes a range of experiences which may be viewed as ‘ontological’ (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Precarity has both a subjective and objective dimension which examines the situation of endemic and permanent uncertainty that characterises the socio-economic realities of persons (Grewal, 2021; Masquelier, 2019; Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). Thus, it can be argued that contemporary forms of precarity – ‘endemic and permanent uncertainty that characterises the socio-economic realities of persons’ – are observed in the
increasing prevalence of formally regulated ‘managed migration’ and increasingly criminalized irregular migration. Thus, in analysing how the return of irregular migrants to their countries of origin may entrench them in informality, the discussion seeks to unpack the uncertainties created in the lives of returnees and how this contributes to continued precarity in the absence of stability.

In analysing migration trajectories, the concept of vulnerability provides a useful framework for examining how spatial and temporal changes in migration may have consequences on migrants, especially those involved with irregular migration. Vulnerability may change or evolve over the migration trajectory, and thus it is important to examine how this is expressed and reflected by the migrant. Vulnerability implies that some people, or categories of people, are more exposed to harm or risk, relative to others (IOM, 2019b). This may be physical, psychological, social, environmental (Macioce, 2018; Paasche et al., 2018). In the context of high-risk and irregular migration, many migrants find themselves in situations which they may be prone to exploitation, physical and psychological harm. From their departure and along the migration process, migrants in an irregular situation are easy targets for abuse and exploitation in addition to the other risks they face during the journey (including death). Vulnerability can be increased by factors such as lack of eligibility for services, homelessness, being trafficked or a history of poverty. In this chapter, we examine vulnerability in context of migrants’ return to Nigeria.

Return migration has evolved from the migration and development focus on voluntary repatriation of third country nationals and the return of migrants at the end of their migration journeys, to a focus on return of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants. This changes in narratives and categorisation shapes the way that return is discussed (Cassarino 2004). Cassarino (2020) notes that “talking about return today differs markedly from talking about return a few decades ago”. Return migration has become synonymous with deportations, removal, repatriation and even connotes a form of pressure or coercion exerted by the state and its law enforcement agents.

There is a clear analytical link between vulnerability and precarity in the context of return migration. The process of return migration often puts migrants in situations of precarity and vulnerability. For example, in the process of return, migrants are often coerced by institutional conditions such as deportation or incentives of reintegration. However, when they return, the support received from institutional actors (the sending/receiving state and international organisations) is very limited. This limited support leads to uncertain socio-economic conditions, hence manifesting as precarity. On the other hand, the precarity experienced by returned migrants makes them vulnerable to exploitation and risk of falling into the hands of smugglers. Also, precarity exposes returnee migrants to livelihood insecurity, which is also a form of vulnerability. The primary data in this chapter is used to substantiate the linkages between precarity and vulnerability and how they manifest in the lived experiences of returnee migrants.
11.3 **Context of the Study**

11.3.1 **Trends in Migration and Return Migration in Nigeria**

Nigeria is an important country of origin, transit and destination in the discussion on regional and international migration. While nationals from neighbouring countries move to Nigeria for employment and economic opportunities, Nigerians also move to other countries within and outside the region (IOM, 2021). The number of Nigerians living abroad has been increasing consistently over the years and it is estimated that about 1.3 million Nigerians reside in other countries (UNDESA, 2020). A recent survey revealed that one in three Nigerians have considered emigration (Isbell & Ojewale, 2018). In regions like Edo state, migration in search of ‘greener pastures’ is rooted in the society and the daily discourse of young people and their families. Most families have a migrant family member who sends remittances (NBS, 2020). Others wish to be like their neighbours and friends who receive remittances from family members abroad (Arowolo, 2000).

Increasing numbers of young people in Edo state have participated in irregular migration either through migrant networks, family pressure or as a result of human trafficking (SOTIN, 2020; Obi et al., 2020; Iwuoha, 2020). Many of these migrants have been stuck in detention centres in North Africa. In attempting to reach Europe, all the interviewees travelled through the Sahara and a North African country. Only one was successful in reaching Europe, while the rest were detained and returned from Libya.

Nigerians have been identified as one of the top five groups of migrants using the voluntary humanitarian return scheme of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in order to return from Libya (IOM, 2020). IOM reports that it supported the return of 1914 Nigerian migrants in 2019 (IOM, 2020). Most of these returnees were through the voluntary humanitarian returns from Libya and Niger to Nigeria (IOM, 2020). In the same timeframe 2287 people were returned from European countries through AVRR programmes and other assisted measures (Frontex, 2020).

Cross-Saharan migration by road is extremely dangerous. The high fatalities and risks of migrating irregularly have been documented in studies and widely publicised by international organisations, humanitarian agencies and governments. However, migrants still embark on these journeys fully aware of the dangers and the possible death that await them along the route (UNDP, 2019). Interviewees shared experiences of being robbed by state agents and militia groups, encountering corrupt officials, being exposed to violence, abuse, kidnap, rape hunger, dehydration, forced labour etc. The current migration policy in Libya and several other North African countries through which migrants from West Africa transit while seeking to gain irregular entry to Europe (such as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) criminalises clandestine/irregular entry, thus migrants when caught by authorities are put in jail or in detention centres (BBC, 2018; Kleist, 2020). Interviewees confirmed that one could be bailed from jail, while in a detention centre, there was no alternative except
possible deportation by international organisations or national governments. It is this deportation process that is referred to as return migration.

The emphasis on migration control by European countries as evidenced in their activities at outsourcing migration control to North African countries has resulted in a situation where migrants are trapped in inhumane conditions in detention centres in Libya (Nashed, 2020; Riedy, 2020). Their focus on control contributes to raising the risk and cost of migration, diverting migration from regular to irregular channels and diverting migrants from one country of destination to another or migrant trajectories crossing through several countries before arriving in the final country of destination. All the while exposing migrants to human rights abuses and danger along the journey (Minter, 2011).

For the European Union, the narrative of a strong and efficient return system is linked to an effective immigration system with functioning legal pathways for migration and entry of third country nationals. This is reiterated in the new pact on migration and asylum (CEC, 2020). For countries of origin, this form of forced or spontaneous return migration is contentious because of how it is perceived by the domestic population. In the Gambia for example, protests initiated by returnees contributed to destabilising an already delicate political situation in the country (Zanker & Altrogge, 2019). Forced returns also have the potential to push returnees into a situation of precarity and poverty for example the return of migrants to Nigeria, leaving some of them worse off than prior to migration (Zandonini, 2020). Furthermore, return may exacerbate inequalities already prevalent in countries of origin. It is therefore important to review the role and effect of return policies in countries of origin and how these policies together with the administrative and legal structures in countries of origin contribute to supporting or reducing migrant welfare and reintegration in their societies.

The Nigerian government with the support of international organisations and humanitarian agencies and European countries are implementing measures aimed at promoting the ‘sustainable return and reintegration’ of these returned migrants (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Current measures aim to provide employment opportunities and livelihood skills to returnees, promote their reintegration thorough providing psycho-social support, legal support promoting community engagement etc. Studies show that to enable returnees to achieve sustainable reintegration, activities must include, in addition to economic projects, initiatives addressing the social and the psychosocial dimensions of sustainable reintegration (Samuel Hall, 2018).

In Nigeria, projects funded by the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) have supported the return and reintegration of returnees in partnership with the government, civil society organisations and private sector. However, there were allegations of corruption and mismanagement of funds for some development projects. For example, funds allocated to create an agricultural training programme for returnees were allegedly mismanaged (Nation news, 2019). This situation leaves returnees with limited options at achieving reintegration. Some returnees have stated that they may turn to crime or re-migrate if no assistance is provided for them on return.

Societal expectations of migrants and returnees on the other hand identify ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ returnees. Successful returnees are expected to establish
their own businesses, build homes, live lavishly based on savings from working abroad (Samuel Hall, 2018; Kleist, 2020). Unsuccessful migrants are those who are indebted and require assistance from their family members for daily living. They are often stigmatised when they seek for paid employment. They are also stigmatised based on their experiences as returnees for example female returnees are frequently referred to as sex workers. Furthermore, the mode of return determines the access to reintegration support however, it does not change the societal perception of the migrant.

Thus, returnees are often self-employed or engaged in micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and petty trading sometimes in a worse off condition than prior to migration, sometimes in a better condition. However, this level of informality predisposes them to precarity. This is because of the difficulty faced by MSMEs in Nigeria. While these businesses may last long enough to be counted as successful by monitoring and evaluation requirements of International organisations, most certainly die within the first 5 years making the sustainability of these businesses an issue that is not addressed by the current measures and remigration an option for migrants. There are limited or no diaspora groups where returnees can band together for support. These are mostly informal and because of the stigma attached in some contexts, some people refuse to identify as returnees (2 interviewees in this study). Others who do so because of the economic benefits through international organisations or the government – for example, e.g. granting interviews, being used in sensitisation activities to deter migration of other young people.

11.4 Methods

This paper is based on interviews conducted in November 2020, in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. Edo state is a renowned region of origin for migrants in an irregular situation and victims of trafficking to Europe (SOTIN, 2020; Obi et al., 2020). I interviewed 10 Nigerians, six males and four females between the ages of 22–30, who had returned from Libya and Europe between 2017 and 2019. Among these, nine returned from Libya and one from Italy and Switzerland. Eight returned through the support of international organisations or the Nigerian government, two returned based on their own initiative. Interviewees were recruited through their network and snowballing technique.

Five key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from organisations and agencies working on return and reintegration of migrants in Edo State. Purposive sampling method was used to identify the main actors involved in return and reintegration in the state. These civil society organisations and government officials interviewed play a key role in return and reintegration measures in the state. The interviewees included members of the Edo state taskforce on trafficking and return. In addition, the chapter builds on research by the author on migration governance in Nigeria and more broadly, West Africa.
The fieldwork in Nigeria, was conducted by a research assistant due to the corona restrictions which prevented the author from travelling to Nigeria to carry out the field work. The interview guide was developed after extensive literature review on vulnerability, precarity and return migration. The key informant interviews were conducted based on interview guide provided by the author. Voice recordings of the interviews along with transcripts were provided to the author. The interviews were conducted in Nigerian Pidgin and English.

11.5 The Efforts of the Nigerian State in Implementing Return and Reintegration Programmes

As stated above, return of irregular migrants is perceived with mixed feelings in Nigeria. However, the 2015 National Migration Policy aims to promote a multidimensional approach to return migration. More so return and reintegration is one of the five thematic groups of the national migration governance framework.

The 2015 National Policy on Migration includes objectives related to return, readmission and reintegration of Nigerian migrants. These objectives highlight the need to aid returnees through establishing legal and social structures for their reintegration and ensuring economic support aimed at promoting self-employment and economic resilience in returnee migrants. The objectives also recognise the need to strengthen the role of the government in the return and reintegration of migrants.

At the national level, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), is responsible for the coordination of the national migration policy in collaboration with all the ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) involved in migration and development programmes in Nigeria. The national migration governance framework ensures the whole of government approach in the implementation of the national migration policy (Arhin-Sam, 2019). The agency is mandated to coordinate the activities for the protection and assistance of refugees, asylum seekers, returnees, stateless persons, internally displaced persons and migrants and to ensure durable integration of returnees into the Nigerian society. The lead agency of the Thematic Group on Forced Migration and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration is the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking In Persons (NAPTIP). NAPTIP works together with NCFRMI and international organisations, CSOs and NGOs active in areas of return and reintegration. IOM and other international actors in practice play a more dominant role in the implementation of the reintegration programmes for returnees from Europe, Libya other African countries and the reintegration of internally displaced persons in the North East of the country. Government organisations provide the relevant policy framework for returns, but operations are driven by international organisations regardless of the salience of returns locally, and in support of their mandate of using funding to drive foreign agendas within domestic settings (Adam et al., 2020a, b).
At the state level, there is an increasing amount of participation from state governments on issues of migration. Some states such as Anambra state and Edo state have set up migration agencies to facilitate diaspora engagement, promote remittances and in the case of Edo state, address the issue of human trafficking, irregular and return migration which is prevalent in the state. The Edo state government has been at the forefront of establishing initiatives and programmes to address irregular migration and human trafficking within the state. In 2017, the government established the Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking to combat irregular migration and human trafficking, which has become endemic in the state.

