CASTE AND EQUALITY IN INDIA
A HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF DIVERSE SOCIETY AND VERNACULAR DEMOCRACY

Akio Tanabe
This book presents an alternative view of caste in Indian society by analysing caste structure and change in local communities in Orissa from historical and anthropological perspectives.

Focusing on the agricultural society in the Khurda district of Orissa between the eighteenth century and 2019, the book links discussions on the current transformation of society and politics in India with analyses of long-term historical transformations. The author suggests that, beyond status and power, there is another value which is important in Indian society, namely ontological equality, which functions as the politico-ethical ground for asserting respect and concern for the lives of others. The book argues that the value of ontological equality has played an important role in creating and affirming the diverse society which characterises India. It further contends that the movement towards vernacular democracy, which has become conspicuous since the second half of the 1990s, is a historically groundbreaking event which opens a path beyond the postcolonial predicament, supported by the affirmation of diversity by subalterns based on the value of ontological equality.

This important contribution to the study of Indian society will be of interest to academics working on the social, political and economic history, sociology, anthropology and political science of South Asia, as well as to those interested in social and political theory.

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Caste and Equality in India
A Historical Anthropology of Diverse Society and Vernacular Democracy
Akio Tanabe

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This book presents an alternative view of caste in Indian society by analysing caste structure and change in a local community from a long-term perspective. It primarily focuses on agrarian society in Khurda district in Orissa1 state between the eighteenth century and the present.

Based on research that began in 1990, I initially planned to examine the place of ‘power’—dominance, kingship and state—in Indian history and society as a critique of the then prevalent academic focus on ‘status’ or brahmanical hierarchy proposed by Dumont. However, as I trod the path of my research, I began to sense that, along with the hierarchy of status and the centrality of power, there was another, perhaps more profound, value that has supported socio-political integration in India, namely ‘ontological equality’, i.e. the equality or oneness of all beings at the ontological level, which, though philosophically orthodox, remains a socially subalternate value as opposed to the hegemonic ones of hierarchy and dominance.

This book is an attempt to locate the subalternate value of ontological equality in the history of India as a diverse society over the past three hundred years. It argues that the value of ontological equality has played an important role in providing the means and place of livelihood for diverse social groups, despite the hegemony of hierarchy and dominance. That is to say, ontological equality has been the basis of diverse society. It supported the life of diversity-in-common.2 This book, moreover, contends that the deepening of democracy from below in the post-postcolonial transformation of Indian society from the 1990s—the emergence of what I call ‘vernacular democracy’—is supported by the contemporary actualisation of the affirmation of diversity based on the value of ontological equality.

In the three hundred years that this book covers, Indian society has undergone many changes. To understand these changes, I categorise modern Indian history into three key periods: ‘early modern’ refers to the period from the mid-sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century, ‘colonial modern’ to the early nineteenth century onwards and ‘contemporary’ to the period after independence (1947).3 Early modern India is characterised by the deepening and expansion of marketisation, the penetration of state power into localities, greater connectivity in socio-cultural–economic life and increasing utilisation of natural resources (Richards
1997, 2003, Kulke and Rothermund 1998, Stein 1998, Kotani 2007, Roy 2013). We call it early modern since we can identify the formative development of features we recognise as modern, that is, of today’s age.

Early modern development significantly affected the workings of the social system that largely regulated the lifeworld of local society, ensuring the livelihood of diverse social groups. However, from the mid-eighteenth century, Indian society was gradually colonised, the region of Orissa coming under British rule in 1803. Although the British began to rule as one of the early modern post-Mughal successor states, India experienced a definite transformation of regime in the 1820s and 1830s with the development of colonialism. Collision and confrontation occurred, as well as negotiation and compromise, as India’s own historical dynamism met new ideas and institutions introduced by the British. Eventually, a socio-political system was created that included inconsistencies and ambivalences particular to colonial modernity. Here Western modernity, represented by rationality and freedom, and Indian tradition, represented by religion and caste, were seen in contradistinction to each other. This colonial dichotomy has made the value of ontological equality invisible.

Striking vestiges of the colonial experience can be seen in independent post-colonial India. Postcolonial refers to a condition in which political independence has been achieved, but elements of colonial systems and values persist. The colonial dichotomy persisted in postcolonial India. Yet, the postcolonial condition contains the creative potential to transcend its own predicaments. It has offered India a chance to search for a new self. Social changes after the second half of the 1990s appear to indicate that India has finally moved beyond the postcolonial to the post-postcolonial period. Part of this book attempts to illustrate the extraordinary significance of this transformation from the viewpoint of a local community through three hundred years of its history.

I use the methods of historical anthropology to understand the dynamism of Indian society, going back and forth between the past and the present. I analyse a combination of historical records and fieldwork to do so, using oral and written sources collected in the field to trace and reconstruct a microhistory spanning more than three centuries. In this book, historical transformation and social memory are combined with ethnographic research of contemporary society. The latter not only provides primary data for analysing present-day socio-political relationships, but also supplements the understanding of historical resources through cultural semantic exegesis. Memories of the past are also analysed as expressions of peoples’ historical consciousness.

Concentrating on the interaction between the historical and the everyday, this book will attempt to illustrate how the patterns of meaning and relationships that shape the lifeworld of Indian society emerge and change. For, while our everyday lives preserve continuity as traditions supported by history, they also achieve historical change. In this respect, the lifeworld of the everyday holds its own historical depth while also working in concert with the world’s historical changes. I aim to depict and problematise the relationship between the structure of the everyday and historical transformations.
Re-examining the historiography of modern India from the perspective of historical anthropology we see an important principle underlying Indian history—the value of ontological equality—being overlooked. Since the colonial period, this value has been hiding in the shadow of caste hierarchy and the politico-economic structures of dominance. Yet, it remains important in the socio-cultural sphere of everyday life and is reappearing as a principle that can potentially reshape modern Indian society. This book contends that the trend towards vernacular democracy, conspicuous since the second half of the 1990s, is a historically groundbreaking event supported by the affirmation of diversity based on the value of ontological equality. By vernacular democracy, I mean a form of democracy that is embedded in the vernacular lifeworld, the formation of which involves both the vernacularisation of democratic politics and democratisation of social relationships. It is produced by the creative mediation between embodied cultural practices and values and democratic ideas and institutions.

The concept of equality in the Indian tradition does not in itself give rise to any concrete socio-political relationships or institutions, unlike the idea of ‘equality of right’ in modern political philosophy. Nevertheless, I maintain that the value of ontological equality has provided the ethos for people to care for and recognise the existence of diverse others in human–human and human–nonhuman relationships and that this is an essential, if latent, principle of life in India. Ontological equality or the equality of being is the idea that the Absolute, while transcending all beings, is at the same time immanent, permeating each being in the world. This means that all beings—whether human or nonhuman, alive or non-alive—are equal at the ontological level, as their essence is one and the same.

This is expressed in the ‘great words’ (mahāvākya) of the vedas in such phrases as “I am Brahman” and “Thou art That”. In India, this idea is not only orthodox, but has also expanded into many forms, and is a popular idea that is widely shared. In the history of India, it has been expressed not only in the vedas but also in various other philosophically diverse forms, such as in Buddhism and the Bhakti movements. In early modern Orissa, it was sonorously expressed, for instance, in popular Vaishnavite movements. Though ontological equality has attracted many scholars and intellectuals in the field of Indology and religious studies, less attention has, however, been paid to its social and political implications.

In what ways is socio-cultural diversity in India connected with the value of ontological equality? I would like to explain this by taking up the Indian logic of tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) that goes beyond the law of excluded middle and allows the co-existence of A and not-A (Yamauchi 1974, Kioka 2014). Against the law of excluded middle in Aristotle’s syllogism, which has had a strong influence on the history of Western thought, classical Indian logic accepts the ‘middle’, namely, ‘both A and not-A’ and ‘neither A nor not-A’. In real life, diverse beings exist in relation to each other—each reflecting and containing the other (Izutsu 1989: 54). The logic of tetralemma grasps the world of mutual dependency, rather than the world of division and exclusion.

The point will be made clearer if we compare Indian logic with Western logic. According to orthodox Western logic, A is A. It cannot be ‘both A and not-A’
or ‘neither A nor not-A’. It has to be ‘either A or not-A’. This means that A and not-A must fight over truth and existence. Either A or not-A will be the master, and the other must be subjugated and enslaved. However, in the world of Indian logic, A and not-A can coexist along with many other diversities. In fact, the Absolute or the ontological equality can find its expression in the world only in the form of diversity. The totality of the One expresses itself in the Many that are interdependent and mutually reflect and contain each other. This principle of life allows for the existence of diversity, where various beings share and participate in the world together.

Focusing on the value of ontological equality is crucial to understanding the dynamics of India as diverse society in the long duration of history. Against the notion that diversity in society is a feature of modern, liberal and open civil society, and not of traditional, closed and hierarchical society, this book suggests that India demonstrates a form of diverse society that challenges such progressivist and dichotomous thinking. Diverse society in India is not based on individual freedom but on the principle of affirmation of diverse beings in their interdependent and mutually reflecting relationships.

To put it schematically, India’s history, society and politics have been characterised by the interaction of the three values of ‘the hierarchy of status’, ‘the centrality of power’ and ‘the equality of being’. It is certain that status and power together have played essential roles in defining Indian society from above. However, the social relations pertaining to castes are not regulated by these concepts alone. When social and political structures have become too rigid, threatening the basic flow of life, the value of the equality of being has provided an ethical foundation for the criticism of and resistance to these socio-political systems. It has functioned as a cultural resource that supports social change from below.

The complementary and contradictory interaction of the three values—the hierarchy of status, the centrality of power and the equality of being—also constitutes the mechanism of what Indian tradition has identified as the basic principle and root metaphor of life: sacrifice. Sacrifice is the act of offering the self for the whole in order to realise this ontological equality and to regain the self as a part of the whole. Offering the self for the whole does not mean the priority of the community over individuals. The whole here cannot be equated with any political or social unit. The idea of sacrifice in India entails the existence of a deity or the Absolute that represents the supreme whole, to which sacrifice is offered. In the Indian tradition, community is not the object of sacrifice for which individuals offer their lives. It is rather a site of sacrificial organisation or a place of ‘diversity-in-common’ to offer sacrifice to the Absolute. It is important to note that the self as ‘a part’ that offers sacrifice and the sacrificed object are ontologically equal to the ‘whole’ to which sacrifice is offered. The hegemonic structure—the disparities of the many, based on status and power—can exist only on the basis of this underlying oneness. In the sacrificial principle, there are such contradictions and mediations between the ontological equality and the structure of status and power.
My core understanding of Indian society and history is based on the above view of the sacrificial principle. Its mechanism of contradiction and mediation underlies the basic structure of Indian society and politics and manifests itself in different forms throughout history. However, under colonial rule, only the structures of status and power within this were taken up as the Indian tradition. While colonialism represented India as a society of rampant discrimination and oppression, in an attempt to distinguish and distance itself from India, it also utilised that structure of hierarchy and power within its own rule system. In this process, the mechanism for mediating the contradictions between the ontological equality and the hegemonic structures in the Indian principle of sacrifice was lost in the polity and economy and preserved only in the limited areas of religion and ritual. However, currently, as India leaves the postcolonial period and heads into a new era, the principle of sacrifice and, in particular, the value of ontological equality are on the verge of playing a new role in the reconstruction and reinterpretation of Indian society.

From the mid-1990s in Orissa, members of the conventionally marginalised ‘low’ castes began to participate in local political processes, and the socio-political environment is currently substantially changing. Accompanying this, the meaning and practices of inter-caste relationships are undergoing a significant shift. Central to this book is understanding the significance of these social changes as part of the democratisation of the everyday in Orissa, without neglecting the transformation of inter-caste relationships in long-term history.

A major concern of studies such as this is that depicting caste groups as low or high reproduces the hegemonic framework of discourse, and I would like to avoid it where possible. However, it is difficult to find appropriate expressions other than these to indicate the social position imposed on them. Therefore, I am left with no choice but to use them. Such a situation in which one cannot but use these words indicates the difficulty of relativising the hegemonic framework of discourse. This in turn illustrates the necessity of crafting new ways of speaking of the world to further enable new ways of imagining the world. This book encompasses such attempts.

The democratisation of Indian society is a complex process. The permeation of democratic ideas and institutional changes are cornerstones to the direction and importance of the country’s composite social change. However, it is also crucial to consider the agency of the people who attempt to imagine and actualise new forms of sociality, as well as the thickness of the culture and history that support such creative imagination and practices. The democratisation of Indian society was not established on the rejection of past culture and history; it has grown, albeit gradually, on the reconstitution of these elements through constructive criticism.

Thus, caste was not simply abandoned as a hindrance to democratisation. Rather, the meaning of caste was reconsidered, and the reconstruction of inter-caste relationships has been attempted. In recent years caste hierarchy and dominance have been heavily criticised and repudiated, especially by low castes. At the same time, in Orissa’s local society, the value of the ontological equality that
resides in the depths of caste tradition has gained new importance, emerging as an important role in the process of democratisation.

I believe that through people’s agency, caste is undergoing a creative reinterpretation. It is manifesting its potential to be used by diverse social groups as a cultural resource: as a tool to cooperate on an equal footing while acknowledging mutual differences. This is a gradual transformation of everyday social relationships and cultural values, where vernacular forms of ordinary life make themselves compatible with the process of democratisation in the wider world. It is a groundbreaking movement in which the vernacular everyday and the world’s historical momentum are articulated together to form a new lifeworld featuring vernacular democracy.

Indian society at present is evidently undergoing radical transformations. There is a path dependency within history in which the forms of culture and nature largely guide the course of that dynamism. Cultural resources accumulated in a place—local and regional—over centuries influence the way people understand and perform social practices. However, the past does not unequivocally decide the present. There is a plurality of possibilities for a new future. Therein lies the potentiality for human ethics and freedom.

In colonial and postcolonial frameworks, tradition and modernity have been perceived as being mutually opposite. Nevertheless, these accumulated cultural resources do not simply wane with the advent of modernity. Instead, the addition of modern socio-political ideals and institutions of democracy enrich the pre-existing reservoir of cultural resources, opening opportunities for new hybrid potentialities.

In this process, the sacrificial principle, in conjunction with the ideas of democracy, is given new form and meaning. Here, caste is reinterpreted from the perspective of ontological equality and is mediated by new democratic ideas and institutions, indicating the emergence of a form of vernacular democracy. It may, in fact, be considered a post-postcolonial transformation that marks the beginning of a new epoch in Indian history. To properly ascertain the meaning and importance of this transformation, this book positions the current era of Indian society within the context of long-term historical changes and attempts to understand its significance from a total, anthropological perspective.

Let me briefly summarise the chapters that follow.

Chapter 1 delineates the problems and perspectives of this book in relation to the debates on caste, moral–ethical agency, democratisation and the post-postcolonial transformation of Indian society. Since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing subaltern participation in local politics. A core aim of this book is to understand the ethical basis of this democratisation process. This issue is directly related to the postcolonial version of the liberal–communitarian debate in India, in which liberals argue for the promotion of universal human rights through state-led modernisation and the communitarians call for the reappraisal of traditional ethics and virtue.

This book argues, however, that the very framework of this debate is a historical product of colonialism, putting the “modern state” and ‘traditional society’ at
opposite ends, reflecting India’s postcolonial predicament. It argues for a third perspective which sheds light on the creative agency of those who are trying to reconfigure a viable ethical practice and discourse, which reconciles vernacular and embodied cultural values with the ideas and institutions of modernity and democracy. It also reviews the debates on caste in India that discuss whether it is the value of hierarchy or domination which provides the best explanation. I bring to light the existence of a third value, i.e. ontological equality, which functions as the moral–ethical basis for enabling people to reconstitute and reinterpret existing interpersonal and inter-caste relationships.

Chapter 2 investigates the history of state and social formation in the Khurda kingdom in the early modern period. An integrative process took place in which the state and local society, the coast and the interior and human society and the natural world began to be increasingly connected. Instead of seeing this increasing connectivity as a result of the penetration of modernising forces from outside, clearing the forest and expanding agriculture, this chapter looks at history from the inside out, how the frontier was opened from the interior of the forest. Forest-dwellers responded to new opportunities and used their environmental knowledge and martial capabilities to become warriors, peasants and herdsmen, thus enabling state and social formation from below. In the course of this, social and ecological spaces opened at the interface of the coastal plain and the interior forest, accompanied by the twin processes of Hinduisation and tribalisation, allowing the diversification of resource utilisation and lifeways. Inner transformative dynamics arose from the engagement between and the management of these diversities.

Chapter 3 looks at the local system of managing diversity and how it was connected with the larger state, market and religious systems. Socio-ecological relationships in the local community were based on the patrimonial ‘system of entitlements’. Here, each family played a role in the state and community and received shares from the local produce. The system of entitlements was based on the sacrificial principle in which each family served a whole that was represented by the local goddess. This system, however, was incomplete at the local level without the symbolic presence of the king both as grantor of entitlements and as central sacrificer. In the early modern period, the Khurda king became divinised as the earthly representative of Jagannātha (lord of the universe), the ‘true ruler of Orissa’.

The development of divine kingship and the popularity of the Bhakti movement led people to understand the performance of their prescribed duties as a sacrificial service to the local goddess and Jagannātha. Thus, the system of entitlements in the context of the ‘sacrificer state and sacrificial community’ gave meaning to everyday activities at the local level and functioned as the basis of people’s social, political and religious identities. It should also be noted that a market economy based on cowry money developed in local societies, and the fort areas in Khurda were among the basic sites of production in the hinterlands that provided various products, mainly cotton textiles, for maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. In this way, the local community, state and market shared a complementary relationship in early modern Orissa.
Chapters 4 and 5 look at social transformations under colonialism. Colonial rule brought about major changes in two stages. Chapter 4 depicts the early colonial transformation. The introduction of private land ownership some decades after colonisation led to the collapse of the system of entitlements, and the formation of the dominant caste-centred jajmani relationships based on unequal land ownership. Caste hierarchy was strengthened by the colonially adopted brahmanical ritual hierarchy, overlapped with the economic landholding hierarchy. Early colonialism thus ‘traditionalised’ hierarchy and dominance in local society. The sacrificial idea of the cooperation of ontologically equal parts and duty as a devotional service to god came to be confined to the religio-ritual sphere and was cut off from socio-economic relationships.

Chapter 5 discusses the second major transformation of society that came with the commercialisation of agriculture in the mid-nineteenth century. A class of new rich emerged, while some of the old dominant classes became impoverished and the poorer classes were reduced to the status of agricultural labourers. The imperial economy increasingly penetrated local society, but in the colonial framework, ‘native society’ was clearly distinguished from ‘the modern state and market’. Nationalist movements, which began in the late nineteenth century, also reflected this colonial dichotomy. Elite nationalism was based on the ideals of rationalism and liberalism, whereas mass patriotism was based on caste, kingship and religion. Although these two movements converged at certain points in history, they remained essentially contradictory.

Chapters 6 and 7 describe the dichotomy between the socio-cultural sphere and the politico-economic sphere in the postcolonial period. This was a continuation of the disjunction between native society and the modern state and market during colonial times. In the socio-cultural sphere, organic relationships between body, land and entitlements were emphasised and the logic of kinship and inter-caste cooperation was recognised and practiced. However, this organic whole was contained within the limited sphere of the socio-cultural and did not constitute the moral basis of the politico-economic sphere. The idealised religio-ontological identity was stressed precisely in contrast to the politico-economic realities.

Meanwhile, factional politics and corruption became dominant in the politico-economic sphere, where cultural ethics do not apply and *mātsya nyāya* (literally, the logic [law] of the fish, corresponding to the English phrase “law of the jungle”) prevails. In this state, as the *Mahābhārata* says, “the strong would devour the weak like fishes in water”. The percolation of democratic politics in India was linked to populist policies by the state. There was greater popular participation in the political process, especially after 1960s, and, as political parties needed to secure popular electoral support, they often resorted to distributing money to rural society in the name of development and welfare. This led to people fighting for shares in state resources through factional politics. Core members of factions belonged to the dominant *khandaīyata* caste, reflecting the power structure of local society in Khurda. The agenda for postcolonial India was hence the mediation of democracy with cultural ethics, which also involved the issue of how to overcome the colonial dichotomy. However, as long as these ethics were based on...
brahmanical hierarchy and the centrality of the dominant caste, traditionalised under colonialism, there could be no successful mediation between cultural ethics and the spirit of democracy. What then can provide the basis of the cultural ethics necessary to perform this task? This issue is taken up in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 8 depicts and analyses the festival of the local goddess, Rāmacaṇḍī. It argues that this ritual can be seen as an enactment of the sacrificial drama of regeneration, where the three values and social configurations of equality, hierarchy and power unfold and interact to reproduce the community. The three phases of the ritual represent ‘revolving values’ which are legitimate, plural and multifaceted cultural resources that people use to valourise their existence and their social practices. This chapter also analyses how the ritual form and the structure of patronage changed historically (ritual in history) and how the ritual invokes historical memory in the form of myths, legends and family narratives (history in ritual). The ritual can be seen as a representation of local history, not as linear transformation but as an accumulation of the past.

The blending of history and ritual enables people to reflect on their past and present. This not only legitimises the status and power of the upper castes but also unsettles their hegemony by questioning prevailing practices. In the postcolonial situation, there is, on the one hand, the hegemonic attempt by old and new elites to ritually assert the colonially constructed structure of status and power and, on the other hand, subaltern attempts to emphasise the importance of devotion and service, thus placing weight on ontological equality as the immanence of the divine power (śakti) of the goddess. Here, we observe dilemma and tension between the hegemonic values of hierarchy and centrality and the subalternate value of ontological equality. In this way, ritual not only reproduces the structure of status and power, but also illustrates the potential for subaltern resistance against the hegemonic structure.

Chapter 9 discusses transformations in inter-caste relationships in local society in order to discover democratic potentialities in postcolonial India. It shows how the contestation and negotiation between hegemony, based on status and power, and its critique and resistance from below, based on the principle of equality, can be found not only in ritual structure as seen in Chapter 8 but also in the actual dynamics of Indian society. Social relationships in India are not just determined by norms and power relations. They are constructed by moral–practical agents who reflect on and negotiate ethically desirable social relationships. Most of the jajmani relations formed during the colonial period were gradually replaced by market-driven relationships. This process involved efforts by lower caste associations to improve their status. Lower castes negotiated with the dominant caste to get rid of patron–client relationships and introduce the market principle. It is notable, however, that the division of labour by caste was retained in the ritual sphere. Lower castes did not abandon their caste identity per se. Rather, they tried to reformulate the content of their ritual roles to enhance the dignity of their caste identity. Here we see the attempt to redefine tradition from below. For lower castes, tradition that guaranteed their identity, was not a structure of hierarchy and dominance. It was about equal and indispensable parts serving the whole. Here
the positioning of the cultural politics of ethics over desirable social relationships is evident.

Chapter 10 argues that the transformation of social relations from below began to extend into politics from the mid-1990s. By the beginning of the 1990s criticism against factional politics mounted and lower castes began to demand equal participation in local politics. However, since factional politics provided valuable cash income, the dominant caste did not easily abandon their interests. This situation changed after economic liberalisation in 1991 and the panchayat (local self-government) reforms in 1992. The panchayat reforms guaranteed reservations for lower castes and women. This reduced the monopoly of politics by men of the dominant caste and limited the influence of factions.

Lower castes and women who have begun to participate in local politics try to redefine politics as a means for the development of the whole through equal participation, service and cooperation, instead of the control of resources by the powerful. This is as an attempt to mediate the subaltern sacrificial ethics, based on ontological equality, and the practice of democratic politics. However, it should also be noted that the decline of factional politics and the change in panchayat politics are partly due to the increasing influence of the market following economic liberalisation. One of the reasons why the dominant caste has lost interest in local politics is because the market has become a new source of cash income. Also the growth of the Indian economy after liberalisation supports the huge redistribution of state resources to local society, contributing to thriving local self-government. Thus, a new agenda for Indian society is how to mediate democracy and global capitalism.

Chapter 11 is the concluding chapter. It suggests that the transformation of local society today can be understood as a process of overcoming the hegemonic structure of hierarchy and power strengthened by colonialism and the establishment of a vernacular democracy that connects subaltern sacrificial ethics with the spirit of democracy. This entails a mediation of the colonial dichotomy, reflected in the postcolonial version of the liberal–communitarian debate, between the principle of the modern state (based on rights and rationality) and the cultural ethics of local society (based on duty and service). This book contends that such developments indicate the shift of Indian society into the post-postcolonial era. The cultural politics of ethics in defining desirable social relationships remains significant and valid for fostering a democratic ethos for living together diversely and equally in the face of global capitalism’s new structures of hegemony in India today.

Notes

1 Although in 2011 the name of the state was changed from Orissa to Odisha and the name of its language from Oriya to Odia, this book uses ‘Orissa’ and ‘Oriya’, respectively, to avoid confusion, as it covers both the Orissa and Odisha periods. Khurda district was formed in 1993 by the division of former Puri district into Puri, Khurda and Nayagarh districts. In 2000, the district name was changed from Khurda to Khordha. This book uses ‘Khurda’ uniformly.

2 This is an adaptation of “being-in-common” by Nancy (1991, 2000).
It is appropriate to consider the early modern period in Orissa as having started from 1568, with the collapse of the medieval Orissan empire.

According to Kiyoshi Miki, “Complete understanding of the fundamental historicity of human beings can be reached by mutually illuminating and criticizing the understanding of it from both historical and everyday perspectives”. Miki also said, “Anthropology that explores human beings from the point of view of historicity … is called historical anthropology” (Miki 1967: 87). I combine the historical and the everyday perspectives in historical anthropology, as Miki does.

The ‘great words’ are phrases that evince the highest principle of identifying Brahman (the essence of the universe and the ultimate reality) with Ātman (the true self) in the Upaniṣad (sacred Hindu treatises). These are conventionally identified as the following four: “Consciousness is Brahman”, “This Ātman is Brahman”, “I am Brahman” and “Thou art That”.

In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Orissa there was a mixture of Orissan-style Utkaliya Vaishnavism, Bengali-style Gauḍiya Vaishnavism, Jagannātha cult and Chaitanya worship. See Chapter 3 for details of Vaishnavism in early modern Orissa.

Most articulately expressed by Nagarjuna (c. 150–c. 250 AD), the four logical possibilities of tetralemma—(1) A (affirmation); (2) not-A (negation); (3) ‘both A and not-A’ (both); and (4) ‘neither A nor not-A’ (neither)—express the logic in the world of relative truth (saṃvṛti satya). These are all negated in the face of the absolute truth (paramārtha satya), which is beyond the four logical possibilities of relative truth. In other words, it is the very existence of the Absolute (śūnyatā or ‘emptiness’ in the case of Nagarjuna)—that is, the level of what I call ontological equality—which makes the coexistence of A and not-A possible. If there is absolute truth beyond the relative world, A and not-A can coexist as relative truths, with both reflecting the absolute truth in relative ways.

According to the Hegelian scheme, “History will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of the Master and Slave is realized, that synthesis that is the whole Man, the Citizen of the universal and homogeneous State” (Kojève 1969: 44). Here, diversity must be denied in order to reach the final truth.

Such an idea, in fact, is not limited to India. It is a universal idea that finds resonance in Japan as well as in Europe. Let me quote Gilles Deleuze as an example.

Opening is an essential feature of univocity. … Only there does the cry resound: “Everything is equal!” and “Everything returns!” However, this “Everything is equal” and this “Everything returns” can be said only at the point at which the extremity of difference is reached. A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess.

(Deleuze 1994: 304)

This quotation from Difference and Repetition seems to me as if to describe the vibrancy of vernacular democracy to come in India, where there is a clamour of diverse voices mingling and interacting with each other to form an inseparable whole. It is at the extremity of difference and diversity that ontological equality can be recognised. And it is based on this ontological equality that there can be the thousand-voiced clamour of multiplicities.

Bhagavad Gītā (IV-24) succinctly states this as follows: “Brahman is the oblation; Brahman is the (offering of) melted butter; by Brahman is the oblation poured into the fire of Brahman; Brahman verily shall be reached by him who always sees Brahman in action” (Sivananda 1995: 117, parenthesis added). There is only Brahman (the
Absolute) that takes multiple forms (with different status and power) for actions in the phenomenal world.

11 With regard to the current political and economic performance, the ‘path dependence’ perspective, which says that such performance depends on the course that society has pursued, is correct to an extent. However, even if they do not bring about direct advantages for current political and economic systems, pluralistic cultural resources that have accumulated through history can be helpful in imagining/creating a new future or in responding to new situations in the future. It is surely too hasty to attempt a value assessment of society or culture with a short-term field of vision that assumes the current political and economic system.

12 For the perspective on long-term changes in history, I am indebted to Braudel (1992, 1995). However, the way in which this concept is used here does not necessarily stay faithful to Braudel—it is used in a broader sense. For a study that effectively uses the concept of long-term changes in Indian history, see Ludden (1989).

13 Śanti-Parva, LXVII, 16-17; LXVIII, 11-12, quoted in Sarkar (1921: 80). The concept of mātsya nyāya is also discussed in Manu Sanhitā, Rāmāyana and Arthaśāstra (Sarkar 1921: 80–1).
Acknowledgements

Just as the historical period that I deal with is quite long, it also took me quite some time to complete the present book. I have incurred academic and intellectual debts to a number of people and institutions too many to thank here. It will not be appropriate, however, if I do not mention at least the following names.

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This book is a substantially revised and updated version of a monograph originally published in Japanese by the University of Tokyo Press in 2010 (Tanabe 2010). My thanks to Toru Yamamoto, the editor at the University of Tokyo Press for all his support. Kyoko Niibe and Tamane Ozeki helped me with editing. I would like to thank Mr Robby Kwan Laurel and Ms Jessica Robinson for the English editing of earlier manuscripts, and Mr Thomas J Mathew for helping me till the completion of the manuscript with his meticulous and excellent editing. My thanks are also due to the editors at Routledge, Dorothea Schaeffer, Alexandra de Brauw and Richard Kemp for their constant and kind support throughout.

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Needless to say, I alone am to blame for any shortcomings.
I have adopted the standard system for transliterating Oriya words. A minor reformulation is that I have adopted ‘ṛ’ and ‘ṛḥ’ for rolled versions of retroflex ‘ḍ’ and ‘ḍḥ’, e.g. ‘kauṛi’ and not ‘kauḍi’ for cowry and ‘Āṣāṛha’ and not ‘Āṣāḍha’ for the name of the month. I have retained the original spellings in the historical documents even where they seem to deviate from the more conventional orthography.
Glossary

**achuāṃ**
untouchable

**adharma**
unlawfulness

**ādi šakti**
primordial power

**ādivāsi, ādibāsi**
lit. ‘original inhabitants’; tribals

**ādya sebaka**
first servant; Gajapati is considered the first servant of Jagannātha. This is ritually represented in his duty of sweeping (cherā pahaṃrā) the chariot in the ratha jātrā (chariot festival) in Puri

**agnijaḷā pūrṇimā**
lit. ‘burning full moon’; the full moon day of Māgha (January–February)

**akṣaya trīyā**
lit. ‘invincible third’. Third day of the bright fortnight of Baiśākha (April–May); an auspicious day to start work

**āmara loka**
our people

**amābāsyā**
ew moon day

**ānka**
regnal year

**ānka bheṭi ṭaṅkā**
silver coin gift given as new regnal year greeting

**ānki dwāri**
boundary guard

**anukūla**
auspicious beginning

**anukūla kiāri**
lit. ‘field of auspicious beginning’, where paddy seeds are first sown on the akṣaya trīyā day

**āranyā**
forest

**artha**
power and wealth

**asparśaka**
untouchable

**aṣṭamī sāra bhoga**
cooked offerings on aṣṭamī day

**aṣṭarājya**
eight kingdoms; name of a unit of caste association

**aṣubha**
inauspicious

**asura**
demon

**aśwapati**
lord of horse

**Āświna**
a lunar month around September–October

**Āṭharagaṛa**
lit. ‘eighteen forts’; name of a little kingdom

**bāhāra loka**
outsiders

**Baiśākha**
a lunar month around April–May
baiṭhi karāna  
lit. ‘sitting scribe’; an office of scribe

bājantari  
military musician

baksi  
army general

Balabhadra  
elder brother of Kṛṣṇa-Jagannātha, constitutes one of the Jagannātha trinity

baḷi  
sacrifice, usually animal sacrifice

baluta  
system of village servants

baṃśa  
lineage, clan

bana  
forest

bandāpanā  
ritual of respect and honour

bandhu  
relatives by marriage alliance

barakandāj  
guard

bārapalli  
twelve villages under a fort

barhei  
carpenter caste

barṣā  
rain; rainy season

basanta  
spring season

bāṭi  
a unit of area: 1 bāṭi = 20 māṇa = about 9 acres (after 1823)

beherā  
head

bāuri  
labourer caste

beherā pradhāna  
principal village head

behorana gumāstā  
state tax collector

Bhādraba  
a lunar month around August–September

bhāga  
share

bhāga cāṣī  
share croppers

Bhāgabata  
Oriya translation of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

Bhāgabata ghara  
lit. ‘house for Bhāgabata’ where villagers recite and listen to the Bhāgabata

bhaidika brāhmaṇa  
vedic brāhmaṇa

bhakti  
devotion, devotionalism

bhāi  
brother

bhāndāri  
barber caste

bhāt  
meal; cooked rice

bhaya  
fear

bhīāna  
record of rights, land records, rent roll

bisarjana  
immersing the image of a deity or a divine object in water as the concluding rite of a festival

bhītara  
inside

bighā  
a unit of area: 20 bighā = 1 bāṭi (in precolonial times)

bhoga  
offering to deities

bhoi  
village accountant

bhuim mula  
fort-level accountant, lit. ‘roots of the earth’

bhumi  
earth

bhumi bhāga  
land part; resources given in the form of land

bhūta  
evil spirit, ghost
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>birā barttana</td>
<td>sheaf salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birja</td>
<td>seed, sperm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bisi</td>
<td>county, a unit of administration, fort area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bisodhana</td>
<td>acquitting, discharging, as a debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bisodhana patra</td>
<td>a receipt, an acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bisoi</td>
<td>chief of a county (bisi), usually the same person as dalabeherā in a fort area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biśwā</td>
<td>1 biśwā = 4 kani = about 49 sq. ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brahmadeya</td>
<td>land donated to the brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>brahman caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brāhmattār</td>
<td>lands donated to the brāhmaṇas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bratā</td>
<td>votive rituals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bṛṣabha</td>
<td>a solar month around May–June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cākhaṇḍa</td>
<td>length from the tip of the middle finger to the bottom of the palm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cālāka</td>
<td>clever, sly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cālanti Viṣṇu</td>
<td>lit. ‘the walking Vishnu’, i.e. earthly Vishnu referring to the Gajapati king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cāndanā, chandina</td>
<td>homestead lands of those who held no entitlement and paid high rent and tax to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caṇḍī</td>
<td>goddess with ambivalent power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caśa</td>
<td>peasant caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catuskoṭi</td>
<td>the Indian logic of tetralemma (four possibilities of a proposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caula</td>
<td>rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chākirī</td>
<td>service; employment as a salaried office worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chanā</td>
<td>chick peas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chandinadar</td>
<td>holders of chandina (cāndanā) tenures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chāṛa khāi</td>
<td>feast after fasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chātātī</td>
<td>watchman of the village, called chaukidar in other parts of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatiśgaṛa</td>
<td>lit. ‘thirty-six forts’; name of a little kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitālāgī amābāsyā</td>
<td>new moon day of Śrābaṇa (July–August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chitau pithā</td>
<td>cake offered to the earth goddess on Chitālāgī amābāsyā day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choudhuri</td>
<td>revenue collector in a fort area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuṛā</td>
<td>flattened rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daḷa</td>
<td>faction, group, troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dala</td>
<td>chief of the garrison at a fort, usually the same person as bisoi, lit. ‘chief of troop’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dalabeherā</td>
<td>military leader, sub-chief of a fort garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dalit</td>
<td>lit. ‘broken’, a self-applied name for people of the ‘untouchable’ caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dāna</td>
<td>donation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
daṇḍa jātrā
lit. ‘stick festival’, a festival of ordeals held in Meṣa (April–May)

Daśaharā
district

Daśaharā bheṭi
services to patron households on the day of Daśaharā

dasturī
a fee or commission
debattār
land donated to gods and goddesses
dehrī
a marshy land
desa
village, country
desa bhoi
village accountant
desa pradhāna
village head
deva-rājā
divine king

Devī Māhātmya
lit. ‘Glory of the Goddess’; Sanskrit text recounting the goddess as creator of the universe
dharma
cosmic law, justice
dhāraṇa
penance and prayer
dimand
dowry; from the English word ‘demand’
diwān
the minister of the state
doḍa
the second preparatory ploughing
doḷa maṇḍapa
swing platform
doḷa pūrṇimā
the full moon day which marks the end of Phālguna (February–March)
dṛṣti
seeing, evil eye
duāra
door

Durgā
Hindu goddess of war, strength and protection, bestower of victory, guardian of fortresses
dvāpara yuga
third of the four yugas (world ages)
dwāra
door

Ekharajat Mahal
Ekharājāt Māhāl, tax-free land given to Jagannātha temple (1858–1974)

Gahmā pūrṇimā
lit. ‘cow mother full moon’; the full moon day which marks the end of Šrābaṇa (July–August), cows are worshipped as mother on this day

Gajapati
lit. ‘lord of elephants’; title granted to the foremost king of Orissa
gāṃ muha
mouth of village
ganḍā
a unit for cowry calculation: 1 kāhāna = 16 paṇa = 320 ganḍā = 1,280 kadā = 1,280 kauṛi (cowry)
gara
fort, often spelt garh in place names
gara dwāri
fort gate guard
gara rahaṇī
fort watchman
gara sebaka
fort servant
Garbhaṇā saṃkrānti
lit. ‘pregnant saṃkrānti’; first day of Tulā
(October–November)
go mātā
cow mother
gomā parba
mother cow festival
gram panchayat
grāma pañcāyat, elected village level institution of
local self-government
grāma, gān
village
grāma debatā
tutelary deity of village
griṣṇa
summer season
guhāri
penance and prayer
gumāstā
tax collector, gomasta
guṇṭha
a unit of area: 1 guṇṭha = 16 biśwā = about 784 sq. ft.
guriā
sweet-maker caste
hājira karaṇa
lit. ‘attending scribe’; an office of scribe
haḷiā
lit. ‘carrier of ploughs’; bonded agricultural labourer
hakadāra
holder of right (haqḍār in Hindustani)
haq
right (Hindustani)
haq-e-sarbarāh
the right of management (Hindustani)
hāri
sweeper-drummer caste
Hari bola
‘chant the name of Hari’; Hari is one of the names of
Viṣṇu/Kṛṣṇa
harijan
a name coined by MK Gandhi for people of the
‘untouchable’ caste, which means children (jan, people) of god (Hari). Today, the term dalit is more
common
hāṭa
(weekly) local market
hemanta
autumn season
hetā
community service land
hetā maguṇi
payment made by village to village heads
hinhayat jagir
tax-free land for one generation
Holi
spring festival when people play with coloured pow-
der and paints
homa
ritual of fire sacrifice
homa ghia
clarified butter for fire sacrifice
hulahuḷi
auspicious high pitched ululating sound made by
women
inām
tax-free land mainly in premodern South India
iṣṭadebatā
tutelary deity
Jagannātha
lit. ‘lord of the universe’; the state deity of Orissa
jagir
land given by the ruler to a state officer in lieu of his
service, Oriya jāgiri
jajmāna
patron-sacrificer in a ritual, Skt. yajmāna, also the
patron family in jajmani relationships
jami khāibā
lit. ‘eat the land’; entitlement holder feeding his body
from crops of the allotted land
jaṅgala forest
jaṅgala loka forest people
jaṅgali forest-dwellers
janmāṣṭamī Krishna birth festival
jāti endogamous caste group
jāti pañchāyat caste council
jāti sabhā caste association
jāu porridge
jautuka dowry
jivātma individual soul
jñāna knowledge
juna grass for the roof of the sword hut
Jyeṣṭha a lunar month around June–July
kabāri fuel wood provider
kacheri royal court (katchery in anglicised spelling)
kadā a unit for cowry calculation: $1 = 16 \text{ paṇa} = 320 \text{ gaṇḍā} = 1,280 \text{ kadā} = 1,280 \text{ kauṛi}$ (cowry)
kadāhāna the first preparatory ploughing
kāhāna a unit for cowry calculation: $1 = 16 \text{ paṇa} = 320 \text{ gaṇḍā} = 1,280 \text{ kadā} = 1,280 \text{ kauṛi}$ (cowry)
kalāḍiha elevated land
kalaśa pot filled with water with coconut and cloth placed on top, functions as a medium of divine power and symbol of auspiciousness
kali juga lit. ‘age of discord’; dark age of decline, Skt. kali yuga
kālisī medium
kāma work, action, Skt. karma; sexual desire, Skt. kāma
kāmanā ghara wish house
kaṇḍārā watchman
kāṇḍi labourer
kani a unit of area: $1 = 12.25 \text{ sq. ft.}$
kāṅkaṇa kind of vegetable that grows in the forest
karana scribe, name of a caste or a post
karani akṣara scripts used by the karana (scribes) in the precolonial period
kartabya duty
karttā lit. ‘doer’ or ‘performer’, indicates the main worshipper in a ritual, usually the head of family or community
Kārttika a lunar month around October–November
kauṛi cowry (also spelled cowrie), marine snail shells used as money, Cypraea moneta
kauṛi bhāga resources given in the form of cowry part
kauṛi bhagiā cowry accountant in a fort; lit. ‘cowry distributor’
kāyaṣṭha scribe caste in Bengal and North India
khāi debā lit. ‘eating up’; corruption
khaṇḍā  sword
khaṇḍāyata  peasant-militia caste, also referred to a ruler of a small region
khaṅjā  originally ‘arrangement’; hereditary assignment
khaṅjā dara  khaṅjā supplies
kharāra  receipt
kharāra patra  written receipt
kharcha  fees
khela  play
khilat  vestment, a ceremonial robe or other gift given by a superior as a mark of honour
kilā  fort
koṭha  state or collective
koṭha bartana  state salary
koṭha karaṇa  lit. ‘state scribe’; an office of scribe
koṭha bārika  lit. ‘state barber’; an office of barber (messenger)
Krṣṇa  Hindu god, often equated with Jagannātha in Orissa
kṛta yuga  first of the four yugas (world ages), another term for satya yuga
kṣetra pāla  lit. ‘provider in the field’
kṣetra pāla pūjā  agricultural ritual where a sheaf of paddy stalks is worshipped as the ‘provider in the field’
kumbāra  potter caste
kuśa  sacred grass, Eragrostis cynosuroides
kusī  happy
lābh māriji  love marriage, from English
lakhirajdar  rent free land
Lakṣmī  goddess of wealth and prosperity
lilā  divine play
mā  mother
mada mamsa  alcohol and meat
Mādaḷā Pāñji  Jagannātha temple chronicle
Māgha  a lunar month around January–February
māguna  toll
mahāsaptamī  lit. ‘the great seventh’; the seventh day in a lunar fort-night of the autumn festival of the goddess
mahāṣṭamī  lit. ‘the great eighth’; the eighth day in a lunar fort-night of the autumn festival of the goddess
māhāra  watchman
mahājan  money lender
mahārājā  great king
mahinā  salary
mahinādāra  salary holders
mālī  gardener caste, they also serve as caretakers in Śīva temples
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mālika</td>
<td>owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māṇa</td>
<td>cane measuring basket which can contain one nauti (gauṇi) or four seer of paddy; a unit of area: 1 māṇa = 25 guṇṭha = about 19,600 sq. ft. = about 0.45 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māṇa basā</td>
<td>festival when harvested paddy in a measure (māṇa) is worshipped as Lakṣmī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māṇḍīā</td>
<td>finger millet, Eleusine coracana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mantra</td>
<td>set of sacred syllables with religio-magical power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>māraphatadāra</td>
<td>trustee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mārgaśīra</td>
<td>a lunar month around November–December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matha</td>
<td>monastery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mātṛ</td>
<td>mother, motherly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mātṛ pūjā</td>
<td>worship of mother goddess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mātsya nyāya</td>
<td>lit. ‘the logic (law) of the fish’ where the big fish swallows the small fish; corresponding to the English phrase “law of the jungle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majukuri</td>
<td>state administrators stationed in the fort, derived from the Persian mazkūri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meṣa</td>
<td>a solar month around April–May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mināha, minyā</td>
<td>minhā or minhāī in Hindustani. Deduction from the assessed revenue of an estate; tax-free residential areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mīrasi system</td>
<td>system of entitlements in early modern South India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mohara</td>
<td>new regnal year gold coin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mokṣa</td>
<td>liberation, the fourth and final aim of man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mouza, mauza</td>
<td>an administrative village for revenue collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukti Maṇḍapa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paṇḍit Sabhā</td>
<td>lit. ‘liberation pavilion scholars/priestly council’, the supreme council of brāhmaṇa scholar-priests in the Jagannātha temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naḍu</td>
<td>unit of local community in South India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>namaskār</td>
<td>greeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narapati</td>
<td>lord of man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nazar, nazaranā</td>
<td>tributary offerings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>netā</td>
<td>political leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nįi gāra</td>
<td>‘fort itself’ in a fort area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nimakahārāma jāgiri</td>
<td>traitor’s jagir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niyāma</td>
<td>norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oṛa</td>
<td>peasant-militias in Orissa, present khaṇḍāyata caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oṛiā</td>
<td>Oriya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>osā</td>
<td>fasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oyārijā</td>
<td>wārijā, land records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paḍihāri</td>
<td>doorkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pāika</td>
<td>foot soldier, often spelt ‘paik’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
xxxvi Glossary

pāika ākhaṛā | martial arts of the foot soldiers in Orissa
pāika bartana | payment for foot soldiers
pāika bidroha | Paika Rebellion (of 1817)
pakhāḷa | watered rice
palli sabha | hamlet assembly
pāna | betel leaves
paṇa | a unit for cowry calculation: 1 kāhāṇa = 16 paṇa = 320
ganḍā = 1,280 kaḍā = 1,280 kaunità (cowry)
paṇā samkrānti | first day of Meṣa (April–May), paṇā is a sweet-sour
drink made from bela (wood apple, Aegle marmelos)
panchayati raj | paṅcāyat rāj, local self-government
panchayat samiti | paṅcāyat samiti, block-level council for local
self-government
pāṇi bodā baḷi | lit. ‘water sheep sacrifice’ offered to Goddess
Rāmacaṇḍī for a good rain
paramparā | tradition, lineage
paramārtha satya | the absolute truth
parganā | district
paścima dwāra | west
paṭā | deed of right to land
peshkash | tribute
phagu | coloured powder
Phālguna | a lunar month around February–March
pradhāna | village head
prakṛti | nature as the generative and dynamic principle of the
phenomenal, functions as the principle of forming
differences
prasāda | sacred leftover of items offered to deities
preta | spirit of the dead, ancestral spirit
pūjā | ritual of worship
pūjārī | brāhmaṇa temple priests
puñji | offering of mixture of raw rice, milk and egg made
into small mounds with a little local liquor poured on
top
pūrba | tradition
pūrṇimā | full moon day
pūrṇimānta | calendar system in which each month ends on the full
moon
puruṣa | man; cosmic man (Puruṣa); the spirit that is immo-
nent as the essence of all beings, functions as the basis
of oneness and ontological equality
puruṣārtha | lit. ‘aim of human’, refers to the four proper goals or
aims of a human life in Indian tradition, namely, kāma
or sensual enjoyment, artha or power and wealth, dharma or cosmological law and mokṣa or liberation
raja  festival of menstruation of Mother Earth, female sexual secretion
rājā  king, chief
rājaguru  royal counsellor
rājatantra  royal rule
rakabā, ruckba  enclosure, the lands constituting an estate yielding a money-revenue
Rāmacaṇḍī  tutelary goddess of the fort area of Garh Mantri
rāsa jātrā  festival of Kṛṣṇa, celebrated on the full moon day of Kārttika (October–November)
rasūm, rusum, russoom  customary payments and allowances
ratha jātrā  the grandest festival in Puri when the Jagannātha trinity makes a journey on the grand road on chariots, also called ‘chariot festival’ or ‘car festival’
ryotwari  cultivator-based settlement
sāānta  master or patron in a patron–client relationship; chief or big man
śabda  sound
sabhāpati  head of assembly
sāhāyiya  helping out
sāhi  hamlet
śakti  sacred generative power
samiṅga  allowance
sāla  wife’s brother
śāmkṛānti  entrance of the sun into the next sign of the zodiac, marks the beginning of a solar month
śāmkṛi bhoga  cooked offerings
saṃvrṭi satya  the relative truth
sañjā  fixed rent
sarabarākāra  tax collector in Khurda during the colonial era; sarbarāḥ (Hindustani) (management) + kār (doer) = manager
śarada  autumn; a rice that is sown in July and reaped in December; middling highland that produces śarada rice
saradāra jānīsī  assistant of chief
sarakāra  government (not necessarily the modern state)
sarakārī bālī  royal sacrifice
sarpanch  sarapañca, subhead of gram panchayat
śarat  wet autumn season
śāṛhī  a cloth bound on head (also the cloth which constitutes the main part of women’s dress, sari)
śāsana  generally means religious teaching, but in Orissan context, refers to the villages provided to maintain brāhmaṇa scholar-priests
sāttwika guṇa  pure nature
Glossary

satya yuga  
first of the four yugas (world ages), another term for kṛta yuga

Scheduled Castes (SC)  
historically disadvantaged caste groups whose status and entitlements are acknowledged in the Constitution of India, mainly ex-‘untouchables’ or dalits

Scheduled Tribes (ST)  
statutorily designated indigenous peoples whose status and entitlements are acknowledged in the Constitution of India

sebā  
service

sebāita  
servant

sebaka bartana  
salary for servants

sejuā  
‘one who prepares the bedding’, previously called suāsiā

sindura  
red powder/paste

siropā  
a cloth tied around the head, given as a mark of honour

śīta  
winter season

snāna maṇḍapa  
bathing platform of the deity

Snāna pūrṇimā  
full moon day of Jyeṣṭa (June–July) when the Jagannātha trinity (Ṭriṭiya Deva in Garh Mantri) is bathed on the bathing platform

Śrābaṇa  
a lunar month around July–August

suāsiā  
one who prepares the bedding

sunā maṇḍā  
gold ingots appearing as monsters on earth

śukhilā  
dry

śūnyatā  
the absolute emptiness that is the ultimate reality in Buddhism, śūnya; Jagannātha is also referred to as śūnya

śwaśura  
wife’s father; husband’s father

tahasildar  
land officer

taṇḍakāra  
collector of fines

tanī, tanki  
quit rent, token tax

tankidar  
land rented at reduced fee

tanti  
weaver caste

teli  
oil-presser caste

ṭhākur-rājā  
divine king

ṭhākurāṇī  
goddess

ṭhānā  
police station

ṭhānī  
formal members of the local community

toilā  
lit. ‘cotton field’; swidden field in which millets and cotton were grown in turn in early modern times. Dry fields used for millet cultivation are still called toilā in Khurda today

toilā kara  
tax on swidden fields producing raw cotton

torānīa nāla  
lit. ‘stream of rice water’ (name of land)

tretā yuga  
the second of the four yugas (world ages)
trivarga: three aims of human life, namely, kāma, artha and dharma
Tulā: a solar month around October–November
tuḷabhīṇā: cotton-carder caste
tuḷasī: holy basil, used in the worship of Viṣṇu
tuḷasī pāṇi: holy basil and water
utnī: a kind of tax
varṇa: lit. ‘colour’, functionally divided four classes of caste
yajmāna: sacrificer
yajña: sacrifice
zamindari: landlord, land owner
zilla parishad: jillā pariṣad, elected district level institution of local self-government
zindabad: ‘long live’
Abbreviations

Ewer Report
From W. Ewer, Commissioner, to W. B. Bayley, Acting Chief-Secretary to Government, dated Calcutta, 13 May 1818, in Selections from the Correspondence on the Settlement of Khoordah Estate in the District of Pooree Vol. I.

Fifth Report

Forrester Report
From W. Forrester, Deputy Collector, Cuttack, to the Secretary to the Commissioner of Cuttack, dated Khorda, 17 October 1819, in Selections from the Correspondence on the Settlement of Khoordah Estate in the District of Pooree Vol. I.

Hota Report

Maddox Report

Mishra Report

Rate Report
“The Rate Report of the Settlement Officer”, From W.C. Taylor, Settlement Officer, to the Collector of Pooree, dated Khordah, 30 November 1879, in Selections from the Correspondence on the Settlement of Khoordah Estate in the District of Pooree, Vol. II.

Selections I
Selections from the Correspondence on the Settlement of Khoordah Estate in the District of Pooree, Vol. I.

Selections II
Selections from the Correspondence on the Settlement of Khoordah Estate in the District of Pooree, Vol. II.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selections III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilkinson Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Weights and measures

Cowry units

1 kāhāṇa = 16 pāṇa
1 pāṇa = 20 gaṇḍā
1 gaṇḍā = 4 kaḍā

*One kāhāṇa was 1,280 kauṛi (cowry) and equal to about a quarter of a rupee in the eighteenth century.

Area

1 bāṭi = 20 māṇa = about 9 acres
1 māṇa = 25 guṇṭha = about 19,600 sq. ft. = about 0.45 acres
1 guṇṭha = 16 biśwā = about 784 sq. ft.
1 biśwā = 4 kani = about 49 sq. ft.

*One māṇa was standardised for the purposes of the 1823 settlement, and its exact measurement in precolonial Khurda is difficult to ascertain. In precolonial Khurda, 1 bāṭi was 20 bighā.

Volume

1 nauti = 1 gauṇi (= 4 seer of paddy)
1 bharaṇa = 80 nauti

*A nauti or gauṇi refers to a cylindrical vessel, around 25 cm in both diameter and depth, usually made of tin or cane in Khurda. It is called ‘cāri sera gauni (four seer vessel)’ since it can contain around four seer of paddy.

Weight

1 maund = 82.14 lbs = 37.26 kg = 40 seer
1 seer = 2.05 lbs = 0.93 kg
1 Introduction
Towards a cultural politics of ethics in everyday practice

Problems and perspectives

Social change and its ethical basis

One day in September 1992, during my fieldwork in the village of Garh Manitri in Khurda, Orissa, I witnessed a grand procession of villagers passing in front of the house where I was staying. It started from the hill where the tutelary goddess of the locality resided and marched through the village streets. The procession triumphantly declared the end of factional fighting and the reunification of the village. Men shouted “Garh Manitri zindabad” (long live Garh Manitri), as they proclaimed to everyone that the village had ‘become one’ again, as it had been in the past. I had seen so much factional discord in the village that I could hardly believe that this procession could bring about any real change. Indeed I was not alone in my scepticism, and many villagers remained unconvinced.

One of the main impressions during my fieldwork in Khurda was the serious disjuncture between the practice and discourse of community, duty and cooperative togetherness in the socio-cultural sphere and of competition, cheating and corruption in the politico-economic sphere. On the one hand there was constant giving and receiving of services and gifts between households. People eagerly performed their roles in the grand local festivals. I was impressed with the sheer length of time people spent together with their kin and fellow villagers in their work and leisure, sitting and talking together about all sorts of topics. There was no doubt about the existence of abundant care and affection. On the other hand, however, there was fierce factional rivalry over the acquisition of state resources that often broke into heated arguments and sometimes even physical violence. Rural society, despite its socio-cultural practice of togetherness, seemed to suffer from a variety of social problems, such as a lack of cooperation among villagers regarding development projects, fighting among political factions and widespread corruption.

Such a disjuncture of the lifeworld reflected the “postcolonial predicament” (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993) of Indian society. Although India achieved political independence in 1947, this did not mean a total departure from the colonial experience. Independent India not only inherited most of
the governing apparatus—bureaucracy, court, police and military—from the colonial state (Jalal 1995), it also maintained the colonial dichotomy of ‘inner tradition’ and ‘outer modernity’ as the semantic framework of cognition and practice. Furthermore, caste hierarchy along with the structure of dominance based on landholding, fixed during colonial times, continued to bind socio-economic relationships in local society. In this way, independent India was never really free of its colonial past. What I witnessed in an Orissan village in the early 1990s was the persistence of a colonially wedged schism between the inner tradition of the socio-cultural sphere and the outer modernity of the politico-economic sphere.

In this predicament, where the lifeworld was fragmented into incompatible parts, socio-cultural practices of cooperation and exchange were given importance as representing community tradition, though its content was often contested. Politico-economic activities, putatively based on the principle of equality and rationality, were dominated by the logic of power and numbers. Low castes and the poor were totally marginalised in local politics, as people of the dominant caste engaged in self-serving factional politics. Many people seemed fed up with factional fighting and the corrupt system that allowed some villagers, particularly faction leaders and their associates, to embezzle public funds. I often heard people lament and criticise this situation, and I too came to share their despondency.

It was at such a time that the grand procession took place. It announced that the village was reunited and, from now onwards, all the villagers would cooperate for the common cause. I was rather pessimistic about the possibility of change. However, I came to understand later that what I had witnessed that day was in fact a significant episode indicating the larger historical transformation of rural society in Orissa. From the mid-1990s, as a general trend, factional politics in Orissa became more contained and the gram panchayat (grāma pañcāyat, elected village-level local self-government) began to function more prominently as the main decision-making body. A new phase of socio-political ‘democratisation’ had apparently begun to take place.

How can we understand this change? A significant factor to explain this change is the increasing participation by the ‘subaltern’ (lower caste, ‘tribal’, poor and/or marginalised groups, like women) population in democratic politics. This democratisation process has been noted in national electoral politics, and it is clear that, simultaneously, the space for subaltern participation at the local level has been growing. These socio-political transformations are related to an important institutional change: the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 devolved power to local self-governments and implemented rigorous reservation measures for marginalised sections—Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC) and women (Bates 2005).

SC, ST and OBC are the terms used in the Indian Constitution to refer to groups recognised as deserving government protection. SC refers to mainly ex-‘untouchables’ or dalits, ST to ‘tribal’ groups and OBC to other disadvantaged castes. These reforms undoubtedly supported increased subaltern participation in local politics. The procession that proclaimed the reunification of the village
became necessary, in part, because it was clear that, due to self-government reforms, hitherto marginalised castes had to be included in local politics.

Questions remained, however, about how to bring about a new democratic inter-caste cooperation, since actual socio-political relationships cannot be defined by one institution alone. In other words, a new “vision of community” (Li 1996) had to be formulated to bring about egalitarian cooperation among multiple caste groups in local society. This book will examine people’s agency in cultural-political negotiations over the establishment of a new socio-moral vision for local democracy. The negotiative process seems to suggest the emergence of a ‘post-postcolonial transformation’ of local society in Orissa, indicating the beginning of the end of the postcolonial predicament.

In order to analyse post-postcolonial transformation and to contextualise its historical importance, this book considers a long duration of local history from the early modern to the postcolonial period. This historical contextualisation enables an understanding of contemporary social changes in relation to wider transformations of the state, politics and inter-caste relationships. It also provides an understanding of how overall socio-political changes develop in relation to the reformulation of social practices and cultural values. Particular attention will be paid to the creative agency of those who are trying to reconfigure viable ethical practice and discourse, which reconcile embodied cultural values with the ideas and institutions of modernity and democracy.

An attempt to describe, analyse and understand the historical transformation of the moral basis of socio-political relationships, this book revolves around the cultural politics of ethics in everyday practice in rural Orissa. In conventional usage, the words morality and ethics are often given distinct meanings; morality tends to indicate collectively shared ideas on good and right, while ethics usually refers to the sense of good and right held by the individuals as reflexive beings. In this book, however, the dichotomy between individual and society is problematised as we recognise and pay attention to the sociality and dialogical nature of moral–ethical agents in the politics of relationships. This results in a blurring of the difference between individual ethics and community morality; therefore, both terms are used interchangeably, unless specified otherwise.

The postcolonial debate

A core aim of this book is a theoretical and an ethnographic intervention in the recent debates on the moral basis of postcolonial India—whether it should be state-centred or society-centred, individual-based or community-based, secular or religious, or modern or traditional—by paying attention to the historical transformation of ethics in everyday practices in Indian society.

A starting point for discussion can be found in the liberal–communitarian debate, a postcolonial version of which is going on among Indian intellectuals. The debate can be summarised as follows, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The ‘liberalists’ stress the need for modernisation and the leading role of the state thereof (Bardhan 1984, Beteille 1994, Sen 1998b, Khilnani 1999). For
them, the moral basis of modern India should rest in the universal and liberalist ethics of human rights. The ‘communitarians’, on the other hand, criticise the teleology of modernist theories and point out the relevance of indigenous values and morality that rest in the society/community of the ordinary (Madan 1987a, b, 1997, Chatterjee 1994, 2004, Nandy 1992, 2006). According to them, the role of the state should be restricted, granting more space to the autonomous working of society/community.

Bardhan (1998) named communitarians, somewhat derogatorily, “anarcho-communitarians”. He talks of “the great divide” in Indian social science discourse precisely over this issue: whether to promote the secular rationality of the modern state or the religious communitarian values of indigenous society. The original liberal–communitarian debate in North America began in the form of criticisms against liberalist thinking represented by Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1999 [1971]). The so-called communitarians, such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (1985a, b, 1989a, b) and Michael Walzer (1983, 1987), criticised the atomistic and disencumbered notion of individuals in liberalist philosophy and instead asserted the embeddedness of the self in community relationships.

The parallel debate in India can be termed a postcolonial version because, in comparison to the original North American debate, it contains distinctively post-colonial twists. The first of these concerns the position of the state. In the modern West (Europe and North America), the state is seen not only as a protector of human rights but also as a possible threat to the freedom of citizens. The liberalists aim to limit the role of the state in civil society and market so that its power is not detrimental to individual freedom. In India, however, liberalists wish to see the state play a more active role in promoting individual liberty and human rights. This is related to the colonial and postcolonial history of India, where the state is seen to represent the values of rationality and modernity against traditional and hierarchical society.

In the second postcolonial twist, the distinction between rights and virtue corresponds, respectively, with the dichotomy of the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’. That is to say, the discourse of individual rights is seen to come from outer influences, including the colonial forces, whereas communitarian virtue is identified with inner indigenous social values. This creates the dilemma of impossible choices. The complementarity of rights and virtue, and of state and society, is denied through a postcolonial dichotomy that makes the outer and foreign and the inner and indigenous mutually exclusive.

The postcolonial liberal–communitarian debate has often been depicted, only partly correctly, as a contest between a perspective which prioritises the individual and one that emphasises the importance of the community. Niraja Jayal, for example, says that while the modernist–liberalist perspective is self-evidently a rights-based one, even the communitarian view “may be seen to be arguing for recognition of communities, rather than individuals, as the proper agents or bearers of rights”. Here, individuals and communities are seen as actors competing over rights. As a corollary, the communitarian insistence is
seen as “detrimental to or diminishing of certain categories of individual rights” (Jayal 1999: 147).

However, the real point of the debate is not just whether the individual or the community should be given priority as the bearer of rights. The potentiality of this particular debate instead lies in expanding our moral point of view and discovering clues about how we can formulate complementary relationships between the juridical and the interpersonal, between the formalistic and universalistic ethics of rights and justice, on the one hand, and the everyday, context-sensitive ethics of mutual respect, care and virtue, on the other (Benhabib 1992). This expansion of our conception of socio-political morality is vital for establishing a democracy that does not compromise its universal value but actually works on the foundation of the history and culture of community relationships. Its universal value lies in taking each person’s interests, values and viewpoints seriously.

Granting rights on the basis of individual freedom is not enough. Besides securing individual rights, a democratic community has to have care and concern for others. How can this be possible? This contribution to the discussion on the moral basis of modern India veers away from conceptual arguments, focusing instead on the possibilities inherent in the practices of the people—particularly the subaltern—as moral/ethical and reflexive agents. Significant subaltern agency can be seen at work, bridging over and mediating the dichotomies of the postcolonial predicament—variously seen as individual and community, right and virtue, outer and inner, modern and traditional, and rational and religious—in the social and moral practices of negotiation.

The subaltern is defined here as those who have a subordinate position in the hegemonic or superalternate discourse of values (Guha 1982a, b, Spivak 1985, Gregory 1997). Subalterns have no voice in the hegemonic discourse and must employ a subalternate discourse in order to resist. In the Indian context, it can be said that the discourse of hierarchy and dominance belongs to the hegemonic, whereas that of ontological equality is part of the subalternate. Although the subaltern voice is oppressed in hegemonic discourse (cf Spivak 1988), they can speak in another voice. This means that the subalterns are capable of constructing another way of speaking based on alternative semantic frameworks that cannot be reclaimed by hegemonic discourses. I focus on the activities of lower castes because it is precisely the subalterns whose voices cannot be enunciated in hegemonic discursive frameworks, who have the greatest potentiality for creating alternative discourses and opening up new futures. As Spivak points out, “the moment(s) of change” brought about by the subaltern are “signalled or marked by a functional change in sign systems” (1985: 330). Social change involves transformation in semantic frameworks, and subalterns are agents in such transformation. When the meanings of words that people use change, the meanings and forms of social relationships are also transformed. As this study will try to show, the subaltern voice is apparently achieving a broader space for enunciation in post-postcolonial transformation. However, this process is subject to the working of power that attempts to ignore and marginalise subaltern voices.
in renewed ways. Nevertheless, it still contains the potential for creating a new ethics.

By focusing on people’s practices, we can ease ourselves out of the either-or teleology that tends to characterise discussions on the moral basis of modern India. The debates that culminated in the great divide led us to believe that we must choose either individual rights or community virtues. But the two discourses can and do exist coevally in practice (Guha 1985a, Gregory 1997). In the life-world of practice it is not necessary to make a definite choice of one or the other, say between the individual and the community. In fact, the ‘commonplace’ (topoi in Greek) or the ‘topic’ is made up of pairs of various oppositions, which can be either antagonistic or non-antagonistic.8

Shared experiences in the lifeworld and their discursive representation are intrinsically two-sided (Shotter 1993). Without the two-sided nature of the shared experience, and its dialogical recognition, the world would suffer stagnancy and oppression since only one overarching and consistent set of social norms or axioms would dominate. The lifeworld is full of dilemmas and inconsistencies, and it is these characteristics which give life to the world, creating potentialities for dialogical interactions and social transformations towards new dispositions and meanings in our practices (Bourdieu 1990: 53).

Fragmentation, incoherence and the dilemmas of the postcolonial condition are significant features of the contemporary Indian lifeworld. The ethnographic descriptions in this book also confirm these aspects. Yet, human agency has the ability to recognise the two-sided, contradictory nature of the lifeworld and to mediate and live through these dilemmas. Human agents attempt to assign varying significance to different aspects of the world and maintain their identity—polito-ethical positioning as responsive beings—in inconsistent and problematic situations. They do so not by consistently adhering to one side of the dilemma but by switching from one side to the other as the situation requires. As Dirks et al. point out, “[i]dentities may be seen as (variably successful) attempts to create and maintain coherence out of inconsistent cultural stuff and inconsistent life experience” (Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994: 18). This book attempts to shed light on such human agency that lives through dilemmas and inconsistencies in the lifeworld, mediating contradictions in practice in situ. This is one of the fields in which anthropology based on ethnographic fieldwork can contribute most fruitfully and relevantly to contemporary issues and problems.

Beyond status and power

This book is partially a critical response to previous anthropological works on Indian society that have mainly concentrated on issues of status and/or power. Such studies describe Indian ‘society’ and ‘culture’ as a consistent order and system within which people’s hierarchical status could be explained and the role of power in defining socio-political relationships could be clarified.9 In this kind of scheme, caste was often proposed as the centre of Indian society and much effort was spent on solving the enigma of caste, namely, whether caste was about
status or power. The discussion was intended to find out how best to explain the caste system, which was taken to be the essence of Indian society and culture, as a consistent and graspable order. This debate has appeared in many avatars, the most recent one being between Dumont (1970) and the neo-Hocartians (Dirks 1987, Raheja 1988a, b, Quigley 1993).\footnote{Put simply, while Dumont argued that caste was about hierarchical status with the brāhmaṇa at the apex, neo-Hocartians criticised Dumont, saying that caste is mainly about power centred on the king or the dominant caste, thus renewing Hocart’s idea on caste.}

The intention here is not to discuss which side has the better argument. Rather, I would like to move away from the common methodological standpoint that seeks to find out the overarching framework by which Indian social relationships can be explained. Both sides are set on finding out the Indian order of things—in the form of either norm or power—in which persons are impersonally placed in prescriptive positions with specific ranks, privileges and duties. What is lacking in these methodologies is the situated agency of people able to reconstitute the ethics and aesthetics of interpersonal relationships.

The order-centred and power-centred views do not recognise that people are not just embedded within normative and power frameworks and bound to obey the prescriptive and the coercive. They have the reflexive and creative capacities to gauge their place in interpersonal interactions and relationships. Beyond status and power, which are undoubtedly important values in Indian society, there is another value, ontological equality, which functions as the ethical foundation for respect and concern for others. These three values—status, power and equality—also define the complex characteristics of caste. Here, ontological equality functions as the moral basis, complementing the rigidity of status and power, for reflexive and practical revisions of existing socio-political relationships from a viewpoint of mutual respect and care.

The complementary and contradictory interaction of status, power and equality arguably characterises the history, society and politics of India. It also constitutes the mechanism of sacrifice, which in Indian tradition is the basic principle of life. Sacrifice is an action that, with self-denial or death, mediates the contradictions between ontological oneness (the equality of being as one) and hegemonic structures (differences of the many based on status and power). The key to rebirth in sacrifice lies in the destruction of the structures of status and power and the realisation of the intrinsic oneness of all beings. Status and power can re-establish their hegemonic structure only on the basis of this equality of being. Not only is mediation of contradictions between the one and the many in the principle of sacrifice a symbolic practice in ritual, it also permeates the everyday lifeworld.

Although people do not usually have the capacity to change social hierarchy or the power structure themselves except in extraordinary cases, they, as negotiative agents, are often able, through manipulating the two-sided and dilemmatic nature of the lifeworld, to relativise the order of status and power through the value of ontological equality. Such agents can be creative in the formation of new patterns of socio-political practices, in the reformulation of the prevalent. Focusing on this kind of agency would be a corrective to previous academic focus on reason
and norm, in which the “power of actors thinking as social and moral beings is neglected and thereby denigrated absolutely” (Overing 1985: 5).

Social practice and cultural resources

How then can this aspect of people’s creative agency embedded in particular socio-political relationships be described? To deal with this question, a good starting point is a consideration of two aspects of cultural-political agency: ‘practice’ and ‘resources’ following Shotter (1993) and Demmer (2016).

The first aspect is related to the social practice of people who are embedded in certain relationships and embody certain forms of behaviour but also have the capacity to reflect and dialogically act upon themselves and others. Practice constitutes the basis of social action in which agents gradually bring about new and different forms and meanings through “repetition” (Deleuze 1994, Yanai 1995). This agency of the self is based on “the autonomous I” which “is ever implicated within and joined with an intersubjectivity” (Overing and Passes 2000: 2). Here, the identity of the autonomous I can only be constructed in relation to others in responsive practices and their intersubjective ethical evaluations (Derrida 1997). That is to say, although moral responsibility rests primarily on the individual, as Bauman (1993) suggests, the responsive nature of morality makes it also a social affair that presupposes the existence of others (cf Weeks 1995: 65). Such ethical intersubjectivity is realised by the “reflexive and embodied agency” of the people (Tanabe and Tokita-Tanabe 2003).

It should be noted that reflexivity and embodiedness point to the basic human condition. Reflexivity is the human capacity to cast a reflective gaze upon the self and the world and assign various levels of significance to them (Taylor 1985a, Mohapatra 1990: 27, Rottschaefner 1998). This is part of the characteristic of human beings as “self-interpreting animals” (Taylor 1985a: 45–76). Human agency requires such reflective capacity to ponder on the meaning and effects of one’s action on the self, others and the world, and, therefore, involves ethical positioning (Taylor 1992). This reflexive self is always situated and embedded in particular circumstances, since human beings are embodied beings. Embodiedness places the human agent in a particular space and time and in a specific nexus of social relationships. In this way, a human agent is a “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962) and a “being-in-common” (Nancy 1991) as an “encumbered self” (Maclntyre 1981, Sandel 1982, Walzer 1987). To be embodied means to be embedded in relationships. To be reflexive means to be responsible for the self in relation to others. These two conditions make human beings moral agents in their practices.

The combination of the human conditions of reflexivity and embodiedness, moreover, brings about an awareness of death and the world beyond. Human agents have the capacity to reflect upon themselves as beings of this world while being aware of the existence of the world beyond. That is to say, human agents are able to relativise their worldly or profane existence—embedded in relationships of status and power—by contemplating the “other” world or the “sacred” (Nishida
The individual is aware of the double-sidedness of existence—an ontological self in relation to the world beyond and an embodied social self in relation to this world (Ueda 1992, Viswanathan 1998).

Indian tradition is conscious of this double-sidedness of beings: spirit (puruṣa) is the essence of beings, and nature (prakṛti) is the generative and dynamic principle of the phenomenal. The combination of these constitutes existence. Prakṛti functions as the principle of forming differences (both social and natural ones), whereas puruṣa is the basis of the oneness or ontological equality of all beings. Prakṛti means nature in a large sense, which contains the entire phenomenal world, including culture and society. Prakṛti is never static, and differences manifested through prakṛti are never stable. These differences are transitory. In its primordial and pristine state, prakṛti also manifests the immanent oneness of its power and existence. Indeed, in essence, prakṛti is not different from puruṣa at the absolute level.

The phenomenal and embodied existence of a human being has a beginning and an end. On the foundation of the axiomatic truth that all human beings die rests the possibility for awareness of the ontological equality and oneness of beings. The importance of the value of ontological equality is emphasised here as it can be viewed as the most important ethical resource for constituting the subalternate form of sociality. This subalternate form of sociality has the potential to resist and rectify the rigidity of the hegemonic structure of status and power. The sense of ontological equality in relation to the sacred and the world beyond, on the one hand, and the actual existence of differences in the socio-political relationships of hierarchy and power in the phenomenal world, on the other, give rise to dilemmas in social ethics and morality. The dilemmatic negotiation of these subalternate and hegemonic perspectives constitutes the basic structure of the cultural politics of ethics. In this way, it is the reflexive and embodied nature that makes the human agent an ethical being in embedded relations—with paradoxes and dilemmas—in the sense of seeking to act in a good and meaningful manner in everyday practice.

However, human agency, in order to work, requires the resources of already existing patterns of practice, symbols, meanings and values which can be employed to create new forms of practice and discourse with recognisable but different meanings, that is, meanings with difference (différance) in Derrida’s sense (Derrida 1982). The second aspect of human agency involves the cultural resources which people depend on to form practice, evaluate their significance and secure moral legitimacy in their social life (Demmer 2016). These resources constitute the historically formed environment which “affords” people to act and think as situated beings in a social milieu (Gibson 1979). It should be noted that what people have in common is not a shared cultural system or a set of agreements about meanings and values, but commonplaces as shared topics “in a flow of social activity which afford common reference” (Shotter 1993: 135, Ong 1991). Such commonplaces constitute a historically accumulated reservoir of resources which can be utilised by collective agents to negotiate and create new forms and meanings of social action (Shotter 1993: 14).
An essential point to reiterate is that commonplace cultural resources are not reducible to a system or a set of rules that prescriptively binds people. Neither do they constitute an unchanging and timeless tradition. Rather, “living tradition” (MacIntyre 1981, Billig 1987, Shotter 1993) as historically accumulated dispositions, meanings and evaluations of practices and discourses can function as rich cultural resources for negotiation, precisely because they contain dilemmas and inconsistencies. Unlike rigid traditionalism, living tradition is not a closed system and is open to new elements and resources. These blend with older elements to form a richer reservoir of cultural resources, providing wider potentialities for new patterns of social practices. People take advantage of the dilemmatic and contradictory nature of living tradition—the interrelationships between the values of status, power and equality in the case of India—to negotiate and adapt to changing situations. In this way, these cultural resources are reproduced through usage in people’s discourses and practices and undergo changes as the discourses and practices are negotiated and transformed.

**Institutional change and the postcolonial agenda**

We must further consider, however, the larger institutional context in which the use of resources by agents is influenced, channelled and limited. Here, institution refers to the social, political, legal and/or economic system that defines the capability of the people in its broad sense. It demarcates the extent and the nature of the social and political arenas where people’s agency can be exercised. In other words, the institution limits the “practical-moral” usage of cultural resources (Shotter 1993).

Taking into account institutional changes is extremely important for understanding the “postcolonial predicament” (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993) of Indian society. Institutional arrangements went through major changes as state–society relationships radically transformed with the colonial experience and independence. As India was colonised, the institutional arrangements of early modern, late precolonial India, involving kingship, market and local community, were broken down and fragmented (Chapters 2 and 3). The idea of modernity as the dominant ideology was imported as not only superior but also exclusive to the colonisers and their indigenous elite allies. This is the root of the outer and foreign characterisation of liberalism and scientific secularism. Meanwhile, ‘traditionalised’ Indian society was identified with caste hierarchy and the jajmani (jajmānī) system—the system of status and power from the colonial point of view.

Indigenous cultural resources, containing aspects of status and power as well as ontological equality, continued to play vital roles in the everyday lifeworld, but were placed in the marginal sphere of non-modernised ‘native society’. In this situation, a dichotomy was created between outer modernity and inner tradition, rather than the two forming a hybrid and common reservoir of cultural resources. Under such conditions, Indian nationalism had a Janus-faced character. It claimed its right to both traditional culture and modern rationality. It insisted on a distinctive national identity in the inner cultural–spiritual sphere, whilst pursuing
universal rationality and right in the outer political–material sphere (Chatterjee 1993).

Indian independence in 1947 did not mean that the country became totally free from the legacy of the colonial dichotomy. It is true that the “rule of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993) between the colonial state and native society ended after independence at least at the level of political institutions, and a democratic nation-state was born that was supposed to integrate the people with the state. However, the traditionalised form of hierarchy and dominance in society persisted after independence. Also, the colonial dichotomy discussed above continues to haunt contemporary India, as evident in the postcolonial liberal–communitarian debate. This is in spite of the fact that the power relation of coloniser/colonised, which created the dichotomous condition, apparently no longer exists.

The postcolonial dilemma stems from the impossible choice between inner identity and outer rationality. The postcolonial agenda lies in the mediation between these two options. In practical terms, an important challenge for postcolonial India is to reconcile the democratic institutions designed for the new “idea of India” (Khilnani 1999) and the living values of the people in society. The local community works here as the moral–political “interface” between the state and the people (Strulik 2004). It is this space of mediation and negotiation that forms the foundation for this study. To consider negotiation is to examine the development of desirable socio-political relationships—practical ethics—that hold both democratic value and the politico-moral sense of the people.

Towards post-postcolonial transformation

It is important to pay attention to the everyday practice of ordinary people, especially the cultural resources employed thereof, in its larger institutional and historical context. This is crucial to understanding contemporary social transformation. After the mid-1990s in rural Orissa, subaltern agency can be perceived as attempting to go beyond the colonially traditionalised structure of hierarchy and dominance, instead mediating between a sense of ethics based on ontological equality and ideas and institutions of local democracy. Such change is referred to here as post-postcolonial transformation, embodying its potential to extend past the postcolonial structure. Practical–moral negotiations gradually change the “grammar” of social practice in everyday life (Melucci 1989: 6, cf Weeks 1995: 104) and exploring their permutations forms a key part of this book. However, these moves from below never go unchallenged. We must also note that there are attempts by the urban–modern elite as well as rural–traditional elite to deny and/or suppress such new subaltern agency. These cultural politics of ethics, involving plural practical–moral agencies at work in the processes of hegemony and resistance in Indian society, will not be neglected here.

In the historical context of over three hundred years, this book seeks to understand the importance of the move towards post-postcolonial transformation. In doing so it explores the complex interrelationships between state and society, individual and community, and the rational and the religious in Indian society,
A depiction of their historical transformation from dilemmatic complementarity to colonial bifurcation and to the present attempt to reconcile and mediate between them.

**The area of study**

**Geographical location**

This book deals with the area called Khurda and particularly the local community centred on the village of Garh Manitri in the Indian state of Orissa (Map 1.1 and Figure 1.1). This area lies between the narrow plains stretching along the eastern coast of India between the Bay of Bengal and the hilly areas to the west. The village of Garh Manitri is located about 20 km west of Khurda town. To and from Khurda there are frequent van services as well as two bus services daily. There is also a daily bus service to Puri (about 112 km), via the state capital, Bhubaneswar (about 52 km). Many bus routes connect Khurda town to different villages and towns in Orissa. The present Khurda district and Puri district roughly cover the territory of Khurda kingdom in the mid-eighteenth century.

