Contestations of Citizenship, Education, and Democracy in an Era of Global Change

Children and Youth in Diverse International Contexts

Edited by Patricia K. Kubow, Nicole Webster, Krystal Strong and Daniel Miranda
Contestations of Citizenship, Education, and Democracy in an Era of Global Change

Contestations of Citizenship, Education, and Democracy in an Era of Global Change: Children and Youth in Diverse International Contexts considers the shifting social, political, economic, and educational structures shaping contemporary experiences, understandings, and practices of citizenship among children and youth in diverse international contexts. As such, this edited book examines the meaning of citizenship in an era defined by monumental global change. Chapters from across both the Global South and North consider emerging formations of citizenship and citizen identities among children and youth in formal and non-formal education contexts, as well as the social and civic imaginaries and practices to which children and youth engage, both in and outside of schools.

Rich empirical contributions from an international team of contributors call attention to the social, political, economic, and educational structures shaping the ways young people view citizenship and highlight the social and political agency of children and youth amid increasing issues of polarization, climate change, conflict, migration, extremism, and authoritarianism. The book ultimately identifies emergent forms of citizenship developing in formal and non-formal educational contexts, including those that unsettle the nation-state and democracy.

Edited by a team of academics with backgrounds in education, citizenship, and youth studies, this book will appeal to scholars, researchers, and faculty who work across the broader field of youth civic engagement and democracy, as well as international and comparative education and citizenship.

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Comparative and International Education: The Challenges of Citizenship and Youth Voices

This book edited by Patricia K. Kubow, Nicole Webster, Krystal Strong, and Daniel Miranda is solidly located in the multiple interdisciplinary fields, which build the tapestry of international and comparative education as interdisciplinary fields of teaching, research, and practice.

By definition, these multiple fields interrogate reality from diverse viewpoints, theories, and methodologies, helping to shed light on the controversies and insights that emerge in diverse areas of education, public policy, and the like. This book explores the connection between citizenship building and youth voices and social movements through emerging challenges.

Surely the readers of this book would wonder why comparative and international education continues to be relevant today? If there is one process that justified the interest of comparativists are the multiple processes of globalization, what is known as the different weaves of globalization, and by implication neoliberalism, impacting our consciousness as much as it impacts our universities, teaching, research, and political-pedagogical action.

Since comparativists started to focus on this phenomena and its impact in our discipline in the 1990s, we are confronted by an even more complex and conflictive national and international scenario, particularly with a war in Europe, a global crisis of the world system, and raising inflation deeply affecting the cost of commodities. If these problems will not be sufficient, access to basic foods and services are more difficult to obtain with analysts and journalists warning of incoming famines in the poorest areas of the world. It is in this social context that accommodations of the axis of power worldwide, and the presence of authoritarian populist and even neofascist movements further contribute shattering the foundations of liberal democracies.

Scholars in comparative and international education have discussed the dialectics of the global and the local from a planetarian perspective. The construct of dialectics is not only a rhetorical device. The concept speaks to subtle and open, intimate as well as universal processes deeply impacting our lived
experience, the ecology of the social sciences, and certainly the thinking about, and practice of education worldwide.

But how we confront scientifically the challenges of globalization to education and particularly in the constitution of new forms of citizenships? For decades what has predominated is a hegemonic scientific model that could be termed “scientistic.” This model separates culture from knowledge, dissociating also power from human interest. This paradigm of normal science emerges as a powerful and unchallenged principle of social rationalization, which serves only analytical goals, though eventually could be implemented in specific policies. Science seems then narrowly defined as a mixture of positivism and instrumentalism and defended on the grounds of statistical rigor and objectivity. Today, the multiple conspiracies pullulating in the internet and discussions of fake news question the validity of scientific premises, challenging the viability of scientific rationality for social engineering and public policy.

Faced with this new reality, a new research rationality emerges, giving growing importance to phenomenology, dialectics, grounded theory, mixed methods, and several forms of qualitative methods. This background provides new narratives such as eco-pedagogy, post-colonialism, subaltern theories, critical theory, theories of racism, or culturally sensitive pedagogies, to name just a few, which are gaining ground in educational research. No doubt, these new traditions are departing drastically from educational patterns associated with top-down neoliberal models of globalization. This book implements and utilizes some of these perspectives exploring the connections between citizenship building, social movements, and youth voices.

Though public education has been called upon to develop a new labor force to meet the rapidly changing international economic demands, new policy dilemmas emerge, particularly concerning the privatization and decentralization of schools. This movement includes raising educational standards and placing a stronger emphasis on testing and school accountability. Decisions based on economic changes have espoused new visions for school reform in universities as well.

Given these challenges, a new generation of comparative educators have become more knowledgeable in traditional fields such as educational foundations, ethnic, class, race, gender, disability, sexuality, or area studies, but they also need to delve into the new domains of political sociology of education, educational anthropology, political science, and political philosophy. Bringing youth voices from the background to the foreground seems to be a crucial contribution of this book.

Becoming more knowledgeable also means being able to create better connections between facts, data, theory, and methods to seek models of explanation of the dilemmas of comparative education. Such models, theories, and theses can be assessed and evaluated jointly with our students in our classrooms.

The diversity of locations, gender, ethnicities, languages, political-pedagogical commitments, and the plurality of methods and theories employed in
comparative and international education classrooms brought multiple voices and ways of enriching our understanding and how we can change the world. Critical theorists insisted that comparative educators should teach and research to change the world into a better world that is possible.

This book takes seriously one of the key concepts that is akin to Freire’s main teaching: the ontological vocation of humanity based on the role of education. The emergence of post-national citizenships questions the principles and values as well as the rights and responsibilities in which national citizenships were founded. Does this new reality reflect a crisis of classic liberalism and particularly of its neoliberal decline in the face of new challenges of globalization and diversity? Multiculturalism, one of the answers to the dilemmas of citizenship and diversity, shows signs of crises in many national contexts confronting the premises of identity and citizenship.

Concepts such as cosmopolitan democracy and global citizenship education have been invoked as solutions to the possible demise of the regulatory power of the nation-state and failed citizenship worldwide. The implementation of the Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) in 2012 by the UN Secretary Ban-Ki Moon and, afterward, the Sustainable Development Goals promulgated by the United Nations in 2015 set the tone for this conversation on global citizenship and its impact on national citizenship and sustainability.

As the editors Kubow, Webster, Strong, and Miranda tell us: “Valuing youth voice in this book has also meant exploring new methodological approaches and representational politics in our engagements with children and youth. As youth around the world powerfully articulate their own ideas and visions for the future through youth-generated media content, digitally-activated movements, community-based organizations, and myriad forms of grassroots leadership, as a field, we are called to center youth not merely as research subjects but also as interlocutors and collaborators.”

Any critical theorist will wholeheartedly agree with these premises, and particularly with the findings of these multiple case studies and theory-driven research that “youth interconnectedness and mobilization around concerns of a global nature reveal a moral impetus to address social ills from new spaces and places and citizen diasporic identities encompassing race, ethnicity, class, gender, and migration” in the face of new tensions and challenges, which Kubow, Webster, Strong, and Miranda identify in terms of the following: fluidity and hybridity, interconnectedness and belonging, identities and identifications, diverse theoretical and philosophical traditions, empowerment and engagement, agency and activism, globals (in the plural), contestations, value convergences and divergences, justice-oriented ideologies, and pedagogies.

Focusing on these ten critical tensions and new directions of our contemporary world should mark the future of comparative education but also social sciences in the next quarter of a century. We shall be grateful to the editors and the authors of this book for bringing to the forefront the voices of youth and youth movements and highlighting some of the crucial areas for further scientific and political contributions.
We should embrace all of those engaged in serious contributions to international and comparative education, particularly those concerned with the question of global citizenship education, youth movements, and voices, and wish you all the best in your work saying with the poet Walt Whitman in *Song of Myself*:

Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the origin of all poems . . .

You shall listen to all sides and filter them for yourself.

Carlos Alberto Torres
1 Contestations of Citizenship

An Introduction

Patricia K. Kubow, Nicole Webster, Krystal Strong, and Daniel Miranda

Introduction

The intent of this book, *Contestations of Citizenship, Education, and Democracy in an Era of Global Change: Children and Youth in Diverse International Contexts*, is to bring the lived experiences of youth into dialogue with dominant and non-dominant discourses of citizenship and citizenship education. The book explores the ways in which citizenship has been framed in various international locales and how youth perceive citizenship norms and civic practices in the Global South and North, offering opportunities to critique and contest binary conceptions of citizenship (e.g., national/international, local/global, private/public, and individual/societal). By interrogating “the national,” this text unsettles the taken-for-granted concepts of democracy and the nation-state by framing citizenship in light of youth experience and perspective with and beyond the global hegemon. Living in an era defined by major global change necessitates greater attention in the field of comparative and international education toward citizen knowledges, identities, and practices of youth. The chapters probe the local/global current in our field and suggest emergent framings of citizenship and citizenship education informed by youth views about the complex conditions and forces influencing their experiences inside and outside schools. Key questions addressed in this text include: How is “the global” being framed in light of recent events in our world? What do the perceptions and concerns of youth suggest about the kind of citizenship education to be promoted in formal and non-formal educational spaces? And, how can this knowledge gained from studies of youth inform future directions for comparative studies of citizenship and education?

This book interrogates and contests citizenship’s traditional framings by ascertaining international youth perspectives. The editors and contributing authors are comparative and international educators who have conducted research studies of citizenship and youth in formal and informal education spaces in the Global South and North. The studies of youth in these chapters unsettle the nation-state and traditional approaches to citizenship, while also challenging existing constructions of citizenship. It is apparent that the meanings of citizenship are changing for youth amid monumental global changes.
brought about by the intersection of social, political, economic, technological, and cultural forces. These powers are shaping contemporary experiences, understandings, and practices of citizenship among youth in a myriad of geographic locales, which are addressed in this text: Africa (Liberia and Nigeria); Asia (Taiwan SAR, Hong Kong SAR, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea); Australia; Europe (Flemish-speaking Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, and the North Rhine Westphalia region in Germany); Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru); and North America (Canada and the US). Readers are asked to consider how citizen identity, positioning, and narrative translate into citizenship educational practice.

The overarching question explored is: What kinds of citizenship are youth in diverse locales resisting and toward what conceptions of citizenship are they supporting? The research studies and analyses undertaken with youth populations in the Global South and North highlight the rigidity of schools as institutions that are slow to change, but that hold possibilities for offering a citizenship education that can help students critique and address global challenges. The text considers the ways in which youth—through a combination of global and local influences—are being summoned to particular social and civic imaginaries and practices for which they resist and engage. This text calls attention to the social and political agency of youth in the midst of rising popular struggles around economic polarization, climate change, conflict, migration, displacement, and a rise in xenophobia, extremism, and authoritarianism worldwide. To understand the challenges youth face as they develop their citizen identities in a global era, the book interrogates notions of “good” citizenship and the ways youth navigate, mediate, and resist the kinds of citizen identities promoted by their respective nation-states. The overall purpose is to uncover the ways diverse populations of youth view citizenship and civic identity in light of globalizing forces. In essence, the book is a conceptual turn toward a theory of youth voice to inform dominant discourses on citizenship and citizenship education. It is a call for a theory of youth voice to inform citizenship and citizenship education discourse in the field of comparative and international education.

**Framing the global**

We are, indisputably, in an era of global change that has been shaped by, and will shape, generations of children and youth to come. Multiple social, political, and economic developments of the past decade have profoundly shifted the current conditions and future possibilities of younger generations. The 2010s began in the shadows of the Great Recession, followed by the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression, and ended with the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered an even worse financial crisis for global economies. For countries of the Global North and South, alike, these economic crises...
have resulted in historic unemployment rates, diminished job prospects for young people, historically high levels of educational debt, and rising economic inequality for more than 70% of the world’s population (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020). The past decade has also been the hottest on record, signaling the intensification of the global climate crisis, which has contributed to an increasing frequency of catastrophic natural disasters that experts predict will lead to “irreversible loss and damage” for children and youth, especially in the Global South (Menke & Schleussner, 2019). With the surge in authoritarian, populist, and nationalist governments and popular movements in the same time period, political analysts have declared that “democracy is in retreat” around the world, strengthening political polarization, fueling state conflict, and seemingly rolling back the wave of “democratization” brought on by the end of the Cold War (Freedom House, 2019).

Due in part to these economic, environmental, and political conditions, the number of people forcibly displaced from their homes has doubled since 2010 to the highest figure recorded by the United Nations since World War II. There are currently more than 70 million people displaced worldwide (UNHCR, 2020). More than half of the world’s refugee population (Oxfam International, 2021), and one out of every eight international migrants, is a child, who is five times more likely to lack educational access (UNICEF, n.d.). For instance, in the first month of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, UNICEF reported that 4.3 million Ukrainian children have been displaced, which is more than half of the country’s estimated 7.5 million child population (NPR, 2022). Thus, the impacts of conflict, international migration and displacement, hostile immigration policies, trafficking, and health pandemics are the backdrop necessitating an urgent reexamination and reframing of citizenship and citizenship education.

While these conditions have created unprecedented constraints on the possibilities for global children and youth, they have also created openings through which youth, by necessity, have exercised their power in advocating for and demanding better conditions to survive and thrive. After years of research and policy that characterized global youth as “disengaged” (Delli Carpini, 2000), often blaming the effects of media and the Internet on this supposed lack of youth political engagement, youth have taken up leadership at the forefront of social movements, turning increasingly to protest and other forms of digitally mediated participatory politics (Cohen et al., 2012; Dalton, 2015). To illustrate, in The Time of Youth, Alcinda Honwana (2012) describes the “rising up” of children and youth today as “cries for freedom by a generation yearning to make a place for itself in the world” (p. 3). Though much of the scholarship and media coverage of youth activism and advocacy of the 2010s has tended to center the Global North, youth around the world have created the largest wave of youth-led activism since the global rebellions and cultural revolution of 1968. Many of these movements have a national and a regional character. The 2011 Tunisian revolution beginning with the self-immolation
of Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed street vendor, catalyzed youth uprisings for regime change that spread across the Arab world, including Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and Libya.

Movements for regime change targeting long-term leaders have similarly formed in 25 African countries over the past decade. The May 2011 Los Indignados (The Indignant Ones) Movement that took hold in Spain, after government cuts to public services, would be the first in a wave of anti-austerity protests led by youth taking aim at the dire economic prospects for youth, including Occupy Wall Street in the US and in nations across Europe. Other movements with a global reach have produced new models of youth organizing. Black Lives Matter in the US, which formed in response to extrajudicial police killings of Black people, has influenced subsequent movements around state violence in Nigeria, Brazil, and India, among others, and typifies the way social media has become central to youth activism online and offline. The international School Strike for Climate or Fridays for Future Movement, which at its peak in September 2019, galvanized an estimated four million students in strike actions in more than 150 countries, is the most widespread organized student movement in a decade that has seen a resurgence of student activism around the world on educational funding, democracy, racial justice, and educational inequality.

The increase in mass mobilizations around the world and the active participation of young people in them highlight the changes in the relationship of the younger generations with politics, on the one hand, and the implicit interconnection between mobilization actions in different parts of the world, on the other. Between 2009 and 2019, mass mobilizations increased in all regions of the world by around 20% (Brannen et al., 2020). In these, both university and high school students have made protest actions more frequent and more visible (Bissant et al., 2021) in different parts of the world (Lai & Sing, 2021; Lertchoosakul, 2021; Shek, 2020). These mobilizations carry an implicit tension. They respond to problems of a local nature as well as circumscribe aspects of global influence. The type of protest actions, the forms of coordination using virtual media, or specific symbolism can be observed in the different countries where mobilizations take place. For instance, in Latin America, during the second part of 2019, there were a series of massive protest events in countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador (Busso & Messina, 2020), with a significant presence of high school students (Rice, 2020; Tapia et al., 2021). Characteristics such as the absence of leaders to lead the protests, the use of digital media to spread actions, the use of concepts such as “the front line,” or the use of artistic expressions as a means of protest were seen before and after in multiple protest events (Lai & Sing, 2021). This phenomenon of influence in protest actions is not necessarily new, but it occurs with a different speed that this global era allows.

These movements invite scholars and practitioners, especially comparative educators, to take more seriously the agency of children and youth, and to reject long-held views and frameworks that suggest that young people have
become “apathetic” or were ever apathetic about their futures. This is the first generation that expects to be worse off than their parents. As Earl et al. (2017) argue, “[Y]oung people’s move toward protest instead of institutional political activity, like voting and working through political parties, results from changing dispositions about the meaning of citizenship” (p. 6). What does it mean to come of age under these circumstances? What does it mean to develop a sense of belonging (or not) and to what do young people seek to belong? This edited book examines the meaning of citizenship in light of the shifting social, political, economic, and educational structures that shape contemporary experiences, understandings, and practices of citizenship among children and youth in diverse international contexts. The contributions in this book call attention to the social and political agency of children and youth in the midst of rising popular struggles worldwide. In this introduction, we trace the state of our field and the way the field is shifting (or needs to shift) to be aligned with youth, citizenship, democracy, and education in this moment of monumental global change.

Framing youth

Society must strive more than ever to defend democratic governance and tackle sustainable development difficulties entrenched in structural inequality and exclusion as the globe starts the long and arduous process of recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and other social ills facing societies. Given that young people are disproportionately harmed and have the most significant stake in the outcome, their engagement and inclusion in politics and the social fabric of their cultures are critical. Modern youth struggle to achieve social and economic milestones associated with maturity, such as graduating from high school and being financially self-sufficient, among other things. They must also deal with complicated global issues such as climate change and increasing political division. Even though there are more impediments than ever before for young people, they are taking action and inventing new methods to question the status quo and demand responsibility of policymakers to not only take action but also invent new disciplinary tactics and demands to change the status quo. As a result of rising disillusionment and mistrust, young people are finding ways to respond to the multiple social, political, and economic injustices they are facing. Their nuanced actions are reframing new ways of thinking and contextualizing citizenship and aid in ushering in a new school of thought about youth civic participation on a global scale (Webster et al., 2020).

Worldwide, young people are at a crossroads as they face a variety of complex concerns, ranging from environmental degradation to rising gender inequalities to basic insecurity (Bersaglio et al., 2015; Orekhovskaya et al., 2018; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2018). They must also struggle with established political and civic powerholders who are often unreachable, unresponsive, and corrupt at the same time, while their socioeconomic options become more
constrained. Despite their excitement about the future, today’s young people are being left behind; they constitute the most significant proportion of the worldwide jobless or underemployed population. Disenchanted with traditional political institutions and procedures, youth are seeking to address these issues through effective means that create effective change.

Even though many adults regard young people as apathetic and incapable, youth civic participation is increasing in many countries, with young people expressing hope for the possibility of bringing about positive social change and the ability to influence the direction in which their countries are headed. The most significant demonstrations of the 21st century have been fueled by diverse groups of young people calling for a more fair, egalitarian, and sustainable future for everyone. Protests against long-standing economic inequality in Chile, corruption in Lebanon, police brutality in Nigeria, gender inequality and limits on reproductive freedom in Poland, and restricted economic possibilities in Tunisia are just a few examples of what is happening throughout the world. Young women activists play significant leadership roles throughout these uprisings and other movements, although they face impediments to participation and ingrained gender norms. Thousands of women are demonstrating globally against governments and patriarchal societies, questioning long-held beliefs about women’s involvement in political life. People under 30 years of age are ready and eager to act and take the initiative to make substantial changes in society. Still, they are less likely to participate in politics via established channels of involvement or with decision-makers who are hesitant to recognize and embrace their contributions. Issues of disengagement are even more salient among youth in conflict-ridden areas across the globe.

It is well-known that children raised in conflictual settings face several barriers during the course of their development. There is clear evidence of the long-lasting effects of collective violence among survivors and subsequent generations. Given the importance of identity development for youth, it is hardly surprising that identification is associated with a wide range of negative and positive outcomes for youth growing up in conflict settings. Understanding identity processes is critical in such environments because conflicts are often due to, and maintained by, competing social identities.

Across a wide range of conflict settings, youth social identity has been examined in relation to a host of other processes. For example, a strong sense of social identity is associated with a sense of solidarity, particularly during social change, and a motivating factor for engaging in such change processes, particularly among minority youth. Moreover, evidence shows that social identity can be a protective factor for youth (Kubow, 2019). A strong sense of identity buffers youth exposed to violence, while a weaker identity among youth leaves them vulnerable to such exposure (Le & Stockdale, 2008; Merrilees et al., 2013). A strong sense of social identity has also been found to protect adolescents from developing more significant depressive symptoms. It exacerbates aggression against the out-group over time. The trajectories of the strength of social identity have also been shown to vary based on group status (Reidy
et al., 2015). The development or maturation in the strength of social identity has also been related to lower levels of insecurity in the community or feeling threatened by out-group members (Reidy et al., 2015). These studies suggest that understanding the role of social identity during adolescence is an essential factor in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Young people hold the promise for the future through their energy, idealism, passion, optimism, and ability to come up with new ideas. While their efforts are often undervalued and primarily go unrecognized, many young people outside the media’s spotlight have become embodiments of commitment, resilience, community service, accountability, and trust. What is clear is that if humanity is to tackle society’s most complex challenges effectively, we must help inculcate such values in the next generations of youth. Globally, young people understand the value of mobilizing to the call for social change. Youth’s public interest in civic engagement is grounded in actions, such as walkouts and mass protests, to address issues such as repression, poor governance, corruption, and unemployment. The momentum built by these types of actions eventually contributes toward a change or movement in systems which impact young people. Youth continue to play an essential role in national and transnational political discourse. Their core values largely depend on whether they can effectively harness their idealism to help change the world.

Unfortunately, young people today are mainly understood as disengaged citizens. Current ideologies only emphasize public actions that imply government as being at the center of politics, and other social group institutions as the foundations of civic life (Bennett, 2008). These are primarily adult-centric definitions, which distort the image of young people and reinforce hegemonic ideas about their marginal status (Farthing, 2010). These adult-centric definitions of citizenship are also deeply ingrained in a young person’s education. Kennelly and Llewellyn (2011) describe how Canadian citizenship education in formal schooling is highly neoliberal, focusing on economic freedom from state interference and political individualism. Other scholars argue that youth participation and the meanings they ascribe to citizenship are constantly changing (Youniss et al., 2002) and are driven by the shifting political (Aniywo et al., 2020; Llewellyn et al., 2010; Weiss, 2020), gender (Cicognani et al., 2012; Gaby, 2017), and cultural landscapes in societies (Kennelly, 2009). Citizenship is often defined by compliant behavior and makes a distinction between legitimate forms of citizenship and perceived illegitimate forms employed by activists. This framing of citizenship only affirms the passive messages about the “good” young citizen and disregards how the decline in traditional modes of engagement is offset by extra-institutional activities, such as boycotts, demonstrations, and petitions (Webster et al., 2020). Undermining the legitimacy of these new forms of citizenship is another way of upholding the status quo and silencing the voices of young people (Farthing, 2010). The citizenship and rights discourse provides important context about the competing forms of democratic participation between youth and adults. Understanding youth citizenship participation from this perspective will help navigate discussions
that address the supposed illegitimacy of youth forms of civic engagement and explore the power imbalances embedded in this conflict.

As children enter what could be called adult-defined environments of engagement, due to societal tensions, they find themselves organizing through various platforms. Moving from physical to cyberspaces manifested by social media, children are constantly creating a new narrative of citizenship. The actualizing of citizenship through multiple formats creates a discourse that young people can co-create new forms of civic engagement. Their ability to co-construct actions and ideologies toward democracy seems to challenge some existing beliefs that youth are unable to be fully vested as developers of constructive citizenship. For example, Webster et al. (2020) discuss how conventional practices and beliefs held about youth-led engagement efforts are attempting to acknowledge the legitimacy of youth civic engagement actions. Their work reiterates youth’s potential to create models of action to support civic efforts in their communities. In essence, youth are actualizing their citizenship participation in critical ways that begins to address democracy and freedom with more nuanced behaviors and beliefs. Kubow’s (2019) work with Jordanian and Syrian urban youth, for instance, reveals how social ontologies of citizen identity among youth are informed by a complex array of identity markers, including nationality, religion, culture, ethnicity, gender, and their developmental stage. Research with Xhosa youth in South Africa also reinforces that a host of identity markers—encompassing more than political and economic considerations alone—are important to youth and must be considered in conceptualizing citizenship and citizenship education (Kubow & Berlin, 2013; Kubow & Ulm, 2015).

Amid cultural diversity and globalization, social change is pushing our concept of citizenship in new directions, including the expansion of information and knowledge through new forms of knowledge creation, much of which is being developed by young people around the globe. Increasing multidirectional movements of people, environmental degradation related to climate change, and the consolidation of international governance bodies have all had an impact on how citizens, particularly youth, relate to their societies. These multiple processes of economic, technological, environmental, social, and political change contribute to the expansion of citizenship worldwide due to their rapid pace, interdependence, and complexity. As societies and cultures become more internationalized and multicultural, attention must be given to the ways young people are introduced to new opportunities to conceptualize citizenship within and beyond the borders of nation-states. Cultural diversity and hybridity must also be considered in youth citizen identity formation and conceptions of citizenship.

Due to the rising complexity of social and political landscapes of communities, there is an emergence of tensions and contestations in post-national societies. These challenges have given rise to new forms of social mobilization and links to transnational movements and the activism of young people. These forms of transnational activism are inextricably linked to social communities
and the emergence of post-national conceptions of citizenship. In light of these transformations, it is essential that we keep in mind that citizenship takes place in a variety of contexts and is informed by the lived experiences of citizens. We see an increasingly interconnected view of citizenship as global thought expands and the meaning of citizenship is redefined. There are direct and indirect links between youth and civic action within their communities and the countries where they reside, which advances the meaning of civic engagement at a broader level. When citizenship is viewed from this perspective, it takes a cosmopolitan perspective, as it acknowledges the challenges involved in creating a more just society and recognizes the complexities, conflicts, and contexts in which youth on a global scale find themselves.

**Framing citizenship**

To locate conceptions of the “citizen” in larger debates about the meanings and processes of citizenship, it is useful to explore some dominant and non-dominant citizenship discourses. Discourse, understood as a body of rules and practices that govern conceptual meanings (Foucault, 1972), appropriates certain ideologies that guide people’s understandings of their place in the social world (Hall, 1986). Discourse about citizenship, and educating for citizenship, are primary ways in which citizenship ideology is produced, reproduced, and circulated (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006). Not natural or neutral, democratic citizenship is shaped by political interests and visions of what the role of the nation-state should be. Kubow (2010) discusses how the dominant discourses of citizenship have been informed largely by Western traditions and located within the imaginary of the nation-state, or what Benedict Anderson (1991) has described as “imagined communities.” Citizenship implies membership in a community (legal status) and an identity (social belonging). Citizenship confers membership, identity, values, participation rights, and common political knowledge (Enslin, 2000), while belonging promotes social or community cohesion. Citizens have been considered to be made or born (Heater, 1999). Citizenship, therefore, has been connected to a location (territory, land, or residence) (Isin, 2009) or acquired through inheritance (one acquires the citizenship of one’s parent at birth) (Heater, 1999). Because equality and freedom are intimately related to constructions of citizenship, how the nation-state balances “cultural demands for differentiation and citizenship demands for integration,” while also maintaining moral and political integrity, is a chief concern (Heater, 1999, p. 115).

Liberal and civic republican traditions have long framed citizenship in the West (Heater, 1999), with democratic participation and individual rights as prominent threads anchoring dominant citizenship discourses (Arneil, 2006). British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1998) identified three categories of citizenship in relation to individual rights, namely civil citizenship (right to speech, property, and equality before the law), political citizenship (right to participate in political processes, often through elected representatives),
and social citizenship (right to general economic well-being and security). Conceptions of the “good” citizen have guided models of citizenship education based on personal responsibility, participation, and justice-orientation (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). However, youth are seldom exposed to a justice-oriented citizenship in formal educational institutions due to its critical emphasis on exploring the root causes of injustice and bringing about social change through democratic social movements. Moreover, most conceptions of citizenship from the Western tradition bifurcate the individual and society, meaning that the individual is conceived as being separate from society and must leave the confines of the private space of the home to engage in the work of the public sphere (Kubow, 2007). This has led to a public-private schism in conceptualizations of citizenship and a devaluation of contributions by women, indigenous knowledge systems, and non-Western approaches that can inform citizenship discourses at large (Kubow, 2007).

Western traditions and assumptions have shaped conceptions of citizenship beyond Western borders through global imperialism. Globalization’s influence is manifested in the economic and political sphere, in the rate and reach of knowledge across space and time through digital technologies, in the movement of populations and mingling of cultures and identities, and in peoples’ views, attitudes, and behaviors toward others (Kubow & Fossum, 2007). Globalizing aims may change or solidify youths’ allegiances and affect their views on questions of justice. As a result, national and global identities have competed for attention in and outside of schools around the world. Dominant citizenship discourses shape social identities, although individuals challenge dominant identities through a process of performativity and language, which function as forms of social action (Butler, 1997; Foucault, 1972; Hall, 1986). While world culture theorists conceive of diverse locals integrating into a single “global,” post-colonial theorists warn against globalization’s homogenizing tendencies and advocate for differentiation. The concern among conflict theorists is that a sole vision of global identity is promoted through dominant ideology that preserves existing power relations. As Nelly Stromquist (2009) explains, “citizenship is linked to universalism, as opposed to particularism, and yet the world is far from equal, and many ‘particularistic’ forms of behavior prevail” (p. 23). We advocate for the consideration of different perspectives on the nature of citizenship and guard against any one global identity in a reimagining of citizenship education for youth.

The contestations levied in relation to Western universalism include: the colonization of the mind as a result of European imperialism (wa Thiong’o, 1986); the need for knowledge from the global South (Amin, 2011) to inform citizenship; the appropriation of post-colonial theory to global citizenship education (Andreotti, 2011); and the consideration of democratic citizenship approaches in non-Western contexts (Kovalchuk & Rapoport, 2019). To this list, we add the need for youth perspectives on, and engagement with, citizenship. A decolonization of citizenship and citizenship education requires the deconstruction of values, knowledges, and preferences that derive from a
colonial way of thinking and who can participate. Decolonization necessitates meaningful and active resistance to hegemonic forces that perpetuate the subjugation and exploitation of minds and bodies, including that of youth. Conceptualizing citizenship anew entails refuting the notion of the global citizen as having a view from “nowhere” or “everywhere” and toward understanding their own location in the world and “that this location provides only one of many views of the world and how it does and should work” (Sant et al., 2018, p. 43). Andreotti (2021) asserts that “we need new educational approaches to look at our collective shadows, our complicity in harm, our socially sanctioned ignorances and modern desires that are damaging our relations and the possibilities of life in the planet” (p. 3). We argue, however, for criticality in citizenship discourses and conceptions of global citizenship education in order to guard against any hegemonic, ideological, or physical force that would limit what might be.

Cosmopolitan approaches to citizenship envision an interconnected society unbounded by political territory; however, cosmopolitan theories must wrestle with “whether universalism is benign, beneficial, or a form of hegemony, and how to balance universal principles with the empowerment of diverse groups in society” (Bromley, 2009, p. 34). Cosmopolitanism is fraught with problems, as there is a tendency to reify the global as a preexisting whole and to use the global as a “pervasive totalizing gesture” that makes thinking outside the global impossible (Stäheli, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, cosmopolitanism supports diversity only in relation to its allowance and expansion of individual rights and freedoms (Appiah, 1997; Bromley, 2009; Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995; Sobe, 2009; Todd, 2015). We must be concerned, therefore, with how “schools are situated in, and in relation to, global processes and phenomena” (Sobe, 2016, p. 152). A conception of global citizenship that moves beyond the notions of charity and formal contracts between nations toward global distribution of rights, responsibilities, and resources is needed (Stromquist, 2009). For Abdi (2015), the original works of anti-colonial scholars (e.g., Achebe, 2000, 2009 [1958]; Nyerere, 1968; wa Thion’go, 1986) “should be continually de-shelved and deployed to refute the simplistic characterizations of non-northern spaces (Monga, 1996) and slowly achieve the intentional destination of decolonizing global citizenship education platforms and prospects” (p. 19). Critical global citizenships (plural) and decolonial approaches are necessary to examine how economic agendas and power relations create inequality and oppression within and between countries (Oxley & Morris, 2013; Swanson, 2015).

Assumptions about citizenship have been challenged more recently in relation to distinctions between stable and transitional societies, nationalism (i.e., how nations recreate themselves through reconstructing their histories), and suspension of the left-right binary between socialism and liberalism (Haste, 2004). “Critical and transnational discourses of citizenship raise basic questions about identity (who we are as citizens), membership (who belongs, and the location of the boundaries), and agency (how we might best enact
citizenship)” (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, p. 657). Cultural, feminist, and reconstructionist forms of critical citizenship discourses have examined power relations and centered inclusion and exclusion in the polity (e.g., institution, state, society, and global community) (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006). Culturally-situated approaches and decolonial methodologies applied to citizenship and citizenship education must take center stage in comparative research and involve the study of, and with, youth. Toward that end, it is important, therefore, to consider the ways in which youth engage with citizenship discourses, the spaces and strategies they use to find meaning, and the opportunities they create as actors in their own right to make change.

Challenging citizenship’s assumptions: locale, liberalism, and longevity

Prominent theorizations of citizenship from Western assumptions and traditions have influenced conceptions of citizen, citizenship, and community. Citizenship has been inextricably linked to the nation-state and geographical borders. The notion of citizenship as tied to land and territory has been increasingly challenged by ongoing, large-scale global migration. Families, local communities, and schools have been seen as main areas for the transmission of social and civic values, yet these ideological spaces have come under greater scrutiny for not equipping students with democratic-orientated knowledge and skills. Moreover, relatively little attention has been given in formal citizenship education globally to the new moment in which societies are located and the issues and challenges they are facing (e.g., pollution, natural disasters, pandemics, crime and violence, and deteriorating mental health). What is at stake is the quality of life for people around the world, which raises questions in relation to what kinds of cultural and social transmission should be undertaken to prepare youth for their lives as citizens.

What about citizenship is being contested in this book? We argue that citizenship is much more complex and nuanced than current models of citizenship afford. Three primary assumptions about citizenship are being contested—namely the notions of locale, liberalism, and longevity as being central to citizenship. From the studies of youth and citizenship in this text, there is evidence that the centrality of location, the liberal tradition, and longevity (in terms of the need to be an adult to effect social change) are being challenged. Regarding locale, citizenship has often been linked with national belonging and tied to a particular territory or geographical space. The authors in this book assert that national or territorial belonging to a political community is increasingly insufficient to developing informed understandings in youth regarding international interconnectedness of economic, social, and environmental issues (Davis, 2007; Habermas, 2001). Other spaces for democratic activity and potential should be considered, such as social movements, transnational media, and gathering spots in towns outside of schools. Weakened affiliations with the imagined community of the nation-state have been shown
through protest, confrontation, critical dramatizations, and demands for social change, while schools largely opt for softer forms of civic activity with youth, such as benevolence and local volunteerism. Youth concerns, interests, and citizenship practices are blurring the traditional distinctions between social, civic, and political practices. Online spaces are being used to isolate and exclude, as well as to create belonging, membership, and connection. Thus, the new forms of advocacy, activism, and community building of youth require further exploration.

In addition to locale, the Western liberal tradition’s emphasis on personal responsibility and participation in traditional political structures, such as voting and governance, seem to be giving way to a more justice-oriented view of citizenship. There is a need to recognize the changing global world in which the concept of citizenship has been politically undermined, with the consequent side-lining of egalitarian ideas that would normally provide a unifying bond across diverse populations within countries. Whilst patriotic identities are located in notions of national citizenship, they are not compatible with the hyper-diversity within countries and are instead associated with rising anti-democratic forces, such as authoritarianism, populism, xenophobia, and racism. It is increasingly difficult to combine diversity and citizenship within a nation, especially when the latter is associated with exclusion rather than inclusion. Other philosophical traditions and epistemological stances, for example, from African and Asian contexts, may help to inform and even guide a new kind of citizenship that is evolving and emerging. Culturally situated, decolonial, and culturally relevant approaches to citizenship and citizenship education may hold possibilities for envisioning multidimensional citizenship anew (Kubow et al., 2000) in various spaces and at different levels (i.e., local, national, regional, and international). The African moral ethic of *Ubuntu*, for instance, emphasizes respect and positions the person as a social being who is born into a community and not separate from it (Kubow, 2007, 2018). The desire is to bring to bear in citizenship discourses, conceptualizations, and educational approaches indigenous knowledge systems and non-Western traditions for the purposes of informing comparative citizenship and education studies.

The assumption that age or longevity is necessary for citizenship participation is also called into question. By longevity, we mean that citizenship in an era of global change is not the purview of adults alone or that citizenship activity occurs only when one gets older. Rather, youth are increasingly aware of global issues impacting their daily lives, and they reason that addressing such concerns cannot wait until a later time when they grow up. This urgency or growing concern around global issues may be an indication of youths’ lack of confidence in adults to make the world, as well as their own societies, better for them. Age or longevity, therefore, may not be a barrier to new forms of citizenship engagement, as youth are participating in ways that reinforce a rights orientation and the notion that youth are willing to assume responsibility to effect social change. There is a generational shift occurring that has
implications for educating youth for their lives as citizens. Studies of how social media is providing new ways of social collaboration on global issues of mutual concern are an avenue for further examination in youth citizenship studies.

Young people’s disillusionment with established frameworks of belonging is also undergirded by the devolution of political and economic conditions, which has become characteristic of late capitalism and disproportionately impacts children and youth. Economically uncertain futures are now central to the life prospects of young people around the world (Cole & Durham, 2006). Precarity has emerged as one of the central ways to conceptualize the experiences and vulnerabilities of rising generations of youth. First coming into use in the 1970s among European labor activists to identify post-Fordist trends of contingent, flexible labor practices, the use of the term “precarity” gained renewed salience in the early 2000s to describe a “more general existential state” (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008, p. 52) that impacts not only labor but also sociality and the conditions of life itself. Within these processes, what is sometimes referred to as “the precariat” has emerged as a new framework of political belonging, which describes the structural location of children and youth in our current historical juncture.

Multiple avenues of social change are pushing our concept of citizenship in new directions, including the expansion of information and knowledge through new spaces of knowledge creation. Multidirectional movements of people, environmental degradation, and consolidation of international governance bodies have all been accelerating, impacting how citizens, especially youth, engage in their societies. The internationalization of societies and cultures creates new dynamics beyond state borders, thereby facilitating the creation of places of citizenship beyond the limits of nation-states. And as a result of these transformations, it is essential that we keep in mind that the places and contexts for citizenship are varied and are shaped by the lived experiences of citizens. In light of the expansion of global thought and the meaning of citizenship, we begin to see an increasingly interconnected view of the concept of citizenship. There is a direct and indirect connection between youth and civic action outside of their local communities and the nations in which they live, creating a broader outlook on civic participation and the challenges involved in creating a more just society.

Aims and structure of the book

This edited book, Contestations of Citizenship, Education, and Democracy in an Era of Global Change: Children and Youth in Diverse International Contexts, examines the meaning of citizenship in light of monumental global change shaping contemporary experiences, understandings, and practices of citizenship among children and youth in diverse international contexts. The book calls attention to the social and political agency of children and youth in the midst of rising economic, environmental, and political struggles worldwide.
The chapter contributions from comparative and international education scholars working in the Global South and North explore the emergent formations of citizenship and citizen identity—including those that unsettle the nation-state—among youth in formal and non-formal education contexts. The book seeks to contribute to citizenship studies in the field of comparative and international education by attending to some social imaginaries and civic practices to which youth engage inside and outside of schools. The goal of the text is to understand the challenges children and youth face as they develop their citizenship identities amid difference (e.g., ethnic minority migrants and dominant culture) while interrogating notions of “good citizenship,” exploring transformative citizenship pedagogies, and considering perspectives on global citizenship outside the global hegemon.

The book discusses the myriad ways in which citizenship is being contested, rethought, and redefined by, and for, children and youth amid globalization, conflict migration, and displacement. What is the meaning of citizenship in an era defined by increasing global change? To address this central question, several areas of contestation are examined in this book, namely: the diverse ways in which citizenship is framed; the diverse spaces in which citizenship is being enacted; and the negotiation of citizenship and difference in a global era. The book’s international focus yields insights on citizenship and citizenship education from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, the US, and other locations across the globe. Major thematic areas explored include: citizenship perspectives on the national and the global scale; contemporary youth social movements, new media and digital citizenships as part of the popular turn in global citizenship (education); citizen identity formation and negotiation of difference in diverse contexts; and convergences and divergences among citizenship’s framings, spaces, and interactions among a host of educational actors and stakeholders.

The book is unique in that it centers children and youth perspectives to uncover the ways they view citizenship and civic identity in light of globalizing forces. The main objective is the empowerment of children and youth by coming to understand the challenges they face and the potentialities they offer. We have sought a broad representation of global experiences and disciplinary perspectives in an effort to contribute children and youth views and practices of citizenship to the larger citizenship discourse.

After the introductory chapter (i.e., Chapter 1) by our editorial team (Kubow, Webster, Strong, & Miranda) which serves to frame the text, the book is divided into three parts to investigate the following areas: tensions and expansions in how citizenship is conceptually framed; diverse spatial contexts in which citizenship is enacted; and negotiation of citizenship and difference in this era of global change. The book concludes with the editorial team considering the convergences and divergences among the chapters, identifying key conceptual categories for a critical democratic global citizenship and education, and offering a research agenda to guide future comparative inquiry.
Part I, Contesting Framings of Citizenship: Interrogations of the National and the Global, consists of four chapters. In Chapter 2, authors Cristóbal Villalobos, Diego Carrasco, Catalina Miranda, María Jesús Morel, Ernesto Treviño, and Andrés Sandoval-Hernández explore the (dis)connections between citizenship norms and other citizenship attitudes in young people in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Using the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2016) data, the authors examine how different patterns of civic norms are related to other attitudes, such as multiculturalism, gender equality, patriotism, and respect for democracy. From this framing, the chapter investigates how students in three distinct geographical regions view the “good” citizen amid global challenges such as climate change, social intolerance, and increasing global inequalities. The authors show how civic norms vary significantly between countries, reinforcing the notion that citizenship is constructed contextually and influenced by political, cultural, geographical, and social factors. Villalobos et al. contend that civic norms help us “to understand how individuals position themselves within their societies” and argue that broader interpretive frameworks are needed to allow youth to understand patriotism without denying the necessity of multiculturalism. Their contribution signifies changing trends for civic education in the global era.

Charlene Tan in Chapter 3, from a Daoist perspective, argues for a shared common humanity within an ethics of difference premised on deference and empathy for others. The need to repudiate racism and foster an ethic of respect for all is increasingly necessary in light of the challenges faced by Asian youth in the COVID world. Concerned that neoliberalism separates the individual from their social world, Tan draws upon UNESCO’s description of global citizenship as people having a sense of belonging to a broader community. Tan suggests that the implication of the Daoist tradition applied to global citizenship education is that youth might view life’s challenges and issues from the vantage point of other ethnic and racial backgrounds. The intent is the promotion of self-reflection, dialogical thinking, and authentic appraisals in a framing of citizenship based on cultural sensitivity, liberation from repression, and harmony with one’s environment.

In Chapter 4, global citizenship is explored by Ernesto Treviño, Rosario Escrribano, Cristóbal Villalobos, Diego Carrasco, María Jesús Morel, Catalina Miranda, and Adolfo Rocuant as they examine the perception of global threats by youth (around age 13) in 24 countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America and consider some implications for global citizenship education. Arguing that local threats can quickly transform into global perils, youth require exposure to a kind of global citizenship education that enables them to understand and respond to global challenges. In their chapter, the authors find that Asian students, for instance, seem to be very aware of sociopolitical threats perhaps due to the geopolitical situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and mainland China. Such studies allow readers to examine the global awareness(es) in youth whose countries have undergone struggle and violence in relation to larger entities. For Treviño et al., developing youths’ abilities to perceive
global threats requires a sophisticated understanding of not only international trends, but also access to reliable information and motivation to sustain interest in global issues.

In Chapter 5, Kathy Bickmore and Diana M. Barrero Jaramillo contend that schools can, but often do not, connect students’ lived experiences with environmental conflicts with opportunities to analyze the transnational causes and consequences of those struggles. Because formal education is shaped by global asymmetries, maldistribution, and resource exploitation, young people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to have access to, and engage in, a critical transnational citizenship education, despite its potential to address political and social exclusion. Resource distribution and environmental exploitation of the Earth contribute to anxiety in non-affluent youth in Canada, but especially for youth in postcolonial Mexico. From their examination of the lived citizenship perspectives of economically marginalized youth and their experienced classroom curriculum in urban, public schools, Bickmore and Barrero Jaramillo argue that global citizenship education be framed as peacebuilding.

Part II, Contesting Spaces of Citizenship: Contemporary Youth Social Movements, Digital Citizenships, and the Popular Turn in Global Citizenship Education, consists of three chapters. In Chapter 6, Keith Heggart and Rick Flowers explore the implications of digitally mediated youth social movements for citizenship education. With a focus on the 2018 US-based and high school student-led anti-gun violence movement, March for Our Lives (MFOL), the authors examine the affordances of digital platforms and social media sites for protest movements. Challenging outdated binary oppositions of online and offline organizing and technological determinism, the chapter situates the resurgence of youth organizing in longer histories of youth participation in social movements, while also tracing the specific affordances and challenges of digital tools in practices of youth agency and inclusive movement building within MFOL. Ultimately, the authors argue that civics and citizenship educators must: consider more deeply how digital tools are used and who is using them; educate in a manner that centers the interdependence of online and offline activism; and create space for youth to educate adults on what it means to be active citizens.

Anita Harris, Jessica Walton, Amelia Johns, and Gilbert Caluya in Chapter 7 consider the trend toward global digital citizenship by examining the “everyday” practices of young Australians in a connected world. Drawing insights from their research project “Fostering Global Digital Citizenship: Diaspora Youth in a Connected World,” the authors argue for interconnected theoretical and applied, holistic approaches on global citizenship and digital citizenship to improve educational policy and programs in Australia. Engagement with young people’s own citizenship practices, especially that of their “everyday” use of digital media, is investigated to consider their relationship with global citizenship and to understand what youth do in their daily digital lives to make rights claims as citizens of multiple and globally connected spaces
of obligation and belonging. The authors argue that this kind of knowledge and understanding can aid in the development of relevant, youth-centered approaches to global digital citizenship education. Global citizenship education, therefore, must attend to new participatory spaces and new participatory modes.

In Chapter 8, Jasmine L. Blanks Jones and Silas N. Juaquellie examine youth citizenship practices and negotiations of power through an ethnographic case study of youth theater performance and humanitarian civic engagement during the 2014–2015 Ebola pandemic response in Liberia. The authors focus on the Ebola Free Liberia Campaign, through which youth artists staged public street dramas and other community-facing interventions with the goal of spreading public awareness around prevention and protection during a critical moment in the Ebola epidemic. The authors theorize how youth become “civic actors” through their stage performances and encounters with community members and stakeholders within international nongovernmental organizations (iNGOs). With attention to horizontal and vertical power relations within the iNGO-dominated social and political landscape, the authors illustrate how Liberian youth, who assumed a mediating role between local communities and gatekeepers within the international development community, exercise collective agency and develop critical citizenship skills, attitudes, and identities through creative civic work. Ultimately, the authors make an important case for the democratic implications of youth participatory theater for international development and youth agency.

Part III, Negotiating Citizenship and Difference in Diverse Contexts, consists of three chapters. In Chapter 9, Heidi I. Fahning explores the conditions and contestations of youth citizenship in a small, Midwestern town in the US. The chapter explores the experiences of youth sense of belonging and conceptions of citizenship in the rural American Midwest. The author theorizes about the construction of citizenship and belonging from a critical and post-structural perspective, emphasizing intersectional subjectification and relational negotiation against and within power structures. Using an ethnographic approach, Fahning highlights the importance of the connections between the specific historical location and the material conditions in juvenile citizenship challenges. In addition, she emphasizes the need for examining the intersections among race, class, gender, and immigration to understand the experiences of belonging among youth.

R. Nanre Nafziger in Chapter 10 considers religion, difference, and youth historical consciousness to investigate civic identity in urban conflict zones in Jos, Nigeria. Nafziger’s chapter begins with an interesting and candid conversation around the convergence of religion and youth understanding and participation in their local communities. Her vivid examples, told from the personal accounts of young people from the Middle Belt city of Jos in Nigeria, take the reader through both a history lesson on youth voice and civic participation in a locale rife with religious and ethnic conflicts. The author points
to the role of contestations and their impact on the construction of identities, which play a major role in how young people see themselves as stewards of a possible change in their society. She argues why the role of identity among Nigerian youth is central to their historical understandings (i.e., historical consciousness) and shapes how they choose to engage as citizens within their local communities. The author provides a nuanced conversation about the interplay of contested spaces within a West African society and considers why such spaces are integral to the civic development of youth.

In Chapter 11, Janaina Vargas de Moraes Maudonnet and Maria Aparecida Guedes Monção examine an education manager training program developed in early childhood education centers in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Drawing upon critical theoretical perspectives to analyze the democratization of educational relations within and outside the school, the authors argue that democratic principles are central to creating more just public spaces. The chapter’s premise is based on the concept of democratic management to make the public school a public space. The authors articulately weave in concepts related to the common good, such as democracy and citizenship, which they note are necessary to transforming thinking and actions in public spaces like education centers. The authors’ discussion of the role of education as a space to promote democratic management is grounded in the historical individual and social dimensions of education for democracy. The underpinning of their argument regarding the role of democratic management in public schooling begins to reframe collective actions toward democracy.

In the last chapter (i.e., Chapter 12) of the book, the editorial team (Kubow, Webster, Strong, & Miranda) conclude by providing final reflections on youth, education, and democracy and suggesting new directions for citizenship studies in the field of comparative and international education. We point out convergences and divergences among the chapters and identify key conceptual categories for a critical democratic global citizenship and education, thereby offering a research agenda to guide future comparative inquiry.

In sum, this book will appeal to academics, researchers, university students, and educators, as well as community-based, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies working with youth, citizenship, and education. With attention to formal and non-formal educational environments, the subject areas likely to benefit from this text include: comparative and international education, citizenship studies, democratic education, social studies education, foundations of education, public affairs, sociology, political science, and cultural and youth studies.