The taskforce is responsible for coordinating re-integration activities of returned migrants from Edo state. It implements a welcome programme aimed at reintegrating returnees of Edo state origin including those returning from Libya or other African countries. The government has established a shelter for returnees and also partners with local NGOs to provide accommodation for returnees. The government through the taskforce brings Edo citizens from the main point of entry and facilitates their transportation back to the state. According to a member describing the activities of the taskforce, “the governor deemed it fit that the task force should go to Lagos, we bring in every indigene that is from Edo state, from Lagos down to Benin” (Interview, government official 1).

Another government official confirmed the efforts of the Edo State government in implementing the Edo State Migration programme for which the governor of the state has been commended thus:

Apart from the reintegration of the returnees, … the Governor equally went ahead to ensure that whoever is even willing that has gone to Libya or in Italy, and want to come back, it has gone beyond the ones that are stranded in Libya, so there is arrangement for the ones that are already there, you’re under a bondage, or you feel you want to come back, the government will take it up, and reintegrate you into the society (Interview, government official 2).

This involvement of the state governments in the provision of reintegration support and coordination is an important way to ensure effectiveness, improved coordination and greater involvement and monitoring of local-level reintegration actors. This is because returnee migrants are eventually going to live within the state, and programmes of state governments, if effective, are more likely to improve the quality of life of returnee migrants and reduce the risks of precarity and vulnerability.

Beyond the national and state governments, there are also international organisations, NGOs and CSOs actively involved in return migration. For example, IOM operates a Migrants Reintegration Centre in Lagos and has reintegrated some persons through skills acquisition in hair dressing, tailoring, catering and others. The centre provides shelter for returnees for a period of 90 days, as well as skill acquisition trainings and psycho-social counselling for these returnees. The Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Programme has been in place in Nigeria offers migrants in a regular or irregular situation who seek, or need, to return home but lack the means to do so, a viable and safe solution to their plight. The programme has facilitated the return and reintegration of more than 14,000 returnees including irregular and stranded migrants, labour migrants, Survivors of
Trafficking (SoTs), unaccompanied and separated minors from more than 20 countries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (IOM, 2020).

CSOs are critical partners in addressing return migration in Nigeria. In Edo state, there is a network of NGOs working on migration known as Network of Civil society organizations against Child Trafficking, Child Abuse and Child Labour (NACTAL). Amongst others, the NGOs focus on issues such as psycho-social support for victims of trafficking, legal support and victims counselling, advocacy, report of cases to the authorities, and sensitisation. CSOs are more visible in the implementation of return and reintegration measures. While some CSOs have a role in the taskforce, there are fewer involved in the policy making processes. Although through their experience, they have a wealth of information which can feed into migration policymaking processes (Bisong, 2019).

Several CSOs have worked in collaboration with the government agencies and IOM on migration issues generally, trafficking of persons, as well as Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR). CSOs emphasize their local knowledge and access, which they believe should ensure they are more involved in the formulation of strategies and in the provision of reintegration support (Interview with NGO officials 1, 2 & 3). CSOs have the potential to provide support to returnees in economic empowerment and psychosocial services, however they also require assistance in all dimensions, especially financially. According to an NGO official, “We have trained people in 3months and we will on our own reintegrate them … if you really train somebody well, reintegration becomes easy. It’s not been easy, but to God be the glory we have very wonderful sponsorship from the Swiss Embassy in Nigeria, which really helped us.” (Interview, NGO official 3). This shows that despite their best efforts, the outcomes are still far from what is desired by both national, state, international and CSO actors.

There is a clear link between all levels of institutional actors in migration management in Nigeria. This link is established within the 2015 National Migration Policy which aims to promote a multidimensional management of migration that involves different policy actors and stakeholders. While national actors are largely responsible for governing migration within the country, state-level actors are focused on managing the reintegration of returnee migrants who are indigenes of their state, while trying to curb irregular migration. On the other hand, international organisations such as IOM are focused on facilitating returnees and facilitating international norms and practices in the migration trajectory of both regular and irregular migrants in Nigeria. CSOs are mainly focused on advocacy and implementation of projects that are in line with both international and national agenda, depending on their partners. The linkages between different institutional actors in migration management creates the legal-bureaucratic contexts in which both vulnerability and precarity occurs in the lived experiences of returnee migrants in Nigeria.
One overarching argument in this chapter is that the interactions between different levels of institutional actors constructs vulnerability. This is so because rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants who are returned to Benin City, Edo state fall into the institutional constraints generated by the state and international/humanitarian organisations working in the sector. It is common practice for migrants to fund their journeys through the sale of personal belongings and socio-economic assets. Hence, returning back to their towns of origin without significant economic capacity, either in savings or assets gained from remittances, leaves migrants in vulnerable situations. As they need to face their debtors (especially for migrants who took loans to finance their journey), hostile or disappointed family members and face societal pressure and disapproval which may be higher in the case of female returnees. Consequently, many migrants who return to Nigeria postpone going back to their cities for days or weeks while staying in the main entry city (Lagos or Abuja). For others, support is organised by the state government or other organisations to provide transportation to their communities of origin. Thus, when such returnees are supported to travel to their states, as a result of the limited time and support provided for them at the reception centres run by IOM in Lagos, the policies of facilitating return from Lagos to Benin and the incomplete support provided by NGOs based in Benin, they are suddenly placed in a context where they have limited control of the outcomes which they experience.

Vulnerability of migrants in return changes along the migration trajectory. Whereas migrants in detention may face the risk of abuse, hunger, forced labour, rape, kidnap etc., on return, they are exposed to a different set of risks. In this study, we highlight five aspects that span socio-economic and political aspects to better understand the vulnerabilities that returnees are exposed to. From the perspective of the state and international organisations, vulnerability is viewed as a phase to pass through (Paasche et al., 2018). But this is a lived reality of the returnees who do not view their vulnerability as a phase. Furthermore, returnees respond differently to the vulnerable and precarious situations in which they find themselves. While some may be deemed successful based on their responses in line with the preconceived outcomes of the international organisations and the state, other outcomes may not be aligned with the expectations of the international organisations and the state. As government official noted

Yes, I can mention her name, her name is Queen, she was a returnee, then she went into fashion, she finished, luck run into her, an NGO, empowered her and at the end a shop was opened for her and other things. I send people to her for training and she is doing extremely well, and she sews both male and female [clothes].... Not even her alone, I have others that did training on soap making and bleach and they are now producing, and they are doing well, like Happy, Happy is doing well with her soap making and perfume too (Interview, government official 1).

IOM defines vulnerable migrants as “are migrants who are unable effectively to enjoy their human rights, are at increased risk of violations and abuse and who,
accordingly, are entitled to call on a duty bearer’s heightened duty of care (IOM, 2019b). The determinants of migrant vulnerability model used by IOM identifies five factors where migrants may be vulnerable during or after migration. These are individual factors, household / family factors, community factors and structural factors. This handbook on vulnerability is used by IOM and local NGO staff to identify the possible vulnerabilities returnees are exposed to and find solutions. However, there is no clearly objective criteria on how vulnerable returnees are identified. In addition, the complexities of vulnerability make it difficult for staff to assess and determine eligibility (Paasche et al., 2018).

The national migration policy does not clearly define vulnerability and in which contexts returnees may be in situations of vulnerability. Although the policy refers to comprehensive reintegration assistance through AVRR programmes, the focus of this assistance is on economic aspects, human rights and psychosocial support. From the perspective of the Nigerian government, return and reintegration programmes should provide returnees with training and education to promote their sustainable livelihoods and comprehensive reintegration assistance. The details of which are not spelled out should be provided through AVRR programmes and the human rights of returnees should be protected during and after return. While state officials may view and be sympathetic towards victims of trafficking, returnees are not viewed with similar empathy as they are seen to be responsible for their conditions through participating in irregular migration (Interview, government official 1).

11.7 Lived Realities of Returnees and Their Perspectives of Vulnerability and Precarity in Returning to Their Communities of Origin

The physical aspect of returning to one’s community of origin may include a transition period, mostly in cities of entry, where migrants attempt to build their confidence and modify their appearance before meeting their families or communities (Kliest, 2020). The complexities surrounding return migration is more pronounced in the cases where people return with little or no resources. This is viewed as shameful and unsuccessful by the migrant themselves and the community (Kliest, 2017, 2020; Paasche et al., 2018). However, post return life evolves differently for returnees. Similar trends have been noted in return of migrants in other West African countries. Studies show that some returnees are in similar or worse social and economic conditions as prior to emigration. For other returnees, social and economic reintegration leads to better outcomes through which they create businesses and are deemed as successful in their communities. While the uncertainty of post return life may result in remigration for others (Mensah, 2016; Kleist, 2017, 2020; Zanker et al., 2019). Post return life is further complicated by failures in multi-stakeholder coordination at the institutional level which contributes to further exacerbating the uncertainty faced by returnees. In Ghana as in other West African countries,
institutional challenges to the reintegration of forcibly returned migrants are pronounced when migrants’ journeys are interrupted or their return is unplanned (Kandilige & Adiku, 2020; Zanker et al., 2019; Tiemoko, 2004).

This section examines the lived reality of returnees and identifies how their experiences of return may differ based on how they returned from where they returned and the support that they received. In line with other studies, it finds that some returnees may find themselves in a worse or similar condition than prior to emigration (Kleist, 2020). The chapter finds that remigration as an option is actively explored despite the known dangers en route, regardless of whether or not reintegration programmes are successfully completed by the migrants (Kandilige & Adiku, 2020). While some returnees find themselves in a better position than prior to migration, these become posters of the government and international organisations to promote reintegration dialogue. However, some other migrants project vulnerability to benefit from possible economic contributions by international organisations and the government.

Focusing on five aspects of post return conditions, the paper examines the vulnerability and precarity experienced by returnees. These five themes are discussed below from the perspective of the returnees and government and NGO officials.

### 11.7.1 Living Conditions (Changes in Accommodation, Feeding and Personal Safety)

Most returnees having sold their property including houses before embarking on their journeys have no accommodation on return. They may also be avoiding family members who are disappointed by their return or facing community disapproval, hence the need to find accommodation (landing spot), pending when they have stable source of livelihood support. Consequently, returnees are exposed to homelessness except they can find family or friends to accommodate them. As a result, the government in partnership with international organisations such as IOM has established shelters for returnees that provide initial accommodation assistance.

The state provides initial accommodation for returnees for a limited period, during which training activities are conducted. Psychosocial counselling and medical screening are also conducted. Afterwards, more permanent accommodation may be provided for returnees especially those with families or children left behind. But there is no systematic manner of deciding who can have access to accommodation support or for how long this accommodation is provided. Consequently, returnees may face the threat of eviction after the initial rent paid for by the government or international organisations run out (Gänsler, 2018) or may resort to family members to pay their rent. The assumption that engaging in business will provide enough resources to cover daily sustenance including paying rents may not be right in all cases. Some businesses may fail or struggle initially, leaving returnees on the verge of homelessness.
Many of the interviewees noted that they were employed or self-employed and had a normal standard of living prior to emigrating. Economic reasons were the main motivation for migrating, either to seek a better life for themselves or their family members. An interviewee noted that “Before I go [went] to Libya, I was living fine, just that I was not that ok. I just have to go and make more money” (Interview male returnee 1). Most returnees prior to migration were able to afford their own accommodation and daily expenses and had a feeling of personal safety in their communities. Restating the difficulty faced after return from Libya an interviewee noted that “Everything is rough to me. [there is] Nothing for me.” (Interview male returnee 1). Another returnee remarked that post-return life is better than life prior to emigration. In the words of one interviewee “Everything change. E con be like say I con dey live well than before I comot [It appears I have a better standard of living than before I emigrated]” (Interview Female returnee 3). For others, there have been no major changes in their living conditions before or after emigrating, for these the consideration of re-migrating is an option that may be explored if not soon, in the future.

For Nigerians who decide not to emigrate, access to decent housing is equally a challenge that they face. The housing shortage in Nigeria is over 17 million units and there are over 25 million homeless people in the country (NBS, 2013). Several housing schemes introduced by the government aimed at providing affordable housing and accommodation for the citizens have not fully addressed the realities of lack of housing and the enabling legal and policy frameworks that reproduce homelessness (Anugbum & Osudike, 2019; Olarenwaju et al., 2016). Instead these schemes have been captured by political elites, resulting in more investment in luxurious accommodation, speculation and land grabbing (Olarenwaju et al., 2016). Consequently, leaving those who need accommodation in a more vulnerable situation.