**Present day Garh Manitri and bārapalli**

Garh Manitri is a large multi-caste village numerically dominated by the khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia) caste, reflecting its history as a fort-village. The

![Map 1.1 Garh Manitri, Begunia block and Puri and Khurda districts in Orissa.](image)
details of its structure in the precolonial period and its colonial transformation will be the subject of the next two chapters.

There are twelve smaller villages called bārapalli (twelve villages) around Garh Manitri, which were under the jurisdiction of the fort of Manitri during the king’s time. Forts in Khurda kingdom formed the nucleus of the local community between the state and the villages. This is referred to here as the ‘fort area’. In the fort area of Manitri, besides the main fort-village, there were nine adjacent inhabited villages, namely, Chhiam, Atharanga, Barabati, Patna, Narayanipada, Nuagaon, Boriko, Simapalli, Mugamanda, as well as three uninhabited villages, Abhilo, Pathua and Akhupadara, which constituted the micro-regional unit. In total, there were twelve surrounding villages and one central fort-village, which made up the ‘micro-regional unit’ of the fort area (Maps 1.2 and 1.3). The military and administrative functions of the state were concentrated in the fort-village. The nine inhabited villages of bārapalli were typically populated mainly by peasants, cowherds, oil-pressers and weavers, besides Saora tribals. This population pattern has remained basically the same to this day (Tables 1.1 and 3.3).

The fort area of Manitri today, of course, does not have any administrative significance anymore, but bārapalli continues as a parlance of collective nomenclature. Noticeably, it still functions as a ritual community and unit during the festival of Rāmacaṇḍī, the tutelary goddess of the fort area of Manitri (Figures 1.2 and 1.3, see also Chapter 8). In the festival, the ex–tax collectors (sarabarākāra)
Introduction

of bārapalli act as the patrons, and various ritual duties are assigned to the families residing in the region (see also Chapter 8). The villagers of Garh Manitri today, however, consider the eight inhabited villages of Nuagaon, Simapalli, Narayanipada, Barabati (including Biswanathpur), Boriko, Atharanga, Chhiam, Mugamanda and the four revenue villages (mouza)—Manitri, Baliberani, Kapileswarpur and Ramachandrapur—that compose Garh Maniriti as constituting the twelve villages (bārapalli). For some reason, Patna, which is a traditional market place, came to be excluded from bārapalli as well as from participation in

Map 1.2 Garh Maniriti bārapalli.

Source: A re-scaled and re-coloured map published by the Land Surveying Department, General Staff Office, Japanese Army in 1942, based on the Survey of India map published in 1930 (available at the Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University).
the Rāmacaṇḍī festival. The four revenue villages that were deliberately created within Garh Manitri by the colonial government to break up the fort-village were subsequently understood by the villagers to constitute the units of bārapalli.

Forrester, the first Deputy Collector of Khurda, had already written in 1819 that he was
decidedly of opinion that the ryots are likely to be better off in villages managed by the pudhans (pradhāna: village head) and bhooees (bhoi: village accountant) than in gurhs (forts) managed by dulbehras (dalabeherā: chief), kotkurns (kotha karana: state scribe), &c.
### Table 1.1 Number of households in Garh Manitri and bārapalli, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Garh Manitri</th>
<th>Chhiam</th>
<th>Simapalli</th>
<th>Narayanipada</th>
<th>Barabati</th>
<th>Nuagaon</th>
<th>Mugamanda</th>
<th>Boriko</th>
<th>Atharanga</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khāṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śūdra (peasant)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanti (weaver)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (ST)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṛiā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer, SC)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobā (washerman)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barhe (carpenter)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhanḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karana (scribe)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer, SC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caṣā (peasant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māli (gardener)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohānti (peasant)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejuā (bed-maker)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣatriya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (ST)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotiṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahānāyaka (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajput (warrior)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatiā (watchman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>473</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.
He suggested “breaking up a gurh and forming a distinct settlement for each mouzah”. This example regarding the change in the conception of bārapalli illustrates how what is considered traditional is not a direct remnant of the past, but a hybrid product of the old and the new. The four administrative villages within Garh Manitri were created only in the colonial period, but people talk about bārapalli, including these four villages, as the ancient unit set up by the chief and the king.

For today’s administrative purposes, villages are formed into gram panchayats. The next levels are community development blocks and, above them, districts. Orissa adopted a three-tier system of pañcāyati rāj (local self-governance)

Figure 1.2 Original rock form of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī.
from 1992, consisting of the gram panchayat, panchayat samiti (pañcāyat samiti, block-level council) and zilla parishad (jillā pariṣad, district-level assembly). The villages belonging to the traditional fort area of Manitri are now divided into different gram panchayats coming under different blocks. The four revenue villages of Garh Manitri, namely, Manitri, Kapileswarpur, Ramachandrapur, Baliberani, plus Chhiam, are in Garh Manitri Gram Panchayat in Begunia block. Atharanga and Akhupadara belong to Botalama Gram Panchayat in Begunia block. Narayanipada, Mugamanda, Barabati and Simapalli are in Gopalpur Gram Panchayat, and Boriko, Nuagaon and Abhilo in Kadaba Gram Panchayat, both in Bologarh block (Map 1.3).

**Geography and population of Garh Mantri**

During my initial fieldwork in 1992, Garh Mantri had a population of 3,555, consisting of 477 households (Table 1.2). Of this, just under half were khaṇḍāyata, the most politically and economically influential caste in the village and in coastal Orissa as a whole (Figure 1.4).

Revenue villages in Garh Mantri are primarily administrative demarcations. Most villagers do not know where the borders of these revenue villages are. More practically and visibly, Garh Mantri is divided into Upara Garh (upper...

*Figure 1.3* The ‘face’ of Goddess Rāmaçāndī with newly inaugurated statues of Durgā and Bhairavī.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Residential location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>Upara Garh, Pāika Sāhi, Nua Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guriā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa Sāhi, Nua Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāri (sweeper-drummer, SC)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Hāri Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (ST)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>Saora Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>Taḷa Sāhi in Taḷa Garh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (priest)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṇa (cowherd)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>Gaura Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barheī (carpenter)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Barheī Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer, SC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Bāuri Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Jaysingh Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobā (washerman, SC)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Dhobā Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Taḷa Sāhi in Taḷa Garh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Barheī Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māli (gardener)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Taḷa Sāhi in Taḷa Garh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohānti (peasant)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karana (scribe)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Jaysingh Sāhi, Brāhmaṇa Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Baliberani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (ST)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>At a fringe of Brāhmaṇa Sāhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotiṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Taḷa Sāhi in Taḷa Garh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>473</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,555</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.

*Figure 1.4* The khaṇḍāyata people in Garh Manitri.
fort) and Taḷa Garh (lower fort). In the precolonial period, the former was the actual fortress. Now, mainly khaṇḍāyats reside there with some scribes and barbers (karaṇa and bhaṇḍāri respectively). Other castes, such as brāhmaṇas, carpenters (baṛhei) and oil-pressers (teli), live in the lower fort (Figure 1.5 and Map 1.4).

The three hamlets of the upper fort are Taḷa Sāhi (lower hamlet), Jaysingh Sāhi (Jaysingh hamlet) and Upara Sāhi (upper hamlet). The chief and his lineage members live in the upper hamlet of the upper fort. There are five hamlets in the lower fort, namely, Taḷa Sāhi, Baṛhei Sāhi (carpenter hamlet), Pāika Sāhi (pāika hamlet),24 Brāhmaṇa Sāhi (brāhmaṇa hamlet) and Nua Sāhi (new hamlet), which is a relatively new extension of the village. These are called “eight hamlets” (āṭh sāhi) and thought to make up the village proper. The hamlets of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) people, such as the Hāṛi Sāhi (sweeper-drummer hamlet), Bāuri Sāhi (labourer hamlet) and Saora Sāhi (Saora hamlet),25 are at the fringes of these two fort areas and are not included in the eight hamlets of the village proper. Needless to say, this is related to their peripheral status in local society.

Figure 1.5 Khaṇḍāyata locality: Taḷa Sāhi, Upara Garh in Garh Manitri.
Map 1.4 Residential areas in Garh Manitri.

Source: By author based on survey and settlement maps and fieldwork.
Notes

1 Intensive fieldwork was conducted mainly from April 1991 to January 1993 when I stayed in Garh Manitri. Additional visits were made between December 1995 and December 1997, between December 1999 and September 2000, and between March 2005 and March 2006 when I stayed in Puri. I have also paid shorter visits to Orissa every year from 2007 to 2019.

2 Zindabad (Oriya, Ḥindābād) is a slogan often used in political demonstrations.

3 In the field of election analysis, the increasing participation of the subalterns or the common people in the 1990s has been termed the “second democratic upsurge” by Yogendra Yadav (2000).

4 Amartya Sen expands and modifies the idea of rights in the context of its effective practice in situ. His framework has the potential for developing a context-sensitive and socially embedded notion of individual liberalism. His terms ‘entitlement’ and ‘capability’ can be understood as important modifications of the Rawlsian concept of ‘right’ (Sen 1981, 1993, Rawls 1999 [1971]). Nevertheless, Sen’s commitment to ‘rational’ individual liberalism remains firm and is unyieldingly critical of communitarian thinking (Sen 1998a, b 1999a, b).

5 Echoing “the great divide”, Nandy describes the situation as follows: “This is a country where the intellectual culture and traditions of political analysis can be divided into two parts. One comprises those who think that the state is a major instrument of social and political change and must be given primacy in social life; the other comprises those who think that, for civil society to thrive, the state must be contained and redefined” (Nandy 2006: 283).

6 The literature on this debate is numerous. See, for example, Rosenblum (1989), Avineri and de-Shalit (1992) and Bell (1993).

7 For similar dilemmas in a postcolonial society in Africa, see Comaroff and Comaroff (1997: 127).

8 For a discussion of “commonplace contradictions” and “axiomatic contradictions” and their implication for anthropological studies, see Gregory (1997). This is also related to the “logic of place” in Nishida’s philosophy (Nishida 2004). See Yamauchi (1974) for a comparative philosophical study of Greek and Indian logic.

9 The essence of ‘society’ was a set of shared rules and values for structural-functionalist and structuralist scholars such as Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Srinivas (1952) and Dumont (1970). The essence of ‘culture’ was the system of meaning and symbols for cultural anthropologists such as Geertz (1973) and Turner (1967). See Overing and Passes (2000), Overing (2003) and Demmer (2016) for criticisms of anthropological views on ‘society’ and prescriptive ‘rules’. Also see Asad (1983) for criticism of Geertz’s ‘cultural system’. As Shotter rightly points out, “Under the influence of modern individualism, which was meant to free us from restrictive traditions, we have tended to equate all traditions with hierarchically structured, closed systems of knowledge, which are supposed to provide members with ready-made solutions to problems, not with materials for arguments” (1993: 171, emphasis in original).

10 The previous avatar of this discussion was between structural-functional analyses, which emphasised ‘positions’ and ‘roles’ (status in the social structure) (e.g. Srinivas 1952 and Mayer 1960), and Marxist analyses, which argued that caste was basically class (power relationships) disguised as culture and religion (e.g. Mencher 1974).

11 Social practice here is based on what Bourdieu calls habitus: “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations” (Bourdieu 1990: 53). Actors can be reflectively conscious of what they are doing without a conscious aiming at ends. I believe that this reflective consciousness is an important factor in the transposability of patterns of behaviour.
12 Deleuze says, “an ‘other’ repetition” is the spirit of “every repetition”, and thus “every repetition” consists of “difference without a concept, non-mediated difference” (Deleuze 1994: 25).

13 In the words of de Certeau: “Analysis shows that a relation (always social) determines its terms, and not the reverse, and that each individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational determinations interact” (de Certeau 1988: xi).

14 This resonates with Ajay Skaria’s reading of Gandhi’s religion of resistance as a politics based on the absolute equality of all beings (Skaria 2016).

15 Compared to the importance of the contestation and dilemma between hegemonic and subalternate values, the contradiction between brahmanical hierarchy and kingly centrality, though important in discussion between Dumontians and neo-Hocartians, actually seems to me to be epiphenomenal in understanding the potential of the ethical basis in Indian society. Karashima also says, “These thirty or forty years scholars have been discussing the issues of caste hierarchy, concentrating their arguments on the question of which of the two, Brahmans or the king (Kshatriya), occupied the pinnacle of the hierarchy, of which of the two, religion or politics, played a crucial role in maintaining social order in traditional India, by quoting A. M. Hocart and/or Louis Dumont. It seems to be more important, however, to realize the interdependence of the two, Brahmans and the king, or the religious and the political, if we consider empirically the function of the so-called caste hierarchy. In the long course of Indian history, the opposition between the allies of Brahmans and the king (Kshatriyas or dominant castes), as ruler on the one hand, and the other groups (classified theoretically as Vaishya or Sudra), as the ruled on the other, has had much significance in society” (Karashima 2009: 110–11, emphasis in original). Karashima further points out that there was “aspiration towards equality among the ruled, though this was never realized” (personal communication).

16 De Certeau says, “Generally speaking, the cultural operation might be represented as a trajectory relating to the places that determine its conditions of possibility” (de Certeau 1997: 145).

17 I extend the use of the word ‘commonplace’ from the rhetorical world to the world of social practice.

18 On plurality of culture and their historical unfolding, see Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 27). They say: “Culture always contains within it polyvalent, potentially contestable messages, images and actions. It is, in short, a historically situated, historically unfolding ensemble of signifiers-in-action, signifiers at once material and symbolic, social and aesthetic”.

19 A useful distinction between (living) tradition and traditionalism is: “whereas tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living. A living tradition … is always in a continuous process of reinterpretation and reappropriation” (Bellah et al. 1985: 140–1). We should remind ourselves, however, that modern and foreign ideas and knowledge can also provide material for arguments and reinterpretations in addition to the traditional and indigenous.

20 North’s definition that “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” perhaps attributes too much power of prescription to institutions (North 1990: 3, emphasis added).

21 Shotter contrasts “practical-moral” knowledge against “practical-technical” knowledge (knowing ‘how’) and “theoretical-conceptual knowledge” (decontextualised knowing) and calls it “knowing of the third kind” (Shotter 1993: xiii, 142).

22 The title of Sen’s book, Reason before Identity (Sen 1999b), indicates that this dilemma is still one of the central concerns of the Indian intelligentsia.

Khaṇḍāyata is the name of a caste, while pāika means foot soldiers who were recruited mostly from the khaṇḍāyata but also from other peasant castes, cowherd caste and Muslims. However, the two are often conflated and the term ‘pāika’ is used as the caste name for those who worked as foot soldiers, excluding Muslims and cowherds. Pāika used strictly as a functional term includes all foot soldiers.

It should be noted that the Khondha (ST), who are priests for Rāmacaṇḍī, live inside the village near the goddess’s village temple, and not on the fringes like the other Scheduled Tribe, Saora. Their houses, though, are fairly isolated from those of other castes.
2 Managing diversities

Frontiers, forest communities and little kingdoms

This chapter investigates the history of state and social formation in the dry hilly tracts of Khurda in Orissa in the early modern period. This was a forested region inhabited by semi-independent local ‘tribals’ before the advent of the Khurda kings. With the formation of the Khurda kingdom (c. 1570–1804), forts guarded by military chiefs and peasant-militias were constructed in forest clearings. Agrarian villages grew around these forts and in the surrounding savanna, which was strategically opened up to provide views for spotting intruders and to keep an eye on grazing cattle. Ponds were dug in the village and streams were carefully directed across the forest and the villages. Fields were made and maintained for various kinds of crops, such as wet rice in lowland, cotton and millets in semi-dry land and fruits in semi-forest orchards. Abundant forests protected these forts and villages and also provided opportunities for hunting, gathering and swidden agriculture. These diverse environments were carefully created and managed according to politico-economic and military requirements.

With increasing interaction between the coast and the interior, forest-dwellers came to be on the move, searching for better positions in the little kingdoms that often emerged in forest and hilly areas. People from the plains, including brāhmaṇas, artisans and service castes, also came to settle in these newly opened villages in the little kingdoms. Such state-formation processes involved the Hinduisation of the many forest-dwellers, who turned themselves into warriors, peasants and herdsmen. The tribalisation of the kingdom’s social formation accompanied this. The encounters of the different communities at the frontier and the subsequent dynamics led to the diversification of lifeways of the people who adopted various occupations and utilised various aspects of the natural resources available. The question is how to understand this social and ecological transformation in the larger context of early modern dynamics.

Perspectives on early modern India


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dynamism of the period are increasingly emphasised. However, in their stress on indigenous agency that was equated with the development of regional capitalism, these revisionists have tended to neglect the role of the British in the development of colonialism. For instance, Washbrook says, “Colonialism was the logical outcome of South Asia’s own history of capitalist development” (Washbrook 1988: 76). This omission has been criticised by postcolonial historians for trivialising the power of colonialism (Chatterjee 1993: esp chapter 2, Gyan Prakash 1990b).

Hitherto, among revisionists and postcolonialists the ‘eighteenth-century question’ revolved mainly around whether there was continuity or change with the advent of colonialism. The primary focus was on market development and state formation. Those who stress continuity tend to see the ‘new’ political economy of the market and the state arising from indigenous social developments. Those who emphasise change characterise the emerging political economy as exogenous and alien to the traditional norms of society. Recently, it has been noted that there is a general dissatisfaction over the “oppositions implicit in the continuity/transformation dichotomy” (Barrow and Haynes 2004).

A more nuanced understanding of early modern Indian society, involving neither assumption is required. Early modern Indian history should be grasped on its own terms while recognising its global character. This understanding needs to consider not only market forces and administrative technology as exterior modernising forces, but also the social and politico-cultural ways in which early modern life was managed and transformed from within. While the early modern transformation was definitely a global phenomenon, its regional development contained particular forms that were distinctively Indian. The important thing is to understand its logic. In my interpretation, what characterises early Indian modernity is the intensification of the encounters of differences and increasingly intricate management of diversities. This chapter looks at the encounters and interactions between the forest and the plain in order to shed light on such aspects of early modern dynamics in Indian and Orissan history.

Early modern in this book refers to the period from the mid-sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. We call this period early modern since we can identify the formative development of recognisably modern features, such as deepening and expansion of marketisation, penetration of state power into localities, greater connectivity in socio-cultural life and increasing utilisation of natural resources (Richards 1997, 2003, Kulke and Rothermund 1998, Stein 1998, Kotani 2007, Roy 2013). In other words, early modern means the early stages of the end of the interactive, communicative and spatial cleavages between the state and local society, the coast and the interior and human society and the natural world, as all spheres of life began to be increasingly connected. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, the social system of everyday livelihood was increasingly permeated by state surveillance and governmentality, and coastal capitalism extended into the interior agrarian and forest world. A more integrated India was being formed in response to the new institutional and technological context.

Instead of seeing this integrative process as the penetration of modernising forces from outside, opening the frontier and transforming the interior from the coastal urban, this chapter pays attention to history from the inside out. It considers how the
frontier was opened from within and how transformation took place from the interior of the forest. More specifically, instead of viewing early modern Indian history as a process of clearing forests and expanding agriculture in response to increasing trade demand, which is a view of history seen from the coastal capital, this chapter attempts to see how the forest-dwellers, some of whom were to be labelled ‘tribals’ in colonial discourse, responded to the new situation and took the opportunity to utilise their environmental knowledge and martial capabilities to turn themselves into warriors, peasants and herdsmen, thus forming an important part of state formation from below in little kingdoms. In fact, many of the little kings and their warriors have origins in the forest. This is related to the fact that in India’s history and politics as well as in literary and popular imaginations, royal power, authority and identity have arisen in, and out of, the forest (jaṅgala) wilderness and wildness (Schnepel 2002: 136–7). The values and connotations associated with the forest and forest-dwellers (jaṅgali) were crucial to the construction of kingship and power in India (Skaria 1999: ix).

After the fall of the medieval Orissan empire in 1568, Orissa saw the formation of a number of little kingdoms based in forests with patches of agricultural zones. This was never a simple process of the ‘growth’ of regional politico-economy and ‘expansion’ of agriculture. There was constant tension in finding the balance between “clearing the jungle and letting it flourish, as well as between Hinduizing and tribalizing the social environment” (Schnepel 2002: 136). Guha also notes that “the struggle between jaṅgli and shetkari (literally field-maker i.e., farmer) was a continuous one” (Guha 1999b: 48). Here, a social and ecological space emerged between forest ‘wilderness’ and agrarian ‘civilisation’, for diverse forms of resource utilisation and therefore diverse lifeways. It was a space where people sought alternatives betwixt and between.

It is important to remember that there were “many and diverse paths along which the peoples of the eighteenth century had earned their livings” in India (Washbrook 1988: 80). Gadgil and Guha also point out the “diversification of the use of biological resources by endogamous groups” (Gadgil and Guha 1992: 207). The very process of opening the forests accompanied social and ecological diversification and the transformative dynamics that arose from the encounters of diverse ethnic groups and their strategic ways of utilising resources (Guha 1999b, Skaria 1999, Schnepel 2002).

The management of diverse groups living together led to the stratified division of work and exchange of products and services, which I will describe in detail in the next chapter. This was not mere imposition of ritual hierarchy or centrality of power (Guha 2013), but collective and careful management of the natural and social environment based on an affirmation of diversity and diversification.

**Establishment of the Khurda kingdom and Garh Manitri**

**History and geography of the Khurda kingdom**

The Khurda kingdom was established after the collapse of the medieval Orissan empire, following the Afghan invasion of 1568. This collapse marked the beginning
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of a major transformation not only in state politics but in the social system and individual identity. It led to the rising importance of “little kingdoms” (Cohn 1987b, Dirks 1987, Stein 1980, Peabody 1991a,b, 2003, Berkemer 1993, Schnepel 1995a, 2002, Berkemer and Frenz 2003), especially in the hilly tracts of Garhjat (fort-abundant) Orissa. Although the Khurda kingdom can be regarded as a little kingdom characterised by “fickle and changeable relations” (Schnepel 1995a: 145), it was not defined by this alone. The Khurda king was special even if not politically predominant, since in spite of his comparatively small territory, he was regarded as the Gajapati (lord of elephants) or the paramount ruler of Orissa. Therefore, the character of the Khurda king was divided between his symbolic greatness as Gajapati Mahārājā and politico-military susceptibility as a little king. In this sense, the Khurda kingdom can be said to have been a ‘great little kingdom’.

Ramachandra Deva, first king of the Khurda Bhoi dynasty, established a small kingdom with Khurda as its fort capital. He was able to present himself as the successor in the tradition of the great Orissan empire by reinstating the idol of Lord Jagannātha in the Puri temple. His position was further strengthened when, in 1592, the Mughal emperor Akbar acknowledged him as Gajapati or the paramount ruler of Orissa. Ramachandra was also given the rank of ‘commander of 3,500’, granting him authority over the Khurda kingdom and placing thirty-one small kingdoms in the surrounding area under his command (Map 2.1).

Map 2.1  Khurda kingdom and feudatory states.

Source: By author based on Eschmann, Kulke & Tripathi (1978: Map 6).
The Khurda kingdom was obliged to pay tribute (peshkash) to the Mughal empire and subsequently, from 1751, to the Marathas. Similarly, the thirty-one feudatory kingdoms around the Khurda kingdom paid tribute to the Khurda king and sent offerings (nazar, nazarana) on festive occasions. Several other little kingdoms in Orissa, which were under the political authority of other powers, also acknowledged the Khurda king’s ritual authority as Gajapati and maintained exchange relations with the king concerning the Jagannātha cult (Map 2.1).12

The Khurda kingdom can be geographically divided into two parts—the forest and the delta. The former, consisting of semi-arid forest-savanna in the north-west with numerous forts, including Khurda, served the military function of the kingdom, while the latter, consisting of fertile alluvial coastal plains in the south-east, i.e. Lembai, Serai, Chausbikud and Rahang, including Puri, the abode of the state deity Jagannātha, served the ritual function. The political and military centre of the fort-palace in Khurda in the forest and the religious and ritual centre of the palace and the temple in Puri in the delta constituted two interrelated pivots in the Khurda kingdom, forming the backbone of its power and authority (Maps 2.2 and 2.3).

The narrow alluvial plains on the coast are verdant and water-rich, with coconut palms, rice fields, small rivers and streams and fertile black soil. Religio-politically, the most important town in the plains was Puri, the seat of Jagannātha. The Khurda king established a close connection with Jagannātha, the ‘real ruler’ of Orissa, claiming his role as the ‘first servant’ (ādya sebaka) (Figure 2.1). Successive Khurda kings systematically reorganised the politico-ritual organisation centred on the Jagannātha cult. New brāhmaṇa śāsana villages were created around Puri and near the road that connected Khurda and Puri to maintain scholar-priests. The representatives of the sāsana brāhmaṇas (scholar-priests) constituted

Map 2.2 Khurda kingdom, 1750.
Source: By author based on maps in Maddox Report, survey and settlement reports and fieldwork.
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the Mukti Maṇḍapa Paṇḍit Sabhā (liberation pavilion scholars/priestly council), the supreme council of scholar-priests, in the Jagannātha temple, and the highest authority in religio-ritual matters (Pfeffer 1978). The present building for this sabhā was constructed in 1578 (Mahapatra 1977: 167), very early in the reign of Ramachandra Deva I.

In the alluvial plains, apart from the kot (kotha, state) land belonging to the king and set aside “for furnishing the immediate wants and expenses of the sovereign in payment of his principal servants and ministers” (Ewer Report: 85–6, para 228), there were jagirs held by the king’s ministers and principal officers, such as the counsellor (rājaguru), the minister of the state (diwān) and the general (baksi), besides the brāhmaṇa śāsana villages. At the village level, village heads (pradhāna) were appointed for the superintendence of cultivation and collection of rents and village accountants (bhoi) for keeping revenue accounts (Wilkinson Report: 129, para 14).

Crossing the Daya river from south to north, from Puri to Khurda, there is a sudden change in the landscape even today. The greenery and water decrease and the landscape becomes dry and arid, with red soil, rocks and scrub. Patches of rice field are only found in the vicinity of villages. In the king’s time, more than 70% of this region was forest and savanna (Table 2.1).
The forest type here was mainly “northern tropical dry deciduous forests”, with light canopies and undergrowth of a few shrubs (Puri 1960: 192). Much of the land was infertile laterite, leaving the remaining, comparatively fertile land for rain-fed rice cultivation (average annual precipitation 1,500 mm). Apart from this, there was swidden agriculture, hunting and gathering in the forests and cattle grazing in the savanna (Figure 2.2).

The most important state apparatus in this semi-arid forest area were the forts (gaṛa). These served as the military and administrative centres of the kingdom. In Orissa, a polity had to have at least eighteen forts to be called a kingdom (Acharya 1969: 264). A larger kingdom needed multiples of eighteen forts. Thus we find little kingdoms with names such as Āṭharagaṛa (eighteen forts) and Chatiśgaṛa (thirty-six forts). The Khurda kingdom is said to have had one hundred and eight, with

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**Table 2.1** Types of land in Khurda region, 1836

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area acre</th>
<th>Area outside jurisdiction</th>
<th>Total area under jurisdiction</th>
<th>Cultivated land</th>
<th>Uncultivated arable</th>
<th>Forest, hills and fields</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>631,283.58</td>
<td>25,306.92</td>
<td>605,976.66</td>
<td>161,906.36</td>
<td>28,941.44</td>
<td>415,128.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(100.00%)</td>
<td>(26.72%)</td>
<td>(68.51%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

seventy-two main forts—note that they are both multiples of eighteen. These forts were concentrated in the forested hilly tracts and not in the alluvial plain (Map 2.4).

Fort Manitri (Garh Manitri) was one of the seventy-two main forts. The fort area consisted of a fort or the central village called ‘fort itself’ (*niji gaṛa*) and several surrounding villages. Hereafter, Garh Manitri refers to the fort-village, and Manitri refers to the fort area as a whole, unless otherwise specified. The number of surrounding villages was typically twelve, and in many places these subordinate villages were referred to as the twelve villages (*bārapalli*). However, there were variations in the size of this micro-regional unit, and the number of surrounding villages could vary from a few to some tens. The fort area was known simply as the fort (*gaṛa, kilā*) or county (*bisi*) in early modern Khurda, and there were many similar inter-village organisations throughout Orissa (Mahapatra 1987: 1–50). These fort areas can be seen as “the enduring and basic units” of social reproduction and the constitutive parts of polities (chieftaincies and kingdoms). They served as such in the hilly tracts of early modern Orissa and possibly in the hilly tracts in east and central India too. Key to this study, they formed the basic unit for the system of entitlements in the eighteenth century (see Chapter 3).

**Tribe and caste in state formation**

To understand the nature of this fort area it is important to look at the historical relationships between the kingdom and the local community in the process of state formation. In discussing this, it is necessary to consider not the State (with
Map 2.4 Forts in Khurda kingdom.

Source: By author based on maps in the Maddox Report, information from Digambar Srichandan (1989), interview with Mr. Niladribihari Srichandan, son of Digambar, and fieldwork.
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a capital $S$) in terms of “regimes, kingship, administration and government”, but
the state (with a small s) as “the various systematic aspects which together and
interdependently fostered the growth and development of complex social orders”
(Perlin 1985: 451). This definition is particularly crucial in looking at the relations-
ships between state and society in India.

LK Mahapatra explains the formation of forts in the hilly tracts of Orissa thus:

Another impact (of early Empires) on this forested habitat of several impor-
tant tribes in the Orissa region may be established with high probability. The Sahara or Sabara, Gond, Binjhal, Kondh and Bhuiyan, who were liv-
ing in Kosala in more or less homogeneous communities, and in most cases
developed indigenous inter-village or larger formations with a headman or
chieftain. These chieftains had got forts constructed with mud or stone walls,
surrounded by a moat and a thorny bamboo jungle beyond the moat to dis-
courage intrusion or attack from outside.

(Mahapatra 1987: 11–2)

Segmentary tribal society, without centralised state authority, probably trans-
formed gradually into a complex society enveloping relations of hierarchy and
power through interaction with ancient empires and lesser kingdoms (Pfeffer and
Behera 2002, Skoda 2005). Alongside influence from outside, this process also
corresponded to “a territorial segmentation and a political development ‘from
below’”, as Kulke points out (Kulke 1978a: 126). Numerous chieftaincies devel-
oped along the coast as well as in the hilly hinterland from the early centuries AD.
These polities were made up of one to several fort areas. From the ancient period
to the Middle Ages, some of them were incorporated into bigger states, but many
in the forest area remained semi-independent.

The early modern period saw important and rapid reorganisation of these
tribal chieftaincies that were incorporated into little kingdoms. There were pro-
cesses of “Kshatriyaization” (Kulke 1976) and “Rajputisation” (Sinha 1962) in
which rulers played a leading role and forest-dwellers turned themselves into
warriors, as well as “peasantisation” in which the local population chose to
become peasants and adopt caste-based division of labour (Bose 1975). This
process, no doubt, involved the transformation of tribal society into caste soci-
ety in many places but tension and balance between tribal and caste elements
were always retained.

Here, we must abandon ideas of linear social progress from tribal society to
caste society (Guha 2013: 56, also see Scott 2017: 231). Instead of seeing the
tribe as a primitive society in the pre-state stage, I suggest we define the term
‘tribal society’ purely by its principle of social formation, meaning a lineage-
based or clan-based socio-political organisation characterised by its segmentary
structure, diffused authority and collective leadership (Bailey 1961, Guha 2013:
58). A ‘tribe’ refers to a segment or the whole of ‘tribal society’. ‘Caste society’ in
contrast is characterised by organic relationships between different caste groups
which together form a hierarchical and interdependent socio-political organisation. A ‘caste’ is a social group within such a larger society, which tends to be endogamous among multiple lineages, ranked relative to others, connected with a particular occupation and seen to be distinct in its lifeways. Needless to say, these analytical concepts exist only as ideal types, and the historical reality cannot be reduced to or contained in these fixed categories.\(^{19}\) It is not only that the semi-independent tribal society coexisted along with stratified caste society under the state but there was also continuity and interdependence between these social formations.\(^{20}\) In fact, the Khurda kingdom, as we will see in the next chapter, exhibits both the segmentary and diffused characteristics of lineage society as well as the stratified and organic relationships of caste society. This dual aspect is also reflected in the fine balance between centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in its socio-political organisation.

**Existing polities and emerging fort areas**

At the time of the establishment of the Khurda kingdom, there were said to have been numerous śuddha khaṇḍāyatās (pure warriors) and saori khaṇḍāyatās (Saora warriors) who were semi-independent chiefs (Ewer Report: 109, para 35). They competed for territory with the autonomous chiefdoms of Atri, Kalupareh, Murdeswara, Banpur and Haladia. It should be noted that khaṇḍāyata here refers not to the caste name but to the autonomous chief. Śuddha means pure and the name suggests that the tribals were purified and became khaṇḍāyata. Also, saori is the adjectival form of Saora and these khaṇḍāyatās were clearly of Saora origin. The saori khaṇḍāyatās have an interesting origin story:

One day the Gajapati king came to the jungle to hunt. There he saw a sari to which bees were attracted because of its sweet fragrance. The king asked to see the owner of the sari, who was an extremely beautiful Saora girl. The king had a relationship with her and she had thirteen sons. The king granted thirteen territories for the sons to rule as khaṇḍāyatās (autonomous chiefs). Since they were born to a Saora mother, they came to be called saori khaṇḍāyatās (narrated to author at a saori khaṇḍāyata village).

Thus, the saori khaṇḍāyatās claim that they were in fact the sons of the Gajapati king, though they concede their Saora origin. They explain the discrepancy between their political strength and ritual inferiority via a legend regarding their ritual status as ‘water untouchable’:

Village people [i.e., caste Hindus] visited a saori khaṇḍāyata’s house for a meeting. Proud of being a king’s son this saori khaṇḍāyata did not offer even water to them. The king, hearing of this, became angry and prohibited saori khaṇḍāyatās from giving water to people. Since then they are water untouchable (narrated to author at a saori khaṇḍāyata village).
Here, their ritual inferiority is ascribed to an incident and not to their origin. Such legends reorient their position as legitimate kṣatriya rulers, with only incidental and peripheral factors determining their name and ritual position.

Indigenous sources say that the Khurda king gained his territory from the king of śuddha saori (pure Saora) who had originally ruled the region. Ramachandra Deva, the first Khurda king, is said to have sacrificed him and buried his head under a tree (Pattnaik 1959: 6, Kulke 1978c: 325). The sacrifice of an indigenous tribal when a tribal chieftaincy is incorporated into a kingdom is a common trope. These tribals often became the tutelary deity (iṣṭadebatā) of the fort or the local chieftaincy. One example from Manika Garh describes the sacrifice of Manika:

A brother of the Mahārājā of Orissa came to live in this place which was ruled by a Khondha chief. He tried to construct a fort here around the shrine of the indigenous goddess Bunya, but the wall of the fort would not hold up. In a dream the goddess told him that to construct a wall he had to sacrifice a human and bury the head. The king’s brother told the villagers about the dream. This caused distress to the Khondha chief. The daughter of the Khondha chief, seeing her father’s distress, offered herself as the sacrifice on condition that her name would be attached to the goddess. The girl whose name was Manika was sacrificed and the fort was built. Today the sacrificed girl is worshipped as Manikibunya, who is said to be a Khondha goddess (Khondha ṭhākurāṇī) and considered the iṣṭadebatī (tutelary goddess) of the fort. Manika Garh (Manika fort) is also named after the sacrificed Khondha girl (narrated to author in Manika Garh).

These myths of “martyr iṣṭadevatās” (Kulke 1993b: 100–1) where a tribal chief (or his representative—the Khondha chief’s daughter in this case) is sacrificed by the king (or his representative—the king’s brother in this case) and becomes the tutelary deity can be interpreted as symbolising a historical transition in the agency of the sacrificer for the goddess. The tutelary goddesses of localities had a special relationship with the indigenous tribal population, with the tribal chief serving as the main worshipper and sacrificer of the indigenous goddess. The sacrifice of a tribal chief by a king is a symbolic act that represents the king as the new sacrificer responsible for the welfare of the population and the tribal chief as the sacrificed.

Interestingly, the sacrificed tribal becomes symbolically one with the goddess. The early modern characteristic of royal integration, which can be seen in this myth, is the irreversible loss of micro-regional autonomy. The chief became dependent on the king’s politico-ritual authority as sacrificer, both for Jagannātha and for local fort goddesses. By becoming a sacrificer for the local goddesses, the king also occupied the central place in the local sacrificial organisation that made up the micro-regional socio-political structure. This loss of local autonomy corresponds to the early modern penetration of royal government power at the local level to survey and control local resources.
Up to the late sixteenth century, the saori khaṇḍāyata and śuddha khaṇḍāyata chiefs as well as other autonomous chieftaincies in Khurda, such as Atri, Kalupareh, Murdeswara, Banpur and Haladia, enjoyed considerable autonomy. The local chief was the central figure responsible for the overall welfare of the chieftaincy. He worshipped the chieftaincy’s tutelary deity, who often had tribal priests (Khondha or Saora in Khurda), though many later also acquired brāhmaṇa priests in the course of their Hinduisation or Kshatriyaisation (Sinha 1962, Eschmann 1978a, Kulke 1976). He also managed the territory’s internal affairs, including the allotment of offices and services. The distribution of resources within the chieftaincy rested with the chief, who also granted land to different office and service holders. People from areas under saori khaṇḍāyata chiefs, who were semi-independent until colonial times, still say that their service lands were given by the chief.

This is in contrast to other regions in the Khurda kingdom where people invariably claim that it was the king who gave them service lands. While there were tributary and military demands, the Gajapati emperor-king in the medieval period did not have any integral part in the internal organisation of the chieftaincy. There was, thus, a multi-layered state structure in which the autonomous local chieftaincies were encompassed by the imperial kingdom. One of the important characteristics of medieval states in India is that sovereignty was never monolithic but rather “layered and shared” (Fox 1971). Moreover, there were other important autonomous spheres and agents within and besides the state, such as temples, religious sects, caste communities, and market and banking networks.\(^{21}\)

The establishment of the Khurda kingdom in the early modern period gradually transformed this structure. It did not mean that pre-existing petty rulers in the area were entirely displaced. Rather, the ‘conquest’ of the region involved the state acknowledging the existing power structure of the locality and putting petty rulers under the king’s supra-authority. This kind of multi-layered power structure where “power and authority … [were] distributed among vertically or hierarchically ordered groups” (Cohn 1987b: 484) seems to be a common feature of the precolonial Indian polity; the product of a history of successive waves of immigration and conquest.\(^{22}\)

From the mid-sixteenth to eighteenth century, however, these chiefs were gradually replaced by royally appointed chiefs of fort areas—the bisois and/or daḷabeherās who were directly under the king’s command.\(^{23}\) The number of autonomous saori khaṇḍāyatas, which was numerous before the advent of the Khurda kingdom, were reduced to thirteen, and there were only four śuddha khaṇḍāyata in the Khurda kingdom at the time of the arrival of the British.\(^{24}\) Atri, Kalupareh and Murdeswara became forts under daḷabeherās in the Khurda kingdom. Banpur became a district in the Khurda kingdom, while Haladia remained autonomous until the British period.\(^{25}\) Thus, the Khurma kings utilised the existing socio-political structure of the forts to form the locally based military—administrative machineries of the state, gradually incorporating them into the organic state apparatus.\(^{26}\) This transformation in the relationship between the local community and the state
Managing diversities represents a major watershed in history: the establishment of the early modern territorial state.

The royally appointed chiefs of the forts were often recruited from position-seeking, itinerant warrior-pastoralists who wandered across forests, hills and the plain, frequently of forest-dwelling origin (Heesterman 2004, Kolff 1990, 2004, Richards 2004). To acquire the office of chief, these claimants had to prove their capability as military commanders through their deeds and receive a royal sanction.

There are many local legends of how ancestor chiefs acquired their territory through conquest. Their origin as itinerant aspirants—warrior-pastoralists—is one of the main motifs. Let us take a look at the oral history of how the chief acquired and established Garh Manitri:

Four brothers from Athagarh were searching for territories to rule in the Khurda kingdom. One day, they carried the king’s palanquin across the strong current of the Mahanadi river when the local cowherds were unable to do so. The king was pleased with their prowess and gave them the position of doorkeepers. (This account that they performed the cowherds’ job as palanquin carriers is considered degrading for the chief’s lineage and is told as a secret history in the village.) After that, when the kingdom was attacked, the four brothers are said to have saved the queen by hiding her in the forest. (Their familiarity with the forest and their forest origin is implied here. The chief is also sometimes derogatorily and secretly referred to as Nahaka by the villagers, implying that they are of Saora origin.) The queen insisted that they be placed in a better position in the royal army and they received positions as door guards of the four cardinal directions. Later, the four brothers were successful in conquering the fort of Kanjia by attacking it when the formidable eighteen brothers of the fort were bathing in the pond. (This story is often told in the context of implying the chief’s cunning and brutality.) Pleased, the king wished to appoint them dalabeherās. (The “official” oral history of Garh Manitri begins from here.) The three older brothers were given the forts of Atri, Bajipur and Kadaribari as dalabeherās, but there was no fort available for the youngest brother at that time. The king promised to arrange territory for the youngest brother, but he said that as a kṣatriya he would win his territory through battle. During his journey in search of territory, he came to the hill of Rāmacaṇḍī and offered her mātṛ pūjā (mother worship). The goddess told him that her abode, Garh Manitri, was at that time occupied by a Muslim chief under the king of Ranpur, a feudatory state southwest of Khurda, and that if he was willing to conquer the fort she would help him. The youngest of the kṣatriya brothers, having obtained permission and recognition from the Khurda king and with the blessings of Rāmacaṇḍī, fought and succeeded in appropriating the territory. Since then, it is said, Garh Manitri was annexed to Khurda kingdom and awarded to the youngest brother, the ancestor of the present chief.
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This legend illustrates how aspirant warriors of that time, often of forest origin, travelled to seek better opportunities, besides showing several interesting aspects of how they achieved better positions as kṣatriyas. Firstly, the four brothers who became chiefs are implied to have been of forest or tribal origin but found opportunities through various deeds, including those considered derogatory and cunning, to achieve their status as kṣatriyas. Secondly, the ancestors of the chiefs derived royal honour and acknowledgement from the Khurda king. He received the position of the chief as a ‘gift’ from the king in return for his meritorious deeds. Thirdly, establishing rulership in a locality required the blessings of the local tutelary deity who represents the indigenous power belonging to the wild forest.

Chronologically, the annexation of Garh Manitri to the Khurda kingdom seems to have taken place between 1592 and 1617. By 1617, Garh Manitri seems to have been well within the Khurda kingdom, as it is reported that when King Purushottama Deva of Khurda was attacked by Mukarram Khan, the new Mughal Subahdar of Orissa, he fled with his family to Garh Manitri “near the border of Ranpur and made it [the provisional] capital” (Mādalā Pāṇji quoted in Mahapatra 1969: 61, parenthesis added).

Garh Manitri and the Khurda kings maintained a close relationship as the fort was used as shelter during war. According to KN Mahapatra, in 1619–1620, fearing a Mughal attack on the temple in Puri, Purushottama Deva hid Jagannātha in Garh Manitri. Again in 1621 the king had to flee to Garh Manitri after being defeated by Ahmed Beg Khan, the Mughal Subahdar, and stayed there until his death the same year (Mahapatra 1969: 62, Pattanaik 1979: 32). The next king, Narasimha Deva, again secretly brought Puri Jagannātha’s brahma—the divine essence of the deity—to Garh Manitri, hid it there and built a Jagannātha temple to house it (Mahapatra 1969: 65). The king also constructed his palace (Tripati and Kulke 1987: 103) and the Jagannātha temple (temple for Tṛtiyā Deva) in the village. The remains of the palace (kacheri) and the Tṛtiyā Deva temple constitute important centres of authority till today.

**King and chiefs: sacrificer state and sacrificial community**

The chiefs of the forts under the Khurda king (bisois and/or daḷabeherās) usually belonged to the khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia) caste, though in at least one fort (Manika Garh) there was a Muslim chief. Khaṇḍāyatas were often the most numerous and powerful caste in the fort area and were concentrated in the fort-villages, though there were also Muslim warriors in many fort areas. Numerous kin (brothers and cousins) of the chief held military and administrative posts in the fort.

The new chiefs, who replaced the indigenous chiefs in Khurda, had been itinerant warrior-pastoralists, often of forest origin. After they were appointed to the post by the king, however, they no longer had independent authority. They were given the ‘king’s sword’ as the symbol of royal authority. They could command power in the localities only as partial representatives of the sovereign king of Khurda. The necessity of royal sanction for the chief’s authority was and still
is ritually represented in Daśaharā festivals in (ex-)forts when he leads a para-
military procession bearing the king’s sword. In the Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī festival
in Garh Manitri, for example, it is ritually demonstrated that the local goddess’s
power, which the chief cannot pacify on his own, is only controlled after ‘royal
sacrifice’ and the chief is conferred the king’s sword under the king’s authority on
Daśaharā day (see Chapter 8).

The extension of the king’s control and authority over the micro-regional pol-
ity-society in early modern Khurda, however, did not entail centralisation in the
modern sense. There were no bureaucrats and armies answerable to a central gov-
ernment and organised into a single structure of command. Neither did the state
employ the soldiers in these forts directly with enhanced state revenue. Although
the chiefs, scribes, accountants, foot soldiers and others who looked after the mili-
tary–administrative business of the state were stationed in the forts as royal gar-
risons, they were sustained mainly by the shares they received in the local system
of entitlements (see Chapter 3). Even the salaries from the state that some offi-
cials received were, in reality, shares of local products given in the king’s name.
Moreover, these state officials had a dual function: they were simultaneously both
servants of the king and hereditary office-holders, that is to say, servants of the
community in their localities. In other words, while the sanction came from the
king, the military–administrative–juridical functionaries were embedded within
the local system of entitlements. In this way, the process by which the Khurda
state took control over a micro-region paradoxically involved decentralisation and
sharing of sovereignty.

If the underlying principle of the local system of entitlements was thereby
largely maintained, there was a crucial transformation during the early modern
period in the way the system of entitlements was legitimated. As surveillance
and control by the state increasingly permeated local society, the king gradu-
ally acquired political and ritual authority over each local office and entitlement.
Through the survey and recording of each entitlement by state officials, details of
which we will see later, the king came to be seen as the source of the entitlements.
Indeed, numerous oral family histories testify how they were given the office and
duty by the king (see Chapter 6).

Medieval Indian states already had a developed administrative technology that
took note of the details of village level landholdings. This, however, was lim-
ited to the central areas of the states. The early modern period saw the further
extension and development of administrative technology beyond the planes into
the forest and hills; the state gathered information regarding entitlements at even
the household level and calculated and recorded them more precisely (cf Perlin
1985). State surveillance and the official records of each entitlement functioned
to affirm that all entitlements derived from the king, and that anyone who held
an entitlement did so by his grace and favour. Eventually he became the person/
institution to whom all work in the locality was ideologically dedicated.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that caste as a sacrificial organisation came
to be directly centred around kingship, as suggested by Hocart and neo-Hocar-
tians, or that the king had actual control over all local resources. The basis of the
system of entitlements remained intact in the localities. While the state did its best to enforce administrative and military control, it depended on local society to provide the military and economic resources necessary for its functioning. Thus, although the king came to be established as the sacrificer at the ideological level and local society was incomplete without his presence, the king could not function independently of the local sacrificial organisation. This reciprocal relationship between the state and local society may be aptly summed up in the phrase, ‘sacrificer state and sacrificial community’.

This structure reflects the way in which forest-based local communities opened up and connected themselves to the larger polity. The local population, often of forest origin and originally itinerant warrior-pastoralists, transformed themselves into warriors, peasants, pastoralists and sometimes chiefs and other office-holders. They also changed the natural environment of the forest-savannna into economic and military resources in diverse ways. For early modern local communities, it was a process to utilise and manage natural and human resources. For the kingdom, the permeation of royal authority into localities was the way to avail local economic and military resources without placing them under direct state management.

Notes
2 See O’Hanlon and Washbrook (1992) and Prakash (1992a) for rejoinders.
3 See also Kumkum Chatterjee (1996), Sushil Chaudhury (1995) and M Athar Ali (1986) for critiques of the revisionists.
4 For instance, Bayly and Washbrook focus on market and administrative developments at the expense of depicting the social in its own terms. At the other extreme, Chatterjee (1993), Nandy (1983) and Gadgil and Guha (1992) reify the concept of indigenous community without clearly articulating the position occupied by the market and the state in the early modern period.
6 The intimate relationship between royal power and the forest has been pointed out by numerous authors such as Heesterman (1985), Shulman (1985a, b), Sinha (1962), Kulke (1976), Dirks (1987), Wink (1986), Kolff (1990), Guha (1999b), Skaria (1999) and Schnepel (2002).
7 However, we should note that there are criticisms of the ‘neo-traditionalist’ tendency to romanticise the precolonial past (Sinha, Gururani and Greenberg 1997, Guha 1999a, b, Grove, Damodaran and Sangwan 1998). We must cognise the elements of coordination and cooperation as well as hierarchy and domination between endogamous groups (castes) in precolonial Indian society.
8 Scott points out, “The barbarian zone, as it were, is essentially the mirror image of the agro-ecology of the state. It is a zone of hunting, slash-and-burn cultivation, shellfish collection, foraging, pastoralism, roots and tubers, and few if any standing grain crops. It is a zone of physical mobility, mixed and shifting subsistence strategies: in a word, ‘illegible’ production. If the barbarian realm is one of diversity and complexity, the state realm is, agro-economically speaking, one of relative simplicity” (Scott 2017: 33). His schema succinctly summarises the characteristics of the two poles of the non-state barbarian (or tribe) zone and the peasant zone under the state. The state formation in
Khurda, however, shows that there was an ample space between these two poles where negotiation and balancing took place.

It would not be too far-fetched to remember how the space of encounter between the forest and the urban had been a fertile ground, in Nepal, Bihar, Orissa etc., for the Buddhist philosophy, which extends its compassion to all living creatures and affirms diversity based on the knowledge of ontological equality of every being. Buddhist influences are notable in Orissan culture and religion, where the god Jagannātha, who is said to be the real ruler of Orissa, is hailed as the great void (mahā śūnya).

According to the traditional account in Orissa, there were four main thrones in India: Narapati (lord of men) in the Deccan, Āśwapati (lord of horses) in the Maratha region, Chatrapati (lord of the umbrella) in Rajasthan and Gajapati (lord of elephants) in Orissa (Stirling 1904: 36).

According to a verse popular even today, “The jewel crown among a hundred thousand kings, he is the king of Khurda. Building his palace under Baruṇei, he protected his subjects happily”. In original Oriya it is: “Lakṣe rājāra mauḍamaṇi, se khordha rāija rājā. Baruṇāi taḷe tolāi naara, sukhe pāḷuthile prajā”.

See Kulke (1978a, 1993a) for details on ritual exchanges between the Khurda kingdom and other little kingdoms.

Forts seem to have been prominent across Orissa. Ewer says that “under former Governments, besides the countries occupied by the present Gurjat tributaries (little kingdoms in the hilly tracts), there were numerous smaller estates denominated gurhs or kullahs (forts) … situated chiefly on the sea coast between Coojung and Juggernaut (Puri).” However, the “numbers and strength would appear to have diminished greatly under the Marattas” (Ewer Report: 5, para 11; parenthesis added).

The nāḍu has been posited as the corresponding unit of the local community in South India. Studies on South Indian history have pointed out that the nāḍu was “significant in establishing ritual, social, and political identities” (Bhatt 1980: 55). See also Subbarayalu (1973: 21), Stein (1977) and Beck (1972). “Like the village, the nad is a unit which corresponds to the sentiments of the people … [it was] not merely an administrative division imposed by the Rajas” (Srinivas 1952: 39). It is also important, however, to pay attention to the variations in the supra-village unit and their historical changes in South India (Ota 2001: chapter 2).

Caution is required as Manitri became the name of a mouza (administrative village) during colonial times. I will specify when Manitri refers to the mouza.

According to LS O’Malley in Puri: A Gazetteer. Bengal District Gazetteers. 1979 (1908), bisi was an administrative unit of ancient Hindu kingdoms. Unfortunately, we do not know where he obtained this information from.

According to Stein, the most significant units of social structure and agrarian organisation under the Cholas in early medieval South India were not villages, but “peasant micro regions” or nāḍus which were “the enduring and basic units of south Indian peasant society” (Stein 1980: 13).

See Mahapatra (1987: 11–2) for the early formation of forts in the hilly tracts of Orissa. Numerous little kingdoms and chieflaincies made up of one to several fort areas developed along the coast and in the hilly hinterland in the early centuries AD.

The tribe–caste distinction and continuity have long been discussed and problematised. See Bailey (1961), Sinha (1965), Skoda (2005), Tanabe (2007b) and Hardenberg (2017: 54–63).

As Guha points out, “Tribes, tribes transformed to dominant castes, and monarchies have all coexisted through centuries in South and West Asia” (2013: 59).

Kaviraj describes it thus: “Political power is often distributed between several layers of legitimate authority stretching from the village or locality at the micro level, through regional kingdoms, to immense empires like the ones set up by the Mauryas or the Mughals” (2000b: 142). See also Bose and Jalal (1998: 243) for the idea of “a politi-
cal and state system based on layered and shared sovereignties” that goes beyond the monolithic rigidity of the nation-state system.

22 According to Irfan Habib: “There is, first, a settlement by members of a caste or clan, perhaps, peasants themselves. Then another clan appears, drives them out or establishes its dominion over them; and then still another. At some stage, if not from the beginning, the dominion of the victorious caste crystallises into zamindari right, held by various leading members of it over different portions of the subjugated territory” (1963: 160). The Khurda kingship appears to have been established through a similar process.

23 Bisoi means the head of a county (bisi) and dalabeherā the head (beherā) of a troop (dalā). Bisoi and dalabeherā were often the same person in forts in Khurda as in Manitri. Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, dalabeherā is used for indicating both bisoi and dalabeherā.


26 An important aspect of the state that cannot be taken up in detail here is warfare. Examples of repeated warfare between chieftaincies, little kingdoms, the Khurda kingdom and surrounding powers are described in Srichandan (1989).

27 Athagarh was a little kingdom in Orissa.

28 The legend probably reflects the historical fact that the three brothers were granted these newly conquered forts by the king. This tallies with the fact that the lineage of the Garh Manitri chief considered the lineages of these chiefs as belonging to the same lineage (baṃśa) and continued to have exchange relations with them, besides observing ritual obligations as lineage members till the 1960s.

29 The forts of Atri, Bajipur, Kadaribari and Garh Manitri were annexed to the Khurda kingdom after 1592 as they are not listed in the record of the arrangement of 1592 by Raja Mansingh (Stirling 1904: 45).

30 On Mādalā Pāñji, the Jagannātha temple chronicle, see Kulke (1993c).

31 In general, the soldiers employed directly by the state rose in importance in larger kingdoms in early modern India (Bayly 1983, Kolff 1990, Peabody 2003).

32 There were some state scribes and accountants who received salaries from the state and did not have shares from the local community. They were obviously less embedded in the local system of entitlements (see Chapter 3).

33 See, for example, Karashima (1984) on the administrative and revenue system of medieval South India.
3 Local society and kingship
Reconsidering ‘caste’, ‘community’ and ‘state’

Caste and entitlements

This chapter makes an empirical and theoretical intervention in the debates on caste, community and state in early modern India. It does so by investigating an aspect of the socio-political structure of a local community in the dry hilly tracts of eighteenth-century Orissa: what I call the ‘system of entitlements’ in Garh Manitri of the Khurda kingdom. Theoretically, it attempts to go beyond both the Dumontian understanding of caste as a structure of socio-religious hierarchy (Dumont 1970) and the neo-Hocartian, king-centred view of caste (Hocart 1970; Dirks 1987; Raheja 1988b) by looking at how the system of entitlements affirmed and managed the diversity of the natural and social environment.

To understand the early modern integration of everyday livelihood in forest clearings with the state and the market, this chapter pays attention to the particulars of ‘Indian social formation’.1 Specifically, it will introduce the idea of an intermediary socio-economic structure—the aforementioned system of entitlements—that supported both the lifeworld of the localities and the workings of the market and the state.2 In understanding these intermediaries, the focus has previously been on the function of the market and administrative practices (e.g. Bayly 1983, Perlin 1983, 1985, Wink 1986 and Kolff 1990). Here, the attempt is to expand the focus from the political and economic to the social and environmental aspect of the intermediaries. Attention is also paid to the ideological importance of kingship for legitimising the system of entitlements, to the state’s progressive incorporation of local forts into its military and administrative machineries and to the development of patriotism and devotionalism that connected people embedded in the local system with the divine king and the state-god in the eighteenth century. This microanalysis sheds light on the complex interrelationship between ‘caste’, ‘community’ and ‘state’ in early modern India.

Entitlements and early modern social formation

Eighteenth-century Orissa was home to a diverse population of peasants, artisans, religious specialists, warriors and administrators. How were they managed? What kind of social system controlled relationships between them? What, if anything,
did local rulers do to maintain social cohesion, so vital for productivity and efficient state management?

Older theories on Indian society held that the so-called jajmani system in the villages was the basis for local division of labour and exchanges. Against this, in the dry hilly tracts of Orissa, it was not the village but a cluster of villages typically surrounding each fortified centre—the fort area—that formed the primary unit for socio-political reproduction through the system of entitlements.

At first sight, my system of entitlements looks similar to the jajmani system identified by anthropologists in the early to mid-twentieth century. However, the two systems need to be differentiated. The jajmani system is based on dyadic patron–client relationships. In the system of entitlements, however, shares and privileges, and the duties required for the reproduction of the state and local society, were prescribed for each family. The system of entitlements is postulated here as a model for early modern Indian social formation and can be elucidated through a description of its actual organisation in relation to the new politico-economic integration that was taking place then in Orissa.

‘Caste’ and the system of entitlements

What is the significance of the system of entitlements for theoretical debates on caste? Recent recognition of the cosmological importance of kingship and dominance in the critique of the Dumontian understanding of caste has led a number of scholars to return to and adopt the Hocartian scheme for understanding Indian society. Here, the king and/or dominant caste is the pivot of Indian social organisation (Dirks 1987, Raheja 1988b, Inden 1990, Quigley 1993, 1994). The categorisation of caste as a “sacrificial organisation”, following Hocart (1950, 1970), seems to hold sway in the literature. However, neo-Hocartians differ over whether the central role as sacrificer is assumed by the dominant caste or the king (see Chapter 1) and also over the locus of the sacrificial organisation, namely, the village, local community or kingdom. Although they stress the centrality of the sacrificer, many scholars of this disposition are not sufficiently attentive to the actual system in which the sacrificial organisation was managed—that is, the system of entitlements.

To Hocart and neo-Hocartians, the power and sacrifice entailed in the organisation of caste are key. However, these should be examined with sensitivity to the different roles of the state/kingship and local societies and to the concrete system of entitlements in which division of labour and resource distribution were managed in early modern India. This chapter argues that the relationship between state and local society can usefully be captured in the phrase ‘sacrificer state and sacrificial community’. Although sacrifice was the paradigmatic idiom in the working of caste and kingship, the function of caste and kingship was not restricted to sacrificial ritual. The idiom of sacrifice permeated the workings of caste and kingship, even ostensibly worldly, non-ritual activities. Caste was a sacrificial organisation in the sense that the work of each part was done for the whole; in this way the system of entitlements can be described as a sacrificial organisation. This point is taken up
in relation to devotionalism (*bhakti*) and the Jagannātha cult in the last part of this chapter. Another point is that, while the sacrificial organisation was indeed centred on the king as the sacrificer (e.g. Dirks 1987), the relationship between the organisation and the sacrificer was much more complex than the neo-Hocartians allow.

The sacrificial structure of the social formation did not mean that it was an exclusively Hindu system. Not only are sacrificial organisations found in other parts of the world, sacrificial communities in India also involved a diverse population, including tribals and Muslims. Moreover, there was so much diversity in religio-social practices even among non-tribal and non-Muslim members that there is no point in talking of a Hindu system as such. The diverse population followed their own religious practices, and a sacrificial structure did not necessarily entail the sharing of beliefs or practices. It only meant that members were supposed to play their part in the service of the whole.

This sacrificial community was both secular, in the sense of allowing the coexistence of diverse religious groups, and religious, as it was related to the value of the whole and the devotional offering to the supreme. The means of approaching the supreme or the absolute, nevertheless, was diverse according to the different roles and positions of each member. Their aggregate sacrificial practice brought about the reproduction of the community and the state as a whole. The ideational basis of the system of entitlements in early modern India was supported by *varṇa* or the structure of the organic whole with functional divisions. The *varṇa* ideology contains the sacrificial principle at its basis as represented by the vedic mythology of Puruṣa (*Ṛg Veda* 10: 90, Inden 1978: 39, Heesterman 1985: 39, Tambiah 1976: 20–1).

At an organisational level, some community servants, such as carpenters, blacksmiths, potters and barbers were reproduced through the endogamous institution of *jāti*. On the other hand, foot soldiers, accountants and even chiefs were competitively recruited from the peasant and pastoralist population rather than only being ascribed by caste in the narrow sense (Kolff 1990, 2004). Because the border and political relationships of polities in early modern India often changed as a result of warfare, there were always new opportunities for military, administrative and other posts to be obtained in newly acquired forts. Candidates for military and administrative posts had to prove their ability through deeds, rather than by mere caste ascription. Yet, once a post was attained, its owners were entitled to look upon it as their hereditary and ascribed occupation or office.

Therefore, it was not the caste system in the sense of hierarchically ascribed status that was crucial for defining people’s identity in early modern India. Rather, caste, in the sense of roles and positions in a complementary socio-political whole, was determined by the integrative structure of the system of entitlements, which was open to *both* achievement *and* hereditary succession. In this sense, it can be said that the system of entitlements functioned as the actual framework of caste or *varṇa-jāti* in this period. The social system of eighteenth-century Orissa was neither one of brahmanical hierarchy (Dumont) nor royal centrality (Dirks).

Each position in the system of entitlements was held by a family and reproduced through the patrilineal line. This made the practical working of the system of entitlements dependent on kinship, even though the system itself was not reliant
upon it. A position could be held by a member of another family with the sanction of the local community (and the king) if required. For example, if the family of, say, a barber became extinct, another barber family could be brought in to take up the position. The system of entitlements was also protected and legitimised by the state, in relation to the functioning of kingship, though it worked according to its own principles. Therefore, the system of entitlements in early modern Khurda was dependent on kinship and kingship for its organisation and constitution, but retained a distinct sphere of its own.  

**Architecture of entitlements**

**Nature of entitlements**

Let us consider the workings of the early modern system of entitlements in Garh Manitri, based on palm leaf manuscripts dating from 1776 to 1806 (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). These administrative documents have been preserved by the descendants of the accountant (bhuiṃ muḷa, literally roots of the earth) of the fort area who was one of the salary holders (mahinādāra) in the locality. They are kept in bundles and are worshipped during the Daśaharā festival (see Chapter 8), along with the other professional tools of the household. The manuscripts are obviously important as a symbol of the household’s traditional authority, but the owner was not aware of the content of the documents.

What has become clear—after careful cleaning and deciphering of the karaṇi aksara (special scripts used by the karaṇa, scribes of the period)—is that they contain rare information concerning precolonial local society. They contain detailed records of rights (bhīṇa), land records (oyārijā), population charts, and lists of

![Figure 3.1 Palm leaf manuscripts.](image-url)
Local society and kingship

annual revenue and expenditure (*jamā* *asul*, *oyāsila* etc.) for the Manitri fort area. They provide data that, among other things, explain how much of which resources were available from which villages, how they were allocated to various entitlement holders and how much tax was levied on each of them. As far as I know, there has been no previous research on the local level administrative records of precolonial Orissa.

It is obvious that the documents dealt with here are state administrative records produced by officials who resided in the locality. After such records were made, one copy was sent to the capital while one was kept in the locality (Pattanaik 1979). Interestingly, both the format and the vocabulary of the documents closely resemble those of the Mughal and Maratha administrative records. They are exemplars of the extension of the advanced administrative technology of the early modern state described by Perlin as “the ‘library’ of categories and techniques” (Perlin 1985: 435).

In the system of entitlements in the fort areas of the hilly tracts of the Khurda kingdom, the concept of *khañjā* was important for allocating to each member of the local community a role and office and in shaping socio-political relations in the region. *Khañjā* generally means arrangement, but in this context it can be understood as hereditary assignments. It signified that a certain person was assigned to assume a particular role or office in the community, to perform the duties accorded to that role and to receive a fixed amount of shares in the form of land, goods, services and cash.

*Khañjā* formed the basis of the structure of the local community in early modern Khurda, but there were also other administrative offices which received salaries from the state such as the accountant (*bhuiṃ muḷa*), chief’s assistant (*śaradāra*
jānīṣī) and scribe (hājira karāṇa). The chief (bisoī/daḷabeherā) and koṭha karāṇa received both state salaries and shares from the local community. These positions illustrate the significant penetration of the state-centred administrative hierarchy into the locality. However, these offices retained many of the characteristics of khañjā. Incumbents had full rights as community members and the right to the office was hereditary. Despite being appointed by the state as state officials, there is no doubt that they became rooted in the local community. Their state-given salary may not have been shares from the community but it was derived from local products. Payment was nominally extracted from the locality in the form of state tax and redistributed as state salary. Therefore, the word entitlement will be used here to cover the rights over shares of resources granted through local khañjā as well as through appointment by the state.

There was another kind of entitlement in early modern Orissa, which gradually became alienable. By the eighteenth century the offices of the village head and scribes were being bought and sold frequently in the plains areas of the province, including in some parts of the Khurda kingdom (Stirling 1904: 57-8). Deeds of sale were produced for these transactions, and they shed some light on the nature of the early modern entitlements that accompanied these positions (see Appendix 1). It is clear that the right to hetā (hīta) land (given in lieu of the office), rusum or russoom (a percentage share from collected tax) (Maddox Report: iv) and other economic resources as well as ritual roles and privileges were inseparable from the office. Besides the land itself, many inheritable entitlements that came along with the position of village accountant or village head were sold in this transaction. The alienability of offices seems to be a part of the market economy’s regional development. In the hilly tracts of the Khurda kingdom, however, the khañjā remained inalienable and hereditary, while also achievable through appropriate deeds, and was intimately connected with and inseparable from membership in the local community. It was directly linked with the social personhood and identity of its holder.

Entitlement holders were recognised for their membership in the community, and apart from receiving tax-free residential land (mināha, minyā), they were given roles in community rituals, various privileges and titles according to their office. In contrast, those who resided in the village but held no entitlement lived on homesteads called cāndanā (chandina) and paid high rent and tax to the community. They were considered inferior in the local community. In this way, attaining a particular entitlement meant accepting certain shares, duties and social roles in the state–society matrix.

Social relations in ‘traditional’ India have previously been discussed primarily in terms of the land tenure system and class in relation to plough-cultivated landholdings, which in turn were connected to caste hierarchy. There are several problems with this approach. Firstly, although the rights over paddy fields were paradigmatic in defining socio-political relations, they were not the only resource upon which the system of entitlements was established in the dry hilly tracts. Entitlements over the products of forests and pastoral fields should also be taken into account. Secondly, the nature of rights in the early modern period was not
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about the ownership of land as has been discussed in previous studies, but about the right to receive a share of diverse kinds of products, including forest, pastoral and commercial products, as well as paddy. Furthermore, entitlements included such factors as ritual positions and roles in community festivals, social status and the right to enjoy privileges and honours bestowed by the king. In other words, the system of entitlements controlled the distribution of both politico-ritual and economic resources. It was the system of entitlements, not caste hierarchy, which determined social personhood and identity in the locality and fundamentally defined social structure in early modern Orissa.

Resource provisions

The bhiāṇa of 1776–1777 (Figure 3.2) records how the resources for various shares and provisions were supplied by the thirteen villages (central fort-village and twelve surrounding villages) of the Manitri fort area. The place—Kandara daṇḍāpāṭa (district), of Manitri fort bisi (county)—and the date—fifty-first regnal year—are specified. It is not clear what kind of function the district or daṇḍāpāṭa had. The existence of a district head, however, is not known historically, and it is unlikely that the district played an important role in political, administrative or military affairs. It was most probably merely a fiscal unit in the kingdom. The main unit for the division of labour, distribution of resources and revenue was the micro-regional county or fort area. Regarding the date of the document, there is only one king of Khurda, Birakeshwari Deva I, who reigned for as long as fifty-one years. It is safe to infer that the date given refers to his reign, the fifty-first year of which was 24 September 1776–13 September 1777.¹⁴

It is notable that the value of land, goods and service were all expressed in cowries (kauṛi) for administrative and accounting purposes (Heimann 1980, Perlin 1987). It indicates both the degree of monetisation (at least for value assessment) in the area and the extent of the state’s accounting and recording technique.¹⁵ The resources are divided into a ‘land part’ (bhumi bhāga, 86.48%), given in the form of land, and a ‘cowry part’ (kauṛi bhāga). The cowry part is further divided into a ‘cash part’ (nagada kauṛi, 1.36%)¹⁶ and khañjā supplies (khañjā dara, 12.16%).¹⁷ The total resources provided by the thirteen villages of the Manitri fort area was 13,115 kāhāṇa, 8 paṇa and 10 gaṇḍā (Table 3.1).

There is ample evidence to suggest that in precolonial times the dry hilly tracts of Khurda had great diversity in modes of living. In addition to wet rice cultivation, important economic activities included grazing in dry fields, swidden agriculture in cotton and millet and hunting and gathering in forests. In 1830, just a quarter century after colonisation, 68.51% of Khurda¹⁸ and 88.86% of Garh Manitri were occupied by forests, hills and fields (Tables 2.1 and 3.2).¹⁹ Vast tracts of forests and pastoral land played an important part in the lives of local society. The tribal Saoras and Khondhas and ‘low caste’ bāuri engaged in hunting bushmeat (rabbits, lizards and birds) and gathering forest products (wild vegetables such as kāṅkaṇa, berries, nuts, honey and firewood). It was common among villagers to clear areas of the forest to make swidden fields (toiḷā, lit. cotton field). They would grow millets, usually māṇḍiā (Eleusine coracana) in the first year and then cotton in the second
year. In the third year they moved on to the next patch, allowing the used land to regain fertility. The resources distributed for the local community in the system of entitlements included these swidden fields as well as pastoral and forest products.

The production of resources in villages and their allotment to entitlement holders were also related to the demographic structure of the fort area. Diversity in

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### Table 3.1 Resources for the system of entitlements in Manitri, 1776–1777

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Cowry value (Area)</th>
<th>Miscellaneous goods and services</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort-village</td>
<td>4,444. 15. 4 (23. 3. 16. 15)</td>
<td>446. 11. 0</td>
<td>42. 0. 0</td>
<td>4,933. 10. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhiam</td>
<td>445. 15. 4 (7. 11. 0. 0)</td>
<td>217. 13. 0</td>
<td>28. 0. 0</td>
<td>691. 12. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atharanga</td>
<td>1,598. 9. 8 (11. 9. 12. 8)</td>
<td>125. 8. 12</td>
<td>16. 8. 0</td>
<td>1,740. 10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barabati</td>
<td>1,044. 15. 14 (8. 4. 12. 8)</td>
<td>141. 1. 0</td>
<td>13. 13. 0</td>
<td>1,199. 13. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patna</td>
<td>378. 7. 0 (2. 16. 0. 0)</td>
<td>94. 5. 2</td>
<td>12. 3. 0</td>
<td>484. 15. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narayanipada</td>
<td>440. 4. 16 (6. 5. 0. 0)</td>
<td>97. 1. 0</td>
<td>10. 13. 0</td>
<td>548. 2. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuagaon</td>
<td>336. 5. 12 (2. 3. 12. 10)</td>
<td>54. 11. 0</td>
<td>10. 1. 0</td>
<td>401. 1. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boriko</td>
<td>576. 2. 0 (3. 12. 21. 10)</td>
<td>93. 10. 0</td>
<td>5. 15. 0</td>
<td>675. 11. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhilo</td>
<td>228. 11. 9 (1. 10. 18. 12)</td>
<td>64. 4. 14</td>
<td>10. 4. 0</td>
<td>303. 4. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of 9 villages</td>
<td>9,494. 6. 7 (66. 16. 19. 15)</td>
<td>1,335. 1. 8 (12.16%)</td>
<td>149. 9. 0 (1.36%)</td>
<td>10,979. 0. 15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 4 villages (no data)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of 13 villages</td>
<td>11,103. 5. 0 (80. 4. 20. 14)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12,925. 8. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus from previous year</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>190. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>11,103. 5. 0 (80. 4. 20. 14)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13,115. 8. 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
1. Three digit numbers represent the monetary value of cowry. Three digits correspond to kāhāṇa, paṇa and gaṇḍā. For example, 4,444.15.4 should be read as 4444 kāhāṇa 15 paṇa 4 gaṇḍā.
2. The numbers in brackets, other than percentages, denote area. Four digits correspond to bāṭi, māṇa, guṇṭha and biśwā. For example, 23.3.16.15 should be read as 23 bāṭi 3 māṇa 16 guṇṭha 15 biśwā.
3. The totals do not match, presumably due to errors in the original record.

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### Table 3.2 Types of land in Garh Manitri, 1829–1830

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area acre (%)</th>
<th>Forest and fields</th>
<th>Cultivated or inhabited</th>
<th>Homestead</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Vegetable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5796.89 (100.00)</td>
<td>5150.98 (88.86)</td>
<td>645.91 (11.14)</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>502.43 (8.67)</td>
<td>64.89 (1.12)</td>
<td>63.94 (1.10)</td>
<td>1.35 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Garh Manitri.

Note
1. Data on the total area are from the census of Orissa. Because land records are available only for 75.93% of the villagers and 52.02% of outsiders owning land in Garh Manitri, other figures in this table have been estimated by increasing figures in the land records proportionately.
forms of living meant that there were not only peasants but also soldiers, priests, merchants and artisans as well as pastoralists and forest-dwellers (Washbrook 1988: 67). Table 3.3 shows the number of households in the Manitri fort area by village and caste. Of the 291 households in the total fort area, 169 (58.08%) lived in the central fort-village (including Chhiam village), while in the rest of the surrounding 8 residential villages there were only 6–32 households, 15.25 households (5.24%) on average. Caste wise, the 43 orā or khaṇḍāyata households who were engaged in military and administrative service were concentrated in the fort-village. The chiefly lineage also belonged to this caste. Almost all other castes are represented too.

In the surrounding villages, the presence of primary producers, such as peasants, cowherds, weavers, oil-pressers and fishermen, is notable. Most of the brāhmaṇas living in the surrounding villages were probably Aṭhagaṛia brāhmaṇas who did not perform any religious tasks, such as those of priests, but engaged in agriculture. None of the surrounding villages had a sufficient variety of castes to enable any one village to be autonomous, and it seems that they relied on the fort-village or other surrounding villages for supplies and services provided by specific caste people.

Roughly speaking, military, religious and administrative specialists (namely, khaṇḍāyatas, brāhmaṇas and karaṇas), together with other artisan and service castes necessary to constitute a local community, were found in the central fort-village, whereas agricultural, pastoral and manufacturing castes lived in the surrounding villages. These surrounding villages depended politically and socially on the fort-village and their resources, coupled with those of the central fort-village, and were accounted for to provide for the needs of the fort area as the primary unit.

The entitlement holders

After specifying the resources provided by each village, the document goes on to prescribe how they are to be allotted among the entitlement holders. According to the categories used in the document, they are classified as shares for gods (debaha), donations to brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇa dāna), village service land (desa hetā), fort servants (gaṛa sebaka) and payment for foot soldiers (pāika bartana). As can be seen in Table 3.4, the direct share of the state (in goods, cash and the land) was only 2.24% of the whole, and most of it was distributed to entitlement holders in the fort area before taxes were taken from them.

Shares of deities

The total share given to the deities was 1,075 kāhāṇa 3 paṇa 5 gaṇḍā 2 kadā (8.20% of the total). There were twelve deities altogether who were entitled to the shares (Table 3.5). It is noteworthy that the local resources were given to the state deity (Jagannātha, Puri), his local representative (Tṛṭīya Deva) (Figure 3.3),
Table 3.3 Number of households by caste in Manitri villages, c. 1800

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Fort 1</th>
<th>Barabati</th>
<th>Atharanga</th>
<th>Patna</th>
<th>Narayanipada</th>
<th>Boriko</th>
<th>Simapalli</th>
<th>Mugamanda</th>
<th>Nuagaon</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaṇa (scribe)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāṇa (scribe) (Vaiśnavai saint)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief (saradāra)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāṇḍa (rājaputa)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oṛa (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotīṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naruto (gardener)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barheī (carpenter)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caśa (peasant)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baṇi (goldsmith)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gūrē (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanti (weaver)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulabhīṇa (cotton-carder)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobā (washerman)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandhīṇa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaṇḍarā daṇḍāsī (watchman)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenā sebaka (Khondha priest)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Table 3.3 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fort</th>
<th>Barabati</th>
<th>Atharanga</th>
<th>Patna</th>
<th>Narayanipada</th>
<th>Boriko</th>
<th>Simapalli</th>
<th>Mugamanda</th>
<th>Nuagaon</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
1 The population of Chhiam village is probably included in the ‘Fort’ category. I have retained the order of castes in the original record. The order may reflect their conception of social hierarchy.
2 Pāṇḍa and rājaputa are a type of brāhmaṇa and warrior, respectively. They are probably put in the same category because they are both considered to have come from outside Orissa. Oṛa are the same as today’s khaṇḍāyata.
Table 3.4 Distribution of resources in Manitri, 1776–1777

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Cowry value (Area)</th>
<th>Cowry part</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gods</td>
<td>991. 9. 7. 2 (6. 9. 4. 7)</td>
<td>83. 10. 14. 2</td>
<td>1,075. 3. 5. 2</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇas</td>
<td>107. 0. 0. 0 (0. 15. 0. 0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107. 0. 0. 0</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village level allocated land</td>
<td>499. 15. 12. 0 (5. 1. 19. 15)</td>
<td>6. 18. 0. 0</td>
<td>506. 4. 10. 0</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort servants</td>
<td>216. 0. 0. 0 (1. 0. 12. 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>216. 0. 0. 0</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>9,080. 6. 10. 2 (65. 7. 3. 9)</td>
<td>1,746. 14. 12. 2</td>
<td>10,920. 4. 0. 0</td>
<td>83.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct share of the state</td>
<td>117. 12. 15. 0 (1. 10. 14. 2)</td>
<td>176. 6. 0. 0</td>
<td>294. 2. 15. 0</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,103. 5. 0. 0 (80. 4. 20. 14)</td>
<td>2,014. 1. 7. 0</td>
<td>13,117. 12. 0. 0</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf scripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note:
1. Three digit numbers representing cowry value correspond to kāhāṇa, paṇa and gaṇḍā. Kaḍā figure is added to four digit numbers. Four digit numbers in area correspond to bāṭi, māṇa, guṇṭha and biśwā. The totals do not match, presumably due to errors in the original record.

Table 3.5 Distribution of resources for deities in Manitri, 1776–1777

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jagannātha</td>
<td>Puri</td>
<td>Orissa’s state deity</td>
<td>200. 12. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tṛtiya Deva</td>
<td>In front of the Garh Manitri palace</td>
<td>Another name for Jagannātha</td>
<td>172. 13. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govinda Jiu</td>
<td>In front of Garh Manitri chief’s residence</td>
<td>Chief’s family tutelary god</td>
<td>297. 6. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gopināth Jiu</td>
<td>Barabati village</td>
<td>Village-level Viṣṇu</td>
<td>70. 7. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapileśwar Deva</td>
<td>Lower fort, Garh Manitri chief’s residence</td>
<td>Fort-area level Śiva</td>
<td>71. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balukeśwar Deva</td>
<td>Chhiam village</td>
<td>Village-level Śiva</td>
<td>17. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balukeśwar Deva</td>
<td>Atharanga village</td>
<td>Village-level Śiva</td>
<td>7. 4. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balukeśwar Deva</td>
<td>Mugamunda village</td>
<td>Village-level Śiva</td>
<td>64. 5. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balukeśwar Deva</td>
<td>Nuagaon village</td>
<td>Village-level Śiva</td>
<td>21. 1. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahāvira</td>
<td>Narayanipada</td>
<td>Village-level Śiva</td>
<td>51. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāmacaṇḍī</td>
<td>Outskirts of Garh Manitri</td>
<td>Tutelary goddess of the fort area</td>
<td>16. 15. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāmacaṇḍī</td>
<td>Atharanga village</td>
<td>Rāmacaṇḍī’s shrine</td>
<td>18. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note:
1. The numbers are in cowry.
Local society and kingship

the chief’s family tutelary god (Govinda Jiu), the tutelary goddess of the fort (Rāmakaṇḍī) and tutelary deities of surrounding villages (grāma debatā), representing and constituting the socio-political relationships.