References


Contestations of Citizenship


NPR. (2022, March 24). *One month of war has displaced more than half of Ukrainian children*. www.npr.org/2022/03/24/1088560767/ukraine-children-displaced-war


Part I

Contesting Framings of Citizenship

Interrogations of the National and the Global
Introduction

Today, we live in an era of global change that is characterized by at least three convergent processes. First, a worldwide transformation of the environment is taking place, which entails climate change, desertification of soils, acidification of the oceans, loss of biodiversity, and an increase in socio-natural disasters. These events are evidence of environmental changes of recent decades that have led scholars to question the current relationship between human beings and nature (Lade et al., 2019). Second, there is a change in the paradigms of economic development. This transformation has implied the revaluation of social justice, the recognition of the importance of social cohesion and educational equity, and the questioning of inequalities generated by the implementation of the current capitalist model (Piketty, 2020). Third, contemporary societies are in an accelerated process of transformation of social identities. This transformation is promoted by the revaluation of individuality, and expansion of subjectivities, while questioning the political construction of the nation-state. The nation-state is subject to a shift in emphasis either on the local community or on the global perspective (Hobsbawm, 2014).

These latter changes have impacted the understanding of what citizenship is, and what it should be, today. Civic norms have been questioned, at least in part, because of the decline in formal participation and the emergence of new forms of political action among youth (Dalton, 2008). Conceptually, citizenship norms involve the discussion of two aspects. On the one hand, citizenship norms are related to the idea of membership, that is, belonging to a community. As Stokke (2017) suggests, the definition of who is (and who is not) a citizen is a subject of debate, especially when considering the growth of migratory flows of people and the emergence of nativist ideologies in Western Europe and the United States. On the other hand, civic norms also imply a normative position on how societies expect citizens to behave and what they
expect them to do in the public and private sphere. In this way, civic norms incorporate an ethical-political component on what it means to be a “good citizen” (Park & Shin, 2006).

However, civic norms are just a component of collections of constructs used to understand citizenship. Citizenship is a complex and multidimensional concept, developed to understand the interaction of subjects with the social, political, and economic structures (Haste et al., 2017). In this sense, the concept of citizenship constitutes a holistic lens (Webster et al., 2018) that comprises a broad set of beliefs, values, skills, knowledge, actions, and dispositions, including both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. For logical reasons, the relationships between the different components of citizenship are not necessarily linear or causal. For example, although civic knowledge and voting in elections seem to have a positive relationship, the relationship between civic knowledge and social mobilization is less clear (Isac et al., 2011; Treviño et al., 2018). Similarly, civic knowledge enables higher levels of awareness about global problems like climate change or pollution, but that does not necessarily imply a higher disposition for civic action (Katzarska-Miller & Reysen, 2018).

In this sense, it is not clear how civic norms endorsement relate to other key civic dispositions such as multiculturalism, gender equality, patriotism, or support for democracy. The main of this chapter is to progress on this latter inquiry. Using the largest and most recent comparative study on youth citizenship, the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (Schulz et al., 2016), we analyze how different patterns of civic norms endorsement are related to four civic dispositions: multiculturalism, gender equality, patriotism, and respect for democracy, using data from 91,153 students from 24 countries in Europe (56,627 students), Latin America (25,319 students), and Asia (9,207 students). In this way, the national and global trends of these citizen attitudes are explored to study the common patterns and differences between these countries and regions. By doing so, the chapter inquires as to how young people endorse different civic norms, thus allowing us to discuss the trends of change in these turbulent contemporary times.

Civic norms: a framework to understand “good citizenship”

Citizenship norms express what is required of citizens in a given community. During the greater part of the 20th century in Western societies, the community was mainly defined through the nation-state. This “imagined community,” as termed by Anderson (2006), allowed individuals to generate a cultural, social, and political membership with a territory, transmitting a set of civic values, especially through the family and school. This transmission process allowed new generations to internalize what was expected of them as “good citizens” (Villalobos et al., 2021a).

However, over the past decades, the imagined community of the nation-state has weakened. The growing scale of migration, the construction of
generational or sexual identities, the expansion of technological networks, and the increasing awareness of globalization have implied a strong questioning of established civic norms. In this scenario, what is expected from citizens is an object of debate. Previous studies shows that civic norms vary contextually, depending on the object of the norm. Using data from the United States, Dalton (2008) shows how civic norms and political participation vary between generations. In a similar way, Akkari and Maleq (2019), using data from Australia, Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, indicate how a person’s civic norms and forms of participation differ according to the context (i.e., local, national, and global) of the discussion.

During the past decades, empirical research has explored different civic norms, such as obedience to the law, political participation, or the promotion of rights, emphasizing how the younger generations endorse these civic norms. A pivotal study on this topic was conducted by Dalton (2008). Using the United States Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey and post-material transformations as a theory to explain the decline in the formal political participation of youth, Dalton (2008) distinguishes two groups of citizens: those who express loyalty to the state and high obedience to the law (duty-based citizenship), and those who express loyalty to the closest group (engaged citizenship) while demonstrating a greater willingness to criticize authority and participate in protests. Dalton’s (2008) central thesis is that there is a generational shift, where the new generations tend to develop a more engaged citizenship, in contrast to older generations, who are closer to conceptions based on duty-based citizenship. Also using information of young Americans, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) distinguish three types of civic norms endorsement types according to the level of involvement of people. According to the authors, the “personally responsible” are those who are fundamentally concerned with their duties and their individual responsibilities. In contrast, “participatory citizens” have a focus centered at the community level, while “justice-oriented citizens” are inclined to visualize civic norms at the societal level. Denters et al. (2007), analyzing 13 countries of Western and Eastern Europe, differentiate among citizenship models based on core norms: a traditional elitist model (law-abiding); a liberal model (deliberation); and a communitarian model (solidarity). In another important study, Schulz and colleagues (2018), using data from ICCS 2016 (which includes Europe, Asia, and Latin America), propose three constructs of civic norms: “conventional citizenship,” “citizenship of social movement,” and “citizenship of personal responsibility.” These constructs correspond, in general, to the three main historical trends of academic discourse on good citizenship: normative, active, and personal (Villalobos et al., 2021a).

Although there are important conceptual differences between these studies, in all cases, civic norms were not represented as a one-dimensional score. This latter commonality highlights the idea that there cannot be a single measure of “good citizenship,” on a single continuum from bad to good. Therefore, most of the studies have used latent variable models such as latent classes
(Oser & Hooghe, 2013) or factor analysis (Dalton, 2008; Denters et al., 2007) to suggest the existence of different dimensions of civic norms. Factor analysis with more than one dimension recognizes subjects’ responses of expressed endorsement of different norms in more than one dimension simultaneously. Meanwhile, latent class models represent different endorsement patterns as typologies. This latter approach is used in the present chapter.

**Other civic attitudes: opening “Pandora’s box”?**

In addition to civic norms, other individual attributes can be categorized as citizenship aspects. Schulz et al. (2018) highlight four main types of attitudes: (1) attitudes toward a civic society and civic systems, for example, attitudes toward institutions (e.g. trust in institutions), authoritarianism endorsement, and tolerance of corruption; (2) attitudes toward civic aims, including the value of democracy and the willingness of subjects to interact with others (e.g., attitudes towards ethnic minorities and homosexuality), as well as aspects related to equal rights (Sandoval-Hernández et al., 2018); (3) attitudes toward citizen participation, which include current and expected participation in formal, informal, community, and political instances; and (4) civic identities, including aspects such as the feeling of belonging to a State (e.g., attitudes of patriotism and nationalism), as well as identity with respect to global citizenship (UNESCO, 2017).

In this chapter, we analyze the relationship between civic norms and four citizenship components: gender equality, multiculturalism, the sense of democracy, and patriotism. The attitudes toward gender equality and the attitudes toward multiculturalism can be understood as intergroup attitudes (i.e., respect, acceptance, and appreciation for the other) (Van Driel et al., 2016). In this way, attitudes toward gender equality and attitudes toward multiculturalism can be seen as necessary dispositions in a democratic system that guarantee peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and equality (Hahn, 1998). In a context marked by the growth of xenophobic attitudes, the increase of migration, and the radical transformations in gender relations, understanding the relationship between these attitudes and civic norms seems to be key to lay the foundation for a democratic society.

The conception of democracy also seems to be a key consideration today, since it allows us to understand political and ideological differences about what democracy is and how it should be strengthened. In this regard, Kennedy and Kuang (2021) show the existence of relatively conflicting views about the nature of democracy in younger generations. With a focus on students from three countries (Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, and Korea), the authors show how students’ understandings of democracy are influenced by civic knowledge, citizenship norms, and learning opportunities. This finding is consistent with other studies using data from the United States and Europe (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Husfeldt & Nikolova, 2003) that have found that liberal, generic, plural, participatory, communitarian, and social welfare views of democracy...
may be related to different democratic traditions and levels of national development. In this way, young people who live in established democracies are more likely to have a more complex understanding of democracy (Quaranta, 2019). Contrary to what one might think, the experience of an authoritarian regime in countries with a democratic history—like many Latin American countries—does not have a noticeable effect on attitudes towards democracy (Sandoval-Hernández et al., 2019). Rather, these attitudes can be affected by several variables, such as civic learning and political discussions, outside the school (Kennedy & Kuang, 2021).

Finally, students’ attitudes toward their country of residence can also be related to civic norms and conceptions of democracy. Children and youths’ attitudes toward their own country can have different meanings, such as nationalism, militarism, pride, attachment to national symbols, sense of belonging to a community, and connection with popular culture, among others (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). In our case, we focus on the concept of patriotism, defined as love or devotion to one’s own country or willingness to act in support of that country (Schulz et al., 2016). In that sense, high patriotism would indicate that young people are not entirely alienated (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) and could even be linked to the development of formal political participation (Kennedy, 2010). But, at the same time, an uncritical patriotism based on the denial of differences can promote xenophobic attitudes (Hobsbawm, 2014) and undermine democracy.

Method

This section presents the data source, describes the citizenship norms profiles, and the four citizenship constructs included in the study (i.e., sense of democracy, gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism), and our analytical strategy.

Data source

We used data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) 2016 to investigate how citizenship norms are related to other key civic dispositions. This study collects responses from representative samples of eighth-grade students (average 13.5 years of age) using a stratified, two-stage probabilistic design, where schools were selected at the first stage and intact classrooms were sampled at the second stage (Schulz et al., 2018). In 2016, 24 countries participated in the study: Europe (i.e., Flemish-speaking Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, and the North Rhine-Westphalia state of Germany); Latin America (i.e., Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru); and Asia (i.e., Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, and the Republic of Korea).
To examine the relationship between citizenship norms and other civic dispositions, we used a set of nominal and binary variables. These different indicators are described next.

“Citizenship norms” is a nominal variable that distinguishes five different patterns of endorsement among 12 citizenship norms. This indicator is obtained as the modal-class assignment from a homogenous multigroup latent class model among countries (Kankaraš & Vermunt, 2015; Masyn, 2017). Following the work of Torres-Irribarra and Carrasco (2021), these five values represent how students endorse citizenship norms. These patterns of endorsement are: (1) comprehensive (39%), including those who express that all civic norms are important, like voting in national and local elections, peaceful protest, political engagement, and social involvement; (2) duty-based (12%), including those who support mainly traditional norms, like obeying the law or respecting authorities and a lower probability of considering actions related to non-conventional forms of political participation; (3) socially engaged (33%), including those who tend to support norms oriented toward helping the community, protection of the environment, and the protection of human rights; (4) monitorial, including those who value non-conventional forms of political participation, like protest, participating in activities in a local community, or signing a petition (12%); and (5) anomic (4%), including students with the lowest endorsement in all citizenship norms compared to the rest of the profile. All these latent groups were generated among all participating countries and regions, using a latent-class model while accounting for the survey design of the study (see Torres-Irribarra & Carrasco, 2021 for more details).

In the present study, we are interested in the relationship between civic norms endorsement and other citizenship dispositions relevant for democracies. In particular, we are interested in their sense of democracy, their endorsement of gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism. We rely on Sandoval-Hernández and Carrasco’s (2020) work, who used data from ICCS 2016 and provided benchmarks for each of these constructs. This work is a measurement strategy for SDG 4.7.4 and has been reviewed and endorsed by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics’ Technical Cooperation Group on the Indicators for SDG 4-Education 2030 (Sandoval-Hernández & Carrasco, 2020). For example, according to this measurement strategy, students above the benchmark on gender equality are students who are highly likely to disagree with the statement, “Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women,” and to agree to “Men and women should have the same rights in every way.” Each of these benchmarks is described here.

“Sense of democracy” is a binary variable that distinguishes students who endorse a complex view of democracy from the rest of the students (Sandoval-Hernández & Carrasco, 2020). Students indicate whether nine different situations are “good,” “neither good or bad,” or “bad for democracy.” Using a homogenous multigroup latent class model over these responses, three
classes were obtained: complex, minimalist, and limited. The present indicator is a dummy code variable for the complex class. Students with a complex view of democracy are more likely to indicate that electing political leaders, aiming for equal rights, and protesting against unfair laws are good for democracy, whereas media concentration, nepotism, and government influence over the courts of justice are bad for democracy. In contrast, students who do not share a complex view of democracy are not able to identify all these features as good or bad for democracy.

“Gender equality” is a binary variable that distinguishes students who highly endorse gender equality, in contrast to students who do not. Students respond to six different items, regarding equality between men and women (e.g., “Women should stay out of politics” and “Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs”). Students’ responses are modeled with a partial credit model, and a benchmark is defined above the Thurstonian threshold of the last category of response to item six, recoded in its reverse form (“Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women”). As such, all students above the benchmark highly endorse gender equality, highly agreeing or disagreeing respectively to each presented item.

“Multiculturalism” is a binary variable that distinguishes students who highly endorse equal rights among all ethnic and racial groups within a country. Students respond to five different items, expressing equal rights among all groups (e.g., “Members of all ethnic/racial groups should have the same rights and responsibilities”). Students’ responses were modeled with a partial credit model, and a benchmark was defined after the Thurstonian threshold for the last category of item four (“Members of all ethnic/racial groups should be encouraged to run in elections for political office”). Thus, all students above the defined threshold highly endorse equal rights among all ethnic and racial groups, whereas students below the threshold are less likely to agree to all affirmations expressing equal rights to all groups.

“Patriotism” is a binary variable that differentiates students who express positive attitudes toward their own country, in contrast to students who do not. Students respond to four different items, expressing positive attitudes towards their own country (e.g., “I have great respect for <country of test>”). Students’ responses were modeled using a partial credit model, and dummy coded right after the Thurstonian threshold of the last category of response to item four (“I am proud to live in <country of test>”). Consequently, students above the defined threshold highly agree to all the items, expressing high patriotism, in contrast to the rest of their peers below the defined threshold.

Analytical strategy
To analyze the relationship between civic norm profiles and the other citizenship constructs of interest, we estimated the proportion of students from each citizenship norm profile that is above the ideal threshold of the four civic
dispositions (i.e., sense of democracy, gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism). If each citizenship norm profile is independent of the studied civic disposition, we expect the proportion of students above and below the threshold to be similar in each country. In contrast, if a particular citizenship norm profile is positively associated to a civic indicator, then we expect that this group should present a larger proportion of students above the threshold, above the rate of the country total. Conversely, if a certain citizenship profile is negatively associated to the civic dispositions of interest, then the proportion of students reaching the target should be lower than the rate of students reaching the expected target in the country.

The reported estimates here are the proportion of students above the threshold within each citizenship norm profile by country, accounting for ICCS’s sampling design. It is worth noting that, unlike cross tabs, these estimates can vary freely from 0 to 1 among all citizenship norm profiles. To aid the interpretation of results, proportions above .07 from the country total are presented in bold and estimates below .07 of the country totals are presented in gray. This number figure is an arbitrary threshold that we have used only to highlight those proportions that are considerably higher than those of the corresponding country. The highlighted differences converge with estimates, which do not overlap with the confidence interval of the respective country’s total and thus represent significant differences.

Results: understanding the relationship between citizenship norm profiles and civic attitudes

The results of the distribution of the different profiles in each country (Figure 2.1) present a common pattern. First, in almost all countries (except the Netherlands and Denmark), most students display a comprehensive (that means, all civic norms are important) or socially engaged (those who tend to support norms oriented to helping the community, protecting the environment, and protecting human rights). Second, the profile that expresses the traditional conception of citizenship (duty-based) describes a rather low percentage of students across the 24 countries (except for Denmark). Finally, anomic students are at the lowest rate, less than 10% in all countries. All of these findings seem to show that a significant part of the youth population tends to be willing to actively participate instead of being disinterested in politics and social issues. These results are consistent with Dalton (2008), regarding the shift from a duty-based to a more engagement of citizenship (Villalobos et al., 2021b).

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of students who are more likely (i.e., are above the established threshold) to express positive attitudes toward democracy, gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism. This table describes similarities and differences between countries with respect to these civic dispositions. In ten countries, the patriotism index is one of the attitudes with the highest rate, followed by the gender equality index with nine countries
Figure 2.1 Profile distribution by country
Table 2.1 Proportion of students above the threshold on sense of democracy, gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sense of democracy</th>
<th>Gender equality</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>Patriotism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Flemish)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>.42 [.40, .45]</td>
<td>.26 [.24, .28]</td>
<td>.12 [.11, .14]</td>
<td>.71 [.68, .73]</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>.34 [.32, .37]</td>
<td>.52 [.50, .54]</td>
<td>.44 [.42, .47]</td>
<td>.64 [.62, .66]</td>
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<td>.69 [.67, .71]</td>
<td>.45 [.43, .47]</td>
<td>.52 [.50, .54]</td>
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<td>.22 [.21, .24]</td>
<td>.76 [.74, .78]</td>
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<td>.17 [.15, .19]</td>
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<td>.20 [.19, .22]</td>
<td>.38 [.36, .40]</td>
</tr>
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<td>.16 [.14, .18]</td>
<td>.22 [.20, .24]</td>
<td>.87 [.86, .89]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chapter authors’ own elaboration based on Sandoval-Hernández and Carrasco (2020).

Note: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals of the estimated proportions. N. R.-Westphalia = North Rhine-Westphalia.

(i.e., Belgium, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, Italy, North Rhine-Westphalia Germany, Norway, and Denmark), while in five countries (i.e., Chinese Taipei, the Netherlands, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, and Estonia) a high percentage is observed in the index of democratic complexity. The multiculturalism index is the civic disposition with the lowest adherence. This latter result is of importance to research alerting to the lack of positive intergroup attitudes necessary for peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and equality in a democracy (Magen-Nagar & Shonfeld, 2018; Sandoval-Hernández et al., 2018).

Additionally, the multicultural attitudes index shows less support from students compared to the patriotism index in most countries. This result could
indicate that students understand both indices as mutually exclusive. When observing the percentage differences between the two indexes (high adherence to patriotic attitudes and low adherence to multicultural attitudes), in European countries such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Croatia, and especially in Latin American countries, there is a greater difference between the indices. As a hypothesis, it could be argued that, in European countries, this difference is generated by the migration process and the discourse of nationalist policies that has gained popularity (Barber et al., 2013; Jovic, 2011). In Latin American countries, this difference could be generated by the politicization of the demands of indigenous ethnic groups (Büsschges, 2015).

On the contrary, in Chinese Taipei and Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), there is a low difference between the indices of patriotism and multiculturalism, although in the first region, the percentage is high (40–50%) compared to the second region (around 20%). It should be noted that Hong Kong SAR is the only country where the multiculturalism index (39%) is higher than the patriotism index (22%). This could be due to attempts to implement a diverse or multicultural education, which has had problems, such as teaching diversity by assimilating or homogenizing racial groups (Fleming, 2019; Jackson, 2017). Multiculturalism could be considered as a first step in learning about diversity. Moreover, these latter results allow us to think that these indices should not necessarily be seen as contradictory.

Besides, Latin American countries (i.e., Chile, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Colombia) have a lower probability of adhering to the democratic complexity index, although Chile would be the best positioned (34%) within this group. This result could be due to the recent transition to democracy that these countries are experiencing since national political contexts affect people’s choices, behaviors, and political orientations (Dalton & Anderson, 2010; Webster et al., 2018). However, some European countries also show low adherence to the democratic complexity standard, like Norway (20%) and Malta (25%). Thus, other factors should be considered, besides democracy longevity, including civic participation, the role of schools in students citizenship development, the effect of peers, or even students’ personal characteristics (Quaranta, 2019).

Finally, there are countries that show a high percentage in the gender equality index and the democratic complexity index, or multiculturalism index (i.e., Finland, Chinese Taipei, Sweden, and Germany’s North Rhine-Westphalia). At the same time, if the percentage of the gender equality index is low, the indices of democratic complexity or multiculturalism are also low (see Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Latvia, Russian Federation, and Peru). This may be due to the fact that the theoretical models of equality consider tolerance and respect for minority groups. That is, the degree of student support tends to be similar for different attitudes (Miranda & Castillo, 2018), in this case, democracy, gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism.

Tables 2.1 through 2.5 compare the percentage of students above the expected threshold for each of the profiles, responding to the question about
Table 2.2 Proportion of students above the threshold on complex view of democracy within each citizenship norm profile by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Profile</th>
<th>Comprehensive</th>
<th>Socially engaged</th>
<th>Duty-based</th>
<th>Monitorial</th>
<th>Anomic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.80 [.77, .82]</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Note: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals of the estimated proportions. Cells flagged with * did not have enough observations to estimate confidence interval (n ≥ 32). Cells in bold are .07 higher than the country total, and cells in gray are .07 smaller than the country total.

N. R. Westphalia = North Rhine Westphalia.
### Table 2.3 Proportion of students above the threshold on gender equality within each citizenship norm profile by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Profile</th>
<th>Comprehensive</th>
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<th>Duty-based</th>
<th>Monitorial</th>
<th>Anomic</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Note: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals of the estimated proportions. Cells flagged with * did not have enough observations to estimate confidence interval (n ≥ 32). Cells in bold are .07 higher than the country total, and cells in gray are .07 smaller than the country total.

N. R.-Westphalia = North Rhine-Westphalia.
### Table 2.4 Proportion of students above the threshold on multiculturalism within each citizenship norm profile by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Profile</th>
<th>Comprehensive</th>
<th>Socially engaged</th>
<th>Duty-based</th>
<th>Monitory</th>
<th>Anomic</th>
<th>Total</th>
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Source: Own elaboration.

Note: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals of the estimated proportions. Cells flagged with * did not have enough observations to estimate confidence interval (n ≥ 32). Cells in bold are .07 higher than the country total, and cells in gray are .07 smaller than the country total.

N. R. Westphalia = North Rhine-Westphalia.
Table 2.5 Proportion of students above the threshold on patriotism within each citizenship norm profile by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Profile</th>
<th>Comprehensive</th>
<th>Socially engaged</th>
<th>Duty-based</th>
<th>Monitorial</th>
<th>Anomic</th>
<th>Total</th>
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Source: Own elaboration.

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N. R. Westphalia = North Rhine-Westphalia.
the relationship between civic norms and other civic dispositions. Table 2.1 focuses on the complex democratic index. As expected, in most countries, the probability of students belonging to the socially engaged profile (who tend to support norms oriented to helping the community, protecting the environment, and protecting human rights) is above the threshold in this index compared to the other profiles. In some countries (i.e., Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong), the highest probability is observed in students of the comprehensive profile (all civic norms are important). At the same time, the probability of being above the standard is lower in most of the students within the anomic profile (with the lowest level for support to all citizenship norms). On the other hand, in most countries, students belonging to the monitorial profile (those who value non-conventional forms of political participation) and duty-based profile (those who support mainly traditional norms, like obeying the law or respecting authority) tend to be close to the average of the population. However, in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Norway, and Peru, the highest probability is found among students with a duty-based profile compared to the other profiles. Finally, there is not a country that presents statistically significant differences between all the five profiles. In most countries, there are statistically significant differences between students of the anomic profile and the socially engaged, and to a lesser extent between the monitorial and the students of the socially engaged profile. The difference between profiles could occur because young people with greater civic participation are exposed to more political concepts and ideas, so that their conception of democracy is more complex (Quaranta, 2019).

Table 2.3 presents the percentage of adherence to gender equality attitudes by profile, where it is possible to observe a similar pattern to the index of democratic complexity. Most of the students belonging to the anomic profile of civic norms tend to express negative attitudes or to be below the threshold in comparison to the students of the socially engaged and comprehensive profiles. Thus, support for all norms or specifically for those oriented at helping the community, protecting the environment, and protecting human rights encourage the adherence to gender equality, in contrast to what happens with those who support mainly traditional norms. In the Dominican Republic, there are no significant differences between the anomic profile in relation to the comprehensive and socially engaged profiles. In Mexico and Peru, there are no significant differences between the anomic and comprehensive profiles, and in the Russian Federation, there are no significant differences between the anomic and socially engaged profiles. Finally, the students who are part of the duty-based profile are close to the average of the index, but in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Croatia, Latvia, Mexico, and the Russian Federation have less propensity to be above the standard. In contrast, in the Netherlands, duty-based students are above the average for the country; however, this is a marginal difference and not statistically significant.

In most countries, both the anomic and duty-based profiles are below the expected threshold of civic dispositions. This marks a difference from the
above results. It seems that duty-based students do not equate equality with other ethnic groups with other attitudes towards equality.

In all countries, comprehensive students are above the national average. On the other hand, in 14 countries, students with a socially engaged profile are below or close to the national average with respect to attitudes about multiculturalism (Table 2.4). This pattern is observed in most countries, with the exception of Chile, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), the Russian Federation, and Sweden, where the socially engaged profile are above the average. Furthermore, in Estonia, Lithuania, and Malta, socially engaged students present the same probability as the global standard. Certainly, comprehensive students have greater attitudes about multiculturalism with respect to the country level, in addition to having statistically significant differences, except in Belgium, Croatia, Italy, Korea, Latvia, the Netherlands, Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), and the Russian Federation.

Finally, Table 2.5 shows the relationship between the profile of civic norms and patriotism. Anomic students are all below their national rates in patriotism. This latter result is consistent with the profile’s low interest on civic norms. A sign of detachment to its social group. By contrast, comprehensive students are above the national average in all countries, although in Croatia, Italy, Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), and Sweden, the difference is not significant. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the socially engaged and duty-based profiles behave in a similar way in the of patriotism, although socially engaged students are more likely to have positive attitudes regarding patriotism. It appears that adherence to civic norms generates a connection between students and their country. However, in order to know the more about this connection, it is necessary to delve deeper into the types of patriotism (e.g., uncritical patriotism) of students according to their culture and country.

**Conclusion**

The next generations of youth will face immense challenges because the world as we know it today will no longer be the same. Climate change, social intolerance, and the increase in global inequities seem to be threats to human existence. To face these challenges, social organizations, schools, and communities must train young people to build new forms of citizenship, with civic dispositions being one of the central components of this process. This chapter has sought to contribute toward this direction, investigating the relationships between civic norms profiles and other four civic dispositions, using the most recent large-scale assessment study available, namely the ICCS 2016.

Three main conclusions can be drawn from our findings. First, the general trends show that the profiles of civic norms endorsement vary significantly between countries. This finding suggests that citizenship norms relevance is constructed contextually, influenced by social, political, and territorial factors. Countries, as a context, may affect what young people perceive to be a “good
citizen” (Villalobos et al., 2021b), for example, the understanding of democracy and patriotism, according to the history of each country, or the cultural expressions and dynamics that shape gender and multicultural attitudes. Although it could be thought of as a hopeful result, it can also lead to certain difficulties, especially considering the globalization and trans-nationalization processes in which we find ourselves immersed. In this way, it seems to be relevant to think how broader frameworks, such as that of global citizenship (Andreotti & de Souza, 2012), might allow us to conceptualize good global citizenship, thereby enabling countries/regions to consider different levels of construction of citizenship (i.e., global, national, and local).

Second, our results show that, despite differences, there is a relationship between the five citizen profiles (i.e., comprehensive, duty-based, socially engaged, monitorial, and anomic) and other civic dispositions. Thus, for example, in most of the countries and for all the variables analyzed, anomic students (those who have low adherence to any citizenship norms) showed lower adherence to positive attitudes toward gender equality, multiculturalism, and patriotism, while comprehensive students (those with high adherence to all citizenship norms) and, to a lesser extent, socially engaged students (those who tend to support norms oriented to helping the community, protecting the environment, and protecting human rights) showed higher levels of adherence. These results highlight the relevance of civic norms in contemporary societies. Far from being a decorative or a merely normative element, civic norms allow us to understand how individuals position themselves within their societies. Strengthening the analysis of civic norms with other variables, and the factors that would explain these citizenship norms (see, for example, Treviño et al., 2021), is, therefore, a central task for researchers and policymakers.

Finally, the results show the relevance of continuing to explore some specific relationships between variables. On the one hand, the relationship between patriotism and multiculturalism is interesting, since it could be showing how an important part of the feeling of love for one’s country could be developed against the feeling of recognition of the other. Generating broader interpretative frameworks allowing patriotism without denying multiculturalism are necessary. Given the ever-increasing global migration trends, this will probably be one of the greatest challenges for societies in the coming years. On the other hand, the high percentage of students above the score-cut-off on gender equality allow us to hypothesize about how gender equality will allow the development of more tolerant and inclusive societies, due to the positive role that women have in attitudes such as tolerance and respect for the other (Miranda & Castillo, 2018). In these two cases, the information analyzed makes it possible to account for how the relationship between the different citizen attitudes occurs, but it does not provide enough information on how these relationships are transformed or deepened over time. Investigating, the mechanisms of influence between norms (e.g., through regression analysis) or
the understanding of how norms are experienced by subjects (e.g., through ethnographies or interviews) is, therefore, a task to be developed in future citizenship studies.

Notes
1 This work has been supported by the National Research and Development Agency (ANID) of Chile, through Project FONDECYT No. 1180667 and Project PIA CIE160007.
2 Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within populations who share certain characteristics (e.g., see: Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002).
3 A Partial Credit Model (PCM) is a unidimensional model for the analysis of responses recorded in two or more ordered categories (e.g., see: Masters & Wright, 1997).
4 A Thurstone threshold is the point on the variable (in the context of a particular item) at which the probability of being observed below a given category is equal to that of being observed in or above that category (Masters, 1988).
5 In order to account for ICCS complex survey design (which includes stratification, clustering, multi-stage sampling, and unequal probability sampling), we corrected all standard errors using Taylor Series Linearization (TSL). TSL is a method used to obtain a linear approximation to a nonlinear function or statistic of interest in the presence of data obtained from a survey with a complex sample design. More information about the ICCS sample design can be obtained from its Technical Report (Schulz et al., 2018). More information about TSL can be obtained from Groves et al. (2004).

References
Cristóbal Villalobos et al.


3 A Daoist Interpretation of Global Citizenship and Implications for Global Citizenship Education for Youth

Charlene Tan

Introduction

Citizenship in a democracy brings with it not only membership status within a political unit but also civic participation and a shared commitment to the common good (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006; Tan, 2020a). Global citizenship goes beyond allegiance to a nation-state, state formation, national responsibility and patriotic education. It entails, as stated by UNESCO (2015), having “a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity” (p. 14). What is stressed here is an identification with a global community based on human interdependency and interconnectedness at all levels. Such an attachment requires humans to extend their obligations to people outside their political units and be “bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern” (Nussbaum, 2017, p. 218). Core values that unite global citizens include “universally shared values such as non-discrimination, equality, respect and dialogue” (UNESCO, 2019a, para 2). Global citizenship education is an integral part of UNESCO’s agenda to advance sustainable development under the Education 2030 Agenda and Framework for Action. The United Nations (n.d.) states that global citizenship education “involves students’ active participation in projects that address global issues of a social, political, economic, or environmental nature” (para 1). In tandem with UNESCO’s conception of global citizenship, the United Nations (n.d.) advocates global citizenship education that seeks to nurture respect for all, to build a sense of belonging to a common humanity and to help learners become responsible and active global citizens (also see UNESCO, 2019a, 2019b).

On the one hand, UNESCO’s interpretation of global citizenship is a good starting point for policymakers, academics, educators, and other educational stakeholders to rally around the ideal of common humanity and active citizenry. On the other hand, UNESCO’s formulation is too vague to guide decision-makers, curriculum planners, school leaders, and teachers to design and enact global citizenship education for students. Specifically, what does it mean for human beings to have a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity? How can global citizenship education help youth to become responsible and active global citizens who show respect for all? This chapter
answers these two questions by exploring a Daoist understanding of global citizenship and its educational implications for youth. This chapter focuses on Daoism as it is an under-researched Chinese philosophical tradition that offers refreshing insights on global citizenship to the comparative discourse on citizenship and citizenship education. It is worthwhile to note that the existing theories and frameworks for global citizenship and citizenship education, including those associated with UNESCO, largely stem from and are shaped by Western/Enlightenment histories, traditions, developments, and presuppositions (Tan, 2020a, 2018). Even the word “citizenship” originated from Greek-Roman democracy and presupposes the Western Enlightenment notions of individual rationality, autonomy, and human rights. There is a tension between the origin of the concept of citizenship that refers to belonging to a local community (originally Greek cities and subsequently nation-states) with the idea of belonging to a global community. It is therefore instructive to rethink and expand the concepts of global citizenship and global citizenship education by examining alternative formulations across cultures. A Daoist orientation of global citizenship and its educational implications for youth serve to inform UNESCO’s goals and direction in global citizenship and education for such. The first part of the chapter outlines a Daoist interpretation of global citizenship based on a textual analysis of two seminal Daoist classics. The second part of the chapter applies the Daoist ideas to global citizenship education for youth using the example of racism in a post-pandemic world.

A Daoist interpretation of global citizenship

This segment elucidates a Daoist understanding of global citizenship by responding to the first question posed in the introduction: what does it mean for human beings to have a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity? The Daoist ideas are taken from two Daoist classics, Daodejing and Zhuangzi. Both texts are regarded as representative texts of Daoism, as evident in the fact that Daoism was known as “the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi” in ancient China (De Bary & Bloom, 1999). Daoism has shaped the philosophical, social, and cultural developments of China for more than two millennia. De Bary and Bloom (1999) observe, “Next to Confucianism, the most important and influential native philosophy of the Chinese has undoubtedly been Daoism” as the two systems “complement each other, running side by side like two powerful streams through all later Chinese thought and literature” (p. 77). The Daodejing, attributed to Laozi who lived during the 6th century BCE, was believed to have been written during the Warring States Period (403–221 BCE) in China. The other text is Zhuangzi which was named after Zhuangzi who lived during the 4th century BCE. Scholars have debated over the authorship of both texts and concluded that they were probably written by a number of unknown authors over a period of time (Chong, 2011; De Bary & Bloom, 1999; Graham, 1986; Tan, 2020b). Hence, this
A Daoist Interpretation

chapter shall use “Laozi” and “Zhuangzi” throughout the discussion to refer to the writers of these texts.

Zhuangzi calls attention to a broader community and humanity that centers on dao (the Course or Way). A representative passage is the conversation between a cook named Ding and King Hui of Liang (Zhuangzi, 3.3–3.6, italics added, all quotations from Ziporyn, 2009):

The cook was carving up an ox for King Hui of Liang. Wherever his hand smacked it, wherever his shoulder leaned into it, wherever his foot braced it, wherever his knee pressed it, the thwacking tones of flesh falling from bone would echo, the knife would whiz through with its resonant thwing, each stroke ringing out the perfect note, attuned to the “Dance of the Mulberry Grove” or the “Jingshou Chorus” of the ancient sage-kings.

The king said, “Ah! It is wonderful that skill can reach such heights!”

The cook put down his knife and said “What I love is the Course [dao, also translated as Way], something that advances beyond mere skill. When I first started cutting up oxen, all I looked at for three years was oxen, and yet still I was unable to see all there was to see in an ox. But now I encounter it with the spirit rather than scrutinising it with the eyes. My understanding consciousness, beholden to its specific purposes, comes to a halt, and thus the promptings of the spirit begin to flow. I depend on Heaven’s unwrought perforations and strike the larger gaps, following along with the broader hollows. I go by how they already are, playing them as they lay. So my knife has never had to cut through the knotted nodes where the warp hits the weave, much less the gnarled joints of bone.”

The king said, “Wonderful! From hearing the cook’s words I have learned how to nourish life!”

Two observations that are pertinent to global citizenship can be noted from this passage: a common humanity in dao, and a broader community through collective flow. The next segment elaborates on these two Daoist principles in order.

A common humanity in dao

First, all human beings share a common humanity in dao (Way). Dao is both a product (Way) and a process (Way-making) (Tan, 2019b). Emphasizing the former, de Bary and Bloom (1999) define dao as “the source of all being, the governor of all life, human and natural, and the basic, undivided unity in which all the contradictions and distinctions of existence are ultimately resolved” (p. 78). Ziporyn (2009), however, highlights dao as a process by describing it as “the nondeliberate and indiscernible process that is claimed
to be the real source of value and being” (p. 214). Concurring with Ziporyn are Ames and Hall (2003) who point out that the etymology of the Chinese character for dao is “primarily gerundive, processional, and dynamic” (p. 57).

To further understand dao, we need to situate Zhuangzi’s views within the historical and social backdrop of his time. He lived during the time of the Warring States Period where many philosophical schools such as Confucianism and Mohism flourished. The proponents of these schools put forward competing versions of the good life through their own dao or guiding discourses. For example, a school of thought conceptualized the “Eight Virtues” that denoted “the four binary oppositions of high and low, close and distant, right and wrong, as well as win and lose” (Lu, 2018, p. 1229). These discursive categories, which were meant to guide the masses to adjudicate what was right from wrong, resulted unfortunately in excessive control, subjugation and curtailment of human freedom. Zhuangzi criticizes the leaders of his time for using their own dao to “browbeat the world, insisting that people believe in it” (7.6). The man-made and prescriptive systems, regulations, and norms had undermined and imperiled the personal autonomy and self-directed actions of the people. The same concern was affirmed in the Daodejing that states that the “people’s lack of order is because those above manipulate them” (Chapter 75) and that those in power “take away from those who do not have enough in order to give more to those who already have too much” (Chapter 77, all quotations from this text are taken from Ames & Hall, 2003). Seeking to overturn the oppressive teachings that diminish human well-being, Laozi and Zhuangzi advocate a (re)turn to a Daoist interpretation of dao.

Dao for both Laozi and Zhuangzi stands in contrast to contrived and dehumanizing tenets, regulations, norms, and practices that prevailed at that time. To follow dao, according to Daoism, is to act spontaneously in accordance with one’s innate disposition (Berkson, 2005; Singh, 2014; Tan, 2020b, 2020c). Zhuangzi in Chapter 7 exhorts all to “follow the rightness of the way each thing already is without allowing yourself the least bias” (7.4) so that all creatures may “delight in themselves” (7.5). Cook Ding epitomizes a lover of dao who participates in everyday activities freely, gracefully, and joyfully. Demanding total devotion, his carving does not only involve his hands but also his hand, shoulder, foot, and knee. In tune with his physical movements are his cognitive and affective engagement that collectively contribute to his effortless mastery. Each stroke of Ding is analogous to the perfect note of the “Dance of the Mulberry Grove” and the “Jingshou Chorus” of the ancient sage-kings. Given that the sage-kings are upheld by the ancient Chinese as exemplary human beings, the comparison of Ding’s workmanship to the artistic achievements of the sage-kings signifies his attainment of moral excellence. Zhuangzi invites us to see beyond the physical to the metaphysical by distinguishing the novice cook from the expert cook. The former is one who sees an ox solely through human eyes, beholding a carcass and viewing things at the cognitive level.
An expert cook like Ding, on the other hand, is able to see beyond the surface to encounter the ox with the spirit. The word “spirit” in Daoism does not refer to ghosts or religious entities (Chong, 2011). To be guided by the spirit means to act spontaneously in accordance with the innate nature of all things; it is “simply the way Heaven has cast them forth” (Chapter 9). In the case of Ding, he succeeds in going with the flow by ensuring a perfect fit between his carving and the flesh of the carcass. He testifies that he “follows along,” “goes by,” and “plays it” when negotiating the harrows, nodes, and joints. Describing Cook Ding’s action as “skillful spontaneity,” Barrett (2011) notes that it “constitutes a spiritual as well as moral ideal: total awareness brings spiritual equanimity by means of perfect attunement between a person and her surroundings” (p. 686). Huang (2010) observes that Cook Ding, as well as other craftsmen mentioned in the Zhuangzi, “managed to get into the flow of the Dao; they follow the hidden seams deep in the pattern of nature and by so doing are able to lead highly effective yet frictionless lives” (p. 1052).

It is a significant point that the aforementioned passage challenges the traditional power structure that prevailed in ancient China. It was the king who visited the cook’s kitchen, showered praises on the cook, and received a life lesson on nourishing one’s soul. What makes Ding outstanding, despite his low status, is his love for and achievement of dao, which makes him ethically superior to the king. Rather than looking down on mundane activities performed by ordinary people, Zhuangzi asserts that these activities are the conduit for one to live a life that is reflective, natural, and joyful. Cook Ding displays intuitive knowledge by being open-minded and spontaneous, immersing himself in the act and enjoying harmony with nature (Chiu, 2018). The example of Ding is about living a particular conception of a good life that connects oneself to one’s social and natural environments. As explained by Tao (2011),

Zhuangzi is using the image of a thickless chopper’s edge navigating joint intervals in an ox to convey the idea of an extraordinarily effective way to navigate and negotiate the various domains of relationality and entanglements in life so that one would encounter as little resistance as possible, thus living out one’s heavenly endowed years.

That is why the king in the passage concludes by proclaiming, “From hearing the cook’s words I have learned how to nourish life!” It follows from my analysis of the example of Cook Ding that a common humanity is premised on innate nature that is found in all human beings. Human beings are equal in essence and possess the same potential to attain moral excellence like Cook Ding. In the main, Daoism stands for ontological parity (Ames & Hall, 2003). With reference to UNESCO’s (2015) interpretation of global citizenship as having “a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity” (p. 14), a Daoist understanding of this term is to anchor global citizenship on the notion of dao that is found in all human beings. It follows, then, that the
curriculum for global citizenship should emphasize *dao* that forms the basis of a global community that upholds the worth, dignity, and value of all human beings.

**A broader community through collective flow**

The second observation from the example of Cook Ding concerns a sense of belonging to a broader community. Not only must individuals follow *dao* and experience the flow, they must also seek *collective flow*, what *Daodejing* calls “the flowing together of all things” (Chapter 62). In other words, human beings need to have a sense of belonging to a broader community by harmonizing themselves with their surroundings. Underscoring harmony, *Daodejing* states, “Refined notes and raw sounds harmonise with each other, and before and after lend sequence to each other—This is really how it all works” (Chapter 2). Ames and Hall (2003) observe that the message here is “relational character of the web of events, and the symbiotic continuities that obtain among them” (p. 178). The *Daodejing* uses the analogy of water to explain collective flow. Being formless and fluid, water is non-coercive, enabling “the flowing together of all things (Chapter 62 of *Daodejing*). Laozi teaches that water “comes nearest to the proper way-making” as it “benefits everything (*wanwu*), yet vies to dwell in places loathed by the crowd” (Chapter 8 of *Daodejing*). Implicit in the idea of *dao*-making are interdependence and interconnectedness of all things (Tan, 2020d).

The attainment of collective flow is through matching the *dao* of all things. To understand this point, it is helpful to turn to another passage in the *Zhuangzi*: Woodworker Qing who reveals how he succeeds in producing exquisite bells (Chapter 19, italics added):

> My skill is concentrated and the outside world slides away. Then I enter into the mountain forests, viewing the inborn Heavenly nature of the trees. My body arrives at a certain spot, and already I see the completed bell stand there; only then do I apply my hand to it. Otherwise I leave the tree alone. So I am just matching the Heavenly to the Heavenly. This may be the reason the result suggests the work of spirits!

The principles of interdependency and interconnectedness—integral to global citizenship education—are evident in Qing’s approach of “matching the Heavenly to the Heavenly.” The term “Heavenly” denotes “the spontaneous and agentless creativity that brings forth all beings, whatever happens without a specific identifiable agent that makes it happen and without a preexisting purpose or will or observable method” (Ziporyn, 2009, p. 217). The expression “matching the Heavenly to the Heavenly” can also be translated as “matching of nature with nature,” indicating a close attention to the innate nature of things (Lu, 2018; Tan, 2020b).
Qing’s awareness of the “inborn Heavenly nature of the trees” guides him to carve the bell stand that matches his *dao* as an artisan with the *dao* of the tree. Qing represents a lover of *dao* who refrains from exploiting anyone or anything by violating their innate disposition. Rather, he subscribes to Other-regarding considerations by synchronizing his nature with that of the trees. To put it in another way, Qing is like the sage who “brought himself to completion by following along with things” (Chapter 25). It follows that a person who possesses a sense of belonging to a broader community is one who harmonizes oneself with one’s surroundings based on each other’s innate natures. It is suggested that global citizenship education should draw students’ attention to *dao* and help them obtain wholeness in and outside the classroom. More detail on the specific strategies and activities for global citizenship education are addressed later in this chapter.

The matching of *dao* in all things is made possible through *wuwei* (non-coercive action), *wuming* (nameless), *wuzhi* (non-dogmatic knowledge), and *wuyu* (objectless desire). *Wuwei* is not about “inertia, indifference, laziness, status quo, laissez-faire, pessimism or passivity” or “subjective intervention, unilateral control, or propensity to overdo” (Lee et al., 2009, p. 73). Instead, it is about letting nature take its own *dao* through simplicity, spontaneity, and non-interference (Chan, 1963). Woodworker Qing follows the exemplary conduct of the “sages [who] keep to service that does not entail coercion (*wuwei*)” (Chapter 2, *Daodejing*). He demonstrates both contemplative and purposive *wuwei*. As explained by Xing and Sims (2011):

*Contemplative Wu Wei* indicates a genuine non-action motivated by a lack of desire to participate in a struggle of human affairs. *Purposive Wu Wei* refers to a technique for a person to gain enhanced control over human affairs. The first is purely passive while the second is a strategy to act in and reform the world.

(p. 99, italics added)

Qing exhibits contemplative *wuwei* by not being entrapped by strife, competition, burdens, and pressures (Watts, 1975). He also displays purposive *wuwei* by acting within his true nature, thereby experiencing “the flow or wellbeing that allows one to be in harmony with all” (Lee et al., 2009, p. 72). Closely related to *wuwei* is *wuming*, as stated in Chapter 37 of *Daodejing*: “way-making [*dao*] is really nameless (*wuming*).” The idea of “nameless” is contrasted with “naming” (*ming*) that signals the authority, power, and privilege associated with formal titles, as embodied by the king in ancient China. Instead of controlling others through one’s position, entitlement, and legislation, *wuming* is about equality where “all things would be able to develop along their own lines” (Chapter 37 of *Daodejing*).

*Wuming* is closely related to *wuzhi* (non-dogmatic knowledge) that castigates the obsession with stored data, ingrained habits and rules of discrimination
in an opinionated and uncritical way (Tan, 2020d). *Wuzhi* is about authen-
tic knowing that involves a continuous process of experiencing, discovering,
and growing through human interactions. A person who embraces authentic
knowing espouses *wuyu* (objectless desire). Chapter 37 in *Daodejing* exhorts
human beings to “leave off desiring” (*wuyu*). *Wuyu* (objectless desire) is anti-
thetical to *yu* (desires) that comprises the human motivations, agendas, and
aspirations to lord over others and be looked up to. These cravings are detri-
mental to harmony as they engender distinctions, comparisons, competition,
and domination between human beings. Both Ding and Qing symbolize *wuyu*
as they are free of egoism and self-promotion, content to be a butcher and a
woodworker respectively, excelling in their craft as well as enjoying personal
and collective flow. The qualities of *wuwei* (non-coercive action), *wuming*
(nameless), *wuzhi* (non-dogmatic knowledge) and *wuyu* (objectless desire)
support universally shared values in global citizenship education such as non-
discrimination, equality, respect and dialogue as noted by UNESCO (2019a).

In sum, a global citizen, from a Daoist standpoint, is spontaneous, inclusive
and collegial, demonstrating sensitivity and care toward people and nature.
The sense of belonging to a common humanity and a broader community
that is emphasized is not societal concord that ignores or suppress one’s per-
sonhood. Laozi and Zhuangzi aim to substitute the inauthentic self that is
shaped by sociality and artificiality with the authentic self that is natural, pre-
social, and free (Judy, 2011; Machek, 2016). Ding—a lowly, illiterate and
insignificant butcher—epitomizes Daoist freedom. His reflection in action
and achievement of aesthetic self-cultivation speaks of his liberation from his
servile task (Graziani, 2005). A Daoist concept of personal freedom implies
the importance of self-reflection, agency, and self-development. As noted by
Wang (2013), Zhuangzi “privileges personhood over conducting world affairs
and believes that only those who attend [to] themselves first can be entrusted
with the responsibility of governing the world” (p. 65). This point is noted
in another passage in the *Zhuangzi* regarding an expert cicadas catcher who
shares his devotion to his craft (Chapter 19, italics added):

> I have a course [*dao*]. For five or six months, I practised piling one pel-
let on top of another. . . . Although heaven and earth are vast and the
ten thousand things numerous, *I am aware of nothing but cicada wings.*
Motionless, neither turning nor leaning, I would not trade away a single
cicada wing for all of creation. How could I fail to catch them, no matter
what I do?

Although personal freedom is foregrounded in Daoism, it is important to
differentiate it from the Enlightenment concepts of free will, rational auton-
omy, and self-determination. As explained by Zhao (2015):

> Different from the ancient Greeks and the modern Westerners, Zhuang-
zi’s freedom is not about free will and autonomy, self-determination and
self-mastery. In fact, his is the opposite of autonomy. Zhuangzi’s non-being self is precisely to get away from the trap of our ego and consciousness, which renders likes and dislikes, attachments and preferences, judgments and evaluations, and consequently the fear, the worries, and the burdens that constrain humanity in this world.

(p. 73)

**Implications for global citizenship education for youth**

The preceding has shown that human beings, from a Daoist perspective, share a common humanity in *dao*. To love *dao* is to be liberated from oppressive and dehumanizing teachings and practices, to realize one’s innate nature and to harmonize oneself with all things. Three clarifications are needed on the Daoist conception of global citizenship. First, the arguments for grounding a common humanity in *dao* do not entail or suggest that *dao*, as understood by Laozi and Zhuangzi, has an authority over other interpretations of common humanity. To put it in another way, the Daoist concept of *dao* is not the only or best path for global citizenship education. Rather, what this chapter has done is to bring attention to alternative interpretations of global citizenship across cultural and philosophical traditions, using the example of Daoism. As noted at the start of this chapter, there is a need to clarify and add to the existing research on the concepts and theories of global citizenship and global citizenship education by examining diverse formulations. A Daoist understanding of global citizenship offers a plausible explanation and justification of what it means for human beings to have a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity beyond the predominant Western traditions, paradigms, and assumptions. It is evident that a *dao*-based conception of global citizenship that values human inter-connectedness is contrasted with the individualistic notions of global citizenship that prevail in the extant literature on citizenship education.

