The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870-1912

Sarah Roddy, Julie-Marie Strange & Bertrand Taithe
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912
Also available from Bloomsbury:

*War, Law and Humanity: The Campaign to Control Warfare, 1853–1914,*  
by James Crossland

*Leisure, Voluntary Action and Social Change in Britain, 1880–1939,*  
by Robert Snape

*Female Philanthropy in the Interwar World: Between Self and Other,*  
by Eve Colpus
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

Sarah Roddy, Julie-Marie Strange and Bertrand Taithe
Contents

List of Illustrations vi
Acknowledgements vii
List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1

1 The Emergence of Charity Enterprise 9
2 Consuming Charity 35
3 Building and Protecting Charity Brands 59
4 Policing Fraud: Regulation and Accountability in the Charity Market 81
5 Aristocratic Fundraising and the Politics of Imperial Humanitarianism 99
6 Franchise Fundraising: Mansion House Appeals 121

Conclusion 143

Notes 151
Bibliography 197
Index 217
### Illustrations

1.1 General Booth and representatives of his soldiers from all parts of the world 10  
1.2 Promotional leaflet, Barnardo’s papers 17  
1.3 Making good citizens of waifs 24  
1.4 Young Helpers’ League promotional leaflet 30  
1.5 Dr Barnardo’s Good Work 31  
2.1 *The Officer*, ‘Hallelujah Lassie’ 39  
2.2 Booth tour tyres 39  
2.3 Booth graph-o-phone 40  
2.4 Light in Darkest England matches 44  
5.1 A Meeting of the Stafford House Committee 106  
6.1 *The Social Franchising Manual* 123  
6.2 ‘Frost’ newspaper cartoon 138
This project was generously funded by the ESRC (Grant number: ES/I031359/1). It originated in a number of conversations between Julie-Marie Strange and Bertrand Taithe and from their collaboration over a number of years. Both have had a strong interest in charities and humanitarian aid respectively; they also share a common enthusiasm for the Victorian era. Together they brought their initial concerns for the material culture of charity into a research question. Dr Sarah Roddy joined in, initially as the research assistant for this project, but she soon became one of the three co-authors, bringing to the project her own considerable scholarship. All chapters were debated and written collectively as were the various articles originating from this project and which develop more fully some aspects of the work. In particular we are grateful to the Journal of British Studies for allowing us to use some of the material that appeared in our article of January 2015, ‘The Charity-Mongers of Modern Babylon: Bureaucracy, Scandal, and the Transformation of the Philanthropic Marketplace, c.1870–1912’.

This work has been grounded in ongoing discussions with contemporary NGOs and in the work done through the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (hcni.ac.uk) at the University of Manchester and in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute. We have benefited greatly from the insights arising from our discussions with colleagues at ALNAP or at the Centre de Réflexion sur les Actions et les Savoirs Humanitaires (CRASH) at MSF. For some of the policy implications of this research we invite our readers to consult our article ‘Humanitarian Accountability, Bureaucracy, and Self-Regulation: The View from the Archives?’ (Disasters, 39 [2015], 188–203) or the article co-authored by Bertrand Taithe and John Borton: ‘History, Memory and “Lessons Learnt” for Humanitarian Practitioners’ (European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 23 [2016], 210–24).

Over the lifespan of the project we have had the opportunity to present aspects of this research to a variety of audiences, and we wish to thank particularly the feedback we received from colleagues at research seminars at universities in Manchester, Exeter and the Institute of Historical Research; the ‘Material Religion in Modern Britain’ conference, Cardiff (2012); a workshop on ‘History, Consumption and Inequality’, Cambridge (2013); the Humanitarian Congress,

We are blessed to be working in a remarkably fast moving and creative research environment in which an extraordinary number of colleagues, past and present, have cognate research interests that have fed into this project: among them, Eleanor Davey, Pierre Fuller, Peter Gatrell, Max Jones and Peter Yeandle. They have all contributed significantly to this project (whether they like it or not!). Of course, any errors remain ours entirely.

We wish to thank the archivists, curators and librarians of the following institutions: Barclays Bank Archive, Dr Barnardo’s Archives, Birmingham Archives, Birmingham Museum, the Borthwick Institute York, the British Library, Devon County Archives, Greater Manchester County Record Office, John Rylands Library, Lambeth Palace Library, Lancashire Record Office, Lancaster City Museum, Liverpool Catholic Diocesan Archives, Liverpool Record Office, London Metropolitan Archive, National Archives at Kew, National Army Museum, National Coal Mining Museum, National Railway Museum, Norfolk Record Office, Northumberland Museum, Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, Salford Diocesan Archives, Scottish National Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, Staffordshire County Record Office, Tameside Local Study and Archive, Tyne and Wear Museum, University of Liverpool Special Collections, V&A Theatre Museum and West-Yorkshire County Archives. We owe a particular debt to the librarians of the John Rylands Library and of Saint Deiniol’s Library where this book first took its final shape.

This book took longer than we anticipated but it is, if anything, more relevant today than we expected when we first devised it.

Sarah Roddy, Julie-Marie Strange and Bertrand Taithe
Manchester, 2018
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Charity Organisation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBVS</td>
<td>Indigent Blind Visiting Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWD</td>
<td>League of Welldoers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPCC</td>
<td>National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWBH</td>
<td>National Working Boys Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSPCA</td>
<td>Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stafford House Committee</td>
<td>Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waifs and Strays Society</td>
<td>The Church of England Incorporated Society for Providing Homes for Waifs and Strays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSM</td>
<td>Wood Street Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YHL</td>
<td>Young Helpers’ League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

An American with a reputation as ‘the world’s record money collector’ arrived for a ‘tussle with London’ at the beginning of 1912. Charles Sumner Ward’s goal was to raise £100,000 in just twelve days for the city’s new YMCA building. Despite some concerns over the supposedly ‘namby-pamby’ YMCA, the British media was suitably impressed with Sumner Ward’s ambition. Newspapers praised his ‘novel outlook on the business side of philanthropy’, and lauded his intention to clinically target the city’s wealthy businessmen during his ‘whirlwind’ funding drive.¹ Breathless press reports continued during the twelve-day effort, and several specially constructed, electrically lit clock dials arranged around central London were updated hourly with the latest cash totals, creating a fervent atmosphere. Although when time ran out the fund remained short of its target by about a third, the campaign could hardly be deemed a failure: £66,000 in just shy of a fortnight was a splendid haul.²

But while journalists had been right to point out the novelty of Sumner Ward’s ‘short period’ fundraising in a British context,³ London in 1912 was hardly bereft of homegrown fundraising innovation. If the press liked the cut of Sumner Ward’s jib, it was in part because Britons had long been conditioned to expect constant reinvention when it came to charity fundraising. And if novelty was one vital element of fundraising success, business-like efficiency and transparency were also much valued. Sumner Ward appeared to embody these qualities but he was far from alone. This book argues that from at least 1870 charity overseers across Britain had not merely been good at winnowing donations from businessmen and others, they had acted as astute and innovative businessmen in doing so. Whether harnessing emergent technologies, securing mass publicity, creating distinctive brands or ‘scaling up’ enterprises, the people we term the ‘charity entrepreneurs’ of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain were at least the equal of any contemporary American philanthropic expert.
They had to be. During the Victorian era, the British charity scene altered dramatically. The tangle of endowments, trusts and parish-based ‘ladies bountiful’ that characterized the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not disappear but they were joined by a recognizably modern charity market, in which increasingly professional ‘collecting’ or ‘voluntary’ charities, which derived their income from subscriptions and donations (rather than the proceeds of large endowments), predominated. This is not to imply that no such charities had existed before. But by 1870, we suggest, a critical mass had been reached, in part because parallel social and technological developments facilitated their foundation, growth and endurance. These more permanent organizations were joined by an increasing preponderance of one-off funds for causes at home and abroad, generally fatal catastrophes of one sort or another, which themselves adopted new technologies in their pursuit of donations.

The resulting intense competition for donors among these funds and organizations, we contend, drove many of them to greater heights of innovation in their fundraising practices. It created, in effect if not in intent, a charitable fundraising ‘market’. This charity market was characterized by competition for consumers (i.e. donors) among charity entrepreneurs. It involved conscious adoption by them of surprisingly up-to-date marketing techniques and strategies to ‘sell’ and distinguish their particular brands of compassion from those of rivals with similar relief remits. It arose organically, as each new enterprise was set up by motivated individuals to tackle a perceived evil of modern industrial society, from child poverty to unemployment, and intemperance to immorality. It was in many ways a classically ‘free’ market, unfettered by state intervention, although an invisible hand of self-regulation imperfectly contained the inevitable frauds and misconducts that even compassionate markets were wont to generate.

This market produced a charitable income whose scale was impressive, even if it must also remain impressionistic. As numerous historians of British philanthropy have noted, putting an accurate total on the amount of money raised for all charitable purposes in the nineteenth century is fraught with difficulties. There were several contemporary attempts, both provincial and metropolitan, to gauge levels of philanthropic income, but the first historian to tackle the issue seriously on a broader scale, David Owen in the 1960s, declared it ‘out of the question’ to reach a satisfying quantitative measurement. In a review of philanthropic scholarship Brian Harrison was initially critical of Owen’s failure to exploit the readily available balance sheets, annual reports and other documentation that he believed made such a measurement possible.
Revising this piece later on, Harrison backtracked and seemed to agree that no meaningful overall figure could be derived.5

Meanwhile, the prolific historian of philanthropy Frank Prochaska also tended to agree that no complete measurement was possible. He cited a purely indicative amount of £6 to £7 million per year being donated to some 1,000 charities in London alone, something derived from contemporary estimates.6

We have our own signal figures: by 1899, William Booth’s ‘In Darkest England’ campaign, launched in 1890, had raised almost £300,000 for food and lodging costs alone; by the 1920s, multiple Mansion House Funds since the late 1860s made in excess of £12 million for various domestic and overseas disasters8; and one of several newspaper funds operated during the Boer War reaped well over 4 million shillings, even as other larger and more ‘official’ funds also sprang up.9

Given the range and volume of funds and collecting organizations, arriving at an integrated figure may be impossible but such sample numbers, coupled with the expanding number of charitable organizations and funds, certainly suggest that the ‘cake’ of charitable donations was getting bigger rather than merely being cut into ever-narrower slivers.

For donors of all classes, opportunities to monetize their compassionate responses to poverty, need and disaster mushroomed in the later nineteenth century. One need only peruse the correspondence files of high-profile philanthropists to see this in action. By the 1890s, William Rathbone, Liberal MP first in Liverpool and later Wales, fielded constant requests for donations, mainly to educational and religious causes. While he told many canvassers that he limited his giving to places to which he was closely connected, he violated his own rule frequently, sending money to fundraisers from Manchester and London and simply asking them not to put his full name on their published subscription lists.10 He evidently found it hard to resist a deserving cause. For another Liberal MP R. B. Martin, the demand that he give to all the charities of his town (Tewkesbury) whether he approved of them or not was ‘most objectionable’; the gifts in many cases ‘are merely bribes in the name of charity – [b]ut how is it to be avoided!’11 If Rathbone found that there were more good causes he wished to support than he was able to, Martin saw charity gifts as a cynical ploy to buy votes but gave nevertheless.

The same was true of less exalted charitable contributors. Across Britain, as more and more voluntary charities were founded, the public were increasingly assailed with chances to hand over cash. While the ‘charity bazaar’ had long been a staple form of middle-class entertainment-cum-fundraiser, it was one that required a conscious decision to attend, and from which the working classes
remained more or less excluded for much of the nineteenth century. As we will show, although the bazaar remained important, the definition of a charity donor expanded far beyond its typical, bourgeois participant. Street fundraising, workplace fundraising and mass media fundraising meant that people from all walks of life, and at all stages of life, were increasingly likely to encounter charitable appeals of one sort or another. As mass culture emerged, the charity donor market acquired a new social depth.

The increasing social depth of donors goes to the heart of our key argument about the development of charitable fundraising in this period. There has been much written about the two transformations in the charity world from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries: as Martin Gorsky noted, first trusts and endowments ceded ground to voluntary, collecting charities, and later, the state gradually encroached into what had been purely philanthropic welfare provision. While a tendency to explain the latter change as the inevitable onward march of the welfare state is now tempered by more nuanced accounts of an enduring, if undulating, ‘mixed economy’ of welfare, the earlier transformation has had less attention, and fundraising’s role in both has been underplayed. Gorsky explains the rise of voluntary charities in Bristol as a consequence of discredited management in charitable trusts and the ‘dual role of voluntary associations for the middle class, expressing the desire to exercise authority over the poor and at the same time representing a middle-class identity divided by religious and political allegiance’. There is undoubted truth to this.

We argue, however, that the central significance of fundraising in itself has been overlooked. The collecting and giving of money fulfilled the needs of people as economic actors just as much as its expenditure served their religious or political identities: charitable giving was a form of compassionate consumption in the midst of sharp rises in other forms of consumption. Moreover, individuals could engage in philanthropic activism and advance a critique of capitalism in ways that united seemingly disparate religious, social and economic backgrounds.

That goes some way towards explaining why mass fundraising arose and endured even as state involvement in welfare exploded.

An historical turn to material culture also presents some important and relevant avenues. Charitable fundraising could entail the consumption of goods in commercial contexts but this was frequently reframed by consumers’ desire to express their compassion while consuming. This emphasis on goods in a world increasingly dominated by the display and consumption of new products marked, if not an entirely new departure, at least a clear acceleration of material social dynamics in charitable giving. Much of the concern for the history of consumer
goods has focused on commodities and their impact on society. The eighteenth-century boom in world-traded goods may have enabled a new consciousness of distant sufferings as Thomas Haskell argued in his landmark article on the origins of humanitarian sensibility, but the late nineteenth century witnessed a wider range of goods and much broader set of representations throughout the strata of society. Consuming goods, Haskell argued, enabled action and the possibility of comprehending the fate of distant societies. Buying in a good cause, through fairer trading practices or purchasing alternatives to blood-tainted products, was to subscribe to the aims of the cause. Late-nineteenth-century religious and charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army or, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Boy Scout movement entailed paramilitary uniforms and other material emblems of membership. But they were not alone in selling the means of identifying oneself as part of a broader group united around moral values. Smaller charities raised revenue and their profile through the publication and sale of subscription lists, objects and printed material; support for good causes could begin and end with ephemeral purchases and the innocent pleasure of consuming compassion. As Aileen Fyfe pointed out in her study of religious tract publishing, commercial and philanthropic activities could closely overlap. This book takes these selling practices and charities’ interest in entrepreneurial innovation as the starting point of our analysis.

Most cities and towns had their turn-of-the-century philanthropic innovators, and a few, notably London, have had their historians. While charity was sometimes truly ‘local’ in that it was confined to a few city streets, both in terms of donors and recipients, it was also a national and an international process. As such, this study adopts a broad archival search, not restricted by region. The book draws on the appeal literature, publications and the ephemera of fundraising but, also, the accounts and auditing of monies raised. To an extent, histories of charities inevitably privilege the organizations that had the long-term stability to retain archives. Digitized newspapers and the extraordinarily rich holdings of the Charity Organisation Society (COS), founded in 1869, have extended the remit of this study. Newspapers carried the advertisements and subscription lists of numerous short-lived funds and organizations. The late-Victorian expansion of the press and print culture, including images and photographic representations, benefited charitable enterprises but also relied on charities to express new areas of concern and new objects of pity and compassion. The COS’s meticulous files on (mostly but not exclusively) London missions and charities may have proved to be of little use in their original purpose – preventing philanthropic duplication and frauds – but they are a goldmine of appeal literature from
This extensive archival search provided a diverse documentary base that has shaped the thematic flow of our six chapters. Chapter 1 examines voluntary charities’ appropriation of features more readily associated with commercial enterprise at the end of the nineteenth century: advertising, marketing and public relations. In the context of a charitable marketplace, this form of entrepreneurship facilitated charities’ capture of new donor markets and enabled them to find the funds to tackle myriad social problems. Chapter 2 extends anthropological conceptions of the ‘gift’ relationship in charitable life to show the extent to which tangible exchange became a vital part of fundraising from the mid-Victorian period. Innovations including ‘purchase-triggered donations’, the creation of charity calendars and an ‘experience economy’ represented a further engagement by charity entrepreneurs with emerging forms of consumer capitalism. The processes by which charitable organizations created a brand that was unique is scrutinized in Chapter 3: how did names, symbols and slogans communicate their values to donors? And, once created, how did charities not only deploy their brands in a competitive context to raise funds, but protect their brand identities from infringement by competitors?

The last third of the nineteenth century marks the point at which significant outside observers recognized the emergence of this new charity market and sought to protect donors from its potential pitfalls. This was not, contrary to some assumptions, the work of the state-backed Charity Commission, which had finally been put on a permanent footing in 1860 after decades of work compiling a ‘Domesday book’ of ancient charitable trusts. Chapter 4 argues that in the absence of a state-backed regulatory system, charities sought to exercise a form of self-regulation by adopting from the business world the emerging mechanics of auditing and accountability as signifiers of legitimacy and as a basis for denouncing those competitors who did not conform to them. We consider the evolving role of elite fundraisers in raising money for international and national causes in Chapter 5 by considering a case study of fundraising for international causes, the Stafford House Committee. Aristocratic fundraising might be viewed as the last gasp of an older patrician form of philanthropy but, we argue, it also engaged in fundraising practices more readily associated with highly professionalized fundraising, albeit one not without controversy. As the chapter demonstrates, old and new forms of fundraising could coexist. Finally, Chapter 6 argues that the organizational growth models followed by many of the most famous charities and appeals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
Introduction

centuries were heavily influenced by and influential upon contemporaneously emerging business replication strategies. In particular, it shows how, throughout our period, the Lord Mayor of London's ‘Mansion House’ appeals, via a pioneering form of ‘franchising’, allowed millions of ordinary donors up and down the country to buy into British philanthropic responses to disasters, both at home and abroad.

Over the period 1870–1912, between the rise of the British Red Cross movement and the sinking of the Titanic, Victorian and Edwardian charities experienced vast expansion and consolidation but they also faced tremendous challenges. Ideas of society, democracy and the state changed around them but also, we argue, through them. The vitality of multiple charitable organizations was to some a worrying indication of the scale of unanswered needs; to others, a demonstration that a modern capitalist society would thrive on its Christian heritage of compassion and charity.26 These debates remain pressing and attitudes to charities often define clearly the polarities of political debate in Britain today.27 To ‘follow the money’ and understand late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century British fundraising in its myriad facets, this book argues, is not only to acquire crucial insights into the wider society in which that activity took place, but also to expose some significant shared roots of a diverse twenty-first-century charity market, or ‘third sector’, whose history has been patchily addressed to date. We argue that many of the practices described as cutting edge in the management of charities today had their first serious iteration and sophisticated application in the period spanning the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In taking a long view, we might better understand the challenges facing the ‘third sector’ today.
The Emergence of Charity Enterprise

Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte and Abraham Lincoln are not names ordinarily associated with Victorian and Edwardian charity. But, on 31 August 1912, the New York Times name-checked them in a roll call of the most ‘extraordinary’ funerals in history, suggesting that an even more remarkable funeral had just taken place. General William Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, was a ‘[n]onconformist religious leader, innovator, fanatic if you will’ and his funeral in London reflected and perpetuated his astonishing success in the world of philanthropy. After lying ‘in state’ for five days, viewed by over 100,000 members of the public, Booth’s corpse was moved to Olympia for a memorial service with a congregation of 34,000; thousands more were denied entry. The following day, an estimated 2 million spectators lined the six-mile route from central London to Abney Park Cemetery to witness the mile-long cortege comprising 6,000 international Salvationists.¹ The organizers shunned ‘Victorian’ obsequies for Booth’s funeral, opting instead for vibrant Salvation Army colours (red and yellow), flags and hymns of rejoicing. According to the British popular newspaper the Daily Mirror, hundreds of spectators fainted and some had hysterics; the police strove to keep order; parents lifted children onto shoulders for a better view; global leaders sent wreaths and messages of respect.²

This was an extraordinary send-off for a missionary from Nottingham who first entered the world of philanthropy in the 1860s with the ‘East End Christian Mission’. By the time of his death, Booth’s charity venture had, after initial setbacks, burgeoned into a global enterprise. His ‘Army’ waged a staggeringly successful war on a global stage, such that the composite image in Figure 1.1, showing Booth with an array of ‘soldiers’ in their varied national dress, was no exaggeration. Sixty countries were represented at his funeral, all converts to his Army. Commentators described him as a ‘true imperialist’ and compared his influence to that of the Pope.³ How had this happened? Underpinning this
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

extraordinary phenomenon was an organization that embraced innovation and modernity. In pursuit of mass Christian salvation and the delivery of welfare services, the Salvation Army, from its creation in 1878, was a visionary organization that harnessed technological and consumer novelties to become a remarkable fundraising machine. As the Daily Mirror noted, some people thought the Army’s techniques ‘vulgar’. Certainly, speaking salvation through a gramophone, harnessing jaunty music hall tunes for hymns, proselytizing the gospel of advertising and shamelessly exploiting commercial ventures did not fit with quaint notions of Christian humility and ladies bountiful. But vulgarity proved to be a formidable ‘weapon’ to the Booth enterprise.4

We use the term ‘enterprise’ advisedly. By the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Salvation Army epitomized the philanthropic world’s successful appropriation of entrepreneurial techniques. Booth’s funeral was a microcosm of their spectacular success; it was a major promotional event, heavily branded, that was filmed for posterity and subsequent repeated use in fundraising and marketing activities.5 If Booth’s internationalism made the Salvation Army a giant in the charitable marketplace, his embrace of consumerism, technology and innovation were replicated to varying degrees by charities operating at a national and regional level too. These dimensions not only enabled charities to expand their donor base, they also marked the transformation of philanthropic organizations from collecting alms based on appeals to Christian and moral

Figure 1.1 General Booth and representatives of his soldiers from all parts of the world. Illustrated London News (29 June 1907). Courtesy of the British Library.
responsibility to models of business enterprise with target markets and tools of self-promotion.

This chapter examines that transformation, primarily through the lens of three case study organizations which reflect international, national and regional charities respectively: the Salvation Army (launched under this banner in 1878), Barnardo’s (founded 1868) and Manchester’s Wood Street Mission (WSM; founded 1869). The case studies share common features. Each of the charities’ beneficiaries were ‘the poor’, broadly defined, and Christian conversion was, to differing degrees, embedded within the goals of each organization. They each had nonconformist male founder figures with forceful personalities: Booth, ‘Dr.’ Thomas Barnardo (whose funeral in 1905 was also filmed for posterity) and Alfred Alsop. However, this is not intended as a rehash of the great founder myths of the charities. Rather, we contend, each man conformed to Joseph Schumpeter’s 1911 definition of the term ‘entrepreneur’, being both innovators and, crucially, motivators of others in the same pursuit. They, and others like them, were creators of new organizations and, in concert, a new industry.\(^7\) They, and others like them, took difficult decisions that made their organizations a success.\(^8\) While we might see a form of ‘social entrepreneurship’ at play in the development of concepts such as the poverty line in the late nineteenth century, late-Victorian charities were also entrepreneurial in a more literally understood, quasi-commercial sense.\(^9\)

Some resembled what we would now call ‘social enterprise’, meaning organizations that have business-like features (they employ staff, manufacture and sell goods, have financial targets, a clear advertising and promotional strategy and a sense of their ‘market’ and competitors), but which direct profits (or at least a percentage of them) into social causes.\(^10\) By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many charities were operating on an enterprise model long before the terms ‘social enterprise’ or ‘social entrepreneur’ were invented. In particular, as this chapter will demonstrate, large and small charities alike displayed what Schumpeter identified as one of the key markers of entrepreneurship: an ability to open new markets. They did so in part by engaging with consumption (as Chapter 2 will detail) but they also utilized advertising, promotion, targeted marketing, publicity and what we would today term ‘public relations’ in order to raise funds for the social causes they helped identify and define.

The chapter begins with an analysis of charitable enterprises’ enthusiastic appropriation of, and innovation in, modern advertising and promotional techniques that involved directly asking for money. It then discusses their
development of new ‘donor markets’ across the social spectrum, before exploring, finally, how they used aspects of the emerging mass media and the power of celebrity to manage their public profiles and create interest that boosted fundraising. Booth, Barnardo and Alsop, we argue, headed organizations that were exemplar exponents – though by no means the only exponents – of an entrepreneurship and a charitable business model which in virtually every facet engaged with and co-opted modernity even as they critiqued it.

Advertising and promotion

In an increasingly competitive charitable world, philanthropic organizations recognized a need to expand existing and develop new ‘donor markets’, a phrase which reflects our contention that donors were consumers with choices when it came to bestowing their money. Existing scholarly analysis has highlighted key donor categories in Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Most studied has been the status donor: the giver who gained social kudos from affiliation to philanthropic organizations and whose association with the organization might be exploited by the charity as a form of celebrity or elite endorsement. High net worth and high-profile individuals were inundated with requests for charity patronage and donations, and their gifts could add impetus to organizations’ fundraising, especially through matched funding schemes. Second, historians have shown how some organizations, hospital funds in particular, concentrated on developing localized giving relationships between more modest donors and specific institutions. Finally, work on the charity bazaar, perhaps the most common form of fundraising activity in the nineteenth century, highlights the importance of women as both donors and fundraisers. As Frank Prochaska pointed out in 1977, women were often behind the organization of charity balls, dinners, festivals and concerts, and they applied the skills and knowledge acquired in domestic visiting to canvas for subscriptions from middle-class men and women in the suburbs. However, these limited donor profiles aside, we know little about how charities developed strategies to target particular markets, establish new funding streams and improve their own competitiveness for donations within an increasingly crowded marketplace.

Charities had long adapted their services and structure in order to meet market demands, in terms of donor and recipient. But an expansion in the number of charities competing for donations in the second half of the nineteenth century made it imperative for organizations to develop a sharper sense of their
existing and desired donor bases. Donor markets tended to be shaped, first and foremost, by geographical, confessional and ethnic interests. Confessional charities could stem from particular communities’ desire to construct ethnic and sectarian identities while, for example, the myriad nonconformist charities that emerged in the nineteenth century were also frequently motivated by a desire to save souls and promote temperance. The local charity usually developed by exploiting regional identity and civic pride, often (although not always) to address local or regional problems. All three case studies in this chapter began as localized, nonconformist missions situated in the thick of urban deprivation (the East End of London and Manchester) with fundraising rooted in liberal religious networks, although each came to conceive of their geographical donor markets in different ways. WSM continued to exploit the local market, Barnardo’s prioritized the national and the Salvation Army pitched itself to both national and international donor markets. As a result, each approached advertising and promotion in diverse, but equally clever and innovative ways.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Wood Street Mission, originally called Manchester and Salford Street Children’s Mission, was one of the largest voluntary organizations in Manchester. The change to a more precise, location-based name in 1886 reflected the provinciality, purpose and geography of the charity: Wood Street, just off Deansgate, was in the notorious ‘slum’ district of the industrial city. The charity’s focus was firmly local and there is no evidence that organizers ever considered ‘scaling up’ by expanding beyond Manchester and Salford. It focused fundraising efforts on local markets too: appeals were made within Manchester and Salford and the wealthy commuter towns that delivered Manchester’s businessmen to the city. Yet this was not a stagnant organization: Wood Street expanded, instead, by extending the welfare services offered, moving from a mission that fed children, to running a boys’ home, soup kitchen for adults, summer camps for children and, for a while, a night shelter for homeless men. The strong local identity of the charity and its association with civic pride were at the core of its ethos and, importantly, of its marketing. At its AGM in 1911, one donor delighted other subscribers by drawing comparison with Liverpool where children did not receive the ‘scrupulous’ care exercised by WSM. So strong were some provincial affiliations to localized need that national and international fundraising appeals might get short shrift from regional-based organizations. In 1873, clergy in Devon rejected appeals for the Indian Famine Appeal, arguing that local need was more pressing. National appeals could also fail to move the resolve of some localized initiatives. When the Manchester,
Salford and District South African War Fund was asked to redistribute excess local funds to the national pot, the committee vehemently resisted.\textsuperscript{22}

In contrast, both Barnardo’s and the Salvation Army rapidly scaled up from similarly modest, localized beginnings, creating new markets and breaking into other regional markets dominated by the likes of WSM. Both Barnardo and the Booths raised considerable money from embarking on nationwide preaching tours, for example. But crucially, both also recognized the value of extensive paid-for advertising in realizing their expansionary ambitions. Indeed, more generally, the mutual benefit to the press and charity purse of charity advertising is suggested by the periodic discounts offered on philanthropic advertising rates. In 1907 Barnardo’s took advantage of special discounts on advertising in the \textit{Standard}, \textit{Daily News} and the religious paper, \textit{The Quiver}.\textsuperscript{23} For local charities that remained local, like WSM, advertising costs might be kept to a minimum by exploiting the news columns of the local press to their fullest potential. As the final section of this chapter will show, there were forms of publicity that were virtually free and particularly valued because, unlike paid-for adverts, they gave the illusion of approval by external bodies. So strategic was WSM’s utilization of the press in this manner that one minister in 1901 commended its annual advertising budget of only twenty pounds.\textsuperscript{24} However, the contrasts went beyond press advertising, and one statistic neatly illustrates the vastly different promotional plains on which the likes of WSM and Barnardo’s eventually came to operate. In 1895, WSM experimented with commissioning 40,000 leaflets for a Christmas appeal across Lancashire, Cheshire and Derbyshire; in later years, the charity issued a still-impressive 10,000 at Christmas and less than half that number for its summer camp.\textsuperscript{25} Barnardo’s, however, thought nothing of issuing 1.5 million appeal flyers each winter.\textsuperscript{26}

The brashness indicated by such a vast number of appeals was matched in the content of campaigns. Without local ties to emphasize, Thomas Barnardo showed himself to be a supreme publicist with an appreciation of the theatrical. He saw the need to attract donors with arresting marketing content, and keep them entertained and engaged once attracted; he even exploited his own marriage for publicity.\textsuperscript{27} Barnardo was clearly aware that he was working at a time when advertising was becoming more spectacular, and he made sure his organization partook in the process with gusto.\textsuperscript{28} Most famously, Barnardo used photographs of ‘waifs’, implying that his homes turned shoeless street children into upstanding citizens, a device that landed him in legal hot water in 1877. It is telling that after he died in 1905, a publicity and advertising subcommittee scaled back the organization’s advertising budget from around £8,000 to £3,000,
still a significant sum. The majority of this expenditure went on adverts in the *Times* and periodicals, where display pieces often broke down problems and their solutions into digestible numbers ‘5,000 orphan and outcast children needing bread!’29 and ‘£16 will maintain a boy or girl in the homes for a year’.30 Advertising in the *Times* was expensive but worthwhile because its readership tended to be ‘high net worth’ individuals.31

Barnardo was not alone in his advertising genius. The Salvation Army was extraordinarily innovative in developing an advertising ethos and training soldiers in the techniques of enterprise, pushing the charity from its London base to replicate the ‘multiples’ model of retail businesses nationally and internationally.32 Their methods for identifying and developing new markets were similar to the techniques of manufacturers like J. and J. Colman (mustard retailers) and Isaac Reckitt (soap powders) who matched aggressive marketing with the strategic deployment of travelling agents charged with developing new or penetrating existing markets.33 By the end of the nineteenth century, the Salvation Army had not only reproduced the East End model across Britain, it had exported it, with sensitivity to local conditions, across the globe. In 1893, the in-house magazine for Army staff, *The Officer*, ran a series of features over several months on ‘How to advertise’. This was, the author noted, an ‘advertising age’.34 Many of the ideas advanced were techniques commonplace to shops and manufacturers by the 1880s: chalking catchy announcements on the pavements; using rubber stamps on the front of magazines; billposting; illuminated transparencies (especially effective at night); sandwich boards; hand carts and handbills. The novelty lay in a philanthropic organization appropriating the techniques of large advertisers in a ‘spirit of enterprise’ to unashamedly develop the Salvationist market (‘Break up some new ground!’) and ‘get money’.35 The series offered advice on fonts, design, use of images, colour and the strategic placing of adverts.

To differing degrees, all three charities harnessed new technological innovations to boost their advertising and appeal campaigns. While paper manufacture was cheaper than ever, and photography and illustration were perhaps ‘the most significant invention(s) of the century for graphic design’, there were less obvious developments in visual design that charities also seized upon.36 Beginning in the 1880s, photolithography, a process that facilitated large print runs at reduced cost and expanded design possibilities far beyond the conventional letterpress, was widely employed by charities for their appeal literature. Some used it to develop the old-fashioned personal appeal letter into a mass-market message; as the Salvation Army found, lithography allowed
letters in General or Catherine Booth’s handwriting to be sent to thousands of recipients, an endeavour which was otherwise too time-consuming to be considered. WSM’s 40,000 Christmas appeal letters presumably used the same technique. The effect of this ‘personal’ touch from foundational figureheads on donors, however impersonal in reality, was likely significant.

Yet there were more exciting and eye-catching design tricks also now open to charities. The last decades of the nineteenth century saw print workshops and enthusiastic amateurs devise thousands of new typefaces. Much of this work went towards periodicals, advertising for commercial purposes or political posters, but it is clear that charities were just as willing to experiment with new designs. In the absence of illustration of any kind, single-sheet appeal literature had been indistinguishable from other pieces of printed ephemera, a title in a larger font size giving way to paragraphs of text conventionally arranged below. As Figure 1.2, an appeal leaflet for Dr Barnardo’s homes, amply demonstrates, there were now myriad techniques to distinguish a flyer. An unusual and striking bubbled font emphasized key pieces of information that any donor would need: the name, address and financial scale of the charity’s work. Discrete, rounded boxes of text contained validating testimony on the charity’s behalf, as well as a personal appeal ‘signed’ by Dr Barnardo. The simplest innovation of all was its printing on coloured paper – pastel shades of yellow, blue and pink were most common – which, as well as sometimes being cheaper, acted as a surprisingly effective distinguishing trait, one that the Financial Times famously adopted in 1893.

Unmistakably ‘modern’-looking appeal leaflets were within the reach of virtually all charities by the end of the Victorian era. Yet the Salvation Army took this process, and advertising strategy more generally, to greater heights than even the successful Barnardo. Clever pastiches of commercial advertisements demonstrated their keen attention to the emerging art. Handbills could be disguised as adverts for niche products: quack remedies (Universal Medicine), shipping companies (Salvation Navigation Co.), house rentals (To Let signs) or other paper forms that would rouse public curiosity (the telegram, railway ticket, five pound notes, reward notices and so on). Other suggestions included playing into consumer desires and anxieties with handbills headlining ‘Which is the best soap?’ or mimicking the adverts of popularly branded goods such as Lemco, a beef extract. Soldiers were encouraged to play around with acronyms (handbills headlining V.C. referred not to the Victoria Cross but the Army’s ‘Vigorous Campaign’) or to print a purse that folded out into an appeal. There was also a suggestion of customizing the latest advertising tools such as
Figure 1.2 Promotional leaflet, Barnardo’s papers. Courtesy of Barnardo’s Photographic Archive.
‘advertising balloons’: one particularly playful idea being to paint balloons with the face of the devil and then, of course, explode them. The Army not only drew inspiration from commercial advertising, but also saw themselves as being in direct competition with it.

Reflecting on why they were so good at raising money, a feature in *The Officer* in 1893 concluded that the Army had a ‘systematic, methodical, businesslike manner’. The hierarchical structure of the organization ensured uniformity and precision while guaranteeing adaptation to local law and custom in whichever part of the country or the world the Army operated. The amount expended on advertising mattered less than the advertiser’s ‘bite’. Each officer was encouraged and equipped to become an advertising whizz, an individual marketing entrepreneur. Army publications for soldiers regularly carried features on the latest techniques in advertising or examples of extraordinary fundraising feats from across the globe, with a strong emphasis on ‘How we do it in America’, the home of ‘hustle’ and advertising training colleges. Why, asked one feature, should the Army not be as up to date in advertising as ‘worldlings’? At the kernel of the Army’s advertising ethos lay recognition that constant fundraising, or ‘begging’, was tedious for fundraisers and donors. The public were fickle and organizations faced constant competition which made ‘perpetual advertising’ with innovation and imagination essential, as evinced in the ‘Novelty corner’ column in *The Officer* in 1899. Officers, this column emphasized, should understand that ‘ruts and routines are fatal to the advertiser’. The Army constantly urged soldiers to look to the world of business where advertising managers were as important to success as managing directors: advertisers needed ‘ingenuity, enterprise, originality, the qualities of surprise, novelty, unexpectedness’. There was, as one feature stated, nothing new under the sun but there were new ways of selling old things.

All of this advertising and appeal literature worked so well because at the core was a strong sense of the target market. Again, the Army urged soldiers to look to business strategies where adverts were always tailored to specific markets. Like other charities, the Army had long used the personal written appeal but, lithography notwithstanding, this was time-consuming and not always appropriate in a mass economy. Certainly, the Army had a clear sense of adapting advertising and fundraising strategies, encouraging officers to exploit or challenge stereotypes as circumstances demanded: two young female officers burst into tears when refused donations from a curmudgeonly man who immediately gave them five pounds; a female officer in Sweden composed her posters and handbills in Latin to flatter male undergraduates. Other examples
carried suggestions for marketing to theatregoers, habitual drinkers or the peculiarities of rural donors.\textsuperscript{54}

Much of the Army’s fundraising targeted working-class districts where ‘sensation’ was perennially successful. Officers were encouraged to mislead the public so long as they did not deliberately falsify information. Good examples of sensation advertising included promoting speakers with depraved pasts (the emphasis had to be on their crimes rather than their names), apparent promises of celebrity (‘The King is coming to Edinburgh!’ meant Christ the King) and extraordinary feats (‘20,000 miles for 2d!’ referred to a speaker from India and the entrance fee to hear him). Historian Pamela Walker has pointed to Salvationists’ dubious blurring of boundaries between commercial entertainment and promotion that relied on the appeal of attractive young female officers to a cynical male public.\textsuperscript{55} It is notable that Army advice on advertising looked not only to business but, also, to highly successful global entertainers like Buffalo Bill, and Barnum and Bailey.\textsuperscript{56} Even Army fundraising and advertising through the medium of a donkey cart brought a sense of the spectacular: ribbons, flags and bells transformed mundane philanthropic begging into a ‘circus’ aesthetic.\textsuperscript{57}

Social depth and the donor market

These advertising examples show how new voluntary charities recognized and sought to develop the social depth of the donor market. Histories of philanthropy have rightly drawn attention to the mutual benefit arising from high status patrons and the targeting of high net worth individuals in fundraising strategies. Yet most of the new voluntary charities also used what we would now call ‘crowd funding,’ establishing mass, small-donor markets in less affluent contexts. As Alfred Alsop of WSM noted, small sums multiplied could make a significant difference.\textsuperscript{58} Crowd funding had a long established pedigree, not least through the ‘collection’ model that operated in churches and chapels. The ‘chain letter’, although attracting much disapproval, especially from the Charity Organisation Society (COS), could also herald considerable profits. Thomas Barnardo took the disingenuous step of relating in one of the charity’s magazines a story of the phenomenal financial haul (£3,768) of a chain letter scheme that began in Kenilworth while simulating disapproval for the method.\textsuperscript{59} Likewise, collecting boxes were a common and reliable source of income for most charities, large and small. Wood Street distributed collecting boxes to public houses and hotels in Manchester, and used them on special events, such as the opening of its Summer
Camp, although the sums collected annually could be small in the context of its broader income: less than forty shillings in 1900.\textsuperscript{60} Collection boxes could, however, be used to forge a strong connection between a specific set of donors and recipients. In Liverpool, workmen from J. Bibby and Sons, an oilcake manufacturer, annually donated over £100 to one of the city’s largest voluntary organizations from weekly contributions in its workplace collection boxes.\textsuperscript{61}

One of the difficulties facing smaller charities’ use of collecting boxes was competition with the nationals. Barnardo’s, for instance, could afford to pay for large posters proclaiming its successful work with children positioned at key railway stations with collecting boxes placed beneath.\textsuperscript{62} These were sufficiently effective for the charity to pay for framed posters at large exhibitions across the country: Earls Court, the Irish Exhibition and the Blackpool Exhibition.\textsuperscript{63} While the collecting box was a reliable method for raising money, it lacked novelty. Some smaller charities were most successful with boxes when collections were tied to spectacular events. A charity in Liverpool, for instance, initiated Christmas tours of the city with a ‘travelling Christmas tree’ in 1912, pulled by a pony and cart, decked out with Chinese lanterns and mock presents. The parade facilitated the promotion of Christmas events while volunteers accompanied the cart rattling boxes borrowed from the Hospital Saturday Fund.\textsuperscript{64}

Other charities used novel collecting boxes. As illustrated on the front cover of this book, William Simpson, a beloved public figure in Liverpool, introduced a ‘bowl’ on the landing stage at Liverpool docks to touch ‘free will’ donations from passersby for causes including the Indian Famine, and South Wales and St. Helen’s Mining disasters. An analysis of the first day’s collections for the Haydock Colliery Relief Fund showed that the majority of donations were made up of pennies and halfpennies. In just eight days, ‘Simpson’s bowl’ had raised over £200.\textsuperscript{65} Another initiative for the same Relief Fund was an ‘ingenious’ mechanical box featuring a model of a colliery engine house with a collier and pit brow girl: with every penny dropped through a slot, the figures of the collier and girl made a bow of thanks.\textsuperscript{66} Railway widow and orphan funds favoured using dogs wearing a collecting pouch or box. ‘Tim’, a rough-coated terrier, collected over £800 between 1892 and 1902 at Paddington Station for the Great Western Railway Widows and Orphans Fund. The Ladies Brigade of Collecting Dogs had, by 1899, collected over £3,000 for widows and orphans of soldiers killed or maimed in the South African War.\textsuperscript{67} So successful were some of these dogs that their remains were preserved, along with their collection tins, for posterity.\textsuperscript{68}

Clearly then, even schemes aimed at penny donations were deemed to benefit from novelty, not least in a context where more and more charities chased after
such donations. One of the most successful fundraising initiatives in Manchester at the turn of the twentieth century was the Jewish Poor of Manchester’s sale of ‘Penny-a-brick’ tickets to raise ‘substantial’ amounts for a new soup kitchen.69 Meanwhile, in Edinburgh in 1911, the Scottish Children’s League of Pity sought to collect a ‘mile of pennies’ to endow a cot in a children’s shelter, an innovation which seems to have had American evangelical roots.70 The Salvation Army also introduced collection boxes for individual families, the development of habitual giving being seen as intrinsic to becoming a Salvationist. ‘Grace before meal’ boxes were placed in living rooms and families urged to drop a penny in before consuming their evening meal as thanks for their comfort. Army agents collected the boxes quarterly.71 Although the sums donated were small (two surviving collection receipts suggest quarterly donations of around 2 shillings), the national scope of the initiative meant that the officers responsible for this scheme had fundraising targets of £10,000 per annum.72 Although hardly novel, the Army also used collecting cards to target similar demographics, deeming them a ‘good old fashioned up and down way of getting money’.73

Within the parameters of the small sum donor market, there could be further distinctions that targeted subgroups according to their available resources. A simple technique that demonstrated charities’ aspiration to social depth of donor bases was an appeal leaflet or advert that explicitly suggested different levels of donation and what that specific sum could do to transform beneficiaries’ lives. Barnardo’s appeal booklets routinely noted what £5 might pay for (a child’s apprenticeship) and what £30 might do (maintain a sick child in the infirmary for a year),74 thus distinguishing between different income demographics within the middle classes. But they also proclaimed, ‘Even the smallest gift gratefully received,’75 and this ethos was suffused throughout many charities’ fundraising strategies. The Salvation Army very clearly operated a sliding scale of donor expectation and soldiers were encouraged to exercise discretion in identifying optimum giving potential in donors. Elderly ladies rarely had spare cash but could usually be persuaded to make things for sale.76 One shilling collecting cards could be distributed to artisans or skilled working-class families. Rather more democratic ‘one penny receipts’ were surprisingly effective too: the sum was so small that ‘very few felt inclined to refuse’ and many contributed more.77 Army fundraising also included former recipients. The ‘Out-of-Love’ fund, for example, targeted former residents of welfare homes to donate a penny a week after leaving. Founded in 1891, this made direct claims on obligations and ties: the fund offered former residents a ‘beautiful’ chance, said Florence Booth, to repay some of ‘the toil, the care, the love, and the expense which has been
so freely and gladly expended upon them'. Women who refunded a significant amount (it is not clear how it was calculated) were given a finely bound Bible and placed upon a roll of honour. It operated on the premise that if 2,000 of the 5,000 women and girls that passed through Army homes could be persuaded to contribute, the initiative would raise between £400 and £500 per annum, equal to the cost of accommodating a further 25 women residents.78

Working-class donors were therefore a popular ‘small sum’ market, and well-timed, well-placed novelty could exploit that funding stream to its fullest. But if this was sometimes a process that required considerable organizational effort for what could be one-off penny donations, the other great ‘small sum’ market – children – was targeted in a more systematic, if no less novel, fashion, and with an expectation of even greater returns in the long term. Frank Prochaska has pointed to mission organizations that, by at least the 1840s, were encouraging middle-class children to donate.79 By the latter half of the nineteenth century, regional and national organizations had perfected child-focused fundraising campaigns. Appeals to ‘comfortably clothed, well-fed children’ prompted self-reflection on their privilege and difference from the ‘poor waif’, an innocent victim of want and adults’ profligacy.80 As one subscriber observed at the WSM AGM in 1899, the rising generation should be trained to ‘feel their responsibilities’.81 The cultivation of donating habits in youth incorporated giving as social responsibility, but it also encouraged a form of ‘brand loyalty’. The small donors of today were, potentially, the keystone of a charity’s tomorrow. Sir Henry Burdett, an energetic fundraiser who transformed hospital fundraising on commercial lines, directed royal fundraising and moved from his career as a physician into the stockbroking world, thought the recruitment of children essential to maintain the vitality of the donor market. He launched a Prince of Wales Fund initiative in 1897 designed to bring the ‘privilege’ of fundraising to children in the hope of creating a ‘children’s army’ of donors in memory of the jubilee year.82

The targeting of a children’s market operated in several ways. First, child donor patterns were often created as extensions of organized adult networks based on confessional culture and geography. Schools and Sunday schools were a common forum, especially when fundraising initiatives were organized in relation to a seasonal calendar. WSM coffers received an annual boost from school-based Whit Week collections while teachers encouraged children to develop fundraising skills through holding sales of work.83 Some children, motivated by fundraising at school, took the initiative and embarked on collecting schemes at home. One industrious child sent WSM over £5 from 140 separate collections.84 Large organizations tapped into child donor markets
through establishing junior clubs. The Salvation Army had a youth arm, divided into ‘Junior’ and ‘Senior’ corps, each with tailored fundraising schemes for children, while Barnardo formed the Young Helpers’ League (YHL) in 1892, an explicit acknowledgement of the value of the children’s market. Within ten years, Barnardo’s claimed to have 63,000 members enrolled in the YHL, each paying a subscription fee dependent on age.

Like the Salvation Army, the YHL operated within a vaguely militaristic model: members became ‘Companions of the League’ and a system of badges and medals, such as the Distinguished Order of Waif Service and the Silver Badge of YHL, rewarded children who met donation targets and recruited other members. The League exploited loyalty, so subscriptions were cheaper for Junior companions transferring to the Senior. An annual winter entertainment for the YHL at the Royal Albert Hall (see Figure 1.3) encouraged identification and group loyalty while presenting further fundraising opportunities: children paid for tickets to attend but were also encouraged to participate by presenting a ‘purse’ of (minimum) donations at the ceremony. Companions could establish localized groups, called ‘habitations’, enabling local identities to form part of a large national organization. Members and subscribers appeared to derive from across Britain with some donors from the colonies too.

