

# **Fighting Global Neo-Extractivism**

**Fossil-Free Social Movements in  
South Africa**

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## **1 Introduction**

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# 1 Introduction

For communities living in the vicinity of fossil-fuel infrastructure, toxic leaks, displacement, and explosions have been a reality from the inception of the fossil-fuel era. ‘Sacrifice zones’ have since sprung up in the parts of the world where fossil deposits are opened for exploitation (Klein 2015). Even though the fossil-fuel industry has tried to keep it secret for a long time, the burning of fossil fuels is a major driver of climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2012). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that between 1970 and 2010, 78% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions came from fossil fuels and industry (Blanco *et al.* 2014, p. 354). However, even after the Paris Climate Agreement in late 2015, the 20 largest economies in the world (G20) provided three times more funds to fossil fuels than to renewable energy (Oil Change International and Friends of the Earth 2020). As it stands, the post-Covid-19 economic recovery will largely be fossil-fuelled in the foreseeable future. But this book is less about predictions and more about contemporary questions of how South African and global fossil-free social movements challenge and change political structures on a warming planet. Therefore we need a thorough understanding of the political power structures enabling fossil fuels.

The fossil-fuel industry remains powerful in financial strength and political connection (Goodman *et al.* 2020). Fossil-fuel interests are deeply entrenched in the fossil-fuel-producing states and the world economy (Di Muzio 2015; Mitchell 2013). This is most obvious for state-owned enterprises, such as Petrobras in Brazil, Statoil in Norway, or the Saudi Arabian Oil Company: in these countries especially fossil-fuel interests are *raison d’État*. In emerging economies like Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, new fossil-fuel infrastructure is under construction and presented as an integral part of the development model. The global supply chains are dripping with fossil fuels. These factors result in the runaway extraction and consumption of fossil fuels globally (see Figure 1.1).

However, today’s political juncture leaves the ‘fossil-fuel bloc’ increasingly isolated, and ‘substantial possibilities for change have begun to emerge’ (Goodman *et al.* 2020, p. 41). Oil wells, gas pipelines, and coal mines increasingly symbolise an uneasiness with the destruction of the planet’s climate and species extinction. Demonstrations in major fossil-fuel developing countries, such as




Figure 1.1 Global fossil fuel consumption.

South Africa, the USA, Canada, Germany, and Australia, are making headlines. Banners flying at demonstrations to ‘end dirty coal’ or to ‘frack off’ and blocking coal mines and pipelines pressure governments to reconsider whether they should allow the fossil deposits buried underground to be exploited. While the fossil-fuel era is everything but history, new social movements emerge, as fossil-fuel interests are still promoted and sustained (de Graaf and Sovacool 2020, pp. 133–139). Activists draw lines between their livelihoods and fossil-fuel projects. Anti-fossil-fuel movements challenge fossil-fuel exploitation and investment by state and private actors. They do so by raising awareness for the livelihoods that are destroyed locally and pointing out how the burning of fossil fuels accelerates climate change globally.

Social movements are more and more recognised for actively shaping energy policy (Temper *et al.* 2020; Piggot 2018). I define social movements against fossil fuels or fossil-free movements (which I will use interchangeably) as organised and sustained groups using different tactics to stop fossil-fuel projects at the point of extraction or any other point of the production cycle. Fossil-free activists are at particular risk of violence, as they threaten the profits of a billion-dollar industry that is often backed by the state and therefore heavily policed. The challenge to stop fossil fuels might be coupled with a range of other demands and frames around conservation, climate change, or anti-racism.

How struggles against fossil fuels play out is context-specific and may involve diverse people and organisations, mainly in fossil-fuel-producing states. Climate activists put increasing pressure on governments and the fossil-fuel industry to bring the fossil-fuel era to an end. The Fridays for Future movement in Europe, Frack Free groups around the world, the Sunrise Movement in the USA, Extinction Rebellion in Western Europe, and the Standing Rock mobilisation against the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada to the USA made claims against the fossil-fuel industry and mobilised impressive numbers of activists over time. Social movement mobilisations against fossil fuels shift the climate change debate and influence fossil fuel use (Temper *et al.* 2020).

Mobilisations against fossil-fuel projects are often happening in countries with heavy carbon footprints outside the Western hemisphere. The fight of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta or the Yasuni-ITT initiative in Ecuador against oil is among the better-known examples. But most of the global struggles against fossil fuels are untold. The names of activists involved and grievances are never voiced. These ‘grassroots environmentalists’ (Staggenborg 2020) are an integral part of the global movement changing energy politics from the bottom up. Often, they form alliances with bigger movements against fossil fuels.