The second clarification concerns the principle of harmony in a Daoist approach to global citizenship. Critical educators and theorists may be critical of harmony, since it can be (mis)appropriated by those in power to support hegemony, abuse of power, and unquestioned obedience in the name of “harmony.” In response to this objection, the first point to note is that Daoists are in alignment with the critical educators and theorists on the danger of using harmony as a tool to further the self-serving agendas of those in powers that oppress others. The first part of this chapter has shown how Laozi and Zhuangzi repudiate all artificial and harmful systems, values, and practices that deprive human beings of their innate nature. The second point in response to the concern raised by critical educators and theorists is that the Daoist understanding of harmony is not unconditional concord among human beings, blind allegiance to authority or the absence of conflict. Instead, the harmony that Laozi and Zhuangzi have in mind is the collective flow that is realized when human beings match their own *dao* with the *dao* of all things. Far from
justifying hegemony through harmony, the Daoist formulation of harmony rejects authoritarianism by calling for all to let nature take its own dao through mutual respect and non-interference. Circumscribed by a Daoist understanding of harmony, global citizenship education seeks to preserve respect for all, a sense of belonging to a common humanity, and the development of responsible and active global citizens.

The third clarification concerns the potential tensions between the Daoist orientation of global citizenship education and those privileged by nation-states and other ideological perspectives across the globe. Although the Daoist ideas presented here are universally applicable, they may not be accepted by all policymakers and social actors in the world due to competing goals for and conceptions of global citizenship education. A Daoist response to this limitation is to acknowledge, and seek to find a common ground among, the pluralistic interpretations and presuppositions of global citizenship education. For example, the Daoist emphasis on helping youth to respect all people as fellow human beings with intrinsic worth is a foundational belief that is compatible with the notions of global citizenship education propagated by many nation-states. The exceptions are authoritarian and oppressive states that reject the very idea of global citizenship and aim instead to indoctrinate their citizens with jingoism, ethnocentrism, and racism. The consensus on the value of human life is broad enough to embrace diverse formulations of global citizenship and yet leaves enough room for each nation-state to determine and enact its version of “respect of all people.” The Daoist affirmation of human life, potentials, and capabilities could therefore unite the varied understandings of global citizenship education across jurisdictions.

The rest of this chapter shall relate the Daoist ideas discussed in the foregoing to education for global citizenship for youth. The focus is on the second question raised in the introduction: how can global citizenship education help youth to become responsible and active global citizens who show respect for all? Following a Daoist orientation of global citizenship, youth need to embrace dao by repudiating divisive policies and practices and join hands with fellow human beings to advance universal harmony. Global citizenship education should direct youth to respect all people regardless of nationality, race, religion, language, and other social constructions. To illustrate the application of Daoist principles to the education for global citizenship for youth, the next section focuses on the issue of racism in a post-pandemic world.

The example of racism

According to Article 1.1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, racial discrimination is

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race or colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., p. 3)

Despite the fact that 182 countries have ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, not enough has been done to reduce incidents involving racism across the globe. Racial attacks against Asians and people of Asian descent that is linked to the COVID-19 pandemic have intensified around the world. The repeated references to the coronavirus as “China virus” and “kung flu” by the former US President Donald Trump has exacerbated hate crimes against Asian Americans (The Straits Times, March 21, 2021). There were at least 267 anti-Asian hate crimes recorded across the UK between January and March 2020; a reporting center called STOP AAPI HATE (AAPI stands for Asian American Pacific Islander) set up by a coalition of Asian-American groups has received over 3,000 reports of incidents of racism, hate speech, discrimination, and physical attacks against Asians and Asian-Americans (Cheng, February 25, 2021). The US President Joe Biden spoke out against “vicious hate crimes against Asian Americans who have been attacked, harassed, blamed and scapegoated” over the pandemic (The Straits Times, March 13, 2021). The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres added that “the pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged governments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate” (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

A priority of global citizenship education for youth is for them to uphold respect for all by condemning racism. To achieve this goal, it is suggested that teachers use real-life case studies of racism that involve young people. A case in point is the experience of a Singaporean student who was beaten in London on 24 February 2020 by a 15-year-old British boy. The latter, who was found guilty in the British court, had told the Singaporean student, “I don’t want your coronavirus in our country” before punching him (BBC News, January 4, 2021). This was clearly a racist act, as the Singaporean had not been infected with coronavirus, had no contact with the attacker prior to the incident and was singled out because of his Chinese looks. As acknowledged by the Crown Prosecution Service’s Daniel Kavanagh, the Singaporean was “clearly targeted in this hate crime because of his ethnic appearance” (BBC News, 2021). Teachers could use this case study to stimulate students to reflect on the actions of the attacker, the trauma experienced by the victim, what they would do should they witness such an incident and possible actions they could take to counter racism and foster inter-cultural harmony. Applying Daoist thought expounded in the first half of this chapter, the teacher could guide the students to analyze this racist incident by sharing with them: (1) the principle of following dao and matching the dao in all things; and (2) an ethics of difference based on deference and empathy.
Following dao and matching the dao in all things

First, the teacher can point out to the students that the aggressor’s racist act in the aforementioned example is an instance of oppression that denies another human being of one’s innate nature, dignity, and freedom. Racism violates the in-born racial features one is endowed with, and reflects the self-centered, fear-inducing, and estranging mindsets and practices to which Laozi and Zhuangzi object. That is why both thinkers urge a (re)turn to dao where human beings respect and act in accordance with the innate disposition of all things. A Daoist approach to addressing racism is the dissolution of one’s ego and self-protective individualism, coupled with the extension of one’s frame of reference to all things by being sensitive to their natural disposition (Tan, 2020e). The teacher could further inform the students that racist comments and actions are evidences of “naming” (ming), “dogmatic knowledge” (zhi), and “desire” (yu) where humans label, stereotype, discriminate, and exclude others based on their race/ethnicity. A Daoist solution to racism is wuming (nameless) that reminds all humans to give up controlling and oppressing others through hurtful words and actions, and wuyu (objectless desire) where all destructive distinctions, comparisons, competition, and domination between human beings are eliminated. The teacher could then draw the students’ attention to Chapter 2 of Daodejing that alludes to the differentiation and prejudice that arise due to naming:

As soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, there is already ugliness. As soon as everyone knows the able, there is ineptness.

Daodejing opposes a fixation with labeling and objectifying people and things. Ames and Hall (2003) posit that “dividing up the world descriptively and prescriptively generates correlative categories that invariably entail themselves and their antinomies” (p. 80). The teacher could also cite Chapter 23 of Zhuangzi that cautions against “try[ing] to control others, using ourselves as the regulating standard.” The destructive consequence of human subjugation is illustrated in the fictitious story of three emperors in the Zhuangzi. Two emperors, upon realizing that emperor Chaos looked different from them, decided to alter the latter’s appearance, leading to tragic consequences (7.15):

“All men have seven holes in them, by means of which they see, hear, eat, and breathe,” they [the two emperors] said. “But this one [emperor Chaos] alone has none. Let’s drill him some.” So each day they drilled another hole. After seven days, Chaos was dead.

Chaos symbolizes a primordial being who is untouched and free of human standards, contrivance, biases, and strife (Tan, 2020c). The coercive act of drilling the holes in Chaos reveals the two emperors’ refusal to accept
Chaos’ appearance and their insistence on eradicating all natural differences. The untimely death of Chaos highlights the detrimental effects on people and things when humans foist their self-regarding and ill-informed values, beliefs, and actions on others. Zhuangzi refutes an “imposition on others of our standard of good, the obligations and responsibilities conceived from the perspective of ‘I’ is at the core of these tragedies” (Zhao, 2015, p. 75). People who hold on to racist thoughts, speeches, and actions are like the two emperors who assaulted and ultimately killed Chaos.

The solution to racism, from a Daoist perspective, is to follow, love, and propagate dao by matching the dao in all things. As explained earlier, the matching of dao refers to harmonizing oneself with one’s surroundings based on each other’s innate natures. Man-made categories that engender racism and other forms of xenophobia need to be replaced by a basic respect for all based on human equality and social harmony. As Zhao (2015) puts it,

To cut people loose from their attachments, Zhuangzi attempts to break down the boundaries erected by our minds and desires, and ultimately to put aside and to lose the minds and wills altogether so that we can get back to the primordial mode of living, being in unity with the whole (hun dun) [Chaos], or as an infant, for whom there is no intelligibility, representation, conception, and language.

(p. 75)

**An ethics of difference based on deference and empathy**

Fortifying the Daoist belief in adhering to dao and matching the dao in all things is an “ethics of difference” (Huang, 2010) that is based on deference and empathy. As noted earlier, Zhuangzi maintains that everything has its own dao which is “the way each thing already is” (i.e., its natural attributes and strengths). Deference propels all to respect the worth of others, to be sensitive to their interests and needs, and to treat others the way they wish to be treated. Ames and Hall (2003) help to explicate the Daoist concept of deference:

Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgement of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self-cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition, and one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others.

(p. 38)

The inculcation of deference requires both unlearning and learning. The unlearning refers to the misconceptions and prejudices one may have about
people of another race/ethnic group. The *Daodejing* urges all to “cut off learning and there will be nothing more to worry about” (Chapter 20); the “learning” here refers to all knowing and naming that hinder oneself and others of achieving one’s *dao* (i.e., one’s true nature). Unlearning ensures that “there is no contentiousness in proper way-making, that it incurs no blame” (Chapter 8 of *Daodejing*). Going hand in hand with unlearning is learning to practice *wuwei* (non-coercive actions) contemplatively and purposively. Contemplative *wuwei* hinges on genuine non-actions that are driven by a lack of desire to participate in pitting one race/ethnic group against another. *Purposive Wuwei* motivates students to act according to their own *dao* and live peacefully with people of all cultures. A person who champions racial/ethnic harmony synchronizes oneself with others spontaneously, like Qing the Woodworker who matches the Heavenly to the Heavenly.

*Wuwei* supports a spirit of deference that is evident not only through accommodation but also empathy (Tan, 2020d). A Daoist formulation of empathy harmonizes the cognitive, affective, and moral dimensions. Briefly, cognitive empathy is essentially perspective taking where a person makes an effort to place oneself in the shoes of another person so as to understand what the latter thinks or feels (Decety & Yoder, 2016). Affective empathy revolves around “the capacity to share or become affectively aroused by others’ emotional states at least in valence and intensity” (Decety & Yoder, 2016, p. 2; also see Fagiano, 2019; Goldie, 2000). The moral aspect of empathy is also known as empathic concern that speaks of the motivation to care for the welfare of others (Decety & Yoder, 2016; Hoffman, 2000). In simple terms, empathic concern is “a fellow-feeling that arises when we consider another’s plight” (Prinz, 2011, p. 230). Empathic concern tends to generate altruistically motivated behavior because it produces shared feelings and prompts an intrinsic desire to alleviate the suffering of others (Kim & Kou, 2014). Taken as a whole, empathy means that we should not violate the innate disposition of a thing by insisting on seeing things from our perspectives and interests.

Illustrating the Daoist formulation of empathy is Chapter 19 of *Zhuangzi* that records a story of a ruler who tried to do good to a bird by feeding it with the finest meat and music, resulting in the bird becoming dazed, fearful, and reluctant to eat and drink. What the ruler had done was to try “to nourish a bird with what would nourish oneself”—an approach that indicates his lack of perspective-taking, emotional contagion, and empathic concern for the bird. What he should have done is to “nourish a bird as the bird itself would want to be nourished” (Chapter 19), which is what empathy is about. In other words, the ruler should not be presumptuous and should “follow along” with the bird (Chapter 25). To do so requires cognitive, affective, and moral empathy by studying the bird’s constitution, diet, habitat, and overall well-being. Empathy celebrates differences and allows “all creatures to delight in themselves” (7.5), regardless of one’s race or other cultural markers. The envisaged result is for all people to be free to adhere to their own nature and conduct themselves joyfully, united by a sense of belonging to a broader
community and humanity. A global citizen does not manipulate or control another person or nature through self-protective, self-conscious, and defensive actions. Instead, such a person is guided by the ideal of a common humanity and advances the innate disposition of all things.

**Strategies for global citizenship education for youth**

Applying Daoist perspectives on empathy to global citizenship education for youth means that they should be encouraged to see things from the viewpoints of other races/ethnic groups, share the experiences of people who look different from them, and be sensitive to their needs, concerns, and interests. Effective lessons on global citizenship are premised on an ethics of difference where students put themselves in the shoes of others, especially those who are the victims of racist comments and actions. Teachers could prompt the students to ask themselves: How would I feel if I were assaulted based on my ethnicity? Perspective taking by the youth helps them to have an ethical and genuine concern for the welfare of other things in the world (Tan, 2020e). It needs to be added that empathy does not require two persons to experience the emotions in the same way or to the same intensity. All that is required is sufficient similarity in emotions or thought where a person can say that one is able to “feel or recall the feeling of the same (or sufficiently similar) sadness” (Campelia, 2017, p. 532).

To promote Daoist citizenship values in their students, teachers could tap on the existing programs and resources on racism. An example is a training course known as RACE that stands for Racism Awareness through Citizenship Education. RACE is an initiative started by SALTO-YOUTH, which is a network of seven resource centers working on European priority areas within the youth field. According to the website, SALTO-YOUTH “provides non-formal learning resources for youth workers and youth leaders and organises training and contact-making activities to support organizations and National Agencies (NAs) within the frame of the European Commission’s Erasmus+ Youth programme, the European Solidarity Corps, and beyond” (www.salto-youth.net/about/).

RACE seeks to stimulate and develop young people’s citizenship education in terms of racism awareness within the youth organizations in order to promote active participation of European young citizens in relation to the civic, political, social, economic, legal, and cultural spheres of their community and to foster positive attitudes towards the feelings of mutual understanding, tolerance, non-discrimination/non-racism and peace. (SALTO, n.d., para 1)

Teachers could spotlight on the objective of “understanding the value of respect for the ‘Other’” by directing students to educational projects on active
citizenship and racism awareness (SALTO, n.d.). Teachers could also tap on the resources available on websites such as the one started by Chichester University in the UK for children and youth, at www.britkind.org. As noted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n.d.):

The visitor to the site is invited to provide information about him- or herself, including age, race, and religion. The site introduces the visitor to other young people of about the same age, who describe their own lives and cultures, including problems they have faced involving racism. In addition to the games, the site contains statistics and other information relevant to the occurrence of and fight against racism; and it contains links to other public service and information sites.

(p. 23)

In enacting the education for global citizenship programs for youth, it is important that teachers eschew didactic approaches and engender active participation and critical reflection in students. It is a salient point that Zhuangzi describes a follower of dao as a reflective practitioner who goes beyond passivity and technical rationality. The primacy of self-reflection is displayed by Cook Ding when he compares his own mastery with that of a novice cook (Zhuangzi, 3.3–3.6):

A good cook changes his blade once a year: he slices. An ordinary cook changes his blade once a month: he hacks. I have been using this same blade for nineteen years, cutting up thousands of oxen, and yet it is still as sharp as the day it came off the whetstone. For the joints have spaces within them, and the very edge of the blade has no thickness at all. When what has no thickness enters into an empty space, it is vast and open, with more than enough room for the play of the blade. That is why my knife is still as sharp as if it had just come off the whetstone, even after nineteen years.

Ding’s point is that possessing the basic knowledge and technique of a cook is a prerequisite for anyone who wishes to be employed in the palace. But routinized and technical skills alone are insufficient for a cook to achieve proficiency. A cook with these basic competencies is merely one who hacks and changes his blade once a month. This is contrasted with an expert cook like Ding whose sublime, sage-king-like ability is admired by the King. Graziani (2005) contends that

Zhuangzi breaks with the traditional framework of self-cultivation and shows that it cannot be reduced to a purely technical exercise: even the most mundane and base activity, if performed correctly, offers a way to preserve and enhance one’s life and summons a spiritual force to lodge itself within the body.

(p. 71)
The development of self-reflection in youth is in concert with a primary objective of UNESCO (2016), namely to instill cognitive and non-cognitive skills and behavioral capacities through global citizenship education. Accordingly, cognitive abilities include critical and creative thinking whereas non-cognitive skills include empathy and communicative capabilities. To cultivate youth as reflective, active, and responsible citizens, teachers should design and implement lessons for global citizenship education that are broad-based, transformative, contextualized, and value based (UNESCO, 2019c). Activities that are broad-based integrate the learning content and outcomes, teaching methods, and the learning environment in formal, non-formal, and informal learning settings. The transformative component of these activities spurs youth on to become change agents through their social and political activism. The activities should also be contextualized by taking into consideration historical, political, sociocultural, and economic factors. Finally, the lessons should be value based by propagating “universally shared values such as non-discrimination, equality, respect and dialogue” (UNESCO, 2019c, para 2). Suggested teaching methods that foster dao-making among students include cooperative learning strategies and the community of inquiry (COI) method that promote dialogical and caring thinking (Tan, 2019b). Some examples of activities that advance personal growth and group cohesion are journal writing, peer feedback, and service learning where students share their learning points from involvement in community projects. Recommended assessment modes for education for citizenship for youth are those that are formative, alternative, and authentic appraisal formats.

Conclusion

Despite the currency and significance of global citizenship, there is no consensus on what this term means and encompasses (Andreotti, 2006; Dill, 2013; Evans et al., 2009; Gaudelli, 2009; Marshall, 1992; Oxley & Morris, 2013; Veugelers, 2011). Global citizenship, as a “fuzzy catch-all phrase” (Mannion et al., 2011, p. 1), is vague, evolving, and debatable (Tan, 2019a). A related point is the absence of substantial philosophical underpinnings of the notion of global citizenship. As observed by Bamber et al. (2018), there is presently “only cursory analysis of the theoretical foundations” for the concept of and education for global citizenship (p. 206). Addressing a research gap on the concept of global citizenship, this chapter proposed a philosophical interpretation by referring to two Daoist classics. The chapter sought to answer these two questions: what does it mean for human beings to have a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity? And, how can global citizenship education help youth to become responsible and active global citizens who show respect for all?

In the first part of this chapter, I argued that human beings share a common humanity in dao, which is the source of value and being for all. To love dao is to be liberated from authoritarian systems and practices that suppress
one’s personhood, to return to one’s innate nature and to harmonize oneself with one’s surroundings. The achievement of collective flow is made possible through  

*wuwei* (non-coercive action),  

*wuming* (nameless),  

*wuzhi* (non-dogmatic knowledge), and  

*wuyu* (objectless desire). A global citizen, it follows, is spontaneous, open-minded, and inclusive, demonstrating deference, and empathic care toward all people and nature. The second section of the chapter related Daoist ideas to education for global citizenship for youth, using the example of racism experienced by Asians in a post-pandemic world. Racism reflects the self-absorbed, divisive, and oppressive worldviews, regulations, norms, and practices to which Laozi and Zhuangzi object. That is why both thinkers urge a (re)turn to  

*dao* where human beings act naturally, ethically, and collaboratively. It is proposed that the teacher encourage their students to become responsible and active global citizens who repudiate racism and uphold respect for all.

Applying Daoist tenets, the teacher could guide the students to analyze this racist incident by referring to the principle of following  

*dao* and matching the  

*dao* in all things, and by engaging an ethics of difference based on deference and empathy. The Daoist construction of citizenship underlines “a relational self and a non-being self, characterized by spirituality and ethics” (Zhao, 2015, p. 77; also see Berkson, 2005). Offering an alternative conception of global citizenship and citizenship education for youth, a Daoist approach to citizenship education is aligned with a thick conception of human good or perfection (Tan, 2020a). According to McLaughlin (1992), the conception of human good or perfection can be thin or thick, with the main difference on the degree to which a citizenship education approach stipulates specific, substantial frameworks of belief and value for citizens. Citizenship education that adheres to a  

*thin* conception of human good or perfection requires the state to be neutral on matters of private good. Such a form of citizenship education is independent of substantial and particular frameworks of belief and value. Citizenship education that is congruous with a  

*thick* conception of human good constitutes, supports, and justifies the notion of the public good (McLaughlin, 1992). This version of citizenship education sketches a comprehensive account of human life and how it should be lived.

A Daoist framing of global citizenship remedies the vagueness in UNESCO’s (2015) interpretation of global citizenship as having “a sense of belonging to a broader community and humanity” (p. 14). A major shortcoming of a Daoist approach to global citizenship is its lack of empirical data for its implementation in schools. Hence, it is recommended that more research be conducted to explore the viability and extent of efficacy of a Daoist conception of global citizenship education in educational settings. In conclusion, this chapter brings to the fore the urgency of education for citizenship for youth amidst a rise in xenophobia worldwide. A Daoist approach to global citizenship places a premium on a common humanity that is anchored in  

*dao*—a shared vision that is essential in our fractured, post-pandemic world.
References


4 Global Citizenship and Youth
Profiles of Perception of Global Threats

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Introduction

The intense interconnectedness of the world’s economies, societies, and environment may imply that a local threat can rapidly convert into a global one. The COVID-19 pandemic experienced during 2019–2021 is the most immediate example of how global threats can affect the lives of the population worldwide. This event has shown how a local health issue—focused on a specific region of China—rapidly transformed into a global threat, transforming social, cultural, and economic conditions in the world (Wolski, 2020). In this sense, COVID-19 is probably the newest example of a specific global threat that, different from others such as climate change or even crime that may take time to expand, unfolded and changed the lives of people around the world in a two-month period.

The way in which pandemic COVID-19 has performed shows one of the greatest challenges for society in the coming decades: the need to develop competencies for being global citizens to understand, analyze, and respond to threats that can rapidly reach worldwide scale. To respond to this challenge, young people have a key role to play in understanding such global issues that are affecting them and that will continue to do so in the future. However, perceiving global threats requires, at least, a sophisticated understanding of international trends, links between local actions and global impacts, access to reliable information, and the motivation to maintain interest in these issues.

The chapter aims to contribute to the research on youth, education, citizenship, and democracy in the current global era. We have witnessed in recent times a global pandemic that affected the entire world, and still, notions of citizenship are circumscribed to notions of belonging to a political community, often defined as the nation-state (Treviño et al., 2021). Such perspective on citizenship may play a valuable role in sustaining key elements of democracy, for example, participation in free elections, involvement in political and social issues, and even participating in protests whenever society identifies abuses of power from the political system (Villalobos et al., 2021). However, the definition of citizenship as national and territorial belonging to a political community is insufficient to develop deeper and informed understandings among youth of the international interconnectedness of social, environmental, and economic issues (Davis, 2007; Habermas, 2001). Living on the earth, with
limited resources, in an environmental crisis due to global warming, the transmission of diseases, and the spread of armed conflicts are only some of the issues that citizenship definitions require to include in this global era. Still, shortsighted approaches on citizenship, sometimes fueled by nationalisms and different types of social segregation common in the developed and developing world, leave out of their definition the fact that all human beings live in a finite and interconnected world (O’Bryne, 2003).

This chapter analyzes the profiles of global citizenship (GC) and global threats among youth of approximately 13 years of age in 24 countries using the data from the International Civics and Citizenship Study of 2016 (Schulz et al., 2018), which included countries in Asia (3), Europe (16), and Latin America (5). Using an innovative person-centered approach via latent classes analysis, the study identifies five profiles in relation to global threats. The latent class analysis (LCA) approach differentiates from traditional variable-centered methods, like regression, for its capacity to substantially describe population attitudes’ heterogeneity in a set of indicators or variables. This method groups people based on their response patterns, each a latent class or profile (Masyn, 2013). International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) measures the perception of global threats through 13 indicators; some examples are climate change, pollution, financial crises, overpopulation, and violent conflicts, among others. In this book chapter, we find five response patterns or profiles. The first one is the aware profile, grouping 52% of the total population. The aware profile is characterized by a probability response pattern where all the indicators are considered a possible threat to the world’s future. An opposite response pattern is the unaware profile (2%), where all the items have a low probability of being considered a threat. Another profile is comprised by the pollutionists (12%), who perceive only the pollution indicator as a possible global threat. Finally, two remaining profiles are the aware but conflict senseless (16%) and aware but overpopulation and climate change senseless (18%). In both cases, the responders perceive each indicator as a possible threat to the world’s future, but related to violent-social conflicts in the first instance and climate change and overpopulation in the second. It is interesting to note that such profiles are present in all the participating countries, and the analyses ensure the comparability (invariance) of the profiles across countries. With this evidence at hand, we describe the profiles and the distribution of patterns across regions and countries.

The chapter is organized into four sections. First, it presents a literature review on GC and global threats to democracy among youth. Second, it describes the data and methods used to estimate the profiles. The third section delves into the main results of the study. The last section presents the main conclusions, limitations, and ideas for further research.

**Literature review**

Developing citizenship attributes for youth in the 21st century represents an enormous challenge due to the complexities of the problems that societies
currently face and the limited set of responses that the political and policy structures of nation-states have at hand for facing these complex challenges (Innerarity, 2020). Over time, the notion of citizenship in education has been focused on social rights and duties, with a special emphasis on voting, knowing, and respecting the functioning of political institutions via the official curriculum in schools (Villalobos et al., 2021). However, such perspective oversimplifies the citizenship concept in an era of complex global challenges for humanity (Treviño et al., 2021).

The context of globalization poses challenges for democracy (Innerarity, 2020) and requires an advanced and multidimensional approach to citizenship definitions (Haste et al., 2017), which consider, at least, the interaction between: (a) civic knowledge; (b) citizenship attitudes; and (c) civic participation (i.e., elections, political parties, and legal or illegal protests). These three dimensions are interrelated, but they are three different conceptual and empirical constructs (Schulz et al., 2018). International literature shows that these three dimensions are linked, but they have low correlations among them (Isac et al., 2014). Thus, the definition of citizenship has been historically shaped by the notions of liberal democracy and nation-state—in which citizenship implies being a member of a community (Villalobos et al., 2021; Andreotti & Pashby, 2013), in this case a country with its political, social, cultural, and legal components (Stokke, 2017; Katzarska-Miller & Reysen, 2018)—and seems to fall short in the face of current and future global challenges.

A seemingly easy way to analyze how youth value global threats around the world is to stick to the concept of GC. However, such a concept is polysemic because it may have different meanings according to the specific framework used to define it and the contexts in which this concept takes form. The notion of GC has been defined in the literature in, at least, four ways. First, a Western view of GC has been used to frame the important issue of knowing, getting involved, and participating locally and globally to solve global challenges (UNESCO, 2014, 2017). This notion of GC emerged after World War II as part of the central role played by international organizations (Trully, 2014) and the legal changes in different countries sharing the human rights framework (Parada, 2009). Within this definition of GC, the literature has emphasized the development of inter- and multi-cultural skills (Barrett et al., 2014) as a way to promote tolerance, knowledge, and respect toward others, as well as the capacity of building societal agreements to live in community. Such a perspective has been labeled as soft or traditional GC (Akkari & Maleq, 2019).

Second, a neoliberal approach to GC is linked to the immense power of international corporations (Trully, 2014), the multiplication of both markets and migrations of capital and transnational workers (Sassen, 1999), and rapid technological changes (Borja & Castells, 1996). According to the neoliberal approach, a combination of factors has created a global and interdependent economy where production and consumption patterns are configured at a planetary scale. The neoliberal conception of GC usually denotes a more economic perspective, and the notion of GC is linked to the intercultural skills
Global Citizenship and Youth

to develop economic exchanges around the world (Davies & Reid, 2005). Thirdly, critical GC is a different approach, which has focused not only on the promotion of global human values but specially on the inequitable processes that affect different minorities and disadvantaged groups (Chapman et al., 2018), and extensively questions the global configurations of power and inequality (Andreotti & De Souza, 2012; Camia & Franklin, 2011).

Finally, the environmental dimension of GC is related to the awareness of the fact that all humans share this finite and interconnected world (Arneil, 2007) in close relationship to nature. To summarize, GC is a polysemic concept that can be defined from different perspectives. It involves at least three components: sociopolitical (soft or critical), economic, and environmental (Kirkwood, 2001; OXFAM, 2015). The four perspectives presented here share the idea that there are global processes that defy traditional citizenship notions based on political participation and voting within a nation-state (Villalobos et al., 2021; Oxley & Morris, 2013). These GC definitions, despite coming from different sociopolitical perspectives, recognize the relevance of globalization and the challenges of expanding the notion of citizenship to face global processes or threats (Holsti, 2002).

Global awareness, a key concept for GC, has been present in the literature at least since the 1970s (Hanvey, 1976). This definition, according to Hanvey (1976), includes five dimensions: (a) perspective consciousness; (b) state-of-planet awareness; (c) cross-cultural awareness; (d) knowledge of global dynamics; and, (e) awareness of human choices. It is interesting to note that “state-of-planet” awareness is a broad dimension with two elements. First, it implies the comprehension of prevailing world conditions, developments, trends, and problems that are confronted by the global community. Second, it also involves having an in-depth understanding of global issues such as population growth, migrations, economic disparities, depletion of resources, and international conflicts. The literature on GC evolved posing several critiques and advancements. Among them, there is a critique of Hanvey’s (1976) description of global awareness because it neither considers the perspective of consciousness nor the introspection needed to know each one’s own place in the local and global structures of power (Merryfield & Subedi, 2001). Case (1993) has also identified global interconnections, along with universal values and cultural practices, as one of the elements of GC, which includes the four major interactive global systems: economic, political, ecological, and technological. A similar case is presented by Pike and Selby (1988), who pointed out the need for global awareness on the health of the planet, which is based on the awareness of global conditions and developments. These conceptual elements are discussed in the findings and concluding sections in relation to empirical results.

Developing GC as part of the purposes of the school system is still a pending matter around the world, although there are interesting examples. The European Union (EU) has promoted policy frameworks that aim at enhancing citizenship education through the promotion of common values and attitudes
among student populations in Europe, while at the same time valuing cultural diversity (Isac et al., 2021). However, an analysis of middle and secondary education texts—on the disciplines of history, social studies, civics, and geography—in 78 countries shows that the nationalist narrative persists in textbooks, and it has not diminished with the political, economic, and social globalization, suggesting that more globalization coexists with nationalism in a non-zero sum game (Lerch et al., 2019). The evidence on these issues shows tensions between the aim of sharing a common culture and valuing diversity, especially among some European-born students that present attitudes that propose that immigrants should not have the same rights as those born in Europe (Isac et al., 2021).

Besides this multi-country institutional effort for developing shared values in Europe, the countries from Asia and Latin America share cultural and linguistic features that are a product of their history. Asian countries, at least those participating in ICCS 2016, are characterized by sharing a common cultural heritage of Confucianism, which emphasizes a long-term horizon for promoting change and respect for authorities, and it may be related to the evidence suggesting that protests are the least preferable way of participation among Asian students (Kennedy & Kuang, 2021). Latin American countries participating in ICCS 2016 also share a common heritage marked by the imposition of the Spanish language on the local indigenous populations since the arrival of the Spaniards in the 15th century, as well as political forms of organization and the instauration of Catholicism as the official religion. Therefore, there are key historical and cultural commonalities among Latin American countries. The development of the region led to widespread corruption and authoritarian regimes (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021). For such a reason, tolerance for corruption (Carrasco et al., 2020; Morris, 2008; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021) and support of authoritarian practices by government leaders (Miranda et al., 2021) are current challenges faced by countries within this region. In sum, the countries from the three regions (i.e., Asia, Europe, and Latin America) face different contexts that may shape their views on citizenship and, specifically for this chapter, the understanding of global threats.

It is important to state that the capacity of schools to promote civic and citizenship attributes seems to be rather limited. Recent evidence shows that school factors explain limited variance of student attitudes toward equality of rights for minorities and women (Treviño et al., 2017), as well as to explain participation in Latin America (Treviño et al., 2018). In fact, nearly 90% of the variance on student citizenship outcomes occurs within schools, meaning that students within the same schools are highly diverse in most of the cases, and schools have to deal with such diversity (Treviño et al., 2019). In the same line, it seems that schools have a limited capacity to influence civic outcomes, and more challenging that schools could promote GC skills, although this is a question for further research.

Recognizing the variety of perspectives on GC, this study follows an empirical approach based on a holistic definition of GC, which involves sociopolitical,
The available data from ICCS 2016 includes violent conflicts, terrorism, crime, overpopulation, and infectious diseases as sociopolitical elements. It considers economic elements such as global financial crises, energy and food shortages, poverty, and unemployment. The environmental aspects include pollution, climate change, and water shortages (Schulz et al., 2018). This exercise will allow us to describe the combination of global threats that students are aware of in countries from Asia, Europe, and Latin America, as an empirical approximation to understand how youth approach GC.

The approximation to the study of GC via global threats has advantages and shortcomings. Among the advantages, the study allows us to illuminate the way in which youth around the world consider these specific sociopolitical, environmental, and economic global threats. We then can identify the way in which students regard the combination of global threats and relate such results to specific contextual elements. The main disadvantage may be that the conceptual framework used by ICCS 2016 may be leaving out key specific global threats that may be more important for students according to their local context. Furthermore, the analysis of global threats does not allow for an in-depth analysis of the different conceptual frameworks of the GC. However, we propose that students with more awareness regarding the different global threats may be more inclined to have a more holistic approach of the sociopolitical, economic, and environmental issues related to GC. We also pose, as a hypothesis, that students with more awareness may be nearer to a critical GC profile.

In general terms, it is possible to hypothesize that each region may face specific global threats more intensively. For example, violent conflicts, crime, poverty, and unemployment may be regarded as key issues for Latin America (Lessing, 2012; López-Calva & Lustig, 2010; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021). In Europe, environmental awareness seems to be a widespread worry among youth (TUI Stiftung, 2018). Finally, in Asia, the geopolitical situation may shape the views of youth in terms of violent conflicts. At the time of data collection for this study, the world did not foresee the COVID-19 pandemic; for such a reason, we present results that represent the situation previous to the spread of the virus.

With this initial effort, we aim at understanding the different configurations of GC understood as awareness of global threats among youth attending schools in 24 countries and three regions. Using the ICCS 2016 data offers a unique opportunity to study this phenomenon around the globe, but it may also have limitations, as discussed in the conclusion.

Data sources and analytical methods

Our study is based on data from the ICCS 2016. The project collected data from two-staged national representative samples of eighth-grade students in 24 countries on key civic and citizenship dimensions, including global threats.
The study selects schools and complete classrooms within schools. Such a characteristic implies the need to use analytical methods that consider the complex or two-stage design of the study (Schulz et al., 2018). ICCS 2016 included students from: (a) Asia (i.e., Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, and the Republic of Korea) for a total of 9,207 students; (b) Europe (i.e., Flemish Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, The Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, and Germany’s North Rhine-Westphalia) comprising a total of 60,077 students; and (c) Latin America (i.e., Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru) with 25,315 students.

The variables selected for these analyses are those in the battery of the ICCS 2016 study related to economic, sociopolitical, and environmental factors perceived by students as global threats, as marked in the literature of GC. The items ask students the following: “To what extent do you think the following issues are a threat to the world’s future?” Item responses are designed as a Likert scale with four levels: “very important,” “quite important,” “not very important,” and “not important at all.” However, for these analyses, the scales were recoded into two levels: (a) important, which includes the responses “very important” and “quite important”; and, (b) not important, grouping answers in the “not very important” and “not important at all” original levels. This recoding was performed under the criterion of diminishing cells with a small number of cases in the items and countries analyzed (Torres-Irribarra & Carrasco, 2021). The specific items of the scale allow students to assess the degree to which they consider problems to be a global threat, as presented in Table 4.1.

We analyzed the data fitting a structurally homogeneous LCA (Kankaraš & Vermunt, 2014) to create students’ profiles on their perspectives on the importance of global threats. As explained in the introduction, the LCA approach differentiates from traditional variable-centered methods—like regression—for its capacity to substantially describe population attitudes’ heterogeneity in a set of indicators or variables. This method groups people based on their response patterns (Masyn, 2013). This means that the method allows for the identification of students with similar profiles, in this case, profiles of awareness on global threats.

The structurally homogeneous model used allows comparing among countries without losing interpretability. In this way, the between-country variation is only the proportion of students in each country that pertains to a latent class (or response profile). Also, the analysis considers the nesting of students within schools (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2008; Henry & Muthén, 2010; Vermunt, 2008), which is part of the sampling-design of ICCS 2016, which collects data of students within schools, as well as the sampling weights and the sample stratification (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010; Gonzalez, 2012). We selected the model following the standard methodologies of LCA, and we performed a robustness check to ensure the stability of results through an exploratory and validation sample (for more information refer to the Appendix).
Study results

The results show that students can be categorized into the following five profiles in relation to their awareness about global threats: (a) aware; (b) aware but climate change and overpopulation senseless; (c) aware but conflict senseless; (d) pollutionists; and (e) unaware. These results are presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. These categories are organized in relation to the probability of students considering each threat as important, according to their answers to the survey questions representing each global threat. Therefore, each profile groups students with a similar probability of response to the group of items. The method used allows us to differentiate across groups, even in the cases when groups of students may have a similar probability of considering one or several threats as important.

The general results for all the participating countries show that 52% of the students fall into a class labeled as aware. Students classified as Aware have 90% or higher probabilities of considering all the threats as important, according to their answers to the questions in the survey. This means that these students see economic, sociopolitical, and environmental factors as important threats for humanity, being aligned with the most sophisticated definitions of GC, which consider all these elements as important.

Conversely, 2% of the students are in a category labeled unaware. Students within this group have less than 10% of probabilities of considering all the threats to the future as important, except for pollution. This means that they have very low probabilities of classifying the different global phenomena as a threat for humankind. Even in the case of pollution, unaware students have only 18% of probabilities of qualifying such a global challenge as a threat. In sum, unaware students do not consider all the global threats measured in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item description</th>
<th>Type of threat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pollution</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water shortages</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global financial crises</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy shortages</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food shortages</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overpopulation</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases (e.g., bird flu and AIDS)</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Köhler et al., 2018.
survey as important. Also, they are only modestly aware of the threat of pollution. However, it is important noticing that unaware students represent a small proportion of the total population of students.

Nearly 16% of the students are classified as aware but conflict senseless. Students within this category have 70% or higher probabilities of answering the items of all global threats as important, except for those related to crime and violence. These students are mostly aware of global threats, due to their high probability of considering them as important, but they have between 50% and 60% probability of considering crime and violent conflicts as global threats. The latter implies that within this profile there is not a clear pattern to identify crime and violence as global threats.

The next class can be defined as aware but climate change and overpopulation senseless, which accounts for 18% of the students. Students in this class show 70% or higher probabilities of considering important all the items, except for overpopulation and climate change. It is worth noticing that students within this profile have 50% of probabilities of regarding overpopulation as a global threat, a magnitude that does not represent a clear pattern in favor or against the perception of this phenomenon as a threat. Complementarily,
students in this category show nearly 65% of probabilities of considering climate change as a global threat. Although this may represent a clearer pattern towards perceiving climate change as a threat, students in this profile have lower probabilities of considering the latter as a threat in comparison to students in the aware profile.

The final class includes 12% of the students who are labeled as pollutionists. Students within this profile have 70% or higher probabilities of considering pollution as an important global threat, according to their answers to the survey. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, students in the pollutionists profile have between 35% to 58% probability of perceiving the rest of the global challenges as a threat. This means that it is only possible to clearly identify this group as worried for pollution, without clearer patterns in relation to the rest of the global threats included in the survey.

Behind these general trends, there are important regional and country differences that deserve attention. Asian countries show somewhat different patterns. For example, the percentage of aware students ranges from 44% in Korea, 53% in Chinese Taipei to 67% in Hong Kong SAR. This finding may be fueled by the geopolitical situation in the region, in which Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong SAR students are aware of the political tensions with mainland

Figure 4.2 Proportions of students by type of global threat awareness profile and country, organized by region

Note: BFL = Belgium (Flemish), BGR = Bulgaria, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, DNK = Denmark, DNW = Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), DOM = Dominican Republic, EST = Estonia, FIN = Finland, HKG = Hong Kong SAR, HRV = Croatia, ITA = Italy, KOR = Republic of Korea, LTU = Lithuania, LVA = Latvia, MEX = Mexico, MLT = Malta, NLD= Netherlands, NOR = Norway, PER = Peru, RUS = Russian Federation, SVN = Slovenia, SWE = Sweden and TWN = Chinese Taipei.
China. If we consider the two categories that are aware of conflicts (*aware and aware but climate change and overpopulation senseless*), the proportion of students in the two profiles accounts for 74% in Hong Kong SAR, 74% in Chinese Taipei, and 78% in the Republic of Korea. This suggests that the hypothesis of geopolitical tensions may be fueling the worry of a threat of violent conflict in the region. Still, there are 19% of students in Hong Kong SAR and 10.6% in Chinese Taipei that are aware but conflict senseless. This may be explained, in part, by the long-term vision toward change influenced by the Confucian tradition in these countries, which includes a perspective of incremental and non-disruptive social changes (Kennedy & Kuang, 2021).

Also, it is interesting to note that the Republic of Korea has the largest proportion of *aware but climate change and overpopulation senseless* students. With nearly 35% of the total student population in this category, it seems that the rapid industrialization and positioning of this country in the global economy has influenced the perception of global threats of the students, since economic dynamism may be regarded as being at odds with the care for the environment. Furthermore, the decrease in the rate of population growth in the past 40 years may be an explanation of the lack of preoccupation for overpopulation as a problem among students in this country (World Bank, 2021).

European countries exhibit a more diverse distribution of students into the profiles. First, one-fifth or more of the student population is classified as *pollutionists* in the Netherlands (31%), Sweden (22%), Norway (21%), and Denmark (20%). These figures represent the highest concentration of pollutionists across the 24 participating countries. The level of economic development of these countries from Northern Europe may be an explanation for these trends, in which consciousness about climate change and the environment is heightened. However, it also reveals that a substantial proportion of students have a reduced conceptualization of the rest of the global threats. This seems contradictory with terrorist events that have happened in several European countries. Furthermore, not being aware of infectious diseases as a global threat is now more evident than in 2016—when the data was collected—but these students did not regard such an element as a threat that unfortunately was transformed into reality in 2020.

Half or more of the student population is classified as *aware* in eight European countries. They are Lithuania (65%), Slovenia (62%), Latvia (57%), Italy (57%), Russia (54%), Croatia (54%), Bulgaria (51%), and Malta (50%). It is noticeable that six countries that were part of the orbit of the Soviet regime have high percentages of *aware* students. This phenomenon may be partly explained by the recent history of armed conflicts, as well as organized crime and terrorist activities in several of these countries. Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the long processes of economic change, have had important impacts on the economic life of these countries. Finally, it is interesting that these students are also conscious of environmental threats,
a finding that may be related to the integration of several of these countries to the European Union, which has set targets to reduce emissions by 2030 (EU, 2021).

In seven European countries, one-fourth of the student population or more is classified as *aware but conflict senseless*, also representing the highest proportions of this profile among the participating countries in ICCS 2016. Belgium (Flemish) (39%), Sweden (37%), Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia) (35%), Denmark (34%), Norway (33%), the Netherlands (29%), and Finland (25%) have more students classified as *aware but conflict senseless* across the 24 participating countries. They are all highly developed countries from Northern Europe, with consolidated democracies characterized by solving their differences through institutional mechanisms (Biseth et al., 2021). This may also explain the high proportions of students in this profile in Belgium (Flemish) and Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia).

In Latin America, *aware* students are the majority in three out of the five countries. Specifically, Chile (74%), Colombia (73%), and Mexico (65%) show the highest proportions of students classified as *aware* among the participating countries—except for Hong Kong SAR that shows a similar proportion of students in this profile. With lower figures but nearing half of the population, the Dominican Republic, and Peru have 46% and 41% of *aware* students, respectively. Rampant inequality, crime, violent conflicts, over-crowded cities, poverty, and unemployment are attributes of the Latin American region (López-Calva & Lustig, 2010; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021), and that may explain why a high percentage of students consider all of the global threats as important.

In the Dominican Republic and Peru, one-third or more of the student population is classified as *aware but senseless to climate change and overpopulation*. After long internal armed conflicts and dictatorships, these countries have recently enjoyed the economic boom in the region during the period of 2000–2012 that brought large segments of the population out of poverty (Rivas, 2015). Such a phenomenon may explain why these students appreciate economic global threats more than climate change and overpopulation. This profile has lower proportions of students in Chile (13%) and Colombia (12%), countries that have had more steady growth and were recently accepted as member countries of the OECD, an organization that groups developed countries.

Finally, the proportion of students in the *pollutionist* profile range from 4% to 15% in Latin American countries. Interestingly, Peru (15%), Dominican Republic (14%), and Mexico (11%) have the highest percentages of students in the *pollutionist* profile in the region. This suggests that such students may have a less sophisticated understanding of global threats, given the economic and sociopolitical threats that are present currently in the region.

The results of this research show that there are different configurations of GC in relation to the perception of global threats to the future of humanity.
Conclusion

The overall aim of this chapter has been to contribute to the discussion of GC and education, considering the enormous challenges that we face as humanity that are not blocked by borders. The interconnectedness of the world in economic, sociopolitical, and environmental terms requires citizens to develop more sophisticated understandings of the world’s workings. The study of the awareness of global threats offers a unique opportunity to study the way in which students understand the world and its economic, sociopolitical, and environmental challenges. The analysis of ICCS 2016 data has allowed us to classify students into profiles in terms of their awareness of global threats, which is an approach to study GC in a more holistic and generalized way.

Most of the students in the study are in the aware profile, meaning that they perceive the different global threats. In fact, across the 24 participating countries, 52% of the students are classified as aware, meaning that they are aware of economic, environmental, and sociopolitical global threats. This may mean that they are more sophisticated in analyzing the interconnection between these three types of threats. These results, however, are not homogeneously distributed among regions and countries.

In the Asian context, there are also high proportions of students in the aware profile, ranging from 44% to 67%. Considering together the students in the aware and the aware but climate change and overpopulation senseless categories, nearly three-fourths of the students in Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, and the Republic of Korea are highly aware of sociopolitical threats, such as violent conflicts. This may be shaped by the geopolitical situation in the Asian region and the tensions between these countries and mainland China.

In Europe, there is a twofold phenomenon. On the one hand, students in northern countries tend to be less sensitive to violent conflicts as a global threat, especially in Nordic countries along with Belgium (Flemish), the Netherlands, and Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia). The democratic and institutional traditions of these countries from the mid-20th century onwards may partially explain the lower awareness of conflict as a threat, because they have channeled social and economic challenges through the institutions of liberal democracy in place in such territories. Conversely, in the countries that were part of the orbit of the Soviet Union, half or more of the students are in the aware profile. Italy and Malta also show a similar pattern.

Latin American countries have high proportions of students in the aware profile. In Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, two-thirds or more of the population are classified as aware, a figure that is approximately 40% in the Dominican Republic and Peru. Such results may be shaped by the economic, sociopolitical, and environmental challenges that converge in the region.

The evidence suggests that students worldwide have sophisticated levels of awareness regarding the different types of global threats and that they may be gauging these threats with some complexity. Therefore, it seems that students are developing GC awareness in relation to different types of global threats.
However, this evidence is not sufficient to assert what type of GC is more common among students in each context. We may hypothesize that aware students have a more critical GC profile, but we need further research to confirm that hypothesis.

Note

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Influence of teacher, student and school characteristics on students’ attitudes toward diversity. In A. Sandoval-Hernández, M. M. Isac, & D. Miranda (Eds.), Teaching tolerance in a globalized world (pp. 33–65). IEA—Springer Open. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78692-6_4


The results show that the model with five classes is the most appropriate option to meaningfully divide students into groups according to their perceptions on global threats. To arrive at this result, we estimated models including from one to ten latent classes. Table 4.1A includes the results and the fit indices. According to the BIC index, the six-class model shows the best fit, while the AIC suggests that the ten-class model has the best fit. However, analyzing the changes in the value of the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic ($L^2$), the improvement of this statistic shows that the improvement in the model is marginal between the models with four to ten classes (6%). Additionally, the classification error between the ten-class and the four-class model increases by 8%. For these reasons, we decided to analyze the solutions between four and five classes, where the classification error is similar (between .14 and .17, respectively).

The study used both an exploratory and a validation sample. We used the exploratory sample to identify the number of latent classes and, with this, the response patterns. Afterward, we used the validation sample to test the replication of results. These processes serve as mechanisms for robustness checks of the models, to ensure that the results of the profiles are statistically

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<th>AIC (LL)</th>
<th>Npar</th>
<th>$L^2$</th>
<th>% change $L^2$</th>
<th>Class. Err.</th>
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</table>

Note: BIC (LL) = Bayesian Information Criteria, AIC (LL) = Akaike's Information Criteria, Npar = Number of parameters estimated in the model, $L^2$ = likelihood ratio chi-square statistic, % change $L^2$ = percentage of change between $k_i$ and $k_j$ class model, Class. Err. = Classification error.
consistent. For the case selection, we randomly divided the complete sample into two groups, keeping the school as the primary sampling unit. All the latent-class analyses were performed with the software Latent Gold v5.1 (Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). For choosing the model with the exploratory sample, we analyzed the variation from one to ten latent classes. Then, we used three criteria for defining the final number of latent classes. First, we assessed the relative fit adjustment indexes AIC and individual BIC. However, these criteria are not sufficient because finding the lowest values in these indexes does not guarantee the best solution due to a possible over-extraction of classes. For this reason, it is necessary to consider the classification error of the model, which is the second criterion for model assessment (Masyn, 2013). Finally, we assessed if the classes obtained have a substantively and theoretically sufficient interpretability, along with the proportion of classes that are not extreme (Henry & Muthén, 2010; Masyn, 2013). Once defining the number of classes, we replicated the latent classes in the validation sample, in which we compared both results and used the literature to interpret them.

We used the criterion of class interpretability to select the final model. Models with five and six classes differ in that the six-class solution adds a class that represents a small portion of the sample, it does not substantially differ from the class with more proportion of cases. When contrasting the four- and

![Figure 4.1A Response probabilities patterns for the five-class solution in the exploratory sample](image)

Note: In the x-axis are the 13 indicators responded by students. The y-axis represents the expected response probability of agreeing with the indicator statement for each latent class.
Figure 4.2A Response probabilities patterns for the five-class solution in the validation sample

Note: In the x-axis are the 13 indicators for which students responded. The y-axis represents the expected response probability of agreeing with the indicator statement for each latent class.

five-class solutions, the analysis of the profiles of the five-class model shows the inclusion of a new class, which has patterns different from the rest with a sizable proportion of students. Therefore, considering both the statistical and substantive criteria and the interpretability of the solution, we decided to select the five-class solution.

As mentioned before, we tested the stability of results of the five-class solution replicating the analyses with the validation sample. Figures 4.1A and 4.2A show that response patterns for both the exploratory and validation samples are highly similar. We estimated the difference in probability of responding each item for both samples, finding an average difference of 0.002 with a range of variation between 0 and 0.02. In terms of the proportion of students in each class, both samples show similar results with a difference ranging from 0.001 to 0.02. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the five-class solution is stable in both samples.