Schemes aimed at the children’s market trained children in how to fundraise, often mimicking established forms of fundraising, such as ‘self-denial’ (the forfeiting of luxuries to donate), collecting cards and the children’s bazaar, while encouraging children to develop novel ideas of their own. Charities may have aimed to cultivate fundraisers and donors of the future but the sums raised from the children’s donor market were far from negligible. If figures printed in the YHL magazine are to be believed, youngsters raised between £90 and £100 in the first quarter of the first year (1892), rising to £747 17s 8d in the third quarter of 1893. Annual donations appeared to peak in 1910 at a remarkable £23,706. Meanwhile, in the early 1880s, Wood Street’s children’s collecting card scheme to send poor children to the seaside was so successful that the charity had to justify how excess funds would be disbursed. Little wonder that with such success, children were built into most charities’ media and print campaigns.

Print and public relations

For most voluntary charities, advertising and marketing nous was allied to the careful management of public image and maximizing opportunities for positive
Figure 1.3 Making good citizens of waifs. *Illustrated London News* (25 January 1908). Courtesy of the British Library.
publicity. For almost every new charitable institution, regardless of size or location, this meant exploiting the print medium in diverse ways. Rising popular literacy and an explosion in the number of newspapers and periodicals made this possible. Increasingly, the need to be heard above a growing cacophony of rivals also made it necessary. The Salvation Army, Barnardo’s and WSM each displayed this skillfully at different levels, demonstrating an acute and responsive understanding of the emerging media landscape and employing a variety of what we might now term public relations strategies to ensure valuable and, importantly, regular coverage in the press. Part of the strategy for each charity centred around the shaping of a charity calendar that provided editors outside their organizations with reliable, seasonal copy and charities with reliable, seasonal publicity, a phenomenon we will explore in the next chapter. But, as this section will detail, charities also cleverly adapted their in-house publications to mimic the rapidly changing mainstream press, as well as recognizing and attempting to harness the power of the emerging phenomenon of ‘celebrity’ in their dealings with the popular media.

Charities produced a bewildering variety and volume of communication material from in-house, much of which benefited from the same technological innovations as their advertising campaigns. Perhaps most famous was the Salvation Army newspaper *The War Cry*, edited by General Booth and his son Bramwell, published weekly from 1879 and bought by soldiers and casual readers alike. For the latter group, it certainly stood out from a crowd of Christian publications for its lively, engaging style. As one historian of the Army notes:

> Its editors employed all the aesthetic conventions of the day: colour covers, bold use of display type, etchings, photographs (by the mid-1890s), and a mix of stories including news, human interest, and fiction. There were features for women, a children’s page, and contests. Blending a Victorian visual aesthetic with a penny-press news sensibility, the sixteen-page broadsheet aimed for mass appeal. It offered religion without the stultifying formality that characterised a good deal of the religious press.94

The newspaper was, as one senior Army officer interviewed about its success noted, ‘instinct with the energy and vitality of youth’, most of its writers being aged under thirty.95 *The War Cry* certainly achieved the mass-market appeal it aimed for; it had a reported peak circulation in 1883 of over 350,000, was widely bought beyond Army members and attracted a degree of debate over what some saw as its ‘un-Christian’ content and distribution as a result.96 Meanwhile, *All the World*, like other popular missionary magazines of the period, informed readers
of the Army’s growing international work and similarly appealed to Salvationists and the wider public. *The Officer* was aimed explicitly at the Army’s soldiers. Yet across all three titles, there is a palpable sense that central office was fashioning a print empire that not only raised the profile of the Army’s work but that also raised significant revenue in its own right and promoted other print-based fundraising initiatives. Readers of *The Officer* (soldiers) were urged to ‘push our books and papers desperately’ and to form networks of street sellers, or what were often called ‘boomers’. Aggressive marketing techniques (the ‘paper war’) were justified because the end result was the salvation of souls.  

Thomas Barnardo sought a similarly wide audience with his *Night and Day* magazine, a publication whose subtitle, ‘A monthly record of Christian missions and practical philanthropy’, and first editorial implied a general focus on missionary charity designed to reach out to non-members, but which became, in practice, almost wholly concerned with promoting the efforts and events of Barnardo’s.  

Like *The War Cry*, it represented a revenue stream while simultaneously creating news and carrying further appeals for money. Barnardo’s memoirs, edited by his wife after his death, claim that in the mid-1890s, *Night and Day* was selling 145,000 copies, suggesting a readership beyond a core of subscribers and workers, who were presumably attracted by the magazine’s content of sensational stories of child rescue. These large circulation figures for what amounted to propaganda sheets gave Barnardo and the Booths immense latitude in managing the public image of their organizations. For all that coverage in the mainstream press was sought and valued by charities, it could, as founding figureheads in particular knew, entail as much negative as positive publicity. Barnardo, indeed, told one correspondent that he felt himself more under attack than even General Booth; being a public figure and necessarily seeking publicity for one’s organization meant placing oneself under ‘a light so illuminating and yet distorting’.  

Producing one’s own publications and making them high-sellers went some way towards correcting this focus.  

As well as producing media for an adult readership, all three charities excelled in producing children’s magazines, a relatively new innovation that proved a vital tool in creating and defining a children’s donor market. The Salvation Army had its ‘children’s War Cry’ *The Little Soldier*, later the *Young Soldier*, while Barnardo, in particular, took to the task of child-centred journalism with aplomb. As we have seen, the *Young Helper’s League Magazine*, directed at those who were already members of the scheme, pushed its readers to new heights of fundraising. Barnardo also acquired, in 1867, a magazine called *Father William’s Stories*, changing its name to *The Children’s Treasury*, then in 1881 to *Our Darlings* and
in 1894 to *Bubbles*. These were, like the *Little Soldier*, largely compilations of waif stories, poetry and pictures (most eventually in colour) and they gave him direct access to children’s nurseries and schoolrooms. He undoubtedly took his lead from the vastly expanding commercial market for children’s literature. Although charged with recruiting fundraisers for a worthy cause, the magazines copied the format of popular magazines such as *Boys’ Own* or *Chatterbox*. As Barnardo recognized, his magazines were in direct competition with commercial products, and charity magazines that were worthy and ‘sermonized’ to children at the expense of entertainment were unlikely to flourish. One writer for the *Young Helpers*’ magazine noted that Barnardo, as editor, had an abhorrence of ‘dullness’ in submitted copy. Indeed, the periodic name changes may reflect an effort to keep the magazine fresh and in keeping with the wider children’s magazine market, the better to draw in new readers.

In its more local context, WSM also realized the value of literature in capturing child donors and fundraisers, and its *Delving and Diving*, a monthly penny magazine, published from 1879, initially featured a children’s corner as well as serial fiction from what appear to have been relatively well-known and popular local authors. Within two years, the magazine had evolved more clearly into a juvenile publication: it featured a mix of waif stories and other fiction, an avuncular page aimed at encouraging well-to-do child fundraisers with reports on children’s fundraising successes, novelties and ideas, as well as poetry and puzzles. By 1883, the magazine claimed a monthly circulation of 60,000. Effective distribution arrangements helped here. *Delving and Diving* was available through any bookseller or could be ordered by subscription. Other organizations, such as the Church of England Waifs and Strays Society, were able to distribute magazines through the existing national network of churches and Sunday schools. Products such as *Delving and Diving* tapped into local nonconformist markets, especially where Sunday schools were keen to cement confessional identities. Notably, *Delving and Diving* could be supplied in bulk to schools on special terms.

If waif stories were a cornerstone of children’s magazines, they were also a bankable form of literature directed at adults and a means of publicizing the organization’s work without boring potential readers. The founders of WSM and Barnardo’s shared a vocation in writing books of supposedly true-life, but in any case arresting, stories of slum children transformed. Alfred Alsop’s *Ten Years in the Slums* and its follow-ups, published under the pseudonym ‘A delver’, were hugely popular. In just nine weeks, one of Wood Street’s publications, *From Dark to Light*, sold upwards of 6,000 copies. It cost one shilling and was
Barnardo was well attuned to what his many booklets, ranging from ‘My First Arab’ to ‘Kidnapped! A Narrative of Fact’, might do. As he noted with refreshing honesty in the introduction to one, ‘nobody reads [annual] reports’, hence his ‘informal and readable accounts’ of work carried out by the charity over the preceding year were designed to be read by as wide an audience as possible, even if their lack of actual accounts and balance sheets attracted critics in the long run. The first, ‘Nobody’s Children’, which reached a circulation of over 20,000, was sold post free for sixpence, or two for a shilling; many of the later booklets went for sixpence a dozen, suggesting a secondary market from which Barnardo’s might have expected to derive only indirect financial benefit. These booklets, generally pocket-sized, invariably featured direct appeals, often for gradated amounts, on their back covers, showing their author’s wish to have them appeal to an occupational cross-section of society.

Another key element of the booklets, subsequently much copied by others (including the Salvation Army) but wildly controversial, were the sets of ‘before and after’ photographs that showed wretched waifs transformed by their encounter with a Barnardo home into clean, well-fed and well-dressed future citizens. The scandal and court arbitration that attended these ‘artistic fictions’ in 1877 are much studied, with allegations of staging, use of models and unseemly poses eventually found to have some basis. They therefore represent an interestingly double-edged public relations case study. Clearly, pre-controversy, as an innovative fundraising device, they had it all: exploiting new technology, appealing to new audiences and strikingly drawing attention to the value of the organization’s work (and of the donor’s contribution to it) via an unmistakable visual message. They helped Barnardo establish relationships with new potential donors among the general populace, to persuade them of his organization’s worth and to maintain an ongoing dialogue with them. These are all important facets to modern definitions of public relations. Yet, equally clearly, the result of the arbitration over the photographs could have dealt a fatal blow to that carefully constructed relationship: there was found to be some level of misrepresentation in some of the photographs, and Barnardo came under sustained, personal and media-saturated attack from prominent forces that included the COS. That he and his organization did not merely weather the storm of the arbitration, but eventually thrived on foot of it – beneficiaries and income virtually quadrupled in the decade after 1877 – is testament to Barnardo’s skill in public relations. His memoirs explain that after the arbitration, ‘the public saw him as a persecuted man and deep wells of sympathy poured refreshing waters
upon him", a result that was no accident, and reflected a constant effort on Barnardo’s part to keep his own side of the story before the public, and a strategic embracing of the arbitration panel’s judgements once made; Barnardo’s trustees pointedly thanked the panel for their ‘comprehensive’ inquiry, implying that its failure to find truth in most of the charges against Barnardo represented a vindication. What began as a potentially devastating external attack was instead moulded into a form of external validation.

Barnardo’s arbitration travails can be seen as a function of another significant trend in the public relations strategies of the new voluntary charities. As much as the spotlight on a flamboyant founder could bring unwanted attention and prompt probing questions, it was also a very effective means of keeping an organization in the public eye. This was part and parcel of the risk management that historians of entrepreneurship have identified as being central to the concept, but it was also an embracing of ‘celebrity culture’. The history of celebrity is relatively recent but there is little doubt that the late-nineteenth-century growth in mass media was a watershed in its development. Simon Morgan has defined a celebrity, for historical purposes, as a person in whom ‘a sufficiently large audience is interested in their actions, image and personality to create a viable market for commodities carrying their likeness and for information about their lives and views’. Given that mass consumption and mass communication are integral to the concept, it should not be surprising that charities strategically used celebrity in their fundraising efforts. Despite recent work on celebrity humanitarianism as a new phenomenon, the early scholarship on high status patronage indicates that versions of this strategy have a long trajectory. WSM may have been a regional organization, but even it attracted international stars to its premises, among them the Australian comedian Ed. E. Ford and the male drag performer Vesta Tilley. Such visits had a double function: as fundraising events in themselves but, also, with photo calls for the local newspapers, orchestrated media exposure. When their starry likes were not available, the Bishop of Manchester or the Lady Mayoress served as reliable, if less colourful, substitutes.

At a more elevated level, Barnardo’s pursued royal patronage as a legitimizing and publicity-generating tactic from at least the 1890s: by the turn of the century, several senior royals, including the king and queen, had lent their names to its causes. In a sense, this echoed the fundraising of earlier in the Victorian era, when the queen and prince consort routinely endorsed campaigns by headin donations lists. As Frank Prochaska has shown, such was the benefit to royalty in being the nation’s ‘philanthropists-in-chief’ that their patronage was spread widely, among hundreds of charities, large and small. Still, Barnardo’s use of
royalty showed a development beyond simple patronage with attempts not only to extend the lustre of royal celebrity to the organization but, also, to generate as much publicity as possible from it. A name on a subscription list was one thing but Barnardo’s promotional material routinely featured drawings and photographs of, and personal messages from, royal patrons (see Figure 1.4). They might well have said very similar things about other charities, but Barnardo’s exploited royal approval to its fullest extent.

The charity promoted stories on its seemingly special royal connections: Princess Mary of Teck opening the ‘Babies Castle’ in Kent in 1886 prompted much press coverage, including the appearance of the illustration below (Figure 1.5) which highlighted her contribution; the use of Queen Victoria’s box at the Royal Albert Hall by the charity’s trustees for the annual Barnardo’s event was cast as a special privilege bestowed on a favoured charity; and later, Princess Alice’s personal rather than lithographed signature on 2,000 promotional letters was offered as proof of particular royal approval for the charity’s work. Royal connections were insinuated through more generic language too, with Barnardo cast as ‘prince of philanthropists’.

Figure 1.4 Young Helpers’ League promotional leaflet. D239/E1/1/9. Courtesy of Barnardo’s Photographic Archive.
The importance of Thomas Barnardo, as well as royal personages, to the charity's media strategy is clear. Much of the organization’s marketing rested on the energy and personality of Barnardo, who became, in effect, a celebrity in his own right. Yet if we apply Morgan’s definition, General Booth may have fitted the bill even more, and conceivably just as much as the most popular royal. The Salvation Army did not reject external endorsements, but it created in-house celebrities who could be used for all kinds of publicity and fundraising endeavours. Both the General’s image and that of Catherine Booth featured heavily in Army literature while information about the wider family’s

Figure 1.5 Dr Barnardo’s Good Work. Penny Illustrated Paper (27 November 1886), p. 340. Courtesy of the British Library.
exploits regularly appeared in the press; the Army even sold tickets to the Booth offsprings’ weddings. More often than not, popular press commentary on the Army was positive and a controlled part of the Army’s publicity drive, although it sometimes came with a snide gloss that suggested healthy disrespect for putting people on pedestals. Yet, Booth’s wax likeness stood in both Madame Tussauds and in the Eden Musée in New York and he received the freedom of the City of London. By 1907 he was conducting regular, well-attended (and widely reported) motorcar tours of England and receiving an honorary degree from Oxford University alongside Mark Twain. Booth’s public profile occasionally invited catty remarks, including a crack about how the General ought to be seen ‘elsewhere than at Madame Tussauds not asking for money’; in other words, only his waxwork did not beg for donations. However, the very fact that the Booths were subject to backbiting in the press shows that the effort to make them famous had worked. From an entrepreneurial standpoint, the success of their organization suggests that they navigated the risk of public exposure with some skill. Ultimately, for all three charities, strategic use of existing stars and high-profile patrons, and cultivation of new ‘in-house’ celebrities generated great public interest and raised the profile of their enterprise.

Conclusion

The discussion above on advertising, marketing and promotion demonstrates the extent to which, in their communication with donor and potential donor bases, voluntary charities of all sizes embraced the new, took risks and fashioned themselves much as contemporary commercial businesses did. Debates about the precise nature of Victorian entrepreneurship still rage among historians. However, Martin Daunton’s stress on the idea that specific and changing social, political and economic contexts all had a hand in the peculiar development of British capitalism in the late nineteenth century is equally applicable to the contemporary British charitable scene. While we might be able to trace particular kinds of fundraising techniques back to roots in much earlier periods – the medieval ‘mailshot’ being just one example – charities like the Salvation Army, Barnardo’s and WSM, partly by virtue of the transformative age in which they operated, were taking part in and shaping a qualitatively new philanthropic world. Key to the charities’ success in doing so was an ability to harness, often in inventive, clever and effective ways, the many and varied technological and social advancements of the period for their own purposes.
These entrepreneurs and their organizations made a measurable difference, if not necessarily in terms of bringing about the kind of society they wanted to see, then at least in the way they went about funding that endeavour. The overall growth of income for our case study charities, despite an increasingly crowded philanthropic marketplace, indicates their success at keeping their local and national profiles buoyant, at selling their ‘product’ to diverse donor markets and creating sustainable organizations, often reflecting the fact that long before their own demise (with or without showy funeral rites) these founding entrepreneurs had shaped an institutional culture resting on a wealth of know-how and support networks.

In that respect, what Alsop, Barnardo, Booth and many other charity founders and overseers of the period helped to create was a professional business model of charity enterprise, which, far from rejecting or decrying modern society in toto, sought to harness some aspects of modern urban life – the market, communication technologies – in a crusade against others – chiefly poverty and its many causes and symptoms, but also secularism. This continual pursuit of the new penetrated every level of their organizations, and in part ensured their survival. This need not imply a perfect model; there were failures even for the three main charities focused on here, and there were outright failures of other similar organizations which did not endure beyond a few years. The filming of Booth’s and Barnardo’s funerals might seem a modern touch in the passing of a couple of ‘great Victorians,’ a signal of the dying of an old world and the emergence of a new. In fact, it was of a piece with their careers, and the marketing clout they had injected into their organizations. As the following chapters show, their generation did much else to make modern humanitarianism.
It is easy to think of charity fundraising as an imbalanced, essentially one-way process, where organizations issue appeals and money flows in at varying rates from sympathetic, altruistic donors. Yet charitable giving has often been understood, particularly by anthropologists following Marcel Mauss, in terms of reciprocal gift exchange, where both parties derive something from the relationship: money for the charity, and various sorts of intangible ‘symbolic capital’ for the donor. The latter is not an unreasonable or unenlightening perspective, and it certainly formed a significant part of the new charity landscape that the previous chapter described. However, we argue in this chapter that British charity entrepreneurs by the end of the nineteenth century were also increasingly conceiving of reciprocity in explicitly material terms, wherein both donor and charitable organization had something tangible to show for their interaction. This ‘charitable consumption’ was not an uncomplicated dynamic, but the chapter analyses it, first, through what we call ‘purchase-triggered donations’, which we divide into directly financially meaningful sales of goods and indirectly financially meaningful sales. Second, the chapter assesses the effect of the increasing commercialization of the religious calendar on the seasonal fundraising of charities. Finally, the chapter places developments in what we term ‘the experience economy’ of charity fundraising in this new context.

Purchases as donations

The growth and increasing sophistication of the public relations strategies of charities as outlined in the previous chapter has an obvious corollary that indicates an emerging conception of the donor as a consumer with choices and the charitable sector as a market where a growing raft of organizations competed for their ‘custom’. It should not surprise us that this period also witnessed a rise
in the overlap between social and commercial enterprise. The usual suspects in this regard are investments in model housing developments and villages or schools, but voluntary charity fundraising also suggests this overlap, in part through the development of what is now sometimes referred to as the ‘purchase-triggered donation’. This was by no means a homogenous activity, and charities used it to different degrees, applied different meanings to it and expected different outcomes. Nonetheless, it represents a further change in how charities went about the business of fundraising in modern Britain.

Selling donated goods to raise money was, of course, not new. It was well established by at least the 1790s both in the sale of ‘good cause’ literature and, most famously, in the ‘charity bazaar’. These strategies remained reliable forms of fundraising throughout the nineteenth century and the bazaar in particular played a role in shaping Victorian consumer culture, particularly among women. Yet, while they were undoubtedly successful, there was also a sense among the new charity entrepreneurs that they lacked novelty and were not a sufficient basis on which to compete for evermore-pressed donors. By 1893, Barnardo’s Young Helpers’ League Magazine explained that it had become ‘the fashion of late to run down this old-established method of helpfulness’. Even Wood Street Mission could playfully ask in the 1880s ‘dolls again?’, referring to the endless run of ‘doll bazaars’ held by little girls in aid of the Mission. The Salvation Army, meanwhile, issued strict regulations to officers holding gift sales (sales of donated goods) because they had fallen into ‘disrepute’ and had ‘questionable practices’ associated with them, a sense reinforced by a litany of satirical portrayals of the bazaar in early nineteenth century and Victorian journalism and fiction, and by criticism from some religious figures.

Still, such ‘fancy fairs’ were too lucrative to discard entirely and, even here, charities advocated novelty to steal a march on competitors. Sales could, for instance, be elaborately themed. The Salvation Army’s suggestion in 1905 of stalls set up as Japanese shops, refreshments in a ‘tea house’ and stallholders in Japanese costume was of a piece with developments in contemporary church bazaars, where efforts at providing something new and spectacular to attract audiences well-used to such events meant that what Prochaska described as the ‘ingenuity and industry of scores of women’ was increasingly supplemented by overtly commercial partners. By the early twentieth century, several parish committees turned to bazaar ‘specialists’ with ‘well-established reputations’, professional companies who decorated the sale hall according to chosen themes: Frederick Le Maistre & Co. in Manchester and J. Tweedale and Co. in Rochdale among them. The tenders for the decoration contract that one
bazaar committee received, for example, involved suggested themes ranging from the exotic (Japanese, World fair, Italian Garden and Eastern City) to the more familiar (Cheshire village, Medieval Manchester) with quotes between 95 guineas and £120. Larger bazaars began to solicit corporate links, including, at various Manchester events, pleas to purchase ‘Camp Coffee’ samples for a penny and packets of ‘Scotonia’ tea ‘if anxious to help the proceeds’, as well as sideshows of ‘ladies’ washing competitions’ that were sponsored by ‘Sunlight Soap’. Deals with printers secured the gratuitous supply of elaborate bazaar handbooks in return for advertising revenue. By the end of the century, bazaars in and of themselves were hardly novel, but they were places where signs of a new kind of commercialism was increasingly apparent. They also had the virtue, certainly in Barnardo’s case, of being events that could range from enormous, centrally organized, society calendar fixtures patronized by royalty, to small affairs organized by networks of local supporters.

While the bazaar still had its place, it did not drive the expansion of the purchase-triggered donation. The satires of fancy fairs as places where female stall-holders flirtatiously encouraged men to buy useless items (‘pen-wipers, Indian figures carefully repaired with glue, and Sealed Envelopes’) for ‘[not] less than twice their market value’ was an exaggeration, but only a slight one, which reflected the reality that these were not truly a part of the real commercial world. By the late nineteenth century, however, increasing numbers of charity entrepreneurs recognized that potential donors were not a captive bazaar audience, ready to be exploited, but consumers who might become loyal ‘customers’ if the right package was on offer. It was the Salvation Army which most clearly embraced this, and which went furthest in terms of commoditizing its own identity. Its enterprising initiative had come early. In its early days, Booth financed the East End Mission through the operation of a soup kitchen offering ‘Hot soup for the millions’ by day and cheap three course dinners in the evening. Within two years, this had expanded from one premises to five, with the shops providing a steady income. Although the kitchens eventually failed, they served their purpose in providing the Booths with experience in operating a business and testified to the value of taking risks. At the time of acquiring the kitchens, the Booths were already in debt and Methodist colleagues strongly advised them to scale back their ambition.

This early entrepreneurship continued with a pioneering and wide-ranging use of purchase-triggered donations. Print formed a significant part of this. The War Cry was a means of advertising and promotion, but it was equally a profit-making enterprise that allowed people to make small, regular donations and
have something to show for it. There were also more one-off pamphlet or novelty purchases, with officers in the Army explicitly encouraged to develop print initiatives in their own localities. One ‘enterprising officer’ created a pamphlet that was cut out in the profile of a ‘Hallelujah Lassie’ (see Figure 2.1).

Similarly, photographs had a double novelty value because they were still sufficiently rare as a technology for many consumers, and as Barnardo realized in the 1870s with his lucrative sale of packets of ‘waif’ portraits, they could feature unorthodox subjects that aroused fascination. By the 1910s, Barnardo’s had moved to selling postcard images of previous residents of homes or of the Rev. Mayers, senior deputation secretary, at large on fundraising spectaculars in New Zealand and Australia or ‘at home’ with ‘Barnardo babies’. In 1899, the Salvation Army’s *The Officer* magazine reported that, where photographs were still sufficiently new to elicit curiosity, soldiers might make tickets of admission to Army events that resembled carte de visites (cheap to acquire if ordered in bulk). Cheap admission tickets (priced around 6d) printed with the portraits of three or more photogenic officers carried novelty value even if buyers had no intention of attending the meeting.

The Salvation Army’s most photographed and depicted officers, however, were its own resident celebrities, General and Mrs Booth, whose images were familiar to readers of the illustrated press, but which also found their way onto common household items. Not only did the General feature frequently as a decorative Staffordshire pottery bust, alongside contemporaries including Gladstone and various national war heroes, but also on more practical items: teapots, plates, cups and needle cases. The Army itself traded in Booth-branded goods but the market also extended beyond the Army’s trade outlets (advertisements in Tasmanian newspapers in the 1890s noted a store as ‘sole agent for General Booth teapots’ suggesting considerable consumer demand for them). It may be that these items involved a form of licensing of the popular Booth image to other manufacturers, since this certainly happened in other contexts. Booth’s celebrity and his embrace of new technology was sometimes turned into a commercial proposition for external businesses that also had returns for the charity itself: the supplier of the tyres for the General’s 1907 motorcar tour was able, for a price that may have gone beyond the in-kind contribution of the tyres themselves, to use his name in subsequent advertising for his product (see Figure 2.2). Meanwhile, recordings of the General’s voice for the ‘graph-o-phone’ could be purchased from the Columbia Phonograph Company as early as 1907, part of the proceeds of which, purchasers were informed, would go towards the Army’s social work (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.1 *The Officer*, March 1905, 99 'Hallelujah Lassie'. Courtesy of Salvation Army International Heritage Centre.

Figure 2.2 Booth tour tyres. *Manchester Guardian*, 19 July 1907, p. 4. Courtesy of the British Library.
If these forays into the commercial world seem forward thinking for a charity, and they certainly foreshadow the kind of corporate-charity partnerships which scholars tend to see as much later, twentieth-century developments, then the Army’s own Trade Department surely trumps all.

As its monthly ‘trade journals’ show, the Army operated what amounted to a modern department store, supplying a vast range of items to both members and non-members. Their London workshops (which manufactured some of the items sold) and warehouses offered everything any soldier in any part of the world could possibly need to carry out his or her duties: uniforms, musical instruments, pens, inkstands, books, boots and even boot polish. Other less directly Army-related items were also on sale. General clothing for men, women and children, sewing machines, cutlery, toilet items including razors, hairbrushes, light fittings, bicycles, home furnishings ranging from tea-sets to sideboards, bassinets, luggage, mangles and wringers and myriad other products were advertised for sale, all of the profits going back to fund the Army’s
social and religious work. Accounts for most of the later period of the Trade Department’s operation do not survive, although two (slightly singed) pages from 1890 suggest a healthy net profit of £12,838, a figure that must surely have expanded as the business did over the next two decades or more.31 Far from taking advantage of the charitable consumer in turning this profit, the Army claimed to compete favourably with commercial rivals. Notes in one issue assured readers that the Army had the foresight to buy materials in bulk so despite wool prices rising, their woollen items would remain at ‘old prices’ even as their competitors saw prices rise 15–20 per cent.32 While competing on price, they also promised a better customer experience: ‘When disheartened by shopping elsewhere’, the journal proclaimed, ‘come to the International Trade Headquarters’, where ‘your judgement will be assisted by expert and friendly advice, instead of being mystified’.33

One historian has suggested that in doing all of this, the Army ‘borrowed from, but did not fully partake of the consumerist ethos’, but this assertion is difficult to sustain.34 There was certainly a moral edge to its marketing and a refusal to sell some products that commercial rivals would have had fewer qualms over supplying and promoting (including tobacco).35 But comparing the Army trade journals with similar mail-order catalogues of the period, including those of the co-operative ‘Army and Navy’ stores and of the more upmarket Harrod’s, indicates, if anything, more of a ‘hard-sell’ approach by the Salvationists, the particular virtues of each product often clearly emphasized in display advertisement style.36 The trade journals slot neatly into commercial mail-order history, where the most successful companies entered the market in order to make the most of an existing network of consumers. Kays, for instance, in the 1880s expanded upon its working-class ‘watch club’ lists, and Littlewoods in the interwar period used its pools customers.37 This is precisely what the Salvation Army Trade Department had done, marrying its ready-made workforce, the poor inmates of its institutions, with its ready-made market for goods, that is, a relatively stable worldwide membership and numerous donor markets.

The Army pioneered a new kind of purchase-triggered charitable donation and an expanded, distinctly new, material culture of philanthropy. Asa Briggs suggested in *Victorian Things* that contemporary philanthropy was ‘often expressed not through the creation of new things to last but to the giving away of old things, notably food and clothes’.38 Even leaving aside the fact that this supposed ‘gifting’ of goods to the poor was often commoditized via small, sometimes nominal, charges designed to avoid ‘pauperisation’, Briggs’s
Charities manufactured and sold a host of new, tangible items, the crucial difference being that they were designed for their subscribers and donors rather than for beneficiaries. By 1893, the Salvation Army’s annual profits from literature and ‘trade’ combined were, according to The Officer, ‘simply enormous’.

On a rather less elaborate scale than the Salvation Army, many charities adopted elements of this practice. As Chapter 1 indicated, literature was the primary output for sale for many of them. But, just as the Army’s beneficiaries manufactured much of its retail stock, other charities that provided an institutional home to the poor (particularly boys, women or those with disabilities) also endeavoured to give them ‘useful employment’. From the very beginning of his boys’ mission, Barnardo recognized that while teaching boys the valuable lesson of self-sufficiency, their work could also provide a regular funding stream, and that notions of ‘reform’ and ‘rehabilitation’ could be used, obliquely or explicitly, to push sales and boost profits. Audited accounts from 1882 containing a ‘summary of industries’ indicate that brush-making, boot-making, tailoring, carpentering, messengering and shoe-blacking, together with sales of bundles of firewood, an aerated water factory and two East-end ‘coffee palaces’ housed in former public houses, produced an annual income of almost £10,000 for the charity. By 1889, Barnardo’s trade manager reported that three vans were engaged in fulfilling water and wood orders across London, and that the wood-choppers could ‘turn out 50,000 bundles per week’ in busy periods. A ‘large and thriving business’ was carried on, although the manager noted that until he could ‘establish a large family or private connection in and around the Metropolis, these industries will not really flourish’, a claim followed by a plea for both wholesale and retail buyers to consult their product lists and place orders.

A number of other contemporary ‘working boys’ institutions purported to do something similar, and the Charity Organisation Society (COS) kept a close eye on a few which it felt may have strayed too far into the commercial world. One such, the ‘National Working Boys’ Home’, had boys hawking across the country tin goods that they had not themselves made. The organization eventually became a limited company. Yet there was in this case a judgement by the COS secretary Charles Loch that the Home’s handbill circulars offering goods for sale amounted to charitable appeals despite not asking for subscriptions, since people were being asked to ‘buy the tinware not on the merits of the ware but to help the destitute’. Though clearly disapproving of an institution whose charitable status was doubtful, this acknowledgement by the self-appointed charity watchdog that
serving items could amount to charitable fundraising shows that the purchase-triggered donation was a real, if in their view wrong-headed, phenomenon in the new charity landscape.

The implications, however misleading, of ‘ethical consumption’ that some organizations promoted were most clearly manifest by the Salvation Army, whose ventures into this territory were explicitly crusading. The Army’s ‘Darkest England’ campaigns are well known. One of the most famous of the scheme’s innovations was a campaign, begun in 1891, to improve conditions in the notoriously dreadful match factories of London, where ‘phossy jaw’ ravaged poorly paid female workers, despite the famous strike of three years earlier. The Army opened its own match workshop, using safer resources and paying better rates to workers. The advertisement shown in Figure 2.4, one of several aimed specifically at women, suggests the Booth genius for marketing. ‘Lights in Darkest England’ safety matches reinforced the Salvation Army and Darkest England brands, while at the same time offering purchasers an early form of ‘caring’ or ‘radical’ consumption, wherein consumers were prepared to pay over the odds for a product because doing so rendered a social good.

The purchase was simultaneously a simple way for charitable consumers to buy into a good cause, a show of support for the vision of working life the matches represented, a souvenir of the donor’s own virtue and, because of its everyday use and branding, an ongoing reminder, to them and to others, of the organization that manufactured and sold it to them.

There is clear evidence of significant direct financial gain to be made from creating opportunities for purchase-triggered donations and proceeds could be used by charities to defray the cost of running homes and other schemes to help the poor. But direct profit was not always the point, and the symbolism invested in such purchases, profitable or not, should not be underestimated. Where sales were on a much smaller scale or where the items sold were of a more nominal character – ‘flag’ pins, and one Manchester charity’s small sales of work made in its leatherwork and sewing classes come to mind – the longer-term financial worth of even the most modest purchase-triggered donation was still apparent. Just as with printed matter, items sold served purposes that might lead indirectly to greater financial returns further down the line. The fact that a sum of money and a physical item changed hands materialized and lent greater meaning to the traditional charitable gift exchange for both parties. If the item were displayed – a badge on the lapel, a newspaper under the arm – it could instantly accrue elements of the social capital that many donors valued. From the point of view of the charities, it could help establish and sustain donor
relationships by identifying a latent sympathy in an individual for their aims. The exchange could also make donors feel a valued part, however small, of the organization’s effort and thus more likely to donate again. None of this was impossible in the absence of physical markers of donations, but they certainly made it easier.

One of the most protean purchase-triggered donations was the commemorative object. By the late nineteenth century, graphic and photographic postcards as well as paper napkins were common examples of cheap, mass-produced purchases.
that could be sold to fundraise. From the 1880s, the United Kingdom became flooded with imported Japanese paper napkins, their delicately decorative printed borders overlaid by London printers with black text that generally referred to a recent event: perhaps a royal occasion, a political event or, commonly, a tragic mining accident. Often sold as commemorative items, it is unclear whether all sales went to colliery relief funds but, akin to numerous material objects sold for fundraising purposes, many buyers undoubtedly believed their purchase was in a good cause. Charity bazaars also tapped into the collecting culture with specially branded ceramics commemorating that year’s fair. Wesleyans at Fleetwood in 1878 commissioned china decorated with pink roses and the name and year of the bazaar printed in gold lettering; Chorley Primitive Methodists in 1883 opted for a floral band with heraldic style symbols, the name and date of the bazaar. Clearly a purchase-triggered donation, the objects were designed to be useful, beautiful and promotional; with distinct annual markers, they were also likely items intended for individual collections. Even one-off pieces, such as an etched glass plate in aid of the Boer War fund, 1900, could capitalize on a collecting culture. Although commemorative paper, ceramics and glassware could be produced relatively cheaply, items held aesthetic value in their own right. A silver inkwell inscribed with details commemorating the Mossfield Colliery disaster in Stoke-on-Trent in 1889 or a painted tin tray sold in aid of the 1893 miners’ lockout catered to a range of pockets while raising money towards relief funds.

The sale of commemorative goods tapped into preexisting social and cultural practices, notably, cultures of mourning and remembrance. Commemorative objects were typically etched with detail of the disaster and symbols of death and mourning, such as the fern leaf denoting eternity. Commemorative ware could also act as a ‘badge’ of honour; the display of such items in the home advertised the purchaser’s sympathies and generosity to visitors. Based on plain goods, most of these commemorative objects could be brought to market quickly, simply engraved or stamped with pertinent information and sold through local fundraising initiatives. When a stampede at Victoria Hall in Sunderland killed almost 200 children in June 1883, the machinery of the purchase-triggered donation swung immediately into action: etched glass goblets were available and the local newspaper produced a commemorative book, bound in black leather with gold lettering and decoration. Inside, the book contained a miniature copy of the special edition of the Herald and Daily Post published the day after the tragedy, alongside the names of those killed and the proceedings of the inquests. Not all commemorative purchases were visual display driven. The
The majority of these items were small and cheap to produce and to buy, but when they generated sufficient interest, could be significant money-spinners and draw on the crowd-funding model outlined in Chapter 1. One of the most famous examples is Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘The Absent Minded Beggar’, written to help raise money for dependents of soldiers engaged in the Boer War. The poem appeared first in a Daily Mail supplement in 1899, but enjoyed an afterlife in fundraising performances and material objects, such as handkerchiefs printed with the poem, sheet music to accompany it, patriotic postcard images and a map of the war zone. In total, the ‘Absent Minded Beggar Fund’ raised an estimated £250,000. Not all purchase-triggered donations were so directly lucrative, but charities certainly came to understand the value of material exchange to their fundraising business.

Seasonal shop windows

Charity entrepreneurs’ understanding of emerging consumer tendencies in late-Victorian Britain therefore went far beyond the bazaar and what Prochaska has quaintly described as ‘provid[ing] a pleasure dear to the human heart, shopping’. Their uses of commerce in fundraising betrayed a sophisticated appreciation of the psychology of consumption, something exemplified in the development of distinct ‘charity calendars’, which engaged with existing festivals and seasonal customs as well as creating new ones individual to specific organizations, all with the intention of realizing funds. Christmas was unsurprisingly common to most charities (even some Jewish ones). Passover, Whitsun, Easter and Harvest festival were variously exploited while myriad invented traditions of ‘founder’s days’ and ‘self-denial weeks’ peppered the calendars of particular organizations.

This was, in part, a straightforward story of publicity strategies. Seasonal copy for charitable publications and the popular press operated as a spectacular shop window for organizations seeking to promote their brand. Charities large and small inaugurated regular events in pursuit of press coverage at particular times of year, and they largely got that coverage. Wood Street Mission’s news cuttings, for example, show that its media year primarily revolved around toy distribution to thousands of children at Christmas and the opening of its summer camp during Whit week. Pictures of children receiving toys
from an avuncular ‘Santa’, in particular, were well suited to the increasingly sentimentalized Victorian Christmas. Reporting on the ‘strangely pathetic’ scenes on Christmas Day at Coram’s Foundling Hospital in central London, nonconformist magazine *The Quiver* noted that scenes of children receiving welfare on Christmas Day were so quaint that all Christmas special issues should represent it. Most already did. Such press features, often written and submitted by the voluntary organizations themselves, legitimized the charity and provided free advertising. Local reports on Barnardo’s Christmas treats cannily gave contact details for any ‘friendless’ child. It was unlikely that friendless children were reading the papers on Boxing Day. What mattered was the opportunity to pitch the Barnardo name, slogan and ‘mission statement’ in palatable and timely copy for the countless potential donors who would be reading. Although some charities initially resisted festive charity, lambasting it as ‘farcical’ ‘flash in the pan generosity’, they eventually capitulated. Such were the marketing dividends of offering Christmas treats that charities would have been foolish not to capitalize.

But if Christmas was a ‘shop window’ in publicity terms, the connotations the festival carried of Christian compassion and, conversely, its increasing commercialization, also presented opportunities for charity entrepreneurs to capture donors’ attention. Christmas fundraising made sense in part because, coming in the depths of winter, it was a period of elevated need among the poor. It was also a time of heightened consciousness among potential donors, and charities were equipped to tap into that. By the 1880s, social commentators were already bemoaning the transformation of Christmas into a secular celebration of excess. An editorial in *The Times* in 1888 complained that the commercial extension of Christmas cast such a ‘long shadow’ over the weeks and months before Christmas Day that readers would soon need a calendar to tell them when Christmas was not. By the start of the twentieth century, such sentiments had taken the form of truism as periodicals and newspapers declared that the romance of Christmas had been replaced by commercialism: an ‘evil’ of ‘toiling, weary, feverish’ consumerism that made life hell for shop staff while preparations for Christmas Day had adopted ‘nightmare’ aspects.

One way of saving Christmas from this secular frenzy of consumption was to harness the dormant spirituality of Christmas, even if fewer people identified with the theological doctrine at the heart of the festival. The Christmas story was, at bottom, about humanity and all hearts could respond. The popular press managed to combine the promotion of Christmas as a commercial entertainment with reminders of the ‘Christmas spirit’ of compassion and suggestions for
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

It is no surprise that newspapers such as The Times ran ‘Christmas lists’ of approved charities while provincial newspapers sponsored local initiatives. Charities were, of course, complicit in this, capitalizing on critiques of consumer excess to push philanthropic giving as part of the seasonal splurge. The main motors of Christmas philanthropic publicity, the toy appeals and distributions, also co-opted what many Christian commentators anxiously saw as a modern corruption of this spirit, namely, personal overindulgence and excessive commercialization.

Pictures of poor children engaged in consumption of relatively indulgent food and new toys were designed to prompt two more emotional, related responses from the general public, both of which might prompt a donation. Those who took the anti-commercialization rhetoric to heart were offered a platform for enacting the ‘true’ meaning of the festival: humanity and compassion towards what were invariably decreed to be grateful, ‘most deserving’ children. Moreover, donating to the less fortunate in this manner might soothe an individual’s residual Christian guilt about festive consumption, particularly since this form of charity was framed as a constitutive part of that consumption. It was no accident that, while cash was certainly solicited at Christmas, in-kind contributions of toys were pointedly sought, perhaps more than at any other time of year. The implication was that patrons might simply add another item to their personal shopping list, or regift a present received in a previous year.

Some fundraising initiatives plugged even more explicitly into commercial practices. The Prince of Wales Fund suggested that parents combine gift giving and Christmas card practices by purchasing a specially commissioned photograph-cum-stamp album for their offspring. The album had space for the autograph and ‘midget photograph’ of the owner inside the front cover. A special deal struck with commercial photographers meant that the first 100,000 children to present their album would win a free portrait of themselves if they could produce their album with a shilling and half crown donation stamp fixed inside. The initiative combined individual materialism with moral sentiment. As a festive gift, the album was ‘full of tender meaning’ but also promised to ‘afford much amusement’ as children offered themselves as photographic subjects. As more photographs and donation stamps were pasted after Christmas, the album would be ‘preserved and treasured’, a memento of childhood for later life. More importantly, tapping into the ‘collecting’ market, the Fund hoped to create a ‘children’s army’ of donors: recipients would seek to collect more stamps, thereby cultivating a lifelong habit of giving. In other words, charities’ exploitation
of Christmas rested on a paradox: Christmas consumption begat Christmas compassion. For the author G. K. Chesterton, the conflation of materialism, indulgence and morality in the name of Christmas threatened to destroy the ‘soul’ of the season.\textsuperscript{74}

Christmas offered the clearest opportunity for drawing these links between individual personal consumption and the demands of charity. But other Christian and secular holidays could be similarly exploited. The Salvation Army, sensitive to the peculiarities of rural economies, developed giving patterns around Harvest time. As clergy had long known, farmers were unlikely to give cash donations but were far more amenable to donating gifts in kind, especially at periods of glut.\textsuperscript{75} In Canada, Harvest festival was so successful for the Army that it was potentially more lucrative than Christmas.\textsuperscript{76} Wood Street Mission also solicited Harvest festival donations before the big push towards Christmas fundraising. In between, Bonfire night might be exploited. One teacher told the Mission’s magazine \textit{Delving and Diving} that ‘my little pupils have given up their fireworks’ in order to contribute over £2 to the feeding fund after the magazine published a request that children and their parents not waste money on ‘squibs and crackers’.\textsuperscript{77}

That sentiment, a belief in the goodness of foregoing personal consumption in favour of or by way of encouraging charitable consumption, formed the basis of one of the more successful inventions of the new charity calendars. From 1886, the Salvation Army annually ran ‘self-denial week’ aimed at existing supporters worldwide which asked them to give up something, for example, an intended purchase, in favour of a donation to the Army’s funds. To avoid ‘fleshly comfortableness’ for a week was painted by \textit{The Officer} as an act of personal reflection and prayer for the Salvationist. The Army was cautious about presenting the week as ‘solely a money-raising campaign’. This was disingenuous: by 1908, the event had raised £72,670 in Britain alone,\textsuperscript{78} and \textit{The Officer}’s manual was replete with suggestions for how to collect cash. Tips on advertising at railway stations, using empty shops and chalking lines on roads to draw attention to the self-denial effort played with consumer anxiety much as Christmas efforts did, contrasting soldiers’ (temporary) lack of consumption with what were presumably bustling streets of shoppers.\textsuperscript{79}

Barnardo’s ran a similarly conceived ‘self-denial day’, which asked Young Helpers to ‘give up something – some luxury or some pleasure’, in the context of a post-Christmas ‘gift week’ which also included a ‘bazaar day’ and a ‘collecting day’.\textsuperscript{80} These overtly Christian (but not doctrinal) events were clearly Lent-like, but specific to organizations, and, usefully, moveable: the Army’s self-denial
week was changed from autumn to spring when its Harvest appeal took off. In a society that remained overwhelmingly Christian in outlook but was consumption oriented, with all the anxieties that this seeming contradiction wrought, the success of these self-denial efforts is hardly surprising. The new voluntary charity entrepreneurs’ ability to manipulate these conflicting emotions in the donating public, according to a carefully worked-out timetable, is nonetheless impressive.

Nevertheless, the charity calendar could also generate unashamed celebrations of consumption and the good it might do. In 1903, the Kings Hospital Fund held a ‘Hospital Shopping Day’ in London, where, on an appointed Tuesday in November, hundreds of retailers agreed to put orange posters in their windows, and cab-drivers flew orange pennons from their vehicles, indicating to shoppers that a portion of their turnover from that day’s business would go to the Fund. ‘The idea’, noted one newspaper, ‘is that people will choose that day to anticipate some want or to satisfy some long-deferred wish, and perhaps even make it a day for the selection of their Christmas presents’. This very literal ‘seasonal shop window’ was judged a ‘qualified success’ with £1,027 raised, but it was not repeated, primarily because many traders had been persuaded to take part on condition they were not asked to do so again, and many other retailers objected to it in the first place as a ‘levy’ on them. Yet even as a one-off, it indicated that charities were not simply searching for, as one newspaper suggested in respect of it, ‘novel enterprises – something that will “catch on”’. They were, in fact, cleverly plugging into emerging leisure activities, in this case shopping, in any way that they could.

The experience economy

Allied to the purchase-triggered donation was the ‘experience economy’. Like the purchase, the exchange of philanthropic gift for an experience was a mainstay of charitable fundraising. Events including musical concerts, grand balls, theatre performances, ‘entertainments’, garden parties, ‘conversazione’, lantern shows and sporting fixtures such as athletics days and cycling events formed some part of most charities’ fundraising strategy from at least the eighteenth century and remained an integral component of the donation market at the beginning of the twentieth. Entertainments organized in the name of, or with the patronage of celebrities, aristocrats and, as Prochaska has shown, royalty continued to hold cachet where attendance was less an expression of support for the specific
cause than it was an opportunity to mix with a particular social set: a kind of ‘in-crowd funding’ to coin a term. Sometimes, it allowed attendees to step inside magnificent, normally off-limits spaces. The Duke and Duchess of Sutherland's Stafford House in London was a favourite venue for myriad benefits. The hall, famous for its staircase, had capacity for 600 guests, and depending on the scale of the entertainment, the grandeur of the setting was enhanced with elaborate floral displays and electric lighting, still a novelty in the late nineteenth century. The Duke and Duchess were selective in which events, or rather causes, they endorsed in person, a fact no doubt reflected in the cost of tickets; some had entry fees for as little as five shillings. This meant, however, that some event organizers ended up hosting guests personally in Stafford House: a privilege for which it was surely worth getting up any charity event.

Similarly, enlisting the support of celebrities could transform a charity entertainment. A performance by Henry Irving at Drury Lane Theatre in November 1900 raised a staggering $6,085 for victims of extreme weather in Texas. Those in attendance may well have intended to donate to the Texas storm fund in any case, but it is probable that many would have looked askance at yet another fundraising effort for natural disasters overseas. The audience's 'giving' and what they were giving for was incidental; it was the recently knighted Henry Irving that most were paying to see. For Irving, meanwhile, there was also an interest beyond the charitable cause itself. America remained a mainstay of his revenue although profits from touring the United States had fallen at the end of the century.