This book explores struggles against fossil fuels in South Africa, Africa’s biggest coal producer and CO<sub>2</sub> emitter from fossil fuels. As I will show in this book, the minerals-energy complex (MEC) – understood as the tight interlinkages among South Africa’s mining and energy sectors, finance, and the state (Fine 2008; Fine and Rustonjee 1996) – is alive and kicking. However, the South African fossil-fuel bloc is challenged by social movements from within the country and faces international pressure for de-carbonisation, emanating from international climate treaties.

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In 2017, 90% of the coal consumed in Africa was produced in South Africa (Mining Africa 2017). As part of the government's growth strategy to expand onshore and offshore fossil-fuel production, multiple sites are currently under application, including lands bordering residential, farm, and conservation areas (Petroleum Agency South Africa n.d.). Existing historical studies provide important insights into understanding fossil-fuel expansionism in South Africa (Hallowes 2011; Lang 1995). However, contemporary fossil-fuel expansion and resistance sites have not yet been studied in any great detail in South Africa. While empirical studies on high-profile anti-fossil-fuel resistances emphasise dispossession, violence, criminalisation of activists, and resistance elsewhere (e.g. Sander 2017; Coryat and Picq 2016; Okonta and Oronto 2003), little has been written about contentious fossil-fuel frontiers in South Africa (useful exceptions include Bond 2018b; Leonard 2016, 2011).

This book offers both an analysis of fossil-fuel hegemony defined as political power entrenching fossil fuels and social movement claim-making against new fossil-fuel projects in South Africa. Fossil-fuel hegemony is place-based and takes different forms depending on previous land uses, forms of resistance, and claim-making of anti-fossil-fuel movements. I offer a qualitative analysis of two different social movement campaigns in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) informed by fieldwork undertaken on the ground. Formed in 2014, the Save our iMfolozi Wilderness campaign's (SAVE) goal is to stop coal mining expansion at the border of the oldest African nature reserve, Hluhluwe–iMfolozi Park. SAVE's campaign is led by two activists of the Global Environmental Trust (GET) who built and extended a social movement network and organise a social movement campaign. Under the SAVE umbrella, GET managed to bring together 11 social and environmental groups determined to stop coal-mining projects in the area. The other social movement campaign I research is Frack Free South Africa (FFSA). This alliance began in 2015 with core activists recruited from the KZN Midlands, which is an affluent part of the province. Many nature conservancies and local businesses in areas proposed for fracking support FFSA. Both SAVE and FFSA stage protests at public consultation meetings and come up with slogans to defend places they value. Their ongoing efforts to stop fossil-fuel expansion have also been covered in the press. None of the campaigns is officially supported by larger organisations such as unions or political parties. This lack of support makes it particularly challenging for FFSA and SAVE to access resources and sustain their campaigns. As I will show, even within KwaZulu-Natal province, the differences in actor configurations and prior land use shape the scope and intensity of anti-fossil-fuel mobilisations.

I will also show that the involvement of NGOs is a key in starting and sustaining anti-fossil-fuel mobilisation. NGOs are assuming a leadership role in anti-fossil-fuel mobilisation in South Africa. Today's resource conflict frontiers can no longer be described as conflicts between labour and capital. The number of actors involved in mining conflicts has increased to include 'new NGO alliances, activist scholars, overall more international political engagement', who have changed the face of anti-mining struggles (Bebbington *et al.* 2008, p. 902). Increasingly, fossil-fuel projects are resisted before the commencement of operations.

### ***Neo-Extractivism, Fossil Fuels, and the Climate Crisis in South Africa***

In African contexts and elsewhere, states have embarked on a ‘full-fledged neo-liberalism’ path from the 1990s onwards. Major changes in the macroeconomic environment and structural adjustment policies have precipitated changes in fiscal policy, which have also led to the decline of formal sector jobs in industries such as mining (Larmer and Laterza 2017, p. 703; Larmer 2010). The tendency to destroy the ‘forces of production’ by wrecking livelihoods and poor working conditions under neo-liberal capitalism simultaneously provoked powerful resistance movements in Africa and elsewhere (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014, p. 20).