In addition to the challenges with accommodation, the high level of increasing insecurity in various parts of the country contributes to a lack of feeling of safety for both returnees and those who choose not to emigrate. Intercommunal violence in many parts of the country as herder–allied armed groups, vigilantes and criminal gangs clash resulting in the death of hundreds of civilians, attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers and kidnaping for ransom in many parts of the country have contributed to the rising feeling of lack of personal safety (HRW, 2021). This heightened insecurity to which people are returns means that they are likely to be displaced again inside the country or seek for places of alternative remigration where they can find safety.

### 11.7.2 Employment Opportunities/ Livelihood Support

Given that the primary reason cited by most migration for emigrating is economic (all 10 interviewees alluded to this), the economic empowerment of returnees ranks high in the priority of the government, international organisations and third
countries providing support to return and reintegration like the EU member states. The national migration policy 2015 emphasises the need to promote training and education of returnees. Consequently, returnees are trained in different skills ranging from agriculture (farming, poultry, fishing), digital skills, movie production, hair dressing, hospitality. Training on soft skills such as time management, presentation, team building and business entrepreneurship skills are also provided. NGO and government officials noted that some returnees take the training process seriously and work towards establishing successful businesses. An official noted that

*Frankly quite a number of them, particularly those who have families, they took it quite seriously. Along the road, there is a lady that sells food, she is a returnee. She was empowered, and through that empowerment, she has been doing that business now for two years. Such, she takes it seriously. We have quite a number of them who are taking it seriously (NGO official 1).*

However, the emphasis on entrepreneurial skills does not mean that all returnees have the ability to be entrepreneurs with improved skills to develop successful business initiatives and who lack only capital and other government support. There may be some returnees who succeed as entrepreneurs but other would require further support either in accessing salaried employment or continuing their education. While the option to further their education exists, interviewees could not confirm that actual support from the government or international organisations was received. Instead they fund it out of their personal savings/effort.

Returnee migrants may face difficulties in accessing salaried employment due to stigmatisation by employers or fellow colleagues. A recent survey reveal that employers may be less likely to higher an unsuccessful migrant. Employers may perceive the tendency to migrate as a negative trait (Samuel Hall, 2018). The labour migration policy and the youth empowerment programmes of the government do not include any specific reference to returnees but are targeted at addressing unemployment in youths in general and empowering them to create business and employment opportunities. Recent efforts funded by the European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) aim to establish community projects that create employment for both returnees and the host communities. An example is the establishment of Cassava and pineapple processing factory in Edo state which will provide employment opportunities for both returnees and the host community (Odeyemi, 2020).

These programmes located in regions with high incidence of emigration are funded by international organisations in partnership with the government. They seek to address the challenge of unemployment faced by both returnees and young people in the host communities. Thus, they reduce the stigma that returnees may face in accessing employment and also provide employment for young people in the host communities with a view to discouraging emigration through irregular channels (IOM, 2019).

With a high unemployment rate of 33.30% in 2020 (NBS, 2020), employment opportunities are scarce for job seekers who choose not to emigrate and returnees also. Consequently, entrepreneurship is encouraged by the government to boost the industrial sector, create employment and utilise labour. However, the unstable
macroeconomic environment and frequent policy changes by various levels of government adversely affects the survival and growth of these SMEs (PWC, 2020). According to a study conducted by UNIDO, the average survival rate for Nigerian SMEs is 20% (Nation News, 2017). State led employment initiatives have been unable to address the challenges of unemployment, being fraught with allegations of corruption or political favouritism. The limited success of these initiatives by successive governments such as N-POWER and SURE-P have resulted in high dissatisfaction in the ability of the government to provide employment (Tochukwu, 2019). This high unemployment rate has results in economic uncertainty, relating to livelihood, for both returnees and non-migrants.

11.7.3 Family Support

The family and social networks play an important role in migrants decision making and their migration trajectory (Stark, 1991; Cassarino, 2004). They equally play an important role in the return and reintegration of migrants (Mensah 2016; Cassarino 2004). Iwuoha (2020) shows how the family environment can shape the perceptions and preferences relating to irregular migration and trafficking. She observes that poverty and unstable family upbringing are some of the driving force that propel people towards irregular migration in Edo state. Some families support the decision to emigrate because of the economic benefits which they envisage (SOTIN 2020). As there are no safety nets provided by the government, families rely on remittances from migrants for their survival. This often creates a high level of dependency on migrants and a pressure to re-migrate when migration journeys are interrupted (Mensah 2016; Kleist 2020). An NGO official observed that

Families don’t support them [returnees], rather families try to push them to go back. Families as well in Benin, maybe the mentality or non-educated Benin parents, they seem to have this attitude or laughable character towards their children when they come back from outside the country whether Libya or however, that your mate and they brought cars and they came to build houses but you are here. So, a lot of them are stigmatized (Interview, NGO official 1).

Returnees have often because of the rejection of their families and the ‘shame’ of return been pushed to commit suicide or have become addicted to illicit drugs (Molobe & Odukoya, 2021). Migration frustration, trauma, rejection are often the most common reasons for the use of illicit drugs (mostly marijuana) by an increasing number of returnees from Libyan detention centres (Molobe & Odukoya, 2021). Observing this rejection by the family a returnee noted “But I know of people who came back, the nature by which they came back, they were not really accepted. They were regarded as what we call ‘badluck’.” (Interview Male returnee 10). Unplanned returns and unsuccessful journeys are also hard on family members who have contributed to funding these journeys either through selling their property or incurring loans. In some cases, these family members may increase the pressure to re-emigrate on the returnee.
There are some migrants who do not inform their families about their decision to migrate, because they feel they would be discouraged from emigrating using irregular channels (SOTIN, 2020; Interview with returnees 4 & 5). These family members are usually educated and resident in other urban cities in Nigeria, thus they are aware of the dangers of irregular migration (Interviews with returnees and NGO officials). These family members also actively support the reintegration of returnees by reaching out to NGO and government officials to inquire about support for their returnee. Families equally organise reintegration support for their members when government support is lacking or insufficient. An interviewee noted that her family paid for their training in hair making. “But my family support me, they put me for work as I come, so I learnt the work (Na hairstylist I learn), but no support to take open the thing [no support to open the shop].” (Interview Female returnee 4).

For migrants who had a longer stay abroad and were sending regular remittances, family members were more eager to welcome them back, compared to others with a shorter stay and whose journeys were viewed as unsuccessful (Kleist, 2020). A returnee from Europe who was sending remittances to his family while abroad noted a different reaction and acceptance by this family. According to him “When I came back, I was accepted. Probably the nature of which I came back. I have lived, I have spent years there and I was not doing bad. I came back and I was not looking tattered. When I came back If they tell you that I was deported, you won’t believe.” (Interview Male returnee 10).

Family and social networks provide an important safety net for returnees. They help to build their confidence and self-esteem, as they seek to return to their previous lives (Iwuoha, 2020; Arowolo, 2000). When there is no supportive family response, this can be harmful to future decision-making regarding migration and emigration (Digidi & Bhabha, 2020; Mensah, 2016). Returnees that have the support of their family member fare better in reintegration and adapting to life after returning from Libya. These families are grateful to receive their family member alive especially after returning from Libya. There are no specific government policies targeted at family members, however in practice their role and influence over migrant decisions is acknowledged. Consequently, sensitisation programmes by agencies such as NAPTIP and international organisations and local NGOs are targeted at family members. Although some returnees choose to stay with friends or fellow returnees rather than return to their family members (Digidi & Bhabha, 2020).

Similarly, in other West African countries, the role of the family especially having a supportive family and community to return to has been acknowledged as essential to successful reintegration. Mensah (2016) while studying the conditions of returnees from Libya to Ghana observed that returnees receive varying degrees of financial and emotional support from their family and friends. However, financial support received was conditional on the financial situation of the family members and friends. Where most of them are poor, it is unlikely that they will offer financial support. Instead the emotional support from the family contributed to pressuring migrants towards re-emigration because of their dependence on remittances (Mensah, 2016).
11.7.4 Indebtedness

Many migrants and their family members borrow to fund migration journeys (SOTIN, 2020). Officials from the NGO and the government confirmed that several returnees had borrowed money to fund their journeys. “A lot of them borrowed money from excess of 500, 600, 300,000 naira to leave. Some took money from LAPO (Microfinance Bank) to also leave. They took it on the guise that they were going to do business and they left” (Interview NGO official 1). They cannot refund these loans on return. In some cases, police authorities have been involved in debt collection from returnees. Government and NGO officials responsible for reintegration intervene when the police are involved, in other to seek a peaceful resolution, without legal or criminal consequences. In other cases, returnees are able to set up payment plans or relocate to another state in the country to avoid debt collectors. However, this state of indebtedness exposes returnees to more abuse and exploitation by creditors or their agents. But there are no official means to address this. According to an NGO official, “these people [returnees] will eventually leave the camp we put them, so they are still faced-out with the issue of people coming to harass them to give them the monies that they borrowed to go [fund their emigration journey]” (Interview NGO official 1).

For some returnees, paying back creditors in addition to adjusting to their new realities is difficult to balance. As an interviewee noted, “I borrowed part of the money to travel. As I came back, when I started working, I started paying back. When I came back people came for their money, then I now told them that gradually, I will pay ‘installmently’, they should just pardon me.” (Interviewee male 5). Others had to sell their businesses or possessions to fund their journey, and became indebted during the migration process because they had to pay ransom to kidnappers or extra funds were required for another part of the journey or to try again after a failed attempt at sea. Another interview stated that “Somehow, partially I didn’t borrow money because I had a shop then, so I sold almost everything. I was a technician, a phone technician. I have to sell most things I have in my shop to travel. When I got there, due to the challenges, we [have to call them] lenders, to borrow monies and do some other things too (Interviewee male returnee 9).

Returnees on arrival in their countries of origin are at risk of economic, psychosocial and physical harm (Alpes & Sørensen, 2016). This is no different in Nigeria especially for returnees who are exposed to physical harm from lenders using thugs or the police to enforce the repayment of their loans. For these returnees, there are no legal alternatives and mediation between the officials at the return centres and lenders may not be respected. This leaves them in a more vulnerable situation and at the mercy of lenders who may further exploit their already difficult situation through bonded service or unfavourable repayment plans.
11.7.5 Participation and Access in Communal Activities and Social Settings

Overall, the role of social networks is crucial in return and reintegration. Returnees often become stigmatized and may be excluded from their network of family or friends upon arrival resulting in depression or even suicide (Alpes & Sørensen, 2016).

NGOs and civil society organisations together with international organisations provide psychosocial counselling and support or returnees. The cases of abuse, especially relating to survivors of trafficking, are reported to the authorities who conduct investigations into tracking smuggling and trafficking networks. However societal discrimination of returnees remains high especially for those that are deemed unsuccessful (Ikuteyijo, 2020). Returnees may face discrimination in seeking employment (Samuel Hall, 2018), participating in social and communal events like village meetings or religious organisations. However, there are a few examples of migrant returnee associations in Benin city although these support groups may exist informally, they are not very vocal or visible. Thus, emphasising that migrants do not want to be identified as returnees because of the stigma attached except where economic benefits may accrue to them.

Returnees recognise that they are excluded from participating in societal matters or that their level of participation may have changed due to the perception of their status as ‘returnees or deportees’. Hence there is a requirement for them to be assimilated into their groups or activities. According to an NGO official “we start by making them feel among others in the society. We start by making them feel that we are one, we don’t discriminate them. If not for myself, nobody knows that these people are from this Libya returnees and all.” (Interview NGO official 2). Some female interviewees noted that they face discrimination in the larger society “When we come newly it was not easy at all because people go say, this one don go do ashawo for Libya o, dem don go do this one, many many talk dey fro grouns. So we just need to encourage ourselves. [when we just came back, we faced some difficulties because of what people said. They accused us of being prostitutes in Libya and other unfounded things] (Interview Female returnee 8).

NGOs provide support for social integration and are helping to change the negative social perception of returnees in their communities through sensitisation activities (e. g the activities of NACTRAL). IOM also uses returnees in its campaign against irregular migration. Here, they are useful in telling their stories in community outreaches and sensitisation programmes (Obi et al., 2020).

These experiences reveal that returnees often remain in precarious circumstances on return to their communities of origin. Efforts by the state and international organisations, do not address this question of precarity and uncertainty which returnees find themselves in. Rather, prolonged social and economic uncertainty remains part of their living conditions. Thus, undertaking precarious migration projects constitute a perceived potential livelihood or escape from this uncertainty.

