PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

PATHWAYS TO EFFECTIVENESS

Edited by
Liliana B. Andonova, Moira V. Faul and Dario Piselli
“Sustainable development goals are being pursued by an unprecedented variety of government, business, and civil society actors operating at levels from the local to the global. Most of these actors now realize that they cannot succeed on their own, and in their search for collaborative governance arrangements have increasingly turned to various forms of partnerships. But which sorts of partnerships have been most effective in supporting the pursuit of sustainability? And how can existing partnerships be reformed to increase their effectiveness?

This volume provides the most compelling answers I know to these important questions. Its contributions range from the development of a theoretical framework that integrates multiple disciplinary perspectives on partnership effectiveness, through the use of that theory to analyze empirical evidence spanning an unprecedented range of issues and scales, to the identification of generalizable guidance for devising more effective partnership arrangements. In short, it is a must read for both scholars and practitioners working on sustainable development and global governance more generally.”

William Clark, Harvey Brooks Research Professor of International Science, Public Policy and Human Development, Harvard University, USA

“A tour de force! Starting with a careful assessment of the concept of public-private partnerships, this book develops a sophisticated argument about conditions determining the effectiveness of such partnerships and explores the persuasiveness of this argument through a range of well-chosen empirical applications. All future research dealing with public-private partnerships will need to treat this book as an essential point of departure.”

Oran Young, Professor Emeritus, University of California Santa Barbara, USA

“Public-private and multistakeholder partnerships have expanded enormously over recent decades in almost every sector of global governance, from health to education and the environment. Curiously, however, there are few systematic or comprehensive studies of their effectiveness despite their ubiquity. This original and impressive collection not only addresses this knowledge gap but also advances a unique analytical framework for evaluating partnership effectiveness. It applies this to a series of rich thematic case studies of partnerships in action, from climate change to drug development, whilst the case studies are complemented in the
final section with contributions which adopt a holistic or systemic perspective to explore the structural conditions which impact the effectiveness of partnerships. A collection which presents significant challenges to many contemporary orthodoxies about partnerships for sustainable development. But equally one which offers practical insights into how sustainable partnerships could be re-designed to combine effectiveness with other important qualities such as accountability, transparency and democracy. A terrific and revealing collection for those with an interest in the workings of sustainable partnerships and the future of global governance.”

Tony McGrew, Distinguished Professor of Global Public Policy, Shanghai University, China

“Partnerships for Sustainability provides a very timely book that allows us to use research results for practical design of pathways with high effectiveness. The sustainable development goals and necessary fast and bold changes cannot be reached without successful, highly effective collaboration of public and private. This book provides solid academic research and excellent cases for decision makers and thinkers. A truly systemic, multistakeholder approach for solutions and actions of highest effectiveness.”

Gilbert Probst, Honorary Professor, Director of Innovation and Partnerships, Geneva School of Economics and Management (GSEM), University of Geneva, Switzerland

“Partnerships for Sustainability offers both a fresh way of thinking about the effectiveness of public-private and multistakeholder governance and a range of new empirical material on partnerships in action. By disaggregating the pathways and conditions underpinning the variable effects of partnerships the authors helpfully unpack the layers that make up governance and the politics that make them tick. The framework comes alive across a range of often intersecting issue areas. It provokes important questions that researchers, teachers, students, and practitioners will want to grapple with.”

Deborah Avant, Sié Chéou-Kang Chair for International Security and Diplomacy, University of Denver, USA

“Over the last 20+ years, public-private and multi-stakeholder partnerships became centrally important forms of global governance. This book has finally given students, scholars and practitioners a systematic framework through which to assess multiple types of effects across environmental, energy and global health cases – and it has done so in ways that yield actionable lessons for the design and implementation of partnership forms of governance.”

Stacy D. VanDeveer, Professor of Global Governance and Human Security, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA
Partnerships for Sustainability in Contemporary Global Governance

Partnerships for Sustainability in Contemporary Global Governance investigates the goals, ideals, and realities of sustainability partnerships and offers a theoretical framework to help disentangle the multiple and interrelated pathways that shape their effectiveness.

Partnerships are ubiquitous in research and policy discussions about sustainability and are important governance instruments for the provision of public goods. While partnerships promise a great deal, there is little clarity as to what they deliver. If partnerships are to break free from this paradox, more nuance and rigor are required for understanding and assessing their actual effects. This volume applies its original framework to diverse empirical cases in a way that could be extended to broader data sets and case studies of partnerships. The dual contribution of this volume, theoretical and empirical, holds promise for a more thorough and innovative understanding of the pathways to partnership effectiveness and the conditions that can shape their performance. The broad range of crosscutting analyses suggest important practical implications for the design of new partnerships and the updating of existing initiatives.

This interdisciplinary book will be of great interest to researchers, students, and practitioners within international relations, political science, sociology, environmental studies and global studies, as well as the growing number of scholars in public policy, global health, and organizational and business studies who are keen to gain a deeper understanding of the pathways and mechanisms that influence the outcomes and effectiveness of cross-sector collaboration and transnational governance more broadly.

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9. Partnerships for Sustainability in Contemporary Global Governance
Pathways to Effectiveness
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Partnerships for Sustainability in Contemporary Global Governance
Pathways to Effectiveness

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Introduction

Liliana B. Andonova, Moira V. Faul and Dario Piselli

As global issues have become increasingly complex and interdependent, public-private and multistakeholder partnerships have gained momentum as new mechanisms of governance. Ever since the endorsement of public-private initiatives among the official outcomes of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, this modality of governance has been promoted across efforts to eradicate poverty, ensure human health and well-being, and fight climate change and environmental degradation. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development gave further impetus to the role of partnerships as a key means of implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The turn to partnerships in global governance has been often driven or justified by their anticipated effects on overcoming collective action failures at a time of accelerating transformations at the interface of Earth and societal systems. In theory, partnerships can facilitate collective action by providing greater flexibility for smaller groups of interested actors to negotiate terms of engagement. They can create mechanisms to bring together public purpose and private incentives in a professed attempt to overcome barriers to welfare-enhancing innovation (Andonova 2017; 2010; Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Stadtler and Probst 2012), and provide new instruments for addressing core issues on the sustainable development agenda such as health, education, humanitarian issues, or clean energy (Andonova 2017; Faul 2014; Pattberg et al. 2012; Szlezák et al. 2010; Westerwinter 2019). In turn, successful partnership experiments are thought to enlarge the scope of cooperation through learning-by-doing and by updating the beliefs and interests of relevant actors. In these ways, partnerships can be characterized as experimentalist institutions (De Burca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Hoffmann 2011) with informal structures based predominantly on non-legalized or soft-law agreements. Thus, scholars and practitioners often expect partnerships to contribute to global public goods by pooling resources and mobilizing new types of collective action in an era of globalization and gridlock (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2004; Börzel and Risse 2005; Hale, Held and Young 2013; Kaul and Conceição 2006).

However, despite the widely anticipated effects of partnerships on improving cross-sectoral collaboration and sustainable development outcomes, we still have limited knowledge on the extent to which such expectations have materialized. On the one hand, no general framework or agreed upon indicators exist at
the international level for evaluating partnerships, with the consequence that the notion of partnership effectiveness itself is often contested. On the other hand, despite the exceptional upsurge in theoretical and empirical research on partnerships in the past 30 years, an overall view of partnership effectiveness and the mechanisms through which these effects are brought about has yet to be elaborated.

The analytic motivation of this volume is precisely to examine the tension inherent in the existing disconnect between the many anticipated effects of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships and the limited systematic assessment of actual on-the-ground effectiveness. The objective is to advance a research agenda that is both of theoretical importance for understanding complex governance systems and the role of partnerships therein, and of pressing policy significance for sustainable development. Two broad questions guide this multidisciplinary inquiry. First, from a theoretical perspective, can we provide a more generalizable framework for understanding the pathways and effects through which partnerships contribute to global governance and problem-solving for sustainability? Second, from an empirical perspective, what can the application of such a framework to the systematic assessment of partnership arrangements tell us, in terms of their ability to support the implementation of sustainable development?

This volume aims to address these two questions and propose a future research agenda on partnerships as a form of governance in at least three ways. First the volume elaborates a multifaceted and interdisciplinary conceptualization of partnership effectiveness that should be broadly applicable across different issue areas and levels of governance. More specifically, it brings different literatures into dialogue with each other (including in international relations, economics, management studies and public policy), thus contributing an analytical framework that specifies different pathways to partnership effectiveness. These include not only the nominal attainment of a partnership’s goals, but also the creation of value for partners, the impact of collaboration among partners and the effects of the partnership on other institutions and affected communities; and ultimately, the contribution of partnerships to addressing broader sustainable development problems, either directly or by creating synergies and co-benefits.

Secondly, we theorize plausible conditions for the variable effectiveness of partnerships, drawing on the literature on institutional effectiveness, decentralized governance, and complex interactive effects. In so doing, our theoretical approach can be applied across different issue areas and levels of governance to illuminate the design features and mechanisms of influence that have contributed to the successes or failures of existing partnerships. In particular, we focus on features that are internal to partnerships such as contractual arrangements, credible commitment of resources, adaptability, and fostering innovation. This approach allows us to critically examine plausible counterfactuals, alternative mechanisms, and a range of second-order effects, whether positive or negative.

Thirdly, the volume seeks to combine this innovative framework with a mix of interdisciplinary research methods to present new data and case studies on partnership effectiveness. More specifically, it draws insights from a broad range of thematic case studies and a series of crosscutting analyses that speak
to ongoing debates on partnership governance and adaptability, as well as their indirect effects on macro-level processes that shape sustainability and development. Contributors to the volume inquire into what facilitates cooperation across different sectors and what kinds of effects such partnerships produce, for whom, and with what implications for problem-solving. In the following sections of the introduction, we clarify key concepts and the scope of the study, situate our theoretical approach in relation to the existing international relations scholarship on questions of partnerships effectiveness, and provide a roadmap to the structure and objectives of the volume.

Partnerships for Sustainability

Public-private partnerships and multistakeholder partnerships have been defined as voluntary agreements that engage various constellations of public actors (such as states, international organizations, or subnational municipal and regional governments) and non-state actors (for instance advocacy organizations, societal or professional associations, businesses, foundations, financial institutions, etc.) in direct collaboration toward shared objectives with an explicit public purpose (Andonova 2017). Throughout the volume we use the term partnerships (in short) broadly to capture the multiple possible arrangements of initiatives between private, civil society and public actors.

The concepts of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships are commonly used as umbrella terms in international relations to identify transnational voluntary initiatives that link different sectors across levels of governance and jurisdictions. Moreover, such initiatives are increasingly inscribed as part of formal intergovernmental processes of the UN and related treaties and agencies. For instance, Goal 17 of the SDGs explicitly states the need to “encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships” (UNGA 2015a, Target 17.17). Similarly, the UN General Assembly Resolution “Towards Global Partnerships” defines partnerships broadly as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both public and non-public, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and, as mutually agreed, to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits” (UNGA 2015b, p.4). While the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development lauds the promise of “multistakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources” (UNGA 2015a, p.27), the complexity and challenges of cooperation across sectors is recognized by both researchers and practitioners.

The terms public-private partnerships and multistakeholder partnerships are frequently used interchangeably in the international relations literature and policy discourses; nonetheless there is an important analytical distinction. Public-private arrangements represent explicit hybridization of authority. They entail the articulation of specific shared purpose and the roles of public entities and non-state actors. In comparison, the idea of multistakeholderism captures a more general move toward multiple types of network-based authoritative arrangements.
in international governance, beyond the traditional assumption of the monopoly of the state (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Avant and Westerwinter 2016; Barnett, Pevehouse and Raustiala 2021; Raymond and DeNardis 2015). These include public-private partnerships but also other arrangements that do not directly engage public authority, such as private regulations in the forms of market-based certifications, private standards, and disclosure and reporting schemes. Partnerships are thus an increasingly salient and distinct modality of transnational relations and transnational governance in an evolving global institutional architecture.

The use of the overarching term *partnerships* in this volume allows us to examine governance arrangements that include actors from at least two different sectors in order to elaborate a more generalizable theoretical framework on partnership effectiveness. It captures the growing prevalence of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships across scales of governance, but also cross-sector arrangements such as business and civil society partnerships, among others (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; 2014). In addition, it recognizes that the respective functions that public and non-state actors are expected to provide through partnerships are not fixed in time. For example, they are increasingly being affected by shifting discourses and evolving societal perspectives about the need to reassert the role of the public sector in shaping innovation and investments toward the provision of global public goods (Barbier 2010; Mazzucato 2013), as well as by growing arguments advocating a new approach by private companies to the creation of long-term public value (Henderson 2020; Mazzucato 2021; Ruggie, Rees and Davis 2021).

The volume thus puts forward a theoretical framework that could apply to different modalities of the phenomenon with respect to the scale and actors involved: from small groups of partners seeking to implement a local sustainability initiative, to large and often overlapping transnational partnerships. Such broad, overarching conceptualization provides the space for an interdisciplinary approach of inquiry. It enables a certain flexibility for the different empirical chapters in the volume to use terms that are specific to their subject of study (for instance, product development partnerships for health, cross-sector partnerships in public policy, or multistakeholder regimes for extractive resources transparency), while embedding their analysis with respect to a common theoretical framework on partnership effectiveness that we elaborate in the following chapter.

At the same time, the contributing chapters in this volume share a set of assumptions about partnerships as a contemporary mode of governance. To begin with, there has been an implicit assumption through the literature and policy discourses that cooperation across different sectors implies the pursuit of objectives that are additional to what each partner could realize by themselves. We posit that this is a constitutive assumption of the nature of partnerships, but also one that needs to be examined empirically against the possibility of window dressing by association, or reincarnating business-as-usual practices.

Moreover, we adopt the assumption already elaborated in the transnational governance literature that, in order to constitute a mode of governance, partnerships require an identifiable public purpose and a set of functions delivered
through formal or informal rules, norms or practices (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009; Andonova, Hale and Roger 2017; Horton and Koremenos 2020; Rosenau 2002; Ruggie 2004). This implies a certain authoritative steering of partners who are affecting – directly or indirectly – the behavior of actors outside the partnership (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Biersteker 2009; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Stadtler and Lin 2017). The element of public purpose distinguishes partnerships as governance from other collective initiatives that may involve multiple sectors, such as lobbying, advocacy campaigns and associations seeking to project norms, pressure and incentives to influence governance (Andonova, Hale and Roger 2017). Our study similarly does not explore public-private infrastructure partnerships, which are important instruments for implementing public projects, but are largely based on subcontracting agreements rather than on the collaborative elaboration of governance objectives and the means to advance them. We do not assume, however, that partnerships necessarily succeed in fulfilling their stated governance functions and objectives; rather, this is the subject of the critical inquiry pursued in this volume.

Finally, our study focuses largely on partnerships that engage with issues linked to sustainability and sustainable development. We define sustainability broadly, following Matson, Clark and Andersson (2016, p.199), as “inclusive social well-being [which] does not decline over multiple generations.” According to this conceptualization, sustainability depends on the integrative management of assets of natural, social, manufactured, human and knowledge capital. Clark and Harley (2020) further elaborate that such integrative management should aim to conserve the aggregate social value of these assets’ stocks, that is, their capacity to generate social well-being, while assuring the integrity of the Earth’s subsystems upon which the latter is ultimately built. Moreover, it should result in concrete opportunity for all societal actors to equitably access these assets, and not just in their abstract availability. This conceptualization retains core elements of the idea of sustainable development as advanced by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987, and in addition, it highlights the complex interface between different sets of assets that are necessary for pursuing sustainability. Such understanding is in line with the recognition, including through the adoption of the SDGs, that sustainability is an overarching objective for high-, medium-, and low-income countries. Moreover, it critically depends on the integrity and complex interplay of societal, environmental, and economic systems (Biermann 2014; Clark and Harley 2020; Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Steffen et al. 2015; Young 2017).

The terms sustainability and sustainable development are therefore used interchangeably throughout the volume, albeit with understanding of their different connotations and scope. While our theoretical framework aims to be broadly applicable to governance through partnerships, sustainability is a particularly important area for investigating questions of effectiveness. Over the last three decades, partnerships have become a prominent modality of sustainability governance, including on issues such as biodiversity, clean energy, climate change, health, resource extraction, and access to innovation, among others. They have
materialized both as truly global initiatives and as projects localized in specific places and regions. In this way, partnerships across a range of sustainability issues provide sufficient inter-temporal and inter-spatial perspectives to explore different pathways to effectiveness and allow for rigorous comparative conclusions and generalizability.

The Unresolved Question of Effectiveness

The international relations literature has provided valuable insights on the politics and agency behind the rise of partnerships in contemporary global governance. Existing research has uncovered the tremendous diversity in partnership forms from large constellations with billion-dollar budgets and recently incorporated secretariats to smaller networks, platforms and projects implemented at the community level. Different partnerships provide widely variable functions – some focus on information and advocacy as the main instruments of governance, others build capacity and new forms of financing, still more seek to provide specific public goods such as access to technologies and services (Andonova 2017; Beisheim et al. 2014; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Kaul and Conceição 2006; Krasner and Risse 2014; Raymond and DeNardis 2015; Westerwinter 2019). The UN General Assembly has routinely announced that partnerships are intended to complement, not substitute, commitments made by national governments (UNGA 2015b, p.4). Yet, partnership governance is simultaneously put forward as a core instrument for the implementation of the SDGs (UNGA 2015a; b). Multistakeholder partnerships are thus increasingly recognized as a new paradigm that might integrate or compete with government action or with bilateral and multilateral efforts. This emphasis is reflected in many academic and policy debates around SDG 17, which often appear to conflate numerous implementation issues (including financing, technology, trade, capacity-building, policy coherence, and monitoring and accountability) into a narrative that simply promotes partnerships (Faul 2018).

Critical questions thus remain as to whether and how partnerships work, for whom, and with what effects. Controversial debates on the legitimacy of partnerships furthermore revolve around the extent to which they deliver on their promise of greater inclusiveness, providing public goods, and negotiating what many see as inherent tensions between the specific agendas of powerful stakeholders and the collective claim of public purpose (Börzel and Risse 2005; Bull and McNeill 2006; Buse and Harmer 2004; Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014; Mert 2015; Utting and Zammit 2009). Scholars have questioned the ways in which partnerships improve the participatory quality of governance (Bexell and Mörh 2010; Bäckstrand 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Storeng and de Bengy Puyvallée 2018), or contribute new and additional instruments and development outcomes (Faul 2016; Sethi and Schepers 2014). We argue that such debates cannot be resolved without a broader analytical framework and systematic focus on effectiveness.

In the existing international relations literature, two sets of methodologies have made important contributions toward increasing our understanding of the effectiveness of transnational partnerships more specifically. In a far-reaching volume,
Pattberg et al. (2012) develop a quantitative approach to assess the extent to which the partnerships registered at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and related platforms have the necessary instruments and resources to be “fit for purpose” and produce a set of intended effects. Their study concludes that for a large proportion of the 210 partnerships examined through an expert survey, the activities, resources, and other inputs appear to be either lacking or insufficient to achieve their stated functions. The fit-to-function methodology has been extended to other large-n samples of public-private partnerships, but also to sets of data on transnational climate initiatives (Chan et al. 2016; Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). This approach has the important advantage of facilitating the comparative analysis of large numbers of partnerships, identifying the types of outputs they produce, and highlighting those that have limited possibilities of being implemented. In doing so, the approach lays the foundation for further in-depth studies of their effectiveness. However, its main limitation is that it uses measures of resource inputs, partnership activities and outputs as a proxy for effectiveness, instead of focusing on direct outcomes or impacts. This is in part due to constraints associated with limited availability of data on partnership implementation, particularly in the early decades of partnership governance. Similarly, in their study of business-humanitarian partnerships, Andonova and Carbonnier (2014) found limited data on partnership impacts, either in the literature or in policy documents, concluding that: “the evaluation of the outcomes of BHPs [business-humanitarian partnerships] in terms of effectiveness with regard to stated goals remains both weak and challenging” (p.364).

A second approach to partnership effectiveness applies an extended logical impact evaluation framework (logframe) to document the inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts of partnerships (Beisheim and Liese 2014; Stadtler 2016; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2011; Ulbert 2013), providing an aggregate assessment of actual outcomes, as well as possible feedback loops that shape the overall effects of an initiative (van Tulder et al. 2016). Taken together, these contributions have offered comparable methodologies to track the full implementation chain of a partnership and assess its impacts against the governance functions it is expected to perform. Moreover, they have generated valuable new insights and data on implementation indicators. Beisheim and Liese (2014) and their colleagues use such a methodology to examine a mid-range sample of 21 transnational public-private partnerships. The study provides a qualitative classification of these initiatives according to their functions (service provision, standard setting, and knowledge transfer) and a ranking of outputs, outcomes, and impacts. This approach has also provided important reflections on the role of partnerships in providing services in political contexts that are characterized by limited state capacity, and on elements of institutional design that could shape variations in effectiveness (Beisheim and Liese 2014; Beisheim et al. 2014).

The input-output-impact methodology, while broadly informative across a range of studies, itself presents limitations for understanding important dimensions of partnership effectiveness. It implies a certain progression of outcomes and impacts and tends to overlook the assumptions built into how an output might
(or might not) lead to an outcome or impact. The approach is also less adapted to identifying relevant counterfactuals against which to scrutinize effectiveness, all of which makes it difficult to generalize beyond the contexts of the specific projects examined. The framework thus offers more limited scope for considering alternative explanations of observed outcomes, mechanisms leading to a set of outcomes and impacts, or partnerships’ unintended or hidden consequences. We argue that an inquiry about effectiveness needs to move toward a conceptualization that considers the pathways through which different types of partnership effects are produced, as well as their unintended and second order effects.

In summary, while partnerships are touted in policy discourses as a promising mechanism to meaningfully address the complex problems inherent in achieving sustainable development, important questions remain around how to conceptualize, disaggregate, and measure the various aspects of partnership effectiveness. Moreover, while the academic literature provides valuable insights on the rise of partnerships, their diversity, and the instruments they deploy, we know considerably less about their actual effects, their distribution across actors, and the pathways through which such impacts are brought about. Do partnerships contribute new and additional outcomes to influence the actors that participate in them and the wider global governance ecosystem? Have existing initiatives been successful in achieving both their stated aims and broader sustainable development impacts? How can we understand and evaluate such effects?

**Disaggregating Pathways to Partnership Effectiveness**

Attributing effectiveness to partnerships as part of larger governance systems for sustainability implies the ability to disentangle the additional – if not truly independent – effects of their activities, as well as the specific pathways through which effects are achieved. How do we approach this challenge? In this volume, we adopt a multidisciplinary approach that brings different literatures into dialogue with each other, including international relations, business administration, economic assessments, public policy studies, and critical political economy perspectives. Building on the key patterns and trends in research on cross-sector partnerships across several academic disciplines, the volume introduces a broadly generalizable theoretical framework on partnership effectiveness that can be applied across multiple issue areas.

More specifically, Chapter 1 by Liliana B. Andonova and Moira V. Faul elaborates a multifaceted framework for disaggregating the meaning of effectiveness and the pathways that lead to different partnership effects, which are ultimately likely to shape partnerships’ impact on societies and sustainability. It advances a conceptual meta-synthesis of existing approaches and proposes a new theoretical framework that specifies distinct pathways to partnership effectiveness. These include (i) the attainment of a partnership’s self-declared goals; (ii) the creation of value for partners; (iii) productive collaboration inside a partnership; (iv) the impacts of a partnership on affected populations; (v) its influence on collaboration and institutions outside a partnership. Ultimately, we seek to establish the
Introduction

problem-solving effect of a partnership and its contribution to overarching sustainability objectives, which may materialize (or not) to different degrees through the five pathways that we elaborate. In other words, we also consider the tensions and trade-offs that may emerge when aggregating the effects that a partnership has on different constituencies or issue areas, as these tensions could result in the narrow achievement of environmental, social, or economic goals at the expense of an integrated approach to sustainability.

Drawing on the broader literature on institutional effectiveness, the theoretical framework further identifies a set of conditions, related to the structuring of partnership arrangements, which are likely to shape their variable effectiveness. These conditions focus on the relevance of contractual features and information sharing for accountability, the credible commitment of resources, the degree of adaptability and learning-by-doing, and the ability to foster innovation. The book thus offers a broadly conceived framework on effectiveness that can be applied to different contexts to critically scrutinize the multiple dimensions and mechanisms through which partnership effects are produced. This allows us to engage with critical questions about the complementarity or contradictions of partnership outcomes and the extent of the cumulative effect of partnerships toward problem-solving. We explore different pathways of partnership effectiveness through a set of case studies drawn from several key sustainability issues and examine questions that cut across issue areas. The diversity of epistemological and methodological approaches is a key distinctive feature of our approach compared to earlier efforts in the study of partnerships effectiveness. The next section presents the structure of the volume and its empirical chapters, along with its overall contributions.

Overview of the Volume

Following Part I of the volume, which includes the Introduction and Chapter 1, Part II presents a broad range of thematic case studies which apply the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1. Our empirical approach aims to contribute in-depth evidence about the actual, rather than the anticipated, effects of partnerships across multiple dimensions of effectiveness and issue areas. The thematic case studies focus on the environment (biodiversity, clean energy, climate change, land use and deforestation), health, and human rights (access to medicines and innovation, polio eradication and child protection). These issues provide us with empirical sites in which questions about partnership effectiveness have gained a particular salience and importance through their sufficiently long history of partnership governance to assure the availability of data to trace effectiveness. Through systematically documented analytic narratives (Bates et al. 1998), the different chapters in this section present fine-grained knowledge on partnership goals and the degree of their attainment, as well as their effects on partners, affected populations, and on institutions and cooperation for sustainability outside the partnership. They apply the theoretical framework of pathways to effectiveness in order to draw more generalizable conclusions with respect to a variety of partnerships straddling the lines between local, regional and global sustainability.
The empirical analysis furthermore captures variation in impacts within cases and across different stages of the partnership implementation or failure to continue its activities.7

Furthermore, examining the different dimensions of effectiveness within sets of broadly comparable issue areas is a way to take into consideration important contextual factors (such as problem structure) while attempting to disentangle how partnership structuring and design features have shaped their effectiveness (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell 2006). The case study analyses draw on primary data from partnership publications and related reports, as well as on semi-structured interviews, secondary research, and, in some instances, extensive fieldwork. These methodological approaches are elaborated in greater detail within individual chapters. The mixed methods approach to our empirical analysis is motivated by the multidisciplinary and multilevel nature of our inquiry. This methodological diversity is much needed to gain an insight on both micro-level pathways and effects of partnership cases, as well as on broader sustainable development impacts of clusters of partnership initiatives. The approach provides us with the possibility to measure or assess elements of effectiveness at different levels of analysis and draw a comparative synthesis. The following sections provide brief summaries of the focus and approach of the empirical and concluding chapters.

Chapter 2 (Part II), by Liliana B. Andonova and Dario Piselli, explores the mechanisms leading to the effectiveness of partnerships by conducting a comparative study of three partnerships in the field of biodiversity and clean energy, namely the Amazon Region Protected Areas Program in Brazil (ARPA), the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad in Costa Rica (INBio), and the San Cristóbal Wind Power Project in Ecuador (Galápagos Wind). After analyzing the governance history and pathways to effectiveness across the three case studies, the chapter examines how the conditions of partnership structuring, proposed in the theoretical framework, shape the variable success or failure to sustain partnership outcomes. The findings reveal an important degree of interplay between the specific pathways to partnership effectiveness, and particularly the relevance of conditions such as sophisticated contracting for specifying partner commitments, establishing accountability mechanisms, enabling learning processes, and leveraging resources and institutional innovation for implementation.

Chapter 3, by Livio Miles Silva Müller and Moira V. Faul, shifts the focus to the implementation of partnerships at the local level. It analyzes the formal and informal collaboration between the public sector, civil society organizations and private foundations in the delivery of sustainable development outcomes inside the Uatumã sustainable use reserve in the Brazilian Amazon. Taking a sociological approach, the chapter combines semi-structured interviews, participant observation in a protected area and documentary analysis to argue that partnerships rarely operate in isolation. Multiple formal and informal partnerships may coexist and be nested inside the same issue area and geographical location, establishing a highly polycentric environment of multiple authorities with overlapping responsibilities. This means that civil society organizations active in the local
implementation of transnational partnership activities often play a crucial role in initiating and brokering new partnerships, complementing and mediating state activities, and translating information between local communities and different levels of regional, national and global decision making. The chapter sheds light on the effects of global partnerships on affected societies, their interplay with local power structures, and civil society entrepreneurship.

Turning to partnerships in climate change governance, Katharina Michaelowa, Axel Michaelowa and Liliana B. Andonova (Chapter 4) examine the brokerage role of the World Bank in mobilizing public and private actors to contribute to the development of transnational carbon markets through the shaping and piloting of methodologies, financing, and capacity. In particular, the chapter assesses the Bank’s pioneering role in international carbon markets, which dates back to the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) in 2000. The authors evaluate such a role against the conditions for effectiveness described in the volume’s analytical framework, and then link it to the carbon markets’ actual achievement of different dimensions of effectiveness. They demonstrate that the World Bank’s involvement has led to a significant commitment of resources and facilitated the creation of sophisticated contracts and methodologies for international carbon markets, even though the Bank has found it increasingly difficult to mobilize private sector financing in recent years. In addition, they highlight that while the World Bank-brokered partnerships have often been effective in creating value for the partners, this has come at the expense of real additionality in carbon emission reductions, and thus hindered the partnerships’ overall contribution to climate change mitigation.

In Chapter 5, Marcela Vieira and her co-authors probe the debate on partnership effectiveness in the context of access to medicine initiatives in global health governance. More specifically, the chapter focuses on public-private product development partnerships (PDPs), which were first created in the late 1990s to develop new drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics where market incentives had failed to induce the pharmaceutical industry to do so alone. After two decades, PDPs have demonstrated that it is possible to develop medicines through alternative business models, as evidenced by significant increases in funding for neglected disease R&D, a renewed pipeline, and a number of new medicines now reaching patients. The chapter, however, adds an additional element in assessing the effectiveness of PDPs against the traditional model of commercial product development in terms of the therapeutic value of their products, and the costs and efficiency of how they conduct R&D. The chapter assesses the extent to which PDPs are seen as no more than a way to fix a small broken corner of the competitive medicines R&D system, rather than as a more broadly disruptive model that could address growing concerns about the inability of the traditional medical product development to meet societal needs.

Chapter 6, by Mara Pillinger, analyzes how the pathways and conditions identified in the volume’s analytical framework contribute to the effectiveness of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), one of the first and longest-lived global health public-private partnerships. GPEI is discussed as a multilevel partnership,
with infrastructure and partners at the global (headquarters), regional, and country levels. Focusing on the global level, the analysis finds that GPEI demonstrates high goal attainment as well as significant value creation and collaboration among core partners. This is achieved through sophisticated contracting, the credible commitment of resources, and some degree of adaptability. The author identifies two paradoxes in this case study. First, the overall effectiveness of the partnership is enhanced by certain inefficiencies related to the intense and long drawn-out partner collaboration internally. Second, the very pathways and conditions that contribute to effectiveness at the global level simultaneously may detract from GPEI’s effectiveness across regional and country levels by excluding non-core partners and other stakeholders from “club” decision making. Nevertheless, the chapter argues that the GPEI illustrates the significance of close collaboration among core partners for the sustained overall effectiveness of this initiative.

The final contribution contained in Part II (Chapter 7) is authored by Susan L. Bissell and David Steven. It examines the impetus to design and establish the Global Partnership to End Violence against Children and its associated Trust Fund. The authors look at the inherently complex processes that accompany the introduction of new ideas and structures that are initially hosted in international institutions. At the same time, they explore the catalytic role of novel approaches in international development, public health, and human rights in inspiring further innovations – in this case, the INSPIRE package of evidence-based strategies for violence prevention and response. The chapter focuses on organizational learning within the partnership and how the challenges of establishing a new entity may lead to significant hurdles in terms of collaboration between the partners. From this perspective, the chapter examines the challenges of starting up a partnership, how collaboration inside this partnership evolved over time, and the influence it had in facilitating some of the key outputs of the partnership, including the attainment of partnership goals at the level of country implementation.

In turn, Part III of the volume presents empirical analyses that explore a set of crosscutting themes, including the systematic challenges that partnerships encounter and the associated need for adaptability; the materialization (or not) of anticipated economic dividends and the promotion of transparency through partnerships; and the fragmentation within sector groupings on partnership governance boards, alongside some empirical tools that can be used to identify them. Such themes have been discussed in the literature before, but there is still limited analysis on their role in supporting or undermining effectiveness in partnerships. Because of their crosscutting focus, the chapters in this part of the volume tend to utilize large n datasets and quantitative methodologies, alongside analyses of specific cases. They further open our empirical exploration to a larger sample of partnerships for sustainability operating across levels of governance, as well as to issues such as resource extraction and global financing through partnerships, providing a broader understanding of the partnership process and additional systematic evidence on the conditions for effectiveness.

The first chapter of Part III, Chapter 8, by Amanda Sardonis and Henry Lee, uses the volume’s analytical framework to analyze 43 local and transnational
cross-sector partnerships that were selected as finalists for the biennial Roy Family Award for Environment Partnerships, from 2003 to 2018. Through a survey of the partnership participants, the authors examine how these partnerships have fared in the years since they were initially evaluated for the award and, in doing so, explore the interface between the adaptability of partnership arrangements and their capacity to overcome challenges and remain effective over time. In addition, the chapter develops three comparative case studies, namely the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, the Metrobús partnership in Mexico City, and the Alianza Shire Energy Access to Refugees partnership in Ethiopia. Overall, the analysis finds that adaptability in its various forms, ranging from changes in governance structures and business models to changes in a partnership’s geographical or thematic scope, makes a difference in terms of partnership effectiveness. At the same time, they suggest that adaptability is intrinsically linked to other aspects of partnership structuring, including sophisticated governance arrangements and learning mechanisms that are flexible enough to accommodate changes in funding streams, political context, and partner composition.

Chapter 9, by Jamie Marie Fraser and Gilles Carbonnier, adds an important dimension to the volume by focusing on transparency as a key factor through which a partnership may influence institutions and collaboration outside the partnership itself. Specifically, this chapter examines the issue of natural resource revenue management by analyzing the effect of a country’s membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on the price of sovereign debt, as a measure of how investors’ expectations may be influenced by the adoption of EITI principles. This is an important way to analyze the effectiveness of similar multistakeholder regimes, since it indicates whether the commitments a country makes under such regimes are perceived as material and credible or not. The econometric analysis uncovers a limited impact of EITI membership on the price of sovereign debt, which has broader development implications. Fraser and Carbonnier then examine EITI implementation and its interaction with country-specific institutional dynamics through two case studies, Indonesia and Senegal. These country studies are used to show that it is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of a partnership in interaction with the specific political and economic structures in which it is embedded.

The final contribution in Part III (Chapter 10) is coauthored by Moira V. Faul and Younes Boulanguiem, who examine the role for governance boards in partnership effectiveness. They address yet another overlooked factor shaping partnership effectiveness: the faultlines that may cause fragmentation within groups of board members from the same sector, and the implications they have for board decisions and, therefore, on a partnership’s sustainability impacts. Contributing a framework of analysis borrowed from the corporate governance literature – faultline analysis – the authors compare 140 board members of three global financing partnerships addressing climate change with three that address health. Faul and Boulanguiem argue that while partnership members tend to be mobilized into a board on the basis of their stakeholder group, a focus on sectoral groups alone may hide other significant dimensions of diversity, which deserve greater empirical
attention. These actual dimensions of diversity – and the faultlines they may give rise to – matter. They provide the micro-foundations for partnership relations and decisions, and therefore have real-world consequences for sustainability.

In Part IV of the volume, the editors provide a concluding chapter that offers a comparative synthesis of the dynamics and patterns of partnership effectiveness explored in the previous chapters. It discusses their implications for the evolution of existing regimes, the design and governance of new partnerships, and their potential for advancing sustainability. The chapter further notes several remaining research questions on partnership effectiveness, and outlines the contribution of the volume to defining a future research agenda in this area.

Overall, the volume provides an important dual contribution to the study of sustainability partnerships. First, it elaborates a broadly applicable theoretical framework, which captures a number of specific conditions, dynamics, and elements that should be taken into consideration when trying to understand – and assess – partnership effectiveness. Secondly, it applies such a framework to the actual design and analysis of a wide range of cases in issues salient to sustainable development, deploying a variety of methodologies. This comparative approach allows us to produce generalizable findings about partnership effectiveness that are at the same time grounded and systematic with respect to a common theoretical framework. Moreover, different chapters examine different dimensions of the pathways to effectiveness outlined in the theoretical framework, depending on the specific governance objectives or aspects of sustainability the cases analyzed seek to address. In this way, we gain both theoretically informed and wide-ranging empirical perspective on the different pathways and the partnership design features that enable or undermine their effects, allowing us to draw broadly generalizable conclusions.

Notes

1 For comparable conceptualizations, see also Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Clarke and Crane 2018; Pattberg et al. 2012; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009; Wang et al. 2018; Westerwinter 2019.

2 On private authority as aspect of multistakeholder governance, see among others, Abbott and Snidal 2009; Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Auld, Betsill and VanDeveer 2018; Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Bütte and Mattli 2011; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Green 2017; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Raymond and DeNardis 2015; van der Ven, Sun and Cashore 2021.

3 On the evolution and different modalities of transnational relations and transnational governance, see Andonova et al. 2017; Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009; Auld, Betsill and VanDeveer. 2018; Börzel and Risse 2005; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Hale 2020; Hale and Held 2011; Kahler 2016; Keohane and Nye 1971; McGrew and Held 2002; Roger and Dauvergne 2016.


5 However, see Hale et al. 2021 on the importance of benchmarks, which can be used to relate outcomes and impacts to an overarching objective, as a means of alleviating such concerns in the application of a logframe approach.
For comparable approaches of systematically analyzing a set of case studies to shed light on a common theoretical framework and contribute further to theory building, see Barnett and Duvall 2005; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Matson et al. 2016; Ostrom 1990; Young and Levy 1999, among others.

On case studies and within case variation to explore mechanisms of influence, see George and Bennett 2005; King, Keohane and Verba 2021; Mitchell and Bernauer 1998.

References


Part I

What Are Partnerships and How to Know Their Effects?
1 The Effectiveness of Partnerships
Theoretical Framework

Liliana B. Andonova and Moira V. Faul

What Is Partnership Effectiveness?

Conceptualizing and assessing the effectiveness of transnational forms of governance such as public-private and multistakeholder partnerships, with multiple configurations across different scales and jurisdictions, is a complex task. For the purposes of this volume, we define effectiveness as the contribution of partnerships to problem solving and sustainability, through a set of pathways that affect actors and their collective capacity to advance relevant objectives and public purpose. This conceptualization starts with the premise that the effectiveness of a governance institution or instrument is ultimately judged by the extent to which it addresses or contributes to solving the specific problems that are the subject of governance. The problem-solving premise is indeed at the heart of a substantial literature on the effectiveness of formal international institutions and environmental regimes. As Keohane (1996) stipulates, “in this broad normative and analytic sense, the proof of effectiveness is to be seen in the improvement of the targeted aspect of the natural environment” (p.14). In a synthesis on environmental regime effectiveness, Young (2011) highlights that “perhaps the core concern is the extent to which regimes contribute to solving or mitigating the problems that motivate those people who create the regimes” (p.19854).

However, the literature on institutional effectiveness is also quick to note that the problem-solving effects of governance regimes are often difficult to discern empirically and that, in addition, they may be an insufficient measure of effectiveness. On the one hand, even if the implementation of a partnership appears to successfully advance a set of objectives, its actual effectiveness may be endogenous to its level of ambition or the ways in which a specific problem is defined (Downs et al. 1996; Mitchell et al. 2020; Miles et al. 2002; Young 2011). Moreover, as partnerships are typically embedded in other layers of governance, one of the challenges is to disentangle their effects from those of other related institutions, as well as from exogenous factors such as changes in economic trajectories and social practices. More generally, evaluating effectiveness requires a counterfactual consideration of what would have been plausible to achieve in the absence of

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a public-private or multistakeholder partnership, and attempting to establish the pathways through which the partnership has influenced relevant processes, behavior, and outcomes (Carbonnier et al. 2011; Haas, Keohane and Levy et al. 1993; Young and Levy 1999). Such analysis furthermore needs to consider preexisting conditions, the effects of other institutions, as well as alternative explanations for the attribution of influence.

On the other hand, more ambitious conceptions of effectiveness would go beyond assessing the impact of a governance instrument on a specific problem in order to examine critically how the problem was defined in the first place, and if such framing is considered adequate, efficient and just (Keohane 1996; Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell et al. 2006; Young 2011).1 They would inquire about intended and unintended effects, be they positive or negative, which may materialize beyond the problem-solving capacity of an initiative (Young and Levy 1999). Such analysis would consider to what extent and how an initiative may contribute to cumulative, catalytic or disruptive effects in advancing aggregate sustainability at different scales from the local to the global (Clark and Harley 2020; Hale 2020a; Michaelowa et al. 2021; van der Ven, Bernstein and Hoffmann 2017). Moreover, it has been theorized that relative effectiveness may depend on the problem structure of an issue, and the extent to which an instrument makes progress in addressing a “difficult” problem because of its complexity or gridlocked politics, in comparison to tackling a more benign and tractable problem (Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell 2006). Finally, the extent and durability of governance effects have to do with the distributional and behavioral impacts of different instruments with respect to affected actors. Governance regimes that create conditions for behavioral change, positive incentives for relevant constituencies, and supportive coalitions tend to produce more stable collaboration and greater long-term effectiveness (Aklin and Mildenberger 2020; Andonova 2003; Dai 2007; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Ostrom 1990; Young 2011).

It is because of such considerations, that our definition of effectiveness includes the pathways through which partnerships may affect actors and outcomes, and their contribution to creating different capacities both for addressing specific issues and advancing aggregate sustainability (Clark and Harley 2020; Young 2020). This implies that partnerships can produce different kinds of effects, including with respect to different actors and constituencies. As Gutner and Thompson (2010, p.233) point out, the performance of a given institution is to an extent “in the eye of the beholder;” it may vary with respect to what objectives are being evaluated and by which audience. In this sense, our emphasis on the pathways to effectiveness seeks to capture both the processes and the mechanisms through which different types of effects are produced for different actors, both directly and through second-order or unintended impacts. We posit that such a disaggregated approach allows us to gain a better understanding of the contributions that a partnership makes to creating different capacities for addressing issues that pertain to sustainability.2 It further challenges both scholars and policy makers to inquire critically about the extent to which partnership outcomes, that advance solutions to a specific problem, may detract from prospects of attaining inclusive social well-being
with respect to other issues or actors, and therefore their ultimate contribution to sustainability. Because of such considerations, the definition of effectiveness and the theoretical framework that we elaborate in the next section seek to provide a tool to document multiple types of partnership effects and, importantly, the interplay and tensions that may appear between them with respect to a broad understanding of sustainability that depends on the complex interplay between earth systems and societal factors and institutions.

Our conceptualization also takes into account the organizational specificities of partnership governance and the ways they differ from more formal institutions such as regulations or international regimes. Partnerships exemplify an informal and typically non-legalized form of agreements on a set of objectives and public purpose, with explicit and implicit functions and means of steering behavior (Andonova 2017; Pattberg and Widerberg 2016; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009; Westerwinter 2019). They are often, at least initially, driven by like-minded groups of actors that find common interest in focusing on smaller, more tractable components of complex global problems, such as climate change, biodiversity conservation or global health (Andonova 2017). Therefore, the solutions advanced by partnerships typically target a narrower set of objectives rather than comprehensive problem solving (Horan 2019). For instance, partnerships can jump-start the creation of new financial instruments to support climate mitigation or access to specific medical technologies, but no single partnership can (or has the authority to) provide a comprehensive normative and regulatory framework for addressing complex global issues, such as climate change or global health. The nature of collective action through partnerships has raised critical considerations about the agendas that they prioritize and the role of power in shaping the goals of partnership arrangements, their representativeness, and the discourses that surround them (Bäckstrand 2006; Faul 2016; Mert 2009, 2015; Utting and Zammit 2009).

Simultaneously, individual partnerships are typically embedded in a broader universe of transnational initiatives, formal treaties and domestic policies within a particular context (Abbott et al. 2015; Andonova 2017; 2010; Biermann and Kim 2020; Hale 2020b; Horton and Koremenos 2020). They reflect multiple normative bases and professional interests of different partners. The embeddedness of partnerships provides further reasons for the need for a framework that examines the mechanisms through which partnerships produce effects on actors, collaborative processes and different aspects of sustainability. We therefore expect that with respect to aggregate notions of problem solving and sustainability, partnerships are likely to contribute specific and variable outcomes, and their effects are likely to be best examined in terms of complementarity, durability or even trade-offs, alongside that of other initiatives. We critically scrutinize different types of effects that materialize or fail to do so across scales of governance, what types of positive reinforcement or contradictions they create and for whom, and how they fit within larger institutional landscapes. Furthermore, within a single partnership, our conceptual framework allows the examination of the extent to which that partnership may contribute to problem solving and sustainability through different pathways to, and conditions of, effectiveness that we identify. We thus adopt a less linear
and more fine-grained approach compared to existing studies, to explore intended and unintended consequences, as well as their direction with respect to actors and layered sets of governance objectives. The next two sections elaborate our theoretical framework, which draws on approaches across multiple disciplines to propose first a typology of pathways to partnership effects, followed by a set of conditions for effectiveness, which guide our inquiry and the empirical analyses presented in subsequent chapters of the book.

Pathways to Partnership Effectiveness: A Multidisciplinary Framework

In order to elaborate the different pathways of partnership effectiveness, we draw on several sets of literature dealing with questions of institutional effectiveness and public-private and multistakeholder partnerships from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and levels of analysis. Such a conceptualization is necessary to advance the theorizing and debate on the sources, mechanisms and limits of partnership effectiveness, and to develop new, appropriate methods for measuring impacts. We propose a typology, captured schematically by Figure 1.1, which identifies five different pathways along which the effects of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships can be examined, and which can be used to situate different perspectives and research priorities alongside each other. The theoretical framework on pathways to effectiveness builds on insights from studies in international relations, business administration, public policy, and critical political economy in order to identify the relevant processes through which multiple types of effects can be expected to materialize. As such, it offers a broadly applicable

Figure 1.1 Pathways to partnership effectiveness.

Source: Authors.
The Effectiveness of Partnerships

The effectiveness of partnerships across levels of governance and with respect to different dimensions that may be more or less relevant with respect to specific context and disciplines. Each pathway is now elaborated in turn.

Contribution to Problem Solving for Sustainability

The ultimate goal of partnerships is, or ought to be, to effectively create value for societies by helping to solve often intractable problems they face. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the overarching concern of our inquiry is to examine the extent to which global partnerships have contributed to addressing specific issues related to sustainability. As already noted, however, existing studies across multiple disciplines have established the difficulties in determining the larger problem-solving impact of partnerships and disentangling it from that of other social and policy factors. Different strands of the literature have identified alternative intermediate pathways that allow us to examine distinct – and more discrete and tractable – dimensions along which partnership effectiveness can be manifested. We examine these different dimensions as plausible pathways through which the effects of partnerships can be expressed, and to gain a larger, cumulative understanding of effectiveness.

Goal Attainment

At the most fundamental level, partnership effectiveness can be measured in terms of the extent to which the partnership itself has been implemented and achieved its formally identified goals. Although such assessment may appear trivial, its importance cannot be overlooked. A case in point are the partnerships launched at the 2003 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as an official outcome of the intergovernmental summit, with the intention of advancing the implementation of global commitments to sustainability (Andonova and Levy 2003). Research has shown, however, that about half of a sample of WSSD initiatives were either never implemented or performed poorly with respect to their stated goals (Pattberg et al. 2012). In their analysis, Pattberg et al. (2012) estimated that a large share of their sample simply lacked the commitment of resources and other instruments likely to be necessary to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, there is often a mismatch between stated partnership objectives and partnership outcomes (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). In 2021, the United Nations Office for Partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) platform has recorded that merely 225 of the 5,487 initiatives registered are on track to reach their objectives, with only 276 being completed.3

Studies in business administration and public policy evaluate effective goal attainment by partnerships against the counterfactual of their added value, compared to preexisting approaches or what partners could have achieved by themselves (Austin 2000; van Tulder et al. 2016; Austin and Seitanidi 2014; Waddock 1988). Goal attainment is thus a foundational aspect of partnership effectiveness. However, the validity of goal-attainment approaches to assessing the effectiveness
of formal or informal institutions is nonetheless contingent on a series of counterfactuals (Bernauer 1995; Gutner and Thompson 2010; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Mitchell 2006; Young and Levy 1999). The analysis needs to establish if certain goals are achieved as a consequence of the activities implemented by the partnership, rather than by exogenous factors, such as changes in market prices, economic downturns or government policies. Other important counterfactuals to consider are how ambitious the stated goals are in the first place (Downs et al. 1996; Faul 2014), the extent to which they challenge the status quo rather than adopting seemingly new but minimal, lowest-common denominator agreements (Berliner and Prakash 2014; 2015; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Sethi and Schepers 2014; van Tulder and Keen 2018), and whether they are actually aligned with the broader objectives of advancing sustainability globally (Horan 2019). Thus, a more rigorous conceptualization of effectiveness requires the specification of the mechanisms through which a partnership has affected the behavior and capacity of actors and the outcomes of their collaboration (Chan et al. 2016; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Miles et al. 2002; Young and Levy 1999). The next set of pathways therefore seek to capture processes and effects that materialize with respect to different actors and institutions, either internal or external to the partnership.

Value for Partners

Effective partnerships are expected to create value for the partners that are involved in them: businesses, civil society organizations, other types of nonprofit institutions, as well local, national or global public agencies (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Clarke, MacDonald and Ordonez-Ponce 2018; Porter and Kramer 2011; Seitanidi and Crane 2014; Stadtler 2016; Stadtler and Probst 2012). Indeed, from the perspective of business administration studies, the primary rationale for public-private and business and civil society partnerships is the cocreation of actor-specific and public gains that would otherwise not be possible to attain or do so efficiently (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; 2014). Such value is a measure of partnership success (Waddock 1988) and is assumed to be additional to what each sector can achieve with its own resources and logics of action, in order to justify the costs and changes that are intrinsic to partnering. Such value increasingly reflects the expectation that private actors, such as corporations, are responsible for preventing and redressing human rights abuses, environmental degradation and social injustice, as part of their broader societal embeddedness and license to operate (Ruggie 2013).

The diversity of partners involved in public-private and multistakeholder partnerships is considered to be an advantage for partnerships, yet tensions may surface between the different – and potentially contradictory – goals and interests of different partners, and also between conflicting demands of the partnership and those of the partners’ home sectors (Buse and Harmer 2007; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a; Stadtler and Lin 2017; Utting and Zammit 2009). What types of value may be created by a partnership and
for whom? How do these types of expected value influence the motivation to engage in a partnership in the first place? These questions represent another integral aspect of partnership effectiveness and require more critical examination and the surfacing of paradoxical tensions as to what different partners may gain from the partnership, how they might value those gains, and how that value may relate to the stated partnership goals.

**Collaboration Inside the Partnership**

Intrinsic to partnerships are the partners who are brought into these collaborative arrangements and how they work together (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). Nevertheless, not every actor that has a stake in the achievement of partnership goals can be intimately involved in the partnership itself. Therefore, effectiveness concerns are raised (mainly in the policy administration and international relations literature) as to which actors are excluded from or under-represented in partnerships, as well as the reasons for those exclusions. Alford and Hughes (2008), for example, propose rational explanations, while Faul (2016) and Harman (2016) advance analyses of power, and Knutsson and Lindberg (2019) and Macgilchrist (2016) foreground the ways in which such power may be contested.

Secondly, while claims continue to be made for the effectiveness of partnerships in redefining relationships between partners (Wessal and Wescott 2019), the complexity of collaborating across sectors is recognized by many researchers; Klijn and Teisman (2003) go so far as to argue that non-collaborative relationships are typical of partnerships rather than being the exception, while Babiak and Thibault (2009) argue that relationships of competition (rather than collaboration) are characteristic of partnering. Critically, Caldwell, Roehrich and George (2017) find that relational coordination affects both internal performance and external value creation, and Maltin (2019) argues that working out relationships between partners and discussing unspoken interests makes partnerships more adaptable to setbacks – and ultimately more successful.

Many scholars argue that institutional design and participation are both intrinsically linked to increased inclusion, and thus the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of partnerships (Andonova and Carbonnier 2014; Bäckstrand 2006; Beisheim and Campe 2012; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Bexell and Mörth 2010; Buse and Harmer 2007). However, structure alone cannot account for more or less effective collaboration (Andonova and Levy 2003; Pattberg et al. 2012); partners who are formally included in a partnership’s governance structure may be excluded from much of its decision-making in practice (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2010; Faul 2016). The interplay of the structuring of partnerships and the partners’ agency in the workings of an initiative is expected to ultimately shape effectiveness (Brinkerhoff 2002; Casey 2008; Mandell 2001). Collaboration among partners is thus a pathway that produces important effects itself in terms of empowerment or disempowerment of actors, and the participatory quality and procedural legitimacy of the partnership (Bäckstrand 2006; Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014; Bexell and Mörth 2010; Dingwerth 2005; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b; Mert 2015).
It furthermore has implications for other types of effects such as the efficiency of achieving partnership goals and their durability (Maltin 2019).

**Impact on Affected Populations**

The stated raison d’être of partnerships typically lies in leveraging resources and instruments that create value not only for partners, but also for other target populations by addressing problems broadly related to sustainability that a single authority has been unable or unlikely to solve alone as a consequence of complexity (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Börzel and Risse 2005; Wessal and Wescott 2019). However, in solving one aspect of a sustainability problem, a partnership might exacerbate a different aspect, or may influence the issue agenda in ways that privilege some solutions and constituencies over others. From this perspective, Cook et al. (2012, p.6) draw attention to what they call the “triple injustice” of environmental policies that can compound the existing double inequity suffered by populations who contribute the least to climate change but nonetheless tend to be the most vulnerable to its consequences (Füssel 2010). While affected populations could be involved in the coproduction of the solutions that partnerships may provide, they tend to be poorly represented in many partnerships, and therefore less able to influence the solutions that are prioritized (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Buse and Harmer 2004; Compagnon 2012; Faul 2016; Storeng 2014). Similarly, Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008) argue that if health partnerships were to consult clinicians, more innovative impacts would follow. More critically, Verger, Bonal, and Zancajo (2016) argue that education partnerships increasingly engage with target populations (in their analysis, families) only as consumers of education, not as concerned citizens or responsible parents.

Alongside institutional arrangements, the distributional implications of partnerships and the extent to which they facilitate changes in actor behavior toward sustainability, is another significant determinant of effectiveness with respect to relevant constituencies (Andonova 2014; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Stadtl 2016; Young and Levy 1999). Consequently, the effectiveness of partnerships should be investigated with respect to their benefits for affected populations and their inclusion in solution design, as well as the extent to which affected populations are able to influence partners’ and partnerships’ behavior and their willingness to engage in new commitments on a specific issue. This is important where, for example, benefits for affected populations may be in tension with the benefits that partners seek for themselves (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Bäckstrand 2006; Hawkes and Buse 2011; Mukherjee and Reed 2009).

**Influence on Collaboration and Institutions External to the Partnership**

In addition to collaboration inside partnerships, researchers also examine cooperation between partnerships and other external actors, as well as the ways in which partnerships interact with other mechanisms and systems of governance. Partnerships are considered to transform the system of actors and rules around
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In summary, the theoretical framework elaborated in this section and summarized in Figure 1.1 captures our argument that both the direct goal-related outcomes of partnerships, as well as their influence on a variety of actors at different levels, represent integral components of any analysis of their overall effects. It provides a disaggregated approach to understanding effectiveness and allows scholars to examine concrete pathways through which outcomes occur that are particularly salient in one or more disciplines, or important with respect to unresolved debates. For instance, while studies have demonstrated that some of the large global health partnerships have succeeded in their immediate objectives in terms of raising resources and deploying life-saving medical technologies, there is less systematic evidence on their impacts on different communities within countries of deployment, on national health systems, or with respect to global health institutions, all of which are necessary components for addressing global health issues. These are distinctive pathways that are addressed across the pillars in our framework (Figure 1.1). The disaggregated approach to analyzing partnership effectiveness that we propose, and its application across a broad spectrum of cases, enables the creation of cumulative knowledge and more generalizable conclusions across disciplines (Matson, Clark, and Andersson 2016; Ostrom 1990).
At the same time, the analytic framework is also a tool to examine how the different pathways to effectiveness integrate to address an overarching problem, and the implications for understanding what and how a specific partnership or a set of partnerships contribute to aggregate conceptions of sustainability. We could stipulate that partnerships which create synergistic or complementary outcomes across multiple pathways are likely to make greater contributions to problem solving and to enable different capacities for advancing inclusive well-being (Clark and Harley 2020; Ostrom 2009; Young 2020). By contrast, contradictory or disjointed effects of partnerships along the different pathways may indicate important limitations or even negative effects in terms of problem solving and sustainability. The analysis would thus need to inquire about the magnitude, direction and form of partnership outcomes and their effects along the different pathways. Taking into account such contradictions and second-order impacts is even more important for our understanding of what it takes to advance sustainability as an integrated objective. Targeted approaches to a specific problem could bring out high problem-solving effectiveness, but inadvertently undermine other essential aspects of sustainability, as critics to vertical interventions in global health, for example, have pointed out (Ehrenstein and Neyland 2018; Harman 2016). Significantly, the disaggregated framework for evaluating the effectiveness of partnerships is likely to lead us to a more critical understanding of the ways in which partnerships may contribute to effectiveness, and how they may not. With the global recognition of sustainable development as a broad set of interlinked objectives that materialize in a polycentric manner, we can no longer assume a single-issue focus of most transnational governance arrangements. Therefore, examining the link between the different pathways to effectiveness and their contributions to a set of overarching societal aspirations must be a central part of the discussion.

Finally, all partnerships examined in this volume seek to make a contribution to sustainability, broadly defined. The pathways to effectiveness framework elaborated in this chapter addresses the long-standing challenge of identifying the underlying reasons for which partnerships may – or may not – succeed in that aim. Specifying the different mechanisms through which partnerships might contribute to sustainability allows the subsequent examination of the extent to which they do. Moreover, in the absence of such disaggregation, it is difficult to isolate partnerships’ effects from that of other governance institutions, policies, and networks with which they interplay or coexist. Each pathway alone cannot explain the dynamics of partnership effectiveness. It is therefore important to map out the different pathways being examined, in an attempt to establish the extent to which a partnership’s effects can be seen as additional or complementary to that of other governance instruments – or if they have produced diffusion, disruption, or catalytic effects. Analyzing the different and interrelated mechanisms that determine partnership effects would thus allow us to document, and, to the extent possible, isolate the specific contributions (or lack thereof) of partnerships to advancing sustainability.

The empirical chapters in the volume therefore seek to establish both the significance of specific pathways and how they shape the broader contribution of
a partnership or sets of partnerships to problem solving and sustainability. This entails analysis of the implications for understanding the overarching effects of initiatives, across different pathways through mutuality or contradictions, synergies or trade-offs. Aggregate analyses alone cannot show these differences, and also do not allow the examination of how these factors may be positively linked to, or in tension with, each other. Adopting a disaggregated approach thus allows us to uncover pathways along which partnerships may have produced limited sustainability effects, with implications as to how problems are being approached, and which elements of partnering or sustainability may have been sidelined.