Various families served the deities: brāhmaṇa temple priests (pūjārī), sweet-makers (guriā) who made sweets for offering, gardeners (māḷī) who served as priests in Śiva temples and the Khondha priest and Saora medium (kālisī) who served Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī. They received resources from the shares of the deity they served as payment for servanthood (sebaka bartana). The brāhmaṇa priest did not cultivate the land himself. Rather there was a tenant cultivator and sub-tenants of the god’s land who paid rent (saṅjā) to the god.

It is interesting to note that the Khondhas and Saoras were the tribals who originally lived in the area and worshipped the goddess. By being allocated the khaṅjā of the deities, they were given a publicly established office and were guaranteed a status and role in the local community. In this way, the system of entitlements functioned flexibly to include the tribal people and their culture in society, as well as those who Kshatriyaised and peasantised themselves.

Land donated to brāhmaṇas

Land was often donated to the vedic brāhmaṇas (bhaidika brāhmaṇa) who ranked the highest within the brāhmaṇa caste. These brāhmaṇas did not work as priests (pūjārī), except for receiving gifts on certain occasions, and depended mostly on
the income from donated lands. They did not cultivate this land themselves, but had tenant cultivators. The brāhmaṇas received a certain amount of produce from them in the form of rent.

In the Manitri fort area, 15 māṇa of land, which was worth 107 kāhāṇa (0.82% of the total), was donated to brāhmaṇas. Within this, there were four brāhmaṇas with normal donated lands: Loknath Das received 1 māṇa (8 kāhāṇa), Raghunath Das 2 māṇa (14 kāhāṇa 10 paṇa), Bauri Misra 2 māṇa 12 guṇṭha 8 biśwā (15 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa) and Ugrasena Paharaja 2 māṇa 12 guṇṭha 8 biśwā (17 kāhāṇa 10 paṇa [the evaluation of the land in monetary terms differed though the area was the same. This was probably because of the difference in the quality of land]). One piece of land measuring 7 māṇa (50 kāhāṇa) was donated to a brāhmaṇa, Gopi Santray, by the army general (baksi) of the kingdom. It had been granted to him as “jāgeri” [sic, jāgiri or jagir] for his state salary (koṭha bartana). This is an example of so-called sub-infeudation in the form of gifting one’s entitlements.

Some of the lands donated to the brāhmaṇas were given as purohita hetā. In return the brāhmaṇas had to work as family priests (purohita) for high-caste families (brāhmaṇas, karaṇas and khaṇḍāyatas) and officiate at community festivals. It is notable that the jajmāna–purohita relationships were encompassed in the system of entitlements. These relationships, which have hitherto been considered a part of the jajmani system, that is, the customary exchange relationships between households, were in fact a part of the system of entitlements in early modern Khurda. Land was also donated to non-priest brāhmaṇas, but details regarding this cannot be ascertained due to a lack of sources.

**Shares of entitlement holders at the village level**

The total shares given to administrative office holders and community servants at the village level were 506 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa 10 gaṇḍā (3.86% of the total). The land that administrative office holders and community servants received was called hetā, with their khañjā name being attached to it—pradhāna hetā (village head’s), bhoi hetā (village accountant’s), dhobā hetā (washerman’s) or bhaṇḍāri hetā (barber’s), for example.

Table 3.6 shows the contents of the shares given to the village-level administrative office holders, such as the principal village head (beherā pradhāna), revenue collector (choudhuri), village head (desa pradhāna) and village accountant (desa bhoi).22 As previously mentioned, a payment (hetā maguṇi) was made by the village to the village heads in addition to the share given by the fort area. This payment varied from 3 kāhāṇa to 5 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa. Administrative officials at the village level did not cultivate the lands themselves but received rent from tenants.

Table 3.7 shows the content of the shares for village servants. Since the carpenters, barbers and washermen shown in the table were living in the surrounding villages, they were given village service land (desa hetā), but, most probably, they served all families of the fort area. The services of carpenters, barbers and washermen, among others, are indispensable for village life in India. They were servants of the whole local community rather than of one particular village. There is no
### Table 3.6 Shares for village-level administrative offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Cowry part</th>
<th>Share from fortarea</th>
<th>Payment from village</th>
<th>Total share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal village head</td>
<td>Karaṇa</td>
<td>42.10.0 (0.13.12.8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42.10.0</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>42.10.0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue collector</td>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>24.15.0 (0.7.12.8)</td>
<td>1.8.0</td>
<td>26.7.0</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>26.7.0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atharanga village head</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>57.14.0 (0.8.7.2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57.14.0</td>
<td>5.0.0</td>
<td>62.14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barabati village head</td>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>63.0.0 (0.10.4.7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63.0.0</td>
<td>5.8.0</td>
<td>68.8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patna village head</td>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>25.14.8 (0.4.4.0)</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td>26.14.8</td>
<td>3.12.0</td>
<td>30.10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narayanipada village head</td>
<td>Teli</td>
<td>33.4.8 (0.12.0.0)</td>
<td>2.0.0</td>
<td>35.4.8</td>
<td>5.0.0</td>
<td>40.4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuagaon village head</td>
<td>Teli</td>
<td>30.14.14 (0.4.9.6)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.14.14</td>
<td>3.12.0</td>
<td>34.10.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boriko village head</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>39.1.10 (0.5.4.14)</td>
<td>0.14.10</td>
<td>40.0.0</td>
<td>3.0.0</td>
<td>43.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simapalli village head</td>
<td>Karaṇa</td>
<td>24.0.0 (0.5.12.8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24.0.0</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>24.0.0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bathua village head</td>
<td>Karaṇa</td>
<td>11.8.0 (0.5.15.10)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.8.0</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>11.8.0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village accountant</td>
<td>Karaṇa</td>
<td>98.5.12 (0.18.0.0)</td>
<td>0.14.8</td>
<td>99.4.0</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>99.4.0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>451.7.12 (4.14.7.15)</td>
<td>6.4.18</td>
<td>457.12.10</td>
<td>26 +α</td>
<td>483.12.10 +α</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
1. Caste affiliations are conjectured from titles and also supported by oral family histories.
2. ‘+α’ in the total indicate that there is a wage from the village which is illegible.
record of rent in the document regarding the share of village servants. This seems to suggest that the village servants cultivated their own khañjā lands.

Table 3.7 Shares for village-level community servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Cowry value</th>
<th>(Area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>Atharanga</td>
<td>6.10.8</td>
<td>2.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>Atharanga</td>
<td>8.12.0</td>
<td>2.12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>Barabati</td>
<td>10.0.0</td>
<td>0.20.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washer man</td>
<td>Atharanga</td>
<td>3.13.12</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washer man</td>
<td>(not noted)</td>
<td>12.0.0</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>41.5.4</td>
<td>7.8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.
Note 1. The total does not tally with the numbers given above. This is probably due to mistakes in writing or calculation.

Table 3.8 Shares for fort servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Cowry value</th>
<th>(Area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bed-maker (suāsiā)</td>
<td>40.0.0</td>
<td>0.4.3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed-maker (suāsiā)</td>
<td>40.0.0</td>
<td>0.3.6.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>33.8.0</td>
<td>0.3.18.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>28.0.0</td>
<td>0.2.12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter</td>
<td>25.0.0</td>
<td>0.2.3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman (māhāra)</td>
<td>11.0.0</td>
<td>0.1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegible</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (7 Persons)</strong></td>
<td>216.0.0</td>
<td>1.0.12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.
Note 1. The total does not match as one person’s record is illegible.

Table 3.8 Shares for fort servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Cowry value</th>
<th>(Area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bed-maker (suāsiā)</td>
<td>40.0.0</td>
<td>0.4.3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed-maker (suāsiā)</td>
<td>40.0.0</td>
<td>0.3.6.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>33.8.0</td>
<td>0.3.18.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber</td>
<td>28.0.0</td>
<td>0.2.12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter</td>
<td>25.0.0</td>
<td>0.2.3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman (māhāra)</td>
<td>11.0.0</td>
<td>0.1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegible</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (7 Persons)</strong></td>
<td>216.0.0</td>
<td>1.0.12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.
Note 1. The total does not match as one person’s record is illegible.

record of rent in the document regarding the share of village servants. This seems to suggest that the village servants cultivated their own khañjā lands.

Shares of fort servants

Table 3.8 shows the shares of the fort servants (gaṛa sebaka), which amounted to 216 kāhāṇa (1.65% of the total). Bed-makers (suāsiā), carpenters, barbers, potters and watchmen (māhāra) received their hetā as servants of the fort. It is significant that these fort servants received considerably higher shares than village-level servants (cf Table 3.7). Both the village servants and fort servants were given land from the local community as their share and also received payments from each household. Annually, the watchman received 1–2 gauni for every māṇa of land a household possessed, the washerman and barber received 2–4
gauni from every couple and the blacksmith and carpenter obtained 2–4 gauni for each plough (to be yoked to oxen) a household possessed. It is unlikely that the payment given to community servants increased in the colonial period, so the custom of receiving payment from households in addition to their hetā land probably already existed in the precolonial period.

In precolonial times, household payments to community servants most likely represented just a portion of the remuneration earned by each household by virtue of its community membership. Inter-household relationships could be cemented by these payments, but they were ultimately formed by the collective system of entitlements. There were no dyadic agreements between individual households, as in the jajmani system. The latter seems to have been a product of the reformulation of the early modern social system under colonialism, when the fort area as a unit of social reproduction was destroyed and each household became an independent economic unit. The next chapter discusses how the nature of these community servants changed to form jajmani relations between households.

Payments for foot soldiers

Payments for military personnel constituted the vast majority of the shares provided in the system of entitlements (10,920 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa, 83.25% of the total). In the document, these are termed payment for foot soldiers (pāika bartana), but the recipients of these shares were not restricted to infantrymen and included state-level military officers, administrators such as the state scribe (koṭha karaṇa) and collector of fines (taṇḍakāra), the labourer (kāṇḍi) and the military musician (bājantari).

Table 3.9 summarises the contents of this part of the document. We see that fourteen military units of foot soldiers are named, including one identified as majukuri or military administrators. Each unit consisted of an officer and several soldiers. The largest unit, with twenty-one members, had the chief of the fort himself as its head. The fourteen units were made up of one unit of fort gate guard (gaṛa dwāri), one unit of boundary guard (aṅki dwāri), one unit of fort watchman (gaṛa raḥaṇī), plus ten units of ordinary foot soldiers and one group of majukuri. A normal foot soldier unit consisted of one head and several soldiers. One unit consisted of three to twenty-one soldiers, the average number being six and a half.

The majukuri comprised the following personnel: Maguni Maharata, Jaganananda, koṭha bārika (state messenger) and koṭha karaṇa (state scribe). Maguni Maharata’s name appears in another part of the document as General Bhramarabara Rai’s maguni maharata (baksi Bhramarabara Raiṅka), and since he received land from the jagir of the state general, he was probably a military officer directly under the royal general. Jaganananda appears in another part of the document as receiving land directly under the government, so he was probably also a military officer at the state level. The koṭha bārika probably worked as a messenger for the state, and the koṭha karaṇa as a scribe in the accounts and state administration. Koṭha karaṇa received a state salary too, as we will see later.
The word majukuri seems to derive from the Persian *mazkūri*, which can be translated as magnates who paid rent to government. In this context, it probably refers to the soldiers and administrators employed directly by the king and stationed in the fort. They were state personnel stationed in the fort, who received not only jagir land and/or a salary from the state but also had their share from the locality.

As regards the shares from the fort area, the chief of the fort area had 458 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa, the head of the unit (sub-chief, *dalai*) an average of 123 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa 5 gaṇḍā and an ordinary soldier 83 kāhāṇa 5 paṇa 3 gaṇḍā. The state military administrators received the following: Maguni Maharata 300 kāhāṇa, Jaganananda 310 kāhāṇa, koṭha bārika 107 kāhāṇa 6 paṇa and koṭha karaṇa 77 kāhāṇa 5 paṇa (see Table 3.10). The payments to soldiers (daḷa bartana, same as pāika bartana mentioned above) were determined for the year. It seems that it took the form of a kind of contract (Kolff 1990).

A document, c. 1776-1777, gives a detailed account of the shares assigned to a soldier named Ram Jena, which can be taken as typical for the period:

soldier wage (daḷa bartana) … Alakhi Jena (leader’s name) unit in the above named (unit), Ram Jena
wage for twelve months, 125 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa, cut of month (masakhatu) one month 10 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa
From this, correct month (oyajība māsa), eleven months, 115 kāhāṇa …
land part and cowry part, 115 kāhāṇa
cowry in villages
Manitri village, at Khambara (name of field) 2 māṇa 26 kāhāṇa,
at Tīkarājhara (name of field) 1 māṇa 12 guṇṭha 8 biśwā 6 kāhāṇa
total of 2 lands 32 kāhāṇa
mango tree and swidden fields 1 kāhāṇa
khañjā at surrounding villages 82 kāhāṇa
Boriko village 6 kāhāṇa 10 paṇa
Mugamanda village 11 kāhāṇa
Naranipada village 15 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa
Nuaga village 13 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa
Abhilo village 2 kāhāṇa 13 paṇa
Akhupadara village 4 kāhāṇa 9 paṇa
Atharanga village 25 kāhāṇa 7 paṇa
Chhiam village 2 kāhāṇa 7 paṇa
total of land part and cowry part 115 kāhāṇa

Payments to soldiers included a land part and a cowry part, which consisted of mango trees and swidden fields. Most soldiers resided in the fort-village (Table 3.3) but the lands assigned to them were usually widely distributed throughout the surrounding villages. Generally, these peasant soldiers leased out their assigned holdings to tenants or sub-tenants, but sometimes they cultivated the land themselves or became tenants of other proprietors. Most of the soldiers belonged to peasant-militia castes such as the khaṇḍāyata and mahānāyaka; one unit leader (daḷai) was from the cowherd caste and three fort watchmen were Muslims. The ‘military labour market’ was not limited by caste ascription and the occupation of soldiering was open to people from a variety of social backgrounds (Kolff 1990).

After that, a collector of fines (taṇḍakāra) is mentioned who seems to have given administrative assistance to the chief. His share was 60 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa. Next, the twenty-one labourers (kāṇḍi) are recorded. In the Khurda region, kāṇḍi refers to the bāuri caste, belonging to the so-called untouchable (achuāṃ, asparśaka) category. They appear to have been engaged in miscellaneous jobs, such as collecting fuel, chopping firewood, carrying loads and constructing temporary camping huts, besides working as agricultural labourers. Their share was 322 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa in total (15 kāhāṇa 5 paṇa 11 gaṇḍā per person on average). The last ones mentioned in the military personnel section were the nine military musicians (bājantari). They included the hāṛi, sweeper-drummers, who are thought to be lowest in the caste hierarchy, and a khaṇḍāyata, who played the trumpet. Even today, the drumming of the hāṛi is essential for the performance of martial arts called pāika ākharā, and the trumpet is played in important rituals. The shares of
the nine musicians were 257 kāhāṇa 14 paṇa in total, the average per person being 28 kāhāṇa 10 paṇa 9 gaṇḍā.

**Entitlements and local society**

Entitlement holders who were legitimate members of the community received shares of resources distributed in the form of land (or more precisely, certain shares in the produce of the paddy fields), goods (including the right of usage of mango trees and swidden fields) and cash and carried out a certain duty for the state and/or the community. It was common for entitlement holders, including khaṇḍāyatas, but excepting high office holders and brāhmaṇas, to be tenants in other holdings. Tenant cultivators had tenancy rights, but did not necessarily cultivate themselves either. In many cases, they had sub-tenants and bonded labourers called haḷiā, often of the lowest dalit castes, hāṛi and bāuri. Those with smaller shares (especially persons of low caste) had to work as tenant and sub-tenant cultivators or bonded labourers to make a living. Both tenancy and sub-tenancy seem to have been based on certain rights in the locality as well. Thus, there was a set of multiple rights—various entitlements to shares of crops and tenancy and sub-tenancy rights—overlapping on a piece of cultivated land.

Table 3.10 shows a list of the shares of various entitlement holders in the Manitri fort area. As can be expected, the payment of shares shows great inequality. The integration of different groups within a fort community entailed socio-economic inequalities and politico-ritual hierarchy. No office was equal in terms of the quantity and quality of the position and shares. Both brahmanical hierarchy and royal honour played a role in influencing the position of each, but the principle of the system of entitlements cannot be reduced to just one deciding factor. The system of entitlements prescribed a person’s position and role in the locality in order to make a workable fort community. It was a “total social fact” (Mauss 1954) that enveloped every aspect of life, including the fulfilling of political, economic and ritual duties, accepting the shares allocated, living in the tax-exempt residential area according to status, employing titles such as daḷabeherā, kotha karaṇa and desa pradhāna, receiving prasāda (sacred leftovers of items offered to deities) in community rituals according to rank and acquiring the privilege of keeping and using tokens of honour (sword, iron pens and emblems). The system of entitlements should be understood as a holistic system that defined identity and socio-political relations within the local community.

The fort areas in early modern Khurda functioned as important politico-military units for the kingdom. This can be seen from the fact that most shares of the fort area were distributed to the soldiers and administrators (83.25%). They constituted the core population for whom service and artisan castes as well as cultivator-tenants provided labour and services for social reproduction. The shares for gods and brāhmaṇas were necessary in order to keep the fort as one of the religio-cultural centres in the kingdom. Although the local community was the basis for the system of entitlements, in the seventeen and eighteenth centuries,
Local society and kingship

it came to require legitimacy from the kingship. The fact that the details of individual entitlements were recorded in the state record of rights suggests that each of them received royal endorsement. The relationship between the state and local community can be further observed in the state’s taxation of each entitlement holder and its tax expenditure in the region.

State taxes and expenditures

State revenue from the community

After resources were distributed within the fort area, the state collected taxes from them. The state’s revenue from the Manirtri fort area totalled 1,942 kāhāṇa 15 paṇa 6 gaṇḍā 3 kaḍā, which was 14.81% of the total resources garnered from the area. The state revenue consisted of: (a) revenue from the royal government’s direct shares, (b) taxes on the shares of the community entitlement holders and (c) taxes collected from the community (Table 3.11 and Appendix 2). On how much tax—tankī and utnī—each entitlement holder paid, see Table 3.12 and Appendix 2.
Especially noteworthy is that tax reductions were provided as privilege to certain entitlement holders. While the village-level administrators and servants were levied tax at rates in the range of 18.75–31.25%, fort-level administrators, servants, and soldiers were levied only between 0% and 10.55%. The total rate was a mere 10.44% on entitlement holders’ shares, and even if we include the state’s direct share and other taxes, the total tax rate is a mere 14.81%, which is indeed very low compared to the early modern Indian states in the plains. Mizushima points out that the states in eighteenth-century South India “continued to acquire the shares of the total products of local society at the high rate of a quarter to a half” (Mizushima 2008: 10). Kotani also says that it would not be too far off the mark to conjecture that, out of the total products of local society, about one third was required for the reproduction of the cultivators, another third was distributed in the local society to various entitlement holders and the remaining third was taken by the state as tax (Kotani 2011).

The low rate of the state tax is related to the fact that Khurda was a little kingdom mainly located in the hilly tracts, even though ritually it was a great one, its authority deriving from Lord Jagannātha himself. In many little kingdoms in the hills, forest-dwelling tribal warriors were exempted from state tax though they had the duty of attending to military needs. In the larger early modern states in the plains, the state began to build standing armies which required increasing state tax. The little kingdoms were more dependent on local society for the working of the state, including the military, while the larger, especially early modern, states developed state apparatus outside society and extracted resources from it. The Khurda kingdom, straddling the hills and plains, can be placed between these two cases.

### Table 3.11 State’s revenue from Manitri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State’s direct share</th>
<th>Tax on community shares</th>
<th>Miscellaneous community tax</th>
<th>Total from Garh Manitri</th>
<th>Total resources recorded in Garh Manitri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>264.11.11.0</td>
<td>1302.14.0.0</td>
<td>375.4.12.2</td>
<td>1942.15.6.3</td>
<td>13117.12.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.62% (2.02%)</td>
<td>67.06% (9.93%)</td>
<td>19.32% (2.86%)</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>(100.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14.81%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
1. The numbers, other than percentage, are in cowry.
2. The total does not match, presumably due to errors in the original record.

While the village-level administrators and servants were levied tax at rates in the range of 18.75–31.25%, fort-level administrators, servants, and soldiers were levied only between 0% and 10.55%. The total rate was a mere 10.44% on entitlement holders’ shares, and even if we include the state’s direct share and other taxes, the total tax rate is a mere 14.81%, which is indeed very low compared to the early modern Indian states in the plains. Mizushima points out that the states in eighteenth-century South India “continued to acquire the shares of the total products of local society at the high rate of a quarter to a half” (Mizushima 2008: 10). Kotani also says that it would not be too far off the mark to conjecture that, out of the total products of local society, about one third was required for the reproduction of the cultivators, another third was distributed in the local society to various entitlement holders and the remaining third was taken by the state as tax (Kotani 2011).

The use of state revenue in the region

A surprising factor regarding the use of state taxes is revealed in the following documents. Let us look first at the document that describes the settlement of state...
### Table 3.12 State tax collected from community entitlement holders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Share (in cowry)</th>
<th>Amount exempted from tankī</th>
<th>Amount taxed for tankī</th>
<th>Tankī rate or tankī amount per head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for offerings)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1018.13.10</td>
<td>200.12.10</td>
<td>818.9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for servants’ salary)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>47.0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (donated land)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>106.0.0</td>
<td>50.0.0</td>
<td>56.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal village head</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42.10.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42.10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue collector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.7.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village heads</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>296.7.10</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>illegible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village accountants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99.4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99.4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village servants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41.5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort servants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>216.0.0</td>
<td>11.0.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of fort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>458.2.0</td>
<td>458.2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotha karana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77.5.0</td>
<td>77.5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotha bārika</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>107.6.0</td>
<td>107.6.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector of fines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60.10.0</td>
<td>60.10.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>322.4.0</td>
<td>322.4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military musicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>257.14.0</td>
<td>257.14.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguni maharata (state-level soldier)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300.0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaganananda (state-level military head)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>310.0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parakshit Rautray (soldier from chief’s regiment)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>201.10.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukhadeb Srichandan (soldier from chief’s regiment)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>252.0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort gate guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8585.5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort watchman</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foot soldiers</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of state tax from entitlement holders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State owned land</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>117.12.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>117.12.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct share of the state</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>176.6.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous tax</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,117.12.0</td>
<td>1,942.15.6</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected at Garh Mani tri by author.

Note
1. The numbers, other than percentage, are in cowry. There are several calculation mistakes in the original record.
   a Land of Jagannātha in Puri.
   b This was originally the state general’s jagir but was donated to a brāhmaṇa.
   c Village watchman’s share.
Table 3.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taṅkī</th>
<th>Amount exempted from utnī</th>
<th>Amount taxed for utnī</th>
<th>Utnī rate or utnī amount per head</th>
<th>Utnī</th>
<th>Total of tax</th>
<th>Tax rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51. 2. 0</td>
<td>200.12.10</td>
<td>818. 9. 0</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>19. 3. 10</td>
<td>70. 5. 10</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 11. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47. 0. 0</td>
<td>11.72%</td>
<td>5. 8. 4</td>
<td>20. 3. 4</td>
<td>42.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 0. 0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14. 0. 0</td>
<td>13.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 11. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42.10. 0</td>
<td>9.38%</td>
<td>4. 0. 0</td>
<td>14. 11. 0</td>
<td>34.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 9. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26. 7. 0</td>
<td>9.38%</td>
<td>2. 7. 10</td>
<td>9. 0. 10</td>
<td>34.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for offerings)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1018. 13. 10</td>
<td>200. 12. 10</td>
<td>14. 1. 0</td>
<td>13. 0. 10</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for servants’ salary)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>47. 0. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47. 0. 0</td>
<td>11. 7. 0</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (donated land)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>106. 0. 0</td>
<td>50. 0. 0</td>
<td>50. 0. 0</td>
<td>13. 0. 10</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal village head</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42. 10. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42. 10. 0</td>
<td>10. 3. 10</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue collector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26. 7. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26. 7. 0</td>
<td>6. 9. 0</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village heads</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>296. 7. 10</td>
<td>Illegible</td>
<td>Illegible</td>
<td>132. 3. 16</td>
<td>44.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village accountants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99. 4. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99. 4. 0</td>
<td>18. 2. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village servants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41. 5. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41. 5. 0</td>
<td>12. 3. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort servants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>216. 0. 0</td>
<td>11. 0. 0</td>
<td>11. 0. 0</td>
<td>3. 9. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of fort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>458. 2. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>458. 2. 0</td>
<td>13. 1. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭha karaṇa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77. 5. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77. 5. 0</td>
<td>8. 2. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭha bārika</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>107. 6. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107. 6. 0</td>
<td>8. 2. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector of fines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60. 10. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60. 10. 0</td>
<td>4. 1. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>322. 4. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>322. 4. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military musicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>257. 14. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>257. 14. 0</td>
<td>10. 5. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguni maharata</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300. 0. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaganananda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>310. 0. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parakshit Rautray</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>201. 10. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>201. 10. 0</td>
<td>7. 2. 0</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukhadeb Srichandan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>252. 0. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort gate guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8585. 5. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary guard</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1. 8. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort watchman</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1. 8. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foot soldiers</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1. 14. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of state tax from entitlement holders</td>
<td>1,302. 14. 0</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State owned land</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>117. 12. 15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>117. 12. 15</td>
<td>17. 1. 0</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct share of the state</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>176. 6. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>176. 6. 0</td>
<td>17. 1. 0</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous tax</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Local society and kingship

revenue. Unfortunately, the year of the document cannot be ascertained except that it is from the tenth regnal year of a certain Khurda king. The contents indicate, however, that it is between the end of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century:

On the ninth day of Brṣaba month [late May], in the presence of bisoi Paramananda Samantray and behoraṇa gumāstā (state tax-collector) Raghunath Patnaik, settlement was made for 3101 kāhāṇa. ... The expense in thānā bae ogeraku (region etc.) is 1100 kāhāṇa, state expense for the palace (koṭha bae naaraku) is 2001 kāhāṇa.

The surprising factor is that out of the 3,101 kāhāṇa collected as state revenue, only 2,001 kāhāṇa was put towards royal expenditure and 1,100 kāhāṇa—over one third—was spent in the region it had come from (Table 3.13). Its use in the region is very interesting: 22 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa was allocated for Sri Satyabādi Deva in Sakhigopal near Puri which was important at a state level, 5 sheep were probably offered to state-level deities in the king’s name along with some payment (possibly as dakṣinā), and funding was supplied for state-level festivals that involved fire sacrifice etc. and the festival of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī, which was important for legitimising the king’s authority in Manitri. In addition, state taxes were used to perform rituals in Manitri, such as the new regnal year (held on suniā day), swing festival (dola parba), paṇā saṃkrānti, mother cow festival (gomā parba) and feast after the fasting of Kārttika month (chāṛa khāi).

Notes made on salary (mahinā) also feature in the document. It was paid from the regional expenditure of state tax to the main administrative officers in the region as shown in Table 3.14. The salary holders (mahinādāra), as they were called, consisted of the śaradāra jānīsī (chief’s assistant), hājira karaṇa (scribe), koṭha karaṇa (scribe) and bhuiṃ muḷa (accountant). They received their salary from state taxes for playing important roles in administration. These officials, except for koṭha karaṇa, did not receive any share of khañjā from the fort area and depended solely on state salaries. Moreover, officials like the chief, west door (paścima dwāra) guard, inner (bhītara) guard, doorkeeper (paḍihāri) and state tax collector (behoraṇa gumāstā) and the king’s palace (behoraṇa) in Manitri village received their allowance (samiṅga) from state taxes. There was no khañjā at the fort area level for the offices of the west gate guard, the inner guard and the doorkeeper, all of whom depended on payment from the state for their existence.

There is another interesting document that deals with the expenditure of state tax in the locality on ritual occasions (Table 3.15). It shows that apart from the amount spent on the gifts for gods of various levels, and for Gaṇeśa pūjā and Rāmacaṇḍī festival in the fort area as a whole, expenditures of state tax in the region included gifts to important officials on ritual occasions, such as the swing festival, Meṣa saṃkrānti, mother cow festival and new regnal year.

It is vital to note that these gifts were not just payments, but gifts given on each occasion every year. Many scholars have pointed out that one of the key functions of ritual performance and exchanges is the construction of socio-political relations. Gifts to the king and the three main ministers on the occasion of the new regnal year represented the acceptance of royal and ministerial authority;
Table 3.13 Expenditure of state tax for deities and rituals in Manitri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Expenditure (in cowry)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Śrī Satyabādi Deva (deity at Sakhigopal near Puri)</td>
<td>22. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 sheep for the state (<em>khatāhu bodā 5 goṭā</em>)</td>
<td>25. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment along with these sheep (<em>e bodā salā saminga</em>)</td>
<td>11. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… [illegible] …, payment for entertaining visitors [?] (<em>melāni kharaca</em>)</td>
<td>29. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarified butter for fire sacrifice (<em>homa ghia</em>)</td>
<td>16. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… [illegible] …</td>
<td>6. 12. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… [illegible] …</td>
<td>20. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the sword hut of Rāmacaṇḍī of this fort, for <em>Āświna</em> month festival¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 sheep [for sacrifice]</td>
<td>10. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffaloes [for sacrifice]</td>
<td>9. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palace offerings [in Garh Manitri]</td>
<td>22. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of above</td>
<td>176. 10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift of silver coin at the new regnal year (<em>aṅka bheṭi ŭaṅkā</em>), 16 rupee²</td>
<td>64. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For things, yoghurt, clarified butter, pumpkin etc.</td>
<td>25. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total [for new regnal year]</td>
<td>89. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the swing festival (<em>dola parbahu</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured powder etc. (<em>abira ogara</em>) 10 units</td>
<td>15. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweets (<em>sāe sākara</em>) 10 units</td>
<td>10. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick peas (<em>chaṇā</em>), 15 nauti</td>
<td>5. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total [of swing festival]</td>
<td>30. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Meṣa saṃkrānti [paṇā saṃkrānti festival]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God Mahāvira’s paṇā drink …</td>
<td>2. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick peas (<em>chaṇā</em>), 12 nauti</td>
<td>3. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes, etc.</td>
<td>10. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, black sugar, yoghurt, cheese etc.</td>
<td>5. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total [of Meṣa saṃkrānti]</td>
<td>21. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For mother cow festival (<em>gasmā [gomā] parba</em>)</td>
<td>25. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting (<em>chāṛa khāi</em>)</td>
<td>25. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of above</td>
<td>190. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Notes
1 This refers to the Rāmacaṇḍī festival held in autumn. The sword hut is the place where the sword as the bearer of the goddess’s power is worshipped.
2 From this document, it is possible to know that 16 rupees was equivalent to 64 kāhāṇa. This means that 1 rupee was 4 kāhāṇa at that time. This rate matches that of the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century (De 1952a, Heimann 1980, Perlin 1987: 367, Vogel 1991: 252).

they reproduced the relationship between the state and the locality. Moreover, the performance of annual rituals by the royal palace inside Garh Manetri village, funded by gifts from the king, confirmed the authority of kingship in the locality. Local officers also received royal gifts for the performance of rituals, symbolising their privileged positions in relation to the state and their right to
Local society and kingship

Claim authority through a share of royal sovereignty that came directly from the king (Dirks 1979). There is no doubt that these gifts were important in constructing politico-moral interpersonal relationships between the king and his officers.

It is clear that the hitherto prominent image of the state in premodern India as a body outside local society, extracting surplus through tax, does not apply here. As a matter of fact, the king and ministers who represented the state constituted specific relationships with members of the local community through various exchanges. These reproduced socio-political relationships in keeping with the principle of the centrality of kingship. Apart from providing salary and payment, the state gave specific privileges of tax exemption and reduction to office holders in the locality and made various gifts on ritual occasions. Furthermore, the king and ministers were provided with gifts of goods collected from local society at these times, linking them to the localities of the kingdom. The state accepted produce from the locality in the form of taxes, but immediately invested one third of this back into the locality. The redistributed produce, which the office holders in the locality received on ritual occasions, were no longer mere goods but politico-cultural capital imbued with royal privileges, honour and dominance.

This system of gifts centring on the king resulted in the penetration of royal authority into the localities and legitimised the local structure of dominance. For instance, the chief, in the logic of the lineage kinship system, was merely the first among equals. Yet, as he came to be imbued with royal authority through gifts

Table 3.14 Salary and allowance from the state to local officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiver</th>
<th>Amount (in cowry)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salary holders</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant of chief (Śaradāra jānīsī)</td>
<td>27. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiṭhi karaṇa</td>
<td>45. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hājira karaṇa</td>
<td>16. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭha karaṇa</td>
<td>65. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhuim muḷa</td>
<td>65. 10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total [of salary]</strong></td>
<td>220. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Allowance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>100. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palace</td>
<td>100. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West door guard</td>
<td>40. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner guard</td>
<td>15. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 doorkeepers</td>
<td>45. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State tax collector</td>
<td>79. 1. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total [of allowances]</strong></td>
<td>379. 1. 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
The original order in the record is maintained.
1 Illegible but calculated by subtraction from the total.
Table 3.15 Regional expenditures of state tax on ritual occasions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Expenditure (in cowry)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Lord Jagannātha’s chariot festival (Śrī Jagannātha mahāprabhuṅka guṇḍicā jātrā)</td>
<td>14. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For offering tulasī leaf and money-gift at the feet of Sri Satyabādi Deva</td>
<td>22. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Śrī Gopināth Deva’s rāsa jātrā festival at Barabati</td>
<td>2. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Mahāvīra’s Meṣa saṃkrānti day paṇā drink, at Narayanipada</td>
<td>2. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For silk on the same occasion [as above]</td>
<td>0. 9. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mugamanda Mahāvīra beubathi [?]</td>
<td>0. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures at the palace [in Garh Manitri] (behorare bae): total</td>
<td>84. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing festival</td>
<td>14. 12. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meṣa saṃkrānti</td>
<td>13. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>14. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New regnal year</td>
<td>37. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>14. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For pratihāri: total</td>
<td>7. 11. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing festival</td>
<td>1. 12. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>3. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New regnal year</td>
<td>1. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>1. 13. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For chief Paramananda Samantray: total</td>
<td>51. 5. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing festival</td>
<td>6. 12. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meṣa saṃkrānti</td>
<td>4. 12. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>11. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New regnal year</td>
<td>21. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>7. 1. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State minister’s (diwān sāhebaṅka) dasurā [?], new regnal year present</td>
<td>4. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State general’s (baksi sāhebaṅka) new regnal year present</td>
<td>4. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor, Mahapattra’s (rājaguru mahāpatraṅka) new regnal year present</td>
<td>4. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s new regnal year present</td>
<td>7. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For koṭha karaṇa: total</td>
<td>5. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>2. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>2. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For bhuiṃ mula: total</td>
<td>5. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>2. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>2. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For beherā pradhāna: total</td>
<td>2. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cow festival</td>
<td>1. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feast after fasting</td>
<td>1. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Gaṇeśa pūjā (haritāḷikā)</td>
<td>4. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New regnal year (suniā) gold coin (mohara)</td>
<td>20. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āśvina parba [Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī ‘great seventh’ festival]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarified butter for fire sacrifice (homa ghia)</td>
<td>20. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State (koṭha) buffalo</td>
<td>30. 4. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep 6</td>
<td>30. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for these sheep</td>
<td>18. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort’s Rāmacaṇḍī’s sword hut festival [‘great eighth’ festival]</td>
<td>37. 10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atharanga Rāmacaṇḍī festival</td>
<td>2. 8. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barabati Rāmacaṇḍī festival</td>
<td>4. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.
of honour and privilege such as the royal sword, he came to represent the king’s sovereignty in the locality, marking him out from the rest of the community. Other office holders, such as scribes and soldiers were also given titles, salary, tax reduction privileges and ritual privileges and through these gifts they acquired the added quality of being the king’s administrators and the king’s soldiers. In this way, the collection and expenditure of state taxes was intimately connected to the reproduction of socio-political relations between the king and his subjects. The system of entitlements functioned as a basis for both community cooperation and dominance through royal authority.

State, market and local community

Table 3.16 shows the shares that each entitlement holder received from the village, fort area and state and the tax taken from them. Royal prestation of salaries and other gifts to local community members signified the return—though only nominally, as, in reality, the resource always remained in the locality—of the resources collected from the locality, transformed as symbolic resources representing royal authority. This was a way in which direct relationships were established between certain individuals and the king. Through the prestations, each entitlement holder embodied a part, and came under the authority, of the king’s sovereignty. This in turn legitimised the system of entitlements and incorporated the fort areas into the administrative and military network of the kingdom. It was a symbiotic relationship; the existence of fort areas was indispensable for the running of the state but the local community also required the king as the central sacrificer and source of legitimation. In this way, there was a complementary combination of sacrificer state and sacrificial community.

It is important to note that the penetration of state power in seventeenth-to-eighteenth-century Khurda did not mean a considerable increase of the state revenue in a direct sense. The state’s revenue from the Manitri fort area came to no more than 14.81% of the total resources garnered from the area. One third of that was spent in the locality itself on local rituals and salaries for the officials stationed there. Thus, we see that the state’s overall revenue from the locality amounted to less than 10% of the total produce.

The fact that the Khurda kingdom did not take much revenue from the locality may seem contradictory to the findings of recent studies which argue that the state’s expansion of revenue enabled the maintenance of standing, professional armies in early modern India (Bayly 1983: 14–5, Peabody 2003: 80–111). However, as Gordon points out, the introduction of a new European-style military system based on disciplined battalions, following a unitary command, required large-scale military forces to be strategically effective. Only kingdoms with enough revenue to maintain such large standing armies adopted this system. Small kingdoms, such as Khurda, retained a military organisation based on the system of entitlements in local society until the colonial period (Gordon 2002: 174). This is related to a striking feature of the Khurda kingdom: the fine balance between the segmentary and decentralised lineage-type social formation
### Table 3.16 Shares and tax of offices (average per head), 1776–1777

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Provision from village (a)</th>
<th>Share from fort area</th>
<th>Tax on share and tax rate (%)</th>
<th>Share after tax reduction (b)</th>
<th>Payment from state (c)</th>
<th>Total of Share (a)+(b)+(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>458. 2. 0</td>
<td>13. 15. 0 (2.88)</td>
<td>444. 7. 0</td>
<td>100. 0. 0, 0</td>
<td>544. 7. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-level military personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>305. 0. 0</td>
<td>21. 5. 0 (6.99)</td>
<td>283. 11. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>283. 11. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileged soldiers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>226. 13. 0</td>
<td>11. 11. 0 (5.15)</td>
<td>215. 2. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>215. 2. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭha karana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77. 5. 0</td>
<td>8. 14. 12 (11.53)</td>
<td>68. 6. 8</td>
<td>65. 8. 0</td>
<td>133. 14. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koṭha bārika</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107. 6. 0</td>
<td>8. 6. 4 (7.81)</td>
<td>98. 15. 16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98. 15. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot soldiers</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>101. 0. 2</td>
<td>10. 10. 11 (10.55)</td>
<td>90. 5. 11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90. 5. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for offerings)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84. 14. 9</td>
<td>5. 13. 16 (6.90)</td>
<td>79. 0. 13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79. 0. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village accountant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td>99. 4. 0</td>
<td>25. 11 (25.78)</td>
<td>73. 9. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73. 9 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiṭhi karaṇa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72. 0. 0</td>
<td>72. 0. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhuṁ muḷa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65. 10. 0</td>
<td>65. 10. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector of fines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60. 10. 0</td>
<td>4. 11. 5 (3.91)</td>
<td>55. 14. 15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55. 14. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed-maker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40. 0. 0</td>
<td>2. 15. 5 (7.38)</td>
<td>37. 0. 15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37. 0. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter (fort level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33. 8. 0</td>
<td>2. 7. 11 (7.38)</td>
<td>31. 0. 9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31. 0. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal village head</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>42. 10. 0</td>
<td>14. 11. 0 (34.38)</td>
<td>27. 15. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27. 15. 0 +α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military musician</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28. 10. 9</td>
<td>1. 2. 7 (3.91)</td>
<td>27. 8. 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27. 8. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber (fort level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28. 0. 0</td>
<td>2. 1. 2 (7.38)</td>
<td>25. 14. 18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25. 14. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village head</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4. 5. 7</td>
<td>37. 0. 19</td>
<td>16. 8. 9 (44.60)</td>
<td>20. 8. 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24. 13. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter (fort level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25. 0. 0</td>
<td>1. 13. 10 (7.38)</td>
<td>23. 2. 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23. 2. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (donated land)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21. 6. 8</td>
<td>2. 12. 16 (13.21)</td>
<td>18. 9. 12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18. 9. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hājira karaṇa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16. 14. 0</td>
<td>16. 14. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue collector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>26. 7. 0</td>
<td>9. 0. 10 (34.38)</td>
<td>16. 6. 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16. 6. 10+α</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Provision from village (a)</th>
<th>Share from fort area</th>
<th>Tax on share and tax rate (%)</th>
<th>Share after tax reduction (b)</th>
<th>Payment from state (c)</th>
<th>Total of Share (a)+(b)+(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15. 5. 11</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>15. 5. 11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15. 5. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gods (for servants’ salary)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23. 8. 0</td>
<td>10. 2. 0 (42.97)</td>
<td>13. 6. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13. 6. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11. 0. 0</td>
<td>0. 3. 0 (7.38)</td>
<td>10. 3. 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10. 3. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber (village level)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9. 6. 0</td>
<td>2. 14. 18 (31.25)</td>
<td>6. 7. 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6. 7. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washerman (village level)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7. 14. 16</td>
<td>2. 7. 9 (31.25)</td>
<td>5. 7. 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5. 7. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter (village level)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6. 10. 8</td>
<td>2. 1. 5 (31.25)</td>
<td>4. 9. 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4. 9. 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf manuscripts collected by author at Barabati.

Note
1. The numbers, other than the number of offices and percentage, are in cowry.
2. (a) = Provision from village, (b) = khañjā after tax reduction, (c) = Payment from state.
   a Parakshit Rautray and Sukhadeb Srichandan, who were foot soldiers from the chief’s regiment and had privileged tax rates.
   b This includes the sub-chief (regiment leader), fort gate guard, boundary guard, fort watchman and other foot soldiers, but excludes majukuri regiment, Parakshit Rautray and Sukhadeb Srichandan.
   c This is further divided and held by priests and other entitlement holders who were responsible for providing deities with goods and services.
   d ‘α’ in the total indicate that there is a provision from village which is illegible.
   e The two servants of the deities, a brāhmaṇa and a gardener, also held khañjā from the share of the deities for offerings.
Local society and kingship

and organic caste society combined with the centralised authority of the sacrificer king.

Increased access to merchant capital, through trade tax and selling royal shares of grain in the market, probably did play an important role in maintaining the standing army. At the local level, the king levied direct taxes on those who were engaged in commercial activities. State taxes collected in cash (cash parts in Table 3.1) had various components, such as tax on swidden fields producing raw cotton (toiḷā kara), tax for fish giving (?) (māccha diā, probably related to fish business) and oil-pressor piece tax (teli khaṇḍi kara, probably related to oil business).36

It is difficult to ascertain the details of these taxes but it is interesting to note that they were paid in cowries by business-related chandinadars or chandina raiyats who resided on cāndanā (chandina) homesteads without entitlements in the locality. Those taxed included fishermen, cotton-carders, weavers and oil-pressers who engaged in business and commercial activities. On a grander scale, it is said that the king’s treasury was enriched “from sayer duties levied on the transit of grain, salt, and every species of merchandise through the territory of Khurda” (Ewer Report: 59, para 173).

Concurrently, the royal garrisons stationed in the hilly tract forts that contained the majority of Khurda’s military strength were largely maintained through the locality-based system of entitlements. What the early modern state of Khurda did was not so much to hire soldiers directly through revenue, but to extend its surveillance and control to and through the military and administrative personnel in the forts. It did so by endorsing and legitimising privileged entitlements of specialised ‘peasant soldiers’ in the local communities. It supplemented some of these honoured positions with a state salary—rather than depending on prebendal levies of ‘armed peasants’—and by adding administrators to the forts which ensured some degree of control by the state.38 The state salary given to some of the more privileged military officers and administrators was part of the local produce given in the king’s name. Thus, it is necessary, while recognising the growing importance of the hired standing army and centralised administration, to acknowledge both state control over and dependence on local society for administrative and military needs.39

The state and the local community, however, did not function outside the vibrant market and its commerce. As part of the process of state formation from the late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, communities were opening up and monetary institutions were being introduced. These factors assisted the commercialisation of the local economy. The state surveyed, recorded and calculated the local resources in cowry and collected tax in cowry (Figure 3.4). The development of the definition and recording of entitlements in numerical terms enabled the value of products to be translated into their monetary equivalent. The state’s translation of local resources into monetary terms helped to connect the local share-based economy with the wider market.40 The wide usage of money and increased importance of the market and trade for the extensive population in the hinterland of Orissa did not mean that there was a breakdown of the community-based system...
of entitlements. In spite of the popular view that “caste-based relations of subsistence” and “money and market” are incompatible (Stein 1989: 10), there was no contradiction but actually even interdependence between local society and the market.41

The local system of entitlements and the market were connected by chandina-
dars. They were not entitlement holders but resided in the locality and contributed towards local activities through the payment of a high tax. They included many business-related caste people such as oil-pressers, sweet-makers, cowherds (who sold milk and dairy products), fishermen (who made and sold flattened rice, cuṟā), weavers and cotton-carders. These people supported the vibrant trade and commerce in the early modern era. Their residence tax and land tax was not only paid in the form of cowry but through certain specified goods.42 One cotton-carder, for example, was to provide yoghurt, pots, firewood and salt to Govinda Jiu, the tutelary god of the chiefly lineage. These had to be procured from the cowherd, potter, Saora and salt merchants, respectively.

The business-related caste population had cowry at hand, since cowry was the currency of everyday trade. Through the payment of tax by these people, cowry money found its way into the hands of entitlement holders in the local community as well. Also, the non-business entitlement holders in the locality sold raw cotton and surplus rice to the cotton-carders/weavers and merchants, respectively, and earned cowry. The existence of chandinadars in the locality was thus a mechanism through which the local system of entitlements opened itself to the larger mar-
ket. There were thriving local markets (hāṭa) where peasants and merchants were involved in monetary exchanges using cowry.43
The circulation of cowry was vital for such chains of transaction. The British consistently bought a large amount of cowry from the Maldives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to meet the expenses of the textile trade in eastern India and the slave trade in West Africa (Heimann 1980, Perlin 1987). In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bengal, weavers were paid in advance in cowry (Perlin 1986: 1045, 1987: 300, 320). There is no reason to doubt that this was also the case with Orissa in the same period, where cowry was widely used (De 1952a, b). So cowry passed from traders and moneylenders to weavers, cotton-carders, various teasers and spinners, to cotton cultivators, including not only khaṇḍāyatas but also, more importantly, bāuris (labourers) and Saoras (tribal), whose dependency on swidden fields was greater. The level of monetisation in the wider population of the hinterland and the importance of cowry in early modern Orissa should receive more recognition than it is usually afforded.

Some of the cotton textiles found their way to English and Dutch traders in the ports of Orissa. There were English and Dutch factories in Pipli (from 1630) and Balasore (from 1633), which were important centres of textile trade in seventeenth-century Bay of Bengal (Prakash 1998). In an account written between 1669 and 1679, we find a mention of Orissa by an English trader, Bowrey: “Rare and considerable quantities of callicoes made and sold to the English and Dutch, cut and finish brought over land to them in their territories in Ballaasore [sic] in the Bay of Bengala [sic]”. The textile trade connected forested villages to the wider world economy.

We may note the striking interrelationships between the vibrant monetary economy, the development of administrative technology and the corresponding bottom-up transformation of the local community. There was indeed increasing compatibility between the local community, the territorial state and the market economy in eighteenth-century Khurda.

**Personhood, patriotism and devotion**

Though politico-economic developments of the eighteenth century remain central to understanding early modernity in India, this study is not limited to those aspects. As part of a more comprehensive perspective, let us now explore the development of personhood in the early modern period, examined here in relation to the Gajapati kingship and the Jagannātha cult.

There was a direct relationship between the duties and rights of the entitlements system and personhood. The intimate and organic relationship between entitlements and a person’s identity can be seen in the ‘embodied’ nature of entitlements. Food is one of the most important determinants of the biomoral nature of a person. It is produced on the land allocated to a family as a part of the patrimonial entitlements. There is a telling expression about the nurturing of the body through land: when a man occupies a service land, he is said to ‘eat the land’ (jami khāībā). In other words, the entitlement holder is feeding his body from the produce of the allotted land. Thus we see that there is a parallel conception of body,
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Personhood and allotted land (Marriott 1976, Daniel 1984), as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6.

Personhood in the local system of entitlements was also connected to the cult of the local goddess. The tutelary goddesses of the forts represented the mother earth of the locality herself, like Rāmacaṇḍī in Garh Mantri. Among the duties prescribed in the local system of entitlements was the sacrificial service for the local tutelary goddess on whose mercy and power all prosperity and victories are dependent. The bodily connection with the allotted land implies that there is also an organic relationship between the local goddess and the residents as her children whose bodies are nurtured by the mother earth herself.

The local community in Orissa not only contained familiar surroundings and people, but also defined the patrimonial rights to the products of the land and duties in the community via the system of entitlements. This may well have led to feelings of indebtedness, creating a moral bond with the local community, which can be called ‘patriotism’ in a primordial sense. The territorial and moral basis of people’s identity was embedded in the exchange relationships of substance-codes, involving body, food and land. This exchange intimately connected people to the local community and land. With the intervention of the god-king in early modern Orissa, this patriotic love for the local community came to be connected with love for one’s country and the divine supreme. For this local sense of patriotism to extend into patriotism for the country, it required a further step.

From the late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the king succeeded in establishing himself as the source of entitlements in the locality. All the entitlements, as family histories tell us, were considered to have been granted by the king (see Chapter 6). In other words, the entitlement holders ate the land given by the king and embodied a part of the sovereignty. Also, the king established himself as the sacrificer centring on the local system of entitlements. In the Rāmacaṇḍī festival (Chapter 8), the goddess’s power becomes pacified and benevolent only after the king plays his role as sacrificer. Furthermore, as the Khurda king developed intimate relationships with the Jagannātha temple in Puri, this sacrificial service became connected with the Jagannātha cult (Figure 2.1).

The relationship between the Khurda king and the Jagannātha temple in Puri was strengthened when Narasimha Deva (1622–1647) built the king’s own palace in Puri to the south of Jagannātha temple and meticulously ordained a complicated system of rights and duties surrounding the rituals of Jagannātha in which the king himself played a crucial role (Kulke 1978c: 332). The Khurda king, as the ādya sebaka (first servant) of Lord Jagannātha, also appeared to have gained divine attributes as “the Gajapatis became known as ōhakur-rājās/deva-rājās (divine kings) only under the ... Khurdā-Rājās”.

This divinisation and ritualisation of the Khurda king was a significant development in regard to his responsibility as the sacrificer legitimising and authorising entitlements in the sacrificial community. With the divine king representing Kṛṣṇa-Jagannātha on earth as the sacrificer, the members of the sacrificial community were able to connect themselves to the kingdom and beyond towards the
universal divine. The entitlement holders carried out the duties prescribed by the king as their service to the local goddess, king and Jagannātha.

The development of the bhakti (devotionalism) cult in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Orissa is relevant here. According to Mukherjee, “Viṣṇuism became the dominant religion in Orissa” during this period (Mukherjee 1978: 319). In the shaping of this early modern Vaiṣṇava bhakti cult, there was a “blending of the typical Oriya school of Viṣṇuism and the Jagannātha cult with the Caitanya faith” (ibid). The khaṇḍāyatas accepted Vaiṣṇava monks as their family gurus. Monasteries for Vaiṣṇava monks were built even in remote areas, including Garh Manitri, and land was donated to support their maintenance, as palm leaf records from 1776–1806 tell us.

Vaiṣṇava teachings to householders often stressed the necessity of performing all duties in service to god. These teachings blended karma yoga (the path of action) with bhakti yoga (the path of devotion), requiring the performance of duty as a sacrifice for the divine. This idea of sacrifice was not a new invention of the early modern period and can be found in the Hindu classics, such as the Bhagavad Gītā. It might be said, however, that the idea of performing duty as sacrifice came to be connected with the early modern structure of the sacrificer state and sacrificial community in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was concomitant with the development of the king’s authority as sacrificer in the locality and the intensification of the king’s relationship with the Jagannātha cult. Thus, each entitlement holder, while remaining in the limited space and time of the here and now, could make everyday activities into acts of service for the divine, linking himself with the universal. The divine king as sacrificer acted as the mediator between community members and the supreme.

Here the subjectivity and identity of community members were no longer simply embedded in the social structure. Although duty was still demarcated by the local sacrificial organisation and performed thereof, identity was self-reflexively defined in relation to the larger sphere of the kingdom and universe. This quality of self-reflexivity connected people to a larger sphere beyond the locality and constitutes early modern subjectivity. It was nurtured through the interaction of local people with the symbolic presence of the king. It can be said that subjectivity was shaped by the subtle workings of early modern royal power penetrating to the level of individuals.

Following Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and power (1977, 1978, 1983), we can argue that early modern subjects in Orissa, who took everyday duty as service for the king and Jagannātha, became subject to the workings of royal power. However, we must be careful to note the difference between the disciplinary power postulated by Foucault as internalised by the modern European subject, and the kind of power that was internalised by early modern subjects in Orissa. In Foucault’s rendition of disciplinary power, the transcendental gaze was assumed by individuals and accepted as if it were their own gaze. Individuals, thus, willingly disciplined themselves in accordance with social norms and ethics. This involves a characteristically Kantian dichotomy between
mind and body. Reason seated in the mind is supposed to control and discipline the desiring body as the basis of the civil man.

In the case of early modern Orissa, however, bodily existence and desire were never totally denied. Even today, the corporeal element constitutes an important aspect of personhood and identity as the body is constructed in relation to marriage, food and land, which define one’s positionality in society (see Chapter 4). Also, desire was not to be suppressed or denied but to be channelled towards god. Even sexual desire was good as long as it was directed towards the godhead (Kṛṣṇa), as propagated in the Śrīmad Bhāgabata Mahāpurāṇa. Thus, there is continuity between body, desire and mind here. The body and desire were not so much controlled by reason as they were channelled towards the divine with devotion. And this is precisely what the early modern royalty did; they mediated and made possible the channelling of the self for the service of the universal godhead of Kṛṣṇa-Jagannātha.

Accompanying the transformation of subjectivity in the early modern period, there emerged a new kind of relationship between the local and the regional (Orissa), one that brought about a grassroots sense of patriotism. This sense of patriotism connected the people’s attachment to land, hitherto confined to the micro-regional locality, with the cultural design of sovereignty and political legitimacy at the regional level of Orissa (Tanabe 2011). Recent research on patriotism in early modern India has shown its non-exclusive characteristics, which allow the coexistence of multiple and heterogeneous identities alongside the sense of belonging to the same country (Bayly 1998, Ray 2003). Bayly, for instance, has paid attention to the continuous development from early modern patriotism to nationalism under colonialism, an important criticism of modernist theories on nationalism, such as those of Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983).

In the case of the Khurda kingdom, the king played the role of sacrificer, at least nominally, even for local communities. The mechanism of sacrifice, thus, enabled various members with different positions and values to share and have a sense of commitment and belonging to the politico-moral space of the local community, which in turn was connected to the state. This integration through plurality and difference formed the basis of patriotism in early modern Orissa.

A notable feature of Oriya patriotism was that the network of exchanges centring on the Jagannātha cult and Gajapati kingship succeeded in connecting the people’s sense of self, which was embedded in particular localities and goddess cults, with ideas and institutions at regional level concerning sovereignty and political legitimacy. It did this without imposing homogeneity. This was made possible by incorporating the local system of entitlements into the state machinery and establishing the king as the source of entitlements and the central sacrificer. It integrated people of the region who connected themselves to Jagannātha through different channels, simultaneously allowing for the continuity of sub-regional and micro-regional identities, often associated with particular polities and communities—little kingdoms, chieftaincies, micro-regions and castes—and correspondingly diverse forms of cultural, religious and livelihood practices rooted in localities, clans and various natural environments. Although there was indeed
no integrated ‘country’ in early modern Orissa, there was a shared sense of the sovereignty of Jagannātha and the political legitimacy of the Gajapati institution among the sub-regional units that constituted the Orissan patria at the level of political morality or political theology. In this way, inhabitants came to identify themselves in relation to the country of Jagannātha and Gajapati, that is, Orissa.56

Concluding remarks

This chapter has tried to demonstrate the importance of the system of entitlements as a mechanism for socio-political reproduction and its relationship to the state and market in early modern Khurda. It was not the village-level jajmani system based on dyadic relations between patron and client households but the system of entitlements at the level of the fort area between the village and the state that prescribed the division of labour and distribution of resources in the locality.

The system of entitlements in early modern Khurda played a vital role for the state. The local community of the fort area was a crucial unit for socio-political reproduction but it was never an autonomous one. With the establishment of state power in the locality in the early modern era, the fort area and its system of entitlements came to be more organically incorporated into the state machinery, as the king became the central authority of the territorial state and was considered ideologically the sole source of resources.

This did not mean, however, that all entitlement holders were organised directly under the king. There were tensions between the state’s attempt to place the military and administrative function of the fort under the king’s direct control and the dependence of the state on local society for the reproduction of human and material resources. The chief, soldiers and administrators were stationed in the fort as a royal garrison, whilst also tied into the local system of entitlements. Thus, the fort area was placed between the control of the early modern state and embeddedness in the local system of entitlements.

This new focus on the system of entitlements leads us to reconsider caste. Caste was not primarily about socio-religious hierarchy as Dumont contends. Rather, it was about the ascribed and/or achieved roles and positions in a complementary social whole, which was based on the system of entitlements. The system of entitlements came to be centred on the king’s authority in the early modern era, and thus the neo-Hocartian postulation of the centrality of the king in caste as a sacrificial organisation is correct to some extent. However, we should remember that the king’s authoritative position as the source of all entitlements and honour should be seen in the context of the historical transformation of the early modern period, rather than as the essential character of caste, which Dirks (1987) seems to suggest.57

Moreover, it was mainly at an ideological level that the sacrificial organisation of the local community came to require the presence of the king as the sacrificer in this early modern development. Although the state indeed attempted to go beyond ideological centrality and gain direct control over military and administrative personnel, this was a measure that compromised rather than characterised the
principle of the system of entitlements. Analysis of early modern Khurda shows that in reality there was a complex balance between the locally based system of entitlements and the power of royalty—both ideological and real—in the working of caste. Caste in early modern India should be contextualised within the complex relationships between state and society rather than reduced to either the socio-religious value proposed by Dumont or a political ideology of kingship in the neo-Hocartian sense.

The most notable feature of early modern Khurda is the incorporation of the local communities of fort areas into the state apparatus as military and administrative centres that established compatible relationships with the vibrant market and trade. As localities were inducted into the redistributive structure of the state and the administrative technology of accounting was introduced, the localities came to be part of a wider network of market exchange.

This transformation of the locality brings us to the emergence of a sense of patriotism in early modern Orissa, revolving around the Jagannātha cult and Gajapati kingship. People’s affection for the land, embedded in the organic connection between their body-personhood and the mother goddess of the locality, was mediated through the institution of kingship to the cult of Jagannātha, the real ruler of Orissa. The Gajapati king, the representative of Jagannātha on earth, had established himself as the central sacrificer and the source of all entitlements. Therefore, the duties assigned in the local system of entitlements now came to be redefined as sacrificial service for not only the local goddess but also the king and Jagannātha. The dutiful were allowed to maintain their way of life as long as it was offered as service for the country and god. It was through such a mechanism that early modern Khurda managed integration through difference.

Notes

1 An aim of this chapter is to interject in the debate on the “yet some unspecified ‘medieval Indian social formation’” (Stein 1985b: 83) or the “medieval Indian system” (Habib 1985: 49), cf Kulke (1995b: 16). This question is not limited to medieval India but also extends to early modern India.

2 It was Kotani (1996, 2002) who first elaborated upon the logic and details of the vatan system for early modern Deccan, partly based on Fukazawa’s earlier findings (1972, 1982, 1991). Mizushima (1996, 2006) followed with his description of the mirasi system for early modern South India. Also see Perlin (1977) on the “system of rights” in eighteenth-century Maratha state. What Kotani, Mizushima and Perlin call vatan system, mirasi system and system of rights, respectively, are different in terms of perspective, but seem to point to essentially the same institutional phenomenon that I call the system of entitlements.

3 For a classic description of the jajmani system, see Wiser (1969 [1936]). Srinivas (1955) later redefined the concept of the jajmani system from reciprocity to caste dominance. For reviews of the jajmani system, see Beidelman (1959), Kolenda (1963), Parry (1979: 74–83), Fuller (1989: 33–63) and Mayer (1993).

Yet, some confusion over the concepts of the jajmani system, the system of village servants and the system of entitlements still persists. For instance, Peabody does not distinguish between the jajmani system and what he calls “the complementary share system”, which he rightly says “provided the ideological underpinnings for revenue extraction at the village level” (Peabody 2003: 92–3). The latter shares similarities with the system of entitlements. Fukazawa (1972, 1991), Kulkarni (1996: 71–4), Fuller (1989: 36–9) and Mayer (1993) point out the basic conceptual difference between the jajmani system and the system of village servants (baluta in west India). Mayer (1993) suggests that jajmani may have been introduced after the precolonial division of labour and exchange broke down due to colonisation—a theory that accords with my reading of the historical data from Khurda (Tanabe 1998). For discussions on historical changes in the division of labour and exchange, see Fukazawa (1972, 1991), Fuller (1977, 1989), Gough (1981: 204), Kulkarni (1996), Mizushima (1990) and Sato (1990). Yet, it is not entirely correct to refer to the precolonial system in terms of village servants. Not only village servants per se—artisans and the so-called service castes—but also village headmen, scribes, accountants, soldiers and religious specialists held hereditary entitlements (with accompanying duties) in the locality.

In the case of Khurda, there were many Muslim warriors including even a Muslim chief in Manika Garh. Muslims in Manika Garh also participated in community rituals, including the worship of local goddesses by the brâhmaṇas. This community practice coexisted along with Islamic belief and practice within the Muslim group. Therefore, sacrifice was not a religious institution in the sense of bringing about a shared system of a particular belief, as it allowed for diversity in the religious sphere.

Moreover, the office and the title were inherited by one of the sons or an adopted son only. Other brothers had to search for other posts. Also, some offices in the coastal area were alienable as I will discuss later. These facts diminished the ascriptive aspects of the entitlements.

Relevant here is Quigley’s insight that caste is a form of structure created in the tension between kinship and kingship (1993: 229). For Quigley the caste system represents the failure of kingship to assert its centrality against the pull of kinship. Problematically, he does not consider the level of the local community and the system of entitlements as an integrative social system providing a basis for caste.

The bhiāṇa in this period contained what may be translated as records of rights by person based on shares. In the colonial period, the multiple rights of entitlement holders were reduced to landownership, and the contents of bhiāṇa were transformed into land records by person. From the colonial government’s point of view, this represented a record of taxes that were supposed to be paid by individuals, and the Maddox Report refers to the “Bhians” as “Rent rolls” (i). We can see the transformation of the nature of right in a concentrated form in the change of the meaning of the word bhiāṇa from precolonial to colonial times.

For example, see Kulkarni (1993) on source materials of the Maratha revenue records that can be used for the study of village structure.

For example, receiving a śāṛhī—a cloth bound on the head—was a symbol of the sacred assignment to the office by the king and Jagannātha.

It has been reported that some offices were alienable in other parts of precolonial India, too (Fukazawa 1982: 251, Bayly 1983, Mizushima 1990, Habib 1999: 125, Kotani 2002). Fuller also mentions that the transfer of inām grants and rights in public worship were common practice from long past (Fuller 1983: 97).

It is said that the peasants in this area considered the term chandina derogatory (Rate Report: 84, part II, para 210).

For Khurda’s regnal years, see Mahapatra (1969).

See Fuller (1989) and Peabody (2003: 93) for criticisms of the non-monetary and non-market characterisation of precolonial Indian society.
From the cash part, payment for the village head is subtracted and the rest is given for fort-level entitlements. The documents clearly prescribe that this payment for the village head is from the village level rather than from the fort level. Payment for the village heads varied from 3 kāhāṇa to 5 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa (Table 3.6).

Khañjā supplies consisted of various items such as swidden fields (toiḷā khañjā), mango trees, yoghurt and pots. They also included various tolls such as village toll (desa māguṇi), car festival toll (Guṇḍicā māguṇi), Bhādraba month toll (bhodua māguṇi: most probably for the Krishna birth festival, Kṛṣṇa janmāṣṭamī), cowry for suniā festival (suniā kauṛi: suniā is a festival marking the beginning of the new reg-numeral year, held on the twelfth of the bright fortnight of Bhādraba [August–September]; see Marglin (1985: 165–6) and Hardenberg (2000)), Kumāra full moon festival toll (Kumāra purnami [sic] māguṇi), toll for the chief (sānta [sic] māguṇi), toll for widows (rāṇḍi dei māguṇi: probably for the fasting (osā) which widows observed in the month of Kārttika), meal (bhāt) for Basu Mahanti, meal for Gopal Patnaek [sic], meal for barber (basantarā bhāt), Jagannanda’s arajuri [?], sītha meal [?], toll for giving four [?] (chāri dei māguṇi) and swidden field plough [?] (toiḷā haḷa).


Census of Orissa 1981; cadastral palm leaf manuscripts collected by author.

The date of the manuscript is uncertain but it was found together with other documents dated to around the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, so they can be presumed to be coeval.

This can be conjectured from the present population pattern. They are said to be from the kingdom of Athagarh and the descendants of a brāhmaṇa father and a sweet-maker mother.

In Manitri, there were twelve villages (desa) excluding the fort-village. Only eight of them had village heads. Bathua is uninhabited but had a village head, whereas Chhiam, Mugamanda, Abhilo and Akhupadara were inhabited but had no village head. The principal village head probably took care of these villages.

Suāsiā literally means ‘one who prepares the bedding’ and performed all sorts of tasks for the families of the king and the chief. It is not certain why their household cannot be found in the population chart by caste in Table 3.3. Today there are five suāsiā (now called sejuā) families in Barabati (Table 1.1).

Watchmen were dalits of the kaṇḍārā caste. Today the office of watchman is referred to as chatiā.

For instance, according to the Maddox Report, in 1890–1900, the washerman, barber, carpenter and so on were “all, though nominally the servants of the community, in the habit of receiving small fixed payments from the villagers, besides fees on special occasions” (233). Maddox categorises the washerman, barber and carpenter not as community servants but as village servants. This is in accordance with the general understanding of the colonial government and of most researchers on Indian sociology in the past. However, as I have mentioned, they should not be seen as servants of the village but servants of the local community and the state, at least in the hilly tracts of the Khurda kingdom.

The meaning of mazkūri is given in one dictionary as “independent Ta’allukdārs who paid their own rents to Government” (Steingass 1892).

However, koṭha bārika did not receive any land or salary from the state.

Only three of the names of fort guards can be ascertained due to gaps in the document. It is highly likely that the three other names were also Muslim but this is not certain. It was not rare to find Muslim soldiers in Khurda as elsewhere. There were many Muslim foot soldiers in Khurda and even a chief of a fort (daḷabeherā) at Manika Garh.

In fact, many bāuris have the title of kāṇṭi even today.

On pāika ākhaṛā, see Tanabe 1995.
Habib says, “The existence of ‘untouchables’ was ... a pillar of Indian peasant agriculture from very early times” (Habib 1999: 144). Mizushima (1990) and Yanagisawa (1996) also note the importance of low-caste members as agricultural labourers in pre-colonial South India.

‘Thān’ means ‘local’. Formal members of the local community are called thānī in Cuttack region.

The festival of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī represents most succinctly the cultural paradigm of the sacrificer state and sacrificial community. See Chapter 8.

The office of assistant of chief (śaradāra jānīsī) and baiṭhi karaṇa belonged to the same person as can be seen from another document.

It is not certain how the nature of this allowance differed from the salary of the same administrative officers, but this payment was also no doubt given to officers essential for the running of the state.

Other state taxes include levy for seedlings [?] (taḷī kuḷa), oxen toll (baḷada pasaṇi) and pole tax (khuṇṭa kara). The content of these taxes are also difficult to ascertain.

According to Hobson-Jobson (Yule and Burnell 1903: 799), “The term Sayer in the eighteenth century was applied to a variety of inland imposts, but especially to local and arbitrary charges levied by zamindars and other individuals, with a show of authority, on all goods passing through their estate by land or water, or sold at markets (bazar, haut, gunge) established by them, charges which formed in the aggregate an enormous burden upon the trade of the country”.

See Alavi (1995) for the difference between ‘peasant soldiers’ and ‘armed peasants’.

As Kotani points out, it is necessary to distinguish between small kingdoms and great kingdoms here. For great kingdoms like Maratha, the importance of enhanced revenue and standing army would be greater than for small kingdoms like Khurda (Kotani 2004). Perhaps it is also necessary to pay attention to the functioning and workings of the lesser polities within great kingdoms in this regard.

A lot of attention has been paid to the relationship between the state and trade and between the state and community in early modern India (e.g. Bayly 1983, Stein 1980, Karashima 1984, 1992, 2002, Dirks 1987, Subrahmanyam 1990b, 2001, Kulke 1995b and Peabody 2003). However, the place of the community in relation to trade has escaped extensive analysis. The development of the interrelationship between the two is worth some investigation. Menon points out, “There is a tendency to conceive of the economies of town and countryside in opposed terms in which commerce and the market are seen as independent of peasant sociology. The rural sphere is seen as characterized by a moral redistributive economy” (Menon 1999). However, he argues, in reference to the precolonial situation in Malabar, “what we have here is a situation in which both the independence offered by the market and jajmani style patronage coexisted largely on account of the volatile nature of the economy” (Menon 1999). His line of thought represents a totalising perspective which sees the relationship between the community and the market as not necessarily opposed but interdependent. Yet, the kind of jajmani relationships that developed around the households that Menon describes appears significantly different from the system of entitlements in Khurda. His jajmani relations may represent the stage when the system of entitlements was inflected by commercialisation and was reorganised around individual households. Or it may be reflecting regional differences in social structure. In Khurda, the rural community ‘redistributive economy’ seems to have been compatible with the existence of trade alongside it. The conditions and content of the transformation of the community across different regions in the early modern period need more serious investigation.

See note 17 for examples of taxes paid in cowry and kind.
Cotton textile and rice seem to have been the two major items that were traded from the hinterland of Khurda, besides salt from Chilika Lake. Cotton textile is still considered a specialty of Khurda. There are ecological reasons behind this. Raw cotton was grown mainly in swidden fields in forests and the hilly tracts, which Khurda had in abundance. In Garh Manitri in 1829–1830, of 645.91 acres of cultivated or inhabited land, as much as 128.83 acres (19.95%) consisted of swidden fields. The raw cotton produced in these was given to the cotton-carders (tulabhīṇā) who carded and teased it into cotton wool, then to others (probably women of different castes) who spun it into thread and then to handloom weavers (tanti) who wove them into cloth.

Hossain (1979: 340–1) says that weavers received advance in sicca rupees but exchanged them for cowries to shop in market.

According to Perlin, “Bengali merchants imported cowries as early as the sixteenth century, exchanging rice and textiles for them at their point of production in the Maldives” and “in seventeenth century ... cowries are found widely utilized in the Indian subcontinent. By the mid-eighteenth century, copper had displaced the shell from most of its old regions of use ... The grand exception lies in eastern India, where Bengal, part of its Bihar hinterland, and Orissa absorbed ever greater quantities, right into the early nineteenth century” (Perlin 1987: 241).


I would like to emphasise the importance of the local community as the basis of people’s identity, with its patrimonial lands, houses and offices, its “sacred groves and local shrines” (Schaar 1981: 309), and its neighbourhood and community, all of which biomorally formed the people’s body-personhood. The significance of the local community or fort area in the hilly tracts of Orissa as both the unit of the system of entitlements and the basis of identity is perhaps comparable to the significance of the nāḍu in South India (see notes 14 and 17 in Chapter 2). Srinivas says, “A man has a great love for his nad” and points out, “Patriotism for one’s nad was widespread and deep” (Srinivas 1952: 66, 69). As Schaar points out, “To be a patriot is to have a patrimony, or ... the patriot is one who is grateful for a legacy and recognizes that the legacy makes him a debtor” (Schaar 1981: 288).

The term substance-code was coined by McKim Marriot (1976) to describe how substances are transmitted from one body to another with not only material but also semantic influence in Indian society. Transmitted substances such as water, blood, saliva or food would have natural-cultural effects on the receiver. In this kind of non-dualistic and monistic worldview, the natural and the cultural, thing and meaning, substance and code cannot be separated.

Kulke says it was Kapilendra (1435–1467) who first called himself “servant” of Jagannātha (Kulke 1978b: 205–6).


Jagannath Das translated, or rather re-rendered, the Sanskrit Bhāgavatam into Oriya in the sixteenth century. This Oriya Bhāgabata became the bible of the bhakti cult in early modern Orissa. Houses for Bhāgabata (Bhāgabata ghara) were made in hamlets for the villagers to recite and listen to. This tradition continues to this day.

Both Gellner and Anderson assume an inevitable teleology in which traditional societies develop to gain the fruits of modernity in the form of nationalism. Consequently, they both consider Third-World nationalism as some kind of application of the modern Western version. If this is the case, however, it might be wondered what was left for the non-Western world to “imagine” at all (Chatterjee 1993: 5). In this regard, Smith...
(1986, 1991, 1995) too has presented an important critique of Anderson and Gellner. His study of nationalism introduced the concept of ‘ethnie’. Like Bayly, he emphasised the continuous development of nationalism from the premodern period. However, the concept of ethnie proposed by Smith retains an air of primordial substantialism which connotes “ideas of blood and race” as the basis of shared identity (Bayly 1998: 11). The basis of politico-moral commitment to a political community, which seems the essence of proto-nationalism/patriotism, however, must be analysed with sensitivity to the specific politico-cultural logic that connects plural personhood to a polity and its territory.

Dirks is correct in pointing out, “The political economy of the south Indian kingdom was therefore ‘moral’ in the sense that access to power and resources was predicated on a set of culturally specific meanings regarding kingship” (Dirks 1987: 134). However, it is also important to recognise that “there were various tensions and disjunctions in the meanings associated with political relations” (Peabody 2003: 8).

I agree with Shotter that “solidarity with others does not mean everyone thinking and feeling the same. It simply means that, in realising the degree to which one relies upon one’s responsive relations with others in being oneself, one cares about establishing a common ground with them when required” (Shotter 1993: 201, emphasis in original). In Indian society, there are many kinds of solidarities—family, clan, hamlet, village, in-law-alliances, caste etc.—which are drawn upon when required.

On “political theology”, see Kantorowicz (1957) and Schnepel (1995b). This shared sense of political morality and love for Jagannātha’s country must indeed have had some part to play in the later formation of Oriya nationalism (see Chapter 5).

Inden and Karashima have suggested that the formation of caste in the medieval period was due to the weakness of kingship, rather than the centrality of kingship. Inden says, “it was the collapse of Hindu kingship which led to the formation of ‘castes’ in something resembling their modern form (albeit not as usually described). That is, the distinctive institution of Indian civilization does not appear until the thirteenth or fourteenth century, at the earliest; and castes are not the cause of the weakness and collapse of Hindu kingship, but the effect of it” (Inden 1990: 82). Karashima also says: “In the Tamil country the formation of jatis and consequent rearrangement of the hierarchy had been accelerated during the period of political instability and social disorder around the thirteenth century, … the process of formation was … by inclusion of some new communities who had gained power into the Brahmanical social order, and the struggle for hegemony between the new and old groups or among new groups caused the rearrangement of caste hierarchy. And, this establishment of new caste-hierarchy was not regulated by the king, but by the local people organized as assemblies” (Karashima 2009: 112).
Early colonial transformation
The emergence of wedged dichotomies

In this chapter and the next, I discuss the historical changes in local society under colonial rule in Orissa. I analyse the development of the dichotomy between the politico-economic sphere and the socio-cultural sphere, as well as the attendant negotiations and mediations. In the politico-economic sphere, the colonial state and the market constructed systems of governance that penetrated the grassroots by incorporating the hierarchy and power structure of local society. In the socio-cultural sphere, however, people sought the basis of community, on which their identities and social unity were supposed to be founded, in religion, rituals and customary social relationships.

We see that there were two stages of colonial transformation. The first transformation took place in the early nineteenth century, which marked the end of the early modern. The totality of social relations within the cosmological framework of the polity was broken down, giving way to a wedged dichotomy between the secular rationality of the political economy, as represented by the colonial state, and religious belief and social values, as represented by Hinduism, caste and divine kingship. The system of entitlements at the local level was replaced by individual land proprietorship, which no longer corresponded to personhood, patriotism or devotionalism. Instead, a land-based class order came to be associated with brahmanical caste hierarchy, which also was largely a colonial construction. Thus a ‘traditionalised’ Indian social formation characterised by ‘caste hierarchy’, ‘dominant caste’ and the ‘jajmani system’ was created in the early colonial period.

The second transformation took place with the overall subsumption and permeation of agrarian society by imperial rule and the colonial economy after the mid-nineteenth century. This second transformation will be taken up in the next chapter.

The British arrival and the fall of the Khurda kingdom

Continuity and disjunction: early British policy

The onset of colonial rule by the East India Company, which, by the mid-eighteenth century, had become one of the post-Mughal successor states, does not mark the introduction of modernity to India. As many historians argue, the continuity
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of early modernity in India experienced a definite break only in the 1820s or 1830s, when company rule, now expanding widely in the sub-continent, began to produce unmistakable effects in society (Marshall 2003: 34, Kanda 2017). The country completely shifted to a new regime in 1858 (Roy 2013), when control over the Government of India was transferred from the East India Company to the British Crown. For agrarian society in Khurda, Orissa, the end of the early modern can be placed at the first survey and settlement in 1820s–1830s, which introduced private property rights to each piece of land and brought about overall change to the socio-economic–political setup.

Precolonial India had its own politico-military dynamism originating from the indigenous design of competing supremacy. In Orissa, the idea of the whole represented by Jagannātha and Gajapati kingship did not mean either harmony or stagnation. Constant competition and war between kingdoms and chieftaincies in Orissa over a greater share of this divine sovereignty was the norm. The British conquest of Orissa seems, in one respect, to have engendered a continuation of these precolonial dynamics within the regional polities. British forces first entered the arena of political conflict in Orissa as one of many players in contemporary politico-military processes. In this sense, their arrival was not a sudden radical disjunction from the early modern dynamics.

Some decades after the British occupation of Orissa, however, a radical departure took place in another sense. In the colonising process, a certain design of colonial rule was instituted. This drastically diverged from the precolonial rule in terms of ideology and institutions and caused a profound dislocation. Colonial rule led to the destruction of the early modern political and cultural framework. Colonial domination fragmented the state–society relationship embedded in the sacrificer state and sacrificial community. So what exactly happened?

The British conquered Maratha Orissa in 1803. The conquest of the Khurda kingdom followed in December 1804. King Mukunda Deva of Khurda was captured and imprisoned in Cuttack and later in Midnapur.

Initially the British seem to have accepted and utilised the indigenous cultural logic of sovereignty for the legitimation of their rule. We see this clearly in the Ewer Report:

On the first conquest of the province (of Orissa in 1803), khelats [sic, khilat] were granted to all the Gurjhat [sic] chiefs by Colonel Harcourt, and that sent to the Rajah of Khurda was of a value and quality corresponding to his superiority of rank, comprising a horse, an elephant and a large sum of money, besides several costly articles of dress.¹

(69, para 196)

According to Cohn, the presentation of khilat to a ruler was the “most literal representation of the act of incorporation into the body of the Mughal padshah” (1997: 114). The British consciously continued the Mughal practice of khilat to secure imperial legitimacy as rulers of the subordinate kings in Orissa, including
the Khurda rājā. Another example of the use of indigenous symbols of sovereignty can be seen in their handling of the Jagannātha cult.

