Founded by Peter the Great in 1718, Russia's police were key instruments of tsarist power. In the reign of Alexander II (1855–1881), local police forces took on new importance. The liberation of 23 million serfs from landlord control, growing fear of crime, and the terrorist violence of the closing years challenged law enforcement with new tasks that made worse what was already a staggering burden.

This book describes the regime's decades-long struggle to reform and strengthen the police. The author reviews the local police's role and performance in the mid-nineteenth century and the implications of the largely unsuccessful effort to transform them. From a longer-term perspective, the study considers how the police's systemic weaknesses undermined tsarist rule, impeded a range of liberalizing reforms, perpetuated reliance on the military to maintain law and order, and gave rise to vigilant justice.

While its primary focus is on European Russia, the analysis also covers much of the imperial periphery, discussing the police systems in the Baltic Provinces, Congress Poland, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia.

“Policemen of the Tsar is a significant and original contribution to the history of the late imperial period and especially to our knowledge of the reign of Alexander II. The police was one of the chief institutions of the tsarist state, an essential force for fighting crime and maintaining order, one of the few government institutions that reached into the world of the peasantry and urban lower classes. But despite its importance, Western historians of Russia have failed to give the police the attention it deserved. Abbott's book goes a long way in solving this problem.”

Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Professor Emeritus of History at the University of New Mexico, author of Famine in Russia, 1891–1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis and The Tsar's Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire

About the Author
Robert J. Abbott has a PhD from Princeton University. He has worked as a university instructor, intelligence analyst, and consultant to US intelligence and law enforcement agencies. His previous research has focused on the history of crime and its impact on society and government.
Policemen of the Tsar
HISTORICAL STUDIES
in Eastern Europe and Eurasia

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Robert J. Abbott

Policemen of the Tsar

Local Police in an Age of Upheaval

Central European University Press
Budapest–Vienna–New York
For Joanne, the love of my life
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Preface

Key instruments of tsarist power throughout their existence, Russia’s local police took on new importance in the reign of Tsar Alexander II (1855–1881). The liberation of 23 million serfs from their landlords’ control, growing fear of crime, and the terrorist violence of the closing years challenged law enforcement to take on tasks that worsened their already staggering burden. The regime’s response was a years-long struggle to reform and strengthen the police. The police’s role and performance in the mid-nineteenth century, the effort to transform them, and the implications of its results are the subjects of this book. For the first two subjects the focus is on 1855–1881, when the central authorities reexamined the police’s mission and struggled to improve them. The consequences of what the government did and did not achieve in what would prove the last major attempt to remake the police, however, were felt until tsarism’s fall. Our discussion of them, therefore, extends from 1881 into the twentieth century.

The major primary sources for this study came from the Russian State Historical Archives. The records of the Department of General Affairs and the Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs include annual reports to the Tsar on the state of the local police.¹ The journals of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, which prepared most of the proposals for strengthening the local police during 1859–1881, were also invaluable.² So too were the papers of the State Council’s Departments and Chancellery, which recorded the intra-government debate on the proposals, and the state papers of P. A. Valuev, which include copies of key reports from this debate.

¹ Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, hereafter RGIA, fonds 1284 and 1281.
² RGIA, fond 1316.
missing from the State Council’s files. The multi-volume published materials of the Commission were also essential as was the compendium of Russian laws available on a website of the Russian National Library. Official histories of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversaw the local police, and of the St. Petersburg police, Russia’s largest and best-qualified force, were also useful sources. So were the works of Russia’s nineteenth-century “police scientists” whom Chapter 4 discusses.

The official histories and the works of the police scientists were the only scholarly studies of the local police produced until well into the twentieth century. In the Soviet period, the pre-revolutionary police were dismissed as obsolete tools of capitalist not worthy of historians’ attention. Western historians in these years, when examining the tsarist period, produced excellent studies of the political police but ignored the local police. By the 1970s, however, Western access to archives and other repositories of tsarist data allowed increased study of pre-Revolutionary institutions, including the local police. Historians have approached the subject from several perspectives. Daniel Brower and Robert Thurston examined the police’s efforts against crime as part of the political and social history of Russian cities. Cathy Frierson, Stephen Frank, and Christine Worobec discussed the peasant communities’

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3 RGIA, fonds 1160, 1161, 908.
5 Ministerstvo vntrennikh del, 1802–1902: Istoriicheskii ocherk (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vntrennikh del, 1902); Kratkii ocherk deiatel’nosti Ministerstva vntrennikh del za deudosatipiatletie 1855–1880 gg. (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vntrennikh del, 1880); Nikolai Varadinov, Istoriia Ministerstva vntrennikh del, 4 vols. in 8 (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vntrennikh del, 1858–1862); and I. P. Vysotskii and V. E. Frish, S-Peterburgskiaia stolichnaia politisia i gradonachal’stvo, 1703–1903: Kratkii istoriicheskii ocherk (St. Petersburg: R. Golike i A. Vil’borg, 1903).
6 See especially Ivan Andreevskii, Politseiskoe pravo, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: V. V. Pratts, 1871–1873) and “Reforma ispolnitel’noi politisi,” Sbornik gosudarstvennykh znanii 5 (1878); Evgenii Anuchin, Istoriicheskii obzor razvitia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdnenii v Rossii s Uchrezhdeniia o guberniakh 1775 g. do poslednego vremeni (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vntrennikh del, 1872); and Ivan Tarasov, Politisiia v epokhu reform (Moscow: A. I. Mamontov, 1885).
law enforcement needs and the central government’s failure to satisfy them.  

Louise McReynolds’s study of crime in the late tsarist period examined popular press accounts of the most sensational offenses and how they shaped public perceptions of the police.  

There also have been several short studies focused directly on the local police. These include an article by John Le Donne on Catherine the Great’s police, my own work on local law enforcement in specific localities, and Neil Weismann’s article on the local police on the eve of World War I.  

This book is the first in-depth assessment of the local police’s role in the tsarist system and how they affected Russia’s political and social development from the Age of the Great Reforms to the eve of tsarism’s collapse.

With one exception, this study focuses on European Russia and leaves discussion of police in the borderlands to an appendix.  
For a succinct account of the administrative-police systems in these regions, see L. E. Lapteva, Regional’noe i mestnoe upravlenie v Rossii: Vtoraya polovina XIX veka (Moscow: Institut gosudarstva i prava RAN, 1998), 55–57, 61–68.

The exception is the Kingdom of Poland, which came under Russian rule at the Congress of Vienna. The police system established there after the 1863 revolution was a model that many Russian officials sought to apply to European Russia. For this reason it requires discussion in the main text. The appendix examines this system at greater length and also covers the police in the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia. The appendix does not describe the police in the Grand Duchy of Finland, which the tsarist regime left largely undisturbed until the twentieth century.  
Preface

For the benefit of readers whose primary interest is police and for readability’s sake, this study loosely translates the titles of police officials with an eye to their closest U.S. equivalents rather than transliterating the Russian titles. Specific dates are “old style,” according to the Julian calendar used in Russia until 1918. In the period covered here it was 12 days behind the calendar used in the West.
## Glossary of Russian Police Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Term</th>
<th>Russian Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Booth watchman</td>
<td>budochnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City guard</td>
<td>gorodskaja strazha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>uezd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County police guard</td>
<td>uezdnaia politseiskaia strazha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County sheriff</td>
<td>uezdnyi ispravnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County superintendent</td>
<td>uezdnyi nachal’nik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective police</td>
<td>sysknaia politsiia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District (rural)</td>
<td>stan’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District (urban)</td>
<td>chast’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District police inspector (rural)</td>
<td>stanovoi pristav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District police inspector (urban)</td>
<td>chastnyi pristav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive police</td>
<td>ispol’nitel’naia politsiia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outdoor police (urban)</td>
<td>naruzhnaia politsiia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>politsiia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police board</td>
<td>uprava blagochiniia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police chief</td>
<td>politsiimeister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police commissioner</td>
<td>ober-politsiimeister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police guard</td>
<td>politseiskaia strazha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police precinct</td>
<td>uchastok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>gorodovoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police sergeant</td>
<td>okolotochnii nadziratel’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police station</td>
<td>s”ezzhii dom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police support unit (messengers and prisoner escorts)</td>
<td>sluzhitel’skaia komanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary of Russian Police Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Russian Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Precinct inspector (urban)</td>
<td>uchastkovyi pristav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct warden (rural)</td>
<td>tysiacshkii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct warden (junior)</td>
<td>piatisotskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranger</td>
<td>uriadnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River police</td>
<td>rechnaia politsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural police court</td>
<td>zemskii sud’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural police court associate</td>
<td>zemskii zasedatel’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural sheriff</td>
<td>zemskii ispravnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town council</td>
<td>ratusha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town magistrate</td>
<td>gorodnichii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township</td>
<td>volost’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township elder</td>
<td>volostnoi starshina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village community</td>
<td>sel’skoe obshchestvo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village elder</td>
<td>sel’skii starosta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village warden (senior)</td>
<td>sotskii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village warden (junior)</td>
<td>desiatkii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>kvartal’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward commander</td>
<td>kvarat’hiy nadziratel’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

The Local Police at Mid-Century

In his annual report for 1855, his first to new Tsar Alexander II, new Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Lanskoï apologized for the state of the local police: “Majesty! I dare not and must not conceal the true state of these officials . . . because without such knowledge improving them will be impossible. Rather, I am obliged to inform Your Imperial Highness that the police often fail to carry out their assignments and, when they do execute them, do so poorly because of their moral corruption . . . . In the view of our people, a police search in a village is a calamity equal to that of fire.” Recalling a survey of provincial governors 10 years earlier, Lanskoï noted approvingly that several had said that for all practical purposes there were no police.¹

Critical Mission, Weak Force

As the minister responsible for the local police, Lanskoï had particular grounds for concern over their poor performance. His, however, was not the only ministry dependent on the police. A contemporary journalist described the local police as, in effect, the eyes, ears, and hands of the state. “Almost everything discussed by ministerial departments,” he noted, “originates with them and goes back to them for enforcement.”² Count Benkendorf, the first director of the political police, whom the new tsar’s father had tasked with monitoring all the bureaucracy, had made a similar observation: that “everything” depended on the local police.³ Public health and sanitation, regula-

---

tion of weights and measures, collection of vital statistics, and information on prices and the state of the harvest as well as the prevention and suppression of crime and public disorders fell to the local police. In addition, the police were responsible for arranging the billeting of troops, suppressing violations of the tax laws, trying petty criminal cases, and a long list of other duties.4

The early development of the local police reflected the efforts of Russia’s most enlightened rulers to replicate Western models. Peter the Great, who reigned from 1682 to 1725, founded the Russian police in St. Petersburg in 1718 under Anton Divier, a Portuguese Jew whom he recruited in his travels to Western Europe. Peter instructed Divier to transform the new capital into a European city. To this end he made him responsible for the design of buildings, public sanitation, and flood control as well as keeping the peace.5 Catherine the Great, empress from 1762 to 1796, corresponded with Sartine, the chief of the Paris police, for insight on improving Russia’s police forces.6 She also expanded the police into Russia’s rural areas in 1775. Seven years later she did the same for cities that did not have them.7 She and Peter I were seeking to create institutions that could change society in positive ways rather than simply maintaining the status quo. Their effort to build what historian Marc Raeff has called a “well-ordered police state” had been the goal of rulers in Western and Central Europe since the seventeenth century. As Raeff observed, however, the corporations of nobility, urban guilds, and church authorities that Europe’s rulers had sought first to displace and then to enlist as instruments of their power were much weaker in Russia. The result was to require the creation of—and reliance on—a bureaucracy less capable than its European counterparts and that widened the gap between the autocracy and most of its subjects.8

A year after coming to the throne in 1801, Alexander I, supported by enlightened bureaucrat Michael Speranskii, centralized command of the police in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1811 he also created a separate Ministry of Police modeled after Napoleon’s. Like Napoleon, however, Alexander soon grew concerned that this Ministry might threaten his own power and in 1819 he abolished it. Tsar Nicholas I moved the police in a different direction. As historian Nicholas Riasanovsky observed, Nicholas was a great admirer of Peter the Great, who had first opened up Russia to Western ideas and practices. The failed revolt of December 1825 by army officers seeking to block his accession, however, made him suspicious of the Western political ideas that had inspired many of the rebels. To suppress such influences Nicholas created a political police, the Third Section of His Majesty’s Own Chancellery. A later Russian police historian assessed that this move reflected a belief that the local police had failed to achieve the lofty goals set by his predecessors. It did not, however, mean the abandonment of the regime’s reliance on the local police. Rather, in 1837, Nicholas enacted a statute that expanded the local police system he had inherited deeper into the countryside. But as Lanskoī complained to Nicholas’s successor, by the end of his reign in 1855, Russia’s police remained a weak and ineffective force.

Organization, Numbers, and Qualifications

Within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, oversight of the police fell to the Department of Executive Police, so named because its police were to execute the regime’s laws and decrees. Its 100-man staff comprised sections for different...

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{organization.png}
\caption{Organization of the St. Petersburg Police circa 1855}
\end{figure}

At mid-century Russia had a patchwork of separate police systems that differed greatly from the imperial capitals to the lesser cities and towns and the countryside. St. Petersburg had the most elaborate system (Figure 1). In 1855 its Police Commissioner reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs through the Military Governor-General and presided over a partially elected Police Board. Beneath the Commissioner were three Police Chiefs, whose jurisdictions were separated by the Neva and Fontanka rivers, 12 districts, each with its own police station, and 56 wards. Each district had two Inspectors, one for administration and one for investigations. Police Commanders headed the wards. At the lowest level were City Guards, who because of their posting in the streets, were known as outdoor police. Most manned booths and some were in a reserve on call for responding to emergencies. By 1855, the police booths had become substantial structures capable of housing three guardsmen, who served successive shifts—and sometimes members of their families.17 Since 1803, St. Petersburg had also had a full-time fire department attached to the police. Firefighting posts were spread throughout the capital. In addition to their regular duties, the firefighters administered corporal punishment at the request of the authorities and serf owners.18 After 1858 the police were responsible for the security of the capital’s electronic telegraph system. The Police Commissioner and the police districts had telegraphic connections with each other, the Winter Palace, the Military Governor-General, and local military commands.19

Except for Moscow, the second capital, where the police were like St. Petersburg’s,20 other urban areas had simpler systems. Provincial capitals such as Kiev had police chiefs appointed by and reporting to their governors. Like St. Petersburg’s Police Commissioner, Kiev’s Police Chief was the presiding officer of the Police Board and was assisted by district inspectors and ward commanders.21 In a county capital, a Town Magistrate managed a force that might or might not include districts and wards. Smaller towns generally did not have police forces and police tasks fell to the

18 Popov, "Under the Halberd."
19 2nd PSZ, 33 (1858): no. 33525a.
21 2nd PSZ, 29 (1854): no. 28685.
members of the town councils.\textsuperscript{22} Under Nicholas I the government had ordered the construction of fire-lookout towers in every Russian city and specified the number of firefighters, horses, and equipment each city was to maintain. The military was responsible for supplying troops to serve as firefighters.\textsuperscript{23} Every city and town had a municipal guard known, as in St. Petersburg, as the \textit{outdoor} police. Initially, the guard was manned on a rotating basis by members of the lowest urban estates and later by hired personnel, but most cities had objected to the high cost. In response, in 1853, the government had authorized the transfer of soldiers to the municipal guards.\textsuperscript{24} Within a few years the guard forces consisted of military detailees in all but a handful of cities.\textsuperscript{25}

In rural areas, where most Russians lived, Nicholas I’s 1837 statute, which covered 44 provinces at mid-century, organized the police by county, district, and village. At the county level, Rural Sheriffs were roughly analogous to the city Police Chiefs. In provinces that had gentry assemblies, the assemblies elected the sheriffs. Elsewhere, the government appointed them. In either case, they reported to the governors and chaired the Rural Police Court, a collegial body of elected assessors: a senior one from the gentry and two others from the state peasants (see below).\textsuperscript{26} Below the Sheriffs, who—along with the other elected members of the court—had to reside full time in the county capitals, were District Inspectors. They lived in separate towns and were appointed by the governors of their province. The lowest ranking police officials in the countryside, they depended on generally unsalaried peasant wardens whose positions predated Peter the Great but had been subordinated to the official police under Nicholas I’s 1837 police statute. They included both senior

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[24] 2nd PSZ, 28 (1853): no. 27372.
\item[26] State peasants were farmers who were technically free but permanently bound to lands owned by the state. They differed from serfs, who were the property of gentry landlords. In the mid-nineteenth century the two groups were roughly the same size and together accounted for about two-thirds of the Russian populace.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and junior wardens, who were responsible for policing roughly 100–200 and 10–20 households, respectively; hence their designation as “hundreds” and “tenners.”

The metropolitan, urban, and rural police also differed in numerical strength. A. D. Balashov, a onetime St. Petersburg Police Commissioner and Minister of Police under Alexander I, once described his goal as the creation of a vast police system that stretched from the humblest peasant hut to the imperial palaces. A fantasy in Balashov’s day, this goal remained far out of reach decades later and the police presence was largely limited to the cities. In St. Petersburg, the breakdown of the city into 12 districts and 56 wards and the large guard force—1,883 men strong in 1858—allowed the maintenance of 777 permanently manned guard booths, each only about 150 steps from those on either side. The law required—and the size of their units allowed—the district inspectors and ward commanders to be in daily contact with their supervisors and subordinates. A police support unit of 300–400 men was also available for escorting prisoners and carrying messages. By international standards, St. Petersburg had a large police presence. In a city 494,700 strong there was one guardsman for every 263 residents. At about the same time Paris had one policeman for every 363 residents and London had one for every 460.

---

27 2nd PSZ, 12 (1837): no. 10505.
30 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politsia i gradonachal’stvo, 118–19.
31 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politsia i gradonachal’stvo, 197.
Table 1: Number and Distribution of Municipal Guardsmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number Prescribed by 1853 law</th>
<th>Actual Number</th>
<th>Guardsman per Inhabitant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial capitals</td>
<td>1,207,460</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>3,227</td>
<td>1/374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County capitals</td>
<td>2,240,870</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>1/628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other towns</td>
<td>160,947</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1/732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All cities and towns</td>
<td>3,609,277</td>
<td>7,554</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>1/515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2 (1870): 329.*

Table 2: Rural Police Districts by Average Size and Population, 1847

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>Avg. District Area</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>Avg. District Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Largest</td>
<td>Smallest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkhangel</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20,624 mi²</td>
<td>Kaluzha</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>508 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7,602 mi²</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>498 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7,407 mi²</td>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>478 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olonets</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,945 mi²</td>
<td>Chernigov</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>472 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,913 mi²</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>464 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3,000 mi²</td>
<td>Podolia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>457 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,883 mi²</td>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>454 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viatka</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,969 mi²</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>423 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,681 mi²</td>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>387 mi²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,574 mi²</td>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>290 mi²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>Avg. District Population</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of Districts</th>
<th>Avg. District Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most Populous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Least Populous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>67,181</td>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29,563</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kharkov</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66,113</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29,448</td>
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</table>

*Continued*
The Local Police at Mid-Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61,099</td>
<td>Kovno</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29,423</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simbirsk</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60,072</td>
<td>Vilno</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27,327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tver</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59,786</td>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viatka</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57,974</td>
<td>Mogilev</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55,651</td>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55,290</td>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54,815</td>
<td>Olonets</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerson</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53,740</td>
<td>Arkhangel</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14,793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moscow was second only to St. Petersburg in the size of its police force as it was in the number of inhabitants. At the start of Alexander II’s reign, it had about 1,000 city guards. In Russia’s other 461 cities and towns, under the terms of an 1853 statute, the number of guardsmen was to vary—in a narrow range—with their population and status. In practice, however, the provincial capitals had much larger guard forces than other urban areas, which fell well short of their prescribed strength (see Table 1).

In the rural areas, the uniformed police presence was minuscule. The 1837 law on the rural police provided for 456 county sheriffs, each with a permanent assessor, and 1,208 district inspectors to cover 42 provinces and one oblast. Despite the creation of a new province (Kovno) and extensive redrawing of boundaries, these numbers were about the same 10 years later when statistics on the size and population of the provinces were first available. Converted to rough estimates of the average size and population of the police districts (Table 2), these numbers give some sense of the enormity of the rural police’s task. Leaving aside Alaska-like Arkhangel province, which

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35 2nd PSZ, 28 (1835): no. 27372.
36 2nd PSZ, 12 (1837): no. 10305, shtaty i tabeli.
was in a class by itself, the amount of territory that a single district commissioner had to cover and the number of people for whom he was responsible generally made for a staggering burden. The differences among the provinces in the size and population of the districts also defied easy explanation. In Kursk, the most populous Russian province at mid-century, population density may have accounted for the government’s establishment of 60 districts, the largest number of any province. This, in turn, gave the province districts of moderate size. Overall, however, the differences from province to province reflected the government’s lack of a consistent approach to the sizing of police units, its perception of the political reliability of the populace, and the provinces’ economic and political importance. Whatever the reason for such differences, it was in the districts that the work of executing the law and investigating crimes was supposed to occur. In his report for 1855, the Minister of Internal Affairs complained that the districts were too large and too populous. The result, he argued, was to make it a “physical impossibility” for the district inspectors to perform a quarter of their assignments even if working 24 hours a day.

Also, with a few exceptions such as the three southwestern provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia, which had a combined total of 350 mounted guards to patrol the large Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian populace, the district police had only peasant wardens and deputy wardens to assist them. Governors and other officials repeatedly complained that the peasant wardens were not real police. Unlike city guardsmen they did not wear uniforms or work regular tours of duty. Instead, service in the position was an obligation either imposed on serfs by their landlords or—if left to the peasant villages—fulfilled in different ways. Some elected the wardens; others rotated the duty among their adult males; and some—individuals as well as communities—hired impoverished individuals to take on their obligation.

38 RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 21, 27.
40 See the examples in Tarasov, Politsiia v epokhu reform, 24–27. Also see A. D. Gradovskii, Organy mestnogo upravleniia, in Sobranie sochinenii (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasulevich, 1904), 9: 322; Andreevskii, Politseiskoe pravo, 1: 195; and Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Brokhaus and Efron), hereafter Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Sotskii,” http://www.vehi.net/brokgauz/index.html.
Lanskoi also noted that the 1837 law creating the rural districts had not provided the district inspectors with assistants or clerical staffs. In the inspectors’ absence from their offices, therefore, there was no one on duty to receive orders or instructions from above or respond to people’s requests.\(^{42}\) Provincial governors echoed these complaints in their own annual reports.\(^{43}\)

In theory other resources were available to help the rural police. Cooperation with the town police, for example, might have helped the understaffed rural forces. According to a government commission, however, jurisdictional disputes between the two were common.\(^{44}\) The military’s Corps of Gendarmes was another potential source of assistance. In the middle years of Nicholas I’s reign, it numbered about 4,300 men.\(^{45}\) Three of its eight regional commands, however, were in Poland, the Caucasus, and Siberia, where the statutes on the local police were not in force. Elements of another command were in the Baltic provinces and Finland, where the same was true. Still, the Corps maintained divisions of 500 men in St. Petersburg and in Moscow and 34-man commands in the other provincial capitals.\(^{46}\) The 1836 statute laying out the organization and duties of the gendarmes specified that police commissioners and heads of police could call on them for assistance.\(^{47}\) The gendarmes also took on duties such as policing the railroads that the undermanned local police were ill equipped to fulfill and that eventually would become a major claimant on manpower.\(^{48}\) Relations between the local police and gendarmes were poor, however, and competition between them was fierce. Although not officially part of the Third Section, the gendarmes were

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42 RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 21, 26.
43 See, for example, RGIA, fond 1281, Sovet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, opis’ 6 (697—numbering is inconsistent), delo 46, “Po otchetu o sostoianii s-peterburgskoi gubernii za 1856 g.” 54; delo 52, “Po otchetu o sostoianii iaroslavskoi gubernii za 1856 g.” 59; delo 55, “Po otchetu nachal’nika iaroslavskoi gubernii za 1857 g.” 55–56.
45 Squire, *The Third Department*, 95.
46 The 1836 law on the organization and duties of the Corps of Gendarmes—*2nd PSZ*, 11 (1836): no. 9355—created seven regional commands in place of the five introduced in 1827 under *2nd PSZ*, 1 (1827): no. 1062. A year later, under *2nd PSZ*, 12 (1837): no. 10779, an eighth was added. The First Region was responsible for the Baltic provinces and Finland as well as several Russian provinces. The Third Region, which was responsible for Poland, was the subject of a separate statute—*2nd PSZ*, 18 (1843): no. 17038.
48 In 1846 a small “temporary” squadron of gendarmes was established to protect the St. Petersburg–Moscow railroad per *2nd PSZ*, 21 (1846): no. 19979. According to P. A. Zaionchkovskii, the number of gendarmes policing the railroads was about 2,500 by the end of Alexander II’s reign, *Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870–1880-kh godov* (Moscow: Moscow University, 1964), 174.
under the command of its Chief and were, in effect, political police. As such, they were widely feared and resented inside and outside government, including by the local police. Competition between the two police forces began at the top. According to Alexander Herzen, Russia’s most influential writer and publisher, in the late 1840s the Minister of Internal Affairs withheld evidence of the existence of the Petrashevtsy, a secret society of Russian socialists, to embarrass the political police. The Third Section’s responsibility for overseeing the bureaucracy also made the local police unlikely to divulge their problems to gendarmes who reported to the Third Section’s Chief.

Several remote provinces such as Astrakhan and Orenburg that were subject to the police statute of 1837 had populations of Cossacks who were potential sources of support for the local police. For the most part, however, the Cossacks lived in areas not subject to the 1837 statute and served as border troops. Elsewhere—as with the Astrakhan and Orenburg Cossacks—their police role consisted largely of providing security for large trading fairs. According to historian Robert McNeal, their heavy use as police did not come until the twentieth century. Under Alexander II the central government focused on subjecting the Cossacks to the authority of the local police, not on using them for police purposes.

Differences in the strength of the urban and rural police aside, the number and breadth of their responsibilities challenged all the local police. As often the Tsar’s only representatives at the grass-roots level, the police were responsible for implementing the vast number of laws and regulations that successive Russian rulers had imposed to control and uplift the populace. The 1837 law on the rural police detailed 54 areas of responsibility.

53 *2nd PSZ*, 12 (1837): no. 10305, chapter II.
handbooks of police duties numbered hundreds of pages. In the words of a journalist in the *Russian Messenger*, there was “no area of human activity in which at the first departure from normal behavior” the police do not become involved. An official history commissioned by the Ministry of Internal Affairs identified the greatest problem of the rural police in the late 1850s as the “extraordinary burden of their diverse work load.” While the urban police were more numerous and their physical turf was much more compact, their forces consisted primarily of guards who did little more than their name suggested. Their workload was also so complex as to challenge even their supervisors’ ability to handle it. Looking back on this period, the Russian legal scholar Ivan Tarasov observed that the law required the police to be architects, chemists, censors, judges, prosecutors, sanitary inspectors, tax collectors, and other occupations as well as defenders of the security of persons, property, and public morality. The breadth of their duties made them important but also increased the costs of poor performance.

The police’s responsibility for documenting the disposition of the tasks assigned to them and for record keeping in general added to their already heavy burden. In St. Petersburg, for example, each of the three police chiefs had to maintain 23 sets of records to account for matters as diverse as arrests; incoming and outgoing business; the distribution of uniforms and weapons; the costs of heating and lighting sentry boxes; citizens’ plans for the design of new building; and births, marriages, and deaths. The 1837 law on the composition and mission of the rural police included examples of 31 different logs, journals, and daybooks the police had to maintain. Historically, even by the standards of a uniform-obsessed society, the central authorities had paid particular attention to the outfitting of the police. Peter the Great’s new capital police had worn cornflower blue coats

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54 See, for example, Vasilii Lukin, ed. *Pamiatnaia kniga politeisiskikh zakonov dla chinov gorodskoi politisii* (St. Petersburg: E. Prats, 1836); and *Pamiatnaia kniga politeisiskikh zakonov dla zemskoi politisii, pomeshcikov i voobshche sel’skikh obyvatelei* (St. Petersburg: Eduard Pratts, 1857) and Petr Guliaev, *Prava i obi-azannosti gradskoi i zemskoi politisii i vsekh voobshche es rossiiskogo gosudarstva, po ikh sostojaniam v ot- nosenii k politisii*, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: Departament vneshei torgovli, 1832).
58 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaiia politiisia i gradonachal’stvo, 118–19.
59 2nd PSZ, 12 (1817): no. 10305, shtaty i tabeli.
of European style to highlight their Westernizing mission.\textsuperscript{60} Peter’s successors, most definitely including Alexander II, lavished attention on even minor details of police uniforms. Their goal, as an official in Alexander II’s Department of Executive Police explained, was to make the police instantly recognizable as agents of the state and to give them prestige.\textsuperscript{61} In St. Petersburg and Moscow (see Figure 2) city guards wore dark green coats with scarlet collars. In other cities and towns watchmen assigned to booths had gray uniform coats and those assigned to messenger duty, districts, or wards

\textsuperscript{60} Shubinskii, “Pervyi peterburgskii general-politsimeister,” 430.
\textsuperscript{61} MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 31.
The Local Police at Mid-Century

wore dark green. Both had brass buttons with the coat of arms of the province and headgear with badges. In St. Petersburg after 1859 the badges had numbers that identified the holder. Pants were the same color as the coats except in summer when white was worn. Non-commissioned officers carried short swords and before 1856 booth guards carried halberds—a practice so reminiscent of an earlier century that it reportedly startled foreign visitors. In 1856 the halberds were replaced with short swords. Several hundred members of the St. Petersburg force had flintlock firearms until 1859, when they were replaced with revolvers designed by French gunsmith Casimir Lefaucheux.62 Police chiefs, district inspectors, and other supervisory personnel in both cities and rural areas wore uniforms prescribed in an 1834 statute that applied to all civilian officials and the gentry and that distinguished ten different uniform categories.63

For all the government’s attention to the police’s appearance, it struggled to recruit officers capable of winning the public’s respect. Rather, the local police were notoriously incompetent and corrupt. Low police salaries were largely at fault. While the police chiefs, sheriffs, and district officers received lodging and travel expenses, with a few exceptions in the most senior posts, they were poorly paid. Rural district police inspectors made about 225 silver rubles per year64—about as much as some unskilled factory workers.65 Police chiefs in large cities such as Kiev or in rural counties made better salaries—500 silver rubles and 422 silver rubles, respectively—but a government commission still described these as too low to attract people with the needed skills and character. Their assistants earned only about 50 rubles a month more than the district inspectors did; city guards, who were drawn largely from military non-commissioned officers and privates, received even smaller salaries; and village wardens went unpaid in all but very few instances.66

The police’s positions in the 14-level Table of Ranks, a key determinant of social standing since its introduction by Peter the Great, reflected their

63 2nd PSZ, 9 (1814): no. 6860.
64 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 218.
lowly status.\textsuperscript{67} Under the terms of the 1837 statute on rural police, rural sheriffs held class VIII positions and district inspectors held class X ones.\textsuperscript{68} At the time, the former gave the incumbents hereditary noble status and the latter gave them non-hereditary noble status.\textsuperscript{69} By 1836, however, the criteria for hereditary nobility had changed. The rural sheriffs now were entitled only to personal nobility and their district inspectors just barely qualified for such status. City police chiefs, who were not under the 1837 law, sometimes had higher ranks. Kiev’s, for example, was a class VII in 1854.\textsuperscript{70} They too, however, were several levels below the threshold for hereditary nobility.

Police officials with positions in the Table of Ranks also were entitled to pensions under the terms of an 1827 decree on military and civilian pensions.\textsuperscript{71} The amount received depended on into which of the nine pension tiers an official fell and on his years of service. Thirty-five years of service were required to collect the full amounts. The tiers in which police positions fell roughly paralleled their levels in the Table of Ranks. Members of the municipal guard, mostly military detailees by the mid-1850s, received meager military pensions. Village wardens, who were unpaid to begin with, had no pension rights. Overall, there was nothing in the pension system that might have attracted people to serve in the police rather than in other government positions.

The government’s reliance on the military to staff the municipal police forces was another source of personnel problems. In cities other than St. Petersburg and Moscow senior police positions generally were reserved for retired officers. The hero of Filippov’s satirical story, Police Chief Bubenchikov, explained his choice of career by remarking that service at the front had worn him out.\textsuperscript{72} Filippov, a distinguished jurist, was intimately familiar with the police’s problems.\textsuperscript{73} Readers with even a slight acquaintance with the police, however, would have had no trouble getting his point. Almost all positions of municipal police chief were filled on recommendation from

\textsuperscript{67} For an introduction to the Table of Ranks and a list of equivalent positions in the civil, military, naval, and court services, see \textit{Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’} (B&E), s. v. “Tabel’ o rangakh.”
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{2nd PSZ}, 12 (1837): no. 10105, shtaty i tabeli.
\textsuperscript{69} “Social Structure and Social Mobility,” trans. Scott Seregny, in Boris Mironov and Ben Eklof, \textit{The Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700–1917} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 200), 1: 208.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{2nd PSZ}, 29 (1854): no.18685, shtaty i tabeli.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’} (B&E), s. v. “Filippov, Mikhail Araamovich.”
the Committee on Wounded Soldiers. Injuries serious enough to disqualify men from further military service must also have reduced their ability to perform as police.

At lower levels, the 1853 law on the transfer of non-commissioned officers and privates to the municipal guards enabled commanders to rid their units of chronic troublemakers and incompetents. An official history of the Ministry of Internal Affairs described the 1853 law as worsening the municipal force. According to Alexander Beklemishev, the Governor of Mogilev, this law had recruited the “dregs” of the army into the police. In 1859, legislation directed military commanders to stop transferring troublemakers and incompetents to the police.

In the countryside, where police at the top and bottom levels were elected, the quality of the police was as bad or worse. In his account of his travels in Russia, Baron Haxthausen was told:

Whenever a rural police chief is to be elected, a miserable and somewhat cunning property owner with official rank in the district applies. He used to obtain the votes of the small property owners in return for small gifts. Now he turns to one or a few of the richest landowners who actually reside in the district and who are often persons of dubious character. He flatters them and promises them full compliance and official favor. They then invite the electors to dinner, propose the candidate, and secure the votes for him through their influence. Once elected, the police chief uses his position to procure money and other advantages, knowing that he will lose his office after six years . . . and that he hardly stands a chance of being re-elected. His patrons and their peasants are shown consideration, but he torments, tricks, and fleeces his peers . . .

The election of village wardens, a common way of filling these positions, reportedly yielded worse results. By many accounts, industrious peasants

74 2nd PSZ, 31 (1856): no. 30098.
75 Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii, 201.
76 As quoted by Tarasov, Politzia v epokhu reform, 24.
77 2nd PSZ, 34 (1859): no. 34401.
79 Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii, 195.
dreaded such service and often imposed it on disreputable members of the community.\textsuperscript{80} As late as 1863, after the implementation of reforms, the Governor of Moscow Province reported that serving as warden was sometimes a penalty for non-payment of taxes.\textsuperscript{81} The same governor who had described the municipal watchmen as the “dregs of the army,” described the wardens as the “dregs of the entire populace.”\textsuperscript{82} Such descriptions doubtless were at least partly reflective of Russian elites’ perception of the peasantry as a semi-savage mass in need of their direction.\textsuperscript{83} They may also have reflected their frustration at what was, to some degree, effective passive resistance to the state on the villagers’ part. Whatever their origin, the criticisms of the peasant wardens by the higher authorities reflected a recognition of the enormous gap between their expectations of what the police were supposed to do and their ability to do so.

Ill qualified to begin with, police officials generally did not stay in their positions long enough to develop expertise. The Department of Executive Police was an exception (see Table 3). The long tenure of its directors, however, had costs as well as benefits. These officials—all civilians—generally advanced to their posts after years of service. Often—as with Pokrovskii and Orzhevskii, Directors under Nicholas I—this service was spent in the Department itself. Their virtues were attention to detail and loyalty to their ministers and sovereign, not imagination or leadership. Pokrovskii, the son of a priest, was legendary for never taking leave in 43 years and for his extraordinary attention to detail. Once, when he took responsibility for the loss of an important document, Nicholas I reportedly said this was “impossible” and insisted that Pokrovskii was covering for a subordinate.\textsuperscript{84} Orzhevskii, another son of a priest, served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 13 years before becoming Director of Executive Police and had headed one of its sections. His biographer praised him for his attentiveness to orders, his hard work, accuracy, and mastery of bureaucratic procedures.\textsuperscript{85} In St. Petersburg,
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the commissioners were all military officers and generally had shorter tenures. A. S. Shulgin\textsuperscript{86} and K. F. Dershau,\textsuperscript{87} however, had prior police experience before heading the St. Petersburg force.

**Table 3**: Tenure of Senior Police Officials under Nicholas I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director of Executive Police</th>
<th>Years in Position</th>
<th>St. Petersburg Police Commissioner</th>
<th>Years in Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M. P. Stehr</td>
<td>1819–1828</td>
<td>A. S. Shulgin</td>
<td>1825–1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. S. Pokrovskii</td>
<td>1828–1833</td>
<td>B. Y. Knyazhnin</td>
<td>1826–1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Zhmakin</td>
<td>1833–1837</td>
<td>A. S. Shkurin</td>
<td>1828–1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. V. Orzhevskii</td>
<td>1833–1857</td>
<td>K. F. Dershau</td>
<td>1829–1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S.A. Kokoshkin</td>
<td>1830–47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A.P. Galakhov</td>
<td>1847–56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Outside the imperial capitals, the rural sheriffs were elected for six years. Also, the town police chiefs and district inspectors, unlike the active duty officers who served in the capitals, were not subject to transfer. The statistics in Table 4 suggest, however, that as Haxthausen reported, turnover in police positions was high. In Kherson Province, all the positions of sheriff changed hands in a three-year period. Elsewhere, with the single—and unexplained—exception of Minsk Province, the figures imply that none of the sheriffs lasted more than a single term. The turnover for non-elected officials was not as extreme but still high. And for officials who stayed in their positions, promotion through the ranks was extremely rare.

In anticipation of early departures from their posts, many police used their time in service to enrich themselves through bribery and extortion. Bribery was near universal in both town and rural forces. As the Governor of Moscow noted in an annual report to the Minister of Internal Affairs, salaries for the municipal police were so low that it was impossible for them to make do without illicit income.\textsuperscript{88} A government commission in the late

\textsuperscript{86} *Russkii biograficheskii slovar*, s. v. “Shul’gin, Aleksandr Sergeevich.”
\textsuperscript{87} *Russkii biograficheskii*, s. v. “Dershau, Karl Fedorovich.”
\textsuperscript{88} RGIA, fond 1281, opis’ 6, delo 73, 87.
Chapter 1

1850s concluded that of the roughly 1,200 district inspectors it would be hard to find more than 10 or 20 who were not taking bribes. Writing from Mologa in 1850, the Slavophil Ivan Aksakov reported that the wives of the town and county police chiefs, whom he described as “very attractive” and “charming,” respectively, were also the recipients of bribes. Looking back on the reign of Nicholas I, a memoirist recalled that in Penza Province the rural sheriffs and district inspectors were on the payroll of horse thieves.

Table 4: Turnover of Police Personnel, 1858/1855
(percentages of total positions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th>Minsk</th>
<th>Novgorod</th>
<th>Vladimir</th>
<th>Kherson</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Rural Sheriffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Rural District Inspectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Municipal Police Chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. All of Above Positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled by comparing the names in directories of provincial officials for 1855 and 1858. Adres-kalendar. Obschaia rospis’ nachal’stvu i iuushchikh i pro-
chikh dolzhnostnykh lits po vsem upravleniim v imperii i po glavnym upravleniiam v tsarstve pol’skom i v velikom kniazhestve finliandskom na . . . god (St. Petersburg: Senat, 1855, 1858). Turnover is defined as disappearance from the police rosters and replacement by new officials with no previous record of service within the province.

89 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 118.
Bribery of police by the tax farmers, who purchased exclusive rights to retail trade in drink in specific regions, was particularly common. David Christian, the leading historian of the Russian vodka industry, has shown that bribery associated with the vodka trade involved, “regular, semi-formal payments to whole layers of officialdom.” According to estimates by Russian government officials that he cited, in the early 1850s rural police routinely received bribes equal to twice their salary. He concluded that bribery was so extensive and the size of bribes so large as to challenge the government’s control over the recipients.\(^92\) Minister of Internal Affairs Lanskoi would have concurred. In one annual report, he told the Tsar that the tax farming system was the major cause of the “moral powerlessness” of the police.\(^93\) The lowest ranking members of the police had less authority than their supervisors and probably less opportunity for bribes. Perhaps because of such disadvantages, they often resorted to other illegal means of enriching themselves, including simple robbery and theft. In his annual report for 1857, for example, the Governor of Nizhnii Novgorod said that the introduction of a municipal guard force had increased crime in his province. His explanation was that the guardsmen were often criminals.\(^94\) Alexander Herzen was exiled in 1840 for repeating rumors in a letter to his father that a policeman had murdered and robbed a St. Petersburg family. Herzen noted that even if this was simply gossip it indicated what the police were like.\(^95\)

The heavy-handedness and brutality of the police may have resulted in part from their predominantly military backgrounds. Despite recurring attempts to avoid mistreatment of soldiers, discipline was harsh in the Russian military of the mid-nineteenth century.\(^96\) Like Makarov, the sheriff in *The Brothers Karamazov*, real-life police often had “the heart of a soldier rather than that of a civilian.”\(^97\) Particularly for Russians of humble means,
this made contact with the police unpleasant and sometimes painful. “Slow to help, quick to torment,” was how one foreign visitor described the police in his account of an 1839 visit.98 Later, members of the gentry and senior officials of varying political views would echo his judgment. Writer and publisher Prince Meshcherskii, for example, was a reactionary disinclined to criticize the old regime.99 Having served in the St. Petersburg police in the 1860s, however, he acknowledged that even in Russia’s most civilized city, torture of suspects was widespread.100

At times even members of the gentry suffered from police heavy-handedness. Count Dmitrii N. Tolstoi, later Director of the Executive Police, complained in his memoirs about the cruelty of a local police official who had frightened and insulted his family by forcibly removing servants from his aged father’s home to meet a military recruitment quota. Tolstoi recalled that this had led him to boycott the coronation of the “despot” Nicholas I, who, he acknowledged, had probably been unaware of his protest.101

### Particular Performance Problems

Deeply critical of the police in general, contemporaries were particularly dismayed by the police’s poor performance of several specific duties. Their enforcement of local non-monetary obligations and collection of taxes in arrears were among the most frequent targets of complaints.102 Responsible for enlisting peasants to maintain bridges and roads, for example, they did so unevenly, largely because of differences in villages’ ability to pay bribes to avoid this.103 Unsurprisingly, internal transportation was grossly underdeveloped. In the 1850s Russia had only about 5,300 miles of first-class roads.