It is not only returnees who find themselves in similar or worse off situations on return that choose to re-migrate. Some returnees who had passed through
reintegration programmes successfully have also re-migrated. The difference is that these returnees have the initial capital to pay for their journeys. After the monitoring period of the projects are over, these returnees liquidate their business and make attempts to emigrate, still through irregular channels. As two NGO officials noted “a particular lady called me, we even made her an Ambassador (during the project) and she called me 2months later that she is now in Sweden. She went back.” (interview NGO official 1). “Not one not two not three, I can give you over forty that has passed through me that have supposedly been reintegrated or rehabilitated by different organization [who have re-migrated].” (Interview NGO official 3).

As a survival strategy, returnees project vulnerability on return in order to participate in reintegration support programmes offered by the government and international organisations. Some returnees have participated in several of these programmes and now use this as a source of livelihood. As noted by an NGO official, “… that’s why the returnees now feel that people are using them to make money, so they also will make money from it.” (Interview NGO official 3). Returnees perceive that they are being ‘used’ by the government and the international organisations, reports of corruption in government run reintegration projects have also damaged their trust in the reintegration process. Returnees participate in several training programmes run by different local and international organisations, they gather equipment from these programmes which are either sold to fund daily expenses or remigration projects. Because there is limited coordination between the organisations running these programmes, returnees can access the system in this manner. However, some officials also feel that returnees may be looking for hand-outs. “So rather than taking those things and plunging it into profitable businesses, they just eat it and are look for hand-outs. I think, so to say, they are not really helping situations”. (Interview NGO official 1).

11.8 Linking the Political Economy of Return and Reintegration with the Lived Realities of Vulnerability and Precarity Faced by Returnees

In West Africa, and in Nigeria also, the issue of returns remains highly sensitive especially for governments (SOTIN, 2020; Zanker et al., 2019; Lücke et al., 2020). While there may be some limited cooperation between West African and European governments on humanitarian returns, the cooperation on forced returns from Europe is erratic and unstable as it may undermine the domestic legitimacy of governments especially since remittances received from migrants abroad contribute significantly to the economic development of these countries (Zanker & Altrogge, 2019; Adam et al., 2020a, b). West African governments try as much as possible to distance themselves from the implementation of forced returns from Europe. As part of their sophisticated strategy of dealing with the demand for migration cooperation from European countries on return migration, state actors work hard to keep
these returns under the radar, so as not to affect their legitimacy or elections negatively (Mouthaan, 2019). For Nigerian policy makers, the investment on return is not commensurate with the domestic losses they will face politically, considering the increasingly important role that the diaspora (comprised of regular and irregular migrants) is playing in domestic elections (Bisong, 2021).

As earlier noted, return migration programmes in Nigeria are spearheaded by development partners and international organisations. These programmes, though aimed at assisting returning migrants and their host communities, are not effective in successfully creating alternative livelihoods for their target participants because of the underlying difficult political and economic context which is prevalent in Nigeria. This is also similar in other West African countries, where rising unemployment rates, increasing insecurity and difficult political and economic situations have prevented the successful reintegration of returnees (Mensah, 2016, Zanker et al., 2019).

The Nigerian government is currently tackling more domestically charged issues of insecurity, high unemployment and a worsening economic outlook (HRW, 2021). These issues are the priority of the government therefore, addressing return migration, which is an agenda driven by the EU is not a priority for the Nigerian government (Arhin-Sam, 2019). This explains the limited institutional resources allocated towards supporting the reintegration of returnees. A similar situation is observed in other West African states, where return migration programmes are equally driven by international organisations and do not fall within the priority of the national governments. Consequently, the inability of the government to support returnees further exacerbates their vulnerability and precarity.

More so, the institutional failure of governments in supporting return migration has been well documented and this contributes to exacerbating the uncertainty in which returnees find themselves in and their exposure to harm and lack of access to services (Tiemoko, 2004; Kandilige & Adiku, 2020). As a result of this lack of interest by the government in providing a supportive reintegration system, returnees are doubtful of the socio-economic programmes provided to support Nigerians such as Sure – P and N-Power, which have also not worked. Consequently, they view the current reintegration programmes as an extension/continuation of these failed state programmes and do not rely on their efficacy. Their perception of the support received by the Nigerian government and international organisations reveals that there is limited coordination of the reintegration support provided. While the quality of this support has improved over the years as noted by NGO officials, the uncoordinated manner in which the support is offered still makes it difficult for returnees to adequately access their support and assistance (Samuel Hall, 2018; SOTIN, 2020). This may also have to do with the less active role of the government especially at the federal level in the return of migrants (Arhin-Sam, 2019). This lack of trust of the system in combination with the unfavourable domestic economic and political conditions do not support the reintegration of returnees (Mensah, 2016).

Thus, through the actions of government and institutional actors, returnees find themselves in situations endemic and permanent uncertainty, being entrenched in informality especially as it relates to their socio-economic realities. More so, this
absence of stability predisposes them to physical, emotional or verbal harm either from the lack of access of services or the exclusion faced in the society, thus heightening their vulnerability. While it is clear that this precarity situated in the broader context of the Nigerian society is also evident in non-migrants, the effects on returnees undermine the measures taken towards reintegration.

11.9 Conclusion

This article sheds light on the lived experiences of returnees in Benin city, Nigeria, showing how their return contributes to recreating vulnerabilities and precarity due to institutional lapses in the return process. The perspectives from returnees reveal that they find themselves in situations of uncertainty and unpredictability over which they lack control. More so, their inclusion into informal businesses exacerbates their precarity, as some of these businesses would not survive the difficult business environment in Nigeria. While the current return programmes enable some migrants to adjust on return, several others cannot do this without the support from their family members or communities. However, the limited coordination in providing support still makes it difficult for returnees to adequately access their support and assistance. Consequently, poorly implemented return programmes, may worsen the vulnerabilities of migrants instead of promoting their integration. However, migrants may reinforce their vulnerabilities in order to benefit from perceived advantages offered by the state or international organisations. Lastly, family and community efforts help migrants cope with the vulnerabilities they are exposed to in their communities of origin. Although returnees may be stigmatised by their family and friends, this contributes to negatively affecting their reintegration and their social and economic status.

More broadly, the current economic and political situation in Nigeria with the increasing levels of insecurity and high unemployment contribute to further worsening the condition of both returnees and non-migrants within the Nigerian society. National policies and programmes exist that may be beneficial to both migrants and non-migrants, but their lack of trust in these government processes prevent them from accessing these programmes. Although efforts aimed at addressing unemployment in host communities of returnees contributes to alleviating unemployment in these communities.

The policy implications of these findings can be widely applicable in other West African countries who are facing similar conditions in reintegrating returnees. Consequently, it is important for the government to play a more active role, beyond setting the policy frameworks in the return and reintegration process. Governments need to take a more active role in the reintegration of returnees and not the current passive role where international organisations are driving the activities. Government programmes designed to respond to the needs of returnees, which may be different from that of non-migrants should be established. More so, the government should review current policies to include the specific needs of returnees (e.g. labour and employment policies). Lastly, there should be programmes aimed at equipping the
family and social networks to support returnees, current sensitisation programmes have helped reduce the number of irregular migrants, however these measures should be targeted at providing families with skills to support their returnee members to rebuild their lives.

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Chapter 12
The Janus-Face of Contemporary Migration: Perspectives on West African Return Migration and Transnationalism with a Focus on Ghana and Senegal

Joseph Mensah, Joseph Kofi Teye, and Mary Boatemaa Setrana

Recently, a burgeoning literature has emerged on the return experience of migrants, with some analysts touting the benefits of return to the socioeconomic development of countries of origin, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, only few studies have examined how return migrants create and sustain transnational connectivity with their countries of destination upon their return to the homeland, and fewer still have analyzed how these dynamics play out in the context of West African migrants. This primarily theoretical paper explores the interconnections between return migration and transnationalism among West African migrants, focusing on the case of Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants. The insistent premise of the paper posits that contemporary migration is essentially Janus-faced, in the sense that migrants are transnational in both their pre- and post-return periods. The paper addresses the following questions: (i) What are the perspectives of Northern countries and supranational bodies, such as the EU, on return migration, and how do these perspectives compare with those of Southern countries, such as Ghana and Senegal? (ii) How do West African migrants view their own return migration, and to what extent are their emic perspectives different from those of Northern governments and their government in the homeland? (iii) How do West African returnees—specifically, Ghanaian and Senegalese returnees—use their transitional connectivities to facilitate their resettlement and reintegration in the homeland upon their return? Clearly, return migration elicits a number of important questions, into which this Chapter stands to provide useful preliminary prescience in the context of Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants.

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12.1 Introduction

During Greco-Roman mythological times, Janus was the god of many phenomena and entities vis-à-vis transitions through space and time, including beginnings, endings, and passages. Depicted as a two-faced person, Janus had functions pertaining to exchange, travelling, and journeys, and was, purportedly, able to see into the past and future, simultaneously, and watch over boundaries of all ilk, including those of city-states, gates, and doorways. With this inherent connectivity to two places in mind, Janus is used here as a metaphor for the underlying transnationality of contemporary international migration.

Prior to the seminal work of Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues in the 1990s (Schiller et al., 1992, 1995), scholars of international migration assumed that most immigrants from the global South make a permanent move to settle in rich countries and thereby sever ties with their homelands. As a corollary, earlier analysts downplayed the Janus-face of the immigrant experience. We now know better: the immigrant experience has gone transnational, with cognate concepts and neologisms, such as “transnational identity” (Mensah, 2014; Satzewich & Wong, 2006), “transnational social spaces” (Faist, 2000: 191), and “flexible citizenships,” (Ong, 1999) becoming trendy in the study of international migration. Since the early 2000s, this basic realization has culminated in a bourgeoning literature on immigrant transnationalism, with some studies focusing on the case of African immigrants in various Western countries (Black et al., 2003a, b; Asiedu, 2005; Flahaux & Reeve, 2015; Sinatti, 2015; Setrana & Tonah, 2016). However, while analysts now generally acknowledge the salience of migrants’ transnational connections to the homeland prior to their return, they have largely overlooked the extent to which these same migrants deploy, or rely on, their transnational identities, connectivities, and practices to facilitate their resettlement in the homeland upon their return. Yet, as Setrana and Tonah (2016: 550) aptly point out: “…the lives of migrants in the countries of origin are also likely to become ‘transnationalised’ and it would be unrealistic to assume that migrants would readily abandon their transnational activities and links after return.”

The fact that the transnational activities of returnees have been understudied in the extant literature is not that surprising, since return migration, in generally, has only now gained some currency among international migration scholars. King (2000), for instance, describes return migration as “the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration” (p. 7). Presently, though, the stories of return migrants are being told with discernible frequency from a number of disciplines, including anthropology, geography, and sociology, with several analysts touting the significant contributions of returnees to the socioeconomic development of their homelands (Cassarino, 2004; Daugaard-Hansen, 2009; de Arce & Mahía, 2012; Nyi et al., 2012). Still, only few studies have examined the interconnections between migrants’ transnationalism and their return migration, and, even fewer still have explored how these interconnections play out in the context of West African migrants living in the West. Additionally, only a handful of studies have examined how
returnees use their transnational practices to help them resettle in their homeland, upon their return.

Quite expectedly, given the complex and multifaceted nature of return migration, its theorization in the extent literature is imbued with considerable contestation. Compounding this contestation is the fact that origin and destination countries are often motivated by different interest when it comes to return migration. For instance, while most advanced countries, especially in Western Europe, routinely deploy return migration as a tool for the removal of “unwanted” immigrants, several West African countries, including Ghana and Senegal, use return migration to boost their diasporic investments and, ultimately, socioeconomic development in the homeland. As a corollary, the return migration policies of origin and destination countries tend to be divergent. In a similar vein, such national policies often differ from, if not conflict with, the goals and aspirations of the migrants themselves (Boccagni, 2011; Sinatti, 2015). For instance, while most origin countries in West Africa entice their returnees to invest in productive ventures in such sectors as healthcare and education, many returnees tilt their investments toward symbolic and conspicuous consumption in the form of mega-houses, luxury cars, and lavish funeral celebrations. Clearly, then, the goals and aspirations of return from above (i.e., from the origin and destination countries) are often at odds with those from below (i.e., from the migrants themselves).

This Chapter uses the case of Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants in the global North to shed light on the interrelationships between the return migration and transnational practices of West African migrants overseas, paying particular attention to how the returnees among them use their transnational connectivities to help them resettle in the homeland upon their return. To the extent that transnational and return migration practices occur not only from the standpoint of migrants, from below, but also in the context of institutional parameters set by nation States and supra-national entities such as ECOWAS and the European Union (EU), from above, we will pay due attention these scaler dynamics to get a better grasp of the key issues at play here.