**Structuring of Partnerships and Conditions for Effectiveness**

The multidimensional conceptualization of effectiveness provides a framework for a systematic comparative analysis of the degree to which partnership effects have materialized across a variety of cases and across issues that are at the core of advancing sustainability. This type of analysis furthermore allows us to attempt to identify a set of conditions that are likely to shape the effectiveness of partnerships. Due to their inherent embeddedness in complex systems of governance, conditions that are both external and internal to partnerships influence the different pathways to their effectiveness (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Vollmer 2009; Young 2011; Westerwinter 2019). Existing studies of transnational governance initiatives – including transnational public-private partnerships, cities’ networks and private certification schemes – have identified a range of political and contextual factors that influence their implementation and uptake. They reveal that governmental policies may provide variable incentives, more hospitable regulatory environments, and reduced transaction costs for actors to adopt transnational voluntary initiatives (Andonova, Hale and Roger 2017; Andonova and Sun 2019; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Cashore et al. 2004). Domestic institutions, social capital and industry associations, in turn, have provided implementation support and expertise that have shaped in important ways, for example, the variable adoption and effects of transnational climate initiatives, private certification and disclosure schemes (Dolšak and Prakash 2017; Eberlein et al. 2014; Grabs 2020; Gulbrandsen 2012; Sun 2022; van der Ven, Sun and Cashore 2021). Studies have similarly found that actors in countries with stronger institutional and societal capacity are more likely, and better equipped, to engage in transnational partnerships (Andonova 2014; Westerwinter 2019). This may seem paradoxical, because such initiatives are assumed to target those sustainability problems and populations that have been under-provided by more traditional governance instruments (Andonova and Levy 2003; Beisheim et al. 2014; Krasner and Risse 2014; Risse 2011). Global external factors, such as sovereignty costs for states associated with partnership arrangements or markets on which the resources and outcomes of partnerships may depend, can similarly influence partnership implementation and effectiveness (Reinsberg and Westerwinter 2019).

One of the objectives of this volume is to examine a range of partnership initiatives across different issue areas in order to gain more generalizable descriptive
inference on the pathways to effectiveness and the applicability of the theoretical framework. Because of the inherent diversity of public-private partnerships and multistakeholder partnerships in terms of size, goals and embeddedness at different levels of governance, it is often difficult to control for, or to examine comprehensively, the variety of external factors that can shape effectiveness in contexts of complex causation (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Young 2011). For this reason, we focus our theoretical inquiry on identifying a set of conditions and characteristics that are internal to the structuring of partnerships, which may help to explain why some are more likely to be effective and others are not. The analysis of conditions for effectiveness is thus exploratory in nature and theory-generating, rather than theory-testing. Nonetheless, the objective is to illuminate important and generalizable conditions that shape partnership effectiveness and explore these conditions systematically through the empirical cases and data presented in this volume (King, Keohane and Verba 2021; Young 2011).

The broad literatures on institutional effectiveness and on institutional design provide theoretical foundations for proposing a set of conjectures on how the structuring of partnerships and their internal characteristics are likely to shape effectiveness. Institutionalist theory and studies of international regimes have identified a set of functions, features and processes through which institutions broadly conceived can influence the behavior of participating actors and the relative effectiveness of international regimes.5 A number of theoretical and empirical works have further highlighted specific design features of both formal and informal institutions that can shape how effectively they perform such functions and their overall impacts.6 More recently, the scholarship on global governance has elaborated accounts of the evolving agency and institutional architecture in international affairs toward complexity and hybridization of authority, with implication for their effectiveness and legitimacy.7 Other perspectives, including studies on regime evolution, experimentalist governance, and more recently on catalytic effects, emphasize the significance of processes that shape the variable development, diffusion and, ultimately, the broader impact of different governance modalities.8

The work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), in turn, has identified a set of features that are specific to facilitating effective governance of common pool resources through decentralized, informal and localized arrangements, conditions that resonate particularly closely with the relatively decentralized and dispersed nature of partnership governance. These conditions have been further explored with respect to international institutions and polycentric governance (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003; Keohane and Ostrom 1995).

Building broadly on the theoretical insights of the institutionalist literature, we proceed to elaborate four propositions on how the structuring of partnerships and their features related to contractual arrangements, commitment of resources, adaptability, and innovation, are likely to shape effectiveness. Necessarily, we adapt institutionalist perspectives to the specificity of partnership governance, which operates in a relatively decentralized manner, both transnationally and at local scales. The four propositions also draw on existing studies on partnership
effectiveness, which have highlighted the significance of partnering processes, mechanisms and structuring through characteristics, such as institutionalization, learning-by-doing, and the level of integrative value creation, as significant factors likely to influence their relative success (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; 2014; Bäckstrand 2008; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Beisheim et al. 2014; Buse and Harmer 2007; Stadtler 2016; Van Tulder et al. 2016, among others).

Proposition 1. Sophisticated contracting, in terms of establishing appropriate specificity of commitments and mechanisms to enable accountability, is likely to increase the effectiveness of partnerships.

This proposition may appear somewhat counterintuitive, given that partnerships frequently rest on informal and limited contracts, at least at the time of their creation. Many partnerships are simply announced and registered as part of partnership platforms; some are launched by memoranda of understanding; while others are more formalized (Andonova and Levy 2003; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009). As partnerships expand and become institutionalized over time, they establish more formal rules and operational procedures (Andonova 2017). Why then is contracting important for partnership success? We stipulate that the quality of contracting is important for the effectiveness of partnerships precisely because of their largely informal and often experimental nature, which aims to influence actors and layers of governance through a certain degree of disruption and institutional learning-by-doing (De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Hoffmann 2011).

Research on collaboration for the provision of collective goods has shown that both formal and informal agreements can help to establish reciprocity, common expectations, and mechanisms to deal with the implementation of common objectives as well as with transgression from established goals, while minimizing long-term damage to cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990). Moreover, the design features of collaborative arrangements matter for advancing their functions and governance objectives (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Koremenos et al. 2001; Mitchell 1994; Ostrom 1990; Roger 2020; Westerwinter 2019; Young 2010).

Drawing on these theoretical premises, we conjecture that contractual arrangements that establish clear lines of responsibility between partners, and mobilize their comparative advantages toward common objectives, are particularly important for informal agreements such as partnerships. This is because, in the absence of a common understanding of their relative contribution and complementarity in terms of expertise, resources, access, norms and associated responsibilities, partners will face more limited incentives and higher transaction costs in implementing informal agreements (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Maltin 2019; Ostrom 1990). Such a level of specificity is particularly important for creating common meaning and trust across sectors and partners, which typically have different domains of activity, priorities, and organizational culture and language (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Stadtler and Lin 2017; Waddock 1988), and in attempting to reconfigure
power relations, that may vary within or between sectors (Brown 2009; Faul 2016; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a). The process of discussing and elaborating common goals, as well as clarifying partners’ commitments and contributions to the partnership, is likely to strengthen the prospect of effective implementation (Buse and Harmer 2007).

The right degree of specificity of contractual arrangement is furthermore likely to require soft but functional mechanisms of information sharing and accountability to ensure implementation and to maintain trust and reciprocity (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010; Bäckstrand 2008; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990; Park and Kramarz 2019). Such mechanisms would, nonetheless, allow for a degree of flexibility to respond to inevitable setbacks that may result from factors external to the partnership, or challenges related to differences in organizational cultures and motivations. As Bäckstrand (2008, p.82) points out, in the context of networked governance with diffuse sites of governance and sources of authority, accountability critically depends on transparency, the presence of monitoring mechanisms, and adequate representation of stakeholders to secure a degree of answerability and redress (Wessel and Wescott 2019; Bäckstrand 2006). Being voluntary and horizontal arrangements structured around a set of commonly agreed goals, partnerships are less likely to rely on hierarchical accountability mechanisms or threat of sanctions. Indeed, by bringing together different organizational actors, the partnership as a unit and its core partners can be subject to peer and reputational accountability in the presence of transparency and information, as well as to market-based accountability mechanisms with respect to donors and competing organizations (Bäckstrand 2008; Grant and Keohane 2005). At the same time, these multiple lines of informal accountability can create split accountabilities with respect to different actors and objectives, which can be exacerbated by financial and political power (Burci 2009; Buse and Harmer 2004).

Thus, contractual specificity and accountability go hand in hand as necessary (although likely not sufficient) characteristics for partnerships to sustain reciprocity, to prevent business-as-usual behavior through cross-sector consultation, and to support the successful and durable implementation of objectives (Acar, Guo and Yang 2008; 2012; Buse and Harmer 2007). Without these features, an initiative may produce short-term reputational gains, but limited substantive commitments and long-term value either for the partners or toward societal and sustainability objectives (Michelowa and Michaelowa 2017; Sethi and Schepers 2014). It is for this reason that we use the terminology sophisticated contracting – to reflect the challenge of establishing the right degree of specificity and mechanisms of interactions, information sharing and accountability that pertains to the problem structure of the issues, the set of partners and collective objectives.

Our analysis thus emphasizes the importance of the contractual environment for the effectiveness of partnerships (see also Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993), rather than the degree of formality or informality of a partnership initiative. This logic departs from arguments that greater institutionalization of partnerships (e.g. in terms of degree of delegation of functions, formal delegation, binding
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obligations, and centralized monitoring and enforcement) is likely to be conducive for greater partnership effectiveness (Beisheim and Campe 2012; Beisheim et al. 2014; Westerwinter 2019). Moreover, we move beyond design alone to also interrogate the practices through which partnerships are implemented (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Faul 2016). We argue that greater delegation and formalization by itself might not necessarily provide the right set of mechanisms and practices to establish common understanding on objectives and responsibilities in the context of voluntary arrangements. Nor may they sustain reciprocity toward the achievement of these objectives for the broadest set of constituencies, given the variable nature of partnership processes and governance. Partnership evolution and structuring is at least as much a matter of practice and managerial processes of implementation (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Andonova 2017; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Faul 2016; Young 2010), as it is of certain design choices at the beginning of the agreements. For these reasons, we focus conceptually and empirically on the structuring of partnerships; that is, the partnership agreements, processes and practices through which design features (such as specificity of commitments and mechanisms of information sharing and accountability) are put in place and evolve over time. We inquire how these features influence the implementation and effectiveness of partnerships, particularly in the absence of hierarchical enforcement.

**Proposition 2. Credible commitment of resources is likely to enhance partnership effectiveness.**

This proposition appears obvious. Yet, the literature has noted a slew of registered partnerships that have not committed the necessary resources or instruments necessary for implementing their stated goals or having a substantive impact on problem solving (Pattberg et al. 2012; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2011). Studies in public policy and business administration stipulate that one of the main rationales for partnerships is the potential for partners to leverage complementary resources, in order to make the advancement of a set of objectives possible or more efficient (Andonova 2018; Austin and Seitanidi 2014; Börzel and Risse 2005; Kaul and Conçeicão 2006; Porter and Kramer 2011). The pooling of resources is the underlying basis for both international regimes and transnational initiatives to strengthen the capacity of relevant actors and domestic institutions, exerting influence through multiple behavioral and managerial mechanisms, to increase the likelihood of effectiveness in advancing sustainability (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993). Clark and Harley (2020) have highlighted the relevance of resources and different types of capacities for advancing sustainability broadly, across levels governance. Commitment of resources is therefore, in many ways, the *sine qua non* of partnership goal attainment as an elementary measure of effectiveness. However, it is yet to be systematically assessed or measured in the academic literature.

By credible allocation of resources, we mean the pledging and management of resources in a way that establishes stable medium- or long-term expectations among all partners regarding partnership objectives. More stable and credible
resource arrangements are likely to provide the basis for longer time horizons for reciprocal action between partners and supporting capacity for implementation (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1996; Ostrom 1990). Alternatively, a partnership that has not secured resources for implementation may fall largely into the category of window-dressing of existing practices, resulting in limited or no change in behavior or collaborative impact (Berliner and Prakash 2012).

Proposition 2 implies that we may observe a continuum of resource-related arrangements – from partnerships that are largely statements of intent without the necessary means for implementation; to partners committing resources in ways that are ad hoc, short-term, or ill-specified across sectors; through to arrangements that have a more integrative and well-clarified structuring of resources with a view to sustained implementation (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Buse and Harmer 2007). While resources are essential for goal attainment, their structuring and long-term prospects are similarly important factors for other pathways to effectiveness, such as cooperation among partners, impact on affected populations, and the intended or unintended effects on institutions outside of the partnership, thus underlining the aggregate contribution of different effectiveness pathways to ultimate problem solving and sustainability.

Proposition 3. Partnership processes that facilitate the adaptability of partnership arrangements are likely to be conducive to greater effectiveness.

A certain degree of learning and adaptability is important for institutions to function and remain effective, as political conditions change, particularly with respect to complex sustainability problems (Biermann 2014; De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003; Parson 2003; Young 2010). Processes that facilitate learning and adaptability may be of particular significance for partnerships, because of their multi-sectoral and experimentalist nature. Partnerships tend to be entrepreneurial and experimental governance arrangements, in the sense that each partner reaches beyond their organizational sphere and standard practices to engage in collective action with organizations characterized by different cultures, mandates, and resources (Andonova 2017; Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Green 2014; Hoffmann 2011). Such strategies may involve a number of risks. For public organizations it may pose risks of undue influence and mismatch in organizational cultures and normative premises, while, for civil society groups, it may involve a degree of professionalization and domestication of the pressure that they may exert. For business actors, risks may include heightened public attention and scrutiny, as well as additional transaction costs associated with partnering with public bureaucracies and civil society organizations that typically have different organizational cultures and normative expectations (Austin 2000; Kolk, van Tulder and Kostwinder 2008). If an initiative involves experimentation with new solutions to address aspects of complex problems that require the leveraging of public and private risks, its success is far from guaranteed. Therefore, partnerships that are organized in ways that anticipate the need for learning-by-doing are more likely to endure through the implementation of their goals and produce
sustained effects (Austin and Setianidi 2012; De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Maltin 2019).

But can we discern the adaptability of a partnership as an organizational quality and an explanatory factor of partnership effectiveness, independent of its results? Not entirely, because adaptability is manifested in response to intermediate outcomes or to external shocks and unanticipated effects. The effectiveness of a partnership is thus likely to depend critically on the extent to which partners are able to learn through implementation, deliberation, and internal and external information to adapt the course of collaboration and outcomes. From this perspective, adaptability refers to the process through which the partnership is managed and implemented, and the extent to which that process allows partners to build institutional resilience in order to address external or internal risks and setbacks. The relevance of internal factors that shape the adaptability of partnerships is likely to vary across different cases. These factors may include agile leadership, the involvement of a facilitator or platform for managing multistakeholder interactions, regular communication, openness about partner-specific motivations, and maintaining trust and common understanding of the partnership purpose (Austin and Setianidi 2012; Maltin 2019; Ostrom 1990; Parson 2003; Stadtler and Karakulak 2020). In other words, partnership processes are likely to be important not only in terms of the collaborative effects between partners, but also for the adaptability of the partnership, which in turn is likely to influence multiple dimensions of effectiveness: from goal attainment to impact on affected populations and institutions outside the partnership, and ultimately, its contribution to problem solving.

Proposition 4. Partnerships that foster innovation – understood broadly as creating or facilitating access to innovative processes, institutions, technologies or financing – are more likely to be effective in advancing sustainability objectives.

Much of the literature on partnerships rests on the assumption that leveraging and facilitating access to innovation, which often requires collaboration across different sectors (Anadon et al. 2016), has been one of the main rationales for the creation of public-private and multistakeholder initiatives (Kaul and Conceição 2006; Moon et al. 2010; Szlezák et al. 2010). In the governance of global health, for instance, public-private partnerships have targeted issues where private sector investment in, and access to, innovation has been frustrated by market failures, institutional barriers or the absence of profit potential (Buse and Walt 2000; Held et al. 2019; Mazzucato, Li and Darzi 2020 2020). Similarly, clean energy partnerships have emerged to facilitate the investment in innovation and diffusion of clean energy technologies and supportive policies, initially in response to the gridlock in international climate and clean energy cooperation in the 2000s (Andonova 2021; Szulecki, Pattberg and Bierman 2011; Zelli et al. 2020). Partnerships have also been rationalized as a means of experimenting with innovative technologies, financing, or consensus building on global issues. And
yet, we have limited systematic data across issue areas on the extent to which partnerships bring about innovative solutions. In other words, we need to examine the relationship between partnership governance and innovation critically and in greater detail to establish whether, how and to what extent individual partnerships succeed in bringing to bear innovative processes, institutions, or products to achieve sustainability outcomes. For instance, the business management literature distinguishes between philanthropic partnerships (for example, donations for specific causes) and integrative partnerships that reexamine private and societal goals to find ground for overlapping and integrated solutions (Austin and Seitanidi 2014). The latter partnership model may be more likely to produce innovation and change, for example, because it requires active rethinking of existing practices (Brinkerhoff 2002; Clarke and Crane 2018). Even in integrative partnerships, the degree of innovation would depend on the extent to which they depart significantly from existing processes of partner organizations, in order to experiment with new approaches that produce disruptive and catalytic effects to advance sustainability (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; Hale 2020a; van der Ven, Bernstein and Hoffmann 2017). Proposition 4 therefore allows researchers to explore systematically, and with greater empirical scrutiny, the interplay between different types of processes and different types of effects of partnerships, with a focus on innovation as a critical factor for sustainability outcomes.

**Conditions for Effectiveness and Complex Causality**

As has become evident from the preceding discussion, the four propositions on plausible conditions for partnership effectiveness have to do with how partnership structures and processes may shape their effects. These propositions imply that success of partnership initiatives is far from certain, and that effectiveness is likely to require careful internal structuring of objectives and partner commitments to provide for accountability, resources, and openness to innovation and adaptability. Indeed, partnerships that are hastily announced at high-level forums or have failed to secure adequate resources or structuring may have a high likelihood of being de facto inactive, as existing studies have documented. Our analysis recognizes that contextual factors, such as policy context, political support, societal capacity or external shocks, are similarly likely to influence the effectiveness of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships. While the more contained objective of the four propositions elaborated here is to discern how significant the structuring and features of a partnership are in producing results and behavioral effects, our empirical analysis also considers their interplay with contextual determinants of institutional effectiveness.

We furthermore take into account that the four factors specified by our theoretical propositions are likely to interact with each other, rather than influence partnership effectiveness independently. The quality of contracting may reinforce adaptability if the contract includes agile accountability mechanisms that enable learning, or it may hinder adaptability if contracting arrangements are either very limited or too rigid. Adaptability is furthermore a characteristic process that
cannot be subsumed under the rubric of contractual structure and resources, since it reflects the path-dependent development of a partnership and the nature of the collaborative processes and leadership within it. Thus adaptability of partnerships is likely to relate closely to the third pathway of partnership effectiveness captured in Figure 1.1, linked to internal collaboration within the partnership. Similarly, the credible commitment of resources is likely to be essential for innovation and access; and yet, it is hardly the sole determinant of how innovation is produced and accessed through partnerships. We therefore treat the four conditions stipulated in this section not as causal factors that are independent of each other, but rather as causal mechanisms, related to the internal characteristics and structuring of partnerships, that can shape – in interaction with each other and with contextual factors – the five pathways to partnership effectiveness. Our approach recognizes that partnerships operate in a context of complex causality, whereby “clusters of causal forces interact with one another” to determine specific outcomes (Young 2011, p.19859; see also Hale 2020). It provides us with a tool to examine qualitatively and critically how specific features of a partnership enable or inhibit complex processes that produce specific outcomes along different pathways to effectiveness.

By identifying a set of conditions internal to partnerships that are likely to shape their effectiveness, the propositions allow us to explore empirically their significance in shaping different dimensions of effectiveness. We expect, for example, that the credible commitment of resources is likely to be critical for goal attainment and for the extent to which a partnership can secure sustained benefits for affected populations and the problems being addressed. On the other hand, partnerships that introduce or seek to scale up innovation might be most likely to produce a visible impact on affected constituencies and on institutions outside of the partnership, while the direction of that effect may be uncertain and range from disrupting prevailing practices to strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms of cooperation. In other words, there are many outstanding empirical questions surrounding the drivers, direction and extent of partnership effectiveness. Our conceptual framework seeks to inform that empirical work and to generate much needed data and comparative insight on the basis of which it is possible to further refine our theoretical understanding of the factors and causal processes that shape the effectiveness of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships.

Conclusion

The theoretical framework on pathways to and conditions of partnerships effectiveness that we present in this chapter is derived from an interdisciplinary inquiry. Discipline-specific approaches have illuminated different aspects of institutional and partnership effectiveness. Current scholarship in each of the different disciplines that we engaged provides a partial view and multiple interpretations of what effectiveness is and how it can be researched. Growing attention to the public purpose of cross-sector partnerships in the business administration and management literatures, alongside the increased examination of public-private partnerships in
disciplines that more traditionally focus on public actors (such as international relations and policy studies), indicates the potential for cross-fertilization. Learning across diverse disciplines that take partnerships as their object of study does not mean collapsing disciplinary categories, questions or priorities. As we have argued, there are complementary contributions and interactions between disciplines that can play an important role in furthering the study of partnership effectiveness.

The pathways to effectiveness framework that we contribute capture such an interdisciplinary perspective. We posit that researchers can usefully identify the extent to which partnerships effectively contribute to problem solving and sustainability by attending to: goal attainment, value creation for different partners, collaboration between partners, effects on affected populations, and influence on external institutions and partnerships. Simultaneously, the following key conditions associated with the structuring and features of partnerships deserve research attention: sophisticated contracting, credible resource commitments, adaptability, and capacity to innovate. These pathways and conditions can interact with each other in the way that they exert influence. For instance, fulfilling the conditions of adaptability and innovation that we identify may allow a partnership to more effectively achieve its goals at the same time as having a positive impact on affected populations and institutions outside the partnership.

By applying the theoretical framework that we contribute, researchers will be able to empirically examine the pathways and conditions that promote and sustain effectiveness (or not) in their empirical studies, as well as how these factors interact. There is no guarantee, however, that these pathways and conditions interact in harmonious or complementary ways. We separate the pathways and conditions to increase researchers’ analytical purchase on the many aspects of effectiveness that are at play, and then on the complexity of their interactions. Indeed, the disaggregated nature of the framework invites researchers to explicitly tackle the complex relations between the different pathways and conditions for partnership effectiveness. The chapters in Parts II and III of this volume demonstrate the utility of disaggregation, using the framework to examine a variety of empirical cases across a range of issues and crosscutting areas of investigation. By elaborating this broadly applicable theoretical approach, we seek to contribute to a deeper, more multidimensional understanding of the effectiveness of global partnerships. Applying this disaggregated model that delineates the diverse pathways to and conditions of partnership effectiveness, researchers and policy makers can ultimately gain a more substantiated and qualitative assessment of the aggregate impact of a partnership toward addressing a specific problem and its contribution to advancing sustainability.

Notes

1 See also further examples linked education (Faul 2014), health (Harman 2016), and nutrition (Schleifer 2018).
2 The importance of creating capacities for addressing sustainability has been identified by Clark and Harley 2020; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Ostrom 1990 and Young 2020, among others.
The Effectiveness of Partnerships

4 See among others Clark and Harley 2020; Jordan et al. 2015; Ostrom 2010; Speth and Courrier 2020; Young 2020.
8 Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Hale 2020a; Parson 2003; Young 2010.
9 See Ostrom (1990) on specificity of commitments and their ownership by stakeholders as conditions for successful cooperation and sustainable management of environmental resources in the absence of hierarchical enforcement.
10 See Grant and Keohane (2005) on the nature and multiple mechanisms of international and transnational accountability.
11 On formal and informal institutions and rational design, see, among others, Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Martin 2019; Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker 2021.
12 See the work of Kramarz (2020) on how rigid hierarchical management and prioritization of rules and procedure may undermine stated values and outcomes of partnerships such as participatory representation or innovation.
13 On the relevance of resources and capacity see also the broader literature on the effects of international and transnational environmental regimes, see Andonova 2003; Andonova, Hale and Roger 2018; Börzel and Risse 2010; Graz, Helmerich and Prébandier 2020; Haas et al., 2003; Horton and Koremenos 2020; Keohane and Levy 1996; Persson and Dzebo 2019; Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Young 2010; 2011; Young and Levy 1999.

References


Part II

Thematic Case Studies
2 Governing Biodiversity and Clean Energy with Global Partners

Liliana B. Andonova and Dario Piselli

Introduction

Over the past three decades, the emergence of transnational partnerships between public and non-state actors in the areas of biodiversity and clean energy has represented an important dimension of the global trend towards the rise of this form of governance. Among the initiatives registered at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, more than 19 percent targeted policy issues relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (e.g., terrestrial species and ecosystems; oceans, lakes and rivers; forest management), while an additional 13.9 percent focused on clean energy objectives (Andonova and Levy 2003; Chan and Müller 2012). Most recently, around half of the partnerships and voluntary commitments submitted to the United Nations’ Partnerships for sustainable development goals (SDGs) online platform covered terrestrial or aquatic biodiversity aspects as part of their strategy, and 12.8 percent contained clean energy commitments. These may range from local, project-level endeavors (e.g., a public-private partnership to fund and manage a new energy infrastructure or specific ecosystem conservation and restoration project) to large multi-stakeholder initiatives that are seeking to mobilize significant amounts of funding, knowledge, technology and expertise.

The growing role of partnerships in biodiversity and clean energy governance can be explained by several concurrent factors. These include increased scientific understanding of the centrality of the biosphere and climate sub-systems to Earth System functioning (Stafford-Smith et al. 2017; Steffen et al. 2015), as well as growing recognition of multi-sector collaboration as an implementation mechanism for relevant international legal frameworks (Andonova 2017; Chan and Müller 2012; Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012). Partnerships are increasingly convened to address funding and capacity gaps that often beset effective domestic action (Andonova 2014; Campe 2014), particularly in areas of sustainable development cooperation that coincide with the priorities of powerful actors in the Global North.

As with other issue areas discussed in this volume, however, we still have limited knowledge of the impacts of existing initiatives on biodiversity and clean energy and the related conditions for effectiveness. Of the few studies that have...
been conducted on these topics, most have assessed partnerships against a set of proposed governance functions rather than actual sustainable development outcomes (Campe 2014; Szulecki et al. 2011; Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012). The need for a broadly applicable methodology for understanding the variable effects of partnerships remains critically important, considering their designation as key means of implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

In this chapter, we thus aim to explore the question of partnership effectiveness in the areas of biodiversity and clean energy by applying the analytical framework presented in Chapter 1 to a comparative study of three partnerships. Two of these initiatives, namely the Amazon Region Protected Areas (ARPA) program in Brazil and Costa Rica’s Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio), were launched with the aim of promoting the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and also to engage with wider considerations relating to climate change and the creation of socioeconomic opportunities for local communities. The third partnership, the Galápagos San Cristóbal Wind Park partnership in Ecuador (hereafter the Galápagos Wind case), had the objective of reducing the Galápagos Islands’ dependence on imported fossil fuels, while simultaneously protecting the region’s fragile marine ecosystem from the risk of oil spills and contributing toward the transition to cleaner energy sources. Taken together, the case studies provide significant insights about the pathways through which partnerships in the areas of biodiversity and clean energy may exert behavioral influence on the partners, as well as about the key factors shaping variable partnership effectiveness. Accordingly, they also hold a series of implications for the design of future sustainable development partnerships.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, we describe the methodology of the paper, summarizing the key characteristics of the three case studies and the rationale for using them in our comparative analysis. We then briefly present our findings on the effectiveness of the three partnerships, trying to identify common patterns in terms of goal attainment, improved collaboration, creation of value for partners and wider sustainable development impacts. In the fourth section, we analyze our findings against the conditions for effectiveness proposed in Chapter 1 that are particularly relevant for explaining the variable effectiveness of partnerships. Lastly, we provide a conclusion.

Case Selection and Methodology

This chapter adopts a comparative approach centered on the structured, focused comparison of three case studies (George and Bennett 2005). The cases highlight the various forms of interaction that may occur between different types of actors under the broader framework of partnerships for sustainable development. Furthermore, they are selected due to a detailed consideration of the contextual factors that would facilitate the comparison. On the one hand, all three case studies concern partnerships operating in areas of high ecological value (including UNESCO natural World Heritage Sites). In addition, the activities of these partnerships sought to integrate multiple elements of biodiversity conservation
and sustainable socioeconomic development in their project design. Third, the respective projects were characterized by strong forms of domestic ownership by local actors and embedded in a similar institutional and regional setting. The case selection thus allows us to examine comparatively the interface between domestic political factors and internal partnership characteristics, across broadly comparable contexts and with respect to biodiversity and clean energy issues. On the other hand, the scale of the three partnerships diverges considerably, including a project-based operation grounded at the municipal level (Galápagos Wind case), a large-scale program in the Amazon region of Brazil (ARPA) and the creation of an entirely new institution in Costa Rica (INBio). Moreover, the types of transnational actors involved, and the form and rationale of their involvement, are ostensibly different, allowing the examination of the inherent diversity of partnerships as a form of governance and the discussion of the variable extent to which generalizable conclusions can be drawn.

The Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio), created in 1989 by the Costa Rican government, achieved global recognition as the first public-private institution in a developing country set up with the explicit purpose of financing biodiversity conservation. Its main work included conducting a comprehensive national biodiversity inventory. It also aimed at creating a market for the collected ecological, biochemical and genetic information through the negotiation of access and benefit-sharing agreements (also known as bioprospecting contracts) with potential commercial users (Castree 2003; Gámez et al. 1993). INBio has been described as a pioneering effort in the mobilization of hybrid coalitions in support of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, given that it effectively predated the 1992 Earth Summit and the adoption of the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) (ten Kate and Laird 2000). Until the sudden demise of its original structure in 2015, the activities of INBio were financed or supported by partners including the government of Costa Rica, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), research institutions from all over the world and the governments of Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Spain (GEF 2007), as well as through bioprospecting contracts, such as the one concluded in 1991 with pharmaceutical company Merck and Co. (Blum 1993). In 2000, as part of its attempts to diversify revenue streams through tourism and to conduct environmental education activities, INBio also inaugurated a biodiversity-themed park known as INBioparque, which was similarly supported by external donations (Charpentier 2001; Wade 2014).

ARPA was originally announced in 2002 during the World Summit on Sustainable Development and arose out of a series of processes that had already been taking place at the national and international level since the 1980s (Andonova 2014). It is widely considered to be the most ambitious transnational partnership to have emerged in the area of biodiversity conservation. Among its main partners, ARPA involved the Brazilian government and agencies, the World Bank and the GEF, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the government of Germany, the state and municipal environmental agencies of the Brazilian Amazon and a number of private foundations and donors (ARPA 2014; 2018). Thanks to the financial and technical assistance coming from transnational and international
actors, as well as continued financial and political support by the Brazilian government, ARPA’s first implementation phase (2002–2010) was renewed twice (2010–2017 and 2014–2039) to expand and consolidate the network of protected areas (PAs) in the Amazon region of Brazil. Its approach seeks to bring together the creation of new reserves with an increase in support to PA managers, the development of new tools to monitor PA management, the promotion of income-generating activities for local communities and the identification of innovative financing mechanisms that could ensure the long-term sustainability of the system of Amazon’s PAs (World Bank 1998b; 2002).

Finally, the Galápagos Wind partnership was established in 2003 as a project-based initiative between the municipality of San Cristóbal Island, the local electricity utility ELECGALAPAGOS S.A., the government of Ecuador, a commercial trust created by the Global Sustainable Electricity Partnership (GSEP) and GSEP member companies, such as American Electric Power (US) and RWE (Germany), the United Nations Foundation (UNF), the UN Office for Partnerships (UNOP), the UN Development Program (UNDP) and local non-governmental organizations (GSEP 2008). Its activities resulted in the establishment of a business operation aiming to partially replace the diesel-based electricity generation system on San Cristóbal with a hybrid wind and diesel system in order to address the island’s dependence on fossil fuels and reduce the risk of oil spills that threatened the marine environment and biodiversity. Operation of the new system was ultimately transferred to the local electricity utility in order to also stimulate local economic development and knowledge transfer.

For each case study, we conducted an extensive documentary research based on a wide range of primary sources and secondary literature. The primary sources include publicly accessible partnership documents (i.e., annual reports, research papers, memoranda of understanding, project appraisals, etc.); policy papers, monitoring reports and communication materials developed by the partners or other relevant actors; and other online sources including newspaper articles and the partnerships’ web pages. We complemented the desk research with some 20 semi-structured interviews to gain a direct perspective from organizations that were involved in the partnerships, supplement insufficient data and allow for the triangulation of findings.

Pathways to Effectiveness: Comparative Findings

Goal Attainment

The first dimension of effectiveness explored with respect to the three case study partnerships relates to the extent to which they have been able to meet their overarching objectives identified at the time of establishment. Owing to the complex nature of the respective partnership activities, our analysis proceeds to identify, based on partnership documents, one overarching objective and a series of corollary objectives that are intended to support the achievement of the former. Table 2.1 summarizes these objectives and the level of their attainment.
### Table 2.1 Partnership objectives and levels of attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Overarching Objective</th>
<th>Corollary Objectives</th>
<th>Level of Attainment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Expand and consolidate PAs in the Brazilian Amazon to cover 10% of total area.</td>
<td>Creation of new PAs covering 50 million hectares (later expanded to 60 million hectares).</td>
<td><strong>Attained</strong>: in 2017 ARPA encompassed 117 PAs covering 60.8 million hectares, or 15% of the Brazilian Amazon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidated and improved management of existing PAs.</td>
<td><strong>Largely attained</strong>: staff and capacity constraints at local level remain.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establish innovative mechanisms for generating and managing funds for long-term sustainability of PAs.</td>
<td><strong>Attained</strong>: Protected Areas Fund and Transition Fund.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not attained</strong>: local revenue-generating mechanisms within PAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen coordination, monitoring, management, and communication.</td>
<td><strong>Largely attained</strong>: published academic assessments more critical than official ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galápagos Wind</td>
<td>Replace diesel-based electricity generation with hybrid wind-power system. Supply 50% of the island’s electricity needs through wind power.</td>
<td>Construct the San Cristóbal Wind Park and hybrid wind-diesel control system.</td>
<td><strong>Attained</strong>: constructed 2.4 megawatts wind park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce fossil fuel dependence, CO$_2$ emissions and oil spill risk.</td>
<td><strong>Partially attained</strong>: Avoided 21,000 tons of CO$_2$ emissions. But current consumption covered by renewables is 30% due to increased demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce energy costs for the Ecuadorian government (reduced subsidy burden).</td>
<td><strong>Attained</strong>: with estimated USD 2.5 million in savings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge transfer and capacity in the host country.</td>
<td><strong>Attained</strong>: local utility ELECGALAPAGOS fully assumed operations in 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Overarching Objective</td>
<td>Corollary Objectives</td>
<td>Level of Attainment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>INBio</td>
<td>Finance biodiversity conservation in Costa Rica by undertaking a National Biodiversity Inventory and marketing access to the related ecological, biochemical and genetic information.</td>
<td>Demonstrate feasibility of wind energy as a renewable technology and foster replication in Galápagos Islands and Ecuador.</td>
<td>Attained: San Cristóbal Wind served as a model for other renewable energy projects in Baltra, Santa Cruz and Isabela islands and inspired other projects in Ecuador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Protect local biodiversity, mitigate risk posed by wind turbines to bird populations.</td>
<td>Attained: improved hatching reproduction rates of endangered Galápagos petrel; monitoring failed to uncover evidence of significant injuries to protected birds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrate biodiversity information in a single administrative entity, using digital and physical formats.</td>
<td>Attained: several innovative biodiversity information management systems developed by INBio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate access to biodiversity information for commercial use and benefit-sharing to finance conservation.</td>
<td>Not attained: economic returns from early bioprospecting agreements not sustained over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase “bio-literacy” in Costa Rica.</td>
<td>Largely attained: environmental education activities conducted by INBio and INBioparque.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on information from ARPA 2018; Conniff 2012; Enerwhere 2016; Fonseca 2015; Gámez 2007; GSEP 2016; Iles 2003; Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais 2020; UNDP 2014; Wade 2014; World Bank 2012; 2018; WWF 2018.
Table 2.1 reveals that overall, ARPA and the Galápagos Wind partnership successfully attained their overarching objectives. In 2017, ARPA celebrated the achievement of its principal target, namely the protection of 60 million hectares of rainforest across 117 PAs (ARPA 2018). Despite some persistent shortcomings in terms of management effectiveness, it is widely credited with strengthening the governance of the PA system of the Brazilian Amazon (World Bank 2012; 2018). Similarly, the Galápagos Wind project substantially increased the share of renewable energy in electricity consumption on San Cristóbal Island to 30 percent by 2016; the reason it did not reach its 50 percent target was due to greater increase in electricity demand over time compared to baseline estimates (GSEP 2016). The partnership further contributed to decarbonizing the economy of San Cristóbal Island, resulting in an estimated 21,000 tons of avoided CO₂ emissions (GSEP 2016). It reduced the Ecuadorian government’s energy costs and subsidy burden, mitigated the risk from oil spills in a fragile marine environment and opened a path for future renewable energy projects in the Galápagos (Enerwhere 2016). INBio attained its original goals only partially. The success of its national biodiversity inventory is internationally recognized. This allowed the institute to generate a treasure trove of information that greatly improved Costa Rica’s scientific capacity and policy making on biodiversity issues (Gámez 2007; Iles 2003; ten Kate and Laird 2000). However, expectations for a consistent stream of economic returns from initial bioprospecting agreements, such as the ones with Merck and Co. and Diversa Corporation, ultimately did not materialize. The institution thus failed to raise substantial market-based financing for biodiversity conservation (Iles 2003).

Creation of Value for Partners

As discussed in the analytical framework (Chapter 1) and in the broader literature, creating value for partners is a core rationale for both private actors and public institutions to engage in partnerships and, hence, an essential pathway to effectiveness (Austin and Seitanidi 2014). For the governments of the three host countries studied in this chapter, entering into a partnership was seen as important for mobilizing sufficient funds and institutional capacity toward the implementation of ambitious domestic commitments on biodiversity conservation (INBio and ARPA)⁴ and decarbonization (Galápagos Wind).⁵ Considering the counterfactual, our research and interviews suggested that these three partnership projects could probably not have been undertaken with existing public sector resources. Moreover, the partnerships also served to experiment with new and additional types of financing mechanisms. In two of the cases, ARPA and the Galápagos Wind Park, the financial and management instruments contributed to building long-term domestic capacity for sustainable management of resources. The evidence is more mixed in the case of INBio, given that despite the important results of its national biodiversity inventory,⁶ INBio did not lead to an expected increase in the country’s income from bioprospecting. This made it impossible to channel part of the additional resources toward biodiversity conservation or
opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, as had been expected (Richerzagen and Holm-Mueller 2005).

For partnering UN agencies, international NGOs and multilateral financing institutions (such as GEF or the World Bank), the value created by the partnerships translated primarily into the advancement of their strategic objectives and sustainable development activities. ARPA and INBio built on and extended GEF programs, and they supported the World Bank’s strategy for greening the organization in response to strong advocacy pressure in the 1990s. Partnership outcomes were thus inscribed within strategic programs such as the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategies for Costa Rica (e.g., World Bank 2004) and Brazil (e.g., World Bank 2011), as well as in the World Bank Operational Programs on Forest Ecosystems and Freshwater Ecosystems (World Bank 2009; 2012). The ARPA partnership contributed to the strategic conservation initiatives of the Brazilian government, but also those of its global partners, such as the World Bank-WWF Forest Alliance (World Bank 1998b) and the WWF Forests for Life Campaign (WWF 2018, p.6). For its part, the San Cristóbal project was embedded in a long-standing cooperation between UNDP and Ecuador on issues ranging from climate change to local economic development (UNDP 2014). The successful implementation of the Galápagos Wind Park, furthermore, reinforced the strategy of the UN Secretariat, facilitated through the UN Foundation, to engage private foundations and subnational actors in partnerships for sustainable development and clean energy (Andonova 2017). In a similar vein, for donor countries providing assistance through their development or technical cooperation agencies in the ARPA and INBio case studies, the supported activities were fundamentally seen as aligned with their respective priorities for development cooperation, as well as with these countries’ international commitments to technology and, under the CBD (e.g., Hansson 1997; NORAD 2009).

Private companies were centrally involved in two of the partnerships. In INBio, these were the pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies that acted as commercial partners in the bioprospecting agreements. In this last case, enhanced legal security in the access to, and exploitation of, genetic resources, was the most important value created for the private sector partners. At the same time, there is limited information on the extent to which such access translated into commercial benefits for the companies. For example, no product based on the samples obtained by Merck and Co. had reached the market by the late 2000s (Gámez 2007). In ARPA, private actors became involved primarily through the contribution of financing for the creation and consolidation of PAs, as well as through an ARPA Private Sector Task Force that was established by WWF-International to provide technical assistance in the preliminary phases of the partnership. However, private donor representatives were also appointed to the two main ARPA governing bodies (the ARPA Program Committee and the Transition Fund Committee).

The different dimensions of value created by the Galápagos Wind project are widely discussed in the reports of the GSEP industry group (GSEP 2008;
Governing Biodiversity and Clean Energy

As the project manager from an international electricity utility company that was involved in the partnership explained in an interview, the Galápagos Wind Park was “designed with a business case in mind, but not on a commercial basis,” elaborating further that it was a “hard project, which does not pencil out quickly from the perspective of commercial developers and in terms of returns on investment.” Industry actors viewed the partnership as a potentially very high-value project in terms of innovation, breaking new ground for the deployment of renewable electricity and corporate sustainability. The substantial investment of USD 10.8 million was made possible through a substantial GSEP capital fund contribution, soft loans by GSEP companies and UNDP, a grant by the UN Foundation and a series of innovative financial arrangements with the government of Ecuador (GSEP 2014). The partnership operated on a non-profit basis, as there was no capital reimbursement and all income generated from the first phase of project was reinvested to support further renewable energy development and biodiversity conservation in San Cristóbal (GSEP 2016). For investors and international contractors, the primary value was therefore the demonstration effect of implementing the first wind energy project ever installed in a remote and ecologically vulnerable site, with measurable impacts in terms of decarbonization, carbon offsets and collaboration with UN agencies. For GSEP and its member companies, Galápagos Wind is furthermore considered a flagship initiative for advancing its mission to demonstrate the potential for wind energy development, deployment and replication, including in developing countries with high vulnerability to climate change. Finally, according to the perspective of a project manager in Ecuador, “the most important value” created was for the municipality and the local utility ELECGALAPAGOS, which established “its own renewable energy division using engineers and operators adequately trained by Galápagos Wind staff.” The partnership was viewed as a “window to demonstrate to the Ecuadorian mainland that people of San Cristóbal were able to own such an important investment,” and to promote sustainability in the Galápagos.

Collaboration Inside the Partnerships and Broader Institutional Impact

In the three partnerships included in this study, the more immediate effects on horizontal collaboration are often relatively easy to identify, as they are usually evaluated in project documents and independent appraisals. In contrast, in some cases it becomes difficult to evaluate these effects against a counterfactual, as project activities can overlap with other preexisting efforts and collaborations. For example, Brazil had seen forest partnerships with entities such as the World Bank and the German government emerge in the Amazon region since the end of the 1980s. Although ARPA presented a significantly new arrangement with the same actors and WWF, focused on the expansion of PAs, some of the previous efforts continued in parallel.
While only minor setbacks and challenges to collaboration were reported in most project documents (GSEP 2016; World Bank 2006; 2009), the outcomes for this dimension of effectiveness appear particularly mixed in terms of the level of support provided by the host governments and the durability of the partnership arrangements. On one end of the spectrum, the Galápagos Wind Park project appeared relatively well-insulated from potential shifting political interests, as it prompted both the national government and the municipality of San Cristóbal to mobilize significant resources through innovative means (e.g., the allocation to the project of local income tax revenues, the provision of special government grants). An interview with a senior staff member of an industry association further emphasized that managing collaboration between partners and with local constituencies was a fundamental aspect of the implementation of the partnership.\textsuperscript{13} GSEP companies saw the Galápagos Wind project as a complex and high-risk endeavor in terms of investment, transaction costs and operation in a sensitive natural environment. As a consequence, it was critical that collaborative arrangements and consultation processes were conducted upstream in partnership implementation in order to establish trust. This strategy was also a matter of clarifying goals, assigning responsibilities and distributing risk. As the senior staff member explained: “success is contingent on the right risk allocation. You allocate the risk to the party that can bear it, otherwise you will fail. Different partners have different capacities to manage environmental, financial, technical, community and policy aspects of the partnerships.”\textsuperscript{14}

On the other end of the spectrum, despite strong political backing by the Costa Rican government in establishing INBio, this support suffered during times of political change, particularly with the rapid decline of the external resources funding INBio between 2005 and 2013 (Fonseca 2015). Relations became increasingly contentious due to the latter’s perceived lack of transparency and accountability, culminating in a controversial bailout of the failing institution in 2015 (Wade 2014; Fonseca 2015). Between these two extremes, the ARPA case experienced several phases in which Brazil’s leadership was committed to domestic policies consistent with the objectives of the partnership and supported its extension.\textsuperscript{15} The level of coordination between the Federal Ministry of the Environment and agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) and the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity (ICMBio)\textsuperscript{16} with core partners was such that, in several interviews, former government officials referred to ARPA as being part of “public policy of the Brazilian government.”\textsuperscript{17} Indeed the creation of ARPA was formalized by government decree No. 4326 (2002), and there is high degree of engagement and ownership by the Ministry of the Environment. The scale and complexity of the partnership made it necessary to conduct regular consultations among the partners through the establishment of clear management processes for approving action strategies, allocating funding to PAs and monitoring the conditions for disbursements. This resulted in the creation of several governing and advisory bodies, including the ARPA Program Committee under the Federal Ministry of the Environment, a Scientific Advisory
Panel and (in the third phase of the partnership) a Transition Fund Committee. Interview respondents noted, however, the more limited voices of representatives of local civil society organizations, which only hold two seats in the Program Committee – a body that tends to be dominated by the main donors and federal agencies. More recently, the election of President Jair Messias Bolsonaro in 2019 has changed the political environment dramatically, with soaring deforestation rates prompting international concern and a more confrontational stance taken toward transnational NGOs, thus making the collaboration in the ongoing third phase of ARPA more uncertain (Hecht 2020; Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais 2020; WWF 2018).

Since partnerships typically seek to make a contribution to problems that are large in scope and for which the solutions might hinge on the targeting of underlying drivers and behavior of actors outside the partnership, it is also important to evaluate the three case studies against their impact on external collaboration and other institutions. From this perspective, a first layer concerns the partnerships’ effects on public policy and the behavior of relevant private actors, while a second layer relates to the spillover of knowledge and practices at the national and international level.

The experience of both the ARPA and INBio cases attests to modest success in influencing external private actors whose behavior was contributing to the issues being addressed. While ARPA resulted in a significant strengthening of domestic capacity relating to the management of biodiversity and deforestation in Brazil, it largely avoided targeting large private interests surrounding the country’s most problematic “arc of deforestation” along the southeastern edge of the forest. The initiative focused rather on the creation and management of PAs in areas that are less affected by the politics of the agro-industrial complex (Trancoso et al. 2010). In turn, the legal framework governing access and benefit-sharing in Costa Rica had a temporary impact on the behavior of the private companies by stipulating specific conditions for access in bioprospecting agreements with INBio (Richerzagen and Holm-Mueller 2005). However, this was quickly rendered obsolete, as companies progressively abandoned natural samples to embrace research on synthetic compounds and digital sequencing information techniques (Conniff 2012).

With respect to broader institutional effects, these three partnerships constituted pioneering efforts in their own fields and, for this reason, represent important opportunities for institutional learning and testing of new methodologies. At the same time, their replicability and scalability outside the specific geographical and political context has been limited – a finding that suggests a certain contextual specificity in the implementation of the partnership model of governance. Their positive spillover effects have been more directly relevant to broader infrastructure and institutional developments for sustainability in the hosting countries. These include, for instance, the development of other renewable energy projects in the Galápagos Islands which were also co-financed by international partners, supported by the open sharing of knowledge and feasibility studies by the GSEP.
and managed by local utility ELECGALAPAGOS. Examples include a wind park in Baltra Island, a photovoltaic power station on Santa Cruz Island and a hybrid power generation system on Isabela Island. ARPA and its financial instruments have, in turn, contributed to the creation of the Amazon Fund as a major new financing instrument for reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, stimulated the broader uptake of REDD-plus initiatives in Brazil (ARPA 2012b, p.36 and pp.43–46) and inspired the recent development of the multi-country Amazon Sustainable Landscapes Program. All three cases, partly due to their visibility and strong public engagement, have contributed to strengthening the position of Brazil, Costa Rica and Ecuador in influencing global environmental negotiation and instruments.

**Impact on Affected Populations and Wider Sustainable Development Objectives**

The impacts of these partnerships appear generally more difficult to assess with respect to their anticipated socioeconomic and welfare effects, including the contribution to local economic development and the promotion of forms of participatory decision making.

The Galápagos Wind initiative provoked controversy in its preparatory stages, as it envisaged the development of new infrastructure in a highly sensitive ecological context. The implementation and indeed the very existence of the partnership, therefore, depended on close consultation and collaboration with local authorities, the Galápagos National Park Service and the Charles Darwin Foundation. Because the primary objectives and structure of the Galápagos Wind partnership were localized at the municipal level, the project produced more readily demonstrable economic and social effects. These included increased economic opportunities during the construction phase of the installation, a net reduction of air pollution due to the displacement of diesel combustion with related health benefits, an improved energy service and the uptake in energy efficiency programs with related savings in terms of electricity bills. The San Cristóbal project was also one of the first projects on the island to include a public communication and consultation program upstream and collaboration with civil society organizations on environmental management activities through the Charles Darwin Foundation. As noted in the discussion on value creation, perhaps the most sizable impact on the sustainability and welfare of the citizens of San Cristóbal has to do with the substantial transfer of technology and management capacity relating to renewable energy projects.

In the case of INBio, the scale of support to sustainable livelihoods was widely seen as insufficient to create long-lasting economic benefits and incentives for conservation (Castree 2003; Iles 2003), adding to a perception that the Institute never liaised appropriately with local communities and indigenous groups (Castree 2003; Miller 2006; World Bank 2006). Several studies note that the initiative contributed primarily to strengthening the position of
private companies as the main actors deciding the fate of genetic resources and biotechnology development (Iles 2003; Royas and Aylward 2003; ten Kate and Aylward 2000). However, before their financial downturn, INBio and INBioparque provided widely recognized public value at the local level, becoming a popular outlet of educational and recreational initiatives centered around the themes of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use (Fonseca 2015).

Finally, while ARPA succeeded in making the management process of PAs more inclusive, through the establishment of participatory management councils and community-level subprojects, the partnership’s impact on poverty alleviation in the region of implementation has been estimated to be limited (Leme da Silva and Ferreira Bueno 2017; Pinho et al. 2014; World Bank 2018). In particular, not only did a vast majority of PAs report difficulties with the financial sustainability of this aspect of the program, it was also concluded that the support provided to traditional income-generating activities in these areas was insufficient to address local socioeconomic needs or alter the opportunity costs of forest users (World Bank 2018). Moreover, ARPA itself acknowledged that it failed to substantially reduce land tenure conflicts and ensure the legal security of tenure rights, an issue which also contributed to exacerbating deforestation pressures (ARPA 2012c). The initiative remained known mainly to PA managers and community leaders, while the role of local NGOs as important intermediaries between transnational programs and local implementation and sustainability has not been sufficiently documented or formally recognized (a notable exception is discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume). More generally, the project assessments and reports of the three global partnerships examined here provided relatively limited data on the welfare implications for affected populations and on-the-ground socioeconomic effects, focusing primarily on established goals and formal partners that are directly engaged in project activities.

Ultimately, all three partnerships were expected to complement their project goals with a series of broader sustainable development objectives that included, among others, reduced greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (ARPA), decarbonization through the deployment of renewable technology (Galápagos Wind), the creation of mechanisms for financing biodiversity conservation (all three) and the promotion of local sustainability and socioeconomic development (all three). Beyond their specific goals, a more complete picture of the partnerships’ wider environmental impacts suggests that the ARPA and Galápagos Wind partnerships have made effective contributions to addressing complex global problems, such as biodiversity conservation and reduced GHG emissions, despite the inevitability of the remaining challenges (summarized in Table 2.2). In contrast, the activities of INBio suffered from a lack of consistent monitoring and evaluation of biodiversity impacts (Castree 2003), and their positive effects relate primarily to increased biodiversity knowledge, public awareness about biodiversity values and influence on Costa Rican policy developments (World Bank 2006).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Environmental Issue</th>
<th>Sustainability Effect</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Protected areas and biodiversity conservation</td>
<td>Significantly extended the area of the Brazilian Amazon under protection. High ecological representativeness of PAs overall</td>
<td>Absence of overarching biodiversity monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant potential impact on biodiversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deforestation and climate change</td>
<td>Significant GHG emissions avoided due to reduced deforestation</td>
<td>PAs mainly implemented away from most rapidly affected arc of deforestation, with further PA expansion likely to be more difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower deforestation reported in ARPA vs. non-ARPA PAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity built for other climate initiatives in Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galápagos Wind</td>
<td>Biodiversity conservation</td>
<td>No protected fauna significantly affected by the turbines</td>
<td>Some deaths of non-endangered birds recorded due to the turbines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 million gallons in fuel shipments avoided; reduced risk of oil spills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption of a conservation program for endangered petrel populations; by 2016, no petrel had been injured by the turbines and hatching and reproduction rates increased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Climate change &amp; clean energy</td>
<td>Avoided cumulative CO₂ emissions of 21,000 tons</td>
<td>Growing electricity demand in the Galápagos, due to population growth and development, has increased use of diesel. New investment and efficiency measures needed if share of renewables is to remain at 30% or increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment of renewable energy to account for 30% of electricity supply</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Built capacity to decarbonize Galápagos, support Ecuador’s commitment under the Paris Agreement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Environmental Issue</td>
<td>Sustainability Effect</td>
<td>Limitations</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>INBio</td>
<td>Biodiversity conservation</td>
<td>Biodiversity knowledge developed through the National Biodiversity Inventory; important in a wide range of policy and legal developments in Costa Rica</td>
<td>No clear indicator linking the development of the National Biodiversity Inventory with improved biodiversity outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica established as an attractive hub and testing ground for innovative practices in biodiversity conservation</td>
<td>Funding stream for biodiversity conservation and sustainable economic activities in PAs remained inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some resources generated through bioprospecting channeled to PAs or used to support research efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Conditions for Effectiveness

Having presented our findings with respect to the different pathways to effectiveness, we now turn to exploring their implications for the conditions for effectiveness linked to partnership characteristics: sophisticated contracting, credible commitment of resources and adaptability and innovation (see Chapter 1 in this volume). As a starting point, it should be emphasized that, in the same way that co-occurring contextual factors shape partnership outcomes, these specific conditions for effectiveness are also unlikely to operate in isolation. On the contrary, they should be expected to interact with each other through positive (or negative) feedback loops throughout a partnership’s governance history. Moreover, our findings suggest that sophisticated forms of contracting, by which we mean contractual arrangements that are sufficiently specific but not excessively rigid to allow for ongoing communication, accountability and learning, may play an early role as a core driver and enable other conditions for effectiveness.

The significance of contracting is directly evident in the cases of ARPA and the Galápagos Wind. In both partnerships, explicitly clarifying common objectives and establishing partners’ commitments and responsibility contributed to a process that built trust, established the value expected by each partner and determined the level of risk they manage together and individually.28 Furthermore, all institutional partners were expected to provide a high degree of transparency and a continuous flow of information in the management of the partnerships, whether through independent evaluations, the setting of specific targets or the definition of strict conditions for financial disbursement (GSEP 2016; ARPA 2018). These types of arrangements prepared partners to address hurdles in implementation and risks associated with political change or shifting interests as they emerged (GSEP 2008; World Bank 2012; WWF 2018).29 In contrast, the INBio case shows that a lack of coherence and insufficient accountability mechanisms in the initial structure of a partnership can contribute to significantly altering its budget and planning from one year to the next (Fonseca 2015; Wade 2014). Furthermore, INBio exposed its activities to severe criticism for their perceived lack of transparency (Iles 2003; Isla 2015; Royas and Aylward 2003).

The introduction of sophisticated forms of contracting further interplayed with other conditions for effectiveness, namely credible commitment of resources, innovation and adaptability. First, the presence of clear and specific contractual and governance arrangements was found to encourage the commitment of significant amounts of resources that are adapted to the issues being addressed in the ARPA and Galápagos Wind partnerships (GSEP 2014; WWF 2018). This commitment took place both in the initial stages of partnership planning and in subsequent stages of implementation. For example, the structuring of the necessary financial, technical and administrative agreements in the Galápagos Wind case took three years to prepare, as opposed to the one-year construction of the wind park (GSEP 2014). This involved setting up a Commercial Trust to manage the assets for the construction, with ELECGALAPAGOS as the ultimate beneficiary, and a Trust Committee as a governance body. In addition, a special purpose vehicle company called EOLICSA was created, which owned and managed the wind park facilities until their transfer to ELECGALAPAGOS in 2016.30
Second, in the initial phase of a partnership, the credible commitment of resources can also feed back into the outcomes of contracting, as partners anticipate having to manage significant amounts of funding, technology and knowledge. In ARPA, the need to ensure long-term resource allocation for the program motivated a series of sophisticated institutional innovations. These included the creation of a permanent endowment fund from the management of grant resources, known as the Protected Areas Trust Fund. The objective was to insulate to some extent grant-based biodiversity financing from the political risk associated with electoral cycles and appropriation of public resources. The Fund was in turn administered by Funbio, a non-governmental and independent financial institution which was created with the support of GEF and other public and private donors in the 1990s. In 2014, a new financial plan was set up by ARPA partners in order to guarantee the long-term sustainability of project activities. The plan, known as ARPA for Life, created a long-term sinking fund (called Transition Fund and also managed by Funbio) to ensure that sufficient resources are available to cover the recurring costs of ARPA until a progressive transition to full government funding is completed by 2039 (WWF 2018). As evident from our discussion of both ARPA and Galápagos Wind, sophisticated, innovative financial and resource arrangements, as well as related contracting and institutional features were an essential element of the planning and durability for both partnerships. In contrast, in the case of INBio, despite the significant initial commitment of resources (Gámez et al. 1993), the absence of a shared, long-term funding vision and transparent and durable contractual arrangements became a significant source of uncertainty when bioprospecting failed to become a viable source of revenue (Conniff 2012; Gámez 2007).

Third, sophisticated contracting in the ARPA and San Cristóbal partnerships provided the basis for the deployment of monitoring mechanisms and other technical tools aimed at assessing the intermediate progress of project activities, thus creating the space for adaptation to shocks and changing contexts. For instance, ARPA partners adopted several changes to the program as a result of their periodic evaluations, including increases in ambition, the ongoing revision of its timeline for implementation and the introduction of the ARPA for Life financing model, inspired by the concept of project finance for permanence (WWF 2015). Similarly, specific elements of the project for a San Cristóbal electricity generating system were modified due to the results of preliminary and intermediate studies, including changes to the project location and design and the introduction of environmental mitigation measures (Eurekalert 2016; GSEP 2008; UNFCCC 2007).

At the same time, our case studies make it clear that sophisticated contracting itself neither emerges from nor exists in a vacuum. At the level of partnership design, the quality of contracting can be positively influenced by preexisting experiences of successful collaboration among partners, which contribute to raising capacity for implementation and trust in the mutual adherence to partnership terms. In the case of ARPA, these collaborative arrangements were embedded in a broader context of prior and parallel initiatives related to the Amazon biome that included the same partners, including multilateral, bilateral, and subnational arrangements on forest conservation (Hecht 2011; World Bank 1998b; WWF 2018). As a former government official who was directly involved in ARPA summarized in an interview, “Classic
governance of PAs has ceased to exist … conservation is collaborative in various ways. [Our government agency] signed 50 new partnerships in 2017 alone.”31

Finally, sophisticated contractual arrangements may in turn be strengthened by the emergence of adaptive responses and innovations. All three partnerships had strong ambitions for innovation. INBio was the first initiative to substantially engage in bioprospecting agreements with a view to creating both financial benefits and public value. The Galápagos Wind partnership was the first project to invest in wind technology in a remote island setting – a decarbonization experiment that entailed many unknowns associated with both the technology and fragile environment. ARPA blended transnational and domestic resources via an independent financial entity to implement a conservation program of unprecedented scale. In all three cases, the mobilization of a partner’s comparative expertise facilitated the delivery of innovative products and services, ranging from INBio’s pioneering biodiversity inventory to the innovative tools and methodologies used by ARPA to prioritize the allocation of resources and evaluate project implementation.32

These aspects of innovation, scale, and bringing together private and public interests inevitably involve risk and unanticipated challenges, which may be internal or external to the respective projects. Adaptability is therefore essential for effectiveness, especially in partnerships with a life span expected to extend over several years. In the case of ARPA, adaptability has been supported through the extension and revision of initial partnership arrangements. For instance, in the early stages, amendments were necessary to include sustainable livelihoods components in the scope of the program and, subsequently, the development of a new financing model in the third stage of partnership implementation.

