Hans Schildermans

EXPERIMENTS IN DECOLONIZING THE UNIVERSITY
Towards an Ecology of Study

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Experiments in Decolonizing the University

Towards an Ecology of Study

Hans Schildermans
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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book is the outcome of a process of study that took place over several years. The starting point of that process was an experience that, for me, turned the university from a habitat for study into a problem, leaving me with no other option than to become the tool with which this problem could be developed. In that sense, the stake of writing this book is not so much to critically denounce what the university has become, but rather to affirmatively propose what the university might become, at least when carefully paying attention to the manifold of study practices that still inhabit the interstices of the university.

One of the central tenets of this book is that studying is never done alone but always in the company of others, hence making it a thoroughly collective affair. Therefore, I would like to thank the people without whom this book would not have been possible:

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Introduction: Inhabiting the Ruins of Excellence

The military outpost of Oush Grab—the Crow’s Nest—is situated between the city of Bethlehem and the Judean desert at the narrow bottleneck of the migratory paths of birds of different feathers. Yearly, more than 500 million swallows, wheatears, eagles, storks, and cranes navigate the skies over the Jordan Valley as they migrate from northeastern Europe to East Africa and back during spring and autumn. Located on a high hill and surrounded by a giant earth mound erected by soldiers during the Second Intifada, the barracks are a common point of orientation for the flocks. The birds recurrently interrupt their migration on the hilltop, giving way to an instantaneous and precarious ecology of small predators and other wildlife attracted by the feathered passers-by.

Given its location on a hilltop, the site has a long history of being a strategic point. It is of significance not only to the age-old back-and-forth movement of flocks of migratory birds and their companion species that temporarily inhabit the site, but also to human beings that have a military interest in the surrounding, lower-lying lands and seek to obtain a more permanent residence there. Situated in the boundaries between town and desert, and due to the distinct topography of the hill, it has served as an excellent lookout for centuries. Before its occupation by the Israeli military, the Crow’s Nest was led by the Jordan Legion, who took it over from the British troops during the Arab Revolt of 1936–9. Some believe that in earlier times it served as an Ottoman outpost and may have been first used for military purposes by a Roman regiment.

One early morning in April 2006, the inhabitants of Beit Sahour, a small town on the eastern outskirts of Bethlehem, witnessed the evacuation of the Crow’s Nest. The withdrawal of the Israeli army was the last act in a long struggle of Palestinian activists against the oppressive presence of the base. Continued opposition against the outpost by the local community and the concurrent refashioning of the military’s geographical organization in the area led to the sudden abandonment of the base. On the morning after the evacuation, people
from Bethlehem overran Oush Grab, smashing windows, walls, and doors with iron bars. At the same time, others tried to salvage everything of even the least worth. Doors, furniture, and electric plugs were detached from buildings, and the water tower in the center of the base partially collapsed due to the removal of steel reinforcement bars.³

How to Live with and in Ruins?

The evacuated military base, desolate and destitute, confronted the inhabitants of the neighboring area with the issue of how the ruins of such an oppressive architecture could be re-inhabited at “the very moment that power [had] been unplugged: the old uses [were] gone, and new uses not yet defined.”⁴ It opened up questions concerning the remnants of the Crow’s Nest: given its current state, how could it be inhabited in a different, less violent, way in the future?

Shortly after the raid, Palestinian government officials and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocated the view that a police force must defend the base in order to avoid further vandalism, and hence to continue using the base within the framework of a military occupation. Some of the inhabitants, however, opposed this perspective and suggested “to stay with the trouble”⁵ and to start to think about possibilities for use other than the two that had already begun to actualize, namely brutal destruction or unquestioned reuse.

According to these inhabitants, neither destruction nor reuse seemed to be a desirable course of action because both refused to engage with the present ambiguity of the place, either to eradicate its colonial past or to superimpose a future that would entail a continued unproblematised re-inhabiting of the infrastructure. Through the inhabitants’ efforts, the situation began to initiate a thinking process around the issue of decolonization as such and, more specifically, the question of “how people might live with and in ruins?”⁶

The question of the possibility of life in the ruins of colonial oppression is all the more urgent for Oush Grab since most of the refugee camps in the area came into being in 1948, shortly after the establishment of the state of Israel, an event narrated in the camps as the Nakba, the catastrophe that caused the Palestinians to flee from their homes. Historically speaking, the main narrative of resistance in the Palestinian refugee camps is hence that of the right of return, of the desire of the exiled people to return to their homes from before the Nakba.⁷

However, to the young refugees living in these camps, who were born there and raised by parents who themselves lived most of their lives in the camps, the
right of return remains, despite its narrative force, a somewhat abstract claim, as they have never actually lived in the houses that they would return to. Therefore, it is hard for them to understand decolonization in terms of an effectuated right of return. Instead, from their perspective, the possibility of decolonization and the challenges that come with it evoke another question.

Reformulating the question from “how to effectuate the right of return?” to “how to live with and in ruins?” makes a slightly different problematization of the situation possible, opening up a different mode of response. Whereas the first question seems to necessitate political and even juridical action aimed at a predefined goal, the second question allows the inhabitants to think through what is happening in their present lives and opens up the possibility of a response that entails more than a plea for a return to the private home of the past.8

Instead, it requires thinking collectively about what it means to live inside the “extraterritorial” space of the camp when it is no longer a temporary state of exception, but has become an enduring condition where exception has become the rule. Taking extraterritoriality not as an exception to be remediated but as a starting point for speculating about different modes of living together, inhabitants of the camp felt they needed a way of organizing themselves other than, for instance, as a political action group, an NGO, or a social work organization in order to sustain the processes of thinking about decolonization instigated by the abandonment of Oush Grab. Interestingly, they decided to gather as a university, a place for collective study.9

In doing so, Campus in Camps, an experimental university in Dheisheh Refugee Camp, tries not to abandon the ruins. Instead, the studiers take up the challenge of responding to the question of how to live there, how to create, in the present, a future that differs from those informed by ideas ranging from “the militarized security institutions of ‘Israeli liberal democracy’ to the rabbinical theodicy of some of its colonists, from the militant Islamism of Hamas to the quasi-secular authoritarian rule of Fatah in the West Bank.”10

The work of Campus in Camps is all the more interesting as the initiative explicitly claims the name university, despite the apparent dissimilarities with contemporary understandings of the university. Campus in Camps, for instance, does not offer degrees; there are no admission criteria for prospective students, nor does it have an extensive research program of which the results are published in academic journals. Moreover, it does not strive for “excellence” or seek to attract the interests of the industry or other big funding bodies. On its website, no information can be found about the different faculties, research centers, or curricula, simply because it does not have any.
Hence, by claiming “university” as a name for their collective, Campus in Camps has simultaneously put in motion a process of thinking about what it means to be a university out of institutional bounds. Instead of looking at the university from the top, as an institution for research and teaching inhabiting a global knowledge economy, it requires focusing on the doings of the various forces gathered within the university itself and on how study allows them to go beyond the constraints of institutionalization to surpass what the university (in the “traditional” sense) demands from its inhabitants. Put differently, making abstraction of the institutional paraphernalia associated with contemporary universities, the work of Campus in Camps narrows the focus on the practices of the university and, more specifically, on its practices of study. As such, it offers a point of departure to reconsider the future of the university itself.

In times when universities seem to concern themselves less and less with societal issues that are not immediately profitable, it is interesting to see that the precondition for the work of Campus in Camps seems to be a deep and strong entanglement between the university and its sociopolitical environment. Crucially, however, this entanglement never boils down to an instrumentalization of study for the sake of liberation or emancipation in terms of futures already known. Instead, the wager of the studiers of Campus in Camps consists of having practices of collective study—such as reading texts, fieldwork exercises, discussing movies, and storytelling—to allow them to attend to the possibilities that persist inside the situation they find themselves in and thereby create footholds for speculation about alternative futures.

Moreover, these speculations never take place in general, but always in relation to the situation that is being problematized. Thus, in a genuinely pragmatic fashion, they allow for making other worlds possible, not in the sense of a purely abstract “out-of-this-world,” but as a different world within this world. Studying, in that sense, is not just a means to learn about the camp and its inhabitants to acquire the skills and competencies that the status quo requires. Instead, it means to engage in transformative processes which give the camp itself a voice in the aspirations for its future.

The collective of studiers of Campus in Camps forces us to situate study on the level of the practices that populate the university as a vector of worldly becoming thoroughly enmeshed in and entwined with ruinous, messy environments, an ecology of study. What this exactly means will be explored throughout the book. The problem to begin with, however, is how the study practices of this Palestinian experimental university can also begin to matter to us, students and
scholars of another kind of university for whom the issue of decolonization and the question of how to live with and in ruins is a slightly different one.

From Decolonization to Decolonization

For those inhabiting the universities in Europe and America—the so-called excellent institutions for research and higher learning—it might feel somewhat remarkable that the camp dwellers of Dheisheh decided to organize themselves as a collective of studiers, a university. In the West, academics and students incessantly keep voicing their discontent with higher education policy and university management during protest marches, actions, and strikes. For us indeed, inhabitants of those “excellent” universities, the name of the university seems to have been spoiled, and its role played out. Not only is the university accused of being an ivory tower, remaining indifferent to the relevant questions and problems of everyday life, it is, at the same time, blamed for having re-organized itself into a knowledge factory that is only interested in useful expertise and the sale of degrees.14

Moreover, given the centrality of decolonization as a cause for collective concern, it seems all the more remarkable that the studiers of Campus in Camps started to assemble under the guise of a university. The university itself has indeed played a major part in the colonial project by creating and consolidating a Eurocentric system of knowledge with universalistic pretenses. Especially from the early nineteenth century onwards, the university became a crucial actor in the construction of a Western canon reflected within the different academic disciplines, often at the expense of non-Western ideas, thoughts, and ways of knowing. Important to note is that the excluded non-Western perspectives not only came from other-than-Western regions, but also that a process of “epistemicide,” to quote Boaventura de Sousa Santos, took place to eradicate those ideas that nevertheless originated in the West, but did not comply with Enlightenment ideas of universalism, emancipation, and progress.15

However, next to canonizing specific ways of knowing, thereby granting them a universalistic stature, at the expense of others, the university also greatly assisted in the spreading of these ideas, predominantly in the national context of the home country. First, the university was the prime educator of the social and cultural elites of the emerging nineteenth-century nation-states. To that extent, it functioned as a gatekeeper to the superior Western system of knowledge and
the professions that required this knowledge (e.g., lawyers, doctors, ministers). Besides, the university was a hotbed for the emergence of a national culture sharing these Enlightenment values to which lower layers of society could aspire. Lastly, and perhaps most saliently, the university played an important role in the construction of knowledge about indigenous populations and related race theories, including the spreading thereof to the public via the disciplines of history, geography, and anthropology.  

Therefore, when raising the question of how to inhabit the ruins of the university, a certain “decolonization” seems to be pertinent as well, although the notion assumes a different meaning here. In recent decades, decolonization has become a major theme in criticisms of higher education. Achille Mbembe underscores that decolonizing the university is a multifarious project that includes, for instance, the removal of colonial inscriptions from the campus, the inclusion of other-than-Western perspectives in the curriculum and the lecture hall, and the democratization of systems of access and management (e.g., hiring criteria, methods of evaluation). Interestingly, Mbembe claims that decolonization also implies “breaking the cycle that tends to turn students into customers and consumers,” thereby forging an alliance between decolonial and anti-capitalist struggles. Put differently, decolonization does not limit itself to the historical legacy of colonialism in particular, but also interrogates the logics and mentalities that continue to occupy the university until today.

Returning to Campus in Camps, it is intriguing that their concept of decolonization does not focus primarily on institutional or curricular reform. Rather, decolonization emerges as a stake in an ongoing process of study. Therefore, it is situated not at the end, but at the core of the educational process. Whereas for Mbembe and Santos, decolonization is first and foremost a political project with a strong epistemological bearing, the studiers of Campus in Camps present us with a practice of study that is itself a way of decolonizing, having the power to decolonize established perceptions and conceptions of the university as well. In that sense, a study of this experimental university could be a manner to meet the demands of a “permanent decolonization of thought,” to quote Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, a way of detaching ourselves from the capitalist and colonial conceptions of the university we have grown so accustomed to.  

In other words, because the disconnection of the university from common questions and concerns, as well as its reconnection into social life via market relations (e.g., student as consumer, the commodification of knowledge in patents and degrees, strengthening of industry–academy partnerships), has left this age-old institution in ruins, the question of how to live with and in ruins,
and hence of decolonization, matters to those inhabiting the contemporary universities in the West as well, although in a different manner.

In that sense, Campus in Camps, this small-scale, radical practice of collective study that has begun to call itself a university, offers a starting point for recovering and reinterpreting the spoiled name of this decaying capitalist and colonial institution. Triggered by this sudden reclaiming of the name of the university, the question is how the ruined institutions of higher learning—ivory towers and knowledge factories alike—can be reconsidered, and how it is possible to think differently about the relations between science and society, knowledge and action, or the public and the university.

Therefore, three questions motivate this book. First, there is the question concerning the tasks of the university. Traditionally, these have been regarded as three separate domains of research, teaching, and service. Second, there is the question concerning the relationship between the university and society, or put differently, how the university takes part in processes of worldly transformation. And third, there is the question concerning the future of the university. How do certain contemporary issues and challenges urge us to rethink the university radically?

Throughout the book, I propose to reclaim the university as an ecology of study, to re-entangle the three traditional tasks of the university, to reconceptualize the relation between world and university, and to reconsider the university’s future.

Inasmuch as the three questions above orient my inquiry, what principally situates it is the practice of study of Campus in Camps. Campus in Camps offers an opportunity, both contingent and urgent, to think differently about the institutions for higher education that have become prime pawns in the competitive market for cognitive labor. Its study practices challenge to reaffirm the relationship between university and society without either accepting its instrumentalization in capitalist enterprises of knowledge production and commodification or hearkening back to the imagined Edenic past of an intellectual stronghold in which academics could study “in freedom and solitude.”

Instead, in Campus in Camps, the university emerges as a place of assembly where questions concerning what can be known and how it can be known get thoroughly enmeshed with questions of living together, and the possibility of a future that acts upon the continuity of the present, rather than annihilating it or taking it for granted. Due to the work of Campus in Camps, the proposition of an ecology of study acquires a highly concrete and precise significance.
Nevertheless, turning to Campus in Camps does not mean to look for a blueprint for a university-to-come. Nor does it mean to instrumentalize Campus in Camps to illustrate a general theory. Both of these approaches would indeed turn the Palestinian experimental university into an example that either needs to be followed or clarifies a philosophical argument. Instead, pointing out that Campus in Camps *situates* my inquiry draws attention to the fact that it offers an initial—and given the exceptionality of the situation always precarious—impulse to think again about the current state of the university without determining *how* we should think about it, and without offering a model of an ecology of study. In that sense, the study of Campus in Camps is itself a point of departure for decolonizing the university, or at least our ways of thinking about it, while reclaiming it as an ecology of study.

Before giving more substance to the proposition of the ecology of study, I will map the environment in which this proposition comes to matter, from which it draws its relevance, so to say. This approach first requires providing insight into the actual trends and tendencies that have left the university in a state of ruin. Furthermore, I will explore different ideas that might inspire new ways of thinking about the university, including the various problems these ideas confront us with. Bearing this in mind, at the end of this introduction I will return to the proposition of an ecology of study and how it will be developed throughout the book.

### A Ruined Institution

The question of how to live with and in ruins may not be unfamiliar to those inhabiting the contemporary university. Since Bill Readings published his critique of university policy and management under the aegis of Excellence in *The University in Ruins*, it has become a common trope in debates about the faith and future of higher education. Readings’ diagnosis indicates how the capitalization and entrepreneurialization of the university since the advent of the knowledge economy have hollowed out its intellectual and educational mission in favor of a more commercial one, namely the production, commodification, and sell-out of useful knowledge.

In his seminal book, Readings traces the history of the university from the influential reform movement in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which inaugurated the modern research university, to the neoliberal reforms of the last decades of the twentieth century, which aimed to promote
“excellence” in the university. The discourse of excellence, he convincingly argues, marks the decay of the university and the loss of a public mission of an institution that henceforth has been left in ruins.

At Readings’ time, and up to today, university administrators seem to be unable to refrain from speaking about Excellence. Excellence seems to be what universities seek, their ultimate motivation, and the standard against which professors, research projects, students, administrators, papers, and lectures are evaluated. The contemporary university aims for a position among the most excellent institutions within university rankings. They seek to continuously improve their profile in both research and teaching by producing excellent knowledge and an excellent workforce that has had excellent training. Academics, in turn, aim to publish excellent articles in excellent journals, and they are expected to deliver excellent courses for their students to obtain excellent grades. Readings strikingly states that “today, all departments of the University can be urged to strive for excellence, since the general applicability of the notion is in direct relation to its emptiness.”

Readings emphasizes that the discourse of Excellence is itself not an ideology. Instead, it is symptomatic of an ethology, a way of behaving and inhabiting, provoked by shifts in the ecology of the university. Claiming that the discourse of Excellence is not an ideology means, in the first instance, that Excellence is not a matter of belief, but instead of measurement. Excellence presents itself to be an objective and value-neutral way to evaluate academic work, to make all equal before the tribunal of measurement. In doing so, the discourse of Excellence has no external referent that might function as a more or less fixed normative ideal to which academic work should aspire, or based on which it could be evaluated. For Readings, this is problematic because precisely such ideals used to imbue the university with a societal mission, which it now has lost as it only seeks self-improvement and the self-improvement of its members in the global knowledge economy.

Whereas for Kant and Humboldt, for instance, this external referent to which the university should aspire was respectively the Idea of Reason and the Idea of Culture, the University of Excellence only concerns itself with the empty formalism of its internal optimization. More specifically, this process of loss of ideological content marks a shift in the landscape in which the university is situated. Formulating the problem in this way shifts the focus from the discourse of Excellence as ideology to an understanding of striving for Excellence as a behavioral strategy for survival in an environment that has become increasingly hostile to the university’s original aspirations, be it toward Reason or Culture.
Readings argues that the behavioral strategy of universities and academics in a survival mode is a symptomatic response to the capitalist logic of measurement and calculation that has installed itself within its institutional infrastructure and within the minds of its faculty and staff. Indeed, the ascent of the discourse of Excellence seems to manifest a direct relation with the proliferation of metrics that aim to measure the results of academic work, ranging from impact factors, h-index, and university rankings, to professor ratings and student grading. Measuring academic work that is measurable, and making academic work that is not measurable quantifiable strengthens the general applicability of the formalist discourse of Excellence, and makes it painfully clear that it does not seek something else than eternal self-optimization.

Situating the academic ethology within the contemporary, metricized knowledge ecology universities find themselves in, Readings’ diagnosis places itself against the background of a dramatic shift in the environment of organizations and institutions that surround the university. From the 1960s onwards, the university has itself been recruited as an essential player in the new (knowledge) economy. Since the main assets and stakes of economic development had shifted from labor power and industrial production to education and training, economists have argued that the second half of the twentieth century has witnessed a transition from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy, apt to the opportunities and challenges of an increasingly globalized market of commodified information and communication.24

In such a global knowledge economy, universities form an important link between supply and demand of information and knowledge. The university has adapted to its new environment and has become an autonomous and entrepreneurial knowledge organization that promotes competition, is eager to cooperate with private investors, puts higher education in the service of economic competition, and empowers students to maximize their skills and competencies in the global labor market.25

More specifically, five ecological shifts can be distinguished that have redrawn the relations between the university and the broader landscape in which it is situated via the construction of networks that have sought to embed not only institutions of higher education, but also individual faculty members, administrators, and students in the new economy.26 A first development is the rise of university–industry–government partnerships. Examples of such partnerships are the increase of funding from private industrial companies for profitable research projects, and the evaluation of research by patent officials, hence making applicability and profitability the norm for scientific research.27
Secondly, licensing offices (management of intellectual property), economic development offices (linking research assets with economic needs), educational profit centers (provision of programs to niche markets), and other boundary-spanning organizations draw the university closer to the world of industry and economics, thereby forcing it to reconceive itself as a for-profit economic actor, on par with the ones it engages with. Thirdly, network organizations such as the Business Higher Education Forum or the League for Innovation aim to solve common societal problems by gathering different forms of academic expertise and public and private interests. Although they involve the university in questions of public concern, the formulation of these questions in narrow economic terms rarely allows for in-depth discussions and comprehensive solutions.

Fourthly, preceding developments and the increase of workload they have brought with them have had profound effects on the management of universities, requiring an extended managerial capacity and an overall increase of administrative staff. The main tasks of these new managers, of whom no longer any real affinity with actual research and higher learning is expected, include the facilitation of new research collaborations and the involvement in network organization. The rise of the so-called administeriat not only is the effect of a shift in the organizational landscape of the university, but equally causes itself a more frequent and intense collaboration between universities and for-profit and non-profit partner organizations. The fifth and last development concerns the increasing importance of metrics at different levels that have led to an entire industry of world rankings and league tables such as Times Higher Education or QS. Inter-university competition, moreover, goes hand in hand with an intra-university audit culture where consultancy offices such as McKinsey and Deloitte are hired to measure and optimize their performance in research, teaching, and administration to climb the scales in international rankings.

All these developments specify a more general shift in the organizational ecology of the university, with other-than-academic organizations parasitizing on the university. Correlatively, this ecological shift has given rise to an entirely different academic ethology as a way of surviving in an environment that is profoundly hostile to those who cling to the pursuit of knowledge for the public good, or for its own sake. Striking is the increased display of market and market-like behaviors by universities, “attaching a price to things that were once free or charging more for items or services that were once subsidized or provided at a cost.”

The ascendant regime of academic capitalism, Slaughter and Rhoades argue, values “knowledge privatization and profit-taking in which institutions, inventor
faculties, and corporations have claims that come before those of the public.”

Knowledge, in this regime, is conceived of as a raw material that should be commodified as a private good via patents, degrees, and trademarks. It acquires monetary value in the stream of profit-generating high-technology products that flow through global markets. The cornerstone of this regime is the necessity of a link between academe and commercial corporations for profitable growth.

Hence, taking Readings’ argument a step further, it could be argued that not only have Reason and Culture lost their ideological function as guiding ideas for the university, imbuing it with a *raison d’être* different from its survival as a self-optimizing institution, but also the idea of the Public Good has increasingly been placed at risk as a viable idea to which the university could aspire. Instead, the discourse of Excellence has installed itself to distract attention from the deep trouble—the state of ruin—universities find themselves in due to the loss of a sound idea that could animate their existence.

In conclusion, the rise of the University of Excellence has taken place against the background of dramatic shifts in the ecological system implicating the university. In their mutual reinforcement, these developments have provoked the current state of ruin of the university, which ironically coincides with its unabated self-glorification as an Excellent institution. This shift does not solely concern the ecology of the university, the increasing amount of other-than-academic organizations that have nested themselves in its surroundings since the 1960s, but also acquires an ethological signification in the behavioral strategy of eternal self-optimization in view of Excellence at both individual and institutional levels.

**Reclaiming the University?**

Having outlined the shifts in the ecology of organizations surrounding the university and the loss of its societal mission induced by those shifts, the question that remains is how to continue to inhabit the ruins of the university and to make a life that is not immediately measurable by profit possible? Which ideas could help in reclaiming the ecology of the university, to decolonize it from the capitalist logics and mentalities that occupy it? It is important to stress that *reclaiming* should not be understood as a return to a glorious past that was free of problems, where people still lived up to the ideals of the purest academic intellectuality.

Instead, the intended meaning is closer to the eponymous agricultural operation that seeks to make the lands that have been exploited by capitalist
production and monoculture capable of fostering life again. Reclaiming is foremost an operation that aims to generate life again in those lands where it had become impossible, and to heal from the damage and destruction done by capitalist modes of exploitation. To heal does not mean to recover and return to the “healthy” state of the past, but assumes the fertility of the remnants itself in fostering new life, whatever form it might take.36

With Readings, it has been argued that the question to which Idea the university should aspire is centuries old. Confronted with the lamentable state of universities at the end of the eighteenth century, both Kant and Humboldt wanted to breathe new life into these ancient institutions and had formulated—as hinted at before—Reason and Culture, respectively, as guiding ideas.37 At this point, it is relevant to dwell a bit longer on these ideas of the university, in order to get a sense of whether they still provide substance for resistance, whether they offer starting points for reclaiming, as well as to see which new ideas of the university have been formulated in more recent years.

In “The Conflict of the Faculties,” a compilation of three essays written in the 1790s, Kant addresses the relationship between the university and its ecology, raising the question of how Reason can be given a place in a university instituted by the state, and as such bearing responsibilities for it. According to Kant, the state is concerned with the welfare of its citizens and, more precisely, with their health, security, and salvation. These three objectives correspond in the university to what Kant called the three higher faculties of Medicine, Law, and Theology, respectively. The lower faculty of Philosophy, however, has no such direct bearing on the administration of government and is solely interested in the pursuit of rational inquiry and disinterested knowledge.38

The infrastructure of the Kantian idea of the university sheds a particular light on the dilemma between Reason and state, thinking and power. Kant discerns a conflict between the higher faculties, who work in the service of the state by providing physical, civil, and eternal wellbeing, respectively, and the lower faculty, which is only concerned with the conditions of truth and which acknowledges no other command than that of Reason itself. In this vein, Kant argues that the faculty of Philosophy, being the home of autonomous Reason, has to scrutinize the academic machinery of the higher faculties, monitor their interested claims to truth and use of reason. As such, the university, by holding together the higher faculties which operate in the service of the state, and the lower faculty, only obedient to Reason itself, constitutes a membrane between Reason and state.

Whereas the higher faculties are subject to the state and have a distinct utility in government administration, the lower faculty has to be conceived of as free
and subject only to the laws given by Reason, not by the government. In calling the university a parliament of learning, Kant puts the higher faculties, supporting the government’s rules and statutes, on the right side of the parliament, “but in as free a system of government must exist when it is a question of truth, there must also be an opposition party (the left side), and this is the philosophy faculty’s bench.” Ultimately, Kant understands this ongoing conflict as a constant progress of both ranks of faculties, which in the end will allow for a government fully inspired by Reason to come into being. In other words, the Kantian idea requires a university that functions as a membrane, protecting Reason from coercion by the state and protecting the state from the free play of Reason. Through the higher and the lower faculties, the membrane both separates and gathers power and Reason, respectively.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, writing a few decades after Kant, addressed the relationship between the university and its outside in different words. For him, the university was not so much the resolution of the conflict between state power and philosophical thinking, but rather a beacon for the advancement of (national) culture. Humboldt’s text “On the spirit and the organizational framework of intellectual institutions in Berlin” has been vastly influential in the development of higher education policies, and up to today, its ideas form a powerful motive for university administrators and public officials to return to during celebrations of foundation days, honorary doctorates, and other academic ceremonies.

The notions of Wissenschaft and Bildung take center stage in the Humboldtian university as its most significant aims. Both are deeply intertwined and would benefit the individual as well as the nation-state. More precisely, the Humboldtian university aims to initiate processes of collaboration in which intellectual achievements of one person can arouse the intellectual interests of others so that what was first expressed by an individual becomes a shared intellectual intuition. Humboldt argues that the inner life of the university should “call forth and sustain a continuously self-renewing, wholly uncoerced and disinterested collaboration.”

These collaborative research practices of the university—the seminar is probably most emblematic in this regard—are what keeps Wissenschaft and Bildung, professor and student, together. They foster the creation of knowledge for its own sake, while at the same time sharing it among professors and students alike. Both the accumulation of knowledge and its simultaneous dissemination among the members of the university contribute to the national Culture of the (German) nation-state, the ultimate frame of reference for the modern research
university in the Humboldtian sense. In other words, the Humboldtian university aims to unite research and teaching under the sign of Culture, and therefore, the university’s societal mission becomes part of a nationalist agenda that intends to promote the cultivation of reason among the citizens of the nation-state.

Both the Kantian and the Humboldtian idea of the university heavily stress the importance of freedom from state power. Their plea to safeguard the so-called uncoerced and disinterested nature of academic research has become a powerful motive in claiming academic freedom and keeping the state at a distance. Moreover, it has also been readily adopted as an argument against university–industry partnerships, namely that if research is to be really profitable, in a comprehensively cultural sense, researchers should be given the time and freedom to pursue their inquiries to where they might lead them, without any set agenda. Within such a narrative, the researcher is staged as “the goose with the golden eggs,” which should not be sacrificed for instant gains, but be granted enough freedom and autonomy so that it will keep on producing in the long run.

Nevertheless, it is highly questionable whether academic freedom in that sense really provides a space for resistance vis-à-vis the capitalization of the university, and whether it would make genuine reclaiming possible. First of all, the firm claim for academic freedom unties the knot between the university and a world for which its research could come to matter. Such an uncoupling not only risks turning the university into an ivory tower that does not concern itself with worldly issues and concerns, but it also leaves up for grabs the question of how knowledge generated during research could be received by those outside the university. More concretely, this means that knowledge becomes disembedded from the contexts where it mattered in the first instance, and can be commodified and sold on the market in the forms of patents and licenses. In that sense, the “old” ideas of Kant and Humboldt do not offer a real alternative.

Recent years have interestingly seen an upsurge of texts that seek to provide the university with a new idea or mission, thereby emphasizing its relation with the world. Most prominently, Ronald Barnett has proposed the idea of an ecological university that actively aims to engage with the world. Intrigued by Barnett’s use of ecology to think about the university, the question now is to what extent his suggestion offers a valid alternative to the capitalization of the university and its disaffected intellectual independence.

Barnett’s repurposing of the university is hinged on a double understanding of ecology. First, he uses ecology in a more neutral or descriptive sense in order to
distinguish the different ecosystems the university finds itself in (such as social institutions or the economy), and that together make up the so-called ecosphere of the university.\textsuperscript{49} While claiming that the university is necessarily implicated in its ecosphere, Barnett underscores that the university not only moves through these ecosystems, but that it is always permeated by them. Secondly, when the university actively seeks to engage with these ecosystems, the notion of ecology acquires a markedly stronger sense, meaning that it becomes a guiding or normative framework for the university, an idea of the university if you like: “If it has a care for the world, the university is impelled to turn towards these ecosystems and bend its resources in assisting their advancement.”\textsuperscript{50} Here, Barnett suggests that the university should take up a more active role in the shaping of current trends and developments in its different ecosystems in view of the advancement of “world well-being.”\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the philosophical force driving Barnett’s ecological university, it might not provide sufficient inspiration to do things otherwise, to inhabit the ruins of the capitalized university in another way, because his proposition is still situated very firmly in the tradition of formulating Ideas of the University, without offering any prospect of how these ideas might play out in practice. In that sense, the Idea of World Well-being is next in line after the Idea of Reason (Kant), the Idea of Culture (Humboldt, Newman), and the Idea of Public Good (academic capitalism \textit{ex negativo}) as providing the overarching normative framework that offers the university a steady point of orientation.

\section*{Idea, Organization, Practice}

Having explored different positions that have been developed concerning the university’s state of ruin, it is time to distance ourselves a bit in order to get a sense of how these different responses make us affective to the questions concerning the future of the university and its relation to the world in one way rather than another. It seems that in the literature concerning the relationship between university and society discussed so far, roughly two approaches can be discerned. On the one hand, under the banner of academic capitalism, sociologists of higher education have lampooned the marketization and corporatization of universities, including the commodification of knowledge in terms of patents, licenses, and degrees. Traditionally, this approach has mainly focused on criticizing actual trends and developments in the organizations of
higher education, with considerably less effort spent on devising alternatives. This approach originated in the early postwar years, when the massification of higher education and the recruitment of science for the military–industrial complex took off. It picked up speed in the 1980s and 1990s when neoliberal policy reforms dismantled the university’s protected status as a public institution and started to put it out for sale on the market.

The second approach, on the other hand, is older and goes back to the university reforms of the early nineteenth century. Given the state of decay of the university at the time, the question was raised how this age-old institution could be re-imagined. Thinkers such as Kant, Schleiermacher, and Humboldt in Germany, and Newman in Great-Britain, proposed different Ideas of the University, speculating about its purposes and trying to envisage the necessary institutional infrastructure (e.g., the Higher Faculties versus the Lower Faculty for Kant, the unity of research and teaching for Humboldt, the importance of the liberal arts in the Anglo-Saxon tradition). In contrast to the critical-sociological approach, these philosophers had a more imaginative take on the question of the relationship between university and society. They thought about positive ways in which the university could foster national culture anew without yielding to the power of the state.

At this point, it is possible to discern a robust implicit connection between the two approaches to the university: both discourses rely on a fundamental understanding of the university as an institution. It is important to clarify that the notion of institution is understood here as the formal structure, whether ideal or organizational, that aims to warrant the persistence of certain informal customs and values. However, although both approaches relate differently to the university, the university as an institution still does constitute a common ground that thoroughly conditions their respective understandings of what a university is and should be.

On the one hand, authors from the Humboldtian tradition require the university as an institution to put flesh on the bones of its idea. The idea of the university only makes sense if one conceives of it in relation to its institutional infrastructure. As such, to the extent that the idea of the university has to do with specific customs and values, with passing on knowledge to the broader public in view of national culture, these customs and values also need to be thought of as embodied in a formal institutional infrastructure that gives them exact meaning and grants them endurance. Put differently, the ideas of the university formulated by philosophers require sketching the university’s institutional
infrastructure to concretize the relations within the university as well as with institutions outside of the university.

The critics of the regime of academic capitalism, on the other hand, conceive of higher education institutions as organizations that are increasingly enmeshed with other organizations. The reliance on an institutional understanding of the university might be less outspoken here. However, it becomes more apparent when considering the fact that they understand the impact of the ascending academic capitalist regime as a transvaluation of the values of the university as a public institution (e.g., community, openness, and universality) in favor of more entrepreneurial and mercantile values. What is presupposed here, then, is the “original” university as an institution that embraced and promoted values such as commonality and openness, before capitalization began to carry out its demolition.

In that sense, a reciprocal capture exists between both approaches as each position refers to the other to gain strength and relevance. Although this is perhaps less clear for the early texts of Kant and Humboldt, contemporary texts that articulate the idea of the university, such as Barnett’s ecological university, often do so in relation to analyses of the critical-sociological kind in order to safeguard their idea of the university from the threats posed by current neoliberal policy reforms. Correlatively, these analyses of the university under the predicament of globalized capitalism seem to take the transcendental-philosophical accounts of the modern research university as a zero-degree to measure the impact of changing policy discourses on academia. The literature on academic capitalism often suggests that the idea of the university as an autonomous public institution for the disinterested pursuit of culturally valuable knowledge has been eroded since the early postwar years and more intensely since the development of neoliberalism.

