Empire Found

21st-century Portuguese popular cultures and coloniality in contemporary international cultural and geographic contexts

daniel f. silva
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Racial Identities and Coloniality in Twenty-First-Century Portuguese Popular Cultures

DANIEL F. SILVA
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Introduction

In the spring of 2020, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published the findings of its country monitoring report on Portugal. The ECRI, part of the Council of Europe (CoE), has conducted this investigation on member states of the CoE every two to three years since 2013, and every four to five years before that, going as far back as 1998. Over the years, the ECRI’s reports have consistently pointed out ongoing trends and structures, as well as recommendations to the state in order to address continuing forms of racism and discrimination. From the outset, this very language of racism and discrimination is significantly limited in its operation within the CoE’s neoliberal foundations and ideologies. As the project ahead will explore, even so-called progressive discourses against racism within a mainstream Portuguese Left tend to share similar limitations. Nonetheless, the 2020 ECRI report point outs crucial aspects around racial discourses (and their structural existences) in contemporary Portugal that the current project will expound upon, particularly those that reproduce imperial narratives of Portuguese racial formation and exceptionalism.

Most interestingly, the report points out the prevalence of racial violence against minoritized groups and racializing rhetoric by public figures like far-right politician André Ventura in complex relation with ongoing negation of racism in Portuguese society. In addressing some structural issues, the ECRI report recommends greater state and community oversight with regards to police brutality and white supremacist members of local police forces, larger investment in education access to minoritized groups, and the expansion of affordable housing for urban working-class people, particularly of color, to be protected from forced evictions. The full report concludes with what is supposed to be a rebuttal to white supremacist rhetoric in the Portuguese public sphere, positing whiteness as a fantasy, particularly in the case of whiteness Portugal, citing the long history of miscegenation on the Iberian Peninsula, Portuguese imperial expansion,
and migration patterns to and from Portugal in recent centuries (“Country Monitoring” 35–36).

This last point, in relation to dominant racial ideologies in Portugal, makes identifying the everyday and ingrained economic, political, and cultural structures of racism an especially murky task. More specifically, it plays more or less directly into conservative and late imperial arguments of Portuguese racial exceptionalism that have long served to legitimize imperial endeavors and sustain the aforementioned racial structures. Following the release of the ECRI report, its historical take on Portuguese whiteness was embraced by left-leaning voices in the media as indeed an adequate response to white supremacist discourses in the public sphere. For instance, sociologist Donizete Rodrigues (2020), in an editorial for news magazine Visão [Vision], agreeably declared, “O ‘branco’ não existe: a formação étnico-racial da nação portuguesa é resultado de um profundo processo de miscegenação de diferentes povos. O ‘branco’ português é, na verdade, um mestiço” [“The ‘white person’ does not exist: the ethnic and racial formation of the Portuguese nation is the result of a profound process of miscegenation of different people. The ‘white’ Portuguese is, in reality, mixed”] (n.p.). Tellingly, Rodrigues made this closing declaration the title of the piece.

Though the conclusions drawn by Rodrigues—namely that racial orders propping up white superiority are long-held fantasies—differ markedly from those drawn by imperial apologists in government in the 1960s, for instance, his commentary ignores how said apologists denied structural racism in Portugal’s African colonies through this exact historiography. Moreover, Rodrigues’s position and that of the ECRI also reveal an important pitfall in mainstream anti-racist discourse that fails to account for the everyday life of white supremacy, ongoing coloniality, and capital. As chapter one will interrogate, the development of Portuguese notions of national whiteness emerges from a public discourse that attempts to reformulate national formation along biological and genetic lines while ignoring or obscuring how whiteness is built and claimed through imperial extraction, exploitation, expropriation, and genocide. In other words, the bio-genetic rebuttal towards whiteness fails to account for its economic and political development and, moreover, its impacts on the racialized lives and lands of non-white people.

For the larger picture of the current project, the ECRI report highlights many of the key conceptual components interrogated here—some of the mechanisms through which colonial and racial structures are reproduced in the post-imperial metropolis, as well as the slippery racial rhetoric of Portuguese ethnic origin/formation and racial exceptionalism. In focusing
at length on how these two components are reproduced and the myriad ways in which they are expressed in the Portuguese public sphere and popular cultures, I hope to shed new critical light on how some of the central narratives of Portuguese settler imperialism, officially finished in 1975, continue to underpin Portuguese national identity and individual identity of popular culture figures, while serving and relating to the reproduction of coloniality in the metropolis.

Though these structures and discourses have been critiqued on an array of platforms, including literary production, academic scholarship, and some political discourse, they are nonetheless ubiquitous in and reproductive of many popular cultural forms, genres, and expressions. These include popular literature, daytime television, celebrity cultures, popular music, and football. Important scholarship has deconstructed and rendered crucial theoretical approaches to ongoing expressions of Portuguese racial exceptionalism, multiculturalism, and imperial nostalgia. The ensuing chapters aim to build on, and dialog with, these interventions by de-codifying how the underlying discourses and premises of contemporary cultural production are tied to dominant narratives of Empire. I seek to understand how the most widely consumed (and largely under-studied) cultural products and images in the Portuguese public sphere are couched in imperial history and nostalgia. In consistently fleshing out the imperial underpinnings of an array of cultural products, I look to contribute critical examinations of largely unstudied lines of national expression and negotiation.

In the process, my overarching goal is to reframe “post-imperial” Portugal as not merely a body politic and discursive terrain grappling with the legacies and narratives of an imperial past, but more importantly, as a set of material structures (economic, political, and cultural) that are grounded in the racial and gendered logics and mechanisms of coloniality. On this particular point, it is important to center the voices and epistemologies of racially minoritized subjects inhabiting Portuguese spaces. Chapter three’s focus on Black footballers in Portugal does some of this work, especially in the context of football’s own socioeconomic industrial complex. In the racialized structures of social (im)mobility, sport becomes one of the few platforms for employment, economic survival, and joy for marginalized people. The flipside is the chain of football labor supply that feeds on these particular structures. Beyond football, cultural production by Black Portuguese, African migrant, and Roma artists and writers have renarrated Portugal along these very terms. In the literary sphere, Djaimilia Pereira de Almeida’s novels Esse Cabelo [That Hair] (2015), and Luanda, Lisboa, Paraíso

1 For more on this topic, see Ferreira; Owen and Klobucka; and Arenas.
[Luanda, Lisbon, Paradise] (2018), among others; as well as Telma Tvon’s Um Preto Muito Português [A Very Portuguese Black Man] (2017) and Yara Monteiro’s Essa Dama Bate Bué! [That Lady Hits Hard!] (2018)—to name only a few—narrate contemporary Portuguese society as a continuity of coloniality.

These are especially rendered legible and knowable in the music of Portuguese rapper Valete. Born Keidje Lima in Lisbon in 1981 to Angolan and São Toméan parents, Valete makes these connections particularly clear in his sarcastically and tragically titled “Quando o Sorriso Morre” [“When the Smile Dies”] (2012). More specifically, his lyrics make the trans-temporal and trans-spatial connection between Portuguese colonial settlement in Africa, formal decolonization, post-independence economic precarity, African migration to the former metropolis, and metropolitan exploitation of this migrant labor force stripped of institutional rights. The song begins with the moment of euphoria surrounding independence:

O colonialismo acabou  
Independência  
Os tugas já se foram, bro  
A terra é nossa.

[Colonialism finished  
Independence  
The Portuguese left, bro  
The land is ours.] (00:11–00:15)

The euphoria, though, makes way to disenchantment stemming from the crumbling of colonial infrastructure following the mass exodus of white colonial high-skilled labor, from which Black residents were barred.

Já não há empregos  
Médicos nem professores  
Não há quadros formados  
Não temos doutores. (nada)

Não há comércio, não há serviços  
Não há nada  
Os tugas bazaram  
Deixaram toda a gente condenada.

[There are no longer jobs  
Doctors nor teachers  
No more skilled labor  
We have no doctors. (nothing)
There are no businesses, no services
There is nothing
The Portuguese left
They left us all damned.] (00:33–00:45)

Valete dialogs here with Amílcar Cabral’s warning during the anti-colonial armed struggle, thus positing the fight against colonialism as one to be carried out long after independence and that colonialism always leaves the necessary conditions for neocolonialism (Revolution 128). Valete goes on to highlight that the precarity left by Portuguese colonial structures of racial marginalization and exploitation has translated into an exploitable labor force in both the postcolony and in the shape of migrant labor abroad.

Passada história
Eles são nossos amigos agora
Emigra para Portugal
E começa uma vida nova

Aquilo é Europa
Lá todos vivem bem
Sai desta miséria
Vai e tenta ser alguém

[That history is over
The Portuguese are our friends now
Migrate to Portugal
And begin a new life

That is Europe
Over there everyone lives well
Escape from this misery
Go make yourself into someone] (1:01–1:12)

The promise and illusion of a better life in a prosperous Europe, packaged as such by colonial educational apparatuses, soon becomes a nightmare of ongoing coloniality.

Isto é Lisboa
Não há sol todos os dias
Muito cimento
Flora só em fotografias

Tens compatriotas a construirem
vilas que eles chamam ghetos
The implied African migrant character in the song’s lyrics is more than a persona, but rather an epistemology that revises dominant metropolitan historiographies guilty of proposing facile periodizations of colonial settlement, decolonization, and independence. The song consistently repeats “o colonialismo acabou” [“colonialism has ended”] to articulate the absurdity and theoretical insufficiency of hegemonic historicization that posits colonialism as something that abruptly ends. Rather, it is a political,
cultural, economic reality and series of mechanisms that are reinvented with periods building on one another rather than erasing one another. It is in relation to this continuity of coloniality in the metropolis that I will examine parts of its everyday cultural life in popular media, giving life to and aiding in the misrecognition of colonial realities. This terrain of cultural production permits, moreover, its implied white Portuguese audience discursive space to imagine itself inhabiting a national public sphere and imperial historiography in which this whiteness is codified in global contexts, participating in global histories of Empire as well as narratives of Portuguese imperial and racial exceptionalism.

The continuity and brutality of Portuguese colonialism was legitimized during its last two centuries by seemingly competing narratives of civilizational endeavour (the civilizing mission of Europe in relation to its colonized peoples) and nonviolent colonial relations built on a racially and culturally hybrid Portuguese ethos that supposedly permitted the Portuguese to easily adapt to the tropics and peacefully interact with its inhabitants. The former was used to legitimize, in the face of international pressure and denunciations, the continued use of slave labor African colonies, positing unpaid labour as an instrument of “teaching” colonial subjects the cultural value of work as a metric of European capitalist civilization. The latter represents another instantiation of legitimizing rhetoric most popularized following the Second World War. While most of Europe began processes of decolonization in Africa and Asia, the Portuguese fascist state, Estado Novo, began to embrace narratives of Portuguese pluri-continentality, multiracial syncretism, and amicable race relations on the international stage in order to defend its resistance to decolonization.

More than a rhetoric of colonial legitimation, these narratives inscribed and formulated a Portuguese cultural and national ethos that was disseminated not only in political spheres, but more broadly in cultural production and mass media. The discourses of a Portuguese civilizing mission, predicated on Portuguese claims to whiteness and participation in its global power, overlapped in complex ways with historical articulations of racial and cultural hybridity as the foundation of “Portugueseness” and its imperial expansion—a supposed product of its inherent necessity for intercultural contact. For example, one of the most cited contributors to this narrative of “Portugueseness,” Brazilian sociologist and anthropologist Gilberto Freyre, wrote, “I am one of those who attribute the ability of the Portuguese to unite themselves with the tropics for love, not convenience, to the close contacts between the Portuguese in Europe and the Moors” (“Portuguese” 45). Freyre was merely one of an existing line of Lusophone intellectuals, dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century, that
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posited “Portugueseness” as a racial and ethnic hybrid formation, one occupying an interstitial space between Europe and the colonized Global South (before it was named such). Such narratives of geo-cultural hybridity also dovetailed with the re-appropriation of symbols and of an imperial golden age (roughly 1415–1580), known in contemporary Portugal as “Os Descobrimentos” [“The Discoveries”], into disseminated iconography, literary celebration, and public education.

By examining a range of contemporary cultural production (literature, intellectual thought, television fiction, musical production, and celebrity culture), Empire Found examines how these narratives of Portuguese hybridity, alongside imperial drives toward global presence and inter-cultural contact, inform how different Portuguese cultural producers position themselves. Such producers include not only individual writers, musicians, and celebrities, but also state entities such as the state-owned media company Rádio e Televisão de Portugal (Radio and Television of Portugal) (RTP), the State Secretariat of Portuguese Communities, and the Camões Institute that embrace and reproduce imperial historical narratives and neo-expansionist views of contemporary Portuguese nationhood as not confined to the western strip of the Iberian Peninsula. To this end, such entities and other dispersed cultural producers have rendered Portugal and “Portugueseness” as a continued global presence by way of its imperial past (represented by Portuguese-speaking enclaves and nations in Africa, Asia, and the Americas) and dispersal of Portuguese emigrant communities abroad.

In other words, contemporary Portuguese globalism and its narratives are performed and carried out in different and overlapping ways by an array of voices and social actors articulating historical and linguistic ties to former colonial spaces, shared cultural origins with the Atlantic South, and the symbolic/political inclusion of Portuguese emigrants around the world. These articulations serve to centralize the Portuguese nation-sign in relation to the cultural, economic, and political hierarchies at work in the European Union as well as postcolonial flows of late capital. For many contemporary producers, such as musicians and celebrities (born after the end of Portuguese empire), this Portuguese global presence, cultural hybridity, and transnational connectivity serve as the foundation to articulate the marketability of their products and themselves as international brands. The fundamental objective of Empire Found is to interrogate the historical depths of such contemporary articulations and what they mean for post-imperial Portugal and current notions of Portuguese cultural identity. Imperial discourses and narratives continue to inform how the nation and Portuguese bodies are represented and positioned in the post-imperial present. I argue that these implied or overt historical dialogs carried out through cultural
production are integral to the very reproduction of the nation-state apparatus in the face of post-imperial economic, political, and demographic shifts that, to varying degrees, threaten the normalized and accepted ideological fabric and self-representations that undergird the nation and its social order.

Chapter Breakdown

Chapter one, “Portuguese Whiteness and Racial Ambiguity in Intellectual Thought during Empire,” lays the foundation for the proceeding examination of contemporary discourses of Portuguese whiteness, cultural hybridity, and imperial desire, by tracing a brief genealogy of such narratives in the context of Portuguese imperialism. I will thus interrogate the parameters of Portuguese national and cultural formation as articulated by an array of Lusophone intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries including Alexandre Herculano, Antero de Quental, Sílvio Romero, Teixeira de Pascoaes, Jorge Dias, Almir de Andrade, and Gilberto Freyre. Such thinkers, I argue, placed Portugal and “Portugueseness” in ambivalent positions regarding Europeanness (and its racial, political, and cultural parameters at this time) and imperial endeavor. This is of particular relevance in the context of imperial decay and increasing marginality in world capitalism in the nineteenth century, spurred on by the independence of Brazil and European scramble for Africa that saw Portugal “lose” significant amounts of territory to which it laid claim.

These perils of the time led to a reassessment of Portugal’s place in relation to the formations of whiteness and Europeanness of northern imperial neighbors, leading to collective nostalgia for an imperial golden age (1415–1580), alongside re-examinations of Portuguese ethnic formation. This turbulent period brought forth a resignification of Portuguese cultural identity that increasingly situated the seven-century presence of Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula as a more central element in the formation of “Portugueseness” as a Mediterranean entity, distinct from central and northern Europe. These revisions also dovetailed with European and North American cultural and scientific thought that located southern/Latin Europe as residing on the fringes of whiteness (Montesquieu, Chevalier, Ripley), further explored in chapter five. Throughout the remaining chapters, however, I aim to lay bare the ways in which these discourses nonetheless overlapped with anti-Black and anti-Arab discourses and structures of dispossession and exploitation.

As Portuguese imperial endeavor was economically revitalized in the twentieth century with the intensified colonization of African colonies (especially Angola and Mozambique), twentieth-century thinkers ultimately
legitimized colonial presence in the face of international pressure to decolonize by taking narratives of Portuguese Islamic and European hybridity to argue for Portuguese expansion as a “natural embrace of the tropics” rather than an apparatus of economic exploitation. Furthermore, the supposedly interstitial place of Portuguese culture, between Europe and the tropics, meant that racial categories of colonial power were not rigidly deployed. In sifting through this array of intellectual discourses, which came to inform negotiations of national and ethnic identity in the public sphere, we get a vision of Portugueseness and its racial parameters as historically contextualized discursive edifices always in conjunction to the desires and exigencies of empire and capitalism.

The proceeding chapter, “Post-Imperial Orientalism and Portuguese Claims to Late Capitalist Westernness in José Rodrigues dos Santos’s Mystery Thrillers,” reflects on a relatively under-studied trope in post-imperial Portuguese cultural production: the deployment of orientalist signifiers and imagery when integrating Middle Eastern and Arab spaces and bodies into literary diegeses. While discourses of historical ties to the Arab world have served to legitimize imperial endeavors, circulating in a more limited yet present fashion today, highly visible cultural products have intentionally participated in Cold War and post-9/11 orientalist tropes in ways that racially (re)situate Portugueseness as part of the cultural, political, and economic web of Westernness. The chapter thus critically examines the bestselling mystery thrillers of writer and journalist José Rodrigues dos Santos, which follow his recurring protagonist Tomás Noronha.

Noronha is a Portuguese university professor and cryptologist, much in the vein of Robert Langdon, the recurring character of American author Dan Brown’s mystery thrillers. Also, similar to Langdon, Noronha works to uncover some of the West’s greatest secrets and help save contemporary civilization (a world order established by Western imperialism) from its supposed greatest threats such as climate change and Islamic fundamentalism. The chapter pays particular attention to two novels from his mystery thriller series, *A Fórmula de Deus* [The Einstein Enigma] (2006), *Fúria Divina* [Divine Fury] (2009), and *Vaticanum* [2016] in which Noronha is contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help decipher and foil secret Islamic terrorist missions to attack metropolitan and religious centers of the West. Contextualizing these two novels in relation to Rodrigues dos Santos’s larger oeuvre, I argue that his thrillers articulate a pop-literary brand of Portuguese identity within late capital that is politically aligned with United States imperialism and hegemonic Western divisions of Orient and Occident—a stance seemingly at odds with the rhetoric of Portuguese hybridity that blurs cultural and racial divisions of bodies and spaces. The orientalist
discourses found in Rodrigues dos Santos’s works fundamentally serve to convey Portuguese agency in continued projects of Western imperialism, thus seeking, I argue, to place “Portugueseness” into dominant global conceptualizations of whiteness in opposition to Portugal’s cultural and economic marginality within the European Union and semi-peripheral status in the racialized world system.

The third chapter of this section charts a brief history of media constructions and representations of Afro-Portuguese soccer players within mainstream narratives of Portuguese multiculturalism and multiraciality. Titled “Football, Empire, and Racial Capitalism in Portugal,” the chapter’s point of departure will be the emergence of Black footballers in Portugal within the context of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. The formation of football clubs in Portuguese colonies, namely Angola, Cabo Verde, and Angola, became yet another mechanism of labor extraction. Star players such as Eusébio (Eusébio da Silva Ferreira) and their exploits on the field, especially during the 1966 World Cup, were signified as exemplary of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism—this at a time when the Portuguese Estado Novo continued its proscribed colonial wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. In this way, Eusébio’s Portugueseness was repeatedly emphasized (while his Blackness was also reified) in the public sphere, as part of a reformulated historicization of Empire based on inclusive race relations whereby Portugal’s African colonies were renamed “overseas provinces,” part of a multiracial and multi-continental Portugal.

More recently, more than 40 years following the end of the Estado Novo regime in 1974 and official Portuguese colonial domination abroad, Black Portuguese players have become fixtures in Portuguese football clubs and the national team. The Portuguese men’s national football team’s success as winner of the 2016 UEFA European Championship coincides with a large influx of immigrants into Portugal from former African colonies, especially from Angola, Cabo Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. This chapter will thus consider how this visibility of Black Portuguese subjects relates to larger forms of systemic anti-Black racism and the continuities of racial capitalism in the former metropolis, while also contributing to the continued hegemonic historicization of Portugal’s colonial past as non-racist. In this regard, the chapter will also shed light on the continued racialization of Black Portuguese players that operates under narratives of Portuguese multiculturalism. Although more overt expressions of racism have been publicly condemned by soccer’s national and international governing bodies, as with racist chants and the throwing of bananas at Black players in soccer stadiums, these pernicious mechanisms of othering are sustained by codified racist discourses in everyday sports media.
By interfacing public articulation of migrant experiences of such athletes (and broader Black communities in Portugal) in their everyday performance of identity on the field and in social media, the chapter also interrogates the possibilities of decolonial mapping of (counter) Lusophone connectivity evoked by athletes. Numerous footballers of migrant/African backgrounds have been visible renegotiators of dominant mono-nationalist frameworks, producing a particular epistemology against the racial underpinnings, limitations, and misrecognitions of common European multicultural narratives. In other words, such cultivations of intersubjective terrains operate against the anti-Black foundations of Portuguese national claims to whiteness and Europeanness that posit, presuppose, and ensnare Black bodies as “migrant” outsiders. Implied in this epistemic resistance, the racial struggle for recognition of full and equitable citizenship in Portugal and Europe need not erase diasporic histories and terrains of intersubjective, political, and affective ties to Africa.

The following chapter, “Color Games: Anti-Blackness, Racial Plasticity, and Celebrity Culture,” aims to explore how Portuguese celebrities that benefit from long-established economic, political, and cultural structures of native and white privilege have racially and ethnically signified themselves away from whiteness, at strategic moments, on social media. In drawing on and examining specific examples of these, the chapter will pay particular attention to how these reproduce and seek to justify themselves via imperial narratives of Portuguese racial exceptionalism and syncretism. Such digital platforms allow celebrities to render themselves as commodities directly to consumers, acquiring followers and subsequently increased visibility, which in turn often leads to more acting roles, recording opportunities (for musicians), and advertising revenue. Social media platforms offer users the possibility of a complex blend of visual and textual meanings, in addition to collective public inscriptions of images via comment sections and replies. In this regard, social media allows for collective participation in the trans-racial signification of particular celebrities.

For instance, throughout the summer of 2018 (in the Northern Hemisphere) Portuguese actress Sofia Ribeiro (born 1984) posted numerous photos of herself on her Instagram account in swimsuits in tropical beach settings with the hashtags “#gabriela” and “#cordecanela” (“#cinnamoncolor”), with one captioned as “Gabriela, cor de canela, veio à janela espreitar” [“Gabriela, of cinnamon skin, came to the window to peek”] in reference to the Brazilian female mulatto titular character of Brazilian writer Jorge Amado’s novel Gabriela, Cravo e Canela [Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon] (1958), and of the later soap opera Gabriela (1975) and film of the same name (1983). The soap opera, Gabriela, was the first ever aired in Portugal to much acclaim and popularity,
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in 1977, three years after the fall of the Estado Novo and two after the fall of the Portuguese empire in Africa. In a complex trans-Atlantic postcolonial flow of cultural meanings, the hypersexualized mixed-race character became a collectively consumed symbol of the exceptionalist legacies of Portuguese colonialism and its alleged nonracist nature. Originally deployed by Amado as a celebrated national and colonial product of Brazilian miscegenation and racial democracy, the hypersexualized and hyper-consumed *mulata* body becomes, for Ribeiro, a racial framework through which to narrate her body while positioning it in relation to the tropical visual background and dominant versions of Portuguese imperial history. In assuming Gabriela’s racial corporality, Ribeiro also reproduces the dominant historical view that equates such supposed racial fluidity and ambiguity as proof of Portuguese nonracist social organization, both in its colonial past, and in the current multiracial metropolis.

The chapter will also consider how the central racial, gendered, and sexual discourses surrounding Gabriela have become part of the quotidian and normalized patriarchal rhetoric surrounding women’s bodies. Enacting trans-raciality, moreover, does not necessarily imply an overt racial identification with a category other than whiteness, but suggests a particular form of access to and appropriation of racial otherness to position the body in mass media and neoliberal cultures of consumption. It is an access facilitated, if not granted, by the supposed fluidity and romanticized erasures of racial categories that, to varying degrees, guided and legitimized the administration of colonial power and became culturally canonized in narratives of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism. In contrast with the signification of white celebrities like Ribeiro, the chapter will also interrogate the repercussions of this movement across racial signifiers for the social existence of nonwhite bodies in Portugal and the broader “Lusophone world” as it is constructed by entities of cultural production and mediation.

Titled “Latin Reinventions: Contemporary Portuguese Singers, *Latinidad*, and Latinx Musical Forms,” the fifth and final chapter interrogates a growing trend in popular music sung by Portuguese artists and some of Portuguese descent: namely their experimentation with and insertions into globalized and contemporarily hybridized musical genres of Latin America and the Caribbean. Since the early 2010s, artists such as Luciana Abreu, Ana Malhoa, Lucenzo, and Kátia Aveiro have all released music sung in Spanish and/or associated with genres that circulate globally under “Latin” categories. According to their lyrical content and interviews, this insertion into such genres is not viewed by such artists as a casual attempt to enter new geo-cultural and ethnic markets while rebranding themselves in the
national public sphere (where they are already known) through the growing popularity of reggaeton, electro-reggaeton, Latin house, hip house, and other genres. Rather, for the artists in question, this movement is articulated largely as a result of a trans-continental ethnic heritage associated with “Portugueseness,” that posits Portuguese history firmly within discourses of *Latinidad* and its earlier incarnation of *Latinité*. As Luciana Abreu sings in the opening lines of her single in Spanish, “El Camarón” [“The Shrimp”] of 2017, “Traigo la música latina en las venas” [“I carry Latin music in my veins”]. Meanwhile, one of Kátia Aveiro’s singles that initiated her venture into “Latin” genres in 2014 was tellingly titled “Latina de Cuerpo y Alma” [“Latina of Body and Soul”].

This will lead to a historical genealogy of Portugal’s place in conceptualizations of Latinicity, as a trans-Atlantic entity, over the last two centuries, contextualizing such musical works in relation to the intellectual production of Michel Chevalier, Jules Michelet, and Gilberto Freyre. More than trendy appropriations of and insertions into *Latinidad* for marketing and consumption purposes, such artists enact a historicization of Portuguese cultural “origins” and heritage that articulate a strategic cultural bond to Latin American and Spanish-language markets, while still conveying the historical agency of Roman imperialism as a primary unifying force of interracial and intercultural encounters. For Portuguese intellectuals and scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, like Matias Aires and José Soares da Silva, “Latinidade” was a terrain of heritage into which Portuguese subjects were to be placed via education and that served to separate Portugueseness from the history of Islamic colonization at the hands of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. For contemporary Portuguese recording artists, the articulation of *Latinidad* has become an expression of Portuguese cultural, ethnic, and historical ties to the nonetheless exoticized tropics. Despite evoking *Latinidad* as a terrain of hybridized cultural forms and identities engendered throughout the history of Western expansion, trans-Atlantic slave trade, and colonial and post-independence racial hierarchies of power, Europeanness (as developed through Roman power) continues to be the implied site of cultural agency and historical origin. At the same time, Latinicity is articulated by these contemporary artists in question as an agglomeration of racialized and gendered stereotypes often placed on Latin American bodies, with Portuguese access to these justified through blurry references to *Latinidad* and *Latinité*. 
In order to best understand, identify, and contextualize contemporary Portuguese claims (individual and collective) to particular historical narratives of Empire such as those revolving around early modern European agency (the “discoveries”), racial exceptionalism, and multi-continentality, it is helpful to gauge how Portugueseness as an ethnicity has been conceived and articulated within cultural and intellectual production. How has the imagination of a Portuguese ethos dovetailed with the articulation of Portuguese nationhood as a fundamentally imperialist edifice? This is an ethos that supposes a particular expression of whiteness—a project of whiteness built through imperial expansion, built on temporal definitions of racial difference, before “race” became an explicit taxonomy of imperial knowledge and basis of extraction, exploitation, and expropriation. The development and renegotiation of racial taxonomies, or race as a floating signifier (Hall 1985), in other words, emerges from the projection of existing modes of othering—religious, political, national, and geographic.

In the context of Portuguese racial formation, these categories increasingly merge together as the Portuguese kingdom is geo-politically consolidated and separated from a neighboring Castilian threat to sovereignty, as well as from an Islamic political and cultural presence that both compromised a burgeoning Portuguese royalty and its illusion of a Christian collective origin. The latter point indicates an early expression of a collective claim to Latin/Christian origin in opposition to the acknowledgment of an Arab/Islamic economic, cultural, and scientific influence in five centuries of Portuguese societal development, which would be invigorated in the nineteenth century through discourses of Latinité in Europe. Dominant historiography of Portuguese national formation makes opposition to Islam and Castile and León central ideological mechanisms, with national founder, King Afonso I, bellicosely defeating Leonese military forces in what is today the Minho region of Portugal to politically separate the county of Portucale from the Leonese Kingdom and establish tentative
borders between the River Lima and just south of the River Mondego. Celebrated battles such as the Battle of São Mamede (1128) and the Battle of Valdevez (c.1140) between the armies of Afonso I and King Alfonso VII of León led to the Treaty of Zamora (1143), officializing Portuguese independence. Before the signing of the treaty, Afonso I led excursions in the name of the Portuguese crown into Islamic occupied territories south of the Mondego with mythologized battles such as the Battle of Ourique (1139) in which Afonso I’s army was severely outnumbered by those of Almoravid forces. Later chroniclers of the battle inaugurated a legend that Saint James intervened in the battle in favor of the Portuguese as divinely mandated rulers of Iberian territory. Later versions substituted Saint James for Jesus Christ, and the episode, known as the Miracle of Ourique, became part of Portuguese nationalistic lore and immortalized in national and Christian iconography. As historian Francisco Bethencourt argues, “the Crusades thus represented a major turning point for Christendom, not only because they gave ideological expression to an enormous process of expansion and conquest, but also because they unleashed new forms of religious persecution and new concepts of ethnic hierarchy” (20).

Portuguese anti-Arabness at the dawn of Portuguese sovereignty thus furthered political and ideological positions of earlier Kingdoms of León, Castile, and Galicia that existed in tension against the different leaders, emirs, and caliphs of Islamic rule on the peninsula. Binary opposition to the Arab/Islamic world would ideologically underpin Portuguese imperial expansion into North Africa, utilizing the “threat” and “inferiority” of an “infidel” people and political structure to legitimize the capture of lands and bodies. As made clear by Gomes Eanes de Zurara’s Crónica da Conquista da Guiné [Chronicle of the Conquest of Guinea] (1453) after accompanying Prince Henry the Navigator’s military incursions along the coast of West Africa, the religious, cultural, and epistemological otherness that marked notions of Moorish “infiéis” [“infidels”] were placed onto Sub-Saharan African bodies. These also coincided with and built on existing exoticist notions of Black bodies circulating in Europe (Sharpley-Whiting 1999) in the late Middle Ages. In this regard, the formation of Portugueseness as an imperial endeavor and claim to whiteness was embedded, as early as the sixteenth century, in an imperial epistemology and system of representation of sameness and difference that would go on to underpin the development of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983).

In light of the anti-Black, anti-Arab, anti-Jewish, and anti-Roma foundations of a Portuguese ethos, this sort of ethnicization carried out by an assortment of historical actors, including royals, nobles, and scribes, always-already implies a foundational racialization of the constructed
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Portuguese ethos. In ways similar to those of European construction as a white arbitrarily delineated continent, Portugueseness as a white ethos or mediated and repeated claim to whiteness, has long been contingent upon the ongoing processes of racial othering vis-à-vis the Arab world, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, and American indigeneity. Throughout the ensuing centuries, Portuguese intellectuals, political figures, and cultural producers reflected constantly on the contours of Portuguese national formation and national identity, often with racial implications especially concerning its imperialist aspirations and failures, as well as its pre-sovereign past.

In many ways, Portuguese claims to whiteness hinged on its place in the development of global capitalism, oppositions of difference to colonized and dispossessed people, and in inter-imperial relations/competition with other European powers. By the 1570s, the Portuguese maritime empire included territorial holdings, claims to small pieces of land, and imperial outposts along the western and eastern coasts of Africa, western India, and southeast Asia, in addition to what would become its crown jewel—the ever-expanding colonial territory of modern-day Brazil. Portuguese maritime hegemony, controlling sea routes and occupying roles of power in the extraction and export of commodities around the world, had come to a halt by the end of the sixteenth century with temporally overlapping political and economic developments in four continents, yet with profound implications for the Portuguese population and territory, thus underscoring the globality of imperial power, or what Lisa Lowe calls the “intimacies of four continents” (2015). In the late 1570s, the Portuguese crown underwent a crisis in royal succession after the young childless King Sebastian disappeared in the battle of El-Kasr el Kibir in contemporary Morocco, losing sovereignty under the Spanish crown from 1580 to 1640. During this time, the Portuguese lost many of its outposts and political grip over in the East Indies to the Dutch crown (as a result of the Eighty Years War), turning imperial interests mainly to Brazil and its growing sugar industry and later mining industries. Early large-scale production during the second half of the sixteenth century depended on indigenous slave labor, which ultimately contributed to the genocide of indigenous populations near colonial coastal settlements. With the crumbling of the Portuguese imperial project in the East, Portuguese imperialist drives shifted to the colonization of Brazil and the building of a mono-cultural economy based on the production and export of sugar in the late sixteenth century.

In Brazil, colonial authorities, supporting the interests of large landowners—*latifundiários*—turned to, and indeed, propelled the growth of the African slave trade in the early seventeenth century. When the Portuguese
independent crown was restored in 1640 following an uprising of nobles from the House of Bragança, Brazilian sugar production and exports were seen as the primary way of rebuilding the Portuguese imperial economy.¹ The lucrative nature of the sugar trade was fundamentally trans-Atlantic not only in its circuits of exportation and consumption, but most importantly in terms of labor, economically dependent on African slave labor. As a result, the network of Portuguese forts and outposts along the western coast of Africa quickly expanded during the seventeenth century for Portuguese control of the slave trade—the racialized and material basis of early global capitalist wealth accumulation.²

Following the succession crisis and subsequent loss of power in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese fell behind central and northern European powers such as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands in the imperial race for global hegemony. Furthermore, and as a result, the Portuguese state fell into increased financial debt and political dependency to Great Britain, with each dialectically intensifying the other. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, signed in 1386, following an attempted Castilian invasion, mandated military collaboration and close trade agreements. With the curtailing of Portuguese imperial markets and extraction in the East, the Portuguese imperial project became increasingly reliant, economically, on single commodities from Brazil—sugar in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and gold in the eighteenth—to sustain a dubious import policy of English goods and English military support, rather than investment in national human capital and infrastructure. As Portuguese historian and social scientist Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins surmises in the late nineteenth century with regards to the previous: “O inglês sentava-se com [D. João V] à mesa e aplaudia os desperdícios; porque todo o ouro do Brasil passava apenas por Portugal, indo fundear em Inglaterra, em pagamento de farinha e géneros fabris, com que ela nos alimentava e nos vestia. A indústria portuguesa constava de óperas e devoções” [“The Englishman would sit at the table with (King João V) and applaud the wastefulness; because all the gold from Brazil would merely pass through Portugal and land in England, as payment for flour and manufactured goods with which she would feed and clothe us. Portuguese industry was made up of operas and religious devotion”] (História vol II, 113). The credit system that disfavored the Portuguese state, together with Portuguese dependency on English military prowess, overlapped with and

² For more on the role of the Portuguese empire in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, see Herbert Klein’s The Atlantic Slave Trade.
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sustained, over centuries, English discourses of Portuguese racial otherness found in English travel writing, intellectual history, and literature.

Travelling through Portugal and Spain in 1780, English captain Richard Croker commented, in correspondence to be later published as a complete volume of his travel diary, on Portuguese society, government, economy, culture, and racial make-up. Though he finds a particular exotic charm to cities such as Lisbon and Oporto, he highlights a lack of urban infrastructure following the earthquake of 1755—“immense heaps of rubbish” (274)—as well as the economic underdevelopment of the Alentejo region. The last point comes down to a foundational failure of the state to properly invest and foment the “proper” capitalistic use of land: “there are, doubtless, many thousands of acres of land in the wastes of the province of Alentejo that might have been brought into the culture of wheat, but it would have cost something to the government in the first instance; and this is contrary to its principle—to take all and give nothing” (289). For Croker and much imperialist thought of the time, this lack of capitalist endeavor and failed capitalist statehood is directly correlated with the articulation of a Portuguese historical/biological make-up and formation of an ethnic character, which overlap in his assessment of Portuguese racial identity. It is one that adds further complexity to the anti-Arab, anti-Black, and anti-Jewish claims of Portuguese national formation.

This argument is at the core of the following passage from Croker’s collection, focusing on Portuguese men, and thus revealing the inter-masculine tensions through which imperial supremacy is imagined:

The Portuguese males are undoubtedly the worst-looking race in Europe; well may they consider the appellation of ombre [sic] blanco, “white man,” as an honourable distinction. They proceed from a mixture of Jews, Moors, Negroes, and French, and seem, from their appearance and qualities, to have reserved to themselves the worst parts of each of these people. Like the Jews, they are mean, tricking, and avaricious: from the Moors, they are jealous, cruel, and revengeful; as the people of colour, they are fervile, indocile, and deceitful; and they resemble the French in vanity, grimace, and gasconade.

In the new world, they have practiced the same mixing system; and a mongrel race, retaining the Portuguese name, and a dialect of the language, have overspread the land, and are the vagabonds and outcasts of Asia. (296–97)

Inscriptions such as these from English and French historical figures, as spokespeople and authorities on early imperial whiteness, abound through
the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, with the attribution of further manifestations of racial otherness to the Portuguese. Lord Byron associates the dark skin of Portugal’s inhabitants to rampant crime in Lisbon following the Napoleonic invasion of 1808, personal and urban lack of hygiene, and overall “ignorance” (16, 115–18). In his travels throughout Europe in Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, Byron articulates a racial hierarchy of European nations—an intellectual endeavor all too common in late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth-century Europe and Americas and that would gain new reverberations in the age of eugenics. More specifically, Byron’s poetic and essayistic work places Portuguese society and ethnicity as the lowest of the Mediterranean: “The Ottomans, with all their defects, are not a people to be despised. Equal, at least, to the Spanish, they are superior to the Portuguese” (198).

More than a decade later, and in the context of imperial endeavor and colonialist development, Joseph Conrad, in his novel, Victory (1915), ties whiteness to not only pigment, but to imperial agency. In the novel, a Swedish businessman, Axel Heyst, finds himself residing in the Dutch East Indies, modern-day Indonesia, as a result of a business endeavor. He tours different islands of the Dutch colonial domain, as well as French and Portuguese colonies. In narrating Heyst’s time in Dili, Conrad’s narrator introduces the city as “that highly pestilential place” made up of “God-forsaken villages” that are home to “a very hungry population clamorous for rice” (15). While in Dili, Heyst becomes acquainted with Morrison, a British expatriate, who is being pursued by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Having spent a significant time under persecution in Dili, Morrison seems relieved to finally find a fellow white man: “He had been wandering with a dry throat all over this miserable town of mud hovels, silent, with no soul to turn to in his distress, and positively maddened by his thoughts; and suddenly he stumbled on a white man, figuratively and actually white—for Morrison refused to accept the racial whiteness of the Portuguese officials” (17).

The articulation of the Portuguese as not racially white is very much a confluence of darker racial features (in comparison with those of Heyst), the geographical location of Portugal on the southern margins of Europe, and perhaps most importantly in the context of colonial endeavor, the perceived Portuguese inability to fulfill the paternalistic endeavor of the white man’s burden. Morrison’s postulation of the Portuguese as not racially white arguably owes much to anthropological reflections on the racial make-up of Europe during the nineteenth century and early twentieth. Contributors to the field of racial taxonomy—an integral academic component of Eugenics—such as William Ridley argued famously that “Africa begins beyond the Pyrenees” (272); and that Europe was made up of three races—the Teutonic
of Northern Europe, the Alpine of Central Europe, and the Mediterranean of Southern Europe that shared anthropometric characteristics with northern African racial groups. As Portugueseness resides on the limits of a phantasmatic European episteme, it is thus unsuited to articulate such an episteme on the other. Portuguese deficit of whiteness is thus both the explanation and consequence of Portugal's colonial incapacity.

Portuguese intellectual history of this time seldom makes explicit reference to Portuguese ethnicization in these terms. Rather, most works speak in terms of “national character” and are steeped in supposedly shared values and notions pertaining to labor, economics, religion, and the state. From these understandings and inscriptions of nationally shared characteristics, intellectuals produce signifiers that formulate the idea of a Portuguese ethos, especially when these signifiers are historicized into stories of national origin. As scholars of critical race and ethnic studies, Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown explain that ethnicization encompasses a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to socio-cultural signifiers of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically, culturally, and economically. Where biological and/or somatic features (real or imagined) are signified we speak of racialisation as a specific modality of ethnicisation. (99)

With regards to Portuguese intellectual production and reflections on Portuguese “national character,” ethnicity is formed around the negotiated and floating signification of national origins, ethos as the guiding beliefs and values of the inscribed community, and the relational opposition of these to those of supposedly greater imperial hegemons. For the English writers and travelers and eugenics thinkers cited above, these origins and shared beliefs are also inscribed at the level of a Portuguese/Mediterranean phenotype. This racial component to Portuguese ethnicity—that is, a deficit of whiteness—would figure more prominently in Portuguese and Brazilian intellectual, sociological, and anthropological works of the first half of the twentieth century.

This degree of ambiguity in racial discourses surrounding Portuguese people and Portugueseness within and beyond the nation-state, as early as the eighteenth century, always interacted complexly with the Portuguese state’s settler colonial projects and its role in the transatlantic slave trade, whether the latter involved the state directly or indirectly in the form of slave ships sailing with the Portuguese flag. As Nell Irvin Painter importantly reminds us, “the concept of slavery—at any time, in any society—calls up
racial difference, carving a permanent chasm of race between the free and the enslaved” (34). Therefore, notions of Portuguese racial ambiguity, as we shall consider ahead in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, seldom compromised the Portuguese state’s colonial and national project of not only freedom and sovereignty (as the antithesis of captivity and enslavement), but also of imperial domination over other racialized bodies and spaces. Along these lines, gendering discourses were always-already at play in affirmations and negations of whiteness. After all, as Vron Ware writes, “blackness and whiteness are both gendered categories whose meanings are historically derived, always in relation to each other but rarely in a simple binary pattern of opposites” (xxiii).

Portugal’s Long Nineteenth Century

These assessments of Portuguese racial otherness in terms of phenotypes and supposedly common traits, as well as in the contexts of imperial endeavor and economic and societal development in the metropolis, would be widely read by Portuguese intellectuals and ultimately impact their own understandings of Portugueseness within global paradigms of power and agency. Imperial decay, political instability, and a tarnished image in the realm of international politics and economics throughout the nineteenth century and first quarter of the twentieth, in addition to the growth of Portuguese publishing houses accompanied by the consolidation of a small national bourgeoisie, made intellectual and literary production a fertile space for interrogations into national identity and character. Indeed, the nineteenth century proved tumultuous and devastating for Portuguese imperial aspirations with the Napoleonic invasion in 1807, Brazilian independence in 1822, and the British Ultimatum—in addition to internal political upheaval and civil war, the turbulent formation of a constitutional monarchy, regicide, and the emergence of Republicanism.

These led to significant intellectual inquests into the decay of Portuguese imperial power and modern society, often with revised genealogies of national and ethnic formation traversing Roman occupation, Visigothic incursions, Islamic rule, the dawn of empire, and the Inquisition.

The nineteenth century began in Portugal, as it did for much of Europe, in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars. The Portuguese crown—led by King João VI—was ousted at the end of November of 1807 by the French imperial forces commanded by general Jean-Andoche Junot, and fled to Brazil, effectively moving the Portuguese Kingdom from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. In the meantime, Junot became governor of Portugal and Duke of Abrantès until he was defeated by British military forces in August of 1808. Multiple French
invasions ensued throughout the 1810s, being fought off by Portuguese-British coalitions when Portugal was under British control, while João VI's court remained in Brazil until 1821. While João VI established the Kingdom of Brazil in 1815, Portuguese military leaders remained dissatisfied with British rule over the Portuguese metropolis, which was supported by the Portuguese regent across the Atlantic. The resistance to British occupation led to the sparking of a liberal revolution in 1820, culminating in a revolt in Lisbon and the demand that the Kingdom of Portugal be restored to the metropolis under a constitutional monarchy. Putting an end to the "embarrassment" of British government of the metropolis, João VI returned, leaving the Kingdom of Brazil in the hands of his son Pedro I who declares the independence of Brazil in 1822—at the behest of his father—as a monarchy. The loss of Brazil—on which the metropolitan economy heavily relied—further augmented notions of imperial/national crises.

Following the death of João VI in 1826, Pedro I of Brazil also ascends to the Portuguese throne as Pedro IV for two months before handing the crown to his eldest daughter Dona Maria II, who would become engaged to João VI's youngest son, and Pedro's brother, Prince Miguel. The latter had led a number of attempted revolts against his father's liberal monarchy, creating a political and military faction known as the Miguelites. By agreeing to marry his niece, he was able to assume the crown in 1828 with the goal of reinstating an absolute monarchy, thus triggering six years of civil war in Portugal between Liberals and Miguelites—the former supported by the UK and France, and the latter by Spain. Peace was reached in 1834, with Prince Miguel being exiled and Dona Maria II returning to the throne of the Portuguese constitutional monarchy. The ensuing decades would be of great political instability with the implementation of the constitution repeatedly challenged and the restructuring of local and centralized government, as well as economic reform, causing opposition and political intrigue between rivaling parties. Queen Maria eventually dissolved or supported coups d'état against different governments. During this time and until the 1880s, as governments and heads of state under the monarchy transitioned back and forth into and out of power, political interest in Portugal's remaining colonies and territorial claims in Africa and Asia was scant. Though the state created the Banco Nacional Ultramarino in 1864 and opened branches in major colonial capitals in the years following, colonial settlement lagged.

During this time, moreover, Portugal's colonial project in Africa was limited to a few substantial urban centers and outposts along the western and eastern coasts. Indeed, sustained Portuguese colonial settlement in Africa had become stagnant over the nineteenth century, even more so after the end of the slave trade, and had become based on penal colonization.
This rapidly changed with the inter-imperial conflicts that led to the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 and the British Ultimatum of 1890. Though the Portuguese had substantive settlements in southern Africa only in Luanda, Benguela, and Maputo (then Lourenço Marques), they claimed a stretch of land from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts, spanning modern-day Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. After the Berlin Conference, officially mapping European colonial divisions of Africa, the Portuguese insisted upon their claims to the central lands and their own project of a trans-African Portuguese zone. In response to this resistance to cede the central and largely unoccupied lands (with the exception of some missionary camps) to the United Kingdom, the latter sent a letter to the Portuguese crown demanding the immediate removal of all Portuguese military in the area. Fearing an armed conflict against a much larger military as well as straining an important military allegiance with the English dating back to the Treaty of Windsor of 1386, the Portuguese acquiesced. Portuguese imperial endeavor relied heavily on military and economic support from the English crown, and so the Portuguese state (a constitutional monarchy since 1834) ultimately ceded to the ultimatum for the sake of its long-term interests. English interests in the region were multiple, including the construction of the Cape to Cairo Railway that would run through the area and to protect the lands claimed by Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company.

This caused a clamorous reaction among Portuguese intellectuals, many of whom were strong opponents of the monarchy, and thus utilized the event to decry the crown’s long dependency on, and subordination to, the English.\footnote{For analysis on the implications of this inter-imperial relationship with England on Portuguese colonialism and its legacies, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) and Luís Madureira’s cogent rebuttal (2008).} The ultimatum caused great shock to the imperial notion of Portuguese sovereignty. In the build-up to the ultimatum, in preparation of the Berlin Conference, Portuguese politicians developed and nationally disseminated what became known as the “Mapa Cor-de-Rosa” [“pink map”], laying and illustrating the aforementioned claim to southern African land from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This led to a renewed public interest in the overseas empire, and renewed nationalist fervor. The burgeoning narrative of Portuguese imperial agency in Africa and its subsequent national/imperial pride was soon crushed by the ultimatum, and understood as the “colonial crisis,” ultimately leading to increased opposition to the monarchy among intellectuals and politicians. This was exacerbated when the state declared bankruptcy in 1891 as a result of decades without imperial profits from
Brazil and the failed attempts at metropolitan industrialization. Distrust in the constitutional monarchy to regenerate the economy and carry out a sustained colonial project further increased during this time. In 1906, King Carlos I installed João Franco as head of state who, a year later, suspends significant portions of the constitution and implements a dictatorship based on anti-republican ideals, threatening to apprehend republican dissidents and deport them to the overseas colonies. On February 1, 1908, Carlos I and his first-born son are assassinated in the Praça do Comércio [Commerce Square] in Lisbon by two republican activists, Alfredo Luís da Costa and Manuel Buíca. The monarchy lived on with Carlos I’s youngest son, Manuel, assuming the crown for another two and a half years until a republican-led coup d’état officially ended the monarchy and inaugurated the first Portuguese Republic on October 5, 1910.

Nineteenth-Century Portuguese Intellectual Reflections on Ethnic Formation

As mentioned, the long nineteenth century of Portuguese history and the travails cursorily delineated above led to critical inquests into and often scathing assessments of Portuguese social formation and national identity. These formed, moreover, the ideological foundations of intellectual movements emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century—most notably a group of writers, politicians, and social scientists who would become known as the Geração de 70 [Generation of 1870]. The collective was comprised of literary and intellectual figures such as Antero de Quental, Eça de Queirós, Oliveira Martins, Guerra Junqueiro, Teófilo Braga, and Ramalho Ortigão; and would come to mark a watershed period in the historicization of Portugueseness along racial, cultural, and global economic lines, and situated within global imperial systems of power and representation. Together with figures who preceded yet temporally overlapped with these, like Alexandre Herculano and Almeida Garrett (who were affiliated with the earlier Romanticist movement), the Geração de 70 inaugurated and canonized particular discourses of Portuguese ethnicity that would reemerge throughout the twentieth century and help found the dominant historicizations of Portuguese imperialism and racial hybridity operating in the contemporary Portuguese public sphere. By the same token, they also build on earlier historiographies of Portuguese and Iberian ethnic formation.

These contributors to national historiography, cultural production, and political discourse ranged and operated across different and often opposing socioeconomic and political ideologies: pro- and anti-monarchy
(mostly the latter), liberal and anti-liberal (though mostly the former), republicanism, Proudhonian socialism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Herculano, a prolific writer and essayist, produced the eight-volume *História de Portugal* from 1842 to 1853, and can be situated within the Romanticist period of European and Ibero-American thought on nation and national consciousness. Herculano’s collection, though, is both a history and a critical genealogy of hitherto dominant national historiography in which Herculano critiques yet presupposes the historicity of Portugal as a Christian European nation. In doing so, he retraces, wittingly or not, the emergence of various anti-Arab historiographic arguments and concomitant historicizations of whiteness and Portuguese claims to it. In framing his project as a “scientific” or “objective” enterprise of scholarship, he takes to task Portuguese historiographers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries for making what to him are non-empirical arguments for both Celtic and Roman origins of the Portuguese povo [people]—yet another term popularized by nationalist thought of his time, though Herculano finds it in circulation in medieval and Renaissance Portuguese prose and poetry. In this regard, Herculano complexly straddles the line between presenting a (meta)historiography of Portugal while questioning the very validity of the category of nation as it was articulated by his predecessors.