In the case of San Cristóbal, the project had to be adapted at the very beginning to reflect a more participatory approach and make use of local knowledge and scientific expertise on birds’ migratory routes and safety around the site of the installation. Adaptive management was also important with respect to policy changes introduced by the government of Ecuador and relating to contractual financing arrangements. Furthermore, the project had sufficient flexibility with respect to delaying the registration and sale of carbon offsets, when prices slumped in international markets in 2013 (Newell, Pizer and Raimi 2013).

On the one hand, the founders of INBio had not immediately considered long-term alternatives to bioprospecting revenues, which had been expected to rapidly emerge as the Institute’s core business due to a series of overly optimistic expectations (Coughlin 1993; Zebich-Knos 1997). By the time these revenues collapsed, its original partners had started decreasing their contributions to INBio, and the relationship with the Costa Rican government had become strained (Gámez 2007; Miller 2006). As a result, not only did INBio fail to raise sufficient resources through potential new revenue-generating mechanisms (e.g., environmental consulting, the management of INBioparque), but the government’s decision to bail out the Institute and rescue its biodiversity collection only came when the fate of the institution was already sealed (Fonseca 2015).33

Conclusion

This chapter examines the mechanisms through which three partnerships in the areas of biodiversity and clean energy have exerted influence on their partners,
as well as the key factors shaping their variable sustainable development impacts. The selection of case studies deliberately focused on transnational partnerships, whose creation was inspired by similar sets of considerations operating in specific geographical and political contexts and characterized by a sufficiently long history in order to evaluate systematically the extent to which different effects materialized. This case selection, aiming to ensure a reliable comparison, is also a source of potential limitations. For instance, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the phenomenon of global partnerships for biodiversity and clean energy has been on the rise, mobilizing new coalitions and modalities that are too recent to be meaningfully evaluated. In this sense, we do not necessarily capture the full variation across a large number of partnerships, some of which may never commit meaningful resources or undertake implementation activities (Pattberg et al. 2012). We have focused on cases that have been implemented with sufficient data to examine the variation in effectiveness and limitations across different pathways, as stipulated in the analytical framework of the volume (Chapter 1).

Furthermore, our empirical analysis suggests that it might be difficult to neatly isolate the effects attributed to the partnerships from those of other institutions and policies in which they are embedded or with which they coexist. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that an analysis of different dimensions and pathways to effectiveness can help reveal a more nuanced picture. More specifically, three challenges emerged as particularly relevant across the three case studies. First, achievement of long-term financial sustainability through the creation of a reliable funding model appears to be critical for the durability of partnerships and their effects, as illustrated in the ARPA and Galápagos Wind partnerships and the contrasting unraveling of INBio. Even in the cases of ARPA and Galápagos Wind, the durability of the financial models could not be taken for granted, and partners had to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, the cases also highlight the importance of domestic institutional support and related elements of unpredictability, owing to the possibility of rapidly changing political contexts. This finding highlights the interplay between contextual factors and conditions for partnership effectiveness, which runs across several other chapters in this volume. Third, we found that it is generally more difficult to discern the extent to which partnership activities effectively targeted socioeconomic co-benefits and support for local livelihoods. Due in part to their global design, the partnership initiatives themselves have provided relatively limited reporting on this dimension.

When the above-mentioned effects and challenges are evaluated against the conditions for effectiveness, i.e., sophisticated contracting, commitment of resources, innovation and adaptability, it is evident that different institutional features and dynamics interact with each other to shape the long-term impacts of a partnership. To begin with, a level of contracting that clarifies common objectives, responsibilities and conditions for accountability can be seen as an important underlying factor in strengthening trust and mobilizing the comparative advantages of each partner. Furthermore, the credible commitment of resources, which appears to be stronger when a partnership builds upon preexisting collaborative efforts and sophisticated forms of contracting, may further contribute to raise capacity and stimulate innovation in governance mechanisms. Finally, we find that the capacity to foster adaptation through clear partnership arrangements
and learning-by-doing approaches can also provide an explanatory factor for the longevity of partnerships, although it might not be able to overcome a lack of commitment by partners and major flaws in the initial partnership strategy.

Finally, our case studies appear to suggest that the success of a partnership model does not guarantee that it would be replicated outside of its geographical and political context. This is to some degree surprising, given the significant ambition and innovation of all three cases examined. While the three partnerships have certainly had important spillover influence, disseminating new knowledge and practices at different scales, their direct impact on international collaboration on biodiversity and clean energy outside of their context has been more limited or indirect. Further, large-n studies could examine the plausibility of discerning cumulative effects across larger groups of transnational partnership and across different pathways of effectiveness. This speaks to the magnitude and complexity of the Sustainable Development Goals’ implementation gap, especially on issue areas that remain characterized by rapid changes in national political environments and ongoing gridlock in intergovernmental negotiations.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge with gratitude the support of the Swiss Network of International Studies (SNIS), which was provided as part of a grant awarded under the Network’s 2017 Call for Proposals (Grant No. 3369). We are also grateful to all the individuals who agreed to be interviewed and shared their experiences with public-private partnerships. These firsthand insights have been essential for the depth and quality of our analysis. We are indebted to Livio Miles Silva-Müller for conducting field research on the project in Brazil. The contributors to this volume, together with others who have participated in project workshops in Florence and Geneva (including Thomas Biersteker, Cecilia Cannon, Jerome Duberry, Özgü Karakulak, Lea Stadtler, and Oliver Westerwinter), have provided invaluable comments which have helped us to further strengthen our arguments.

Notes

2 The majority of the support provided by the GEF, Norway and the Netherlands occurred through a joint funding program known as the Biodiversity Resources Development Project (World Bank 1998a; 2006).
3 For example, the 1992 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest (PP-G7) launched by Brazil, the G7 and the World Bank, and the 1998 WWF/World Bank Forest Alliance.
4 In Costa Rica, INBio’s goal to increase knowledge about the country’s biodiversity, while developing non-destructive uses of such biodiversity, was seen as a key contribution to the country’s 1989 National Conservation Strategy for Sustainable Development (Gámez et al. 1993) and the implementation of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). In Brazil, the ARPA partnership was considered necessary to achieve the commitment by the then-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s commitment to increase areas of the Brazilian Amazon under strict protection to a minimum of 10 percent of its total area (World Bank 1998b), while also contributing to the country’s commitments under the CBD, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda.
At the beginning of the 2000s, the Ecuadorian government had launched a vision to reach zero fossil fuel use in the four populated islands in the Galápagos by 2015. As part of these efforts, which included the analyzed partnership, the government launched a broader partnership with UNDP and the GEF known as ERGAL (Renewable Electrification of the Galápagos Islands) (UNDP 2014).

By the end of the inventory activities supported by the GEF and by the governments of Norway and the Netherlands in 2005, INBio had become a worldwide leader in taxonomic inventory and largely exceeded its original goals, amassing an exceptional collection of more than 3.5 million specimens (around 23,000 species, of which 2,000 were newly discovered) (INBio 2010; World Bank 2006).

Interview with project manager from an international electricity utility company, September 2018.

Interview with project manager from an international electricity utility company, September 2018 and email exchange with project manager in Ecuador, September 2018.

Interview with senior staff member of industry association, September 2018.

Email exchange with project manager in Ecuador, September 2018.

Ibid.

Interview with senior staff member of industry association, September 2018.

Ibid.

Interview with former government official #1, February 2019.

Until 2007, the management of federal PAs, including those supported by ARPA, was assigned to IBAMA. In 2007, this responsibility was transferred to the newly-founded ICMBio.

Interview with former government official of Brazil #2, February 2019; interview with senior staff member of national NGO, March 2019.

Interview with senior staff member of national NGO, March 2019.

See also interview with former government official of Brazil #3, March 2019; interview with senior staff member of international NGO, March 2019.

See for example de Camino et al. 2000 for the World Bank and GEF’s financing of INBio.

Interview with senior staff member of industry association, September 2018; interview with project manager of international electricity utility company, September 2018.

Email exchange with project manager in Ecuador, September 2018.

See also personal communication with former government official of Costa Rica, May 2018.

Interview with former government official of Brazil #3, March 2019.

Interview with senior staff member of national NGO, March 2019.

Interview with senior staff member of industry association, April 2019; presentation of former senior staff member of international NGO, March 2016.

Notably, there is limited evidence of involvement of local communities in these accountability mechanisms. In ARPA, affected communities have been represented primarily by more established NGOs that were assigned seats within its various committees and panels (World Bank 1998b). Similarly, in the Galápagos case, civil society participation was mostly facilitated through the local authorities and the Charles Darwin Foundation.

Email exchange with project manager in Ecuador, September 2018. See also GSEP (2014; 2016).

Interview with former government official of Brazil #3, March 2019.
For example, ARPA introduced an online system known as *Cérebro* to allocate resources to specific protected areas. In turn, *Cérebro* itself was based on another innovation, known as *conta vinculada*, which consisted in the use of special blocked accounts in order to ensure a faster and decentralized access by PA managers to the funds they needed. In terms of monitoring tools, ARPA relied on instruments including Conservation and Investment Strategy (ECI), which serves to identify existing financing needs at the PA level and compare them with available resources to facilitate prioritization; FAUC and SisArpa, which are monitoring tools to keep track of key information on PA management activities; and RAPPAM, a WWF-developed methodology to evaluate management effectiveness.

On the contrary, GSEP’s continued commitment to Galápagos Wind allowed the San Cristóbal project to operate at a loss until its ownership was transferred to the local electricity utility in 2016.

A recently announced global partnership in the area of biodiversity is the UN Biodiversity Lab, which brings together UN entities, technical partners and data providers with the objective of scaling up the use of geospatial data on biodiversity and ecosystems in decision making (see https://www.unbiodiversitylab.org, accessed 12 January 2021). In the area of clean energy, a fitting example is represented by the coalition of national governments and private sector, known as Mission Innovation, launched in 2015 with the goal of doubling public investment in clean energy innovation (see http://www.mission-innovation.net, accessed 18 February 2021).

References


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3 Protecting the Amazon and Its People

The Role of Civil Society in the Local Effectiveness of Transnational Partnerships

Livio Silva-Muller and Moira V. Faul

Introduction

The job of protecting the environment is shared between the state and society under Brazil’s 1988 Constitution (1988, Art. 225). Various legal mechanisms were set up to ensure this joint responsibility, including multistakeholder councils at federal, state, and local levels, as well as different financial mechanisms and information sharing tools. This obligation translated into numerous partnerships, ranging from localized and informal, to national and formal. At the same time, partnerships have gained prominence as a mode of transnational governance in international settings.

Partnerships are defined as voluntary agreements among public and a variety of private actors on specific governance objectives and the means to advance them (Andonova 2017). The partnership literature has effectively documented this new mode of governance, showing what partnerships are and why they emerge (Andonova 2017); why and how design matters (Beisheim and Liese 2014); and how large samples of partnerships vary, for example, across issue areas, functions, and participation (Westerwinter 2019). What remains under-studied are partnership complexes comprised of multiple, partially overlapping partnerships that span transnational, federal, state, and local levels, such as that found in the environmental governance of Brazil. This chapter addresses this gap by examining how the multitude of global, federal, state, and local-level partnerships, policies and actors play out on the ground over time as they seek to contribute to shared partnership objectives; in this case environmental and social protection in the Brazilian Amazon. Specifically, this chapter reports on an inductive study of a sustainable development reserve, which revealed the important contributions of civil society actors to transnational partnership effectiveness at the local level.1 Our analyses reflect the increasing participation of civil society organizations in policy processes, as well as the capacity of the Brazilian state to engage proactively in environmental policy (Andonova 2014); such a policy, Andonova argues, would have been unimaginable a decade earlier, in the times of strong claims to the right to develop. Based on our empirical analysis, we argue that civil society actors behave as partnership entrepreneurs to enable horizontal and vertical collaboration inside partnerships (Pathway 3 in the analytical framework

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offered in Chapter 1) and also between transnational, federal, state and local level partnerships (Pathway 5), in ways that create value for target populations (Pathway 4) and partners (Pathway 2) and further the achievement of partnership goals (Pathway 1).

We reveal the ways in which policies and transnational partnerships to end deforestation have increased in complexity over time; and how civil society actors instigate, broker, and navigate complex environmental governance in the Brazilian Amazon. First, partnerships are established to fill governance and funding shortfalls; their establishment then exposes remaining gaps which civil society actors seek to fill by instigating and brokering new partnerships. Second, civil society actors (mainly NGOs and INGOs, and one foundation) connect the multiple levels in which other partners function. Civil society actors are not tied to one level; they move between transnational, federal, state and local levels. Partnerships are touted as being essentially more agile forms of governance; our findings suggest that this agility is enacted by civil society actors through their initiatives and activities to coordinate within and across partnerships. Finally, civil society actors create value through horizontal coordination between actors and partners at the local level, and through vertical coordination across transnational, federal, state, and local levels. Overall, these findings indicate that, in the protection of the Amazon rainforest, local civil society actors act in entrepreneurial ways to ensure that transnational partnerships can effectively achieve their goals at the local level in the Brazilian Amazon.

After a brief description of our empirical site (Sustainable Development Reserve (RDS) Uatumã) and our inductive methodology, we present our analysis of the increasing complexity of the partnership space for the protection of the Brazilian Amazon over time, revealing how entrepreneurial civil society actors have contributed to the instigation and effectiveness of transnational partnerships at local, state, federal and transnational levels. We then elaborate the ways in which civil society actors activate and organize vertical and horizontal relationships and activities within the multiple partnerships they have been instrumental in establishing. Our conclusion details the contributions of this chapter to this volume’s analytical framework and to the broader literature.

**Empirical Site and Methodology**

Our empirical site is the Sustainable Development Reserve of Uatumã (RDS Uatumã), an area of 424,430 hectares in the northern state of Amazonas (Figure 3.1). RDS Uatumã is home to around 1,300 river dwellers, a so-called “traditional population,” who practice small-scale fishing and farming. The selection of RDS Uatumã was based on its participation in numerous partnerships, national and transnational. Various institutions and regulations have shaped the existence of this Sustainable Development Reserve, from global environmental legislation and transnational partnerships to national and state-level legislation and partnerships. The majority of these relied on NGO actions for their creation and coordination, as well as their continued relevance and impacts. RDS Uatumã
therefore constitutes an empirically interesting site to examine how this environmental governance plays out and how state and civil society actors create and navigate it. In addition, Uatumâ has received little research attention and partners welcomed our research request.

Examining how multiple transnational partnerships play out at international, federal, state, and local levels entails a methodological shift to address this degree of complexity. As transnational partnerships are implemented at the local level, they become embedded in that location’s political and social realities. The set of actors and histories that turn out to be relevant cannot easily be identified beforehand. For this reason, we adopt an inductive approach in which data collection and analysis are entangled and influence further rounds of collection and analysis. Concretely, this means that crucial actors were identified by participant observation and documentary analysis, which then informed our choices of additional interviewees. Therefore, the full partnership and institutional complex is wider than the one we present, meaning that different configurations of local, national and transnational partnerships may be identified in different localities or at different times. The inclusion of some organizations was more obvious than others. For instance, ARPA and Amazon Fund logos appear in RDS Uatumâ’s official signs and on boats and buildings; others were surfaced in interviews with key actors and participant observations. We do not claim that RDS Uatumâ is a representative protected area, but the multiple overlapping partnerships that are present there reflect the reality of many other protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon. In Amazonas State alone, there are at least eight other protected areas with the same partnership configurations that we identified in RDS Uatumâ. Thus, our focus is on identifying the pathways to effectiveness of the partnership complex around RDS Uatumâ, which may also help identify
elements for future research to understand why other cases work similarly or differently (Small 2009).

Empirically, the findings we present are based on analyses of three types of data collected during the year 2019. First, we conducted 21 in-depth interviews with key informants. Our entry point to the local level were two NGOs: Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS) and Instituto de Conservação e Desenvolvimento Sustentável da Amazônia (IDESAM). Subsequently, through purposive sampling, we identified additional interviewees in the federal and Amazonas State governments, as well as community representatives; interview guides were adapted according to the type of actor. Second, we conducted participant observations inside RDS Uatumã, in FAS’ offices in Manaus, and visited four local communities and the state office. Various informal conversations and observations contributed to sense-testing our analyses and the arguments made in this chapter. Third, our analysis of partnership and project documents (both publicly available and privately shared by interlocutors) complements the ethnographic and interview information. Documents were analyzed from global, federal, state, and local levels, including agreements, the management plan of RDS Uatumã, and NGOs’ lessons learned documents: these data were particularly important for triangulation and illustration. Data were collected in Portuguese by one of the co-authors, who is a native speaker, and then translated into English. We used two main analytical strategies. First, we sought to understand the broader field in which our case is sited using bipartite network analysis, and to illustrate the extent of organizations’ overlapping memberships in the complex of partnerships that govern the Brazilian Amazon. The bulk of our case study analysis used inductive thematic coding to identify the roles played by different actors at and across different levels of this partnership complex.

Civil Society, Brazilian Environmental Governance, and Partnership Creation

Deforestation in the Amazon has multiple entangled causes, the majority of which are related to economic or social causes: land speculation and land grabs, global commodities markets, money laundering, logging, mining, roads, soybeans, cattle ranching, household dynamics, and population growth (Fearnside 2017). Over the past three decades, successive Brazilian governments have devised protection instruments that address these causes, and NGOs have been central to protection efforts on the ground in the Brazilian Amazon region. This section first presents relevant federal and state protection instruments, before describing NGOs’ and foundations’ efforts to initiate, design and mobilize transnational, federal and state partnerships to provide additional financing and coordination in order to achieve the goals of environmental and social protections of the rainforest and its inhabitants.

First, protected areas that address only environmental factors have existed for decades. In the 1980s after years of grassroots campaigns, Brazilian forests gained legal recognition as sustainable use protected areas (Hecht and Cockburn 1990; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). In addition to environmental protection,
sustainable use protected areas also take into account the economic, social, and cultural rights of local populations. These populations are allowed to deforest for subsistence purposes in an environmentally sustainable way and may benefit from social assistance, such as education, health and welfare provisions. Protected areas were first created on a case-by-case basis, via decrees (Drummond, Franco and Silva 2010) until 2000, when the Brazilian Congress created the National System of Protected Areas (SNUC in Portuguese) which provides an overarching framework for all protected areas. The system divides protected areas into integral protection or sustainable use categories and regulates their creation. Once protected, land grabs and deforestation in these areas decrease, since potential appropriators cannot obtain land tenure. As of February 2019, sustainable use protected areas comprised over 70 percent of the total of 255 million hectares of protected areas in Brazil (Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2021).

The second cornerstone of Brazilian environmental governance consists of the environmental police of federal and state-level governments who are responsible for identifying and repressing attempts to deforest private and public areas, whether they are designated protected areas or not. With the support of remote sensing technologies, environmental police conduct logistically difficult raids to protect areas that are being deforested. These command-and-control policies were strengthened during the tenure of Brazil’s Environmental Minister Marina Silva (2003–2008), when she hired over 2,000 new Ministry officials (Abers and Oliveira 2015), including more technical staff specialized in remote sensing (Rajão and Vurdubakis 2013). With deforestation rates reaching almost 25,000 km² per year by the beginning of the 2000s (INPE 2022), federal and state governments needed a substantial amount of funds to conduct more command-and-control operations; and to create and consolidate protected areas.

Due to concern about increasing deforestation and insufficient funds to address it, the NGO World Wildlife Fund International (WWF-I) mobilized a number of actors to broker the Amazon Regional Protected Area (ARPA) partnership, which was launched in 2001. This transnational partnership is jointly managed by actors from national and international public, private and voluntary sectors: the World Bank, WWF International, the Moore Foundation, the Brazilian Minister of the Environment, and a Brazilian NGO (Funbio), scientists and protected area managers. ARPA is financed by the Brazilian federal government alongside international bilateral, multilateral and foundation donors, and these funds are disbursed only to public actors to create and consolidate protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon. The Brazilian federal government has committed to increasing its contributions as international donor funds taper off by 2040. In total, 117 federally designated protected areas (including RDS Uatumã) amounting to 60,000,000 hectares have received funds from ARPA (GEF 2018).

Funbio (an NGO that specializes in managing transnational environmental funds) conducts the operational management of ARPA’s payments and logistics. Funbio disburses funds from international partners to public sector actors when they meet protection targets (measured in thousands of hectares). At first, state-level protected areas could not receive ARPA funds, despite comprising
a substantial proportion of all protected areas in the Amazon region. In 2004, states in the Brazilian Amazon region successfully pressured the Ministry of the Environment to allow Funbio to channel ARPA funds to public sector actors working in state-designated protected areas, mainly to the managers who implement the RDS Uatumã Deliberative Council’s management plan.

While federal and state-level public sector actors were granted access to ARPA funds, local and national NGOs – who are central to environmental and social protection work in the Amazon region – were not. IPAM, a Brazilian NGO, working together with international NGOs within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) advocated for an international mechanism to compensate state and civil society actors for reduced deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (IPAM 2008). In 2007, a second transnational partnership (the Amazon Fund) was created during the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP-12 in Nairobi). This funding stream is based on IPAM’s concept of compensated reduction, whereby countries that reduce deforestation below a determined level are rewarded (Santilli et al. 2005). The Amazon Fund uses funding provided by Norway, Germany and Petrobras to make non-reimbursable investments in prevention, monitoring, and combating deforestation, and promoting conservation and the sustainable use of the Amazon rainforest area (Marcovitch and Pinsky 2019). Brazilian NGOs, the federal government, state governments from the Amazon region, and scientists govern the Amazon Fund; no seats are reserved for donors (Norway, Germany and Petrobras). Unlike ARPA, the Amazon Fund finances protection projects inside and outside officially designated protected areas. The Fund manages around BRL 3.3 billion and had supported 103 projects by 2019. A substantial share of Amazon Fund projects (approximately 40 percent) is implemented by national NGOs, with the remainder aimed toward public federal and state-level environmental institutions. This fund was affected by the election of President Bolsonaro in 2018, and the fund is not making new disbursements until disagreements with his administration are resolved regarding both environmental and multistakeholder decision making in Brazil.

A third partnership (shown in white on Figure 3.2), the Amazonas State Policy Partnership (between the NGO Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS), Amazonas State and Bradesco, a private bank), was enshrined in State Law 3135 in 2007. The partnership designated FAS as co-implementer of the policy alongside public sector actors including the state-level Secretary of the Environment and environmental police. It authorizes FAS to implement various projects that attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or improve carbon sequestration by avoiding deforestation. While FAS remains the main implementer, this partnership also serves to facilitate further and deeper NGO work inside state-level sustainable use protected areas. NGO activities range from environmental education and ecosystem services valuation, to supporting sustainable livelihoods for residents. Financed by Bradesco, a national private bank, the partnership also invested BRL 20 million to implement payment for an ecosystem services scheme inside sustainable use protected areas in Amazonas State.
There is a high level of overlap of different state and non-state actors involved in ARPA, the Amazon Fund and the Amazonas State Policy Partnership described above. Figure 3.2 depicts a bipartite network (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson 2013) constructed on the basis of shared membership of each of the three partnerships, that provides an illustration of the overlapping memberships and complexity of partners and partnerships in Brazilian environmental governance. RDS Uatumã, the sustainable development reserve that we use as our case study for the empirical analyses in this chapter, is outside the partnerships, but has financial ties to four of the actors in ARPA and the Amazonas State Policy Partnership, two of whom are NGOs (Funbio and FAS).

The Brazilian environmental governance system can thus be characterized as a complex of overlapping combinations of policies, partnerships, and partner organizations, both public and private, aimed at funding and implementing different but related goals and projects (including federal and state-level protected areas, federal and state-level environmental police, the transnational ARPA partnership, the regional Amazon Fund and the state-level Amazonas State Policy Partnership). In the remainder of the chapter, we reveal the ways in which NGOs have been instrumental in initiating and obtaining funds for transnational, federal, state and local-level partnerships; in developing (or advocating for the development of) additional mechanisms to fill shortfalls in protection; and in implementing social and environmental protection activities. Without these NGO-inspired and brokered partnerships and activities, financial and relational constraints would hinder
Civil Society Brokers Local Relationships to Create and Consolidate Social and Environmental Protections

Protected areas are not naturally occurring zones defined by historical or natural boundaries. Rather, to fulfil their environmental and social goals, these areas are delineated and defined in ways to make them – and their inhabitants – visible to external actors. This act of boundary setting may not reflect community or geographical identities as they are understood by the inhabitants themselves, which then requires additional local brokerage and coordination. In RDS Uatumã, civil society actors worked bilaterally with global actors to raise funds and render the protected area visible and amenable to support from the transnational partnerships we describe above. The same civil society actors that supported the reserve development are members of the transnational partnerships that the reserve subsequently benefited from.

RDS Uatumã was created in 2004 and comprises an area of 424,430 hectares. Around 400 families (1,500 individuals) reside along the Uatumã riverbank inside the reserve, and their livelihoods depend on subsistence from local water and land resources (RDS Uatumã Management Plan 2009). These families are spread across 20 different communities that are part of two municipalities, São Sebastião do Uatumã and Itapiranga. In terms of land, almost 60 percent of São Sebastião do Uatumã municipality lies inside the reserve, compared to 40 percent of Itapiranga (Instituto Socio Ambiental 2022). However, only a minority of the inhabitants of both municipalities live inside the reserve.

The region in which RDS Uatumã is found has a long history of environmental depredations with negative social and health consequences. In 1986, 300,000 hectares were flooded during the construction of the Balbina Hydroelectric dam (Fearnside 2019). This powerplant reduced residents’ supply of fish from the river, triggering a humanitarian response that was organized with the unions since there was no official state or federal support to meet residents’ livelihoods and nutrition needs. In 1996, the state conceded 450,000 hectares to the Precious Woods company for the extraction of timber for commercial purposes. In 1990, the federal government created the Biological Reserve of Uatumã to preserve the region’s biodiversity, however local inhabitants were denied residency, driving them downriver.

In response to the negative social effects of these environmental protections, civil society actors (NGOs, residents and unions) organized to create a Sustainable Use Reserve, which pays more attention to affected populations (Pathway 4 of this volume’s analytical framework). First, the designation of Sustainable Use Reserve renders the inhabitants of the reserve visible to external actors. In order to be protected, a series of socioeconomic and environmental studies about the area had to be conducted (RDS Uatumã Management Plan 2009). For the first time, the number of residents, their education level, and their health status were
taken into account. After designation as a protected area, specific public policies became applicable and operational (for example, payment for ecosystem services schemes, Special Credit Ratings, etc.). Additionally, the federal state included more RDS Uatumã residents within their cash-transfer policy; since protected area status prohibits extraction for commercial purposes, residents need an income substitution mechanism.

Secondly, the change in status from ordinary citizens to residents of the protected area changed the dynamic between the municipalities and the residents; they became a particular constituency capable of rewarding or punishing municipal-level politicians in elections. This is not to say that they always homogeneously support the same causes, but this status differentiates them from other residents in the same municipalities and can have political consequences. The new mayor visits the reserve four times a year, and every month she organizes a boat to bring community leaders to the urban center of Itapiranga.

In the current administration of Itapiranga, the relationship has improved. The old administration was not so present, but it helped the communities a little bit. This year was the first trip of the mayor to the reserve, and from what we hear people saying, she has been more present. Of course, there are still many things missing, but at least she comes to Uatumã.

(Interview with senior NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019)

Protected area status engendered an influx of policies and actors, such that “after it became a protected area, people started coming here. Before, we were kind of forgotten by others.” Thus, being designated a protected area rendered this area and its inhabitants visible to municipal, state and federal-level governments, and increased their perceived political salience.

Who would represent these newly visible communities? The governance system in which protected areas are embedded demands a single interlocutor between communities and external actors, thus designation as a protected area triggers the need to establish a Community Association. This was difficult in RDS Uatumã in which there is a large number of diverse and dispersed communities. Communities do not have a formal legal existence: for political representation, each community elects a community leader responsible for solving internal problems and channeling their demands to external actors. In addition to these community-level mechanisms, groups of communities are frequently aggregated into what are called poles (“polos” in Portuguese). One pole usually consists of 6 or 7 communities, which are geographically close to each other, but may not share cultural or other identity markers.

Outside the scope of the formal transnational partnerships, IDESAM (an NGO already working in the RDS Uatumã) sought funding from Germany and the Moore Foundation to broker collaboration between the communities and different levels of governance to solve this coordination problem (Pathway 3). The sustainable development reserve was created in 2004 with the support of
WWF-Brazil to undertake the environmental and social studies necessary for its creation. Between 2005 and 2008, IDESAM started to facilitate a series of participatory workshops with residents of the reserve and the Amazonas State. IDESAM and Amazonas State designed and created an association uniting all 20 communities: the Associação Agroextrativista das Comunidades da RDS Uatumã (hereafter the Community Association) (RDS Uatumã Management Plan 2009, p.148).

The Deliberative Council of RDS Uatumã, which writes the area’s management plan, comprises 22 seats, half of which are held by civil society and the other half by public sector or government organizations. Brokered by IDESAM, the Community Association holds one seat on the Deliberative Council, and each pole holds a seat as well, totaling four seats for community representatives (Pathway 4). The other seven seats allocated to civil society are held by IDESAM and other regional and national associations. On the government side, two seats are held by municipalities with territory inside the reserve (São Sebastião do Uatumã and Itapiranga). A neighboring municipality (Presidente Figueiredo), which is also part of the older Biological Reserve of Uatumã, also holds a seat. Finally, Amazonas State holds a number of seats representing its environmental protection and research institutions, and environmental police.

The RDS Uatumã Deliberative Council elaborated a management plan that assigned rules of usage to zones within the protected area. Financial support for this process was provided by Germany and the Betty Moore Foundation, both of which are active in the partnerships described above (ARPA, Amazon Fund, Amazonas State Policy Partnership). Scientific support was provided by WWF-Brazil as well as IDESAM. The RDS Uatumã management plan, a 400-page document, took five years to negotiate, with IDESAM supporting the representation of community views.15 NGO representatives argue that by including the community in the decision making as partners, zoning decisions are more meaningful since zones are allocated according to the community’s actual usage and needs (Pathways 2 and 4). In this way, IDESAM and community members developed a flexible zoning system with areas devoted to sustainable farming, game fishing, strict environmental protection and sustainable tourism (RDS Uatumã Management Plan 2009). The plan defines a clear pathway to implementation in order to achieve the overall objective of protecting the area: strengthening biodiversity and traditional ways of life (Pathway 1).

Through these processes, NGOs were instrumental in making, brokering and navigating the institutional complex of partnerships in the Brazilian Amazon’s environmental and social protection. The Management Plan was brokered by NGOs, financially supported by transnational donors, and includes actors from other transnational, national and state-level partnerships in Brazilian environmental governance. Being designated as a sustainable development protected area opened up new partnership possibilities to RDS Uatumã. At the state level, Amazonas State included RDS Uatumã in the inaugural cohort of 16 protected areas covered by the Amazonas State Policy Partnership in 2008. As a result, Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS), the national-level NGO responsible for
co-implementing the Amazonas State Policy Partnership, established a physical presence inside RDS Uatumã.

In addition, value is created for civil society partners in two ways. First, both NGOs operating in the protected area (FAS and IDESAM) received large amounts of money from the Amazon Fund to implement multiple projects related to the Deliberative Council’s management plan (Table 3.1). In 2011, RDS Uatumã became part of the ARPA program. Therefore, establishing local partnerships was needed to achieve the goals of the transnational partnership (Pathway 1), and then increased the resources available to NGO partners (Pathway 2) as well as the complexity of environmental governance in Brazil (Pathway 5). Secondly, membership of the Amazonas State Policy Partnership grants FAS legitimacy to mobilize the municipalities and show them ways to engage with the protected area. At the beginning of the current electoral cycle (2016), FAS presented their work to the

Table 3.1 Amazon Fund Grants to NGOs working in RDS Uatumã

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grantee</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS)</td>
<td>BRL 19 M</td>
<td>Promote the containment of deforestation and improve the quality of life of traditional populations living in the protected areas of the state of Amazonas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS)</td>
<td>BRL 31 M</td>
<td>Continue and expand the actions of the Bolsa Floresta Program in state protected areas in Amazonas State: (i) support the development of small enterprises and sustainable forestry; (ii) build capacity of leaders and strengthen local residents’ associations for the management of environmental, social and income-generating projects; (iii) systematize and disseminate contents, methods, lessons learned and innovative solutions; and (iv) implement public calls for proposals for small and medium income-generating projects in the areas surrounding the protected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Instituto de Conservação e Desenvolvimento Sustentável da Amazônia (IDESAM)</td>
<td>BRL 12 M</td>
<td>Support the strengthening of community forest management in Amazonas State by: (i) developing the Forest Cities platform to connect forest stakeholders and support timber production chains; and (ii) supporting sustainable production and commercialization of timber and vegetable oils.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amazon Fund (2021) Project Portfolio.
the executive and legislative branches of Itapiranga’s municipal administration in a two-day event. Since then, FAS and municipal staff have worked closely on various occasions.

When the Amazonas State and the Association get together, the relationship with the municipalities becomes stronger. It changes a lot because we get to enter the municipal chambers through the associations. We support this. In the past, there was no openness with the city halls, today we have more voice in both municipalities because of the partnerships.

(Interview with NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019)

By going inside municipal assemblies and opening doors for collaboration, FAS makes its knowledge available to the municipality and mobilizes them to partnership (Pathways 2 and 3). Nevertheless, the NGOs’ work extends beyond electoral cycles of municipalities and states: they have seen multiple elections, and several cycles of staff changes. Their presence in the area contributes to the accumulation and translation of practical knowledge and institutional memory related to the reality inside RDS Uatumã and its communities.

How Civil Society Actors Enhance Partnership Effectiveness for Sustainable Development

In the case of RDS Uatumã, in ways unparalleled by any other actor, NGOs instigated and co-designed transnational and local partnerships, and continue to broker and navigate the multiplicity of transnational, national and local partnerships that comprise Brazilian environmental governance. As a result, meager public finances are complemented by partnerships (such as ARPA, the Amazon Fund or the Amazonas State Policy Partnership) or public and private donors to those partnerships. NGOs connect partners horizontally inside each of the different levels at which these partnerships operate as well as vertically between the local, state, federal and global levels (Pathway 3) in ways that create value for the partners (Pathway 2) and advance the achievement of partnership objectives (Pathway 1) and deliver benefits for affected populations (Pathway 4) as we now detail.

Horizontal Ties

NGOs create value at the local level (inside RDS Uatumã) by working effectively with state-level civil servants and through disbursing partnership funds effectively to the protected area for environmental and social protection work. FAS and IDESAM staff work with the public sector manager of the protected area on a regular basis. The RDS Uatumã manager is very active, spending some 20 days a month in the area. This is unusual. Due to fiscal constraints, states usually hire one manager to cover many protected areas. For example, in Amazonas State, 12 managers oversee 42 protected areas amounting to over 18,000,000 hectares (Secretaria do Meio Ambiente do Estado do Amazonas 2018). ARPA delegates
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responsibility to a protected area manager based on the way their funds are used to achieve the overarching goal, within an agreed project management matrix. Thus, the protected area manager’s decisions matter in meaningfully using the funds they get from ARPA. The RDS Uatumã manager’s relations with NGOs appear to help his decision making in the interests of the target population and ecosystem (Pathway 4). FAS also enables environmental protection in the protected area, using their own funds to pay directly for equipment for biodiversity monitoring, diesel for transportation, boats, docks, and other similar items. FAS’ main activity is the implementation of a payment scheme in return for ecosystem services inside state-level protected areas, paying a small fee to inhabitants who do not deforest primary forest. The program comprises a series of activities which include participatory workshops (where communities add qualitative character to existing quantitative data on deforestation and fires), local leadership building, as well as skills workshops to improve agricultural activities.

NGOs work in complementary ways toward achieving the twin goals of environmental and social protection in protected areas (Pathway 4). FAS uses funds from the Amazon Fund, the Amazonas State Policy Partnership, and the donors to these partnerships to deliver health and education projects (social development) within the environmental limits defined by the management plan of the protected area. For example, they implement an inter-communitarian educational program for children in RDS Uatumã, providing one of very few opportunities for children from different communities to come together. A few weekends every year, FAS brings children from different communities into a single location and conducts a variety of workshops on environmental education, theater and writing. One local teacher commented:

At first, I even wondered if it was good, but then through a school project, FAS saw the things in the school and started to talk to me more. After I noticed what they had developed, it helped me a lot in the classroom. Today the children want to learn to read because they don’t want to be ashamed of themselves in front of the other communities. They see the children from the other communities reading and talking, and they are interested in doing the same. FAS has been involved in this project for four years.

(Interview with civil servant, RDS Uatumã, March 2019)

The teacher thus evaluated the effects of these inter-community activities as positive for the target population, motivating children to be more engaged in learning. Furthermore, a teacher from a state-level institution in one of the communities also appreciated FAS providing environmental education locally. These materials have been used extensively and would not have existed without FAS.

Complementary to these social protection schemes, IDESAM (who brokered the Community Association agreement) is mostly concerned with income-generating activities for the members of the reserve (economic development), focusing on creating and consolidating sustainable tourism in the area. Community members and the Community Association were initially uneasy about developing
sustainable tourism because of weak land tenure regimes. The Amazonas State System of Protected Areas stipulates that public land inside protected areas should be conceded to residents. Nevertheless, the residents of RDS Uatumã were only receiving temporary concession contracts. Without stronger land tenure arrangements, inhabitants of the reserve deemed any investment in tourism as too risky. IDESAM (a national NGO) used Amazonas Fund financing (state-level) to lead a strong collaboration between communities channeled through the Deliberative Council (local), resulting in the residents of Uatumã gaining collective rights over the land in 2014. Subsequently, an increase in community members building small hotels for eco-tourism took place, amounting to nine different locations inside RDS Uatumã and a seat in the Deliberative Council for representatives of the local tourism industry. FAS thus complements state activities in collaboration with municipalities through different channels. In the absence of FAS and in the context of the limited municipal budget, activities of this nature would likely not take place. Thus FAS, with financial support from transnational and state-level partnerships, creates value for the local ecosystem and the target population (Pathways 2 and 4).

In RDS Uatumã, the role of FAS goes beyond complementing in certain realms. During fieldwork, we took part as a participant-observer in the meetings to organize the inter-communitarian Olympics. FAS staff invited community and municipality representatives to the FAS office inside the reserve, spending a full day facilitating participatory discussions to organize an Olympic Games “made by you; in your way.” The topics under discussion included which community would host, what sports would be part of the games, and whether representation would be based on communities or poles. They then listed all the tasks necessary for the Olympics to take place and assigned an actor to each task. This included actors from the 20 communities, the two municipalities, state and FAS. An inter-community committee was formed to oversee and ensure coordination, after which FAS stepped back and let the committee manage a process over which they felt ownership due to the participatory process undertaken.

Vertical Ties
Spanning different layers of this complex, NGO actors provide vertical coordination and relationships and also produce and translate local level knowledge to other decision-making levels (Figure 3.3).

FAS operates at the local level in 16 different protected areas and can therefore accumulate knowledge on how to effectively implement sustainable development policies at the local level (Pathway 1). Importantly, there is a systematic and institutionalized effort to transform their experiences into knowledge products relevant to state, federal and transnational actors (Pathway 2). This happens through several channels. In the FAS Manaus office, there is a specific department with the mandate of consolidating field knowledge and producing publications that define the lessons learned and challenges in the field (e.g., FAS 2017). Furthermore, at the state level, FAS has an active role in informing policies through the seats it
Figure 3.3 Vertical ties across levels of governance. Source: Authors.
holds in different working groups, e.g., the Working Group of Amazon Fire. Third, FAS is responsible for the secretariat of the federal level policy working group, the Brazilian Climate Forum. Finally, it also takes part in the global UN Sustainable Development Solution Network. Thus, the organization deliberately brokers knowledge from the field into state, federal and transnational decision-making fora (Pathway 5).

Both FAS and IDESAM contribute to social and environmental protection (Pathway 1) by responsibly drawing down funds from state, federal and transnational partnerships, and disbursing or using these funds at the local level (Pathway 2). First, IDESAM applied for transnational-level funds from Germany and the Moore Foundation. IDESAM then brokered the Association to facilitate local-level representation, writing the Management Plan together with WWF-Brazil, a national-level NGO. Second, both NGOs applied to the Amazon Fund, crafting and negotiating proposals that required initiative and technical capacity. The funds are used to foster close collaboration (Pathway 3) with local communities and Deliberative Councils; state actors (the protected area manager or policy Working Groups); federal and transnational policy fora; and other NGOs with complementary contributions in one or many levels of governance.

NGOs’ partnering relationships (Pathway 3) span across local, state, federal and transnational levels, enabling the translation of knowledge and knowledge products from the local to state, federal and transnational levels, as well as addressing power through successful advocacy efforts (for example, efforts to secure collective land rights). Thus, NGOs fulfil functions such as spanning boundaries (building relationships), acting as an intermediary (disseminating knowledge), and as brokers (building capacity as well as building relationships and disseminating knowledge) (Neal, Neal and Brutzman 2022).

This suggests that, in the case of RDS Uatumã, civil society actors undertake collaborative partnering activities (Pathway 3) that enable vertical coordination between transnational, federal and state partnerships and actors (Pathway 5), in ways that create value for target populations (Pathway 4) and partners (Pathway 2), and further the achievement of partnership goals (Pathway 1) in order to contribute to problem solving for sustainable development.

**Conclusion**

This chapter argues that civil society actors are critical in environmental governance in Brazil in four ways. First, NGOs initiate and strongly influence policy, develop transnational partnerships, and establish transnational and state-level funding structures that complement federal and state-level financing for environmental and social protection in the Amazon rainforest. Second, they advocate for and design new partnerships that could fill gaps in existing governance and funding schemes while ensuring complementarity at and across transnational, federal, state, and local levels. Third, NGOs work with actors at the local level in participatory ways, creating value within that level to serve target populations and the ecosystems in which they are embedded. Finally, NGOs work between
transnational, federal and state-level actors and partnerships, and across global, federal, state and local levels to effectively draw down financing in addition to brokering knowledge and addressing power imbalances from local to state, federal or transnational levels.

We build on existing accounts of state entrepreneurship in partnerships (Andonova 2017) to show how NGOs act as partnership entrepreneurs: they instigate and broker partnerships; ensure representation and voice for local communities; secure and spend funding on community and partnership priorities; and strategize on how to make the partnerships and their sustainability activities work. Overall, the case of RDS Uatumã demonstrates the importance of NGOs in enabling local communities and transnational partnerships to reach each other in ways that support local activities for sustainable development. Relatedly, it also shows how crucial transnational partnerships are for financing many domestically agreed objectives. In various stages of developing the partnership complex, NGOs and one foundation participated inside and outside formal partnerships to ensure that the overall system of partnerships could deliver effectively on global and federal environmental goals, and for local communities and ecosystems. These findings suggest that studying NGOs that work between several partnerships and across several levels, might reveal an important mechanism in furthering partnership goals and public policy or community objectives. Thus, our analysis contributes a sociological examination of how crisscrossing actors (in this case, NGOs) make bridges between previously unconnected groups (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007).

The pathways to effectiveness in partnerships for the protection of the Brazilian Amazon rely on NGOs throughout the Brazilian environmental governance system. The goals of the transnational partnership to protect the Brazilian Amazon (Pathway 1) would not be achieved without the NGOs who use partnership resources to support protection activities in RDS Uatumã. Alongside federal and state enforcement of environmental protections in RDS Uatumã, NGOs also conduct the social and economic protection activities that are integral to the effective implementation of sustainable development reserve status. Moreover, NGOS are central to initiating and maintaining collaboration between partners, connecting local actors to each other and with the transnational partnership (Pathway 3). At the transnational level, WWF International gave impetus to ARPA while Funbio provided the financial apparatus to receive and allocate resources appropriately. Locally, IDESAM worked with communities to ensure that they were represented in collaborative decision-making bodies and that the management plan reflected their interests. FAS had a key role in mobilizing other partners (e.g., municipalities and communities), complementing public sector activities using funds they received from international mechanisms (e.g., educational and health activities), and making information meaningful between different levels of governance. In our study, NGOs also ensure the inclusion of local populations in decision-making structures and processes, with the intention that any consequences have a more positive impact (Pathway 4). Communities in RDS Uatumã derive value from the partnership
(Pathway 2) through representation in decision making for the protected area in which they live and also through the social and economic protection activities the NGOs undertake.

Value is created (Pathway 3) for NGOs in this partnership complex through receiving funding for their activities; holding influence at the local, state, federal and transnational levels; and being able to fulfil their missions. Value for the partnership donors and the different levels of the Brazilian government comes from achieving their goals for the partnership through the work of NGOs, rather than doing the work directly. In the protection of the Brazilian Amazon, our findings show that NGOs influence the broader system in which the partnership operates (Pathway 5), by noticing gaps and initiating new partnerships to fill them. The proliferation of partnerships described in this chapter would have been less likely and less effective without these NGOs. Finally, the communities in RDS Uatumã had suffered under the first wave of purely environmental protections in the 1980s. Motivated by grassroots movements, the partnerships we analyzed sought to include social and economic protections for the inhabitants, and NGOs have been central to mobilizing and implementing this expanded vision of sustainability.

This chapter, though, leaves some questions unanswered. First, power relations play an essential role where multiple actors operate in the same area. The creation of a Community Association to facilitate external representation, for example, is a very delicate process. Equally, while local communities are rendered visible to transnational partnerships, is it in terms dictated by the transnational, federal and state partnerships; not necessarily in terms that the communities would organize or recognize themselves. Future research could unpack how transnational partnerships and money flows create imbalances in existing relationships on the ground, creating novel actors with little social capital but vested with power through transnational partnership funding and processes. Second, further research could examine the extent to which goal attainment is served by the interactions between various policy instruments (market incentives, command-and-control policies, pedagogical approaches) that the different actors in Brazilian environmental governance put in place at the local level and how civil society relates to these other policy instruments. Finally, further research should build on the argument made here to assess whether activities by civil society actors across partnerships in other protected areas correlate with better environmental and social impacts at local and global levels.

Notes

1 Chapter 2 of this edited volume presents a detailed study of the Amazon Regional Protected Areas (ARPA) Partnership, which is also one of the partnerships relevant to the protected area we analyze in this chapter. While they undertook a detailed comparison of ARPA with two other regional cases (INBio and Galápagos Wind), we approach it differently. We take as our starting point the empirical case of one sustainable use reserve in which ARPA is embedded as one of many partners, to examine the pathways to local-level effectiveness of the complex of environmental partnerships and governance mechanisms in the Brazilian Amazon.
Protected areas designated as “integral protection” are largely aligned with IUCN category I-IV (IUCN 2016), which in the Brazilian context includes biological reserves, ecological stations or wildlife refuges for example. “Sustainable use protected areas” include IUCN categories V-VI (IUCN 2016), which in the Brazilian context includes sustainable development reserves (such as our case study RDS Uatumã), extractive reserves and national forests, among others.

State-level environmental agencies started to seek more participation in ARPA in 2004 and documents indicate that a MoU signaling the intention of letting them participate was signed that year. The exact year when funds started to be channeled to state-level protected areas is not clearly indicated in any document. It can be inferred, though, that this was between 2006 and 2008.

Interview with senior NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with senior NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.

Petrobras is a listed corporation whose shares are owned mostly by the Brazilian Government.

Interview with senior NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with resident of RDS Uatumã, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.

What Cook, Smith and Utting (2012) call the “triple injustice” of green policies, as a corollary to the previous
Interview with senior NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.
Interview with senior civil servant, Itapiranga, March 2019.
Interview with resident of RDS Uatumã, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with senior NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.
Interview with senior civil servant, RDS Uatumã, March 2019; Interview with senior NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with senior NGO staff, Manaus, April 2019.

These funds were also used in other protected areas where these NGOs operate.
Interview with NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with senior NGO staff, Rio de Janeiro, February 2019.
Interview with NGO staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.

Primary forests are forests that have grown to maturity without much human interference.
Interview with civil servant, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with senior NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.
Ibid.
Interview with senior NGO Staff, RDS Uatumã, March 2019.
Interview with NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.
Interview with NGO staff, Manaus, March 2019.

The Brazilian Climate Forum is a multistakeholder body composed of civil society and government (including the president of Brazil). It is also legally recognized as one of the institutions responsible for implementing the Federal Climate Change Policy (Law 12187/2009).

This bilateral funding is different to ARPA funding, which relies more on a systematic and automated down flow of money to the state.

References


4 Brokering Private Action for Sustainable Development

The Role of the World Bank

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Introduction

Broker organizations (or brokers for short) are identified as important facilitators of multistakeholder partnerships, which could furthermore support more effective collaboration between different sectors (Stadtler and Probst 2012; Stadtler and Karakulak 2020). In this sense, they provide a range of facilitative, informational and mediational functions. Brokers can provide platforms to connect different actors and provide a basis for communication and agreement between organizations with diverse cultures and priorities. Beyond simply providing platforms, they can facilitate bridging across organizations by fostering common understanding of the objectives of the partnerships in which they are engaged, and they can support their interaction with expertise and by cultivating trust among partners.

This chapter examines the role of the World Bank as a broker organization between, on the one hand, public institutions at the international and domestic level, and, on the other hand, private actors in the development of markets for international greenhouse gas emission credits. This interaction of the World Bank with other public institutions and private actors has involved the establishment of partnerships with different degrees of formalization and participation of the public and non-state sectors. Such initiatives include the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) as a pioneering public-private partnership for generating international emission credits initiated by the World Bank. They also include the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) where states are the primary participating constituencies but private and advocacy actors are also involved as observers on the governing board and as co-implementing entities. This chapter thus uses the term partnership broadly to refer to a range of different agreements and interactions between public institutions and private actors in the development, implementation and transactions of emission credits. It focuses the analysis first on the brokering role of the World Bank and how this role shaped the degree to which collaboration among relevant actors was successful in developing international markets for carbon offsets and emission credits as a mechanism for addressing climate change. Furthermore, it examines how World Bank-brokered initiatives have influenced broader global institutional arrangements for international carbon markets outside

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these partnerships. These arrangements include generating and trading credits, as well as financing underlying activities.

Several studies in international relations have already highlighted the role of international organizations, and the World Bank specifically, either as entrepreneurs of new governance modalities such as partnerships (Andonova 2017) and trust funds (Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Knack 2017; Reinsberg et al. 2020), or as orchestrators of initiatives that engage a broad range of actors other than states to advance a set of functions and governance objectives (Abbott et al. 2015; Hale and Roger 2014). As we will discuss, both of these roles are closely related and sometimes indistinguishable from the World Bank’s role as a broker. The chapter builds on an earlier article by some of the authors (Michaelowa et al. 2021) on the role of the World Bank in launching and facilitating partnerships for international carbon market mechanisms. It now turns the focus specifically on the extent to which the conditions for the different pathways to effectiveness, highlighted in the conceptual chapter of this book (propositions 1–4), were affected by the World Bank’s activities. In light of this analysis, we will also discuss the extent to which meeting these conditions may have actually put the partnerships onto the pathways to effectiveness elaborated in the analytical framework (Chapter 1) and resulted in the adoption of meaningful activities by these partnerships. Ultimately, this will shed some light on the implications of these initiatives for addressing the climate change problem.

**The World Bank as a Broker: Conceptual Considerations**

The concept of a broker is closely related to the concept of an orchestrator. Abbott and Snidal (2010, p. 317) define orchestration as organizational activity that

> entails mobilizing and working with private actors and institutions to achieve regulatory goals, for example, by catalyzing voluntary and collaborative programs; convening and facilitating private collaborations; persuading and inducing firms and industries to self-regulate; building private capacities; negotiating regulatory targets with firms; and providing incentives for attaining those targets.

Orchestration thus encompasses a broad range of initiatives that could be enabled in several ways through the platforms of international organizations.

With the concept of the broker, we wish to capture a more specific facilitation and bridging role between the actors or organizations working together that can lead, for instance, to contractual agreements and new institutions (such as trust funds). Furthermore, a broker can go some way beyond the activities of simple orchestration by getting heavily involved in the development of new tools and procedures as opposed to just facilitating the joint activities of others. When coordinating between different actors is simultaneously used to move the policy or institutional agenda, the concept of brokers also overlaps with the concept of political entrepreneurs. According to Christopoulos and Ingold (2011; 2015), both
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are important strategic actors in public policy, and both are viewed as “exceptional agents” endowed with expertise and strategic position. Yet, Christopoulos and Ingold (2011) also highlight some key differences in agency and functions between entrepreneurs and brokers. In particular, policy entrepreneurs use their informational advantage to act as strategic and often opportunistic actors and to actively seek influence (see also Andonova 2017; Boasson and Huitema 2017; Mintrom 1997). Mintrom and Norman (2009, p.651) identify essential dynamics of policy entrepreneurship, such as “displaying social acuity, building teams, defining problems, and leading by example.” Andonova (2017) shows that these characteristics also apply to the World Bank. She argues that international organizations, such as the World Bank and their leadership, have acted at opportune political moments as entrepreneurs of public-private partnerships and new mechanisms of governance within the multilateral system, in an effort to draw attention to a set of problems, leverage political and non-state resources and coalitions and devise new instruments to attempt to address them.

Here, however, we are primarily interested in the World Bank’s role as a broker. Brokers serve rather as “unique interlocutors” that take center stage in inter-organizational interactions and provide a set of trust-building and bridging functions (Provan and Kenis 2008; Stadtler and Probst 2012). Rather than mobilizing latent interests for a common social movement or lobbying effort, they are mediators of conflicting beliefs who engage diverse sets of actors within a group and provide the relevant tools and mechanisms to move forward. Importantly, the literature also highlights that these positions can switch, as entrepreneurs become brokers, once a particular partnership initiative or policy space is created, or leave such roles ambiguous.

The importance of broker organizations has been highlighted in the context of policy networks (Christopoulos and Ingold 2011; 2015) with respect to the network coordination of multi-organizational governance (Provan and Kenis 2008) and, more recently, for transnational governance initiatives such as cross-sector partnerships (Stadtler and Probst 2012; Stadtler and Karakulak 2020). Provan and Kenis (2008) depict a continuum of networked governance which can be brokered to a very limited degree or not at all or, conversely, highly brokered either by a participant that has taken on the functions of a broker or an external organization providing highly centralized facilitative functions. These functions range from providing a platform, communication, information or expertise, to establishing greater trust and accountability among participants or developing viable tools for the implementation of planned activities. Provan and Kenis (2008) further stipulate that the greater the number of the participants, the lower the density of a priori trust; while the more diffuse the consensus among participants, the more important a broker organization is likely to be for the effectiveness of network-based governance. The literature further suggests that resources, legitimacy and a certain expertise are among the key assets for brokers to provide “network-level competencies” and facilitative functions (Provan and Kenis 2008, p.10). Stadtler and Probst (2012) elaborate similar functions of broker organizations – as conveners, mediators, and learning catalysts, noting that the specific roles along these
dimensions may vary at the different stages of the development and implementation of partnerships. Overall, the literature suggests that effective brokerage could support the effectiveness of network-based governance, such as partnerships, involving public-private interactions.

In this chapter we seek to examine, more specifically, to what extent the brokering role of the World Bank has had a direct effect on four of the five pathways elaborated in the theoretical framework, namely, goal attainment, value creation for partners, collaboration inside the partnerships, impact on institutions (notably carbon markets) outside the partnerships and an indirect effect on affected populations (see Chapter 1). The chapter takes an inter-temporal perspective to examine the impact of World Bank brokerage on the structuring and effectiveness of carbon offset funds and their broader influence on carbon markets.

Four Periods of World Bank Involvement in International Carbon Markets

Michaelowa et al. (2021) identify four separate periods of World Bank involvement in international carbon markets related to the phases of the development of these markets over time: a starting phase 1997–2005, a boom phase 2005–2011, a downturn 2012–2015 and a slow restart from 2016 onward, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

Starting Phase 1997–2005

When international market mechanisms for greenhouse gas emission reduction were first included in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the details of their functioning were yet to be explored. As an actor with strong economic expertise as well as experience in the policies and politics of developing countries, the World Bank was in an ideal position to take over a leadership role in this phase. Recognizing that market mechanisms could become an attractive area for its own future diversification, the World Bank was also ready to invest significant human resources in the development of this field. The World Bank’s key initiative was the launch of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) in 2000 to pioneer carbon market activities and to demonstrate that markets were indeed a useful tool in support of the mitigation of global climate change (Andonova 2010). The PCF aimed specifically at the participation of large companies and governments; 17 private companies and six governments subscribed. At the same time, the World Bank engaged in a broad program developing national strategy studies for the use of market mechanisms by middle- and low-income countries that laid the groundwork for specific mitigation projects to be submitted to the PCF. In 2003 and 2004, the World Bank further broadened its approach by opening two additional trust funds – the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) and the BioCarbon Fund – to explore further synergies with other domains of sustainable development. There are 11 private companies and six governments participating in the BioCarbon Fund (Bio Carbon Fund 2021). In addition, the World Bank got involved in the
conceptual development of concrete methodologies for calculating the volume of emission reductions achieved by different project types. In this phase, the World Bank could be considered a political entrepreneur (Andonova 2017), mobilizing the latent interest of governments, private entrepreneurs and some NGOs for a common goal at the same time as heavily focusing on establishing itself as the leading international organization responsible for these new markets. While it failed to achieve the latter goal, since different bodies within the UNFCCC were given authority over the methodologies and projects proposed for the international market mechanisms, most of its other activities were clearly successful. Furthermore, the mobilization of interests went beyond the typical activities of an entrepreneur, notably through its strong investment in different institutional approaches and the capacity-building activities. The World Bank’s activities also went beyond simple orchestration. They not only provided a platform for exchange and some support measures but also actually forged contractual agreements determining the distinct functional roles of the different actors as investors (governments and some private enterprises) and monitors (civil society and NGOs). In fact, the key concepts of transactions on the international carbon markets and related blueprints were developed under the PCF, including key legal documents, such as emission reduction purchase agreements. This is why we speak of brokerage here. Furthermore, at the same time as enabling the engagement of other actors, the World Bank itself increasingly became a more participatory actor, developing interests similar to those of the investors and consultancy firms active on the market. Its development in this direction became fully visible only in the following period.

**Boom Phase 2005–2011**

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which generates emission credits from projects in developing countries took off in early 2005 following a significant increase in demand for emission credits, mainly from companies covered by the EU emissions trading scheme. Prices for emission credits and transaction volumes climbed. Companies in developing countries began to see emission credits as a new type of export commodity. In these conditions of unfettered market dynamics, the World Bank shifted its strategy from pioneering to engaging in high-volume transactions. In a partnership with private carbon brokers and credit buyers, the Umbrella Carbon Facility (UCF) was set up and pooled USD 0.75 billion for the acquisition of 130 million carbon credits from two of the largest projects on the market (Michaelowa et al. 2021).

Another partnership launched in this boom phase tried to resolve problems related to a specific sector, forestry. The CDM rules had excluded forest protection and required afforestation and reforestation projects to issue credits that would only have a limited period of validity. Given that private sector interest to buy such temporary credits was extremely limited, the World Bank brought together governments of many forest-rich countries in the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008 to address all types of forest-related emissions mitigation.
The goal of the FCPF was to ensure that forestry would be fully included in carbon markets in the future and that advanced, highly aggregated methodologies would enable permanent credits to be granted to forestry-related activities. While no private sector actors were directly involved, donors and activity implementers, such as UN agencies, were part of the governance structure.

**Downturn 2012–2015**

The failure of the Copenhagen conference in late 2009 to agree on a reform of the international climate policy regime led to a decline in trust in international carbon markets. This became evident when the EU stopped the import of CDM credits, resulting in a 95 percent decline in emission credit prices by the end of 2012. This in turn led to an exodus of many private market participants. In contrast to the many private emission credit buyers that stopped paying the contractually agreed prices, the World Bank continued to honor its long-term credit acquisition contracts under the different carbon funds (Michaelowa et al. 2021). It set up new initiatives to preserve market niches, such as the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev), which bought credits from projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Pilot Auction Facility (PAF) that provided a floor price for emission credits from methane-reduction projects through an innovative put option that gives the credit seller the right to sell the credit at a predetermined price. Both initiatives were crucial to ensure that a minimum number of private sector players was preserved. By subsidizing the annual “Carbon Expo” fairs throughout this period, the World Bank provided a venue for various international carbon market players to exchange experiences and helped to sustain an “epistemic community” (Michaelowa, Shishlov and Brescia 2019; Paterson et al. 2014). Regarding the pathways to effectiveness laid out in Chapter 1, the World Bank thus created value for partners, sustained collaboration within the existing partnerships and strongly influenced institutions outside its partnerships. However, the goal of creating thriving international carbon markets could only be attained to a limited extent, as the World Bank was unable to catalyze additional demand for credits.