Each perspective, however, comes with its own problems due to the focus on the level of the institution. Whereas the critical-sociological perspective risks placing us with our back against the wall, while making us aware how problematic the university’s situation is, the transcendental-philosophical perspective tends to offer far-fetched and idealistic visions of the university without providing a sense of how they could be realized. What both perspectives lack is a vision of a future that is different from the ones that present themselves as obvious or necessary. More concretely, they seem to lack substance for resistance. In opposition to these institutional perspectives, focusing on the organization and the idea of the university respectively, I want to suggest that it might be interesting to think about the university starting from its practices.
To Begin Again with New Beginnings

After having outlined the different approaches, it is time to formulate the problem along somewhat different lines than the organizational and ideational understandings of the university to trigger a slight shift in perspective, another awareness of the situation we find ourselves in. Such a shift in perspective could make us attentive to the possibilities that might still remain within the ruins of the university.

Reproblematizing the problem of the university between university and society in terms of an ecology of study, with a focus on practices, might open up such a perspective. Before expanding further on what it might mean to understand the university as an ecology of study, I will explain how the three key terms of this proposition—ecology, practice, study—each address a specific challenge that comes with the three questions that motivate this book, concerning the tasks of the university, the relation between university and society, and the future of the university.

First comes the term of ecology. As argued before, the capitalization of the university has intensified the commodification of knowledge not only in the sphere of teaching (e.g., degrees, modules), but also in the sphere of research (e.g., patents, licenses). This process of commodification has disembedded knowledge from the contexts in which it mattered in the first place and has cut loose the ties between knowledge production and societal questions. Foregrounding aspects of interdependency (instead of compartmentalization), indeterminacy (instead of fixed goals), generativity (instead of planned productivity), and mutual co-becoming (instead of exchange), ecological thinking seems to offer an exciting alternative to the capitalization of the university. It makes one attentive to how different human and other-than-human actors live together in symbiotic, predatory, or parasitic relationships, and how they thrive or suffer in co-created environments that can be either fostering or poisoning.54

Remarkably, both of the aforementioned institutional approaches have witnessed an ecological translation in recent years. Situating the university in a knowledge ecology, instead of a knowledge economy, Susan Wright has made a case for a new conceptual lens to study the organizational landscape the university finds itself in.55 Writing more from the philosophical background of the other tradition, Ronald Barnett has suggested the idea of an ecological university to understand how the university can relate to its ecosystems for the promotion of World-Wellbeing.56
Taking into account these (institutional-)ecological perspectives on the university along the lines of a focus on the *practices* of the university may considerably shift the point of view, however. Understanding the university in terms of its practices, and the relation between university and society as never given, but always locally, partially, and temporarily enacted in the course of practices, requires an alignment with contemporary practice-theoretical approaches. These approaches seek to navigate the midstream between both totalizing social ontologies with their focus on structures and systems, and individualizing social ontologies that stress individual agency and self-determination.\(^{57}\)

In contrast to the organizational and ideational approaches, a practice-theoretical approach stresses the actual, processual gatherings and doings that take place within the university, rather than its institutional infrastructure, its normative ideals, or its organizational form. Adopting such an approach, Masschelein and Simons, for instance, have focused on university lecturing as an experimental practice of profanation in which what is being lectured about (e.g., words, viruses, rivers, currencies, codes, buildings, God, drugs, stones) is detached from its regular, sanctioned use and made available for new uses.\(^{58}\) Roussel's plea for university learning environments addressing social and ecological change, with its stress on “series of emplaced bodies, objects, modules, networks and design elements that students and teachers collectively assemble into working prototypes and architectures to test ideas,” likewise comes close to such a practice-theoretical perspective on higher education.\(^{59}\)

Furthermore, in view of a possible redefinition of the university’s traditional tasks, I propose to grasp the practices of the university as practices of *study*. In recent years, the concept of study has been taken up again in discussions in educational philosophy and theory in order to conceptualize a radical alternative to the individualistic, opportunistic, conformist understandings of education under the banner of learning. Study, in contrast, would emphasize the collective and communal aspects of educational processes on the one hand, and link education to a radically anti-capitalist movement of resistance on the other hand.\(^{60}\)

Moreover, the concept of study appears to propose a welding of the three classical tasks of the university—research, teaching, and service to society. Study places the educational processes of the university right in the middle of a world of struggle where societal and political transformation is at stake. Besides, it draws together processes of knowledge production (“research”) and dissemination (“teaching”) in those moments and places where people, as collaborative units of study, start to question the world they are living in.
Conceptualizing the three core tasks of the university in their intertwinements and at the level of practices is one of the challenges this book aims to address with its proposition of an ecology of study. Adopting a different point of view, embracing not only an ecological take on the matter, but also situating itself in relation to the practices of the university (instead of its idea, its organization), requires another mode of doing theory as well, since both the critical-sociological and the transcendental-philosophical approach have fallen short in offering real alternatives to the capitalization of the university, and making its ruins inhabitable again. Therefore, the last part of this introduction further clarifies and contextualizes the mode of doing theory to which the book adheres.

Taking Up the Threads

Whereas the previous section tried to explain what proposition might be relevant to shed new light on the debate about the relationship between university and society, this final section aims to clarify which mode of doing theory might meet the demands of such a task. After all, it has become clear by now that an overly critical perspective only hardens the fronts by portraying a dim future, which leaves us without any real hope, whereas a strictly philosophical account often eclipses the problems it tries to address with all too abstract and utopian ideas.

At this point, I wish to pick up some threads found in the work of thinkers such as Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, and Donna Haraway. In light of Latour’s verdict that “critique has run out of steam,” the urgent question is which role philosophical and theoretical work can and should assume now. Latour is not opposed to critique per se, but he problematizes its focus on denouncing and debunking existing positions, as this merely impoverishes a debate that precisely is in dire need of new perspectives. Moreover, the critical stance would operate a separation between the people who still live under a “false consciousness” from the critics who know what is really at stake, rather than forging new alliances or gathering a public around actual matters of concern.

Instead, what is needed are ways of doing theory that gather people, that do not proclaim to know what others still need to learn, but that incessantly relay stories in order to enrich and foster debate, instead of denouncing and debunking, which would only make the debate more sterile. Such stories do not necessarily aim to set an example, prove an exceptional case, or show us something inherently good (whatever that might mean). Instead, they are stories that recount the event of an achievement or failure in doing things otherwise, in reclaiming.
Isabelle Stengers (1949), the Belgian philosopher of science, former student of Noble Prize-winning chemist Ilya Prigogine, and Whitehead-scholar who provides the main philosophical inspiration for this book, has forcefully stated what is at stake in such stories:

We have a desperate need for other stories, not fairy tales in which everything is possible for the pure of heart, courageous souls, or the reuniting of good wills, but stories recounting how situations can be transformed when thinking they can be, achieved together by those who undergo them. Not stories about morals but ‘technical’ stories about this kind of achievement, about the kinds of traps that each had to escape, constraints the importance of which had to be recognized. In short, histories that bear on thinking together as a work to be done. And we need these histories to affirm their plurality, because it is not a matter of constructing a model but of a practical experiment. Because it is not a matter of converting us but of repopulating the devastated desert of our imaginations.63

The story of Campus in Camps seems to be precisely such a story, not because it presents us with a model of an alternative university, or because it recounts the experience of innocent people who founded a utopian university in the most dystopian conditions, but because it is precisely a “technical” story of how things can be done otherwise, and how study can become possible even in an environment far removed from the comfortable lecture halls and seminar rooms of the universities in the West.

In that sense, it does not provide us with a critical story exposing how things go wrong in the contemporary university (in the way the stories of academic capitalism do). Nor does it make us dream of a university finally recovered from its vices and living up to its original mission again, as the stories about the Idea of the University make us believe. Instead, it merely discloses that things can be done differently, including the different problems and constraints that had to be met in order to transform the situation the studiers had found themselves in before they began to study.

In the course of the book, the conceptual proposition concerning an ecology of study and the technical story of Campus in Camps mutually provide a hold for one another. More precisely, the experiment of Campus in Camps allows us to situate the all too general questions of the three tasks of the university, the relation between university and society, and the future of the university in the palpable presence of a particular university and at the level of its practices. In doing so, it is not the intention to instrumentalize Campus in Camps for a theoretical argument that is of no concern to them, or to construe their practice as a critical lens to unveil that other universities no longer engage in study practices.
Instead, the study of Campus in Camps is a way of decolonizing thought because it allows us to interrogate a certain Western idea of the university and therefore possibly liberate it from the capitalist-colonial logics and mentalities that have occupied this conception, stressing excellence more than anything else. Not only is the geographically non-Western practice of Campus in Camps of use here, but also a re-reading of the non-Western elements of the European university in the Middle Ages, stressing its existence as a site of collective study, rather than the Enlightenment interpretation that retroactively recruits the university as a place of humanistic higher learning. Therefore, the book proposes to think practices with other practices, stemming from the commitment that writing about is always writing with and, hence, that it is essential to consider what to write about carefully. In the words of Haraway, this goes as follows:

It matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters what stories we tell to tell other stories with; it matters what knots knot knots, what thoughts think thoughts, what descriptions describe descriptions, what ties tie ties. It matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.

Relaying this line of thought to my questions, it is clear that it matters what university we study to study the university with. Taking further inspiration from Haraway, it means to understand doing theory as a game of cat’s cradle, taking in hand a pattern that has been given and drawing out, via a series of possible transformations, new patterns by relaying and returning the thread.

The game of cat’s cradle allows for discerning four features of doing theory that seem to be of importance here. First, in the game of cat’s cradle, different people come together to play around a common thread, without submitting to an overarching logic of either growth and victory, or denunciation and loss. On the one hand, the different patterns that emerge when the thread is passed on present an idea of ongoing transformation without falling into the trap of growth, as the thread does not become bigger or longer. String figures are hence not about the accumulation of knowledge or profit. On the other hand, it is a way of creating a series of patterns without radically cutting the loop. It is not about denunciation or debunking in order to lay bare and cut loose particular presuppositions, to extract a specific position from the debate. Instead, the challenge is to compose with unasked-for patterns. Hence, taking care of and paying attention to the thread, instead of growing or cutting, seem to be the core rule of the game.

A second feature is that it demands a particular loyalty to what is given (maybe a methodology of “data” after all, in a very literal sense), and here loyalty
should be distinguished from fealty or fidelity. The loyalty of taking the relay has to do with the care for the thread that is required. Knowing that what you take in has been held out requires a thinking in-between, a willingness to take the relay, and draw out another pattern. As such, it is not the same as commenting, which often stays inappropriately close to what is commented on, or hacking a text to make it affirm one's own ideas. Instead, it is a way of playing with and being put at play by ideas that make one think, in which thinking hence is not so much an individual capacity, as it is the achievement of a series of collective, shared relays.68

Third, thinking in relays requires a response to the trust of the held-out hand. It is vital to make clear that this trust is not trust in the (personal) other, but rather trust in the creative uncertainty of a specific encounter, an always partial connection in a particular milieu, of the in-between of the relay. It means to accept not to be the author of one's ideas, but to participate in a process and practice of thinking thoughts with other thoughts, to expose oneself to the risks of always-emerging beginnings without the security of fixed end-points. It is in giving hold and taking hold, passion and action, attachment and detachment that new patterns can be composed.69

Finally, it is an activity in which the participants experience the joy of creation, of making and thinking together, of taking care of a common thread in relay and return, and of giving way to always new and unforeseen futures. It is a way of doing theory aimed at an activation of the possible, in the sense that it does not so much transmit a “knowledge of” as to give expression to a “belief in” that transforms the world “from something given into something to be explored, always to be constructed and created, and this again not according to the measure of ‘what is’ but according to the measure of ‘what this world is capable of’.”70

Situated in the relays between the ecology of study, a theoretical intervention of the propositional kind, and the practical experiments of Campus in Camps, the book is conceived as a zigzag-movement going from the story of Campus in Camps to the conceptual elaboration of an ecology of study and back again. The book proceeds through various relays, offering new points of departure and drawing out three different figures that correspond to the different parts of the book.

The first figure concerns the emergence of the university in the Middle Ages. It offers a new entry point, a new beginning to think about the university. Returning to the medieval university provides a historical argument to bracket our institutional conception of the university and makes the proposition of the
ecology of study more palpable. Since the medieval university did not concern itself with science, the second chapter that makes up this figure raises the question of which place the sciences can obtain in the university. This chapter presents Stengers’ theory of scientific practices as a reciprocal capture of requirements and obligations, to situate the sciences in the university, as well as to construct a theoretical framework for the analysis of practices of study.

The second figure, then, places Campus in Camps center stage. Stengers’ conceptualization of practice will be brought to bear on the study practices of this Palestinian experimental university. The first chapter of this figure concerns the impulses that motivated the coming into being of a university in the refugee camp in the first place. Here, the question will be how the all too general question of decolonization acquired specific and concrete importance for the studiers of Dheisheh: which traps had to be escaped, which difficulties were encountered, which constraints had to be recognized. The fifth chapter, consequently, will delve deeper into the technical requirements that rendered this practice of study operative, efficacious—what made it work and how?

After having gone through the practical experiment of Campus in Camps, the last figure is a return to Stengers’ reading of the speculative philosophy of Whitehead and his conception of the university as a home of adventures. The sixth chapter will unpack this proposition and take it further, drawing on the series of relays being played before, giving more substance to the proposition of the ecology of study. Assisted by Stengers’ reading of Whitehead and situated by the study practices of Campus in Camps, the seventh chapter, finally, aims to propose a pedagogy of study.
Part One

Inside the Studiers’ Workshop: The Invention of the University and the Challenge of the Sciences
The University in the Middle Ages: On the Invention of a New Use of Reason

Given the deadlock that the university as institution confronts us with, how is it possible to construct a new point of departure? This chapter endeavors to search for new beginnings that might permit telling a different story about the university and its relation to the world. Therefore, I will take recourse to the invention of the university in the Middle Ages, since it might start a story of the university that is different from either the narrative of its ruinous sell-out to capital or the nostalgia of its glorious past as a sanctuary where people could study “in freedom and solitude.”

Taking recourse to, however, does not mean returning to the past to find a model for future universities, or retracing the university’s origins. Instead, my aim will be to test the hypothesis of the university as an ecology of study to construct a historical argument that makes this proposition more palpable, as well as to provide insight into what it might mean concretely. In that sense, tracing the roots of our contemporary universities back to the universitas magistrorum et scolarium of the Middle Ages confronts us with a different image of the university altogether, namely as an association of masters and students that gathered in cities such as Paris and Bologna to read and study texts together.

Indeed, the Latin notion universitas did not imply a sense of universality, nor did it refer to the universe. Instead, it referred to two different but strongly interrelated meanings: association, gathering, or community on the one hand, and guild on the other hand. These two meanings—association and guild—point in two directions, internal and external. Externally, universitas as a mode of organization with very union-like features tells us something about the relation between the medieval university and the claims that were laid on it by external powers, most notably the church. Internally, universitas comes with a specific understanding of the relations between professors and students gathered in the university, namely in terms of artisans and apprentices. Hence, the two meanings
of universitas allow us to understand the relation between the university and its external world, and the internal organization of the community of studiers.

I will argue that the university was a specific way of dealing with the questions, problems, and challenges of its time and that it came with the invention of a new use of reason. It is important to stress that this chapter does not seek the title of a historical truth, but that it aims to construct a viewpoint that might afford us a novel perspective on the university discussing the sociopolitical field in which the university came into being, the paradigmatic cases of the universities of Paris and Bologna,¹ and the internal dynamics of the university as an assemblage of study. Advancing a particular account of the invention of the university, drawing on Isabelle Stengers, this chapter concludes by suggesting that, within the ecology of study that the medieval university was, a new use of reason came into being, at once facilitated and required by this new way of gathering around texts.

Before I set out, however, it might be helpful to outline in very general terms the historical context of the long twelfth century that was marked with the emergence of the university. Historians have called this time frame the Renaissance of the twelfth century, referring to its cultural revival after the decline of the early middle ages.² The two most important institutions of the time were the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire, who constantly quarreled among themselves about questions of power, of which the most famous example is probably the Investiture Controversy. At the same time, the feudal system was in decline, and people started to move from the countryside to the city to learn a craft in the workshops of artisans. Next to people migrating to the city, there was much migration between different cities as well, especially by poor, religious people, the so-called clerici vagantes, wandering clerks. One last thing to keep in mind, given its strong bearing on the intellectual dynamics of the medieval university, is that at the time the printing press was not invented yet, and hence textual sources were limited. This meant that texts were still copied by hand and were a scarce and expensive good.³

The Age of Universitas

I begin with discussing the sociopolitical context of the twelfth century at large and situating the newly emerged universities in relation to external claims of power that were being made, mainly on behalf of the church. Overall, different stages can be distinguished in the development of the first universities, corresponding to the variable dominance of different sociopolitical factors
(e.g., relations between church and emperor, feudalism as social structure). These factors not only constrained or molded the new universities, but, to a large extent, also afforded and even necessitated their coming into being. Put differently, it was only within a specific societal context that the university could materialize, insofar that this context required its invention to address certain problems of its time. This does not mean, however, that one can only understand the university in function of its time—if that were the case, it would not have survived. Nevertheless, it is only within the specific force field of the medieval society that the invention of the university could occur. It means, therefore, to understand the university under the sign of the event as a radically contingent event that nevertheless marked a decisive shift in the way people related to power, coming from the outside, and texts, to be found inside the university.4

A first crucial factor for the emergence of the university was renewed attention for ancient texts in the margin of the conflicts between ecclesiastical and secular powers, of which the Investiture Controversy (1076–1122) between Henry IV of the Holy Roman Empire and Pope Gregory VII about the competence to install high church officials was the climax. In order to defend their arguments, advocates of the pope and the emperor equally took recourse to the juridical arguments that could be found in collections of texts such as the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the legal code of the Byzantine Empire. This renewed attention for Roman and Byzantine law soon resulted in a collection of both primary and secondary texts, compiled by the Bolognese monk Gratian, the Decretum Gratiani, a work that would become the central object of study of medieval canon law.5

It is hence within and due to a specific societal context—the struggle between secular and religious powers—that certain texts that had long been forgotten came to matter again, without it being prescribed, however, how they could come to matter. Byzantine legal texts, for instance, acquired new meanings in light of the quarrels between pope and emperor, whereby it was not just a matter of using them in the function of a predefined goal, but primarily of studying the modalities of their use, and raising the question how they could acquire a new significance in the organization of social and political life. In short, due to struggles between different institutions trying to lay claim on social life, it not only became relevant to read and study these texts, but in turn this studious activity also afforded the possibility for profound societal and cultural transformations, often in excess of the scope of its initial institutional instrumentalizations.6

In the wake of the Investiture Controversy, the church reinvented itself as universitas fidelium outside and above the hierarchical system of secular
feudalism and, hence, also outside and above the claims made by secular powers such as the emperor. In doing so, the idea of universitas—which at that time did not yet denote the collectives of studiers—acquired new relevance. The reformation of Cluny disconnected the bishops’ spiritual dominion from the feudal order, while the church reconceived itself as one uniform association that could autonomously realize its goals, out of reach of any secular power. In other words, the struggle between secular and ecclesiastical power provided the stimulus for a political-theological revaluation of universitas, which up to that time simply meant a totality or a whole.7

The revaluation of universitas, however, was not merely a political-theological affair. In the end, it affected the organization of social life as a whole as well. Central to the rediscovery of universitas was indeed the question of how libertas, an essential medieval virtue, could be realized. In its original form, the medieval liberty pertained to the private sphere of the familia, with its associated ideas of peace and protection. People believed that the solidarity of the family tie granted the individual members their freedom. This freedom was not absolute; it did not express an independence of all possible bonds. On the contrary, these familial bonds were viewed as a precondition for freedom because they provided shelter for subordinate members. In the feudal system, this structure of organizing private life was extended to social life. Relations of dependence between suzerain and vassal, just like the relation between father and son, were believed to safeguard freedom through protection.

The rediscovery of universitas as a general principle to gather collectives (not yet the collectives of studiers specifically) gave way to a re-interpretation of the notion of libertas, understood henceforth as liberation from the web of dependency ties that pervaded the entire society. These dependency ties, which initially were believed to safeguard the individual’s liberty, indeed stifled individuals in an exploitative and belligerent feudal sociopolitical organization. The social, horizontal ties of the people included in the universitas were meant as a radical alternative to the vertical ties characterizing the feudal system. Contrasting with the hierarchy, dependency, and inequality, implicated in feudal verticality, the universitas strongly upheld the personal freedom and mutual equality of its members.8

Some historians even go as far as to argue that the long twelfth century saw the rise of a genuine and general communitarian movement, permeating different layers of society, due precisely to the principle of universitas. Thus, not only did it help the church to reconceive itself as a community of believers, outside of the feudal order, it also provided the narrative through which the
newly proliferating cities began to understand themselves as *universitates civium*, associations of citizens. Moreover, within the cities, the idea of *universitas* aided the communities of craftsmen to organize themselves into guilds, of which the *universitas magistrorum et scolarium* was just one example, similar to the guilds of furriers, ironworkers, druggists, bakers, and saddle makers.

The broader communitarian movement, animated by the principle of *universitas*, inspired these collectives of studiers to organize themselves in the margins of the rules of cities, which gave them a special legal status. In the years before the emergence of the university as a collective of studiers, the number of people coming to the cities to study had strongly and rapidly increased. Around 1117, Guibert of Nogent wrote that years before, when he was a child, there were barely any masters in the cities. Besides, their knowledge was so limited that it was even hardly comparable to the bulk of knowledge that the wandering clerks of his older days transmitted from city to city. During the twelfth century, the amount of monastery and cathedral schools indeed exploded, and it became problematic for students to find appropriate housing. Moreover, an increasing number of students took the existing schools by storm. Therefore, masters started to organize their own private schools where one could obtain the *licentia docendi*, which allowed one at that time to become a master to teach in the schools of the diocese.9

The multiplication of readings and teachings of the Bible brought about by the proliferation of schools and masters posed a threat to the church. The *universitas magistrorum et scolarium*, which differed from the monastery and cathedral schools, proved very helpful to the church in bringing order, and it becomes clear that from the beginning, the newly emerging universities were a matter of great concern for the church, which absolutely wanted to secure the right reading of the Bible. To preserve this monopoly, the church constantly tried to lay claim on the new university. Most particularly, the church granted the new university the privilege to hand out the *licentia ubique docendi*, the right to teach everywhere, outperforming the *licentia docendi* granted by the schools that allowed masters only to teach in one’s own diocese. This made it possible to decrease the proliferation of monastery and cathedral schools, and hence could bring unity again in the teaching of the Scriptures.10

In conclusion, situating the newly emerging universities within the sociopolitical field of the long twelfth century, a threefold flow of power can be outlined. First, there was the necessity to read and study texts in order to deal with the pressing timely concerns such as the relationship between secular and religious institutions. Secondly, it is clear that during this time of turmoil,
new ways of organizing social and political life were sought after. In this regard, the communitarian principle of *universitas* that was already centuries old but slightly forgotten attracted renewed attention, ultimately providing a means to escape from the constraining and hierarchical ties of feudalism. In that sense, *universitas* also provided an emancipatory narrative for the newly emerging communitarian organizations within cities. Moreover, the *universitas* inspired people to gather as a collective of studiers precisely to read and study old texts. This finally brings me to the third flow of power, in which the church granted the young universities the *licentia ubique docendi*, the right to teach everywhere, in a move to discredit the teachings of the proliferating cathedral and monastery schools and to solidify its hold over these new collectives of studiers and their reading of the Holy Scriptures.

### An Urban Invention

Although no determining factors can be distinguished that would cause or provoke the coming into being of a university, it is remarkable that the first universities were strongly integrated into the urban fabric of the emerging cities of the twelfth century. More precisely, it was in Bologna and Paris that the first associations that went by the name *universitas magistrorum et scolarium* or *universitas studii* appeared. Indeed, the university is a thoroughly urban invention, which played an essential role in the lives of the many wandering scholars inhabiting the growing cities. Both universities, however, also differed on crucial aspects, most notably regarding the contents of study, the university’s relationship with the city, and the ties between professors and students.11

To begin with, the university of Bologna, allegedly the oldest one, came mainly into being to serve the career interests of laypeople studying Roman law. It was lay both in terms of the people teaching and attending, and in terms of subject matter.12 The focus on secular Roman law had everything to do with the flourishing of career opportunities for urban laypeople occupied with jurisdiction throughout the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. These demanded a professional training in practical legal skills such as the compilation of official documents and pleading in courts. Moreover, as hinted at earlier, the various events surrounding the Investiture Controversy renewed the attention for the texts of Roman law as well: for laypeople, the study of texts and arguments from Roman law often proved to be the best preparation for confronting the political claims of the papacy and for drafting original new political theories.13
Whereas Pepo was the first master to teach at Bologna's law university, its intellectual development primarily benefited from the presence of Irnerius, between 1116 and 1140. This scholar commented extensively on Justinian’s *Corpus Iuris Civilis* and the *Digest*, using a method of critical analysis reminiscent of the Parisian scholar Abelard's *Sic et Non*, a set of hermeneutical rules of thumb to gather and confront different authorities or claims in one and the same authoritative text. Not much later, in the 1140s, the monk Gratian completed his *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*, whose significance for the establishment of canon law in Bologna ran parallel primarily to that of the Irnerian commentaries for Roman law. Thus, the combination of a quasi-curricular basis for Roman and canon law, on the one hand, and the method of scholastic dialectics, on the other hand, turned Bologna into the most important center for law studies, attracting students from all over Europe.

The students coming from other Italian cities, or more far-off regions, however, were not protected by the city laws of Bologna. Therefore, in November 1158, Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa issued the *Authentica Habita*, the foundational formulation of a *privilegium scolarium*, a privilege that protected academics and their freedom from humiliations and malpractices such as reprisals for debt. Since Bolognese students were already protected by municipal law, and canon law students by canon law itself, this mainly entailed an amelioration of the rights and privileges of the many foreign students (*causa studiorum peregrinantur*). At the same time, the *Authentica Habita* protected students from exterior factors but left open the question of the organization of the student body.

Echoing the emergence of communes, craft guilds, and trade guilds, characterized by their democratic and anti-feudal nature, the students could subsequently organize themselves effectively as a *universitas*, a self-governing, and self-protecting association of students. This was a student association with elected officers, statutes, and an independent legal status. Each *universitas* had its own elected student rector. The masters were external to the university and were hired upon the initiative of the student body. They assembled in a quite rudimentary association for the regulation of examining procedures and the entry to their professional group. Whereas students were very well organized, masters did not form a strong association. In that sense, the university of Bologna was really a student university, a collective of people interested in civil and canon law that had organized themselves in order to study ancient legal texts.

After some time, the student association became so strong that it started to resemble a totalitarian regime. Students had a distinctive social status, were assembled in executive committees, and treated masters as hirelings who had
to take an oath of submission. Each year, the students elected several masters whose income depended on the student fees. The statutory controls imposed by the students were extremely rigorous, which granted them a very powerful position. More than it was a university of masters and students, the university of Bologna was a collective of students with a large degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{18}

University life in Paris developed more or less in the same period as in Bologna. However, it took a few years longer for the Parisian university to crystallize. Already in the eleventh century, there was much educational activity in Paris, more specifically around the cathedral schools in the houses of the canons attached to Notre-Dame. Throughout the twelfth century, the social and cultural climate of Paris became even more fruitful for the expansion of schools, as the city attracted many people who taught philosophy and theology, the two most important fields of study in Paris. Whereas the cathedral schools of Notre-Dame remained the most important for theology, the old and new monastic schools around the bridges and on the left bank offered refuge to the masters in logic and grammar. Just as in Bologna, many of the people studying or teaching in Paris came from other parts of the continent.\textsuperscript{19}

At that time, the students, often poor people who traveled from one city to another, were extremely dependent on the church, who provided them with clerical rights on the condition that the students themselves were considered to be clerics, \textit{clerici vagantes}, religious people who led a nomadic life attending a school in a town which was not their hometown. In this way, and functionally similar to the \textit{Authentica Habita} protecting the Bolognese students, foreign students in Paris were submitted to ecclesiastical jurisdiction to guarantee their security and privileges.\textsuperscript{20}

In that sense, the Parisian university came into being throughout negotiations between masters and bishops, in which one of the major stakes was the conferral of the right to teach. After all, the dispersion of schools had resulted in a situation where the church became practically incapable of controlling what was taught in these schools. Many masters taught on the basis of different interpretations of the Bible, and the church feared that the multiplication of schools would go hand in hand with a multiplication of heretic readings. Hence, what developed in the course of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century was a tactical alliance between the church and the masters. Where the latter endorsed this alliance in pursuit of their quest for educational autonomy, the church primarily designed this in an attempt to protect the Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{21}

The conferral of the right to teach, the \textit{licentia ubique docendi}, would be crucial for the birth of the Parisian university. At the end of the twelfth century,
the first embryonic associations between Parisian masters and their schools came into being to claim more rights from the bishop of Paris. These hesitant associations quickly gained momentum, resulting in an overarching community of masters and students in Paris, which was granted its statute in 1215, thereby officially transforming this association into a quasi-autonomous university.\textsuperscript{22}

When royal sergeants killed several students during street riots in 1229—a severe violation of the clerical privilege which exempted them from civil jurisdiction—the masters decided to strike. They initiated an exodus from Paris to other cities in the north of France, Toulouse in the south of France, and even England. Concerned about the intellectual climate of the city, Pope Gregory IX soon after promulgated the bull \textit{Parens Scientiarum}, in which he proclaimed Paris as the new Cariath Sepher, the brilliant city of books and letters mentioned in the Old Testament. This bull granted the Parisian masters the right to confer the \textit{licentia ubique docendi}, the right to teach everywhere. Whereas schools were only able to confer the right to teach within the same school, the university could grant the right to teach all over the continent, and as such, so the pope must have reasoned, the university, devoted to the study of theology, could also become a full partner of the church in the protection and preservation of the Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{23}

Theology was, however, not the only subject taught at the university of Paris. It also had a large faculty of arts, which functioned as a propaedeutic to the superior faculty of theology, and later the other superior faculties of medicine and canon law. Each superior faculty had its own organization and dean. All students with the degree of master of arts were full members of the university government. Regular students of the faculty of arts were considered to be members of the university government whose assemblies they could attend without having an actual voice or power of decision, however. Once a student had moved on to the superior faculty of theology, canon law or medicine, he could actively participate in decision making. Granting both masters and students a place in the university government warranted the democratic nature of the Parisian university, as opposed to the dictatorship of the students that characterized the Bolognese university.\textsuperscript{24}

For both the university of Paris and Bologna, processes of migration over the European continent as well as urban expansion were of great importance, forcing foreign students and masters to organize themselves to obtain the necessary protection from authorities. In Bologna, this protection was ultimately safeguarded by the \textit{Authentica Habita} issued by the emperor. In Paris, it was the pope who, after the dramatic strike of 1229, granted the universities the right to
award the *licentia ubique docendi*. Despite the difference in content matter (law in Bologna versus philosophy and theology in Paris), and the organizational core of the university (students in Bologna versus masters in Paris), the stories of the origin of these universities have a few much more remarkable features in common. In both cases, the migration to the growing cities went hand in hand with a migration of the text from secluded spaces (e.g., monastery, cloister, archive) to the public urban life. However, the ways of dealing with the texts also underwent major shifts, and it is this precise meaning of study as a specific technical relation to a material object, which, dovetailing with the *universitas*’ connotation of an association of craftsmen, will be the next issue to be addressed.

### The Craft of Studying

Three ingredients of the historical context in which the university emerged are of particular importance to understand its function as an *assemblage of study*. Calling the new universities assemblages of study first of all emphasizes the social dimension of these universities, which were constituted as gatherings of masters and students. Furthermore, the notion highlights the material and technical dimensions that need to be taken into account for understanding why those collectives were not just discussion groups or “think tanks,” but really gatherings of *studiers*, of people who study *something*. Taking these three connotations together, the relation between masters and students in these associations, the rediscovery and translation of ancient texts as study materials, and the particular techniques applied while reading and studying these texts come into view now.

First, picking up on the discussion of *universitas* as a communitarian principle of organization, it is noteworthy that not only the church and the emerging cities conceived of themselves as *universitas* (*universitas fidelium* and *universitas civium* respectively), but also people within the cities formed associations around their craft for mutual support and advancement of their profession. Not merely in Paris and Bologna, but in other cities as well, people practicing the same craft generally lived and worked close to each other, and because of their shared socioeconomic interests, it was, to a certain extent, helpful and relevant to work together. Unlike the feudal structures, the urban context facilitated a self-organization of people in labor associations where they could meet as a community around their craft, and together claim the same rights and privileges.

*Universitas*, in that sense, no longer denoted merely an association, but more specifically an association around a craft, in the sense of what is mostly called
a guild: it brought together master-craftsmen and apprentices, who collectively engaged with the specific materials and techniques of their craftsmanship. It was also in this sense that the organizational structure of universitas sparked the interest of the communities that formed themselves around texts in order to study them.

Conceived as a guild, the first universities’ main task was not so much the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next, or the production of new knowledge for society’s needs, but rather the application of reading and writing techniques on textual study materials. To that extent, it was really a community of master-artisans and student-apprentices that practiced the crafts of reading and copying together. In doing so, the university partly took over the work that had for centuries been done by monks in the monasteries, namely the copying of ancient texts—a work to be done by hand as the printing press had not yet been invented. Hence, with the invention of the university, knowledge workers that traditionally worked in total seclusion, behind the walls of cloisters and monasteries, suddenly moved into the light of communal urban life.25

The second and third features shed light on studying as a craft within the guild-like structure of the universitas. The second feature concerns the textual materials that were being studied at the first universities. In this regard, the rediscovery of ancient texts (such as, most famously, of Aristotle) via the Arab world has been of particular importance. The twelfth century saw some extremely fruitful exchanges between intellectuals in the Arab world and people working with texts on the European continent, most notably in Italy and Spain.26 This was mainly due to the presence of translators and translations. From the eighth century onwards, many translations of ancient texts had been produced, which, for instance, had already made the Bible, texts by the Church Fathers, and certain other classical authors widely accessible. A considerable amount of Latin and almost the entirety of Greek literature, however, remained practically undisclosed. Translators living close to the Arab and Byzantine world, for instance, James of Venice, Burgundy of Pisa, Aristipppe of Palermo, and John of Sevilla, rediscovered many of these works, especially from Greek philosophy and science.27

In other words, the quantity—and quality—of secular and religious texts that had become accessible in translation represented an enormous amount of intellectual materials that could be investigated and studied. Nevertheless, in the times before the invention of the printing press, accessibility should not be overestimated. Texts were available in Latin, but needed to be carefully copied and transmitted, which cost much time and money.28
This brings me to the third feature, which concerns the technical conditions of the new universities. Some have argued that the uniqueness of the university as an intellectual gathering stands in direct relationship to the specific techniques of mediating and studying text. Texts were scarce at that time because they could not be copied *en masse*. In other words, there were not many texts and authors, and from the texts that existed, there were only limited copies.