Masyn (2013) suggests a set of criteria to interpret and label latent classes, which include putting attention to both the average response rates within each class and the items that separate one class from others. Following such suggestions, we labeled the classes using both the typical behavior in response probabilities for different items and using items showing either very high or low patterns of response patterns within its class.
Globalized Local Environmental Conflicts in Mexican and Canadian Youths’ Lives and Schooling
Silenced Citizenship Questions

Kathy Bickmore and Diana M. Barrero Jaramillo

Introduction

Resource mal-distribution conflicts, including exploitation of the Earth’s environment, are escalating urgent questions for the world’s citizens. While experienced directly by local citizens, these conflicts often involve indirect transnational social structures that are masked from view, left unquestioned. The symptoms, anxieties, and misgivings arising from such social conflicts over resources and environmental (un)health are especially vivid in the lives of non-affluent youth, in the Global North and especially in the Global South (Bandura & Cherry, 2020; Kassimir & Flanagan, 2010). Resource equity is one crucial element of just and sustainable peace (Burton, 1990; IEP, 2017; Ross, 2010). Democratic citizenship and governance can—but often do not—address such conflicts inclusively, equitably, nonviolently, and transnationally. Similarly, citizenship learning opportunities in schools can—but often do not—connect youth’s lived experiences of resource conflicts with analysis of these conflicts’ transnational social-structural causes, consequences, and influential actors (Haste et al., 2017; Misiaszek, 2016; Wahrman & Hartaf, 2021). Such conflicts and peacebuilding possibilities would be experienced and taught differently in unequal local (social class) and global (South or North) locations (Jooste & Heleta, 2017; Mikander, 2016).

Unfortunately, formal education is itself shaped by legacies of systemic, globalized, mal-distribution, and exploitation of resources that impede just democratic social and ecological relations (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Paulson, 2008; Davies, 2011). Quality school-based citizenship learning opportunities are unequally distributed, within and across national contexts: youth from economically deprived backgrounds are less likely to gain access to engaging and critical transnational citizenship education, even though, when available, such opportunities show promise to help overcome social and political exclusion (Diazgranados-Ferráns & Sandoval-Hernández, 2017; Kahne & Spote, 2008; Mistry et al., 2017). While transformed schooling practices can help diverse learners to recognize and challenge such systemic violence,
contemporary (global and national) citizenship practices are very often influenced by neoliberal assumptions about subject matter as well as unequally positioned students (Apple, 2010; Goren & Yemini, 2017; Sant, 2019).

In this chapter, we examine the lived citizenship perspectives of economically marginalized youth (10–15 years old), and their experienced classroom curriculum, in ordinary state-funded schools in economically marginalized areas in the Global South and North. Participants include 81 students and 21 teachers in four schools in one central (Guanajuato) Mexican city, and 55 students and 14 teachers in three schools in one south-central (Ontario) Canadian city. We listen to the students’ understandings of environmental and economic resource conflicts they experienced locally, and what they believed citizens like themselves could do to mitigate or transform the roots of those conflicts. We compare these students’ representations to those in the enacted curricula, described by the students and their teachers in separate focus groups. This chapter focuses on participants’ perspectives about social conflicts in which tangible material (resource) interests are prominent, as these most clearly illustrate the disjuncture between narrow neoliberal-individualist and broader critically global-minded dimensions of (peacebuilding) citizenship education. Lastly, we discuss some implications for future scholarship and practice in global citizenship education for peacebuilding.

Research contexts

Considering global economic inequality, it is valuable to compare youth and schools in a post-colonial resource extraction society in the Global South (México), with youth and schools in a Northern settler society with a continuing influx of global migrants (Canada). Our research sites were purposively selected public schools in economically marginalized urban metropolitan neighborhoods experiencing direct violence, in the province of Ontario, Canada (three schools, grades 5–8) and in the state of Guanajuato, México (two schools with grades 5–6 and two with grades 7–9), in 2014–2017. México and Canada are imperfect democratic systems, each experiencing widespread concern about aggression, lethal violence, citizen disengagement, and social inequalities involving youth (Abrego, 2010; Bickmore, 2014). Although not generally recognized as an armed conflict zone, México ranks low (140th among 163 countries) on the Global Peace Index (IEP, 2016). Tens of thousands have been killed and displaced by drug gang activities and associated policing in recent decades. In the central Mexican state where our research takes place, the economic inequality and direct violence situation has deteriorated: the number of crime victims in Guanajuato increased by about 50% between 2010 and 2014 (IEP, 2021). In Canada, a relatively peaceful country (eighth on the Global Peace Index), high-poverty communities still experience considerable direct and systemic violence (Doob & Cesaroni, 2004; IEP, 2016).

In both countries, but even more so in México, the student and teacher research participants described alarmingly frequent experience with both
direct (physical) and indirect (systemic) violence at home, at school, and in the streets of their communities. These economically marginalized youth experienced indirect systemic violence such as poverty, pollution, and ecological damage. Patterns of ecological and economic harm—“slow violence” (Nixon, 2011)—emerge through structures of unequal power and resource distribution. Unfortunately, the transnational and social-structural causes and potential remedies of such citizenship conflicts over resources have been addressed minimally in both Canadian and Mexican curriculum (Tirado Segura & Guevara Niebla, 2006; Tupper et al., 2010).

Explicit democratic citizenship education has been a priority and a site of significant policy change in México in the last two decades (Conde-Flores et al., 2017; Pérez-Expósito, 2015). Official (federal) curriculum discourses emphasize active, inclusive democratic citizenship and participatory discussion. A required civics and ethics course, alongside other curriculum and discipline policy, emphasizes the inculcation of individual values and “competencies” for democratic convivencia—peaceful, cooperative (compliant) social coexistence (Nieto & Bickmore, 2016). Other subject areas, such as language, science and health, history, and social sciences, also include learning expectations relevant to peace-building citizenship (Bickmore et al., 2017). Global and cross-cultural dimensions of citizenship are mentioned in the school curriculum in México, though not emphasized.

Global, as well as multicultural and environmentally oriented, active citizenship is prominent in Canada’s (provincial) official curricular goals, although inter-group inequities within the country may be presented as in the past and mainly solved (Leduc, 2013; Peck et al., 2010). Ontario’s Ministry of Education mandates character education, focusing on individual citizenship values rather than social or political institutions (Winton, 2010). Global citizenship education in Canadian schools often involves co-curricular charity fundraising, leaving unexamined the causes of human misery or proposals for systemic solutions (Mundy & Manion, 2008). Such Canadian policy directives are generally “unfunded mandates” (Hughes et al., 2010). Students from different social status locations typically have unequal citizenship learning experiences in school, largely disconnected from their lived experiences and concerns (Farmer et al., 2015; Tupper et al., 2010). In either context, education that ignores (globalized) social and political structures of inequality is unlikely to contribute to citizenship capability for transforming conflicts, especially when these transcend local and transnational spheres (Andreotti, 2021).

Citizenship and peace education about globalized resource conflicts

Mexican and Canadian young people show concern about many resource-based conflicts such as poverty, environmental degradation, migration, and territorial claims, in addition to intersecting cultural justice issues such as gender-based exploitation, and direct violence (Bickmore et al., 2017; Reimers & Cardenas, 2010). Robust international evidence indicates that when students
have had opportunities to discuss conflicting perspectives about such public issues in an open, inclusive classroom climate, they tend to have a better understanding of democratic questions and processes, and greater interest in democratic participation, compared with students who have not had such experience (Schulz et al., 2010). Learning opportunities that engage youth in interpreting and expressing multiple perspectives about the causes and consequences of conflicts can help them to develop agency for peacebuilding citizenship (Kwok & Selman, 2017; Lopes Cardozo et al., 2016). Other participatory pedagogies, such as simulations and community service learning, also apparently improve knowledge and inclinations to participate in democratic citizenship for peacebuilding (Kahne et al., 2013). Such education, exploring together crucial questions that are too often silenced, would influence youth’s sense of being democratic actors, as well as their abilities to communicate, analyze, negotiate differences, and participate in transforming complex social conflicts toward just peace.

Unfortunately, citizenship and peace education theory and practice have often silenced or not adequately addressed economic and environmental resource interest dimensions of conflicts (Novelli et al., 2017; Ross, 2010). First, curricular (citizenship) discourses about inequality, labor, and environmental conflicts may emphasize individual responsibility rather than social-structural or political causes or remedies (Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011; Rogers & Westheimer, 2017; Young, 2011). Neoliberal educational discourses and practices, which have spread globally from the relatively privileged Global North and West, emphasize individual skills and hegemonic cultural values for assimilationist and tolerant community relations, ignoring social diversity and globalized social structures of inequity (Salomon, 2011; Suárez, 2008). For instance, Latin American governments and global institutions usually emphasize narrow convivencia (peaceful coexistence) rather than engagement in active democratic peacebuilding (Carbalaj Padilla, 2013). As a result, citizenship and peace education does not always clearly distinguish empirical from political questions, nor inform collective citizen action through civil society and governance institutions intersecting with ecological, economic, and cultural systems (Barton, 2019; Ho & Seow, 2015; exceptions include Blanchet-Cohen & Reilly, 2017; Shuttleworth, 2015). Understanding the workings of domestic and transnational institutions that link individual citizens to processes of collective governance, rights protection, and regulation is crucial for handling social conflicts over resources. However, institutional, political, historical, and personal reasons can make it difficult for teachers to implement multi-perspective curriculum addressing inequity and other conflict (Cárdenas, 2017; Lopes Cardozo, 2015; Sleeter et al., 2016).

Conceptual framework: conflict education for democratic peacebuilding citizenship

Building just, democratic, and sustainable peace requires citizen capability to confront the systemic actors, factors, and interests at the roots of social
Conflict and violence. Conflict itself—disagreement, inter-group tension, misunderstanding, and competing desires—need not be violent, inevitable, or destructive. To engage together in transforming conflicts non-violently and democratically, toward justice, is to develop and exercise citizenship agency for peacebuilding (Lederach, 2003). However, the transnational actors shaping conflicts over resource interests are often difficult to see, and to resist or regulate, through existing nation-state or “global” forms of governance. Illustrated by the outer triangle in Figure 5.1, violence has direct (visible) and indirect (systemic) dimensions. Direct violence is overt intended harm such as war, rape, or slander; participants may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or intervenors (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Systemic violence includes social-economic injustice rooted in tangible status inequality and inequity, and cultural exclusion injustice rooted in identity-based norms, symbols, and ideology that justify direct violence and social, political, and economic exclusion (Galtung, 1990). As Philippe Bourgois (2009) elaborates, informal (socialization) and formal (school) education also may normalize direct physical violence, such as military threats or gender-based harassment. Each dimension of violence reinforces the others, in a vicious cycle.

Nancy Fraser’s (2004) theory of justice begins by articulating the substantive “content” of injustice (what we call systemic violence, above), which violate both social-structural equity and cultural inclusion. Social-structural dimensions of justice involve redistribution and equitable access to resources for fulfilling human and intersecting ecological needs. Cultural dimensions of justice are norms, ideologies, narratives, and symbols reinforcing social identity recognition, trust-building, and inclusion (i.e., overcoming mis- or non-recognition, mistrust, and social exclusion). In addition, Fraser argues that it is essential to (re-)build fair and accessible participation processes in which diverse people have representation and voice through governance and civil society institutions, social movements, public media dialogue, restorative

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**Figure 5.1** Dimensions of violence and peace (© Bickmore, 2021)
justice peacemaking, treaties, and other forms of democratic encounter and negotiated decision-making. When resource conflicts are transnational in scope, thereby beyond the purview of nation-state mechanisms, these participation processes are especially elusive and exclusive. Thus, nonviolent democratic (citizen) participation, in addition to socio-structural equity, and cultural inclusion are essential for building just peace, especially in the context of globalization.

The central (black) and intermediate (striped) zones of Figure 5.1 represent the processes and mechanisms pivotal to Fraser’s theory of justice. The central (black) triangle represents systemic (just) peace. Conflict mediation and transformation actions nearing this ideal dynamic address and redress the historic and contemporary systemic roots of violence through democratic participation processes. The striped middle zone represents regulatory types of interventions to handle conflicts, quell violence, and build toward peace. Many of these mediating conflict mitigation initiatives are what Fraser (2004) calls “affirmative” approaches to justice: they mitigate some harmful injustice symptoms, yet assume or affirm existing social-systemic hierarchies. Examples include universalized citizen voting rights (that may displace Indigenous or local sovereignty), or worker protection regulations (that do not challenge the wage structure). Toward the pale outer (violent) edge are those interventions designed to stop particular episodes of violence, such as peacekeeping strategies including policing to control trafficking and criminal violence (that disproportionately repress certain groups rather than addressing systemic incentives). While these processes can increase stability and reduce direct violence, they do not allow or support ways to assess, critique, and transform social-structural and cultural injustices at the root of destructive conflict.

Our framework thus connects directly experienced violence and injustice to their systemic causes and remedies, enabling us to illuminate (missing) ingredients in youth’s lived and school-based citizenship learning opportunities. In practice, these three dimensions of democratic peacebuilding citizenship—participatory (political) representation in decision-making, inclusive (cultural) recognition of diverse and non-dominant identities and ideologies, and (social-structural) redistribution of resources and power—intersect and reinforce (or impede) one another (Novelli et al., 2017). Fraser’s theory of justice enables us to discern the potentially transformable conflicts underlying patterns of harm, and thereby to identify the ways education could contribute to critical globally minded citizenship for peacebuilding (also Bellino et al., 2017). Such approaches to global citizenship education would not merely describe or prescribe responsible citizen participation; they would provide opportunities and scaffolding support for youth to practice critical thinking and citizenship agency, in relation to lived social-cultural injustice problems that concern them. While education alone cannot transform societies into systemically peaceful, just democracies, schools are powerful social institutions that may influence their societies toward change (or not).
In this study, we engage the perspectives and learning opportunities of some Mexican and Canadian youth in marginalized urban communities, to learn from and with these youth about how they understood conflicts pertaining to environmental and economic inequality, and their potential citizen agency to address those conflicts. This chapter focuses on students’ and teachers’ perspectives about resource interest conflicts, because these conflicts foreground the important social-structural dimensions of a globally minded citizenship education for building just peace.

**Research methods**

The cases in this study are sets of public schools in economically marginalized neighborhoods experiencing direct violence, in one city each in Ontario, Canada, and Guanajuato, México. Following the methodological insights of Bartlett and Vavrus (2017), the full research project examined “vertical” aspects of the cases such as federal and provincial violence rates, curriculum and education policies, and “horizontal” comparison within and among focus groups and schools in each city. The cities are not named to protect confidentiality. Schools were purposively selected to reflect diverse populations and neighborhoods experiencing higher than average poverty and violence rates. In each school, the main method of data collection was focus groups with students and teachers. The project’s approach to data collection was informed by John Paul Lederach’s (1995) notion of culturally “elicitive” (vs. prescriptive) conflict transformation education, and Mason and Delandshere’s (2010) democratic inquiry principles. Thus, students and their teachers participated in separate small-group workshops (focus group sessions) designed to facilitate active and inclusive learning, in their own languages and pursuing their own priority concerns. Each participant had several opportunities to communicate their perspectives on the session agenda topics. This participant-centered, elicitive research did not examine any explicit prescribed or self-contained program (nor pre-set definition) of peace or citizenship education: rather, researcher-facilitators elicited via focus groups the understandings and concerns that youth and teachers each selected and narrated based on their own experiences. The whole international comparative Peace-Building Citizenship project was driven by the following research questions: How did participating youth understand and feel about various social conflicts affecting their lives? What repertoire of possibilities and roles did they see for democratic peace-building citizenship activity, to help transform these conflicts? How did they view their schooling as informing (or not) their peace-building citizenship agency? How did these youths’ perspectives compare with those embedded in their teachers’ narratives and enacted curricula?

The sites were four Mexican and three Canadian schools, each visited four to six times during about a year, between 2014–2017. Participants included 81 Mexican and 55 Canadian students (age 10–15), and 21 Mexican and 14 Canadian teachers. In each school, one group of teachers participated in three
to five focus group workshops, while there were three to six student focus groups that met once (see Table 5.1). Teachers were recruited based on their interest in participating in workshop conversations about teaching for citizenship and/or peace. These teachers, in consultation with school administrators, recruited the volunteer student participants, to reflect the diversity of each school’s population in terms of grade levels (5–8 in Canada and 5–9 in México), conflict experience, gender, and socio-cultural factors (i.e., primarily economic status and experience of violence in México, mainly ethnicity and immigrant status in Canada). The study was designed to facilitate participants’ reciprocal articulation and reflection upon the social conflicts experienced by marginalized youth in these contexts, and upon the ways their daily schooling did and did not address their understandings or show promise to develop their citizen agency for transforming those conflicts. In separate focus groups, students and their teachers discussed the various social conflicts experienced around them and the options they saw for handling them. They were also invited by researcher-facilitators to consider how their enacted classroom curricula seemed to broaden or foreclose relevant citizenship capabilities for addressing various conflicts and contributing toward peacebuilding.

Teachers participated in a series of three to five focus group workshops in each school, occurring a few months apart. These workshops began with teachers sharing examples of lessons or teaching resources that they considered relevant to peace and/or citizenship and how they might have implemented them. Also, each set of teachers previewed and suggested adjustments to the tasks and image prompt sets to be used in student focus groups, for purposes of improving local comprehensibility and relevance. For instance, Canadian teachers advised that photos (e.g. a news photo of a demonstration against an oil pipeline) be used rather than cartoons (e.g. one about water

<table>
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<th>Table 5.1 Focus group participants and schools</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Schools</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato, México</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTO1 (grade 7–9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTO2 (grade 5–6)</td>
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<td>GTO4 (grade 7–9)</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>Ontario, Canada</td>
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<td>ON1 (grade 5–8)</td>
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<td>ON3 (grade 5–8)</td>
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After focus groups were conducted with students (see later), the researcher-facilitators shared in the following teacher focus group session an anonymized draft summary of their school's student focus group results. This session invited teachers’ reflections on how their teaching (content and pedagogy) responded to their students’ understandings and concerns. Later sessions with teachers were animated by the research team’s summary analyses of relevant official curriculum expectations in their jurisdictions, prompting joint reflection about potential intersections between democratic peacebuilding education goals and opportunities available within teachers’ work. The later workshops with participating teachers, supplemented by follow-up visits with larger numbers of teachers in some schools, also enabled researchers to present (for teachers’ iterative critique, elaboration, and discussion) initial results from the research. Meeting with the teacher groups during paid school hours, several times in the course of a year, enabled accessible and practice-grounded participation in co-learning.

Workshops with several student focus groups were held at each school, in private spaces without teachers present. Each focus group elicited four to six students’ understandings and concerns about various social conflict and violence they experienced, and what they believed citizens could do about these problems. First, researchers used 10–12 image prompts to elicit students’ understandings of the conflicts. Next, the students selected two problems they considered to be of particular concern or interest, and worked like reporters, naming and discussing the “who-what-where-why-how and now what” of each conflict—the stakeholders affected, what they thought had caused or exacerbated the problems, and what they thought authorities and ordinary citizens could do about those problems. Students communicated their sense of what opportunities and agency they had (or not) to understand and handle the various types of social conflicts, shared how their experienced school curricula had addressed those concerns (or not), and finally offered suggestions for teachers. The students’ understandings were then compared with the enacted curriculum as described by participating teachers and students. In some schools, researchers were able to visit similar populations of students near the end of data collection, to present and hear students’ perspectives on anonymized summaries of initial results.

To strengthen reliability, the findings from student and teacher focus groups were compared within-group, between-group, and between teachers and students in each school, and later across schools. The locally adapted, iterative structure based the inquiry on the particular contexts and concerns of students and teachers in each school. The iterative visits also enabled some early problem-solving: for instance, after researchers noticed the predominance of male students in the first three focus groups held at school GTO1, the school kindly enabled the implementation of three additional focus groups with female majorities. Researchers returning multiple times to discuss and build upon initial findings with each group of teachers also strengthened mutual comprehensibility and therefore the usefulness (for scholarship and
for teaching) of the information collected in each school. Further data analysis involved iterative thematic coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994) in dialogue with the three-dimensional Peace-Building Citizenship conceptual framework discussed earlier.

The findings of this study, based on a few voluntary small focus groups, by no means offer generalizable evidence about the entire student population of those schools, cities, or nation-states. Bartlett and Vavrus’ (2017) framework remind us that data for each case were collected at a particular historical moment. For instance, our data collection took place prior to the upsurge in global youth-led environmental and climate change justice movements. A follow-up study at a different moment in time would shed additional light on participants’ perspectives. The one-time focus groups with students limited the time available to elicit and elaborate upon their concerns. Similarly, the numbers of teacher participants in each school were small and reflected these particular educators’ concerns, perspectives, and disclosures (not researcher observations) at the time of the visits. Despite these limitations, the comparisons within and between the transnational research contexts shed light on multiple factors that may shape and impede marginalized youth’s opportunities to develop global-minded democratic citizenship agency to address resource interest conflicts.

**Study findings**

In this chapter, we focus on the resource-based issues that Mexican and Canadian student participants discussed during the focus groups, such as poverty, environmental degradation, and migration, as well as their suggested citizenship responses (i.e., what they believed could be done to address these problems). In our study, youth participants shared and enthusiastically discussed complex understandings of direct and some indirect dimensions of social conflicts that surrounded their lives. However, their sense of how citizens could respond to these problems, through existing democratic systems, even locally and especially globally, was thin and precarious, embodying little sense of possibility for citizen engagement. Our findings also illuminate how the enacted curriculum, as described by students and teachers in each school, seemed to facilitate, constrain, or be (ir)relevant to citizenship learning in the face of students’ lived experience with resource conflicts. We conclude by comparing within and across the research locations.

**Guanajuato, México**

Overall, Mexican students demonstrated complex understandings of direct (visible, experienced) and some indirect (social-structural and cultural) dimensions of resource-based conflicts. During the focus groups, Mexican students discussed pollution, labor exploitation, poverty, drug trafficking, and emigration from México. Several student groups chose to delve deeper into the topic.
of pollution. They expressed worry and anger about several pollutants prevalent in their communities, including from nearby export-driven leather tanneries, describing the direct harm they experienced as a result. For example, students said their tap water was too contaminated to drink, and “there are waste, diapers, and dead animals” in local rivers (GTO1, also GTO4).

Initially, students of all genders and ages drew from cultural discourses that privatized responsibility, attributing individual attitudes as a main driver of pollution: people “not caring about the environment,” being “lazy” or “dirty.” When researcher-facilitators invited them to identify background factors in the conflicts, various students in each school identified domestic institutional actors including shoe and leather factories, the national oil company, and the government. Most students recognized how the social-economic interests of these actors intersected with inadequate democratic representation to perpetuate these environmental problems: “they [government officials] are not interested in our communities. There are many unpaved roads, and lack of services” (GTO1), “factories have nowhere to throw their chemical wastes” (GTO2). Thus, many students recognized local and national social-structural and political factors exacerbating environmental conflicts but did not mention global factors (e.g. trade relations) in this conversation.

In discussions of solutions to these environmental and economic problems, social structures, large actors such as factories, and democratic governance disappeared. When researcher-facilitators asked about potential citizen action, students’ repertoire of solution options emphasized “affirmative” (Fraser, 2004) individual responsibility—such as refraining from littering, cleaning up, or raising awareness. Occasionally, students mentioned collective action along similar lines: “I would ask my teachers to let us do a [clean-up] brigade, to avoid having our patios full of trash” (GTO3). While such actions may reduce the direct harm of trash in the immediate neighborhood, they do not engage the democratic system, nor address the indirect causes of larger environmental harm. None of the students expressed much sense of citizen agency for addressing national or transnational social-structural factors, such as taxation or trade rules, that contribute to local environmental harm. Students of all genders described government interventions to conflict mitigation such as fines, jail time, or limiting citizen participation. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, these interventions do not redress systemic roots of environmental violence, or contribute toward democratic participation. In general, most participating students saw themselves only as constrained individual actors, occasionally addressing some symptoms of these problems. Only a couple of students suggested communicating to (unspecified) government officials, such as “protest so that they [officials] pave the roads, and improve garbage collection” (GTO1) or writing letters to representatives (GTO3). However, their peers responded with doubt that these citizenship actions would lead to change.

Through their lived experiences, participating Mexican students, across schools and grade levels, identified exploitative wealth disparities between the
Global North and South. They shared how family members and neighbors experienced labor exploitation, including low wages and unemployment, driving many to migrate northward in search of better opportunities (see also Nieto & Bickmore, 2017). They also described the lack of viable economic opportunities in their city as a key driver of drug trafficking. Similar to their discourse on environmental conflicts, students pointed out some social-structural causal factors, but did not mention existing processes of collective governance (beyond border enforcement), rights protection, or regulation that could mitigate such problems. Despite clear awareness of globalized social-structural disparity conflicts, participating students did not identify citizenship mechanisms such as civil society, nongovernmental organizations, social movements, or international treaties, nor identify themselves or family members as global “citizens” who could take action on these issues.

In sum, participating student groups recognized all three dimensions of the “content” (Fraser, 2004) of the resource-related injustice conflicts they discussed—especially the direct participants’ conflicting interests, consequent behavior, and its lived consequences for various parties, and that both cultural bias and social-structural power complexities made these conflicts disproportionately harmful to lower-status parties such as themselves. They were generally less aware of the “process” (Fraser, 2004) for building just peace: how indirect (especially transnational) actors shaped situations to fulfill their desires at others’ expense, and especially how democratic citizen action and governance could transform these conflicts. The few potential remedies students were able to suggest were compliance- and force-based affirmative (non-transformative) remedies, responsibility of low-status individuals (Young, 2011), and coercive enforcement by domestic government authorities, to partially mitigate some harm while leaving unjust systems intact.

Existing citizenship education in school apparently did not help. Teachers and students described how some resource-based conflicts were being addressed in their experienced (civics, science, and geography) curriculum. Pollution and migration were problems most often included in this enacted curriculum; economic inequality, poverty, and drug trafficking were less common. In a few instances where these resource conflicts were addressed in learning activities, students themselves had brought up the issues, exercising their agency as curriculum actors. Similar to the students’ discourse, nearly all this enacted curriculum focused on symptoms and normative cultural dimensions (e.g., responsible individual values and self-regulation). These lessons rarely identified collective actors influencing mitigation or transformation of social-structural factors in resource conflicts, even at the local level—much less how citizens might influence government policies or transnational relations to alter the balance of interests underlying lopsided wage structures or industrial pollution. By emphasizing individual responsibility, and minimizing collective and social-structural dimensions, the enacted citizenship education curriculum left existing systemic violence normalized and unquestioned. Thus, most of the experienced curriculum practice, that Mexican participants shared, reinforced
primarily what these students already knew, namely responsibility of low-status individuals to be compliant, rather than practicing critical citizenship inquiry into underlying causes, hidden (including transnational) actors, or consideration of democratic mechanisms or actions for making change.

However, a few lessons did invite students to express their own perspectives, and to listen and respond to peers’ perspectives when discussing issues or negotiating group projects, thereby practicing some dialogic skills for participation in active citizenship toward peacebuilding. In a couple of exceptional instances, students did study various actors’ roles, and articulate their own viewpoints about what those actors should do, in a local environmental problem. A grade 6 science and language project examined tannery pollution (GTO2): mixed-ability groups collected and discussed the benefits and costs of having tanneries in their neighborhood, then created and presented action plans. As a culminating writing assignment, students were tasked to write letters to the tannery owners or other actors, although these were not sent. Students and teachers describing this project did not mention transnational ownership, customers, or commerce policy. Beyond the important fact that this topic reflected students’ locally experienced conflict concern, this and most other Mexican teachers’ frequent use of cooperative teamwork pedagogies (sometimes in mixed-ability groups) offered opportunities for less- as well as more-confident students to speak and act for themselves in relation to peers with alternate perspectives or approaches, to practice mutual aid, cooperative problem-solving, and group action such as creating presentations or reaching agreement—practicing the participation, inclusion, and sometimes equity dimensions of peacebuilding citizenship at a small but powerful (interpersonal) scale.

Participating Mexican students expressed considerable interest in learning more about these conflicts, including underlying social-structural causes and participatory political solutions. They especially called for active, multi-perspective pedagogies such as debates, roundtable discussions, drama, and community participation. That is, these students expressed strong concern and motivation, but at best, they felt themselves to be citizens-in-waiting (Bellino, 2018), who might later address the sources and solutions of tangible resource conflicts around them. They generally did not know historic or contemporary examples of how similar problems had been addressed collectively, nor who or what mechanism might facilitate engagement in such action. They looked to schooling to fill this gap.

**Ontario, Canada**

Like their Mexican peers, participating Canadian students recognized several social-structural, cultural, and political factors and actors—cultural, social-structural, and political/participatory—in various types of transnational and local resource conflicts. They expressed strong concern and direct encounters with local economic inequality and poverty. In particular, Canadian students
were concerned about pervasive homelessness in their city, economic deprivation of Indigenous peoples, and environmental problems, though they were less passionate than their Mexican peers in relation to the latter. In schools ON2 and ON3, students elaborated in detail about several ecological issues including global climate change, scarcity of clean water, and many kinds of pollution. Unlike their Mexican peers, participating Canadian students identified their individual behavior as consumers and waste producers (not just litterers) as contributing to environmental conflicts, in addition to recognizing themselves as victimized by environmental damage and other resource conflicts. Students in all three schools recognized the conflict around the development of oil pipelines (related to a visual prompt used and then-current news), and the particular threat and harm these posed to (Indigenous) people and to animals, including (geographically distant) marine life. Only students in ON3 mentioned company owners and environmental “protesters,” as actors with opposing viewpoints about government regulation of oil companies and transit infrastructure investment. In ON1, unlike other schools in either municipality, most student focus groups quickly moved away from environmental concerns to other issues they considered more serious. When researcher-facilitators asked about what people like themselves or their families could do about environmental conflicts, some Canadian students, similar to their Mexican counterparts, mentioned symptomatic individual participation such as litter clean-up campaigns. Somewhat unlike their Mexican peers, a few Canadian participants also mentioned persuading the government to support alternative energy development.

Although (according to their teachers) several of these students directly experienced severe poverty, hunger and homelessness, participating students discussed these matters using the third person, unlike their Mexican peers, apparently due to a fear of being stigmatized. Asked about factors that exacerbated poverty and economic inequality, ON2 and ON3 students named individual deficits and risk factors (e.g., violence at home, inadequate education, and “bad choices” such as drug/alcohol abuse) as well as social-economic factors (e.g. high rent and cost of living, low wages). In addition, all these students, who were mostly first- and second-generation immigrants from several continents (see Nieto & Bickmore, 2017), recognized large-scale transnational migration push factors such as war, scarcity, and unemployment. They disagreed respectfully, sometimes passionately, with one another about how many newcomers their government should accept. Students also mentioned hiring discrimination rooted in cultural biases regarding gender, race, religion, immigrant origin, (poverty) neighborhood, and physical appearance (e.g., tattoos). They emphasized discrimination against racialized and Muslim immigrants, which many of their own families had experienced. Some students raised, unprompted, concern about Indigenous peoples’ violated territory and rights. They referred to both settlers and Indigenous people as “they” and sometimes in past tense, not recognizing themselves (contemporary urban settlers) as implicated in ongoing settler-colonial relations. Unlike
peers in México, student participants in Canada did not acknowledge corporate or wealthy stakeholder interest roles. Moreover, they indicated only vague notions of the government’s roles in policy making (or enforcement) in relation to resource conflicts.

In sum, like their Mexican counterparts in this study, Canadian student participants knew quite a lot—often, from lived experience outside of school—about the “content” and symptoms of several resource-based conflicts. For instance, they recognized the conflicting interests of direct participants, the (negative) consequences of various conflicts for some other stakeholders, and the further damage and causal roles played by cultural bias and social-structural inequality. However, also like the Mexican students, they showed little awareness of participation processes (what Fraser, 2004 calls representation): how democratic actors, institutional spaces or mechanisms (historically or in the present), or their own potential roles as citizens, could transform the roots or pervasiveness of such conflicts. Their repertoire of potential responses to poverty, inequality, and ecological damage was limited to small-scale affirmative mitigation of symptoms—for example, individual charity donations, self-regulation to not express aggressive biases or lower resource consumption, and a few vague references to the government enforcement—not transformative learning, addressing underlying causes or fundamental changes. At the same time, like their Mexican peers, they expressed a strong desire for substantially more opportunity to learn in school, in more depth, about causes and consequences of difficult social conflict problems, as well as what citizens could do to resolve or transform such problems.

Canadian students and teachers described some enacted curriculum opportunities related to resource-based conflicts. School ON2 teachers described extensive attention to environmental issues—studying carbon consumption “footprints,” documentary film and literature on deforestation and on consumption and disposal, a tree-planting project in Haiti, and “garden buddy” activities with Kindergarten children. Two teachers had taken their students to City Hall, where students presented their concerns about various issues, primarily environmental. In the other two schools, environmental problems were not a prominent topic voiced in teacher focus groups. While ON3 teachers did not describe much environmental education, their students described lessons on ecology, sustainability, and eco-friendly homes from the preceding year. Teachers in ON1, whose students had demonstrated little knowledge or concern about these issues, rarely mentioned environmental problems, except in passing reference to exploitation and pollution of Indigenous lands.

More than for Mexican counterparts, most Canadian participants’ experienced curriculum had addressed aspects of global inequality. Some ON1 classes studied child labor in the Global South and Chinese laborer conditions in Canadian history. Some ON3 classes studied differential global Northern and Southern life expectancies and education levels (e.g., in Germany, Bhutan, and Chad), although apparently not their systemic causes. Many classes had examined the plight of refugees from the Syrian war, which was in the news
the year of data collection, emphasizing empathy and occasionally Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Teachers in all three schools had taught about historical injustices against First Nations peoples, some mentioning continuing conflicts over Indigenous land and resources and many built around fictional literature presenting an “Indigenous point of view” about coerced residential schooling. One ON3 teacher said she had presented poverty and pollution conditions in northern Ontario First Nation reserves as “like Third World countries”—showing compassion, from a vantage point of superiority, for distant Others. Resource conflict issues, especially the macro social structures shaping the competing interests and action options of powerful and less-powerful stakeholders, were not prominent in this enacted curriculum. One exception was a teacher’s simulation game about capitalist market inequity, which did not identify actual countries or regions (ON1).

Several Canadian teachers did say they taught for “global citizenship,” although their students did not voice that term. From an implicitly Northern perspective, the curriculum teachers called global citizenship education emphasized empathy for “less fortunate” Others, and the attitude that “one person can [and should] make a difference.” In addition to the lessons given earlier, some teachers described extra-curricular clubs in which student volunteers engaged in awareness fundraising activities on behalf of people suffering in the Global South. Each school had some poverty-mitigation services, representing an implicit curriculum, such as subsidized school meals, confidential distribution of groceries, and annual food donation drives. Overall, the enacted curriculum presented some action options to mitigate some symptoms of some resourced-based conflicts, locally and infrequently for the global South through small-scale charity distribution or awareness. While such “affirmative” approaches (Fraser, 2004) presumably mitigate some harm caused by economic or environmental exploitation, they leave unchallenged the local and transnational social-structural and cultural hierarchies that perpetuate that harm, and do not necessarily equip students for critical inquiry or active participation in the political processes that might contribute to guide transformation of underlying causes. So, similar to the Mexican schools, the Canadian schools’ enacted curriculum emphasized the middle band in Figure 5.1: low-status individuals’ responsibility to comply and help out in non-disruptive ways. One notable difference was that, more often in Canada, some lessons extended students’ horizons to examine resource-related social conflict problems beyond their local region and national borders, in the Global South (see also Nieto & Bickmore, 2017), communicating a “global citizenship” of the fortunate.

Like some of their Mexican colleagues who emphasized discussion and cooperative groupwork pedagogies, some participating Canadian teachers also recognized conflicts as pedagogical opportunities. Beyond teaching “about” particular conflicts, these teachers guided their students to practice some capabilities of peacebuilding citizenship agency, as recommended by research literature cited earlier about such pedagogies for developing citizenship inclinations.
and capabilities. For example, all described some whole-class discussion pedagogies. Some ON2 teachers explicitly taught conflict analysis skills, such as identifying stakeholders, perspective taking, and handling emotions. At least two teachers presented, or had their students select and present, weekly news articles on conflictual events. Another ON2 teacher taught peacemaking problem-solving steps for handling interpersonal disputes, in and beyond the classroom. These skills constitute important building blocks for addressing and potentially transforming the direct and indirect dimensions of conflict and associated violence, applicable to active citizenship in handling resource interest justice problems.

Cross-case discussion

Participating Mexican and Canadian students demonstrated strong concern and motivation to learn, as well as abilities to articulate, constructively disagree, and analyze direct and some indirect causes, factors, and perspectives on complex social conflicts related to resource exploitation and mal-distribution. As our findings show, the resource-based conflicts that were most salient to students overlapped but differed across national contexts. In Mexican schools, students showed particular concern about conflicts such as pollution, poverty, and poverty-linked problems including out-migration and drug trade. While Canadian students also showed concern about these issues, they mostly talked about them with a sense of distance and less urgency. Presumably, young people’s experiential knowledge and sense of concern and also their understandings of conflict, peace, and citizenship is shaped by their different positions within the local and global geopolitical system.

Across research contexts, students’ citizenship repertoires in response to resource conflicts focused on individual actions that did not always address the systemic causal factors they had initially identified. In both countries, when asked what people like themselves could do, the students’ narratives shifted away from social-political causes or remedies toward a compliant citizenship of individual responsibility, and quite often toward a sense of hopelessness. For example, Canadian youth spoke of harm mitigation (e.g., recycling or charity donations to “others”), whereas Mexican youth named more patterns of local and transnational economic exploitation (learned viscerally and narrated often in first person, not evidently covered in their teachers’ lessons). Most Mexican and Canadian student focus groups recognized in vague terms the roles of “government” as providers, enforcers, and regulators of resource services such as garbage collection, welfare support, public transit (ON), and paved roads (GTO). Youth participants across contexts, however, communicated a sense of disillusionment with contemporary adults’ citizenship practice. Many students, considerably more so in México than in Canada, communicated a sense of disempowerment, explaining that they felt they could not influence government practices or the social structures of resource inequality and
exploitation by powerful “private” interests. Furthermore, many participating Mexican students explained why they distrusted government actors, sometimes arguing that they exacerbated conflicts and violence, disproportionately harming people living in poverty. Very few students in either national context mentioned policies around either technological development of renewable energy or pollution mitigation, or political-economic development such as taxation or regulatory policies, as options to mitigate or transform resource conflicts.

Despite the differences in the experience-based knowledge and concern of Mexican and Canadian students, most of the enacted curriculum focused on small-scale affirmative approaches that addressed the symptoms of the problems, and often individual attitudes, while overlooking the indirect social-structural and cultural-symbolic contributors (consistent with the critiques of Ross, 2010; Fraser, 2004). With few exceptions, teaching in each setting emphasized neoliberal narratives such as individual responsibility for one’s own economic fortunes and for ecological preservation, minimizing or invisibilizing nation-state responsibilities, processes, or the flaws in those processes. The emphasis on individual and cultural dimensions of conflict mitigation, neglecting domestic and transnational systemic transformation, represents a major gap in citizenship education in all seven schools across countries. In the few classroom lessons about economic inequality in either country, there were even fewer opportunities for students to learn about how citizens could participate in actions to mitigate or transform those conflicts, beyond minimal charity. This swath of silenced questions within enacted citizenship education curricula reinforces the globalized social-economic structures of resource exploitation and mal-distribution, not informing their transformation.

Alongside these shortcomings, participating Mexican and Canadian teachers and students provided a few promising examples of enacted curriculum addressing some environmental and economic resource conflicts, although they agreed that these lessons were not sufficient to create significant opportunities for developing capabilities, knowledge, and relationships for transforming these conflicts through participatory democratic processes. For instance, a Mexican history unit about the cultural change and political uprising against economic exploitation and elite land control that became the 1917 Mexican Revolution constitutes evidence of a feasible curriculum showing a slightly successful effort to change political and economic structures. Student teams in one Canadian class created investigative videos about local environmental conflicts, promoting recommended solutions. Not least, in several classrooms in each country case, students had opportunities to engage in small-scale joint inquiry, issues discussion, and cooperative work that could build relational, dialogic, and critical thinking capabilities that these young people could themselves mobilize in pursuing their existing concerns about larger-scale resource interest conflicts with intersecting economic, cultural, and political dimensions.
Conclusion: conflict, social institutions, and participative spaces in citizenship education

Mexican and Canadian students in all seven schools made clear their strong awareness and concern about many resource-based conflicts, including environmental and economic problems. They also expressed desire to learn more about these conflicts’ causes, consequences, and potential avenues toward transformation. By listening to marginalized students’ perspectives about resource-based conflicts in their lives and their enacted curriculum, this study shows how state-funded schooling in México and Canada could, but too often did not, help youth to expand their citizenship agency for addressing the globalized resource interest conflicts and unequal social structures they care about. In each setting, we found many gaps and a few bridges between the enacted curriculum and these students’ lived experience of resource interest conflicts. Students’ knowledge and feelings of concern were rooted in their particular global Southern or Northern experiences, yet reflected common concerns about systemic poverty and continual ecological damage. Mexican and Canadian student participants had not experienced many reasons to view their governments or civil societies as places to engage constructively in rebuilding more just human and ecological relationships. In both contexts, the youths’ formal education generally lacked tangible examples of citizen action in either global or domestic political arenas (e.g., governance participation, NGOs, social movement organizing, treaties and alliances). Also missing were analyses of multiple viewpoints on concrete historical or contemporary examples of social-political changes attempted or realized by democratic means.

While participating teachers sometimes addressed resource conflicts, their citizenship-related lessons focused primarily on symptoms and personal responsibility, not systemic factors and actors with conflicting interests. In very few reported instances, lessons included non-disruptive participatory democratic citizenship activities, such as writing letters to company owners (in México) or delivering speeches and asking questions of municipal government representatives (in Canada). In general, the enacted curriculum did not evidently examine multiple perspectives and policy proposals regarding system-level actors, policy controversies, or governance processes for conflict transformation. Thus, globalized resource interest conflicts were rarely addressed explicitly as democratic citizenship issues.

Our understanding of building just peace, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, distinguishes three intersecting elements crucial for learning and doing democratic citizenship for just peace: one, processes for direct and representative participation in collective (political) processes for handling conflicts; two, cultural inclusion identity narratives, norms, values, and symbols about conflicts and about others; and three, social-structural (economic) equity. By focusing here on economic and environmental resource interest conflicts, this chapter highlights the fundamental social-systemic justice dimensions of citizenship that are needed in public education for all. That is, tangible human needs and desires may be (un)
fulfilled through (un)democratic social and political institutional processes. While experiential life learning is also essential, school education may inform, or not, youth’s comprehension of factors they have not directly seen, and their consequent participation in such justice-based citizenship processes.

The citizenship questions most silenced were the social-structural equity dimensions of the conflictual issues the youth were concerned about, and the collective participation options and barriers citizens faced in confronting them. These systemic justice questions were masked in both the Canadian curricula—embodying a global North perspective of benevolent superiority—and the Mexican curricula—embodying a complicated mix of Global South experience with globalized discursive understandings. Yet, societies and global relationships have changed over time, here and there. Youth need a foundational repertoire of ways in which participation in collective democratic actions and institutions may influence such changes. By including the perspectives of both Mexican and Canadian youths and teachers, we also show the uncanny similarity—despite divergent global locations and lived experiences—of the system-supporting individual-responsibility messages embodied in their enacted citizenship curricula. Further transnational research and exchange, foregrounding the perspectives and experiences of youth in the Global South and North, may inform and encourage more global justice-minded citizenship education for building just and sustainable peace.

References


Part II

Contesting Spaces of Citizenship

Contemporary Youth Social Movements, Digital Citizenships, and the Popular Turn in Global Citizenship Education
6 Contemporary Youth Social Movements

The Interdependency of Digital Affordances and Youth Agency

Keith Heggart and Rick Flowers

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is to describe and discuss what implications the rise of contemporary youth social movements and their heavy use of digital platforms have for citizenship education. We first dispel the widely made claim that the rise of recent youth social movements has come about largely because of the expansion of digital platforms. Indeed, there has been a long history of youth-led social movements that predates digital technologies. This means that analyzing contemporary youth social movements requires focusing as much on the affordances offered by digital technologies as on the skills, capabilities, and attributes of young people themselves. There are three broad implications for contemporary, or future directions in, citizenship education. Firstly, even more emphasis should be placed on analyzing the specificities of digital platforms as they are used for social movement building. Secondly, more emphasis should be placed on understanding the interplay between, or interdependence of, online and offline youth activism. Finally, there should be less emphasis on educating young people to be more active citizens, and more emphasis on strengthening the capacity of youth activists to educate adults to be more active citizens. Indeed, one of the lessons of social media activism is that youth are not the ones that need to be taught what active citizenship means; rather, it is adults.

People of all ages are discovering new ways—or adapting old ways—to organize via social media, to build awareness, to encourage action, and to call for change. In some cases, these approaches simply make use of the affordances of new technology to increase the scope and scale of what had previously been done before. For example, using technologies like email to share the links to online petition sites enables something that previously was time-intensive and geographically localized to become something that can have a national, or even global, scale. Alternatively, there are new forms of organizing ever-developing—flash mobs and online crowdfunding, for example—that make use of the affordances provided by social media and mobile technology to mobilize and encourage action in entirely new or different ways (Tufekci, 2017).
While in the first decade of the 21st century, there was much enthusiasm for “Twitter Revolutions” such as the Arab Spring, Morozov (2011) was critical about the efficacy of these revolutions and the wider role of social media in encouraging successful action. Morozov is mistrusting of for-profit companies like Twitter and their involvement with governments and rightly points out that social media tools can be used to oppress as easily as they can be used to galvanize revolution. More recently, protest movements like *The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, March for Our Lives*, and *Fridays for Future* have provided scholars with valuable sources of information to examine the intersection of online and offline movements and its nexus with a digitally active and capable youth. A crucial and developing facet of these movements is that the oft-cited division between online and offline activism is increasingly becoming a less than useful tool for exploring the way that modern social movements engage (Jurgenson, 2012).

**Rejecting technological determinism and recognizing a history of youth-led social movements**

It is true that young people are leading various contemporary social movements. Mei (2021), for instance, observes that the Hong Kong democracy movement provides a recent example of youth-led activism. She goes on to describe how

> [s]ocial media was the key to mobilize youth to participate in protests which intensified the impact of the Umbrella Movement. During the 79-day protest, WhatsApp and Facebook were the main social media platforms and became fundamental to the movement (Wang, 2017). WhatsApp was used to share information among personal social networks. Ordinary citizens could directly participate in the protests through their own devices by creating and distributing their personal narratives. Meanwhile, Facebook was used for widespread posts (e.g., public statements and event announcements).

(Mei, 2021, p. 148)

At a descriptive level, WhatsApp and Facebook offered affordances that youth activists before the era of social media did not have. It is more expensive and time-consuming to produce and disseminate paper pamphlets than upload accounts and narratives on social media platforms. This is not to mention how much easier and cheaper it is, via social media, to share still and moving images, let alone to move beyond one-to-many broadcast and type to-many dialogical communication channels. But it is a misleading and simplistic technology-determinist analysis to suggest that young people are exercising leadership more so than in the past because of these affordances. We do not agree when Clark et al. (2020) assert that emergent studies necessitate a
rhetorical of traditional conceptions of citizenship and political participation in light of creative and alternative online avenues (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Kahne et al., 2015). We do, however, agree with Literata and Kligler-Vilenchik’s (2018) nuanced analysis of the specificities of youth digital participation. Examples of specificities include: Is the program institutionally-driven, top-down, and instrumentalist? Is there much space for youth “voices” to be heard? To what extent are young people enabled to “own” the process of creating their own digital products? Who participates, how, and with what ends?

The main point we want to make is that youth-led social movements are not new phenomena that have come about as a result of digital affordances. Young people exercised leadership in social movements addressing global issues, such as war and military conflict, apartheid, civil rights, burgeoning consumerism, sex and contraceptives, authoritarian education, and environmental deterioration. For example, Murphy (2018, p. 257) describes the role that high school students played in the US civil rights movement. One notable example is Lowery who is

best known as the youngest participant to have completed the three-day voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965 . . . This was a long-term strategy that involved scores of high school students participating in daily voting rights protests, with wave after wave being arrested until the jails were full.

Stone (2021) draws our attention to large-scale youth participation in the global anti-war and civil rights movements of the 1960s. The role of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) established in 1960 offers an example of an organized group of youth lending leadership to a movement. Indeed, “Martin Luther King, Jr. and others had hoped that SNCC would serve as the youth wing of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), but the students remained fiercely independent of King and SCLC, generating their own projects and strategies” (Stanford University, 2022). Inspired by the student anti-war movement, Denis Hayes, a young activist, organized campus teach-ins to raise awareness about air and water pollution. Hayes was not a one-off participant; with a broad coalition, his initiatives developed into a US nationwide campaign and, in 1970, the first Earth Day event was launched. Going back further, youth movements in Germany, before the Nazis banned them, illustrate another example of young people leading movement-wide efforts to bring about big-picture change. They “were inspired by a desire to provide young people with alternative, some might say complementary, educational opportunities to those offered by schools and families” (Flowers, 2005, p. 112). They criticized what they perceived as a growing materialism and a politics of authoritarianism they saw having deep roots in traditional family structures and schooling. One well-known German youth movement was the Wandervogel. Students organized forest expeditions for young people
with idealized goals of carving out spaces where not only young people could vote, but build an ideal “new world” for young people.

**Case study of a contemporary youth-led social movement: March for Our Lives**

In order to ground the themes of this chapter, we sketch one contemporary case study. *March for Our Lives (MFOL)* is a significant youth-led movement, not just because of its scale and success, but also because, to paraphrase Salamon’s (2018) words, it awakens the spirit of the student activism of the 1960s civil rights and progressive education movements. The organizers of *MFOL* are quick to point out that they have drawn inspiration from the American Civil Rights Movement. The MFOL organizers held a similar tour to the Freedom Riders of the 1960s, called “The Road to Change” where they “met with family members, community leaders, and survivors of gun violence across the country” (March4OurLives, 2020). *MFOL* also inspired the global youth-led *FridaysforFuture* movement.

March for Our Lives (MFOL) is the activist movement initiated by Parkland Florida teenagers that has a direct link, her own inspiration, for Thunberg. Reported in the *Time* account, in May 2018, “[she] suggested . . . [to Swedish climate activists that] they emulate the . . . [the Parkland students] who had recently organized school strikes to protest gun violence in the U.S.” (Atler, Haynes, & Worland, 2019, p. 58). Significantly they did not follow up but Thunberg did in her own Friday strikes.