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99 Vladimir Petrovich Meshcherskii (1839–1914), was the grandson of Nikolai Karamzin, the famous historian, writer, poet, and critic. For many years the publisher of *The Citizen* (*Grazhdanin*), a right-wing paper subsidized by the authorities under the last three tsars, he was exceptionally well-connected and, according to his critics, widely despised. See his obituary in the *New York Times*, 24 July, 1914 or, for a blander view, * Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (B&E), s. v. ”Meshcherskii, Kniaz Vladimir Petrovich.”
102 For a list and discussion of these local obligations, see * Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (B&E), s. v. ”Zemskie finansy,” and Boris Veselovskii, *Istoriia zemstva za sorok let* (St. Petersburg: O. N. Popovoi, 1909), 1: 4–6.
103 See, for example, V. V. Shompulev, “Provincsial’nye tipy sorokovykh godov,” *Russkaia starina*, 95 (1898): 312.
in its entire Empire. The police’s responsibility for collecting arrears in the soul tax was another abysmally executed duty. This tax was levied on communities on the basis of the number of adult male peasants and members of the lower urban estates. A government survey in 1861 reported that overdue payments exceeded one million rubles in several of the provinces and were large in all of them. Relative to total soul tax revenues, which reached 26,646,92 rubles in 1859, this amounted to a major revenue loss. V. A. Artsimovich, of Kaluga—by reputation one of Russia’s best governors—blamed the growth of arrears on the poor performance of the local police. His explanation was simple police inattention to the task. Minister of Internal Affairs Lanskoï blamed the problem on the excessive burden of police duties. Others argued that the responsibility of the police for tax collection was one of their major sources of illegal income. One police official, for example, treated the visiting Frenchman Alexandre Dumas to a humorous account of how villages faced with the prospect of paying a large amount of arrears would settle with the local police officer for a fraction of that sum. In instances such as this the laughter involved was at the expense of the government, not the police or the villagers. The former received a badly needed supplement to their salary and the latter got off with a lower tax payment.

Preparing criminal and civil cases for trial was another police duty that attracted wide criticism. In the cities a division of the police board took on this responsibility. In the countryside a division of the rural police court handled the most important cases, but the rest fell to the district inspectors. By many accounts, even in the best of circumstances police investigators lacked the education required for this task. Russian contacts also told French scholar Leroy-Beaulieu that in the pre-reform era, preliminary inves-

104 Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 283.
106 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Podushnaia podat’ v Rossii.”
107 RGIA, fond 1281, opis’ 6, delo. 80, “Po otchetu o sostoiannii kaluzhskoi gubernii za 1861 god,” 58.
108 RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 21, 28.
111 See, for example, N. Polozov, “Neskol’ko slov ob ugolovnykh sledstviakh,” Russkii vestnik 31 (February 1861): 752.
tigations were doubly profitable to the police. They could get bribes from the guilty and extort the innocent.\textsuperscript{112} The police also reportedly were preoccupied with other responsibilities.\textsuperscript{113} The results were long delays in prosecution, dismissal of cases at the whim of the investigators, torture and intimidation of suspects, and frequent falsification of evidence.\textsuperscript{114}

As emancipation of the serfs approached, the police’s failings as protectors of public order were a greater public and official concern. In 1848, when other European capitals faced revolutions, Russia had remained calm. It was not, however immune from contemporary states’ concern with creating a police that could control popular unrest.\textsuperscript{115} The violent protests against tavern operators in small towns and larger villages in 1859, for example, illustrated the Russian police’s inability to deal with such problems.\textsuperscript{116} In rural areas where no mounted guards were available, the police often had to call on the army or gendarmes to put down violent protests. The distances involved precluded timely responses.

Simple crime was a more prosaic threat to public order, but the police were also unable to deal with it. In the countryside the police had neither the time nor the manpower to devote to tracking down criminals. Viatka’s Governor also told Alexander Herzen that when dealing with armed gangs the police were often intimidated. The governor attributed this to police cowardice, but the rural police were at an extreme numerical disadvantage in situations of this sort.\textsuperscript{117} In his annual report for 1857, Lanskoi told the Tsar

\textsuperscript{114} Dobrov, \textit{Otkrovennoe slovo}, 62. Also see the quotes from contemporary jurists in Wortman, \textit{The Development of Russian Legal Consciousness}, 217 and Kucherov, \textit{Courts, Lawyers, and Trials Under the Last Three Tsars}, 4–6; and the comments of Polozov about the frequent failure to punish the guilty “Neskol’ko slov ob ugodovnykh sledstviakh,” \textit{Russkii vestnik} 31 (February 1861): 752.
that any success the police might achieve against crime was probably accidental. In Nizhnii Novgorod Province, he reported, 80 percent of all crimes went unsolved; in Tver Province 76 percent went unpunished.\footnote{RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 11, 11.} The provincial governors’ reports to Lanskoï told similar stories. In 1856–60, for example, private losses from theft totaled 996,800 rubles, according to Iaroslavl’s Governor, of which the police recovered only 29,980 rubles.\footnote{RGIA, fond 1281, opis’ 6, delo 41, “Po otchetu o sostoyanii iaroslavskoi gubernii za 1861 god,” 32.} These figures were for \textit{reported} crimes. As Lanskoï observed in his 1855 report, in Russia instead of reporting a crime to the police most Russians were more likely to conceal it from them.\footnote{RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 21, 27.} A grotesque story told to Alexandre Dumas gives some sense why the police were so hated and feared. A district inspector told the Frenchman how he had once found the dead body of an infant near a peasant village. Believing that anyone so poor as to abandon a child would be unable to afford a bribe, the inspector moved the dead body to the outskirts of a wealthier village, where families were willing to pay generously to avoid his threatened physical inspection of all the women of childbearing age.\footnote{Dumas, \textit{Adventures in Czarist Russia}, 84.} The use of dead bodies as extortion tools was reportedly particularly common in provinces with cold climates. In his account of his exile to Viatka Province, Herzen reported that the local police had moved a frozen body from village to village to extract bribes from the inhabitants eager to avoid an inquest.\footnote{Herzen, \textit{My Exile}, 1: 241.}

In the cities, where hot pursuit of criminals was possible, the fight against crime should have gone better but did not. Unlike the English and American police, their counterparts in Russian cities did not walk beats. Rather, Russian municipal guards were stationary and depended on citizens to report crimes to them.\footnote{For discussion of this practice and its impact on criminal investigations, see Robert W. Thurston, “Police and People in Moscow, 1906–1914,” \textit{The Russian Review} 39 (1980): 326.} In 1843, one year after the creation of London’s detective division, Russian authorities had considered creating a similar force in St. Petersburg only to decide that they lacked the resources to do so.\footnote{Vysotskii and Frish, \textit{S-Peterburgskaiia stolichnaia politiia i gradonachal’s’tvo}, 147–48. On the London detectives, see Haia Shpayer-Makov, \textit{The Ascent of the Detective: Police Sleuths in Victorian and Edwardian England} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).} As a result, by mid-century, when detectives were becoming famil-
iar figures in other European capitals, Russia had none.  

In an 1858 issue of the *Journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs*, the government acknowledged that criminal investigative services of any kind were virtually nonexistent.  

At times, the police’s incompetence in investigating crime could be almost farcical. Both the expatriate writer Ivan Golovin and Prince Meshcherskii reported incidents in which the St. Petersburg police used their own funds to purchase duplicates of property that had been reported stolen. In one instance the owner had already recovered the original property, to the embarrassment of the police. These cases involved crimes against the wealthy. Crimes against people of humble means typically went uninvestigated. Worse still, like the hero of Gogol’s *The Overcoat*, ordinary citizens who reported crimes to the police ran the risk of being treated as criminals. An English visitor reported that the police’s unwillingness to investigate crimes against members of the lower classes even extended to murders. Exceptions to such neglect were so rare that they attracted high-level attention. In 1843 Nicholas I awarded a special decoration to a St. Petersburg policeman who apprehended the murderer of two prostitutes. Meshcherskii reported that as late as 1859 the lucky policeman was still an honored figure in St. Petersburg. He was doubtless still an exceptional one and in the rural areas would have been even more so. Together, the state peasants and the landlords’ serfs accounted for about two-thirds of Russia’s populace and peasant-on-peasant and serf-on-serf crimes were doubtless the most common criminal offenses. In the case of horse thieving, a widespread occurrence that was often the work of organized criminal groups, such crimes were also among the most destructive, given the peasants’ dependence on horsepower to farm their land and transport their crops. By numerous accounts, however, the police often failed to investigate the offenses or include them in crime statistics.

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125 On the history of detectives in Russia, see *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ ruskogo biograficheskogo instituta* *Granat*, hereafter *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (Granat), s.v. "Sysknaia politsiia."

126 *Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del*, 31 (1858), 11–12.


Obstacles to Reform and Improving Prospects

For all the recognition of the police’s problems, numerous plans for reform had foundered for lack of needed resources and in the face of bureaucratic and gentry resistance.¹³¹ By virtue of his years as a governor and a member of the central bureaucracy, Minister of Internal Affairs Lanskoï was intimately familiar with this history.¹³² While stressing the need for police reform to the Tsar, he faced several major obstacles to accomplishing this.

Russia’s underdeveloped economy and backward society were at the top of the list of such obstacles. Whether measured in per capita wealth, literacy rates, education, or other attributes at the start of Alexander II’s reign, Russia ranked well behind the West European states that its leaders viewed as its peers. Only about 10 percent of Russia’s populace, for example, could read and write. This was about one-sixth the literacy rate in Great Britain and, one-fifth the rate in France, and ranked well below the rates of Spain and Italy.¹³³ With basic literacy in such short supply and concentrated in major cities and well-off provinces, recruiting qualified police would have been a difficult task even given higher salaries and better working conditions.

Inadequate funding compounded the recruiting challenge. In the late 1850s, this obstacle reflected the government’s genuinely dire financial state. During 1853–1856, driven by outlays for the Crimean War, government expenses exceeded revenues by almost 700 million rubles—a deficit of 60 percent. Reducing expenditures became the order of the day.¹³⁴ The inability of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to obtain more spending made a bad situation worse. Until 1863, in

Until 1863, in addition to receiving funds from the Treasury, ministries and agencies had other revenue sources that were, in effect, their money. These were sometimes as large as Treasury allocations.¹³⁵ In the case of the

¹³² Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, s.v. “Lanskoi, Sergei Stepanovich.”
Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, these included insurance fees and other local taxes. Such sources must, therefore, be taken into account when reporting a ministry’s spending. Even when this is done, however, as in Table 5, in 1858 spending for the local police excluding those in the two capitals and the outdoor police amounted to less than one percent of spending by all government ministries and agencies. The biggest claimant on state funds in the late 1850s was the military. In 1852 before the Crimean War, its expenditures were seven and a half times greater than those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and by the end of 1854 its expenditures were almost 20 times as great. While other nonmilitary ministries also fared poorly in the competition for funds, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had particular grounds for arguing that it needed and could make better use of resources under the Ministry of War’s control. At mid-century, for example, the Army maintained a 145,000-man Internal Defense Corps that consumed budget resources the police must have coveted. By all accounts the Corps was inefficient, poorly trained, and manned by the type of poorly performing troops the military had transferred to the police during 1853–1859. According to historian John Shelton Curtiss, the Internal Defense troops often had to call on regular troops to deal with peasant resistance.

136 The exclusion of spending for the two capitals and for the municipal guard can be seen in the detailed breakdowns of proposed and authorized spending reported, respectively, in MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 6–11 and 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, straty i tabeli. Spending figures for the St. Petersburg and Moscow forces, including the outdoor police, were reported, respectively, in 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44772, straty i tabeli and 3rd PSZ, 1 (1881): no. 131, straty i tabeli. Under the 1853 statute (no. 27372), except in exceptional cases, expenditures for the city municipal guards were to come from city revenues not from provincial or central government sources. They were sometimes reported in 2nd PSZ, for example, in 50 (1875): no. 54433, straty i tabeli.

137 According to Ministerstvo finansov, 1802–1902, 1: 636–37, total government spending for 1858 was 361,356,000 rubles.

138 This had been true since the time of Peter the Great and would remain so until the collapse of tsarism. See Walter M. Pintner, “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1914,” Russian Review 43 (1984): 231–59.


140 Curtiss, The Russian Army, 42.

141 See, for example, M. I. Bogdanovich, Istoriicheskii ocherk deiatel’nosti voennogo upravleniia v Rossi i pervoe dvadtsatipiatiletie blagopoluchnogo tsarstvovaniia gosudarstva Imperatora Aleksandra Nikolayevicha (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 1879), 2: 41–42.

142 Curtiss, The Russian Army, 42.
The Local Police at Mid-Century

ing such large expensive noncombatant forces a major policy goal. In the 1850s, in contrast, the continued existence of the Internal Defense Corps enabled the Ministry of War to cite its domestic peacekeeping role to justify its large claim on the state budget.

Table 5: Level, Distribution, and Sources of Local Police Spending, 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Fire Department</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Treasury</td>
<td>88,203</td>
<td>123,533</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>212,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Duties</td>
<td>1,744,299</td>
<td>7,695</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,751,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Revenues</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>762,603</td>
<td>437,751</td>
<td>1,200,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Tax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44,778</td>
<td>79,743</td>
<td>124,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other sources</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>31,800</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>35,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1,833,453</td>
<td>970,409</td>
<td>520,866</td>
<td>3,324,728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Corps of Gendarmes and the Ministry of State Domains were also competitors of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its search for additional police funding. As a Russian police historian noted, the establishment of the Third Section and Corps of Gendarmes reflected Nicholas I’s judgment that the regular police had failed to do their job. As long as this view persisted, the regular police were denied the additional funding that the elite police received. The Ministry of State Domains, which supervised the peasants on state-owned lands, had argued successfully that rural police districts were unnecessary in such areas. In theory, this might have eased the burden of the rural police. In practice, the rural police consistently attempted to assert control and jurisdictional disputes were common.

More generally, considerations of bureaucratic politics often made even ministries and agencies with no police roles of their own reluctant to increase

144 Tarasov, Polititsia v epokhu reform, 6.
145 Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii v Rossii, 129.
spending for police.\textsuperscript{146} Resentment of the police’s actual or potential power within the high bureaucracy had a long history in Russia. The foreign-born Anton Divier, St. Petersburg’s first Police Commissioner, had been widely resented by other officials for his closeness to Peter the Great, whose children he tutored. After the death of Peter’s wife, the Empress Catherine I, his arch rival had him exiled for life, but Peter’s daughter Elizabeth, his former pupil, recalled him to his post after ascending the throne in 1741.\textsuperscript{147} Later, during his six-month reign in 1762, Tsar Peter III authorized the appointment of police chiefs in selected towns and cities who were to report to his favorite, Baron Nicholas Korf.\textsuperscript{148} Historian Marc Raeff described this move as one of the policies that antagonized Korf’s rivals and led them to support the coup by Peter’s wife, Catherine the Great.\textsuperscript{149} The creation of the Ministry of Police in 1811 was met with hostility by other ministries and provincial governors and Alexander I himself complained that Balashov, his chosen Minister aspired to limit his power. While retaining his rank and title, Balashov was removed from control of the ministry in 1812 and spent the next several years in other assignments. The Ministry of Police was abolished in 1819, but other ministers remained wary of creating a strong police agency.\textsuperscript{150}

The gentry’s hostility or indifference to police reform was another obstacle to increasing police spending. Gentry disdain for service in the police aside, the landlords had a stake in the weakness of the police. The small size of the rural police was both a result of—and a reason for—the persistence of serfdom into the 1850s. The inclusion of landlords (\textit{pomeshchiki}) in the title of Lukin’s handbook of rural police laws reflected their police power.\textsuperscript{151} In the countryside outside the lands of the state peasants, gentry landlords were the real police. The law allowed them to sentence their serfs to punishments ranging from caning to two months in their private jails to exile to Siberia.

\textsuperscript{148} 1st PSZ 15 (1762): nos. 11477, 11478.
\textsuperscript{150} Monas, \textit{The Third Section}, 41–44; Squire, \textit{The Third Department}, 32–41.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Pamiatnaya kniga politeiskikh zakonov dla zemskoi politii, pomeshchikov i vuoobshche sel’skikh obyvateli}
for major offenses. Exiled serfs were included in the count of recruits the serf-owner had to provide for the army, protecting landlords from permanent losses in their labor force.\textsuperscript{152} Powers of this sort were crucial to the continued existence of serfdom.

By the late 1850s, however, the link between serfdom and the police system was becoming a sword that cut two ways, improving the prospects for police reform as well as highlighting the challenges. With its paternalistic conception of its responsibilities, gentry staffing, and ultimate reliance on landlords and backward peasant wardens, the police system was the political equivalent of serfdom. As a result, the moral and practical arguments for opposing both systems were largely the same. In those years, the progress of liberal sympathies in society, fear of violence, and the desire to overcome the backwardness that had led to Crimean defeat were all on the rise. These forces were to lead Alexander II in November 1857 to announce his intention to emancipate the serfs.\textsuperscript{153} A few months later, in February 1858, he asked Lanskoi and three other officials to prepare a plan to reform the local police.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} Blum, \textit{Lord and Peasant}, 429.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{MSVUK: OP}, part 1, sect. 2, 140.
Alexander II’s pledge to emancipate the serfs had made it inevitable that his subsequent call for police reform would focus on Russia’s rural areas, but in early 1858 the nature and extent of the changes reform would entail were unclear. Over the next several years the central authorities would consider—and, for a time, support—three different approaches. While shaped in part by bureaucratic rivalries and budgetary stringencies, these would reflect differing perceptions of Russia’s security needs, the wishes of the Tsar, and the success of foreign police systems. They also would involve vastly different levels of complexity, in one case leaving institutions other than the police untouched and in another requiring reform of the courts and the creation of new local governments. As a result, the choice between the differing approaches would determine whether police reform would be an isolated project or a path to other of Russia’s Great Reforms.

**Differing and Complementary Approaches**

The earliest response to the Tsar’s call for a police reform plan was the work of Michael Murav’ev, the Minister of State Domains and an unabashed opponent of the promised emancipation of the serfs. As a young man, he had joined a secret society some of whose members later participated in the attempted coup by army officers in December 1825. Briefly arrested as a suspected participant, he had quickly established his innocence and in his subsequent bureaucratic career steadily distanced himself from his youthful radicalism. As a self-proclaimed champion of the landlord class, in 1847 he had opposed an effort by the Minister of Internal Affairs to replace the gen-
try-elected sheriffs with appointed officials. More than this, he had called—unsuccessfully—for placing the sheriffs under the supervision of the president of the local gentry and eliminating the appointed district police. As luck would have it, when appointed to head the Ministry of State Domains in 1857 he was to be responsible for territory that had no district police. Their absence was due to the efforts of his predecessor, Count Paul Kiselev, to keep the state peasants under his protection. Murav’ev, however, had abandoned Kiselev’s other policies, for example, by working to maximize the revenue the peasants could provide to the state rather than focusing on their economic development.

Murav’ev’s proposal was to leave the rural police unchanged but subordinate them to “county superintendents.” These officials were to be recruited from the military and have both military and civilian authority. More important, they were to be authorized to take command of both the military and the police in the event of peasant rioting. Their creation would effectively sideline the Ministry of Internal Affairs because in addition to controlling the local police they were to report directly to the Tsar rather than to Lanskoï’s ministry. To ministerial rivals of Lanskoï, this plan held out the hope that the new officials would be more responsive to their needs than provincial governors had been. It also had potential appeal to landlords who would retain their right to elect the rural police chief. Still, rather than being a blueprint for reform, it was basically a plan for martial law designed to appeal to those who expected the worst from Emancipation.

A quite different approach to police reform was proposed by a junior Ministry of Internal Affairs official, the young Michael Saltykov who had published the first two of his Provincial Sketches in 1857 under the nom de plume Shchedrin. Saltykov had followed an unusual path to involvement in police reform. As a younger man, he had attracted the suspicion of the authorities for participating in the Petrashevsky Circle, a forum for the discussion of socialism. Later, he was exiled to Viatka for censorship.

1  MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 1, 4–5.
2  Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Murav’ev, Graf Mikhail Nikolaevich.”
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offenses.4 Lanskoi, who had been Viatka’s Governor at the time, was impressed by Saltykov and after his appointment as Minister named him to head an internal committee on police problems.5 On the basis of this and his experiences with the provincial bureaucracy, in early 1858 Saltykov prepared a memorandum that called for emulating the English police.6

Imitating a foreign police model was not new for Russia. Peter I, Catherine II, and Alexander I had modelled their police after those of France, first the Paris police and later Napoleon’s Police Ministry. After the Crimean War, victorious France with its centralized system of government and small police presence in the countryside was a logical model for Russia to follow. Among contemporary European states, France was also among the most attentive to the development of the police. In 1852, for the first time, France had extended its police system to small towns, and in 1855 it had standardized police ranks and salaries countrywide.7 In the 1850s, however, the French political model that attracted Russian reformers was not the centralized regime of Napoleon III but the local self-governing communities championed by Tocqueville and other of the Second Empire’s critics. Saltykov himself had translated excerpts from Democracy in America during his exile in Viatka.8 In his 1858 memorandum he would echo the criticism of French despotism in Tocqueville’s other classic work, The Old Regime and the French Revolution.9 More important for the promised reform of Russia’s local police, he accompanied this with praise for England’s police system.

England had become a police innovator in the mid-nineteenth century, first by establishing Sir Robert Peel’s “new” police in 1829 and then by expanding it to other counties and cities on a voluntary basis in 1836 and a mandatory one in 1856.10 The English police, especially, London’s, were

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4 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Saltykov, Mikhail Evgrafovich”; Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 79.
8 Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 64–65, 151.
known for their focus on fighting crime, an effort some proclaimed to be a great success.\footnote{Chapman, \textit{Police State}, 37. For a discussion of the statistical evidence for the English police’s success against crime and alternative interpretations of them, see Phillip Thurmond Smith, \textit{Policing Victorian London: Political Policing, Public Order, and the Metropolitan Police} (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 11–12.}

Saltykov’s view of the English police had much in common with that of the early English police historians, who depicted them as attentive to the defense of civil liberties, allies of the courts and local governments, and the product of unique traditions that set them apart from police on the Continent.\footnote{Examples of this “Whig history” interpretation include Charles Reith, \textit{A Short History of the English Police} (London: Oxford University Press, 1948) or T. A. Critchley, \textit{A History of the Police in England and Wales}, 2nd ed. (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1971).} Later, revisionist historians would effectively challenge this view and describe the police as designed in good part to control the growing working class and with many similarities to police on the Continent.\footnote{See, for example, D. Taylor, \textit{The New Police in Nineteenth-century England: Crime, Conflict and Control} (Manchester, UK: Manchester Univ. Press, 1997).} These differing depictions explain how eventually the English police would be attractive to Russian liberals and conservatives alike. In terms of its impact on police reform in Russia in 1858, however, the memo’s accuracy or inaccuracy was beside the point. Its purpose was not to describe how England was but how Saltykov wished Russia to be. Specifically, his memo was a call to concentrate its police on the suppression of crime and to transfer their other duties to elected local governments. To this end, Saltykov argued for defining the police’s task as, “the pursuit of violations of the law” and for establishing “local governing boards parallel to the police.”\footnote{\textit{Polnoe sobranie sochinenii M. E. Saltykova}, 1: 46.}

Saltykov’s proposal was an internal memo, not a political manifesto. Still, it had an unmistakable political message. By defining the police’s role as “exclusively repressive” and urging the creation of new elected local governments, Saltykov was appealing both to society’s fear of disorder and to its desire for greater political influence. He also was expressing the view that police reform could not be an isolated process.

The young official’s memo, while including a few practical details, ignored the major cultural, social, and political problems of introducing an English-like police into Russia. Differences in the size of territory to be
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policed were particularly striking. Russia’s 42 provinces in which the 1837 police statute were in force covered about 1,750,000 square miles. This was almost 35 times as large of England. Inevitably, differences such as this would draw the attention of critics of the English police model who would pay particular attention to the need for more police. Increasing the size of the force, however, was not at all inconsistent with what Saltykov had proposed. Saltykov’s patron, Lanskoi, had identified the police’s minuscule rural presence as no less a problem than their vast duties and highlighted the need for more police. Also, one particular means of accomplishing this—the creation of a mounted rural guard—was an idea with roots that long predated Alexander II’s reign and that even opponents of the autocracy had supported. In the 1820s Paul Pestel’, a leader of the Decembrist Revolt and a republican, had proposed creating a larger mounted guard—25,000 strong—to police the countryside after his planned emancipation of the serfs. Nicholas I, whose ascension the Decembrists had sought to block, was also a supporter of mounted police patrols. His reign was to witness the creation of mounted patrols in Bessarabia in 1828 and in Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia in 1841 and 1843. Lev Perovskii, his Minister of Internal Affairs in 1842–1853, also had proposed introducing patrols of 10 police into each of Russia’s counties but had failed to win the necessary funds. While working on reform of its own police, Russia would also introduce a mounted police guard in the Caucasus early in Alexander II’s reign.

Whatever the merits of the other options, in the winter and spring of 1858, Murav’ev’s plan for county superintendents enjoyed the greatest political support. In particular it had the backing of the two other officials tasked to collaborate with Murav’ev and Lanskoi. Both—Adjutant-General Iakov Rostovtsev and Minister of Justice Victor Panin—would play positive roles in advancing Emancipation as successive chairmen of the Editing Commissions finalizing the Emancipation statute. Initially, however, com-

15 Monas, The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I, 47; M. Ol’minskii, Gosudarstvo, biurokratia i absoliutizm v istorii Rossii (St. Petersburg: Zhizni i znaniie, 1910), 182.
16 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 489.
17 Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitiia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii, 205–06.
18 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 38026.
mentators such as Herzen saw their appointments as troubling. Rostovtsev had been a favorite of Nicholas I. As a young man, he had warned Nicholas of the Decembrist conspirators’ plans, but loyal to his fellow officers, he had not given their names. Later he had worked with the then-Tsarevich Alexander on reform of Russia’s military training. Rostovtsev was legendary for his devotion to the imperial family that had raised him, the son of a schoolmaster, to a position of great prestige. As evidenced by his early skepticism toward Emancipation, he was no sycophant. At the same time, he feared the chaos Emancipation might bring and had already supported another of Murav’ev’s proposals, the introduction of military governors-generals, to prepare for rural violence. Panin, a holdover from the reign of Nicholas I and the owner of 20,000 serfs, had a history of rigidity and distaste for reform. According to Richard Wortman, he was notorious for his passion for rules and formalistic approach to the law, and even discussion of reform made him uncomfortable. At the same time, Panin was exceptionally devoted to Alexander II who treated him with a respect Nicholas I had never given him. This inclined him to favor a quick response to Alexander’s instructions—an advantage for Murav’ev’s already formulated plan. But it also made him willing to change course if the Tsar desired.

Lanskoi, who was 70 years of age in 1858, was not known for strong leadership or political skill. Rather, he had a reputation as indecisive, averse to confrontation, and overly reliant on subordinates. At the same time, as one of Alexander II’s first two ministerial appointments, he had some political influence with the Tsar. Also, as the next few months would show, he had an exceptional eye for talent. This would serve him well in responding to Murav’ev, Panin, and Rostovtsev.

21 Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 163.
22 Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, s. v. “Rostovtsev, Iakov Ivanovich.”
26 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Lanskoi, Graf Sergei Stepanovich.”
In the normal order of events preparation of the Internal Affairs Ministry’s response to the county superintendent plan would have fallen to the Director of Executive Police, Semen Zhdanov. In the words of a chronicler of Emancipation, “a correct bureaucrat of the old stamp . . . who subordinated all his actions to the will of his minister,” Zhdanov was no enemy of reform. He also had served a previous tour in his department and had close familiarity with the police and its problems. Lanskoi, however, bypassed Zhdanov in favor of a newcomer to the Ministry, Iakov Solov’ev, who had no background in police matters. An expert in agricultural statistics, Solov’ev had served in the Ministry of State Domains in 1843–1855 under Count Kiselev. After moving to the Ministry of Internal Affairs he had worked in a newly established department to prepare the data required for the promised Emancipation.

In his memoirs Solov’ev acknowledged reading Saltykov’s memo, but in a display of what another memoirist described as his tendency to be self-serving, he dismissed it as little more than unorganized thoughts. In spring 1858, however, he laid out a counter to the Murav’ev proposal that incorporated many of Saltykov’s ideas. This failed to win over the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs, the body established to prepare the Emancipation. On May 16, in what would prove the nadir for the Saltykov-Solov’ev police reform strategy, the Main Committee approved the plan for county superintendents as the basis for legislation.

RISING AND RECEDING REFORM

The summer and fall of 1858 and the several months that followed would witness a dramatic reversal of fortune for those of the Internal Affairs Ministry’s approach to police reform. Its rising fortunes would result from the ability of its advocates to enlist the provincial governors behind their cause, pub-
lic criticism of the county superintendent plan, and the favorable reception of their approach by the liberal press. The first was something for which Solov’ev himself could take great credit; the second was a reaction to the failure of Murav’ev’s plan to offer anything positive to gentry society; and the third was the appeal of English-style police reform to gentry hoping for political influence in the post-Emancipation countryside.

Solov’ev’s ability to line up the governors behind his approach to police reform was due to both a tactical error on his opponents’ part and his exceptional skill in exploiting it. In a concession to Lanskoï they probably came to regret, in May Murav’ev and his allies had agreed to circulate their plan among the governors for comment. This was an advantage to Solov’ev because the governors had much to lose from the creation of competitors at the county level. This advantage was heightened when Solov’ev and a like-minded associate V. A. Artsimovich, the Governor of Kaluga Province, were put in charge of summarizing the comments. After giving the governors three months to prepare and submit their reviews and taking three more months to prepare their report, Solov’ev and Artsimovich delivered a summary to the Tsar. Ostensibly a commentary on the plan for county superintendents, it was actually a call for English-like police reform. Its key recommendation was to transfer many of the police’s judicial duties to new investigating magistrates. It also called for placing most city police forces under rural police control, increasing salaries, and replacing gentry-elected police with government appointees.

In drawing recommendations that matched Solov’ev’s earlier plan, the two officials were taking more than a little editorial license. True, some governors actually had put forward ideas similar to Solov’ev’s. According to K. K. Grot of Samara, for example, “the major problems of the police” were “the inordinate number of responsibilities imposed upon them and the scarcity of personnel.” Others such as Tver’s Governor Baranov, however, had made different and sometimes bolder proposals. While endorsing several of changes Solov’ev favored, Baranov insisted that these would

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34 “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 590.
35 “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 577.
36 “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 262.
be ineffective unless community control of the police were strengthened. To achieve this he proposed creating an all-estate council of delegates.\textsuperscript{37}

Solov'ev and his colleagues would also benefit from public criticism of the plan for county superintendents. This criticism, which occurred despite an official ban on discussing the Murav’ev proposal,\textsuperscript{38} reflected the failure of this plan to offer little more to society than the promise of protection against peasant violence. True, it did allow the gentry to continue to elect the rural sheriffs—a privilege they had never valued highly. It did so, however, while subjecting the sheriffs to more bureaucratic control than the provincial governors had exercised. Criticism came from all directions. Herzen and Ogarev’s \textit{The Bell}, which was published abroad but smuggled into Russia, argued that by creating governor-like officials at the county level, the plan would increase the bureaucratization of Russia several fold, in effect creating a new “Byzanto-Germano-Chinese system.”\textsuperscript{39} Inside Russia, both opponents and defenders of serfdom made common cause in attacking the plan, with one provincial gentry assembly protesting that it was “unjustifiable in both political and administrative terms.”\textsuperscript{40} As Thomas Pearson correctly observed, such public criticism did not “as a rule” pressure public officials into making political concessions. It did, however, provide useful information on the practicality of their reform proposals.\textsuperscript{41} It also may have influenced the vacillating Tsar.\textsuperscript{42}

Public criticism of the Murav’ev plan was accompanied by expressions of support for the Saltykov-Solov’ev approach. The most articulate and influential of these appeared in Michael Katkov’s \textit{Russian Messenger}, between May and October in three articles that, according to Katkov’s biographer, attracted widespread favorable attention.\textsuperscript{43} Katkov, who had published Saltykov’s first \textit{Provincial Sketches} two years before, would later move sharply to the right in reaction to rebellion in Poland. In 1858, how-

\textsuperscript{37} “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 577.
\textsuperscript{38} Zhurnaly sekretnogo i glavnogo komitetov po krest’ianskomu delu (Petrograd: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1915), 1: 96.
\textsuperscript{39} Kolokol, August 15, 1858, 171.
\textsuperscript{40} Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government, 158.
\textsuperscript{42} On Alexander II’s character and decision-making style, see Walter G. Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (London: Anthem Press, 2012), 202.
\textsuperscript{43} S. Nevedenskii, Katkov i ego vremia (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1888), 122.
ever, he was among Russia’s leading reformers and his journal was the most widely read and respected organ of gentry liberalism.\textsuperscript{44} The author of the articles, Stepan Gromeka, a former gendarme, in contrast, was more controversial. To his critics, who included Alexander Herzen, Gromeka was a suspicious figure and possible police spy.\textsuperscript{45} To others he was a serious journalist whose official connections enabled him to address topics others could not.\textsuperscript{46} One year before, he had published an article praising the English police.\textsuperscript{47} In 1858, he followed with three more pieces on this theme. The first, “The Bounds of Police Power” appeared in May and praised what Saltykov had described as a hallmark of the mid-nineteenth century English police: their respect for the rights of the public.\textsuperscript{48} As it happened, this was a sentiment that Herzen, despite his distrust of Gromeka, would voice at about the same time.\textsuperscript{49} Citing Austria as a country that had overextended police power at the expense of such rights, Gromeka argued that it was government’s responsibility to restore the proper balance. In a Russia considering the introduction of super-police in the form of county superintendents, this was a powerful statement. Gromeka’s next article, “Police Casework,” appeared in July and praised the English police system not for protecting the public’s rights but for easing the task of the police.\textsuperscript{50} According to Gromeka, the London police’s concentration on the prevention of crime was a source of efficiency as well as a guarantee of public liberties. He contrasted them with the Russian police, whom he depicted as drowning in a sea of paperwork because of their responsibility for numerous matters unrelated to their law-and-order mission. “Real improvement of the police,” he argued, “can be achieved only by limiting rather than broadening their power.” The final article, “The Police Outside the Police,”

\textsuperscript{44} On the political line and popularity of \textit{Russkii vestnik}, see A. V. Zapadov and V. G. Berezina, \textit{Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki XVIII–XIX vekov} (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1961), 309–10.
\textsuperscript{45} On his criticism of Gromeka, see \textit{Ocherki po istorii russkoi zhurnalistiki i kritiki} (Leningrad: Leningradskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1965), 2:1201.
\textsuperscript{46} For a favorable judgment of Gromeka, see \textit{Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’} (Granat), s. v. “Gromeka, Stepan Stepanovich.”
\textsuperscript{47} Stepan Gromeka, “Dva slova o politsii,” \textit{Russkii vestnik} 9 (June 1857): 175–79.
\textsuperscript{48} “Predely politseiskoi vlasti,” \textit{Russkii vestnik} 15 (May 1858): 170–79.
\textsuperscript{49} Writing around the same time as Gromeka’s article, Herzen said, “In England, a policeman at your door adds to a sense of security.” Quoted in E. H. Carr, \textit{The Romantic Exiles: A Nineteenth Century Portrait Gallery} (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1933), 136.
\textsuperscript{50} “Politseiskoe deloproizvodstvo,” \textit{Russkii vestnik} 16 (July 1858): 178–94.
which appeared in October,\textsuperscript{51} dealt with the landlords’ police powers and was more a cautionary note than a call for action. In his previous pieces Gromeka had implied the need for change on the government’s part. Here he warned the gentry that whatever their desire for reform of the police, they were the police that mattered to the millions of Russian serfs. The implication was that unless the landlords were prepared to sacrifice their police powers, reforming the state’s police would mean nothing.

This combination of press support for English-style reform, fierce public criticism of the Murav’ev plan, and the provincial governors’ comments made a strong impression on the Tsar. On October 25 he told Lanskoï that he disagreed with many of Solov’ev’s recommendations but would allow their submission to the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs. Although Murav’ev continued to support it, in effect the plan for county supervisors was dead. By the end of January 1859, Solov’ev had persuaded Panin and Rostovtsev that focusing the police on repression was a better path to protecting law and order than the county superintendent plan.\textsuperscript{52} This emboldened Solov’ev to call for more reductions in the responsibilities of the police in a proposal that the Main Committee approved on March 25, 1859.\textsuperscript{53} It stripped the police of duties unrelated to the suppression of crime, specifically by removed their judicial powers and transferred their responsibilities for local economic affairs to new elected zemstvos. It also replaced the gentry-elected police with government-appointed sheriffs, eliminated most separate municipal forces, and placed their personnel under the control of the sheriffs.\textsuperscript{54} Details such as these were important but paled in comparison with the call to transfer police duties. In effect, a proposal for police reform had become a pathway to two of Russia’s Great Reforms.

**Table 6: The Commission for the Reform of Provincial and County Institutions**

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<th>Ministry/Agency</th>
<th>No. of Members</th>
<th>Names</th>
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\textsuperscript{52} “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 597–98.

\textsuperscript{53} “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 598–99.

\textsuperscript{54} “Zapiski Solov’eva,” 41, 600–01.
To draft the laws, this proposal would require the Main Committee to establish a Commission for the Reform of County Institutions. Later to also cover provincial institutions and renamed accordingly, the Committee—most often known simply as the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions—was well suited to lead the drive for police reform. Its members included Solov’ev, Saltykov, and other “enlightened bureaucrats” (see Table 6). It was headed by Nikolai Miliutin, a brilliant official and the bête

55 2nd PSZ, 36 (1861 addendum to 34): no. 34285a.
56 2nd PSZ, 36 (1861): no. 35020a; L. E. Lapteva, Zemskie uchrezhdeniia v Rossii (Moscow: Institut gosudarstva i prava RAN, 1993), 34.
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noir of Russian conservatives—a later Minister of Internal Affairs once described as a “red.” Miliutin, however, was an acknowledged master of bureaucratic politics. In 1846, he also had managed the transfer some of the duties of the St. Petersburg police to an elected council. His selection boded well for his Ministry’s approach to police reform.

Even as Lanskoi’s police reformers were scoring this bureaucratic triumphs, their ability to avoid the adverse public reaction that had contributed to the defeat of Murav’ev’s plan was about to be tested. Specifically, the arrival of gentry delegates in the capital in August 1859 to consult with the commissions drafting the Emancipation law was to provide the first real opportunity for gentry representatives to gauge their likely role after the liberation of the serfs. As outlined in vehicles such Gromeka’s articles in Russian Messenger, the liberal gentry were hoping that in return for their surrendering ownership and control of the serfs, they would get to play the leading role in the zemstvos and new courts. Many saw the August meetings as previewing the future the government envisaged for them after Emancipation. If so, the Ministry’s behavior toward the delegates dispelled their hopes of being more than junior partners. Their instructions, for example, stated that rather than discussing general principles, they would only provide information to allow “the adaptation of the general provisions to the unique features of each province.” They also barred formal meetings among the gentry and said that only upon invitation could delegates address the committees. These instructions opened a breach between the liberal gentry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry’s plans for the township administrations that were to assume the landlords’ police role for

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60 Emmons, The Russian Landed Gentry, 228.

groups of villages widened the breach by barring gentry involvement. This break was reflected in written protests that would later be viewed as seminal documents in the history of Russian constitutionalism. Focusing largely on the Ministry’s plans for Emancipation, some of these protests extended to the plans of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions. A commentary by prominent liberal Unkovskii of Tver Province, for example, condemned specific projects in progress, none of which had been published. His comments were widely circulated in handwritten form and later in Herzen and Ogarev’s Voice from Russia. Two deputies from Kharkov Province—Khrushchev and Schreter—also voiced skepticism over the work of Nikolai Miliutin’s police commission. By 1860, even proposals for police reform that mirrored those of Saltykov and Solov’ev were drawing the Internal Affairs Ministry’s fire. In January, for example, the Ministry censured the gentry of Vladimir Province for a proposal that would have given it the right to appoint the rural sheriffs and transfer many police duties to new judicial officials and all-estate local governments.

For all the attention they once received from historians, the liberal gentry were more important as contributors to Russian political thought than as practical political actors. For this reason, the political significance of their break with the Ministry of Internal Affairs should not be exaggerated. The strength of anti-abolitionist views among the landlords and within the high bureaucracy by late 1859 was such, however, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs could ill afford any more criticism. And the arrival of the second group of gentry delegates in the capital further soured gentry relations with the Ministry. More conservative than their predecessors, the gentry in this

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63 These included the Address of the Five and 13 statements submitted by individual deputies. For the names and views of the signees, see N. P. Semenov, Osvobozhdenie krest’ian v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra II: Kronska deiatel’nosti komissii po krest’ianskomu delu (St. Petersburg: M. E. Komarov, 1890), 2: 935–37; and Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government, 110.
64 Prilozheniia k trudam redaktionnykh komissii dlia sostavleniia polezheniiia o krest’ianskah vykhodiatishchikhh iz krepichnov zavisimosti. Otzovy chebov vyzvannykh iz gubernskikh komitetov (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1860), 2: 682.
66 Prilozheniia k trudam redaktionnykh komissii, 2: 780–81.
second group criticized the Ministry not for insufficient commitment to reform but for what they viewed as its anti-landlord policies.\footnote{P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Otmena krest'ianogo prava v Rossii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literature, 1954), 118–19; Emmons, The Russian Landed Gentry, 198–309.}

Undeterred, the Miliutin Commission pressed on with preparing a police reform package and on April 30 forwarded it to the Main Committee.\footnote{MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 1–8.} Its key elements were two draft statutes: on County Police and on Investigating Magistrates.\footnote{MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 13–62.} The establishment of the Commission for the Reform of County Institutions a year before had been the political high-water mark of the police reformers’ cause. These statutes were the fullest expression of their vision. The Statute on County Police included most of Saltykov-Shchedrin’s recommendations. Except for specified large cities, it subordinated the separate municipal police forces to new county police headed by government-appointed county sheriffs. These sheriffs would supervise the district police commanders and the village wardens, who also were to become appointed officials. More important, the police were to surrender most of their judicial and administrative responsibilities. While still responsible for apprehending suspects and handing them over to the courts, they would no longer decide guilt or innocence. While still responsible for compiling economic and financial data, they would no longer be administrators of the local economy. Instead, their major focus was to be on suppressing crime and public disorder. They were to become largely, though not exclusively, an internal security force. In addition, including spending for the urban police—the subject of a later separate statute—the police budget would increase by about 70 percent.