Before the invention of the university, texts were copied in the monastery cells of the monks. Reading and studying texts was therefore an exclusively monastic activity that required one to retract from public and communal life in order to devote oneself to the text. As such, the relation toward text was a religious one, and the activity of copying came close to praying. Accordingly, when the monks read and copied the text, the text was recited out loud, which again implied that it had to be done in isolation. This was also due to the fact that texts did not have interpunction, and the words were not separated by blank spaces (*scripta continua*) to economize on writing space. Because of this specific textual configuration, reading was by definition not done in silence, but involved mumbling and ruminating the words of the text.

In the twelfth century, around the time of the emergence of universities in growing cities, the text, the principal material that the masters and students of the *universitas* worked with, underwent drastic changes, which made it possible to relate to it differently. More precisely, the text became readable without recitation (as we can still do nowadays) due to its new features which included a more extensive use of punctuation, footnotes, and paragraph structure. Perhaps the most significant shift, however, was the separation of words with blank spaces: whereas before the text had to be read out loud in order to be understood, it could now be read “at a glance.”

This technological shift thus induced a transformation of the experience of reading. Before the emergence of the so-called university script, reading had been a spiritual exercise, requiring not only the eyes, but also the mouth and the ears. After this technological shift, the eye took center stage as the text became readable at a glance. Illich argues, “[t]he page was suddenly transformed from a score for pious mumblers into an optically organized text for logical thinkers.” Instead of being a matter of sensory embodiment of the divine text, reading became an exercise in distancing oneself from the text. At the same time, the text was no longer something that could only be believed in, but became something that could be crafted and studied.

In summary, in order to appreciate the novelty of the internal dynamics of the first universities, three factors were of particular importance: first, the rediscovery
of universitas as an organizing principle for craftsmen associations; secondly, the accessibility of study materials in the form of texts; and thirdly, the development of university script as a textual format. The invention of the university took place against the backdrop of the power struggles between pope and emperor, migratory movements throughout Europe, urban expansion, and intellectual discussions over the interpretation of the Bible. All of these developments shaped the university in a double sense. If they unquestionably facilitated its coming into being, they also implicated it in specific societal concerns (e.g., how to live together outside the feudal system? how to organize urban life? what are the legal competences of church and empire?). Of course, these concerns often elicited political debate, yet most importantly, they initiated and gave shape to concrete practices of study. Due to the rediscovery and translation of a vast amount of ancient texts, and to the fact that these texts were transcribed into university script, which provided a different sensory experience of the text, it became possible for readers to acquire a certain distance between themselves and the available texts in order to study them.

A New Use of Reason

The availability of texts, a shift in writing and reading techniques, and an urban and collective culture of reading were vital ingredients for the coming into being of the university. What is remarkable is that the invention of the university facilitated another way of relating to textual sources at the same time as it paved the way for a new use of reason. The radicalism of the invention of the university consisted in breaking with the prayer-like divinatory reading that was done in the seclusion of the monastic cell, and in using reason in a way to confront different authorities without getting bogged down in mere antagonism. 33

This new use of reason was, of course, shaped by distinct contextual constraints. The first one concerned the strong sense of authority attributed to the texts. It has already been mentioned that although many translations of ancient texts had become available, the fact that these needed to be copied by hand made them a scarce and expensive good. This also meant that for every field of study, only limited texts were read: where theology focused on the reading of the Scriptures, the law universities occupied themselves with interpretation of the Digest, and the Decretum Gratiani, lastly, was the primary focus in the faculties of canon law. In the faculty of philosophy, which prepared studiers for the higher faculties, the works of Aristotle had, at a certain moment, become the key source of interest.
Hence, given the limited number of authors read, the authority of the studied texts increased. In fact, it is very likely that the etymological affinity of “authority” and “author” has its origin in the workshops of the master-craftsmen and student-apprentices, signifying the secure connection between the work and its maker, with the one “speaking for” the other’s skill. Consequently, texts written by authors such as Aristotle had the same authority as their authors. The texts could be glossed upon, but not contradicted. Put differently, the text had an absolute authority which meant that it could not be discussed critically, proving the author right or wrong, or analyzing the conditions under which the author could be right or wrong, a way that would authorize the content of the text anew. Since the authority came from the text itself, an authorization based on critical discernment of the conditions under which an author had made such and such a statement was utterly irrelevant.

This is key to understand the way in which texts were being read within the medieval university. Even though the text was no longer read in a religious, prayer-like way, as Illich convincingly shows, the shift in writing techniques did not yet allow for a genuinely critical attitude toward texts in the habitual modern sense. The bookish text that was the primary material of study of the medieval university was a composite of the different authorities that could not be repudiated or proven wrong. In that sense, there was a strong sense of loyalty to what was written by the ancient authors.

Still, this in no way implied a way of reading that was completely submissive to the authority of the text. The authority of the text was understood in terms of the reliability of a witness that is called upon. If this meant that indeed the truth of the words of the authors could and should not be questioned, it was still the task of the studiers to construct the precise meaning and implications of these words.

The transformation of the manner of studying texts becomes evident in the rise of the *quaestio* in the medieval university. Whereas the *lectio* was a way of reading texts out loud and glossing over them in the presence of a public (instead of secluded in the monastic cell), the *quaestio* put forward a problem or issue on which different authorities disagreed. During the *quaestio*, these different (ancient) authors were called upon as reliable witnesses to this problem in the form of shorter or longer citations abstracted from their context. That is why in the written accounts of the *quaestio*, a problem is literally placed in the middle, around which quotes from different authors are assembled to confront each other.34
Here again, it should be emphasized that the purpose of the *quaestio* was not to settle once and for all who is right and who is wrong, a way of doing that would require the students to oppose some of the authorities to solve a contradiction by taking away one of the terms. In that sense, it is not about debunking, denouncing, criticizing, or judging. Rather, during the *quaestio*, success or failure depended on the achievement of a peaceful cohabitation of different citations of authorities within one, univocal text. In the newly crafted text, the different positions could be affirmed despite their relative contradictions, or in other words, that these contradictions had been transformed into contrasts.35

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the kind of reasoning elicited by the text in the medieval university had something to do with the postmodern “anything goes”-mentality which, by affirming diverging authorities, mainly affirms the absolute truths of difference or subjectivity. On the contrary, the work to be done by the studiers at the university during the *quaestio* was to create an agreement between the authors in spite of their relative incompatibilities and contradictions, and this could only be done by adding to the text, making it richer and more comprehensive, instead of drawing out the statements that did not fit, based on the statements transmitted by another author. To that extent, the use of reason that was invented in and with the university could be called a *diplomatic use of reason* that tried to negotiate between different authorities and forge a precarious and always contestable agreement.

In Paris, the aim of this diplomatic use of reason was especially pertinent to resist a total bifurcation between the worldly truths of philosophy, as found in the Corpus Aristotelicum, and the religious truths of Christianity, as revealed in the Bible. The Condemnations of 1277, in which the Bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier listed 219 prohibitions or constraints that the masters and students were required to respect, can be read precisely from the background of this concern. Generally, it is assumed that Tempier merely took issue with the unorthodox conclusions of Averroist masters such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and that the Condemnations manifested a repressive manner of exerting power over what was being taught at the university. However, they could also be read as exhibiting a concern not to cut the world into two pieces, secular and religious, preferring instead to create new folds that would allow diverging statements to coexist.36

Therefore, the work of the medieval masters and students was performed under a double assumption. First, it was assumed that the different authorities never lied and, as such, could be called upon as reliable witnesses while dealing
with a question. These authorities had to be respected, which meant that they could not be left out of the discussion, even when their statements did not fit in the general understanding of the problem, and even though they could not be contradicted or proven wrong. Secondly, it was assumed that there only exists one truth and that every separation in different “worldviews” should be resisted. This indeed did not mean that different positions (e.g., Christian, Aristotelian) toward a question were unequivocally accepted, but rather that the divergence in statements concerning the question actually posed a problem, which the work of the masters and students strove to deal with through the creation of a precarious peace, “rendering relatable that which previously inhabited irreconcilable worlds.”

From a more conceptual perspective, the efficacy of the diplomatic use of reason is to create coexistence amongst contradictory claims. It differs sharply from the critical use of reason that aims to denounce or debunk certain positions in order to unveil the reality behind different statements. In that sense, the critical use of reason is made for cutting, for taking away those claims that have been proven false or that have been discredited, whereas the diplomatic use of reason is made for folding, for creating the conditions under which diverging positions can be made to coexist in a precarious and always partial agreement.

However, the diplomatic use of reason does not only differ from the critical use of reason. It also differs from the experimental use of reason inaugurated by Galileo that became paramount at the university in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, Stengers draws a parallel between scientific thinking on the one hand and the dealing with texts as performed in the medieval university on the other hand. More precisely, she claims that both traditions resemble each other in the importance attributed to authority and the necessity of staging authority in the course of an argument. Whereas the medieval studiers had to reckon with the fact that ancient authors simply had authority, leaving them with the question of how this authority should be taken into account, scientists respect “nature” as their only authority, leaving them with the challenge of how to make nature create authority, or put differently, “how to make nature speak.” This means that whereas the authority of the authors is given in the text, the authority of “nature” needs to be produced during scientific practices. It needs to be decided how nature can be recruited as a reliable witness in debates amongst scientists, as well as how scientists can come to listen to nature.

Here, a difference can be discerned between the practices of the medieval studiers and the practices of the early scientists. Whereas scholastic practices
intend to stabilize history through the production of an agreement between conflicting statements, scientific practices are predicated on the experimental achievement which constitutes nature as an authority on the one hand, and which interrupts history, bringing something new to the world in the experiment, on the other hand. Given our interest in the three traditional tasks of the university, this leads us to the next question: How, starting from this medieval conception of university study, can the sciences be given a place at the university?
How to Learn Something New? The Place of Scientific Practices at the University

Going back to the emergence of the university in the Middle Ages afforded us a slight shift in perspective: from the university as an institution to the university as a collective of studiers, technically engaging with textual materials. This chapter takes up the problem encountered at the end of the previous one, namely, is there a place for the sciences at the university? Central to this challenge is the question of how the production of new knowledge, different from the diplomatic balancing of opposing givens, characteristic of the scholastic practices, can find a place at the university.\(^1\) Crucial, in this regard, will be to further the conception of the university as a bundle of practices holding together a collective of studiers, in order to include practices where the production of knowledge is at stake as well, or where, more precisely, the production of knowledge can be conceived as study, rather than science.

In that sense, the goal of this chapter is twofold. First, it aims to reflect on the place of practices of knowledge production within the university. If, indeed, we do not want to take the medieval university as a model for a future university, a decision which would authorize the ban of the sciences from the university, the question of how the sciences can find a place at the university, how the university might provide a habitat for them, becomes crucial, especially given the current dominance of STEM disciplines. Therefore, and secondly, this chapter aims to further develop the concept of study practice to include processes of knowledge production as well. Decisive in that regard will be the hypothesis on the convergence of the experimental and the diplomatic use of reason within study practices, since this might allow us to reconceptualize study as an intertwinement of the university’s educational, scientific, and societal tasks, at least on the level of its concrete practices.

Given the centrality of practices, Isabelle Stengers’ “ecology of practices” is particularly pertinent. At the height of the Science Wars in the 1990s, the Belgian philosopher of science intervened in this conflict to complicate the
discussion and conceptualize the constructivist nature of scientific practices. A digression into Stengers’ philosophy of scientific practices, including their relation to other-than-scientific practices wherein knowledge is being produced, provides additional inspiration for the further development of the concept of study practices, thereby helping in giving practices of knowledge production a place at the university. At the end of this chapter, the concept of study practices will be fleshed out even further by engaging with other contemporary theories of study. I start, however, by further situating Stengers’ concept of scientific practice in the heated debates of the Science Wars, which instigated Stengers’ thoughts about the sciences and knowledge production more in general.

It’s Practices All the Way Down!

Claims made in the name of Science often pretend to be neutral, value-free, and objective. Precisely these characteristics of Science had become the focus of the debates during the Science Wars of the 1990s. Natural scientists adhering to the idea that their profession indeed leads to neutral, value-free, and objective knowledge quarreled with a deconstructivist readership that had organized itself since the 1970s in an array of new sub-disciplines such as social studies of sciences and science and technology studies. The latter’s main critique was directed at the idea that science only investigates a world out there and objectively reports about it; in contrast, these critics upheld that science is through and through a political activity that not just represents a world out there, but actively contributes to its construction, including the different kinds of inequalities, exploitation, and exclusions that are integral to it.²

The natural scientists’ fierce reactions to these allegations show, according to Stengers, how much they had been offended. Not only had they been accused of being politically biased, but the existence of the very beings that they aimed to investigate had also been discredited as being purely scientific fiction. Moreover, what the Science Wars exposed was the fact that thinking of Science in terms of an overarching, broadly defined domain that makes claims which are (approximately) neutral, value-free, and objective proved extremely unproductive in facilitating a dialogue between the sciences and their interpreters. Therefore, Stengers proposes not to think of Science in all too general terms, but rather to understand the claims made by scientists from the point of view of their concretely embedded practices of knowledge production.³
In doing so, Stengers dismisses the purely relativist accounts of scientific discovery without taking recourse to the kind of radically realist understanding that places “Science” in objective opposition to “the world out there.” Instead, she understands scientific claims in relation to the scientific practices, which in the first instance had made it possible for these claims to become acceptable to the scientific community. Putting heat to the amalgam of modern Science allowed Stengers to discern a myriad of distinct scientific practices, each with their own inventive and creative ways of producing knowledge, and each heavily dependent on specific practical possibilities and constraints.

The practice of the experiment is exemplary. Defining the experimental invention as “the invention of the power to confer on things the power of conferring on the experimenter the power to speak in their name,” Stengers stresses the reciprocal capture between scientist and scientific fact as it comes into being during the actual experimental practice. Conceiving of the experiment as a generative assemblage involving scientists, machines, and particles makes her understand scientists and their facts as intimately entwined and thoroughly interdependent beings.

Given the emphasis on practices, Stengers’ perspective has strong affinities with a trend that emerged in social theory in the 1970s, which decided to focus more on practices than on broad, over-arching concepts such as the Economy, Politics, Religion, or Science for that matter. Instead of great schemes that should grant an absolute sense of stability to the always precarious relationships between buyers during a bargain, politicians during a negotiation, and believers during Holy Mass, social theorists started to focus on an ever-developing variety of diverging practices that gather different practitioners with different interests and ways of belonging around what is at stake during the particular practice. Indeed, it’s practices all the way down!

In general terms, the stakes of such practice approaches are to step beyond either a totalizing or an individualistic view of social reality. Whereas the totalizing view assumes that society as a whole, functioning according to certain principles, determines social behavior (e.g., Marxism, structuralism), the individualistic view postulates that individual behavior is the only thing that truly exists and that society is merely a theoretical construct (e.g., rational choice theory, Chicago school of economics). As an alternative to either of these social ontologies, the concept of practice seemed to provide a viable middle way between the individual and society as a whole: “Practices are where the realms of sociality and individual mentality/activity are at once organized and linked. Both social order and individuality, in other words, result from practices.”
Despite the diversity of practice theories, Theodor Schatzki argues that three main features characterize the concept of practice. The first is that a practice is “an organized constellation of different people’s activities.”\(^7\) This means that different people are involved and brought together by an activity that unfolds following a more or less organized structure. It is assumed that the people engaged in the activity know the tacit rules of the activity, which not only means that they know what to do and how to do it but also that they know how to go on with the activity despite unforeseen circumstances. As such, practices, according to Schatzki, are shared social situations in which the different participants have certain expectations about each other’s activities and act accordingly.

The second general feature is that essential characteristics of human life or social phenomena such as science, power, and social change must be understood as rooted in the organized activities of multiple people. A person’s behavior cannot, for instance, be understood outside of the context of the practice in which the person participates. From a methodological point of view, this implies that practice theorists will focus not so much on science, economics, or politics in general, but rather on specific scientific practices (e.g., conducting an experiment), on economic practices (e.g., negotiating a price), and on political practices (e.g., a debate in parliament).\(^8\)

The last basic tenet of practice theory stresses that rule-following and knowing how to go on, particular to human activity, are implicit. This non-propositional, tacit knowledge is bodily or embodied. As such, practice theoretical accounts of social phenomena aim to challenge the modernist subject–object distinction or the mind–body split. Being involved in practices is indeed not so much about having a clear idea about what this means, but rather about being capable of performing the activities of the practice according to the expectations that circulate it.\(^9\)

It is with respect to this concept of rule-following that Stengers’ ecology of practices sets itself apart from other practice theories most evidently. “Nothing is ‘done.’ Everything is to be negotiated, adjusted, aligned, and the term ‘practice’ refers to how these negotiations, adjustments, and alignments constrain and specify individual activities without determining them.”\(^10\) It is in the subtle difference between constraining on the one hand and conditioning on the other hand that Stengers finds a possibility to interpret and understand the hesitations of the scientists, the moments in which it is not so much a question of following a rule, or knowing how to go on, but of stumbling upon a problem that makes practitioners diverge, disagree, and possibly change the rules altogether to create ongoiness. It is also at that point that an opening is created to conceive of practices of knowledge production as practices of study.
Put differently, Stengers’ scientists situate themselves in a practical field, not one, however, that conditions, structures, or dictates their behavior, but rather one that constrains their activities in light of what can or cannot be risked, and of the consequences their actions may involve. As such, every practice has a strong sense of open-endedness. In that sense, such study practices do not only produce new knowledge, they also take care of the consequences of the new knowledge, and try to grasp which role it plays and can play in a world in the making.

Understanding practices of knowledge production along these lines, however, does not mean that simply “anything goes” or that every practice is like any other. Stengers argues that practices are recalcitrant and have their ways of defending their borders through inclusion and exclusion. Hence, what is required is to draw out the specificity of a practice. Convincingly, Stengers argues that what scientists find so insulting in the accusations from relativist philosophers and sociologists is their claim that scientific practices are purely social practices, meaning practices like any other. Moreover, it is precisely this “like any other” that makes it impossible to discern the particularities and peculiarities of various practices of knowledge production.11

Stressing what makes a practice specific, and different from any other, therefore, also goes beyond looking for a shared identity of the practitioners of the same practice. Stengers defines a practice as a technology of belonging, which she strictly separates from a technology of identity. Whereas a technology of identity would allow to gather different practitioners via the shared, uniform norms and values (rules) that inhabit the core of the practice, a technology of belonging would gather different practitioners around this practice without a priori determining how they belong to it. It makes it possible to discern and validate divergences between different practitioners, such as the moments when the facts do not “speak for themselves” but require debate, when specific interpretations do not “go without saying,” but make practitioners stumble and hesitate.12 It is in those moments of hesitation, moreover, that practices of knowledge production can be understood not just as scientific discovery, but acquire the character of study.

For Stengers, a practice as a technology of belonging regards the specific holding together of scientists, instruments, materials, and ideas in the course of the practice. How these different constituents interact during the practice can never be determined by an already-existing rule—an idea that upsets scientists because it reduces their doings to a social practice “like any other.” Instead, it is always something that still has to be performed, needs to be done, that requires to be negotiated, adjusted, aligned. Therefore, Stengers proposes to draw out the
specificity of a practice through investigating its requirements and obligations rather than by establishing its (social) rules and norms.

Requirements and Obligations

Scientific practices, and practices of knowledge production in general, are indeed not social practices “like any other,” just as political and religious practices are not social practices “like any other.” The question now will be how to grasp the specificity of practices of knowledge production and thereby refuse scientists the comfort of hiding themselves behind the massive identity of objective Science on the one hand, without insulting them with the objection that their practice is merely a social practice on the other hand. Interestingly, Stengers proposes to understand scientific practices in terms of how the practices themselves at once necessitate and constrain the processes of thinking practitioners engage in. Therefore, it is vital to understand practices not as guided by a set of rules or norms, which all too easily grants scientists the comfort of a rigid identity (and ipso facto exposes them to social-constructivist critique), but rather as constrained by requirements and obligations. It is this distinction between requirements and obligations, moreover, that ultimately will prove helpful in the analysis of study practices as well.

For instance, when scientists were confronted with the solar neutrino problem (the solar neutrino being a particle that only interacts weakly with matter, traversing the Earth as light traverses the air), they had to assume the existence of the neutrino, although it had not been detected yet. In that sense, the neutrino obligated scientists in the form of an open question that did not determine how the question could be resolved. Successive experimental achievements such as the Homestake mine experiment subsequently allowed scientists to detect solar neutrinos, but also posed new problems such as the discrepancy between the theoretically predicted and empirically detected amount of solar neutrinos. Put differently, setting up these experimental situations was a way to fulfill the requirements posed by the problem. The requirements did not determine the solution to the problem, but constrained how scientists could think about it.

In short, whereas the requirements denote how a specific phenomenon demands to be researched (what it requires to become an object of scrutiny), the obligations refer to what makes the scientists hesitate while doing their research. In that sense, requirements are the specific things that have to be done by a scientist to render a particular phenomenon “researchable” (e.g., setting
up an experimental situation). In the case of the solar neutrino problem, scientists needed to design an extensive experimental setting, and different colleagues had to be mobilized to ensure that the right protocols were followed. The requirements a geologist has to fulfill are, for instance, different from the requirements that a physicist has to fulfill. While the physicist can bring the particle to the lab, it is, indeed, impossible for the geologist to bring the Earth’s outcrop into the lab.\textsuperscript{15}

Indeed, requirements do not merely refer to the practices for which they apply. This would again reduce requirements to self-referential norms, and scientific practices to social practices. The requirements do not so much emerge from what, for instance, colleagues, students, financers, or the public require from the scientist, but rather from what the world requires, or more specifically, from that in which needs to be researched requires from the scientific practitioner in order for it to become responsive to the scientist’s questions. The construction of an experimental apparatus, for example, is what the solar neutrino problem (and physics more in general) required in order to become responsive to the obligation of the neutrino, implying that the neutrino itself both afforded and demanded the construction of such an apparatus.\textsuperscript{16}

This means that the paradoxical mode of existence of the neutrino (predicted but not proven) facilitated setting up an experiment that could demonstrate the existence of a particle which had been a necessary unknown of theoretical models, and that the particle actively lent itself to such an experimental achievement. In contrast to social or intersubjective rules, requirements refer to what the world requires to become an object of scientific inquiry. This entails that they refer to what the scientific practitioners are obligated by, the obligations.\textsuperscript{17}

Contrary to the requirements, \textit{obligations} do not mobilize scientists; they do not grant stability, but rather make scientists hesitate. Because scientists are obligated toward what they inquire, they are not easily compelled to endorse the theories that their colleagues have fabricated concerning their object of study, unless they have recruited reliable witnesses. What seems to be at stake for Stengers is not only to address scientists by identifying them with what is required of them, but also, more importantly, to address them as being obligated via their practice. To address scientists in this way means to wager on the possibility that they will not shelter behind the identity the requirements risk to provide once they get institutionalized in disciplines and methodologies.\textsuperscript{18}

Consequently, scientists must not just be addressed as individuals who follow the rules that govern their practice and make it “good science,” but rather as people for whom something is at stake in this scientific practice, and as being
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obligated by what makes them hesitate, before being mobilized by the particular scientific requirements:

An obligation, indeed, does not identify, because it leaves open the question of how it should be fulfilled or what would betray it. It is not intended to gather around the same mode of judgment, and it can divide. Moreover, the question of what practitioners are obligated by is never general. It is always about what such a situation, such a proposal obligates to.19

In other words, whereas requirements grant stability to a scientific practice and make practitioners converge around what they research (in the sense that they prescribe what protocols or procedures have to be fulfilled in order to pass the test particular to a specific scientific practice), obligations make practitioners diverge.

Intrigued by the neutrino, scientists formulated hypotheses, devised experimental apparatuses, and performed calculations to substantiate theoretical arguments in order to cautiously focus on the problem which the neutrino posed to them. The obligation, hence, makes it impossible to claim to know where practitioners are inclined to hesitate. In other words, it could be argued that whereas obligations denote what is being thought about in the course of a scientific practice, requirements denote how practitioners are required to think.

It is essential to underscore that requirements and obligations are intimately entwined, in a reciprocal capture, which means that the obligation that a phenomenon poses comes with requirements as to how this phenomenon can be approached. The requirements can only be articulated in relation to the obligation of a particular object of scientific inquiry (e.g., the neutrino, the Earth’s outcrop). Conversely, the obligations can only gain relevance within a practice of knowledge production for which the obligation matters, and that incites practitioners to become responsive to what this obligation requires (e.g., constructing an experimental apparatus, erecting a field laboratory). Dissolving the amalgam of modern science and conceptualizing scientific practices in terms of their requirements and obligations thus enables understanding the immanent divergences of practices of knowledge production.

Understanding a practice, any practice, in terms of its requirements and obligations, makes it impossible to maintain the sharp distinction between science and non-science, a distinction that has led to the normative discrediting of so many knowledge practices as being “unscientific.” Instead of a sharp border between science and non-science, Stengers’ conception of practice opens up a landscape of immanently diverging practices of knowledge production whose
scientific merits can never be judged upfront or in absolute terms, but only by getting to understand what its practitioners adhere to, and how a specific obligation requires them to do as they do.20

Learning Something New, Learning Anew

The previous sections introduced the stakes of Stengers’ ecology of practices, namely to rethink the relation between science and non-science in a way that does not unduly relativize the work of scientists on the one hand, but that also respects the value of other-than-scientific practices on the other hand. The wager of Stengers is to create a possibility of peace, a civilized debate between practitioners as belonging to their respective, irreducibly different practices, each with their own requirements and obligations, when war (e.g., insulting, debunking) is more probable.

Not only does the understanding of practice in terms of its requirements and obligations open up such a space for debate, but it also lays the groundwork for an analytical approach to investigate other practices of knowledge production as well, and not just the practices sanctioned by the name of Science. In that sense, the distinction Stengers draws between requirements and obligations could come to matter to the analysis of practices of study as well. Stengers has demonstrated the potential of this distinction by comparing how believers belong to the Virgin during their pilgrimage to how scientists belong to the neutrino during the experiment. Both the Virgin and the neutrino are not actually present; rather, it is their virtual presence—as beings believed in but not proven—that sets an assemblage of pilgrimage, respectively, experimentation, in motion.21

The virtual presence of the Virgin and the neutrino poses an obligation that makes practitioners hesitant before these phenomena, and it is due to the feeling of being obligated to that which makes them think and feel, in and through hesitation, that practitioners try to meet the requirements of this obligation. Whereas in the case of the scientist, the obligation posed by the neutrino requires assembling an experimental apparatus, discussing with colleagues, and establishing a research program, the obligation coming from the Virgin requires the believer to pray, to go on a pilgrimage, and to make oneself receptive to the presence of the divine being.22

In that sense, not only in scientific practices, but in all other practices, requirements and obligations exist in these kinds of mutual couplings in which the requirements are ways of responding to the obligation being posed. This
obligation can be felt most strongly when being fully part of the practice and its own ways of meeting the requirements. As such, the obligation does not exist before the requirements that have to be met; nor do the requirements bring an obligation into existence. Both emerge at the same time, and articulation of the requirements goes hand in hand with articulation of the obligation. And practices, then, are the very name of this process of reciprocal articulation.

The question now is, given the diversity of scientific practices, each with their own requirements and obligations, situated within a broader field of other practices, each also with their own requirements and obligations, how is it possible to discern a practice as “scientific.” Answering this question will further the exploration of the place of the sciences, understood on the level of practices, within the university. Moreover, it will help to shed light on the relation between “purely” scientific practices and study practices, understood as an intensification of scientific practices due to the cross-fertilization of an experimental and diplomatic use of reason.

Interestingly, when reflecting on what keeps different scientific practices together and makes them intelligible as scientific, Stengers does not refer to a collective identity, constituted by a set of theoretical premises or methodological rules, shared by all scientific practices. Instead, she suggests that what makes scientific practices converge, despite their variety, is a particular question. Stengers claims that the central question that matters to all scientific practices, irrespective of their many differences, is the question of how to learn something new?

It is to this question that every scientific practice has an answer, although the various answers that can be given may differ significantly. Whereas the physicist would perhaps respond that learning something new demands the installation of an experimental apparatus that makes the phenomenon of interest an object of investigation, the historian may answer that it requires spending sufficient time in the archive to read old sources patiently, and the psychologist might refer to the questionnaire or the survey as a means to learn something new.

Stengers argues that the efficacy of the question of how to learn something new is twofold. On the one hand, the question cannot unite scientific practices without making them diverge: in their attempt to respond to this question, it will soon become clear that even though this question concerns every scientific practice, they will all respond to it differently. Since scientific practices are engaged in different discussions, make use of different methods, and raise different standards concerning their work, they cannot answer the question of how to learn something new—although this question is pertinent to all of
them—unequivocally. On the other hand, this question excludes the practices for which this question does not matter. Hence, juridical, medical, or therapeutic practices are kept out of the firing line, instead of being denounced and devalued as merely non-scientific. In short, the question of how to learn something new makes scientific practices converge (the question matters to the entire range of scientific practices), while at the same time making them diverge (the question matters to them differently as they will respond differently).

Raising this question to unearth the meaning of the concept of scientific practice sets a double operation in motion that dissolves the amalgam of modern science, and discredits its idea of a rationality secluded from the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts of the everyday world. The generic question “how to learn something new?” unbinds the sciences from the consensual justifications that identify them with an approach that is rational “in general,” as opposed to the particularistic irrationality of opinion and common sense. Instead, it permits inquiring the specificity of scientific practices as they diverge from one another, including the specific rationality particular to every scientific practice.

Placing the question of how to learn something new centrally within the discussion about the meaning of scientific practices raises a problem when considering the early history of the university, as recounted in the previous chapter. Did the university not come into being as an assemblage of studiers reading ancient texts relying on a diplomatic use of reason to create the possibilities for peace between different conflicting authorities? Were they, to that extent, not more interested in harmonizing or stabilizing history than in making history, bringing something new into being, learning something new?

At this point, it becomes possible, if not necessary, to complicate the historical development of the sciences and reflect on what it might mean to do scientific work at a university. Indeed, the habitat in which scientific practices take place might not so much transform the nature of scientific practice itself, as it does transform the meaning scientific practices have for those outside or at the border of this habitat, namely society or the world at large. That is why the tendency to practice sciences outside the university—for instance in private laboratories owned by companies—is so worrisome, since it allows for immediately commodifying the new that has been learned during scientific practice into a marketable good, instead of first raising the question of what its meaning or use could be apart from its exchange value.

Consequently, practices of knowledge production at the university might not primarily converge around the question of how to learn something new?—a question that matters to scientific practices outside of the university as well;
within the university, this question namely gets complicated by another one: how to learn anew? That is: how to transform the relationships we entertain with the world we inhabit and the new that has been learned in a thoughtful and inventive way?26

In that sense, the university can be considered as the knot between two lines of thinking—the cumulative effort of two uses of reason. First, there is the diplomatic use of reason, already present in the medieval university, aimed at the harmonization of history and knowledge through a diplomatic intervention that creates the possibility for peace between conflicting authorities. Secondly, there is the experimental use of reason that, having emerged mostly on the outside (e.g., Galileo, Boyle), only gradually acquired its place as part of the university. The experimental use of reason is not so much interested in stabilizing history as in bringing something new into the world. The university can therefore be understood as the place where scientific invention employing experiment takes place on the one hand, yet also where the question of what the meaning of this invention could be for the world outside can be raised on the other hand.

From that point of view, it seems that by practicing science at a university, science potentially acquires the character of study. As such, study is not merely aimed at the creation of new scientific knowledge but primarily denotes a hesitant relation toward what is new, opening the question of what its place can be in the world, or how the event of an experimental achievement can be inherited. In that sense, study is the point of convergence between the three classical tasks of the university that are usually understood as separate, namely research, teaching, and service to society. In the course of practices of study, not only is something new discovered, but also a collective of studiers gathers around it to devote due attention to it, investigate it together, and speculate about its possible consequences for the world.

By reclaiming practices of study as a starting point to think about the university, I wish to omit an all-too-easy nostalgic plea for a return to the Middle Ages, where the university did not have to concern itself with scientific discovery yet and was of no interest to private investors, the state, or the industry on the one hand, and an all-too-quick acceptance of the current capitalization of the university due to the commodification of scientific knowledge on the other hand. Instead, I suggest to give the sciences a place at the university within the broader framework of study, because this provides the possibility to think about scientific practices (driven by the question of how to learn something new?) as being thoroughly educational as well and implicated in societal issues and concerns, which raise the question of how to learn anew?
Practices of Study

Conceptualizing the university from the point of view of its practices of study is not such a strange idea. Already in the Middle Ages, the notion of *studium* was used to denote the specificity of the university. When the emperor or the pope sanctioned medieval universities, they bestowed the name *universitas studii*. This name denoted, more than the usual denomination of *universitas magistrorum et scolarium*, the activity of this association, namely study. In the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, the Latin verb *studēre*, from which the noun *studium* derives, means not only studying, learning, or pursuing knowledge, but also being attached to or being in favor of. As such, the concept denotes an affective and a cognitive activity, constituted by the relation between studier and study material.

In recent years, the concept of study has acquired renewed attention in the field of educational philosophy and theory, as well as elsewhere. The literature on the concept of study is marked by a few telling contrasts, interpretation of which will shed more light on the notion’s different facets. At the same time, having outlined my understanding of study in relation to Stengers’ account of (scientific) practices, the notion has in fact already been drawn toward a more precise meaning that concretely situates it on the coordinates outlined by the four fields of tension, which will now be discussed.