**Slow Restart Since 2016**

The Paris Agreement that came into force in 2016 includes provisions for two new international carbon market approaches: a bilateral one (Article 6.2) and a multilateral one under international oversight (Article 6.4). The negotiations on their specific designs took 6 years before being concluded at the UN climate summit (COP26) in Glasgow in late 2021, and full operationalization will be undertaken in the next years. This was due to several lines of conflict regarding the stringency of the new mechanisms, as well as whether or how activities and credits from the Kyoto market mechanisms can be transitioned into the new approaches.

As soon as the ink was dry on the Paris Agreement in 2015, the World Bank developed new partnerships with the aim of upscaling activities and providing a “one stop shop” solution to transfer different kinds of credits. The Transformative
Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF) brought together five countries, but no private sector players, in order to develop blueprints for crediting mitigation policy instruments. The Networked Carbon Markets (NCM) initiative created in 2016 includes governments, private companies, academia and civil society and tries to develop a tool for deriving “exchange rates” between different types of emission credits. The work of the NCM has fed into the design of a “warehouse” to stock different types of credits and link to a “transaction facility” that includes a blockchain-based registry. Moreover, a “climate market club” (CMC), set up by the World Bank, brings together national governments to jointly develop modalities for piloting activities under Article 6.2. These governments can authorize public or private sector entities, sub-national entities or civil society organizations to participate in the CMC. In contrast to the World Bank strategy in earlier phases of the international carbon markets, where the World Bank-brokered initiatives aimed at mobilizing mitigation projects outside the World Bank’s own project pipeline, the key aim of this multi-pronged approach now is to generate revenues from the generation of emission credits of World Bank-owned projects (Michaelowa et al. 2021). This is highly problematic, as these projects are likely to have happened anyway and thus do not fulfil the “additionality” criterion. (See the discussion below regarding the overall effectiveness of the partnership with regard to climate change mitigation.)

How World Bank Activities Affected the Conditions for “Pathways to Effectiveness”

Chapter 1 formulates four propositions regarding the characteristics of partnerships conducive to partnership effectiveness. The authors suggest that the effectiveness of partnerships depends on: (1) sophisticated contracting with the appropriate specificity of commitments and accountability mechanisms; (2) the credible commitment of resources by the different partners; (3) the adaptability of the partnership arrangement; and (4) the capacity of the partnership to foster innovation. In the following section, we reexamine the evidence presented by Michaelowa et al. (2021) to demonstrate the effect of World Bank brokerage activities on each of these four conditions. As we will see, the World Bank’s contribution to establishing these conditions varied substantively over the four periods sketched above.

Sophisticated Contracting

World Bank carbon finance was crucial in defining highly elaborated contracts for international carbon markets, which underpinned the PCF. They were widely taken up by the private sector afterwards. Ever since, the different steps (project idea note, project concept note, project design document and validation and verification manual) have been applied throughout international carbon markets, even if regulators implemented slight changes to the original World Bank blueprint. The activities of the NCM, the warehouse and the CMC are trying to replicate this
approach and define the bases of Article 6 activities. While many private actors have suggested that blockchain could be an innovative technology to reduce transaction costs of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), the approach chosen by the World Bank is likely to define how blockchain will eventually be used under international carbon markets.

World Bank-developed baseline and monitoring methodologies have served as crucial preconditions for new partnerships in international carbon markets. This has been the case in the first phase of carbon markets when the work of the PCF was important in defining generic principles. However, the World Bank encountered serious resistance by CDM regulators regarding the specificities of baselines, and a significant share of World Bank submissions were rejected (Michaelowa et al. 2021). The TCAF and the CMC have again attempted to develop methodologies for policy crediting. But like CDM regulators in the past, country members of the TCAF and the CMC have been reluctant to embrace the methodological approaches suggested by the World Bank.

With regard to accountability measures, the World Bank has deteriorated over time. Carbon funds developed in the early 2000s had elaborate reporting requirements to funders and the general public, with detailed annual reports and websites providing project-specific information. Post-2015, partnerships like TCAF and the CMC no longer publish annual reports, nor project-specific information. Often, the only way information about these partnerships is made publicly available is through reports from country members, like the UK and Switzerland.

**Credible Commitment of Resources**

The World Bank provided its own resources for carbon funds established during the starting phase of international carbon markets. Partners in carbon funds had to credibly commit resources (through unconditional promissory notes or payments into dedicated trust funds) before their participation in funds would be confirmed. For each fund, the World Bank determined *ex ante* the minimum funding level required before a fund would actually be set up. Therefore, prospective participants had the incentive to mobilize other participants in order to ensure that this minimum overall funding level would be attained. Once funds were ready for participation by governments and private sector entities, the participants had to pay in a share of the pledged funding. The World Bank then calculated the annual contributions required until the total of the pledge was reached (Prototype Carbon Fund 2004). The World Bank’s brokering activities were particularly important for designing this model and, through it, eliciting a coalition of willing donors interested in supporting the early implementation of carbon offsets, despite the relatively long political gridlock that surrounded the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. By 2005, when the Protocol came into force, a series of carbon funds and related methodologies were already established through coalitions of states, experts and, in some cases, private actors (Andonova 2010). This model continues until today. However, the World Bank has found it increasingly difficult to mobilize private sector resources. None of the post-2015 partnerships benefits from direct funding
by the private sector. Governments are still willing to contribute to such partnerships, but not to the desired funding volumes. For example, the TCAF that was aiming at a total budget of USD 0.5 billion only reached USD 0.21 billion.

**Adaptability of Partnership Arrangements**

If the partnership is defined at a high level of aggregation encompassing all World Bank-led carbon market activities involving private sector actors and governments, a high level of adaptability can be found. Throughout the different phases of international carbon markets, the Bank tried to define new types of vehicles appropriate for the phase in question. For instance, the PCF portfolio focused on large emerging economies and transition countries which were seen as key frontrunners for the still new market mechanisms. When the “gold rush” started, the World Bank tried to benefit by setting up the UCF, focusing on massive HFC-23 projects. Critiques of the World Bank project portfolio by the media and NGOs prompted the creation of capacity-building programs to engage lower income countries, as well as the creation of new funds such as the BioCarbon Fund that could engage in countries that lack large-emissions point sources in industry (Andonova 2010; Andonova and Sun 2019). The Paris Agreement’s call for upscaling carbon markets led to vehicles like the TCAF that tested upscaling beyond projects and programs. The World Bank, as a broker of new carbon market instruments, thus learned from the outcomes of the carbon funds set up during the starting phase of international carbon markets when designing subsequent vehicles.

Within each specific vehicle, especially the carbon funds, adaptability was relatively low – the only exceptions being those funds that had two subsequent tranches. For example, the BioCarbon Fund issued two tranches in 2004 and 2007. Voluntary carbon markets played a larger role in the second tranche than in the first, with the share more than doubling from 6.5 percent of funding to 13.9 percent (BioCarbon Fund 2021). This reflected the recognition that the demand for forestry credits was larger on the voluntary markets, and therefore the fund would be able to sell credits more easily and at better prices. The reform thus led to substantial financial benefits for the participants in the fund.

A clear lesson can also be seen in the design of the Partnership for Market Implementation (PMI), which is the direct successor of the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR). The PMR aimed to support countries in introducing carbon pricing instruments, like emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes. However, most of the funding vanished in government bureaucracies without such policy instruments actually being set up. When designing the PMI, the World Bank put a much larger focus on ensuring that activities under the initiative would be directed toward this aim.

**Fostering Innovation**

The World Bank engaged in innovation in international carbon markets in different “waves” linked to the specific phases of the market. In the early 2000s during
the starting phase of the World Bank’s engagement, it tried to lay the basis for concrete transactions through the careful elaboration of blueprints for each element of the project cycle. Here, different stakeholders were brought in, including lawyers to elaborate contractual clauses; independent audit companies to develop the approach to third-party validation and verification; and engineers and economists who could elaborate baseline and monitoring methodologies. During the boom phase of the market, the activities focused on sectors that were underrepresented in the market, such as avoiding deforestation. Here, innovation related to the development of “nested” and jurisdictional approaches to forest protection. During the downturn, innovation generally declined, but the PAF for the first time developed an approach that enabled the generation of an effective floor price for mitigation credits in the future. Project developers could bid for the price of a put option, which would guarantee them a fixed sales price per emissions credit. In the restart phase innovation again accelerated and focused on the development of methodologies for upscaled crediting, the development of procedures to calculate exchange rates between different types of emissions credits and the use of blockchain for transactions and MRV systems.

A significant amount of the innovation developed through the World Bank-led partnership(s) has been decisive in shaping international carbon markets. This is particularly the case for the innovation undertaken in the starting phase. The set of documentation developed by the PCF for each step of the project cycle continues to shape the way in which international carbon markets operate. But not all innovation undertaken by the World Bank was successful. Many baseline methodologies were rejected by the regulators. The Carbon Delivery Guarantee to reduce the risk of investment in mitigation projects was not endorsed by private sector project developers. Methodologies for upscaled crediting have not been taken up by other international carbon market players. The approach of the NCM to calculate exchange rates between different credit types has been severely criticized by carbon market specialists and, so far, has not been operationalized.

**Linking the Creation of Conducive Conditions to Goal Achievement**

In this section, we try to highlight plausible links between the successful creation of the above conditions and the actual achievement of the goals considered through different pathways to effectiveness. When the World Bank’s brokerage was successful, how far did it effectively contribute to the attainment of the partnership’s goals, value creation for partners, collaboration inside the partnerships and to an impact on institutions (notably carbon markets) outside the partnerships and, eventually, on affected populations?

The overall problem targeted by the partnerships brokered by the World Bank is anthropogenic climate change, more specifically greenhouse gas emissions from private and public activities. This problem has persisted over recent decades and gained in relevance over time. Clearly, the activities undertaken under international carbon markets can address climate change only if they actually lead
to greenhouse gas emission reductions. The overarching goal of the partnerships was to catalyze international carbon markets to offer governments and the private sector the possibility to reach emissions commitments through access to emission credits at lower costs. Ideally, this should lead to a willingness to make more stringent commitments. Yet, the latter is not easily demonstrated. In addition, it has sometimes been possible to create emission credits for activities that do not mitigate emissions, as we elaborate in the discussion on additionality below. Hence, rather than mutual support between private benefits and the overall goal, there can be an inherent tension between financial benefits for individual participants and the global public good of climate change mitigation. This tension has persisted in the partnerships over time.

Even regarding the more direct objective of creating efficient emission reduction opportunities, the degree to which this can be considered successful has changed over time. It can clearly be said that looking at the situation around 2010, the goal of providing access to cheap credits seemed to have been achieved in an overwhelmingly successful manner. But revisiting the question in 2013, after the price crash for emission credits, would probably have led to a completely different assessment – namely an assessment of complete failure. This consideration shows that the partnerships could not control one of the key parameters: demand for emission credits in the larger carbon market significantly depends on a range of political and economic contextual factors. This will remain the “Achilles’ heel” of partnerships in the international carbon markets, unless the partnerships can credibly show how they mobilize a critical mass of demand. A precondition for such demand is that international carbon markets are perceived as mobilizing additional emission reductions and not generating emission credits from “business-as-usual” activities. Historically, the World Bank did not put an emphasis on stringent additionality provisions in the methodologies developed under its initiatives. This was the case both in the starting phase of the CDM, when various World Bank-led methodologies were rejected for that reason, as well as in the post-2015 restart phase when draft methodologies, developed under TCAF, were criticized by both researchers and governments participating under TCAF. As the World Bank did nothing to apply concepts proposed by researchers that might ensure additionality (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003) and could have allayed the concerns of NGOs and experts (see, e.g., Schneider 2009), it jeopardized the goal achievement of its partnerships.

Projected value creation for partners related to the generation of emission credits for private sector participants and were subject to stringent domestic climate policy instruments and stable access to competitively priced emission credits for government participants. For the World Bank, value was fuzzier, related to generating revenues from the administration of trust funds, generating reputation due to being a pioneer in a new field and generating synergies linking development and climate change-related work streams (Michaelowa et al. 2021; see also Flues, Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2010, 5; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011). Governments saw value in the public goods the partnership created that would have been too expensive for single governments to develop, including baseline
and monitoring methodologies and blueprints for the project cycle. The brokering role of the World Bank in partnerships created political value for proactive industrialized country governments, which sought to promote the development of carbon markets and engagement of developing countries during a period of deep stagnation in international climate negotiations (Andonova 2017). In fact, the Dutch government had set up its own procedures for emission credit procurement through the CERUPT and ERUPT tender programs in the early 2000s but discontinued these programs once the World Bank partnership gathered steam. The Netherlands then set up a dedicated carbon fund under the World Bank umbrella. For some government participants, a longer-term value aspect was to enable more ambitious international climate policies due to the proof that emission reductions were not prohibitively expensive.

The value creation of the partnership was uneven, depending on the time horizon. Governments and private sector participants that needed credits at a specific point in time before 2011 were getting issued credits earlier and more cheaply than through other avenues, particularly if they invested in the UCF. This partnership managed to create value for partners by combining resources for transactions with attractive pricing. The price of USD 6 per credit was significantly lower than the price of smaller transactions on the market, that on average reached USD 11 in 2006 (World Bank 2007). Due to the sheer size of the UCF, transaction costs for participants were lowered by the involvement of the World Bank. It should be noted that the transactions of the UCF which came from projects aimed at reducing the industrial gas HFC-23\textsuperscript{1} generated a lot of scrutiny and discussions about perverse incentives which could lead to an increase in emissions (see, e.g., Andonova 2010; Wara 2007). This led to NGOs becoming critical of international carbon markets and triggered political movements prohibiting the use of CDM credits in the EU emission trading scheme (Michaelowa et al. 2019).

Furthermore, partners did not always get the amount of credits they had envisaged because many projects, with which the early generation carbon funds had contracted emission reduction purchase agreements, had underperformed and not delivered the credit quantity forecast. Moreover, the crash in the price for emission credits from 2011 onward meant that private sector players who waited before buying emissions credits could get the credits much more cheaply than those that participated in the World Bank carbon funds. The same applies to government participants. A government buying credits in 2013 to cover its shortfall under the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol would have had to spend an order of magnitude less than a government that invested in a carbon fund at the World Bank in 2003–2004.

With regard to collaboration inside the partnership, the role of the private sector has diminished over time, while that of governments has increased. This is due to the fact that private sector entities did not see a need to engage in such a partnership once the market, particularly the CDM, had matured. From 2005 onward, there was a wide range of credit supply available on the market and, given the emergence of versatile project developers and intermediaries, the advantage that
World Bank carbon funds held in the beginning had dissipated. Given that after 2012 private sector entities could not use emission credits in most jurisdictions – and this has not changed since the Paris Agreement came into force – they have not reentered the new World Bank initiatives under Article 6. The scope of government collaboration has broadened over time with the World Bank branching out into niches such as action in Least Developed Countries. Yet, the range of governments involved in World Bank carbon finance has remained relatively stable over time.

The influence of the World Bank-led partnerships on collaboration and institutions outside the partnership is multifaceted and has evolved over time. The partnerships clearly enabled a faster emergence of international carbon markets as the boom period could build on their conceptual groundwork. These partnerships were also a core around which an “epistemic community” of carbon market actors developed. However, it could be argued that the World Bank-led partnerships also contributed to a crowding out of other initiatives. For example, the subsidization of the “Carbon Expo” fair led to the demise of the privately organized “Carbon Market Insights” fair when the boom phase of the market ended. A bottom-up organized template for an emission reduction purchase agreement by a consortium of lawyers from developing and industrialized countries in the starting phase of the CDM market was pushed aside by the contract model provided by the PCF that focused on industrialized country interests. Equally, the carbon funds set up by the World Bank for specific governments like Spain, Italy and the Netherlands replaced private sector-led offers to manage carbon funds for these governments.

**Conclusion**

In the last two decades, the World Bank has played a key role in brokering partnerships on international carbon market action involving governments and private sector actors. Under the umbrella of “World Bank carbon finance,” a range of specific carbon funds and initiatives were set up that played a crucial role in the operationalization of the Kyoto mechanisms in the early 2000s and, since then, have contributed to innovation in these markets. Given that private sector partners no longer received relevant value from the partnerships after the CDM matured, they became less engaged over time.

As international carbon markets have evolved in three distinct periods since their emergence around 2000, the characteristics of the partnerships have changed. Among the four characteristics of partnerships deemed as relevant for their effectiveness, as specified in Chapter 1, high specificity of commitments and accountability as well as credibility of commitments were particularly prominent during the early phase of the World Bank-brokered partnerships, when the various initiatives were a model of transparency and all involved partners were willing to commit sizeable resources. Over time, accountability has declined together with resource commitments by partners. Still, compared to other types of partnerships, the credibility of commitments remains much
higher given that for any initiative of the World Bank, partners need to provide legally binding promissory notes.

Adaptability has been high on the “umbrella” level with the spawning of new initiatives by the World Bank throughout the period, whose characteristics clearly indicate lessons learned from experiences with previous initiatives. It has been lower at the level of the individual initiatives, with only a few initiatives being able to change their approach over time. Only a few initiatives have been discontinued, but many have considerably reduced their activities. Innovation has been the declared aim of the partnerships, but its actual level has changed over time: periods of rapid innovation alternated with periods of revenue maximization for selected partners.

Overall, the World Bank has successfully played a role as broker for partnerships on international carbon markets that have been sustained over several decades in rapidly changing conditions. These partnerships have been effective in making international carbon markets a key tool of international climate policy in the second half of the 2000s. However, the World Bank’s lenient approach to additionality led to growing criticism of international carbon markets by NGOs and media. It thereby contributed to the fall in demand for emissions credits that led to a stalling of international carbon markets between 2012 and 2015. While the partnerships were creating value for their partners, at least as long as the carbon markets were thriving, this value creation was at least partially achieved by not prioritizing sufficiently ambitious projects early on in order to achieve a more effective provision of the public good of climate change mitigation. The underlying problem of climate change and mitigating it through the globally most cost-effective means remains as burning an issue as before the start of the partnerships.

Whether the new initiatives of the World Bank, in the context of the market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, will be as effective as the initiatives of the early 2000s regarding the Kyoto mechanisms remains to be seen, but it is likely that effectiveness will be lower today. In particular, the risk of pushing non-additional activities persists, as the World Bank has explicitly stated its interest in bringing its own pipeline of projects financed through classic World Bank loans into carbon markets under Article 6 (Michaelowa et al. 2021). If the World Bank does not change its approach with respect to observing strict additionality of projects, it may jeopardize the international carbon markets at large, because of its influence on additionality practices and the potential backlash by advocacy critics of market mechanisms as instruments for addressing climate change. Such an outcome would mean that the overall goal of the partnerships in supporting the development of robust carbon markets could be compromised, unless the long-term goal of addressing climate change through more ambitious additionality criteria is prioritized over the short-term value creation for the broker and key members of the partnerships. A lot will now depend on how the international community operationalizes the strict principles agreed for Article 6 at COP26 in Glasgow. If it manages to properly implement these principles in actual methodologies and approaches applied “on the ground” in international carbon markets, the risk outlined above may not materialize.
Note

HFC-23, a potent hydrofluorocarbon, does not deplete ozone but it is a greenhouse gas that has increased over the past decade despite international environmental agreements aimed at its reduction (Stanley et al. 2020).

References


5 Advancing Innovation and Access to Medicines

The Achievements and Unrealized Potential of the Product Development Partnership Model

Marcela Fogaça Vieira, Ryan Kimmitt, Danielle Navarro, Anna Bezruki and Suerie Moon

Introduction: Partnerships and the Global Pharmaceutical Research and Development System

When the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015, Goal 3 called upon the world to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all.” Achieving this ambitious objective depends, in part, on the development of and access to health technologies such as drugs, diagnostics, vaccines and medical devices (hereinafter referred to either as “health technologies” or “medicines”). Specific targets for SDG 3 include providing access to medicines (Target 3.8) and supporting research and development (R&D) for “diseases that primarily affect developing countries” (Target 3.b) (United Nations n. d.). The COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder to the world of what has long been recognized in the health community – that access to medicines is essential for health (WHA 60.29, World Health Assembly 2007).

Health technologies are not ordinary consumer goods but rather essential goods, just like food and water. However, current systems for the R&D and delivery of medicines do not meet the needs of most of the world’s population. Nearly 2 billion people lack access to essential medicines (WHO 2017) and about 90 million people globally are pushed below the poverty line each year due to health care expenditure (WHO 2020b). The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that more than 1.7 billion people every year require treatment for at least one neglected tropical disease (WHO 2020a).

The pharmaceutical R&D system that has emerged over the past century – and been globalized in part through the World Trade Organization and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – is based on intellectual property rights, which provide a time-limited monopoly to the rights-holder. Firms are expected to invest in R&D and later recoup those investments through product sales. Potential market size and profitability drives R&D priorities and investment, and firms can charge the highest price the market (or state regulator) will bear during the monopoly period. This system promotes R&D...
investment in lucrative areas where product development risk is manageable, but neglects diseases where the risk is too high and/or the market is too small. High prices are built into the system by design. This traditional approach to R&D does not deliver affordable, relevant innovation for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The challenges for high-income countries are also increasingly clear; high prices of new medicines are straining the sustainability of health systems and restricting access, even in the wealthiest countries (Morgan et al. 2020). Furthermore, there is insufficient R&D investment for novel antibiotics, outbreak-prone diseases (“pathogens of pandemic potential”), and many rare and/or pediatric diseases that affect all countries.

The question has arisen as to whether different approaches to organizing, financing or incentivizing R&D – sometimes referred to as “alternative” or “new” business models of R&D – can address some of the shortcomings of this traditional approach (Suleman et al. 2020). One area where there has been significant experimentation in alternative business models is that of neglected diseases (also known as neglected tropical diseases or poverty-related neglected diseases), which predominantly affect people in LMICs. It has long been recognized that commercial R&D models did not and would not generate innovative health technologies for these diseases because the market incentive is inadequate to do so (Trouiller et al. 2001). Thus, approximately two dozen public-private product development partnerships (PDPs) were founded around the turn of the millennium to spur R&D into medicines for neglected diseases, such as malaria or sleeping sickness. While PDPs constitute an important category within the larger universe of health partnerships, their impact has been less extensively studied than those of global financing initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. However, with at least two decades of experience with PDPs, there is now a sizeable body of evidence to assess their effectiveness.

While there is significant variation in how they operate, a PDP is usually a non-profit organization with a separate and distinct legal identity that enables collaboration to advance the R&D of drugs, vaccines, diagnostics and other health technologies directed at unmet health needs. PDPs are generally funded by public and philanthropic contributions, which allows R&D to focus on health rather than market outcomes. PDPs usually bring together academic, government, industry and philanthropic actors to jointly develop new health technologies. Usually, they do not conduct R&D activities in-house but rather operate as “system integrators” that coordinate several partners who perform these activities (Munoz et al. 2015). A common objective among PDPs is to produce new health technologies that meet the following characteristics: “effective, high quality, acceptable to the target group, and available at an affordable price” (Munoz et al. 2015) with affordability and accessibility concerns built early into the R&D process.

The remainder of this chapter assesses PDPs’ effectiveness, according to the five pathways of the typology discussed in Chapter 1 in this volume. There is a growing body of literature about PDPs, focusing on specific organizations, target diseases, projects and products, as well as how they operate, their funding and
governance structure, among many other aspects (Munoz et al. 2015; Moran et al. 2010; Moran et al. 2005; Policy Cures Research n. d.). We draw on this literature to summarize PDPs’ effectiveness in terms of goal attainment (Pathway 1) and their impact on affected populations (Pathway 4); in terms of refilling empty development pipelines and bringing new products successfully through the long, costly and risky process of medicine development to reach patients. We then consider whether PDPs have demonstrated effectiveness in terms of creating value for partners (Pathway 2) and improving collaboration between them (Pathway 3), for example, by mobilizing resources or offering partners incentives to collaborate. We then turn to the Pathway 5 question of whether PDPs have influenced institutions outside the partnerships, for which we draw on a recent study (Moon, Vieira and Kimmitt 2020) comparing the costs and efficiency of PDPs against the traditional model of commercial product development. Specifically, we assess the extent to which PDPs are seen as self-contained exceptions to the rule that should be applied only in certain cases, or as a more disruptive business model that can address growing concerns that the traditional business model is unable to fully meet societal needs.

This chapter uses a mixed-methods approach to analyze the effectiveness of PDPs. Literature reviews had previously been conducted by the authors on a number of the topics mentioned here, e.g., PDPs (Navarro and Moon 2019), costs (Vieira and Moon 2020), timeframes and success rates of traditional pharmaceutical R&D (Kimmitt et al. 2020). We also collected and analyzed quantitative data (on costs, timeframes and attrition rates gathered through surveys) and qualitative data (gathered through interviews) on non-commercial R&D initiatives for a separate study prior to the writing of this chapter (Moon, Vieira and Kimmitt 2020). We draw on these literature reviews and original data sources to analyze the effectiveness of PDPs under the framework discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume. We offer more detailed descriptions of the methodology relevant to sections 3 and 4 at the start of those sections below.

Goal Attainment and Impact on Affected Populations

After two decades, PDPs as a group have demonstrated that it is possible to develop medicines through alternative business models, as evidenced by significant increases in funding for neglected diseases R&D, a renewed pipeline and a number of new medicines now reaching patients.

Global funding for neglected diseases R&D has grown substantially in recent decades. It was up 38 percent in 2018, at USD 4.07 billion (Policy Cures Research n. d.), compared with just USD 2.95 billion in 2007 (Policy Cures Research 2020b), when tracking began. Yet, it still remains a small fraction of the total global investment in pharmaceutical R&D, which was estimated at USD 181 billion in 2018 (Statista 2020). A breakdown of total global funding for neglected disease R&D between 2007 and 2018 shows that, of an estimated USD 44.9 billion, the largest proportion came from public (67 percent) and philanthropic (19 percent) sources, with industry accounting for 14 percent. For comparison, in
2007, the proportions were public (70 percent), philanthropic (22 percent) and industry (8 percent) (Policy Cures Research 2020b). Sources of PDP funding have thus consistently been driven largely by public and philanthropic organizations.1

PDPs receive a relatively small proportion of the total R&D funding for neglected diseases, accounting for 13.5 percent of the total (USD 553 million) in 2018 (Policy Cures Research 2020b). Total funding directed to PDPs themselves has remained relatively stable or even decreased proportionally to other recipient types. The growing global investment in overall R&D for neglected diseases indicates growing interest in developing medicines for these diseases and greater involvement from other actors in the field, such as academics.2 In turn, the number of health technologies under development for neglected diseases has grown significantly in the past two decades. A 2005 analysis found that 75 percent of 63 projects for the development of health technologies for neglected diseases were led by PDPs (Moran et al. 2005). A 2015 analysis found a significant increase — with 485 product candidates in the pipeline, 58 percent of them had come from PDPs and other public-private partnerships (Policy Cures 2015). While there was a decline in the proportion of total products under development by PDPs, there was an increase in the absolute number of projects from PDPs as well as a greater involvement of other actors. As of August 2019, there were 585 products in the pipeline (Policy Cures Research 2019). This increase in the development of health technologies for neglected diseases has been called a “remarkable quiet revolution” “that could dramatically improve the way we prevent, treat and diagnose neglected diseases” (Policy Cures 2015), potentially saving millions of lives and promoting the well-being of many more.

As the R&D process is long, often extending over more than a decade, it has only recently been possible to assess how effective PDPs have been in actually bringing products to market. PDPs have demonstrated it is possible to develop medicines through alternative business models as evidenced by the growing list of products that have successfully been developed (see Table 5.1).

PDPs have not only developed products but the features of these products are an important aspect of their effectiveness. PDPs seek to develop products that are affordable, offer significant therapeutic advance and are suitable for use in resource-poor health systems (e.g., no need for refrigeration). In contrast, the traditional commercial R&D model that has evolved in industrialized countries allows products to be marketed at profit-maximizing prices, rewards the development of “me-too drugs” (which offer little or no therapeutic advance, but are less risky to develop and can claim market share) (Prescrire 2020) and are not designed for use in LMICs.

PDPs focus on areas of unmet health needs, so the products they develop usually offer at least some therapeutic advance over the status quo, although the baseline for neglected diseases is often quite low since there has been little investment in them previously. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), for example, received regulatory approval in 2018 for fexinidazole, which transformed treatment for the lethal disease known as sleeping sickness (Human African trypanosomiasis) (DNDi 2018). Previously, the only available treatment was melarsoprol,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>Product Name</th>
<th>Product Type</th>
<th>Therapeutic Area</th>
<th>Year of Approval</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<td>Fexinidazole</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness)</td>
<td>2018 (EMA)</td>
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<td>DNDi</td>
<td>Nifurtimox + eflornithine combination therapy (NECT)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
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<td>2009* (N/A)</td>
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<td>DNDi</td>
<td>Sodium stibogluconate + paramomycin</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Visceral leishmaniasan</td>
<td>2010** (N/A)</td>
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<td>Chagas disease</td>
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<td>Liposomal amphotericin B (intravenous, single dose); Liposomal amphotericin B (single dose) + miltefosine; Liposomal amphotericin B (single dose) + paromomycin</td>
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<td>Visceral leishmaniasan</td>
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<td>Ritonavir + rifampicin (1:1 ratio)</td>
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<td>HIV and tuberculosis coinfection</td>
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<td>Artesunate-mefloquine (ASMQ)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2012 (WHO PQ)</td>
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<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
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<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>2015 (WHO PQ)</td>
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<td>Diagnostic</td>
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<td>African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness)</td>
<td>2013*</td>
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<td>iLED fluorescent microscope</td>
<td>Laboratory</td>
<td>Tuberculosis; malaria; leishmaniasis</td>
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<td>Preventive</td>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVCC</td>
<td>Clothinandin (SumiShield™ 50 WG)</td>
<td>Vector control/</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVCC</td>
<td>Clothinandin/deltamethrin (Fludora® Fusion)</td>
<td>Vector control/</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVI</td>
<td>Bivalent killed whole-cell cholera vaccine</td>
<td>Vaccine</td>
<td>Cholera</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVI</td>
<td>(Shanchol™)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IVI</td>
<td>Bivalent killed whole-cell cholera vaccine</td>
<td>Vaccine</td>
<td>Cholera</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVI</td>
<td>(Euvichol®)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IVI</td>
<td>Bivalent killed whole-cell cholera vaccine</td>
<td>Vaccine</td>
<td>Cholera</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lifebox</td>
<td>Pulse oximeter</td>
<td>Medical device</td>
<td></td>
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(Continued)
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<tr>
<th>Meningitis Vaccines Project</th>
<th>Meningitis A vaccine (MenAfriVac)</th>
<th>Vaccine</th>
<th>Meningitis A</th>
<th>2010 (WHO PQ)</th>
<th>24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Artemether-lumefantrine (Coartem® Dispersible)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2008 (Swissmedic)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Artesunate (injectable) (Artesun®/Larinate®)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2010 (WHO PQ)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
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<td>MMV</td>
<td>Dihydroartemisininpiperaquine (DHA/PQP) (Eurartesim®)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2011 (EMA)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
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<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2012 (EMA)</td>
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<td>MMV</td>
<td>Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine + amodiaquine (SPAQ-COTM/Supyra®)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2014 (WHO PQ)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Pyronaridine-artesunate (Pyramax® Granules)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2015 (EMA)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Artesunate (suppositories)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2018 (WHO PQ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Artesunate (suppositories)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2018 (WHO PQ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Tafenoquine (Krintafel®)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2018 (US FDA)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMV</td>
<td>Artesunate (injectable) (Larinate®)</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2018 (WHO PQ)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>Malaria Ag P.f HRP2 ELISA</td>
<td>Diagnostics</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2017** (N/A)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>STANDARD™ G6PD</td>
<td>Diagnostics</td>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2019** (N/A)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATH</td>
<td>DMPA-SC (Depot-medroxyprogesterone acetate self-injectable) (Sayana® Press)</td>
<td>Contraception</td>
<td>Contraception</td>
<td>2015 (UK MHRA)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB Alliance</td>
<td>Isoniazid/rifampicin</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>N/A (N/A)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB Alliance</td>
<td>Rifampicin + isoniazid + pyrazinamide</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>N/A (N/A)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB Alliance</td>
<td>Pretomanid + bedaquiline + linezolid</td>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>2019 (US FDA)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on publicly available data (sources in Annex)

* Year that the therapy was recommended by the WHO.
** Year that the therapy was rolled out.

Note: This table is meant for illustrative purposes, as a snapshot of products brought to market by PDPs. It is compiled based on information available on PDPs’ websites (see Annex for full details). Some information was not available from these websites, especially regarding the year of regulatory approval. This information has not been externally verified and may not include all available products.
a dangerous arsenic derivative that killed one in twenty patients treated. DND/i had previously developed an improvement on melarsoprol by demonstrating that a combination of two preexisting drugs (nifurtimox and eflornithine) was safe and effective against the disease. However, this combination treatment required a painful diagnostic procedure (lumbar puncture), a hospital stay and a team of skilled health workers, which was a heavy burden on both individual patients and the health system. Fexinidazole could be given as a once-daily oral pill for ten days and without the need for a lumbar puncture. The product demonstrated the feasibility of developing medicines that offer both therapeutic advance and are well-suited for use in countries where costly health system resources, such as hospitals and physicians, are in scarce supply. Fexinidazole was also significant because it was a new chemical entity – that is, a molecule that had not previously received regulatory approval for any other disease. Many previous PDP projects had repurposed existing drugs for specific use against neglected diseases. To do so could certainly deliver significant therapeutic benefits but was not considered as technologically challenging or risky as developing a new chemical entity, exposing PDPs to the critique that they could carry out incremental innovation but not make big leaps forward. The approval of three new chemical entities developed by PDPs, the Medicines for Malaria Venture’s tafenoquine, TB Alliance’s pretomanid, as well as DND/i’s fexinidazole, provides another indicator of effectiveness.

In addition to therapeutic advance and suitability for different contexts, affordability is a key metric for the success of a PDP’s product. PDPs often consider affordability of the end product as a key criterion early in the R&D process, when they are considering multiple candidate technologies or manufacturing options. For example, the Meningitis Vaccine Project – a partnership initiative between the WHO and the non-governmental organization PATH with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – successfully developed the MenAfriVac vaccine by tapping the specific competencies of multiple public and private partners (Gordon, Røttingen and Hoffman 2014). The strategy for MenAfriVac was mainly influenced by the demand from African governments for a ceiling price of less than USD 0.50 per dose (Bishai et al. 2011; Gordon, Røttingen and Hoffman 2014; Kulkarni et al. 2015; Tiffay et al. 2015). Kulkarni et al. (2015) noted that the project succeeded due to “transparency and an intense and close collaboration” of the parties, which allowed for proper know-how and technology transfer, i.e., crucial nonexclusive patent licenses for the necessary technology. Ultimately, MenAfriVac was sold at the target price and was widely adopted by governments in the meningitis belt that stretches across West and Central Africa, causing cases of meningitis to fall steeply in the years following uptake of the vaccine (Gordon, Røttingen and Hoffman et al. 2014; Trotter et al. 2017). A similar approach was taken when DND/i developed combination treatments for malaria (artesunate-mefloquine and artesunate-amodiaquine), for which target prices were set at levels affordable in malaria-endemic countries (Luiza et al. 2017; Wells Diap and Kiechel 2013).

A comprehensive assessment of all products developed by PDPs is beyond the scope of this chapter. Not all PDP products, however, will necessarily offer all
three key features identified here – therapeutic advance, ease of use in resource-poor settings, and affordability – since technological and other factors mean it is not always feasible to do so. We note, however, that these objectives, which are often articulated in target product profiles (Terry, Plasència and Reeder 2019), are usually core to a PDP’s mission and constitute an important way in which their effectiveness should be assessed. It is also an important distinction between the objectives of PDPs vis-à-vis traditional commercial approaches to R&D.

The list of successfully developed products in Table 5.1 is testament to the effectiveness of PDPs in attaining their primary goal. The characteristics of those products – offering therapeutic advance at low-cost and adapted for use in resource-poor settings – suggests PDP-developed products are likely to have beneficial impacts on the health of their target populations. Studies tracking the health impact of new products are not always available, but the experience with the meningitis vaccine cited above offers a powerful illustration of what is possible.

**Partnerships: Creating Value and Facilitating Collaboration, Not Competition**

Turning now to Pathways 2 and 3 of this volume’s framework, how effective have PDPs been in creating value for partners and facilitating collaboration between them? A full response to this question would require in-depth evaluation of each of these organizations, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. But we can develop some insights by referring to the literature and identifying concretely what PDPs have done to try to achieve these goals. PDPs often mobilize financial and knowledge-based resources from partners and combine them into a structured framework that provides incentives for partners to collaborate, and, ultimately, advance R&D. How do they do so? Bishai et al. (2011) characterized PDPs’ organizational structure as having a “lattice form,” that is, they stitch together resources available across a broad range of partners, connecting funding to intellectual property to research and production capacities in order to collectively co-produce new medicines. Gordon, Røttingen and Hoffman et al. (2014) also noted that this type of structure lowered the project’s risk “as it enables switching among partners for specific deliverables and contributions,” when demanded by circumstances and according to their expertise. Taylor and Smith (2020) analyzed the role of three PDPs in developing and delivering new health technologies for sleeping sickness: DNDi (as described above), the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and the Global Alliance for Livestock Veterinary Medicines (GALVmed). They found that “all three organizations have been responsible for delivering new innovations for diagnosis and treatment through brokering and incentivizing innovation and private sector involvement” and conclude that “it is doubtful that these innovations would have been delivered without them” (Taylor and Smith 2020, p.1).

We identified additional ways in which PDPs create value and facilitate collaboration between partners through a study we conducted on non-commercial R&D initiatives (Moon, Vieira and Kimmitt 2020). The study we present here
mainly focused on gathering and analyzing evidence on the costs and efficiency (i.e., timeframes and attrition rates) of non-commercial R&D and analyzing how they compared to averages from commercial R&D. In addition to quantitative data (presented in the next section), we also collected qualitative data from a number of PDPs and/or experts on such initiatives. We contacted 48 non-commercial R&D initiatives to request their participation in the study and collected quantitative data from 8 organizations on 83 candidate products and qualitative data through interviews with 20 individuals from 12 organizations, many of which were PDPs. Out of those, 18 individuals provided their perspectives based on projects conducted within their own organizations and two were experts with knowledge of a range of PDPs. The quantitative data referred to a range of different types of health technologies (vaccines, diagnostics, drugs), but given the limitations of our dataset and the impossibility of comparison across organizations for diagnostics and vaccines, the results include only quantitative data related to drugs (more specifically, to 16 new chemical entities or NCEs). The qualitative data refer to all types of health technologies. Data was collected between June and September 2019. The participating organization (PO) and individual names were anonymized for confidentiality and quotes were edited for brevity and clarity.

In our interviews with actors engaged in PDPs, we identified six roles that PDPs play to enable collaboration among different partners and how these roles create different types of value that partners expect from joining a PDP.

First, interviewees emphasized the relevance of a non-profit organization playing the role of a broker across a portfolio of candidate technologies spanning multiple organizations. This role was especially relevant in making decisions concerning which product candidates to move forward, especially in the context of limited availability of funds.

[We conduct] head-to-head comparisons among many candidates from different organizations. It is important to note that our mandate is to develop a technology, to promote a cure being found. It is not tied to a single candidate. Industry prioritizes single drug development. (PO 05)

We see everybody’s data. So, if you come to me with a new compound, we can tell you is this new or not. And that requires a model in which somebody like us can establish a reputation for being an honest broker. (PO 08)

We have a portfolio management group that looks across vaccine candidates and does some down selecting based on the data shared and established criteria. … There is limited funding, so researchers and developers understand that it’s better to act jointly, go to the funders and present this as a collaborative research effort across the field. (PO 11)

Second, the potential for knowledge and data sharing was raised by interviewees as one of the main characteristics and strengths of engaging in PDPs. It was highlighted that data sharing was easier and more frequent in non-commercial
R&D initiatives, with PDPs playing a role in facilitating and fostering knowledge exchange.

Over the years that [practice] has built up, and people are really sharing data with each other. We facilitate knowledge exchange among research institutions in our collaborative network. … We have had a pretty good history of people sharing pre-publication data and results at our Annual Meeting where most of our consortium’s researchers gather. … they see the advantage of the discovery, preclinical and clinical people talking and interacting with each other. (PO 11)

Third, another factor mentioned was the expert knowledge that PDPs have of the diseases as well as their social contexts and markets in LMICs, which can improve the quality of the product developed and its utilization in low-resource settings since the technologies can be better tailored to the context in which they are to be used.

We try to identify in which areas we can help…[I’m] talking about access to biobanks, clinical trials, engagement with WHO and communities, understanding the markets and willingness to pay in comparison to other products. And these are areas where we provide a lot of value. (PO 04)

We have experience in engaging communities in clinical trials. Community involvement adds a significant budget. Pharmaceutical companies recognize it is not in their expertise and they do not want to take responsibility for it. Rigorous community engagement efforts lead to additional costs, which pharmaceutical companies usually do not have to carry, but it also leads to better outcomes. (PO 05)

We also bring our expertise, and we have a technical team as well as disease experts who can say what will work and not work in a particular setting. We try to bring reality to the product development to say what kind of things they should be focusing on to make development more sustainable. So we are, in a way, offsetting some of the early marketing or research, so that a company might not have to invest to understand the marketplace. We bring that to them. (PO 04)

A fourth important reason to engage in partnerships was access to centralized resources, such as compound libraries and biobanks, which can reduce costs and increase the speed of product development.

We asked manufactures about what is the added value of working with us [PDP], and for example, having a biobank with access to different types of samples is super valuable for these companies, because for some diseases it is so hard to get access to them and without it, it wouldn’t be possible [to conduct R&D]. I guess it is a case where, if you have collaboration, it facilitates and eases the R&D process, and reduces costs and time, definitely. (PO 04)
Fifth, resource mobilization for partner organizations was also highlighted as a significant incentive to engage in partnerships and work with PDPs. PDPs often apply for funding that can be distributed among partners, especially in the early stages of R&D, which was mentioned as a significant factor that de-risks later stage investment for other actors, including the private sector, and increases interest in developing products for neglected diseases.

We don’t have our own commercial interests; intellectual property remains with researchers and vaccine developers, enabling our organization to be a neutral and honest broker among R&D partners, global stakeholders and funders. Most of our scientific partners collaborate in developing and implementing a large R&D grant which we mobilize, which provides a common incentive to produce results. (PO 11)

We essentially act as a bridge between funders or donors, the ones that fund us to build upon these technologies. So, in a way, we are providing funding to offset some of the early costs for these companies that are working with us. In other words, what we’re doing is trying to bring down the early R&D costs, for instance, for a company which might not otherwise have invested so early a couple of million dollars or even larger sums, by bringing some donor dollars into that area. So, in a way, we effectively reduce the cost to the company. In return, what we ask for is that they reduce the cost when they go sell this in our target market, which is low- and middle-income countries. (PO 04)

Some of the areas that we work on, most private companies have not thought of putting investments in, because it’s not usually lucrative or commercially viable. We are not talking about making lots of money, but we are incentivizing players to come into certain areas where the critical needs are there but nobody is paying attention. That is one way in which we catalyze development. (PO 04)

Lastly, some private actors may benefit from the knowledge that is generated through collaborating with a PDP, which may generate spillover into more profitable areas:

Let’s say that for some studies a company gives us a drug free of charge so that we can set up the studies. After we conduct studies with a drug that already has a marketing authorization, the company may have an interest because we are doing studies as a pilot or proof of concept in special populations that may interest the company, [they can possibly obtain] a marketing authorization extension for it. The company is always interested in collaborating to find out what is happening with this treatment.” (PO 01)

The findings outlined here underscore that PDPs can facilitate collaboration by offering resources that partners value, thereby bringing them into the fold.
Different types of resources offered by PDPs were highlighted in the interviews, including funding and de-risking later investments, knowledge of the diseases, social contexts and markets in developing countries, facilitating decisions on which products should move forward in the development pipeline and fostering knowledge and data sharing among partners. All of these resources — funding, information and knowledge — are ways PDPs reduce the costs and risks that product developers face, thereby lowering the barriers to goal attainment.

**Impact Outside of PDPs: Comparing Non-commercial and Commercial R&D**

An important but often under-emphasized aspect of effectiveness concerns the impact of a PDP on institutions and collaboration outside the partnership itself (Pathway 5 in this volume’s framework). In the context of pharmaceutical R&D, the external impact of PDPs could be considered as the extent to which their business model could be applied beyond the niche area of neglected diseases. Understanding the extent to which this is feasible requires further analysis of whether the PDP model could be applied more broadly.

In the previous section, we analyzed the role that PDPs play in facilitating scientific collaboration, rather than competition. Scientific knowledge is a cumulative endeavor. It is widely understood that science progresses more quickly and is of higher quality when individual researchers and organizations share information and data, so that each may benefit from the knowledge of others. This is the key principle behind the well-established scientific practices of peer review and publication, and more recent moves toward open innovation approaches. Yet commercial R&D is primarily competitive, with strong incentives for secrecy and exclusivity. The ability of PDPs to broker collaboration is an important aspect that could be emulated beyond neglected diseases, a point to which we will return in the conclusion.

A second key question is the extent to which PDPs are comparable in costs and efficiency to commercial R&D models. If so, this would imply that non-commercial R&D could potentially be extended to other disease areas. We address this issue based on the study described above (Moon, Vieira and Kimmitt 2020) in which we gathered and analyzed evidence on the costs and efficiency (i.e., timeframes and attrition rates) of non-commercial R&D initiatives and compared them to averages from commercial R&D. We summarize the key findings here:

**Costs, Timeframes and Success or Failure Rates**

Our study found that non-commercial R&D differs in many significant ways from commercial R&D. However, it is possible that the sum of these differences would cancel each other out so that total costs and efficiency would be largely in line with commercial averages. Given the small size and heterogeneity of our dataset, our study provides hypotheses for further testing against a larger dataset, rather than conclusions. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study since 2005 that examines costs and efficiency, across more than one
non-commercial R&D organization, and compares it to commercial benchmarks (a ground-breaking study was conducted by Moran et al. (2005), but with a very small dataset given that these organizations were only a few years old at the time). Pharmaceutical R&D (product development) is characterized as being a long, costly and risky process. It typically consists of several stages and multiple phases, beginning with basic research and early discovery, followed by preclinical studies and Phase I (small-scale), II (medium-scale), and III (large-scale) clinical trials, before submitting to regulatory (marketing) approval. The process can vary according to different technology types, leading to a wide range of estimates available for costs, timeframes and success rates.

Regarding costs, the collected quantitative data on non-commercial R&D were largely in line with commercial benchmarks (Portfolio to Impact (or P2I) model estimates), with some variation by phase of development. For the technology type “simple new chemical entities,” total costs for non-commercial R&D were 13 percent higher than the P2I estimates (USD 52 million for non-commercial vs. USD 46 million for commercial). The largest differences were in the preclinical stage and Phase I, where the costs in our sample of PDPs were more than double the commercial estimates. Conversely, Phase II and III trials were less expensive for simple new chemical entities in our data but by a small margin. For “complex new chemical entities,” total costs were similar – 8 percent lower than commercial averages, (USD 54 million for non-commercial vs. USD 59 million in P2I). In contrast to simple new chemical entities, non-commercial preclinical and Phase I costs for complex new chemical entities were lower than for commercial. Notably, Phase II costs were much higher in our dataset (USD 12.7 million vs. USD 6.4 million for commercial). This could be in part due to the higher proportion of Phase II/III trials in our dataset than in the commercial data. Phase III costs were substantially lower than the commercial estimates, which may be explained by the fact that many pivotal trials were in Phase II. The opportunity to forgo Phase III testing would drive up Phase II costs while lowering Phase III costs. The proportion of pivotal Phase II tests may differ between commercial averages and our dataset. The sample size is too small for statistical significance testing or to generalize to other organizations working on non-commercial R&D more broadly; rather, the findings suggest a hypothesis that overall costs to develop simple and complex new chemical entities are similar between non-commercial R&D initiatives and commercial benchmarks.

The qualitative data identified many more reasons why non-commercial costs would be lower than commercial R&D, but did not shed light on the magnitude of these effects. The overall emerging hypothesis is that direct costs of non-commercial R&D are expected to be equivalent or somewhat lower than commercial. Indirect costs for commercial R&D are expected to be higher due to greater overheads and capital costs.

In total, we identified twelve factors that drove costs up or down in the different phases of product development: Three factors pushed costs upward, and five factors pushed costs downward for non-commercial R&D in comparison with commercial (Table 5.2). Four factors were categorized as indeterminate, as
they would affect both non-commercial and commercial R&D in the same way. Table 5.2 presents a summary of the factors influencing costs (Moon, Vieira and Kimmitt 2020).

Regarding timeframes of product development, the emerging hypothesis is that non-commercial R&D timeframes are expected to be equivalent or somewhat longer than commercial. The quantitative data for simple new chemical entities shows that timeframes between non-commercial and commercial R&D averages were roughly similar. Non-commercial R&D had shorter preclinical times (1.65 years vs. 2.49 years for commercial) and longer Phase I times (2.61 vs. 1.80 years for commercial). Non-commercial R&D also had much shorter Phase II times (1.75 vs. 3.38 years for commercial), while Phase III times were slightly higher (3.67 vs. 3.18 years for commercial). Overall, our dataset suggested modestly faster timeframes for non-commercial simple new chemical entity development (taking 9.67 years vs. 10.85 years in the commercial averages). For complex new chemical entities, the non-commercial preclinical stage was much shorter (1.00 vs. 2.87 years commercial), Phase I testing slightly shorter (1.67 vs. 1.93 years commercial), Phase II longer (4.25 vs. 3.51 years commercial), and Phase III longer (4.0 vs. 2.8 years commercial). Overall, non-commercial development time was nearly identical for complex new chemical entities, at 10.92 compared to 11.11 years for commercial.

We identified twelve factors influencing timeframes for non-commercial R&D (summarized in Table 5.3). As with costs, the identified factors were categorized by their potential to push timeframes up or down for non-commercial R&D in comparison to commercial R&D. Seven factors were likely to lengthen timeframes for non-commercial R&D, no factors were likely to shorten timeframes and five factors were categorized as indeterminate. Yet, while the qualitative data identified many more reasons why non-commercial timeframes would be longer than commercial, it did not shed light on the magnitude of the effects.

Table 5.2 Factors influencing costs for non-commercial (vs. commercial) R&D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs Pushed Upward</th>
<th>Indeterminate</th>
<th>Costs Pushed Downward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure building and training at LMIC’s trial sites</td>
<td>Number of arms of the trial</td>
<td>Type of technology (i.e., simpler)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of affected community in product development</td>
<td>Duration of treatment or disease progression</td>
<td>Trial location in LMICs (vs. high-income countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited scientific understanding of the disease</td>
<td>Prevalence or incidence of the disease</td>
<td>Organizational costs (i.e., non-profits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Predictive model and attrition profile</td>
<td>Advances beyond existing standards of care easier to show with smaller trial size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lower input prices for non-profit organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Factors influencing timeframes for non-commercial (vs. commercial) R&D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframes longer</th>
<th>Indeterminate</th>
<th>Timeframes shorter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower availability of funding</td>
<td>Need to develop regimens of multiple products (rather than single products)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slower decision-making processes</td>
<td>Combined Phase 2/3 trials</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer time to negotiate access to candidate compounds</td>
<td>Duration of treatment and/or disease progression</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer regulatory/ethical review</td>
<td>Seasonality of disease incidence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple simultaneous related trials, longer time to reach conclusions</td>
<td>Prevalence or incidence of the disease</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller organization scale or less mature organization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time for capacity building in LMICs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.4 Factors influencing attrition rates for non-commercial (vs. commercial) R&D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attrition Rate Higher</th>
<th>Indeterminate</th>
<th>Attrition Rate Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited availability or use of optimization tools</td>
<td>Type of technology or product</td>
<td>Lower preexisting standard of care means easier to demonstrate benefit of candidate product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited scientific understanding of disease</td>
<td>Testing for multiple indications</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide prevalence or incidence of the disease means broad target population across which a drug must be shown to be effective</td>
<td>Combinations or regimens</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Reluctance to stop the project</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
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Regarding success/attrition rates of product development, the quantitative data were not sufficient for analysis. The qualitative data uncovered more reasons why attrition rates might be higher in non-commercial R&D, but also provided a number of reasons why there might be no difference. Again, the magnitude of the effects is not quantified. The overall very tentative hypothesis that emerges is that success/attrition rates for non-commercial R&D would be equivalent to commercial R&D.

The qualitative data identified nine factors influencing success/attrition rates for non-commercial R&D (summarized in Table 5.4). As with costs and timeframes, the
identified factors were categorized as likely to drive attrition rates higher or lower for non-commercial R&D in comparison to commercial R&D. Three factors were identified as pushing attrition rates higher for non-commercial R&D, one factor as pushing attrition rates lower and five factors were categorized as indeterminate.

If non-commercial R&D is characterized by equivalent or lower direct costs (excluding indirect costs and costs of capital), equivalent or longer timeframes and equivalent attrition rates to commercial R&D, then overall, non-commercial R&D (including PDPs) would be expected to perform as efficiently as commercial R&D. The final expected direct costs and quantity of products resulting from a pipeline of non-commercially developed candidate technologies, then, would largely be equivalent to those resulting from commercial R&D.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Ever since their emergence, PDPs have demonstrated effectiveness across Pathways 1–4 of the volume’s analytical framework, highlighting their potential contribution to expanding access to medicines as a key dimension of SDG 3. This is evidenced by increased funding, renewed product pipelines, and finished products reaching patients on the ground. PDP-developed medicines often offer significant therapeutic advance, are designed to be easy to use in resource-poor settings, with affordability built-in from the early stages of the R&D process. PDPs have also demonstrated the capacity to offer value to partners and facilitate collaboration by playing a number of roles within partnerships. In contrast to commercial pharmaceutical firms for whom effectiveness is measured through financial returns for shareholders, the criteria against which PDP effectiveness must be assessed are more numerous and complex.

What has made these PDPs effective? Our data suggest that at least three of this volume’s proposed four conditions for effectiveness (internal to a partnership) are directly relevant to PDPs: Fostering innovation, sophisticated contracting and credible commitment of resources. The *raison d’être* of PDPs is to foster technological innovation, but this has not been enough: They have also had to adopt innovative practices in order to do so. More concretely, PDPs have carved out a very specific role as “orchestra conductors” within the broader pharmaceutical R&D ecosystem, bringing together public and private actors to work in ways they were not used to. Bringing disparate actors together usually required sophisticated contracting, both to clarify actor roles and ensure that each would deliver what the partnership needed. Control over valuable resources, such as funding, scientific data and access to biobanks, were important levers that PDPs used to secure the contractual provisions with partners that were necessary for goal attainment. In turn, ensuring that the PDP could secure those resources required a credible commitment of funds, usually in the form of multi-year grants from public and philanthropic sources. In this way, the three conditions are intertwined. Assessing the relevance of the fourth proposed condition – adaptability – would require further research on individual PDPs that is beyond the scope of this study. More in-depth analysis of specific PDPs
may also yield valuable insights as to why some are more effective than others and why some enjoy greater longevity, productivity and organizational growth than others.

While PDPs have demonstrated significant effectiveness overall, when considering their influence on institutions outside their own niche (Pathway 5), PDPs’ impact has been limited. In recent years, there has been only one new PDP created focused on developing new antibiotics (the Global Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership, GARDP), and one PDP (DNDi) has expanded its portfolio to address hepatitis C and COVID-19, neither of which are considered neglected diseases; it is no coincidence that GARDP was a project originally incubated at DNDi. Meanwhile, some even foresee a potential shift away from PDPs as the main model for addressing neglected diseases. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has been the single largest funder of PDPs (Policy Cures Research 2020b). However, in 2018 it created the Bill and Melinda Gates Medical Research Institute as a “non-profit biotech” to focus on clinical product development for malaria, tuberculosis and other neglected diseases, despite the existence of (Gates-funded) PDPs already focused in these areas (Bill and Melinda Gates Medical Research Institute n. d.). The future of PDPs thus remains vulnerable to the ebb and flow of philanthropic and developmental aid financing. One reason PDPs have not made waves beyond their own niche area may be how they are framed or understood. Neglected disease R&D is often characterized as a market failure, with the corollary that the market works well for other diseases. Yet, the problems of limited therapeutic advance and high prices of new medicines suggest the market is not working perfectly for other diseases either. But as long as PDPs are seen as acts of charity, rather than as alternative business models, their broader applicability will remain under-recognized.

Our research suggests that various aspects of the PDP model could be applied more broadly to health R&D and possibly beyond. The hypothesis emerging from the empirical data is that non-commercial R&D can be comparable to commercial R&D in terms of costs and efficiency. At the same time, PDPs offer important advantages over commercial R&D in terms of incentivizing therapeutic advances, scientific collaboration, affordability and products well-suited for use across countries of all income levels. Alternative approaches to traditional R&D could use the model of PDPs to generate better outcomes for society. The PDP model may also be usefully applied to needs for technological innovation for sustainable development more broadly, such as for low-cost clean energy technologies, drought-resistant or low-pesticide agricultural technologies, sustainable packaging or clean water (Anadon et al. 2016). In each of these areas, reducing costs and risks and facilitating data and knowledge-sharing to advance innovation – and equitable access to it – could contribute substantially to sustainability.

Two major issues need to be addressed, however, if PDP-type models are to be more widely applied. The first is to identify incentives for scientific collaboration in a competitive commercial environment. A key feature of PDPs has been that they focus on diseases with no commercial potential. This enables them to attract contributions and collaborations among commercial entities, since there
is no potential loss of profit at stake. Contributions to PDPs from pharmaceutical firms are usually considered acts of corporate social responsibility, not core to the business strategy of the firm. For diseases where significant profits are at stake and big rewards go to the first firm to develop a breakthrough product, collaboration will be far more complex to design.

The second is credible commitment of resources, the absence of which has been the Achilles’ heel of PDPs. PDPs rely on public and philanthropic money. Governments and philanthropists would need to allocate sustained funding for R&D, in many cases by pooling this funding internationally, yet most have not demonstrated the willingness to do so. Various proposals have been elaborated over the years, for example, for an R&D treaty that would create binding commitments on public R&D investment (WHO 2012) or the creation of an R&D fund at the Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, hosted by WHO (WHO 2016). Yet none of these proposals has attracted major financial support. Significant public sums have been mobilized, however, for R&D for novel antibiotics (CARB-X n. d.) and epidemic threats (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations n. d.). The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed an unprecedented surge in public R&D investment, mobilizing more than USD 9.1 billion in the first ten months of the pandemic from at least 38 countries (Policy Cures Research 2020a), demonstrating that it is certainly feasible. Yet sustained internationally pooled funding of health technology R&D has not yet been realized. In the absence of long-term public or philanthropic funding, PDPs or other non-commercial initiatives have to find other ways to finance their R&D, for example through sales, limited-profit models or other means.

This analysis has shown that there is potential for PDPs to catalyze more disruptive changes to the pharmaceutical R&D business model. However, to date this potential remains unrealized, and PDPs have treated only one symptom of an R&D system in need of more comprehensive intervention.

Notes

1 From 2007-2018, PDPs received a total of USD 6.6 billion, of which 44 percent from public and 56 percent from philanthropic donors for neglected disease R&D. In 2007, total funding was USD 567 million (41 percent public and 58 percent philanthropic) and in 2018, USD 553 million (59 percent public and 40 percent philanthropic). A break-down by funder shows that the Gates Foundation (philanthropic) has been the main funder, accounting for 52 percent of total funding from 2007-2018 (a low of 38 percent in 2018, down from 52 percent in 2007), followed by government funds from high-income countries mostly the US (US NIH and USAID) and the UK (UKDFID), with 18 percent and 11 percent, respectively (2007: US - 22 percent, UK – 4 percent; 2018: US – 21 percent, UK 21 percent) (Policy Cures Research 2020b).