From the inception of its Maratha campaign, the East India Company was well aware of the political importance of the Jagannātha temple in Puri for establishing rule in Orissa.2 A letter was soon dispatched to the main priests of Puri, written by a famous Bengali pandit. It assured them of “the religious tolerance of the British and their particular benevolence to their subjects” (Kulke 1978d: 346). In response, shortly before the British occupied Puri, the priests of Puri informed them that

the Brahmins at the holy temple had consulted and applied to Juggernaut [sic] to inform them that his temple was under its protection, and that he had given a decided answer that the English government was in the future to be his guardian.3

As a consequence, the British met no resistance entering Puri, since Jagannātha, the true ruler of Orissa, had accepted them. They went on to make full use of Jagannātha’s “decided answer” to acquire recognition from the kings of Orissa. Following their entry into Puri, the British sent letters to the kings in the surrounding area in which “the circumstances of Juggernaut’s decision (which was a fact) was not omitted”.4

It is clear that the British were fully aware of the cultural ideas in Orissa concerning the relationship between legitimate sovereignty and Jagannātha and made full political use of it. Yet, it is vital to note that the British were not committed to the internal logic of the cultural system. As Kulke correctly points out, there is a basic continuity in the meaning of Jagannātha for the precolonial Hindu rulers and the British.5 However, we may note that there is also a key departure from the precolonial Hindu notion of sovereignty as an act of religious sacrifice. For the Khurda king, Jagannātha was the object of worship and devotion. The British, however, regarded the Jagannātha cult only in terms of its ‘political’ utility, since for them the cult was a “religious prejudice” born from idolatry. This attitude can be seen in Commissioner Harcourt’s remarks:

On all occasions when the subject of that valuable acquisition of the Province of Cuttack [Orissa], is under considerations, the important possession of the Temple of Juggernaut must stand in a prominent view; in a political light its value is incalculable.7

The beginning of the colonial division of spheres between native religion and rational politics is readily apparent. In the colonial view, the former was subordinated to and to be only utilised for the latter.

The splitting of the domains of state politics and religious society is the most significant characteristic of colonial rule. Within the precolonial polity, politico-economic and religio-cultural matters constituted an indivisible whole for ruling the kingdom. For the British, however, the central concern was controlling the
political economy. Only if necessary would they utilise aspects of indigenous culture and religion as tools for their political ends.

**Historical actions, discursive meanings**

The British, employing the cultural logic of sovereignty, gradually developed the colonial way of government where, on the one hand, the state was established in the name of rationality, and, on the other hand, elements of ‘tradition’ were objectified, fragmented and deformed. This process included complicated interactions between plural agents, involving conflict, appropriation, compromise and assertion.

In recent research on India there is a proliferation of critiques of colonialism and orientalism (Dirks 1987, Inden 1986), which emphasise how colonial powers and related essentialist perspectives transformed (or deformed) Indian society. This is a useful and important perspective. However, relying solely on the role of colonialism and orientalism in our understanding of the formation of modern Indian society may lead us to belittle or ignore the historical agency of the Indian people. This is tantamount to granting the agency to create and represent reality only to the coloniser and the orientalist. This is, as van der Veer says, “in itself an Orientalist fallacy that denies Indian agency in constructing their society and simplifies the intricate interplay of Western and Indian discourses” (van der Veer 1994: 21). We must instead see India as a social and cultural arena of interaction, where historical dynamism involved an interplay of dominance, resistance, accommodation and appropriation of cultural and political influences among heterogeneous agents, both Indian and non-Indian.

‘Revisionist’ scholars such as Bayly (1983, 1988, 1993) and Washbrook (1981, 1988) rightly pay attention to the internal dynamism of early modern India that is connected to the development of colonial domination. They consider the resilience of Indian agents in precolonial and colonial history. Yet, Bayly and Washbrook tend to focus solely on the role of the political economy, reducing the historical dynamism of the shift from the early modern to the colonial to a narrative of the indigenous development of capitalism. In effect, the agency of the Indian people is demoted to a position beneath the force of capitalism and the actions of Indians are described as if they struggled only for power and riches. The significance of the political economy and the development of capitalism in the history of colonialism is undeniable, but arguments such as those of Bayly and Washbrook neglect the value and meaning attached to actions which are vital in understanding the nature of agency.

It appears that critics of colonialism and revisionists do not elucidate how Indian agents themselves interpreted the historical transformation and their positions within it. If we assume that it is a human need to seek one’s cultural–political and existential worth through actions, as I indeed believe, it is necessary to look at the framework of interpretation through which the agents attach meanings and values to the world and their actions.

As we have seen, the political dynamism of precolonial Orissa, with its constant rivalry and wars among rulers, has been interpreted by revisionist scholars
as struggles for power and wealth, which the British joined. This view sees a parallel between the precolonial and the colonial motivations, as the cultural values attached to sovereignty appear important only as a way to ensure political dominance. However, for Indian agents, wars were never simply in pursuit of power and wealth but were closely connected with religious and cultural values and meanings. On the conquest of Orissa, the British, not sharing the same cultural conceptions, saw only political value in the utilisation of the beliefs of the ‘natives’ and gradually established the great divide between the domains of politics and religion in society.

Consider the following fragment of oral history in the Khurda area regarding the 1804 battle between the Khurda king and the British:

The British forces were having trouble capturing Khurda fort. This was because they were obstructed by the power of the tutelary goddesses of Khurda fort, Baruṇei and Karuṇei. Charan Patnaik, an infamous tax-collector, betrayed Khurda by telling the British about this and suggested that they should attack with a cannon ball dipped in cow’s blood. The goddesses, polluted by the blood, lost their power and told the king that the kingdom could yet be saved if he offered a pregnant brāhmaṇa woman and a pregnant black cat in sacrifice. The king, however, refused to commit such an anti-harmic (adharma, irreligious, immoral, unjust) act and left the battlefield. (Narrated to author near the ruins of Khurda fort; Figure 4.1.)

Figure 4.1 Baruṇei hill where Khurda fort was based. The signboard says “India’s Last Freedom Fort”.

Here, the Khurda people’s attitude to the British and to themselves is shown in an interesting way. This story tells us that British rule in Khurda began with an act that violated dharma (religion, universal law and ethics, moral imperative) whereas the king chose to keep to the right path by leaving the battlefield. There is a distinction between the unrighteous ‘politics’ of the colonial government and the Khurda king’s adherence to dharma. This distinction between the politics of wheeling and dealing and ethics, or righteous behaviour, reflects a dichotomous interpretive framework between the ‘outer’ field of politics monopolised by the colonial government and the ‘inner’ field of religion and spiritual values maintained by the colonised (Chatterjee 1993).

A curious aspect of this discourse is the admission that Khurda or India was not one united whole since there was a traitor, by the name of Charan Patnaik, who revealed secrets to the British. The motif of the British defeating Indians with the help of traitors is popular in the historical discourses on colonisation throughout India. We often hear the name of Charan Patnaik, who was powerful in early nineteenth-century colonial Orissa, as a synonym for traitors and treachery. Even today, people talk about how cunning and rich his descendants are. The Ewer Report mentions a Churn Patnaik who was one of the leading tax collectors and under whom other tax collectors were “little better than mere instruments” (69, para 180).

Charan Patnaik is also said to have instigated the arrest of Bakshi Jagabandhu, the leader of the Orissa Uprising (Paika Rebellion) of 1817, on the charge of treason and collaboration with the Marathas in February 1817. Charan Patnaik was murdered in his village during the rebellion. Commissioner B Thomas reports that no villager came to his rescue (De 1962: 16, 35). The secrets of Barunei and Karuniei being divulged to the British by Charan Patnaik is not based on historical facts in a strict sense but reflects collective memory about a treacherous collaborator. People recount how the glorious unity of India or Orissa was lost, dharma destroyed and foreigners like the British came to rule their land, all due to acts of treachery. Such criticisms are often linked to expressions of dissatisfaction with present conditions in India and Orissa.

**British rule and the traditionalisation of Indian society**

*Ritualisation of kingship, overtaxation and rural indigence*

In terms of law and administration, the British rule in Khurda had significant implications for the conceptual frameworks of local people, including the perception of ‘traditional’ India as a ‘caste society’.

After the defeat of 1804, the Khurda king was stripped of all political rights and estates. The territory of Khurda kingdom became a khas mahal, or government estate, under direct colonial administration, as the Khurda subdivision of the Puri district. The tradition of Gajapati kingship seemed to have ended here. However, there was another twist in the king’s fate, which came with the change in British policy regarding the Jagannātha temple. In the early years of colonial rule in Orissa, the British tried to manipulate the Jagannātha cult to consolidate
their position. Initially they followed the Maratha system of administration\(^{12}\) and brought the temple lands under the direct management of local officials at the Board of Revenue in Cuttack (Das 1978: 143). Yet, the more the British tried to directly control the administration of the temple, the more they found themselves unable to manage it adequately.

As a result, they decided to bring back the Gajapati king of Khurda onto the scene. They released Mukunda Deva II from imprisonment at Midnapur in 1807 (Pattanaik 1979: 145, 161) and vested him with “the superintendence of the temple of Jagannātha and its interior economy, the conduct and management of its affairs, and the entire control over the priests, officers, and servants attached to the idol and to the temple” under Regulation IV of 1809 (quoted in Laurie 2000: 76). In this way, while the British government was responsible for the temple’s finances, the Puri king (Khurda king) took over temple administration as the superintendent.\(^ {13}\) This “system of dual responsibility” continued till 1863 (Das 1978: 144, Kulke 1978d: 356).\(^ {14}\)

Meanwhile, in Khurda, Major Fletcher, who had led the conquest, was appointed to the administration in 1805. When he assumed office he confiscated the land part of the entitlements of the chiefs, sub-chiefs, foot soldiers and other office holders. The British saw these as political offices that had to be abolished under the new regime. Only those employed as sarabarākāras, or tax collectors, under the colonial government, received new jagirs (land given in lieu of service with quit-rent). The word sarabarākāra itself, as well as its system, was a new import into the area by the British (Ewer Report: 61, para 177).\(^ {15}\)

Land tax was the core source of income for the British East India Company in the early nineteenth century. Since the eighteenth-century precolonial period, land tax, namely the state’s collection of agricultural products, constituted the main part of state income in India. However, from the early nineteenth century the land assessment amount was set at a higher level than that of the eighteenth century. This was because the East India Company, as a profit-making organisation, sought to increase its income from India and contribute to state finances in Britain at the time. The East India Company made payments to the state treasury, which were used for bonds issued by the state to pay for the growing expenses of warfare (Brewer 1989).\(^ {16}\)

Fletcher attempted to maximise revenue from Khurda. As a result, the amount of land tax increased at fluctuating and arbitrary rates with successive temporary settlements. Gross land revenue increased from Rs. 114,320 in 1805–1806, to Rs. 114,914 in 1813–1814, Rs. 122,306 in 1814–1815 and Rs. 141,845 in 1815–1816 (Rate Report: 26, part I, paras 8–11). This rise in taxes devastated the peasants in the region, and many deserted their villages.\(^ {17}\)

The condition of the Oriya cultivators was further aggravated by the depreciation of cowry, which was the main currency in the local market as well as for taxes.\(^ {18}\) The rate of exchange between cowry and silver was 3 to 4 kāhāṇas per rupee under the Marathas (Stirling 1904: 36, De 1952a: 8, De 1961: XXVI), and 4 kāhāṇas to a rupee according to a record of the 1770s in Garh Manitri. From the mid-seventeenth to the eighteenth century, 1 rupee was exchanged for between
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1 kāhāṇa 15 panas to 4 kāhāṇas of cowry. After colonisation, however, as tax was required to be paid in rupees from 1809 and copper coins were introduced in 1811, the value of cowry depreciated to as low as 7 kāhāṇas per rupee (De 1961: XXVI), leading to severe economic hardship. The introduction of the rupee currency unified the economic sphere, leading to the loss of autonomous spheres of exchange in cowry among peasants. Income from cotton textile production for the Indian Ocean trade also declined. Thus, the village economy was directly hit by a wave of deflationary recession due to the scarcity of silver.

Even as the peasants in Khurda suffered from high rates of land tax, they lacked the money to pay taxes, while the price of rice, the main agricultural produce, fell due to deflation. As a result, not only did the real value of the tax on agriculture become higher, but the value of cowry the peasants saved as family wealth depreciated radically, and their stock of real wealth decreased. Moreover, they could no longer expect any additional income from cotton textiles. Under such conditions, local society in Khurda was economically depleted, and people became increasingly dissatisfied with the new regime.

The Orissa Uprising of 1817

Most severely hit by early British policy were peasants, peasant-soldiers and their superiors, the daḷabeherās and daḷais. This discontent culminated in a rebellion in 1817. At the end of March 1817, about four hundred Khonds (Khondhas) from Ghumsar entered Banpur, south of Khurda, and started looting British government property. These Khonds were the so-called tribals in colonial parlance, but more correctly forest-dwelling warriors of the Ghumsar kingdom from the Maliah hill tracts. Though they did not pay tribute to the Raja of Ghumsar and remained autonomous, they acknowledged his supremacy and provided military services in times of war and other needs (Behara 1984: 3, 28–9). They constituted an important military asset, albeit with ambivalence, for the Ghumsar king.

The Khond rebels were immediately joined by the pāikas and daḷabeherās of Khurda, led by Baksi Jagabandhu. The rebels marched from Banpur to Khurda and finally towards Puri. They intended to restore the king’s sovereignty in Khurda. On 14 April 1817, Jagabandhu and the pāikas entered Puri. According to the petition of the Raja of Puri dated 6 March 1818, “Jagabandhu … tried to take him [Khurda king] and his family to Khurda with the intention of installing him on the throne there as the Raja of Khurda”.

However, the king did not join the insurgents and the British forces quickly suppressed the rebellion. Puri was regained by the British on 18 April 1817, and the king was taken captive to Cuttack. Jagabandhu escaped to the forest and attempted sporadic resistance but finally surrendered in early 1825.

Although the rebellion failed in its direct aim, it marked a historically significant point. Not only did it lead to a reconsideration of the company’s policies in Khurda, but it also came to be known as a glorious historical event that proved the courage and independent spirit of the Oriya people in popular and nationalist historical discourses. The event came to be known as the great Paika Rebellion.
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(pāika bidroha) of 1817, and episodes from its history are talked about even today. It is mainly due to this history that pāika and their martial arts are celebrated as representing Orissa’s independent spirit. People of the khaṇḍāyata caste, in particular, place great importance on the rebellion as a basis of their identity.

Creating proprietors, dominant castes and jajmani relations

After the rebellion of 1817, the company was forced to reflect upon and reformulate its colonial policy in Khurda and Orissa. As a result of the resistance, both passive and open, “parts of Khordah [sic] were almost entirely depopulated, large tracts of arable land thrown out of cultivation, and all revenue work came to a stand still” (Rate Report: 26–7, part I, para 11).

After abandoning the collection of 1817–1818, land tax was lowered to about Rs. 50,000 in total (Rate Report: 27, part I, para 15), almost two-thirds less than the Rs. 141,845 levied in 1815–1816. There was to be no increase in the rate of land tax until minute measurements and settlements were made for different classes of land later in 1836. Steps were taken to restore the jagirs of the daḷabeherās and daḷais. Moreover, all the jagirs of the daḷabeherās and daḷais were augmented. These measures were obviously taken for highly pragmatic and political reasons. In the words of Forrester, who recommended such a course, it was advisable “not only as a matter of justice but as being the likely means of keeping them quiet, and securing their assistance in the police of their gurhs which can hardly fail to be of considerable use” (Forrester Report: 113, para 67). Pāika jagirs, however, were never to be returned since it was thought that “neither justice nor policy requires the restoration of their lands” (Forrester Report: 113, para 66).

From the 1820s, the East India Company began to implement systematic administrative measures concerning land. This was expected since the tax levied on land was one of the main sources of income for the colonial government. The revenue department’s survey and settlement, however, displayed an almost paranoiac effort towards systematic categorisation and enumeration (Cohn 1987a, Appadurai 1993). The colonial government ignored the fact that land use and resource distribution were intimately connected to the division of labour and cooperation in the community. They deliberately disassociated land rights from socio-political relations and instead classified land by the kind of tax to be levied on the cultivator (D’Souza 2004, 2006). In 1820, Wilkinson, the new deputy collector of Khurda, issued the deed of right (paṭā) in order to ascertain the cultivator. As a result, sarabarākāras began to grant deeds of right to cultivators for the first time in the history of Khurda and thus laid the foundation for the ryotwari or cultivator-based settlement.

The first survey and settlement in the Khurda region began in 1827 and was completed in 1836. It is this survey and settlement that marked the end of the early modern and the beginning of the colonial modern in local society in Khurda. They measured the land, classified types of land according to yields, determined proprietary rights and fixed taxes (Rate Report: 32–3, part II, paras 52–6). This settlement introduced uniform measurements for the first time, and the revenue
demand was directly imposed on and collected from individual cultivators. Before this survey and settlement, the tax collectors of the fort region collected taxes within their respective jurisdictions, and the tax rates depended on the customs set according to the system of entitlements. The survey and settlement of 1836 brought about profound changes in the land system of Khurda. The colonial government sifted through the multi-layered rights to a particular piece of land and allocated a deed of right to one person, granting exclusive proprietary rights along with the obligation to pay taxes. In this way, the land was alienated from the socio-political relationships it represented and supported and became individual property.

The British government used the liberal discourse of private proprietorship free from the oppressive structure of hierarchical society to legitimise proprietary land ownership (Mehta 1999). However, what British policy actually brought about was a reification of the socio-economic hierarchy based on landholdings. Firstly, the settlement of 1836 consolidated the position of local elites by employing them as sarabarākāras in the colonial government. The old privileged classes of daḷabeherās, daḷais, koṭha karaṇas, baithi karaṇas, bhuiṃ muḷas and pradhānas—that is, former military, administrative and revenue officials at local levels—were appointed to this office. In return for collecting tax from the cultivators, they were allotted jagir lands and money amounting to around 20% of the collection (Wilkinson Report: 126, para 11. Rate Report: 51, part II, paras 61–3). In the fort area of Garh Manitri, the chief, the cowry accountant, two scribes, village heads and a village scribe were appointed sarabarākāras. Sarabarākāras were no longer daḷabeherā or koṭha karaṇa in the original sense. However, they continued to be referred to as such and had ‘traditional’ authority as local leaders. The colonial government, by appointing them tax collectors, preserved their politico-economic privilege and in consequence gave official support to their ‘traditional’ position as local elites.

Secondly, the land used for ‘religious’ purposes was, with the colonial ‘liberal’ policy of non-interference in ‘native’ religious affairs, allowed to be retained in the hands of previous occupants either rent-free (lakhirajdar) or for reduced fees (tankidar). These privileged landholdings included debattār that had been donated to the gods and goddesses and brāhmatār that had been donated to the brāhmaṇas. Lands donated to the brāhmaṇas were permitted to be held by the respective brāhmaṇa as they were, with tax reduction privileges. On debattār land, the māraphatadāra (trustee), sebāita (servant) and cultivator were left with their multi-layered rights and the land was registered as being in possession of the deity.

After this, in the settlement of donated lands in 1838–1843, lands donated to deities came to be registered in the name of the māraphatadāra (marfatdar in British spelling) or trustee, as a proprietor without the right to buy and sell the land (Rate Report: 34–7, part II, paras 63–80). The class of people who benefited most from this policy was definitely the brāhmaṇas. At that time, those who performed religious service in the temples, mostly brāhmaṇas, usually became trustees. Others, such as māḷis (gardeners), who were often care takers of the
Śiva temple,25 and the tribal Khondhas and Saoras, who were priests for autochthonous goddesses, could also become trustees. Many brāhmaṇas were given de facto exclusive ownership and tax reduction privileges on the donated lands by the colonial government and came to form a part of the large landlord class by the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In Garh Manitri, the amount of land held by brāhmaṇas increased dramatically from 9.110 acres (2.64% of the total cultivated land in the village) in 1829–1830 to 124.048 acres (17.26%) in 1911 (Table 4.1). The colonial government’s policy of non-interference in the religious sphere had in effect led to the preferential protection of religious specialists, especially brāhmaṇas, who maintained and extended their privilege.

The pāika, who had previously received entitlements as foot soldiers of the fort, were reduced to mere cultivators in the 1836 settlement, and their landholdings were to be assessed at the regular tax rate. At the same time, however, the settlement confirmed the position of the mainly khaṇḍāyata caste pāikas as the largest landholding caste (Table 4.1). Therefore, khaṇḍāyatas were transformed in the early colonial period from the king’s soldiers to the dominant caste, whose ownership of land became an important basis for social authority. The concept of a dominant caste in the sense of a community of landholders was, thus, a creation of colonial administration (Bayly 1990: 139).

Community servants such as carpenters, blacksmiths and washermen were permitted tax-free possession of their land entitlements as long as they continued to serve the community. The customary payment that community servants gained from each household remained in form but changed dramatically in meaning in the colonial period. As the system of entitlements broke down, service castes no longer performed services for the community as a whole. Instead, individual households gave them payment for specific services rendered. The exchange of service and grain came to be based on dyadic relationships between patron (jajmāna) households and service caste households.

Thus, what are seen as customary exchanges between patron and client households in the so-called jajmani system are products of colonial history. They are what remained when custom was reinvented after the system of entitlements broke down, and each household had to become an agent as the unit of exchange (see Chapter 9). In this way, the land tenure system, which was intimately linked to the system of entitlements in the precolonial period, came to be disconnected from the holistic reproductive process of the community and the state. Simultaneously, the unit of reproduction of social relations shifted from the local community to the household (Mizushima 1990), and a new kind of ‘unitary caste hierarchy’ emerged, where the ritualistic brahmanical caste hierarchy more or less matched the socio-economic hierarchy based on landholding.

*Colonial caste?*

British policy was at best duplicitous. The colonial government claimed to be creating modern individuals and proprietary rights according to market principles.
Table 4.1 Landownership by caste in Garh Manitri, 1829–1830 and 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>1829–1830</th>
<th></th>
<th>1911</th>
<th></th>
<th>Rate of increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>Percentage (%)</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>Percentage (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>9.110</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>124.048</td>
<td>17.26</td>
<td>1,261.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>4.240</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>41.434</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>877.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>753.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>3.400</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>15.571</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>357.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>2.220</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>6.718</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>202.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujiā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>12.160</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>34.574</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>184.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>22.130</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>60.675</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>174.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>6.450</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>9.997</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>54.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khāṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>205.570</td>
<td>59.49</td>
<td>308.382</td>
<td>42.92</td>
<td>50.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>12.970</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>11.043</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>−14.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribal)</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.558</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>−30.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dho baru      (washerman)</td>
<td>9.520</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>6.468</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>−32.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotis̄ha (astrologer)</td>
<td>1.590</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>−39.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāri (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>24.320</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>12.433</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>−48.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (tribal)</td>
<td>7.890</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.908</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>−63.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karana (scribe)</td>
<td>21.520</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>2.549</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>−88.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr̄eī (carpenter)</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.395</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māḷi (gardener)</td>
<td>illegible</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.449</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>345.580</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>689.385</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>99.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf scripts from Garh Manitri for 1829–1830 and land settlement records from Ekharajat Mahal office for 1911 collected by author.

Note
1. The figures for an average household in 1829–1830 for brāhmaṇa under-represent their economic status since they had the deities’ lands in their possession, but these were not yet registered in their names at this stage. Landholdings of jagir or deity’s land as trustees are included in figures for 1911.
Yet, they also attempted to stabilise and control society through categorising and implementing hierarchies according to caste. These contradictory British attitudes were apparent in British Indian law (Washbrook 1981: 653). Whereas public law intended to enlarge and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals in the market place, personal law subjected individuals to religious and community obligations. This meant that ‘Hindus’ came under the ordinance of Hindu classical scriptures in the sphere of personal law. This undoubtedly enhanced the authority of brāhmaṇas who were regarded as scholars with the ability to interpret law. Also, since classical Hindu scriptures presented law according to one’s caste affiliation (varṇa), court procedures pertaining to personal law involved the classification and identification of people according to caste (Chatterjee 1993, 1996).

The duplicitous character of the British government in India is related to the colonial difference between the rational modern state and hierarchical native society. The principle of the rational state was to prevail in the politico-economic sphere, but the space for native society was to be given in the socio-religious sphere. Native society was to be carefully observed and controlled by the rational state. There was clearly a double standard over whether liberalism or religion should be the legal principle and whether the individual or caste should be the subject of law. The ideology of rule appeared to be based on the principle of liberalism and to make the individual the subject of law. But, administrative and legal systems were developed based on religion and caste on the pretext of respecting native culture in order to use the existing social system in India for the purposes of governance.

The zeal of the colonial government in observing and grasping the Indian order of things was truly remarkable. Two years after the publications of Walter Hamilton’s *A Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Description of Hindostan and the Adjacent Countries* in 1820, which is considered “the first full-scale effort to produce a Gazetteer of India” (Cohn 1987a: 232), a similar book on Orissa by A Stirling, titled *An Account (Geographical, Statistical and Historical) of Orissa Proper or Cuttack* was published in 1822 (reprinted 1904). As is apparent in these books as well as in the innumerable administrative reports, settlement reports, census reports and regional caste and tribe monographs (Sherri 1974, Ibbetson 1987, Crooke 1974–1975, Risley 1891, Thurston 1987), the colonial passion for objectifying, describing, classifying and enumerating Indian society was extraordinary. It was part of the orientalistic, colonial attempt to gain intellectual and practical control over Indian society.26 The Indian census, which began in 1871, played a central role in the efforts of the British administrators to objectify and classify Indian society.27 People were classified according to their ‘race’, ‘religion’ and ‘caste’ and in the census of 1911, castes were noted in a hierarchical order.

Colonial caste classification was used practically in wider administrative measures. In the land records of the colonial period, for example, the jāti or traditional office (such as dalabeherā or koṭha karaṇa) of the occupant of each plot of land was given after his/her name. To cite concrete instances from the land records (bhiāṇa) of 1829–1830, on palm leaves found in Garh Manitri, names and jāti
Early colonial transformation

(with reference to the specific office) were written as ‘Nāṭh Sandarā, oda [sic, ora] pāika’, ‘Nām Jogi Śricandan, kaudibhägiā [sic, kauri bhagiā]’ (cowry accountant) and ‘Padalabhā Pajhāri, brahmaṇa sebaka’ (brāhmaṇa priest).28 Similarly, on the land deed or paṭā which began to be distributed in 1820 in Khurda, the name of the cultivator/occupant was written along with the jāti.29

In the precolonial period, the only ascription pointing to caste status was in the form of titles, marriage alliances, offices held and general conduct as regards diet and clothing etc. There was mobility in both status and caste. If a man succeeded in proving himself and gained recognition from the community and the king, he could acquire a new entitlement, titles and marriage alliances and climb the social ladder. It was common for a peasant or a warrior, often of tribal origin, to acquire the status of a scribe or a peasant-militia in this manner. Sometimes new castes were created, as in the case of the saori khaṇḍāyatās, who were probably tribal Saora in origin but gained khaṇḍāyata status due to their political power. Today, there are cases of inter-marriage between saori khaṇḍāyatās and other khaṇḍāyatās. It seems that the saori khaṇḍāyata is gradually losing its distinction and merging within the general khaṇḍāyata as caste. However, in the colonial period, since caste or office was recorded in written form on land records and deeds of right as ‘traditional’ status, there was an objectification and fixing of caste and status among families.

It is clear that there was a fundamental change in the conceptualisation of caste community and identity. Caste became the keyword to represent the Indian social order. This conceptualisation was necessary to enable the colonisers to control the colonised as calculable entities (Appadurai 1993). Enumeration of caste members was possible, in turn, by creating boundaries between different castes and by the homogenisation of members in the same caste community. Previously diverse and contextually shifting identities were fixed and standardised under colonialism.

In Khurda, at the top of the hierarchy was the locally dominant class of sarabarākāras (khaṇḍāyatās and karaṇas) and brāhmaṇas who held large tracts of land free of tax or with light rent and who formed the local elite or “local rich” (Ludden 1990: 174). Below them was the ‘dominant caste’ (pāikas or khaṇḍāyatās) that, in aggregate, occupied a major portion of cultivated land. The families and castes of these classes were reminiscent of the precolonial system of power and so continued to be considered the ‘traditional’ authority of the locality by villagers. The artisan and service castes that were in ‘jajmani’ relationships with the landholding households were placed below them, and on the lowest rung of the ladder were what the colonial government called the “labouring classes” (Maddox Report: 124, 135, 224), such as the low caste bāuris and hāṛis and the tribal Saoras and Khondhas.

Village society accordingly became stratified in a structure of dominance and hierarchy, along with the social formation of caste hierarchy, dominant caste and the jajmani system and decontextualised from precolonial principles of community, kingship and sacrificial service. The colonial state, with its centralised bureaucracy and military, guided society into reproducing the status quo of the newly traditionalised social structure and extracting the agrarian surplus. This
orientalist and stereotypical picture of traditional India, which saw the overlapping of a land-based class order and brahmanical caste hierarchy at the village level while the conqueror state hovered above extracting the agrarian surplus, became the reality in this early colonial period (Washbrook 1981, 1988).

Notes
1 ‘(K)helats’ [sic, khilat] are gifts of clothes, weapons, horses and elephants given from the suzerain to the vassal, practised by the Mughals.
2 Governor General Wellesley sent a strict order regarding the Jagannātha temple to the commanding officer of the British forces on the day of the declaration of war against the Marathas. It read, “On your arrival at Juggernaut you will employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the Pagoda, and to religious prejudices of the Brahmns and pilgrims” (quoted in Kulke 1978d: 346).
5 Kulke says, “The Christian government was thus following the line of the Hindu Rājās, who had often used Jagannātha for political purpose” (1978c: 347).
6 Governor General Wellesley’s words. See note 2 above.
8 A less elaborate version of this legend is reproduced in Orisa Deba Debi (Gods and Goddesses of Orissa) (Mohanty 1980).
9 It is important to note that the rebellion of 1817 had plural genealogies and diverse participants. In order to go beyond the homogeneous representations of the actors and their aims that reflect colonial and/or dominant caste–centred perspectives, I propose that we call the event the ‘Orissa Uprising of 1817’ (Tanabe 2020).
10 It is interesting that in popular discourse, especially if the speaker belongs to another caste, it is emphasised that the traitor was a karaṇa by caste. The tax-free estate (jagir) that Charan Patnaik received from the British under the category of ‘grace jagirs’, which were granted as “compassionate allowances, or as rewards for good service” (Rate Report: 66, part II, para 145), for his assistance is popularly called nimakahārāma jāgiri or traitor’s jagir. Thus, from a popular perspective revealed in oral history, there were divisions within Khurda along caste lines, which were weak points that aided colonisation.
12 The only exception was the pilgrim tax, which was abolished in 1803 only to be reintroduced in 1806.
13 From this time onwards, the Khurda king came to be referred to in official documents as the Raja of Khurda or the Raja of Puri. The king legally became the Raja of Puri with the Sri Jagannath Temple Act of 1955.
14 Although Act X of 1840 abolished the pilgrim tax, the government continued to pay the subsidy to the temple till 1863.
15 Sarabarākāra is a corrupted form of sarbarāhkār which means a manager in Hindustani. The British gave this title to tax collectors in Orissa. Wilson’s glossary says on “Sarbarāhkār [sic]”, “In Cuttack the title was given to the village accountant when he was the general director and manager off the revenue affairs” (Wilson 1968: 465). Although the term and the system of sarabarākāra were newly introduced to Orissa by the British, the word sarbarāh or management was already in use in precolonial time. See Appendix 1 for the usage of huk-i-serbera [sic, haq-e-sarbarāh] or right of management.
This is also related to the establishment of the “investing society” as ownership of stocks and bonds became popular among the middle classes through the “financial revolution” (Sakamoto 2015).

In 1813, W Trower wrote: “It appears evident that a system of extreme tyranny, violence and oppression has existed, which has proved ruinous to this once flourishing country by the consequent desertion of a great proportion of the cultivators of the soil. … I am concerned to state too and [sic] that this system is to be dated from the conquest of Khurda by the British troops” (W Trower, Collector of Cuttack to G Warde, Secretary to the Member, Board of Revenue, dated 12.11.1813, quoted in De 1962: 8).


According to the French merchant, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, who was in India in the mid-seventeenth century, 1 copper coin (paisa) was exchanged for 55 cowries in Agra and 80 cowries in the coastal area. Thus, the exchange rate at the time was between 1 kāhāṇā 9 paṇa to 2.5 kāhāṇas to a rupee. According to Hamilton, 1 rupee was exchanged for 2,500–3,000 cowries (1 kāhāṇa 15.25 paṇa-2 kāhāṇa 5.5 paṇa) in 1727. Sir Henry Elliot mentions that 1 rupee was exchanged for 2,400 cowries in 1740, for 2,560 in 1756, and as many as 6,500 cowries in 1833 (De 1952a: 8; 1961: XXVI). According to Stirling, 1 rupee was equal to 3 to 4 kāhāṇas (Stirling 1904: 36)

See Kuroda (2008) for “concurrent but non-integrable currency circuits” that supported autonomous spheres of exchange.


For a fuller discussion of the Orissa Uprising (Paika Rebellion) of 1817, see Tanabe (2020).

From R. H. Wilson, Offg. Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Lower Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department, dated Fort William, 21 February 1880, p 33, para 7, in Selections III.

Māḷīs often have a special position of offering services in Śiva temples.

As Said says, “Rhetorically speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative; to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularising and dividing things Oriental into manageable parts” (Said 1978: 72).

As pointed out by Carrol (1978), Cohn (1987a) and Dirks (Dirks 2001).

Almost the same pattern, with the specification of jāti but not of office, was also found in the 1911 land records of Garh Manitr and, surprisingly, as late as 1965.

Jātis were written with reference to the office up till 1820s, reflecting jāti’s embeddedness in the local socio-political structure. Later, however, more generic terms for jāti were used as caste became more standardised in the legal and administrative framework. Interestingly, these deeds also functioned as certificates of caste status among local people in postcolonial Khurda. According to villagers, when in doubt, people showed or demanded to see the deed to prove caste or traditional office status (e.g. daḷabeherā, daḷai) of their family at the time of marriage.
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy
Political economy and cultural identity

Colonial rule shifted to a new regime in 1858, when the British Crown took control of the Government of India directly from the East India Company. At around the same time, the colonial dichotomy between the politico-economic sphere and the socio-cultural sphere was firmly consolidated. The British government institutionally kept a distance from matters of religion, kingship and caste, which were seen to belong exclusively to ‘native society’. The Jagannātha temple and Gajapati kingship were granted autonomy in the religio-ritual sphere, which was associated with caste duties. Colonial rule and economy impacted rural society through commercialised agriculture which monetised rural society and reshuffled the socio-economic order. Through the ongoing politico-economic transformation, people attempted to adhere to the socio-cultural tradition of religion, kingship and caste as the basis of their identity. This drove the wedge deeper and accentuated the dichotomy between the ‘modern state and market’ and ‘traditional society and culture’.

This dichotomous framework has influenced not only the academic understanding of Indian society but also the formation of Indian and regional nationalisms. There was a discrepancy and an uneasy alliance between elite nationalism and popular patriotism. The cultural ethics represented by religion and kingship, which were idealised in the patriotic imagination of common people, contained dilemmatic and unsettled relationships with the public rationality of elite nationalism. This incongruence between the techno-rational political idea of the elite and the religio-ontological cultural identity of the popular masses was to pose continuing problems for postcolonial India and Orissa.

Social change under the imperial regime

Ritualised kingship and the return of Jagannātha

It might have been expected that the position of the Puri king would be weakened due to his suspected collaboration in the Orissa Uprising (Paika Rebellion) of 1817. However, the British government’s commitment to preserve and entrust matters in the socio-religious domain to Indians, together with pressure from missionaries to sever government connections with ‘idolatry’, led in time to the Puri king’s position being not only maintained but also strengthened.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003173519-5
In 1843 the government released to the temple the last endowment of Satais Hazari Mahal in the parganās (districts) of Rahang, Serai, Chaubiskud and Lembai, amounting to revenue of Rs. 17,420. This had been granted to the temple by the Marathas and subsequently had been managed by the British East India Company. Furthermore, the British government by the Deed of 1858 assigned a portion of the estates in Khurda, with revenue worth Rs. 16,827, to the temple and added another portion worth Rs. 6,804 by the Deed of Gift of 1863. These estates came to be called the Ekharajat Mahal. Ekharajat Mahal consisted of the whole of zilla Tapanga and thirty-four villages (later divided into seventy-three), including Garh Manitri, in zilla Rameshwar, totalling 156 villages or 67,520 acres (Map 5.1).

The deed of 1863 declared that

from the time of transfer of the said lands the Government have no further connection, direct or indirect, with the officers of the Temple of Jagannath its management revenue or otherwise and that the Rajah of Khurda in his capacity of Superintendent is solely responsible for the due application of its revenues and the due administration of its affairs.

(Hota Report: 102)
All financial and administrative links between the colonial government and the Jagannātha temple had been severed, and the Puri king as the superintendent was to enjoy enhanced financial independence as well as administrative autonomy regarding the temple and its endowments. Temple endowments not only supported the economics of kingship under colonialism but also functioned as the territorial basis for the continuity of the religio-ritual aspect of royal authority. Hence, paradoxically, the colonial king’s position was strengthened as he was granted rights over certain territories, but his rule simultaneously came to be restricted to the newly constructed religio-ritual domain. In the new colonial–royal territory of Ekharajat Mahal, local rituals also flourished with royal patronage. In Garh Manitrī, which came under Ekharajat Mahal, the Rāmacaṇḍī festival came to be held with new vigour under the patronage of the king and his officers (see Chapter 8). Here, devotionalism, patriotism and the sacrificial ethics of service for the whole were maintained in the ritual sphere, disjointed from the political economy, which was controlled by the colonial state.

Kingship, in this way, was made to continue in its ritualised form. The strengthening of the Puri king’s ties with Jagannātha appeared to secure his position as the Gajapati of Orissa, but it was ritual kingship devoid of political sovereignty. The Puri king and the Jagannātha temple were officially guaranteed their place in the religio-social sphere. The Gajapati king was further divinised and ritualised as the Puri king came to be referred to as cālanti Viṣṇu (literally, the walking Vishnu, i.e. earthly Vishnu) in the colonial period (Kulke 1978d: 357). The Puri king made full political use of his ritual authority in the Jagannātha temple and tried to increase his authority in the religio-social sphere by strategically distributing privileges of the temple to (ex) feudatory kings (Kulke 1993a).

Divinisation and ritualisation of the king under colonialism, then, cannot just be seen as a continuous development from the early modern. In the early modern period, the sacrificer state not only enumerated and recorded people’s entitlements in a rational manner but also connected people’s everyday life, based on that entitlement, to the divine through royal mediation. The ritualised domain under the colonial regime came to be a disengaged fragment. It was given peculiar importance as representing a ‘tradition’ of divine kingship and ‘native’ Hindu religion but was isolated from the productive action of everyday life, which in turn came under the minute surveillance of the colonial state through survey and settlement.

**Commercial agriculture and new social dynamism**

The colonial administrative apparatus became more or less complete in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the commercialisation of the agrarian economy developed and local society came to have a new dynamism. Revisionist historians (Bayly, Washbrook, etc.) are right about the importance of this transformation from the mid-nineteenth century, but it should be taken as the second pivotal change after the first colonial impact of structural fragmentation.

Let us look at the social changes in Khurda by taking up the example of Garh Manitrī. There, a widespread commercialisation of agriculture took place, as growth of the market and trade in agricultural produce from the mid-nineteenth
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

century led to surplus from the villages (mainly rice) being taken from the hinterland to the towns and exported overseas. It is said that “exports by sea in 1897–98 came to 26 lakhs of maunds”. The price of rice rose in Orissa in the latter half of nineteenth century with the commercialisation of the agrarian economy (Maddox Report: 121).

A significant change came when agricultural land became a commodity due to the colonial government’s introduction of the right to sell land. In Khurda, the right of occupancy granted to cultivators by the 1836 settlement became a de facto right of transfer and soon the sale and purchase of land began spontaneously. This became a de jure right in 1874 (Rate Report: 71, part II, para 163). With the official recognition of the right of transfer, the market value of cultivated lands rose and the number of land transactions increased dramatically (Rate Report: 72, part II, para 166). Land prices rose, and land transactions increased all over India in the late nineteenth century (Roy 2006: 145). It was part of the colonial policy to “enhance agrarian commercialization and its link to world trade” by establishing “private, alienable property” in law and by reinforcing “class differentiation” among rural people (Stein 1992: 17).

Roy argues that, generally speaking, inequalities in landownership did not increase during the colonial period (Roy 2006: 155). But, if we analyse the history of distribution of resources in Garh Manitri (though institutional changes from the precolonial to the colonial make comparisons difficult), inequalities were more widespread in the early nineteenth century (1829) just after colonisation than in the eighteenth-century (1776–1777) precolonial period (cf Tables 3.16, 5.1 and 5.2). There were clearly great inequalities in resource distribution in the eighteenth century, but the low castes too had small landholdings (entitlement shares; Table 3.16). In 1829, however, 37.72% of these households became landless (no possession of paddy fields) (Table 5.3).

The spreading inequalities in landholding in Garh Manitri in the early nineteenth century, in the 1820s to be more precise, were a result of various kinds of rights to a plot of land—such as the right to cultivate and the right to shares in the produce—being concentrated in the hands of one person who owned the land under the system of private ownership. As a consequence, many households were legally deprived of the entitlement to a certain percentage of the produce.

If we analyse the situation from the early nineteenth century onwards, we note not so much the amplification of inequalities in landownership but drastic changes in the pattern of landownership as well as increasing inequalities in income, as Roy correctly points out (Roy 2006: 156). The benefits from commercialisation went mostly to the trader castes and landowners who succeeded in the agricultural business. If we compare the change in landholdings along caste-lines in Table 4.1, we note that there is a considerably higher rate of increase of landholding by oil-presser (877.22%), fisherman (753.46%), potter (357.97%), sweet-maker (184.33%) and cowherd (174.18%) castes, besides brāhmaṇas (1,261.67%). Many of these castes managed cultivation using cheap labour, besides also engaging in commerce and trade. A few of them became the new rich, having succeeded in accumulating wealth through commercial agricultural and acquiring property.

As the economic status of the new rich rose, the economic status of the traditional hereditary elite who could not cope with the change fell. Relative to other
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

Castes, landownership of the khaṇḍāyata—the supposed dominant caste—in Garh Manitri decreased from 59.49% to 42.92% between 1829–1830 and 1911 (Table 4.1). This does not mean, however, that khaṇḍāyatas as a whole declined. There were some khaṇḍāyata families who became successful in the colonial economy while others declined. This means that in the late colonial period the old status of office or caste no more guaranteed socio-economic position, which now depended on adaptability to the new situation. With the change in economic status, the new rich, including some merchant caste families, began to replace old elite office holders as sarabarākāras under the colonial government.

At the beginning of colonisation, the office of sarabarākāra in Garh Manitri was occupied by the chief, the accountant and two scribes. However, around 1878, the accountant and the two scribes were deprived of their offices and the 57 acres of jagir land that came with the offices were also confiscated because, it is said, they did not pay their taxes properly. The dramatic decrease in the landholdings of the scribe caste from 6.23% to 0.35% between 1829–1830 and 1911 is a case of a decline in fortunes of the traditional administrative elite (Table 4.1). The

---

**Table 5.1 Landownership by caste in Garh Manitri (paddy field only), 1829–1830**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0–1</th>
<th>1–2</th>
<th>2–3</th>
<th>3–4</th>
<th>4–6</th>
<th>6–</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (priest)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaṇa (scribe)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṇa (cowherd)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotisa (astrologer)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guriṣa (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telī (oil-presser)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mālī (gardener)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhubā (washerman)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāri (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribe)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (tribe)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaṇḍarā daṇḍāsī (watchman)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**
1. ‘1–2’, for example, indicates more than 1 acre but less than or equal to 2 acres of land. ‘6–’ indicates more than 6 acres of land.
Table 5.2  Landownership by caste in Garh Manitri (paddy and swidden fields), 1829–1830

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0–1</th>
<th>1–2</th>
<th>2–3</th>
<th>3–4</th>
<th>4–6</th>
<th>6–</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (priest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karana (scribe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaurā (cowherd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotisa (astrologer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṇi (sweet-maker)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mālī (gardener)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhubā (washer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāri (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (tribe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāṇḍārā daṇḍāsī (watchman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
1. ‘1–2’, for example, indicates more than 1 acre but less than or equal to 2 acres of land. ‘6–’ indicates more than 6 acres of land.

Table 5.3  Landholding pattern in Garh Manitri, 1829–1830 and 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acre</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0–1</th>
<th>1–2</th>
<th>2–3</th>
<th>3–4</th>
<th>4–6</th>
<th>6–</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1829–1830</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paddy field only</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.72)</td>
<td>(5.26)</td>
<td>(14.91)</td>
<td>(10.53)</td>
<td>(4.39)</td>
<td>(8.77)</td>
<td>(18.42)</td>
<td>(100.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. swidden field</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.79)</td>
<td>(23.68)</td>
<td>(10.53)</td>
<td>(11.40)</td>
<td>(8.77)</td>
<td>(8.77)</td>
<td>(21.05)</td>
<td>(100.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paddy field only</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.89)</td>
<td>(19.66)</td>
<td>(17.12)</td>
<td>(15.64)</td>
<td>(6.98)</td>
<td>(9.94)</td>
<td>(6.77)</td>
<td>(100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
1. ‘1–2’, for example, indicates more than 1 acre but less than or equal to 2 acres of land. ‘6–’ indicates more than 6 acres of land.
chief had 47.828 acres of jagir, but in 1929, he was dismissed from the office of sarabarākāra and his land was confiscated. This is said to have been because he was too haughty for the king’s liking. The chief’s family subsequently migrated to Britain. These instances reflect the collapse of the old system of hereditary authority and the emergence of new socio-economic opportunities and risks under the colonial rule of law and economy.

Since then, the office of sarabarākāra in Garh Manitri (which consisted of four administrative villages) could be purchased for money. The new rich, which included five from the scribe caste, two from the khaṇḍāyata caste, one sweet-maker and one oil-presser, saw it as an investment opportunity and bought the office in auctions. By attaining the post of sarabarākāra, they received tax-free land and approximately 20% of the taxes collected, as well as acquiring socio-ritual authority in local society, including privileges in the community ritual of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival (see Chapter 8).

‘Depeasantisation’ of small farmers and low castes

Commercialisation of agriculture, increase in cash transactions and the consequent dominance of the rural money lender (mahājan) led to mass-scale indebtedness among petty peasants by the end of the nineteenth century (Maddox Report: 126–32, Bose 1993:87). The money lenders were not townspeople but usually large- and mid-scale farmers in local society (Stein 1992: 16, Bose 1986: 5). Petty peasants in debt sold their land to rich farmers in some cases, but most of them continued to farm in order to pay back debts. There were also some who handed over their rights to land, became sharecroppers and continued to farm on the same land. However, in such cases, they had to hand over a higher share of produce to the owners (Prakash 1992a: 23, Chaudhuri 1975). Overall, small-scale landownership by peasants continued even under the commercial agrarian economy (Bose 1993: 87, also see Bose 1986: chapters 4 and 5, Prakash 1992b: 23). Generally speaking, peasants became proletarians when their labour was substantially subsumed in capitalist relations of production (real subsumption) in some cases, and a part of capitalist agriculture when their labour was subsumed in form through debt (formal subsumption) in other cases (Prakash 1992b: 21, Banaji 1992). In Indian villages, most peasants were subsumed into capitalism through the latter process.

Money lending functioned as a thorough mechanism for expropriating surplus. It was not just a mechanism of exploitation but a way of embedding petty peasants and their life within commercial agriculture and perpetuating the cycle of production, sales and payment of interest. The establishment of such a mechanism was part of the process by which Indian villages came to be linked to global capitalism (Bose 1993). Petty peasants kept ploughing the same land either as indebted small cultivators or as tenants of landowners engaged in agricultural business. Agriculture was no more a part of the subsistence peasant economy but a part of the global market economy. The so-called ‘depeasantisation’ in colonial India was, thus, a process by which small peasants were incorporated into the mercantile world through debt and tenant fees while remaining in agriculture, rather than
one by which peasants lost land and became proletarianised (Prakash 1992b: 23; Bose 1986: chapters 4 and 5).

Yanagisawa argues that agricultural commercialisation led to the increased independence of small farmers and low castes in the wet regions of South India, where irrigation developed and agriculture was intensified (Yanagisawa 1996). Peasants in the dry areas of South India are also reported to have become more independent (Robert 1983). By contrast, many studies suggest that small-scale farmers and low castes became subordinate to the rural rich. It seems that both the independence and subordination of peasants were complex, interlinked processes. Rich and mid-scale farmers, as free players in the market economy, often tried to subordinate and exploit small-scale farmers and low castes. Small farmers and low castes, however, tried to resist subordination for their own autonomy. Patterns of dominance and resistance took different forms, according to the historically specific ecological, social and economic conditions in each region, such as class structure, means of raising capital, availability of cultivable land, water resource, population constitution and social customs (Yang 1989, Washbrook 1976: 73–7, 90–3, Yanagisawa 1996: chapter 5).

In Garh Manitri, the increase in landlessness was not caused by proletarianisation that accompanied commercial agriculture but by the introduction of private landownership in the early nineteenth century (cf Tables 3.16, 5.1 and 5.2). Later, from the mid-nineteenth century, the rich increased their profits by using the landless as cheap labour. While the new rich succeeded in optimising commercial opportunities, the fortunes of some of the old rich declined. Agrarian business by village entrepreneurs acquired capital through the sale of farm products and the use of cheap labour (Tomlinson 1993: 66). The landless were used and exploited by the rich, and their state of poverty became fixed in most cases (Mohapatra 1990: 50, Pati 1993: 14–7).

The landless low-caste population had to work for the landowning class as bonded labourers, called haliā (literally, carrier of ploughs), who were “engaged by the year and paid daily in kind”. In Garh Manitrī, Saora landownership decreased from 7.890 to 2.908 acres from 1829–1830 to 1911. In 1829–1830, the hāris owned a considerable amount (24.320 acres) of cultivated land, considering their dalit status. This was due to the heritage of entitlement from the precolonial period. However, as the system of entitlements broke down and landownership and alienability were introduced, landownership among the hāris decreased to 12.433 acres by 1911 (Table 4.1) and they probably became bonded labourers. By contrast, land owned by the dalit bāuris increased from 2.220 to 6.718 acres. This is an example of low castes improving their economic conditions with the advent of commercialisation.

In Orissa, however, the economic improvement of the lower castes was limited, as many agricultural labourers and small-scale peasants became increasingly subordinated socially and economically in the process of agricultural commercialisation. As Roy points out, “Credit, commerce, inequality, and growth were positively correlated in rural India” (2006: 166, emphasis in original). This applied in the case of colonial Orissa. Economic growth was accompanied by increasing
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

economic inequalities. Commercialisation of the agrarian economy strengthened the relationship of domination and subordination between the rich and the poor. It involved the decline of the old hereditary elite and the emergence of the new rich but did not destroy the basic hierarchical structure of agrarian society. Rather, colonial capital functioned to reinforce the subservience of agrarian labour (Robb 1992: 116).

At any rate, we should avoid an either-or analysis of whether colonial modernity was liberating or oppressive for the low castes. As Lata Mani insightfully points out in a different context, “even as colonial modernity opened up a structure of opportunities, it simultaneously inaugurated its own logic of discrimination and submission” (1998: 6). Aspects of dominance and resistance in colonial modernity varied according to the regional contexts.

Ecological changes and the structure of dominance and subordination

The predicament of the lower castes worsened due to ecological changes caused by environmental destruction under colonialism. In the 1830s, the colonial government promoted the clearing of forests for cultivation and permitted the free use of forests. By doing this, they sought to increase taxable lands and hence enrich the government (Wilkinson Report: 131, para 17). Instead what actually happened was the indiscriminate cutting down of forest trees and the sale of timber, firewood and bamboo to other regions. The marketing of timber, needless to say, was related to its increased importance as a commodity within the colonial economy. As a result, by the 1870s, the situation was disastrous and the forests of the Khurda region were rapidly dwindling (Taylor Report (1877): 176–7, paras 69–70). In order to restore forests, the government banned swidden agriculture in 1871 (Taylor Report (1877): 177, para 72). Moreover in 1880, all unsurveyed lands in Khurda were categorised as protected forests and placed under the Forest Department (Taylor Report (1886): 132, part 2, para 369). The use of forests and wastelands was severely restricted.

In Table 5.4, we can see the land use according to produce in Manitri village in 1911. If we compare the figures with Table 3.2 that show land use from 1829–1830, we see the almost total annihilation of swidden agriculture. Hardly any millet is grown anymore, despite its precolonial importance as a food, especially for the lower castes. Raw cotton, which had been an important source of cash income for the villagers, was no longer grown. In Khurda, dry fields are still called toilā (cotton fields). In the eighteenth century, cotton yarn and textile produced from cotton grown in these fields constituted an important part of the agrarian economy. Industrialisation in Britain led to so-called de-industrialisation in India, and the Indian cotton industry, with a few exceptions, generally declined. Peasants lost their additional income, and low castes and women, who were involved in cotton-carding and spinning, were particularly badly hit.

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, swidden agriculture in Khurda had alleviated the effects of inequalities in ownership of paddy land (Tables 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3). Cotton and millet from swidden fields were economically important for the low caste and the poor. The loss of swidden fields as a subsistence supplement meant that people had to rely on produce from ploughed lands. The paddy field came to be more important. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, inequalities in ownership of cultivated lands came to be directly reflected in social relations of dominance. The Saora and bāuri, in particular, lost their means of production in the forest, such as hunting and gathering and shifting cultivation, and the degree to which they were dominated by the landowners as bonded agricultural labourers increased (cf Maddox Report: 136).

### New wealth and ‘traditional’ authority

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, land given in lieu of community service also gradually became private property. The colonial government now allowed community servants to keep their service land (hetā) as ordinary taxed land, even after they stopped performing service to the community. The survey and settlement of Khurda region in 1836 recorded 501.585097 acres of service land, whereas the survey and settlement of 1886 recorded 87.169 acres which had declined to 60 acres in 1897–1898. Moreover this was tax-free land for one generation (hinhayat jagir) and was registered as cultivated land by the time the next generation inherited it. In other words, community service land had completely disappeared by the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, service castes lost their function as servants of the community, and their jajmani exchange relations with the employer household came to be the new form of traditional relationship.

In this way, most of the tax-free land (jagir and hetā) held by traditional officers and service castes disappeared by the late colonial period. Only the lands classified as religious, the jagirs of the tax collectors and tax-free residential areas (mināha, minyā) remained as the institutional basis for ‘traditional’ roles in local society. The traditionalised structure of the unitary caste hierarchy created in the

#### Table 5.4 Types of land in Garh Manitri, 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area acre (%)</th>
<th>Forest and fields</th>
<th>Cultivated or inhabited</th>
<th>Homestead</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Vegetable</th>
<th>Orchard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5796.89 (100)</td>
<td>4895.80 (84.46)</td>
<td>901.09 (15.54)</td>
<td>24.21 (0.42)</td>
<td>768.01 (13.25)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>3.38 (0.06)</td>
<td>82.31 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Land settlement records collected from Ekharajat Mahal office by author.

Note
1. Data on the total area are from the census of Orissa.
2. The sum of cultivated or inhabited land does not correspond to the numbers presented above. This lack of correspondence is probably attributable to mistakes in writing or calculation in the original record.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area acre (%)</th>
<th>Forest and fields</th>
<th>Cultivated or inhabited</th>
<th>Homestead</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Vegetable</th>
<th>Orchard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5796.89 (100)</td>
<td>4895.80 (84.46)</td>
<td>901.09 (15.54)</td>
<td>24.21 (0.42)</td>
<td>768.01 (13.25)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>3.38 (0.06)</td>
<td>82.31 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
early colonial period gradually collapsed. With the rise of the local new rich and the disappearance of the old dominant class privileges in the late colonial period, the gap between economic status and ritual status based on a traditionalised role began to widen.

The question facing colonial authorities was how to deal with this social transformation and maintain order. The main contradiction was between traditionalised authority and the newly powerful. There were several ways to translate newly acquired wealth into authority in colonial India. To purchase land and become a zamindar (landowning aristocrat) was one way. To get an education and acquire rank in colonial government was another way. In Ekharajat Mahal, the quasi territory of the king of Puri, the new rich were offered opportunities to purchase the position of tax collector, which had been formerly occupied by traditionally privileged classes like chiefs, accountants and scribes. With the purchase of this position, the new rich were able to translate their wealth into the privileged position of being an officer of Jagannātha temple under the king. Through this mechanism, the ‘tradition’ of sarabarākāra as the local privileged class continued and was given a fresh economic basis with the entry of the new rich. As a result, the community rituals in Ekharajat Mahal flourished as an opportunity to represent rank, privileges and order in a hierarchy that combined the authority of colonially ritualised kingship and the wealth of the new rich who had benefited from the colonial economy.

Socio-economic changes in the process of agricultural commercialisation were thus incorporated in the traditionalised structure of dominance and system of honour and privilege. This was one of the aspects of “the dynamics of continuity” (Ray and Ray 1973) from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Some gained new wealth while the fortunes of others declined, but the colonial temple administration and kingship in Khurda functioned to translate these changes into a traditional system of dominance and hierarchy. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 8.

Cultural politics of identity and difference

The emergence and spread of Oriya nationalism

The beginning of modern Oriya consciousness can be marked by the establishment of the Cuttack Printing Company, which began publishing the weekly Utkaḷa Dīpikā in 1866 when a catastrophic famine took place (Dash 1978: 364). The year 1866 can be considered a turning point in the history of Orissa. The devastating famine of that year exposed the colonial government’s incapacity and callousness. Socio-political reform movements began as people saw the need for improvements in society (Mishra 1979, Pattnaik 1980, Mohanty 1982, Mohapatra 1990: 48, Sugimoto 2007: 38–43).

The following decade saw the establishment of a number of publications and voluntary associations that promoted developmental, educational and reform activities. Examples of voluntary associations include Utkaḷa Bhāṣa Unnati Bidhāyini Sabhā (the Society for Development of Oriya Language), established
in November 1866; Utkaḷa Bhāṣa Uddipani Sabha (the Society for the Promotion of Oriya Language), established in May 1867 at Cuttack; Cuttack Debating Club, established in February 1868; and Cuttack Society, established in November 1868. As regards publications, the monthly periodical Bodhadāyini o Bāleśwara Sambāda-Bāhikā (Giver of Knowledge and Balasore News Channel) was founded in July 1868 in Balasore, and the Oriya newspaper Utkaḷa Darpaṇa (Mirror of Orissa) began in 1873 in Balasore.

A large part of Orissa had been incorporated into Bengal Presidency, and there was a prominence of Bengali bureaucrats and landlords as well as Bengali language in the region. Hence, the Bengali question became important with the rise of Oriya nationalism. Soon after 1866, the question of the medium of instruction in schools—whether it should be Oriya or Bengali—became a subject of public attention and discussion. The debate soon developed into a tussle between Oriya and Bengali intellectuals. The backdrop of the debate was Oriya resentment about Bengali dominance in Oriya-speaking areas. A substantial number of Bengali landlords emerged in coastal Orissa under colonialism, and there was also a preponderance of Bengalis in administration and education. In this context, there arose the Orissa Language Movement (Oṛiā Bhāṣa Āndoḷana), to promote Oriya as the medium of instruction and establish it as a modern literary language (Sugimoto 2007, chapter 1).

In the face of the post-1866 social reform activities and the perceived need to defend collective interests as Oriyas, consciousness of an Oriya identity grew among intellectuals, beginning with the language issue and developing into an Oriya nationalism that demanded autonomy for the region. Since the majority of the Oriya-speaking area was merged with the Bengal and Madras presidencies and the Central Provinces, demand grew for the unification of the Oriya-speaking areas under one administration. The activities of voluntary associations in the late sixties and seventies laid the ground for the formation of Utkaḷa Sabha (the Orissa Association) in 1882 in Cuttack (Mohapatra 1990: 91–2, Sugimoto 2007, chapter 2). Utkaḷa Sammilanī (the Utkal Union Conference) was formed in 1903 and is considered to signal the beginning of the organised phase of Oriya nationalism (Mohapatra 1990: 74, Sugimoto 2007, chapter 3). It was to function as the central organisation advocating Oriya autonomy till 1920.

Meanwhile, Indian nationalist movements intensified in 1903 with the proposal for the partition of Bengal. The anti-partition movement developed into the Swadeshi movement in 1905–1908. However, Oriya nationalists remained at best ambivalent towards the movement that centred around Bengali intellectuals (Mohapatra 1990: 111–4, Sugimoto 2007, chapter 3). In fact, since the partition proposal included suggestions that served some purpose towards the amalgamation of Orissa, Oriya nationalists actually supported it. This made it impossible to establish overall cooperation with nationalists in Bengal. During this period, despite requests from leaders of Congress and the provincial conference, the Orissa Association and Utkal Union Conference refused to establish official links with them.
Yet, there was sympathy for the Swadeshi movement, in terms of anti-colonial sentiment, the promotion of domestic manufacture and national education. Oriya nationalists began to share anti-colonial sentiments with other Indian nationalists of this period, but the difference of interests between Oriya and Bengali intellectuals made them take different political strategies. As the opposition between the colonial government and Bengali nationalists intensified in the early twentieth century, Oriya nationalists found themselves in an ambivalent position, unsure as to which side would support their cause. To improve their situation vis-à-vis the Bengalis, they decided it was better to side with the British. Although, in order to secure self-rule for the Indian nation as a whole, it was necessary to wage an anti-colonial movement in alliance with the Bengalis. As Sugimoto points out, it was the doubly peripheralised position of Orissa within both the Indian colony and early Indian nationalism that made Oriya intellectuals so ambivalent (Sugimoto 2007). Supporting one would always be contrary to the cause of the other.

**Dissonant nationalisms**

For Orissa’s educated class, the ‘public sphere’, based on the ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘rationality’ introduced by colonialism, provided the discursive space to nurture nationalist discussions (Sugimoto 2007, chapter 2). These were based on Western political ideas and naturally had a “derivative” character (Chatterjee 1986). The public nature of such a discursive space was limited in terms of participation under colonial conditions. The educated class largely internalised the techno-rational ethos through the pedagogical project of colonialism (Anderson 1991, Bhabha 1994, Pinney 1995, 1997), but it lacked general acceptance among the common people. The latter did not have access to the public sphere in a double sense: firstly they were colonised subjects who did not have the right to participate in state politics, and secondly they were ‘non-educated’ and did not have access to the literature of the nationalist movement. The activities of Oriya nationalists regarding administration and education did not attract them. Kaviraj is here correct about “the state of neighbourly incommunication … between the sphere of middle-class and subaltern-class discourse” in the colonial situation (Kaviraj 1994: 53).

As we have seen, the British administration, after some trial and error, came to draw a distinction between the domain of state politics, under the direct management of the colonial government, and the realm of society and customs, which the colonialists felt should be left to the ‘natives’ in a non-interventionist policy. The colonised were only allowed to act as full agents in the colonially redefined domain of ‘traditional society’. Here, the personhood and identity of Indian people were seen to be defined and confined in terms of religion, caste and kingship; these categories had been decapitated into non-political social or cultural phenomena. The movements of the elite nationalists can be seen as resistance to the colonial confinement of the ‘natives’ to the socio-cultural sphere.

What is interesting, however, is that religion and kingship, which the British had assigned to the social domain outside state politics, were precisely what
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy constituted the basis of popular anti-colonial identity. Elite nationalists attempted to create a basis for their cultural sovereignty and identity in the cultural–spiritual sphere (Chatterjee 1993). They were to create a ‘national culture’ that could be shared among the people and utilised as a symbol of national unity. Such an endeavour shows the presupposition of the homogenous national ‘space’, which is very different from the popular imagining of the traditional country as a cosmic-ontological ‘place’ where each person is guaranteed a specific identity in relation to the sacred centre of kingship and religion. The common people, especially the so-called caste Hindus, held colonially traditionalised and popularly idealised religion and kingship as defining their ‘authentic’ identity.26

We should note the continuous development as well as colonial transformation of patriotism from the early modern to the colonial period, which provided the cultural basis for the popular sense of identity and political morality. As Bayly says, “What modernity did was to transform and redirect these emergent [patriotic] identities rather than to invent them ex nihilo” (Bayly 1998: 3, parenthesis added, emphasis in the original). The weakness of his argument, however, is that continuity of patriotism is stressed at the expense of appreciating the transformation of its semantics under colonialism. It is important to pay attention to the fact that, under colonialism, the idea of liberal democracy as a universal political ideal upon which nationalism was based was imported to India from outside, and it was institutionally and politically monopolised by British citizens while it was denied to Indians. Thus, it is necessary to consider the effect of the “rule of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993) between the coloniser and the colonised on the form of Indian nationalism more than Bayly seems to allow. Nationalism was to have a peculiar twist in its relation to modern and traditional ideas. The disjunction between the popular sense of patriotic unity and modern elite nationalism—a direct descendant of the colonial dichotomy—was to pose a serious problem when it came to constructing a workable political community into the postcolonial period (see Chapter 6).

As the basic politico-economic system, including land tenure, was structured according to techno-rational principles under colonialism, people’s everyday activities were largely expunged from the institutions (local community, kingship and religion) that had supported their ontological identity. In this situation, ‘traditional’ socio-religious activities and symbols came to represent the world of the lost ideal for the popular masses. This mentality intensified in the face of the economic sufferings of peasants and social change due to the commercialisation of agriculture in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The disintegration of the traditional rural structure was connected with the loss of the social order, which was seen as characteristic of the ‘age of discord’ (kaḷi juga) in the indigenous model of historical decay.

According to Indian cosmology, there are four yugas (ages) that get progressively shorter corresponding to the increasing decline in the religious, moral and physical state of the world. According to Śrīmad Bhāgavatam (3.11.19), the first kṛta yuga (or satya yuga) lasted 1,728,000 years, then tretā yuga lasted for 1,296,000 years, dvāpara yuga for 864,000 years and lastly the present kali yuga...
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

is to last for 432,000 years. Patriotism under colonialism was nurtured by such an “apocalyptic” (Mohapatra 1990) mentality to look “elsewhere” (Pinney 1997: 860) beyond the colonially defined real and rational. As a corollary, popular patriotism was to hold a contrary and dilemmatic position in relation to elite nationalism that held techno-rationality in the homogenous empty space of “meanwhile” (Anderson 1991).

As Chatterjee points out, there is a kind of sociological determinism in Gellner and Anderson’s theories on nationalism, where the idea of evolutionary progress from traditional society to a modern nation is presupposed (Chatterjee 1986: 21, cf Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991). Gellner sees nationalism as an outcome of modern industrial society. He argues that modern industrial division of labour requires a centralised educational system run by the state to create a standardised culture through the spread of literacy. The shared culture holds together atomised and mutually substitutable individuals so as to form a nation. Similarly, Anderson attributes the main cause of the growth of nationalism to modern print capitalism, through which a common national consciousness emerged as the print languages formed “a unified field of exchange and communications” (1991: 44). Thus, Anderson and Gellner do not seem to see the possibility of the emergence of varied forms of nationalism based on the continuous development of different politico-cultural paradigms in diverse areas.

It has been argued by Chatterjee that the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on identity, but rather on a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the nationalist society propagated by the modern West.

(Chatterjee 1993: 5)

Chatterjee’s point about the possibility of a different imagining by non-Western nationalists is important. However, he tends to pay attention only to the difference posited by nationalists between India and the West, overlooking how the various strands of anti-colonial nationalisms attempted to develop their own form of modern nationalism that encompassed both indigenous morality and the idea of liberal democracy. Here we should give more credit to the wide scope of nationalist imagination among Indian agents across both the traditional and the modern, rather than restricting it to the inner sphere as Chatterjee does or neglecting it altogether as Anderson tends to do.

In sum, anti-colonial nationalism in India was based, on the one hand, on liberal democracy and progressivism as an exoteric framework that could be used to communicate with the outside world, including the British. On the other hand, the idioms of kingship and religion were utilised as an esoteric framework for the patriotic integration of the popular masses into the nationalist movement. At the all-India level, the idiom of Rāma rājya (the kingdom of Rāma), for example, was used by Gandhi to invoke the image of the ideal Indian nation that was
There is no doubt that there must have been great diversity in what people of different castes, classes and gender imagined from such idioms. Nevertheless, such mythic–royal–religious idioms were successful, if not in providing a concrete framework for a new nation, at least in bringing people into anti-colonial movements.

We may note here the extent to which the framework for the anti-colonial stance was influenced by colonialism. It was not purely that the elite nationalist discourse of liberal politics was the result of colonial education. The notions of cultural tradition, on which popular patriotism based their anti-colonial self-identity, were also largely influenced by the colonial dichotomy between socio-religious ‘tradition’ and politico-economic ‘modernity’. Popular patriotism just inverted the evaluation of socio-religious tradition, seeing it as the lost ideal to be regained, rather than as a premodern limitation. The popular patriotism that continued from the precolonial period, thus, came to have an anti-modern, elsewhere character in the colonial context. Yet, in idealising the cultural values represented by religion and kingship, they were placed in a dilemmatic position in relation to the public rationality of elite nationalism. Thus, the anti-colonial stance of the Indian people contained an incongruent dilemma between the techno-rational political ideal and religio-ontological cultural identity.

**Jagannātha, patriotism and Oriya nationalism**

In late nineteenth-century Orissa, the potential bridge between the elite and the common people in the anti-colonial movements came through a series of incidents regarding the position of the king of Puri and the Jagannātha temple. Lord Jagannātha and his earthly representative, the king of Puri, who embodied the tradition of Gajapati kingship, were not only imbued with religious/ritual meanings. They guaranteed and represented Oriya identity, giving them political significance too. The uniting incidents that will be described shortly, however, illustrate the ambiguous and complex position of these powerful symbols in relation to nationalism. In order to understand the development of anti-colonial movements in their totality, it is necessary to consider not only the activities of the educated class in the public sphere, but also the popular participation and imagination that largely influenced the ethos of nationality.

The king of Puri and the question of the Jagannātha temple administration became a public issue beginning with the events of 1878 when King Dibyasingh Deva was sentenced to lifelong exile on a murder charge (Mukherjee 1977: 342–60). The case was publicised through Oriya newspapers such as the *Utkaḷa Dīpikā*. Although literacy at that time was not very high—4% in 1881 in the Puri district—the articles in the newspapers certainly had an impact. Each village had at least someone who was literate and could read out the newspapers to the community. Common people were not responsive to the topics of education and administration, which were concerns of elite Oriya nationalists only. However, when it came to topics such as Jagannātha and Gajapati kingship, the focal points
of their religio-ontological identities, ordinary villagers took a keen interest. The effect of print capitalism (Anderson 1991) went beyond the border of literacy in a country like India, where many common people, though not directly literate, had access to and interest in the world of print. As Bayly points out, India was “a ‘literacy aware’ society, if not a highly literate one” (1996: 39). The common people of Orissa reacted with resentment towards the government decision to exile their king for life. They felt that he was indeed a victim of British political manipulation (Mukherjee 1977, Dash 1978).

In the 1880s, the Oriya nationalist movement gained impetus when popular protests surged in response to the proposed Puri Temple Act (Mohanty 1982: 44–5, Dash 1978, Bayly 1998: 73–4). The Act represented an attempt by the British to increase their control over the management of the Jagannātha temple and diminish the role of the Gajapati king. The Puri temple case of 1886–1887 induced further heated demonstrations, when the minor king, Mukunda Deva’s guardian and grandmother, Rani Surjamani Patamahadei, fought against the government’s proposal to pass the superintendence and management of the Jagannātha temple onto a committee. Protests against the government were made in public meetings and the press. The case eventually resulted in the government’s decision to recognize the minor king’s right of superintendence, and this was celebrated by the people. Here, Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha functioned as the symbolic focus for the anti-colonial movement.

The Puri temple case marks the pivotal point when elite Oriya nationalists openly began to employ the symbols of Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha to enhance their nationalist cause. Elite nationalists had maintained a neutral position in relation to the issue of reforming the Jagannātha temple administration as per their ‘progressive’ public philosophy in the press in the early 1880s (Sugimoto 2007: 94–5), but as protests against the government rose with this suit, they also began to fervently support the Gajapati king. It was with this case that elite Oriya nationalists, whose sphere of activities had been limited mainly to the issues of administration, education, social reform and literature, began to be more aware of the power and semantics of popular patriotism. Dash argues that, whereas

other issues including the issue of the replacement of the Oriya language affected only the educated and urbanized class who were vocal … the Puri temple case drew the common people, the silent thousands, to the fold of Oriya nationalism.

(1978: 368)

The incidents of the 1880s demonstrated that the king of Puri in his connection with the Jagannātha cult possessed enormous popular appeal in Orissa. Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha were vital as symbols for the common locus of Oriya patriotism from the precolonial period to colonial times.

Bayly (1998) and Ray (2003) discuss the importance of patriotism and its influence on the emergence of modern nationalism. Bayly even takes up the example
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

of Orissa briefly in his discussion on the development of nationalism from precolonial patriotism (1998: 73–4). Their attention to patriotism is certainly essential, but it is necessary to point out that there was never a smooth and complete transition from precolonial patriotism to modern nationalism. The subaltern masses did not embrace modern nationalism per se but continued to place importance on moral–ontological identities connected with patriotism well into the colonial period. The relationship between the patriotic ethos of the people and modern nationalism remains complex and problematic even today (although there have been moments of successful coordination, such as the Gandhian non-cooperation movements).

Though there was coordination between the educated elite and common people concerning their understanding and use of the Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha, such as with the Puri temple case, there were also prominent divergences. There was no all-encompassing Oriya nationalism centring on Gajapati and Jagannātha. The main discursive framework for elite nationalists lay in a progressive public philosophy. They criticised the attempted intervention by the colonial government into the Jagannātha temple affairs, but from a liberal point of view. From one perspective, the argument of Oriya nationalists against the government proposal was based on the emulation of the colonial principle of non-intervention into native religious affairs. The difference, however, was that whereas the colonial view involved othering native religious symbols, the employment of the same liberal principle by nationalists resulted in protecting from the government the sphere of Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha temple as their ‘own’. It established their cultural self-identification with these symbols.

The utilisation of Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha as symbols of Oriya nationalism highlighted dilemmatic differences. There was no consistency at the theoretical or discursive level between the liberal progressivism on which nationalist discourse is founded and their cultural identification with these ‘feudal’ and ‘religious’ symbols. This incongruence explains the hesitation of elite nationalists to utilise Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha as nationalist symbols in the early 1880s, as stressed by Sugimoto (2007). As the Jagannātha temple issue became a public concern in the late 1880s, Oriya nationalists realised the potential of Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha as powerful political resources for mobilising the masses and asserting Orissa’s cultural identity. Though the dilemmatic incongruence remained, these symbols were established as representing Oriya identity and continue to do so today.

For the common people, Gajapati kingship and Jagannātha were not to be reduced to symbols representing the nation of Orissa as a homogenous cultural entity. They were meaningful in the context of specific relationships. Rather than being symbols of a common national identity, the king and Jagannātha instead embodied the devotional focal point from which a body-person with a specific role in the cosmic whole derived his particular ontological place. Patriotism, the affection for one’s own land and tradition, on which at least a part of anti-colonial feelings was based, was generated and aggregated through the cultural idioms of religion and kingship. These idioms mediated between the idiosyncratic identities
of a people and the whole. In the colonial situation of peripheralised Orissa, Gajapati and Jagannātha functioned as the symbol of the lost ideal around which the core of popular anti-colonial sentiment began to form.

There was also an inconsistency among the common people regarding the evaluation of the Jagannātha temple. There was increasing criticism, especially among the lower castes, of the casteist conservatism of the Jagannātha temple. Exclusion from the temple was a source of resentment to the ‘untouchable’ dalits. In 1881, the members of Mahima Dharma, an egalitarian reformist sect, attempted to forcibly enter the temple, take out the statues and to burn them, which resulted in violent clashes and the death of one of the members (Eschmann 1978b: 376, Banerjee-Dube 2001, Sugimoto 2007: 92–3). In 1938, Gandhi’s ‘harijan’ movement attempted entry into the temple with his harijan followers, but it failed. It was not possible for the discriminated and oppressed to accept the entire traditional setup.

Dilip Menon is correct in pointing out the “existential dilemma” of low castes who would only be subordinated in “Hindu tradition” (Menon 1997). This does not mean, however, that they would simply discard tradition and embrace liberal progressivism. Negating one’s own history does not solve the existential problem. There are constant efforts—from Gandhi’s harijans and Ambedkar’s neo-Buddhists to dalits in today’s India—to reconstruct the basis of who lower castes feel they are in reference to their past and present. It is significant that Ambedkar opted for Buddhism that denies caste hierarchy and the ‘Hindu’ tradition on the one hand, whilst attempting to secure their position within the wider ‘Indian’ tradition on the other (Viswanathan 1998: chapter 7).

Lower castes in the locality where I did my fieldwork attempted to secure a better and more dignified position within the local community tradition by transforming the pattern and semantics of their caste duties. This is done not only in reference to the ideal of liberal civil society; it also involves the reformulation of the community tradition that includes caste-based division of labour by the local people themselves (see Chapter 9). The agency of the lower castes is key in redefining the forms of ‘their’ tradition into one which they can see themselves as being part of (see Chapters 9 and 10).

Anti-colonial alliance and postcolonial agenda

Between the imported idea and institution of nationalism nurtured by the elite on one side, and the indigenous politico-moral ethos held by the common people on the other, there were many attempts to articulate the two. From the early twentieth century, these are most conspicuously represented by Gopabandhu Das in the case of Orissa and by Gandhi at the national level. Gopabandhu Das (1877–1928) devoted himself to establishing a link between the nationalist movement and the common people by organising educational and development activities and voluntary services in rural areas. He is referred to as the father of modern Orissa and given the title Utkalamaṇi (the jewel of Orissa).
MK Gandhi was instrumental in uniting different sections of Indian society beyond class, religion and language to create a truly national anti-colonial movement. These attempts to bridge derivative and indigenous politico-cultural ideas were also endeavours to connect the different senses of nationality held by the elite and the popular masses. This involved the redefinition of both traditional culture and modern politics; the former had to concede to democratic demands, and the latter had to appeal to the masses. It might be said that nationalist struggles could gain popular participation only when they successfully joined the popular sense of politico-morality with the anti-colonial nationalist movement. The Gandhian movement in its successful periods of the 1920s and 1930s was a primal but perhaps short-lived example of such a bridging (Haynes 1992).

In early twentieth-century Orissa, a new link began to develop between urban intellectuals and the rural masses who were coming up as a new political force (Mohapatra 1990: 117, Pati 1993, 2001, chapter 4). The coordination of Oriya nationalists with the Indian nationalist movement was achieved gradually in the 1910s, as the resentment towards the colonial government grew among the Oriya elite and the attitude of Congress towards the periphery—with its various linguistic regions—changed to cognise their specific needs. This gradual coordination culminated in the success of the Gandhian mass movements, including the Non-Cooperation movement (1920–1922) and the Civil Disobedience movement (1930–1934).

Agriculture became relatively less important for the Indian economy after the 1920s. Agricultural growth dwindled due to the exhaustion of cultivated land and the decline in trade (Roy 2006: 90). Reduction in public investment contributed to falling productivity, but the decisive factor was land scarcity. Population rose in this period, and people were forced to cultivate land that was inferior in terms of fertility and water access. As a result, productivity did not rise in spite of increased labour (Roy 2006: 112). The agrarian economy gradually worsened, and landlessness increased (Roy 2006: 92). In the meantime, industrialisation based on Indian capital progressed. Thus, the urban middle class grew as the rural economy stagnated (Nagasaki 1999: 335–54, Wakimura 2006: 158–63, 177–83).

The Government of India introduced the electoral system through the Morley–Minto Reforms in 1909, the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms in 1919 and the Government of India Act in 1935, giving regional autonomy and limited representation to Indians. These became the foundations for the gradual development of democracy in India. After 1937, provincial governments consisted of a majority elected to the provincial legislatures, allowing Indians to hold power. Though these were limited elections based on wealth, voting rights were nevertheless extended to 350,000,000 Indians (Nagasaki 1999: 357).

However, religion and caste were politicised due to the system of separate electorates, which had been in place since 1909. This later became the cause of identity politics and the partition of India and Pakistan (Pandey 1989, Nagasaki 2002: 16, Dirks 2001, Bayly 1999). The middle classes who led the regional autonomy movements remained in leading positions in politics after independence. Many of
them adhered to the basic Indian principles of nationalism, secularism and democracy, but the gap between the urban elites and rural people remained unbridged (Nagasaki 2002: 17).

With the establishment of the independent province of Orissa in 1936, the initial aim of Oriya nationalism for autonomy was realised. India became independent in 1947, but this did not mean the establishment of an Indian nation-state with a coherent politico-cultural edifice. The many important languages, cultures and religions within India are beyond the remit of this study. Rather, I would like to continue examining the basic incongruence within India between the political idea of liberal democracy and modernity on which the new nation-state was founded and the cultural values of the common people on which the patriotic ethos of the country was based.