Herculano, by questioning the legitimacy of earlier yet dominant versions of Portuguese nationhood and framing it as an ideological construction and normalized signification of social relations, opens the possibility of further historical renegotiation. He thus critiques the historiographic synthesis of Celtic and Roman origins as an ideological swoop of erasure of other later inhabitants as well as a fantasy of national origin through which to historicize later moments of the past.

Nos escritores gregos e romanos encontravam-se importantes notícias sobre a Espanha antiga, sobre os povos que a habitaram ou dominaram; sobre os seus costumes, guerras, e mais sucessos. As passagens relativas a essas matérias estudaram-se, compararam-se, esclareceram-se por longas e atentas investigações, e os anais das raças que tinham precedido o estabelecimento das nações modernas da Península poderam tecer-se aproximadamente. Restava buscar um fio que prendesse as duas grandes épocas e as fizesse depender logicamente uma da outra; isto é, restava buscar um povo, uma tribo, uma família, fosse o que fosse, que remontando aos tempos mais afastados pudesse considerar-se como origem e tronco da nação portuguesa e esta, não como uma nova sociedade constituída com diversos elementos, mas sim como transformação ou modificação daquela.
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[In Greek and Roman writers [historiographers] one found important news about ancient Spain, about the peoples that controlled and inhabited it; about their customs, wars, and successes. The relevant passages on these matters were studied, compared, and clarified through long and close research, and the annals of the races that preceded the formation of the modern Peninsular nations were interweaved. All that was needed was a thread that could tie these two grand epochs and make them depend logically on one another; that is, all that was needed was to locate a people, a tribe, a family, or whatever it took that, dating back as far as possible, could be considered the origin or trunk of the Portuguese nation, not as a new society constituted by diverse elements, but rather as a transformation of this sort of society.] (34)

Herculano, in other words, levies a subtle critique at the then dominant (yet still relevant today) narrative of a Portuguese ethos situated into a longer constructed history of whiteness, that traces itself back to and thus incorporates Roman and Celtic histories. In doing so, and in a rather un-Romantic way, he refutes the notion of synthesis, positing it as fantasy of national cohesion at the service of foregrounding an ethos—one of whiteness through historical groups problematically and posteriorly claimed as white. Rather than a synthesis grounded in the “transformation” or assimilation of social elements and peoples into a Celtic-Roman-centric society, Herculano’s historiographic project is more concerned with the historical tensions between the different groups of inhabitants, as well as the socioeconomic and political tensions that have rendered Portuguese societal relations.

Herculano dedicates significant attention to challenging the contrived historical argument of the Portuguese as descendants of pre-Roman and Roman Lusitanians, as proffered by Luís Vaz de Camões in his epic poem of Portuguese imperial endeavor, Os Lusíadas [The Lusiads] (1572), as well as by numerous historiographers tied to the Church and to Portuguese nobility. Herculano thus argues that this historical fantasy of Lusitian origin was promoted, disseminated, and normalized as tied to the imperialist pretensions of the Portuguese nobility; and as a mode of historicizing the Portuguese nation as stemming from an inherently expansionist ethos (39–40). His genealogy of Portuguese nationhood effectively destabilized this widely held and imperially mediated version of Portuguese origin by arguing that civilizational history of the Iberian Peninsula is rendered not through the prevalence of one phantasmagorical “original race,” but of a constant process of inter-civilizational (or interracial, to use his term) encounters and mixtures. He defends that the cultural life of the Celts on
the peninsula quickly fused with and was resignified via preceding and later migratory groups:

Quando os carthagineses entraram na Península, não só as duas raças mais antigas, os íberos e os celtas, se achavam confundidas nos territórios centrais, mas também as tribos das orlas do mar e ainda os celtas e os celtiberos do sertão tinham misturado com os fenícios e gregos, principalmente com os primeiros, cuja influência na população foi tamanha que ficou predominando até hoje no país o nome que eles lhe puseram.

[When the Carthaginians entered the Peninsula, not only did the two most ancient races, the Iberians and the Celts, find themselves mixed in the central territories, but the coastal tribes as well as the Celts and Celtiberians of the hinterlands had also mixed with the Phoenicians and Greeks, especially with the former whose influence on the population was so considerable that even today the name they attributed to the country predominates.] (48)

It is important to note that the term “race” employed by Herculano in the specific passage above may refer to the existing imperialist racial categories of the time that underpinned the moment of racial capitalism. He also applies the term retroactively to the different Eurasian/Mediterranean/African civilizations that occupied or resided in the territories of the Iberian Peninsula. During and in the decades following Herculano’s life, the notion of a “raça nacional” (“national race”) would be popularized and embraced by the state. The conception, to be celebrated in an annual Dia Nacional da Raça, tied together ongoing notions of bellicose imperial national origins alongside the commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries and a post-Ultimatum imperial fervor for the Portuguese colonial project in Africa.

Before we further unpack the widespread notion of a “national race” steeped in Western imperial discourses of whiteness, it is important to underscore Herculano’s theoretical contribution to later genealogical formulations of Portuguese nationality and ethnicity. While Herculano decenters prominent narrativizations of national whiteness, he inaugurates a particular understanding of national history and the formation of a Portuguese people as produced via the confrontation and mixing of earlier peoples. In many ways, his work evokes a nascent conceptual paradigm of nation and ethnicity based on constant unfixity, hybridity, temporal context, and renegotiation based on relations of power—and thus moving away from notions of national totality. While he utilizes this framework to dispel ideas
of national essence or generalizations of Portuguese formation at the service of political argument and power, the understanding of Portugueseness as a fluid process based on intercultural mixture would be taken in a different direction by later intellectuals.

During the 1870s, historian and social scientist Oliveira Martins writes his two-volume *História de Portugal* [*History of Portugal*] (1879). Though he seems to align himself conceptually with Herculano in questioning the fantasy of a line of descent between the Portuguese and Roman Lusitanians, his central project of “descobrir a nossa raça” [“uncovering our race”] (author’s italics) (9) is guided by an attempt to locate, or rather substantiate the notion of a singular Portuguese collective character, a historical exceptionalism that separates it from other neighboring nations—especially Spain—and that could offer the basis of a Portuguese race. As with Herculano, this deployment of the term “race,” despite being used interchangeably or in conjunction with nationality, “povo” [“people”], or pátria, is always-already implicitly imbued with notions of whiteness derived from Portuguese expansion and its anti-Black, anti-Arab, and anti-Jewish foundations. In prefacing his genealogy of the Portuguese “race,” Oliveira Martins argues in favor of an origin of Portuguese specificity among the Lusitanians as a key factor in distinguishing a Portuguese national race constituted by positive characteristics from a Spanish race composed of less favorable traits. Like other European and Ibero-American intellectuals who trafficked in ideas of national “character” during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, Oliveira Martins deploys an array of nebulous categories of difference and dubious cultural stereotypes to support what for him are sound arguments.

He begins by conceding that the Portuguese are part of the same ethnological group to which he refers as “Hespanha” [“Spain” in earlier Portuguese orthography]: “as diversas populações da Hespanha, individualizadas sim, formam, contudo, no seu conjunto, um corpo etnológico dotado de caracteres gerais comuns a todas” [“the diverse populations of Spain, though individualized, form, nonetheless, as a group, an ethnological body imbued with general characteristics common to all”] (5). He goes on to affirm a Lusitanian specificity at the core of the Portuguese race that legitimizes its imperialist endeavor:

entre as diversas tribos ibéricas, a lusitana era, senão a mais, uma das mais individualmente caracterizada. Não esquecemos, de certo, a influência posterior dos sucessos da história particular portuguesa: mas eles só por si não bastam para explicar o feitio diverso com que as coisas, em si idênticas, se representam ao nosso espírito nacional. Há no génio português o quer de vago e fugitivo, que contrasta com
a terminante afirmativa do castelhano; há no heroísmo lusitano uma nobreza que difere da fúria dos nossos vizinhos; há nas nossas letras e no nosso pensamento uma nota profunda e sentimental, irónica ou meiga, que em vão se buscareia na história da cultura espanhola, violenta sem profundidade, apaixonada mas sem entranhas [...] magnânima sem caridade [...] Trágica e ardente sempre, a história espanhola difere da portuguesa, mais propriamente épica; e as diferenças da história traduzem as dessemelhanças do caráter.

[amongst the diverse Iberian tribes, the Lusitanians were, if not the most, one of the most singular. Let us not forget, most certainly, their influence on the later successes of Portuguese history: but these alone are not enough to explain the specific temperament with which things, being identical, are represented in our national spirit. There is in the Portuguese character something vague and fugitive that contrasts with the affirmative condition of the Castilian; there is in the Lusitanian heroism a nobleness that differs from the fury of our neighbors; there is in our letters and in our thought a profound and sentimental note, sarcastic and kind, for which one searches in vain in the history of Spanish culture, violent and shallow, impassioned but without substance [...] magnanimous without kindness [...] Tragic and forever burning, the history of Spain differs from that of the Portuguese, more properly epic; and so the differences in history are translated into dissimilarities of character.] (Vol II, 5–6)

Though he begins by stating that Lusitanian heritage is insufficient to account for Portuguese specificity in relation to neighboring Spain, he goes on to posit its centrality in Portuguese exceptionalism.

Oliveira Martins’s ambiguous position regarding Lusitanian heritage is part of his particular racial schematization of Portuguese history and the racial dynamics of continental Portuguese national formation. For him, the consolidation of Portugal’s current continental borders implied the control over different races under the same crown through the territorial expansion south of the River Mondego—the southernmost border of the pre-independence County of Portugal after it merged with the County of Coimbra. As a result, and acknowledging the centuries of Arab and Berber presence within the territories that compose Portugal’s current borders, he asserts that “em Portugal faltou uma unidade de raça” [“Portugal lacked a racial unity”] (Vol II, 13). Though this has been attenuated but not fully resolved, in his view, through seven centuries of contact between the northern races of early sovereign Portugal and Arab races of the Al-Gharb,
the consequences of racial difference in the social formation of southern Portugal were still evident in his day:

Todos vêem ainda hoje como é rara a população do sul, menos densos portanto os laços colectivos; e todos sabem como essas regiões sujeitas por séculos a guerras exterminadoras, habitadas por moçárabes, invadidas por bérberes, taladas pelo fanatismo almorávide, passaram para sob o império da monarquia nascida na Galiza portuguesa.

[All can see even today how underpopulated the south of Portugal is, and thus its deficit in collective ties; and everyone knows how those regions subjected to centuries of exterminating battles, inhabited by Mozarabs, invaded by Berbers, devastated by Almovarid fanaticism, came to reside under the empire of the monarchy born in Portuguese Galicia.] (Vol II, 12)

In other words, demographic and economic differences between northern and southern Portugal are, for Oliveira Martins, reflections and remnants of historically deeper racial differences—particularly due to what for him is the social backwardness of Arab and Berber social and economic organization. In this anti-Arab regard, Oliveira Martins aligns the sovereignty of an expansionist Portuguese monarchical state with an implied fantasy of a fixedly Germanic Galician Kingdom, which thus forms his conceptual core of Portuguese whiteness in relation to Arab/Mozarab southern Portugal.

Oliveira Martins furthered Herculano's arguments regarding a heterogeneous Portuguese population by framing it in racial and ethnic terms—for him, an often-contradictory blend of biological and cultural notions of race according to racial scientific discourses of the time. His in particular were rooted in an early form of social determinism often found in the philosophical core of naturalist thought and realist cultural production of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. Therefore, for Oliveira Martins, based on his anti-Arab claims, racial difference is produced and manifested in the material (economic and cultural) conditions created by and within a given civilization or long-term occupation of a given land. Consequently, the population residing within said conditions are ultimately determined by them.

In schematizing a hybrid Portuguese formation of whiteness, Oliveira Martins suggests that the formation of a Portuguese nationality cannot be translated into a unified Portuguese race or ethno-genetic group, and thus the concept of a totalized Portuguese nationality is always in tension with the heterogeneity of its population:
Há ou não há uma nacionalidade portuguesa? Questão absurda, assim formulada. Evidentemente há, se nacionalidade que dizer nação. Se por nacionalidade se entende, porém, um corpo de população etnogenicamente homogéneo, localizado numa região naturalmente delimitada, insistimos em dizer que tal coisa se não dá connosco. Se por nacionalidade se entende, finalmente, essa unidade social que a história imprime em povos submetidos ao regime de um governo, de uma língua, de uma religião irmãs,— como nós o temos sido durante sete séculos,— evidentemente a resposta só pode ser uma.

[Is there, or is there not, a Portuguese nationality? An absurd question, formulated that way. Evidently there is, if nationality means nation. If by nationality we mean, on the other hand, a population that is ethno-genetically homogenous, located in a naturally delimited region, we insist that such a thing does not exist among us. If by nationality we mean, finally, that social unit that history imposes on people under a government regime, a regime of one language, and one affiliated religion—as we have been for seven centuries—clearly, there can only be one answer.] (Vol II, 21)

This would be further complicated theoretically by later arguments from Portuguese intellectuals and writers of the early to mid-twentieth century, the production of Portuguese nation having to consistently integrate different races and racial histories occupying Portuguese space and forming Portuguese society by glossing over said differences and how power attends to them.

As a respected historian and contributor to the Geração de 70, Oliveira Martins's work would be influential for other intellectuals of his time and after. Following Herculano, his historiographic project would further canonize the vision of a heterogeneous national formation and population in albeit ambiguous racial terms. Moreover, Oliveira Martins centered the notion of “malleability” (Vol II, 48) as a supposedly inherent mechanism of Portuguese national renegotiation. It is this sort of ethnic and cultural indeterminism, he argues, that allows “que recebemos e assimilamos as influências estranhas” [“us to receive and assimilate foreign influences”] (48). By “foreign influences” he is arguably referring to literary, intellectual, political, and consumptive models and trends emanating from north of the Pyrenees, but this discourse of national and racial malleability would be applied by later cultural critics and social scientists to Portuguese colonial encounters and the development of colonial societies, as I shall address below.
Before shifting to the twentieth century, other works by key members of the Geração de 70 contributed to the multifaceted elaboration of Portuguese racial discourses. As Oliveira Martins wrote his historiography of Portugal, he participated in the weekly conferences that came to consolidate the collective of intellectuals, held in the Casino Lisbonense during the spring of 1871. These evolved from the earlier encounters of the group, called the Questão Coimbrã [Coimbran Question], while students at the University of Coimbra called for an artistic shift from Romanticism to Realism as a cultural mode of signifying social change and portraying social realities. The group, guided by Proudhonian socialist ideals called for an artistic and philosophical mode, Realism, that would serve, in Eça de Queirós’s words, as “a crítica do homem. É a arte que nos pinta a nossos próprios olhos para nos conhecermos, para que saibamos se somos verdadeiros ou falsos, para condenar o que houver de mal na nossa sociedade” [“the critique of man. It is art which paints us through our own eyes so that we may know ourselves, so that we may know if we are true or false, so that we may condemn what is wrong in our society”] (Queirós, “A literatura nova” 137).

The framing of the conferences was guided by an intellectual grappling with the decay of empire and of Portuguese global hegemony over the preceding three centuries. The principal organizer of the conferences, Antero de Quental, a poet and social philosopher hailing from the Azores, wrote the manifesto that eventually served as the conference preamble. There, he and the other signatories comprising the Geração de 70 envisaged the goal of the conferences as:

Abrir uma tribuna onde tenham voz as ideias e os trabalhos que caracterizam este movimento do século, preocupando-nos sobretudo com a transformação social, moral e política dos povos; Ligar Portugal com o movimento moderno, fazendo-o assim nutrir-se dos elementos vitais de que vive a sociedade civilizada, procurar adquirir a consciência dos factos que nos rodeiam na Europa; Agitar na opinião pública as grandes questões da Filosofia e da Ciência modernas; Estudar as condições da transformação política, económica e religiosa da sociedade portuguesa.

[Establish a forum for the ideas and works that characterize this moment of the century, those things concerned, above all, with the social, moral, and political transformations of the world's peoples; To link Portugal to the modern movement, thus making it nourish itself on the vital elements that sustain civilized society, looking to acquire the knowledge of the facts that circulate around us in Europe; To excite
within the public sphere the great questions of modern Philosophy and Science; To study the conditions for political, economic, and religious change in Portuguese society.] (404)

The conferences were thus not only about debating how this group of intellectuals, writers, and aspiring politicians of largely upper-middle-class families could align Portuguese society with the discourses, cultures, and knowledges of imperial central Europe. In doing so, they also produced their own imperially nostalgic inquests and theorizations of how Portuguese society, the state, and its economy—once the forbearers of Western modernity—“fell behind” the rest of imperial Europe.

It is along these lines that Quental proffered what was the most emblematic and widely circulated intervention of the conferences, his essay “Causas da decadência dos povos peninsulares nos três últimos séculos” [“The Causes of the Decadence of the Peninsular Nations in the Last Three Centuries”]. In attempting this sort of genealogy of imperial decay of early modern Iberian global hegemony, he specifically targets Spanish and Portuguese royal embracing of the Catholic Counter-Reformation and Tridentine doctrine in everyday state-making, national signification, and imperial policy. Through his own form of late nineteenth century post-Enlightenment rationalism that critiques metropolitan inequality and underdevelopment while supporting colonial endeavor in the Global South, he is particularly critical of the consequences of the Inquisition and the related rise of Jesuitism—especially the expulsion of “Jews,” “Moors,” and “New-Christians” and what it meant for national knowledge production and economics:

Com a Inquisição, um terror invisível paira sobre a sociedade: a hipocrisia torna-se um vício nacional e necessário: a delação é uma virtude religiosa: a expulsão dos Judeus e Moiros empobrece as duas nações, paralisa o comércio e a indústria, e dá um golpe mortal na agricultura em todo o Sul da Espanha: a perseguição dos cristãos-novos faz desaparecer os capitais [...] Com o jesuitismo desaparece o sentimento cristão, para dar lugar aos sofismas mais deploráveis a que jamais desceu a consciência religiosa: métodos de ensino, ao mesmo tempo brutais e requintados, esterilizam as inteligências, dirigindo-se à memória, com o fim de matarem o pensamento inventivo, e alcançam alhearem o espírito peninsular do grande movimento da ciência moderna.

[With the Inquisition, an invisible terror descends on society: hypocrisy becomes a national and necessary vice: delation is a religious virtue: the expulsion of Jews and Moors impoverishes both nations, paralyzes
commerce and industry, and deals a fatal blow to the agricultural economy across southern Spain: the persecution of New Christians liquidates capital (...) With Jesuitism the Christian spirit disappears, giving way to the most deplorable sophisms that have plummeted religious consciousness: modes of education, at the same time brutal and complex, sterilize the intelligence, targeting memory, with the goal of killing innovative thought, and succeed in divorcing the peninsular spirit from the great movement of modern science.] (70–71)

For Quental, therefore, the age of a lost Portuguese modernity was materially produced through what his contemporaries, like Oliveira Martins, would have called a multiracial society composed of and derived from Arab and other Semitic knowledges. Drawing further on Quental’s passage above, somewhat ironically, what were deemed non-white societal elements by Catholic Counter-Reformationist doctrines had provided the epistemological and economic bases for Iberian participation in the burgeoning knowledges of imperial whiteness—“the great movement of modern science.” What is thus lamented in this superficial defense of Islamic and Jewish participation in Portuguese nationhood is the loss of whiteness, or the acknowledgment of a deficit on whiteness and its material criteria vis-à-vis central and northern Europe.

Meanwhile, we can connect his thoughts on Islamic and Jewish contributions to imperial nationhood with his under-elaborated reflections on models of colonization and formation of colonial society: “a Inquisição passa os mares, e tornando-nos hostis os índios, impedindo a fusão dos conquistadores e dos conquistados, torna impossível o estabelecimento duma colonização sólida e duradoura: na América despovoa as Antilhas, apavora as populações indígenas, e faz o nome de cristão um símbolo de morte” [“the Inquisition crosses the seas, making us hostile to the Indians, impeding the fusion of conquerors with the conquered, prohibiting the establishment of a solid and lasting colonization: in the Americas, the Inquisition depopulates the Antilles, threatens the indigenous populations, and makes the Christian name a symbol of death”] (71). It seems that, for Quental, perhaps through ignorance of other European colonial projects, Counter-Reformationist segregation in the colonies and the metropolis became the greatest hindrance to the formation of Portuguese societies built on interreligious and interracial fusion. Quental’s underfleshed understanding of miscegenation as a mode of colonization seems to deploy an early Darwinist view of miscegenation that would be later embraced by some eugenicists, by which the supposedly “stronger” traits of European Christianity (as opposed to Catholocism) would triumph and
thus inaugurate and signify a white society from hybrid origins. This would arguably also apply to metropolitan demographics, in Quental’s view. Two supposedly majority Christian nations would thus be at the vanguard of imperial whiteness, and non-Christian elements would ultimately be subsumed into the formation of white Portugueseness/Spanishness. This would, of course, imply an epistemic, if not physical, violence that would underpin assimilation—conditions that are uncertainly beyond Quental’s purview.

At the same time, Quental and others of the generation were able to conceptually and historically reconcile multiracial foundations of the burgeoning Portuguese modernity of the fifteenth century with the extractivist, slavocratic, and genocidal logics of racial capitalism on which the lost grandeur was based. As such, Quental merely acknowledges that the material and epistemological formation of white supremacy, especially during the early modern period, was based in no small part on the knowledges of those who were to be discarded by the project of whiteness. Nonetheless, his acknowledgment of an early imperial Portuguese society that diverged from the narratives of a Christian bellicose would contribute to later imperial narratives of Portuguese multiraciality—that is, that of a metropolitan symbiosis of Germanic and Semitic elements. Furthermore, Quental’s seminal essay, a crucial part of the literary and intellectual production of one of the most canonical generations of Portuguese letters, went a long way toward popularizing a historical view of Portuguese national and ethnic formation as built upon interracial and interreligious fusions, in which racial and religious difference mutually signify each other. In this sense, his essay also centers a paradigm of thought regarding national and cultural formation based on theorizations of hybridity that implicitly underscore white supremacy while obfuscating its material power and violence.

Eça de Queirós, Orientalism, and Portuguese Racial Plasticity

The Geração de 70 also formulated or at least gestured toward a rendering of Portuguese whiteness steeped in the period’s particular stage of capitalism, marked by the temporal crossing of an emerging European industrialism sustained by raw material extraction in the Global South, the decay of Portuguese colonial projects, and an enduring system of colonial knowledge and representation. It is in the latter, more specifically, that one finds the consistently renegotiated realms of racial, gender, and sexual meanings that inform capitalist extraction and divisions of labor. In the literary works of the generation’s most acclaimed writer, Eça de Queirós, one finds
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a complexly and at times, tacitly, interwoven localization of whiteness in Portuguese society and on a global scale. In this regard, his Realist aesthetic lends itself to discerning and cataloguing the desires, performances, and participation in Empire of a Portuguese bourgeoisie, though localized on the periphery of industrialized Europe. Indeed, the central characters of his work are embedded in bourgeois circles and its cosmopolitan trends of consumption of manufactured goods imported from industrial Europe. The latter is thus hailed by said characters—with tones of sarcasm, nationalist lament, and admiration—as the beacon of capitalist modernity from which Portugal is barred.

Though Portuguese bourgeois whiteness is positioned by Eça as a deficit in relation to industrial central Europe and compromised by the fall of Portuguese colonial extractivism and lack of industry, his white bourgeois characters nonetheless partake in various ways in the racial and gendered fabric of Empire and its orientalist, anti-Black, and anti-indigenous cartographies and corporal discourses. It is especially through modes of consumption that his bourgeois characters articulate notions of whiteness by connecting their place in local and global capital to global modes of production and Western imperial discourses of racial otherness. Many of his characters cultivate private and public bourgeois life through a blend of European manufactured goods ranging from technology to attire and exoticized furnishings and décor such as Persian rugs and East Asian statues. These include central characters in some of his most acclaimed works such as Dona São Joaneira in O Crime do Padre Amaro [The Crime of Father Amaro] (1875); Jorge, Luisa, and Basílio in O Primo Basílio [Cousin Bazilio] (1878); and the Maia family in Os Maias [The Maias] (1888).

Two of his lesser known and lesser acclaimed works, O Mandarim [The Mandarin] (1881) and A Relíquia [The Relic] (1887), make specifically orientalist materials and fantasies central elements of intrigue and wonder in their respective plots. Like most of his central characters, the protagonist of O Mandarim serves to lay bare the mediocrity of Portuguese bourgeois subjects—for Eça de Queirós, a talentless class that owes their social standing to the intergenerational wealth produced by the cunning of its ancestors. Thus, the novel’s protagonist, an amanuensis named Teodoro, working as a public scrivener for the Ministry of the Realm, dreams of social ascension into bourgeois life and without needing to cultivate any particular talent or endure any toil. He, therefore, embodies the (petit) bourgeois ideas of facile accumulation that Eça centers as both a cause and an effect of Portugal’s position on the fringe of capitalist modernity. Teodoro reads a mysterious book that speaks of the existence of a millionaire in China from whom the reader can inherit his wealth by merely ringing a
bell. Before finishing the book, a bell duly appears accompanied by the voice of the devil. Teodoro thus makes a Faustian pact with the devil to inherit the fortune of the unknown wealthy Chinese man, drawing on the “Mandarin paradox” posed in François-René Chateaubriand’s *Le Génie du Christianisme* [The Genius of Christianity] (1802): “If thou couldst by a mere wish kill a fellow-creature in China, and inherit his fortune in Europe, with the supernatural conviction that the fact would never be known, wouldst thou consent to form such a wish?” (188). A central twist involves the sporadic apparitions of the assassinated titular Chinese man, Ti Chin-Fu, that torment Teodoro and make him cast doubt over the legitimacy of his newfound wealth.

Darlene Sadlier points out the complexity of Eça’s deployment of orientalist tropes: “In *O Mandarim*, Eça is deeply concerned with the contrasting notions of the Orient that were current in his day, oscillating between the valorization of a Far East aesthetic sensibility associated with empire and the vilification of a yellow population regarded as barbarous and a threat to Western civilization” (97–98). Pedro Schacht Pereira comes to a similar argument in relation to *A Relíquia* in which the Orient “ceases to be a mere *topos* and becomes also the locus of a sustained critique of hegemonic orientalist discourses” while “acquir[ing] its greatest complexity and affords its author the most decisive breakthrough in his career since the publication of *O Crime do Padre Amaro*” (433). Despite Eça’s ambiguities, the Orient is constructed as a racialized site of extraction for both Eça’s plots and his personal/aesthetic performance of European personhood. Both novels harness existing textualities of orientalist narratives and discourses circulating in Europe merely at the service of providing a diegetic supplement of exotic intrigue to the critique of bourgeois subjectivity and desire. Pereira goes on to consider that while “Eça’s orientalism evince[s] fascination and disgust toward the Orient,” “the Orient is an opportunity to reorient his literary career and orientalism is a discourse that allows him to simultaneously analyze Portuguese devotional life, disparage mainstream European orientalism, and dramatize a theoretical discussion on the critical relevance of literature for the new age he felt he was entering” (435).

One must concede that Eça made it a point to problematize dominant orientalist notions of East Asian societies, knowledges, and histories held in Europe. In his essay, “Chineses e Japoneses” [“The Chinese and the Japanese”] (1894), he writes to Western audiences:

esses povos da extrema Ásia, por ora só conhecemos pelos lados exteriores e excessivos do seu exotismo. Com traços estranhos de figura e trajo [...] Por trás [...] do exotismo, existem sólidas instituições sociais
e domésticas, uma velha e copiosa literatura, uma intensa vida moral, fecundos métodos de trabalho, energias ignoradas, o europeu mediano não o suspeita.

[Of those peoples of the Far East we only know them through their superficial images of excess and exoticism. With strange corporal traits and garments (...) Behind (...) the exoticism exist solid social and domestic institutions, an established and copious literature, an intense moral life, fecund methods of labor, unrecognized energies that the average European never suspects.] (Obras Completas 2: 1258)

While Eça offers a more nuanced Eurocentric knowledge production of Chinese and Japanese societal and cultural life, he nonetheless subscribes to existing racializing discourses in the Western episteme that tie together phenotypical alterity ("strange corporal traits") and different yet praiseworthy social norms. The sorts of orientalist valorization found in Eça's work do not, in fact, diverge drastically from a vast body of European literature of the nineteenth century. With regards to such literary products, Edward Said, who shifted orientalism into an object of critical postcolonial analysis, notes: “The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but to a series of valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past” (Orientalism 85). In this sense, Eça nonetheless contributes to the textual universe of Western/European literary and cultural spheres that posited the Orient as worthy of Western praise according to Eurocentric epistemologies yet fantasticaly othered.

While articulating a Portuguese Westernness/whiteness as oppositional to, yet extractive of, East Asian knowledges and cultural production (arts and dress), Eça's particular diegetic and personal deployment of orientalism also promotes a notion of Portuguese intercultural and interracial plasticity—an exceptionalism that differentiates Eça's orientalism from those of the rest of Europe. Eça historiographically recircuits the centuries-long Portuguese extraction, appropriation, and consumption of East Asian artistic modes, that is, mosaic tiles, as evidence of a Portuguese imperial modus operandi of cultural exchange that would further materialize in the intellectual production and political rhetoric of the mid-twentieth century. Portuguese colonial encounters and exploitation are thus already reconfigured through the elaboration of a historical narrative of Portuguese cultural syncretism that obfuscates extractivist logics. In typical Eça fashion, O Mandarim and A Relíquia, as well as his own public life, offer both critique and endorsement of both orientalist discourses and the tenets of intercultural consumption for
the production of white bourgeois identity. His oeuvre is, indeed, often a critique of the very aspects and desires of bourgeois life to which he, too, subscribes.

In *O Mandarim*, Teodoro, ridden by guilt for the death of Ti Chin-Fu and the usurpation of the latter’s wealth, travels to Beijing to donate a portion of his new-found wealth. He is received and housed in a luxurious abode that corresponds to many of his orientalist fantasies of Chinese life and quickly adopts what for him is an extravagant rendering of traditional Chinese attire—“uma tunica de brocado azul escuro abotoada ao lado; com o peitilho ricamente bordado de dragões e flores the ouro” [“a dark blue brocade tunic that buttoned at the side; the chest was richly embroidered with golden dragons and flowers”] (94). By simply wearing such attire, he proclaims acculturation and immersion into Chinese psychic, political, cultural, and epistemological life—or rather, his fantasy of it:

pelas misteriosas correlações com que o vestuário influencia o caráter, eu sentia já em mim ideias, instintos chineses:—o amor dos cerimoniais meticulosos, o respeito burocrático das fórmulas, um ponto de ceticismo letrado; e também um abjeto terror do Imperador, o ódio ao estrangeiro, o culto dos antepassados, o fanatismo da tradição, o gosto das cousas açucaradas.

[through the mysterious correlations with which attire influences character, I already felt in my ideas, Chinese instincts:—the love of meticulous cerimonies, the bureaucratic respect of formulas, a bit of lettered skepticism; and also an abject terror towards the Emperor, hatred toward foreigners, the cult of ancestors, the fanaticism of traditions, tastes for sugary things.] (95)

In many ways, Teodoro, here, is a parody of cultural extraction and plasticity, as his performance as “Mandarin” is subtly deconstructed by other characters and revealed to be a farce. Teodoro, in fact, knows only two words of Mandarin Chinese and is ignorant of both Chinese history and the historical moment in which he finds himself, with tumultuous Sino-Japanese relations soon to deteriorate into the First Sino-Japanese War. A similar caricature of a Portuguese orientalist bourgeois man would also appear in other works of Eça, most notably his pseudonymic character Fradique Mendes in *Correspondência de Fradique Mendes* [The Correspondence of Fradique Mendes] (1900) who also dons similar attire during his travels in East Asia. Arguably, herein lies yet another moment of Eça’s self-critique: for he, too, was known to dress in a similar fashion during his time in China (Sadlier 98). One can thus read such parodic renderings as possible critiques of the superficiality
with which Europeans appropriated and extracted cultural forms, all the while reproducing orientalist fantasies of Empire.

Eça is not the first or last Portuguese orientalist (as the next chapter will make clear), but he is arguably the most canonical figure of modern Portuguese literature to center Portuguese protagonists, though deeply flawed, as mechanisms of cultural contact and, through them, wittingly or not, stage the politics of this contact and consumption. For Eça, this contact and casual appropriation of cultural forms and products through an essentialist lens belies an alignment of Portuguese bourgeois racial identity with Western imperial epistemologies and is potentiated through a specifically Portuguese history of empire. The orientalist fascination and fetishization enacted by both him and his protagonists is “naturalized” thanks to centuries of contact and occupation in East Asia. In this sense and through this historical connection, he and his characters mentioned above are able to produce a specifically Portuguese interculturality tied to Empire in complex and misrecognized ways.

This seems to be a way that a more contemporary writer, the Angolan José Eduardo Agualusa, deploys and memorializes Eça's Fradique Mendes. Born José Eduardo Alves da Cunha in colonial New Lisbon (today Huambo), Angola, of Portuguese parents, Agualusa (his penname meaning Luso water) recovers Eça's character in his novel Nação Crioula: A Correspondência Secreta de Fradique Mendes [Creole] (1997). Drawing on Eça's rendering of the character, Agualusa cultivates Fradique Mendes as emblematic of Portuguese trans-Atlantic and trans-racial plasticity—one that moves and proclaims to belong in multiple racialized spaces and as consumer of racialized bodies. If Eça's Fradique Mendes is supposed to serve in part as an autobiographical self-critique, Agualusa's titular character also mirrors, in a more celebratory fashion, his own claims to trans-racial plasticity in a Lusophone world that allegedly effaces facile understandings of imperial power as a Manichaean enterprise. Fradique Mendes's claims to feeling at home in Lisbon, Luanda, and Rio de Janeiro mirror Agualusa's own sense of identity as he relates in a 1999 interview: “Who I am takes few words: an Angolan in transit, almost without race [...] I was born in the highlands. I want to die in Benguela, an alternative would be Olinda, in northeastern Brazil” (Rozário 358).

Agualusa's own racial politics, as well as those that mark his novels, dovetail in many ways with late colonial ideologies of Portuguese pluri-continentality and interracial cordiality that will be further unpacked ahead. His oeuvre and cultivated public persona thus evoke a longer intertextual history of Portuguese racial identity politics and performance. In this regard, Eça's usage of orientalist characters are both misrecognized and celebrated as examples of a Portuguese racial fluidity that will be
expounded on and harnessed toward other objectives such as late colonial legitimation and literary aesthetic/commercial success. Agualusa’s claims to racelessness are predicated on both ancestral hybridity as with his numerous mixed-race characters and/or through geo-historical mashups of Lusophone locales. His protagonists often move through these effortlessly, and their claims to trans-raciality are based on often problematic senses of belonging to spaces. These are in turn marked by racialized bodies that are often sexually consumed by his cisgender male protagonists who supposedly evince their own white privilege through sexual liaisons with non-white women, as (Agualusa’s) Fradique Mendes does with his African wife, Ana Olímpia Vaz de Caminha, who was born a slave but becomes one of the country’s wealthiest women following her marriage to Mendes. As mid-twentieth-century colonial narratives and ideologies will go on to popularize, though not inaugurate, interracial sex between Portuguese men (articulated by some intellectuals as a historical predisposition of their racial hybridity) and non-white women resolves and erases the racialized divisions of bodies and labor that underpin other European colonial projects.

**Early Century Imperial Nostalgia and Portuguese Ethnic Formation**

The Portuguese political and imperial crises of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth and the intellectual and literary reflections on a decaying Portuguese modernity led to the emergence of new forms of hyponationalist thought, politics, and cultural production following the transition to the Republic and its early decades of political instability. Imperial nostalgia for the golden age of the Discoveries became intertwined and codified in a renewed search for a Portuguese ethos and the inscription of a people—some used the term raça—as produced by pre-Europe ancestry and by the glory of imperial yester-century. This period, spanning the 1910s and into the heart of António de Oliveira Salazar’s fascist dictatorship (the Estado Novo, or New State), implied a profound recircuiting of Portuguese subject-formation into narratives of imperial grandeur—with the Discoveries marking Portugal’s inauguration of Western modernity—and its enhanced colonial settlement project in Africa post-Scramble. At the same time, the sense of loss and reclamation of Portuguese empire was also accompanied by exaltations and theorizations of a Portuguese raça—a collective understanding of Portuguese nation mediated by intellectual, cultural, and political elites. These notions of raça, as we shall examine below, also implied a series of contradictory reflections on Portuguese phenotypes steeped in the slippery
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racial scientific and colonial thought of the time. Despite its questionable definitions and divergence from contemporary understandings of race, it nonetheless operates as a taxonomy of individual and collective sameness and implied oppositional differences vis-à-vis other spaces, nations, and colonized peoples.

Building on earlier intellectual historiographies of Portuguese ethnic formation, poet and essayist Teixeira de Pascoaes published in 1915 his book-length essay A Arte de Ser Português [The Art of Being Portuguese], which became canonical for its celebration of Portuguese ethnic origin redeemed by imperial endeavor. This origin is one of ethnic and cultural hybridity and mixture made into a totality that, for Pascoaes, is the Portuguese “Race.” He begins his essay with definitions of terms he will go on to intertwine. With regards to the term “race”:

Empregámo-la como significando um certo número de qualidades electivas, (num sentido superior) próprias de um Povo, organizado em Pátria, isto é, independente, sob o ponto de vista político e moral.

Tais qualidades são de natureza animal e espiritual, resultantes do meio físico (paisagem) e da herança étnica, histórica, jurídica, literária, artística, religiosa e mesmo económica.

[We shall employ the word as referring to a certain number of elective qualities, (in a superior sense) unique to a People, organized in Fatherland, that is, independent, in a political and moral sense.

Such qualities are of biological and spiritual nature, resulting from its physical space (landscape) and its ethnic, historical, juridical, literary, artistic, religious, and even economic heritage.] (10) (author’s italics)

The exceptional Portuguese “Race” or “character,” in his view,

resultou ou nasceu da mais perfeita e harmoniosa fusão que neste canto da Ibéria se fez do sangue ariano e semita.

Estes dois sangues, equivalendo-se em energia transmissora de heranças, deram à Raça lusitana as suas próprias qualidades superiores, que, em vez de se contradizerm—pelo contrário—se combinaram amorosamente, unificando-se na bela criação da alma pátria.

[resulted or was born from the most perfect and harmonious fusion of Aryan and Semitic bloods on this corner of Iberia.

These two bloods, being equal to each other in the transmission energy of heritage, gave to the Lusitanian Race their own superior qualities that, instead
of contradicting one another—on the contrary—combined amorously, unifying in the beautiful creation of the national soul.] (58) (author’s italics)

Here, as throughout his essay, Pascoaes renders an impassioned nationalism and a reclaimed Portuguese imperial modernity through which national formation is rehistoricized. In doing so, Pascoaes canonizes both mixture and a primordial interraciality at the core of national formation and as conduit of imperial glory. Furthermore, and with great repercussion for later narratives celebrating Portuguese colonial miscegenation and supposed intercultural fusion as evidence of imperial benevolence and exceptionalism, Pascoaes deploys a particular language of amorous symbiosis.

This intercultural fusion forms the core of his articulation of Portuguese exceptionalism that traverses, for him, a broad repertoire of supposedly Portuguese norms, everyday praxes, spirituality, metaphysics, and artistic life. It is across these that he formulates the tenets of the nationalist aesthetic movement known as Saudosismo—with the very name supposed to evoke the exceptionalism of Portugueseness—from the word saudade. His essay arguably canonized and inserted into nationalist thought the notion of untranslateable words, most notably, saudade, loosely translated as nostalgic longing. The nostalgia evoked by him and other participants in the movement including intellectuals like Jaime Cortesão, painters like António Carneiro, and even the imperial messianistic streak in poet Fernando Pessoa’s work, is of lost empire and further back, lost Lusitanian glory. In his essay, Pascoaes painstakingly and repetitively makes Saudosismo into a holistic project of national consciousness and formation—with untranslateable works reflecting exceptionalism and the material and metaphysical conditions tied to these evoking the singularity of a Portuguese “Race.” From the outset:

Portugal é uma Raça, porque existe uma Língua portuguesa, uma Arte, uma Literatura, uma História (incluindo a religiosa)—uma actividade moral portuguesa; e, sobretudo porque existe uma Língua e uma História portuguesas.

A faculdade que tem um Povo de criar uma forma verbal aos seus sentimentos e pensamentos, é que melhor revela o seu poder de carácter, de raça.

Por isso, quanto mais palavras intraduzíveis tiver uma Língua, mais carácter demonstra o Povo que a falar. A nossa, por exemplo, é muito rica em palavras desta natureza.

[Portugal is a Race, because a Portuguese Language exists, as does an Art, a Literature, a History (including religious)—a Portuguese moral activity; and, above all because there is a Portuguese Language and a Portuguese History.
The faculty of a People to create a verbal form of its sentiments and thoughts is what best reveals its power of character, of race.

Therefore, the more untranslatable words a Language possesses, the more character demonstrated by the People who speak it. Ours, for instance, is very rich in words of this nature.] (17) (author's italics)

As he claims at the outset of his essay, a race, and especially the Portuguese Race, is a dynamic entity, though he attempts to fix it within a particular historical moment. The exceptionalism of the Portuguese Race as demonstrated by its singular use of language thus originates in its articulated hybrid ethnic origins and traverses into its contemporary everyday life. Saudade, for Pascoaes and other adherents to the Saudosismo movement best embodied the hybridity of Portuguese ethos and ethnicity—with, as Miguel Vale de Almeida underscores, saudade “explained as a contradictory feeling that is specific to Portuguese character. It supposedly connected separate spheres: the Semitic element of Saudade as pain, and the Arian element of Saudade as desire” (51).

Pascoaes’s proto-nationalism situates this Portuguese Race as the greatest example of his definition of the term (13). Though he never racializes Portugueseness in relation or opposition to existing notions of European whiteness and Global Southern otherness, his celebration of past Portuguese imperial glory is always-already a racialized enterprise. In this regard, and as the New State would appropriate and expand upon, the imperial nostalgia and calls for imperial renaissance always situate themselves in existing paradigms of global racialized power. Thus, in the context of an imperial project, most materially pertinent in Africa, this national Race is grounded in anti-Blackness.

This would be made most evident through colonial policies in Africa that guided Portuguese settlement in the early twentieth century, consumed representations of Black bodies in the metropolis, and the celebration of the Portuguese “Race” through the annual “Dia de Camões, de Portugal, e da Raça” [“Day of Camões, Portugal, and the National Race”] on June 10 beginning in the 1940s. The date was first celebrated in 1880 following a royal decree by King Luís I to commemorate the 300th anniversary of poet Luís Vaz de Camões’s death, but was re-envisioned by Salazar’s New State as a nationalist celebration—with Camões and his Os Lusíads having long served as a nationalist metaphor—and the new official name of the date was declared by Salazar in 1944 during the inauguration of the Jamor National Stadium on the outskirts of Lisbon. This component was heightened with the renaming and expansion of the celebration as a national holiday replete with nationalist propaganda. The reframed celebrations implied, moreover,
a nationalist historicization—a historiographic elaboration of Portuguese whiteness that was to date back to ancient Lusitania at the height of Portuguese colonial settlement in Africa. Though the commemoration did not overtly refer to skin color, it built upon earlier self-racializations of the Portuguese based on the fantasy of national/ethnic origins traced back to Roman and pre-Roman Lusitania and canonized not only through the intellectual production outlined above, but also most visibly through Camões’s epic of nation and empire—*The Lusiads*. In Camões’s imperial poetics, Portuguese expansion and its key figures, especially Vasco da Gama, are mythologized as descendants of Lusus.

This centering of Lusitanian/Roman origins in the June 10 celebrations thus operated adjacent to the discourses of settler colonialism and, in the 1930s and 1940s, a rhetoric of “civilizing missions” that implicitly if not overtly underscored metropolitan claims to whiteness. The process of colonial settlement in Africa following the Ultimatum was a profoundly visible process in the metropolitan public sphere and through ever-expanding print and audio-visual media. The soliciting of settlers from impoverished rural communities in the metropolis implied a collective positioning of whiteness vis-à-vis the spaces and bodies to be exploited and occupied. As Cláudia Castelo (2007) uncovers, the state’s objective of securing settlement in Africa through a steady flow of Portuguese migration to the colonies included consistent propaganda and advertising campaigns positing settlement as a racialized mode of social mobility—a way that rural Portuguese can access the financial and symbolic capital of white bourgeois life. On a broader level, enhanced colonial settlement during the early decades of the twentieth century was hailed by the state and many elites as a renaissance of Portuguese imperial grandeur, and thus centered in the New State’s promoted historiography of Portuguese empire and whiteness.

After the ultimatum, and especially after the Republican era began in Portugal (following the assassination of King Carlos and his son), colonial policy toward settlement shifted drastically. Part of the English claims to the central lands argued that Portuguese occupation of them was economically ineffective, and thus an inefficient imperial endeavor. The Republican state sought to rectify this, and by extension grow its national economy, by enhancing settlement and extractive imperial mechanisms in Mozambique and Angola. Following the installment of the first Republic in 1910, guided by mainstream political philosophies opposed to monarchy and slavery but supportive of Portuguese colonialism, the state looked to foment migration of metropolitan Portuguese citizens to its African colonies, particularly Angola and Mozambique. The goal was to prevent another type of ultimatum
from occurring as well as to increase colonial profits for the state and build metropolitan wealth.

**Lusotropicalism and Portuguese Racial Specificity**

The last three decades of Portuguese colonial presence in Africa saw a shift in political rhetoric in the national public sphere and on the international stage of world politics. As other European empires began processes of decolonization following the Second World War, the Portuguese imperial state, led by Salazar, began to embrace the work of Brazilian sociologist and anthropologist Gilberto Freyre in its public rhetoric. Freyre’s vast and voluminous intellectual publications argued for a particular version of Brazilian history and social formation based on intimate and institutional relations between white/European slaveholders and enslaved bodies of African descent. Through a Boasian approach, his overarching argument traced the lack of institutionalized racial divisions in Brazil, and a supposed broader lack of racial violence in relation to the United States, to the colonial modus operandi of the Portuguese. More specifically, he postulated that the Portuguese were more adept at cultural contact and social formation in the tropics than other European empires due to their own ethnic formation following Germanic and Moorish occupations and geo-cultural proximity with northern Africa. To be clear, similar arguments had been made earlier by Portuguese and Brazilian intellectuals, but Freyre connected and built upon many of these, ultimately crystallizing them into a more expansive theory of cultural formation and civilization across Portuguese colonies and imperial spheres of influence he coined as Lusotropicalism.

Freyre first offered this argument in *Casa-Grande e Senzala* [*The Master and the Slaves*] (1933), and in a 1940 publication, *O Mundo que o Português criou* [*The World the Portuguese Created*], he further expounded: “Portuguese culture, which more than any other has linked European civilization to the tropics […] I am one of those who attribute the ability of the Portuguese to unite themselves with the tropics for love, not convenience, to the close contacts between the Portuguese in Europe and the Moors” (Freyre, *O Mundo* 45–46). The Portuguese state and other political elites publicly decried and rejected Freyre’s theories initially, favoring colonial rhetoric and policies of a civilizing mission based on Portuguese claims to whiteness. However, with increasing international pressure to decolonize Africa in the late 1940s, the Portuguese state began to integrate Freyre’s Lusotropicalist arguments into public political rhetoric in the 1950s, tying them into the state’s rebranding of the empire as a pluricontinental and multiracial nation and its colonies as overseas provinces. In response to international claims
of colonial exploitation and neglect, and to quell growing anti-colonial sentiment among its population, the state looked to extend access to health and education for its non-white subjects. Even as the wars for independence were well under way, Portuguese state officials publicly legitimized its protracted colonial project through Lusotropicalist arguments.

As Miguel Vale de Almeida perspicaciously points out, Freyre's work temporally overlapped with and built upon an intellectual trend of “ethnic psychology” (50–54) that arguably has its roots in the late nineteenth century intellectual production concerning “national character,” cursorily traced above. Almeida importantly singles out the works of ethnologist Jorge Dias. Through the latter’s publications, celebrated in Portuguese political rhetoric and reproduced in the public sphere, many of the arguments found in Freyre’s Lusotropicalism were further disseminated. Dias’s Os Elementos Fundamentais da Cultura Portuguesa [The Fundamental Elements of Portuguese Culture] (1950), for instance, also argues that the Portuguese “população é constituída pela fusão de elementos étnicos do Norte e do Sul” [“population is made up of the fusion between ethnic elements from the North and the South”] (12).

As with Freyre, this is Dias’s point of departure for bold claims regarding a specifically Portuguese cultural fluidity or plasticity (to use Almeida’s term) and its role in Portuguese expansion, articulating and celebrating an exceptional Portuguese “miscibilidade” [“mixability”]. In his view, the Portuguese never felt “repugnância por outras raças e foi sempre relativamente tolerante com as culturas e religiões alheias. A miscigenação portuguesa não tem só uma explicação sensual, embora a caracterize uma forte sexualidade. Ainda hoje o Português tem decidida inclinação por mulheres de outras raças e é capaz de mostrar grande afeição ou profundo amor” [“repugnance toward other races and were always relatively tolerant towards other cultures and religions. Portuguese miscegenation does not have merely a sensual explanation, though it is characterized by a strong sexuality. To this day, the Portuguese man has a conscious inclination toward women of other races and is capable of demonstrating great affection and profound love”] (26).

In many ways, the notions of Portuguese racial hybridity and unfixity found in Dias, Freyre, and others draw upon globally dispersed foreign appraisals of Portuguese whiteness or lack thereof, such as those cited earlier from Lord Byron to Joseph Conrad. These were also central in substantial Brazilian intellectual production of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth on national struggles for modernity and assessing the colonial conditions leading to Brazil’s place in the world system. Literary critic Silvio Romero considered the lack of a modern Brazilian literature and cultural
life a consequence of the Portuguese colonizer’s deficit of Europeanness and related propensity for miscegenation that could not adequately create a social order for whiteness to be guaranteed (21). In the 1940s, Brazilian intellectual Almir de Andrade, in a much more Freyrean vein, celebrated Portuguese colonial legacies precisely because of a such a deficit. The latter underscores a greater Portuguese proximity to the Orient and Africa than to Europe as the historical grounds for inaugurating a Brazilian society through intercultural fusion rather than through violent means (70–75). He would go on to integrate Getúlio Vargas’s own fascist New State in Brazil (1937–45) and thus embed such historicizations of Brazilian social formation into the public sphere via state propaganda. In both Portugal and Brazil, these historiographies of exceptionalism, grounded in layers and degrees of racial hybridity and relatively nonviolent interracial contact and love, continue to structure notions of national consciousness, citizenship, and historical belonging. As Miguel Vale de Almeida highlights with regards to the legacies of Jorge Dias and Gilberto Freyre, “the ideas in [Dias’s] essay circulate in Portugal with the same vigor as Freyre’s theses do in Brazil: they are both texts whose main theses coincide with national self-representations” (51).