2 Academic institutions accounted for USD 521 million or 18 percent of total funding in 2007 and USD 1.64 billion or 40 percent of total in 2018. Industry was USD 263 million or 9 percent in 2007 and USD 903 million or 22 percent in 2018. Funding for national government agencies represented 13 percent in both 2007 and 2018, USD 374 million and USD 695 million, respectively (Policy Cures Research 2020b).
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Advancing Innovation and Access to Medicines


Annex

Table 5.5 Products developed by PDPs - List of sources used for Table 5.1

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6 Sustaining Partnerships
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative Case

*Mara Pillinger*

**Introduction**

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is “the longest, largest, most expensive global health program ever” (Matlin 2018). It is also the first and longest-running global health multi-stakeholder partnership. At the global (headquarters) level, the partnership was initially comprised of four “core partners”: WHO, UNICEF, the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and Rotary International. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) formally came on board as the fifth core partner in 2010, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, joined as the sixth core partner in 2019 (after the conclusion of this study).

In 1988, the World Health Assembly passed Resolution 48.12, which called for polio eradication in just 12 years, by the year 2000. It has now taken more than twice as long as anticipated (and still counting). By 2000, GPEI had succeeded in reducing the global incidence of polio by 99 percent. Then progress stalled. In subsequent decades, GPEI survived several near-death experiences and a string of missed eradication targets. The partnership has confronted vaccine-related technical obstacles, global and local political tensions, and community-level social challenges, all of which fueled growing public doubt about whether polio eradication was even possible.

But in the face of these challenges, the core partners maintained an unrelenting commitment to achieving polio eradication and proved willing to reexamine GPEI’s problem solving and sustainability. During the period covered by this study, 2010–2018, GPEI made significant adjustments to its technical approaches and strategies and to the way it operates on the ground, including how it engages with local communities (Abraham 2018; Aylward and Tangermann 2011; Closser 2010; Cochi et al. 2014; Patel and Cochi 2017; Vaz et al. 2016). The partnership also underwent several rounds of organizational reform and restructuring aimed at changing how it is governed and functions at the global level (Pillinger 2019).

This chapter focuses on how the organizational dynamics among GPEI’s five core partners impact the organization’s problem solving and sustainability. In particular, I investigate the sources of the GPEI’s durability in the face of significant challenges and delays in achieving polio eradication. Such durability is a precondition for effectiveness – at least in a sphere such as global governance.

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and development, where meaningful and sustainable progress is seldom achieved quickly and easily.

This question of durability has far-reaching implications for global health governance and for other issue areas where partnerships have become a favored form of governance institution. For the past two decades, policymakers have increasingly chosen to work with and within multi-stakeholder partnerships (Andonova 2017). Across issue areas, the number of such partnerships has increased by 700 percent, even as the formation of traditional intergovernmental organizations has declined by 20 percent (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Kaul 2006; Pauwelyn et al. 2012; Pevehouse et al. 2018). Between 2000 and 2015, funding for global health partnerships grew by 57 percent annually, whereas funding for the four UN health agencies grew by roughly 5 percent (IHME 2018).

Yet, in a way, these partnerships were not built to last. Amid the optimism and adrenaline sweeping global health governance in the late 1990s and early 2000s, global health partnerships were founded with the ethos that they were working to put themselves out of business; with a couple of decades of concerted effort and unprecedented funding, it was thought we could make HIV, TB, malaria, and vaccine-preventable diseases history. However, that has not quite come to pass. And the COVID-19 pandemic is putting those goals even further out of reach – halting or even reversing progress made over the past decades and redirecting financial and human resources away from other global health priorities (Hogan et al. 2020; Joseph 2020; Rauhala, Paquette and George 2020).

So, what happens when partnerships formed for short- and medium-term goal achievement fail to achieve their goals within the envisioned time frame? If stakeholders have not given up on the actual goals or the partnership approach, the crucial question becomes: When the going gets tough, can the partnership keep going? Partnership durability thus becomes a precondition for effectiveness. After all, a multi-stakeholder partnership cannot achieve its goals if the partners cannot weather challenges and conflicts and keep the organization going until those goals are achieved. GPEI’s demonstrated ability to maintain a high level of engagement and resource commitment from partners despite setbacks (prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, at least) makes it an important case for studying partnership effectiveness.

I find that GPEI’s durability is rooted in high levels of goal attainment, value creation for core partners, and collaboration between core partners. These are achieved through sophisticated contracting, the credible commitment of resources, and adaptability. However, the other two pathways to effectiveness have proven harder for GPEI. In the past, GPEI has struggled to achieve a sustainable impact on affected populations (beyond the obvious benefit of delivering polio vaccinations). While the partnership has made tremendous progress along that pathway from the perspective of health outcomes through innovation, it still falls short from a governance perspective. Additionally, the multi-stakeholder partnership’s influence on collaboration and institutions outside GPEI has been limited.

One advantage of the analytical framework applied in this volume (Chapter 1) is that, by disaggregating the various pathways to effectiveness, it allows us to
detect and grapple with the complex relationships between them. The GPEI case makes several contributions to our understanding of these relationships. First, my findings suggest that there may be a temporal or hierarchical aspect to how the various pathways fit together. Of the five pathways, we can distinguish between those that focus on internal aspects of the partnership (value creation for partners and collaboration inside the partnership) and those that focus on its external effects (goal attainment, impact on affected populations, and influence on other institutions). The essence of GPEI’s durability is that the core partners approach “the partnership” not simply as a type of organization but as a set of relationships. Maintaining shared commitment and close coordination among partners has been vital to sustaining polio eradication efforts. Thus, to the extent that a functioning partnership is a precondition for sustainable impact, internally directed pathways may need to precede externally directed pathways.

Second, the GPEI case illustrates potential trade-offs between different dimensions of effectiveness. According to dominant narratives of organizational performance, “good” organizations are both efficient and effective, taking for granted that the two are mutually compatible (Baimyrzaeva 2012; Christensen et al 2007; Diefenbach 2009; Hood 1991; Schedler and Proeller 2010). My findings challenge this assumption. Many of GPEI’s internal governance processes – including its consensus-based, repetitive multi-level decision-making model – are far from efficient. Yet, these processes are crucial to sustaining the partnership as a set of relationships and are the source of its value creation for partners and collaboration inside the partnership. In short, governance inefficiencies paradoxically contribute to GPEI’s effectiveness.

Another paradox has to do with the relationship between GPEI’s effectiveness at the global (headquarters) level and its effectiveness across global, national, and local levels. At the global level, GPEI’s insular “club governance” model promotes goal attainment, value creation for and collaboration among core partners, sophisticated contracting, credible commitment of resources, and accountability – all of which contribute to the partnership’s durability, problem solving, and sustainability. On the other hand, this insularity has also led to the exclusion of non-core partners, including national officials and community members, thereby undermining GPEI’s impact on affected populations and hindering their ultimate goal of polio eradication.

Methodology and Plan of Analysis

This chapter applies the volume’s analytical framework (Chapter 1) to an in-depth case study of a single partnership. I engage in systematic process-tracing and development of analytic narratives, which yield a fine-grain insight into how the various pathways to effectiveness are operationalized and interact with one another at the micro-level, in the context of a single partnership (Creswell and Poth 2018). GPEI is a promising partnership for this type of case study for two reasons. First, as one of the oldest and longest-lived multi-stakeholder partnerships, it is a paradigmatic case for studying partnership durability. Second, GPEI
stands as an example of a partnership whose problem-solving effectiveness has varied over time, and the core partners have repeatedly grappled with how to reform the organization in order to make it more effective. Through an in-depth analysis of these efforts, we can observe how partners approach, prioritize, and manipulate the various pathways identified in the analytical framework in search of improved problem solving and greater sustainability. My findings are based on 25 semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018 with former and current staff from the five core partner organizations as well as outside donors and independent experts.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first give an overview of how GPEI is structured and operates and recount the progress it has made toward polio eradication and the challenges it has encountered in finishing the job. In the third section, I analyze GPEI’s performance through the lens of the five pathways to effectiveness and four conditions for effectiveness. In particular, I focus on how the core partners have progressed along (or failed to) the various pathways through organizational reforms. Finally, I draw on the GPEI case to generate hypotheses about the various pathways to effectiveness that might build upon or compete with one another.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative: Mission and Structure

GPEI’s overall structure is multi-layered – from the global down through the regional, national, and local levels – with complex and porous relationships between the players across all levels.

At the global headquarters level, the core partners work together to develop GPEI’s programmatic and technical strategies, establish financial resource requirements, conduct fundraising and advocacy, and coordinate and supervise GPEI’s activities around the world. GPEI has never had a freestanding Secretariat, with independent staff employed directly by the organization (along the lines of the WHO Secretariat, for example). Instead, GPEI’s global management and operational activities are carried out by staff from each of the core partners who form a virtual Secretariat, collaborating on planning and decision making from within their home agencies. They then carry out partnership activities directly through their agencies’ individual polio programs, which run vertically from the headquarters level through the regional and country levels down to the ground (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014). In addition, GPEI has “outside” (i.e., non-core partner) donors and supporting partners. At the global level, these consist primarily of governmental, multilateral, and philanthropic donors.

The GPEI Secretariat has two leadership bodies: The Polio Oversight Board and the Strategy Committee. The Polio Oversight Board is comprised of the heads of the core partners’ agencies and provides high-level leadership, engagement, and oversight. The Strategy Committee, which manages the partnership’s day-to-day operations and handles lower-level strategic decisions, is comprised of the technical leadership of the core partners’ polio programs and is chaired by the WHO Polio Director, who serves as the de facto GPEI Leader. Beneath the Strategy Committee,
the Secretariat is divided into Management Groups comprised of members from all of the core partners, which focus on different aspects of GPEI’s strategy and operations. The Management Groups are then subdivided into task teams.

At the country level, the core partners work hand-in-hand with Ministries of Health, which are in charge of their own national polio eradication programs, as well as with supporting partner NGOs on the ground. WHO and UNICEF also have regional-level polio eradication programs. Technically, the “Global Polio Eradication Initiative” encompasses all these actors and activities at every level. However, my research focuses on GPEI’s global structure, governance, and operations. Thus, from here on, when I talk about “GPEI,” I am referring to the headquarters level.

In sum, GPEI is an example of club governance – the partnership is governed by the partners who are most deeply engaged with polio eradication on the global level, by virtue of their technical expertise and capacity, financial contributions, or both. In terms of input legitimacy (Mugge 1999), this model is grounded in the principle of selectivity, according to which Board members (whether they serve as individuals or representatives of organizations) are selected by other Board members on the basis of their vested interest or expertise. This stands in contrast with other governance models, such as those in which Board members are elected by partnership members or represent constituencies. The legitimacy of selective governance is derived from its exclusivity and claim to technocratic effectiveness (Koppell 2010). At the same time, selectivity is a controversial input legitimacy principle for multi-stakeholder partnerships because it necessarily excludes certain stakeholders. As we will see, the trade-off inherent in this governance model has important implications for GPEI’s progress along the various pathways to effectiveness.

GPEI’s Contribution to Problem Solving: Progress and Pitfalls

When GPEI was established in 1988, there were over 350,000 cases of polio in 125 endemic countries, and polio paralyzed more than 1,000 children per day (GPEI n. d.; WHO 2018). The task ahead was massive. Though the numbers vary in different parts of the world, ending polio transmission requires reaching 80–99 percent of the world’s children with between four and nine (or sometimes more) doses of the vaccine. GPEI describes the challenge more succinctly: Vaccinating “every last child.”

Thirty years later, GPEI has reduced the global incidence of polio by 99 percent. In the past two decades alone, 20 million health workers and volunteers have been mobilized to administer over 10 billion doses of vaccine to over 2.5 billion children, saving some 18 million children from paralysis (WHO 2017; 2018; GPEI n. d.). Two of the three strains of wild poliovirus have been successfully eradicated, while the third remains endemic only in Afghanistan and Pakistan. No one should underestimate the magnitude of this achievement.

But there is also no avoiding the fact that stamping out the last 1 percent of polio cases has proven far more difficult than anticipated. GPEI has repeatedly
set and then missed target dates for eradication: 2000, 2005, 2008, 2015, and 2018. It was initially estimated that eradication would cost somewhere between USD 155 and USD 250 million. In actuality, it has already cost USD 17.3 billion (GPEI 2020a). Between 1985 and 2002, GPEI spent a total of USD 2.2 billion to eliminate polio in 115 countries. Since 2010, GPEI has spent between USD 850 million and USD 1.1 billion per year to eliminate polio from the final four endemic countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and India.

Moreover, progress has been uneven. For most of the 2000s, eradication efforts stalled and there was “no significant reduction of polio cases” (IMB 2013b). Worse, vaccination coverage rates dropped off in countries that had already halted polio transmission, leaving them vulnerable to outbreaks. However, since 2010, we have seen a dramatic, though erratic, overall decline in wild polio cases, reaching an all-time low of 22 cases in 2017 (though rebounding in 2019 and 2020) (GPEI 2020c). In 2014, India was declared free of wild poliovirus, followed by Nigeria in 2020, leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan as the only two endemic countries (Guglielmi 2020).

What accounts for this erratic progress? GPEI has confronted several sets of obstacles since 2000 (Abraham 2018; Pillinger 2019). At the local level, polio eradication is widely regarded as an idiosyncratic Western priority, and therefore became a convenient political bargaining chip and cash cow, since it is a highly visible and well-resourced program. The flow of misinformation over social media contributed to growing vaccine skepticism. Vaccinators also face resistance from communities that wonder why they should care so much about vaccinating children against polio – of which they have seen perhaps one or two cases – when one in five children die from lack access to basic medical care and clean water. So too, geopolitics has intervened, with religious fundamentalists in Northern Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan banning and boycotting immunization campaigns and, tragically, shooting vaccinators. There have also been technical problems with vaccine failure and inadequate surveillance and immunization campaign strategies.

Finally, there are challenges related to the organizational dynamics of the partnership itself. Crucially, none of the individuals I interviewed (including independent experts and GPEI critics) cited organizational dysfunction as one of the major obstacles to polio eradication. Nevertheless, in the face of external obstacles, GPEI evinced a nearly Panglossian optimism (Abraham 2018; Bristol and Millard 2015; Closser 2010; IMB 2012b). Even as progress flatlined between 2002 and 2010, the partnership continued to advertise the 99 percent success figure and to promise that polio eradication was just a year or two away. For much of the 2000s, this mindset prevented the organization from adequately recognizing and responding to the challenges it faced. In addition, there was growing tension between the original four core partners over how the organization was governed, particularly the degree to which decision-making authority was centralized in the hands of WHO.

Despite all these challenges, GPEI demonstrated the ability to maintain a high level of engagement and resource commitment from partners. With the arrival of
BMGF as a core partner, the core partners repeatedly engaged in efforts to reform how GPEI is governed and operates in order to improve the organization’s effectiveness – at least along certain pathways. The overwhelming takeaway from my interviews was that although the partnership faces no shortage of difficulties in achieving the goal of polio eradication, and although there is no shortage of disagreement among them, the core partners expressed that they are in this together until the end, they will succeed or fail as a unit, and they are committed to collaborating to get the job done. (However, this chapter concludes with a discussion of how the COVID-19 pandemic may be overtaking this ethos.) In the next section, I evaluate GPEI’s effectiveness through the lens of the different pathways and conditions for effectiveness in the volume’s analytical framework and explore how this durability is generated and maintained.

Analyzing GPEI’s Effectiveness

Overall, GPEI exhibits high levels of goal attainment, value creation for core partners, and collaboration among core partners, which they achieve through sophisticated contracting, the credible commitment of resources, and adaptability. Effectiveness along these three pathways is centrally responsible for the partnership’s durability. On the other hand, the multi-stakeholder partnership has at times struggled to achieve a sustainable impact on affected populations. The core partners have made concerted, innovative efforts to improve GPEI’s sustainable impact on a broader range of health outcomes for affected populations. However, in terms of governance impact, the partnership still falls short. Additionally, the multi-stakeholder partnership’s influence on collaboration and institutions outside GPEI has been limited.

Goal Attainment

GPEI’s goal is to eradicate polio. Eradication is an all-or-nothing prospect, which puts GPEI in a unique situation when it comes to evaluating goal attainment: Two of three strains of poliovirus have been eradicated. In 2019, there were 99.96 percent fewer polio cases than in 1988. And yet, as long as there is a single case anywhere in the world, GPEI has not succeeded.

That said, GPEI scores highly on all the elements of goal attainment described in Chapter 1 of this volume. The partnership has been fully implemented. Its stated goal is monumentally ambitious and aspirational – nothing short of wiping a disease from the face of the Earth. If the goal is achieved, it will be directly attributable to GPEI (across all levels of the partnership). Moreover, the fixed and aspirational nature of GPEI’s goal contributes powerfully to the partnership’s durability – particularly when it comes to staving off donor fatigue. As Bill Gates put it:

Eradicating a disease is hard, slow, painstaking work… [But] either we eradicate polio, or we return to the days of tens of thousands of cases per year.
That is no alternative at all. We don’t let children die because it is fatiguing to save them.

(Gates 2009)

It also helps maintain a unity of purpose and cohesion of the overarching strategy among the core partners. A BMGF staffer reflected:

[as] we’ve had more discussions [with people from other health initiatives] about what we can learn for GPEI, [what] we’ve heard from outside the program [is] “Wow, GPEI is such a great partnership! Everybody is on the same page. We wish we had that!” And we just think it’s so funny, because “oh, if you only knew.” But really, it’s true…. The malaria community, for example, is so dispersed and fragmented in terms of strategy. And we, as polio, have clarity on that and everybody is on the same page. So at least the partnership has gotten us that far.10

Two of the conditions for effectiveness described in the analytical framework of this volume support GPEI’s high degree of goal attainment. First is the continuous credible commitment of financial and organizational resources by core partners – particularly BMGF, the US government (represented by CDC), and Rotary, who constitute GPEI’s largest donors (GPEI 2020a). These actors have repeatedly reiterated that they “will do whatever it takes” until the job is done.11,12

The second is the establishment of accountability mechanisms, particularly the Independent Monitoring Board: A group of prominent external experts established in 2010 to monitor GPEI’s performance. Known for its blunt assessments, the Independent Monitoring Board has played an instrumental role in pushing the partnership to learn, adapt, reform, and ultimately become more effective (Bristol and Millard 2015).

**Value Creation for Core Partners**

A second pathway to effectiveness is for the multi-stakeholder partnership to create value for partners. Here again, my overarching assessment is that GPEI scores highly, in part due to the nature of the goal itself. Eradicating a disease is, by definition, a global achievement – something that no partner or sector could do alone and that could not be done without a global coordination mechanism. By providing this coordination, GPEI creates value for the core partners and for other stakeholders at all levels of the partnership.

On a deeper level, the types of value that the multi-stakeholder partnership creates, and the mechanisms and conditions through which it creates value, differ across geographical levels. At the headquarters level, value is created through sophisticated contracting arrangements, including an informal division of labor among the core partners in which each has their own “sphere of responsibility” based on their areas of expertise and capacity.13 These spheres of responsibility were the defining characteristic of the multi-stakeholder partnership’s operating model prior to
the 2013–15 restructuring and still largely apply when it comes to implementation throughout the study period.\textsuperscript{14} The consensus among interviewees was that, in general, this division of labor “works really well for GPEI.”\textsuperscript{15} A WHO staffer emphasized that, over time, it has created “well-established norms of working together [while] respecting [the] boundaries” of one another’s contributions and constraints, which is “very critical, especially when talk[ing] about UN agencies…[because then] the working relationship is easier.”\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, when the limitations of this model became apparent – particularly with respect to decision making – the core partners demonstrated adaptability in revising it, as I discuss in the next section.

Additionally, due to the nature of the goal and of the core partners involved, GPEI has largely avoided conflicts about who is gaining what and whether anyone is pursuing their own parochial interests. For example, none of the core partners have business interests at stake – a situation that can and has created conflicts in other partnerships by introducing doubts about partners’ motivations. These kinds of conflicts often undermine value creation. This is not to say that relations are consistently cordial. There are strong (and healthy) disagreements over specific technical strategies.\textsuperscript{17} At times, the core partners have competed over credit for successes or for financial resources.\textsuperscript{18} Although, once again, the core partners demonstrate a willingness to adapt in ways small and large to address these tensions, for example, by coordinating their fundraising asks and activities and by building trust.\textsuperscript{19}

Looking across geographic levels, the core partners’ activities at headquarters achieve value for regional and country stakeholders primarily through the credible commitment of resources, including funding and technical expertise. For example, an interviewee described their experience working on a social mobilization strategy in an endemic country:

\begin{quote}
[A BMGF staffer] met with us just when we were starting up, and he said “what are your thoughts about social mobilization?”… [We were] targeting a progressive increase of 100 per month for the [rest of the] year. He said, “That’s 1,000 by the end of the year. Why don’t you make it 3,000?” And when he said [that,] I heard both his technical experience, [and the] implication that he was going to make sure the funding was available for it. So that’s a pretty powerful conversation, when you can respect both the technical [expertise], as well as the cheques that go along with that.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

They are also able to shift strategies and resources in response to challenges at different levels and in different countries, as well as to facilitate transfer of knowledge and best practices across countries, though at times they have struggled to do so successfully (GPEI 2012, 2013a). For example, one interviewee pointed to the creation of Emergency Operations Centers in endemic countries, which brought the government and country-level partners together under one roof to coordinate activities.\textsuperscript{21}

However, on the whole, GPEI’s ability to create value for stakeholders at the national and community level is an ongoing challenge. An anecdote from one interviewee sums up this problem quite bluntly:
The best thing somebody once told me was from one of my colleagues in the field...who said, “You guys come here from [HQ] and you tell us ‘You’re doing great work, but you need to do x, y, z.’ And we tell you, ‘Thank you very much, that’s great. We’re going to do that.’ And then you go away and we’re going to do things the way we need to do it. And that’s ultimately the reality.”

GPEI’s struggles in this regard are a frequent target of criticism from the Independent Monitoring Board.

**Collaboration Inside the Partnership**

At the global level, GPEI is a stand-out example of strong collaboration among partners, again achieved through sophisticated contracting and mechanisms of interaction and decision making. The core partners engage in constant, close collaboration and consensus decision making on matters great and small. This requires a substantial time commitment and is arguably inefficient. But the partners insist on it, saying it builds trust and ensures coordination rather than internal competition. To arrive at this system of collaboration, GPEI has undergone an evolution in decision making and governance processes through organizational reform efforts, thus exhibiting adaptability (Pillinger 2019).

In discussing the motivation for organizational reform, interviewees explained that BMGF, CDC, Rotary, and UNICEF were, to varying degrees, dissatisfied with the extent to which the “spheres of responsibility” operating model concentrated decision-making and strategy-setting responsibilities in WHO’s hands. As a CDC official put it,

There was a sense that the [other] partners weren’t always involved in the key decision-making processes within the program, and so they were looking for [internal] transparency and more shared decision making...[and] communication.

The partnership’s 2013–15 restructuring replaced the previous system with a consensus decision-making model, in which each of the core partners has a voice in every decision at every level – often repeatedly, as strategic decisions are rolled up from the Task Teams to the Working Groups to the Strategy Committee to the Polio Oversight Board. This approach is time- and energy-intensive and arguably inefficient, as I discuss below. Yet interviewees felt that it improved GPEI’s effectiveness by strengthening the collaborative relationships between the core partners and ensuring that everyone has an equal voice. As a former UNICEF staffer put it:

[GPEI] is much more consensus-driven... It’s truly [the core partners] coming together and having a discussion, thinking about how to move forward. That’s not to say that there isn’t disagreement or that there aren’t different
perspectives, [and] maybe sometimes it’s not easy to get to resolution on something. But I think what’s really helpful is that it truly acts as a partnership now.28

The individuals I spoke with from all five of the core partner organizations were overwhelmingly committed to this consensus ethos, even when they found themselves on the “losing” end of key decisions. For example, one senior WHO official told me

it did happen a few times that my opinion was a minority opinion among the GPEI partners. So, we followed their decisions, but they knew I didn’t agree with those decisions. But sometimes, in the interest of partnership, you need to do that.29

The Independent Monitoring Board recognized this as well, describing “an improving sense of unity among partners” (IMB 2014a).

Along with greater unity came greater trust. Prior to restructuring, the Independent Monitoring Board and management consultants had observed a lack of trust and collegiality among core partners (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014; IMB 2014a). These tensions surfaced after BMGF joined as a core partner, shaking up the way that the original four core partners had been working together for two decades.30 As a CDC staffer put it:

[w]hen [BMGF] first came on there wasn’t… There was a lot of building of trust around “what are you [BMGF] trying to influence?” Because we [i.e., the other core partners] had been at it a while and we wanted to make sure they were in it, invested in it, like we were invested in it.31

Similarly, an interviewee from BMGF recalled:

Given that we [were] sort of the new kid on the block, with it comes a little of [the feeling that] we have to prove ourselves… But that’s OK. That’s all part of [figuring out] how do we come together… [The core partners] are all very different in our cultures and how we work. And when we come together, we already have preconceived notions and expectations. So, then it’s [a matter of] thinking about, “OK, so how do we weed through that and really get to what’s important and critical, and get the work done?”… It’s the give and take and recognizing that and being able to compromise. It’s a partnership.32

This genuine collaboration among the core partners is the most substantial contributing factor to GPEI’s effectiveness and the key ingredient in its durability. However, the nature of GPEI’s club governance model and the intensity of the core partners’ engagement with one another comes at a price – namely, the exclusion of other stakeholders.33 GPEI’s tendency to exclude non-core partners (including major donors and sometimes Ministries of Health) from decision making at the
global level has long been a focus of criticism, particularly out of concern that it would lead to a loss of support for the partnership (IMB 2012a, c, 2013b, IMB 2015; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014). As a former senior GPEI staffer reported, “we were hearing from the mid-level managers, and regional and country staff that there was a lot of talking at the partnership’s HQ level, but they are disconnected from the implementation level.”

Over time, the core partners have made a genuine effort to address this problem, but within limits. GPEI has become significantly more transparent to outside stakeholders, but not necessarily more open to their input on strategy or operations (Pillinger 2019). For instance, the core partners have invited major donors to attend open sessions of the Polio Oversight Board and select other governance committee members as observers, but have not exactly coaxed them to weigh in in meaningful ways. They also created the Polio Partners Group. At its meetings, leaders of the core partner agencies engage directly with stakeholders and the Polio Partners Group co-chairs attend certain Polio Oversight Board meetings to relay stakeholders’ feedback. The intent behind the Polio Partners Group’s creation was to give outside stakeholders – particularly the governments of polio-affected countries – a greater voice in strategic decision making. However, interviewees who have been deeply involved with the Polio Partners Group reported that, overall, the extent of their engagement and influence has been limited.

Impact on Affected Populations

GPEI’s advancement along the fourth pathway to effectiveness, its impact on affected populations, has been mixed. On the one hand, the multi-stakeholder partnership’s club governance model excludes target populations from governance, thus creating sustainability problems. Limited community input and involvement in global decision making is one of the partnership’s chronic weaknesses and has arguably undermined progress toward polio eradication (IMB 2013a).

The core partners recognize this weakness and have taken concrete steps to address it by increasing country (if not community) representation in HQ meetings, e.g., by creating country-specific task teams in which Ministry of Health officials participate. However, several of the core partners’ staffers interviewed were ambivalent about these steps, suggesting that representation continues to be a problem. For example, one interviewee opined that the new, more inclusive approach to meetings has inhibited frank discussion, since staffers are reluctant to criticize the performance of country programs if Ministry of Health officials are on the call.

However, involvement in formal governance is not the only path to community influence. Arguably, the challenge at the root of all GPEI’s other challenges is that polio eradication is not as high a priority for affected communities as it is for the international community. Many more children fall ill and die from diarrhea and pneumonia than from polio, yet they attract far less attention and funding – a paradox that generates anger, suspicion, and resistance in affected communities (Abraham 2018; Closser 2010; Muraskin 2012). Over the years, confronting community resistance, including a refusal to accept polio vaccinations, has forced
GPEI further along this pathway to effectiveness by innovating and adapting its overall strategy to ensure that they are addressing the priorities of affected populations and creating benefits beyond polio eradication. GPEI-funded health workers now spend at least half their time providing other health services, including routine immunizations, bed nets, Vitamin A drops, clean water, mobility aides, and, in 2020, combating COVID-19 (GPEI 2016, 2017, 2019a–c, 2020b). While GPEI has seen success with these efforts, they are a continuous work-in-progress.

**Influence Outside the Partnership**

At the global level, GPEI has had limited interaction with other partnerships or governance actors that are not polio eradication stakeholders. For this reason, and perhaps because eradication campaigns are a somewhat *sui generis* undertaking, influence outside the partnership appears to be the least relevant dimension of effectiveness for GPEI. That said, certain innovative aspects of GPEI’s structure and governance have become models for other partnerships and governance initiatives. For example, the GPEI’s Independent Monitoring Board is a precedent-setting institutional innovation that inspired the creation of the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, an accountability mechanism for global health crisis preparedness efforts. And the initial proposals for the reform of the Roll Back Malaria partnership (now the RBM Partnership to End Malaria) imitated some of GPEI’s key design features, including its dual governance bodies (the Polio Oversight Board and Strategy Committee) and its operating model (Pillinger 2019, p.686).

In considering the influence on other partnerships and governance actors, it is also worth distinguishing between the influence of GPEI as an organization and the influence of polio eradication as a project. The latter is extensive and quite polarizing. The ongoing failure to achieve polio eradication despite the vast resources expended has fueled debate among global health experts over whether eradication is the right goal, for polio or any other disease (Gallagher 2019). Critics argue that, smallpox notwithstanding, stamping out every last case of a disease is effectively impossible, and that eradication campaigns divert funding from broader priorities (such as universal health care and health systems strengthening) in pursuit of a “white whale” (Caplan 2009; Kareff 2013; Kenney 2012; McNeill 2011). Proponents argue that eradication is ultimately cost-effective and can contribute to building health systems (Cochi and Dowdle 2011; Craig et al 2017; Nandi et al. 2016; Zimmermann, Hagedorn and Lyons 2020). This debate has played out, in particular, around proposals for malaria eradication with disagreements having impacted the work of the Roll Back Malaria partnership (Pillinger 2019).

In sum, GPEI’s durability is rooted in high levels of goal attainment (Pathway 1), value creation for core partners (Pathway 2), and collaboration between core partners (Pathway 3), which are achieved through sophisticated contracting (Proposition 1), the credible commitment of resources (Proposition 2), and adaptability (Proposition 3). On the other hand, the partnership has struggled to achieve a sustainable impact on affected populations and has had limited influence on outside institutions.
Discussion: Sequencing and Trade-Offs Along the Pathways to Effectiveness

Applying this volume’s analytical framework to the GPEI case enables us to tease apart the different pathways and conditions that contribute to the partnership’s effectiveness and durability. Reciprocally, this deep micro-analysis of a single partnership yields some observations about how the various pathways and conditions might interact with one another. My findings highlight several sequencing effects and potential tensions and trade-offs among these pathways.

Internally Focused Pathways before Externally Focused Pathways?

First, there may be a temporal or hierarchical aspect to how the various pathways fit together – namely, that progress along internally focused pathways lays the foundation for progress along externally focused pathways. Of the five pathways to effectiveness identified in this volume, we can distinguish between those that are directed internally and those that are directed externally. Value creation for partners and collaboration within the partnership are firmly bound up in the internal workings of the organization and the interactions between the partners themselves. In contrast, goal attainment, impact on affected populations, and influence on other institutions are more externally focused, having to do with the outcomes that the partnership generates and the impact that it has on actors who are not necessarily deeply engaged with the partnership as an organization.

Logically, there is a clear link between the externally directed pathways (particularly the first two) and a partnership’s problem-solving effectiveness. Nevertheless, my analysis of the GPEI case suggests that a partnership’s durability – its ability to hang together over the long haul and to withstand challenges, conflicts, and setbacks – is rooted in the internally directed pathways to effectiveness.

My analysis finds that the single most significant factor in this multi-stakeholder partnership’s success is that the core partners treat GPEI like a partnership in the truest sense of the word. In other words, the “partnership” is not just a type of organization; it is a set of relationships whose maintenance must be prioritized. The core partners are partners, not just members of the same organization.

In the wake of the 2013–2015 organizational reform, this ethos was operationalized in how the core partners govern the multi-stakeholder partnership and implement its program. Though core partners have competed over credit or leadership in the past, the shift to consensus-based decision making and the trust built through close collaboration seems to have largely (if not entirely) defused these tensions. The individual partners do not distinguish between their efforts and the partnership’s efforts, nor do they claim agency credit for the partnership’s work. For interviewees, BMGF, CDC, Rotary, UNICEF, and WHO are GPEI, and GPEI is BMGF, CDC, Rotary, UNICEF, and WHO (and now Gavi). When staffers from different agencies spoke about one another, they did so with genuine respect. Of course, interviewees experienced the frictions, frustrations, and
dysfunctions that are an inescapable part of any partnership between individuals or organizations. They also amply acknowledged and appreciated one another’s contributions and commitment; without exception, my interviewees expressed that they are in this together until the end; they will succeed or fail as a unit; and they are committed to collaborating to get the job done. At the outset, I argued that partnership durability is a precondition for problem-solving effectiveness – when the going gets tough, an organization that cannot keep itself going will have trouble achieving its goals. Thus, to the extent that internally focused pathways generate durability, progress along these pathways may be prior to, and lay the foundations for, progress along externally directed pathways and overall partnership effectiveness.

**Decoupling Efficiency and Effectiveness?**

At the same time, the GPEI case illustrates potential tensions between different dimensions of effectiveness. According to dominant narratives of organizational performance, “good” organizations are both efficient in their processes and effective in producing outcomes (Baimyrzaeva 2012; Christensen et al. 2007; Diefenbach 2009; Hood 1991; Schedler and Proeller 2010). These narratives take it as an article of faith that efficiency and effectiveness are mutually compatible – and, indeed, that efficiency is key to effectiveness. However, by disaggregating various dimensions of effectiveness, the volume’s framework (Chapter 1) allows us to critically interrogate this assumption. My findings suggest that, in this case, it does not hold up – at least not with respect to the internally directed pathways to effectiveness.

GPEI’s high marks on value creation for partners and collaboration within the partnership are a result of the governance processes and practices that were put in place through organizational reform efforts, chiefly the multi-stakeholder partnership’s discussion-intensive, consensus-based decision making. However, interviewees from all of the core partner agencies readily admitted that GPEI’s decision-making process is repetitive, time-consuming, and bureaucratic – in short, it is highly inefficient. Interviewees described how things have changed:

In all these groups, there are consensuses [reached] within these task teams and committees and then it comes to the Strategy Committee and they have to agree… [and once] the Strategy Committee comes to consensus decisions, some real strategic decisions are pushed up to the Polio Oversight Board and they have to reach consensus as well.43

You can see how many committees there are. So, so many committees, so many different layers, and there’s only a finite number of people in GPEI, so there’s one person sitting on like five committees. [After the restructure] our job became just to sit on these committees. So, your days would be just meeting after meeting…44
There are more levels of decision making [than before the restructure, and] a lot of effort goes into coordination.\textsuperscript{45}

What would take five mins [to do] before, now takes five weeks.\textsuperscript{46}

Outside experts I consulted likened the amount of time the core partners spend consulting with one another as being in a co-dependent relationship; as one put it, “literally, I think that those organizations are in touch with each other every single day; multiple times a day.”\textsuperscript{47}

But despite their commonly expressed frustration with the number of meetings and the slower pace, more than three-quarters of my interviewees felt that, on balance, the new governance processes have been good for GPEI, leading to “considerably closer working relationships” among the core partners (IMB 2012b). For example, a BMGF staffer said that thanks to consensus decision making, the core partners now “speak with one voice.”\textsuperscript{48} Another interviewee told me that GPEI “is largely fit for purpose even though the focus on equal voice for each agency perhaps has implications for slowing down decision making.”\textsuperscript{49} Most tellingly, the core partners have resisted moving away from this model, even though they have been urged to do so by management consultants. One of my interviewees recounted such an exchange:

[The consultants said] “Why does everyone go to all those meetings?” And I’d say, “We have limits on who should be attending each meeting. [People] are there if they need to be.” And [the consultants said], “There [are] too many meetings!” And I’m like, “Yeah, we all agree with that, but that’s how it works.”\textsuperscript{50}

In short, GPEI’s governance practices are highly inefficient. Yet they are also essential to the partnership’s effectiveness because they foster value creation for partners and collaboration within the partnership. Thus, applying a disaggregated concept of effectiveness to the GPEI case reveals an important latent tension within orthodox narratives of what makes an organization effective.

\textit{Global-Level Effectiveness vs. Cross-Level Effectiveness?}

Another important tension at work in the GPEI case is the apparent trade-off between the effectiveness among the core partners at the headquarters level versus effectiveness across the global, regional, and country levels. As we have seen, the club governance model that is responsible for GPEI’s durability at the global level also detracts from the partnership’s cross-level effectiveness, by excluding non-core partners and other stakeholders from decision making and limiting the impact on affected populations. Moreover, the significant majority of interviewees felt that GPEI’s organizational reforms enhanced effectiveness at the headquarters level; only two felt that those reforms had a meaningful and positive impact on GPEI’s effectiveness at the country level.\textsuperscript{51} In fact, most of the interviewees believed that restructuring had not made much difference to the
partnership’s on-the-ground performance one way or the other.52 A few even worried that intensified collaboration at the headquarters level – time-consuming and clubby as it was – had actually widened the gap between the global and country-level programs. For example, one senior GPEI official reflected:

The challenge is how you have country and regional leadership represented in that [decision-making] process because there was really limited buy-in from country and regional staff [into global-level partnership governance] and they didn’t see much value in participation... And it was tough! I don’t think [GPEI] was able to achieve it to the level of efficiency that was necessary.53

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the GPEI case highlights some of the complex dynamics underlying the pathways to effectiveness. In an ideal world, these pathways would be additive and synchronous, such that partners committed to improving partnership performance and sustainability could work to advance along all pathways at once. However, the sequencing effects and trade-offs we observe in the GPEI case complicates the picture. Partners may be forced to prioritize some pathways before or above others. The organizational reforms that partners implement to strengthen some dimensions of effectiveness may detract from others. Of course, the tensions I have described may not be inevitable and the extent to which they are replicated in other multi-stakeholder partnerships is a question for further research. The advantage of the disaggregated conceptualization of effectiveness offered in Chapter 1 is that it allows researchers and partnership members to think through these tensions and synergies.

Finally, it must be noted that the findings from this case study predate the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has cataclysmically upended the global health agenda and may be fracturing GPEI’s cohesion, commitment, and resources. In particular, it has intensified long-standing pressure from outside the partnership, including from other programs within WHO, to dissolve GPEI as a discrete, globally active entity and integrate polio eradication efforts with broader public health services and systems. This transition was always the endgame and planning for it has been underway since 2013 at least (GPEI 2013b). But the plan was for the bulk of the transition to take place after eradication. Then, in December 2020, WHO leadership moved to accelerate this time frame and start the transition in non-endemic countries in 2022, reportedly taking the other core partners and outside donors by surprise (Fortner 2021).

The implications of these developments for GPEI’s durability and effectiveness are not yet clear. In the end, it may be that even a partnership as durable as GPEI is not durable enough to withstand an exogenous shock of such magnitude as the COVID-19 pandemic.54 However, this does not detract from the importance of goal attainment, value creation, and collaboration in sustaining GPEI over three decades of challenges and conflicts, nor does it nullify the findings about partnership effectiveness that we can draw from the GPEI case.
Notes

1 Although this was not the start of BMGF’s engagement with GPEI. They had been a donor since 1999 and became more deeply and publicly involved beginning in 2007.

2 Exceptionally, there are a few individuals carrying out political advocacy work who are employed directly by GPEI.

3 A current GPEI organigram at https://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Updated-GPEI-Organigram_03.18.2021.pdf, though note that this organization structure is similar to, but not the same as, the structure during the period under study.

4 For more on how GPEI is structured and operates at the country level, see Closser 2010 (especially pp.47-52), as well as the GPEI Independent Monitoring Board reports (available at http://polioeradication.org/who-we-are/governance-and-structure/independent-monitoring-board/).

5 Input legitimacy depends on adherence to standards of fairness and transparency in membership selection and participation (Mugge 1999).

6 Polio is an infectious disease caused by the poliovirus. The virus spreads through fecal-oral transmission, either person-to-person or via ingestion of contaminated food or water. The vast majority of infections are asymptomatic or produce only mild flu-like symptoms. However, 1 percent of infections result in paralysis which may be permanent or lead to death. This occurs most often in children under the age of five. Endemic countries are countries that have not halted the transmission of wild poliovirus. A country is certified as having halted transmission when no cases have been detected for a period of three years.

7 Interview 1, March 2017.

8 Interview 4, June 2017.

9 Interview 1, March 2017; Interview 4, June 2017; Interview 7, November 2017; Interview 9, December 2017; Interview 11, March 2018; Interview 14, May 2018; Interview 16, May 2018; Interview 1, May 2018.

10 Interview 11, March 2018

11 Interview 11, March 2018. See also Interview 1, March 2017; Interview 4, June 2017; Interview 5, June 2017; Interview 6, September 2017; Interview 12, March 2018. See also Rauhala et al. 2020.

12 The consequences of the US’s potential withdrawal from WHO for GPEI are not yet clear. However, Secretary of State Pompeo has indicated the administration may continue to participate in polio eradication despite withdrawal.

13 Interview 1, March 2017; Interview 4, June 2017; Interview 5, June 2017; Interview 6, September 2017; Interview 8, November 2017; Interview 16, May 2018; Interview 20, July 2018; Interview 21, September 2018. Traditionally, CDC brings scientific and technical expertise, especially related to labs, surveillance systems and vaccine research. UNICEF is primarily responsible for vaccine procurement, communications and social messaging, and community mobilization. Rotary handles political advocacy and fundraising, while Rotarians on the ground act as volunteers and assist with gaining local political and community support. Finally, WHO serves as the “lead agency” or “chief implementing partner,” liaising with, and providing technical support and capacity to, Ministries of Health to implement vaccination campaigns, as well as monitoring surveillance data. When BMGF joined as a core partner in 2010, it became involved in all of these spheres.

14 Interview 1, March 2017; Interview 11, March 2018; Interview 20, July 2018.

15 Interview 20, July 2018.

16 Interview 1, March 2017; Interview 4, June 2017.

17 Interview 7, November 2017; Interview 13, March 2018; Interview 16, May 2018. See also IMB 2013a.

18 Interview 9, December 2017; Interview 10, December 2017; Interview 13, March 2018.
During the period under study, Gavi was the exception to this, being included in one of the GPEI Working Groups even though it was not a core partner. However, Gavi came to be seen as a core partner, which only serves to emphasize the distinction between those who are in the “club” and those who are not.

These narratives are often lumped together under the administrative doctrine known as “New Public Management.”
References


Introduction

The World Summit for Children in 1990 and the 1991 World Development Report called for national and global compacts on children’s rights and human development, alongside a four-part agenda: creating human development profiles; identifying and costing human development targets; restructuring budgets; and designing a political strategy to garner support (Himes 1995). In particular, the Summit marked a crucial turning point in the setting of “goal posts” for achieving outcomes specifically for children in well-indicated categories (Shaw 2007). The origins of the Summit were squarely articulated in studies of poverty and impacts of the recession on children that were published in the 1980s (Jolly and Cornia 1984). Moreover, scholars and practitioners noted that “Children’s problems are often approached within narrow perspectives which ignore the deeper causes of their unsatisfactory conditions, attaching individual rather than social systems and causes” (Jolly and Cornia 1984). Against this backdrop, the era of goal setting and enhanced collaboration nationally and internationally was born.

In 2000, eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General and later endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Whereas a number of partnerships and alliances were formed to support the achievement of the MDGs, none of the eight goals included a specific reference to violence against children or to their safety and protection. While the Millennium Declaration did identify freedom from “the fear of violence, oppression or injustice” as a fundamental value “essential to international relations in the twenty-first century,” no specific targets or means of implementation were proposed to safeguard it. Early in the 2000s, this was seen as a major shortcoming. In the foreword to the 2002 World Report on Violence and Health, for example, Nelson Mandela argued that “violence is so dominant that it thwarts hopes of economic and social development” (WHO 2002, Foreword). The 2011 World Development Report confirmed this statement, finding that many low-income countries were stuck in “recurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty, and violence” that would block them from meeting any of the MDGs (World Bank 2011, xi). For children, analyses showed that “not a single Goal can be achieved unless
In 2015, the UN Sustainable Development Summit ushered in a totally new set of goals, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2015). In the 2030 Agenda, multiple goals and targets directly related to keeping children protected from violence, abuse, exploitation and neglect were included, mainly as a result of the advocacy of several interrelated coalitions of UN entities, non-governmental organizations and philanthropic actors. Advocates and practitioners – from the UN to civil society, the private sector, faith-based organizations and young people themselves – saw in the SDGs an opportunity to advance the cause of evidence-based protection of the world’s children. Importantly, building on the SDGs’ endorsement of partnerships as key means of implementation of the Agenda (Andonova 2017; Faul 2018) and inspired by earlier partnerships of the MDGs, such as Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, these allies began calling for a new global partnership focused on ending violence in childhood.

Establishing Agenda 2030 was an exercise in both diplomacy and “visioning.” In Spring 2014, the President of the General Assembly asked the New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) to prepare a report for a General Assembly Thematic Debate on “Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies” (Steven 2014). The report found that an influential group of member states believed that a standalone goal for peace and justice would compromise national sovereignty and divert resources from development to security. They argued that peace should and could not be considered an addition to the traditional social, environmental, and economic pathways of sustainable development. The CIC report counter-argued for the inclusion of SDG 16, focused on peaceful, just and inclusive societies. It debunked fear that goals related to peace and security would be used against less stable countries by so-called “more stable” countries. Moreover, it called for “a credible route to implementation” (Evans and Steven 2013) in order to reach political consensus. An increased focus on solutions and implementation platforms eventually turned a normative conversation into a strategic one. The CIC’s paper also posited that SDG16 champions should not wait for the negotiations to conclude to start implementation. Partners were urged to design global partnerships to pilot new approaches and demonstrate their effectiveness. A shift in emphasis from problems to problem solving was a political strategy as well as a practical one. Equally important was the inclusion of the concept of universality and nations being “at one” in their struggle for better lives for all citizens.

Additional insight emerged from informal consultations in 2014 with UN member states. Proposals for SDG 16 covered a range of threats to peace, justice and inclusion, many of which were contentious. Just as there was strong support for an SDG target for ending violence against women (that became SDG 5), there was universal agreement that a target to end violence against children be included, even if a standalone SDG16 may eventually be rejected. The negotiators mobilized
a group of champions for children, believing that “goals against violence” was missing in the SDGs (ChildFund Alliance et al. 2014b). End Violence – the global partnership focused on ending violence in childhood – was founded by four interrelated groupings of advocates, all of whom influenced the positions of member states.

First, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Violence against Children (SRSG) had a mandate rooted in the Secretary-General’s 2006 report on violence against children (UNGA 2008). This landmark study had begun the shift toward evidence-based prevention arguing that “no violence against children is justifiable; all violence against children is preventable” (UNGA 2006). The SRSG called for “a global effort on an unprecedented scale” to end violence, based on strategic partnerships between political leaders, multiple sectors, ordinary citizens and children themselves (Office of the Special Representative on Violence Against Children 2015).

Second, UNICEF – with its mandate from the UN General Assembly to protect children’s rights – alongside five civil society organizations (ChildFund Alliance, Plan International, Save the Children, SOS Children’s Villages International and World Vision International) advocated for children’s issues in the post-2015 development agenda (ChildFund Alliance et al. 2014b). This group mobilized early, describing proposals from the High-Level Panel on the post-2015 Agenda as a major breakthrough for children. Throughout the negotiations, the civil society coalition linked this priority to other health and development priorities for children (ChildFund Alliance et al. 2014a). Agenda 2030, they argued, could only deliver its broader promises to children if threats to their safety were effectively tackled.

Third, the public health community – led by the World Health Organization (WHO), hosts of the Violence Prevention Alliance – was increasingly influential in promoting an evidence-based approach that aimed to understand and prevent violence across a population (see for example, CDC n. d.). WHO and partners marshaled evidence and identified strategies that could be used to protect children from violence. This built confidence that violence against children was indeed a preventable, measurable and, ultimately, resolvable problem.

Finally, the Elevate Children Funders Group – a group that included the Oak Foundation, the Human Dignity Foundation, and private and public philanthropists – played an influential role. Like the child-focused UN agencies, foundations saw violence prevention as a missing piece of the puzzle for child development. The group had substantial convening power and was agile in its deployment of resources. It established a pooled fund with “the goal of securing the strongest possible language relating to [violence against children]” in the post-2015 agenda (Funds for NGOs 2015).

Negotiations concluded with agreement on a standalone target (SDG 16.2) to “end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children” (UNGA 2014). Targets for preventing specific forms of violence and abuse and targets that promote peace, justice and inclusion in the communities in which children live were also included (UNGA 2014). Importantly, the
negotiation process helped build foundations for implementation. Even before Agenda 2030 was finalized, consultations began on the creation of a new partnership to end violence against children.

The resulting Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (End Violence) was a unique and inherently complex cross-sectoral partnership. While there are a host of long-standing partnerships in children’s health, education, HIV/AIDS and other fields relevant to the rights and well-being of children, few existed or currently exist explicitly for the protection of children. Where they did exist prior to the establishment of End Violence, they were neither global in scope nor did they have the very high ambitions of the End Violence partnership. Due to its recent history, End Violence can be characterized as a partnership that remains nascent in its operations. As a consequence, while there is some literature describing the partnership’s structure and activities, and internal documentation is available on End Violence’s website (End Violence, n. d.) and in the archives, a search for more analytical material yields little that advances our understanding of its effectiveness.

By drawing on the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 1, the present chapter aims to start filling this gap in at least three ways. First, it assesses the “aspirations for effectiveness” prioritized by End Violence’s founding partners against its early results in terms of goal attainment (Pathway 1 of the volume’s framework). Secondly, it focuses on how the activities of End Violence strengthened collaboration between the partners (Pathway 3) as a key intermediate pathway to overall partnership effectiveness. Finally, it seeks to analyze the partnership’s outcomes in terms of the volume’s propositions regarding partnership structuring and its relationship to effectiveness (Chapter 1), in particular the conditions of sophisticated contracting and credible commitment of resources. In doing so, the chapter specifically explores the dynamics that come into play in the start-up phase of a global partnership and how they might shape that partnership’s future developments and pathways to effectiveness. For our analysis, we draw on a variety of UN, civil society and academic data sources. No interviews were conducted to specifically inform this chapter, however, the authors both call upon data sources with which they have been consulting since the design and inception of End Violence; much of that was work commissioned for the explicit purpose of establishing the new partnership.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides an in-depth background to the partnership and its relevance to the field of children’s protection and safety. The second section looks more closely at the debates surrounding the design phase of End Violence and how these related to future choices around governance arrangements. In the third section there is a deeper look at the objectives of End Violence and its theory of change, exploring the possibility of measuring steps toward goal attainment in the “start-up” phase of the partnership. The fourth section considers the impact that the establishment of End Violence had on the behavior of End Violence partners and the extent to which the partnership has impacted collaboration and institutional ways of working, another pathway to effectiveness described in the analytical framework of this volume. In this
The Concept of “End Violence” and Its Emergence

Existing partnerships, and the literature about their achievements and barriers to their success, informed the creation of End Violence. A report from the Global Development Incubator (2015) was especially influential in this regard, noting that:

In response to increasingly complex global problems, the global development community has launched an ever-growing number of collective action bodies. A conservative, non-exhaustive count shows a more than fourfold increase in these types of efforts between 2000 and 2015 alone […] When set up well, an MSI [multi-stakeholder initiative] can achieve more-than-the-sum-of-its-parts results.

The authors of the report specifically referenced the SDGs, noting that both collaborative efforts, and increased and pooled finances will surely be necessary if SDG targets are to be achieved. Their recommendations for the process of establishing an effective partnership were heeded by the founders of End Violence: proceed with caution, look at other alternatives, and consider whether the timing is right for such an initiative. In particular, two alternatives to End Violence were considered, but were ultimately dismissed. One was closer collaboration with the office and efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Violence Against Children (SRSG). A second option was to work more closely with existing partnerships Together for Girls (n. d.).

Several additional factors influenced actors on the urgent need for a new alliance. The timing certainly did seem to be right. A global analysis (UNICEF 2014) delineated various forms of violence experienced by children around the world. Data on the scale of non-lethal violence was also increasingly available, as a growing number of countries had undertaken surveys of the prevalence of violence against children, with some receiving financial support from Together for Girls and the US Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2021).
Later, a team of authors led by the CDC undertook a systematic review of surveys on the prevalence of violence, finding that 1 billion – or half of the world’s children – had experienced violence in the previous year (Hillis et al. 2016). Finally, a global learning initiative on violence in childhood was completed, underscoring the nature and extent of the social, cultural and political barriers to the safety and protection of children (Know Violence in Childhood 2017).

At the same time, consensus was growing about solutions as to how to prevent and respond to violence in childhood. During the period leading up to the agreement of the 2030 Agenda, major international actors had drawn on existing evidence to propose recommended strategies for preventing and responding to violence. If Not Now, When? (Steven 2014) compared three frameworks – the SRSG’s eight imperatives, UNICEF’s six strategies, and WHO’s seven strategies. It found that, despite differences in emphasis and language, there was common ground for a synthesis. This strengthened the case for action and investment in developing SDG targets for ending violence against children, with the potential to build support for implementation among governments, the private sector, civil society and funders.

Protecting children against different forms of violence had never been at the top of policy agendas and the field had traditionally been starved of resources, but there seemed to be some potential for integration and to raise the profile of violence in childhood. A review found widespread consensus among partners that “the level of attention and organization by the field [was] still far from what is needed” (Mikulski and Venturini 2016, 7). But the SDG targets provided an opportunity to shift from a narrow child protection lens to a more integrated and cross-sectoral approach to violence prevention. There was also potential to use the coalition formed during the SDG negotiations as a foundation for more sustained partnership. In sum, in 2016 and coincident with Agenda 2030, several factors existed for the protection of children in ways that had not existed before. These factors, including the political context, the power of the involved actors, the ways in which the issue of child violence was understood and portrayed and the characteristics of the issue itself, shaped the political priority which led to End Violence (Shiffman and Smith 2007). The timing was clearly right, and a logical next step was to formalize commitments to setting up End Violence as a new governance mechanism that could provide global leadership on the issue.

**The Design Phase of End Violence**

The design of the partnership was guided by a review of lessons from six existing multi-stakeholder partnerships: Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), SUN (the Scaling Up Nutrition movement), the Education for All movement, the Global Partnership for Education, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and Every Woman, Every Child (Steven 2015b). According to its authors, “the jury is out on whether partnerships are a solution to growing international fragmentation” (Steven 2015b, p.15). Partnerships are often set up in reaction to perceived failures of global governance, making it possible for them to emerge as competing
centers of power. They also face challenges in fulfilling their remit to help major international organizations collaborate more effectively, especially when a partnership was hosted by one of these organizations. Questions were raised, for example, about the hosting arrangement for End Violence and whether the host should or should not be a UN agency. Among the lessons, the review found that “all models of partnership involve a compromise in their design” and that “there is no magic bullet” (Steven 2015b, p.18).

For the purposes of this chapter, the review thus identified a number of trade-offs, each of which had implications for the structuring of the new partnership and each of which covered challenges that the partnership’s leadership would continue to grapple with through its early years.

A first trade-off that the founders of End Violence grappled with was between establishing formal and elaborate governance structures for the global partnership or more ad hoc arrangements. They opted for the former, arguing that formal structures provide legitimacy and offer partners the confidence that their voices will be heard. However, a new entity can easily end up with cumbersome decision making and accountability structures well before it has the budget to need them or the capacity to service them. “The governance you start with is not the governance you need” (Steven 2015, p.16) the review stated, recommending that governance structures should be allowed to evolve over time and show the necessary flexibility in response to unforeseen changes. In the early years, resources could instead be dedicated to what lies beneath formal governance – the leadership team needed to build political support, build relationships and networks and, where necessary, challenge the status quo.

At the level of national implementation, a second trade-off was between “inclusivity and ownership on the one hand, and focus and strategic clarity on the other” (Steven 2015b, p.18). Partnerships had struggled with national ownership and with how to bridge the gap between a global framework and the national political leadership needed to turn commitments into action. “Which countries? And how many?” were key questions for any new partnership, the review argued. The urgency of preventing violence against children would suggest broad coverage should be achieved as quickly as possible. However, keeping the group of pathfinders small would increase focus on countries committed to “making the ‘journey’ from political will, through building a platform for implementation, to delivering at the scale needed to demonstrate results” (Steven 2015b, p.14). Again, questions of adaptability and learning-by-doing became central to the design of End Violence.

A third trade-off concerned the necessity to ensure credible commitment of resources, including through the creation of adequate financing mechanisms. Steven (2015b, p.13) noted that “Money is a lever, but needs to be used with care. Compelling concepts and solutions matter too.” This indicated the need to ensure that the standalone fund would not overshadow the strategic and substantive work of the partnership. Pathfinder countries needed to understand whether they could expect the partnership to provide them with finance for new programs to end violence or, conversely, whether its role was to advise on the case for investment,
propose a portfolio of costed solutions that countries could explore and experiment with and – where necessary – act as a broker for other funders. The former approach was more transactional, with the risk that the formative period of the partnership would be dominated by the need to raise and manage funds and distribute resources to support projects and programs. In the end, the latter was agreed upon.

Finally, the review underlined the importance of building a broader movement that would be able to influence political realities and move the partnership beyond technocratic solutions alone. However, “the promise of movement-building is easier to make than to keep” (Steven 2015b, p.14). Other partnerships had struggled to create a groundswell of demand for policy change. Grassroots networks need support if they are to participate in a partnership on an equal footing with larger institutional partners.

Deciding which options to select in these trade-offs is intrinsic to partnerships, and the incorporation of lessons learned from other partnerships were well received. Most of the partners had long histories supporting work to protect children, and several had experience with other global partnerships, like Gavi, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative or Scaling Up Nutrition. The implications of these discussions for End Violence’s pathways to effectiveness will be further discussed in Section 5.

The Start-up Phase of End Violence: From Theory of Change to Early Evidence on Goal Attainment

End Violence was established with ambitious objectives: building and sustaining political will, accelerating action and strengthening collaboration toward ending all forms of violence against children (End Violence 2016b). The objectives laid out in the zero draft of the partnership strategy were vetted by partners and through a series of global consultations. Using online platforms, the strategy and its objectives were also examined by groups of young people, and attempts were made to incorporate their suggestions.

It was remarkable, given the breadth and depth of the field, that consensus was successfully reached and shared value identified. However, it should be noted that the unifying goal of End Violence was largely aspirational (i.e., the achievement of a world in which violence against children is reduced to zero), and that the three objectives discussed above were themselves not formulated in quantitative terms. As such, in order to understand the extent to which End Violence is effectively attaining its goals, it is important to also explore its theory of change. The changes it seeks are: increased political will for the issues, greater resource allocation, and better interventions to better keep children safe. In its most basic form, the theory of change adopted in 2016 is based on five stages. First, it envisions partners coming together for the safety and protection of the world’s children. Second, it expects partners to agree to the implementation of a package of interventions that keep children safe (through a framework called INSPIRE, which will be discussed below). Third, it assumes that more political leaders and others will
support ending violence in childhood and the implementation of the relevant SDG targets, as evidence accumulates that implementing INSPIRE is successful and affordable. Fourth, it imagines that success will breed success, with countries and other partners sharing lessons learned and more funding flowing to sustain implementation activities. Finally, and as a result, it expects the world’s children to feel – and be – safer and more secure. This theory of change (End Violence 2017) has a number of assumptions within itself. For example, it is expected that partners create national and sub-national multi-stakeholder platforms for the design and implementation of new initiatives to keep children safe. In turn, it is assumed that these will be successful and that success will beget success.