(Stone, 2021, p. 252)

**Background and goals**

*MFOL* was provoked by the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. On February 14, 2018, a former student, Nikolas Cruz, killed 17 current students at the school. It became the most-deadly school shooting in US history, surpassing the Columbine shooting in 1999, which caused 15 deaths. This tragedy immediately prompted an outcry and a demand for changes to gun laws in the US. In the recent past, such calls have been led by public figures or parents of victims and have struggled to engender any meaningful response. The government response is a well-worn one, offering “thoughts and prayers” and, it appears, little hope of any real change. However, the response in the case of *MFOL* built on the legacy of 1960s student activism: this time the calls for change were led by the students of the schools themselves, who had seen their classmates killed. Protesters urged a swathe of legislative changes, including raising the age requirements for purchasing guns, establishing waiting periods and mental health checks for gun buyers, and banning the sale of bump stocks (devices which turn semi-automatic weapons into fully automatic ones).
Scale and temporality

For the purpose of this chapter, we are not measuring MFOL’s effectiveness by legislative outcomes. We are focusing on the numbers of people and other resources mobilized and in what period of time. By these measures, MFOL has achieved impressive success. After describing the scope and nature of MFOL’s success, we discuss to what extent this is because of digital affordances.

Students at the school were quick to link the events taking place with calls for gun reforms—even during the shooting itself. One such student was David Hogg, who later became prominent in MFOL: “Hogg, 17, took out his phone and started filming and interviewing classmates. He was hiding in a school closet at the time, as the gunman walked the halls” (Salamon, 2018).

In the short digital record Hogg and fellow students describe their immediate circumstances. Initially they talk of feeling isolated within the classroom while the building is being secured, then they begin to realize the terror of the situation they are in because of the active shooter, finally they start to advocate for gun control. Near the end of the 3:47 video segment Hogg calls on “legislators of the country to take action and stop [gun violence] from happening.”

(Hogg, 2018, cited in Jensen, 2020)

It is important to note that Hogg’s film was “purposeful and carefully crafted” (Jensen, 2020). He talked about his political views, and he disseminated it live. During the shooting, other students used Twitter to broadcast live their anger and fear. The students established a Twitter handle that, in the space of a year, gained 450,000 followers. Another student, Corin, built an Instagram account that has gained over 300,000 followers. Kasky “quickly came up with the hashtag #NeverAgain, which he shared on Facebook and Twitter” (Jones, 2018). Nineteen days after the shooting, MFOL’s Facebook account had garnered more than 300,000 followers. The various social media platforms were used to provide information about events.

The pace at which students strategized and organized campaign events was very fast. In the space of four days, they “hatched plans for a 100-student bus trip to Florida’s State Capitol, to lobby legislators about gun control” (Jones, 2018); a nation-wide bus tour; and a mass rally in Washington, DC. USA Today reported that the rally could be the biggest single-day protest in DC’s history (Durando, 2018), with some estimates stating that more than 800,000 people attended. Now, more than two years later, MFOL appears to be continuing to grow in power and influence. Through the formation of local chapters, they have begun campaigning, directly targeting politicians who take money from the powerful gun lobby and the National Rifle Association (NRA). According to their website, they have successfully mobilized young people around this issue. The 2018 midterm elections saw the youth voter turnout increase by 47%, which was the highest youth voter turnout in US election history. In addition, more than 46 NRA-backed candidates lost their elections.
Understanding MFOL effectiveness: interdependence of digital affordances and youth agency (skills and capabilities)

MFOL student-activists rely heavily on social media tools. But to what extent do these digital affordances explain MFOL’s successes? Yaffe (2018) implies that digital affordances are central to explaining how MFOL student leaders are effective. She refers to them as digital natives and observes this generation grew up learning how to get what they want from the internet. The immediacy of their lives on the internet where information and communication are ever present and only one click away had transmitted itself into their engagement with politics. They were not satisfied with the previously slow timeframe and instead wanted immediate results. And indeed, Corin, one of the MFOL co-founders, said as much.

The Parkland students have used social media on a daily basis since the shooting. Student organizer Emma González created a Twitter account on Feb. 18—four days after the Parkland shooting. Now she has 1.2 million followers. She’s using Twitter to share messages of solidarity and to ridicule politicians about gun control. “People always say, ‘Get off your phones,’ but social media is our weapon,” says student organizer Jaclyn Corin. “Without it, the movement wouldn’t have spread this fast.”

(Salamon, 2018)

While digital affordances enable a shorter temporal dimension for social movement-building, they do not necessarily determine other aspects of effectiveness. It is the specificities of the social media platforms and tools that matter. For example, the architecture of the platforms contributes to whether the communication is top-down and message-driven or dialogical. We write more about such specificities further on. Here, we emphasize the importance of the particular skills and capabilities that young people deploy.

Jensen (2020) is a theater educator and appraises the high level of skill and capability deployed by the MFOL student leaders. It is true, as Corin attests, that social media tools are fundamentally important to MFOL’s organizing work, but equally important are the public speaking, social research, and storytelling skills of the student leaders.

Gonzalez, a Cuban American with nascent organizing experience (she was the president of her School’s Gay-Straight Alliance), took the stage at the “March for Our Lives” Rally in Washington DC before hundreds of thousands of her young peers and other allies.

(Jensen, 2020)

The Washington Post named her speech as powerful and memorable (Epstein, 2018). Mention has already been made of Hogg’s carefully crafted film. Not only is he digitally savvy but articulate in responding to accusations that his film and other digital posts are fake. Jones (2018) describes him as a “policy
wonk, who researched each community’s demographics and its history of youth voter turnout and mass shootings.” “Corin, ever the organizer, ran logistics, connecting with youth leaders” (Jones, 2018).

In other words, there is an interdependence between digital affordances and youth agency in MFOL. Coburn (2018) argues that, while social media and the internet had a relevance, the reason there was so much cut-through was because MFOL “foregrounded the perspectives of students’ themselves.” However, the real strength of the movement lies in the fact that the young leaders are capable of inspiring others to take part in their movement. This wasn’t solely restricted to school students. At the March for Our Lives event in Washington, there were, according to Coburn, significant numbers of older protestors, as well as many first-time marchers, many of whom brought their own issues and linked the problems of gun violence to issues of racism, sexism, and sexual violence.

**Digital affordances and challenges for MFOL to be inclusive and participatory**

Stornaiuolo and Thomas (2017) take a techno-optimistic view and suggest digital affordances are enabling youth activists to even more effectively disrupt “dominant notions of civic participation—notions influenced by White, able-bodied, cisgender, and middle-class or wealthy men” (p. 355). The case of MFOL provides some confirmation on this thesis. Despite being from a white and affluent part of Florida, the initial MFOL leaders have successfully acted in solidarity with African-American and Latino students. Hagopian (2018) entitled his paper, “March for Our Lives Means Black Lives Too.” But, is this success at being inclusive to be explained by the digital affordances or the politics and skills of the student leaders, or an interplay of both? And what does it take for MFOL to respond to the “role of systemic racial inequality in both public and legislative response to mass shootings, police brutality and entrenched social violence” (Mathiason, 2019, p. 95). Being inclusive is one thing, but being able to change deeply entrenched racialized inequalities is another. Mathiason argues that, while changing the rules around gun ownership may be important, it will not be enough to change the cultural assumptions around systematic violence. He writes:

> Like the ’60s, the 2010s are a time of great social change accompanied by a rise in identitarian politics, including American exceptionalism and white masculinity in crisis. As numerous studies have shown, more so than mental illness, religious views, or party affiliations, what most perpetrators have in common is that they are white men.

*(2019, p. 92)*

In order to prevent gun violence, Mathiason (2019) argues, there is a need to address this form of violent racism. Mathiason then goes on to compare MFOL
with other movements that are explicitly race-based, such as #BlackLivesMatter and the #MillionHoodies March. He argues that the voices we should be listening to are the leaders of these movements, whose voices are not being heard as clearly as their peers from Marjory Stoneman Douglas High. There have been reasons advanced for why this might be the case—such as the lack of a clear policy agenda. However, Mathiason dismisses these, instead arguing that the reason why the students from MFOL are receiving more media attention is because they are an acceptable face for change and their lives—those of white children from affluent, suburban Florida—are more valuable than those of black children. This is a significant difference from the Freedom Riders:

Million Hoodies and BLM have garnered significant media attention, but public opinion has been split—much as it was split about the Freedom Riders during the 1960s. And, like the Freedom Riders, the attendees at protests for black lives have faced negative consequences, including mob violence, police brutality, and arrest.

(Mathiason, 2019, p. 93)

Abiding relevance of resource mobilization theory

To say that digital affordances should not be seen as the determining cause of youth-led social movements is one assertion; it is another to suggest it is important attention be paid to their specificities. McCarthy and Zald’s (1997) resource mobilization theory, developed in the 1990s, has abiding relevance. Organizing a social movement, whether with or without digital affordances, is time intensive. There are administrative duties that need to be performed. Letters to be written and answered. Posters and leaflets to be designed, created, and distributed. Fundraising events to plan and host. Rallies to organize and other groups to communicate with. There are also educational materials to be created and shared with other like-minded people. And, perhaps most time consuming of all, there is the process of building the movement: seeking out and speaking to potential new members, exhorting them to join the movement and to take action. There are also risks to physical safety, reputational and financial wellbeing to consider, including in cases when a ruling regime deems particular groups illegal, death, injury, imprisonment, the loss of employment opportunities, and vilification in the press. There are also risks to emotional well-being that might manifest: for example, being isolated from peer groups and families.

Navigating these challenges takes resources. McCarthy and Zald (1977) categorized social movements in terms of how effectively they mobilized organizing resources such as those described earlier. In their analysis, which became known as Resource Mobilisation Theory, they argued that while the original issue to be addressed—for example, gun violence or climate change—is an important factor for the development of the social movements, its success as a whole is more closely related to how efficiently resources are mobilized.
Social movements have been around for as long as people have gathered in groups and organized to bring about political and social change. And, for as long as activists have been mobilizing popular support for their cause, there is a requirement for organization. In this chapter, we draw attention to the conditions and affordances that contribute to more or less effective social movement organizations. While Earl and Kimport (2011) analyze what they characterize as “digitally enabled social change,” they acknowledge that there are social movements who make good use of the affordances of new technologies for their organizing purposes, and those who do not. The crucial factor in the success of social movements, according to Earl and Kimport, is not so much the affordances of the technology, but the way these affordances are employed:

We hold that it is the harnessing or leveraging of such differences that can perturb previously well-understood social processes, and lead to changes in both processes and our understanding of them.

(2011, p. 33)

Digital affordances and digital divides

Before building on Earl and Kimport’s (2011) analysis of how affordances are deployed, we want to challenge the idea that digital affordances necessarily have made organizing and social action more participatory and enabled flatter decision-making structures. Bimber et al. (2008) suggest that Web 2.0 platforms make it possible for activists to enable many-to-many communication at higher scale and lower cost. Lower costs, in turn, expand the potential for less reliance on paid staff. Theoretically, this means that there can be a flourishing of new types of social movements, run by volunteers. Earl and Kimport (2011) predict that we will see the growth of organizations that are smaller and less formal. They called this organizational fecundity, with a proliferation of structures to support and sustain social movements. Schlozman et al. (2012) asserts, furthermore, that as a result of social media

the range of information available has been diversified and “democratised”; and the number of news sites and commenters has multiplied, which in turn has increased the number of different viewpoints available to citizens.


Ekström and Östman (2015) point to social media affording more opportunities for individuals to be authors, not just passive consumers of web content. There is no real cost in terms of time, money, or other resources in order to do this. And, once one post for an event has been created, it can be shared widely. The affordances of digital technology mean that there is no cost in producing new versions of material, and hence it is a simple matter to share
advertisements, flyers, films, and such widely. Sites like change.org are good examples of this. On this site, anyone can set up a petition, and then share it widely, via their own social media profiles. The site itself automates the management processes involved in collecting signatures, validating identities, and passing on completed petitions.

The idea that “it costs nothing” to join social media campaigns, however, elides some of the significant work around persisting digital divides. Thorson et al. (2018) suggest that the same social inequalities that exist offline exist online in their study of how young people’s political views are formed. They find that young people choose on social media “what to read, watch, ‘like’ or ‘follow’” (2018, p. 184), less according to digital affordability or accessibility, and more according to how they are socialized at home and school. In other words, young people who grow up in families where politics is discussed around the dinner table and in homes and schools with “rich” reading resources are more likely to be politically active and opinionated than young people who grow up in families and schools without much reading material. Keating and Melis (2017) assert that an important implication of these findings is that these new online tools do not appear to be mobilising a new audience or extending the type of young adults who are politically engaged. Instead, young adults are only using social media for political engagement if they are already interested in politics.

Digital affordances and implications for citizenship education

Our interest in social movements lies in what they mean for educators working within these fields. If, as we’ve explained earlier, the influence of digital and social media has not heralded a change in the way that young people are organized—or organize—social movements, what does that mean for teachers and educators working in schools and other educational institutions? Many governments in Western countries either explicitly or implicitly require the teaching of civics and citizenship as part of the curriculum in compulsory schooling. In England, for example, citizenship is a compulsory subject. In Australia, civics and citizenship features prominently in the Australian Curriculum. Other countries have similar aims and curricular requirements. Central to many of these arguments is the desire for young people to be “active citizens,” although the precise nature of what that might mean in practice can be vague and the mechanisms to develop this vary greatly from country to country (and, at least in Australia, from state to state). Within Australia, much of the focus of civics and citizenship education (CCE) is on either the history of Australia or the responsibilities of citizens. This is particularly acute in New
South Wales, where it is integrated into subjects like History and Geography. One of the criticisms of previous models of CCE is that it conceptualizes a limited understanding of what it means to be a citizen—one that is more focused on “citizens-in-waiting” than “citizens-in-action.”

**First implication: study efficacy and specificities of digital platforms as they are used for social action**

Scholarship about the internet (Kahn & Kellner, 2004) and social media (Fullam, 2017; Murthy, 2018) has tended to focus on who was and was not using digital tools, rather than how the tools were being used. In addition, a sharp distinction was drawn between online spaces and offline spaces. But, this is an arbitrary divide with the idea that what happens in one sphere (i.e., the online space or the physical space) doesn’t necessarily translate into action in the other. Indeed, there is much discussion about whether online participation leads to offline participation in social movements (Milošević-Đorđević & Žeželj, 2017). However, we think that it is not productive to study one or the other; rather, it is better to study how they are enmeshed. The online and offline world is indisdivisibly part of the organizing and social action space. Just as protestors see no meaningful difference between the two, the creation of an arbitrary divide is a longstanding assumption to be much more robustly tested. Already, activists are recognizing this and evolving their organizing and training practices to better reflect this unity: for example, Reveille, a social movement think tank, specifically runs sessions that focus on Online to Offline Organising, and the Australian Council of Trade Unions does something similar with its Digital to Field Organising Program.

For the purpose of advancing civics and citizenship education, scholarship should closely study specificities of youth digital participation. Youth activists need to know how to deploy digital affordances effectively. Literata and Kligler-Vilenchik (2018) use four domains in their empirical research. We paraphrase them in Table 6.1. Such analysis can directly inform citizenship education programming.

Lane et al. (2019), likewise, research how social media affordances create various types of contexts and participation.

Just as the physical infrastructure of a neighborhood determines the extent to which neighbors can share stories with each other and engage in their community (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006), the affordances of social media interact to shape the possibilities for political expression.

(p. 2180)

They refer to online communication infrastructure. This leads to comparing the affordances of respective social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.
Table 6.1 Domains of youth digital participation

| Aims (of the respective social movement) | • Do they arise from a small or large number of activists?  
| | • Are they process- or product-focused?  
| | • Are they instrumental or dialogical?  
| Actors | • Do they seek to create community and belonging, or are they inward-focused and self-absorbed?  
| | • Do they work exclusively or inclusively?  
| Contexts | • Is the campaign institutionally driven, top-down, and instrumentalist? Is there much space for youth “voices” to be heard?  
| | • Do the online, offline, and hybrid spaces have strict hierarchies or are they open-access?  
| | • Are young people enabled to “own” the process of creating their own digital products?  
| | • Who participates, how, and with what ends?  
| Intensities | • How are intensities shaped by the affordances of the digital platforms? For example, can young people be the group administrators, or merely participants who mostly read messages and rarely interact with others?  
| | • Is participation executory and task-based versus empowering and structuralist?  

Second implication: the interdependency of offline and online activism

Debates and theorizing about the merits or otherwise of digital activism, as digital technologies become ever more embedded, are outdated (Kwak et al., 2018; McCafferty, 2011). Morozov (2011) and Gladwell (2010) are prominent early critics of online activism, labeling it as nothing more than “slacktivism” or “clicktivism.” Tufekci (2017) argues that a slower pace of physical organizing—meetings, letter drops, making and distributing print posters—as in the US Civil Rights Movement, has the value of building relationships and enabling careful planning for mass events. She suggests that the faster pace of organizing enabled by digital platforms could explain the ephemeral nature of some contemporary social movements. This could be seen as exemplified by “flash activism,” a nod to the idea of flash mobs, indicating the temporary nature of these movements. In a meta-survey of these debates, Max Halupka (2018) is critical of the assumed demarcation between online versus offline activism. In activist practice, as well as in working and everyday practices, digital technologies are so ubiquitous that they can only be seen as enmeshed in the DNA of campaigns.

For citizenship education, whether the social action is offline or online, there are foundational skills and capabilities that are important. These include: social research; designing visual and text-based communication strategies; public speaking; preparing written notices of events; negotiating racialized, gendered, and classed inequalities; and interpersonal communication. Yes,
there are now a larger number of digital affordances for youth activists to work with, but the spheres of online and offline activism are interdependent.

To help illustrate the enmeshed nature of offline and online activism, we focus on photos. In pre-digital times, photos and other types of still images were produced and used to document and communicate for campaigns. Relatively speaking, analog photos had high-production value. They were carefully chosen and curated to maximize their purpose in high-order messaging. Indeed, they were often produced by professional photographers. But in digital times, photos are much less costly and easier to take. They are not necessarily carefully chosen and curated. Instead, many more are taken by both professional and non-professional activists. They are used not only for high-order messaging but also for communicating lower-order and everyday happenings. Digital photos are taken and used by frontline and ordinary campaign participants to tell stories. Instagram is one social media platform that exemplifies this shift, in which posts and stories can only be made when a photo is taken and uploaded.

Nathan Jurgenson (2019) places this shift in the type of affordances presented by the digital photo in Zygmunt Bauman’s influential social theory of modernity, built around the metaphor of an increasingly “liquid” world. He argues that nearly everything becomes less solid and heavy and instead lighter, more fluid, porous, agile, and difficult to grasp . . . in the past, her argues, the social world was “solid” and meant to last, and today it is increasingly more liquid and impermanent.

(p. 21)

Digital photos are used to witness and to tell others that they were there and saw that. Think for example of selfies and people taking and uploading photos of their participation in a seminar or protest rally. The theoretical significance of this shift is that “social photography should be understood not as something removed from the moment but as something deeply immersed in social life. More than documenting moments to archive and preserve them behind glass, social photography often attempts to communicate being” (Jurgenson, 2019, p. 84). The practical significance of digital photos is that they illustrate how relationship building, messaging, and dialogue, which are all key dimensions of social action, create affordances that contribute directly and simultaneously to both offline and online movement-building.

**Third implication: less emphasis on educating young people to be more active citizens, and more emphasis on strengthening the capacity of youth activists to educate adults to be more active citizens**

There is a longstanding history of anxiety that “young people are apathetic, uninterested, or unwilling to participate in civic or political life” and this justifies
the investment in a citizenship education project (Stornaiuolo & Thomas, 2017). One could say that there is a taken-for-granted assumption that citizenship education is about adults inspiring and educating young people to take more interest in, and have more confidence to, bring about positive social and political change. But what we highlight in this chapter is a longstanding history of youth-led social movements. The implication here is for the citizenship education project to be re-conceived to be as much, if not more, about youth leaders educating older people, shaping public opinion, and planning for positive social and political change. For schools and other formal education providers, this would mean shifting from a deficit to a strengths-based perspective when it comes to designing citizenship education curriculum. A deficit perspective assumes that young people lack knowledge, skills, and desirable attributes. A strengths-based perspective assumes that there are stories and accounts of youth-led social movements that can be instructive.

To advance citizenship education and capacity building for youth-led social movements, it is not so much a task of romanticizing these stories and accounts, but rather to develop a repertoire of tools and frameworks to analyze and learn from them. We acknowledge the expansion of digital platforms and how they have changed the ways people organize and mobilize, but we have pointed out that to analyze youth-led social movements still requires paying attention to the foundational aspects of social action that are alluded to in Table 6.1.

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Keith Heggart and Rick Flowers


7 Toward Global Digital Citizenship

“Everyday” Practices of Young Australians in a Connected World

Anita Harris, Jessica Walton, Amelia Johns, and Gilbert Caluya

Introduction

Fostering young people’s global digital citizenship in a mobile and connected world is a growing priority for policymakers. Schools are important spaces where the civic identities and practices of diverse young people are nurtured (MCEETYA, 2008; UNESCO, 2014). One key challenge in a globalized world is developing school curriculum that supports digital literacy, responsibility, rights claims, and intercultural understanding in order to cultivate global citizenship (Walton et al., 2013, 2014). As we have outlined elsewhere, “digital literacy’ refers to the technical and social skills to navigate technology, judge the quality and reliability of online information, and understand the social norms that apply in online settings” (Third et al., 2014, p. 3; see also Gilhooly & Lee, 2014)” (Harris & Johns, 2021, p. 401). As Caluya and colleagues (2018, p. 11) note, “A step beyond merely ensuring digital access, digital literacy is proposed as a set of teachable skills that can be imparted to vulnerable or minoritized groups to protect them from risk.”

Digital literacy skills development is primarily focused on the use of privacy settings on social media, detection of false accounts and misinformation, the use of blocking tools to limit exposure to bullying and hate speech, and so on (Siapera et al., 2018). However, digital literacy is also often linked to digital citizenship, which builds on the focus on skills and capacities but extends this into the domain of social responsibilities to others online. As Third and colleagues (2014, p. 7) argue, this “marks a shift to thinking about online practices as fundamentally social and community-based practices, as opposed to purely individual ones.” Digital citizenship approaches are interested in promoting digital participation of social groups, building social cohesion online, and understanding “how digital infrastructures can support a wider ‘civic culture’” (Coulty et al., 2014, p. 615). In this regard, digital citizenship is increasingly brought into conversation with global citizenship and the need for intercultural competencies, meaning the cultivation of global civic responsibilities and ethics (Andreotti, 2006) and capacity for respectful and ethical negotiation of participation, claim

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making, and expression in shared spaces where diverse groups interact, from local communities to global digital publics.

Policymakers have attempted to address the “global” dimension of digital citizenship by joining with media industry partners and human rights organizations to develop programs that foster safe, responsible, equitable, and inclusive citizenship in a digitally connected world (UNESCO, 2014; Tan & Park, 2015). We acknowledge that there are valid criticisms of how human rights organizations, including UNESCO, frame their understanding of educational development, human rights, and social inclusion within a Western, Enlightenment model, which is often insensitive to local knowledges and practices within diverse cultural, economic, and social contexts (Andreotti, 2006, Andreotti & Pashby, 2013). Nonetheless, in principle, support for programs that harness growing global and digital interconnectedness and develop skills to engage in cross-cultural dialogue, which are core values and practices of global citizenship education, prevails in policy discussion (UNESCO, 2014). In practice, however, fears regarding who is in control in a digital era and what role governments should play in managing young people’s online behaviors and digital lives have led to a widening gap between policy—framed around human rights and global citizenship—and school-based programs—oriented toward risk management and social cohesion agendas (Livingstone et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014; Collin et al., 2011; McCosker, 2015; Walsh et al., 2020; Office of the e-Safety Commissioner, 2016a). This tension is underscored by persistent concerns about social media and internet services that make available sexualized or violent and extremist content to young people, but which are hosted in other jurisdictions beyond the regulatory powers of the state in which they are viewed (Livingstone et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014, 2019; e-Safety Commissioner, 2021b).

Nonetheless, while debates about regulation in this context are focused on platforms, services, and content, current youth digital policies and school-based programs in the Australian and regional context are more concerned with young people’s own digital practices, which are persistently framed as risky and a potential threat to social cohesion (Collin et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014, 2019; UNESCO, 2014). These concerns dominate the policies and programs of digital citizenship, reducing their effectiveness in promoting the potential benefits of online engagement to help develop young people into ethical and informed citizens. This also results in a worrying disconnect between digital and global citizenship curriculum and programs. Despite global citizenship policies and programs identifying that digital networks, technologies and cultures enable forms of youth-led civic participation, intercultural understanding, and learning (MCEETYA, 2008; Wierenga & Guevara, 2013; UNESCO, 2014), this focus is often sidelined in digital citizenship policies and programs. Although the literature may highlight links between transnational digital media use and global citizenship orientations, there is a gap between these claims and the content of programs, which are often framed by nation-centric and securitized understandings of citizenship and participation (McCosker, 2016; Johns, 2021).
In the first part of this chapter, we present a brief profile of Australian youth and digital inclusion within a striated Australian policy and program landscape to highlight tendencies to narrowly frame youth global and digital citizenship and to argue for a more integrated approach. We next consider the role of everyday youth digital media practices, with particular attention to marginalized youth who are often the target of corrective policies. We argue here that the everyday digital media use of young people should be more closely examined with attention to differences in class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality to bring together a more critical and expansive understanding of global citizenship and digital citizenship, in order to better align formal initiatives with young people’s everyday experiences of global digital citizenship.

**Australian youth: demographics and digital inclusion**

As reported by Lam et al. (2021), there are approximately three million youth aged 15–24 in Australia, constituting around one-eighth of the population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). Among young people aged 12–24, just under half are either first- or second-generation migrants (VicHealth, Data61, CSIRO & MYAN, 2017). Twenty-five percent of young people aged 12–24 are from a culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) background, and this population is growing at a faster rate compared to the total population in this age group (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b; Hugo et al., 2014).¹ Five percent of the Australian youth population (aged 10–24), or about 1 in every 20 young people, is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018, p. 3).

Young Australians are significant users of the internet, digital and social media, and mobile technology. Ninety-seven percent of Australian households with children and young people have internet access (86% of households overall) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Ninety-two percent of Indigenous youth have internet access at home, with 86% accessing the internet at other sites, including schools and libraries (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018). People aged 15–17 years are the highest proportion of internet users (98%), and this age group also spends the most amount of time online (18 hours) for personal use each week (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Ninety-four percent of Australian teenagers have mobile devices and use these primarily for entertainment, communication, and social media, and 78% of Australian teenagers have one or more social media accounts (Rhodes, 2017). YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook are the platforms of choice for Australian Gen Zers (1991–2005) and Millennials (1976–1990), with use skewing away from Facebook and towards Instagram for the younger cohort (Roy Morgan, 2020). Comparatively, the second platform of choice among the youngest generation, Generation Alpha (2006-present), is TikTok, with increasing use among Gen Zers who are 25 years and under (Roy Morgan, 2020).

As Lam and Harris (2021) note, the internet is “increasingly regarded as an essential service” for young people’s participation in education, employment,
information, community services, organization of finances, health and well-being, and connecting with family and friends (Thomas et al., 2019, p. 5). Young people’s engagement with global youth cultures and digital life is widening youth horizons and enabling cosmopolitan forms of citizenship, social action, connection, and belonging (Johns, 2014; Third et al., 2014). However, internet access is stratified for young Australians, with young people from refugee, migrant, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds as well as youth from lower socioeconomic neighborhoods experiencing lower levels of digital inclusion, mainly due to issues of affordability (Lam & Harris, 2021; Harris et al., 2017). Further, rural/urban divides prevail in Australia, with studies finding that those living in remote areas experience a “double jeopardy of digital disadvantage,” such that inequalities that result from lack of access to digital infrastructure are compounded by inequalities in education and work (Lam & Harris, 2021; Mossberger, 2009; Park, 2016). These issues around digital use, access, and inclusion shape considerations of global and digital citizenship education, which we turn to next.

Global and digital citizenship education: parallel rather than intersecting

Global citizenship broadly encompasses a socially responsible global outlook and active participation toward creating a more socially equitable world (Wierenga & Guevara, 2013). In the past, citizenship education and global education have been scrutinized for doing “little more than add[ing] international content into citizenship activities or global education activities into citizenship” (Davies et al., 2005, p. 73). This critique, particularly of “outdated models of education associated with national frameworks,” strengthened calls for global citizenship education (Davies et al., 2005, p. 73). However, with the growing trend toward global citizenship at a global and national policy level (i.e., OECD, 2018; Petersen, 2020; United Nations, 2015), studies have critiqued global citizenship education that, on the surface, proclaims to have a global outlook aiming to address international problems, but continues to operate from a nation-state standpoint acting for the nation’s best interests (Moon & Koo, 2011; Schattle, 2015; Walton, 2020). Additionally, the approach to global citizenship education has been critiqued for its overemphasis on a common humanity at the expense of taking a more critical stance to understanding global inequalities and unequal power relations (Andreotti, 2006; Pashby, 2015). Although there is a place for recognizing a common humanity and common global goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals outlined in the Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015), there is a risk of counteracting those goals if a critical approach to global citizenship is overlooked. As Andreotti (2006) argues, a critical and historical approach to global citizenship education must be central to educational policies and programs; otherwise, the “generation encouraged and motivated to ‘make a difference’ will then project their beliefs and myths
as universal and reproduce power relations and violence similar to those in colonial times” (p. 41).

In Australia, there are some policy nods to global citizenship in key education documents, such as the recent Alice Springs Mparntwe Education Declaration (Education Council, 2019), which replaced the Melbourne Declaration (MCEETYA, 2008). The 2008 Melbourne Declaration’s preamble noted that “global integration and international mobility” required Australia to “nurture an appreciation of and respect for social, cultural and religious diversity and a sense of global citizenship” (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 5). This global citizenship ideal was retained under Goal 2 of the recent Alice Springs Mparntwe Education Declaration in 2019 to nurture young Australians to become “active and informed community members,” which calls upon educators to teach them to “understand their responsibilities as global citizens” so they can “contribute to local and global communities” (Education Council, 2019, pp. 5–6). Despite such policy gestures, there are only cursory references to global citizenship in the Australian national curriculum (Buchanan, 2018; Petersen, 2020). For example, in the Civics and Citizenship section, it is only in Year 9 that reference to the global is mentioned to “examine global connectedness and how that is shaping contemporary Australian society” (ACARA, 2021). Even then, global connectedness is still focused on the nation-state rather than also considering transnational connections. Rather than examining everyday forms of citizenship, the majority of the content on democratic participation centers on understanding Australia’s legal and political systems. Petersen (2020, p. 7) attributes this “disconnect between policy rhetoric/intention and curricular content in Australia” to a lack of priority in an overcrowded curriculum, where discipline learning within a high-stakes testing educational culture takes precedence, and to funding cuts to nongovernmental organizations that had previously provided the majority of content and teacher training in the area of global education.

Although there have been calls for a critical approach toward global citizenship education, the approach to global citizenship in Australian policy documents, similar to that of intercultural understanding (Walton et al., 2013), is still primarily framed within a celebratory approach toward internal cultural diversity and a benevolent approach to neighboring countries. For example, in the Alice Springs Mparntwe Education Declaration (Education Council, 2019), references to global citizenship are limited to how young people should “understand their responsibilities as global citizens . . . to effect positive change” (p. 6) and “who value and celebrate cultural and linguistic differences, and engage in the global community, particularly with our neighbours in the Indo-Pacific regions” (p. 8). The focus is very individualistic, with the aim to co-exist harmoniously with neighboring countries. Comparatively, a critical global citizenship education “aims to equip individuals to go beyond a benevolent discourse of ‘helping others’ and promotes recognition of complicity within geopolitical power relations and the reproduction of inequalities” (Andreotti & Pashby, 2013, p. 425).
Digital citizenship policy has likewise taken a very safe approach, with an emphasis on cyber security and online safety and an evident hesitation to embrace the potential of digital technologies to enhance global civic and political understanding, engagement and recognition (Tan & Park, 2015; Third et al., 2019). In Australia, digital citizenship is significantly determined by the government and state policies initially implemented under the Rudd Labor government with the National Strategy for Young Australians (Australian Government, 2010) and the Cyber-Safety Plan (Conroy, 2007), and has continued in this mode since then. This focus on online safety and the collapsing of all reference to digital citizenship under this less controversial term has been consolidated in recent years with the establishment in 2015 of the world’s first e-Safety Commissioner to develop evidence-based school resources addressing online safety, cyber-bullying, and hate speech across numerous state departments, industry and not-for-profit (as well as for-profit) sectors (e-Safety Commission, 2016b, 2019a, 2019b, 2021a, 2021b; Walsk et al., 2020). Some of the resources developed in the context of online safety address marginalized social groups, with a new section offering resources for “diverse groups” (see www.esafety.gov.au). This section makes available resources for Indigenous youth, LGBTQ+ youth, and young people with disabilities. Reports are also available to educators (e-Safety Commissioner, 2021a, 2021b). Despite the inclusion of these resources, which address broader social inequalities, and subsequently greater vulnerability of marginalized groups to digital risks, the focus continues to be on online dangers framed within an individualized understanding of risk, as well as safety education framed by a psychosocial framework of harm minimization. This coincides with what McCosker et al. (2015) found in their collection examining digital citizenship policy and everyday practices in Australian, European, and North American contexts. McCosker (2015, p. 21) specifically connects youth education around online risks to state apparatuses and domains of “security” that seek to maintain nation-centric priorities and interests.

Further, this raft of policy interventions and resources centers upon the concept of the young person as having a civic deficit, requiring them to be guided toward ideal participation. In terms of what this participation looks like, McCosker (2015) argues there is a “persistent idea” liberal ideal of citizenship in these programs, which acknowledges that to ensure children and young people’s safety and wellbeing, online interactions “should be rational, conflict and risk free” (p. 24). Where young people’s participation in issues-based movements and activism regarding systemic racism, sexism, misogyny, homophobia, and transphobia and so on runs counter to this ideal, for example, producing passionate disagreement, efforts to dismiss these expressions as dysfunctional forms of “cancel culture” often arise to marginalize and discredit youthful civic expression and activism (Owens, 2019). Recently, the focus on strengthening online safety and protection frameworks for young people, and a continued shift away from discourses of digital citizenship, which center young people’s agency, expression and rights-claims, culminated in the Online
Safety Bill 2021, which passed both houses of parliament in June 2021, and which increases the powers of the e-Safety Commissioner to limit children and young people’s access to digital content deemed harmful. Decisions regarding how harmful content is defined will be at the discretion of the Commissioner. The move has been met with criticism, with questions of how these increased powers will be targeted, and fears being raised around a “Fosta-Sesta” type act that censors young people’s digital participation in a manner that may hamper LGBTQI+ and other minority youth accessing safe spaces for information seeking and community building (Stardust, 2021). In other words, the bill is framed around a risk-based perspective rather than a rights-based perspective. This reinforces a view expressed by UNESCO (2016, p. 53) recently, which notes that, in the Asia Pacific region, Australia stands out as having far more policies oriented to safety and risk than to opportunity.

From an education perspective, and as we have found in our current research, most schools in Australia have some kind of cybersafety or information and communications technology (ICT) policy. Our preliminary findings from a systematic desktop school policy review of 670 secondary school websites (out of 3479 secondary or combined schools in Australia) conducted between September 2020 and June 2021 show that while many schools do not use the language of “digital citizenship” or “digital citizen,” most (63%) have some kind of cybersafety or ICT policy. Publicly funded schools (or government schools) were more likely to have a policy (77%) than not, while private schools (sometimes called “non-government schools” or “independent schools”) were more likely to not have a policy (55%). This is because many government schools derive their digital citizenship programs, policies, or curriculum from government agencies (e.g. the aforementioned federal Office of the e-Safety Commissioner or state-level education departments), as well as relying on non-profit organizations established to protect youth online.

The vast majority of government and nongovernment school policies and programs focus entirely on cybersafety, protecting students from educational distractions (mobile phone policies) and protecting youth from the dangers of the internet, including cyberbullying, online grooming, radicalization, sexting, and pornography. While these approaches seem effective for their purposes, they are limited in their capacity to: understand young people’s existing everyday digital practices, competencies, and strengths; respond to complex digital media environments as a simultaneously social, civic, and political space; and engage meaningfully with young people’s informal efforts for multiscalar civic life and social solidarity online. Despite government schools being more likely to have a digital citizenship-related policy, the rare schools that have a more complex, holistic digital citizenship policy that moves beyond cybersafety and educational risk were mostly private, nongovernment schools. These “best practice” examples focused on online responsibilities, civic participation, and contributions to global communities. While we are wary of drawing conclusions just yet, this raises questions about whether differences in resources shape differential responses to technology, such as punitive versus
non-punitive approaches or risk-focused versus civic-focused approaches, that might deepen currently existing digital divides or generate new ones.

As we can see from the aforementioned text, both global citizenship and digital citizenship have some limitations in both their policy framing and implementation. Given that global or international connections are primarily enabled by digital technologies and given that digital citizenship places us in contact with international content and audiences, one might imagine that these two policy domains would interact more than they do. This is particularly relevant in the Australian context where extensive transnational networks are the norm: nearly half the population is overseas-born or has an overseas-born parent, and there are high numbers of temporary migrants. Yet these discussions tend to be had in separate areas, with separate bodies, for separate purposes, and end up with separate, disconnected policies that, arguably, ill-prepare youth people to engage meaningfully, fruitfully, and safely with the global digital landscape. Further, as the digital media environment evolves alongside the changing landscape of youth participatory practice, it is timely to expand policy and practice beyond cybersafety, risk, and opportunity toward more integrative conceptualizations of youth digital citizenship. Scholars who work in this area include: Vromen (2017), Third (2019), and Collin (2011) in the Australian context; Yue et al. (2019) and Goh and Pang (2016) in Singapore; Couldry (2014) and Livingstone et al. (2007) in the UK; Leurs in Europe; Bennett et al. (2009) and Papacharissi (2010) in the US. Broadly speaking, their scholarship promotes a more rights- and social-actor-centered approach as well as bringing together the digital with the global as interconnected domains of citizenship practice, often via cross-disciplinary research. For example, innovative interdisciplinary conceptual frames can investigate practices of global digital citizenship amongst youth by bringing media and migration scholarship on “digital diasporas” (Leurs, 2014, 2015; Georgiou, 2014) into dialogue with sociologically informed conceptualizations and critiques of global citizenship and digital citizenship (Andreotti & Pashby, 2013; Couldry et al., 2014; Isin & Ruppert, 2015; Papacharissi, 2010; Wierenga & Guevara, 2013). Harris and Johns (2021) call for more field-crossing analysis of the everyday “lived” negotiations by youth from diverse racial, cultural, and religious backgrounds of local and transnational digital spaces and connections, including how they narrate their own multiscalar citizenship identities through those practices.

Building on this work, we focus on one important way that a more integrated approach could productively expand conceptualizations of global digital citizenship, that is by becoming more attentive to everyday practices of global connectedness among Australian youth. Accordingly, the following discussion provides a snapshot of young people’s everyday global digital citizenship practices, highlighting research with marginalized youth, as they are often perceived as those most in need of citizenship education and policy interventions. These examples provide a glimpse into the ways young people are already exercising new forms of digital and global connectedness but is not
meant to comprehensively represent the existing literature. In discussing the ways young people exercise a diverse range of global digital citizenship practices beyond the limits of a “soft” approach to global citizenship (Andreotti, 2006) and digital citizenship beyond a cybersafety lens, we emphasize the need for research, policy, and educational practice to take an integrative and critical approach to global digital citizenship. This can better inform efforts to build school-based global digital citizenship programs and curricula that are based on robust empirical evidence and that respond to the opportunities and challenges that everyday participation in transnational and local digital spaces present to youth.

Young people’s everyday practices of global digital citizenship: some insights

Young people are at the forefront of connectivity online, and this is where new forms of youth solidarity, social action, and connectivity are emerging. Those aged 15 to 24 are “the most connected age group in the world” (UNESCO, 2019, p. 18). While policy has focused on equipping them with skills and values to safely navigate online environments as productive digital citizens, far less attention has been paid to young people’s everyday, informal, self-initiated digital practices in relation to civic participation. Young people increasingly use digital tools and especially social media to forge connections with others; build and sustain social and civic relationships; and situate themselves in local and global communities and issues. These activities are often informal and transient, and emerge organically out of youth social and civic networks. Because of these features, they are not well-captured by digital citizenship policy and engagement models, even those designed to understand and facilitate youth participatory practice and active citizenship online. Such rich, digital civic participation is certainly not captured by digital citizenship policies designed only to address the threats to personal safety of the digital environment.

In Australia, notwithstanding enduring issues of digital divide and exclusion (Thomas et al., 2019), young people are significant users of the internet, digital and social media, and mobile technology, as outlined earlier. Not only do they have access to these technologies, but also they are first adopters and users of social media platforms, apps, and digital devices, using these simultaneously for social, civic, and political purposes. Young people use these digital affordances not simply for entertainment, leisure, and information, but as a primary means for social and civic connection and everyday political participation, which include forging connections with others, creating a presence and having a voice in the public domain, building and sustaining social and civic relationships, and engaging in user-generated content production and peer-to-peer sharing on issues of personal and public significance. A significant number of young Australians feel more confident, more able to express themselves, and report greater levels of freedom online than off (Office of the e-Safety Commissioner, 2016a). Consequently, the internet and digital
media are critical spaces for youth participation, self-expression, recognition, communication, and belonging (with both positive and negative effects, for example, engagement in digital publics where they encounter new ideas versus the creation of “echo chambers” of like-minded individuals). Furthermore, there is a strong positive relationship between young people’s social media use and political engagement (Vromen et al., 2015; Xenos et al., 2014). Young people are driving new social-media-based forms of political engagement and are more likely than other age groups to engage in such activities (Vromen et al., 2016).

While there is considerable debate globally as well as in Australia specifically about the extent to which the internet, digital, and social media have changed young people’s formal political and civic participation (e.g., see: Bessant, 2016; Castells, 2007; Livingstone et al., 2007; Xenos & Bennett, 2007), much of the research and policy discussion relates to the use of social media platforms by political parties or civics education programs attempting to engage youth, or the role of social media in advancing activism and movements undertaken by young people who are highly politically engaged (Johns, 2020). These debates do not take into account young people’s everyday global digital practices, which do not always mirror conventional modes of political organizing or community building. As such, current policy approaches are not adequate to understand and harness these opportunities created by the young people themselves, which may not speak to more conventional modes of political and civic participation.

The following discussion provides examples of how young Australians, particularly marginalized young people—the vast majority of whom are neither activist nor apathetic (Harris et al., 2010)—have used the internet and digital and social media to engage in a range of civic and social networks in unprecedented ways. We note how migrant backgrounds, mobility and migration pathways, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality all shape their everyday digital practices as young citizens in a global, digital world. We draw particular attention to marginalized youth because, while marginalized youth are often singled out for being at risk of “civic deficit” and digital exclusion, research into their everyday participatory practices reveals that in spite of structural disadvantages, they are highly civicly and politically engaged in informal ways, especially online. For example, international, comparative research shows that these youth constitute those most likely to express a sense of efficacy and positive attitude toward political engagement on digital and social media (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 527), making them “the ‘ideal’ models for the everyday-making, networked young citizen, who are yet to see their own lives and experiences reflected in formal institutionalized politics” (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 528).

In the Australian context, it is critical to acknowledge that Indigenous people are among those most marginalized from formal civic and political participation, owing to the history and ongoing effects of colonization and dispossession, including the legacy of denial of citizenship and ongoing abuse
of rights, lack of recognition of sovereignty, few mechanisms for parliamentary or other statute representation, and the absence of a treaty. And yet Indigenous Australians have always been politically active and are leaders in the digital sphere, frequently using social media to build solidarity, express political identity, and engage in social action. As Carlson and Frazer (2018, p. 1) demonstrate, “Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people have always been early adopters of technology and use social media at rates higher than non-Indigenous Australians.” In their research, they have found that Indigenous people use social media as a new “meeting place” for coming together and building community, which is particularly important in the context of forced removal of people from family and land. It is also productively used for expressing Indigenous identity, facilitating cultural knowledge translation, offering new ways to respond to racism, and enabling political activism. Indigenous youth especially take up social media to maintain connections and mobilize communities for activism; as Kennedy (2020) finds, “this is particularly the case for young people who are encouraged to travel to attend schooling, university, and gain employment away from their home Country” (p. 6).

Carlson and Frazer (2018) further document formal and informal Indigenous media advocacy, political movements, and campaigns facilitated by digital media. These include Indigenous X, a Twitter account (@IndigenousX), created by Luke Pearson in 2012 to broadcast Aboriginal voices and stories, and to provide perspectives on current issues. The account includes a weekly rotation of hosts from different sectors of the Indigenous community, including artists, politicians, academics, teachers, doctors, and students (Carlson & Frazer, 2018), and has become a major platform for community media engagement and advocacy, often countering mainstream media bias. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities have also been active in joining transnational movements addressing institutional racism and discrimination including offshoots of the #BlackLivesMatter movement, which in not all but many instances involve Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander activists using the hashtag or creating new hashtags to mobilize community and shape public discourse. Other examples are local Australian chapters of the Canadian Idle No More political group, which advocates for an end to violence against Indigenous women and girls. The Australian #SOSBlakAustralia movement also emerged in 2011 as a protest against government plans to forcibly close remote Aboriginal communities in Western Australia, and which “leveraged extensive online networks to coordinate mass protests” and also led to transnational support from Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities (Carlson & Frazer, 2018, p. 21). These examples demonstrate how Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people’s everyday engagements on social media have political intentions and effects.

The experiences of young people with a migrant or refugee background are also critical to an understanding of everyday practices of global digital citizenship in the Australian context. A recent pilot study of CALD youth (18–25 years old) in Victoria, Australia, suggests that such youth use internet and
communications technologies to participate not just at a local level but also across the state, the nation, and transnationally, and being “highly engaged in global civic practices through digital technologies, participating across all key domains of citizenship: social, political, cultural and economic life” (Caluya et al., 2018, p. 4). Take, for example, the political dimension of digital citizenship. While almost 80% of CALD youth surveyed avoided participating online with political parties and 90% avoided contacting politicians directly online, 50% nevertheless used the internet to inform themselves about elections and party politics, 57% used social media to keep up with social and political issues, and 70% used the internet to inform themselves about their rights (Caluya et al., 2018, p. 6). Thus, just in terms of political dimensions of digital citizenship, these findings provide evidence of a politically engaged diasporic youth. Other studies of CALD youth have found that they especially use social media to engage civically and politically; for example, Vromen et al. (2016) have found that speaking a language other than English at home is a positive predictor of young Australians’ political engagement on Facebook (see also Kenny, 2016; Wyn et al., 2017).

Relatedly, studies among young temporary migrants in Australia focusing on Chinese international students have shown young people use different digital platforms to create multiple communities and networks, for example, using Facebook to engage in local civic culture, and WeChat or Weibo to connect with people in other international locations (see Gomes, 2018; Martin, 2016; Wong & Hjorth, 2016; Zhao, 2019). Another example of such youth using social media platforms for global digital civic and political engagement is Johns’ (2020) research on Malaysian-Chinese youth in Malaysia and Malaysian international students in Melbourne, Australia. Social media platforms were critical for promoting outward-facing political and civic actions (Facebook), maintaining social connections with other students and family members back home (Facebook, WeChat, WhatsApp), and maintaining internal communications for activist and friendship groups (WhatsApp). These findings also give pause to accounts that Gen Z youth have abandoned Facebook and other platforms for Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, despite the significance of these platforms to emerging Gen Z civic and political cultures. As these examples highlight, Facebook and messenger apps WeChat and WhatsApp continue to be important platforms facilitating transnational civic, political and familial connections.

Young people who adhere to diasporic identities are also forming productive transnational networks of connection and belonging (Collins et al., 2011) that move beyond traditional models of local transmission of cultural and political identity from one migrant generation to the next. These function as spaces of peer-to-peer communications, youth community building, and “spaces of safety” (Nilan, 2017, p. 181), and foster collective engagement with social issues and solutions to social problems. For example, in their analysis of an email list of a Muslim youth online community, Johns and Rattani (2016) identified that a diverse spectrum of arguments and voices was able
to be maintained through the email list, with some topic threads not only producing deliberative exchanges and consensus building but also oftentimes sparking agonistic and passionate disagreements that transgressed boundaries of what is acceptable in other formal spaces of cultural or political participation. Interviews with participants and moderators identified that this led to productive discussions around what constituted a culturally safe space, while also allowing participants to reflect on their own positionality, ethics, values, rights (e.g., to safety or free expression), and beliefs. Online spaces and digital media are also integral to young Australian Muslims’ forms of social, civic, and political expression, connection, and agitation, both within Australia and when forging transnational networks (Harris & Roose, 2014; Johns, 2014).

Gender and sexuality critically shape young people’s digital and global citizenship practices. Young women were early adopters of ICT in Australia and globally and have led the way in the use of new technologies for hybrid purposes, blending social, personal, civic, and political activities through these means (Harris, 2008). Marginalized young women are also the group most likely to become engaged in civic and political practices through their social networks (Roker, 2008). Research with LGBTIQ+ youth has long shown how they use online spaces to develop a sense of membership and connection, but also articulate a collective voice and take action for social change locally and globally. In their study of one online group, Hanckel and Morris (2014, p. 872) find that “the community not only provides a sense of belonging for the participants and reduces their experiences of isolation, but also connects them to resources and networking opportunities that foster political participation.” These global digital citizenship practices and spaces blur the boundaries of youth cultures and politics. For example, youth cultures that emerge around celebrity influencers have an important political role to play, as evidenced by a research study examining the representations and followers of queer-identifying YouTuber Troye Sivan, whose pop career was launched on YouTube and via talent shows, but who has since used his personal brand and celebrity to amplify “crucial health and well-being messages” while “continuing to foster a sense of community and loyalty among their young followers” (Abidin & Cover, 2019, p. 217). Such young people who become influencers by creating digital media content and attracting a large public following often engage in advocacy, activism and community building through their self-representation as well as their status in online networks, even while they may not produce explicitly political content.

Overall, new participatory spaces, networks, and groups are being established, but so are new participatory modes. The communicative acts themselves, not merely the platform, are important. Social networking sites, in particular, have been found to promote global youth belonging and social and community connectedness (Collin et al., 2011, p. 7), and to enable and expand mechanisms for taking action and making change (Rose & Morstyn, 2013). Social media use is significantly related to individual political engagement by Australian youth (Xenos et al., 2014). Common youth activities range
from the creation of networks, groups, blogs, and vlogs, which “create and sustain a youth friendly space for public discussions where they can address a social problem that affects them” (Caron, 2017, p. 656), to producing, consuming, and sharing content such as posts, tweets, comments, and memes that provide a “light” youth cultural entrée to and interpretation of social issues and extend the parameters of what counts as political commentary. Byron (2022) shows how informal networks of support built on platforms identified as “queer” platforms, such as Tumblr (Byron, 2022, pp. 131–135), can provide LGBTIQ+ young people with a safe space to share experiences and seek information on mental health and other chronic health conditions that is free of judgment and sensitive to different forms of gender expression and identity—conversations not always found on other platforms or in formal health settings. Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Snapchat, and TikTok have also become important platforms for such peer-to-peer health, civic, political, and social communication and community building.