The successful alliance between the elite and the common people, as well as that between nationalist and cultural–ethical discourses, in the Jagannātha temple case in the late 1880s in Orissa and in the wider mass nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s should be seen as temporal, though crucial, phases. This is not to deny the necessity of seeing the nationalist movement develop in its interaction with the popular level (Pati 1993: 246). It would be wrong to assume either the centrality of the elite in the nationalist movement or the “duality of nationalisms”, that is, the independent and parallel existence of elite and subaltern nationalisms, as Pati rightly points out in his critique of some subaltern writings.

However, while the nationalist movement indeed brought about phases of alliance between the elite and the common people, it does not mean that there was a national resolution to the question of the colonial dichotomy and the related chasm between the elite and subaltern discourse. The colonial dichotomy between the politico-economic rationality of the modern state and socio-religious custom of native society haunts the Indian nation. The problem of bridging the gap between the elite-dominated techno-rational political ideas and institutions and the religio-ontological cultural identities of the common people remains an important postcolonial agenda. The difficulty stems from the fact that the ‘tradition’ of Indian society has been defined in contradistinction to the rational sphere of the ‘modern’ state. The next chapter will take a closer look at the postcolonial predicament in rural Orissa.

Notes
3 The word ‘Ekharajat’ is of Arabic origin (Ikhrajat), meaning expenses (Maddox Report ii).
5 For an interesting account of a temple under colonial rule, see Appadurai (1977). Also see Fuller (1983).
6 On kingship in colonial India in another region, see Price (1996).
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7 1 maund = 82.14 lbs, 1 lakh = 100,000. Maddox Report: 129.
8 Increase in brāhmaṇa landholdings was purely due to institutional changes, as lands registered in the names of deities came to be registered in the names of brāhmaṇas who had managed the lands.
9 Gradual decrease in landholdings of the old elite can be seen all over India (Roy 2006: 156). This indicates that the class structure established in the early colonial period became unstable in the late colonial period.
10 The colonial government often granted economic privileges and administrative positions to the local rich and powerful (Stein 1992: 17). They strengthened their authority in local society through links with the colonial government, while the colonial government tried to extend its influence over local society by including them in their system of governance (Yang 1989). However, it was the Puri king as the head of the Jagannātha temple who appointed the sarabarākāras in Ekharaţat Mahal where the temple had tax collection rights. There, the new rich gained ritual authority in local society through their links with kingship.
11 Canal and well irrigation systems, however, were concentrated in Punjab, Madras, United Provinces and Sind (Roy 2006: 121).
13 Maddox Report: 136. The same page shows details of the modes of payment.
14 Mani refers to the position of women in the colonial period, but her analysis can be applied to subalterns in general, including low castes and tribals.
15 There were pockets of areas and industries where labour-intensive artisanal traditions survived and eventually supplied labour and capital to small-scale industry (Roy 2006: 192).
17 Taylor Report (1886): 144, part 2, para 369, Appendix Form No. 7.
19 These are corrupted forms of minhā or minhāī (Hindustani).
20 About one million people, amounting to a third of the population, died in coastal Orissa (Wakimura 2002: 29). Wakimura (2002) points out that the increase in famine and plague in late nineteenth-century India is related to the modern development in trade and communication. Also see Sen (1981) on food deprivation and famine due to lack of entitlements.
21 Its precursor, Bodhadayinī was founded in Balasore in 1861 as the first Oriya magazine.
22 See Sugimoto (2007, esp chapters 1 and 2) for details about publications and voluntary associations in late nineteenth-century Orissa.
23 For various historical reasons, Bengalis had many advantages in getting education and government posts.
24 An organisation of the same name, whose activity was limited to literature, was established earlier in 1877.
26 On the historical construction of Oriya identity, see Mohapatra (1996).
27 I have taken the term “exoteric” (politics based on the liberal–democratic and egalitarian discourse) and “esoteric” (politics utilising religious and cultural idioms) from Nagasaki (1994). Similar divisions in political discourse are noted by several scholars. Chatterjee (1993) talks about the distinction between the “outer domain” and “inner
Consolidation of colonial dichotomy

domain”, Haynes (1992) about “outer politics” (institutional, rationalist politics) and “inner politics” (informal politics based on kin–caste–personal connections) and Freitag (1991b) about “political discourse” and “cultural discourse”.

Rāma is the central figure in the Ramayana, considered an avatar of Vishnu, who established a prosperous and just kingdom in Ayodhya.

It is interesting that Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, a Bengali nationalist writer, lamented in the late nineteenth century that “Bengalis have no history” whereas “[e] ven the Oriyas have their history”. By history he meant “the glorious deeds of their forefathers”, the memory and remnants of which were abundantly available for the Oriyas but not for the Bengalis (Chatterjee 1993: 76).

In Puri district, literacy rate (% of people ages 10 and above) was 7.25 in 1881, 6.5 in 1891, 9.22 in 1901, 7.47 in 1911, 8.33 in 1921, 8.64 in 1931. Among males, it was 13.70 in 1881, 12.70 in 1891, 17.95 in 1901, 14.31 in 1911, 15.57 in 1921, 16.09 in 1931. Among females, it was 0.80 in 1881, 0.30 in 1891, 0.49 in 1901, 0.63 in 1911, 1.08 in 1921, 1.18 in 1931 (Orissa District Gazetteers, Puri 1977: 482–3). These numbers were similar or slightly higher for the two other coastal districts, i.e. Cuttack and Balasore, and considerably lower for the feudatory states (Census of India, 1931, vol VII, Bihar and Orissa, part I, Report: 224–5).

The various strands in the nationalist movements—including those of Gopabandhu Das, Bankim, Tagore, Gandhi and Iqbal—can be said to have been different attempts to create a form of nationalism that could appeal to both modern and indigenous ideas of nationalities.

Kaviraj says, “(Gandhi’s) kind of discourse managed to bridge the gulf between the two sides (the elite and the masses), and keep the values, objectives and conception of the world of the two sides intelligible to each other” (Kaviraj 1991: 85, paranthesis added).

I will not give details here of the illustrious Indian nationalist movements of 1920–1947 which are well covered by works of historians. On the aspect of nationalist movements in Orissa, see, for example, Mohanty (1982), Mohapatra (1990), Pati (1993) and Sugimoto (2007).

For example, Henningham talks of the “duality of the insurrection” consisting of “elite nationalist uprising” and “subaltern revolt” (Henningham 1983: 164). Similarly, Dasgupta talks of the separation between “elite politics” and the “autonomous mobilization” of the “subaltern” (Dasgupta 1985: 135), cf Pati (1993: 250). Tanabe (2020) discusses “heterogeneous genealogies” rather than the duality in the Orissa Uprising of 1817.
6 Postcolonial tradition
The biomoral universe

Postcolonial predicament

This chapter and the next describe the postcolonial predicament experienced by the people inhabiting the fragmented lifeworld of rural Orissa. The present chapter briefly touches on the history of democratisation and development in independent India, before going on to depict socio-cultural ideas and practices based on the agrarian structure. The next chapter takes up the politico-economic sphere related to the cash economy and local politics. Through this I would like to show the wedged dichotomy between the socio-cultural and politico-economic spheres. I attempt to shed light on the moral–practical dilemma people face between an existential identity based on biomoral values and instrumental rationality in pursuit of politico-economic interests. This chapter and the next refer to situations observed in 1991–1993 unless otherwise specified.

Orissa became an independent province within the Indian empire in 1936. In 1949, it took its present form as a state when the Oriya-speaking areas in the feudatory kingdoms were united. The most obvious change which took place after independence was that the Indians obtained participatory rights in the institutional politics of the state and political activities centring on elections also began at the village level.

Political independence, however, did not mean sudden and total emancipation from the colonial experience. It is true that the “rule of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993) between the colonial state and native society ended institutionally after independence, and a democratic nation-state was born, which was supposed to integrate the people-as-nation with state politics. The ideal of the nation-state was subsequently clearly formulated in the Constitution of India in 1950. However, there was still a discrepancy between the democratic and technocratic values of the modern nation-state and the common peoples’ religio-ontological values embedded in the moral and ritual universe. In this context, the pressing postcolonial agenda was the practical mediation between democratic national institutions and popular cultural ethos.

Postcolonial India is characterised by the persistent dilemma of the mutually exclusive discourses of a modern nation and traditional society. The sphere of state politics no longer excludes Indian people, and there are attempts by the

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central and state governments to bridge the nation and the people to form a ‘modern nation with ancient tradition’. However, basic differences between the foundational ideas of free individuals sharing the national imagination and the popular ethos’ ontological position make conciliation difficult. On the one hand, the idea of modern politics is based on the assumption of free, individual citizens committed to the public good coming together as a collective to form a nation. The cultural ethos of the common people, on the other hand, places importance on persons with different identities based on various religious and caste affiliations, each locating themselves as parts of a whole.

Instead of the exclusive bifurcation of state and society as in the colonial framework or a smooth integration of the nation and the people into one coherent national space, two sets of discourses and practices persist concomitantly, namely modern nation and traditional society. The traditional and the modern here do not denote something that is actually old and new. The discourse and idea of traditional and modern are both products of the (post)colonial dichotomy. These coexist, compete and manifest contradictions in India’s public sphere, each claiming greater legitimacy than the other. The postcolonial liberal–communitarian debate, which I mentioned in the introductory chapter, is a manifestation of the dilemma rooted in the parallel presence of these two sets of discourses and practices in contemporary India.

Cultural politics of the modern and the traditional

In rural Orissa in the early 1990s, the evaluation of outer modernity and inner tradition varied positively or negatively according to viewpoint and context. People retained both discursive frameworks and aspired to possess both politico-economic resources and moral–ritual identities. For instance, the dominant castes stressed the democratic principle of majority rule to protect their dominance in factional politics. At the same time, they tried to maintain their privileged roles in community rituals. The lower castes, too, called for equal democratic rights to underscore their political participation and share of distributed resources. In the context of community rituals, they attempted to redefine their traditional roles to gain a more honourable status.

Such a situation cannot be reduced to the modernist–emancipationist picture of the conservative dominant castes versus the progressive lower castes. Both dominant and lower castes utilised modern democratic discourse and traditional socio-religious discourse. Rather, cultural politics unfolded over the meanings and content of the modern and the traditional.

Of course, this is not to deny that there were no attempts to overcome the colonially traditionalised structure of hierarchy and dominance. There were indeed such movements by the lower castes in particular; resistance against the traditional social structure was necessary for asserting their rights and dignity (see Chapters 9 and 10). This did not mean, however, that traditional moral–ontological identities were discarded and the liberal individualist framework was embraced. What the oppressed attempted to do was to selectively adopt the opportunities offered
by the modern institutional framework (such as democracy, human rights, voting rights and caste reservation) and also to redefine their moral–ritual identities to enhance both their politico-economic interests and socio-cultural standing. In this process, they rejected roles that were demeaning—such as cleaning dirt and carrying the palanquins of the upper castes—and took up those that they deemed of value, stressing their significance—such as being spirit mediums, priest and drummers for the village goddess (see Chapter 9 for further details).

It should also be noted that the introduction of modern democratic institutions into rural society did not immediately benefit the oppressed. Factional politics that accompanied the development of ‘democracy’ in rural India from the 1960s to 1980s led to a structure of distribution of state resources that benefited the local elite and the dominant caste (see Chapter 7 for further details on factional politics). This proved how the colonially constituted power structure entailing the amalgamation of state administration and the local system of hierarchy and dominance persisted for a long time, even under democratic institutions.

Subaltern resistance was part of the dissent against this postcolonial power structure. It was precisely in such a context that the complex cultural politics over the practices and evaluation of traditional identity and modern politics unfolded. That is to say, definitions of democracy and rights in the politico-economic sphere and traditional duty and role in the socio-cultural sphere were negotiated. These negotiations were not about choosing between modernity and tradition but about the forms and meanings of discourses and practices. Actual socio-political relationships came to be slowly redefined and reassembled through these negotiations.

In this way, the colonial dichotomy between the modern nation and traditional society continued in India after independence. State administration and the market economy articulated with the local power structure in the politico-economic sphere, while the people tried to maintain aspects of community and religiosity in the socio-cultural sphere. The inevitable outcome of this discrepancy between outer modernity and inner tradition was the lack of coherence in rural society between the newly introduced politico-economic activities associated with modern institutions and the socio-cultural activities that were seen to be traditional. There was an irreconcilable gap between the world of interests and rights and that of morality and duties.

When I refer to the outer modernity of the politico-economic sphere and the inner tradition of the socio-cultural sphere represented and interpreted by the people as two distinct spheres of practice, I do not mean that the former actually came from the outside in the modern period with the advent of colonialism, while the latter was a vestige of precolonial local customs. It goes without saying that politico-economic practices existed before the colonial period. In fact, the advanced administrative technology and market networks of early modern India were passed on into the colonial modern period. Moreover, the jajmani system, represented as the inner tradition of inter-caste exchange relations, emerged from the collapse of the system of entitlements in the colonial period. Similarly, caste hierarchy was strengthened during colonial rule. If we look at the history and content of ideas, institutions and practices labelled as modern
or traditional, we see that they all include aspects of continuity from the preco-
lonial period and change due to reorganisation under the colonial period. As I
have repeatedly emphasised, the very distinction between the modern politico-
economic sphere and the traditional socio-cultural sphere is a product of colo-
nial modernity. Under colonial modernity, the modern/traditional narrative was institutional-
ised as a discursive means for differentiating between the self and the other cultur-
ally and politically (Said 1978, 1993, Inden 1990, Breckenridge and van der Veer
1993). The modern/traditional dichotomy was superimposed on the coloniser/col-
onised and West/East dichotomies. Accordingly, the state and market controlled
by the colonial government came to be referred to as outer modernity, and the
socio-cultural sphere of caste and religion, the domain of non-interference by the
colonial government, came to be regarded as inner tradition.

Nevertheless, this distinction did not mean that the two spheres were mutu-
ally exclusive. Rather, the traditionalisation of villages in colonial India led to
the penetration of colonial power through the existing structure of dominance
(Yang 1989) and the functioning of a more efficient mechanism for exploiting the
agricultural surplus (Ludden 1990). Ludden says: “Using tradition to bolster the
rural rich became standard and explicit colonial practice and in effect subsidized
commodity production at colonialism’s agrarian base. Orientalism served capital-
ism well” (Ludden 1990: 174). In other words, the colonial state incorporated the
structure of hierarchy and dominance of traditional society into its own system of
rule, utilising and othering it at the same time.

Fragmented life

India’s agenda of recreating a coherent framework out of the modern/traditional
dichotomy carried over into the independence period. The year 1947 indeed
marked a political watershed, but the problem of finding a new discursive frame-
work for comprehensively defining modern India still remained. The postcolonial
predicament—the colonial division between outer modernity and inner tradi-
tion—continued at least till the early 1990s.

People in local society try to retain and redefine their moral and ontological
identity in relation to their practices in the socio-cultural sphere. This traditional
sphere remains displaced from the overall political structure of the nation-state.
It constitutes a sphere of limited ‘moral economy’ based on local agriculture,
jajmani relationships and ritual reference to the kingship, factors which were
traditionalised under colonialism. According to EP Thompson, moral economy
means “a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the
proper economic functions of several parties within the community” (Thompson
1971: 79). For James Scott it is “the structure of a shared moral universe, a com-
mon notion of what is just”, represented by two moral principles—“the norm
of reciprocity” and “the right to subsistence” (Scott 1976: 167). Discourse and
practice in this sphere presents the basis for existential identity, where each part
is related to the whole.
Although the concept of moral economy is indeed useful, we cannot assume that an autonomous system of values persisted from the past to modern and contemporary India. Rather, we need to pay attention to how so-called traditional society was constructed under colonial and postcolonial modernity. The very distinction between moral economy and market economy as being traditional and modern, respectively, was a product of colonialism in India. Furthermore, it was precisely within this dichotomy that the moral economy, manifested as socio-cultural practices related to the institutions of kinship, caste and kingship, represented what was in the past and what should be in the future. In other words, the discourse based on the moral economy emerged in a pure form precisely due to the circumstances of colonialism.

The outer modernity that is seen to dominate the politico-economy today (at least till the mid-1990s) is supposed to represent the values of rationality and equality of rights. However, in reality, this sphere, especially since the 1960s, has been characterised by factional politics, cheating and corruption. As state development projects and democratic institutions came to be linked to structures of power in local society, the dominant caste tried earnestly to participate in factional politics in order to secure their share in the state’s resources. Factional politics are considered to belong outside the moral sphere of the community and deemed to be ruled by principles of power and competition devoid of moral concerns. Nevertheless, money embezzled from state resources through factional politics was an important source of income for the dominant caste and local elites.

Coherence in life is almost impossible under such a divided framework of thoughts and actions. The only politico-economic basis for socio-cultural activities is rice agriculture which is increasingly waning in importance today. On the contrary, the competition for state resources has been aggressive, though the practice of cheating, fighting and embezzlement is a source of frustration for the villagers. The villagers are forced to live a fragmented life of incoherency between their moral identity and pursuit of community, on the one hand, and politico-economic activities, on the other. They lament the loss of morality in kali juga, while doing whatever it takes to acquire money.

In the sections below, I discuss how the structure of dominance traditionalised under colonialism continued in local society after independence. I then explore the socio-cultural ideas and practices related to agriculture, where entitlements, land, agriculture, cooking, food, body, ancestors and goddesses are biomorally connected. I use the term ‘biomoral’ to illustrate how the circulation of bio-material substances is inextricably linked to the process of communication of socio-moral values and meanings. Everyday socio-cultural life involves (or is made possible by) the exchange of biomoral substance-codes. It is important that we understand that people’s ontological identity is founded on such biomoral connections. In postcolonial India, however, the biomoral world is limited to the socio-cultural sphere and does not extend to the politico-economic sphere of the state and market. This is indicative of the postcolonial predicament of the people’s lived reality in local society. The socio-cultural sphere can be seen as
self-contained and harmonious to some extent by being cut off from the dynamics of the politico-economy.

**Continuity and change**

**Independence as passive revolution**

Anti-colonial nationalism attributed Indian people’s suffering to the destructive nature of colonial rule. The end of colonialism was to usher in a new era of independence in which freedom, equality and economic development would prevail. However, such lofty expectations were dashed; independence did not hail the arrival of the ideal nation. The people were supposed to have gained sovereignty through an independent nation-state, but they were still kept far away from state politics. Ranajit Guha calls this predicament the “historic failure of the nation to come to its own” and points out that it constitutes the “central problematic” of the historiography of modern India (Guha 1982a: 7). Transfer of power was characterised by a “passive revolution” in which the independent state as the successor of the colonial state continued to depend on the pre-existing dominant classes for effective rule without radical transformation in social and political relations (Chatterjee 1986: 30, Gramsci 1971: 114–5, 118–20, 1988, Kaviraj 1997a, Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 38).

In the village, the characteristics of local society traditionalised by colonialism included both the hierarchical aspect of caste with the brāhmaṇa at its apex and the centrality of the dominant caste based on unequal landholding and the jajmani system (Bayly 1999, Dirks 2001). The structure of dominance later included the local new rich who had gained wealth in the commercialised economy. These aspects of hierarchy and dominance persisted and characterised postcolonial Indian society.

The practice of ‘untouchability’ was constitutionally condemned, reservation measures for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were introduced, and several attempts were made to counter socio-economic inequality through land reform. Nevertheless, the government’s commitment to empower the underprivileged remained at best half-hearted since their political rule was dependent on the support of the old dominant classes in the aftermath of the passive revolution.

After independence, land reform laws were passed in several states in India to protect tenant rights and reduce socio-economic inequalities. The Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 and Orissa Land Reforms Act of 1965 abolished the rights of middlemen (i.e. absentee landlords) between the state and cultivators (Behuria 1990: 375). The Orissa Tenants Protection Act of 1948 and Orissa Tenants Relief Act of 1955 supported tenant rights by banning arbitrary eviction and limiting the price of land rent. The Orissa Land Reforms Act of 1973 specified the upper limit of landholding by a single household (Behuria 1990: 374).

However, these laws allowed much leeway. In many cases, landlords, who were the local elites, registered their land under the names of their family members and relatives to stay within the ceiling. They also changed their tenants every few years to preclude tenants from gaining ownership rights. In addition, they
evicted tenants to evade tenant protection laws (Kurosaki and Yamazaki 2002: 77). In the end, these laws did not lead to a large-scale redistribution of land. It is, however, significant that these laws heightened tenants’ awareness of their rights. In the context of a passive revolution, the government had no choice but to rely on the support of dominant classes, while the subalterns increasingly grew discontented as they became aware of their denied rights.

In coastal Orissa, the old dominant classes consisted of brāhmaṇas, karaṇas and khaṇḍāyatas. Brāhmaṇas and karaṇas were mostly local elites who possessed fairly large estates and often held government jobs, while the more numerous khaṇḍāyatas constituted the dominant landholding caste. This traditionalised social structure was reproduced in the socio-cultural sphere. The jajmani-style exchanges constructed under colonialism continued to reproduce the structure of dominance based on patron–client relationships. Annual agricultural rituals and community rituals represented and reproduced the moral universe of local society based on the moral–ontological values of caste and kingship. The discourse of cultural ethics used in this moral and ritual universe was that of ‘brotherhood’ (bhāi), ‘helping out’ (sāhājya), ‘norm’ (niyāma) and ‘tradition’ (pūrba, paramparā). Such cultural ethics are intimately related to the indigenous sense of body, kinship, caste, land, agriculture, kingship and religion.

**Ecology and agrarian economy**

Under colonialism, the market economy and state control had profound and dominating effects on the socio-political and ecological environment at the grassroots level. The diversity in ways of life, including hunting-gathering and shifting cultivation and pastoralism, supported by the rich ecological conditions in the precolonial period was reduced to a socio-economic hierarchy in terms of possession of amounts of plough-cultivated land. This change was accompanied by ecological impoverishment represented by irreparable deforestation.

Little remain today of the forests where people used to hunt wild animals, gather food and fuel and engage in swidden agriculture in Khurda. Instead we find, apart from paddy fields and residential areas, some shrubs here and there, stretches of grass field for animals to graze and fields planted with cashew nut trees that produce the most valuable cash crop for the people living in the area (see Chapter 7). Villagers had to either buy firewood through middlemen from distant forests or collect fuel from nearby shrubs and their cashew fields before gas (LPG) in kitchen was introduced from the mid-2000s (Figure 2.2).

The basic subsistence economy in Garh Manitri is rain-fed, wet-rice agriculture (Figure 6.1), although the relative importance of the agrarian economy has decreased from the colonial period due to the advent of other sources of cash income. The aggregate area of cultivated land in Garh Manitri increased considerably from 455.130 acres, in 1829–1830, to 689.385 acres, in 1911, and to 1,045.068 acres, in 1993 (Table 6.1). The rate of population growth, however, exceeded the growth rate of the arable. As a result, per household area of paddy land decreased from 2.954 acres in 1829–1830 to 2.209 acre in 1993.
If we turn to the Khurda district, we also find that cultivated land decreased per capita with the growth in population. It was 0.907 acres (36.71 are) in 1921, 0.635 acres (25.70 are) in 1931, 0.561 acres (22.70 are) in 1941, 0.677 acres (27.40 are) in 1951 and 0.695 acres (28.13 are) in 1961 (Mishra 1971). Decrease in farm size is the general trend in South Asia and is not unique to Khurda and Orissa (Kurosaki and Yamazaki 2002: 81–2). Rice yield per acre in Khurda was approximately 544.8 kg in 1880, 559.8 kg in 1915, 585.8 kg in 1952–1953 and 646.5 kg in 1953–1954 (Mishra 1971: 55). Yield per hectare was approximately 1,346 kg, 1,383 kg, 1,448 kg and 1,520 kg, respectively. Apart from the exceptionally good harvest in 1953–1954, the annual growth rate of agricultural productivity was a mere 0.1% (with an overall growth of 7.5%) in the 72 years from 1880 to 1952.\(^5\) Thus, we can conclude that rice production per head decreased in colonial Khurda. Moreover, increased pressure on land meant that marginal lands were brought under cultivation, increasing the production cost (Mishra 1971: 55).

There has, till very recently, been little change in the method of rice agriculture. While the green revolution was indeed significant for food security in India as a whole, its effect on society was limited to certain regions. Two-thirds of agricultural land in India remains without irrigation even today. The green revolution, which started in Punjab in the 1960s, spread to Haryana and West Bengal by the 1980s but bypassed most of Orissa except the narrow coastal strip. In Orissa, only 16% of the land is irrigated compared to 75% in Punjab. Also, per hectare consumption of chemical fertiliser in Orissa is a mere 9 kg compared to

![Wet rice field, removing weeds using oxen.](image)

*Figure 6.1* Wet rice field, removing weeds using oxen.

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\(^5\) For a detailed analysis of agricultural trends and productivity in Khurda, refer to Mishra (1971).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>1829–1830</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Average per household</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>4.240</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>41.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (priest)</td>
<td>9.110</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>1.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṛiā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>12.160</td>
<td>(3.52)</td>
<td>2.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>22.130</td>
<td>(6.40)</td>
<td>2.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māḷī (gardener)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>3.400</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khāṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>205.570</td>
<td>(59.49)</td>
<td>5.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>12.970</td>
<td>(3.75)</td>
<td>6.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohānti (peasant)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhanḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>6.450</td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribe)</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baṛhei (carpenter)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobā (washerman)</td>
<td>9.520</td>
<td>(2.75)</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1.590</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>1.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṇi (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>24.320</td>
<td>(7.04)</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saora (tribe)</td>
<td>7.890</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaṇa (scribe)</td>
<td>21.520</td>
<td>(6.23)</td>
<td>7.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>2.220</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>345.580</td>
<td>(100.00)</td>
<td>2.954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Palm leaf documents for 1829–1830 collected at Garh Manitri, land settlement records for 1911 collected from Ekharajat Mahal office and field research by author for 1993.

Note:
1. The figure for ‘average per household’ in 1829–1830 for brāhmaṇa under-represents their economic status since they had the deities’ lands in their possession, but these were not yet registered in their names at this stage.
2. The number of households for 1911 could not be determined because only records by land parcel were available.
The green revolution depended on water access, so there were many regions that did not benefit due to lack of irrigation. The instability of agricultural infrastructure, primarily lack of irrigation, is one of the greatest constraints to increasing agricultural productivity (Fujita 2002: 106).

Not only is there no irrigation in the Khurda region, but farmers also preferred the ox plough and cow dung manure until around 1997. Tractors, chemical fertilisers and insecticides came to be more commonly used only after that. There was, of course, some use of chemical fertilisers and insecticides from the 1970s, but it was limited. As the ox plough was used, people kept cows and oxen at home and hence there was plenty of dung for natural fertiliser. When tractors became gradually more common from around 1998, many people stopped keeping oxen and cows and had to start purchasing chemical fertilisers.

Since paddy acreage per household in Garh Manitri decreased from 1829 to 1993, rice production has also declined in comparison to 160 years ago. This means that there has been almost no agricultural development in the Khurda region since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In fact, we could even say that there has been underdevelopment. If village life had improved in the past decades, which many of the elderly said it had at the beginning of the 1990s, it was due to non-agricultural employment or distribution of state resources. In other words, if the people of the Khurda region hoped for a better life, they had to seek employment outside the agricultural sector or get involved in factional politics and compete to grab state resources.

If we see Table 6.1 on landownership by caste in Garh Manitri and compare Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 6.2, there is a considerable change in the ownership pattern. Khaṇḍāyatas remain the dominant landholding caste, occupying 52.86% of all land in Garh Manitri, although their average landholding has decreased to 2.466 acres per household (general average 2.209) from 5.139 acre per household in 1829–1830. There is also a notable decline in the economic condition of the once-wealthy karaṇas. Today their landholding per household is as low as 0.180 acre. Brāhmaṇas have the second-highest average landholding of 3.359 acres per household. However, their position in the village in terms of aggregate landholding has decreased by 43.14% since 1911. People of these three high castes told me that their more successful brothers, who had chances of better education and employment, now live in cities. There is, on the other hand, a remarkable increase in landholding by the business castes, namely, the sweet-makers and oil-pressers—on average 2.776 acres (the third highest) and 4.483 acres (the highest), respectively. This, of course, is related to their success in the expanding market economy.

The landholdings of the low-caste hārī and bāuri, as well as that of the tribal Saora, remain low today. Average landholding was 0.589 acres for the hārī (fourth lowest) and 0.373 acres for the Saora (third lowest), while all eleven bāuri households were landless (lowest) in 1993 (Table 6.1). Bāuri were the only group that had increased their landholding from 1829 to 1911 but later became landless. Unlike in the case of South India reported by Yanagisawa (1996), colonial modernity did not necessarily improve the condition of the low caste. The breakdown of the system of entitlements meant that the right of landholding became more
Table 6.2  Landholding pattern by caste in Garh Manitri, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0–0.5</th>
<th>0.5–1</th>
<th>1–2</th>
<th>2–3</th>
<th>3–4</th>
<th>4–6</th>
<th>6–</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṛiā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māḷī (gardener)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khāṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohānti (peasant)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribal)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāṛhei (carpenter)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhoṭā (washer-man)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotiṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (tribal)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaṇa (scribe)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>113</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
1. ‘1–2’, for example, indicates more than 1 acre but less than or equal to 2 acres of land. ‘6–’ indicates more than 6 acres of land.
fragile, subject to arbitrary and often violent social pressure, especially from the dominant caste, in colonial and postcolonial Orissa.

Many landless low-caste people told me how the dominant castes had made them sell what little land they had because they had fallen into debt and how they had been threatened by force to sell at very low prices. Their grievances probably reflect historical facts. This, of course, does not mean that the low castes did not try to uplift themselves politically and economically. But, since the possibilities of expanding their landholdings were very limited in the Khurda region, they tried to negotiate the shares they received from their patron households. In other words, low-caste households hoped to improve their socio-economic relationships in local society rather than try to become independent. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 9.

Thus, while average landholding per household has not increased since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the pattern caste-wise has changed considerably to the advantage of the business castes and to the disadvantage of the traditionally high castes and low castes. In the discourse of traditionally high-caste villagers, their own economic downfall, together with the advent of the business castes—sweet-maker and oil-presser—was related, especially, to the modern age of discord (kali juga) when the caste order is to be corrupted. A khaṇḍāyata commented: “With the coming of the British, the businessmen or vaisya started to rule the country and the kings and brāhmaṇas lost their power. Nowadays business-minded people accumulate all the wealth and power”. The changes, on the other hand, are taken by the business caste people as a welcome sign of modernity. One oil-presser businessman, referring sarcastically to high-caste families, commented: “Those who work hard will get results. If you sit idle all day, how can you expect to succeed in life?”

While landholding is obviously an important measure of socio-economic status, it is also important to note that the paddy field is no longer unquestionably the main source of wealth and social position. Nevertheless, the paddy field still plays an important role in family identity at the community level. This is not only because land has long been the main economic resource in rural India but also because important cultural and social meanings were and still are attached to paddy land. In fact, as I will go on to argue, concepts regarding the body, food, possession of land and the annual cycle of rice cultivation are closely related to the workings and reproduction of lineage and caste, which are considered the main institutions that provide the basis of traditional identity.

**Life in the biomoral universe**

To understand the continuing importance of paddy land for the traditional identity of villagers, it is necessary to understand the cultural schema and social practices that connect body, personhood, kinship, caste, land, local community and country. As Bayly argues, the core of such ideas was that “the human mind, the human body, the city and the polity were all composite and complementary organizations of bio-moral substance” (1998: 15). As I try to show with ethnographic evidence,
such popular ideas, which I refer to as the biomoral, still influence the sense of traditional identity today. Let us now look at how kinship and the agricultural cycle are interrelated in a seemingly harmonious whole, keeping in mind that the very fact that they can be described in a holistic manner is actually a result of the postcolonial condition. In precolonial times, the relationships between the local community, market and the state were much more complex and open-ended, as we noted in Chapter 3. It was in colonial times that ‘traditional society’ with its agrarian economy was formed in contradistinction to the state and market economy. The former came to be represented as static and cosmologically harmonious in opposition to the dynamism of the latter.

Regarding personhood in South Asia, it has been correctly pointed out by ethnosophical studies that persons are not conceptualised as individual “bounded units” (Marriot 1976: 111). It is necessary to look at how humoral and fluid biomoral interactions involving the exchange of “substance-code” (Marriott 1976)—materials that carry cultural meanings and values—constituted and determined the position and identity of a dividual body-person (Marriott 1976, Barnett 1976, Marriott and Inden 1977, Appadurai 1981, Daniel 1984, Fruzzetti and Östör 1984). Instead of an individual, i.e. indivisible, bounded person, a dividual refers to a person consisting of fluid and transferrable substance-codes, who is therefore divisible.\(^8\)

The term ‘body-person’ is used here to indicate how the body as a corporeal substance and personhood as social roles and position are inseparable (Fruzzetti, Östör and Barnett 1992). According to this biomoral definition of body-person identity, interactions between land, food and human bodies—the aggregate of which is supposed to make up the basic network of economics and society—are particularly important. A body-person is constructed from the corporeal substance-code made through a marital match and ingested food. Since the food is produced on a particular piece of land, the moral-nature of that particular earth substance is also taken into the body-person.

Socio-political position, titles and ritual privileges also constitute personhood as they carry certain substance-codes as well. Similarly, actions influence a body-person since they involve an inter-exchange of biomoral substance. Here, agents (the initiator) and patients (the object of agency) are implicated in complex ways through this causal nexus (Tanabe and Tokita-Tanabe 2003, Strathern 1988, Gell 1998). In this regard, gift exchanges are extremely important in determining personhood since the moral-nature of the giver is contained in the gift—women, food, land and other ritual–economic resources—and influences the personhood of the receiver.

Anthropological studies of India in the 1960s and 1970s have described in detail the kind of care and attention paid by Indian people to who they accept water, food and women from. These matters are related to concerns about maintaining their ‘proper’ body-personhood, and previous studies suggested that they represent the norms of Indian society (Mayer 1960, Gell 1998). I would argue that we can also see this phenomenon in another way. Instead of starting with the
existence of a ‘society’ where there are norms prescribing exchanges, we can see how the politico-cultural acts of exchange determine the relationships or ‘sociability’ (Parry 1979: 13, Strathern 1988: 221, Ingold 1989: 61) between various body-persons and their relationships with the environment. In other words, it is the aggregate of these biomoral exchanges that form body-persons and their networks which make up society and polity. A body-person can be seen as a knot in the overlapping and multi-layered networks of exchanges that constitute group and territorial formations.

Besides, we should be conscious of the larger framework of biomoral personhood. The discourse on the biomoral character of the person and the world does not indicate a manifestation of static Indian culture but an expression of the anxiety of the self in postcolonial India. The discourse on the fluidity of individuals constitutes the ‘traditional’ sphere where everybody and everything are biomorally related to each other, in contradistinction to the individualist, interest-oriented, ‘modern’ world. Moreover, the repetition of this narrative sustains the contested space of affect, memory and duty surrounding the idea of community. This discursive space of the traditional self allows people to express anxiety and frustration regarding ‘what should have been’. Let us see further details of these conceptions and practices.

**Formation of the body**

According to common folk discourse in Orissa (and in India in general), a human body is formed when the man’s seminal fluid (birja) mixes with the woman’s sexual secretion (raja) during intercourse. Sperm is said to make the bones and the female sexual fluid the flesh.

Ancestral bones, by their association with sperm (‘birja’ also means seed), are believed to be a source of fertility and represent the continuity of the household. After cremation, the bones of married adults are placed in a hole on the wall of the house facing the backyard and plastered over with mud (Figure 6.2). This is worshipped every full moon, new moon and saṃkrānti for the welfare and prosperity of the family. Pictures of rice plants and rice mounds are drawn on the walls of houses where ancestral bones are buried during the harvest festival of Lakṣmī pūjā (Figure 6.3). The conceptual and symbolic association of ancestral bones with the abundance of crops is obvious.

The ancestral bones kept in the wall are eventually taken to the Ganga in Gaya, whenever the family can afford to do so, be it in one generation or after many, and immersed in the final funeral ritual (van der Veer 1988). One villager explained to me that the bones evaporate and go up to the sky with water, fall to the ground as rain, become rice grain, are eaten by the descendants, become sperm again and reproduce more descendants. In a faint resonance, *Manu Smṛti* (Laws of Manu) III-76 states: “An oblation duly thrown into the fire, reaches the sun; from the sun comes rain, from rain food, there from the living creatures (derive their subsistence)”. Also *Bhagavad Gītā* III-14 says, “From food come forth beings; from rain food is produced; from sacrifice arises rain, and sacrifice
is born of action”. Upon this classical notion of cyclic sacrifice are added folk beliefs regarding the cycle of ancestors and descendants. Right from conception to death and their subsequent incorporation as an ancestor, persons are involved in interactions and exchanges of substance-codes which embed them in society and the cosmos.

While the man’s sperm is referred to as the seed, the woman’s womb is called the field (van der Veer 1988, Fruzzetti and Östor 1984). It is not only the seed that determines the character of the body, since seeds grow in biomoral exchange with the field. It is considered important that the male seed is planted and nurtured in a ‘proper’ female field for it to grow into a body that matches its lineage and caste.
A soul (jivātma) befitting the vessel is said to enter the gross body during pregnancy. Development of a proper body in a proper field is vital for fulfilling the duty prescribed as the heritage of the lineage. Hence the necessity for a ‘correct’ marriage alliance. A correct marriage alliance in Orissa is conducted between families that are equal in caste and lineage status. Unlike the case in North India, marriage in Orissa is not hypergamous but principally isogamous, though there are slight hypergamous traces in comments like “I am nobody’s sāla or śwaśura”, used to express superiority. Sāla means wife’s brother and śwaśura means wife’s father, so the two terms refer to the status of wife-giver. In fact, the Puri king gives his daughter in adoption to a brother before her marriage takes place in order to avoid becoming a wife-giver.

Those who are related by marriage are referred to as bandhu, which may be translated as relatives by marriage alliance. Villagers very often stress the importance of having bandhus. Of the several candidates to become the bride of the youngest brother of the family in whose house I was staying, one was a good looking girl for whom Rs.15,000 was offered as dowry (jautuka in Oriya or dimand from the English word demand). This was a relatively high offer compared to others, which ranged from Rs.5,000 to Rs.8,000. However, this girl had neither father nor brothers, and she was rejected for this reason. One person commented: “We get married to get bandhus. There is no point in a marriage without bandhus”.

When arranging a marriage, often a prospective daughter-in-law or son-in-law is introduced by a bandhu’s bandhu. When people want to find out the status of a
particular family for a possible marital alliance in a distant village, they first ask
who their bandhus are. By tracing the network of bandhus, they can find someone
they know and are able to learn about the approximate status of the family con-
cerned. It is, in fact, the marital network of bandhus that make up the endogamous
group or jāti. These networks are ranked, and people are very conscious of their
traditional status. The territorial sphere of a marriage alliance was also connected
with territorial identities in an important way. There are several spheres of marital
networks. The immediate sphere consists of direct relatives by marriage alliance—
called bandhu—that is, the family of one’s spouse. Then comes the bandhu net-
work of one’s own family and then that of the bandhus of one’s lineage. Thereafter
comes the network of bandhus of bandhus. Lastly, there is a network of possible
bandhus, which is the same as the endogamous caste group or jāti.

In precolonial Orissa, the territorial sphere of a jāti as a marital network often
corresponded to the unit of sub-regional kingdoms. For example, in Khurda the
peasant-militias were called Oṛa or Oṛiā (Oriya) by caste name and formed a
marital network within the kingdom. They did not form marital alliances with
peasant-militias of other kingdoms. In this way, it was partly the jāti or networks
of marital alliance which endorsed the importance of sub-regional little kingdoms.
In the case of the khaṇḍāyatas of Garh Manitri, for instance, the chief’s family has
its own network of bandhus which is distinct from that of the other khaṇḍāyatas of
the fort, who in turn are distinguished from khaṇḍāyatas outside the fort.

Under the early modern system of entitlements, bandhus held similar entitle-
ments and the kinship rank of a family more or less matched the kind of office
it held. Although this is not the case today and the gap between socio-economic
position and traditional status has increased, the notion that marriage alliances
should be made between people with equal status persists. The idea that there
should be a correspondence between a person and the land allocated by the system
of entitlements can clearly be seen in the notions regarding how a body is nurtured
by the produce of the land.

‘Eating’ the land, nurturing the body

A body born from a suitable marriage alliance is fed and maintained by the rice
produced on land ascribed to the family as service land (hetā, jagir) and passed
down to succeeding generations. The body requires food harvested from the
proper land and cooked by the proper person (mother or wife) in order for it to
develop into a person fit to perform the necessary duties designated to the family
status. Hence, there is great care about whose hands a person receives food from
(kāhāra hātaru khāibā).

Family lineage (baṃśa) in Orissa is patrilineal. As there is little service land
left, it is mainly privately owned land, besides tax-free residential land, titles
and ritual privileges that are important inherited rights today. Equal inheritance
among brothers is the norm, except that customarily the eldest son inherits an
extra portion of land, titles and ritual privilege. Although daughters today have an
equal legal right to parental property, they do not usually claim any land, except in
rare cases. When a daughter does make such a claim, it leads to litigation almost without exception, and villagers like to talk of such cases as yet another example of the modern age of discord where daughters have lost their sense of respect, gratitude and shame. The continuity of a lineage is considered important not only for the reproduction of the family so that family duty is performed and property taken care of but also to feed and sustain the ancestors, who in turn grant protection and prosperity to their descendants.

A lineage with many brothers usually breaks up after the father dies. But it is considered better if brothers can live together as one household, as long as it is practical. The ideal of the extended family is regarded very highly today. Living in the same household is expressed in phrases such as “We eat from the same pot (Goṭie hāṇḍire āme khauchu)”, signifying that the rice or food that nurtures the body is procured together, cooked together and consumed together. This also indicates the significance of sharing food substance besides bone and blood.

The so-called service land is said to have been granted by the king in lieu of service given to the community and the state. A man is said to ‘eat the land’ (jami khāibā) when he holds service land. Eating food produced on such land is one of the most important ways in which substance-codes affect the bodily constitution of a person. Since land was allocated as a patrimonial right in the system of entitlements that defined the socio-political structure of local communities in Khurda, it is natural that for a person to occupy a certain office and thus an allotted land; it is considered necessary for him to have the proper body-personhood to suit the office. Just as it is important for the seed to match the earth, the sperm the womb and the food the body, it is important that the body matches the family with its prescribed entitlements to land and office.

The question, “Does that person suit the land?” (Se loka se jamiku sohiba ki?), arises especially in the case of adoption, when a person is brought from outside to inherit an office. The chief of Garh Maniriti today was adopted by the family from an affinal relative (bandhu), after the original chief migrated to England. His elder brother was brought first but was sent back to his natal house after he contracted leprosy and so did not match the chief’s land. Leprosy is considered a manifestation of sin (pāpa). This person was considered to have got the disease because he transgressed dharma by accepting an office that was beyond his capacity. The present chief was then brought but he also contracted leprosy. It is said, however, that he was cured after he prayed to Rāmacaṇḍī—the tutelary goddess of the region who also represents the earth of the locality—to be accepted. He remains in the office today.

**Land, its proper name and family history**

The organic and humoral relationship between personhood and land is strengthened by the fact that often a particular piece of land allotted to a family has a proper name suggestive of the owner’s stature. In fact, most of the paddy fields, apart from the newly developed ones, have names and are referred to by those names even today. Each plot is seen to have a proper name and a particular
character. Service lands, which were given in lieu of service to the community in the system of entitlements, all have names related to the owner’s prescribed duty, such as kumbāra hetā (potter’s service land), pradhāna hetā (village head’s service land) and Rāmacandīna bhoga khañjā jami (arranged land for Śrī Rāmacandī’s offerings, which is the Khondha priest’s land). Today, these names still refer to particular plots of land.

In some cases the land’s name is related to how it came to be granted to the owner. For example, we find the name ‘stream of rice water’ (torāṇiā nāla) owned by a pūjārī brāhmaṇa family. Torāṇi refers to the liquid in pakhāḷa (watered rice). Pakhāḷa is prepared by soaking cooked rice, generally leftovers, in water overnight to mildly ferment it. This water is called torāṇi. Pakhāḷa is a typical Oriya dish, very simple and popular, consumed especially in rural areas. A variation of pakhāḷa with fresh rice, spices and yoghurt is also offered to Lord Jagannātha. Villagers say that drinking torāṇi after eating pakhāḷa rice gives them satisfaction. The name torāṇiā nāla thus has a humorous inflection. I asked the pūjārī how he acquired the land and how the land got that name. He said:

Once the king of Khurda, attacked by the Mughals, escaped to Garh Manitri. He did not have anything to eat. The king asked the pūjārī for some food. The pūjārī had just finished offering pakhāḷa bhoga to Tṛtiya Deva (another name for Jagannātha). He offered the pakhāḷa prasāda to the king.13 The king had pakhāḷa to his heart’s content and, finally drinking up the remaining torāṇi, became very satisfied. Thereupon, the king granted the pujāri a piece of land called ‘torāṇiā nāla’ which was added to the pūjārī’s khañjā land for the service of Tṛtiya Deva.

This episode seems to have a basis in history as Khurda kings often sheltered in Garh Manitri in times of danger (see Chapter 2). Memory and discourse related to the history of Khurda kingdom and Garh Manitri are here associated with a family’s history and its landholding entitlement.

Another example of a land with a story is one called ‘clarified butter eater’ (ghia khiā) belonging to the chief. The narrative goes as follows:

The chief of the Manitri fort area was one of the selected few who had the privilege of free entry to the royal palace. One day, the chief saw the palace cooks in distress and asked them the reason. The cooks answered, “The king has ordered fried spinach as one of the dishes for lunch today, but we put salt in it twice by mistake. It has become too salty. There is no more spinach in the kitchen and the king is waiting for lunch right now”. The chief told them, “Do not worry. Just do what I tell you”. He told them to put a large amount of clarified butter into the fried spinach. The cooks served the king lunch, including the fried spinach with clarified butter. The king tasted the spinach and liked it very much. He summoned the cooks and asked them where they got the idea as the spinach tasted much better than usual. The cooks told the king that they would tell the story only if he kindly promised them that their heads would be spared.
The king agreed and the cooks told him what had happened. The king was very pleased with the chief and presented land to him saying: “You will need more land since you know how to eat clarified butter”.

Although today there are relatively few families which still hold service land attached to their traditional office or connected to their family history, the idea that it is proper for a person to eat the fruits of his/her own land is still ritually important. For instance, during the harvest festival of māṇa basā or Lakṣmī pūjā, which celebrates the harvest in the month of Mārgaśīra (November–December), it is considered important that paddy harvested from the family land is used for worship. A māṇa overflowing with paddy is worshipped as Goddess Lakṣmī (Figure 6.4). People who have migrated to towns or cities do not buy paddy from

*Figure 6.4* Lakṣmī pūjā or māṇa basā. Harvested paddy in a measure (māṇa) is worshipped as Lakṣmī.
shops to fill the māṇa. They arrange for paddy harvested from their family land to be sent to them for the ritual occasion because they must worship the goddess who has come to their land. In this way, the cosmological life cycle, involving the body, land, paddy, ancestors and goddesses, continues to revolve.

The harvest festival is just one of the important rituals in the agricultural cycle. Let us look then at the other agriculture-related functions and annual rituals. These give us a wider understanding of traditional ideas and practices regarding connections between the body, lineage, land, food, nature and the divine.

Rites of reproduction

Seasonal time and sacred ritual

The cycle of rice production and its consumption is closely connected with both the seasonal cycle of nature and annual cycle of rituals. The rituals related to the production and consumption of rice, in turn, are connected to the relationships of kinship and caste, which are considered ‘traditional’, since rituals are the time when collective actions and exchanges are performed through kinship and caste. Thus, the yearly cycle of rituals matching the cycle of production and consumption of rice is very much related to the enactment and reproduction of relationships of family, kinship and caste, all of which are seen as part of traditional concepts and practices. Since the seasonal rituals practically and aesthetically go with the cycle of nature, they are easily linked to the concept of the cycle of time repeated from the ancient times, that is to say, to tradition.

Another important point about the subsistence economy, which was intimately related with the cycle of nature, is that the community and its members were able to maintain a sense of the sacred in its contact with nature in the process of reproduction. As we will see below and also in the analysis of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival in Chapter 8, it is considered necessary to receive śakti or the sacred generative power from the earth for the production of food. The agricultural process is accompanied by various rites which ensure the proper transformation of śakti. The earth goddess and manifestations of the generative power in the form of goddesses are worshipped, and gods are also invoked to grant protection, in the annual religious festivals that are related to the agricultural cycle. Thus, people feel a connection to deities and nature. This maintains the sense of the sacred in village life.

A brief account is given in Table 6.3 of the indigenous calendar’s social and agricultural reproductive cycle with related rituals. In Orissa, the year is divided into six seasons: spring (basanta), summer (grīṣṇa), rainy-season (barṣā), wet autumn (śarat), dry autumn (hemanta) and winter (śita). The seasons are marked by special days in the lunar and solar calendars when rituals are performed.

Concomitance of equality and hierarchy

In the annual cycle of the seasons, clear ideas are expressed about how the land, as mother goddess, matures in its generative power with the heat of spring and
### Table 6.3 Annual rituals and agricultural cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of occasion</th>
<th>Time of the year</th>
<th>Ritual or agricultural activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dola pūrṇimā</td>
<td>End of the lunar month of Phālguna (February–March)</td>
<td>Procession of village deities. Coloured powder (phagu) and green mangoes are offered to the gods on swing platforms (doḷa maṇḍapa). Reading of the new calendar takes place in front of deities and villagers. Earth is worshipped (bhumi pūjā). The first two preparatory rounds of ploughing (kaḍhāṇa and doḍa) have been finished by now. The end of the lunar year and the start of the new year. All payments to agricultural labourers and service castes must be completed by this time and agricultural contracts with bonded labourers (haḷiā) and tenant cultivators (bhāga cāṣī) are made for the new year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holi</td>
<td>Day after doḷa pūrṇimā; first day of the lunar new year</td>
<td>People play with coloured powder and paints. Spring festival to celebrate the coming of the new reproductive cycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paṇā saṃkrānti</td>
<td>First day of the solar month of Meṣa (April–May)</td>
<td>Mother earth, hot and dry in this season, is cooled down and made ‘wet’ by offering paṇā (a cooling drink). Marks the beginning of the solar year. Start of the summer season.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daṇḍa jātrā</td>
<td>Same day as paṇā saṃkrānti</td>
<td>Devotees stay together in the ‘wish house’ (kāmanā ghara) and undertake penance, like rolling on hot sand, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akṣaya triyā</td>
<td>Third day of the bright fortnight of Baiśākha (April–May)</td>
<td>Paddy seeds are ritually sown on the ‘field of auspicious beginning’ (anukūḷa kiāri) by the head of household. The earth is worshipped as a goddess. Paddy seeds sown on this date are said to give a good harvest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raja (menstruating earth)</td>
<td>Starts from the last day of the solar month of Bṛṣabha (May–June) for four days</td>
<td>Festival for girls and young women. Earth is not ploughed during this time in order not to inflict any pain on mother earth who is menstruating. The final preparatory ploughing is finished just before the occasion. After this festival, cultivators choose an auspicious day to start proper sowing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Table 6.3 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of occasion</th>
<th>Time of the year</th>
<th>Ritual or agricultural activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Snāna pūrṇimā</strong></td>
<td>Full moon day of Jyeṣṭha (June–July)</td>
<td>The trinity of Trīṭya Deva is bathed on the bathing platform (snāna maṇḍapa). The land is ploughed when the paddy plants grow to about 15–20 cm. Some days later it is flattened again, and this is repeated after about ten days. The ritual marks the beginning of the monsoon season. Rain is expected to fall on this day. The Chariot Festival (ratha jātrā) is performed in Puri a fortnight after snāna pūrṇimā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chitālāgi amābāsyā</strong></td>
<td>New moon day of Śrābaṇa (July–August)</td>
<td>A special cake called chitau piṭhā is offered to the earth goddess in the paddy field. The paddy field is weeded around this time. Paddy plants are spaced evenly. The ritual is for abundant crops and protection against snails.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pāṇi bodā baḷi</strong></td>
<td>Sunday or Tuesday before the full moon of Śrābaṇa</td>
<td>‘Water sheep sacrifice’ offered to Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī for a good rain. Medium is possessed by the goddess. Khondha priest performs pūjā. Brāhmaṇa performs homa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gahmā pūrṇimā</strong></td>
<td>Full moon day of the month of Śrābaṇa</td>
<td>Cows are worshipped as go mātā (cow mother) or go Lakṣmī (Goddess Lakṣmī in the form of a cow). Also the birthday of Balarāma (another name is Haḷadhara, meaning the plough holder).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī festival</strong></td>
<td>Ninth day of the dark fortnight to tenth day of the bright fortnight of Āświna (September–October)</td>
<td>Generative power of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī enters the village in the form of the medium and water pots. The water filled with the goddess’s generative power spreads in the paddy field. The grandest community festival where all the castes in the region perform certain roles. (See Chapter 8 for details.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Garbhaṇā saṃkrānti</strong></td>
<td>First day of the solar month of Tulā (October–November)</td>
<td>‘Pregnant saṃkrānti’. Sweet rice porridge (jāu) is cooked in the paddy fields to be offered to Goddess Lakṣmī, represented by the paddy ‘pregnant’ with new grain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Māṇa basā</strong></td>
<td>Every Thursday in Mārgaśīra (November–December)</td>
<td>Time of rice harvest. Lakṣmī represented by newly harvested rice put in a measuring basket (māṇa) is worshipped with varieties of cakes and other delicacies (see Figure 6.4). (Continued)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
summer, is made cool and fertile with the coming of the rains, then inseminated with the seed grains and becomes pregnant with the new paddy, bringing about food and prosperity to the people in the form of newly harvested rice. This rice is worshipped as Lakṣmī, an aspect of the mother goddess representing prosperity and auspiciousness. This process is marked with rituals involving interactions among gods, nature and people, which define and confirm the role and position of each individual and family in the social network of kinship and caste (Figures 6.5 and 6.6).

It is through the correct performance of these rituals and closely interwoven agricultural activities that the blessings of the mother goddess, in the form of food and abundance, is gained. The food thus produced supports the bodies of persons for carrying out duties and is offered to feed the ancestors of the family and lineage. In this way, humans, ancestors, nature and gods interact in this cycle to bring about the overall reproduction of the socio-cosmos.

In the ritual processes, we see that there are manifestations of both ontological equality and social differences. While all are ontologically equal in relation to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of occasion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kṣetrā pāla pūjā</strong></td>
<td>Tuesday or Saturday of Māgha (January–February)</td>
<td>After the harvest, a few knotted sheaves of paddy stalks are left in the field of auspicious beginning. These sheaves, called the ‘provider in the field’ (kṣetrā pāla), are worshipped as a goddess (see Figure 6.5). The paddy from the kṣetrā pāla will be used for the ritual sowing on akṣaya trīṣṭī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bāri śitaḷā</strong></td>
<td>After threshing</td>
<td>The earth is consoled after threshing paddy on it is over and cooled down with offerings. Threshing is done in the backyard by oxen tied to a pole stamping on paddy plants. This pole is also worshipped with offerings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agnijaḷā pūrṇimā</strong></td>
<td>Full moon day of Māgha (January–February)</td>
<td>The ‘burning full moon’. Bundled straw and vegetables are burnt in the ‘field of fire’ (agnijaḷā pūrṇimā). After the fire consumes the straw, people eat the vegetables baked in it as prasāda. After this, the fire is said to be satisfied and will not bring calamity to the village. The ritual also anticipates the coming hot weather.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.

Note
1. These examples are from Garh Mantritri. There are variations in the contents of rituals and festivals in different areas in Orissa.

Table 6.3 Continued
Figure 6.5 Kṣetra pāla pūjā. A sheaf of paddy stalks is worshipped as the ‘provider in the field’ (kṣetra pāla).

Figure 6.6 Threshing paddy in the backyard.
sacred power of generation, differences in status and power matter once people are back in society to fulfill their roles. For example, during the village festival of daṇḍa jātrā in the hottest months of April–May (Table 6.3), the devotees of a goddess gather together in one place and undergo penance, such as fasting, walking on hot charcoal and rolling on hot sand. During this time, they stay in a wish house (kāmanā ghara) and eat together regardless of caste. One devotee said, “We are all mother’s children. What does caste mean in front of her?” The penance of rolling on hot sand is related to an episode in the Lakṣmī Purāṇa which is chanted every Thursday in the month of Mārgaśīra. A devotee explained that even Lord Jagannātha had to go through penance to seek Goddess Lakṣmī’s forgiveness and receive food from her.

Lakṣmī, the goddess of wealth and prosperity and the wife of Jagannātha, visited the house of Caṇḍālās (untouchables) during Lakṣmī pūjā to receive worship. Fearing pollution, Jagannātha’s older brother Baḷabhadra did not approve of this. He told Jagannātha to drive Lakṣmī away. Obeying his older brother, Jagannātha told her to leave. Lakṣmī cursed the two brothers and left. Since the goddess of wealth and prosperity left them, the brothers fell into a miserable condition, without food or water. They went to look for Lakṣmī. They wandered in penance for twelve years and rolled on the hot sand of Puri without taking any food or drink. Finally, when they found Lakṣmī at the Caṇḍālā’s house, they requested her to come back. Lakṣmī consented on one condition: that there would be no caste distinction or rule of purity when devotees have mahāprasāda (the leftovers of the food offering at Jagannātha temple in Puri).

The penance in daṇḍa jātrā is said to emulate the actions of Jagannātha and Baḷabhadra in search of Lakṣmī. This wonderful story of the divine play (lilā) tells us that the hierarchical principle of purity and pollution does not have any meaning in relation to Lakṣmī, who represents the female generative power. As in the story, everyone can eat mahāprasāda in the same place from the same pot regardless of caste. Mahāprasāda left over after someone has eaten it can be taken without concern for pollution. This kind of equality and irrelevance of hierarchy is also manifested during the daṇḍa jātrā when people eat and sleep together regardless of caste. In front of mother goddess, all are one.

However, this does not mean that hierarchy and centrality are totally abrogated by the power of the goddess. In the Jagannātha temple, except in the partaking of mahāprasāda, strict rules of purity are observed. The idiom of kingship also plays a central role. Similarly, village hierarchy and domination are restored once the devotees return home after daṇḍa jātrā. One villager who participated in the daṇḍa jātrā penance said:

Everyone, regardless of caste or economic status, has the right to pursue their wish (kāmanā) by approaching a god or goddess. Everybody needs food, clothing and shelter and every family needs children. There is no difference among different castes regarding this. But once these are attained,
the duties people should fulfil in society are different and these are prescribed by caste.

This example shows that there is an equality of basic needs as a living being. It is only when equality is achieved that social cooperation through each person performing his/her role becomes possible. However, it also means that once this need for equality is accomplished, people must accept their status and role in accordance with their body-person. Ontological equality certainly exists as a fundamental value, but it is in a revolving relationship with the values of hierarchy and centrality. The relative importance and relevance of equality, hierarchy and centrality change according to viewpoints and contexts in the sense of Malamoud’s “revolving hierarchy” (1981: 41).

It is important to remember here that agricultural activities and the related rituals today do not constitute the complete picture of a people’s economy or worldview. The villagers are well aware that paddy agriculture and rituals are not the only world any more, and they are not done as a part of an unconsciously followed practice embedded in unreflected and unchanging tradition. Rather, paddy agriculture and the rituals together with the social institutions of kinship and caste are given special importance precisely because people feel that this world of interaction and mutual workings of humans with gods and nature, which provide them with their sense of ontology, is being threatened. Here, the agricultural and ritual cycles are not only embodied but also objectified and valued in contradistinction to the market economy and factional politics.

Many villagers feel that, in today’s world, the networks of mutual relations and interaction between humans, ancestors, deities and nature which provide biomoral identity to their existence are threatened and must be protected. Biomoral connections reproduced through ritual may be of little or no use for survival in today’s competitive world. They are, however, irreplaceable in providing a substantial basis for people’s identity. Indeed, it is this significance that makes them an important part of the cultural politics of dominance and resistance.

In contradistinction to the symbolic value attached to the world of the subsistence economy based on plough-cultivated lands, villagers nowadays seem to have a growing desire for cash income. The paddy field alone can no longer satisfy the material needs of the villagers, and the reliance on cash has increased.

The conceptual dichotomy that people hold today, of the subsistence economy and socio-cultural activities on the one hand, and the cash economy and factional politics on the other, derives from their colonial and postcolonial experience. Community, market and the state had complementary roles in precolonial India. The dichotomy was colonially created when local society and its agricultural economy were traditionalised and separated from the workings of the colonial government and the imperial economy, which functioned to extract wealth from the colony. Even in the present postcolonial situation where there is no longer a colonial government and imperial economy to exploit the village economy, the dichotomy in the form of a contradiction and distinction between modern politics and the market economy on one side, and the moral agrarian community on the
other, remains real to the villagers. In order to better understand this postcolonial predicament, let us now turn to the cash economy and factional politics.

Notes

1 See Pinney (1995) on the pictorial representation of such coherent national space and the discrepancies in reality.

2 The formation of an oppositional framework of modernity versus tradition is universal in the modern world. Cultural discourse in the modern period is institutionalised under this framework (Sekimoto and Funabiki 1994). Narrating the birth of a nation from the traditional to the modern was a discursive necessity for the modern state and society to become subjects of history. Each modern nation distinguished itself from other nations by recounting the uniqueness of their respective national cultures in the institutional context of the nation-state.

3 Passive revolution refers to a political and institutional transformation from above which does not involve participation of the people at large (Gramsci 1971: 114–5, 118–20).

4 Available data from palm leaf cadastres show that there were 345.580 acres for 117 households. Since about 24.07% of the households were missing from the record, I estimated pro rata that there were 455.130.

5 See Blyn (1966), Guha (1992) and Yanagisawa (1997, 1998) for discussions on agricultural productivity and changes in colonial India.

6 We should note, however, the transformations in social relations (for instance, intercaste exchange and agricultural employment) during this period in the Khurda region (see Chapter 9). The 1970s and 1980s were periods of change with implications beyond the spread of green revolution. In other words, we should describe and explain changes in these periods not only from the point of view of increase in agricultural productivity but from the perspective of larger politico-economic change, including the increasing role of the state and market in the rural life.

7 It should be noted though that the areas which benefited from green revolution now face multiple crises including depletion of groundwater. See Fujita and Mizushima (2020) on the issue of sustainability of Indian agriculture.

8 The term dividual has been discussed in South Asian and Melanesian anthropology (Marriot 1976, Strathern 1988), as well as in social theory (Deleuze 1992).

9 This is in parallel to what Cohen aptly argues about the discourse on family in India. He says, “I find the repetition of the decline of the joint family suggestive of familism (or relationality, fluidity, dividuality, and so forth), not as a static quality of ‘Indian culture’ or ‘the Indian self’ but rather as a site of anxiety and conflict, of the simultaneous maneuvers of loss and recovery in the construction of personhood and community within the space of an urban India modernity” (Cohen 1998: 105).

10 Day on which the sun moves from one zodiac to the next.

11 Låkṣmî is the goddess of fertility, wealth and auspiciousness.

12 This is not only in relation to human reproduction. The same kind of discourse can be found in relation to agricultural production (Fruzzetti, Östör and Barnett 1992, Daniel 1984).

13 Bhoga is the food offered to a deity. After bhoga is offered, it becomes prasâda, which literally means divine blessing, and is consumed by devotees.

14 Also see Das and Mahapatra (1979: 85–102) and Mohanty (1997). My data is from Garh Manitri, Khurda. The contents of rituals change from region to region even within Orissa.

15 Orissa uses a lunisolar calendar which combines the lunar cycle and solar cycle as in other Hindu calendars. In the lunar cycle, Orissa follows the pûrnimânta tradition in which each month ends on the full moon.
This is a popular Oriya text written in the sixteenth century by Balaram Das. There are many inexpensive publications of *Lakṣmī Purāṇa* sold in the market. It is read aloud by women during Lakṣmī pūjā, every Thursday in the month of Mārgaśīra. See Marglin (1985: 175–80) and Mohanty (2008) for a more detailed explanation of the tale. Mohanty discusses how Lakṣmī “challenges male Brahminical authority and advocates both feminism and caste equality” (2008: 5). Also see Gregory and Vaishnav (2003) on Lachmi Jagar from the Bastar district in central India.
7 Cash and faction
‘The logic of the fish’ in the political economy

We will look at social relations in the world of factional politics and the cash economy in this chapter. Whereas the moral–ontological self is socio-ritually secure, the political economy is considered extraneous to the moral community. Here, people struggle and compete to accumulate cash and power, disregarding tradition, moral norms and ethics. Cheating outsiders, embezzling public funds and bribing officials are entrenched in village life in postcolonial India. Villagers acknowledge and lament the prevalent situation in the political economy, but accept it as a necessary evil to adapt to the ‘reality’ of the modern age where the logic of the fish dominates. The big fish, oblivious of legal or moral considerations, eat the small fish: the powerful and the clever (cālāka) exploit the weak and the honest. This logic of the fish is often quoted as the overriding principle of the modern age.

Socio-culturally, the body-person constituted by the biomoral substance-code is represented and constructed through various gift exchanges and rituals. The political economy, represented by the cash economy and factional politics, is conceived of as being outside this biomoral order. People deem it unnecessary to take into consideration traditional morals and ethics in this sphere and say it cannot be helped that they must take recourse to any means necessary for the pursuit of wealth and power. It goes without saying that such a situation is not favourable for promoting healthy politico-economic activities. But, the biomorality of the socio-cultural sphere cannot be applied to contemporary politico-economic activities. Villagers make possible their freedom of self-interested action in the political economy by maintaining social relations and ritual practices that embody their tradition in a limited sphere. The cash economy and factional politics are distinguished from this sphere as having nothing to do with their traditional values and ethics. Here we have a glimpse of the conflict of values over identity and freedom in postcolonial India.

Ambivalence of cash economy

Pursuing Lakṣmī

Given the negligible increase, or even decrease, in per capita agricultural output, it is understandable that villagers look towards non-agricultural income. The

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expansion of the cash economy and its workings outside the socio-economic relationships supported and defined by rice agriculture has led to a semantic distinction between subsistence and cash economies. The two economies involve two different kinds of values which are played out, and to some extent manipulated, by villagers in order to retain community values, on the one hand, and to adapt to the cash economy, on the other.

This commercial economy, combined with exposure to advertisements, creates new demands and desires for commercial products. Now villagers, especially the young, want to wear trousers and shirts, watch TV and videos, listen to music from a hi-fi system, install fans and coolers in their homes, ride scooters or motorcycles, build concrete houses and so on. These things are already done by wealthier families in Garh Manitri who invariably earn money from outside. In 1997, only a tiny portion of households in Garh Manitri had a fridge, VCR, DVD player and PC, and home telephones were barely available (cellular phones were only talked about and seen as dream items). From 2000, several households began to have telephones and by 2005 more than one hundred households (above 20%) in Garh Manitri had them. CD players have also become very common. Cellular phones were not common in the village because of bad reception but became quite common among town dwellers by 2005. Now in 2019, almost all households have more than one cellular telephone as the cellular network covers most rural areas. Money is the means to obtain these items, but a large amount of money is needed to satisfy material wants that cannot come from the paddy fields any more. A modern kind of Lakṣmī (Hindu goddess of wealth) who can grant these new amenities is the cash that must come from outside.

There are various means of getting cash today. The most important cash crop in the Khurda area is cashew. Lack of irrigation precludes commercial vegetable cultivation in most areas of Khurda. Cashew trees are suited to the climate of this region and are easy to take care of. Cashew cultivation was initiated by the government in the 1970s for soil conservation. Because of the high price that the nuts fetch, many villagers took to cashew cultivation. Buyers from Kolkata and Hyderabad come to the village in April, when the fruit is ripe, and most of the crop is sold to them for export. In 1992, on average, a cashew cultivating household earned about Rs. 3,000 per annum, which was a considerable amount by their standards. Today in 2019, a cashew cultivating household earns about Rs. 20,000 per annum on average. About 30% of the households in the village, mainly khanḍāyatas, own cashew land. Around Garh Manitri, formerly uncultivated fields unfit for rice cultivation have now mostly been turned into cashew orchards.

This region also produces stones for buildings. In 1992 bāuris and Saoras earned about Rs. 20 a day by cutting stones. By 2005 this increased to Rs. 100 a day. Today in 2019 they earn Rs. 300–350 a day. Bonded labour (haḷiā) was prevalent in Garh Manitri through the colonial period and up to the 1960s, but by 2000 this practice had ceased. People nowadays are employed as daily wage agricultural workers. The daily wage was about Rs. 15 in 1992, Rs. 60–70 in 2005 and Rs. 200–250 in 2019. Those who work as daily agricultural labourers are
mainly Saoras and landless khaṇḍāyatas. Even factoring in the rise in consumer prices after 1991, we can say that the real wages of agricultural labourers have increased to some extent.

But, as Usami (2002: 132) points out, although the poverty population ratio fell as real wages rose from 1973–1974 to 1989–1990 in rural India, after the economic reforms of 1991, the ratio has scarcely fallen despite the rise in the real agricultural wage rate. Though I could not determine wages in the Khurda region before 1991, the decrease in the number of indebted agricultural labourers from the 1970s is consistent with the general trend of improvements in the condition of agricultural labour. Nevertheless, we need to be thorough in investigating the extent of amelioration of rural inequalities during this period. Jayaraman and Lanjouw show that “Although most village studies support the survey-based judgment that rural poverty declined in India during the 1970s and 1980s, … progress has been slow and irregular and … inequalities within villages have persisted” (1999: 1). Also, after 1991, though real wages rose as employment opportunities and means for earning cash (including through agricultural labour) increased, inequality between households increased as income depended on the presence or absence of able workers, as well as the physical capacity and health of individuals. Hence, there are households that are able to avail the opportunity for economic improvement, while others remain poor (Krishna 2004).

Obtaining chākirī (service), that is, permanent employment as a salaried office worker, is today the most preferred way to secure cash income. Getting employment often requires connections. Before the economic liberalisation of 1991, chākirī usually meant government employment. Factional politics and political connections play a large role in getting government jobs. From the late 1990s, however, people became more willing to take up employment in private companies. Some young people prefer jobs in private companies, seeing better salary prospects. In 1992, there were only ten or so residents of Garh Manitri who were government or private sector employees. Other villagers with outside employment tended to live in the cities, while keeping their houses and rice fields in their brothers’ care. Table 7.1 shows the number of salaried employees in Garh Manitri, including those living outside the village in 1992.

In more recent years, the importance of non-agricultural income increased in major ways. According to the household survey conducted in collaboration with Koichi Fujita in Garh Manitri in 2016, farm income constitutes only 6.34% of household income, while non-farm income constitutes 93.66%. Within non-farm income, labour wages constitute only 10.86% (agricultural wages 2.02% and non-agricultural wages 8.84%), and 89.14% of income comes from salary, business and pension sources (salary from the private sector forms 39.20%, salary from the government 25.14%, business 17.86% and pensions 6.94%). The average total household income per year is Rs. 217,720 (around US$3,266), out of which non-farm income is Rs. 203,918 (around US$3,059), and farm income only Rs. 13,802 (around US$207). This is a sea change from the situation in 1992 when farm income and agricultural wage still constituted the most important source of income.
Table 7.1  Employment and business among Garh Mantri villagers, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>No. of household</th>
<th>Govt. service</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Military/ police</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>No. per household</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Own business</th>
<th>Grand total</th>
<th>No. per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer, SC)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brāhmaṇa (priest)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohānti (peasant)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karāṇa (scribe)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gūrīā (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (ST)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barhei (carpenter)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobā (washerman, SC)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māḷī (gardener)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotiṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer, SC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuta (fisherman)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (ST)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.

Note
1. Includes those working and living outside, but retaining a household in the village.
People say that until the 1960s, few villagers wanted to be office workers or to live outside the village. Villagers say that then there was nothing much to buy anyway. In those days, if they had any extra cash they used to buy farmland, but today it is difficult to earn rent as landlords due to tenancy protection laws, and they no longer invest in buying paddy fields. Land for growing cashew is also exhausted, and villagers think that there are no ways of earning any more cash through agriculture. Until the beginning of the 1990s there was little chance for upward socio-economic mobility even if they left the village, so most villagers stayed and sought ways to get cash from outside the village while still living there.

Since the late 1990s, however, as employment opportunities increased, many people began to live outside the village to secure steady income. Even the choice of spouse changed from being based on the amount of landed property the potential affinal family had to whether or not they had cash income. By 2005, the number of people working in the private sector had increased considerably. Although I could not determine the total number, there were many people who lived outside the village, sent remittances and kept in touch with their families and relatives.

Although a percentage of government jobs are reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST), villagers in this category often do not have enough educational qualification to use the opportunity. There are only a few among the bāuri (SC) and Saora (ST), for example, who are permanently employed. Scarcely any of them own a business. They possess only small plots of land (cf Table 6.2) and depend mostly on daily labour in agriculture and rock-cutting to earn their living. Previously, until the 1990s, they were not keen to send their children to school and many children worked as labourers or, in the case of female children, helped with domestic work, but today in 2019, many families struggle with difficulty to provide their children with education.

Most of the sweeper-drummer caste youths (hāri, SC), on the other hand, go to towns and cities to work in government, private companies or wealthy households often as cleaners. Hence they are relatively well off in terms of cash income (Table 7.1). Those in the towns use the opportunity to educate their children. Younger generations of the sweeper-drummer caste have started to gain higher posts in government offices by utilising the reservation quotas. In general, there is a growing economic gap between those SCs who stay in the village as landless labourers and those who stay in towns and utilise the opportunities for education and employment by taking advantage of the reservation system.

Today, there is fervour for education in rural areas. Households with the means try to send their children to English medium schools. Garh Manitri too now has a private English medium school. At the same time, however, the poor who have been left out of economic development are unable to provide their children with basic education. Since the late 1990s, there has been both economic and educational disparity. Such disparities will no doubt lead to increasing socio-economic inequalities.

Even as the desire for cash is increasing it is difficult for those living in the village to increase their cash income under the present conditions. There are only a handful people who obtain employment in the village or in a nearby town. The
paddy field is no longer an object of investment unless one intends to run a large scale agricultural business. The land for cashew is already saturated. In this situation, villagers cannot see their own village land as the source of cash-wealth, although many remain in their village seeing no better alternative to enhance their economic and social positions. The paddy field may produce just enough rice to support their body, but it does not create cash to meet their material desires in the contemporary consumerist culture. While staying inside the village, people see the outside as the only possible source of cash income.

Some villagers resort to irregular means to obtain cash from outside. Cheating in business and embezzling public funds are not rare occurrences. The general feeling is that honesty has meaning only within the inner community, and that only clever people adept in fraudulence get rich. In such a situation, the subsistence economy is seen to be supported by the moral community whereas the cash economy is considered to belong to the cut-throat world of the outside. A succinct comment by a village woman represents the feeling among the villagers. She said, “Money has to be brought from outside in one way or another”.

Let me give an example of a sad episode which illustrates the ambivalence of gaining cash income. A neighbouring household of my host family became unexpectedly well off from around 1992. The villagers gossiped about how they acquired money: through stealing, cheating and so on. When I returned to the village in 1995, I heard that a young daughter of that household had died due to a sudden stomach pain. The villagers whispered to me that a little monster in the form of a walking piece of gold called ‘golden head’ (sunā muṇḍā) had appeared in that house. Though it is known that whoever touches the monster will die in the near future, the girl’s father forced her to catch it. Thus, the household became wealthy, but lost their daughter. This is a moral tale of how self-gain and love are incompatible, and those who are overcome by greed for money end up losing their loved ones.

The villagers’ story of the origin and nature of sunā muṇḍā is as follows:

Under the monarchy (rājatantra), gold and silver were used mainly for worshipping deities, and kṣatriyas ruled according to dharma. But colonialism led to rule by vaiśyas, such as the East India Company, and dharma was neglected as money-making became the priority. The kings had hidden many gold ingots underground before the British took over. After many years passed, these gold ingots came to life and became sunā muṇḍā. The gold ingots appeared as monsters on earth as they sensed how people fought over money. Sunā muṇḍā has legs and can move about. It appears to people who are greedy for money and possesses them. One must never try to catch it. Whoever touches it will become rich but will die soon afterwards.

Here we see how the people recount the decline of dharma and the rise of a money-dominated world due to colonial rule. The greed for money is considered to have come with colonial modernity. We see how people’s colonial experience is combined with the traditional idea of history as a gradual decline of the moral order from a golden age. Sunā muṇḍā appears suddenly out of nowhere. Its appearance
Cash and faction
tests one’s ability to stand by one’s morals without giving into temptation. But, no
one can deny their desire for money. The tale of sunā muṇḍā is an expression of
the existential dilemma. When villagers talk about how sunā muṇḍā appeared and
ruined someone, they seem to have mixed feelings of sympathy, condemnation
and also a little bit of envy.

Cash and cashew

The cultivation of cashew as a cash crop, which started only in the 1970s, has
become one of the most important sources of income in Khurda since the late
1980s. The way the cashew is cultivated and turned into cash sits in stark contrast
to the cycle of rice agriculture, which maintains the socio-cosmological values
of a moral community, as we have seen in Chapter 6. Cashew farming involves
no deities, requires no ritual and hardly any seasonal labour. There is hardly any
work—ritual or practical—that marks the cycle of the annual reproduction except
for the harvesting and selling.

During harvest time, villagers set up huts in the cashew fields and stay there to
prevent theft. The theft of rice from the field is considered one of the biggest sins
and a betrayal of the community norm. It is very difficult to cut the paddy and take
it away without being found out. I have never heard of cases of rice theft in the
fields of Khurda. Theft of cashew nuts, in contrast, is not uncommon. The sense
of wrongdoing or sin seems to be much less than, say, in the case of rice theft. The
sense of moral community does not seem to apply to cashew cultivation.

After the harvest, the villagers sell the nuts to a broker who usually comes from
Kolkata or Hyderabad. Four to five raw cashew nuts, weighing around 50 gm,
fetches Rs. 1 in 1992, which was not a small amount for the villagers. The cashew
nuts were used as de facto money in everyday exchanges in the village in the
1990s. Now in 2019, the selling price of cashew nut is Rs. 100–120 per kilogram.
Four to five raw cashew nuts, weighing around 50 gm, fetches around Rs. 5–6.
Prices fluctuate from year to year roughly corresponding to the amount harvested.
The more harvested, the less the price. Prices can also change within one year and
may even rise and fall on a daily basis. Because of this, the villagers try to sell at
the optimum moment. The price of cashew tends to dominate conversation during
this period, and even children discuss it. The villagers look excited, as it is one of
rare chances when they can make money.

This uncertain and fickle nature of the cashew nut business affects the villag-
ers’ concept of money. The amount of cash villagers can earn depends on this
externally determined fluctuation and the timing of the sale, which is decided
individually irrespective of social relations and calendrical dates. These charac-
teristics of the business can be contrasted with practices, such as rice agriculture,
which are embedded in ‘traditional’ socio-cultural contexts, the biomoral cycle of
society, environment and religion. With cashew, prices are determined in places
beyond their reach, and cash is earned only by those who choose cleverly. Only
individual luck and talent are relevant, unrelated to connections with relatives,
land, ancestors and gods.
Cashew cultivation has brought villagers a cash income. Its practice, however, is seen to lie largely outside the moral community. This attitude supports the concept that cash comes from outside where community norms do not apply. Many people from villages, unfortunately, frequently cheat ‘outsiders’ in business. This does not mean, however, that cheating is common in everyday life. A distinction is drawn between outsiders (bāhāra loka) and ‘our people’ (āmara loka). Cheating is absent among family members, relatives and fellow villagers, who belong to the latter category. Therefore, to prevent cheating in business interactions, people either seek actual kin relations or try to forge classificatory kin relationships with potential business partners.

In the cashew nut business, outsiders from Kolkata and Hyderabad, who approach the villages in Khurda to purchase cashew nuts, become targets of cheating. Pre-harvest buying is a usual practice in the cashew nut business, and buyers from outside must often rely on a local middleman to contact the owners of the orchards and to collect the nuts. The middleman, therefore, receives a part of the money in advance from the buyer for the reservation and collection of nuts. There are cases of cheating, when the middleman does not give the due quantity of nuts to the buyer and the money given in advance is not returned. Other villagers know that the middleman intends to cheat the buyer from the start, but do not dare warn him because, after all, the middleman is a ‘village brother’ (gāṃ hisābre bhāi), whereas the buyer is an outsider. Outsiders usually cannot do anything about the cheating, and the business relationship ends there and then.

I once tried to convince a villager who was involved in cheating that it is better to establish more permanent business relationships, and that nobody will want to do business with the village if these kinds of activities continue. His answer, however, was that there were plenty of buyers from outside, and there was no doubt that he could make extra income every year with a new outside person. Outsiders here are seen as anonymous and replaceable people, who are the targets of one-time profit-making only and for whom no moral considerations are necessary.