It was not only in London theatres that such events took place, however. By the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of provincial theatres hosted charitable events regularly throughout the year: Manchester’s Gaiety Theatre hosted an annual charity dance while the nearby Prince’s Theatre hosted a week of charity performances just before Christmas. For the theatrical venues, charges for use of the venue covered the costs while offering promotional opportunities, both in newspaper reports of fundraising events and in advertising upcoming commercial performances to a captive audience. Often, charitable entertainments featured a local celebrity or an established theatrical company, thereby aping the kind of celebrity appeal that Irving demonstrated. But local entertainments could also provide an opportunity for amateurs to drum up audiences from an otherwise disinterested public by appealing to their compassionate spirit. Manchester’s ‘Minnehaha Minstrels’, an amateur music and comic troupe, appear to have made their reputation on charity events for the likes of Wood Street Mission and the Manchester and Salford Refuges; one 1891
estimate featured in the periodical *Truth* suggested that over the previous eleven seasons they had raised ‘no less that £5,848’ for local causes.\(^{92}\)

Some amateur events were glamorous simply by virtue of their illustrious participants. The ‘Wandering Minstrels’ were an orchestra with amateur but largely aristocratic musicians and conductors, notably the Hon. Seymour Egerton (son of the Earl of Wilton), who gave charity concerts, predominantly in London, but also in the provinces, between 1860 and 1898. In their first ten years, the Minstrels claimed to have handed over £8,000 (clear of expenses) to charities.\(^{93}\) Between 1870 and 1895 they raised almost £17,000 in their own right, and were sufficiently proud of their fundraising prowess that they wrote to *Truth* about their efforts after that publication had commended the rival Minnehaha Minstrels.\(^{94}\) Fundraising initiatives in conjunction with other organizations, such as the Mansion House Fund, raised further revenue. One of their last major concerts was in aid of Princess Mary’s Ward at Richmond Hospital, raising £480.\(^{95}\) Again, audiences need not actively support the cause in question. Reports in *The Graphic* and *Vanity Fair* were potentially more interested in reporting who was in attendance, both in the orchestra and the audience.\(^{96}\) For the Minstrels themselves, the orchestra appears to have begun as a leisure pursuit. Early ‘smoking concerts’ were for friends rather than funds while humorous poems, drawings and photographs of each other suggest that the orchestra was, for members, simply a fun thing to do.\(^{97}\) Likewise, the causes were so diverse, from hospitals to institutes for the blind to clubs for working men and crèches, it is difficult to identify any specific philanthropic agenda.

The same can be said of some of the numerous charitable efforts of a new breed of hobbyists. Cycling was the occasion for several benefits in aid of Wood Street Mission at the turn of the century.\(^{98}\) Manchester and Salford Harriers suggested a charity cycling parade in 1897, to which the committee readily agreed.\(^{99}\) Making money for charity was the stated purpose of the event, but the experience of raising it was evidently a jolly for all involved. The fancy dress procession, the 1901 version captured on film by Mitchell and Kenyon, was replete with participants dressed as cavaliers, clowns and so-called Native Americans, all playing up to an ‘amused crowd’.\(^{100}\) But there were also overtly political leisure organizations whose members’ philanthropic agenda was more explicit. The Christian socialist Clarion movement, which encompassed cycling and later rambling clubs, also included ‘Cinderella clubs’ which frequently made common cause with Wood Street Mission, contributing hundreds of pounds to the charity’s summer camp or Christmas breakfast annually, and providing
entertainments to children at the Wood Street premises. The value of charity was in itself a debated concept within the Labour Church movement, but these were contributions that seemed to chime with the movement’s overall aims, while also offering an outlet for members’ activism and camaraderie. Cinderella club entertainments, as Wood Street Mission was aware and tried to mitigate, were also potentially a means of seeding socialist, rather than Gospel, messages in the next generation.

The ‘experience economy’ of the charitable world could therefore be vastly more complicated than an experience provided in exchange for a donation: the provision of the experience, to donor or to charity recipient, could constitute a sought-after experience for the volunteer. For many who gave of their time, skills and talents for fundraising purposes charity was, if not exactly an afterthought, then at least a tangential output or justification of the whole process. This is not to suggest that it was entirely lacking in compassion and altruism, but just as Christmas consumption bred a kind of guilty compassion in some, the pleasures of social life and leisure activities could be directed to help those denied the same luxuries. Fundraising gave additional meaning and drew extra attention to an annual, pleasurable cycle of society galas, amateur concerts, fancy dress parades and even political activism, a fact of which voluntary charities were, unsurprisingly, happy to be the frequent beneficiaries.

If pleasure was a key purpose of some voluntary fundraising, pain, or at any rate, physical endurance, was also sometimes writ large. Beyond cycling and sports clubs holding charity versions of their normal races and matches (and in the 1880s, ‘champion female walker Madame Englo’ offering her services for charitable purposes), there were also feats from ordinary citizens. One ardent advocate of temperance walked twice between Brighton and London to raise awareness for the cause, but group charity walks also became common at the turn of the century. In 1903, one newspaper reported that ‘the sporting men of Perth’ in Scotland had realized they would have to have a ‘walking contest’ or they would find themselves left behind; they fixed on a walk around Perthshire, with an entry fee of 1s and with money to be collected along the route. A group of Lancashire and Cheshire schoolboys took part in a similar walk on behalf of Manchester Royal Infirmary in 1905, while the glibly monikered ‘Flat Foot’ suggested in the Yorkshire Evening Post that ‘the pedestrians of Leeds’ should get up a forty- to fifty-mile walk in aid of that city’s General Infirmary and Public Dispensary. There are echoes here of the kind of muscular Christian masculinity that had emerged from the middle of the nineteenth century and which would be promoted by the Boy Scout movement, founded in 1908. For
participants, the charity walks meant fresh air, vigorous physical activity, male company and, by virtue of their philanthropic purpose, good citizenship.\footnote{110}

Unusually lengthy treks also evoked a sense of martyrdom, sending a signal to would-be donors that if participants were prepared to sacrifice time and shoe leather in a cause, spectators might at least spare a few pennies for it.\footnote{111} There could also be a kind of entertainment for the spectators expected to donate. This was evidently the case when one young woman sought a contribution for a bazaar from a farmer: ‘[He] promised a fat sheep, provided that the lady would wheel the live animal in a wheelbarrow to Calverhall village. The challenge was accepted, and the young lady gallantly accomplished the feat, wheeling the sheep, which weighed 90lb, a distance of nearly three miles unaided. ‘This unique performance’, it was reported, ‘was witnessed by a large company’, and of course, reported in the newspaper.\footnote{112} Walking may have found its feet, so to speak, as a fundraising mechanism at this point in part because such long walks had become increasingly unusual in a world of widespread rail and growing motor transport, rendering them worthy of attention when undertaken for charitable purposes. In their own context, they were precursors of the sponsored charity marathons and mountain climbs so prevalent in the present day, even if charities themselves tended not to organize them.

Meanwhile, the more ‘extreme’ celebrity endurance feats which have become the mainstay of the umbrella appeal Comic Relief\footnote{113} had not yet emerged, although two of their key aspects were present and merely awaiting full exploitation by charities and volunteers. First, Matthew Webb, the naval officer who was the first to successfully swim the English Channel in 1875, was personally enriched by his effort; even ‘working men’ were invited to contribute to a large testimonial in his honour, suggesting the strong fundraising potential of such notable heroics.\footnote{114} Second, similar principles of a well-known personality sweeping into town on a wave of publicity underpinned General Booth’s previously mentioned motor-car tours, in which the convoy of cars (including one provided for the press) went – note the language now familiar from many a fundraising effort – ‘from Land’s End to John o’ Groats’, ‘making a magnet of his motor-car wherever he appear[ed]’.\footnote{115} Newspaper readers were given schedules of where the tour would visit and precisely when, and were even told details of what the General ate on the tour.\footnote{116} If most of this represented an accidental boon for charities, there were also ways in which charitable organizations engaged directly in developing an experience economy. Some of the older manifestations of this were still around in the late nineteenth century, although they were increasingly subject to
controversy; as Shusaku Kanazawa has recently shown, voting charities, which allowed subscribers to determine where their donations were spent, were not entirely killed off by the new breed of professionalizing voluntary charities and the concerted opposition of the COS.117 Donors could still be given opportunities to visit institutions that catered to charity recipients (the Foundling Hospital is a good example) and subscribers expected to see exactly how their money was disbursed.118 Yet there were new departures in charities’ direct forays into the experience economy too, and more spectacular, ambitious and self-consciously modern events were organized to take advantage of charity consumers’ thirst for experiential novelty.

This could include individual participation in synchronized activities for the purposes of raising money, such as the seasonal ‘self-denial’ events discussed above. It could also, as organizations like Barnardo’s and the Salvation Army understood, involve adjusting their offerings to compete against commercial forms of leisure and entertainment. One of Barnardo’s first bold ventures was to purchase a public house, the Edinburgh Castle, and reinvent it as a coffee house-cum-Mission hall. The Salvation Army took this further, appropriating not just the spaces of popular culture but its forms too: the songs and conviviality of Salvationist meetings were copied directly from the music hall. Little wonder that seaside resorts were early target markets in the Army’s life.119

Meanwhile, by the turn of the century the magic lantern show was giving way to cinefilm as the novelty entertainment as commercial leisure became ever more sophisticated. Barnardo’s annual YHL entertainment at the Royal Albert Hall featured a short ‘kinematograph’ demonstration as early as 1898, although, in a reverse, by 1904, its place in the line-up had been taken by a lantern slide exhibition, suggesting that new technologies were not always readily available.120 Indeed, suppliers of lantern slides (for sale or hire) continued to advertise in the industry magazine *The Philanthropist* into the 1910s.121 With characteristic enterprise, the Salvation Army did understand the commercial potential of the new technology and in 1905 introduced the ‘Popular Saturday Night’. This entertainment was abbreviated to ‘PSN’ to give a clubby feel and also billed as ‘Pops for the People’. The PSN exploited new modes of entertainment to play to a leisure market that, notably, was not overtly Salvationist. Aimed at families, it also took into account working-class weekly habits: Saturday nights were popular for family marketing and the Army advised soldiers to advertise that entertainments finished around 9 pm, giving families time to catch late-night markets en route home. *The Officer* ran advice on how to run successful PSNs, emphasizing the appeal of ‘modernity’ to family audiences. Halls must make use
of electricity to illuminate entrances and signs announcing the entertainments to create excitement and vie with beautifully lit commercial venues; indoors, electricity should flood the room to create wonder. The most important element of these events, however, was the Kinematograph. Interspersed with a bill of music, songs, talks and refreshments, three cine films on different ‘catchy, educational, interesting, pathetic, humorous, striking’ subjects, ideally alongside one feature with a ‘lesson in it’, would lure the curious public inside.\textsuperscript{122}

The PSN suggested the Salvation Army’s sensitivity to exploiting experience as a commodity but, also, their appreciation of the timing of fundraising. The sample advert for PSNs printed in \textit{The Officer} deliberately made no mention of the Salvation Army, highlighting instead the word ‘Kinematograph’, modernity, family entertainment and compatibility with existing leisure practices. Likewise, the bill of entertainment printed was mild in its religious focus. Crucially, PSN admission costs were low and officers instructed to resist eliciting donations from the audience during the evening. They could, however, ‘push’ Army literature.\textsuperscript{123} The objective was less to raise large amounts than to get lots of people into the Hall for a small fee and to advertise Army events in the following week. Indeed, by the 1890s, the Salvation Army had developed a fledgling notion of spectacular entertainment as a potential ‘loss leader’. The expense of sending ‘specials’, that is, guest speakers, across the country to feature in regional meetings was so productive in developing markets that speakers who ran at a loss were still worth it.\textsuperscript{124}

Even bazaars were, by this period, trading as much on the notion of patrons paying for an experience as on them purchasing goods. With a combination of stalls and entertainments such as musical and dramatic performances, pictorial exhibitions, marionette shows and games including darts and shooting ‘jungles’, attendees were able to, and many did, spend a full day (or more) at the larger bazaars. As much as organizers exhorted visitors to ‘SPEND’ at the stalls, promotional material tended to emphasize the ‘irresistibly funny’ or ‘weirdly thrilling’ sideshows and amusements in ‘unexpected places’.\textsuperscript{125} As noted above, organizers transformed their venues into elaborate sets and saw no contradiction in marrying historical themes with the parallel lure of modernity. ‘Telegraphic, telephonic and electrical exhibitions’ were put on and the visitor to one bazaar in 1894 was promised ‘as much as he wants in the way of electricity’ from an ‘electric machine’.\textsuperscript{126} Gramophone demonstrations were common, and one Lancashire event had at its centre, ‘The Illuminations’, where ‘Electric Arc Lamps’ would enable visitors to ‘enjoy beauties which cannot be got elsewhere’.\textsuperscript{127} Patrons of a bazaar near Rochdale, meanwhile, were promised a glimpse of a ‘head without
a body', a carnival touch that was echoed in the increasingly common palmistry tent.128 By this time, therefore, one could attend a bazaar, handing over multiple admission fees to various sideshow attractions, and leaving only with the memories of the experience rather than a tangible item bought from a stall. As one booklet concluded, ‘Of all the ways I’ve ever heard / Both serious and funny / This one – it surely takes the cake / For getting people’s money’.129

Conclusion

Charities large and small demonstrated that they had at their disposal multiple ways of co-opting a growing consumerist tendency among diverse donor markets. Donors still had the option of ‘gifting’ in return for nothing more tangible than a sense of self-worth or an inchoate form of social capital, but as many more active fundraising volunteers showed, that was not always sufficiently satisfying. The material souvenir of a donation, however small, the ‘radical’ purchase of everyday items and services and the effortful fundraising feat were among the means by which charity fundraising became embedded in the later Victorian and Edwardian period. Religion, and what Prochaska has called ‘kindness’, remained motors of much charitable endeavour as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, but charities could not and did not ignore the fact that the world around them was gradually becoming less formally religious (that recognition was the basis of the very existence of many charities that had started as ‘missions’) and rapidly becoming more commercial. Thus, when the COS called the aforementioned ‘Hospital Shopping Day’ a ‘preposterous proposition’ and a ‘dodge’, it was simply demonstrating its own inimitable capacity to misjudge the prevailing public mood. ‘It is a mistake’, its magazine said, ‘to appeal to selfishness and vulgarity instead of to charity. There is plenty of charity in England if it is properly approached. There is unfortunately plenty of vulgarity too, but it is not generous’.130 Even in its own terms, that assertion could not, as the foregoing chapter has demonstrated, have been more wrong.
Building and Protecting Charity Brands

The concept of branding seems singularly modern. Yet business historians are divided on the issue: while some see no substantive, conscious commercial branding before the eighteenth century, others argue that it is ‘as old as known civilisation’, so that even the ancient Greeks are deemed to have produced ‘proto-brands’. Whatever, most agree that the late nineteenth century was especially significant in the development and global spread of branding practices. This was a time when, in Britain and beyond, manufacturers of items as diverse as soap, beer and clothing became trusted household names as a result of conscious strategies to mould consumer choices. Given the well-noted salience of entrepreneurs in bringing about this branding revolution, it ought to come as little surprise that charity entrepreneurs of the period were similarly adept at creating and managing brand identities and developing what marketing scholars call ‘brand personalities’ for their organizations as part of a conscious drive to direct the donating public’s largesse towards their coffers.

In branding as in much else, then, those who ran Victorian and Edwardian charities could be cutting-edge. To be sure, few charities would have spoken explicitly about their organization in terms of a ‘brand’, but their social practices relating to crafting, promoting and protecting their identities and reputations bear key markers of the branding process. This chapter argues that, far from charity and non-profit branding being a recent phenomenon – some scholars and practitioners speak of it as a product of the late twentieth century – charities in the latter decades of the nineteenth century were acutely sensitive to the significance of creating a unique identity, promoting that identity through a system of visual and linguistic signs and protecting it from imitation. The chapter starts by exploring the foundational elements of charity branding: names, logos and slogans. It then interrogates how far and in what ways Victorian charities developed branding, particularly in the emergence of ‘brand personalities’ that communicated their values to the donating public. Finally, we elucidate the ways
in which charities protected their brands, once established, from the taint of scandal and infringement by competitors.

What’s in a name? The elements of branding

It has proved notoriously tricky for historians and other scholars of brands to agree on a precise definition of the term, but the most expansive interpreters of branding – those who see the roots of the process in the ancient world – necessarily give the most open version. According to this reading, brands have two fundamental purposes: first, to convey information about a product or service, and second, to convey an image or meaning, often to do with quality or values. This elastic definition allows claims of branding going back thousands of years, even if those making the claims admit that branding has gained multiple layers of complexity up to the present day. Those complexities have notably increased since the later nineteenth century, when many of the technologies on which modern branding relies first became widely available. Developments in transport, printing, advertising and public relations, among others, all played a role in making brand creation possible for commercial enterprises. Yet, as the previous two chapters have shown, charities of the period were equally willing and able to capitalize on these advancements for their own ends, and did so. Thus branding could be and was a crucial part of the charity arsenal far earlier than many imagine. This section will concentrate on the first part of the above definition, conveying information, to show how all voluntary charities engaged with the branding process to some degree, with specific focus on names, slogans and logos.

An organization’s name was, of course, its most immediate unique identifier, and a vital means of conveying its purpose to the donating public. Yet before we get to the parts of the names that conferred uniqueness, it needs to be noted that, just as, to the Charity Organisation Society’s (COS) chagrin, there was a significant degree of overlap in the provision of particular welfare services, there was also overlap in some of the language used in naming the organizations that provided them. Indeed, the COS’s archive, which contains a broad spread of voluntary charities for the period, suggests that names tended to fall into a relatively slim range of categories: multiple ‘associations’, ‘societies’ and ‘funds’, slightly fewer ‘unions’, ‘leagues’ and ‘refuges’ and still fewer ‘institutes’, ‘asylums’, ‘orphanages’ and ‘hostels’. The two most popular soubriquets used by charities were ‘mission’ and ‘home’. All of these naming conventions, as the next section
of this chapter discusses, indicated something about the values inherent in the organization, but they equally allowed charities to convey something – accurate or not – of the structure they took and the nature of the activity they carried out, thereby shaping donors’ expectations and, to an extent, because of the increasing familiarity of the terms, reassuring them that they were supporting a legitimate charitable enterprise.

The relative popularity of these names indicates the shift that was well under way in the charitable world. ‘Institute’, ‘asylum’ and ‘orphanage’ were terms that were falling out of fashion in the late nineteenth century, implying a trend away from austere, distant names that were often associated with the state and were inextricably bound up with notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’. Meanwhile, ‘union’, ‘society’, ‘association’ or ‘league’ suggested organizations that operated on the principles of joint effort and collective responsibility, even if, in practice, many such organizations may have been the archetypal ‘one-man-bands’ we touch upon in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, an image of cooperation was communicated. And while a ‘fund’ had a temporary air about it, terms like ‘society’ and ‘league’ evoked solidity and permanence, avoiding any hint of ‘fly-by-night’ begging. Moreover, the mutuality implied by these epithets was of a piece with the kind of relationship the organizations wished to build with their donors. They said, concisely, that working together solves whatever problem the charities and their donors set about tackling.

The two most popular voluntary charity names, ‘home’ and ‘mission’, varied in the degree of information they imparted about the structures and purposes of the manifold institutions that bore them. While ‘homes’ intimated residential institutions – by implication friendlier than ‘orphanages’ – and so required donations to pay for the board and lodging of their inmates (whether children, the elderly or the disabled), ‘missions’ were an altogether more slippery concept. Missions that distinguished themselves through spatial prefixes (Wood Street Mission, Manchester City Mission, Tower Hamlets Mission, North East London Mission, South East London Mission, Drury Lane Mission, Great Arthur Street Mission and so on) often encompassed a vast range of activity, and developed seemingly ad hoc welfare services to the generic poor and needy in their localities. To be a local mission, then, was to be a ‘one-stop’ welfare shop, fighting poverty in whatever forms it manifested itself, and appealing to myriad donating constituencies: whether you fretted over child poverty, unemployed men or the elderly, a local mission probably had a scheme that could use your money. The very flexibility of the term ‘mission’, which first and foremost implied an organization was Christian (and, by implication, trustworthy)
but also allowed a charity to expand, contract and change its operations as its
overseers saw fit, is a large part of the explanation for its popularity. Equally,
there were some ‘missions’ that distinguished themselves through object-driven
prefixes (Deaf and Dumb Mission, the London Spectacle Mission, Watercress
and Flower Girls Mission), thereby identifying their precise purpose. There was,
then, a relatively limited palette of recognizable names readily available to charity
entrepreneurs, and it can be useful to think of this part of the naming process,
in an effective distinction proposed by business historians, as ‘name selection’
while the addition of prefixes and other qualifiers – or indeed, the occasional
use of entirely unique organizational descriptors such as ‘Army’ – represented
a form of ‘name composition’ which made individual organizations distinctive,
more of which later.⁶

A further part of the branding package was the visual image projected by
charities, for which there were many outlets, and which often functioned in much
the same way as the generic descriptors above by communicating the essence of
an organization at a glance. For example, by the early 1900s, printed materials
for the National League for the Blind depicted its name, date of establishment
and the image of two interlocked hands denoting solidarity and friendship, a
striking visual reflection of the collective action of the organization.⁷

Meanwhile, Fegan’s Boys Homes was among several charities that
incorporated images of the buildings that housed them into their letterheads,
a move that had the twin effect of distinguishing it from multiple other ‘boys’
homes and establishing its credentials as a fully operational and evidently well-
supported charity that could afford substantial premises.⁸ Some were more
literal in communicating their charity’s purpose: the letterhead of the Children’s
Country Holiday Fund featured a roundel containing images of playing children
in an obviously bucolic setting.⁹ That of the Ladies Printing Press, a charity for
‘necessitous gentlewomen’, featured a similar roundel depicting the women hard
at work; in this instance, it acted as a double marketing strategy since among
the female printers’ services was die-stamping of letterheads with addresses and
distinctive logos.¹⁰

Others drew on existing associations. The Mariners’ Friends Society, which
helped sailors in distress, featured a naval-type flag on its printed matter, and St
Andrew’s Waterside Mission, which also worked with sailors, sometimes used
an anchor symbol.¹¹ Symbols with religious connotations, meanwhile, were
understandably popular. The militaristic and religious featured not merely in
the Salvation Army’s name and structure but also in its material culture. Its crest,
developed in 1878, was red (symbolizing Christ’s blood), yellow (connoting the
fire of the Holy Spirit) and blue (representing the purity of God). At its centre, a cross was overlain with an ‘S’, to denote Salvation through Christ’s death, with two crossed swords, denoting the Army’s conception of war against sin. The cross and swords were encircled by a blue ring bearing the words ‘Blood and Fire’. A series of dots at the bottom of the crest denoted the Gospel. The circle is encased by yellow rays (Fire) and topped with a crown that proclaims Christ as King. A red banner underneath carries the name of the Army. As a visual image it is striking and was used widely on officer uniforms as well as printed matter. The Church Lads’ Brigade, similarly, used a crest with a cross at its centre, overlaid on crossed swords and a helmet, and containing the letters C, L and B. Even beyond those charities that assumed quasi-military form, recognizable badges, crests and monograms were popular, appearing on appeal literature, annual reports, adverts, stationery, receipts, donation slips, buildings and even clothing. The Liverpool Food and Betterment Association, for example, had monogrammed ‘costumes’ and food carriers for its lady helpers.

Yet, lest we fall into the trap of thinking of logos as primarily visual and, by implication, nonverbal, it ought to be noted that a particular typeface was potentially just as important an identification cue. Most charitable ventures, however small, had branded stationery; even if this did not feature crests or pictures, it did tend to have the name and address of the organization printed in a distinctive font, and sometimes in colours other than black, creating a striking and memorable effect. The vast expansion of typography in the latter half of the nineteenth century meant that new and innovative typefaces could shape and enhance a brand identity. That charities were interested in the strategic use of typography is suggested not only by the print matter they left behind, but also by the survival in some charity archives of ornate printers’ business cards proclaiming the latest technology. Some organizations, such as the Guild of Brave Poor Things, adopted the florid styles associated with the Arts and Crafts movement. Others, such as the League of Welldoers in Liverpool, preferred a heavy Gothic type. Bold, creative typeface and design could also, as noted in Chapter 1, present a stark distinguishing feature to appeal literature when so much charitable print material continued to reproduce reams of text.

Another means of distinguishing and quickly establishing the purpose of a charity, as well as of aiding recall of the brand, was to fashion a motto or slogan to accompany the name and visual identifiers. The slogan (a word, appropriately in some instances, derived from the Gaelic for ‘battle-cry’) remains an important aspect of branding, since it is a further opportunity to raise awareness of and clarify the branded product’s purpose, something that names and images,
necessarily, can only do in the most succinct fashion. Slogans therefore have to be designed to extend and support, rather than contradict or confuse, the impressions created by the brand name. In the commercial world, scholars and practitioners remain unsure about why particular slogans work and others do not catch on. If it is difficult to establish the effect slogans have today, it is infinitely more so to understand the impact of charity mottos in the nineteenth century. What we can say is that slogans were as varied in their tone and inspiration among Victorian charities as they are among today’s enterprises, with some relatively prosaic in form and intent, and others more reliant on allegory and (frequently biblical) allusion. The Home of the Holy Rood simply declared itself to be ‘For aged and incurable women’. Donation slips for the North East London Mission carried the slogan ‘To succour and to save’ with an image of a disabled girl. The Female Mission to the Fallen advertised itself as ‘A woman’s mission to women’, a neat summary of the charity’s remit.

Contrasts of light and darkness were relatively commonplace biblical references used in charity tag lines. The Christian Mission to the Fallen and Outcast Women claimed through its motto to bring ‘light in the darkness’, while Drury Lane Mission routinely employed ‘Light that shineth in a dark place’, a line taken from the Gospel of John, and usually accompanied in their literature by a clever image that used different shading techniques around the words. Similarly, the slogan for St. Andrew’s Waterside Mission proclaimed, ‘Our sailors into all the world’, a reference to missionary activity taken from St. Mark’s Gospel. Literary allusions also featured in charity slogans. The rather patronizingly titled Bristol disability charity, the ‘Guild of the Brave Poor Things’, appeared to have a fittingly condescending slogan in ‘Laetus sorte mae’ or ‘Happy in My Lot’ which was taken (via a similar institution in London) from a novel by Juliana Ewing. Tower Hamlets’ Mission, meanwhile, shamelessly appropriated the title of Andrew Mearns’s sensational pamphlet ‘The Bitter Cry of Outcast London’ (1883) for its appeal literature, some thirty years after it had first been published. Its overseer, F. N. Charrington, evidently thought the slogan worth recycling regardless of changes in the city in the intervening period.

For others, slogans played a significant role in communicating a particular unique selling point of the charity. Barnardo’s famous claims, plastered across much appeal literature and even the very buildings of the organization, were of an ‘ever open door’ with ‘no destitute child ever refused admission’. The ‘League of Welldoers’, meanwhile, promoted itself from its renaming in 1907 to the founder’s death in the 1930s with the expansive slogan ‘Everybody’s charity’. In its earlier incarnation as the Food and Betterment Association, the charity had
often specified ‘Irrespective of creed’ on its printed materials. Slogans could thus play an important role in establishing the principle of openness, both to recipients and donors, and thereby avoid closing off parts of the donor market before people had read further into the appeal literature. They said to the public that these organizations needed, wanted and welcomed them.

Giving one’s organization a name, parts of which might be shared with multiple other organizations, or using a visual sign or motto to complement that name, were hardly innovations. These signifiers might happen to coincide with one another, and they might happen to mark an organization out in donors’ minds, but they do not constitute conscious branding strategy as we know it today. This is to misunderstand two fundamental points about these charities’ very real branding prowess. The first is that, as much as charity branding now is highly professionalized, often employing the same creative agencies as commercial entities, in their own context, many Victorian charities were highly professional in their approach to branding. The confluence of name, logo and slogan was usually a result of conscious deliberation, assessment of rivals’ efforts and exploitation of emerging technologies, precisely the same process that the likes of Lever Brothers went through in creating brands such as Sunlight or Lux soap, albeit in those cases with limited aid from a trademark and patent agent.

The second factor that indicates the conscious strategy behind charity branding is the persistent appearance in charity archives of efforts to adapt or rethink brands. Although frequent alterations in nomenclature could indicate a charity trying to hide past scandal or mismanagement (see Chapter 4), most changes suggest charities’ awareness of a shifting market and the need to adapt and regulate brand identity in order to be competitive. For example, both Thomas Barnardo and William and Catherine Booth initially founded missions with virtually identical names; respectively, the East End Juvenile Mission, opened in 1868, and the ‘East End Christian Mission’, established in 1864. Each enjoyed moderate success, but their names suggested spatial specificity and limited ambition, something from which neither party suffered unduly. By the 1870s, Barnardo had ‘rebranded’ into the much more distinctive ‘Dr Barnardo’s Homes for Destitute Children’, or often simply ‘Dr Barnardo’s Homes’. Meanwhile, the Booths, under pressure of direct competition with multiple other nonconformist missions of one sort or another in London alone, gave their venture the new and strikingly different name of the ‘Salvation Army’. Both name changes indicate charity entrepreneurs who were consciously strategizing their place in the emerging marketplace, in what turned out to be tremendously successful bids to improve on existing success.
Barnardo and the Booths were pioneers, but as the period wore on, smaller organizations also paid attention to branding, and adapted their brands when they did not work. Sometimes, the market simply moved away from an existing successful brand, forcing change. As subscriptions to the ‘Home for Destitute Children’ (founded 1874) in Liverpool began to drop off in 1912, the charity abandoned the distinctly ‘Victorian’ terminology of ‘destitution’ to become simply ‘The Home’, printed in a large modern typeface on the front cover of reports. The change cast off potentially Dickensian associations but also implied that this was the definitive home for children, although the name’s claim to this status was undercut by the explanatory ‘For Girls under Twelve Years of Age’ printed in brackets below. Similarly, the North End Domestic Mission in Liverpool began to use ‘North End Mission’, a reflection perhaps that ‘Domestic’ carried outmoded notions of ladies bountiful patronizing the poor.

On other occasions, there was recognition by charities that, however well considered, a brand identity just failed to catch on. The organization ‘Santa Fina’, formed in 1907 as an offshoot of Manchester University Settlement, took its name from a saint, Seraphina, who was paralyzed in youth and bore her sufferings with grace and fortitude. There was logic in this name choice, since the charity did educational and recreational work with disabled children. Its use of floral imagery drew on Seraphina’s association with white violets. Yet while donors were likely to recognize Santa Fina’s parent organization, the university settlement, it is doubtful how many potential donors were familiar with ‘Santa Fina’ or her significance. From 1909, recognizing that the branding was too subtle for most, the charity printed a sub-name on its donor receipts and publications, ‘Ancoats Crippled Children and Disabled People’, before changing the name of the charity in 1912 to the more direct ‘Invalid Children’s Aid Association’.

Charitable values and ‘brand personality’

The charitable sector in the period 1870–1912 showed a clear and evolving awareness of the power of branding as a means of communicating key information to donors and recipients alike. This reflected similar emerging practice in the business world. But there is one aspect of branding where charities were arguably ahead of, rather than in step with, the commercial sector. In the past three decades, business and marketing scholars have begun delineating and exploring the concept of ‘brand personality’, with Jennifer Aaker defining this as ‘the set of human characteristics associated with a brand’. The creation of
brand personality is therefore seen as a two-way process, where brand managers are saying something about the traits and values of their organization and their brand, and consumers of a branded product are also saying something about their own traits and values in consuming it. Brands are not solely or primarily material constructions then. As one recent work puts it, they are ‘cultural things’ and ‘exist primarily in the minds of the people who participate in the surrounding culture’.\footnote{36} Seen in these terms, it would be difficult to argue other than that Victorian charities’ image management was a form of branding and quite sophisticated branding at that. While Lever Brothers, Colman’s and other commercial enterprises were still engaged in the later nineteenth century in the mass selling of their branded products largely based on perceptions of product quality, and only later began consciously cultivating brand values,\footnote{37} charitable enterprises were, as we will show, implying quality but also establishing a set of shared values with their would-be donors which constituted, in effect, prototype ‘brand personalities’. This section identifies charities’ core strategies for promoting particular values and ideals.

Despite contemporary commentators’ (and some historians’) misplaced anxieties about secularization, the near-ubiquitous value embedded in the vast majority of charitable branding practices at the end of the nineteenth century was Christianity and the implication and expectation of compassion and benevolence that came with it.\footnote{38} In that context, it is hardly surprising that Christmas was the peak period in the philanthropic fundraising calendar, given the season’s powerful resonance with humanity and compassion. Indeed, as multiple commentators noted at the turn of the twentieth century, Christian compassion was so deeply embedded in wider culture, and in social and moral practice, that individuals did not need religious faith to subscribe and respond to Christian values. These values of religious faith and compassion could be inscribed in brands in several ways. Most obviously, many charities promoted explicit associations with Christian compassion through formal affiliations to established confessional cultures and particular institutions. To a point, the hierarchies, networks and identities of organized religion provided ‘parent’ brands to myriad charitable endeavours that claimed kinship. At the most formalized level, the Church of England directly sponsored multiple organizations, from national initiatives such as the Waifs and Strays Society (established in 1881), to more specialized outreach initiatives, such as St. Andrew’s Waterside Mission (established 1864). These organizations could communicate their official endorsement in diverse ways. The Waifs and Strays Society was, in its full title, ‘The Church of England Incorporated Society for
providing Homes for Waifs and Strays’, while St. Andrew’s Waterside Mission put its patrons – seventeen bishops headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury – front and centre on its publications.\textsuperscript{39} To be a Church of England charity was, certainly for Anglican donors, a kitemark of trustworthiness and quality. This explicit association also automatically drew the singular charity into the web of values and ideals supported by the church, investing it with credibility and authenticity, especially given the Anglican Church’s ties to crown and state.

The Catholic Church similarly boasted a network of national and regional organizations that capitalized on diocesan structures and recognizable confessional identities. One of the largest was the ‘Catholic Rescue’ initiative, an umbrella brand for multiple children’s homes nationwide by the end of the century, for which ‘Rescue Saturday’ diocesan collections were taken.\textsuperscript{40} Many of the constituent homes which were partly funded by these collections then had an additional unique brand identity that made their Catholic credentials clear while also, often, intimating something else. This might be a further note of compassion and familial comfort, as in ‘Father Berry’s Homes’, in Liverpool, or ‘Father Hudson’s Homes’, in Birmingham, both named for their clerical overseers. Or it might be an association with a particular saint and, by extension, their personal qualities; ‘St Joseph’s Girls’ Home’ in Manchester, a laundry, had a patron who was at once known for his work and his model parenthood, powerful implications that Catholics would have grasped.\textsuperscript{41} Institutions so named might also benefit from some lay individuals’ tendencies to harbour enduring ‘devotions’ to particular saints or other religious entities such as the Sacred Heart. In any case, this universal identification in branding of Catholic charities as Catholic had two purposes. First, it told Catholic donors that the church was doing something to prevent what Catholic Rescue literature characterized as the ‘proselytizing’ of Catholic children by other supposedly nonsectarian charitable institutions (and by extension discouraged devout Catholics from donating to the latter).\textsuperscript{42} Second, it assured donors that their money would be spent according to a Catholic ethos, which did not coalesce with prevailing (Protestant) Victorian notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ but saw the poor as inherently holy and their relief as part of one’s religious duty.\textsuperscript{43}

The implication of shared Christian values within charities linked to nonconformist chapels, rapidly on the rise in urban districts across the country, could be just as overt. Their names often conflated some combination of confessional identity, particular places of worship, localities, congregations and individual ministers under the term ‘mission’, and, as noted above, many chapel-based ‘missions’ extended to include one particular or even a range of
philanthropic endeavours. A snapshot of Liverpool at the turn of the twentieth century highlights nonconformist missions centred around temperance (the Wesleyan Mission, the Welsh Women's Total Temperance Union or the North End Domestic Mission) or women's rescue, such as the Calvinistic Methodist Women's Town Mission. The near-ubiquitous word ‘mission’ in itself was shorthand for core Christian values and practices. At its most basic, ‘mission’ meant going out into the world for religious purposes. To specific confessional constituencies, the established ‘brand’ of the parent sect signalled that more fine-grained shared ideals would be applied in whatever relief work was undertaken: the values of charities that were sponsored by a chapel were, de facto, the values of its congregation. Such missions necessarily limited their appeal beyond a sometimes relatively small and often very local core of fellow travellers (and certainly to Catholics, as noted). But there were, equally, de facto nonconformist charity entrepreneurs whose precise Christian affiliation was kept deliberately unspecific in their branding, or who laid claim, via brand signifiers, to a clearly Christian but nonsectarian ethos in order to circumvent that limitation and appeal more broadly. Both Barnardo and Lee Jones of the Liverpool League of Welldoers to some extent fell into this category: both were obviously Christian, and indeed obviously Protestant, but pointedly claimed no proselytizing motive for their organizations, a claim that did not always wash with Catholics but had more success with Anglicans.

That was one branding response to the potentially limiting identification with a particular minority religious denomination; the other was to go entirely in the opposite direction and make a virtue of one's evangelicalism and nonconformity. Although the Salvation Army jettisoned the word ‘mission’ from its original title, its new name still clearly adverted to a bullishly missionary ethos. But renaming enabled them to cast off the expectations and norms of orthodox Methodism (they had been criticized by the Methodist circuit, for instance, for accruing debt). ‘The Salvation Army’ had no immediate confessional connotations, yet still made powerful, value-laden claims: that salvationism lay at the core of the enterprise and that the scale and cost of the task was akin to making ‘war’. The Army’s branding ensured that its missionary impulse consistently linked salvationism with salvation from poverty, while simultaneously suggesting that the dynamic ‘Army’ was capable of tackling both deficits. Booth’s lightning-quick appropriation of Henry Morton Stanley’s popular In Darkest Africa (1890) for his own In Darkest England (1890) was a case in point. Not only did this show the Army’s eye for a catchy brand name, it also associated the Army with the colonies and foreign missions, a field where evangelical enthusiasm and
cooperation was at that point growing, even as nonconformist unity at home was fraying at the edges. Both urban poverty and the empire, of course, were of considerable interest to constituencies beyond nonconformity. Hence reframing the Army’s mission in these terms did not downplay its nonconformist side, and did not retreat into wishy-washy Christian platitudes, but did emphasize the organization as a particularly vigorous exponent of universal Christian, and indeed, British values. This was savvy brand positioning.

Compassion and humanity may have been values inherent to Christian charity, but they could, of course, be intimated through more secular branding signs too. Appeals issued by St Giles Chapel Mission in the 1880s, already carrying clear Christian significance through its name, featured the allegorical figure of Charity, for example. Meanwhile, many charities deployed images of ‘waif’ children or elderly people as part of their brand identity, intrinsically sympathetic figures that were supposed to evoke pity in the donor while associating the charity with humanitarian values. It is notable just how many organizations chose to focus on children or, to a lesser extent, the aged, as the principal recipients of their munificence, even when their services catered to a much broader population. For example, the Watercress and Flower Girls’ Mission played shamelessly on the affective status of poor little girls even though, by the 1890s at least, they were catering to the aged, infirm, generically poor and children of both sexes. The addition of terms such as ‘waif’, ‘children’, ‘street arab’, ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ to charity titles and slogans played to donors’ emotional responses. When allied to descriptive terms such as ‘home’, donors could imagine they were giving their cash to places where caring staff and eminently deserving recipients lived in quasi-familial networks, associations that carried obvious affective and moral capital.

But, perhaps perversely, these same branding elements can also be seen as cultivating a more hard-headed brand personality in order to play into the values of more discriminating donors. Claims to the ‘deservingness’ of one’s beneficiaries represented a conscious way for charity entrepreneurs to nullify criticism by the emergent ‘scientific charity’ lobby (including the likes of the COS and the League of Help) that voluntary charities were too prone to giving ‘indiscriminate’ aid to potentially undeserving beneficiaries. They implied to potential donors, whether this was the full story or not, that a charity dealt with a legitimate, ‘deserving’ constituency of recipient. Judicious use of adjectives, as in ‘distressed gentlewomen’, ‘aged poor’ and ‘crippled children’, similarly implied authentic need. Genuine advocates of ‘scientific charity’ would not have accepted such practices in and of themselves as being of a piece with their philosophy.
Nevertheless, for potential donors, overwhelmed by the plethora of causes to support, and at least dimly conscious of a growing culture of suspicion and caution around them from the likes of the COS, these associational adjectives and images of the ‘deserving’ operated as shorthand for a worthy cause. Charities attempted, through branding, to reassure donors that their money would be safe with them.

This kind of selective marketing, which saw organizations putting their best face forward and obfuscating the potentially more problematic aspects of their work, is also reflected in the example of the RSPCA’s ‘Liverpool Temporary Home for Lost and Starving Dogs’. Established in 1883, its brand personality was consciously developed and modified over the following two decades in pursuit of a winning formula. The Home was founded ostensibly to provide shelter to stray dogs, reunite lost dogs with owners, rehome dogs for a donation (the ‘sale’ of the dog) and destroy dogs suspected of carrying disease. In the context of moral panic about rabies, the charity destroyed the vast majority of dogs, giving rise to a potentially sinister association with the ‘temporary’ nature of residence. Early imagery on annual reports varied between friendly mutts and malnourished, howling hounds. Each type was affecting, albeit in different ways: the friendly dog implied the pet dog’s loyalty and companionship while the starving hound appealed to donors’ pity. Pointedly, neither image made much association with the destruction of stray dogs. The charity tried assorted variations on these themes, including a ‘before and after’ version with both images, before settling in 1899 on pathetic canines and an outstretched human hand. In 1904, the charity became “The Liverpool Dogs’ Home’ while annual reports downplayed the number of destroyed dogs while suggesting that these dogs were exclusively ferocious or diseased. The charity’s branding reflected that in giving over their money to a dogs’ home, most donors were expressing compassion for animals, and the organization was happy to join in fostering that image.

At the individual level, charities made attempts to incorporate additional, more distinctive traits into their brand personality. This was often about communicating a sense of competence and professionalism. It is notable that some charities deployed official titles and status indicators in their system of value signs. Clerical titles intimated religious authority, credibility and legitimacy and conferred the same on the organization tied to their name, as in ‘Father Berry’s Homes’. Such was the weight of clerical identifiers that founders with no theological training might appropriate titles for their ‘market’ value. Critics of Reuben May, who ran Great Arthur Street Mission, were keen to note that he ‘describes himself as a “pastor”’, despite no evidence of his ministerial
authenticity ever having come to light. As another complainant noted, May was usually ‘clothed somewhat in the garb of a clergyman’. As the next chapter shows, the ‘Reverend’ Hugh Jones similarly headed multiple charities in the Wirral where, again, critics were unable to locate substantiating evidence of his clerical qualifications.

Other titles played on similar connections with established professions to invest charity brands with their associated traits. Thomas Barnardo was, according to his biographer, rather vain with an acute theatrical sensibility. It was probably his desire for public status that led him to adopt the title of ‘Doctor’ over plain ‘Mister’ or ‘Brother’ Barnardo. But ‘Doctor’ also endowed Barnardo with gravitas and removed his charity from the intensely competitive world of assorted, relatively undistinguishable men of ministry, into something more cerebral and official. ‘Doctor’ brought to mind medicine, and encouraged the public to associate the charity with objectively good social reforms of health and sanitation, being led by an increasingly respected medical profession. In this sense, Barnardo’s appropriation of the title as a kind of trademark for authority and professionalism was astute. This was also, of course, a branding tactic adopted by many producers of medical products in the nineteenth century in a bid to avoid the taint of ‘quackery’. It was unfortunate for Barnardo that his rivals, resentful of his charity’s momentum and doubtful as to the morality of some of his techniques, publicly queried his moral right to use the title when he had started, but not completed, a medical degree. However, as with the medicine brands, the proof was in the product and Dr Barnardo (he later did enough to merit his medical title) weathered this storm. On balance, the title probably did the Barnardo brand more good than harm.

Various forms of patronage also served to imbue charity brands with certain positive traits. Endorsement by well-known individuals was an important signifier of an organization’s trustworthiness and merit, but it also invested the charity brand personality with associated characteristics. The most striking example, perhaps, was in the prefix ‘royal’. For the likes of the ‘Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals’, royal endorsement was perhaps the greatest accolade in terms of social capital and the charity was quick to include the royal crest in its promotional material. It suggested to the public that this was a charity that was traditional, respectable, established and influential, since, surely, the crown would not allow their brand to be tainted by association with anything less. Of course, the endorsement of an organization by public figures (including royals) operated to mutual reputational benefit as a kind of branding pact. The patron promoted the charity’s values and, in turn, became associated
with those values. For the charity, the sheen of celebrity, ‘noble’ birth or financial success reflected on the surface of the organization. Aristocratic endorsements conferred noblesse oblige, tradition, authority and stability.

Other endorsements seemed more one-sided in the sense that the charity that adopted the prominent individual’s name had most to gain. The use of the late General Gordon’s name by numerous boys’ homes, with the cooperation of his sisters, was in part a memorialization of Gordon, but his reputation was such that it hardly needed the boost at that point. The homes, however, capitalized on the heroism, dynamism, inspiration and boldness that the public associated with the general, all traits that any charity seeking funds to shape boys’ lives would be happy to appropriate. Meanwhile, in a move no doubt designed to counter claims that their work among the poor, especially men, fostered crime, the League of Welldoers sought and gave prominence to the Liverpool Police Head Constable’s endorsement of their work. That, again, shows the clear-minded and conscious branding in which charity entrepreneurs were engaged. Ultimately, although the jargon of ‘brand values’ and ‘brand personality’ would have been utterly alien to them, those who ran Victorian and Edwardian voluntary organizations had to be and, as we have shown, were acutely aware that reputation and the emotional and cerebral responses they evoked in their donor markets were one of the most important parts of their business. As business historians Casson and Lopes observe, strong brand identities were particularly important for nondurable consumer goods because they encouraged repeat buys. Donations were the ultimate nondurable because causes almost always demanded a ‘repeat buy’. In that context, charity brands needed careful development and management.

Protecting the brand

That being the case, brands also required protection. Since cultivating a brand identity, imbuing it with positive associated traits and disseminating it among the donating public required considerable effort, charity entrepreneurs had to be alive to potential brand damage caused either by scandal within their own organizations, or by jealous competitors. The legal tools for engendering such protections were relatively limited in the late nineteenth century and used only by some charitable organizations to any significant level. Yet there were numerous other channels through which the integrity of a brand could be maintained. This section will look, first, at those non-legal initiatives which insulated brands against reputational damage caused by internal flaws and failings and imitation
by external actors, before moving on to discuss the use by charities of the new technology of ‘trademarks’ and other legal constructs in defending their brands.

As Chapter 4 will discuss in more detail, when scandal arose in individual charitable organizations it could be greeted in a manner that sought to protect the reputation of charities as a whole by portraying the offending institution as operating outside the sector’s self-imposed norms. Thus, for the legitimate enterprise that found itself, for example, associated with an errant treasurer, as Wood Street Mission did in 1908, brand management needed to be swift and deftly handled if reputational damage was to be avoided. Wood Street’s committee recognized as much and, as soon as the story broke, had a notice placed in the local newspapers in which the renowned chairman, Alfred Simpson, reassured the public that no losses had been made by Wood Street on foot of this ‘defalcation’.

Meanwhile, when Barnardo was under attack in the events surrounding the so-called arbitration, one of his key adversaries used a ‘miserable’ photograph of the founder in a bid to tarnish his reputation: Barnardo’s features were blurred and his ‘dandy’ pose undermined any serious import. In response, Barnardo distributed a carefully posed carte-de-visite, an image of sober earnestness and unostentatious respectability with his facial features clearly defined. Gillian Wagner sees this image of Barnardo as a turning point in his life but it was also a turning point in the branding of the charity. Following the public disputes over his management of the charity, Barnardo agreed to ‘professionalize’ with a committee of trustees and to publish his financial accounts. Yet while seeming to surrender control in one sense, Barnardo’s release of this photograph as a tactic to rebuild trust indicated how far he perceived himself as the core of the charity’s ‘brand’. Lesser charities used photographs in a similar way. When the editor of the journal Truth publically invited Walter Austin, founder of the London Cottage Mission, to explain the financial accounts for the charity, Austin’s riposte was his portrait.