In keeping with the initial debate about partnership structuring, the question of how to ensure credible commitment of resources was uppermost in the minds of the founding partners, and it featured prominently in the theory of change. In particular, the partners agreed to establish a multi-donor Trust Fund as part of the new initiative. While they noted that “the fund itself can only be part of the answer to mobilizing the finance that ending violence against children will need” (Steven 2015a, p.8), its creation shows that resource commitment was intrinsic to the theory of change and the success of End Violence and can be seen as an initial goal attained by the partnership. A major injection of seed funding was provided by the government of the United Kingdom. That funding was tied to a workstream within the overall field, namely ending online violence against children. However, its very presence raised expectations and hopes. The goal was to grow the Fund to USD 1 billion.

The theory of change included the notion of bringing together “pathfinder countries,” of all income levels, that were prepared to implement nationally owned plans to protect children and prevent all forms of violence and abuse from 2016 onward. The aim was to form a balanced coalition of 10–20 countries that could step forward and take the opportunity to lead on this issue – both at home and internationally – with lessons shared among countries as momentum grows. An early indicator of success in this regard was the February 2018 Solution Summit, about which partners conveyed appreciation for learning opportunities and a shared platform (End Violence 2018). That Summit attracted participation at Ministerial level, of young people, civil society leaders, as well as three heads of UN agencies and the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN.

Even more importantly, however, some early evidence about the attainment of End Violence’s objectives can be found in the initial experience of leading pathfinder countries, including Indonesia, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, as well as by virtue of the fact that by 2021 the number of pathfinder countries had increased to 31. These initial pathfinding countries were prepared to announce their commitments to ending childhood violence and to engaging in the new initiative launched with the Secretary-General of the UN in May 2016. Beyond the fanfare of launch and announcing intentions, pathfinders set out to establish coordinating mechanisms, multi-stakeholder steering groups and leaders with sufficient heft to enable the convening of multiple sectors and disciplines that had roles to play in the protection of children.
Success, or “goal attainment” in the partnership pivoted on a number of countries becoming early adopters of the End Violence Strategy. The logic was that countries would announce an interest in pathfinding as an indication of political will. This would lead to an increase in the allocation of resources to support the implementation of relevant components of the partnership’s evidence-based intervention tool (INSPIRE). With more resources, implementers would be able to do more to accelerate action. Thus, pathfinding was a way to begin the process of country engagement and, from there, the engagement of national governmental and non-governmental actors working to protect children.

Sweden was the first country to take up the End Violence challenge and was designated a focal point. As with many other countries, there were questions about working domestically on the issues and providing international support. A staunch supporter of child protection programming around the world, it was the first time that Sweden looked at its domestic situation. The country joined End Violence at a time when greater numbers of unaccompanied migrant children than ever found themselves on Swedish soil. The Swedish authorities wanted to join the partnership to learn from others about such things as ways to effectively realize the rights of children on the move. The Swedish Minister responsible for health and social welfare joined the founding Board of End Violence.

Tanzania was another pathfinder, with a history of accelerating work in the area of child protection. In fact, Tanzania was the first country, with the support of the US CDC and later Together for Girls, to complete a household survey on violence in childhood. As a pathfinder armed with the evidence of the survey, Tanzania convened multiple partners to develop a national plan of action for the safety of its youngest citizens (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania 2016). Tanzania took things a step further: costing their plans and the implementation of relevant aspects of the INSPIRE package. The Tanzanian Minister of Health was the founding co-Chair of End Violence, although timing of meetings and competing priorities impeded her active involvement in governance.

For Mexico, the pathfinding experience is best described as stop-start, in large part because of political processes, election cycles, and the inherent demands of a federated state (Government of Mexico 2017). Mexico announced pathfinding at a time when elections were ongoing for the Head of State and other leadership positions. Ministries and departments were nevertheless convened, from health to education and from law enforcement to social welfare. Decision makers at the highest levels were involved in committing Mexico to the partnership, signifying strong political will and leadership. Mexico had a seat on the founding Board although the national elections at the time prevented more active engagement.

Indonesia was the fourth pathfinder and also completed the household survey on violence in childhood (End Violence 2016a). The State hosted a visit from senior Swedish officials to discuss and compare notes on pathfinding. Indonesia’s Minister overseeing child protection held a seat on the founding Board of End Violence and took an active role in convening partners inside the country. She remained an active and animated leader through the Solution Summit and beyond.
Collaboration between Partners

During the first few years of End Violence, partners saw value in collaborating (Shawar and Shiffman 2021): End Violence was a novel idea, and there were high hopes for resource mobilization. As mentioned, the 2018 End Violence Solutions Summit was also a collaboration highlight. Partners shared a global stage, with Heads of UN agencies, Ministers and even one Head of State in attendance. Strong collaboration leading up to and during the Summit generated goodwill. It also yielded a number of lessons learned and other insights. Partners spoke favorably of their interactions at the Summit with governmental and non-governmental partners and leaders (End Violence 2018). In the short term, at least, collaboration was highly valued and modeled partnership behaviors.

Moreover, the necessity of moving toward the implementation of the initial steps of End Violence’s theory of change led to increased collaboration and yielded significant results. In this stage, the founding organizations were particularly focused on developing guidance and credible indicators on effective interventions. Prior to the establishment of End Violence, UNICEF had published, alongside a data compendium on child protection, a handbook of what works (UNICEF 2017). Partners built on this and other resources to create a new publication describing evaluated interventions that implementing countries were expected to draw upon. The outcome was a set of proven and effective interventions called INSPIRE: Seven Strategies for Ending Violence Against Children (WHO et al. 2016). INSPIRE identified a select group of strategies that had shown success in reducing violence against children including implementation and enforcement of laws, norms and values, safe environments, parent and caregiver support, income and economic strengthening, response and support services and education and life skills (WHO et al. 2016). In turn, End Violence called for the collective and deliberate implementation of INSPIRE by partners in pathfinding countries, within inter-sectoral and interdisciplinary costed plans of action. This was a departure from the single-issue plans implemented by different ministries and institutions to keep children safe. It is still premature to evaluate the level of national collaboration in the deployment of such a toolkit.

What is clear, however, is that finding value in End Violence’s objectives and theory of change had different meanings for different partners from the earliest days. Smaller NGOs, on the one hand, welcomed the opportunity to join hands with some of the bigger organizations with larger budgets and staff. Conversely, some of the bigger partners were concerned about ceding territory to others and also feared that the partnership might supplant and/or divert existing funds. Hence, the value proposition of End Violence, while enthusiastically welcomed from the outset, has always been – and remains – an open question, with different partners interpreting differently the value that was accruing to them. Inevitably, these conflicting perspectives on value creation had a bearing on the extent to which the partnership were able to mobilize and improve collaboration between global partners.

From this perspective, several challenges to collaboration emerged. The first one was linked to resource mobilization. Few core funders put money into End
Violence and/or its Fund. Rather, they subscribed to the principles, objectives, and aspirations of End Violence but maintained funding streams that predated the SDGs and the partnership. So, in fact, collaboration was encouraged but never rewarded monetarily for partners, pathfinder countries or others.

The second challenge concerned the emergence of conflicting views among the partners on a series of logistical and governance arrangements, including the question of hosting End Violence. From the outset, the UK government asked UNICEF to host the Fund; UNICEF seemed a natural host, since headquarters staff in New York had been active from the start. There was some discussion about housing End Violence outside the UN System, but no alternative solutions were offered. Moreover, partners were looking for a quick solution, and anything other than using an existing administrative and financial system would have taken some time to establish. Finally, UNICEF could offer rent-free office space to the End Violence Secretariat. It thus seemed illogical and costly to separate the Fund and the Secretariat. However, immediate problems emerged with this choice. Some partners felt that UNICEF already dominated the child protection field, and hosting the initiative would grant UNICEF too much influence on strategic direction, priorities and other activities. Furthermore, critics felt that UNICEF would be too close to the new influx of funding and overshadow smaller, worthy partners. Additionally, the optics of hosting End Violence in UNICEF were also questionable and potentially confusing; some felt that the partnership would be seen as part of the UN system, not an independent, public-private initiative. Others said that the hosting choice tilted the balance in the direction of colonial development assistance models; a partnership where the global North would be dictating once again to the global South. This is to an extent inevitable with a UN host like UNICEF; however, it reinforced initial obstacles to partner collaboration.

The third challenge to collaboration concerned the difficulty of mobilizing sufficient domestic ownership for End Violence’s agenda, particularly in the global North. End Violence always intended to be a global partnership, however, this proved difficult for many high-income countries. On the one hand, many of these countries assumed their support for End Violence would be through providing resources to low-income countries by donating to the Fund. End Violence, however, was premising its success on countries at all income levels implementing INSPIRE domestically. While providing support to the Fund was always presented as an option, it was a secondary goal of the partnership — accelerating action was the principal aim. On the other hand, End Violence was calling for an all-of-government approach to the safety and protection of children; however, the rallying of appropriate ministries and departments was entirely novel, as was the domestic implementation of INSPIRE. In the United States, for example, more than 30 federal government departments and agencies have some role in the protection of children internationally (USAID 2012); a number which increases exponentially when one considers domestic departments and agencies responsible for children within the United States. For many countries, convening and coordinating multiple actors was difficult even prior to Agenda 2030. In other countries, it was difficult to appoint a coordinator with
sufficient power for effectiveness and efficiency. On a more positive note, however, for seemingly the first time, health ministries were given a constructive and coordinated role in addressing the rights, well-being and safety of children beyond immunization and nutrition. Even in countries where the health sector addresses child abuse, prior to End Violence there had been few examples of coordinated, integrated efforts involving justice, social welfare, education and others.

Partnership Structuring and Its Impact on Collaboration

**Sophisticated Contracting**

From the start, the design choices adopted by the End Violence founders made it a highly formalized partnership, characterized by a number of detailed governance arrangements. Indeed, while there was a strong desire to keep the governance of End Violence “light,” this was perceived as impossible from the outset, owing to its global scope, broad objectives and diversified stakeholder composition. A number of principles thus guided the development of the partnership’s tripartite governance structure.

First, cognizant of how other partnerships had designed their Boards, End Violence aspired to a Ministerial-level Board. Board leadership was to be gender-sensitive, to have one lead from the North and one from the South and to reserve seats for civil society, foundations, governments, the private sector and/or UN agencies. Membership was very fluid initially; the specifics of which constituency would be represented (or not) on the Board was unspecified. The hope for high-level engagement was linked to the first objective of the initiative to gain and sustain political will and to raise the profile of ending violence in childhood. Annual meetings of this Board meant a light commitment on the part of Board members, recognizing their busy schedules and multiple commitments. UNICEF’s Executive Director and the Tanzanian Minster of Health and Social Welfare were the first Board co-Chairs.

In contrast, the second level of End Violence’s governance, the Executive Committee, was more of a working collection of Director-level professionals. It was chaired by a foundation head, with a civil society organization or UN agency representatives acting as deputy chairs at any given moment. This Committee worked closely with the Secretariat while the End Violence Director reported to the Chair of the Executive Committee. Meeting four times a year and heavily active in setting strategic direction and priorities, the Executive Committee was comprised of representatives from across the globe.

The Chair of the Executive Committee was also a sitting member of the overall Board. Moreover, information flowed between these two bodies in other ways. The Secretariat played a part, as did Executive Committee Members who were also represented on the Board. Importantly, the Acting Director of the End Violence initiative reported to the Chair of the Executive Committee. This was considered important to the independence of End Violence. It would be seen as
an initiative acting on the wishes of its governing bodies, rather than on those of a particular member organization, Member State or other entity.

A third body was set up to guide and manage the Trust Fund. With its heavy focus on safety and protection of children online, this body interacted closely with the then UK government’s We Protect initiative; a collective concerned about on-life safety and children, that has subsequently become an independent entity. The Fund Unit in the End Violence Secretariat set out criteria for calls for proposals for resources in the Trust Fund. That Unit established a roster of experts to review proposals and to make recommendations for funding. In turn, the Fund Steering Committee reviewed recommendations and approved and/or suggested alternatives. This Committee was comprised of funders, a dedicated seat for the UK government, a member of We Protect, and others. The Chair of the Fund Steering Committee reported to the Executive Committee; communications to the Board were also ensured through informal meetings and discussions and, of course, via the liaison work of the Secretariat.

As is perhaps obvious, the resulting governance structure was bulky and was perceived by some as a threat to the effectiveness of the partnership, despite a widely shared idea that a certain level of formality was inevitable. This is especially true given the ambitious goals of End Violence and the attempt to capitalize on the initial financial contribution by the UK government to the new Trust Fund. But is there any early evidence of the actual influence that these specific governance arrangements had on End Violence’s outcomes? On the one hand, the partnership’s Secretariat spent considerable time servicing the various governing bodies, for the most part, without sufficient human resources. In the initial months of the initiative, there were no staff solely dedicated to governance, but there were opportunities to call upon the expertise of consultants. On the other hand, by building an inclusive governance structure, End Violence’s formalized governance likely had a positive impact on collaboration between the partners. Though cumbersome, these governance structures provided an opportunity for all partners, on a rotating basis, to be part of shaping End Violence – at least in the initial stage of its activities – in all levels of the governance structure.

**Credible Commitment of Resources**

Another question on the conditions of End Violence’s structuring concerns the extent to which the credible commitment of resources by the partners potentially improved the effectiveness of the partnership. From the outset, the funding of End Violence was challenging, both funding the Secretariat and activities in the Business Plan and developing a relationship between End Violence and the newly-established Trust Fund. However, partners appeared committed to solving these challenges and, in so doing, built mutual trust toward increased collaboration. With respect to funding the Secretariat, UNICEF was particularly engaged and generous with its initial support: hosting the initiative at no cost; providing staff members with funds for the first two years for recurring operational expenses and for some activities; and providing additional staff and financial
support leading up to and during the 2018 End Violence Solutions Summit. Other partners also contributed staff time: some seconded, some remaining in their own organizations giving days-per-month to the efforts of the Secretariat. Civil society partners in particular stepped up in this respect. In addition, one government seconded a staff member into the Secretariat remotely. That staff member joined as a key partner to End Violence, working out of the WHO office in Geneva.

Lastly, and in keeping with another proposition of this volume’s analytical framework (Chapter 1), there was an eagerness to create flexible and innovative solutions to support the implementation of the partnership. First, since some private and philanthropic partners were not able to put their money into a UN agency, they set up a parallel source of funds called Ignite Philanthropy. The Secretariat largely accessed these funds to hire consultants to assist with work on indicators and measurement, to establish the Trust Fund, and recommend possible designs for governance. Signing powers for the Ignite funding was vested in a member of the Fund Steering Committee and the Chair of the Executive Committee. Secondly, the dedicated Trust Fund was established with an ambitious fundraising goal of USD 1 billion. This was consistent with a recommendation made in the review by the Global Development Incubator (2015, p.26) “Go big or go home with a fund.” The idea was to provide easily accessible funds for efforts in the field that would show success.

Nevertheless, after the Trust Fund was set up, certain aspects of resource commitment became more controversial. In a field starved of resources, founders had committed that the Trust Fund would not draw from funding already destined directly for or to partners. The initial injection of GBP 40,000 from the UK government,3 was indeed not sourced from official development assistance (ODA) but rather from the Home Office. This was a marked departure from traditional sources of funding for the protection and safety of children internationally, since these sources tended to be ODA with funds flowing from the global North to the global South (for example, from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department of International Development (DFID, now Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office) and others). Apart from the initial funding from the UK and private foundations that found innovative ways to support the Trust Fund, most other sources of funding for End Violence tend to be drawn from governmental ODA. Japan, for example, provided funding drawn from ODA for the third pathway of the fund: protecting children in humanitarian settings. Moreover, governments found it difficult to source additional funds for ending violence against children, preferring to divert resources that may otherwise have flowed directly to UNICEF or civil society organizations in the global South. There was some confusion initially arising from the fact that UNICEF hosted the Trust Fund, while UNICEF is itself a “fund.” UNICEF, as a fund, commits resources only to low- and middle-income countries; meanwhile, the End Violence Trust Fund (hosted by UNICEF) was not limited to countries of particular income levels.
Another challenge to the Trust Fund was the earmarking of contributions to specific issues, which appeared to run counter to expectations of greater trust and collaboration by the partners in pooling resources. For instance, the contribution from Japan was targeted only at children’s safety in humanitarian contexts, and the UK Home Office made their initial pledge of support solely for the protection of children from forms of online violence. Some foundations’ support was also strictly tied to online violence in childhood. However, in its initial phase, the Trust Fund desperately needed to raise resources and thus accepted such earmarked funding. Thus, the financial resources that were committed were credible. Nevertheless, the way that funds were committed (restricting funds or specifying particular issues) rendered the Fund largely donor-driven and created a potential threat to effectiveness by setting limits on the partnership’s responsiveness to its target populations and on its ability to work toward all of its goals equally.

Finally, even with respect to the question of the human resources contributed to the partnership, there were some drawbacks in terms of effective collaboration. While appreciated, the secondment system limited the possibility of securing staff members with relevant expertise and skills. Moreover, some of the seconded staff members worked remotely from within their respective organizations which demanded additional coordination efforts. Furthermore, while UN recruitment rules were relaxed to some extent (for example, the hiring panels were not solely from UNICEF but also included another partner from End Violence), the turnarounds time to bring new staff in was still lengthy. It can be argued that these staffing challenges were directly related to the question of funding, since secondments would not have been needed had there been sufficient resources to hire freely into the Secretariat.

Conclusions

End Violence – the partnership and fund – were created to fill a major gap in the existing partnership landscape. Accompanying the new SDGs, the initiative was designed as a means to implement the targets related to the safety and protection of the world’s children. End Violence has achieved a great deal in its first years of existence, but it is still plagued by the kind of challenges typical of this type of partnership in addition to some new hurdles that are unique to this field of work.

The ultimate measure of effectiveness for End Violence will rest in achieving the various SDG targets that relate to the safety and protection of the world’s children. The idea of drawing more attention to children’s safety and protection at the highest levels of government, civil society, the private sector, among faith leaders and others was – and remains – strongly appealing. Ultimately, child protection leaders want to see the safety and protection of children the world over afforded the same respect and resources as other areas including child survival, primary education, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS and nutrition. The End Violence partnership and fund seems an excellent way to achieve this.

As End Violence matures, its wider impacts would become more evident and possible to scrutinize. There is to date no formal evaluation of End Violence.
Even so, for the aforementioned reasons, some adjustments now may serve the efficiency and effectiveness of the partnership. On the one hand, it can be argued that while the initial design phase of End Violence focused on the need for sophisticated contracting in order to establish a governance structure that was acceptable to all partners, the initial issues faced by the partnership suggest that governance mechanisms, hosting arrangements and agreed-upon goals may already need to be revisited as the partnership continues to evolve. Adaptability is important to any successful partnership, and End Violence is no exception.

In addition, the credible commitment of resources is likely to remain a major issue in at least two ways. First, the partnership and its Trust Fund continue to need staffing and financial support. Secondly, the governing bodies of End Violence also require adequate servicing and resources, implying the need for broad and flexible investments from partners. Ultimately, the success of the partnership and its associated Trust Fund will therefore hinge upon the continuous engagement by champion governments and other private sector and foundation partners that can help keep this inter-sectoral issue high on the political agenda.

Notes

1 The chapter uses the words safety and protection interchangeably. Internationally, work on violence, abuse, exploitation and neglect has, since 2008, been referred to as “child protection” (UNICEF 2008). Violence is used by some as the overarching description for all adverse childhood experiences, as well as to identify structural, cultural and social dimensions of life that negatively impact children.

2 In its 2019–2021 strategy, End Violence has slightly changed its strategic objectives, which are now: (i) growing the global demand for action to end violence against children; (ii) mobilizing new resources; and (iii) equipping practitioners. However, the new objectives are still formulated in qualitative terms (End Violence 2019).

3 As noted earlier, a commitment of GBP 50,000 was made. The establishment of the Trust Fund took a number of months, thus the first tranche of GBP 10,000 was administered directly by UNICEF. Thereafter, the Trust Fund and its governance structure was responsible for the remaining resources.

References


Part III

Crosscutting Themes
8 Partnerships under Pressure
Lessons on Adaptation and Overcoming Challenges

Amanda Sardonis and Henry Lee

Introduction
Partnerships are inherently challenging. They require two or more partners to share common goals and to work together over the lifetime of a project. While each partner may bring different skills, experiences and resources to the partnership, each also has different cultures, priorities and needs. Allocating responsibilities between partners to maximize effectiveness is thus a complex endeavor – even when partners are in the same sector. Moreover, external factors such as government changes or fluctuations in business cycles may place partnerships under pressure. In some instances, partnerships may be unable to gain needed political support or obtain financing. In other cases, catalytic events or trends that partners anticipate may not occur; or partnership arrangements become plagued by governance problems in the operation and management of the project.

In sum, realizing and sustaining the benefits of the partnership while minimizing financial and political costs can be daunting, requiring a high level of flexibility, creativity and commitment among the partners. This is why the capacity of a partnership to adapt and learn as conditions change is increasingly discussed as an important indicator of its ability to overcome challenges and achieve its overarching objectives (Andonova 2017; Cheng et al. 2015; De Burca et al. 2014; Hoffmann 2011; Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). In this volume, the presence of processes that facilitate the adaptability of partnerships is hypothesized to be a condition leading to greater partnership effectiveness (see Chapter 1).

This chapter investigates the durability of partnership arrangements and their adaptability as a key condition for partnership effectiveness and long-term sustainability, consistent with Proposition 3 of the volume’s analytical framework. We study a set of partnership initiatives selected as finalists for the Roy Family Award for Environmental Partnership, a biennial award established in 2003 by the Harvard Kennedy School to recognize effective, high-potential and innovative cross-sector partnerships that create significant benefits for the partners, their stakeholders and the environment. Since its inception through the end of 2018, 43 separate partnerships were selected as finalists and eight were chosen for the Award, with a significant variation in geographic scope, the range of topics addressed and sustainability impacts. To assess if and how these partnerships
lived up to their initial potential, we sent a survey to 37 of these partnerships. Our goal was to understand whether and how they adapted to overcome the challenges that they encountered. In this chapter we summarize the responses to this survey and present three case studies examining in greater detail the varying level of adaptability of the three partnerships, the different dynamics of such adaptability and how the partnerships’ ability to adapt impacted their effectiveness.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we present a brief history of the Roy Award program and discuss our methodology. Next, we briefly discuss the results of the survey of the 37 partnerships before introducing the three case studies – the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project, Mexico City Metrobús, and Alianza Shire. Finally, we provide a comparative discussion of how adaptability influences pathways to effectiveness across the three cases and present our conclusions.

Research Methods

The Roy Award Program

Since 2003, the Environment and Natural Resources Program (ENRP) at the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) has presented a biennial award to a “cross-sector partnership that enhances environmental quality through novel and creative approaches” (Belfer Center 2021). The award recognizes the most promising of these partnerships and provides a positive incentive for governments, corporations and organizations to push the boundaries of creativity by taking risks that result in significant environmental value. Recipient partnerships must demonstrate a high level of creativity, make a significant contribution to the environment and have the potential to be replicable in other regions and countries.

When the award was established, the program defined public-private partnership as a cooperative, authority-sharing relationship between actors in the public sector (governments large and small and/or government agencies, intergovernmental organizations) and the private sector (corporations, civic organizations). In 2003, terms like multi-stakeholder partnerships and cross-sector partnership were not in wide use. “Public-private partnership” was thus a recognized and recognizable shorthand for cooperative relationships with actors in different sectors. Perhaps because of the legal and contractual implications of the term “partnership,” we have seen a widening of the terminology used to include collaborations, alliances, cooperative ventures, inter-organizational collaborations, multi-sectoral relationships, distributive governance, collaborative alliances, etc. Over the years, the Roy Award has shifted its language from public-private partnerships to cross-sector partnerships in order to reflect the progressive widening of the partnership terminology.

The Roy Award program uses three basic criteria for identifying potential nominees and assessing nominations: each must engage in a partnership, defined as participation of two or more separate organizations or actors; those organizations or actors must operate in at least two different sectors (academic, civic,
Partnerships under Pressure

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business, government or non-profit); and the partners must work together collaboratively on a project or program that tangibly improves the quality of the environment. Nominations that meet the basic criteria and nominees identified by the program undergo a preliminary assessment using four evaluation criteria: innovation, effectiveness, transferability and significance. Notably, the concepts of innovation and effectiveness are defined slightly differently than in the present volume. More specifically, the notion of innovation refers to the creativity of the project’s approach to solving an environmental problem, as well as to creativity in partnership design. Effectiveness is measured by determining if and how the project has made demonstrable, concrete progress toward achieving its goals.

After an in-house review, the pool is narrowed down to between five and seven finalists. These finalists are not necessarily the six highest scoring partnerships in the pool, but represent a diversity of regions, topics, and partnership structures. A comprehensive assessment is prepared on each finalist, which is sent to a panel of external reviewers. The purpose of the external review is to gather expert opinion to inform the Harvard selection committee, which selects the winner. The Award is not a “lifetime achievement award,” and the winner does not receive a monetary prize. The recognition from Harvard University confers political and academic credibility that can be leveraged into additional funding, increased buy-in from potential partners and stakeholders, and a potential push to scale-up operations or inspire other partnerships in different regions.

The Roy Award Dataset and the Survey

The Roy Award process has resulted in the detailed evaluation of 43 partnerships that were selected as finalists over the course of eight two-year cycles (2003–2018). Partnerships varied in the number of partners (as few as two, to as many as several hundred), topic areas, governance structures and geographic regions (see Figure 8.1). Partnership categories have shifted over time, with the early award cycles dominated by projects focusing on forests or conservation and energy, while more recent cycles have become more diverse in topic areas. This change is a result of the breadth of partnership activities in recent years as well as a concerted effort to include a range of environmental projects in each slate of finalists.

The advantage of this set of partnerships to study questions of variable effectiveness is three-fold. First, the partnerships have already met baseline criteria for potential effectiveness including demonstrable, concrete progress toward achieving goals, innovation in their approach and collaborative process of partnering and transferability for additional higher-order impacts. Second, the evaluations contain historical information including why and how the partners came together, how they leveraged partners’ strengths and resources, and a record of their stated goals. The final advantage is a practical matter. Since the collected information contained the names of the people working in the partnering organizations at the time the partnerships were active, these individuals served as survey participants and interview subjects. Given that web searches to determine the continued existence and evolution of the Roy Award partnerships proved inconclusive, these
Figure 8.1 Roy Award partnerships by topic area and geographic region. Source: Authors.
survey and interviews provided a unique opportunity and data to examine questions of the durability and effectiveness of partnerships.

At the same time, the Roy Award partnership dataset has limitations. Some of the evaluations were prepared more than 15 years ago, so some information is outdated. Furthermore, many of the evaluations were conducted in the beginning and mid-life stages of the partnership and, in some cases, there are no data on actual goal attainment as opposed to aspirational or potential achievements. To determine if a partnership was still in existence or how it ended or evolved, we reached out to the individuals whose names we obtained from the original evaluations and asked them directly about the status of their partnership. To standardize our inquiry and gather richer information, we prepared an online survey questionnaire with one opening question: “Is the partnership operating today?” If the respondent answered no, they received a set of five additional questions about the partnership end date, the reason(s) why the partnership ended, goal attainment and value creation. If the respondent answered yes, they received a set of four distinct questions about goal attainment, how the partnership has changed and current and future challenges. The survey was designed to elicit answers to the following questions: why do some partnerships demonstrate effectiveness – in creating value in a durable manner and meeting their goals – while others fail to adapt to changing circumstances and shocks? What are the challenges partnerships face and how do partnerships change over time to overcome them in order to attain their goals and create value?

We contacted 134 individuals from 37 partnerships, finalists and winners from 2003 through 2016 (we did not survey the six finalists from the 2018 cycle since they had been recently evaluated). Out of the 37 total partnerships contacted, representatives of 27 partnerships responded. Forty-nine survey responses were received in total, of which 44 (i.e., 90 percent) were complete with usable information (Table 8.1).

After compiling the survey results, we divided the insights thematically into those pertaining primarily to challenges faced by the partnership and those illustrating the evolution of the partnership in response to such challenges. This helped us to understand the role of adaptability as a condition for partnership effectiveness and its influence on the ability of the partnerships to endure over time and meet their goals.

**Case Study Selection**

In order to delve more deeply into the specific dynamics of partnership adaptability, we conducted three case studies, selecting three partnerships that were sufficiently mature and with interview-accessible individuals. These case studies also represent three different levels of adaptability, as well as different ways through which the partners tried to attain their goals. We built each case study around interviews with people from as many partnering organizations as possible, a careful review of existing materials generated from the partnering organizations (annual reports, project documents) and external documentation from literature.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership Name</th>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Exist Y/N/U*</th>
<th># Solicits</th>
<th># Resp.</th>
<th>Resp. Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Printers Project</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greening the Alwar District</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>Noel Kempff Climate Action Project</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pingree Forest Partnership</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulabh Shauchalaya Complex</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eden Again Project</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF/FedEx Clean Delivery Truck Partnership</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Neighborhoods – Open Space Residential Design</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONABIO</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>/</td>
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<td>Asian Conservation Awareness Program</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing the Amazon Timber Industry Program</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Dairy Quality Assurance Program</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Iraq Marshland Initiative</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equator Initiative</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hybrid Systems for Rural Electrification in Africa (HSREA)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galápagos San Cristóbal Wind Project</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City Metrobús System</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerants, Naturally!</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>SolarChill</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td>World Economic Forum Water Initiative</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca-Cola and WWF Partnership</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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(Continued)
### Table 8.1 Continued

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<thead>
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<th>Partnership Name</th>
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<th>Status</th>
<th>Exist Y/N/U*</th>
<th># Solicits</th>
<th># Resp.</th>
<th>Resp. Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millennium Water – Southeast False Creek Olympic Village</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oro Verde - Green Gold Refrigerants, Naturally! **</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registry of Socio-environmental Responsibility (RSR)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Sourcing Initiative</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% 21 9 43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dow-TNC Partnership on Ecosystem Services</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malwa Biobank</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
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<td>Oro Verde**</td>
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<td>Finalist*</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsible Sourcing Initiative**</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Finalist*</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% 19 7 37%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Vim Toilet Academy</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Partnership for Cleaner Textile (PaCT)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>California Healthy Nail Salon Collaborative</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<td>Camden SMART Initiative</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Forest Watch</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>U</td>
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<td>Global Methane Initiative</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onondaga Lake Remediation and Restoration</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles**</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Finalist*</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>71% 22 8 36%</td>
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2018 shortlisted partnerships not solicited

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advancing Green Infrastructure Program</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh PaCT**</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Shire</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluetch Award Program</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware River Watershed Initiative</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Air Minnesota</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Finalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors from Roy Award Finalists database

* Yes / No / Unknown **Repeat finalist
and news searches. As we developed the case studies, we organized the analysis along the following dimensions of effectiveness: (1) achievement of planned objectives and goals; (2) collaboration inside the partnership; and (3) durability and adaptability of the partnership over time.

Survey Results and Analysis

What Are the Main Challenges to Partnership Effectiveness?

In the survey, challenges stemming from political and legislative change were most commonly reported (nine respondents, from six out of 27 partnerships). Such challenges included changes in governments at either the national or subnational level. To meet these political challenges, the officials interviewed emphasized the importance of cultivating institutional support, engaging government partners and building sustainable support as an adaptive strategy for the partnership to survive electoral and business cycles (see Figure 8.2).

The second most common challenge encountered were barriers or obstacles that related to the specific project at hand (e.g., “illegal mining and corruption” in the instance of a fair-trade gold mining project or maintaining environmental monitoring standards on a pollution mitigation project).

The third most common category, “financing sustainability,” included a range of issues relating to fundraising, anticipating revenue streams or maintaining financial support from donors or partners. Unsurprisingly this was a common challenge, with just as many partnerships flagging it (six out of 27 partnerships)

![Figure 8.2 Most common challenges. Source: Authors, based on survey results.](image-url)
as with "political and/or legislative change." The next most common category, "governance-related change," refers to both changes in the governing partners, such as new members of a project’s Board of Directors, and changes in the priorities of existing governing partners.

The category of "operations and/or management" included diverse problems, such as issues with "multi-jurisdictional communication and coordination," decision making around resource allocation and compliance with or enforcement of partnership commitments. One of the survey respondents summed up both the values and challenges brought about by multi-sector partnerships: "Collaboration and partnerships create new opportunities for competitive advantage, open new markets, and broaden organizational capabilities [as well as] create a new set of management challenges."

Lastly, several responses described the challenge of maintaining "buy-in and engagement." For example, one partnership described its challenge as "to keep momentum after major achievements have been reached." In contrast, another described "ensuring we continue to evolve to maintain relevance." Two others described problems with maintaining "commitment" or effectiveness over long-time horizons. Here the commonality was centered around durability of engagement – meaning that the partnership faced obstacles in sustaining itself long enough to meet its goals.

**How Do Partnerships Evolve and Adapt?**

As partnerships endure over time and challenges arise, we can expect to see variable degrees of capacity and success in overcoming them. From this perspective, retaining flexibility and the capacity to evolve as their political and economic contexts change were generally considered very important conditions for partnership effectiveness across the survey’s participants. To gain an insight into the internal features and strategies that allow some partnerships to adapt and endure, our survey explicitly asked partnerships that still exist, "How has the partnership changed over time?" The results are summarized in Figure 8.3. The most common category was evolution in the governance structure, referring to either a change in the actual members representing the partnership or a more fundamental change in its governance arrangements. Interestingly, while changes in governance were common, they did not appear to be disruptive. One of the survey respondents noted, "The leaders from each of the participating companies, including myself, changed, but the fundamental enthusiasm has remained unchanged." As illustrated by a second respondent, governance-related changes can even lead to the transformation of a partnership into another type of entity, such as transitioning from a project to a private-sector association. Contrary to being indicative of challenges faced by the partners, such an evolution may actually highlight that the partnership has achieved its objectives and become financially sustainable over the long term.

In addition to changes in governance, respondents also referenced changes in geographic scope with at least three partnerships expanding over a vaster
jurisdiction. Two others described evolving in response to a technological advancement that required a new orientation. Finally, one respondent mentioned the need to change its business model to gain access to a different funding stream after the initial funding mechanism failed.

**Case Studies**

**The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project**

The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project, which takes its name from the Bolivian national park in which it was implemented, was the first winner of the Roy Family Award in 2003. Over its 19-year lifespan it faced a range of both specific and generalizable challenges and was one of four partnerships where different partners submitted contradictory answers to the first question in our survey (Is the partnership operating today? Y/N). According to the original design of the project, The Nature Conservancy (an international NGO) would partner with a local Bolivian non-profit (Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza) and then recruit corporate investors (American Electric Power, BP Amoco, PacifiCorp) to finance the acquisition of logging rights from timber companies on two million acres of forestland adjacent to the existing Noel Kempff Mercado National Park (established in 1979).

The objectives of the partnership included doubling the size of the park from approximately two million to four million acres. Once expanded and protected
from environmental degradation and deforestation, it would act as a carbon sink absorbing millions of tons of carbon emissions by protecting the park from logging, agricultural clearing and other activities. In return, corporate partners who paid to buy the concession (i.e., rights to the land previously owned by logging companies) were to receive 51 percent of certified carbon offsets over the project’s 30-year intended life. The Bolivian Government was meant to receive 49 percent of the carbon benefits in return for closing the timber concessions for the project, and it pledged to use the income to fund community development and park management activities (The Nature Conservancy 2009). The partnership also included plans to form a venture company, Canopy Botanicals, to develop and market forest products. Lastly, the partnership was meant to accomplish an impressive range of objectives that involved investment in not only the upkeep and management of the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park itself but also human capital investments and scientific activities underlying the management and monitoring of protected and non-protected areas.

Based on information gathered from various interviews, the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project deviated from its expected objectives, intended duration and original governance structure. The most significant factor in the project’s premature demise appears to be the political and legislative disruption associated with the election of Bolivian President Evo Morales in January 2006, approximately nine years into the project’s lifecycle. The project advanced as planned for the first decade (1997–2006), and the president preceding Morales (President Eduardo Rodriguez) was a strong supporter. Morales was Bolivia’s first indigenous President, espousing traditional beliefs about the sanctity of Madre Tierra (Mother Earth). He did not embrace the business model underlying the partnership, seen critically by some as “selling Mother Earth.” The idea of commercializing the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park seemed fundamentally incompatible with the political values of the new administration. There was, in fact, a window of opportunity during which Morales and his administration were still open to the idea of the project, even though they wanted to renegotiate the terms. Unfortunately, the initial flexibility disappeared as his administration became convinced by other stakeholders to oppose the partnership outright.

In 2009, a highly critical report by Greenpeace, entitled “Carbon Scam: Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the Push for Sub-national Forests Offsets” attacked the credibility of the local organizational partner, Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, and the motivations of the corporate investors (AEP, BP America and PacifiCorp). Once it became clear that the Bolivian Government had no intention of ever commercializing their carbon offsets, the three corporate investors decided to permanently end their involvement in the project. This decision reportedly took place around 2012. Finally, in 2013, the Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza initiated project close-out, with an ultimate end to all activity in 2016.

Despite its ultimate failure, the partnership did produce one or more notable outcomes across its environmental, social, economic and scientific goals (summarized in Table 8.2).
### Table 8.2 Evaluation of the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project outcomes against its own goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Intended</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Acquisition of concessions from logging companies to double the size of the park to 1,582,322 hectares.</td>
<td>Project was confirmed to still include the expanded area, meaning 809,371 hectares of land were effectively added to the national park. Adequacy of the monitoring and protection of the expanded protected area, however, is unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avoid an estimated 7 million tons of CO₂ over the 30-year life of the project.</td>
<td>Prevented 1,034,107 metric tons of verified CO₂ emissions, which were estimated to have resulted from avoided logging and deforestation while the project was running between 1997 and 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in soil erosion and runoff into rivers from agricultural activities.</td>
<td>Concessions were successfully purchased and agricultural activities were effectively avoided for at least 13 years of the project, thus it can be assumed that there was some level of avoided soil erosion and runoff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved management of biodiversity.</td>
<td></td>
<td>64 species of birds, the maned wolf and marsh deer were all identified in the expanded area of the park but not present in the original park. Species’ populations were successfully monitored in a Site Conservation Plan and then managed with an Integral Plan of Protection when the project was still in existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Educational program for local community on sustainable farming and resources management techniques.</td>
<td>Schools for local indigenous communities were refurbished with project funding. Funding was provided for two teachers through the Municipality of San Ignacio. Project funding also was provided for educational supplies and scholarships for at least 120 primary and secondary students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding for various social programs to support impacted communities.</td>
<td>A Program for the Sustainable Development of Local Communities ran from 1997–2001 and claimed to improve access to health, education, and communication. A Community Development Program ran from 2002–2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding for various infrastructure projects and programming.</td>
<td>Confirmation that a small airplane and landing strip was purchased for the project; current status of the plane and its associated infrastructure is unclear but likely no longer maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal and technical assistance to obtain land title for indigenous people.</td>
<td>Through effective legal advocacy, the project enabled successful attainment of legal status of “Communities of Native People” for indigenous communities living in the Park and a formal land title.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(Continued)
Table 8.2 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Intended</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Employment generation.</td>
<td>At least 11 new park rangers from the local communities were hired with funding of the program (duration of the employment is unclear). At least 80 community members were temporarily employed for surveying forest resources within and beyond the park expansion area. At least one indigenous community was financially worse off due to loss of sawmill jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eco-tourism development.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure developed to facilitate ecotourism (e.g., visitor center) was observed to be in disrepair in interviews; the remote location of the Park created considerable obstacles to facilitating tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and marketing of new forest products.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The proposed venture company was not commercially viable: Canopy Botanicals produced low returns on investment, and investors had to incur additional costs to dissolve the business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-enterprises for heart of palm and mahogany plantings, agroforestry projects, animal husbandry, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concessions were obtained for a heart-of-palm business on 11,000 hectares and sustainable forestry on 90,000 hectares; this created the first timber selling point in the Department of Santa Cruz run by an indigenous community. It was not confirmed to have been profitable or still in existence. As of 2009, the timber business was not profitable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader technical impacts</td>
<td>Advances in carbon stock measurement methods and research on the impact of logging on carbon sequestration.</td>
<td>The partnership was one of the first REDD+ projects (aimed at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing countries), contributing to the body of knowledge on REDD+ verification standards and approaches. The project also advanced the use of carbon accounting, remote sensing technology and carbon benefit modeling, but third-party verification of avoided emissions ended prematurely.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on interviews and available documents (Asquith, Vargas Ríos and Smith 2002; Angeleri 2009; The Nature Conservancy 2009, 2010).
Given that the project did not endure for its expected 30-year duration, however, it is clear that the partnership was at least partly unable to adapt to emerging implementation challenges and changes in contextual factors and, thus, did not meet its sustainability objectives. The monitoring and verification scheme did not continue beyond 2005. Various aspects of the social programming and microenterprise efforts also collapsed relatively early in the project’s lifespan. Additionally, the governance structure, implementation activities and underlying business model were effectively disrupted by the new Bolivian administration.

At the same time, there were other dimensions of the partnership that showed a certain degree of adaptability and outlasted the project’s premature demise. In particular, the partners established, as part of its financing mechanisms, an endowment fund for the benefit of the park management activities (monitoring, protection, park rangers, infrastructure), which is reportedly still in use for the protection and management of the expanded national park. They also created an institutional infrastructure that was able to endure. The Noel Kempff project enlisted the support of a local partner, Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, which was able to stay engaged in the project even after the other partners left. A stakeholder from The Nature Conservancy revealed that “The most important decision The Nature Conservancy ever makes is who do we partner with? Are they ‘hired hands’ or are they partners?” In the case of the Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, The Nature Conservancy clearly made an effort to identify an organization that was strong and active.

The Mexico City Metrobús

The Mexico City Metrobús project is a partnership created to develop Mexico City’s first Bus Rapid Transit line; a busway with dedicated lanes and protected stations, which has since evolved into a seven-line Metrobús system. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, as Mexico City leaders looked for ways to reduce emissions, improve public health and increase mobility in a congested city prone to poor air quality, lower cost solutions like Bus Rapid Transit emerged. The Shell Foundation was interested in investing in transport and energy solutions in cities in low- and middle-income countries. An initial USD 7.5 million grant established EMBARQ, the World Resources Institute (WRI) Centre for Transport and the Environment. In Mexico, the Centre for Sustainable Transport (CTS), which represented EMBARQ’s Mexico City office, worked with private funders, international NGOs and local and national leaders in Mexico and the Mexico City region to establish Metrobús, a public agency formed under the Secretary of Transportation. Through leveraging international expertise, private funding and political buy-in, EMBARQ-CTS developed and implemented the first Metrobús line. This route ran along Insurgentes Avenue, a highly utilized thoroughfare underserved by public transit but with 262 private microbus owners operating concessions along the route. In 2005, Line 1 of Metrobús was launched, and in the years that followed, six more lines were implemented. Key to laying the groundwork for the route was communicating with existing mini-bus operators and other
stakeholders. Strong governmental leadership helped build project consensus, with additional organizations providing assistance specific to certain aspects of the project – developing a train platform, working on education or meeting with specific constituents. The success of the Bus Rapid Transit corridor required that Metrobús would be given exclusive access to the Insurgentes route, which meant microbus operators would no longer be able to operate there. More than 200 “one man, one bus” concessionaires were ultimately consolidated into a larger cooperative (Corridor Insurgentes, S.A. or CISA) as part owners and employees of Metrobús. Today the city’s Passenger Transport Network works with CISA to operate the Metrobús (Francke, Macias and Schmid 2012).

Although private and NGO investment financed much of the planning and implementation costs, the Mexican Government funded the development of the stations and the purchase of the buses. Most of the subsequent Metrobús lines were funded by the government. After Lines 1 and 2 were completed, many of the private funders and NGOs involved at the outset assumed smaller roles and were eventually phased out as the organization became fully operational. Over time, Metrobús grew as a unique organization, and EMBARQ-CTS was folded into WRI’s Ross Center for Sustainable Cities, where it continues to provide technical assistance to environmental and transit projects in Mexico. Private funders, like Shell and the Hewlett Foundation, completed their initial work and eventually moved on to new projects. In 2014, the Hewlett Foundation shifted its funding portfolio out of Mexico entirely. The World Bank is no longer an active partner in Metrobús but funds other environmental projects in the region.

Today, Mexico City’s Metrobús system is seen as an example of a successful Bus Rapid Transit project and serves approximately 1.5 million daily riders (see Table 8.3 for a summary of outcomes). Metrobús moved very quickly from conception to implementation with Line 1 starting operation just three years after initial discussions. The Bus Rapid Transit reduced travel times substantially along the Insurgentes Corridor with improvements on most lines of between 40 and 50 percent. Travel speeds increased and, based on survey data, 15 percent of users shifted from private vehicles to public transportation. Emissions reductions for the seven-line system are estimated at around 160,000 tons of CO₂ per year. However, these estimates are generally not based on direct measurement and Mexico City-wide emission reductions have also been pursued through a slew of other policy efforts besides Metrobús. A 2007 World Bank study showed that a 10-corridor system had the potential to reduce air emissions between 300,000 and 500,000 tons per year (Vergara and Haeussling 2007).

In contrast to the Noel Kempff partnership, most of the Metrobús project has endured through evolution and growth, even though the initial partnerships have largely dissolved. Metrobús is an independent transit organization that continues to expand its services, having moved from one to seven lines. Although it faces ongoing questions of revenue adequacy and management capacity, it is integrated into Mexico City’s central budget and has the political support to continue. There are eight other Bus Rapid Transit systems across the country, suggesting that its basic concept was replicable in different regions. For the partnering organizations,
### Table 8.3 Evaluation of the Metrobús outcomes against its own goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Intended</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Reduce emissions from automobiles in Mexico City and the region.</td>
<td>Reduced over 100,000 tons carbon dioxide equivalent in first three years, about 40,000 a year since. Estimated 10 percent modal shift or reduction of vehicles. 1,108 old one-bus units replaced by cleaner Metrobús fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Encourage more Mexico City residents to commute via public transit instead of private vehicles. Improve working conditions for Insurgentes bus drivers.</td>
<td>As of 2007, Metrobús ridership was 220,000 daily riders. Current estimates are 600,000 daily riders on Line 1, and 1.5 million across all 7 lines. 15 percent of Metrobús riders shifted from car or taxi. Driver shifts reduced from 12 hours to 8 hours on average. Routes are standardized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Expand transit options at a much lower cost than subway lines. Bus Rapid Transit costs USD 0.5 to 15 million per kilometer. Underground metros USD 45 to 320 million per kilometer. Reduce commuting times to grow economic activity.</td>
<td>Infrastructure and fleet costs (public and private) for Line 1 were USD 157 million, about USD 8 million per kilometer. 50 percent reduction in travel times on Line 1, and 50 and 40 percent on Lines 2 and 3, respectively. Estimated 180 million worker hours of productivity created. Fares are directed to a trust fund and reinvested in Metrobús.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific and Technical</td>
<td>Demonstrate the feasibility of Bus Rapid Transit as a transit solution. Utilize emissions reductions climate credits as a funding stream.</td>
<td>Successfully proved concept of Bus Rapid Transit; EMBARQ worked on similar projects in eight additional Mexican cities. Utilized climate funding as a small part of revenue until 2017, when fund phased out.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on interviews and available documents (Hidalgo and Carrigan 2010; Vilchis, Tovar and Flores 2010; World Bank 2009).
Metrobús generally allowed their sustainable transport portfolio to grow. WRI, for instance, has expanded its reach and now works with many other cities on transport projects. Private funders have shifted their funding approaches, allowing new projects to be developed.

An important element of this success has been the capacity of the partnership to build political will and bring in technical expertise, as well as to connect private funders to the project. For example, EMBARQ oversaw several private grants that were all used for this project, centralizing investment. At the same time, with strong political leadership from Claudia Sheinbaum (then-Secretary of the Environment of Mexico and current Mexico City mayor) and former mayors Marcelo Ebrard and Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (who was then elected President in 2018), the project was pushed through the approval process and received continuous support for its expansion.

Alianza Shire: Energy Access to Refugees

Alianza Shire was initially conceived in 2011 and formally established in 2014 to improve conditions in refugee camps in the Shire region of Ethiopia by deploying reliable, efficient electricity infrastructure. This partnership, between the Spanish Agency for International Development and Cooperation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Norwegian Refugee Council and energy companies (Iberdrola, a Spanish multinational energy utility, Acciona.org, the foundation arm of Acciona, and Signify, a global lighting company), was aided by the participation of a third-party facilitator, the Innovation and Technology for Development Centre at the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (itdUPM). After a significant preparation phase, the partnership launched a pilot project in the Adi-Harush camp in Shire, Ethiopia, successfully bringing energy improvements to 8,000 Eritrean refugees. The project is now continuing into its second phase by expanding into three additional refugee camps in the region.

All Alianza Shire partner organizations have direct funding or implementation roles, with the exception of the itdUPM. In what turned out to be an innovative step, the partners hired experts at the university to facilitate interactions among the partners (substantially increasing the flexibility of the governance structures) and also to provide technical support for monitoring and evaluation. The preparation phase of the project lasted two years and resulted in a clear Memorandum of Understanding, funding structures, and guidance principles based on the notions of transparency and shared governance. This process created a three-tiered governance structure (steering, technical, and communications) and designed clear procedures to resolve disputes and periodically evaluate the project and its functions.

Organizations contributed staff to all three governance tiers, based on their expertise. Within each committee, specific plans were developed to guide work, with the steering committee making final decisions. The itdUPM ensured regular meetings of each committee and encouraged the development of cross-partnership
communications tools to keep the partnership informed. This structure continues today as the project moves to its second phase. The energy companies led on technology, materials sourcing and training. UNHCR and the Spanish Agency for International Development and Cooperation played an institutional role for broader project support. The Norwegian Refugee Council was not part of the original partnership development, though later played an important implementation role and served on several of the committees. In the pilot phase, the Norwegian Refugee Council also worked directly to build the capacity of the Ethiopian Energy Utility company, even though a new implementing partner (ZOA International) is expected to take over the Council’s role in the second phase.

In terms of its impacts, the Alianza Shire partnership showed proof of concept for this type of energy infrastructure in humanitarian settings. The project achieved its training and installation goals in the Adi-Harush camp pilot project, bringing electricity to 8,000 refugees, installing 63 LED streetlight fixtures and providing training to on-the-ground maintenance staff (Rojo et al. 2017). A neutral partnership facilitator (itdUPM) was seen to play a particularly critical role, by taking responsibility for work that did not clearly fall to other organizational partners, as well as providing full research and evaluation support to identify challenges as they emerged.

In assessing the impacts of the partnership, itdUPM clarified that “the objectives of the partnership must be differentiated from those of the first phase pilot.” Both aspects saw successes, but questions relating to long-term implementation, evaluation and measurement remain (see Table 8.4), especially as implementation took longer than initially anticipated due to administrative and technical challenges.

Many of the remaining challenges are expected to be addressed in the second phase of the project, which demonstrates partners’ attempts to adapt the partnership’s dynamics and engage in a learning-by-doing approach. First, insufficient on-the-ground engagement was noted as an important obstacle to implementation, and a new partner (ZOA International) was brought in. Secondly, in the pilot phase, the refugee camps themselves were the focus, while the link between the camps and their host communities was not considered. Moving forward, this was also identified as a problem to be corrected in the second phase by expanding solar electricity systems and training to households and businesses in host communities. Third, a key challenge was described as the long-term funding and maintenance of the projects after installation and once the implementing organizations have moved on. The financing responsibilities of the pilot project have progressively become the responsibility of a local NGO, but the partnership is still working to identify sustainable models for the second phase that would not require an ongoing commitment from the partnering organizations. Finally, the assessment of the first phase of the project provided only preliminary results, while scaling up a project often demands quick and more detailed turnarounds. The goals of an agile pilot process and the rigor of a traditional academic institution (in this case, itdUPM) can find themselves at odds, curtailing the project’s ability to incorporate feedback.
### Table 8.4 Evaluation of the Alianza Shire outcomes against its own goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Intended</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental</strong></td>
<td>Improvement of electricity grid in host community and refugee camps to reduce wood-burning emissions and wood harvesting. Installation of street lighting. Training for maintenance.</td>
<td>63 LED streetlights installed, covering 4 kilometers. Indoor lighting in 7 communal kitchens. Two public street boxes. Estimated 1,500 fewer tons of firewood collected. Estimated 2,000 tons reduction in CO₂.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Employment of host community members and refugees in installation and maintenance. Training in business management and service provision. Increased safety at night. Coordination between entities on energy, education, and gender issues. 8,000 refugees impacted in pilot phase.</td>
<td>19 refugees and host community members trained. Estimated 60% reduction in nighttime robberies. Training for Ethiopian Electrical Utility staff. Local actors involved in implementation but not at the strategic level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Connection of local businesses to grid. Increased employment in camps. Cost savings over diesel purchase.</td>
<td>Cost savings from diesel estimated at USD 37,000 per year. Four long-term training participants employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and Institutional</strong></td>
<td>Establish coordination group and relationships with local authorities. Utilize pilot project to evaluate success of future projects.</td>
<td>After successful pilot project in Adi-Harush camp, the partnership will expand to three additional sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific and Technical</strong></td>
<td>Provide technical and managerial capacity and training to local stakeholders.</td>
<td>Technical experts trained and brought together. Multiple case studies and evaluations performed to share with broader communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on interviews and available documents (Rojo et al. 2017).

### Adaptability and Pathways to Effectiveness

The three partnerships presented in these three case studies were recognized by the Roy Award program as having high effectiveness potential at the time of their evaluation. The extent to which they lived up to their potential, however, varies across the cases. Tables 8.2–8.4 illustrate some of the main outcomes of the partnerships across the environmental, social, economic, political and scientific and technical domains. In turn, these outcomes can be assessed against the pathways of effectiveness that have been conceptualized in the volume’s analytical framework (Chapter 1). On the one hand, the shortened duration of the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project limited its ability to meet its own long-term goals in terms
of avoided emissions from deforestation (Pathway 1 of the analytical framework) and mostly failed to create value for the partners (Pathway 2). Similarly, since certified carbon offsets could never be commercialized, its intended catalytic effect on the uptake of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) projects by other institutions did not materialize (Pathway 5). Moreover, it is unclear whether the potentially positive impacts that the project had on the protection of biodiversity in the national park and on the livelihoods of local communities (including the attainment of formal land titles and the creation of socio-economic opportunities) have been sustained since the termination of the partnership (Pathway 4). On the other hand, the Metrobús and Alianza Shire partnerships can be seen as more successful experiences. In addition to achieving their own goals, both partnerships created successful proofs of concept that could be replicated by other institutions, e.g., the Bus Rapid Transit projects in other Mexican cities and those promoted through the portfolio of WRI; and the additional refugee camps to which the Alianza Shire project was expanded. They also created significant value for and increased collaboration between the partners, as well as producing positive impacts on affected constituencies, e.g., Mexico City’s commuters and bus drivers and the refugees in and host community members of the Adi-Harush camps.

Based on the case studies, it is possible to argue that the progress of the partnerships was closely dependent on their capacity to learn and adapt in response to both initial shortcomings and intermediate shocks. Importantly, such a capacity appeared to be only partly related to the purported nature of partnerships as more flexible and experimentalist institutions (De Burca et al. 2014; Andonova 2017). More significantly, the variable presence of sophisticated partnering and governance arrangements that enabled learning and adaptation, building capacity for ongoing evaluation and flexible decision making, emerged in our case studies as an important precondition for overcoming challenges to partnership implementation. This is in line with the main propositions on conditions for effectiveness, that are internal to the structuring of partnerships as elaborated in the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1. As we compare the results of our analysis and suggest some transferable lessons, we bring in some examples of other partnerships in our dataset for additional context.

As we saw in the Noel Kempff case study, the election of the Morales administration catalyzed disruptive changes in the project’s governance structure and created major stakeholder engagement problems, which then led to the partnership’s early demise. Importantly, these three issues – political change, governance structure change and an inability to sustain stakeholder engagement – were also among the most commonly cited challenges in our partnership surveys. The Noel Kempff case thus illustrates how there might be substantial challenges in sustaining partnership through all phases of the partnership life cycle. The approach and start-up phases take a long time to get right, which can cause frustration and deplete initial partnership resources. Once partnerships make it through the implementation phase, scaling-up the original concept to full implementation requires overcoming several financial challenges. Some partnerships fail to establish a sustainable
Partnerships under Pressure

financial base and thus cannot cover their start-up costs. Others rely on the promise of available financing that does not materialize, thus undermining the original business proposition that initially motivated the partners. The Noel Kempff partnership failed to capitalize on two of its projected revenue streams. First, it was denied access to carbon credits, in part, because of the ideological dispute with the Bolivian government. Second, it failed to launch a forest products venture company, curtailing project activities that would have contributed to the partnership meeting its social and environmental goals. Similarly, another partnership in our Roy Award database, the Registry of Socio-environmental Responsibility, counted on funding from REDD+ that failed to materialize, so the partnership had to change its financing model from limited-duration foundation funds (given in anticipation of REDD+) to one more reliant on corporate contracts.

For other partnerships, scaling up often depended on a market that did not yet exist. For example, the Hybrid Systems for Rural Electrification in Africa partnership was built on a system to deliver electricity generated by solar energy and biofuel from feedstock grown and processed locally. Scaling up the system required tapping into a larger biofuel market that did not expand as anticipated; this ultimately compromised the success of the project. Likewise, the initial phases of the Oro Verde partnership required funding from outside organizations (foundations, NGOs), but their financial sustainability plan hinged on creating a market for sustainable, ethically produced gold. Their auction of certified gold failed to attract sufficient bidders, undermined by a high gold price and the added pressure of having to manage the corruption that pervaded the industrial mining sector in Columbia at that time, which made it impossible for their product to compete.

Each of these projects was unable to transition to a financially sustainable phase of operation. Other impediments to scale-up include a failure to meet the required economies of scale for corporate partners, inadequate commitment of resources from partners and champions, fatigue and burnout and the inability to replicate results in a different context. For example, the goal of the Future Vehicles Project (between FedEx and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)) was to replace FedEx’s fleet of 30,000 local delivery trucks with hybrid vehicles over ten years, thereby creating a market for hybrid trucks. The partnership’s selection for the Roy Award was based on its success at pushing cutting-edge technology into the market and the potential for widespread replication, but FedEx ultimately did not meet its commitment. The company needed the hybrid trucks to be cost-competitive with the standard truck over its lifetime and the engine manufacturer needed a commitment for a large order to bring the price of the vehicle down. The partners acknowledged that the FedEx-EDF project took a long time from concept to demonstration, and perhaps the partners could have done more to accelerate the process, scale up faster and create more momentum in the sector to make the trucks cost-effective. These actions did not happen.

Other partnerships that ran into obstacles in the scale-up phase include the Responsible Sourcing Initiative, led by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to reduce the environmental impact of consumer goods manufacturing through its “Clean by Design” program. NRDC established an assessment model
and worked to promote best practices throughout its partners’ supply chains and increase transparency and disclosure in China. Meaningful participation by brands to push for environmental improvements in the supply chain was the biggest challenge to scaling up the program. After working with more than 100 factories over 10 years, NRDC no longer leads the program, which has transitioned to a private-sector trade association.

Taken together, these examples show that a crucial element of partnership adaptability is the ability to anticipate and prepare for potential political and/or legislative changes (or the lack thereof) through a partnership’s initial governance arrangements. When this does not happen, it is not guaranteed that a change of course would be successful in responding to shocks. For example, key elements of the Metrobús partnership’s evolution were its early consultation with the microbus owners; its alignment with the city’s environmental and social priorities that were necessary for continued political support; and the success of its first phase of implementation, which further increased adaptability and support through a demonstration effect (consistent with Andonova 2017). On the contrary, the Noel Kempff project tried to work with local stakeholders and to solidify the support of the government, but this was not sufficient. At least one project stakeholder believed more should have been done to engage with the Morales administration at an earlier stage, while it was still open to the possibility of a renegotiated deal. According to our case studies, a potential means of future-proofing partnerships could, for example, include the creation of sustainable financing mechanisms capable of outlasting changes in partnership governance. In the Noel Kempff case, the revenue from the sale of emission reduction credits to the Bolivian Government was undermined when the latter refused to commercialize such credits, and yet the project achieved some protection by creating an endowment fund which outlasted the partnership itself.