Faction and corruption

Another important source of cash for the villagers is state resources distributed through administrative channels. The state plays a vital role in redistributing wealth from urban to rural India in the name of development. Receiving shares from government schemes and embezzling public funds are obvious ways of securing extra income for the villagers. This practice is very much related to the existence of factional politics.

In 1991, when I arrived to begin my fieldwork in Garh Manitri, political activity among the villagers was very lively. As I look back now, it was the last phase of active factional politics at the village level involving the majority of the dominant caste population. This had been going on from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, before factional politics came to be confined to a smaller section of the local society (see Chapter 10). I remember how impressed I was one night when I saw many villagers sitting on their verandas eagerly listening to an election broadcast on the
radio in 1991. The villagers were shouting in joy or disappointment as the results were announced. I thought to myself, “How politically conscious these people are!”, comparing it to the situation in contemporary Japan where the political apathy of the younger generation was and still is often lamented.

It was only later in my stay in the village that I realised that the villagers’ active interest in politics was not quite due to their developed sense of civic commitment. I came to see that people were enthusiastic about political participation in Indian villages because it was a means of obtaining a share of state resources. Distribution of resources through political channels plays a substantial role in making a living in rural India.

**Democracy and development**

It has been pointed out that democracy in India has failed to guarantee good governance in the economic sphere (Currie 1996, Nayyar 1998). The structural reason behind this is the disjunction between democratic politics and economic development. While the main constituents of democracy, the voting population, are in agrarian society and there have been political measures to ensure their votes, the developmental initiatives of the Indian state in terms of economic policy have been mainly directed towards the industrial sector.

There is little wonder why there was hardly any rural development in the Nehruvian era (1947–1964). In the Nehruvian vision of modern India, politics was oriented towards the techno-rational pursuit of the public good. Economic policies aimed at state-led industrialisation based on import substitution and the production of basic goods in the public sector. While capital-intensive industry was promoted (Kurosaki and Yamazaki 2002: 72), agriculture and land reforms were relatively overlooked. Policies were designed for the construction of an autonomous national economy as a reaction against the experience of forced free trade under colonialism (Esho 2002: chapter 3). As India aimed to decolonise the economy from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, it adopted a strict form of economic nationalism (swadeshi). This prevented the country from gaining the benefits of international trade and adopting more efficient technology. As a result, India’s growth rate remained low due to the late development of labour intensive industrialisation, unlike the case of East Asia with examples such as Japan and the Asian Tigers, and lost its competitive edge in international trade (Sugihara 2003: 190–6, Tomlinson 1993: 177–85).

However, the problems were not restricted to economic policies alone, and free trade was not a panacea. Land reform, basic education, medical insurance and social security were required for independent India to counter various issues such as poverty, illiteracy, illness and inequality (Drèze and Sen 2002: 14–21). Nehru was conscious of these issues and tried to go forward step by step, maintaining consensus among different interest groups in keeping with democratic principles (Brass 1994, Khilnani 1999). This is particularly laudable considering that many ex-colonies adopted developmental dictatorship. But, this also meant
compromising with existing power structures and resulted in discrepancies in social reform (Bardhan 1984).

By the late 1950s, the problems of low agricultural productivity and inequalities in distribution were being taken seriously. Several policies were introduced for agricultural development and empowering subalterns, dealing with land reform, community development and pāñcāyati rāj. But these did not lead to reform of the overall dominant structure of rural India, as local elites, such as landlords, and bureaucrats who monopolised administrative power and economic wealth remained in control. In the context of a passive revolution where the people were not true participants in the revolutionary change of independence (see Chapter 4), the state had no choice but to ally itself with educated local elite landlords in order to establish hegemony in rural society (Brass 1994, Chatterjee 1997, Kaviraj 1997a).

Agriculture was given little attention. Although measures towards some land reform in some states, community development programmes and a system of local self-government were taken for rural development and empowerment of the marginalised, they did not result in transforming the overall structure of dominance in rural India. There have been various legislations for protecting and enhancing the rights of tenant cultivators in Orissa as mentioned in the previous chapter. These laws probably affected landholding conditions in local society more in the sense of raising the consciousness of the tenants than transforming the actual ownership of the land. These reforms often only meant that intermediary rights holders registered their landholdings in the names of family members and changed tenants often enough so that there would not be a claim to their land. They were manipulated by the local elites—administrators and landholders—who monopolised political power and economic wealth. The state, after all, had an alliance with the educated and landowning local elites for establishing hegemony over rural society. However, the gradual rise of subaltern consciousness slowly but surely affected the socio-political fabric of local society.

In Garh Manitri, there was once a very powerful and rich man who was a scribe (karaṇa) by caste. He migrated to Garh Manitri from outside, received favour and a position in the sub-tahasildar’s office from the king and had considerable power and wealth in the 1950s and early 1960s. He amassed wealth in the form of land and political power through connections with the Ekharajat Mahal office. Apparently, he could give away his daughter’s weight in jewellery for her dowry. He was not only a rich landlord but also a local tax collector (sarabarākāra) and had the final say in all local matters. Until the mid-1970s, he also played the role of the patron-sacrificer in the annual water goat sacrifice (Table 6.3), an invocation ritual for rain, as the representative of the local community. However, he was reduced to a pauper after the abolition of the Ekharajat Mahal. This kind of local elite characterised early independent India. Subsequently, as the source of wealth and the power structure in the locality came to be transformed, such concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the local elite gradually began to wane.
The commitment of the Indian people and the government to the institution of electoral democracy had a gradual effect on the nature of political practices. A new wind began to blow in the 1960s with the expansion of participatory Indian democracy. Political competition reached its height in the Lok Sabha elections of 1967. Not only did the overall number of voters increase when the low castes joined electoral politics, many parties and several leaders challenged the monopoly of the Congress Party (Yadav 2000). One party rule by Congress ended with this national election (Kothari 1967). Democratisation in India meant a downward expansion of the participatory basis of democratic politics in which the underprivileged in terms of caste, class and gender increasingly took an active part.

Indira Gandhi responded to this wave of democratisation with populist measures. Under her regime (1966–1977 and 1980–1984), attention was paid to rural development and much of the resources of the state were intended to benefit the lower strata of the population. The popular base expanded from local elites to the larger rural population as the government in the 1970s and 1980s redistributed state resources directly to the people for political support (Bardhan 1984, Khilnani 1999, Nayyar 1998). This distribution took the form of food and fertiliser subsidies and poverty alleviation programmes. “Subsidy raj” (Bardhan 1984) broadened political participation in the local agrarian society where factional politics developed. Here the numerically dominant caste—usually having the most land—often played a prominent role. The local elite—the privileged few with large scale landownership and connections with the government—still had an important part in local politics but they had to take into account the voting power of the dominant caste and their clients.

The populist turn under Indira Gandhi meant that the state became the main source of resources for the people. This redistribution and reallocation of resources by the state was seen to reduce socio-economic inequality. In this situation, factional politics became popular from the 1970s as villagers tried to influence the flow of governmental resources. The factions were led by dominant caste leaders who influenced resource distribution at the village level through factional politics. Although state resources came mainly in the name of community development and poverty alleviation, the resources were distributed among and consumed by the main factional members of the dominant caste. Factional politics was closely related to corruption in government. Administrative staff and politicians received bribes from local factional members.

State resources were very important for the local economy because of poor agricultural productivity. Further, opportunities for cash income outside agriculture were limited because of the state-controlled economy under the license raj. “Rent-seeking” flourished in public institutions while ordinary villagers had little chance of getting cash income (Krueger 1974). Many regions and classes did not benefit much from the green revolution. In regions such as Khurda, where agricultural productivity hardly improved, securing state funds through factional
politics was almost the only way to increase income even after the green revolution. Beside state resources, the only significant means of obtaining cash income for the villagers was the production of cash crops like betel leaves and oilseeds such as cashew nuts and peanuts. Land for such cash crops, however, mostly belonged to the local elites and the dominant caste.

Increasing popular participation in electoral politics over the years and the large state investment in agrarian society from the late 1960s led not to a democracy of equal participation or rural development but to factional politics dominated by the local elite and the dominant caste and the consumption of state resources by them. This colonially traditionalised structure of dominance still characterises the post-colonial condition of rural Orissa. Resources gained from the state were shared and consumed among the faction members without being utilised for community development. Let us then look at the details of how factional politics functioned in the village.

The faction and its function

I employ the term faction here to refer to the group called daḷa at the village level in Orissa. There have been several definitions of the faction in Indian villages. Lewis defines factions as “small groups which … are held together primarily by cooperative economic, social and ceremonial relations” (1958: 114). Nicholas defines them as “‘noncorporate’ political conflict groups, the members of which are recruited by a leader on the basis of diverse ties” (1963, 1965: 27–9, 1968: 255). Bailey defines the faction as “a political group” cooperating without “a common ideology” but with “[a] leader with whom they (members) each separately have their own transaction” (Bailey 1969: 52). These definitions more or less tally with my observation. Although the constitution of a daḷa differs from village to village, it is primarily a political clique with several oligarchic leaders (netā) who form a fairly stable core.

Brass (1965) and Washbrook (1976) observed the wider existence of factions in Indian society from the national level to the grassroots level. According to them, factions constitute a network of vertical political alliances involving ties between the patron/leader and client/followers, cutting across caste and class and linking the lowest sections at the village level with the highest at the national level. Hardiman (1982) criticised this view, saying that seeing India as a “factious society” is based on an “Orientalist assumption” and that we should focus instead on the role of class in political organisation. As Hardiman points out, it would be misleading to assume the existence of a “great faction” as an enduring group that connects the lowest to the highest. As far as I could observe, the factions in the village do not pay allegiance to certain fixed leaders at higher levels, but have a logic of their own existence, always negotiating their relationships with political forces outside the village.

Nevertheless, it is also true that there is a tendency for village factions to have some connection with political parties outside, though it is neither structured nor
permanent. Although Hardiman tries to show that “anthropologists in general have endorsed” that “there is a tradition of presenting an appearance of village unity to the outside world” and uses it as evidence of the absence of structural connections between village-level factional conflicts and higher level factional conflicts, his reading seems rather biased (Hardiman 1982: 212–3). The tendency to present an appearance of unity to outsiders certainly exists, but it is part of socio-ritual behaviour based on the ‘inner’ idioms of kinship, brotherhood and community.

Such activities and representations are not incompatible with the existence of interest-pursuing political groups in the ‘outer’ sphere. The occasion Lewis cites as an example of presenting an appearance of unity to the outside, that is presenting Rs. 1 to married daughters irrespective of factions when visiting the village they married into, typically belongs to the inner framework of behaviour, but is not evidence of the absence of connections between village factions and higher political parties, as Hardiman suggests. Bailey’s observation that the tendency of village factions to stick together in their dealings with outsiders, on the one hand, but to link up with political parties outside, on the other hand, is not a contradiction but totally correct pace Hardiman (1982: 212). Village factions cannot be reduced to mere “temporary groups recruited over particular disputes” (Mayer 1960: 121) as Hardiman (1982: 230) suggests. At least in contemporary village Orissa, factions form groups through which major political activities are conducted, though their membership is far from being clear-cut or constant.

To say that the main political activities in the village are among factions dominated by the dominant caste is not to deny that there are other forms of political conflicts based on caste and class. The most important perhaps is the conflict between the dominant caste and the lower castes (see Chapters 9 and 10). In Orissa this conflict, however, is not fought through factions or political parties. According to Mohanty, “The failure of caste associations or opposition parties to pave the way for the autonomous politicization of the lower castes had facilitated the continuation of upper caste control over major political parties” (1990: 353).

Most typically, there are two groups within the dominant caste which form the factions that are given support by other caste groups. The smaller caste groups tend not to divide themselves but to remain united in their support for a faction. People living in smaller villages tend to stick together in their support for a particular faction of a bigger and more influential village nearby. They are often careful not to make commitments to a particular faction. This vagueness is part of their political strategy to have both factions constantly court them. At election time, they carefully negotiate with the leaders of both factions and secretly promise electoral support to one faction after detailed discussions over what their village would gain—immediate cash and the promise of a future share in government resources—in return for their support.

The history of the emergence of factions in Garh Manitri illustrates how faction is related to the distribution of state resources and the rivalry within the
dominant caste. According to villagers, Garh Manitri became involved in politics in the mid-1970s when several key villagers became active in the communist party. There was an influential member of parliament (MP) of the Communist Party of India from Bhubaneswar (the capital of Orissa) who maintained good relationships with key persons in Garh Manitri, and the whole village supported the communist party during elections. The subsequent division and formation of factions in Garh Manitri correspond to the time when Congress lost power for the first time after independence in the election of 1977 and the Janata Party took power at the centre and the state.

Around 1978, some money and positions became available due to the establishment of a high school in the village. Conflicts started when doubts arose regarding the distribution of this new resource from the state. The khaṇḍāyatas—the dominant caste—of Taḷa Sāhi in Garh Manitri accused the khaṇḍāyatas of Upara Sāhi of embezzling from the high school and monopolising jobs and positions. The Upara Sāhi khaṇḍāyatas had political connections with the Congress Party, while the Taḷa Sāhi khaṇḍāyatas supported the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and anti-Congress Janata Party. The ensuing distrust made it impossible for the two factions to work cooperatively. Each of the village factions became involved in the political rivalry between Congress and the Janata Party (then the Janata Dal and Biju Janata Dal) at the state and central levels. In this way, two factions were entrenched in Garh Manitri.

One of the most important functions of a faction is to control the distribution of state resources that come to the village through politico-administrative channels. The members of the faction whose affiliate party is in power, especially at the state level, can expect priority in gaining a share of government largesse, such as seeds, fertilisers and rice distributed either for free or at subsidised prices; jobs in the bureaucracy, official contracts, admission to educational institutions and pensions are other perks. If they go through the factional channel, they can also expect better treatment or, at least, avoid harassment from the bureaucracy. Resources are distributed among faction members according to their ability to speak out and contribute within the faction.

Faction members, in return for these resources, deliver votes at the time of elections. Through such electoral support, the leaders of these factions develop rapport with national and state-level leaders, such as members of the state legislative assembly (MLAs) and members of parliament (MPs). These ties ensure the flow of resources to the faction that bets on the right candidate. Usually, a faction’s allegiance to a particular political party will depend on the factional leader’s network of political relations that have developed over time. The connections between political parties and village factions far from being structural and permanent are more often than not contingent and, perhaps, based on temporary personal relationships.

Factional leaders are pivotal in forming connections with higher political leaders and with local administrative offices. I have seen faction leaders always on the move, often riding a bicycle or scooter, visiting houses, surrounding villages, the block office, tahasildar’s office and police stations (thānā and outpost). Such
Cash and faction

Connections are vital in gaining government resources and administrative favours and protection from harassment. Faction leaders are usually educated and have some oratorical and literary abilities, combined with their kin–caste–personal and political connections. Leaders help faction members apply for government benefits and loans, register land purchases and sales, file police complaints and court cases, apply to higher educational institutions and arrange to provide ‘facility’ (an English term used as a euphemism for cheating) in student examinations.10

Villagers are often dependent on their leaders for matters requiring connections and knowledge of administrative procedures. Administrative procedures require more than just knowing the official rules. Practical knowledge and personal connections are required to talk to the right person and give the appropriate amount of bribe at the right time (Ruud 2000). Leaders are also political operators during elections. They often receive money from the political party they support and go about visiting key persons in and around the village to arrange for vote banks. The leaders of different castes ask for concessions from the faction leaders.

Factional politics spread because of the opportunities it provided for the villagers to get resources directly from the government. The idea that elections were a way for people to get their share of state resources permeated to the grassroots level. But this also meant that state resources were distributed and consumed through the local power structure centring on the dominant caste at the expense of the overall development of the community. Weaker sections of society were systematically excluded from the political process. Factions manifest the principle of majority rule combined with populist politics, where votes are directly rewarded with benefits by the government (Frykenberg 1987). There is no doubt that this has contributed to involving many villagers, though often only of the dominant caste, in political activities.

Bribery and embezzlement

Bribery and embezzlement are some of the most commonly discussed problems hampering contemporary India (Fuller and Harriss 2000, Gupta 1995, Mohapatra 1997, Parry 2000, Visvanathan and Sethi 1998, Wade 1982, 1985). Corruption is deeply entrenched in postcolonial India. This, in turn, is related to the crisis concerning the governability, legitimacy and political institutions of the Indian state (Bose and Jalal 1998, Juan 1978, Kaviraj 1984, Kohli 1990). In rural Orissa, a significant amount of cash income for the villagers is attained through corruption. Bribes for officials involved in administrative procedure are commonly referred to by the English word ‘percentage’. This institutionalised bribery not only ensures extra income for government employees (some, like engineers, have more opportunity than others), but also opens the way for villagers to act as contractors.

When there is construction work in a village, usually a villager with the necessary knowledge works as the contractor. Small-scale construction work is usually dealt with at the block level (panchayat samiti), an organisation which exists between the village (gram panchayat) and district (zilla parishad) organisations.11 To get the contract from the government, various bureaucrats such as the block
development officer (BDO), junior engineer and higher officials, local representatives like the block chairman and politicians like the local member of legislative assembly must give support. Leaders of the faction that supports the ruling party at the state-level function as nodal points between the politico-administrative centres and the local community. They are thus usually involved in the mechanism for bringing subsidies to the locality through their connections with government officials and politicians and thus have influence in choosing the contractor.

The contractor must give percentages as bribes to all the officials and political leaders involved in bringing government money to the contractor. The contractor attempts to reduce the expenditure for the construction to a minimum, since he can keep the balance. As a result, the quality of the work is often below the prescribed standard. There is an ‘understanding’ (the English word is used) between the contractor and the officials who have received a percentage, so the quality of the work is not questioned. In a liberal democracy, the ‘public’ is supposed to function as a check on government spending, but the contractor and faction leaders are seen as village ‘brothers’, making the enforcement of standards impossible. Corruption is often expressed as khāi debā (literally, eating up) and faction members often literally eat up the acquired money at feasts held among themselves. This kind of perception is related to the idea of food (or substance) as the mediator of moral codes as mentioned in Chapter 6 (Bayly 1998, Daniel 1984, Marriott 1976).

A feast associated with village politics is held secretly, attended only by the major male faction members. Giving this kind of feast seems to have the effect of sharing the benefit as well as the ‘sin’ among ‘brothers’. Alcohol and meat (mada mamsa), seen as symbols of sensual pleasure (and talked about with a sense of moral censure) in Orissan villages, are considered essential in this kind of feast. Consumption of these items on such occasions is the material sharing of sinful pleasures. I once attended such a feast, having been invited just a few months after I began to stay in the village in 1991, not knowing its moral implications or even where the money actually came from. The following morning, the wife of my host, whom I referred to as ‘elder brother’s wife’ (bhāuja) called me, and we had the following conversation. She was clearly angry with me and I was puzzled.

*Bhāuja:* Where did you go last night?
*Tanabe:* I went to a feast.
*Bhāuja:* What did you eat and drink?
*Tanabe:* Curry and chapatis.
*Bhāuja:* (Reproachfully) You didn’t have just that. You had alcohol and meat, didn’t you?
*Tanabe:* Well, I had some …
*Bhāuja:* (In a very strong tone) You must never go to such a feast again. Do you understand? Never!

I was stunned by the severity of her tone. Later, I understood that feasts of alcohol and meat, particularly those linked to corrupt factional politics, were morally
condemned. I also understood that my elder brother’s wife was worried that I would embody the sin by participating in such feasts. Although the politico-economy is seen to be outside the biomoral order, the body-person is thought to be affected by the exchange of substance-code. Bribery and embezzlement are unacceptable from the biomoral point of view. However, factional politics dominated by powerful men and corruption continued in spite of severe moral criticisms by women (and low castes, as we will see later).

During fieldwork, I often travelled between villages and towns by a scooter and was always troubled by the pot holes on the thinly paved road. Despairing that the quality of roads in rural Orissa was not improving despite the large expenditure of public money, I once questioned a village leader why the people did not complain about the condition.

Tanabe: Why do people not complain to the contractor? Everybody knows that he eats up the money and as a result the road becomes damaged very quickly. After all, it’s everybody’s road. Would it not be nice to have a good road for everyone?

Village leader: You don’t understand. You are a child in these matters. It is good in a way that the road gets damaged quickly. We can then request the government again for money. Then another person from our village can become a contractor and get some money and again we can have a feast. In this way, many people can receive its benefits. Besides, it is not only the contractor who is getting money. Everyone gets a percentage, starting from the MP and MLA to the BDO and junior engineer. If a contractor does not give percentages to these people and use all the money for the construction, nobody will give him the job.

Rationale of factional politics

So, why was factional politics so active in rural Orissan villages from the 1970s to the early 1990s? It was simply because it was the easiest way for the members of the dominant caste to gain extra income. The opportunity was offered by the populist government, who attempted to ensure political support through the distribution of state resources. The size and centrality of the dominant caste in the local power structure of patron–client relationships made them the key players in village politics. Factional politics at the village level was about competing for more resources for distribution among those who were related by blood and territory.

State resources, which are supposed to be utilised for local development, are caught in an entirely different logic of political distribution and sharing. The party in government tries to secure electoral support from ‘their’ people through the distribution of state resources. Administrators see development projects as opportunities for receiving their share of bribes. The contractor and factional members maximise their share, not through enhancing production, but through systematically reducing the expenditure and quality of production, thus starting the cycle all over again. Here, the economic logic of production and distribution is totally
lost as the distribution of state resources does not depend on productive activities in the locality, but rather is ensured by impeding them. People can expect some share only through participation in the chain of corruption, embezzlement and factional politics. Local society in Orissa from the 1970s to the early 1990s was trapped in such rent-seeking activities.

In this way the village became politicised and factions developed. However, so far, we only have an explanation of why the dominant caste attempted to get state resources through electoral politics. The question still remains as to why political rivalry grew within the dominant caste in a single village. Why were they not able to cooperate among themselves?

Faction and friction

In the discussion of how rural society in Orissa came to be politicised and factional politics centred on the dominant caste developed, a compelling question remains unanswered. Would it not have been more rational for the villagers to join forces in gaining a maximum share of state resources? Why did they not cooperate with each other? One answer, given by game theory, to the question of why village people were unable to cooperate is that there was no trust among them regarding each other’s commitment to utilise state resources for the common good. Game theoretic concepts, such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), explain why people with a “rational choice” would opt for non-cooperation and a free ride even if it is not beneficial for the overall welfare (not Pareto optimal or Hicks optimal) (cf Olson 1965). This is because each player is not sure of the others’ intentions and chooses the option that minimises their risk, even though it does not maximise their gain. By extension, a more recent development in game theory claims to have found certain conditions that go beyond the tragedy of the commons (Ostrom 1990, Platteau 1994). What is required for cooperation to prevail is that a significant majority of people trust each other’s commitment for the common good and institutional support that would promote such trust.

Distrust indeed seems to be a cause behind the non-cooperative factional politics of the villagers. Unable to trust each other’s intentions, they formed factions with people close to them in blood and territory. People engaged in activities that would increase their own faction’s benefit at the cost of the development of their community as a whole. However, this does not explain how and why such a situation of distrust came about. To understand this, we need to take into account culture and history as conditions for social coordination and cooperation. This approach is adopted by theories on “social capital” (Coleman 1990, Putnam et al 1993) which consider social relationships of trust and reciprocity as resources for cooperation that are historically accumulated and thus path dependent. Social capital theory, in turn, tends to evaluate society in a larger political context, often ignoring the changing relationships between state and society. They presuppose a unilinear and progressive process of accumulation of social capital that does not seriously take historical transformation into account. The notion of capital, the
accumulated amount of which decides performance, fails to recognise cultural–political contestations of value and semantics within society, confining the space of people’s agency too narrowly.\textsuperscript{13}

In the social capital framework, it is assumed that the amount of social capital that has been stocked in society through the pedagogical practice of learning to cooperate decides the extent to which society can undertake collective activities successfully (Mohapatra 2001: 1765). I would argue, however, that rather than assuming that a uniformly defined and calculable set of social capital decides a group’s capacity to cooperate with each other, we should acknowledge the existence of historically accumulated ‘cultural resources’ that are plural and dilemmatic, and that they can be transformed into different patterns of social practice.

We should pay attention to the larger institutional contexts in which the framework for using cultural resources is defined. Putnam’s framework fails to pay attention to the postcolonial predicament of Asian and African societies where cultural resources are systematically and institutionally ‘hierarchised’, ‘traditionalised’ and placed in disjunction from the practices of the modern state.

When we look at the colonial and postcolonial history of Indian society, we note that there are indeed rich cultural resources for community cooperation preserved in the socio-ritual sphere. Here, the role of the parts for the welfare of the whole is repeatedly enacted. However, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, a dichotomy was wedged between the socio-ritual sphere of traditional society and the politico-economic sphere of the modern state under colonialism. In the postcolonial condition, this dichotomy continues to divide socio-ritual activities—based on agrarian relationships—and politico-economic activities—based on democratic institutions and the cash economy. The kind of cultural resources for community cooperation that are preserved and enacted socio-ritually are not utilised in the politico-economy.

This is related to the history of the colonial framework where socio-ritual matters represented by kinship, caste, kingship and religion are placed in contradiction to the politico-economic concerns represented by the modern state and the market economy. The former is seen negatively as the remnants of the past by techno-rational modernists, whereas the latter is evaluated negatively in the popular traditionalist conception of modernity and history that places the religio-ontological self ‘elsewhere’ than in the present politico-economic setup. Thus the discrepancy between the socio-ritual sphere and the politico-economic sphere in the postcolonial predicament makes it difficult for the cultural ethics of cooperation to be applied in politico-economic activities, which are considered outside the moral community. The semantic location of modern politics outside the moral and ontological universe explains why the villagers accept the practice of corruption and factions as a necessary evil of the times. The villagers consider socio-ritual activities to be the basis of their traditional moral self, while taking politics to be the manifestation of moral decline in kali juga to which they have to adjust. In this sphere of factional politics, the main aim of the players is maximising shares from state resources even at the expense of others. Trust and reciprocity have no place in this sphere.
Democracy and cultural ethics

It should be noted that while factional politics may be condemned, no villager would deny the value of democracy. As Chatterjee says, “if we have to give a name to the major form of mobilization by which political society (parties, movements, non-party political formations) tries to channel and order popular demands on the developmental state, we should call it democracy” (Chatterjee 2000: 46–7).

Ironically, the formation of factional politics in postcolonial India indeed exemplifies the diffusion of the idea and institution of democracy where “everyone can imagine exercising some influence” (Khilnani 1999: 60) upon the distribution of state resources. It is, in a sense, due to “the success of Indian democracy” (Kohli 2001) that there are active factional politics at the grassroots level. It is ironic to call this a development of democracy, since factional politics is often carried out according to the logic of “majoritarian populism” (Fuller and Harriss 2000: 25) where electoral votes are sought at the expense of the ethics of substantive democracy according to which the rights of minorities and the universal public good should be respected. This is a typical example of “the basic form of the paradox of democracy in India”, namely, the incongruity between the “institutional logic of democratic forms” and the “logic of popular mobilisation” (Kaviraj 1991: 93).

It is difficult to evaluate this situation: whether it should be seen positively—as one type of development of democracy—or negatively—as a deviation from the spirit of democracy. One serious problem might be that a large section of the Indian people, with the exception perhaps of the educated elite, do not seem to believe in politics as a means of creating a better state and society. They tend to consider it a necessary evil, or at best a field of opportunities for securing and enlarging their share of resources. Either way, political activity does not accompany a sense of high ideals or moral legitimacy, whereas socio-ritual tradition is often taken as an enactment of desirable relationships lost in the politico-economy. The problem seems to be that there is a disjunction between the people’s sense of cultural ethics based on moral–ontological identity and the politico-economic practices based on the techno-rational values (understood as the logic of the fish) of the modern nation-state.

Since there are often factional quarrels and fights in the village over the distribution of government resources, villagers grieve over this situation and say that all this is the result of the money-oriented modern economy. They express hatred towards this age of discord in which the good old community tradition is collapsing. This kind of attitude that looks to the idealised past, combined with a cynical mind-set towards politics as an arena of competition for share-maximising, definitely does not encourage the healthy development of democracy.

Is there no way out of this situation? If tradition is to be identified with the structure of hierarchy and dominance, and modernity with equality of individuals, then the two cannot be bridged. People must choose to either keep the traditional community or become modern individuals. However, it is my contention that there are cultural resources far richer than can be reduced to just hierarchy and dominance in Indian society. In subsequent chapters I pay attention to the
subalternate value of ontological equality as a potential ethical basis for local democracy in India. By showing how this value is increasingly being employed in the transformation of socio-political practices, I would like to suggest that the practices of democracy can take a vernacular form without losing their essence. But before that, let me first explain, in the next chapter, the content of the cultural resources in Indian society and the transformations for which they have been used in history.

Notes

1. This phrase (Oriya mātsya nyāya, Skt. mātsya nyāyah) is discussed in Mahābhārata (Śanti-Parva, LXVII, T6-17, LXVIII, II-129) as well as Manu Śamhitā, Rāmāyana and Arthaśāstra (Sarkar 1921: 80–1). Also see Peabody (2003: esp ‘Introduction’).

2. Recently, villagers have begun using fertiliser and hybrid plants to increase yield. Although land for growing cashew is already exhausted, this has led to more intensive production.

3. Rs. 20 was about 90 yen or 70 US cents in 1992. Rs. 100 is about 256 yen or US$2.33 in 2005.

4. Rs. 15 was about 60 yen or 47 US cents in 1992. Rs. 60–70 rupees is about 154–179 yen or US$1.40–1.63 in 2005.

5. For detailed results of the household survey conducted in 2016, see Tanabe and Fujita (2021).

6. Also see Brass (1997) for an account of more recent local politics.

7. For details on micro politics in Garh Manitri and its gendered analysis, see Tokita-Tanabe (1996).

8. This is also pointed out by Bailey (1963: 148).

9. The same point is made by Bailey (1963) and I endorse his observation pace Hardiman (1982: 212–3).

10. Since I was living in the house of one of the community leaders, many people came to him for help and I often assisted him by writing and typing up petitions to the government.

11. The village, the block and the district levels constitute the three-tier model of community development.

12. See also Platteau and North for the path dependence argument from the institutional economic history perspective (North 1990, Platteau 1994).

Contradiction and mediation in sacrifice

This chapter discusses the Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī festival, the grandest and most elaborate community ritual in and around Garh Manitri. The ritual has a long history and the performance of each of its parts invokes a shared past. I first discuss the relationship between ritual and history. Then I describe and analyse the festival, centring on the historical memory evoked by ritual performance. Focusing on this community ritual provides valuable insights as patterns of ritual practices are by nature difficult to change, and represent and illustrate traditional social relations.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that ritual enforces a singular, fixed set of social relations and values. If ritual is a living tradition, it constantly provides plural potentialities. Ritual is constructed by polyphonic and plural interactions between people in history and indicates their adaptation to multiple future possibilities through reinterpretation of tradition (MacIntyre 1981, Billig 1987, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, Shotter 1993). People are given the opportunity to reconstruct their past, present and future by experiencing tradition through ritual performance that engages their bodies and emotions, allowing them to feel the rich depth of the legitimate and the authentic therein.

I analyse the ritual with reference to three types of social values or configurations therein, namely, ‘hierarchy’, ‘centrality’ and ‘equality’. These values are represented in ritual performance as legitimate cultural resources for social practices. These cultural resources contain dilemmas and contradictions and are, therefore, open to the creation of new practices and discourses through negotiation and mediation. Whereas anthropological studies on society in South Asia have focused on either the ‘hierarchy’ of purity (Dumont 1970) or the ‘centrality’ of royalty (Dirks 1987, Quigley 1993), I suggest that there is another important principle—ontological ‘equality’ to which existing studies pay little attention.

It is my contention that this principle helps us to register the complexity of social configuration in India, both past and present, as well as to comprehend spontaneous social participation and cooperation from below. It is also important
for addressing the universal ethical question of how to reconcile the contradiction between the fundamental equality of human existence, on the one hand, and differences in power and status in the world, on the other. Sacrificial ritual involves the enactment of the opposition and mediation of structure and anti-structure and life and death. It is also a mode of communicating between earth and heaven (Biardreau 1976: 153). It is a fundamental human act/idea, acknowledging and, at the same time, attempting to mediate basic contradictions in the processes of life.

**History and ritual**

*History in ritual*

Collective ritual, like the Rāmacaṇḍī festival, often has an aspect of history telling: how the community came into being and how certain individuals and families achieved their present status and power. As Eliade (1959) points out, rituals often enact cosmogony. By going back to the primordial time of origin and tracing history through ritual performance, the participants of a ritual are able to embed the present positions of individuals and families within the collective history of the community. Here, the cosmic origin overlaps with the phase of ontological equality in the ritual process. By invoking the original oneness of beings and performing the historical formation of the structure of power and status, ‘history in ritual’ has the effect of not only reconfirming what is supposed to be but also critiquing what actually prevails. That is to say, rituals not only legitimise the hierarchy of status and centrality of power but also unsettle the forms of their practice. By representing what is ritually authentic, ritual has the effect of calling everyday practices into question.

People discover their identity through ritual performance. This is because symbols in ritual can connect people, bodily and emotionally, to the sacred origin and allow them to reflect upon their present standing in relation to it. The symbolism of ritual should not be understood as representing static cultural meanings of set codes. Rather, rituals enable participants to connect with the sacred and to gauge their historical position in the ‘here and now’. The plural values in ritual afford space for negotiation and also permit multifaceted contestation and resistance. In other words, a ritually constructed social identity is “overdetermined” in that it is constituted by a complexity of multiple factors, not reducible to a simple contradiction (Althusser 1969).

*Ritual in history*

The complement of ‘history in ritual’ is ‘ritual in history’. The degree of importance and semantic content ascribed to each aspect of the cultural resources represented in the ritual—hierarchy, centrality and equality—have changed in history. The Dumontian insistence on the ahistorical and changeless nature of the structure of hierarchy is now seen to be a colonial–orientalist viewpoint (Raheja 1988a,b, Inden 1990, Ahmad 1991). Instead, a number of important studies have paid attention to the centrality of power in Indian society (Cohn 1987b, Dirks 1987,
Ritual, history and identity

Raheja 1988a, b, Quigley 1993). However, as these works themselves show, the semantics of centrality and their import have also changed in history. Thus, centrality of power cannot be an alternative structural model for Indian society.

It is important to historicise Indian society. But to do so, it is not enough to pay attention only to the workings of power and institutional change initiated by the state, as critiques of Dumont tend to do (Dirks 1987, Raheja 1988a, b, Quigley 1993, Fuller 1996, Fuller and Bénéï 2000). I would like to add another aspect to understanding historical change, namely, the role of subaltern resistance, whose politico-moral foundation is made from the cultural resource of ontological equality. Ontological equality, under certain historical conditions, amends existing patterns of practice in status and power and offers a critical alternative to the structure of hierarchy and dominance (see Chapters 9 and 10). I suggest we consider the history of Indian society in terms of contestatory negotiation and mutual transformation between the values and forms of hierarchy, centrality and equality.

Analysing ritual in history requires sensitivity to the changes in the kind of self-identity that is discovered and formed through ritual performance. The latter part of the chapter deals with the cultural politics concerning the significance of ritual performance in different historical contexts, focusing in particular on the transformation of meanings attached to the ritual from the precolonial to postcolonial times. I take up the three values and social forms in the ritual performance and see how they are related to the dynamics of social change by focusing on how each of them is emphasised or eclipsed in the course of the ritual process.

Ritual sequence

The Rāmacaṇḍī festival takes place over seventeen days in the month of Āświna (corresponding to September–October), between the ninth day of the dark fortnight and the tenth day of the bright fortnight. The first sixteen days correspond to Durgā pūjā and the seventeenth with Daśaharā, though in Garh Manitri they are treated as one continuous festival. The period between the first and the thirteenth day is the preparatory time for welcoming the goddess. We shall begin our description from the fourteenth day (see Map 8.1 for the processional route).

Fourteenth day: mahāsaptamī (the great seventh)

Bathing: at around seven o’clock in the evening, a Saora medium, a Saora sacrifice-executor and a Khondha priest make their way to Rāmacaṇḍī’s hill after bathing in a pond. According to the medium, after bathing his body becomes the sacred vessel in which the goddess will reside, and hence not even a brāhmaṇa is allowed to touch him. This is an interesting statement considering that the medium is treated as an untouchable tribal at other times.

Worship: the Khondha priest begins a series of rituals in front of Rāmacaṇḍī and first prepares two water pots (kālaśa) which, besides the medium, are also considered vehicles for the goddess’s śakti (power). These earthen pots are filled with water from Rāmacaṇḍī’s well, topped with mango leaves, coconut and cloth
and placed before the goddess. Then pūjā (worship) is performed in which an offering called puṇji is made. First, red, yellow and black powder is mixed with water into a paste and painted as make up on the base of the rock structure of the goddess, the part that is said to be her face. This part is also decorated with red flowers and some water is sprinkled. Then a garland of flowers, a black sari, which the medium will later wear, and puṇji are offered to the goddess. Lastly the priest offers a lit lamp, completing the series of rituals. The pattern of the pūjā is the same as the usual Hindu worship except for the puṇji. Puṇji is a mixture of raw rice, milk and egg made into small mounds with a little local liquor poured on top. This puṇji seems to be of Khondha origin and, indeed, is considered so by the villagers also. When this first worship is completed, the Khondha priest performs worship on behalf of villagers who have brought offerings for the goddess. Thirty to forty plates of offerings are passed on to the Khondha priest and are returned as prasāda after the priest performs abridged versions of the worship.

Possession: the Khondha priest takes the black sari offered to the goddess and hands it over to the Saora medium. The medium wraps this tightly around his waist and hips. After putting on the sari, the medium sits in front of the divine rock and meditates. The drums beat louder and the people gathered on the hill shout ‘Hari bola’ (‘Chant the name of Hari’ [another name for god Viṣṇu]) in unison several times. The Khondha priest takes some red paste (sindura) from the rock and smears it on the medium’s forehead and then takes the garland from the goddess and puts it on the medium. The medium’s eyes become bloodshot, his
body begins to shake and he jumps up, possessed by the goddess. The medium, having now become the goddess herself, runs to the front and devours the puñji offering without using his hands. The Khondha priest then offers liquor and a lit lamp to the medium. The worship performed for the goddess in the rock form is performed for the medium. Thus, the goddess and the medium become identical. Next, the medium is given a floral umbrella, and he dances amidst the devotees, shouting ‘Hari bola’ to the sound of incessant drumbeats. The people are full of joy and excitement.

Penance and sacrifice: when the dance ends, the medium goes around listening to the devotees’ problems and wishes. There are many prostrate devotees waiting on the hill to have their voices heard by the goddess (Figure 8.1). Devotees who have been staying on the hill of Rāmacaṇḍī for many days praying

Figure 8.1 The medium/goddess listens to a devotee’s pleas as others await their turn prostrating at his/her feet.
to the goddess are called first by the medium and given answers to questions or blessings. This penance and prayer are called guhāri or dhāraṇa. They lie before the goddess during the daytime and pray for their wishes to be fulfilled and sleep in a nearby cave at night. They partake only of the remains of the food (prasāda) offered to the goddess. While this is going on, a cock is sacrificed by the sacrifice-executor, attended only by the Khondha priest, Khondha attendants carrying water pots, the barber and the sweater-drummers (hāṛis). Others are not allowed to see this sacrifice as it is considered very dangerous. The cock is provided by a person of the sweater-drummer caste in Taḷa Garh. When the devotees on the hill finish praying, the medium, the Khondha priest, the Khondha attendants carrying the water pots, the sacrifice-executor and the drummers proceed down the hill with the barber holding a torch at the head of the group (henceforth referred to as the medium-group).

**Placating caṇḍī, preta and bhūta:** the first destination of the medium-group after leaving the hill is the deserted village area. The deserted village is said to have been once inhabited by fishermen. It is said that the sound of the fishermen making flattened rice irritated Rāmacaṇḍī and so they were destroyed. Making flattened rice is a traditional occupation of a sub-caste of fishermen. Here Rāmacaṇḍī’s prasāda is offered to caṇḍī (goddesses who have strong ambivalent power), preta (spirits of the dead) and bhūta (evil spirits) in four places where there are or were ponds. The ponds are said to have Rāmacaṇḍī names. The Khondha priest makes the offerings to the caṇḍī, preta and bhūta. Only the medium, sacrifice-executor and drummers are present at this point. Some villagers follow the medium and the procession but they should not see the offerings being made. Offering Rāmacaṇḍī’s prasāda may be said to placate the caṇḍī, preta and bhūta and at the same time bring them under her control, since taking prasāda means accepting her superiority. This is reminiscent of the offering of Jagannātha’s prasāda to Goddess Bimalā in the Jagannātha temple in Puri, which transforms it into mahāprasāda (great divine remains). Bimalā is considered the autochthonous goddess of the area and was probably worshipped in the precincts even before Jagannātha.

**Marching to the village and the Taḷa Garh:** the procession of the medium-group then enters the village from the ‘mouth of village’ (gāṃ muha). At the village border is the house of the watchman (chātiā) and a cock is sacrificed here. The cock used to be offered by the watchman, who is from a dalit caste. Since the watchman has left the village, a member of the family (an oil-presser by caste) who came to occupy the house instead is responsible for offering the sacrificial cock. This is an interesting example of the connection between the office and the house. The procession moves to the upper part of the village from the lower end. The medium and the water pots, both representing the goddess, are worshipped in the houses en route. The head of the household (karttā) performs the rituals for the medium, and the Khondha priest performs it for the water pots. The houses en route from the entrance of the village up to the royal court are only allowed to present dry offerings (śukhilā bhoga). That is to say, raw or fried items, such as fruits and sweets are allowed, but not those boiled in water, such as cooked rice and curry. Cocks offered by individuals of Taḷa Sāhi are sacrificed in front
of a shrine dedicated to the Goddess Siddheśwarī, who is said to be Rāmacaṇḍī’s younger sister.

Sword lifting: when the procession arrives at Rāmacaṇḍī’s temple located in front of the royal court, the medium and the Khondha priest go inside and close the doors behind them (Figure 8.2). The chief (daḷabeherā) lays the king’s sword (rājāṅka khaṇḍā) on the ground in front of the temple. The sword symbolises the king endowing the chief with authority as the legitimate ruler in the fort. There is a legend behind the ritual act of laying this sword in front of the medium.

In the olden days, the chief did not believe in the divinity of the medium and tested him by challenging him to lift up the king’s sword, which was twelve-foot long. The medium not only lifted up the sword with ease but also started swinging it fiercely. The chief had to submit himself before the medium and admit the authenticity of the possession of the medium by the goddess.

In this part of the festival, this legend is enacted. The māḷī, priest of the Śiva temple, worships the sword with flowers and milk and places a small knife next to it. The medium and the Khondha priest leave the floral umbrella inside the temple. The barber holds the torch, bends down and leads the medium. They walk slowly around the sword anti-clockwise. Circumambulation for worship in Hinduism is usually clockwise. Only some tantric and tribal rituals include anti-clockwise circumambulation. The medium sways his body and head, looking to the heavens occasionally. The villagers explain that he is waiting to receive even greater power from the goddess. Having gone around three times, the medium bends down, lifts the sword and the knife, stands up and begins to dance. In a dramatic moment, the sound of drums grows louder and the excited villagers shout ‘Hari bola’ several times.

Figure 8.2 Worship of Rāmacaṇḍī at the Garh Manitrī village temple.
**King’s offerings:** the medium goes towards the remains of the royal court holding the sword. The people are now convinced that the power of the goddess has possessed the medium and offerings are made at the royal court (kacheri) in the king’s name (Figure 8.3). This royal court is believed to have been built when the king of Khurda escaped to Garh Mantri and made it the capital, which seems historically plausible (see Chapter 2). The royal court had been used as the office of Ekharajat Mahal’s sub-tahasildar (a tax-collecting officer). In the 1960s, the king of Puri also visited the place for hunting. Today, a villager (a brāhmaṇa) who used to be an officer at that office makes the offerings, but what is important is the fact that the offerings are made in the king’s name even now. Here the Khondha priest worships the medium and the water pots, and the goddess accepts cooked offerings (samkuri bhoga) for the first time. After this, houses along the procession route, except those of the dalit castes, are allowed to make offerings of cooked food.

**Animal sacrifices:** after this, animal sacrifices are offered on behalf of individuals residing in the lower fort in front of a small shrine dedicated to Goddess Maṅgalā next to the temple of Rāmacaṇḍī. Here sheep and goats are sacrificed for the first time. It might be said that elements of the so-called great tradition increase with the addition of cooked offerings and the sacrifice of goats and sheep. When the head of a sacrificial animal is cut off by the sacrifice-executor, the medium drinks the blood that runs from its body (Figure 8.4). As in the case of the sacrificed cocks, the body of the goat or sheep is taken home, cooked and

*Figure 8.3* Ruins of the royal court. Trṭīya Deva temple with a thatched roof is on the left. To the right is the white Rāmacaṇḍī temple. Mangla’s shrine, partially obscured by trees, is to the left of Rāmacaṇḍī temple.
Ritual, history and identity

The heads of the sacrificial animal (goat or sheep) from the royal sacrifice and mahāśṭamī (the great eighth) sacrifice go to the king’s court (actually to a person who used to work there). Of the others, one head each is given to the sub-chiefs (daḷai, six families), the barakandāj (guard), the carpenter and the police. The rest goes to the sacrifice-executor as his share. Earlier the carpenter did not get a share, but, in 1991, after he demanded his share ‘according to tradition’, the sub-chiefs who managed the ritual asked him to make an oath in front of Rāmacaṇḍī. When he complied, he was also given a share. The share given to the police was started in the 1960s after a small police station was established in Garh Manitri.

**Procession to Upara Garh:** the procession of the medium-group headed by the medium leaves the lower fort area, and at its outskirts, at the shrine of Maṅgalā in the dalit Bāuri Sāhi, the Khondha priest performs worship for the water pots and cock sacrifices are done for individuals of this hamlet. No food offerings are accepted from the bāuris. Then the medium-group proceeds to the upper fort area. The procession passes by the dalit Hāṛi Sāhi en route, but no offerings are made here. When the procession reaches the entrance of the fortress, a sacrifice is performed in front of the shrine dedicated to Goddess Duārasuṇī. Duārasuṇī (duāra means door) is said to guard the entrance of the fortress. She is also said to be a younger sister of Rāmacaṇḍī. The first cock to be sacrificed there is offered by the hāṛi hamlet near the upper fort area, and sacrifices of cocks, sheep and goat on behalf of individuals follow. In the upper fort area too, the medium and the water pots are worshipped at houses along the route (Figure 8.5).
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Sword play: the medium performs the sword play (khaṇḍā khela) in front of the scribe’s (koṭha karaṇa) house, where there is also a shrine dedicated to Rāmacaṇḍī. First, the scribe spreads a piece of cloth made of two red saris joined together in the open space in front of his house. The medium goes slowly around the sari anti-clockwise led by the barber amidst the rising excitement of the crowd. When he goes around for the third time he rolls on to the sari as if to lie down on it, but then continues dancing and swinging the sword (Figure 8.6). The procession then moves to Upara Sāhi, where the chiefly lineage resides and accepts worship. It is noteworthy that the chief himself worships the tribal medium who holds the king’s sword. The last sacrifice on behalf of individuals is performed in front of the shrine dedicated to Rāmacaṇḍī in this hamlet.

Royal sacrifice: the procession finally reaches the ‘sword hut’ (khaṇḍā ghara) constructed near the chief’s residence. A brāhmaṇa priest throws rice and flowers on the medium, chanting a mantra (Figure 8.7). The medium then places the sword in the hut. The brāhmaṇa performs a series of rituals to sanctify the sacrificial goat (Figure 8.8). Then the sacrifice of the goat, called the royal sacrifice (sarakārī baḷi) takes place. As the name indicates, the sacrificial animal is supposed to be given by the king. There is evidence in the palm leaf document of 1776–1777 that the king used to donate expenses for the offerings at the palace in Garh Manitri and two sheep and a buffalo for the Rāmacaṇḍī festival, presumably for the mahāsaptamī royal sacrifice and mahāṣṭamī sacrifice, respectively (see

*Figure 8.5* The garlanded medium/goddess accepts offerings from a khaṇḍāyata who is touching his/her feet as two men sitting on the left hold the two water pots symbolising the goddess. The Khondha priest sitting in the middle is performing the pūjā.
Chapter 3). Even after colonisation, the Ekharajat Mahal sub-tahasildar’s office in Garh Mantri (used to give donations for the animal in the name of the king. After the state government took over the administration of the Jagannātha temple in 1954, the Jagannātha temple office in Puri began to contribute Rs. 100 for the royal sacrifice and this custom continues today.

Just after the goat is sacrificed, the medium drinks its blood and falls down, which results in the goddess leaving his body (Figure 8.9). From then on, the power of the goddess is said to reside in the sword. The goat is later cut up by the sacrifice-executor and distributed among the entitlement holders in the fort area according to custom (Figure 8.10). The chief is given the penis and testicles in which the śakti (divine power) is said to be concentrated. The head of the goat is given to the ‘state’ (which meant the king’s court and then the sub-tahasildar’s office in the village, and now the villager who was an officer there. He also happens to be the brāhmaṇa who officiates in the royal sacrifice). The rest of the body is divided into eighty-five equal portions. Four portions are considered spare. Eighty-one portions are divided between the state (three portions), the chief, the sub-chiefs (six families), the ex-sarabarākāras (ten families), Garh Mantri pāikas (foot soldiers believed to have been twenty-four families but extended to thirty families), Chhiam pāika, Barabati pāika, Baliberani pāikas (two families), koṭha karaṇa, baithi karaṇa (scribe), potters (ten families), carpenter, gardener, sweet-maker, blacksmith, washerman, astrologer, barber, bāuris (three families), medium, kabāri (usually means fuel wood provider: Saora, two families), Baliberani kabāri and Chhiam kabāri.
Fifteenth day: mahāṣṭamī

Sword worship: in the morning and evening from this day to the last day of the festival, the sword and water pots representing the goddess are worshipped in the sword hut, with the brāhmaṇa acting as priest and the chief as the worshipper (karttā) (Figure 8.11). The form of the ritual is the same as that of a usual Hindu ritual and the mantra for the worship of forest Durgā (bana Durgā) is used. Iron pens and palm leaf scripts, which were used for writing in the olden days and were indispensable for administration, are collected from the traditional royal authorities of the region, namely, the chief, sub-chiefs, scribes (koṭha karaṇa and baiṭhi
Figure 8.8 The priest chants a mantra to the royal sacrificial goat.

Figure 8.9 After accepting the royal sacrifice the medium falls down near the sword hut.
Figure 8.10 Distributing the meat of the royal sacrifice.

Figure 8.11 The chief (front) and the priest (back) perform pūjā to the king’s sword, bearing Rāmacañḍī’s śakti.
karaṇa) and cowry accountant (kauṛi bhagiā), and from the ex-sarabarākāras and others who are new patrons of the festival, and are placed next to the sword and worshipped (Figure 8.12). The new patrons of the festival were the new rich of the area who volunteered to become patrons of the festival after there was a financial crisis following the abolition of Ekharajat Mahal. They were accepted as a kind of honorary sarabarākāra. After the attempt to ‘freeze’ tradition, however, no new honorary sarabarākāra came to be accepted. Contributing these items to the sword hut is thought to be an honour.

**Mahāṣṭamī sacrifice**: the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice is performed at midnight. First the temple priest (pūjārī) cooks the offerings and the vedic brāhmaṇa offers a fire sacrifice (homa). When this is over, the brāhmaṇa sanctifies the sheep which is then sacrificed. This sacrificial sheep, like the one in the royal sacrifice, used to be given by the sub-tahasildar’s office in Garh Manitri in the king’s name till Ekharajat Mahal was abolished. Today, a new rich man from bārapalli who volunteered donates a sheep every year and receives ritual privileges as an honorary sarabarākāra. The Khondha priest picks up the head of the sacrificed animal and places it on a pot. The brāhmaṇa takes this into the sword hut, offers it to Rāmacaṇḍī together with the cooked vegetarian food and performs worship (Figure 8.13). The worship includes dipping a piece of kuśa grass in the blood collected in the pot and scattering the blood over the food offerings.

The cooked offering and the meat of the sacrificed animal are distributed to the entitlement holders in the fort area the next morning according to the custom. The head of the sacrificial sheep goes to the ‘state’ (the brāhmaṇa who used to work

*Figure 8.12* Palm leaves and iron pens placed in the hut, along with the water pots and the sword.
at the king’s court) and the rest of the body is divided into twenty-seven portions which go to the state (three portions), the chief, sub-chiefs (six families), cowry accountant, koṭha karaṇa, baiṭhi karaṇa, ex-sarabarākāras (ten families), barakandāj (assistant-officer at king’s court), pūjāřī brāhmaṇa, guard pāika (who is in charge of protecting the sword hut) and barber. The forty-one portions of cooked offerings (aṣṭamī sāra bhoga) are allocated to the state (three portions), the chief, sub-chiefs (six families), koṭha karaṇa, baiṭhi karaṇa, ex-sarabarākāras (ten families), barakandāj, pūjāřī brāhmaṇa, vedic brāhmaṇas (ten families), blacksmith, potter, carpenter, astrologer, gardener, washerman and bāuri. Two portions are also kept for performing pūjā at the time of immersion of the water pots (bisarjana). On the sixteenth day, worship is performed in the usual way in the sword hut.

*Figure 8.13* The priest performing the mahāṣṭamī sacrificial rituals.
The seventeenth day: Daśaharā

Tool worship: on Daśaharā day, which is considered the day to commence new work, each household lays out the tools of its profession and worships them (Figure 8.14). For instance, in khaṇḍāyata houses, swords and agricultural tools are worshipped, while scissors and combs are worshipped in houses of the barber caste. Daśaharā is the day of Rāma’s victory over the demon king Rāvaṇa and also the day on which the Paṇḍavas prayed to Durgā to grant them victory before the great Mahābhārata war and is hence thought to be an auspicious day on which to begin battle and also other works. Services to patron households (Daśaharā bheti) commence from the day of Daśaharā for a few days. This involves brāhmaṇas and other service castes visiting patron households and beginning their work (anukūla).

Daśaharā procession: in the evening, the final worship is performed by the brāhmaṇa and the chief in the sword hut. For the final pūjā, the barber, bearing a torch, comes along with the drummer to call first the koṭha karaṇa and then the chief from their houses and take them to the sword hut. Then to the sound of drums the king’s sword, filled with the goddess’s power, is handed over to the chief by the brāhmaṇa priest (Figure 8.15). The chief carries the sword and leads the Khondha priest, brāhmaṇa, scribe, torch-bearing barber and the drummers in a procession. En route, khaṇḍāyatas and patrons of the festival (ex-sarabarākāra) join them as the procession passes in front of their houses. Auspicious water pots and lamps are placed in front of each house and women sound the huḷahuḷi. Huḷahuḷi is the auspicious high-pitched ululation made by
sticking the tongue out slightly and moving it from side to side. This is a process to take Rāmacaṇḍī back to her abode and at the same time a pseudo-military march (Figure 8.16). On the way, peasant-militias and cowherds perform martial arts (pāika ākhaṛā).¹¹

The procession leaves the lower fort area and reaches the Daśaharā field.¹² First the brāhmaṇa priest performs a pūjā. Then the chief followed by the others are supposed to write, “We seek protection at the feet of the auspicious Rāmacaṇḍī” (Śrī Śrī Śrī Rāmacaṇḍī caraṇe śaraṇa”), three times on a palm leaf with an iron pen (now replaced by paper and a ballpoint pen) then tear and throw the leaf/paper away. By doing so, it is said that any work begun on Daśaharā will be successful. Everyone except the Khondha priest then leaves the spot. The Khondha priest

Figure 8.15 Flanking the priest the chief holds the sword for the Daśaharā procession while the barber holds the torch.
worships the water pots before immersing (bisarjana) them in the pond. This is a secret ritual and no one else is allowed to see it.

The chief and the rest of the procession go to the Trīṭīya Deva (Jagannātha) temple in Taḷa Garh where they are given a mixture of the holy basil leaves and water (tuḷasī pāṇi) by the pūjārī serving at the temple, who is in turn given some money-gift (dakṣiṇā). The chief receives the tuḷasī pāṇi first. While he does so the brāhmaṇa priest holds the sword. The procession then moves back to Upara Sāhi of Upara Garh and goes to the temple of the tutelary deity of the chiefly lineage, Govinda Jiu. Here also they receive tuḷasī pāṇi.

When they reach the chief’s house, the chief is greeted with a ritual of respect and honour (bandāpanā) performed by the barber. Then the brāhmaṇa performs rituals on the sword, returns the sword to its scabbard and hangs it in the sword room of the chief’s house. The sword is not brought out again until the following year. Those who took part in the procession are welcomed back to their respective houses with the women’s huḷahuḷi and this marks the end of the festival.

Interpreting the festival

Transforming śakti through the sacrificial process

Of special interest in the analysis of this festival is the process of transforming divine power, or śakti, which is represented as the essence of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī.
herself (cf Tanaka 1991). The indigenous power represented by the goddess is thought to be the source of the power of production and fertility, as mentioned in Chapter 6. The villagers call this power primordial power (ādi śakti) and the mother (mā) of all. The goddess’s power of fertility is essential for the regeneration of the community. The basic structure of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival may be interpreted as a process by which the primordial power of the goddess is invited into the community and directed to become a protective and generative force for the reproduction of the community.

Here I analyse the transformation of the goddess’s unfolding power as multiple values and social configurations interact in the course of the ritual. The festival may be said to play out in the following order: arrival of the goddess’s power of fertility which manifests ‘equality’ of beings in submission to the divine; union of the goddess and the royalty mediated by the brāhmaṇa priest, who represents the order of ‘hierarchy’; control and consumption of the product of the union through the power structure of ‘centrality’.

Interestingly, the process of transformation of the goddess’s power overlaps with the cosmological history of the fort area. The process of the festival is said by the villagers to show how the goddess of the forest tribals came to gradually accept the worship of the king and the brāhmaṇas, and how the different castes were called by the king to form a proper fort-community.

**Arrival, submission and equality**

The goddess and her power enter the village mediated by the Khondha priest and Saora medium, who are considered to be in close relationship with the goddess. The goddess is said to have been originally worshipped by the Khondha and Saora people in the forest. Only the indigenous tribal people can mediate the extremely strong and dangerous power of the goddess initially. The Khondha priest and Saora medium do not attempt to control the goddess’s power but accept her as absolute. A part of the Khondha priest’s prayer says, “I am giving you whatever you have given me. Protect us”. These words show an attitude of surrender to the goddess’s will. This is in contrast to a comment by one brāhmaṇa that mantras have so much power that even deities have to obey the power of the words.

Possession of the medium by the goddess can be seen as absolute surrender and self-sacrifice by the medium as he provides the goddess with his body. Possession is a concrete manifestation of the goddess’s power and the first part of the process of her transformation. The goddess, who usually stands in the form of a rock, gains speech and mobility by taking the form of a living medium and answers the devotees’ questions directly, blesses them and moves around the village. It is significant that the first to offer the sacrificial cock at the hill of the goddess is the sweeper-drummer caste, who are considered to be lowest in the brahmanical hierarchy. Those allowed to be at the site of sacrifice are also tribals and dalits. This is probably because the goddess’s power is close to the primordial state at this stage and holds an ambivalent meaning for this world. Those who have peripheral positions in society can touch such power.
Placating caṇḍī, preta and bhūta wandering in the deserted village area is the next step in the transformation of śakti. Caṇḍī, preta and bhūta may be said to represent the destructive aspects of divine generative power and appeasing them is part of the process of removing the dangerous aspect of the power before the procession enters the village. The entry of the goddess, who originally belongs to the forest, into the village leads to dissolving borders and the structural order, since the basic division that demarcates the village from the forest collapses here. At this stage in the festival, people are connected to the goddess on a one-to-one basis through their faith and devotion (bhakti). Hierarchical and power relations between people lose their meaning since the only relation that matters is the one between the devotee and the deity. This phase manifests ontological equality among beings.

Even the chief, who represents the king in the locality, becomes an equal among people in front of the goddess. He is stripped of his power and authority as the goddess takes away the king’s sword from him in front of her temple. It is one of the most dramatic representations of the principle of equality before the divine, when the chief bows down on the ground in front of the goddess in the body of the tribal Saora medium. The king too accepts the medium/goddess’s power and presents offerings at the royal court. The king, the chief, the dominant caste and other members of the community pay homage to the goddess in the Saora medium’s body, as only absolute servitude is awarded with a blessing. In this way, the king, the chief and other villagers accept the sacredness and power of the forest goddess manifested in the tribal medium.

Union, mediation and hierarchy

In the same process, however, we also find evidence that the goddess herself is gradually adopting the civilisation represented by royalty and coming closer to the realm of the king. An instance of this is the transformation of the offerings the goddess comes to accept. On the hill in the forest, the offerings are raw rice, eggs and liquor, but when the procession enters the village, sweets and fruits are offered, and on reaching the royal court, cooked food is offered. This is said to show the historical transformation from the tribal goddess to the king’s goddess. This is reminiscent of the legend of Jagannātha, who used to be worshipped by the tribal Savara in forests and only had roots and fruits as offerings, but started to accept cooked offerings when he came to Puri. Moreover, when the procession enters the village and the medium begins to accept offerings from the houses, it is the male head of the household (karttā) who performs the worship on behalf of the individuals in his household. Women of the house cook the offerings but are not to go out on to the street and must wait inside the house for the medium to come to them. Also, no food offerings are accepted from bāuris and hāṛis. Here we can see the appearance of the household orders based on gender and caste segregation, rather than individual devotees without caste and gender differences as was the case on the hill of Rāmaçaṇḍī.

The idiom of sexuality is expressed when the goddess rolls on the red sari in front of the scribe’s house. This may be interpreted as the goddess accepting the
king’s offerings and it may also be said to have sexual overtones. The villagers’ explanation is simply that the goddess lies down on the sari because she is happy (kusi), but a red sari is worn by the bride at the wedding and ‘to lie’ (soiba) is a colloquial term for having sexual intercourse. This part of the ritual can be said to indicate the goddess’s sexual contact with the king as the representative of Jagannātha on earth, and she is said to be pleased by the king entertaining her with superior cooked offerings and the red silk sari. This contact between the king and the goddess leads to their union in the royal sacrifice.

The royal sacrifice can be interpreted as the self-sacrifice and absolute surrender of the community, with the king as the central sacrificer. At the same time, it is symbolic of the union between the goddess and the king. It is the culmination of submission and, simultaneously, a great turning point in the formation of the social order, since the king’s presence as the representative of the community is prominent. The king unites with the goddess, represented by the king’s sword that is filled with the goddess’s power after the sacrifice. It is also notable that this process is made possible by the mediation of the brāhmaṇa priest who represents the value of purity.

The royal sacrifice differs from previous sacrifices in that the subject of the offering is not the individual or household but the whole community represented by the king as the sacrificer and that the sacrificial animal is sanctified by the brāhmaṇa. The brāhmaṇa’s mantra, which represents the ordering principle, succeeds in separating the king’s sword from the body of the living medium as the latter puts down the sword in the sword hut. Proper pronunciation in chanting the mantra is considered very important precisely because the segmented sound creates diversification and order in the world. The power of the goddess then leaves the body of the medium entirely as he collapses after accepting the royal sacrifice. Thus the goddess’s power is transferred from the body of the medium into the sword which may be controlled as the medium of divinity, unlike the uncontrollable and unpredictable medium who was drunk and fierce. That is to say, with the help of the brāhmaṇa, who has the authority of dharma (socio-cosmic principles and order), the king and his representative chief become the agents who can utilise the indigenous power of generation. The authority of the brāhmaṇa is derived from his ‘purity’, that is to say, his qualification or right to perform certain actions (Inden 1985: 34). The purity of the brāhmaṇa confers on him a high position in the caste hierarchy, which is represented in this part of the ritual.

Through the brāhmaṇa’s intervention and manipulation the indigenous power of the goddess carried into the village by the Saora medium and the Khondha priest is transferred to a sword which can be worshipped in a temple (the sword hut). At the same time, the indigenous tribal people are transformed from being the mediator of the goddess’s power, who have a privileged position, to peripheral, ‘impure’ beings, who are not allowed entry into the sword hut after this. Here, clearly the social order based on the principle of hierarchy is established, mediated by the brāhmaṇa.

In the mahāṣṭamī (the great eighth) sacrifice, the Saora medium is no longer present, and the Khondha priest and Saora sacrificer play only supplementary
Ritual, history and identity

The brāhmaṇa priest who enters and performs worship in the lamp-lit sword hut. Here we see that the medium of power has clearly shifted from the tribals to the brāhmaṇa.

The goddess’s wild power is controlled and transformed into benevolent, protective power by the brāhmaṇa’s authority. However, it is not the brāhmaṇa but the king and his representative, the chief, who can employ this power. This division of roles is characteristic of the Indic world, where there is a clear distinction between the priest as the one who brings power under control, and the king as the exerciser of power. The hierarchy of purity/impurity with the brāhmaṇa at the apex and the structure of dominance centred on the king and chief are thus formed. The brāhmaṇa performs rituals for the patron and the results of the rituals belong to the sacrificer as the patron. The brāhmaṇa’s purity is guaranteed by the fact that he transcends the world and does not receive the fruits of ritual.

Due to the brāhmaṇa’s intervention, the world filled with the goddess’s beneficence is divided by boundaries and hierarchy. Social order is brought about amidst chaos by the segmenting power of the word or language. The community is constructed as the king/chief reunites segmented society. The ‘king’s sacrifice’ entails the simultaneous enactment of the segmenting effect of hierarchical order introduced by the brāhmaṇa and the unifying effect of the structure of dominance centred on the king. This is the point at which the socio-political hegemonic system of codes (system of meanings) is established.

**Distribution, consumption and centrality**

The king’s sacrifice is a process of uniting the goddess with the king through the medium of the brāhmaṇa. Fertility, prosperity and military success are granted to the local community as the indigenous power is united with the outsider ruler, the king. The goddess vests her power and authority to exercise that power in the sacrificer-king. Thus, the king, who employs śakti, becomes the embodiment of the supreme male principle, and the counterpart of the supreme goddess, the embodiment of sakti (Yokochi 2000: 264).

The indigenous and local power of the goddess unites with the king, who represents the sovereignty of Jagannātha on earth. Through this union, the generative power of the goddess bears fruit and society is endowed with well-being through procreation of the people, abundant crops and military success. The king, with the help of the brāhmaṇa, becomes the centre of power as the sacrificer par excellence, as he is the one who proved himself, with the acceptance of the goddess, fit to unite with the power of production and to administer this power.

After the royal sacrifice, the goddess’s power is exercised by the king, and various resources that manifest the goddess’s power (such as the meat of sacrificed animals, grains and land) are distributed under the king’s authority. The sacrificial organisation is the essence of the traditional system of entitlements. The sacrificial process is made possible through the cooperation and division of labour among people, and the moment the animal is sacrificed it is treated as the product of the sacrifice which is to be divided and consumed by the community. Each
family that contributed in the sacrificial community through service gets a share. Viewed from the king’s perspective of exercising royal power, this system’s aim is to bring about auspiciousness and with it all worldly goods, such as fertility, prosperity and victory, based on the values of honour and duty. The centrality of the ruler is clear from this perspective. The king takes charge of the products of the union with the goddess and redistributes them.

The ritual representation of the king’s centrality and the significance of his role in redistribution may be seen paradigmatically in the distribution of the meat of the sacrificial animal in the royal sacrifice. The sacrificed animal is the scapegoat of the community represented by the king, which offers itself to the goddess in an act of absolute surrender. As Hubert and Mauss rightly point out, the sacrificial animal symbolises both the sacrificer and the community represented by the sacrificer (Hubert and Mauss 1964). Sacrifice involves the destruction of an animal that is equated with the self and symbolically represents the death of the self. At the same time, the process of death and destruction in sacrificing an animal brings about the unity of the sacrificer and power, and just after the moment of its sacrifice, the animal is treated as the auspicious product of the union (sanctified remnant of ritual prasāda) and is transformed into an object for distribution and consumption in the name of the royal rule and order.

The sanctified meat of the sacrificial animal is objectified as it becomes a thing to be consumed by the community centred on the king and his representative, the chief. Here the death of the self is transmuted into the death of the other, and the self re-establishes itself as the subject that consumes the product of the other’s death. The essence of power lies precisely in this logic of violence and consumption. The king’s power is established in the sacrificial process as violence that acquires the product of nature’s power, distributes it and consumes it. That is to say, its essence lies in killing, distributing and eating. The process of objectifying and externalising what is equal to the self is linked to the peripheralising of those who are supposed to be an essential part of the community. This is seen in the transformation of the position of tribals.

The motif of externalising and peripheralising is further seen in the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice. The sacrificial animal is symbolically equal to the sacrificer and the sacrificial community he represents. What is interesting here is that the sacrificial animal in this case may be seen to be associated with the tribals. Tribals are generally thought to be forest people, and it is said that during the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice, caṇḍī, preta and bhūta that live in forests roam around outside the sword hut. Only the tribal Khondha priest, the Soara sacrifice-executor, the chief and the brāhmaṇa priest are allowed to be present for the sacrifice. While the chief and the brāhmaṇa perform a homa ritual inside the sword hut, the tribals are not allowed to go inside as they are deemed impure and peripheral beings. Here we can see clearly the structural opposition between the presence of the brāhmaṇa and the chief in the pure bright area inside the hut and the presence of the tribals, caṇḍī, preta and bhūta and the sacrificial animal outside in the dark. This is no doubt linked to the traditional dichotomy between the village and the forest. Here the centre and the
periphery of the community’s social order are expressed and defined, as the relationship of the ruler and the ruled is legitimised.

It is only when the sacrificial animal, symbolising the evil and the external, is killed that its head is offered inside the sword hut, and its flesh cut up and consumed by the community. It is notable that the tribals are not included in the distribution of the meat and cooked prasāda from the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice, and the brāhmaṇa, who until then has not accepted offerings, is included. The Rāmacaṇḍī festival is a local variation of Durgā pūjā (the great autumn festival of the goddess). The sacrificial animal of the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice is often equated with the buffalo asura conquered by Goddess Durgā mentioned in Devī Māhātmya. In fact, it is said that a buffalo was sacrificed in the past at the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice.17 There is an implicit equation between the buffalo asura and the tribal population here. It symbolises the dominance of civilising power over the dark forest.

We also find in historical records of the late eighteenth century that the king had gifted ‘buffalo for sacrifice’ or ‘state (koṭha) buffalo’ for ‘Rāmacaṇḍī’s sword hut in this fort in the festival of the month of Āświna’ (Tables 3.13 and 3.15 in Chapter 3). There is an interesting oral history about why the sacrificial animal was changed from buffalo to sheep, which is as follows:

It was the role of the principal village head (beherā pradhāna) to take care of the sacrificial buffalo for the mahāṣṭamī ritual. But the buffalo ran away on mahāṣṭamī. The principal village head tried but failed to catch and bring back the buffalo. It must have been the will of the goddess Rāmacaṇḍī. The local people said that the goddess must be offered sacrifice, and demanded that the village head himself should be sacrificed instead. The principal village head was forced to the sacrificial pole and a rope was put over his head. At that moment, the principal village head prayed to Rāmacaṇḍī from his heart. Then, by the grace of the goddess, the buffalo came to the pole and offered its head. The principal village head was thus saved. From that time, the sacrifice of buffaloes was stopped and sheep were used instead.

It is said that the principal village head used to punish the villagers very harshly to keep order in the community. He kept various tools for punishment in his house, such as instruments for binding and torture. This episode shows how the villagers got their revenge against the authoritarian principal village head. It contains implicit criticism of the controlling power that marginalises the weak and suggests that anyone can well be in the position of the sacrificed, if the goddess wills it. It relativises the history of civilisation conquering the forest and its tribals and speaks to the supremacy of the generative power of the forest goddess.18

In the march on Daśaharā day, the consumption motif takes the form of an attack directed to the outside. The pseudo-military procession is headed by the chief, who holds the sword symbolising royal authority and the power of the goddess, followed by other traditional office holders and the soldiers. In the
demonstration of this power and authority, even the brāhmaṇa priest is obliged to stand behind the chief. Performance of martial arts is a demonstration of violence that has gained legitimacy. The procession heads for the imaginary enemy outside.

At the Daśaharā field, the water pots, which are said to be another medium of the goddess, are thrown into the pond in the paddy fields. The water in the pot from Rāmacaṇḍī’s well thus returns to the fields, the site of production, having been saturated with the power of the fertility of the goddess. This water is believed to bring good harvest to all twelve villages of the Manitri fort area. The blood from the sacrifice is also said to run to the fields and bring good harvest.

On Daśaharā day, all castes in the fort area begin their work. The community order reaffirmed in the festival shifts from ritual space to the realm of everyday practice. They worship the tools of their profession in the morning and, having then reflected upon their duty and role, visit their patron households and begin their service. Rice is harvested just over a month after this festival and is collected by the land owning households before it is redistributed through service and exchange. This shows a part of the mechanism of dominance with the redistributive flow of resources based on the power relations of centrality. We also find a continuity in the motif of exercising the sacrificial power of killing, distributing and eating.

At Daśaharā, the people affirm the roles they ought to play in the whole at the level of embodied practice. They establish their biomoral personhood at the level of the body-person by offering their service ordained by the king as sacrifice to the indigenous goddess and Jagannatha, accepting the fruits of sacrifice, such as meat and paddy, distributed by the king that are manifestations of the goddess’s power and eating them as products of the union between the goddess’s power and the king’s authority.

Revolving values: the superalternate and the subalternate

Thus, in this ritual, there is a transformation of the goddess’s power in three phases of (a) equality, (b) hierarchy and (c) centrality. The importance of the co-presence of the three phases in the sacrificial process is that they represent alternate formulations and values of socio-political relationships. They represent the plural values which coexist as cultural resources with dilemmas and transformative potentiality.

I would like to suggest that equality, hierarchy and centrality constitute revolving values in the sense of Malamoud’s “revolving hierarchy” (Malamoud 1981: 41). Malamoud develops this idea as an extension to Dumont’s concept of “encompassment” (Dumont 1970). Encompassment in hierarchical relations refers to the higher sphere partially defining and ideologically subordinating the lower sphere, while the latter, still being autonomous, retains the possibility of confronting the former. Malamoud argues that, if this is the case, the relationship between the encompassing and the encompassed can revolve according to viewpoints. This means that in a certain context a particular value may dominate while other values
are encompassed and subordinated for the time being, but when another point of view is taken, a different value encompasses the other values.

Malamoud applies the idea of revolving hierarchy to the hierarchical relationship of the “aims of man” (purusārtha) in Indian tradition. When the aims of man are placed in an encompassing–encompassed relationship, Malamoud argues,

according to the point of view adopted … each term of the trivarga (three aims of this life, namely kāma or sensual enjoyment, artha or power and wealth and dharma or cosmological law) can be conceived in turn as that which provides the explanatory framework for understanding not only its two partners, but mokṣa (liberation, the fourth and final aim of man) as well. (Malamoud 1981: 41, parenthesis added)

That is to say, from the point of view of dharma, we can draw up a configuration in which dharma encompasses kāma, artha and mokṣa, but from the perspective of artha, dharma, mokṣa and kāma are encompassed, and from the viewpoint of kāma, artha, dharma and mokṣa are encompassed. Further, “the multiplicity of points of view is not only a theoretical possibility, but is actually to be found … in the Indian authors themselves” (Malamoud 1981: 41).

Raheja also stresses the “shifting configurations of castes” (Raheja 1988b: chapter 5) and argues that there are “the multiple configurations of castes, the multiple hierarchies, and the multiple perspectives on social life” (Raheja 1988b: 519). Her notion of “shifting positionality”, where positionality and interrelationships shift between the principles of “centrality”, “hierarchy” and “mutuality” according to context and viewpoints, is useful in doing away with an overarching principle, as in the Dumontian hierarchy or neo-Hocartian centrality (Raheja 1988b). However, her framework tends towards postmodernist relativism where everything is reduced to context and viewpoints and does not account for the actual politico-social structure in history. As a result, she does not quite explain the interrelationship of the three. Besides, her emphasis on “mutuality” does not quite posit the fundamental value in Indian society. The examples that Raheja cites as manifestations of the principle of mutuality are relations of equal exchange, but they seem to me to be established not in caste as a sacrificial organisation but in caste as “substantialised” units (see Chapter 9), or in relationships between individuals. If we are to understand caste as a sacrificial organisation in history, attention to the social value and relations of ontological equality is vital for capturing the structure and dynamism of Indian society. I say this because the regeneration of the hegemonic structure, as well as its transformative potentialities, is made possible due to the overriding value of ontological equality in the phase of death and destruction.

In this way, the three values of equality, hierarchy and centrality can be seen as alternate values that revolve according to contexts and viewpoints. As Gregory (1997) points out, we should recognise that there is “coevality” of different values, “switching” between them, and the “asymmetrical recognition” of the same
phenomena from different points of view. This does not mean, however, that the viewpoints can switch freely, since the power of hegemony is always at work. There is constant cultural–political negotiation between the hegemonic and the subalternate, as we will go on to discuss.\(^{19}\)

How then do values revolve in the context of this ritual? The basic mechanism for the transformation of power through the three phases is sacrifice (baḷi, \textit{yajñā}).\(^{20}\) I define sacrifice as the offering of the self for the whole.\(^{21}\) The sacrificial process involves the two-fold path of death and rebirth. The offering of the self means death and deconstruction of the old self. But through death, there is contact with the original immanence and the sacred source of life. Through this contact there is the reconstruction or rebirth of the new self which is given new life in relation to the sacred. Sacrifice is the means to destroy the subordination of the self to “the world of things” structured by the everyday “real order (\textit{l’ordre réel})” and to attain a “return of the intimacy, the immanence between the human and the world” (Bataille 1976: 307). It is a mechanism by which the sacrificer contacts the realm of the sacred so as to allow the energy of life to flow into the process of reproduction.\(^{22}\)

As Girard points out, the “sacred concerns itself above all with the destruction of differences” (1977: 241). The principle of equality achieved through sacrificial submission to the divine corresponds to the process of death and deconstruction, that is, the first part of sacrifice wherein all differences based on status and power are denied. I want to stress the importance of this part of the ritual because it is through the complete denial of difference through absolute surrender or self-sacrifice (through possession and/or devotion) that contact with the sacred is possible. In other words, all is ontologically equal in relation to the sacred, as differences in status and power are meaningless.

When the power of the goddess is immanent, the rules of purity/impurity are meaningless. On the Rāmacaṇḍī hill in the forest, there is no bar on caste or gender. Also, we see this in an episode during the water sheep sacrifice ritual (pāṇi bodā baḷi, Table 6.3) in 1992. At that time, the sacrifice-executor was in a state of ‘impurity’ after a baby was born to his family. The villagers had called another Saora sacrifice-executor from another village to perform the role in the festival. When the time came for the first sacrifice, however, the medium/goddess ordered the original sacrifice-executor to perform the role, disregarding the rule of purity and pollution. From the structural point of view, the sacrifice-executor should be replaceable by members of the same jāti. But, the goddess had demanded that the sacrifice-executor of Garh Manitri should play the role, in spite of the fact that he was in a state of ritual pollution. This suggests the importance of biomoral relations and a body-person nurtured by being born and brought up in the locality over rules of purity and social structure.

Now, the contrast drawn here between the phase of sacrifice representing the equality of being and the phases of hierarchy and centrality representing status and power is reminiscent of Victor Turner’s formulation of “communitas” and “anti-structure” as opposed to “structure” (1969). In the first phase, the existing structure breaks down and people face each other as ontologically equal beings.
In other words, social relations based on everyday status and roles dissolves and egalitarian and communal connections emerge anew (van Gennep 1960, Turner 1967). Everyday structure functions smoothly based on such ties of communitas. The phase of death and destruction in ritual has a creative role in the construction of social relations. The equality phase resembles the ritual stage glossed as “liminality” in anthropological literature (van Gennep 1960, Douglas 1966, Turner 1967).

I would like to note, however, that what I call the equality phase here is not exactly the same as anti-structure in Turner’s sense. Turner’s formulation gives priority to the functional reproduction of the structure. The phase of communitas is said to be anti-structure and only defined as the opposite of structure. Liminality in this sense serves functionally to reproduce the social structure in the end. The equality phase does indeed negate status and power, but its meanings cannot be reduced to its “anti” character.