Appeals to past reputation and modifications to the brand were both ways of dealing with a brand imperilled by internal problems. Yet if a brand’s chief purpose was to communicate the distinctiveness of the entity to which it was attached, a far greater problem came from external actors who, seeing its success, might attempt to appropriate it by using a similar name. An equal amount of difficulty might arise in instances where two organizations arrived at similar names by coincidence, a state of affairs that was not unlikely given the fashions in naming practices discussed above. For example, however the ‘Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’ (SPCC) and the ‘Society for the Protection of Women and Children’ (SPWC) arrived at their strikingly similar names,
the former evidently found it problematic. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children complained that the SPWC, unlike the SPCC, did not carry out rescue or preventative work with children. Thus the name was both a close imitation of the complainant’s brand, and, the SPCC claimed, misleading.\textsuperscript{61} The SPCC asserted its authentic and exclusive ‘right’ to its name or anything resembling it.

Distinguishing names was clearly important, both in terms of identifying objectives and ensuring that donors’ gifts reached the cause for which they had been intended. But many of the weapons for staving off imitation were inherent in the branding practices explored earlier. A name might be buttressed by multiple other brand signifiers which formed a bubble of informal protection for a charity’s identity and helped make its encroachment by others much more difficult. One of the most common means of doing this was through the prominence of the charity’s named founder or overseer in the brand. It is notable how many organizations featured founders’ names, signatures and photographic likenesses in their brand strategy. London Cottage Mission branded its child welfare services as ‘Walter Austin’s Homes’.\textsuperscript{62} Great Arthur Street Mission was more commonly known as ‘Reuben May’s Mission’ and his signature, photographic likeness and personal history formed a steadily ageing but indisputable brand throughout his lifetime.\textsuperscript{63} Liverpool Sheltering Homes, an organization responsible for emigrating 6,000 children from Liverpool to Canada between 1873 and 1911, was inextricable in the local imagination from Louisa Birt. The charity was often referred to as ‘Mrs. Birt’s Homes’ with Louisa, a formidable Evangelical, depicted as an affectionate, maternal figure.\textsuperscript{64} But while this kind of personal branding promoted important brand values, chiefly a sense of stability and familial intimacy, it also spoke of authenticity and trust. If donors were accustomed to seeing a particular person as the face and personification of a particular institution, it became much more difficult for others to imitate it.

Architecture could work similarly. Buildings often featured prominently in the material branding of charities, with many larger charities commissioning distinct edifices. Liverpool Infant Orphan Asylum, for instance, self-consciously developed an architectural style that reflected the civic pride of other key buildings in the city. The new premises intimated the social value, ambition and reach of the charity while making a bold statement about the success, legitimacy and value of the charity and its endorsement by Liverpool’s sponsoring elite.\textsuperscript{65} While it shared the grandeur of civic architecture, the Asylum was, in itself, branded with core ‘trademarks’ of the charity: the buildings bore the name and foundation date of the Asylum. Other charities celebrated their
plain buildings as signs of pragmatism and thrifty accounting. In turn, as we have seen, representations of charity architecture were reproduced in appeal literature and on stationery. This fetishization of buildings within branding did two things. First, it established the distinct location and identity of the charity and literally grounded it in donors’ minds, so that any would-be imitator would be disadvantaged by not being associated with the familiar image of the building. Second, it guarded the brand against suspicions about internal operations. Charities that offered children’s accommodation were particularly sensitive to allegations of poor sanitation, overcrowding and decrepit furnishings, so that their annual reports typically featured photographs of neat and clean dormitories, pristine kitchens and dining rooms, and wholesome staff in starched uniforms. The brand was therefore protected against damage from both external and internal sources.

The conscious nature of these brand protection measures becomes clear when we examine instances where imitation and imposture arose. Charities urged would-be donors to take careful note of their identity markers (signatures, crests, logotypes, images and so on) as a way to avoid giving to the ‘wrong’ institution. There were, of course, levels of ‘wrongness’. Names might, as stated, coincide quite innocently. Moreover, the flipside of charities using fashionable designs from local printers was that two organizations might use the same design. Both Liverpool Teetotal Crusade’s and the League of Welldoers’ print material between 1909 and 1912 featured a red and black floral vine motif. In a climate of fierce competition, such seeming coincidences could give rise to suspicions of deliberate imitation in a bid to confuse donors. These suspicions were compounded by the intermittent reality of ‘sham’ collectors for charities real and imagined, going about telling convincing narratives and rattling collecting boxes. Victims of imposture wrote to newspapers to remind the public to seek the charity’s ‘trademark’, that is, its core symbols and signatures, to authenticate the collector. Wood Street Mission, in 1907, had to notify the public that people using collecting cards to raise money for its summer camp were entirely unofficial. Wood Street did not issue any such cards. Aware of bogus collectors having claimed their name, the Glasgow Poor Children’s Dinner Table Society notified readers of the Herald in 1898 that its official lady collectors would have ‘collecting books bearing the signatures of the secretary and treasurer’ and copies of the annual report ‘which will this year have a pink cover’. The secretary for the Royal Hospital for Children and Women reminded readers of The Standard that he always gave printed receipts for donations that bore the lithographed signatures of himself and the Treasurer. Distinguishing
brand features were a tool that could be used to authenticate organizations when under immediate threat of imitation.

The development of these kinds of authenticating brand signifiers was an informal kind of ‘trademarking’. But, in formal terms, trademarks must be understood as being distinct from brands: while it became possible, from 1876, to register the tangible elements of a brand, names, logos and mottos, the intangibles of values and brand personality are not seen as part of that intellectual property.\(^{71}\) That may go some way to explaining why the official, legally actionable trademark found its way into relatively few charities’ armouries. Since charities were already innovators in ‘brand personality’, the benefits associated with registering a trademark formally (and expensively enforcing that registration if necessary) were less apparent to them than to commercial enterprises.

Nonetheless, some charities with clearly commercial interests thought it worth the cost of registering trademarks. The Salvation Army, once again, was at the cutting edge, registering the name ‘Blood and Fire Salvation Army’ along with its crests and logo as early as 1884 for use on musical instruments and cotton handkerchiefs.\(^{72}\) By 1891, the Army had registered the same trademark for use in a whole slew of goods: tools, cutlery, razors, pocket knives, ice skates, machine parts, instrument cases, leather labels; all manner of leather goods and shoes; cigar and cigarette cases; tobacco pouches; regular clothing; sanitary clothing; safety clothing and gloves; photographic paper and goods; printing inks; lampshades; printed matter; newspapers; periodicals; books; bookbinding materials including cloth; photographs; stationery; adhesives for stationery or household purposes; artists’ materials except paint; typewriters and typewriter ribbons; office requisites; instructional and teaching materials other than apparatus; ordinary playing cards; prints; engravings; paper filters; duplicating apparatus and inking sheets for duplicators; insulating paper; and music cases.\(^{73}\) This phenomenal (and selective) list gives a sense of just how ‘commercial’ the Army was but, also, just how commercially astute. By contrast, there is no record of ‘Barnardo’s’ in the trademark registers until 1989.\(^{74}\)

Other charitable outfits laid claim to a ‘trademark’ although it is doubtful whether the mark was ever legally registered. The National Working Boys’ Home provided accommodation for boys who made and sold tinware. The organization was a rather unusual hybrid of the charitable and the commercial. It was established as a charity that raised money through selling home-manufactured goods, but after several years, it registered as a commercial company (probably to avoid the prying eyes of the Charity Organisation Society). The name remained the same and the company marketed itself as an organization whose profits
supported otherwise homeless or workless boys, thereby maintaining a kind of charitable fiction. The marketing was sufficiently convincing that most people appear to have believed it was a philanthropic organization.\textsuperscript{75} The advertisements for the Home's tin goods carried a 'Fraud Caution', warning against imposter sales representatives and fake goods. Authentic Boys' Home tinware carried a trademark stamp (a heart with the initials 'NWBH') that was also reproduced on circulars, Home vans and receipts. The stamp was of course reminiscent of the traditional maker's marks that metal manufacturers had long used, and which they increasingly registered formally after 1876.\textsuperscript{76} Although the National Working Boys' Home used the language of 'trademarks' and clearly understood the value of stamps of authenticity, there is no evidence that they ever went to the expense of registering their trademark officially.

The blurred boundaries between commerce and charity in the NWBH may well explain the embracing of a literal, if not legal, trademark. It is notable that seemingly connected branches of the Boys Home, often bearing the same name or a minor deviation from it (such as 'NWBH, Peckham', 'National Working Boys Depot', 'Working Boys Institution', 'Working Lads Self-Help Brigade') also produced and/or sold domestic goods (often but not always tinware) with similar trademarks. The NWBH, Peckham seemed to be a neat imitation of the NWBH: the Peckham home was ostensibly called 'Farnborough House', the road on which the original home was situated; both mentioned the high risk of imitation in their circulars; and both Homes manufactured goods that carried a heart stamp, although the Peckham outfit's stamp was less elaborate for those eagle-eyed enough to spot it.

Each of these organizations operated in a murky area, preying on the benevolent public who mistakenly assumed they were supporting a charity. More worrying was the proximity of these organizations' names and their proclaimed practices to those of authentic charities. Pelham House Home for Working Boys, supported by Royalty, opened in 1892.\textsuperscript{77} There was a St. Andrew's Home and Club for Working Boys in London, established 1866, that enjoyed aristocratic and high Anglican support, and provided accommodation and self-improvement facilities for homeless or friendless boys.\textsuperscript{78} The Reverend of St. Giles opened a Working Boys' Home in Drury Lane in 1886.\textsuperscript{79} Birmingham and Sheffield were among the first provincial 'Working Boys' Home' (established 1880 and 1881 respectively).\textsuperscript{80} By the 1890s, cities as diverse as Chester, Sunderland and Hereford had Working Boys' Homes while Liverpool and numerous Scottish urban centres had Catholic Working Boys' Homes.\textsuperscript{81} Most were allied to local civic and church committees and operated as a form of superior lodging home with
improving recreational facilities. Few employed the boys in the manufacture or sale of goods. It would not be surprising if many members of the public assumed that the ‘National Working Boys’ Home’ was an umbrella organization for the multiple provincial homes, since, as outlined in Chapter 6, some charities did operate within a ‘franchise’ system. The scope, then, for confusion and imitation was considerable, and informal trademarks were one device that organizations (whether genuine charities or essentially commercial operations posing as such) might use to help would-be supporters distinguish among them.

The power of names and signatures as identifying trademarks for charities was something clearly understood by the Secretary of the London Society for the Employment of Necessitous Gentlewomen, James Colmer. When, some time in the 1870s, the aforementioned Ladies Printing Press, which he ran as part of that society, lost the contract to print the annual report for his uncle William Colmer’s Indigent Blind Visiting Society (IBVS; founded in 1835), James embarked on a conscious and vengeful campaign of brand damage against the latter charity. Following his uncle’s decision to move printing elsewhere, James established a rival charity for the blind, calling it the ‘Indigent Blind Relief Society’, and bringing his brother, also called William, on board. Having appropriated the subscription list to their uncle’s charity, the two brothers sent their circular appeals to established donors of the IBVS. The similarity in the organizations’ names would almost certainly have led some donors to confuse the two charities and send money to the nephews’ organization. But the IBVS and James Colmer were also acutely aware of the fact that the addition of the signature of a ‘William Colmer’ might act as a further assurance to potentially confused donors that they had the right organization. The IBVS urged its donors to recognize that ‘the William Colmer who signs himself as secretary of the new society is not the same person as our secretary, Mr Wm. Colmer’ – note the subtle differences in the signature. Following complaints from donors and ‘Uncle’ William, the nephews changed the name of their organization to the Blind Poor Relief Society.

Yet, that was not the end of the tale. Having initially been keen to use the good reputation of the IBVS for their organization’s gain and been thwarted, the pair then began to mailshot circulars that undermined the established charity and deliberately created ‘doubt and confusion’ among its donors. Several false allegations of financial irregularities were made, resulting in the nephews finding themselves in court on charges of libel, which were ultimately sustained. One periodical surmised that James Colmer felt he ‘got off cheaply’ with a £50 fine, which he paid ‘with a jaunty air and left the court laughing’. It seems probable that lasting damage was caused to the IBVS. But the episode contains within
it several indicators that charity entrepreneurs grasped not just that brands and unofficial trademarks were needed to establish bona fides, but that they could be damaged easily and required protection, through the courts if necessary.

**Conclusion**

The reasons for the emergence of modern branding in the commercial world had many similar and equally compelling motivations in the charity sector. These included distinguishing from competitors in a burgeoning market, communicating notions of quality and trustworthiness in services offered and protecting one’s market share once established. But charities were pioneering in one significant sense: the nature of their ‘business’ was such that values had to be integrally inscribed into their brands from the outset. While commercial enterprises were still feeling their way towards developing what would later be identified as ‘brand personality’, most charities’ entire fundraising strategies were centred on creating a communion of sentiment between fundraiser and donor. The ‘purchase of compassion’ which giving money to charity represented necessarily involved a negotiation between seller and buyer as to what specific notions of compassion were being bought and sold, and the most successful charities recognized that and developed brands and brand personalities every bit as sophisticated as anything that later emerged in the commercial sector.

If charity brands were ahead of their commercial counterparts in that respect, however, they lagged in terms of brand protection, for reasons that in part are linked to the cultivation of brand personality. Despite the existence of a trademark register from the 1870s, most ‘trademarking’ in the charitable world in this period was of an informal nature: signs and signatures that confirmed the authenticity of the organization to those in the know, but were open to flagrant abuse by anyone determined enough to do so, as the Colmer case demonstrates. We can speculate that most charities did not formally protect their brands with trademarks because it would have been expensive to do so. Moreover, paying to defend a brand against infringement in court was not within the means of many, and for those who might have afforded it, it was surely beyond the bounds of acceptable expenditure as far as some subscribers were concerned. Moreover, as Barnardo found during his ‘arbitration’ with the COS, and as the IBVS found despite winning their libel case against James Colmer, the whiff of scandal emitted by a court case, even a vindicating one, might be more difficult to throw off than any damage wrought by the original brand infringement.
Policing Fraud: Regulation and Accountability in the Charity Market

We have argued strongly in the previous chapters that the voluntary charity sector that took shape in the late Victorian period operated in many significant respects as a market. Given that even the most gung-ho of Victorian capitalists accepted that financial markets needed ground rules in order to operate efficiently and engender trust among those who engaged with them, the regulation of the charity market will be our next subject. Business historians have tended to argue that 'self-regulation' by businesses was of paramount importance in the laissez-faire Victorian economy, with the state only beginning to play a bigger role in the process in the twentieth century.¹ That view may well underestimate the state's growing role in, for example, prosecuting corporate crime in the nineteenth century.² Nonetheless, in the virtual absence of government oversight, 'self-regulation' is the model that the charity sector had to adopt. In both Britain and the British Empire more widely, fundraising was a private matter and charities were largely exempt from state scrutiny. The remit of the Charity Commission, put on a permanent footing in 1853, was restricted to the control of endowments and land supporting the vast majority of hospitals and many schools.³ Even then, the commission often limited itself to good governance advice and paper exercises.⁴ It had neither the jurisdiction nor the means to tackle the surging number of urban charities, charitable funds and causes, relief funds and foreign emergency appeals.⁵ Most philanthropic enterprises remained entirely unregulated by the state until the Charities Act of 1960.⁶

The management of fraud and the contingent establishment of accountability mechanisms were, therefore, crucial factors in how the new voluntary charities policed themselves in this period. The development of particular financial and administrative practices as normative within the charitable marketplace was inextricable from the phenomenon of 'charity fraud', that is, the perceived misuse or misappropriation of donations. Given the lack of a legal framework to
police the charitable marketplace, the ‘charity fraud’ was a slippery construction, defined in symbiosis with, and in opposition to, shifting notions of ‘best’ or ‘virtuous’ practice. In this context, individual charities eagerly seized fraud denunciations to advertise and authenticate their own legitimacy. This shaped a contested but oddly virtuous exchange market: by the turn of the twentieth century, charities not only published account sheets but debated them publicly too. Yet, as innovative administrative practices became increasingly normalized, the boundaries of ‘fraud’ expanded to include organizations unable or unwilling to keep pace. The dynamic and extra-legal character of this process meant that definitions of charity fraud and attempts to regulate it were neither fixed nor resolved: charity fraud remained a discursive product of those who took the trouble to denounce it.

This chapter draws on the exposés of charity frauds published by the society journal *Truth* and the little-used ‘Enquiry department’ archives of the Charity Organisation Society (COS), which interrogated the management of charities on a national scale, to illustrate how self-regulation of the charitable marketplace developed in a vacuum of state regulation. These agencies, we argue, established a business-oriented, administrative and accounts-based measurement of charities’ legitimacy. A case study from the start of the twentieth century then illuminates how mechanisms for identifying fraud, developed by *Truth* and the COS, were applied at a regional level by an individual charity entrepreneur, while the final section considers where the state and donors fit into the picture.

**Establishing the parameters of legitimacy: the COS and the press**

In his groundbreaking article on charity and the Victorians, Brian Harrison noted that snobbery and self-aggrandizement combined to make the financial administration of charitable management the ‘grubby aspects’ of philanthropy, a source of waste and duplication. Further, a new category of crime emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the ‘charity fraud’, whereby smiling swindlers quietly misappropriated charitable funds. According to Harrison, these frauds were rarely exposed for fear of frightening off subscribers. Harrison was labouring under a misapprehension. Since the publication (and revision) of that essay, patronage and networking practices among charitable committee members have received considerable critical attention but the charity fraud, variously conceived, remains little understood.
Commission, as noted, dealt only with endowed charities, that is, charitable trusts set up by wills, rather than those which raised money by direct appeal to the public. Cases of fraudulent fundraising brought to court generally fell under arcane Tudor vagrancy laws and were overwhelmingly at the petty end of the scale. Ignored by law enforcers and beyond the remit of state control, the bureaucratic management of charitable associations, relief funds and myriad small organizations was left to the scrutiny of a self-regulating marketplace.

As Anna Clark argued so persuasively, the history of regulation and reform bears a close relationship to that of scandal. The philanthropic marketplace was no exception and, as this chapter demonstrates, relied heavily on allegations of financial or administrative abuse to define best practice. The public had long turned to the press to make the complex world of finance ‘imaginatively visible’, to act as adjudicator of ‘trustworthy’ financial systems and, through the circulation of information (in some cases, rumour), to effect changes to financial practices. In the absence of robust legislation, fraud had to be presented and proclaimed, a process that increasingly raised issues of measurable accountability and performance, or effectiveness, to identify and define boundaries between the licit and illicit. In this context, ‘authentic’ charities urged the public to give donations less from the heart, and turn instead to careful discrimination based on identifying sound financial practice.

By the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the number of charitable schemes operating across Britain had mushroomed. In his survey of English philanthropy, David Owen estimated that London charities alone expended up to seven million pounds annually by the late 1860s. As the Times speculated in 1888, however, a ‘handsome share’ of annual donations simply ‘leak[ed] away’. Donors had no machinery for discerning the ‘wholesome’ charity from the ‘shifty or shiftless’, a discriminatory language more commonly applied to recipients. Correspondence to the editor noted that the public discriminated between charities on the basis of patrons or well-known figures on committees, an inadequate safeguard as few patrons, or even committee members, were engaged in the everyday operation of charities. Many charities, in fact, were ‘altogether unreal’ in that they amounted to ‘one-man’ organizations. At the other end of the spectrum, large and ‘splendid’ institutions pleaded longevity and size as guarantor of credibility.

Nationally, the most vigorous regulatory agent was the COS. Founded in 1869, it had well-known ambitions to ‘rationalize’ the multiplicity of overlapping charitable agencies and apply supposedly ‘scientific’ principles to the distribution of relief and charity. In the former it made little headway over the ensuing
decades, and by pursuing the latter, it would eventually find itself locked in an ultimately losing battle with quite divergent philosophies, notably Fabianism.\textsuperscript{19} However, as Owen noted, one achievement of the COS over its lifetime was its ‘war on charity malpractice’, in which it vowed to police fundraisers as diverse as the begging letter writer and the ‘fly-by-night’ charity.\textsuperscript{20} To this end, the COS employed a variety of regulatory tools that, in the process, helped define what ‘fraud’ and ‘legitimacy’ in the context of charity actually meant.

First, the Society produced two separate publications aimed at guiding the benevolent through the philanthropic field. The \textit{Charities Register and Digest} issued for sale from 1882, followed in a line of similar attempts to provide basic information on assorted provident agencies, including Sampson Low’s \textit{One Shilling Guide to the Charities of London} (published periodically from 1850), Herbert Fry’s \textit{Shilling Guide to the Charities of London} (annually from 1863) and Thomas Hawksley’s \textit{Charities of London} (1869).\textsuperscript{21} While acknowledging this lineage, the COS version was far more comprehensive. Fry’s first edition had 175 pages while his fifty-fifth, issued in 1919, had 359; already in 1890, the COS register contained almost 1,000 pages and boasted a national remit. The register gave details of the aims and management structure of known charities and ostensibly invited would-be benefactors to make independent judgements as to which of the listed institutions might best carry out the work they wished to see done. The introduction outlined the COS philosophy and urged donors to give only to those agencies which conformed to it. ‘A list of charities’, it noted, ‘without some knowledge of the modes in which their benefits ought to be turned to account, is like a pharmacopoeia without knowledge of the elements of medicine’.\textsuperscript{22}

While the Register had its uses, the COS also produced a more explicit ‘Cautionary Card’ from at least the early 1870s. This was a ‘black list’ of charities considered beyond the pale of charitable support, which was privately distributed, chiefly to COS subscribers.\textsuperscript{23} A charity could be included on the Cautionary Card for numerous, not always clear, reasons. The knowledge base of both the register and the Cautionary Card was nonetheless the same. Since its inception, the COS had operated an ‘Enquiry Department’ at its central office in London, which was closely supervised by the COS secretary (for most of the relevant period, C. S. Loch\textsuperscript{24}) and which employed a number of visitors who, as the name suggests, visited and investigated charitable causes to gauge their worth. These visitors then produced reports of varying length and detail on individual charities that could be sent in response to public requests for information. Such requests might be made from a variety of motives. To some correspondents, it seemed almost habitual to refer all appeals received to the authority of the
COS; for others, only especially suspicious circulars were queried; and for many subscribers, the COS was contacted only in instances where the appellant's name was recognized from the Cautionary Card. Much the greatest number of queries on Loch's desk were in response to another ingeniously deployed weapon in the COS arsenal, the press 'advertisement'. Concentrating on charities the COS considered the most dubious, generally prominent 'one-man' outfits, this practice involved placing a simple notice, usually in the classified columns of the *Times*, along the following lines: ‘Persons receiving appeals from [named individual and/or institution] are requested before responding to them to communicate with the Secretary, Charity Organisation Society, 15, Buckingham Street, Adelphi’. This prompted two responses. First, it tended to attract a flood of correspondence from those who had been the targets of the charity’s appeals, enabling the COS to put its case against their continued support privately and directly. Second, it planted a seed in the minds of readers, who might never get in touch with the COS, that the given charity was, in some degree, untrustworthy. Both techniques, the COS hoped, would lead to a reduction in the charity’s income. This advertising reached only a limited section of the population, *Times* readers, but it was an influential section, including those whose net worth attracted constant charitable appeals, and who were likely to be solicited to lend their names to charity committees. From the COS’s point of view, it was significant that such publicity could be achieved without giving the ‘advertised’ charity any basis on which to engage in lengthy, and perhaps counterproductive, libel action. The infamous Barnardo arbitration case of 1877, which exonerated Barnardo of COS charges of misappropriation of funds, had probably been as damaging to the COS’s reputation as Barnardo’s, if not more so. The ‘advertisement’ that raised public suspicion but made no allegation against persons or organizations was a neat and effective trick.

This reflects the extent to which, Barnardo notwithstanding, the press rather than the courts became the main public arena in which charity fraud was combated, even as it was also (at least partially) perpetrated there. Indeed, the COS soon had a journalistic comrade in arms. From 1876, Henry Labouchere published the weekly newspaper *Truth*, a curious mix of society gossip and investigative exposures, with an estimated weekly circulation, by the 1880s, of 30,000. Labouchere was by far the most proactive and risk-taking agent in terms of publicizing supposed charity frauds. An initial, typically gung-ho, series from its first issues named several alleged ‘charity-mongers of modern Babylon’, many already known to the COS. Among the concerns *Truth* targeted as unworthy of public support were the ubiquitous begging letter imposter and the ‘padrone’.
of the ‘Italian slave trade’.

As the paper pointed out, however, successful as these ancient practices were in extracting money, they were ‘excelled by the ingenious managers and secretaries of certain sham Associations and Missions, the nominal objects of which have a larger attractiveness than the diseases and poverty of the letter writers’. Among many ‘one-man bands’ singled out for opprobrium were, at the larger end of the scale, Dr ‘Bernardo’ [sic] and Reuben May’s Golden Lane Mission in Great Arthur Street, and, perhaps more ‘fly-by-night’ in nature, a German named William Christian who ran the Middlesex Soup Kitchen and James Colmer, discussed in Chapter 3, who operated a ‘Society for Finding Employment for Distressed Gentlewomen as Printers’. The series signed off with the hope that the examples adduced would ‘serve as beacons’ to warn a benevolent public against the ‘quicksands’ of craft, deception and villainy in ‘charitable’ practice more generally.

Although the personnel of COS and Truth cooperated closely, Labouchere’s newspaper tended to publish and risk damnation in a manner that the more cautious COS avoided. Labouchere was sued for libel on numerous occasions, although few charity cases appear to have gone against him. The COS was frequently pressed for legal guarantees of indemnity by nervous editors to whom they communicated cases of fraud. Other newspaper editors might seek advice from the COS on potentially fraudulent appeals from charities, and carry COS adverts, but the same editors might, frustratingly, continue to carry the appeals and adverts of charities on the COS blacklist. In contrast, Truth traded on scandal and was sufficiently dedicated to the exposure of fraudulent charities that it eventually began producing its own Cautionary List. It is worth noting that some newspapers carried clippings from Truth or reported Truth’s investigations, thereby advertising suspicious charities from a distance and without fear of litigation.

Not surprisingly, the COS harnessed Labouchere’s paper and on at least one occasion, discussions about preparing a file specifically for exposure in Truth took place. As Loch told one inquirer, ‘[W]e are in no way officially responsible for the Truth book, but the editor constantly appeals to us for information, and is no doubt guided by it to a considerable extent.’

Administration and accountability

An active process of exposure, driven by two zealous national institutions, was clearly in place, therefore. The question arises, however, as to what, precisely, the COS and Truth were exposing and with what end in mind. Unscrupulous
Policing Fraud

fraudsters who, ostensibly, ran charitable schemes while creaming profits for personal use may have been what came to mind for many who read about ‘sham’ charities. But it needs to be emphasized that the terms on which the COS and Truth cried fraud, while fairly well defined, were also broader than one might imagine. The question was not so much what constituted fraud per se but, rather, as Truth asked, what constituted a ‘real charity’? The answer was an organization that, while disbursing alms, also conformed to a set of specific administrative measures. First, according to the COS and Truth, a charity needed to have a committee overseeing its fundraising and relief work. This was hardly a new development; the board of eminent citizens was certainly the oldest form of legitimacy and required that these figures had sufficient local clout to impact on the public perception of the charity. This reputational management mechanism had always been open to challenge. Cronyism and nepotism were potential flaws, and gathering a prestigious board was neither an easy nor a cheap process. The COS and Truth further stipulated, however, that such boards had to meet regularly and could not consist simply of respectable persons who lent their name to the enterprise without ever exercising functions of oversight. From the charity entrepreneur’s viewpoint, of course, gathering a board that was both prestigious and active was an even more difficult process.

Second, the charity had to account for all the money it received and expended via a regularly published, readily available, detailed and, ideally, independently audited balance sheet. The production of accounts was not necessarily expensive since they were often kept at a basic level that would have been familiar to anyone working with double entry books. Yet, accountancy historians nevertheless remind us that, even in the late nineteenth century, double entry books, the alleged bedrock of the Protestant ethic according to Max Weber, were not all that common in many businesses. Auditing, moreover, added further expense. Third, the proportion of money expended on administration costs and other non-relief expenses ought not to be too high, although this point was difficult to define precisely. Excessive management costs, it was implied, often signified fraudulent practice. Yet taken together, all of these administrative stipulations could potentially tie charities into an impossible race towards greater transparency and low cost delivery; management burdens increased in order to satisfy notional accountability tests, but administrative costs needed to be low enough to pass those tests. While other criteria might be taken into account in judging a charity, particularly by the COS (the level of overlap with other organizations in provision of services, for example), these were the key facets of a charitable institution that could be considered ‘legitimate,’ and any
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

institution, however well intentioned, that did not conform to them could be publicly branded, in some measure, as fraudulent.49

The COS’s mechanisms for authenticating charities caused some confusion among the donor community. Loch received numerous letters from benefactors of particular institutions plaintively wondering on what grounds their favourite charity had been placed on the Cautionary Card. As he explained to one correspondent, names on the card were not to be taken necessarily as rogues; it was, he noted, rare to come across institutions that were completely nonexistent and many were on the list not because any definite criminality could be detected, but because they were grossly mismanaged.50 The nuances of these distinctions may not always have been clear to the benevolent public, either in the stark cautionary lists or the sensational press denunciations. However, the culture of suspicion they engendered meant that even small voluntary organizations were increasingly expected by sections of the philanthropic public to adopt the administrative infrastructure of ‘real charities’ as outlined above. Not having a committee or failing to publish detailed accounts were gradually established as suspect choices, allowing space for misappropriation of funds to take place. Many organizations complied in order to dispel the cloud of suspicion. For example, Great Arthur Street Mission’s eventual adoption of COS-approved financial practices after its founder Reuben May’s death, saw it removed from the COS cautionary card after thirty years in 1911, even as the COS continued to regard its actual work as ‘a quaint survival of primitive Christianity’ for which there was no real need.51 Yet many charities who satisfactorily met COS or Truth criteria, might expect, not just to escape implications of impropriety, but to be promoted in the very publications that exposed frauds and urged caution. Both the COS’s Charities Register and Truth’s Cautionary List juxtaposed identification of fraudulent outfits with advertisements for what they assured readers were well-regulated and transparent organizations. Thus, the exposure of fraudulent practices in the charitable marketplace established the parameters of ‘legitimate’ charity: it was two branches of the same work.52

Becoming accountable: self-regulation in action

Although the COS waged a typically ambitious (some might say overreaching) national campaign to identify fraudulent practices, similar principles could be seen playing out at a regional level, where the process of identifying, proclaiming and preventing charitable ‘fraud’ often focused on a failure to conform to
particular administrative niceties. The case of Jones versus Jones in Edwardian Liverpool – mentioned in Chapter 3 – provides evidence of the self-interest involved in such self-regulation. In March 1908 the Reverend Hugh Lloyd Jones (Lloyd Jones), Birkenhead, warned Herbert Lee Jackson Jones (Lee Jones), Liverpool, that he intended to sue him and his printer for defamation of character and libel. Lee Jones invited the reverend to ‘proceed at pleasure’ and forwarded the name and address of his solicitor. The legal threat was the culmination of a three-year feud between the men, much of which Lee Jones conducted through his charity’s journal, *The Welldoer*, and letters to the local press.

Lloyd Jones operated a charity, the Gospel News Mission, also known as Elgin Street Mission and, prior to that, United Church Mission, in Birkenhead. Operational for around fifteen years, the Mission purportedly provided breakfasts for poor children, parcels for poor widows, Christmas festivities and winter fuel for poor families in Birkenhead. Lee Jones’s charge against Lloyd Jones was that his ministerial status was fraudulent and that he misappropriated the charity’s funds. Lloyd Jones was by no means the only target for Lee Jones’s suspicion. In 1905, Lee Jones had a ‘blacklist’ of six ‘discreditable’ charities operating in the Liverpool and Wirral region: three ‘missions’ and three children’s homes. Lee Jones also ran a charity, the Liverpool Food Association (renamed the ‘Liverpool Food and Betterment Association’ in 1898 and ‘The League of Welldoers’ [LWD] in 1908), founded in 1893, delivering welfare services in the dockland area of North Liverpool. Similarity between the two charities increased when Lloyd Jones changed his signature from ‘Hugh L. Jones’ to ‘H. Lloyd Jones’ around 1906: Lee Jones was known as H. Lee J. Jones. The two men, both in their thirties at the time of the scandal, were the founders, figureheads and administrators of their respective charities. The LWD was a large and relatively successful outfit by regional standards, constantly expanding its remit in the first decade of the twentieth century, although the charity’s debts were well publicized.

Though these debts made him vulnerable to public scrutiny Lee Jones declared a ‘special’ interest in Lloyd Jones’s exposure: if the two men were apt to be confused in the public mind, Lee Jones hoped public castigation of Lloyd Jones would distance the LWD from its competitor, the Mission. First, Lee Jones called the authenticity of ‘Reverend’ Jones’s identity into question. Jones also mistrusted the changing and concurrent use of multiple names for a single charity (it was ‘not nicely’ suggestive) and the absence of any public affiliation between the Mission and a recognized denomination. Jones could also call on other allegations in the public domain against the ‘reverend’. An article in the satirical journal *Porcupine* in February 1905 cast doubt on Lloyd
Jones's credibility, asking how donations to his Mission were spent. In 1907 Lloyd Jones sought a reduction in a debt order only for the case to be thrown out, the judge concluding that Jones ran a business disguised as a charity in order to cheat his creditors. Lloyd Jones appeared to have pocketed 90 per cent of the previous year's Mission funds for personal use. Despite the judge's description of Lloyd Jones as a predator upon the public, it was not within his remit to bring formal charges. When Lloyd Jones next tried to fundraise in Birkenhead Park, however, he met with public hostility and required police protection.

His associates in the Mission were hardly worthy characters: one of his fundraisers, James Baxter, carried previous convictions for collecting donations for an entirely bogus charity. The crux of Lee Jones's accusations of fraud rested not on this association with dubious individuals but on the opacity of the Mission's balance sheets. Accounts for the year ending 30 September 1907 showed that the Gospel Mission raised over £170, 65 per cent of which was disbursed on rent, coal, gas, cleaning and Lloyd Jones's 'allowance'. The remaining 35 per cent went on 'general expenses', into which costs for printing, postage, 'incidentals', furniture and the distribution of free meals and outings for poor children factored. As Lee Jones observed, the (limited) objective of the charity was casually 'lumped' with general expenses. Lloyd Jones's annual 'allowance' was £5 more (£65) than the expenditure on 'general' costs although Jones lived with his wife and five (soon to be six) children at the Mission, supported by a domestic servant, and he undoubtedly benefitted from the 'expenses' on rent, fuel and so on. As Lee Jones observed, it was impossible to verify the authenticity of the reverend's claims of distributing over 5,000 meals per year. His accounts were signed off by two members of the 'committee' rather than independent auditors. That one of the committee members, James McKinley, was barely literate hardly boosted faith in the administration of the Mission. Transparency did not improve when, in 1910, Lloyd Jones appointed his 19-year-old son, a grocer's assistant, as honorary secretary of the Mission.

Despite Lee Jones's collaboration with the Liverpool police in investigating several charities at this time, his efforts did not result in legal proceedings for fraud. Neither Jones, nor the police, had any grounds on which to prosecute Lloyd Jones, or others, in courts of law because the organizations under scrutiny ostensibly disbursed some charity, albeit a paltry percentage of funds procured. In the absence of police prosecution, Jones turned to the press to discredit Lloyd Jones and denounce his practice as scandalous. Since 1905, Lee Jones had pressed editors of the city's press, Evening Express, Liverpool Courier, Daily Post.
and *Mercury*, with recommendations that they develop a localized ‘black list’ to prevent newspapers inadvertently promoting suspect charities by running appeals or stories about the charity, copy that was often submitted, as Lee Jones knew only too well, by the charity rather than independent reporters. The fact that philanthropic articles provided such easy (unverified) copy for newspaper editors often thwarted attempts to combat fraudulent practice. Other charities that Jones investigated at this time, such as the Bethesda Children’s Homes and White Rock Children’s Home, frequently sent photographs of smiling waifs with cheery stories of ‘good works’ for inclusion in the press, a process that simultaneously legitimated and promoted the organization.\(^67\) It was high time, Jones urged, that local and regional charities were ‘placed upon a proper footing’.\(^68\) That Jones’s appeal effectively duplicated national ‘blacklist’ schemes, most notably that run by the Charity Organisation Society, illustrates his doubt about the value of schemes that demanded members of the public be proactive in seeking information about charities they sponsored. Similarly, Jones’s lobbying of newspapers to take a lead in denouncing fraud replicated Labouchere’s utilization of *Truth* as a ‘beacon’ against deception but demonstrated the need for local responses to local charities. His action raised the very pressing problem of how far the public trusted a charity’s legitimacy simply because it was local and, imaginatively at least, familiar. The vast majority of donors gave to charitable schemes on impulse rather than decisions made in full awareness of ‘sound’ financial mechanisms.\(^69\)

Jones was exasperated that his previous warnings to newspaper editors against specific charities had been ignored. Indeed, unless supported by the police, anxieties about ‘fraud’ or ‘misappropriation’ were difficult to authenticate. Nevertheless, Jones’s petitioning bore some success, with some editors rejecting copy from organizations on his blacklist.\(^70\) That these were usually balance sheets that bore no evidence of independent audit, and unauthenticated reports of recipient relief suggests an increasing awareness among newspaper editors of mechanisms for testing an organization’s credibility.\(^71\) The difficulty for Lee Jones was that newspaper editors were neither consistent nor were they courts of law. When financial reports appeared legitimate enough, newspapers tended to run with the story. Certainly, following the run of disastrous publicity in 1907, Lloyd Jones staged at least one Mission event, a Christmas party, in collaboration with well-established, national organizations, such as the Band of Hope and Salvation Army, which lent Jones the sheen of legitimacy, although how far participation of these bodies was official is unclear.\(^72\)

Lloyd Jones was relatively confident in his enterprise although he failed to pursue his action against Lee Jones for libel. His assurance rested on the lack
of clarity over legitimacy in the charitable marketplace. Who, he asked, had authorized Lee Jones as ‘cock of the walk’ to legitimate charities? Charitable ‘fraud’ was subjective and Lloyd Jones exercised ‘no more tomfoolery’ in philanthropic endeavour than Lee Jones ‘or anyone else’. It was ‘scandalous’ that Lee Jones should accuse him of fraud while ‘squandering’ the funds of the LWD and failing to publish a list of subscribers.\(^73\) The LWD ran highly successful fundraising bazaars: what, asked Lloyd Jones, happened to all that money? Both charities claimed the support of a committee but were, in practice, the respective empires of Jones and Jones. Both men lived in the headquarters of their organization. Lloyd Jones suspected that Lee Jones’s energetic persecution of small charities was to disguise shortcomings in the LWD. He had a point. Despite his increasing efforts to toe the bureaucratic line, Lee Jones was investigated by the COS on several occasions. From the outset, the Liverpool branch of the COS had kept a watchful eye on the charity’s operations, especially as Lee Jones, in his early twenties, was relatively unknown to the city’s elite. Correspondence between Lee Jones and the Anglican Venerable Archdeacon Madden and the Liberal MP William Rathbone in the first years of the Food Association’s operation highlights a degree of suspicion towards Jones in terms of his motives (to ‘play shop [in the slums]’) and his ‘promiscuous’ giving.\(^74\) Jones came to the attention of the national COS in 1905 following an inquiry from Charles Dowding, a vicar from the Lake District, who considered a newspaper advert for the League read ‘fishily’. Loch made inquiries to the Liverpool branch, even asking if Lee Jones was anything to do with Lloyd Jones. Although they found nothing untoward with the organization, the COS could not recommend it because the charity’s debts meant it was not self-supporting.\(^75\) The difference with Lee Jones was that, unlike Lloyd Jones, far from profiting from the charity, he kept it functioning by sinking his and his mother’s capital into the venture.\(^76\)

For Lee Jones, the exposure and policing of local organizations in the local press was pivotal to raising public awareness, not only of ‘discreditable’ schemes but also of the very need to discriminate. In this sense, his zeal for exposing suspect charities was self-legitimating. By identifying what was wrong with other charities, Lee Jones implicitly stated what was right about his. This was not lost on other organizations. Following initial press features on Lloyd Jones in 1905, the secretary of the Birkenhead Cinderella Society, a welfare scheme for children, wrote to Lee Jones declaring his intention to ‘take up the pen’ against the ‘reverend’. In the same letter, he ‘justified’ the operation of the Cinderella Society and expressed ‘fraternity’ with Lee Jones.\(^77\) Such correspondence
suggests an anxiety to authenticate charitable enterprise, partially at least, by participating in the exposure of others.\textsuperscript{78}

The parochial conflict between Jones and Jones illuminates the violent controversy and libelous dispute that could exist between charity entrepreneurs at the turn of the twentieth century. Immediately significant at a regional level, the case study also highlights the voluntary bureaucratic machinery for identifying fraud, validating charitable practice and regulating finance, which had emerged piecemeal within the charitable marketplace over the previous thirty years. Lee Jones’s motivation in pursuing ‘suspect’ charities may have been self-interested but his campaigns borrowed heavily from mechanisms of voluntary administrative scrutiny that had emerged at a national level since the 1870s. That he appropriated such mechanisms on behalf of a presumably ignorant public suggests, on the one hand, the limited success of these modes of scrutiny: the work of combating charity fraud in a self-regulating market was never redundant. On the other hand, the Jones case demonstrates how far the COS’s parameters for identifying and proclaiming fraud, especially the scrutiny of charitable organizations’ administration, had become normative even in the periphery of the charity market.

\textbf{State responsibility versus donor responsibility}

Therefore, while an idea of what charitable legitimacy meant may have been diffused repeatedly by \textit{Truth} and the COS, there were several factors, as the ‘Reverend’ Lloyd Jones case attests, that prevented the complete excision of fraud from the charity marketplace on a national scale. First was the remarkable ingenuity, and adaptability, of would-be fraudsters who wore the sheen of respectability by gathering a nominal committee and publishing some kind of balance sheet. At least one of \textit{Truth}’s warnings to the naively benevolent actually offered reassurance to the imposter: ‘So long as you are continent, patient, and not too greedy’, it noted, ‘you need hardly fear scandal.’\textsuperscript{79} This may also explain why the COS was careful in the distribution of its detailed reports on charities: correspondents who requested a report were questioned closely about their motivation for doing so, for fear that COS investigations would give clues to the would-be swindler in avoiding detection.\textsuperscript{80} It is notable that Lee Jones’s pursuit of Lloyd Jones may have raised public suspicion for a time but was hardly successful in ridding the region of a resourceful fraudster. In 1914, the national magazine \textit{John Bull} catalogued Lloyd Jones’s ‘astonishing’ record of chicanery,
dating from at least 1892. At the time of publication, Lloyd Jones had moved premises and was running his Mission as ‘St. Jude’s Mission Church.’ Once again, he appeared to have the apparatus of an authentic charity, a meeting room, ‘children’s home’ and balance sheet available on request. On inspection, these were each of dubious legitimacy: there were no children in the home, no flock at the Mission and the accounts were authenticated by the secretary and treasurer of the Mission, roles filled at that time by Lloyd Jones.

Indeed, the second problem facing the presumptive regulators of the charity marketplace was the continued absence of legislation to deal with fraud in the charity sector. Tudor vagrancy law was hardly appropriate for regulating sophisticated, ever-changing modern fundraising practices and the Charity Commission could barely cope with its limited remit of regulating endowed charities. Those promoting regulation of the charitable market were divided on the means to achieve it. While the COS lobbied the home secretary for an extension of the Charity Commission’s powers, Truth echoed Liberal MP Joseph Chamberlain’s criticism of the ‘irresponsible body’ and called for its powers to be ‘pared down.’ The shortcomings of the Charity Commission did not stifle isolated calls for an alternative state regulation of the voluntary charity sector, although an attempt by Lord Shaftesbury to introduce legislation to ‘prevent frauds on charitable funds’ in 1873 was thwarted. Members of parliament felt that the proposed accounting regulations would be too onerous on what they still, anachronistically, imagined the voluntary sector to be: small groups of benevolent women in country parishes. Moreover, opponents to the bill deemed that protecting ‘fools’ who were taken in by rogues should not take precedence over allowing genuine charities to flourish without excessive state regulation.

Parliament, forced to act against fraud in other sectors, remained unwilling to regulate the charity marketplace, perhaps mindful that a kind of self-regulating moral economy, overseen by the COS and others, was developing in lieu of any such action.

Yet the self-appointed arbiters of that moral economy continued to lobby for legislative backing and stricter judiciary. In its ‘charity-mongers’ series of articles, Truth had noted, ‘Socially as well as financially the injury worked by fraudulent charities is so serious, and yet so very difficult of detection, that the necessity for legislative interference is unquestionable.’ As the newspaper reflected, manipulators of frauds were ‘among the cleverest scamps of the day’, and knew just how far they could go to escape the law. Shaftesbury had continued to press for a charity fraud bill that would allow any subscriber of twenty pounds to a voluntary fund to summon the charity manager before a court to reveal
accounts and expenditure, but *Truth* thought it unlikely the bill would get parliamentary time that year.\textsuperscript{87} *Truth* and the COS repeated the call for charity registration or licensing and a charity inspector on several further occasions, at one point stressing that this was not suggested ‘out of tenderness for those who waste their money on such institutions’ but, rather, for the sake of intended beneficiaries of donations who were the ‘real victims’ of misappropriated or squandered funds.\textsuperscript{88} Notably, both *Truth* and the COS compared the situation extant in the charity sector with that in private companies, imagining that much more stringent legislation was in place to deal with fraud and embezzlement in the financial sector\textsuperscript{89}; although historians disagree on how effective these laws were.\textsuperscript{90}

There were obvious and pressing reasons for the COS and *Truth* to repeat calls for statutory regulation. As a charity, the COS, like Lee Jones, had a clear financial interest in attempting to shut out allegedly fraudulent competitor organizations from the charitable marketplace, but also took on a considerable financial burden in doing so. If the state were to regulate the sector, the COS might be relieved of some of this outlay. Moreover, an 1890 *Truth* article pointed out the potentially high costs to the newspaper editor and proprietor of denouncing alleged fraudsters. If the recently exposed Walter Austin, head of the ‘London Cottage Mission’, went ahead with threatened libel action, Labouchere lamented, ‘I have still before me a certain expenditure of many hundreds – probably thousands – of pounds, the prospect of recovering any of which, assuming everything in my favour, is extremely remote.’ For this reason, he went on, ‘no man in his senses’ would ‘make a public charge of dishonesty’ against such fraudsters, leaving the average ‘charity-swindler’ little to fear from exposure in the press.\textsuperscript{91}

Further to parliamentarians’ ‘fools’ remarks, the longer a publicity campaign against a supposed charity fraudster went on, the more frustrated cautioners became with a public that gave money without asking questions or heeding warnings. As a former superintendent of police who thwarted a bogus Manchester mission in 1888 later reflected, many people sent large donations annually to institutions they knew nothing about when ‘a little inquiry’ would often show that a considerable portion of their money was ‘squandered’ in expenses, and that the intended recipients received only ‘the pittance which is left.’\textsuperscript{92} Likewise, charting Lloyd Jones’s history, *John Bull* proclaimed him an ‘imposter of the first rank.’\textsuperscript{93} That it did so in 1914, over twenty years after Jones’s first scam and almost ten years after the local scandal, suggested that however much the public was alerted to rogue philanthropists, they were woefully susceptible to imposters who, with little fear of legal prosecution, could make considerable profit from
perpetual reinvention in an ever proliferating and unregulated charitable market. By 1915, Lloyd Jones had moved to another address in Birkenhead and was operating the ‘British Tract Enterprise’, ostensibly raising money for soldiers at the front by selling ‘soldiers’ wallets’ and assorted pamphlets. As early as 1908, the Reverend Samuel Hawkes urged Lee Jones to abandon his efforts at pursuing Lloyd Jones and the purveyors of the ‘Bethesda’ Mission and Home for Friendless Girls: the police were impotent and both cases had been ‘so fully’ set before the public that if people were wronged by the fraudsters, they ‘deserved to suffer’.