TikTok has enabled young people to become engaged in social issues in a way that is entertaining and peer palatable (Abidin, 2021). One example shared by Abidin (2021) relates to the Australian bushfires of 2019–2020, where firefighters performing TikTok dance videos and the sharing of memes and other popular content related to the fires demonstrated how participatory social media cultures can facilitate playful sharing of information, but also which demonstrate the use of humor to cope with disaster and to promote solidarity. YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook are the platforms of choice for Australian Gen Z (born 1991–2005) and Millennials (born 1976–1990), with use skewing away from Facebook and toward Instagram for the younger cohort (see Roy Morgan, 2020). More than just offering an alternative space or forum, social media is fostering new ways of discussing, connecting, and collaborating with others around issues of concern, as previous examples of influencer and meme culture on TikTok and the facilitation of queer communities of care on Tumblr demonstrate. Social media is found to cultivate active and collaborative—rather than simply passive and “dutiful”—forms of youth participation; what Vromen et al. (2016), drawing on Bangs) describe as “everyday making citizenship norms.” Young people’s everyday use of social media platforms, including activities such as posting, sharing, following, commenting, and liking, constitute new and legitimate civic and political engagement practices that are “creative, horizontal and ad hoc” (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 523). Global and digital spaces and communicative practices are particularly relevant to youth who face exclusion from other more formal mechanisms for civic and political expression.

Although digital spaces have the potential toward a more global outlook, focusing on everyday practices also opens onto the discovery of social effects that may run counter to “global” orientations. Recent findings, for example, indicate that young people’s digital networks continue to be characterized by cultural and ethnic homophily rather than intercultural bridging (Groshek &
Koc-Michalska, 2017; Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011). This indicates that the social and technical affordances of digital media may create echo chambers that amplify nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racial and religious intolerance. Social media platforms can also produce adversarial, antagonistic, and toxic cultures and practices leading to arguments that more often foster and sustain division, racism (Matamoros-Fernández, 2020), political polarization, and uncivil behavior, rather than social connection, community, consensus, and civility. For example, cultures of trolling (McCosker & Johns, 2014), bullying and harassment (Carlson & Frazer, 2018; Carlisle et al., 2019), image-based abuse (Albury et al., 2019), memefied hostility, and sharing of violent or extremist content sometimes threaten to overwhelm and derail more productive digital expressions, as outlined in our examples given earlier. Recognizing this, we argue for more empirical testing of how global digital citizenship is developed, interpreted, and actioned in the lives of young people in Australia, and where the possibilities and tensions lie in operationalizing this toward global citizenship.

**Conclusion**

There is a need for more expansive, holistic, and responsive global digital citizenship policy. On the one hand, it must go beyond digital citizenship as limited to safety, risk, and literacy and, on the other hand, adopt a more critical understanding of global citizenship that extends further than a focus on individualistic action for common humanitarian goals that do not take into account the role that nation-states and historical global inequalities have played in creating global problems in the first place. Global digital citizenship policy needs to be grounded in strong empirical evidence that accounts for everyday digital spaces and practices as engagement in themselves. Moreover, it is critical to be able to better respond to and support emerging forms of online (global and local) civic participation, solidarity and social action that manifest in these more everyday social practices (addressing what is both productive and problematic), because the traditional distinctions between social, civic, and political practices have become blurred for youth, and their civic and political agency is intertwined with their social and digital relationships and activities.

We have argued for an approach that addresses the links between digital and global citizenship. Capturing the increasing global and digital connectedness of young people’s civic and political participation will help inform educational programs that better align with young people’s digital media practices and experiences of citizenship in a global context more generally. Importantly, Xenos et al. (2014, p. 161) have found that, where it exists, digital civic education, which mixes digital literacy with civic and political discussion topics, is significantly and positively related to young Australians’ individual and collective political engagement. And this education is yet to encompass everyday
practices. Research and policy approaches can tackle the opportunity and challenge of diversity for global digital citizenship by examining if, and how, youth perform citizenship through their current digital media practices and how these practices compare with their perceptions of school-based digital citizenship and global citizenship programs and digital-citizenship-related policies.

It is critical to know more about the types of digital media practices that youth engage in; to explore what types of citizenship orientations and skills are fostered through these digital media practices; and to compare how these align with, or depart from, conceptualizations of global and digital citizenship as they are currently defined by policymakers and implemented in existing school curricula and programs. From this knowledge base, it would then be possible to create evidence-based benchmarks and recommendations to inform global digital citizenship school-based programs that better align with the benefits espoused in global citizenship education and that are more open to other forms of digital citizenship practices beyond being defined in relation to risk. Taking an integrated approach to global digital citizenship that is grounded in young people’s everyday practices has the potential to strengthen the relevance, inclusivity, and value of existing programs for a broader student population in Australia and beyond.

Notes

1 “Culturally and linguistically diverse” (often abbreviated to “CALD”) is an official term used by the Australian government to describe people who come from non-English-speaking backgrounds. It is frequently used in the policy literature to broadly identify “racial, ethnic and religious minorities in Australia who are migrants or descendants of migrants” (Caluya et al., 2018). As a result of this official designation, many funded studies and organizations are pressured to use this terminology despite its obvious flaws. First, the term is distinguished from Indigenous Australians or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, even though this group also speak languages other than English. Furthermore, the term is used even for people who come from countries with English as an official language, (e.g., the Bahamas, Fiji, Ghana, and Singapore). Finally, it is also used for people who only speak English but are seen as having a “CALD” background, usually because they are not white. By contrast, white people that speak languages other than English tend not to be designated as CALD. In short, despite its official definition, the term tends to be used to designate non-white migrants. We acknowledge that it has been problematized as a frame that subtly racializes and “others’ ” minority cultural, racial, and ethnic groupings, setting them apart from white, Anglo or European background youth, and marking them as in need of different modes of government.

2 FOSTA-SESTA refers to a controversial bill signed into law by former US President Trump, which was intended to curb illegal sex trafficking online. It made the hosting of certain pornographic and sexually explicit material by various services and platforms illegal (Romano, 2018). An unintended consequence of the law was a move by litigation-averse platforms to ban any form of sexual content online, leading to a purge of content on popular social media platforms, which was found to impact negatively on queer-friendly platforms such as Tumblr (Stardust, 2021).
References


Anita Harris et al.


“It Takes a Person”
Youth Activism, Public Health, and Citizenship Performance During Liberia’s Ebola Epidemic

Jasmine L. Blanks Jones and Silas N. Juquellie

Introduction

In a photo posted on UNICEF Liberia’s Facebook page on 9 December 2014 from the 2014–2015 Ebola Free Liberia campaign drama “No More Shaking Hands,” Alexander M. Z. Gbafore and Joshua M. V. Jimmy, two Liberian male youth actors, are surrounded by an audience. Liberian children, perhaps as young as eight years old and adults, predominantly market women, gather around Gbafore and Jimmy in the covered outdoor Sunday market in Bassa Community, Gbarnga City. Joshua smiles broadly while Alexander leans away, arms crossed over his chest with a look of skepticism. They portray characters that the audience is likely to encounter in everyday life as they grapple with the spread of a deadly virus throughout the region and the new behaviors required to prevent it. Their T-shirts bear the campaign slogan, “Ebola Free Liberia,” and feature the B4 (Burning Barriers Building Bridges) Youth Theatre logo along with UNICEF’s logo.

By partnering with youth actors, who are in the community and engage in multi-directional knowledge sharing with audiences, UNICEF sought to build local legitimacy by taking early action in the public health crisis. This was a change in approach after the UN’s detrimental role and subsequent denial of responsibility in Haiti’s 2010 cholera outbreak.1 Having these public health messages performed by youth further illustrates UNICEF’s mobilization of young people in fulfilling its mission to advocate for the protection of children’s rights. For the youth actors, the T-shirt branded with nongovernmental organization (NGO) logos, the campaign title, and “Ebola Awareness Drama Street Team” across the back established their authority on Ebola prevention. The T-shirt was evidence that they had received information, most likely through a training program, and support from powerful international actors. Here, the youth actors built their citizenship skills by serving in a mediating capacity, bringing together international expertise on combating the spread of the virus and community-level perspectives on the realities of implementation.

During the Ebola epidemic of 2014–2015 in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the World Health Organization recorded more than 11,000 Ebola-related deaths and nearly 29,000 reported cases.2 Of these, roughly 40% of
reported cases and 5,000 deaths occurred in Liberia. Daily life was disrupted for the many more who contracted the virus, their families, and broader communities, encountering stigma in the 18 months post-epidemic and, for some, even years after new cases re-emerged (Kelly et al., 2019; Overholt et al., 2018). As is often the case with public health crises of this magnitude, efforts focused on a cure rather than preventative measures. Mass awareness campaigns were late-coming, allowing rumors and misinformation to pervade public discourse for months as the virus spread (Brandt et al., 2021; Cheung, 2015). In Liberia, the earliest cases were reported in March 2014, though they were quickly dismissed by the Ministry of Health as not, in fact, being Ebola. This announcement dominated discussions on the radio, which serves as the primary news outlet for most citizens. Though the virus continued to spread and international media began to track its development, the first public awareness campaign in Liberia was initiated by a group of youth theater artists in June 2014, more than a month before an official Government of Liberia town hall on Ebola in late July (Blanks Jones, 2018). Declaring this public work as a “duty of the responsible citizen” according to one male youth performer during a meeting to launch the Ebola Free Liberia campaign (Blanks Jones, 2014), the youth actors set out to educate their communities that the virus was real.

This case study focuses on the civic engagement activities of 25 youth between ages 10 and 23, who co-created B4 Youth Theatre’s Ebola awareness performances in Liberia. B4 Youth Theatre is a US 501c3 and Liberian local NGO founded by Black American educator and theater practitioner Jasmine L. Blanks Jones (author 1) and led by Liberian education administrator Silas N. Juaquellie (author 2), through which actors engaged an estimated 300,000 Liberians on practices for Ebola prevention between June 2014 and February 2015. In this study, we share our challenges, lessons, and insights on how youth civic actors asserted themselves as citizens whose contributions were crucial to solving a problem affecting the lives of thousands in the region, which triggered global humanitarian intervention.

We conceptualize B4 Youth Theatre as a mediating institution, which filled gaps in public awareness efforts in the early months of the Ebola epidemic. The gap between policy implementation and community-level actionability has allowed for the proliferation of social marketing activity in international development (French et al., 2010). Civic actors in mediating institutions are thus positioned as both citizen and client, or consumer/producer, in ways that often raise tensions in grassroots/iNGO partnerships. Drawing from social marketing theory, the set of strategies used by the civic actors implies that as institutions exchange goods or services, which communities have reason to value, communities, in turn, accept a given intervention, and they enter into a new social contract (French et al., 2010). iNGO provision of public goods as the fulfillment of the social contract is particularly important in contexts where the government under delivers on its responsibilities to citizens such as providing education, health, and security (Carpi & Diana, 2019). Kassimir
Jones and Juaquellie (2010) provide implications of state and private sector failure to uphold the social contract for youth citizenship:

Citizenship implies a social compact that binds governments and citizens but . . . governments in the developing world are often unable to deliver on this compact . . . young people often take up the slack by providing services and, in the process, they develop civic competencies and identities . . . attention to youth as citizens in developing nations expands the meaning of and motivation behind civic action.

(p. 111)

In the Ebola Free Liberia campaign, the youth are both target audience and implementers who understand the “importance of target audience- or customer-defined value,” a central aspect of social marketing (French et al., 2010, p. 34). They are mediators between local populations and the iNGO donor, and, therefore, the theater company itself is a mediating institution.

We collected and analyzed data through the conceptual lens of Nussbaum and Sen’s (1993) capabilities approach with keen attention to hierarchical scales of power as the youth civic actors were integrated into UNICEF Liberia’s larger social marketing campaign. Capabilities are the beings and doings (i.e., being safe/healthy, going to school) that people have realistic opportunities to actualize should they have reason to value such beings and doings. Drawing on the capabilities approach, we asked how the youth are being citizens in the present through partnership with an iNGO. Secondly, we asked what the youth are doing among themselves and in lateral social interactions with communities. In all, we sought to understand how these beings and doings contribute to their development of civic competencies.

We found that through the Ebola Free Liberia campaign, the youth actualized their capabilities as citizens, which was demonstrated through their ability to address real-world problems by applying civic knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values. Through their partnership with UNICEF, the youth actors gained authority as citizens whose voices were amplified within the communities where they performed as well as internationally in the media. As youth acted out dramatic scenes on a critical public issue, they simultaneously took action as change agents. This intentional use of “act” and “action” is central to Boalian-inspired theater for change and underscores our analysis of their performances, whether intended for audiences or for their everyday interactions with powerful development professionals and elder community members. Augusto Boal’s theater techniques were developed through analyses and critiques of dialogue and interaction between audience and performer following Paulo Freire’s pedagogical stance that students and teacher are co-learners. Taking this as our starting point, we theorize the youth theater performers’ interACTions as doubly performative. Beyond their dramatic performances given before an audience, they also perform their expertise as community advocates in everyday conversations and activities with international funders. We
argue that the youth theater performers’ interactions with communities in Liberia and international development professionals demonstrated citizenship practices, which enabled them to serve a key function as emergency response mediators between the public and international development community.

**Context of the Ebola Free Liberia campaign**

The Ebola epidemic was reminiscent of Liberia’s deadly 14-year civil conflict lasting from 1989–2003. Thousands were killed with contested estimates ranging from 60,000 to 200,000, though some argue that the numbers at the higher end include those who experienced starvation, malnutrition, and disease (Ellis, 1995). Nearly half of the nation’s 1989 population of 2.13 million was displaced. Children were conscripted as soldiers and the education system was in upheaval for an entire generation’s K-12 education. Early post-war efforts to reintegrate youth into society often focused on boy child soldiers, excluding the needs of girls. B4 Youth Theatre was established in 2010 to support gender equity in education as central to maintaining peace. Aside from the high death tolls and social disruption, the civil war and the Ebola epidemic also held in common the deeply felt threat of terror as a consequence of even the most mundane activities. While it is true that Liberia was still rebuilding from a devastating civil war that was characterized in the media by iconic images of child soldiers and stories of gross human rights atrocities, it is equally true that Liberia, and its youth in particular, has suffered large-scale disinvestment under an extractive global economy even in times of peace.

Since its establishment in 1822, the power ascribed to foreign actors in Liberia has complicated the role of the state toward its citizens with more recent international development regimes impacting state disinvestment. Many scholars connect the colonization and subsequent exploitation of Liberia by the US with the protracted civil war while some focus on the political and economic marginalization of indigenous persons by Black settlers sent by the American Colonization Society and their descendants (Ellis, 2006; Huband, 2013; Sesay, 1996; Williams, 2002). Such disinvestment has contributed to poor public services and declining trust in the government (Alonge et al., 2019; Omeje, 2013; Riddell, 1992). Large Liberian refugee and more recent immigrant populations in the US, the UK, and other parts of the world exert political influence in Liberia through remissions and the funding of public-serving projects such as schools, as well as political campaigns (Antwi-Boateng, 2012; Pailey, 2021; Young & Park, 2009). Paired with many powerful international development organizations and a host of multilateral organizations such as the UN, World Bank, bilateral organizations, and humanitarian iNGOs that permeate almost every aspect of public and private life in countries such as Liberia (Fearon et al., 2009; Kassimir & Flanagan, 2010; Nagel & Snyder, 1989), statements such as “The international community will choose our president for us” confirm that youth may perceive little value in civic engagement (Blanks Jones, 2015).
As a local NGO with varied funding support, B4 Youth Theatre functions as an implementing partner within the international aid system (Esser & Ha, 2015). Depending on the project, the theater company may be accountable to donors (e.g., governmental, multilateral or bilateral, and iNGOs), to the Government of Liberia (which receives aid) in regard to its policies, and, most importantly, to those who directly and indirectly benefit from such programs. The vast majority of B4 Youth Theatre’s program is implemented by the youth’s own design and resources. However, the Ebola Free Liberia campaign was initiated locally by the youth and shortly thereafter funded to scale in partnership with UNICEF in Liberia.

We conceive of this study’s participants and ourselves collectively as civic actors and the theater company as a mediating institution where members possess civic and political knowledge, skills, and attitudes that can facilitate shared civic action (Ben-Porath, 2012). We trace the theater company’s processes of filling gaps in services from the state and creating space for solidarity and building collective resources toward the goal of developing youth civic capabilities and citizenship identities. Kassimir and Flanagan (2010) caution against structuring citizenship through frameworks which focus on the pre-citizenship characteristics of youth as “less capable and consequential political actors in the present” (p. 100). Maclay and Özerdem (2010) assert that Liberian youth’s ability to contribute to society depends upon genuine offers for participation in vertical (governance) integration and horizontal connection with other young people. We find that the citizenship practices of the youth civic actors through the Ebola Free Liberia campaign present opportunities for youth to make change in their own lives and in their communities in the international development landscape.

**Ebola Free Liberia campaign performance methods**

The aim of the Ebola Free Liberia project was to create awareness through theater (Boal, 2005) on Ebola prevention (causes) and protection (signs and symptoms). Awareness activities were carried out through messaging in drama, songs, and readings in simple English or local languages in the street, markets, National Transportation Association parking lots, and communities. Together with UNICEF’s Communications for Development section, the civic actors used a stratified sampling (Tipton, 2013) technique to select nationally representative target communities and markets for a quasi-experimental design drawing on social marketing theory for large-scale behavior change (Andreasen, 2006; Peersman, 2014). The Ebola Free Liberia drama teams implemented awareness performances in 29 communities and performed at 145 different sites throughout the country. Data used for this chapter includes research fieldnotes and memos (Emerson et al., 2011) taken by us (Blanks Jones & Juaquellie) in 2014–2015, the theater company’s organizational internal communications such as Arts Instructor reports, public-facing materials such as the website, flyers, and screened video recordings and interviews.
with youth participants between 2016–2019, which often cited the Ebola Free Liberia campaign as a key component for how the youth understood their ability to create change in their society as citizens.

The theater company used four approaches in the campaign implementation phase: street drama; house to house visits; focus groups; and video screenings. The street drama approach involved 12–15 youth civic actors per site who performed unannounced dramatic scenes in major streets, namely five scenes at each location. The civic actors collected questions, concerns, and suggestions from the audience on how they felt about the activities and what they could improve upon. The house-to-house approach was included after the civic actors identified that, over time due to the epidemic, many people were not moving from one place to another. Juaquellie split the teams into small groups that went from home to home (25–30 per day) in the targeted communities, performing the drama and reading the messages out loud in simple Liberian English and posting flyers strategically when necessary. The focus group approach targeted community ambassadors among volunteers from the audiences at every performance site. Those selected were trained to carry out focus group awareness as a continuity of the performance’s messages and provide regular reminders in their town/village/community on Ebola prevention and contact tracing. Community ambassadors maintained close contact with approximately 2700 people throughout the campaign. Some used video screenings of performances, when possible, constituting the fourth approach of the theater company’s implementation phase.

As the Liberian youth took on more leadership through the Ebola Free Liberia campaign, with many civic actors transitioning from students to instructors, the role of Blanks Jones shifted from administrator/facilitator to witness, helping youth amplify their projects to new audiences, including those abroad. As an American, Blanks Jones engaged US-based audiences who were able to respond to on-the-ground needs that the civic actors identified in local communities, such as lack of basic medical supplies or personal protective equipment (PPE). US-based audiences shipped more than 10,000 pounds of medical supplies to B4 Youth Theatre’s Liberian Board of Directors to distribute in the communities identified during the awareness campaign. This shift in Blanks Jones’s role provided the ethnographic distance for her to study the youth theater company’s cultural production and practices as an example of how the theater for development process becomes locally embedded in partnership with international development professionals and donors.

Under Juaquellie’s direction, the team of arts instructors (i.e., former program participants between the ages of 16–23 who also performed in the Ebola awareness campaign) introduced a crucial element of dialogic engagement with audiences. Among the inaugural cohort of B4 Youth Theatre’s arts instructors in 2013, Juaquellie was trained by Blanks Jones in popular theater drawing from a community engagement model, which informed his artistic direction. The team’s use of dialogic engagement, which focuses on the interplay between actors and audience, is rooted in popular forms of precolonial
African ritual and drama (Ogunba & Irele, 1978; wa Thiong’o, 1986) and developed as praxis through their training in Augusto Boal’s forum theater methods (Blanks Jones, 2018). Popular theater in both conceptions insists on the involvement of the audience as a crucial component of how performances take shape in the moment. The arts instructors were careful to center improvisation and integrate audience questions and critical feedback into live performances. Their early awareness efforts in June 2014 and subsequent partnership with UNICEF Liberia’s Communications for Development section resulted in an approximate reach of 300,000 people across two counties: Bong and Montserrado. Through the shifting terrain of the Ebola epidemic, the student participants, arts instructors, and Juaquellie, who sometimes acted in the street theater performances himself, displayed their competence as civic actors who mediated public health discourse between their international development partner (UNICEF) and the public.

Democracy and youth participatory theater

The proliferation of NGOs on the African continent generally, and Liberia particularly since the end of its civil wars in 2003, has important implications for youth citizenship, as the responsibilities of the state are increasingly managed through NGOs. Legacies of colonialism and imperialism continue to weaken the African state and thus make NGOs important for undertaking public functions such as the provision of basic services (i.e., water and education) and intervention in policy, advocacy, and public campaigns. Similarly, the Ebola Free Liberia campaign is an example of how large iNGOs partner directly with local NGOs and grassroots organizations to address civic and democratic issues including emergency response.

Entrenched power imbalances show up in international development regimes’ provision of crucial public services, such as democracy building, conflict resolution, human rights work, cultural preservation, environmental activism, policy analysis, and research and information in Africa (Lewis, 2020). Uneven exchanges between international actors and local actors show up in language, knowledge production, funding, and partnerships where international actors claim to bring equity to local populations yet exacerbate global inequities (Martins, 2020). Donor organizations are often critiqued for restricting national employees from defining problems for themselves, setting the agenda, and exercising greater positional power within development organizations (Loschi, 2021). In many instances, African staff of iNGOs are not passive victims of the system. For example, in Angola, Peters (2019) demonstrates the practices of refusal enacted by employees who reject cooperation and co-optation within the neoliberal NGO sector marked by structural inequalities, even at the expense of career advancement. In Ghana, Kumi and Kamruzzaman (2021) demonstrate a similar phenomenon where Ghanaian nationals were keenly aware of how their work was being recuperated into the false premise that international experts have brought the development. This is
also the case in Liberia where nationals are frequently not recognized for their contributions toward development projects in international aid ethnography literature or oftentimes in practice on-the-ground.

For youth, navigating the variety, spread, and function of NGOs is further complicated as lines between state and civil society responsibilities are blurred. Kassimir and Flanagan (2010) contextualize citizenship for youth in the Global South and situate them not as citizens in the making, but rather citizens in the present. Drawing on their analysis of *Growing Up Global: The Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries*, issued by the National Research Council and Institute of Medicine (2005), and *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation* (WDR), issued by the World Bank in 2006, Kassimir and Flanagan (2010) argue that regarding youth, powerful international institutions affect the everyday conditions of life for people in the developing world. Yet, engaging in civic actions to hold these institutions accountable is beyond the reach of most young people; it is even a challenge for the leaders of the nations in which they live. That absence of accountability may affect how developing world youth calculate the potential efficacy of engaging in civic or political behaviors and the forms their actions might take.

(p. 96)

However, several studies in Africa highlight the agency of local actors (Madison, 2010) and the potential for collaborations between international development professionals and local actors, which aspire toward anti-colonial practices. Crewe’s (2014) comparative case study in Asia and Africa highlights the potential for Western development professionals to act in solidarity with local partners by thwarting systemic power imbalances through creative aid practices. Schwartz (2010), for example, demonstrates the ways in which many local NGOs in Mozambique filled gaps in a comprehensive youth policy in postwar reconstruction in one of the more successful youth reintegration efforts in a post-conflict society.

The youth in the Ebola Free Liberia campaign similarly navigated the complexity of the international development landscape in Liberia by anticipating the need for mass awareness and filling critical gaps in UNICEF’s broader Ebola communications strategy using the tools of Theatre for Development (TfD). TfD has a long history in Africa as a subfield of international development communications and jointly a subfield of applied theater. TfD is an extension of Paulo Freire’s pedagogies of freedom as theorized and practicalized by Augusto Boal (2000), with a growing presence in Africa as early as 1978 (Plastow, 2009). TfD is process-oriented, structured by critical reflexivity on the relationship between a theater practitioner and a particular community. However, it is not immune to misuse. TfD has endured harsh critiques as an imperialist tool driving forward the aims of international organizations or as a
technology of social control in the development of African nation-states, which simultaneously absolves the government of responsibility and places the burden of social change in the hands of under-resourced communities (Odhiambo Joseph, 2005; Okuto & Smith, 2017). However, many scholars (Byam, 1999; Chivandikwa, 2018; Plastow, 2015; Smith, 2017) focus on recent shifts toward citizen activism and advocacy in the theater for the development process.

The public nature of the Ebola Free Liberia campaign engaged audiences in dual meanings of interACTions-theater performances that were simultaneously social actions (Boal, 2005). Dialogic engagement, which is central to Boal’s forum theater methods, has been used to involve campaign audiences in the performances and to share power between actors and audience, thereby allowing more involvement as audience members make suggestions for changes during the actual performances. A form of embodied discourse, theater-based interACTions lower barriers to participation presented by differential literacy practices, ability to speak in an acceptable register for deliberation, and access to privileged spaces (Sullivan & Lloyd, 2006). Boalian-inspired TfD leverages citizens’ embodied knowledge and lived expertise to challenge the information presented in the performances and to explore new possibilities.

The Ebola Free Liberia campaign

Dialogic engagement for a public vision

On 11 December 2014, the B4 Youth Theatre team unloaded a chartered taxi bus, recognizable as a passenger van except for its seats, which were extended by padded pieces of wood attached to the end of each row. Most seatbelts were removed to make it possible to carry additional passengers. Fifteen civic actors excitedly discussed their expectations for this first official performance of the UNICEF Liberia partnership under the title Ebola-Free Liberia. Most of our performances prior to this had been local, often within walking distance of our headquarters in Community House, but with sponsorship from UNICEF, we were able to secure regular transportation and had arranged a contract with the driver. On this day, we were in the market at Suakoko community, a 20-minute drive from Community House in Gbarnga, the capital city of Bong County.

Juaquellie watched as the students began to take the space as usual. With recorders in hand, they followed senior arts instructor Cynthia’s (age 18) lead to play a song then junior arts instructor Gabriel’s (age 16) lead to begin the dance to get the audience’s attention. When the audience reached about 50 people, Juaquellie told them it was a good time to start the dramatic performance. The youth actors translated the messages from the flyers from UNICEF to the Kpelle language, familiar to most people in Suakoko. The scene was titled, “Don’t Hide Any Sick Person”:

A male character enters the open space in front of the market booths that the students claimed as their stage. The audience immediately recognizes
the space being transformed as the man pantomimes closing the door and responding to the sunlight. His face is crossed with worry as he begins speaking into the open air: (loosely translated) “What can I do to help my wife who is sick? I feel so worried and afraid for her; I don’t know what to do. I have to take her somewhere else so she is not reported for being sick.” His friend enters the scene in passing and stops to ask him what is wrong as his wife comes out vomiting blood and showing all the signs and symptoms of Ebola. He rushes to grasp his wife as she drops to the ground, but immediately the friend shouts, “NO! Don’t touch her!”

At that point in the drama, the audience erupted in applause, interrupting the performers and started to discuss among themselves: “This is the same thing that can be happening to us in this community” (in Liberian English); others say, “You see! These are the ways this Ebola has spread.” A young boy points to the lead actor then imitates walking through his own imaginary door, laughing with a friend. One woman spoke directly to the community members standing further off, “My people your come see it ooo message the children them giving us today” (also in Liberian English which means, come and see what messages the children are sharing with us today). Another audience member spoke directly to the actors saying, “This is true my children” as those nearby also nodded in agreement saying “yes” and “that’s true” among themselves. The actors continued the scene after a few minutes of audience engagement:

The husband’s friend calls 4455 and the county Ebola response team arrives in less than five minutes to spray the house and collect the sick wife to take her to the Emergency Treatment Unit. The actors are wearing personal protective gear including large face shields with their entire bodies covered in white suits and shoe covers and have materials including the tubes and nozzles used to spray a sanitizing solution that resemble those likely to be used by the actual county Ebola response team. The actors ended speaking directly to the audience, “Don’t hide any sick person.”

The contextual nature of the performances “grabbed” the audience’s attention, helping them understand and internalize the prevention messages because they saw themselves as part of the drama directly or indirectly. The actors pantomimed everyday actions, wore realistic costumes, which normalized the use of personal protective equipment by medical professionals and countered fearful perceptions, foregrounded cultural norms around collective decision making and care, and included the actual phone code people had seen posted on many flyers, providing contextual material that resonated with the audience’s lived experiences. After the drama, the audience was encouraged to ask questions. Some of the questions were answered by the actors and arts instructors who attended the UNICEF training, while others were
referred to the UNICEF’s communications section. The audience raised questions such as:

1. If someone gets this virus, can they survive?
2. Do we have an area (clinic, hospital) to treat anyone who has the signs and symptoms?
3. Will we have the emergency treatment units (ETUs) in our county?

Performed within the context of local communities, the performance went beyond what posters and other media forms were able to achieve. For example, early in the epidemic, radio commercials and flyers produced by UNICEF, along with cartoon images displaying the signs and symptoms warned, If you get this virus you will die, prevent yourself from it. Call 4455 they will help you. The action-oriented performances made the written messages come to life because they illuminated embodied experience and knowledge. Audiences saw that there was a need to include specific equipment in order to safely transport those who were sick. They also had a clearer image of what to expect during treatment at the ETUs.

The physical theater helped the public develop a collective vision for treatment because during these performances everyone was engaged. The audience followed the messages based on the aesthetic of the drama’s composition and delivery with excitement building during each stage of the performance. Before the performance began, the actors energetically played a popular song on the recorder composed by local artist, who is now a politician, Mogana Flomo, Jr. about Ebola in the Kpelle language that says “Ebola Ebola ooo Ebola la ku gei?” meaning, Ebola, Ebola what have we done to you? The well-arranged dances with varied movement patterns borrowing from traditional and contemporary dance forms moved the audience to dance along, encouraging more excitement as each actor performed their own choreography or improvisation. Their gestures through pantomime transformed the physical space and made the audience imagine having a sick relative in their own lives. The performances were entertaining and vivid. The civic actors used local materials to create blood by mixing gari (a locally-made cassava as cream) with red Kool-Aid powder and water. The actor’s performance from timing to bodily comport and facial expression from the moment she ran out of the house vomiting to when she slumped to the ground was wholly convincing. There was not a person in sight who did not stop to see what was happening while the performance was going on.

The comments made during the audience-imposed break for applause, reflection, and interaction demonstrate the potential of drama for civic engagement in emergency response. The audience’s verbal agreement, encouragement, and questions signaled that the performance was relevant to their lives. Perhaps most importantly, the performance spoke to a pervading fear of the Emergency Treatment Units (ETUs), known as places of death before people had the knowledge that it was possible to survive Ebola. This was key in citizens
It Takes a Person

developing confidence in the ETUs instead of running away and hiding the sick from them. The civic actors were proud of their work’s impact in the community. From their smiles, energy level, and responses to questions, one could see their excitement and feel their sense of accomplishment. They shouted the slogan, “B4YT- we the talent!”, and joyfully ended the activity. Audience participants surrounded the civic actors after the performance and asked further questions. Adults sought information for their children to join the program. Many of the youth who asked questions about getting involved were selected as Community Ambassadors who were given flyers to distribute in areas that were off the beaten path but where there were residential homes. These youth were invited to focus group trainings to learn how to explain what they saw in the performance to further the awareness of people who did not see it for themselves. Boarding the rented taxi bus, we sprayed the vehicle with Clorox mixed with water, wore our plastic raincoats to create a barrier against the spread of Ebola, and departed the Suakoko market for our return to Gbarnga City.

Shared risk and responsibility of citizens

The lateral social connections of shared risk and responsibility among the theater company’s civic actors, administrators, and board members who were liable for the activities bound the theater company together as a mediating institution. Reflecting on the Ebola Free Liberia campaign in a 2019 interview, one civic actor shared:

The Ebola crisis was like a crisis that happened in Liberia that everybody was afraid to go out to talk to somebody. But B4[YT] as an organization sacrificed, likewise the students. So it takes a person, because we were putting our lives to risk while people complaining about the virus how it’s all over and how it can kill rapidly, and then students sacrificing to go out there in the community to mobilize. It takes a person who’s got that godly heart and a real citizen of a nation that love[s] their country . . . Once you have certain skills, you will have a better chance. Public speaking can carry you anywhere. How to share your ideas when someone needs it. Arts are essential. Add the arts skills along with daily life activity, you live an easier life and get a better chance.

(Interview with Hannah N. Mckay, age 20, Senior Arts Instructor, B4 Youth Theatre Liberia, 13 August 2019, emphasis own)

Mediating institutions often provide the mechanisms for young people to lift their voices and make claims on powerful institutions such as the government or INGOs in order to better their quality of life (Sen, 1999). Hannah, a senior arts instructor and former student performer, described how the theater company, along with the students, engaged in the risky work of community mobilizing. As partners in UNICEF’s broader Ebola communications strategy, the
civic actors in the Ebola Free Liberia campaign used their integrated role in UNICEF’s larger communication strategy to mediate community concerns as an act of citizenship.

Hannah’s understanding of a “real citizen” exceeds nation-state bounds through vertical partnership with UNICEF. Her conceptualization of citizenship is not rooted in discourses of rights and responsibilities within the social contract between the citizens and the state but resounds with African indigenous conceptualizations of personhood (Assié-Lumumba, 2020; Cossa et al., 2020; Takyi-Amoako, 2018). To actualize real citizenship, “it takes a person.” Responding to the Ebola epidemic as a citizen, as a person, had everything to do with being human through and with other humans, including sharing power and space with the international development professionals responsible for larger communication strategies.

The civic actors developed new strategies with UNICEF’s communications for development section, which led to changes in their scripts for future performances. The youth documented audience questions in written reports, shared these insights in training meetings given by UNICEF C4D, and urged us as researchers to advocate for changes in email correspondence with the UNICEF Communications for Development officer. For example, their performances soon after the campaign event in Suakoko included the use of plastic bags as PPE for people who took the responsibility of caring for sick family members in communities where there were no ETUs. Simultaneously, using their institutional relationship to the US-based board of the theater company, they were able to solicit resources for clinics in communities that were under-resourced and closed for all services because doctors and nurses did not have the basic equipment to maintain their own safety. These strategies exceeded the traditional use of theater in social marketing campaigns as solely for dissemination of health messages as the civic actors also collected data from local audiences through their live performances. The civic actors were recognized as knowledge bearers who filled a gap between what the community needed in order to adhere to best practices for Ebola prevention and ensure accountability among international development organizations responsible for meeting these needs.

Beyond their partnership with UNICEF and their integration into the structure of the theater company, the civic actors also drew upon lateral social connections among themselves and with the community to create a vision for change. The arts instructors discussed the role of arts in citizenship, highlighting another function of mediating institutions as described by Kassimir and Flanagan (2010) to “create social spaces and social relationships that connect citizens of all ages to each other and to the other major sectors of society” (p. 93). These connections are actualized through the dialogic nature of performance in creating spaces for imagination, reflection, and reciprocity (focus group, 13 August 2019):

within the arts all the things you are doing they are just to make your audience or your followers to be honest . . . you can also encourage that
A student participant and performer at the time of the Ebola Free Liberia campaign, Edward advanced to the role of junior arts instructor. For him, the practice of citizenship most evident in the youth civic actors’ performances is the ability to influence others to imagine and contribute to a better society. As such, their performances are “always embodied and purposeful within a designated time and space that evokes the imaginary” with the realization that “we need the imaginary to envision the world and ourselves differently” (Madison, 2006, p. 322). Edward and Hannah performed citizenship through their ability to lead others across age groups, but especially among their peers. Their examples of leadership are rooted in concerns impacting the ability of citizens to live in a society that is better for the whole. The civic performances they describe allowed the audience to imagine a society that they have reason to value, reflect on their own complicity in the problems identified in the performances, and engage in public discourse around solutions.

The youths’ civic capabilities are actualized in the being and doing of citizenship. This fuller picture of local actors within international development projects demonstrates that youth can be healthy, sensing, feeling, and thoughtful humans who do the things they have reason to value with and toward other human beings (Nussbaum, 2011). The civic actors are citizens who reclaim social spaces such as public markets to collectively engage communities in public discourse and civic actions, which may make claims from larger institutions or the government or even compensate for their failures to fulfill the social contract.

Looking inward: mediating public discourse in the dialogic performative

In September 2014, the B4 Youth Theatre National Director Silas Juaquellie and one arts instructor attended an Ebola awareness training through UNICEF. The Communications for Development (C4D) specialist, named A. B., who was in charge of this meeting and the entire Ebola media strategy for UNICEF Liberia at that time, took careful steps to integrate community groups, including traditional and religious leaders, local authorities, influential individuals, and the community as a whole, spearheading a shift toward what he calls “Community Engagement for Development.” A Liberian himself, he was motivated to closely engage communities in a vision that was geared towards building resilience within communities, and see[ing] our local leaders stepping forward as key partners in tackling issues that affect
them. For too long communities have been on the receiving end. The fight against Ebola in Liberia is a strong reminder of how powerful our communities are.

(A.B. pseudonym, C4D Specialist, LinkedIn, retrieved 4 June 2021)

A. B.’s vision underscores the moral responsibility of international development institutions to engage in equitable exchanges with local partners. His dedication to this vision was evident in regular phone and email communication and having space within the meeting agenda for implementing partners such as the theater company to present field reports. This consistent communication, his openness to critique of the best practices, and genuine interest in finding solutions gave the civic actors the freedom to experiment with audience solutions in their performances. His leadership from within an international development organization offers a corrective to the more self-centered practices of local intermediaries who bypass opportunities for transformation with communities (Loschi, 2021). A. B. made sure the youth civic actors were welcomed into training spaces as partners who gave reports from the field and advised on messaging edits rather than those on the “receiving end.”

Citizenship born of collective agency and problem solving is the root of education. In theorizing how Western education may escape schooling, Varènne and Gordon (2009) argue that comprehensive education is preceded by the ability to pay attention as a key component of being human: “facing culture as the ongoing human production of arbitrary constraints that are themselves openings for new possibilities places education at the core of what makes human beings human.” Because of the high stakes of the spread of the Ebola virus disease, there was no space to entertain a supposed (though unrealistic) distance between the youth civic actors as the messengers and community members as the receivers. Rather, freedom from the devastating effects of Ebola could only be achieved through their collective striving with both youth and local communities as key knowledge bearers. A. B.’s recognition of their contributions as citizens who contribute to solving problems encouraged the youth to persevere in their civic engagement efforts.

With this freedom to experiment in their performances, the civic actors improvised dramas as they might occur in real life between parents, teachers, elders, police, children, and their peers. Each improvised scene was designed to be followed by a short question and answer period with the audience to find ways to address the challenges presented by the information shared through the drama. Across 145 sites in 29 different communities, repeated questions arose such as:

1) If you go to the clinic, how can they help you if there is no cure?
2) How should a person take someone who is sick to the clinic if the advice is to avoid physical contact with people who are sick and even the clothing of people who are sick?
3) If I kill an animal in the bush, is it safe to eat?
4) Can I get Ebola from buying food that is open in the market?
A flipchart provided by UNICEF was helpful for informing students and communities, but the civic actors did not have answers to some of these questions. In some cases, the question-and-answer period was used as a way to raise concerns and pushback against the messages being shared. Questions 1 and 2 are such questions that do not seek an answer so much as a solution to pre-existing problems that are heightened in emergencies. Rhetorically speaking, why would someone go to a clinic that does not have medicine, doctors, or supplies? How are people expected to demonstrate an ethic of care for their sick loved ones without physical touch? What support or best practices exist to protect the well-being of those charged with their care?

In these cases, the youth civic actors found that the best practices demonstrated in their performances were not actionable in communities. These best practices were outlined on posters and print media, proclaimed on radio broadcasts, and broadly accepted at face value. It was an ongoing challenge to spread awareness through posters and flipcharts in areas with low reading ability. Radio broadcasts faced similar difficulty in areas where there were weak signals. Yet, when the messages were put on bodies through physical theater in public venues, audiences began to see the gaps that would lead to poor implementation. When an audience member questioned the best practice advice to take a sick relative to a clinic that they knew was under-resourced and unstaffed, the civic actors experimented with audience suggestions for in-home care using items that were more readily available in communities such as plastic gloves and plastic bags in place of PPE. This experimentation laid the groundwork for the development of best practices on Ebola care guidance for those who could not access medical care. Performing these messages is a strategy for collective visioning.

Discussion

In the Ebola Free Liberia campaign, the civic actors developed citizenship skills, attitudes, and identities by actively engaging as mediators between UNICEF Liberia’s Communications for Development section and public audiences in local communities. By asserting their shared humanity with powerful stakeholders, they were vertically integrated into strategies often perceived of as beyond the capability of youth in Africa. In arts instructor Hannah’s words, this kind of work, “takes a person” to center shared humanity in a way that taps into individual and collective values and even international development organization moral codes. Their citizenship identities were on display once they were given the opportunity, the freedom, to be leaders, educators, negotiators, actors, and people who contributed to the theater company’s development as a mediating institution. They also built citizenship skills and attitudes horizontally with their peers and community audiences. Through these connections, they displayed their capability to do things often thought of as outside of what children and youth are expected to have the ability to do, speak
in front of a crowd, travel to new places, write professional reports, manage a budget, or even earn money to improve their own quality of life.

Youth citizenship identities were developed outside of the constructs of nation-state citizenship (Diouf & Fredericks, 2014). The adaptability of the donor relationship which recognized the valuable role of the youth civic actors as knowledge bearers allowed young people to actualize their collective agency as citizens who through their own awareness efforts were able to create a positive change in their society. Additionally, youth reported that their actions during the Ebola Free Liberia campaign contributed to their confidence in giving voice to social and political issues across the gerontocratic divide. Their experiences traveling to “see places [they] never knew” across the country (focus group, 29 July 2016) provided opportunities for greater exposure and respect from elders in their home communities who enjoyed hearing about their travels to different parts of Liberia. Finally, they described their dedication to this public work as their duty as citizens often citing the way their parents and grandparents gathered together to build roads where the government did not. A form of collective agency, the youth civic actors understood their performances to be an extension of traditional African collective practices, whereby citizens join together to create the kinds of lives they have reason to value.

“*It is not finished (Totally)*”

This case study offers a critical account of the impact of street theater on the youth actors regarding their development of citizenship skills, attitudes, and identities. We detailed how TfD provides an alternative for youth to engage in civil society through vertical integration with the iNGO community and their elders in local communities where they have often experienced marginalization and horizontal connection with other young people where they can experience the excitement of engaging in a shared project that creates a valuable change. The youth’s dialogic engagement with public audiences and international development actors situates the theater company as a mediating institution within the international aid system. The public-facing nature of their work ensures that they are recognized for their contributions among local audiences. However, their contributions were only made known to international audiences in accordance with UNICEF’s agenda, which did not include their voices or the breadth of lessons learned from their direct experiences with local communities. This is often the case for smaller grassroots organizations, which do not have the capacity to access large international platforms for public relations. Their collective agency, including institutional status of the theater company as a local NGO connected to a US 501c3, enabled them to obtain needed resources and gave them leverage in negotiating terms of engagement with their funding partner. The ability to articulate the value their work added to the larger UNICEF strategy was essential in securing resources to advance their own work and opportunities for greater visibility.
We demonstrate how youth civic actors make critical civic engagement contributions for social impact interventions that local communities have reason to value. Their ability to create feedback loops in community education and awareness in times of uncertainty corresponds with a broader shift in recognizing and valuing local knowledge systems. Reorienting the practices of youth civic actors through the lens of performance, to understand them as theater actors who contribute to social and political change, contests more dominant conceptions of citizenship as constrained to the realm of electoral processes, which exclude children and often youth (LeCompte et al., 2020).

Conclusion
Youth theater artists in the Ebola Free Liberia campaign employ collective agency to move the needle toward more justice-oriented development practice by calling-in both audience and development practitioners as co-creators of actionable solutions for monumental problems. This bridging work requires trust on the part of communities, which research has shown are more inclined to engage fully through local forms of communication such as music, dance, and drama. Bridging these divides also requires adaptability on the part of donor organizations. Further, this case study highlights the moral responsibility of public health professionals, including those in international development, to be intentional about recognizing knowledge, skills, abilities, and capital of local communities to bridge the health equity gap (Burch, 2021). However, the limited capacity for assessment and evaluation of project implementation did not permit us to make claims as to the generalizability of our findings for best practices in health education and communication.

Future research employing the tools of implementation science to health education and communication campaigns would build an evidence base for the translation of such methods across contexts in emergencies (Inusa et al., 2018). B4 Youth Theatre and UNICEF in Liberia's Ebola Free Liberia campaign has tremendous implications for freedom and justice-oriented visions of education, particularly as increasing attention is given to out-of-school contexts (Baldridge, 2020; Clay & Turner, 2021; David-Chavez et al., 2020). Education that seeks to equip today's youth to solve the problems of tomorrow must recognize the ways that youth are already laying the foundation through their creative civic work.

Notes
1 See Domonoske's (2016) article on the role of peacekeepers in the 2010 Cholera outbreak in Haiti.


“‘It is not finished (Totally)” is the title of the original recorded theme song by B4 Youth Theatre for the second phase of the Ebola Free Liberia campaign.

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Part III

Negotiating Citizenship and Difference in Diverse Contexts
Introduction

Historically homogenous, Christian, and working-class, many small towns in the American Midwest have undergone dramatic demographic and political shifts due to changing economic conditions, a decline in union presence, and a subsequent increase in immigration. Past research on citizenship, national belonging, and education has found youth conceptions of citizenship are informed by a sociohistorical materiality of a place, where certain bodies have been granted access to full citizenship and others have been marked as unable to fully belong. This chapter seeks to add to these conversations by focusing on the everyday constructions of citizenship of three Black youth in Riverton, a rural Midwestern-American town. More specifically, this chapter connects the local histories of Riverton to the conditions inherent in American citizenship and reveals how these conditions are experienced and contested among high school students within the school setting and broader community. This work, situated in an intersectional subjectification framework (Ong, 2003), is premised on the assertion that constructions of citizenship must include analyses of the political, economic, and societal structures that influence conceptions of belonging, yet this relationship is not stagnant and without contestations of the individuals themselves. Analysis of both the unique context of Riverton and how youth experience the related conditions within their everyday lives can lead to deeper understandings of rural perspectives and contribute these understandings to the study of youth citizenship and its constructions in varied formal and informal educational spaces.

A substantial section of research on citizenship and education, commonly conceptualized as based on legal status, political participation, or attainment of civic knowledge, has shifted towards an understanding of individuals’ experiences of belonging (Josić, 2016), “who counts” as an American (Shirazi, 2018), and who feels “at-home” (Yuval-Davis, 2011) in the nation. Past research has determined schools are a space to examine the normative state and societal discourses creating the ideal “citizen” and witness the multiple daily negotiations of who belongs as a citizen. During the secondary school stage, young people are said to form social and political commitments and are
supposedly going through the coming-of-age process in the modern Western concept (Maira, 2009). I too consider youth as thinking agents, indisputably influenced by global, national, and local discourses, but able to formulate notions of belonging in their own right. While many studies (Abu El-Haj, 2015; Ghaffar-Kucher, 2009; Maira, 2009) centered the everyday lived experiences of youth mitigating the spoken and hidden conditions of political and cultural citizenship and belonging in urban American society, research centering the experiences of youth in rapidly diversifying, rural areas of the country has been less prevalent (DeJaeghere & McCleary, 2010). With the continuous change of local demographics in the American Midwest, across the nation, and globally, it is important to analyze how educational spaces are sites to observe narratives of exclusion reflected in increasing global xenophobic and white nationalist rhetoric, as well as how youth experience these shifts locally.

This chapter explores the everyday, intersectional practices of othering that emerge in a rural, Midwestern public education system, as well as highlights how specific youth conceptualize and experience citizenship within these hierarchical conditions in formal, informal, and community-based educational spaces. Like Miraftab (2016), I “pay attention to physical space and the role it plays in negotiation of issues thrown up by living with differences on the same proximate turf” (p. 204). By mapping the material conditions of citizenship within this town as established through its history of labor relations, racialization, and immigration, I contend the contestations of citizenship or youth’s everyday experiences of belonging are impacted by the distinctions of this town’s specific historical dynamics shaped by national and transnational webs of power. A focus on three Black youths’ narratives alongside historical and contemporary accounts of the town reveals how longstanding dominance of exploitative labor practices and white supremacy in American society, underscored by widespread anti-Blackness, emerge in the youths’ experiences. Although the United States is built on a legacy of slavery and continual, entrenched systematic racism, the specific connections between the economic structure of this town and its history of stoking racial violence through strike-breaking and the related power of the corporate foundation must be noted in order to understand the materiality and intersectionality of the conditions influencing youths’ experiences of belonging and thus, their constructions of citizenship in Riverton.

Unlike past scholars (Ghaffar-Kucher, 2009; Shirazi, 2018) who centered the conceptions of belonging among primarily immigrant, nonwhite, urban youth, in the larger, year-long ethnographic study from which this chapter is based, I concentrated on the experiences of rural high-school youth from a wide variety of racial, religious, economic, and gender backgrounds. Going into this ethnographic project, societal hierarchies surrounding race, class, and gender were predicted to be considerable influences on conceptions of citizenship and belonging (Lalami, 2020). Furthermore, educational systems are a central site where “the disjuncture” of citizenship (Abu El-Haj, 2015, p. 2) emerges. During high school, youth become citizens, yet lines of belonging
based on their positions within structural hierarchies grow more apparent. However, open-ended interviews with educators and community members, as well as accounts of the town’s history, repeatedly referenced racial resentment as specifically stemming from the distinctive labor relations and economic exploitation in Riverton. As such, I grew particularly attuned to how the stated and observed experiences of three Black youth—Brittney, Letitia, and Amani—were connected to the local conceptions of power and privilege. Thus, the research questions guiding this chapter are: how are hierarchies surrounding “who is an American” apparent in a rural Midwestern context and, relatedly, how then do these three youth experience and conceptualize citizenship throughout their everyday lives?