The Statute on County Police was silent on the need to increase the rural police presence. In his annual report for 1855, Lanskoi had told the Tsar that it was physically impossible for the rural inspectors to effectively police their large districts.\footnote{RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 21, 27.} The draft statute, however, left the size of the districts unchanged, and while calling for making the peasant wardens a salaried force appointed by the county sheriffs, it made no provision for paying the wardens’ salaries. Instead, it left the costs, as yet unspecified, to the peasant communities with not a word about their willingness or ability to
assume them.\textsuperscript{71} It also called for exempting the wardens from capital punishment and non-monetary obligations such as maintaining roads and bridges.\textsuperscript{72} Exemption from obligatory military service, however, was explicitly excluded from these inducements, which suggested that this had been proposed but rejected.\textsuperscript{73}

The Statute on Investigating Magistrates was designed to both unburden the police and improve the administration of justice. Under current law the police were responsible for questioning witnesses, assembling evidence, and other duties related to preparing the state’s case against accused suspects. These duties were time-consuming and required education that most police lacked. Lengthy delays in prosecution, failures to bring cases before the court, and falsification of evidence were frequent consequences.\textsuperscript{74} The new statute sought to fix this by relieving the police of these duties and transferring them to “investigating magistrates,” two of whom would be assigned to every district. Recruited from graduates of judicial faculties, the new officials were to cooperate with the district police. They would, however, report to the Minister of Justice, not the Minister of Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{75}

The introduction of the Miliutin proposals before the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs marked the start of months-long resistance by Lanskoi’s opponents in the high bureaucracy. Believing that rising gentry opposition to Emancipation would eventually lead to the ouster of Lanskoi and Miliutin, their opponents sought first to postpone discussion of the measures to an unspecified later date.\textsuperscript{76} Impatient to be done with the process, however, the Tsar insisted that the reform be operative by the fall of 1860.\textsuperscript{77} Failing in this first approach, the opposition then suggested that the reform be introduced in stages with priority given to those easiest to implement.\textsuperscript{78} This argument carried the day.

\textsuperscript{71} MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 17–18.
\textsuperscript{72} MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 59.
\textsuperscript{73} MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 149–52.
\textsuperscript{75} RGIA, fond 1162, opis’ XVI t, Gosudarstvennaiia kantseliariia Gosudarstvennogo soveta, delo 1, “O preobrazovanii uezdni politsii,” 18.
\textsuperscript{76} Materialy dlia istorii upravleniia krest’ianskogo prava, 2: 460.
\textsuperscript{77} RGIA, fond, 1162, opis’ XVI t, delo 1, 1–2.
\textsuperscript{78} RGIA, fond, 1162, opis’ XVI t, delo 1, 1–3.
The Rural Police

On May 17, the Main Committee convened to decide which of the proposed statutes should go to the State Council for enactment into law. Lanskoi and the Emperor’s brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich argued for submitting the entire package. The other members of the Committee made three counterarguments: that moving the municipal police under the rural sheriffs would distract the sheriffs with urban problems, that the redefinition of police duties would confuse the police, and that eliminating the landlords’ right to elect the rural sheriffs would add insult to the injury Emancipation would entail. The other members did, however, endorse the law on investigating magistrates. They also professed to support increasing police salaries but claimed to be only able to afford onetime grants to the governors to reward especially deserving police. On June 8, 1860 the Statute on Investigating Magistrates was enacted into law. So too were a set of instructions to the new officials and a decree detailing the police’s relationship with them. The provision for block grants was included in the statute on investigating magistrates in the amount of one million silver rubles.

As Prince Meshcherskii recalled in his memoirs, the postponement of major police reform on the eve of Emancipation was something foreigners would have found hard to believe. Initiated to prepare for Emancipation, the reform debate was now being suspended to smooth Emancipation’s path. What made this possible was something that Meshcherskii chose to ignore: that Emancipation was not the sudden dramatic change that many had feared or wanted. Rather, it was a drawn out process that left the freed serfs under the landlords’ control during a transition stage and tied them to their lands for decades to come. Also, in return for the elimination of the landlords’ police authority the liberated serfs had to police themselves, using institutions of “self-government” they often regarded as more a bane than a blessing. Specifically, the Emancipation statute required the establishment of

79 Zhurnaly sekretogo i glavnogo komitetov, 1: 492.
80 Zhurnaly sekretogo i glavnogo komitetov, 1: 495.
81 Zhurnaly sekretogo i glavnogo komitetov, 1: 495–99.
82 Zhurnaly sekretogo i glavnogo komitetov, 1: 499
83 Zhurnaly sekretogo i glavnogo komitetov, 1: 501.
84 2nd PSZ, 35 (1860): no.35890.
85 2nd PSZ, 35 (1860): no. 35891.
86 2nd PSZ, 35 (1860): no. 35892.
87 2nd PSZ, 35 (1860): no. 35890, art. 5.
88 Meshcherskii, Moi vospominaniia, 1: 242–43.
village community and township assemblies, each chaired by elders. The village communities were to consist of no more than 20 male souls apiece. The townships were to combine adjacent village communities in a single county into units of 300 to 2,000 male souls in size. Ostensibly, sources of assistance for the uniformed police, in practice the village and township elders were often no more useful or capable than the peasant wardens.\textsuperscript{89} Although probably more compliant than the landlords in their dealings with the police, they were not to prove more effective.

With the enactment of Emancipation in February 1861, reconsideration of the Lanskoï-Miliutin reform of the rural police was technically possible but politically unrealistic. In spring 1860, the Main Committee had agreed to resume discussion of the reform package after Emancipation was under way. On April 23, however, Lanskoï retired: Nikolai Miliutin was removed as Chairman of the Commission for the Reform of Provincial and County Institutions; and both were succeeded by Peter A. Valuev.\textsuperscript{90} Contemporaries attributed these personnel moves to the Emperor’s wish to placate the landlords.\textsuperscript{91} While Lanskoï was old and sick and had only a few months to live, his name was linked irrevocably to an Emancipation the landlords resented. So too was Nikolai Miliutin’s. Valuev, in contrast, had a reputation as a defender of the landlords, but also as someone astute enough to cultivate the powerful and influential regardless of their political views. Having begun his career in a position below the Table of Ranks, he had risen rapidly through a combination of personal contacts, luck, and recognized eloquence as a writer and speaker. The son-in-law of a famous poet, he had attracted the patronage of Nicholas I after a chance meeting at a Moscow ball in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{92} As Governor of Courland Province in 1855, he had authored a widely circulated memo that was both a blistering attack on the bureaucracy and a panegyric to the just deceased tsar.\textsuperscript{93} Its two messages, while not mutually contradictory, illustrated what some contemporaries depicted as his deeply conflicted political views and others as efforts to ingratiate himself with both liberals and conservatives. As it happened, the memo did win him the support of

\textsuperscript{89} 2nd PSZ, 36 (1861): no. 36657, arts. 40–119; Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 23–25.
\textsuperscript{90} Garmiza, Podgotovka zemskoi reformy 1864 goda (Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1957), 167.
\textsuperscript{91} Dzhanshiev, Epokha velikikh reform, 314; S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1911), 1: 360.
\textsuperscript{92} 92 Lincoln, “The Ministers of Alexander II,” 475, 477.
\textsuperscript{93} “Duma russkogo vo vtoroi polovine 1855 goda,” Russkaiia starina, 70 (1891): 348–50.
Grand Duke Konstantin—a hero of reformers and a patron of Russia’s Naval Ministry, which Valuev had specifically excluded from his criticism of the bureaucracy. Pleased by Valuev’s praise, the Grand Duke forwarded the memo to the Minister of the Navy for circulation among his officers.\textsuperscript{94} His support smoothed Valuev’s path to promotion to St. Petersburg, where he worked for Minister of State Domains Murav’ev, an opponent of Emancipation whom Valuev had served very well despite their mutual antipathy.\textsuperscript{95}

Valuev had had little to say about police reform before becoming Minister,\textsuperscript{96} but his appointee to head the Department of Executive Police, Dmitrii N. Tolstoi, was an outspoken critic of the Solov’ev approach. Despite his resentment of the police as a young man,\textsuperscript{97} by 1861 Tolstoi had become their vocal defender. In his memoirs he described Nikolai Miliutin, Solov’ev, and their associates as conspirators whose goal was to “weaken the police to the greatest possible degree.”\textsuperscript{98} He also recalled that in 1861 when Valuev asked for comments on the Miliutin police reform package, he had described it as an “anarchical” plan for the “separation of society from the police.”\textsuperscript{99} Instead of supporting the transfer of police duties to new institutions, he had called for increasing police resources and leaving their allocation to the governors rather than dictating them from St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{100}

Tolstoi’s talk of anarchy and call for more police must have echoed many contemporaries. Viewing the confusing Emancipation decree as trickery by the landlords, peasants across Russia had responded with mass refusals to fulfill their obligations to them or the state, often with violent protests. By spring, the number of rioting peasants had reached levels unmatched since the eighteenth-century uprising led by the Cossack Emelian Pugachev that had temporarily controlled a huge territory in eastern Russia.\textsuperscript{101} In Penza


\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’}(B&E), s.v. “Valuev, Petr Aleksandrovich.”

\textsuperscript{96} Courland, where Valuev had been Governor, had a large German population and a police system that differed from that of the Great Russian provinces. See appendix to this book.

\textsuperscript{97} “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 11.

\textsuperscript{98} “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 40.

\textsuperscript{99} “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 47.

\textsuperscript{100} “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 47–48.

Province, in an indication of the police’s inability to control the situation, the rioters captured a police chief and placed him under guard. Throughout the countryside it was left to the army to reestablish order.

Against this backdrop, Valuev issued what both supporters and critics of the Miliutin Commission’s plans must have found a maddeningly equivocal statement on the draft Statute on County Police. Specifically, in October 1861, in written comments to the State Council, he described the Statute, including its call for new all-estate local governments and judicial reforms, as “consistent with the instructions” the Commission had received in 1858 and 1859 but “not fully satisfactory” because it did nothing to increase the police presence in the countryside. To his credit, Valuev was identifying a major gap in the Statute. His suggestion for filling this gap, however, was almost cursory, amounting to only a few sentences. Also, the force he proposed—seven mounted policemen for each county capital and another two for each of the districts—was sizeable in comparison with the county police’s current strength, but his note said nothing about funding it.

Having endorsed the Miliutin proposal, albeit tepidly, and suggested the addition of mounted commands, Valuev did nothing to advance either proposal in the months that followed. This position, as a later memoirist charged, essentially amounted to doing nothing. His silences may have reflected his indifference to another’s plan or his expectation that delay would allow to put his personal stamp on police reform. In either event, his diary entries for April and May of 1862, when the State Council and the Main next discussed the draft Statute fail even to mention it. The official summaries of the meetings of the State Council and Main Committee on police reform also gave no indication that Valuev worked to advance its cause. Instead, its sole defender was State Secretary Nikolai Bakhtin, who was working on judicial reform, which he saw as a complementary issue.

With the Minister of Internal Affairs unwilling to defend the Miliutin-Solov’ev police reform and other ministers indifferent or hostile, the Main Committee and the State Council’s Department of Laws again took a piece-

102 Zaionchkovskii, Otmena krepostnogo prava, 172.
104 Meshcherskii, Moi vospominaniia, 1: 242–43.
105 Valuev, Dnevnik, 1: 149, 153–54, 156, 158.
106 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 112–53.
107 Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, s. v. “Bakhtin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1796–1869).”
meal approach. In May of 1860, the imminence of Emancipation had been their professed reason for such a strategy. Two years later, lawmakers claimed a different justification: “. . . the Joint Session recognizes that the only outcome that can be given to this important question is to immediately execute that part of the projected resolution that relates to the organization of the police, their composition, and means of support, leaving unchanged their sphere of competence, the bounds of their power, order of action, distribution of duties, accountability, and responsibility until the reorganization of the judicial and economic administration (emphasis added).”

The Joint Session followed up on this decision with a new draft by spring and by September 21 had approved final financial details. On December 25, what were officially termed the “Temporary Rules on the Organization of the Police” were published. The Rules combined most of the separate municipal and rural police into new county police administrations headed by sheriffs who were to be appointed by the governors after a review of all the incumbents. As in the past, the sheriffs were to be both government officials and chairmen of the local police boards that continued to consist of representatives elected by the gentry, peasants, and urban estates. Overall, changes were minimal, with “the sphere of competence, the bounds of power” and such “not changed by the present rules” and remaining in force.

The Rules increased spending for the county police by roughly the same amount as in the 1860 Miliutin proposal less the salaries of the elected assessors, which were moved to off-budget accounts (see Table 7). This spending allowed for salary increases (see Table 8) that the Notes of the Fatherland described as allowing an honest policeman to make do without bribes.

There was, however, no provision for creating mounted police patrols in the counties and districts. Also while the sheriffs and the police boards were authorized to hire and fire village wardens, there was no provision for paying them. The Rules also raised the positions of sheriff and district inspector by a single level in the Table of Ranks, to class VII and class IX, respectively, but these new ranks entitled them only to personal—not hereditary—nobility.

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108 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 149.
109 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087.
110 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, art. 33
112 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, art. 25.
Chapter 2

Table 7: Proposed and Authorized County Police Budgets, 1858–1863

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount (rubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Authorized Spending</td>
<td>1,833,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Proposed by Commission on Provincial and County Institutions</td>
<td>3,256,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Authorized Spending Specified in Temporary Rules</td>
<td>3,256,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures for 1858 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, appendix, “Vedomost’ o raskhodakh zemskoi politsei v 44 guberniakh,” 46–47; Those for 1860 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 11, 72, 187, and 262. Figures for 1863 are from 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862), no. 39087, art. 4 and shtaty i tabeli. 1860 and 1863 figures exclude salaries of elected gentry assessors; those for 1858 include these salaries.

Table 8: Rural Police Salaries in Rubles, circa 1858–1863

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>In late 1850s</th>
<th>Under Temporary Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County Sheriffs</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Police Officer</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The pre-1862 salaries are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 218 and from 2nd PSZ, 29 (1854): no. 28685; the salaries introduced by the Temporary Rules are from 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, shtaty i tabeli.

The reception of the Rules by the press was in keeping with their designation as a “temporary” measure. In early January 1863, the St. Petersburg Gazette applauded the merger of most of the urban and rural police forces and the increases in salary. At the same time, it described the rules as only a “palliative” and expressed the hope that they would prove a prelude to genuine reform.113 The Northern Post followed the publication of the Temporary Rules with an article, “Detectives and Policemen.”114 This praised the English and the American police for their focus on protecting the public from crime and looked forward to similar improvement in the Russian police.115 A few months later the paper described the Temporary Rules as part of a process that would only

113 S-Peterburgskie vedomosti, no.8 (10 Jan. 1863): 1.
114 S-Peterburgskie vedomosti, no.8 (10 Jan. 1863): 1.
be completed after enactment of the judicial and zemstvo reforms. The anonymous author referred to “rumors” that these reforms would be ready soon as providing grounds for hope that the completion of police reform would follow soon. A subsequent article identified another problem that had yet to be addressed: the excessive amount of territory for which the rural police inspectors continued to be responsible. Here too his emphasis was less on what the Temporary Rules had accomplished than on how much remained to be done.

The central authorities would spend all of 1863 putting the final touches on the promised final hurdles to police reform: the 1864 zemstvo and judicial statutes. As two of the greatest of the Great Reforms, the creation of new elected local governments and the introduction of new courts have been the subjects of extensive study. The high quality of this scholarship makes it unnecessary to revisit the political struggles that shaped them or the substance of the statutes. Their impact on the police, however, is another matter.

Reformers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs had argued that in addition to improving local government and the administration of justice, the zemstvo and judicial reforms would increase the police’s efficiency by assuming many of their duties. The central authorities had ostensibly accepted this argument, describing the police rules of December 1862 as “temporary” and pledging to revisit them after the zemstvo and judicial laws were on the books. Their enactment did not immediately clarify the lines of authority between police, zemstvos, and courts. Particularly for the zemstvos, the power—as opposed to the duties—of the new bodies remained unclear. Also,

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118 2nd PSZ, 39 (1864): nos. 40457 and 41475-41478.
the enabling legislation called for the introduction of the new bodies in only 33 of the 44—soon to be 45—provinces in which the Temporary Rules were in force. The laws did, however, make it clear that the new institutions had the potential to assume a great deal of the burden of the local police.

Most of the responsibility for the local economy fell to the county zemstvos after 1864. The zemstvos were to organize local markets and fairs, maintain roads and bridges, and gather statistics. Social welfare, public health and sanitation, supervision of widows and orphans, and military recruitment also were in their charge. Formal removal of these duties from the police awaited a permanent police statute. Still, advocates of English-style police reform had ample reason to view the 1864 zemstvo legislation as a victory. The judicial reforms, in turn, marked a big step beyond the 1860 law on investigating magistrates in separating the police from the administration of justice. The creation of elected justices of the peace responsible for petty civil and criminal matters once handled by the police was particularly important. Valuev had opposed this legislation. He also had tried to restore some police powers transferred to the investigating magistrates. The 1864 judicial statutes, however, took away the police’s power to pass sentence on petty criminals, passport violators, and excise evaders. They also reduced their involvement in civil suits. Landmarks in the history of Russian justice, these laws also freed the police from time-consuming tasks and removed major opportunities for bribery. More so than the zemstvos, however, the new courts challenged the police to do their business in ways that they and their masters would often find uncomfortable. Rather than being themselves the law, the police were to be subject to it as the well-ordered police state gave way—however haltingly—to a system of rule by law.

__120__ For the 33 provinces, see 2nd PSZ, 59 (1864): no. 40457, art. 4.
Chapter 3

Metropolitan and Municipal Police

The Temporary Rules and the debate over police reform that preceded them had focused primarily on the rural police and given short shrift to the cities, to the point of reducing their police staffing and budgets to provide resources for the counties. Believing that rural unrest, not urban violence, was the more pressing threat, the central authorities with few exceptions continued to neglect the cities well after the enactment of the Temporary Rules. St. Petersburg and Moscow, however, were explicitly excluded from the places in which the Temporary Rules were to be in force. Police in both cities would experience important changes in the rest of 1860s. Because of its greater political stature, however, St. Petersburg would be a particular focus of efforts to strengthen the police. Elsewhere, as with the reform of city government, which would be delayed until 1870, reform of the municipal police would languish to the detriment of the towns and cities they served.

More Police versus More Reform

In 1865, with both the judicial and the zemstvo reforms on the books, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Commission for Reform of Provincial and County Institutions had an opportunity—and, in the thinking of some, explicit instructions—to complete police reform. Valuev, as both Minister and Commission Chairman, was doubly responsible for doing so.¹ To

¹ On Valuev’s chairmanship of the Committee, see Garmiza, Podgotovka zemskoi reformy, 167. On his sidelining of the Committee, see Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize, Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861–1930 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 12.
assist him he reconvened the Commission’s Police Section under M. N. Pokhvisnev. The former governor of Vil’no Province, a censor, and a school inspector, Pokhvisnev was also Director of the Department of Executive Police, a position to which Valuev had named him in 1863 following a disagreement with D. N. Tolstoi. Pokhvisnev was known primarily as a bibliophile and collector of historical documents, not as a reformer. Nonetheless, under his guidance the Commission prepared a proposal for a comprehensive statute that would reform the police along the lines proposed by Solov’ev and Nikolai Miliutin. Just as under these early reformers, it focused primarily on police in the countryside.

Valuev’s treatment of Pokhvisnev’s proposal would set a pattern that would persist for the remainder of the 1860s. Rather than seeking his fellow ministers’ approval, he left it aside and concentrated on a second proposal—for a mounted police guard—that he had also instructed Pokhvisnev to prepare. In October 1861, Valuev had described a mounted guard as a needed complement to the Statute on the County Police. In 1865, in contrast, he treated it as an alternative approach. This shift most likely reflected his belief that the zemstvo and judicial reforms had gone too far. When the zemstvo reform was being prepared, Valuev had unsuccessfully tried to narrow the scope of the new institutions’ authority and the transfer of duties from police to zemstvo. Valuev also had opposed the creation of elected justices of the peace and tried to restore some police powers transferred to the investigating magistrates. In 1865, delaying legislation that would formalize the police’s loss of authority offered Valuev a backdoor route to restricting the new institutions and achieving his earlier goals.

Pokhvisnev’s proposal called for the creation of a 6,632-man mounted force—about 1,000 more what Valuev had suggested a few years before. Units of 17 men apiece were to be introduced at the district level in 36 of the

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2 Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, s.v. “Pokhvisnev, Mikhail Nikolaevich, 1811–1882” and “Tolstoi, Dmitrii Nikolaevich, 1806–1884.” Tolstoi’s biography was published in 1991 in a volume on individuals with surnames beginning with V and T, which were unpublished when the original series was discontinued in 1918. For Tolstoi’s account of his dismissal, see “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 55–56.
4 Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 142–44.
46 provinces in which the Temporary Rules were in force. The commands would consist entirely of military transfers. They would report to the district police inspectors; and supplement rather than replace the village wardens, who were themselves to receive government salaries. The estimated annual cost of the new units at full strength was 2,000,000 rubles. The units were to be phased in gradually with only 200,000 rubles to be spent in the first year.

As in the immediate aftermath of his appointment as Minister, Valuev was proposing something that most conservative gentry would probably have endorsed. With landlords no longer policing the peasants, the gentry-dominated zemstvo assemblies, which convened for the first time in 1865, often voiced concern over the threat from crime in the countryside. More than simply talking about the problem, county assemblies in Moscow, Petersburg, Poltava, Pskov, Smolensk, and other provinces petitioned the government to strengthen the rural police in ways that ranged from providing salaries to the peasant wardens to the hiring of guards and auxiliary police. Many zemstvos offered to cover from one-third to all of the costs. The Minister of Internal Affairs cited these requests to support its proposals for a mounted police guard. Out of what was probably a mixture of preference for his own proposals and fear of creating a zemstvo-controlled police, however, Valuev agreed to none of them.

In August 1866, Valuev submitted his plan to the State Council, where Minister of War, Dmitrii Miliutin, and Michael Reutern, the Minister of Finance, opposed it. Both were formidable opponents. Invaluable to Alexander II for their expertise, they were to be among the longest lasting of his ministers. Reutern was to serve for 16 years (1862–1878). He owed his position to his knowledge of state finance and the patronage of the Tsar’s brother Konstantin Nikolaevich. According to Yanni Kotsonis, he also benefited from a belief that as a Protestant he could be counted on to be frugal and trustworthy.

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6. In 1863, Bessarabia Oblast had been added to the 44 provinces originally covered by the Temporary Rules. In 1865, Ufa Province would be spun off from Orenburg Province, bringing the number of covered provinces to 46. MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 157.
Valuev in his diary accused him of aspiring to be prime minister.\textsuperscript{11} Although not known as a reformer, Reutern had priorities—restoring the ruble and railroad development—that disinclined him to support most of requests for spending increases.\textsuperscript{12}

Dmitrii Miliutin, Nikolai’s brother would serve for 20 years (1861–1881) and be Imperial Russia’s last Field Marshal. A brilliant military strategist, he was later the driving force behind the major reform of the Russian military that would include the introduction of universal male military service.\textsuperscript{13} Like Reutern, he had a reputation for favoring cost-effective policies.\textsuperscript{14} At the same time he frequently complained in his diary and elsewhere about Reutern’s tight-fistedness with regard to military requirements.\textsuperscript{15} Valuev described him in his diary as a “bigger red” than his brother Nikolai.\textsuperscript{16}

Both ministers criticized the Valuev plan as too costly. Miliutin, who was working to reduce the size of the peacetime armed forces, argued that a smaller military could not afford to transfer so many men to the police.\textsuperscript{17} Reutern simply maintained that the government could not afford the required expense.\textsuperscript{18} Valuev was able to counter Miliutin by proposing that the commands rely on hired volunteers instead of military transfers.\textsuperscript{19} He was, however, unable to counter Reutern who rejected his successive suggestions to allocate the funds from local taxes and then from the Treasury.\textsuperscript{20} In an effort to salvage the plan Valuev indicated he would not oppose creating a scaled-down version. In response, in January 1867 the State Council suggested he identify places in which to test the effectiveness of the proposed mounted patrols. Valuev recommended counties

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Valuev, \textit{Dnevnik}, I:153.}
\footnote{On Miliutin’s career and views, see Forrestt A. Miller, \textit{Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia} (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), esp. 1–25.}
\footnote{Miller, \textit{Dmitrii Miliutin}, 66.}
\footnote{Valuev, \textit{Dnevnik}, I: 61.}
\footnote{\textit{RGIA}, fond 1162, opis’ XVI, delo 1, 8.}
\footnote{\textit{MSVUK: OA}, part 1, sect. 9 (1870): 7.}
\footnote{\textit{RGIA}, fond 1162, opis’ XVI, delo 1, 8.}
\footnote{\textit{MSVUK: OA}, part 1, sect. 9, 14–15.}
\end{footnotes}
in Courland, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhegorod provinces where banditry was particularly severe, but Reutern again balked at the level and source of funding proposed. Discussion dragged on into 1868 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs requested money to cover the transfer of the state peasants to its supervision following their emancipation two years before. This request would result in the creation of 90 districts in addition to the 34 established in the aftermath of the Temporary Rules. By this time Valuev had been forced to resign because of his perceived mishandling of relief operations after a major harvest failure. His proposal for a mounted rural police guard was also rejected once again, but completion of the police reform prepared by Nikolai Miliutin and Solov’ev remained stalled as well.

**Expansion in St. Petersburg**

Minister of Internal Affairs Valuev, a champion of expanding in the police in the countryside, was to play a similar role with for the St. Petersburg police. Valuev had given an inkling of his plans for St. Petersburg as early as February 1862 when he successfully requested funding for an additional 200 guardsmen for the capital. In June, he obtained a credit amounting to about 40 percent of the capital police’s annual budget to allow the hiring of another 950 guardsmen. This increase was described as only “temporary.” Director of Executive Police Dmitrii N. Tolstoi maintained, however, that Valuev was exploiting the public’s concern over suspicious fires that had destroyed the offices of his Ministry in the spring of 1862 to advance his long-term goals. When the initial credit had been expended, Valuev urged the State Council to extend another 100,000 rubles to St. Petersburg and 65,000 rubles for Moscow. The Moscow funds were not to be “tem-

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23 MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 9, 1, 3, 7–8.
24 *Izvestie iz otcheta Ministra vnutrennikh del za 1861, 1862, i 1863 gg* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministarstva vnitrennikh del, 1865), 70–73.
porary.” Rather the city authorities were instructed to subsequently cover them from regular revenues.26

Increasing the number of police in the two capitals need not have marked a break with the reformist policies of Solov’ev and Nikolai Miliutin. If anything, it might have been seen as criticism of former Police Commissioner Peter Shuvalov, a favorite of the Tsar’s, who had reduced the number of guards by one-third a few years earlier.27 In October 1863, however, Valuev proposed a huge increase in the strength of St. Petersburg’s police and a reorganization plan that marked a clear departure from the Miliutin-Solov’ev approach. His proposal called for the creation of a 2,374-man police guard plus a reserve force of 150 and a 300-person auxiliary command. If approved, these increases would roughly double the size of the current guard force and the current budget. Equally if not more important, the proposal called for dividing the police into separate functional branches. One would work to prevent and suppress crime and protect public order. The other would adjudicate petty criminal and civil cases, which were scheduled to be handled by the justices of the peace in the then-upcoming judicial reform.28

In November Valuev submitted his proposal to the Director of the Second Section, which was responsible for the codification of Russian law, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of Gendarmes, and the Governor-General of St. Petersburg.29 The replies of these officials—all of whom had a stake in the proposal—are not available. According to Valuev’s account, however, the proposal was defeated because of its perceived inconsistency with the pending judicial reforms.30 Given the nature of the proposal and the policy record of two key reviewers this explanation is plausible. Leaving judicial authority in the hands of the police would have flown in the face of the transfer promised in the Temporary Rules. In addition, M. A. Korf of the Second Section and D. N. Zamiatnin, the Minister of Justice. Korf had opposed Valuev’s efforts to limit the competence of the zemstvos.31 Zamiatnin also had been

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26 Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnutrennikh del, 70.
27 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politiia i gradonachal’stvo, 176.
28 Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnutrennikh del, 72–73; and “Po povodu predpoloagaemogo preobrazovaniia gorodskoi politii v S-Peterburge,” Severnata pochta, December 24, 1863, 1149.
29 Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnutrennikh del, 73.
30 Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnutrennikh del, 73–74.
31 Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 47–48.
campaigning to separate the police from the soon-to-be established new courts. Also, according to Thomas Pearson, he was one of three Ministers—Dmitrii Miliutin and Reutern were the others—who consistently opposed Valuev’s policies on local government.\(^{32}\)

Rather than putting a halt to police reform in the capital, the rejection of Valuev’s 1863 proposal paved the way for a larger reform that would eventually have a momentous impact on St. Petersburg’s police. St. Petersburg, as a city and one with an elected government of sorts, was little affected by the zemstvo legislation.\(^{33}\) It was, however, to prove a key venue for the 1864 judicial reforms. The 1860 law on investigating magistrates already had marked a major step toward separating the police from the administration of justice in the capital and elsewhere in Russia. Initially distrusted as clones of the police, the magistrates soon won reputations for integrity and skill. Their improved image was reflected in their portrayal in novels and the press.\(^{34}\) Dostoevsky’s Porfiry Petrovich, Raskolnikov’s nemesis in *Crime and Punishment*, for example, had an intelligence and commitment to justice that set him apart from the buffoonish, corrupt, and tyrannous police that were stock figures in earlier Russian literature. He eventually would inspire non-Russian authors of detective fiction. Chesterton’s hero Father Brown and Agatha Christie’s Hercule Poirot both were modeled partly after Porfiry Petrovich.\(^{35}\)

The creation of elected justices of the peace responsible for petty civil and criminal matters once handled by the police was another element of the judicial reforms that would have a major impact on St. Petersburg.\(^{36}\) Valuev had opposed the legislation establishing the new justices.\(^{37}\) He also had tried to restore some police powers transferred to the investigating magistrates.\(^{38}\) The 1864 judicial statutes, however, took away the police’s power to pass sentence

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\(^{32}\) Pearson, *Russian Officialdom in Crisis*, 41–42.


on petty criminals, passport violators, and excise evaders. They also reduced their involvement in civil suits. Landmarks in the history of Russian justice, these laws also freed the police from time-consuming tasks and removed major opportunities for bribery. More important, they challenged the police to do their business in ways that they and their masters would often find uncomfortable. Rather than being themselves the law, the police were to be subject to it as the well-ordered police state gave way—however haltingly—to a system of rule by law.

**Karakozov and Trepov**

By 1866 when the justice of the peace courts opened in St. Petersburg, the capital’s police were facing problems that overshadowed their relationship with the justices. On April 4, the revolutionary Karakozov attempted to assassinate Alexander II as the Tsar was leaving the Summer Garden. In response, the current Police Commissioner was removed from office and Gen. F. F. Trepov, was named to replace him. In May a decree eliminated the position of St. Petersburg Governor-General and placed Trepov directly under the Minister of Internal Affairs on regular police issues and under the Third Section’s Chief on internal security. In October a reorganization of the St. Petersburg police was announced.

Trepov, who would serve until 1878, was a different type of police commissioner. His recent predecessors, while forced to resign for perceived police failures, had been well connected politically and familiar to St. Petersburg society. Alexander Patkul, Commissioner from 1860 to 1862, who gave up his position following the suspicious fires and student demonstrations of 1862, was a childhood friend of the Tsar’s. Ivan Annenkov, Commissioner from 1862 to 1866, was an officer in the elite Imperial Guards. One of his brothers was a city governor. Another was a famous literary critic. Despite such connections, he could not survive

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39 On Karakozov, his background, and associates, see Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 331–53.
41 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 43162.
42 2nd PSZ, 46 (1871) addendum to vol. 41 (1866): no. 45691a.
43 *Russkii biograficheskii slovar*, s. v. "Patkul', Aleksandr Vladimirovich (1817–1877)."
the police’s failure to have detained Karakozov, who had posted a manifesto announcing his intention to kill the Tsar weeks before his attempted assassination. Trepov, in contrast, was an outsider with a murky background. Reputedly the illegitimate son of a German nobleman, he was so little known in St. Petersburg society that some attributed his appointment to a dark secret. A probably more accurate explanation was his reputation for ruthlessness. As a young cavalry officer, Trepov had participated in the suppression of the November Uprising of 1830 in Poland. Later, in 1866 and 1867, he had served as police commissioner in Warsaw. His harsh treatment of the populace—he reportedly ordered the police to shoot into a group of unarmed demonstrators—led to his removal. After the Polish uprising of 1863, however, the tsarist government recalled him to help restore Russian rule and placed him in charge of all the police there. In November 1864, he survived an assassination attempt that would prove to be only the first of several. Ultimately his name would be linked inseparably to that of the revolutionary, Vera Zasulich, who wounded him with a gunshot in 1878 in reprisal for his order to flog a prisoner and was found not guilty of the charge. Throughout his tenure in St. Petersburg the press would criticize him for disregarding the wishes of the city council and imposing heavy taxes to maintain the police. But the press would also acknowledge—grudgingly—the positive impact of some of his actions on security in the capital.

The reorganization announced in late 1866 for implementation the following year was more an effort to introduce the best features of contemporary foreign—particularly English—police forces than to expand their numbers and power or follow the strategy of Saltykov, Solov’ev, and Miliutin. England’s police were attractive to Trepov, not because of their purported respect for civil liberties but for their reputed effectiveness, particularly

45 Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 144.
46 According to Ana Siljak—in Angel of Vengeance: The Girl Assassin, the Governor of St. Petersburg, and Russia’s Revolutionary World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 119—some believed Trepov to be Alexander II’s illegitimate half-brother.
47 For more on Trepov, see Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Granat), s. v. “Trepovy.” Ana Siljak, Angel of Vengeance, 110, 110, 218, and Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 596–97, 605.
48 See, for example, Vestnik Evropy, Apr. 1868, 824–42; June 1869, 872–81; and Sept. 1871, 404; and Otechestvennye zapiski 17(1867): 186–89.
against crime. To use a term favored by the late Cyril Black that has fallen out of use by historians, Trepov’s emulation of London’s police was a modernization program.\textsuperscript{49} It streamlined the police’s organization and reorganized and re-staffed them. It also increased police salaries and established—for the first time—a training academy and a detective division. The changes in police structure (see Figure 3), while hardly exciting, were overdue for a force that was organized roughly as it had been in the eighteenth century and had become less and less manageable as the population had grown. In place of the 12 districts and 52 wards, it established 18 precincts commanded by inspectors. The precinct inspectors, who were to communicate directly with the central police command, were to be drawn from the most capable of the district and ward commanders.\textsuperscript{50}

Trepov’s reorganization left the size of the police guard roughly unchanged but involved a major effort to improve its command and control and the qualifications of its personnel. It also entailed cosmetic changes such as replacing the name guards with policemen. As had been true of the guards, however, the new policemen and their counterparts in other cities, were a stationary force, that is, they did not walk beats but waited for citizens to bring complaints to them.\textsuperscript{51} The 1,350 policemen were distributed among 705 police posts and the major markets and rail stations. The posts were to be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by officers in three rotating shifts, with 96 two-person teams of police sergeants each responsible for several posts. Six other sergeants oversaw the markets and rail stations.\textsuperscript{52} An order of December 13, 1866 instructed Trepov to review the qualifications of the existing guardsmen, retain only the most capable, and hire qualified replacements for those dismissed. To help accomplish this, the police budget was to be greatly increased (also in Table 9), albeit not to the level of Valuev’s 1863 request.

In his report for 1867, General Trepov claimed to have dismissed—or sent back to the military—about half of the guardsmen and replaced them with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Vysotskii and Frish, \textit{S-Peterburgskata stolichnaia politiiia i gradonachal’stvo}, 177–79.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Thurston, “Police and People in Moscow, 1906–1914,” 326.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Vysotskii and Frish, \textit{S-Peterburgskata stolichnaia politiiia i gradonachal’stvo}, 197.
\end{itemize}
He also reported that the new recruits had to begin their service in a reserve division and receive training in police procedures, relations with the judiciary, and the geography and population of the capital. Trepov described this training as based on London's, which he praised as a model. Like his liberal contemporaries, he may have exaggerated the London police’s virtues. According to police historian Haia Shpayer-Makov, the London police provided only brief and rudimentary initial instruction

Sources: Derived from description in Vysotskii and Frish, *S-Peterburgskaiia stolichnaia politsiia i gradonachal'stvo*, 177-81 and 2nd PSZ, 42(1867):no. 44772, shtaty i tabeli.

more capable hires. He also reported that the new recruits had to begin their service in a reserve division and receive training in police procedures, relations with the judiciary, and the geography and population of the capital. Trepov described this training as based on London’s, which he praised as a model. Like his liberal contemporaries, he may have exaggerated the London police’s virtues. According to police historian Haia Shpayer-Makov, the London police provided only brief and rudimentary initial instruction

53 *Vsepoddanneishii otchet s-peterburgskogo ober-politsimeistera za 1867 god* (St. Petersburg: Kantselariia ober-politsimeistera, 1868), 17. The annual reports of the St. Petersburg police published under various titles, also including *Vsepoddanneishii otchet o deiatel’nosti s-peterburgskoi gorodskoi politssiia* and *Vsepoddanneishii otchet s-peterburgskogo gradonachal’nika*, from 1867-1878, are a major source for this study. Hereafter they will be cited as *Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za . . . god*.

54 *Vsepoddanneishii otchet za 1867 god*, 12.
to recruits and relied primarily on on-the-job training.\textsuperscript{55} Trepov probably also exaggerated the potential of the reserve division to train police recruits. According to his first annual report, to qualify for the regular force, reservists had to demonstrate skills that varied with their rank. Sergeants had to be proficient in writing, arithmetic, and the history and geography of Russia. Policemen had to be able to read printed and handwritten documents and do simple arithmetic.\textsuperscript{56} To judge from contemporary accounts, such skills were in short supply even in the upper ranks of the force. Trepov, however, was silent on how, if at all, the force trained police inspectors and above. In London at the time, all but two or three officers at the top of the system were promoted from the ranks of sergeants and policemen.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Selected Statistics on the St. Petersburg Police, 1863–1867}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Spending (rubles) & Actual Number in 1863 & \textsuperscript{*}includes 1,350 policemen and 192 sergeants. \\
\hline
Authorized for 1863 & 514,000 & 1,425 \\
Requested by Valuev in 1863 & 1,030,000 & 2,824 \\
Authorized for 1867 & 907,439 & 1,542 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Sources: Izvlechenie iz otcheta ministra vnuchennikh del, 71–73; Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 god, 141; and 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44772, shtaty i tabeli.

In yet another instance of emulating foreign practice, the edict established a detective division.\textsuperscript{58} Reminiscent of both France’s Sûreté and even more so, London’s Scotland Yard, the division was to prove a popular element—at least with the educated classes—in an unpopular police force.\textsuperscript{59} Despite another change in uniforms—this one to make them appear more mod-

\textsuperscript{56} Vsepoddanneishii otchet za 1867, 153.
\textsuperscript{58} Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 god, 16; and Vyoostikii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaiia politsiiia i gradonachal’stvo, 195.
ern (see Figure 4)—the capital’s policemen were prosaic, familiar figures.⁶⁰ The plainclothes detectives, in contrast, had a sinister glamor, because of their role in identifying the perpetrators of grisly crimes that fascinated the public in those early years of the popular press. Their most exciting operations were regular features of Trepov’s annual reports and were often well received.⁶¹ Their first chief, Ivan Putilin, became famous for locating the perpetrator of a bloody quadruple murder in June 1867. Adept at self-promotion, he later wrote a book depicting himself as Russia’s Sherlock Holmes.⁶²

A separate law issued in July established police to patrol the capital’s rivers, canals, and offshore waters.⁶³ Trepov may have been inspired by the example of the Thames River Police. Thanks largely to its success against crime on London’s waters and docks, this force, created in 1800, survived the elimination of many of the elements of the pre-1829 police and eventually became a division of the Metropolitan Force.⁶⁴ St. Petersburg’s river police was headed by an officer assigned by the Naval Minister in consultation with the Police Commissioner. Staffed by 150 seamen and 20 non-commissioned officers, they had duties that went beyond the struggle against crime. These included rescuing people and boats in distress, certifying the safety of ferries and other passenger ships, and fighting waterborne fires. The decree establishing the new unit authorized the acquisition of two steam-powered fire boats and several small river craft. The nature of their duties and the special qualifications they required tended to win the river police greater public respect than most of their compatriots. In a single year that St. Petersburg’s official history implied to be typical, they reportedly responded to 9 fires, 15 instances of ships piling into bridges, 7 ship collisions, and 25 sinkings of cargo vessels. They also res-

⁶⁰ There would be additional changes to the uniforms in 1867; 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 443330, shtaty i tabeli.
⁶¹ See, for example, the discussions in Otechestvennye zapiski 173 (1867): 189 and Vestnik Evropy (Jun. 1869): 1877–78.
⁶² Ivan Putilin, Sorok let sredi ubiit s i grabitelei (Riga: Mir, 1900). Also see the discussion of Putilin in Louise McReynolds, Murder Most Russian: True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013), 10–12, 27–28.
⁶³ 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44774.
Figure 4: St. Petersburg Policemen, 1866

Source: 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 43321, chertez i risunki

cued 116 people from drowning, recovered 83 dead bodies from the rivers and canals, and saved the cargo from 13 of the 25 sinking ships.65

65 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politsiia i gradonachal’stvo, 203–04.
The press’s reaction to Trepov’s changes to the St. Petersburg police was an interesting mixture of praise and calls for more reform. The latter may have reflected opportunism on the part of reformers. In post-Karakozov Russia, when the government was cracking down on assertive zemstvos and closing journals, critics of the regime may have seen police reform as a safe issue to discuss and means of discreetly broaching sensitive political issues. Shortly after the reorganization of the capital’s police, for example, *Notes of the Fatherland* praised the new detective division, the training program, and General Trepov’s efforts to replace military detailees with hired policemen. Trepov had identified these as key elements of his program. But while Trepov had billed the last of these elements as a move to improve police qualifications, the anonymous author described it as a move toward a civilian police force. He also reminded readers that by law all the capital’s police “not excluding the Police Commissioner” held civilian positions. While accurate, this statement bordered on criticism of the decades-old reliance on military officers and of Trepov himself.