A first tension concerns the *subject of study*. In other words, it concerns the question of who is studying. Is study an activity performed on behalf of an individual subject seeking the isolation of the library or the archive, or is it a thoroughly collective event in which different people come together around a matter of concern? In this regard, Masschelein interestingly contrasts the iconography of Saint Jerome, absorbed in the text while seeking the seclusion of his cell with how Saint Thomas is depicted, namely as engaged in discussion with a public while reading from a book. Both are figures of study; however, both embody a different kind of study, namely individual versus collective. The first image of study can, for instance, be found in Lewis’ Agambenian account of study in which he understands it as a process of withdrawal from the world and its particular demands. One could think of those moments when one gets lost in the library, loses track of time, and no longer knows which aims to pursue or which demands to meet, and when, in the end, one devotes time and attention to something that one has encountered almost serendipitously while working in the archive.
In contrast, the second image proposes an idea of study as a public and collective activity, in which different people come together to discuss something. The center of discussion can be virtually anything—a virus, a river, a divinity, a text—as long as it has been made present during a lecture or other educational gathering, and thus turned into an object of study.\(^\text{30}\) However, it can also be that the collective of studiers discuss their position as studiers, given specific social and historical conditions. Study, in that sense, means the analysis of these conditions and how they normalize exclusions such as racism or sexism.\(^\text{31}\) It is, at last, also this image of study as performed by a collective that can be found in Ford’s account of communist study that is understood as a “commonness against,” a particular mode of gathering in order to contest capitalist economy, and to create a way of living together from the bottom up.\(^\text{32}\)

A second tension has to do with the logic of study, or more precisely, the relation between means and ends. Whereas some argue that study is an intentional activity aimed at, for instance, the inquiry and critique of social and political structures,\(^\text{33}\) or the democratization of the very conditions in which one studies in view of an anti-racist decolonial future,\(^\text{34}\) others conceive of study rather as a process that one gets caught up in almost incidentally, and that only succeeds when it uproots previously conceived plans or intentions. It is in this regard, for instance, that Lewis’ conceptualization of the dialectic between learning and studying can be understood. He argues that study can be considered as the profanation of learning: as the acquisition of knowledge increasingly becomes a pure means, detached from all intentions or aims initially held, learners transform into a studiers.\(^\text{35}\) What is disclosed in the act of studying, Lewis argues, is the educability of the studiers themselves:

Study becomes a kind of pure means without end. The result is an experience of educability without end. Here educability is not placed in the service of any aim outside itself. It is not made into a mean for an end. Nor is it merely an end in itself. Rather, it suspends the means-end logic altogether, producing a pure experience of the self as educable—as a ‘whatever’ being freed to be otherwise than.\(^\text{36}\)

In this account, studying denotes the moment when the initial intentions, aims, and purposes of learning are suspended because the presence of something encountered in the archive or the library requires attention and interrupts the process of learning, which transforms the learner into a studier while affording an experience of educability itself (instead of the experience of attaining a goal, meeting a demand).
Here a third tension comes into view, namely how different authors consider the relation between study and the world in which it intervenes, or in other words, the *politics of study*. A first line of thought, already hinted at, conceives of study as a strong antagonistic force that contests the political status quo via scrutiny. Dyke and Meyerhoff refer to the Experimental College of the Twin Cities, which was organized together with other studiers in order to resist the racist biases of the American system of higher education and engage a multitude of interested people in alternative modes of study, outside and against this system.37 Less extreme is the conception of study as emergentist politics, a way of enacting new ways of living and being together from the bottom-up, firmly embedded within the sociality of study itself. Harney and Moten point to those moments when people take issue with something and, starting from their discussion about the issue, develop new ways of relating and interacting, which in itself already enacts an alternative vision of the political. In these contexts, study is understood as a radical praxis that provides the possibility for a new sense of collectivity to come into being in relation to a specific political concern (e.g., racism, exclusion, poverty, marginalization).38

The following two lines of thinking see the relation between study and the political somewhat different and claim that it is crucial that study is not understood immediately as part of or engaged in political processes, be it *against* the existing world, or *for* another world. Masschelein and Simons, for instance, argue that although the political question of how to live together is inevitably present during the lecture, it is only present as secondary in relation to that about which the question is raised (e.g., a microbe, a mountain, a machine). As such, the discussion during a lecture or a seminar differs from a purely political discussion (understood as an exchange of statements informed by political ideologies), because something is made to interfere within the process and suspends the political conversation in order to make an educational encounter with a particular thing possible.39

Additionally, Ford is hesitant to intermingle study and politics too easily or too quickly. Although he is convinced that there is a radicality to study, a specific political efficaciousness associated with its “commonness against,” he does not claim that study is political from the beginning onwards. Rather, he argues that study offers “an occasion for politics.”40 In that sense, both are not entirely unrelated. Instead, it is the case that studying, without perhaps any singular political aim in mind, might create the possibility for political action. Thus, while this conception safeguards the autonomy of study—of not being predefined by any political goals—at the same time, a sense of political efficacy
remains, albeit in the second instance. In other words, by offering an occasion for politics, study can be understood as complicating or delaying the political process itself.

A fourth and last tension concerns the place and time of study. In general, three positions can be discerned. A first, perhaps more traditional, position is taken by those who situate study within the educational arrangements of the institution of the university. Typically, this is, for instance, the lecture hall as a place of collective, public study and the profanation of a poem, a painting, a particle, or the library where the studiers get lost among the sources and books, and forget about the initial questions that brought them there in the first place.41 A second position is taken by those who situate study radically outside of the university, for instance, on the streets in the course of an Occupy Wall Street-protest,42 the Baltimore Rebellion,43 or the Barricades Project.44 This position, generally, runs parallel to positions that draw a strong connection between study on the one hand, and political action, on the other hand.

A third position concerns the processes of study that take place in or around the university, but not as part of an official curriculum. Harney and Moten write about these moments when inside, but despite the university, study takes place in what they call the undercommons, the unofficial and unrecognized sites of study, where it shows itself as an intellectual sociality, to be encountered on campus and beyond. They write about the studiers committed to black study in the university’s undercommon rooms. […] They study in the university and the university forces them under, relegates them to the state of those without interests, without credit, without debt that bears interest, that earns credits. […] They’re building something in there, something down there. Mutual debt, debt unpayable, debt unbounded, debt unconsolidated, debt to each other in a study group, to others in a nurses’ room, to others in a barber shop, to others in a squat, a dump, a woods, a bed, an embrace.45

Combining a Stengersian practice-theoretical point of view with a conception of study practices as those practices where the question of how to learn something new and the question of how to learn anew, and where the experimental and the diplomatic use of reason get intertwined, allows now for situating the concept of study practices in terms of the tensions outlined above. First, it is clear that from the perspective of practices, study is a thoroughly collective event that brings together an amalgam of human and other-than-human actors (e.g., objects, instruments). Although studiers can sometimes work alone (e.g., preparatory reading for a lecture, editing minutes after a meeting), this experience can only
be adequately understood within the framework of a broader study practice that includes other studiers as well. Secondly, since study practices take place within a more or less organized setting, they are frequently initiated with a more or less clear purpose in mind, or at least have a driving question or issue. To that extent, there is some kind of intentionality at work. However, importantly—and more interesting—is the fact that practices of study, although often initiated intentionally, lead to moments of indeterminacy where the means of study overshoot the ends, and alternative futures become conceivable, where something strongly insists upon the studiers, requires their attention, and poses an obligation that makes them hesitate and think.

Thirdly, rather than being a critical force that seeks to deconstruct or denounce, study practices have a more speculative approach due to their ability to rekindle thought about contemporary issues by making something present (e.g., a virus, a text, a painting). This can drastically alter the terms and conditions of discussion, and, in that sense, open up different possibilities (rather than closing down via critical deconstruction and denunciation). Lastly, though study practices are closely associated with the university, they are not limited to the institution of the university. Outside of the university, remarkable practices of study come into being, from the point of which it is possible to question the university and the research–teaching–service nexus radically. One such practice is the experimental university Campus in Camps that aimed to study the camp and the lives of its inhabitants while seeking to make other futures possible. The next figure, therefore, concerns the particular case of this radical study practice in order to develop further and concretize what it means to study.
Part Two

Campus in Camps: An Experimental University in a Palestinian Refugee Camp
Beyond Victimization and Normalization: On Questioning Situations and Studiers’ Obligations

This chapter starts with a little displacement or, more precisely, a relay. Returning to the experimental university of Campus in Camps, the question now is what the obligation of their practice of study is, and which activities this obligation requires the studiers to perform. It is important to note that Campus in Camps does not understand its own practice from the perspective of study. Instead, the concept of study practice is deployed as a conceptual tool to disentangle the requirements and obligations of this experimental university and to shed a different light on their work. At its turn, the study practice of Campus in Camps will provide new commencements and open new ways of thinking about the future of the university to be developed further in the next part.

To that extent, the connection between the activities of Campus in Camps and the concept of study practice can be understood as a mutually generative binding that affords both more than what they could achieve separately. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Campus in Camps calls itself a university (Al-Jame’ah in Arabic), and therefore, in light of the previous analyses, the notion of study practice is perhaps not all too far-fetched to deepen Campus in Camps’ reflections about the meaning of the university.

Starting from Stengers’ conception of a practice as a reciprocal capture of requirements and obligations, this chapter aims to grasp the obligation of the study practice of Campus in Camps. The chapter intends to pinpoint what makes the participants of Campus in Camps study, the source of their hesitations and collective stammering in front of the questioning situation that started their thinking processes. In the next chapter, I will shed light on the requirements of the practice of Campus in Camps, the activities and ways of doing that this obligation demanded them to perform, and which, conversely, allowed for the obligation to be felt, so that something might start to insist on their ways of thinking and open up another future.
A Questioning Situation

Dheisheh, the refugee camp where Campus in Camps performs its activities, was established in 1948, in wake of the Nakba, when Palestinians had to flee their homes. In his reflections on the camp, the Italian legal and political philosopher Giorgio Agamben understands it as a state of exception, a temporary suspension of the juridical-political order by the sovereign, a conceptual figure denoting those in power, that grants the sovereign the possibility to freely transgress the limits of the very juridical-political order it represents.2 However, speaking about the temporariness of the camp—its exceptionality—would sound somewhat strange nowadays to those who have lived in a camp for more than seventy years, or for those who were both born in and have raised their children there.

This tension between the exceptionality of the camp (the excess of violence that brought it into being) and the camp’s decade-long endurance (its transformation into a habitat for different generations of refugees) confronted the younger inhabitants of the camp with a problem. Historically, the main narrative of political resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas puts the so-called right of return, the right to go back to the houses from which the Palestinian refugees had been expelled, central. To the children and grandchildren of these first-generation refugees, such a right seemed quite abstract, since they were mostly born in the camp and spent their whole youth there.

As such, this tension raised the question of how they, as inhabitants, could relate to the camp and imagine its future. Intuitively, to most of the refugees, it seemed desirable to persevere in their struggle to do away with the camp, to remedy this historical anomaly, and to end this state of exception. However, others hesitated before this suggestion and objected to it. Throughout its long existence, the camp has grown as a space of communal life that, despite its precarious conditions, has been a living environment for all who lived and grew up there together. Hence, putting too much stress on their victim status while claiming the right to return to their original houses would even do an injustice to the history of the camp and the communal life it fostered. Put differently, they felt that these strategies would be a betrayal of their own experience.

The questioning situation, to quote Souriau, the problem before them that incited thinking, feeling, and acting in order to be realized, or the possible that required to be instaured (as a work-to-be-done) had to do with decolonization: how to decolonize the camp and find other ways of living there, inhabiting its ruins?3 Decolonization here does not only mean the returning of lands that had been taken by the Israeli settler-colonists, a territorial decolonization, but it also
(and especially) means a process to unlearn and get rid of the colonial logics and mentalities imposed on the lands and their inhabitants, a decolonization of the mind. In that sense, decolonization “not only means resisting territorial occupation and violence, but also transforming institutions, cultural products, approaches, and values. Moreover, in the context of pedagogy, ‘decolonization’ basically signifies a non-institutional education where knowledge is produced and shared collectively.”

For Campus in Camps, speaking in terms of decolonization is doubly appropriate. First of all, it concerns the very material question of inheriting the legacy of settler-colonialism and the different claims that it has made and continues to make on the spaces and places in and around the camp. Think, for instance, of the debates about the future of The Crow’s Nest, whether it should be demolished or reused. Secondly, and here its educational dimension comes in, decolonization raises the question of how to unlearn the logics and mentalities of the liberal-democratic nation-state imposed on them via the relation of the ban—the exile required for the foundation of the state of Israel. Most pertinently, perhaps, decolonization raises the question of how to initiate processes of collective learning in order to inhabit the camp differently, to learn anew.

Decolonization, as a questioning situation, a work to-be-done that requires thoughtfulness and inventiveness, is traversed by three tensions. The first, as already hinted at in the Introduction, is the tension between the narrative of decolonization as a revolutionary event on the one hand, and the narrative of decolonization as a solution to a problem on the other hand. Whereas the first posits decolonization as a radical breakout of violence against the oppressing powers in order to liberate the oppressed, the second sees it as the result of a problem-solving procedure. Due to the use of violence, within the first narrative, decolonization risks to shape itself exclusively in the face of its enemy, and hence to mimic the very oppressing strategies it aims to oppose. The second narrative, on the contrary, can be questioned for its lack of radicality and the risk to compromise to the colonizing forces. Therefore, in the end, for Campus in Camps, both narratives had to be omitted.

A second tension, particularly relevant to inhabitants of Dheisheh, concerns the question of whether they were willing to understand decolonization as a past-oriented struggle that aims to reconquer the houses they—or rather their ancestors—inhabited a long time ago (the right of return). Or that they, on the contrary, might take it as an opportunity to think in new ways about their predicament and possible interventions, in ways that are different from
an effectuated right of return, to learn anew and create a future that is different from the ones that present themselves as obvious or necessary.

Thirdly, and again taking up the two tensions mentioned above, they are confronted with the dilemma either to understand decolonization as a counter-force against the colonizers, risking to assimilate themselves to those who they vehemently oppose, or to resist such a temptation and conceive of decolonization as a long-term transformative process made possible by the production of an interstice—a small yet radical shift in perceptions that opens up alternative futures and different trajectories.

Campus in Camps has chosen this second path to wager on the possible production of an interstice that would allow the studiers to relate differently to the camp and its inhabitants—to learn anew. It required that the studiers would not start with readymade solutions, from futures already known, but that they tried to give both the camp itself and its inhabitants a voice in the imaginations of their shared future. Moreover, it required that in and through practices of study, they would become susceptible to the obligation of their practice, which would make them hesitate before the camp and its future, instead of abolishing it, as would have been justified based on the right of return.6

Creating a Shared Language

The first year focused on the establishment of a common language and approach to understand and discuss the contemporary condition of Palestinian refugee camps. The Collective Dictionary is a series of publications that contain definitions of concepts the studiers deem necessary to think about the issues and challenges that come with inhabiting a refugee camp, more specifically, the improvement of living conditions without normalizing the exceptionality of the camp.7

In small groups, the studiers conducted interviews, wrote reflections on personal experiences, undertook excursions, did photographic investigations, and analyzed documents in order to get a better grasp—which means here: more grounded in the everyday experiences of the inhabitants of the Palestinian camps—of their communal ways of life. In addition to working in the small groups, guests were invited to participate in biweekly plenary discussions on citizenship, refugee studies, humanitarianism, gender, mapping, and research methodologies. Many events were open to the public to reinforce the connection between the studiers and the other inhabitants of the camp.8
The studiers published *The Collective Dictionary* at the end of the first year. In each of the eleven booklets, they developed one key concept. In alphabetic order, the different concepts included citizenship, common, knowledge, ownership, participation, relation, responsibility, sustainability, vision, and wellbeing. Throughout the different publications, it became clear how much the right of return was still a topic of debate among the inhabitants of the camp. In almost every booklet, studiers asked themselves how it was possible to shed a different light on the right of return, when concepts such as citizenship or ownership would be rethought outside of a colonial liberal-democratic framework and what they could mean when conceptualized from the perspective of those who had to create new communal ways of living together in the camp—the state of exception where the liberal-democratic order is suspended.

In the following paragraphs, the series of publications of *The Collective Dictionary* will be read from an interest in the pressing contradiction between the strong claim of the right to return on the one hand and the more affirmative reflections on communal life in the camp on the other hand. The understanding of the right of return as the right of individuals to return to their former private house can be read most actively in the booklet *Vision*. In the process leading to this publication, the participants were asked to reflect on the lives of camp inhabitants in 2040. It was one of the first exercises, taking place in March and April of 2012, aimed at making an inventory of the different views that were held concerning the right of return. As such, it differs from the other booklets that were the result of group work on a concept, and that were finished almost a year later, in January 2013. The booklet contains an array of perspectives on the reality of refugees in 2040. Participants individually expressed their ideas on the right of return through a narrative, a simulation of a guided tour, a proposal, a declaration, or a media conference.

Some of the contributions to the booklet assumed an effectuated right of return, telling stories about people who will have returned to their original villages, leaving the camp behind as a ghost town. One even proposed to transform the desolate camp into a museum that would provide an account of life under the settler-colonialist occupation. Others have expressed a mix of a deep despair concerning the possibility of returning on the one hand, and the optimistic hope that return will be effectuated on the other hand: “In 28 years, I expect the camp will be as it is now, but with more buildings and an increased population. […] However, I hope there will be no camp in 28 years. I hope that we will be back, back to our destroyed villages.”
Another contribution that voices a pessimistic stance toward the possibility of return underscores the ongoing engagement and struggle of the inhabitants of the camp in claiming the right of return. One participant outlined a vision in which the living conditions in the camp have been improved so much that the exceptionality of the camp has been normalized—that the camp has become almost like a city. Nonetheless, the camp dwellers still hold on to their right of return:

Despite the development of the camp, and despite all its strong social relations, our young generation is still insisting on the idea of return. All this development will not change the fact of our catastrophe and the beginning of the camp. We still remember our lives in the tents. We still remember the cold of winter and the heat of summer. […] I insist that we will never lose our right of return even if we achieve all the possible development of life.11

In some of the later entries in the dictionary, similar sentiments can be noticed. In Citizenship, for instance, one of the participants explains the importance of the land and the sense of belonging it elicits in order to understand what it means for a Palestinian to be a citizen: “The portion of the refugees who live in West Bank refugee camps define themselves as ‘temporary residents.’ They are waiting to return to the land where their roots belong to.”12 In another booklet, Knowledge, a participant argues why the experiences and memories of the older refugees in the camp are so valuable. She explains that the later generations of refugees have no experience of life before the Nakba and that, hence, the stories told by the first-generation refugees are the only access they have to this knowledge: “I found out how much the people love and hold on to their land, their stories, and their houses, so I found the first generation of refugees to be the most important source of knowledge in the camp.”13

Put differently, the speculative exercises bundled in Vision show how much the participants seemed to hold on to the right of return at that time. Moreover, due to the divergence of opinions on the matter (some assuming the impossibility of return, others speculating about the consequences of an effectuated return), these initial discussions made clear that the right of return, how it can be understood, and what different understandings imply for related aspects of life such as citizenship, participation, and responsibility, is an issue with no easy solution and over which often opposing standpoints confront one another.

The publications after Vision, however, written in the course of what Elzenbaumer called the third phase (in which the participants did different fieldwork exercises), generally advance a more positive view on life in the camp. Instead of starting from the not-yet of the right of return or the no-longer of the
Beyond Victimization and Normalization

Camp, the studiers here tried to come to terms with the specificity of their living conditions in the camp and the social relations they foster and sustain.

In *Common,* for instance, a studier compares her life in Doha—a small village next to Dheisheh where wealthier refugees can buy a plot of land or an apartment—with the life in Dheisheh. From her experiences in Doha, she has learned that the city misses the common traditions and habits of the camp, since there were no “original” Dohan people. All residents are new and do not know each other very well. She praises the strong social relations in Dheisheh and the shared culture they have built throughout the years: “It may be familiar to you that life in a city would be better than in a refugee camp, but to me, because of the camp’s social relations, I prefer the camp. Perhaps that is strange to you.”

Other participants agree with this positive appreciation of the durable social fabric of the camp. One of them writes: “Sharing is a precious concept that is represented in every small detail of our daily lives. We share all that can serve our community and our world.”

In many publications, the word *Mujaarawah*—a verb that can be translated as “neighboring”—is used to grasp the social commitment to the community of the camp. The verb expresses the practices of sharing that take place between the different inhabitants of the camp. It includes not only the sharing of food or materials, but most importantly, knowledge and experiences. One of the participants writes about how the recipe of maftoul, a traditional Palestinian dish, is shared through collective practices: “Even maftoul itself is a knowledge transferred between the generations. We learned how to make maftoul from our parents, and they learned that from their parents and so on.”

Next to the social ties in the camp and the practices through which knowledge and experiences are shared, the infrastructure of the camp is also conceived as a shared space. Because the architecture of the camp was never intended to last long, houses are very close to each other, which creates a network of tiny alleys throughout the camp. One of the participants explains that the constructed environment of the camp is experienced as one living milieu, instead of as a concatenation of individual houses, and that the walls constitute the collective consciousness of the camp:

> For us, and for the other inhabitants of the camp, the walls are neither public nor private property. Many people consider them common. The paintings tell our stories of refugeehood and daily life to visitors of the camps. They are part of a process of communal participation, creating collective emotions.

In other words, whereas the publication of *Vision* expressed the desire of return, including all the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts related to it, the publications
written while doing fieldwork in the camp attempt to come to terms with the actual ways of living together in the camp in a more affirmative way. In contrast to Vision, these publications are thoroughly grounded in the living conditions of the camp, having emerged from very concrete and specific ways of engaging with these, and of studying the camp. In that sense, a contradiction can be distinguished in the dictionary between the right of return that gives a *de iure* justification of returning to the former private house and the *de facto* experiences of living together in the camp that are affirmed at various other moments.

Sometimes, a particular concern or question is raised via which this contradiction acquires a very powerful presence. In Responsibility, for instance, the following statement can be read: “This point came out of our talks with the community group we met: their biggest concern was how we were going to do something in the camp without changing its exceptionality through normalizing it.” A similar tension is voiced in Participation in the form of the following question: “Is it historically acceptable to think about the public space of a temporary camp?” Creating a public space in a camp is understood by its inhabitants as a strong political act that risks normalizing the camp and to turn it into a town or a city, a decision which would ultimately delegitimize the right of return. Put differently, affirming the camp as a convivial space with strong bonds of solidarity seems to involve the risk of undermining its meaning as a temporary location of precarity and exclusion, a state of exception, and, hence, the possibility of claiming the right to return. This debate is echoed in nearly all of the conceptual speculations collected in The Collective Dictionary. Analyses of The Initiatives, the publications that were written after a series of practical experiments within the camp, will show how the studiers tried to come to terms with this dilemma.

**Turning Contradictions into Contrasts**

The second year of the program focused on knowledge creation through specific activities such as gatherings, walks, events, and urban actions. These activities were not only situated by the camp but also directly engaged its various conditions. Informed by the reflections and discussions that took place while working on the dictionary, The Initiatives aimed to intervene in the spatial ordering of the camp without normalizing its exceptional status or blending it into the fabric of neighboring cities, for instance, via focusing merely on the improvement of infrastructure or the optimization of urban qualities.
studiers selected nine sites within the camps and their immediate surroundings to investigate (interventions also took place in neighboring camps), and to inquire how these sites constitute what they have suggested to call an *urbanity of exile*. According to them, the very existence of these so-called common places—a desolate pool, the small alleys, the pedestrian bridge between Dheisheh and Doha—begets new spatial and social configurations, that enable conceiving of the camp beyond its crystallized image as a locus of marginalization, poverty, and political subjugation.


In the first part of every booklet, the studiers present the site with photographs, maps, descriptions, and a short history of its use. The second part displays the research process, offering an account of the activities undertaken (document analyses, interviews, fieldwork, focus groups, urban action, photography, and walking exercises) in order to grasp the current state of the site and how it is being used. Lastly, the third part of each booklet suggests interventions that allow us to envisage new uses of the different sites.

Throughout *The Initiatives*, the contradiction between the right of return and the affirmative accounts of communal life in the camp re-emerges in three different ways, manifesting in problems that run throughout the different interventions. The first problem concerns the issue of public space within the camp. The second problem has to do with the refugee identity of those who live outside the camp. Lastly, the third problem concerns the representations of both the camp and its inhabitants. Although the problems of public space in the camp, the meaning of the refugee status, and representation are highly interconnected, it can be argued that in every initiative, one of them prevails over the other two. In the remainder of this section, the different initiatives will be presented from the perspective of the problematic situation they deal with.

The first problem concerns the *creation of public space* in the camp. Since the camp is constructed according to the most pressing social and spatial needs, public space is almost absent. Houses are built immediately next to one another, leaving barely any space where people could gather or hang out. Due to the risk
of normalizing the camp’s exceptionality, and thus undermining the claim of return, public space is a highly contested issue within the camp. In almost all of the different interventions, the question of public space was a crucial problem to confront.

In *The Garden*, for instance, the studiers developed a proposal to redesign the old and overgrown garden next to the Al-Feniq center. They wanted to create an appealing place where they could organize different kinds of activities. Therefore the participants, first of all, proposed to move the entrance and perforate the walls to increase accessibility and visibility. In addition, their proposal comprised a playground, an open-air cinema, a space for seminars, and a barbecue in order to attract different people from different ages to the garden. Thirdly, they proposed to install a system of awnings of which the colors could be changed easily. In this way, the screens would not only provide sun protection but could also announce upcoming events. Each type of event, whether a movie screening, reading seminar, or a discussion, would have its own color. Fourthly, small spatial interventions, such as a climbing wall, would increase interactions with the space of the garden. Lastly, and this point is the least elaborate, they were considering a safekeeping and maintenance system devoid of cameras and locked gates.

Overall, the suggestions made concerning the future of the garden were understood as a challenge to “the assumption that upgrading implies normalization or permanence. Improving living conditions in the camp is not undermining the struggle for the right of return, rather it reaffirms refugees’ capabilities in envisioning and realizing.”21 This statement forcefully makes it clear how building in a camp is an act with strong political connotations, which hence requires careful consideration. In this case, the design of *The Garden* attempts to avoid both a normalization of the camp condition on the one hand, and a neglect of the need for public space in the camp on the other.

Not so much the design, but rather the use of public space was central to the initiative of *The Square*. In 2007, the UNRWA22 Camp Improvement Program started the conversation about the creation of a public square in Fawwar—a refugee camp with a rather conservative reputation. At that time, the women of the camp especially raised questions about the creation of such a place because they presumed they would be the last to benefit from such a project. Consequently, it instigated a discussion about the presence of women in public spaces, and more generally, about the uses of a public square. Many questions were raised, such as:

What activities would be acceptable in such a place, who would take care of the space, which community members should be using it, what should be the role of
women in this space, and finally what should the space look like and what would be its impact on the surrounding context?23

In the course of this initiative, the studiers experimented with different usages of the square by organizing a joint cooking workshop, followed by an English class in the square. On one early morning, the women of the camp assembled to clean the square and to install the cooking equipment. During the day, they prepared several Palestinian dishes, and afterward, there was an English language class, as the women had expressed the desire to learn the language.

In the booklet published after this intervention, the concerns raised before the event were placed side by side with the reflections uttered afterward. The studiers argued that the square cannot be open or public in and of itself, and that no square can be public in the sense of “for everyone,” but rather that through shared and collective practices, such as cleaning together, cooking, eating, and learning a language, the square could be made open or public. Therefore, they argued that rather than a permanent state of affairs, the publicness of the square is an achievement to be obtained, time and again.

*The Pool* also dealt with the question of reactivation: here, however, not of an empty public square, but of the abandoned Solomon's pool, near the camp of Arroub. In the Roman era, this pool had been an essential node in the water supply network for Jerusalem. In 2012, it was a desolate site that, during the winter, gathered water which would not evaporate until summer and that throughout the whole year gathered garbage from passers-by instead, which in combination turned the pool into something like a swamp for most of the year. Nevertheless, because of its historical importance and its geographical location, the studiers deemed the Solomon's pool an exciting site to reactivate as a node between different camps. Throughout the booklet, they explored the spatiotemporal network of which the pool is part of. Both its historical value and the aqueducts that situate it in a long-gone water supply network were brought to the fore. Again, the participants reclaimed the pool by cleaning it, increasing its accessibility by building a small bridge, and organizing a few activities there. In this way, they aimed to draw attention to this forgotten site and to invite people to take care of it: “We started cleaning and collecting garbage to bring attention and a sense of concern to the space.”24

The last initiative in which the issue of public space in the camp takes center stage is *The Unbuilt*. During this initiative, the studiers investigated the history of land possession in the West Bank and the emergence of the camps. Often it is not clear who owns the land, and notwithstanding UNRWA’s rules, land is continuously being sold, swapped, and passed on, which complicates things
even further. This initiative aimed at mapping the so-called camp common, understood in a double sense. On the one hand, it denotes the open spaces in the camp or the debris of devastated buildings. On the other hand, the participants use this concept to describe the strong social fabric that is both the beginning and end of practices of sharing and neighboring (mujaawah). “Open spaces can be considered a body or material, while the social relations, or well-being, are the soul—both of them reinforce and build each other to create the common.”

The participants mapped the unbuilt spaces in the camp and attempted to trace who had owned these spaces previously.

In sum, the first problem in which the contradiction between right of return and camp experience emerges is that of the creation of public spaces, including questions of the design of public space, the making public of space through use, the re-activation of abandoned sites, and the generative interdependency of social and spatial relations. Public space is a highly debated topic in Dheisheh, and many of the participants held quite diverging opinions on the matter, ranging from a plea for the creation of public space in order to have places to hang out and meet, to a complete refusal of public space since these would ultimately undermine the right of return by normalizing the camp’s exceptionality.

The second problematic situation had to do with the meaning of the refugee status in relation to the camp, or, more precisely, the relation between refugees living inside and outside the camp. Increasingly, inhabitants of Dheisheh moved—provided they had the means of course—to the direct surroundings of the camp, most notably to the Qatar-sponsored village of Doha. This increasing emigration of Palestinian refugees who go to live in the neighboring city, together with the urban sprawl around the confines of Dheisheh, raised the issue of what it means to be a refugee when living in a city, instead of a camp, and whether it transformed the sense of belonging to the camp. Moreover, it required to reflect on the meaning of return when refugees dwell in more ordinary places such as a village, and again, how one might relate to the threats this poses given the normalization of the exceptionality of the refugee status.

In The Bridge, the studiers investigated the meaning of the desolate pedestrian bridge between Dheisheh and Doha. Initially, the bridge was built by the inhabitants of the camp and Doha. It afforded children the possibility to cross the street while going to school safely. As such, the participants understand it as exemplary of the refugees’ resilience and their capacity to accommodate their own needs. Moreover, they view it as a symptom of how the culture of the camp infects its neighboring areas:
The importance and reality of building bridges and connecting camps with the surrounding areas, like the case of Dheisheh and Doha, led to opening new perspectives to influence and combine the existing cultures of cities and villages with those that exist in the refugee camps.  

By 2012, however, the bridge was not used anymore and had instead become a garbage belt. In order to reactivate the use of the bridge, and to open it up to new uses, the participants proposed some activities that could take place. “We decided to use the bridge to reinforce the relations between the families of the camp and Doha city through social activities that focus on reviving the social meaning of the bridge.” Instead of using the bridge as a way to cross the street, they wanted to make it a meeting place between the camp and the city, where exhibitions, public events, social activities, or a market could take place. In doing so, the bridge could also become a space for encounters between the inhabitants of Dheisheh and the city-dwellers of Doha again.

More than proposing any real interventions, *The Suburb* presents an extended reflection on the move of refugees to Khalid Cave Mountain, next to the camp of Dheisheh. Based on a historical overview of the uses of the mountain, a problematization of land ownership in the camp, and interviews with people who moved to the suburb, the booklet brought the varieties of a sense of belonging to the camp amongst those who decided to live outside it to the forefront. One of the interviewees proclaimed: “I believe that the place where I am living does not have anything to do with my refugee status. I can keep my status as refugee no matter where I live.” Via statements like this, the issue of what it means to be a refugee is taken away from the realm of law—where it is a question of legal documents and passports—to the realm of experience.

*The Municipality* has a similar structure and investigates the same topics. It takes its lead, however, from the city of Doha. Again, Doha is first situated historically, and then interviews were conducted in order to inquire about the people’s ties to the camp. A common remark is that the inhabitants of Doha have a stronger affinity with the social fabric that grew organically inside the camp (where they have lived for so long) than with the barely developed social fabric of Doha itself. People who live in Doha would spend much of their time in Dheisheh, and the majority of the social life in the area still occurs there rather than in Doha. Consequently, although the inhabitants of Doha no longer live in a camp, the camp remains a vital ingredient in the way they conceive of themselves and situate themselves in a broader network of relations: “What caught my attention during this research is that the refugees in this city are still
linking themselves to the camp. They continually present themselves as refugees from this or that camp, and they live in Doha.”

In short, regarding the problem of the relationship between refugees living outside the camp and inside the camp, the contradiction between right of return and camp experience appeared as a matter of identity and belonging. The initiatives undertaken voiced concern for the possibility of a shared refugee identity given the fact that some refugees already partially obtained a kind of return, or at least were able to leave the camp and live in a neighboring city. The studiers problematized this question not only in relation to official legal documents that grant an identification (e.g., passport, land ownership), but most importantly, also in relation to shared spaces that help to give shape to a shared sense of belonging to the camp despite physical and legal borders.

After the creation of a public space in the camp, and the relation between refugees living inside and outside of the camp, the question of representation is the third challenge that can be discerned. Not only does this problem have a powerful presence in both preceding issues as well (how to represent respectively the camp and the refugee beyond exceptionality and normality), it also acquires a significance of its own in the initiative that deals with the narratives about the Nakba and Palestinian resistance as they are told in the camp and made present via graffiti. In that sense, this last problem, the representation of the camp and refugees, spans the different initiatives, but becomes an issue of its own in The Pathways. This publication investigates and presents the drawings that were made on the walls that make up the small alleys of the camp. The central concern here is how to tell stories about, and to make images of the camp and the refugees without normalizing the exceptionality of the situation.

The booklet begins with a reflection on the role of graffiti in the coming into being of a collective consciousness in the camp:

Graffiti itself creates a cultural climate through paintings and words that mix life’s bitter realities in the camp with the dream or future vision that is an awareness of future generations of refugees and the striving to create an acceptable present for the future.30

Throughout the remainder of the publication, the studiers present different representational strategies for raising a collective consciousness of the camp (e.g., stories, social media, physical and digital fora, graffiti) and expand on what they call Nakbaliterature, the stories that were told by their parents and grandparents, with collective readings and writings about these stories as a way to represent the camp and the refugees.
In short, in this last problem, the contradiction that drives the activities of Campus in Camps resurfaces as a matter of representation. Questions dealt with as part of this problem were: how to represent refugees beyond the binary opposition of victimization and normalization, or repression and agency? How to do justice to all the small-scale engagements and forms of self-organization that take shape within the camp without normalizing its exceptionality? Referring to the graffiti on the walls of the camp and the stories that are told by the older generations, participants elaborated different narratives to communicate their experiences in the camp.

**Return to the Common**

This chapter has aimed to introduce the practice of study of Campus in Camps. Specifically, the focus has been on the driving force behind their practice, namely the tension between the legal-political claim of the right of return on the one hand, and the experience of living together in the camp on the other hand. In concluding this chapter, the main question concerns the obligation of their study practice. What is it that makes the studiers hesitate and think, instead of recognize and judge?

What is interesting when reading the different contributions to *The Collective Dictionary* is that at some points, the right of return is reconceived through the lens of the camp as a site of living together. It is at these points that both the right of return and the experience of living together in the camp are affirmed and taken up in a process of thinking that transforms both of the terms without reducing one to the other. At that point, the camp condition is conceived neither as precarious nor as normal, but rather as a site for collective experimentation in living together. Moreover, this process of thinking, provoked by the practice of study, allowed to conceive of both the right of return and the camp condition via different words and propositions.