Citizenship and intersectional subjectification: theoretical framework and context

Framing citizenship and belonging

In this chapter, I build off of critical and post-structural understandings of citizenship and belonging. Ong (2003) considered citizenship an outcome of the intersection of multiple influences (ethno-racial, gender, class, political) that intentionally or indirectly impact the possibilities of belonging. Drawing on the examples of Cambodian refugees Ong (2003) argued, citizenship is not based on a legal status but rather through the Foucauldian concept of the “analytics of power” that play a preeminent role in location individuals’ actions and attitudes toward citizenship (p. 15). These analytics of power are not all encompassing. They involve a counter notion; the individuals’ own conception and knowledge of belonging. Ong (2003) further described this struggle as processes of “subjectification”:

These processes of being subjected, by objectifying modes of knowledge/power, and of self-making, in struggling against imposed knowledge and practices, are central to my understanding of citizenship . . . The effects of technologies of governing . . . can be rejected, modified, or transformed by individuals who somehow do not entirely come to imagine, to act, or to be enabled in quite the ways envisioned in the plans and projects of authorities.

(p. 16)

Understanding citizenship and belonging as a relational negotiation derives from post-structural theorists who reject the premise of totalizing, universal, and deterministic descriptions of society. Static conceptions of citizenship and power are challenged through examination of the minutiae of everyday interactions.

Ong (2003) stressed, “It is in the space of encounter and enmeshment—in the practices directed at newcomers, and the multiple daily interactions that
ensure—that the meaning and exercise of citizenship happens” (p. 16). Young people engage in mundane practices intertwined with family, peers, political rhetoric, the popular media, leisure, sports, and activities in and related to formal schooling. I conceptualize belonging and citizenship as interrelated and enacted through the everyday, mundane, and relational interactions of individuals within and against the “technologies of governance,” (Ong, 2003) understood as the policies, programs, and attitudes echoing through the public sphere. More than solely an agentic performance and surely not an inevitable certainty based on social or political standing, I instead conceptualize citizenship as a relational negotiation of belonging impacted by various technologies of governance and structural hierarchies. The negotiations vary depending on the unique intersections of the sociopolitical, racial/ethnic, and economic positions of the individual youth.

**Intersectional subjectification**

To analyze the power hierarchies and experiences of youth citizenship in a small town in the Midwest, this chapter employs the critical framework of intersectionality. Emerging from an analysis of legal cases by Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality theory stresses that gender, race, citizenship status, religion, and other forms of identity overlap. Collins and Bilge (2020) encapsulate the broad definitions of intersectionality as follows:

Intersectionality investigates how intersecting power relations influence social relations across diverse societies as well as individual experiences in everyday life. As an analytic tool, intersectionality views categories of race, class, gender, sexuality, class, nation, ability, ethnicity, and age—among others—as interrelated and mutually shaping one another. Intersectionality is a way of understanding and explaining complexity in the world, in people, and in human experiences.

Collins and Bilge (2020) argued for the use of intersectionality as an analytical tool in the education field for two reasons applicable to the aims of this chapter. First, intersectionality as an analytical framework reminds us that education and citizenship/belonging is a political project undergirded by webs of power and technologies of governance. Understanding the ways youth are “being-made” into citizens and often pushed out because of their positions within structural hierarchies provides a more expansive approach to address the complexities of the contestations of belonging on a societal, not individual level. Collins and Bilge (2020) stressed, “Intersectionality resists neoliberal pressures to focus on individual and personal causes of social inequality, pointing out how structural factors are always at work” (p. 164). Secondly, intersectionality as an analytical tool provides an opening for youth, teachers, and community members to realize the interconnectedness of experiences, foster alliances, and collectively work toward building greater equity.
While one’s position in the intersectional structures impacts one’s experiences of citizenship and belonging, young people negotiate their futures within a complex web of official and unofficial influences. Ong (1996) described these occurrences as the “cultural process of subjectification, a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation state and civil society” (p. 738). This chapter utilizes the framework of intersectional subjectification to study the ways Riverton youth could potentially “self-make” citizenship within the power structures and establish the possibilities of belonging within and despite the conditional processes of “being-made.”

**Relational negotiation in education**

Several scholars situated in citizenship and education literature seek to understand the everyday negotiations of citizenship and belonging of youth in educational settings. Shirazi (2018) among others found the educational experiences of youth reveal broader “struggles over which bodies, histories, and cultural practices count as American” (p. 116). Although focused on Latino youth in rural and urban areas, DeJaeghere and McCleary (2010) also analyzed the multiple, intersectional influences on youths’ belonging, while also directly focusing on how youth negotiate and work against and within these structures of power of the nation-state. DeJaeghere and McCleary (2010) situated Ong’s (2003) subjectification framework in the experiences of Mexican youth within a social setting revolving around the school. This study established the complexity of influences on youth conceptualizing citizenship within local, national, and transnational ties, as well as focused on how youth imagine and negotiate their civic identities within the varying structures of power in educational spaces.

**Riverton: study context**

This chapter centers the conceptions and experiences of youth citizenship in Riverton, a unique microcosm where debates over “who belongs as an American” are fraught with historical political and economic divisions, largely related to a food processing corporation that is far and above the largest employer in the town. Locals joked that the rather striking scent oozing from the food processing plants “smells like money,” a testament to the major landmark many residents described as the economic heartbeat. The plants and their interwoven effects are unmissable when living in Riverton. It is difficult to escape the physical presence and impossible to ignore the sharp 4:00 p.m. shift change whistle that echoes through the surrounding blocks. The analyses of youth construction of citizenship in Riverton established later in this chapter cannot be separated from the history of this key corporation, as it has negatively framed changing workforce demographics, drastically impacted economic conditions, and through its corporation, financially and culturally influenced the educational system in the town.
According to local accounts of its history,4 Riverton prospered as a regional hub for decades. At its origins over a century ago, this corporation was considered a “benevolent employer” that provided solid middle-class wages and above-average benefits to its employees regardless of rank. Throughout the first 50 years of the corporation, workers considered a job at the plant a “very good job,” protected and represented by a strong and respected union presence. This led to reports of jealousy and resentment felt by some farmers and other members of the town not employed by the company. In my conversations with longtime local residents employed outside of the corporation, expressions of hostility surrounding their comparably lesser compensation were apparent. Generally, the company maintained a strong commitment in fostering a good environment for its workers and through the establishment of a community foundation, a strong, well-resourced town. Despite the company originally being known as a “benevolent employer,” a pronounced, progressive, and powerful union presence simultaneously existed in this town, leading to strife throughout its history.

Throughout tensions with the union, the corporation upheld a system of white supremacy. During a strike in the early 1900s, the company elite reportedly brought in Black strikebreakers to break up the strike and in response, the all-white workforce violently beat the Black strikebreakers and pushed them out of town. As Thandeka (1999) theorizes, these tactics exemplify the development of racial contempt, a tool used by the white elite to position lower-class workers against each other economically and protect the elites’ economic interest and dominance. By placing a scapegoat in the form of Black strikebreakers, the white elite distracted the lower-class strikers from joining forces and gaining momentum for their demands. Stoking racialized violence to dispel potential labor movements continued throughout the town’s history, leading Riverton to be known as one of several “sundown towns”5 (Loewen, 2005) in the area. The corporation protected and perpetuated this one-company power structure and further laid siege to lower-paid workers through racial violence.

In the mid-1980s, organized labor across America was in decline amidst neoliberal “Reagonomics.” In the midst of a recession and facing decreased profits, the meatpacking company in Riverton instituted a 23% wage cut on top of a wage freeze instituted in the late 1970s. In response, the local union went on a long, nationally publicized, and deeply divisive strike plagued by inter-union conflict and an unsupportive state government. The deeply emotional strike spurred multi-faceted divisions across families and the community at large, resonant of the effects of the decline of organized labor and economic shifts across the country during this time. In Riverton during this time, members of this formerly tight-knit community were pitted against one another into those who supported striking and those who did not. Reflecting a broad trend toward decreasing union power during the 1980s, the strike ended unsuccessfully for the local union. Shortly after a highly publicized series of confrontations with the national guard, the corporation re-opened
the original plant without responding to workers’ demands, and created a shadow, non-union plant to recruit more workers who would work for even lower pay. Eventually, this ushered in a new, low-paid labor force in the town, Latino immigrant workers, the majority of them Mexican directly recruited by the corporation. In the early 2000s, corresponding with the growing Latino population, Riverton has become a hub for immigrants and refugees, notably from East Africa and Asia, due to a surplus of jobs in the plants. At the time of this study, 51% of Riverton’s public school system was non-white, with this percentage predicted to continue to grow.

The economic conditions, as resulting from the 1980s strike, further fueled the community divisions, exclusionary racism, and personal resentment as resulting from years of class warfare. In 2010, about 90% of the shadow plant were non-white workers and in the other plant about 25% of the employees were non-white. The differences in pay exist between the two plants as well. In 2019, wages at the shadow plant started at $15/hour for backbreaking, food processing line work, with few benefits. Across at the “main plant” wages for the same job started at $17/hour with additional health, education, and retirement benefits included. Before the strike, however, line workers at the main plant would have made $25.86/hour (adjusted for inflation) with comprehensive benefits and deliberate safety measures in place. This assault on workers’ livelihoods resulting from this strike has lasting material consequences for the dynamics of the town and the youth in my study. Generally, due to their parents’ low-paying employment in the shadow plant, 56% of students in the high school qualified for free and reduced lunch. Alongside this demographic and economic shift, the political district in which Riverton is located voted for Donald Trump by nearly 8 percentage points after voting for Barack Obama by nearly 23 percentage points in 2012 and 2008.

Riverton is a town where the global intertwines with the local and as Miraftab (2016) states, “reveals the permeability of place and the formation and collision of multi-scale processes” (p. 13). This chapter seeks to contribute a nuanced account of the power dynamics and effects on youth citizenship within a rural context. Like Miraftab (2016) contended, the complexity of towns like Riverton cannot fully be grasped by siloing cultural, political, and economic analysis and “moving between and across vantage points and analytical scales . . . is the only way to braid together the threads in a global heartland” (p. 14). To illuminate the complexity inherent in the experiences of Riverton youth, I took a critical, relational approach to ethnography, with a strong focus on the ways the youth shared their experiences.

Methodological approach

Research design

The findings of this chapter are derived from data collected throughout an immersive, critical ethnography. I lived in this small town, a few blocks away
from the Riverton high school, from October 2018 until June 2019. Through daily ethnographic observations in the high school and informal conversations across the community, I developed “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of observed youths’ experiences of belonging within various spaces in their lives, while noting historical and entrenched structures impacting these conceptions. The youths’ personal narratives illuminate how cultural and political norms shape their sense of citizenship and how they simultaneously undergo continuous processes of being made and self-making.

This ethnographic study utilized four techniques for data collection: (1) in-school observations in four classrooms (Home Economics, Wood Shop, English Literature, and Social Studies), as well as informal spaces (hallways, cafeteria, gyms, media center) in the Senior High School; (2) observation in informal spaces in the town frequented by youth and related community members, including sports games, community events, local coffee shops, and political events; (3) open-ended interviews to focus on personal narratives with a cohort of eight youth, their teachers, and community members; and (4) analysis of documents including historical and contemporary accounts of the town, public school newspapers, town newspapers, the school handbook and posted school policies, school board meeting minutes, and community announcements.

The specific data composing this chapter include extensive ethnographic notes from school/community observations, selected public documents including social media, newspaper articles, and press releases, as well as youth interview transcripts.

**Youth selection**

Working alongside teachers and drawing from six months of observations, I selected several students to be focal participants. The students were chosen due to several factors—including involvement in the school (class, activities, etc.), diverse personal backgrounds (socioeconomic status, gender, race, and religion), and expressed interest/willingness in the study. For this chapter, I focus on three specific youth—Amani, Brittney, and Letitia—as their experiences of belonging and citizenship were impacted differently by racialization and community normative hierarchies.

Amani was one of several popular football stars, whose families were part of the African diaspora that moved to Riverton for jobs at the food processing plant when he was very young. More than any other youth in my study, Amani was seen interacting positively with many different people in various spaces of the school. Although he often hung out with other African immigrants who played football, Amani seemingly moved about with a carefree sense of freedom throughout multiple friend groups within the school that was noticeably different from other students. Therefore, Amani was an intriguing participant to examine experiences of belonging. Although I was unable to conduct a
personal interview with him due to scheduling, I relied on several in-depth interviews with him published in local and school newspapers, as well as thorough analysis of his robust social media presence as basis for the findings of this chapter.

Brittney, a Black junior, was originally from Chicago and was previously enrolled in a Christian boarding school in a nearby state before her family moved to Riverton. Her parents were recruited to work “for corporate” and “brought the family to the middle of nowhere right before middle school.” Letitia, also a Black junior, moved three years ago from a larger urban area because of similar familial economic prospects. A teacher specifically recommended that I should interview Letitia because “she would have a lot to say about the conditions of the school.” Letitia was first described to me as “very thoughtful and deep . . . she does not suffer fools.” Similarly, Brittney was described to me as “very opinionated and perceptive . . . she likes to talk.” Along with expressing considerable interest in sharing their experiences, I chose both of these youth to interview because they had been having repeated issues with a white male student in their grade over the use of the n-word. Their interview (which they asked to be completed together) was an opportunity to discuss this and other racist incidents I had observed with students who expressed a willingness to talk candidly.

**Critical ethnographic narrative analysis**

Prior work in narrative inquiry in citizenship and education has illuminated experiences of “uprooting, relocation, adaptation to new surroundings and linguistic realities” (Baynham & DeFina, 2016, p. 21), yet has generally lacked critical analysis of the broader societal discourses impacting the individual narratives. Kaper (2018) in her study of female domestic workers in South Africa utilized an analytical approach she termed Critical Ethnographic Narrative Analysis (CENA), an analytical approach combining aspects of ethnographic data collection, Critical Narrative Analysis (Souto-Manning, 2014), and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992). This analytical combination is used to explore how the lived and imagined communities of my participants connect to the narratives they share, the researcher’s own experiences, and the myriad historical and structural influences impacting these narratives of belonging. Highlighting the narratives of the participants as they are expressed reflects the individuals’ experiences based on their unique background, related societal position, and historical understandings. Triangulating these narratives within and against themes drawn from other data from the documents and observations can trace broader societal discourses. As shown in the next section, CENA is an apt methodological tool to demonstrate how experiences of youth belonging and related construction of youth citizenship are situated within structural hierarchies surrounding economic status, race, and gender within this high school and town.
Findings

Youths’ experiences of belonging and constructions of citizenship are conditional on their intersectional positions within local reiterations of broader, normative power structures, yet within everyday interactions holds the potential, even if it is often unrealized, for these power structures to be confronted and contested. In this section, I demonstrate that the structural hierarchies related to race and social class reflect long-standing, entrenched systems of othering. In the first example, I connect the undisciplined use of the n-word by white students in Riverton to the local power of the corporate foundation. As shown, everyday actions led to the entrenchment of a racial hierarchy and related exclusion of certain racial groups from the normative power structures. Mundane and unchallenged ways “made” Brittney and Letitia unable to belong due to their race, and thus these two youth were pushed out of citizenship in the town. In the second example, I establish how Amani’s experiences of belonging are conditional on his position as an athlete within normative structures of this community. Although his identities as a male football player afforded him some sense of belonging, Amani’s experiences reveal how the conditions of whiteness and economic class still limit the construction of citizenship, albeit in ways different from Letitia and Brittney.

Corporate money, racialization, and being pushed out

Coinciding with demographic, economic, and political shifts and related tensions, the main corporation in Riverton started a foundation in the early 2000s that has since invested heavily in the community and specifically in the school district. Due to its significant support for the school, several Riverton residents stressed in informal interviews that the corporate elite, in effect, buys influence on school operations, and any systematic problems stemming from the corporation such as poverty and racism are swept under the rug. For example, in an open online community petition, one comment in particular centered on the racism intertwined with being a one-company town with a major corporation that financially supports the town and greatly contributes to the school:

As a small community, all publicity is skewed toward making Riverton sound like a progressive city—a welcoming city. This is only to keep the stakeholders of the corporation happy. Without the corporate foundation this town would implode. New immigrants and refugees are not accepted or loved—only used for the money-making machine of the corporation. The deep divide of old Riverton and the new Riverton that is emerging has a Grand Canyon size gap in its population. The poor are held powerless with only glimpses of opportunity all while the narrative of the white elites and the money machine of the company keeps the train on the tracks.
The corporation held considerable power over the town’s operations and discouraged workers organizing to combat the oppressive economic structure that prevented them from earning higher wages. Moeller’s (2013) study on the Nike Foundation notes the unequal power conditions and the reluctance to challenge the status quo that factor in the relationships with foundations, recording “if we conclude that the best investment is not in young women, will we take the risk to tell Nike that? No, we cannot” (p. 621). A Riverton teacher similarly hesitated directly critiquing the corporate foundation in Riverton, but alluded to the tensions with the corporate foundation in a conversation:

It [the corporation] has been good to us, as you know, as a school district, right? We can’t complain about that. This is complicated relationship, though. It’s very political. Very political. So that’s . . . Yeah . . . That’s really interesting.

The history of race relations in Riverton from the towns’ inception has been plagued by white violence and exclusion of non-white individuals. The everyday acts of racialization apparent in the school and between students and reflected in the narratives of Brittney and Letitia, uphold this racial hierarchy and result in strong conceptions that they, as Black young women, do not belong and cannot belong in Riverton.

**Corporate power: establishing and enforcing conditional hierarchies**

About halfway through my fieldwork, a rumor of a racist incident swirled throughout Riverton High School, as documented in my fieldnotes:

Kids in the school are talking non-stop about an incident last weekend. The rumor is that a white student on the dance team was using the n-word with some of her other friends on Snapchat. A Black student on the basketball team was like “hey just don’t use the hard—er at the end, not everyone is okay with that but it’s fine with me—it’s whatever.” The white girl did not listen and instead wrote n***** on a snowbank and broadcasted it throughout her Snapchat and Instagram stories. The Black student talked to the basketball coach who then brought it up with administrators. The white student has a wealthy dad who told the coach and the administrator that they would be hearing from his lawyer next and then it all dropped. I overheard another girl on the dance team brag that her friend’s dad is big at the corporate offices and thus “controls the school.”

This incident epitomized the economic and societal power of the majority white, economic executives employed by the major corporation in the town.
Teachers, coaches, and administrators may have realized the negative effects using the n-word has on Black students and took steps to discipline the antagonizing students, as the basketball coach attempted. Yet, the parents of the white students hold power in the corporation that continually provides jobs and ample resources to the school system and fundamentally keep the town afloat. The school administration should have denounced this and other racist incidents in the school but instead they protected the source of financial support at the expense of Black and brown students. The school administration was bound by a company whose profits exploded when they trucked in low-paid Black strikebreakers and Latino immigrant workers to replace the formerly unionized, majority white employees. Racism had been historically profitable to the Riverton white elite and thus their children often reflected those attitudes in school and throughout the community.

For example, white youth and teachers alike used racist language, such as “ghetto girls,” “nasty,” and “rough” to describe Black youth, illustrating the impact of everyday, racist language in defining those who do not belong. In class discussions and activities, white youth often alluded that Black youth were “less intelligent” than “their friend groups,” which were majority white. These comments and microaggressions were reflected in the unequal school disciplinary practices, disproportionately impacting Black youth, as well as fewer Black youth enrolled in advanced classes. The persistent and combined instances of “being-made” through repeated acts of racialization reflects the entrenched nature of white supremacy in the United States and in Riverton.

**Everyday acts of racialization in class**

Brittney explicitly connected the everyday, unchecked interactions, such as the use of n**** to the development of an accepted culture of racist exclusion in the school in our interview:

Like, sometimes when you’re in a class with a bunch of white folks and you’re the only student, it’s like you feel out of place already. And then it’s like the students feel they can just say the N word whenever they want to. They feel like they can just say it, say freely, say it anytime, saying when it’s not even necessary. But . . . I feel like when you allow something happen . . . it’s like don’t expect if you allow something small to happen don’t expect for big things not to happen. Like when they allow just n**** and some girl had said, n*****, they all start getting mad. I mean well half the Black kids are getting mad. and I was like y’all can’t get mad at them because y’all allow n****. Once y’all allow the n**** part of course, they finna say n*****, cause they feel like it’s comfortable. They feel like they could just say whatever they want. I mean they know it’s bad. They’re still going to say it. But for me, I would say that I get treated different, cause I feel like because in this school if your perspective is different, you’re treated different.
Letitia similarly elaborated on this experience:

It’s more the kids. I think a lot of kids nowadays are very confused. Like they just going off what they hear and what they see . . . Y’all can call us n***** but we can’t call you all no cracker? We can’t say you all some white snow bunnies? You know, I’m saying we can’t. No offense to you, but we can’t say that right. But if we said that we would get in so much trouble, we would of got suspended. But if they say something like that, it’s “oh he didn’t mean it like that.”

Seemingly mundane instances left unchallenged and assumed conventional including non-Black students receiving “n-word passes” contributed to an environment where Black students like Brittney and Letitia felt as if they do not emotionally or psychologically belong. Like Brittney picked up on, we should not “expect for big things not to happen.” In Brittney and Letitia’s perspectives, individuals they interacted with on a daily basis continuously reminded and reinforced the students of their place outside the normative racial hierarchy.

Brittney, as well as Letitia, understood the kids who use the slur are deliberately trying to provoke some sort of reaction stating, “You know what I’m saying, that means you want me to say something” and “They know it’s bad.” According to conversations with the administration, teachers in the school, particularly when re-designing the English curriculum, discussed in-depth about how to teach this word, sparking input and debate from parents. In one classroom I observed frequently, the students read *Of Mice and Men*, a book that uses the n-word, the teacher prefaced the reading of this book with a firm condemnation of using the racial slur:

It was not okay when it was written and it is not okay now. I hear you all saying oooohhh I got a pass to use it. I can use it whenever I want. No. You. Cannot. It is a word with a history of hurt and racism. And we’re not going to use it when we read. And I better not hear about any more of these passes, cause that’s just not okay folks. It’s just not.

As the youth and the teacher took turns reading the book out loud, they switched any use of n***** to “Black guy.” However, during those classes as the book was being read out loud, I observed Brittney and Letitia express obvious discomfort and annoyance whenever a particular white young man in the class read out loud or made any noise. Their sighs and rolling of eyes did not spark an obvious reaction from the male student or the classroom as a whole, yet I noted at least ten occurrences in my field notes of expressed tension between these two individuals. I found out later from Letitia and the teacher that this young man loudly and repeatedly proclaimed he had received “n-word passes” from “some Black kids” in the school, and there was nothing anyone could do about it. This particular male student was described by the
teacher as “a real pickle . . . he likes to provoke others and me constantly” and
any conversations and punishments she invoked had not forced any change in
his behavior. In fact, by bragging about it, the student seemed to relish in his
ability to provoke without any lasting consequences enacted by the adminis-
tration. This signaled to Brittney and Letitia, as well as other Black students
in the school, that their concerns and experiences are less valuable than the
white students, further entrenching the racial hierarchy and their exclusion.
Letitia, Brittney, and the teacher all expressively and unequivocally rejected
the “n-word pass” arrangement and those who participated, in their interviews
and as observed during class. However, the contestations regarding the use
of the racial slur exemplify the influence of everyday language to the estab-
ishment of a racial hierarchy, the related exclusion of Black youth, and thus,
the conditions of youth citizenship in Riverton. These everyday instances cul-
minated in an experience Brittney and Letitia shared of being pushed out
of a Riverton McDonalds, further exhibiting how acts of racialization led to
youths’ understandings and experiences of citizenship.

**Being pushed out**

In our conversation, Brittney and Letitia described feeling disrespected,
unwanted, and forced out of one of the most well-known American establish-
ments, McDonald’s, due to their race:

[LETITIA] When we walk in we’ll find our seats, we got a . . . they, they
gave us like a certain amount of time to order food. Or else it’s like “y’all
got to go” . . . Like we couldn’t even sit down. You feel like you gotta
hurry up and order some food before you get put out, but we have liter-
ally watched a group of white kids go sit down and talk and talk or just
sit there.

[BRITTNEY] It happened two weeks ago again. I was with some Black peo-
ple right? And I was with some boys or whatever. You know boys often
they’re loud. But I saw like, the white boys and the Mexicans and they
were being extra loud . . . The McDonald’s cashier was like, “You guys
have to order or you’ll have to go.” I told her hold up, you can’t put us
out, if you ain’t put them out. She’s like, “whatever.” And we was custom-
ers and it was like, you know, we just left. We felt like we had to leave.
I just felt disrespected because you should never have to feel like you’re
not wanted if you call this place your home. I don’t call this my home at

[HEIDI] Where do you consider home?

[BRITTNEY] Oh, Africa is my home. If you said where you were raised, I’d say
Chicago, but Africa is my home.

As described, this particular racist interaction exposes the cashier’s anti-
Blackness, yet it also exhibits the general community’s complacency in racism.
The cashier harassed the group of Black kids for sitting and talking without
ordering, although they let a group of white boys and Mexican boys engage in the same behavior without acknowledgment. This racist behavior was not rare in this Riverton McDonalds. It happened to these two young women more than once, suggesting this was a common attitude toward groups of Black youth. None of the other customers stood up for the Black youth when this interaction occurred nor engaged with the youth when they left the restaurant. Brittney and Letitia were left with little option but to try to stand up for themselves, and then ultimately leave the establishment. This interaction epitomizes Black individuals being pushed out and excluded from the community and normative American society.

Brittney, as a high schooler, has come to understand that Black people like her are not intended or able to belong in Riverton. She rejected the town when she proclaims, “This is not my home.” Instead, although she has never set foot on the continent, she claimed Africa was her home. Her rejection of the community and associated country that rejected her evokes warranted criticism of the imagined “American” identity. The development of the racial hierarchy and Brittney’s eventual rejection of Riverton and mainstream, white-dominated American society is a continual, pressing process composed of small interactions prioritizing, valuing, and listening to non-Black voices over the experiences of Black youth like Brittney and Letitia. While some Black youth, such as Amani in the next section, are more able to fit in the normative hierarchies and feel a sense of belonging due to other aspects of their identity, Brittney and other Black youth are pushed out of school, out of McDonald’s, and out of the Riverton society.

“Us/them,” conditional belonging, and economic hierarchies

The American football team at Riverton High School was the talk of the town throughout their season. Friday night home games were the main social event during the fall in this Midwestern community, when seemingly the entire community cheered on “the boys” as they aspired to another state tournament berth. The football program in the high school strongly exemplified the shifts in racial and economic demographics that defined Riverton in the past few decades; the majority of the Varsity team were a part of the African diaspora. Several local and regional newspapers profiled the team as a “human interest story,” alongside the more typical coverage of the games themselves. Discourse analysis of these newspaper profiles pointed toward prevalent framings of immigrant communities in Riverton as shown in these newspaper excerpts:

In Riverton, where fans flock to watch their football team play, it’s given the primarily African immigrant team a sense of belonging, purpose and identity. It’s also made their assimilation into what had been an almost entirely white community that much more seamless. Football has helped put them and their town on the map. “I wouldn’t say that Riverton has been a good place to grow up, I’d say it’s been a great place,” a former African player now playing in college said. “A lot of people know us
[the African immigrant community] in Riverton. I’ve never witnessed any racism there.” A Riverton elected official proclaimed, “this was one of the best things in the world to happen for this town, I am so glad those guys picked football to play.” A white Riverton football player said, “They are so good at it [football]. We all treated each other well; there was never any tension or any racism.” “Things were starting to change in Riverton,” said the white Riverton football coach. “Those kids loved football. I tried to create as many opportunities for them as I could. They have been so good for our program.”

On any given Friday night in the fall, several generations of fans, from elderly white farmers to African immigrant parents to groups of Latino middle schoolers, all proudly donned the school colors to line up outside the stadium well before game time. Historically, American football and other team sports have been purported as a means of assimilation into American society and an acceptable channel of social mobility for discriminated communities. Foley (1990) stresses football games are foremost a community ritual—a family reunion, religious-like gathering, and display of school spirit—rolled into a few hours under the Friday night lights. In small towns like Riverton, the school is a gathering place for the community and, thus, community members closely engaged with school activities even if they did not have a direct connection to the school through a student. As the former football player said, “A lot of people know us [the African immigrant community] in Riverton.” Instead of being viewed by the white elite as solely low-paid plant workers, many young African immigrant men in Riverton were associated with football, a traditional marker by which success was measured (Faliveno, 2020).

The Riverton High School football community composed of the team, fans, and town members was portrayed in newspaper features and in informal conversations, as a microcosm of an aspirational American imaginary, a community that “invites” these newcomers to, as Abu El-Haj (2015) describes, “join in the values and practices of this tolerant, diverse nation” (p. 149). This framing, prevalent in the American imaginary, relies on and upholds the benevolent portrayal of mainly white figures of power “welcoming” the outsider and thus puts the onus on the outsider to gratefully assimilate to the imagined community. Media portrayals compose a narrative positioning of African players as the “them” opposing the white, imagined “us.” For example, statements in newspaper articles featuring the team, such as “They are so good at it. I am so glad those guys picked football to play”; “Those kids loved football. I tried to create as many opportunities for them”; and “[they] credit football for saving them,” implicitly mark this group of African students as different and as outsiders entering into the typical Riverton imaginary. Shirazi (2018) similarly finds classroom conversations about difference under the guise of liberal multiculturalism, “frequently constructed notions of an American ‘us’ and an undifferentiated ‘they’ in ways that reified culture” (p. 20). The interactions in Riverton portrayed the African immigrant football players as “them” and
framed these individuals as a static group who must integrate into the town’s imaginary.

Although the African football players were positioned as a “them” group of outsiders due to their racial and immigrant identities, their association with the overtly American sport of football provided a bridge to ease entry into the American national imaginary. “Those kids,” the African young male athletes, were deemed beneficial enough to be associated with the Riverton imaginary by white gatekeepers due to their football talent. The coach’s statement, “They have been so good for our program,” was a nod to their athletic prowess, the success they bring to the town, and an example of a liberal multicultural community Riverton was imagined to be as expressed through multiple newspaper articles and informal conversations. Local businessmen proudly exclaimed that “racial tensions are a thing of the past” in an article talking about the demographic shifts and the several teachers highlighted the football program as beneficial to bridging community divides. In newspaper portrayals of the football team, the “integration” of African immigrants was represented as “that much more seamless” due to sharing the commonality of football. A former white player affirmed this depiction stating, “we all treated each other well; there was never any tension or any racism.” Repeating players’ sentiments of “I’ve never witnessed any racism there” absolved non-Black, not recently immigrant individuals in Riverton from interrogating how the structural conditions benefited them and how they upheld these conditions, at the expense of those who do not benefit.

Contrary to these statements, racism was prevalent in Riverton and it was particularly felt by Black students, but these experiences were not necessarily expressed by this group of young African male football players. Since football was familiar and already celebrated by many in the town, Amani and other immigrants involved with the sport may not have been racialized or marked as “other” in the ways Black American individuals like Brittney and Letitia who were not able to use football to assimilate. Highlighting the experiences of Amani outside of the typical school day, in school-sponsored activities like football, this section explored how youths’ positions in conditional hierarchies vary, even if they share different aspects of identities. Noting these differences between youths’ experiences related to gender and immigration status begins to contribute more insight into the diversity of experiences of youth citizenship in rapidly changing rural communities.

**Conditional belonging**

On his social media, Amani expressed a sense of belonging in Riverton because he met specific conditions that predicate belonging within the community—affiliation with football.

[Amani’s social media] I’m truly blessed to say I’m from Riverton. This city has brought me so much love and happiness. Taught me how to be grateful with the little things and cherish every moment.
[Newspaper interview] Amani said, “Riverton is for everybody. If you’re a new kid, we’ll take you in like you’ve been here forever. I guarantee if anybody came here for a day, they would already feel like this is home.”

Amani extended his experiences of belonging to everyone else in the community when he proclaimed, “I guarantee if anybody came here for a day, they would already feel like this is home.” The football team and the connections stemming from football led to students like Amani feeling as if they belong in certain areas of the school and community. Amani’s experience was heartwarming to hear and I deeply respect the work of the coaches and community members in contributing to Amani’s sense of belonging. Yet, this attitude did not address other non-white students harassed and targeted because of their identities, nor acknowledge the experiences of youth outside of the stadium. This is not to say Amani’s, and other African football players’ experiences of belonging and positive renderings of Riverton were not “true” or should not be highlighted. Instead, I maintain those defending the depictions of the liberal multicultural paradise where “there was never any tension or any racism” should also listen to those students who may not be associated with football and whose experiences of belonging have not been conditional on their football success. Furthermore, the capitalist economic system is racialized and based on exploitative practices targeting low-paid Black and brown workers who often refugees and immigrants. The conditional sense of belonging Amani expressed does not acknowledge or address the economic limitations that, as explained by Abu El-Haj’s (2007), “afford people the possibility of participating effectively in society” (p. 296) as citizens.

**Economic hierarchies and citizenship**

Football was framed as the main avenue for African immigrant youth in Riverton to set themselves up for future economic success in numerous newspaper profiles:

Amani has a dream: Make enough money playing professionally to put an end to Mom’s sixteen-hour shifts . . . He said, “All of our moms and families have been through a horrific story. For us, working hard in sports is to find a job in a sports field and give back to our parents.” Another one of his teammates concurred, “I want to play college football somewhere . . . I’m not sure where, but I’d like to go someplace where it’s warm.” . . . Amani echoed these professional dreams; “I want to continue to play football, to be a pro . . . I want to be a player.” For the Riverton African population, football has been more than a game. It’s been a provider.

Although sports can be a source of positivity and community building, this framing places the onus on the youth and their families as though they were naturally deficient and must be “saved” instead of critically analyzing
the exploitative economic conditions that limit immigrants’ access to stable and sustainable economic circumstances. This framing also depicted the white “longstanding” residents as the “saviors” and perpetuated an attitude that newcomers should be inherently grateful for the opportunity to benefit from the generous white citizens. The portrayals of the African immigrants in this town as related to football were problematic in the ways they subtly perpetuated a deficit portrayal of African immigrant groups, while simultaneously glossed over structural economic marginalization and the perpetuation of white supremacy.

The majority of Riverton players’ parents worked at the food processing plant “on the line;” one parent on the night shift and one during the day, as the double shifts were necessary to barely make ends meet. As detailed previously, the principal employer in the town is a contradictory force entrenched with a history of the union strife and lowering of wages after people of color were deliberately used as strikebreakers, yet it is also a “benevolent provider” of scholarships and capital improvements for the education system in Riverton. In an informal conversation with me, a white parent and community leader described the economic disparities in Riverton:

We’re a barbell community where we have very, very, very wealthy and very, very, very poor. And so I think that’s the thing to be changed. I mean, there are things to be changed, but that’s kind of who we are as a community, but the poverty does bring some challenges.

Poverty, stemming from the low wages and corresponding with lack of union representation at the plant, is a significant issue facing many Riverton youth. The “barbell community” as this parent labeled Riverton is reflected in and has significant effects on the conceptions of citizenship of the youth. The disparate amount of familial, generational wealth between white and non-white individuals continues to position non-white youth as deficient and outside the possibility of full citizenship. Amani, and the other African football players, were positioned to work toward a chance of economic success, yet are not able to structurally alter the economic conditions that have kept their families in poverty. Similarly, the African football players’ expressions of belonging reflected this conditionality. They could “belong” as long as they did not rock the boat of the economic system that benefited the white and wealthy members of Riverton and American society. As elaborated, this framing perpetuated an us/Them and benevolent provider narrative that ignore the experiences of other youth who may not feel the same sense of belonging and impede needed attention to structural conditions inhibiting citizenship.

**Conclusion**

This chapter makes several contributions to the study of citizenship and belonging in diverse cultural contexts. One, by showcasing how structural
Hierarchies as observed within educational spaces are intrinsically connected to the specific histories and conditions in this town, this work highlights the important connections between local specific historical and material conditions and contestations of youth citizenship. The specific location of this inquiry also broadens the urban-centric focus of past work in youth citizenship and education. This focus on smaller rural communities undergoing political, economic, and demographic shifts in the American Midwest contributes deeper understanding to education literature, by including the experiences of youth negotiating economic and social divides in a close-knit environment.

Two, within the school and outside the walls, conditional hierarchies were reproduced by teachers, administrators, and peers through everyday actions. In an era where increased xenophobic nationalism threatens United States society, it is imperative that we explicitly name where and how divisive rhetoric and practices of exclusion occur in order to combat these everyday actions and dismantle hierarchies. On the surface, some individuals like Amani, typically excluded due to their race, nationality, or religion could achieve some semblance of “belonging” as long as they conform to community norms such as success in sports. Amani and other Black players also brought notoriety and a sense of pride to the town, contributing just enough to be “accepted” by locals. Yet, even if these individuals claimed belonging, this belonging was conditional on their conformation to the societal expectations. Attention on the individual youths’ everyday interactions across multiple sites within their daily lives emphasized the nuances within youths’ experiences in a way that expands past the literature.

Finally, this chapter is a springboard to further critical examination of how Black youth experience hierarchies around race, class, gender, and immigration status in different spaces and attention to where youth experience a sense of belonging. The in-depth stories and experiences of youth in this specific town highlight the negotiations and potential areas for improvement salient for this unique social milieu. This project does not intend to generalize these youths’ stories and experiences to all those in other Midwestern small towns, nor all Black youth who live in similar settings. Although Riverton is not atypical of other small Midwestern towns, it is albeit marked by a distinctive political and economic history. Potential insights gained from this study may resonate with other small, rural communities facing demographic and political shifts in the United States and abroad. Yet, like other studies focusing on the relational conceptualization of citizenship, this chapter focuses on some experiences and stories of one specific site, representing a subset of Black American that is not often included in youth civic discourse. With sustained attention to how youth experience belonging and construct citizenship, opportunities to expand the spaces where youth feel a sense of belonging and systematically combat exclusionary hierarchies may emerge.

Notes

1 The youth I interviewed for this chapter self-identified as Black throughout their interviews, so I used this term to describe them throughout this chapter.
This descriptor is not intended to homogenize the vastly different experiences of individuals within Riverton and the United States, yet it seeks to acknowledge the shared history stemming from colonialism and slavery impacting these specific youths’ experiences.

2 Pseudonym to protect participant confidentiality.

3 The major employer will not be named in this chapter to provide anonymity to the town, and most importantly to the participants in this study. This chapter is a result of a constant deliberation to include enough detail to provide sufficient context on the effects of the unique nature of its impact and relationship with the town, while also ensuring the confidentiality of its participants. Similar studies name the corporation and the town outright. I have chosen to attempt to keep the town and company confidential to protect the youth participants and to show that the unique characteristics of this particular town are present in other towns across the American Midwest.

4 None of the historical accounts, figures, and facts include direct references, as this would name the town and possibly lead to my participants being identified. However, all information come from reputable public, state, and company employment, demographic, and political records.

5 “Sundown towns” as defined by Loewen (2005) are towns throughout the United States where African Americans and other non-white people were pushed out through violent threats, restrictive housing/employment policies, and other informal or formal measures, ensuring they were “not welcome after sundown” (p. 1).

6 Pseudonyms chosen by youth participants to protect confidentiality.

7 To maintain confidentiality of this site and participants, I chose to limit my description to this immigrant and refugee group to “African,” although the majority of the population in Riverton are from a specific country in East Africa. Over the past decade, African refugees and immigrants from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda have settled in Riverton due to the prevalence of available jobs and proximity to others from their home countries. My choice to use “African” is not intended to homogenize the vastly different home countries, cultures, and experiences of individuals from the African continent, but solely to aspire toward confidentiality of the participants in this study. This choice is also not intended to classify this group as non-American in terms of legal citizenship, as the majority of this population holds American citizenship.

References


10 Crossing the Great Divide
Youth Historical Consciousness as a Bridge to Civic Identity in Urban Conflict Zones in Jos, Nigeria

R. Nanre Nafziger

Introduction
It was a dusty cold harmattan afternoon in Jos, north-central Nigeria. As I entered the central roundabout of the National Museum, I could hear the scattered sound of bats hanging in the tall trees that lined the small stream. Other than that, there was quiet. A few young almajiri boys hung around underneath the trees taking a break from their street hustle. I walked toward the old part of the museum, the replication of the old, brown Kano wall towering against the hazy skies. Past the gate, I headed toward the amphitheater that used to house vibrant local dramas, now empty and lonesome. The square huts that surrounded the backstage were broken and in disrepair. Gone are the voices that once occupied these rooms and open spaces, of young girls plaiting their hair, squealing from pain as the elderly women on thick wooden footstools chastised them for turning their necks the wrong way as they feasted on roasted corn and groundnuts brought by other young girls carrying trays on their heads.

Over the past weeks and months, I met with youth participants in four interactive focus group discussion sessions as part of the *Youth, History, and Culture Study* in four different urban communities in low-income areas of Jos, a city in Northern Nigeria segregated along ethno-religious lines and with a deep history of conflict. I met the groups separately, and they requested to meet each other and spend the last two sessions together as a larger group. The day at the museum would be their first gathering.

The youth arrived in groups from their various communities, all well dressed and eager. They acknowledged each other with silent smiles and nods, then sat in clusters on different edges of the old set of stairs in the open amphitheater. The first activity was to find someone they had never met from another community and ask them a series of questions. That was all it took. Soon the air filled with laughter and conversations, a few needed to be nudged, but most were ready to interact and meet new people. That day was the start of many new friendships across the ethnoreligious lines. The violent conflict which had overshadowed their entire lives in the religiously segregated city dissipated in shy smiles, boisterous laughter, and

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joyous youthful exuberance of finding something new and unique within the mundane details of that dusty harmattan day.

Youth history and culture study

This chapter analyzes the historical consciousness of a group of young people that grew up in a city torn apart by ethnoreligious conflict. The *Youth History and Culture Project* was a youth participatory action research study that investigated how young people understood the complex history of their communities, developed historical consciousness, and created civic identities. Their historical consciousness is set in a background of having no formal history education, as history was removed from the Nigerian curriculum of primary and junior secondary schools in 1982 and replaced with social studies, which had little or no history content (Afolabi, 2018). While history education was returned to the curriculum in 2019, only a few of the youth in this study had taken history classes in school.

The study was conducted between 2019 and 2020 in Jos, central Nigeria. I used ethnographic and participatory methods to engage 42 youth between the ages of 18 and 22 from four urban communities. The youth were selected as being active members in community and youth organizations through referrals and snowballing sampling from community organizations. Permissions were obtained from each participant. The study analyzed young people’s historical consciousness, how they understand the past, and use it to inform present and future actions and engaged them in collaborative history projects where they constructed a brief history of their communities through interviewing community members. The research questions were: (1) how do youth gain knowledge of, and understand local, national, and international history? (2) how does their understanding of history relate to their civic identity and how they engage with their communities? and (3) can critical reflection through collaborative history-making transform young people’s historical consciousness and foster engaged citizenship?

Positionality

This study is informed by my experiences growing up as a bi-racial girl in Jos, Nigeria, in a time when there was no pronounced ethnoreligious conflict. My firsthand experiences in learning the history of my community came from trips to the National Museum, which was also a site of gathering for this study. I was also influenced by the countless trips to my mother’s village about three hours from Jos in Langtang North local government area. My research is equally informed by over two decades of youth organizing, my involvement in social movements as a young adult, and my experiences as an educator who integrates the study of history and culture into work on civic engagement. As a scholar-activist, I am intrigued by how young people’s knowledge of history frames their civic identity and engagement practices.
Identity and conflict in the little city of Jos

Jos is a small city of less than a million people located in the north-central region of Nigeria, known historically as the Middle Belt region but under the geo-political zone structure of the North-East. It is the capital of Plateau state and is characterized by mild to chilly weather with a state motto of the “home of peace and tourism.” Nigeria is a nation deeply divided by religion, ethnicity, and social class. Since its independence from the British in 1960, Nigeria has gone through tumultuous political upheavals including a civil war, coup d’états and military dictatorships, and various constitutional and parliamentary changes. Since 1999, democracy has failed to bring the various conflicts in the country into relief. Nigeria has over 300 ethnic groups and is divided across religious lines with the predominance of Islam in the North and Christianity in the South. Plateau state lies in the center of this conflict, both geographically being located in the central region between the Muslim North and Christian South and politically, as a state composed of minority ethnic groups, which stands in stark contrast to the more homogenous regions dominated by majority ethnic groups of the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo.

Although Nigeria has one of the largest economies in Africa, it is marked by prevalent poverty levels, corruption, gross inequality, and low rankings on global indices such as the Human Development Index (HDI), with high infant and maternal mortality and low life expectancy (OXFAM, 2017). More than 89.2 million Nigerians, 41 percent of the population, live in poverty (World Bank, 2022). Nigeria is considered a weak or failed state (Oko et al., 2018) and is ranked as one of the world’s most fragile nations. In a global index that measures risk indicators such as insecurity, economic decline, state legitimacy, and human rights and assesses the “vulnerability of states to collapse” (Uso & Egbunike, 2020, para. 4), Nigeria ranks 14th, next to nations that are amid civil war such as Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Uso & Egbunike, 2020). The majority of Nigerians live without access to electricity, running water, sanitation facilities, healthcare, or quality schooling. In stark contrast to the widespread poverty, the Nigerian political and economic elite have stupendous amounts of wealth (Oxfam, 2017).

Inter-ethnic, communal, and religious conflicts have plagued Nigeria since its creation in 1914 (Ajala, 2009; Madueke (2018a); Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). “Nigeria is a country profoundly bifurcated along the lines of religion, language, culture, ethnicity, and regional identity” (Ojukwu & Onifade, 2010, p. 173). Competing groups fight for power with a winner-takes-all approach, and ethnic and religious differences are exacerbated by competition for scarce and dwindling natural resources (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).

While ethnic groups can be assumed to take on a religious character, for example, the Igbos of the Southwest are predominantly Christian/Catholic while the Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Muslim, the religious character of ethnic groups cannot be conscribed. Conflicts between dominant ethnic groups and minority ethnic groups can be described as ethnoreligious and are
based on the construction of identities such as indigenes/non-indigenes and settlers/migrants (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Ethnic minorities are frequently marginalized by majoritarian politics, and agitations for self-determination have also emerged from these struggles both by the majority and minority groups. Religious identity is also arguably more important or as important as an ethnic identity. Since the democratic dispensation began in 1999 after decades of military rule, violent religious, ethnic, and communal conflicts have worsened. This is in large part due to the exclusionary policies and the inherent contradictions of elite accumulation under capitalism (Babalola et al., 2019, p. 24).

Jos has become the symbol of the contestations of citizenship and indigeneity (Krause, 2011). With over 30 ethnic groups, Jos has earned the title of “mini-Nigeria” (Isa-Odidi, 2004, p. 19) and, as a microcosm of the country, reflects its deep divisions. The indigene/settler conflict is compounded by religion. Those who claim to be indigenes of Plateau and Jos are Christian minority ethnic groups, including the Berom and Anaguta. The “indigenes” describe the Muslim Hausa Fulani also known as the Jasuwa, as “settlers” (Madueke, 2018b) but also lay claim to the development of the city (Krause, 2011). Religious differences have further compounded differences between ethnic groups, “indigenes,” and “settlers” who are already in competition over natural resources (Isa-Odidi, 2004).

Ethno-religious and communal conflicts have killed over 7000 people in Jos and its surrounding areas since 2001. The sparks of the Jos conflict have been ignited due to political appointments and signify fierce competition regarding who qualifies as a Jos “indigene” and thus has the right to hold office. Different ethnic groups have claimed “ownership” of Jos since its founding in 1915, even though Jos has attracted migrants from all parts of Nigeria in its over 100 years of existence (Krause, 2015).

In 2001, a Hausa man was appointed as local government Chairman in Jos North LGA. This led to five days of violence from 7 to 12 September when over 1000 people were killed, this included both Muslims and Christians. Over the next two decades, thousands more have been killed in sporadic outbreaks of ethnoreligious violence, which the locals call “crises.” This also led to the segregation of the city along ethnic and religious lines. Christians and Muslims moved to occupy separate quarters of the city, with invisible lines created that no one from the other side could cross after certain hours of the day, if at all. In 2008, another local government election in Jos North rekindled the flames of conflict with more killings. The ethno-religious conflict is exacerbated by an ineffective security apparatus made up of special task forces of combined police and military personnel, who also prey on impoverished communities and rape, rob, and murder innocent civilians. The state government is implicated by playing ethnic politics and providing a broader stage for conflict through choosing their kinsmen and also selectively ensuring that development projects such as the construction of roads are completed in areas occupied by their ethnic group.
Due to both the conflict and the threat of state-sanctioned violence, communities created vigilante groups to defend themselves. In urban slums, such as the ones engaged in this study, violent vigilantes conduct “jungle justice” against those accused of crimes such as petty theft. These vigilantes, also known as “jungle boys,” served as both a source of protection from an outsider as well as a form of internal community social control. These groups also asserted their power by collecting “taxes” which is known as “collation” in return for forms of “protection” from outsiders (Krause, 2019). The vigilante groups became a readily available force of “everyday violence networks,” which formed the “organizational backbone of large-scale political violence. When they align with ethnic and religious organizations and their youth networks, the organizational structure for mass killings emerges” (Krause, 2019, p. 1478). For example, in 2001, 2008, and 2010 conflicts, youths were known to mount roadblocks and murdered anyone who was from the opposite religion, often demanding they recite a prayer or murdering them based on their religious dress. Women also played roles in supporting the vigilante groups by performing domestic tasks such as cooking, hiding fighters, and even participating in the fighting themselves (Uhunmwuangho, 2011).

Young people within the crisis

Nigeria has one of the youngest and largest youth populations in the world. Over 75% of Nigeria’s population is under the age of 24 (UNFPA, 2018). African youth are often portrayed in negative terms such as a “lost generation” (MacQueen, 2013; Oviawe, 2010; Salami, 2013), a “ticking time bomb” (Ighobo, 2013), and “a disenfranchised majority” (Honwana, 2013, para. 12). However, while young Nigerians face many social, economic, and political challenges, they have been innovative in improvising livelihoods as they try to make ends meet. Nigerian youth have inherited an unstable and underdeveloped nation from past leaders who failed to fashion a viable path to Nigeria’s development (Barchiesi, 2020; Ekeocha, 2018). Despite challenges, Nigerian youth continue to find meaning, build their identity, counter negative stereotypes, and engage in cultural, political, and social struggles to reclaim their individual and collective identities (Agbiboa, 2015; Dagona et al., 2013; Obadare, 2010; Strong & Ossei-Owusu, 2014).