*The Herald of Europe* addressed police issues in bolder fashion. In April 1868, a long article “Judicial Review: Court and Police” discussed the English police model, St. Petersburg’s progress in replicating it, and how far it still had to go. The author maintained that in the previous three years the judicial reforms had greatly reduced the police’s duties unrelated to the prevention and suppression of crime and had made them more effective. Still, he argued, the police had too many duties that were “absolutely not police business.” He urged the authorities to continue to follow the English model, which, he maintained, would enable the police to do more with less. This final point echoed arguments English critics of the new police had made—with positive results for the police. An English legal scholar has noted that calls for reducing police spending did much to shape the London police’s focus on the struggle with crime.

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66 In May 1867, the government dissolved the St. Petersburg provincial zemstvo and arrested its president for petitioning it to summon zemstvo representatives from throughout Russia to consult on the economy; in June it enacted a law making the presidents of all zemstvo assemblies and boards legally accountable or zemstvo actions during their tenure. Veselovskii, *Istoriia zemstva za sorok let*, 3: 119–28.

67 *Otechestvennye zapiski*, 173 (1867): 186–89.

68 On the journal’s political line, see *Ocherki po istorii russkoi zhurnalistiki i kritiki*, 2: 368–69.


In 1869 the journal again compared the capital’s police with their English counterparts. After pointing out that the English police were not as popular—particularly with the lower classes—as their champions claimed, the author maintained that St. Petersburg’s were less popular still. He attributed this to the lack of community control over the police and to the sometimes-excessive cost of maintaining them. To illustrate this, he cited Trepov’s failure to persuade St. Petersburg’s city duma to contribute to an increase in the police budget in 1866. According to the anonymous author, the duma recognized the police’s need for higher salaries, but still rejected Trepov’s request. His explanation was that the duma’s perception of its police needs differed from Trepov’s and that achieving a consensus would require more community control of police spending. In 1867 about 80 percent of the capital police’s budget came from St. Petersburg’s taxes. The central government’s share may have increased in the next few years, but if so, it did only slightly.

The duma’s rejection of Trepov’s bid for more funds was a fascinating and rare example of a local government—albeit the Empire’s most powerful one—effectively resisting the central authorities during the post-Karakozov crackdown. It was not, however, the only example of successful resistance to Trepov’s plans for the police. Rather, it was matched by bureaucratic resistance to another police plan: the extension of the capital police’s authority to the suburbs. As Reginald Zelnik explained in his classic study of St. Petersburg workers, much of the capital area’s industrial work force was employed in factories surrounding, not within, the city. There they were policed not by Trepov’s force but by the St. Petersburg county police who reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the provincial governor.

Like Trepov, Nikolai Levashov, the Governor in the late 1860s, perceived the industrial suburbs as likely breeding grounds for unrest. Still,
while eager for more support for the suburban police, he also sought to preserve his authority over them. In 1868, the State Council agreed with him and rejected a proposal to merge the metropolitan and suburban police.\footnote{Zelnik, \textit{Labor and Society}, 265–66.}

\section*{The Neglected City Police}

While discussing Valuev’s proposals for St. Petersburg and enacting the Trepov-era changes, the tsarist authorities paid much less attention to the police in other cities. Such neglect worsened key municipal police problems that the Temporary Rules had not addressed. At the end of the 1850s spending on the police in Russia’s 461 cities and towns was roughly one million rubles with another quarter million in city funds spent on the municipal guard.\footnote{MSVUK: \textit{OP}, part 1, sect. 2, 391.} In 1860, the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions had proposed reducing total spending on the city police by eliminating the positions of hundreds of police chiefs in all but 69 cities and towns and placing the rest under the county sheriffs. In a proposed update to the 1853 Statute on the Municipal Guard, it also had proposed reducing the number guardsmen by about one-sixth while providing an infusion of central government funds that would double total spending on their salaries (Table 10). In addition, it included a pledge to assist the cities with the costs of transitioning to a salaried patrol force. Thereafter, the Ministry of Internal Affairs would set floors and ceilings on spending for the municipal patrols but would allow city governments to participate in deciding specific expenditures.\footnote{MSVUK: \textit{OP}, part 1 sect. 2, 150, 188.}

The Temporary Rules incorporated the Commission’s suggestions for spending on the cities and towns that retained separate police forces and for those merged with the county police. No new statute on the municipal guard was enacted, however, and it is unclear what was decided on the number of guardsmen or the level of spending on them. Documents pertaining to 1865 and 1866 published by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions suggest, however, that both numbers and spending continued to rise after 1860.\footnote{MSVUK: \textit{OP}, part 1 sect. 3 (1870): 238, 345–45.}
Table 10: Actual or Proposed Spending and Staffing for the Municipal Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spending on Municipal Police</th>
<th>Number of Municipal Guardsmen</th>
<th>Spending on Municipal Guardsmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857/1858</td>
<td>970,409 rubles</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>251,986 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>887,100 rubles (proposed)</td>
<td>5,847</td>
<td>512,172 rubles (proposed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>887,100–991,098 rubles*</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Temporary Rules included specific figures on spending for the county police but not for the city police. The figure of 991,098 rubles is calculated by subtracting spending for the county police from reported total spending and may include miscellaneous spending for police such as the mounted guards maintained in some provinces.

Sources: Figures for 1858 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2), appendix, “Vedomost’ o raskhodakh gorodskoi politsii v 44 guberniakh,” 122–23; those for 1860 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect.2, 11, 72, 187, 262, and 321. Figures for 1863 are from 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862), no. 39087, art. 4 and shtaty i tabeli.

Limiting the number of cities with separate police forces to 69 was designed to allow the channeling of more municipal police spending to places perceived to have the greatest needs. To this end, the decree on implementation of the Temporary Rules gave the favored cities about half of all the funds provided for police in Russia’s 461 cities and towns.79 The 69 jurisdictions included Odessa, Taganrog, and Kerch, which had province-like status because of their military strategic importance as ports; 42 provincial capitals; 19 county capitals of economic importance; and five smaller towns and villages. These were Bakhchisaray and Karasu-Bazar in the territory of the Crimean Tatars, Radzivilov in the formerly Polish Volhynia Province; Dubovka in remote Saratov Province; and Sergiev Posad, home of one of Russia’s oldest monasteries and a favorite destination of Russian Orthodox pilgrims.80 The selection criteria that yielded such a mixed lot of cities, towns, and villages were precise in some cases and vague in others. Cities with populations of over

79 The edict on the Temporary Rules (2nd PSZ, 37: no. 39087, shtaty i tabeli) allocated 4,247,998 rubles to the police and specified that 3,256,900 would go to the rural police, leaving a residual of 991,098 rubles for all the urban police. According to MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 11, 490,050 rubles—was to go to the 69 cities and towns with separate police forces.
80 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, shtaty i tabeli.
15,000 and provincial capitals, for example, were all supposed to be chosen. Others, however, could qualify on the basis of “other conditions.”

In the few months before the issuance of the Temporary Rules the question of funding had become a potential stumbling block. In response, in September 1862 Valuev had agreed to Ministry of Finance’s request to exclude the salaries of elected police assessors from the police budget and increase city police spending gradually to limit the impact on central government funds. He also pledged to identify cities that could eventually bear all or part of the cost of increased police protection. This was to prove a difficult task for reasons Tables 11 and 12 try to explain. Table 11, which is based on official statistics for 1857 (the only year for which I could locate the needed data), lists the population and revenues of the most and least populous cities scheduled to have separate police forces under the Temporary Rules of December 1862. These statistics allow calculation of the per capita revenue for each of the cities—a rough indicator of the relative ability of each city to contribute to the support of the police. The results indicate that while some of the largest cities, presumably the most in need of large police forces, were among the best off in per capita revenue, more than half of these cities were less well off than some of Russia’s smallest cities. Odessa, a thriving port and the largest city covered by the Temporary Rules, stood at the top of the list in terms of per capita revenue. It was followed—although not too closely—by Nizhnii Novgorod, which hosted a large annual fair that accounted for as much as half of all Russian exports of commercial goods. Kiev, another city with a large population, also ranked among those with the largest per capita revenue. On the other hand, Tula and Kursk, two other of the largest cities, ranked at the bottom in such terms. Table 12 presents police spending, including spending for the municipal guard, as a share of city revenues—a rough measure of the burden of such spending on the city. Data for Odessa were unavailable, but those for Nizhnii Novgorod suggest it had the least difficulty supporting the police and the most room in its budget for non-police programs. Tula, Kursk, and Vil’no, on the other hand, had to devote more of their resources to the police than any other city.

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81 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 10.
82 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 10.
Table 11: Population and Revenue for Largest and Smallest Cities in 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenues (rubles)</th>
<th>Per Capita Revenue (rubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa*</td>
<td>101,320</td>
<td>1,101,965</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>62,497</td>
<td>233,925</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>61,680</td>
<td>118,239</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>56,257</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>50,641</td>
<td>57,920</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vil’no</td>
<td>45,881</td>
<td>68,911</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>40,771</td>
<td>42,005</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>37,665</td>
<td>52,862</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>35,863</td>
<td>49,897</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhni Novgorod</td>
<td>35,683</td>
<td>201,736</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Least Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>14,834</td>
<td>27,753</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>14,159</td>
<td>25,965</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>13,031</td>
<td>18,324</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>12,758</td>
<td>29,089</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>12,608</td>
<td>18,295</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>10,144</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>9,484</td>
<td>25,254</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>9,187</td>
<td>20,142</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerch*</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>20,624</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigov</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>20,528</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cities with status of provinces.

Sources: “Vedomost’ o sostojanii denezhikh sredstv gorodov v koirx predpol-agaetsia osobaia politsii za 1857 godu” and “Sravnitel’naiaia vedomost’ o sostave i soderzhanii gorodskikh politseiskikh komand,” Trudy komissii o gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdeniakh (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1860), part 1, book 4.
## Table 12: Police Spending as a Share of City Revenue in 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Police Spending, incl. for municipal guard</th>
<th>Police Spending as a % of revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1,101,965</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>233,925</td>
<td>40,280</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>118,239</td>
<td>17,356</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>11,927</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>57,920</td>
<td>19,083</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vil’no</td>
<td>68,911</td>
<td>19,520</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>42,005</td>
<td>14,435</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>52,862</td>
<td>9,791</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>49,897</td>
<td>10,367</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhni Novgorod</td>
<td>201,736</td>
<td>13,676</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Least Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>27,753</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>25,965</td>
<td>6,371</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>18,324</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>29,089</td>
<td>6,238</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>18,295</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>25,254</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>20,142</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerch*</td>
<td>20,624</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigov</td>
<td>20,528</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cities with province-like status.

Sources: “Vedomost’ o sostoianii denezhikh sredstv gorodov v koikh predpolagaetsia osobaia politsiia za 1857 godu” Trudy komissii o gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdeniakh (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1860), part 1, book 4; and MSVUK OP: part 1, sect. 2, appendix, “Vedomost’ o raskhodakh gorodskoi politsii v 44 guberniakh.”

The crude measures in these tables, it should be noted, reflect only relative ability to pay for police, and say nothing about the absolute levels of expendi-
tasures required to support a high quality police force. Nor do they have anything to say about the willingness of the cities to pay for police who worked for the central authorities rather than for the cities themselves. As historians of Russian urbanization have shown, cities experiencing rapid growth and industrialization were struggling to meet urgent non-police needs such as improving sanitation and housing and reducing disease. In Moscow the police themselves were—or tried to be—involved in such efforts in 1863 when their chief proposed the building of rooming houses for the large number of peasants moving there in search of employment. In this instance, a special commission rejected the proposal and instructed the police to focus more on suppressing crime than on addressing its presumed causes. Neither in Moscow nor in any of Russia’s growing cities, however, could the authorities ignore the tradeoff between spending for the police and social welfare and sanitation improvements.

In 1863, Valuev addressed the funding issue by asking the State Council to allow city police forces to charge fees for services, citing St. Petersburg’s and Moscow’s experiences as precedents. Since 1858 St. Petersburg’s police had collected fees for registering passports, verifying addresses, certifying property transactions, and other actions in amounts that varied by social estate. In November 1860, Moscow’s police obtained the right to do the same. This may have led Valuev believe to believe he would encounter little resistance to further expanding the arrangement. He may also have seen this proposal as a means of bypassing a provision of the recent introduction of a comprehensive state budget. Specifically, in 1863 for the first time revenue sources previously controlled by individual ministries and agencies became central government funds under the Ministry of Finance’s management. For accounting purposes, the sources of funds for individual ministry’s programs often remained as they had been before. Nonetheless, and for all the obvious benefits of having a unified picture of the govern-


82 Bradley, Muzhik and Muscovite, 281–82.

83 Materialy o sborakh dlia usileniia soderzhaniia politsii (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1866), 19.

84 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 1 (1870): 508.

ment’s finances, Valuev and other non-Finance ministers probably regretted their loss of exclusive funds and were looking to restore them. When Valuev circulated his draft proposal on police fees for services to selected colleagues and provincial governors, however, it met with sharp criticism. The governors argued for larger fees.\(^8\) Other ministers and agency heads subjected the proposal to frequent procedural delays, requesting more details and criticizing specific fees as excessive. Some also questioned the basic idea of charging people for actions such as registering passports that the government required them to perform.\(^8\) The Director of the Department of State Economy made the most telling objection: that many of the activities for which fees were to be charged were to be removed from the police’s duties upon implementation of the zemstvo and judicial reforms.\(^9\) Valuev’s response—a feeble one—was that he was only proposing to charge these fees on a temporary basis—until the zemstvos and new courts were up and running.\(^9\) Valuev persisted with his proposal but to no effect. It languished in the Finance Ministry’s Commission for the Revision of the System of Taxes and Fees without attracting sufficient support and remained unapproved when Valuev resigned from the Ministry.\(^9\)

The funding and size of the municipal police forces arose again as issues in 1865, when Pokhvisnev’s proposed police statute included a municipal police budget and staffing plan.\(^9\) Excluding spending on municipal guardsmen, proposed expenditures on the city police were roughly the same as provided for in the Temporary Rules of December 1862. To keep the lid on spending, the report requested a sharp reduction in the number of municipalities with separate police forces—from 61 to 24. Fifteen of these were large cities with populations of 40,000 or more as well as commercial, industrial, and political significance.\(^8\) The other nine were smaller towns and villages that were important for their strategic location or religious significance.\(^9\) Together

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8 Materialy o sborakh dlia usilenia soderzhania politsii, 72.
8 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 522, 524.
9 Materialy o sborakh dlia usilenia soderzhania politsii, 53.
9 Materialy o sborakh dlia usilenia soderzhania politsii, 66–67.
9 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 571–79.
9 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 214. The cities were Astrakhan, Vil’no, Voronezh, Kazan, Kishinev, Kiev, Mogilev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Saratov, Tula, Kharkov, Kherson, Odessa, and Nikolaev.
9 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 214. These were Taganrog, Kerch, Narva, Sevastopol and the five villages and hamlets given separate police forces under the Temporary Rules.
Chapter 3

the 24 forces accounted for roughly one-quarter of proposed total spending on the municipal police.

In contrast to his tight-fistedness for the rest of the city police, Pokhvisnev called for increasing spending on the municipal guards to 1,050,000 rubles. This was both higher than its current level and double what Nikolai Miliutin and Solov'ev had requested in 1860. It would allow a roughly 25 percent increase in the number of guardsmen and about a 35 percent increase in their salaries. To justify this he pointed to the growth in population in the previous few years, the changes in post-Emancipation society, and what he described as an almost universal increase in drunkenness and drink-related crime.96

Pokhvisnev’s claim that social disorder was on the rise was one that most contemporaries would have been accepted unquestioningly. The loosening of alcohol controls in 1863 had led to a huge increase in the number of taverns, more visible public drunkenness, and a surge in arrests for alcohol-related offenses.97 In 1863 alone the number of taverns grew from 90,200 to 233,000 and in some regions the press reported even greater percentage increases in alcohol sales.98 Both public officials and non-government commentators generally perceived such numbers as signals of a breakdown of law and order. In an 1864 report to Valuev, for example, Moscow’s governor complained that the new alcohol controls were leading to an “incredible increase in crime.”99 In the same year the censor Nikitenko complained in his diary that crime was reaching unprecedented levels.100 By 1866, the Tsar himself was making similar complaints.101

The widespread concern with crime augured well for the expansion of the municipal police had Valuev chosen to support this cause. For all his efforts to increase St. Petersburg’s police’s strength and to provide new revenue sources for other urban forces, however, Valuev was more committed to expanding the rural police. As we have seen in our discussion of the

99 RGIA, fond 1281, Sovet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, opis’ 7, delo 60, “Po otchetu o sostoiianii moskovskogo gubernii za 1864 god,” 111.
100 A. V. Nikitenko, Dnevnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1955), 5: 293–94.
101 Zelnik, Labor and Society, 250–51.
county police, rather than going forward with Pokhvisnev’s statute, Valuev chose to press the fight on creation of a rural police guard. The result was to leave the questions of urban police reform and expansion of the municipal police guards to Pokhvisnev’s successor as Chief of the Police Section of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions. The official in question, M. I. Anisimov, had been a member of the Police Section under Nikolai Miliutin. During 1867–1869 he would prepare proposals that reflected both Miliutin’s approach to police reform and Pokhvisnev’s draft police statute. In a modest concession to the governors he proposed restoring roughly 30 provincial capitals to Pokhvisnev’s proposed list of cities with separate police forces. This gesture did nothing to advance his proposals, which enjoyed even less success than his predecessor’s.

Without even the half-hearted Valuev to champion its cause, official discussion of urban police reform virtually ceased. After years of delay, however, in 1870 the government enacted a reform of city-governments that was the urban counterpart to the 1864 zemstvo reform. Like the 1864 legislation, it transferred responsibility for regulating local industry and trade, maintaining local infrastructure and similar functions from the police to elected bodies. It also established city dumas that like St. Petersburg’s in 1866 could resist central government requests to spend more on their police. Unlike the zemstvos, the city governments received a guarantee that the police would enforce their decisions. This guarantee, however, came at a price. The statute required the city assemblies to submit proposed decrees to the local police chiefs for approval.

Similar to the zemstvo and judicial reforms, the 1870 Municipal Statute should logically have been followed by a revised statutes on the city police

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103 On Anisimov’s dates of service and draft General Statute and Instructions on the Police, see MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 341–57.
104 2nd PSZ, 45 (1870): no. 48498.
and on the policemen who made up their bottom ranks. Neither measure, however, was to be enacted in the 1870s. Instead the tsarist authorities took a piecemeal approach that would continue until the crisis of the late 1870s forced the government to address the cities’ law-and-order problems.
With Valuev’s departure from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsibility for both the county and the municipal police fell to his successor Alexander Timashev. Unlike Valuev, Timashev, had spent his career in the military. As former chief of staff to the Director of the Third Section and Corps of Gendarmes, he was knowledgeable about military police but had little background—or interest—in civilian affairs. Timashev also had a history of opposing the reforms of the early 1860s. His first act as Minister, the selection of B. P. Obukhov, Governor of Pskov Province, as his deputy, had sent a strong signal to this effect and also previewed his policy with regard to police reform. A year before, Obukhov had written a memo to Valuev which argued for additional police manpower and tighter central control that pleased the then Minister of Internal Affairs but outraged veterans of the reforms of the Emancipation period. One of these, Iurii Samarin, had included it along with a rebuttal by Alexander Vasil’chikov, a member of the Pskov gentry, in a pamphlet that was literally going to press as Obukhov’s selection was announced. Vasil’chikov argued that Obukhov’s policies would push the police to “intrude into every aspect of community activity,” a course that would damage law enforcement and society as had happened in Pskov. His remedy was to relieve the police of burdensome activities unre-
lated to the battle with crime. To Vasil’chikov, specialization, not expansion, was the path to improved police performance.

However strong his views on reform and the police, Timashev was not a strong Minister. A protégé of P. A. Shuvalov, the Third Section’s chief and the leader of the anti-reform faction in the court, Timashev was more interested in artistic pursuits than in ministerial matters, according to Prince Meshcherskii. Daniel Orlovsky, author of a classic history of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, describes his appointment as the start of a years of “routinized and bureaucratic leadership in which political vision was non-existent.” Timashev, however, was to serve as Minister longer than either of his predecessors and while less capable than Valuev, he would benefit from having a new model for police expansion that was widely viewed as a success.

The Polish Police Model

In 1863, Poles in the remnant of their country given to Russia at the Congress of Vienna rose up against their occupiers in what is known as the January Uprising. After early success, the rebellion was brutally crushed and many of the privileges the Poles had enjoyed under the terms of that transfer were eliminated. In a surprising turn of events a major role in this crackdown was assigned to Nikolai Miliutin, one of the architects of Russia’s incomplete police reform and a man whom Valuev had derided as a radical. Resented and even despised by conservative Russians for his work on emancipation and perceived anti-gentry views, Miliutin was also a harsh critic of the Polish gentry and the Catholic clergy for their support of Polish independence. As such, he was able to make common cause with his erstwhile critics after the January Uprising. His early efforts included the preparation and enactment of laws to complete the emancipation of Congress Poland’s peasants and strengthen their position versus their former landlords in new rural communities. More important for this study, Miliutin also took the lead on a reorganization of provincial and county institutions and the creation of a

3 On Timashev’s relationship with Shuvalov, see Zaionchkovskii, “P. A. Valuev (Biograficheskii ocherk),” Valuev, Dnevnik, 1: 10; Meshcherskii, Moi vospominaniia, 2:114.
4 Orlovsky, The Limits of Reform, 127.
6 2nd PSZ, 39 (1864): nos. 40609, 40610.
rural guard. The first of these measures roughly doubled the number of provinces and counties to reduce the burden of administering them and allow closer control of the populace. It also created two deputies for the county commanders, one for administration and one for police, to further the same goals.7 The second measure created about 2,700 guardsmen to be selected from the most capable members of the gendarmes and civilian police and by the absorption of gendarme county commands.8 No more than 10 percent were to be native Poles. They were to operate under the county commanders and be distributed into new police precincts. A study by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions later claimed that 80 percent of the guards could read and write.9

Relative to the population, the rural guard was not large. Rather, the 1866 law called for a ratio of guards to populace of 1:2,500 in the countryside and 1:1,500 in the cities. Russian advocates of police expansion, however, probably viewed it as at least a good start. The law also specified that a small number of mounted guards be stationed in the provincial capitals and county seats and a single mounted guard assigned to each precinct for rapid response and improved communication. The introduction of standard-size provinces, counties, and precincts, the appointment of separate administrative and police deputies, and the pledge to recruit a highly qualified, if not an elite, force probably were also attractive to conservative Russian officials.

As an advocate of establishing a mounted police guard in the Great Russian provinces, Valuev could and should have benefitted from higher officialdom’s enthusiasm for the Polish police model. The usually politically adroit Minister of Internal Affairs, however, was either blind to this opportunity or unwilling to take advantage of it. As one of his biographers noted, Poland was one issue on which the often equivocating Valuev chose to take a stand against his hardline colleagues, including Michael Murav’ev, his onetime superior.10 This may have led him to avoid doing anything that smacked of praise for Russian policy in the Kingdom. Resentment of his nemesis Nikolai Miliutin may have also disinclined him to tout the Polish police model’s success.

7 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 44012.
8 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 44013.
9 MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 11, no. 3 (1871): 189.
10 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Valuev, Petr Aleksandrovich.”
Timashev, in contrast, was a strong supporter of the Russian crackdown in Poland and of the police guard introduced there. As a former gendarme, he had commanded police like the Polish rural guard and in his first year as Minister, he presided over the introduction of a greatly scaled-down version of this guard in the provinces of the Northwest Region annexed during the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century. Under the terms of an August 1868 ukase, 624 precinct wardens—also known as “thousanders”—were distributed among the six provinces of the region (Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Mogilev, Vil’no, and Vitebsk) to support the district inspectors. Each district was broken down into two or three precincts with one warden in each. The underlying assumption was that as government-appointed and salaried employees, the precinct wardens would be more effective than the senior and junior village wardens below them. In a note prepared four months later, the region’s Governor-General described their creation as a good start. But he also argued that they were too few and too poorly paid to be truly effective and urged Timashev to replace them with a larger, better-funded mounted guard more like that in Poland. In 1868 and 1869, Timashev also received two other proposals for creating a similar force. One—by Paul Kosagovskii, the Governor of Vitebsk Province and later Timashev’s Director of Executive Police—called for assigning 168 of the gendarmes stationed in the province to the command of the district inspector. The other—by Alexander Beklemishev, an original member of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions who would later head its Police Section—called for eliminating separate gendarme, village police, and non-combat military units in Mogilev Province and replacing them with a new 772-man internal guard along Polish lines. In contrast to Valuev’s plan for a mounted guard, these proposals were fiscally astute and, in the latter case, may actually have reduced spending for internal security in the province. At the same time, affecting as they did the Imperial Gendarmes and the Ministry of War, they were politically bold and at least at that time, unrealistic.

12 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 4, 10.
13 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 4, 3–9.
By 1870 Timashev had decided on his own plan. On January 2, he discussed his idea with Alexander II, who told him to outline it to the Council of Ministers. The plan called for a new division of provinces into districts and districts into precincts, similar to what had been done in Poland. It also called for abolishing the position of village warden and replacing the wardens with 17,251 full-time salaried county guardsmen, 12,000 of whom would be mounted. The junior wardens in the villages, said to number about 400,000, were also to be replaced by a 133,000-man village guard. Police positions at every level were to become appointed rather than elected ones. These changes were to support an expansion of the authority of provincial governors and the bureaucracy at the expense of the zemstvos and courts.

Despite the backtracking from the liberalized censorship statute of 1865 that had occurred in Valuev’s final years as Minister of Internal Affairs, the winter of 1870 witnessed wide and sometimes critical press discussion of Timashev’s proposals. In January and February, the Moscow Journal and the Stock Market Journal devoted several articles apiece to the plan. Both opposed the proposed expansion of gubernatorial authority over the zemstvos and courts but supported the creation of a rural guard. The Moscow Journal recalled an 1864 proposal by a county gentry assembly to replace the peasant wardens with salaried police. It also cited zemstvo support for a similar measure and argued that a county police did not exist and had to be created from scratch. The Stock Market Journal stated that police reform was every bit as important as reform of the judiciary given the frequency and importance of the police’s interaction with the public. It went on to argue for a comprehensive approach. This would include replacing the Temporary Rules with a permanent police statute, expanding the police presence in the countryside, and increasing the number of investigating magistrates.

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18 The articles in *Moskovskie vedomosty* appeared on January 24, February 10 and 18, March 19, and April 1. The article in *Birzhevye vedomosty* appeared on January 29 and February 11 and 19. They are reproduced in *MSVUK: OA*, part 1, sect. 10, prilozhenie.
19 *MSVUK: OA*, part 1, sect. 10, prilozhenie 18–19.
journal was emphatic on the need to reduce the police’s responsibilities. It argued that both the number of their duties and the unpopularity of some of them made the police’s job a near impossible one.\textsuperscript{20} Other more critical press discussion of Timashev’s police proposal echoed the commentary on the 1866–1867 reorganization of the St. Petersburg police, stressing its heavy monetary costs rather than rejecting it outright. The \textit{Herald of Europe} took explicit exception to the argument that any move to strengthen the police would mean more repression. Instead, it argued that society could actually benefit from a stronger police. At the same time, it faulted Timashev’s plan for being too expensive and argued for continued sharing of responsibilities between the zemstvos and the police.\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{St. Petersburg Journal} took a similar tack. It urged the authorities to avoid an increase in taxes and the size of the force and tighten the police’s focus on the fight against crime.\textsuperscript{22}

The reception of Timashev’s proposal within the government was similar to that in the press. With the by-now predictable exceptions of the Ministers of War and Finance, the Council of Ministers supported Timashev’s plan for a large police guard but gave a cooler reception to his proposals on provincial institutions. Minister of Justice K. I. Palen, a former Assistant Director of Executive Police,\textsuperscript{23} was lavish in his praise for the county guard and urged its prompt enactment.\textsuperscript{24} The Director of the State Chancellery’s Polish Section, Dmitrii N. Nabokov compared it favorably to the Polish rural guard, which he described as a great success.\textsuperscript{25} Others objected to specifics of the police proposal but supported it in principle.\textsuperscript{26} Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin, in contrast, bluntly described the plan as designed to make the Minister of Internal Affairs Russia’s virtual prime minister.\textsuperscript{27} He also questioned the rationale for such a force, arguing that if it was intended for riot control it was unnecessary, and that if intended to reduce crime it would prove coun-

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} MSVUK: \textit{OA}, part 1, sect. 10, prilozenie 147–53.
\bibitem{21} \textit{Vestnik Evropy}, No. 5 (June 1870): 378.
\bibitem{22} \textit{S-Peterburgskie vedomosti}, January 27, 1870, 1.
\bibitem{23} \textit{ Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’} (B&E), s. v. “Palen, Konstantin Ivanovich.”
\bibitem{24} MSVUK: \textit{OA}, part 1, sect. 10, 200.
\bibitem{25} MSVUK: \textit{OA}, part 1, sect. 10, 239.
\bibitem{26} See the comments of State Comptroller Tatarinov and Chief of the Second Section Urusov, MSVUK: \textit{OA}, part 1, sect. 10, 211, 228–31.
\bibitem{27} MSVUK: \textit{OA}, part 1, sect. 10, 239.
\end{thebibliography}
terproductive. Here he cited his experience with the Army’s internal security troops, which he had found to be ineffective in suppressing crime and sometimes actually increasing it. Reutern criticized the plan as unnecessary, expensive, and damaging to community-controlled institutions. He disputed Timashev’s claim that crime had been on the rise since the end of Emancipation’s two-year transition, attributing it instead to an increase in investigations and trials resulting from the judicial reforms. He argued that salaries for the 133,000 village guardsmen would impose a crushing 8,000,000-ruble burden on the peasantry. He also questioned Timashev’s estimate of the cost of the 17,251-man county guard and argued that even as estimated, it was beyond Russia’s means. Finally, he argued that a larger police force would likely interfere with the zemstvos and peasant townships.

The Commission on Provincial and County Institutions Reassembled

In response to the questions in the Council of Ministers on April 16, the Tsar requested further study of Timashev’s plan. To lead this effort Timashev reconvened the Commission for Reform of Provincial and County Institutions. The Commission that met on June 10, however, bore little resemblance to the one that had spearheaded so many of the accomplishments of Alexander II’s early reign. Nikolai Miliutin, Iakov Solov’ev, and their fellow reformers were gone. In their place were conservative officials. Their views were epitomized by those of Gen. Alexander Beklemishev, the former Governor of Mogilev Province, who headed the Commission’s Police Section. An original member of the Commission in 1858, Beklemishev had not been a supporter of the police programs developed by Solov’ev and Saltykov. Solov’ev later said in his memoirs that Beklemishev’s indifference had surprised him, noting—with uncharacteristic acknowledgment of another’s ability—that he was among the brightest and best educated of the

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28 MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 10, 250–51.
29 MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 10, 146–73.
30 RGIA, fond 1316, Komissia o gubernskikh i ueznykh uchrezhdeniakh, opis’ 1, delo 10, “Zhurnal za 1870 god.” 1.
31 RGIA, fond 1316, opis’ 1, delo 10, 5; the members of the full Commission are listed on 1–2; the members of the Police Section are on 5.
A dozen years later Beklemishev had been transformed from a political neutral to a leader. Still no reformer, he was to display the intelligence that Solov’ev had acknowledged and the focus on practical matters of police organization he had displayed as a governor.

The membership of the Commission’s Police Section was heavily stacked in Timashev’s favor. Eight of its twelve members came from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; there were none from the Ministries of War or Finance. Unlike the original Commission, however, staff and academic advisers were to play very active roles in its 1870 reincarnation. This was evidenced by the Commission’s early calls for the collection of historical and comparative data on the police. These were to include police proposals submitted to the Commission since its founding; information on the police in Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Bavaria, and France; and statistics on the numbers, costs, and distribution of Russia’s village police.

The set of countries whose police forces were to be studied must have been disturbing to remaining champions of the Saltykov-Solov’ev approach to police reform. For one thing, England, the model for these police reformers, was conspicuous by its absence. For another thing, there was the inclusion of Austria, which Gromeka had described as the antithesis of the English police model. For a third, the police in all these countries still bore the signs of the eighteenth century Polizeistaat, having a very broad understanding of the police’s responsibilities.

In light of Timashev’s proposal to create a large rural guard, the most likely reason for the choice of countries was their common approach to policing the countryside: the use of centralized force organized on military lines. Specifically, each country relied on a national gendarmerie that, unlike in Russia, routinely supported the civilian police authorities, and focused more on law enforcement than on political policing. In 1868, Beklemishev had proposed the actual replacement of the gendarmes with a force that would do both these things and Kosагovskii, now another member of the Police Section, had proposed subordinating a gendarme unit to the district police and concen-

32 “Zapiski Solov’eva,” Russkaia starina 41, 254.
33 RGIA, fond 1116, opis’ 1, delo 10, 3; delo 8, “Zhurnaly 16 maia 1870 g.,” 15; and delo 15, “Zhurnaly 1-go zasedaniia politseiskogo otdela,” 1–5.
trating them on the fight against crime. Such proposals probably remained a bridge too far in Russia at that time, but the experience of France, Prussia, and Austria illustrated less controversial ways of accomplishing the two officials’ goals. In all three countries the gendarmes were part of the armed forces but had a primary mission to support the Minister of the Interior in day-to-day police matters. France’s large gendarme force—over 24,000 strong—must have seemed a particularly attractive model to Timashev and his supporters. It was over three times as large as Russia’s Corps of Gendarmes, which, in any event, the Minister of Internal Affair did not control. Belgium and Bavaria had gendarmeries modeled after France’s. According to police historian Clive Elmsley, at the time of the Commission’s study, the Belgian gendarmes were rapidly increasing their crime-fighting role.

The studies requested by the Commission reflected a commitment to research that historian George Yaney described as pathbreaking for a Russian body of its sort. They also reflected society’s interest in “police science.” An academic discipline in Russia since 1835, when a university statute established a chair in that field, police science had once been highly theoretical and abstract. In the 1860s, however, it became more practical. Although still heavily influenced by the works of German legal theorists such as Robert von Mohl, Russian police scientists began to focus on real-world problems such as costs and organizational structures.

35 MSVUK: OP part 1, sect. 4, 98–104; and 105–19.
37 Payne, The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 89.
38 Russia’s Corps of Gendarmes grew from about 4,300 in the mid-1850s to about 6,700 by the end of the 1870s. Squire, The Third Department, 247–48 and Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870–1880-kh godov, 174.
40 Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe, 237.
41 George Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize, 13.
42 These documents, published as Materialy sobrannye dlia vshchaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii o preobra-zovani gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdennii, have been indispensable sources for this study.
44 Robert von Mohl (1799–1875) was a German jurist associated with the theory of the Rechtsstaat, a “constitutional state” or “state of law,” which he distinguished from the Polizeistaat of the enlightened rulers.
I. E. Andreevskii, a professor at St. Petersburg University, was a leading figure in this pragmatic school who would influence Beklemishev’s Police Section. Andreevskii had government as well as academic experience, having worked in the office of the St. Petersburg provincial procurator while conducting research. As tutor to two of Alexander II’s sons, he had credibility with conservatives. As someone who had given free lectures to the students of his university when the government suspended classes there in 1862, he also enjoyed liberals’ support. In 1871, he published the first of a two-volume work, *Police Law*, that included his observations on the modern police and his recommendations for improving police performance. Early in this work he advanced the thesis that a decrease in the police responsibilities of the state was a necessary and positive stage of police development. After reviewing the state of the police in England, France, and Prussia, he stated this more bluntly, arguing that the more tasks the police had, the worse their performance. Appearing at the time it did, this thesis and Andreevskii’s entire study lent “scientific” support to police reformers.

Evgenii Anuchin, the author of a study of Siberia exiles that had won a prestigious award from the Imperial Geographic Society, played a more direct role in the Police Section’s work. The Commission had tasked Anuchin with preparing a history of Russian police institutions to accompany the collections of documents it was assembling. Published in 1872, this history was more a narrative than an interpretive study. Still, it clearly described increased specialization as the major trend in the development of Russia’s police. It also noted that a proposal to bring this process to a conclusion had been prepared in the 1860s but had yet to be enacted. The implicit message was that it was time to correct this and replace the Temporary Rules with a statute that would complete the reform begun under Solov’ev and Saltykov.
What Anuchin was suggesting need not have conflicted with Timashev’s goal of a large police force. Instead, the proposal he cited was the one Pokhvisnev had prepared for Minister of Internal Affairs Valuev along with a companion piece to create a rural police guard. Valuev, however, had rejected the former and pressed ahead with the latter and in 1872 chances were poor that the more conservative Timashev would break with Valuev’s pattern. The various studies requested by the Commission’s Police Section, however, provided evidence of wide support for making the police more specialized as well as more numerous.

The survey of provincial governors’ views on the needs of the police published in 1871 was a striking example of generally conservative officials’ supporting a police policy originally devised by reformers. It also illustrated the thorough preparatory research for which Yaney credited the Commission. The summary described the police’s mission as “the protection of social order, law, and personal security, and the prevention of crime.” It then went on to lament the burdening of the police with duties unrelated to this mission and to recommend reassigning them to other bodies. A separate study of the police’s relations with the zemstvos and volosts by Prince Sergei Leuchtenberg, a grandson of Tsar Nicholas I, provided statistics to back up the governors’ complaints. The officials cited in these studies were not reformers. The governors’ ranks, in particular, had been purged of suspected reformers under Valuev. Often they accompanied their calls for transferring more responsibilities to the zemstvos and courts with pleas to increase their control over these bodies. At the same time, their experience had persuaded them that a narrowing of the police’s focus was essential to improving police performance. Neither reformers nor reactionaries in their views on the police, they would be better described as pragmatists.

53 Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize, 13.
55 “Zapiska i otchet po Imperatorskogo Vysochestva Kniazia Sergeyia Maksimilianovicha Romanovskogo Gertsoga Leikhtenbergskogo o sostoianii i deiatel’nosti politseiskikh organov i otnosheniiakh ikh k vo
56 Zaionchkovskii, “P. A. Valuev (Biograficheskii ocherk),” Valuev, Dnevnik, 1:30.
57 See, for example, MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 1 (1871): 12, 21, 22, 25.
On May 31, 1871 using these statistical materials and studies the Commission began a yearlong drafting process. The results reflected near total acceptance of the experts’ calls to define the police’s mission narrowly. The Commission recommended that the police concentrate on the prevention and suppression of crime. To allow this, zemstvos, courts, and fiscal agencies would take over the police’s other duties.\textsuperscript{58} It also approved in principle the creation of “territorial townships”—units defined in geographic terms rather than by the number of peasant villages. These were to be staffed with fulltime guardsmen and be, in effect, Russian versions of Poland’s rural police precincts. With around 20,000 ground and horse-mounted police, this guard force was larger than the 17,251 men Timashev had proposed.\textsuperscript{59} The Commission did not, however, endorse Timashev’s recommendation for a 133,000-man village guard.

Rebuffed by his own Commission, Timashev chose to largely ignore its recommendations much as Valuev had done to Pokhvisnev’s draft 10 years earlier. In March 1873, he sent a proposal to the Council of Ministers that consisted almost entirely of recommendations to increase the size and budget of the police.\textsuperscript{60} The proposal called for creating 43 new rural police districts,\textsuperscript{61} increasing police salaries, and establishing a 19,666-man police guard. To justify the large expenses that his proposals would entail, Timashev cited statistics that he claimed to show a major increase in crime. Widely believed by contemporaries, this claim was hard to prove when the only numbers available were for arrests, prosecutions, and convictions rather than criminal incidents. And in any event Timashev’s use of these data was crude. Ignoring such factors as the growth of the population, the increased number of police, and the like, he stated that the annual average number of horse thieves exiled

\textsuperscript{58} RGIA, fond 1316, opis’ 1, delo 15, 19–22. Pages 20 and 21, which relate to the meeting of May 3, 1871, are misplaced here.

\textsuperscript{59} RGIA, fond 908, Papers of P. A. Valuev, opis’ 1, delo 310, “Materialy o podgotovke proekta administrativno-politseskiho reform,” 315. Sub commission 4’s report is missing from the Journal of The Commission on Provincial and County Institutions. This account is based on a summary by the Department of Executive Police dated March 15, 1873 stored with Valuev’s state papers.

\textsuperscript{60} RGIA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 120–35.

\textsuperscript{61} This would bring the total number to 1,405 up from 1,227 in December 1862 when the Temporary Rules were promulgated.
to Siberia during 1857–1866 had increased to 500 compared to 300 in the previous ten-year period.\textsuperscript{62}

Timashev’s proposal drew fire from the Ministers of War and Finance for failing to further police specialization.\textsuperscript{63} The latter also dismissed Timashev’s claims about an increase in crime, arguing that the statistics he cited actually reflected improved police performance rather growth in crime. In an example of his own distortion of crime statistics, Reutern also argued that the high incidence of crime in Perm Province, which had a mounted police guard illustrated the futility of Timashev’s proposal for a larger guard force.\textsuperscript{64} As Reutern was certainly aware, the regime’s use of Perm as a place of exile for convicts accounted for a good part of its crime problem.