Freyre’s work and that of other Portuguese and Brazilian intellectual contemporaries such as Adriano Moreira, Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda, and Jorge Dias, in addition to the response from the New State, popularized a profoundly ambivalent national sense of racial identity that would prove vital for the reproduction of Portuguese colonial empire and post-imperial complicity in the ongoing life of racial capitalism. This was a sense of both hybridity of ethnic origins inscribed phenotypically by Freyre and others as well as of racial indeterminacy as the ethical and ethnic foundation for its celebrated versions of interracial sex and intercultural fusion. This in no way subverted imperial drives and narratives. Rather, it provided the latter a political legitimacy grounded racially and culturally—shifting the terminology from empire to “civilization” or “pluri-continental” nationhood and thus serving as a new mode of misrecognizing imperial violence. In this regard, this discursive fabric of a racially hybrid or indeterminate Portugueseness has allied itself with and thus been propagated by the continuities of racial capitalism. It is a purported and exceptionalized fluidity of what is firmly embedded in the material life of global white supremacy.

It is important to note that dominant or most visible references to Portuguese hybridity and cultural unfixity in the public sphere are intimately tied to empire. There is, on the other hand, as Cristiana Bastos underscores, little to no public reckoning with how Portuguese racial hybridity and deficits of whiteness play a role in the racialization processes
of Portuguese migrant laborers in other parts of the world, namely those under other imperial powers. In this sense, the constant foregrounding of imperial endeavor and exceptionalism, often explained through discourses of Portuguese hybridity, always circuit the latter into an underlying claim to whiteness—that of historical imperial agency. In other words, conceptualizations of Portuguese racial and cultural fluidity must always be grounded in a collective positionality of agency within the paradigms of racial capitalism, and seldom in a positionality of material subalternity vis-à-vis inter-imperial standards of whiteness.

The arguments concerning Portuguese hybridity and “mixability” proffered by Freyre, Dias, and others and subsequently implemented into dominant imperial historiographies of empire in the public sphere during and after the New State continue to structure national self-representation as mediated through existing webs of power. These and the continued celebrations of a Portuguese imperial grandeur of the past (consistently inscribing a dawn of Western modernity, global expansion, and benevolent interracial relations) in post-imperial metropolitan social order and life constitute, moreover, a system of meanings—historical, identitarian, and sexual. It is within such a system that Portuguese and non-Portuguese individual identities are named and formed, and how Portuguese identities are performed in popular cultures and everyday life. Through corporal self-inscription and individual performance, as well as through cultural production of different sorts tied to the industries and strategically fluid mechanisms of racial capitalism, the quotidian procedures of imperial nation-making and its exceptionalisms are carried out.
CHAPTER TWO

Post-Imperial Orientalism and Portuguese Claims to Late Capitalist Whiteness in José Rodrigues dos Santos’s Mystery Thrillers

Mystery Fiction in Portugal and in Western Imperial Cultures

In global circuits of literary production and consumption, genre fiction (crime, spy/detective, fantasy, horror, romance) has occupied a particularly prevalent place, if not for critical acclaim, for sheer economic impact as bestsellers. The popular embracing of such literary products undoubtedly says something about the ideological terrain in which they circulate as cultural artifacts. More specifically, these have often participated in the shaping of said ideological terrain, namely in the context of Empire and imperial nationhood. This is especially the case with spy/detective fiction, and more broadly, mystery thrillers featuring protagonists that need not be spies or detectives yet perform the labor of safeguarding existing forms of capitalist and imperial order. Literary historians and scholars have typically posited the popularization of this particular genre in nineteenth- and twentieth-century British literature, as a mode of metropolitan collective self-representation and global imperial endeavor over othered bodies and spaces. Sam Goodman, for instance, considers the figure of the spy in literary and cinematic works to be deeply entrenched in articulations of English nationhood and Britishness (2015). As Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee explores, moreover, colonial power and metropolitan order/selfhood were neatly bonded: “disturbances in the economy of power at ‘home’ in metropolitan Britain were created through the figure of the criminal colonial native from India” (85). Yumna Siddiqi further interrogates what she calls “fictions of intrigue” as a literary and cultural terrain that responds to “a current of anxiety about incursions from Empire, and its influence upon the established pattern of English life” (18) in the late Victorian period. This “popular literature of Empire” thus quells the “concern about the instability of individual identity, the disintegration of social and moral order, and the eruption of crime and violence” (18).
Portuguese literature, unlike that of Great Britain and the United States, does not have a rich tradition of crime and mystery fiction in literature or film, especially one that could be situated within, or conveying of, a Portuguese national/imperial project. A key feature of this tradition is the protagonist, as Goodman suggests above, which crystallizes and performs racial, gender, and sexual orders of power, personhood, and labor. The white cisgender heterosexual male protagonist performs political agency, military coercion, and/or epistemic domination over othered bodies in the metropolis or colonizable spaces, thus centrally partaking in the reproduction of nation and Empire. The protagonist takes on particular forms of labor in these reproductive endeavors, safeguarding orders of bodies as detectives for the imperial state in the case of Sherlock Holmes, destabilizing sovereignty abroad as spies such as James Bond, and articulating knowledge for imperial mechanisms of extraction and accumulation as academics in the case of Indiana Jones or Robert Langdon.

Following formal political decolonization, such fictional figures within North American and European mystery fiction continue to represent particular narratives of imperial nationhood and, more broadly, the ongoing life, knowledges, and structures of racial capitalism in the twenty-first century. Moreover, and telling, works of mystery fiction in this vein continue to be bestsellers in their national markets and globally, with translations into numerous languages and cinematic adaptations. As with spy and detective fiction of the nineteenth century, the popularity of such works in the West in the twenty-first century cannot be separated from the ideological fabrics making up contemporary imperial ontologies and understandings of Western power, especially its perceived post-Cold War enemies. This is particularly evident in the bestselling works of novelist Daniel Silva (of no relation to myself) and their recurring protagonist Gabriel Allon, to give one particularly popular example in circles of literary production and consumption in the United States.

It is in this context that contemporary Portuguese mystery fiction emerges, most notably through the bestselling works of José Rodrigues dos Santos. The reasons and theories behind the relative lack of a present mystery fiction within Portuguese letters, especially prior to the twenty-first century, also consider why the genre has flourished in translation among Portuguese readerships. Maria Morgado Lopes, for instance, drawing on comments made by other contemporary mystery fiction (particularly within police fiction), writes that a common explanation for the under-development of the genre in Portugal concerns the lack of democracy during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century when the genre became popularized in other countries: “o desenvolvimento de uma literatura policial nacional só poderia
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In the context of the New State regime and its far-reaching propaganda machine, spanning over 40 years, “não existiam crimes, como, aliás, se poderia provar na leitura dos jornais desse tempo, sujeitos a uma censura previa, onde se proibia quer a notícia de suicídios quer de inundações e outras catástrofes naturais acontecidas em solo lusitano” (“Crimes did not occur, as one could prove by reading newspapers of that time, subjected to censorship in which news about suicides and even floods and natural disasters on Portuguese soil were prohibited”) (Lopes 3–4).

Nonetheless, some titles in the last century and a half of Portuguese literature can be considered pioneers or early symbols of mystery literature (crime, spy, or otherwise). These include Eça de Queirós’s first novel, *O Mistério da Estrada de Sintra* [The Mystery of the Sintra Road] (1870), co-written by Ramalho Ortigão, a few creative and semi-autobiographical accounts of notable Portuguese bandits of the 1800s, and a few Portuguese writers whom Lopes theorizes “escreveram romances policiais [que] recorreram a pseudónimos estrangeiros (ingleses, regra geral) e exportaram os crimes e as investigações ficcionais para fora das fronteiras nacionais” (“wrote police fiction while resorting to foreign pseudonyms (typically English) and exported their fictional crimes and investigations beyond national borders”) (3). It is also worth noting the popularity of Portuguese translations of Anglophone crime fiction during the mid-twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Most notably, the Portuguese publishing house, Livros do Brasil, published their series, “Vampiro do Bolso” [“Pocket Vampire”] from 1947 to 2007, spanning 703 volumes, each a translation of an international work of crime fiction.

Concerning this relative absence of Portuguese crime fiction, which we can further extend to mystery fiction more generally, Lopes further argues:

> [I consider the inexistence of Portuguese crime fiction to result from a complex of factors, within which standout the rigid hierarchization of the Portuguese literary system (with various sorts of prejudices that still last today) and the imperatives of a socially engaged literature; constituting a]
more subtle form of censorship aligned with self-sensorship, in the fear of betraying a particular cause or ideology.] (4)

More recently, however, following the fall of the New State in 1974, prolific Portuguese crime fiction writers have emerged, most notably Henrique Nicolau, author of eight works spanning a ten-year period, and Francisco José Viegas, a versatile writer of poetry, theater, essays, and, of course, crime fiction. It is also a genre that other acclaimed writers have at least dabbled with, as is the case of Miguel Sousa Tavares, best known as a sports journalist and historical fiction novelist and children's literature writer, with his novel *Madrugada Suja* [Dirty Dawn] (2013).

Carlos Jorge Figueiredo Jorge, reflecting on contemporary crime and broader mystery fiction, considers the deployment of Portuguese geographical spaces or lack thereof in the genre:

Pelo menos até à geração mais recente, que até nem se pode considerar a mais produtiva, a tendência foi sempre para um uso quase exclusivo da localização das histórias fora de Portugal e para a utilização de pseudónimos anglo-saxónicos. E mesmo nos modernos os *mundos possíveis estrangeiros* continuam a partilhar com os *portugueses* cerca de 50% da produção portuguesa.

[At least up until recent generations, which cannot even be considered the most productive, the tendency has been toward a nearly exclusive localization of plots outside of Portugal, and toward the use of Anglo-Saxon pseudonyms. And even in the current generation, fictionalized foreign worlds continue to make up about 50% of Portuguese production.] (116)

As we will interrogate ahead, this trend is also evident in the works of José Rodrigues dos Santos, in which Portuguese geo-political spaces are incorporated into Western imperial cartographies of late capitalism. Furthermore, despite a relatively subtle presence of mystery fiction in the Portuguese public sphere, few Portuguese writers have deployed elements of spy fiction to the extent that Santos has, in terms of character development as well as in terms of diegetic international scenarios of political intrigue.

One can argue that the lack of spy fiction in not only Portuguese letters, but also in film and cultural production more broadly, has to do with how colonial apparatuses have evolved following the crumbling of Portuguese settler colonies in Africa. While British and United States intelligence agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States and the Secret Intelligence
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Service (SIS) of the United Kingdom continue to have particular visibility in cultural imaginaries and agency in the current geo-politics of late capital, the post-New State Portuguese government quickly dissolved its most infamous secret branch of law enforcement, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) [International and State Defense Police], and today the PIDE is remembered as a symbol and institutional arm of the old fascist state.

The Mystery Fiction of José Rodrigues dos Santos

Born in Beira, colonial Mozambique in 1964, Santos has been a journalist and news anchor for the Portuguese state media network Rádio e Televisão de Portugal [Radio and Television of Portugal] since 1991 and is a professor at the NOVA University Lisbon. He has been a prolific fiction writer, releasing a book or two nearly every year since 2002, with his works selling three million copies in Portugal alone (as of early 2020), and appearing on bestseller lists in France, Switzerland, Canada, and Turkey. His perennial bestseller status, and indeed broader literary career, has been aided by his earlier and continued visibility in Portuguese news media, as a celebrated journalist and television anchor, with his image as such corresponding to racial, gender, and sexual politics of respectability and seriousness projected on to white cisgender heterosexual masculinity.

His work is best known for his mystery/thriller series, comprised of ten books thus far, and centered on protagonist Tomás Noronha, a historian and cryptologist and professor of ancient texts and artifacts at the NOVA University Lisbon. Noronha’s character, as well as many of the plots in which he is centered, bears many resemblances with other mystery/adventure protagonists of the Global North, particularly academics such as Indiana Jones and Robert Langdon (of Dan Brown’s mystery series, which includes Angels and Demons and The Da Vinci Code). In fact, Noronha’s diegetic work and action often combines the archaeological expertise of Indiana Jones with the analytical knowledge of Langdon pertaining to ancient art. As with Langdon, Noronha’s academic work is operationalized into particular geo-political contexts in which Western supremacy and imperial logics are performed. Santos physically constructs Noronha much in the vein of other common white North American and European mystery fiction protagonists like James Bond or Indiana Jones—handsome, intelligent, and physically fit. A notable exception to this trend would be John le Carré’s George Smiley character, a career officer in the British intelligence agency, who is described as balding, overweight, and short.

The respective series of both Brown and Santos situate their protagonists at the service of contemporary Western imperial desires as articulated
through “War on Terror” rhetoric and the material forces underneath its Western narratives of saviorism. In the wake of September 11, 2001, then US President George W. Bush’s pronouncement framed and encapsulated the post-9/11 global cartographies as articulated by and in the West, a Huntington-esque clash of civilizations, between “the civilized world” and the “Islamic world” (Bush n.p.). This repeated division, not new to US and broader Western imperial politics, as Edward Said carefully analyzed and theorized in Covering Islam (1981), not only targets “Islamic extremism,” but does so through a further-encompassing dichotomy of a Western “civilized world” and an opposite “Islamic world.” It is within this particular ideological climate that scholar Tanya Serisier places the popular fiction works of Dan Brown, particularly the aforementioned Angels and Demons (2000), as illustrating “the cultural motifs and anxieties” (149) inherent to the War on Terror and its discursive fabric. More broadly, works such as those of Brown and Santos, convey a particular moment in the long chain of orientalist thought and discourse and wider drives of racial capital.

Indiana Jones, Robert Langdon, and Tomás Noronha all work in ancient artifacts, and cast Western epistemological gazes on to the materials they uncover or obtain from different temporalities and geo-cultural spaces. Their plots tend to revolve around connections between artifact and present power struggles within late capital. Like Langdon, Noronha (a renowned cryptologist) is often contacted by different state apparatuses of hegemonic nations in the capitalist world system, which frames and informs the global connectivities in the respective diegetic universes. These include the CIA and FBI of the United States, in addition to Interpol. Noronha’s endeavors, akin to those of Langdon and Jones, partake in a broader and implied process of historicizing the West, expanding its temporal and geographical bounds, and in turn legitimizing its claims to global supremacy. In this regard, his actions tend to concern the history and development of Western science and philosophy, from ancient origins to present applications in anti-capitalist/anti-Western insurgency and Western counter-insurgency. In the process, as I shall further interrogate ahead, Santos’s novels, specifically his Tomás Noronha series, politically align Portugal and Portugueseness with Global Northern and Western capitalist interests in the context of contemporary imperial mappings. These emerge in Santos’s works as colonial global divisions of East and West, primarily, with often orientalist tropes that are repurposed into exigencies of capitalist maintenance in the present. Moreover, Portuguese political and cultural alliances and contributions to dominant Western power and epistemology in contemporary racial capitalism are carried out in complex ways at the level of Noronha’s body—one that in the tradition of imperialist mystery fiction is an idealized image of nation vis-à-vis the global. In this sense, his body
and its interpersonal actions are articulated within the parameters of white patriarchal norms, and in a particular racial spectrum of whiteness, as he interacts with other bodies.

Situating Portuguese History in Dominant Historiography of Whiteness

This positioning, or indeed centering, of Portugal within Western imperial histories can be found in the Noronha series in different ways and in various temporalities of Empire. To begin with, the very name of the protagonist carries historical weight and reference to a so-called “golden age” of Portuguese imperial endeavor, known as Os Descobrimentos [the discoveries]—spanning 1415 with the capture of Ceuta until 1580 with the crisis of succession leading to the Iberian Union under King Phillip II of Spain. Though his date of birth is unknown, D. Tomás de Noronha was a celebrated, though largely forgotten, Portuguese poet of the Iberian Union period, passing in 1651 (Marnoto 119). Scholars such as Rita Marnoto, according to her own research, places his birth approximately a decade to 15 years before the Portuguese Succession (1995). Most relevantly, he descended from a long line of Portuguese nobility affiliated with the then reigning House of Avis. Noronha himself as an adolescent arguably frequented the court of D. Sebastião, the last of the Avis kings, as the son of the monarch’s squires.

This rearticulation, and indeed supplementation, to Portuguese imperial history through Noronha’s mastery and heterosexual masculine exploits is buttressed from the outset of the series by a recovery of Portuguese “discoveries” and historical claims of further Portuguese agency at the dawn of European expansion. The first novel of the Noronha series, O Codex 632 [Codex 632: The Secret Life of Christopher Columbus] (2005) follows the protagonist as he is summoned by the American History Foundation to continue the work of a historian who is found dead in Rio de Janeiro. The historian had been researching documents concerning European voyages of “discovery” to what would become the Americas in a nascent European global cartography. The deceased historian had left his research documents and primary sources coded and with clues to other sources spread around the Atlantic world. In furthering this line of research, Noronha finds himself on the precipice of uncovering seemingly occulted facts of Christopher Columbus’s life as intertwined with the political structures, secret societies, religious violence, and struggles for early modern maritime imperial power. Tied to different and cross-temporal subplots of intrigue, Noronha discovers that Columbus was not a Genoese sailor, but a Portuguese Jew contending with the emergence of the Inquisition in Iberia.
This sort of Portuguese claiming of Columbus and integration into the imperial nation’s historicization dates almost as far back as Columbus’s voyages. In the early twentieth century, however, different lines of research by various Portuguese historians rehashed the argument through interpretations of various artifacts. Santos’s novel draws heavily on the historical arguments made by historian Augusto Mascarenhas Barreto published in three books: O Português Cristóvão Colombo, Agente Secreto do Rei D. João II [The Portuguese Columbus—Secret Agent of King John II] (1988) and two volumes of Colombo Português: Provas Documentais [Portuguese Columbus: Documental Proof] (1997). These postulate that Columbus was in fact born in the parish of Cuba, in the Portuguese Alentejo region and that his real name was Salvador Fernandes Zarco, son of Dom Fernando, Duke of Beja and Viseu, and Isabel Gonçalves Zarco. A Portuguese physician based in the United States, Manuel Luciano da Silva, who dedicated much of his later life to Portuguese imperial and Portuguese diasporic history, shared the same arguments as Barreto and published in resoundingly nationalist book titles like Columbus was 100% Portuguese, originally published in English in 1987, and The Religious and Mythological Powers in the Name of Cristóvão Colon (1991). This nationalist historicization of Columbus as part of a Portuguese imperial golden age and formative Westernness further posits that Columbus defended Portuguese imperial interests by diverting the Spanish crown’s attention from India by coaxing them into funding a trip he knew would not lead to India. The underlying premise to this version of Columbus’s voyage is that the Portuguese had already sailed to the Americas, as part of its maritime grandeur. Tomás Noronha thus enters the imaginaries of Portuguese readerships as the great unveiler and disseminator of a heightened Portuguese Western imperial legacy.

Through Noronha’s dealings in different parts of the world and encounters with various bodies from different regions, Santos positions Portugueseness within a long topology of racial geographic thought, often evocative of texts and ideologies that have become part of mainstream geopolitical and racial thought, such as Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996). This is especially relevant in the climate of world politics in which Noronha is often enraptured, particularly conflicts between Western and Islamic civilizations, if we use Huntington’s system of categorization. The plots surrounding Noronha also convey an order of whiteness—phenotypical, epistemological, and economic—reminiscent of geographical divisions/categories of race and culture of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, in which Portugal and southern Europe more broadly are vectored into a Mediterranean civilization on the fringes of Europe, marked by its own Islamic history and ethnic formation. As noted in the opening chapter, the development of this line of geopolitical thought has a long history in the formation of Europe
itself in relation to fears of Islamic encroachment into geographic projections of Christian influence.

Throughout the so-far ten-part Noronha series, he is physically described as possessing dark features and green eyes (inherited from his French great-grandmother, as told to the reader at the beginning of the first installment of the series *Codex 632*); meanwhile the bodies of Anglo-American, Germanic, and Scandinavian spaces and origins typically possess blue eyes and light brown to blonde hair. The US CIA and FBI agents who often appear in the series are of Anglo-American or European descent, with English, German, or Scandinavian surnames and the corresponding corporal markers of central and northern European somatic whiteness. This is, of course, reminiscent of the strain of geographic racial thought discussed at greater length in chapter one, appropriated, built-upon, and popularized by philosophers and social scientists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as Jules Michelet and William Z. Ripley. The latter drew upon and incoherently compiled existing racial scientific scholarship from and on Europe, facial and corporal features, along with anthropometric data (cephalic index) correlated to social behaviors, traditions, and labor practices that informed southern Europe’s position in capitalist realms and maps of accumulation and production, thus situating southern Europe phenotypically, culturally, and economically in proximity to Northern Africa and the Arab world.

**Tomás Noronha and the Sexual Parameters of Portuguese Whiteness and Masculinity**

In different novels, Santos historically and racially situates Noronha and Portuguese national identity within a European and European-American division of Anglo-Saxon/Germanic versus Latin, circuiting Portuguese ethnicity into the Latin world. In chapter five, I shall flesh out the ambivalent and multifarious approximations and distancing of Portugueseness in relation to notions of Latinicity of the nineteenth century and its various reinventions as Latinidad and an articulated Latin world. In *Fúria Divina* [*Divine Fury*] (2009), the fourth installment of the Noronha series and analyzed further ahead, reference to the protagonist’s “Latinness” is used to ethnically distinguish him from his Anglo-Saxon CIA collaborators, giving historical, gendered, and sexual meaning to phenotypical and national differences. In a dialog with a blonde-haired blue-eyed CIA agent, Rebecca Scott, with whom he is working, and who is posited as his sexual interest, as common in each novel of the series, she explains to him that co-workers call her Maggie because they claim she looks like United States actor Meg Ryan. Noronha takes up the topic of conversation to attempt a sexual advance by
agreeing with the chauvinist comparison of the two women, and adding “claro que você é mais bonita” [“of course, you are more beautiful”] (266). She responds, exclaiming, “Ai esse sangue latino! Mister Bellamy bem me avisou! Tenho de ter cuidado consigo!” [“Oh, that Latin blood! Mister Bellamy was right to warn me! I have to be careful with you!”] (266).

The development of Noronha’s character and historicizing of Portuguese nationhood and cultural identity thus straddles the line between situating Portugueseness as participant and contributor to Western late capitalist hegemony, while retaining imagery of a marginalized and fringe Europeanness. On one level, Latin difference is articulated through the nexus of hypersexuality and Noronha’s phenotypical features distinguished as darker than those of his Anglo-American interlocutors. On another level, though, the passage’s racializing reference to Noronha’s sexual mores dovetails more broadly with his imperial character development. Both in the passage and throughout the series, his sexualized Latinness is developed as part of his “Don Juan” persona, one for which women’s bodies are deployed much in the same vein as non-Western geographies and material artifacts. In other words, women in the Noronha novels serve largely as objects over which he performs imperialism, through knowledge-sharing in the form of long monologs as well as through sexual domination. Over the course of the series, his sexual accrual of female bodies augments his imperialist value as a way of vindicating a trite rendering of Latin masculinity as hegemonic in the inter-imperial economy and battle ground of racialized masculinities.

Another passage further ahead in *Fúria Divina*, while sitting next to Rebecca Scott on a commercial airplane flight, encapsulates Noronha’s positioning as masculine object of ventriloquized female sexual desire, this time in relation to a flight attendant:

A ruiva lasciva inclinou-se sobre Tomás, deixando vislumbrar os seios opulentos por entre a gola entreaberta da camisa, e abriu-se num sorriso maravilhoso.

“Deseja mais alguma coisa?”

Ao ouvir esta pergunta, o historiador engoliu em seco.

“Não, obrigado.”

A ruiva pousou-lhe o copo de champanhe no tabuleiro, voltou a sorrir e deu meia volta, bamboleando o traseiro até desaparecer por entre as cortinas da parte dianteira do avião.

“Jesus!”, exclamou Rebecca, que estava sentada ao lado de Tomás a observar a cena. “Você tem realmente saída com as mulheres. Até as hospedeiras lhe fazem olhinhos!”
As in the passage above, a significant portion of his interactions with female characters are filled with innuendo and normalized sexual harassment met with flattery. These exist on the same plane of inter-gender relationships and dynamics grounded in binarist patriarchal norms, with him occupying a lead role in action and the impartment of didactic knowledge in relation to, and through, female characters.

In every novel, his mastery over space and knowledge is reflected and augmented by his mastery over the cisgender female characters that enter the diegetic universe, enacting a sort of racial and gendered division of labor within the interpersonal economies that inform relations in the plot. He is to perform agency in his adventures, taking the initiative and executing various plans and escapes that ultimately lead to a resolution and a salvaging of
reality and global political order. This production of Noronha’s image in each novel is augmented and indeed sustained by the auxiliary labor of women who either assist haphazardly in his endeavors (that is, as getaway drivers or accomplices) often with limited expertise in relation to his own. Very much in the vein of other white male mystery/spy fiction protagonists like Indiana Jones, James Bond, and Robert Langdon, Noronha’s female sidekicks provide a sexual labor that produces his value as master for readers entrenched within white imperial patriarchal paradigms that inform metropolitan collective life. The female bodies/patriarchal currencies he sexually accrues also mark his geographic loci of agency, overlapping with the geo-political terrains where his heroics are performed.

He is an object of sexual attraction within patriarchal heterosexual paradigms in which women characters are lured by his mastery of situations, Western knowledges, and bodies. The women with whom he interacts are choreographed by Santos as helplessly “unable to resist” his traits of modern white bourgeois masculinity—dark-featured whiteness, intelligence, and courage. This construction of his mastery/desirability, tied to the series’ articulation of Portugueseness, is furthered by the fact that many of his subordinated female interlocutors ultimately “cede” and break different taboos in the process. In the first novel of the series, Codex 632, in which he is still married, a blonde-haired, blue-eyed (repeatedly described as voluptuous) Swedish female student of his ultimately overcomes her own fears of partaking in adultery and breaking student–professor boundaries by pursuing a sexual relationship with the protagonist. In the second Noronha novel, A Fórmula de Deus [The Einstein Enigma] (2006), Ariana Pakravan, an Iranian nuclear physicist with whom he ends up working, falls helplessly in love with him despite supposed taboos of intimate relations with Westerners or non-Muslim men. She cannot help but see him as the life-shifting object of fulfillment she had left Paris to pursue in Iran.

His sexual “conquest” of female characters is situated in competitive relation to other male characters, especially white male characters marked as Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, his conquest and performed virility over blonde-haired and blue-eyed women place him and an implied broader Latin masculinity at the top of an inter-imperial/inter-European/inter-Western hierarchy of masculinity. This is enacted not only through Noronha’s own sexual actions, but through his centrality in an imperial binarist economy of sexual desire, as indicated in the passage above. In other words, the series’ project of repeatedly re-Westernizing Portugueseness overlaps with and is carried out through a conservative re-imperializing of Portuguese and Latin patriarchal structures and repertoire of binarist and chauvinist masculine behaviors.
One can argue that this speaks to a fundamental component of the series’ implied project of Europeanizing Portugueseness and Portuguese metonymical bodies—an imperial project that informs much of Portuguese cultural production and the formation of nationhood into which citizens are interpellated. Through a metonymical protagonist that works to maintain and safeguard the power imbalances of contemporary Empire, the series mobilizes Latinness, specifically European Latinness, toward the center of European and Western geo-politics and its criteria of whiteness. Read in tandem with the Noronha series’ anti-Islamic project of historicizing Portuguese ethnic and national formation away from the history of Islamic occupation, Portuguese Latinness also reclaims a Roman point of origin in order to elide or reduce the material and cultural impacts of Arab and Islamic political and economic presence.

While Santos’s phenotypical oppositions between a dark-featured Noronha and light-featured Anglo-Americans shares similarities with Ripley’s hierarchical schema of three European races and North/South European divisions mentioned in chapter one and cogently unpacked by Roberto Dainotto (2007), this dynamic is recontextualized into the twenty-first century and Santos’s diegetic terrains enact projections of southern European agency against established and ongoing hierarchies of whiteness. In this regard, the Noronha series, and some of Santos’s other works, deploy Portuguese claims to whiteness through contemporary post-911 and late capitalist criteria of Westernness at the level of the body and of the nation, which, in the mystery genre, tend to be intertwined. In this sense, claims to a revised and more economically/politically central Portuguese whiteness in the world system are often carried out through anti-Islamic rhetoric and rehearsed orientalist postures held by Noronha and his CIA interpellators, while reinscribing a Portuguese and Iberian ethnic separation from the Islamic world, of which the peninsula was once part. Noronha serves, moreover, as a savior of Western dominance, with his heroics ultimately thwarting Islamic “terrorism” (conveyed through fantasies of orientalist and religious barbarism and “envy” of the West), rather than as modes of insurgency against the long history of Western power and destabilization of sovereignty in Islamic and Arab nations/regions.

Orientalist Tropes and Reproducing European Portugal

Santos’s takes on this thematic line, serving multiple functions aligning anti-Islamic discourse with the historicization of Western thought and universalization of science as a Western entity, appears as early as the second book in the Tomás Noronha series, A Fórmula de Deus. The title is in reference
to a fictionalized obscure text written by Albert Einstein that is found in Iran and stored under heavy security in Tehran by the Iranian government. He is contacted by Pakravan, an Iranian nuclear physicist working for the Iranian Ministry of Science, to decipher Einstein’s text. Shortly after his arrival in Tehran, the text becomes of interest to both the Iranian and United States governments, as it is believed to contain instructions for creating an atomic bomb, thus positioning the plot within decades-old fears in the West of an Iranian nuclear program and its larger context of orientalist fantasies of terror and military threat from the Middle East reproduced and exacerbated by the “war on terror” following September 11, 2001. He is soon contacted by a lead CIA agent, Frank Bellamy, who forces him to play both sides and ultimately serve as a CIA spy against the Iranian state alongside a local CIA agent, Golbahar Bagheri, described as looking “like a boxer. He was well built, with a protruding brow and bushy black beard, thick dark hair sprouting out of the top of his shirt and from his small ears” (99).

His covert operations for the CIA within the Ministry of Science are ultimately revealed and he is pursued by Iranian authorities, which include action passages through orientalist signified spaces (bazaars, crowds, masked gunmen, and bearded pursuers). Pakravan ultimately sides with Noronha and helps him escape Iran, allowing him to decipher Einstein’s text and dispelling the belief that it contained formulas for a nuclear bomb. Rather, he reveals the text to be Einstein’s theoretical text on the scientifically legitimate existence of God. In addition to aligning himself politically with Western, specifically US political desires, throughout the novel he is interpellated in Iran as a Westerner and relative site of cultural difference, which for Pakravan constitutes a cultural border that she is prohibited from crossing according to Iranian law within the plot.

Anti-Islam discourses in Santos’s bestselling works thus partake, knowingly or unwittingly, in the continued Europeanization of Portugal, and concomitant separation from Islam and the Arab world. This racial and political topology continues in later installments of the Tomás Noronha series, as early as the 2009 publication of Fúria Divina [Divine Fury], once again entrenched in post-9/11 Western fears of insurgency, specifically from Al-Qaeda. In this, the fourth book with Noronha as protagonist, he is once again contacted by CIA official Frank Bellamy to assist the agency in deciphering a coded message, suspected to be instructions to Al-Qaeda members across the West and that may contain secret information on Al-Qaeda’s possible possession of atomic weaponry. This particular feature of the plot figured prominently in the marketing of the book, with the back cover of the second edition (released in the same month as the first) featuring the main paratext (offering clues for framing the meanings contained in
the literary product to consumers): “E se a Al-Qaeda tem a bomba atómica”? [“What if Al-Qaeda has the atomic bomb”?]. The book and its marketing apparatus thus took anti-Islamic fear to a new level of intrigue in Western imaginaries where the book was most sold. The sales statistics seem to indicate that the anti-Islam marketing plan worked to great effect. Though Fúria Divina was only released in mid-October of 2009, it was the highest selling book in Portugal that year, with approximately 160,000 copies sold from October to the end of December (“Rivais”).

Another key character, in this case the novel’s antagonist, is known simply as Ahmed, an Egyptian teenager growing up in an unnamed city in Egypt in the mid-2000s. He is the focal point in alternating chapters, with Noronha the protagonist of the other chapters, which chart his path toward radicalization. The novel, through Santos’s typical attempt at imparting some type of knowledge (scientific, religious, or otherwise through a Eurocentric lens), tries to portray to its Western readership the complexities of Islam, though in a limited fashion via a facile and unnuanced Sunni/Shia opposition. Despite this attempt at complexity, the Islamic world articulated by the novel is nonetheless a time-space of political instability, “failed statehood,” and extremism that are conveyed as naturally occurring phenomena, dehistoricized, as they are in other Western representations, from a past of Western infiltration, occupation, and colonization. The alternating chapters feature Ahmed’s initial exposure to “radical Islam” (situated by the narrator in Sunni thought) through a new religion instructor in school, his eventual recruitment into Al-Qaeda as well as Noronha’s movements in search of the origin of the cryptic email. The diegesis culminates in Ahmed and Noronha crossing paths as an Al-Qaeda atomic bomb is about to be detonated in Lisbon. By explaining “radical Islam” along the facile lines of Sunni–Shia difference, the novel ignores not only the long history of Western intervention and empire-building in the Islamic world, specifically the Middle East, but also the complex history of power-building and social order in the region along the lines of labor, gender, and sexuality, in tandem with Western infiltration.

In his quest to decode the intercepted Al-Qaeda email at the beginning of the plot, Noronha and his CIA collaborators discover that the email was sent from Lisbon. The reader later learns that Lisbon is strategically selected as a Western target for Al-Qaeda’s atomic bomb as the organization seeks to reclaim the former territories of the Umayyad and Abbasid Dynasties, beginning with the region known then as Al-Andalus, the Western end of the caliphate’s domain, corresponding to the Iberian Peninsula and from where the Christian Reconquista gradually expelled the former’s political presence—an early and historicized point in the formation of a white Christian
Empire Found

Europe. This leads Noronha, the broader diegetic space of the novel, and its Portuguese readership to reflect on the history of Moorish rule in Portugal and the Iberian Peninsula. More specifically, this climactic development in the novel serves as a mechanism through which to stage the continual Europeanization of Portugal and its post-imperial geo-political alliance to late capitalist Western power. The anti-Islamic fabric of the novel, with Islam and Islamic history posited as oppositional to contemporary Portuguese positions in the Post-9/11 world system, articulates the centuries of Islamic and Arab presence as a pre-modern and pre-national past of which only vestiges remain, rather than the period of economic, intellectual, cultural, linguistic, and political development that provided the material conditions and foundations for Portuguese empire and contemporary nationhood.

The unfolding of events and the growing centrality of Lisbon in the novel’s signifying chain coincide with Noronha’s teaching of a course at the NOVA University simply titled “Estudos Islâmicos” [“Islamic Studies”] with little to no reference to disciplinary focus, historical parameters, or Noronha’s own capacity to teach such a course. This would contribute to the novelistic construction and representation of Noronha’s Western mastery over knowledge whether the topic pertains to religious history, global warming, or quantum physics, on all of which he has dissertated at length throughout the series. In standard orientalist fashion, the academic web of which such courses have been couched in Westernized universities, the course thus compresses, curates, and reframes a broad range of temporalities, ideologies, and knowledges into one body of study that takes these as its object of scrutiny through a Western lens. His teaching of the course is revealed a third of the way through the book, on page 202, after he returns to Lisbon from various CIA rendezvous.

In one particular class session, he takes the students out of the classroom and for a guided experiential learning exercise—a walking tour through the hilly Lisbon neighborhood of Alfama with the purported objective of pointing out architectural, planning, and infrastructural legacies of Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula. He immediately communicates to the class that there is little existing evidence of such legacies, and articulates nothing on the history of social formation and organization during that five-century period. This reflection, or lack thereof, is limited to two sentences: “Já não existem aqui casas mouriscas [...] Mas, se repararem bem, Alfama mantém um certo ar de casbah, não acham?” [“There are no longer Moorish structures here [...] But, if you look more closely, Alfama retains a certain kasbah atmosphere, don’t you think?”] (202). The last sentence, though recognizing the aforementioned legacies, reduces the formation of the fairly vast neighborhood and its current urban layout developed during Islamic
Orientalism and Claims to Late Capitalist Whiteness

rule to an “air” or “atmosphere.” The same can be said of the profound scientific, agricultural, and political foundations for Western imperialism and the development of global capitalism laid by Islamic rule throughout the Mediterranean world, the Middle East, and Africa. This articulated historical separation enunciates, moreover, racial capitalism as a firmly Western enterprise. Through the Westernizing epistemology of Noronha and his class (and its pedagogical role in the cultural artifact that is the book itself) Santos’s novel partakes in the historicization of Lisbon as a European capital, rather than a previously Islamic one. Such a gesture on the part of Santos and his narrator showcases, once more, the ongoing and never completed Europeanizing project based on what AbdoolKarim Vakil has theorized as a narrative of national history as Reconquista in which the formation of the nation is reduced to “an epic history of territorial conquest as Christianization. The making of Portugal, in other words, is literally the erasure of Islam; in such a narrative by definition, there was no place for Muslims in national history” (“Muslims” 3).

Noronha’s idea for a class session through the streets of Alfama is ultimately a ploy for him to probe the Muslim students enrolled in his course about their knowledge of any radical Islamic activity in Lisbon. Also as part of his informal spy work for the CIA, Noronha goes on to frequent a mosque in Lisbon in search of such radical activity to which the coded email could be tied. The targeting and scrutiny of Muslim bodies in Lisbon ultimately posits these as outside the parameters of modern contemporary Portuguese sensibility, entities that are to be elided from the present history of Portuguese formation and ethnic life, much in the vein of the erasure of the nation’s Islamic influence and the historicization of Islamic expulsion as one from a Christian space. Days after Noronha’s outdoor class, he receives a phone call from one of his students in the class informing him that a previous student, Zacarias Ali Silva, described as “aquele moço de barbas que andou lá na faculdade no ano passado” [that boy with a long beard that was at the university last year”] (219), had disappeared for nearly a year. Noronha is able to contact Zacarias who tells him he is held in Lahore, Pakistan, by a mysterious “they” that the reader is made to understand as an Islamic fundamentalist group.

Zacarias, as a Muslim body, is, like the series’ female characters, situated as a subordinated supplement to the agency and mastery of Noronha. Zacarias, in this case, is deployed as racialized and gendered topos of mystery that helps propel the novel’s construction of orientalist intrigue. To be more specific, his racial difference intersects with and renders the gendered difference of Muslim masculinity—one of both excess and enigma in relation to Western capitalist norms of physical personhood and
surveillability, with excess facial hair signifying a threatening and veiled body: “um rosto coberto por uma barba negra encaracolada que envelhecia prematuramente” [“a face covered by a curly black beard that aged him prematurely”] (230).

In this regard, the novel does not convey Islamophobia and anti-Arabness merely in terms of international politics, but does so also in terms of everyday discourses and structures in Portuguese society. As Vakil elucidates:

Se, como tem sido defendido, a presença islâmica em Portugal se caracterizou, até recentemente, pela sua quase invisibilidade, o 11 de Setembro, primeiro, e o 11 de Março, mais acentuadamente criaram uma conjuntura altamente volátil e extremamente ambivalente, de curiosidade e mesmo de genuíno interesse pelo Islão, por um lado, mas não menos de suspeita e desconfiança, por outro, que uma ignorância generalizada sobre os muçulmanos, e a falta de preparação dos profissionais dos media em particular, em nada contribui para dissipar.

[If, as has been argued, the Islamic presence in Portugal has been marked, until recently, by its near invisibility, September 11, and then March 11, created a highly volatile and ambivalent period—one of genuine interest in Islam, on the one hand, but no less of suspicion and fear, on the other; both underscoring a general ignorance about Muslims and the overall lack of preparation on behalf of media professionals that propagated said ignorance.] (“Comunidade Islâmica” 4)

The dominant political and cultural dynamics in Portugal regarding Islam pointed out by Vakil can be found in Fúria Divina via Santos’s characters and narrator, as blend of Western curiosity and othering via the projections of fear and deviance. Characters, both Christian and Muslim, often embark on soliloquys concerning the religious and political history of Islam through lenses that fit dominant Western discourses on Islam.

**Oriental Spaces, Imperial Nostalgia**

In many ways, Zacarias’s body, racially signified as mysterious, excessive, and corrupted, corresponds to the signified urban topology of Lahore upon Noronha’s arrival in the city:

*Coff! Coff!*

O cheiro ácido e penetrante da poluição penetrou-lhe nas narinas e invadiu-lhe os pulmões. Tomás tossiu, aflito, e olhou lá para fora. Uma nuvem violeta erguia-se das ruas, pairando sobre os milhares
e milhares de motos e automóveis que enchiam como formigas as artérias poeirentas de Lahore. O pior, percebeu, eram os auto-riquexós, cujos escapes exalavam rolos densos de fumo; pareciam chaminés de fábricas montadas sobre rodas.

[Cough! Cough!]

The acidic and penetrative smell of pollution penetrated his nostrils and invaded his lungs. Tomás coughed, suffering, and looked outside. A violet cloud levitated off the streets, hovering over the thousands and thousands of motorcycles and automobiles that clogged like ant swarms the dusty arteries of Lahore. Worst of all, he noticed, were the auto rickshaws, whose exhaust pipes exhaled dense rolls of smoke; they looked like chimneys of factories riding on wheels.] (246)

Lahore, much like Zacarias's body and its shrouded whereabouts, ultimately becomes both a site of civilizational opposition between the fantasized fully Westernized Lisbon and the excess (of pollution and bodies) and deficit (of order and visibility) that is used to signify the urban Islamic world in Western imaginaries. Lahore is signified along these lines via Noronha’s own bodily and sensory rejection of the abject and vertiginous physical and atmospheric quotidian of the city, in implied opposition to Lisbon and the West, for both the protagonist and Western reader. Noronha’s physiological reaction is conveyed, more specifically, as a Western body, “suffering” under attack by a hostile and invasive space that is both life-threatening (“acidic” that “penetrates” and “invades”) and a sub-humanly infested and sickly terrain (“dusty arteries,” “clogged,” by “ant swarm”). The smoggy and abject city, like the bearded Muslim male body, formulates its mysterious, threatening, and non-white presence in the Western diegesis of imperialist intrigue.

This description of Lahore through Noronha’s Orientalizing gaze is later juxtaposed to the late capitalist modernity of Lisbon and its racialized and gendered ordering of social life, as seen and articulated through the manipulated gaze of Ahmed shortly after his arrival in the Portuguese capital where he is sent to infiltrate Western society in the Al-Andalus in order to detonate Al-Qaeda’s nuclear weapon.

A novidade que de início mais o espantou, e para a qual não estava verdadeiramente preparado, foi a riqueza que encontrou em Portugal. Os automóveis brilhavam de tão novos que pareciam, os autocarros tinham portas que se abriam automaticamente, as estradas eram impecáveis, não havia papéis nem plásticos espalhados pelos passeios, as pessoas tinham um aspecto bem tratado e dos seus corpos
emanavam fragrâncias perfumadas, não se viam bairros degradados nem esgotos a céu aberto nem lixeiras pelos cantos nem revoadas de mendigos, o ar respirava-se limpo e tudo parecia ordeiro e arrumado.

[The novelty that at first most shocked him, and for which he was truly unprepared, was the level of wealth he encountered in Portugal. The cars shined in their apparent newness, the buses had doors that opened automatically, the roads were impeccable, there were neither pieces of paper nor plastics polluting the sidewalks, the people had a well-kept appearance and from their bodies emanated perfumed fragrances, there were no dilapidated slums nor open sewer systems nor waste bins on corners, nor flocks of beggars, the air was clean and everything seemed orderly and tidy.] (3XX!!!)

This ordering of life causes a shock for Ahmed, conveyed as one of admiration in the contrast between “civilizations,” but with Western standards of social and environmental life posited as the implied model of comparison. At the same time, the Orientalizing signification of anti-modern deficit of the urban Islamic world as voiced by Ahmed, specifically in relation to his native Cairo, marks the articulation of Lisbon’s modernity. In other words, the Westernized Portuguese capital is binaristically what Ahmed’s Islamic world is not, thus further emphasizing the West/East, Christian/Islamic duality, at the level of everyday urban life, that guides the entire novel. Most importantly, for Santos’s literary political project, it is this binary that Portugal and Portugueseness must repeatedly traverse in his placement of the post-imperial nation in contemporary geo-political mappings in the current moment of Empire.

Engendered via the centuries of extraction and exploitation inherent to the development of Empire, Ahmed’s admiration of the metropolis, and the narration of it, elide the material histories of imperial violence. Moreover, and although Ahmed’s “more secular” Muslim host family in Lisbon tells him that the wealth of Lisbon (capital of one of the poorest European countries) pales in comparison to that of central and northern Europe, the passage and the novel center an image of a sanitized Lisbon in accord with the criteria of Western late capitalist modernity to which its nationalist project strives. In doing so, they omit from this image the spaces of racialized marginalization and urban slums where the infrastructure and social welfare of the modern metropolis break down, spaces that also reflect the metropolis’s current racial division of labor inhabited by exploitable and discardable bodies.

The cultural life of the Lahore is later defined by Noronha and CIA agent Rebecca Scott in terms of different forms of religious pathology.
and excess in relation to presupposed norms of Christian practice—of mysticism, on the one hand, and fundamentalism, on the other. As they prepare the operation to rescue Zacarias with the assistance of other CIA operatives, Scott asks Noronha, “Tem alguma ideia do tipo de muçulmanos que vivem nesta cidade?” (268), to which he replies: “Sufis [...] Aliás, os sufis de Lahore são famosos. Quem não conhece as noites sufis no santuário de Baba Shah Jamal? Parece que dançam até entrarem em transe, entregando-se a Deus. Dizem que é interessante. E muito místico” [“Sufis ... Actually, the Sufis of Lahore are famous. Who does not know about the Sufi nights at the Shrine of Baba Shah Jamal? It looks like they dance until they are in a trance, delivering themselves to God. I am told it is interesting. And very mystical”] (268). Scott then retorts that Lahore is home to Lashka-e-Taiba, categorized by several states as a terrorist organization in the post-9/11 lexicon of Western geo-political thought, in addition to “mais uma mão-cheia de outras organizações fundamentalistas islâmicas. Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi e Carachi são autênticos viveiros de radicais” [“another handful of Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Karachi are true breeding grounds for radicals”] (269). Scott goes on to summarize: “Esta pode ser a cidade da noite sufi de Baba Shah Jamal, mas não se esqueça que é também a cidade das manhãs sangrentas da Lashkar-e-Taiba” [“This may be the city of the Sufi nights of Baba Shah Jamal, but do not forget that it is also the city of the bloody mornings of Lashkar-e-Taiba”] (269).

This version of Lahore is later juxtaposed to another time-space of the city, that of the British Raj. He meets Scott on The Mall, a major thoroughfare of the city lined with iconic landmarks of Mughal architecture and several monuments of British empire. As Noronha and Scott move through The Mall, he cannot help but marvel at what he and the narrator reflect on as remnants of British colonial grandeur, while recentering British rule as epistemic agent in what for Noronha is the only redeeming part of the city:

Atravessaram o The Mall em direcção ao museu de Lahore, uma bela construção em estilo neomogul que Tomás logo admirou. Estavam em pleno Raj britânico. Neste sector da cidade tudo era grandioso e imponente, com a grande avenda a separar Lahore como um rio majestoso, de um lado o belo museu naquele estilo neomogul à Taj Mahal, do outro a Universidade do Punjabe.

[They crossed The Mall toward the Lahore Museum, a fine construction in neo-Mughal style that Tomás immediately admired. They were truly in the British Raj. In this part of the city, everything was grandiose and opulent, with the grand avenue dividing Lahore like
a majestic river, on one side the beautiful museum in that neo-Mughal style like the Taj Mahal, and the University of the Punjab on the other.]
(262–63)

Importantly, the passage above, early in chapter 27, follows a citation from Rudyard Kipling’s *Kim* in a brief dialog between Scott and Noronha that opens the chapter, thus framing the space the protagonists are about to enter through the epistemological gaze of Empire. They make reference, more specifically, to the Zamzama Gun at the beginning of *Kim*, to Kipling’s phrase “Who hold Zam-Zammah, that ‘fire-breathing dragon,’ hold the Punjab.” Noronha and Scott’s entrance in the city is thus marked by a meshing of inter-imperial Western desires and temporalities, with Kipling’s phrase on imperial control of the city, contextualizing British colonial presence as a fraught victor of a long history of different imperial occupations, positing Lahore as a space where a nascent imperial struggle is set to unfold. This time the context is that of Empire’s late capitalist order of geo-political power and the insurgency against which is conveyed to Western audiences of the novel as a struggle between West and non-West, Global North versus Global South, and through the paradigm of Empire’s “war on terror.” In this case, the novel, in allying Portuguese imperial desires to those of the West and of the US, establishes Lahore as a space where imperial claims and alliances can be performed against the “oriental” insurgent threat—a performance aligned with US foreign policy and carried out on specific bodies on the Lahori ground.

This moment of power-building and related safeguarding of contemporary Empire in its late capitalist stage (through Portuguese agency) is further contextualized and prefaced by a Western colonial nostalgia voiced through Noronha’s assessment of The Mall:

As fachadas dos edifícios estavam degredadas, era certo, mas cintilava ali ainda com esplendor a grande jóia arquitectónica do Raj. Olhando o The Mall era possível viajar no tempo e recuar às indolentes tardes de *cricket*, com *os gentlemen* a encherem os passeios pela avenida, as *ladies* com pequenas sombrinhas a protegê-las, os *The Times* com semanas de atraso dobrados por baixo dos braços, os cavalos e as charretes a percorrerem a estrada com os seus clip-clops característicos, as figuras de laço ou gravata a entrarem nos *clubs* para o *tea time* com *scones* e as conversas em torno do *great imperial game*, as *mensahib* vestidas com...

[The façades of the buildings were decayed, it is true, but there was still a scintillating splendor to the grand architecture of the Raj. Looking at The Mall, it was possible to go back in time to the tranquil
Orientalism and Claims to Late Capitalist Whiteness

afternoons of cricket, with gentlemen filling the sidewalks of the avenue, ladies with small umbrellas protecting them from the sun, weeks-old editions of The Times folded under arms, horses and carriages riding down the street with their characteristic clip-clop, dandies with ties or bow ties entering the clubs or salons for tea time with scones and conversing about the great imperial game, the mensahib dressed in...](263–64).