Clearly, the nexuses between return migration and transnationalism elicit a number of thorny, yet intriguing, questions, for which this chapter seeks to provide some answers in the context of West Africa, drawing primarily on case of Ghanaian and Senegalese immigrants in the West. The insistent premise of this chapter, which flows from our titular commitment, avers that migration, especially in its contemporary manifestation, is patently Janus-faced. This inherent duality plays out not only in the day-to-day activities of migrants, but also in the very consciousness of migrants, impinging on their personal identities and sense of belonging as they live their life in a third space-a-la-Hommi Bhabha (1994). More importantly, this connectivity to two (or more places), per transnationalism, continues even after the migrant return to the homeland, as we shall soon see. Even though our approach here is primarily theoretical, we draw specifically on the empirical works of Setrana and Tonah (2016) in Ghana and Sinatti (2015) in Senegal to firm up most of arguments. Accordingly, we pay homage to the “ethnographies of return” (Oxfeld & Long, 2004) provided by these scholars in the two national contexts (Ghana and Senegal) relevant to our chapter.
Following this introduction, the Chapter is divided into five substantive sections. The first provides the theoretical grounding for the Chapter by examining how return migration has been theorized in the extant literature, with some insights into the nexuses between return migration, on the one hand, and immigrants’ transnationalism and integration, on the other. The second section profiles the international migration trends in West Africa, in general, and Ghana and Senegal, in particular, before we deal with the perspectives of return migration from above—i.e., from northern governments as well as the governments of Senegal and Ghana—in the third section. In the penultimate section, we zero in on the perspectives of return migration from below—i.e. from the emic realities of Ghanaian and Senegal migrants themselves. We end the chapter in section five where we synthesize our main findings on how transnationalism is enmeshed in both the pre- and post-return lives of the migrant.

12.2 Return Migration and Its Intentions

With growing evidence of the beneficial role of return migration to the socioeconomic development of origin countries [(de Haas, 2005), coupled with the fact that many first generation migrants are approaching their retirement age (Fokkema, 2011; White, 2006)], return migration has gained considerable attention in academic and policy circles around the world. At the same time, as with migration, ‘return migration’ remains an elusive concept to define, with its meaning and synonymous concepts varying per context and, indeed, per analyst. For instance, Kunuroglu et al. (2016: 3) use ‘return migration’ and an equally abstruse term, ‘remigration’ as synonymous. However, we doubt whether these two terms are close enough to be substitutable. A ‘remigrant,’ to us, is someone who is migrating again, as signified by the prefix ‘re,’ but not necessary migrating back to the home country, as commonly implied in the concept of return migration. We thus find Guzzetta (2004), for one, using the term ‘reverse migration’ as a preferred synonym for ‘return migration’—a semantic move that is, arguably, more appealing, since there is an implicit return (back) to the starting point, which is often the homeland.

Adding to conceptual muddle is the fact that ‘return migration’ has both permanent and temporary dimensions that are not readily deducible from some of the common definitions of the term. Also, ‘return migration’—both as a concept and as a phenomenon—overlaps quite substantially, if not conterminously, with transnational mobility among migrants, making it hard to distinguish between the two terms in most cases. Meanwhile, as Carling and Erdal (2014) note: “While the boundary between return migration and transnationalism is sometimes blurred, it also makes sense to see the two as distinct concepts, influencing each other” (p. 3).

Dustmann and Weiss (2007: 238) define ‘return migration’ as a “situation where the migrants return to their country of origin, by their own will, after a significant period of time abroad.” While we are in general agreement with this definition, we are still unsure what constitutes “a significant period of time abroad,” just as we
doubt whether the homeward trip should necessarily be voluntary to qualify as return migration. For our purpose, “return migration” is a broad, relative, and contextual concept that denotes the homecoming of the migrant. It is broad in the sense that it covers both permanent and temporary returns, as well as both voluntary and involuntary moves back home. We also use it—as did Kunuroglu et al. (2016)—to embrace the homeward return of not only the first generation migrant, but also of the second and subsequent generations. It is relative and contextual in the sense that it has no essential quality that distinguishes it from other forms of homeward returns, such as return visits, circular migration, and transnational migration, in particular. With our definition, West African migrants who were forced out of Libya during the recent turmoil, for instance, are all return migrants or returnees, even though they did not come home by their own will for the most part. Similarly, migrants who are deported to their homelands are included in this broad definition of return migration. As Sinatti (2015) notes, “return is largely a tool for the removal of unwanted immigrants through forced and semi-voluntary return mechanisms” (p. 276); mind you, some researcher might decide to operationally define ‘return migration’ to exclude such returnees and deportees, as did Dustmann and Weiss (2007)—either way, our view of return migration being a relative and contextual concept remains both consistent and defensible.

The theoretical and empirical boundaries between return migration and transnational mobility are particularly nebulous. It is virtually impossible for someone, other than the migrant involved, to make this distinction; and to the extent that two different migrants can dub practically the same form of mobility differently (as either return migration or transnational migration) speaks to the relative nature of the concept. Since return migration is not always permanent, but sometimes temporary, any categorical distinction between it and sustained transnational migration is hardly justifiable. Indeed, because many migration decisions are open to future change, the notion of permanent return is even problematic (Carling & Erdal, 2014: 2–3), and this realization brings the overlap between return migration and sustained transnational mobility into even bolder relief. Although the boundary line between transnationalism and return migration is blurry, the two concepts are neither coterminous nor interchangeable; they are, indeed, distinct.

Another wrinkle in the theorization of ‘return migration’ concerns the distinction between its behaviour and intention. Until quite recently, migration scholars have been blindsided by their inattention to the return intentions of migrants. There is now a growing attention to migrants’ return intentions, and for good reasons. For one thing, “behavioural-tracking data [on migration] are prohibitively expensive to collect” (Tezcan, 2018: 390), and researchers are increasingly relying on surveys to gauge migrants’ return intentions as a proxy for their migration behaviour; of course, while the two are not the same, they are closely related. Understanding migrants’ return intentions is also important in its own right: it helps both origin and destination countries to “calculate projections on applications, eligibility and scope of retirement benefits” Guzzetta, 2004: 110). Moreover, given that most diaspora engagement policies to lure citizens back home have underperformed, if not failed, the need to understand the return intentions of migrants cannot be overemphasized.
(de Haas et al., 2015). As Bilgili and Siegel (2017: 15) rightly point out: “[h]aving a better understanding of migrants future plans regarding return may help policy makers find out about the potential of return and develop programs and policies that enhance return for development through the transfer of skills, financial resources, and experience.” Also, who can deny that migrants’ return intentions affect their decisions on employment, savings, investment, human capital formation, and civic and political participation at both ends of the migration cycle (Bilgili & Siegel, 2017; Lapshyna & Düvell, 2015).

Even though for many migrants, the idea of returning to the homeland is a definite yes, for some it is a definite no, and for still others, it remains a possibility, which is “neither certain nor unthinkable” (Carling & Erdal, 2014: 2). These options, and the attendant uncertainties, have created some confusion in the way survey questions on migrants’ return intentions are posed in the available literature. As Tezcan (2018: 391) points out, most surveys that ask questions about “intention to return/intention to stay” exclude an option to respond “I don’t know,” thereby forcing respondents into a binary choice. However, “I don’t know” is a reality when it comes to return intentions—a reality, which cannot be ignored if we are to maintain any theoretical lucidity. Perhaps the thorniest issue in the literature concerns the interconnections between immigrants’ return, transnationalism, and integration. The issue is twofold: First, what are the likely effects of immigrants’ integration in the destination country on their return migration or return intentions? Second, what effects, if any, do immigrants’ transnational ties with the homeland have on their return migration and its intentions? These questions can be framed in other ways. For instance, are those who are structurally or economically integrated more likely to return than those who are only socio-culturally integrated? Does transnational connectivity undermine or promote immigrants integration or not?

Carling and Pettersen (2014: 15) examine return migration intention in an integration-transnationalism matrix to accentuate the complex imbrications between these variables—i.e., return intention, integration, and transnationalism. Once we conceive of “integration” and “transnationalism” as a scale that ranges from a low- or weak- to a high- or strong-point, we can determine how return intention might play out in the context of a particular migrant, based on where he or she is located along this scale. It is clear from the Carling-Pettersen approach that integration and transnationalism are not absolute phenomena, which are in strict competition of each other; rather, they are relative, and connected to each other to some degree, depending on the context. Below is how Carling and Erdal (2014: 3) describe the Carling-Peterson integration-transnationalism matrix in relation to immigrants’ return intention:

Carling and Pettersen’s analysis of return migration intentions shows that it is the relative strength of integration and transnationalism that matters. Unsurprisingly, the highest odds of planning return are among people who are strongly transnational and weakly integrated. And conversely, the people who are strongly integrated and weakly transnational are the least likely to be planning return migration. In the middle, however, are two different groups with intermediate levels of return migration intentions: those who are both integrated and transnational, and those who are neither. (pp. 3–4: emphasis in original)
Clearly, it is not easy to determine, in absolute terms, how immigrants’ return intentions are affected by their integration and transnational ties, as neither of the latter two is absolute; indeed, each comes in the form of a continuum, along which the migrant is positioned based on his or her particular circumstance.

What does the extant literature say about the return migration of West African migrants vis-à-vis these revelations? What are the relationships between the return migration of these migrants and their transnational activities? To what extent are West African migrants—and specifically the Ghanaian and Senegalese among them—engaged with their countries of destination upon their return to the homeland? What are the perspectives of the migrants themselves on return migration, relative to those of their destination countries in the global North and their homelands in the South? Answers to these questions would invariably point to different directions, depending on the specificities of the individual and the collective involved, as well as the theorization underpinning any such discussion.

12.3 West African Migration to the Global North

As with almost all regions of Africa, West Africa has a long history of human mobility, traceable to the pre-colonial period. This tradition was boosted in the post-colonial era by way of cash crop-induced labour migration across international borders inherited from the colonial enterprise. For instance, increased production of cocoa and coffee in the forest regions of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire engendered a massive influx of wage-labour from countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (Konseiga, 2005). While migrants have been crisscrossing the sub-region over the centuries, the immediate post-independence decade of the 1960s saw the emergence of a discernible pattern in which countries of the arid and semi-arid half in the north, including Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, became the primary sources, while those in the coastal or southern half—notably, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana—served as the main destination points. With time, many West African countries adopted restrictive migration policies during economic downturns, some of which entailed the mass deportation of undocumented migrants, as happened in Nigeria in late 1970s and early 1980s (Adepoju, 2005; Konseiga, 2005). In such situations, adamant migrants have little or no choice but to shift their attention to other countries within Africa or beyond that might be relatively receptive to their search for a greener pasture. Such trends persisted for the greater for part of the post-independence era until ECOWAS initiated programs to ease travel restrictions for all member states with the ratification of its Protocol on Free Movements of Person in 1979 (Gnisci & Treémolières, 2006) which was revamped in 2008 with the ECOWAS Common Approach to Migration. The latter provided guidelines for member states to move beyond a regime of migration control and exclusion to one of migration management. With these initiatives, ECOWAS citizens can now, among other things, travel visa-free and stay in another country for a maximum of 90 days (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Interior, 2016). Meanwhile with the
prevalence of civil war in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, refugee movements have become commonplace in many parts of the sub-region since the early 1990s, with countries such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria hosting thousands of West African refugees (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Interior, 2016).

There are indications that labour movements, which feed into the extraction of local natural resource and the production of cash crops, have waned under contemporary globalization and its attendant innovations in telecommunication and long-distance transportation. Since the late 1980s, in particular, more and more West Africans have been migrating to North American and European countries. Much of the European-bound flows have been notoriously dangerous, with migrants, most of whom are young males, crossing the scorching Sahara sands through Northern African countries such as Libya, Algeria and Morocco through the Mediterranean and Malta to Europe. That West Africans have been forced by socioeconomic and political circumstances at home to risk their lives on such hazardous trips is bad enough, but to see Europeans maltreat them—in what amounts to a quasi-apartheid migration exclusion, as though Europeans did not, or do not, emigrate to Africa—is even worse.