In a more disturbing development for Timashev, the Directors of the Second and Third Sections of the Emperor’s Chancellery, Urusov and P. A. Shuvalov, also opposed the proposal.\textsuperscript{65} Both compared it unfavorably with the Polish police model. They argued that Timashev’s proposed guard would be less well paid and, thus, less qualified than their Polish counterparts and that as a result be more likely to do harm than good. Urusov, while not known as a supporter of large police forces, had endorsed Timashev’s 1870 proposal. Shuvalov’s opposition was both more surprising and more ominous. A favorite of the Tsar, who had made him St. Petersburg’s Police Commissioner at age 30, Shuvalov had both political influence and police experience.\textsuperscript{66} As Chief of the Corps of Gendarmes, he had presided over a major reorganization that had established mounted commands in 13 cities.\textsuperscript{67} Shuvalov also was said to have been responsible for Timashev’s appointment as Minister.\textsuperscript{68} In 1873, however, he belittled the plan for requiring the mounted policemen to supply their own horses and likely to require the police to pay much of the cost of clerical support. Without his support, the program’s defenders—

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{62} RGIA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 148.
\item\textsuperscript{63} RGIA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, “Otzyvy ministrov i glavnoupravliauschikh otde’nymi, chast’iami i obiasnenie na onye Ministra vnutrennikh del po delu ob ustroistve politii,” 155–57 (Miliutin’s comments dated April 20, 1873), and 148–53 (Reutern’s comments dated May 1, 1873).
\item\textsuperscript{64} RGIA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 148–49.
\item\textsuperscript{65} RGIA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 162–80 (Urusov’s comments dated April 21, 1873) and 181–87, esp. 181 (Shuvalov’s undated comments).
\item\textsuperscript{66} On Shuvalov’s influence and tenure as the Third Section’s Chief, see Hingley, The Russian Secret Police, 54–57.
\item\textsuperscript{67} 2nd PSZ, 41 (1867): no. 44956.
\item\textsuperscript{68} P. A. Valuev (Biograficheskii ocherk), Valuev, Dnevnik, 1: 30.
\end{itemize}
Minister of Justice Palen and Valuev, then the Minister of State Domains—were too few to prevail.

Timashev attempted to revive his plan by submitting a new version to the State Council in March 1874. It differed from the previous year’s version primarily by proposing a larger police budget, presumably to respond to Shuvalov’s objections. Again, however, the plan failed to win sufficient support, being too little and too late for the Shuvalov camp and worse than its predecessor for Miliutin and Reutern. In what may have been an effort to demonstrate the value of a mounted force, Timashev won approval to establish a “temporary” mounted guard in Samara. As with a similar temporary force approved for Perm and Kazan provinces in April 1870, the number of guardsmen was left to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to decide in consultation with the provincial authorities but could not exceed the limited funds provided. According to the Commission on Provincial and District Institutions, the Samara guard force consisted of 132 men; Perm’s and Kazan’s totaled 242 men and 144 men respectively.

Neither Timashev’s 1873 or 1874 proposals made any provision for correcting the longtime neglect of the municipal police. Rather, they proposed an additional reduction in the number of cities and towns that could maintain separate police forces, dropping the 19 county seats and 5 other villages and towns from the 69 municipalities that the Temporary Rules had allowed to do so. This continued neglect was compounded in 1874 by the impact of the introduction of universal male military service on the staffing of municipal police. For all its positive impact on Russia’s armed forces, the 1874 reform’s shortening of the term of active duty service to six years—from 12—made it impractical to continue the practice of transferring conscripts to serve as policemen and firefighters. The number of cities that still relied on detailed soldiers for such purposes is unclear but apparently was sizeable. In 1873, in anticipation of the reduction in the military term of service, the Senate had instructed the military to transfer 4,000-6,000 men to city police and fire departments. The transferees were to be

69 RGLA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 144–47 (Palen’s comments dated April 20, 1873) and 158–61 (Valuev’s comments dated April 3, 1873).
70 RGLA, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 215–20.
71 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 51843.
73 For the text of the statute, see 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 51983.
released from the military and become hired personnel after six months of training. This onetime infusion of manpower and money quickly proved inadequate and the beleaguered city governments pressed for more assistance. As a result of financial stringencies, however, the central government could provide only occasional small increases—in the Kharkov, Kiev, and Odessa police. Some came with provisos that the city would assume a greater share of spending for the police. Kharkov, for example, was told it would have to pay half the police budget in 5 years’ time and all of it after 10 years. Kiev was placed on a similar schedule, which was moved up a few years later. Other cities were told they could petition to hire more police but only with their own funds.

While promising to reduce the longtime threat of crime, Timashev’s 1873 and 1874 proposals failed to prepare the police for the emerging threat of urban riots and did not even mention the potential for rural disorders. With regard to the latter, the authorities may have taken false comfort from their muddling through the “move to the people” of 1874 when thousands of radical students left the cities to encourage the peasants to rise up against the authorities. Despite the enthusiasm of the would-be revolutionaries, this movement encountered widespread peasant hostility and led to over 1,000 arrests. Trepov’s police also had been able to quickly contain the 1872 strike at the Nevskii Cotton Mill in St. Petersburg by means that were oppressive and authoritarian but avoided physical force. Urban riots, on the other hand, had already become a problem that the police were unable to contain. In Eastertime of 1871, for example, anti-Jewish rioters raged through Odessa for three days, looting and destroying stores and houses, injuring hundreds of police, and requiring the authorities to call in troops to stop them. One year later the police’s arrest of two workers in Kharkov led to days of rioting and the burning of police stations. The 1872 Kreenholm Strike in Estland

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74 2nd PSZ, 48 (1873): no. 52438.
75 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874) no. 53380; 50 (1875): no. 54433; 51 (1876): no. 55923. On the problems of policing Odessa in this period, see Daniel L. Brower, “Policing the Riotous City,” Chapter 5 of The Russian City between Tradition and Modernity, 1850–1890 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), 188–221.
76 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 58986.
77 2nd PSZ, 48, (1874): no. 53323.
78 The literature on the revolutionary populism of the 1870s is extensive, but Venturi’s Roots of Revolution remains the most comprehensive study. See especially, chapters 19–22.
79 Saint Petersburg Encyclopaedia, s. v. “Neva Strike 1870.”
80 Brower, The Russian City, 198, 200.
Province, in an area not subject to the Temporary Rules, also entailed violence and frightened the authorities as a possible harbinger of worse to come. Reginald Zelnik described it as “a seven on the Richter scale of labor unrest to the Nevskii’s four.” He reported that it involved over 5,000 workers, some of them physically resisting armed troops.\footnote{Reginald E. Zelnik, \textit{Law and Disorder on the Narova River: The Kreenholm Strike of 1872} (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1995), 15–16.}

In 1875 and 1876, out of stubbornness, inertia, or a belief that he would eventually wear down his opponents, Timashev kept the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions in session preparing studies to bolster the case for expanding the police.\footnote{RGIA, f\^ind 1316, delo 15, “Zhurnal politseiskogo otdela,” 51–55 (session of March 28, 1875), 54–58 (session of April 2, 1875); and delo 43, “Zhurnal subkomissii politseiskogo otdela,” April 9, 1875–March 17, 1876.} None had any more success than their predecessors. Also, while the county and provincial zemstvos, like the city governments, petitioned for more police, the central authorities’ response was feeble. Despite numerous complaints about rural banditry, for example, it created only one small mounted patrol—in Nizhnii Novgorod Province.\footnote{2nd PSZ, 50 (1875): no. 54766.}

### Police Expansion at Gunpoint

The outburst of revolutionary terrorism in early 1878 magnified Russia’s law and order problems and brought the stalemate over police expansion to a close. In January 1878, the revolutionary Vera Zasulich shot and wounded General Trepov in St. Petersburg. In February, in Rostov a terrorist shot a police spy, and in Kiev revolutionaries fired six shots at an assistant prosecutor. Then, on March 31, the acquittal of Vera Zasulich by a St. Petersburg jury led the authorities—correctly—to anticipate more attacks. In response, on the evening of Zasulich’s acquittal, a Special Conference of law enforcement and education officials convened in St. Petersburg to map out a response to the crisis.\footnote{P. A. Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 59. According to Tatishchev, \textit{Imperator Aleksandr II, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie}, 2:591, Alexander II had created this commission in 1875 in response to the “to the people” movement.} Headed by P. A. Valuev, the Conference also included Timashev, Chief of the Third Section and Corps of Gendarmes Gen. N. V. Mezentsov, who would fall victim to an assassin in August.\footnote{On August 4, 1878 the revolutionary Sergei Stepiak-Kravchinsky fatally stabbed the Third Section’s Chief in the center of St. Petersburg. Kravchinsky leapt onto a fast coach driven by a co-conspirator and...}
and Minister of Justice Palen, who had backed Timashev’s plan for 17,000-man county guard.\textsuperscript{86} Urusov, the Second Section’s head, and D. A. Tolstoi, the reactionary Minister of Education, also participated. \textsuperscript{87} This was the body that would enact a plan for the nationwide strengthening of the local police.

Even in the midst of terrorist attacks, the Special Conference struggled to win approval from the Committee of Ministers for specific police proposals. Probably because the rural police were so undermanned, its proposal for expanding them encountered less resistance than its measures for the city police. On April 28, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presented the Conference with a plan for creating a rural mounted police. The Conference quickly and unanimously approved this.\textsuperscript{88} When the proposal moved to the Committee of Ministers, the graveyard for previous programs of this sort, Minister of Finance Reutern opposed it, making the same criticisms he had made about Valuev’s and Timashev’s earlier proposals.\textsuperscript{89} This time, however, he stood alone. On June 9, 1878, the Committee announced the establishment of a force of 5,000 mounted rangers to be distributed among 46 provinces.\textsuperscript{90} The Minister of Internal Affairs, the provincial governors, and the county police chiefs, respectively, were to allocate this force by province, county, and district.

While Reutern had failed to block the introduction of the new force, the resources allotted were modest in comparison with previous proposals (Table 13), testifying to the severity of Russia’s resource constraints. War against the Ottoman Empire in 1877–1878 had played havoc with Reutern’s efforts to stabilize Russian finances. In 1878, budget expenditures were twice as great as revenues, the number of notes in circulation almost doubled, and the value of the ruble fell by roughly 60 percent.\textsuperscript{91} Under these conditions funding large expensive programs was all but impossible and the authorities

\textsuperscript{86} MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 10, 200.
\textsuperscript{87} Zaionchkovskii, Krizzi samoderzhaviia, 59.
\textsuperscript{88} Zaionchkovskii, Krizzi samoderzhaviia, 61.
\textsuperscript{89} Seredonin, Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti Komiteta ministrov, 3: 87.
\textsuperscript{90} 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 58610.
\textsuperscript{91} Ministerstvo finansov, 1802–1902, I: 638–39; Kotsonis, States of Obligation, 36.
were forced to go to scrimp in ways that once would have seemed inconceivable. The new mounted rangers, for example, were authorized to carry firearms, but they had to provide their own.\(^2\)

**Table 13: Proposals for a Rural Police Guard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originator</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs Valuev</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>6,632</td>
<td>2,000,000 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs Timashev</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>17,251</td>
<td>3,600,000 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Section of Commission on Provincial and County Institutions</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>19,666</td>
<td>4,090,296 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Internal Affairs Timashev</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,752,750 rubles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* The figures for the 1866 proposal are from *MSVUK: OP*, part 1, sect. 3, 492–502. Those for 1868 are from *MSVUK: OA*, part 1, sect. 10, 91–92. Those for 1872 are from *RGLA*, fond 908, opis’ 1, delo 310, 124, 129. Those for 1878 are from *2nd PSZ*, 53 (1878): no. 58610.

How best to bolster the city police was a more contentious issue that took longer to resolve. On August 8, the Committee instructed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare a detailed proposal for strengthening the police in the major cities,\(^3\) but it was not until mid-November that the Ministry won approval for a specific plan of action. Its plan had two parts. First, it provided 267,400 rubles a year to strengthen the police in nine cities\(^4\) that were centers of revolutionary activity or had rapidly growing numbers of industrial workers. Second, it provided another 138,000 rubles a year for the creation of detective divisions in police forces that did not have them. According to the enabling legislation,\(^5\) which included unusual detail about the deliberations of the Committee of Ministers, each provision encountered some resistance. With regard to the funds for nine key cities, Reutern noted that some

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\(^2\) *2nd PSZ*, no. 58610, Proekt, art. 7, primechanie.

\(^3\) Zaionchkovskii, *Krizis samoderzhaviia*, 77.

\(^4\) Kazan, Kharkov, Kiev, Nikolaev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Odessa, Rostov-on-the-Don, Samara, and Saratov.

\(^5\) *2nd PSZ*, 53 (1878): no. 59025.
had recently received additional funding, which, he observed, had done little apparent good. The Committee’s response was to officially acknowledge Reutern’s point. In effect, this put the Minister of Internal Affairs and the nine cities’ police chiefs on warning to spend the additional funds with special care. This probably persuaded Reutern to support the increase, which won unanimous approval. The proposed allocation of funds for detective divisions, on the other hand, encountered objections from an unidentified member or members that the Committee could not paper over. In particular, objections were raised that the proposed detectives would inevitably clash with the gendarmes in investigating conspiracies. The president and a majority of the Committee’s members agreed but noted for the record that this was a risk worth taking in Russia’s current crisis. The amount of money provided, however, was small and it is unclear what, if anything, the cities did with it. Lists of the police staffs in the cities of Kiev and Kharkov for December 1882, for example, made no mention of detectives.96 It was not until 1902 that Odessa, Russia’s fourth largest city, established a detective division.97 Six years later—in 1908—the government enacted a decree to establish detective divisions in all the nation’s cities.98 All this suggests that at least some cities had failed to comply with the instructions issued in 1878.

In the next two years evidence would mount that however modest the resources involved, the laws of June 9 and November 19, 1878 had signaled the victory of the champions of police expansion over the advocates of English-style police reform. Finally successful in expanding the force, Timashev retired in late 1878. His successor and former deputy Gen. Lev Makov99 was able to appoint 40 more mounted rangers apiece in Moscow and Kharkov province plus smaller numbers for other jurisdictions.100 In September, the Committee of Ministers approved his request for another 500 rangers to be allocated at his discretion.101 Lack of money, however, constrained the Ministry from continuing such increases. In December, it laid out procedures for zemstvos, city governments, and factories—to pay for

96 3rd PSZ, 2 (1882): no. 1164, shaty i tabeli.
97 3rd PSZ, 22 (1902): no. 21588.
98 Weissman, “Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914,” 61.
100 2nd PSZ, 54, (1879): nos. 59614, 59684a, 59684b, 59684v, 59807, and 59926.
101 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 59986.
additional police protection.\textsuperscript{102} Several zemstvos and city dumas took advantage of this offer.\textsuperscript{103} Factories did so in greater numbers, usually requesting the assignment of a single policeman.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1880, the government turned to reorganization instead of expansion to bolster the police. In August, it abolished the Third Section and placed its gendarmes under the new Minister of Internal Affairs Gen. Count M. T. Loris-Melikov.\textsuperscript{105} A hero of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Loris-Melikov had headed the Supreme Administrative Commission established in February 1880 after an attempted assassination of the Tsar. To restore a sense of normalcy, however, he had recommended dissolving the Commission in August. He also had asked to become Internal Affairs Minister.\textsuperscript{106} At his urging, the decree appointing him removed oversight of posts and telegraphs and foreign religious denominations from the Ministry’s duties. This made it more of a police agency. The Minister also merged the Executive Police and the Corps of Gendarmes into a powerful Department of State Police.\textsuperscript{107} Thanks largely to the growth of its railroad police, the Corps of Gendarmes was over half again as large as at the start of Alexander II’s reign—with a total strength of about 6,700.\textsuperscript{108} According to Zaionchkovskii, Loris-Melikov’s goal was to tighten working-level coordination between the gendarmes and local police. Ultimately his opponents blocked this goal, prolonging their decades-old contentious and competitive relationship.\textsuperscript{109} As commander of both the political and local police, however, the Director of the new Department had much greater political stature than the heads of the old Department Executive Police. Two Directors of State Police—Viacheslav

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 60310.
\item See, for example, 2nd PSZ, 54, nos. 60599 (44 additional police for Voronezh in Tambov province from city duma funds); 60407 (a policeman for Morshansk county in Tambov province to be paid for by the zemstvo) and 60431 (another police assessor for city of Kuznetsk in Saratov province to be paid for by city duma); and 55 (1880–81): 60789 (two patrolmen for Belogorod county of Kursk province to be paid for by the zemstvo).
\item 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): nos. 60500a, 60959, 61027, 61140, 61711, 61833, 61838, and 61853.
\item 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): nos. 61279, 61284.
\item On Loris-Melikov’s actions as Head of the Supreme Administrative Commission and Ministry of Internal Affairs, see Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 148–229 and 230–99, respectively.
\item 2nd PSZ, 54 (1979): no. 61550.
\item Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 174.
\item Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 244–48, 396–400.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
von Plehve and Petr Durnovo—would later rise to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs.\(^{110}\)

Unlike Timashev and Makov, Loris Melikov was an advocate of administrative and economic reforms. His supporters—and some opponents—have described his proposals as the seeds of a Russian constitution;\(^{111}\) but historians have generally described them as modest.\(^{112}\) His support for local self-government and focus on law and order implied a willingness to transfer more economic and judicial duties from the police to the zemstvos and courts. His short tenure, however, witnessed no such measures. On March 13, 1881 after surviving the bombing of his carriage, Alexander II was killed by a second bomb thrown by a member of the People’s Will. Unable to prevent Alexander II’s assassination, Loris-Melikov was also unable to win the support of the Tsar’s successor. On May 7, 1881 he resigned from the Ministry.\(^{113}\)

With Reutern gone from the Ministry of Finance and Dmitrii Miliutin retiring as Minister of War in 1881,\(^{114}\) police reform had no champions at the highest level of power. In October 1881, the Commission on Provincial and District Institutions was dissolved.\(^{115}\) Its passing after 22 years marked the end of a long debate between advocates of English-style police reform and champions of police expansion. While the latter had the upper hand, neither side had achieved a decisive triumph. Both the police rules of December 1862 and the laws increasing the number of rural policemen remained “temporary” measures and would stay so through the autocracy’s collapse.

\(^{110}\) Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917, 137, 142.


\(^{112}\) See, for example, Richard Pipes, Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 141; Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 104–14; and Venturi, Roots of Revolution, 689–93.


\(^{114}\) Both Reutern and Dmitrii Miliutin would occupy important positions after the death of Alexander II. Reutern as chairman of the Committee of Ministers, and Miliutin as a member of the State Council. Neither, however, retained the influence they had had as ministers. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar (B&E), s. v. “Reitern, Mikhail Khristiforovich” and “Miliutin, Dmitrii Alekseevich.”

\(^{115}\) “Komissiia o gubernskikh i uezdnih uchrezhdeniakh,” in Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv SSSR v Leningrade: Putevoditel’, eds. N. N. Valk and V. V. Bedina (Leningrad, 1956), 131.
Despite the failure of both sides in the long police debate to fully achieve their goals both left their mark upon the police. By the end of the reign of Alexander II the police had also changed in ways that neither side had expected. Some of both the planned and unanticipated changes had important consequence and some meshed poorly with one another. Also, while some individual changes can be quantified, others cannot.

New Units, New Weapons

Changes experienced by the police by 1881 that were unrelated to the debate over reform versus expansion involved their technical capabilities and weapons. In St. Petersburg in 1873 and in Moscow in 1881, the police established medical units that boosted their medical forensic capabilities and freed the rest of the two forces from duties they were ill equipped to perform. As Elisa Becker has shown, Russian physicians had had forensic responsibilities since the time of Peter the Great. After the 1864 judicial reform, when physicians’ testimony, like that of the police, could be challenged in court, coordination between police and prosecutors became more important. The existence of a medical division within the two capitals’ police forces facilitated this. And forensic medicine was neither the new units’ only nor the most important duty. They also supervised public sanitation to prevent and coun-

1 2nd PSZ, 48 (1873): no. 52032, shtaty i tabeli and 51 (1876): no. 56784, shtaty i tabeli; 3rd PSZ, 1 (1881): no. 111, shtaty i tabeli.
ter epidemic diseases; oversaw hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies; inspected prostitutes for syphilis; and performed other vital tasks. Staffed by trained physicians and veterinarians, they were centers of genuine expertise exercising roles the rest of the police force was supposed to fill but could not. As a result, their inclusion in the capital’s police relieved rather than worsened the local police’s burden.

The introduction of newer, more lethal weapons was another change affecting the police that was unrelated to the long debate over specialization versus expansion. An 1879 decree ordered both the rural and urban police, who had been armed only with swords in 1855, to carry revolvers. Even in a time of terrorist violence this was a momentous step, enough so that to reassure society, the authorities quickly issued detailed instructions on the permissible use of armed force.

**Rules for Police Use of Armed Force**

After arming the police with revolvers countrywide in 1879 the Committee of Ministers issued instructions on when the use of armed force was permissible. The instructions specified the following five situations in which policemen could use their weapons:

1. **To avert an armed attack upon the policeman.**
2. **To avert an unarmed attack by several persons on a single person if no other means of defense were possible.**
3. **When assisting those already under armed attack.**
4. **When arresting a criminal offering violent resistance or in flight.**
5. **When pursuing an escaped criminal offering violent resistance or in flight.**

The rules required a policeman using armed force to report the incident to his superior as soon as possible. They also specified that when called upon “to restore order,” police and gendarme commanders should announce their

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4 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 59576.
intention to use force three times in a loud voice and only use firearms when absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{\textdagger}

Other changes in the police had been on the agenda of Ministers of Internal Affairs since the late 1850s and early 1860s. The primary goals—numerical strength, improved personnel, and concentration on the prevention and suppression of crime—could and should have been complementary. Often, however, the authorities had pursued them as if they were alternatives. The result had been slow and uneven progress and a confused police mission. As in the past, significant differences also persisted between the metropolis and the rest of the country and the urban areas and the countryside.

**Numbers, Qualifications, and Workload**

The government’s efforts to increase the size of the force had varied from place to place as well as from time to time. In St. Petersburg, in 1866 Trepov had abandoned Valuev’s efforts to expand the force and focused on improving its personnel. As a result, while the capital’s population grew from about 668,000 in 1869 to about 832,000 in 1877, the number of policemen remained at its 1867 level of 1,350 and the number of sergeants stayed at 192. Trepov’s successors added 39 police sergeants in 1879 and another 239 in 1880.\textsuperscript{\textdaggerdbl} Still, even in the midst of terrorist attacks, funds for expansion remained tight. This was clearly evidenced in 1880, when while increasing the number of policemen, for fiscal reasons the government pledged to revisit its action after three years. Moscow’s police had a similar experience. The size of its police force remained roughly constant from the early 1860s until after the death of the Tsar. A reorganization of the Moscow force in late 1881 set the number of policemen at 1,450.\textsuperscript{\textsection}

Elsewhere, spending for the police was modest in the few years after the enactment of the Temporary Rules and slowed in the 1870s until the crisis at the end of that decade (Table 14).

\textsuperscript{\textdagger} 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 60066.
\textsuperscript{\textdaggerdbl} 2nd PSZ, 54 no. 60402; 55 (1880): no. 60816.
\textsuperscript{\textsection} 3rd PSZ, 1 (1881): no. 131, shtaty i tabeli.
Table 14: Spending for Town and County Police, 1858–1881

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Personnel Spending (rubles)</th>
<th>Annual Growth*</th>
<th>Operating Spending (rubles)</th>
<th>Annual Growth*</th>
<th>Total Spending (rubles)</th>
<th>Annual Growth*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4,247,998</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4,570,417</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4,009,612</td>
<td>-12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5,082,206</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>3,842,836</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,319,091</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5,161,927</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>4,882,937</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>1,641,077</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>6,524,014</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>5,059,195</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1,707,309</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6,766,504</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>5,215,492</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1,841,008</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7,056,500</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>5,144,418</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>1,870,184</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>7,014,603</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>5,162,891</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1,895,930</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>7,058,821</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>5,248,449</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2,014,028</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>7,262,477</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>5,321,680</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2,130,416</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7,452,096</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>5,431,848</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2,126,890</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>7,558,737</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>5,485,177</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2,194,638</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>7,679,815</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>6,117,163</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>2,192,088</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>8,309,251</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>6,618,288</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>3,277,886</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>9,896,174</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>10,241,436</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>7,505,416</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4,166,340</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>11,671,755</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Year over year or, when figures for successive years are not available, average for intervening years.

Sources: Expenditures for 1863 are from 2nd PSZ 37 (1862): no. 39087, art. 4. Expenditures for 1865 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 261. All other expenditures are from, Otchet gosudarstvennogo kontrolia po ispolneniiu gosudarstvennoi rospisi i finansovykh smet za . . . god (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo otdeleniiia Sobstvennoi E. I. V. kantseliarii, 1868–1882) and are ex post.

Differences in the type of data used in the table argue for caution in interpreting the first few years’ spending figures. The figures for 1863 and 1865, like those in Tables 5, 7, and 9, reflect planned or authorized spend-
Thereafter, the figures are actual expenditures reported by the State Comptroller pursuant to the financial reforms of the early and mid-1860s. The difference between authorized and actual expenditures in the early 1860s could be large for some years. In 1860, for example, the government had authorized a one-time allocation of 1,000,000 rubles to improve the local police; but two years later, Reutern reported that this money was still unspent. From 1866 on, however, year-to-year changes track well with known events such as the creation of 90 new districts in 1868 and of 5,000 mounted rangers in 1878.

Other sources indicate that the number of policemen outside the two capitals grew from 7,014 in 1857 to 8,194 in 1870. Until the 1874 reform of military conscription, however, as many as 6,000 of these were notoriously ill-qualified military detailers. In a handful of large cities, police numbers continued to increase in the few years that followed. By the mid-1870s Kharkov’s force was two-and-a half times its 1857 size and Odessa’s force was 60 percent larger. Rapid population growth in both cities, however, reduced the impact of these increases. Kharkov’s population more than tripled in this period; Odessa’s roughly doubled. In other cities, population growth was more modest, but the size of the patrol force was flat. In an effort to correct this, in 1878 the Special Conference called for 2,000 more police for Russia’s cities. The government’s response was to allocate 267,400 rubles to strengthen the police in nine cities in November 1878. In addition to covering only a single year this was less than half of the sum required to pay for 2,000 more police.

In the rural areas the expansion of the force was also slow until the end of the 1870s. In the few years after enactment of the Temporary Rules the

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8 2nd PSZ, 35 (1860): no. 35890, art. 5; MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 51.
10 Compare 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 53380, shtaty i tabeli (Kharkov) and 51 (1876): no. 55923, shtaty i tabeli (Odessa) with Trudy komissii o preobrazovanii guberniikh i nezadnykh schrezhdenni (St. Petersburg, 1860), part 1, book 4, 3.
12 Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviiia, 67.
13 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 59023. In 1876, according to 2nd PSZ 51, (1876): no. 55923, shtaty i tabeli the cost of Odessa’s 522-man police guard force was 142,984 rubles a year. Assuming the same per capita costs, a 2,000-man force would cost 547,831 rubles.
number of rural districts grew from 1,227 to 1,261 in response to governors’ requests and the extension of the Rules to Bessarabia. In 1868, the transfer of the state peasants from the Ministry of State Domains to the Ministry of Internal Affairs led to the creation of another 90 districts, which probably accounts for the spurt in spending in the year that followed. By 1878 the number of districts reached 1,368. The introduction of mounted and foot patrol forces in Samara, Perm, and Kazan did increase the police presence there but only by a total of about 500 police.

The establishment of the mounted ranger force in 1878 allowed the creation of 5,000 precincts below the district level. The next year saw the authorization of another 109 in May and June and 550 more in September. But to free up funds for the new force, the government abolished the precinct wardens in the Northwest Region and the mounted patrols in the Southwest. The combined strength of these forces was about 1,000 men. In addition, the new precincts were generally too large and too populous to be effectively patrolled by a single policeman. The Ministry of Internal Affairs boasted in 1881 that it was “very rare” for a precinct to be over 100 versts (66 miles) from one end to another and that only about a fifth of the precincts were 50 to 100 versts in width. The ratios of populace to rangers (Table 15), however, were orders of magnitude larger than in the cities. Also, the small size of the mounted force meant continuing police reliance on peasant wardens.

According to the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, in 1870 there were roughly 44,000 senior wardens and a quarter million junior wardens. There also were over 100,000 township and village elders. Neither the Commission nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, took comfort in these numbers or saw the wardens and elders as real police.

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14 Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitiiia administrativno-politeiskikh uchrezhdenii, 157–58. Anuchin does not mention the inclusion of Bessarabia and it is unclear whether his figure includes its districts. According to 2nd PSZ, 38 (1865): no.40140, Bessarabia became subject to the Temporary Rules in 1865; and according to MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 5 (1876), it had 21 districts.

15 2nd PSZ, 43 (1868): no. 45996.

16 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 58610, art.1.


18 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 59986.

19 2nd PSZ, 51 (1878): no.58610, art. 3.

20 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 1, 489 and sect. 4, 10.

21 Kratki ocherk deiatel’nosti Ministerstva inuennikh del za dvadsatipiatiletie 1855–1880 gg, 81.

22 Kratki ocherk deiatel’nosti Ministerstva inuennikh del, 77–78.

Recruiting more capable police had been a key goal of reformers such as Saltykov and Solov’ev and was one that to which their successors continued to profess their commitment.

**Table 15:** Rural Police Precincts by Population circa 1878

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precincts</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>Less than 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,698</td>
<td>10,000–20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>20,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Except in St. Petersburg, however, after the mid-1860s the authorities focused more on trying to increase police numbers than on improving their qualifications. After taking command of the St. Petersburg police in 1866, Trepov raised salaries to attract better recruits and trained them along English lines. Large budget increases in 1867 and 1869 boded well for his efforts.24 Still, while boasting of the large number of incompetents removed from the force, Trepov acknowledged continuing difficulty finding capable replacements. According to his annual reports, retired and furloughed soldiers, whose dominance of the force police chiefs and governors had bemoaned for years, remained the largest source of new police.25 And after 1869 the police budget stagnated. In 1873 the city received province-like status and Trepov became City Governor.26 Trepov’s own salary and the salaries of the rest of the force, however, were unchanged.27 In 1876, after a three-year review of the capital’s new status, the salaries previewed for 1877 were the same as 10 years before.28 By the time of his final annual report Trepov was complaining that low salaries had become

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24 The police budget was 907,439 rubles in 1867, according to *2nd PSZ*, 42 (1867): no. 44771, shtaty i tabeli.; 1,071,676 rubles in 1869, according to *Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1869 g.*, Prilozenie ("Vedomost’ o rashkhode na soderzhanie s-peterburgskoi politii"), 29; and 1,074,311 rubles in 1877, according to *2nd PSZ*, 51 (1876): no. 56784.  
25 See, for example, *Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 g.*, 153 and *Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1868 g.*, 151.  
26 *2nd PSZ*, 48 (1873): no. 52012.  
27 *2nd PSZ*, 48 (1873): no. 52032, shtaty i tabeli.  
28 Compare the shtaty i tabeli of *2nd PSZ*, 42 (1867): no. 44771 with *2nd PSZ*, 51 (1876): no. 56784.
a major obstacle to attracting good recruits. The quality of already employed police personnel also became the frequent subject of complaints by government officials and the public. According to Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, for example, an 1881 survey of the metropolitan police force showed a great number were incapable of taking up a protocol and many could not correctly sign their names.

Outside the two capitals, for both the municipal and the rural police the Temporary Rules of December 1862 had been a big step forward. In addition to tripling many police salaries, the Rules put an end to reserving the positions of municipal police chief for wounded and aged military veterans and the positions of their rural counterparts for the clients of local notables. Instead, the governors were to review the incumbents in their subordinate police forces, dismiss those who did not measure up to their jobs, and replace them with more qualified recruits. In the next few years the governors’ annual reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs were replete with claims of success. Thereafter, a small number of cities were able to follow such initial attempts to attract more capable police with subsequent salary increases. By the mid-1870s, for example, the salaries of police chiefs and district officers were twice as high in Kiev and Odessa as they had been in 1863. In other cities police officials’ salaries remained at their 1863 level.

The government made sporadic attempts to supplement police salaries with bonuses and other incentives. In 1865, for example, it authorized half a year’s salary for military detailees who remained on active duty after completing their mandatory service. Depending on how long they remained, they also could receive silver or gold chevrons to wear on their sleeves and a silver medal. In 1870, Trepov was authorized to promote up to one-fifth of the military officers in his force or to enroll them in one of Russia’s honorary orders. He also received 15,000 rubles for one-time awards of up to 50 rubles to policemen with five years of service. As a temporary measure, in anticipation of a pending change in the military conscription system, he also

29 Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1878 god, 20.
30 Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 2: 119.
31 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, art. 5.
32 See, for example, RGIA. fond 1281, opis’. 6, delo 27, “Po otchetu o sostoiianii iaroslavskoi gubernii za 1865 god,” 58; delo 34, “Po otchetu o sostoiianii kaluzhskoi gubernii za 1865,” 57–58.
33 2nd PSZ, 40 (1865): no. 44433, shtraty i tabeli.
34 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 55923, shtraty i tabeli.
35 2nd PSZ, 40 (1865): no. 42660.
A Police Balance Sheet

could arrange exemptions for policemen from being recalled to active duty.\(^\text{36}\) Later that year the same arrangements were extended to Moscow’s police force.\(^\text{37}\) In 1873, on the eve of the introduction of the new conscription system, all municipal police and firefighters were exempted from being called up for active military duty as long as they remained in their positions.\(^\text{38}\) And in 1877, governors and police commissioners were authorized to nominate policemen and firefighters for an excellent service medal.\(^\text{39}\)

In rural areas there were no increases in police salaries after 1863 and no other incentives. By the 1870s, the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions was complaining that pay was 60–70 percent too low to attract good recruits.\(^\text{40}\) In an 1876 survey of 32 governors, only seven described the rural police as capable of executing their assignment. Fifteen described them as incapable. Another ten responded with circumlocutions such as “about as good as can be expected, given their pay and working conditions.”\(^\text{41}\)

These complaints pertained to police officials of rank. At the bottom of the system salaries were worse and complaints about poor performance were more frequent and more intense. Even in Odessa and Kiev, where police salaries were higher than elsewhere, policemen were poorly paid. At a time when it required about 225 rubles a year to support a peasant family of three,\(^\text{42}\) policemen’s yearly salaries in these cities were 120–190 rubles.\(^\text{43}\) The salaries of the mounted patrols in Samara, Kazan, and Perm also were in this range;\(^\text{44}\) and according to the 1878 law creating a 5,000-man mounted police, the new policemen’s annual salaries were not to exceed 200 rubles.\(^\text{45}\) Uniformed like the municipal police (Figure 5), the rangers were sartorially impressive compared to the peasant wardens, but they reportedly were no more popular. Police scientist Ivan Tarasov reported that the rangers quickly met with

\(^{36}\) 2nd PSZ, 45 (1870): no. 48034.
\(^{37}\) 2nd PSZ, 45, no. 48839.
\(^{38}\) 2nd PSZ 47 (1873): no. 52438.
\(^{39}\) 2nd PSZ 52 (1877): no. 56962.
\(^{40}\) This estimate comes from the early 1870s. MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 1 (1871): 51–53.
\(^{41}\) “Otzyvy gubernatorov i chinov politsii o sposobakh i sredstvakh ispolneniia politsii razlichnykh obzia-
nostei vozlozhennykh na nee zakonom,” MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4 (1876).
\(^{42}\) P. A. Zaionchkovskii, ed. Krest’iashkov Denisovich v Rossii v 1870-1880 gg. (Moscow, 1968), 20.
\(^{43}\) 2nd PSZ, 50 (1873): no. 54433 and 51 (1874): no. 55923, both shtaty i tabeli.
\(^{44}\) On Perm and Kazan, see MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 5 (1871): item 2. On Samara, see 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 51241.
\(^{45}\) 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 58610, Proekt, art. 6.
Figure 5: The Rangers

Sources: Picture is from 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878): no. 58610, shtaty i tabeli

almost universal disapproval.46 Leroy-Beaulieu reported that they were ini-

46 Ivan Tarasov, Politiia v epokhu reform, 58.
tially well received but soon wore out their welcome. “At the start,” he wrote, “people could not find words enough to praise this excellent institution . . . Two or three years later the same unanimity prevailed but in the opposite direction.” Notes of the Fatherland maintained that “at least” two-thirds of the mounted police were recruited from the “dregs of society in mental and moral terms.”

The uniformed police’s salaries were lavish compared to those of the peasant wardens and their assistants. According the Commission on Provincial and District Institutions (see Table 16), of the roughly 17,000 paid wardens and 15,000 paid junior wardens, the vast majority made less than 50 rubles a year. About a tenth of the wardens and over a third of their juniors made less than 10 rubles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Salary</th>
<th>Wardens</th>
<th>Junior Wardens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 50 rubles</td>
<td>16,661</td>
<td>14,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–100 rubles</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–150 rubles</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150–200 rubles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200–250 rubles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the above</td>
<td>17,490</td>
<td>15,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The government’s failure to raise salaries to levels that could attract capable recruits was matched by failure to persuade those already in the force to serve long enough to benefit from their experience. This too had been a goal of the early reformers for whom the high turnover of police officials had been disturbing. Despite the authorities’ attempt to reduce the turnover, however, it grew worse as time progressed. The figures in Table 17 suggest as much. Compiled from the police rosters of five Russian provinces, they depict the changing percentage of policemen leaving the service in the successive stated intervals. Had the reformers’ plans succeeded, one would expect turnover to have been high before 1861,

47 Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 2: 123.
higher in the next few years, and decreasing thereafter. This would reflect the initially poor work conditions, the purging of incompetents after 1862, and the longer tenure resulting from higher salaries. The table suggests such results were rare. The figures for all police for 1861–1865 (part A) may be an exception, even allowing for the additional year included. (The unavailability of rosters did not allow for consistent three-year breakdowns.) The very high turnover in 1861–1865 could imply that governors did dismiss poor performers. With the possible exception of Vladimir, however, turnover was as high or higher after 1865 than before the Temporary Rules.

The figures for county police chiefs in Vladimir in part B of the table also suggest some success in reducing turnover there. To a lesser extent, the same may have been true in Novgorod. Elsewhere at the county level and in all the districts, however, the problem of excessive turnover worsened to judge from the table’s statistics. By the middle of the seventies the police were experiencing a total turnover of personnel in a five- or six-year period. Rather than evolving into a force of seasoned professionals, they were becoming more than ever before a collection of neophytes and transients.

**Table 17: Turnover of Police Personnel (in percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>1858/55 (%)</th>
<th>1861/58 (%)</th>
<th>1865/61 (%)</th>
<th>1868/65 (%)</th>
<th>1871/68 (%)</th>
<th>1874/71 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part A. All Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part B: County Police Chiefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part C: District Police Inspectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18: Incoming Policemen and Sergeants in St. Petersburg by Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate/Previous Position</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Pct. Of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retired Military Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Civilian Officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentry</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children of Clergy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Class</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers’ Children</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired/Furloughed Soldiers</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Detailees</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1241</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Vsepoddanneishii otchet... za 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870 gg.
The sources from which Table 17 are derived have no information on turnover in the lower ranks of the police and while some annual reports of the St. Petersburg provide such information, their message is unclear. Specifically, the reports for 1867 through 1870 included statistics on the number of policemen and sergeants entering the reserve division and the estate to which they belonged (see Table 18). Because the size of the reserve division was fixed, the number of incoming police should equal the number departing. As a result these figures provide some sense of the amount of turnover in these ranks. In a force of 1,350 policemen, 192 sergeants, and 150 police reservists these figures indicate that turnover for some years was high. The years for which this was so, however, were those in which Trepov was reducing the size of the force and trying to rid it of military detailees. Rather than highlighting a problem, therefore, the large numbers of entrants may have signaled Trepov’s success. The information on the estate and previous employment of the recruits, however, indicate that despite Trepov’s efforts to end the use of military detailees almost eight percent of the policemen continued to consist of such transferred personnel. And while freely hired—presumably after review of their qualifications by police supervisors—retired and furloughed soldiers still accounted for over half of entrants into the force.

Reducing the police’s voluminous responsibilities had been for a short time the most sought after of the police reformers’ goals. In 1858 and 1859 Saltykov, Solov’ev, and Nikolai Miliutin had urged the Minister of Internal Affairs to transform the police from a multipurpose administrative agency to a specialized security force. The Ministry’s commitment to this goal had wavered in later years. Still, when in his 1880 report Minister Lev Makov claimed to have achieved it, his claim had some basis in fact.49 The creation of the investigating magistrates in 1860 and the zemstvo and judicial reforms of 1864 had assigned what once had been exclusive police duties to new institutions. At the same time, the police had remained at least formally responsible for these duties under the Temporary Rules of 1862. This was a frequent source of confusion. Also, while the Temporary Rules were in force in 46 provinces by 1881, the zemstvo statute had been implemented only in 34 provinces and the judicial reform in 33 province-

49 Kratkii ocherk deiatel’nosti Ministerstva vnutrennikh del za dvadsatipiatiletie 1855–1880 gg., 73.
Three of the provinces that had neither zemstvos nor new courts (Archangel, Astrakhan, and Orenburg) had gentry populations too small to hold the necessary elections. The others were on or near the western border with populations the regime regarded as politically suspect. The duties of police in these provinces presumably remained the same as at the start of Alexander II’s reign.

In places where the investigative magistrates, zemstvo, and judicial reforms were introduced, the press and some provincial governors credited them for lightening the police’s burden. In 1868, for example, the *Herald of Europe* maintained that the introduction of investigating magistrates and new courts had reduced the capital police’s duties by more than half. The author, however, made no attempt to document the claim. General Trepov, a reactionery, was silent on this matter as he was on the impact of the 1870 city government reform on the police. According to one historian, Trepov deeply resented the reforms for giving legal status to court decisions but not to police directives. Some governors, like Trepov, focused on their personal accomplishment and need for more resources in their annual reports with only occasional tepid acknowledgments of the positive impact of the reform. Iaroslavl’s governors were exceptions. For reasons that may have involved simple consistency with their predecessors’ reporting practices, successive governors praised the impact of the reforms in their annual reports. In his report for 1861, for example, Governor Obolenskii wrote that the new investigating magistrates were helping the police as well as improving the administration of justice. In his report for 1863, Obolenskii’s successor Unkovskii repeated such praise. He also expressed the hope that the zemstvo and judicial reforms would bring more progress. By 1867 Unkovskii was writing of the “liberation” of the police. He also was claiming that their reduced duties were allowing them to focus on their primary mission—the protection of

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54 RGIA, fond 1281, opis’ 6, delo 41, 35.
55 RGIA, fond 1281, opis’ 6, delo 27, 49, 64–65.
social order and security.” In addition to making these claims Iaroslavl’s governors provided some basis for validating them. Specifically (see Table 19), they reported statistics for 1864–1869 on police activity in four of the province’s counties that give some indication of the practical impact of the judicial and zemstvo reforms on the police. Part A of the table tracks the number of *dela*—individual items of business or cases—and part B reports the amount of incoming paperwork. Because the zemstvos and courts were introduced in Iaroslavl’s counties in 1866, it is the period after that date should be of concern. If the new institutions had helped reduce police business, it would be reasonable to expect the figures on casework and paperwork to reflect this. The figures in Table 19 do exactly that. In 1867 or, in some instances, in 1866 both casework and paperwork began to decline. In most, though not every instance—witness Rybinsk in A and B—the decline continued or leveled off in the years that followed. When indexed to 1866, as in parts C and D of the table, the figures also indicate that the decrease was substantial, sometimes exceeding the 50 percent reduction a journalist claimed to have occurred in the imperial capital.