This expression of nostalgia does not necessarily indicate a longing for a colonial return. Rather, it serves a double function in situating Noronha's protagonist body and its forthcoming action in the trans-temporal history of Western Empire. First, Noronha's fantasized images of white bourgeois British colonial life in the Raj reclaim European imperial presence by recentering the epistemologies at the heart of European/Western social ordering and extractive economies in the postcolonial world. In other words, and as a result, effective/peaceful ordering and economic life, through Noronha's nationalist Portuguese gaze, is rendered synonymous with Empire, thus legitimizing Noronha and Scott's Western presence and forthcoming performance of mastery in the postcolony, as it did in the white man's burden rhetoric of old.

This reminiscence of colonial political order in accord with imperial epistemologies of collective life and rule is also the backdrop for the novel's circuiting of its Portuguese protagonist's actions into contemporary rhetorics of Western occupation in the Middle East and broader Islamic world, specifically savior narratives around bestowment of democracy in spaces politically othered as failed states and autocratic dictatorships. In other words, the Western struggle against the phantasm of Islamic insurgency that is to ensue in different strategic locales including Lahore and Lisbon, is also one that aligns with Noronha's own values of capitalist democracy. The final confrontation that pits Noronha's Western reason, mastery, and resolve against Ahmed's radical insurgency is also one of safeguarding Western fantasies of democracy and, concomitantly, the economic structures of racial capitalism that they uphold and misrecognize. Ahmed's path to radicalization, as articulated through the Western-aligned gaze of the narrator, charts his taught rejection of democracy and embracing of what is often posited as its racialized Islamic opposition—Sharia law. In his personal lessons with instructor Ayman bin Qatada, Ahmed is taught that any state that does not abide by the Sharia is to be considered a kafir government that must be overthrown (284). Ahmed, who works as a tour guide in Cairo outside of school hours, makes an inquisitive comment about the meaning of democracy, citing an encounter he had with a kafir tourist, and suggesting
democracy as a way to “mudar um governo sem grandes problemas” [“change a government with little hassle”] (285). Ayman bin Qataba, the novel’s mechanism of staging the phantasm of angry anti-Western radical Islam, furiously interjects in Ahmed’s comment:

‘Democracia?’ perguntou quase aos berros, a voz carregada de indignação. ‘Democracia?’

Ahmed deu um salto de susto no seu lugar; não esperava aquela reação e muito menos o ardor escandalizado que nela sentia.

[…]

‘Tu não tens estado a ouvir o que tenho explicado? Então ando eu aqui a revelar-te o islão, a mostrar-te que Alá ordenou o respeito integral da sharia, que a verdadeira liberdade está no respeito da Lei Divina e tu... tu... tu vens-me falar de... de democracia? Não percebeste nada do que eu te ensinei?’

[‘Democracy?’ he asked nearly screaming, his voice filled with indignation. ‘Democracy?’

Ahmed jumped from his seat in shock; he did not expect that reaction and much less the scandalized fury he felt from it.

(…)

‘Have you not been listening to all I have explained? Here I am revealing Islam to you, showing you that Allah ordered the full adherence to the Divine Law and you... you... you come to me speaking of...of democracy? Have you understood nothing of what I taught you?’] (286)

In his continued rage, Ayman bin Qataba goes on to furiously oppose facile Western capitalist concepts of freedom and the premise of democracy—a simplified version of which the novel’s protagonist will dutifully defend, one that upholds, codifies, and nationally organizes the structures of capital; and one with which the implied reader (constructed through the paratextual matter of the book) also identifies.

‘Então tu não estás a ver que a democracia dá às pessoas o poder de fazerem elas próprias a lei? Numa democracia são as pessoas que decidem o que se pode fazer ou não fazer, o que se pode ou não proibir. Isso é contra o islão! No islão as pessoas não têm o poder de decidir o que é legal ou ilegal. Esse poder é exclusivo de Alá!

[‘Do you not see that democracy gives people the power to make their own laws? In a democracy it is people who decide what they can
or cannot do, what can be prohibited or not. That is against Islam! In Islam, people do not have the power to decide what is legal or illegal. That power is exclusively Allah's!

The threat constructed and posed in the novel is, therefore, not only a military one against religious-political models of Western Judeo-Christian society, but also against the Enlightenment values and epistemologies that have underpinned the development of Empire and capital. They are, here, particularly simplified in the implied version of democracy that must be saved, with the help of Noronha's actions, a political structure that codifies larger notions of human freedom.

As in the common Western imperial rhetoric of intervention and occupation in the Middle East, bin Qataba's proposed model of rule according to Sharia law equates to a brutal Islamic political regime from which Muslims themselves must be saved. Therefore, the instructor's ventriloquized rhetoric unsurprisingly devolves into horrific brutality to be made law.

‘Os adúlteros têm de ser lapidados até à morte, mesmo que as pessoas discordem dessa penalização. Quem faz a lei é Deus, não são as pessoas! A Lei Divina está enunciada no Santo Alcorão e na Sunnah do Profeta, que a paz esteja com ele, e as pessoas gostem ou não, têm de a respeitar na íntegra. Se não o fizerem, tornam-se kafirun e a sociedade mergulha na jahiliyya. É por isso que a democracia é inaceitável para o islão. Ao retirar o poder a Deus e entregá-lo aos homens, ela está a semear a heresia e o politeísmo.’

[‘Adulterers must be stoned to death, even if people disagree with that penalty. It is God that makes the law, not people! The Divine Law is enunciated in the holy Quran and in the Sunnah of the Prophet, may peace be with him, and whether or not people like it, they must obey the law in its entirety. If they do not obey, they become kafirs and society falls into jahiliyya. That is why democracy is unacceptable for Islam. In removing power from God and delivering it to men, democracy sews heresy and polytheism.’] (287)

More broadly than bin Qataba's rhetoric, insurgency and resistance in the Middle East is framed by a ventriloquized doctrine that makes Christian nationhood of the West its enemy, rather than Empire as exercised in its late capitalist stage.

In the first third of the novel, Noronha seems to be a tempering voice to the anti-Islam rhetoric articulated by Anglo-American characters like CIA agents Bellamy and Scott. Somewhat surprisingly, these roles reverse
as Noronha, Scott, and other CIA operatives wait for Zacarias to meet Noronha in Lahore. After Noronha explains to the CIA agents the reasons for which he studied in Cairo for an unspecified period of time, he is asked if he met any fundamentalists during that time and if he gathered any insights as to why “andam eles a atacar toda a gente? Por que fazem estes atentados horríveis?” [“they are attacking everyone? Why do they commit these horrible acts?”] (294). Scott, his interlocutor in this moment, guesses the acts are a consequence of “razões socioeconómicas, a pobreza, a ignorância” [“socioeconomic reasons, poverty, ignorance”] and that the “radicals” “fazem uma interpretação abusiva do islão” [“have a violent interpretation of Islam”] (295).

Noronha, in one of his expository/didactic soliloquies, with typically brief questions from his female interlocutor, tells Scott and the reader that the violence is not merely an interpretation of the Quran, but the essence of Islam, framing his articulation of Islam in opposition to Christianity.

‘Oiça, é preciso entender um conjunto de coisas sobre o islão,’ disse. ‘A primeira, e talvez a mais importante de todas, é que o islão não é o cristianismo. Nós temos esta fantasia de que os profetas promovem sempre a paz e de que para eles a vida é sagrada, seja em que circunstâncias for.’

[...] ‘Quando um cristão faz a guerra, é importante que perceba que está a desobedecer a Cristo.’

[...]

‘Pois essa é uma importante diferença entre o cristianismo e o islão. É que, no islão, quando um muçulmano faz a guerra e mata gente pode estar simplesmente a obedecer ao Profeta. Não se esqueça de que Maomé era um chefe militar! No islão, pode acontecer que o muçulmano que se recuse a fazer a guerra seja precisamente aquele que desobedece ao seu Profeta!’

[‘Listen, you need to understand a few things about Islam,’ he said. ‘The first, and perhaps most important of all, is that Islam is not Christianity. We have this fantasy that prophets always promote peace and that for them life is sacred in all circumstances.’

(...) ‘When Christians make war, it is important to understand that they disobey Christ.’

(...) ‘Thus, that is an important difference between Christianity and Islam. In Islam, when a Muslim makes war and kills people he may
be simply obeying the Prophet. Do not forget that Muhammed was a military chief! In Islam, it can happen that a Muslim who refuses to go to war may be that who disobeys the Prophet!’] (295–96)

Noronha goes on to further extrapolate on the dangers this poses to the West, the referred to “we,” or “infiéis”—the constructed religious target of this radical Islam, from which he is to rescue the “western world.” He explains to Scott, in a retort to her defense of Islam as a religion of peace, that it is only peaceful to Muslims, and that,

‘No nosso caso, os não muçulmanos, as ordens inscritas no Alcorão ou no exemplo de Maomé são que temos de pagar aos muçulmanos uma taxa humilhante. Se não o fizermos, seremos mortos [...] ou nos convertemos em muçulmanos, ou nos humilhamos, ou somos assassinados.’

[‘In our case, as non-Muslims, the orders inscribed in the Quran or in the example of Muhammed demand that we pay Muslims a humiliating tax. If we do not do so, we will be killed (...) either we convert to Islam, humiliate ourselves, or we will be murdered.’] (297)

**Historicizing Portuguese Relations to Islam**

This particular dialog and the politicized actions of the Portuguese protagonist’s heroics in saving the West from its “greatest nightmare” is further underpinned and sustained by the novel’s historicization of relations between Islamic and Christian/European Empires. Also during Noronha’s conversation with Rebecca Scott as they awaited Zacarias in Lahore, Noronha traces a history of Muslim imperial violence against the Christian West, thus serving as a broader historical backdrop in which to situate his forthcoming action. Noronha’s fight against Islam in the novel is thus placed into the same historical chain as the Crusades in countering what is posited as an Islamic imperialist drive.

Repare, desde o tempo de Maomé que os muçulmanos se habituaram a estar na ofensiva e a dominar os outros povos. Espalharam-se rapidamente pelo Médio Oriente e pelo Norte de África, usaram a força para ocupar a Índia, os Balcãs e a Península Ibérica e chegaram a atacar a França e a Áustria.

[...]

As cruzadas constituíram o primeiro esforço dos cristãos de abandonarem a defensiva, após quatro séculos consecutivos a serem
atacados! Foi só com as cruzadas que os cristãos se ergueram contram os muçulmanos e passaram à ofensiva.

[Notice that since the time of Muhammed, Muslims became accustomed to being on the offensive and dominating other peoples. They spread quickly through the Middle East and through North Africa, used military force to occupy India, the Balkans, and the Iberian Peninsula, and got to attack France and Austria.

(...) The Crusades constituted the first effort by the Christians in abandoning their passiveness, after four centuries of being attacked! It was only through the Crusades that the Christians rose up against the Muslims and went on the offensive.] (322)

The rhetoric of the “Reconquista” is thus part of a broader historicization of Europe (in and beyond Fúria Divina), and the Iberian Peninsula’s placement within it, as demographically, epistemologically, and culturally distinct from Asia, North Africa, and the broader Mediterranean world. The “taking back” of land by Christians, in other words, articulates an implied historiography of a Christian West that is signified retroactively as such, reaching back to the Christian Roman Empire and concomitantly pointing to a fantasy of Christian Roman societal if not ethnic origin into which earlier pagan populations were integrated. This is very much at the heart of post-Islamic nation-building on the Iberian Peninsula, with nation names and demonyms derived from Roman provinces of the peninsula, that is, Hispania and Lusitania. Furthermore, this historicization of a European Iberia, as evidenced in Noronha’s didactic diatribe to the reader and Rebecca Scott, presupposes and, indeed, constructs a notion of pre-Islamic fully Christian Iberian societies, while erasing the presence of Jews and the prevalence of pagan traditions syncretistically integrated into Christianity as part of its own expansion on the peninsula.

The Roman association with Christianity, also fraught with internal tensions across its expansive territories, seems to alibi tactics of Roman imperial domination on Iberian lands. After all, Roman occupation of the peninsula and other territories, like Islamic occupation, also came with a military, political, and tax cost for its inhabitants. Sidestepping the physical and epistemic violence of Christianization under Roman rule, Christianity is implicitly foregrounded by Noronha and similar historiographies as a redeeming factor, due in large part to its confluence with constructions of European whiteness. As such, and in intermeshing Christianity with the Roman Empire in the historicized fabric of whiteness, the Romans
become integrated into the imperialist genealogy of the West, as part of the Western epistemological drive for temporal expansion and imperial legitimacy. In other words, this also implies a whitewashing of the Roman Empire, with its infrastructural, military, political, and economic structures also integrated into this Western genealogy of development and supremacy.

Along similar lines, Noronha articulates the centuries of Islamic rule on the Iberian Peninsula not as a mechanism of social formation in which forms of economic organization and knowledge inaugurated new models of collective life integral to the engendering of Portuguese society and empire (as Herculano, Pascoaes, and Freyre would go on to argue); rather, Noronha enunciates and implicitly places himself in what for him is a clear distinction between an Islamic invasion of Iberia and the phantasm of the peninsula’s natural Christian inhabitants. In his historicizing dialog with Scott, more akin to a monologued exposé, Noronha takes this distinction further by eliding Islamic and Arab knowledges, infrastructural innovation, and agricultural development on which modern “Western” science and social formation were built, from his traced genealogy of the West. More specifically, he articulates a neat separation of European expansion, beginning with the Portuguese, from the development of Arab and Islamic shipbuilding, astrological, and cartographic knowledges that spurred Portuguese expansion. Furthermore, he draws a hard distinction between Western and Islamic empires along the lines of modernity, with the former as its greatest example and proponent and the latter as assiduous opponent. Noronha explains to Scott that European expansion, and especially into Islamic territories, humiliated Muslims (327–28) who “passaram séculos a comportar-se como imperialistas e a invadir país após país. Alguma vez tinham de provar o fruto que antes impunham aos outros” [“lived centuries acting like imperialists and invading country after country. At some point, they had to have a dose of their own medicine”] (323).

Against the backdrop of a backward Islamic world, he posits and lauds the modernizing endeavor of Western imperialism in the Middle East during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With inter-imperial humiliation on the one hand of European colonialism, he argues that on the other,

os europeus construíram infra-estruturas que eles não tinham, instituíram sistemas escolares e serviços públicos que não existiam e aboliram a escravatura. Se for a ver bem, não há comparação do grau de desenvolvimento das terras islâmicas que tiveram colonização europeia com o das terras islâmicas que permaneceram sob o domínio muçulmano. Só os palestinianos criaram sete universidades desde a
The construction of racial and civilizational difference between the seemingly inherent backwardness of the Islamic world in contrast to the modernity and benevolence of Western expansion as mechanism of development is further augmented by Noronha's manipulation and reordering of historical data. He unsurprisingly makes no mention of the stripping of public services, human rights, and freedom (even by Western definitions of it) from Palestinians, to give one example. In this regard, the misapplication and differential application of modern values according to racialized and racist taxonomies so integral to Western imperialist endeavor is also ignored in Noronha's articulation of, and alignment with, Western/white supremacy.

Noronha goes on, charting Islamic insurgency not necessarily as a reaction to European expansion and occupation, but as a fundamental imperialist drive at the heart of Islamic religious thought and doctrine, a drive that is seemingly not a part of European expansion, and masked by white man's burden rhetoric. The essentialized Islamic drive for expansion, according to Noronha, has prevailed despite its crumbling of empire; and sustains, furthermore, notions of Islamic awakening and renaissance that he explains are central to fundamentalist discourse and action. This is an expansionist rhetoric that, moreover, explicitly targets the West, and Europe most specifically. In this regard, the construction of a destructive Islamic essence must repeatedly restage and rearticulate the separation of Islam and Christianity and the Arab world from Europe, as well as the Europeanization of the Iberian Peninsula.

Apesar da espantosa expansão europeia, o islão manteve o objectivo declarado de conquistar toda a Europa e fez uma derradeira tentativa de retomar a ofensiva atacando de novo o Sacro Império Romano no século XVII, mas o segundo cerco de Viena fracassou e os exércitos islâmicos
bateram em retirada. [...] Segui-se derrota atrás de derrota, até que os europeus entraram em pleno coração do islão.

[Despite the stunning expansion of Europe, Islam maintained its declared objective of conquering all of Europe and made a last attempt at retaining the offensive, attacking once more the Holy Roman Empire in the seventeenth century, but its second siege of Vienna failed and the Islamic armies quickly retreated. (...) What followed was defeat after defeat, until the Europeans entered into the heart of Islamic land.] (323)

Centuries later, and after a sequence of European imperial occupations trivially explained by Noronha, he goes on to situate current fundamentalism as the contemporary manifestation of this imperialist drive: “O islão está, pois, a viver um grande despertar. Existe uma vontade muito forte por parte de alguns muçulmanos de passar à ofensiva e estender o islão a todo o planeta” [Islam is, therefore, living a great awakening. There is very strong will on the part of some Muslims to go on the offensive and expand Islam to all the world] (330).

Noronha further articulates this imperialist drive, and the phantasmatic imposition of Sharia law that threatens the West and capitalism, as a vague desire guiding what he considers the intolerance of Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Hamas (318), rather than rooted against particular instantiations of Western imperial power. In the matrix of Western historicity, to which Noronha contributes in both the diegetic and broader public sphere, anti-imperial insurgency is re-narrated into Empire’s economy of desire in which resistance is decontextualized as even a manifestation of envy toward Western quality of life. He tells Scott, “muitos muçulmanos começaram a comparar as suas vidas com as dos ocidentais e isso fê-los questionarem-se. Por que razão viviam os países islâmicos na pobreza e tinham governos tão corruptos? Por que motivo estavam tão atrasados em relação ao Ocidente?” [“many Muslims started to compare their lives to those of Westerners and that made them question themselves. Why did Islamic countries live in poverty and had governments so corrupt? Why were they so backward in relation to the West?”] (325). Within this matrix of meaning, Western supremacy must project itself as an object of epistemic desire and by the same gesture, occult its own shortcomings in relation to its own narrative.

The novel articulates not only a Western fantasy/fear of Islamic insurgency to different and interrelated effects (Western intrigue, the reproduction of a binarist West, and Portuguese placement within it), the plot, especially through Noronha’s voice, articulates a Western fantasy of Islamic imperialist epistemology, teleology, historicization, and desire. Within this paradigm of
thought and knowledge, Noronha argues that for Muslims, time and events are organized according to supposed imperatives of territorial conquest and Western/Christian affronts thereto. In doing so, moreover, Noronha elides and justifies decades of Western interventions, occupations, and belligerence in the Middle East since the 1970s for the extractive logics of contemporary late capital. During his superficial tracing of European imperial history in the Middle East, Noronha seemingly concludes that history ends with the formal political independence of Middle Eastern states in the 1950s and 1960s, namely those created and partitioned by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Scott interjects in his history lesson, “Está bem, mas isso tudo é história. [ … ] Que eu saiba todos esse países já recuperaram a independência” [“That is fine, but all of that is history. ( … ) As far as I know, all those countries regained their independence”] (324). Noronha retorts:

Acha que tudo é história? Olhe que os muçulmanos não vêem a coisa assim. Nós, os ocidentais, encaram a história como uma coisa que já passou e que não deve condicionar-nos. É, mais uma vez, a cultura cristã que nos orienta, mesmo que não nos apercebamos disso. Mas os muçulmanos não são cristãos e olham para as coisas de maneira diferente. Encaram acontecimentos de há mil anos como tendo acontecido agora!

[ … ]

O passado para os muçulmanos tem uma importância desmesurada, eles encontram ai orientação religiosa e legal. [ … ] Daí que a colonização dos países islâmicos pelos europeus os choque acima de tudo.

[You think that everything is history? Be aware that Muslims do not see it that way. We, Westerners, approach history as something that has already happened and that should not condition us. It is once more the Christian culture that guides us, even if we do not realize it. But Muslims are not Christians and they look at things differently. They approach events from a thousand years ago as having happened just now!

( … )

The past for Muslims holds excessive importance, in it, they find religious and legal guidance. ( … ) And so the colonization of Islamic countries by Europeans shocks them most above all else.] (324)

Scott interjects once again with a blend of incredulity and agreement, for the sake of emphasis and dramatic effect to the Western Portuguese reader: “Mas já lhe disse que eles recuperaram a independência há muito tempo!” [“But as I have said, these countries regained their independence a long time
Orientalism and Claims to Late Capitalist Whiteness

Noronha responds, once more, thus emphasizing: “É verdade, mas para eles é como se tudo tivesse ocorrido ontem.” [“It is true, but for them, it is as if everything happened yesterday”] (324).

Ironically, Noronha and the broader novel are guilty of this same ordering of time and history by situating the novel’s central events and dilemma within a long history of Islamic imperialist drive against the West. Despite his own claims that Western historicization occurs in a linear fashion with clear temporal separations, he betrays his philosophy of history by intermeshing the Reconquista with the development of European expansion and the persistent separation of a white Christian Europe from non-white, non-Christian Asia and Africa.

Tomás Noronha as Portuguese White Savior

As Zacarias looks to escape from the Al-Qaeda group that had recruited him to Lahore, he becomes, himself, a space or site of confrontation between orient and occident as they are constructed and pitted against each other throughout the novel. Herein lies another way that he serves as a supplement to Noronha’s imperial mastery and Portuguese Westernness. Zacarias is thus posited as an object to be rescued by Noronha as white savior, while metonymically standing in for an oppressed Muslim population that must be saved by the paternalistic West from Islamic fundamentalism. In this regard, his distancing from Al-Qaeda and siding with Noronha is articulated in the novel as a small yet significant triumph of the Judeo-Christian West over Islam and the Middle East. This orientalist confrontation ultimately comes to a head in the streets of Lahore when Zacarias is spotted with Noronha by an Al-Qaeda operative who suddenly stabs Zacarias in broad daylight. In one of the novel’s action scenes/passages, the untrained Noronha roundhouse kicks Zacarias’s assailant, thus buying enough time for his CIA collaborators to snipe the attacker in time to save Noronha. Zacarias ultimately dies on the street from his wounds, but not before leaving Noronha a subtle clue indicating where he can find proof that Al-Qaeda possesses and plans to detonate nuclear weaponry in the West. His life and his death, his diegetic discardability, are normalized effects of the Western fantasy of a “barbarian” Islamic world, and, as such, serve as mere literary mechanisms in the novel’s development and for the effect of intrigue. His fantasized body and experience serve as currency in the staged clash of civilizations, which Noronha uses to accrue his own knowledge and instruments to resolve the plot’s fundamental dilemma of impending Western doom.

After Fúria Divina, José Rodrigues dos Santos would go on to publish another novel of the Noronha series in which the protagonist endeavors
against Islamic threats to Portugal and the broader West. In his 2016 work, *Vaticanum*, Santos situates Noronha's actions in response to an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) antagonist. The plot stages a common trope of Western Christian anxiety utilized in the Western spy/mystery fiction genre of the twentieth-first century—that of Islamic terrorism targeting the Vatican. Although the Arab antagonist known simply as “Hassassin” in Dan Brown’s *Angels and Demons* (2000) does not work for an Islamist organization, rather the Illuminati in opposition to the Vatican, his actions and behaviors are deeply racialized in accordance with orientalist notions of Muslim male deviance at the heart of Western fantasies and fears of “Islamic terrorism.” *Vaticanum*'s plot, which revolves around ISIL’s kidnapping of the pope and threat to decapitate the pontiff, bears a more obvious resemblance to Daniel Silva’s *The Messenger* (2006). In the latter, the recurring white male protagonist of Silva’s own spy thriller series, Israeli-American spy and art restorer Gabriel Allon, foils a plot to attack both the pope and the US president orchestrated by Ahmed bin Shafiq and his Osama bin Laden-esque financier known only as Zizi. All of these works, and the broader oeuvres of each writer, partake in post-9/11 orientalist mappings and Western narrativization of geo-political power in contemporary capital, while situating these misrecognized terrains as sites of racial/sexual fantasy and intrigue for Western (or Western-interpellated) readers.

*Fúria Divina*, though, I would argue, fleshes out, more than other books of the Tomás Noronha series, with various overlapping layers, a historicizing project of separating Portugal from the Islamic world and its history and placing the Iberian nation into a political and racial cartography of the West. In articulating Portuguese Westernness, particularly through a white savior protagonist, its plot interweaves a repurposing and cross-temporal translation of Reconquista rhetoric with contemporary anti-Islam War on Terror discourses and their intimately related anxieties. This intermingling of anti-Islam discourses from different periods of Empire and formation of a Christian Europe in opposition to an othered Islamic civilization serve to reproduce and salvage a notion of a Western world and its Enlightenment values. The novel enacts and grounds a number of “the fears conjured in western nations around the potential dangers of illegal immigrants, refugees, and Muslim immigration more broadly” (Serisier 149). On this facet, the novel, particularly through the aforementioned scene in which Noronha takes his Islamic Studies class to the streets of Lisbon to subtly probe his Muslim students, identifies Muslim male bodies as targets of suspicion while inscribing Portuguese imperial nationhood and European historicity on their bodies, marked as dangerous outsiders in the present
as well as of a pre-European past. Santos mobilizes these anxieties of white supremacy and Empire at the core of the ideological, genocidal, and extractive logics of Western formation to repeatedly position Portugal and Portuguese cultural identity as Western, long separated from its Islamic foundations. The novel’s particularly Portuguese/Iberian orientalism thus revolves around the restaging of anti-Islam at the core of imperial Portugueseness into the nation’s present claims to Westernness, doing so especially via a fantasy/trope of Islamic revanchism, targeting specifically the previously Islamic-ruled spaces of Al-Andalus for its nuclear attack on the West.

The novel also partakes in particularly gendered orientalisms, common to media coverage, political rhetoric, and cultural production in Western public spheres, including popular fiction. Muslim masculinity is deployed as a site of overlapping deviance—the excesses of Islamic patriarchy, religious violence, and hypersexualization. As Serisier also underscores in relation to Dan Brown’s *Angels and Demons* and its Muslim antagonist known simply as “the Hassassin,” “[h]e is a remorseless killer, a fanatical and vicious Muslim driven by hatred for the Christian west. This figure has become a familiar trope, not just in mass-produced ‘low-brow’ fiction, but in contemporary representations of the good and evil of international and domestic politics” (149). By the same token, and as is also a common component of contemporary orientalist discourse in Western geopolitical thought, Muslim women in the novel, most notably Ahmed’s wife Adara, are deployed as objects of Muslim patriarchal oppression, corporal/political currencies to be saved by Western agents of history like Noronha. Adara is first introduced in the novel as the wife promised to Ahmed through an arrangement made between their respective fathers. They are united only following Ahmed’s move to Lisbon after he bargains with his instructor and Al-Qaeda superior Amayadd to have the marriage officialized. Adara quickly becomes an object of Ahmed’s and (supposedly) Islamic patriarchy’s racialized violence and hyper-surveillance. Soon into their marriage in Lisbon, Ahmed forces her to have sex with him to consummate the marriage, after which he inspects the bedsheets for blood as a sign of a virginal hymen. After he witnesses Adara walking in public without a niqab, against his wishes, he confronts her upon her return home with physical violence:

A palma da mão do marido abateu-se-lhe sobre a face uma, duas, três, sucessivas vezes, cobrindo-a de estalos.

“Sua prostituta! Sua desavergonhada! Como te atreves a desobedecer-me?”

Ahmed ficou descontrolado. Era a primeira vez que batia na mulher, mas a fúria tinha tomado conta dele. Adara encolheu-se no canto do
hall de entrada do apartamento, os braços a cobrirem a cabeça, o corpo a tremer e reduzido a uma bola defensiva.

[The palm of her husband’s hand struck her face once, twice, thrice, numerous times, covering her in slaps.

“You prostitute! Have you no shame?! How dare you disobey me?”

Ahmed lost control. It was the first time he hit his wife, but his fury had taken over him. Adara curled up in a corner of the apartment’s entrance hall, her arms covering her head, her body trembling and reduced to a defensive ball.] (380–81)

Adara’s body thus becomes an exoticized repository of white Western fantasies of Islamic feminine helplessness and Islamic masculine and patriarchal excess, which simultaneously serve to obscure the everyday structural life of Western patriarchal violence.

This positioning of Muslim women in Western imaginaries is surely nothing new, predating 9/11, and accompanying Western rhetoric of Middle Eastern intervention, occupation, and economic extraction from European literatures of the Renaissance to the Persian Gulf War of the early 1990s. Mainstream Western feminism, drawn and popularized through the centering of white bourgeois cisgender women’s experiences, has provided a critical grounding for broader imperial civilizing and savior discourses. Within this strand, and at times appropriation, of feminism, for Western imperialist ends, universal values and rights are constructed from white Western bourgeois cisgender epistemologies. Lila Abu-Lughod critically analyzes the intimate bonds between white Western saviorship and its particular reifications of Muslim women’s bodies leading to the formation of a “new common sense about going to war for women’s rights” (79). Throughout, she interrogates the disparate yet interconnected bonds between institutions, Western non-governmental organizations, and cultural/knowledge production, paying particular attention to the commercial publishing industry in which José Rodrigues dos Santos most certainly partakes:

This industry commissions and promotes a genre of books that one can identify, and judge, by their covers. We see them at airport bookstores. The copycat images are of women wearing black or white veils, showing only their eyes. The titles are variations on a theme: A True Story of Life behind the Veil in Saudi Arabia; Sold: One Woman’s True Account of Modern Slavery; My Forbidden Face; Without Mercy; Burned Alive; Married by Force. (79)
Adara’s story within Fúria Divina is thus circuited into Western economies of desire for consuming vulnerabilized bodies, part of a broader pornography of pain for the sake of humanitarian action (which can be traced back to European and European-American abolitionist painters depicting the horrors of slavery in the Americas after an “enlightened” Europe had already abolished the institution). In this sense, the novel looks to interpellate Portuguese readers into identifying with this particular Western epistemology of Muslim women’s bodies and the collective desire for military intervention and occupation in the deeply and fantasmatically homogenized Islamic world.

As noted above, this articulation and commoditization of Muslim women through a specific trope of vulnerability and precarity simultaneously inscribes a fantasy of a brutal Islamic patriarchal culture as well as a corrupted state system that fails to protect Muslim women, thus framing Western military intervention as a mode of saving said women. As Therese Saliba theorizes in the case of the civilizing rhetoric surrounding the Persian Gulf War, targeting not only Iraqi and Kuwaiti bodies, but those of a broader, monolithic, and interchangeable Muslim/Arab world:

In media representations during the Persian Gulf Crisis, the twentieth-century “civilizing mission” to avenge the rape of Kuwait and to unveil Saudi women was performed symbolically in the name of women’s rights. The Saudi women’s struggle for autonomy was distorted by U.S. Media to portray them as dependent on the white cultural savior. Ironically, much of the destruction in Iraq, which included the deaths of tens of thousands of women and children, was justified by the “barbarism” of Arab sexism from which the United States was purportedly “protecting” Arab women. (273)

In this regard, and drawing on Saliba’s important connection between white Western savior rhetoric and military intervention undermining sovereignty, Fúria Divina contributes to a Western discursive fabric of continued occupation and extraction, while situating and historicizing Portugueseness as part of its epistemological, political, geo-cultural, and rhetorical groupings. This is in addition to Portuguese contributions to the material and militarist endeavors of occupation in the Middle East and against other forms of insurgency and disruptions to Western/global northern domination of global capital, with the Portuguese state having deployed its armed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans.

Portuguese claims to Europeanness and Westernness have implied, since the second half of the twentieth century, alignment with military and
diplomatic mechanisms that regulate regional and global regulation of capitalism. These include founding membership in the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, admission in the United Nations in 1955, and entrance into the European Economic Community in 1986, all of which have been engaged in, and have contributed to, “counterterrorist” operations and geo-political ideologies. Through these, Portuguese troops have been deployed to Afghanistan throughout the 2000s as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with the purpose of overseeing political stability of the US-installed state and its economic policies. Since 2008, the state has also contributed militarily to the European Union response to piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden in order to safeguard European trans-continental trade. Most recently, Portuguese forces partook in Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve (CTJF–OIR) from 2014 to 2019 against ISIL.

It is important to note that Santos’s narrative centering of white Western saviorship as tied to the ongoing extractive logics of global capital targeting postcolonial spaces is not limited to his Tomás Noronha series. For instance, in his O Anjo Branco [White Angel] of 2010, he situates the white male savior figure in a different historical temporality and locale of Empire—the Portuguese colonial war of counter-insurgency in Mozambique—to great commercial effect in Portugal. It was the highest-selling book in Portugal in 2010 despite its release in late October, selling approximately 135,000 copies. The novel follows a Portuguese doctor who, in his goal of improving public health in rural peasant communities of the colony, settles in colonial Mozambique in the 1960s and travels to remote villages in order to provide care to ailing native inhabitants. Though the novel offers some representation of colonial brutality, Portuguese imperial history in its late colonial era is redeemed for a neo-Lusotropicalist readership through the benevolence of the novel’s paternalistic protagonist and his “proper” carrying out of Western imperial epistemes and biopowered notions of health and social ordering. His Tomás Noronha character, moreover, enacts a signification of contemporary Portugueseness aligned with post-9/11 Western geo-political rhetoric and fantasies of whiteness as grounded in historical, gendered, and religious orientalist oppositions to the Arab and Islamic Worlds.
At the 68th minute of a Portuguese football league match between Vitória Sport Clube of Guimarães and Futebol Clube do Porto on February 16, 2020, Malian forward Moussa Marega of FC Porto finally had enough of the racist chants, vitriol, and violence hurled at him by sections of the Vitória Guimarães's supporters. Suffering the abuse throughout the game, after scoring what turned out to be the game-winning goal in the 61st minute, he pointed to his skin in defiance against the home crowd’s racism. Supporters reacted by ripping out stadium chairs and throwing them onto the field at Marega. He continued to play on until the 68th minute when he walked off the field in protest, evading teammates begging him to remain in the match and dodging more chairs hurled at him as he exited toward the locker rooms. He replied to the racist spectators (who once cheered for him during his time playing for Vitória years earlier) in that moment by raising his two middle fingers to the crowd.

The myriad instances of anti-Black racism in sporting venues, the responses to them by various social actors, and the discourses underpinning these tell a particular story of how the Portuguese imperial past is historicized and its colonial ideologies are reproduced in the context of contemporary race relations and divisions of labor. The sporting sphere has long been a particularly fertile one for the collective negotiation of Portuguese empire (past and present) and a turbulent terrain for the inscription and quotidian playing out of current metropolitan racial power dynamics. As incidences of racial abuse from spectators toward players have garnered increased media attention in Europe in recent decades, the governing body of European football—UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) developed, in October of 2019, a three-step protocol for referees to implement immediately (“Empowering”). Upon becoming aware of any racist behavior from supporters, the referee is to request a warning be made over the stadium’s public-address system. If the behavior continues, the referees are instructed to suspend the match for 10–15 minutes with teams sent to the locker rooms.
for that period of time. Upon returning to the field, if the racism continues, referees must abandon the match.

These measures came in response to the numerous cases that have attracted attention to racism in football stadiums following abuse suffered by high-profile players who have protested in response, not only in Europe, but in Asia and South America as well. The vast majority of these incidents are specifically of anti-Black racism and targeting playing of African descent. Though critical light was increasingly shed on the matter when some of the world’s top players such as Cameroonian forward Samuel Eto’o, Italian forward Mario Balotelli, Brazilian defender Roberto Carlos, Ghanaian-German midfielder Kevin Prince-Boateng, and Senegalese defender Kalidou Koulibaly were targeted during the early 2000s to the present, Black footballers had long been subjected to it in European and settler colonial nations structured around anti-Black racial divisions of labor, power, and privilege. As European public spheres grapple to make sense of racism in football stadiums in relation to mainstream discourses of national diversity and multiculturalism, racist acts in sport have been largely compartmentalized from broader social and cultural racial structures. Across Europe, an array of personalities, from sports commentators to football club and league officials, have attributed the acts to a few groups of supporters, typically from organized fan bases. The attribution of the occurrences to sports hooligan culture ultimately fails to connect the racism in stadiums to broader histories and normalized discourses of racial power and oppression, thus conveniently diverting attention from substantive inquiries into how racism operates in post-war and post-imperial Europe.

As numerous scholars and theorists have pointed out, post-war European distancing from racial categorization has facilitated the rise of particular post-racial politics that have been complicit in reproducing systems of racial inequality and everyday racism (Constant 2009; Stam and Shohat 2012). From state to state, these sorts of post-racial politics overlap and function in tandem with various national narratives of racial exceptionalism that also informed myriad colonial discourses such as French Enlightenment liberalism (Liberté, égalité, fraternité) or Portuguese late colonial Lusotropicalist revisionism (more on this below). Such narratives functioned then, and continue now, to obscure the everyday operations of white supremacist structures, publicly silencing collective consciousness around racist systems. The contemporary overlapping of exceptionalist racial narratives with post-racial politics has come to structure mainstream discourses and debates of multicultural Europe, foreclosing substantive interrogations of racism, misrecognizing/alibiing overt public racism of right-wing socio-political sectors, and surreptitiously reproducing white
supremacist divisions of labor and power. Sport, football in particular, has been a fertile ground for the projection of these narratives in mainstream media and among public figures in various national public spheres, most notably in France following its national team’s World Cup victories in 1998 and 2018 (Dubois 2010). In many ways, therefore, the racism in football has allowed political and affective investments in maintaining European white supremacy to go largely unchecked, allowing discourses of multicultural Europe to operate alongside the anti-Black, anti-Arab, anti-Amerindian, anti-Roma, and orientalist foundations of the idea and socio-political praxis of Europe.

The largely symbolic gestures against racism from the football world, such as Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA’s) Say No to Racism or even the London-based Kick It Out diversity and inclusion organization, have also largely failed to make any substantive connections between the racial ideologies that come to bear in stadiums and the everyday life of racist cultural discourses and politics. Black English footballer Raheem Sterling of Manchester City FC is arguably the first high-profile figure from the European football world to attempt such connections in a socially visible way. After being a target of racial abuse during a league match against Chelsea FC in London, and becoming the subsequent object of media attention as a result, Sterling posted a poignant message and piece of critical media analysis on his Instagram page (Sterling 8 Dec. 2018). There, he contextualized the abuse he faced within a broader trajectory of racially inflected media bias against Black players. He contrasted two news headlines from the tabloid The Daily Mail’s digital platform, MailOnline, concerning two Manchester City youth players, one white (Phil Foden) and one Black (Tosin Adarabioyo) who purchased homes for their families. Whereas Foden was commended for purchasing “new 2 million-pound home for mum,” Adarabioyo was criticized for “splashing out on mansion on market for 2.25 million pounds despite having never started a Premier League match.” Sterling critiqued the coverage as imbalanced media coverage that fueled racist behavior and propagated particular anti-Black racist stereotypes.

The case of racial abuse against Marega was not the first in Portugal to make headlines. In February of 2012, groups of FC Porto fans in the club’s home stadium were heard making monkey sounds in unison at two Black players of the opposition team Manchester City FC—Ivorian midfielder Yaya Touré and Italian forward Mario Balotelli. FC Porto officials denied the facts and testimonies of UEFA investigators, but the club was ultimately fined, though a mere 2,000 euros. Marega became the first high-profile player to walk off an official competitive match in protest, though Boateng had walked off of a friendly match in January of 2013 for AC Milan, and was
followed by his teammates, with the match subsequently being abandoned. Of all the cases witnessed in top division matches in Europe, Marega’s case was singular not only in his response, but in the level of escalated vitriol and the intended physical violence enacted by Vitória supporters in throwing stadium seats onto the pitch at Marega. The scenes shocked audiences, journalists, and pundits around the world, and thrust Portuguese football into the foreground of stadium racism debates.

Public responses from politicians to football personalities in Portugal varied, without broader inquiries into racial systems of power. Prime Minister António Costa and President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa denounced the events, with the former saying, “No human should be subjected to this humiliation,” and the latter stating, “Portugal’s constitution very clearly condemns racism, as well as any other forms of xenophobia and discrimination.” These would be prime examples of what Stefano Fella and Carlo Ruzza have termed “mainstream anti-racism” in contemporary Europe (though applicable to other parts of the world, especially in settler colonies). Fella and Ruzza contend that “within ‘mainstream anti-racism’ the general solidarity of the majority of the population with the victims of racist attacks is mobilised, focusing on the racist as an individual perpetrator” (25) [italics mine]. In other words, racism in the broader social realm beyond only football is often addressed in mainstream media and public sphere practice as individual-based actions. By the same token, less mainstream but often corporatized anti-racist thinking in terms of structures is often deeply imbricated in the machinery of racial capitalism, with initiatives, usually through diversity and inclusion offices in corporations, universities, and other institutions focusing on social mobility through existing structures rather than substantive anti-racial capitalist analyses. Such mainstream anti-racism ultimately upholds the broader operations of race-based power in capitalist and neoliberal structures of labor, consumption, accumulation, and institutional privilege. It is important to note that there are notably more critical voices in the realm of Portuguese public politics that have shed light on issues of systemic racism, namely Member of the Assembly of the Republic, Joacine Katar Moreira (the first Black woman in Portugal to head a party list, that of Livre, in a legislative election), and Mamadou Ba, Director of the international non-profit organization SOS Racism’s Portuguese chapter.

More openly problematic, yet equally indicative of public racial discourses in Portugal, the attacks on Marega garnered comments from far-right Portuguese politicians, such as members of the Chega [Enough] party defending Vitória fans in the name of Enlightenment liberal ideals like “free speech” while decrying public outrage against “perceived” racism as
political correctness gone too far. Then party chair, André Ventura, made several media appearances in addition to social media posts simultaneously arguing that the actions of Vitória supporters were not racist and that public outcry was hypocritical in its assessment of racism toward Marega while silent on what he claims were racist attacks on white members of Portuguese society. In this regard, racism is approached by Ventura and larger parts of the public sphere as not structural and connected to hierarchies of power inherent to empire, but as largely circumstantial and fundamentally multi-lateral. Though Ventura and the Chega party represent a seemingly negligible portion of Portuguese voters, both politician and party have tapped into racial discourses found in numerous and highly visible online forums. Ventura, the Chega party, and others like the Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) [National Renovator Party] have operated on platforms of right-wing populism and degrees of rhetorical white supremacy that harness particular ideals of public racial discourse combining notions of free speech to protect open racism and xenophobia while decrying any denunciation of racism as race-baiting and “true racism.”

These are the sorts of responses that make up the vast majority of comments in the response sections of videos and posts from Black public figures like Moreira and Ba. In a Facebook post from Ba himself, marking the 2019 International Conference on Afro-European Studies Conference held in Lisbon, some comments call him the most racist Black person they know while others call for violence and deportation utilizing various racial epithets and terminologies. The same can be found in comment sections of YouTube videos from Moreira’s television appearances, where racist and purportedly post-racial comments intersect with misogyny and ableism directed toward Moreira’s speech disability.

The ubiquity of these overt racist commentaries and reactionary sentiments toward anti-racist positions go far beyond the small electorate that make up Portugal’s far-right parties. Moreover, such arguments and attributions of racism to the person denouncing it were also present in the public debates and responses following the incidents in Vitória’s stadium. For instance, Vitória’s club president, Miguel Pinto Lisboa, defended the club’s supporters by blaming Marega for inciting their attacks, which he did not perceive to be racially motivated. During this public defense, staged at the customary post-match news conference, Pinto repeatedly portrayed his club as guided by a culture of racial, gender, and religious equality, going as far as referencing the club’s formation and arguing that the club’s colors are black and white in order to symbolize racial equality (“Miguel Pinto Lisboa”).

Responses such as these to the incidents against Marega not only highlight a neat compartmentalization of football from societal structures
that often underpins political inaction, but also make it clear that football has become a terrain in which hegemonic discourses of national race relations, narratives of (post)colonial exceptionalism, post-racial fantasies, and also myriad and complex forms of othering are staged. It is within this terrain, and largely as a byproduct of systemic racial oppression and continuities of particular divisions of labor integral to national and global racial capitalism, that Black Portuguese bodies are most visible in national society and everyday cultural production.

**Anti-Black Imagery and Post-Racial Denial**

The public voices of contestation and critical inquiry into the legacies and structural dimensions of racism in Portuguese society have often struck a destabilizing nerve at the core of Portuguese national historicization and the state’s long-spanning pedagogical project. Public figures such as Moreira and Ba, both of migrant backgrounds (Moreira having moved to Portugal at age 8 and Ba at age 22), often underscore the colonial legacies of racial formation and structural racism, while also highlighting the continual embrace of exceptionalist narratives of Portuguese empire as a collective mode of silencing inquiry into racism. These narratives exist not only on a plain of public discourse, but have had a strong material existence that has been fundamental to the carrying out of Portugal’s centuries-long imperial project, from expansion to settler colonialism, to postcolonialism. The project of fomenting an imperial metropolitan consciousness is arguably as old as Portuguese empire itself, and in many ways has outlived formal Portuguese colonial presence in the Global South. Such an imperial consciousness has been built through the terrain of cultural production (literary and artistic production), political rhetoric, and imperialist public materialities including statues, monuments, museums, the circulation of imported and consumable commodities from colonized spaces, maps, and school curricula.

Many of these materialities have been state-operated over the centuries and have formed and circuited individual and collective identity and economies of desire tied to empire—consumptive, sexual, and political. Therefore, in doing the important critical work of tying contemporary everyday racism to broader paradigms of power and imperial history, in public forums no less, such interventions strike at the heart of a long-standing imperial world-making process into which subjectivation is embedded, and that has its own specificities in Portuguese empire, but traverses European expansion and Western imperialism more broadly. US professor and writer Robin DiAngelo’s term “white fragility” is particularly helpful in contextualizing what she has seen as the defensiveness of many white people in addressing
the structures of white supremacy. DiAngelo provides a brief summarization of how white fragility operates and the colonial notions of whiteness that lie beneath defensiveness on issues of racial injustice:

[W]hite fragility quickly emerges as we are so often met with silence, defensiveness, argumentation, certitude, and other forms of pushback. These are not natural responses; they are social forces that prevent us from attaining the racial knowledge we need to engage more productively, and they function powerfully to hold the racial hierarchy in place. These forces include the ideologies of individualism and meritocracy, narrow and repetitive media representations of people of color, segregation in schools and neighborhoods, depictions of whiteness as the human ideal, truncated history, jokes and warnings, taboos on openly talking about race, and white solidarity. (8)

Many of these ideologies can be found in the reactionary rhetoric among not only the far right and in online comment sections, but also on mainstream platforms to varying degrees, from allusions to “problematic neighborhoods” and welfare gripes to racialized beauty ideals and normative speech. More than a reactionary practice, these inform an everyday collective and dialectical performance/consumption of whiteness in the societal life of the body and subject, found in an array of products and commodities, from the cultural to the cosmetic. These have been often overtly expressed in widely consumed forums, particularly in mainstream television in the decades following decolonization and the fall of the right-wing Estado Novo [New State] authoritarian and colonialist regime.

Television dramas, comedic programs, stand-up comedians, and especially football have been particularly visible vehicles and cultural commodities through which the substantial growth of the Black Portuguese community following formal colonialism and migratory waves has been publicly historicized via the discourses of white supremacy and national imperial narratives. The popular sketch comedy program of the 1990s and early 2000s, Os Malucos do Riso [Laughing Lunatics] (1995–2008) had a recurring Black character/caricature of a male African migrant named Ernesto (played by Angolan-Portuguese actor Hoji Fortuna) that works in construction alongside two white working-class men. Fortuna’s only other recurring characters spanning multiple seasons of the program were all in roles of constructed migrant otherness—a member of a local amateur soccer player and a migrant school child—always with a heavy stereotyped “African” accent that Fortuna himself does not possess. The punchlines of these sketches revolve around Ernesto’s constructed lack of linguistic proficiency in Portuguese, his pathologized consumption of alcoholic beverages, and laziness. The
program, like the stand-up comedy of Fernando Rocha who cultivated a large national following with tours and audio sales of performances and was a cast member in Os Malucos do Riso, created fictional worlds of recurring othered characters staged in implied opposition to the normativity of white, cisgendered, bourgeois, urban (center), and heterosexual male bodies. Besides the aforementioned caricature of the Black migrant laborer, both the program and comedian utilized recurring caricatures of a male Romani “delinquent,” a Romani slum, a duo of stereotyped blonde women as “bimbos,” characters with speech disabilities, inmates in prisons and psychiatric asylums, and “backwards” rural peasants from the interior of the Alentejo region. The Os Malucos do Riso franchise also included spin-off sub-series tellingly titled Malucos nas Arábias [Lunatics in the Arabias] (2005) and Malucos na Selva [Lunatics in the Wild] (2006); the former centered on an array of orientalist tropes and the latter deploying fantasies and fears of indigeneity in the Americas, with cannibalistic tribes the usual object of the sketches’ punchlines.

Popular visual representations such as these of Black bodies in Portuguese post-imperial metropolitan space give an everyday and often misrecognized presence to the racial ideologies comprising white fragility and defensiveness that fundamentally make up the historical and imperial formation of Portugueseness itself. In light of this, Black bodies are seldom posited as Portuguese, but as an outside other situated within a particular imperial spectrum of racialized power and division of labor—a continual binary opposition to the centuries-long historicization of Portuguese nationhood. Here we may further expand and complicate DiAngelo’s provocation in terms of Portuguese social formation. Besides the discourses and fantasies of white supremacy that make up contemporary silencing and sanitizing of anti-racist critical inquiry, there is also an overlapping nationalist element to this that has codified colonial discourses into articulations of collective identity and nationalist affective bonds to particular versions of collective history. In other words, the public silencing and defensiveness manifests itself as a built-in and mutually reproducing component of these very narratives of exceptionalist imperial national history and formation. The Portuguese nation-building process has been based on expansion and the discourses of alterity that have underpinned it in overlapping periods of Portuguese continental consolidation and transcontinental occupation—anti-Castilianness, anti-Arabness, anti-semitism, anti-Blackness, and the envisioning of Europeanness as the geographic, philosophical, cultural, institutional, and political embodiment of these. These can be found in a wide breadth of cultural and political artifacts foundational to Portuguese imperial nation-building such as royal scribe Fernão Lopes’s Crónica de D. João
I [Chronicle of King John I] (1443), which in retroactively historicizing King John I’s legitimacy to the Portuguese throne establishes Portugueseness in opposition to a Castilian other as a sovereign threat to the former.

Lopes’s successor as royal scribe, Gomes Eanes de Zurara, was later mandated to interpret and record the expansion of the nation into the northern African city of Ceuta in 1415 in what would be titled Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta [Chronicle of the Siege and Capture of Ceuta] (1450). This particular text articulates (not for the first time in Europe) a different other that semantically functions in opposition to the “growing” nation: that of the Moor—thus enveloping the mission of the Christian Reconquest into the narrative of the nascent Portuguese expansion. A few years later, Zurara would pen the Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné [Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea], narrating Portugal’s imperial voyage south and signifying Black bodies into Portuguese imperial systems of representation and historicization. The racialization of disparate bodies and geographies would become a central component in widely disseminated literary artifacts, many of which are, to this very day, mandatory reading in school curricula. This is especially the case with what is known as Portugal’s imperial epic, as mentioned in chapter one, Luís Vaz de Camões Os Lusíadas [The Lusiads] (1578), mythologizing Vasco da Gama’s voyage from Portugal to India around Africa, and attempting to eternalize Portuguese territorial and economic expansion as a heroic feat over inferior, perilous, and inefficient lands, peoples, and seas. Other intellectual and cultural products abound along these lines such as those explored in the first chapter. More recently, in the decades following the formal end of Portuguese colonial settlement, an aesthetic trend in literary and film production has centered on colonial nostalgia, with bestselling books such as Manuel Arouca’s Deixei o Meu Coração em África [I Left My Heart in Africa] (2005), Jaime Magalhães’s Os Retornados [The Returnees] (2008), and Tiago Rebelo’s O Último Ano em Luanda [The Last Year in Luanda] (2008) lamenting the end of empire and accumulation from former colonist perspectives. Similar meanings of nostalgia for the intermeshed periods of empire and national grandeur imbue the consumption of imperial monuments found across the country and in national celebrations of the Discoveries.