Thus, while continuing to call vainly for legislation, those agents who sought to regulate charities placed some responsibility for charitable fraud on the shoulders of the public, without whom it could not be perpetrated. *Truth* increasingly assigned blame for fraudsters’ success to these unquestioning donors, particularly ‘early subscribers by whose help the swindle is started’; those who had their attention called to the truth by a body like the COS but went on giving regardless; and committed annual subscribers who never received any financial report that would ‘bear investigation’. Such outright ‘negligence’ made donors culpable in the perpetuation of fraud. Donors, the COS told readers of its *Charities Register*, had to learn to discriminate not only between charities that were ‘useful’ and those that were not, but also those that were well regulated and those that were mismanaged. In a legally unregulated, but highly public and information-saturated charity marketplace, the onus was on charitable donors to act responsibly and to exercise what is now termed ‘intelligent giving’.

In that sense, the perception of who the ‘victims’ of charity fraud were changed subtly over the period. ‘Charity’ as a concept, ‘good’ charitable institutions and the deserving recipients of charitable aid were innocent casualties of charity fraud. Many of those whose money was misappropriated received less sympathy.

**Conclusion**

Fraud debates and scandals raised essential questions of legitimacy, authenticity and respectability. By narrowing the range of possible answers to these questions, the COS and *Truth*, as well as those policing the parochial boundaries like Lee Jones, introduced normative, capitalistic approaches to what had often been considered a premodern form of exchange. The alms-giving of old did not entail such publicly monitored accounts or the demonstration of efficient relief. The drivers of such accountability practices were multifaceted. There was
undoubtedly the shared culture of the world of business and finance at a time when every charity called on financially powerful and savvy individuals to act as major donors and members of the board. But to be accountable, and to be seen to be so, was also part of an identity-shaping process. Accountability was relevant to the self-narrative of the institutions themselves. To be transparent was to be open and popular, clearly connected to the rich and powerful, while calling on the generosity of the greater number. A less blatant motor of accountability was probably a desire to include and exclude in equal measure. The actual costs of bringing together a board of patrons, publishing accounts and auditing them, that is, devoting a fraction of the sums raised to the cost of running a charity, were all ways of pricing out of the market the smaller, often more ad hoc, charities which had dominated the charity and humanitarian market in the first half of the nineteenth century. Any organization led by a single individual would be the focus of scrutiny for both Truth and the COS and would struggle to meet these demands. The emphasis on publishing accounts, associated usually with a complete annual summary of activities, sought to establish or restore credibility in a very contemporary sense. The echoes that both narratives and accounts might obtain in the press (and all the public relations efforts that this press coverage entailed) were not within the means of every charity entrepreneur.

This market logic also entailed a degree of caveat emptor assessment of charities by the givers. Yet it is not evident that this drive towards regulatory practices responded to genuine public anxieties. Rather, they emerged as a mechanism to control an expanding but highly competitive market devoid of other regulatory dimensions, enabling individual organizations to proclaim virtue through advertising ‘best practice’ and identify fraud by pointing at those who did not conform. Press scandals served as an expurgatory exercise through which purity and order could be re-established, albeit, perhaps only temporarily. To patrol charities as a unique, morally pure, sphere of activity was to set tight limits to the range of people and expertise allowed to compete for public generosity. Paradoxically, it also entailed a more jaundiced worldview in which the hydra of fraud would always grow new heads and false identities, making policing a necessary but thankless task. This was recognized by those who did the ‘cleaning up’. After the conviction of William Harper Bradshaw, ‘one of the most disgraceful cases in the fertile annals of charitable imposture’, who ran a seaside children’s home, ostensibly but unknowingly patronized by several peers and MPs, Truth noted that ‘[t]he charity world is full of Bradshaws. I have at least half a dozen of them under my observation at the present moment.’
Later, recalling the exposure of Walter Austin, it complained that ‘as soon as one is down another springs up in his place’.101

This lament did not entail a call for the abolition of charity and one could think about Truth’s efforts as merely a way of limiting fraud below what accountants now call ‘an optimal level’, the threshold of tolerated abuse below which further regulation would stifle innovation and enterprise, while allowing ‘legitimate’ charities to grow.102 The idea of the market as, in Stephen Hopgood’s phrase, ‘the most efficient mechanism’ for meeting public needs was in the ascendant then as it is now, but the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century regulators sought to harness ideas of a ‘good marketplace’ in order to close it to the ‘discreditable’.103 In the story of Lee Jones versus Lloyd Jones it is unclear whether the so-called clergymen delivered any of the relief for which he obtained funding. His status as a ‘one-man band’, lack of transparency and accountability attracted suspicion. Ironically, these were the same reasons that the COS repeatedly investigated his adversary, Lee Jones. The COS and Truth attempted to shape a moral economy for the charity market but, in the absence of adequate legislation, their main focus was formal and fetishized bureaucracy. In order to flourish, charities increasingly sought to establish their own legitimacy via the voluntary adoption of such bureaucratic strictures, and via the denunciation of those who failed to act similarly. In a sense, if fraud did not exist, it would have to have been invented. As the next chapter shows, such practices and preoccupations characterized even the fundraising initiatives of elite networks, activists that might, perhaps, have had their legitimacy almost taken for granted. That, at the start of the twenty-first century, charities, and their critics, remain preoccupied with authenticating business practices as a signifier of legitimacy highlights just how important the innovations of the Victorian period were.104
Aristocratic Fundraising and the Politics of Imperial Humanitarianism

So far, this book has shown the extent to which philanthropic fundraising was a competitive marketplace. We have illustrated how, from 1870, charities became more entrepreneurial and developed practices contingent on business management: creating and protecting brand identity, extending conceptions of the donor market and ways of mining it, auditing and becoming accountable to their donors and potential donors. This chapter considers these practices in what may, at first, appear to be an anachronistic context: aristocratic philanthropic networks. By this, we mean fundraising initiated, directly organized and overseen by aristocrats, magnates and grandees rather than elite patronage of good causes or societies. Aristocratic philanthropy has a long history, and has encompassed everything from alms doled out to the poor to funding the development of infrastructure to create employment and welfare. This kind of philanthropy was often conservative and self-interested, pitched at quelling or forestalling social unrest and there is a scholarship of ‘social control’ dedicated to it. The present chapter is concerned with a different kind of aristocratic fundraising with a much slimmer historiography: the relief efforts of groups of aristocrats and industrial magnates for international disasters or conflicts in the period before the expansion of the semi official, civic fundraising that characterized the Mansion House Funds discussed next in Chapter 6.

Previous chapters have referenced the political framework in which fundraising for domestic causes took place and, in particular, the science of poverty, that most familiar political context for British charity. This chapter examines fundraising in the context of international politics during the Russo-Turkish conflict in the 1870s. The political context and shape of what became known as ‘humanitarian aid’ is best outlined by Rebecca Gill in her book, *Calculating Compassion: Humanity and Relief in War, Britain 1870–1914* (2013). Gill’s book takes in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) and the Balkans crises
100 The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

(1876–78). Gill pays particular attention to, first, the development of the Société Internationale de Secours aux Blessés des Armées de Terre et de Mer (later known as the International Red Cross) during the Franco-Prussian War and, second, its operation, alongside other aid organizations such as the Turkish Compassionate Fund, during the Balkans crises later in the 1870s. In this chapter, we turn to an aid organization that has received comparatively less attention, perhaps because its exclusivity in terms of sex and wealth seems so anachronistic to the emergence of a modern humanitarian sensibility.

Presided over by George Sutherland-Leveson-Gower (1828–91), third Duke of Sutherland and one of the richest men in Victorian Britain, the Stafford House Committee emerged in the 1870s as one of the most powerful elite philanthropic networks in Britain, both in its fundraising capability and its ability to deliver aid in overseas conflict areas. Committee members included peers and magnates whose wealth relied upon the Empire. Together, they sought to establish an elite and business-like agenda for humanitarian fundraising. Stafford House was one of a number of aristocratic charitable organizations in this period. It was unusual in being so exclusively masculine in its membership. We focus on it here because, thanks to the bureaucratic acumen of Henry Wright, the Duke of Sutherland’s secretary, it left comprehensive records of high-level fundraising. These archives open a small window onto a vista of privileged private enterprise that combined aristocratic patronage, capitalistic forms of accountability, fundraising and publicity alongside the delivery of international aid. As a case study, Stafford House Committee illustrates the ways in which even a relatively traditional model of fundraising, that of aristocrats calling on networks of high net worth individuals to subscribe to a good cause, could engage with modernizing dimensions of the charity market. Importantly, the chapter illustrates the ways in which old and new practices associated with fundraising could coexist.

International fundraising and grandees

The mechanics of ‘getting money’ for the victims of international disasters or wars in the late Victorian era did not differ noticeably from that for established, domestic charities but such campaigns were especially comparable to domestic disaster funds (for instance, for colliery explosions) in their transient nature and intensity. This is hardly surprising. After all, international charitable fundraising had deep roots, not least in Christian-led campaigns for famine relief and against slavery. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the global reach of the
British Empire extended the British public’s charitable world vision considerably, as epitomized by the foundation of the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War at the outset of the Franco-Prussian War and the diverse international causes indulged by the Mansion House Funds, generated by the lord mayor of London. The international fundraising through Mansion House is discussed in detail in the next chapter. Here, it is worth noting that it began to expand its fundraising for international causes in the 1870s and generated thousands of pounds towards famine relief and environmental and human disasters. Mansion House’s turning point for international fundraising was the Indian Famine Fund, 1877, which eventually totalled in the region of a quarter of a million pounds. The founder of the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War, Loyd-Lindsay, looked to the Geneva Convention, 1864, as a raison d’être for international humanitarian intervention. The Society operated until 1905 when it was subsumed into the newly created British Red Cross. Mansion House and the National Society aside, religiously driven relief funds were the most common form of relief work abroad, with missionary networks called upon to fund overseas orphanages, soup kitchens and famine relief. These campaigns competed in the same charitable marketplace mapped out in previous chapters for domestic causes, and indeed, were often overseen by the same organizations, such as the Salvation Army. Such international initiatives typically abided by the same rules associated with their sectarian, linguistic and class solidarity in order to benefit from the globalization that unfettered imperialism enabled.

The great and good had always played a part in these kinds of campaigns. As Frank Prochaska has noted, royal and aristocratic patronage was significant, and as Chapter 3 above detailed, the imprimatur of royalty or high-profile individuals conveyed charity brand values such as authenticity, authority and worthiness: one reason why, as we have seen, fraudsters were so keen on appropriating well-known names for their pseudo-committees. Sometimes, however, persons of high net worth and philanthropic disposition were motivated to initiate fundraising schemes themselves. For example, Angela Burdett-Coutts, who inherited most of her banker grandfather’s wealth (around £1.8 million) in 1837 at the age of 23, famously launched the home for homeless women, Urania Cottage, with Charles Dickens in the 1840s. However, the late 1870s, and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 in particular, saw a notable spike in elite fundraising initiatives, much of it led by high-profile women for whom the earlier work of Florence Nightingale was both rival and inspiration. Paulina Irby, daughter of a minor noble family from Norfolk, was from earlier in the decade an activist on
behalf of Balkan Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Irby capitalized on news in 1876 of the persecution of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, what came to be known as the ‘Bulgarian Atrocities’ or ‘Horrors’, to boost both her fund and those of several associates. Emily Anne Smythe (nee Beaufort), more usually known as Viscountess Strangford, and often associated with the foundation of St John Ambulance and the development of district nursing, also became heavily involved in both the Bulgarian uprising and the Russo-Turkish conflict, delivering humanitarian aid in a personal capacity and raising funds from Britain to relieve Christians through her Bulgarian Peasants Relief Fund. And Burdett-Coutts, again, was instrumental in founding the Turkish Compassionate Fund in aid of Muslim refugees in 1877–78, making some of the earliest and, at over £2,000, the largest donations to the fund. Rebecca Gill has given the most comprehensive analysis of the political context in which these multiple fundraising ventures operated and their varying fortunes. Meanwhile, the Stafford House Committee, under the aegis of the third Duke of Sutherland, offered aid to sick and wounded Turkish soldiers in the 1877–78 conflict.

This list of funds and their varied beneficiaries indicates the degree to which, by the latter half of the century at least, humanitarian sympathies were strongly aligned with political choices and economic opportunities. British international aid in the early Victorian period was characterized by solidarity with assorted Christian minorities. The efforts of Irby and Strangford, and their strong support from William Gladstone and within wider Liberal circles, continued this trend. Yet in December 1876, the Duke of Sutherland chaired a meeting to determine what might be done to ‘alleviate the great sufferings’ that prevailed among Turkish soldiers. This meeting led to the formation of the Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish soldiers, an initiative that was controversial with sections of the British press more sympathetic to orthodox Christian Russia. One of the richest magnates of Victorian England, Sutherland’s wealth and social standing gave him a dominant role in federating an extraordinarily effective fundraising structure which, like many parochial fundraising groups, was led by the principal notables of the era. The committee took the name of his London residence, Stafford House, and assembled a formidable coalition of ninety-four benefactors and leading philanthropists. The list included the Nawab of Hyderabad Salar Jung Bahadur who ruled the richest of all Indian princely states; the eccentric recluse Cavendish-Scott-Bentinck, fifth Duke of Portland; the notorious Earl of Lucan; Henry Holroyd, third Earl of Sheffield; and Sutherland’s own son-in-law, Charles Stuart, twelfth Lord Blantyre, who funded a hospital under his own name. Also allied were leading
figures such as the financier and former president of the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews, Sir Moses Montefiore, and the conservative politician Baron Henry de Worms, president of the Anglo-Jewish Association between 1872 and 1886, who would later become the secretary to the Board of Trade. Most of the leading ninety-four grandees, arranged by rank and seniority in all public documents, were notable Conservatives.¹⁴

Just as competition for donors prevailed in the domestic charity market, fundraising for singular international disasters could also present potential donors with multiple channels for their largesse. The complicated Balkans crisis and its several British funds with varied beneficiaries is an especially good example. The Ottoman and Russian empires had long been at odds by the time crisis erupted. The struggle for dominance in Bulgaria in the mid-1870s opened the door to the resurgence of Russia as a great European power after the humiliation of the Crimean War. The Bulgarian conflict was heavily politicized in Britain, particularly by The Bulgarian Horrors, a pamphlet written from opposition by William Gladstone, in which he set the tone for Christian indignation at Ottoman atrocities against Bulgarian minorities.¹⁵ Although Britain did not intervene militarily in favour of the Bulgarians, the political campaign in their support symbolized the renewal of interventionist diplomacy across Europe.¹⁶ The issue of humanitarian intervention and for whose benefit it might be practiced became hotly contested. Disraeli, prime minister at the time, denied the involvement of the Ottomans and minimized the brutality of the repression of Bulgarian peasants. At the same time, a variety of Catholic and Protestant groups lobbied to protect multiple ancient Christian groups while orientalist realpolitik played out on an increasingly bleak portrayal of the Muslim other.¹⁷

Yet fundraising for humanitarian relief during these crises suggests a complex picture in which some British imperialists upheld Muslim identity and the need to support the weakened Ottoman Empire against the Russian aggressor and its proxies.¹⁸ Across the United Kingdom, a wide range of charities attempted to navigate the deep-seated interests and political choices at play. As much as the public might agree that one set of victims (such as the Bulgarian Christians) was entitled to succour, the needs of civilian victims on all sides could be acknowledged. But the politicization of the crisis in Britain was such that the wounded and soldiers of the Ottoman armies, the same soldiers accused of committing the Bulgarian atrocities, could also become subjects of British humanitarian fundraising. As Lady Strangford, an informed observer of the Balkans, observed: ‘As for the Turks, I doubt if for many years Justice will be
done them in England – it will require a long time to calm the passions which
colour and daub everything they do now in the eyes of some of the English –
who see only the surface and known nothing of the depths and counter currents
below.\textsuperscript{19}

Whatever the moral and religious politics at play, each of the funds, in practice,
vied with each other for the British public's donations, and was deeply conscious
of the fact. When Sutherland inaugurated the Stafford House Committee it came
to light that another initiative with similar objectives, under the leadership of
Lord Stanley of Alderley, had already raised and sent £1,100. This fund merged
into the Stafford House Committee. Meanwhile in 1877 Lady Strangford, who
was fundraising independently to manage hospital structures near the frontline,
discovered that being caught in military crossfire was not her only problem.\textsuperscript{20} She
faced competition for donations from Burdett-Coutts's newly minted Turkish
Compassionate Fund, managed by the British Embassy in Constantinople,
and raising resources towards rehousing and equipping refugees.\textsuperscript{21} Strangford
complained to the British ambassador in Turkey that the Burdett-Coutts fund
had 'suddenly suffocated' her own subscriptions, which had been 'going on
well and steadily'. By October 1877, she had to find funding from the Turkish
Red Crescent until her own fundraising in the United Kingdom could resume
its previous pace.\textsuperscript{22} While Strangford's initiative was unusually personal, her
fundraising was clearly in direct competition with more distant sympathizers
who had sufficient authority and status at home to generate successful rival
fundraising schemes.\textsuperscript{23} Their activism was limited to raising donations and
to the devolved management of these funds to professionals in the field, the
most significant of whom was Vincent Kennett-Barrington, who had worked
with both St. John Ambulance and the British National Aid Society.\textsuperscript{24} Even here,
however, rival fundraising efforts need not eclipse cooperation on the ground.
The British ambassador at Constantinople was a key contact and facilitator for
each fund. And while Strangford's work gradually lost its distinctive identity
to merge into the Red Crescent's work, she also associated with Sutherland's
Stafford House initiative, and indeed Kennett-Barrington switched between
her operation and that of Stafford House.\textsuperscript{25} Later on in the conflict, although
at times their appeals for donations ran consecutively on the same page of
newspapers,\textsuperscript{26} Stafford House also played a small and adjunct role to the Turkish
Compassionate Fund's work.

The British public navigated this web of competing funds connected to the
Russo-Turkish conflict with the same mixture of compassion and pragmatism
that domestic charities, as we have seen, were able to harness. In her long series of
appeal letters to the readers of the *Daily Telegraph* throughout 1877–78, Burdett-Coutts thus mingled heart-rending stories of individual suffering with precise accounting of the suitably ‘meagre’ relief given: 4½d per day for women and 2½d per day for children was ‘just sufficient for Turkish peasants’, she had been assured by ‘the native members’ of her committee.27 This kind of appeal echoed advice that Florence Nightingale had given to Paulina Irby on fundraising appeals earlier in the decade: the public wanted to know the details of the distress and the relief of it, but they also wanted assurances that their money was not going to be wasted in any way.28 Witness accounts in the press were therefore a crucial means of generating interest and cash for each of the funds throughout the war, although they needed to be used judiciously. As Burdett-Coutts’s secretary noted in late 1878, there was little point sending another letter to the *Telegraph* when the public’s attention was focused on recent domestic disasters, including the sinking of the *Princess Alice*.29

As with other high-status fundraising networks in this period, Stafford House Committee cultivated public sympathy for its recipients, wounded soldiers, by emphasizing their suffering. This focus on giving to the wounded rather than the sick, the military rather than the civilians, reflects the origins and ethos of early humanitarianism and its focus on heroic sufferings of ‘splendid, brawny, broad-backed men’ who for months, ‘shoeless and shelterless’ and living ‘on a pound of black bread a day’, have made the ‘heroic defence of their country that has astonished Europe’.30 Even so, throughout the conflict, many of the reports in the press on Stafford House aid relayed the combination of medical help for wounds with that for the sicknesses associated with war zones, notably dysentery, typhoid fever and scurvy.31 Even less heroic perhaps, by March 1878, reports in the press noted that the committee was engaged in disease prevention, burying the ‘great number’ of dead horses and oxen that lay around Constantinople in order to prevent pestilence.32 Although far removed from the stated objectives of the fund at the beginning of its campaign, press reports implicitly acknowledged that relieving sickness and disease among soldiers (and civilians) were of a piece with assisting victims of war.

Despite the Stafford House Committee’s broad membership and the public branding of the organization as a large coalition of ‘great men’ (a sketch in the Christmas issue of *The Graphic* in 1877 of the Committee [see Figure 5.1] promoted the initiative as an elite masculine enterprise that touched the festive fundraising imperatives discussed in Chapter 2),33 in practice, relatively few attended the formal meetings or participated in the reporting processes that committee work entailed. In effect, for much of 1877–78 an executive committee
including the Duke, the Marquis of Stafford, the Marquis of Ormonde, General Marshall, General Sir Henry Green and the Duke’s secretary Henry Wright customarily attended the important meetings. In the final year of the committee, the meetings were attended by groups of seven to fourteen more or less titled individuals gravitating around the wealth and influence of the committee. As with other ventures of this nature, the committee membership represented the welding together of patronage networks and commercial interests that all contributed to the fundraising activities of the committee. As the papers of Sutherland reveal, major landlords and industrialists gave to a wide range of charitable enterprises which varied from the most traditional school-building committee, the local hospital associated with their regional and local footprint to the wider range of charitable enterprises that took the fancy of the noble household.\textsuperscript{34} Even in increasingly democratic times, aristocracy and wealth exuded brand values of quality, reliability and worthiness.

As Shapely and Prochaska have shown, this provided and reinforced prestige in the many settings where aristocrats and their families sought to influence society while these giving networks also enabled them to call on ready-made committees and rhizome-like fundraising structures, leveraging influence and funds in

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{A Meeting of the Stafford House Committee, \textit{The Graphic}, 22 December 1877 (Duke of Sutherland at the centre of the image). Authors’ private collection.}
\end{figure}
localities where, for instance, Sutherland’s name or that of his prestigious associates topped local pyramids of influence. Angela Burdett-Coutts thus expected her commercial connections to fundraise on behalf of the Turkish Compassionate Fund among their employees. More generally, aristocrats and grandees expected enterprises, factories and social groups indebted to them to respond to their calls for marshalling fundraising activities. The calls were open to the wider public and, like any other charity, built on their respectability to attract funds. Though their social networks may appear antiquated relics of aristocratic power, the Stafford House Committee was a financial powerhouse with robust claims to modern management. In absolute terms, the committee could match the British National Aid Society in fundraising and reportedly surpass it in effectiveness.

Stafford House’s fundraising strategy showed many of the hallmarks of other voluntary charities of the period. It began with classic modes of subscription that enabled the regular publication of subscription lists associating lesser mortals to members of the committee. The Nawab of Hyderabad collected funds independently in his territory (£5,300 in 1876). Alongside the subscription lists, the Duke of Sutherland’s report in April 1879 acknowledged the combination of financial fundraising in the form of concerts and theatrical entertainments and the donation of goods that ‘assisted greatly’ in alleviating ‘the sufferings of the wounded’. Some of these concerts had taken place at Stafford House with the Duke loaning his prestigious home in exchange of a guaranteed return. In July 1878, for instance, Algernon Borthwick, son of a conservative MP and proprietor of the Morning Post, was thus given the privilege ‘to arrange [a concert] and to guarantee a sum of £250 to the fund’. The exchange of cash against social capital could not have been more explicit and it showered Mr Borthwick with the leeway to entertain in palatial surroundings. The event was billed as being specifically in favour of the Gallipoli Hospital, in receipt of aid from the Stafford House Committee. The event, which was covered by the conservative press, took place as a ‘Grand Morning Concert’ at 3 pm in the afternoon under the patronage of HRH Princess Mary Adelaide and a veritable who’s who of titled ladies. It involved a dozen singers from Mr Mapleson’s operatic enterprise. The celebrated actor Henry Irving read some texts, including a short passage from Dickens’s David Copperfield. For a guinea apiece spectators could mingle in Stafford House and benefit from a private visit of the picture galleries of the palatial home. As Chapter 2 highlighted, Sutherland loaned the house for a range of charitable events he favoured.

According to the Committee’s report, by March 1879, they and Lord Blantyre combined had raised £43,750 12s 4d or, in 2014 money, using the economic
cost which assesses project expenditures in relation to the percentage of GDP, £68,880,000.00.\textsuperscript{40} This sum provided fifty salaried medical staff (surgeons and physicians), five staff in charge of logistics, nineteen translators and, directly reporting to their agent Kennett-Barrington, a central office of four accountants and clerical staff. This medical team carried out their work in twenty-one hospitals under their control, three evacuation operations by train and contributed to a refugee shelter.\textsuperscript{41} Each surgeon received a salary or stipend of £1 a day for their services to the Committee.\textsuperscript{42} By July 1878, 71,274 medical cases had been treated.\textsuperscript{43} In comparison, the official British Red Cross sent a little less than one third of this staffing. In correspondence to his wife Alice, Kennett-Barrington reflected on the jealousy arising from this disproportion between a private fund and what claimed to be a national organization:

The National Society do not like Stafford House having done so much more than themselves, as of course the Nat. Soc. ought to be the representative Society of England. They have I believe spent almost the same amount as we have, but the expense of their special ship swallowed up a terrible sum and after all was of little use.\textsuperscript{44}

In proportion, the Stafford House Committee also financed a greater number of medical staff than the Red Crescent of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{45} The scale of this humanitarian effort was in itself difficult for the Committee to communicate to the Ottoman authorities who often remained suspicious on the ground. In 1877 the Committee’s Constantinople office thought it necessary to print the monthly record of its staff and work in French and English in order to paste them on the walls of their hospitals. French being the lingua franca among Russian and Ottoman elites, these posters were meant to provide a modicum of safety to the employees of the Stafford House Committee and of Lord Blantyre.\textsuperscript{46}

**Accountability, Stafford House and international relief**

The fundraising activities associated with this conflict were of a piece with the ‘experience economy’ discussed in Chapter 2, but international relief funds were an explicitly modern exemplar when it came to their management. Kennett-Barrington, who had previously worked in war zones under the auspices of the Red Cross Society, began managing the Stafford House fund in 1877 from Constantinople, taking no remuneration in this role beyond his expenses. As we outlined in Chapter 4, even this practice might be identified by the likes of the
Charity Organisation Society [COS] and the press as open to mismanagement. Indeed, Nightingale had advised Irby, in a similar situation, to add a line on her appeal literature to note that ‘the directresses always pay their own expenses’. Allegations of misuse of funds did sometimes arise. In December 1877, The World newspaper suggested, entirely erroneously, that £197 of Stafford House funds had been spent on a dinner in Constantinople for Kennett-Barrington and others. Potentially anticipating such criticisms, Kennett-Barrington made the Russo-Turkish War Fund accounts publicly available, down to the smallest sums. He harassed the often financially inept medical directors of each hospital which the fund supported for full invoices and detailed returns. In turn, he supplied the Stafford House Committee board meetings with detailed accounts that were monitored and discussed by a specialist finance officer. In Britain, the fund’s only expenditure was on advertising, printing and postage; all personnel connected with the administration of the fund worked on a voluntary basis. Though much of the fund’s income originated from private gifts (some of them very large such as the £6,000 provided by the Duke of Portland or the £3,357 3s. and 5d. sent by Lord Blantyre), every shilling was accounted for by the publication of the Committee’s ‘Final Report’ in April 1879.

Between the closure of the fund’s activities and the publication of its report, Kennett-Barrington reconciled a variety of invoices, letters of change, notes and exchange rates to produce an unimpeachable financial narrative of the committee’s work. All bills were logged into books that were copied in duplicate. Every cheque was registered and issued with more than one signature, the stubs of all cheque books were returned and stored in the Sutherland archives. These accounts were precise and extremely detailed considering the challenges that war presented and the unexpected vagaries of transportation costs. In fact, Kennett-Barrington’s standards of reporting exceeded the norms of many contemporary businesses including some on the stock exchange where most of the members of the Committee would have had interests. All the same, a board composed of major landlords, entrepreneurs and industrialists such as the Stafford House Committee was probably accustomed to high levels of formal reporting and accountability. Sutherland himself managed his considerable inherited wealth with a degree of venture capitalism, particularly in relation to railways and mines. As a global entrepreneur he had financial interests in a wide range of ventures in Serbia, France, Borneo, Palestine and Syria. In the United Kingdom, over his investment career he ventured in no fewer than eight major railway enterprises or consolidations. His peers and members on the Stafford House Committee were equally enterprising and it is not surprising that
the humanitarian enterprise expected highly detailed accountability to donors. Yet this accountability was also a major claim to efficiency and transparency to the wider public and the press.

Prior to the arrival of Kennett-Barrington, the funds of the Committee had been mediated by leading Turkish politicians, most notably Ahmed Vefyk Pasha whose role Sutherland acknowledged in his preface to the Report while arguing that, due to his other political responsibilities, he could not continue after September 1877. In reality, the Committee had responded to a bruising campaign from British anti-Turkish newspapers such as The Times, who queried whether ‘a single penny’ of aid reached the intended beneficiaries, proclaiming, ‘How the Turks swindle the Stafford House Committee’. This anxiety, that only a small percentage of money raised for a fund ever reaches intended beneficiaries, continues to plague international fundraising initiatives. In this case, accusations against Vefyk Pasha were rooted in previous allegations of corruption although corruption was, The Times insinuated, the modus operandi for the entire Ottoman Empire. In response to these accusations the committee produced their robust paperwork: ‘As to the statement that not a penny sent through Turkish sources has been applied to its proper purpose in Asia, I repeat that we have vouchers and receipts for all the stores sent there’. Kennett-Barrington and the committee had to repeat this message on several occasions in September 1877 and the charity distanced itself from Ottoman politicians to avoid being tarred with the charge of corruption hanging over their administration. Only by countering accusations made by The Times and others, denouncing its selective and negative editing of the dispatches from their own correspondents, could the charity attempt to correct the rumours of wasteful handling of charitable goods and money.

These accusations undermined the presumed respectability one would have associated with the Committee’s social standing. The board of eminent citizens and figures gathered in the Committee was certainly the oldest form of legitimacy available and its composition put it at the summit of the respectability index which stood as implicit guarantor to all charities. Yet even this august company was open to challenges of cronyism and nepotism while geographical distance from the distribution of relief, Kennett-Barrington notwithstanding, diminished the effectiveness of their supervision. The production of accounts and their auditing was a relatively inexpensive countermeasure in this respect, though the complexity of the operation demanded a team of five to deliver the auditing in the case of the Stafford
House Committee. The accounts were basic in that they did not calculate the capital depreciation or other forms of incremental losses yet Kennett-Barrington’s figures would have been familiar to anyone working with double entry books. This exercise in public accountability included the appointing of a local auditor Mr Scaife from the firm Wellesley Hanson based in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{60} Minor supplementary expenditures relating to accounting were then lodged separately.\textsuperscript{61} At every step of the way the Stafford House Committee took extraordinary measures to represent its work as precisely as could be done.

Where the Committee organization also acted as a business was in its careful handling of networks, supply chains and local administration. The committee’s first priority had been to ensure its supply and distribution lines using existing commercial partnerships in Constantinople and London to ensure the safe passage of goods and money. Whereas the National Society squandered much of its income on a ship destined to maintain its supplies, Kennett-Barrington utilized commercial experience and influence to obtain free passage from commercial lines such as the French \textit{Messageries Maritimes} or the Austrian \textit{Lloyds} for transportation and delivery of medical supplies.\textsuperscript{62} The distribution depots similarly used the commercial goodwill of business associates and kept the storage and transportation costs extremely low. At a local political level, the reports and letters of Kennett-Barrington and his associates account for close and constant management of relations on the ground.

This raises the question of the extent to which, in addition to evident accountability to donors, ‘accountability to beneficiaries’, a relatively recent concept in humanitarianism, was also inscribed into the work sponsored by Stafford House and other British relief funds during the war.\textsuperscript{63} The notion that the inequalities of power between the direct consumers of aid and local leaders were in any way thought of by the administrators of the funds is given the lie by Burdett-Coutts’s Turkish committee members urging her to give scanty allowances to their fellow Turks in distress.\textsuperscript{64} Yet there is no doubt that, at the very least, the funds were extremely sensitive to local politics.\textsuperscript{65} In 1877–78 British relief committees operated in the Ottoman Empire at the invitation of the local authorities and had to abide by the specific cultural norms of a Muslim society. Medical staff hired locally alongside expatriates had to produce their medical qualifications on arrival while an edict by the Turkish Sultan forced expatriate medical staff to seek informed consent from their patients before operations. Many surgeons were frustrated by this state of affairs and deplored
being unable to amputate at will. In some cases, they hired amputees to argue the case for the loss of a limb with patients at risk of gangrene. The need to be sensitive to Islam was implicitly linked to the memories of the Indian uprising of 1857. The presence of the Muslim ruler of the largest principality in India on the Stafford House Committee vouched for the significance of this relief work among Indians, who had contributed about 15 per cent of the fund’s income, and acted as a symbolic guarantor to the fund’s sensitivity to local religious beliefs and practices.

While competing for donations as outlined above, Stafford House worked with other relief funds in delivering aid. This needed to be managed carefully, since each fund had appealed on behalf of particular, often very different, constituencies of victims. Donors to the Stafford House fund had given money explicitly to help wounded Ottoman soldiers rather than civilian victims: those who intended giving to the latter might be even more circumspect about their donations potentially helping armed combatants. The sudden advance of Russian armies towards Constantinople at the beginning of 1878 precipitated a surge of around 150,000 Muslim refugees, some of whom were hosted in the great Mosques of Constantinople Hagia Sophia and the Blue Mosque. Kennett-Barrington reported in March 1878 that, unlike the successful fundraising for the benefit of Ottoman soldiers and war wounded, the Turkish Compassionate Fund’s fundraising in favour of refugees failed both to meet its target and to raise significantly its profile with the British public. The fund did receive sympathetic coverage in the press, even in the comic paper Judy, and on account of the many letters Burdett-Coutts sent to editors. Queen Victoria responded almost immediately to the refugee crisis with a donation of £100. By the end of January 1878, the Compassionate Fund had sent over £24,000 in money and materials to Constantinople to meet the swell of refugees. Yet by April 1878 Austen Layard wrote to Burdett-Coutts to say that he had given notice to the Turkish government that funds raised had fallen off and would not permit ‘relief on so large a scale as that hitherto adopted.’ By March 1880, the fund was clearly winding down with, Burdett-Coutts claimed, money to feed refugees for five more days only. The fund closed at the end of June that year. Rebecca Gill gives a figure of over £40,000 raised for the Turkish Compassionate Fund, not dissimilar to the amount raised by Stafford House. Although ostensibly set up to aid soldiers, Stafford House Committee reports in spring 1878 focused more on the epidemics that decimated refugee groups and filled the hospitals under Stafford House management than on wounded soldiers. The typhus, small pox and typhoid epidemics presented a major threat to life for the patients and
carers alike. By June 1878, thirteen out of thirty-nine medical staff serving directly under Kennett-Barrington had been taken ill with typhus, and two had died in service. Despite their emphasis on aid for wounded soldiers, Stafford House assisted the Turkish Compassionate Fund’s work with refugees and the sick, implying that the constituencies of those in need were inseparable. The collaboration also indicates the ways in which rivals for donations in the competitive marketplace could work together in the delivery of aid.

The politics of humanitarian fundraising

Stafford House Committee’s political agenda was intertwined with commercial and class interests that aligned private and public good, geopolitical perspectives and imperialism. The period 1877–78 might be seen as the apex of this alignment and the greatest enterprise in the Stafford House Committee work. The negotiations towards the peace treaty of Berlin brought the Russo-Turkish War to a close and ended the Stafford House fundraising activities. The decision to end the fund’s presence in Turkey, made by the Committee in London, was sent by telegram on 22 March 1878. Kennett-Barrington closed the accounts in July 1878 just as the peace treaty was signed. The remaining funds were transferred to help refugees in Constantinople and Kennett-Barrington expressed his concerns regarding the fate of the wounded still in the care of the Committee’s hospitals. There were no obvious structures to which they could easily be transferred. The decision to withdraw from Turkey also highlighted the drying up of funds. The final attempts to raise funds, such as the concert in July 1878, merely facilitated the orderly withdrawal. The hospital in Gallipoli was already officially in Turkish hands on 21 June 1878, and by 15 July 1878 all equipment and resources of other hospitals were put in the hands of the Turkish military. The final fundraising of July 1878 was intended to prolong the Committee staff presence at the Gallipoli hospital for only another month. By then the Committee’s fund had completely run out and besides this last fundraising effort, so had its sense of purpose. Turkey’s military defeat ended the humanitarian campaign revealing how humanitarian work was subservient to the necessities of the conflict.

This ending reveals the meshing of politics and humanitarian work. The needs of civilians or, indeed, the many wounded soldiers still in the wards were known and acknowledged but as the war ended so did the urge to intervene to bolster one of the warring parties. Far from any notion of neutrality, the
humanitarian fundraising of 1877–78 was explicitly partisan and framed by the context of a Turkish war effort against Russian invaders. While some journalists such as the *Times* correspondent at Erzeroum Captain Norman, W. T. Stead's *Northern Echo* and the pioneering reporter at the *Daily News* Archibald Forbes clearly wrote in support of Russia, Algernon Borthwick, owner and editor of the *Morning Post*, used his newspaper as a platform for the defence of the Committee and its work. Even Sutherland, usually aloof, made his sympathies public. He received the controversial Colonel Valentine Baker (self-styled ‘Baker Pasha’), an officer of the Ottoman army and viewed by many in Clubland London as a hero despite his conviction for indecent assault in a railway carriage in 1874 for which he served a year in prison. Sutherland was much criticized in public and in parliament for his association with Baker and his endorsement of the Turkish cause. He nevertheless embraced the consequences of his political choices when in January 1878, some months before the cessation of hostilities, he delivered a speech at St James Hall in which he compared Russia to a snake and accused Gladstone of being one of its agents.

This unlikely outburst provoked indignation and derision in equal measure. The Liberal-leaning and irreverent *Punch* lambasted Sutherland’s mixing of politics and humanitarian aid in no uncertain terms. Despite the speech’s status as ‘the silliest of many silly utterances’, *Punch* noted the dangerous influence such silliness wielded when spoken by one so powerful. The speech ‘comes from one who bears a ducal title, lives in several palaces, owns a county, figures at the head of a charitable movement’ and has so many commercial interests. As the magazine concluded: ‘Let the Duke of Sutherland stick to his Sutherland improvements and steam engines, and not try to act as an organ of public opinion, or even his own opinion in public.’ On the opposite side of the political spectrum, *Vanity Fair* praised the Duke in order to highlight in stark terms the class dimensions of the British political debates, claiming that Gladstone had been properly chastised by Sutherland’s comments. Whereas any ‘ordinary man’ alleging Gladstone to be a Russian agent would have been ‘demonstrated to be ignorant, malignant and false’, the ‘exalted’ person of the Duke had made Gladstone ‘miserable and penitent’. After all, *Vanity Fair* concluded, ‘Mr. Gladstone had never been considered a gentleman by Society.’ The contrast between Jingoist and noisily anti-Russian conservatives and pro-Russian campaigners was most acute in the final throes of the war when, before a peace settlement could be reached, the possibility of a Russian advance on Constantinople seemed ineluctable considering the demoralized state of the Ottoman armies. For all his fundraising muscle, *Punch* dismissed Sutherland
as another rich and eccentric man rather than as a force to be reckoned with in British politics. *Vanity Fair* however noted that Sutherland’s fundraising activities on behalf of the ‘liberties of Europe’ were viewed, by some at least, as a key indicator of his political sympathies in a British context: ‘he has ceased to be a Liberal, and has become a Conservative’.85

Qualifications of the Russo-Turkish War as a war for liberties notwithstanding, the Stafford House Committee did seem to have been largely staffed by conservative grandees. In his lengthy speech from January 1878, which remained largely unreported in the press except in the *Morning Post*, Sutherland made the connection between humanitarian relief and political intent in relation to the famine relief effort in India, noting that the ‘people who have just despatched half a million sterling in charity’ would ‘hardly be willing to part with such a possession’. By the same token, Sutherland thought it ‘desirable’ to ‘maintain the independence of Persia and of Turkey’. He reversed the arguments set forth by Gladstone and his associates regarding the Bulgarian atrocities to evoke the crimes of ‘Bulgarian avengers’ supported by the Russians: confiscation of property, violation of women, torture and ‘butchery’. Aware of the clearly partisan character of the Stafford House Committee’s activities, Sutherland rooted the authenticity of claims against the Bulgarians in the witness accounts of ‘English gentlemen’ working on behalf of the Turkish Compassionate Fund, in association with the English Consul’s reports of atrocities against Muslim and Jewish women and children.86 While his speech was sensationalized and ridiculed, in many ways it utilized the same narratives anti-slavery campaigners had employed for nearly a hundred years beforehand.87 In the war of words that divided pro- and anti-Russian geopolitical views, charitable operators such as Sutherland staked their claims and political legitimacy on humanitarian narratives rather than class or traditional status alone.88

In contrast with the National Aid Society which staked its origins in the Geneva Convention, the Stafford House Committee had chosen its side. Its hospitals and ambulances nevertheless used all the emblems of the National Aid Society and Red Crescent and Kennett-Barrington had disseminated the text of the Geneva Convention for both belligerent parties.89 Stafford House’s finitude contrasted with the endless reinvention of the National Aid Society and its institutionalization as a unique international ideal and social organization.90 As John Hutchinson and Rebecca Gill have shown, the National Aid Society (or Red Cross as it became), the first international aid movement, remained divided for much of the first fifty years of its existence.91 What funds such as the Stafford House Committee, the Turkish Compassionate Fund or that of Lady Strangford...
revealed was an alternative origin to the humanitarian movement, one not based in the principles of the founders of the Geneva Convention, but in the prudent and modern management of compassion in the context of political and commercial sensitivities.

It also, of course, had much to do with economic interests. The Stafford House Committee was a network of venture capitalists and investors, bound by commercial as well as moral interest. The Duke of Sutherland was a railway magnate before he was a philanthropist and, even though he undoubtedly responded emotively to the plight of wounded Turkish soldiers, he also had designs on Ottoman economic development. In May 1878 he wrote to the British ambassador in Constantinople, Austen Layard, scoping the benefits of investing English capital into Turkish coalmines, specifically those at Heraclea: it would assist the Turkish government and give the English public a ‘real interest in the future welfare of the country’ beyond charitable giving. In a similar vein, he also attempted to compete for the creation of a Euphrates railway line, which would provide rapid access to India and a more secure access than the narrow Suez Canal. Following the closure of the fund for wounded Turkish soldiers, the Stafford House Committee turned to other global affairs although with little of the success that characterized the fundraising of the late 1870s.

The combined strength of the Stafford House Committee for fundraising could be deployed for charity or enterprise in equal measure. As such, it attracted international attention from groups dressing capitalist ventures in humanitarian clothes. The most controversial was an approach by the king of Belgium to the Stafford House Committee, organized as ‘The Upper Congo Exploration Committee’ in 1879. Leopold II, king of the Belgians, had set up the Association Internationale Africaine in 1876 and was, by 1879, financing the exploration of the Congo Basin by Henry Morton Stanley. The king’s private colonial enterprise was cloaked by a broad humanitarian discourse which combined the desire to educate the African people and bring to them Christianity. Approaching Stafford House in March 1879, the king suggested that while subscriptions to the initiative ‘ought to be considered a mere act of philanthropy’ they would also confer the right to obtain shares issued by the Association. By 1879 trade to the Congo was already estimated at £50,000–60,000 annually for Manchester alone and the committee seemed originally won over by the philanthropic rhetoric. Yet the king’s original brief was very similar to any other venture capitalist enterprise. It involved considerable outlay in return for a percentage of the profits guaranteed by the establishment of a trading monopoly. Though from the first meeting the king claimed to be ‘opposed to monopoly and greatly in
favour of free trade', the Stafford House Committee remained suspicious of the Congo enterprise's economic model and further scrutiny revealed that the king had misrepresented his plans and the full risks investors might incur.  

A first and contentious point was the legal status of an organization domiciled in Brussels and the legal redress one could obtain against the king of Belgium in a Belgian court. Leopold's reputation across Europe was tainted and between 1879 and 1882, he was the object of allegations in relation to the white slave trade. Burdett-Coutts in particular challenged the trustworthiness of the proposal finding loopholes in its funding structure and distancing herself from its trading dimensions. Henry Green disapproved that 'the philanthropic and scientific objects were not kept separate from the commercial'. But it was on the humanitarian programme itself that the proposal eventually founndered. The plan for capitalist exploitation of Congo paid lip service to the development of its people but in such an unconvincing manner that Burdett-Coutts, herself a firm advocate of an African charitable investment, could not accept the validity of the king's intention. The committee, representing one of the largest groups of real estate owners and venture capitalists in Britain, declined the king's offer to raise funds on his behalf.

Undoubtedly, members of the Stafford House Committee straddled enterprise and philanthropy in their own careers and were not opposed to what might be termed 'social enterprise'. As we note elsewhere, the balance of economic interest and philanthropy could be reversed with enterprise per se as a form of benefaction. Other Stafford House ventures, such as the attempt to obtain railway franchises from the Chinese government, were framed in a simpler context of social benefits and development returns through infrastructural work. In line with imperialist economic thinking, the committee represented any successful investment as a potentially philanthropic gesture or indeed as a response to imminent or past famines. In the context of China which experienced in 1878 one of the largest famines on record and for which there had been considerable fundraising worldwide due to the exertions of missionaries such as Timothy Richard and the Shanghai business communities, this link between infrastructure and famine was obviously relevant.

As a philanthropic enterprise, the Stafford House committee reached its apex in 1878. When it resumed its formal activities within months of the Russo-Turkish War, on 5 June 1879, as the Stafford House South African Aid Fund, it included a ladies’ committee under the patronage of HRH The Duchess of Cambridge and the presidency of Baroness Burdett-Coutts. At that stage, the Stafford House Committee could have claimed to have brought together most of
the significant grandees of the Empire. Burdett-Coutts was no longer competing but instead provided Sutherland’s closest female match in terms of wealth and influence.\(^{108}\) Under her, the formal organization of a ladies committee ensured that women’s contribution was formally recognized in the new campaign.\(^{109}\) The two committees merged in the task to raise a national campaign to finance medical staff and hospitals at the occasion of the war in South Africa against the Zulu kingdom in 1879. The initial funding call was made in the *Morning Post* of 4 June 1879. It framed the new appeal as a means of continuing the previous appeal while engaging with a critique of existing military health services: volunteer aid was deployed where ‘most needed’ while the lack of medical expertise and equipment meant officers and wounded Zulu suffered as a consequence. It was, then, ‘high time that those who did such wonders in the Turkish war, who treated tens of thousands of cases and saved thousands of lives, should do the same for Englishmen’.\(^{110}\) Another article in the same newspaper on the 5 June mocked officialdom as ‘often slow and constantly cumbersome’.\(^{111}\) The Committee’s main target was to help ‘our poor boys, immature and unseasoned’ who had been ‘hurried off under the short-service system’ to participate in a campaign where ‘dysentery and malarious fever have already prostrated a great number’.\(^{112}\)

Despite an initial round of support towards the initial £1,000 needed to send a small surgical team, the fundraising did not go according to plan or precedent. According to the accounts published in its report and audited on 23 March 1880, the fund raised and disbursed a mere £6,201 1s 1d, approximately one-eighth the amount raised two years earlier for the Russo-Turkish War.\(^{113}\) The political climate was different: the war of aggression against the Zulu kingdom was generally not well accepted by the British public and the fundraising explicitly criticized the British administration. While the fundraising failed to attract sufficient attention, the committee claimed to have made a point, perhaps belatedly, by sending trained female nurses to the hospitals of the British army. This was, after all, what Strangford had been doing all her career.\(^{114}\) Meanwhile, the public failed to respond to funding calls more obviously grounded on a critique of military practices than evidence of overwhelming need. If the plight of the Turkish soldier had seemed a worthy cause against a Russian aggressor, that of British soldiers represented a political scandal subsumed in the general critique of the conduct of the war against the Zulu kingdom.