In *Relation*, for instance, the right of return is understood as the possibility to roam around freely in the region around the camps of Arroub and Dheisheh:

*It is a proposal for a right of return to the land, to move through a natural space, and to live in health. The way its green areas are used and shaped by the people provides a vision of a sustainable setting, a way of looking forward to the eventual end of military occupation.*

31
In *Common*, one of the participants reports on a journey outside the camp to contrast how the younger generation understands the right of return, with the ideas that the older generations hold:

> When my refugee friends had the chance to go to the occupied territory of forty-eight, their priority was to see the Mediterranean Sea rather than the villages of their origins. Such an act explains and reinterprets the third generation's notion of returning to the common, while reflecting the spirit and idea of the evolving culture within refugee communities in the refugee camps.32

The accounts mentioned above shed a markedly different light on the right of return. It is no longer understood as a projected return to a former individual home, but slightly turns the present experiences of the camp into an ingredient in the collective imagination of future possibilities.

In a reflection on this renewed attention for the common in the practice of Campus in Camps, Hilal and Petti strongly differentiate the common from the public: whereas the public is given to the people by structures of power, the common comes into being during interaction and communication. Therefore, common space is predicated on a people that invest time and energy in its production. Hilal and Petti argue that in colonial and postcolonial contexts, the public has often been used to expropriate the common. At the same time, refugee camps are sites where the categories of public and private become indistinguishable and where it is impossible to discern private from public property (e.g., the “possession” of the unbuilt spaces). In that sense, the refugee camp is a kind of anti-city where the liberal-democratic idea of politics that assumes the separation of public and private is being called into question. As such, Hilal and Petti conceive of the camp as “a potential counter-laboratory in which a new form of urbanism is emerging beyond the idea of the nation-state.”33

In Stengers’ idiom (as presented in the previous chapter), it seems that *life in exile* is the obligation that activates the practice of study of Campus in Camps. Life in exile, the fact that people have lived together in the camp for decades, is that what makes the studiers hesitate and think, drawing their attention to the common. It is what makes them discuss, object, and diverge while their opinions oscillate between the struggle for the right of return on the one hand and the affirmation of the experience of living together in the camp on the other hand.

Moreover, life in exile is what makes the participants of Campus in Camps hesitate before the three problems outlined above, and what renders these issues truly problematic: (i) how to create public space in the camp without normalizing its exceptionality?; (ii) how to relate to the camp as a refugee living
outside its borders?; and (iii) how to represent the camp? In contrast to the camp which reappears in all three of the problems, life in exile is absent from the very formulation of the problem, leaving the inhabitants of the camp largely insensitive to it and its ensuing experience of commonness until they started to study the camp. However, more than the camp in itself, it is the fact that people have been living in exile for decades—and thereby changing the nature of the camp and its exceptionality—that seems to constitute the obligation of the practice of Campus in Camps.

This means that even though the camp is the actual material condition that connects the problems of creation, relation, and representation, life in exile is what makes the studiers hesitate and think. It can be argued that the camp condition itself is too strongly connected with the right of return, which makes it easier to recognize it as an exceptionality and the refugee as its victim. The focus on the camp and its injustices as it is present in the publication Vision, for instance, seemed to divide the participants in two fronts: those who forcefully claim the right of return versus those who pay tribute to the durable social fabric of the camp. Put differently, the contradiction between the right of return and the experience of living together in the camp divided the inhabitants into two oppositional fronts.

Imagining the future of the camp during group discussions, however, did not seem to be a fruitful approach as the discussions continually revolved around this contradiction. It was only by studying the camp that the participants gained insight into what incited them to think. It was through the fieldwork exercises that a reciprocal capture came into being between the practitioners, the studiers on the one hand, and the obligation of life in exile on the other hand.

Stated somewhat differently, as long as the contradiction above dominated, the camp could only be the concern of a public debate or a political action, but could never become something that would make the participants think, as everyone had his or her reasons to argue for or against one of the sides of the contradiction. Due to the practices of study, the camp itself—that is, the fact that people had constructed their own way of living together there—could become an active ingredient in the discussions and could start to oblige, forcing the participants to hesitate before it and before their own existent dispositions.

Ilana Feldman, an anthropologist who was engaged in some activities of Campus in Camps, also raised this point. While reflecting on the initiative, she writes that the creation of The Collective Dictionary required an engagement with the actual spaces and places of the camp. Through interviews, walks, photographic exercises, and writing texts, the participants started to situate their
thinking in relation to the actual camp as a place of living together. She argues that because of these activities, participants were able to establish a different relationship with the places that were already so familiar to them. Moreover, she writes, it probably was “from this new vantage point, this new embodied perspective on the camp, that they were able first to produce new kinds of definitions of familiar terms and then embark on initiatives that engaged these spaces in new ways.”

In sum, the obligation of life in exile allowed turning the camp into an active ingredient in the thoughts of its inhabitants, make it an object of study that made the inhabitants of the camp think (“what is this place we are living in?”), instead of to recognize and judge (“the camp is unjust and should be abolished!”). Furthermore, this distinction between recognizing/judging on the one hand, and thinking, on the other hand, is an important one, as it is the effect of the production of an interstice, affording the possibility to learn anew. While studying the camp, it became possible to start to think about the camp—more specifically concerning the three aforementioned questions which all have a relation to the camp—beyond merely recognizing it in terms of either victimization or normalization. In other words, studying the camp—and the next chapter will further elucidate what this entailed—made it possible to turn the contradiction into a contrast by affirming both contradictory terms and transforming them in the course of the process of study, and to start to conceive of the right to return as a return to the common.
Having focused on the central obligation of the study practice of Campus in Camps, that which makes the studiers hesitate and think in their confrontation with the questioning situation of decolonization, I now turn to the requirements that seem to correspond to this obligation. According to Stengers’ theory of practice, every practice can be understood as a reciprocal capture between requirements and obligations. While the obligation makes practitioners hesitate and think, the requirements allow for becoming sensitive to this very obligation, which indeed requires to be addressed in one way rather than another. For this reason, the requirements are not merely social rules followed in the course of practice (e.g., Wittgenstein’s language games, Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology), but emerge and develop in direct relation to an obligation, something that is at stake; in this sense, the requirements only come to matter in order for the obligation to come to matter too.\(^1\)

In order to grasp the requirements of Campus in Camps’ practice of study, I will analyze various activities undertaken by the studiers that made them sensitive to the obligation of life in exile and made them hesitate while discussing the camp and the right of return. In the first section, the activity of storytelling will be read through the lens of Whitehead’s concept of abstraction and his imperative to take care of our abstractions. The second activity concerns the different photographic exercises that helped in making a comparison between the camp and the surrounding city. After that, the focus will be on the importance of mapping and mapmaking as another exercise in studying the camp, in which the map becomes a matter of study, turning the camp from a living condition into something that can be scrutinized and represented. Lastly, I will discuss experiments with the use of public space in the camp, in order to gain a sense of what it means when space is created as something public, how public space actually gathers a public, and can give rise to varied culture of use.
Taking Care of Our Abstractions

The first activity has to do with telling stories. In *The Collective Dictionary*, concepts that are deemed indispensable to understand the lives of the people living in Dheisheh, such as participation, ownership, and wellbeing, were contextualized in various stories that forged connections between their experiences and the meanings of the concept. In order to substantiate the theorization of this activity, this section will draw on the stories that can be found in the booklet *Knowledge*, which contains seven stories that situate the concept of knowledge within everyday experiences of living in the camp.

An important storytelling technique used by the studiers is to dramatize the concept in the different experiences and events in which it matters. Dramatization forbids holding on to any general definition of a concept and necessitates embedding the concept within the contexts or situations in which it is relevant and upon which it exerts its force. Foregrounding the force concepts exert on the way we experience situations underscores the fact that concepts do not merely represent phenomena “out there,” but that they actively intervene in our experience of the situations they render intelligible, which means to be graspable in the specific way the concept calls for, rather than another.

In the booklet *Knowledge*, telling stories is meant to repel all general definitions elicited by the question “What is knowledge?” Instead, this way of writing requires to unfold the drama of knowledge. The studiers exchanged the “What is?”-question for a manifold of questions such as “Who wants knowledge?,” “How much knowledge?,” “Why do they want knowledge and how does it come to matter to them?,” “And where and when does knowledge matter?” Whereas the general question “what is knowledge?” would demand an answer that supposes to uncover the essence of knowledge, and that would hence fit nicely into a textbook definition of knowledge, the other questions allowed the studiers to situate the concept of knowledge within the diverse dramatic processes in which it emerges. This means that they paid equal attention to the experiences that are retained within the concept and to those that have been obscured by it.

In one of the stories, a studier reflected on the notion of “development,” writing that the knowledge generated because of development purposes often maintains and enlarges existing socioeconomic inequalities. Moreover, he wrote that the banner of development obfuscates the way academic knowledge plays a role in and even accelerates this process. Through a story about genetically modified organisms (GMOs), he explained that knowledge produced about GMOs
is often legitimized in view of a solution to the hunger problem. Genetically modifying crops would increase production, so that the harvest might feed more people. However, this “development” quickly runs the risk of making small farmers dependent on big companies that have a patent on the seeds of genetically modified crops. By thus privatizing and commodifying knowledge, the patent plays a crucial role in enhancing inequality, depriving small farmers of their capacity to grow their own produce.

In a second move, the studier opposed the patented knowledge with the knowledge his grandfather acquired in the orchard. Although the grandfather did not possess any degree or certificate in agriculture, he cultivated and planted trees throughout his entire life. The knowledge he acquired through his labor was shared among co-workers and grew in relation to the trees, the seasons, and nutrients. The studier continued to explain that conceiving of knowledge as a private property decouples people from the knowledge that grows via sharing and experience. He dramatized how knowledge can produce a difference, related to thoroughly collective experiences of learning in which even non-human actors (e.g., plants, rainfall, bugs) participate.

In recounting the drama within the concept of knowledge, the studier outlined the network in which this concept can come to matter and for whom it comes to matter and in what way. To that extent, storytelling situates concepts inside the events, experiences, and relations that make up the fabric of the concept. It is a way of bringing together and passing on a variety of facts without domesticating them inside definitions. Stories can make us think about the way we use a specific concept to explain or justify a situation, or they can lure our feelings toward other ways of experiencing an event. Dramatization lays bare the multiple and dispersed meanings and interests that were drawn together within a concept.

The aim of dramatization, however, is not merely denunciatory—a critique of the commodification of knowledge, for instance. More than a method of general deconstruction of all concepts, it is a way of telling specific stories about specific concepts. Dramatization does not aim to arrive at a “correct” understanding of what a concept really is, but rather at a dynamic and pragmatic insight into how the concept works. This means that it analyzes how a concept is used to sanction specific practices (e.g., the scientific knowledge of GMOs), whereas others are delegitimized as inappropriate or obsolete (e.g., the vernacular knowledge of the orchard).

Storytelling, through dramatization, played a vital role in the making of The Collective Dictionary. The concern to take care of the concepts we use to describe
our experiences on the one hand, and the concern for the lure for experience that concepts constitute—how they allow us to become affected by a question or an issue—resonates strongly with Whitehead’s caution to *take care of our abstractions.* Studious storytelling can be precisely understood as a way of taking care of our abstractions. Commenting on Whitehead, Stengers explains:

> For Whitehead, abstractions as such were never the enemy. We cannot think without abstractions; they cause us to think, they lure our feelings and affects. But our duty is to take care of our abstractions, never to bow down in front of what they are doing to us.

Abstractions, and hence concepts as well, are not a purely intellectual affair, corresponding with “abstract thought” as opposed to “concrete thought.” Whitehead indeed is not interested in “abstract thought” as such: for him, abstraction is a necessary ingredient in thinking, always situated. Moreover, not only thinking, but also perception requires abstraction because it makes recognition possible.

An event, the most concrete fact, for instance, a bird singing his song in the early morning, can be named, but as soon as we talk about it, we use more abstract terms to refer to the actual singing. More precisely, it is due to our abstraction of the bird’s song that we can recognize the bird singing. As such, abstraction makes recognition possible, and vice versa. We recognize the bird’s song, although we barely have words to describe it. Abstractions make it possible to pay attention to events that otherwise might have remained barely noticed. Of the bird’s song, it is possible to say, “Did you hear it? There it is again!,” drawing attention to the song, even without recourse to any abstract name. In that sense, “recognition and abstraction essentially involve each other. Each of them exhibits an entity for knowledge which is less than the concrete fact, but is a real factor in that fact.”

Abstractions, therefore, do not inhabit the realm of abstract thought, but are vital ingredients in the occurrence of the event, understood as an actual occasion. They are part and parcel of how we experience what happens, and they sensitize us to what we can be aware of in perception. Abstractions therefore seem to have a double efficacy. First, they allow us to render intelligible and communicate experiences. The abstraction of knowledge, for instance, seemed to render the studiers at first incapable of perceiving the knowledge of the orchard, only becoming sensitive to it by telling its story.

Abstractions, however, not only “catch” (or “prehend”) events by naming them, they also—and this is their second efficacy—lure our feelings and affects,
make a specific experience of an event possible, constituting in their own way a prehension. Having told the stories of knowledge was an experience that altered how the studiers could perceive events in which knowledge was generated or shared. Consequently, we cannot be against abstractions as if we would have a more authentic experience without them, for it is very much due to abstractions that we can experience what happens in this way, rather than in another. Therefore, it is vital to take care of them, of how they lure our experience.

In *The Collective Dictionary*, the participants engaged in a process of taking care of the abstractions that are at play in their experience of the camp through storytelling. In doing so, I contend, the studiers aim to overcome what Whitehead has called “The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary.” This term indicates the belief that we already know and have coined all the fundamental ideas that can be applied to our experience, and that these ideas can be explicitly expressed in human language, in concepts.

*The Collective Dictionary*, on the contrary, demonstrates the internal differences of various concepts. It makes clear how concepts collect a multiplicity of experiences that can henceforth affect us in a particular way rather than another, constituting a particular prehension. Moreover, the participants attempted to question these concepts from the point of view of experiences that were until then neglected by the concept, in order to transform its efficacy, to lure our feelings toward other aspects of knowledge, ownership, participation, responsibility, or one of the other concepts included in the dictionary.

In order to omit “The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary” and inspired by what Ursula K. Le Guin calls “The Carrier Bag Theory,” *The Collective Dictionary* can be understood as a carrier bag of concepts for living together in the camp. Stories, according to Le Guin, are carrier bags that are used for collecting, carrying, and telling the stuff of living. Containing not only wild facts and messy descriptions, but also remote memories and high hopes, it is often said of stories that they blind us to the present.

Instead of viewing storytelling as deceit and disguise, Le Guin suggests to understand the story as “an active encounter with the environment by means of posing options and alternatives, and an enlargement of present reality by connecting it to the unverifiable past and the unpredictable future.” Stories do not distract from “what is really happening,” but draw our attention to specific ingredients in the construction of lived reality, affording the possibility to take care of our abstractions.

In that sense, stories are carrier bags for clashing points of view without pacifying conflicts, and hence, for diplomacy. Once more in the words of Le Guin (1989b):
Conflict, competition, stress, struggle, etc. within the narrative conceived as carrier bag/belly/box/house/medicine bundle, may be seen as necessary elements of a whole which itself cannot be characterized either as conflict or as harmony, since its purpose is neither resolution nor stasis but continuing process.11

Stories do not aim to settle conflicts once and for all, nor do they aim to explain events so they can stop us from thinking. Instead, through dramatizing concepts, stories collect a manifold of experiences and events to make us pay attention to what is happening, and how our abstractions constitute a specific lure for experience of what is happening, affording to prehend the situation in one way, rather than another. In that sense, unfolding the drama at the heart of a concept by telling stories and making a dictionary means to think with abstractions and hence to take care of them, while becoming attentive to how these concepts operate as vital ingredients of our experience.

Comparison as Concern

The second activity concerns photographic exercises and the making of comparisons. Several activities (e.g., Common1, The Municipality) aimed to compare the neighboring city of Doha to the camp of Dheisheh, and to analyze what it means to move from the camp to the city as a refugee. In making use of interviews and photographs, the studiers followed different tracks in trying to (re)construct rapport between Dheisheh and Doha. The objective was to trace how refugee identity and a sense of belonging changed after people had moved from the camp to the city, and ultimately, how a move to the city transformed perceptions of return.

Grasping the relation between Dheisheh and Doha in terms of rapport begs the question how rapport differs from the more familiar notion of relation. Compared to a relation, the term rapport renders the constructed nature of the relationship more explicit. Because of the ubiquity of the notion of relation in social theory, it has become the default position to conceive of human beings as always embedded in social, material, and technological networks of relations. Stressing relationality can then be understood as a reaction against what Barad has called thingification, the turning of those relations into things, entities, or relata, a view that, she argues, has enormously infected the way in which we perceive and understand the world. Instead, she claims, “relata do not pre-exist relations.”12 It is only within this and out of this web of relations that relata—entities, objects, humans—can emerge.
In opposition to the notion of relation, the notion of rapport underscores more strongly the fact that the relationship is not always already there, in the sense that it does not merely pre-exist the relata, but can and must be constructed with them. As such, it renders the work that has to be done in order to create a relation explicit: going beyond the commonly held view that everything is already related, the notion of rapport draws attention to the radically constructed nature of relations, and to the processes in which they are made and unmade.

Referring to Galileo’s experimental apparatus of the inclined plane, Stengers argues that its efficacy consisted in putting the height of the starting point of the ball in relation to its point of impact on the ground, and hence to construct rapport. In Stengers’ French, it becomes clearer that this was a deliberate mettre en rapport of two variables, instead of a demonstration of a merely necessary relation that was always already there. Whereas Galileo took advantage of the experimental achievement to silence his rivals by claiming that the discussion why bodies fall is nonsense and that we should limit ourselves to inquire how bodies fall, the question is now whether it is possible to inherit the achievement of rapport in a way different from just offending those for whom this particular rapport does not matter or matters in a different way.

At two moments, the studiers tried to make a comparison in order to build rapport between Dheisheh and Doha. First, one of the participants compared the two using nine indicators: housing, streets, interrelationships, organizations, public space, water, electricity, education, and healthcare. For each of the indicators, the studier compared Dheisheh and Doha in a few lines, followed by a small, often evaluative comment. For the housing indicator, for instance, he wrote that he would prefer to live in Doha because it has more open space between the houses, and people do not live as close to one another as they do in Dheisheh.

However, two issues can be raised concerning this kind of comparison. First, there is the alleged neutrality of the indicators. Although at first, the indicators look quite neutral, they seem to take a fully equipped city as the default position. Hence, one could ask whether these indicators provide an interesting perspective for looking at the modes of living together in Dheisheh, as opposed to those in Doha. This relates to the second issue concerning the often evaluative comments that reinforce the city’s superior position: apparently, the camp is entirely evaluated from the point of view of the city. Judging the camp from the perspective of the city makes us recognize an anomaly or exception, but it does not really give the camp the power to make us think, or to produce a difference in our perception or experience of it. As such, these two criticisms can be formulated as a double test that a comparison needs to pass in order to build
rāport. First, it requires to suspend immediate evaluation from an outsider’s perspective (e.g., the neutral indicators) and, secondly, to compare without taking either of the terms compared as the measure for the other.

In the contribution that follows, Visual Investigation Dheisheh/Doha, a second attempt is made at a comparison, this time using photographs. The first image is a wide camera shot taken from the middle of the street that separates the camp from the city, clearly demarcating the cluttered sidewalk of Dheisheh with the sterile facades of Doha. This style of exhibiting a strong contrast between Dheisheh and Doha is sustained throughout the other pictures. The remaining pictures are always presented two by two. Whereas on the left side, a view of Dheisheh is shown, the right side shows Doha. The different sets contrast the main entrances of the two areas, sceneries alongside the streets, empty spaces in the camp and the city, and the main road separating the two areas.¹⁴

When comparing these pictures, the differences demonstrated between Dheisheh and Doha stand out. The pictures of Dheisheh give the impression of a crowded, disorderly, dirty, overgrown town, cluttered with informal dwellings heaped up next to small alleys. Doha, on the contrary, is represented as an empty, orderly, tidy settlement, that seems to be built according to a strict and fixed housing scheme with big lanes and where public and private spaces are nicely separated.

Now, how does this different way of comparing Dheisheh and Doha pass the double test? In relation to the first concern, the visual representation seems to suspend the judgment that was made all too quickly during the comparison with so-called neutral indicators. The comments under the pictures are minimal (e.g., “Street in Dheisheh”) and merely aim to name what is shown, rather than to evaluate or judge. Nowhere can it be inferred that it would be preferable to live in Dheisheh, rather than in Doha, or the other way around. This brings me to the second concern: to what extent is the comparison conducted on the terms of only one of the compared parties? In this regard, both areas get the chance to present themselves on their own terms. The pictures do not seduce the beholder to judge one of the sides from the point of view of the other. Both sides appear to convey a rather uncanny feeling, which allows the viewer to retain some distance toward both the camp and the city.

Therefore, it seems that rapport has been created between a camp and a city that were always already related, and this rapport, comparing certain aspects of Dheisheh and Doha, made the studiers think differently about the always-already-there relation between the two living spaces. The rapport not only made a comparison possible, but also, and more importantly, the comparison
made *new* rapports possible; the comparison allowed to rethink and recreate the relationship between the camp and the city on the one hand, and between the Dheisheh/Doha agglomeration and its inhabitants (on both sides of the border) on the other hand.

The comparison, hence, generates two kinds of rapport. First, there is rapport between the parties being compared. Referring to the Latin etymology of comparison, Stengers explains that “*compar* designates those who regard each other as equals—that is, as able to agree, which also means able to disagree, object, negotiate, and contest.”15 There is only one rule to be respected in order for the comparison to be relevant, and that is that rapport is built between terms in their “full force” and without “foul play” that weakens one while ensuring the position of the other. Consequently, the terms of the comparison can neither be imposed from above, as neutral, nor can they come from one of the parties because this would require that the other party would describe itself in terms of the other. It is instead in the *border zone*, where each party presents itself in its own terms, in its divergence, that “comparative” friction can arise: friction being in this case the capacity to disagree, object, negotiate, or contest—in short, to compare.

Secondly, there is rapport built between the comparison and those for whom this comparison comes to matter. Commenting on Stengers’ interpretation of Galileo’s inclined plane, Verran argues that the constructed rapport between the height of departure and point of impact authorized claiming that what is measured lent itself to measurement in order to convince an audience. The apparatus did not only testify of a natural phenomenon, but also, and most importantly, proved to be a persuasive participant in a polemic. That is why she calls the experimental achievement a participant-comparison, drawing attention to the fact that the comparison did not merely *represent* a state of affairs, but was called upon to *convince* rivaling opinions, to discredit the knowledge of philosophers and theologians as unscientific speculation and belief.16 The question now is whether a different relation is possible, whether these representations can participate in another way, not to persuade those gathered, but to make them think.

In other words, it seems that the pictures have managed to present both the camp and the city in their divergence rather well, without reducing one to the other. Moreover, they made the studiers capable of starting to think about the relation between Dheisheh and Doha as two diverging but interweaving entities. Drawing out the divergence between the city and the camp, each on its own terms, with full force, without foul play, through a translation into a visual
idiom, allowed to generate a sense of where and how the two intermingle as well, for instance, in the construction of a shared sense of belonging.

Interestingly, *The Municipality* contains an image that imitates the style of the first picture of the series. It is again a wide shot of both Dheisheh and Doha on opposite sides of the street, which thus becomes a *border zone*, a space of friction. Below the image it is indicated that the left-hand side is Doha, whereas on the right-hand side, Dheisheh is shown. However, in contrast to the first picture, this image does not allow one to make a clear distinction between the camp and the city based on the picture alone. The beholder needs the additional information given below to discern the two, and even then, each side of the street seems to mirror the other. However, this does not mean that both are “in fact” precisely the same, that there is no difference between Dheisheh and Doha, or that the refugee identity effectively identifies people dwelling on both sides of the border zone in the same way. Instead, the picture opens up a border zone for friction to arise, to make people disagree and discuss what it means to live as a refugee in a city or a camp.

The sharp contrast demonstrated in the pictures did not participate in a way that silenced (like the rapport constructed by Galileo did) but rather in a way that initiated a learning process concerning the question of what it means to be a refugee when living in a city, instead of in a camp, and which consequences this bears for the right of return. The contradiction between camp and city evoked in the initial comparison was transformed into a contrast, affirming both sides, instead of denouncing one in favor of the other. The comparison required paying attention to the specific ways in which camp and city diverge, but also to the senses of belonging that exist and come into being in-between the inhabitants of the camp and those of the city.

**Milieu, Milieu**

A third activity concerns the making of maps. In *The Unbuilt*, studiers made an inventory of the empty spaces within Dheisheh in order to identify sites for possible interventions. Their concern was the so-called forum of the camp, “the place in which people used to talk, to plan, to demonstrate, and to organize social and political practices freely and without being restricted by a certain vision or agenda.” Historically, the origins of Dheisheh’s forum trace back to the “street” as a locus of demonstration during the first years after the establishment of the camp. Thereafter, it moved to the youth center, built in 1969, which hosted social,
becoming response-able

On this page of the document, the author discusses the role of a youth center as a forum for cultural, and political activities and discussions. The youth center could perform this role as a forum until the first Intifada in 1987, when it was shut down by the Israeli military, who believed it to be a stronghold of Palestinian political activism. At that moment, the forum, as a site of debate and contestation, moved to the prison where many young inhabitants of the camp were locked up.

The investigations conducted in the course of the mapping experiment were aimed at surveying potential sites to recreate such a forum. The studiers photographed the unbuilt plots that were found, and the resulting photographs, together with the map, constituted the primary study materials. The map delineates the territory of Dheisheh on which different plots of empty land are marked in black. As such, the map shows where the unbuilt spaces can be found, how big they are, and how they are situated in relation to one another. Pictures convey an impression of what these sites look like. By doing this, the studiers transformed the environment of the camp into a kind of middle around which different people could gather. They made the milieu as environment, the camp, into a milieu as middle, the map, entangling these two meanings of milieu in the process. Now, how can the activity of mapmaking be grasped from the perspective of a study of the milieu?

At first glance, the meaning of milieu seems to be continually fluctuating between these two poles: environment and middle. Serres, however, arguing that every middle is an environment for another middle, warns for such an all too dichotomized understanding of milieu. Middle and environment are indeed always expressed relatively toward something else—environment or middle, respectively—and hence should not be absolutized. Understanding the milieu in this way, as a system of relations without a center around which the system would be organized, prevents exaggerating the importance of the middle as a central point of orientation. The milieu indeed lacks any fixed, stable orientation; it does not provide a foundation. Instead, it is an ever-emergent system of interdependent relations. In the words of Ingold, the milieu as a whole can be conceived as a meshwork, whereas the milieu as a middle is a knot amidst the many other knots that make up this meshwork, “a knot in a tissue of knots, whose constituent strands, as they become tied up with other strands, in other knots, comprise the meshwork.” As such, the milieu is a meshwork of interdependent relations that is always generative of new connections, new knots.

Next to its connotations of interdependency, indeterminacy, and generativity, Ingold adds an understanding of the milieu as a medium in the chemical sense, as that which causes a reaction to take place. Drawing more precisely on James Gibson’s psychology of perception, Ingold conceives of the milieu as a medium...
affording perception and action. It is not what we perceive or what we act upon, but rather what we perceive in and what we act with.\(^{21}\) The sky, for instance, is itself seldom an object of perception. It is indeed not so much what we see, as what we see in, a milieu of visual perception. The light of the sky is itself not perceived; it is instead what affords perception. Whereas the former directs our attention to the surfaces of things, the latter “redirect our attention to the medium in which things take shape and in which they may also be dissolved.” The milieu, here understood as a medium, is thus what affords something to happen.\(^{22}\) Now, how can these different meanings of milieu help in understanding the activity of making maps in Campus in Camps?

In the process of mapping and photographing the camp, the different meanings of the notion of milieu entangle. It is by drawing a map and taking pictures of Dheisheh that the camp as an environment is visualized and becomes something that the participants can behold. Put differently, the camp as an environment becomes a middle itself around which people gather. Here, the discussion revolved around the question of how the camp can create a forum through the regeneration of its unbuilt spaces. Furthermore, even the third meaning of milieu, namely medium, can be discerned in the activity of mapmaking. The map as medium indeed affords the studiers to gather around a common concern—what they have called the forum of the camp—so that they actually make the camp present in their conversation. The map makes it possible not only to discuss about the camp, but it makes the camp-as-map a participant in the discussion. It becomes something to think with.

Indeed, maps do not only function as spatial representations. Maps also, and most importantly, help to create a social or political space that is or can be operative in the process of relating to the present otherwise, affording the imagination of different possible futures: “Maps connect heterogeneous and disparate entities, events, locations, and phenomena, enabling us to see patterns that are not otherwise visible.”\(^{23}\) Maps allow people to make sense of the world they inhabit. By underscoring the social space that maps disclose, Turnbull argues not only that maps “grasp” reality in terms of understanding, but also in a sense that it can be administered and governed. As such, the map cannot be localized outside the reality of the camp, but becomes an essential operator in its becoming.\(^{24}\)

In the words of Whitehead, “the novel entity,” the map, “is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes.”\(^{25}\) The “many” of the milieu as environment are synthesized,
drawn together, into the “one” of the milieu as middle, the novel entity of the map. The mapping of the milieu, however, does not simply entail a redoubling, or the superimposition of a blueprint. The “novel entity” of the map draws together the “many entities” of the camp as a living environment; it connects heterogeneous and disparate entities, events, locations, and phenomena.

More importantly, still, the map is situated “disjunctively among” the many entities “which it leaves,” which it represents, and is therefore not situated outside of the camp. Mapping is never a neutral activity, and the map does not grant its beholder a so-called objective point of view—a view from nowhere from which it is possible to go everywhere. Maps are situated representations that form an active ingredient in the becoming of the places they map. In that sense, the map is “not forged in the ascent from a myopic, local perspective to a panoptic, global one, but in the passage from place to place, and in histories of movement and changing horizons along the way.”

Retaking the issue of passage in the visual idiom of the knot and the meshwork, it seems that the camp is drawn together by and in the map like the meshwork is drawn together by and in the knot. Different strands come close and entangle in the creation of the knot. Neither the map, nor the knot, however, are definite endpoints in the process of mapping and tying respectively. Rather they are points of passage that force one to slow down on the way to a future still unforeseen:

Knots are places where many lines of becoming are drawn tightly together. Yet every line overtakes the knot in which it is tied. Its end is always loose, somewhere beyond the knot, where it is groping towards an entanglement with other lines, in other knots.

The notion of milieu thus denotes not only the environment that surrounds us, the middle that we can pay attention to, and the medium that affords us the capacity to perceive and act. It is also a place of passage, of indeterminacy and, hence, of present-oriented possibility. In that sense, speaking with Serres, the map enables “learning in this blank middle that has no direction from which to find all directions.”

To that extent, a more positive rendering of what Turnbull has termed the social space of the map can be given. Turnbull is right in arguing that maps do not only represent reality, but actively shape it in the practices of administration and government that they afford. It would, however, be limiting to curb our understanding of the social space of the map to its repressive functionality.
It is indeed possible to conceive of this social space not only as an arena of subjugation, but also, and more interestingly, as a forum where it is possible to think about the future of the camp with the camp, made present now as a map. Mapping made it possible to discern possibilities for reinstalling a place for discussion and debate within the infrastructure of Dheisheh, a physical forum, by raising the question of what it would mean to create such a place within a refugee camp.

In conclusion, to understand the map as “disjunctively among” the entities of the camp which the map synthesizes (as I tried to do based on the quote by Whitehead) entails that mapping decelerates the speed with which ever more and ever new relations come into being within the generative meshwork of the camp, affording to slow down around the camp as a map, as a middle around which people gather. To situate this map among the other entities underscores the fact that it does not afford the possibility to reach a point outside the camp, an Archimedean point that, due to its exteriority, enables some sort of transcendent judgment. The fact that the map is “among” other entities requires understanding it as a new knot in the meshwork of the camp. It is here, in the transformation of the milieu as environment into the milieu as middle, a new knot in the meshwork, that it is possible to discern the fourth understanding of milieu, namely the milieu as a site of possibility and indetermination, a point of passage.

Making Common Use

The fourth and last activity that will be discussed consists of the reinvented uses of sites under scrutiny (e.g., the Arroub Pools, the Fawwar square, the Al-Feniq garden). The investigations conducted during the preparations for the publication of The Square are taken as a starting point to think about practices of use and the possibility of common use. In the course of this initiative, the studiers reflected upon the meaning of public space in the camp in relation to a specific square commissioned by UNRWA. The challenge was to find a fruitful way of gathering in this open space that was until then in principle public, but in practice barely used.

The studiers tried to think about the meaning of public space within a camp in relation to the public square constructed in Fawwar in 2007. Fawwar had the reputation of being a rather conservative camp in which women were often assigned the role of taking care of the household, while staying at home. Hence, most of the women were very skeptical about the establishment of the square.
They argued that they would have no right to the square since they were simply prohibited to be present in public spaces.

The experience that an external authority—UNRWA—cannot simply make a public space via the construction of a square instigated a learning process around the question of what it means for a space to be public. Moreover, it raised the questions of how the presence of the square normalizes or legitimizes the camp, and how such a place can be used so that it is not just “made free” by an external authority, but taken in hand by a community of people?

After a discussion in the Women’s Center that helped to articulate the unease that the women felt in relation to the square, they decided to research which new uses would be possible through using the square, rather than taking the feeling of exclusion as a critical point from which to denounce the square’s “publicness.” The action they organized consisted of three activities: cleaning, cooking, and an English class. In the early morning, the women started to clean the square. At first sight, this seems to be a banal act, but noteworthy is that it acquired a specific political importance in the course of the Egyptian revolt. The day after President Mubarak was forced to step down, protesters began cleaning Tahrir Square. The alienated “public” space, a space installed by and associated with the fallen regime, was reappropriated by the people.29

Inspired by this gesture of care, the women cleaned the square in Fawwar in order to regain a sense of ownership over the place, to feel at ease in a place where until then they mainly felt they did not belong. By using the square, by cleaning, cooking, and learning English, the women started to turn the square into a commons, and it is through the social relations fostered there that the meaning of the square also changed. Whereas before the publicness of the square had alienated the women, the square was now again taken in hand as a commons.

In his reflections on use, Agamben emphasizes that use does not define an instrumental or intentional relation between a subject that makes use of an object being used. Instead, use is an action in which both agent and patient become indistinguishable, generated through the activity of use.

Every use is first of all use of self: to enter in a relation of use with something, I must be affected by it, constitute myself as one who makes use of it. Human being and world are, in use, in a relationship of absolute and reciprocal immanence; in the using of something, it is the very being of the one using that is first of all at stake.30

In other words, subject and object of use find themselves in a relationship of interdependency toward one another. Thoroughly enmeshed with each other in the course of use, they entirely depend on one another for as long as the activity
of use takes place. From the moment one of the components disappears or is subjugated to the other, authentic use becomes impossible.