Portuguese Football and African Migrant Bodies

In this regard, Portuguese race relations continue to be informed by the imperial circuitries and mediated histories of national identity that operate via a long material, textual, political, and corporal field of meaning in which Black bodies have served as objects of particular forms of national
production. Moreover, it is within this everyday discursive and historical fabric that Black bodies, and non-European bodies more broadly, are signified, surveilled, and consumed in post-imperial race relations—while liminally integrated into frayed narratives of contemporary multicultural nationhood. The disparate meanings surrounding Black bodies in football lay bare the various textualities and imageries that have been latched onto these bodies throughout the development and reproduction of Portuguese imperial narratives—which continue to render Black people in Portugal as ambivalent citizens of the nation-state. In this sense, the term “migrant”—often applied or implied even for second- or third-generation immigrants—speaks to the space occupied of flexible symbolic inclusion that envelopes such bodies alongside quotidian experiences of stripped citizenship lived through institutional violence, barred access to the neoliberal webs of social mobility, and myriad forms of cultural marginalization (from stadiums to literature).

Through experiences and histories of Portuguese footballers of African migrant backgrounds (varying in generations) and how these are articulated in the national public sphere, we can critically understand the contemporary points of contact between national imperial historicization, postcolonial African migration, and the current continuities of racial capitalism that these uphold. Within this matrix, the term “migrant” continues to be deeply entrenched in anti-Black formations and definitions of Portuguese ness and its concomitant claims to Europeanness. As such, “migrant” as noun or adjective, continues to indicate a polymorphous site of tension—a taxonomy of white supremacist knowledge, imperial state surveillance, and a burgeoning epistemology potentially disruptive of imperial understandings and ordering of power, bodies, and spaces. Focusing largely on Black footballers of the Portuguese men’s national team who won the 2016 European Championship, I shall interrogate the complicated relationship between their hyper-visibility, the consumption of their labor, the colonial discourses that frame this consumption, and the racial narratives that uphold the current stage of racial capitalism. The last term, “racial capitalism,” shall serve here as a theorization of power, “proceeding from the recognition that procedures of racialization and capitalism are ultimately never separable from each other” (Melamed 77). Furthermore, this entails a critical framework that contextualizes the topic of this essay within “the complex recursivity between material and epistemic forms of racialized violence which are executed in and by core capitalist states with seemingly infinite creativity” (Melamed 77).

Within the imperial continuities that mark metropolitan society, full access to citizenship is quotidianly denied as the Black body has historically
been a central corporal object over which the notion of Portuguese (and European) citizenship has been produced through empire. Through many roles and facets, Black lives have served as mechanisms of production for the imperial schema of Portuguese nationhood and citizenship within the development of racial capitalism. These include the economic and cultural instrumentalization of Black bodies as labor tools of accumulation, as labor-driven commodities in the Atlantic slave trade (which was a central focus of Portuguese imperial endeavor on a market level as well as colonial settlement). Related, and indeed intrinsic to these, the production of Portuguese Europeanness and national claims to whiteness have been imperially contingent upon the constructed inferiority and colonizability of African bodies, lands, and commodities—from Zurara and the establishment of administrative and slave-holding outposts up and down the western and eastern coasts of Africa to the Berlin Conferences, the effects of which augmented the Portuguese state’s call for developing colonial settlement and situating Portuguese colonial claims as a part of a Europe’s “white man’s burden.” Throughout the different epochs of Portuguese imperial nation-building, Black bodies have been sites of not only economic pleasure, but also of intertwined corporal fantasies and pleasures for imperialist subjects and audiences—sexual, sporting, culinary, among others—tied to and derived from the varied discourses of excess and deficit that have been placed on such bodies.

In her illuminating ethnography of African migrant life in Lisbon, Kesha Fikes theorizes the consumption of Black migrant labor in Portuguese society (guided by a migrant/citizen dichotomy and racial paradigm of power) as rendering their bodies as “migrants for citizens” (7). According to Fikes’s analysis, this racialized consumption of migrant bodies and labor (especially Cape Verdean female fishmongers, “peixeiras”) is grounded in recent processes of Portuguese Europeanization following the formal end of empire, specifically its entrance into the European Economic Community in 1986. The racialization of Cape Verdean female labor, despite operating in proximity to white Portuguese female laborers, “had assumed a ‘rightful,’ socially productive role as appendages to Portuguese civilians and thus as catalysts for appearances of European modernity” (7). This post-imperial Portuguese Europeanness thus implied revised paradigms of white European subjectivity—“the ideal of the Portuguese citizen became synonymous with a picture of middle-classness” (7) and with greater participation in neoliberal modes of consumption. More broadly, the post-imperial influx of low-wage racialized labor—one that signals a new stage of racial capital and colonial relations—came to stage Portuguese nationhood’s shift, as Fikes crucially underscores, “from an
emigrant to an immigrant nation” (8); from one whose economic marginality in the world system at the turn of the twentieth century citizens obliged its (white) citizens to enter racialized divisions of labor abroad in complex ways (Miguel Vale de Almeida 2004) to a national economy based on white middle-class life. Migrant bodies are thus corporal sites against which neoliberal bourgeois national life is imagined after empire, as well as material sites of economic exploitability to be extracted for an emerging national system of accumulation.

The persistence and repurposing of racial capitalism’s discourses of otherness, particularly of anti-Blackness that are certainly at play in the cultural terrain of football, fundamentally lay bare the limits and silencings of contemporary national narratives of multicultural inclusion. Despite attempts at enacting anti-racist policies and activist work in articulating a national space for racial justice, narratives of post-racialism, Portuguese racial hybridity, and imperial exceptionalism continue to also be harnessed to obscure the continuities of imperial racial paradigms of social ordering. There is, of course, a long history of Portuguese narratives of multiculturalism utilized for these very purposes in earlier historical periods, from Herculano to Freyre, as explored in chapter one.

Decades after the fall of empire and the Estado Novo, Lusotropicalist narratives and discourses surrounding Portuguese global connection and intercultural encounters continue to live a ubiquitous existence, often underpinning and defending imperial nostalgia, race relations, and political/cultural ties to former colonies through Lusofonia [Lusophony], the Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa [Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries], among other initiatives. In other words, Lusotropicalist discourse and imagery has helped inform dominant understandings and positionings of Portuguese nationhood in the current moment of global capital, its relationship to the European Union, and broader national identity. White defensiveness in public discourse surrounding contemporary Portuguese race relations thus possesses a further historical texture as claims to multiraciality and peaceful race relations have become integral parts to national imperial identity. This takes on certain and complex identitarian and affective bonds between the individual, the collective, and the state.

What is at stake for Black Portuguese bodies of African migrant backgrounds in this ideological atmosphere of nationality is the occupation of an ambivalent and contingent space, especially for professional footballers due to their high visibility and consumability. The presence of Black and mixed-race footballers in the professional circuits of Portuguese football dates back to the early twentieth century, with then colonies serving as
locales of extraction of not only natural resources, but also of particular bodies-commodities in the form of footballers. Portugal's largest clubs, such as the Lisbon-based Sport Lisboa e Benfica, Sporting Clube de Portugal, and Clube de Futebol Os Belenenses, all had vast scouting networks in Angola, Mozambique, and to lesser extents, in Cabo Verde. In fact, the formation of local soccer clubs in Portuguese colonies became an understudied component of the development of settler colonialism in the early to mid-twentieth century—one that operated beyond but often in concert with colonial state power, driven by local colonist sport and cultural organizations. Sporting clubs became instruments and signifiers of colonial assimilation, in the context of both players and club officials. As Nuno Domingos argues in his exploration of football as an organized sport in colonial Lourenço Marques (Maputo), the state and societal sanctioning of the inclusion of Black officials in the leadership of football served in the formation of an African petite bourgeoisie, one that would defend the interests of the colonial state through marginal forms of political and cultural participation. Meanwhile, Todd Cleveland points out that a large number of the players who were recruited by metropolitan clubs from the colonies were *assimilados* [assimilated], an official colonial category until 1961, dating back to the rhetoric of a Portuguese civilizing mission.

Football clubs in Portugal's African colonies became parts of a trans-continental network of scouting operations for the extraction of colonized athletic labor for metropolitan club success—sporting and commercial. As scouts of Portuguese clubs expanded their interest in colonized African spaces as locales of recruitment/extraction, clubs like Benfica and Sporting established their own feeder clubs in Angola and Mozambique, such as the latter's Sporting Clube de Lourenço Marques (today Clube de Desporto do Maxaquene) in 1920 and the former's Sport Luanda e Benfica in 1922. Throughout the ensuing decades, a number of African players, though composing a small portion of team rosters, became club stars and were eventually called up to the Portuguese national team. In November of 1937, Benfica star Guilherme Espírito Santo (best known as Espírito Santo) became the first Black footballer to play for the Portuguese national team. Born in Lisbon to parents from São Tomé e Príncipe, he and his family migrated to Angola during his childhood where he began his football career with Sport Luanda e Benfica. There, he garnered attention from the metropolitan parent club, eventually signing a professional contract at the age of 16 in 1936. He would go on to spend 14 seasons with the club, playing a vital role in winning four national championships and three national cups, scoring 199 goals in 285 games, and officially retiring in December of 1949. White players of colonist families were also recruited through
these networks, including Espírito Santo’s contemporary and Lisbon rival, Fernando Peyroteo, who was recruited by Sporting from its Luandan affiliate, Sporting Clube de Luanda in 1937.

The 1950s saw the influx from colony to metropolis of some of the most notable footballers in the history of the Portuguese league and national team, particularly from Mozambique. These included Sebastião Lucas da Fonseca (known in the football world as Matateu), his younger brother Vicente Lucas, Mário Coluna, and Hilário Conceição (all of whom were mixed-race); followed by the 1960s that witnessed the arrival of who many argue to be one of the best Portuguese and world footballers of all-time: Eusébio da Silva Ferreira, known simply as Eusébio. These players, with the exception of Matateu, were integral members of the Portuguese national team that achieved its highest ever finish in a World Cup, earning third place in 1966 in England. Eusébio and Coluna were at the heart of Benfica’s European Cup victories of 1961 and 1962, with the former becoming a globally recognized national icon during a tumultuous decade for the Portuguese Estado Novo and its colonial project in Africa.

The height of Eusébio’s on-field success and stardom, particularly the 1966 World Cup, coincided with the anti-colonial wars of independence and brutal Portuguese counter-insurgency action in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. The armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial state, which thrust its colonial policy further into the spotlight of international scrutiny, led to an intensification of Lusotropicalist rhetoric, with players like Eusébio and the image of a multiracial and multi-continental national team manipulated by Estado Novo propaganda as glimmering examples of Portuguese multiraciality and amicable colonial race relations. As Cleveland’s cogent study of the movement and integration of African footballers into metropolitan Portuguese football circles during the 1950s through the 1970s explores, many, especially the most celebrated, African migrant footballers became complicit in Estado Novo propaganda and everyday societal hierarchies, complexly due to the expectations of a fascist regime. However, in dissecting the political pragmatism of African migrant footballers in Portugal of this era, Cleveland fundamentally argues that

this amenability constituted neither a Gramscian, hegemonically induced capitulation to cultural power, nor a Fanonesque, reverential, if perverse and subconscious, emulation of the dominant community; rather, Lusophone African footballers pragmatically pursued opportunities to improve their lives and, by extension, those of their families, while still retaining indigenous identities that were, of course, never static in their composition. (10)
From as early as those moments, Black and mixed-race footballers, especially from Portuguese African colonies, have been sites of overlapping colonial discourses and imperial narratives. Their othered bodies became integrated as fluid signs of the imperial expansiveness and grandeur of Portuguese nationhood, domination of colonized bodies (that simultaneously stand in for territories), and also of legitimizing narratives of Portuguese multiraciality and pluricontinentiality. Many, most notably Eusébio, attained national icon status—informed by these mediating imperial discourses as well as on-field production for national sporting success. At the same time, as Domingos poignantly reminds us, “the attempts to instrumentalize sports for social and political management, presenting it as an example of social integration, were at odds with the discrimination that prevailed on the ground” (56).

In many ways, the louder the critiques of Portuguese colonial racism on the global stage, the louder the state’s (and not only) rhetoric of a multiracial and pluricontinental Portugal became. With the armed anti-colonial struggle against Portuguese colonialism in full swing on three different fronts (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique), the World Cup of 1966 offered the Portuguese state as well as other non-state entities invested financially and affectively in a narrative of multiracial Portugal the opportunity to choreograph and further underscore this narrative for both the national public sphere as well as for global audiences. As Luís Lourenço points out, “Na cerimónia inaugural da competição, o representante e porta-estandarte da bandeira de Portugal era um rapaz africano, algo destacado por alguns jornais” [“At the competition’s inaugural ceremony, Portugal’s representative and standard-bearer was an African boy, subsequently underscored by several newspapers”] (43).

Lourenço further elaborates that this type of celebration in Portuguese print media was not limited to just those newspapers that had close relationships or shared ideologies with the fascist state. He points out with respect to the sports daily A Bola [The Ball]: “Curiosamente, o jornal que faz uma leitura e abordagem mais nacionalista do que sucede no mundial não é um dos jornais que se associam frequentemente ao Estado Novo, mas sim o jornal A Bola” [“Curiously, the newspaper that offered a more nationalist reading of the events of the World Cup was not one of those frequently associated with the New State, but rather A Bola”]. Lourenço’s research identifies several examples of Portuguese print media’s embracing of Lusotropicalist narratives of pluricontinental and multiracial Portugueseness:

Começa-se também a verificar-se algum discurso de defesa da multirracialidade portuguesa. O Diário de Notíciás afirma que os
jogadores estão unidos, independentemente do seu clube ou cor de pele, enquanto A Bola apresenta a ideia do “tipo português” de futebol, que o jornalista Vítor Santos classifica como “uma estranha maneira euro-latina-africana”, afirmando também que os portugueses são “os europeus menos europeus do Velho Continente”. Ele defende que o espírito cultural português lhe permite recorrer ao negro e ao mestiço de África, o que faz com Portugal escape ao futebol excessivamente disciplinado do resto das equipas europeias.

[One can find rhetoric defending Portuguese multiraciality. Diário de Notícias affirms that the players are all united regardless of their club of skin color. Meanwhile, A Bola presents the idea of a “Portuguese football style,” which journalist Vítor Santos classifies as “a strange Euro-Latin-African manner,” also affirming that the Portuguese are “the least European Europeans of the old continent.” He argues that the Portuguese cultural spirit allows the Portuguese to recruit Black and mixed-race players from Africa, thus allowing Portugal to elude the excessively disciplined football of other European teams.] (42)

The example from A Bola, whose owner, Cândido de Oliveira, had many disagreements with the New State, illustrates the degree to which the Portuguese public sphere embraced many Freyrean theories centering Portugal and Portuguese racial history at the heart of a Lusotropical world. The piece regurgitates many of Freyre’s arguments, while circuiting the racial make-up and “playing style” of the national team to these colonial nationalist discourses, especially concerning the historical racial hybridity of Portugueseness that simultaneously obscures the aforementioned exploitative structures of colonial football recruitment. The statement thus legitimizes the material realities of labor recruitment in a most Freyrean way, by positing Portugueseness as historically occupying an interspace between Europe, Latin America, and Africa.

Exceptional Victory: Euro 2016 and Celebrated Multiraciality

Fifty years after the success of the Portuguese men’s national team in its first participation in the World Cup, the national team won its first trophy at a major tournament—the 2016 European Championship held in France. The tournament final between Portugal and host France was unprecedented—the first European Championship final in which the majority of players on the field (12 of 22) at the starting whistle were of sub-Saharan African descent or origin. The Portuguese national team fielded five: Pepe of Afro-Brazilian descent who migrated to Portugal as a footballing teenager,
William Carvalho who was born in Luanda and migrated to Portugal during his childhood, Renato Sanches who was born and raised in the Lisbon outskirts to a San Toméan father and Cape Verdean mother, João Mário of Angolan descent born in the northern city of Oporto, and Nani (Luís da Cunha) born in Amadora in the Lisbon metropolitan area in a Cape Verdean migrant family. Starting the final on the bench were four additional players of African descent: Bruno Alves (Portuguese-born son of Afro-Brazilian former player Washington Alves and a Portuguese mother), Danilo Pereira (born in Bissau and moved to Lisbon at the age of five), Eliseu dos Santos (born in the Azorean city of Angra do Heroismo to a Cape Verdean mother and a Portuguese father), and Ederzito Lopes, best known as Éder (born in Bissau in 1987 and moved to Lisbon with his family at the age of three). The latter stepped onto the field in the second half and scored the dramatic game-winning goal in extra time of the final to give Portugal its first ever national team victory at the senior level.

In addition to ethnic minorities from the African diaspora, the team also featured one player of publicly self-acknowledged Roma descent, Ricardo Quaresma, whose family’s presence in Portugal goes back several generations. The squad’s make-up included players of several other cultural and migrant experiences, in addition to its nine players of African descent, that correlate with different components of contemporary claims to Portuguese global influence, presence, and post-imperial cartographies. These include players born abroad from working-class Portuguese migrant families—as in the case of Anthony Lopes and Raphaël Guerreiro. Both were born, raised, and spent their entire lives in France (the latter of a Portuguese father and French mother). Adrien Silva was also born in France to a Portuguese father and French mother and raised there until the age of ten when his family moved to northern Portugal. Cédric Soares was born in Germany before following his parents back to Portugal. Following the end of empire, the post-Salazar state enacted numerous policies designed to establish new and robust political, cultural, and linguistic connections with the sizable communities of Portuguese emigrants residing abroad (especially in the United States, Brazil, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). The rhetoric of a Portuguese “global nation” centered on reappropriating at symbolic and political levels the vast émigré population; a sort of reincarnation of the late colonial “Portugal não é um país pequeno” [“Portugal is not a small country”] pink map super-imposing its African colonies over Western and central Europe, which was also disseminated via state and private media networks. In addition to representation from Portugal’s former colonial mappings, reborn today in articulations of Lusofonia (Brazil, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe), and emigrant communities
abroad, the squad was also celebrated for including players from diverse and often economically and culturally marginalized regions of the nation-state: Cristiano Ronaldo born in Madeira, Eliseu born in the Azores, Adrien Silva and Vieirinha from the Minho region, Eduardo from Trás-os-Montes, and José Fonte and Rafa Silva from the Porto region.

The victory set off not only collective celebrations and patriotic fervor in Portuguese media outlets, but also particular historicizations of the event in post-imperial contexts, positing the successful team as a reflection of different narratives of racial inclusion, national diversity, imperial grandeur, Portuguese ethnic hybridity, and colonial-esque desire for syncretism (through patriarchal sexual economies and heteronormative masculine agency). Numerous opinion pieces in daily newspapers and sports periodicals illustrate the affective investment of writers and readers in imperial narratives of the Portuguese nation. This is not particularly new, as sports media has long intertwined national team aspirations to success with imagery of imperial conquest and endeavor. For instance, in the build-up to different World Cups for which the national team qualified, sports periodicals have attributed nicknames to that year’s team, or developed reader polls to determine the moniker. Often involving the location of the tournament as geographic site to dominate, many nicknames have been celebratory references to Portugal’s imperial past. Ahead of World Cup 2010, hosted in South Africa (the first World Cup held in Africa), Portuguese national team manager, Carlos Queiroz, nicknamed the team “Os Navegadores” [“The Navigators”] in light of Portuguese voyages of the “discoveries” centuries earlier—positing Africa, once again, as a site of inscribing Portuguese national endeavor:

“Pelo tributo que temos de fazer aos nossos antepassados e à maior epopeia da história dos portugueses. Dividiram o mundo com a Espanha e chegaram ao Japão. Temos ali um simbolismo, mas acho que o termo navegadores adaptava-se mais a esta circunstância de jogarmos na África do Sul, num sitio onde dobramas aquele cabo”

[“The Navigators—as the tribute we must offer to our ancestors and the greatest epic of Portugal’s history. They divided the world with Spain and reached Japan. It is a form of symbolism, but I think the term ‘navigators’ can be adapted to the circumstance of playing in South Africa, a place where we rounded that cape”] (Gouveia, n.p.)

Similarly, ahead of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, sports daily Record conducted an online survey to determine the national team’s moniker, and the winning nickname was tellingly “Os Conquistadores.”
Following the sporting victory of Euro 2016, the dominant imperial narrative was not so much about conquest, especially since the tournament was held in Europe rather than a part of the “conquerable” or formerly colonized Global South. Rather, the victory was most commonly contextualized as a triumph of Portuguese multiraciality (celebrated as both legacy of amicable empire and reflection of contemporary metropolitan society) or as an embodied promise of inclusive or ameliorated national race relations. This sort of celebration and collective meaning-making traversed mainstream media—centrist (right and left center) political outlets and ideologies, public voices, and sports media. One particular op-ed by journalist and opinion writer Sérgio Pires, published in the online sports news outlet Maisfutebol [More Football] of the IOL online portal (part of the Portuguese conglomerate Media Capital) during the national team’s run to the final, encapsulates the discourses of a celebrated Portuguese multiculturalism, its limitations, and the normalized racializing processes and histories they reproduce. It also foregrounds the insufficient ways in which racism is critiqued in the public sphere, often focusing on individual racist attitudes rather than the long existence, collective complicities, and cultural and economic mechanisms that sustain racial capitalism. The piece, titled “United Colors of Portugal,” was part of Pires’s bi-weekly opinion column dedicated to social commentary on football, “Geraldinos e Arquibaldos” [“Gerals and Archibalds”], in reference to the class distinction in football stadiums observed by Brazilian writer, journalist, and playwright Nelson Rodrigues, between fans in general seating or terraces and those in the higher-priced “arquibancada” with the best views of the field (along the sidelines, rather than behind the goals).

The piece begins by referencing Ricardo Quaresma’s on-field performance after his game-winning goal in the last minutes of extra-time of the round of 16 elimination match against Croatia, and arguing that the on-field success of players of minoritized and migrant backgrounds give “um pontapé (ou cabeçada) no âmago da intolerância” [“a kick or header to the heart of intolerance”]. He goes on to imagine, what for him, is a contradiction or conundrum for the “preconceituoso militante” [“militant bigot”] who, during an imagined rant against Romani citizens or Brazilian migrants as the national team plays, interrupts himself to cheer for Quaresma or Pepe. This belies a presupposition that football resides on a separate or adjacent social sphere from that of racialized divisions of labor, production, and consumption. Rather, what appears as a contradiction is resolved on the plane of labor and consumption, with footballers as objects of consumptive pleasure circuited, in this case, to pleasures of consuming and accompanying sporting success and nationalist pride.
The consumption is exploitative, and therefore, tolerable as the labor of untol erated bodies is at the service (with exceptional labor) of the nation that still makes imperial claims to white European ness, in addition to the economic goals of the Portuguese Football Federation. Furthermore, within the rhetoric and everyday discursive, economic, and institutional existence of white supremacy and racial capitalism, athletes (especially successful ones) are often, even if temporarily, consumed as exceptions to dominant stereotypes without ever fully possessing the categories of white valid personhood. Not only is the work of footballers exceptional, so is its consumption with their bodies as objects of pleasure rather than subjects of societal privilege. The consumption of footballers of minority backgrounds as objects of national pleasure exists simultaneously within the same system of representation and meaning that pathologizes minoritized bodies and communities politically, culturally, and economically. Moreover, bodies are made tolerable in their service to nationalist causes, while still devalued and made objects of scrutiny and violence through the everyday racial ideologies that undergird and narrate racial power.

Much of the op-ed also discusses racism as individual-based and tacitly proposes that the national team’s success can possibly help individual racists change their minds. This posits racism as merely an ideology that operates mainly at the individual level, ignorant of how racism, specifically anti-Black and anti-Romani racism, has been integral to the very formation of Portuguese nationhood and its imperialist development. As a result, this individual-based approach to racism via a vehicle as present as football in Portugal translates over to broader society, thus reproducing the illegibility of state structures of racism and dominant historiographies of Portuguese cultural history. Pedro Sousa de Almeida also underscores the limitations of dominant conceptions of racism in football as individual-based:

The excessive attention given to “anti-social” behaviors of specific groups, beyond reifying the idea of the “racist fan” in opposition to
“tolerant society,” exonerates other actors involved in football. We must thus highlight the role of the media in reproducing colonial racial ideologies and ideas of the nation. However, this does not involve merely tackling the racist discourses within football as simple reflections of dominant norms and values, but also requires interrogating the relationships between national identity, imperialism, and colonialism](72)

Similarly, mainstream understandings of diversity and fantasies of inclusion within the limiting paradigms of racial capitalism articulate themselves on an individual and metonymic level, in which one particular experience or subject-position can be reflective of the nation. Pires, in reference to the team’s two defenders of Brazilian descent and to midfielder and youngest player Renato Sanches (born and raised in the Musgueira neighborhood on the outskirts of Lisbon, constructed to precariously house displaced migrants and residents from other parts of Lisbon), proclaims: “Portugal é um miúdo da Musgueira a pegar no meio-campo como quem joga no bairro e dois centrais de sangue brasileiros nascidos um de cada lado do Atlântico” [“Portugal is a boy from Musgueira controlling the midfield as if he were playing on the streets and two central defenders of Brazilian blood born on each side of the Atlantic”]. In making a claim against racism, Pires also deploys racial signifiers in describing playing styles—situating Sanches’s performance on the field in the racialized spaces of Portuguese urban geography, rather than celebrating his impressive display by contextualizing it in football terms of tactical awareness and skill.

Furthermore, within this type of argument, football constitutes a cultural terrain in which national-identifying consumers are transcendentally interpellated into the subject-positions of players (themselves operating as metonymy of the nation), as if deep socio-historical divisions could be traversed, if not altogether resolved, through footballing consumption of national pride. Football and the broader sporting realm have long operated at the service of fomenting nationalist consciousness—an ideological terrain that can sublimate or indeed serve the collective misrecognition of material power that constitutes racial capitalism. Material difference and inequality is trivially addressed as it is subsumed into what or whom Portugal is—as in, “Portugal is a young boy from Musgueira.” This fundamentally forecloses recognition or inquiry into how the imperial idea and social ordering of Portugal formed the Musgueira neighborhood itself (and other marginalized neighborhoods) and played a role in the transit of bodies to it. The Musgueira neighborhoods were comprised of temporary residences originally built in the 1960s to house coercively displaced working-class
neighborhoods from the Alcântara valley to facilitate the construction of the then Salazar Bridge (renamed the 25th of April Bridge in 1974) as a symbol and vehicle of modern transportation for a modernizing economy. The neighborhoods (Musgueira Norte and Musgueira Sul) soon expanded in the form of shanty towns with the growing number of Portuguese rural migrants and African migrants fleeing the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the crumbled economies and infrastructures left after decolonization. In other words, Pires blindly situates football and the Euro 2016 national team as an idealized reflection of society, without greater inquiry into their material relationship in terms of racialized divisions of labor, spatial organizations of racialized power, and the extractive capitalism of football as an industry of production and consumption.

This common and misrecognizing historicization of Portuguese race relations underpins the claims to national exceptionalism in the last century and are reproduced in Pires’s opinion article in the context of the 2016 national team and contemporary Europe. He notably posits this Portuguese national team—“a reflection of the nation”—as an example of diversity and social inclusion at a time that right-wing nationalism and white supremacist rhetoric began to re-enter mainstream politics in Europe:

Na altura em que a xenofobia irrompe pelo discurso de vários líderes políticos da Europa é significativo que neste Euro Portugal uma quase perfeita seleção da sua diversidade, no mesmo solo gaulês que em 1998 viu a primeira seleção multicultural da história levar França ao topo do mundo do futebol.

[At a time in which xenophobia spreads through the discourse of political leaders in Europe, it is significant that in this Euro, Portugal, an almost perfect selection of its diversity, on the same Gaulish soil that in 1998 saw the first multicultural national team in history take France to the top of the footballing world.] (Pires n.p.)

Through the national team, Pires sees Portugal as a new leader in European multicultural politics and supports his position by historically connecting the multiculturalism of the team to dominant and imperially popularized narratives of Portuguese colonial history. He thus concludes his piece by tying the supposed multiculturalism of the national team as a contemporary contributor to national exceptionalism, and as a manifestation of a racially and culturally hybrid Portuguese ethos in which racial and national purity do not apply due to both the history of Iberia and the history of Portuguese interracial contact via empire:
Quando leio ou ouço teorias sobre “Portugal para os portugueses,” sorrio. De puro-sangue lusitano só conheço os cavalos. Para lá do seu retângulo, esta nação é verdadeiramente grande sobretudo pela miscigenação que inventou há séculos e pela diaspora que cultiva há décadas. Esse legado é a bandeira, sem pagodes, que esta seleção ajuda a empunhar. Essas são as mais autênticas cores de Portugal.

[When I read or hear theories about “Portugal for the Portuguese,” I smile. Of pure Lusitanian blood, I only know horses. Beyond its rectangle, this nation is truly great above all because of the miscegenation it invented centuries ago, and because of the diaspora it has cultivated over decades. That legacy is the flag, without doubt, that this national team helps lift. Those are the most authentic colors of Portugal.]

Within this line of argumentation, colonialism and Portuguese diaspora (and diasporas into Portugal) are all subsumed into the grandeur and exceptionalism of nation, itself articulated through the patriarchal imperial foundations of power and its narratives of misrecognition. In other words, Pires situates the multiculturalism of the national team and the nation within the and disseminated narrative of Portuguese miscegenation—as national origin and mode of contact with the colonized world.

Somewhat less celebratory headlines questioned what the ethnic and racial diversity of the team said about Portuguese race relations and tolerance of “difference”—denoting the presupposition of a national sameness. This is the case, for instance, with the opinion piece, “O futebol português desdramatiza o preconceito” [“Portuguese football downplays prejudice”] by journalist Christiana Martins in the Portuguese daily Expresso. The title and the article place football as a socially exceptional terrain of apparent inclusivity when juxtaposed to larger Portuguese society and race relations:

Os jogadores da seleção de futebol são uma síntese da nação. Em Portugal, alguns dos principais futebolistas vêm de classes sociais desfavorecidas e representam minorias da sociedade nacional, alguns negros outros ciganos. Éder, Danilo, Renato Sanches, Eliseu, Quaresma são apenas alguns exemplos de uma democracia futebolística nem sempre comprovada fora de campo. Mas será que tal acontece porque o desporto é mais democrático ou serão realmente os portugueses uma população mais aberta à integração da diferença?

[The players of the national team are a synthesis of the nation. In Portugal, some of the main footballers come from disenfranchised social classes and represent minorities in national society, some Black,
others Romani. Eder, Danilo, Renato Sanches, Eliseu, Quaresma are merely a few examples of a footballing democracy that is not always reflected off the field. But can that be because sport is more democratic or is it really that the Portuguese are a people more open to the integration of difference?] (Martins n.p.)

The article thus repeats a metonymic equivalence between national team and body politic that glosses over the material and political conditions of exploitation, racialization, marginalization, and violability. Though cognizant, to some extent, of systems of inequality, the national team and the football world represent a democratizing and redeeming sphere of society and cultural life, which would, in turn, gesture towards a post-racial utopia. Along these lines, Pedro Sousa de Almeida warns: “o contexto social e cultural do futebol abre espaço a um discurso “pós-racial,” igualitário e no qual se sugere que as desigualdades raciais são parte do passado” [“the social and cultural context of football creates space for a post-racial discourse of equality in which racial inequalities become part of the past”] (75).

The article also makes an implied and common distinction between “the Portuguese” and “difference” (as in the players Martins names above), thus repeatedly codifying Portugueseness as whiteness and antithetical to Blackness, Roma, Brazilians and so forth—corporalities and malleable citizens marked by the term “migrant” whether that frayed status applies to one or two generations of Black families in Portugal or several centuries of Romani presence. As I have argued above, this remits back to the anti-Black, anti-Arab, and anti-Romani foundations of imperial Portuguese constructions of and claims to Europeanness.

**Football’s Racialized Labor Structures in Contemporary Portugal**

By presupposing football as a sort of parallel socio-cultural sphere, this also obfuscates deeper questions of how racism operates and its relationship to football. Football resembles some type of inclusion precisely because it is built on the structures of exclusion, exploitation, and inaccess in racial capitalism. Professional football is another industry imbricated in and built upon racial capitalism, as it was during the period of colonial settlement (which was merely one era of racial capitalism and empire). African migrant marginalization in the metropolis, from which athletic labor is extracted and cultivated beginning at young ages through local youth teams (and through complex circuiting of desire between social mobility, sporting glory, and “love of labor”) represents the continuity of colonial apparatuses and corporate capitalist endeavor.
As Amilcar Cabral argued, to repeat a quote from the introduction, in a forewarning ahead of imminent decolonization, colonialism leaves behind the conditions for neo-colonial forms of exploitation on national and transnational levels. Colonial systems of accumulation, extraction, and marginalization in Lusophone Africa based on the vulnerabilization of colonized majorities created and left a global labor surplus to be exploited through emerging transnational networks of production, consumption, and migration central to neoliberal late capital. These conditions were compounded, moreover, by the crumbling of infrastructure and public health (hitherto based on the skilled labor of white colonists and employment segregation barring Black residents from such labor and access to necessary education). Coupled with growing civil conflicts, spawned either against colonial rule or as part of postcolonial resistance against the military encroachment of global capitalist interests, the deep residues of colonial power left profound material effects leading to the displacement of millions of people, and many to the former metropolis. In this regard, the migrant experiences of players of African descent on the national team (and beyond) in Portugal, and their families, is informed by the history and unfolding of racial capitalism and empire, from colonial settlement to late capital.

It is the continuity of colonial racial divisions of labor that have made football one of the few avenues of social mobility or indeed stability. This is the case not only for footballers who have become visible national stars or even first division league players. Professional football in Portugal (as in other nations and parts of the world where the football industry has financially benefited from the legacies and continuities of empire), from the first division through its lower four tiers and regional leagues, has long represented an industry of employment and social networks for disenfranchised members of Portuguese society. This is an industry, in other words, that is profoundly dependent upon national and global socioeconomically vulnerabilizing structures. This includes various forms of often precarious labor such as grounds-keeping, facility maintenance, cleaning and laundry, and even athletic labor itself as lower league clubs employ players on short-term contracts.

Clubs, big and small from the first division to the semi-professional fourth and fifth tiers, are all deeply implicated and involved in such structures through their youth academies and teams, serving as community networks that provide material goods and sustenance for socioeconomically disenfranchised youth and their families. On the other hand, and at the same time, within the economics of modern football, small local clubs have developed their own financial models based on positioning themselves in the networks of commodity and labor movement/transaction, participating
in the webs of recruitment by national and foreign clubs. Nani’s trajectory through the ranks of football clubs in Portugal and beyond is illustrative of this. The football star, of Cape Verdean descent, was born in Amadora, a city northwest of Lisbon developed through the influx of migrants from rural Portugal and the former African colonies in the second half of the twentieth century, many of whom worked in the construction of public housing complexes that supplanted most, though not all, informal constructions. Through family and neighborhood networks, he began training with Real Sport Clube located in the neighboring city of Queluz at the age of 14. The club provided him and his family with a small stipend, assistance with food, and assisted in municipal bureaucratic matters.

In addition to providing assistance to a member of the local community, the provision of goods to Nani were also an investment in his labor and body as commodity and site of profit. After three years with the club, he was sold to first division club and national giant, Sporting Clube de Portugal, for an undisclosed fee—the local club serving as a feeder in the webs of recruitment in the national footballing landscape, much like colonial clubs did in the first half of the twentieth century. Following four years with Sporting (two as a youth player and two as a member of the senior team), he was sold to English club Manchester United, one of the wealthiest in the world, for 25.5 million euros, with Real Sport Clube receiving 5 percent of the fee under a now common clause that entitles a player’s first professional club and/or youth academy a portion of resale profits. These serve as royalties for the professional formation, or rather, formation of the player as labor commodity. It is through these mechanisms of labor formation and extraction in the metropolis (in football and beyond, namely in even more precarious labor sectors), in other words, that the material continuities of Empire are lived.

**Football, Language, and the Codification of Anti-Blackness**

Giving meaning to and simultaneously misrecognizing such structures and racialized economies of exploitation and extraction is a complex and shifting discursive field of everyday racism in the form of aforementioned narratives of Empire as well as in the quotidian articulation and representation of racial difference—always an overt deviation from an implied norm of white European Portugueseness. It is thus worth interrogating the breadth of signifiers and fantasies of deviance, excess, and deficiency that are utilized to racially signify Black bodies in the football realm within a national public sphere. At the beginning of this chapter I discussed the ubiquity of anti-Black racist chants in stadiums in Portugal, and Europe broadly, in
addition to some of the racially biased media coverage and discourses that legitimize and reproduce widely circulating stereotypes placed on Black citizens, footballers or otherwise.

The rapid and meteoric rise in the career of Renato Sanches from late October of 2015, when he was a recently promoted Benfica youth player to the senior team, to July 2016 when he was named Best Young Player of Euro 2016 (the youngest player to win the tournament), was signified during that period in media outlets, stadiums, and blogs in ways that highlight the intricacies of everyday racial discourse in sport and beyond, from the “overt” to the seemingly innocuous yet tired fantasies. Benfica scouts had found him as a ten-year-old playing for the youth team of his local club, Águias da Musgueira, eventually paying the latter 750 euros (toward local schools) and 25 footballs (for the club) in order to have Sanches transfer to their state-of-the-art youth academy in the affluent Seixal municipality (Fitzpatrick n.p.). In the months after his debut with the Benfica senior team at the age of 18, in which he became a regular starter with great success, officials from rival clubs as well as football pundits in Portugal and abroad publicly questioned Sanches’s age, arguing that he was much older than 18 and fomenting conspiracies of forged birth certificates.

Carlos Severino, an official and presidential candidate for Benfica rival Sporting, was the first public voice to question Sanches’s age, followed by then club president, Bruno de Carvalho, who proffered a conspiracy theory that Sanches had forged his birth certificate. For months and into July of 2016 as the Portuguese national team advanced through the knockout stages of Euro 2016, this was a topic of discussion in press conferences, on football pundit programs, and newspapers in Portugal and abroad, with public figures in football from other countries also weighing in. Most notably, Guy Roux, a former manager in France and television commentator during Euro 2016, asserted following Sanches’s performance at the tournament: “He says that he is 18 years old but I believe that we have to look at his past [...] I can assure you that he is 23 or 24” (Sanchidrián n.p.). The rumors and conspiracies were finally dispelled when the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias attained information directly from the database of the Hospital Amadora-Sintra, registering Sanches’s birth on August 18, 1997.

These sorts of allegations have been common in football and the sporting world, targeting athletes of African descent, while such lines of public questioning are never applied to white European players. Racialized suspicions of age fraud have been levied against African players and football federations since early on in the post-independence period when African national teams were incorporated into FIFA in the 1960s, evoking and often wrapped in imperial global northern discourses of inefficient postcolonial
statehood and incapable African democracy and bureaucracy. An early high-profile case centered on the Nigerian men’s national team following the 1988 Olympic Games when FIFA found that the birth dates of three national team players diverged from those registered by the same players in previous tournaments. The Nigerian national team was subsequently banned from all international matches for two years. Since then, innumerable African players in Europe, and even those born in Europe to African migrant families, have been targets of similar suspicions, with the racist/criminological fantasy of non-white forgery fueling numerous journalistic investigations and even their own fabricated and erroneous findings. This was the case in 2005 with an emerging star of world football, Nigerian forward Obafemi Martins of FC Internazionale Milano, when an Italian journalist published erroneously reported data from the Nigerian federation’s official page without further fact-checking.

Similar circumstances further fueled the suspicions surrounding Renato Sanches when the Portuguese newspaper Jornal de Notícias reported on March 19, 2016 that his birth in 1997 hadn’t been registered with the municipality until 2002, again without further investigation into the discrepancy that was immediately utilized by the aforementioned Carvalho and Severino in their public offensives. Months later, in July, more rigorous journalism from the unrelated Diário de Notícias clarified the circumstances of the discrepancy and attained the official birth record from the hospital. Such suspicions of age and identity fraud that have accompanied players and citizens of African descent in Portugal are part of a broader white supremacist and imperial epistemology of personhood that posits non-white bodies as fraudulent entities—racially inscribing migrant desires as criminal and migrant identities as sites of suspicion to be “known” and thus surveilled. An investigative piece for the United States-based sports website, Bleacher Report, by journalist Richard Fitzpatrick, charting the success and challenges faced by Sanches, including the controversy surrounding his age, cites the common racist expression in Portugal: “African children go to the city registry office [to register their births] on their bikes” (Fitzpatrick n.p.).

It is within this same matrix and everyday life of racial meaning and ordering of power that we must critically situate the racist chants Sanches and many other Black players have often faced in football stadiums. Sanches himself was the target of stadium racism in an April 2016 away match for Benfica against Rio Ave in the northern city of Vila do Conde. As he left the pitch toward the tunnel to the lockers at the end of the game, fan video footage captured supporters directing monkey chants toward him (“Renato Sanches Reacts”). In the more global realm of football analysis, journalism, and commentary, racial understandings and meanings have colloquially
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and more professionally (in media circles) come to frame how players, their bodies, and on-field performances are articulated, with particular attributes typically and historically attributed to Black players such as speed, stamina, and power. These attributions and fantasies of sporting performance are in many ways derived from colonial stereotypes of corporal excesses undergirding racial divisions of labor, and are often framed as biological traits considered central to the on-field success of Black players, downplaying any learned skills such as technical ability with the ball at their feet, tactical awareness, or collective synergy with teammates.

Imperial racial categorizations and geographical divisions based on Western epistemologies have informed how national football teams outside of Europe are essentialized, with particular playing styles, player behaviors, and/or team characteristics based on racial difference applied to entire regions of the world. A common practice for many European national teams, including Portugal, in preparation for a World Cup is to schedule preparatory friendly matches against national teams from the same continents/regions (especially North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Middle East, and East Asia) as those opponents they will face in the World Cup group stage. For instance, prior to the 2002 World Cup held in Japan and South Korea, with Portugal being grouped with the latter co-host, Portugal played a friendly against China. Ahead of the 2006 World Cup, the national team played friendlies against Cabo Verde and Saudi Arabia in preparation for their group matches against Angola and Iran. The trend continued prior to the 2010 World Cup with friendlies against Mozambique and China ahead of group-stage games against Ivory Coast and North Korea. Before the 2014 World Cup where Portugal was drawn in a group that included Ghana, the national team played a friendly against Cameroon. In the 2018 edition, prior to facing Morocco in the group stage, Portugal played a friendly against Egypt. The implied, and often explicit, reasoning suggests similar player profiles and playing style across national teams in such racialized regions. A nuanced analysis in tactics and patterns of play would reveal that the 2002 Chinese and South Korean teams had starkly different tactical set-ups and approaches to defending. In fact, one can argue that Portugal’s 2–0 victory over China (which defended deep in their own half) did nothing to prepare the team for the South Korean team’s high pressing approach to defending, resulting in Portugal’s elimination from the competition after their loss to South Korea in the final group game.

Racial divisions of footballing bodies also underpin how non-white and/or non-European players are understood and compared to one another, especially those playing in Europe. Shortly after Renato Sanches broke into the Benfica first team and began catching the eye of the national
and international public, as well as the scouting eyes of bigger European clubs, he was almost instantly compared to two other European players of African descent, Edgar Davids and Clarence Seedorf of the Netherlands (of Afro-Surinamese descent), who also wore their hair in locks for much of their careers. In fact, the corporal fragment of his hair in locks (part of the highly fragmented Black body within the matrices of racial capital and its laboral/sexual exploitation) has often served as a deeply racialized and metonymic stand-in for Sanches himself in the public sphere—with comments in Portuguese sports media forums referring to him pejoratively as “Trancinhas” [“Little Braids”].

Minor resemblences in hair, in addition to the tired racial posture of white supremacy that quickly opposes/compares one person of color to another of the same racial “group,” led to the projection of Davids’s and Seedorf’s playing styles onto that of Renato Sanches. Media headlines throughout Europe quickly reflected this. In February of 2016, three months after his debut for the Benfica senior team, Italian website CalcioMercato.com ran the headline: “Milan eye the ‘new Seedorf,’” the latter having spent a significant portion of his career with the referred-to AC Milan. During Euro 2016, Italian sports daily Gazzetta dello Sport utilized the headline: “Renato Sanches, un po’ Davids e un po’ Seedorf, scorta Nani e Ronaldo” [“Renato Sanches, a little bit Davids and a little bit Seedorf, helps Nani and Ronaldo”]. In footballing terms, arguments can be made that Sanches shares few similarities with either Seedorf or Davids. The latter, though considered a box-to-box midfielder or the “number 8” position, as is Sanches, was arguably more tenacious defensively, specifically a better tackler and ball-winner. Meanwhile, Seedorf played mainly as a creative attacking midfielder (though he played deeper at different points in his career), and was a more gifted dribbler and shooter than Sanches. He was seldom compared to white midfielders, despite sharing more similarities with French midfielder Didier Deschamps or Portuguese midfielder Tiago in his great ability to shield the ball, cover a lot of ground with tactical astuteness, and pass effectively in tight spaces, thus being a crucial player in quick transitions from defense to attack.

These forms of entrenched everyday racism operate in a discursive and public terrain of racial capitalism misrecognized in the complex forms of national racial exceptionalism and its claims for Portuguese racial formation and contemporary race relations. The racial signification of bodies through sporting ideals and comparisons, or through the application of racialized terminologies to particular on-field bodies has often been tied to (overtly or implicitly) and excused by aforementioned continued historical discourses of Portuguese racial hybridity and exceptional multiculturalism. This tends to be the case even in public critiques of racism against minority players,
again, some of the most visible cases in the public sphere. The reification of racial difference thus occurs, and is permitted to occur, in normalized ways—whether it is the reference to Renato Sanches as “trancinhas” (though encountered mainly in user forums online in the registered public sphere) or the far more ubiquitously used nickname given to Ricardo Quaresma—“o cigano” [“the gypsy”] or “ciganito” [“little cigano”]. His audacity on the field in the forms of tricks and unorthodox kicks of the ball, notably his trivela shots and crosses (with the outside of his foot rather than the instep), are often circuited to the imperially inscribed deviance of Romani bodies and modes of knowledge. The resistance (real or perceived) on the part of the Romani community in Portugal and Europe more broadly to white European capitalist relations of production and consumption has historically been met with reactionary recalcitrance of racializing discourses—specifically of criminality and informal commodity markets.

**Between Affect and Hate: Ricardo Quaresma and Anti-Roma Discourse**

Quaresma himself is one of the few Portuguese footballers and public figures to openly express knowledge of their Romani ancestry or identify as Romani in the public sphere. His great uncle, Artur Quaresma, and uncle, Alfredo Quaresma, were noted footballers during the twentieth century, spending much of their respective careers with Belenenses in addition to successful spells on the Portuguese national team. In numerous interviews throughout his career, Ricardo Quaresma has reflected on the numerous instances of anti-Roma discrimination he has faced and the structural racism of Portuguese society, raised in the impoverished Casal Ventoso neighborhood on the outskirts of Lisbon, often referred to as an epicenter of Portugal’s narcotics epidemic in the 1990s. He recalls being a suspect of different forms of deviance tied to his ethnicity, his place of residence, and racial/socioeconomic conditions, and has been a vocal critic against racism in football and beyond, noting, “When I hear people say there is no racism nowadays it makes me laugh. When something happens in Portugal it’s always fault of Gypsies, Blacks, immigrants. It’s tough to live with this” (Heneage). Though outspoken, he has sometimes embraced the racially inflected nicknames he has been given, including “o cigano” and “Zé Lelo,” given to him by national team captain, childhood friend (from their time as youth players at Sporting), and international superstar Cristiano Ronaldo.

The name, particularly “Lelo,” is a reference to a long-used and stereotyped caricature of deviant Romani masculinity, most notably in nearly every episode of the aforementioned Portuguese sketch comedy program, Os Malucos.
do Riso. Played by actor Camacho Costa, Lelo da Purificação was a recurring character across several episodes per season, and reproductive of racialized hegemonic fantasies of Romani deviance and life. Each sketch featuring the caricature took place in a courtroom where he was the defendant on varying charges of criminality attributed to Romani subjects in the imperial European imaginary—theft, forgery, breaking and entering, and illicit sales of stolen goods. The Lelo caricature of Os Malucos do Riso provided viewers with a visual rendering of these racialized discourses over which national European personhood was to be recognized and identified with. This visual representation rendered a corporal schema—dark features (though typically light skin and phenotypically white-passing), jet-black gelled hair, black clothing with gaudy gold jewelry as implied ornate supplements of excess and deviance. In this sense, criminality is very much tied to dominant fantasies of Romani excess and to the appearance of deviance from bourgeois capitalist norms, itself portrayed and indexed through the character’s raspy voice, overly gestural language, and disorderly speech (“mispronounced vowels and consonants”).

The visual presentation of the Lelo caricature, popularized though not invented by the writers of Os Malucos do Riso, would be augmented over the last decades by subsequent Portuguese sketch comedy programs. For instance, the program Estado de Graça [State of Grace], which ran for three seasons on the state network Rádio e Televisão Portuguesa (RTP) from April 2011 to December 2012, aired a sketch parodying the international game show O Elo Mais Fraco [The Weakest Link] titled “O Lelo Mais Fraco” [“The Weakest Lelo”]. The sketch pits two “Lelo” caricatures in contest against each other’s knowledge of Romani stereotypes, after each contestant introduces themselves through a range of anti-Romani tropes associated with the corruption of imperial and capitalistic ideals—flea market vendors, melancholic singers, black market experts, and bargainers prone to physical violence and traveling in large families. Estado de Graça’s replacement on the RTP program line-up, Anti-Crise [Anti-Crisis], continued the tradition of anti-Romani representation with sketches such as “Livraría Lello”—a fictionalized news report of a bookstore run by a Romani man named Lello, serving as a corrupted and disorderly version of the famed bookstore of the same name in Oporto. Dressed in black pants and a shabby black blazer over a black dress shirt with a gold chain over it, plus a black fedora over unkempt hair and a long beard, the sketch’s punchlines center on how this “Lello” operates his bookstore in an empty caravan and with only a handful of books. The same program had a recurring skit of a Romani fado group called “Lello Kitty,” a parody of “Hello Kitty” featuring mainly male musicians who are unable to play a guitar nor sing on note, singing with
stereotypically raspy voices and on stereotypical topics of robbery, stolen commodity sales, and large families.