Migration in West Africa, in particular, and Africa, in general, has never been a closed, autonomous system, divorced from cognate trends elsewhere in the world. For centuries now, West Africa has been nested in the global migration system to one degree or another. For instance, during the so-called “Age of Discovery” in Europe, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, West Africa served as one of the leading destinations for European emigrants who were supposedly exploring the World, then (Mensah, 2010). And, following their “discoveries” came the enterprise of colonization and the infamous Transatlantic Slave Trade, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, which culminated in the Scramble for Africa, from 1884 to about the start of the first World War in 1914 (Mensah, 2010). Through these diabolical machinations, Africa was literally divided up among the European powers, with many Europeans settling on the continent, while some Africans were at the same time forcibly shipped en masse to the Americas, as slaves, to work the plantations.

Lest we forget, at the time of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, from the 1760 to about 1820, Europeans were trekking all corners of Africa for raw materials to support their industrialization. Hyperbolically speaking, it was, perhaps, the fear of the African mosquito that saved African lands from sizeable permanent European settlements, except in South Africa where the sub-tropical, temperate, and Mediterranean climates remain unconducive for mosquitoes. Arguably, it was only when Europe entered the fourth stage of its Demographic Transition, around the mid-1970s, that European migration to Africa effectively dwindled. At that time, both the birth and dearth rates of most European countries ebbed very low, with no surplus population to send out. It was just around that same time that the tide of voluntary migration turned, with West Africans emigrating to European and North American countries. Clearly, then, to insinuate—as does conventional wisdom—that West Africans, in particular, or Africans, in general, are, perhaps, the only ones
who emigrate *en masse* to the global North, and never *vice versa*, cannot be farther from the truth.

Presently, there are large West African diasporic communities in nearly all major European and North American cities. With a regional average Human Development Index (HDI) of a mere 0.491 in 2019, ranging from a low of 0.377 in Niger to a high of 0.651 in Cabo Verde (Table 12.1), it is unsurprising that many West Africans use migration to diversify their livelihood and live chances. For the most part, the origins and destinations of West African international migrants are mediated by the legacies of colonialism, with most of them migrating to the countries of their former colonial “masters.” Not only did many European countries, at first, give preferential treatment to migrants from their former colonies, but the latter also find it easy to settle in these countries, given their commonalities in official language and culture. We thus find many Anglophones—from countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone—migrating to Britain and other English-speaking countries such as the US and Canada, just as Francophones from Senegal, Burkina Faso and Cote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current(^a) population (2020)</th>
<th>Global emigrant stock, 2017(^b)</th>
<th>Remittance, 2019 (US$ millions)</th>
<th>HDI, 2019</th>
<th>Colonial power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>12,123,200</td>
<td>657,594</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>20,903,273</td>
<td>1,518,063</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>555,987</td>
<td>237,921</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>26,378,274</td>
<td>1,065,361</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>2,416,668</td>
<td>106,525</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>31,072,940</td>
<td>856,204</td>
<td>3723</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>13,132,795</td>
<td>467,933</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1,968,001</td>
<td>106,901</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5,057,681</td>
<td>405,732</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>20,250,833</td>
<td>1,143,309</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>24,206,644</td>
<td>383,917</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>206,139,589</td>
<td>1,309,063</td>
<td>25,368</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>16,743,927</td>
<td>643,640</td>
<td>2495</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>7,976,983</td>
<td>374,691</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>8,278,724</td>
<td>524,460</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional mean</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/western-africa-population/; \(^b\)World Bank (2018b); \(^c\)Human Development Index; \(^d\)American Colonization Society
d’Ivoire and Lusophones from Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau heading to France and Portugal, respectively. The increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the EU, in particular, have reduced West African migration to Europe, pushing many prospective migrants underground into the cruel arms of human trafficker and ‘connection men’ and other fraudulent actors (Mazzucato, 2008). Notwithstanding these constraints, West Africans continue to emigrate to different parts of the world, with some countries, such as Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria, having more than a million of their citizens living outside their own borders by 2017 (see Table 12.1). Expectedly, remittance remains a major source of foreign exchange for almost all West African countries, contributing to nearly 6% (on average) of their respective Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) by 2019 (Table 12.1).

12.3.1 Senegal and Ghana: International Migration Trends

With Ghana’s independence in 1957 and Senegal’s in 1960, the former has a slightly more post-independence experience than the latter. Also, Ghana’s population of 31.1 million is almost twice that of Senegal which stands at 16.7 million (Table 12.1), just as the size of the Ghanaian economy, with an estimated GDP of USD65.56 (World Bank, 2018a) is more than double that of Senegal’s USD24.13; their respective GDP per capita are USD2,202 and USD1,521 (World Bank, 2018a). Despite these notable differences, the two countries have the enviable reputation of being among the very few stable countries in Africa. This is attested by their peaceful change of governments over the years, and their ability to deal with their socio-economic and ethnic problems without much violence. While both economies did reasonably well during their immediate post-independence period, under their respective trailblazing Presidents—i.e., Kwame Nkrumah for Ghana and Léopold Sédar Senghor for Senegal—living conditions in both countries deteriorated from the late 1970s to about the late 1980s, following the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (Mensah, 2006). In addition to extensive currency devaluations and civil service retrenchments, both countries were compelled by IMF-World Bank conditionalities to withdraw subsidies from the provision of amenities and social services such as healthcare, education, water and electricity (Mensah, 2006). Their GDPs dropped precipitously, inflation and unemployment soured, and crime and other social problems increased for the greater part of the SAPs era. It was against the backdrop of these conditions that citizens from both countries—including many with higher education or professions in demand, such as physicians, nurses, engineers, and teachers—began to leave in droves for greener pasture overseas (Adepoju, 2005; Black et al., 2003a). It was not until the early 2000s that the Ghanaian and Senegalese economies began to enjoy renewed vigour and growth, with some attendant improvements in living conditions (Mensah, 2010; Flahaux & Reeve, 2015). And it was around this time that many of diasporic populations—who left Ghana and Senegal in 1980s and 1990s, and thus relatively settled in their host
countries—intensified their transnational connectivity, short-term visits, and return migrations to the homeland (Asiedu, 2005; Flahaux & Reeve, 2015).

By 2017, there were over 0.8 million Ghanaians living outside the country, according to estimates by the World Bank; the corresponding figure for Senegal was 0.6 million people (see Table 12.2 below). The main non-African destinations for Ghanaians include the US, UK, Italy, Germany and Canada, in that order. For Senegal, the leading non-African host nations are France, Italy, Spain, US, and Belgium, in that order. Interestingly, whereas UK, the former colonial power for Ghana, is second only to the US, as the leading non-African destination for Ghanain migrants, France, which comes in first for Francophone Senegal, places as far down as ninth among the top-ten Ghanaian destinations. With remittance accounting for 5.5% of Ghana’s GDP and as high as 9.9% of Senegal’s (Table 12.1), migration is clearly an important component of the lives of people in both countries.

12.4 Return Migration: Perspectives from Above

12.4.1 The Case of Western Governments

During the 1960s, several Western countries, including France, UK, Germany, US and Canada relied, on foreign workers to boost their economy (Flahaux & Reeve, 2015: 101; Marot, 1995; Mensah, 2010). Consequently, their immigration policies were quite flexible, with some even allowing citizens from their former colonies to enter without visa. France, for one, set up recruitment offices in West African countries such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire to facilitate the migration of workers to France (Flahaux & Reeve, 2015: 101; Marot, 1995). As the global economy went into a tailspin during the OPEC crisis of the early 1970s, many Western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ghana Destination</th>
<th>No. of emigrants</th>
<th>Senegal Destination</th>
<th>No. of emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>171,428</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>119,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>93,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>47,287</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>41,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>24,718</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16,006</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13,990</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9372</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6797</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5980</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| World total | 865,204 | World total | 643,640 |

Source: World Bank (2018b)
started to tighten their immigration regulation, only to relax them somewhat in the late 1980s, as globalization and the cumulative effects of earlier migration engendered more international migration around the world. By the late 1990s, as the population of Blacks and other ethno-racial minorities increased in major cities of the West (e.g., London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Paris, Toronto, and New York), immigration became a highly contentious political issue, forcing many governments to curb the flow of racial minority immigrants.

Numerous studies (e.g., Cassarino, 2004; Ghosh, 2000; Sinatti, 2015; Mensah, 2010) have shown that the immigration policies of the EU and other Western countries, including US and Canada, are now geared towards the curtailment of irregular immigration. Consequently, “return” is used by many Western governments in conjunction with such terms as “removal,” “readmissions” [to the homeland], “expulsion,” and “deportation”—all of which seek to turn back unwanted immigrants, such as those who have overstayed their visa or those whose asylum applications have been denied (King, 2000; Koser, 2000). And, as Sinatti (2015) points out, implicit in the Western idea of return is the fact “that the return of these migrants would be permanent.” Ensnared in this scenario of permanent return, many undocumented migrants expend substantial resources on what Mazzucato (2008), writing in the context of Ghanaians in the Netherlands, calls the “the formal and informal economies of identity papers” (208–209).

Meanwhile, many Western countries are coming to the realization, justified or not, that they need to incentivize countries of the global South to have the latter readily re-admit their citizen-returnees. Often the incentives given in the related bilateral agreements include funding for youth employment and other initiatives to boost the role of returnees, in particular, migrants, in general, in the development of countries in the global South. It is with this mindset that the EU gave Senegal nearly EU300 million for economic development and other migration-related needs in a bilateral cooperation agreement from 2008 to 2013 (Sinatti, 2015; Republic of Senegal [RS] and European Commission [EC], 2007). This approach is premised on the belief that “improving conditions in the country of origin will reduce the desire to emigrate and curtail irregular migration” (Sinatti, 2015: 279). However, is the situation that simple and straightforward? We know from the hypothesis of migration hump (de Haas 2007), for instance, that development or short-term economic growth does not necessarily reduce migration. In fact, there are indications that as countries develop, migration and other forms of human mobility increase—after all, it is not the very poor that engages in international migration, for one. In the final analysis, it is apparent that the position of the global North, regarding return migration, is quite problematic, to put it mildly: Not only is their idea of incentivising the returnees’ homelands likely to have the opposite consequence, but their conception of return as something more or less permanent is equally questionable. As the premise of this chapter posits, migration is essentially Janus-face; and most migrants remain mobile and transnational even after they return to their homeland, often due to circumstance they cannot control much, and at times out of their own volition.
12.4.2 The Case of the Senegalese and Ghanaian Governments

Both Senegal and Ghana readily acknowledge the importance of migration to their respective economies (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Interior, 2016; Setrana & Tonah, 2016; Republic of Senegal [RS], Ministry for Senegalese of the Exterior [MSE] 2006; Sinatti, 2015). With remittance accounting for so much of their GDPs, who can candidly aver otherwise. It is in this context that programs for diaspora engagement and return migration have gained currency in policy and academic circles in both countries (Asiedu, 2005; Mensah et al., 2018; Sinatti, 2009; Flahaux & Reeve, 2015). Ghana and Senegal are among the few West African—and, indeed, African—countries to invest significant resources in the management of migration for their benefit. Ghana for one passed a National Migration Policy through its parliament in 2016, and is currently working on a Diaspora Engagement Policy through the renowned Center for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana. Quite expectedly, the Ghana National Migration Policy has specific policy objectives and strategies for return migration. These include efforts to facilitate the return, readmission, and reintegration of emigrant; enhance the government’s capacity to manage return migration; raise the awareness of Ghanaians on the importance of migration to national development, and that of returnees on job opportunities in Ghana (Government of Ghana, 2016). There are also strategic moves to develop guidelines for the evacuation of Ghanaian migrants in emergency situations, and to create a database of Ghanaians in the diaspora (Government of Ghana, Ministry of Interior, 2016: 44–45). Furthermore, with a Dual Citizenship provision in the nation’s Citizenship Regulation Act of 2001, Ghana extends citizenship rights to its diasporic community worldwide. The same can be said of the passing of its Representative of People’s Amendment Act, (ROPAA: Act 699, of 2007), by which the government is extending voting rights to Ghanaians abroad (Mensah et al., 2018). Moreover, Ghana now has a Diaspora Affairs Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Integration, and a Diaspora Desk in most of the Ghana Consulate offices overseas to address matters of mutual interest to the Ghanaian government, diaspora, and potential returnees. And, as Teye et al. (2017) note, the Emancipation Day celebrations, held annually in Ghana since 1998, and the more recent Pan African Festival (PANAFEST) are all part of the government’s effort to encourage the diasporic and returnee communities to be actively involved in the sociocultural and economic life of the nation.