It is in the use of the square as a commons that the community that gathers there constitutes itself as a community of commoners, as people dependent on and affected by this common space. Also, it is while using the square as a commons, that the space is taken care of, and regenerated by new possibilities of common use initiated by the participants. While experimenting with the square, the women did not so much inquire what public space is in general, or who they are in relation to this public space that they do not feel they have access to. Making use of the square forced them to reformulate these questions: what is this square where we do not feel we belong, and correlatively, what are we capable of in making use of the square?

In doing so, a culture of use came into being around the public square. In her work with Tobie Nathan, Stengers coined this term to grasp what it means that people gather in order to discuss and debate about the possible uses of a force of which the efficacy is unstable and dependent upon how it is used. Nathan distinguishes three phases in the coming into being of a culture of use. First of all, a force of which the efficacy is ambivalent, capable of both fostering and ruining, curing and poisoning, manifests itself. In a second phase, a collective concerned by this force constitutes itself in order to investigate the modalities of control over this force experimentally. The third and concluding phase coincides with instituting a culture of use. This means to give shape to a continuous process of learning how to use this force. In this context, Nathan refers to the appearance of Dionysius in Ancient Greece, an event which required the people to learn how to worship this strangely forceful deity, but it is also possible to think of cultures of use in relation to the appearance and allure of a public square in a Palestinian refugee camp.31

The public square commissioned by UNRWA constituted a new force in the camp, one that moreover could easily be converted into a threat due to the normalization of the camp it might entail—“the camp is a living environment like any other, since there are even public squares.” Therefore, it was necessary to think about possible uses of this force. Accordingly, a collective concerned by the force of the public square, the women of Fawwar, gathered in order to learn what it means that this square is a public square, and to learn that such publicness can never be taken for granted, but needs to be achieved.

Concerned with the possibility of a shared use of the space, and vigilant about an understanding of public as “for anyone” (from previous experiences, they had precisely learned that they were excluded from such an “anyone”), they tried to
reclaim the square, partially appropriate it through use. In that sense, a culture of use came into being. Stengers explains:

The culture of uses, and not just uses justified by a diagnosis or aiming at an end, is a problem of collective interest, which requires a collective knowledge. This can be called a collective expertise in the old sense where the expertise referred first of all to a knowledge derived from experience and cultivated in its relationship with experience.32

In this respect, cultures of use are never about individuals acquiring insight into an unstable force, but about collectives that produce knowledge in relation to this force—a drug, a god, a square—around which they gather. This knowledge, secondly, is experiential. It cannot be derived from a general rule or a faraway objective, but should be related to actual experiences of use. This requires an experimental inquiry into how this force can be used.

It suspends every moral consensus (“it is prohibited to use drugs,” “Dionysius does not deserve to be worshipped,” “the construction of a public square normalizes the exceptionality of the camp”) and opens the way for a different kind of consensus, one that cannot be derived from a general rule but has to be achieved throughout processes of use during which a collective lets itself become affected by something. Put differently, consensus here does not mean that everyone agrees, but refers to the etymological meaning of consensus in which we find con-, meaning “together,” and -sensus, from sentire, meaning “to feel.” Consensus therefore denotes the experience of collectively being affected by something. In other words, it does not mean to think the same, but to think together.33

Even more than the interdependency between who uses and what is used, it is the generativity of use that becomes apparent. Use is a thoroughly generative process, instead of an extractive one as it is usually conceived. The use of the square is not extractive (it cannot be exhausted), but is generative: it generates new, common relationships between the people and the square, new activities that can be performed there (such as learning English), and new social bonds between the people that have gathered. The use of the square as a commons thus enables the coming into being of new relationships between people and the square, and the emergence of a sense of belonging. The process does not attempt to extract the potential of the square to the fullest, nor does it exclude other possible uses; rather, it activates the space in a way that it is no longer public in the sense that it is commissioned by an external authority, “for anyone,” but in the sense that it is constructed to gather a public.34
The activities of the women (e.g., cleaning, cooking, learning English), however, in no way coincide with a prescription for future use. Since the use is common and generative, there is always something that exceeds every possible definition of the use that can or could be made. Common use—using something as a commons, not as private property—generates not only the commons—the square as space made public—and the commoners—the women as agencies belonging to the square, as gathered in the square. It also generates, and maybe most importantly, a practice of commoning—future processes of use of the public square.35

In the aftermath of the event, the women started to raise questions about what other kinds of activities could be organized in the square and how they could keep it open for other people that might be interested in organizing activities. In that sense, “every use is a polar gesture: on the one hand, appropriation and habit; on the other, loss and expropriation. To use […] means to oscillate unceasingly between a homeland and an exile: to inhabit.”36 Making use of the square, making it common, means to inhabit it in the sense that the women regain a sense of belonging to the square that nevertheless does not exclude other people, but, on the contrary, opens the possibility of co-engaging in this collective process of use, this practice of commoning.

What a Questioning Situation Requires

Which requirements can now be extracted from these activities, that each in their own way aimed to respond to the questioning situation of decolonization and make the studiers sensitive and hesitant vis-à-vis the obligation of life in exile, in defiance of all too rash, obvious answers of others? Four things can be distinguished that seem to be of importance in all four of the activities discussed above, and that could be called the requirements of Campus in Camps’ practice of study.

First, there is the requirement to gather people, to bring them together in a specific arrangement. People were brought together not only to tell stories, but also to discuss the future of the camp’s forum around different maps they had made. The second requirement has to do with observing. Observing here does not just mean to have a look from a distance, but to actively engage in making the camp present in one’s thinking, for instance, using photographs and maps. Thirdly, studying the camp seemed to require materializing the experience of living in the camp via written accounts, pictures, and maps. Materializing the
camp made it possible to turn the camp into a veritable touchstone, to let it object or resist when specific interpretations or propositions were made. The fourth and last requirement is then to experiment, to try out new ways of relating to the camp and the situation its inhabitants find themselves in. The last activity, in which a culture of use around a public square took shape by taking it in hand as a commons, is probably most emblematic.

Hence, gathering, observing, materializing, and experimenting operate as constraining requirements on the ongoing processes of thinking, making studiers responsive to the obligation of life in exile. While studying the camp and its questioning situation of decolonization, these requirements afford the possibility to think about the camp differently, instead of just recognizing it in terms of an unfulfilled right of return. More precisely, this practice of thinking made possible by studying the camp, induced a shift in the narrative of political action because it made the insistence of the commons more directly felt, as a future-oriented possibility, and as an alternative to the all too obvious liberal-democratic return to the private house of the past. In that sense, and quoting Ford, Campus in Camps provided an “occasion for politics”: its practice of study paved the way for a different style of relating to the camp and altered the mode of struggle without becoming itself political.37 Whereas before the inhabitants of the camp were confronted with the contradiction between the right of return, and the experience of living together in the camp, studying the camp in all its dynamics, and giving it the power to constrain thinking, transformed this contradiction into a contrast, making possible futures different from the ones already imposed by others.
Part Three

A Home of Adventures: Whitehead’s Account of the University and its Relation to the Future
The Studiers’ Constraint: Whiteheadian Adventures and Matters of Study

In his address, “The Universities and Their Function,” the British mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead asserted that “the universities should be homes of adventure shared in common by young and old.” It is this proposition, uttered at the inauguration of the Harvard School of Business, that will make possible a new relay. With that goal in mind, Whitehead’s proposition not only allows for a new beginning, but also needs to be taken up with the dramatization of the event of study in the activities of Campus in Camps, so that their practice may indeed come to matter in a more philosophical consideration of the future of the university as well. In fact, Whitehead’s proposition emphasizes a conception of the university—a home of adventures—as a way of inhabiting the world, which strikingly dovetails with the questions that initiated and animated the work of Campus in Camps, namely how to live with and in ruins, and how to inhabit the permanent state of exception of the camp?

Assisted by Stengers’ work on Whitehead, his proposition will be unpacked and brought to bear on the question of the university. Conceiving of the university as “a home of adventures” raises the question of what Whitehead might mean when he uses the peculiar notion of adventure. Moreover, his statement situates the university as a dwelling for such Whiteheadian adventures as embedded within the world already inhabited by the studiers. From the middle of the chapter onwards, the concept of “matters of study” will be coined to create a reciprocal capture between studying and learning, two educational processes whose dynamics—as we have seen—have often been claimed to exclude each other mutually. In this chapter, I want to argue that learning and studying do not so much render each other impossible, but instead require, intensify, and complicate each other in the course of the aforementioned Whiteheadian adventures.
Ruminations of Common Sense

When thinking of Whitehead's notion of adventure, it is essential to keep in mind his commitment to the idea that thought should not exclude anything. Stengers explains this commitment by referring to Whitehead's reading of Socrates' activities on the agora as just such an adventure of thought for the fundamental reason that it actively engages the ruminations of common sense. What will become clear is that thinking for Whitehead is not predicated on a critical attitude that purifies an argument or extracts certain positions from the debate by debunking and denouncing, but instead on a speculative one that adds to what is already ruminating, that complexifies and densifies, and that is, ultimately, adventurous, rather than revolutionary.

She goes on to explain that in *Modes of thought*, Whitehead goes back to the streets of Ancient Athens to witness the conversations between Socrates and the inhabitants of the polis in order to reinterpret the role of the philosopher: he claims that there are different beginnings of philosophy to be distinguished based on the multiple interpretations that are possible of Socrates' engagement with the public. It is possible to encounter, for instance, Socrates, master of the aporia, who does not pretend to have an answer to the questions he raises, but who only wants to confront his interlocutors with the difficulty, if not impossibility, of formulating a response. Secondly, we encounter Socrates, master of Plato, for whom the aporia paves the way for a learning process during which the Athenians discover a knowledge that transcends the divergent responses that they have suggested themselves. And finally, we encounter Socrates, the martyr, who has been condemned for poisoning the public peace and corrupting the youth.

Whitehead wonders which attitude Socrates could adopt in the face of the ignorance encountered on the streets of Athens. Stengers clarifies that, not excluding anything from thinking, the Whiteheadian Socrates brings a kind of assemblage, a gathering into being. None of the different responses received, no matter how divergent or partial, are merely denounced or debunked in order to demonstrate one of the interlocutors' ignorance. Instead, Socrates listens to the question of Lysimachus, relays the issue to Nicias, whose answer elicits the dissenting opinion of Laches, and consults Melesias' feeling about the topic. Moreover, he continues to complicate the discussion by bringing in new elements.

In Whitehead's rendering of the foundational myth of philosophy, Socrates is not someone who just confronts blunt ignorance—only himself being aware of his own ignorance; he is rather the one who activates a landscape of diverging
lines of thought, which he aims to transform and not pass judgment on. “If he does not step forward as an arbitrator, judging and excluding, the question of divergence can become a matter of collective concern, that is to say, become a dimension of what, with Whitehead, we can call common sense.” As such, the Socrates staged in Stengers’ reading of Whitehead is someone who energizes the ruminations of common sense, who incites the public to express their thoughts and opinions, to object to that which “goes without saying,” and to make thinking into a collective event.

Hence, the Whiteheadian Socrates does not interrogate his interlocutors despite their responses, but is in need of these responses to think and to make thinking a collective affair, and not only strategically or rhetorically to make an already certain point more palatable. He encounters citizens who were already thinking long before he arrived at the agora. This Socrates is engaged in and situated by a common sense that ruminates and that was already ruminating long before his arrival. He adopts an affirmative stance with regard to the diverging lines of thought he encounters and constantly complicates the conversation.

Hence, instead of extracting, the gesture of critique, the Whiteheadian Socrates adds to what is already ruminating. Instead of stepping forward as the one who claims to know, or even the one who knows that he does not know, he presents himself as the one who encourages the inhabitants of Athens to articulate their thoughts around an issue of collective concern, a question that makes common sense ruminate, such as the question of how we can train the children to be brave, what it means to live a virtuous life, or, as in the case of Campus in Camps, how to live with and in ruins.

In doing so, the ruminations of common sense are taken up in an adventure that transforms the terms which had been mobilized to articulate the positions of those gathered with respect to the problem that connects them. Think, for instance, of how the common sense of the camp ruminated the right of return, how the right of return afforded a specific experience of the situation—an experience that eventually could be transformed.

Savransky reminds us that the concept of adventure, despite its more romantic connotations, derives etymologically from the Latin adventurus, “which signals an exposure to that which is about to happen, that is, an investment in the possibility of an event, where the latter becomes associated with a sense of difference that matters.” An adventure in the Whiteheadian sense opens up a middle space, in between a questioning situation that makes common sense ruminate, and the possible transformation of this questioning situation—from the right of return to the return to the commons.
In that sense, by exposing itself to what the future might bring, thinking, on the condition that it does not exclude anything as urged by Whitehead, can be understood as a “welding of imagination and common sense.” This entails endorsing a speculative relation toward common sense, instead of one that is critical. Whereas the critical gesture always extracts by cutting away what is supposedly deceitful or illusionary, the speculative gesture adds by welding—a metallurgic operation—the possible to the problems that make common sense ruminate, in view of an adventurous transformation of those ruminations.

Furthermore, whereas a critical attitude would purify the scene of reasoning, a speculative attitude densifies the scene by continuously adding to the ruminations of common sense. This means that the Whiteheadian Socrates does not extract certain positions from a debate by means of debunking or criticizing. Instead, he aims to articulate specific diverging lines of thought while complicating the reasons uttered by his interlocutors. In doing so, the people the Whiteheadian Socrates’ encounters on the agora start to relate in a different way to the reasons they have given, and what they were talking about becomes a cause for thinking.

It is important to underscore that speculation, here, indeed refers neither to the rationalities associated with financial speculation for future accumulation of wealth nor to the calculation of probabilities in view of control and management. It should instead be associated with a struggle against the probabilities that would make any future predictable or manageable in advance. Speculation in the sense of Stengers and Whitehead means to open up the possibility of a future that is not a mere extension of the present or of what presents itself as inevitable or most probable. Instead, “speculating demands the active taking of risks that enable an exploration of the plurality of the present.” As such, speculation takes what is already there as its point of departure in the present, the ruminations of common sense, yet seeks to transform what makes common sense ruminate into a cause for collective and differential thinking, instead of a cause for individual, unilinear judgment (“Laches is wrong, and Nicias is right”) or relativistic indifference (“both Laches and Nicias are right when considered from their respective perspectives”).

Judgment and indifference are two positions that do not require taking a risk, as they find security in either a transcendent code, or general relativism. In other words, the adventure neither aims at passing judgment (“they believe, we know”), nor does it produce indifference (“in my opinion, in your opinion”). However, it adds to what is already ruminating in view of a possible transformation of these diverging lines of thinking, “to make sense in common,” a collective and transformative achievement which is of the order of the event.
Put differently, Whitehead’s speculative gesture needs to be understood as “a gesture that bets on the possibility of conferring on that which brings us together the power to make us think together.” It is a risky gesture that wagers on the possibility to create a “we” that is engaged in a collective process of thinking. Welding imagination and common sense requires a common sense that is capable of ruminating, of objecting, and that is recalcitrant:

The Whiteheadian adventure does not aim at awakening, leaving the cave. It is itself a dream, a storytelling: to learn ‘inside’ the Platonic cave, together with those who live and argue within it. Not in the hope that the false appearances will gradually yield their secrets, but in the hope that these ‘appearances,’ if they are appreciated in their affirmative importance, might be articulated into fabulous contrasts.

Put differently, the Whiteheadian adventure is a thoroughly collective and transformative process, oriented toward the future. It activates and engages the different dimensions of common sense and affirms them in their divergences, without trying to go beyond what makes common sense ruminating. It is oriented toward the future in the sense that it does not try to know or control the future (e.g., to predict based on what is probable), but instead makes those gathered sensitive to the possible that insists in every situation and that makes it possible to resist the futures that present themselves as obvious or necessary.

Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university as a home of adventure does not only put forward the kind of adventures described above as the main activity of the university. It also situates these adventures within a worldly environment by calling the university a home, implying an exteriority, an outside. This part of his proposition raises the question of how the university, with its adventurous style of thinking, might constitute a home, how it generates a manner of inhabiting the world, a mode of habitation.

On Habits and Habitats

Thinking of the university in terms of habitation, as a home, as Whitehead’s proposition demands, draws attention to the relation between the university and those who inhabit it on the one hand, and the relation between the university and the environment which it inhabits on the other hand. Thinking in terms of habitation, however, does not separate the question of the habits of those gathered from the habitats that might require a slight transformation of those habits. Proposing to conceive of the university as a home of adventures requires
to think of “the mutation of the habits that animate certain ways of response with the constraints and possibilities of transformation that their respective habitats may provide.”13 Thus taking up the question of habitation as a central theme allows for avoiding two distinct but parallel pitfalls constituted by isolating or separating either of the two dimensions of habitation—habit or habitat.

The first danger is to reframe habitation as a question of habits, of modes of individual behavior in a world that remains, from the perspective of habits, largely forgotten. When Foucault, for instance, in his later work on ethics, subjectivity, and truth focuses on technologies of the self as “habitual” practices of formation of the self dating back to the Greco-Roman period, he makes himself vulnerable to the first danger of understanding these practices as “exercises of self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself.”14 Endorsing such a strong focus on the self, and more particularly on a conception of the self as an independent ethical substance to be worked on and ultimately transformed, risks forgetting the connection between self and world.15 Put differently, by reducing the question of the self to a matter of technologies of the self, Foucault risks remaining indifferent to the worldly or cosmic dimension of habits, and to reduce ethology to ethics.

The second danger would be to reduce habitation to a question of habitats, of designs of environments that would produce specific kinds of subjectivities and ways of living one’s life. Exemplary in this context is Sloterdijk’s theory of the anthropogenic island in which he analyzes different dwellings and designs. Conceiving of architecture as “the medium in which the explication of the human sojourn in manmade interiors processually articulates itself,”16 he raises the question of which kind of human becoming these dwellings and designs render possible or impossible. His study of the apartment is a case in point in how the architectural surroundings constitute a basis for philosophical reflection on our contemporary condition: “Dwelling itself and the production of its containers becomes a spelling-out of all the dimensions of components that are joined in primal coalescence on the anthropogenic island.”17 When considered from the perspective of habitation, however, Sloterdijk’s overemphasis on habitats as production sites of human becoming risks to reduce the problem of ecology to a problem of—in a Sloterdijkian turn of phrase—ecologistics by understanding the world as a repository for anthropogenic resources.18

It requires no argumentation that both approaches have their value for the questions they seek to address, of subjectivity and anthropogenesis, respectively. However, they have little to offer when trying to understand Whitehead’s peculiar conception of the university as a mode of habitation, as both approaches separate
the ethological question of habits from the ecological question of habitats. Stengers argues that the concepts of habit and habitat are strongly interrelated and that it is impossible to come to terms with one side of the problem without immediately taking into account the other. The etho-ecological perspective, as she calls it, affirms

the inseparability of ethos, the way of behaving peculiar to a being, and oikos, the habitat of that being, and the way in which that habitat satisfies or opposes the demands associated with the ethos or affords opportunities for an original ethos to risk itself. In that sense, reading Whitehead’s proposition through Stengers etho-ecological lens draws attention to the interrelatedness of habits and habitats, how habitats may propose certain kinds of behavior, while leaving to the being inhabiting the habitat the freedom to dispose or even oppose.

John Dewey has perhaps most famously written on the interrelatedness of habits and habitats. In his reflection on the meaning of environment in *Democracy and Education*, Dewey begins with assuring that the environment denotes something more than the surroundings which encompass the human being. He asserts that the environment has to be understood as “the specific continuity of the surroundings with his [the human being] own active tendencies.” As such, Dewey affirms that the living being and its environment are strongly interrelated, co-dependent, and share their existence in the same lively milieu.

Drawing on a few examples, Dewey goes on to explain that the activities of an astronomer, for instance, “vary with the stars at which he gazes or about which he calculates.” Likewise, the archaeologist relies on the relics, inscriptions, and ruins that constitute his environment, which he requires in order to get access to the epoch of his concern. Stressing the continuity between living beings and their environments, Dewey defines a habit as “an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action.” In other words, a habit determines the way a living being goes about in his environment. Furthermore, education, in the Deweyan sense, should then be understood as “consisting in the acquisition of those habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his environment.”

Dewey emphasizes that a distinction is to be made between passive habits, ways of doing that are wrought within the organism, and active habits, ways of doing in which the individual takes control over his environment. He gathers the passive habits under the denominator of habituation, which he defines as “our adjustment to an environment which at the time we are not concerned with modifying.” It is the way we get used to our surroundings—clothing, home,
city—by unconsciously making use of what they offer in our daily lives. “We get used to things by first using them.” 25 The active habits are part of a process of what Dewey calls adaptation, which he defines as “quite as much adaptation of the environment to our own activities as of our activities to the environment.” 26 With this concept, he stresses the fact that both individual and environment are engaged in a process in which each part affects transformations in the other. In other words, and drawing on Haraway, the Deweyan etho-ecological perspective can be understood as reflecting the process of symbiogenesis, a becoming-with of the world and the being that is part of it.

Dewey’s writings on the relation between being and environment become problematic, however, when he asserts that “the environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being.” 27 He gives the example of water, which provides an environment for a fish, since “it is necessary to the fish’s activities—to its life.” 28 He goes on to explain that the north pole is “a significant element in the environment of an arctic explorer, whether he succeeds in reaching it or not, because it defines his activities, makes them what they distinctively are.” 29

Nevertheless, what if, as of this moment, the water that constituted the habitat of the fish becomes increasingly polluted with oil and plastic? What will be the “characteristic activities” of the fish? What should the arctic explorer do as the prospect of a summer without a north pole becomes more likely every year? Developments such as the pollution of the oceans and the breakdown of ecosystems due to extinction pose a challenge to Dewey’s understanding of the environment as those conditions that make the “characteristic activities” of a living being possible or impossible. Instead of explaining what the characteristic activities of a living being are, the developments above raise the question of what a living being is capable of.

Stengers dramatizes the question of what a living being is capable of by drawing on the transformation of the “characteristic activities” of amaranth—a resistant weed. Due to the extensive use of Roundup on soils destined for the propagation of genetically modified soybeans, amaranth had become capable of resisting the eradication its natural habits, its characteristic activities, would have caused. Given this radical shift in its living conditions, the poisoning of its habitat, the amaranth had to adapt itself to its new, supposedly lethal environment. In doing so, the plant has actually become capable of surviving in an environment that was designed for its extermination.

Stengers explains that “the possibility that an amaranth becomes tolerant of Roundup is therefore an ‘adaptation’ that its population has been capable of at
the moment the environment had become lethal. The science made in Monsanto has neglected what the aim of survival made the population of amaranths capable of.”30 It is important to emphasize that this is not an intentional, let alone critical, action on the part of the amaranth as an active subject. Rather, this species has become a site where an unforeseen event could take place, a new contingent articulation in the becoming of the world.

As such, this presents a strong case of an etho-ecological event, which shows that the inseparability of ethos and oikos does not equal their dependence. No habit is entirely contingent on its habitat, and no habitat can transform in any predictable way the habits it engenders. The ruination of soils due to Roundup did not determine the eradication of amaranth. Instead, it made the species capable of resisting such an eradication, altering or modulating its sensitivity to its threat. Stengers makes clear that “the environment proposes but that the being disposes, gives or refuses to give that proposal an ethological significance.”31 She adds, however, that at the same time, an ethos never contains in itself, a priori, its own meanings, let alone that it can master its own reasons. In other words, the question of what a being is capable of, in response to its environment, is subject to the highest unpredictability and its achievement of the order of the event.

If we are to follow Whitehead’s proposition that the university is a home of adventures, this co-dependency of ethos and oikos, habit and habitat, needs to be taken seriously, starting exactly from the indeterminacy given in the fact that we never know what a living being is capable of. Put otherwise, it means to conceive of the interrelatedness of being and environment not as a closed loop of stimulus-response reactions, but as an open system prone to the highest unpredictability. More precisely, Whitehead’s proposition raises the question of how the university as a habitat for adventures might provide an occasion for transforming existing habits of thought by giving something the power to make us think. This means that this problematic something that is made present in the environment affords an ethos of study the possibility to risk itself, to become engaged in a Whiteheadian adventure that might transform the terms in which the problem was initially posed.

Sympoiesis or Taking Care of the Consequences

Following Whitehead in considering the university as a home of adventures, the question arises how this concept relates to the idea of the university as a welding of experimental and diplomatic uses of reason, as suggested earlier. Taking
up this line of thought, it seems as if the university should not only foster the coming into being of scientific inventions and facts by way of an experimental use of reason, but also ought to take care of the consequences these inventions and facts might elicit within a world that might have profoundly changed with their coming into being, offering an occasion for slowing down.

Taking care of the consequences, considered a pragmatic art here, refers to how these inventions and scientific facts relate to the world, how they can be received by the world, how they possibly respond to problematic situations that make common sense ruminate. In other words, the university is not only the site where the question how to learn something new finds its home (the question that makes scientist-practitioners converge despite the variety of scientific practices), it also raises the question how to learn anew: how to live together with that which in the course of scientific practices has come into being?

At this point, the invention of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) might provide a clarifying illustration. According to Stengers, common sense is precisely what could object against specific uses of scientific findings such as GMOs. The invention of GMOs requires a milieu where this scientific fabrication might come to matter in one way rather than in another, and thus where its meaning might be something of concern. The activists gathered around the issue of GMOs, for instance, do not just criticize or debunk these crops as such, they primarily raise the question of what consequences the production of GMOs plays into, of how GMOs differently affect the lives of subsistence farmers, unruly weeds, Monsanto shareholders, and butterflies and bees. Thus conceived, it means taking care of the consequences that the invention of GMOs entails, and slowing down around social injustices or environmental impairments that possibly could come into being due to their invention.

Tying together an experimental use of reason aimed at creating something new, and a diplomatic use of reason that takes care of the consequences made possible, the Whiteheadian university actively takes up a role in worldly becoming. Its mode of habitation cannot, in contrast to Dewey, be understood as merely a process of either habituation or adaptation—no matter how mutual and interdependent these processes might be understood. Rather, and taking my cue from Haraway, its mode of habitation comes close to what she calls a process of sympoiesis, a thoughtful and inventive making-with that engages multiple beings reciprocally captured by one another, in transformative and adventurous processes of becoming.

It is essential to demarcate sympoiesis from two other concepts, the one more biological, the other more sociological, for which it might be mistaken.
First, it differs from symbiogenesis. Whereas symbiogenesis tries to grasp how different parts of the world conceived as an organic and dynamic whole develop together, mutually interdependent, sympoiesis foregrounds and makes explicit the active part each element can play in the process due to interventions that are always local, precarious, and partial. Neither should it be mistaken for autopoiesis, a concept used to describe self-producing autonomous units with centrally controlled, homeostatic, and predictable spatiotemporal boundaries. Sympoiesis, in contrast, denotes “collectively-producing systems [that] do not have self-defined spatial or temporal boundaries. Information and control are distributed among components. The systems are evolutionary and have the potential for surprising change.”

What the GMO-activists do when coming together around this issue of collective concern that not only has a scientific but also a political bearing can be understood as a way of taking care of the consequences, a process of sympoiesis or making-with in thoroughly entangled configurations in which there is no criterium to be found in an imagined past or a predicted future, which might allow to fixate and stabilize the meaning of what has been brought into being, or to authorize a judgment on how it should be used. Indeed, GMOs—or any other scientific invention, discovery, production—are neither good nor bad in themselves.

Taking care of the consequences thus renders important and amplifies the “It depends!” that lets itself be heard as a response to the question of whether a particular new articulation in the becoming of the world is good or bad. What it requires is an environment in which its consequences can be taken care of, whereby again, it needs to be stressed that this does not mean stabilizing or controlling the invention's meaning. However, it also obliges us not to leave it up to the market of the knowledge economy to determine how the invention will be used and signified. Situated by what makes common sense ruminate and adding to it, the new that is being learned in the university transforms our relations toward the world and those inhabiting it.

Put differently, the university as a home of adventures does not refer back to political framings of times long gone to deal with the problems of the present (“we are at war with a virus”), nor is it likely to propose easy quick-fixes that promise to take away a problem without affecting our ways of living (e.g., solar panels, LED-light bulbs). Instead, the university gathers a collective of studiers to inquire something that makes common sense ruminate, a questioning situation like what the right of return might mean for a refugee having grown up in exile, or how GMOs differently affect the lives of those who are put at risk by their
invention. In that sense, and referring to Haraway, the Whiteheadian university is a place of “staying with the trouble”:

In urgent times, many of us are tempted to address trouble in terms of making an imagined future safe, of stopping something from happening that looms in the future, of clearing away the present and past in order to make futures for coming generations. Staying with the trouble does not require such a relationship to times called the future. In fact, staying with the trouble requires learning to be truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful or edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as mortal critters entwined in myriad unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, meanings.

Ultimately, Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university, read through Stengers’ etho-ecological lens and Haraway’s concept of sympoiesis, allows for conceiving of the university as triggering a certain kind of transformation in the way it affects not only the world but also those who live in it. Noteworthy is that the event of this transformation accepts neither any cause that would make its happening probable or predictable nor any criterium that would justify, legitimize, or authorize it. In that sense, there is no external, transcendent position or perspective that would allow for passing judgment on the event. If there is indeed no such form of transcendence, the question remains toward what the adventurous process of study is situated, what incites it, and what makes those events of transformation without transcendence possible.

### Matters of Study

Looking back at the studiers in Dheisheh, the children and grandchildren of the refugees who activated the common sense of the camp by raising the question of what the right of return might mean to them, it is clear that what allowed them to slow down and study this question were various exercises in the camp, ranging from collecting the stories of older inhabitants, making maps of the empty spaces, taking pictures in order to compare the camp with the neighboring city, and refurbishing a desolate public square. How can we understand the specific efficacy of these matters of study—pictures, drawings, notes, maps, schemes—in acquiring the power to draw diverging lines of thinking toward a point of entanglement where they could be transformed? Being a passage point that forces one to slow down, an attractor that pulls divergent perspectives together, matters of study are catalysts for thinking collectively, sympoietically. Still, in order to get a more definite sense of the notion, it is
important to separate it from other “matters” that have in recent years been topics of debate, more precisely matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care.

The construction of the first one, the *matter of fact*, coincides with the invention of modern science, at the moment when Galileo devised the experimental apparatus of the inclined plane in order to describe the motion of falling bodies. Not only did Galileo create a relationship between the point of departure (in terms of height) and the point of impact (in terms of distance) to describe how bodies fall, he also mobilized this experimental achievement in order to exclude the philosophers and theologians from the scientific territory he had just founded. In that sense, the experimental achievement was recruited in order to convince opponents with scientific proof (“the experiment speaks for itself”) or to expel those who ask the wrong questions (“the question why bodies fall is subject for speculation, not for science”). Scientific evidence is here referred to as a matter of fact, a truth that cannot be questioned because it has been verified drawing on quantifiable measurements (e.g., height, width, speed, IQ). Those who object against what is a matter of fact are either forced to recognize that they were wrong and have to respect the objective truth of the fact, or run the risk of being expelled from the realm of “rationality” (narrowly understood as respecting what has been scientifically proven). Put differently, the logic of matters of fact sets an operation in motion that splits those who know (and know how they can know, what counts as knowledge) from those who believe, whose sense of reality is based on purely subjective impressions and sensations, and that separates the sphere of science from the sphere of politics, objectivity from subjectivity, and fact from value.36

By conceiving of scientific findings as a *matter of concern*, instead of a matter of fact, Bruno Latour attempts to remediate this bifurcation between science and politics. While a matter of fact presents a fact “as it is,” as if it can be found in a natural world that is “out there,” distinct from human subjectivity and intention, a matter of concern renders the web from which the matter of fact emerged explicit. Think, for instance, of the inclined plane that made the tracking of the motion of falling bodies possible. “A matter of concern is what happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you would do by shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of the theatre.”37 In contrast to the matter of fact, which gives an objectified version of the thing or finding, cut loose from the social, material, and technical conditions that had made its fabrication possible, the matter of concern acknowledges the constructed nature of the fact. In opening up its black box, it also gives it the
power to gather a thinking public, instead of an ignorant or superstitious public that needs to be convinced by what is scientifically proven.

Hence, a matter of concern does not only open the black-box that had produced—ex nihilo—a scientific fact, but also entails a different way of bringing in the public. It brings together those for who the coming into being of this fact might be of concern, who might undergo the consequences of the transformations it effectuates in the world. Therefore, Latour suggests the idea of a Parliament of Things, an assembly that gathers different representatives of the public around a particular issue of concern. More specifically, the Parliament of Things gathers these representatives not as experts or technocrats, as those who can claim a kind of knowledge that would authorize them to speak for all, to have the final say, and to impose their decision on all the others. Instead, it is as representatives of the industry, the people, the planet, the state, and all the other singular actors concerned about this issue that they gather in the Parliament of Things. Discerning matters of fact from matters of concern as two different ways of presenting scientific findings that entail another relation to the public, Latour thus makes an effort to rethink the relations between science and politics to omit the kind of expertocracy that would proclaim that the facts speak for themselves, authorizing decisions that are thoroughly political (e.g., “the figures show that … and thus,” “research proves that … and thus”).

Thirdly, with the matter of care, María Puig de la Bellacasa adds a layer to the matter of concern as conceived by Latour. Although concern and care are strongly related, speaking in terms of care draws attention to the active and ethical engagements that sustain such a matter: “One can make oneself concerned, but ‘to care’ contains a notion of doing that concern lacks.” Grasping something not just as a matter of fact or a matter of concern, but as a matter of care emphasizes the embodied and embedded actions of those brought together in this web of interrelatedness, actions that are therefore subject to ethical reflection, always situated by the specific matter of care at hand.

Whereas the matter of concern is foremost a notion that explains how things are constructed and how they gather a concerned public, a matter of care more explicitly addresses our co-dependent existential participation in the possible becoming of these constructions and how they require, most importantly, an attitude of ethical consideration. Thinking with care, as Puig de la Bellacasa explains, underscores “those doings needed to create, hold together and sustain life’s essential heterogeneity.” To that extent, matters of care underscore the ethical reflection that is required by every process of sympoietic co-becoming, in order “to think about how things could be different if they generated care.”
In other words, whereas a matter of fact can be used as a bat to shoo away the irrational people who ask the wrong questions, or to persuade those who still need to be convinced, a matter of concern visualizes the ontogenesis of what was hitherto a matter of fact. In doing so, a matter of concern enables a political debate in which scientific facts can find their place without being assigned the role of unquestionable proof. A matter of care, then, intensifies the matter of concern in the sense that it foregrounds our doings with regards to the matter at hand, that it is, in fact, precarious and, therefore, in need of care.