This terrain of cultural production and consumption renders an epistemology of imperial European Portugueseness taking Romani bodies as objects over which a Portuguese ontology may be reproduced. Despite the five centuries of Romani presence in the Iberian Peninsula, according to activist Vítor Marques of the União Romani [Romani Union], the targeting of Romani bodies in cultural production and state surveillance bespeaks imperialist fears of anti-assimilation (specifically pejorative notions of “vida cigana”—“gypsy life”) and the positioning of ciganos in the dominant Portuguese imaginary and public sphere as a vestige of a pre-Europeanized Portugal—a sign of a Portuguese non-Christian and non-European past to be discursively effaced in the repeated claims to Europeanness. As researchers Olga Magano and Maria Manuela Mendes point out, the legislative, judicial, and cultural apparatuses of anti-Roma othering are nearly as old as Portugal's Europeanizing project:

Since then, the rendering of Romani otherness vis-à-vis white European Portugueseness via webs of cultural production implies a collective participation of the broader public sphere in consuming, rearticulating, and reproducing these notions of difference within which collective and individual identity is couched. Beyond the responses to such mainstream representations of alterity found in online forums, comment sections, and
local in-person social circles, members of the Portuguese public sphere participate in the everyday signification of difference by performing it themselves, whether that is in the form of Halloween and Carnival costumes of stereotyped “Lelos” and “gypsy women” or by racializing Quaresma’s play on the football field.

This everyday collective process of racial and ethnic meaning-making, the rendering of alterity, and its pernicious socioeconomic consequences and structures it upholds, are disguised and excused in a common rhetoric found in Ronaldo and the public’s defense of utilizing the term “Lelo” in reference to Quaresma. During the Portuguese national team’s run to victory at Euro 2016, the term caught on. After Quaresma scored the game-winning penalty kick in the quarter-final match against Poland, Portuguese sports daily O Jogo [The Game] ran the headline: “Lelito, vamos a Paris” [“Little Lelo, let’s go to Paris”]. Even within activist circles and Romani voices in the public sphere, the term’s historical weight in its relationship to centuries of systemic marginalization and persecution is misrecognized. For instance, in a Rádio Renascença news report and discussion, then transformed into a written article, the topic of Ronaldo and the media’s application of the term “Lelo” to Quaresma is debated in its marginalizing potentiality, with a sub-heading reading, “Lelo, carinhoso ou ofensivo?” [“Lelo, endearment or offensive?”] (“Poderá Quaresma” n.p.), while characterizing it as an “epíteto carinhoso” [“epithet of endearment”]. Cited is the aforementioned President of the Romani Union, Vítor Marques:

É uma expressão carinhosa. Já tivemos um programa televisivo, “Os Malucos do Riso,” em que foi incorporada a figura do cigano e era conhecido por Lelo [...] Não é pejorativo, não é ofensivo quando ela é dita sem um preconceito racial. Quando o Cristiano diz no reino para o Quaresma “Vamos Zé Lelo” é de uma forma carinhosa.

[It is a term of endearment. We’ve already had a television program, “Os Malucos do Riso,” in which the gypsy figure was incorporated and was known as Lelo [...] It is not pejorative, it is not offensive when used without any form of prejudice. When Cristiano says in training, “Let’s go, Zé Lelo,” it is in an affectionate way.] (“Poderá Quaresma” n.p.)

The facile separation of the Lelo trope from its inter-contextual application denotes the prevalence of a hegemonic racial discourse that conveniently erases pieces of racial historicization and racialization processes, and rehistoricizes it under the guise of affection.

These forms of rehistoricization, furthermore, are circuited to and have been a key ideological mechanism of Lusotropical versions of Portugueseness
and Portuguese colonial race relations. As noted above, such versions are themselves part of an affective circuitry between subject and body politic—a mode of white national subject-formation. Love, endearment, and affection—dismissive euphemisms for colonial violence (sexual and epistemic) in mainstream Lusotropical discourse of Portuguese exceptionalism—are repeatedly repurposed as tools of a Portuguese interracial ethics designed to revise the past and fluidly resignify its instruments of oppression and their material consequences, even today. This further underscores what Anna Klobucka has cogently pointed out as “the Portuguese and Freyrean tradition of infusing the representations of Lusophone colonialism and postcolonialism with postulations of affect as a centrally operative force” (40). As with other forms of interpersonal intimacy, the private (in this case, Ronaldo’s longtime friendship with Quaresma) is understood as a space for an exceptionally Portuguese resolution of difference no matter how intensely that difference has been signified and instrumentalized in the development of racial capital.

The claiming of affect here further points to the ambiguous terrains occupied by the “migrant” body. As the affective of the private blends itself with the affective of the public, Quaresma being the nation’s “Zé Lelo,” or the nation being “a kid from Musgueira,” this process denotes a form of frail and fraught possession by the nation of such bodies. In doing so, such bodies are integrated into the notion of Portuguese nationhood affectively held by members of the public sphere, including those that attempt to speak for the nation in said public sphere, while speaking for the “migrant” subject, and thus reproducing the epistemic violence of the imperial nation. As such, the integration is always-already contingent upon the “migrant’s” performance as contribution to the desires of nation, whether capitalist accumulation or sporting success. In other words, a “Zé Lelo” figure is temporarily integrated into Portugueseness if propelling the national team to victory, meanwhile the plethora of “Lelo” caricatures on television, through which Romani bodies are made knowable to the mainstream public, are forcefully foreclosed from Portugueseness.

Within the cultural and economic terrain of football, its everyday significations from myriad voices in the public sphere, the racialized and gendered forms of exploitation at the heart of the imperial nation are often obscured through the celebratory narratives of multicultural integration following the sporting success of minority/migrant bodies. Even these celebrations are marred by their own ambivalences and hypocrisies, as the proclaimed “Portugueseness” of the player in question is contingent upon success on the field, becoming a marker of “assimilated” status in the imperial nation. This contingency was aptly pointed out by an op-ed in
the Portuguese daily newspaper *Diário de Notícias*, provocatively asking in reference to Ricardo Quaresma: “Português quando acerta, cigano quando falha?” [“Portuguese when he scores, gypsy when he misses?”] (Nunes n.p.). Cited in the article is activist Olga Mariano (also known as Olga Natália), President of the Associação Letras Nômadas [Association of Nomad Letters] and founding member of the Associação para o Desenvolvimento das Mulheres Ciganas Portuguesas [Association for the Progress of Portuguese Romani Women]. She points out what Homi K. Bhabha has coined the “metonymy of presence” (128) in the fantasmatic operation of stereotypes (one standing for the group), and how these guide the limited terms of inclusion into nation, Portugueseness, in this case: “Quando um cigano faz alguma coisa de mal pagam todos por um, quando é coisa boa, até se esquecem que é cigano” [“When a Romani person does something wrong, the entire community is blamed. When a Romani person does something good, they even forget the person is Romani”] (Nunes n.p.).

**Imperial Nationality, Migrant Assimilation, and Epistemic Resistance**

What often gets lost in the popular rhetoric of football and nationhood, when it is centered on minoritized bodies, is the broader reproduction of imperial nationality that surpasses football as industry and cultural production. In other words, the consumption of football, particularly the multicultural meanings placed on the national team, has become a terrain in which more-encompassing imperial ideals of assimilation, coded as integration, are projected. In this regard, the ambivalent corporality of “migrant” becomes an object of consuming an assimilationist version of Portuguese imperial history and present race relations. This is not at all distinct from the societal experience of migrant subjects—interpellated as such through state and state-sanctioned institutions that situate them as malleable bodies to be circuited into the political and affective spaces of imperial national identification, while also, and subsequently dwelling as objects of surveillance of a nationalizing gaze. Here, education, housing, policing, and incarceration collide in order to circuit and coerce migrant bodies into the dictates of racial capitalist logic of Portuguese nationhood. In other words, integration and assimilation must retain and reproduce the economic, political, and cultural mechanisms of white supremacy.

At the level of public policy, from education to urban planning, social integration is articulated as assimilation into norms of everyday performance of imperial Portugueseness. More specifically, this operates in the context of postcolonial migration through an opposition of mono-nationalities—
“host” nation versus nation of origin. In her study of education policy and racial curricular norms in Brazilian and Portuguese primary schools, education scholar Eugénia da Luz Silva Foster analyzes how children of African descent, especially of African migrant backgrounds, relate to their curricula and its national frameworks. In many ways, the curricula she encountered in the different schools studied resembles and contributes to mainstream ideas of European multiculturalism, in which imperial European nationhood is the epistemological norm into which migrant subjects are to be assimilated, with the limited days dedicated to African history (often via European historicizing lenses) representing the practice of curricular inclusion. In one Portuguese school visited, in the Damaia-Lisbon area, with a significant portion of the student population of African descent, she observes that “a abordagem intercultural é de certa maneira feita de forma esporádica, na semana da África, o dia da África, ou no dia que é comemorado no dia 25 de Maio. A cada dia da semana é realizada uma atividade diferente, buscando trazer para a escola outras culturas e saberes” [“the intercultural approach is done in a somewhat sporadic way, during ‘Africa week,’ ‘Africa Day,’ or in commemorating May 25. Each day of the week brings a new activity, with the goal of bringing into the classroom other cultures and knowledges”] (n.p.).

Foster quickly juxtaposes this temporally and quantitatively limited inclusion to the standard and everyday epistemological practice of imperial nationhood: “No dia a dia prevalecem atividades comuns e sempre numa perspectiva da cultura portuguesa. Há, sim, a meu ver uma ênfase no desenvolvimento da portugalidade das crianças africanas” [“On an everyday level, there is a prevalence of common activities always through and providing a Portuguese cultural perspective. There is, certainly, in my understanding, an emphasis on developing the Portugueseness of African children”] (n.p.) This is undergirded, moreover, by a systemic lack of teachers of African descent, thus further rendering the school space as reminiscent and reproductive of a particular civilizing and assimilationist mission: “raramente se encontra professores de origem africana nas escolas que possam trazer algum ‘alento’ para as nossas crianças. Elas são obrigadas a engolir a cultura portuguesa, os valores, hábitos e costumes dos portugueses” [“one rarely finds in Portuguese schools teachers of African descent that could offer some ‘inspiration’ to our children. They are obligated to absorb Portuguese culture, the values, habits, and customs of the Portuguese”] (n.p.).

Numerous footballers of migrant/African backgrounds who have lived postcolonial migrant experiences through the institutions and everyday social and cultural life of imperial Portuguese nationhood, have been
visible renegotiators of dominant mono-nationalist frameworks, producing a particular epistemology against the racial underpinnings, limitations, and misrecognitions of common European multicultural narratives. In this sense, some have used the terrain of football, and specifically the national team as a heuristic (utilized in the public sphere) to situate their histories, bodies, and identities as sites of knowledge from which to problematize imperial nationhood, unveil its profound bonds to the history of racial capitalism, and imagine new terrains of intersubjective life beyond national dichotomies and hegemonic postcolonial articulations of a “Lusophone world.” This type of epistemic resistance took place in complex opposition to efforts in the public sphere, from media personalities and political figures, to position the Euro 2016 national team as a victory of Portuguese colonial history and exceptionalism, a centering of Portugal and emigrant/immigrant history in notions of Lusofonia, or even as collective (assimilationist) integration of “difference” into continued frameworks of white European nationhood.

In this regard, their bodies and subject-positions have become sites of a constant tension between their historicizing of their own migrant experiences and a dominant imperially derived historicization that circuits their trajectories in the post-imperial life of racial capital into cartographies of Lusofonia. At the risk of this recircuiting, numerous members of the Euro 2016 national team and other Portuguese players of African descent who have appeared for the national team have articulated their own migrant cartographies and imagined modes of intersubjective life that move beyond and complicate the mono-nationalist frameworks of Portuguese nationhood as taught in schools and that predominate in the public sphere. This has entailed particular performances and curations of specific migrant identity in public life, from on-field displays holding flags other than that of Portugal, to cultivating a social media presence that is multilingual or that actively forges Black diasporic terrains of solidarity and knowledge.

Euro 2016 winner Danilo Pereira (mentioned above), for instance, articulates nationality beyond Portugal by underscoring intertwined affective and political ties to his country of birth, Guinea-Bissau, where he resided until the age of five. His posts on social media, namely on Instagram where he has approximately 346,000 followers as of July 2020, often inscribe his bi-nationality vis-à-vis Portuguese national narratives that, despite their ideologies of trans-continental hybridity and Lusophone transnational connectivities, continue to center Portugal and Portuguese allegiance as a teleological end of a migration-assimilation project within its political borders. For instance, in January of 2017, ahead of that year’s Africa Cup of Nations, the first major tournament appearance for the Guinea-Bissauan national football team, Pereira marked the occasion with
an Instagram post offering a message of encouragement and solidarity with his birth nation: “Começa hoje a caminhada para este grande povo” [“Today starts the journey of this great people”] with the hashtag “#minhasorigens” [“#myorigins”] (Pereira 9 Jan. 2017).

Though his use of the term “origin” may play into notions of temporal progress into Portuguese assimilation, his articulation of solidarity to a “great people” that are not the Portuguese in that moment, can also be understood as disrupting notions and narratives of his being fully aligned with Portuguese national consciousness, especially six months after playing a significant role in the first major victory of the Portuguese national team.

Nelson Semedo, not a member of the 2016 squad, but part of the Portuguese national team that lifted the inaugural UEFA Nations League trophy in 2019, adds another layer to the participation in everyday production of terrains of migrant intersubjectivity. Born and raised in Mira-Sintra in the Lisbon metropolitan area, Semedo’s family hails from Cabo Verde, and through his social media imagery (though not only) he situates himself within a specifically Cape-Verdean immigrant sphere of collective life. This is one that forges spaces of solidarity and resistance against the anti-Black foundations of Portuguese society and nationhood, and that, relatedly, challenges the mononationalism and especially monolingualism of Portuguese imperial nationhood and its exceptionalist narratives of multi-continentalism found in dominant understandings of Lusofonia.

More than other Lusophone African migrant groups, Cape Verdeans and people of Cape Verdean descent in Portugal have been particularly visible and have established specific networks of cultural production, communal life, and epistemological survival, with a notable linguistic component. This is arguably due in part to the longer history of substantial Cape Verdean migration to Portugal dating back decades before independence, as well as due to the larger population of Cape Verdean nationals in Portugal. In this regard, Cape Verdean migrants and their descendants have experienced the anti-Black tenets of Portuguese national consciousness and nation-building in a particularly impactful way, especially in relation to narratives of miscegenation and racial exceptionalism promoted by light-skin and white Cape Verdean elites of the mid-twentieth century. In confrontation with the quotidian anti-Blackness of Portuguese society, public figures of Cape Verdean descent, especially those raised in contemporary metropolitan racial capital, have developed modes of coping with and challenging these

1 In 2018, the number of Cape Verdean nationals residing in Portugal was reported as 34,663. The second largest reported number of Lusophone African nationals were from Angola—18,382 (“Relatório”).
in everyday life while articulating a racial consciousness aligned with Black diasporic knowledges. In the process, these have come to constitute forms of anti-imperial epistemes of self and community that move beyond dominant notions of national and foreign, Portuguese and Cape Verdean. These modes of knowing and resignifying space and bodies can be found in a host of cultural production—from Cape Verdean diasporic literatures to hip-hop written and performed in Cape Verdean Creole by artists raised in Portugal.

In this vein, language, Crioulo, becomes both text and form for Cape Verdean-Portuguese modes of collective knowledge, evoking the long history of contact and contestation undergirded by colonial violence and the African slave trade. Public figures of Cape Verdean descent thus partake in this production of Cape Verdean community in Portugal through Crioulo. To this effect, Semedo's social media participation in public life is done so through many posts written in Crioulo, especially when these are in reference to family or the neighborhood where he was raised. This sort of articulation of migrant and diasporic community also conveys specific opposition to Portuguese assimilationist education outlined by Foster above, and more broadly to the centering of the Portuguese language as celebrated (tacitly or overtly) Portuguese imperial legacy and continuity.

In opposition to such hegemonic and deeply racialized notions of Portugueseness and migrant otherness, surveillance, and assimilation, articulations of selfhood such as Pereira's and Semedo's stake a claim for Black migrant self-enunciation and for reordering paradigms of mono-national identification and confluences of race and nationality. In other words, such cultivations and performances of Black bi-nationality operate against the anti-Black foundations of Portuguese national claims to whiteness and Europeanness that posit, presuppose, and ensnare Black bodies as "migrant" outsiders. In this regard, Black subjectivities may posit themselves as Portuguese and European while also doing particular work of challenging the racial underpinnings of Portugueseness, as their lived experience in Portugal is wrapped in the nation's imperial historiographies and implications in racial capital. Implied in this epistemic resistance, the racial struggle for recognition of full and equitable citizenship in Portugal and Europe need not erase diasporic histories and terrains of intersubjective ties to Africa. Rather, these histories are harnessed into a broader contestation to the white supremacist structures and epistemologies of European nationhood and its driving of racial capitalism.
Merely a minute of a November 2018 segment from a Portuguese talk show highlights many of the complexities, and often controversies, of racial discourse in the Portuguese public sphere, wrapped, as we have explored earlier, in continued exceptionalist narratives of national imperial history and the materialities of white supremacy. The exchange in question comes from the program Cá por Casa com Herman José [Here at Home with Herman José] (2016–present), airing on Portuguese state television, Rádio e Televisão de Portugal (RTP), and hosted by longtime television personality Herman José. In addition to short comedy sketches, each episode features three or four celebrity guests. This episode (season 3, episode 25), aired on November 14, 2018, and featured the following guests: Portuguese actors/playwrights João Didelet and António Machado, Portuguese writer Margarida Rebelo Pinto, and Portuguese (of Cape Verdean descent) singer Sara Tavares.

With all four guests and host sitting around a coffee table on a stage decorated as a living room, and following the second of Tavares’s performances on the episode, José sparks a conversation with Tavares about her recent album release and the artists featured. Tavares shares that she looked to collaborate with Lusophone artists that, though residing in Lisbon, represent different parts of the Lusophone world, stating “eu quero usar a matriz lusófona” [“I want to use the Lusophone matrix”]. This instantly prompted José to comment, unsolicited, “é uma matriz fortíssima e que nos une verdadeiramente, não é?” [“it is a very strong matrix which truly unites us, right?”] before further digressing: “no outro dia, estava eu a falar com, e perguntei ao, Matias Damásio, se ele não concordava—realmente, Portugal não um país racista, é verdadeiramente intercultural. E o Matias me dizia ‘sim, eu vejo a dançar as danças africanas a brancos muito melhor que se dançam nos sítios originais’” [“the other day, I was speaking with, and asked, Matias Damásio, if he did not agree—really, Portugal is not a racist country, and is truly intercultural. And Matias replied ‘yes, I see white people dancing African dances much better than in dances’ places of origin’”] (48:46–49:26).
Perhaps out of discomfort or in an attempt to comedically distort racial issues, turning these into jokes and puns, José suddenly pivots the conversation away from Tavares and suggestively asks Pinto: “Já tiveste algum amor colorido?” [“Have you already had a colored love?”]. Seemingly caught off-guard, the writer responds: “Não, não sou dada às etnias” [“No, I really don’t care for ethnic people”] (49:15). With guests and audiences realizing that Pinto misunderstood José’s question, or that she fell into his semantic trap, José quickly clarifies that by “amor colorido” he meant a moment in which she may have felt a strong sexual attraction to someone that then left her attraction unrequited. While the similar term “amizade colorida” [“colored friendship”] is colloquially used throughout the Portuguese-speaking world as akin to “friends with benefits,” José arguably uses “colorido” here as a dismissive play on the issue of race relations while evoking colonial taboos and fantasies of interracial sex, especially since racial/ethnic difference and supposed societal inclusivity were the topics of conversation up to that point. This also stems from a longer imperial history of racial comedy manifested in different forms, from minstrel-type vaudeville shows to an array of commodities including sweets and candy, as we will unpack further ahead.

Seconds after arguing that Portugal is not a racist nation, but rather one that is “truly intercultural,” José’s guest, Pinto, quickly and seemingly contradicts him. Rather than as opposing views on migration and post-Estado Novo Portuguese race relations, both José’s assessment of Portuguese racism and Pinto’s aversion to “ethnic people” operate as converging discourses in the public sphere, with ideologies of white supremacy informing how “intercultural Portugal” is signified publicly. The very term by which Pinto refers to migrants and non-white Portuguese residents—as “ethnic people” or “ethnicities” at a time of European racial discourse in which “race” is not recognized as a demographic category—delineates the racialized border between Portugueseness and Africanness. This evoked opposition between Portugueseness and “ethnic people” also reinscribes white Europeanness as the implied demographic norm of the Portuguese nation-state. This sort of bifurcation of Portuguese versus racial/ethnic other has of course, and as theorized in earlier chapters, long been informed by colonial discourses that have underpinned racial capitalism, past and present. Like the term or duality “migrant/citizen” considered in the previous chapter, the evoked duality here—“ethnic” versus “Portuguese”—also renders a lexicon of racial capitalism’s “technology of antirelationality” (Gilmore 261). These are thus the terms by which bodies are partitioned and by which racial capital “invalidates terms of relationality—to separate forms of humanity so that they may be connected in terms that feed capital” (Melamed 79).
The comedic normalization of such terms of antirelationality from early Portuguese imperial expansion to the present can be found in other platforms of Portuguese celebrity culture that (mis)appropriate, obfuscate, and reproduce both material structures of racial antirelationality as well as the exceptionalist rhetoric of Portuguese imperial history and the complex constructions of Portuguese whiteness within the life of racial capital.

This problematic exchange on Câ por Casa is further indicative of many other dominant and highly circulating racial and post-imperial ideologies in the Portuguese public sphere. As discursive terrains, these also inform how public figures present and signify their bodies and their places in racial capital while simultaneously taking advantage of its structures and histories of exploitation and obfuscating these in the process. These discursive, visual, and cultural maneuvers, to be explored in greater length in this chapter, often take as point of departure some of the historical and racial arguments raised by Herman José.

First, there is José’s arguments regarding the Lusophone world, following Tavares’s evocation of a “matriz lusófona,” as a geo-linguistic space of intercultural collaboration, within which Portuguese society represents its non-racist core. This sort of historical interpretation of Portuguese society now and in its colonial past, has been an integral part of the emergence of the term and geo-cultural and linguistic grouping that has become known as Lusofonia, discussed in this volume’s introduction. It is one that, celebrated as a foundationally non-racist terrain of cultural exchange, permits, while failing to acknowledge the past and ongoing forms of coloniality, particular and deeply imbalanced forms of racial self-articulation and access to non-European cultural forms; and by the same token, barring non-white (signified as non-European or of non-European ethnicity) from partaking in the institutional life of the Portuguese state and the structures of socioeconomic well-being. Rather, Lusofonia rehashes much of the mid-twentieth century Portuguese imperial rhetoric of amicable race relations that obfuscates the materialities of racial exploitation and capital.

This very point fuses with another argument made by Herman José in his digression, citing Matias Damásio’s anecdote, a Black Angolan singer/songwriter, and celebrating the popularity of “African dances” among white Portuguese citizens as evidence of non-racism, revealing once more mainstream and commonly held understanding of racism as divorced from the legal, institutional, and economic life of ongoing Empire and capitalism. The embrace of “African dances” by white Portuguese youth cultures in Lisbon is posited as proof of his argument regarding the Lusophone world as one of cultural exchange, without accounting neither for the material
exploitation of Black migrant cultural production by Portuguese recording and media companies nor for the experiences of precarity that have inspired such cultural forms whether in colonial/postcolonial homelands or in the continued coloniality of metropolitan divisions of labor. This sort of conditional embrace favors, moreover, particular platforms for and renderings of Black voices, namely in music and sports, and effaces Black voices of social critique and political endeavor, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the process, and specifically through industrial mechanisms of cultural production (media companies and their ideological inclinations, for instance), such voices are recalibrated and those that “feed capital” (Melamed 79) and Portuguese exceptionalist narratives are publicly embraced. This would be the case with José’s evocation of Matias Damásio in order to assert the supposed non-racism of Portuguese society—a particular form of tokenization and ventriloquization—deploying the assumption that someone that is not white is either an expert in assessing racism or should do the work of diagnosing it.

**Interracial Sex and *Mestiçagem***

As indicated by the awkward and problematic exchange above between José, Pinto, and Tavares, there is, within the Portuguese public sphere and the broader racial structuring of capital in Portugal, a simultaneous fascination and revulsion toward people and bodies deemed non-white or non-European. Relatedly, there is a particular attraction toward racial discourses emanating from the history of Empire and capital—an attraction that is facilitated and publicly explained by exceptionalist narratives of Portuguese interracial amicability, ethnic plasticity, and cultural syncretism. These manifest, as noted above, in the terrains of comedy (whether in media through established public figures like José and Fernando Rocha, or through popular racial jokes), in sports discourses, in commodities, and through celebrity culture. As we shall interrogate in this chapter, this attraction and fetishization—which also includes abjection, silencing, and exploitation—are not only explained by exceptionalist and state-sanctioned historiographies of Portugueseness, they are integral to the reproduction of these and to the reinvention of racial capitalism in Portugal and the recalibration of concomitant narratives and cartographies of Empire.

While Margarida Rebelo Pinto revealed her aversion, sexual or otherwise, toward “ethnic people,” Portuguese imperial history and dominant historiographies thereof are replete, as discussed in chapter one, with celebrations of interracial sex, a mechanism of colonial patriarchal oppression that has been historicized as a form of interracial proximity and
amicability. Within the Portuguese public sphere, this history of interracial sex—undergirded by the hypersexualization of Black and Brown bodies—along with its racial taxonomies and its popularized narrativizations, continues to be consumed and articulated in new and complex ways and via an array of entities and subjects. Through the circulation of commodities, mainstream cultural products, and celebrity cultures, such imperial taxonomies are rendered highly visible once more, reestablished as part of popular culture in modes that misrecognize imperial systems and histories of exploitation.

A key way in which this is manifested as a result concerns the complicated relationship between racial categories and skin color, with the former—the discursive modes by which capitalism has enshrined its system of exploitation (Gilmore)—being obfuscated or reduced to a visual schema of pigment through which white bodies can assume (often stereotyped) images of non-white bodies. In the process, the long histories and experiences of resilience and resistance forged by non-white subjects are effaced and exploited for renewed purposes of capital and the participation of particular bodies and commercial entities within it. By extension, knowledge of the structures of racial exploitation undergirded by racial taxonomies is also effaced, an erasure that has long been integral to narratives of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism.

This interweaving, or rather, blurring of distinctions between race and color, as a part of the aforementioned exceptionalist narratives of Portugueseness is also a fundamental mechanism for yet another component of Portuguese discourses of hybridity mentioned in chapter one—the fantasies of transraciality that are supposedly sanctioned through dominant notions of Portuguese cultural syncretism and pluriraciality. Arguments and fantasies of transraciality (both those celebrated and those abjectified) have centered on and privileged European and white Portuguese men both as agents of sexual hybridization and as negotiators par excellence of intercultural exchange and supposed symbioses. Within colonial capital's racial division of labor, non-white bodies were not afforded the privileges of cultural negotiation; and by the same token, were rendered as objects of cultural and sexual exchange to be manipulated by agents of white patriarchal power.

These racial dynamics of capital and their frayed historicizations are thus recodified and reproduced in the present, with production and consumption in the public sphere via digital or physical commodities, permitting national participations in this brand of continued imperial historicization. One particularly visible commodity—a popular chocolate cookie known as “Mulata” [“Mulatto woman”]—serves as a telling example of this, one that,
more specifically, instrumentalizes the obfuscation of racial categories of power by blurring and strategically confusing race with color, to profoundly fetishizing effect. Manufactured by the Azores-based food company, Moaçor (part of the food, logistics, and hospitality conglomerate Finançor), roughly 1,200,000 packs of “Mulata” cookies are produced each year (“Moaçor Produz”), with the cookies featured on popular network television shows and food programs. The cookies are also central components of a host of dessert dishes that take on further historically suggestive evocations, as is the case of “Beijos de Mulata” [“Mulatto Woman Kisses”]—a dish made of deep-fried dough wrapped in crushed “Mulata” cookies.

There is, certainly, a long colonial history of racial fetishization that operates via particular calibrations of skin color, with color—as marker of othering, abjection, or hypersexualization—serving as the framework of consumption. In this sense, the imperial signification of skin color has, of course, been a central component in systems of racial categorization that have underpinned colonial endeavors. This point precisely, however, gets strategically lost in the confusion of race and color here. Color and its implied colonial historicity becomes complexly contorted in the jocular circulation of the commodity, permitting consumers to partake in colonial structures of exploitation and their taxonomies while erasing, once more, said structures from public discourse. The branding around “Mulata” cookies—harnessing a profoundly racialized term—takes advantage, moreover, of Portuguese imperial historicizations of interracial sex and Lusotropicalist narratives that have become central components of late imperial and contemporary notions of Portuguese national identity and national consciousness concerning the nation’s place in the history of modernity.

In different parts of the former Portuguese overseas empire, especially in the metropolis and its largest settler colony, Brazil, the term *mulata* is far more than a racial taxonomy of earlier colonial slavocratic society. A product of interracial sex sanctioned by colonial power against Black bodies, *mulata*—derived from “mule”—has become a celebrated cultural trope of romanticized interracial intimacies and a synecdoche of miscegenation—historicized as a particular mechanism of interracial symbiosis whereby racial barriers were supposedly broken. In other words, the “mulata” trope, canonized via a considerable circulation of cultural and intellectual products, is posited as product and symbol of exceptionalized race relations that underpin hegemonic notions of Portuguese (post)imperial nationhood, dominant narratives of Brazilian national formation, and the historicization of a benevolent and mild Portuguese imperial history that is key to fraternal ideas of *Lusofonia*. In this regard, “Mulata” cookies represent merely one more artifact of a long legacy of cultural and intellectual commodification
of what is, all at the same time, a fetishized image of Black womanhood, a dominant historiography of imperial power and racial capital, and a central component of national identification. As such, “Mulata” cookies partake in the web of signifiers and commodities by which subjects participate in Portugueseness and a national (post)imperial public sphere.

Across the aforementioned Lusophone spaces, especially in the former metropolis and in contemporary settler colonial Brazilian society, the *mulata* has become celebrated since the mid-twentieth century as both emblem and evidence of amicable race relations, as in Gilberto Freyre’s theorizations of Lusotropicalism and subsequent formulations of racial democracy. Such historiographies have been codified via hypersexualized images of constructed *mulata* bodies, most notably in the literary works of Jorge Amado and their cinematic adaptations, of international popularity. His works have profoundly contributed to Brazil’s national narrative of racial hybridity, temporally overlapping with the whitening and mainstreaming of samba via the bossa nova movement. Amado’s cultural relationship with the female body emerges through his *mulata* characters, which became part of national lore from the late 1950s to the 1990s.

During this period, some of his *mulata* female protagonists achieved the status of national symbols, especially those from his most celebrated novels such as his 1958 *Gabriela, Cravo e Canela* (*Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon*) and the 1966 *Dona Flor e Seus Dois Maridos* (*Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands*). The cinematic adaptation of the former as *Gabriela* (1983), starring Sônia Braga and Marcello Mastroianni, was particularly successful in acclaim, at the box office, and in (inter)national popularity. Since the 1970s, the novel was also adapted twice as a soap opera in Brazil, in 1975 starring Braga and in 2012 starring Juliana Paes. Notably, the 1975 rendition brought the fetishized *mulata* trope back to Portugal with its 1977 airing via RTP as the very first soap opera to air on Portuguese television, popularizing the genre in Portugal very much through its rehashed colonial racial and sexual politics. In this regard, one can argue that the *Gabriela* soap opera offered Portuguese audiences, following the decay of its overseas empire, a new way of collectively celebrating colonial legacies as well as Lusotropicalist sexual fantasies and exceptionalist national narratives. As we shall unpack further ahead, *Gabriela’s mulata* imagery continues to play a complicated role in Portuguese media and celebrity culture.

Russell G. Hamilton also inserts Amado’s mixed-race female characters into larger cultural trends in Brazilian history as “both the subjects and objects of a nativistic and, indeed, pan-Luso-Brazilian cult. This cult of the *mulata encantada* (enchanted mulatto woman) has been codified as a romanticized component of Brazil’s national identity and popular culture”
Empire Found

(181). Hamilton also cites verses from poet and bossa nova songwriter Vinicius de Moraes:

Eu amo a mulata brasileira:
e a carioca com especialidade.
A mim me dá vontade de celebrá-las
na poesia mais rasgada do samba mais delirante,
mais sem peias.

[I love the Brazilian mulatto woman:
and especially the carioca [native of the city of Rio de Janeiro]
I feel compelled to celebrate them
in the most lavish poetry of the most delirious,
most unbridled samba.] (“Ensaio” 94)

Hamilton’s reading captures Amado and de Moraes’s articulation of the mulata as the revisionist synthesis of Brazilian racial history, the cult having “much to do with historical ideologies, myths, and realities of miscegenation and creolization” (Hamilton 182). De Moraes’s verses were published in a particularly notable 1966 edition of the popular Brazilian magazine Realidade (Reality), which included a photoshoot by Walter Firmo titled “Ensaio em cor mulata” [“Essay in the Color of Mulatto Woman”], featuring photos of mixed-race women accompanied by literary and musical treatments and historicizations of their bodies. The exposé’s byline thus read: “Preto mais branco—em qualquer proporção—dá mulher bonita, como mostra o fotógrafo Walter Firmo” [“Black plus white—in whatever proportion—makes a beautiful woman, as shown by photographer Walter Firmo”].

As the byline indicates, this exposé served to historicize interracial sex into national and Lusophone transnational discourses of racial exceptionalism. It is worth noting that this publication of Realidade temporally overlapped with a particular height of Lusotropicalist discourses harnessed by the far-right anti-communist military dictatorship in Brazil (1964–85) as well as by Portugal’s Estado Novo regime as it sought to repeatedly legitimate Portuguese colonialism in Africa against mounting international pressure and armed struggle for independence. With the latter point in mind, another set of verses found in the exposé, coming from the Brazilian owner of a bar in Rio de Janeiro, Joaquim Ferreira, voiced a commonly held historiographic argument found in Lusotropicalist discourses:

A mulata é a maior obra de Portugal.
Muita gente diz por aí que português é burro,
mas vamos e venhamos,
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The Mulata is thus posited as an exceptional and inimitable emblem of racial union, supposedly endemic to Portuguese expansion and to a phantasmatic Portuguese ethos (explored in chapter one), as well as indicative of a larger project of an alternative modernity. This is one that can be found at the heart of Freyre’s treatises on a Lusotropical civilization, which, as Ferreira suggests, rivals that of space travel and Western medicine.

Therefore, the colonial histories evoked by “Mulata” cookies concern not only the fetishization of mixed-race women, but also how (post)colonial state-sanctioned violence against Black women is repeatedly narrativized into exceptionalist frameworks of national collective identity and imperial history. Herein lies the persistent allure of this type of imagery as it underpins contemporary forms of production and consumption as well as individual and collective notions of nationality. In consuming “Mulata” cookies, Portuguese subjects consume both the violence over Black bodies on which racial capitalism has been built (with particular repercussions in
the international cacao and chocolate industry, the development of which Portuguese colonialism played a key and pernicious role) as well as the narratives through which such violence has been imperially historicized.

**Sofia Ribeiro, Skin Color, and Portuguese Racial Exceptionalism**

This sort of historicization of interracial sex and miscegenation (more broadly), inaugurating new modes of misrecognizing the racial, gendered, and sexual mechanisms of capital, overlaps in complex ways with narratives of Portuguese cultural syncretism and racial-ethnic formation. As touched upon above, the former serve as evidence of the latter, articulated most clearly by chapter one's citation of Gilberto Freyre attributing “the ability of the Portuguese to unite themselves with the tropics for love, not convenience, to the close contacts between the Portuguese in Europe and the Moors” (O Mundo 45–46). This calibration of the imperial past via sexualized and romanticized bodies also ushered in a lexicon and field of imagery through which to colloquially and quotidianly articulate individual and collective Portuguese racial hybridity, while intermeshing, once more, racial categories with differences in pigment, even among white Portuguese subjects—those that have now, and in previous family generations, materially tapped into the structures of economic privilege and institutional access to social welfare. In this sense, imagery tied to Black, Indigenous American, and mixed-race bodies—as these have been imperially signified, but also reclaimed through powerful resistance movements—has become appropriated by numerous highly visible celebrity figures in the Portuguese public sphere. It is to them that we shall now turn our attention, starting with a particular repurposing of *mulata* imagery and symbols.

One particularly notable case concerns model and actor Sofia Ribeiro (1984–) who, since 2007 has had leading and supporting roles in some of the most-watched soap operas in Portugal including *Morangos com Açucar* [*Strawberries and Sugar*] (2007) and *A Herdeira* [*The Heiress*] (2017–18), as well as hosting duties on the variety show *Portugal na TVI*, an appearance on Portugal’s *Danca com as Estrelas* [*Dancing with the Stars*], and several appearances in popular magazines including *GQ Portugal*, *Lux Woman*, and *Women’s Health Portugal*. Ribeiro, in her self-positioning within the Portuguese public sphere and its imperial historicities, enacts various historical discourses of Portuguese racial ambiguity and hybridity into which white Portuguese bodies of darker features, like that of Ribeiro, are often circuited and signified.

This of course harkens back to a long history of Portuguese and Brazilian intellectual and cultural inquiry on the place and formation of Portuguese
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ethnicity, traced in chapter one, and their attempts at making sense of pre-Roman, Roman, and especially Arab/Islamic occupations on what would become continental Portuguese lands. In the process, the prevalence of dark phenotypical features among Portuguese (and Spanish) residents vis-à-vis those of central and northern Europe became a corporal terrain on which a frayed history with Europeanness was signified alongside canonized arguments of a foundational Portuguese racial hybridity and mixability that spawned amicable colonial relations and a supposedly Lusophone civilization. As a result, the terminology used to signify such bodies of dark features are ensnared into emerging articulations of Portuguese whiteness, highlighted by racial ambiguity and unfixity—evoking the supposedly more flexible and tropically adaptable whiteness celebrated by Gilberto Freyre and other intellectuals. In this regard, the term moreno/morena, in its strategic ambiguities, is particularly emblematic of these overlapping historicities, and continues to be placed on bodies while serving as part of an identitarian lexicon within Portuguese paradigms of subject-formation.

The term itself, also common and equally ambiguous in Spanish-speaking locales, shares an etymological origin with the term mouro [Moor], derived from the Greek Maurusii and Latin mauri in reference to Berber tribes of Northern Africa with whom the Roman Empire came in contact. Moor would later become an early modern European taxonomy for Muslims and non-Muslims of Northern Africa, Abyssinia, and the Arabian Peninsula. In the process, the term Moor became a deeply racialized and classificatory mechanism for Christian European territorial expansion into Muslim lands, with Islamic difference signified onto complexions supposedly darker than those of Europe, including southern Europe. Though normalized today and largely divorced from this anti-Muslim origin in the Portuguese public sphere, moreno/a derived from mouro/a, continues to signify dark features, ranging from white bodies with brunette/dark brown hair to Black bodies. Nonetheless, in Portuguese and Spanish-speaking geographies, the term is deployed, corporalized, and visualized in particularly racialized ways, especially in contrast with bodies of lighter complexion and hair. This form of contrast is especially prevalent in, and pivotal to, Western images of beauty and the industries they underpin, including cosmetics but also those of visual cultural production such as film and media and their adjacent celebrity cultures.

Within these terrains of cultural production and imperially derived imageries, classifications and visualizations of moreno/o-ness intersect in complex ways with the mulata historical and societal trope. The former often circulates in ways that underpin the anti-Blackness of the latter in terms of its sexual reification of Black women’s bodies as objects of white patriarchal
pleasure. Moreover, the centralization of morena/o bodies partakes in the erasure of Black bodies from Luso-Brazilian public spheres and cultural production, which is, itself, a key function of the celebrated histories of miscegenation behind the canonization of mulata imagery. As Afro-Brazilian scholar, dramaturg, and politician Abdias do Nascimento argued in his seminal *Brazil, Mixture or Massacre? Essays in the Genocide of a Black People* (1979), the intellectual and popular celebration of miscegenation dovetails with colonial anti-Blackness and the pursuit of white notions of national progress, ultimately promoting the gradual genocide of the Afro-Brazilian population. Part and parcel of this gradual destruction of a part of humanity is the avoidance of individual and collective identitarian assertions of Blackness and the white supremacist signifiers attributed to it. The abjection ascribed to Blackness from European expansion to eugenics and finally to late postcolonial capital was reproduced once more in mestiçagem narratives for which the mulata trope stands in Brazilian nationhood, but also in larger dominant historiographies of Portuguese imperial history. As much as Freyre celebrates specific Afro-Brazilian contributions, Blackness continues to be a site of aversion within Brazil’s supposed harmonious society constructed through miscegenation, as well as within Portugal’s claims to a contemporary multicultural society—as highlighted by Margarida Rebelo Pinto’s comments on *Cá por Casa*.

The ambiguous terminologies surrounding moreno/a also partake in the everyday cultures and socioeconomic structures of anti-Blackness in both Portugal and Brazil, with personal identification away from Blackness as part of national and international respectability politics. Freyre himself pointed this out in his *New World in the Tropics* (1959) when discussing prominent Brazilian figures of African descent in national politics and cultural production: “There are a number of colored men in high public office, though Brazilian courtesy would describe them, not as ‘Negroes’ (as even near-Nordic individuals with a drop of African blood are described in the United States), but as morenos—that is, people of dark complexion” (10). As numerous scholars have pointed out, this oppositional relationship between blackness and respectability takes on different forms in terms of public presentability, or boa aparência [good appearance], codified in beauty and celebrity industries and impacting access to employment and institutional legibility, as well as garnering elevated state surveillance and subsequently mass incarceration.¹

¹ For more on boa aparência see Kia Lilly Caldwell’s *Negras in Brazil*, Elizabeth Hordge-Freeman’s *The Color of Love*, Kesha Fikes’s *Managing African Portugal*, and Jennifer Roth-Gordon’s *Race and the Brazilian Body.*
Celebrity culture and public prominence and visual cultivation of self in mediated public life is very much built on these paradigms of anti-Blackness. In Portugal, such paradigms and their discourses of respectable appearance also operate under contemporary distinctions between citizen and migrant in which racial discourses are repurposed and reshaped, Kesha Fikes points out (154). Cultivating celebrity identity in social media spheres and other public appearances within the post-imperial state’s citizen–migrant distinction, notable white Portuguese celebrities like Ribeiro and others are allowed to partake in white middle and upper-class respectability politics while still tapping into imagery derivative of Portuguese imperial exceptionalism and historiographies of national ethnic formation. This is, furthermore, a privilege of white Portugueseness that is not afforded to even residents of migrant backgrounds, even those with complexions similar to Ribeiro.

The ways in which Ribeiro, as actor and model, has been curated in different Portuguese visual media, in addition to the ways she has articulated herself via social media (especially on Instagram where she has more than a million followers) is particularly indicative of this strategic fluidity that has become an integral component to Portuguese exceptionalist narratives and how these continue to be legible in the public sphere. By the same token, such fluidity, always wrapped in imperial historicity as it is performed, has become central to the cultivation of white celebrityhood for some public figures. Though supposedly fluid as exceptionalist narratives would have it, different renderings of white corporality, especially in the case of women, are compartmentalized in ways that evoke Western imperial racial and sexual discourses. In the case of Ribeiro, there is a stark contrast between her visual presentation on fashion magazines geared toward white urban middle-class women, like Lux Woman, and men’s magazines like GQ or Men’s Health. In the former, her body and complexion is lightened to fit white bourgeois standards of beauty, body, lifestyle, and fashion; whereas in the latter, her body, in being rendered as an object of sexual consumption, is portrayed with darker complexion and in less clothing.

We can, therefore, consider these differences in relation to her cover photos for Lux Woman and GQ Portugal. On the March 2017 cover of Lux Woman, sexually articulated respectability is visualized via “modest” and presumably high-end clothing and cropped hair dovetails with lighter complexion. In contrast, on the cover of GQ Portugal’s February 2014 issue, Ribeiro’s darker complexion morena-ness and curly hair are visually circuited here into a corporal portrayal of sexual accessibility and consumption that includes pink panty hose revealed by a pulled-up short dress and the placement of a birthday cake between her legs commemorating the
magazine’s 13 years of publication in Portugal and standing in for Ribeiro’s sexualized corporality to be consumed.

Ribeiro is, in other instances, an active participant in this sort of dichotomy that visually renders modes of fluidity in the public sphere. In her own social media platforms, she often enacts similar imagery and narrates her body through particular symbols of exceptionalist Portuguese imperial historiography, including those of celebrated miscegenation that have historically served to ensnare the bodies of Black and Brown women. For instance, in an August 2018 Instagram post while on vacation on the Portuguese south coast of the Algarve region, she narrates her body, dressed in a swimsuit with palm trees in the background, via an evocation of Jorge Amado’s famed *mulata* character, Gabriela, captioning her photo: “Gabriela, cor de canela, veio à janela espreitar” [“Gabriela, color of cinnamon, came to the window to peak”] (Ribeiro 9 Aug. 2018). Ribeiro thus situates her body in the textualities of miscegenation and racial ambiguity, positioned visually in a tropical-esque setting of palm trees and coastal space, very much akin to the spatial positioning of Gabriela’s character in novel, soap opera, and film. Gabriela, as an image of non-whiteness and specifically fetishized articulations of mixed-race-ness, her eroticized body is often parcelled into similarly exoticized physical terrains.

Beyond this post, Ribeiro has evoked “Gabriela” as a sort of alter-ego she takes on while on tropical and/or beach vacations, dressed in bikinis or sun dresses. She thus captions an August 18 post of the same year during the same vacation with a photo of her sitting in a pool—“Gabriela sendo Gabriela” [“Gabriela being Gabriela”] (Ribeiro 18 Aug. 2018). Similarly, and in a comedic tone, she captions a July 16, 2020 post—“Gabriela foi à janela, mas está um calor do caraças e voltou para dentro” [“Gabriela went to the window, but it is hot as hell so she went back inside”] (Ribeiro 16 Jul. 2020). When Ribeiro does not evoke “Gabriela” in the main text of her Instagram posts, she includes the hashtags such as “#gabriela,” “#cordecanela” [#cinnamon skin”], and “#morena.” Away from the beach, however, Ribeiro articulates her body differently, thus neatly compartmentalizing her “canela” and other narrativizations evoking symbols and images of mixed-race bodies and their exceptionalized historicities from her celebrity and public life in the metropolitan capital. In her social media posts situated in bourgeois urban spaces and involving the quotidian circulation of manufactured goods, she thus narrates herself and her less-tan complexion into paid advertisements and sponsorships for different brands and companies such as Italian underwear/lingerie clothing label Intimissimi and Spanish beauty supply chain Equivalenza. Akin to her visual rendering in *Lux Woman*, her now lighter complexion, in which “cinnamon skin” no longer appears, is centered
as part of the curation and commoditization of goods pertaining to the beauty and fashion industries geared toward white bourgeois European consumers. These disparate renderings of Ribeiro’s face and body through contrasting imageries and narrations are also indicative, moreover, of the Eurocentric/white bourgeois standards of valid personhood that inform public presence (or lack thereof) of Black bodies. The lightening of skin through cosmetics or post-photoshoot digital manipulation impacts Black Portuguese women in myriad ways, including erasure from, and abjection in relation to, notions of beauty being sold. With the exception of a few notable Black Portuguese actors and models such as Ana Sofia Martins and Sofia Baessa, the barring of Black bodies from such industries and the racialized discourses of valid personhood they propagate continue to mesh with long colonial histories of abjection and reification of Black bodies at the service of capital’s extractive logics. As Fikes’s research lays bare, racial discourses such as these continue to be repurposed into the reproduction of citizen–migrant distinctions, with Blackness continuing to be signified into the latter.

These sorts of visual renderings of Ribeiro’s body have also come into play with regards to her roles in television and cinema productions, in which she is often cast into the fringes of whiteness, Europeanness, and Portuguese citizenship. For instance, in the 2017–18 telenovela A Herdeira, aired on the privately owned Portuguese television network TVI, an unlightened Ribeiro was cast as Soraia Fuentes, a young Romani woman who is raised in a Galician and Portuguese Romani family residing in an encampment in northern Portugal. The program’s construction of Romani life and community is built on commonly held fantasies and stereotypes of cigano/a (“gypsy”) bodies and ontologies discussed in the previous chapter, with cisgender male characters dressed in dark colors, thick beards, and raspy accents—while cisgender female characters like Ribeiro’s Soraia Fuentes also embody mainstream stereotypes of Romani gender dichotomy and deviance. In this regard, Soraia Fuentes typically appears on camera in long skirts and blouses, dark-colored and/or containing bold prints, gaudy jewelry with several necklaces and big earrings (Figure 4.1).

In addition to her stereotyped appearance, her character is also made to evoke other gendered fantasies of cigano/a epistemological deviance, particularly suspicions of witchcraft and polytheism. She is often seen praying to deities that are merely mentioned, without further substantive elaboration, such as “Mãe Lua” [“Mother Moon”] and “Mãe Sol” [“Mother Sun”]. Such constructions of epistemological difference operate in tandem with modes of social deviance inscribed on cigano/a bodies, as members of the community are also constructed as drug traffickers and users.
In addition to being yet another example of Romani stereotyping and ventroliquization on the part of Portuguese cultural producers and casted actors, Ribeiro’s assigned role as a cigana is permitted not only by her recognized whiteness, Portugueseness, concomitant citizenship, and institutional power to do so. Her casting as such is, moreover, an example of a larger trend in Portuguese film and media casting and character construction, utilizing actors of darker features—moreno/as—to play roles of stereotyped Romani characters as well as Latin American migrants in Portugal, South Asian characters, and Muslim/Arab embodiments. The actors in such roles are often Portuguese actors who circulate and are otherwise positioned in institutional and cognitive spaces of whiteness, as in the case of Sofia Ribeiro. In A Herdeira, this distinction between Portuguese citizenship and Romani non-citizenship, played out corporally on the darker complexions and features of cigano/a characters, is further emphasized by the one Romani character that does not fit this phenotype—the titular character, the blonde-haired and blue-eyed Luz Fuentes, played by Anglo-Portuguese actor Kelly Bailey. The telenovela’s main plotline thus revolves around Luz discovering that she had been abducted as an infant and raised in the Romani community (a tired stereotype of Roma as kidnappers), but she is in fact the biological child of millionaire Duarte Alvarenga.

This casting trend of placing actors recognized as white and circulating in the Portuguese public sphere as white celebrities also serves to stage, and is informed by, existing narratives and dominant imperial historiographies concerning Portuguese cultural and ethnic hybridity, as well as related fantasies of Portuguese plasticity. Just like Ribeiro herself signifies her
body into narratives and symbols of miscegenation and racial hybridity as often as she positions it into white-dominated spheres of bourgeois commodities, film and media producers and production companies enact similar dynamics. Similar to how she also compartmentalizes her performances of plasticity, corporately mediated plasticity through casting is also compartmentalized via not only spaces in which “othered” characters are situated, but also through stereotyped articulations of their deviance that reproduce racial discourses and understandings of Portugueseness as intertwined with whiteness and oppositional to racialized taxonomies of Blackness, Romani-ness, Latin Americanness, and Arabness.