In the Global South, the extension of extractivism in remote areas is disproportionately affecting indigenous peoples and small farmers (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014, p. 1). The neo-liberal extraction model in the Global South is marked by an ongoing ‘growth and export-oriented development strategy’ driven mainly by liberalisation of the resources sectors (Engels and Dietz 2017, p. 1). Critical discussions of the global neoliberal extraction model focus increasingly on questions around climate change and environmental degradation (Pirani 2018; Malm 2016; Di Muzio 2015).

South Africa’s government faces contradictions between its promotion of fossil-fuel extractivism and the commitments made at the Paris Climate Summit. In the context of the Paris summit, the South African government has recognised that the burning of fossil fuels results in ‘marked temperature increases, rainfall variation, and rising sea levels as well as an increased frequency of severe weather events’ (UNFCCC 2016). However, the government’s projected industrial policy conflicts with the pledge of reaching peak emission between 2025 and 2030 and reducing its emission footprint thereafter (Climate Action Tracker 2018).

Coal remains the primary source for energy generation in South Africa with an over 90% contribution to the grid, followed by nuclear, which adds just over 5% (World Bank 2018; Department of Energy 2016). As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, South Africa has recognised adverse impacts stemming from climate change. Reportedly 71% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 1988 originate from fossil-fuel-producing companies (Griffin 2017). South Africa already suffers from climate change-related droughts and other extreme weather events (Hallowes 2015). From the 1970s onwards, South Africa’s state-owned utility Eskom has massively increased coal input, resulting in a rise in the power grid’s contribution to climate change (Burton and Winkler 2014, p. 2). South Africa’s carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption are the 12th highest worldwide (The Guardian Datablog 2016).

According to Bond (2008, p. 1047), climate change activism in South Africa is vital, because ‘CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, measured as a percentage of per capita GDP, are twenty times higher than even those of the United States’, thanks to the economy’s excessive reliance on coal. Activists are questioning the current neo-liberal model of extractivism that underlies the imminent fossil-fuel expansion. South Africa’s high numbers of protests can also be attributed to the intensification of

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environmental crises and immanent land grabs (Runciman *et al.* 2016; Bond and Mottiar 2013). Tensions arising from these interlinking crises have caused several casualties in South Africa's recent history. While the Marikana mine workers' struggle was forcefully thwarted, leaving 34 workers dead on 16 August 2012 (Alexander *et al.* 2012), an anti-mining activist lost life to environmental activism in the Eastern Cape in March 2016. Activists in KZN and elsewhere are repeatedly abused as 'anti-national, anti-people, anti-development' (Yeld 2018).

Neo-liberal extractivism in South Africa leaves a huge environmental footprint in mine-hosting communities and often ignores its own social and environmental responsibility targets (Forsslund and Etkind 2013). As Klein (2015) writes, mine-hosting communities become 'sacrifice zones' in the form of 'black lungs for the coal miners or the poisonous waterways surrounding the mines' (pp. 172–173). Growing alienation from the existing extraction model can be seen in the emergence of anti-extractive social movements.

The geographical focus of this study is KZN province. I use KZN located in the southeast of South Africa as a case study, because it exemplifies the new fossil-fuel expansionism in South Africa. Socio-environmental struggles against polluting industries, including petrochemical industries in Durban and coal mining in Somkhele, have previously shown that social movements are facing up to state-backed industrial projects (KaManzi and Bond 2015; Leonard and Pelling 2010). KZN currently has only four high-grade coal mines operating (Eberhard 2011, p. 3). While historically being a labour-providing province to the mining industry (van Wyk 2013), there are plans to open estimated fossil-fuel reserves in the subsurface of the province. Close to 40% of the province is earmarked for gas exploration (likely via 'hydraulic fracturing' or 'fracking') (Savides 2017). There are also applications for controversial high-grade coal projects in the proximity of Africa's oldest national reserve.

One of the largest export terminals in the world is situated in KZN. The Richards Bay coal terminal (RBCT) services clients in both the east (India and China were the biggest customers between 2010 and 2017) and the west (where Spain and Italy were the biggest customers in the same timeframe). RBCT ships out more than 98% of coal, with just over 1% leaving the country from Durban (South African Market Insights 2017). Therefore, coal exports are almost exclusively leaving the country from KZN. Proximity to the export infrastructure is a crucial asset for companies aiming to open new mines and export coal.