Conclusions

The range of partnerships in the Roy Award database spans 16 years, a diversity of topics, locations, governance structures, operational configurations and institutions. Our analysis of this database, together with the three selected case studies, shows that partnerships, once formed, are difficult to sustain long enough to create value and meet their goals. While each partner brings different skills, experiences and resources to a project, each also has different cultures, priorities and needs. Moreover, internal and external factors will change over time, making some partnerships unsustainable. These obstacles are likely to be exacerbated as partnerships become more complex and inclusive in terms of the number and types of organizations and institutions that are included. Across the Roy Award dataset, the difficulty in responding to legislative and political changes, establishing sustainable financing mechanisms and ensuring effective partnership operations and collaboration represented the three most commonly cited problems.
In this chapter, we have explored how the partnerships included in the dataset have sought to overcome such problems and whether a partnership’s dynamic of adapting and exhibiting learning-by-doing has helped mitigate challenges. Our results broadly align with Proposition 3 in this volume’s analytical framework, which hypothesizes that partnership adaptability may be a determinant of greater partnership effectiveness, all other aspects remaining equal. First, the survey results suggest that adaptation may take different forms, ranging from changes in governance structures and business models to the modification of a project’s geographic scope to better match the spatial dimensions of the problem the partnership is trying to solve. Secondly, our findings also suggest that such adaptations do make a difference in terms of partnership effectiveness. On the one hand, the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project partnership did not adequately prepare for potentially unanticipated challenges to its business model and allegedly also failed to learn and respond quickly to such challenges (for example, by not engaging with the Bolivian Government when it was reportedly open to renegotiating a deal for the project). The part of the partnership that did endure was precisely the endowment fund component of its financing strategy, representing an early attempt to build partnership resilience and insulate it from changing circumstances. On the other hand, the Metrobús and Alianza Shire initiatives have attained their goals due, in part, to their capacity to anticipate, plan for and adapt to changing circumstances. Lastly, our case studies illustrate how adaptability, as a condition for partnership effectiveness, is intrinsically linked to other aspects of partnership structuring. These include the development of initial governance arrangements that are flexible enough to accommodate changes in funding streams, political context and partners’ composition, as well as the establishment of learning mechanisms that can facilitate and guide adaptation by leveraging the inherent flexibility of partnership arrangements.

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9 Effectiveness of Transnational Partnership Regimes in Long-Term Resource Revenue Management

Jamie Fraser and Gilles Carbonnier

Introduction

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a transnational multi-stakeholder regime that governs transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. Its aim is to develop a global standard for transparency in the operations and governance of the extractives sector, particularly in resource-rich developing countries. At its core, the EITI is a system of accountability wherein monetary transfers are reported by both state entities and extractive industries and further reconciled by an independent auditor. In-country implementation is developed and overseen by a multi-stakeholder group that includes representatives from government, industry and civil society. Since there is no unique formula for how countries must achieve EITI transparency targets, operating structures and mechanisms vary widely between implementing countries. These transparency targets are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the EITI international Secretariat based in Oslo. Once the Secretariat determines that sufficient accountability mechanisms have been put in place, it certifies the country as “EITI Compliant.”

Variations between EITI implementing countries make it challenging to evaluate the effectiveness of such a multi-stakeholder partnership. Selected studies have shown that, in some cases, the EITI has contributed to reducing corruption and improving overall trust in the way extractive resources are governed (Villar and Papyrakis 2017), sometimes helping to increase foreign investment (Öge 2016a; Malden 2017; Schmaljohann 2013). Other evaluations have concluded that the EITI has no effect on the political or economic systems of the implementing countries (Kasekende et al 2016; Sovacool and Andrews 2015; Sovacool et al. 2016).

In this chapter, we approach EITI effectiveness through the fifth pathway of the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 1, while acknowledging that the different pathways to effectiveness described there can be seen as strongly interrelated. In particular, we argue that the effectiveness of EITI membership can be largely equated with its ability to effect change in institutions outside the partnership, with the ultimate goal of reducing or eliminating corruption and illicit financial flows within the extractives industry (i.e., overall problem-solving effectiveness). Specifically, this study examines the effect of EITI membership on the price of sovereign debt, which is a measure of how investor expectations are influenced by

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EITI membership. This is an important way to analyze the effectiveness of EITI as a multi-stakeholder regime because it indicates whether the commitments a country makes under EITI are perceived as material and credible or not. In order to achieve its stated objectives (i.e., goal-attainment effectiveness), EITI implementation must enable structural reforms in economic and political institutions and allow for the creation of oversight structures that promote transparency with the participation of industry, government and civil society. The credibility of such commitments within a country should, in theory, influence external institutions such as sovereign debt arrangements and the expectations of investors.

We first present and discuss the results of an econometric analysis of EITI effectiveness that uncovers the pathways through which investor confidence is impacted by EITI membership. We then examine EITI implementation and its interaction with country-specific institutional dynamics through two case studies: Indonesia and Senegal.

### Background

Many studies describe how resource-dependent states can effectively manage resource wealth to stabilize their economy, diversify their economy and reduce resource reliance. However, the specific contributions of multi-stakeholder partnership regimes in the extractive sector are under-researched. The so-called “resource curse” phenomenon has been amply studied. Resource dependence can damage an economy’s development due to the price volatility of natural resources (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009; Zhang et al. 2015) and the increased risk of corruption and exploitation of resource revenues. Resource dependence sets up a trade-off between the economic benefits of diversification and the political disincentive to redistribute power away from the political center (Dunning 2005). However, there is evidence that a single institutional solution is not suitable for all cases (Gelb et al. 2002). In states where institutions are weak and unable to enforce checks on spending or ownership laws, revenues from resource extraction are vulnerable to exploitation by interest groups and patronage networks (Tornell and Lane 1999); used to maintain authority over the population through economic dependence (Weinthal and Luong 2006); or mismanaged by authorities to serve their own political interests (Frankel 2012; Carbonnier 2013).

Evidence suggests that taking natural resource assets out of state control (Weinthal and Luong 2006) or developing policy networks (Orihuela 2013) can reduce corruption and foster the development of stronger institutions. Multi-stakeholder partnership regimes, such as the EITI, attempt to catalyze or augment this process. However, the literature on the effectiveness of EITI has produced mixed results. Some case studies have demonstrated that EITI membership increases transparency (Öge 2016b; Sovacool and Andrews 2015) and decreases corruption (Villar and Papyrakis 2017), while other studies have found the opposite (Kasekende et al 2016; Ocheje 2006; Sovacool et al 2016). There is also evidence that EITI compliance attracts investment (David-Barrett and Okamura 2013; Malden 2017; Schmaljohann 2013) and has a positive impact on economic
development (Corrigan 2017). However, the positive effect of the EITI on improving transparency may be caused by other underlying factors, such as the strength of civil society to enforce government commitments to begin with (Furstenberg 2015; Öge 2017).

This study contributes to the literature on EITI effectiveness by performing a systematic analysis of how EITI implementation is viewed by investors. The EITI can be viewed as a mechanism through which governments commit to transparent resource management over the long run. Thus, investor expectations on EITI outcomes in an implementing country can indicate whether this commitment from the government to transparent resource revenue management is seen as credible.

**Operationalization**

This paper proposes that the effectiveness of EITI can be assessed through the lens of investor expectations on transparent resource revenue management. Greater transparency and accountability in the extractives sector as a mechanism for reducing corruption is the primary goal of the EITI. Better resource revenue management can lead to greater public investment and thus increase economic growth. If membership in EITI is viewed as a credible commitment to effective resource revenue management, then markets will lower the price of sovereign debt, signaling a less risky investment.

**Data**

Data availability presents a significant challenge for this study. Only 59 countries have participated in the EITI since its founding in 2002. Fewer still have economic systems that are robust enough to be able to channel investor expectations effectively. Most notably, only 36 EITI-affiliated countries issue publicly traded sovereign debt, the market mechanism through which investor expectations can be analyzed. The full list of EITI-affiliated countries for which data on publicly traded sovereign debt is available can be found in Table 9.1.

We constructed a timeline of EITI membership status for each EITI-affiliated country. Countries are listed as “EITI Candidate” countries upon the announcement that the government intends to adopt the EITI principles. As of 2019, 30 of the 59 EITI-affiliated countries had succeeded in implementing all of the EITI guiding principles and have been listed as “EITI Compliant” by the secretariat, 14 of which are included in our sample. Seventeen countries had at some point been suspended, and six had withdrawn from the EITI altogether. Data on the timeline of membership for each country was compiled from media announcements and documents available on the EITI website (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 2019). The study also uses complementary data on GDP growth rates (World Bank Indicators 2019a), inflation rates (World Bank Indicators 2020), the global volatility index (Thomson Reuters DataStream 2019) and a measure of institutional durability (Center for Systemic Peace 2019) to further examine how intervening factors could influence the relationship between EITI membership
Table 9.1 EITI-affiliated countries, with available sovereign debt data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of EITI Candidacy Announcement</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of EITI Candidacy Announcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3 September 2017</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>15 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>15 October 2014</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>12 May 2008</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>19 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>23 February 2016</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>19 March 2014</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>22 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>17 October 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>6 August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>23 May 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>22 May 2013</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>26 February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>19 October 2010</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>12 February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10 February 2010</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>27 September 2007</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>17 October 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (2019).

and investor expectations of a government’s credibility to manage resource revenues in the long term

Panel-Level Granger Causality

We first use a Granger causality model to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between a change in the country’s EITI membership status and the price of its sovereign debt. EITI membership status is defined as a sequence of events beginning with the announcement of EITI candidacy and then full membership if approved. We also include suspension of membership or exit from the EITI if applicable. The event timeline is formatted as an ordinal variable, with possible values of one to five, where each value denotes a membership status. Thus, interpretation of the results will allow us to determine if there is a significant relationship between stages of EITI membership status and the price of sovereign debt.

Granger causality is a type of econometric analysis that can determine with a specified degree of confidence that “Event A” precedes “Event B.” In this case, Event A is a change in EITI membership status and Event B is a change in the price of sovereign debt. This analysis allows us to determine if there is a statistically significant likelihood that changes in EITI membership status systematically precede changes in the price of sovereign debt. While this will not establish direct causality, it allows us to explore different possibilities for a relationship between the two variables.
We augment the model to test for the effect of three additional variables that could intervene in the relationship between EITI membership and the price of sovereign debt. First, to test if debt burden has an effect on the relationship between the price of sovereign debt and EITI membership status, we include a variable denoting the amount of World Bank debt a country holds (World Bank Indicators 2019b). Second, we include a measure denoting the percentage of GDP derived from natural resource rents (World Bank Indicators 2019c) to account for the possibility that investor expectations are weighted by how reliant a country is on extractives revenues. Finally, we test if corruption perception influences the relationship between investor expectations and EITI membership status in adopting countries (Transparency International 2019).

**Country-Level Granger Causality**

Country-level Granger causality analyses are used to allow for the possibility that the relationship between the price of sovereign debt and EITI membership fluctuates depending on country-specific factors. There is a possibility that different directions of causality in each country may interfere with the panel-level results. This allows us to account for this possibility and analyze each country individually. We perform the Granger causality analysis on each EITI-affiliated country listed in Table 9.1 individually.

**Event Study**

Finally, an event study methodology is used to test if there is an abnormal variation in the price of sovereign debt against a baseline index around the date that EITI candidacy is announced. Adapting from Campbell et al (1997), abnormal movement around the event date is defined as

\[
\varepsilon_{it}^* = R_{it} - E[R_{it} | X_t] 
\]  

(9.1)

\[
y_{it} = Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}^* 
\]  

(9.2)

Where \(\varepsilon_{it}^*\) is the abnormal return for index \(i\) at time \(t\), \(R_{it}\) is the observed return of index \(i\) at time \(t\) and \(E[R_{it} | X_t]\) is the expected return of index \(i\) at time \(t\) given the benchmark return \(X_t\). Time \(t\) is the event window, which is defined as the number of days before and after the date of candidacy announcement. Here, the baseline index used is the Bloomberg Emerging Markets global index, obtained from the Thomson Reuters (2019) DataStream database. While the analysis does not conclusively prove that the announcement of EITI candidacy causes the abnormal returns, it indicates whether the events occurring around the timeframe studied are somehow disturbing the market for sovereign debt, beyond what would normally be expected. Here, an abnormal return is mathematically defined as a return greater than one standard deviation above or below
what would normally be expected over a given window of time around the date of EITI candidacy announcement.

Results

Panel-Level Granger Causality

Results of the panel-level Granger causality tests, shown in Table 9.2, demonstrate that there is no significant systematic relationship between changes in EITI membership status and the price of sovereign debt in either direction of causality. This holds true even when the intervening variables of interest are taken into account, which hints to the fact that investors do not expect EITI status to significantly alter governments’ behavior.

This indicates that investors may not view the EITI as a sufficiently effective commitment to alter economic and political institutions to the extent that it influences investor confidence regarding the way resource revenue will be managed and how this, in turn, will impact solvency risks.

Country-Level Granger Causality

As with the panel-level analysis, when we run the Granger causality test on each country individually, there does not appear to be any significant relationship between EITI membership and the price of sovereign debt. Again, the results do not provide any evidence of a significant relationship between EITI membership and investor expectations on how improved resource revenue management might alter sovereign debt risk (Table 9.3).

Table 9.2 Panel-level Granger causality, effect of EITI membership on the spread of the default sovereign debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spread</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>0.3229</td>
<td>0.3191</td>
<td>0.3352</td>
<td>0.3477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>0.9619</td>
<td>0.9428</td>
<td>0.9897</td>
<td>0.9256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7573</td>
<td>0.8875</td>
<td>0.7343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>0.8153</td>
<td>0.8276</td>
<td>0.8247</td>
<td>0.8265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>0.9958</td>
<td>0.9744</td>
<td>0.9969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>0.3939</td>
<td>0.3733</td>
<td>0.1871</td>
<td>0.4041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Spread</td>
<td>0.6110</td>
<td>0.5835</td>
<td>0.6134</td>
<td>0.5858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.1906</td>
<td>0.1847</td>
<td>0.1946</td>
<td>0.1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.9449</td>
<td>0.9424</td>
<td>0.9226</td>
<td>0.9471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>0.0782*</td>
<td>0.0678</td>
<td>0.1655</td>
<td>0.0722*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>0.9600</td>
<td>0.9596</td>
<td>0.9909</td>
<td>0.9564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>Additional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9620</td>
<td>0.6876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.4649</td>
<td>0.4316</td>
<td>0.7488</td>
<td>0.5387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
* = Significant at 90% confidence
Table 9.3 Country-level Granger causality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

**Event Study**

As detailed in the methodology section, the purpose of the event study is to determine if there is significant deviation in how the price of sovereign debt is affected by the announcement of EITI candidacy as compared to what would be expected without any announcement. Only 12 countries could be included in this analysis due to lack of available bond data over a time period of sufficient length before joining the EITI (Armenia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal and the Seychelles). The event study analysis shows that an announcement of EITI candidacy is often associated with significant abnormal return. Even if the price of sovereign debt for most EITI-affiliated countries does react to the announcement of EITI candidacy status, the direction of change produces mixed results (significant positive response for seven countries versus significant negative response in four countries, and one country with no significant result obtained).

The event study analysis does not provide any explanation for these different responses. Several reasons might account for the mixed direction of effects. The relative dependency of a country on extractive resources at the time of EITI candidacy may determine whether investors respond positively to EITI membership. Although most EITI-affiliated countries are resource-rich developing nations, the degree of dependency on natural resources varies: World Bank data from 2000 to 2016 show that the average percentage of GDP derived from natural resource rents for all EITI-affiliated countries ranged between less than 1 percent and 47 percent. Moreover, resource dependence fluctuates over time for individual countries: for example, the Republic of the Congo derived 62 percent of its GDP from natural resources in 2000 against 25 percent in 2016.

While the Granger causality analysis found that the percentage of GDP derived from natural resource rents had no effect on the relationship between EITI membership status and the price of sovereign debt, it could be the case that resource dependency does not enter directly into the calculus made by investors in response to EITI membership but rather is internalized in other ways. For example, it could be that the risk associated with resource dependence is already internalized in the
price of sovereign debt at the time of the EITI membership announcement. In that case, resource dependence could influence how investors respond to an EITI candidacy announcement without having a direct causal relationship with the price of sovereign debt.

**Does EITI Membership Affect Investor Expectations on a Country’s Long-Term Fiscal Management Position? The Cases of Indonesia and Senegal**

EITI membership may not have as large an impact on revenue management credibility as it has been credited with. However, our results indicate that it is possible that the impact of EITI membership on investor expectations is more heavily influenced by country-specific conditions than can be accounted for in the econometric analysis above. Previously, we have discussed that EITI’s overall problem-solving effectiveness can be examined through the fifth pathway to the effectiveness of partnerships, introduced in Chapter 1. Essentially, the effectiveness of EITI can be equated with its influence on collaboration and institutions external to the EITI itself; namely, the domestic political, financial and civil institutions of EITI implementing countries, which in turn may influence investor expectations and the price of sovereign debt examined in this study. In other words, the extent to which the EITI can impact and exert change on existing economic and political institutions of an implementing country is likely to determine how effective the partnership may be at achieving its goals of transparency and accountability in the extractive sector.

The stated goal of the EITI is to reduce corruption through transparency over payments between state institutions and extractive industries. The most important mechanism in the EITI is the reconciliation of payments between oil and mining firms in resource-rich countries and those countries’ governments. Ideally, mandatory disclosure of payments between the state and extractive companies would reduce corruption by making it more difficult to hide corrupt practices from the public. However, there is no one-size-fits-all regarding EITI structure nor in how the EITI interacts with existing regulations, laws and incentives structures. The latter vary greatly depending on national contexts. The evaluation of EITI effectiveness should thus be complemented by country-specific case studies.

To complement the econometric analysis summarized above, we have selected two EITI implementing countries for further discussion: Indonesia and Senegal. These countries were chosen because their outcomes in the event study were either negative or insignificant, which runs counter to the expectations of the literature on EITI membership outcomes. The objective is to explore why these two countries display results that run counter to prevailing assumptions; since these countries do not fit the theoretical assumptions developed above, they could provide more insights as to how investor expectations are influenced by EITI affiliation or not.
EITI in Indonesia

After a brief overview of the EITI in Indonesia and its governance mechanisms in place at the time of EITI candidacy, we discuss how effective the EITI has been at influencing the underlying political and economic institutions in Indonesia with a view to achieving its stated goals.

Indonesia became an EITI Candidate country on 19 October 2010. The EITI in Indonesia consists of three main bodies: a steering committee, an implementation team and a transparency team. All three include representatives from the central and regional governments and civil society, while representatives from the extractive industries sit only on the implementation and transparency teams (EITI Indonesia 2020a). The steering group is responsible for appointing members of the other two committees for fixed terms of three years, based on recommendations from the Minister of Home Affairs, business associations and civil society organizations (Republic of Indonesia 2010). Article 8 of Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2010-26 gives the transparency team authority to request data and information from central and regional governments, extractives sector companies and other stakeholders (Republic of Indonesia 2010). The implementation team is tasked with collecting reports for reconciliation from the central and local governments, BPMigas (a former government authority that oversaw upstream oil and gas activity and was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in November 2012) and private sector companies (Republic of Indonesia 2010). Reports submitted by government entities are first reviewed by the Agency for Finance and Development Supervision (BPKP), while private-sector reports are required to have been verified by an independent auditor (Republic of Indonesia 2010). These reports are then reconciled by a reconciler appointed by the implementing team. All costs for these activities are provided through the national budget (Republic of Indonesia 2010).

Indonesia has a history of resource reliance. However, compared to other resource-rich developing countries, Indonesia has been successful at diversifying its economy in recognition of the dangers posed to it by volatile commodity prices (Dunning 2005). The reasons behind diversification could provide some insight into why investors seem to lack confidence that the EITI will lead to better management of resource revenues. Any economy highly dependent on resources is exposed to volatility risk due to fluctuations in the global price of those resources. However, diversification also creates alternative power bases outside the control of national political elites. Economic diversification in resource-rich developing nations can thus be presented as a calculated trade-off between economic growth and the risk of political instability.

Suharto, president of Indonesia from 1968 to 1998, began the process of diversifying the Indonesian economy away from reliance on natural resources. In his 2005 paper, Thad Dunning develops a framework for assessing the trade-off between economic growth and political rivalry that governments of resource-rich countries experience, using Indonesia as one of the case studies. The paper states that,
Suharto’s diversification programme was therefore premised on political logic, in that he empowered a private sector dominated by a small group of ethnic minority Chinese, whose ethnicity precisely served to discount any credible future claim they could lay on national political power.

(Dunning 2005, p.469)

In essence, diversification of Indonesia’s economy was possible from a political standpoint only because those who benefited the most from diversification did not pose a threat to Suharto’s power. The result was that the Indonesian economy could diversify without creating substantive power bases outside the control of the existing regime.

Rising commodity prices from 2003 to 2008 provided a boon to the Indonesian economy that it was not prepared for and therefore did not fully exploit (World Bank 2010a). The systems of economic governance put in place by Suharto remained even after his resignation and, by some assessments, played an important role in the political transition that took place in Indonesia in the early and mid-2000s (Dunning 2005). Dunning also provides a potential explanation for this: that “resource dependence is the outcome of strategic decisions by incumbent elites to limit the extent to which political opponents can challenge their power” (Dunning 2005, p.475). It is possible that the incomplete diversification of Indonesia’s economy and its failure to utilize these windfall revenues were a result of this political calculation. Indeed, windfall revenues were spent on subsidies rather than investment, and oil and gas production did not increase in response to rising global prices throughout the 2000s (World Bank 2010a). In order to take full advantage of these revenues, the government would have needed to allocate the majority toward productive investment. However, this could only be done if the result of these investments did not present a significant threat to the government’s power base.

Do these factors influence how investors responded to Indonesia’s announcement of EITI candidacy? This study identifies four possible factors that could have influenced investor expectations around the time that EITI candidacy was announced in 2010. First, the mechanisms of resource revenue distribution can have a significant impact on investor perception of how efficiently the government will manage its resource revenue. Division of resource revenue between the central and regional governments is governed by two pieces of legislation: Law No. 33 of 2004 and Government Regulation 55 of 2005. The proportion of non-tax revenues going to the regions are: 15 percent from oil, 30 percent from natural gas and 80 percent from mining (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan, 2014a, b). Additional dividends are paid to the government by four mining companies in which the government holds partial ownership (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014a). Royalties for minerals are calculated based on the value per ton/kg sold or exported, rather than the extracted amount (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014a). However, there are some exceptions to this schema. In three regions with special autonomy, Aceh, Papua and West Papua, the local government receives 70 percent of oil and gas revenues generated in those provinces (KAP Gideon Adi and
Partnerships in Long-Term Revenue Management

Rekan 2014b). Article 28 of Government Regulation No. 55 of 2005 states that after the revenue-sharing calculation is made, there is a reconciliation process between the central government and local authorities in producing regions (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014b). After the accounts are reconciled, there is a direct cash transfer to the local authorities. The central government’s financial report for 2010 indicated that 23 percent of national government revenues came from the oil and gas sector, while 8.2 percent came from the mining sector (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014a, KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014b).

There are a few aspects of this process of revenue distribution that could influence investor behavior. Most significantly, the reconciliation process is not clear nor is there any mention of who has authority over this process or what steps are taken if there is a discrepancy in reporting. Lack of clarity in the reconciliation and reporting process is at the core of what the EITI attempts to resolve. In the minds of investors, there may still be room for doubt that this process is being managed efficiently, and there appears to be little safeguard against corruption throughout the reconciliation process. Indeed, this is a demonstration of the conditions for effectiveness, presented in Chapter 2 of this volume, which highlight the relevance of credibility in the soft contractual arrangements of a specific partnership and related adaptability to contextual factors with a view to attainment of partnership goals. The EITI has no mechanism for enforcement of a country’s commitments as part of the EITI engagement. The only way to ensure accountability is by threat of EITI status being suspended, beyond lobbying and diplomatic pressure by international development actors. If sanctioning mechanisms and accountability incentives are not credible, it could undermine the effectiveness of the partnership regime. Alternatively, if investors can see that the government is seriously investing in transparency and compliance, this may be a strong commitment signal.

Secondly, the Indonesian government’s method for allocation and disbursement of the funds it receives is central to the investor expectations reflected in sovereign debt markets. The World Bank assessment (2010b) reported that the Indonesian government consistently delayed the disbursement of funds in the lead-up to EITI candidacy, which slowed GDP growth (World Bank 2010b). Further, the central government did not place enough of a priority on public investment in infrastructure, which constrained the private sector despite rising FDI inflows (World Bank 2010b). The government budget for 2011 had increased the amount allocated for capital investment (World Bank 2010b), but it is possible this was not enough to satisfy investor concerns.

Third, investors may not be convinced that the legal framework governing the extractives sector is sufficient to ensure that EITI transparency mechanisms function as intended. The right to produce in the extractives sector is awarded exclusively by the central government. The terms of mineral contracts are lex specialis, which means these contracts are not subject to changes in government regulation or taxation regimes over the time spans they cover (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014a). In effect, these extraction contracts operate outside of the general legal and regulatory framework of Indonesia, which may present an opportunity for corrupt activities by industry, government actors or both.
Different types of contracts are awarded during different stages of production, and each is associated with different taxation, royalty and customs payment obligations (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014a). Moreover, government-controlled entities, such as BPMigas and Pertamina (the state-controlled oil and gas company), have significant authority in the management and supervision of upstream and downstream oil and gas extraction (KAP Gideon Adi and Rekan 2014b). To test if the state-owned nature of the oil and gas industry could potentially be an issue, we reran the panel-level Granger causality test as shown in the results section of this paper with an additional dummy variable, indicating a state-owned oil or gas company in operation. Results demonstrate that the presence of such a state-owned enterprise has no significant effect on the interaction between EITI membership status and the price of sovereign debt. Despite the lack of econometric evidence, there is anecdotal evidence that investor perceptions are negatively impacted by the lack of clear separation of regulatory authority in the extractives space (World Bank 2010a).

Finally, there may be significant doubt among investors that EITI mechanisms in Indonesia actually function as intended. The official EITI report from 2010 states that not all companies in the extractives sector submitted reports for reconciliation. Further, in order to reconcile tax information, the government taxation body required a letter of authorization from the company to disclose that information. Several companies did not authorize the disclosure; thus, their tax information could not be reconciled within the scope of the 2010 EITI report. Although only a few companies were excluded from the reconciliation and analysis, EITI regulatory bodies could not compel these companies to report under the current framework. This lack of authority to compel companies to comply with EITI principles could be one reason why investors did not have confidence that the EITI would function as a transparent mechanism.

In sum, EITI implementation in Indonesia is heavily weighted toward government control and oversight, and civil society has very little say in the functioning of the EITI beyond an advisory role. Further, EITI bodies lack authority to compel companies to comply with the transparency measures. However, this analysis shows that the greatest hindrance toward the EITI facilitating the effective use of resource revenues may be the government itself. The government’s hesitation in using resource revenue to invest in diversification and infrastructure means investors may perceive the EITI as too little too late. If investors did not think the EITI went far enough to facilitate change in how the government of Indonesia manages its resource revenues, this could explain why the announcement of EITI candidacy had a negative impact on the price of sovereign debt.

**EITI in Senegal**

Senegal became an EITI Candidate country in July 2013. The government of Senegal formally established the EITI Senegal by decree No. 2013-881, which outlines the organization and functioning of the National Committee (World Bank 2016). As in Indonesia, all costs for EITI Senegal’s operations come out of the
central government budget. The Steering Committee of the EITI is charged with installing a technical secretariat (Republique du Senegal 2013). EITI Senegal is governed by a multi-stakeholder group, which comprises 26 members from government, the private sector and civil society (EITI Senegal 2020). The principal legislation that governs the activities of the mining sector was set in decree No. 2004-647 in May 2004 and was revised around the same time that EITI candidacy was officially announced in 2013 (World Bank 2016). Extractive industry companies operating in Senegal make payments to the local and central governments, although they benefit from certain exemptions during their first three years of activity (Republique du Senegal 2013).

The first EITI Senegal report produced (Republique du Senegal 2013) exposes a significant lack of information transparency in all aspects of EITI processes. Six of the 13 companies in the hydrocarbons sector and five of the 25 companies in the mining sector did not submit EITI declarations for reconciliation. The report further states that of those that did, only two of the hydrocarbons companies and seven of the mining sector companies submitted documents that were reviewed by an external auditor. The report itself notes that the reconcilers were not able to produce a reliable assessment based on the limited data received. Data on the state of the extractives sector in Senegal as a whole are limited, with very little reliable information on either reserves or artisan and small-scale mining activity. Furthermore, the reconcilers were not able to confidently establish how much the extractives sector contributed to Senegal’s budget for the year 2013. There are even difficulties in establishing all actors in the extractives sector: the mining code dictates that the titles of mining companies can only be communicated publicly with the written permission of the title holders. The report summarizes these difficulties in their recommendations, stating that it is essential the Steering Committee act aggressively to increase awareness about the EITI and the importance of transparency. These recommendations (Republique du Senegal 2013) are in line with Proposition 1 of the conditions for partnership effectiveness presented in Chapter 2: that the establishment of specific commitments and accountability mechanisms will likely increase the effectiveness of partnerships. In the case of Senegal, these steps cannot be taken until there is more complete information available regarding the status of the commitments from both private-sector and government actors.

What impact does this have on investor expectations? Using publicly available data, the World Bank’s (2016) Senegal report showed a USD 21 million discrepancy between declared tax payments and tax revenues. This problem would be exacerbated by the discovery of new oil fields off the coast of Senegal and the commencement of new mining operations in 2013 and 2014 (World Bank 2016). The World Bank (2016) report also describes how the government of Senegal acknowledged that the lack of data was problematic and sought to improve the investment climate by implementing a review of the extractives sector. The EITI could have been one avenue that the government used to increase its legitimacy on transparency and accountability, although it appears to have done little to shore up investor confidence. While the lack of data was a problem, it was set against
the backdrop of strong macroeconomic fundamentals and a relatively strong and stable democracy. A sound economic and political system can mitigate the concerns of investors to a degree, but a lack of information could still prove to be a major reason why investors did not have confidence that implementation of the EITI would actually indicate the government could effectively manage its resource revenue.

One explanation for why investors did not demonstrate a significant response to the announcement of EITI candidacy status is that the government made public its intent to seek candidacy status one full year before it submitted the official application for candidature (World Bank 2016). By the time candidacy status was officially announced, it had already been priced into the sovereign debt market and thus investors had little new information to react to. It is possible that in the time between the government making public its intention to pursue EITI candidacy and the time that candidacy was officially announced, investors did not recognize that there would be substantive change to the regulatory regime with EITI implementation. These are important considerations that could account for why investors did not react to the official announcement.

**EITI Effectiveness**

In this study, we assess EITI effectiveness on institutions outside the partnerships within the fifth pathway of the analytical framework described in Chapter 1, a pathway that appears to be strongly related to a partnership’s overall problem-solving effectiveness and goal attainment. After discussing the results of a panel-data econometric analysis, two individual case studies show how critical it is to examine EITI effectiveness within a country-specific context. In the Indonesian case, the EITI appears to have been largely ineffective at exacting change on existing political and economic institutions. The EITI was implemented around preexisting structures in the framework of a diversification agenda managed by political elites. No strong mechanisms were put in place to change how existing institutions operate or to exert additional oversight, at least on the basis of publicly available information. Looking at EITI effectiveness in Senegal does not allow one to draw a clear conclusion, partly because of the lack of available data at the time of the EITI candidacy announcement. Better data and stronger evidence on the degree of improvement in financial reporting in the extractives sector remain necessary to assess the extent to which the EITI has effectively moved forward in achieving its stated goals.

While the empirical literature on EITI effectiveness has so far focused on quantitative indicators without much regard to country-specific contextual circumstances of implementation, a detailed analysis of institutional dynamics in individual implementing countries provides a better understanding of how and why the EITI has succeeded in achieving its objectives under specific circumstances. The case studies presented above demonstrate how the effectiveness of EITI can be determined by the unique characteristics of the political and economic contexts in which it is applied. In the same way, Fraser and Carbonnier
(2020) show that terror events shape investor expectations in different industries to varying degrees.

Indeed, it may even be necessary for the EITI to adapt to the political context of an implementing country if it is to be effective at all, as Proposition 3 of the analytical framework (Chapter 1) stipulates with respect to the adaptability of partnership arrangements to different institutional contexts and challenges as a condition for greater effectiveness. The EITI relies on accountability mechanisms and the enforcement of transparency rules to effect any real change in the extractives sector. The power to enforce EITI commitments derives from various factors and actors depending on the specific institutional context: there is no one-size-fits-all pathway to effectiveness when it comes to a multi-stakeholder initiative such as the EITI (Andonova and Carbonnier 2014).

This study aimed to analyze the effectiveness of the EITI through the lens of investor confidence. Investor expectations on how EITI membership may affect resource revenue management is directly tied to how investors expect the EITI to interact with the political and economic dynamics of an implementing country. Thus, one can interpret the results of this study as an indication that investor expectations on EITI effectiveness are inherently shaped by how they perceive the EITI in context, i.e., that the multi-stakeholder initiative adapts depending on specific politico-economic interactions in implementing countries.

Conclusions

This chapter presents the first analysis of its kind on the effectiveness of EITI with respect to investor expectations as reflected in movements in the price of sovereign debt, using a rigorous analytical framework and providing insights about mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of resource governance regimes. The study presents and discusses the results of a panel-level and country-level Granger causality as well as an event study focusing on the relationship between EITI status and investor confidence. Two additional country studies show that it is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of EITI in interaction with the specific political and economic structures in which the partnership is embedded. The interaction between the EITI and national institutional dynamics seems in fact more important in determining partnership effectiveness than the structure and governance of the EITI itself.

The EITI appears to be effective when contextual characteristics allow the partnership to exert significant checks-and-balances functions. Furthermore, proper incentive structures and oversight mechanisms play an important role in instilling confidence in a credible EITI governance regime. The analytical framework put forth in this volume can serve as a catalyst for further research on the effectiveness of partnerships and governance regimes in the extractive sector. Even more importantly, its application to the present chapter suggests that for partnerships that seek to influence institutions beyond the partners themselves (for example, by promoting transparency), prevailing institutional dynamics and contextual factors are likely to play a major role in shaping partnership effectiveness.
Note

1 Yemen is considered here to have withdrawn from EITI. In actuality, it was suspended following political instability and eventually delisted from EITI.

References


Introduction

The partnership model is ubiquitous in sustainability. Much of the partnership debate in research (and in policy and practice) revolves around differentiating between the public, private, and voluntary sectors from which partners are drawn. Differences between these sectors are assumed to affect the relations between them, and therefore the effectiveness of partnerships. Yet, differences beneath the surface of these categories are rarely examined. In this chapter we argue that the partnership debate’s focus on sectoral factions disregards other aspects of diversity and their potential to affect partner relations and partnership effectiveness. “Diversity” signifies the extent to which members of a group are similar or dissimilar, and can be examined across multiple characteristics. These multiple dimensions of diversity provide some of the micro-foundations for relations between partners, a critical pathway to partnership effectiveness according to this volume’s analytical framework (Chapter 1).

Our purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to identify aspects of partner diversity that are understudied but consequential, and consider their effects on pathways to partnership effectiveness. These analyses enable the examination of the extent to which multiple dimensions of diversity – and the interactions between them – may produce more or less significant faultlines in partner relations. Examining these micro-foundations of partner relations enables an improved theorization of partnership effectiveness; it also holds important implications for board decisions and the sustainability impacts these partnerships may deliver. Taking governance boards as our empirical setting also allows us to extend a partnerships literature that tends to overlook the role of governance boards (see Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a, 2021b for rare examples of such analyses).

To fill this gap, this chapter contributes a framework – faultline analysis – borrowed from the corporate governance literature. First introduced by Lau and Murnighan (1998), faultline analysis enables the simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of diversity in teams and governance boards. Rather than assuming the significance of sector groupings, faultline analysis provides a set of theories and methodological tools to empirically identify sub-groups, and to measure the faultline strength between them. Partnerships for sustainability that use boards
as governance mechanisms tend to appoint board members from different stakeholder groups as constituency representatives or, in rare cases, in their individual capacity (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b). It is possible that faultline analysis will identify functional sub-groups that fit the officially recognized stakeholder categories; we argue, however, that this cannot be assumed, but rather requires empirical analysis.

We apply faultline analytical tools to the executive boards of six Global Financing Partnerships (GFPs) to examine how multiple dimensions of diversity may affect collaboration inside partnerships (Pathway 3 of this volume’s analytical framework). Our empirical analyses compare the boards of three GFPs addressing climate change (71 board members) with three that address health (70 members). The climate GFPs have 100 percent public sector board membership (even if the board engages with non-voting civil society and private sector observers); in contrast, the health GFP board members are drawn in differing numbers from public, private and voluntary sectors. Our analyses show that certain faultlines that are expected between different sectors are not observed, while other faultlines exist within the same sector. Statistical significance testing showed that, in this sample of partnerships, board members from the public sector are as likely to have either economic- or issue-focused professional experience as members from the private sector. However, a statistically significant association was calculated between donor and sector: against the policy narrative of the private sector mobilizing significant resources for sustainability, donors to these partnerships are significantly associated with the public sector, not private. Furthermore, donors are significantly associated with an economic logic of action (counter to expectations that economic logics belong more in the private sector), and non-donors with an issue-specific framing whatever sectoral grouping they belong to.

Regarding the volume’s analytical framework, our findings illuminate collaboration inside the partnership as a pathway to effectiveness (Pathway 3) by investigating boards as an effective accountability mechanism (Proposition 1). Additionally, our faultline analyses reveal the ways in which collaboration between partners can have an impact on other pathways to effectiveness and partnerships’ ultimate problem-solving effectiveness: which partners are included and partner relations can circumscribe the scope of goals that partnerships may set for themselves (Pathway 1) and the credible commitment of resources by partners (Proposition 2), shaping partnerships’ impacts on affected populations (Pathway 4) and overall contributions to sustainability. We also show that beyond the partnerships studied, “partnership” cannot be considered a generic mode of governance – the specificity of partners included and the relations between them holds consequences for partnership effectiveness and sustainability impacts.

Rather than repeating reviews of the partnership literature already provided in this volume and elsewhere (for example, Andonova 2017; Clarke and Crane 2018; Wang et al. 2018), we begin this chapter with a closer look at the corporate governance literature. Theories of governance and group formation offer axes of analysis that are critical to questions of relations between partners and partnership effectiveness. We then introduce faultline analytical concepts, before
defining the methods and measures we use in our empirical analyses. We report on the alignments and faultlines generated through the simultaneous examination of three dimensions of board member diversity (sector, professional experience, and donor or non-donor status) in the boards of six partnerships that address climate change and health. Finally, we discuss our analyses with reference to this volume’s analytical framework and the wider literature.

The Role of Governing Boards

Governance mechanisms are theorized to contribute significantly to the performance of all organizations. As the most noteworthy mechanism of corporate governance, boards are considered to affect a firm’s performance as measured by financial success, market share or investor satisfaction (Bezrukova et al. 2009; Jehn and Bezrukova 2010). In partnerships, Burci (2009) argues that “boards take programmatic decisions such as adopting the work plan and budget of the partnership, and the partnership secretariat is expected to implement its decisions and be accountable to it.” (p.378). If boards influence an organization’s results, what then influences board performance? A number of theories have been proposed to explain the significance of governance boards in firm performance. For the purposes of this review, we group these theories according to external and internal factors that are considered to affect governance boards as the boards, in turn, affect the organizations they govern and more widely.

The first wave of governance research used principal-agent theory to examine relationships between the board, shareholders and senior management (Daily, Dalton and Cannella 2003; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 1996). Based in neoclassical economic concepts of rationality and utility maximization, the premise of principal-agent theory is that if managers act in their own interests and not in those of the principals (that is owners, investors, or shareholders), then a governance board drawn from these principals is required to monitor their actions (Hermalin and Weisbach 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, agency theory lacks explanatory power with regard to: first, different types of principals (conflicts between large and small owners, or overlapping principals and agents such as are found in family firms); and second, the variety of roles (beyond monitoring) that board members play (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2016; Charan, Useem and Carey 2013). Potential conflicts of interests between executives, directors and shareholders are also highlighted in studies of power relations between organizations’ boards and senior management (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella 2009). While stewardship theory emphasizes alignment between the interests of owners, boards and managers, this remains a minority view (Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin 1998).

Secondly, board effectiveness has been theorized to rely on board composition, internal organization and decision-making processes. Stakeholder perspectives reveal the contribution of, and difficulties arising from, the inclusion of broader representation (usually organized labor) in board deliberations and decision making (Crucke and Knockaert 2016; Moriarty 2014). Additionally, applications of
behavioral economics approaches to boards emphasize the importance of boards in resolving conflicts among stakeholders and in gathering and processing information (Huse 2005; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse 2009).

Thirdly, an expansive perspective on boards from political sociology and political economy examines the balance between the distribution of the benefits and risks that organizations generate for the economy and society (and more recently, the environment), or sustainability more broadly (as is the focus of this volume). Such research considers the ways in which board structures shape the development of different types of capitalisms locally and globally, alongside the ways in which boards perpetuate the control of elites over societies and economies (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2016; Zahra and Pearce 1989). More narrowly, the role of the board in monitoring and accountability in terms of measuring an organization’s external performance comprises the majority of corporate governance research and policy attention (Berthelot, Francoeur and Labelle 2012, Murray 1989).

Finally, boards are theorized to act as broker between an organization and its external context. Resource theory focuses on the board mobilizing useful external resources into the organization and giving advice to senior management – referred to as the board’s service role (Crucke and Knockaert 2016; Forbes and Milliken 1999). These resources could consist of funding, lines of credit or useful relationships with external individuals and organizations. Legal approaches focus either on the organization’s wider legal environment (Baber et al. 2005), or on the board’s legally mandated responsibilities (Zahara and Pearce 1989). In addition, different societies hold different normative expectations for organizations, which shape board composition, such that the US model of shareholder corporate governance differs from stakeholder models of governance that are more widely used in, for example, Germany or Japan (Aoki 1988; Jackson 2005).

Most of the concerns identified from the corporate governance research above are reflected in the volume’s analytical framework. Internal relations (whether between board members, or between board and stakeholders and managers) are reflected in Pathway 3: collaboration inside the partnership. References to the effects on the broader political economy and the organization’s context echo the concern in Pathway 5 with influence outside the partnership. Effects on the organization’s performance are seen in Pathways 1 and 2 (goal attainment and value creation for partners) and how these contribute to sustainability more broadly. The final set of issues identified in the literature underpin the empirical analyses in this chapter: how board members mobilize resources into the partnership (see also Andonova 2018), and how board members’ attributes align to contextual norms (here, sustainability logics and sub-sectoral stakeholder representation). The links between the corporate governance literature and the volume’s analytical framework are summarized in Table 10.1.

It is important to note that while the corporate governance literature addresses most of the pathways to effectiveness identified from the multi-disciplinary literature review in Chapter 1 of this volume, it omits the impact on affected populations (Pathway 4). This is perhaps unsurprising, since most of the corporate literature draws on neoclassical economics and business referents, which have
Table 10.1 Relevance of corporate governance literature to partnership effectiveness

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Source: Authors.

tended to discount affected populations (and environments) as externalities. Externalities are conceptualized as effects on third parties (who have no control over the transaction) and have tended not to be accounted for in evaluations of the effectiveness of corporations.1 This has meant, in practice, that corporations whose actions negatively affect populations and environments do not account for social and environmental costs of their actions, but only the increases in profits and shareholder value. And yet, public funds are generally used to repair the damage. Thus, the analytical framework in Chapter 1 adds the hitherto neglected dimension of impact on affected populations (Pathway 4) as an aspect that would enrich the corporate governance literature, and any study of partnership boards.

Thus, despite the substantial literature dedicated to governing corporations, boards tend to be overlooked in the partnership literature. And yet, significant theoretical importance is ascribed to boards’ influence on any organization. The corporate governance literature illuminates the ways in which one pathway to effectiveness (collaboration among partners) interacts with other pathways, here, goal attainment and value creation for partners, and influence outside of partnerships. While not all partnerships are governed by executive boards, if we fail to study the potential effects of this significant governance mechanism in those partnerships that have executive boards, we cannot give a full account of partnership effectiveness. This chapter therefore foregrounds partnership boards as key actors
in the governance of certain partnerships, as they in turn exercise their governance functions in the sustainability issue they address.

**Multiple Diversities within Sectors**

The corporate governance literature argues that external performance measures are affected by internal board functioning, and that internal board functioning is affected by the diversity of board members. Some researchers have argued for the positive influence of more diverse board members in sourcing heterogeneous and innovative perspectives and information that are useful to the organization (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Forbes and Milliken 1999). However, diversity has also been shown to engender inter-group conflict and impede decision making (Cannella, Park and Lee 2008). Thus, Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson (2010, p.552) argue that “it is the heterogeneity or homogeneity of these traits among board members that affects how they work together.” But which traits?

The management literature tends to use a limited definition of diversity. The majority of empirical studies that have been undertaken on diversity have focused mainly on demographic characteristics, such as race and/or gender (Thatcher, Jehn and Zanutto 2003). The recent literature on stakeholder involvement in boards mainly examines the inclusion of one particular stakeholder group, namely employees (Freeman 1984; Moriarty 2014; Van Buren 2010). Nevertheless, Tuggle et al. (2010) highlight the ways in which board members’ heterogeneous professional experiences influence discussions in board meetings, while Thatcher and Patel (2012) identify conflicts originating from informational differences.

Partnership researchers’ focus is narrower still. There are many differences in the partnership literature across business and management, international relations and politics, and public administration. However, all three bodies of literature tend to focus on differences between public, private and voluntary sectors, each of which is conceptualized as internally cohesive. And yet, specialist literatures studying each of these sectors emphasize the differences in scale, scope, practice and preferences within these groups. This within-sector heterogeneity cannot be ignored by those of us who study the interactions between them. Too often a definition of heterogeneity, purely in terms of public, private, and voluntary sector factions, obscures other aspects of board members’ diversity that could affect relations between partners. Inside boards, membership of sub-groups could map directly onto sectoral categories but could also cut across them. The identification of sub-groups is therefore an empirical question.

This chapter contributes sharper conceptual tools that may be used in examining the internal diversity and functioning of partnership boards, and an empirical application of these tools. We move beyond the conventional partnerships research focus on factional groups (public, private, voluntary sectors) to open up the research space to examine differences within sectors. The intersections of a variety of sectoral and non-sectoral aspects of diversity impact individuals in different ways than one alone might, and are theorized to change the responses
that an individual may experience in professional and wider social contexts. We now review one of the methodological innovations (faultline analysis) that could provide additional rigorous evidence on some of the pathways to effectiveness summarized in Chapter 1 of this volume. By measuring faultline strength between sub-groups formed on the basis of other diversities (across or within sectors), we show the utility of identifying other significant, if less obvious, faultlines in partnership boards and their effects on partnership effectiveness.

**Faultlines, Board Functioning and Organizational Performance**

Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines splitting board members into sub-groups based on the analysis of several intersecting attributes (Lau and Murnighan 1998). Faultline analysis provides theoretical propositions that seek to identify sub-groups based on the simultaneous analysis of multiple attributes. It then considers how the interactions between these sub-groups may affect governance processes and outcomes. In the late 1990s, early pioneers of faultline analysis defined core concepts and theorized the effects of faultlines on team processes and firm outcomes. Lau and Murnighan (1998) suggested that diverse teams split into sub-groups holding opposing opinions, theorizing sub-group formation and polarization through mechanisms of homophily. The early 2000s saw a wave of studies that developed measurement techniques and extended the scope of attributes examined beyond demographic diversity (Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye 2012).

In the social categorization approach we adopt, sub-groups are considered to result from team members differentiating between an in-group (us) and an out-group (them) (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). Thus, the more traits that individuals share on more than one dimension of diversity, the higher the comparative fit in one sub-group rather than another. For example, where several board members with professional experience in economics (Econ) represent a donor (D) government (Gov) they are considered more likely to form a sub-group. Where a sub-group of board members share most or all of the same traits, a strong sub-group is identified; if members of a sub-group only share a few traits, that indicates a weak sub-group. Inside strong sub-groups, it is probable that members of those sub-groups will identify more strongly with their fellow sub-group members than the wider group; the opposite is theorized regarding members of weak sub-groups where only one or a few attributes are shared (Phillips et al. 2004). Moreover, the more highly correlated two dimensions may be (in this study, for example, donor status correlates with economic professional experience), the higher the comparative fit (Jehn and Bezrukova 2010; Veltrop et al. 2015). In contrast, where two dimensions are not correlated (e.g., working in the public or private sector and professional experience) then these sub-groups are considered less likely to affect performance (Knippenberg and Van Ginkel 2010). This crosscut diversity is theorized to weaken faultlines, enhance information-sharing and improve decision making (Sawyer et al. 2006). Additionally, when members have to address matters that are related to one of many dimensions of diversity,
then that dimension is more likely to be activated (Lau and Murnighan 2005). For example, if a project is proposed that foregrounds economic rather than social or environmental outcomes, the board members who have economic professional experience might work together more harmoniously even if they diverge on other dimensions.

Two issues regarding faultline analysis are particularly important in the study of partnership boards: the structural effects of faultlines on group functioning (Pathway 3), and the effects on resulting group decisions (Pathways 1 and 4, and broader sustainability impacts). Stakeholder inclusion can be considered an ethical practice, and yet it can impair board functioning (Crucke and Knockaert 2016). The effects on group functioning are theorized to follow a curvilinear relationship, wherein groups (here, boards) with either very strong or virtually non-existent faultlines experience higher levels of conflict in comparison to groups with medium faultline scores (Thatcher et al. 2003). Secondly, faultlines affect the decisions that the wider group takes (Kaczmarek et al. 2012), and therefore the organization’s performance (Veltrop et al. 2015). In the empirical context studied, these decisions pertain to the goals a partnership sets for itself (Pathway 1); the actions needed for the implementation of those goals; and the broader contribution the partnership makes to sustainability, including its impact on affected populations (Pathway 4).

In much faultline analysis, researchers undertake regression analyses for corporate effectiveness criteria. “Performance” in the corporate governance literature is usually interpreted to mean maximizing profit and return on investment. However, an exclusive focus on maximizing shareholder value is a relatively recent phenomenon (Friedman 1962), which is also geographically limited to certain high-income countries (Mazzucato 2021). The responsibilities of businesses and financial institutions to society and the environment are again becoming more explicitly recognized (Fink 2019; Gartenberg and Serafeim 2019). Given the complexity inherent in sustainability issues and the framework of partnership effectiveness proposed in this volume, simple outcome measures and regressions on economic measures alone are not appropriate to these analyses; a different methodological approach is required.

**Operationalizing Faultline Analysis**

A faultline perspective on partnership boards can be broken down into three analytical questions. First, which multiple dimensions of diversity matter in the boards studied? Secondly, how do different dimensions of diversity interact to form sub-groups among board members, with the potential for in-group harmony and out-group discord? Third, how does this affect organizational performance? Faultline analysis empirically identifies sub-groups within larger groups through analyzing the micro-foundations of group formation. While originally focused on individuals’ demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, age), other relevant attributes can be identified according to the context, organization and group examined. Faultline analysis simultaneously examines multiple attributes of the
same individual and compares the resulting profile with others in the group, to then cluster them into empirically identified homophilous sub-groups.

In this empirical context, what aspects of diversity matter in measuring faultlines in boards? The emphasis in the partnership literature, on the assumed differences between public, private and voluntary sectors, overlooks other potentially noteworthy aspects of diversity among partners (board members in this analysis). And yet, diversity among board members relates to many more aspects of professional and organizational diversity. The corporate governance literature also draws attention to the salience of the organizational context in board member selection. Contextual norms are reflected in the composition of governing boards, which in turn affect the framing of the organization’s contribution and ways of working (Table 10.1).

Three dimensions of diversity are particularly relevant to the analysis of GFPs for sustainability. First, board documents identify board members not only by their sector, but also by sub-sectors (governments and International Organizations (IOs) in the public sector; business and finance in the private sector; and finally civil society). Secondly, as Crucke, Moray and Vallet (2015) argue, “faultlines are explanatory constructs for the effects of internal representation of competing logics” (p.236). Regarding sustainability, three different logics of action are considered important: economic, environmental and social. The solution to any issue or intermediate goals contributing to resolving that issue can be portrayed using any one, or combination of two or three, of these frames (Elliott 2012, Raworth 2017). In the GFPs studied, we coded the logics identified in individual board members’ professional experiences as either “economic”; or “issue” (relevant to the issue addressed by the GFP: health or climate change); or “other” (representing professional experience not directly related to the issue, e.g., law or diplomacy). Finally, board members are identified in partnership documents with reference to their resource mobilization for the partnerships on whose boards they sit (in this analysis as donors or not). Thus, we operationalized faultlines relevant to partnership governance boards by coding characteristics identified as salient in GFPs’ selection of board members (sub-sector and resource mobilization) and individuals’ professional experience (as a proxy for their framing of the sustainability issue in question), as summarized in Figure 10.1.

![Figure 10.1](image-url)
Method

As with partnership research, the team diversity literature has also tended to analyze one characteristic of diversity at a time and has provided contradictory findings. Faultline analysis offers a more precise view: sub-groups may be formed within and across (as well as between) factions, and this may affect the processes, decision making, and impacts of global governance partnerships. Thus, a major contribution of faultline analysis is the simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of diversity that have been identified as relevant to the boards studied, and their normative and operational context. Faultline analysis also provides methods for measuring these structures and operationalizing the analysis of sub-group formation, thus opening new avenues for reconsidering the relations between partners and their contribution to the effectiveness of partnerships.

Sampling and Sample

While a variety of governance structures and practices have been identified (for example, Aguilera and Jackson 2003), global financing partnerships tend to use governance boards largely comprised of stakeholder representatives with a small minority of partnerships appointing a small minority of individual members. Consistent with faultline analysis, we identified a set of global financing partnership boards in which different configurations of attribute diversity were present. We selected three partnerships in climate change where only public sector representatives hold seats and three in health where private and voluntary sector participation is encouraged (Table 10.2).

Table 10.2 Sample of six global financing partnerships for sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate Change</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF: Adaptation Fund</td>
<td>Finance projects and programs that help vulnerable communities in developing countries adapt to climate change (AF 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF: Green Climate Fund</td>
<td>Limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change (GCF 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF: Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>Safeguard the global environment by helping developing countries meet their commitments to multiple environmental conventions (GEF 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance</td>
<td>Help vaccinate the world’s children against deadly and debilitating infectious diseases (Gavi 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFATM: Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria</td>
<td>Raise, manage and invest the world’s money to accelerate the end of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as epidemics (GFATM 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM: Partnership to End Malaria</td>
<td>Mobilize for action and resources, and forge consensus for coordinated action against malaria (RBM 2021)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on cited sources.
Data Collection

The “black box” of board room deliberations remains largely closed to researchers. Therefore, for this research project, we collected documentary data on the attribute diversity of board members in these six global financing partnerships for sustainability. Official partnership documents provided data on the relevant sub-sector categories of board membership (government or IO, business or finance, and civil society) and also their role in resource mobilization (donor or non-donor). Professional biographies available online provided data on the professional backgrounds of board members, as a proxy for their framing of the issue that the partnership addresses (economic, issue – health or climate change, respectively – or other).

Data Analysis

Table 10.1 in the literature review above summarizes the theoretical derivation of the attributes relevant to the empirical analyses of these partnership boards: sub-sector (government or IO, business or finance); funding relationship (donor or non-donor); and professional experience (relevant to the issue that the partnership addresses (environment or health), economic (development economics, finance, investment), or other (addressing an issue that is different to that addressed by the GFP, such as law or diplomacy). Board documents and board members’ professional biographies were first analyzed against these theoretically derived codes. Subsequently, we derived descriptive statistics and carried out a chi-squared test to ascertain the significance of the association between the three dimensions of diversity examined. We then computed sub-groups using the average silhouette width (ASW) method (Meyer and Glenz 2013), as we now describe.

Computing Faultline Measures

Many faultline measures are limited to analyzing small groups and computing no more than two sub-groups (Thatcher et al. 2003), or give overarching faultline values without identifying which members belong to which sub-groups (Gibson and Vermeulen 2003; Trezzini 2008). Rather than limiting our analysis in this way, we adopted Meyer and Glenz’s (2013) cluster-based approach – average silhouette width (ASW) – since it allows the identification of the number of sub-groups and also sub-group membership. Furthermore, the ASW algorithm supports our focus on individuals’ comparative fit, resulting in the calculation of sub-groups with higher within-group similarity and lower between-group similarity (Knippenberg and Van Ginkel 2010).

The ASW algorithm operates in two steps. First it starts pre-clustering with one of two agglomerative clustering algorithms: the Ward algorithm (Ward 1963) and the average linkage algorithm. For a sample size of $n$ observations, these two algorithms yield a set of $n$ different configurations of clusters, composed of 1 to $n$ observations. The first configuration is composed of $n$ clusters, where each cluster is composed of a single observation. Then, depending on the algorithm and
clustering criteria, for each of the following configurations the number of clusters is reduced by one, as the pair of closest clusters is merged into one. The question that poses itself at this stage is which of the \( n \) configurations would represent the optimal solution. This is all the more pertinent as the observations exist in a high dimensional manifold and their number is large.

A quantification and hierarchization of the goodness of fit of each configuration is given through the computation of the average silhouette width (ASW). The ASW strength quantifies two important pieces of information into a single score: (a) how well an individual fits inside its own cluster, (b) in comparison to how it might fit into another cluster. This requires the quantification of the dissimilarity to other observations inside its own cluster; the quantification of the dissimilarity to the other observations inside the closest cluster; and the comparison of the two.

The dissimilarities between two observations are calculated using Euclidean distance. Since all our attributes are categorical, the algorithm makes use of dummy coding for each level of the observations’ attributes where the occurrence of a level is given a value of \( 1/\sqrt{2} \) and 0 otherwise (Meyer and Glenz 2013). This way, two observations that differ in terms of one attribute would have a Euclidean distance of 1. The Euclidean distance between two observations in terms of the number of different attributes \( \delta \) can be expressed as follows:

\[
d(\delta) = \sqrt{\delta \times 2 \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2} = \sqrt{\delta}
\]

At the level of each configuration yielded by the Ward or average linkage algorithms, the ASW cluster algorithm computes the cluster faultline score by averaging over the individual silhouette widths, proceeding by moving only one observation at a time to the closest cluster to calculate the new faultline score. It does so for all observations and makes one of the moves final if it yields the best increase in the overall configuration’s faultline score, which is an average of the faultline scores of all clusters. Among all resulting configurations with different initial associations from Step 1, only the one maximizing the ASW is retained. In addition to its hierarchization and quantification advantage, this method is all the more interesting as it overcomes the issue of agglomerative clustering that is only able to merge entire clusters together. In practice, a maximum number of clusters that we are not willing to exceed during the optimization is fed to the algorithm. This is essential to guard against the calculation of an equal number of clusters as observations, where each observation fits perfectly inside a cluster composed only of itself.

Analysis and Findings

In this section we present our findings from applying faultline analysis to 141 members of six global financing partnership boards. We first focus on the characteristics that are present across the space of these partnerships. Secondly, we compare climate change and health partnership board members’ alignments,
the sub-groups identified within and across sectors, and individual “fit” in those sub-groups.

**The Space of Partnerships**

Across the six partnerships studied, certain alignments were not present in the data (Table 10.3). Only one private sector actor is a donor to a partnership on whose board they serve, and their professional background is economic (D/Bus/Econ); there are no D/Bus/Iss or D/Bus/Other. As expected, there were no civil society donors (D/CS/*). Thus, of the total 39 donors, 98 percent were public sector representatives (87 percent government and 11 percent from IOs). A higher proportion of donors had an economic professional background (71 percent), whereas the majority of non-donors held an issue framing (67 percent). Board members’ work experience generally aligns either with the GFP issue (climate change or health) or with an economic framing of the issue addressed; there appear to be few linkages to other sustainability issue areas on these boards.

In order to ascertain the significance of the relationship between these different characteristics, we carried out statistical analysis in the form of a chi-squared test. There is not enough evidence to claim an association between sector and professional experience: representing either public or private sectors does not correlate with an individual’s professional background being more economic or issue-specific (Table 10.4a). In contrast to assumptions of within sector cohesion, this finding shows a critical faultline within both public and private sectors arising from their professional experience. Another potential faultline within the public sector is the statistically significant association between donor and professional experience, such that being a (public sector) donor is associated with an economic professional background and non-donor status (both public and private) is associated with an issue framing (Table 10.4b). The significance test also showed, however, that there is enough evidence to claim a statistically significant association between sector and donor (Table 10.4c), that is, public sector representatives make credible commitments of resources to these partnerships, while private sector board members do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Non-donor</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>ND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p-value 0.517  p-value 0.000004674  p-value 0.00304

Source: Authors.