What is significant about Turner’s theory is not that structure and anti-structure simply alternate repetitiously, but that there is potential for new historical dynamism to emerge from the dialectic (Kasuga 2004). There are many instances in history where the exhilaration and excitement in festivals and rituals were strongly linked to revolt and resistance from below (Hobsbawm 1965, Thompson 1991, 1992). Thus, anti-structure and communitas not only contribute to reconstruction of structure, but also contain the creative and dynamic possibilities of reassembling the structure differently. Similarly, the principle of equality that manifests in the communitas phase not only serves to reproduce the social structure, but also provides potentialities for reformulating social relationships as the underlying principle of society.

Another important point made by Turner is that the patterns of relationships and values in structure and communitas coexist in everyday social life as “two contrasting social models”. He also argues that “[t]he ultimate desideratum, however, is to act in terms of communitas values even while playing structural roles, where what one culturally does is conceived of as merely instrumental to the aim of attaining and maintaining communitas” (1969: 177). Bauman points out that the two social models put forward by Turner coexist in contradictory and conflicting ways in “social space” as “processes that proceed, respectively, ‘from the top down’ and ‘from the bottom up’” (Bauman 1993: 119). In the same manner, I suggest we take up the coexistence of the ‘subalternate’ and the ‘superalternate’ values in Indian society. Aspects of status and power can be seen as superalternate structures placed from above as prescriptive norms of hierarchy and centrality for the management of society. The aspect of equality, however, not only denies structure but also works as a foundation for the subalternate sociality of spontaneous relationships based on the ethics of ontological equality with mutual dignity and recognition from below (Bauman 1993, Gregory 1997).

The contradiction and contestation between the domination of the superalternate values and the resistance of the subalternate value constitute the real dilemma of human socio-political relationships that manifests in the ritual mechanism and in everyday interactions. It seems to me that the coexistence of these two forms of
social togetherness is at the heart of the dilemma of human life (Gregory 1997). I would like to emphasise the importance of recognising the existence of plural alternate values in Indian society rather than one overarching value that is shared by all and determines social structure (Dumont 1970). It is indeed true that the value of hierarchy, for example, is accepted and utilised even by groups of people who are considered the most impure (Moffatt 1979, Deliège 1992, 1999, Mosse 1994). But this does not mean that purity is the only relevant value. The values and social configurations of hierarchy, centrality and equality are all accepted as legitimate in Indian society.

What I am trying to suggest here is that the superalternate aspect of brahmanical hierarchy as well as royal centrality, which have been the focus of previous studies, constitute only a part of the larger sacrificial process. There is another crucial aspect, ontological equality, which represents the subalternate value and makes the spontaneous commitment of members possible. By the terms superalternate and subalternate, I am not suggesting that there are certain values for the ruling class and others for the oppressed class. Rather, the superalternate and subalternate values are alternate values that have relevance in different situations and contexts for everybody. Whereas superalternate values construct social order through prescriptive norms, subalternate values deconstruct such norms and bring people back to ontological equality. From that basis, people have the chance to reflect upon and reconstitute new social relationships.

To me, the ontological oneness of beings provides a politico-moral resource for constituting the subalternate form of sociality. It constitutes the basis of mutual respect and recognition—beyond socio-political status and power—that is the key to interpersonal ethics. This subalternate form of sociality in my opinion has the potential to challenge the structure of hierarchy and centrality represented by status and power. I deem ontological equality to be the crucial value as the ethical basis of social and political relationships in India, having the potentiality of being utilised to reflect upon and transform everyday practices.

### Ritual dimensions

#### King and community

Let us now look at the transformation of the meaning of ritual in different politico-social contexts in history. According to Bloch (1986), the ritual form and its symbolic structure do not change over time. Although Bloch pays attention to the historical changes in the ‘function’ of the ritual, he tends to reduce semantic transformations of ritual to changes in the power holders whose authorities are legitimised by the ritual. I would like to argue, however, that the meaning and function of a ritual, despite the stability of its symbolic structure, can change quite significantly over time.

It can be safely assumed that the basic structure of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival was formed during the Khurda king’s time, after Garh Manitri was conquered and annexed to Khurda (see Chapter 2). It was based on the Khondha sacrificial ritual on to which brahmanical and kingly elements were added.
An interesting aspect of the festival is that it represents the relationships between the king and the local community. It shows the symbolic centrality of the king as the sacrificer around whom the sacrificial organisation of the local community is constituted. Although the king himself is absent in body, there is a strong symbolic presence of royalty, signified most prominently by the king’s sword and royal sacrifice. In the ritual performance, the king’s presence is represented as being indispensable for controlling and transforming the local goddess’s power into a benevolent one. Sacrifice as a process of death and regeneration is shown to be achieved through the system of entitlements in the community with the king as the sacrificer. All fruits—wealth, abundant crop and military success—gained through the work of the community members are accepted as the fruit of the sacrificial service with the king as sacrificer and shared in accordance with the system of entitlements.

This ritual eloquently represents the local community members’ connection with kingship (Tanabe 2003b). Each member is defined according to duty and entitlement by the state. Duty is accepted not only for the community and the tutelary goddess, Rāmacaṇḍī, but also for the king and the state deity Jagannātha. The connection with Jagannātha is ritually represented in the act of going to the temple of Trīṭya Deva (local Jagannātha) to receive blessings at the end of the pseudo-military march on Daśaharā. Here, sacrificial service in the locality is eventually connected to devotion for Jagannātha. Thus, while remaining in the locality and serving the local community and its goddess, individuals also connect themselves through the king to the state deity.

In early modern Khurda, the establishment of the king’s symbolic authority at the local level went side by side with the permeation of the state’s power of surveillance and control over individual entitlements and the local distribution of resources. The king was no longer just the worshipper of Jagannātha at the state level, but also the sacrificer for the local goddesses as his symbolic presence—often represented by the king’s sword given to the chief in each fort—was transformed into something more ubiquitous, so to speak, at the local level. In this way, the local goddess representing the indigenous local power was united with the king who increasingly became divinised as the representative of the supreme state god Jagannātha during this period.

In the course of the ritual process, the chief is shown to be incompetent as the sacrificer controlling the goddess’s power. This can be seen through the ritual representation of his challenge to and defeat by the local goddess when his sword is taken away. It is only with royal intervention that the goddess is satisfied and transformed into the benevolent protector of the region. When the brāhmaṇa and the king intervene, she leaves the body of the tribal shaman and unites completely with the king’s sword. The king’s sword becomes blessed with the power of the goddess and comes to symbolise the union of royal authority and the local earth goddess’s power. The chief of the fort regains and holds this sword again only at the time of the Daśaharā march as the representative of the king and the goddess.

The sacrificial ethos represented in the ritual also extended into everyday practice where the duty of each member was performed as a sacrificial service in the
system of entitlements in precolonial Orissa. The allotment of duties and entitlements in the locality, represented and reconfirmed in the ritual activities and sharing of sacrificial meat and prasāda, also functioned as the basis of everyday activities. Since each duty and entitlement was seen as defined and granted by the king who was also the earthly representative of Jagannātha, the people were able to make their everyday activities into service for the king and the god. Prosperity, fertility and military success, the results of community cooperation, are accepted as the fruits of sacrificial service by the community centred on the king. The motif of the distribution of these fruits is most typically represented in the handing out of the meat of the royal sacrifice.

This kind of development in people’s positioning and subjectivity is related, as I suggested in Chapter 3, to the popularisation of the bhakti cult in which the aspect of bhakti (path of faith) and karma (path of action) were combined to provide religio-spiritual meaning to the performance of everyday activity as sacrificial duty for the supreme, represented by Kṛṣṇa-Jagannātha in early modern Orissa. It was a way to connect oneself to the divine through a worldly duty in the here and now. Bhakti ethics appear to have provided a means of turning everyday activities into divine service. In contrast to Protestant asceticism (Weber 1992), it can be characterised as devotionalism, where actions are offered for the divine and their fruits are accepted as divine blessings. Here, the ritual not only represented the structure of hierarchy and centrality but also ensured the ontological equality of the parts. Each person was able to connect with the divine through service. From the viewpoint of devotion and service, hierarchy and centrality were not central. Hierarchy, centrality and equality were revolving values.

Ritual semantics in the colonial era

The Rāmacaṇḍī festival gained a new significance as a basis of ‘traditional’ identity under colonialism. As I argued in Chapter 4, the most important change under colonial rule was that a dichotomy was wedged between the ‘modern state’ and ‘traditional society’. The ritual was placed in the latter sphere and no longer represented the overall model for politico-socio-religious practices. The sacrificial logic and the related phenomena of caste, kingship and religion were all confined to the traditional sphere in contradistinction to the modern. However, in a positive light, we could say that indigenous religious ethics were not destroyed by colonial modernity but were preserved in a limited sphere. Ritual serves to preserve cultural resources due to its structure, which is difficult to change.

According to the villagers, the festival is an “ancient” ritual that has continued in the same form “since the king’s time”. It is true that the ritual did not incorporate the change of power with colonisation. It continues to represent the king as the central sacrificer. In fact, the meaning of the ritual in the colonial and postcolonial contexts will become more apparent if we pay attention to what is not told or what is hidden in the discourse related to the ritual. Colonial history is actually made conspicuous by its absence. This is important because this absence signifies a kind of refusal to represent the colonial experience as ‘authentic’ in the
ritual sphere. The conviction of the preservation of tradition from the king’s time, together with the deliberate neglect of the colonial experience that may compromise the glory of tradition, shaped the ritual’s significance in colonial history.

As I described in Chapter 4, after the British conquest of the Khurda kingdom in 1804, the Khurda king lost all his political power and was made the superintendent of the Jagannātha temple in Puri. Khaṇḍāyatas who had enjoyed privileges as the king’s warriors were also stripped of their special rights and authority and were reduced to mere cultivators, at least in official eyes. This colonial memory of humiliation still lingers. Khaṇḍāyatas in the region told me the following story:

We are called khaṇḍāyatas since we are the holders of khaṇḍās (swords). Without khaṇḍās, we will no more be khaṇḍāyatas. You have seen that we place our khaṇḍās as the tools of our profession (saja) and we worship (pūjā) them on Daśaharā day. It is because we are khaṇḍāyatas. But you know what happened? This is what I have heard. During the time of the British, they were so afraid of us that they came and confiscated some of our khaṇḍās. Of course, our ancestors kept most of them in secret and we still have them, but those whose khaṇḍās were taken away, they cried and cried because they had lost their khaṇḍās. Do you understand? And moreover, the British ordered that we were not allowed to take out in public a knife longer than one span (gotie cākhaṇḍa; the length from the tip of the middle finger to the bottom of the palm). That’s only this long (showing his hand). They were so afraid of us that they did not want us to carry even a small knife! If they had seen us with our khaṇḍā, they would have fled.

This was narrated with much laughter at the end of the story. Here we observe the complexity of the response towards the colonial power. The khaṇḍāyatas were deprived of their swords and prohibited from carrying even a knife. They were, in effect, dispossessed of the symbol of their masculinity and martial identity, and it seems that they still carry the stigma of their emasculation today. It is obvious who the real power holders were, and the colonisers had the power to enforce orders upon them. However, the colonised try to laugh at the cowardice of the colonisers, implying that they themselves have always been the truly courageous. As a means of resistance, the colonised tried their best to prove their ‘real’ identity, albeit in a restricted form. This was only possible in the ‘non-political’, ritual domain but nonetheless they remained true to their own ‘tradition’.

When the king was offered the Ekharajat Mahal as his estate in 1858 (see Chapter 5), it must have been a good opportunity for the king and his people to secure a protected domain for enacting their tradition. Garh Manitri was included in the Mahal and a sub-tahasildar’s office was established there. It is no wonder then that in the Ekharajat Mahal, the newly created ‘royal territory’, royal and martial traditions were strengthened and performed with grandeur, though admittedly not in a ‘real’ political or martial sense. The festival of Rāmacaṇḍī in Garh Manitri was one such performance where the people, mainly khaṇḍāyatas, could
satisfy, albeit ritually, their thirst for regaining the masculine and martial tradition and also their lost sense of honour and identity. The Rāmacaṇḍī festival in the Ekharajat Mahal under colonialism provided people with the means to connect their traditional roles with a sense of the sacred and royal authority.

Although the festival was decontextualised from the precolonial political structure of kingship, it was re-contextualised in the system of colonial royalty. The festival of Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī seems to have flourished in the area as it was patronised by the king and the sarabarākāras of Ekharajat Mahal. It was funded by the king’s tax office (sub-tahasildar’s office), called kacheri, and the sarabarākāras, who were usually locally recruited.

The sarabarākāra’s position was not only prestigious but also economically beneficial as they were given tax-free land or jagirs plus 15–20% of the collected tax as salary. They formed an influential class in the locality. But from the late nineteenth century onwards, the office was bought and sold, as the new rich who had successfully adapted to commercialised agriculture came to take on this position (see Chapter 4). It is notable that the newly appointed sarabarākāras, together with the old royal officers, such as the chief, sub-chiefs, accountants and scribes, have the privilege of placing their iron pens and palm leaves, their symbols of authority as a literate managerial class, beside the king’s sword in the sword hut. They also receive a certain portion of the remains of offerings and sacrifices and are allowed to take part in the Daśaharā procession together with the chief and pāikas.

Thus, the new rich who had emerged amidst socio-economic changes in the late nineteenth century gained ‘traditional’ honour and privilege in local society by becoming sarabarākāras in the Ekharajat Mahal. The Rāmacaṇḍī festival linked the temple administration reconstructed in the late colonial period, and the system of ritual kingship associated with it, together with the new socio-economic dynamism brought about by commercial agriculture. It became an occasion to represent the system of royal honour and privileges restructured during the colonial period, contributing to the traditionalisation of the system.

The main significance of the ritual came to be its representation of the colonially reconstructed structure of hierarchy and centrality. It was based on the system of honour and privilege centring on colonial kingship as well as the colonial–brahmanical caste hierarchy. Here, tradition came to mean the structure of status and domination. People’s connection to the divine through service and ontological equality came to have only a subsidiary position. The most important function of the festival in this period was to represent and reconfirm the new structure of dominance reconstructed in the late colonial period as authentic tradition.

This tradition was based on connections between the structure of honour and privilege centred on the colonial ritual kingship, orientalist caste hierarchy centred on the brāhmaṇa and the newly reassembled socio-economic class structure. Values of ontological equality and sacrificial service were preserved in the symbolic structure of the ritual that was comparatively difficult to change. The reason why the festival was conducted in an especially grand manner in the late colonial
period, however, was probably to represent and reconfirm the new forms of hierarchy and centrality.

It is ironic that the festival flourished due to the colonial hand. The colonial government established the Ekharajat Mahal to make the Jagannātha temple financially independent in accordance with the colonial division between the ‘modern politics of state’ and the ‘traditional religion of society’. The Ekharajat Mahal was established to sustain a purely ‘religious’ tradition that was devoid of politics. However, as I have repeatedly emphasised, the performance of the ritual was a part of the cultural–political endeavour to re-establish traditional identity vis-à-vis the modern state.

The main function of the ritual was no longer the confirmation of a person’s position in the cosmological whole. The integrity of the whole was lost with colonisation. The cosmological whole was represented in the ritual sphere, but it no longer encompassed the actual everyday lives of people under colonialism. Representing the whole on the basis of the connection between god and king in ritual was a way of idealising the self that was lost in the colonial modern and expressing it as tradition that should be recovered.

The revitalisation of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival under colonialism should be seen as an expression and assertion of tradition as the ‘lost ideal’. This kind of mentality was related to the formation of popular patriotism in Orissa that centred on the Gajapati king and Jagannātha under colonialism. We should note, however, that this revitalisation of ritual was also due to the ritual gaining new patrons in the context of colonial administration and economic development. The colonial dichotomy thus displays a curious merging here too. The meaning of the festival in the late colonial period should be understood in the context of the complex dynamics between colonialism and ritual kingship, the growth of commercialism, emergence of the new rich and anti-colonial patriotism.

Postcolonial cultural politics and ontology of ritual identity

After independence in 1947, the areas of Ekharajat Mahal gradually lost their connections with the colonial royal system. As attempts were made to bring politics and culture together under the nation-state, the colonial dichotomy lost its institutional backing, and the Jagannātha temple and the Puri king gradually lost their autonomy. The Sri Jagannath Temple Act of 1954 stipulated that the Jagannātha temple would now be under the control of the state government. By this law, the king lost his rights to take tax from the Ekharajat Mahal. A new survey and settlement was conducted from 1953 to 1965 by the state government to standardise the tax rate in the Ekharajat Mahal with other state-owned (khas mahal) areas in Khurda. In 1974, the Ekharajat Mahal was formally abolished by the Amendments to the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. The sarabarākāras finally lost their privileged position together with the rights over their jagirs.

When the state government took over the administration of the Jagannātha temple in 1954, the management of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival ran into serious financial
difficulty as the king and the king’s court stopped financing it. The sources of funding for sacrificial animals for the royal sacrifice and mahāṣṭamī sacrifice and offerings at the royal court on mahāsaptamī had to be replaced. For the royal sacrifice, which involves the main symbol of the king as the sacrificer, the villagers negotiated with the Jagannātha temple office and succeeded in getting the temple to contribute Rs. 100 every year. A villager who used to be a court officer (and is also the brāhmaṇa priest for community rituals) agreed to take on the responsibility of providing the offerings to be given at the king’s court and received the privilege of accepting the prasāda. A rich man from bārapalli volunteered to donate the sheep for the mahāṣṭamī sacrifice in return for ritual privileges as an honorary sarabarākāra. Thus, new arrangements were temporarily made for the new situation.

In the mid-1960s when some of the sarabarākāras lacked the financial capacity to support the festival due to the loss of their jagirs, the finances of the festival fell into crisis again. This time, there was another rich man who volunteered to be patron of the ritual as an honorary sarabarākāra. His offer was accepted for one year as a result of an agreement reached by the leaders of Garh Manitri. The following year, more new rich volunteers came forward to make the same offer. It was a critical time for the future of the festival. Adopting new honorary sarabarākāras would secure the finances of the ritual. But these changes were now without legitimacy since the Rāmacaṇḍī festival had lost its direct relationship with the king, who had been the source of legitimacy for any changes.

An important decision was made by the influential villagers who were running the festival—mostly the traditionally high office holders—that not only would the new offers to become patrons be turned down but also the person who got the position for one year would now be declined as a patron for future rituals. All the arrangements would remain as before. The people in charge of running the festival recorded the details of the rights and responsibilities regarding the festival in notebooks, in order to preserve the details of the festival “as it had been carried out from the king’s time”.

From then on, the festival was to be conducted according to the record in the notebooks. The festival was thus reified and fixed—‘frozen’ as it were—as the villagers’ cultural ‘tradition’ became totally detached from the dynamism of the political economy of the area. The old elites’ attempts to freeze the ritual seem to be related to the desire to preserve their privileged position now under threat. In this scheme, their notion of tradition seems seriously limited by the frameworks of ‘colonial memory’, which equates tradition with the masculine structure of power and hierarchy (Nandy 1983: 73, cf Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993, Tanabe 2003a).

It is interesting to note that while the old elites were concerned about the aspects of hierarchy and centrality in the ritual and wished to preserve the system of patronage and privileges in a frozen form, non-elite villagers began to find new meanings in the Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī festival. This can be seen in the recent
changes in ritual practice and discourse which have developed since the early
1990s. For instance, first, more emphasis is now placed on individual devotion
to the goddess. More and more villagers wish to receive the goddess’s bless-
ings directly and individually. The villagers told me in 2019 that this tendency is
continuously increasing. We find evidence of this in the rising number of offer-
ings made individually when the Khondha priest worships the goddess on the
hill. Second, there is a growing number of devotees prostrating and waiting to
have direct communication with the medium/goddess. According to the village
people, previously only those who went through hard penance and purification
dared to come before the goddess for direct communication, and so there were
naturally fewer people in the past. Third, there are more animal sacrifices offered
individually to the goddess. In 1991, there were more than fifty sacrifices of goats
and sheep and more than hundred sacrifices of chickens. The number contin-
ues to increase. Fourth, another significant change is that whereas previously
the medium/goddess selectively visited only some houses during the procession
through the village, the medium/goddess now enters every house on the route
to bless family members, particularly married women who cannot come out in
public. Fifth, the meaning of writing, “We seek protection at the feet of auspi-
cious Rāmacaṇḍī”, at the time of the Daśaharā procession seems to have changed.
Instead of wishing for collective victory and welfare of the community, people
now make individual wishes to the goddess. In the 1990s, it became clear that
people prayed to the goddess for fulfilment of personal wishes, such as passing
exams and getting jobs. I was particularly surprised when I noticed in 1992 that
the chief was not writing the sentence when he was supposed to be the first one to
write it. When I asked the reason why, he answered that he was not starting any
special work and besides he had no particular wish to make at that time. These
examples suggest that more emphasis is now placed on direct individual ties and
contact with the goddess.

This does not mean, however, that faith has become purely an individual mat-
ter. The importance of devotional submission and sacrificial offering of the self is
also emphasised today as the most important feature of the community ritual in
the villagers’ discourse. Even the brāhmaṇas and the dominant caste admit that
devotion is the most important aspect in conducting the ritual. “Everybody does
their own duty (kartabya) as service (sebā) (to the goddess)” is a set phrase one
hears in relation to the explanation of the sacrificial organisation. This is related
to the villagers’ insistence on the significance of the values of ‘duty’ and ‘service’
of each person for the community and the goddess.

While the old elites are trying to preserve the system of privilege and honour
in the ritual to continue to represent the structure of status and domination, others
have begun to stress the importance of individual devotion and sacrificial service
for the community and the local deity based on the value of ontological equality.
This is related to the cultural politics of contestation and negotiation between the
rulers and subalterns over what constitutes proper social relations and a “vision of
community” (Li 1996).
Notes

1 See Fuller (1996) and Fuller and Harris (2000) for an important critique of Dumont regarding politico-economic changes under modernity.

2 By sacrifice-executor, I refer to the person who actually executes sacrifice by cutting the head of the sacrificial animal. The sacrificer, is \textit{yajmāna}, a person who is considered the central agent of the sacrifice, for whose sake sacrifice is performed and who represents the sacrificial community.

3 The black sari worn by the medium is donated by a person of the carpenter caste. It is said that their ancestor was saved by the goddess when he went to sea by boat and a storm broke out. The carpenter prayed to the goddess and promised that he would offer a sari every year if she saved him. The storm subsided and the carpenter was saved. Since then the carpenter and his descendants have been offering a black sari every mahāsaptamī.

4 The floral umbrella is offered by a Pāika family. Their story is as follows: the family’s ancestor had gone to Burma to work. One day, he wanted to pick flowers growing in the river as offerings to god but could not get near them. A log came floating by so he got onto it and picked the flowers. After he picked sufficient flowers and got back to the shore, he realised that what he thought was a log was in fact a crocodile. The crocodile shook its head as if to bid the carpenter goodbye. The carpenter knew that it was Rāmacaṇḍī who had protected him. He promised to offer an umbrella of flowers every year to express his gratitude to the goddess.

5 It is said that previously the medium went around all bārapalli villages before entering Garh Manitri village.

6 The families of the medium and the sacrifice-executor collect the offerings presented by the houses and these are distributed afterwards between them.

7 The same sword is also called ‘Rāmacaṇḍī’s sword’ since, as we will see later, it is worshipped as the symbol of Rāmacaṇḍī’s divine power.

8 This knife is the kind often carried by Saoras. The villagers say that perhaps the medium just used to hold this small knife in the procession before the migration of ‘Hindus’ and the test of lifting up the king’s sword. It is historically possible. At any rate, the villagers regard the existence of the sword and the small knife as evidence of the antiquity and historicity of the festival.

9 The barakandāj belongs to khaṇḍāyata caste. The term barakandāj is explained as “[a] guard” (Maddox Report, 233) and “[m]en armed with matchlocks” (Fifth Report, 8).

10 The sacrifice-executor will eventually take these spare portions if they are not required.

11 Pāika ākhaṛā is considered to be a traditional martial art (cf Tanabe 1995).

12 This is an area in the middle of a cultivated field (Map 8.1).

13 The three phases seem to reflect the general form of ritual. See Bloch (1992).

14 Ginzburg suggests that the regeneration of this world is only possible through contact with the dead, and this contact is mediated by those on the periphery of the social system (Ginzburg 1990). Here the power of nature in the form of the goddess is manifested and mediated in this world through the socially marginalised.

15 The division between the village (\textit{grāma, gāṇ}) and forest (bana, āranya) marks a basic symbolic dichotomy between culture and nature in the Indic world.

16 In the Indic worldview, the phenomenal world exists in its most subtle form as sound vibrations (\textit{śabda}). Hence, a mantra, a collection of segmented sounds, has the power to represent and bring about the principle of order. Correct pronunciation of a mantra is important because that itself has the power to shape the world.

17 The best sacrificial animal for Rāmacaṇḍī is said to be the water buffalo. During my stay, in 1992, a villager offered a buffalo as sacrifice to Rāmacaṇḍī to express gratitude for the release of his son from prison. This was the first time in decades that a buffalo sacrifice had taken place. In buffalo sacrifices performed previously, the meat was divided and eaten by tribals and ‘untouchables’. In the 1992 sacrifice, however,
the buffalo carcass was said to have been buried on the outskirts of the village, though some villagers said that it was eaten by some others, who denied the allegation. Unlike the sanctified meat of goats and sheep, eating sacrificed buffalo meat is taboo for general castes. The offering of a buffalo sacrifice also took place in 2009, when a father expressed his gratitude to Rāmacaṇḍī for his son winning the local elections.

Although the principal village head is saved from being sacrificed in the end, we see a hint of a continuum between buffalo and human sacrifice. In fact, human sacrifice is considered to be superior to buffalo sacrifice. The Khondhas actually performed human sacrifice until the colonial period, causing the government to intervene (Boal 1982, Padel 1995). Human sacrifices also took place in the kingdom of Ranpur next to the Khurda kingdom for Goddess Mani Nāgeśwari. The Ranpur king is said to be of Khondha origin, and the Khondha priest of Garh Manitri has affinal relations with the Khondhas of the Ranpur region.

See also Guha (1985a) on the coexistence of the subaltern discourse with dominant discourse.


This point is in accordance with Hocart’s suggestion that a polity-society is organised to perform sacrifice in order to contact the sacred “in quest of life” (Schneipel 1988).

See Sekine (2002) on impurity and pollution in India.

For a dramatic confrontation between brahmanical hierarchy and subaltern egalitarianism in the ritual context, see Pinney (2001). A drunken low-caste medium, possessed by a goddess, ventured to enter a Kṛṣṇa temple, when a brāhmaṇa prostrated in front of the medium/goddess and begged him/her not to enter the temple in fear of defilement.

Here, it is necessary to distinguish ontological equality from modern egalitarianism. Egalitarianism connected with liberalism takes the individual as the ultimate unit of society. Equality in the liberal conception is between individuals who exist prior to the community. Parekh suggests the possibility of a democratic liberalism which prioritises community before individuals (Parekh 1993). This is an interesting suggestion but is still trapped in the individual–community dichotomy. The value of ontological equality dealt with here does not assign priority to either individuals or community. It is necessary to recognise the fundamental yet dilemmatic complementarity between the singularity of individual beings and the plurality of being-in-common (Nancy 1991, 2000).


For details on human sacrifice and other Khondha (Khond) rituals, see Boal (1982) and Padel (1995).


These days, there are also many cases where animals are offered to the goddess without being killed. These animals wear a red scarf around their neck and freely roam around.
In this chapter, I discuss the transformation of caste relationships in local society in Orissa after independence. I look at how plural values and social relations inherent in the mechanism of sacrifice manifest in caste relations in village Orissa today and shape relations of dominance and resistance.

As the previous chapter showed, there are contradictions and mediations between the superalternate values of hierarchy of status and centrality of power, on the one hand, and the subalternate value of ontological equality on the other. The dynamic interactions between superalternate and subalternate values are not limited to ritual but are also found in actual social relations. Social dynamism is born precisely because there are multiple visions of ideal society, and people can negotiate how ideal human relationships should be.

Caste semantics

Beyond ‘hierarchy’, ‘substantialisation’ and the ‘kingship centred’ view

Caste in contemporary India is often seen as the remnant of a waning tradition. The advent of egalitarian liberalism and capitalism is taken to be the force of change destroying or restricting the relevance of caste in contemporary society. Against such a view, I argue that caste remains an important frame of reference in defining identity in rural Orissa. That the aggregate endeavours of different groups of people redefine the form and meaning of caste and maintain its relevance has been neglected in many previous theories, which have tended to consider caste concerns merely in terms of the presence or absence of ‘hierarchy’ or in terms of ‘substantialised’ group formations.

As already mentioned, anthropologists in the past have taken for granted that the key to understanding Indian society lies in explanations of the caste hierarchy with the brāhmaṇa at the apex (Dumont 1970, 1971). Dumont explains modern changes in caste in terms of “substantialisation” in the politico-economic domain, where “structure seems to yield to substance” (1970: 226), as castes act as independent and substantialised units against each other. However, he stresses that such substantialisation applies only to “the politico-economic domain of social life” (1970: 227), and “the politico-economic domain is encompassed in an
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Thus, for Dumont, the overall hierarchical structure of caste remains unchanged.

Fuller challenges Dumont’s structural model on caste, pointing out the “ostensibly contradictory evidence emerging from modern change” (1996: 12). He suggests that hierarchy and inequality of caste is denied in public, though there is a “substantialist assertion about cultural distinctiveness” between castes (1996: 21). That is to say, each caste legitimises marriage traditions and caste-specific habits regarding food and clothing, not in terms of caste hierarchy or principles of purity-pollution, but in terms of cultural differences between castes. Caste here is talked about as if it is a substantialised and distinct ‘community’ with a specific culture. He further notes that there continue to be “relational hierarchical values”, that is considerations related to purity and pollution, which “remain salient in the private, domestic domain even though they have been displaced by substantialist ones in the public domain” (1996: 13).

In sum, Fuller argues that there is ‘traditional’ caste hierarchy in the private domain whereas in the public domain it is replaced by substantialised caste discourse and practice. He seems to accept the Dumontian premise of hierarchy as the essence of traditional caste without seriously accounting for the aspects of centrality and equality in the culture prior to modern changes. He also considers the outside force of egalitarianism as the cause of social change and fails to acknowledge the agency of local people. It is my contention that present-day inter-caste exchanges at the local community level cannot be reduced to either substantialised caste practices in the public domain or continuity of traditional caste hierarchy in the private domain. Caste-based relations have been reformulated and given new meanings in local situations where they form the basis of people’s identity.

I have discussed, particularly in Chapters 1 and 8, the more recent attempts by several influential scholars to redefine caste as sacrificial organisation (Dirks 1987, Quigley 1993, Raheja 1988b). These theories were developed in opposition to Dumont’s brahmanical model of caste hierarchy and entailed a rehabilitation of Hocart’s theory of caste where sacrifice plays the central role. I agree that local caste practices should be understood as having sacrificial significance, but differ from the neo-Hocartians in one important respect. Their principal concern was to understand the cultural and cosmological importance of kingship and dominance in Indian society, and they have a tendency to reduce the meaning of sacrifice to its political or power-related aspect.

The meaning of sacrifice in India, and its influence on Indian society, has a richness and breadth that includes but also goes beyond kingship and dominance. Kingship and dominance can be usefully interpreted in terms of sacrifice but the reverse does not hold: sacrifice cannot just be interpreted in terms of, and thereby reduced to, matters of kingship and dominance.

I attempt to provide an understanding of caste as sacrificial organisation, paying attention to its more encompassing semantics. I suggest that the sacrificial principle may function as the pivot between the ontology of caste and the moral basis of socio-political cooperation founded on the recognition of difference and
Recast(e)ing identity
diversity. In other words, there is a possibility of positively reformulating caste, 
through reinterpretation of the sacrificial principle, as a way of realising coopera-
tion while respecting differences. The ontology of caste takes a particular form 
and meaning in the contemporary context. In order to understand how the ontol-
yogy of caste may (or may not) relate to the moral basis of society and state in 
India, it is necessary to decipher how today’s caste functions in different spheres 
of society.

More concretely, I would like to explore how these values and possible social 
configurations manifest in inter-caste relationships in contemporary rural Orissa. 
As caste is fragmented today and assumes different forms and meanings in dif-
ferent spheres, I try to contextualise each of them in contemporary socio-political 
settings and explain their meaning with reference to dominant ideational frame-
works. I also consider the significance of sacrifice in the contemporary socio-
political context and analyse its transformation in relation to people’s agency.

Jajmani, the market and caste as sacrificial organisation

The kind of caste-based exchange, which I will attempt to highlight in this chap-
ter, has often been discussed in terms of the jajmani system (a system of patron–
client relationships between landholding households and other households), 
though unsatisfactorily. Many researchers have noted the contemporary waning 
of jajmani relations with the advent of the market economy. Here again, the force 
of change is seen as coming from outside the locality and breaking the community 
relationship in a unilateral manner.

However, as I discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the customary exchanges 
between patron and client households in the so-called jajmani relationships them-
selves are a product of colonial history, where custom was reinvented after the 
system of entitlements broke down and each household had to become an agent 
of exchange.

What is significant here is that in such inter-household exchanges there are 
continuous negotiations regarding the content and price of services as the outer 
circumstances change. People negotiate with each other to selectively introduce 
market exchanges in certain spheres while maintaining caste-based relations in 
others. From this perspective, what is commonly said to be the erosion of the 
jajmani system due to the effects of the market economy can be interpreted as 
a continuity of the agency of households as units negotiating exchange rela-
tionships. What we must do, then, is to pay attention to the “adaptability and 
mutability” (Mayer 1993: 387) of the system of division of labour and exchange 
throughout history, paying heed to people’s agency. Mayer points outs that “arti-
sans and Untouchables … forged out of dissolution of the old village order new 
economic and ritual relationships” (1993: 388-9). It is important to take note of 
their contestatory negotiations with patron households.

There is a reformulated continuity of caste-based relations. This is not a mere 
advance of capitalism, but a field of exchange that is consciously selected, main-
tained and transformed by people. Further alterations in caste-based exchanges in
the postcolonial period should be seen as a continuous historical process. I also argue that the meaning of caste in this socio-cultural sphere is changing from status-oriented hierarchy and power-oriented centrality, traditionalised and hegemonically emphasised under colonialism, to an idiom of sacrificial cooperation and talked about in terms of duty (kartabya) and service (sebā) for the community and the local deities. It seems to me that there is growing emphasis on the sacrificial cooperation of equal castes that attempts to get away from, or at least underplay, purity-centred hierarchy and dominance.

It should be noted that giving less importance to the hierarchical and dominative aspect of caste has not meant that the people necessarily opted for individual liberalism in every sphere, in spite of the fact that individual liberalism is often taken to be the modern alternative. Caste-based jajmani exchanges have been abolished in the non-ritual, economic sphere where market exchange has taken over, but what is seen as the religio-ritual duty of castes, which offers the basis of moral–ontological identity, has remained till today. These caste-based relations and cooperation in the socio-cultural sphere have continued with reformulated forms and meaning as a result of the contested negotiation of different sections of village society. Here, we can see both adaptability and dynamic changes on the one hand and the robust durability and continued importance of caste in Orissa on the other.

Caste today

While there has been a reformulation of caste practices in the inner domain, the outer domain has been permeated by the value of the equality of individuals, denying the importance of caste hierarchy. After independence, one of the foremost concerns of the government was to bridge the colonial dichotomy of traditional society and the modern state and to integrate them in the new form of the nation-state. Although the tradition of the national culture was to be celebrated, features in society that were seen to be incongruent with the principles of democracy and liberalism were considered suspect for the development of modern India. Here, there was a clear rejection of the caste system in the future of Indian society. The existence of caste was recognised in the constitution only in a negative sense, that is to identify historically discriminated groups for redress through the official policy of reservation. Through this measure, the drafters of the constitution hoped to make Indian society casteless. The reservation policy in the constitution involves the identification of oppressed groups under the categories of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Oppressed groups are identified in terms of caste groups or jāti. In order to realise the equality of individuals based on the ideals of liberal democracy, the Indian government accepts the existence of oppressed caste groups as a reality and formulates policy accordingly.

The reservation policy based on caste, however, contains a paradox. In one sense, it is based on a continuation of the colonial view of Indian society where caste communities, together with religious communities, were seen as parts that
made up the conglomerate whole of Indian society (Dirks 2001). It is notable that
the kind of classification of caste groups they employ is the same as in the colo-
ndl–brahmanical caste hierarchy model. They just labelled it differently. SC is
another name for untouchable dalit castes whereas ST is used for ādivāsi or tribes.
Although they use the word class for OBCs, its application is based on caste clas-
sification and the category, in fact, more or less corresponds to the category low
caste in the normative representational model of the caste hierarchy (Figure 9.1).

The normative representational model of caste based on hierarchical divisions
became the hegemonic discursive framework on caste under colonialism. A new
kind of ‘monistic caste hierarchy’ emerged, where the ritualistic brahmanical
caste hierarchy more or less matched the socio-economic hierarchy. Although
this socio-economic hierarchy underwent further changes with the commerciali-
sation of agriculture, the colonial–brahmanical discourse of caste hierarchy has
remained the ‘traditional’ model of Indian society. Often, discussions and policies
regarding caste accord with this image of the caste hierarchy, whose classificatory
model in ritualistic brahmanical style is readily available in normative discourse.
Such a model obviously by no means exhausts the realities of caste in the past or
the present, but its importance persists in the categories of colonial and postcolo-
nial India.

It is important to note that caste categories persist in public discourse, and that
people are bound to act as caste members in certain contexts (e.g. when applying
for jobs in the reserved category), though there is no official institution through
which a caste can make decisions as a unit. Though there are unofficial caste asso-
ciations that can take and enforce decisions, most of them have become almost
non-functional today (see below). It is ironic that the reservation policy, which
is supposed to eliminate discrimination between castes and aims at individual
freedom and equality, seems to have the effect of heightening caste affiliation.
In cities, people seem to have been consciously “remembering to forget” caste

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Figure 9.1  Schematic caste classification in Khurda.
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divisions (Renan 1990), but the VP Singh government’s decision to implement a part of the Mandal Commission report in 1990 to extend reservation to Other Backward Classes arguably led people to remember caste divisions along the lines of official categorisations. This was followed by violent public demonstrations staged by student groups organised according to caste classification. It seems as if the contradiction in the official attitude has manifested on the surface: on the one hand it is committed to the ideal of equality of individuals, but, on the other hand it recognises the reality of India as a caste society and implements policies based on caste divisions.

**Public evasion and discreet adherence**

The constitutional idea of the equality of individuals and the spirit of denial of caste discrimination has become widespread in the outer, public sphere of India today. The commitment to the negation of caste hierarchy, in the sense of either the denial of its existence or its negative value, seems now strongly prevalent in the public sphere. Even in the village, people are careful when making comments on caste matters to an outsider. If asked about caste by a stranger, people will want to dismiss the point by saying, “There used to be many restrictions, but nowadays there is no more caste. People have become free”. This cannot be taken as proof of the decrease in the importance of caste. It shows only that affirming the value and existence of caste hierarchy can no longer be legitimised in the outer sphere.

Although the commitment to the ideal of castelessness is generally accepted in the public sphere, the ostensible adherence to castelessness in practice often only means that they take care not to create situations where questions of inter-caste restrictions would arise. When there is a feast at a village school, for example, it is discreetly understood that a person belonging to the brāhmaṇa caste will cook so that nobody objects to eating. The caste question should especially not arise in a place like a school, which is one of the local centres for the dissemination of the modern liberal discourse. Yet, what is relaxed nowadays in the village public sphere is the rule of commensality in the context of a feast. On such occasions, people of different castes sit together to eat. This is in a way a demonstration and reconfirmation of castelessness in public. It is obvious that castelessness in practice is rather limited; caste questions are evaded rather than addressed in public. There is no commitment to the annihilation of caste divisions.

**The meaning of caste distinction**

In the inner domain of inter-household exchanges, temple rituals and community festivals, caste distinction is often approved and positively kept in practice. Rules regarding the giving and taking of water and food are generally observed in the interactions between villagers in everyday circumstances (as opposed to public occasions such as school feasts). Also, most people practice caste endogamy except in rare cases of ‘love marriage’ (lābh mārijī, a corruption of the English word is used), which is still considered an illicit and anti-social act in rural Orissa.
It should be noted that these practices that maintain caste distinction are often upheld not because of concern for personal purity, since in towns, male villagers are known, through gossip, to relax restrictions regarding sex and food. Rather, these norms maintaining caste distinction are upheld in the non-official, locally legitimate inner context because caste holds importance as a frame for people’s moral–ontological identity.

This does not mean that the value of purity-oriented hierarchy largely structures social relations in rural Orissa. It must be emphasised that the ‘traditional’ brahmanical value of purity and pollution or the discourse of caste hierarchy in explicit terms is employed only in a limited context. Although the religio-ritual authority of the brāhmaṇa is maintained and continues to be important in rural Orissa, hierarchisation of caste groups seems to be largely a remnant of the colonial–brahmanical ideology, which only has meaning as part of the normative representation and discourse of the ‘traditional’ scheme (Figure 9.1).

More often, caste distinction is explained in “substantialist” terms (Fuller 1996; Mayer 1996). The way people talk of caste distinction here is to treat caste as a device to maintain division among ‘communities’ with different cultures and traditions. To explain the existence of caste restrictions regarding marriage and food, people tend to emphasise the cultural differences between castes, rather than their hierarchy. For example, people say, “Different castes have different ways of eating, drinking, wearing clothes and doing votive rituals (osā, bratā). How can a woman from a different caste maintain the right family tradition?” This is a way to avoid controversies about caste hierarchy and at the same time affirm the value of caste distinctions.

However, we must note that this kind of non-hierarchical, substantialised caste practice does not necessarily lead to the kind of change from “interdependence” to “competition” noted by Dumont (1970: 227) for the politico-economic sphere and further applied to the whole society by Fuller (1996). I would say that the substantialist assertion is a way to negate the importance of caste hierarchy and to utilise caste distinctions to bring about the creation or re-emergence of a new kind of image of caste interdependence in the socio-cultural sphere, which is one of the main arenas for forming a person’s moral–ontological identity in rural India. Here, we see the appearance of caste as sacrificial organisation, which is based on neither competitive substantialisation nor hierarchy. Rather, it is talked about in terms of each distinct caste’s “service” and “duty” to the community and local deities. Such talk is often used as rhetoric to legitimise the hegemonic structure and conceal discrimination. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the same discourse can be utilised for subaltern resistance against the existing structure of dominance.

Let us now see in concrete terms what forms of caste-based exchanges exist in a contemporary Oriya village and how they were formed in history.

**Caste division of labour and exchange reconsidered**

Many researchers have pointed out that what has been called the jajmani system in fact consists of several different kinds of relationships and these relationships
do not constitute a coherent system (Commander 1983, Fuller 1989, Good 1982, Lerche 1993, Parry 1979, Pocock 1962, Raheja 1988a). It is becoming clear that diverse kinds of relationships, which were forged and reformulated in colonial times after the fragmentation of the system of entitlements, were arbitrarily included under the jajmani label. The inter-caste exchange relations and division of labour found in present-day rural Orissa can be divided first of all into two kinds, namely services for the community and the customary exchange relationships between individual households.

**Services for the community**

Services for the community include those provided for community rituals and to the deities in the village. These duties were originally prescribed for different caste families as part of their obligation as community entitlement holders. These obligations towards the community were often ignored in discussing the jajmani system, but in fact they originate from the “system of entitlements”, which was the basis for the division of labour and exchange in the precolonial period. There were many other services prescribed for the local community and the state under the precolonial system of entitlements in the administrative and military spheres, but all of them were abolished under colonialism (see Chapter 5). What remained were mainly ritual and religious services for the community. The ritual bias of these services for the community is thus a product of colonial history. But, as I will show later, the villagers today give special importance to these ritual duties as the basis of the cultural identity of the family and caste.

There were also new services and offices prescribed for kingship and the state under colonialism. The sarabarākāras, or tax collectors under the colonial government, received tax-free land in lieu of service. The administrative function of the sarabarākāras was abolished in the 1970s, while they continued to be patrons of the community festival, with special ritual privileges. These new posts created under colonialism were obviously not based on the precolonial community–kingship structure, but were embedded in colonial circumstances. However, these duties are also seen as traditional by the local people today. The kinds of services provided for the community are listed in Table 9.1. Although the table is listed by caste, it is important to note that particular services were allocated to those families which held entitlement specifically for those purposes.

Recently, there is a tendency among the low castes to underplay hierarchy and centrality and to emphasise the sacrificial cooperation of various castes in community rituals. Here, although the same ritual sphere is shared in practice, there is a contestatory and “asymmetrical recognition” of the same phenomenon from hegemonic and subaltern points of view (Gregory 1997, Guha 1985a). This can lead to more direct confrontations and, as I will discuss later, there have been attempts by some of the low castes to challenge and redefine the form and meaning of ‘traditional’ caste roles.
There are four kinds of exchange relations between individual households. First, the relationship between the jajmāna (patron) and purohita (family priest); second, the relationship between the sāānta (master) and sebaka (servant); third, the relationship between the sāānta and haḷiā (bonded labourer); and fourth, the relationship between sāānta and tribals. These exchange relationships are between individual households.

\[
\text{Table 9.1 Caste-wise services for the community}
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barṛhei (carpenter)</td>
<td>Provide wooden seats for Rāmacaṇḍī festival; some take part in building chariots for the ratha jātrā (chariot festival) in Puri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>Provide fuel wood for the doḷa pūrṇimā festival; provide juna (grass for the roof of the sword hut) for the Rāmacaṇḍī festival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>Carry the torch during community festivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedic brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>Perform fire sacrifice (homa) ritual in the community ritual of the water goat and Rāmacaṇḍī festival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pūjāri brāhmaṇa</td>
<td>Regularly perform worship in temples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dḥobā (wahserman)</td>
<td>Regularly wash the clothes of temple deities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauṛa (cowherd)</td>
<td>Regularly provide milk for making offerings to deities and carry gods’ palanquins in doḷa pūrṇimā festival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guṛī (sweet-maker)</td>
<td>Regularly make sweets and snacks for offering to deities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>Play drums and sweep ritual fields and streets for community festivals, provide large wickerwork trays (ḍālā) for offerings at community festivals and work as messenger of announcements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotiṣa (astrologer)</td>
<td>Read the new calendar at doḷa pūrṇimā (the beginning of the lunar year).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>Provide a knife for the Rāmacaṇḍī festival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaṇa (scribe)</td>
<td>Donate as patrons of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival and have the privilege of placing the iron pen and palm leaf script.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaṇḍāyata (peasant-militia)</td>
<td>Chief and ex-officials donate as patrons of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival and have the privilege of placing the iron pen and palm leaf script. Join the (pseudo-)military procession on Daśaharā. The chief has other special ritual roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khondha (tribe)</td>
<td>Regularly worship Rāmacaṇḍī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>Provide earthen utensils for community festivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māḷī (gardener)</td>
<td>Regularly perform rituals at Śiva temple and prepare garlands and colour powder for community festivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saora (tribe)</td>
<td>One plays the role of the medium of Rāmacaṇḍī and another the sacrifice-executor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli (oil-presser)</td>
<td>Provide oil for lighting the torch during the Rāmacaṇḍī festival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.

**Exchange relations between individual households**

There are four kinds of exchange relations between individual households. First, the relationship between the jajmāna (patron) and purohita (family priest); second, the relationship between the sāānta (master) and sebaka (servant); third, the relationship between the sāānta and haḷiā (bonded labourer); and fourth, the relationship between sāānta and tribals. These exchange relationships are between
individual households rather than between castes, though the content of the service is determined by the caste of the service provider.

**Jajmāna-purohita relationship**

Vedic brāhmaṇas perform rituals and function as the family priest (purohita) for high caste—namely, khaṇḍāyata, karaṇa and other brāhmaṇa—families on occasions of marriage, birth, funeral and death anniversary. Pūjārī brāhmaṇas perform the same function for other castes (except for tribals and dalits who have their own priests).

In the precolonial period, there seems to have been a special community entitlement for the purohita. This can be deduced from the presence of land named purohita hetā (family priest service tenure land) in the palm leaf records from the late eighteenth century (Chapter 3). Purohitas enjoyed the share from this land as well as gifts (dāna and dakṣiṇā) from the jajmāna. After the system of entitlements broke down, it seems that the purohita depended upon gifts/payment from the jajmāna. Adults are generally respectful towards brāhmaṇas, using honorifics when addressing them. When a non-brāhmaṇa meets a brāhmaṇa, he greets him with folded hands and says *namaskār*, and the brāhmaṇa usually only lifts up one hand as a blessing without saying anything in return.

In rituals, the brāhmaṇa’s authority and superior status is enacted as he sits on a low wooden stool while the non-brāhmaṇa patron adopts a crouching position with his feet on the floor. Khaṇḍāyatas simply explain this in normative terms by saying, “Brāhmaṇas are the most superior (*sabutāru baḍa*)” and the brāhmaṇa says that his superiority lies in his purity (*sāttwika guṇa*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) of the vedas and rituals. Brāhmaṇas also stress their independence by pointing out that unlike other castes, they can perform all rituals by themselves if they so wished. Thus, ritual performance depends on brāhmaṇas as priests, and they are highly valued for this purpose.

Brāhmaṇas have strict rules regarding the exchange of food and water, and this constitutes their special status and ritual authority. Brāhmaṇas never accept cooked food from other castes, even those of their patrons. As we see from Figure 9.1, whether or not a brāhmaṇa can touch (touchable or untouchable) or accept water (water touchable or water touchable) from a person of a particular caste is a determining factor in caste discrimination. Thus, the brahmanical concept of purity defines exchanges and social relations at the level of practice.

However, it is interesting that the purity and superiority of brāhmaṇas are paradoxically undermined by the very performance of brāhmaṇas’ social duty as priests. Brāhmaṇas play the role of family priests and receive a donation (dakṣiṇā) just after performing rituals. A patron may also send rice and vegetables to the brāhmaṇa’s house later through a barber.

Khaṇḍāyatas say that though brāhmaṇas claim to be superior, they, in fact, work for them and receive payment in money or kind, while khaṇḍāyatas do no work for brāhmaṇas. Khaṇḍāyatas also point out that on the auspicious day of starting work on Daśaharā day of Rāmacaṇḍī festival, the brāhmaṇa priest visits...
them along with other service castes, whereas they do not go to the brāhmaṇa’s house. In fact, when khaṇḍāyatas need to see their household brāhmaṇa priest, the head of the household seldom goes to the brāhmaṇa’s house, but sends a barber or a child to call the brāhmaṇa. In these cases, hardly any emphasis is placed on the value of pure/impure. We see a perspective that contrasts with the brāhmaṇas’ stress on their independence, as the khaṇḍāyatas emphasise the dependence of the brāhmaṇas on their patrons. It is as if to say the brāhmaṇa works for and is thus inferior to the khaṇḍāyata (the jajmāna), by seeing the brāhmaṇa’s work as service.

Such a view is partially shared by the brāhmaṇas. The highest ranking brāhmaṇas are considered to be those who are not priests, maintain minimum links with worldly life and devote themselves to study and spiritual practices. Moreover, some works performed by brāhmaṇas as priests are thought to be inauspicious and polluting to them. For example, a gift (dāna) is given to a brāhmaṇa at the time of a person’s death in order to rid the dying of sins (pāpa) (Parry 1980, Raheja 1988b). The brāhmaṇa who accepts this gift is thought to accept the sins of the dying, and it is said to be inauspicious (aśubbha) to see the face of the brāhmaṇa who has accepted such a gift from one’s kin, especially one’s father. Brāhmaṇas consider conducting funerals as inauspicious and to be avoided. Brāhmaṇas who take on such inauspicious work are limited and are not supposed to perform vedic rituals, such as fire worship (homa) and fire sacrifice (yajña), which require a high level of purity in the priests. Brāhmaṇas who perform vedic rituals are called vedic brāhmaṇas and are higher in rank.

The superiority of the brāhmaṇa is, thus, relative in discourses about value as brāhmaṇa priests are seen as performing service for the happiness and well-being of the patrons through ritual. Brāhmaṇas even take on the sins and pollution of the patrons at times. Such a perspective and interpretation is based on the centrality of the dominant caste, the patron. The normative discourse of the brāhmaṇa’s superiority is shared, but it is only the brāhmaṇa who manipulates this discourse in practice. The dominant caste perspective considers brahmanical superiority to be relative and stresses the centrality of their own power. We also find that such a perspective is partially shared among the brāhmaṇas themselves. Thus, the patron–priest relationship is much more complex and subtle than the representative model of caste hierarchy.

Sāānta-sebaka relationship

This relationship is between the patron (sāānta, master) and the service providing households (sebaka, servant), except the brāhmaṇa. Barber, washerman, iron-smith, potter, astrologer and carpenter households are said to perform services (sebā) for patron households, mostly of the dominant khaṇḍāyata caste, and are called sebaka (Table 9.2, Figure 9.2).

The sāānta-sebaka exchanges were not dyadic in the precolonial period but were embedded in the system of entitlements, where duties and shares were defined in relation to the community–state structure as a whole. The term ‘sebaka’
also meant that they were servants of the community as a whole, as the word “servant of the fort” (gaṛa sebaka) suggests. (Here the word fort refers to the unit of the local community consisting of a fort and several villages.) They were not servants of patron households in dyadic relationships. After the fragmentation of the system of entitlements in colonial times, these exchanges were reformulated into dyadic relationships between households and the servant households came to be considered servants of dominant caste landholding households.

In the precolonial period, in addition to land given as part of the share, the performer of the service was probably given one sheaf of rice a year by each service-receiving household, as the name of the gift *biṛā barttana* (sheaf salary) suggests. This practice continued until the 1960s. According to the villagers, the arrangement was that the barber and the washerman received one sheaf every year per couple in the family, and the blacksmith per bullock plough.4 According

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Recipient castes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baṛhei (carpenter)</td>
<td>Make wooden utensils and furniture on order</td>
<td>All castes except dhobā, bāuri, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāuri (labourer)</td>
<td>Day labour</td>
<td>Mainly high castes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaṇḍāri (barber)</td>
<td>Prepare the marriage platform, clean the front of the house for the agricultural rite of aksāya trīyā, act as messengers on auspicious occasions, cut hair, shave beard, cut nails, shave hair and beard for funerals; wives cut nails and put red dye on women’s feet at childbirth and funerals</td>
<td>All castes except dhobā, bāuri, Khondha, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dħobā (washerman)</td>
<td>Wash clothes for both ritual and everyday occasions and provide and place firewood on the funeral pyre</td>
<td>All castes except bāuri, Khondha, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāṛi (sweeper-drummer)</td>
<td>Day labour</td>
<td>Mainly high castes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotīśa (astrologer)</td>
<td>Make horoscopes</td>
<td>All castes except bāuri, dhobā, Khondha, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamāra (blacksmith)</td>
<td>Make and repair iron tools</td>
<td>All castes except bāuri, dhobā, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbāra (potter)</td>
<td>Provide earthen utensils for life cycle occasions, funerals and agricultural rites</td>
<td>All castes except bāuri, dhobā, Khondha, Saora and hāṛi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field research in 1992 by author.
to the villagers, the washerman and barber received one sheaf of paddy per married couple, the blacksmith and carpenter one sheaf per plough and the potter one sheaf per household. One sheaf of paddy gives about 2–4 gaṇi of paddy rice. This prestation has a nuanced character as a ‘gift-salary’ whose semantics shift according to the point of view one takes. Patrons place more emphasis on it as a gift which constitutes the master–servant relationships whereas service providers tend to emphasise it being a salary or payment for the service.

Since the 1970s, the gift-salary to the service providers has been given not in bundles of paddy stalk but in a measure of paddy grain. In 1992, the blacksmith received 8–10 gaṇi per plough, and the barber and washerman 8–10 gaṇi per couple (husband and wife). The amount of rice that service castes receive has increased 2.5–4 times since the 1960s. This is said to be the result of negotiations based on comparisons with the market price. The carpenter and potter have stopped receiving annual payments and have switched to piecework payment and daily wages (Rs. 35–45 per day in 1992). Thus, from the 1970s, the amount of rice to be given has become a matter of negotiation in accordance with the market price of labour, and carpenters and potters have become daily wage earners. These changes are important as they are the result of negotiation between the patron and the service caste households. The role of caste associations was instrumental in these changes (see below).

Sāānta-haḷīā relationship

Although some dalit hāri and bāuri families were given entitlements as military musicians (bājantari) and labourers (kāṇḍi), respectively, in the precolonial
period, the amount of shares allotted was comparatively small and certainly not sufficient to sustain them (see Chapter 3). As a result, they had to work as bonded labourers (haḷiā) in the fields of larger landowners.

After the system of entitlements disappeared and the swidden fields on which the low castes depended were banned in the colonial period, their dependence on income as agricultural labourers increased (see Chapter 7). The relationship of dominance and subordination intensified in the structure of agricultural society. These bonded labourers began to disappear from the 1960s and were replaced by wage labourers, as bāuris took up jobs as stone cutters and young male hāṛis started to go to towns for employment (mainly as cleaners).

Sāānta-ādibāsi⁵ relationship

Although individual households do not have regular exchange relations with the tribals and social relations between them are rare, the relationship between high-caste villagers (mainly khaṇḍāyata) and ādibāsi (Khondha and Saora) is interesting and worth noting. The tribals are also referred to as ‘forest people’ (jaṅgala loka), as they bring the meat of forest animals, berries and firewood to the village every now and again and exchange them for rice and cash. The forest is deeply linked to the local goddess who is thought to be the source of life and responsible for the fertility of the region. Tribals living in the forest are seen as dangerous and polluting, but are considered to have magical power. Sometimes the villagers rely on such power.

There is one lineage of Khondha and two lineages of Saoras who reside in Garh Manitri. The Khondha family was given entitlement as the priest of the local goddess Rāmacaṇḍī, and the Saora families were granted entitlements as the medium and sacrificer-executor for the same goddess. They continue to serve the goddess, holding the same entitlement lands today. These arrangements have been made in recognition of their special qualification as mediators of the goddess’s power. Besides carrying on with their work as the community ritual specialists for the goddess, the tribals continue to provide magico-ritual–medical services to individual households on request.

For instance, amongst the tribals there are those who produce various medicines from animals and plants in the forest. These medicines are said to include poison, love potions and abortifacients and are apparently actually used by the villagers. There is also a custom in which a sickly child or a child born after the mother had a stillborn baby is ‘sold’ to tribals in exchange for a Re.1 coin and left with a Saora couple for one day.⁶ The child calls the couple father and mother from that day onwards and this relationship continues for the rest of their lives. Also, on the day of their wedding, khaṇḍāyata women go with the Khondha priest to worship Rāmacaṇḍī in order to receive a blessing for the marriage. The water offered to the goddess on this occasion is used to bathe the person to be married as part of the marriage ritual. The goddess’s fertility power is passed into the water, mediated by the Khondha priest, who is considered untouchable on other occasions. Tribals are also required by khaṇḍāyatas for curing the effects of the evil
eye (दृष्टि) and possession by evil spirits (प्रेत) as it is said that people are cured by fetching water offered to the goddess from the houses of the Khondha priest or Saora medium and drinking it or sprinkling it over the body. These are despite the fact that they are classified as ‘untouchable’ in the normative scheme (Figure 9.1). The role of the tribal Khondha and Saora as mediator for the goddess’s power and blessings are reminiscent of their role in Rāmacaṇḍī festival during the equality phase. The value of ontological equality manifests not only during rituals but also in everyday life in certain contexts.

Caste and jajmani in a contemporary village

The system of division of labour and exchange in the locality perpetually evolved in history, and continues to do so today. The villagers place ‘traditional’ value on the ritual and social services offered along the customary ‘jajmani’ and ‘community service’ lines. This is especially the case now since the customary economic division of labour and exchange is increasingly being replaced by market exchanges. Today, with the exception of certain chosen ‘traditional’ roles and relationships, which are mostly ritual and social ones, the domain of the cash economy looms large. Villagers buy their everyday necessities from the trading castes in the village (blacksmiths, potters, sweet-makers and so on) or from shops in the village. Desire for cash income has been growing in recent years and the cash economy is increasingly permeating village life.

It should be pointed out, however, that this is not a case of the market economy destroying or eating into the traditional jajmani system from the outside as is popularly conceived of. Village people distinguish between the sphere in which the market principle should be adopted and the sphere in which customary exchange relations should be maintained. This is related to the cultural politics of village people’s identity formation, since the selection is based on their understanding of what forms the core of their ‘traditional’ identity. The introduction of the market principle in the economic field is partly related to the caste ‘uplift’ movement by low-caste groups under the aegis of their caste associations. Let us see what caste associations are and how they attempted to form their identity and shape their position in society.

Caste associations and change

Caste association activities

Caste associations (जाति सभा) emerged in the late colonial environment at the end of the nineteenth century (Carrol 1978). These caste associations were formed by extending and uniting caste councils (जाति पाँचायत) across regions in order to improve the social and economic status of castes as competitive units. The formation of caste associations represents the substantialisation of caste in its paradigmatic sense. It is significant that caste associations were formed in response to colonial circumstances (Carrol 1978). The colonial government adopted a policy of non-interference in matters relating to religion and ‘native custom’ and left
caste questions to the caste councils. This is not only because of the British government’s principle of liberalism, but also because there was clearly “an intention of the British colonial rulers to position caste groups as social organizations of the smallest unit in India under British colonial rule and to utilize their autonomous ability to maintain order for the purposes of colonial rule” (Kotani 1994: 146). This colonial policy gave a privileged position to caste (jāti) as an autonomous unit. This kind of colonial administration, together with the enumeration and classification of people in caste terms in the census, resulted in a heightened consciousness among the people regarding caste affiliation and ranking. Thus the policy of non-interference has in fact greatly interfered with and influenced Indian society (Dirks 2001).

In Khurda too, many caste associations were established, such as the sweet-makers association, oil-pressers association and potters association. For example, the oil-pressers association, including the Garh Manitri region, was called aṣṭarājya (eight kingdoms). Each rājya consisted of eight to twelve villages. The head of a rājya was called beherā (chief) and the head of the aṣṭarājya was called sabhāpati (head of assembly). To give another example, the potters committee (kulāḷa samiti) of the same region was called Āṭharagaṛa (eighteen forts). There were eighteen beherās who headed each gaṛa (fort). The head of the committee was called sabhāpati. It is interesting that idioms of kingship, such as kingdoms and forts, are used in the organisation of caste associations. This may be related to the sense of sovereignty and autonomy of these associations. This opens up the question of the cultural logic of the internal management of each caste in relation to the idea of royalty.

These primary units of caste associations corresponded to the endogamous groups, which were further organised into district-level associations and then all-Orissa-level associations. For example, barbers have, besides the local level association, the Puri District Bariko Association and the All Orissa Bariko Association, whose headquarters is located at a monastery (matha) in Puri, where their caste tutelary god (iṣṭadebatā) Narasimha is worshipped. Some castes have even established inter-state associations, like the karaṇas (scribes) who joined hands with kāyasṭhas (a scribe caste in Bengal and North India) of other states. The marriage circle has also extended beyond the original endogamous unit with the organisation of a wider caste association. People say that members of the same association are allowed to get married as they are of the same jāti, and marriages have long begun to take place between families belonging to different regions, including inter-state marriages.

In order to raise their socio-economic status, caste associations specified detailed rules regarding marriage and the work that the association members could perform. For example, the Bariko Association stipulated that they would not serve as messengers or clear away the used plates after a feast for those other than brāhmaṇas, karaṇas and khaṇḍāyatas. Also, the sweet-makers association in Khurda prohibited their members from selling eggs or betel leaves (pāna), which is considered the work of Muslims and washermen. These rules were made to maintain their honourable identity and to keep up their social status as a whole.
At the same time, they tried to improve the caste’s economic status and education by offering loans, employment opportunities, scholarships and student hostels.

Caste associations also tried to increase members’ income within the village. It is important to note that it was the caste associations’ initiative which led to the introduction of the market principle into the economic spheres of inter-caste exchange. Led by the leaders of caste associations, service castes negotiated with their patron families to replace the custom of sheaf salary, whereby only one sheaf of paddy was provided annually, with the provision of paddy rice whose amount could be negotiated. They demanded an increase in the amount of rice they receive. In some cases, like the carpenters and potters, they succeeded in negotiating with the dominant patron caste to pay the market price for each piece of work in cash instead of rice. In Garh Manitri, it was thanks to the initiative of the leader of the potter’s association that they succeeded in changing the deal from a fixed annual payment to a piecework sale system in the 1960s. The local leader of the potters’ association, Gangadhara Nayak, proudly told me that they all cooperated together to rectify the unfair system of exchange.

It should be noted that such moves by caste associations did not mean the end of all customary caste division of labour and exchanges. Caste associations have introduced market principles in selected interactions while maintaining customary duties in the socio-cultural religio-ritual fields. They could not deny their caste identity as long as they sought to improve the status of their caste and tried to look for the basis of their caste identity in the customary roles in religious rituals. Caste as the basis of identity and agency continues in the subaltern attempts to enact social transformation and improvement of their position. It is notable, however, that there was also a process of reformulation of their traditional role in the ritual sphere, too.

The history of reorganisation of customary exchange relations emerged from village people’s activities in pursuit of socio-economic status as well as an honourable cultural identity in the colonial and postcolonial contexts. Here, the idea that the traditional socio-economic system was destroyed by the advent of the market economy or the ideology of liberal egalitarianism does not fit. The market principle, which is supposed to be modern, was introduced into the village through caste associations’ efforts to raise social status. Also, the discourse of liberal egalitarianism was only selectively employed in specific contexts in matters relating to socio-political rights in the public sphere. The people’s interest in reformulating their ‘traditional’ duty was not for individual equality but mainly for the honour and dignity of their caste group. In this way, the agency of caste associations played a prominent role in restricting the sphere and reformulating the contents of caste-based exchanges.

The waning of caste associations

Caste associations gradually lost their relevance in postcolonial India after the 1960s. The new socio-economic dynamism, which gave birth to the substantialisation of castes, further led to heterogenisation within caste, as differentiation
of power and wealth developed within each group (Fuller 1996: 12–3). In
such a situation, it became increasingly difficult for caste associations to con-
tinue to work as one community and impose strict rules for work and mar-
rriage. Gradually, caste associations lost their ability to raise their members’
socio-economic status and have become largely defunct in many cases. While
caste associations as a means of socio-economic improvement are thus gradu-
ally waning, caste cooperation in the wider region continues to take place at a
political level when common interests emerge to make demands on the state.
This is especially important in relation to the policy of reservation and caste
politics. However, in the case of rural Orissa, this aspect of caste as a political
unit is less prominent.

With the caste association no longer functioning as an agent to improve socio-
economic status, it became up to individual men and families to manage and
attempt to improve their own welfare by utilising kinship and personal connec-
tions. In the socio-economic sphere of activity it can be said that individuals and
families, rather than caste, became the main agents from the 1970s onwards. This
also means that the negotiation of payment between service castes and dominant
patron castes is left to individual households, putting the service castes at a disad-
vantage as they cannot depend on their respective caste associations.

Caste as sacrificial organisation

Ritual duty and identity

With the introduction of market principles, the continuity of caste division of
labour and exchange in the socio-cultural sphere cannot be explained in terms
of rational choice by individuals. This is because what matters in this field is not
economic interest but moral–ontological identity. The persistence of caste-based
roles in the socio-cultural sphere shows that the people in rural Orissa continue to
see their caste ritual duty as one of the most important sources of their identity.
The acceptance of ritual as a source of identity does not mean, however, that
people accept the brahmanical purity-oriented hierarchy or the power structure
of centrality as the only relevant values. On the contrary, there is a process of
renegotiation of the form and meaning of caste duties, especially from below, as
I have emphasised.

The practice of allocating caste-based roles in the socio-cultural sphere is sus-
tained and given significance in today’s rural Orissa as a sacrificial organisation.
Villagers say, especially in reference to the community ritual, “Each caste has
its duty to perform for god. Only if everybody performs his duty correctly, can
we perform the festival to god’s satisfaction. And only if god is satisfied will he
give his blessings”. What is stressed here is the value of performing one’s duty
as service to the divine. Though the same idiom of duty can be, and sometimes
indeed is, used by the brāhmaṇas and the dominant caste to legitimise the existing
relationships, what is interesting is that we can often note negotiative attempts by
the lower castes to change the form and meaning of caste duty when the impor-
tance of service for the divine is emphasised. The lower castes have become more
Recast(e)ing identity

enunciative in their attempts to shift the semantics of caste order from hierarchy and centrality to the sacrificial cooperation of different but ontologically equal parts. When they stress the importance of duty to god, they seem to imply that it is not the mediation of the brāhmaṇa or the centrality of the dominant caste but one’s own devotion and service that is necessary for divine blessings.

It is noteworthy that several castes started refusing to perform the kind of allotted work which they regarded as impositions from above and degrading of their dignity. For example, cowherds refused to carry palanquins for high castes at their marriage ceremonies in the 1970s. The high castes threatened them and insisted that they perform their traditional duty. The cowherds answered back by saying that their real traditional role was only to carry the palanquins of gods in religious rituals, but subsequently the high castes had forced them to carry them as well. They argued that this deviation from real tradition should be rectified. When the discussion did not result in agreement, the cowherds told the high-caste people that if they continued to force them to carry palanquins for them, they would not carry palanquins for the deities in the village festival either. As the time of the village festival approached, the high-caste people had to give in and gave their word that they only had to carry the palanquins of deities. More disputes followed after the festival, but as the vehicle used for the bridegroom in marriage processions gradually changed from the palanquin to the Ambassador (the Indian-made automobile) in the 1980s, the topic no longer arose.

The cowherds saw the work of carrying palanquins for the high castes as degrading according to their sense of dignity. However, instead of denying the traditional role altogether, they decided to redefine what they saw as constituting real tradition. When this was denied by the high castes, the cowherds resisted by refusing to play the ritual role in the village festival (Figure 9.3). The high castes had to give in, probably because they did not want to be held responsible for disturbing the proper performance of the community festival. This kind of revision of the existing arrangement comes about as people begin to reflect upon the prevalent social matrix as something that can be changed.

Another example is the hāṛis’ reluctance to clean up the village before the community ritual. Before the Rāmacaṇḍī festival in 1991, I was walking in the village with Narayana Srichandan, a khaṇḍāyata leader. Rama Naik, a hāṛi, was cleaning the street. Narayana said to me, “Hāṛi people have the work of cleaning the whole village before the festival”. Then, Rama Naik turned around to me and said, “If we do not clean, these people hit us”, pointing at Narayana Srichandan.

Narayana Srichandan seems to have wanted to emphasise the harmonious, cooperative aspect of the community festival in which different caste people have different work (kāma). However, such a harmonious model of society was disputed by Rama Naik. Antagonism and contestation—‘the political’—within social relationships surfaced with such resistance from below. Here, I am using the term ‘the political’ in the sense of Mouffe, who stresses antagonism, diversity and conflicts in society beyond the role of hegemony that creates consensus (Laclau 1996, 2000, Mouffe 1993, 1996, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Rama Naik’s statement clearly indicated that he was cleaning because of the fear of violent
enforcement by the dominant caste group and not because he accepted the present system. He was well aware that there were alternatives to the social arrangement and refused to take the present one for granted. These cases of resistance can be seen as attempts of the lower caste to empower themselves and redefine their ‘traditional’ duty in order to maintain their dignity and self-respect.

Let me give another example of a young barber, Gobinda Barik, who opened a hair “saloon” (the English word saloon was used for the barber shop) in Garh Manitri in 1990. This was the first time in this village that a barber offered the service for cash outside the so-called jajmani relations. I asked him why he wanted to open a hair salon. He said, “Instead of serving masters (sāānta), I wanted to do my work on my own. Here, it is my shop and I am the owner (mālika)”. Gobinda Barik decided to pull himself out of the jajmani relations in order to become the independent owner of a barber shop. He did not opt to remain in the patron–client relationships which would at least give him a constant, though low, source of income. He preferred to put himself in a market relationship, which might lack guarantees but would grant him some independence.

The lower castes have attempted to transform caste-based division of labour and patron–client relationships in the local community in a way that could undermine the unquestioned reproduction of the old hegemonic structure of hierarchy and dominance. Their aim here is to relocate themselves in a more respectable position with dignity and economic independence. But we must ask ourselves a question here. Does lower caste resistance mean that the social mechanism of
Caste as a whole is in the process of disintegrating? That does not seem to be the case.

It should be noted that although several castes refused to perform roles which they deemed degrading, they are more willing to accept what they considered as their proper ‘traditional’ ritual roles. Let us take the case of Gobinda Barik, the young barber who opened the salon. His father is the head barber who undertakes ritual work, such as carrying the processional torch in the community festival. When I asked Gobinda Barik whether he wished to take over his father’s role in the festival, he said,

When the time comes, I will decide. If I feel that I want to do it, I will do it. I do not want other people to tell me to do so. Previously, I did not feel like doing it, but now I am gradually beginning to think that I should do it. It is honourable work. It is a service (sebā) for the goddess.

He does not want to be forced to do the ritual duty, but sees the job as an honourable one and considers accepting the duty when the time comes. He seems to accept that there is some meaning in the role. He says he does not want to be pressured into doing the job, thus clearly denying the value of hierarchy and domination, but feels it is his service to the goddess.

In my understanding, it is this attitude of service to the divine that is the basis of subalternate cooperation. Here, as also in the case of the cowherds who refused to carry palanquins for the high castes but were ready to accept their role for the deities, we see that the paradigm of caste as sacrificial organisation is not denied altogether. Rather, the duties in the sacrificial organisation are coming to be redefined from below.

Similarly, although the sweeper-drummers are reluctant to do the cleaning up of the village, they take pride in being drummers in the community ritual. Rama Naik, who criticised the dominant caste for forcing them to do the cleaning, accepts the drummer’s role in the Rāmacaṇḍī festival. He said to me with a touch of pride, “Unless we beat the drum, the goddess does not come to the village”. It is true that the sound of the drum is essential for the goddess to possess the medium, to pick up the king’s sword and to dance fiercely with the sword in hand. Many young male hāṛis working in the cities come back to the village during the festival to beat the drum. This shows that the sacrificial principle of playing one’s role for the whole is not denied as long as there is an egalitarian respect for each role. Rama Naik was defying what he saw as hierarchical and oppressive but accepted the role which granted him pride and dignity as well as an indispensable position in the community. The lower castes were ready to submit themselves to the divine but rejected being suppressed in society.¹⁸

It is notable that when explaining their traditional role, the lower castes emphasise devotionalism and the sacrificial ethics of duty in the belief that one can approach the divine through service. This is based on the idea of ontological equality of beings who are all capable of approaching the divine by offering their work as sacrifice.² This equality operates at the level of the right to
approach the divine through work and not at the level of the content or choice of service. Therefore, I call it *ontological* equality which is different from the individual equality found in liberalism that involves freedom of choice of work. They attempt to make their caste identity and role indispensable and honourable in the collective sacrificial endeavour, while denying, or at least minimising, hierarchy and dominance in inter-caste relationships by redefining their ‘traditional’ duty and position.

Nonetheless, since the idea of sacrifice in Indian history has long been related to the idea of hierarchy and dominance, it is not possible to simply discard its implications for the organization of caste. There will continue to be a process of contestation, antagonism and negotiation in a field of unequal power relationships. The idiom of cooperation and duty is also employed by the high castes as an ideological discourse in order to maintain the structure of hierarchy and dominance. As we saw in the case of Narayana Srichandan, the dominant caste attempts to legitimise the cleaning job of the sweeper-drummers by claiming that it is their traditional duty and that their cooperation is necessary for the proper running of the community. However, this does not mean that we should belittle the creativity of subaltern agency. An important transformation of inter-caste relationships in their form and meaning of practice seems to be taking place.

Since identity as much as interest has become an important focus in contemporary Indian politics—whether local or national—the matter of values has become a serious politico-cultural concern. We should pay sufficient attention to the constant subaltern efforts to negotiate and transform the content and meaning of caste duties into democratically acceptable and existentially meaningful ones. Reinterpreting the meaning of caste-based ritual duties by emphasising the ‘submission’ aspect of offering duties as service to god may be seen as a re-emergence of devotionalism (bhakti). Whereas devotionalism in the early modern period was connected with all spheres of life, including institutions of the local community, like kingship and Jagannātha, the re-emerging contemporary version seems to refer only to the inner socio-cultural sphere. The politico-economic outer sphere is excluded as being unrelated to the ideology of sacrificial ethics or devotionalism. It is considered a distinct sphere for individuals and their families to make the most of their profit-and-power-maximising ability. The function of caste as sacrificial organisation is restricted to the socio-cultural sphere.

This kind of limited position given to caste as sacrificial organisation only in the socio-cultural sphere seems to reflect the fragmented form of life and dichotomous consciousness in rural Orissa today. Ritual duties based on caste indeed continue to provide people with their existential identity in the locality, but only in a fragmented way and fail to encompass their entire life-style or worldview. There have been, however, preliminary attempts to use sacrificial ethics to transform practices in the larger politico-economic sphere, which I will address in the next chapter. It is interesting to see how sacrificial ethics, which has mainly developed with the phenomenon of caste, is now beginning to transform itself beyond the socio-cultural sphere to provide the basis of morality in the politico-economic sphere.
In sum, caste in today’s rural Orissa can be said to be at the intersection of its denial or withering in the politico-economic sphere and its reformulated continuity in the socio-cultural sphere. Though caste can also be used as a resource to form political groups (Mitra 1994), and the transformation of communities into political actors is a typical phenomenon in postcolonial democracies (Chatterjee 1998a, b, 2000, 2004), this aspect does not seem to be very important in the current political conjuncture in Orissa.

Yet, continuous contestations and negotiations to redefine and recast caste identity in pursuit of interests and dignity do take place. This shows people’s agency and efforts to marry their sense of moral–ontological identity with political democracy and equality. Here the notions of sacrifice, service and duty play the mediating role between the ontology of caste and the idea of democracy. The importance of caste as reformulated sacrificial organisation should not be disregarded if we are to do justice to the complex history of the local community and the agency of people in the locality. India must provide the politico-economic sphere with a sense of value and ethics based on identities that are both democratically acceptable and ontologically meaningful to people. Do sacrificial ethics based on equality proposed by subalterns provide an answer? I will consider this in the next chapter.

Notes

1 For a review and criticism of the jajmani system, see Fuller (1977, 1989) and Mayer (1993).
2 Other Backward Classes (OBC) came to be included in the reservation policy in 1990 following the announcement of the implementation of the Mandal Commission report by the government of VP Singh.
3 Mayer says, “Villagers often justify the prohibition of inter-caste marriage by saying that the khan-pin (food and drink) or rahan-sahan (way of life) of castes is different and therefore marriage, the most intimate of relations, is barred between them” (1996: 59, parenthesis added). This discursive and empirical situation in Ramkheri seems to be almost identical to that in Garh Manitri.
4 Compare with the arrangement described in the Maddox Report (233).
5 I use the Oriya spelling ‘ādibāsi’ here and ‘ādivāsi’ in the all-India context.
6 The same custom is reported of the Aghriā (Skoda 2005). Also see Tanabe (2007b).
7 All personal names cited are pseudonyms.
8 This attitude echoes Skaria’s formulation of Gandhian philosophy: “Surrender without subordination” (Skaria 2016).
9 This philosophy is most eloquently discussed in the Bhagavad Gītā, the most popular Indian scripture, which is often the subject of discussion in local society.
This chapter attempts to locate endogenous potentialities for building local democracy in contemporary India. I pay particular attention to subaltern agency in redefining the ontology of caste and, thereby, attempt to culturally underpin the significance of the democratic representation and cooperation of multiple social groups in local self-government. The emergence of such potentialities was never an automatic process. It was made possible by the institutional reform of local self-government (panchayati raj) in 1992 that stipulated rigorous caste and gender reservation measures and by the permeation into the subaltern strata of the idea of equal representation related to human rights and democracy.

Instead of seeing the democratisation process in India as the internalisation of the modern state’s values, which entails a top-down perspective towards universalising subjects (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, Fuller and Harriss 2000, Parry 2000), I see the new possibilities as a sign of subaltern agency utilising and mediating both indigenous and exogenous resources towards a democratic cooperation that recognises differences.

Institutional change has enabled subalterns to challenge hegemony and create a new, culturally meaningful and politico-economically functional framework of discourse and practice from hybrid resources—the sacrificial ethics of caste and the institution and value of egalitarian representation—to secure their legitimate and dignified position in participatory democracy. The emergence from below of a new vision of democratic community may indicate the dynamic transition of Indian society beyond the “postcolonial predicament” (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993).

Can the ethics of ontological equality and sacrificial cooperation provide the political sphere with a moral basis for democratic relationships? This chapter addresses this question by considering transformations in village politics. It will examine subaltern agency and cultural–political negotiation for the establishment of a new socio-moral vision for local democracy. The negotiative process seems to me to suggest a post-postcolonial transformation of local society in Orissa, indicating the beginning of the end of the postcolonial predicament.