**Table 19: Level of Police Activity in Iaroslavl Province, 1864–1869**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1866</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Casework</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iaroslavl</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybinsk</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uglich</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myshkin</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Paperwork</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iaroslavl</td>
<td>7,365</td>
<td>7,191</td>
<td>8,534</td>
<td>7,105</td>
<td>6,514</td>
<td>6,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybinsk</td>
<td>11,019</td>
<td>11,266</td>
<td>10,705</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>9,951</td>
<td>10,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uglich</td>
<td>15,986</td>
<td>16,889</td>
<td>17,268</td>
<td>14,728</td>
<td>14,222</td>
<td>14,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myshkin</td>
<td>10,951</td>
<td>12,007</td>
<td>11,664</td>
<td>10,989</td>
<td>9,858</td>
<td>9,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>45,321</td>
<td>47,353</td>
<td>48,753</td>
<td>42,570</td>
<td>40,545</td>
<td>40,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56 *RGIA*, fond 1281, opis’ 7, dolo 32, 44.
57 *RGIA*, fond 1281, opis’ 7, dolo 32, 23; *Sudebnye ustavy 20 noyabria 1864 g. za piatidesiat’ let*, 2:1.
58 *Vestnik Evropy*, 1868, no. 4, 828.
Table 19 says nothing about the type of responsibilities still in police hands or whether they varied by province. An 1873 study by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, however, helps answer these questions.59 Its director asked the police in Iaroslavl and Kostroma provinces to assign each incoming item of business in January and July of 1872 to one of eight categories. Table 20 presents the results in modified form.

The categories used in the study and listed in the first column allow some conclusions about the extent to which police in the two provinces focused on the prevention and suppression of crime. All of category 6 and most of category 1 consist of crime-related duties; and category 4 included many duties related to the investigation of suspects. If these categories and no others are accepted as defining the mission that the police reformers had in mind, the police had a long way to go to achieve that goal. At the county level and in Kostroma’s districts responsibilities for maintaining internal security at most constituted 60–70 percent of police business. At the district level in Iaroslavl, in contrast, such duties accounted at most for barely 50 percent. And while the shares devoted to the various categories in both provinces’ districts were fairly similar, the same

was not true of their counties. In the director’s judgment, differences in the implementation of the zemstvo and judicial reforms, differences in the size and makeup of the populations in the two provinces, and differences in categorizing their business all contributed to the differences in the reported breakdown of the duties of Iaroslavl’s and Kostroma’s county police chiefs. He did not express great concern about the lack of standardization but was highly critical of the police’s lack of focus on preventing and suppressing crime.

In the next few years the government further burdened the police. In 1874 it abolished the arbiters of the peace and transferred many of their duties to the district police. The introduction of universal male military service also increased the police’s role in supervising mobilization.

Table 20: Distribution of Police Business in 1872
(percentage of total business)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>County Police</th>
<th>District Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iaroslavl</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iaroslavl</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Prevention and suppression of felonies, misdemeanors, disorders, epidemics, and livestock diseases; supervision of industrial and commercial regulations, passport rules, and so forth.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Prevention, extinguishing, and investigation of fires.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Recovery of taxes, obligations and duties, and arrears of various sorts.</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Execution of judicial decisions, serving subpoenas, escorting convicts and exiles to places of confinement, cooperation with investigating magistrates, and so forth.</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Promulgation of decisions of higher instances, execution of demands of superior offices and officials, gathering information for the local administration and for the higher echelons of government.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7%</th>
<th>1%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. Detection of criminals, recovery of property  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>13%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>27%</th>
<th>11%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

7. Inventory of confiscated property and auctioning of same.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3%</th>
<th>7%</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

8. Registration of furloughed military personnel and supervision of retired veterans.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figures may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. This is a simplified version of two tables that show absolute numbers rather than percentages and separate numbers for January and July.


In 1876, the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions did another study of police business. This one covered 55 counties and 52 districts in 29 provinces. Unlike the 1873 report, this survey used 20, not 8 categories of business. It also used only *paperwork* as a measure of activity and reported its results in broad ranges. Several respondents noted that because duties related to maintaining public order and investigating crimes were driven by events rather than by instructions from above, these duties tended to generate less paperwork than enforcement of the decisions of the central ministries and agencies. None of the respondents, however, disputed the main message of the survey’s results (Table 21) that activities most related to the fight against crime were taking a backseat to general administrative duties. Worse still, the comments on “judicial and investigative matters,” depicted them as distracting the police from crime fighting. Reportedly, a “majority” of the gov-

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61 "Отзвыв губернаторов и чинов полиции о способах и средствах исполнении полиции различных обязанностей возложенных на нее законом," *MSVUK*: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 1876.

62 *MSVUK*: OP, part 3, sect. 4.
ernors, presumably those in provinces operating under the judicial reform, complained that the new judicial institutions were increasing the police’s burden by requiring them to provide support that sometimes went beyond the law’s requirements. This claim was at least partly plausible. The judicial reforms did require the police to support the courts and enforce their decisions and the more efficient the courts the greater their demands upon them. Whether and—if so—how often, the courts’ demands went beyond legal requirements are much less clear; and the governors’ complaints may simply have reflected their and the police’s resentment of the courts’ authority. According to Russian legal historian N. Polianskii, there was frequent friction between the police and the justice of the peace courts, where the police believed their job to be done when they had brought charges against an accused and resentful when these charges were challenged.

Table 21: Numbers of Counties with Given Ranges of Incoming Paperwork in 1876

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>0–1,000</th>
<th>1,000–5,000</th>
<th>5,000–10,000</th>
<th>10,000–15,000</th>
<th>15,000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Making announcements, obtaining information, serving summons, publicizing and searching for property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collection of taxes and duties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Judicial and investigative matters</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Military obligations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Protection of property and possessions</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Protection of personal security and good order</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Otzyvy gubernatorov i chinov politsii o sposobakh i sredstvakh ispolneniiia politseiu razlichnykh obiazznostiui vozlozhennykh na nec zakonom,” MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 1876.

63 MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 319.
A Police Balance Sheet

International Comparisons

Comparing the development of Russia’s police with those of England and France also has light to shed on the results of the decades-long effort to improve them. Both Western countries were moving to strengthen their police even as Russia was doing so. In England the County and Borough Police Act of 1856, which required the establishment of police forces in villages, towns, and cities other than London, created three inspectors to determine the new police’s eligibility for Treasury grants. Their inspections amounted to a multiyear campaign for uniform professional standards that was crucial to the development of the modern English police.65 English officials also had to address high police turnover, the poor quality of police recruits, and other problems facing their Russian counterparts. In France the leadership of the Second Empire (1852–1870) worked to create and expand a system of commissaires not unlike the Russian sheriffs and police chiefs and to consolidate its rural and urban police.66 The Third Republic that replaced it in 1870 focused great attention on the reorganization and expansion of the police in France’s capital after suppressing the Paris Commune.67

Comparison of the Russian, English, and French police forces is most straightforward for their capitals, but differences in the coverage of the three countries’ statistics require caution in interpreting them. The number of inhabitants per policeman, for example (see Table 22), was a metric that Russia and other states used to track changes in their police forces. But at a minimum, comparisons of this metric must also take account of the differences in the size of the territory for which the respective forces were responsible. According to Trepov’s first annual report, St. Petersburg’s police patrolled 128 square miles of territory.68 This was only one-fifth the size of the 688 square miles that London’s police covered.69 It was, however, four

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68 Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 god., 141.
times the size of Paris even after the French capital’s annexation of neighboring suburbs in 1860.\(^7\circ\)

**Table 22:** Inhabitants per Patrolman by Capital, Selected Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>Paris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such differences aside, the changes in the ratio of inhabitants to policemen or constables help illuminate the Russian regime’s goals for the police.
and degree to which it achieved them. The narrowing difference between the ratios of inhabitants to police in St. Petersburg and London, for example, clearly reflected the early success of General Trepov’s efforts to make a bloated ineffective police force more like that of England’s capital. Trepov’s initial annual reports highlighted this metric along with other more explicit comparisons to the London police. Thereafter, London’s force expanded with the growth of its population, albeit at a slightly slower rate, but St. Petersburg’s did not expand. After 1869, Trepov no longer cited the ratio of people to police in his yearly reports. The widening difference between the ratios in St. Petersburg and Paris in the 1860s, in turn, reflect Trepov’s efforts to streamline his force and the efforts of both the Second Empire and the Third Republic to maintain tight control over a historically rebellious city.

Russia’s use of military detailees in police patrols in cities other than St. Petersburg precludes easy comparison of their ratio of inhabitants to policemen with those of cities in England or France. Until the 1874 military reform put an end to the transfer of troops to city patrols, most Russian cities relied on unqualified soldier as policemen. England did not approximate Russia’s 1857 average ratio of 714 city dwellers to one patrolman until 1874–1875, and thereafter this ratio changed only slowly. But its city policemen were hired recruits not military transfers. As such, they were more likely to be interested in a career and could be more easily dismissed for poor performance. In France under both the Second Empire and the Third Republic the number of police in cities outside Paris was small. Cities such as Lille and Rouen had ratios of citizens to police as high as 1,000:1. As in the capital, however, their policemen were hired employees, not detailees, and were subject to dismissal for even minor infractions.

Differences in the size of the rural police presence in Russia, England, and France were larger and more consequential. Of the three, Russia faced the greatest challenge because of the vastness of its rural territories and

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71 Vsepoddaneishii otchet . . . za 1867, 141; Vsepoddaneishii otchet...za 1869, 108.
72 See Chapter 4, p. 109 of this study.
73 The average ratio was 738 inhabitants per constable in 1874–1875 and 722 per constable in 1887. Durston, Burglars and Bobbies, 87; and W. T. Stead, “The Police and the Criminals of London -I.” The Pall Mall Gazette, October 8, 1888, as posted on the W. T. Stead Resource Site, attackinghthewall.co.uk
74 Georges Carrot, Histoire de la police francaise, 146.
until the introduction of the rangers in 1878 it did little to narrow this gap. Only the handful of provinces with mounted guards had anything resembling England’s rural constables or the gendarmes who were France’s primary rural police. Even then less than a fifth of the rangers were responsible for precincts with populations below 5,000; and in two-fifths of the precincts the population exceeded 10,000. In England the median population per rural constable was much smaller, falling from roughly 1,500 in 1858 to about 1,200 two decades later.\(^77\) In France, rural policing fell to a gendarme force that ranged between 20,000 and 24,000 in size organized into 3,624 brigades, each with five or six horsemen or policemen.\(^78\) These brigades were dispersed throughout the country, generally guarding major roadways. Their number exceeded the size of the entire English county police and was larger than Russia’s gendarmes and local police combined, including those in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Russia’s slight success in developing professional policemen relative to that of England and France was another indicator of the limited payoff of its efforts to strengthen the police. Russia’s best conceived approach was in St. Petersburg, which combined increases in salary for police supervisors with training for the lower ranks. When police spending plateaued, however, recruitment became less effective. Elsewhere, Russia’s attempt to recruit more capable police was limited to raising the pay of police chiefs, sheriffs, and inspectors under the Temporary Rules. As evidenced by the quick return to high turnover among these officials (recall Table 17), the positive impact of such raises was short-lived.

In England, salary increases were slower in coming but efforts to retain police personnel were more successful. In London in 1869, constables’ salaries remained as they had been 40 years earlier.\(^79\) Police also faced harsh discipline, 60–70 hour work weeks, frequent physical attacks, and some killings that discouraged seeking long-term careers.\(^80\) These concerns also gave rise to


labor militancy. In 1872, about 3,000 sergeants and constables participated in a mass meeting and short-lived strike to protest poor pay and working conditions.\(^8^1\) The policy of restricting hiring from outside the force save for a few topmost posts, however, left no alternative than to promote inspectors from sergeants’ and constables’ ranks. The prospect of promotion—however slow and infrequent—plus a rise in salaries after the dismissal of the strike leaders contributed to slowing turnover in the 1870s.\(^8^2\) A different situation prevailed in the counties. There, the chief constables—the counterparts of Russia’s sheriffs—came mostly from the local gentry and preferred hiring inspectors from the outside rather than promoting constables or sergeants who generally had been local farm laborers. According to historian Carolyn Steedman, the result was to create a group of several hundred inspectors who could not advance to chief constable and remained in their positions for years, coming to think of themselves as policemen in a way that the constables did not.\(^8^3\) In English cities and towns other than London, most chief constables as well as inspectors had risen either through the ranks of their own department or by transferring from one force to another in search of advancement.\(^8^4\) And for towns and counties alike the inspection process mandated by the 1856 police statute contributed to raising professional standards.\(^8^5\)

France’s approach to the development of its police differed from Russia’s and England’s. According to a Prefect of Police in the 1850s, “unequivocal, absolute devotion to the . . . government” was the main criterion for service in the police.\(^8^6\) Still, the large salary increases he introduced in 1854 probably attracted more capable as well as more politically reliable police.\(^8^7\) And, according to Elmsley, in time the *commissaires* began to see themselves as professionals with careers that might involve moving from small towns to bigger cities.\(^8^8\)

A focus on the fight against crime was another characteristic of the English and French police that Russia sought to emulate. Russian commen-

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\(^8^6\) As quoted in Payne, *The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte*, 208.
\(^8^7\) On the size of the salary increases, see Payne, *The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte*, 214.
\(^8^8\) Elmsley, "A Typology of Nineteenth Century Police," 12.
tary often exaggerated both England’s and France’s success on this front. Even as Gromeka and Saltykov were praising England for concentrating on the fight against crime, for example, English local governments were construing the 1856 Police Act as authorizing their use for inspecting weights and measures, collecting taxes, surveying roads, and other administrative tasks.\textsuperscript{89} Similarly, in 1866, a Russian study of foreign police systems maintained that there was no other country than France in which it was harder to conceal a crime or hide a criminal.\textsuperscript{90} At the time Paris had a long tradition of using detectives, but there were no detectives or investigating magistrates elsewhere in the country.\textsuperscript{91}

Given the great differences in the three countries’ courts and crime statistics, metrics such as the number, geographic dispersal, and skill of their detectives, while crude, may be the best source of insight on the relative focus on crime by the Russian, English, and French police. Measured in terms of numbers and presence throughout the country, by the late 1870s Russia’s police trailed their English counterparts by a wide margin and the French police by a smaller one. St. Petersburg’s detective division had an authorized strength of 20 near the end of Trepov’s tenure.\textsuperscript{92} One year later London’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had 250 men; by 1884, it had 800.\textsuperscript{93} In 1878, the Russian regime only grudgingly approved the Special Conference’s plan to create detective forces in cities other than St. Petersburg; and it is unclear whether any cities did so.\textsuperscript{94} In England by the 1880s, relative to the size of their police forces, Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham had bigger detective divisions than London’s Metropolitan Police.\textsuperscript{95} These cities also benefitted from the assistance of the Metropolitan Police, which had circulated photographs and biographical records of recidivists since 1880.\textsuperscript{96} France’s Sûreté had 141 detectives in 1872, all based in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[89] Steedman, \textit{Policing the Victorian Community}, 53.
\item[90] FNU Annenkov, \textit{Politseiskie postanovleniia inostrannykh gosudarstv} (St. Petersburg: Akademiia nauk, 1866), 1: i.
\item[92] 2nd PSZ, 51 1876: no. 56784, shtry i tabeli.
\item[93] Critchley, \textit{A History of Police in England and Wales}, 161.
\item[94] See Chapter 4 in this book, “Police Expansion at Gunpoint.”
\item[95] Durston, \textit{Burglars and Bobbies}, 200.
\item[96] Shpayer-Makov, \textit{The Ascent of the Detective}, 49.
\end{footnotes}
Paris. Meanwhile, measured in qualitative terms, Russia’s detectives definitely trailed those of both England and France with France’s probably ranking first. Observers such as Howard Vincent, the creator of London’s CID, based his reorganization of London’s detectives on the Paris force. According to police historian Gregory Durston, Vincent viewed Paris’s detectives as far superior to London’s. Durston also reports that English officials and the educated public generally shared this view.

**Performance against Crime**

Comparisons with England and France aside, the fight against crime definitely became more important in Russia as Alexander II’s reign progressed. This was particularly true in St. Petersburg. There, population growth and industrial development were widely perceived to be contributing to a breakdown of order that demanded a police response. From his earliest days as Police Commissioner, St. Petersburg’s Trepov responded with initiatives such as the introduction of a detective division and the river police. Trepov also initiated the collection and publication of statistics on arrests and crime both to highlight the importance of the police’s crime-fighting mission for the police themselves and to encourage the public to support them. With the latter goal in mind, in 1870 he also overhauled the *St. Petersburg City Police Gazette* to include accounts of police cases likely to interest the public. In his report for 1870 Trepov cited the accounts of the murder of a Count and of a strike at the Nevskii Cotton Mill as pieces that had attracted particular attention. In the same report he expressed the hope that such information would translate into better public understanding of and support for the police.

Statistics in Trepov’s annual reports (Table 23) offer an interesting picture of police priorities, public willingness to report crimes, and social conditions in St. Petersburg. The difference between the large number of arrests in Part A and the much smaller number of reported crimes in Part B, for example, makes it clear that the St. Petersburg police saw their primary job as maintaining good order.

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99 Durston, *Burglars and Bobbies*, 189.
100 *Vseppoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1870 g* (St. Petersburg, 1871), iv.
Table 23: Arrests and Crimes in St. Petersburg, 1867–1878

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Offense/Year</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1872</th>
<th>1873</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drunkards</td>
<td>26,616</td>
<td>32,217</td>
<td>34,622</td>
<td>29,334</td>
<td>33,745</td>
<td>31,115</td>
<td>27,566</td>
<td>24,771</td>
<td>24,232</td>
<td>21,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beggars</td>
<td>6,026</td>
<td>9,338</td>
<td>8,985</td>
<td>4,453</td>
<td>6,246</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>4,840</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>5,464</td>
<td>3,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Vagrants*</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>4,049</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>3,252</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>2,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrants</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport Violators</td>
<td>6,992</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>11,459</td>
<td>6,613</td>
<td>6,599</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>8,948</td>
<td>7,766</td>
<td>8,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserters</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected Criminals</td>
<td>6,038</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>7,842</td>
<td>7,610</td>
<td>115**</td>
<td>7,198</td>
<td>6,387</td>
<td>7,987</td>
<td>7,063</td>
<td>7,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbers of the Peace</td>
<td>4,199</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>7,105</td>
<td>520**</td>
<td>6,337</td>
<td>5,793</td>
<td>6,870</td>
<td>5,292</td>
<td>7,013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Offense</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1872</th>
<th>1873</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacrilege</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>3,481</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td>3,060</td>
<td>2,911</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>3,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfeiting</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These statistics come from the annual reports of the St. Petersburg police. I was unable to locate the 1871 report, and the 1870 report did not include such statistics.

NR= not reported
*Unregistered prostitutes.
**As reported.
in the streets rather than protecting the citizenry. It also suggests the public had low expectations that crimes against life and property would be investigated.

The large number of arrests for drunkenness, begging, and female vagrancy in the late 1860s may also have reflected the high incidence of alcoholism and the worsening plight of the poor, particularly unemployed women. Abolition of local monopolies over the sale of vodka had led the number of taverns to soar and the price of drink to fall.\textsuperscript{101} An influx of women in search of employment was also occurring while population growth was outstripping the increase in jobs.\textsuperscript{102} Public officials, the press, diarists, and the Tsar himself all claimed to have observed signs such problems were worsening.\textsuperscript{103} Doctors also reported a surge in deaths from exposure and syphilis.\textsuperscript{104}

The significance of the large declines in arrests for offenses against public order reported for the 1870s is harder to assess. It is possible that actual drunkenness, begging, and similar behaviors were declining in those years, as were the arrests for these offenses. At the same time, as Table 2.4 shows more clearly, the declines were so large and fast as to warrant skepticism that these behaviors were changing as implied. And because this was a period of rapid population growth, these figures imply even more rapid declines in arrests per inhabitant.

An alternative interpretation is that the fall in arrests reflected the police’s shift in tactics to what might be termed a preemptive approach. In 1872, for example, the police used the internal passport system to require laid off peasant factory workers, to return to their villages.\textsuperscript{105} Trepov’s report described these workers as especially likely to slip into a life of crime. It also described this move as a way of preempting labor unrest, citing that year’s large and violent strike at the Kreenholm factory in Estland Province as the type of development his police were trying to prevent.\textsuperscript{106} In 1873, the police closed several hundred of the capital’s taverns, depicting them as seedbeds for crime and probably also regarding them as venues for plotting conspiracies.\textsuperscript{107} While neither measure had any observable impact on arrests for other offenses against public order, both could well have translated into a lower incidence of drunkenness, begging,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{104} Reginald Zelnik, \textit{Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia}, 279–82.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Vsepoddanneishii otchet ... za 1872 g.} (St. Petersburg, 1873), 4.
\textsuperscript{106} See Zelnik, \textit{Law and Disorder on the Narova River: The Kreenholm Strike of 1872}.
\textsuperscript{107} The shutdowns were implemented under the terms of 2nd PSZ, 47 (1873): no. 52394.
\end{flushleft}
Table 2.4: Increase in Arrests and Crimes in St. Petersburg, 1867–1878
(As percentages of the first year in which the statistic was reported.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Arrests for Offenses against Public Order (all figures in percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offense/Year 1867 1868 1869 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunkards</td>
<td>100 121 130 110 127 117 104 93 91 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beggars</td>
<td>100 155 149 74 104 68 80 70 91 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Vagrants*</td>
<td>100 89 132 135 132 109 70 83 70 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrants</td>
<td>100 NR 80 37 48 37 31 23 10 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport Violators</td>
<td>100 NR 164 95 94 105 121 128 111 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserters</td>
<td>100 NR 126 81 130 56 56 41 74 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected Criminals</td>
<td>100 NR 130 126 NR 119 106 132 117 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbers of the Peace</td>
<td>100 NR 133 169 NR 151 138 164 126 167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.</th>
<th>Reported Crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sacrilege 100 47 24 24 41 35 6 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murder 100 71 157 186 257 257 114 171 229 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arson 100 800 1100 350 400 300 400 550 250 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rape NR 100 92 77 215 146 69 46 46 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theft 100 111 126 191 179 141 168 159 167 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterfeiting NR 100 103 NR 45 15 10 5 NR NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NR = Not reported.
and vagrancy. The police’s shift in tactics may also have contributed to the 1870s’ rise in reported thefts, the only crimes against life or property for which the statistics are large enough to allow analysis. Here too, the increased reports of theft may have reflected worsening economic hardship or population growth. But a plausible case can be made that the police used the resources freed up by their new tactics against offenses against public order to focus more on theft and that in response the public brought more of such crimes to their attention.

The savings in time and effort resulting from the police’s more efficient tactics against drunkenness and vagrancy probably increased their opportunity to focus on other offenses. Closing taverns in the capital, while likely to have increased underground vodka sales and drunkenness in the suburbs, only required cancelling or refusing to renew their licenses. Such an approach consumed far fewer resources than arresting drunks on the street. Trepov’s account of how the police handled what was in effect the exile of fired workers after the shutdown of a plant on Vasil’evskii Island also suggests that this was a simple process. Informed beforehand by management, the police were at the factory gates when the shutdown was announced to dispatch its peasant workers to the provinces. Such behavior undoubtedly had little appeal to the lower classes, who, in any event, were not the audience Trepov was targeting in his reports. Rather, like the descriptions and statistics on the police’s success (Table 25), they were intended to appeal to people of means. To judge from the press’s praise for the detective division, this appeal had some success. To the extent to which this was true, the public may well have begun to report more crimes in the expectation they would be investigated.

Table 25: Thefts and Robberies Successfully Investigated by St. Petersburg Detectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1872</th>
<th>1873</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Success is defined as arrest of perpetrator but not necessarily recovering property.
Sources: Statistics come from annual police reports published during 1867–1878. I was unable to locate the 1871 report; the reports for 1868, 1877, and 1878 did not include such statistics.

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108 Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1872 g., 5.
However successful the police’s tactics, their fate was tied to Trepov’s. While the General survived Vera Zasulich’s attack, the notoriety ended his career. With his departure, publication of the annual reports and crime statistics ceased as the police concentrated more on the struggle against revolutionaries. Turnover at the top of the force probably also made it more difficult to pursue consistent police goals. While Trepov had served for a dozen years, three different individuals headed the force in the three years after his ouster, resulting in a return to the high turnover rate of the pre-Trepov years and probably to the policy drift.

In other cities and towns with a few exceptions the police focused less on developing their crime-fighting capabilities. Odessa, for example, was one of the Empire’s largest cities and had province-like status years before St. Petersburg. At least as late as 1876, however, it had no detective division and probably lacked one two years later when the central authorities provided funds for introducing detectives into the major cities. Elsewhere, the central government established crime-fighting units in cities and counties it perceived to have special need for them. In 1870, for example, it created mixed foot and mounted police commands in Perm and Kazan provinces, the former a growing industrial center in the Urals and the latter a transit route for Siberia-bound runaways. Perm’s 200-man force made about 630 arrests in its first year in action. Arrests increased rapidly in each of the next three years and by the end of 1874 were almost double their initial level. Kazan’s police patrol was three-quarter the size of Perm’s and so were its total arrests for this period. Both, however, focused more on vagrants, deserters, passport offenders, and disturbers of the peace than on crimes against property and persons, which accounted for only 17 percent of total arrests. In 1874 and 1876, the authorities created similar guard detachments for Samara and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces, in the latter case to enhance security at the large annual trading fair. The Perm, Kazan, Samara, and Nizhnii Novgorod forces were all to be “temporary,” pending the replacement of the

110 This was done under 2nd PSZ, 53 (1878); no. 59024.
111 2nd PSZ, 45 (1870): no. 48531.
112 On the size of the Perm and Kazan commands, see MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 5 (1871), item 2, 16–23. On
the crime statistics for 1873–74, see MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 3 (1876), item 2, “Vedomost’ o prestupleniakh i pro stupakh obnaruzhennykh strazhnikami, v 1871–1874 godakh,” 28–35.
113 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 53245 and 50 (1875): no. 54766.
Temporary Rules with a permanent police statute. In addition, even in the provinces with mounted patrols, the government acknowledged—in its 1876 study of police paperwork—that the absence of trained detectives made it all but impossible to investigate crimes such as extortion. It also acknowledged that even simple theft and robbery were often impossible for the district police to cover given the large size of their districts. This was particularly true in districts with no mounted police forces.

The establishment of the mounted ranger force in 1878, while prompted by terrorism, also had important implications for the fight against crime. The lack of police mobility and small police presence in the countryside, both of which this measure addressed, had long been viewed as near insurmountable obstacles to successfully fighting crime there. In a probable effort to improve public perceptions of the rangers, Minister of Internal Affairs Makov made much of their crime-fighting work in a published 1880 report. The figures he cited for the initial five months of the rangers’ activity if annualized by projecting the implicit rate of arrests per month would amount to only one arrest per ranger. If complete, however, his statistics also indicated that 70 percent of the arrests were for crimes against persons and property. These included theft, horse rustling, robbery, murder, and arson. Makov may have been selective in the numbers he reported and omitted offenses such as passport violations and vagrancy. If so, he was also understating the rangers’ level of activity and reflecting an uncharacteristic regard for the expectations of the public.

Performance of Non-Crime Duties

For all the complaints that the police’s economic and general administrative duties were distracting them from the fight against crime, their performance of these duties remained important through Alexander II’s tenure. By all accounts, the police’s execution of these duties was poor; and their increased attention to law-and-order, however limited, may have been partly at fault. This was particularly true in provinces with no zemstvos or reformed city councils. There, more attention to crime meant less attention

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to other duties. But even where the new institutions did exist, the police could not simply leave their non-crime-related duties to them. Instead, lawmakers’ failure to provide the new institutions with non-police agents to implement their decisions left them dependent upon the police for support. When, as often happened, they did not receive such support, they joined the provincial governors and other government officials in criticizing the police’s performance. Although frequently depicted as bitter adversaries, governors and local governments often proposed the same or similar remedies.

The police’s poor execution of their administrative and economic responsibilities was a major theme in the 1876 survey of police paperwork. A “majority” of the governors complained that their duties for protecting public health and preventing livestock diseases were executed only on paper. Some charged that in provinces without zemstvos the police struggled to monitor food supplies and prices and that in those with zemstvos, they ignored these duties. The governors were sharply critical of the police’s important tax collection work. Volhynia’s governor called for a new tax collection agency. Governors also were highly skeptical that the police could perform as required in a military mobilization.

The zemstvos expressed their views on the police’s handling of their non-crime related duties clearly and vehemently in response to an 1880 invitation from the Internal Affairs Ministry to discuss the management of peasant affairs. Ignoring their narrow instructions, most zemstvos addressed all of local government, including the police. After years in which opponents of English style police reform had headed the Ministry, the zemstvos had become by default the major defenders of this approach. But they also had identified a gap in the plans of Saltykov, Solov’ev, and Nikolai Miliutin: the failure to explain who would enforce their decisions. This was evident in a contemporary’s account of their responses. The Moscow

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117 MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 130–32.
118 MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 212–13, 231, 238, 260.
119 MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 221.
120 MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 4, 313–14.
121 On how the zemstvos were able to disregard the Ministry’s instructions and engage in a broader discussion, see V. Iu. Skalon, Zemskie vzgliady na reformu mestnogo upravleniia (Moscow: S. P. Iakovlev, 1884), 1.
and Voronezh provincial zemstvo, for example, urged limiting the police’s mission to the fight against crime, the course the early police reformers had chosen.\textsuperscript{122} Other zemstvos echoed this. At the same time, they also called for the creation of new agencies to assume the police’s general administrative and economic duties, particularly tax collection. The Pskov provincial assembly went so far as urge creating a zemstvo-controlled police.\textsuperscript{123} Others recommended a state-controlled force, arguing that putting the zemstvos in charge might make them cogs in the law enforcement system.\textsuperscript{124} Far from being politically selfless, such recommendations displayed strong concern for the zemstvos’ self-interest. But they also reflected a recognition that, whoever was in charge, improving upon the local police’s handling of local administrative and economic matters would benefit the zemstvos as well as the government.

\textbf{Summing Up}

The surveys discussed above allow three firm conclusions. These pertain to the size and composition of the police’s workload, the police’s qualifications, and their numerical strength. On the first of these subjects our sources suggest early but incomplete success in achieving the reformers’ goals with some backward movement in the 1870s. Governors’ reports, press, and statistics from Iaroslavl Province suggest that the zemstvo and judicial reforms initially reduced the local police’s workload by about 50 percent. Later surveys by Prince Leuchtenberg and others, however, also suggest the share of police duties unrelated to maintaining law and order was substantial. They also indicate that it varied greatly by region. Elimination of the arbiters of the peace probably increased such duties at least slightly. So too did the 1874 military reform. And in the 13 provinces not under the zemstvo and judicial reforms, the police’s workload was as heavy and varied in 1881 as it had been in 1855.

Multiple sources also indicate that after slight improvement in the mid-1860s, the quality of police personnel returned to its abysmal pre-reform state. Official sources such as the Commission on Provincial and County

\textsuperscript{122} Skalon, \textit{Zemskie vzgliady}, 168–69.
\textsuperscript{123} Skalon, \textit{Zemskie vzgliady}, 173.
\textsuperscript{124} Skalon, \textit{Zemskie vzgliady}, 170, 183.
Institutions acknowledged as much in their appeals for additional funds for salaries. They tended to dwell on the deficiencies of the village wardens whom the authorities wished to replace. Police scientists such as Ivan Tarasov in his 1885 study, *Police in the Age of Reform* did much the same. Others, such as the French scholar Leroy-Beaulieu were more direct and colorful. The Frenchman described the police as ignorant, indolent, and venal overall, and worse as one moved from city to countryside. By his account, the city police were impressive at first glance but incompetent and careless to all who had to deal with them. In the rural areas, they were defective and abusive; and at the precinct level, the mounted police were the scourge of the populace they were created to protect.

With respect to numerical strength, the police were strongest in the cities but years of neglect had eroded their strength by the end of the 1870s. The Special Commission’s quick infusion of resources into the largest cities testified to its recognition of such neglect. In the rural areas, the statements and proposals of successive Ministers of Internal Affairs told a grimmer story. At the start of the reign Lanskoï had described it as physically impossible for the police inspectors to do their job given the size of the rural districts. To remedy this, Valuev had proposed a force of 6,600 men to patrol three quarters of the provinces. Timashev had requested 150,000 men; and the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions had asked for almost 20,000—three times greater than the eventual size of the ranger force. By the end of Alexander II’s reign the rural areas remained largely unpolicéd save for the village wardens who were universally acknowledged to be incapable.

These separate conclusions add up to judgment that the decades-long effort to improve Russia’s local police had failed. In an article published a few years before the end of Alexander II’s reign, police scientist Ivan Andreevskii observed that the local police still bore the mark of their eighteenth-century origins. Andreevskii, whose work had influenced the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, was an expert on the police of other contemporary European states and a student of Russia’s own police history whose judgments commanded wide respect. In this instance his judgment

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A Police Balance Sheet

was a damning one, implying that after years of attempted reform and reorganization, the local police were still a backward force out of place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. To judge from the evidence examined in this study, this judgment was accurate. It also had important negative consequences that require detailed discussion.
Chapter 6

Consequences and Implications

Both the changes the regime made to the police and those it failed to complete had long-term consequences that ranged from shifts in the bureaucratic balance of power to farther-reaching damage to society and the state. Worsened rural lawlessness and continued reliance on the army to restore order in towns and peasant villages were among the most harmful consequences. So too were damage to the center’s ability to enforce its writ and increased popular resentment of the authorities. Failure to complete police reform also impeded the development of the new courts and elected local governments. Because Alexander II’s successors neither reversed nor completed his police reform agenda, the consequences of what he did and did not accomplish would be felt into the twentieth century. The Temporary Rules of December 1962, for example, remained in force until tsarism’s fall in 1917 and the police’s duties were never redefined in light of the Great Reforms. Also, after the introduction of the mounted rangers in 1878–1879, major expansion of the rural police did not occur until 1903, when the government replaced 67,000 village wardens with 40,000 salaried, armed, and uniformed village guards.¹ This force—which was described as “temporary”—was to allow the ratio of police to rural inhabitants to reach but not exceed 1:2,600—lower than the target set for Congress Poland (1:2,500) in 1866.² Nothing was done to increase this ratio in the Romanovs’ remaining years in power. Instead the regime increased the mobility of the force, first setting the share of mounted guards at 25 percent and later authorizing higher shares where conditions warranted this.³ In the cities the regime enacted

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¹ 3rd PSZ, 23 (1903): no. 22906; and Weissman, “Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914,” 50.
² On the Polish target, see 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 44011.
dozens of ad hoc increases in police positions and salaries rather than taking a comprehensive approach. As a result, many rapidly growing cities had only small police forces by the early twentieth century and police salaries ranged from modest to abysmal.\(^4\) In 1912 when the Council of Ministers reviewed the state of the police, its account of police problems echoed Lanskoi’s 1855 complaints. Too heavy a workload, inadequate numbers, poor pay, and competitive relations with the political police were at the top of its list of police defects.\(^5\)

**Ministerial Gains, Loss of Local Control**

For all the limitations of the mounted rangers, their creation gave the Ministry of Internal Affairs a larger local presence, increasing the advantage it had long enjoyed over other ministries. This did not transform its chief into de facto prime minister as Loris-Melikov had virtually been. It did, however, convey great political influence. Between the 1905 Revolution and the establishment of a republic in February 1917 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was, in effect, Russia’s Prime Minister. Of the seven men who held that post three—Goremykin, Stolypin, and Sturmer—had been Ministers of Internal Affairs and a fourth—A. F. Trepov—had served in that Ministry. Two—Stolypin and Sturmer—served simultaneously as Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs and made control of the police a key governing tool.\(^6\)

Making the Minister of Internal Affairs the Chief of Gendarmes also bolstered the Minister’s stature and initially promised to improve cooperation between the two police forces. Within months of Alexander II’s death, however, his successor removed the gendarmes from the provincial governors’ control. This eliminated the tool Loris-Melikov had planned to use to improve the division of labor between gendarmes and local police.\(^7\) The gendarmes also remained part of the military, which limited the Internal Affairs

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\(^4\) Weissman, “Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914,” 48, 52.

\(^5\) Thurston, *Liberal City, Conservative State*, 103.


\(^7\) Hingley, *The Russian Secret Police*, 71–72.
Minister’s control over them. This remained true until the fall of tsarism. Even Peter Stolypin, one of two Ministers of Internal Affair to serve simultaneously—in 1906–1911—as Prime Minister was unable to promote a protégé in the Corps of Gendarmes because of opposition from the War Ministry.

Reducing already weak local control over the local police was another consequence of the changes made under Alexander II. The provincial gentry and city governments were the two groups most affected by this process. Before the Age of the Great Reforms, the landlords had policed their own estates and elected the rural sheriffs and their senior associates. The former had been key to their power. The latter, to the amazement of foreign visitors such as Baron Haxthausen, had been undervalued by the gentry and had never been an effective instrument of political power. Still, after the abolition of serfdom put an end to the landlords’ direct police powers, some conservative officials and gentry spokesman had had second thoughts about the utility of the gentry’s involvement in the management of the police. Minister of Internal Affairs Valuev had argued for leaving the election of the sheriff’s assistant in gentry hands, only to have the Temporary Rules of December 1862 make this an appointed position.

Liberal gentry spokesman A. A. Golovachev also came to regret the loss of the right to elect county sheriffs. Golovachev had typified the gentry’s indifference to local affairs until the run-up to Emancipation, when he and fellow members of the Tver gentry emerged as aggressive advocates of self-government. Later, in his classic study of the early post-Emancipation years, Golovachev argued that the revocation of the gentry’s right to elect the sheriffs had been a costly loss for which the creation of the zemstvos had been inadequate compensation.

Neither Valuev nor his more conservative successors made any effort to restore the gentry’s pre-1862 role in electing the police. All of them, however, chose not to act on provincial governors’ frequent calls to eliminate the members of the county police administrations elected by the gentry and other

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8 * Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (B&E), s. v. “Zhandarmy.”
10 * MSV’UK: OP*, part 1, sect. 3, 4–5.
estates. These positions would survive until 1889, when the State Council accepted a recommendation from the Minister of Internal Affairs to eliminate them. In the interim they had no real power, contributed nothing to policing the countryside, and served only to consume scarce funds that would have better gone to raising the salaries of other personnel.

City governments’ control over the police had been waning before Alexander II came to the throne. As was true of the landlords, their loss was in large-part self-inflicted. Specifically, by replacing citizen patrols and hired guards with military detailees the cities had reduced the service requirements of their citizenry and achieved monetary savings at the cost of also weakening their own control over police personnel. And the savings achieved were to prove transitory. In preparing the Temporary Rules the authorities had selected the cities that were to have separate police forces with an eye to their potential for eventually paying all or most of the costs of these forces. By the late 1860s, 80 percent of St. Petersburg’s police budget was coming from the city’s funds. By 1877, Odessa was paying for its entire police budget and Kharkov and Kiev had been given deadlines to do the same. Increased responsibility for funding the police did not mean increased control over police activities or personnel. On the contrary, as police scientist Ivan Tarasov observed, the central authorities had increased the cities’ role in supporting the police but had tightened their own hold over them. The financial burden this imposed on the cities most likely varied from place to place. Even when spending for gendarmes and outlays for the regular police were combined, as was done for 1890 in an article in the Brokhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, the total accounted for less than 10 percent of Odessa’s expenditures. Odessa, however, as seen in Tables 11 and 12, was a prosperous city and other cities had far fewer resources to devote to

13 See the governors’ recommendations to this effect in response to an 1870 survey by the Committee on Provincial and County Institutions in MSVUK: OP, part 3, sect. 1 (1871): 47. Their recommendations were incorporated in Timashev’s March 1873 proposal to the Council of Ministers—RGLA, fond 908, Papers of P. A. Valuev, opis’ 1, delo 310, “Materialy o podgotovke proekta administrativno-politseiskoi reform,” 120.
14 3rd PSZ, 9 (1889): no. 6087.
15 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 120–21.
16 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44772, shtaty i tabeli.
17 2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 53380 (Kharkov); 50 (1875): no. 54433 (Kiev); 51 (1876): no. 55923 (Odessa).
18 Tarasov, Politsiia v epokhu reform, 9.
19 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Politsiia.”
the police. In either event, in terms of the damage to the cities’ political control over their own political affairs, the costs were far larger than the monetary outlays.

**Rural Lawlessness and the Lack of Non-Military Force**

Outside the cities, the failure to introduce more and better qualified police had consequences that far outweighed the shifts in the ministerial balance of power and weakening of gentry and city control of the police. In particular, by the end of Alexander II’s reign Russians of greatly different political views generally agreed that with the landlords no longer responsible for law and order, violent lawlessness had become widespread in the countryside. The accuracy of this perception is at least questionable. At a minimum, some degree of landlord bias was certainly at play. Still, few contemporaries would have quarreled with historian Stephen Frank’s conclusion that the lack of an effective police force was “by far the greatest stumbling block” to the restoration of order in the peasant villages.

Research on the post-Emancipation Russian countryside has made it clear that peasant villagers as much as the gentry were victimized by rural lawlessness. A leading expert on twenty-first century Russian crime has observed that if one were looking for the antecedents of current organized crime in the decades after Emancipation rural banditry would have seemed a promising candidate. Horse stealing was a particular concern given peasants’ dependence on horsepower to plant and transport their crops. A study published by the Imperial Free Economic Society in 1885 revealed that entire villages were engaged in such theft; other studies indicated that horse thieves operated in gangs numbering hundreds of men. Contemporary and modern scholars laid much of the blame with the weakness and corruption of the

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police.\textsuperscript{25} Also, as Christine Worobec and Cathy Frierson have noted, brutal vigilante reprisals were common and could be worse than the crimes themselves. Lopping off hands, crushing skulls, and impalement on rods were common punishments.\textsuperscript{26} Such vigilante justice was itself a key element of rural lawlessness, at times transforming relations among peasant villages to something akin to modern day gang fights. Ill equipped to prevent the original offenses or apprehend the offenders, the police were equally at a loss in dealing with the responses.