These analyses challenge key assumptions in the partnership literature: that sectors are internally coherent and the private sector will contribute additional resources.

Comparing Climate Change and Health Partnership Boards

Climate change boards are composed of solely public sector actors: governments and IOs. However, there is differentiated clustering beneath this surface sectoral homogeneity; public actors fall into different alignments depending on their funding role and professional experience. Health partnerships’ representatives from private and public sectors, formed (a) more clusters, and (b) more heterogeneous clusters than in the climate partnerships (Table 10.5).

Measures of individual fit in sub-groups identify the extent to which an individual “belongs” with the other individuals inside the same cluster; the closer to

Table 10.5 Summary table of analysis of alignment, clustering and individual fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th></th>
<th>Health</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>GCF</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Gavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Board members</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># clusters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># individuals in each</td>
<td>10,3,3</td>
<td>6,4,9</td>
<td>5,18,9</td>
<td>9,3,2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
1.00, the better the fit. Since the algorithm also considers the goodness of fit for an individual into other clusters, a zero or negative score does not denote “bad fit” within a cluster, but rather “poorer fit” within other clusters in the same board. These individuals could be considered “floating” and likely to attach to one or other group or group position depending on the identity mobilized by the issue under discussion, or conversely as boundary-spanners who could take an active role in bridging across differences between other stronger clusters.

**Intersectional Alignments, Sub-Groups and Individual Fit**

Thirty “alignments” are possible between the three intersecting categories studied (funder status, sub-sector, and professional experience). Of these, 15 are present in the six GFPs studied (Table 10.6). Present on all six boards was the alignment of a non-donor government representative with an issue framing (ND/Gov/Iss). Government representatives with a professional background in economics who were donors (D/Gov/Econ) were present on five boards (not AF), as were non-donor government representatives (ND/Gov/Econ, not RBM). Also present on five boards were donors with an issue framing (D/Gov/Iss, not GEF).

We put together notions of sub-groups and individual fit to discriminate between strong and weak sub-groups depending on the number of individuals in a sub-group with the same or similar characteristics. Sub-groups where individuals align on all three characteristics measured a fit score (or FAU) of 1.00. Sub-groups where the majority of individuals align on all three categories, but a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alignment</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Count of Alignment:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AF</td>
<td>GCF</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Gavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/Gov/Iss</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Gov/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/Gov/Econ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Gov/Iss</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/IO/Iss</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/Bus/Iss</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/Fin/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/CS/Iss</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/IO/Iss</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/IO/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/IO/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Gov/Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/Bus/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND/CS/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/Bus/Econ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

Note: Results are shown in descending order of the total number of individuals in each alignment category.
minority align only on two characteristics score a mean of 0.60–0.80, depending on the number of individuals who align on three attributes or fewer: the more that align on three, the higher the score. Sub-groups where just one attribute of three are aligned across the group score closer to 0.00, and sub-groups where none of these characteristics are aligned in all or most members score negatively (Table 10.7).

Since climate change partnerships only comprise public actors (government and IO), it is not surprising that 9 out of 10 clusters aligned on all three dimensions of diversity, in comparison to 8 out of 15 clusters in health GFPs. GEF was the only board where there were more members in a weaker sub-group than in the two strong sub-groups; however, alignments in that weaker sub-group (D/Econ) have been shown to be significant (Table 10.4b). The sustainability framings identified from board members’ biographies vary within sectors more than across them. In the health GFPs, the strength of alignment within the

<table>
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<th>Table 10.7 Faultlines and cluster alignments</th>
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Source: Authors.
A cluster FAU score close to 0 or negative is not considered to denote good “fit” in a cluster as much as “not fit” in other clusters in the same board.
private sector clusters (1.00) is greater than that of public sector clusters that include ten individuals (Gavi: D/Gov and IO) and four individuals (RBM: IO). In GFATM, no strong sub-groups of for-profit actors were identified, but civil society formed a strong sub-group. Eight members each in GFATM and RBM were not sorted into clusters due to lack of shared alignments (negative FAU scores). Strong sub-groups with many members were present in all the GFPs, except RBM. Overall, the dimensions of diversity identified empirically vary within the same sector and interact differently within the same sector, resulting in potential faultlines that differ from existing accounts of public and private factional groups.

Discussion: Using Faultline Analysis to Advance Research in Partnership Effectiveness

Faultline analysis complements the existing – but incomplete – sectoral approach that dominates the partnership literature. Our study contributes innovative insights into how differences within sectors may affect group dynamics and partnership governance. Our findings show that empirically identified sub-groups may differ substantially from sector categories alone: multiple characteristics provide the actual micro-foundations for relationships between partners (Pathway 3). Moreover, at the same time as diversity affects partner relations, it is complexly intertwined with other pathways to effectiveness. For example, Ebrahim, Battilana and Mair (2014) argue that preferentially involving donors signals “upward” accountability, whereas including representatives of affected populations indicates a broader social framing of accountability (Proposition 1). And yet, few partnerships bring affected populations into their decision making (Gavi and GFATM are exceptions), which could be expected to affect the extent to which they achieve positive impacts for affected populations (Pathway 4).

Furthermore, faultlines are not theorized to cause conflict indiscriminately. First, the negative effects of faultlines may be attenuated by clear and shared organizational goals (Crucke et al. 2015), such as can be agreed through sophisticated contracting (Proposition 1). A vaccine does not vary much whether delivered in Birmingham or Bangalore, but climate adaptation strategies vary depending on local contexts, and mitigation solutions range from technical to behavioral to political. However, the goals themselves (Pathway 1) and the selection of partners (Pathway 3) may become narrower in order to avoid potential faultline conflict: a partnership focused on vaccines may select board members who subscribe to disease-focused goals rather than broader health system strengthening or public health objectives. Climate change partnerships’ broader goals may provoke conflict, but arguably reflect a more complete vision of the issue addressed and sustainability more broadly.

Faultlines affect group functioning when differences in values or logics of action arise (Sawyer et al. 2006; Crucke et al. 2015). Rather than assuming cohesive logics of action inside the public, private and voluntary sectors, our empirical analyses revealed a statistically significant association between public sector
donors and an economic logic of action. Thus, despite reported reconceptualizations of development away from economic growth alone and toward sustainability (Elliott 2012; Raworth 2017), historically privileged actors (donors) continue to bring an economic focus to their governance responsibilities, which may skew the partnerships in the direction of profit making more than delivering environmental and social outcomes (Bitzer, Glasbergen and Leroy 2013; Utting and Zammit 2009). This finding supports the public administration literature that theorizes an orientation toward private sector managerialism in high-income countries’ public sectors (Boston et al. 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Moreover, the correlation between donor status and public sector stands in contradiction to the widely touted policy discourse of additional resources committed by the private sector (AfDB et al. 2015; Schmidt-Traub and Sachs 2015). Thus, this study shows the continuing relevance of donor vs. non-donor as categories of analysis despite recent policy and research focus on public vs. private dichotomies; it also invites more empirical investigation of the promise of private investment in partnerships for sustainability.

Mitigating such historical inequalities in decision making is possible. Strong groups of non-donor public sector board members with an issue framing are present in all partnership boards. There is the potential for these “subaltern” sub-groups (Tully 2002) to become sites for challenging and reformulating political and historical subjectivities (Sabaratnam 2011; Sachs 1992). However, faultline theorists maintain that if group members do not actively identify with their sub-group, they are unlikely to take action (Jehn and Bezrukova 2010; Veltrop et al. 2015). Political and sociological research suggests that individuals who belong to lower status sub-groups might preferentially associate with higher status groups and support dominant interests instead (Fanon 2008[1952]; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a; Spivak 1988), particularly since they belong to elites domestically (Fanon 2007[1963]; Dülffer and Frey 2011). Thus, while we identify the potential for non-donors to work together, this remains an empirical question.

Future Research and Implications

The study of the macro-processes of international relations benefits from the investigation of their micro-foundations, for example through faultline analysis. The analyses presented here were conducted on documentary data collected from partnership websites; further empirical research using interview, survey or observational data is needed to examine the activation of faultlines through board members’ agency. Further research is also needed from sociological and anthropological traditions to examine whether and how crisscrossing actors who share a range of characteristics with individuals in several sub-groups might bridge potential faultlines, and to what effect (Sawyer et al. 2006; van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). Another empirical question remaining is the impact of the lack of more widespread representation of affected populations inside partnership boards, and the attendant effects on partnerships’ impacts on these populations (Pathway 4).
We suggest two promising avenues for methodological development. First, the ASW score usefully illuminates the individual and sub-group levels of analysis, revealing clustering across multiple dimensions of diversity, but does not (alone) give a full account of faultline strength at the board level. We posit that ASW could usefully be complemented by the calculation of social distance in order to more accurately render the whole board level of analysis (Bezrukova et al. 2009). These results could be calculated by multiplying the Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters identified and visualized to assess the distance between clusters in the social space of different partnership boards. Secondly, a systems approach to partnership research would helpfully investigate the extent to which individual partnerships, each with narrow goals, may complement each other – and other actors in the complex governance of sustainability – in addressing specific sustainability issues, and sustainability more broadly. Such an investigation of a “system of systems” of partnerships for sustainability could examine the patterns, forces and interrelationships between individuals, issues and goals, while identifying the complex interplay of dynamics and drivers that shape the system.

Although faultlines can be disruptive, the literature provides practical recommendations to reduce conflicts. First, by explicitly reflecting on board processes and developing interaction structures, board members can prevent faultlines negatively affecting group performance (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003; Mäs et al. 2013). In order for this reflexivity to occur, however, partners need to be aware of the multiple dimensions across which faultlines might arise, particularly the understudied faultlines within sector categories. Secondly, interactions over longer time periods could mitigate some effects of faultlines (Harrison et al. 1998; Jehn et al. 1999); partnership boards whose membership changes more frequently may not derive that benefit (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b). Finally, “the partnership model” cannot be considered generic: different dimensions of diversity affect the micro-foundations of each partnership’s functioning. The multiple diversities inside each partnership need to be identified (Lau and Murnighan 1998) and the continuing effects of historical relations surfaced (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a).

Conclusions

Our empirical analyses focused on relations between partners (Pathway 3) and partnership boards as an accountability mechanism (Proposition 1). Through these analyses, we illuminate additional aspects of the volume’s analytical framework (Chapter 1). First, boards may hold partnerships accountable for reaching partnership goals (Proposition 1), yet these goals (Pathway 1) may be framed narrowly and in ways that might exclude the welfare of affected populations (Pathway 4) or contribute less to sustainability more broadly. Narrow framing might result from boards’ attempts to avoid internal conflict, and have the potential to become skewed toward donor priorities and economic framings of sustainability. Secondly, we find an absence of credible commitments of resources from the private sector (Proposition 2); they may contribute to sustainability in other
ways but (in this sample) they do not contribute financially to the financing partnerships in which they occupy decision-making board positions. Finally, “partnership” is touted as a generic model of international cooperation; in contrast, we demonstrate that the micro-foundations of partner relations matter (Pathway 3), and are complexly intertwined with other pathways to effectiveness.

In response to a partnership literature that tends to focus on one characteristic of partners (their sector), we argue that analysis of partners’ sectoral alignment alone is not sufficient; other relevant aspects of diversity should be examined. Furthermore, in the contemporary shift in research attention away from relations between higher- and lower-income states toward multi-stakeholder and polycentric governance, our findings show that it is not rigorous to ignore challenges that persist from long-standing categories of development actors and the historical power relations between them. Future research could usefully engage more with multiple relevant aspects of partner identities; they provide the micro-foundations for the implementation of the partnership governance model, and hold real-world consequences for partnership effectiveness and sustainability.

Note

1 For a more extended treatment of externalities in ecological economics, see, for example, Van den Bergh (2010) and Bithas (2011).

References


Part IV

Conclusion
Public-private and multistakeholder partnerships are now embedded in the fabric of global governance. As claims intensify as to the variety of functions that are expected to be provided by partnerships across multiple levels of governance, this volume offers a dual contribution, elaborating an innovative theoretical framework on partnership effectiveness and applying it to generate new qualitative evidence and data across multiple issues that are at the core of advancing sustainability.

The main theoretical contribution of the volume is the articulation of a new disaggregated framework that identifies a set of pathways and conditions underpinning the variable effects of partnerships (Chapter 1). The framework challenges prevalent debates about the nature of partnership governance. Public-private and multistakeholder initiatives neither necessarily provide functional solutions to governance failures associated with globalization and policy stalemates, nor do they necessarily amount to largely superficial window-dressing driven by corporate actors. Rather, a more nuanced and interdisciplinary conceptualization of the effectiveness of partnerships highlights how different types of effects can materialize across different constituencies and layers of governance. These effects must be actively examined rather than assumed, while recognizing relevant counterfactuals, inequalities of power, and the emergence of second-order positive or negative outcomes. We argue that understanding the distribution of such different effects provides us with a more accurate perspective on what partnership effectiveness entails, as well as its limitations or outright failures. This is a necessary baseline from which it is possible to analyze the relative contribution of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships to both addressing specific problems and pursuing sustainable development more generally, alongside or in interplay with, other governance modalities.

The second, empirical, contribution of this volume lies in the wealth of cases, data and analyses presented (Table 11.1), which present ample evidence of the value of assessing partnership effectiveness against more numerous and complex dimensions of effectiveness than previously recognized. The contributions of partnerships to problem solving and advancing sustainable development is ultimately a matter of producing multiple effects across different pathways for multiple constituencies. Effectiveness is amplified when such pathways work together.
Table 11.1 Issue areas, cases, data and crosscutting themes analyzed in the volume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>Case Studies, Data and Chapter(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change, carbon funds &amp; markets</td>
<td>Case study of World Bank-brokered funds and market mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions reduction since 1999 (Michaelowa, Michaelowa &amp; Andonova, Chapter 4).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biodiversity and clean energy</td>
<td>Comparative case studies of the Amazon Region Protected Areas Program (ARPA) (Brazil); Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio, Costa Rica); San Cristóbal Wind Power partnership (Ecuador) (Andonova &amp; Piselli, Chapter 2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protected areas, conservation and development</td>
<td>Case study of Reserva de Desenvolvimento Sustentável do Uatumá (Brazil) (Silva-Muller &amp; Faul, Chapter 3); protected areas also covered by Andonova &amp; Piselli (Chapter 2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durability and adaptability of partnerships for environmental protection and sustainability</td>
<td>Dataset and survey of 27 partnerships from the Roy Family Award for Environmental Partnerships. Case studies of Noel Kempff Climate Action project (Bolivia); Mexico City Metrobús (Mexico); and Alianza Shire partnership for energy Access to refugees (Ethiopia) (Sardonis and Lee, Chapter 8).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency in natural resource revenue management</td>
<td>Panel-level data on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). National case studies of Senegal and Indonesia (Fraser and Carbonnier, Chapter 9).</td>
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<td>Children’s rights</td>
<td>Case study of Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (Bissell and Stevens, Chapter 7).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global health: polio</td>
<td>Case study of Global Polio Eradication Initiative (Pillinger, Chapter 6).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global health: access to medicines</td>
<td>Data on 10 product development partnerships for drugs, vaccines and diagnostics (DNDi, FIND, IPM, IVCC, IVI, Lifebox, MMV, Meningitis Vaccines Project, PATH, TB Alliance) (Vieira et al., Chapter 5).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnerships’ governing boards</td>
<td>Faultline analysis of 3 partnerships focusing on climate change (Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund, and Global Environment Facility) and 3 focusing on health (GAVI, GFATM, Roll Back Malaria) (Faul and Boulanguiem, Chapter 10).</td>
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Source: Authors.

In a cumulative manner. However, our research shows that this is not always the case, revealing instances of tensions and even contradictions and trade-offs across pathways to effectiveness.

This concluding chapter provides a synthesis of our main findings. We shed light on recurrent challenges to effectiveness and the ways in which some partnerships have succeeded in overcoming them, alongside limitations related to the types of solutions that they contribute to sustainability and entrenched power
dynamics. We begin by noting that the durability of partnership arrangements has emerged in our empirical research as an important baseline that plays a key role in shaping the extent to which partnerships exert their anticipated effects. We then turn to the discussion of our findings with respect to the pathways to effectiveness and the conditions related to partnership structuring. Finally, we offer reflections on the contributions of the volume in dialogue with different strands of literature on global governance and sustainability, and suggest avenues for future research.

**Durability of Partnerships**

In order to effectively contribute to sustainability, partnerships must at least last long enough to pursue their goals. However, this baseline expectation of durability cannot be taken for granted, as several of the case studies presented in this volume and the survey of the Roy Family Award partnerships aptly illustrate. Existing research has already highlighted that a notable share of partnerships registered at high-level international platforms may never take off in ways that provide sufficient inputs for implementation (Pattberg et al. 2012). Our findings further elaborate this line of inquiry by demonstrating that even partnerships that have actually been implemented frequently face internal or external setbacks. External risks have included changes in the political context (for example, a change in government, withdrawal of support from a particular initiative, amendments to existing policies, etc.) or in market conditions that prevent anticipated financial returns from materializing. Internally, partners have to manage differences in organizational culture, priorities and power which, if overlooked or undermined by lack of transparent engagement, could stall effectiveness and unravel cooperation. Achieving durability sometimes involves a prolonged start-up phase, sacrificing immediate efficiency for eventual longer-term effectiveness. Indeed, among the case studies in this volume, partnerships that succeeded in achieving their objectives also demonstrated capacity for endurance and adaptability, both with respect to planned strategies and in the face of unexpected risks.

The recurrent theme of partnership durability that emerges through our research is significant because it highlights that partnerships are ubiquitous but also fluid features of governance. By their nature, these initiatives are embedded in broader institutional frameworks through overlapping activities and the diverse affiliations of their stakeholders. At the same time, individual partnerships tend to pursue highly specific and sometimes time-bound objectives; they are not necessarily wired as long-term institutional fixtures. These dual characteristics of partnerships as embedded and highly focused modes of governance further validate the need for a more disaggregated assessment of concrete effects along different pathways to effectiveness, which considers objectives and processes internal to the partnership and also their external impact on societies and institutions.

We now turn to the most important insights on partnership effectiveness along the specific pathways elaborated in the theoretical framework (Chapter 1). We reflect on some of the synergies that have materialized across pathways, but also on contradictions and limitations that became apparent through our empirical inquiry.
Pathways to Effectiveness

Goal Attainment

Actors convene partnerships around a set of objectives that they have agreed upon, albeit from different positions of power in negotiating them. Moreover, once these goals have been set, the possibility of measuring their attainment represents an important means through which to rally partners, raise additional funding and communicate results. It is therefore not surprising that goal attainment proved to be the most prominent pathway to effectiveness along which partners themselves evaluate the performance of partnerships.

Notably, partnerships that focused on relatively concrete and circumscribed targets placed strong emphasis on their attainment. The ARPA partnership, for instance, set out with a goal of expanding and consolidating protected areas to cover 10% of the Amazonian biome in Brazil and attained this target in the first phase of its implementation, subsequently expanding it to 15%. It ultimately became one of the largest and most ambitious transnational conservation initiatives in scope, creating value beyond what public or private actors would have been able to achieve by themselves. At an entirely different scale and setting, the Alianza Shire partnership successfully implemented its pilot phase, securing access to electricity and improvements in safety and services in a refugee camp in Ethiopia. In turn, the data and analysis of a set of ten pharmaceutical Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) has provided evidence of additional investment in research and development for diseases that were previously neglected, resulting in renewed product pipelines and specific medical products that are more broadly accessible in low-income contexts and offer significant therapeutic advances. World Bank-brokered partnerships were successful in their goal to jump-start the development of carbon markets by mobilizing finance, elaborating accounting methodologies, and creating capacity in low- and middle-income countries.

And yet, while concrete and relatively narrow partnership goals can focus partner resources and commitment on their implementation, in some cases they may sidestep or even undermine other objectives that are essential for attaining sustainability broadly conceived. We have observed such dynamics among the cases examined, with implications for the direct and indirect effects of partnerships. For example, critical concerns (including within partnership boards) that initiatives such as GPEI and Gavi may indirectly divert resources from other health priorities in comparison to more disease-focused goals, have led to decisions to dedicate a small proportion of funding to strengthening health systems. In the case of the ARPA partnerships, civil society organizations in Brazil contested its predominant focus on protected areas, demanding greater attention to social and development issues in the Amazon region, and the inclusion of sustainable-use and extractive reserves in the scope of the program’s provisions.

Our research furthermore reveals that partnerships often revise their goals in the course of implementation. Some initiatives introduced more ambitious targets along the way, as in the cases of the Mexico City Metrobús and ARPA. Others, like
the Galápagos Wind project, succeeded in their immediate objective of displacing 2.4 megawatts of fossil fuels by implementing a hybrid wind power system on San Cristóbal Island, but had to downscale the original expectation of a 50% reduction in fossil fuel use to 30%, due to a rise in local energy demand that could not be anticipated. The initiative similarly adapted its goals early on to include wildlife conservation and capacity-building components as essential aspects for the sustainable development of the island. The GPEI followed yet another trajectory. It made substantial progress toward the goal of eradicating polio, with 99.96% fewer polio cases in 2020 than in 1988. However, a host of political and place-specific reasons have prevented eradication in the two remaining endemic countries. The decision was taken not to adjust the target, but rather to persist with the partnership’s ultimate goal of eradication. This, in turn, triggered significant internal change (updating the initiative’s strategy and financial commitments), as well as external controversy regarding the high volume of resources committed to a priority that is not widely supported in the countries affected. Multiple partnerships explored in this volume also developed a set of auxiliary targets early on during the implementation to address aspects of sustainability adjacent to their principal goals, a tendency that also became evident through the survey of the Roy Family Award finalist partnerships.

In several of the cases analyzed, the immediate partnership goals materialized only partially or were ultimately not achieved, providing more insight on recurrent challenges to partnership effectiveness. Prominent transnational initiatives such as the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project in Bolivia and INBio in Costa Rica started with ambitious goals and implementation phases, but experienced in their institutional history what Oran Young (2011) has termed “arrested development” (p.19855). In both instances, the partnerships and the attainment of their objectives were highly dependent on political and market-based contextual factors. Ultimately, both partnerships ceased to exist despite some early achievements, most notably the creation of the National Biodiversity Inventory by INBio. In turn, the analysis of EITI membership and its impact on the terms of international finance reveals a gap between countries’ adoption of EITI principles and the complex political dynamics of implementation that remain detached from the partnership. To attain the EITI’s goal of reducing corruption and illicit financial flows, member countries must allow the partnership to perform its oversight function. However, long histories of opacity and deeply rooted political complexity in the management of resources have prevented investors from gaining confidence in the governance of the extractives sector, effectively weakening the signal associated with EITI membership.

Overall, our findings suggest that the goal attainment pathway of partnership effectiveness tends to materialize with respect to relatively well-specified and often narrowly targeted goals that command strong and durable commitments from core partners. This approach is highly characteristic of partnerships as a transnational mode of governance, and can produce tensions with other pathways to effectiveness, for instance with respect to impacts on affected populations and broader sustainability objectives.
Value for Partners

Political questions of who gets what, when and why (Sell 2003) are central to examining the effectiveness of partnerships. Many of the cases analyzed in the volume reveal that the value created for partners tends to be associated with the attainment of partnership goals, suggesting a close nexus between these two pathways. However, this could also indicate that core partners – those who have led the founding of the partnerships and who are represented in its governance – may contribute to a narrow framing of the partnership’s goals that aligns with their own expectations. Moreover, our multi-disciplinary and broadly comparative empirical approach has allowed us to examine how different types of benefits materialize to public, private sector and civil society partners, and the contradictions that may emerge.

Across several cases examined, project documents and partners who were interviewed speak of value created both at the macro level for sustainability and for core partners, both public and non-state. For example, the value of PDPs materialized in correcting a market failure in the development of medicines for neglected diseases, and also by creating value for the academic, government, industry, and philanthropic organizations that participated in the initiatives. In a field of innovation and technology development, where competitive R&D and profit maximization dominates, PDPs facilitated more open and efficient sharing of knowledge and increased resource flows to partner organizations (as well as to the partnerships as a whole). It also created value in terms of access to more affordable and context-adapted medical technology.

In a similar vein, the attainment of core objectives by partnerships such as ARPA, GPEI, Alianza Shire, Galápagos Wind and Mexico City Metrobús delivered value to international partners and donors who expected these projects to contribute to their strategic priorities and agendas, as well as to national government agencies and local municipalities, who could raise resources and gain political leverage to pursue ambitious programs that they otherwise would not have been able to embark upon. Private sector actors, in turn, have sought to obtain reputational benefits and explore the potential for future market opportunities, while simultaneously reducing their own financial risks through blended financing strategies which involved financial contributions from host governments and other donors.1 Our research on global financing partnerships found that there is a significant association between the public sector and providing partnerships funds, while business, finance and civil society representatives enjoy the benefit of holding decision-making seats in financing partnerships for health.

Finally, several chapters found that the strong commitment to realizing value for core partners may also create tensions with respect to more comprehensive sustainability objectives, or for constituencies that are not directly represented in a partnership’s governing structure. Prioritizing value creation for core partners, the early portfolio of World Bank partnerships rolled out large-scale, low-cost carbon offsets implemented disproportionately in large emerging economies and at times produced contradictions and even pathologies – such as investing in HFC-23...
(trifluoromethane) destruction projects or overlooking the climate-related challenges in low-income countries – that could ultimately compromise political trust in carbon markets as instruments to advance sustainability. Similarly, while polio eradication has continued to represent a key priority within the agendas of international partners involved in the GPEI, it has progressively become less relevant to national governments that are simultaneously dealing with other public health issues which require significant resources.

In this respect, a crucial problem therefore consists in the level of engagement of affected populations, whose perspective could help deliver synergies between the value accruing to individual partners and the overall problem-solving effects of the partnership. Despite being frequently referred to as partners in partnership documents, these populations and communities in many instances are not sufficiently represented in governance structures, while their well-being is fundamental to advancing sustainable development. For example, civil society organizations working in RDS Uatumã in the Brazilian Amazon facilitated the creation of value for many partners in the complex of Brazilian environmental governance (including for local communities, by ensuring a voice in decision-making structures and improving education and livelihood opportunities; for transnational partnerships and donors, by translating and implementing their goals at the local level; and for federal and state-level public actors working to protect the Amazon). Yet, the role of local civil society organizations in wider transnational partnerships such as ARPA often takes place at the level of local implementation, rather than substantial participation and influence in the partnerships’ decision-making structures. Additionally, competition between partners regarding the value that may accrue to them can hinder partnership formation and structuring. In the End Violence partnership, smaller NGOs were satisfied that participation in the partnership would increase their resource base, whereas some larger civil society and international organizations railed against their decreasing share of existing resources.

In sum, while many cases reveal convergence between partnership goals and value creation for partners, tensions arise when there is competition for resources, creation of split incentives for certain partners and the support for broader impacts of the partnership, ambiguous signals to and from markets, and inadequate involvement of affected communities as core partners. Such contradictions with other pathways depended on the extent to which partners’ incentives were congruent with partnership goals and with the pursuit of sustainable development at large.

**Collaboration within Partnerships**

Another advantage of disaggregating the pathways to partnership effectiveness is the opportunity to inquire more deeply into processes of internal collaboration and their implications for advancing sustainability. What does it take for partners to collaborate effectively? While business administration studies have focused substantially on how internal partnership structuring and processes affect
collaborative outcomes (Austin and Seitanidi 2012a, b; Stadtler and Probst 2012), the international relations scholarship has so far attributed less attention beyond scrutinizing the tendencies of uneven participation across stakeholders (Andonova 2014; Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Pattberg et al. 2012). Indeed, questions remain about who gets to be a partner and what the power dynamics within an initiative are (Faul 2016; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021). Several dynamics along this pathway became apparent through our research.

To begin with, the role of partnership brokerage has proved to be an important factor contributing to the effective management and adaptability of partnerships, as well as in linking them more effectively to other initiatives horizontally and to local communities. Interestingly, we found that in our sample of initiatives, different types of non-profit organizations have most frequently taken on brokerage roles in many of the partnerships examined. They range from expert organizations as in the cases of Alianza Shire and PDPs, to civil society organizations such as FAS in the Brazilian Amazon, transnational NGOs such as WWF in ARPA and the WRI in the Mexico City Metrobús partnership, as well as not-for-profit industry associations such as the GSEP (which itself operates as a sustainability partnership bringing together CEOs of electricity companies) in Galápagos Wind. The World Bank is a particular type of actor which, as an international organization with considerable agency, assumed roles both as governance entrepreneur and partnership broker to establish carbon offset partnerships. The United Nations Fund and the UN Office for Partnerships have similarly taken on the role of partnership facilitators of larger portfolios of partnerships within the UN, which are exemplified by the Galápagos Wind project in our study.

Several of these organizations (the WWF, the World Bank, and GSEP), but not all, have assumed multiple roles in partnering processes – initially as governance entrepreneurs for the creation of new partnerships, then as core partners in the respective initiatives, and also as brokers and thus facilitators within specific partnerships. Overall, broker organizations have played an important role in stabilizing collaboration among partners, often by leveraging resources and expertise to cushion unanticipated setbacks, as well as by shaping the design of the processes and institutional mechanisms through which partnerships are implemented.

Our collective research further highlights that continued and substantial coordination among core partners is highly significant for steering partnerships toward realizing their objectives. This is particularly the case at critical junctures in which a partnership may need to manage unexpected challenges or update the nature of their agreements, the roles of the partners, or its implementation activities. Interviews cited across several chapters highlight that effective communication, as well as the distribution of risks and responsibilities according to the shared understanding of roles and comparative advantage of each partner, allow partnerships to better manage different types of setbacks. More generally, setbacks can be characterized as inherent to cross-sector partnerships, due to the diversity of contexts, organizational cultures, logics of action and incentives that partnerships bring together.
Across multiple cases, meaningful engagement by national and subnational governments in the establishment and governance of a partnership has also enabled successful on-the-ground collaboration for implementing and adapting partnership goals. This is illustrated by the significant role of Brazilian government environmental agencies in the ARPA partnership; the central involvement of the San Cristóbal municipality and its electric utility in the Galápagos Wind project, alongside strong coordination by representatives of the Ecuadorian government; and the driving role of Mexico City’s mayor and environmental agencies in the Metrobús partnership. The early implementation of the End Violence partnership through pathfinder countries has similarly sought to leverage strong policy commitments from national governments to advancing the cause of ending violence against children in practice.

However, dynamics of close-knit collaboration among core partners can also create certain risks should core partner support be withdrawn, as well as a tendency toward selective club governance rather than more broadly representative structures. Such political risks are exemplified by the freezing of the Amazon Fund’s resources after the election of the government of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, or the withdrawal of government and donor support from the INBio partnership in Costa Rica. Even where partnership governance design includes representatives of conventional stakeholder groups (public, private, and voluntary sectors), faultlines within these sectors may divide the core partners into different subgroups that have more consequential effects on group functioning. In the six global financing boards examined, differences within the public sector grouping (between donors versus non-donors, and economic- versus issue-logics of action) appear at least as significant as between public and private sectors. Furthermore, the extent to which PDPs meaningfully engage host governments and intended beneficiaries tends to be rather indirect and top-down, through transnational partners and specialized agencies. The resulting tension – between close substantive collaboration at the level of partnership governance as a consequential basis for effectiveness, alongside the potential disenfranchisement of actors with less power, access, and voice – holds implications for issue-framing, agenda-setting, as well as partnership activities themselves. These risks and tensions shape the kinds of effects that are produced and their distribution, and therefore have implications for the legitimacy of partnerships.

**Impact on Affected Populations**

By focusing attention on external as well as internal pathways to effectiveness, our analytical framework allows us to scrutinize indirect effects, which are less well understood in the partnership literature. While partnerships ultimately aim to influence a broad range of actors beyond core partners, disentangling their effects on affected populations is often challenging. Through our collective research, it has become apparent that data on partnership effectiveness at the subnational level and with respect to specific domestic constituencies is less readily available. Partnership documents tend to focus on overall goal attainment and more
visible macro-level inputs and effects. Moreover, they interact with a multiplicity of policies, institutions, and other transnational initiatives to shape outcomes at national and local levels. As a consequence, understanding such interactions and the relative contribution of a partnership to effective governance depends, in part, on the angle a researcher takes and the pathways that can be scrutinized through different research methodologies. The deliberate diversity of cases selected in our study reflects the multi-layered nature of partnership governance. It reveals how the specific focus of partnerships, the nature of partners, and the localization of initiatives profoundly shapes which types of effects are prioritized and produced for affected populations.

The cases of partnerships in the Brazilian Amazon have illustrated the complex interplay between domestic institutions, transnational partnerships and their impacts on local populations and governance. This reflects the density of domestic and transnational governance initiatives that have come to populate the region throughout its turbulent history over the last four decades (Hecht 2011). In this context, civil society organizations and subnational programs such as the state-level Bolsa Floresta have been essential intermediaries between affected communities and the multitude of transnational initiatives working in the Brazilian Amazon. It is such interactions on the ground that can generate positive effects for local communities: in RDS Uatumã, for example, rendering affected populations more visible to national and transnational governance bodies. Thus, partnership initiatives have had some positive social impacts in the region through the participation of local and regional actors. For instance, they have indirectly regularized the land rights of some local communities by prompting the government to formalize the status of protected and sustainable-use areas; they increased attention to local priorities in natural resource management, and provided education and health services. At the same time, our research also has revealed the limitations of transnational partnerships, for example, with respect to their contribution to core sustainable development priorities such as poverty reduction, or in terms of their very ability to operate in high-deforestation areas that are dominated by commercial interests and related political struggles (see also Pinho et al. 2014).

Overall, the analysis across our cases suggests that effectiveness for local constituencies was realized to a greater extent in partnerships that were more localized at the subnational level in terms of their core objectives, and worked closely with sub-state authorities and stakeholders. Both the Galápagos Wind partnership and the Mexico City Metrobús initiative produced concrete benefits for specific municipalities and their citizens, including improved access to public services (energy and transportation, respectively), reduced air pollution, increased investment, realization of much-needed infrastructures, and development of local capacity and skills. The Alianza Shire partnership created tangible benefits for refugees in its pilot phase, including access to electricity, services and improved security. The global PDPs examined were explicitly established to provide for an unmet need in affected populations: cheap and effective treatments for neglected diseases. This global goal setting in response to local needs has resulted in positive outputs
Conclusion

for those affected, with new products that offer therapeutic benefits at lower cost and that can reach patients in marginalized or hard-to-reach communities.

Notably, however, even with respect to these locally embedded cases and objectives, it is primarily through global partners and their publications that information on partnership outcomes is reported, resulting in relatively limited detail about local communities or direct input from them. Moreover, affected communities are often not directly or systematically included in the governance structures of many large partnerships with a global scope. Nonetheless, the analysis of partnership boards demonstrated that of the three global health financing partnerships examined, two include one representative from affected communities at the board level (Gavi and the Global Fund), showing that the design and structuring of initiatives has implications for who is represented or excluded from decision making. By targeting both high- and low-income countries as pathfinders in its implementation, the End Violence partnership has sought to overcome the framing of the problem of violence against children as pertaining to low-income countries alone, making the suffering of children and their voices more directly heard and more readily visible both globally and within national contexts.

Influence on Cooperation and Institutions Outside the Partnership

Our analytical framework furthermore allowed us to consider the extent to which partnerships produce diffuse and potentially catalytic effects beyond the immediate scope of their goals, that is, on other institutions and governance processes.

At the national level, several of the initiatives examined have produced significant spillover effects in terms of creating and locking in new institutional capacities and policy development for sustainability. In at least four cases (the Mexico City Metrobús, Galápagos Wind, ARPA, and the World Bank carbon partnerships), a broader institutional effect became clearly visible through our research. Notably, the first three of these partnerships adopted an exit strategy that strengthened domestic institutional capacity to continue the provision of collaboratively developed services and public goods. These institutional effects have coincided with strong engagement by government agencies and subnational authorities as core partners, the leveraging of resources by both global and domestic partners for the medium and long term, and the engagement of local civil society organizations.

However, some partnerships in our sample that started with a strong set of long-term commitments and were initially on track to successful implementation (such as the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project and INBio) ultimately encountered challenges that stifled both goal attainment and the anticipated, broader catalytic impacts. Somewhat surprisingly, our studies found that even partnerships that had an observable institutional impact at the domestic level did not necessarily scale up beyond their specific contexts, with direct diffusion of innovative practices only taking place to a limited extent. For example, the survey of a set of partnerships selected over 15 years as finalists for the Roy Family
Award, because of their high promise for environmental effectiveness, revealed that a substantial share of these initiatives faced challenges related to political or policy change, financing, or project-specific circumstances. The promise of broader impacts materialized for some of these projects, but not others.

In turn, owing to their nature and goals, large global partnerships directly aim for extensive impacts on a global scale. However, their influence on governance and sustainable development beyond their targeted objectives appears to be circumscribed. For instance, while PDPs have produced a significant change in the development of and access to drugs and diagnostics for neglected diseases, their potential to spur disruptive and productive changes to the traditional pharmaceutical R&D business model remains unrealized. Moreover, the anticipated effect of EITI on financial markets, which are several steps removed from its adoption in specific countries, has so far failed to materialize. Of the large global initiatives examined, the World Bank partnerships had a visible catalytic impact on the development of international carbon markets, particularly in their early stages, enabling a faster emergence of carbon markets and the development of technical expertise. However, questions remain regarding the extent to which these partnerships may have also contributed to either crowding out other initiatives led by the private sector or, conversely, crowding in investments that otherwise would not have been mobilized.

Partnerships are often touted as a widely replicable and generalizable model of cooperation for sustainability, and yet many cases analyzed in these pages speak to the high degree of specificity regarding the context and selection of partners in a given partnership arrangement, as well as the micro-foundations of relations between partners across and within sectoral categories. Certain initiatives had broader effects that can be empirically traced through replication and lessons learned: for example, INBio inspired the establishment of similar research institutes in other low- and middle-income countries, and ARPA provided inputs to the creation of the Amazon Fund and the Amazon Sustainable Landscapes Program. Nonetheless, the broader diffusion and uptake of specific partnership innovations remained limited. This finding is somewhat surprising, because several of the partnerships studied explicitly sought to implement projects that would have a larger, replicable impact. It reveals that the partnership model is not generic, but rather specific to their context, partners, and problems. Our findings thus suggest further research is needed on the conditions that can amplify catalytic impacts (Hale 2020; Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018), and more critical engagement with the widespread policy narrative of partnerships and sustainable development.

**Conditions for Effectiveness**

We start from the premise that partnerships function as one type of governance mechanism among many others inside complex and multi-layered governance systems. Our approach therefore attempts to isolate a set of conditions that are specific to partnerships and may shape their effectiveness in significant ways, while recognizing that contextual factors are also important in enabling
or frustrating the realization of partnerships’ contributions to sustainability. Our conceptual framework identifies four key factors in the structuring and characteristics of partnerships that shape their effectiveness: sophisticated contractual arrangements, credible commitment of resources, adaptability, and innovation.

One significant insight of our collective research is that these four conditions for partnership effectiveness do not work in isolation. In certain cases, two or several design features of a partnership may reinforce or undermine the degree to which the partnership may be considered effective in one or more of the pathways delineated above. In other instances, failure in one of the conditions may undermine the viability of an initiative either directly or through negative feedback loops across other conditions for, or pathways to, effectiveness.

**Contracting**

First, we found that sophisticated contracting appears to be of fundamental significance both for the durability and effectiveness of partnerships, including in a number of cases as a prerequisite for securing credible commitments of resources and enabling adaptability. Extensive front-loading of efforts is often required for partners to establish a common language and understanding of objectives, and also to clarify the respective roles of partners according to their comparative expertise, the inputs they would provide, and the benefits that may accrue to them. In addition, sophisticated contracting typically involves agreement on the organization and governance of the initiative, as well as on the processes through which it will be implemented, reviewed, and evaluated to create feedback loops for monitoring, information sharing and accountability. Where present, such elements of contracting generally helped to establish greater trust and stable expectations among core partners and with other stakeholders, facilitating credible commitments to, as well as subsequent implementation and adaptation of the partnership – a finding that was anticipated by our framework and theoretical approaches to institutional effectiveness more broadly (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990). Of particular relevance to partnerships, unambiguous contracting is theorized to attenuate the potential negative effects of faultlines between the diverse groups and individuals that are brought together (Crucke et al. 2015).

Multiple interviews and cases have illustrated the significance of such upfront contractual arrangements, which mainly happen through soft and informal means such as planning documents, feasibility documents and, in some instances, memoranda of understanding. Only in rare instances does the structuring of partnerships also involve the adoption of domestic legislation to enable specific aspects of implementation. In several cases (for instance Galápagos Wind, End Violence, GPEI, and ARPA) the upfront contractual work took extended periods of time to complete, and required some adaptation from partners to agree on the scope of partnership objectives and the structuring of governing bodies. For instance, GPEI’s multi-level, consensus-based decision making may be inefficient, but it has proved highly effective at holding dissimilar partners together over time and allowing for agreement on evolutionary (not disruptive) changes in the
partnership’s governance and accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, survey responses from the Roy Family Award finalist partnerships indicated that governance structures that had been negotiated and endorsed provided legitimacy and reassured core partners that they would be heard – thus introducing certain expectations of ‘internal’ accountability. Sophisticated contracting therefore may take time, but it provides partners and partnerships with a shared understanding of their goals and roles, which facilitates other conditions for and pathways to effectiveness. At the same time, a number of the case studies revealed that sophisticated contracting has only rarely been used to provide partnerships with established mechanisms of external accountability, particularly with respect to affected populations and other stakeholders that are not represented in their governance structures.

**Resources**

The credible commitment of resources often depends on sophisticated contracting, and at the same time provides incentives and motivation for innovation in several of the studies presented. Such commitments have proved to be of critical significance for the attainment of partnership goals. Moreover, they have had important implications for the nature of cooperation within the partnerships, and ultimately for their effects on sustainability more broadly. Financing mechanisms capable of outlasting changes in partnership governance were needed, including effective fundraising, anticipating revenue streams, or maintaining financial support from donors or partners.

First of all, partners themselves committed resources to partnerships. For instance, the World Bank partnerships’ requirement of unconditional promissory notes by participants served as a signal of credible commitment of resources, while the ex-ante announcement of a minimum total funding level required for each fund further strengthened the incentives for collective action among partners. Furthermore, the commitment of resources to the global financing partnerships was significantly associated with public sector board members, but not to the same extent with businesses or financial institutions. Similar trends have been documented also in larger sets of global public-private partnerships (Andonova 2018). In other words, these partnerships have not secured financial resources from private sector partners on a significant scale, but the potential of these actors to provide such resources (if not credible commitments) has been sufficient to give them a voice in partnership decision making. According to Faul and Tchilingirian (2021), private sector actors may provide other, non-financial, resources such as expertise or networks, but the primary reason given for their inclusion is increasing and improving financing for sustainability (AfDB et al. 2015). In the same way, despite the creation of a multi-donor Trust Fund to support the objectives of the End Violence partnership, concerns remain about securing adequate resources to support both its secretariat and governance functions.

In addition to donors who provide resources, the type of financing mechanisms used by partnerships matters. In the cases of ARPA, Galápagos Wind
and Mexico City Metrobús, sophisticated institutional design and contracting mechanisms became the basis for adopting and implementing innovative financial instruments. The Roy Family Award finalists overwhelmingly described a lack of sustainable financing mechanisms as the main barrier to their durability and effectiveness. In one case, after its initial funding mechanism failed, a partnership changed its business model to gain access to a different funding stream. Moreover, the resources required for effective partnerships are not limited to finances alone: PDPs leveraged the multi-year public and philanthropic funds they obtained to also secure contractual commitments ensuring access to the scientific data and biobanks critical to the partnerships’ effectiveness. Thus, the credible commitment of resources by partners to their collaborative initiative remains a fundamental factor for the realization of partnership effects and their contribution to sustainability.

The links between this and other conditions for effectiveness are seen in many cases. For instance, once GPEI reached a stage that required a significant new mobilization of resources, an important restructuring of its governance – and recontracting with core partners – took place to reaffirm the partners’ commitment of resources, and to the partnership’s goals. In contrast, although the INBio partnership started with strong resource commitments from the government, private partners and donors, its implementation was plagued by concerns regarding the limited transparency and accountability of the original contracts, which was ultimately a factor that contributed to ending the partnership.

Adaptability

Adaptability to overcome unanticipated risks in the implementation of partnership objectives is critical to partnership effectiveness across multiple pathways. Different partnerships reported on multiple approaches to adaptability and evolution, including adapting governance structures and business models and extending a partnership’s spatial dimensions or objectives to better match those of the problem being tackled. Partnerships with a pilot phase in their design, such as Alianza Shire or the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, built in expectations that some learning and adaptation was likely to be required with respect to the scope, efficiency, and legitimacy of their approach. A large proportion of respondents to the survey of the Roy Family Award finalist partnerships identified the need to learn and adapt flexibly to external shocks (in political and economic contexts) and internal stressors (over time, or in scope and scale) as a critical factor in effectiveness.

Our findings across cases demonstrate that adaptability of partnerships is enabled by contractual arrangements that facilitate regular interaction and transparency between partners, as well as with their wider stakeholders. For instance, the Mexico City Metrobús partnership made important adaptations to involve bus drivers directly as stakeholders and address their concerns regarding potential loss of income, which was essential for the long-term success of the project. In the ARPA and Galápagos Wind cases, adaptation in the scope of
their activities was required early on in response to civil society concerns. These adaptations improved the prospects for the effectiveness of these partnerships, particularly with respect to impacts on affected populations and the environment respectively, which had not been fully considered in the initial blueprints of the initiatives.

Adaptability is frequently required to secure new and stable resources when expected market benefits do not materialize or other financial hurdles occur, again illustrating the interplay of the underlying conditions for effectiveness we have identified. In several of the cases examined (such as INBio or the Noel Kempff Mercado project), the limited capacity to adapt to political and economic changes proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the partnerships in terms of their viability and effective implementation. The long-term effectiveness of the ARPA partnership was directly dependent on its ability to mobilize resources from a number of different donors (such as the GEF, bilateral country donors, private foundations), while those of Galápagos Wind relied on the successful diversification of financing sources. In a number of ways, adaptability is facilitated by sophisticated contracting, and required for partnerships to ensure the credible commitment of resources over time.

**Innovation**

Finally, efforts to develop innovative products or approaches to achieve partnership goals (including innovative financing mechanisms) proved to be explicitly at the core of the majority of partnerships examined. This is a telling finding, since our research did not deliberately select cases according to this dimension. For instance, PDPs leveraged resources with the primary objective of developing new products and technology for neglected diseases; in order to achieve that aim they adopted an innovative R&D business model and partnering practices that have the potential (as yet unrealized) to transform conventional commercial practices in the pharmaceutical industry. ARPA’s financing mechanisms sought to create innovative long-term instruments for conservation financing (referred to internally as “finance for permanence”), which were in turn closely integrated with the governance, monitoring and implementation aspects of the partnership and national institutions involved. Equally, the global financing partnerships studied provided innovative pooled financing mechanisms to which public and private donors could contribute, even if private donors in the main elected not to. In turn, the End Violence partnership developed a new tool, INSPIRE, to guide and benchmark policy interventions that seek to end violence against children.

Overall, whether the specific output was renewable energy, more efficient transport, development of drugs for neglected diseases, payments for ecosystem services, or more participatory protected areas management councils, the innovations identified in this volume represent elements of more complex innovation and governance systems for sustainability (Anadon et al. 2016). In all of these cases, the creation and diffusion of innovations was not only an objective itself of the partnership (to create value, and to impact populations and institutions),
but was also central to the approaches through which the partnership’s goal would be achieved. In several cases, early experiments with innovative activities did not reap the expected returns, illustrating (as discussed earlier) the political embeddedness of partnerships and the risks associated with the partnership approach.

**Problem Solving for Sustainability**

Ultimately, partnerships should be expected to contribute to problem solving for sustainability, including the consideration of the potential trade-offs and tensions that may arise in the pursuit of specific environmental, social, and economic objectives. From this perspective, the case studies covered by the volume are relevant to a broad range of issue areas that pertain to advancing sustainability (Table 11.1). If we use the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a reference, these include, *inter alia*, the contribution of PDPs and global health and financing partnerships to the achievement of Goal 3 on Good Health and Well-being, the role of conservation partnerships in reducing deforestation and mitigating biodiversity loss as part of Goal 15 on Life on Land, and diverse efforts to achieve Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) and 13 (Climate Action) through the deployment of clean energy projects and sustainable electricity and transportation systems at the local level. Many partnerships targeted several issue areas simultaneously.

How can we assess the effectiveness of partnerships in terms of problem solving with respect to pressing sustainability issues such as those that are formally recognized by the SDGs? Our findings confirm that the approach taken by partnerships in addressing sustainable development problems is necessarily partial, as most of the initiatives examined sought to make a specific intervention as part of a broader range of solutions to complex global issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, unequal access to health, or decarbonization. The notion of the incremental and potentially disjointed contribution of new mechanisms of governance such as partnerships to global governance solutions has been advanced before (Andonova 2017; Faul and Tchilingirian 2020; Biermann et al. 2009), prompting us to approach the question of effectiveness through a disaggregated analysis of the intermediate pathways through which different effects materialize at different times.

Whereas it can often be difficult to quantify the relative contribution of a partnership to the overall solution of a complex problem, the adoption of specific, outcome-oriented partnership targets can, if implemented successfully, provide measurable indicators against which such performance can be evaluated. In the case of partnerships that attained their goals, the chapters in the volume have highlighted their specific contributions in terms of reduced or avoided CO₂ emissions, improved air quality in urban environments, increased access to life-saving medicines, access to more efficient and reliable sources of energy and public transportation, avoided deforestation, and access to electricity and greater security in a refugee camp setting. In this sense, partnerships themselves engage in
defining the specific problems and a set of specific interventions to address them. The inclusion of measures of goal attainment in our framework also allows us to document failures to achieve such goals, and the factors driving variable effectiveness along this pathway.

Another important advantage of using a disaggregated framework to understand partnership effectiveness consists in the possibility of identifying tensions or trade-offs that may exist between different intermediate pathways and the overall problem-solving effect of an initiative. For example, is there always synergy between the creation of value for partners and the problem-solving potential of a partnership, or can the first also occur at the expense of the latter? In partnerships such as ARPA, Galápagos Wind, Alianza Shire or the Mexico City Metrobús, which were characterized by the creation of value for the partners (e.g., specific benefits for national and local stakeholders, mobilization of additional financing, alignment with partners’ goals and priorities), the value created for partners provided an overall positive contribution to advancing action and solutions on the broader environmental issues being tackled. However, as demonstrated by the case of the GPEI, this creation of value for partners does not necessarily translate into overall problem solving for sustainability, as it may support narrower goal attainment strategies that correspond to how an issue was framed by the partners, rather than to more integrated approaches on health services and infrastructure. Equally, the World Bank carbon funds created value for partners through the mobilization of finance, introduction of market incentives, and deployment of carbon offset projects. However, their long-term contribution to addressing climate change in a way that responds to broader sustainability concerns depends on adopting more ambitious and rigorous additionality standards over the prioritization of efficiency and profit for core partners.

Establishing the contribution of partnerships to problem solving through second-order effects that are often indirect or unintended is another challenge which is nonetheless crucial to address, as it pertains to the broader sustainable development impacts of partnerships beyond a specific goal or issue area. For instance, participation in transnational and domestic policy partnerships has helped to increase the capacity and political leverage of relevant authorities to pursue more robust sustainability agendas. These findings echo broader theoretical approaches that identify gains in domestic institutional capacity as key mechanisms for effective problem solving and advancing sustainability (Clark and Harley 2020; Haas et al. 1993; Young 2011), and extends them to transnational mechanisms of governance such as public-private and multistakeholder partnerships. And yet, we found that data are less readily available on many of these dimensions, being external to the core objectives of individual initiatives. Our findings provide qualitative descriptions of such effects across the various cases that we examined, both because relevant quantitative data are often missing and because partnerships’ broader sustainability objectives are themselves formulated qualitatively. Our research thus implies that establishing partnership targets (and related monitoring and information sharing frameworks) across all five pathways to effectiveness that we identify in this volume would better account for an initiative’s
impact. This could represent a critical means to make the effects of a partnership’s efforts more visible and thereby increase learning among core partners, as well as accountability toward other partners and stakeholders with respect to advancing sustainability as an integrated objective.

**Partnerships, Global Governance, and Sustainability**

Partnerships represent a distinct modality in the polycentric and complex structure of contemporary governance. Such initiatives hold the promise of producing important contributions toward advancing sustainability. However, what we call the ‘partnership paradox’ highlights the fact that partnerships promise a great deal but without clarity as to what they deliver. Thus, we argue that rigorous conceptual and empirical work on the actual effectiveness of partnerships is critical to understanding their relevance and role in international relations and sustainable development. In this concluding section, we reflect on the ways in which our analysis has attempted to advance academic and policy debates on public-private and multistakeholder partnerships, global governance, and sustainability, as well as on fruitful avenues of future research.

First, the dual contribution of this volume (theoretical and empirical) holds promise for a more innovative and in-depth understanding of the pathways to partnership effectiveness and the conditions that can shape their performance. If partnerships are to break free from the current partnership paradox, more nuance and rigor is required for understanding and assessing their actual effects. The multi-disciplinary theoretical framework that we present takes seriously the potential of partnerships to contribute to sustainability and, rather than assuming that such effects will materialize, gives researchers the analytical purchase to examine them in a more nuanced and critical manner. It allows us to highlight aspects of partnership functioning and effectiveness that may be well-researched in one discipline, but not in others. For example, while the literature on management and business administration foregrounds the internal workings of partnerships, this has been largely overlooked in politics and international relations accounts. At the same time, questions of power and contractual arrangements that are frequently addressed in political analyses tend to be missing in business administration research. This volume offers a theoretical apparatus that is successfully applied to diverse empirical cases, and could be extended both to broader data sets and case studies of partnerships.

Such application is all the more important from a policy perspective. Presently, there are two formal SDG indicators related to measuring the contribution of multistakeholder partnerships to achieving sustainability, both of which we argue are insufficient to the task. First, SDG Indicator 17.16.1 seeks to measure no more than the “number of countries reporting progress in multistakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the achievement of the SDGs” (UN Statistical Commission 2021, p.22). Secondly, SDG Indicator 17.17.1 initially required reporting against the “amount of United States dollars committed to public-private and civil society partnerships” (UNGA 2017, p.24), a measure
that was then narrowed further to the “amount of United States dollars committed to public-private partnerships for infrastructure” (UN Statistical Commission 2021, p.22). Resourcing of partnerships, while crucial for their success, is just one of multiple conditions for effectiveness as we have elaborated in this volume.

The analytical framework and findings presented in this volume constitute an important call for the development of additional methodologies to both understand and track the implementation of partnerships and their effects along different pathways. Such frameworks would also enable the scrutiny of the synergies, as well as the contradictions and trade-offs, between different effects, pathways and with respect to the broader objective of advancing sustainable development as an integrated overarching objective and in an equitable manner. We recognize that this is a challenging task. Yet it is crucial if partnerships are to live up to their promised contribution to sustainability and additionality alongside existing policies and instruments, which cannot be assumed to be linear or essentially synergistic. Our research has revealed that evidence of the attainment of a broader range of sustainability objectives (creating additional social and environmental benefits, and strengthening capacity) is more mixed compared to data on immediate partnership goals. Assessment may be blurred due to more limited and variable availability of information. As multistakeholderism increasingly becomes an important mode of governance across global issues – from health and the environment, to cyber security, private military companies, the Internet, education, and clean energy – expanding our practical understanding of multiple pathways to effectiveness and aggregate outcomes is a salient and pressing agenda in both research and practice.

Second, our study brings in a renewed focus and novel approach on effectiveness to the broader literature on global governance. Terms such as complex governance, regime complexity, polycentric governance and governance fragmentation have captured the dynamic reconfiguration of agency, modalities, organizational fields, authority and hierarchy, legal arrangements and degrees of formality in the contemporary institutional architecture. Variable sets of partnerships thus exist within a thicker layer of transnational initiatives and networks, in which more traditional expressions of power continue to play out, and certain states and institutions hold – and can wield – more power over others (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Djelic and Quack 2010; Slaughter 2005). Applying the framework elaborated in this volume to the broader swath of transnational initiatives can help to achieve a more grounded, multi-dimensional and in-depth inquiry into the effectiveness of transnational forms of governance. Additional research using diverse methods is needed to establish the cumulative effect of multiple transnational initiatives, especially as partnerships continue to be framed as key means for achieving sustainable development. Moreover, our research unveils a significant degree of interface between preexisting policies, the activities of international institutions and a variety of partnerships and other transnational initiatives. The interplay between different modes and instruments of governance with respect to pathways to effectiveness is another angle of inquiry that is ripe for further research. Such investigation requires substantial new data and methods of analysis and aggregation at – and across – different levels, while
maintaining a critical scrutiny on the distributional and power implications for relevant constituencies. Building on the pathways to effectiveness framework, such inquiry would provide new lenses to better understand the effects of the multimodal and overlapping institutional architecture of global governance.

Thirdly and importantly, the volume engages what many observers view as an increasingly pressing and existential question – how to advance sustainable development for present and future generations through effective transnational collaboration and local action. Challenges recurring on a global scale – such as pandemics, a changing climate, loss of biodiversity, and the unprecedented depletion of diverse natural stocks, alongside the persistence of social prejudice, inequalities, and violence – put at risk the capacity of societies to achieve inclusive well-being, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups. Our research has sought to generate new knowledge on the pathways through which public-private and multistakeholder partnerships can effectively contribute to a trajectory toward sustainability. The findings provide evidence that successful partnerships, in terms of intermediate goal attainment, tend to contribute relatively targeted solutions to concrete and well-articulated problems around specific issues, spaces, and political jurisdictions. Moreover, effectiveness along specific pathways can be associated as well with negative second-order impacts on other dimensions or gaps driven by power inequalities, which can in turn detract from the overall objective of sustainability. Indeed, while clearly establishing sustainable development as the overarching aspiration of the international community, the SDGs themselves are organized around targeted problems and indicators (Kanie and Biermann 2017). While such an approach seeks to enable concerted action and greater accountability, our research findings caution that it may inadvertently obscure how the realization of a specific target may produce trade-offs that run counter to the complex and integrated character of the concepts and practices of sustainable development. Understanding the contribution of partnerships to sustainability requires us to consider the different pathways to effectiveness as our research has demonstrated, as well as their interplay with other institutions and issues that are at the core of realizing inclusive well-being and safeguarding natural capital to sustain it. Such an understanding demands that researchers and policy makers pose critical questions. What kinds of issues or solutions that may be key for sustainability are strategically omitted from the purview of partnerships or other institutions? What strategies can contribute to stronger complementarities across different pathways to effectiveness, as well as between transnational and formal government institutions, and across the SDGs? Finally, such integrative questions are also important for discerning the catalytic or disruptive effects of governance experiments such as partnerships. While we found limited direct diffusion of innovation outside the immediate context of most partnerships analyzed in the volume, there is much to be explored on the types of processes that hold the greatest potential to create cumulative change in practices, norms, and capacity to support broader uptake of innovation and a shift in paradigms. We offer a theoretical framework and the wealth of grounded empirical research presented in this volume as a helpful tool and entry point to new integrative research on pathways to sustainability.
Notes

1 The proportionality of the value accruing to private partners in terms of profits (particularly in comparison to the cost of pursuing the same goal through other means) has been raised in the literature (Shaoul et al. 2008; Ehrenstein and Neyland 2018), but was not examined in the case studies in this volume, which mostly included partnerships in which private actors did not seek a direct return on their investments or allocation of resources.

2 See, for example, Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Alter and Raustiala 2018; Andonova 2017; Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Barnett, Pevehouse and Raustiala 2021; Biemann and Kim 2020; Faul 2016; Kahler 2018; Keohane and Victor 2011; Ostrom 2010; Raymond and de Nardis 2015; Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2021; Zelli and van Asselt 2013.

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