Unlike Ghana, Senegal does not have a dual citizenship provision in its Constitution, neither does it have a formal, parliament-sanctioned National Migration Policy. Still, Senegal sees it as matter of top national priority, and has, accordingly, mainstreamed migration across many policy domains, including education, health care, social security, and pension. Also, as Sinatti (2015: 276) rightly points out, Senegal is a country of special interest to the EU, in particular, when it comes to migration, since it is located at the heart of the main migratory route for irregular migrants from West Africa to Europe. Senegal has a Ministry for the Senegalese of the Exterior (MSE), created as far back as 1993, through which it...
deals specifically with its diaspora- and returnee-related issues. In 2006, the priorities of the Senegalese government concerning return migration were consolidated in a policy document on migration and adopted by the MSE (Republic of Senegal, MSE, 2006). Unlike the EU and other Western countries and supranational entities, the Senegalese government (like its Ghanaian counterpart), through this policy document adopts a broad conception of return migrant to include not only migrants who are deported, but also those who come home for short- or long-term visits, tourism, and ‘permanent’ resettlement. The document also acknowledges that even though some Senegalese emigrants are high-skilled workers, the vast majority are, indeed, low-skilled men, who often emigrant alone with the intention of making money to return home (Flahaux & Reeve, 2015; Republic of Senegal, Ministry for Senegalese of the Exterior [MSE], 2006). This is generally different from the case of Ghanaian emigrants, among whom are many high-skilled workers, including physicians, nurses, teachers, and other university graduates (Adzei & Sakyi, 2014; Asampong et al., 2013; Asiedu, 2005). Another subtle difference between Senegal and Ghana is the fact that the former tends to have a more selective and elitist approach to return migration than the latter (Ammassari & Black, 2001; Republic of Senegal, Ministry for Senegalese of the Exterior [MSE] 2006; Sinatti, 2015; Asiedu, 2005; Setrana & Tonah, 2016). For instances, this is how Sinatti (2015), who has studied Senegalese migration for some time now, summarizes the situation there:

Encouraging the return of a small portion of migrants with sought-after skills and attracting diaspora investment in sectors identified as relevant for national economic growth while still reaping the benefits of remittances sent by the majority of other emigrants offers Senegal the best of both worlds. Senegalese policies towards return not only adopt a strongly elitist stance, but also refuse a distinction between different temporalities of return, favouring mobility over permanent resettlement…the Senegalese government reveals a notion of return that focuses on attracting migrants’ resources and skills rather than on the return of migrants themselves. (p. 281; emphasis is mine)

The government of Ghana, on the other hand, encourages the return of a broader spectrum of its citizens, including both skilled- and unskilled-workers, and even African-Americans and Afro-Caribbeans of all socioeconomic background, through such initiatives as the Dual Citizenship provision, the PANAFEST festival, and the Joseph project, which targets African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans. Named after the Biblical Joseph, who was sold into captivity by his brothers, this Joseph project encourages the return visit of ‘historic’ African diasporas to Ghana for tourism, investment and re-settlement (Mensah et al., 2018).

Also, a close reading of the Senegalese approach—as presented in its 2006 policy document on migration—suggests that the government is not only selective, targeting the elite for the most part, for obvious reasons of getting more resources, but it also favours fixed or short-, rather than long-term returns. Here too the words of Sinatti (2015), with insights from the MSE document (MSE, 2006) is worth repeating: “…governmental initiatives favour the return of high-skilled migrants on fixed-term assignments and promise information and assistance to a restricted number of aspiring migrant investors with promising ideas” (p. 281). Of course, one should not be under any illusion that the Ghana government is also keen on
procuring as much resources, skills and investments from its diaspora and returnees as possible; it just so happens that its approach—as one can discern from the National Migration Policy and other diaspora engagement programs—is not that selective and elitist, or at least not explicitly so, as in the case of Senegal. For instance, as part of the Year of Return celebrations in 2019, the government of Ghana granted citizenship to 126 African-American and Afro-Caribbeans in a ceremony at the Jubilee House—the seat of the Ghana government (Asiedu, 2019). Notwithstanding these subtle, yet noteworthy differences, both Ghana and Senegal do not see return as primarily forced or involuntary return, as in deportation, for instance. For both countries, return migration is mainly voluntary, and that forced return amounts to an aberration or a crisis situation to be dealt with as such. Furthermore, for both Ghana and Senegal, return needs not be permanent or even long-term, it can be short-term visit or take the form of circular or transnational migration, thereby reinforcing the Janus-face character of contemporary migration.

12.5 Return Migration from Below: Emic Perspectives of Ghanaian and Senegalese Migrants

One can plausibly argue, based on experience and anecdotal evidence, that, in general, African, (and for that matter West African), migrants tend to have a deep-seated urge to return, eventually, to their homeland. This cultural imperative is not easy to theorize: Can we say that African or West African migrants are essentially different from other migrants, or just that the difference here is one of degree and not of essence. It is not easy to talk about (West) African culture, as such, without bordering on essentialism. While we do not think West African cultures are different, in essence, from those of other societies, we still believe West African migrants, like other Africans, tend to have greater propensity (as in the degree of propensity) to return home, due to their strong attachments to their traditional lands, extended family systems, and the attendant communal lifestyles and ethos, from which they find it hard to sever their ties for good. Indeed, Europeans and other non-African societies used to also have such high propensity, except that most of them have now moved on, due to their hyper-modernization and technological advancements which have shifted their cultural practices further away for traditionalism and communalism, and attachments to primary land resources and extended family ethos. Thus, from our perspective, communalism and traditionalism are not essentially African, but universal; and that most societies have adhered to them at one time or another. To us, the notion of an essential West African or African culture, that is at its core different from that of European culture is hard to sustain, since African culture is not even monolithic, and has internal diversities, in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, and other cultural practices, that are mind-bogglingly complex in their own right.
Against the backdrop of this cultural expectation, many Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants romanticise about their return with a nostalgic zeal that is hard to fathom or contain at times. Thus, for most Ghanaians and Senegalese, as with most Africans, migration is ‘temporary’ (Gmelch, 1980). For many (if not most) of them, the real thrill in, and motivation for, migration lies in the return; and many cannot wait to return, with all the associated mystique and allure of foreignness and the accolades of the conquering son or daughter, who has ventured abroad and lived with foreigners and return safely (Carling & Åkesson, 2009). As Sinatti (2015) notes in her study of Senegalese migrants “They indicate return itself as the reason that motivates departure” (p. 282); the irony here cannot escape us, but that is the reality among many (West) African migrants. However, these days, the passion to return is tapering down a bit, due to the influence of globalization and its electronic-mediated communication innovations that allow migrants to easily collapse space and time, and interact with people back home instantaneously on a daily basis, without having to return, *per se*. Meanwhile, these same technological innovations have facilitated migrants’ transnational travels, with many Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants now involved in back-and-forth trips between the homeland and the destination. This transnational connectivity is often used to lay the groundwork for various socioeconomic and political plans they might have for their eventual return (Asiedu, 2005; Black & King, 2004; Ammassari & Black, 2001; Ammassari, 2004; Flahaux & Reeve, 2015).

With the eagerness to return so strong among Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants, as with other West African migrants, it is hardly surprising that many among them pursue homeowners at the homeland, while still living overseas (Black & King, 2004; Ammassari & Black, 2001; Sinatti, 2009; Asiedu, 2005; Firang, 2011). The familial and cultural pressures to build a house, while living outside or upon return, are so intense that many migrants have little or no choice but to sacrifice adequate housing or homeownership in their destination to help finance housing projects in their homeland, in what has been dubbed *transnational housing career* (Firang, 2011). Various real estate agency in both Ghana (e.g., Regimanuel Gray Limited; Trasacco Estate; Devtraco Ltd) and Senegal (e.g., Global Property Senegal Ltd) are tapping into the growing demand for housing among returnees and members of the diaspora with creative financial arrangements and loan facilities to allow them to pay for a mortgage in the homeland while living abroad. Similarly, there are government programs to facilitate the legal acquisition of building plots among the diaspora and returnees. For instance, Sinatti (2015) writes about a Senegalese government program that allocates a vast amount of land for the development of *cités de la diaspora*—i.e., a place where exclusive apartments are built for migrants through real estate cooperatives facilitated by the Senegalese government. Notwithstanding such government programs, there is evidence that many Senegalese and Ghanaian returnees and people in the diaspora prefer to put up their own buildings in neighbourhoods of their own choosing (Grant, 2009; Setrana & Tonah, 2016; Sinatti, 2009, 2015). In the case of Ghana, in particular, one finds migrants and returnees putting up mega-houses, many of which hardly get completed before the...
unfortunate demise/passing of the migrants or returnees who started them in what has been colloquially dubbed the “funeral home syndrome”.¹

Besides dealing with housing, it is the need for a sustainable income that, perhaps, exercises the minds of returnees most. Keenly aware of the acute dearth of job opportunities that “pushed” them out of their homeland in the first place, many returnees enter into self-employment, relying on their resources and networks at both ends of the migration cycle. Perhaps nothing puts returnees to the path of transnational connectivity more than the need to make a sustainable living at home upon their return. As several studies in Ghana (e.g., Setrana & Tonah 2016; Kyei, 2013; Anarfi et al., 2005) and Senegal (Flahaux & Reeve, 2015; Sinatti, 2009, 2011) have shown, returnees in both countries tend to establish businesses with ties to the outside world. These international ties are usually for business partnerships, mentorship, and capital sourcing. Invariably, having spent some time overseas, many of these returnees have unique insights into the business niches, opportunities, and gaps at both the homeland and the destination, which they can exploit to their entrepreneurial advantage. As a corollary, many gets into such sectors as import/export, trading, entertainment, hotel and hospitality, healthcare, and education, where they have a competitive edge over their non-migrant counterparts. In fact, some among the latter even depend on the former to help them establish business networks overseas. Like the entrepreneurs, many returnee-professionals (e.g., physicians, professors, and engineers) maintain their networks abroad with personal visits and other short- and long-term professional leaves such as sabbaticals. As Setrana and Tonah (2016) note, in the context of Ghanaian return migrant-professionals:

Such visits help them to keep abreast with new trends and modern technologies in their jobs while at the same time boosting their incomes back home. It further enhances the ability of return migrants to compete with non-migrants for the opportunities available in the Ghanaian labour market because of the general believe that people who are trained abroad have good work ethics and are smarter. (p. 556)

In addition to the return migrants who cultivate their transnational connectivity for entrepreneurial and professional development are those whose engagement with their former destinations are mainly for personal reasons—e.g., visiting their second- or third-generation immigrant children, undergoing their annual medical checkups, renewing their residency and other official documents, filling their annual national income taxes, and collecting their pensions or other social benefits.

Naturally, migrant businesses in Ghana and Senegal have not escaped reproach. For instance, some authors (e.g., Grant & Oteng-Ababio, 2012; Black et al., 2003b; Ammassari, 2004) are concerned that many of these businesses are too small, with little or no innovative capacity to help move the broader national development agenda forward much. Others, such as Grant and Oteng-Ababio (2012), lament that some of these migrant businesses even have detrimental consequences for the health

¹This refers to a situation surrounding a mega-house, mostly in Accra, built by migrants, which is for the most part incomplete, but rushed to be completed upon the death of the migrant owner to make preparations for the funeral and celebrations of the migrant owner’s. Such buildings are at times called “Toronto funeral homes” to signify their ties to the outside world or to migration.
and wellbeing of people in the homeland; notable examples in this case include businesses that deal with the importation of electronic waste and other used or second-hand commodities, such as fridges, computers, and clothing. In fact, one wonders, what good or development impetus can a nation get from the importation of underwear, towels, socks and blankets, for example? However, to the extent that there is some demand for these items in the homeland, the issue becomes rather contentious, with no simple answer. Also, there are those who chide migrant entrepreneurs for bringing disreputable Western enterprises such as erotic and nightclubs and ‘adult’ massage parlours, which, in the minds of many traditionalists and religious zealots, undermine the moral fiber of society. That many West African migrants engage in the conspicuous consumption of non-productive luxurious goods and services (e.g., mega-houses; flashy cars; and lavish funeral, birthday, outdooring and naming ceremonies) has been yet another source of criticism in the literature. The concern here is a simple one: such lifestyle tends to put the socioeconomic inequality in society on a bolder relief, and, thus, feeds into new rounds of emigration among the youth (Setrana & Tonah, 2016).