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By the time of my initial fieldwork in the early 1990s, villagers were highly critical of factional politics. The lower castes, who were excluded from the political process, voiced their discontent over political corruption in the community. Even among the dominant caste who engaged in factional politics there was a sense of despondency about the violent confrontations and corruption in politics, which they said was a part of the money-oriented modern economy and self-centred politics characteristic of kalì juga, the present age of discord.

This kind of criticism of the "criminalisation of our [India's] economic and political life" (Beteille 1994: 565) is common all over India today. Amoral and self-centred activities in the politico-economic sphere cause great sorrow and annoyance to Indians, and there is increasing condemnation of corruption from every stratum of society (Mohapatra 1997, Visvanathan and Sethi 1998, Fuller and Benei 2000). This has been analysed by some researchers as a sign of the internalisation of "the impersonal norms and values of the modern state" (Fuller and Harris 2000: 14, Parry 2000: 29). In other words, Indians can criticise corruption because the pedagogical project of the modern state has succeeded.

According to this view, moral reflexivity about corruption in modern India has been made possible due to external intervention. Yet, corruption is not simply critiqued from the perspective of the modern impersonal norm. Among the people of India there is a point of view that the advent of the modern state is the cause of corruption. To fully appreciate recent critiques one must take into account the "two-sided" (Shotter 1993) complexity of the self-reflexive framework in which the postcolonial predicament is interpreted and understood.¹

It seems to me that the postcolonial dichotomy of the modern state and traditional society as a discursive and interpretive framework enables Indians to understand their present predicament and criticise corruption in two ways. On the one hand, one may speak of traditional society’s hierarchy and oppression as the cause of the failure of the modern state apparatus. From this perspective, it is the negative tradition of Indian society that prevents the ideal of modernity from realising itself. On the other hand, one may also blame the advent of modernity—kalì juga, represented by self-centred politics—as the cause of corruption. The corruption of modern politics in this view is contrasted with the idealised religio-moral universe—that once was but is declining in the modern age—the remnants of which people see and try to maintain in community rituals and relationships.

The two possible interpretations of the present predicament permits a two-sided view, or at least a two-sided dialogue on the merits and demerits of traditional society and the modern state. People adopt one or the other perspective according to their social position and context and are aware of both viewpoints. Recognising the existence of such a two-sided discursive framework is important for understanding the complexity of the cultural–political negotiation over the definition of morally desirable socio-political relationships.

The image of morally desirable relationships is contested by hegemonic and subaltern perspectives. The higher castes and the lower castes have different ways of criticising factional politics and envisaging how local politics should be. This contestation is much more complex than is indicated by a simplistic
Vernacular democracy

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traditional–conservative versus modern–progressive framework. Rather, a dia-

logical process reconstructs local socio-political relationships through reflexive
criticisms and “practical–moral” (Shotter 1993) negotiation that attempt to medi-
ate and go beyond the postcolonial dichotomy. The basis of this dialogical process
is a contestatory negotiation over the vision of community.

To understand socio-political change involving practical–moral negotiation,
I employ the concept of ‘moral society’ alongside those of political society and
civil society. These concepts enable me to consider the plural spheres of dis-
course and practice coexisting in postcolonial India, each having different roles
and values.

Civil, political and moral society

Moral society is conceptualised in contradistinction to civil society—the interme-
diate sphere of individuals’ voluntary associations that exist between the state and
the family—and to political society—the sphere of political demands made by the
people on the state. Although civil society in urban India is very active today and
there may, indeed, be potentialities for civic alliances of diverse groups, beyond
the borders of caste, class and gender (Appadurai 2002), it is still fair to say that
civil society, in the sense of the sphere of modern associational life, has not taken
root in large segments of the Indian population. Instead, people in the lower strata
use survival strategies in which “the imaginative power of a traditional structure
of the community … has been wedded to the modern emancipatory rhetoric of
autonomy and equal rights” (Chatterjee 1998b: 282). Here, the subjects engaged
in political activities seeking autonomy and equal rights are independent commu-
nities—pseudo, invented or otherwise—instead of individuals. Political society,
then, is the sphere of community competition for state resources.

Chatterjee’s (1998a,b, 2000, 2004) concept of political society aptly captures
the actual field of mediation between the population and the state in postcolo-
nial societies. Political factions in postcolonial rural India are also products
of political society. In the 1970s and 1980s, the dominant khaṇḍāyata caste and
related brāhmaṇa and karaṇa elites in Orissa succeeded in establishing, or rather
appropriating, political representation of the locality. They thus controlled access
to state resources meant for local development, to the exclusion of other, lower
caste, communities. This exemplifies a negative manifestation of political society.

What this concept of political society does not capture, however, is the ethi-

cally imaginative and creative power of the community in Indian history. I turn to
this facet of the community as the site of “ethical life” (Hegel 1952). I refer to this
site, in which morally desirable human relationships rather than individual rights
or political gains are at issue, as the space of moral society. In moral society,
instead of entire communities acting as individual players (as in political society),
the community defines the arena of practical–moral negotiation among its mem-
bers. The borders and content of the community are defined through negotiation.

One of the main concerns in contemporary India seems to me to be the contesta-
tion over defining membership and relationships in a community, be it national,
religious or local. Freitag aptly talks of the ongoing “redefinition of Indian civil social space and who will be allowed to participate publicly inside that discursive space” (1996: 232). The matter, however, does not end with the question of membership but extends to the issue of morally desirable relationships in the public social space. In the case of the local community in rural Orissa, critical self-reflection and contestatory negotiation surround what should be the proper socio-political relationships in the community.

The term moral society will no doubt call to mind the idea of moral economy espoused by Thompson and by Scott, so I would like to point out the differences between the two notions. Moral economy refers to “a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community” (Thompson 1971: 79) or “the structure of a shared moral universe, a common notion of what is just” governed by the “norm of reciprocity” and the “right to subsistence” (Scott 1976: 167). Peasants are moved to protest when their subsistence is threatened as capitalist penetration leads to the destruction of institutions of protection against starvation and hardship (Scott 1976, 1985, Thompson 1991).

Here the moral economy is equated with precapitalist social relations and their subsistence ethics, which are contrasted with those of the market economy. However, as Sundar and Jeffery point out, “Peasants and others are defending selected and sometimes invented traditions, rather than simply drawing unthinkingly upon shared norms and values; and market exchange must be assumed to be normally part of peasant economies” (1999: 17). The notion of moral society that I propose here goes beyond the sphere of subsistence economy and its ethics. Moral society works to legitimise or criticise politico-economic practices in a wider sphere, including the market economy and democratic politics. It also works to modify and reconstitute people’s embodied sense of morality in relation to modern institutions and ideas of democracy and civil society.

The notion of moral society stresses people’s agency in the creation and reformulation of practical–moral relationships. People constantly renegotiate what is morally desirable in accordance with changes in the wider socio-political context. Morality here is not a residue of traditional community norms that stand against modern ideas and institutions. Rather, it is a two-sided “topic” or “dilemmatic theme” (Shotter 1993: 14) on which dialogical negotiation can take place to give social relationships a new style. New styles of social relationships are possible because people can draw upon their cultural resources. Cultural resources, as patterns of practice and discourse that assign meanings and values to the world and society, are historically accumulated in the social reservoir (Shotter 1993, Demmer 2016). The reservoir of cultural resources, including both old and new, provides materials and possibilities for people to create new patterns of practice and discourse that align with the contemporary context. Here the idioms and rhetoric of morality may be used to affirm, resist or transform the existing socio-political order.

The discourse on corruption based on the two-sided ideas of how the community should be, for example, belongs to the sphere of moral society. Through
contestatory practical–moral negotiation, moral society generates “a new way of talking”, which, in turn, “institutes a new form of human interrelationship” (Shotter 1993: 53). Democratisation is particularly important here as it gives space to marginal voices with the potential to provide new points of view and, thus, new styles and sets of relationships.

The focus of practical–moral negotiation and contestation over socio-political relationships in the local community in rural Orissa today seems to me to lie in overcoming caste and gender inequality and in constructing the kind of socio-political relationships that can reconcile the cultural ethos of the community and ideas of democratic representation. Here, the continuing and transforming sense of desirable community relationships is connected in a hybrid manner to the idea of democracy and civil rights, allowing dilemmatic coexistence, mutual influences and new potentialities. Based on field research in a village in coastal Orissa, Mohapatra argues that “the language of community and the vocabulary of civil society coexist uneasily (but sometimes with a lot of possibilities)” (2001: 671). The idea and discourse of civil society and those of community here obtain a new dynamism through a two-sided dialogue. The concept of moral society seeks to pay attention to such possibilities for creating new forms of relationships.

No monolithic set of moral rules dominates society in contemporary India. Rather, the situation is dilemmatic, fragmentary and often confrontational. Nonetheless, postcolonial Indian society manages to maintain a sphere of interaction in which the issue of practical–moral relationships remains a common concern (Sen 2005). In proposing a heuristic definition of moral society, I use the word moral as a descriptive rather than as an evaluative term. Just as political society contains elements that are not worthy of approval, moral society often includes aspects of oppression and domination in the name of morality that denigrate the ethics of democracy. Nevertheless, just as “much churning in political society in the countries of the postcolonial world … can be seen as attempts to find new democratic forms of the modern state that were not thought out by the post-Enlightenment social consensus” (Chatterjee 2000: 47), the churning in moral society can be seen as attempts to find new forms of socio-political relationships in postcolonial society that can mediate between and satisfy both community ethos and democratic values. Moral society is a sphere of this churning: a shared site for dialogue in which ethically desirable socio-political relationships are multivocally contested and negotiated.

**Factional politics and moral resentment**

**Of love and hate**

Factional politics in rural India developed particularly in the 1970s with the populist turn of the government, which tried to secure political support in exchange for the distribution of state resources in the name of poverty alleviation and development (see Chapter 7). This process of politicisation of society was connected with the infiltration of the postcolonial state into the everyday lives of people (Khilnani 1999:41). The state claimed itself responsible for people’s welfare and promised
to offer solutions to all problems. What state resources actually provided, however, was never enough to satisfy people’s needs, let alone their desires, and severe competition developed over access to those resources. This resulted in the over-politicisation of social life in rural India.

Factional politics was not only about the rational pursuit of appropriating maximum state resources, but was also entangled with interpersonal, emotionally charged issues, such as moral commitment, betrayal, criticisms and hatred. Participants in factional politics criticised the self-centredness and lack of social morality of their opponents. These criticisms were often the cause of deep hostility and antagonism. The root cause of such moral resentments lay in an inherent contradiction in factional politics between group formation and resource distribution.

Factional politics is connected with the principle of majority rule combined with populist politics in which the vote is directly rewarded with government benefits. The more supporters a leader gathers the more chances he will have to secure resources from the state. The language of kinship and brotherhood is used to express the relationship among faction members and stress the strength of their solidarity. Faction leaders seek to maximise their following using the rhetoric that all faction members are bound by ties of mutual trust, dependence and cooperation. Yet, when it comes to distributing resources the logic of maximising individual shares dictates a smaller number of beneficiaries. Hence faction leaders tend to choose relatives and close allies as beneficiaries while excluding others. Such acts are seen by the excluded as a betrayal of brotherhood and they sometimes turn against faction leaders. This leads to an exchange of moral condemnations, and emotionally charged arguments sometimes turn violent.

*Where is the moral basis of reunified local society?*

Among the dominant caste, the problems of local politics are understood as a manifestation of the dichotomy between the ideal community of brotherhood and the realities of factional politics and political manoeuvrings. This understanding is mapped onto the postcolonial dichotomy between traditional society and the modern state. These problems are also seen in terms of the indigenous understanding of history as a process of deterioration. That is why villagers often grieve that the unity of the village in the past was destroyed by the rivalries and conflicts that arose with the arrival of modern factional politics.

Oligarchic leadership (netā) is the accepted way to adapt to and deal with outside political and bureaucratic realities. Corruption in politics is seen as unavoidable in dealing with matters pertaining to the present modern state system. One faction leader explained to me in 1991, “This is kāli juga. Money comes only from outside. Can we just sit and be hungry? We have to engage in politics in order to get money from the government”. But because “brothers”, who should ideally cooperate in all matters, fight over resources in the process of factional politics, the ideal community moves further away from villagers’ reach. They repeatedly express their frustration and despair by saying, “These days, factional politics is everywhere. Even brothers cannot live together in harmony”.

It is in this context of practical–moral dilemma that one should understand the procession declaring village unification in September 1992, mentioned in Chapter 1. After many decades of factional politics, most dominant-caste people of Garh Manitri were tired of the fighting and mutual suspicion. They were prepared to go on with it only as long as it would ensure them some share of the state’s resources. The social cost for the share, however, was becoming too high. Sometime before the procession took place, the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution were announced, which would change the whole political context in the village. It stipulated more autonomy and funding for local governments, direct participation of people in the decision-making process and reserved seats for SC, ST, OBC and women in local self-governing bodies. It also guaranteed the budget for various schemes at the gram panchayat level, whereas in the past, getting money from the district and block levels had been an important task for faction leaders.5

This meant that the issue was no longer about how to acquire state resources through factional channels but about how to distribute the resources to the satisfaction of the people concerned. The distribution of resources could no longer be decided just within the dominant caste. Furthermore, economic liberalisation in 1991 led to more freedom in economic activities. Villagers were no longer dependent solely on the distribution of state resources. Instead of engaging in factional politics with high psychological and social costs, such as rivalry, betrayal and violence, people began to seek opportunities to obtain wealth in the market. All these factors contributed to people’s eagerness to see changes in the village’s political life. Thus, when the proposal was made to “make the village one again”, nobody objected openly. This proposal matched not only people’s moral image of the community but also the social demands of the political, economic and institutional contexts.

Nevertheless, the procession for village unification that took place in 1992 was merely a step towards the formation of democratic cooperation. Those involved did not provide any blueprint for a new basis or set of principles for local political relationships. The moral–ritual value of sharing and cooperating, from the perspective of the dominant caste, is based on the idiom of brotherhood within the same caste and is not straightforwardly applicable to relationships with other castes. So the question remains: how can the village become one? If the moral–ritual value of brotherhood continues to be unacceptable for inter-caste relationships, what should the moral and social basis be for local political relationships that include multiple caste groups?

Here, one may note the shift in the local political agenda from the politics of demands for competitively claiming and acquiring resources from the state to the politics of relationships that negotiate and contest the way diverse groups of people participate in the political process and obtain a share of the resources that it offers. In other words, one could say that a shift occurred from political society to moral society. Because local society is granted funds and autonomy through the institution of a reformed gram panchayat, the question now is how to bring about democratic cooperation that involves lower castes and women and the fair distribution of resources at the local level.
The answer cannot be a simple replacement of traditional relationships and values with modern liberal egalitarianism. Modernity does not gradually replace or marginalise existing practices and values but increases cultural resources by adding new ideas to the social reservoir. It also influences the way social practices are formed out of these hybrid cultural resources. With the addition of modern cultural resources, moral agents are provided with more possibilities for creating new patterns of practice out of the enriched social reservoir. A mutually exclusive opposition between traditional structure and modern values, in which either the existing structure persists or external forces take over, cannot be assumed. Rather, the transformation involves the use of resources that derive from both “internal dispositions” and “external forces” (Bourdieu 1990: 55).

Social and political relationships in the locality are embedded in practices that draw their pattern and meaning from accumulated cultural resources. Although the ideas of democracy and civil society definitely play an important role as newly added cultural resources, they require legitimacy and support from the historically formed and embodied sense of cultural ethos in order to have a secure place in society. As long as the image persists of traditional society privileging brahmanical hierarchy and dominant-caste power, the gap between traditionally based moral relationships and modern democratic institutions and values will remain unbridgeable. What is needed to establish a bridge is a new vision of ethically desirable relationships whose value is compatible with democratic ideas. Does such a vision actually exist? It is my contention that subaltern criticism of politics and their perspectives based on egalitarian sacrificial ethics play an important role in providing an alternative vision of community and a key to bridging the embodied sense of cultural ethos and democratic values and institutions.

**Transformation of local politics**

Subaltern criticism

Just as the dominant caste became disillusioned with factional politics, the lower castes also began to express their dissatisfaction with village politics by the early 1990s. In fact, significant changes in inter-caste relationships had already occurred from the 1960s to 1980s, although they were limited to the socio-economic and ritual sphere. The landholding structure and factional politics centred on the dominant caste still largely controlled the village political economy in the 1970s and 1980s.

There was thus a disjunction between the reformulation of caste relationships towards equal participation in the socio-cultural sphere and the dominant-caste-centred power structure in the politico-economic sphere. This disjunction represented the postcolonial predicament’s paradoxical nature and fragmented form of life. In this predicament, where the lifeworld was fragmented into inconsistent parts, socio-cultural practices of cooperation and exchange were given importance as representing community tradition, though its content was often contested, while politico-economic activities, which were supposed to be based on
the principle of equality and rationality, were dominated by the logic of power and numbers.

By the early 1990s, however, awareness and hope gradually arose among the lower castes that alternatives existed to the existing political order and that they could negotiate with the higher castes to improve their condition. What happened then was that lower caste people put forward their new vision of community, based on egalitarian sacrificial ethics, which they nurtured in the socio-ritual sphere, and began to apply it to the political sphere. Lower caste questioning and criticism of existing power relationships began to extend beyond the socio-ritual arrangement to politics. During my initial fieldwork in 1991–1993, I often heard low-caste people angrily condemning factional members, albeit behind their back, for embezzling government subsidies meant for community development and resorting to threats of violence in order to impose their political decisions.

One such criticism came from Krushna Sethi, a young washerman. In 1991, a meeting was held to appoint committee members for the college in Garh Manitri. Faction leaders attempted to include as many of their allies as possible on the management committee of the college and influenced the use of the budget and the appointment of teachers and staff. The candidates vying for the positions were mostly khaṇḍāyata faction members. In the course of the meeting, Sethi spoke out and said that the committee should have a representative from each hamlet in Garh Manitri. Dominant-caste faction members tried to shout him down. One faction leader then suggested that committee members be elected on the basis of merit and recommendation. Sethi’s proposal was ignored, and the discussion went back to selecting people from the two khaṇḍāyata factions.

After the meeting, one of the faction leaders commented on Sethi’s statement. He said,

It is all very well to say that there should be one representative from each hamlet. But that would not work. Committee members must possess a certain quality. What quality do they have? Each family has had its role in the village. We have been the leaders of the village from the past and this quality cannot be acquired overnight.

This remark presupposes the authenticity of the traditionalised structure of power centred on the dominant caste and other local elites. Furthermore, this leader criticised Sethi for not having fear (bhaya). He said, “Nowadays, young boys do not have fear. Without fear, how can there be right administration?”

Fear or awe is not necessarily a negative quality in India. Bhaya, in its positive aspect, is connected with the sense of respect towards the divine and elders and is considered a good quality in certain contexts, although having fear for one’s fame, life or property, for example, is considered shameful and undesirable. Bhaya is also an idea, however, that can be imposed on the socially weak as an ideology to rationalise their subordinate positions. In this particular case, the need for fear was connected to respect for the caste order and obviously had conservative implications.
In contrast to the khaṇḍāyata leader, Sethi later said to me, “The factions are destroying the village. Everybody must cooperate to develop the village. That is why I said there should be a representative from each hamlet. Then there can be real cooperation involving everybody”. His vision of community also drew on the idea of traditional society. It was not, however, based on the structure of domination and hierarchy but on the cooperation of different sections for the benefit of the community. The idea of representation has long been a part of the moral sense of justice in the political field after independence. It has acquired legitimacy, along with the idea of democracy, in the discursive space of what constitutes proper administration and government.

There seem to be two conflicting ideas of representation here. The logic of representing particulars demands that each social group be represented, whereas the logic of representing the majority says that the majority should rule. The latter is supported by the democratic institution of electoral politics, in which numbers matter. In the example above, the faction leader employed the logic of the majority, which works in favour of the political primacy of the khaṇḍāyatas. Sethi, however, employed the logic of representing particulars when demanding representation for each hamlet in the village. Because the composition of each hamlet more or less corresponds to a caste group, this suggestion had an aspect of caste-wise proportional representation.

In factional politics, the state’s resources have to be distributed in proportion to political influence to secure the most votes. In the public meeting to consider the college committee, this factional logic reigned at the beginning. But, when Sethi presented a legitimate argument based on the logic of representation of particulars, the faction leaders had to respond by resorting to another legitimate discourse. This was why the khaṇḍāyata leader took up the logic of meritocracy and connected it to the logic of majority representation. This example reveals a complex situation involving plural and contestatory ideas and discourses regarding desirable political representation and community relationships. These include hegemonic ideas of the representation of the majority and ‘traditional leadership’ on the one hand, and subaltern notions of representation of particulars and cooperation among different sections of the community on the other hand.

Notably, Sethi and the khaṇḍāyata leader also drew on different aspects of traditional morality to legitimise their respective political positions. The khaṇḍāyata leader’s insistence that committee members must have a certain ‘quality’ invokes the discourse of traditional morality in which individuals should keep to their assigned position in the structure of hierarchy and domination. This hierarchical morality worked along with the logic of majoritarian representation to deny representation to the lower castes. Sethi, by contrast, employed the discourse of traditional morality in the sense that each person should have a properly recognised and respectable role. This discourse of egalitarian morality was combined with the logic of representation of particulars to promote the representation of different strata of the community.

What is significant here is that Sethi’s proposal fuses the paradigm of sacrificial cooperation, the service of each part for the benefit of the whole, and the idea
of democratic representation. It is a vivid example of creative subaltern employment of the cultural resource of sacrificial ethics based on ontological equality. Although his suggestion was not taken up seriously by the dominant caste, that he could put forward such a proposition in public was a sign of growing opportunities for subalterns to speak for themselves. This can be seen as an example of cultural–political contestation in moral society over visions of desirable community relationships, although power relations at that time obviously granted more space to the hegemonic discourse and less to the subaltern voice. This situation, however, changed with institutional transformations and the subsequent devolution of power.

Institutional change and devolution of power

The combined effect of economic liberalisation that began in 1991 and the restructuring of local self-governments that was initiated by the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution in 1992 gradually brought about the democratisation of local political processes. Table 10.1 shows the changes in the caste composition of Garh Manitri gram panchayat. A new system of gram panchayat that included the villagers’ direct participation in palli sabha (hereafter, the hamlet assembly) and gram sabha (hereafter, the village assembly), stipulated by the 1992 constitutional reforms, began to function in 1997 in Orissa.11 The participation of lower castes and females in the gram panchayat became a general trend (Table 10.2).

Today, the gram panchayat is slowly becoming more democratic in terms of representation and function. Meanwhile, participation in factions has decreased among the dominant caste, which means that fewer villagers overall are involved in them. Those involved in local politics, however, still form factions. In fact, factional politics has spread because different castes now participate in politics. Factional politics today therefore involves fewer people but more groups or castes. Nevertheless, I would say that the transformation of factional politics is an improvement over the situation in the early 1990s. Violent confrontations between faction members have come to an end and the dominant caste no longer holds a monopoly on the state’s resources. The site of factional disputes has at least shifted to local self-government institutions which now take political decisions. So, even though factional politics persists, the gram panchayat is gaining the capacity to do, at least in formal terms, what it is officially supposed to do, namely, talk about and decide on ways to improve local welfare through development schemes.

Of course, the situation is not perfect. Factional rivalry and corruption in politics have not disappeared. Despite these shortcomings, changes in gram panchayat membership have certainly transformed the atmosphere of the meetings. Although, in most cases, the lower castes and women obtain their seats only through reservations, their presence in the political sphere has become part of everyday life. The 1992 reforms formally specify that decision-making in the gram panchayat, village assembly and hamlet assembly cannot occur in the absence of reserved groups, so the lower castes and women cannot be ignored. Many lower
Table 10.1 Garh Manitri gram panchayat profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Date</th>
<th>Sarpanch</th>
<th>Nayab Sarpanch</th>
<th>Samiti Member</th>
<th>Ward Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr. 1957</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15 members: all male khaṇḍāyata 9 (60%) brāhmaṇa 2 (13%) OBC 2 (13%): teli (oil-presser) 2 SC 1 (7%): bāuri 1 ST 1 (7%): Saora 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 Apr. 1957–10 Apr. 1967)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 members: all male khaṇḍāyata 12 (67%) brāhmaṇa 2 (11%) OBC 3 (17%): teli (oil-presser) 2, caṣā (cultivator) 1 ST 1 (6%): Saora 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 1967</td>
<td>brāhmaṇa (male)</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>20 members: all male khaṇḍāyata 13 (65%) brāhmaṇa 2 (10%) OBC 3 (15%): teli 3 SC 1 (5%): bāuri 1 SC 2 (5%): Saora 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15 May 1967–2 Apr. 1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 members: all male khaṇḍāyata 14 (70%) OBC 3 (15%): guriā (sweet-maker) 1, gauṛa (cowherd) 1, teli (oil-presser) 1 SC 1 (5%): dhobā (washerwoman) 1 ST 2 (10%): Saora 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1975</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>10 members: male 7 (70%), female 3 (30%) khaṇḍāyata 5 (50%): male 4, female 1 brāhmaṇa 1 (10%): (female 1) OBC 3 (30%): gauṛa (cowherd, male 1), māḷī (gardener, male 1), baṛhei (carpenter, female 1) SC 1 (10%): bāuri (male 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10 May 1975–18 Feb. 1981)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb. 1984</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan. 1992*</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>baṛhei (carpenter, OBC, female)</td>
<td>WAH</td>
<td>10 members: Saora 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Table 10.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Date</th>
<th>Sarpanch (male)</th>
<th>Nayab Sarpanch (female)</th>
<th>Samiti Member (female)</th>
<th>Ward Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Feb. 1997</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>12 members: male 8 (67%), female 4 (33%), khaṇḍāyata 4 (33%) (male 3, female 1), brāhmaṇa 1 (8%) (male 1), OBC 3 (25%): gurīā (sweet-maker, male 1), māḷī (gardener, male 1), teli (oil-presser, male 1), SC 3(25%): dhobā (washer, male 1), hāṛi (sweeper-drummer, female 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar. 2002</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>teli (oil-presser, OBC, male)</td>
<td>barhei (carpenter, OBC, male)</td>
<td>12 members: male 8 (67%), female 4 (33%), khaṇḍāyata 5 (42%) (male 3, female 2), OBC 4 (33%): teli (oil-presser, male 2), gurīā (sweet-maker, male 1), māḷī (gardener, male 1), SC 1 (8%): hāṛi (sweeper-drummer, female 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb. 2007</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata</td>
<td>bhaṇḍāri (barber, OBC, male)</td>
<td>khaṇḍāyata (male)</td>
<td>12 members: male 8 (67%), female 4 (33%), khaṇḍāyata 8 (67%) (male 7, female 1), OBC 2 (17%): gurīā (sweet-maker, female 1), gaura (cowherd, male 1), SC 2 (17%): hāṛi (sweeper-drummer, female 2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Garh Mantri gram panchayat office records.
Note:
Nayab Sarpanch = subhead of gram panchayat; Samiti = block-level council; SC = Scheduled Castes; ST = Scheduled Tribes; OBC = Other Backward Classes.

Local self-government was dissolved on 1 August 1995, as the 1992 elections were not held in accordance with the provision of the 73rd amendment of the constitution.

Prior to 1992, there were seven villages under Garh Mantri grama panchayat (Garh Mantri, Parichhal, Chhania, Loipur, Kochiakhali, Baliberani and Chhiam). Since the 1992 election, there have only been three (Garh Mantri, Chhiam and Baliberani).
Table 10.2 Social profile of panchayati raj institutions in Orissa, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SCW</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>STW</th>
<th>BCC</th>
<th>BCCW</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>RW</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zilla Parishad</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.95%)</td>
<td>(6.32%)</td>
<td>(15.69%)</td>
<td>(9.95%)</td>
<td>(17.56%)</td>
<td>(9.60%)</td>
<td>(22.13%)</td>
<td>(8.78%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samiti</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>6,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.25%)</td>
<td>(7.21%)</td>
<td>(16.54%)</td>
<td>(10.82%)</td>
<td>(16.80%)</td>
<td>(9.27%)</td>
<td>(22.27%)</td>
<td>(7.84%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarpanch</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>6,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.70%)</td>
<td>(5.39%)</td>
<td>(24.22%)</td>
<td>(14.34%)</td>
<td>(12.34%)</td>
<td>(7.41%)</td>
<td>(20.64%)</td>
<td>(7.96%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>7,874</td>
<td>7,056</td>
<td>13,885</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>14,021</td>
<td>8,665</td>
<td>20,353</td>
<td>6,529</td>
<td>87,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.99%)</td>
<td>(8.06%)</td>
<td>(15.86%)</td>
<td>(10.47%)</td>
<td>(16.02%)</td>
<td>(9.90%)</td>
<td>(23.25%)</td>
<td>(7.46%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Election Commission, Orissa n.d.

Note
Zilla Parishad = district-level assembly; Samiti = block-level council; SC = Scheduled Castes; SCW = Scheduled Caste Women; ST = Scheduled Tribes; STW = Scheduled Tribe Women; BCC = Backward Class Citizens; BCCW = Backward Class Citizen Women; UR = Unreserved; RW = Reserved for Women.
castes and women, hitherto largely excluded from local politics, have become aware of the discrepancy between the prescribed norm and the reality of the political process. As a result, political consciousness and frustration are growing among these groups over the present local political situation. They more often openly voice complaints that the state’s resources still get “eaten up” and that the gram panchayat does not function according to the rules and fails to respond to their views and needs. That such criticisms are possible shows the increase in political awareness among these groups and the growing space for their voices.

Another important change is that the increasing number of development plans directly and exclusively targeting the poor has resulted in the state’s resources reaching underprivileged sections more than before. Previously, community development schemes were usually implemented at the district and block levels. Dominant-caste leaders with connections in the district and block offices used to control the flow of the state’s resources to the village level and could embezzle funds. Now with the devolution of power, some portions of the development schemes are implemented directly by the gram panchayat. This has resulted in a change in the way the schemes are implemented. Until the early 1990s, dominant-caste oligarchs decided who would get contracts for construction projects (such as road paving). Members of the faction in power usually got the contracts. Since the reformation of local self-government, however, contractors must be approved in the hamlet assembly by majority vote. As a result, the opportunity to bid for contracts has been extended to lower caste aspirants. In many cases, several people in a ward or administrative village get together to raise the required capital and share the benefits from the contract.

The increase in the number of castes participating in local politics, however, does not necessarily mean that all the state resources reach the target population. As I have already mentioned, embezzlement and corruption persist. Obtaining a contract still implies making some extra cash through embezzlement. But the way in which embezzled state resources are distributed has changed. There is a degree of democratisation here too. The sarpanch (head of the gram panchayat) needs to satisfy the demands of influential people in the gram panchayat, hamlet assembly and village assembly to gain their support; otherwise his or her decisions will be overturned. The sarpanch ensures this support by granting contracts, giving bribes or promising influential people that their wards will profit from particular projects. The sarpanch and others in his or her faction effectively fix how much of the state’s resources go to which ward. If the ward members and the villagers feel that they are not getting enough of the benefits, they can hint at the possibility of changing their allegiance and not approving the sarpanch’s suggestions at meetings. As the sarpanch must ensure people’s support in these meetings, he or she is bound to listen to them. In such a situation, the state’s resources are more equally distributed to different wards and, therefore, to different castes.

Subaltern sacrificial ethics and democracy

Significantly, the increasing democratisation of local politics in rural Orissa has not led to the emergence of disembedded, equal individuals. Social differences
in terms of caste and gender remain a salient feature. What has occurred is more equal representation of various caste groups and women.

A clear illustration of some of the unintended consequences of institutional reforms can be seen in the case of the reservation policy in which caste and gender categories are used to demarcate underrepresented segments of the population. The government’s long-term intention is to eliminate caste and gender differences in terms of individual rights in the public sphere. In other words, reservation measures are designed not to preserve caste differences but to get rid of them. In reality, however, as different castes gradually become represented in local politics, subaltern villagers seem to reinterpret the ontology of caste—sacrificial ethics—as the moral basis of local democracy. As Mitra points out, “Interpreting caste … leads to the larger issue of how to relate the ontology of jati and varna … to the moral basis of society and state in India” (1994: 50).

The villagers consider caste differences employed in the political representative scheme not as something negative to be eliminated through the development of democracy but, rather, as the basis for providing fairer entitlement and enfranchisement for different groups. This interpretation of the ontology of caste may provide a suggestion for “alternative designs for life based upon the recognition of difference” (Das 1989: 46). Whereas the “quest for homogeneity and similarity—the premises for the idea of harmony in the modern world—ends up by treating society as a mere ‘collection’ of people”, Das further notes, “a creative transformation of some of the assumptions of the ideology of caste may, in fact, help us to deal with the aberrations of the modern state” (1989: 46, 51). I suggest here that egalitarian sacrificial ethics, presented by subalterns as a new vision of community, has the potential of functioning in rural India as the pivot between an ontology of caste and a moral basis of democracy that recognises difference.

Subalterns reformulated and utilised sacrificial ethics to culturally legitimise and promote the reorganisation of local politics in Orissan villages in the 1990s. Lower caste people draw on the value of ontological equality in sacrificial ethics to connect democratic representation and the institution of caste and to legitimise and support the representation of various castes in the new gram panchayat. Here one sees the development of a new kind of socio-political relationship in which hierarchy and domination are downplayed and the equality of different caste groups in terms of their participation in, contribution to and receipt of shares in the community are emphasised. The vocabularies used by the villagers to describe the work in the gram panchayat strikingly resemble the cultural resources developed and used in subaltern efforts to secure a dignified place in socio-ritual activities.

Notably, the lower castes draw on the sacrificial idioms of duty (kartabya), service (sebā) and share (bhāga) to legitimise and insist on their equal participation and entitlement in the public sphere. They seem to be suggesting that various groups form parts of the whole and that each part has the duty of serving the whole and is entitled to a share of the whole, in accordance with sacrificial logic. For example, Sethi said to me in 2000,
You know there used to be so much factional politics in the village. … Everyone was acting only for personal interests. … That is not right. I do what I have to do as service. It is for the village that I do my duty. Everyone should do their work correctly without self-interest.

Also, when I interviewed lower caste ward members and ex-ward members in 2005, many of them said that they became ward members so that they could do some work as service and duty “for the ward”, “for the people” and “for the development of the village”.

Doing one’s work as service and duty is standard vocabulary in Orissa (and in other parts of India as well). The (ex-) ward members’ words sounded like a cliche to me at first. Later, however, I came to realise they were innovative applications of clichés or popular idioms, commonplace cultural resources, to give readily cognisable but original significance to the new patterns of political practice in local society. Subalterns use idioms of sacrificial ethics, such as service and duty, to emphasise the necessity of granting legitimate roles and positions to different groups of people in society who can work for the welfare of the whole. In doing so, subalterns give cognisable meaning to the new system of political representation and connect the ontology of caste to the spirit of democracy.

The form of representation in the gram panchayat in the year 2005 almost exactly followed what Sethi espoused fourteen years earlier. The organisation of the gram panchayat, with representatives of different castes, and the discursive framework employed, which emphasises service and duty for the common good, seem to me to suggest that egalitarian sacrificial ethics, which developed mainly in the context of caste, is now beginning to extend beyond the socio-ritual sphere to provide a moral basis in the political sphere.

I was convinced of the creative agency of the subalterns as something more than cliche when I heard how villagers associate equal rights in representation with equal rights to “shares”. They say that the distribution of funds, allocation of projects and so on are done, or are supposed to be done, “according to share” (bhāga anusāre). In an interview in 2005, one Saora man (husband of an ST ward member) explained the mechanism for the distribution of the state’s resources in the gram panchayat:

[The government budget] is given ward-wise. Work comes to the wards one by one. In our hamlet, the work of road paving came in that manner. … Everything is distributed according to quota [he used the English word here]. Large wards gain more according to their share. Everything is like that.

People are content if they feel that they are getting their fair share from the government. Although they stress their sense of service and duty to the whole when it comes to results, what matters most is not whether the state’s resources have brought about overall development of the village but whether each part is getting its rightful share. Also, although the discourse of equality of rights is prevalent nowadays, in practice it is, more often than not, understood in terms of each ward
Vernacular democracy

and caste having rights to representation and shares. In this way, subalterns construct a new idea of democratic representation and egalitarianism by linking the sacrificial logic—that particular parts of the whole have particular shares according to their roles—to the idea of equal political rights.

This seems to me to indicate that the sacrificial logic underlying the early modern system of entitlements (Chapter 3), exemplified in the notions of service and share, has re-emerged in a new form in the context of local political relationships today. The reappearance of sacrificial logic in the contemporary context is also suggested by the subaltern usage of the idiom of ‘government’ (sarakāra) to legitimise public positions and roles. Pramila Naik, a hāṛi woman and an ex-ward member, said, “I am doing what I am supposed to do. Now the government (sarakāra) has granted us a place in the panchayat. I will do my service (sebā)”. The word sarakāra means government, but not necessarily the modern state. It can also refer to the royal government. The royal sacrifice given in the king’s name in the Rāmacaṇḍī festival, for example, is called ‘sarakārī baḷi’ (government sacrifice). When Pramila Naik mentioned that the government granted them a place in the panchayat, she was referring to the new reservation scheme in the reformed local self-government.

Her words remind us of the many family histories that recount how a family was given entitlement and duty by the king (Chapter 6). Caste as sacrificial organisation has the king as the central sacrificer and the giver of the share (bhāga) and duty. In reference to the duty granted by the sarakāra, Pramila Naik was saying that her position is legitimately sanctioned by the sarakāra and that she is doing it as a sacrificial service for the local community and the country. Here, again, we see an innovative extension of old idioms centred on sacrificial ethics in the new political relationships between state and society in order to legitimise positions and give recognisable cultural meanings.

Whither vernacular democracy?

What may be happening in contemporary India is the creation of a vernacular democracy based on people’s creative blending of embodied cultural resources and ideas and institutions of democracy. Here vernacular refers to the non-official cultural resources of discourse and practice that are historically accumulated and practical-morally embodied in the lifeworld of the villagers. In particular, I have in mind the discursive resources of service, duty and share, commonplace idioms of sacrificial ethics that are mediated with democratic practices. These vernacular idioms, related to the ontology of caste and sacrificial principles, are employed in local politics to ensure proper representation and entitlements to multiple groups, recognising difference yet retaining a sense of cooperation and community.

Moreover, subalterns have emphasised ontological equality in sacrificial ethics. This egalitarian sacrificial ethics is presented today, from the subaltern viewpoint, as the new foundational idea for the democratic local community. This democratic community is composed of parts that stand as equals—rather than of parts embedded in hierarchy and domination—and work for the welfare of the whole and receive their rightful shares from the whole. Whereas, in the past, local
elites and higher castes have represented hierarchy and domination as traditional social norms, today subalterns have started to use the cultural resources of ontological equality and sacrificial idioms of service, duty and share to explain and legitimise their newly acquired political position.

The vernacular vocabularies people employ as cultural resources have long been used and put into practice in the area. They have the capacity to evoke the memory, emotions and meanings that provide existential significance inscribed on, or, rather, materialised in, their body-persons in relation to place. This evocation is not a mere repetition of the past. It is an innovative adaptation of historically accumulated cultural resources for giving values with vernacular meanings to the contemporary sphere of democratic practices. Democracy in India is gradually taking root in the vernacular.

Even so, the process of democratisation is by no means complete. Although the development of local democracy is under way, at least in terms of representation in the gram panchayat, it is not accompanied by local economic development. With the liberalisation of the economy in 1991, market opportunities have increased. Yet, market activities are basically individual affairs independent of the community. As more people—especially those with education and means—are interested in improving their own welfare through the market, they have less incentive to spend time and energy for community development.

Ironically, part of the reason why subaltern democratic participation became possible in the villages was that the traditionally powerful have become less interested in the competition for state resources as they now prefer participation in the capitalist economy. Democratisation of the gram panchayat in the 1990s was partly possible not because members of the dominant caste internalised democratic values, but, rather, because they saw better opportunities in the market and became less obsessed with controlling local politics while, at the same time, lower caste groups took up the new opportunity of participating in local politics.

Whereas the logic and institution of democracy have more or less successfully undermined hierarchy and domination in the political sphere and have managed to connect themselves with local vernacular values and practices, they have not succeeded in seriously challenging the economic inequality associated with capitalist development (Kaviraj 2000a:115). In this situation, there is an increasing disjunction—with hidden and paradoxical interdependence—between the success of participatory democracy and vibrant economic development in contemporary India. The challenge and agenda for post-postcolonial India is to investigate the means of establishing complementary relationships between vernacular democracy and the global market.

Notes

1 Akhil Gupta argues that “the discourse of corruption ... plays th[e] dual role of enabling people to construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as citizens” (Gupta 1995: 389). Gupta’s constructivist argument is relevant but for two points. First, when villagers in Orissa criticise the corrupt state, they often contrast it with the ideal-
ised picture of uncorrupted traditional society, not with civil society. Second, Gupta’s framework does not take into account the existence of another point of view in which the blame for corruption is attributed to traditional society instead of the state. The idea of civil society, in fact, is often associated with the ideals of the modern state and contrasted with the hierarchy and oppression of traditional society that inhibit realisation of those ideals.

Chatterjee has paid attention to this aspect in a different context. He deals with the condition of human beings who are born as members of society in which “subjective rights must be negotiated with the ‘ascribed’ field of the ethical life of the community” (Chatterjee 1993: 232).

Thompson and Scott seem to assume that “Poor peasants and others draw upon these traditional rights and customs when faced with attempts by landlords or capitalists to impose new, more contractual and market-based notions of rights and obligations” (Sundar and Jeffery 1999: 17). However, as I have argued in Chapter 9, in postcolonial Orissa, it was the weaker clients who sought more contractual and market-based exchanges in preference to the customary patron–client jajmani relationships.

Thompson, at least, is well aware of the coexistence of moral and market economies among the peasants in eighteenth-century England: “And of course the rioters were already deeply involved, in some part of their lives, in a market economy’s exchanges of labour, services, and of goods” (1991: 272).

The 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution in 1992 (effected in 1993) established a system of local self-government at the three-tier levels of district, block and village (constituted of several villages). Local self-governments were given considerable fiscal authority and political power over development projects. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were given seats and positions as heads in proportion to their population ratio. One-third of the seats and positions as heads were reserved for women (Bates 2005).

Sugata Bose appropriately says that, rather than the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, the “problem of reconfiguring the relationship between nationalism, democracy, and development needs to be relocated in the very different context of the dialectic between domination and resistance, privilege and deprivation at the global, national, and local levels” (Bose 1997: 59).

As Bourdieu says, “Habitus, the historically accumulated dispositions of practice, has a mechanism of regulated transformation in which the internal dispositions—the internalization of externality—enable the external forces to exert themselves, but in accordance with the specific logic of the organisms in which they are incorporated, i.e. in a durable, systematic and non-mechanical way” (1990: 55). If this is the case, one cannot assume an exclusive dichotomy between tradition and modernity in the development of moral practices in modern India.

Tatsuro Fujikura discusses the importance of “awareness” as “signaling new forms of aspiration and as producing new forms of socio-political action” (2013: 37).

Gupta (1998: 17) describes a similar situation.

The opposition between the logic of proportional representation and that of meritocracy is a familiar topic with regard to reservations in the national political discourse as well.

The hamlet assembly is “the meeting of all the electorates of a revenue village” (Government of Orissa n.d.b). Its functions include choosing the recipients of poverty-alleviation programmes, guaranteeing social justice to the poor and making sure that “government facilities” reach them. It is also supposed to plan and prepare development programmes for its own area and decide who implements them. It is authorised to audit the accounts of all grants employed in its jurisdiction. The village assembly is the meeting of “all the voters of all the revenue villages under a gram panchayat” (Government of Orissa n.d.a). It is meant to organise community service and execute agricultural production plans. All projects and their expected costs must be approved at the village assembly before any work is undertaken by the gram panchayat. The budget
and implementation of all grants received by the gram panchayat must be sanctioned by the village assembly. This assembly allows direct participation of the villagers—including SC, ST and women—and discussion of matters of common interest.

12 These schemes include Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY, Complete Village Income Scheme), which aims to create village infrastructure and provide food security and additional wage employment for the poor; Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY, Golden Jubilee Village Self-Earning Scheme (now called Deen Dayal Upadhyay Antyodaya Yojana); Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY), which is a housing scheme for the rural homeless; aid for widows (bidhaba bhata); aid for the elderly (barddakya bhata); and subsidised rice for those below the poverty line (BPL, caula).

13 The SGRY wage-employment programme, for example, which was implemented in September 2001, has become a very important scheme for the village-level political economy in the mid-2000s. Through this scheme, many concrete roads are now (as of 2005) being constructed as durable assets within villages, and villagers are employed as wage labourers (part of the wage being paid in rice).

14 The common use of such a phrase is related to the popularity of the teachings of the Bhagavad Gītā, which emphasises work as duty and service.

15 Nevertheless, significant differences distinguish the caste-based sacrificial organisation of the ritual sphere and its application in the political sphere. Cooperation in the ritual sphere involves functional division of work in which each caste has a different role to play. In contrast, the idea of each caste having a different function is irrelevant in the political sphere. What matters in the political sphere is to ensure equal rights and participation of diverse caste groups.

16 On the importance of place, Christian Norberg-Schulz (1980) talks of “genius loci” (the attendant spirit of a place) in relation to “vernacular architecture”. Genius loci can be understood as a poetic way of describing the collective memory associated with a place and its capacity to evoke emotions, sentiments and meanings.

17 In this regard, the redistribution of resources by the state from the urban to the rural is possible precisely because urban capitalism has developed sufficiently to enable such transfer of wealth. Although many scholars point out the disjunction between democracy and development in India today (Kohli 1993, Currie 1996, Varshney 1995, Nayyar 1998), we also need to pay attention to their paradoxical interdependence. I say paradoxical because there is indeed a contradiction between democracy and development at a deeper level. Democracy is not only about equal enfranchisement but providing the capacity of self-determination to all. Democracy, in the sense of self-determination, is about providing socio-political conditions in which each person can pursue their desired way of life. However, today’s development under global capitalism demands people to be economically useful, hence restricting their ways of life. What is more important is the tension at the deeper level of value of life or life form, rather than issues of equality and disparity.
11 Conclusion

Beyond the postcolonial

Where can we find the basis of social and political morality in India today? Can there be an Indian form of democracy inspired by its own culture and history? Wherein lies the ethical foundation of democracy in India? What role does the ontology of caste play thereof? These are some of the basic questions that I have tried to answer in this book. As I discussed in the introduction, in a postcolonial version of the liberal–communitarian debate among the Indian intelligentsia, the liberals, arguing for the promotion of universal human rights through state-led modernisation, confront communitarians calling for the reappraisal of traditional ethics and the spirit of tolerance found in society. In the course of this book, I have tried to show how the very framework of this debate that dichotomously opposes the modern state and traditional society is a product of colonialism and hence reflects India’s postcolonial predicament.

I also pointed out that many studies on Indian society have tended to concentrate on analyses of caste hierarchy with the brāhmaṇa at its apex and/or the structure of dominance centred on kingship and dominant caste. However, these studies do not consider the perspective that people are not just embedded in systems and structures, but are capable of initiating changes, or at least giving new meanings to changes. It goes without saying that Indian society has undergone and continues to undergo significant transformations in history. The issue then is how to describe both continuity and change and analyse how people’s agency works. I attempted to do so in this book by looking at how major changes in the institutional context shaped the moral–practical application of historically accumulated cultural resources by the people.

The colonial dichotomy dominated the main framework of the colonial and postcolonial state and society. However, since the mid-1990s in particular, successful attempts are being made to overcome this dichotomy. The incident proclaiming village unification that I presented at the beginning of Chapter 1 can be interpreted retrospectively as an indication of the deepening of democracy that was to come. Such movements cannot be considered straightforwardly as the triumph of state-led modernisation, or as the revival of traditional social ethics. Rather, they should be seen as part of a more complex process of mutual change in the interaction between the state and society in Indian history. I dealt with a longue durée historical transformation of a local society, considering its changing...
relationship with the state from the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial to what I venture to call the post-postcolonial in order to understand how the colonial dichotomy was created and sustained and is presently in the process of being resolved.

**Ontological equality as an ethical foundation**

Hierarchy of status and centrality of power are indeed important in Indian society. However, in this book, I stressed the significance of another fundamental value, ontological equality. Ontological equality provides the ethical basis for showing respect and care towards others, demanding the same from others and commanding respect and care of the self. The three values—hierarchy, centrality and equality—define caste relations in complex ways. Status and power may differentiate the self from the other, but the self and the other are identical and equal in essence. Such equality, however, does not and cannot define social norms. The value of ontological equality is the counterpart of the hegemonic social structure based on status and power. It functions as the moral basis for reassembling existing socio-political relationships from the perspective of mutual respect and care between the self and the other.

I have suggested that the interplay of the three values—hierarchy, centrality and equality—has shaped history, society and politics in India. I have also argued that this very interplay constituted the mechanism of sacrifice as the fundamental principle of life. Only (symbolic) death by sacrifice can bring about regeneration and rebirth. By death, I mean the destruction of one’s existence at the phenomenal level and the denial of the hegemonic structure of status and power. The ultimate oneness underlying the existence of all beings emanates through such destruction and denial, and equality becomes all pervading. Sacrifice is the restructuring of the self as a part of the whole by offering the self to a greater being and identifying with the all-pervading, immanent oneness.

Here I want to stress that offering the self to a greater being has nothing to do with totalitarianism, where a nation or community is prioritised over the self. The self that is reconstructed through sacrifice is a part of the whole, but is also equal to the whole in essence. In other words, differences and diversity exist at the phenomenal level, while all are one and equal in essence. In fact, ontological equality can find its expression only in the form of diversity and heterogeneity. Such affirmation of diversity based on ontological equality allows people to be parts of the whole and demand equal respect without being subjugated to the whole. At the same time, they can serve the whole, each in individual ways, by having their unique roles and positions, as long as their existence is equally respected. Here we see the moral foundation of a diverse society.

It is my contention that the value of ontological equality in India (and beyond) has held universal significance as an ethical basis whereby diversity and heterogeneity are affirmed. Affirmation of diversity based on the value of ontological equality in Indian history and society is, I think, the most important cultural resource to offer an ethico-political foundation for both challenging the hegemonic hierarchy
of status and the centrality of power and for constructing an alternative sociality from below.

**Historical transformation**

In early modern Orissa, new frontiers emerged with the opening of the forests. These were the meeting points of diverse people with different ways of life across the forest and the plain, as well as sites for tribalisation and Hinduisation. The management of diversity was institutionalised by the system of entitlements, which prescribed the rights and duties of community members as well as their ways of natural resource utilisation. This system was characterised not only by hierarchy of status and centrality of power but also by careful collective management of the natural and social environment based on the affirmation of diversity. The geographical basis of this system was the local community—the fort area in the case of Khurda—but the system was not complete at the local level. It required the king as the central sacrificer and the grantor of the entitlements. Since the Khurda king was the earthly representative of the universal god Jagannātha, the positions of local community members in the socio-político-cosmic whole were guaranteed through their performance of prescribed duties and “eating the land” ascribed by the king. A person’s everyday activity was a meaningful sacrificial offering to the local goddess, king and Jagannātha, which in turn secured his/her place in the local community, the kingdom and the universe. Thus, there were significant interrelationships between caste, community ethos, patriotism and religious devotionalism.

The importance of the local community—fort areas—should also be understood in relation to the development of the market economy and military–administrative apparatus in early modern Orissa. The system of entitlements did not collapse as the market and the state administration developed. Rather, the fort areas in Khurda functioned as important local military–administrative centres for the state and also as the basic site of production in the hinterlands that provided raw cotton for manufacturing textile and rice for trade in the market that thrived on cowry money transactions.

Colonialism brought about major transformations in two stages. As revisionist historians point out, there was an aspect of continuous development from the precolonial to the colonial. Pre-existing commercial and financial networks and state administrative apparatus were reorganised and incorporated into the imperial administration and economy by the colonial government from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. However, as postcolonial historians argue, colonialism also brought about disruptive changes in local society. The introduction of private land ownership in the 1820s–1830s led to the breakdown of the system of entitlements and the destruction of the socio-economic institutions underlying community cooperation. The ‘traditional’ dominant caste-centred jajmani system was created during this phase of colonialism.

As the revisionists point out, this process involved the maintenance of the local structure of dominance. However, as it entailed the traditionalisation of the
structure of hierarchy and dominance, the aspect of ontological equality in the sacrificial ethics of parts serving the whole came to be downplayed. The logic of revolving values was preserved in practice only in the ritual sphere. The local economy based on cowry was irreparably damaged as the enforced introduction of silver coins for tax levied by the colonial government at the beginning of the nineteenth century led to a major depreciation of cowry value. In Khurda, kingship became ritualised as the king became the head of the Jagannātha temple. As a result, kingship and religion came to represent the socio-political ethics that existed ‘elsewhere’ rather than in the ‘here-and-now’.

The second phase of colonial transformation occurred around the mid-nineteenth century. The attention of the colonial state shifted from tax collection by survey and settlement to the investigation of native customs and religion through ethnographic description and analysis. Here the politico-economic sphere of the colonial state and the socio-religious sphere of ‘native’ society were completely separated, as the latter became the object of colonial academic and administrative concern. In Khurda, after many twists and turns, the Jagannātha temple, which was previously run by state taxes, was given the right to levy taxes on certain lands. The connection between the temple and the state was thus severed. Kingship was further ritualised as colonial policies created the economic basis for an autonomous religio-ritual sphere in Orissa headed by the Puri (ex-Khurda) king.

Meanwhile, the imperial economy further penetrated local society leading to increasing commercialisation of agriculture in the late nineteenth century. Major transformations in local agricultural relations occurred during this period. Agricultural commercialisation led to increased social stratification and the growth of a merchant class as the new rich. The old dominant classes who could not adjust to these changes became impoverished. The low castes and peasants left behind in the process of commercialisation became even poorer and were forced to become tenant farmers and bonded labourers. New dominant classes were formed by the combination of the remains of the old dominant classes and the new rich who sought to join the ranks of ‘traditional’ authority in the locality by acquiring land and official posts related to the colonially ritualised kingship. Local community rituals, such as the Goddess Rāmacaṇḍī festival of Garh Manitri, thrived as occasions to display such authority. The religio-ritual sphere clearly proved to be the locus of people’s identity in local society.

This religio-ritual identity based on the community ethics of local society, with Jagannātha and the Puri king as the central symbols, came to be linked with popular patriotism. By idealising ritualised religion and kingship of the elsewhere, it defied colonialism and provided the foundation for esoteric nationalism. Popular patriotism and elite Oriya nationalism had different roots. The latter began over linguistic issues and was founded on the ideals of social reform and progress. They did converge in anti-colonial mass movements over temple law suits in the 1880s, and popular patriotism, Oriya nationalism and Indian nationalism later came together during the anti-colonial movements of the 1920s and 1930s. However, the rational progressivism of the elite nationalists and popular patriotism based on religio-ritual sacrificial ethics were not entirely integrated.
Postcolonial predicament

The dissonance between the techno-rational political idea of the elite and the religio-ontological cultural identity of the popular masses was poignantly exposed after Indian independence. The postcolonial predicament involved a disjunction between the politico-economic sphere (based on the logic of the fish) and the socio-cultural sphere (based on the logic of the community) in rural society. The independent government tried to establish the logic of the nation-state by redefining the culture of traditional society as national culture and linking its cultural ethos to national politics. However, the creation of a homogenous national space militated against the sacrificial ethics of the heterogeneous parts serving the whole.

The percolation of populist politics and democracy in the village manifested in the form of factional politics from the 1960s to the early 1990s. The structure of dominance centred on the dominant caste that had been created under colonialism became linked to majority rule in democratic politics, as the politico-economic sphere and distribution of state resources were run by factions led by the dominant caste. Factional politics was criticised from the point of view of community ethics. It was considered a manifestation of social deterioration characteristic of kalijuga, a necessary evil in the face of reality and a sphere where community ethics did not apply.

Low-caste subalterns attempted to redefine tradition. They started refusing to play ritual roles which they saw as degrading and oppressive. They also tried to reinterpret the meaning of caste from a subaltern point of view. For them, caste was not about hierarchy and dominance but about equal parts serving the whole. Each part was necessary and indispensable for the reproduction and prosperity of the whole, and at an ontological level, in the eyes of god, all are equal.

The value of ontological equality can be observed in the ritual of the Rāmacaṇḍī festival. There, the three values of equality, hierarchy and centrality unfold in revolving relationships. In some anthropological theories, the phase of denial of status and power is construed as communitas and the phase of anti-structure in the rituals. I try, however, to show that this phase, when ontological equality pervades, does not merely have a functional role for structural reproduction. I focus on its potential as the basis for reflecting on and reformulating relationships from below.

Post-postcolonial vernacular democracy

Although the redefinition of social relations was limited to the socio-cultural sphere in the heyday of factional politics, the transformation of social relations from below began to extend to the sphere of politics from the mid-1990s. By this time, even the dominant caste was disillusioned by factional politics that brought about divisions between brothers and kin over money and influence. Low castes criticised the dominant caste–led factional politics for failing to utilise state resources for local development. They also began to demand representation in local politics.
Local politics was greatly transformed as equal participation in local self-government was institutionally supported by the panchayat reforms of 1992. As the practice of factional politics and the centrality of the dominant caste are breaking down, the institution of the gram panchayat is gradually achieving its prescribed goal. Democracy based on proportional representation is also gradually taking root in local society.

The values and practices of sacrificial cooperation and ontological equality, which have been preserved mainly in the ritual and religious sphere as cultural resources, are now re-emphasised in people’s discourses as the ethical model of social and political relationships. I see this as a subaltern attempt to re-articulate sacrificial ethics with democratic values. When low castes and women participate in village politics, they say that they are doing their duty by representing their respective groups. Their view of the gram panchayat is that it should be run according to the logic of sacrificial cooperation that acknowledges the ontological equality of different parts. Each part offers its duty as service for the whole and expects an appropriate share in lieu of contribution.

Here the idiom of sacrifice as a cultural resource is given new meaning in democratic practices. We see signs of new discourse and practices and the potential of subaltern agency for creating an alternative future. The subalterns re-contextualise caste relations in the framework of egalitarian sacrificial ethics and reinterpret these relations as the foundations of local democracy. Many low-caste people strongly resist discrimination but they consider caste distinctions per se not only as the basis of identity but also as a necessary political framework for diverse groups to secure rights to equal political participation.

Subaltern agency here presents a pragmatic rejoinder to and a way of surpassing the postcolonial liberal–communitarian debate between the endorsement of individual rights and the re-evaluation of community virtues. The possibility of vernacular democracy lies in such moral–practical articulation between the universality of democratic rights and the historically and culturally nurtured virtue of sacrificial ethics. By vernacular, I refer to the forms of embodied practice and discourse historically accumulated in the people’s lifeworld. Idioms of sacrifice, such as service, duty and shares, were used in the early modern system of entitlements and in postcolonial sacrificial rituals as symbols to culturally and ethically define social relationships. Today, by reinterpreting and creatively utilising this vernacular cultural resource, it is possible to maintain a mutual understanding of sacrificial ethics with an emphasis on egalitarianism to bring about a model of democratic cooperation among diverse groups.

Subaltern reinterpretation of caste transforms the ‘tradition’ of local society defined by hierarchy and power into heterogeneous cooperation based on ontological equality. Egalitarian sacrificial ethics proposed from below is a new vision of local society that respects the uniqueness of various social groups and guarantees their dignity and rights. It creatively reinterprets caste and offers a potential ideological foundation for establishing democracy based on the affirmation of difference. This new dynamic is gradually transforming the grammar of everyday social practice through moral–practical negotiations. In this process, the
principles of the modern state (rights and rationality) are articulated with the cultural ethics of local society (duty and service). Thus, we see a transition from the postcolonial, where there was a disjunction between the principles of the modern state and those of local society, to the post-postcolonial.

Key to the shift is the transformation of the significance of ontological equality. Under the postcolonial disjunction in local society the sacrificial structure in the socio-cultural sphere reproduced the network of humans, nature, ancestors and gods in the cycle of death and regeneration. According to this configuration, there is only cyclic reproduction as social change and progress is denied. In fact, the very denial of change qualified as a manifestation of authentic tradition and the foundation of cultural identity. Ontological equality was the value on which such cyclic sacrificial structure was based, but it did not manifest directly in the material world as it was the other-worldly anti-structure of the dominant politico-economic structure. In the politico-economic sphere, in the meantime, the model of social development based on human rights and rationality was the ideological foundation of representative democracy in independent India. This sphere aimed for the realisation of society based on freedom and equality in the everyday world. These ideals, however, were not achieved immediately, as local society in Orissa was riddled with factional politics and corruption centred on the dominant caste. In such a situation, people sought self-gain by unethical means in the politico-economic sphere while trying to secure their self-identity in the socio-cultural sphere. Thus, they faced an ethical dilemma.

Vernacular democracy in local society in Orissa attempts to resolve such a dilemma. In the process of its development the value of ontological equality was transformed from an other-worldly principle of anti-structure to an ideal that functions as a reference point to reflect on the present and imagine a better future in this world. Ontological equality never, by its nature, fully manifests itself in the everyday world, and hence, its realisation is constantly deferred as an unfulfilled ideal. It is this very deferring that enables the ideal of equality of all beings to become the ethical basis of critiquing the present and opens up hope for the new future (Bloch 1977 [1932], Kasuga 2007, Miyazaki 2006).

Is the post-postcolonial transformation a story of the success of vernacular democracy with a happy ending? Not entirely. While the subalterns seem to enjoy their spring in the gram panchayat, the battlefield for the dominant classes seems to have shifted from the politics of control over state resources to acquiring wealth in the market economy. The subalterns seem to claim victory in the place where many of the dominant classes have already lost interest and vacated. Meanwhile, some of the dominant classes have attempted to pursue both economic success in the global economy and imposition of majoritarian values on society through Hindu nationalism.

Currie says that “50 years of electoral multiparty democracy in India have failed to guarantee good governance in the economic sphere” (1996: 803). While India is succeeding reasonably in making agrarian local society into a place of democracy, and in creating a viable market economy in urban areas, there is no proper coordination between the two spheres. The spread of democracy has
empowered more people to have their say in politics, but the market economy has tended to privilege the rich at the expense of the poor. Yet, it is the wealth of the market economy that allows the state to redistribute resources for development schemes implemented by local self-governments (Varshney 1995: 13, 1998). In this situation, there is an increasing disjunction, and paradoxical interdependence, between the success of participatory democracy and vibrant economic development in contemporary India (Nayyar 1998, Kohli 1993, Currie 1996, Varshney 1995).

Nevertheless, from the late 2000s onwards, we may note people’s rising aspirations towards building a constructive relationship between politics and economics. People’s quest for a better life is linked to securing life-sustaining land, water, forests, economic infrastructure and human development in the form of education and health care (Neyazi, Tanabe and Ishizaka 2014). These are signs that the people want democratic politics to be connected to sustainable and cumulative development. The challenge and agenda for post-postcolonial India is to investigate the means of ensuring complementarity between vernacular democracy and the global economy.

Vernacular democracy and biomoral relationships

What are the wider implications of vernacular democracy in our world today? How does vernacular democracy work in the age of biopolitics, where life is the central agenda of politics? Politics cannot just be about guaranteeing life for one’s own people.1 Democracy is self-government by the people who wish not simply to live, but to live well together. Politics must find ways to respond to such aspirations. What are the conditions for living a good collective life? How can democracy bring about such conditions?

Aspirations for a good life together involve pursuing one’s way of life, which in turn is created by forming what one believes are good relationships between the self and the other. I suggest that we include the biomoral interactions—fluid exchanges between the self and the other (Chapter 6)—as an ethical facet of biopolitics so that the major agenda for democracy becomes how to bring about socio-political conditions that will enable people to pursue their own way of life in symmetrical interactions and exchanges with others.2 Vernacular democracy, as an attempt to live together diversely and equally, is a revised form of the biomoral consideration for multiple ways of life. It seeks a heterogeneous and yet symmetrically communicative society based on the critique of both the older biomoral practices associated with caste hierarchy and individualistic self-seeking in the political economy. Moreover, attention to biomoral relationships, as well as the affirmation of diversity based on ontological equality, open up perspectives on connective, dividual and vital relationships between human life and the non-human world (Deleuze 1992, Marriott 1976, Strathern 1988, Latour 1993, Appadurai 2016).3

The post-postcolonial transformation of Indian society marks an important phase in local socio-political practices where there is an apparent mediation of the postcolonial dichotomy through the establishment of vernacular democracy.
This does not mean, however, the end of antagonism, conflict and division. Rather, conflicts and dilemmas hitherto suppressed in the postcolonial structure of hegemony have begun to manifest in the political process as the subaltern has been given a voice. There is a widening of agenda in this process. We cannot presuppose that the pedagogy of rationality from above will automatically bring about the universal basis for democracy. Neither can we support traditionalism or majoritarianism that entails hierarchy and exclusion.

We have to go beyond the presupposition that there must be a common idea or identity behind democratic communities. What we need is a democratic ethos for living together diversely and equally, grounded in people’s sense, value and practice. This requires still more churning of cultural resources—old and new—by multiple agents. Here, it is necessary to acknowledge division and dilemmas in society and to ensure participatory and enunciative space for the widest possible range of people (Mouffe 1993, Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Stavrakakis 1999).

In this process, the very existence and political enrolment of heterogeneity, conflicts and dilemmas are conditions, rather than impediments, for a democracy that is always “to come” (Derrida 1996, 1997, Mouffe 1993, Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Stavrakakis 1999).

We need to construct a new vision of society and politics from the experiences of the lifeworlds of multiple localities while being aware of their global connections. The potentiality of vernacular democracy unfolds when it is founded on the history and culture of local societies on which the people’s life forms are based, and diverse people acquire the capacity to reimagine and reformulate their biomoral relationships with others as ethico-political agents for the open future.

Notes

1 The COVID-19 pandemic has thrust this question to the forefront in an acute manner. Self-protection is given utmost priority. In many places, even death ceremonies were practically abandoned to protect human life. Should we aim for survival alone or do we wish to live well with human and non-human others?

2 Appadurai suggests “progressive dividualism”, which echoes with my suggestion of combining biomoral practices with democratic politics (Appadurai 2016: 145–8).

3 Indeed, the environmental issue has become an important part of alternative democratic movements (Tokita-Tanabe and Tanabe 2014, Cadena and Blaser 2018).

4 As Mouffe says, “The real issue is not to find arguments to justify the rationality or universality of liberal democracy that would be acceptable by every rational or reasonable person. Liberal democratic principles can only be defended in a contextualist manner, … what is needed is the creation of a democratic ethos” (1996: 5, emphasis in original). In support of Mouffe, Stavrakakis says, “Instead of harmonizing subjectivities democracy recognizes the division of the citizens’ identities and the fluidity of their political persuasions” (1999: 129).

5 Derrida’s “Democracy to come” is based on a sustained “engagement with regards to democracy” as an open-ended project that is inscribed by undecidability and constant deconstruction (1996: 83). This undecidability keeps every decision and situation open to other possibilities (or ‘alternates’). Also see Mouffe (1996) and Laclau (2000) on the importance of undecidability for political ethics in democracy.
Appendix 1
Deed of Sale of Village Office

Deed of Sale by Pudhans [pradhāna] of Mouzah Odeypore in Pergunnah [parganā] Limbaee

Dated Wednesday, 27th Assin [Āświna], in the 43rd Ank [aṅka] or year of the reign of Rajah Beer Kishore Deo Maharajah.¹

We four persons, Dhurnee Das, Koornee Das, Kesub Das and Seba Das, Pudhans of mouzah Odeypore in Pergunnah Limbaee, having this day received from Kishen Patjoosee Mahapater, inhabitant of Putna Kishen Sarunpore, Hat [Hāṭa] Delang, in the above pergunnah, the sum of Rs. 76-8 [76 rupees 8 anna] in cowrees, or at the current rate of exchange of 2k-4p. [2 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa] per rupee, altogether 172 kahuns [kāhāṇa],² which is a fair price, execute the following deed of sale. We sell to you our pudhanee [pradhāni] or right of management (huk-i-serbera [haq-e-sarbarāh]) in the whole of the said village of Odeypore, the ruckba [rakabā] of which is about 15 battees [bāṭi] 10 beegahs [bighā], and also our hita [hetā] pudhanee or service lands, which are 3 beegahs Dehee [dehrī], 3 beegahs Kala [kalāḍiha], and 7 beegahs Sarud [śarada], altogether 13 beegahs. You will hold the pudhanee of the village as long as the sun, moon and earth last. Should any Sawunt [sāānta] or chief, or our heirs or any other claimants advance a claim, we will be responsible, so long also you will enjoy the hita [hetā] pudhanee or service lands, which we have sold, with everything above and beneath, water, dry land, mineral productions, wells, wood, stones, fruit trees, &c. You may cut down and plant trees on the ground and act as you please with the above hita; also you will receive the customary sarhee (siropa) [śāṛhī (siropā)] of Sri Juggunnath Jeo. This deed will stand for ever as a kirai putr [kharaṛa patra] and bishodun [biṣodhana] or receipt.

Witnesses—several Pudhans and Bhooees.

Deed of Sale by a Bhooee or Village Accountant

Dated Monday, 25th Assin, in the 17th Ank or year of the reign of Biresree Raja Dirb Sing Deo Maharajah.³

I, who am Rugoo Nath Maintee, Bhooee of Mouzah Gowree Pot Matiapara, in Pergunnah Limbaee, execute in [sic, on] behalf of Sunkur Putnaik, inhabitant of Mouzah Odeypore, the following deed of sale, having this day received from you

Deed of Sale by a Bhooee or Village Accountant

Dated Monday, 25th Assin, in the 17th Ank or year of the reign of Biresree Raja Dirb Sing Deo Maharajah.³

I, who am Rugoo Nath Maintee, Bhooee of Mouzah Gowree Pot Matiapara, in Pergunnah Limbaee, execute in [sic, on] behalf of Sunkur Putnaik, inhabitant of Mouzah Odeypore, the following deed of sale, having this day received from you
the sum of 35 rupees in cowries or kahuns 83-2 [83 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa] at the rate of 2-6 [2 kāhāṇa 6 paṇa] per rupee,\(^4\) which is a fair and even price. I hereby sell to you in exchange for that sum the Bhooe [Bhoi] Giri or Office of Bhooe of the said mouzah, which was formerly purchased by my father with the sanction of the Maharajah. The ruckba of the village is about 85 battees (or beegahs 1,700). I sell you likewise my hita lands which are established at the customary rate of 12-8 [12 rupees 8 anna] rupees per battee, with my dustooree [dasturi] and russoom [rasūm]. You will enjoy the office of Bhooe and the hita land as long as the sun, moon and earth last. Should any sawunt (chief) or huqdar [hakadāra], or neigh-bour or heirs of mine advance any claims, I shall be responsible for satisfying them. Till the day of resurrection, you will possess the hita land, and everything above and beneath it—water, dry land, mineral productions, ponds, wells, trees, stones—you may cut down and plant trees at your pleasure. This is given as a deed of sale and receipt. Witnesses—several Pudhans and Bhooees, and others (Stirling 1904: xxxiii, parentheses added).

Notes

1 The forty-third reginal year of Bīrakeśarideba corresponds to 1770–1771 AD (Mahapatra 1969: 285).
2 Here, 76 rupees 8 anna (1 anna is 1/16 rupee) was paid in cowries at the rate of 2 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa per rupee, which becomes 172 kāhāṇa. The exchange rate between rupees and cowries had to be specified each time as it fluctuated.
3 The seventeenth reginal year of Dibyasiṃhadeba (I) corresponds to 1701–1702 AD (Mahapatra 1969: 171).
4 Here, 35 rupees was paid in cowries at the rate of 2 kāhāṇa 6 paṇa per rupee, which is 83 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa.
Appendix 2
Details of State Tax

a) Revenue from the royal government’s direct shares

Category a) represents the state’s direct relationship with the villages that formed the foundation of production. It constituted a mere 13.62 per cent of the state’s revenue. The state allowed the resources from the villages to be first distributed to the local entitlement holders. This positioning of the state is reflected in the phrase “remainder for the state” (koṭha rahaṇi), which is the name for the land part of the state’s direct share. Apart from this direct share, the state also took cash cowry tax from the users of the swidden fields (growing millet and cotton), and from the fishing and oil-pressing businesses, which are related to the market economy.

The direct share of the royal government from the resources available from Garh Manitri was 294 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa 15 gaṇḍā. The land part, namely the state-owned land, was 1 bāṭi 10 māṇa 14 guṇṭha 2 biśwā, which was worth 117 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa 15 gaṇḍā. From this, state tax of 75 per cent was collected. The remaining 25 per cent was the tenant cultivators’ share. There was also the cash part (nagada kauḍi) of 176 kāhāṇa 6 paṇa that was collected by the state (Table 3.12). In total, after deducting the tenant cultivator’s share, 264 kāhāṇa 11 paṇa 11 gaṇḍā was given to the state. This amounted to only 2.08% of the local products distributed in the system of entitlements.

b) Taxes on the shares of community entitlement-holders.

Category b) denotes the state’s relationship with local entitlement holders. These were taxes collected from the shares distributed to the community entitlement holders and consisted of approximately two-thirds of the entire state tax (65.54 per cent). It was the most important source of revenue as far as taxes levied from localities were concerned. The state’s revenue presupposed the existence of a system of entitlements, which the state not only protected but was dependent upon for generating its income.

Two types of taxes were paid by the entitlement holders, namely taṅkī and utnī. According to the Selections I & II, taṅkī meant quit rent that had a specially privileged rate. Taṅkī was given to the king as “token” (Pfeffer 1978: 428) of their accepting and subjugating themselves to royal authority by which they received
their shares and assignments. As regards utnī, it is not certain precisely what kind of tax it was, but it was certainly one levied on entitlement holders, collected along with the taṅkī.

The tax rate varied in accordance with the particular relationship between the state and an entitlement holder. Obviously, in cases where there were tax exemptions and tax reductions the entitlement holders were given that much more privilege from the state. The relationship between the royal government and entitlement holders depended on the kind of exchanges that existed between the two, that is to say, what kind of function (military, administrative, or other) or value (for instance, ritual or religious legitimacy for power) the entitlement holder offered and what kind of economic/symbolic resources the king gave in return. Taxes were part of the different exchange relations that existed between the state and the community members in each locality and gave rise to the positioning of the different entitlement holders in relation to the king.

How much tax did each entitlement holder actually pay (Table 3.12)? Firstly, out of the resources of 1018 kāhāṇa 13 paṇa 10 gaṇḍā distributed as the share to the deities, there is no tax levied on the land known as the “auspicious nectar-like royal banquet” (śri amṛta maṇoī), worth 200 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa 10 gaṇḍā, which is the land donated to Lord Jagannātha of Puri, the source of legitimacy of the Orissan kingship. This tax exemption is understandable due to the politico-ritual importance of Lord Jagannātha to the royal government. Regarding the taxes for the other deities, 818 kāhāṇa 9 paṇa, there was only a low tax of 8.59 per cent levied on them, the taṅkī rate being 6.25 per cent and the utnī rate 2.34 per cent. Although deities other than Jagannātha held importance only at the regional or local level, their patronage by the royal government was of considerable significance since the king’s local legitimacy depended on how the king presented himself as the sacrificer for these communities. In contrast, there was a high tax levied on the payment for servants of deities (42.97 per cent).

Out of the 106 kāhāṇa of land donated to brāhmaṇas, 50 kāhāṇa was originally the jagir of the state general and this part was exempted from tax. As for the remaining 56 kāhāṇa, there was a taṅkī of 25 per cent and it was exempted from utnī. Tax on the brāhmaṇas was relatively low and was obviously a part of the privileges given to those brāhmaṇas who taught the locals the ideal of the sacrificial community and the significance of the king as the dharma-keeping sacrificer.¹

As regards tax rates for officials in the surrounding villages, that of the principal village head and revenue collector was 34.38 per cent, the village head 44.60 per cent and the village scribe 25.78 per cent. The tax rate for village servants in the surrounding villages, such as washermen, barbers, and carpenters, was 31.25 per cent. Although these tax rates were much lower than that of the state-owned land (75 per cent), they were still relatively high among entitlement holders. Village heads received certain privileges as administrative office holders, but seemed to have been considered more as village officers than state administrators. Their position can be ascertained from the fact that they received some direct payment from the villages.
The share of the village watchman (11 kāhāṇa), who was one of the seven fort servants, was not taxed. The village watchman was an important profession for the state; the fort played a central military function and he ensured its security. For the share of the other four fort servants, namely the carpenter, barber, potter and bed maker (205 kāhāṇa), each person was taxed 2 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa 10 gaṇḍā per head, which meant a tax rate of 7.38 per cent. The fort servants were more privileged from a tax point of view than village servants despite the fact that the contents of the job hardly differed. This was arguably because the fort servants directly served the fort, which was crucial for maintaining the operation of the state.

Military personnel were further privileged as far as tax rates were concerned. First of all, the chief, koṭha karaṇa (scribe), tax collector, labourers, and military musicians were exempt from taṅkī. Other soldiers paid reduced taxes, such as 1 kāhāṇa 4 paṇa for the fort guard, 1 kāhāṇa 8 paṇa for the boundary guard and fort watchman, and 2 kāhāṇa 14 paṇa for the rest of the foot soldiers, which is an average tax rate of 2.47 per cent. With regards the utnī, 100 kāhāṇa of the chief’s 458 kāhāṇa 2 paṇa were exempted from tax, the labourers were entirely exempted, Maguni Maharata who was a state level soldier had 210 kāhāṇa out of 300 kāhāṇa exempted. Out of the taxed amounts, there is an especially low rate of 3.91 per cent for the chief, military musicians, state level soldiers Maguni Maharata and Jaganananda, the soldier of the chief’s regiment, Parakshit Rautray and Sukhadeba Srichandan and 7.81 per cent for the other soldiers and guards.

It is not clear why the soldiers, Parakshit Rautray and Sukhadeba Srichandan in the chief’s regiment were given these tax privileges but it might have been as some kind of a special privilege given by the king to these individuals for some particular reason. It was quite common, apart from tax reduction and tax exemption, for the king to endow certain individuals with some privileges such as the use of specific titles or symbols. Thus, the tax rates of the military personnel combining taṅkī and utnī were very low, ranging from 2.13 to 10.51 per cent. This is not surprising, since the recruitment of military personnel at the community level constituted one of the utmost concerns of the state.

c) Taxes collected from the community

Category c) indicates the state’s relationship with the fort area community as a whole. It included land tax as well as the meals and transportation fees provided perhaps for various state messengers to the localities. The existence of such taxes suggests the state’s acknowledgement of the importance of local communities as socio-political units. Miscellaneous taxes from the fort area under different names such as fort deities (gāra bhagabāṭī) 20 kāhāṇa, ‘kārajī meals [?]’ 28 kāhāṇa 14 paṇa, examination meals (pariksā bhāṭ) 5 kāhāṇa, ‘khandhiāṇa [?]’ 3 kāhāṇa, transport fee (bāja kharcha) 100 kāhāṇa, ‘prostitute subject tax [?] (dāri prajā māguṇ)’ 100 kāhāṇa, plus land tax (māṇa pāṇi) 146 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa 12 gaṇḍā 2 kaḍā. Regarding land tax, out of the usable land of the whole of the Manitri fort area (80 bāṭi 4 māṇa 20 biśwā 14 guṇṭh), the jagir of the state general (baksi),
1 bāṭi 19 māṇa, was untaxed. This jagir consisted of 7 māṇa of land donated to a brāhmaṇa, and the land part of Maguni Maharata’s soldier salary, worth 1 bāṭi 12 māṇa. On the rest of the taxable land, 78 bāṭi 5 māṇa 20 biśwā was levied via a tax of 1 kāhāṇa 14 paṇa per 1 bāṭi which makes the māṇa land tax 146 kāhāṇa 12 paṇa 12 gaṇḍā 2 kaḍā. In previous studies, it has often been presupposed without foundation that the land tax comprised the major state revenue in the precolonial state, but this clearly was not the case at least in the Khurda kingdom, where land tax constituted only a small part of the state’s revenue.

Note

1 Sharma says in the context of Orissa: “The significance of land grants to Brahmanas is not difficult to appreciate. The grantees brought new knowledge which improved cultivation and inculcated in the aborigines a sense of loyalty to the established order upheld by the rulers, who could therefore dispense with the service of extra staff for maintaining law and order” (1965: 281; quoted in Kulke 1982: 246). Kulke re-emphasised the “constructive” aspect of land grants to the brāhmaṇas through which the king attempted integration of the locality, pace scholars of the “Indian Feudalism School” who interpreted these land grants in terms of the alienation of central power to the intermediaries. Karashima (1984) points out the importance of brahmadeya (the land donated to the brāhmaṇa) as a part of the king’s policy to govern the locality in the case of Chola.
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