Continued reliance on the army to quell disturbances was another result of the failure to strengthen the police. Historians have described a desire to avoid such reliance as a driving force in the rise of the nineteenth-century European police. According to F. C. Mather, for example, a belief that the police were better able than the army to avoid provoking violent responses that damaged lives and property won them particular support from the middle and upper classes.\textsuperscript{27} Allan Silver made a similar point. He identified the reduced likelihood of resorting to the military for internal peacekeeping as one of the perceived benefits of police expansion that most appealed to governments in nineteenth-century Europe.\textsuperscript{28}

In the pre-reform years, the poor performance of the Russian police during the anti-tavern riots of 1859 had highlighted their weakness in dealing with mass disorders.\textsuperscript{29} Later, their inability to control the massive peasant disorders that followed the announcement of Emancipation had done the same.\textsuperscript{30} As Prince Meshcherskii noted with amazement in his memoirs, however, Russian lawmakers did little to address this weakness in the early 1860s.\textsuperscript{31} They persisted in this stance through the mid-1870s. Then in 1875 in Chigirin County in Kiev Province false claims that the Tsar had ordered the peasants to complete the redistribution of land provoked large-scale distur-

\textsuperscript{25} Galeotti, \textit{The Vory}, 12–17.
\textsuperscript{27} Mather, \textit{Public Order in the Age of the Chartists}, 101.
\textsuperscript{29} Christian, \textit{Living Water}, 320–52.
\textsuperscript{31} Emmons, \textit{The Russian Landed Gentry} 81, 93.
bances that required military force to suppress. Large peasant disturbances in Voronezh Province in 1875 and in Perm and Orenburg Provinces in 1878 also resulted in the intervention of troops.\footnote{Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 11.} According to Russian historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii, these incidents fell well short of the violence that had wracked the countryside in the spring of 1861.\footnote{Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia na rubezhe XIX-stoletii} (Moscow: Mysl’, 1973), 34–35.} It was probably for this reason that the government was able to get away with a weak response: the creation of the mounted rangers.

In the 1880s and 1890s, the police’s ability to control rural disorders was tested more often. For the most part they failed the test. Zaionchkovskii assessed that military policing of the countryside in 1881–1903 increased compared to Alexander II’s reign.\footnote{Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia}, 34–35.} As noted, he acknowledged that the numbers of troops suppressing a single demonstration did not reach the level of spring 1861 until the twentieth century. He also found that the number of both incidents and troops involved fell in some years, sometimes quite sharply.\footnote{Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia}, 34–35.} Still, the frequency with which the police required military assistance testified to the inadequacy of the regime’s efforts to bolster their strength.

The police’s need for military help increased after the 1905 Revolution. Even the ruthless Stolypin reportedly made “incessant” complaints about the police’s lack of wherewithal to contain disorder.\footnote{Ascher, \textit{P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability}, 53.} His appeals for support led to friction with Minister of War Roediger. The latter complained that in January and February 1906 alone the military was called on to perform police functions 2,300 times. Able to survive the Emancipation years despite their weakness, the police were less fortunate during the last tsar’s reign.

\section*{Damage to Center, Zemstvos, and Courts}

By failing to transfer the police’s non-crime related duties to the zemstvos and courts or create enough policemen to handle them the regime damaged itself as well as the new institutions. By 1881, it was no longer true that, as

\begin{itemize}
\item P. A. Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Krizis samoderzhaviia}, 11.
\item P. A. Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia na rubezhe XIX-stoletii} (Moscow: Mysl’, 1973), 34–35.
\item Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia}, 34–35.
\item Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Samoderzhanie i russkata armiia}, 34–35.
\item Ascher, \textit{P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability}, 53.
\end{itemize}
Benkendorf had once said, “everything” depended upon the police.\(^37\) Years after the creation of zemstvos, new city government, and courts, however, the local police remained critical to the autocracy. Their important role in monitoring reservists after the introduction of universal male military service was a prime example. As several governors complained to the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, this last of Alexander II’s Great Reforms greatly increased the police’s duties.\(^38\) It also was a reminder that whether out of unwillingness to rely on the zemstvos or inability to create a new agency the tsarist regime still depended upon the local police for tasks it valued highly. And, as the provincial governors had noted in complaining of the burden imposed upon the police, these duties were often executed poorly or ignored.

Legal scholar A. D. Gradovskii offered a similar verdict. A professor at St. Petersburg University, Gradovskii also contributed to liberal journals such as The Voice. He once engaged in a famous exchange with Dostoevsky over the value of Western political principles to Russia.\(^39\) He was, however, known primarily as an expert on local government. In an 1883 study, he argued that the police were ill qualified to serve as tsarism’s principal representatives at the county level and below. He also bemoaned the inadequacy of their support to central ministries other than Internal Affairs. His proposed remedy was to create a new position of county administrator, give the other ministers their own local enforcement agents, and take away such duties from the police.\(^40\) Such recommendations were in vain. In 1893, N. M. Korkunov, Gradovskii’s successor as professor of law at St. Petersburg, was still complaining of the multitude of duties unrelated to security imposed upon the local police.\(^41\)

The failings of the local police also worsened society’s antipathy toward the state. Like his predecessors, whose attention to the details of police uniforms he shared, Alexander II sought to impress the populace with the police’s stature as his representatives. As before, however, the police’s behavior undermined this effort. In his first annual report, Minister of Internal


\(^{39}\) Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s.v. “Gradovskii, Aleksandr Davidovich.”

\(^{40}\) A. D. Gradovskii, Organy mestnogo upravleniiia, in Sobranie sochinenii, 9: 331.

\(^{41}\) Korkunov, Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo, 2: 410; Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s.v. “Korkunov, Nikolai Mikhailovich.”
Affairs Lanskoi had told the Tsar that the simple people he most wished to impress viewed the appearance of police in a village as a calamity equal to that of fire. This attitude may have worsened by reign’s end as a result of the creation of the mounted rangers. According to Leroy-Beaulieu, villagers despised the new policemen, whom they nicknamed “chicken-stealers” (kuriatniki) in what was both a play on words on their name (uriadniki) and a judgment on their character. He acknowledged that the lower classes might still regard the Tsar with semi-religious devotion. At the same time, he described the public’s extreme distrust of the police and other local officials as undermining their legitimacy as agents of the Tsar and depriving this devotion of practical significance. The frequency with which villagers refused to believe the police’s accounts of imperial decrees led him to recall Iurii Samarin’s observation that for the peasants, “a round of musketry” was often “the only authentic confirmation of the imperial commands.”

Later accounts from the beginning of the twentieth century supported the Frenchman’s claim. Memoirs of former police officers, scholarly studies of peasant life, and the police’s official journal all reported that the local police bore much of the blame for the deep disrespect for laws and authority in the countryside.

In the cities among the burgeoning class of factory workers by numerous accounts resentment of the police was greater than in the countryside. In many respects this was to be expected. Police historians have often observed that the desire to control industrial workers was a key motivation for the development of the modern European police. In 1868 a writer in the Herald of Europe had cautioned his readers that their enthusiasm for the London police was not shared by members of the English capital’s laboring classes and that they should expect St. Petersburg’s workers to also be hostile to their police.

Trepov’s use of passport rules to forestall unrest among laid off workers, while appealing to the propertied class, doubtless evoked such hostility. So too did practices such as allowing factory owners to pay for police

44 “Vnutrennii obozrenie,” *Vestnik Evropy* (June 1869), 872–81.
45 *Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1872 g.,* 4.
in their establishments. Violence against police, sometimes on large scale, occurred in several cities as in Odessa in 1871 and Kharkov in 1872. Such violence may have worsened by the start of the twentieth century. Semen Kanatchikov, the radical worker, claimed in his memoirs that by the eve of the 1905 Revolution, hatred of the police was intense and widespread even among politically indifferent workers. According to Kanatchikov, killing policemen was considered an act of heroism in workers’ circles. As a later Bolshevik and a Soviet official, Kanatchikov may have been a biased observer. Historian Robert Thurston reports, however, there were 76 unprovoked attacks on police officers in Moscow alone during 1906 and 1907, some resulting in death.

Protectors of property though they were, the police were not popular with the upper classes, particularly among those of liberal sympathies. In the 1880s, Leroy-Beaulieu reported that educated Russians often compared the mounted force to the oprichniki, the bodyguards of Ivan the Terrible. Such attitudes persisted and may have worsened in subsequent decades. According to Thurston, police closures of liberal newspapers and banning of lectures by liberal spokesmen were steadily eroding support for the police among the urban-based upper and middle classes by the eve of World War I. Still, as Louise McReynolds noted, photographs of the funerals of policemen killed in the line of duty in 1906 gave evidence of some community support for individual policemen. Sales of cheap detective stories for boys and young workers, which reached 10 million a year around the same time, also testify to some enthusiasm for the forces of order. In the aftermath of the 1905 upheaval, such reactions were probably to be expected. It also was sig-

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46 See, for example, 2nd PSZ, 54: nos. 60310, 60500a, 60959, 61027, 61140, 61176, 61451, 61711, 61833, 61838, and 61853.
47 Brower, The Russian City, 198, 200.
52 Thurston, Liberal City, Conservative State, 100–02.
53 McReynolds, Murder Most Russian, 149.
significant that the detective heroes who so fascinated Russian readers in the years before World War I were Westerners: Nat Pinkerton, Nick Carter, and Sherlock Holmes.\textsuperscript{55} Even among Russians with a taste for fantasy, making heroes of their own police force was beyond imagining.

The police also held back the courts, zemstvos, and city governments. In calling the police eighteenth-century creatures, scholar Ivan Andreevskii was contrasting them with zemstvo and judicial officials, who, to the educated public, epitomized modernity. He also was highlighting their difficulty working with the new organizations. The reformers of the early 1860s may not have intended these organizations to evolve into powerful political players. They did, however, see them as partners in fostering respect for law and economic development. In practice, the police proved both unable and unwilling to be so.

The damage done to the new institutions by the police was most deliberate in the case of the courts and was driven by a mixture of political calculation and personal resentment. In St. Petersburg and Moscow police hostility toward the justice of the peace courts, which dealt, with minor offenses, was intense and began at the top—with the police commissioners. According to historian Lester Thomas Hutton, St. Petersburg’s Trepov was especially resentful that decisions of the justices of the peace enjoyed the force of law, while his police’s regulations did not.\textsuperscript{56} In Moscow, Trepov’s counterpart, N. U. Arapov, criticized the justices of the peace for failing to punish people charged with insulting or disobeying the police—with some justification, according to some legal scholars.\textsuperscript{57} At the working level, police officers accustomed to meting out their own justice resented having to defend their charges before the justices.\textsuperscript{58}

The police also were often at odds with the upper courts. Jury trials were frequent targets of criticism by officers who believed the juries to be biased in favor of defendants and unwilling to accept police evidence. Foreign visitors to Russia often were told amusing stories, some greatly exaggerated, on the lengths to which juries would go to exonerate defendants, including


\textsuperscript{56} Hutton, “The Reform of City Government in Russia, 1860–1870,” 105.


\textsuperscript{58} On relations between the police and justices of the peace, see N. Polianskii, “Mirovoi sud” in \textit{Sudebnaia reforma}, eds. Davydov and Polianskii, 2: 209, 218.
some who confessed their guilt.\footnote{Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 2: 357–58.} Such anecdotes doubtless reflected the tendency of Russia’s elites to see peasants as totally uncivilized and unable to understand law or justice. As Jane Burbank has argued persuasively, they also reflected ignorance of the positive features of Russian peasants’ legal culture.\footnote{Burbank, Russian Peasants Go to Court, 5.} Fairly or not, the police were sharply critical of Russia’s juries, most notably by a Petersburg jury’s acquittal of Vera Zasulich for shooting General Trepov. Overall, the police’s relationship with the judicial system was one of hostility. In 1876 they had reported through their governors that judicial and investigative responsibilities were among their most burdensome activities measured simply by the amount of paperwork. The governors’ call to reduce the courts’ ability to impose on the police nicely reflected the daily efforts of the police to minimize their support to the courts.

The police were less confrontational with the zemstvos and reformed city governments than with the courts. Still, they withheld cooperation and support to a degree that constrained the development of these new institutions. In his history of the zemstvos’ first 40 years, Boris Veselovskii reported only a handful of instances in which police–zemstvo conflicts led one of the parties to appeal to a governor for redress. For the most part, he observed that police–zemstvo tensions were limited to the normal conflicts to be expected of institutions working alongside each other.\footnote{Veselovskii, Istoriia zemstva za sorok let, 3: 115.} To judge from the 1876 survey by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions, Veselovskii was on the mark. In contrast to the sharp criticism of the courts, the 1876 survey was silent about zemstvo–police conflict. Unfortunately for the zemstvos, this silence was probably more a reflection of the police’s tendency to ignore them than a reflection that all was well between the two. Zemstvo participants in the 1880 discussion of the state of peasant institutions strongly complained about the police’s failure to enforce zemstvo decisions. Legal scholar A. D. Gradovskii included the zemstvos as well as central agencies other than the Ministry of Internal Affairs among the entities needing their own enforcement staffs. He also suggested that such officials might be joint appointees of the central authorities and elected local govern-
Ivan Tarasov, his younger counterpart at Moscow University and the author of a major study of the police reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, also complained of the police’s poor support to the zemstvos and city councils. In large part, the problem was probably the police’s inability to help rather than their hostility. In either case, the result was to impede the development of the new institutions.

**Impeding Liberalizing Reforms**

An obstacle to Emancipation before 1861, police weakness slowed the lifting of other controls on society and the economy for years after. Prolonging the internal passport regime was one clear example. The police’s need for assistance in enforcing law and order also led them to block proposals to ban extrajudicial imprisonment and resist the 1861 lifting of alcohol controls. In the latter case the police were even able to whittle away at the reform, ostensibly to protect the peasants from drink-related problems. Their efforts were most popular with conservatives. But they also won the support of some liberal and radicals. Ivan Pryzhov, historian of Russian drinking customs, convicted revolutionary, and model for a character in Dostoevsky’s *The Possessed*, for example, supported some of their efforts.

Their primary motive, however, was to ease the task of policing peasant villages and eliminate venues for working-class plotting.

Restrictions on the rights of Russians to travel outside the areas of their permanent residence for more than short periods dated from 1719. Then-Tsar Peter the Great’s main concerns were to ensure the smooth working of military conscription and collection of the soul tax. After 1763, when payments for passports were introduced, the revenues made the system even more attractive to the authorities. While all the tsar’s subjects were subject to some controls, restrictions were greatest for peasants, lower urban estates,

63 Tarasov, *Politsiia v epokhu reform*, 9; on Tarasov’s background and publications, see * Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (B&E), s.v. “Tarasov, Ivan Trofimovich.”
and religious and ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{67} In 1859, a government commission concluded that it would be impossible to reform the internal passport system under the current taxation and conscription regimes.\textsuperscript{68} As a historian of the passport system has observed, however, the perceived threat that free movement of the peasants would pose to the social order was an even greater obstacle to liberalization.\textsuperscript{69} As a result, while the conscription and tax system saw major changes in the 1870s and 1880s, reform of the internal passport regime did not occur until 1894. Even then peasants, factory workers, and minority groups remained subject to substantial constraints.\textsuperscript{70}

Implementing the passport system entailed a great deal of work for the police in some localities. In 1860–1870, for example, the number of passports issued—primarily for migrant laborers—averaged 1.29 million per year. In the following decade, the average number almost tripled. St. Petersburg and Moscow factories, logging camps in the Northern provinces, and Volga river ports, were the most common destinations.\textsuperscript{71} In all these areas, the police, whose numbers had grown much more slowly, had to register all the migrants upon their arrival. Arrests for passport violations also were greatest in these cities and regions, increasing the police workload there. In St. Petersburg the number of such arrests averaged almost 7,000 a year during Trepov’s time as commissioner. Rather than complaining about the work passport enforcement entailed, however, Trepov discussed it in his annual reports only once—to highlight its value in ridding the capital of laid off factory workers.\textsuperscript{72} The reaction of his counterparts in other cities and rural areas was probably similar. There also were few complaints about then burden among the police rank-and-file, for whom the internal passport system was a source of bribes.\textsuperscript{73}

Overall, the work the internal passport system entailed for the police was beside the point. Less concerned with violations of the passport regime than

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{moon2} Moon, “Peasant Migration, the Abolition of Serfdom,” 333–34.
\bibitem{avrutin2} Avrutin, \textit{Jews and the Imperial State}, 93–94.
\bibitem{moon3} Moon, “Peasant Migration, the Abolition of Serfdom,” 339–43.
\bibitem{vsepoddanneishii} \textit{Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1872 g.} (St. Petersburg, 1873), 4.
\bibitem{brower} Brower, \textit{The Russian City}, 196.
\end{thebibliography}
Consequences and Implications

grateful for its help in controlling the lower classes, the local police valued it as indispensable to their efforts to keep the peace. Hence the persistence of migration controls long after they were needed to support military conscription or soul tax collection, and provide revenue to the state.

Determining who was to be imprisoned as well as where, how, and under whose auspices became a major concern of the tsarist authorities only after—and as a result of—the reforms of the early 1860s. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the curtailment of corporal punishment in 1863 put an end, first, to the landlords’ ability to imprison or exile their serfs and, then, to the government’s use of its primary tool for punishing criminals. Prior to these reforms there were few state prisons and most of the inmates in those that did exist were awaiting trial rather than serving sentences. After 1863, however, the prison population soared. Small and poorly constructed to begin with, Russian prisons grew crowded to overflowing, with no separation of inmates by age, gender, severity of their crimes, or whether or not they had been tried. In addition, prison guards and wardens, few in numbers and poorly qualified, were overwhelmed by the influx of inmates. Abuse of prisoners became more widespread and more severe. These problems were of particular concern to the Ministry of Internal Affairs because oversight of the prison was largely a responsibility of its Department of Executive Police.

To its credit, the Department made some good faith efforts to deal with the influx of prisoners. These were not enough to prevent prison reform from moving much more slowly than elsewhere in Europe. But the fault lay more with the lack of resources than with the specifics of its proposals. An 1865 law prepared jointly with the Ministry of War ordered the replacement of military prison guards with hired personnel in an effort to improve the supervision of inmates. In 1867, the Department circulated a proposal

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74 For the specific restrictions on the use of corporal punishment, see 2nd PSZ, 38 (1863): nos. 39504 and 39505. For a study of the history of corporal punishment in Russia, see Abby Schrader, *Languages of the Lash: Corporal Punishment and Identity in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002).
76 Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s.v. “Tiur’ma.”
78 2nd PSZ, 40 (1865): no. 42055.
for separating pre-trial and time-serving prisoners.\textsuperscript{79} The government, however, failed to raise guards’ salaries enough to attract qualified recruits. And the proposal to house inmates awaiting trial, including for petty offenses, from hardened criminals could not overcome the Finance Ministry’s objection that its cost would be excessive.

The Department’s positive efforts aside, the imprisonment of individuals who had not been charged much less convicted of crimes in court was a matter on which prison reformers and police authorities parted ways. The prisoners in question included peasants whom their communities had ordered imprisoned for chronic disruptive behavior, children whose parents had done the same, and individuals the police had imprisoned on their own authority as perceived threats to society. Their champion was the Ministry of Justice, which saw the prisons as extensions of the courts. On both philosophical and practical grounds the Ministry of Internal Affairs resisted the Justice Ministry’s efforts to put an end to their imprisonment. It favored the use of police power rather than the judiciary to remedy social problems. More important, its overburdened police saw the imprisonment of groups thought likely to eventually perpetrate crimes as a means of simplifying their responsibility for maintain law and order.\textsuperscript{80}

The Internal Affairs Ministry’s ability to prevail on this issue hinged on its control of prison oversight. This went unchallenged in the 1860s. In the 1870s, a prison reform committee considered transferring this to the Ministry of Justice but had a change of heart. Internal Affairs retained control until 1895.\textsuperscript{81} It exercised this after 1879 through a Main Prison Administration.\textsuperscript{82} Later lawmakers would revisit the issue in discussions of juvenile offenders, peasant justice, and administrative law. In the interim the police retained what its leadership viewed as a useful supplement to their often shaky authority.

The police’s behavior toward the excise reform after its enactment in 1861 was also driven largely by their need to strengthen their control over the lower classes. While this reform was being prepared, Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Lanskoi had supported it, largely to correct the existing sys-

\textsuperscript{79} Adams, \textit{The Politics of Punishment}, 52.

\textsuperscript{80} Adams, \textit{The Politics of Punishment}, 71–72, 84, 94.

\textsuperscript{81} Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s.v. “Tiur’ma,” Adams, \textit{The Politics of Punishment}, 83, 90, 120, 130.

\textsuperscript{82} 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no.59160.
tem’s corrupting influence. Under this system, which gave a few dozen tax farmers exclusive control over retail trade in the Great Russian provinces and in cities of the West and Southwest, the farmers had routinely sold sub-standard liquor and overcharged their customers. They also had routinely bribed the police and other officials to make this possible.\footnote{On Lanskoi’s criticism, see RGIA, fond 1284, opis’ 66, delo 11, “Otchet Ministra vnutrennikh del za 1857 god,” 4. On the pre-reform system of alcohol controls, see Kratkii ocherk 50-letia aktsiznoi sistemi vzi-manii nalogi s krepkikh napitkov i 50-letnia deiatel’nosti uchrezhdennii zavedyvaissheikh neoklkadnymi sborami (St. Petersburg: V. T. Kirshbaum, 1913), 1–6.} After 1863, however, with Lanskoi gone and the reform under way, the Ministry’s position changed. The new free-trade-like regime, like so many reforms of the day, was similar to an English model.\footnote{Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England, 1815–1872 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), 64–86.} It allowed anyone to produce or sell alcoholic beverages upon payment of a licensing fee or an excise tax. The result was a huge increase in the number of taverns and, to all appearances, a similar increase in crime and public drunkenness. The response of successive Ministers of Internal Affairs and police such as St Petersburg’s Trepov was to call for a reduction in the number of taverns.

The tavern-closing efforts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the local police took several forms. These included shutting down private taverns in favor of a smaller number of community-operated ones and sponsoring local temperance movements.\footnote{Abbott, “Alcohol Controls and Russian Politics, 1863–1876.” Russian History 43 (2016): 93–98.} Reutern’s Ministry of Finance, the leading defender of a system that was the government’s largest single revenue source, rebuffed these efforts for a time. In 1873, however, it agreed to a compromise with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which itself probably realized the risks of over-restricting the source of so much revenue. A statute enacted in that year increased the licensing fees required of taverns in an effort to reduce their number. It also authorized St. Petersburg’s Police Commissioner to limit the number of liquor licenses in the capital after consulting with the Finance Ministry. The same law gave the provincial governor the power to do the same in the capital’s suburbs.\footnote{2nd PSZ, 48 (1873): no. 52394.} In 1874, these procedures were applied to the remainder of St. Petersburg Province and to Moscow and Odessa.\footnote{2nd PSZ, 49 (1874): no. 53091.} In 1876, they were extended for another three years.\footnote{2nd PSZ, 51 (1876): no. 56425.} Thereafter, the tavern-
closing campaign came to an end as the police and their Ministers struggled against bigger threats. The campaign also fell victim to revelations in the *Herald of Europe* that the police had coerced and bribed—sometimes with alcohol—peasant villagers to close down taverns and sign temperance agreements.⁸⁹ These accounts revealed that far from being high-minded efforts to mitigate the ravages of free trade, the police’s actions had been designed to ease the task of controlling its victims.

**Implications for the Tsarist System**

The long effort to improve the police showed flashes of creativity and determination to improve local conditions that by themselves might have inspired some confidence in the tsarist government. The plan to unburden the police while expanding legal rights and community self-government, for example, was ingenious, though never implemented fully. The studies of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions also yielded insights into local conditions and governance that warrant a more favorable appraisal of its work than historians have generally offered.⁹⁰ Its efforts to complete the police reform in the 1870s also deserve respect if not high praise. So too do Trepov’s early moves to improve the police in St. Petersburg.

Even as the government suffered from the police’s weakness, it was responsible for this suffering. In particular, its failure to enact more than temporary police measures from 1862 until its collapse clearly illustrates its political fecklessness. Mistaken priorities, weak leadership, and bureaucratic conflict all were on near constant display. These factors combined to prevent the autocracy from strengthening a force that was critical to its ability to enforce its will at the local level.

The regime’s mistaken fiscal priorities, particularly its high defense expenditures, were major causes of its failure to improve the police. Despite its image as a police state, Russia devoted only a small share of its resources to the police. Under Alexander II, annual spending for the town and county police never exceeded 1.6 percent of “ordinary” expenditures, the measure

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⁹⁰ Scholarly discussion of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions has generally focused on the lack of accomplishments after 1864 rather than on the proposals it prepared in those years. See, for example, Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform*, 197–99; and Yaney, *The Urge to Mobilize*, 12–21.
the authorities used to understate their budget deficit (see Table 26). In the same years the share of such expenditures devoted to the Ministries of War and the Navy ranged between 33 percent and 41 percent. These ministries also accounted for most of the “extraordinary” expenditures. These generally added about 10 percent to the budget in peacetime and as much as 90 percent during the Russo-Turkish War.91

Dysfunctional politics may have been more to blame for the failure to enact more than “temporary” police measures. The long saga of the Commission on Provinicial and County Institutions, which one author called the “eternal” commission, reflected the authorities’ chronic inability to make important decisions.92 Their problems began at the top. As one of Alexander II’s ministers observed, advisers could count on his support only until “court intrigues, the denunciations of the secret police, and newspaper articles” led him to seek other advice.93 Other, less spiteful commentators painted a similar picture. Some noted that Alexander often played his ministers off against the other to prevent any of them from becoming too powerful.94 Others noted his avoidance of confrontation. After telling Lanskoï that he disapproved of much of the Saltykov-Solov’ev police reform, for example, he let discussion of it drag on for years. Later, after telling Timashev he supported his plan for a 17,000 man mounted guard, he let opponents pick it apart. Such behavior illustrated the insecurity and desire to protect his prerogatives that Keep described as the source of Alexander’s inconsistency and indecisiveness.95

Ministerial intransigence also contributed to the failure to strengthen the police. Both Valuev and Timashev rejected subordinates’ workable police reform plans to pursue their own agendas. Both spurned the advice of governors to reduce police duties. Their opponents Reutern and Dmitrii Miliutin also allowed bureaucratic rivalries to blind them to the need for more rural police. Their argument that an increase in the police presence would damage the peasant-controlled township governments strained credulity on several counts. It ignored the degree to which the police’s exces-

94 See, for example, Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 16; John Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 351.
95 John Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 351.
Table 26: Spending for Local Police and Total Government Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spending for Town and County Police (rubles)</th>
<th>Total “Ordinary” Government Spending (rubles)</th>
<th>Town and County Police as a Share of Government Spending (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>4,247,998</td>
<td>432,200,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>4,570,488</td>
<td>428,236,000</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>4,009,612</td>
<td>413,298,011</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>5,082,206</td>
<td>424,904,090</td>
<td>1.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>5,161,926</td>
<td>441,282,998</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>6,524,014</td>
<td>468,797,909</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1870</td>
<td>6,766,503</td>
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<td>1.39</td>
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<td>1871</td>
<td>7,056,499</td>
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<td>7,262,476</td>
<td>543,317,034</td>
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<td>1875</td>
<td>7,452,095</td>
<td>543,221,526</td>
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<td>7,558,737</td>
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<td>1879</td>
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<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>11,671,755</td>
<td>746,433,036</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Expenditures for the town and county police for 1863 and 1865 are from 2nd PSZ 37 (1862), no. 39087, art. 4 and MSVUK: part 1, sect. 3, 261. Those for 1867–1881 are from the annual State Comptroller reports Otchet gosudarstvenno-nogo kontroli po ispolneniu gosudarstvennoi rospisi i finansovykh sмет za . . . god. Total government expenditures are from Ministerstvo Finansov, 1802–1902, 1: 636–69 and 2: 640–43.

Sive burden was already resulting in such damage and the possibility that additional police might lessen the burden. Also as George Yaney argued, rather than being moves against peasant self-government, the actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were often efforts to address problems that peas-
ants could not resolve. Finally, neither Reutern nor Dmitrii Miliutin ever explained why a sizable police presence was acceptable in the cities but dangerous in the rural areas—a question the Herald of Europe had once posed to its readers. Worse, by opposing more generous funding of the police they helped make their warnings self-fulfilling prophecies when the mounted police became rural tyrants.

Whatever the merits of the reformers’ and the conservatives’ positions, the regime’s inability to choose among them and adopt more than temporary measures to improve the police testified to its paralysis in the face of fatal threats. The Stock Market Journal had argued in 1870 that the ill-conceived and burdensome laws the police had to enforce made their job almost impossible. Had the censor allowed, the Journal might have added that the regime that imposed these laws was even more at fault. However enlightened individual officials and policies, overall the tsarist government was fundamentally flawed. Ill served as it was by its local police, the regime served them even more poorly.

97 Vestnik Evropy, 1870, no. 5, 378.
98 MSV’UK: OA, part 1, sect. 10, prilozenie, 148.
Appendix

Police in the Borderlands

The years that saw the central authorities struggle to strengthen the police in the Empire’s heartland witnessed similar efforts in the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Kingdom of Poland, and Siberia. The center’s goal—in the first four regions—was to tighten control over non-Russian groups that were themselves fractious or had potential foreign champions. Except in Central Asia, a theater of military operations requiring special treatment, it also sought to achieve an administrative standardization that most Russian rulers since Catherine the Great had pursued. Their success varied greatly from region to region. By the time of Alexander II’s death the Baltic provinces retained a police system that had been little changed for centuries. Not until well into the reign of Alexander III would Russia extend its police system to these provinces. In Poland, in contrast, the tsarist authorities regarded the police system created in the 1860s as a model for Russia to emulate. The Caucasus and Siberia fell in between the Baltic and Polish cases, and Central Asia lagged behind all the others with a military police system that remained unchanged for decades.

Russia’s efforts to strengthen the police in its border regions deserve our attention on several grounds. They illustrate the enormity of the challenge tsarism faced, the monetary and other resource requirements that limited its freedom of action in the heartland of the Empire, and the complexity of imperial politics. St. Petersburg’s varying commitment to reshaping police in the borderlands also has much to tell about its priorities and the drivers of its decisions.
The Baltic Provinces

Estland, Lifland, and Courland, which covered much of today’s Estonia and Latvia, had been under Russia’s control since the eighteenth century. Russia acquired the first two in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) and the third

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in the 1795 partition of Poland. Although subordinate to a single Governor-General, the three had separate legal and administrative systems. Each, however, was dominated by ethnic German noblemen organized in knightly corporations. The Baltic Germans were widely seen as more civilized and polished than the Russian gentry. As a result, they often held important positions in the Imperial bureaucracy.¹ Benkendorf, Chief of the Third Section under Nicholas I, and Reutern, the Minister of Finance under Alexander II, were Baltic Germans. So too were numerous military officers. In 1871, 58 percent of the Russian General Staff were Germans, many from the Baltic provinces.²

Even as they prospered in the service of the tsar, the Baltic German nobles exercised near total control of provincial and local government, most definitely including the police. This continued after the emancipation of their serfs, which occurred separately in each of the three provinces during 1816–1819. Their powers began with the right to enforce the law and punish lawbreakers on their own estates. Peasant-elected village police also were subordinate to them and they headed the influential parish courts.³ The nobility’s major police power, however, was its monopoly of the positions analogous to—but more powerful than—Russia’s rural sheriffs. In Courland, this official was known as a Hauptman and was elected for life. In Estland, he was known as a Hakenrichter, was elected for fixed term, and while having no full-time assistants, could deputize other noble landowners should circumstances warrant this. In Lifland the noble landowners elected two Ordnungsgerichter and their assistants in each county for terms of several years.⁴ Few cities had separate police forces. In those that did the police resembled those in Russian cities, but the police boards were dominated by ethnic German guilds and corporations of the nobility.⁵ In Estland’s Dorpat, a university town now

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³ For a detailed description of the manorial, peasant, and parish police, see *2nd PSZ*, 31 (1856): no. 30693, arts. 645–703.

⁴ *MSVUK: OA*, part 1, sect. 11 no. 2 (1871): 112–16.

⁵ *MSVUK: OA*, part 1, sect. 11 no. 2 (1871): 116–17.

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known as Tartu, for example, the board had to include an official with academic rank.\textsuperscript{6}

Unjust as the Baltic police system was, it was not ineffective. Throughout the nineteenth century, foreign and Russian visitors described the three provinces as models of good order, often contrasting them with the rest of the Empire. Writing in the \textit{Journal of the Ministry of Justice}, for example, two Russian authors identified Lifland and Estland, as the provinces least plagued by crime.\textsuperscript{7} In a rejoinder the revolutionary Peter Tkachev disputed their interpretation of the statistics that underlay their analysis, but agreed that the incidence of crime was lowest in the Baltic provinces. While arguing that cities were the breeding grounds for crime, he described the Baltic cities as exceptions to this general rule.\textsuperscript{8} As Latvian and Estonian scholars would later argue, crediting the German elites for the positive conditions in the Baltic, while inaccurate or simplistic, was a widespread, even typical view.\textsuperscript{9}

The political reaction of the tsarist authorities to the privileges of the Baltic Germans was a different matter than their admiration for the Germans’ abilities. The police powers of the Baltic nobility had drawn sporadic criticism from the central authorities since the eighteenth century. Time and again, however, pro-German rulers protected the Baltic elite. Catherine the Great was herself an ethnic German who openly imitated Baltic models in her 1775 statute on provincial and local government. Still, she found herself at odds with the German elites in her efforts to standardize the machinery of government. The 1775 statute and the 1785 charter of the nobility reduced the German nobility’s privileges.\textsuperscript{10} Her successor, Tsar Paul I, however, restored them.\textsuperscript{11} Alexander I, Paul’s son, took a harder line. Specifically, he pressed the Baltic gentry to liberate their serfs, albeit without giving up land. According to Richard Pipes, Alexander’s successor Nicholas I was “arguably the most pro-German of Russian rulers.” In 1849, he impris-

\textsuperscript{6} 2nd \textit{PSZ}, 16 (1861): no. 37607.
\textsuperscript{9} See, for example, Bilmanis, “The Grandeur and Decline of the German Balts,” 56–58.
\textsuperscript{10} Bartle, “The Russian and the Baltic German Nobility,” 239–41.
\textsuperscript{11} 1st \textit{PSZ}, 24 (1796–97): no. 17584.
on the Slavophil Iurii Samarin for circulating a manuscript that was critical of the Baltic Germans.12

The Romanovs’ admiration for the German Balts aside, their special status became increasingly anomalous in the 1860s. Alexander II, while less pro-German than Nicholas I, was a supporter of the Baltic elite.13 Still, when Russia was emancipating its own serfs and reforming its police and courts, he had little option but to allow discussion of Baltic privileges. In 1862, the State Council addressed reform of the police and courts in the three Baltic provinces but did so with little effect.14 Distracted by its ambitious reform agenda and the 1863 Polish Uprising, and influenced once again by the Baltic Germans’ defenders, the central authorities chose not to act. While the Temporary Rules of December 1862 took away the Russian gentry’s right to elect rural sheriffs, the Baltic gentry retained this right. A decree of February 1866, however, did restrict the Baltic nobility’s ability to interfere with peasant self-government. It also required the estate owner to hand over suspects detained on their estates to the local court rather than punishing them themselves.15 In 1866, the State Council also recommended realigning the Baltic police along the lines of those in the heartland. The case for reform was made with particular eloquence in an undated note prepared by Active State Secretary Leont’ev that argued for reform out of concern for justice for all the provinces’ inhabitants as well as for the strengthening of the Tsar’s control.16 It also recommended bringing Baltic police and judicial institutions in line with those in the Russian provinces, but for years the recommendation was ignored.17

In the 1870s, the unification of Germany under Prussia’s auspices gave the Baltic nobles a potential foreign champion. This aroused some Russian concern
that the provinces might become a second Schleswig-Holstein, duchies with a large German population that Prussia had annexed from Denmark in 1867.\footnote{Thaden, “The Abortive Experiment,” 141.} The 1872 Kreenholm strike, Europe’s largest to that point and a disturbance sparked by the abuses of factory-operated police, also led to increased Russian interest in tightening control of the Baltic.\footnote{Zelnik, Law and Disorder on the Narova River, 27, 38, 40, 66.} Alexander II, however, continued to ignore these concerns. The 1870 Russian Municipal Reform instructed the Governor-General of Lifland, Estland, and Courland to discuss the introduction of that measure into the Baltic provinces.\footnote{2nd PSZ, 45 (1870): no.48498, art. 3.} But it was not until 1877 that this occurred, in effect breaking the Baltic Germans’ control of the city police.\footnote{Haltzel, “The Baltic Germans: Quarrels and Accommodations with Russian Officialdom, 1855–1881,” 137.} The three provinces escaped the terrorist violence of Alexander’s final years and measures responding to such violence. As a result, the new mounted rangers were not introduced there. Nor were the other changes to the European Russian police enacted in the final years of Alexander II’s reign.

The German-dominated police system in the Baltic provinces might have persisted indefinitely had it not been for the ascension of Alexander III, the least pro-German of Russia’s nineteenth-century tsars. In March, 1882, his nationalist Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Ignat’ev asked a senatorial inspector, N. A. Manasein, later the Minister of Justice, whether the police system in the Baltic provinces met the needs of the populace.\footnote{Thaden, “The Abortive Experiment: Cultural Russification in the Baltic Provinces, 1881–1914,” 62; Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (B&E), s. v. “Manasein, Nikolai Avksent’evich.”} His negative response set in motion a russification effort that would be completed under Count D. A. Tolstoi, yet another Minister of nationalist views. A. A. Polovtsov, a member of the State Council and the founder of the Russian Historical Society, advised Alexander and Tolstoi to complete the reform of the Russian police before expanding their system to the Baltic. The Tsar, however, ignored this advice and moved to replace the German-dominated police with government-appointed officials under St. Petersburg’s control.\footnote{Thaden, “The Abortive Experiment: Cultural Russification in the Baltic Provinces, 1881–1914,” 62.} Under the terms of a June 1888 State Council recommendation approved a month later by the Tsar, the existing Baltic police system was abolished and replaced by one modeled closely after that in the Russian provinces. The
new police included 21 county sheriffs, 194 rangers, and 458 city patrolmen.24 Although much of the county police continued to be staffed by Germans, large numbers of Russians were appointed to the new force.25

The absence of “before-and-after” statistics on the fight against crime or other police duties precludes a high confidence assessment of the impact of the 1888 changes in the Baltic. Manasein’s critique and Polovtsov’s call for a delay, however, make it clear that the decision to replace the German-elected police had little to do with police effectiveness. Manasein, like Leont’ev in the early 1860s, had argued not that the Baltic police regime was ineffective, but that it was unjust. To have argued the former would have fled in the face of the numerous accounts of the tranquility and prosperity of the three provinces. Polovtsov, in turn, was referring to failings of Russia’s police that were well known to contemporaries. Prior to the 1880s, many, and perhaps most, senior tsarist officials probably believed that the Baltic provinces were better policed than the rest of their Empire. In introducing the new system tsarist officials were acting in the belief that the Latvians and Estonians would prefer Russian-appointed police to German landlords. With ethnic Germans still economically dominant, however, and Estonian and Latvian nationalism on the rise, any popular support that the new police did enjoy would prove short-lived.

**The Caucasus**

The imposition of Russia’s rule took longer and was more violent in the Caucasus than in the Baltic. Russian administrators distinguished between the Caucasus’s Northern and Southern Regions. The former included Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia, and other territory now part of the Russian Federation. The latter included today’s Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and parts of northern Turkey and Iran. In the Southern Caucasus, Georgia was annexed in 1801, but it was 1828 before the remainder of the region came under Russia’s control after wars against the Turks and the Persians. In the North, Russia established control of the lowlands during the same period. In the mountains, however, it had to fight a 30-year war

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24 3rd PSZ, 8 (1888): no. 5188.
(1829–1859) against tribal leader Shamil and more years of war against the Circassians to pacify the region. Both North and South were subordinate to a single official, known first as High Commander and later as Viceroy. The Northern Region was known as the Caucasus Oblast from 1827–1847, when it became Stavropol Province. The Southern Region was known as the Transcaucasus Krai and underwent a succession of administrative reorganizations over the same period, going from 13 provinces and oblasts in 1830 to two in 1840, to four in 1846, and to five three years later.

Unlike in the Baltic, where it left the existing police system intact, Russia imposed police systems in the Caucasus Oblast and the Transcaucasus Krai. In the South Caucasus, however, it initially included natives in the staffing and control of the local police. The 1801 Statute on the Incorporation of Georgia, for example, provided for the election of two members of the Georgian gentry to the county police boards. It also urged the appointment of Georgian police chiefs in the cities. In the countryside local notables policed their own estates. Native elders and peasant wardens also policed their villages under loose police supervision. As late as 1825, the Russian authorities authorized the use the Legal Code of King Vaktan VI, an eighteenth-century Georgian monarch, in civil disputes. Also the 1827 Statute on the Administration of the Caucasus Oblast, while making the Russian bureaucracy responsible for appointing all uniformed police officials, included the various native groups in policing the towns and countryside. The statute made different arrangements for Armenians, Georgians, and mountain tribesmen, for Christians and Moslems, and for nomadic and sedentary peoples. Often, however, the powerful High Commissioners ignored or openly opposed the center’s efforts. Gen. K. V. Knorring, the High Commissioner in 1801–1802, did the first. Gen. I. V. Gudov, the High Commissioner in 1806–1809, did the second.

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26 2nd PSZ, 1, (1827) no. 878; 22 (1847): no. 21164.
28 1st PSZ, 16 (1800–1801): no. 20007.
29 1st PSZ 40 (1825), no. 30172.
30 2nd PSZ, 1 (1827): no. 878.
Under Gen. I. F. Paskevich, High Commissioner in 1827–1831, outreach to the native groups gave way to ruthless russification in both the Caucasus Oblast and the Transcaucasus Krai. An 1833 decree put military officers in charge of the police in Transcaucasia’s Armenia Oblast. In 1837, the Imperial Corps of Gendarmes created a division exclusively for the Caucasus. In the same year, military officers replaced all the police officials in Caucasus Oblast. The same occurred in the Transcaucasus Krai two years later. Russian administrators also abolished the use of customary law. Then, in 1840, they introduced a police system like the 1837 statute in force in Great Russia and staffed it entirely with Russians.