By 1884 the committee began to show its fragility. The grandees were politically exposed and became increasingly unwilling or unable to commit time and resources. Declining financial supremacy may have played a role, of
course. For instance, the decline of Burdett-Coutts’s charitable enterprises can be attributed squarely to the catastrophic reduction of her income following her marriage to Ashmead Bartlett, her secretary, which contravened the terms of the will that had endowed her such material fortune. The Duke of Sutherland proved increasingly cautious and responded negatively to a similar call to send resources to help General Gordon at Khartoum and subsequently the relief army. On that occasion, other veterans of the Russo-Turkish War had taken radically different paths. Baker Pasha conducted a relief operation that ended in defeat while Kennett-Barrington joined the National Society’s participation in the ill-fated Suakin expedition a year later. Viscountess Strangford was still on the ground but now working for the St John ambulance rather than as fundraiser in her own right. But by 1884 Sutherland had lost much of his appetite for foreign humanitarian ventures and especially when Gladstone, his old adversary, was in power.

Conclusion

The independently wealthy entertained many benefaction schemes across the empire and beyond. In doing so they made constant references to formal liberalism rather than the imperialist notion that might is right. In some respects, one might regard these globalized acts of philanthropic activism as the last charitable gasp of traditional elites. The efforts of the likes of Sutherland and Burdett-Coutts seem an almost feudalist throwback when set against the dynamic, demotic campaigns of the charity entrepreneurs with whom we began this book. Yet when examined in detail, it is clear that it was through their engagement with the modernizing practices of the charity marketplace and their concern for efficient delivery that these groups coalesced around humanitarian projects. They shared some important characteristics with domestic charity entrepreneurs, including not only a keen appreciation of the right buttons to push when addressing particular audiences of potential donors, but also an understanding that an openly touted business-like management was a key tool in their fundraising armoury. Clearly, the British donating public responded with a degree of generosity to the competing claims of the various funds backed by their various elites. Cases could be and were made for each set of victims that were strong enough to attract tens of thousands of pounds. In the swirl of fundraising around the Russo-Turkish War in particular, we see one vision of how British aid for overseas objects of compassion might have developed in the
longer term. That the Stafford House Committee's later ventures were a relative failure, however, is reflective of public resistance to the kind of overtly politicized and economically self-interested aid model that it ultimately represented. While this type of aristocratic humanitarian aid lived on throughout the rest of the period, the vast bulk of the British public's donations towards overseas war and disaster victims went not through their piecemeal efforts, but through the civic framework of the Mansion House Fund which, with some exceptions, adopted both a more neutral political stance and a more innovative business model in its fundraising efforts.
Franchise Fundraising: Mansion House Appeals

It should by now be apparent that growth was a watchword of the new charity market. The voluntary charity sector as a whole grew, many individual organizations scaled their operations up and their donor markets out and, ultimately, the amount of money raised for charitable causes reached unprecedented heights. Indeed, even the conservative, patrician form of philanthropy examined in the preceding chapter had global ambitions. In driving this growth, as we have seen, charity entrepreneurs both mimicked and anticipated emerging business practices in marketing, advertising, branding and accountability. Thus, even as it critiqued poverty and inequality, the charity sector in this period firmly hitched its wagons to a form of capitalism then in the ascendant, such that, as Jo Littler has discussed, its practices can often seem eerily familiar to those studying the supposedly new, business-minded, post-welfare state third sector of the twenty-first century.¹ Not for the first time, it is possible to see parallels between a 'liberal' nineteenth century and a 'neo-liberal' twenty-first, even among groups whose raison d’être is often perceived as mitigating economic liberalism’s grosser iniquities.

In this chapter we analyse the organizational expansion of Victorian and Edwardian charities in a similar light, arguing that many were heavily influenced by, and influential upon, the business replication models that were contemporaneously finding their feet in the commercial sector. In particular, the chapter focuses on ‘franchising’, a social enterprise buzzword in today’s third sector, but a form of charity brand roll-out, which we show had nineteenth-century precedents, the most significant of which is arguably one of the most familiar charity fundraising vehicles encountered (if, we contend, misunderstood) by Victorianists. The chapter begins, therefore, by examining the nature of a franchise, as understood in both business history literature and in the third sector today, showing, through historical examples, that several early voluntary
charities helped to pioneer similar expansionist principles. It then examines the operations and growth of the Mansion House and its many appeals for both domestic and international causes, arguing that it represented an initial high watermark of what we term ‘franchise fundraising’; and a conceptual forerunner to the more recent likes of Comic Relief and Children in Need. Franchising, we argue, is not a new charitable growth strategy borrowed from the commercial world, but a tried and tested formula that helped raise millions of pounds for the Mansion House’s appeals from the late nineteenth century.

Social franchising: the future or the past?

According to some commentators on third sector growth and development in the twenty-first century, ‘social franchising’ may well represent ‘charity’s next top model’.

Seen by many as a means of taking proven good ideas for tackling social ills, scaling them up and making them work to achieve similar social goals across different spaces and territories, in the past decade or so, social franchising has been the theme of civil society conferences, the subject of blogs and press articles aimed at charity professionals and the driving force, as the name suggests, behind the foundation of the International Centre for Social Franchising. The latter and the Social Enterprise Coalition in the United Kingdom even offer step-by-step manuals and consultation on how organizations and individuals that might wish to can go about engaging in social franchising.

The concept has also begun, tentatively, to attract an accompanying academic literature, much of it focused on its application in healthcare, but with some interest also in the theoretical underpinnings of the model. Much of this discussion has originated in business schools and scholars interested in new conceptions and applications of social enterprise more generally, suggesting that social franchising is conceived of as a modern import from the private sector. Indeed, when introducing the concept of social franchising to practitioner audiences, references to famous business franchises and what can be learned from them – chiefly McDonald’s – are rife, and in explaining the various replication strategies charities could employ, instructional literature tends to use the word ‘business’ liberally.

To a degree this is sensible: as historical studies of commercial franchising tell us, the private sector has made concerted and successful use of franchise models, primarily since the mid-twentieth century, as companies have sought new ways to expand. Two forms of franchise have predominated in that time and offer different benefits to the central franchisor firm and to franchisees.
What some scholars refer to as ‘traditional’ or ‘agency’ franchising involves a franchisor allowing franchisee agents to sell its products, often giving them sole rights to do so in a given territory, and to exploit its trusted brand in doing so. This is ‘traditional’ because it is seen to have nineteenth-century roots, the likes of the Singer Company having distributed its sewing machines in precisely this manner. Car dealerships, petrol retailers and, in Britain, tied public houses represent further good examples of this type of franchise. For the franchisor, this model offers an effective means of distributing one’s product, and a way of doing so with less exposure to financial risk (that resting largely on the franchisee). However, it tends to offer less control for the franchisor, more opportunities for local innovation and therefore a possible side effect of brand damage. Meanwhile, what scholars classify as ‘business-format franchising’ involves the franchisor licensing a ready-made business ‘box’ to individual franchisees, who are given a clear template to conduct their own local version of the original business concept, and who, again, get to exploit an established brand in doing so. This came into its own in the 1960s, with the likes of McDonald’s and Domino’s. This arrangement gives the franchisor more control and less chance for the franchisee to deviate from the central brand, but is consequently more demanding of the franchisor’s resources; some franchises may eventually be taken over completely by the franchisor. A key point to remember for franchisees in both these formats is that they freely choose to buy into the franchise.

It is understandable therefore that such templates serve as an example to the third sector as it, apparently belatedly, tries to get in on the franchising act. Mirroring the above classification, instructional material on social franchising tends to emphasize a spectrum of replication that is open to charity enterprises, from a flexible form of ‘dissemination’, within a ‘loose network’ relationship between ‘originator’ and ‘implementer’, through a more rigid form of business-format franchising to, at the other end, a situation where local implementing branches are wholly owned and controlled by the originator (see Figure 6.1).

The undoubted advantage in basing social franchising on its commercial

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6_1.png}
\caption{The Social Franchising Manual.}
\end{figure}
equivalent lies in the fact that the latter has decades of diverse practical experience and a well-developed scholarship of that experience which can be drawn upon, even if the specifics differ in some important respects. As even the most ardent advocates of the concept admit, much more needs to be known about the successes (and failures) of the infant social franchising sector.

With this in mind, we argue that taking a longer historical perspective offers a different picture of charity replication strategies, which suggests that franchising should not be seen solely as an import from the private sector. Franchising for charitable purposes and for social good has a history of its own which ought to be taken into account as practitioners attempt to resolve the challenges that replicating their models present today. Business franchising is, as historian Thomas Dicke contends, a ‘contractual method of organising a large-scale enterprise that evolved out of the traditional practice of selling through agents’. Charities, as the previous chapters have outlined, were nothing if not large-scale enterprises, and if we understand fundraising as a business practice, donations as a purchase and branding as a critical component of a charity’s success, then it may not be such an enormous leap to see the networks of volunteer fundraising committees, groups and individuals which were their financial lifeblood as proto-franchisees who were at least informally contracted to the central franchisor ‘firm’. In that respect, the replication and scaling up that charities attracted to the concept of social franchising seek today has much deeper roots than the literature around the supposedly ‘new’ models gives credit for, and they can and should look to models pioneered in the emerging voluntary charity sector in the late Victorian period, just as much as to well-known fast food chains that emerged in the twentieth century. Franchising is another example of the charitable sector both being shaped by and shaping the commercial sector as the two developed in parallel.

Our definitions in place, it is worth noting where different charitable organizations fall on the replication spectrum in Figure 6.1 above. The ‘scaling up’ of the likes of Barnardo’s and the Salvation Army was partly a story of pushing the brand, via advertising, eye-catching fundraising initiatives and other promotion techniques, as previous chapters have shown. But it would be difficult to argue that the central ‘firm’ was not the main motor and monitor of activity in these organizations in this period. Whether in relation to the services delivered to beneficiaries, or to fundraising innovation and prowess, these were charities resolutely led from the centre, and ‘wholly owned’ in terms of the control their founders and central committees exercised over their activities, even at a local level. An ‘army’, even a religious one, is not a franchise, any more
than it is a federation.\textsuperscript{18} The Salvation Army might have encouraged initiative from its subordinates but it did so within clearly defined boundaries, channelling good ideas from individuals through the filter of central office before they were then promoted through centrally produced literature. Editions of The (Field) Officer may have featured a ‘novelty corner’, which spread these innovations, but they also featured highly prescriptive advice on what was expected of each ‘field captain’.\textsuperscript{19}

And yet, the rapid expansion of such missions surely owed something to other commercial replication methods. Just as contemporary companies were beginning to engage in what business historians have referred to as the first (up to 1890) and second (up to 1914) phases of ‘multiples’ retailing growth,\textsuperscript{20} ambitious missioners understood the need to grow their own ‘businesses’ into new regions and territories. The route that the Army went down was to attract officers who acted much as salaried managers in a retail context rather than as franchisees.\textsuperscript{21} They were given, as the pages of The Officer attest, much advice on how to run their local operations, and a certain degree of leeway to enact their own ideas in fundraising and evangelizing, but there was not a wholesale business format sold to them, nor did they have the genuine autonomy from the central ‘firm’ that came with operating a franchise: officers could not, for example, choose not to fundraise for the ‘Darkest England’ campaign.

Moving left on our spectrum, however, there are contemporary examples of missions that more clearly aspired to operate along the lines of a ‘business-format franchise’. The London Spectacle Mission offered both eye glasses and spiritual succour to its beneficiaries, generally aging people who relied on continued sharp eyesight for their livelihood, such as printers, seamstresses and cobblers. It was founded by Dr Edward Waring, a member of the Royal College of Physicians, in 1886, and carried on by his daughter after his death in 1891. Applicants for glasses did not pay but had to have a ‘spectacle card’ given to them by a subscriber to the mission (who received a set number of such cards for set amounts donated). They were then tested for a pair of suitable spectacles and sent away with them, along with a Bible and a prayer book.\textsuperscript{22} It was, according to Truth, a success, distributing over 1,500 pairs of glasses in 1901 alone, even if the Charity Organisation Society (COS) objected to the distribution of spectacles ‘without oculist’s orders’.\textsuperscript{23} The Warings obviously knew they had a good idea worth replicating, and produced a pamphlet promoting a prototype social franchise in action. Spectacle Missions: Their Object, Advantage and Management gave precise details on how interested parties might replicate the mission for a fifteen-pound outlay on necessary equipment, and hoped that ‘spectacle
missions may become a regular and recognised form of work throughout the length and breadth of the land'.

The Warings offered a ready-made ‘business box’ in an effort to ensure that more people might benefit than they could themselves assist. The ambition to spread their simple but effective idea and to receive a small fee for their advice and necessary equipment means that the Spectacle Mission conformed neatly to ideas around social franchising that are abroad today. The Warings opened and operated four London branches but professed themselves ready to advise anyone who wanted to open their own spectacle mission. Whether it was taken up or not is difficult to confirm, although regional newspapers certainly noted the Mission’s success, and there was a similar outfit begun in New York in 1888. The addition of ‘society’ to the Mission’s name in later years might also imply that London was conceived of as a kind of headquarters for a loose network of similar missions.

There is also a sense, however, in which this loose kind of franchising could spring up more by accident than design, particularly when the idea and branding was strong enough. The death of General Gordon of Khartoum in 1885 prompted an outpouring of national mourning, and memorial efforts were eventually channelled into the Gordon Boys’ Home, based first at a temporary site provided by the government at Portsmouth and later, on a permanent basis, at West End near Woking in Surrey. Proposed by the Prince of Wales, the homes had a strong military ethos and purpose, with drills, pipe bands, parades, uniforms and martial ranks featuring heavily. ‘To make it national in the real sense of the word’, both boys and fundraising were sought from around the country, with local committees encouraged to finance the accession of local boys to the home. A sum of Twenty-two pounds per head per annum was enough to educate boys and instruct them in trades, although many went on, unsurprisingly, to join the army. There was an inescapable logic to this form of memorialization: in his lifetime Gordon had taken an interest in male ‘urchins’; the home could reform its inmates in part via appropriate military training; and Gordon’s name was bound to attract significant donations to pay for the work.

Such was the logic that beyond the ‘official’ national memorial home, several others also seized upon it. In 1885–86, boys’ homes bearing Gordon’s name appeared in Nottingham, Manchester, Croydon, Dover and quite possibly beyond. The Nottingham Gordon Boys’ Home was in fact the first to open, in 1885, and expanded into new premises on several occasions before closing in the 1960s. The Manchester home was run by Alexander Devine, previously involved in the Lads Club movement, who adopted the Gordon name for an
existing home after Gordon’s death, although he had to relinquish control to a committee after running into financial difficulty, and the home was eventually subsumed into the Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls Refuges in 1891. The Croydon home was founded by George Murdoch in 1886, and was similarly taken over by the Waifs and Strays Society in 1891, although the home retained the Gordon name. The Dover home, meanwhile, was opened by Thomas Blackman in 1885 and attracted the attention of the COS, who identified what appeared to be genuine mismanagement of the home (chiefly that it was not very clean) and saw it as piggy-backing on the ‘real’ Gordon home at Woking.32

Yet the idea that there was one ‘real’ Gordon Boys’ Home and any others were imposters is typically black-and-white COS thinking. In reality, the Gordon homes represented a kind of informal franchise. Alike in name, the homes were also similar in their practical operations. Each home could count on prominent patrons, and each took in boys, educating and training them, involving them in quasi-military pursuits such as pipe bands and later scouting, and often bedecking their premises in images of Gordon, imperial flags and queen-and-country mottoes. Home managers were aware of each other’s existence: as the appeal literature of the Dover home noted, ‘[W]e are glad to say this is one of several Institutions bearing the honoured name of General Gordon’ and, like a true franchise, ‘all of the Gordon Institutions are managed independently of each other’.33 If Blackman et al. were therefore franchisees of the Gordon Boys’ Home ‘business box’, who was the franchisor in this instance? It was not the Nottingham home which was the first, nor the best-known ‘official’ memorial home at Woking, not least since the latter was more than willing to use the COS investigation of the Dover home to its potential benefit, at one point writing to ask what could be done to stop the latter receiving donations from a public which might have confused it with the Woking National home.34 There was no financial relationship between any of the homes in the way one might expect in a franchise today. And yet, it can be argued that there was an informal licensing of the Gordon name and the concept, inextricably linked with his persona, of reforming poor boys. Those who in effect owned that name were Gordon’s sisters, at least two of whom (Miss Gordon and Mrs Moffitt) took close interest not only in the Woking home, but all of the others too; they visited, made presentations, raised money and attended AGMs. Their support and approval was a powerful guarantee for home managers, to the extent that Thomas Blackman took care to note in his appeal literature that the Dover home had been founded ‘by permission of his late sister Miss Gordon’.35 The sisters also protected the brand: Blackman stopped a ‘snowball’ letter fundraising campaign
when Mrs Moffitt objected to it. They acted, therefore, as unofficial franchisors of the Gordon Boys’ Homes, able to ‘license’ their brother’s name and legacy and confer legitimacy on those who used it.

Franchise replication of another form was practiced by the other great ‘societies’ of the Victorian voluntary sector, the RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, founded in 1824) and the NSPCC (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in 1884). The two shared significant overlap in membership, and were organized along similar lines. They were both, by necessity, national organizations, whose central headquarters in London conducted anti-cruelty campaigns and lobbied government for favourable changes in legislation; but they also needed local branches, who conducted rescue and investigative work into animal and child cruelty cases in their own areas, and fundraised to support both themselves and the national campaigns. Branches had a certain degree of autonomy, therefore, but by the 1870s, the RSPCA, conscious of brand management, was only permitting branches to use its name if they committed to defer to the central committee in all legal and financial matters. Branches of both societies also had to pay what amounted to a franchise fee to the parent society, in return for services that lent uniformity to the organizations across the country. The Liverpool branch of the RSPCA, for example, in an 1876 report, noted that £300 had been remitted to the parent society ‘in return for an efficient staff of officers supplied during the past year’.

This model, where local branches sprang up more or less spontaneously wherever groups sympathetic to the cause emerged, where they had their own identity, but also represented the national brand in their localities and where they could innovate locally but still had to abide by certain strict administrative rules emanating from the centre, can certainly be seen as a form of franchising. Local activists in either child or animal welfare might easily have channelled their effort into their own distinct organizations, but found it useful to buy into, literally, the national profile and strength of the larger societies, in the same way that a local sales agent found it easier to sell ‘Singer’ sewing machines. Key to the success of franchising, then, is the strength of the brand and what it represents. Without a clear purpose, a recognizable and trusted name and a central ‘firm’ to nurture and protect it, there can be no franchise. With these important aspects in mind, the next section explores in detail the operation of what was arguably the most financially successful fundraising franchise in Victorian and Edwardian Britain.
Dealing in disasters: Mansion House appeals

The author A. A. Milne once claimed expertise in the Lord Mayoralty of London because he could name four of the many hundreds of men who had held the title; these were, he wrote, Dick Whittington, Dick Whittington and Dick Whittington (who was, of course, mayor on three occasions), as well as, the result purely of recalling from childhood a terrible pun on his unusual name, Stuart Knill. This, Milne noted, was an inevitable consequence of the essential anonymity of the position. Each man in the post ‘is never himself, he is just the Lord Mayor’. ‘He can do nothing to make his year of office memorable; nothing that is, which his predecessor did not do before, or his successor will not do again. If he raises a Mansion House Fund for the survivors of a flood, his predecessor had an earthquake, and his successor is safe for a famine. And nobody will remember whether it was in this year or in Sir Joshua Potts’ that the record was beaten.’

Subsequent histories seem to confirm Milne’s vignette. Less than a fifth of London’s 600-plus lord mayors have been granted entries in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and not all, it would appear, were even guaranteed the formality of a *Times* obituary: the nineteenth-century lord mayors may not quite have been ‘a dull and mediocre lot inclined to be old and fat’, but they have certainly been largely forgotten as individuals.

Relative anonymity should not, however, be mistaken for a lack of significance in the position. Fundraising was a key duty of the Victorian and Edwardian lord mayor and it appears to have been discharged with remarkable success by the collective of the mayoralty’s otherwise forgettable incumbents. A 1910 estimate put the amount raised by Mansion House appeals at more than £7,000,000 in just under forty years since 1871, and a 1927 estimate said £12,000,000. In that context, the fact that the Mansion House Fund that has been most written about by historians remains the temporary distress and unemployment fund of 1885–86, which totalled just £80,000, is odd. The Mansion House was more than the occasional (and hardly solitary) bugbear of the Charity Organisation Society that the history of British philanthropy has so far described. The fact that the Mansion House has left no central archive of its funds adds further intrigue. What was this inchoate organization and how was it so successful at fundraising? It is a central contention of this chapter that the Mansion House represented an early and enduring form of charity franchising.

The Victorian era created enough opportunities for a franchise based around ‘disasters’ and their relief to grow and develop. Even in the midst of
The Charity Market and Humanitarianism in Britain, 1870–1912

‘Pax Britannica’, it is evident that Britain and its empire presented plenty of possibilities for sudden, violent death. A necessarily incomplete trawl through press coverage of incidents of multiple fatalities alone, across several distinct categories, suggests that between 1870 and 1912, at least 8,500 people lost their lives in dramatic fashion in domestic disasters. In that period, no less than 3,706 miners died in major colliery disasters across England, Scotland and Wales; at least 4,451 people died in water-based accidents inland and (sometimes quite some way) off the coast, whether fishermen, naval servicemen in non-combat circumstances, civilian travellers or pleasure cruisers; 192 lost their lives in major land-based ‘transport’ accidents, including railway crashes and bridge collapses; 124 people died in ‘industrial’ accidents – factory building collapses or explosions; what must be a bare minimum of 70 people died in multiple fatality fires; 216 people were killed in major crowd crushes; and 194 were lost to what tend to be classed as ‘natural disasters’, including floods and landslides.  

These figures must, of course, be an underestimate, and they can and do take no account of what were surely many scores of further incidents with more modest death tolls that failed to gain any substantive attention from the press. This kind of underreporting had a counterpart in overseas catastrophes where, as today, usually only the very familiar or the very worst received any degree of newspaper coverage. A devastating flood in Italy or Texas was considered news; an inferno in Salonica, or the, it would appear, remarkably fire-prone cities of Canada also garnered coverage. Beyond Europe and North America, however, editors considered that British readers wanted to know only about the most appalling famines, the most devastating hurricanes or the human consequences of the most protracted and deadly conflicts. Death tolls appear important in both types of disaster. In the former, this was because its newsworthiness seems largely to have been in its property-destroying effects – whole towns and cities wiped off the map, a point on a map being most readers’ sole concept of the place in question – while in the latter, it was because death tolls were often too large to contemplate, too large even to be recorded accurately by the relevant (often British) authorities. For example, Mike Davis notes both under-reporting of likely death tolls in Indian famines (1877) and press estimates of death tolls so large as to make the mind boggle (‘twelve to 16 million’ was commonly reported in 1898).  

What these reported disasters had in common, however, was that they prompted the opening of relief funds of one sort or another, which appealed to the British public for monetary aid on behalf of the victims or their bereaved dependents. These funds could take many forms and towards the end of the
century, newspapers exploited their public profiles to open and manage their own relief funds. Yet, of the 168 major home and international disasters that we have been able to trace in the press and that attracted relief funds between 1870 and 1912, it is notable that at the very least, more than a third (66), were accorded some form of Mansion House Fund by the relevant lord mayor of London. As A. A. Milne suggested, it was rare that a mayor did not need to issue an appeal during his year in office. Thus, even as aristocratic committees and funds attempted to shape Britain's overseas charity giving in their interests, the Mansion House in great measure superseded their efforts and emerged as a pivotal site of emergency humanitarian fundraising for both foreign and domestic causes, both in terms of the amount of money raised, and in terms of the number and variety of individual funds and appeals launched.

The leadership of civic authorities on this front was not unusual: across Britain the mayors of most cities and towns found themselves opening relief funds when occasion demanded it, with, for obvious reasons, those located in the mining districts (especially South Wales, Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Lancashire) and those on the coast (Hull, Southampton, Portsmouth) most likely to be thus called upon. Local sentiment and practicalities created these funds: constituents and perhaps even friends of the mayor and his aldermen were likely to have been affected by whatever calamity had occurred; donations were likely to be largest and most numerous from those in the vicinity of the disaster; and, once gathered, the funds were more often than not doled out to dependents by a local committee who took it upon themselves to monitor family circumstances and continued ‘deserving’ status closely. Local administration in respect of local disasters made sense. In general, mayors were simply offering their administrative machines in response to the spontaneous outpouring of generosity that tends to follow within a community hit by an adverse event; in most cases, money simply flooded in and little in the way of ‘appeal’ as such was required to attract it.

Mansion House Funds, although sometimes subject to the same pressures in respect of Greater London–based appeals (including the Distress fund of 1885–86), were in the main something altogether different. Fitfully from the 1860s, and on a more regular basis from about 1870, the lord mayor’s fundraising remit was understood by the press and the public to extend far beyond his own limited civic borders in the square mile of the City to encompass not just the United Kingdom and the empire, but the entire globe. While a mayor in a town in Lancashire, say, generally had the option and inclination to initiate a relief fund of his own only when a tragedy in his own borough or its environs demanded
it, the lord mayor of London was expected to navigate, literally, a world of possibilities, where any and every humanitarian disaster, at home and abroad, might be granted the imprimatur of his office and his residence and be made an object of national charitable appeal. ‘National’ here is key: despite his borough’s growing financial clout, Mansion House Funds were never parochial in their appeal to donors. In fact, despite the fitful efforts of the likes of the Stafford House Committee, they were Britain’s chief means of mounting a concerted, nationwide, charitable effort in respect of humanitarian emergencies.

This worked, in practice, through a form of ‘franchising’ of the Mansion House fundraising ‘brand’. While the London mayor decided which causes to promote, and could declare his intention to receive money at the Mansion House from all corners – in some instances this was all he did – he collected most money nationally for ‘official’ Mansion House Funds with the cooperation of his fellow civic leaders across Britain. An early appeal for the 1874 Bengal famine is a case in point. First, other mayors were invited to take out a franchise: the lord mayor wrote to his counterparts in provincial towns and cities asking them to open local funds in the Mansion House’s name and remit the money to London. Only one mayor (of York) seems to have held out, although Liverpool Corporation may not have been alone in delaying a public meeting and a public subscription list for some weeks. Scores of councils and parishes eventually joined the effort. Second, the franchisees ensured that local markets could be targeted: civic administrations knew which regional newspapers to advertise in, where to post appeal posters, what churches and workplaces to target for collections and which local grandees and industrialists to tap for bigger contributions. Third, this could all happen without overburdening the central franchisor with risk: the fund’s reach could be exponentially expanded without demanding an unreasonable investment of time and effort from the lord mayor. In much the same way that, for example, the Singer company’s use of sales agents helped it to distribute its machines and find local markets for them with relative ease, and made it easier for consumers to purchase machines carrying a brand they trusted, this civic franchise allowed the lord mayor to boost his fund, while at the same time, giving charitable donors/consumers the chance to contribute easily to a prominent national fund.

At a local level the Mansion House appeal could function as a local enterprise; church and civic collections, cash boxes and petitioning of influential individuals meant that a community of charity was reinforced and renewed. The locality was not so much represented through these committees, as it was imagined, and it confirmed traditional alliances of establishment figureheads as well as the depth of religious mobilization. The bulk of the donations were nominal
and visible. Thus the subscriber lists of the hugely successful 1877 fundraising appeal in favour of the victims of Famine in India would appear locally and tell a consistent tale of social hierarchies of giving. The £345 15s 7d collected in Tamworth in Devon was received from 159 individuals and groups who each contributed varying sums. Two rich parishes alone contributed £43.58 To be listed individually required contributing more than 10 shillings to the fund (worth between c.£40 and £631 in today’s money). This threshold of giving was clearly identified by the givers who mostly contributed 10 shillings exactly. The ‘social labelling’ arising from this publicity undoubtedly contributed to the local relevance of the fundraising work.59

For the franchisees, the civic leaders and other provincial committees who undertook to co-ordinate fundraising at a local level, we can detect similar advantages at stake from their participation as those experienced by commercial franchisees. It must be remembered that they did not have to buy into the central ‘firm’; local mayors could decline to promote the Mansion House appeal in their areas if they so wished, and the lord mayor of London had no power to mandate their participation. We might well ask if the cause was something provincial mayors felt people in their locality were likely to want to donate towards, why not constitute themselves independently? By placing themselves under the Mansion House umbrella, weren’t they allowing London’s lord mayor and the national fund to take the credit for their hard work? To a degree this is true. But franchising allowed local committees to accrue key benefits. Most obviously, local committees were able to market their efforts in several helpful ways. They benefited from national advertising and communication emerging from the lord mayor’s office.60 They were also able to highlight their own particular contributions to the central fund, showcasing their generosity on a national and even international stage. The individual who gave 5d and the local committee that gave a few hundred pounds could each take pride in a hefty ‘British’ relief fund total. Local committees could also engage, quite consciously, in regional fundraising competitions that often involved sub-franchises. For example, the committee in Clayton-le-Moors, Lancashire, charged with fundraising for the Mansion House Indian Famine appeal of 1897, were solicited to remit their funds to Blackburn who would then send it onward to Manchester, the regional centre. A letter from Blackburn noted that ‘you kindly helped us in 1877 to make this District third on the list of subscriptions,’ suggesting that local pride was at stake just as much as individual social capital.61

The analogies here with a modern fundraising franchise such as Comic Relief or Children in Need are obvious. Although often run to a regular timescale
rather than in response to particular disasters, such ‘telethon’ style entities similarly ask local groups and individuals to buy into their operation on a one-off basis. ‘Franchisees’ are asked to generate funds in whatever way they see fit, but to use the branding of the umbrella fund in doing so, and thereby to benefit from its national profile, both in terms of the additional funds that might help attract, and in terms of the additional kudos it might accrue to the individual fundraiser. Regional BBC coverage could even be said to generate a similar sense of local fundraising competitiveness.\(^{62}\) In addition, franchisees in all cases avoid heavy administrative burdens. Today’s Comic Relief event organizers need not get a charity licence, and neither they, nor the local Mansion House committees shoulder the complexities and risks of having to disburse the funds they have collected. In the Mansion House 1877 appeal, for example, the London committee took responsibility for remitting the entire fund, in stages, to a Central Relief Committee in Calcutta via Rothschild’s bank.\(^{63}\) The lord mayor also undertook to have the accounts of the fund ‘professionally audited’.\(^{64}\) Both moves indicate a wider truth about the lord mayor’s suitability to head these quasi-national funds, which is that he sat, literally, in the middle of the City of London at a period when the global reach of its banks and bankers was increasing, and an audit culture was gradually taking shape among them.\(^{65}\) In the end, harnessing all of this effort to the Mansion House Relief Fund for Bengal reaped a healthy national total of £200,000.\(^{66}\)

Successive lord mayors therefore had at their disposal a powerful fundraising ‘brand’, consisting of a recognizable and reputable name with a centuries-long connection to the establishment, and a relatively recent but developing track record of effective financial intervention in disaster relief. That brand, informally licensed across civic and religious networks around the country, became gradually established in the minds of the charitable public over the final decades of the nineteenth century as more and more funds came and went, for the most part successfully. However, since not all causes could be adopted, the lord mayor was regularly confronted with choices as to which emergencies merited the brand’s use. As franchisor, he had to ensure that he maintained the integrity of the brand, or potential franchisees would demur from using it, just as, for example, a car dealership would decline to sell vehicles from a company whose products had been revealed to be faulty.

There appear to have been several criteria by which lord mayors made these choices, and they are suggestive of the brand’s value and of successive mayors’ consciousness of that value and the need to protect it. First, as noted, press coverage played its part. If newspapers reported a disaster extensively, they or
their readers were sooner or later likely to ask if and when a Mansion House Fund would be opened. The press therefore acted as both information source and motivation for lord mayors. Second, lord mayors struggled with two related dilemmas: would the cause in question strike a chord with a national audience, and were there other ongoing Mansion House Funds that might compete for public attention and generosity? Third, the intervention of the great and good increasingly came to influence mayoral decisions: when 300 members of parliament petitioned the lord mayor in 1912 to launch a fund in aid of Turco-Balkan relief, he could hardly refuse. Finally, mayors surely had to consider the matter in personal terms: if their fundraising, despite A. A. Milne’s view, was likely to be a key part of their legacy, avoiding undue controversy and ‘brand damage’ was clearly important to their own reputations.

The process by which particular disasters and emergencies were accorded Mansion House Funds was therefore a more or less transparent one, and the merits of different causes were openly discussed in the press. The many instances where a lord mayor declined to open a fund are particularly instructive. Reasons for such refusals varied. Some were relatively uncontroversial. The Regent’s Canal Explosion in 1874 was considered, not unreasonably, to be ‘of too local a character for a national appeal’ by the then lord mayor and a local committee stepped in to marshal local contributions. In 1877 an appeal on behalf of a famine in Brazil was rejected as a Mansion House cause because the lord mayor noted ‘we had India on our hands’. Turkish refugees were not to get their own fund at the Mansion House in 1878 because the Turkish Compassionate Fund and the Stafford House Fund offered ample opportunity to the public ‘to place their contributions in a reliable and recognized channel’. Not being of sufficiently national appeal, likely to distract from or be overshadowed by a greater disaster, or duplicating the work of other committees were all reasons cited for the Mansion House name not being used in respect of a particular disaster, and in many cases these reasons were uncritically accepted.

In other cases, controversy ensued. When two overseas famines occurred at the same time, there could be few in Britain who would get exercised about which most deserved British generosity, and in 1877, clearly, imperial considerations won out over any sympathy felt with Brazil’s plight. This became far more problematic when, as in 1878, major domestic disasters coincided. In the normal run of things, the capsizing of the Princess Alice pleasure boat on the Thames with the loss of 640 lives on September 3, and the loss of 268 men at a pit explosion in Abercarn, South Wales, on 11 September, would have been prime candidates for individual Mansion House appeals, both sufficiently spectacular
and heart-rending in their effects to draw donations from beyond their localities. The events occurring within days of one another, however, meant that matters were not so cut and dried. The lord mayor was initially loath to grant Abercarn a Mansion House Fund, reasoning that it would cut the previously announced *Princess Alice* appeal in two; he was persuaded to change his mind after announcing his decision when a delegation pressed the Welsh claims upon him and argued that ‘great claims upon charity do not as a rule reduce subscriptions, but increase them’. The two funds ultimately raised well over £30,000 each in a little under two months, with many provincial sub-appeals, it would appear, made and remitted to London jointly despite the lord mayor’s fears.

Nonetheless this neglect of the miners’ plight, however brief, seemed to speak of mayoral priorities. We might well ask, had the *Princess Alice* sunk eight days after the miners of Abercarn were killed and trapped, rather than the other way around, would the mayor have had similar pause? ‘Bill Blades, bricklayer’, who reported ‘from the workshop’ for the radical *Reynolds’ Newspaper*, would likely have thought not. The working man’s plight, in his view, was routinely ignored by the Mansion House which, his Scotch foreman pointed out, could be traced to the fact that ‘the responders to a lord mayor’s fund are the middle classes’. The mayor might sometimes be persuaded to help the working class in Britain, but he would be more apt to respond, it was claimed, ‘if it had been the cause of suffering n------ anywhere in Africa or of distressed householders in the moon’. This dichotomy between domestic and international (less often extraterrestrial) causes was a continual point of contention. The inevitable cry that ‘charity begins at home’ could be thrown at the lord mayor from one side; from the other, earnest *Times* editorials insisted that (very often ‘self-inflicted’) distress at home was nothing compared to suffering around the world.

Two funds during the early 1880s were especially controversial and seem to bear out some of these criticisms of the Mansion House. They also both demonstrate the extent to which the Mansion House ‘brand’, although in the gift and under the protection of the lord mayor, could be wrested from him by the lobbying of prominent citizens on behalf of their own pet projects. In 1881, as the ‘Land War’ raged in the west of Ireland, impoverished tenant farmers refusing to pay their landlords’ ‘rack-rents’ and by their ostracizing actions making one Co. Mayo land agent, Captain Charles Boycott, an enduring addition to the *OED*, the Mansion House was lobbied to intervene. But while poor harvests had caused a minor ‘famine’ in the same region in 1879–80, responses to London’s Mansion House Fund in respect of this had been rated ‘inadequate’ in Ireland and a Dublin Mansion House Fund was instead inaugurated. This was quite
distinct from London’s Mansion House, but was certainly suggestive of the power of the ‘Mansion House’ brand.

In 1881 the then lord mayor of London, J. Whittaker Ellis, was asked to support, not the distressed tenants, but the distressed landlords of Ireland, who had organized their own ‘Irish Property Defence Association’ against the demands of peasant proprietors and an ‘Association for the Relief of Ladies in Distress’ in support of those female estate-owners who suffered by mass non-payment of rents. Ellis went about seeking franchisees in the usual way, sending circulars to mayors around Britain. He had been persuaded to open the fund in part by the lobbying of prominent aristocrats, some of them with Irish estates of their own, including the Duke of Sutherland, no wallflower in the matter of political philanthropy as Chapter 5 has shown. Although spuriously claimed as ‘non-political’ by Ellis, who, as Perry Curtis revealed, later described ‘his role in the campaign to counter “the baneful effects of the Land League” and to defeat the fumes of “anarchy and lawlessness”’, it was clearly a pointedly partisan and only dubiously humanitarian effort. The decisively political nature of the fund did not please many provincial mayors, and prompted one Irish Home Rule MP to declare later that in the matter of Ireland, the London Mansion House had been ‘a leech or sucker, not a helper or support’. One cartoon (Figure 6.2) that portrayed Sutherland and others struggling to push the fund beyond £11,000 was not wholly accurate; but the final amount of £21,000 was hardly enormous in the context of Mansion House Funds, and betrayed a sense that brand damage had occurred.

A year later, another cause celebre got the very same mayor and the Mansion House into further hot water. His literary connections in Iceland alerting him to ‘famine’ in that country, William Morris, the pre-Raphaelite designer, author and activist, pushed it onto the relief agenda, first by writing to newspapers and forming an ad hoc fundraising stream, and then by endeavouring to secure a Mansion House Fund, as he had on a previous occasion in 1875. Morris keenly understood the power of the lord mayor’s stamp of approval. Writing to the wife of an Icelandic friend he impressed upon her the necessity of getting a ‘good’ committee together in London, ‘for the names’ sake’ if not necessarily for the administrative work they might do. The more prominent the committee, the greater the likelihood, he explained, that the lord mayor himself would chair the committee. All went well until the press started to question the very existence of the famine in Iceland, and Ellis, who had been tempted into granting a Mansion House Fund, found himself denying repeated claims of ‘fictitious woe’ in Iceland. Press coverage descended into claim and counterclaim and philosophical debates
over what precisely constituted a ‘fact’, but, even if the distress was, it would appear, genuine, further damage had been done to the Mansion House’s reputation among the public. The *Northern Echo* questioned the lord mayor’s judgement in the matter: ‘he stands by the famine, but he does not show that before opening the subscription list he made himself acquainted at first hand with the facts. He does not seem to have got any nearer to Iceland than Copenhagen.’

---

**Figure 6.2** ‘Frost’ newspaper cartoon. D593/P/26/7b. Courtesy of Staffordshire Record Archive. The Story of ‘a Frost’. There was a boy named Ellis Rex who lived at Mansion House; and he said, ‘I will make a big Snowball and Hundred Thousand at least’ – and he got some other boys to help him. So with a great shout they set it rolling; but a sharp frost soon set in.
Any such questioning of the lord mayor’s political biases, judgement or trustworthiness risked damage to the Mansion House brand, and Ellis’s successors seem to have grasped the fact. To use a twenty-first-century term, in the wake of these missteps and of the similarly criticized 1885–86 distress fund, a degree of ‘brand management’ was required. By the 1890s, therefore, it would appear that lord mayors were increasingly reluctant to open funds on the say so of others, or in response to a public clamour without proper consideration. Speculating upon a possible Mansion House Fund in aid of the victims of English floods in 1891 the *Yorkshire Herald* cautioned the incoming lord mayor:

There is no doubt about the distress that has been caused by these floods, and the movement for assistance has influential support. But whether the matter is serious enough for the lord mayor to take it up is, perhaps, open to question. Mr Evans, warned by the mistakes of some of his predecessors, will be careful not to make an appeal from the Mansion House unless and until he is sure of his ground.\(^{87}\)

Mr Evans both heeded this call and did not. During his mayoralty, despite requests, there was no Mansion House Fund for striking Durham miners (the feeling in London being against them), for the London unemployed, for the victims of the Liberator Building Society scam or for cholera victims abroad.\(^ {88}\) Yet Evans made a promise to a national mining accident association, in a meeting held at the Mansion House, that he would meet any mining disaster during his term of office with ‘an immediate response’, words that may have comforted the Bill Blades of the world, and on which he made good within weeks as a Welsh colliery explosion took 112 lives.\(^ {89}\) Colliery disasters, after all, could be and generally were presented as de-politicized events, and tended to be extensively communicated by reporters and artists on the scene: the mayor and the donating public knew they stood on relatively safe ground with them.

The Mansion House, then, remained for the most part a name that signified to donors up and down the country that their money would be going to a worthwhile cause, through the hands of trustworthy persons and with proper oversight to ensure that only the most ‘deserving’ cases benefitted by the proceeds. The nature of the lord mayor’s tenure meant that temporary franchisors occasionally allowed personal connections and hobby horses to tarnish the brand, but this was a rare enough occurrence. It is worth noting, moreover, that while the lord mayoralty itself may have changed hands each year, there was crucial administrative continuity in the mayor’s private secretary: William Soulsby held the position from 1875 until 1931, the very period when the Mansion House Fund developed
into an efficient fundraising franchise.\textsuperscript{90} We can speculate that he represented a crucial form of institutional memory; certainly, when he wrote a recollection of his fifty years of service for the \textit{Times} in 1927, he deemed fundraising ‘for the relief of distress all the world over’ a crucial part of the mayor’s, as he saw it, increasingly important role, and one which was worthy of half the full page the newspaper afforded him.\textsuperscript{91} And while the lack of archival records from the Mansion House itself makes it difficult to determine Soulsby’s precise role in administering each of the funds, we do know that in 1913, beneficiaries from a Mansion House Flood Fund were sufficiently grateful towards Soulsby that both he and the lord mayor who had called the fund into existence were rewarded with presentations of inscribed silver boxes bought with 3d subscribed by ‘every man who received relief from the fund’.\textsuperscript{92}

Overall, then, while some damaging mistakes were made in who was allowed to employ the Mansion House brand in the 1880s, lessons appear to have been learnt from them. As the bruised honorary secretary of the 1885–86 distress committee told the \textit{Times} in 1894, one reason for the failure of that venture had been ‘the way in which many of the members of the committee mounted on their own hobbies and fed on their own faddles’ recommending little-known charities to receive funds. ‘Thus much of the money collected was dribbled away and did no good’ The current lord mayor, he was pleased to note, had stated that ‘local distress should be dealt with locally’ and would not repeat these errors.\textsuperscript{93} By the end of the century, the Mansion House name and reputation had sufficiently recovered that its two Indian Famine Funds in 1897 and 1900 raised the remarkable sums of £773,000 and £390,000 respectively\textsuperscript{94}; its South African War and Refugee funds took in well over a million pounds all told, and funds for a 1903 Volcano eruption in St Vincent in the West Indies and a 1909 earthquake in Italy took £75,000 and £140,000 respectively.\textsuperscript{95} One of the most lucrative Mansion House Funds in aid of a (more or less) domestic disaster came at the very end of our period, when some £414,000 was raised for families, many based in Southampton, who lost relatives on board the \textit{Titanic}.\textsuperscript{96}

How accurate is it to view the Mansion House Fund as a franchise? In the sense that its ‘big idea’ was merely gathering money to address the aftermath of disasters, it is not ‘social enterprise’ in quite the way we might understand today. But in its format, it surely conforms to what historians of commercial franchising have understood as early agency franchising, where a central ‘firm’ creates, supplies and successfully brands a commodity that can be sold to consumers by multiple sub-agents, who are free to buy into the franchise or not
as they see fit. In this instance, that commodity was not cars or sewing machines, it was compassion and the chance to express it monetarily, as individual donors, as regional communities and as a nation. There is a very strong case for arguing, therefore, that given the volume of money generated, the Mansion House appeals stand as one of the most successful franchises of the era, whether of a commercial or non-commercial type.

Conclusion

It is not, then, too much to claim that the development of some charitable organizations in this period were influenced by the ‘replication’ models that were developing contemporaneously in the commercial sector. The Mansion House stands as the ultimate umbrella brand, available for co-option by any regional or local committee who wanted its imprimatur to raise money in a particular cause. It can be seen, in some respects, as the Comic Relief or Children in Need of its time, creating the opportunity to give, which could then be franchised out to multiple sub-agents across the country, the central committee’s role being to promote and protect the brand, and receive the money in its final, proudly proclaimed total before disbursing it to the appropriate agencies. Other more integral organizations followed different commercial replication models, which encompassed a kind of multiples approach then gathering pace in retailing, and variations on a theme of business-format franchising. Thus, while the notion of ‘social franchising’ has certainly been having something of a moment in the 2010s third sector, it arguably has roots that go far deeper than many of its evangelists may realize.

This is not to suggest that there are no new ideas in charitable fundraising, since there are evidently nuances and innovations aplenty in how charity franchising is conceived today. But it is about showing that the roots of this philanthropic practice, like the roots of many others, are to be found in this crucial period of charitable development, and that to the extent that this new charitable world was a product of and grew up in close parallel to the modern capitalist economy, it partook in and has a place in the birth and development of some of the business world’s most widespread and successful phenomena. How to grow an idea, how to generate money and how to protect one’s hard-won reputation are all skills that businesspeople value to this day; they are also all skills that the entrepreneurial men and women involved in the Victorian and Edwardian charitable world were well versed in.
Conclusion

Between 1870 and 1912, philanthropic organizations in the charity market proliferated and competition intensified. Novelty rubbed shoulders with familiarity in the perpetual reinvention of fundraising practices. The charity entrepreneur became the driving force, both within particular organizations and within the wider sector, of rolling innovation. This was most apparent in the ways that charity entrepreneurs transformed their communication strategies in the period concerned. Although advertising, marketing and public relations as we know them were in their relative infancy in the late nineteenth century, charities large and small were no less quick than commercial enterprises to recognize that, properly applied, these techniques could help reach and persuade new consumers, or in other words, increase the social depth of their donor markets. In terms of promotion and publicity alone, charities in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Britain became unmistakably entrepreneurial.

This was further reflected in how charity entrepreneurs negotiated the fact that the motives of potential donors might not always chime precisely with Christian understandings of the virtue and necessity of charity. Altruism was never out of the picture, and society remained overwhelmingly Christian in outlook; many of the new voluntary charities that emerged in this period were founded in response to a perceived spiritual poverty as much as a material one. They could hardly therefore ignore the escalation of what some Christian commentators regarded as dread consumerism and secular leisure pursuits. Yet rather than rail uselessly against these developments, realist charity entrepreneurs co-opted them as part of their fundraising strategies. Charities did not merely compete with each other for the patronage of donors, but with other, myriad temptations and demands on individuals’ disposable income. The social capital accrued by a charity donation remained a strong selling point for charities, but it was joined by conscious efforts to sell tangible items, some tokenistic, some more practical, others experiential and some what we would today term ‘ethical’.
The pragmatism of charities’ adopting and adapting consumerism had a counterpoint when it came to their use of branding. The communication of brand values, and the consequent development of what scholars now term a ‘brand personality’ that binds brand and consumer together and breeds loyalty, came relatively naturally to organizations with religious roots whose whole *metier* was the advancement of a particular set of values and ideals. What sellers of soap and beer had to work at, sellers of compassion could do with relative ease. And if accommodations with mass consumption were a sometimes uncomfortable but necessary fit for many charities, branding was a largely uncontroversial process which could build on existing senses of Christian identity and entailed finding only the most effective expression of an organization’s individual ‘personality’. Moreover, in a context where the charitable market was regularly penetrated by plausible shysters and assailed by some commentators as too difficult to navigate for well-intentioned donors, branding and unofficial trademarking was a weapon that legitimate charities could use to establish their bona fides.