Current applications for fossil-fuel expansion can radically shift the social and economic fabric of KZN province. As I will show, coal mining was introduced in the 1880s as a symbol of progress, helping to cheaply electrify households (Davenport 2013; Singer 2011). Pollution from coal was portrayed as a necessary by-product. With the latest introduction of new cleaner coal-fired power stations in South Africa, there is a newfound belief that fossil fuels are compatible with human and environmental health. Another argument in favour of coal is its abundance and low production costs.

This book looks closely at how new fossil-fuel projects are part of a broader hegemonic accumulation regime and discourse to expand the fossil-fuel frontier.

Powerful corporate actors entrench political consensus that social movement campaigns challenge in places they value. In places with historical geography that privileged conservation or in white neighbourhoods, anti-fossil-fuel project mobilisation is particularly persistent. In the absence of political parties supporting large-scale renewable transitions, social movement campaigns set the limits of fossil-fuel extraction in South Africa.

My case study consists of two social movement campaigns using ‘thick’ descriptions to make sense of the ‘bounded reality’ (Snow and Trom 2002) of proposed fossil-fuel projects in KZN. Using a theoretical framework building on the Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci, I explain that resistance relies on ‘organic intellectuals’ weaving together disparate grievances against fossil fuels. Unless opposition to fossil fuels can unite, no political frontier against fossil mining can be established. Conservationists, local business people, and residents need to join forces to voice their grievances against fossil-fuel mining. My research shows that NGOs play an important role in articulating and coordinating anti-extractivist struggles. Moreover, NGOs create opportunities to increase and maintain the resistance against fossil-fuel projects in KZN.

### *Post-Apartheid State and Social Movements*

Movements and their intellectual leaders need to be studied by considering the ‘general complex of social relations’ they are embedded in (Gramsci 1991, p. 8). Democratic civil society organisers under apartheid were united in their opposition to the racist apartheid government of the National Party (NP). The United Democratic Front (UDF) that gained momentum in the 1980s was formed of unions, parties, churches, and national as well as international NGOs and support groups, and is described as ‘one of the quintessential social movements of the 20th century’ (Stokke and Ballard 2005, p. 80). The recent history of social movement mobilisation in post-apartheid South Africa can broadly be divided into two phases. First, the ‘honeymoon period’ under Nelson Mandela’s presidential term in office (1994–1999) was characterised by social movement de-mobilisation and absorption of anti-apartheid activists into state institutions (Leonard 2011, p. 116). The second phase since 2000 has witnessed the emergence of novel social movements marked by the beginning of the Mbeki era, continued through the Zuma presidency (1999–2007), and the deepening of the neoliberal reforms (Bond 2012). Neo-liberalisation continued under the Zuma presidency (2009–2018), as he replaced Mbeki using some more nationalistic overtones, but not changing economic policy. Cyril Ramaphosa, who assumed office from Zuma in February 2018, began his tenure by entrenching neoliberal policy rather than bringing it to an end (Bond 2018a). Not least, Ramaphosa became one of the richest people in South Africa as a shareholder and board member of many multinational companies investing in mining, retail, communication, fast food, and many more industries (Butler 2013).

The deepening of neo-liberalisation and the end of the Mandela era was marked by social movement re-mobilisation. However, this time, there was no single enemy, but mobilisation revolved around a plurality of grievances (Ballard



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*et al.* 2006). The highest proportion of reported protests remains labour-related followed by community protests (Runciman *et al.* 2016). While these categories are broad and based on police reporting, they speak to the continuing relevance of labour in organising dissent in South Africa. However, many service-delivery protests and environmental protests against polluting industries (Leonard 2018; Lodge and Mottiar 2015; Habib and Opoku-Mensah 2009) are staged. While the study of labour movements has received a lot of attention in South African scholarship (Botiveau 2017; Marinovich 2016; Buhlungu 2010), novel formations, especially environmental social movements, are relatively understudied.

Scholars observe a relative decline of support for the African National Congress (ANC) over the years (Friedman 2018; Maharaj *et al.* 2011). South Africa under democracy offers various challenges as well as opportunities for social movement mobilisation. From the perspective of marginalised South Africans, the ANC's promise to redeem the injustices of apartheid has been largely disappointing, offering ample opportunities to remind the party where it failed (Stokke and Ballard 2005, p. 80). On the other hand, the post-apartheid government tends to channel dissent to deliberative fora. Participatory democratic governance inviting civil society organisation to participate in decision-making was strengthened in post-apartheid South Africa (Leonard 2014; Ballard 2007). Active participation of the citizenry was an express rallying point of the ANC, with grassroots organisations putting pressure on the newly formed government to stay true to the mass civic appeal that brought down apartheid (Friedman 2006, p. 1). From this vantage point, a tendency to capture and manufacture civil society actors has been observed. Leonard (2014, p. 381) shows that the 'post-apartheid state is financially supporting those types of individuals and organisations who are retreating from robust criticism'. Funding and support mainly go to larger civic organisations willing to provide services to the government, sometimes becoming a 'mirror image of state policies' (Leonard 2014, p. 379).