This has been the case with numerous other actors, some of high celebrity status and lead roles like Rita Pereira, and others who have forged careers in secondary or supporting roles. Noua Wong (born 1983), a model and actor born in Rio de Janeiro and raised in Portugal who embodies morena corporalities, has been cast into many of the aforementioned racial taxonomies, often in the same productions. For instance, in the 2018 Portuguese action/comedy film Linhas de Sangue (posited by critics as the greatest Portuguese Blockbuster of all time and featuring more than 50 recognizable actors and public figures), Wong plays the racially ambiguous Safira—an ambiguity that is operationalized into the devious tasks she must carry out as part of counter-terrorist measures against the shadowy Chanceler (Alfredo Brito)—leader of an international “terror” organization planning a coup of European states starting with Portugal. For one task, she poses as a Muslim woman dressed in a burqa and infiltrates a locale held by the Chancerel and protected by a motion-censor security system. In another task, she poses as a racialized object of sexual attraction for one of Chanceler’s henchmen, Laboreiro (Miguel Costa), playing a Portuguese woman of African descent with her hair in micro-braids. After an initial encounter with Laboreiro in public, Safira breaks into his home in order to seduce him before brandishing a knife and slitting his throat. Among Wong’s other acting credits is her role on RTP’s television mini-series, País Irmão, in which she plays a transgender Brazilian woman. Meanwhile, in season eight of the popular multi-season teen/young adult telenovela Morangos com Açucar, her first major acting credit on television, she plays a jovial Portuguese domestic worker who has a romance with her employer’s son, Lourençio (David Carreira). It is a role by which her dark features are imagined and signified through the subalternized labor (physical and emotional) she performs for her white(r) bourgeois Portuguese employers and in relation to the middle-class spaces that make up the program’s scenes and settings.
Racial/Cultural Plasticity and Portuguese Corporal and Sonic Evocations of Lusofonia

The social media posts of Sofia Ribeiro and their articulations of self in relation to historicities of Portuguese imperialism, along with their hegemonically celebrated symbols, are also indicative of some of the ways Portuguese celebrities that partake and/or are situated within paradigms of whiteness (cultural production, residence, placement in capital) circulate in the post-imperial Lusophone world. This circulation is thus mediated publicly by narratives of colonial exceptionalism and the claims to Portuguese ethnic indeterminacy and malleability. In this sense, there are an array of white Portuguese celebrities, beyond Ribeiro, who articulate themselves via social media and other renderings of public life through these discourses and imageries that have become common components of Portuguese celebrityhood and narratives of empire’s yesteryear. These evoked narratives carry further repercussions when such celebrities look to situate themselves in different geographic and cultural terrains of the Lusophone world.

In this sense, these very acts of self-signification and public identitarian performance do the work of consistently rendering and reproducing this very notion of a Lusophone world by inserting themselves in spaces and terrains of cultural production in locales once colonized by the Portuguese state. Their presence therein is, moreover, legitimized by channeling historiographic claims of Portuguese amicability, mixability, fluidity, and hybridity. The visual and aural configurations of Portuguese bodies in Lusophone spheres, presented by such digital expressions and platforms of national celebrityhood, in turn impact how these spaces and terrains are signified to the consumptive Portuguese national public. This public is also subsequently and repeatedly situated in an ongoing collective imaginary of Portuguese colonial past, retracing particular imperial geographies and the bodies contained therein to be re-ensnared into fantasies of a frayed transnational collective—Lusofonia.

A particularly elucidative example of this comes from the digital and televised cultivation of public selfhood by acclaimed fado singer, former radio show host, and television personality Raquel Tavares (born 1985). Tavares came to fado fame at the age of 12 when she won the prestigious annual contest “A Grande Noite de Fado” [“The Great Night of Fado”] in 1997. At the age of 19, and before her first album was released, she made her first cinematic appearance, playing the role of a young fado singer in the 2004 film O Milagre Segundo Salomé. Her debut self-titled album was released a couple of years later in 2006, for which she won the prestigious
Amália Rodrigues Award in 2007. This cemented her acclaim and prominent place as one of a generation of young fado stars, including Ana Moura, who have sustained the revival of the urban folk genre since the late 1990s and led by the likes of Dulce Pontes, Madredeus, and Mariza following the peak of Amália Rodrigues’s career in the mid-twentieth century during the Estado Novo era. Since then, Tavares continued to cement and augment her stardom in Portugal, by being a fixture in the most frequented *casas de fado* [fado bars] in Lisbon, and abroad through an array of international concerts since 2010 as well as notable collaborations with international musicians of different genres including famed Brazilian samba singer Xande de Pilares.

Fado itself, as a genre that has come to be constructed as a national musical expression, is illustrative of imperial and Europeanizing mechanisms of forging Portuguese national identity. As anthropologist and ethnomusicologist Lila Ellen Gray points out, the cultural origins of fado have been a topic of debate, with racial and imperial implications concerning Portugueseness.

Polemic surrounding origins has been central to published Fado discourse at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. While the main strains of this polemic argue for African-influenced derivations via the Black slave trade and Lisbon’s positioning as port city vis-à-vis colonial contact and expansion, Arab derivations due to the long-standing presence of the Moors in Portugal, or a combination of the two, others link Fado to the music of the medieval troubadours, to the expression traditions of rural Portugal, to the Celts, or the “gypsies.” The theory of origins granted the most currency by contemporary academics situates Fado’s “birth” in the first half of the nineteenth century and locates its primary influences as Afro-Brazilian […] link[ing] the sung Fado in Lisbon to a confluence of Afro-Brazilian and Iberian influences in relation to the traffic in African slaves; colonial relationships between Portugal and Brazil; and intercultural exchange via the port cities of Lisbon, Seville, Rio de Janeiro, and Salvador. (12)

Gray goes on to expound on specific similarities shared between sung fado and other musical genres derived from the African slave trade and trans-Atlantic connections between Africa, the Americas, and Europe such as the Afro-Spanish Fandango, Afro-Brazilian dance forms like *lundum* and *fofa*, and the *modinha*—“a melancholic improvised genre accompanied by the guitarra that circulated via Brazil and was popular in the late 1700s to early 1800s in Lisbon” (13). Gray also discusses fado’s popularization via “Lisbon’s
dispossessed, at the social margins—particularly Lisbon’s brothels, cafés, and prisons” before it “socially ascended early in its development to salons and bullfights frequented by the aristocracy” (13).

Considering fado’s history among Lisbon’s marginalized bodies and spaces, its popularization arguably owes much to its voicing of the burdens (a translation for the Portuguese term fado) faced by such marginalized subjects. During the twentieth century, fado became increasingly associated with saudade and the saudosismo movement (explored in chapter one), mediated by the cultural producers of the latter. To this day, saudade and its expression of Portuguese particularity continues to be evoked in the musical genre, with innumerable fado song titles and lyrics centering the term. As the concept and national romanticism of saudade became increasingly politicized during the early twentieth century decay of Portuguese empire and affiliated with the symbolic and melancholic recovery of an imperial golden age, fado became increasingly divorced from its non-white and disenfranchised origins in the Portuguese public sphere and in dominant historiographies.

Kimberly DaCosta Holton’s work on fado’s origin stories asks, among others, a fundamental question: “Why, in the minds of many, has the fifteenth century caravel endured as the locus of fado’s maritime creation, despite scholarship which has shown, unequivocally, that fado appeared as a song form in Lisbon no earlier than 1820? What explains the three-century disconnect between ‘impressionistic’ and ‘academic’ narratives of fado’s temporal emergence?” (“Fado Historiography” 4). For Holton, “it is the logic and rhetoric of saudade which most convincingly accounts for the dogged perseverance of fado’s discovery era creation myth” (4), which she importantly points out as stemming from “the nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalist movements that promoted the development of saudade as a centerpiece of Portuguese ‘ethnic psychology’” (“Fado Historiography” 4). As Holton underscores, and as I have cursorily outlined, fado’s popularization in Portugal itself has a pre-saudade history, after which the New State propaganda machine would intervene.

Due to its groundings in particular expressions of class consciousness and more or less implicit denunciations of capital’s materiality of oppression, the early years of the Estado Novo proclaimed a staunch anti-fado rhetoric (Colvin 149). More specifically, “as the fado had gained popularity as a genre of protest among the working class and factory labourers in the first decades of the twentieth century, the [pre-Estado Novo] military dictatorship was interested primarily in lyrical censorship aimed at quelling the spirit of organized strikes and the propagation of socialism, communism, and anarchy” (Colvin 155). Lyrical censorship ultimately led to aesthetic and political shifts in the genre, aided by the Estado Novo’s Secretariado de
Propaganda Nacional [Secretariat of National Propaganda] and its funding of particular films, promoting “notions of progress, and the pobrete mas alegrete [poor but happy] images of Lisbon’s fadistas and their degraded popular neighbourhoods” (Colvin 156).

As Gray points out (82–86), fado, in the process and via an array of social actors ranging from Estado Novo politicians to musicians and intellectuals, propagated tales and theories of fado’s origin as tied to the Descobrimentos and thus as part of a nationalist memorialization of a Portuguese imperial golden age. Gray thus quotes a fadista who recites this unofficial historiography: “Fado was born from the spirit of ventura (fate, destiny, risk) of the Portuguese people who through the Discoveries gave new worlds to the world. Or fado was born from the saudade of those who remained for those who left or from the saudade of those of who left for those whom they left behind” (84). As Holton has also laid bare, fado also circulates across the Portuguese diaspora in ways that perform a historiographic labor akin to what Gray’s fadista argues, tying together Portuguese emigration to colonial history, to national identity:

It is these adapted value systems and the “persistent” and “dramatic” four hundred year history of outbound journeying that makes the impressionistic explanation of fado’s genesis, predicated as it is on the figure of the sailor and concomitant sense of deterritorialization and melancholy, so powerful. This explanation resonates on multiple national levels facilitating an easy connection between fado and Portugal’s era of discovery, its era of colonization, and its era of emigration. (“Fado Historiography” 3)

Wide proliferated and politicized versions of fado’s origin, such as that quoted above, thus situate fado into a particular configuration of imperial Portuguese whiteness, tying the genre to seafaring and the affective burdens associated with the patriarchal centerings of imperial narratives. In other words, fado and its melancholic core came to express the sadness around the departure of male agents of Empire—their own and those of their heteronormative nuclear families, images of which also became core components of nationalist ideologies, not least of which Salazar’s dictum of “Deus, Pátria, Família” [“God, Fatherland, Family”]. In addition to fado’s historical evocations of imperial symbolism, origin, and nostalgia, it is, today, situated most visibly in other materialities of whiteness and racial capital, most notably the spaces designated for its middle- and upper-middle-class consumption and presentation in the public sphere. Within Lisbon’s racialized urban geographies, casas de fado [fado bars] are located mainly in the expensive Alfama and Bairro Alto neighborhoods, where accomplished
fado singers like Tavares can be found performing: “Elite fado art-house venues, which cater to tourists and to ‘in the know’ aficionados who can afford to pay steep prices, boast fine dining and professional fado, often sung by fadistas who have international careers and recording contracts with multinational labels” (Gray 88).

Therefore, debating Raquel Tavares’s whiteness on the sole basis of pigment is both incomplete and insufficiently based in the material life of white supremacy; after all, her dark features tenuously permit her to enter and strategically “put on” racial and cultural categories and signifiers of non-white/non-Portuguese otherness. Her cementing in fado situates her within both the long cultural and discursive terrains of the imperial construction of Portuguese whiteness as well as in the contemporary urban geographies, socioeconomic structures, and cultural practices of Portuguese whiteness. Beyond fado, especially since she announced a hiatus from her music career in 2020, Tavares has also become a fixture on television programs, namely talk shows, that stage the construction and centeredness of whiteness in the national public sphere through white hosts and predominantly white studio audiences that partake in the spectacle of Portuguese race relations put on for home television audiences. Though the 2010s have seen a small yet visible increase in Black actors in telenovelas and in Black television hosts, such a presence is nonetheless marginal or limited to particular racial and socioeconomic configurations as with Mário Andrade’s silent role as stage assistant on the popular working-class program O Preço Certo [The Price is Right], subordinated to the only cisgender white male on the program—host Fernando Mendes. Moreover, the hosting of television programs continues to be widely viewed in profoundly racialized terms, as labor serving the constructed valid personhood of white Portuguese bodies/citizens. This was evident in author and journalist Conceição Queiroz’s denunciations of racist messages and abuse she has privately received in response to both her role as a Black woman as lead news anchor of TVI’s 24-hour news channel as well as her vocal critiques of systemic anti-Black racism in Portugal (“Conceição Queiroz denuncia” n.p.).

Like Sofia Ribeiro, Tavares straddles the material and cognitive spaces of Portuguese whiteness while also evoking notions of racial ambiguity and Portuguese cultural fluidity, most notably as she circulates and documents non-white terrains inside and outside of Portugal, including parts of the enunciated Lusophone world. As is commonplace within celebrity culture in the social media age, Tavares cultivates and disseminates a public image online for fans and followers, showcasing seemingly mundane actions, but more ubiquitously tracing her own movement through and in relation to commodities, cultural production, professional activities, and the
geographies and corporalities emergent from racial capital and Empire. For instance, in July of 2018, Tavares debuted, via a short “boomerang” video clip on her Instagram account, a new hair-do—micro-braids—in preparation for her vacation trip to Morocco (Tavares 12 Jul. 2018).

It is worth noting that Tavares has sported braids in other instances in which she circulates in Black and African spaces, such as a vacation trip to São Tomé e Príncipe, posted on Instagram in January of 2018 (Tavares 17 Jan. 2018), or in her musical collaborations with samba singer Xande de Pilares. The particular hairstyle, a form of braiding with profound meanings of epistemic resilience and epistemological production across the African diaspora, has been historically and socially ensnared and racialized into corporal politics of valid personhood and respectable public presentation. The presence of micro-braids in Portuguese media is thus often racially compartmentalized and staged as a signifier of deviance, as discussed in the context of Noua Wong’s role as Safira in Linhas de Sangue. Coming from a background of placement within white bourgeois Portuguese spaces, Tavares’s body carries the capital necessary to extract what is much more than merely a hairstyle from the histories and epistemologies of the African diaspora into her own repertoire of celebrity image-making, without facing the material consequences faced by Black woman, all the while playing into notions of Portuguese racial fluidity.

Though she evokes a particular racial fluidity to legitimate her aesthetic dabbling in Black aesthetic and cosmetic cultures, Tavares nonetheless compartmentalizes and narrates her temporary use of micro-braids. As she notes in the post’s caption, it is “o look eleito para as mini-férias! Gosto tanto, mas tanto de tranças! É uma arte popular muito bonita” [“the look I have chosen for my mini vacation! I really, really like braids! It is a very beautiful popular art”]. In taking on what for her is merely a “look,” she does so by partaking in its racialization as a “popular art”—with the popular in implied opposition to bourgeois spaces of white self-articulation. It is in this regard that she selects the “look” as ideal for her leisure vacation time, which she will spend on the African continent. The racialized “popular” is thus signified as antithetical to her professional life and appearances on Portuguese television and advertisements. It is a garb to be temporally worn for expressing her place in the long history of racial capital and in dominant historiographies of Portuguese national identity, in turn aiding in the racialized rendering of the non-white spaces into which she moves as locales in racial opposition to those of Portuguese Europeanness.

In the post, Tavares also racially situates the “look” in Cabo Verde while in the process of thanking the salon that styled her: “Obrigada @so.laa por me levarem a viajar até Cabo Verde no vosso cantinho” [“Thank you @so.laa for
taking me on a trip to Cabo Verde in your little corner”). Though the salon is located in Alcochete, across the Tagus River from Lisbon, the racialized space and bodies of a Portuguese former colony is yoked with the hairstyle. The Blackness that is problematically evoked by the “look” is thus crystallized into Cape-Verdeanness and to white Portuguese fantasies of it. By associating hair braids with Cabo Verde, she acknowledges, though superficially, that she is taking on epistemes and corporal practices that reside outside of constructed notions of Europeanness, though without acknowledging how these are objects of Portuguese state surveillance and violence against Black bodies. A few days later, she began posting photos of her styled in micro-braids with other Portuguese celebrities during her vacation in Morocco.

What seems to undergird and legitimize her circulation in non-white and racialized appropriation of Black signifiers is the racial ambiguity and fluidity attributed to Portugueseness and to white moreno/a bodies in particular. These are traits that are attributed to her in the comment section of the post, with one notable comment from another white Portuguese celebrity, the lighter skin and blue-eyed television talk show host Ana Lúcia Matos, who also garnered attention in July of 2018 for wearing micro-braids ahead of her own vacation trip to Cabo Verde. Matos thus enthusiastically commented and articulated a kinship of temporary Blackness: “Txiiiiiiii neguinha!!! mana crioula” [“Heyyyyyy Black girl!!!! Creole sister”] (Tavares 17 Jul. 2018). The racially loaded terminology, while serving to communicate and celebrate solidarity between two white celebrities as they temporarily perform fantasies of Blackness and resignify themselves racially, is also part of the everyday discursive and linguistic terrains of racial exceptionalism that promote white racial fluidity in the Lusophone world. This is especially the case for white Portuguese and Brazilian bodies that enact this sort of strategic and compartmentalized racial traversing. Racialized terms such as nego/a—derived from a shortened pronunciation of negro/a and [Black person]—as well as its gendered diminutive and augmentative forms, neguinho/a and negão/negona, have become embraced, particularly in the Brazilian public sphere and slowly in Portuguese popular culture, as terms of endearment. These, when used by white subjects to address non-white people, are circuited into national and Lusophone narratives of interracial cordiality and intimacy, evidence of exceptional race relations. Therefore, the Instagram exchange between Tavares and Matos intermeshes overlapping components of dominant historiographies of Portuguese imperial history, race relations, and Portuguese ethnic formation/racial indeterminacy.

Into her vacation in Morocco, Tavares herself utilizes, via her Instagram account, the term nega, this time in addressing a Black Portuguese celebrity,
Angolan-born Weza Silva (a former model and best-selling lifestyle writer), who joins Tavares in Morocco. She thus narrates Silva as follows: “A nega mais poderosa de Saïdia!!! Olha quem é ela! @mrspreta! Ela rebenta com o cenário!!!” [“The fiercest Black woman in Saïd!!! Look who it is! @mrspreta! She slays wherever she goes!!!”]. In using the term in public communication with a Black woman, she arguably lays claim to some type of liminal proximity to Black women, and by extension inclusion into Blackness, by appropriating an international language of Black women and Black queer and trans empowerment. This discursive and racial maneuver seemed to work and be embraced by commenters on the post, with one comment, from a woman who identifies as Black, proclaiming both Tavares and Weza as “Pérolas negras lindas” [“Beautiful Black pearls”].

Tavares performs this type of racial approximation not only through her visual appearance in micro-braids and through the words of the post’s caption, but also through her use of racialized emojis and hashtags. The latter, “#africanfashion” and “#afrostyle,” once again configure her extraction of Blackness as highly situational and compartmentalized, as well as her articulation of Blackness as merely a repertoire of corporal and aesthetic presentation for the public sphere. The former, meanwhile, also used by other white Portuguese celebrities of darker features, serve to further approximate her temporarily to Blackness, but also more generally, to notions of Portuguese racial fluidity and (post)colonial cultural syncretism. Her racial and skin color articulation via emojis on Instagram is also highly situational and contingent upon the person accompanying her in the photo/post and the space she occupies therein. While she represented herself in the post with Weza Silva through a brown-skin emoji, she utilizes a light-skin and brown-haired emoji for both herself and fellow white Portuguese celebrities on social media.

It is important to bear in mind the difference between the consequences of white Portuguese women of darker features occupying such racialized imageries, and the repercussions faced by Portuguese women of African descent when their bodies are articulated in sexualized ways. For the former, taking on such imagery and historicities does not compromise their claims to citizenship. Rather, such articulations augment their performance of Portugueseness by evoking celebrated historiographies and symbols of national/ethnic formation and imperial mythology. On the flipside, the freedom to sexually articulate oneself is far more frayed for non-white women, and Black women in particular, with notions of deviance—sexual and otherwise—colonially projected onto bodies to be legally and institutionally excluded from Portuguese citizenship and to be sites of exploitation, extraction, and surveillance.
This trend of not only white women, but also white men, temporarily adopting Black diasporic forms of hairstyling is part of a broader and, indeed, global ongoing history of associating signifiers, linguistic specificities, and Black forms of cultural production with “coolness,” especially within youth cultures. For instance, words that have become normalized fixtures in popular and official lexicons can be traced back to the youth cultures of Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, and other former Portuguese colonies, with the three nations mentioned representing the largest Lusophone migrant ethnic groups in Portugal. In this regard, the appropriation of hairstyles and insertion into musical genres borne out of Black diasporic experiences are substantive examples of this history. Therefore, one naturally finds these everyday expressions and extractions of Black diasporic metaphysics as well as white imperial fantasies of Blackness at the confluence of youth culture and making/reproduction of celebrity. The latter necessitates constant repositioning into the politics of desirability circulating among young consumers in order for themselves (celebrities) to be consumed.

Beyond resonating with Portuguese youth cultures, this sort of racial posturing and strategic performance of non-white identitarian and metaphysical repertoires (and imperial fantasies thereof) at the service of celebrity image-making reverberates with dominant historiographies of Portuguese racial exceptionalism, ethnic formation, and multiculturalism. The corporal and racial configurations of white celebrities like Tavares and Ribeiro perform an imperial imaginary of Portuguese exceptionalism that claims a post-racial Portuguese imperial subject and colonial society that was not structured around racial difference enshrining modes of capitalist extraction. The evocation of Portuguese post-racialism (past and present) is thus staged through a configured whiteness that effaces itself at the superficial level of pigment and hair (which is misrecognized as evidence of exceptionalist race relations and lack of systemic racism), and in the process stages the historical effacement of racial categories and power at the core of nationalist claims of a multiracial and pluricontinental Portugal. This sort of visual configuration carries further implications when accompanying and partaking in articulations and stagings of Lusophone terrains previously colonized by the Portuguese crown/state. In this regard, the Lusophone postcolony is thus rendered knowable and once again placed into exceptionalist historiographies to Portuguese metropolitan audiences through the placement of white celebrity bodies and their self-articulations in relation to contemporary Lusophone spaces.

For Tavares, this sort of accessing of cultural production and practices emanating from outside of Portugal has been central to not only her public image and professional trajectories in music (as we shall discuss
further), but more broadly to her sense of self positioned in a world of “cultures.” In an interview for the self-proclaimed feminist association Capazes [The Capable], published on YouTube in 2015, Tavares speaks about her upbringing in Alfama—before it became a gentrified and prestigious Lisbon neighborhood—as one that “cheira a cores, cheira a muitos países, cheira a muitas culturas” [“smells of colors, smells of many countries, smells of many cultures”] prior to declaring: “eu gosto mesmo de vestir outras culturas” [“I truly like to wear other cultures”] (“Maria Capaz” 1:00–1:10). Tavares has taken this problematic trope of “other cultures” as garments as a mode of positioning herself in and across non-Portuguese musical genres, mediated significantly by record labels, music producers, and other singers. Within continued historical celebrations and articulations of Portugueseness along Lusotropicalist lines, the distinctions between Portuguese and non-Portuguese cultures tend to be murky. This murkiness is itself underpinned by the Lusotropicalist rendering of Portugueseness as adaptable to (especially to the tropics and the Global South) and capable of traversing cultural borders, and in the process subsuming these into Portugueseness—a historiography that celebrities very publicly reproduce via their identitarian and public image calibrations.

These dynamics and complicated semiotics of Portugueseness articulated via Tavares’s enunciation of self and movement across Lusophone geographies and cultural terrains are staged most evidently in her samba performances and the journey that led her to these. During the early to mid 2010s, Tavares integrated the famed Rio de Janeiro samba school, Grêmio Recreativo Escola de Samba Acadêmicos do Salgueiro, based in the Salgueiro neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro on the hill of the same name. Her Instagram posts feature numerous photos of her as part of the school and partaking in the 2014 Carnival parade in Rio de Janeiro’s Sambódromo (Sambadrome) Marquês de Sapucaí. During this time, her Instagram feed showcases some of the Rio de Janeiro social circles she integrated, composed of other samba students and established samba singers, as well as the ways she looked to integrate herself into particular notions of Brazilianness and implied Brazilian national narratives. In such posts that look to express and curate this integration for her followers, she utilizes popular Brazilian colloquialisms such as “vamo qui vamo!” [“Let’s go!”] (February 9, 2014), iconic musical lyrics of Brazilian music like “Garota de Ipanema” [“The Girl from Ipanema”] (February 1, 2014), and even the racialized language of Brazilian racial history turned into alleged terms of endearment. In a February 7, 2014 post with a young Afro-Brazilian girl, Tavares captions: “A neguinha mais linda do Rio de Janeiro!!!” [“The prettiest little Black girl of Rio de Janeiro!!!”] (Tavares 7 Feb. 2014).
During her time with Acadêmicos do Salgueiro, she made the acquaintance of famed samba singer and Rio native, Alexandre Silva de Assis, best known as Xande de Pilares who, at the time, was a fixture in the renowned samba school where he launched his career as part of the samba-pagode band Grupo Revelação. Part of the samba umbrella of subgenres, pagode traces its origin to the transatlantic slave trade and the forging of Afro-Brazilian community and diaspora in the Atlantic world. Though the sonic aesthetics of samba have been extracted by white Brazilian and international musicians since the 1950s into bossa nova and Música Popular Brasileira [Brazilian Popular Music], samba as musical expression continues to be racialized and marginalized in different ways in mainstream Brazilian music and pop culture while still being a crucial platform for Black consciousness, resistance, and communal life.

In 2013, Tavares and Pilares released two songs with accompanying music videos: “Sem Fantasia” [“Without Costume”], a cover of Chico Buarque’s song of the same name, released in 1968, and later performed by Buarque and Caetano Veloso in 1978, and “Aceita” [“Accept”] written and produced by Tavares and Pilares, the lyrics of which communicate their serendipitous meeting in the Acadêmicos Samba school and their ambiguously romantic connection. In the official performance video for “Aceita” in which Tavares sings in Brazilian Portuguese, scenes of the two artists in the vocal booth of a production studio are interspersed with scenes of the two sitting on a sofa singing the song’s lyrics while playing two traditional samba instruments—Pilares the guitar, and Tavares the tambourine. The visuals to the song stage Tavares’s “wearing of different cultures” and, in the process, render a clear aesthetic distinction between her corporal presentation in fado performance versus that of her samba performances. More specifically, while on the sofa playing the tambourine and singing the lyrics to “Aceita,” Tavares is dressed in a tank top with her hair partially braided in cornrows. Meanwhile, across all scenes of the video, her skin is significantly darker than in her fado music videos, album covers, posters, and performances (Figure 4.2).

Though very much a product of lighting and cosmetics, her navigation across genres and her implied participation in their signification is visually negotiated by modulations in skin color between light-skin with dark hair and eyes in fado promotional materials and videos to more ambiguously Brown in corporal presence while singing samba. Furthermore, like other Portuguese exceptionalist narratives of hybridization, Tavares’s participation in samba, through not only these songs with Pilares but also via her samba performances for the Acadêmicos do Salgueiro, is less about fusion than about reifying differences and notions of genre authenticity between fado and samba as well as between the racialized bodies that traditionally
perform each. One can argue that this sort of opposition through which Tavares moves from fado to samba and back runs counter to the hybridizing logics that underpinned fado’s very formation and to the ways in which current young generations of fado singers from across the Portuguese diaspora curate their own fado performances by integrating performative elements from the musical genres of their “host” nations, which Holton analyzes in a later work (“Fado in Diaspora”) focusing on fado singers born and raised in New Jersey, USA and of Portuguese descent.

Tavares’s “wearing of samba cultures,” in other words, does not redefine the borders between fado and samba. Rather, in many ways, this dissonance in aesthetic rendering of both reinforces the racialization of each genre, and the Portuguese national claims of authentic fado. As such, fado is repeatedly reinstated as Portuguese, to be sung in European Portuguese by white Portuguese bodies. By contrast, in order to enter samba while retaining fado’s purported and historically/imperially constructed whiteness, Tavares must shed her fado garment before donning her racialized samba outfit and Brazilian (specifically Fluminense) variant of Portuguese. In the process, Tavares has been able to largely sidestep any significant criticism accusing her of diverging from notions of “authentic” fado, which can be seen in “the angry polemic” (Manuel 2021) against Spanish recording artist Rosalía for her fusing of flamenco with trap and reggaetón, to use another Iberian example of an artist whose professional trajectory started firmly within a genre that is evocative of notions of national identity. By neatly separating her fado persona from her samba persona, she is able to retain her privileged place in the privileged racial spaces of fado as “authentically white” Portuguese music. Fado, as a terrain of whiteness (aesthetic, historical, and socioeconomic) in Portugal and globally continues to circulate as a space for the individual and collective performance of whiteness and where the racial tenets of Portuguese citizenship are enshrined.
CHAPTER FIVE

Latin Reinventions: Contemporary
Portuguese Singers, *Latinidad*,
and Latinx Musical Forms

The previous chapter touched on a couple of examples of Portuguese celebrities immersed in the structures, discourses, and everyday privileges of whiteness that have strategically performed racial fluidity toward their own celebrity public image and reinvention/rebranding. In the process, these have evoked, through embodiment and self-narration, both long-held narratives of Portuguese imperial exceptionalism and the racial discourses of exploitation and extraction obfuscated by said narratives. By extension, the opaque borders of Portugueseness are symbolically expanded via the conjuring of historiographies pertaining to national and ethnic formation, such as those introduced in chapter one, but importantly, negotiated by the white bodies permitted to act and self-narrate fluidly. Other relevant examples can be found among Portuguese pop singers like Ana Malhoa (1979–). Before analyzing Malhoa’s trajectory, it is worth considering the historical connections between *Latinidad* and *Latinité*, and the positioning of Portugueseness within both, which artists like Malhoa have strategically exploited in their own articulations of racial and ethnic fluidity.

*Latinidad* and *Latinité*

As I have briefly discussed in chapter one, narratives on southern European historical, linguistic, and cultural ties to the Roman Empire have been trafficked in different ways, in different historical periods, and toward different ends. In that chapter, I make mention of Portuguese intellectuals of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries who have situated, to varying degrees, Portuguese ethnic formation and national identity into a longer genealogy of Roman and post-Roman Empire southern Europe, grounded especially on fantasies of linguistic origin and, adjacently, Roman occupation as early expressions of collective territorial life, partitioned by Roman political boundaries of provincial dominions. The names of these—Hispania and Lusitania—continue, of course, to circulate widely and can be
found at the heart of national and international nomenclatures of nation, language, and post-imperial remappings, that is, the “Lusophone world.” As also noted in chapter one, this sort of historiographic connection to the Roman Empire served, in some measure, to articulate a longer history of Europeanness as intimately and inherently bonded to whiteness. By tracing this trans-temporal and trans-spatial Portugueseness back to the Romans, Portuguese national identity and history is thus situated within a longer historiography of whiteness conflated with Christianity, early capital, and in opposition to Africa.

Over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this articulation of Roman origin, expressed especially in terms of Latin or Romance languages shared among southern and more or less young European nations, gained traction in Europe and the Americas through burgeoning discourses of Latin specificity. These sorts of mappings ultimately led to, and built on, a widely accepted division of Latin Europe verus Anglo-Saxon/Germanic/Scandinavian Europe. One of the more impactful remappings of this sort, from the last two centuries, was carried out by French intellectual Michel Chevalier in his coining of the term *Latinité* [Latinicity] and his larger historical and cultural argument regarding post-independence Americas—that the former colonies of imperial nations of official Latin-derived languages (Spain, Portugal, and France) possessed particular cultural traits that radically distinguished them from the (former) colonial possessions of imperial nations of official Germanic languages (England, Germany, and the Netherlands). Chevalier’s *Latinité* encompassed both the former colonies and the former metropolises, thus enunciating a postcolonial transnational cultural collectivity and concomitant communal subjectivity that argues for shared cultural and political values based on linguistic and ethnic Latin origins.

Chevalier’s argument, published in his 1836 volume of letters, *Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord* [Letters on North America], drew, moreover, on previous theorizations of European cultural identities and divisions thereof. One of these interpretations of Europe came from French historian Jules Michelet in his global historiography from a European vantage point, *Introduction à l’Histoire Universelle* [On History: Introduction to World History] of 1831. The title in French is particularly noteworthy as it frames the work as an overtly universalist endeavor, a narrative of world history articulated from Europe, contributing to an existing imperialist system of global representation while positing the site of articulation as the core of universality. For Michelet, his contemporary Latin Europe represented the degeneration of the imperial legacies of the Roman Empire, particularly embodied in what he understood to be the economic, political, and cultural backwardness of Italy and Spain following the Enlightenment’s shifts in political and
economic philosophy—itself a crucial point in the historical positing of northern Europe as the great cultural and political force in Europe. It is a celebration of Enlightenment thought for Michelet, moreover, that leads to his championing of northern Europe over Latin Europe. Within this dichotomous framework of Latin versus Anglo-Saxon Europe and by extension Latin versus Anglo-Saxon America, we see a burgeoning racialization, as Robert Newcomb indicates (11), or at least, a discourse that articulates epistemological difference between spaces and bodies via official language and, by extension, degrees of Europeanness (and therefore whiteness) imagined via particular narratives of civilizational history and divergence from the supposed universality and normativity of Enlightenment thought.

Michelet does not, however, situate France as firmly within Latin Europe as Chevalier seems to. For Michelet, France occupies a hybrid geo-cultural space composed of provinces that he perceives to be historically tied to either Latin Europe and possessing “Roman and Iberian blood as in the cases of Provence and Languedoc, by which France binds herself to Italy and Spain” (105–6) or northern Europe through northern provinces such as Normandy and Champagne. He establishes this duality through a racialized lexicon, referring to Spain and Italy as being part of and examples of “southern races” while northern Europe is specifically composed of Celtic and Germanic races, in his view. Michelet’s work, this particular book as well as his larger oeuvre, are very much products of a post-Enlightenment gaze that, following the fall of southern Europe’s overseas empires, inaugurated a new geo-cultural center of whiteness and by extension, epistemological center of an imperial capitalist world system now dominated by European nations north of the Pyrenees. This post-Enlightenment whiteness was thus grounded on the Enlightenment’s revised or updated notions of modernity in terms of personhood and social organization such as political democracy, separation of church and state, rationalism, economic productivity, and free markets.

Considering the arguments proffered by Michelet and Chevalier, Paulo Moreira importantly reminds us that this French pan-Latinism “was an attempt to validate French imperialism with a culturalist discourse about rivalries with England, Prussia, and Russia” (160). As the geo-cultural interspace between northern and Latin Europe, Michelet posits France as the mediator that will unite both parts of Europe, particularly by reasserting the backwardness, or un-Enlightenment of southern Europe. Its alleged intellectual and cultural affinities with northern Europe make France, in Michelet’s view, the culturally superior and dynamic force that “shall one day unite under its influence all the peoples of Latin languages” (106)—those that remain culturally stagnant and unmodern. In other words, Italy,
Spain, and Portugal “can reach an understanding of the modern world only through the intermediary of France” (62). Seeing France as part and contributor to the Enlightenment’s inauguration of a greater civilization, Michelet posits southern Europe as the target of a revised civilizing mission and white man’s burden.

Chevalier’s arguments would thus expand Michelet’s to the spaces colonized by southern Europe as part of a spectrum of not only whiteness, but also a revised hierarchy of global imperial power. Internal hierarchies of European races, claims to whiteness, and civilizations were, in other words, trans-atlantically translated to Inter-American hierarchies as a northern European framework through which to understand post-independence American nations. Following independence, a European system of global representation thus continued to inform how postcolonies were seen not only abroad but internally.

Chevalier’s treatise on divisions between North (Anglo) America and Latin America specifically posited the latter as a trans-atlantic continuity of Latin Europe, thus utilizing the term Latinité as a category composed of various forms of post-Enlightenment otherness. In this regard, he does not see France as a fixed part of Latinité. Rather, he associates what he sees as the prosperity of the United States being historically tied to the political and economic values of France. Like Michelet’s argument on the interspace between southern and northern Europe, Chevalier articulates the political, philosophical, economic, and cultural role of France as that of bringing the south into modernity thereby firmly locating it, once more, among the northern sectors of Europe. As a result, the former American colonies of southern Europe were doomed to failure because of the inadequate civilization and civilizing endeavor of their colonizers, an inadequacy that rendered these colonial powers incapable of implementing the Enlightenment’s ideals of social organization. From Chevalier’s point of view, this is in stark contrast to the United States, steered by Enlightenment ideals inaugurated in France, and therefore, representing a civilizational continuity of the Enlightened West—a result of French, English, and German imperial economic, political, and philosophical endeavors.

It seems, then, that the Americans are called to continue the series of that succession of progressive movements which have characterised our civilisation ever since it quilted its cradle in the East. This people will become the founders of a new family, although perhaps the features which now predominate in it will hereafter cease to be the prominent traits; whilst the Spanish-Americans seem to be an impotent race, which will leave no posterity behind it, unless by means of one of those
inundations which are called conquests, a current of richer blood from the North or the East, shall fill its exhausted veins. (428)

The shifts in traits Chevalier foresees with regards to the United States, he explains in an earlier letter, will engender a new “hitherto unknown variety of the human race, inferior to the English and French types in many respects, particularly in taste and philosophy, but superior to the rest of the human family by its extraordinary combination of sagacity, energy of will and hardy enterprise, by its admirable aptitude for business, by its untiring devotion to work” (427).

The former colony is thus first inferior to the metropolis, and an inferior imperial power, situated, for Chevalier, below the collective value of the United States, can only lead to an even further inferior postcolonial society. With regards to the United States, Chevalier posits its practice of capitalism and political organization as taking Enlightenment ideals to new heights. In this sense, the economic and political success of the United States represents, for Chevalier and other travelers and thinkers of European origin, a new paradigm of both whiteness and the white European social ordering. The United States becomes, in other words, an image of coloniality within a project of nationhood that integrates Western hierarchies of personhood and difference, culture of consent, and mode of coercion over a populace.

Chevalier does not merely inscribe different forms of collective inferiority onto Latin Europe and America, doing so in order to convey his own French imperial nationalism, positing France as a civilizing and paternalistic force that can lead the people of Latin America toward the standards of society and personhood he nebulously attributes to Anglo-America: greater collective productivity, nationalist sentiment, and a refined republican political structure. In these ways, Chevalier celebrates supposed collective social values that would later be venerated by Max Weber in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* of 1905. Chevalier regards France as holder and producer of these values that, alongside, its Latin historical connections, makes it the ideal civilizer of South America. With regards to France, as the exceptional, that is, the only enlightened nation of Latin origin, Chevalier once again argues: “She is at the head of the Latin group; she is its protectress” (16). As such, “she is the depositary of the destinies of all Latin nations of both continents. She alone can save the whole family from being swallowed up by a double flood of Sclavonians and Germans. To her it belongs to rouse them from the lethargy into which they are plunged in both hemispheres” (16). As he stipulates in an earlier quote, South America would need another conquest or a process of cultural recolonization to rescue it from a meaningless future. France would thus be the Western power, of
proper Europeanness, most capable of effectively carrying out this endeavor, curing the ills of Latin nations by administering the remedies of the north.

Although a *de jure* French conquest did not occur, the values and ideals of post-Enlightenment France pertaining to personhood, social organization, political structure, economics, cultural production, urban planning, and architecture, would later be embraced and celebrated by Eurocentric national elites in Latin America. Chevalier’s work, moreover, inaugurated a lexicon of cartographic, linguistic, epistemological, economic, and therefore, racial difference that would be embraced by European and American state and regional governments (such as the European Union) as well as political, cultural, and academic elites. The pathologized differences projected on bodies and spaces of the supposed Latin world—dovetailing with and further complicated by the anti-Black, anti-Arab, and anti-Indigenous structures of Spanish and Portuguese imperial endeavor—would come to be legitimized by eugenic discourses, migration policies, and carceral politics within Europe and the Americas.

Notions such as those evoked by Chevalier, namely characterizing societies and cultures as “impotent races” (428) that “will leave no posterity” (428) behind them would, moreover, constitute the fundamental philosophical backbone of eugenics initiatives carried out around the globe. Chevalier’s recommendation for an influx of European immigrants from north (Germanic) and east (Slavic) of the Pyrenees in order to improve Latin American society and bring it into updated paradigms of Western civilization, would later be echoed by national elites throughout Latin America and embraced by eugenicists. In this regard, it lays an early post-independence blueprint for modernizing Latin American national societies. In racial terms, Chevalier’s injunction effectively meant whitening the population by way of the “higher” categories of whiteness that he argues were far better ambassadors of the Western civilizing mission. This meant not only diluting Blackness and American Indigeneity, but also whitening national power, replacing the Latinized social and cultural authorities with Europeans supposedly better equipped to establish a modern social and economic order based on existing discourses of racial otherness and locally expressed and put into practice through the systemic and cultural coercion of Black and Indigenous bodies for labor.

The alterity of Latin America in relation to Anglo-Saxon North America, is part of a northern/central European system of global representation that posits independent North America as a product of European modern ideals to which Latin America, as a collection of societies like Latin Europe, serves as one of its retrograde others. The articulated Latin impotence at the level of societal organization, economic activity, political structure, and personhood
all serve to elevate Anglo-Saxon and Germanic entities and identities as beacons of intertwined modernity and whiteness. We can thus pinpoint in this type of binary discourse—Latin Europe and America versus Germanic Europe and America—as a crucial moment in the racialization of European and American ethnicities. Latinness thus came to imply a degradation of whiteness seen as structuring entire societies, and a form of racial otherness that would continue to be placed on all bodies associated with such societies, as indicated by the Latinx/Hispanic racial category in the United States that continues today.

The northern and central European, and subsequently, United States articulation of Latin European (especially Iberian) and American cultural and societal inferiority ultimately began to shape the othering of entire languages such as Spanish and Portuguese, tied to othered national spaces and their former colonies in the Americas. Within this post-Enlightenment system of representation, national languages of Iberia, as signifiers of pathologized national cultures, became themselves pathologized and therefore were understood as markers and modes of communication of uncivilized cultures and illegitimate bodies. This ultimately led to the confluence of linguistic and ethnic otherness in the Latinx/Hispanic category despite the racial heterogeneity of postcolonial Latin America. In more recent United States censuses, the term has been used to denote ethnic identity as separate from racial identity, allowing individuals in the United States to identify as white Latinx or Black Latinx, for instance. Despite the ambivalent separation of race and ethnicity, there continues to be, in the United States, a need to track, monitor, and curtail (through deportation and incarceration) the presence of people of Latin American descent—the composite geographic and corporal other over which United States hemispheric hegemony and national identity has been discursively propped up throughout over two centuries of military, political, and economic incursions into Latin America.

The historical narratives, interpretations, and prognoses pertaining to the Americas devised by the likes of Michelet, Chevalier, Weber, and so many other European intellectuals of the nineteenth and early twentieth century profoundly contributed to the global system of representation embraced and consented to by many national elites in the Americas. These had themselves been influenced by an array of northern and central European travelers to colonial South and Central America as early as the 1500s and also during the advent of Enlightenment ideals that ultimately posited the core of Western civilization toward the north of Europe. As a result, the nation-building process, along with its demanded creation and control over a public sphere and local societal hierarchization, was carried out very much through these perceived differences between Latin and Anglo-Saxon Europe.
and America. For Latin American elites, this meant facing the legacies of what they learned to be retrograde colonial projects of Portugal and Spain all the while reproducing (and looking to modernize/perfect according to post-Enlightenment narratives) a social order that these very powers had installed. Additionally, it was a narrative of inter-American differences that was embraced by and helped inform the political agenda of nascent United States elites with imperial hemispheric aspirations, as seen by the interrelated discourses of “Manifest Destiny” and the Monroe Doctrine.

It is in relation to early nineteenth century French pan-Latinism and its embracing in an array of policies and cultural production briefly outlined here that discourses of Latinidad have emerged. The term itself can be traced in international academia to sociologist Felix Padilla’s 1985 *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*—an important work in the shaping of the field of US Latinx Studies at the time. Padilla theorizes Latinidad according to his ethnographic research conducted in Chicago, USA as a form of historical consciousness as the basis of solidarity among people of Spanish-speaking Latin American and Caribbean descent. Juana María Rodríguez would later revise this theorization in order to account for the colonial histories and legacies of anti-Blackness, anti-Indigeneity, colorism, cisgenderism, and heterosexism that have structured racial capitalism in the Latin American and Caribbean states from where US Latinx people have migrated across generations. In this sense, she frames Latinidad as “a particular geopolitical experience but it also contains within it the complexities and contradictions of immigration, (post)(neo) colonialism, race, color, legal status, class, nation, language, and the politics of location” (22). Despite conveyed solidarities, these “complexities and contradictions” in terms of racial, sexual, and legal status difference within the collective Latinidad impact one’s access to institutional well-being and the degree of state-sanctioned surveillance and violence in the United States.

At the same time, notions of a collective Latinidad in the United States are also mediated by media corporations, food manufacturers, and commodities that articulate residents of Spanish-speaking Latin American and Caribbean descent as a unified market for commercial purposes. For Arlene Dávila, this is a process of Latinization—a commercial discursive strategy that interpellates people of different national migratory and non-migratory backgrounds (as with Spanish-speaking Indigenous populations of what is today the Southwestern region of the US) into a situationally homogenous collective. Dávila thus theorizes Latinization as “the ‘out-of-many, one-people’ process through which ‘Latinos’ or ‘Hispanics’ are conceived and represented as sharing one common identity” (16). Dávila also leaves important space for non-commercial forms of Latinization in the United States and in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Processes of Latinization are thus not a solely “top-down development, resulting from the commodification and appropriation of Latino culture or from self-agency; rather, they stem from involvement of and negotiations between dominant, imposed, and self-generated interests” (17).

Ideas, utopias, and transnational economic communities across Latin American nations have also contributed to narratives of Latinidad outside of US Latinx communities. The earliest expression of these came arguably in the process and wake of national independence movements from Spain in South America via Simón Bolívar’s vision of a united Spanish America that could best defend itself against the emerging imperialist drive of the United States in its quest for Western hemispheric hegemony. Though Bolívar’s dream has not materialized as he envisioned it, different political and economic alliances across Latin American states have emerged over the years, most notably the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), created in 1960, and that by 1980 had 13 member states. LAFTA would eventually lay the groundwork for the revised free trade bloc of the region, the Common Market of the South, or Mercosur, inaugurated in 1994. In Europe, meanwhile, pan-Latinism impacted different forms of inter-state political and economic collaboration, as with the Latin Monetary Union formed in 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland based on the French Franc. Over the course of the ensuing decades, other European economies joined, while some South American nations—Peru, Colombia, Venezuela—adopted the Franc system without joining the Union. The Union ultimately could not survive the First World War, and eventually disbanded in 1927.

Beyond the realms of political economy, regional, historical, and linguistic commonalities spawned from Portuguese and Spanish colonialism have been harnessed and have impacted the production and dissemination of different forms of popular culture in Latin America and rehashing of cartographies of European pan-Latinism. This is evident in the aforementioned categories of musical production, such as Latin pop and Latin house, that articulate musical genres from across the Caribbean, Central and South America, US Latinx communities, and even Iberia as different parts of a nebulous whole inaugurated by Portuguese and Spanish imperialism in the Western hemisphere and with supposedly shared Roman origins. It is along these lines within the realm of cultural production, most notably music, that pan-Latinism, or Latinité (in the terminology of Chevalier and Michelet), and Latinidad most visibly collide. The entities of musical categorization and those that measure success and sales, themselves spawned from the long history of global coloniality, as is the case with US-based Recording Academy
and *Billboard* magazine, continue to reproduce musical cartographies that evoke this connection. For instance, the *Billboard* Music Award categories include Top Latin Song, Top Latin Artist, and Top Latin Album, utilizing an ethnic and racial category as a genre alongside award categories that are genre specific. Meanwhile, the Grammy award categories of the Recording Academy also articulates “Latin” as a collection of geo-cultural specific sub-genres, with the award categories: Best Latin Pop or Urban Album, Best Latin Rock or Alternative Album, Best Regional Mexican Music Album, and Best Tropical Latin Album.

The Latin Recording Academy—founded in 1997 by the Recording Academy and headquartered in Miami, Florida, USA—has organized the annual Latin Grammy Awards since 2000. The geo-linguistic parameters of the Latin Recording Academy and its awards is more clearly defined, and include Spain and Portugal alongside Central and South America and the Caribbean, with an emphasis on Spanish and Portuguese-language production. Songs written and sung in so-called minority languages in these spaces have also been considered, but following a majority vote by academy members. Meanwhile, works from Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking artists from Africa are overtly excluded. The Latin Recording Academy nonetheless articulated a historical configuration of “Latin” that includes part of Latin Europe alongside Latin America in a way that also reproduces colonial historiographies of the Iberian Peninsula as a fantasmatic point of origin, while erasing actual Afro-diasporic and Indigenous histories of Latin American and European musical production.

Another important international organization in the reproduction of pan-Latinism in recent decades was the Latin Union, operating from 1983 to 2012 and headquartered in Paris, but inaugurated in 1954 through a signed ratification at a convention held that year in Madrid. Following the creation of the League of Nations in 1945, the Latin Union looked to create a collective international community based on the notion of a shared cultural history and “um património linguístico e um sistema de referências históricas e culturais” [“a linguistic patrimony and a system of historical and cultural references”] (“A Organização” n.p.). Considering the strained relationship Salazar’s Estado Novo had with the League of Nations concerning Portugal’s recalcitrant colonial project in Africa, Portugal’s placement in another, seemingly more friendly, international community would be an important diplomatic maneuver. Its purpose was thus outlined in its constitution:

a) Promover no mais alto grau, a cooperação intelectual entre os países que a integram e estreitar os laços espirituais e morais que nos unem,
b) Promote to the highest level, intellectual cooperation between member countries and tightening the spiritual and moral bonds that unite us,

c) Safeguard the mutual and deepened knowledge of the traits, institutions, and specific needs of each Latin people.

d) Place the moral and spiritual values of Latincity at the service of international relations, with the goal of achieving greater understanding and cooperation between nations and contributing to the prosperity of its peoples. 

(“Convenção Constitutiva” n.p.)

By the time the Latin Union folded in 2012 due to bankruptcy, it had 36 member states spanning Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and across six official languages—Portuguese, Spanish, French, Catalan, Romanian, and Italian. Its work offered financial support, through governmental and private donations from member states, toward the teaching of Latin languages across the globe and cultural projects including exhibits, documentaries, conferences, and research. Through such initiatives, the Union looked to consistently produce knowledge that validated the supposed historical and cultural connections of its members. It even created and promoted its own set of annual events and traditions including conferences and the annual Dia da Latinidade [Latinicity Day] and the Semana de la Latinidad [Latinicity Week].