It was not the only such weapon. Indeed, regulation of the charity market as a whole largely fell to charities themselves. By promoting a supposedly correct way of operating a charitable enterprise, groups like the Charity Organisation Society (COS) and the League of Help, with the support of media outlets like *Truth*, pushed those who did not conform to the margins of the market. To fail to bring together a committee of oversight regularly, to not publish annual accounts or to neglect to have them properly audited were gradually established as suspect choices that marked a charity out as potentially fraudulent and certainly unworthy of donor support. This model became so widely accepted that even those who were sometimes accused of failing to live up to it themselves could, like Lee Jones of Liverpool’s League of Welldoers, apply its standards against local rivals. That these standards were borrowed from the cutting edge of the business world is self-evident. Much like accountants sometimes speak of an ‘optimal amount of fraud’, the charitable market needed to define and identify fraud in order to define and identify legitimacy. It was also a process that, intentionally or not, favoured larger charities who could afford the requisite machinery of accountability over smaller ones who often could not. Although the COS decried charities that, in its view, tried to do too much, it ironically created circumstances where for many charities bigger was better.

For all the innovation in the charity market, the charity entrepreneur could draw on an arsenal of older modes of fundraising, from the charity bazaar to the charity ball. Likewise, not all charity entrepreneurs were newcomers to the philanthropic market. The persistence of aristocratic and elite networks
of fundraising highlights how the old and new could coexist within the same organization. While aristocrats continued to bestow credibility and celebrity on more democratic good causes, elites also continued to organize and initiate for causes they deemed sufficiently worthy. These networks, like Stafford House Committee, provided a kind of bridge between innovation in the market and the philanthropic do-gooding of old. However anachronistic they may have seemed to the Booths and Barnardos of the world, these networks engaged in the modernizing sensibilities of charity innovation, not least, in practices associated with self-regulation and accountability. This may have been born of necessity rather than choice but, given most of these players also acted as significant figures in venture capitalism, they could draw on a wealth of business and financial acumen not only to drive their initiatives forward and lend them credence as professional outfits. Nevertheless, the contradictions between an older paternalism and modernizing charity entrepreneurship were writ large when elite networks exploited ‘humanitarian aid’ to develop more explicitly capitalistic development in imperial contexts.

Models of growth in the charity sector were varied, and reflected a similar variety of expansion in the business world. Remarkably few charitable enterprises that endured for any significant length of time failed to grow in some form or other. Some charities diversified their target beneficiaries within a relatively limited geographical space, and some rolled out their services regionally and nationally; some, of course, did both. The growth strategy in many such cases was a variation on the ‘multiples’ model then taking hold in the retail sector, where the central office retained control of operations. For others, a kind of prototype franchising was the engine of growth. This, again, varied in how it rolled out. Some, like the Spectacle Mission and the Gordon Boys’ Homes, were a kind of ‘business box’ franchise that allowed local operators to buy a charity format off the shelf and run it according to the originator’s plan; others, such as the RSPCA and NSPCC, involved the payment of a fee in return for use of a national brand and certain centralized administrative services while still allowing local innovation. Looser still was the Mansion House Fund brand, which local civic committees could buy into or not on an ad hoc basis, depending on their enthusiasm for the particular cause. The remarkable sums of money raised by the latter during the fifty years covered by this book suggests the robustness of this kind of franchise, and certainly puts the lie to any notion that franchising is a great new frontier in the charity world of the twenty-first century.

At the heart of the charity market, then, was competition. Historians who have used the records of charitable institutions have long noted the vicissitudes
of income flow, and the waning influence of this or that charity. All charities complained at one stage or another that competition was getting tougher. All in turn noted in their minutes the need to develop new techniques, seek supplementary income streams or upgrades to their fundraising. What these jeremiads signalled was a profound shift towards a much more layered and complex fundraising environment which required constant inventiveness and opportunity hunting. It is this competitive ethos, this book argues, that made change not only legitimate but unending and necessary. Fundraising innovations defined new objects of charities just as much as they refined ways of bringing attention to them.

The never-ending uncontrolled efflorescence of new charitable activities was and remains a mystery to those who attempted to understand them purely from a social and political angle. Culturally these fundraising activities defined loose forms of membership through consumption or participation in activities, many of which might be conducted within the locality by individuals whose sense of social responsibility or imagining of society might have been fragmentary or demotic. This explains why, total war notwithstanding, the charitable sector survived even the first interventions of the state during the Great War, or, at a later stage, the growth of a holistic welfare state. The provisions of the welfare state opened up new avenues for charities to develop complementary, sometimes subsidiary, roles for themselves. Underpinned by what Donileen Loseke called the ‘discursive production of morality’, including the depiction of intervention and ‘clients’ in positive terms, ‘charity’ proved resilient to the rise and fall of welfare state ideologies.

The regulatory framework developed during the Great War, which attempted for the first time to give some order to the charitable marketplace, focused on specific wartime causes: it enlisted existing fundraising initiatives and controlled what might have become a shockingly fraudulent marketplace. War efforts had entailed the restriction of charitable work in the past, most notably during the Zulu war or the Boer wars. By 1914 the preparation for war took into account new organizations such as the St John Ambulance or the British Red Cross and their fundraising as part of a mobilization plan of all paramedical facilities. Some of the grandees whose families had previously led the charitable sector in more politically controversial fundraising efforts diverted some of their money and social kudos towards war preparations. The charitable market was obviously transformed profoundly by the war experience but only to revive in the interwar and in the postwar eras. Since the 1940s the entrepreneurial charity world has invested the streets of Britain with ‘charity shops’ set up by new charities like
Oxfam, Help the Aged and a multitude of other causes. To a much greater extent than in most other parts of the world, this charity shopping experience has grown and gradually occupied the vacant spaces on the British high street. They are the new charity bazaars breathing life into dying marketplaces. Regulatory attempts since the war have blossomed, yet they have not managed to either regulate the wildest funding schemes or subdue their potential for social challenge.

In a self-contradictory manner, Conservative governments since the 1980s have been bent on regulating a charity market which they desire and fear in equal measure. Ideologically, some of the 1980s politicians were looking backwards to an imagined Victorian social order. Arguably it took the Thatcherite turn against the welfare state to make some social historians focus afresh on the charitable sector with a correspondingly positive outlook. In the 1990s the sudden emergence of post-socialist nations in Eastern Europe begged the question of what made liberal society vital and vibrant by contrast with authoritarian and statist polities of the Soviet era. This renewed discussion around the concept of ‘civil society’, that is, one in which the number of voluntary organizations would stand as the best proxy for free associative life, intellectual debates and the emergence of a democratic sphere. These debates borrowed from the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas but also engaged with the Victorian tradition of liberal thinking which, from John Stuart Mill to the COS, defined a ‘good’ society as one in which redistribution would spring from compassion and voluntary giving. In political terms, the Victorian template of liberal society could be reclaimed. The conservative turn to ‘Victorian values’ was not a turn to the more objectionable notions of ‘morality’ or separate spheres, but an appeal to roll back the state to enable civil society to thrive once again. The ‘Big Society’ agenda of Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron in the late 2000s returned to this model, seeking to replace the bureaucratic state with innovative society, centralized government with self-rule and welfare handouts with charitable engagement. Never had an idealized notion of Victorian charity been so clearly imprinted on the political consciousness, although New Labour leaders in the 1990s also drew some inspiration from the Victorian era when they sought to foster social entrepreneurship and innovative social voluntary practices.

In these political contexts, where neo-liberal arguments for the state’s retreat from welfare appear to be winning, it is tempting for the third sector to, consciously or not, return to first principles of the voluntary charity sector that emerged when liberal capitalism was in the ascendant. Indeed, it cannot entirely be a coincidence that many of the quasi-business practices, models and ideas that we describe in this book as driving that first mass wave of collecting
charities are now often spoken of, in modified and supposedly modernized form, as solutions to the roll-back of welfarism and consequent increased demands on the charity sector. But while the two periods are analogous, in other ways, the world of late-Victorian and Edwardian charities could not differ more from the one we currently inhabit. In the intervening century, through grant giving and other incentives, the state became, and remains, a fundraiser for charities, many of which become, in turn, subcontractors.11 This enmeshing of state and charities would have been challenging to the COS and the Fabians. The liberals of yesteryear would have been even more concerned at recent political efforts to curtail charitable lobbying.12

Perhaps, then, the lesson of this investigation into the late-Victorian and Edwardian charity market is that fundraising was always a form of lobbying which challenged complacency. Major social reform campaigners such as the Salvation Army staffers would not have conceived of their work otherwise. The tendency to hubris of a dynamic charitable marketplace is precisely what made it so disquieting to Victorians and, today, to politicians. Current anxieties about aggressive fundraising led to new legislation in 2016, all intent on curbing ‘excess’ in the wake of politically embarrassing charity frauds. In words reminiscent of COS literature, the head of the charity commission, a now much more powerful if still quite small organization could declare: ‘The new law [2016] is part of a package of fundraising reforms introduced last year to strengthen fundraising practice and regulation. We know that many in the sector are working hard to support these changes, and to review their own fundraising practices so that public trust can be restored.’13 Victorian critics, Truth among them, also resented the relentless pursuit of funding. They too bemoaned the nagging it generated to their conscience. Trust was tested, as was political tolerance. The two remain deeply entangled. Charity fundraising campaigns constantly cast new light on the most blatant consequences of social inequality and framed them as moral outrage. Arguably some of that fundraising sentimentalized and did not propose radical social change in a manner that members of the trade unions or Labour party might have approved, but even that claim could be counterbalanced by the numerous cases where charities spoke harshly to power.

The gagging legislation enacted to prevent ‘political’ lobbying from the charitable and humanitarian sector drew some of its legitimacy from a false sense of the separation of charity and politics in some long lost Victorian golden age. Relentless press campaigns from the conservative press against ‘charity scandals’ barely hide their prime intent to keep such social critique in its place. Selective conservative readings of the past saw a silent world of obedience and a subdued
charitable sector. For worshippers of the market in its most idealized form, they ignored just how vocal, cacophonous and volatile marketplaces were. To survive in that noise the charity entrepreneurs of the late Victorian and Edwardian era embraced the idea of innovation in fundraising while fundraising reshaped their social aims. Now, in an era of unprecedented wealth inequality, most of the controversies of this bygone marketplace remain as relevant as ever.
Notes

Introduction

1 *Daily Mail*, 4 January 1912, 4; *Daily Telegraph*, 4 January 1912, 6; *The Times*, 6 January 1912, 8.
2 According to the *Daily Mail* of 24 January 1912, £66,000 was the total reported by the committee. Some months later, with stragglers presumably accounted for, another newspaper reported that a final total of £87,000 had been reached. *Hull Daily Mail*, 9 September 1912, 3.
3 As the newspapers noted, Sumner Ward had had considerable success with the same technique in North America, and YMCA branches in the Antipodes had adopted similar methods. On the supposed turning point that Sumner Ward’s campaigns represent, see Adrian Sergeant and Elaine Jay, *Fundraising Management: Analysis, Planning and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2014), 10–11.
7 *All the World*, January 1900, 94.
8 *The Times*, 8 November 1927, xii.
10 Out-letterbook (1891), Rathbone papers, University of Liverpool Special Collections, RPIX.5.5.
11 Letter to R. B. Martin (1882), Martin’s Bank papers, Barclays Bank Archive, 9/325.
13 Martin Gorsky, Patterns of Philanthropy Charity and Society in Nineteenth-Century Bristol (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), 18–19.
15 Gorsky, Patterns of Philanthropy, 19.
24 But this is not to deny that charities shaped geographical understanding of Britain, the empire and the wider world as we will explore further in Chapter 5. See David Lambert and Alan Lester, ‘Geographies of Colonial Philanthropy’, Progress in Human Geography 28, no. 3 (2004): 320–41.
Notes


1 The Emergence of Charity Enterprise

1 *New York Times*, 31 August 1912, 6; *Daily Mirror*, 28 August 1912, 4.

2 *Daily Mirror*, 30 August 1912, 4. See also *The Times*, 23 August 1912, 4; 24 August 1912, 9.


4 *Daily Mirror*, 30 August 1912, 9.

5 The Army had a trial run with the death of Catherine Booth. The death of Catherine in 1890 had demonstrated the potential of Booth funerals as a major event: 50,000 people visited Catherine Booth as she lay in state and her burial attracted significant press coverage. Pamela J. Walker, *Pulling the Devil's Kingdom Down: The Salvation Army in Victorian Britain* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 2001), 235.


Though it is important to note that ‘social enterprise’ is a contested concept and models vary in contemporary society, ranging from organizations that strive to improve the lives of employees (the Big Issue magazine is perhaps the best example) to large-scale corporate bodies who direct differing degrees of profits into charitable causes (e.g. the Body Shop under its founder, Anita Roddick). See, for instance, Jack Quarter, Sherida Ryan and Andrea Chan, Social Purpose Enterprises: Case Studies for Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 3–23.


Good examples of this can be seen in the archives of the third Duke of Sutherland held in Staffordshire County Record Office (hereafter SCRO), Series D 593/V/10; the personal papers of M.P. R. B. Martin in Barclays Bank Archives, Martin's Bank, 9/308; and the private papers of William Rathbone, at the University of Liverpool, RP IX.5.5. Some donors complicated the ‘status’ nexus by giving anonymously. Sarah Flew, ‘Unveiling the Anonymous Philanthropist: Charity in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Victorian Culture 20 (2015): 20–33.


17 See, for instance, The Manchester, Salford and District South African War Fund, Greater Manchester County Record Office (GMCRO), M21/1/1–M21/4/9.
18 Minute book, 12 January 1886, John Rylands Library (JRL), Wood Street Mission (WSM) papers, WSM/1/1/1.
19 See, for instance, Committee resolution not to take children from outside Manchester and Salford on summer holidays, 13 June 1904, JRL, WSM papers, Minute Book, WSM/1/1/2.
20 Annual Report (AR), 1911, JRL, WSM papers, WSM/2/1/2/10.
21 Letter book of Richard Brown, Portreeve of Tavistock, 1874, Devon Record Office (Exeter), MFC/81/1–11.
22 Manchester, Salford and District South African War Fund resistance to redistributing excess local funds to the national scheme, 27 November 1899, GMCRO, M21/1/1.
23 Publicity Sub Committee Minute Book, 25 September 1907, Barnardo papers, University of Liverpool Special Collections (ULSC), D/239/B3/6/1.
24 Annual Report 1900–1901, JRL, WSM papers, WSM/2/1/1.
25 Draft Minute Book, 1885–96, JRL, WSM papers, WSM/1/2/1.
26 Publicity Sub Committee Minute Book, 10 October 1906, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D/239/B3/6/1. The year after Barnardo died, Barnardo's issued 350,000 for its 'Founder's Day' appeal. Ibid., 4 April 1906.
28 Susan Ash, Funding Philanthropy: Dr Barnardo, Metaphor, Narrative and Spectacle (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016).
29 The Times, 25 December 1893, 6.
30 The Church Advocate, 1 July 1887.
31 Publicity Sub Committee Minute Book, 21 February 1896; 8 January 1906; 9 January 1907; Barnardo papers, ULSC, D/239/B3/6/1.
34 The Officer, February 1893, 57–8.
35 The Officer, March 1893, 85–6.
37 Minute Books, November 1895, JRL, WSM papers, WSM/1/1/1.
39 Much of this advice was repeated and updated periodically. See, for instance, The Officer, May, June, July and November issues in 1904.
40 The Officer, February 1905, 63–6.
41 The Officer, August 1905, 303.
42 The Officer, December 1893, 354.
43 The Officer, April 1904, 125.
44 See, for example, advice from the man who raised $400,000 for a statue of Ulysses Grant in the United States. The Officer, June 1895, 188; April 1903, 187; April 1904, 125. Thomas Richards notes the idea of America as the centre of advertising in the late Victorian period (but argues that Britain had particular modes of innovation). Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851–1914 (Redwood, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
45 The Officer, July 1905, 255.
46 The Officer, March 1899, 110; April 1899, 151.
47 The Officer, June 1904, 223.
48 See features in The Officer in April, May and June 1904.
49 The Officer, November 1904, 407.
50 The Officer, May 1904, 175.
51 The Officer, April 1904, 125. On value of personal appeal, see The Officer, December 1893, 357.
52 The Officer, June 1893, 174.
53 The Officer, May 1904, 175.
54 The Officer, May 1904, 175–9.
55 Walker, Pulling the Devil’s Kingdom Down, 196–8.
56 The Officer, April 1904, 125.
57 The Officer, March 1893, 86.
58 Delving and Diving, 1, January 1880, 64–5.
60 Annual Report, 1900, JRL, WSM papers, WSM/2/1/1.
61 Porcupine, 8 December 1906.
62 Publicity Sub Committee Minute Book, 10 October 1906 and 12 December 1906, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D/239/B3/6/1.
63 Publicity Sub Committee Minute Book, 10 April 1907, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D/239/B3/6/1; they were placed free of charge.
64 League of Welldoers, Liverpool Record Office (LRO), M364 LWD/6/4, 1912.
65 News cuttings, 1878, Haydock Colliery Relief Funds (HCRF), Legh of Lyme papers, GMCRO, E17/113/11.
66 Ibid.
67 See Report included as supplement to Liverpool Temporary Home for Lost and Starving Dogs, Annual Report, 1899. LRO, 179 ANI/9/10/1–20.
Notes


69 Minutes of the Soup Kitchen Committee of the Jewish Poor of Manchester, 9 March 1905; 2 January 1906; 25 October 1906; 25 November 1906, GMCRO, M151/1/1.

70 Aberdeen Daily Journal, 8 April 1911, 6; The Courier and Argus, 11 November 1907, 7; Nottingham Evening Post, 27 October 1910, 2.

71 All the World, Special issue, January 1900, 2.

72 The Officer, December 1893, 372. A surviving collection receipt suggests small sums from 'streets'. Receipt, 1 December 1905, Darkest England Fund, Salvation Army International Heritage Centre (SAIHC), DEF 2.

73 The Officer, December 1893, 357.


76 The Officer, September 1893, 277.

77 The Officer, December 1893, 373.

78 All the World, 1891. See also The Nest Children’s Home, SAIHC, GB 2133 TN.


80 Delving and Diving, 6, July 1885, 101–103 (Letter purporting to be from an adult former waif addressed as a letter to kids).

81 Annual Report, 1899, 12–13, WSM papers, JRL, WSM/2/1/1.

82 The Times, 18 December 1897, 8.

83 Annual Reports, passim, WSM papers, JRL, WSM/21/1–2. See also Delving and Diving, 1, July 1880, 169. One school’s sale of work raised over eleven pounds.

84 Delving and Diving, 1, August 1880, 186.

85 See, for example, the ‘Star cards’ collections in the Junior Corps. The Officer, 1905, 255.

86 Under-eighteens paid a shilling per year; eighteen to twenty-five-year-olds paid half a crown.

87 Membership Application Form, 1902, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D239/E1/1/9.

88 Young Helpers’ League Magazine, 1892, 27–8.

89 Delving and Diving, 1, June 1880, 150.

90 Young Helpers’ League Magazine, 1899, 53; Delving and Diving, 2, November 1882, 32.

91 Young Helpers’ League Magazine, 1892, 28; 1893, 72.
92 Young Helpers' League Magazine, 1910, 13; 1912, 16.
93 Delving and Diving, 1, May 1882, 120; June 1883, 136.
95 Edinburgh Evening News, 6 October 1886, 4.
96 Waterloo Directory of English Newspapers and Periodicals. There were minor controversies over The War Cry’s sale on Sundays and its distribution in workhouses due to supposedly ‘immoral’ content. Worcestershire Chronicle, 6 September 1890, 6; Edinburgh Evening News, 21 August 1885, 4.
97 The Officer, December 1893, 373. The Army also advocated that bazaars should have a stall selling SA literature.
98 Night and Day: A Monthly Record of Christian Missions and Practical Philanthropy, 15 January 1877. The magazine was retitled National Waifs Magazine in 1899 and ran until the 1930s.
99 Syrie Louise Barnardo and James Marchant, eds, Memoirs of the Late Dr Barnardo (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1907), 234.
100 Ibid., 228.
101 Another national example is the Waifs and Strays Society magazine Brothers and Sisters, aimed at members of its ‘Children’s Union’. On Barnardo’s production of children’s and juvenile magazines, see Ash, Funding Philanthropy, 118–47.
103 A. R. Neuman, Dr Barnardo as I Knew Him (London: Constable, 1914), 63.
104 Delving and Diving, 1, 1880, 13–15; 28–9; 39–40; 60–3.
105 By Christmas 1883 circulation was at 60,000. See Delving and Diving, 4, 1883, 12. This was a significant rise even from April the previous year when circulation figures were 30,000. Delving and Diving, 3, 1882, 110.
106 This magazine was called Waifs and Strays.
107 Delving and Diving, 3, 1882, 64.
108 A delver [Alfred Alsop], Tens Years in the Slums (Manchester: John Heywood, 1879).
109 Delving and Diving, 3, 1882, 63.
110 Appeal and promotional booklets, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D239/A3/6/1–18; D239/A3/17/1–8.
111 Ibid.
112 Snapshots booklet, c. 1914–15, and Betsy Bobbet appeal booklet, c. 1890s, both Women’s Social Work Dept. files, SAHIC, uncatalogued.
Notes


118 Simon Morgan, ‘Celebrity: Academic ”Pseudo-event” or a Useful Concept for Historians?’, *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 1 (2011): 98.


120 News Cuttings books, 1905–14, WSM papers, JRL, WSM/14/2.

121 YHL ephemera, 1896–1901, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D239/E1/1/9.


124 *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 30 June 1894, 410.


128 *The Star*, 11 April 1891, 1, reprinted a piece from *Truth* on Booth’s daughter falling ill and being attended by five carers in a chic part of Cannes; while doubting its veracity, the *Star* suggested that ‘the way out’ of ‘darkest England’ had been found as far as General Booth’s own family was concerned.

129 *Daily Mail*, 18 July 1904, 5; *Daily Mail*, 27 June 1907, 10. He also received the freedom of the City of London. *Illustrated London News*, 4 November 1905, 658.


2 Consuming Charity


7 *Young Helpers’ League Magazine*, 1893, 25.

8 *Delving and Diving*, 3, January 1882, 62.

9 *The Officer* repeatedly issued regulations for sales in the 1890s and 1900s. *The Officer*, May 1894, 146.


12 *The Officer*, February 1905, 68.

13 Prochaska, ‘Charity Bazaars’, 76.

14 *The United Methodist*, 7 April 1910, 307; Stalybridge Methodist Bazaar booklet, March 1913, Tameside Local Studies and Archives, DD116/1/12; J. Tweedale and Co. to Ryecroft Church committee, 1 September 1913, Record of Ryecroft Congregational Chapel, Tameside Local Studies and Archives, NC1/4.

15 East Cheshire Union Decoration Subcommittee, 14 October 1904 and 15 October 1904, Tameside Local Studies and Archives, NU1/12.


17 East Cheshire Union Bazaar Committee, 3 November 1904, Tameside Local Studies and Archives, NU1/12.

18 Harrow Floral Fete leaflet, 1900; and booklet for YHL Bazaar, Guildhall, 1901, both YHL ephemera, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D239/E1/1/9.


20 Walker, *Pulling the Devil’s Kingdom*, 49.

21 Ibid., 49ff.

22 *The Officer*, March 1905, 99.

23 YHL ephemera, c. 1910s, Barnardo papers, ULSC, D239/E1/1/9.

24 *The Officer*, March 1899, 110.


of Victorian Culture 17, no. 2 (June 2012): 127–46; Christmas Trade Journal, 1912, 32, Trade Dept Files, SAIHC.

27 *Launceston Examiner*, 24 February 1893, 7; *The Tasmanian*, 18 February 1893, 2; *Daily Telegraph (Launceston)*, 11 January 1893, 3.


29 *Daily Mail*, 4 February 1907, 3.


31 Trade Department Accounts, 1890, SAIHC, FIN.

32 Trade Journal, November 1907, 12, Trade Dept Files, SAIHC.

33 Trade Journal, November 1907, 13, Trade Dept Files, SAIHC.


35 More forward thinking was in evidence in its disavowal of cigarette advertising which claimed dubious medical benefits. Trade Journal, July 1907, 22, Trade Dept Files, SAIHC.


39 For example, the Jewish Sanitary Association (Manchester) made a small profit from selling bars of carbolic soap to visiting beneficiaries. Minutes of the Visiting Association, 1884, Jewish Sanitary Association papers, GMCRO, MF2687. Meanwhile the ‘scientific’ Manchester League of Help charged for (stamped)
second-hand clothes acquired from its depot 'to prevent pauperisation'. Minute book, May 1910, League of Help papers, GMCRO, M294/10/1/3.

40 The Officer, December 1893, 358.


42 T. J. Barnardo, Something Attempted, Something Done! (London: J.F. Shaw & Co., 1889), 161; emphases in the original.


46 Women's Herald, 12 November 1892; Women's Signal, 7 June 1894, 403; Woman's Penny Paper, 11 January 1894, 31; The Friend, 3 June 1892, 8; see also Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–1925 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), passim, for discussion of the discourse involved in the branding of the matches.


48 Annual Report, 1911, Manchester and Salford's Invalid Children's Aid Association papers, GMCRO, M802/4/1.

49 For examples of postcards, see Barrow Colliery Disaster Commemorative Postcard, 1907, National Coal Mining Museum, YKSMM.1992.1409; Disaster at Bullcroft Colliery postcard, 1912, Wakefield Museum 1996.1695; Hampstead Mine Fire Commemorative Postcards, 1908, Birmingham Museum, 1995V632.324; 1995V632.322; 1995V632.328 (this includes an unusual one with a photographed image of 'the miners' last message', a chalked note on 'trusting in Christ') and Postcard view of scene at Stanley Pit Disaster, Stanley, County Durham, 1909, Northumberland Museum, NRO 085564/2 and NRO 08564/4.

Fragmentary Documents of Everyday Life for the Collector, Curator, and Historian (Hove: Psychology Press, 2000), 221.

51 Commenorative Ceramics Collection, Lancaster City Museum, LANMS.1974.149.6 and LANMS.1974.31.3.a.

52 Commenorative Ceramics Collection, Lancaster City Museum, LANMS.1974.60.6.


54 See, for example, in Northumberland Museum: Memorial glass for the Hartley Colliery disaster, 1862, ASHMM 1988.101/1; Memorial glass to the Whitehaven Pit Disaster, 1910, ASHMM 2001.21/1; Memorial glass to the West Stanley Disaster, 1909, ASHMM 2003.47/1; Memorial glass to the Barrington Colliery accident, 1894, ASHMM 2005.83/1; Memorial glass to the Seaham Colliery Explosion, 1880, ASHMM 2006.272/1. See also Memorial glass dish for the Newbiggin Fishing Disaster 1904, ASHMM 2004.73/10.


56 Musical score [undated], National Coal Mining Museum, YKSM.1999.83.1.

57 Daily Mail [supplement], 31 October 1899, 4.


60 Minutes, 3 December 1890, Jewish Sanitary Association or Jewish Ladies Visiting Association, GMCRO, MF2687.

61 News cuttings books, 1905–12, WSM papers, JRL, WSM/14/1–2.


63 Liverpool Mercury, 27 December 1895, 6.

64 The Social Beacon, December 1895, 6–7.

65 See, for example, comment pieces in the Derby Mercury, 22 December 1880, 1 and The Times, 27 December 1881, 7.

66 The Times, 10 December 1888, 9.


68 The Times, 24 December 1913, 7.
Notes

70 See The Times, 10 December 1888, 9; 27 December 1881, 7; 9 January 1885, 9; 26 December 1911, 7; 25 December 1908; 24 December 1913, 7; and 24 December 1910, 9. F. J. M., The Speaker, 22 December 1906, 348–9. See also Belgravia, 77, January 1892, 47–56, for similar comments.
72 See multiple toy and in-kind Christmas appeals by Manchester organizations: Manchester Guardian, 11 December 1905, 12; 17 December 1907, 5.
73 See Henry C. Burdett in The Times, 18 December 1897, 8.
76 The Officer, December 1893, 356–7.
77 Delving and Diving, 3, January 1882, 62; 3, November 1881, 31.
78 All the World, May 1908, 229. See All the World, March 1907, for tabulated annual increments from 1888.
79 The Officer, September 1893, 275–8; September 1895, 272–5.
80 Young Helpers League Magazine, 1892, 37–8; 1899, 181.
81 All the World, March 1897, 101.
82 Daily Mail, 4 November 1903, 3; Grantham Journal, 7 November 1903, 7.
83 Portsmouth Evening News, 29 September 1903, 2.
84 The Times, 17 November 1903, 10.
85 Grantham Journal, 7 November 1903, 7; Daily Telegraph, 7 October 1903, 12.
86 Yorkshire Evening Post, 2 November 1903, 2.
87 Prochaska, Royal Bounty.
88 See, for example, Evening Telegraph, 12 January 1898, 3, and Morning Post, 6 March 1900, 3.
89 Correspondence, Governor of Texas, Joseph Sayers, to Henry Irving, 20 November 1900, Henry Irving Papers, V & A Theatre Museum, THM/37/1/40.
91 See, for instance, Croydon Dramatic Club, patronized by local politicians and civic dignitaries, gave unspecified ‘dramatic performances’ in the parish rooms in aid of Croydon’s Institution for Trained Nurses. John Rylands Library, University of Manchester, Annie Horniman Papers, AEH 3/2–15.
92 Truth, 9 July 1891, 58.
93 The Graphic, 25 June 1870, 44.
94 Truth, 16 July 1891, 112.
95 Wandering Minstrels Archive, British Library (BL), K.6.e.2.
96 Wandering Minstrels Archive, Album III, BL, 188201899, K.6.e.3, Item 56.
97 Wandering Minstrels Archive, Album I, BL, K.6.e.1.
98 London cyclists also proposed annual races in aid of the Metropolitan Hospitals Fund. *Cycling: An Illustrated Weekly*, 5 November 1892, 246.
99 Minute book 2, 15 February 1897, WSM papers, JRL, WSM 1/1/2. Sums ranging from £50 to £60 accrued to the Mission as a result over the next few years. Other charities including hospitals also benefited. *Manchester Guardian*, 15 August 1898, 10; 27 August 1900, 9.
100 Manchester and Salford Harriers Cyclists’ Procession (1901), BFI Mitchel and Kenyon collection: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8FLeQpeVT8. Similar parades took place elsewhere contemporaneously: *Burnley Express*, 19 June 1895, 3; *Isle of Man Times*, 11 June 1898, 8; *Gloucester Citizen*, 26 September 1902, 3; *Hull Daily Mail*, 19 March 1909, 3.
101 Annual Reports, passim, WSM papers, JRL, WSM/2/1/1.
103 Minute book 2, 12 October 1903, WSM papers, JRL, WSM 1/1/2.
104 Children from beneficiary charitable institutions were also often invited to take part in the cycling parades. Minute book, June 1901, WSM papers, JRL, WSM 1/1/2; *Manchester Guardian*, 9 July 1901, 7.
107 *Evening Telegraph*, 19 June 1903, 4.
112 *Hull Daily Mail*, 14 November 1908, 5.
114 *The Graphic*, 4 September 1875, 3. Although it was suggested, the hapless Thomas William Burgess, second to complete the feat in 1911 after multiple failed attempts over the previous decade, did not attract the same level of financial appreciation. *Daily Mail*, 8 September 1911, 4.
3 Building and Protecting Charity Brands

5 Examples of each of these from the COS files include the ‘Distressed Gentlefolk’s Aid Association’, the ‘Mariner’s Friend Society’, the ‘Children’s Country Holiday Fund’, the ‘Christian Men’s Union’, the ‘Rural Labourers’ League’, the ‘Providence Row Night Refuge’, the ‘Domestic Servants Benevolent Institute’, the ‘Royal


11 Fifty-eight annual report, 1906, Mariners’ Friend Society files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/14/1; Appeal leaflet, c. 1890s, St. Andrew's Waterside Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/105/1.

12 Letter, 2 June 1892, Church Lads’ Brigade files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/230/1.

13 See League of Welldoer publications, LRO, M364LWD/7/1.

14 Letter, 1 November 1873, Drury Lane Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/30/1.

15 See cards from William P. Blevin, and others in League of Welldoers printed materials, LRO, M364LWD/12/6.


19 Ibid.


22 Appeal leaflet, c. 1870s, Female Mission to the Fallen, files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/69/1.
27 See Ash, *Funding Philanthropy*, 13–82, on the power of the ‘open door’ metaphor in Barnardo’s brand.
32 Annual report of Home for Destitute Children, 1874, LRO, 286 OWE/10/7.
33 North End Domestic Mission Annual Reports, LRO, 266/NOR/2/1.
34 Minute book, 15 November 1912, Santa Fina records, GMCRO, M802/1/15; Annual reports, Santa Fina records, GMCRO, M802/1/16. The name seems to have been dropped in Annual Reports by 1915, although for a couple of years Annual Reports and fundraising material retained the ‘sub’ name ‘Santa Fina Branch’ to avoid losing established donors.
38 Present-day studies on charity brand personality indicate that benevolence remains a key element of brand personality across all charities. Adrian Sergeant, John B. Ford and Jane Hudson, ‘Charity Brand Personality: The Relationship with Giving Behaviour’, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (2008): 474.
39 ‘To Church People’ appeal circular, c. 1890s, St. Andrew’s Waterside Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/121/1.
41 *The Harvest*, October 1892, 24.
42 *The Harvest*, January 1893, 78.
44 ‘Mission’ as a nomenclature was of course not exclusive to nonconformist organizations and a number of Anglican and Catholic organizations also used the term; they might signal a confessional identity by prefixing with a saint, for example.
45 For example, prompted by complaints of proselytizing of Catholic children in Protestant homes levelled by the Catholic bishop of Salford, a raft of letters and editorials in Manchester publications sustained a long debate in 1887. News cuttings book, 1882–1911, Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls Refuges papers, GMCRO, M189/8/5/2.
47 Appeal leaflets, c. 1880s, St. Giles Christian Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/019/007.
50 Annual reports, 1884–1904, Liverpool RSPCA files, LRO, M364 CHC/126.
52 Wagner, Barnardo, 62.
53 Although see Lori Loeb, ‘George Fulford and Patent Medicine Men: Quack Mercenaries or Smilesian Entrepreneurs’, Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 16 (1999): 126–7, on the point that other alternative medicines were marketed on the basis of not being from the established and, by implication, ineffective medical profession.
55 See Chapter 4 for more on the various Gordon homes.
57 Lopes and Casson, 'Entrepreneurship', 291.
58 Minute book, 27 October 1908, WSM papers, JRL, WSM 1/1/3; Manchester Guardian, 25 November 1908.
60 The Mirror, 27 October 1890, 4, London Cottage Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/066/010. See also Truth, 6 November 1890, 929–35, for full charges against Austin.
64 ‘Mrs Birt’s good work among the slum children of Liverpool’, Liverpool Citizen, 14 January 1888, 10, LRO, 050 CIT.
65 Liverpool Infant asylum, also known as ‘Salisbury House School’, LRO 362 SAL/4/1–4.
66 See League of Welldoer printed materials, LRO, M364LWD/7/1.
67 Two of the most popular bogus collection tricks were posing as a religious fundraiser, and posing as collecting money for miners. Ad Clerum (warning to check if clerical collectors genuine), 1899, Salford Diocesan Archives, Bilsborrow Acta, Vol. 1899–1900, 103. Sheffield Independent, 8 June 1886, 6; Morning Post,
9 August 1888, 6. *Sheffield Evening Telegraph*, 25 August 1902, 3. Many of these frauds were prosecuted under vagrancy laws.


69 *Glasgow Herald*, 30 September 1898, 9.

70 *The Standard*, 23 January 1884, 3.


72 Intellectual Property Office trademarks database (IPO), UK0000036066 (11/03/1884); IPO, UK0000036069 (11/03/1884); IPO, UK0000038350 (01/07/1884): https://trademarks.ipo.gov.uk/ipo-tmtext (accessed 12 January 2017).


77 *Morning Post*, 17 April 1892, 5.

78 See *Morning Post*, 7 July 1884, 3.

79 *Morning Post*, 5 January 1886, 3.

80 Birmingham boasted a ‘Home for Destitute and Working Boys’, which enjoyed mayoral and local elite support. By 1885 it was known as the Home for Working Boys. Unlike the commercial outfits, Birmingham boys were assisted in finding employment or training to a trade. The boys received a penny per shilling earned and had further cash incentives towards good behaviour and self-improvement. The boys’ earning in total amounted to an estimated third of the running costs for the Home although its fortunes fluctuated over the next twenty years. *Birmingham Daily Post*, 12 July 1883, 5; 30 November 1886, 4. The word ‘destitute’ was dropped in 1885 on account of the stigma attached to it and associated bullying of boys in factories and so on. *Birmingham Daily Post*, 25 November 1892, 3. See *Birmingham Daily Post*, 2 December 1892, 3, for an article on whether or not to continue.

81 *Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, 8 December 1885, 5. *Cheshire Observer*, 23 April 1892, 7; *Liverpool Mercury*, 6 August 1891, 5; *Sunderland and Daily Echo*, 21 April 1893, 2; *Gloucester Citizen*, 7 June 1895, 3; *Edinburgh Evening News*, 11 June 1895, 2.

83 Illustrated Police News, 23 August 1879, 4.
85 Memories of scandal did stick. Some twenty years after being exposed for poor financial management and exploitation, the damaged reputation of the ‘Kilburn Sisterhood’ (criticized in the Times and Truth in the mid-1890s) was raising queries in the mind of potential donors over the worthiness of the ‘Sisterhood of St Peters, Kilburn’. Letter to COS, 1896, St Peter’s Home & Sisterhood files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/34/1.

4 Policing Fraud: Regulation and Accountability in the Charity Market

4 Every county archive in Britain will contain examples of exchanges and bureaucracy relating to endowments. See, for instance, in the West Yorkshire Archives the papers of the Nettleton charity set up in the parish of Almondbury, Nettleton’s Charity Almondbury 1613–1977, WYA, WYK/KC643/2/2.
6 The Charities Act of 1960 also repealed various mortmain and charitable Trusts Acts of 1853, 1856 and 1860.
7 The concept of virtuous marketplace is borrowed from Victoria E. Thompson, The Virtuous Marketplace: Women and Men, Money and Politics in Paris, 1830–1870 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). It also refers to the

8 The notable exceptions were specific war charities which were regulated and registered as a result of two acts in 1916 and 1940 respectively. The 1940 act was repealed by the 1992 Charities act. In contrast, organizations such as Friendly Societies were formally subjected to auditing and transparency rules by the 1872 Friendly Societies Act.


10 Harrison, Peaceable Kingdom, 217–59.


15 The Times, 10 December 1888, 13.

16 The Times, 17 November 1888, 15. The allure of well-known figures on committees as a successful marketing tool was replicated in the financial world with the appointment of public figures on Boards of Directors. Taylor, Boardroom Scandal, 177.

17 The Times, 7 December 1888, 13.


20 Owen, English Philanthropy, 229.

21 Low’s and Fry’s guides went through several editions and name changes. Sampson Low, Low’s One Shilling Guide to the Charities of London: Corrected to April 1863 (London: S. Low, 1863); Herbert Fry, The Shilling Guide to the London Charities for

Annual Charities Register and Digest (London: Longman, 1890), i.

22 Samples of Cautionary Cards available in COS archives: for example, Cautionary Card, 1897, Cautionary Card, 1907, COS papers, LMA, A/FWA/C/A/03/035 and A/FWA/C/A/03/043/01.

23 Charles Stewart Loch, initially a COS volunteer, became secretary in 1875, serving until 1914. According to his *Times* obituary, ‘He made the COS. He was the COS’.


27 See, for example, a sequence of responses to a COS *Times* advert against Reuben May, 1880–81, Great Arthur Street Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/26/6–9.

28 For a superb example of this, see the archives of the third Duke of Sutherland held in Staffordshire County Record Office, Series D 593/V/10 – used extensively in Chapter 6 below.


31 Henry Du Pré Labouchere (1831–1912) was Liberal parliamentary representative for Northamptonshire for twenty-five years from 1880 and an energetic journalist whose exposés often pre-empted those of W. T. Stead, the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Labouchere is best remembered for proposing the clause on homosexuality to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 under which Oscar Wilde was tried. Gary Weber, ‘Henry Labouchere, *Truth* and the New Journalism of Late Victorian Britain’, *Victorian Periodicals Review* 26, no. 1 (1993): 37; Claire Hirshfield,
Notes


32 *Truth*, 5 July 1877–23 August 1877.

33 *Truth*, 26 July 1877, 123–4; 2 August 1877, 156–7; Padroni, more usually associated with America, were middlemen who rented out the labour of their fellow Italian immigrants. See Joseph P. Cosco, *Imagining Italians: The Clash of Romance and Race in American Perceptions, 1880–1910* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 15.

34 *Truth*, 9 August 1877, 188–9.

35 *Truth*, 19 July 1877, 90–2; 23 August 1877, 251–3. The COS had extensive files on all of these institutions: Barnardo files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/10/1; Great Arthur Street Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/26/1; London Society for Employment of Necessitous Gentlewomen files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/39/1; Middlesex Soup Kitchen files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/28/1. For a report on the COS investigation of Reuben May, see also *Christian Commonwealth*, 22 April 1886.

36 *Truth*, 23 August 1877, 251–3.

37 For Labouchere versus the Zierenbergs, proprietors of the St James Home for Inebriates, see *The Standard*, 14 December 1893, 2; for the unsuccessful libel case taken by the begging letter writer G. Brooks, see *Liverpool Mercury*, 18 December 1896, 7; for a rare case that went against Labouchere, see *Reynold’s Newspaper*, 2 December 1894, 3. However, the plaintiff, a Reverend Macmillan, was granted only a farthing in compensation and told he should never have taken the case.

38 Wontner and Co. solicitors to C. S. Loch, 2 November 1892, St James Home for Female Inebriates files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/70/6.


40 This was initially carried in the columns of the main paper as a ‘twelve month’s black list’ from 1903; from 1906 it was a supplement to the paper; from 1907 it was available to buy separately. *Truth*, 22 January 1903; 6 February 1907; 12 February 1908. The association between *Truth* and scandal reportedly cost Labouchere a post in the 1892–95 Liberal government when Queen Victoria refused to sanction the editor and proprietor of *Truth* holding office under the crown. Herbert Sidebotham, *Henry Du Pré Labouchere* entry, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), online edn: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30600 (accessed 5 September 2017).

41 See, for example, *Dundee Courier & Argus*, 4 January 1894, 3; *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 26 January 1895, 6; *North-Eastern Daily Gazette*, 27 August 1896, 4.
Notes


49 St Agatha’s Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/31/1; League of Welldoers files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/283/1.

50 Loch to Mr Cruckenthorpe, 12 December 1900, St Giles Christian Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/19/005.


52 So much so that, as with Lee and Lloyd Jones, those who denounced others were also liable to investigation.

53 Correspondence between Lee Jones and Lloyd Jones, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364LWD/28/5/1.

54 See Jones’s list in correspondence with Asst. Head Constable and Head Constable of Liverpool Police and editors of Liverpool press, 8 February 1905, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/4. The ‘questionable’ charities were: Pastor Black’s Children’s Homes and Mission; Mr Baxter’s Old Forecastle Mission; Mr Housley’s United Christian Mission; Rev. Hugh L. Jones’s Gospel News Children’s Mission; Mrs. Morris’s White Rock Home for Children; Mrs. H. S. Pike’s Shoeblack’s Home. Later investigations extended to include Mrs. Price’s Bethesda

55 For the sake of consistency with the archival references, this book will use the name League of Welldoers throughout.

56 For extent of charity’s debts, see assorted correspondence and documents in League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364LWD 15/40–41; 15/50–59; 15/61 and 15/107.

57 Lee Jones’s anxiety about confused identities was not misplaced; the metropolitan-based Charity Organisation Society investigated whether Lee Jones was, in fact, Lloyd Jones. See League of Welldoers files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/283/1.

58 Lee Jones’s notes, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/1. No record of ordination could be traced and in census returns for 1901 and 1911, Lloyd Jones’s occupation appeared as a publisher and ‘missioner.’ Census of England and Wales, return for Hugh Jones, 8 Grey Rock Street, West Derby, 1901; Hugh Jones, 2 Elgin Street, Birkenhead, 1911.

59 Porcupine, 3 February 1905.


63 Lee Jones’s notes, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/1.

64 See letter from James McKinley to J. Griffin, editor of Birkenhead News, forwarded in correspondence to Lee Jones, 31 May 1908, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/8.


66 Correspondence between Jones and Asst. Head Constable Liverpool Police, 16 August 1907, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364.LWD/28/5/4. Some proceedings were brought against suspect children’s charities for neglect. See, especially, details of prosecution against White Rock Home for child neglect, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/3/10–11.

68 Balance sheet and commentary reprinted in the Welldoer, March 1908, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/1.

69 Jones was aware of national ‘cautionary list’ schemes; copies of the Truth Cautionary List scheme, discussed below, and correspondence with the editor of Truth are collated in his archive, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/6, and he corresponded with the editor of this list regarding several of his ‘questionable’ charities: League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/1/12 and LWD 28/1/2; M364 LWD/28/2/15; M364 LWD/28/3/15–18.


71 See, for instance, Lee Jones’s correspondence with editor of Courier, 20 December 1907, regarding Pastor Black’s Children’s Homes; and J. Griffin, editor of Birkenhead News, 31 May 1908, regarding Reverend Jones League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/8.

72 Liverpool Courier, 26 December 1909. Jones was adept at transforming the mundane into something extraordinary: a routine letter from the Royal palace congratulating the correspondent on good works was trumpeted as a personal endorsement of the Mission from the king and queen. See cuttings from Birkenhead News, 1911, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/1.

73 Correspondence between Lloyd Jones and Lee Jones, 9 October 1907, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/17–18 and 23.

74 Correspondence between Lee Jones and key local figures 1893–1910, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364LWD/11–22. Rathbone thought that the elite had a responsibility to lead efforts to relieve the poor. See William Rathbone, Social Duties: Considered with Reference to the Organization of Effort in Works of Benevolence and Public Utility (London: Macmillan & Co, 1867).

75 Cutting from The Guardian, 15 March 1905, League of Welldoers files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/283/1. Margaret Simey in her history of charitable effort in Liverpool was less forgiving, arguing that Jones had all the ‘skill of an advertising agent’, was combative in denouncing others but had no regard – in his first decade at least – for accounting of income and expenditure. See Margaret Simey, Charity Rediscovered: A Study of Philanthropic Effort in Nineteenth-Century Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1992), 119–23.

76 League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD 15/145 and 20/29–35; for instance, M364 LWD 15/38; 15/78–79; 15/81–85 and 15/5–6.

77 Correspondence with John Rowland, 21 February 1905, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364 LWD/28/5/12.
78 For practices associated with 'naming and shaming', see Andy Croll, 'Street Disorder, Surveillance and Shame: Regulating Behaviour in the Public Spaces of the Late Victorian British Town', Social History 24, no. 3 (1999): 250–68.


80 Loch to George Prior, 6 August 1885, Great Arthur Street Mission files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/26/012.

81 That newspapers performed a contradictory role in promoting and exposing frauds is underscored here; the editor of John Bull was the fraudulent Horatio Bottomley. See Alan Hyman, The Rise and Fall of Horatio Bottomley: The Biography of a Swindler (London: Cassell, 1972).


83 The Times, 2 July 1880; Truth, 24 May 1900, 1258. Labouchere had long been a strong ally of Chamberlain. On the Charity Commission's inadequacies, see Owen, English Philanthropy, 215–46.


86 The Times, 10 December 1888, 9.

87 Truth, 19 July 1877, 90–2.


90 For some, the legislation was 'tardy and ineffective'; more recently James Taylor has disputed this, suggesting that more cases (approximately ten per year), of corporate crime came before the courts in the late nineteenth century than is generally imagined. Taylor, Boardroom Scandal. See also, John Briggs et al., Crime and Punishment in England: An Introductory History (London: Routledge, 1996), 187–8; and George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845–1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

91 Truth, 20 November 1890, 1012–14.

92 Jerome Caminada, Twenty-Five Years of Detective Life (Manchester: J. Heywood, 1895), 236.


94 Lloyd Jones fundraising material, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, M364LWD/28/5/9.
Notes

95 Samuel Hawkes to Lee Jones, 18 May 1908, League of Welldoers papers, LRO, LWD M364, 28/1/5.
96 Truth, 14 August 1890, 576–7.
97 Annual Charities Register and Digest, xlvii.
100 Truth, 14 August 1890, 332.
101 Truth, 20 April 1905, 1001.