Because of the corporatist character of the post-apartheid South African state, dissent was partially absorbed into the Tripartite Alliance made up of the ANC, the umbrella Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). As a result, even in some of today's service-delivery protest hotspots, such as Durban's Cato Manor, Merebank, and Wentworth, the ANC still manages to achieve good polling results (Lodge and Mottiar 2015).

Some civic organisations shifted their discourse to become more rights-based, affirming the Constitution. However, the rights-based approach runs the risk of demobilising civil society and weakening the grassroots appeal of social movements (Bond 2014; Leonard 2011, pp. 124–125). The Constitution's deliberate participatory spaces favour a prescribed corporatist engagement that further entrenches the grassroots' marginality. Friedman calls the existing participation mechanisms 'intrinsically hostile to effective participation of the poor' (Friedman 2006, p. 3). Moreover, commentators have observed that the ANC has shown a great aversion to oppositional extra-institutional politics, portraying activists as anti-democratic (Stokke and Ballard 2005, pp. 89–90; Habib and Opoku-Mensah 2009, p. 50).

Social movements challenging state-supported or state-sponsored practices are often characterised as anti-ANC and become criminalised. Oppositional grassroots activists from the Landless People’s Movement, Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Shackdwellers’ Movement, and anti-extractive groups have experienced repression and criminalisation (Ballard 2007, p. 20; Bond and Mottiar 2013; KaManzi and Bond 2015).

Post-apartheid social movement mobilisation is characterised by the absence of a common threat or unifying agenda. Jacklyn Cock, writing about the green movement in South Africa about a decade ago, observed the absence of a ‘single, collective actor that constitutes the environmental movement in South Africa and no master “frame” of environmentalism encoded in any blueprint’ (Cock 2007, p. 174). Yet, evidence from my research suggests that more sustained grassroots organisations are in the making. Part of the newness of emerging social movements is their interconnectedness within heterogeneous networks. The maintenance of these networks is not simple. Heterogeneity has also left social movements fragmented. Nevertheless, as I show in this book, socio-environmental struggles can align with the demands of different social groups. In light of accelerating fossil-fuel infrastructure expansion and climate crisis aggravation, movements of this kind are unlikely to disappear.

### *Structure of the Book*

The remainder of the book is divided into two parts. The first part is about the theory and practice of resource extractivism. It looks at ways in which fossil-fuel extractivism is politically sustained in South Africa – both historically and today. The second part of the book is on social movements fighting fossil fuels – in South Africa, but also globally. Part I opens with Chapter 2, in which I present fossil-fuel frontiers as expanding general tendency underlying global capitalism involving extractivist practices. Its key characteristics are expansion and conflict. The deepening of resource frontiers undermines livelihoods and displaces residents and deteriorates the environment. The fossil-fuel frontier is a particularly destructive front that has its roots in industrialisation. However, while the fossil frontier creates environmental destruction, it has also contributed to economic development and prosperity in industrialised countries. The fossil-fuel economy enabled a consumer society that made life more comfortable worldwide for those lucky enough to have access to it. I highlight that the expansion of fossil fuels is organised by coercion and consent. Drawing on the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, I stress that the expansion of fossil fuels is actively entrenched by dominant fractions in government, finance, and civil society.<sup>1</sup> I also show that any dominant social bloc needs to reach out to organise alliances and entrench its own interests possibly by using force.

In Chapter 3, I trace the emergence of fossil-fuel hegemony in South Africa from apartheid through to this day. After 1994, the ANC entrenched and expanded fossil-fuel extraction to fix developmental backlogs among historically disadvantaged South Africans rather than overcoming fossil fuel dependence. However,

democratic elements in decision-making have been established to ensure formal participation in industrial projects such as mining. From a critical point of view, today's regulatory framework is biased towards favouring extraction.