Notably, the Portuguese state had a particularly visible role in the Union in its last decade, with state entities like the Instituto Camões [Camões Institute] (dedicated to the promotion of Portuguese language and culture around the world) and the State Secretary of Portuguese Communities office investing in the Union. Through such funding, the Union created a Prémio da Latinidade [Latinicity Prize], inaugurated in 2002, won each year until 2012 by a Portuguese writer, cineaste, political figure, architect, academic,
or artist, with the award ceremony hosted at the Instituto Camões in Lisbon. In this regard, the Union offered the Portuguese state yet another platform to exercise a revised imperial drive toward linguistic expansion and thereby relevance on the international stage, reincarnating the Estado Novo mantra of “Portugal não é um país pequeno” [“Portugal is not a small country”] and the so-called “pink map.”

Initiatives such as the Latin Union and other pan-Latinist articulations reproduce a Portuguese Latinness that straddles a line rendered visible by music artists like Ana Malhoa and Luciana Abreu. This calibration of Portuguese Latinness articulates connectivity to Latin America while racializing Latin American bodies via globally circulating sexual tropes in ways that reproduce the articulated whiteness of European Portugueseness. By the same token, these also reproduce the racial colonial divisions on which transatlantic cultural and linguistic connections were built, and that were repurposed by even the earliest articulations of pan-Latinism by Chevalier and Michelet.

**Ana Malhoa and the Performance of Latina Sexuality**

Malhoa’s entrance into the music industry began during her childhood as the daughter of famed popular music singer José Malhoa, who enjoyed particular stardom in the 1980s and early 1990s in the popular genre that would become known as pimba. Though the naming came from a 1995 hit song, “Pimba Pimba,” by another Portuguese artist, Emanuel, the genre itself existed under the ambiguous terminologies *música popular* [popular music] and *música folclórica* [folk music]. Regardless of the complexities of naming, the genre has long been associated with origins in rural Portuguese marginality and precarity, with lyrics evoking hyper-romantic sentimentalism and sexual innuendo always within the matrices of heterosexuality and cisgenderism. Though the genre has seen notable women performers such as Ágata and Rosinha, the majority of the genre’s most successful artists have been men such as Emanuel, José Malhoa, and Quim Barreiros. Indeed, the genre’s famous innuendos articulate and codify patriarchal power especially through sexual performativities based on overlapping dichotomies of masculine/feminine and active/passive. The very name “pimba” emerges from the articulation of cisgender heterosexual male penetration, derived from the lyrics of a 1994 song by Portuguese rock group Ex-Votos, titled “Subtilezas Porno-populares” [“Porno-popular Subtleties”]. Sonically, pimba songs are often comprised of, in addition to the aforementioned vocals, instruments including the accordion, electric keyboard, synthesizer, acoustic and electric guitars, and drums.
Pimba’s close ties to rural continental origins, as well as the Portuguese diaspora formed largely by rural emigrants to industrialized cities in the global economic center, means that it is often packaged and signified in marginalized ways in the national musical landscape, as Richard Elliot elaborates in notable contrast with fado:

[Pimba] is a deliberately “low” form of music and shuns most forms of sophistication; this quality as much as its musical style distinguishes it from contemporary Fado. Both musics have associations with revistas, and Fado has often been associated with low humor, but in general it has abandoned this approach for a more somber existentialism; one learns to understand and appreciate Fado over time, whereas Pimba is designed to be instantly catchy. Pimba is the dominant form of music in many village festivals and also has a vibrant presence on the streets of Lisbon, often becoming the soundtrack to the festas populares during the summer in a far more obvious way than Fado. (135)

Pimba’s ties to folkloric and romanticized spatial and cultural terrains of rural Portugal serve to situate it within overlapping paradigms of Portuguese rurality and romanticized whiteness in the late colonial and post-Estado Novo periods. As a result, we can posit Ana Malhoa’s emergence in Portuguese popular music, as daughter of José Malhoa and performing with him from childhood to her 20s, within a particular lineage of musical aesthetics that gave material visibility to a particular calibration of Portuguese whiteness while its institutional and capitalist existence was symbolically obfuscated by narratives of national racial exceptionalism.

As a famous teenager, Malhoa was also a fixture on Portuguese television, most notably as host of the children’s variety show and Saturday morning cartoon lineup Buéréré in the late 1990s. With the goal of reinventing her public image as a singer out of her father’s shadow and, most importantly, beyond the national confines of pimba sounds, Malhoa, her record label, and its larger industrial apparatus looked to position her first studio album, Ana Malhoa (2000), into Latin pop circuits via Portuguese-language remakes of Mexican popular music hits of the time as well as with US pop and techno/electronic dance music (EDM) sounds accompanying Portuguese lyrics on feminine sensuality, cisgender heterosexual romance, and unrequited love. The album’s first single, released in June of 1999, was notably a remake/translation of largely forgotten Mexican pop singer Norah de Vega’s single “¿Donde Están?” [“Where are You All?”] written by Leonardo Mora, translated thus “Onde Estão?” Meanwhile, the last single off the album was yet another remake, this time of Mexican pop star Thalía’s 1997 international hit “Amor...
a la Mexicana” [“Mexican Style Love”]. Malhoa’s version, co-written by Jorge do Carmo, was translated and re-titled into the nationalistic “Amor Lusitano” [“Lusitanian Love”]. Malhoa’s transition into Latin pop terrains was notably facilitated by the album’s international distribution and marketing via Universal Music Group, though it was produced and released in Portugal through Portuguese recording company Espacial.

Malhoa’s first album was only the beginning of a 20-year (and counting) musical trajectory into racialized global circuitries of popular cultural consumption that have also encompassed Angolan pop music genres kizomba and misnamed articulations of kuduro, house, EDM, and thus revised notions of Portuguese pimba. Her second album, Por Amor [For Love] (2001), included an original Spanish-language song titled “Mírame” [“Look at Me”], co-written by her and Jorge do Carmo—her first song performed entirely in Spanish. The album, in attaining certified gold sales status in Portugal, cemented her growing stardom in Portugal through a strategic blending of musical aesthetics hitherto unseen in Portuguese popular music, while bringing substantial profits to a burgeoning national music industry. Her third album, Eu [I] (2003), following a sonic aesthetic akin to her first two albums, featured a first single performed and released in both Portuguese as “Eu Ficarei” [“I Will Stay”] and Spanish as “Me Quedaré”—a romantic ballad.

Her fourth album represented a leap forward in her musical aestheticization and self-narration into racial and sexual notions of Latina womanhood, with the title, Eu Sou Latina [I am Latina] (2004), while also achieving certified gold status on Portuguese sales charts. Her first single from the album was her performance of Mexican singer-songwriter Marco Antonio Solís’s 1998 hit song “Si No Te Hubieras Ido” [“If You Hadn’t Left”], originally written for and released by Mexican-American singer Marisela in 1983. It was the album’s third single, also titled “Eu Sou Latina,” that most emphatically served to articulate Malhoa’s rendering into sexually fetishized imageries of cisgender Latina women. With her lyrics, directed at a subject who will be unable to resist the “tentação” [“temptation”] of her “lábios sedutores” [“seductive lips”], she declares by way of a warning:

Eu sou Latina
De corpo quente e negro olhar
Sina
De quem por mim se apaixonar
Eu sou Latina
De alma quente e sensual
E um negro olhar que é fatal.
Beyond the lyrics, the song also aims to evoke hyper-consumed sonic aesthetics of Latin pop music as it circulates globally as a reified entity in the global mapping of musical production and consumption, itself lending from histories of African diasporic and Indigenous soundscapes. For instance, and arguably replicating the sounds of two of the most circulated and consumed hit songs of the Latin pop category that traversed into the Anglophone world in recent decades—Puerto Rican singer Ricky Martin's two international hit singles “The Cup of Life” (1998) and “Livin' La Vida Loca” (1999), the beat of “Eu Sou Latina” appropriates common Salsa instrumentation and sound structure, itself derived from Afro-Cuban and Afro-Puerto Rican musical genres including Son Montuno, Mambo, Plena, and Bomba. The sound of Ricky Martin’s early solo success internationally as well as the 1990s hits of Thalía, known as the “Queen of Latin Pop,” came to define, in many ways, the sound of the frayed category during the 1990s, itself named by the US recording industry. While romantic ballads such as those of Spanish singer Julio Iglesias and Brazilian singer Roberto Carlos initially defined the category in the 1970s through Spanish and Portuguese language songs, Gloria Estefan’s crossover success into English-language singing over historically Afro-Caribbean instrumentation and arrangement intermingled with synthesizers and electronic sounds, as in her 1985 international hit song “Conga,” redefined the category as aligned with US-based notions of “Latin” sound and dance.

Malhoa’s claiming of her body and broader identity as Latina permits her to enter and, in turn commercially sustain itself via, the musical genres that are negotiated and reformulated into the category of Latin pop. In order to do so, she taps into the imagery of Latina womanhood that is most readily available to her—that which has been reified through the global white supremacist networks of visual media and cultural production dispersed and connected to global flows of said imagery. The image itself, as articulated in the lyrics of “Eu Sou Latina,” evoke a somatic topology of Latina corporality steeped in vague, non-Black, dark features that embody the hypersensuality ascribed to non-white women. In this regard, Malhoa looks to harness what Mayra Mendible hasconcisely theorized as “an almagam of eroticized, racialized
tropes about Latins that inform U.S. popular culture” while pointing out that “a complex history undergirds these imaginings, many of which still evoke familiar caricatures of ‘Latinness’” (3). These themselves can be traced back across European and US imperial textualities and discourses concerning Central American, South American, and Caribbean bodies and spaces, with imagery of gendered hypersexuality and accessibility underpinning and sustaining extractivist and exploitative logics of racial capital and Empire in the southern Americas.

Since her 2004 self-declaration as a Latina, Ana Malhoa has, throughout an ongoing prolific career traversing more than ten additional studio albums, repeatedly articulated herself through sexualized and racialized imageries conjured in dominant and often stereotyped renderings of Latinx women, while extracting and attempting to stand in for the experiences of Latinx women in spaces and temporalities of anti-Latinx orders of power—one of them being Portugal. This is in spite of nonetheless common narratives of Portuguese ethnic and cultural placement in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historiographies of Latinité that are today haphazardly superimposed on discourses of Latinidad that frame political and transnational cultural relations in Latin America and the Hispanic Caribbean as well as Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean diasporas in the United States.

Malhoa has publicly claimed the corporal and sexual textualities of Latin American and Latinx women while, and in the process, participating in the white Portugueseness that has informed and affirmed her place in Portuguese society—politically, institutionally, and culturally—while women of Latin American migrant backgrounds find their bodies to be sites of surveillance in Portugal—corporal borders that cognitively compartmentalize citizen from migrant in metropolitan imaginaries and the state apparatus. As Eliany Nazaré Oliveira uncovers with regards to Brazilian immigrant women in Portugal in the mid-2010s, for instance, Brazilian women tend to struggle with unemployment and must often settle for work in the highly gendered and racialized labor terrains of sex work or domestic labor (2019).¹ This material impact of the racial, gendered, and sexual signifiers of Latina womanhood—or merely its trope for Malhoa—is not only lost in Malhoa’s temporary and musical embodiment of such signifiers, it is strategically obfuscated at the hands of a state-sanctioned national recording industry and at the service of racial capital.

¹ For more on the trafficking of sex workers from Brazil to Portugal, see the work of Manuela Ribeiro and Octávio Sacramento (“Violence against Prostitutes”) and (“Mulheres marcadas”); as well as Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Conceição Gomes, and Madalena Duarte (“The Sexual Trafficking of Women”).
Malhoa’s self-styling into a fetishized Latina image would come to undergird her further insertion into Latin American, Caribbean, and Latinx music genres and webs of musical consumption. Her 2005 album, for instance, saw her position herself as a reggaeton artist with the title Hot Reggaeton and with a different artist name, Lil Queen, advertised as her reggaeton alter-ego. The album lists the famed and pioneering Dominican production team Luny Tunes as executive producers, though in reality the album was a collection of covers by Malhoa of songs from popular reggaeton artists such as Ivy Queen and Daddy Yankee that Luny Tunes had produced. Outside of Portugal, the album was only distributed in the United States and Canada, presumably in large part to the Portuguese-American communities based there. In this regard, Malhoa, her team, and the Espacial record label were arguably less concerned with geographically expanding Malhoa’s stardom into new markets than with reformulating her national celebrity through a musical genre that, as with other countries in the mid-2000s, had seen growing popularity in Portugal.

This was notably the case following the international hits of Puerto Rican reggaeton artists such as Wisin & Yandel’s “Rakatá” (2005), Hector y Tito’s “Baila Morena” (2004), and especially Daddy Yankee’s “Gasolina” (2004)—all of which enjoyed substantial circulation on Portuguese radio, televised music video programs, and nightclub sets. Many such songs, including those listed, evoked, through their own patriarchal and racial complicities, a sexualized Latina image, the contours of which aligned in many ways with those of existing stereotypes and fantasies of Latinx women and that Malhoa has looked to appropriate. For Malhoa, inserting herself in the production and consumption of reggaeton, even in such an openly superficial way as covering songs was mainly about tapping into the “newness” of the genre’s growing international popularity to reinvent herself and thus reproduce her celebrity through what for her is merely a temporary terminology of self-identification and sexual visibility in the Portuguese public sphere. In other words, Malhoa’s performativity of reified and “trendy” Latina imagery can be thought of as merely a mechanism towards the consistent objective of reproducing stardom through what is also a public attempt at perhaps rethinking the limits of Portugueseness or harnessing its historicized supposed capacity for cultural fluidity.

2 See Rivera, Marshall, and Hernández for a succinct history of reggaeton, its grassroots yet transnational emergence, and its relationship to other particular musical genres (such as hip-hop, reggae, and Latin pop) and a broader panorama of musical production and consumption.
Her next studio album, *Nada Me Pára* [Nothing Can Stop Me] (2007) would return to her previous sound aligned with the sonic norms of the Latin pop category of the late 1990s and early 2000s, with renewed evocations of “sangue latino” [“Latin blood”] in the first single from the album, also titled “Nada Me Pára.” The same is true for her following album titled *Exótica* [Exotic] of 2008, with a song titled “Minha Alma Latina” [“My Latin Soul”] in which, according to the song’s lyrics in the repeated chorus, the so-called “Latin soul” is expressed through the intensity of romantic attraction and desire:

Alma latina apaixonada
Alma latina enamorada
Quero ficar sempre a teu lado
Quero ter o teu amor

[Impassioned Latin soul
Enamored Latin soul
I want to be forever by your side
I want your love] (“Minha Alma Latina” n.p.)

Malhoa would go on to double down on this imagery with what would become one of her most successful singles, “Bomba Latina (Yo Soy Latina)” [“Latin Bombshell (I am Latina)”), from what was then her highest selling album, tellingly titled in Spanish *Caliente* [Hot] (2011). The album attained platinum status, arguably aided by Universal Music Group distributing an album of hers worldwide for the first time. The song’s chorus evokes the same imagery as those previously cited:

Bomba latina
Sou pura adrenalina
Uma paixão de rosas e espinhos
Caliente como o fogo

Bomba latina
O ritmo que domina
Sensual eu vivo a vida
Sem medo da loucura do amor.

[Latin bombshell
I am pure adrenaline
A passion of roses and thorns
*Caliente* like fire
Latin bombshell
The rhythm that controls you
Sensual is how I live life
Without fear of love’s madness] ("Bomba Latina" n.p.)

Latina-ness is once again and repeatedly reduced to a strict and narrow set of signifiers concerning hypersexuality and uncontrollable “hot-blooded” love that consumes the implied receiver of the song’s narrative.

Her next album, the multi-platinum Azúcar [Sugar] (2013)—evocative of long-standing fantasies of non-white women’s hypersensuality in Latin American and Caribbean musical genre and broader cultural production—saw her transition once more to reggaeton by way of a hybridized Latin pop/house sound that garnered success in the early 2010s for Latinx artists such as Pitbull and Jennifer Lopez. Most songs on the album are bilingual—sung by Malhoa alternating between Portuguese and Spanish, with the project produced once again by Luny Tunes. Malhoa would then struggle to attain similar success with her next two albums, Superlatina [Super Latina] (2015) and Futura [Future] (2016), performing a similar fusion of reggaeton and house that she and her production team labeled “Tropical Urbano” [“Urban Tropical”].

With the latter album failing to reach gold status in Portugal, Malhoa, one can surmise from an apparent shift in sonic aesthetics, looked for a new sound, leaving behind reggaeton for other racialized musical inflections, most notably Brazilian funk, or baile funk. In the process, Malhoa once again traffics professionally in the complicated waters of self-insertion into modes of cultural production and expression emerging from specific material and local conditions of racial capital. Like the case of reggaeton in Puerto Rico and the broader Hispanophone Caribbean, funk gained popularity through producers and consumers located in urban marginalities of Brazil, first in Rio de Janeiro, then in other large Brazilian cities and shanty towns. As Sandra D’Angelo theorizes, funk, as a genre, “offers a strong sense of place: a pictorial place of art and dreams, a meaningful place of action and, finally, a utopic place for thousands of socially excluded youths living in harsh conditions in Brazilian shanty towns” (44).³ For similar reasons, funk is profoundly and overlappingly racialized and sexualized in the Brazilian, and by extension, international spheres of musical consumption. The dynamics of creative expression in the face of, and in combat with, discourses and materialities of racial capital

³ D’Angelo’s piece also offers comprehensive historical background on Funk as well as a cogent explanation of its particular sonic and visual characteristics.
are effaced or highjacked by Malhoa (and her management) for the purpose of once again reinventing her musical branding.

Her 2017 single “Ampulheta” [“Hourglass”] marked the grand revealing of her new sound as the description of the song, accompanying its placement in the digital marketplaces of iTunes and YouTube, makes clear: “‘Ampulheta’ é uma evolução na continuidade do projeto de Ana Malhoa, impondo-se pela sua camaleónica irreverência e estilo inspirador. Um novo tema em que as raízes urbanas se misturam com as harmonias latinas, criando a ambíência perfeita” [“‘Ampulheta’ is the evolution in the continuing oeuvre of Ana Malhoa, imposing herself through her chameleonic irreverence and inspiring style. A new title in which urban roots mix with Latin harmonies, creating the perfect ambiance”] (“Ana Malhoa—Ampulheta” n.p.). The song in question features a bassline pattern that is characteristic of funk behind house and electronic dance music synthesizer notes during the chorus. In incorporating funk sounds and aesthetics into her music and its performance, Malhoa adds yet another urban genre into her exploitative musical repertoire, joining not only reggaeton, but also trap (emerging as a subgenre of hip-hop in Atlanta, USA in the early 2000s before gaining popularity in Latin America and the Caribbean), and kuduro (originating in shanty towns of Luanda, Angola in the early 1990s). Malhoa’s venturing into kuduro implied sounds less common in the genre itself than in the commercialization of the term in popular reggaeton and house songs such as Lucenzo’s “Vem Dançar Kuduro” [“Come Dance Kuduro”] and its subsequent revision into the international hit “Danza Kuduro” with Puerto Rican reggaeton star Don Omar.

As the description of “Ampulheta” notes, Malhoa’s reinvention, or “evolution,” is still articulated via popular Latin American and Caribbean sounds. Moreover, the single was Malhoa’s first release through her own record label, La Dueña Records. Her foray into funk thus represents her own expansion of the geographic borders of her “Latina” aesthetics, now including urban Brazil within the web of fantasized spatialities evoked through her musical production. Her musical shift included another component at the visual level, particularly in the music video for “Ampulheta” in which orientalist imagery and fantasies are deployed. The video begins with wide shots of an unnamed mountainous area of arid land made to resemble a desert, and in her first appearances in the video, Malhoa emerges at the top of a cliff and dons a niqab covering only her face, hair, and neck (not her shoulders) along with a sleeveless body suit and thigh-high boots. The second close-up of Malhoa sees her wearing rhinestones on her face with a hijab over just her hair and shoulders. Her purported and self-proclaimed “Latina” musicality, even as it is revised, continues to be the mechanism
by which she reinvents herself and her place in the national musical marketplace, just as it was when she transitioned from child star who sang alongside her father and later on children’s television programming.

Other white Portuguese celebrities have also “transitioned” musically into Latin pop and popular Latin American musical aesthetics through racialized sexual signifiers that are part of the “Latina” corporal trope—with another notable figure being Luciana Abreu (1985–) who became a teenage national sensation in 1999 after winning the televised singing contest, Cantigas da Rua [Songs from the Street], which aired nationally on the SIC network, before gaining renewed notoriety for her audition on Idolos (part of the international Idols franchise) in 2004. From there, she became a television star, being casted as the titular protagonist of the Portuguese version of the teenage soap opera Floribella, running from 2006 to 2008, and adapted from the Argentine teen soap opera Floricienta offering a national and modern spin on the Cinderella tale.

Following a highly successful musical career as a teenager, with multi-platinum albums as her Floribella persona as well as a solo album, Lucy (2008), which sold six times platinum, Abreu went on a several-years hiatus from music before returning in the 2010s in search of a musical and pop star identity that would shed her teeny-bopper image of the previous decade. In order to sexually rebrand herself, she too began incorporating Latin pop, Latin house, Bachata, and kizomba sounds into her music, most notably on her 2017 album Luciana Abreu, which featured the single “Camarón” in which Abreu sings in Spanish over a Latin house beat. Though she departs from Malhoa’s self-articulation as a “Latina,” Abreu’s “Camarón” also claims “Traigo la música latina en las venas” [“I carry Latin music in my veins”]. Furthermore, and also akin to Malhoa, Abreu’s song conjures up sexualized corporal topologies historically projected onto (though often reclaimed by) Latinx women, such as “tumbao” and hip-swaying. Similar signifiers find their way into other Spanish-language songs of Abreu. In this regard, these sorts of fetishized racial/gender topologies are harnessed into, and ultimately serve to articulate the career and biographical transition from teenage celebrity to sexually affirmational adult music star.

As Isabel Molina Guzmán reminds us, the visual (as well as musical) representation of Latina-ness repeatedly constructs Latina bodies as “ambiguous symbols for marketing and selling difference” (127—in Mendible). Ana Malhoa’s insertion into and assumption of fetishized Latina imagery in the context of the Portuguese public sphere complicates this further as such a sphere and its national discourses continue to conjure, at some level, fantasies of malleable Portuguese ethnic formation. Nonetheless, Malhoa seeks to overtly perform corporal and cultural
symbols of fantasized Latina-ness in a reified manner that itself runs parallel to the reification and categorization of so-called Latin musical genres in the global marketplaces of musical commodity circulation. The fantasized Latina topos is, moreover, an integral and consumable object in the transnational—especially in North American and European spaces and imaginaries—circulation of many cultural commodities categorized as “Latin” for non-Latin consumption. Myra Mendible concisely and poignantly theorizes “the Latina body” as “a convenient fiction—a historically contingent, mass-produced combination of myth, desire, location, marketing, and political expedience” (1).

In the context of a (still) imperially nostalgic and driven Portuguese public sphere, “the Latina body” as it is articulated by Malhoa continues to be both part of a continually conjured imperial cartography as well as a signifier of a confusing sometimes conflation, sometimes dissonance, between contemporary Inter-American enunciations of Latinidad and early nineteenth century European and South American historiographies of shared Latinité across Romance-language-speaking Europe and formerly colonized Central American, South American, and Caribbean nations. In this regard, the strategic performativity of a reified Latina-ness by Malhoa and others like Luciana Abreu and Kátia Aveiro—“building on the assumption that ethnic groups are constituted through various classificatory, discursive acts and corporeal exchanges” (Mendible 3)—serves as both a binding and divorcing point of the two narratives on collective “Latin” identities. In other words, the reified “Latina body” as object of consumption binds by recharting nineteenth-century imperial imaginaries and historically “permits” European (and especially Iberian) access to Latin American cultural forms for late capitalist convenience; while it also divorces by reinstating European/Latin American dichotomies along racialized lines, with “the Latina body” acting as a discursive and corporal border separating Europeanness from Latin Americanness, European whiteness from non-European otherness. This conflation and dissonance between Latinité and Latinidad provide the historical backdrop and historiography that allow Malhoa and her music to articulate the border between Portuguese whiteness and non-Portuguese otherness as she traverses racialized music genres; from the racial-gender normative aesthetics of pimba and its evoked whiteness, to Latina fetishization in her performance of Latin Pop and Black diasporic musical traditions.
Lucenzo, *Latinidad*, and Afro-Diasporic Expressive Cultures

While the strategic and caricaturized appropriation of *Latinidad*—in its sexualized and racialized forms, “permitted” historically by Portuguese associations with both *Latinidad* and *Latinité*—has become part of musical production and celebrity-making in the Portuguese public sphere by Portugal-based artists, another artist of Portuguese origin has taken this aesthetic onto a global scale. In discussing Portuguese deployments of *Latinidad*, aesthetically or in the realms of celebrity persona-making, French-born artist of Portuguese parents, Lucenzo, begs particular analysis for his rise in music from local act in Bordeaux to global star, one-hit-wonder status notwithstanding. Born Luís Filipe Oliveira in 1983 in Bordeaux to Portuguese parents hailing from rural Vila Flor of the Bragança district of northeastern Portugal, Lucenzo began his musical career as a local rap artist alongside other Portuguese emigrants in the Bordeaux area, with whom he formed a group named Les Portuguais de Bordeaux [The Portuguese of Bordeaux] as a teenager. His first song of relative success in terms of circulation was “Portugal é Nossa Terra” [“Portugal is Our Land”], released in 2006 and accruing a niche listenership among Portuguese emigrants, especially those in Francophone spaces due to the song’s rap lyrics in French separated by the sung chorus in Portuguese, both over a synthesized accordion of traditional Portuguese “popular music” (often found in pimba and circulated significantly across Portuguese emigrant communities) and a sped-up bassline.

The following year saw Lucenzo attempt to expand his audience linguistically with two songs featuring lyrics in Spanish in the chorus, though dominated by French rap lyrics with a few words in Portuguese peppered throughout. These were “Emigrante del Mundo” [“Emigrant of the World”] over a reggae guitar pattern and bassline, and “Dame Reggaeton” [“Give Me Reggaeton”] over a reggaeton bassline and synthesizer including a Bachata guitar patter made to be reminiscent of Daddy Yankee’s global hit song of 2004 “Lo que Pasó, Pasó” [“What Happened, Happened”]—with both choruses repeating their Spanish-language song titles. This early phase of Lucenzo’s career, pre-stardom, was already marked by his use of multiple Black diasporic musical genres—hip-hop, reggae, and reggaeton. In cursorily discussing Lucenzo’s musical trajectory and his proximity to Black expressive cultures, particularly reggaeton, Petra R. Rivera-Rideau highlights the marginalization that Portuguese working-class emigrants face in other Western and Central European host nations, often working and residing in contact with African migrant and Afro-diasporic communities. This experience within the everyday life of racial capital surely played a role
in Lucenzo’s musical formation, but the trajectory of his artist development, with him in collaboration with his management and record labels, further complicates his relationship to Afro-diasporic musical expressions and to global terrains of Blackness.

The aforementioned songs were released through French record label Yanis Records and distributed through Scorpio France. “Emigrante del Mundo,” through both its titles and lyrics, looked to aesthetically place Lucenzo as a global multi-lingual artist, able to traverse different linguistic and cultural markets through not only language but of musical genre incorporation. This shift in Lucenzo’s artistic image and work temporally overlapped with the emergence of global popular culture stars that similarly centered multi-lingual lyrics (especially in terms of some of the largest language musical markets—the Anglophone and Hispanophone) and Afro-diasporic musical traditions, though in commoditized and mediated forms for global and white consumptions. Even at this early stage of his career, one can identify parallels between his musical aesthetics and established stars, most clearly Cuban-American artist Pitbull (Armando Christian Pérez) who, like Lucenzo, began his foray into music as a rapper having grown up in close proximity to Miami’s African American community and the global impact of hip-hop and its cultural and aesthetic politics. As a bilingual artist, Pitbull (and his management) were able to transition first to reggaeton through his lyricism at similar tempos to that of rap music and then to the popular electronic hybrids hip house and Latin pop. Lucenzo’s self-fashioning as “Emigrante del Mundo” (also the name of his first studio album released in 2011) is, moreover, evocative of Pitbull’s own self-proclamation and marketing as “Mr. Worldwide.”

Through this sort of terminology, both position themselves as global artists while justifying their exploitation of Black musical forms from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. This is justified through the deployment of frayed global citizenship discourses that misrecognize or fail to account for the racial and gendered politics of such citizenship that bar particular subject-positions from nation-state citizenship as well as from easy transit from state to state. In the cases of Pitbull and Lucenzo, for instance, access to the global and to global consumer acceptance hinges upon their cis-gendered heteronormative whiteness and fair-skinned somatic appearance, allied to their deployment of hyper-consumed Black cultural forms—the latter always operating in complex tandem with the barring of Blackness from citizenship, the hyper-surveillance of Black bodies globally, and the postcolonial and post-abolition economic structures of anti-Black racism.

The title of “Emigrante del Mundo” adds yet another discursive layer of global access in relation to Pitbull’s “Mr. Worldwide.” As opposed to global
citizenship, Lucenzo’s term evokes access to global terrains of (always racialized) cultural production and consumption through an imagery of de-centeredness suggested by the term “emigrant.” If citizenship implies institutional and cultural belonging, the state of being emigrant everywhere and always in the time-space of the global suggests the lack of belonging to a particular national or local culture or space of meaning-making. This sort of self-proclaimed identitarian indeterminacy and implicit celebration of un-belonging is thus reminiscent and evocative of other prevalent Portuguese and Lusophone discourses of ethnic hybridism, cultural syncretism, and fantasies of global reach. While conjuring images of these, Lucenzo’s title also performs the concomitant effacement of the structures of racial capital that permit his privileged movement across spaces and access to musical genres/visual aesthetics. In other words, by renaming this access into “emigrant,” a term of marginalization that racialized groups have projected onto them by apparatures of power, the racial and gendered structures of coloniality and capital are rendered illegible. In this sense, Lucenzo’s claim of perpetual unbelonging to any particular space is, in some ways, reminiscent of Agualusa’s claim of being “without race” (cited and discussed in chapter one), especially if we acknowledge that global spaces in the ongoing era of racial capital are always-already racialized. For Lucenzo’s musical and aesthetic trajectory this means a sort of “built-in” justification and legitimation of his (and his collaborators/stakeholders in the music industry) accessing and exploiting of Afro-diasporic cultural forms.

Though Lucenzo’s early musical productions landed largely niche audiences, record labels like Yanis and then global conglomerate Universal Music Group arguably saw in him, or projected onto him, a formula for international sales and circulation success that was already in operation through artists like Pitbull. Lucenzo’s breakthrough hit came a couple of years later in January of 2010 with “Vem Dançar Kuduro” [“Come Dance Kuduro”] featuring France-based US artist DJ Big Ali, with the song breaking into the top 15 hits in six different countries, including a number one peak position in Sweden, number two in France, and number five in Belgium. With this particular song, Lucenzo looked to incorporate yet another Black musical form into his artistic repertoire, with the title highlighting kuduro, a music and dance genre emerging from the marginalized and impoverished outskirts of postcolonial Luanda, Angola in the 1980s as residents and artists looked to make sense of and grapple with the effects of the ongoing Angolan Civil War (1975–2002) and the earlier anti-colonial Angolan War of Independence (1961–75).

Kuduro’s name stems from a bilingual double entendre, with one meaning coming from Kimbundu signifying a difficult situation, and another coming
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from Portuguese, meaning “hard ass,” thus speaking to the corporal performativity of the genre and its epistemological importance in relation to violence over African bodies. The genre itself has an important legacy from a particularly challenging moment in Angolan history, an art of the body and sound-creation emanating from the need to survive a period of destruction of both the body politic and the literal body of the populace. As Hershini Young aptly underscores in her exploration of kuduro’s performative politics of disability (tied to the war’s consequences on the bodies of residents), the genre “includes both able-bodied and debilitated bodies, and uses a somatic vocabulary that reflects the material effects of postcolonial violence on African bodies” (391). Young, throughout her paper, goes on to highlight the ways that kuduro “forces us to rethink performance, race, and embodiment in ways that foreground the legacy of historical violence and that decenter normative ideals of the black body” (392).

In Lucenzo’s song, however, this importance of kuduro in the spaces of its origins is completely erased from the sonic and lyrical terrains of the track. More specifically, the song’s rhythm is largely devoid of any sounds characteristic of the genre. With its bassline more characteristic of house-reggaeton combinations alongside a synthesized accordion loop, the song was deceivingly received on the international stage as a kuduro track, but appealing to fans of reggaeton and electronic dance genres in Europe. The music video’s imagery accompanying the beat and all-Portuguese lyrics also contributed aesthetically to this parallel with reggaeton. The song’s music video, with over 37 million views on YouTube as of July 2021, was filmed in Old Havana, with some of the staged bodies (most of whom were of African descent) dancing steps and movements more aligned with Caribbean forms like salsa and merengue than with kuduro. Furthermore, the video’s mise-en-scène focuses heavily on the physical and architectural decay of the city’s old urban center, arguably in a way that is strategically made to resemble a decaying colonial capital populated by Black bodies in an aesthetic of postcolonial precarity, one that to the Western/global northern consumer can serve as a stand-in for an array of global southern geographies of Africa and the African diaspora.

This sort of visual aesthetic impacting the cultural circulation of the song, alongside its Hispanic Caribbean sonic traits (long a part of Lucenzo’s musical trajectory), arguably led to the collaborative remake of the song that catapulted Lucenzo to another level of notoriety. In August of 2010, a mere eight months following the original song’s release, the remake of the song was released by acclaimed Puerto Rican reggaeton artist Don Omar with the title “Danza Kuduro,” featuring Lucenzo with the former’s vocals in Spanish and the latter’s in Portuguese. It featured on and was the breakout single of
Don Omar’s album, *Meet the Orphans*, released in November of that year. The song became an undoubted global hit, topping circulation and sales charts at different points in 12 different countries and charting in a host more; and sold multi-platinum in six nations, including five times platinum in the United States. The remake’s music video, with over 1.2 billion views on YouTube (as of July 2021) and one of the first music videos to break the billion-view barrier, features a markedly different aesthetic to that of the original.

Rather than foregrounding a physical space of postcolonial precarity in spheres of the African diaspora, “Danza Kuduro” centers spaces inhabited by members of the diaspora but enjoyed and consumed by international bourgeoisies. Filmed in the Saint Martin Collectivity, the northern French-controlled part of the Caribbean island of St. Martin, the video features intertwined scenes of Don Omar and Lucenzo on a yacht or in the outdoor poolside and waterfront areas of an upscale tourist resort or villa. Despite the change of scenery from one video to another, both enact forms of racialization that intersect with sexualizing imagery of women from the dominant cisgender male gaze embodied by both Don Omar and Lucenzo. What is more, the women populating the video’s ordering of gendered power structures are largely Black and Brown and embodying the racial and sexual trope of the mixed-race standards of sensuality and anti-Black racial ambiguity, veering away from dark-skinned presence. In this regard, the female bodies inhabiting the video’s spaces of subalternity vis-à-vis the song’s artists embody the racially ambiguous and sexualized image of “morena” evoked repeatedly by Lucenzo’s lyrics of the chorus in the original and the remake.

_Balança que é uma loucura_
_Morena vem a meu lado_
_Ninguém vai ficar parado_
_Quero ver mexer cú duro_

[She sways like madness
Morena come by side
No one will stand idle
I want to see you shake your hard ass]

As Rivera-Rideau points out regarding the sexual politics of the video in question, “the heteronormative and patriarchal gender relations evident in ‘Danza Kuduro’ are not surprising given that similar gender representations pervade many Reggaetón music videos and lyrics” (160).

In this sense, Lucenzo and his management are able to successfully situate him in the gendered and racialized orders of reggaeton and international
popular music via the original “Vem Dançar Kuduro” and the remake. Such
a movement in terms of image and celebrity-making is also made possible
by his own strategic ambiguity as “Emigrante del Mundo”—the title of his
full debut album, released in September of 2011 and featuring both versions
of the song, and opening with “Danza Kuduro.” The album itself failed to
chart in Latin American and Caribbean markets, but managed to appeal most
heavily to European, non-Spanish-speaking audiences with interest in the
sonic aesthetics of reggaeton, house, rap, and limited stereotyped notions of
“Latin music” sung in French and Portuguese. Emigrante del Mundo the album
thus charted in France with a peak position of eight, in Switzerland with
a position of 15, in Portugal peaking at 24, and in Austria peaking at 60.

Until this point, Lucenzo has been unable to remotely replicate the
success of the “Vem Dançar Kuduro”/“Danza Kuduro” moment, though he
has forged collaborative efforts with other global superstars of popular
music including Jamaican artist Sean Paul. The years immediately following
“Emigrante del Mundo” saw him reuse racial and sexual imagery similar
to that of his earlier hits, with a similar focus on continuing his insertion
into the ambiguous global markets of “Latin music” most notably with his
single “Obsesión”—a remake of the 2002 hit song by Dominican-American
Bachata group Aventura. Here he sings the verses of the song in Spanish
while French-Algerian singer Kenza Farah sings the chorus in Spanish in one
version of the song, and in French in another version. The song was released
as one of the singles in a collective album titled Tropical Family in 2013,
comprised of French artists of various African and Caribbean backgrounds,
plus Lucenzo thus cementing his musical place among non-European forms
for European markets.

Conclusion

The music artists covered in this chapter have all forged or reinvented
their careers by taking particular aesthetics associated with frayed and
(in the Portuguese and international public spheres) often over-simplified
aesthetics of Latinidad and Latin American and Caribbean music genres. This
sort of musical appropriation, in varyingly caricaturized forms, has been
taken on with different references to Portuguese inclusion in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century French and Southern European notions of Latinité, often
intertwining it with contemporary constructions of Latinidad, centuries after
the two discursively drifted from each other as a result of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century processes of migration, racialization, and developing
moments of racial capital and Empire in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In the process of inserting themselves into so-called Latin music genres
and markets, such artists have looked to African and Afro-diasporic musical forms and expressions often harnessing and staging hyper-visible and consumed images of Blackness into their sonic and visual products.

It is worth noting that several other prominent white Portuguese music artists have also performed similar exploitations, and to overt racist effect. These include Ana Malhoa’s father, José Malhoa, and his 2015 pimba single, “Morena Kuduro,” whose lyrics repeatedly refer to “o Kuduro/cu duro daquela morena” [“the Kuduro/hard-ass of that morena”], utilizing the term “Kuduro” as a sexual innuendo alluding to the buttocks of an ambiguously dark-featured woman. Even Portuguese celebrities that are not music artists have performed similar musical trends. For instance, comedian and television personality Rui Unas made a musical contribution along these lines in a song ahead of Portugal’s participation in the 2014 World Cup held in Brazil titled “A Dança do Campeão” [“The Dance of the Champion”]. In the kuduro-inflected song, featuring Luciana Abreu and Angolan-born Portuguese DJ Mastiksoul, Unas delivers rap-style lyrics over a kuduro beat in a caricaturized “Angolan” accent similar to that found in the sketch comedy program Os Malucos do Riso [Laughing Lunatics] (chapter three). Drawing on the song’s lyrics, kuduro is, at least in part, exploited here to approximate Portuguese musical tastes and ethnic formation to that of host country Brazil, in which reified notions of Blackness for hegemonic consumptions have been circuited by white elites into national notions of collective racial indeterminacy.

These are, of course, also central to hegemonic notions of Latinidad as foregrounded in the aesthetic terrains of “Latin music” curated and circulated by global northern media conglomerates. Herein lies the greater connection between these two examples (of several others) and the cultural and historic signifiers evoked by the career trajectories and celebrity-making processes of artists like Ana Malhoa, Luciana Abreu, and Lucenzo. The latter group, more consistently than the former, have centered Portuguese ethnic and racial indeterminacy while discursively promoting the misrecognition of long-held structures of white supremacy and racial capital of which the imperial projects of the Portuguese past and the current economic systems of the Portuguese state have long participated in.
Epilogue

As Portugal—as a nation-state, public sphere, and power structure—assesses its colonial history through both celebratory and critical stances, and everything in between, much of this history is refashioned in seemingly innocuous yet ingrained ways in quotidian life. Herein lies the importance of interrogating these in the contexts of popular cultures in which many of these refashionings and legacies are commoditized across industries of cultural production and even in food production, as in the case of Moaçor’s “Mulata” cookies. Rather than focusing on some of the most visible and readily legible collective reminiscences of empire, often wrapped in colonial nostalgia, as with the continued celebrations of the so-called Discoveries (in the form of monuments, historical figures, and historical dates, or the online poll to select the seven world wonders of Portuguese origin in 2009),¹ I preferred to explore the ways in which discourses of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism, national formation, and orientalism continue to inform the production and consumption of cultural commodities and even the public persona-fashioning of some celebrities. The 2009 poll, for instance, is made up of churches and forts from different parts of the world where Portuguese imperial power was enacted, whether through settlement in former colonies or in important parts of trade routes controlled by the Portuguese, but only tells a portion of the story concerning the depths of Portuguese coloniality today.

Coloniality lives on not only in these terrains of cultural production, but also in the material structures of the (post-)imperial nation-state, within which the former are embedded. For starters, the curated and commoditized racial fluidity of celebrities is grounded in a Eurocentric societal terrain in which whiteness as an ongoing material project is based on the exploitation of non-white bodies in both the imperial past as well as in the contemporary nation-state. Furthermore, as Shirley Anne Tate theorizes with respect to

¹ https://projetos.7maravilhas.pt
the growing trends of racial cosplay/blackfishing among social media influencers:

This practical consciousness of knowing one's whiteness at the same time as exploiting Black bodies for profit continues the racial capitalism of enslavement and colonialism. Rather than direct use of Black bodies as labor and unit of value, we see instead the twenty-first century's white grasp of the value of Black bodies through the multiplier effect of Instagram's construction of the social, cultural, and economic capitals of racial cosplay/ blackfishing. (206)

Blackfishing, the definition of which we see at play in Raquel Tavares's admission of "wearing other cultures," also hinges on the continued exclusion of Black bodies in the visual renderings of modern Portuguese society in mainstream cultural production. In this regard Black bodies are to be excised from the spaces of national articulation, barred from social mobility within racial capital, and exploited for labor in low-wage positions and industrial sectors. This coincides with the disparity in value attributed to racialized bodies, and in the cases of situational value in which, as with blackfishing, Blackness—or white fantasies of it—is extracted and assumed only in particularly contexts, whether on vacation in Africa or in venturing into Afro-diasporic cultural forms like samba, but discarded when it comes to occupying nationalist fantasies of Portuguese musical forms (that is, fado) or white bourgeois platforms that visually render modern Portugueseness through pale white skin and white beauty standards.

The historical contexts of Portuguese coloniality in which blackfishing and other forms of articulation of racial ambiguity and fluidity emerge in the public sphere must be taken into account as they add further layers to the act. More specifically, as I argued in chapters four and five, the discourses of Portuguese exceptionalism and racial syncretism that legitimized settler colonialism permit these acts to be not only misrecognized in the public sphere, but also consumed. In the process, these acts, performances, and curations of self further reproduce narratives of colonial exceptionalism and national ethnic and cultural formation.

The narratives and the broader discursive realm of coloniality, though, are inseparable from the material life of coloniality. As mentioned above, the racial compartmentalization that celebrities perform when blackfishing in specific social contexts while reverting to legible standards of white personhood reinforce the compartmentalization of Black and other non-white bodies from particular aspects of society, particularly social mobility, thus reproducing the precarity of racialized labor, which continues to be an economic core
of racial capitalism today in Portugal. As chapter three on sporting labor underscores, particularly in the footballoing world and especially on the part of Black players, racial capital today, decades after settler colonialism, depends, namely in urban centers, on the labor of African, South American, and Eastern European migrants and their children, many of whom were born in Portugal. More broadly than football, contemporary Portuguese capitalism depends on maintaining a racial division of labor inaugurated through European expansion. The maintenance of such a division requires a multitude of mechanisms (from incarceration, surveillance, de facto segregation, lack of access to education and institutional privileges) and building on the material legacies of colonial exploitation and exclusion in then colonies as well as those that emanate from the centuries long lack of investment in human capital in the metropolis during Portugal’s imperial project.

The sort of analysis conducted here on the topics and forms of cultural production explored also seeks to pinpoint the depths in which continued forms of racial othering in both cultural and media realms as well as in material and institutional life of the Portuguese nation-state relate to a particularly ongoing identitarian endeavor of Europeanization. In studying racialization processes and racial capitalism in Europe, one should never take Europe as a given geo-political and cultural entity. Rather, Europeanness must be understood as an ongoing historical project of nation-making and whiteness-making. This would, at least in part, explain the racial xenophobia of not only right-wing groups and political parties throughout Europe, but also in mainstream rhetoric on immigration, and also the very positioning of southern Europe as a fortress physically barring non-white and non-Christian bodies from entering, but also protecting the claims to whiteness that have structured European identities, national and otherwise.

Despite the prevalence of discourses of racial fluidity in not only late colonial rhetoric but also in dominant forms of national historicization in the nineteenth century (as discussed in chapter one), Europeanness as a white formation was nonetheless embraced as part of the material machinery of racial capitalism as well as part of Portuguese national identity. Whiteness must also be understood materially as derived from the structures and logics of racial exploitation and extraction, determined by the racial ascribing of which bodies were to be exploited. As much as Portuguese and Brazilian intellectuals, from Oliveira Martins to Gilberto Freyre, historiographically posited Portugueseness on the fringes of Europeanness, whiteness was claimed and performed on an everyday level of controlling the means of production based on racial divisions of labor and in the quotidian reality of freedom versus captivity, and more recently, of citizenship versus migranthood.
As chapters one and two explored, moreover, Portuguese national emergence and identity participated actively in the colonial formations of whiteness in terms of its material and ideological terrains, across national European imperial projects, most notably through what would/has become known as orientalism. Not only have Portuguese intellectuals and cultural producers of the nineteenth century to the present (from Eça de Queirós to José Rodrigues dos Santos and Ana Malhoa) incorporated orientalist imageries into their creative repertoires, and concomitantly, the epistemologies of whiteness that consolidated themselves via orientalism, but orientalism can be found at the heart of Portuguese national formation. As my citation of AbdoolKarim Vakil in chapter two pointed out, the very concept of Portuguese nationhood was based on Reconquista of land, commodities, and knowledge from Arab and Muslim control. In other words, the very emergence of Portuguese nationhood, as it expanded from its stronghold of what would become northern coastal Portugal south and east bound, was based on an inscription and classification of Muslim people and knowledges as outsiders and pernicious threats to Christianity. The legacies of this equivalence of Portugueseness, and more broadly, Europeanness with fair skin and Christianity would come to structure national, European, and imperial structures of racial power and exploitation.

Though my project looks to understand how popular cultures have served as terrains through which coloniality has been reproduced and persistently normalized, these same terrains are also important grounds in which coloniality has been publicly contested. The book's introduction cites rapper Valete, for instance. Beyond him, however, Portuguese hip-hop, or rather hip-hop in Portugal, has been an important and decades-old (yet still dynamic) vehicle of contestation against white supremacy, state violence against racialized lives, contemporary racial exploitation, and even concepts of Portuguese Europeanness and narratives of colonial exceptionalism. This has been done by artists who explicitly depict and signify the everyday violence of racial capitalism in Portugal while also developing modes of knowing and living beyond those imparted by coloniality. In some cases, Portuguese hip-hop artists offer decolonial alternatives to dominant Portuguese and Lusophone cartographies and also contest the hegemony of Portuguese language, and in the process the racial duality of citizen versus migrant that has come to impact individual identity formation, by writing and performing in Cape Verdean Creole, or to a lesser extent, Guinea-Bissauan Creole.

For more see Sebastião B Cerqueira’s "Forgetting How to Swim."
See Bert P. Vanspauwen’s "Lusofonia as Intervention."
See Derek Pardue’s Cape Verde, Let’s Go.
Beyond hip-hop, other musical genres have been sights of decolonial discourse and action against the gendered and racial forms of colonial power. Fado artists have also participated in this movement, especially emerging fado talents like the duo Fado Bicha⁵ [Fado Queer], two of the few openly queer fado performers and writers, who have been arguably the most consistently critical and public fado voices against Portuguese coloniality. For instance, their song, “Lisboa, Não Sejas Racista” [“Lisbon, Don’t be Racist”] of 2019, a rewriting of Amália Rodrigues’s famous fado song “Lisboa, Não Sejas Francesa” [“Lisbon, Don’t be French”] contains lyrics such as:

Revisita a tua história
senhora Lisboa
aprende a quem deves memória
os caídos da tua coroa.

Mas ouvi dizer
que agora queres fazer
um museu da lusa aventura.

Chega de enaltecer
Um império assente em escravatura.

Lisboa, não sejas racista
colonialista

[Revist your history
lady Lisbon
learn about whom you should remember
those felled by your crown.

But I heard
that now you want to build
a museum of the Luso adventure.

Enough of celebrating
an empire built on slavery

Lisbon, don’t be racist
colonialist]

⁵ For more on Fado Bicha as well as a critical genealogy of gender transgression and queer worldmaking in fado, see Daniel da Silva’s Trans Tessituras.
Queer transgressions against cisgender and heteronormative binaries have a history of presence in post-New State Portuguese popular music, as early as António Variações in the late 1970s and early 1980s. His musical performance across and blurring the barriers of musical genre (fado, rock, folk music) was intimately tied to his quotidian transgression of binarist gender norms and heterosexist conceptions of valid person that also undergird coloniality. Today, a similar musical and identitarian repertoire is taken on by popular artists like Conan Osíris, nominated and selected to represent Portugal at the 2019 Eurovision contest.

Other artists, especially of African descent, who have emerged into, while reshaping, pop music in Portugal have decentered historical claims to whiteness in musically narrating Portuguese spaces as non-white, or presenting Portugal in Black. A case in point would be the song “Nova Lisboa” of 2018, by Dino D’Santiago, whose musical sound is grounded in the Cape Verdean genres funaná and batuque often fused with contemporary forms such as afrobeat, kizomba, zouk, and hip-hop. The song’s title underscores the emergence of a Black Lisbon over the last four decades, while subliminally juxtaposing this New Lisbon with the colonial city of the same in Angola, renamed after independence as Huambo. The song is always-already an epistemological and historiographic project that is concerned with re-historicizing both urban and broader national space through the movement of Black bodies and knowledges—akin to what Fred Moten would call “black study” (2013), not simply a presentation of Black communities in this space.

In sum, this very small snapshot of resistant popular cultures permits a conclusion of hope and struggle, that coloniality is being contested through very public means that are, to varying extents, allied to grassroots movements and community organizing against the institutional mechanisms that safeguard coloniality and capital. These range from protests against police violence on Black life to community universities in racially (which is always socioeconomically) marginalized spaces such as the Cova da Moura neighborhood in Amadora. Popular culture, in other words, offers a fertile terrain for decolonial struggle. As a mural on the façade of the Moinho da Juventude [Youth Center] in Cova da Moura reads: “outro mundo é possível se a gente quiser” [“another world is possible if we wish”].
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