There is no denying that the goals and aspirations of the individual migrant is not always congruent with those of the nation state. Often with limited business acumen and skills, in the context of a poorly developed enabling environment for business, it is unsurprising that most migrants play it safe by taking only minimal risk with their hard-earned money from not only places of extreme cold climates, but also of cold shoulders, metaphorically speaking. Also, some migrants have bitter experiences with their previous business ventures in the homeland and, thus, cannot eschew being cynical about doing business there again (Black et al., 2003a). These dynamics account for the discernible risk aversion and lack of innovation found among immigrant businesses in both Senegal and Ghana. At the same time, we need to be balanced in our analysis, for categorical answers—regarding whether or migrant businesses are small or not; innovative or not; and, good for the broader national development agenda or not—are patently unsustainable. It is not surprising then that Setrana and Tonah (2016), concluded in their study of Ghanaian migrant businesses that “…our findings revealed that although some of the businesses were small and for sustenance purposes, they provided employment to many residents in Ghana” (p. 558). The fact that they used various qualifications to avoid a categorical conclusion is quite noteworthy. In the final analysis, it bears reiterating that the perspectives of the returnee from below are not similar to those of the national government from above. As Sinatti (2015) rightly puts it in the context of Senegal:

The personal development ambitions of migrants lead to investments that are distant from the aspirations of economic growth indicated in Senegalese government policy. Real estate investments and migrant businesses may contribute to upgrading disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods or villages, generate demand for the services of local craftsmanship…or bring local benefits through multiplier effects, but their overall contribution to national development is limited. (p. 283)

Similarly, there is a clear disjuncture between the perspectives of return from the migrants themselves and those of northern governments, most of whom see return as mainly permanent and involuntary. For most West African migrants, return is
rather a temporary phenomenon entailing both forced and voluntary migrants, many of whom sustain their livelihoods through forms of transnationality, even upon their return to the homeland. This is how Setrana and Tonah (2016) summed up this sentiment in their study of returnees in Ghana:

Contrary to the perspectives of northern governments where any return that involves re-emigration is seen as indicating a failure of the sustainability of return…. an alternative view suggests that in order for return to be sustainable, returnees often need to retain continued access to the wider international, professional and social world in which they have worked and lived. (p. 555)

So far, as the cases of Ghanaian and Senegalese migrants indicate, many returnees rely on their transnational connections to help them resettle in the home country upon their return, often travelling back-and-forth between the two ends of the migration cycle, with the origin now serving as the substantive abode for the migrant. Clearly, then, the migrant life in the post-return period is as transnational as it was in the pre-return era—there lies the Janus-face of contemporary migration.

12.6 Conclusion

From the preceding analysis, it is quite clear that even though many migrants settle and become integrated into their destination countries, they concomitantly remain connected to their homeland through various transnational engagements, and it is with this understanding that we, in this chapter, cast the migrant experience as Janus-faced. It is significant to note that migrants often sustain simultaneous connectivity to both ends of the migration cycle, not necessarily because they are unable or unwilling to integrate. Rather, many of them use this connectivity to facilitate their livelihoods in both the origin and destination countries. Whereas most Northern governments tend to see return migration as primarily involuntary and permanent, Southern governments, such as those of Ghana and Senegal, perceive return migration mainly as a voluntary phenomenon, with both temporary and permanent dimensions. Thus, there is some divergence in the perspectives from above—i.e., perspectives of Northern countries (and supra-national bodies such as the EU) vis-à-vis those of Southern countries. There is also some discrepancy between how return migration is perceived and enacted by the migrants themselves, relative to the perspectives of their origin countries. For instances, whereas the latter seek to use the resources of returnees to pursue broader national development goals, the former tend to use their resources for non-risky and often non-production ventures and celebrations aimed at boosting their social status in the local community. This dynamic is as common among Ghanaian returnees as it is with their Senegalese counterparts, pointing to a convergence of return perspective from below.

At a different level of abstraction, one can discern a funnel-shaped divergent-convergent schema in which the perspectives from above are divergent as much as possible, while those from below converge. To help bring all this to a coherent close...
is our recurrent metaphor of *Janus-face*, with which we have shown that migrants are usually as transnational in their post-return era as they were in their pre-return time—thus, be it in the origin or the destination, the migrant is Janus-faced.

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Chapter 13
Conclusions

Joseph Kofi Teye

While West Africa has become the focus of media and policy discussions on migration because of its high level of both labour migration and forced displacement, there is a general paucity of data on the dynamics of migration flows and their impacts on socio-economic development in the sub-region. As a way of helping to fill some of the existing knowledge gaps which make it difficult to integrate migration into development planning processes, this book has employed various theoretical perspectives to analyse the trends, patterns, drivers, and socio-economic impacts of both voluntary and involuntary migration in West Africa. The authors have also examined policy responses to intractable migration-related challenges, and outlined policy recommendations for improving migration governance, strengthening mechanisms for the protecting, and maximising the developmental impacts of migration for both countries of origin and destination of migrants.

The presentations have demonstrated that despite the popular narratives which suggest mass movement from West Africa to Europe and which have partly led to increased efforts by the EU to prevent irregular migration from West Africa through strict border control (Zanker et al., 2020), a majority of migrants from the West sub-region still migrate intra-regionally. Current intra-regional migration flows in West Africa have largely followed historical patterns, where labour migrants continue to move from Sahelian countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) to the mineral-rich and plantation communities in coastal countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Recent data supports historical patterns which indicate that circular migration is still very dominant in West Africa (Awumbila et al., 2014). The choice of destination of intra-regional migrants is largely determined by a combination of factors, such as proximity, colonial legacy and common official language. Migrants tend to move to nearby countries, with similar colonial history and common language. Consistent with the historical patterns, Côte d’Ivoire is still the most
popular destination of intra-regional migrants, as labour migrants from many of the francophone countries, especially Burkina Faso and Mali are easily attracted to the Ivorian cocoa economy.

While intra-regional migration is greatly facilitated by the ECOWAS Free Movement protocol, a number of challenges, such as harassment of migrants at borders and contradistinctions between the protocol and national laws of some member states, militate against the realisation of the full potential benefits of free movement and regional integration. Many of these challenges are products of lack of commitment on the part of West African governments to fully implement the free movement protocol (Adepoju, 2005; Teye et al., 2015). Future intra-regional migration patterns will largely depend on the commitment of West African governments to support the implementation of the ‘right of residence’ and ‘right of establishment’ components of the protocol. Effective management of the tensions between citizens of member states and nationals in some ECOWAS countries (e.g. Ghana and Nigeria) as well as full implementation of ECOWAS new strategies, such as the social security portability and the proposal to remove the maximum 90 days ‘visa free’ stay in another country, will enhance regional integration in West Africa.

Although intra-regional migration is still the dominant type of migration, a number of changes have been observed in migration patterns in the West Africa region. First, Libya which used to be a popular destination for West Africans intending to enter Europe through the Mediterranean is no more a preferred destination for West African migrants, due to political crisis and insecurity. New migrants’ destinations have emerged, both within and outside Africa. The new destinations in Africa include emerging oil producing countries, such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. There has also been increasing labour migration towards South Africa. Strict visa regimes, in popular destination countries in Europe and increased opportunities in labour markets in the Gulf region, have also led to increased flow of West Africans to the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Both intra-regional mobility and migration outside the region have been seriously affected by Covid-19 related border closures. Another feature of migration in West Africa that has witnessed changes is the gender composition of migrants. Historically, migration streams from and within West Africa were dominated by male labour migrants, who largely worked in mineral-rich and plantation communities in host countries within the sub-region. Many of the migrants who moved to Europe and destinations outside the region were also largely males. As a result of patriarchal norms, which construct men as ‘bread winners’ (i.e. providers) and women as ‘care givers’, females were expected to stay at home and take care of children. Migrant women mainly joined the migration trail as wives, sisters and daughters. However, within the last four decades, women have been increasingly moving independently for education, work, and other purposes (Awumbila & Torvikeh, 2018). This feminization of migration streams reflects changing norms and gender ideals. Such changes are also the result of the transformation of local and global structures, including changing labour markets and advanced telecommunication that facilitates transnational practices, such as long-distance parenting. Increasing number of women are also important aspects of the infrastructure of migration facilitation. As the paper on irregular migration from Senegal shows, while irregular migration is
male dominated, women play a critical role in mobilising religious and financial support. Migration is also contributing to changes in traditional gender roles of migrant families. As a result of increasing feminization of migration, masculinity and femininity ideals are negotiated and changed, even if patriarchal norms continue to affect notions of female migration in some settings.

With particular reference to the factors that drive people from their usual areas of residence, the chapters presented in this volume demonstrate that while the drivers of migration in West Africa fall under all the four categories of drivers identified by Van Hear \(2012\), which entail predisposing/underlying factors, proximate drivers, precipitating factors and mediating drivers, the dominant policy narratives on the drivers of migration suggest that international migration from West Africa is driven by climate change, poverty, and political conflicts. The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (i.e. Rabat Process), for instance, primarily focuses on addressing these ‘root causes’ of irregular migration \(EC, \ \text{2005}; \ \text{Knoll} \& \text{de Weijer}, \ \text{2016}; \ \text{ICMPD}, \ \text{2019}\). The attribution of migration to climate change is supported by evidence, as both slow on-set climatic processes (e.g drought and rainfall variability) and rapid on-set events (floods) contribute to massive out-migration in West Africa \(Schraven \text{et al.}, \ \text{2020}\). However, contrary to media narratives which suggest that climate change is contributing to irregular migration towards Europe, many climate-induced migrants actually migrate over short distances to nearby rural communities where they can undertake their farming activities. Also, while poverty contributes to migration flows in West Africa, many poor migrants only migrate over short distances to nearby rural areas or urban areas because they do not have financial and social capital to undertake long-distance travel towards Europe. It is therefore concluded that while programmes being implemented in West African countries to alleviate poverty are good, they may not immediately significantly reduce irregular migration Europe because migration itself is an integral part of social transformation \(de \text{Haas}, \ \text{2010}; \ \text{Haas} \& \text{Frasen}, \ \text{2018}\). Migration flows from West Africa towards Europe may only reduce in the long-run when there are more job opportunities within West African countries. The findings also clearly show that current policy approaches, which focus on limiting risky irregular migration through information campaigns \(Carling, \ \text{2007}; \ \text{Fargues} \& \text{Bonfanti}, \ \text{2014}\), are not likely to achieve desirable results because they fail to recognise the role of religious beliefs in preparing for and interpreting the experiences of harrowing journeys with a high risk of harm and death. As the paper on irregular migration from Senegal shows, many of the people who embark on risky irregular migration are aware of the dangers associated with such journeys, but they believe that God will protect them during such journeys.

The findings in this volume also demonstrate that West African countries, in recent years, are making efforts to enhance the governance of migration. To this end, a number of policies and programmes have been implemented with the aim of strengthening mechanisms for the protection of current and return migrants. However, existing State-led frameworks for protecting vulnerable refugees and labour migrants are ineffective. Additionally, existing frameworks for protecting vulnerable return migrants are not comprehensive. West African governments, therefore, need to work with development partners to strengthen mechanisms for
the protection of displaced populations and effective reintegration of vulnerable return migrants.

The last decade also witnessed increased efforts on the part of West African governments to harness the benefits of migration. As a result of the recent increase in the flow of migrants’ remittances and the inclusion of migration governance in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, a number of West African countries have mainstreamed migration issues into their national development policies and plans. Some of these policies have outlined strategies to ensure that return and current migrants contribute to socio-economic development. These policies have yielded moderate results, as some current and return migrants, for instance, have been contributing to socio-economic development through investments. As the analysis in Chap. 12 shows, some migrants also often sustain simultaneous connectivity to both ends of the migration cycle (host country and country of origin), not necessarily because they are unable or unwilling to integrate, but rather to use this connectivity to engage in productive economic activities. Additionally, as the papers on remittances in Burkina Faso and diaspora investments in Nigeria have shown, diaspora remittances and investments in West African countries have the potential to contribute greatly to socio-economic development in West African countries. However, there is a general lack of programs to enhance the developmental impacts of financial remittances. As a way of leveraging remittances for development West Africa governments should work with financial institutions to develop more attractive remittances-linked investment products. Diaspora-led investments should also be promoted by improving the investment environment, organizing regular investment promotion campaigns among people in the diaspora, creating incentives for diaspora business development, and reducing the administrative cost of doing business in West Africa.

References


13 Conclusions


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