Looking now at the studiers of Dheisheh, or the GMO-activists, one could argue that the issues and questions they try to address not only are a matter of ethical consideration, of thinking with care, but also and foremost require to be studied, to be given the power to make us think, and initiate adventurous processes of which the unpredictable effects might open up different possible futures. Therefore, putting forward a matter of study is also a way of intensifying Latour’s idea of matter of concern. What is intensified referring to study, however, is not so much that the issue itself is of concern, or requires care—which would indeed be true as well—but that what is of concern and requires care is given the power to make us slow down, to hesitate and think, so as to become susceptible to other possible futures that might make their insistence felt.

More concretely and referring to Campus in Camps, this means that within the gathering of studiers, something, a matter of study, needs to be made present that turns those gathered into a studious public, a *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*. One could think in this respect of maps, sketches, notes, photographs, comparisons, stories, schemes, or drawings around which the studiers can actually—materially, technologically—gather, and which can make them think about a questioning situation that requires a response. The emergence and presence of such a matter of study slows down the discussion between the studiers because it obliges to ask questions such as “Where do you see it?,” “Why do you say that?,” “How do you draw these relations?” In doing so, the matter of study affords the possibility of hesitation, of reconsideration, instead of jumping to conclusions.

In other words, matters of study operate as constraints on the thinking of those gathered around it. Therefore, through the way they gather and referring to the kind of enunciations afforded in this gathering, matters of study differ slightly from matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care. This means to acknowledge that the questioning situation around which the university gathers cannot be given a response based on scientific expertise, narrowly understood, solely. Nor does a response based on political arguments or ethical considerations
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Transformation without Transcendence

Following Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university as a “home of adventures,” this chapter has attempted to articulate the processes of educational transformation that are at play in the course of practices of study. Transformation here should not be understood as a merely individual affair, such as certain narratives of learning (as the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competences) and personal growth imply, but as a thoroughly collective and even worldly event, constituting a new articulation in the becoming of the world.

Moreover, endorsing Whitehead’s idea of adventure entails a conception of transformation or becoming that is radically open-ended, and that does not require any a priori criterium that would authorize, legitimize, or justify one course of events over another. The Whiteheadian adventures constitute a transformation without transcendence, not following the logic of probability but assuming radical possibility. Indeed, the Whiteheadian universe is one in which “the fairies dance and Christ is nailed to the cross.”42 and, as such, does not need conditions that might make something possible that would not have been possible before—the critical endeavor of defining conditions of possibility. Rather, in a thoroughly creative world, a pure becoming, where in principle everything is possible, the question is not so much to the conditions that would allow for this or that event to happen, but instead to the constraints that are required in inheriting the achievement of this or that event without determining where it will lead.

In that sense, matters of study operate as a constraint on the thinking of those gathered around a questioning situation and transform the relationships that each entertains with what is of concern. Five features can be distinguished that spell out the specificity of matters of study as a crucial ingredient in processes of transformation without transcendence. In that sense, these five features intensify Whiteheadian adventures by turning them from instances of pure becoming into events of situated study.

The first feature has to do with the questioning situations that make common sense ruminate, and that require study. Matters of study change the nature of the conversation that can be held over these issues due to the fact that they make the issue present in a specific way, for instance, via drawings, maps, or
notes. In that sense, they not only invest the situation with new meanings, they are also a way of artifactualizing the situation, making it palpably, materially present, and granting it the power to object in the exchanges between studiers (artifactualization). Secondly, matters of study knot together a variety of diverging lines of thinking—the spectrum of hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts that studiers might have concerning the issue at hand—without unifying them, without pacifying the ruminations of common sense by making them bow down in front of a law or principle that transcends them all—an eternal peace that washes away divergence (association). Instead, matters of study effectuate partial connections that bring different diverging lines of thinking into proximity while intensifying a sense of the possible—the third feature—that is required for the transformation of this divergence to take place. Matters of study make attentive to the lure of the possible, the fact that there is no necessity in the given order of things, and that everything is susceptible to transformation and change (possibilization).

To that extent, matters of study, fourthly, can be grasped as a passage point in a process of transformation without transcendence. As a passage point, matters of study do not announce or prefigure the coming into being of a new order that takes away all discords; instead, they activate, gather, and transform the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts concerning the questioning situation made present as a matter of study. Think, for instance, of how the contradiction between the right of return and the experience of living together in the camp had been transformed into a productive contrast in the course of Campus in Camps’ practice of study (transformation). Lastly, the matter of study is not just a material object, yet at the same time cannot be understood without taking into account the concrete ruminations of common sense that it gathers, makes present, and transforms. In that sense, at the end of the study process, the matter of study—the photographs, the maps, the sketches, the schemes, the notes—will only remain as a testimonial residue of the reaction that has taken place and that has transformed the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts of all those gathered around the matter of study (materialization).

To conclude this chapter and taking relay from Stengers, who in turn took the relay from Marx’ Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, we could argue that the wager of engaging in practices of study is to change the world, not just to understand it—at least, that is, if the world, if this world, is given the power to change us, to force our thinking, and become affected by it. And it is precisely through matters of study that this world, this myriad of questioning situations in need of change, can be made present and give the power to change us. Put differently,
to engage in Whiteheadian adventures is to know no other constraint except for the matters of study that situate these adventures and allow for a transformation of the situation, including those who are affected by it. This means to become able to learn anew, to establish new ways of relating to that which has been granted the power to gather a collective of studiers and make them think, and the university, ultimately, is the home for such adventures.
Making Other Futures Possible: Toward a Pedagogy of Study Practices

Having created a new beginning, a new relay, with Whitehead’s proposition on the university, this chapter will play back the thread from back to front. Uncoiling the line, starting from Whiteheadian adventures and matters of study, and zigzagging through Campus in Camps’ practice of study, the aim is to unfurl a pedagogy of study practices. Indeed, having outlined a conceptual framework to grasp what is at stake in the course of practices of study, the speculative-pragmatic experiments which make other futures possible, the question is to further define a pedagogy of study for triggering, in the words of Stengers, “events where a ‘becoming able to’ is at stake.”1 Hence, a pedagogy that does not just address those involved in the way they perform their “characteristic activities,” as Dewey would have it, but pre-eminently as “being capable of.” Being capable of here means, more than just prone to adapt to changes in the environment, to be engaged in a situated process of sympoiesis that wagers on a possible transformation of the milieu and its inhabitants—a relational transformation that is always of the order of the event.

After that, the thread will be further recoiled by returning to the questions regarding the place of the sciences at the university, and its relation to study. Thinking together sciences and study affords a perspective on the university as an institution again, including its relation to society—the problem I began with at the beginning of the book. Now, however, the perspective is not so much informed by any general normative Idea of the university, or by critiques of its current capitalization. Instead, the point of departure lies in the actual practices of study that still inhabit the institution of the university, the unpredictable, eventful effects of studious gatherings, and which, as such, constitute a multitude of impulses for experimenting with the pedagogy of study, and thereby reclaiming the university as an ecology of study.
Studying within Ruins

At the end of the previous chapter, five features of matters of study have been discerned and preliminarily defined that set them, to a certain degree, apart from matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care. These five features were artifactualization, association, possibilization, transformation, and materialization. The question now is how these features relate to one another in the process of study, what their precise meaning is when thought of together with the actual practice of study of Campus in Camps, and how they generate starting points for a pedagogy of study. In other words, I will try to further differentiate between those features of matters of study that have to do with those practical constraints that effectuate an event of study on the one hand, and those features that describe what happens during study, the efficacy of study, on the other hand.

The constraints that have to be respected to achieve a moment of study, an achievement which is always of the order of the event, can be grasped by referring to the features of artifactualization, association, and materialization. Importantly, these features are not entirely independent from one another, as it seems that association and materialization invariably play a part in artifactualizing a situation at stake, in constraining thinking to produce an interstice, a difference that inflects our habitual ways of thinking.

After the studiers of Campus in Camps left the seminar room where they had envisaged the future of the camp in at times optimistic, at times pessimistic projections, and started to investigate the camp, they came back with photographs and maps of the camp. It was due to the materialization of their thinking about the camp in these photographs and maps, as well as in written accounts and conceptual schemes, that they started to become able to think anew about the camp, in the presence of and while actively relating to these material objects. This, however, does not mean that these objects were simply used to convince others of “their” individual vision, but to give the camp, their shared environment, the power to slow down their thinking, to object to the many individual projections they had cast onto the camp, and against the conclusions they consequently had drawn (“the right of return is the only viable future!”).

In that sense, going out and doing fieldwork in the camp, materializing their thinking in photographs, maps, and stories forced the studiers of Campus in Camps to generate study materials, materials that could be used to produce a difference that matters in the discussions—a difference, moreover, that does
not replicate a difference of opinion, in which two parties confront each other and struggle to make their point and convince the other, but that emerges, transindividually, as a transformation induced in the thinking of each and every studier in relation to the materials that had acquired the power to generate such a difference.

It is at this point that the relevance of association becomes evident. It should be emphasized from the beginning that this does not merely mean the bringing together of people, a collective or gathering of studiers in a strictly anthropocentric way, as if it were an association of human beings only, performing and conjoining their “characteristically” human activities. Instead, from the outset, the association includes other-than-human beings as well, makes them present via photographs, stories, and maps, study materials that interrupt the exclusive conversation of humankind, and produce a shift in the perceptions and thoughts of those gathered around them. Hence, the question is not only who or what is brought together, but also—and perhaps primarily—how they are brought together, which role they assume in this coming together, and what this role allows or disallows them to say, how it changes the modes of expression.

In Campus in Camps, for instance, the studiers did not just talk about the pictures or think about the maps. Instead, the making of maps and pictures became a vital ingredient in the process of thinking itself, assuming a subjectivity in objecting against specific interpretations studiers might a priori have voiced about them, and requiring the studiers to think with them. Giving life in the camp a forceful presence in the discussions about the future of the camp, these study materials acquired the power to obligate the studiers to hesitate, not to jump to conclusions, and not to indulge in rivaling opinions either, yet to transform the relations they have toward the situation they find themselves in, or in other words, not to yield to victimization or normalization, but to think about life in settler-colonial ruins.

Together, materialization, the creation of study materials, and association, the bringing together of a collective of studiers around these materials, artifactualize the questioning situation that required study—in the case of Campus in Camps, decolonization and the possibility of life in ruins. The artifice operates as a way of making a questioning situation present through matters of study around which a collective of studiers gathers. Artifices initiate a collective learning process through an experimental convocation of something that makes the people who gather around it think, instead of recognize.
Stengers makes clear that “the artifice complicates the process, slows it down, welcomes all doubts and objections, and even actively incites them, while also transforming them and listening in a different mode.” To that extent, the artifice disrupts the kind of conversation in which everyone gives his or her reasons, in which everyone comes together to reach a rational agreement; instead, the artifice, the materials it makes present, and the roles assumed by those gathered around them, forces to go slower.

In other words, the concept of the artifice and the practice of Campus in Camps dramatize the fact that thoughts do not come “naturally,” that we are not thinking subjects relying on Reason as some innate infrastructure. Instead, the efficacy of the artifice is to force the divergent reasons in relation to a concrete, material questioning situation to express themselves in a way that allows each reason to relate to other reasons, in order to become what it desires to be, namely an adequate response to the initial questioning situation. This means that the situation becomes able to resist arguments that transcendently impose themselves by disqualifying others. And indeed, matters of study as well as the presence of other studiers—all representatives of the situation—are vital ingredients in resisting such general judgments.

More than it is a matter of purifying the scene of study, a critical operation of debunking and denouncing that removes a position from a debate, thinking with artifices means to densify the scene of study. In that sense, it is a speculative-pragmatic test to make something present that insists upon thought and gives consistency to the interdependency of reasons of which none can, on its own, claim the capacity to define a response. It incites those involved to take care of the consequences of the possibles that make themselves felt, including the responses they inspire.

Here I come to the two remaining features that do not so much define the constraints study imposes on thinking, but rather shed light on the efficacy of study, what study “yields” so to say. First, there is the aspect of possibilization, which can now be defined as the process in which something that went unnoticed before can start to insist upon the thinking of the studiers, drawing their attention. In the case of Campus in Camps, it was life in exile, and more precisely, the communal aspects of life in exile, beyond the divide of public and private, that demanded to be taken into account within their thinking about decolonization. This insistence opened up the possibility to think differently about the right of return, and to rethink it as a return to the common, the possibility to go to the sea.

Speaking in terms of possibles instead of potentials might sound strange. However, it is to omit the logic that is immediately related to potentials, namely...
Making Other Futures Possible

the all too often heard demand that potential should be actualized. This demand, moreover, can only be resisted by paradoxically leaving the potential inoperative, impotent. The possible, on the contrary, is something that is always already present—it should not be made present. However, the presence of the possible is often obscured by established habits of thought, rendering us insensitive to its lure.

Moreover, a possible does not demand to be realized, since it is already real in the effects it produces, the ways in which it insists upon our thinking, how it, for instance, changed the perceptions and understandings of the camp when its inhabitants started to pay attention to it, study it. More precisely, the possible is present as a work-to-be-done without defining how it can be done, in contrast to the potential, which suggests a one-on-one relationship with the actual.

Lastly, the feature of transformation points to the experience when the studiers have become capable of responding to the questioning situation that demanded a response, that instigated a process of study, bringing studiers together around the study materials they had produced, making them sensitive to the possibles already present in the camp. Such a transformation does not take place on behalf of an active subject kneading the environment at its disposal as malleable matter, nor is it the passive undergoing of a transformation required by the environment, an adaptation. Instead, it is a sympoietic co-becoming of the world and its inhabitants, a mode of habitation, being the achievement of a practice of study.

It is due to the collective experiments on the public square in Fawwar, for instance, that the square had been transformed into a commons—a place where people could dwell and make use of it, instead of an empty space where people felt alienated from, even to the extent that they saw it as a threat because it risked to normalize the camp. At the same time, those who gathered on the square had also been transformed by starting to relate to one another and to the square in a different way. It is in that sense that studying within ruins afforded a way not only of inhabiting the ruins, but also of transforming them, reclaiming them to make another life, a life in common, possible.

A Practice in the Middle Voice

Study is, in that sense, a highly interdependent and generative process, a practice in the middle voice, in the words of Stengers. It transforms divergent experiences into a javelin projected beyond the limits that define these divergences, initiating
an adventure in the Whiteheadian sense. Practices of study induce and deploy ways of affecting and being affected, of doing and undergoing, gathering those who are concerned by a transformation in the middle voice that it seeks to activate.

Conceiving of study practices as practices in the middle voice forces us to consider our relation toward the situation we study as neither active nor passive. Studying in the active voice would mean that our relation is one of appropriation, that we, as studiers, make the matter of study our own, that we acquire control over it so we can put it to use in our jobs and everyday lives. To that extent, the modern sciences in the current culture of academic capitalism study in the active voice, by appropriating and capitalizing what is studied via patents, publications, and degrees. Studying in the passive voice, on the contrary, would imply that our relation is one of pure exposure, that a matter of study is disclosed before our eyes, forcing us to undergo what it demands of us.

Studying in the middle voice, however, requires letting oneself be affected in order to affect, to let oneself be touched in order to touch—and vice versa. It ties together the becoming of the world with the becoming of a collective of studiers inhabiting this world. Moreover, it makes it possible to conceive of learning processes as adventures that engage a collective of studiers around a questioning situation, and that will transform not only this situation but also the studiers that have accepted to become affected by it.

To that extent, it affords an experience of thought in the pragmatic sense. According to Dewey, it is indeed more precise to say, “it thinks” rather than “I think.” Thinking, in this view, is like a raging storm that sweeps by, and that absorbs everyone and everything it overblows. Thinking is not an activity to be done on behalf of an intentional subject that chooses to think; it is rather what one gets caught up in, like one gets caught up in a storm. What is at stake is not to play with thoughts, but rather to be put at play by thinking. Thinking, in that sense, is a transindividual event in which doing and undergoing become thoroughly enmeshed. As such, it cannot be understood in either the active or the passive voice. Instead, it is the effect of an experience that can only be grasped in the middle voice.

The middle voice, according to Stengers, triggers the following questions: How does this situation concern us? What does this situation ask from us? How can we respond to what the situation demands? These are posed in such a way, moreover, that the response given can never be general nor generalizable, that there is no transcendent criterium with which the legitimacy of the response can be evaluated. Besides, it requires of those who come together that what will
emerge from their assembly will not belong to any one of them individually. In that sense, assembling matters of study seems to be an obligatory passage point if this learning process is not just a random process of transformation or change (learning in the general sense), but becomes a real educational event, an event where “a becoming able to’ is at stake.”

What is of importance is not so much that the questioning situation has been transformed, or that the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts of the collective of studiers have been transformed. Instead, what matters is that this questioning situation, which has been granted the power to involve a collective of studiers in an experience of thought in the presence of these matters of study, has triggered the event of becoming able to respond. This response, more particularly, is not motivated by political opinions or economic interests, but comes forth from the event of study itself.

Composition, Problematization, Attention

The event of study, just like the experimental achievement sought after by the scientists, does not happen out of nothing, yet neither can it actively be produced in any determinate fashion. Rather, it requires a pragmatic testing that tries to enforce such an event without knowing exactly how it can be produced. Relying on Stengers, three arts can be distinguished of which the efficacy, when practiced concurrently, consists precisely in generating an event of study. These three arts are the art of composition, problematization, and attention, and together they constitute a pedagogy of study. Important to emphasize is the fact that these arts do not follow a functionalist means to ends logic, which would presuppose a sense of predictability or probability, but rather reinforce each other in the practical experiment which wagers on the possibility of an event.

The first art, of composition, has to do with how people are brought together around something and what kind of role they can assume in the gathering. Stengers refers to the slow and often repetitive palaver, as it was practiced in many African societies, to illuminate what it means to speak in an assembly, and the mode of speech elicited by the palaver comes strikingly close to the one practiced during study. Stengers stresses that the palaver in no way resembles the democratic debate as we know it. Whereas the democratic debate should be open to all citizens, the palaver only summons the elders. In that sense, it is radically anti-democratic because it excludes those who do not belong to the group of elders. Being an elder, however, should not be understood as belonging
to a group that grants a sense of identity and privilege. Instead, being an elder, Stengers explains, means to assume the role of an elder, and to accept that this role puts a constraint on what can and cannot be said, and how it can be said in the course of the palaver.9

Since the word of the elders cannot be contradicted, they should extract from their experience those syntaxes, rhythms, and ways of saying that elicit contradiction, that put forward an intentional "I" that defends “its” reasons. Speaking like an elder brings about an impersonal experience that verily transforms the speaking subject into an elder. Every speech act should express a thought that does not contest the question around which the elders gather.10 Similarly, during practices of study, people gather as studiers, which means to refuse attempts to convince others of what one already knows—using rational arguments or not. The assumption is that the questioning situation has the power to gather, precisely because there is hesitation, divergence, and risk for conflict, over and against any individual opinions.

Despite the presence of such an issue at risk, over which there might be conflict, a practice of study, just like a palaver, is characterized by a specific kind of trust. People do not gather because an agreement has to be made, which makes every participant responsible, but instead because an agreement is expected to produce itself. Such trust transforms the listening habits of those involved. They no longer listen for clues that can help them construct a counter-argument, or for clues that will unveil the intentions of the interlocutor. Hence, the efficacy of the composition is not due to the goodwill or tolerance of some of the participants with regards to their more persuasive associates. Rather, its efficacy is due to the matters of study having given a forceful presence of the questioning situation, granting it the role of a participant in the composition, which can object and induce hesitation.

Consequently, the slow and repetitive process produces a common sensibility concerning the consequences of the response that is being risked—a response that belongs to no one. Here, the impersonality of the common is of importance, since the decision is not taken by an individual someone, not even by the democratic collective, but it will have produced itself: “The decision to be made is made without anyone being able to appropriate it, without anybody else being able to guarantee that it is the best possible decision. The decision will have received ‘its’ reasons.”11

Put differently, the art of composition fosters a mutual sensibility and readiness to be affected by a questioning situation made present via matters of study. It brings people together in a way that undoes both personal intentions.
and general solutions in order to make them susceptible to a sympoietic process of interdependent co-becoming. It is a composition without a composer and certainly without a transcendent position from which it is possible to evaluate the response that will have been produced as the effect of the composition.

Secondly, the art of problematization has to do with how something is made present within the composition, namely, as a matter of study. How can something—a situation, a cause—be allowed to make us think? How can it be transformed into a question in order to suspend the conclusive “and thus” of rational debate, the logical consequence based on givens, and slow down reasoning, taking care of the consequences? Stengers argues that “the problematization does not go back to the most general but confers on the situation, always this or that situation, the power to question what seemed to be self-evident.”

Here, Stengers refers to the only moral advice that Leibniz has ever given—“Dic cur hic? Respice finem,” “Say why here? Consider the end,” since it reflects the relevance of the situatedness of every response for the art of problematization. What is at stake in Leibniz’s dictum is, in the first instance, not so much the response itself that will be given, but rather the affective and existential transformation the advice induces, which Stengers describes as an enlargement of the imagination. Respecting the demands of Leibniz’s “Dic cur hic?” requires to take into account all the dimensions a response to a questioning situation might play into, to take care of the consequences, and imagine what a response might imply for the ones that are not immediately present in the gathering of studiers, but who, due to the situationist injunction, are made present in their thinking.

Leibniz’s dictum problematizes general reasons that could be invoked in a discussion in order to make the situation and our relation toward it truly problematic. To that extent, “the question Dic cur hic aims to have the efficacy to problematize the general reasons by making the ‘here’ [hic] come to matter - suspend your action, let yourself be affected by the ‘this,’ that is to say by this world.” This means that general reasons—“the camp is unjust and should be abolished,” “the right of return is the only viable claim,” or perhaps more familiar to our ears, “growth is the only solution,” “human beings are naturally selfish”—do not count in the conversation, unless they are reconfigured as situated reasons. The only reasons that can be taken up are those that come forth from and engage with the situation, henceforth a truly problematic situation.

In sum, the art of problematization affords the possibility of what Haraway calls response-ability, of being able, given this situation, to respond. A response, in this sense, is always a response for and to. It is a response for because it takes
place in the presence of the problem it engages with. It is never a response informed by general reasons, but always specific reasons. Hence, it is also a response to, always situated by the problem it addresses. It requires warding off all transcendent reasons that could be given, and engage with all the divergent dimensions that the problem plays into, to effectuate a transformation that takes up these reasons in an always local, situated, precarious, and partial response.

The art of attention is the third and final art that, together with the arts of composition and problematization, constitutes a pedagogy of study. Moreover, the presence of this art transforms practices of study into truly educational assemblies. A mere combination of the arts of composition and problematization would engender the coming into being of what Latour calls a Parliament of Things, an assembly around matters of concern, and is, as such, more an assembly of the political kind. The practice, however, of the art of attention ensures that what appears due to the pedagogy of study not only is a matter of concern, but is intensified to become a matter of study. Whereas a matter of concern induces a discussion that cannot be reduced to general arguments and logical conclusions such as “sciences proves that … and thus,” or “as evidence shows … and thus,” a matter of study does not only summon us to give our situated and hence divergent reasons, but also forces us to slow down reasoning, to study.

Stengers defines the art of attention as “an art of the middle voice, a tentacular art because it is about letting oneself being touched, and to give what touches us the power to make us feel and think, but always ‘here’, never ‘off the ground’.” As such, the art of attention is a relational art, tentacular, in the words of Stengers. Haraway clarifies that tentacle comes from the Latin tentaculum, which means “feeler,” and that tentare, the Latin verb from which it is derived, means “to feel” and “to try.” Conceiving of the art of attention as tentacular foregrounds the fact that it is a mix of touch and try. It is reminiscent of someone who is blindfolded and suddenly has to trust his haptic senses in order to find his way. The art of attention is, therefore, perhaps rather a way of paying attention with the hands than with the eyes. Moreover, it is a risky art since one never knows what one will touch or where it will bring you since destinations at a distance are literally out of sight.

The risks involved in the art of attention, however, point in yet another direction than merely unpredictability or uncertainty. Claiming that the art of attention poses a risk also means to stress the sense of the possible that it affords, how it allows for attending to the possibles that insist in every questioning situation, and for which our current modes of abstraction have made us
Insensitive, anesthetized. In that sense, paying attention also means to become susceptible to these possibles and what they might demand, the transformations they allow for, and the futures they render perceptible. Put differently, matters of study play an important part in forcing us to pay attention to the questioning situation at hand: not just to project an interpretation onto them or give a general reason for them, but to slow down and experience the situation we find ourselves in, in a new way, to learn anew.

The Creation of the Future

Having pursued the proposition on the university as an ecology of study practices, including the pedagogical consequences it entails, it is now time to directly address the initial questions of this book—how to think about the tasks of the university? how can the relation between university and society be conceived differently? and what could the future of the university be, given the state of ruin it finds itself in?—and articulate a provisional response.

To begin with, traditionally, or more precisely, with the birth of the modern research university at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the tasks of the university have been defined as teaching, research, and service to society—an educational, scientific, and societal task. Thinking about these tasks from a practice-theoretical point of view, it is first of all easy to distinguish scientific practices such as laboratory experiments, fieldwork, archival research, and surveys on the one hand, and educational practices such as lectures, seminars, excursions, and internships on the other hand. How can these tasks now be redefined from the perspective of practices of study?

With Stengers, we have seen that the question that drives scientific practices (the question that makes them converge without submitting them to the general rubric of “modern Science”) is the question of how to learn something new? This question matters to all scientific practices, although the way it matters, and the responses given to the question may differ significantly. For an archaeologist, for instance, learning something new requires performing excavations and bringing findings to the lab to estimate their age, provenance, and former use. For a sociologist, it might require conducting a mass scale survey in order to acquire an idea of the dispositions and opinions of a segment of the population. For a physicist, learning something new often requires devising a specialized experimental apparatus that affords a (hypothetical) particle the possibility to demonstrate its attributes. Hence, although the different scientific practices—
each with its own requirements and obligations—which have come to fruition within the university in the last two centuries have other ways of learning something new, learning something new still matters to all of them, throughout the diversity of the often very practical responses to this question.

Within study practices, the question of how to learn something new gets thoroughly entangled with the question of how to learn anew? This question is associated with the experiences of ceasing to take the existing order of things for granted, of problematizing, and trying to create a setting in which it becomes possible to start to think differently, to open up futures that diverge from the one that already has started to actualize itself, and to pragmatically experiment with the enactment of a future that had been rendered imperceptible due to our modes of abstraction. It is these kinds of practices that we encountered in Campus in Camps, where studying the camp afforded the possibility to think differently about its future, and where the right of return to the private house of the past was transformed into a future-oriented return to the common. And again, it needs to be stressed that this is not a moral story, telling us that nothing is impossible to the brave of heart, but precisely a technical story, about the requirements and obligations of a practice, the risks involved in every questioning situation, and the consequences that had to be taken care of.

As such, practices of science and practices of study are deeply intertwined: to a certain extent, learning something new seems to be a precondition for learning anew, since the very coming into being of something new always forces us to think about and hesitate before how it might come to matter, to take care of the consequences it entails and the possibles it activates. In that sense, the university can be understood as a place where scientific practices are genuine practices of study, where the questions of how to learn something new and how to learn anew are indeed thoroughly entangled. To that extent, the university proposes an altogether different ecology for the sciences than, for instance, the laboratories of private companies, because its primary aim is—or at least should be—not to sell the products of scientific labor, and thus violate the pragmatic constraint to take care of the consequences, by leaving it up to the market to decide how these products will be used.

Instead, the university aims to effectuate a combined effort of two uses of reason, namely an experimental use of reason and a diplomatic use of reason. Whereas the experimental use of reason dates back to the invention of modern science with Galileo’s inclined plane, the diplomatic use of reason is much older and was practiced by the studiers of the medieval universitas magistrorum et scolarium, who tried to negotiate an agreement between contradictory claims.
When properly taken together, these uses of reason may effectuate a coming into being of something new, while at the same time taking care of the consequences it entails, and raising the question of which futures it unlocks.

Interestingly, it is along similar lines that Whitehead had defined the aims of the university, when he wrote at the end of *Modes of Thought* that “the task of the university is the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, can affect the issue. The future is big with every possibility of achievement and of tragedy.” In that sense, which is also the sense I associate its conception as an ecology of study with, the university has nothing to do with harmonizing or stabilizing the present (like in the medieval university), nor with the idea of disinterested, pure science and *Bildung* (like in the Humboldtian research university), nor, lastly, with the commodification of knowledge for a capitalist market (like in the university of the postwar knowledge economy). Instead, its task consists in the creation of the future, and it is at that point, in its concern for the new, that its scientific and educational tasks become indistinguishable, aligned in study.

Claiming that the university is oriented toward the future, however, does not mean that the university can control what is to come in any determined way. In his apparently innocuous proposition, Whitehead does not relate the future to growth, accumulation, progress, or any predefined outcome. He does not even suggest that the university could achieve the futures it creates. There is no sense of probability or predictability at work in his proposition. Instead, the future seems to come with radical uncertainty, as it is impossible to know how “rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation” can concretely affect it.

It is at this point that the third, “traditional” task of the university—societal service—comes to matter, not in the least since it again brings to mind the second key question of this book, namely how to conceive of the relationship between university and society? Understood as an ecology of study, the university is not so much the thinking head of humankind—a space where the issues humanity confronts are solved or where humanity’s cultural and intellectual heritage is being transmitted to younger generations. Such a conception would place the university outside of the world that it should provide service to, decoupling it from the societal issues and questions that it is supposed to engage with.

Rather, understood as an ecology of study, deeply enmeshed and entwined with the world it inhabits, the university, a collective of studiers, gathers around the very issues and questions that make common sense ruminate, joining forces with a public that was already thinking long before the university took action or raised its voice. The university, then, studies these questions that people were
already thinking about—be it how to teach children to be brave in battle, how to use a public space in a camp without normalizing its exceptionality or, how to deal with GMOs taking into account all those who will be affected by them. It activates divergent dimensions of the questioning situation and takes them up in a Whiteheadian adventure, an adventure that will allow learning anew, to inhabit the world in a new way.

The pedagogy of study interweaves and complicates the diverging lines of thought that are already ruminating in the landscape of common sense in order to make a transformation possible that engages these different perspectives without an imposition of a unifying rule that transcends them all, but rather through situating them by something that makes the people gathered learn anew, a particular matter of study. These entanglements between partial and, therefore, divergent perspectives that make up common sense are made in a tentacular way, via reciprocal, composite ways of affecting and being affected, without dramatic moments of absolute rupture where an agreement would be imposed, informed by one of these perspectives only.19

Instead, the agreement, or perhaps the response, will be of the order of an impersonal and transindividual event, achieved due to the constraints associated with the pedagogy of study. Put differently, when studiers generate matters of study with regard to a questioning situation that makes common sense ruminate, the diverging dimensions of common sense are taken up in processes of commoning, of making sense in common, and making another future possible. This brings us to the third question. After having discussed the task of the university and its relation to society, the remaining question now concerns the future of the university, or formulated in the speculative-pragmatic mode: What can be done?

Resist, Reclaim, Relay

Based on the perspective developed in this book, one might be tempted to think that the only thing that could be done is to do away with the institutional university altogether. Has the history of institutionalization of the university not predominantly been a history of decline and decay, of ruination? Ever since the first studiers came together around ancient texts at the beginning of the long twelfth century, the university has been laid claim on by a variety of powerful authorities. Only shortly after its emergence, both religious and political authorities tried to curb the university, putting it to use in ensuring that the Christian doctrine was taught in the right way, by means of the licentia ubique
docendi (Paris), or for educating laypeople for juridical and administrative professions that could strengthen imperial dominion (Bologna).

Centuries later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Humboldtian refurbishment of the university was precisely aimed at making it a site for independent research and Bildung, assuming that when the university would be set free from direct state power, it would more easily contribute to the cultivation of the German nation. In that sense, the university became part of a process of nation-state building. Although direct intervention from the state was averted, its societal mission was emphatically understood as being a hotbed for national culture, to educate the professionals that could take care of the nation’s physical, social, and spiritual wellbeing.

After the Second World War, and with the development of a knowledge economy, the university became an important site of production. This went hand in hand with a massification of student numbers and an increase of partnerships with state and industry for the development of Cold War technology. Later on, these processes have only been intensified due to neoliberal reforms that started to reinterpret academic freedom as the freedom to engage in whatever partnerships to pursue whatever knowledge, as long as they are commercially profitable. Following the analysis of Readings, it seems that the contemporary discourse of Excellence has decidedly proven to be mostly an empty shell, symptomatic of the evaporation of any steering Idea of the university.

Given this development, it would be all too easy simply arguing to do away with the university, to return to its glorious, pure origins, when corruption had not yet set in, and to follow the lead of the many small-scale practices of study that have come into being outside of the university. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile not to get rid of the institution of the university so quickly, and to stay with the trouble a bit longer. In the end, universities are still extremely resourceful sites, in terms of both intellectual repositories (e.g., libraries, collections, archives, laboratories) and networks (e.g., study groups, departments, disciplinary societies). Instead, what might be required is another mode of inhabiting the institution of the university. This means to inhabit the university not as a knowledge factory (with its incessant injunction to produce, publish, patent) or an ivory tower (risking to decouple the university from the ruminations of common sense and thereby paradoxically deliver it to domineering Ideas), but rather as a precarious ecology of study. This mode of habitation calls for a threefold course of action, namely to resist, to reclaim, and to relay. And it is precisely this threefold course of action that I wish to associate with the challenge of decolonizing the university.
Resisting can have three different meanings. In the first instance, it means to resist the university’s way of capitalizing on knowledge practices, both educational and scientific, by always trying to install disconnections that disembed the production of knowledge from the contexts where it comes to matter. Separating knower (e.g., expert, professor) and known (e.g., patent, course content), and uncoupling knowledge from their “objects” (e.g., population, situation), these disconnections, separations, and uncouplings play a crucial role in the commodification of knowledge as “expertise” that can be sold to present and future “professionals.” Resisting hence means, in the first instance, to actively resist those university policies that play into the hands of an increasing capitalization of knowledge, of which the critical tradition has made us all too aware.

Secondly, resisting also means to acknowledge that more money or more autonomy—a call often heard from protest movements—will not by itself provide a solution to the predicament of the university. Whereas more money will only result in the call for more output, more autonomy risks to decouple the university from the worldly problems it could concern itself with, from its response-ability. This second sense of resisting means to resist acting like the so-called “goose with the golden eggs,” that requires not to be impeded while performing its work, yet instead coming to terms with the many non-innocent ways in which the university plays its role in the world, to exercise the pragmatic art of taking care of the consequences of its responses, its response-ability.