Russia’s inability to impose its will on the Caucasus with a purely punitive approach eventually led to a change of course. In 1844, Nicholas I appointed Field Marshal M. S. Vorontsov to the new position of Viceroy reporting directly to him. The Tsar’s instructions were to adopt more moderate policies in the South and concentrate on defeating the North. A hero of the 1812 War against Napoleon, Vorontsov had served in the Caucasus under Prince Tsitsianov, one of the first High Commissioners, and had a reputation as a friend of the Caucasian peoples. In his nine years as Viceroy, Vorontsov achieved a remarkable rapprochement with the Georgian gentry, the Tatar sultans, khans, and other Moslem potentates, and the Armenian merchant class, appointing native notables to positions of responsibility in the police and elsewhere and pleasing the merchant by his encouragement of trade. As a military commander, he was less successful. In 1845 a large force under his command suffered massive losses at Shamil’s hands, escaping complete destruction out of sheer luck. It would be 1859 before Shamil was defeated. Still, the combination of carrots and sticks enabled Russia to achieve effective control of both the Southern and Northern Regions by the early 1860s.

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34 2nd PSZ, 8 (1833): no. 6282.
35 2nd PSZ 11 (1837): nos.10241, 10779; 14 (1839): no. 6282.
38 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 73.
Russia’s strengthened control was reflected and furthered by its reorganization of the police. In 1862 it created a 2,100-man rural guard for the Transcaucasus. Staffed by native and Russian volunteers, this force assumed the duties formerly imposed on the local communities as a type of feudal obligation. These duties were to protect important travelers passing through their territory, delivering mail, and suppressing rural banditry. More important moves to strengthen the police came in 1867 with a major reorganization of the police in both the Northern and Southern Caucasus. Under its terms, the December 1862 Temporary Rules on the Police in the Great Russian Provinces were extended to Stavropol Province. This made county sheriffs responsible for policing the towns as well as the countryside except in a few of larger cities, which had police chiefs. District inspectors supported the sheriffs and police chiefs, but there were no elected police boards. In the Transcaucasus the local police were organized along slightly different lines. County Superintendents (emphasis added), one grade higher than sheriffs or police chiefs in the Table of Ranks, were responsible for policing the countryside. Unlike Stavropol Province’s sheriffs they had assistants and other staff that generally enabled them to do without rural districts. Exception was made, however, for a few areas whose remoteness or unique populations required the creation of districts. In effect, after 1867 there were no major differences between the police systems of the Caucasus and those in the Great Russian provinces. The year 1867 also saw the introduction of the 1864 Judicial Reforms into Stavropol Province and Transcaucasus Krai. Investigating Magistrates had already been introduced in the former and in 1874 the Municipal Reform of would be introduced into the latter, further narrowing the difference between the administrative structures of Great Russia and the Caucasus. In 1888, the same year that saw the imposition of Russia’s police system in the Baltic provinces, the nationalist Tsar Alexander III would narrow the gap further by dividing the Transcaucasia’s 37 counties into 125 districts like those that had existed in Russia since 1837.

40 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 38026.
41 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 45259.
42 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): nos. 45260, 45261.
43 2nd PSZ 39 (1864): no. 41275; 49 (1874): no. 53996.
44 3rd PSZ, 8 (1888): no. 5188.
Contemporary commentators offered mixed assessments of the impact of the various changes on police performance. The Russian memoirist A. L. Zisserman, who served in the Caucasus from 1842 to 1867, including as a district police inspector, described police corruption and drunkenness as rampant when he arrived in the region. He maintained, however, that both problems lessened under Vorontsov.\(^45\) While resentful of Vorontsov’s efforts to enlist non-Russians into the Caucasus police, Zisserman reported that this effort was no sham, noting that he had been well supported by an Armenian deputy during his time as district inspector.\(^46\) Viscount James Bryce, a British professor and later a longtime Liberal Member of Parliament, had more praise for Russia’s efforts to enlist Caucasian elites. While judging British police in India to be more capable than the Caucasus police, he credited Russia with achieving better relations with the native peoples of the Caucasus.\(^47\) At the same time Bryce had harsh words for the Caucasus rural guard, whom he described as often in league with robber bands.\(^48\) His countryman John Buchan Telfer, a naval officer and geographer, echoed Bryce’s charge that the rural guard cooperated with robbers. He also reported that a guard’s detachment refused its commander’s orders to provide an escort for his party.\(^49\)

The most damning criticism of the Russian police in the Caucasus was that a centralized bureaucratic system was ill suited to a region with so many different languages and cultures. In his account of his travels in the Caucasus in 1842–1843, Baron von Haxthausen observed that while a centralized bureaucracy was “particularly adapted” to Russia, it would be “wholly unsuited and perhaps fatal” to the Caucasus.\(^50\) The many languages in the

\(^{46}\) Zisseman, Dvadtsat’ piat’ let na Kavkaze, I: 276–77. Elsewhere (I: 119–21) Zisserman complained that Vorontsov’s policy often undermined the authority of Russian officials. He also (I: 323–25) described being rebuked by his superiors for threatening to seize cattle from a village that was refusing to turn over suspected robbers.
\(^{48}\) Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat, 196.
region and the insularity of the villages were depicted as particular barriers to effective centralization. Zisserman, who spoke Georgian and Tatar as well as Russian, recounted that his first deputy, while a capable officer, spoke not a word of Russian. A German explorer who traveled through the Caucasus in the 1850s described a visit to Ossetia where the police superintendent was a Georgian speaker unable to communicate with the locals. Both the county and the municipal police employed translators, but this may have heightened the population’s sense of being under a foreign organization. Also, language differences aside, the culture of the Caucasian villagers was worlds apart from that of their Russian conquerors. Zisserman closed his memoir with a detailed description of a group of Chechens who chose to die rather than surrender to Russian troops. The incident persuaded him that the region was home to “special types” of people unlike others Russia sought to rule. Zisserman believed that Russia’s inability to understand such differences was resulting not just in continuing military failure but also in a broader failure to have any impact at the grassroots level. While his comments applied to the Russian presence in general, they had particular relevance to the police. As British visitor James Bryce observed, in going about their business as if they were in Novgorod, its officers may have reassured their masters that all was well, but their behavior had little relevance to the world of the Caucasus.

Central Asia

Central Asia was the last of the borderland regions to come under tsarist control, with most of its conquest occurring in or shortly after the reign of Alexander II. By the late 1850s Russia had enveloped most of today’s Kazakhstan with a ring of forts and established three oblasts in the Kazakh Steppe, one under the Governor-General of Orenburg and two under the Governor-General of Western Siberia. In the next few years the search for alternatives to the cotton formerly supplied by the Confederate States, geo-
political rivalry with the British Empire and China, and clashes with the nomadic peoples of the steppe led the tsarist regime to push southward toward the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, today’s Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Months before the death of Alexander II, Russia secured the western flank of its Central Asian territories with a bloody victory in what is now Turkmenistan.  

As in the Caucasus, the administration of Central Asia underwent a long series of changes, with oblasts being established, renamed, subjected to border adjustments, and combined under governors-general. By the early 1880s, the region included two General Governorates—for the Steppe and for Turkestan—with five oblasts between them and two Steppe oblasts reporting directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Kokand Khanate had been abolished. Khiva and Bukhara were Russian protectorates, and the Turkmen oases had become the Transcaspian Oblast. The oblasts were divided into counties, the number of which varied from four to seven over time and from place to place.

The key police officials in this system were the heads of the counties and of the small number of cities. County superintendents and city magistrates held positions analogous to those of the sheriffs and police chiefs in the European Russian provinces. Like the sheriffs and police chiefs, they were responsible both for maintaining law and order and for administering their jurisdictions. They differed from their counterparts in the interior, however, in being active duty military officers. As such, they were authorized to exercise both military and civilian power in some counties. Elsewhere, while legally lacking such combined authority, they were often perceived to have it, which greatly increased their influence. Eugene Schuyler, an American


56 S. A. Tarkhov, “Izmenenie administrativno-territorial’no delenie Rossii za poslednie 300 let,” Geografia 15 (2001), https://geo.1sept.ru/view_article.php?ID=200101502; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 48, 51–58; 2nd PSZ, 29 (1875): nos. 55061. According to Pierce (Russian Central Asia, 67–68), the county superintendents had both military and civilian power in the Steppe oblasts of Ural’sk and Turgai, according to 2nd PSZ, 50 (1875): no. 55061. According to Pierce (Russian Central Asia, 67–68) in other oblasts they had no formal military authority, but local units often deferred to them rather than to their military superiors.
diplomat who traveled widely in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Empire, described the county superintendents as more powerful than the sheriffs in European Russia. Much the same was true of the police chiefs in the major cities. Under the terms of an 1865 statute, Russian officers were to head the city governments, which generally had separate Russian and native districts. They could draw on the local garrisons to patrol the streets and maintain order. They also could call on a native police that maintained order in the non-Russian quarters and regulated the bazaars and visiting caravans.

The Russian officers from whose ranks the county superintendents and city magistrates came were ill prepared for their positions. As soldiers, they had been trained to fight wars, not administer counties or cities. Also, as a German officer attached to their forces in 1873 observed, they were generally ignorant of the native languages. Eugene Schuyler encountered an exception—a Bashkir captain in the Russian Army who was fluent in several Central Asian languages and headed the Tashkent police. But he also noted that the captain, a Moslem, was charged with fanaticism and dismissed. Worse than such limitations, so many troublemaking officers had been transferred to Central Asia that the region had a reputation as “a refuge for the scum of military society.” Their low salary and need to spend lavishly to entertain native notables and superiors en route to military campaigns also encouraged them to engage in extortion and embezzlement.

The result of these many failings was a police force notorious for corruption and poor performance. According to Schuyler, county superintendents lived in luxury by levying unauthorized taxes on the native peoples. He also was told that when informed of such abuses, military governors often simply moved the miscreants to other counties. British Army officer and popu-

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60 2nd PSZ, 40 (1865): no. 42372, arts. 38–41.
lar author Frederick Burnaby repeated Schuyler’s reports in his own account of travel in Central Asia in 1875. 65 Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin, once the author of plan for reform of the police in European Russia, depicted the Tashkent force and their fellow officials as so venal and incompetent that he became a hated figure in the city. But his account also made Tashkent synonymous with official corruption. 66

Observers also faulted the police for undermining native local government by manipulating the elections of village elders and other local officials to ensure their compliance with Russian rule and silence about local abuses. Except in Transcaspia, one of the last parts of Central Asia to fall under its control, the tsarist regime pledged to leave most of local administration in Central Asia in the hands of the native peoples. This control was to be exercised via a combination of traditional native governance and a system of villages and townships like those in European Russia. In a departure from traditional practice, however, local leaders once selected on the basis of their age, wisdom, and clan or family ties were to be elected for three-year terms. Most observers depicted these elections as a sham. Schuyler, for example, reported that it was “always easy for the Russian authorities to insist upon the election of anyone they wished.” 67 British clergyman and explorer Henry Lansdell, who traveled through Central Asia after Schuyler, witnessed the election of a township elder that he described as well run, with multiple candidates and a secret ballot. But he also reported that the men elected were generally weak men beholden to the Russians and having little credibility among the natives. 68

The governors-general and the central authorities made numerous attempts to remedy these abuses, but fear of native separatism, continuing military operations, and reluctance to weaken the instruments of control limited their freedom of action. Neither the zemstvo nor the judicial statutes of 1864, both of which were linked to police reform in the interior provinces, were introduced into Central Asia. Governor-General von Kaufman did introduce a modified version of the 1870 municipal reform in Tashkent

in 1877. More so than in the interior, however, the powers given to the community were narrowly circumscribed and the reform had little impact. In 1886 the Tsar approved a new statute on Turkestan that may have worsened the corruption problem by increasing the number of police positions to be filled. Specifically, it divided the counties into precincts headed by inspectors to support the county superintendents. The 1867 statute, which the new law replaced, had made no mention of these positions. Complaints that the law weakened both the governor-general’s power and other controls on the native peoples eventually blocked its implementation. When Lord Curzon, later the Viceroy of India, traveled to Turkestan in 1889, however, he described the provisions for police precincts as being in force. As in European Russia after the 1874 military reform, the new law called for replacing the troops who policed the Russian areas of Turkestan’s cities with hired policemen. In 1891, a Temporary Statute for the administration of the five steppe oblasts also authorized the superintendents to hire policemen. Such measures paled in comparison with those in other borderlands. Transcaucasia, the other region where Russians were heavily outnumbered by peoples of a different race and religion, had had a civilian police guard since 1862. Siberia had a similar but smaller force. Central Asia would see nothing that even approximated this. The failure of the two statutes to address the corruption of the police and their superiors fueled increasing criticism from the public and officialdom in the next two decades. The resistance of many Central Asian officials to the resettlement of peasants from west of the Urals, the official government policy since the late 1880s, exacerbated this. It also led to calls for bringing the region’s institutions more in line with those in European Russia. Defenders of the status quo, however, had powerful supporters. Alexei Kuropatkin,

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69 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 80.
70 3rd PSZ, 6 (1886): no. 3814, art. 61.
71 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 84–85.
72 George N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1889), 257.
73 3rd PSZ, 6 (1886): no. 3814, art. 70.
74 3rd PSZ, 11 (1891): no. 7574, art. 43.
Police in the Borderlands

Minister of War in 1898–1904, for example, had headed the Transcaspian Oblast in 1890–1898. As Minister, he continued to involve himself in its affairs. Also, as events would later show, Alexander Krivoshein, head of Russia’s Department of Peasant Resettlement in 1904–1905, rejected criticism of the Turkestan police as a distraction.

The debate over Central Asia sharpened in 1908 when the Senate sent Konstantin Palen to Turkestan to lead an inspection. Palen was instructed to determine the feasibility of extending civilian government and preventing the military from impeding colonization. In Transcaspia his inspection led to the suspension, dismissal, or indictment of two-thirds of the oblast’s officials. Among those who faced criminal charges was Ashkhabad’s police chief, who was accused of murder. Palen then produced a final report that, in effect, ignored his instructions. Instead, he proposed introducing zemstvos for Russians and settled natives, modestly extending civilian government, and increasing reliance on the county police. His proposals reportedly were discussed at great length in St. Petersburg. Once again, however, the authorities chose to do nothing.

Palen’s inspection was the last major effort to address the problems of Central Asia’s administration and its police. Both would survive until tsarism’s collapse. Their survival, however, was a poor measure of success. In the interim, Central Asia’s military-police regime perfectly illustrated the arbitrary power, incompetence, and corruption that brought about the autocracy’s downfall.

Congress Poland

The police that many tsarist officials came to regard as a model to emulate emerged after a series of failed Russian attempts to establish a system capable of maintaining order in the Kingdom of Poland. Entrusted to Russia by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Kingdom initially enjoyed substantial autonomy, having its own parliament, its own laws, its own army, and its own police. As in the provinces of European Russia at that time, police in

77 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 87.
78 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 89–90.
79 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 88–89.
the Kingdom were largely confined to the cities. In the rural areas nobles enforced the law on their own estates and policed the powiats or counties through elected representatives. Tsars Alexander I and Nicholas I chafed under the limitations on their control and frequently clashed with the Polish elite until 1830 when the Poles’ November Uprising resulted in war with Russia. After defeat by a Russian army in 1831, Congress Poland retained its separate administrative status within the Empire but lost its constitution and separate army. Paskevich, the victorious Russian commander was appointed Viceroy and as he had done in the Caucasus launched a long period of repression.\(^81\)

Police measures, particularly the introduction of Russian military police, were critical elements of Paskevich’s restriction of Polish freedom. In February 1832 the Russian General Staff established a special unit of the new Imperial Corps of Gendarmes—the Third Gendarme District—to be based in Poland.\(^82\) When fully staffed, the District would include about 1,000 officers and men, half stationed in Warsaw and half spread out in 39 other cities and two fortresses.\(^83\) The authorizing decree specified that because a knowledge of Polish was critical to the gendarmes’ mission, Polish natives would be allowed to serve in the lower ranks. It was stipulated, however, that Polish recruits should have already served at least five years in the Russian armed forces.

Even as Russian gendarmes were being introduced, the local police continued to exist and remained largely in Polish hands.\(^84\) Warsaw, where the police commissioners were Russian army officers, was something of an exception. Even there, however, political reliability was not the only criterion for service. Russia continued to rely on wounded Russian veterans to staff the Night Watch.\(^85\) And as late as the early 1860s, Polish natives still accounted for much of the capital’s police.\(^86\)

To a far greater degree than in European Russia, the gendarmes and the regular police differed sharply in their missions. In effect, Congress

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\(^{82}\) 2nd PSZ, 7 (1832): no. 5165.

\(^{83}\) 2nd PSZ, 18 (1843): 17038, shtaty i tabeli.

\(^{84}\) Thaden, *Russia’s Western Borderlands*, 152.

\(^{85}\) 2nd PSZ, 8 (1831): no. 6291.

\(^{86}\) MSVUK: OA, part 1, section 11, no. 3 (1871): 178.
Police in the Borderlands

Poland had two police forces. The gendarmes were instruments of an occupying power responsible for enforcing its writ. The regular police, while also charged with maintaining public order, were instruments of the local authorities. Widely viewed as powerless relative to the gendarmes, they still were important because of the multitude of responsibilities for everyday government. In the rural areas the local police were assisted by Cossacks, first in unspecified numbers and later in groups of 25 per county. With a reputation for being violent and abusive, the Cossacks were criticized even by Poles who favored cooperation with Russia and in the early 1860s the number of Cossacks attached to the police was reduced to five per county.\(^8^7\)

From the standpoint of the Russian authorities, the gendarmes were by far the more successful force. For almost three decades after their introduction in 1832, they maintained order in Poland, even in 1846–1848 when so much of Europe and Austrian and Prussian Poland experienced revolution.\(^8^8\) The local police, in contrast, like their counterparts in Russia, were both overburdened and undermanned. Nikolai Miliutin, one of the architects of Russia’s police reform, maintained that the effect of these problems was to deny Poland a real local police.\(^8^9\)

In 1863, Russian repression and misrule sparked violent Polish resistance that lasted until well into 1864. One Russian response was to introduce yet another police force and put the military in control of all the Kingdom’s police until the restoration of order there. In December 1863, Russia’s War Ministry established the Military Police Administration of the Kingdom of Poland. All military and civilian police were to be under a new Policemaster-General. Military Police Superintendents responsible for one or two counties or for special military districts in some provinces would support this official. They, in turn, had the local gendarme commanders as their deputies and controlled the civilian police superintendents.\(^9^0\)

Effective as an immediate response to rebellion, the new police regime had a makeshift organizational structure that reflected its temporary status. The Third Gendarme District, for example, had eight provincial commands. These corresponded to the eight provinces that had existed at its founding.

\(^8^7\) MSVUK: OA, part 1, section 11, no. 3, 175.
\(^8^8\) Thaden, Russia’s Western Borderlands, 153.
\(^8^9\) MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 11, no. 3, 133.
\(^9^0\) 2nd PSZ, 38 (1863): no. 40456.
Appendix

The number of provinces, however, had dropped to five in 1845. To correct this and prepare for the departure of the Military County Superintendents, the Ministry of War reorganized the Third Gendarme District into—five counties—in 1864. St. Petersburg also began to discuss a more orderly arrangement of its Polish police and a major reform of the Kingdom’s government and society.

The leader of the reform effort was Nikolai Miliutin. Although his views on Emancipation had made him anathema to Russian conservatives, Miliutin had an antipathy to the Polish gentry and Catholic Church that his conservative critics shared and that would win him their support in his efforts to reshape the Kingdom. At the request of Alexander II, Miliutin prepared proposals for emancipating Congress Poland’s serfs and ensuring their control of the reformed community (gmina) assemblies formerly dominated by the local gentry. Both won quick approval. He was assisted by the Slavophil Iurii Samarin, a critic of the Polish gentry as he had been of the Baltic Germans. Together they also prepared and won the implementation of laws to reform provincial and county institutions and the local police. The first of these doubled the number of provinces and counties in the Kingdom—to 10 and 85, respectively—in an effort to reduce officials’ workload and allow closer surveillance of the populace. The counties were to be headed by superintendents appointed by the Viceroy. Except in Warsaw, provincial capitals, and the city of Lodz, these officials were also to command the municipal forces in their jurisdictions. Each was to have two deputies, one for administration and one for police. The second law set the strength of the rural guard at 2,683 officers and privates to be recruited from the most capable members of the local police and from county gendarme commands, which were to merge with the guards. No more than 10 percent were to be native Poles. They were to operate under the county commanders and be distributed into new police precincts, with a ratio of guards to popu-

91 2nd PSZ, 20 (1845): no. 18136a.
92 2nd PSZ, 39 (1864): no. 40600.
94 2nd PSZ, 39 (1864): nos. 40609, 40610.
96 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 44012.
ulace of 1:2,500 in the countryside and 1:1,500 in the cities. A study by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions later claimed that 80 percent of the guards could read and write.

Even as the new rural guard increased the power of the rural police, its absorption of the gendarmes’ county commands allowed a redistribution of the gendarmes’ resources. Within weeks of the creation of the rural guard the Ministry of War reorganized the Kingdom’s gendarmes, doubling the number of provincial commands, limiting lower level commands to 34 of the 85 counties, and establishing a railroad division. The statute describing the Gendarme District’s mission and staffing barred the transfer of Poles or Catholics into its ranks.

Unlike Miliutin’s plans for the Russian provinces, the 1866 changes to the local police in Poland were moves to strengthen the bureaucracy rather than steps toward the transfer of police powers to independent courts or elected local governments. True, in 1875 a version of the 1864 judicial reform would be introduced into Congress Poland. For a time this may have placed limits on the power of the police there as it did in the Russian provinces. In tsarism’s remaining decades, however, the authorities would move to undue much of the judicial reform throughout the Empire. And never would they expand the 1864 zemstvo legislation into the erstwhile Kingdom. As a result, while Valuev, Timashev, and other tsarist ministers would point to the Polish police as a model for Russia, it is better evaluated as a tool of tsarist imperialism than a system for enforcing the law and protecting the public. With more and better qualified personnel than their counterparts elsewhere in the Empire, the local police in Poland may have been better in controlling crime and maintaining public order. Their primary purpose, however, was to control the Poles.

Siberia

The forces that shaped the police in Siberia differed greatly from those that shaped their counterparts in the other borderlands. Unlike the Baltic
provinces or Poland, Siberia had no entrenched nobility challenging the center for control of their territory. Members of the nobility were not only few in number; they consisted largely of officials and military officers with personal nobility attained by serving the state.\textsuperscript{101} Also, in contrast to the war-plagued Caucasus, Central Asia, or rebellious Poland, by the start of the nineteenth century Siberia was a conquered region that had been effectively pacified. As a result of these factors, the tsarist bureaucracy had virtually \textit{carte blanche} to develop and implement its police plans. It also was able to introduce a police system managed entirely by appointed officers. At the same time, with territory half again as large as Europe, and a population of only about one million in 1800, Siberia posed challenges to effective policing not encountered in the Baltic, Caucasus, Central Asia, or Poland.\textsuperscript{102} These would be compounded by the center’s use of Siberia as a place of exile and punishment or criminals whose frequent escape from their places of confinement disrupted social order in the region.

Siberia’s police system and its entire government were largely the work of one man, Michael Speranskii, the earliest—and, to some, the greatest—of Russia’s enlightened bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{103} As Governor-General of the region in 1819–1821, Speranskii developed a knowledge of and commitment to its needs that led to the drafting and enactment of a landmark 1822 statute. This Siberian Charter was to shape Siberia’s government institutions until tsarism’s fall.\textsuperscript{104} The Charter was a bureaucratic document \textit{par excellence}. Under its terms the region was to consist of two governorates-general—for Western and Eastern Siberia—separated by the Yenisei River. Each included two provinces and one oblast. The provinces were divided into regions with administrations that differed with the size of their territory and population, the number of native peoples within their borders, and their accessibility. The native peoples were grouped according to whether they were settled or nomadic, with the nomadic people further broken down on the basis of their frequency of movement. Cities were divided into large, small. The oblasts and maritime districts had simpler but still multi-layered structures.

\textsuperscript{101} Igor Naumov, \textit{The History of Siberia} (London: Routledge, 2006), 102.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{1st PSZ}, 38 (1822); no. 29125.
As did the provinces of European Russia, Siberia had separate rural and urban police. The rural police consisted of 36 sheriffs, one per each region.\(^{105}\) None of Siberia’s towns, even the five classified as large, had police commissioners as did large Russian cities. Instead, all 44 Siberian cities were headed by magistrates, as in the small towns of European Russia.\(^{106}\) In most rural regions the sheriff had two or more associates. The city magistrates had district inspectors and in the largest cities, sergeants to assist them.

Minor differences in titles and organizational structure aside, Siberia’s rural police differed from those in European Russia in two important ways: the much larger size of their territories and their status as appointed rather than elected officials. In 1822, Russia’s rural police did not yet include the 1,207 district inspectors introduced in 1837 and were mostly elected by the local gentry. Still, European Russia’s rural sheriffs numbered in the hundreds rather than in the dozens. The small size of Siberia’s population meant that its sheriffs had far fewer people to oversee. The vast distances from one settlement to another, on the other hand, made support from the elders and wardens in the tiny villages and native settlements more difficult to come by. The elected elders and wardens, whose communities would remain under the sheriffs’ direct control until the end of the nineteenth century, were no more useful than their counterparts in the European provinces, but the sheriffs had no alternative to them.\(^{107}\)

Appointed though they were by the higher authorities in their provinces or oblasts, Siberia’s sheriffs were no better in enforcing the authorities’ orders than their gentry-elected counterparts in European Russia. According to Herzen, as Governor-General, Speranskii had inspired such fear in the Siberian police that they bribed the peasant villagers not to report their abuses. Herzen also reported, however, that after a few years the corrupt police were back to their former offenses. In addition, with a small pool of local recruits to draw on, the authorities had little choice but to lower their standards. According to a study by a Russian historian, runaway exiles some-

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105 On the sheriffs’ organization, duties, and numbers, see 1st PSZ, no 29125, part 1, chapter 3, sect.2, arts. 75–79, and Tabeli razdeleniia Sibiri.
106 1st PSZ, no 29125, part 1, chapter 3, sect. 5, arts. 105–115, and Tabeli razdeleniia Sibiri.
times were chosen to be sheriffs.\textsuperscript{108} From time to time the central authorities offered salary premiums and other inducements to attract better qualified officials.\textsuperscript{109} The harsh conditions and isolation of Siberia, however, generally undermined such offers. Siberia’s urban police, also appointed officials as were those in European Russia, had similar recruitment problems. Speranskii’s Charter gave the Committee on Wounded Soldiers the right to name candidates for city magistrate and, as elsewhere in the Empire, injuries qualifying candidates for the positions often prevented them from performing their duties.\textsuperscript{110} As in European Russia at the time, there were no hired policemen to man guard posts or maintain order in the cities. Instead the magistrates had relied on Cossacks who were both untrained as police and often notorious for their own disorderly conduct.\textsuperscript{111}

Fewer and less qualified than the police in European Russia, Siberia’s police also faced a criminal problem that police in the interior did not. For centuries, Russia’s rulers had used Siberia as a place for criminals sentenced to hard labor or exile. In the early nineteenth century, these groups generally accounted for less than 10 percent of the overall population of Siberia, but were concentrated in a few regions where their share was far greater. Most convicts worked in the Nerchinsk Mining Region, some 800 miles east of the eastern shore of Lake Baikal.\textsuperscript{112} Speranskii had addressed the management of Siberia’s exiles in a detailed statute—one of nine issued along with the Charter for Siberia.\textsuperscript{113} In part to reduce the burden on the police, this law provided for a military command to accompany exiles to their place of confinement and officials to monitor them subsequently. His plans for the exiles may, as an English traveler to Siberia observed, have been “utopian” from the outset.\textsuperscript{114} In either event, the criminalization of vagrancy in the Empire in 1823 increased the number of exiles to a point that soon overwhelmed the system for controlling them. With vagrancy a crime, the number of exiles

\textsuperscript{109} For examples, see \textit{2nd PSZ}, 7 (1832): no. 5267 and 10 (1835): no. 8164.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{1st PSZ}, no. 29125, part 1, chapter 6, art. 178.
\textsuperscript{112} Beer, \textit{The House of the Dead}, 27, 80.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{1st PSZ}, 38 (1822): no. 29128.
\textsuperscript{114} Charles Herbert Cottrell, \textit{Recollections of Siberia in the years 1840 and 1841} (London: John W. Parker, 1842), 164.
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soared. In 1819–1822, it averaged 4,000 per year. In 1826–1846, this doubled.115 The result was to make a shambles of the mechanism for monitoring them. According to Daniel Beer, in 1838–1841 about 51,000 convicts fled their place of exile, only a third of whom were captured.116 Vagrants and political exiles doubtless made up some of these numbers. Most, however, were a mix of murderers, rapists, arsonists, bandits, and burglars.117 Often they joined the ranks of what contemporaries called “General Cuckoo’s Army,” wandering bands of fugitives who sometimes resorted to violence.118

The fugitives’ behavior provided grist for gory tales to foreign visitors. Charles Cottrell was told of one escaped convict who murdered 26 people, culminating in the stabbing and disemboweling of a 10-year-old girl.119 Such violence did not, however, move the authorities to create more police. Instead the only notable increase in the police occurred in Siberia’s gold fields, which experienced a boom after the legalization of private mining in 1824, when the introduction of gold panning made prohibition infeasible.120 In 1838, the tsarist government required regions with significant gold production to have special officials eventually known as “mining sheriffs” to maintain order in the gold fields and provide security for shipments.121 Each sheriff had 20 Cossacks under his command and in case of need could get more support from Cossacks or the military.122

In 1847–1861, Eastern Siberia’s Governor-General was Nikolai Murav’ev whose impact rivalled Speranskii’s. A military hero from a noble family, Murav’ev was worlds different than Speranskii, the classic bureaucrat and son of a priest. Under instructions to claim territory along the Amur River contested by China, he did this so well that he received the title Count Amurskii. He also became famous for rooting out corruption.123 Neither he

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119 Cottrell, Recollections of Siberia.
120 Lincoln, The Conquest of Siberia, 185–86.
121 2nd PSZ, 13 (1838): no. 11188; 19 (1844), no. 17775.
122 2nd PSZ, 13 (1838): no. 11188, arts. 78–79.
123 On Murav’ev’s domestic and foreign policy accomplishments, see Lincoln, The Conquest of a Continent, 190–96.
nor his counterpart in Western Siberia, however, expanded the police. In 1856, there were four fewer sheriffs and ten fewer heads of municipal police than provided for in the Siberian Charter.¹²⁴

Even when poised for major reforms west of the Urals the tsarist authorities rejected suggestions for similar change in Siberia. In 1856, the government committee that oversaw Siberia observed that Speranskii’s Charter needed no major changes and called for stricter adherence to its terms rather than for reform. At the same time, it noted that updating the Siberian police system to bring it in line with that in European Russia might be appropriate.¹²⁵ Still, it would be 1867, five years after the issuance of the Temporary Rules for the police in European Russia, before such action was taken. The new statute on the Siberian police merged the rural and urban police in all but 14 Siberian cities. The sheriffs who commanded the combined units were given full-time assistants, but there was no increase in the number of sheriffs and no mention of city guards or patrolmen. As did the Temporary Rules for the European Russian police, the 1867 Statute left the police’s duties unchanged. With neither the zemstvo nor the judicial reform to be introduced into Siberia, however, there was no indication that the 1867 statute was to be temporary. Other than the municipal reform of 1870, which from the outset was scheduled to be implemented in Siberia, there was no other legislation affecting the Siberian police’s duties in the remainder of Alexander II’s reign.¹²⁶

In 1879, however, Alexander approved the State Council’s recommendation to create a police guard in Western Siberia. The guard was to consist of hired personnel, include both mounted and foot police, be under the command of the sheriffs, and replace the Cossacks. Their number and salary were left to the discretion of the Governor-General with the proviso that total spending could not exceed 37,407 rubles, less than 2 percent of the amount budgeted for the mounted rangers in Russia, the year before. The guardsmen were to carry weapons and wear badges. The Ministry of War was to provide the weapons at no cost.¹²⁷

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¹²⁵ 2nd PSZ, 31 (1856): no. 31124.
¹²⁶ 2nd PSZ 45 (1870): no. 48498; 47 (1872): no. 50723.
¹²⁷ 2nd PSZ, 54 (1879): no. 59737.
The Tsar Liberator’s successor, Alexander III, limited his changes to Siberia’s administration to bureaucratic reshuffling, but also began what would prove a new stage in the history of the region. In 1882, his government eliminated Western Siberia as an administrative unit, putting Tomsk and Tobol’sk on the same footing as provinces in European Russia. It also transferred Semipalatinsk and Akmolynsk Oblasts to a new Governor-General of the Steppe. Two years later it split Eastern Siberia into two new governorates-general: Priamursk and Irkutsk. At the same time, Alexander’s reign saw the beginning of construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, a development that would transform Siberia’s history. By allowing quicker access from the Russian heartland to Siberia, the Railway would have a major impact on both. The provinces west of the Urals would benefit from increased trade, greater contact with the countries of the Pacific and Far East, and migration opportunities for land-starved peasants. Siberia, for its part, would experience an influx of wealth and people to the cities. The Railway would also link Siberia to the social and political upheavals that would put an end to tsarism in the twentieth century.

Impact and Implications

Whatever their effect on the borderlands, the changes in the police systems of those regions had a major impact on the center’s ability to accomplish its goals—police and otherwise—in European Russia. In addition, analysis of the measures they took in these regions has important contributions to make to our understanding of tsarist decision making.

The sizable resources committed to strengthening the police in the Caucasus and Congress Poland probably offer the clearest example of how the tsarist government’s actions in the borderlands affected its ability to achieve other goals. In the mid- and late-1860s when Valuev and then Timashev were calling—unsuccessfully—for the creation of a rural guard in the Great Russian provinces, the government was paying for 2,017 guards in the Caucasus and another 2,683 in Congress Poland. The laws creating

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129 3rd PSZ, 4 (1884): no. 2366.
these forces were vague as to whether all their members would be *mounted* police but imply that most would be so. Each was larger than all the mounted patrols in the provinces then under the Temporary Rules. Together, they were almost as large as the 5,000 rangers established in 1878 in response to terrorist violence.

Table 27: Spending for Local Police in the Caucasus and Congress Poland in 1868 (rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Rural Guards</th>
<th>Sheriffs, Police Chiefs, and Staffs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>562,664</td>
<td>484,848</td>
<td>1,047,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Poland</td>
<td>599,310</td>
<td>737,925*</td>
<td>1,337,235*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,161,974</td>
<td>1,222,773*</td>
<td>2,384,747*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes spending for Warsaw city police

Sources: 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 38026; 41 (1866): nos. 44013 & 44015; 42 (1867): no. 45268; 43 (1868): no. 45480.

In monetary terms the two forces (Table 27) were also costly, amounting to half as much as spending on the local police in all of European Russia. Neither Siberia nor the Baltic Provinces would have mounted police guards until 1879 and 1889, respectively, and in Central Asia Russia relied on military police. The central authorities spent very little on police in the Baltic, but in 1869 the local police in Siberia cost about 400,000 rubles.132 Police spending figures for Central Asia are harder to come by, pertain to later years, and are separate for Turkestan and the rest of the region. Planned police spending in Turkestan in 1887 was 244,000 rubles; for the Five Steppe Oblasts in 1892 it was 345,000 rubles.133

In light of the frequent complaints of Finance Minister Reutern and Minister of War Miliutin in the 1860s that the government could not afford to spend more on the police in European Russia, the commitment of so much manpower and money to the Caucasus and Congress Poland cries out for explanation. Responding is challenging because this study had no access to archives or other sources with details on tsarist decision making.

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132 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44681.
133 3rd PSZ, 6 (1886): no. 3814, shtaty i tabeli and 11 (1891): no. 7574, shtaty i tabeli (combined figures for county and city police forces in both cases).
Police in the Borderlands

on police matters in these regions. Also, extrapolating Russian ministers’ positions on Polish police matters from their stances on police reform in European Russia would often be mistaken. For example, Nikolai Miliutin, an advocate of reforming rather than expanding the local police in Russia, favored the opposite course in Congress Poland. His brother Dmitrii, the Minister of War, opposed Valuev’s plans for the creation of a rural guard in Russia but supported increasing police controls in Poland.¹³⁴ Finance Minister Reutern, in contrast, consistently opposed expensive government projects other than railroads out of a desire to reduce Russia’s budget deficit.¹³⁵

For all the limitations of our sources, the nature and the timing of the government’s police measures in the borderlands provide some insight about what caused it to act as it did. In the case of Congress Poland, for example, there can be little doubt that maintaining the Empire’s control in the face of violent resistance was the center’s primary motive. As would be the case in 1878 when the government created the mounted rangers, armed resistance proved an effective antidote to ministerial bickering and indecision. The motivation for Russia’s police-related actions in the Caucasus, on the other hand, is much less clear. By 1862, when Russia created a rural guard there, the long war against Shamil’s forces was at an end. More to the point, the new guard was based not in the North Caucasus but in Transcaucasia, which had no recent history of anti-Russian resistance. Rather, the one notable instance of peasant violence—in Georgia’s Sangrelo Province in 1857—had been directed at members of the hereditary Georgian elite and was settled only when the Russian military enforced an armed peace. This background and Russia’s encouragement of native participation in Transcaucasia’s rural guard—something it discouraged in Poland—suggest the region’s elites may well have supported or even requested a force to police the countryside. In Georgia, where emancipation proved more protracted and more favorable to the landlords than in Russia, the nobility had particular reason to do so. Still, when violence did occur in the emancipation years—as happened in

Abkhazia in 1866—the rural guard was unable to control it without the army’s assistance.  

In the Baltic Provinces and Siberia, the government’s slower and more modest police activities reflected different aspects of tsarist decision making. While far from the most notorious example of the arbitrariness of Russia’s rulers, tsarist policy toward the three Baltic provinces clearly illustrated the perils of the concentration of power in the hands of a hereditary sovereign. For decades the fondness of a succession of Russian rulers for the German nobility—in effect, their personal whims—allowed the Baltic elites to retain a police system that was archaic and blatantly unjust, and at times to ignore the center’s efforts to change it. The abrupt imposition of the Russian police model despite senior officials’ recommendation to first complete its reform also was driven by the monarch’s whim—a nationalist disdain for Germans. In Siberia, in contrast, while Nicholas I took a personal interest in Siberia as a foreign policy tool vis-a-vis China, both he and other rulers tended to rely on powerful governors-general to manage Russia’s interests. Both the enlightened bureaucrat Speranskii and the swashbuckling Nikolai Murav’ev—men with no knowledge of Siberia before serving there—became legendary figures for their efforts to transform Siberia. Both, however, would be followed by officials of lesser ability and lesser commitment and would prove unable to overcome the combination of Siberia’s remoteness, harsh climate, and status as a place of exile. Siberia in the nineteenth century was a place to which people were sentenced or went to seek their fortunes rather than a place to live. As such, it had need for prison police and mining police but its regular police would remain underdeveloped until the railway and peasant migration transformed society there.

Central Asia’s police development—or, more accurately, the failure of its police to evolve—was yet another story. When Lord Curzon visited Central Asia in 1889, he noted that an unnamed author’s remark that “martial law is the normal condition” was truer in Tashkent than anywhere else in the Empire. Much the same could accurately have been said of the Caucasus in the 1830s or Poland in 1863. In these areas, however, reliance on military


137 Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889, 240.
officers or military units to police the towns and countryside was temporary stage that eventually gave way to the development of civilian forces. In Central Asia the police continued to be commanded and staffed by an officer corps that was ill prepared for such duty. To some extent, this reflected St. Petersburg’s continuing concern with the possibility of military operations against Britain or China. To a much greater extent, however, it probably reflected the tsarist authorities’ belief that there was no alternative to military rule in a region where Russians were surrounded by much larger numbers of native peoples of a different race and a non-Christian faith. In 1912 upon his return from Turkestan, Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein illustrated this belief in explaining why the regime had chosen not to act on Palen’s recommendations: “The introduction of a general civilian administration in place of the military or the establishment of the zemstvo are . . . useful . . . but only if there is a strong Russian population in the region . . . Meanwhile the actual Turkestan is a sea of natives . . . When one has seen the universal predominance of the natives in Turkestan, one cannot but feel that this is still a military camp, a temporary halting place during the victorious march of Russia into Central Asia . . . The uezd commandants (county superintendents RA), the main working force in the local administration are very well selected...”

Krivoshein, was a conservative but no reactionary, and was one of the few ministers able to get along with both the Duma and the Imperial family. As such, he expressed the views of what could accurately be described as mainstream educated society. His disdain for the native peoples and his belief that they were not ready for civilian rule, therefore, do much to explain the persistence of a military police system that had long since seen its day in the rest of the Empire.

138 As translated in Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 89–90.
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Founded by Peter the Great in 1718, Russia’s police were key instruments of tsarist power. In the reign of Alexander II (1855–1881), local police forces took on new importance. The liberation of 23 million serfs from landlord control, growing fear of crime, and the terrorist violence of the closing years challenged law enforcement with new tasks that made worse what was already a staggering burden.

This book describes the regime’s decades-long struggle to reform and strengthen the police. The author reviews the local police’s role and performance in the mid-nineteenth century and the implications of the largely unsuccessful effort to transform them. From a longer-term perspective, the study considers how the police’s systemic weaknesses undermined tsarist rule, impeded a range of liberalizing reforms, perpetuated reliance on the military to maintain law and order, and gave rise to vigilante justice.

While its primary focus is on European Russia, the analysis also covers much of the imperial periphery, discussing the police systems in the Baltic Provinces, Congress Poland, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia.

“Policemen of the Tsar is a significant and original contribution to the history of the late imperial period and especially to our knowledge of the reign of Alexander II. The police was one of the chief institutions of the tsarist state, an essential force for fighting crime and maintaining order, one of the few government institutions that reached into the world of the peasantry and urban lower classes. But despite its importance, Western historians of Russia have failed to give the police the attention it deserved. Abbott’s book goes a long way in solving this problem.”

Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Professor Emeritus of history at the University of New Mexico, author of Famine in Russia, 1891–1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis and The Tsar’s Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire

About the Author

Robert J. Abbott has a PhD from Princeton University. He has worked as a university instructor, intelligence analyst, and consultant to US intelligence and law enforcement agencies. His previous research has focused on the history of crime and its impact on society and government.