While the first part of the book deals with the hegemonic structure of the fossil-fuel bloc, the second part analyses social movements fighting fossil fuels in South Africa and later offers a global outlook. Again, the second part will start with theoretical considerations. Chapter 4 starts with a literature review on 'spaces of social movement struggles' that is mainly concerned with the way space and place enable or constrain social movement mobilisation. The next section of the chapter links these insights on space to the notion of leadership. I present social movement leadership as a rather underdeveloped field of study. Leadership in social movements is central in giving direction and developing a sense of 'we'. Social movement leaders give political direction and frame the movement's demands. Chapter 4 closes with a discussion of the methods I used to analyse fossil-free movements in South Africa. During my fieldwork, I made use of a mix of qualitative methods including expert interviews, participant observations, and document analysis. In this part, I also reflect on my role as a white Western researcher in a postcolonial setting.

Chapter 5 discusses leadership practices and framing processes in the anti-coal movement in Fuleni bordering the oldest conservation area in Africa, the Hluhluwe–iMfolozi Park. In this chapter, I first trace the conflicted history of the area that is still known for its military battles between the Zulus and the British and later the eviction of local residents for the conservation park. In a second section of the chapter, I discuss framing processes of the Save our iMfolozi Wilderness campaign against coal mining bordering the conservation park. The leadership group of the movement changed the framing of the campaign several times in order to keep the campaign alive. This also happened when external shocks changed the movement's opportunity structure to make claims. I analyse the frame shifts referring to interviews with activists and written documents such as blog posts or press statements. I finally discuss why the Environmental Justice (EJ) framing that was adopted later in the campaign proves most successful in mobilising a broad movement campaign. EJ takes into view how polluting industries are often constructed in poorer neighbourhoods. This framing represents an experience beyond the fossil-fuel sector and offers potentials to connect the dots with other social movement campaigns.

In Chapter 6 on Frack Free South Africa (FFSA), I focus on anti-fracking movement tactics to stop the government-backed plans for hydraulic fracturing in the country. Movement tactics crucially give political direction to social movements. The choice of tactics will decide on the movement's success or failure to mobilise. FFSA used tactics to increase numbers as well as showing its worthiness to the outside. I discuss blocking and delaying, educating, connecting, and prefiguring as the four main tactics employed by FFSA. The analysis shows that many of the movement's resources are spent on information sharing, as fracking is not a very well-known technology in the South African context. Especially, declaring everyday places 'frack-free' is a low-level tactic to fight back potential intrusions

of the fossil-fuel industry. Prefigurative practices are low-risk everyday actions portraying that a life without hydraulic fracturing is possible and desirable. In the conclusion and discussion of Chapter 6, I look at the potentials for concerted claim-making in between the two campaigns. I highlight that both SAVE and FFSA converge around the common goal of fighting fundamental changes in land-use practices of the fossil-fuel industry. Both movements share a commitment to nature conservation. However, it shows that they need to reach out to the wider public to broaden their appeal. The governing ANC that commands a majority in parliament stands firmly behind the ‘fossil-fuel bloc’. Thus, the fossil-free movement needs to find allies to increase the pressure to de-carbonise the South African economy.

In Chapter 7, I offer a – perhaps surprising – analysis and comparison between Germany’s and South Africa’s fossil-free movements. Both countries are the number one producers of fossil fuels in Europe and Africa, respectively. In both countries, social movements thus stand against entrenched fossil-fuel interests. The German fossil-free movement managed to mobilise many activists forcing concessions from the national government. Finally, it will be of interest what are the potentials of different social movement frames regarding concerted claim-making between movements of the Global South and the Global North. I offer an analysis of the potentials of the Environmental Justice (EJ) frame comparing it to de-growth and Green New Deal (GND) frames. The book finally suggests that while fossil-free movements might not be the only hope for a post-fossil future, they certainly are the actors that address the issue of de-carbonisation most forcefully.

## Note

- 1 I reject a demand-side approach that solely focuses on end consumers. According to the demand-side approach, consumers are responsible for the fossil-fuel economy, as they demand goods that are powered, produced, or delivered by fossil fuels. This demand-side view, however, overestimates the choice that consumers have, and it disregards the systemic nature of production and supply chains. Most consumers indeed do not have the choice to consume fossil-fuel-free goods and services, because supply chains are dripping of oil. Therefore, this study builds on the insight that the supply side of fossil fuel matters – i.e. the organisation of the energy and transport systems. Today’s fossil-free movements are focusing increasingly on the supply side.

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