Thirdly, resisting means to resist the temptation to give in to cynicism, to resist the lure of the academy of misery with its complaints and its grievances. This means to recognize that, overall, most of the European universities are still resourceful sites where appropriate tools can be found to study. And to study, importantly, implies to resist, it means to organize, problematize, and scrutinize despite the many attempts to capitalize on study. Resistance requires study, and to study means to engage in joyful practices that connect with and transform from within the ruminations of common sense. In the words of Stengers:

To resist a likely future in the present is to gamble that the present still provides substance for resistance, that it is populated by practices that remain vital even if none of them has escaped the generalized parasitism that implicates them all.20

The great advantage of such a practice-oriented point of view is that at the local level of practices, as opposed to the institutional level, things can be done relatively easily. As such, the many practices in which people at universities still engage are potent sites of resistance. Hence, an important work to be done is reclaiming the practices of the university.
Here we touch upon the second course of action, *reclaiming*. Although reclaiming might at first evoke a sense of rediscovery of something old and authentic that has been forgotten, it is essential to clarify that here it does not imply such a conservative-restorative operation. It is not about going back to the past, but about inventing manners of inheriting the past so that it can come to matter here, now, and for the future. Within the field of ecology, reclaiming designates processes of renewing and restoring ecosystems and habitats in the environments that have been decayed, damaged, and destroyed due to capitalist exploitation. The aim of reclaiming is not to restore the land to how it was before, but instead to render it capable of fostering life again, to wager on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins.

Similarly, reclaiming the practices of the university does not mean to repeat in the same way what has been done before, but about inventing ways of engaging in study practices that resist and transform the current kinds of parasitism. It means to experiment with pedagogies of study that might be of use in giving *this* situation—always *this* situation—the power to make us think. As such, reclaiming is not so much past-oriented, as it is future-oriented. Reclaiming study practices does not mean to consolidate a certain image of the university (e.g., as a public institution for the production and transmission of knowledge); it is much more about giving shape again to an image of the university through study practices within the university that are situated by questioning situations which require response-ability.

Lastly, and this relates to practices as sites of resistance, reclaiming, which seems to be by definition situated on the level of practices, is always, or at least most of the time, a joyful activity. Reclaiming practices excites the feeling that things can be done otherwise and that there are many other people who are willing to become engaged together in such practices of study, to make another future possible. As opposed to the sadness of complaining, which always foregrounds the bad and the ugly, the joy of reclaiming takes actual situations, including the unpredictable possibles that abound in their interstices, as a starting point for collective creation of the future.

The last proposal concerns not only the question of what can be done, but also the strange question of how this book can be concluded. Not so much one of concluding, the task at hand is rather one of *relaying*. What matters is above all *not* to conclude, *not* to formulate any “and thus” that would follow logically from and seal the argument, the patterns and ideas that have been elaborated, for every “and thus” marks an arbitrary cut in the process of thinking that will have made this “and thus” possible.
Relaying means to hold out. What is held out here is not so much a blueprint for a university to come, or for an ecology of study that has already started to actualize itself. Such knowledge would indeed once again be of the “and thus” of the “conclusion.” Instead, relaying means to trust in the creative uncertainty of the encounter, trusting that what has been held out will be taken into new hands that will draw out new patterns, new transformations, new ways of decolonizing the university and reclaiming an ecology of study.

Emphasizing the creative uncertainty that accompanies every relay foregrounds the fact that what has been held out comes without any theoretical guarantee, without any security that it will work in whatever situation. Instead, what has been held out always comes with a pragmatic challenge, namely the challenge to take it in hand, to take up the threads, to perform the necessary transformations that will make it work, that will give this situation here the power to make us think.

Hence, relaying a conclusion that is not of the kind of “now we know that … and thus,” but of the kind of “given this situation, it is possible to,” demands to activate a possible amidst the diverging lines of thought that transform a situation into a question, that transform the university into an ecology requiring reclaiming, and for which the practices of study that still inhabit this ecology are like a thousand different initial impulses to give a situated significance to the all too general words that, indeed, another university is possible.
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Chapter 1


2 Ibid., 10.

3 Ibid., 8.

4 Ibid., 13.


9 In a joint publication, they write that in Arabic, the noun Al-Jame’ah does translate not only as university, but also as a place for assembly. See *Campus in Camps. A University in Exile*, 13. http://www.campusincamps.ps/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The_CIC_BOOK.pdf

10 Petti, Hilal, and Weizman, *Architecture after Revolution*, 19. Campus in Camps continues the work of the Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), which was founded in 2007 by Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal Weizman. DAAR aims to be a place for “conceptual speculations and pragmatic spatial interventions, discourse and collective learning” (cf. http://www.decolonizing.ps). In that sense, Campus in Camps was a way to provide a more sustainable character to the small-scale projects and initiatives taking place at Oush Grab, and to provide a bearing on political discussions about the future of Palestine and dealing with colonial heritage. Around the same time, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), where Hilal is director of the Camp Improvement Program, wanted to start a project on the representation of camps and refugees together.
with the Refugee Camp Communities of the Southern West Bank. These events created the occasion to think about an educational project that could engage more inhabitants of the Dheisheh Refugee Camp, next to Beit Sahour, in activities similar to those by DAAR. Based on his experience as a lecturer teaching students from refugee camps at Al Quds Bard University (AQBU) and as an architect at DAAR, Petti had become convinced that the camp was the right place for the campus to engage students in the events that are taking place there. In a reflection on the start-up of Campus in Camps, he writes that his experience of working with students from refugee camps in AQBU has taught him that the university is a place where different kinds of narrations, ideas, and discourses can come into being, but that it is important to contextualize and connect them in and with the lives of other people affected by the issue under study. Besides, moving from the protected space of the campus to the camp forces the university to open itself to other forms of knowledge and learning. See Campus in Camps.


12 Fred Moten strikingly articulates this when he writes: “Like Deleuze, I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that.” Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons. Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2013), 118.


14 See Stefan Collini, *What Are Universities for?* (London: Penguin, 2012); Gerald Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity*, trans. Aileen Derieg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013). What makes the predicament of the university even more problematic is that, at the same time, other organizations and institutions seem to have taken over the traditional tasks of the university. This trend is most outspoken in research and teaching. In order to obtain a degree, it is no longer necessary to attend lectures or courses at a university, as there are plenty of private agencies and training centers that organize the educational programs
to dispense the required knowledge, skills, and competences. Besides, it has become possible to acquire an enormous amount of specialized knowledge online via platforms such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). On the side of research, it is clear that universities are not always the most efficient institutions to produce knowledge, and increasingly private companies and businesses have their own Research & Development section to conduct the research that was done before in the laboratories of universities.


20 Important to emphasize is that in this context, ecology is not primarily understood as a narrative to make the university more “green.” However, it is arguable that the problems of climate change and a sustainable future touch upon the heart of the university as an entanglement of science and politics, of questions of acquiring new knowledge, questions of living together, and questions of futurity. Instead, placing ecology, in the original Greek sense of “study of the house, the living-place, the habitat,” upfront affords being able to sketch a perspective in which the more pertinent question becomes how the university, as a habitat left in ruins, still harbors potential for configuring new habitable ecologies.


22 Ibid., 41.

23 The modern research university of the times of Kant and Humboldt related directly to the nation-state. It needed to educate professionals in the fields of medicine, law, and theology, who, due to their philosophical formation, could question the foundations of their field (Kant), as well as create a “gebildetes Publikum” (“an educated public”) that could embody and preserve German national culture (Humboldt). See ibid., 68–9.
24 See Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). The central role of the university in the new economy as producer and seller of knowledge has spawned a vast amount of articles and books that seek to construct the conceptual and methodological tools to map the ongoing economization of the university in detail. Clark Kerr’s book on *The Uses of the University*, published in 1963, has been programmatic in that it sets a research agenda about, for instance, the relation between university and industry, the disintegration of the academic body into a loosely assembled network of research units that have closer relations to external parties than to the university itself, and the rise of the administrative staff and the correlated peripheralization of academic staff. See Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Later on, critical sociologists of education have coined the term of academic capitalism to grasp this development. For a review, see Tiago Sihagi and Patricia Saltorato, “Academic Capitalism: Distinguishing without Disjoining through Classification Schemes,” *Higher Education* 80, no. 1 (2020): 95–117.


26 These developments have also taken place against the background of budget cuts in the higher education sector, which have made it necessary for universities to engage more intensely with other partners to acquire additional funding. Lucrative partnerships with industry, conducting commissioned research for companies, commodifying the results of intellectual labor via patents and licenses, developing spin-off companies, and making a profit from the rental of university real estate for residence, conference facilities, and industrial parks are just a few examples of tactics that universities have deployed in order to survive.


This behavioral strategy is, in the first instance, directed toward students as potential customers of higher education. However, it is essential to note that universities increasingly aim to create additional markets and attract new types of customers. This strategy is not limited to departments that have always been close to market interests, such as biotechnology, pharmaceutics, or information technology. Classics departments—notoriously far removed from lucrative businesses—have, for instance, invested in the exploitation of profitable trips to Greece and Italy in order to generate additional external revenue. Furthermore, departments of psychology and educational sciences have made a business from the development and selling of tests and measurements copyrighted by the faculty. Slaughter and Rhoades, *Academic Capitalism*, 26.

Ibid., 29.


Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties,” trans. Mary Gregor, in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1789; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 3–18. To complete Kant’s institutional chart, it should be added that the lower faculty of philosophy is subdivided in two departments. Whereas the department of historical knowledge is concerned with history, geography, philology, the humanities, and the natural sciences, the department of pure rational knowledge focuses on pure mathematics and pure philosophy, the metaphysics of nature and morals.


With *Mochlos; or The Conflict of the Faculties*, Derrida has written an influential commentary on Kant’s text. In his reading, Derrida problematizes the sharp separation of Reason and power, which seems to be at the basis of Kant’s idea of the university. He argues that “the whole forms an invaginated pocket on the inside of every part or sub-set.” Just like the university as an institution founded by the state is an invaginated pocket of the state itself, the lower faculty is an invaginated pocket of the university as a whole, and the department of pure rational knowledge is an invaginated pocket of the faculty of philosophy. Derrida argues that there is a continuous regression of Reason within this institutional framework. Moreover, the problem with the place of Reason is radicalized when considering the foundation


Wissenschaft can unproblematically be translated as science in a very broad sense (including philosophy, literature, etc.). The translation of Bildung, however, is less straightforward. It cannot be translated by education, for instance, as this noun is too general and includes instrumental forms of education such as training as well. Bildung, on the opposite, is an utterly non-instrumental form of education, an end-in-itself.

Humboldt, On the Spirit and Organizational Framework, 47.

Humboldt was strongly inspired by the texts on the university written by Schelling and Schleiermacher. They argued against an all too stark contrast between Reason and the state as it is presented by Kant. The concept of culture allows for thinking of a process of cultivation, through Wissenschaft and Bildung, that could form a bridge between the population of the nation-state as it is, and the cultured nation-state with educated officials. See Friedrich Schelling, “On University Studies,” trans.

Cardinal Newman’s discourse on the university forms the Anglo-Saxon counterpart to Humboldt’s Idea of the University for German Culture. Whereas for Humboldt *Wissenschaft* and *Bildung* are central to the formation of a national culture, the Anglo-Saxon tradition primarily takes recourse to national literature for similar purposes, hence giving rise to the liberal arts tradition that is still prevalent at universities and colleges in the Anglo-Saxon world. John Henry Newman, “The Idea of the University,” in *The Idea of the University. A Reader*, ed. Michael Peters and Ronald Barnett (1852; repr. New York: Peter Lang, 2018), 180–96.


Some of these new ideas were collected in Ronald Barnett and Michael Peters, ed., *The Idea of the University. Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: Peter Lang).

For the sake of completeness, the seven ecosystems are knowledge, social institutions, the economy, learning, human subjectivity, culture, and the natural environment. Ronald Barnett, *The Ecological University. A Feasible Utopia* (London: Routledge, 2018), 56.

Nevertheless, this case could be made as the modern texts on the university generally aim to breathe new air into an institution that had been in decline due to organizational failure for decades. See Bahti, “Histories of the University,” 438–9.


61 Also, in recent years mainly right-wing politicians have proved themselves as extremely proficient debunkers in claiming, for instance, that climate models are science made in China, aimed at a destabilization of Western economies, or that young climate activists are brainwashed by communist political movements, and that hence, they should not be listened to. On the importance of post-critical thinking for educational philosophy and theory, see Naomi Hodgson, Joris Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, *Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy* (Columbia: Punctum Books, 2017); Kai Wortmann, “Post-Critical Pedagogy as Poetic Practice: Combining Affirmative and Critical Vocabularies,” *Ethics and Education* 14, no. 4 (2019): 467–81.


64 For the difference between Western as a geographical location and Western as a hegemonic style of thinking that has suppressed other styles of thinking that have emerged in the geographic West as well, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “A Non-Occidentalist West? Learned Ignorance and Ecology of Knowledge,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 26, no. 7–8 (2009): 105–6.

65 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 12.

66 Cat’s cradle is a game played all over the world, albeit in different versions. Despite the many different sequences and figures that can be made, some common characteristics can be discerned. The game is played with one piece of string, of which both ends are tied together in order to form a loop. This loop is held between two hands, and so the game begins. Now, another player takes over the piece of string, which allows for another pattern to emerge. After that, the first player (or a third for that matter) receives the pattern again, thus creating a new figure. The game continues in this way until the players arrive at a string figure that does not allow it to be passed back again. As such, cat’s cradle is a game without winners or losers, or more precisely, to win means to be able to go on time and again, to take what is passed on and respond. To play cat’s cradle, then, means to engage in a collective process of continuous unfolding in which new patterns arise continually. Often, the string figures depict scenes that are part of stories told while playing the game. A few examples are Little Boy Carrying Wood, a string figure found around the river Klamath in Oregon, Canoe with Two Sails, a string figure from the Gilbert
Islands, Fish in a Dish, a quite common string figure that was rediscovered in various places, or the Navajo string figure Two Coyotes Running Opposite Ways. Haraway argues that as storytelling devices, string figures are not only a child's game but also a pedagogical practice, as they initiate children into the stories and narratives of the older generation while at the same time giving them literally out of hand to the new generation. The game of cat's cradle, however, is not only a child's game or a pedagogical practice, but also a way to understand what it means to do theory in educational philosophy and theory. Ibid., 13–14.

67 Ibid., 12.


69 Ibid., 134; Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 10.


Chapter 2

1 The universities were, of course, not the first institutions of higher learning. On the European continent, cathedral schools and monastery schools for the education and training of clerks already existed. In the Arab world, higher education had been a significant part of social life much before the coming into being of the university. Some scholars go as far as to say that the first instance of higher education was Plato’s Academy. For our argument, we will limit ourselves to those forms of higher education that actually called themselves a university (universitas magistrorum et scolarium).


3 On the history of the text and the development of the printing press, see Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962). Dramatizing the importance of the modalities of text for the university ex negativo, Stengers even claims that the invention of the printing press, and hence the possibility to produce large amounts of text, killed the

4 Understanding the university under the sign of the event means to situate this account within an ontology that can be traced back via Stengers and Deleuze to the philosophy of Whitehead. An event, according to Whitehead, does not constitute a radical break in the continuity of time, marking a shift between past and future. Rather, the experience of temporality is the effect of a succession of events, a process, and every event is an ingression of different prehensions (“ingredients” of the event) that do not “explain” the event, but make up its singularity. Isabelle Stengers, *Thinking with Whitehead. A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 185–200.


7 The concept of *universitas* was found for the first time in written sources in Cicero’s translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*. Cicero used the word as a translation of ῥόνα, a syntagma that denoted the world in its entirety. The concept brings to the fore a sense of comprehensiveness and totality. It designates the world as an all-encompassing whole. Next to this mention in *Timaeus*, Cicero uses the concept twice in his *De Natura Deorum*. Here it is accompanied by a genitive that clarifies what is contained within the totality of *universitas*, first the totality of things, “universitatem rerum,” secondly the totality of human beings, “universitatem humani generis.” Whether it was of human beings or earthly things, the concept of *universitas* expressed the idea of a totality, an all-including assemblage. *Universitas* designated a singular unit, constituted by different elements that could, however, not be defined as merely an enumeration of these constituting parts. The *universitas* has an existence of itself, independent from the elements that compose it. Throughout history, it acquired different meanings, and in the twelfth century, it became particularly relevant again in the re-organization of social, political, and economic life. For an overview of the use of the concept of *universitas* from antiquity to the middle ages, see Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld, “Geschichte der Juristischen Person: Universitas, Corpus, Collegium im Klassischen Römischen Recht” (Habilitation Thesis, University of Munich, 1933). For a history of the idea of the university and its renewed importance in the twelfth century, see Pierre
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10 Ibid., 23–5.

11 For completeness, the medical school of Salerno should also be mentioned, as it had a similar reputation in medicine as Paris had in theology and Bologna in law. Alan Cobban has called it a proto-university because it got its papal recognition as a studium generale much later than the universities of Bologna and Paris. De facto, it was already organized as a universitas at an earlier stage, but because the school matured quite slowly, it only got its official recognition in 1280. Another early university is the university of Oxford, which closely resembled the university of Paris in terms of its teachings and organizational structure. See Alan Cobban, *The Medieval Universities. Their Development and Organization* (London: Methuen & Co, 1975).

12 From the 1140s onwards, canon law was also being taught in Bologna.


18 Ibid., 62–5.


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23 Ibid., 83. See also Nardi, “Relations with Authority,” 89–90.

24 Ibid., 85. On the teachings of the university of Paris, see Riché and Verger, *Des Nains sur des Épaules des Géants*.


27 Next to Aristotle's *Logic*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*, also mathematical works from the Ancient Greeks, such as Euclid and Archimedes, and medical works of Hippocrates and Galen were translated. Moreover, a lot of Arab commentaries on these texts were made accessible, for instance, the works of Al-Khwarizmi, Al-Razi, and Avicenna. At last, and quite important for the development of law universities, was the rediscovery of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* of the Byzantine emperor Justinian. See Le Goff, *De Intellectuelen in de Middeleeuwen*, 46–51.


31 Illich, *In the Vineyard of the Text*, 2.


33 The scholastic method places strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning to extend knowledge by inference and to resolve contradictions. It often takes the form of explicit disputation in a combined written and oral form. A topic drawn from the tradition was brought forward as a question, to which the studiers gave different responses, leading them to the formulation of a counterproposal. Because of its emphasis on rigorous dialectical methods, scholasticism was eventually applied to many other fields of study (e.g., law, medicine). It began, however, as an attempt

34 For the sake of completeness, the *disputatio* should be mentioned as a third scholastic practice central to the medieval university. It proceeds in a way similar to the *quaestio*, but has less the character of an exercise. It is performed at the end of a degree to prove one’s knowledge of and competence in a field of study. Schwinges, “Student Education, Student Life,” 232.


36 See, for instance, proposition 89: “Quod impossibile est solvere rationes philosophi de eternitate mundi, nisi dicamus, quod voluntas primit implicat incompossibilia.” The proposition denies that it would be impossible to refute the arguments of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the world, without asserting that the will of God embraces incompatibles (*incompossibilia*). Sara Uckelman, “Logic and the Condemnations of 1277,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 39 (2010): 215.


Chapter 3

1 It is only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the sciences acquired a noteworthy position in the university. From the Middle Ages onwards, the university consisted of the lower faculty of philosophy and the higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology. With the Humboldtian university reform in 1810, the university increasingly became a site of scientific research. This process went hand in hand with a specialization of the sciences in different disciplines with their own journals and associations, and the professionalization of hitherto technical jobs such as engineering. Walter Rüegg, ed., *A History of the University in Europe. Volume 3: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


4 Ibid., 89.


8 Ibid., 13–14.

9 Ibid., 14.

10 Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino*, 62.


12 Ibid., 190.


16 Ibid., 158. Similarly, while the Earth itself cannot be brought into the lab, the requirement that the geologist will have to meet is of a different kind and can be met, for instance, by relying on the analysis of soil samples.


19 Stengers, *La Vierge et le Neutrino*, 68.

20 Ibid., 67.

21 Ibid., 167.

22 Ibid., 187–8.

23 Ibid., 78: “Comment apprendre du nouveau?”

24 Ibid., 78–9.

Invoking the concept of learning in educational discussions means to take a risk. Two reasons can be discerned why it involves a risk. First, formulating critiques of the concept of learning and how it is deployed within policy discourses has become quite a successful recipe within the field of educational theory. It has been argued, for instance, that too strong of a focus on the concept of learning limits our understanding of educational phenomena to only include the individual acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competencies, thereby forgetting about the educational role of the teacher or the importance of the subject matter. Moreover, educational theorists have argued that the focus on learning plays into the hands of neoliberal policies that seek to transform societal issues (e.g., unemployment) into individual problems (e.g., employability). In that sense, the concept of learning seems to have been instrumentalized for political or economic aims. The second reason why using the concept of learning seems to imply a risk concerns not so much its narrowing down within political or economic discourses, but rather its widening up in philosophical arguments. In an analysis of the relations between philosophy and education, Masschelein and Simons argue that in the work of what they call the learning philosophers—the examples given include Latour ("learning curves"), Habermas ("learning processes"), and Sloterdijk ("learning")—the concept of learning is stretched to the extent that it merely denotes processes of change or transformation in a very general sense. They claim that it has lost its precise educational meaning when it starts to denote only change or transformation. In this case, the concept of learning seems to be instrumentalized for the social, political, or ethical project of a particular philosophical theory. As such, learning has become a suspicious concept in the eyes of many philosophers of education. The more it is instrumentalized for sociopolitical purposes (cf. the learning society), the more eager philosophers of education have been to do away with it. However, learning seems to be an important concept for Stengers (apprendre, apprentissage), although again, it runs the risk to become a notion that is too general and hence to lose its educational meaning (in that sense Stengers could perhaps be called a “learning philosopher”). Nevertheless, I believe it is relevant to retain “learning” here. Taking the risk of using the notion might provide an interesting opportunity to reclaim learning, given the damages done due to its instrumentalization in policy discourse. In opting for this risk, I do not wish to claim that Stengers’ work is educational through and through, just because she uses the concept of learning. Nor do I think that in her work, the concept of learning could be easily exchanged for notions such as change or transformation (although these connotations are present as well). Rather, I will attempt to make the notion of learning interesting again from an educational point of view by conceptualizing it in relation to study. Hence, I will not argue that learning and studying are two altogether different phenomena, nor that they denote the same phenomenon but rather that they require each other. This means that a conception of learning that could be interesting from an
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educational point of view would require including an aspect of study, as well as
that study could benefit from a collaboration with learning in order to become a
transformative world-making process. On the instrumentalization and narrowing
down of learning in neoliberal discourses, see Gert Biesta, Beyond Learning.
Democratic Education for a Human Future (London: Routledge, 2006); Biesta,
“Interrupting the Politics of Learning”; Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein,
“The Governmentalization of Learning and the Assemblage of a Learning
philosophical arguments, see Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, “Educational
theorists,” in Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, ed. Michael Peters
(Rotterdam: Springer, 2016), 687–93. For another way of drawing the relationship
between studying and learning, see Derek Ford, “A Pedagogy for Space: Teaching,
Learning, and Studying in the Baltimore Rebellion,” Policy Futures in Education 14,
o. 2 (2016): 176–93; Weili Zhao, “Daoist Onto-un-learning as a Radical Form of
Study: Re-Imagining Study and Learning from an Eastern Perspective,” Studies in

27 On the relation between universitas and studium, see Jürgen Miethke, “Universitas
und Studium: Zu den Verfassungsstrukturen Mittelalterlichen Universitäten,”

28 Jan Masschelein, “Some Notes on the University as Studium: A Place of Collective
Public Study,” in Reconceptualizing Study in Educational Discourse and Practice, ed.

29 Lewis, On Study, 44–5; Tyson Lewis, “The Fundamental Ontology of Study,”
Educational Theory 64, no. 2 (2014): 166.

30 Masschelein and Simons, “From Active Citizenship to World Citizenship,” 243–4;

31 Meyerhoff, Beyond Education, 164.

32 Ford, Communist Study, 45.

33 Ibid., 115.

34 Eli Meyerhoff and Fern Thompsett, “Decolonizing Study: Free Universities in
More-than-Humanist Accompliceships with Indigenous Movements,” The Journal
of Environmental Education 48, no. 4 (2017): 240,


36 Tyson Lewis, “Study: An Example of Potentialism,” in Reconceptualizing Study in
Educational Discourse and Practice, ed. Claudia Ruitenberg (London: Routledge,
2017), 14.

37 Erin Dyke and Eli Meyerhoff, “Toward an Anti- and Alter-University: Thriving in
the Mess of Studying, Organizing, and Relating with ExCo of the Twin Cities,” in
Out of the Ruins. The Emergence of Radical Informal Learning Spaces, ed. Robert
Haworth and John Elmore (Oakland: PM Press, 2017), 174–93; Meyerhoff, Beyond
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Education, 163–98; A similar idea is present in the notion of “commonness against” in the work of Ford: Ford, Communist Study, 45.

38 Harney and Moten, The Undercommons, 18–19.


42 Lewis, On Study, 151–60.


45 Harney and Moten, The Undercommons, 67–8.

Chapter 4

1 For the analysis of Campus in Camps, I have worked with two types of sources. First, there are the texts written by the initiators, Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal, and by close collaborators such as Eyal Weizman and Bianca Elzenbaumer. These texts were essential to obtain a general idea about the vision and activities of Campus in Camps. They have, however, only played a marginal role in the analysis, as they merely provide a general account of what happens. To acquire a more detailed understanding of their work, I have consulted the publications that participants contributed to during their activities. These were collected in The Collective Dictionary and The Initiatives. Whereas the first series deals with different notions participants deem relevant to understand the camp condition, the second series presents a variety of concrete actions they have undertaken in investigating the camp and effectuating social and spatial interventions. These series contain reflections, reports of discussions, photographs, and maps that have been generated
in the course of the first two years of the program. It is mainly on the accounts in these two series that I have based the analysis.


4 Because of this ambiguity, and its frequent use in critical theories, the term decolonization has become rather slippery. Tuck and Yang, for instance, have argued that due to the easy adoption of the concept and tactic of decolonization within educational discourses and practices (e.g., the increasing number of calls to decolonize schools, curriculum, methodology), the notion has become a metaphor that makes it possible to produce agreement between often contradictory decolonial strategies and objectives. Therefore, it risks hollowing out radical anti-colonial critiques and becoming “an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation.” Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 7.


6 Before analyzing the study practice of Campus in Camps, the sources for the current and the next chapter will be situated in the temporal structure of the program. According to Bianca Elzenbaumer, who participated as a project activator, the program, once it took off, had four phases. The first eight months of the program were dedicated to a process they called unlearning. This phase involved a series of seminars in which participants questioned the concepts they used
to understand their lives with, from the standpoint of everyday experiences. A common thread in the discussions was the need for new narratives about the camp that make it possible to notice the inventive ways of self-organization and political practice that take place. In a second phase, six project activators joined the group that would help the participants in giving concrete shape to the social and spatial interventions in the camp they intended to perform. The challenge at this point was to combine the speculative-conceptual work done during the seminars with concrete actions. A major problem which they soon encountered was that most of the project proposals either were still heavily informed by the interests of international aid agencies (e.g., the proposal for roof gardens by someone who had no interest in gardening), or were almost purely imaginative and unattainable (e.g., the proposal to set up a water park). Confronted with this situation, they decided to delay the formulation of project proposals, and instead focus more on the language. This hesitation announced the coming into being of the third phase in which they created The Collective Dictionary. This phase, however, was not only characterized by an increased focus on language through the elaboration of a shared vocabulary, but also by a shift in pedagogical approach. The first two phases mainly consisted of discussions and seminars within the four white walls of the Al-Feniq Cultural Center. In the third phase, they decided to go outside and started to walk through the camps while discussing, observing, mapping, taking photographs, and thinking about new concepts. These attempts to situate their thinking by concrete situations encountered in the camps resulted in a series of publications on concepts, The Collective Dictionary. Lastly, in the fourth phase, the project activators gradually withdrew, leaving the participants space to develop their own project proposals, which this time were more grounded in the reality of the camp that they had studied in the previous phase. Reports on different project proposals can be read in The Initiatives, which will be discussed in the fourth section. On the temporal structure of the program, see Elzenbaumer, “Speculating with Care.” On the process of unlearning, see Silvia Franceschini and Luca Guerrini, “Campus in Camps. Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of Un-Learning,” Revisiones, no. 7 (2017). On The Collective Dictionary, see Ilana Feldman, “Reaction, Experimentation, and Refusal.”

The educational philosophy that informed this practice came from Munir Fasheh, a Palestinian mathematician and pedagogue, who worked together with Campus in Camps. Taking issue with the colonial knowledge that is detached from but imposed on people, he emphasizes the importance of knowledge that is grounded in personal experiences people have with the world. See Munir Fasheh, “Community Education: To Reclaim and Transform What Has Been Made Invisible,” Harvard Educational Review 60, no. 1 (1990): 19–35.

9 On the notion of common, the studiers prepared two booklets that both deal with this notion from another angle. Whereas *Common*, mainly discusses the importance of practices of care for preserving the commons as commons, *Common*, relates the notion of the commons with the right of return in order to rethink the Palestinian struggle.

10 *Vision*, 47.

11 *Vision*, 54.

12 *Citizenship*, 36.

13 *Knowledge*, 28.

14 *Common*, 43.

15 *Participation*, 23.

16 *Knowledge*, 18.

17 *Ownership*, 15.


19 *Participation*, 28.

20 *Campus in Camps*, 45–63.

21 *The Garden*, 50–1.

22 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

23 *The Square*, 17.

24 *The Pool*, 40. The stakes of *The Stadium* are similar. The intervention on this site included fieldwork in order to explore how it is used. Here, however, no specific interventions or proposals for reuse or redesign were being made. See *The Stadium*.

25 *The Unbuilt*, 35.

26 *The Bridge*, 27.

27 Ibid., 66.

28 *The Suburb*, 72–3.

29 *The Municipality*, 59.

30 *The Pathways*, 15–16.

31 *Relation*, 37.

32 *Common*, 17–18.


34 Feldman, “Reaction, Experimentation, and Refusal,” 421.
Chapter 5

1 Think, for instance, of how the obligation posed by the solar neutrino particle requires the physicist to construct an experimental situation in a laboratory, whereas the obligation posed by the Earth to the geologist corresponds to different requirements because indeed the Earth itself cannot be brought into the laboratory and, hence, requires another way of approaching it.


4 Knowledge, 22–6.

5 There is a shift here from the more commonsensical notion of concept as it is used to describe what is contained in *the Collective Dictionary*, to the more technical term of abstraction that plays an essential role in the philosophy of Whitehead. Whereas all concepts are abstractions, not every abstraction is a concept. Concepts are hence a subset of the set of abstractions; more specifically, they denote those abstractions that can be put into words and, hence, communicated. The example of the bird further on in this paragraph would be an example of an experience of which there is abstraction (one can recognize the singing of the bird), but no concept (although one can recognize it, it cannot be put in words).


8 In the context of the Palestinian camps, anthropologists have, on many occasions, argued that it is of great importance which notions are used to describe situations since they play an essential role in the shaping of public perceptions and humanitarian policies. See Ilana Feldman, “The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine Refugee,’” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 387–406; Julie Peteet, “Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine-Israel Conflict,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 153–72.


11 Ibid., 169.

Notes

13 Common, 18–27.
14 Ibid., 28–39.
17 The Municipality, 24–5.
18 The Unbuilt, 22.
20 Ingold, Being Alive, 70.
22 Ingold, Being Alive, 129.


Agamben, *The Use of Bodies*, 87.


Chapter 6


4 Ibid., 9–10; see Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*.

5 Ibid., 10.

6 Ibid., 10: “S’il ne se pose pas comme arbitre, jugeant et excluant, la question de la divergence peut devenir matière à préoccupation collective, c’est-à-dire devenir une dimension de ce que, avec Whitehead, on peut appeler le sens commun.”


12 Stengers, *Thinking with Whitehead*, 516.

13 Savransky, *The Adventure of Relevance*, 211.


From a historical point of view, Pierre Hadot has made a similar remark by claiming that the exercises of the self that Foucault discusses always imply an insertion of the self in a social or even cosmic order, and that they hence are never purely exercises of the self on the self: “In my view, the feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element: belonging, that is, both to the whole constituted by the human community, and to that constituted by the cosmic whole.” Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 208.


17 Ibid., 470.


21 Ibid., 11.

22 Ibid., 46.

23 Ibid., 47.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 11.

28 Ibid., 11–12.

29 Ibid., 12.

30 Stengers, *Civiliser la Modernité?* 123: “La possibilité qu’une amarante devienne tolérante au Roundup correspond donc à une ‘adaptation’ dont sa population a été
capable lorsque le milieu est devenu létal. La science made in Montsanto a négligé ce dont la visée de survivre rendait capable le peuple des amarantes.”


33 Stengers, Réactiver le Sens Commun, 192–3.

34 Beth Dempster in Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 33.


36 Whitehead has called this separation of fact and value, of objectivity and subjectivity the bifurcation of nature in primary and secondary qualities, where primary qualities are believed to reside in things themselves, and secondary qualities only exist due to our perception of things (e.g., sound, smell, color). It is no coincidence that he pointed in the direction of not only Newton and Hume, but also Kant, whose critical project aimed to delimit the terrain of Reason (including its laws concerning how something can be known) from the terrain of belief. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, 30; Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 231–2; Bruno Latour, What Is the Style of Matters of Concern (Asse: Van Gorcum, 2008), 10–11.

37 Ibid., 39.


39 Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care. Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 42.


41 Puig de la Bellacasa, Matters of Care, 60.

42 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 338.


Chapter 7

1 Stengers, “The Cosmopolitical Proposal,” 1002.

2 See Vision.
3 Stengers and Bordeleau, “The Care of the Possible,” 27.

4 Stengers, Civiliser la Modernité? 45.


9 Stengers, Civiliser la Modernité? 40–1.

10 Ibid., 41.

11 Ibid., 41. “la décision à prendre soit prise, sans que nul ne puisse s’approprier, sans que nul non plus ne puisse garantir qu’elle est la meilleure possible. La décision a reçu ‘ses’ raisons.”

12 Ibid., 51. “La problématisation ne remonte pas vers le plus général mais confère à la situation, toujours telle ou telle situation, le pouvoir de mettre en cause ce qui, pourtant, semble aller de soi.”

13 Ibid., 51. “La question Dic cur hic a pour efficace recherchée de problématiser les raisons générales en faisant importer le ‘ici’—suspens ton action, laisse-toi affecter par le ‘ceci,’ c’est-à-dire par ce monde.”

14 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 78.

15 Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik,” 12–16.

16 Stengers, Civiliser la Modernité? 197: “L’art de l’attention est un art de la voix moyenne, un art tentaculaire car il s’agit de se laisser toucher, et de conférer à ce qui nous touche le pouvoir de nous faire sentir et penser, mais toujours ‘ici’, jamais ‘hors sol’.”

17 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 31.

18 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 171.


20 Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, 10.
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   Relation
   Responsibility
   Sustainability
   Vision
   Well-being

3) The Initiatives
   The Bridge
   The Garden
   The Municipality
   The Pathways
   The Pool
   The Square
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   The Suburbs
   The Unbuilt

All sources can be consulted via: http://www.campusincamps.ps.
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