5 Aristocratic Fundraising and the Politics of Imperial Humanitarianism


5 Gill, *Calculating Compassion*, 25–47.


8 Gill, *Calculating Compassion*, 98.


12 Richards, *The Highland Clearances*, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2013). ‘The Sutherlandshire reclamations,’ *The Daily Free Press*, The Sheep Grazing of Sutherland, from the *Transactions of the Highland Society*, 1890, Miscellany Scrap Book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/24/7/7. Richards argues that the expenditure on estate improvement in Scotland grossly exceeded the income. The third Duke thus inherited the largest aristocratic fortune in Britain but one that was unsustainable on traditional revenue streams. The third Duke’s subsequent investment strategy continued on the agrarian lines of his predecessors but included a greater reliance on industrial ventures. Richards, *Highland Clearances*, 283–97.

13 George Charles Bingham was implicated in the disastrous charge of the light brigade, and was also known for his harsh terms as a landlord in Ireland.

14 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.


19 Letter from Vicountess Strangford to Austen Layard, 8 September 1877 (ff. 54), vol. LXXXV (ff. 289), September–October 1877, Layard Papers, BL, add MS 39015.

20 She later led hospitals in Adrianople and Sophia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. She was captured with her hospital staff in 1877. On her death aboard the *Lusitania* in 1887, her *Times* obituary noted that Strangford had never recovered from the sufferings inflicted by her captivity at the hands of the Russian. *The Times*, 28 March 1887, 10.

21 Letter from Angela Burdett Coutts to Layard, 9 April 1878 (ff. 208), vol. LXXXVII, December 1877–January 1878, Layard Papers, BL, add MS 39017. Note, we use ‘Constantinople’ for consistency with contemporary sources.

22 Letters from Vicountess Strangford, 24 October 1877 (ff. 86) and 21 November (ff. 137), vol. LXXXVI, October 1877, Layard Papers, BL, add MS 29016.


26 See, for example, *The Morning Post*, 24 November 1877, 5.

27 *Daily Telegraph*, 3 September 1877, 5.

28 Florence Nightingale to Paulina Irby, c. 1875–76, Nightingale papers, British Library, Ms45795, ff. 86–91.
29 William Lehman Ashmead Burdett-Coutts to Layard, 3 December 1878, Layard papers, British Library, Ms39023, ff. 290.

30 *The Morning Post*, 24 November 1877, 5.

31 See, for instance, *Daily News*, 15 February 1877, 2; and *The Morning Post*, 13 April 1877, 5.


33 *The Graphic*, 22 December 1877.

34 Charities catalogue pages, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/V/10. Unfortunately, the accounts of this estate are less precise than for other large estates. It includes a range of contributions to Foxley Charity, Deaf and Dumb Institute, Working Men’s mission Winter appeal, a British Belleville Mission (in Paris) and so on. See Fortecue papers, Devon Record Office (Exeter), 1262M/FZ26, for a considerably more comprehensive account of a large estate’s charitable expenditures. The Fortescue supported around thirty-one individuals and charities per quarter. Though a wealthy family with large estates in Ireland and the South West, their wealth could not be compared with the Sutherlands’ estate.

35 Letter from Angela Burdett-Coutts to Layard, 28 September 1877 (ff. 185), vol. LXXXV, September–October 1877, Layard Papers, BL, add MS 39015.

36 Central committee minute book, 1877–79, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/4/1.

37 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 3, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

38 Minutes of the Stafford House Committee, 5 July 1878, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/4/2.


40 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 183, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1. This calculation is based on the methods of www.measuringworth.com. On a GDP per capita or income value, the figure would be £38,630,000.

41 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, iii, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

42 Out-letter book (England no. 2), March 1878–September 1878, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/2/4.

43 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 11, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

44 Morris, *First Aid*, 152.

45 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 40, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1; Month lists of ambulance and hospital staff of the Stafford House Committee and those under Lord Blantyre, 1877–78, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/2.
Monthly lists of ambulance and Hospital Staff printed in Constantinople, format c. A2, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/2.

Florence Nightingale to Paulina Irby, c. 1875–76, Nightingale papers, British Library, Ms45795, ff. 86–91.

Stafford House Minute book, 21 December 1877, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/4/1–2.

Report and record of the Committee, April 1879, 4, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

Stafford House cheque stubs, 1877–79, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/3/5.

See Taylor, Boardroom Scandal.

Third Duke's non-estate business interests, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/27.

Third Duke's non-estate business interests, 1865–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/27/1–6; Railway interests in Great Britain, 1829–1914, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/33.


See, for example, The Northern Echo, 31 August 1877 and The Times, 14 September 1877, 5.

Just Faaland, Does Foreign Aid Reach the Intended Beneficiaries? (Bergen: Derap, 1983).

The Times, 14 September 1877, 5.

Evening Standard, 2 September 1877, Scrapbook, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/7.

Vanity Fair, 5 January 1878, Scrapbook, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/7. See also Gill, Calculating Compassion, 117–23.

Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 14, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

See, for example, Richard Williams to Sir E. Cromwell, 30 August 1878, Out-letter book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/2/2.

Kennett-Barrington to his wife, 13 March 1878, Morris, First Aid, 152.


66 MacPherson, *Under the Red Crescent*, 16.


68 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 127–8, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

69 Letters from Kennett-Barrington commissioner General to the Committee, March 1878, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/2/1.

70 *Judy*, 29 August 1877, 201.


72 *Bath Chronicle*, 31 January 1878, 6.

73 *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1878, 5.

74 *The Morning Post*, 6 March 1880, 5; and *Sheffield Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 1880, 2.

75 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 26, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

76 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 40, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1. Of the forty-five working for the Red Crescent, seven had died; in the British Red Cross, three out of fourteen were ill.

77 The Turkish Compassionate Fund was reported as being in charge of around 40,000 people by April 1878. *The Advertiser*, 6 April 1878.


79 Report and record of the Committee, 1879, 41, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/2/1/1.

80 At the outset of the war, Forbes had been attached to the Russian army and wrote of the ‘splendid valour’, ‘bravery and humanity’ of the Russian soldier opposed to the ‘barbarism’ of the Turks. See Gill, *Calculating Compassion*, 80–4.


82 *The Spectator*, 9 January 1878; *Echo*, 12 January 1878.

83 *Punch*, 26 January 1878, Miscellany Scrap Book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/24/7/7.
84 *Vanity Fair*, 26 January 1878, Miscellany Scrap Book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P24/7/7.
85 *Vanity Fair*, n.d. (c. January 1878), Miscellany Scrap Book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P24/7/7.
86 ‘The Eastern question’ (c. 1878), Miscellany Scrap Book, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P24/7/7.
89 Letters from Kennett-Barrington Commissioner General to the Committee, March 1878, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/2/2/1.
95 Sutherland to Layard, 11 May 1878 (ff. 76), vol. XC (ff. 401) May–June 1878, Layard papers, BL, add Ms 39020.
97 Stafford House Committee to promote an Asia Minor and Euphrates railway, 1878, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/3.
Notes

99 Upper Congo Exploration Committee, 1879–82, minutes of meeting with the king, 26 March 1879, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/5.

100 Legal papers of Upper Congo Exploration Committee, 1879–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/5/2.

101 Memorandum, Upper Congo Exploration Committee, 1879–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/5.


103 Minutes of the March 29 meeting, Upper Congo Exploration Committee, 1879–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/5.

104 The interest in Chinese railways began in 1873 at the bequest of Belgian and British railway industrialists. Letter on formation of Chinese committee, 1873, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P/26/1/1.


108 Clara Burdett Patterson, Angela Burdett-Coutts and the Victorians (London: John Murray, 1953), 205–22. Burdett-Coutts's main charitable priorities were mostly domestic and included church building, the protection of children, relief work in Ireland in 1880 which was combined with the development of the Irish fishing fleet (a strategy emulating that developed by the Sutherland in Scotland); Diane Orton, Made of Gold: A Biography of Angela Burdett Coutts (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980).

109 Burdett Patterson, Angela, 210.

110 Morning Post, 4 June 1879, Scrapbook, South African Committee, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/4/4.

111 Morning Post, 5 June 1879, Scrapbook, South African Committee, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/4/4.

112 Morning Post, 11 June 1879, Scrapbook, South African Committee, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/4/4.


Letter from secretary, 22 May 1884, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D503/P26/8.


Strangford to Gladstone, 17 August 1882 (ff. 48), *Vol CCLII*, Gladstone papers, BL, add. MS. 56450.


6 Franchise Fundraising: Mansion House Appeals


8 See *The Social Franchising Manual.*


11 Ibid.


19 *The Officer*, January 1899, 7–9.


25 *The Star*, 7 June 1888, 2.
26 Gordon's School remains at the site to this day, and still styles itself 'The National Memorial to General Gordon'. Peter McBurnie, The Gordon Schools: A Short History (Aberdeen: Grant Print, 2002). Our thanks to Dr Max Jones for this reference.

27 Daily News, 13 January 1886, 6; Essex Standard, 28 March 1891, 2.

28 There were also at least two Gordon Boys' Homes attached to the Gordon Boys Brigade, at Southampton and Portsmouth. Southampton Herald, 21 January 1899, 3.


30 Manchester Times, 31 October 1890, 8; Manchester Courier, 26 December 1890, 51.


32 Kensington COS to CS Loch, 9 June 1905, Gordon Boys Orphanage files, COS Enquiry Dept, LMA, A/FWA/C/D/178/1.


36 Dover Express, 16 March 1900, 5.


39 Annual Report, 1876, Liverpool RSPCA files, LRO, M364 CHC/126.

40 For those interested: 'Why does the Lord Mayor like pepper? Because without his K.N., he'd be ill.' A. A. Milne, 'The Lord Mayor', in idem, If I May (London: Methuen, 1921), 92–7


43 The Times, 26 March 1910, 11. A previous estimate was for £2.1 million raised between 1872 and 1893, making the seventeen years in between especially productive. The Times, 14 November 1893, 3. For the later estimate, see The Times, 8 November 1927, xii.


These figures are derived from newspaper reports of multiple fatality accidents that attracted relief funds of one form or another. Many incidents overlap in terms of how they might be categorized – for example, industrial fires – but no accident has been counted in more than one category.

46 York Herald, 23 December 1872, 7; Derby Daily Telegraph, 21 September 1900, 3; The Times, 12 September 1890, 8; The Standard, 26 June 1877, 3; Manchester Courier, 18 July 1892, 5; Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1900, 9.


48 The Western Mail opened several funds in aid of major Welsh colliery disaster victims in the 1890s. Western Mail, 12 June 1890, 3; 19 November 1892, 7; 21 June 1893, 4. The Daily Telegraph’s famous ‘Shilling Fund’ during the South African war at the end of the century was therefore part of a growing tradition. (Indeed, the same paper had had a similar, if smaller, ‘shilling fund’ in 1895 on the rather less disastrous occasion of the cricketer W. G. Grace’s 100th first class century. See Derek Birley, Sport and the Making of Britain [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993], 341).

49 According to amalgamated news reports, these funds account for £4,180,968 worth of aid, which is certainly an underestimate of the aid money that passed through the Mansion House during the period. Without surviving central records, however, the true figure is difficult to pin down.

50 Manchester Guardian, 30 September 1908, 3.

51 See, for example, Morning Post, 4 October 1880, 7; The Standard, 13 October 1893, 2; Manchester Guardian, 17 April 1908, 4.

52 Minute book, 1885–1911, Clifton Hall Colliery Relief Fund papers, GMCRO, M294/6/1/2.

53 These dates refer to the Hartley Colliery disaster of 1862, the Lancashire ‘Cotton Famine’ of the same year and the Oaks Colliery disaster of 1866, each of which benefited from Mansion House Funds. The ‘Captain’ shipping disaster fund of 1870 and the Franco-Prussian War fund opened at the Mansion House in 1871 widened the remit and set the tone for the next several decades of funds. See Anna Milford, ‘Charity begins at the Mansion House’, The Lady, 6 November 1984.

54 For example, see Minute book, 1889, Hyde Colliery Relief Fund, Tameside Local Studies and Archives, CA/HYD/119/23.

55 Cases where the mayor declined to launch an official Mansion House Fund but let it be known that he would accept any donations sent to him on behalf of local mayoral funds include the Haydock Colliery explosion at Wigan in 1878, the Clifton Hall colliery accident in 1885 and the Penncuick colliery explosion in
56 *The Times*, 24 February 1874, 6; Corporation minute book, 1874, LRO, MIN/SPE/1/4.
57 See *Sunday Times*, 7 June 1874, 1, for a flavour of the different ‘franchisees’.
58 Indian Famine relief fund, November–December 1877, Devon Record Office (Exeter), D3773/3/234.
60 For example, *Illustrated London News*, 13 June 1874, 562.
61 Blackburn committee to Clayton-le-Moors Indian Famine Fund, 26 January 1897, Lancashire Record Office, UDCL/31/3.
63 Rothschild connections to the Mansion House continued: the family was represented on the committee when the mayor launched an appeal on behalf of persecuted Russian Jews in 1882. John Cooper, *The Unexpected Story of Nathaniel Rothschild* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 107–10.
64 *Daily Telegraph*, 28 July 1874, 2.
66 *Sheffield Independent*, 7 July 1874, 6.
67 *The Times*, 16 November 1912, 7.
68 *Birmingham Daily Post*, 9 October 1874, 8; Scrapbook, Regent’s Canal Relief Fund, 1874, Royal and Sun Alliance files, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/028/MS38840/003.
69 *Aberdeen Journal*, 12 October 1877, 3.
70 *Bristol Mercury*, 4 February 1878, 5.
71 *Liverpool Mercury*, 16 September 1878, 7.
72 *Leeds Mercury*, 16 November 1878, 2; Steamer ‘Princess Alice’ and Abercarne Colliery relief fund, 1878, Yarmouth Town Clerk’s files, Norfolk Record Office, Y/TC 90/2/19.
73 *Reynold’s Newspaper*, 12 March 1882, 2.
74 *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 12 January 1878, 3.
75 *The Times*, 26 October 1871, 9.
Notes

76 Huddersfield Daily Chronicle, 14 January 1880, 4. This was also set up to rival the Duchess of Marlborough’s Fund, named for the then Lord Lieutenant’s wife. The Irish Crisis of 1879–80: Proceedings of the Mansion House Relief Committee (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1881).

77 Mansion House Committee for the Defence of Property in Ireland, 1881–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/7b; The Times, 5 May 1881, 10.


79 Ibid.

80 Northern Echo, 22 December 1881, 2; Dundee Courier & Argus, 10 February 1883, 3.

81 Mansion House Committee for the Defence of Property in Ireland, 1881–82, Sutherland papers, SCRO, D593/P26/7b.

82 Morning Post, 8 August 1882, 2; The Standard, 8 August 1882, 6; Pall Mall Gazette, 24 August 1882, 6; Richard L. Harris, ‘William Morris, Eiríkur Magnússon, and Iceland: A Survey of Correspondence’, Victorian Poetry 13, nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter, 1975): 121.

83 Harris, ‘William Morris, Eiríkur Magnússon, and Iceland’, 125.


86 Northern Echo, 30 September 1882, 3.

87 York Herald, 11 November 1891, 4.

88 York Herald, 3 May 1892, 5; Pall Mall Gazette, 17 November 1892, 7; York Herald, 21 December 1892, 4; Aberdeen Journal, 19 September 1892, 5.

89 Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, 26 July 1892, 2; 30 August 1892, 7.

90 Hope, My Lord Mayor, 160.

91 The Times, 8 November 1927, xii.

92 Daily Telegraph, 21 February 1913, 13.

93 The Times, 5 January 1894, 6.

94 It is worth pointing out that Mike Davis greatly misrepresents the second of these funds as ‘desultory’ in relation to the parallel South African War funds, suggesting it amounted to just ‘7 per cent’ of the latter. Davis cites a figure given in the Times on 17 February 1900, the day after the lord mayor opened the fund, which was,
Notes

given the age of the fund, a creditable £52,000; by the end of 1900 it was well over a third of a million pounds. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 164. The claim is uncritically repeated in James Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 289.

95 The Times, 21 March 1903, 5; 17 April 1909, 4.

Conclusion

3 Gill, Calculating Compassion, 213.
7 One of its main advocate was of course a historian of Victorian Britain: Gertrude Himmelfarb, The De-moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).


13 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/charities-act-2016-new-fundraising-rules. This new legislation intended to tackle the commercial arm of the charitable market: so-called professional fundraisers to whom charities might subcontract their fundraising activities.
Bibliography

Primary sources

Archives

*Barclays Bank Archive*

Martin's Bank papers

*Birmingham Archives*

Commemorative handkerchief

*Birmingham Museum*

Commemorative postcards

*British Library*

Sir Austen Layard Correspondence
Florence Nightingale papers
Wandering Minstrels Archive

*Devon Record Office (Exeter)*

Fortescue Papers, Indian Famine Relief Fund (1877)
Letter book of Richard Brown, Portreeve of Tavistock (1874)

*Greater Manchester County Record Office*

Clifton Hall Colliery Relief Fund papers
Haydock Colliery Relief Funds, Legh of Lyme papers
Jewish Sanitary Association papers
League of Help papers
Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls Refuges papers
Manchester and Salford Invalid Children's Aid Association papers
Manchester, Salford and District South African War Fund
Minutes of the Soup Kitchen Committee of the Jewish Poor of Manchester
Miscellaneous bazaar ephemera
John Rylands Library
Wood Street Mission papers

Lancashire Record Office
Clayton-le-Moors Indian Famine Fund

Lancaster City Museum
Commemorative Ceramics Collection

Liverpool Record Office
Home for Destitute Children annual reports
League of Welldoers papers
Liverpool Temporary Home for Lost and Starving Dogs, Annual Reports
Liverpool RSPCA files

London Metropolitan Archive
Charity Organisation Society Enquiry Department files
Regent’s Canal Relief Fund (1874), Royal and Sun Alliance files

Museum of London
Commemorative handkerchief

Museum of Science and Industry
Commemorative objects collection

National Archives, Kew
Daily Telegraph Shilling Fund files, National Archives, Kew, NSC 21/501

National Army Museum
Absent-Minded Beggar Handkerchief

National Coal Mining Museum
Commemorative postcards, objects and images

National Railway Museum
Railway dog objects and images
Norfolk Record Office
Yarmouth Town Clerk's files

Northumberland Museum
Commemorative postcards and object

Salvation Army International Heritage Centre
Papers of the Salvation Army

Staffordshire County Record Office
Duke of Sutherland papers

Tameside Local Studies and Archive
Church bazaar archives

Tyne and Wear Museum
Commemorative objects

University of Liverpool Special Collections
Barnardo papers
William Rathbone papers

Victoria and Albert Museum
Commemorative handkerchief
Henry Irving Papers

West Yorkshire Archives
Netleton's Charity Almondbury papers

Newspapers and periodicals
Aberdeen Journal
The Academy
The Advertiser
All the World
Bath Chronicle
Belfast News-Letter
Belgravia
Birkenhead News
Birmingham Daily Post
Bow Bells
Bristol Mercury
Brothers and Sisters
Burnley Express
Charity Organisation Review
Cheshire Observer
The Child’s Guardian
The Christian World
The Church Advocate
The Courier and Argus
Cycling: An Illustrated Weekly
Daily Despatch
Daily Mail
Daily Mirror
Daily News
Daily Telegraph
Daily Telegraph (Launceston)
Delving and Diving
Derby Daily Telegraph
Derby Mercury
Dover Express
Dundee Courier & Argus
Echo
Edinburgh Evening News
Essex Standard
Evening Standard
Evening Telegraph
The Friend
Glasgow Herald
Gloucester Citizen
Grantham Journal
The Graphic
The Harvest
Huddersfield Chronicle
Hull Daily Mail
Illustrated London News
Illustrated Police News
Isle of Man Times
John Bull
Judy
Launceston Examiner
Leeds Mercury
Liverpool Citizen
Liverpool Mercury
The London Journal
Manchester Courier
Manchester Guardian
Manchester Times
The Mirror
Morning Post
The National Waifs Magazine
New York Times
Night and Day: A Monthly Record of Christian Missions and Practical Philanthropy
  (renamed National Waifs Magazine in 1899)
North-Eastern Daily Gazette
Northampton Mercury
The Northern Echo
Nottingham Evening Post
The Officer
Pall Mall Gazette
Penny Illustrated Paper
The Philanthropist
Porcupine
Portsmouth Evening News
Punch
The Quiver
Reynolds's Newspaper
Sheffield and Rotherham Independent
Sheffield Evening Telegraph
Sheffield Independent
The Social Beacon
Southampton Herald
The Speaker
The Spectator
The Standard
The Star
Sunday Times
Sunderland and Daily Echo
The Tasmanian
The Times
Truth
The United Methodist
Vanity Fair
Wakefield Express
Western Mail
Woman's Penny Paper
Women's Herald
Women's Signal
Worcestershire Chronicle
York Herald
Yorkshire Evening Post
Young Helpers’ League Magazine

Contemporary publications

A delver [Alfred Alsop], Tens Years in the Slums (Manchester: John Heywood, 1879)
Andrew, William Patrick, Euphrates Valley Route to India: In Connection with the Central Asian and Egyptian Questions (London: WH Allen & Company, 1882)
Annual Charities Register and Digest (London: Longman, 1890), i
Barnardo, T. J., A Brief Account of the Institutions Known as 'Dr. Barnardo's Homes' (London, 1879)
Barnardo, T. J., The King’s Business Requireth Haste (London: Shaw & Co., c. 1894), Barnardo papers
Barnardo, T. J., Something Attempted, Something Done! (London: J.F. Shaw & Co., 1889), 161
Caminada, Jerome, Twenty-Five Years of Detective Life (Manchester: J. Heywood, 1895)
Ewing, Juliana Horatia, The Story of a Short Life (SPCK: London, 1885)
Gladstone, William Ewart, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London: J. Murray, 1876)
Harrod's Stores, Victorian Shopping: Harrod's Catalogue 1895 (London: David & Charles, 1895)

*The Irish Crisis of 1879–80: Proceedings of the Mansion House Relief Committee* (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1881)


Low, Sampson, *Low’s One Shilling Guide to the Charities of London: Corrected to April 1863* (London: S. Low, 1863)

MacPherson, R. B., *Under the Red Crescent; or, Ambulance Adventures in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78* (1885; repr., New York: Scribner, 1897)


Neuman, A. R., *Dr Barnardo as I Knew Him* (London: Constable, 1914), 63


Waring, Edward J., *Spectacle Missions: Their Object, Advantage and Management* (London, 1887)

**Official papers**

Hansard, H. L., 3rd series, 216 (London, 1873)

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014

**Online**


‘Funeral of Children’s Home Founder, Doctor Barnardo’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sD1AiGmUbJY (accessed 4 March 2016)


social-enterprise-network/2012/nov/06/social-franchising-how-what-benefits (accessed 10 October 2016)

http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/CroydonGordonWS/ (accessed 8 February 2017);
http://www.the-icsf.or (accessed 10 October 2016);


Manchester and Salford Harriers Cyclists’ Procession (1901), BFI Mitchel and Kenyon collection, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8FLeQpeVT8


Unpublished material


Secondary sources


Ash, Susan, Funding Philanthropy: Dr Barnardo, Metaphor, Narrative and Spectacle (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016)


Birley, Derek, Sport and the Making of Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993)


Casson, Catherine and Mark Casson, The Entrepreneur in History: From Medieval Merchant to Modern Business Leader (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013)


Church, Roy and Christine Clark, 'Product Development of Branded, Packaged Household Goods in Britain, 1870–1914: Colman’s, Reckitt’s, and Lever Brothers,' *Enterprise and Society* 2, no. 3 (2001): 503–42


Coopey, Richard, Sean O’Connell and Dilwyn Porter, 'Mail Order in the United Kingdom, c. 1880–1960: How Mail Order Competed with Other Forms of Retailing,' *International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research* 9, no. 3 (1999)


Crawford-Spencer, Elizabeth, 'Deriving Meaning for Social Franchising from Commercial Franchising and Social Enterprise,' *Journal of Marketing Channels* 22, no. 3 (2015): 163–74


Croll, Andy, 'Street Disorder, Surveillance and Shame: Regulating Behaviour in the Public Spaces of the Late Victorian British Town,' *Social History* 24, no. 3 (1999): 250–68


Faaland, Just, Does Foreign Aid Reach the Intended Beneficiaries? (Bergen: Derap, 1983)


Flegel, Monica, Conceptualizing Cruelty to Children in Nineteenth-Century England Literature, Representation and the NSPCC (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016)


Gill, Rebecca, Calculating Compassion: Humanity and Relief in War, Britain 1870–1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013)


Gorsky, Martin, Patterns of Philanthropy Charity and Society in Nineteenth-Century Bristol (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999)


Hall, Donald E. (ed.), *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)


Harris, David, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Pub Co., 2007)


Bibliography


Bibliography


Kanazawa, Shusaku, “‘To Vote or Not to Vote’: Charity Voting and the Other Side of Subscriber Democracy in Victorian England”, *English Historical Review* 131, no. 549 (2016): 353–83


Bibliography


Milford, Anna, ‘Charity Begins at the Mansion House’, *The Lady*, 6 November 1984

Milne, A. A., *If I May* (London: Methuen, 1921)


Morgan, Simon, ‘Celebrity: Academic “Pseudo-event” or a Useful Concept for Historians?’, *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 1 (2011)


Bibliography


Richmond, Vivienne, 'Rubbish or Riches? Buying from Church Jumble Sales in Late-Victorian England', *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing* 2, no. 3 (2010): 327–41


Bibliography

Roddy, Sarah, Julie-Marie Strange and Bertrand Taithe, 'Humanitarian Accountability, Bureaucracy, and Self-Regulation: The View from the Archive', *Disasters* 39, s. 2 (2015): 188–203


Sergeant, Adrian, John B. Ford and Jane Hudson, ‘Charity Brand Personality: The Relationship with Giving Behaviour’, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (2008)


Waterloo Directory of English Newspapers and Periodicals


Index

Note: Page numbers in italics denote figures.

Aaker, Jennifer 66
‘Absent Minded Beggar, The’ (poem) 46
Accountability 6, 81, 83, 86–8, 97, 145
and aristocratic philanthropy 108–13
and self-regulation 88–93
Adelaide, Mary 107
administration, of charity 86–8, 90, 93, 110, 111, 118
advertising, advertisement 12–19, 25, 32, 37, 78, 85
advertising balloons 18
sensation advertising 19
agency franchising 123, 140–1
All the World 25–6
Alsop, Alfred 11, 19, 27, 33
Anglican Church see Church of England
animal welfare 71, 72, 128
anti-cruelty campaigns 72, 128
architecture 75–6
aristocratic philanthropy 6, 50, 52, 73, 78, 99–108
accountability and Stafford House 108–13
international fundraising and grandees 100–8
politics of humanitarian fundraising 113–19
Association for the Relief of Ladies in Distress (Ireland) 137
Association Internationale Africaine 116
Auditing 6, 42, 87, 90, 91, 97, 99, 110–11, 118, 134, 144
Austin, Walter 74, 75, 95, 98
Bahadur, Salar Jung (Nawab of Hyderabad) 102, 107
Baker, Valentine 114, 119
Balkans crises (1876–78) 99–100
aristocratic philanthropy in 103, 104
Barnardo, Thomas 11, 14, 19, 26, 28, 47, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 80, 85, 145, 170n. 54
Barnardo’s 11, 55, 124
advertising and promotion 14–15, 16, 17
arbitration 28–9, 74, 80
brand protection 74, 77
experience economy 49, 55
localized initiatives 13, 14
print and public relations 25, 26–7, 28–30, 30
purchase-triggered donations 36, 38, 39, 42
royal connections, utilization of 29–31, 31
seasonal shop windows 49
social depth of donor market 19–20, 21, 23
Waif photographs 14, 28, 38
Young Helpers’ League (YHL) 23
Bartlett, William Ashmead 119
Belgium 116–17
‘Big Society’ 147, 153n. 27, 194n. 8
Bingham, George Charles (Earl of Lucan) 102, 181n. 13
Birmingham 68, 78, 171n. 80
Blackman, Thomas 127
Blackpool Exhibition 20
Blind Poor Relief Society 79
Boer War funds 3, 45, 46
‘boomers’ 26
Booth, Catherine 31–2, 38, 65, 66
death of 153n. 5
Booth, Florence 21–2
Booth, General William 3, 10, 11, 25, 26, 31, 37, 38, 54, 65, 66, 159n. 128, 161n. 30
funeral of 9–10
Borthwick, Algernon 107, 114
Bottomley, Horatio 179n. 81
Boycott, Captain Charles 136
Boy Scout movement 5, 53, 127
Boys’ Own 27
Bradshaw, William Harper 97
branding, brands 59–60, 80
architecture 75–6
and aristocratic philanthropy 101, 106
brand personalities 59, 66–73, 144,
168n. 38
conscious strategy 65
elements of 60–6
failure of 66
imitation and imposture 75, 76,
77–80
logos 63
Mansion House Funds 132, 134, 135,
136–9, 140
motto/slogan 63–5
organization’s name 60–2
protection of 73–80
purposes 60
scientific charity 70–1
similar names 74–5
social franchising 124, 126, 127–8
symbols 62–3
trademarking 77, 78, 80
and typography 16, 63
and values 67, 68–9, 70, 72–3, 144
visual image 62, 63
Briggs, Asa 41–2
Bristol, voluntary charities in 4, 64
British National Society for Aid to the Sick
and Wounded in War 101, 107, 108,
111
British Red Cross 101, 108, 146
Brothers and Sisters 158n. 101
Bubbles 27
Bulgaria 103
Bulgarian Atrocities/Horrors 102, 103, 115
Bulgarian Peasants Relief Fund 102
Burdett, Sir Henry 22
Burdett-Coutts, Angela 187n. 111
decline of charitable enterprises 119
ladies committee 117, 118
Turkish Compassionate Fund 102, 104,
105, 107, 111, 112
Urania Cottage 101
Burgess, Thomas William 165n. 114
business franchising 123, 124
Calvinistic Methodist Women’s Town
Mission 69
Cameron, David 147
capitalism 4, 6, 32, 109, 116, 117, 121, 141,
145, 147
Casson, Mark 73
Catholic charity 68–9
Catholic Church 68
‘Catholic Rescue’ initiative 68
Catholic Working Boys Homes 78
Cautionary Card 84–5, 88
Cautionary List 86, 88, 178n. 69
Cavendish-Scott-Bentinck, John (Duke of
Portland) 102, 109
celebrity culture 29, 38, 51, 54
chain letter scheme 19, 156n. 59
Chamberlain, Joseph 94
charitable consumption 35, 144
commemorative objects 44–6
direct financial gain 43–4
ethical consumption 43
experience economy 50–7
purchases as donations 35–46
seasonal shop windows 46–50, 67
charitable giving 51
as reciprocal gift exchange 35
Charities Acts 81, 172n. 6, 173n. 8,
195n. 13
Charities of London 84
Charities Register and Digest 84
charity bazaar/market 2, 3–4, 12, 23, 36–7,
56–7, 145–6, 147
commemorative object 44–6
charity calendars 6, 46, 49, 50
Charity Commission 81, 83,
94, 148
charity entertainment 51–2
charity entrepreneurs see entrepreneurs
Charity Organisation Society (COS) 5–6,
19, 28, 42, 57, 60, 71, 82–6, 91, 95,
96–7, 109, 125, 127, 129, 144, 148
Charities Register 88
and the press 86–7
Charrington, F. N. 64
Chatterbox 27
Chesterton, G. K. 49
Index

child-focused fundraising campaigns 22–3, 26–7, 48–9
Children in Need 122, 133, 141
Children's Country Holiday Fund 62
children's magazines 26–7
Children's Treasury 26
child welfare, and franchising 128
China, venture of Stafford House Committee in 117
Chorley Primitive Methodists 45
Christian, William 86
Christian Mission to the Fallen and Outcast Women 64
Christian Socialism see Clarion movement
Christmas fundraising 46–9, 67
Christmas tours 20
Church Lads' Brigade 63
Church of England 27, 67–8
Cinderella club entertainments 52, 53
Cinderella Society 26
Cinderella 92
cinefilms 55
civic authorities, role in relief funds 131
civil society 147
Clarion movement 52
Clark, Anna 83
collecting boxes 19–21
Colmer, James 79, 80, 86
Colmer, William 79
Colmer, Wm. 79
Comic Relief 54, 122, 133–4, 141
commemorative objects, sale of 44–6
Congo Basin, exploration of 116–17
Conservatives, conservatism 99, 103, 107, 114–15, 121, 147–8
consuming charity see charitable consumption
corporate-charity partnerships 40
cronyism 87, 110
crowd funding 19, 46
Croydon Dramatic Club 164n. 91
cycling 52, 53, 165n. 98

Daily Mail 39, 46, 151n. 2
Daily Mirror 9, 10
Daily News 14, 114
Daily Post 45
Daily Telegraph 191n. 48
'Darkest England' campaigns 43, 44, 125
Daunton, Martin 32
Davis, Mike 130, 193n. 94
Delving and Diving 27, 49
Devine, Alexander 126–7
de Worms, Henry 103
Dicke, Alexander 124
Dickens, Charles 101, 107
disasters 130–1
international see aristocratic philanthropy
under-reporting in press 130
see also Mansion House Funds
Disraeli, Benjamin 103
Dominos 123
donations, purchases as 35–46
donor markets, social depth of 19–23, 143
donor responsibility 93–6
Dowding, Charles 92
Drury Lane Mission 61, 64
Earls Court 20
East End Juvenile Mission 65
Egerton, Seymour 52
Ellis, J. Whittaker 137–9
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship 1, 4–6, 10–12, 29, 32, 33, 36–7, 46, 47, 50, 59, 62, 65, 69, 70, 73, 80, 82, 87, 93, 97–8, 109, 119, 121, 141, 143, 144, 145–7, 149
ethical consumption 43
Evans, David 139
experience economy 6, 50–7, 108
Fabians, Fabianism 84, 148
fancy dress procession 52–3
Father Berry's Homes 68, 71
Father Hudson's Homes 68
Father William's Stories 26
Fegan's Boys Homes 62
Female Mission to the Fallen 64
Financial Times 16
Food and Betterment Association 64
see also League of Welldoers
Forbes, Archibald 114, 185n. 82
franchising
business 124
fees 128
Mansion House Funds 129–41
social 121, 122–8, 123, 141

219
Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) 99, 101
fraud 81–2, 96–8, 144, 146
administration and accountability 86–8, 97
and aristocratic philanthropy 101
COS and press 82–6
and self-regulations 88–93
state responsibility versus donor responsibility 93–6
Frederick Le Maistre & Co. 36
‘free will’ donations 20
Friendly Societies 173n. 8
From Dark to Light 27
Fry, Herbert 84
Fyfe, Aileen 5

Gaiety Theatre 51
Geneva Convention (1864) 101
gift giving 48
Gill, Rebecca 99–100, 102, 112, 115
Gladstone, William 102, 103, 114, 115
Glasgow Poor Children, Dinner Table Society 76
Gordon, Charles George 119, 126–7
Gordon Boys’ Homes 126–8, 145
Gorsky, Martin 4
Gospel News Mission 89
‘grace before meat’ boxes 21
grandees, and international fundraising 99–108
Graphic, The 52, 105, 106
Great Arthur Street Mission 71, 75, 88
Great War 146
Green, Sir Henry 117
group charity walks 53
Guild of Brave Poor Things 63, 64
Habermas, Jürgen 147
Harrison, Brian 2–3, 82
Harvest festival, Canada 49, 50
Haskell, Thomas 5
Hawkes, Rev. Samuel 96
Hawksley, Thomas 84
Haydock Colliery Relief Fund 20
Help the Aged 147
Herald 45, 76
Holroyd, Henry (Earl of Sheffield) 102
‘home’, in charity names 60–1
Home for Destitute Children 66
Home for Working Boys 171n. 80
Home of the Holy Rood 64
Hopgood, Stephen 98
hospital funds 12, 22, 50, 52
Hospital Saturday Fund 20
humanitarian aid 99, 102, 114, 120
humanitarian fundraising 100
Mansion House Funds 129–41
politics of 113–19
humanitarian sensibility 100
Hutchinson, John 115

Iceland, ‘famine’ in 137–8
imperialism see aristocratic philanthropy
‘in-crowd fundraising’ 51
India
famines, Mansion House appeals for 101, 132, 133, 140
relief effort of Stafford House Committee in 112, 115
Indigent Blind Visiting Society (IBVS) 79–80
in-house publications 25
innovations 146
intelligent giving 96
International Centre for Social Franchising 122
international fundraising, and grandees 100–8
see also Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers
International Red Cross see Société Internationale de Secours aux Blessés des Armées de Terre et de Mer
Invalid Children’s Aid Association 66
Irby, Paulina 101–2, 105, 109
Ireland, Land War 136–7, 138
Irish Exhibition 20
Irish Property Defence Association 137
Irving, Sir Henry 51, 107
Italy, 1909 earthquake in 140

Jewish Poor of Manchester 21
Jewish Sanitary Association (Manchester) 161n. 39
John Bull 93–4, 95
Jones, Lee 69
Index

Jones, Lloyd versus Jones, Lee 89–93, 95–6, 98
Jones, Rev. Hugh 72
J. Tweedale and Co. 36
Judy 112

Kanazawa, Shusaku 55
Kays catalogues 41
Kilburn Sisterhood 172n. 85
Kinematography 55, 56
Kings Hospital Fund, 'Hospital Shopping Day' 50, 57
Kipling, Rudyard 46
Knill, Stuart 129

Labouchere, Henry 85, 86, 91, 95, 174n. 31, 175n. 40
Labour Church movement 53
Ladies Printing Press 62
Land War (Ireland) 136–7, 138
Layard, Henry Austen 112, 116
League of Help 70, 144
League of Welldoers 63, 64, 69, 73, 76, 89, 144
legitimization of charity 82–6
Leopold II, King of the Belgians 116–17
liberalism 3, 102, 119, 121, 148
Littler, Jo 121
Little Soldier, The 26
Liverpool Food and Betterment Association see League of Welldoers
Liverpool Infant Orphan Asylum 75
Liverpool Sheltering Homes 75
Lloyds 111
lobbying 136, 137, 148
local charity 33
development of 13–14
Loch, Charles 42, 83, 84, 86, 88, 92
logos 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 76, 77
London Cottage Mission 74–5, 95
London Spectacle Mission 125–6, 145
Lopes, Teresa da Silva 73
Loseke, Donileen 146
Low, Sampson 84
Loyd-Lindsay, Robert 101

magic lantern shows 50, 55
management costs, excessive 87
Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls Refuges 51, 127
Manchester and Salford Harriers 52
Manchester Guardian 39
Mansion House Fund 52, 99, 101, 120, 129–41, 145
Abercarn colliery disaster (1878) 135–6
appeal for Bengal famine (1874) 132, 133, 134
auditing 134
branding 132, 134, 136–9, 140
domestic vs. international causes 136
factors related to opening 134–5
functioning at local level 132–3
Iceland famine 137–8
Indian famine 101, 132, 133, 140
Land War (Ireland) 136–7, 138
and local committees 133
Princess Alice disaster (1878) 135–6
rejections 135
Soulsby, William 139–40
Mapleson, James E. 107
marathons 54
Mariners’ Friends Society 62
Martin, R. B. 3
mass media fundraising 4, 12, 23, 25, 29, 31, 144
matched funding schemes 12
Mauss, Marcel 35
May, Reuben 71–2
McDonalds 122, 123
memorialization, and social franchising 126–8
Messageries Maritimes 111
Mill, John Stuart 147
Milne, A. A. 129, 131, 135
‘Minnehaha Minstrels’ 51, 52
‘mission,’ in charity names 60–2, 69, 169n. 44
missionaries 117, 125
missionary networks 101
Montefiore, Sir Moses 103
Morgan, Simon 29
Morning Post 114, 115, 118
Morris, William 137
motor-car tours 54
mottos 63–5
mountain climbs 54
Murdoch, George 127

naming conventions 60–2, 65–6
National League for the Blind 62
National Working Boys' Home 42, 77–8
Night and Day magazine 26
Nightingale, Florence 101, 105, 109
nonconformist missions 13, 65, 69
North East London Mission 64
North End Domestic Mission 66
Northern Echo 114, 138
novelty 15, 18, 20, 22, 36, 38, 51, 55, 125, 143

Octavia Hill 176n. 44
Officer, The 15, 18, 26, 38, 39, 42, 49, 55, 56, 125
‘one-man bands’ 86, 98
one-off pamphlet 38
‘one penny receipts’ 21
One Shilling Guide to the Charities of London 84
organization’s name 60–2
Our Darlings 26
‘Out-of-Love’ fund 21
Owen, David 2, 83, 84
Oxfam 147

Padroni 175n. 33
Pelham House Home for Working Boys 78
Perry Curtis, L. 137
Philanthropist, The 55
photographs, sale of 38, 48
photolithography 15
politics
and aristocratic philanthropy 103
of humanitarian fundraising 113–19
local, and accountability for funds 111–12
Potts, Sir Joshua 129
press (also see media) 148
and aristocratic philanthropy 105, 109, 110, 112, 114, 118
coverage of disasters 130
and Mansion House Funds 134–5
scandals 97

Prince of Wales Fund 22, 48
Princess Mary's Ward, Richmond Hospital 52
Prince's Theatre 51
print and public relations 23–32
private sector, and franchising 122–3
Prochaska, Frank 3, 12, 22, 29, 36, 46, 50–1, 101, 106
professionalism 2, 6, 33, 36, 55, 65, 71, 72, 74, 104, 122, 134, 145, 195n. 13
promotion 12–19, 32, 37
publicity 14, 46
Punch 114–15
purchases, as donations 35–46, 143

Quiver, The 14, 47

Rathbone, William 3
Regent's Canal Explosion (1874) 135
regulatory frameworks 146–7, 173n. 8
religion
and aristocratic philanthropy 103
Balkan Christians 102, 103
and charity 57
and franchising 124–5
and relief funds 101
and Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) 104
sensitivity, in Ottoman Empire 111–12
responsibility, state versus donor 93–6
Reynolds' Newspaper 136
Richard, Timothy 117
Richards, Eric 181n. 11, 181n. 12
Richards, Thomas 156n. 44
Rothschild 192n. 63
‘royal,’ as prefix 72
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) 128, 145
‘Liverpool Temporary Home for Lost and Starving Dogs’ 71
royalty 29
Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) 99
aristocratic philanthropy in 101–8, 119
end of 113
epidemics during 112–13
politics of humanitarian funding 113–19
sensitivity to local politics 111–12
see also Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers

Sacred Heart 68
Salvation Army 5, 9–10, 101, 124–5, 148, 153n. 5
advertising and promotion 15–16, 18–19
branding 69–70, 77
'Darkest England' campaigns 43, 44, 125
experience economy 55
localized initiatives 13, 14
name and structure 62–3, 65, 69
Popular Saturday Night (PSN) 55–6
print and public relations 25–6, 31–2, 40
purchase-triggered donations 36, 37, 38–40, 40–2, 43
seasonal shop windows 49
social depth of donor markets 21, 23
Santa Fina 66
Schumpeter, Joseph 11
scientific charity lobby 70–1
Scottish Children's League of Pity 21
seasonal shop windows 46–50, 67
Christmas fundraising 46–9
self-denial day/week 49–50, 55
self-regulations 81, 82, 88–93, 145
Shaftesbury, Lord 94–5
Shapely, Peter 106
'Shilling Fund' 151n. 9, 191n. 48
Shilling Guide to the Charities of London 84
significance of fundraising 4
Simpson, Alfred 74
Simpson, William 20
'Simpson's bowl' 20
slogans 63–5
'small sum' market 22
smoking concerts 52
Smythe, Emily Anne (nee Beaufort) 102, 103–4, 115, 118, 119, 181n. 9, 182n. 20
social enterprise 11, 117, 121–2, 140, 154n. 10
Social Enterprise Coalition 122
social franchising 121, 122–8, 123, 141
social labelling 133
Soulsby, William 139–40
South Africa
and Stafford House Committee 118
War and Refugee funds, Mansion House 140, 193n. 94
sports clubs 52, 53
Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers 100, 102, 104, 108–13, 115–16, 117, 135
accountability for funds 109–10
accountability to beneficiaries 111
accusations against 110
auditing 110–11
collaboration with other funds 112–13
decline of 118–19
economic interests of 116, 117
and exploration of Congo Basin 116–17
focus on epidemics 112–13
focus on soldiers 105, 112
funds raised by 107–8
handling of networks, supply chains and local administration 111
ladies' committee 117–18
and local politics 111–12
management of funds 110
meetings 105–6, 106, 109
paperwork of 109, 110
political agenda of 113
Stafford House South African Aid Fund 117–18
Stafford House South African Aid Fund ladies' committee 117–18
Standard, The 14, 76
St. Andrew's Home and Club for Working Boys 78
St. Andrew's Waterside Mission 62, 64, 67, 68
Stanley, Henry Morton 69, 116
Stanley of Alderley, Lord 104
Star, The 159n. 128
state responsibility 93–6
status donor 12
Stead, W. T. 114
St Giles Chapel Mission 70
St John Ambulance 102, 104, 119, 146
St Joseph's Girls' Home 68
Strangford, Lady see Smythe, Emily Anne
Stuart, Charles (Lord Blantyre) 102, 107, 108, 109
St Vincent (West Indies), 1903 Volcano eruption in 140
Sumner Ward, Charles 1, 151n. 3
Sutherland-Leveson-Gower, George (Duke of Sutherland) 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 110, 119, 137, 181n. 11
economic interests of 116
politics of 114–15
ventures of 109
swimming 54

Taylor, James 179n. 90
Ten Years in the Slums 27
Texas storm fund 51, 130
Times, The 15, 47, 48, 83, 85, 110, 114, 136, 140
Titanic 7, 140
Tower Hamlets’ Mission 64
trade journals 40, 41
trademarking 77, 78–80, 144
transparency 1, 87, 90, 98, 110, 135
Truth 52, 82, 85–6, 86–7, 88, 91, 93, 94–5, 96–7, 98, 144, 148, 175n. 40
Tudor vagrancy laws 83, 94
Turkish Compassionate Fund 100, 102, 107, 115, 135
closure of 112
and Stafford House Committee 104, 113
Turkish Red Crescent 104, 108, 115

Upper Congo Exploration Committee 116
Urania Cottage 101

Vanity Fair 52, 114, 115
Vefyk Pasha, Ahmed 110, 184n. 54
venture capitalism, and aristocratic philanthropy 109, 116–17
Victoria, Queen 112, 175n. 40
virtuous marketplace 82, 172n. 7
voting charities 55

Wagner, Gillian 74
waifs 14, 22, 23, 24, 27–8, 38, 70, 91
Waifs and Strays Society 27, 67–8, 127
Walker, Pamela 19
walking, walks 53–4
Walter Austin’s Homes 75
‘Wandering Minstrels’ 52
war charities 173n. 8
War Cry, The 25, 26, 37, 158n. 96
Waring, Edward 125, 126
Watercress and Flower Girls’ Mission 62, 70
Webb, Matthew 54
Weber, Max 87, 111
welfare state 4, 121, 146, 147
Welldoer, The 89
Western Mail 191n. 48
Whitewater Colliery Relief Fund 46
Whittington, Dick 129
widow and orphan funds 20
Women’s Herald 44
Wood Street Mission (WSM) 11, 51
advertising and promotion 14, 16
brand protection 74, 76
celebrity culture 29
experience economy 52–3
localized initiatives 13–14
print and public relations 25, 27, 29
purchase-triggered donations 36, 37
seasonal shop windows 46–7, 49
social depth of donor market 19, 22–3
Working Boys Home 42, 77–9
working-class donors 22, 41
workplace fundraising 4, 107
World, The 109
Wright, Henry 100, 106

Yorkshire Evening Post 53
Yorkshire Herald 139
Young Helpers’ League Magazine 26, 27, 30, 36
Young Soldier 26