Youth agency, and youth resistance, are ways in which young people address the precariousness of their material existence and relative marginalization. Nigerian students and youths find alternate means of forming and embracing their political identity through student politics (Strong, 2017). Other youths have sought reprieve from grievances through the formation of militant, ethnic youth movements such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Arewa Youth Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council, and the Nigeria Delta People’s Volunteer force. These groups have expanded in power and scope due to the elevated levels of youth unemployment (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). Some of these groups have turned into
terrorist organizations, such as the infamous Boko Haram group, which was originally founded as a religious organization that embraced young people. While narratives bend toward criminalizing youth as troublemakers, there is a need to understand the complex power dynamics and how African youths have resisted authority and used creative means to assert their rights to full citizenship (Agbiboa, 2015).

Youth in Jos has also been described in these problematic terms such as “a huge pool of angry brigade of youths” (Uhunmwuangho, 2011, p. 112). These youth are seen as readily available for use in violence (Krause, 2017, 2019) that can be mobilized for harm. However, during historical moments such as the #EndSARS rebellion in 2020, youths in Jos showed the ability to catalyze social action in peaceful and deliberate ways.

History education, historical consciousness, and citizenship

Historical consciousness is the way we understand the past and use the past to interpret and determine the present and future (Angvik & von Borries, 1997). Historical consciousness is intertwined with civic identity and can be used as a framework to understand how young people form cultural and civic identities and envision collective or individual futures (Wexler, 2009). We know little about how young people interpret images from the past, how they come to understand history, and what they know (Wineburg, 2000). It is critical to understand young Nigerians’ historical consciousness to be better able to interpret their actions and civic identity:

Lack of knowledge about others is one of the reasons for misunderstanding and conflicts between peoples and nations. If we know more about young people’s way of thinking and their attitudes to historical and cultural issues, we will better understand why problems may occur, and thereby create a platform for reflection and thinking which may give impulses for positive changes. For that reason, knowledge about historical consciousness among young people is especially important.


Most young Nigerians have not had access to history as a subject in schools, since history was removed as a compulsory subject from schools in 1982 (Afolabi, 2018; Nafziger, 2020). Through a series of changes in the curriculum in post-independence Nigeria, and external influences from the US Education Development Council (EDC) and the British Curriculum Renewal and Educational Development Overseas (CREDO), Nigeria, alongside other former British colonies, introduced social studies. Social studies effectively replaced history as a subject with little history content, resulting in the slow phasing out of history as a subject in primary and junior secondary schools (grades 1–9). History remained an optional subject for senior secondary
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schools as part of the arts option but declined as a chosen subject of study in the West African examinations due to its removal in the lower levels of education. History was later returned to the curriculum through the advocacy of the Historical Society of Nigeria in 2018 and is now a compulsory subject for basics 1–9. However, most of the youth in the study had not taken history as a subject in school.

While the study participants had little or no access to school-based history education, the study showed that young people have multiple sources of history including stories they had heard from their parents, religious and cultural festivals in their villages or the city, travel to landmarks such as the Jos Museum, listening to the radio, reading newspapers, or accessing online social media sources such as Facebook and WhatsApp messengers where stories are often shared in small bites. It is important to also note that most of the students did not have access to smartphones, due to their economic status, so their access to the internet was also limited.

The complexity of youth identity is informed by their social, political, and cultural group identity, which places them in a specific socio-historical context. Youth are historical actors, and, therefore, historical consciousness informs their present actions or inactions. Their actions and inactions shape the history that is written today. The choices they make have consequences for the future, just as their parents’ choices shaped the world they live in today. As historical actors, youth have a sense of historical consciousness, an understanding of social conditions and events, and an interpretation of history.

Young people can be considered “citizens in the making” (Wexler, 2009, p. 163). While young people may have strong loyalties to their communities, they may develop civic identities that are located outside of their immediate contexts. Tensions can play out between their loyalties to family, ethnic group, religion, and community, as well as how they relate to their broader categorization of youth in a globalized world where they are influenced by social media. Exploring young people’s citizenship is important in understanding broader themes of citizenship and vulnerability within the global context of conflict (Arnot & Swartz, 2012). If understanding history is pertinent to understanding present civic identities and notions of collective futures, there is a need to better understand “how young people become historical” (Wineburg, 2000, p. 310).

Participatory and collaborative methods to understand youth historical consciousness

The communities engaged in the study are described by locals as “ghettos” or “jungles” Madueke (2018a). They are dense urban settlements that are unplanned with small houses scattered across rock formations and hills, without adequate sewage or sanitation channels. These ghettos are not just a result of poor urban planning but also evidence of the influx of people into the city of Jos at such rapid rates that the growth of housing could not accommodate.
There are often scant inner road systems, and the neighborhoods are best navigated by foot or, if necessary, by motorbike. In each of them, there is a high presence of young people hanging out in the streets due to an elevated level of unemployment.

The youth I worked with were all from modest means. Some of the youth had completed their secondary education, and others had dropped out. While others were in the process of applying to universities or polytechnics, others were engaged in apprenticeships, including hairdressing, tailoring, welding, and mechanical work. The youth, while from diverse backgrounds, were very friendly and jovial with each other. Through the course of the study, they formed friendships, several of which continued past the end of the study. They would know better where their fellow participants lived, and, if someone did not make a meeting, they would go and look for them or call their number. They would update me on if someone had left town or something had happened to a family member.

The youth participants were deeply grounded in the community. They knew the streets well, and the community members were also familiar with them. As I walked the streets of their neighborhoods, people would call out to the youth from shops, and the youth would stop to greet people, say hello, and discuss different things. This was true for most participants. They knew the problems of their communities and were abreast and opinionated about local matters, violence in the community, local government elections, battles between the mai angwas, and, in general, all were the eyes and ears of the “jungles.”

Youth Participatory Action Research (YPAR) involves training young people to identify issues of concern, conduct research, and take leadership to improve their communities. It is a specialized form of community research that promotes the power and voice of young people (Ozer, 2016). YPAR studies build on the understanding that young people are experts and can create knowledge, empower themselves, and fight for social justice through research (Caraballo et al., 2017). It can also help youth see themselves as school and community leaders, promote critical consciousness, and develop the ability to move beyond individual explanations to a broader focus (Watts & Flanagan, 2007).

For the study, I selected two Muslim communities and two Christian communities in Jos North local government area. The four communities were Jenta (Christian), Tudun Wada (Christian), Gangare (Muslim), and Dadin Kowa (Muslim and mixed). Three of these sites, Jenta, Gangare, and Tudun Wada, had experienced elevated levels of conflict with similar challenges of lack of running water, high rates of crime, lack of functional public-school systems, and high rates of drug abuse and sex work.

In each of the communities, I met with the Mai Angwa, or community leader, to get permission for the study. I also worked with local youth organizations to select the youth participants for the study. In the final selection process, I selected a diverse group of young people in terms of ethnic and
gender identity. I selected 48 youth participants between the age of 18 and 24, representing 21 different ethnic groups, and an even number of male and female participants (24 each). I used activity-based focus group discussion groups, youth journaling, memo-ing, participant observation, collaborative history projects, and community presentations to collect data to answer the research questions.

The research took part in three parts. The first part was interactive focus group discussions that interrogated questions of knowledge of history, and questions around identity and understanding of civic attitudes. The participants were asked to draw family trees, interview their family members about their family history, and share stories of knowledge of the history of their communities, Nigeria and Africa. One exercise, for example, was a free writing exercise where the participants were asked to write down everything that they knew about African history. Another activity was a game called “where in the world” where participants could choose where in the world they would want to be born, and with what physical characteristics. An activity also involved participants placing in order important aspects of their identities such as ethnicity and religion. The second part of the study was a collaborative history project where the participants decided on a topic they wanted to research about the history of their community and conducted interviews with elders, youth leaders, and community members with knowledge of the community history. Each of the communities chose different questions to focus on. The final part of the project was a mini-conference and a community presentation. I contacted history students and lecturers at the University of Jos to present different topics on the history of Jos and Nigeria. On the second day of the mini-conference, youth presented their collaborative history projects back to their communities. They invited community members to the community presentation, including all the people they had engaged in the project. They also created a video with a local videographer that showed the work they had done in their collaborative research. Community members were invited to respond to the youth presentations, and a small celebration of their work followed it. Youth also engaged in collective and individual reflections and responded to the summary of findings that I presented to them from the activity-based focus group discussions.

The community that I focus on in this chapter is the Jenta community, a predominantly Christian community that is one of the well-known “jungles” located in a central location in Jos North. The question the youth chose to investigate was: what is the history of the Jenta community? Under this key research question were sub-questions, which included: (1) how did the Jenta community come to be? (2) why is there only one major religion in Jenta? (3) why is there so much violence in the community? and (4) what is the role of youth in solving the problems we are facing as a community?

In the three vignettes that follow, I highlight important conversations and findings from each part of the study. These vignettes highlight the journey through the process of expanding their historical consciousness and opening
Youth reflections on conflict and difference

Bala was one of the leaders of the Jenta group because he had helped to recruit other members from the community and had been part of previous youth peacebuilding projects. At the time of the study, Bala was training as an apprentice in tailoring, but he also helped his family with the family farm, often doing the manual labor of farming in a nearby rural community outside of Jos before coming to the sessions, often covered in a layer of dust and sweat, but ready to be active in discussion, despite his fatigue. Born in Jenta, Bala was a popular figure in the community, and people would call out to him as we walked through the small streets.

Pirkat is a young woman who at the time of the study was 18 years old, had completed secondary school, and had just entered a private college outside of Jos. She was always one of the first to come to the sessions, with hair neatly braided and often wearing makeup, ready to engage. She had come to Jenta as a young girl when her family could no longer afford housing in other parts of the city. She would often say “Me? I am not from Jenta.” And then laugh. But by the end of the study, she had become much prouder of her community. She often had divergent views but would be slow and hesitant to speak up. She participated in different youth leadership training in the city before and provided well thought out and articulate responses to questions.

Binta was also just completed her secondary school studies, and looking for “admission” to higher education. Loud and vivacious, Binta always had something to say and was never afraid to express her opinions. Her family had lived in Jenta for a long time, though she was not sure of how long.

Steven, like Bala, was also training as an apprentice and looking forward to soon obtaining his “freedom.” “Freedom” is when a young apprentice is released from their apprenticeship to practice on their own, a kind of graduation that is often accompanied by a celebration. Steven was training as a mechanic, and would also come to sessions from work. He was very assertive and often intent on being contrary, holding strong views and very well-known to the “jungle” boys, the street gangs, in the community.

Bala, Pirkat, Binta, and Steven were part of a group of 12 youth from Jenta that regularly participated in the interactive focus group discussion sessions. During a session preparing questions for the community visit, the conversation turned toward the topic of religion and what questions to ask about the presence or absence of other religions in the Jenta community. The conversation turned to the 2001 crisis, and I asked the youth to elaborate on the events.

NANRE: What happened in the crisis?
STEVEN: We chased them away.
NANRE: Were you born?

CHORUS: Yes, I was born . . . Yes, we were born . . .

BALA: But that time all of us were . . . (gestures to indicate a small child) . . .

NANRE: So, what happened in the crisis?

STEVEN: We chased the Muslims.

NANRE: Who chased who?

BALA: The Christians chased the Muslims out of the area.

NANRE: Why?

PIRKAT: Because the Muslims also chased the Christians from their side.

BINTA: From their area.

NANRE: When was the crisis?


NANRE: That was 18 years ago. What was the date?

BALA: Actually, we do not know.

BINTA: I was still a baby.

NANRE: You just know 2001, so that was a long time ago, so what happened then? Throughout your lifetime?

PIRKAT: The Christians have continued to live on their own side, and the Muslims have continued to live on their side. It is only in the market that we can meet.

The Jenta youth describe the 2001 crisis as a pivotal moment when the communities were divided and segregated by religion. Steven takes on a collective positioning on behalf of the Christians in his community using the word “we” even though he was a toddler at the time. Pirkat in her remarks notes the continued segregation throughout their lifetimes, noting the divisions between religions that endured over 20 years. As the conversation continued, the youth participants discussed how the conflict related to the present time:

BALA: So, in the 2001 crisis, it was a misunderstanding.

NANRE: It was a misunderstanding?

BALA: Yes, but they have settled [reconciled]

CHORUS: (Interrupting—shouting). They did not settle! They did not settle!

PARKAT: If they settled, they would go back to their houses.

BINTA: But they sold their houses.

In this part of the conversation, the youth discussed whether the conflict between the Muslims and Christians in Jos had been settled or reconciled. They spoke about the nature of the separation resulting in the physical sale of houses. However, Steven continued to assert that conflict was very much alive in the city.

STEVEN: Even if you enter that Terminus (the main market) you as a Christian if a Muslim were to step on you and you slap them (indicates a big slap), they will call it a crisis cause . . .
BALA: . . . even if it is just a little misunderstanding.
NANRE: But how will you know that he is a Muslim?
CHORUS: We know them . . . we know them!
STEVEN: By their fruits, you will know them . . . we know them.
PIRKAT: What they are saying is they want to rule over Plateau state because if you allow them, they even share some fields around here. If they manage to collect Plateau state, this is where they will build. That is, through RUGA.

Pirkat refers to RUGA, a government program that was being debated in the Senate at that time that would give Hausa and Fulani people land in Plateau state to graze their cattle. The RUGA program was very controversial because it delved into the conflict of land ownership and rights to land that had fostered the conflict in the first place. Pirkat expressed concern about the program having an impact on their community through the redistribution of land. When I asked her what the solution is, she said that the Muslims should go back to where they came from, but Bala and the other youth argued that they have no home, because they are Fulani herders. The youth continued to argue very loudly, and they began to speak in Hausa, the dominant local language. I asked Binta to interpret what they were saying for me, as the proverb was too complicated for me to decipher from my limited knowledge of Hausa. Binta explained in Hausa a proverb:

BINTA: Meeting with a chicken does not stop you from cutting it.
NANRE: What does that mean?
BINTA: Being used to a chicken does not stop you from cutting it.
PIRKAT: And we are the chickens.
BINTA: We are the chickens . . . so being used to us does not stop them from killing us . . .

From this conversation, the youth had knowledge of history and a sense of historical consciousness. They were aware of recent local history, the conflicts that began in 2001 as well as the impact on the segregation that they saw in their community today. They understood that living in a segregated society was the result of decades of conflict and also recognized the combustibility of the present moment, where conflict could break out at any time. They were also aware of the fragility of present and future relationships with others across the religious divide. While they knew a few Muslim traders and water sellers that passed through their community, they were aware that this sense of familiarity did not guarantee their safety. The depth in which the young people understood this conflict was both surprising and affirming. I was unfamiliar with how the community had become segregated, and we delved deeper into the story in the next part of the project.
Excavations through collaborative history projects

The collaborative history projects were a central part of the participatory youth action research. In the tradition of counter storytelling (Solóranzo & Yosso, 2002), the youth created a process of investigating the history of their communities to tell these stories and share them back with the community. The process of collaborative history-making helps to focus not on what the youth do not know about history, but rather, on enabling them to see what they can know, through a process of critical questioning and learning through their research.

The youth project in Jenta focused on creating a basic history of the community. They conducted four interviews, two with community elders, Elder Mary (female), and Elder Manasseh (male), one with the community youth leader and football coach, Coach Ayuba, another male youth leader, Jalloh, and a young female leader in one of the prominent local churches, Sarah. The youth selected these leaders to interview based on their perceived knowledge of community history and their accessibility. The youth participants had to agree through consensus on the selected interviewees. Their research was supported by local youth leaders under my guidance. Each of the interviews was captured by video and audio recordings. The youth put considerable effort into selecting community members, conducting the interviews, drafting reports of the interviews, and creating public presentations of their findings.

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The youth participants found that Jenta was founded in 1962 by the Jarawa ethnic group, who came to mine tin. All the respondents reported that before the 2001 crisis, Jenta was a mixed community where Christians and Muslims lived together. The youth leader Jalloh noted:

We used to live together. The Muslims came [here] to mine. Then people started coming. When the community was developed, then came the issue of whom to give power . . . At that time, we do not have any problems here, all these smokers, all these hoodlums we do not have. Before, there will only be two people fighting, and the Mai Angwa will solve the problem. If they [the police] take them [the youth] to the police station, he [the Mai Angwa] will take them and say that these are his people, they cannot take them. So, we enjoyed his leadership . . . [but now] It is the youths that are causing the problem in the community. If you are walking, you will see the young boys, and they will stop you and take what you have from us. So now, under our leadership, we are trying to see what we can do, with you, to join hands.

The community leader discussed a time of relative peace between two religious groups and the role of community leadership but blamed the current problems of the community on the youth. This points back to the earlier discussion of how young Nigerians are often criminalized and depicted as being
a problem to their communities. In a separate interview, Elder Manasseh dis-
cussed how after the 2001 crisis, Muslims completely abandoned the area, leaving abandoned houses left unclaimed that became centers for drug use and criminal hideouts. Elder Mary narrated a similar story:

Before the crisis, Muslims and Christians were living together. But shortly after the crisis, they [Muslims] are no more here. In a few years to come, the homes that were deserted, are where drinks are being sold, so that is where they are increasing in this community now. . . . It started with the drinks. As I told you when we came, there was a crisis. There were not so many drinks, but after the crisis, more children started drinking. And so, it is from there we started hearing of the occultism and stealing and other things from the society.

Elder Mary discussed the problem of alcoholism and crime as outcomes of the 2001 crisis, touching on the traumatization of young people which led to alcoholism. She blamed many of the problems on parents who were not able to raise their children, left to work outside the community, and left children to become “wayward.” The problems of urban decay are evident in this community; however, it is unclear how the crisis led to increased crime in the community. Sarah, a respected young female leader of a local church, noted the problems of the community related to youth upbringing but also to a sense of belonging that was created among the youth in the groups of jungle boys:

They have many problems, no school fees, cannot go to school, and are frustrated. So, these jungle boys have a bond; if you go there, at least you will have a drink, you will get drunk, smoke he will give his brother, and have a bond when you are fighting one you are fighting another.

In her response, Sarah discussed both the implications of broken families, economic problems, and the bonds created formed by the gangs that welcomed youth into their fold and provided a sense of family and community. While the female leaders interviewed were quite sympathetic to the problems that young people faced in the community, the male leaders tended to view youth as the problem and cause of problems within the community. For example, Jalloh describes the actions of the youth as “tormenting the community” and vowed to “do something about it.” This is especially scary because the following week, a set of youth leaders decided to “sanitize” the community by sweeping for criminals the following week and meting out terrible punishments as a form of “jungle justice.”

A second question the youth asked was why Jenta was known as or called a ghetto. Sarah responded:

It is known as a ghetto because it is being neglected. There are a lot of educated people in this community. There are a lot of wealthy people, but
they are just selfish. If you are the only rich person, will you enjoy those riches? So, if you extend to others before you know it, the ghetto will cease to be. But instead, you say, if it is not my family, if it is not my child, I do not have anything to do with it.

Some of the problems Jenta faced included elevated levels of drug abuse, street crimes such as armed robbery of pedestrians and homes for things like mobile phones and cash, street “thugs” called dembe (animals), and violent crimes, including rape and beatings during robbery attacks. There is a complete lack of police or security presence in the community, and the street boys’ task themselves with keeping the community safe through jungle justice (extrajudicial justice for those considered criminals), while they also commit crimes of their own. There are some neighborhood watch groups, that patrol at night, but they in no way compare in power to the street gangs. Many of the residents live in fear. The area is also very rocky, and there is a problem with roads and the issue of clean water. Although there is a river flowing through Jenta, it is very polluted. Jalloh also noted his own response to the question of Jenta being a ghetto:

We, the people, are residing in this community. We contribute to this. That is why outsiders look at this community like a ghetto . . . Nobody is going to call this community a ghetto [in the future]. We are going to sanitize the community, we do not have a police station, and we do not have a road network. But those people see that we do not have anything, that is why they live in the ghetto.

The final question the youth participants were asked is, “Does Jenta have a future?” Another youth leader, Coach Ayuba, rejected the notion that Jenta was a jungle or a ghetto:

In places like this, you find people most of the same mindset. They believe in poverty; only the poor live in Jenta. However, it is not like that. Why would you believe you are a poor man if you have hands and eyes? Even when the Hausa are here, we have jungle, and there is a river down there where they were smoking . . . Yes, we live in the ghetto, and we behave like people that live in the ghetto. Life is not easy; that is why it is called the ghetto.

In summary, the youth participants of Jenta found different ideas and conceptualizations concerning the problems of Jenta. While there were some historical details in the interviewee’s descriptions of the problems, most of the discussion centered around Jenta’s current problems and the roles of different members of the community in fostering these problems and resolving them. As in other communities, the role of youth participants in both creating and solving community problems was emphasized, while encouragement
was given by the respondents to the possibilities of the future. The emphasis in Jenta was also heavily moralized within Christianity as the solution to the problems of the community. Although economic and political forces were at play, the moral impetus of religion was emphasized as having the power to solve community problems. The interviews with elders and youth leaders revealed some important aspects of the history of the crisis, but there was a far greater emphasis on the present, namely the moral lapses of young people and the neglect of their parents, and the stigma that is associated with being from a community that is called a ghetto. It became clear that there was an ardent desire to rebuild the community; however, there was little evidence of reconciliation with the past. The community leaders were more focused on looking inward than on building bridges outside of the community. In the next vignette, we see that the youth took a different approach.

**Healing across intergenerational, religious, and ethnic divides**

The healing of the wounds of conflict that have endured across generations is complicated and requires extensive processing. The research in the communities helped the youth to understand not only the conflict that they had lived through but the general social crisis and malaise that were fallouts of the continuous conflict. The conversations with elders and young community members helped the youth participants to have a deeper sense of community, as well as to understand their place as young citizens. Pirkat said the following after the community research:

> Before, I was not happy to be part of this community because I thought that the Mai-Angwa did not do anything about the (gangs), but now, I know that the Mai Angwa and the elders, they are doing something about the gangs, so I am happy about that.

Pirkat had been very vocal about the issues of the Jenta community and her dismay at having to live there. But after conversations with community members, she began to have a sense of hope. She continued in her reflections on the connectivity of struggles within her community:

> I used to think that the problems my parents were talking about the gang it was just me but when we met with the Mai Angwa (community leader) I found out that many parents are also struggling with their youth and that I am not the only one that my parents are talking to, so I see that all of this is, it is connected.

The many conversations that the youth engaged in helped to bridge a deep intergenerational divide and enabled the youth to see their roles as members of the community.
Another connection the young people made was through their engagement with youth from other communities. Ideas of ethnic and religious differences in a town that has been segregated for over two decades run deep in the veins of the community and into the lives of children that were raised within the crisis. However, the young people in this study showed a deep desire to overcome these prejudices and divisions. At the beginning of the study, many of the youth participants were afraid to cross into communities that were not their own, even though many were geographically close to each other, less than a mile in some cases. Despite this, in the earliest days of the study, the youth would ask me about other communities that I was working with and immediately expressed interest in meeting the youth from the other communities.

We agreed that the last two interactive focus group sessions would be a gathering across the communities in a larger group at the National Museum (also known as the Jos Museum), a centerpiece of the Jos community located in the middle of the town. This location was an important choice as it presented a neutral meeting ground. We gathered the youth participants at this location and allowed them to mingle and interview each other, which the youth very much enjoyed. The open-air theatre we used for the presentations was full of laughter and conversation. Following the museum meeting, we found that youth participants had spontaneously begun to visit each other in their various communities, and friendships were formed and deepened over time. The youth participants decided to conduct other activities together, which included a visit to the library. When it was time for the community research, I noticed that some of the youth participants from other communities would join in for the research and blend into the scene. The process of the YPAR opened up the possibility for friendships and broke down barriers that once existed.

The religious divide within the city of Jos is nothing less than extreme. These constructed borders are not known to strangers but are demarcated by residents. The stories that were told indicate how these demarcations came to be and what they mean for young people today. While the divisions that mark the city remain evident in the lives of the youth participants, the youth demonstrated a willingness to overcome religious divisions through friendship.

In the closing ceremony, I asked the youth participants to find youth from a community that they had never been to before and with whom they had formed a friendship during the project. They moved quickly to find their friends from other religions and held them and laughed and talked. It was a moment of deep joy for all of us. Many of these friendships strengthened over the period of the research project but went beyond its close. This has important implications for planning and implementing projects to engage youth participants across religious divides. Learning history together was a way for these youth participants to engage and disrupt the narratives that had been handed down as storied violence from across generations. On the final day of the mini-conference, the four communities were asked to work together on
a single presentation. They decided to write and recite a poem that reflected their unity and strength.

After the second phase of the project and its completion, the youth participants formed a group called History Makers, to continue the work of the project. The History Makers also formed a Facebook group, through which they communicate regularly. Sometimes it is about regular day-to-day events, or someone asking for prayers when they are sick. At other times, they share information about history they have gleaned from the web or happenings of interest and importance on the political scene. Some of the youth also began projects on peace-making and intergenerational storytelling. A group of the youth also participated together in the #EndSARS rebellion, which began in 2020, as well as the other protests and actions in the city of Jos.

Possibilities for crossing the great divide

For the past twenty years, Jos has become a distinctly segregated town. In what I call the great divide, communities are segregated based on religious and ethnic identity, and the lines are rarely crossed. From this study, we collectively discovered possibilities for a process of healing across intergenerational, religious, and ethnic divides. The process of collaborative history-making and storytelling produced a level of catharsis. For some of the interviewees, there was an apprehension about what would be done with the information provided, while for many, there was a sense of relief in telling their stories. The crisis in Jos has endured for 20 years, and there has been no process of reconciliation and no justice for the victims, despite numerous commissions and panels of inquiry. There remains so much anger and discontent in the city, and the process of healing will take deliberate and sustainable efforts.

The research also showed that youth have a sense of historical consciousness that is collective and based on knowledge of local issues and culture. They can relate their knowledge of the past and apply it to the present, as evidenced in the conversations on the conflict. The historical trauma of past generations lives on in these youth and is evident from the ways that they discuss the violence of the crisis and personalize the conflict. Because the violence has not stopped, the storied violence becomes part of a generation’s lived experiences. While they may not have been involved in the conflict, their friends who operate gangs are the ones that enforce the strict religious segregation in their communities.

The young people in the study show strong affiliations with their families and communities as well as strong religious identities. Nigerian scholars (Falola, 2009; Madunagu, 2008; Nnoli, 2003) have consistently identified ethnic identity problems as central to the internal conflict in Nigeria. However, I did not find a strong sense of ethnic identity among the majority of the youth. The youth themselves denounced tribal infighting in their communities and sought to transcend the boundaries of ethnic divisions.
Young people, who are part of multiple generations that have never taken history classes in school, have learned history through other means: the media, stories from their family and community members, as well as public events that take place in their communities and hometowns. Re-engaging with the past opens up radical possibilities for an unimagined future. Engaging young people in praxis through collaborative history-making can help them to break shackles of insecurity and negative identities to instill a new sense of confidence in their capabilities to create histories in line with their own visions for their communities.

Through this research, I found that Nigerian youth have a sense of historical consciousness and value the importance of the past in understanding the present. While they may lack historical knowledge, they put together what I refer to as a “pidginized” history. The young people employ various sources of history, including oral history and stories from their families and the community, and combine this with forms of popular knowledge and information from social media, films, and books to create their individual and collective identity and develop a sense of historical consciousness. While young people may imbibe some of the negative ideas about other religious and ethnic groups from their parents, these ideas can be disrupted through transformative education experiences such as collaborative history-making.

In this chapter, I highlighted three important vignettes of a youth participatory research project in Jos, in which young people documented community histories, and came together across ethnic and religious lines, to forge collective and individual civic identities that were more tolerant, respectful, and appreciative of cultures and religions other than their own. The study is a glimpse into the potential for historical consciousness to serve as a vehicle for national unification and conflict resolution in the fragile nation-state of Nigeria, with the potential for application in different national contexts.

Notes
1 *Almajiri* are children under Islamic mallams that are sent out to beg in the street to earn their keep.
2 Nigeria has had various iterations of regions, states, and zones since its formation in 1914. It currently has six geo-political zones and 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
3 *Mai Angwas* are the local leaders of communities, usually selected through hereditary rights or the selection of a small community. Mai Angwas are often wrongfully labeled as local kings. They are not wealthy by any means but rather occupy a position as moral leaders of the community and are often consulted on community matters by the community members themselves and by the government.
4 While the youth are not ethnically Hausa, Hausa language is the lingua franca or most spoken language in Jos.
References


Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine an experience in the training of educational managers of public early childhood education centers in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil, whose main axis focused on the democratization of the internal relations of such institutions. By sharing this experience, it is intended to highlight the possibilities and challenges of training programs for educational managers that have democracy as a principle.

Brazilian children are considered subjects of rights, having as legal support the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil, 1998), the Statute of the Child and Adolescence (Brazil, 1990), and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989). This legal apparatus is the foundation of the National Curriculum Guidelines for Early Childhood Education (Brazil, 2009), a law that guides early childhood education policies in Brazilian municipalities and the pedagogical practices carried out in early childhood education centers. In Brazilian law, early childhood education is considered a right of children and their families and a policy to strengthen citizenship. According to Teles (2015), early childhood education has a social dimension, understood as a public, secular educational institution, with qualified professionals to work with children and their families and that must always have the participation of public bodies in the perspective of gender equality, race/ethnicity and human rights in the construction of its guidelines in order to guarantee solid bases for a democratic and non-violent education in the perspective of a dignified and plural society.

In this sense, the training proposal presented in this text, by focusing on the democratization of the internal relations of early childhood education centers, recognizes that children from an early age learn to exercise their citizenship based on interaction models provided to them, which underlies the importance and the need to have democracy as the central axis of common practices and relationships in the daily life of a center of early childhood education.
Democracy is not something that is learned by just listening; it necessarily involves experiences. As Freire (1997) states, “If there is a knowledge that is only incorporated to man experimentally, existentially, this is democratic knowledge” (p. 92). Regarding the training of managers, it is essential to prioritize training strategies based on democracy, participation, and reflection on everyday school life in order to ensure impacts on daily practices. In other words, for the training of managers to promote learning that favors the constitution of democratic centers of early childhood, a constant dialogue between theory and practice is necessary in order to promote praxis in the search to structure a more humanized educational routine.

The experience of training managers analyzed here is anchored in the work of scholars who advocate for democratic perspectives in education, such as Paulo Freire (1997, 1983, 1996, 2003), Michael Apple and James Beane (2001), Vitor Paro (2000, 2001, 2002, 2008), and Monção (2013, 2019). These authors point out that the constitution of democratic schools and educational centers can only be achieved through the democratization of internal relations, and the sharing of power, so that professionals, children, and families collectively decide on the issues that support the organization and educational daily life. Dialogue and negotiation occupy a central place in democratization processes and exclude any actions of domination in which the subjectivities of professionals, families, and children are denied to satisfy individual or collective interests.

It is important to highlight, among the chosen authors, the contribution of Paulo Freire’s studies, whose legacy is recognized worldwide as one of the founding figures of critical pedagogy. His work proposes an emancipatory education based on praxis, that is, on the reflection and action of subjects on the world, with the aim of transforming it toward social justice, as proposed in one of his most famous books, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1983). For Freire (1983), dialogue is a fundamental category:

Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming—between those who deny others the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression. If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person “depositing” ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be “consumed” by the discussants.

(p. 39)
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, the concepts of democracy and democratic management and their implications for education in the Brazilian context are analyzed. In the second part, the experience of training early childhood education managers, as developed in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil, during 2010, is described. Finally, the advances and challenges that this experience provided both to educational managers and to the construction of training proposals aimed at these professionals are discussed.

Democratic management and its implications for education

The Federal Constitution of Brazil, approved in 1988, established democratic management as an educational principle. However, this does not mean that this principle has been unanimously lived and understood without contradictions in its practical implementation. The concept of democratic management is marked by a polysemy of understandings that reflect the tensions and contradictions of Brazilian society. To understand them, this part of the chapter begins with a contextualization of the origins of this concept in the country’s legislation. Then, the concepts of management and democracy and their implications for education are theoretically discussed.

After decades of civic-military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, Brazil experienced, from the mid-1980s, a process of re-democratization of the state. During the period, the civil society organized to prepare a new constitution for the country. Among the pillars of the new constitution was the commitment to popular participation in decisions and monitoring of public policies, enabling the right of all Brazilian citizens to have a voice through various instruments of deliberation, including the sectoral councils. Sectoral councils are understood as institutionalized public spaces with plural and equal composition between the state and civil society. Deliberative in nature and with legal force, its function is to formulate and oversee the implementation of policies and to redefine priorities and budgetary resources in related areas. In the case of education, the respective entities include the Control and Monitoring Council of the Basic Education Maintenance and Development Fund (Fundeb), the School Feeding Council (CAE), the Municipal Education Councils (CME), and the School Councils. According to the Federal Constitution in relation to school councils, education professionals, the community, and family members must jointly decide the project and the directions of the early childhood education center and schools, considering the principles of respect for human rights and the parameters of education in the country through democratic management and with some financial autonomy. For instance, Paro (2001) found that community participation in the organization and functioning of the school had both the objective of guaranteeing the right to democratic control of public services and was related to a project for the development of citizenship.
The proposal of democratic management in the process of formation of the Federal Constitution of 1988 aimed to make the public school a public space, managed by the logic of the public and the common good, breaking away from the private and patrimonial forms that have generally characterized Brazilian society. Democratic management is premised on the notion of a state of rights marked by a public culture of rights. In this sense, democratic management would have as its horizon another social function of the school, namely movement toward a fairer society where differences in opportunities would be reduced (Arroyo, 2008). However, despite nearly three decades of promulgation of the constitution, the perspective of democratic management as a commitment to community participation during public policies, and in the case of schools, in pedagogical plans and educational policies, has been losing strength, becoming depoliticized and bureaucratized, devoid of its most radical meaning, which is the experience and defense of public school as a public good at the service of all citizens (Arroyo, 2008). One of the elements that led to the loss of the radicality of democratic management in Brazilian schools and early childhood education centers was the maintenance of bureaucracy in the Departments of Education, which remained hierarchically organized and established strict rules for spaces of participation, without improving the reflection on the meaning of democracy in schools.

To understand the challenge of implementing democratic management in early childhood education centers and schools in Brazil, it is necessary to consider the dispute of antagonistic projects for the country present in the process of drafting the Brazilian Constitution. On the one hand, there was the defense of a popular democratic project through political decentralization as a possibility of articulating participatory decision-making processes, social control, and expansion of the state’s role in guaranteeing citizens’ rights. On the other hand, administrative decentralization and the lack of State responsibility were defended. And in this dispute, behind an apparent confluence of nomenclatures—participation, civil society, citizenship, and democracy—very different projects of society and conceptions of the State were presented (Arelaro & Maudonnet, 2017). The term “civil society,” for example, could mean groups that were not part of the government. However, in the neoliberal context, this term has been associated with the emergence of the so-called Third Sector and business foundations, with a strong emphasis on philanthropy (Dagnino, 2005).

Although the popular democratic project was based on constitutional principles, the Brazilian state promoted, from the 1990s, a reconfiguration of social and educational policies with a view to reducing costs. These policies were anchored in neoliberal principles in which the market is the regulatory axis (Monção, 2013). Maria Tereza Leitão Melo (2011) highlights that, from the neoliberal perspective, management is linked to conservative changes and supported by the logic of market needs. From this perspective, the articulation with the pedagogical plan of the school and the reflection on social inclusion and the public character of democratic management are excluded.
To guarantee the “total quality” of education, “the applied formula is business management, in which the search for results is based on pedagogical pragmatism and the efficiency and effectiveness of the models, making competitiveness a method and the search for individual success a rule” (Melo, 2011, p. 244).

Melo (2011) analyzes two elements of the neoliberal approach to educational management. The first is the disregard of the school as a space of conflicts and contradictions inherent to the people who live and work there, denying the plurality that can enrich the internal reflection of the school and the construction of consensus to give life to the pedagogical plan of the school. The second element is the initiative of the State seeking partners interested in “saving the public school,” without any analysis of the determinants and responsibilities for the current precariousness of the educational system, attributing the resolution of the problem to the school community. Melo (2011) also presents fundamental indicators to guarantee that the proposal for a democratic public school is discussed, implemented, managed, and evaluated democratically:

- school autonomy through a collective pedagogical plan that presents alternatives for daily life, which is based on the analysis of reality and is linked to the education system to guarantee the character of the public and not allow the State to transfer its responsibility for education;
- decentralization of power understood as a way of implementing a collective work methodology, which breaks with the centralized and hierarchical model, sharing roles and responsibilities;
- social representation in the school councils, which implement spaces for participation in the formulation of policies;
- social control of education management through instruments of social representation that official policies and programs are evaluated and monitored by society;
- election of school leaders, which holds the possibility of democratizing management, which, combined with other indicators, can strengthen democratic relations in schools; and
- the inclusion of all segments of the school community in school councils, which are legitimate spaces for everyone to participate in the elaboration and implementation of the pedagogical plan.

Reflecting on these elements is essential to recovering the radicalism of democratic management and both to value and give visibility to the experiences of democratization of the educational system and schools to promote exchange and the strengthening of democratic education and educational policies (Monção, 2013). The lack of reflection on the sociopolitical components around the theme of democratic management makes it difficult to have a comprehensive view of the context, which may lead to analyses that do not reflect the reality experienced by the actors of the children’s centers (Monção, 2013).
To discuss in greater depth the meaning of the radicality of democratic management, it is necessary to discuss the concepts of democracy, citizenship, and their specificity as applied to educational management. As Paro states, in a broader sense, democracy means “mediation for the construction and exercise of social freedom, encompassing all the means and efforts that are used to reach understanding between groups and people, based on historically constructed values” (2001, p. 34). In this sense, the democratic relationship involves relationships between groups and individuals who, through coexistence, assert themselves as actors (Paro, 2008).

Democracy as a requirement for the common good is opposed to the individualistic perspective, anchored in personal interests. Competition and the enhancement of individual capacities in unequal social contexts, without guaranteeing equal opportunities, enhance the use of the term “democracy” for non-democratic purposes (Monção, 2013). Usually, the term “democracy” has been used indiscriminately, as a slogan. According to Apple and Beane (2001), “we hear the defense of democracy used countless times, every day, to justify practically everything that people want to do: we live in a democracy, right?” (p. 15). The ambiguous and contradictory meaning of the term “democracy” reveals its character of mediation. As democracy is not constituted without experimentation, to promote a democratic education it is necessary to live dialogic actions.

Norberto Bobbio (2000) points out that democracy is based on the hypothesis that everyone can decide about everything. For him, a minimum definition of democracy presupposes three elements, namely a set of rules and procedures; a significant number of citizens with the right to participate in decision-making, either directly or indirectly; citizens can actually choose between real alternatives, guaranteeing their rights to freedom of opinion and expression of their own ideas. According to Bobbio (2000), to know whether democracy has prospered in a given country, we must “see if there has been an increase not in the number of those who have the right to participate in decisions that concern them, but in the spaces in which they can exercise that right” (p. 40). Political democracy presupposes the existence of a pluralist society, with the freedom to disagree, with greater distribution of power, and with favor toward the democratization of civil society, which allows one to identify a central feature of democracy in modernity, namely the freedom of dissent. Bobbio (2000) considers that only when the exercise of dissent is free is it possible to find the real consensus that legitimizes a democratic system founded on citizenship and human rights.

In agreement with Bobbio, Brazilian sociologist Maria Victoria Benevides Soares reaffirms the importance of the active participation of citizens in decision-making processes in the public sphere for the affirmation of democratic citizenship but highlights the importance of considering human rights in the process. According to Soares (2004), when discussing democratic citizenship, the existence of human rights is presupposed: “There is no democracy without the guarantee of human rights and vice versa” (p. 43). The author recalls that
human rights are universal and are above geopolitical borders and that, due to their amplitude, they encompass the citizenship rights of each country.

Citizenship and democracy are processes based on experiences; therefore, as Soares (2004) explains:

Passive citizenship—that granted by the State, with the moral idea of protection and favor—is distinct from active citizenship, that which instructs the citizen as a bearer of rights and duties, but essentially a participant in the public sphere and creator of new rights to open spaces for participation.

(p. 46)

Respect for individual freedoms must be associated with the guarantee of social rights. Soares (2004) warns of the need to combat the naturalization of the idea that only the right to vote exempts economic inequalities. Currently, it is not possible for societies that are not supported by the practice of solidarity to guarantee freedom and equality. Solidarity is a political attribute of citizenship: “the solidarity that naturally must derive from a new political regime, a new economic system—foundations for the creation of radical democracy” (Soares, 2004, pp. 64–65).

The concept of education that supports democratic management is based on the concepts of democracy and active citizenship, and aims at the formation of the human being in its entirety, as stated by Paro (2001):

It is a historical-cultural update, it is assumed that the educational components it provides to human beings are something much richer and more complex than the simple transmission of information. As mediation for the historical appropriation of the cultural heritage to which citizens are supposedly entitled, the ultimate aim of education is to favor a life with greater individual satisfaction and better social coexistence. Education, as part of life, consists mainly in learning to live as much as history allows. Through it, contact is made with the beautiful, with the fair and with the true, one learns to understand them, to admire them, to value them, and to contribute to their historical construction, that is, it is through education that prepares for the usufruct (and new productions) of spiritual and material goods.

(p. 37–38)

Starting from the conception of democratic education, whose function of the school is the integral formation of the human being, both in the individual and social dimensions, education for democracy must guide the pedagogical plan of schools. Considering that the essential characteristic of management is mediation to achieve a purpose, it is necessary to have coherence between means and ends and to promote education for democracy. Paro (2001) states that there must be coherence between training for democracy and the
integality of subjects and mediation to make it possible. The broad concept of administration as the “rational use of resources for the achievement of determined ends” (Paro, 2000, p. 18) serves as a starting point to analyze school administration. There is a common sense, especially in authoritarian societies, that administration is related to relationships of submission and command, but as stated by Paro (2001), this is not what defines it in the context of education, but rather mediation as a characteristic for the achievement of a given purpose. The author highlights that the means and the ends are not independent, but they condition each other. If, on the one hand, it is necessary to select the means and ways of using it to reach a certain end, then, on the other hand, those that are not adequate can distort the purposes or compromise its reach (Paro, 2001).

When seeking to establish a truly democratic education, school management needs to consider the specificity of education, and in no way can it trans-pose strategies from the business area driven by capitalist interests with the purpose of profit, for the educational area should be guided by emancipatory education (Monção, 2013). According to Anísio Teixeira (1968):

In education, the supreme target is the student to whom everything else is subordinate; in the company, the supreme target is the material product, to which everything else is subordinate. In this, the humanization of work is the correction of the work process, in education, the process is absolutely human and corrects a certain relative effort for the acceptance of inevitable organizational and collective conditions. Thus, the two administrations are polar opposites.

(p. 15)

Democratic school management is focused on social change and not on authoritarian and submissive relationships, which often characterize business management. In order for a democratic education to be effectively constituted, Apple and Beane (2001, p. 17) have presented some necessary conditions as follows:


In sum, school management involves the articulation of all the work developed at the school, integrating activities, means, and purposes for its
functioning and organization: “If the administration is the mediation for the realization of its purpose and if the purpose is the educated student, there is nothing more administrative than the pedagogical itself, that is the process of educating him” (Paro, 2002, p. 20).

Policy in practice: an experience of training educational managers in early childhood education with democracy as a principle

The experience reported in this chapter refers to the training program for early childhood education managers called “Rede em Rede” (Connected Schools), which was intended to train educational managers of early childhood education centers in the city of São Paulo, Brazil, between 2008 and 2010. The focus herein is on 2010, which dealt with the theme of democratic coexistence in Child Education centers. In São Paulo where the training took place, the educational managers at schools are made up of at least two professionals: a principal and a pedagogical coordinator. The principal is responsible for the administrative and pedagogical management of the early childhood education center. The principal is legally responsible for the unit and establishes contact with the Department of Education; in addition, the principal accounts for the expenses incurred with the budget and keeps track of the presence and absence of professionals, and, together with the pedagogical coordinator, coordinates the implementation of the pedagogical plan. The principal also establishes direct contact with families on a daily basis and promotes the training of the work team, especially support staff who work in the kitchen and cleaning. The pedagogical coordinator coordinates the continuing education of the teachers. Despite this division, in practice, both managers must plan the training of actors in the educational center together, in order to guarantee the unity of practices and principles according to the pedagogical plan.

In the Brazilian legislation, Early Childhood Education is divided into daycares (for babies and children from 0 to 3 years and 11 months old) and pre-schools (children aged 4 and 5 years). Although in some cities this service is provided in institutions that integrate both age groups, in the city of São Paulo, public service to these ages occurs separately by daycares and preschools. In São Paulo, preschools are fully managed by the public administration, and daycare centers are managed both by the public administration with public buildings, public facilities, and public servants and by the transfer of public resources to non-profit private management institutions, called “partners.” The city of São Paulo, located in the southeast region of Brazil, in the Brazilian state of the same name, is the largest city on the American continent, with a population of approximately 12 million inhabitants. At the time the “Rede em rede” (Connected Schools) training program started in January 2008, São Paulo had 2547 Child Education units, distributed among 511 preschools, 367 public daycare centers, and 1669
partners daycare centers (Femeisp, 2013). The training was mandatory and intended only for educational managers of public administrative institutions (a total of 878 units) and involved approximately 1750 educational managers (principals and pedagogical coordinators). Privately managed institutions did not participate in the training, as they receive funds to train their own professionals.

Between 2008 and 2009, the training program was based on different themes at each meeting and unified guidelines for all teaching centers. This training perspective did not allow for either the deepening of theoretical references nor the articulation of them in daily practices, while also disregarding the diversity and singularities of each region. These issues were identified as negative aspects by educational managers who evaluated the program at the end of 2009. According to the testimonies of the participants, the training program did not have a methodology that favored the active and reflective participation of educational managers, often focusing exclusively on studies of texts and books, without articulation with practice. These training methodologies reinforce the recurring complaint of Brazilian educators that theory is disconnected from practice and raises a constant request for practical training, such as workshops linked to a particular language, such as dance, music, or written language. Although workshops with specific themes are important to expand the repertoire of education professionals in offering educational proposals to children, continuing education needs to go further and enable reflection on how relationships with children and families are established, uncovering contradictions between discourses and practices.

The testimonies of educational managers also highlighted the importance of a training methodology that considered their experiences and provided a reflective dialogue between practice and theory. Therefore, managers suggested looking for successful training experiences that inseparably linked practice and theory, enabling the construction of new knowledge about educational management and early childhood education. Having information on certain content is different from a training process in which it must necessarily cause a change in practice and the actors involved. A training process occurs when a real dialogue with the studied authors and practice takes place, placing the experiences with children as the axis of the discussions. Paulo Freire (1983) established an important distinction between banking education and liberating education. For Freire, in banking education, subjects receive information, such as deposits in a bank. In this perspective, there is no creation, no knowledge, and no transformation. On the contrary, libertarian education has dialogue as its cornerstone. Unlike a transmissive and oppressive monologue, dialogue allows for problematization, questioning, and mutual advances. In addition to the analysis about the lack of a participatory methodology, the educational managers highlighted the importance of finding ways to document their training to contribute to their pedagogical practice. When evaluating the program in 2009, educational managers, in addition to pointing out
the lack of a participatory methodology, highlighted the importance of finding ways to document their training to contribute to their pedagogical practice. Reflective documentation breaks with the bureaucratization of records and can create new materials that reveal other alternatives of action.

Considering the analysis of the program in previous years, the central focus of training in 2010 was the promotion of dialogic coexistence and the democratization of internal relations in the educational context through work groups that ensured a participatory and reflective training methodology. The experience with the work groups is a formative methodology that is very present in the management of the Brazilian education departments, as evidenced in actions such as the elaboration of curriculum guidelines with the participation of professionals who work in different departments of the education network. It is also widely used in research groups composed of researchers and education professionals who seek to deepen their research and contribute to the advancement of educational knowledge. In the case of the training program presented here, the work group was a methodological training strategy that allowed managers to establish dialogues and reflections on their practices and contexts with their peers. This methodological strategy assumes that training in education must constitute permanent spaces for the analysis of practice and theory that underpin, in a continuous movement of praxis, thereby enabling the formation of democratic experiences through participation from professionals, children, and families. The work group methodology can also provoke a reflection beyond the daily life of early childhood education centers, involving the analysis of structural dimensions that need to be changed in public policies to promote dialogue between daily practices and public policies to guarantee the rights and needs of children, professionals, and families in schools.

Following the proposal of the “Rede em Rede” (Connected Schools) program, the work groups were composed of six people, being one director and one pedagogical coordinator from three different early childhood education centers. These groups were organized around three themes:

1) the relationship between the different actors within the center, whose focus was the democratization of relations between teachers, support staff, and children;
2) the relationship between school, family, and community that focused on the democratization of everyday relationships between professionals and families; school councils; and relations with the surrounding community; and,
3) the relationship between education managers inside the centers, focused on the democratization of the relationships between the components of the management team and the sharing of power and responsibility.

The choice of the theme represented what was considered a great challenge for each center. Within the work groups, managers proposed a common
question for the entire group related to the theme to help shape the focus of the work to be developed. Some examples of questions included the following: How to design training strategies that include the support staff made up of professionals who work in the cleaning and kitchen sectors? How to ensure the effective participation of families in the schools’ pedagogical decision-making process? How to ensure unity within the management team, focusing on democratic coexistence? Why and how to listen to babies and kids at school? Based on the definition of the focus of the investigation, each work group chose the research instruments that best suited the process of observing the institutional contexts.

This formative perspective advocated collective work, research, and inquiry as a presupposition of everyday practices. Thus, based on the elected question, each group had to complete four tasks: to prepare a diagnostic about the institutions’ situation; to read and debate theoretical references related to the chosen question; analyze the data collected and; create or apply proposals to improve the practices in place. Educational managers conducted a school diagnosis to understand how the school community perceived the context related to the question proposed by the work group. Learning the different actors’ points of view (e.g., children, professionals, and families) was an imperative condition to the research. To create and foster a democratic relationship at the schools, it is necessary to understand the actors’ thoughts about their own contexts. According to Paulo Freire, to apprehend a context and seek the democratization of relationships, it is necessary to understand how the actors think, elaborate, and signify it. In other words, it is necessary to listen to the other. For Freire (1996), “listening” means having a permanent availability to open oneself to speech, gesture, and the difference of the other, understanding their ways of conceiving the world.

To develop the diagnosis, that is, to listen to the demands and conceptions of professionals and family members in schools about the chosen problem, the questionnaire and the interview were the instruments most used by educational managers, followed by the option of observing some moments in the daily life of the institution (e.g., children entering or leaving, parents’ meeting, school council, among others). The questionnaire, interview questions, and observation scripts varied according to the problem-question selected by the work group. Some sample questions that were posed to families included: Do you think the daycare is open to families? What possibilities exist in the daycare center for the participation of families? What suggestions would you give to be worked on in this center? What do you think should be changed at the parents’ meeting? What themes would you like to be discussed at the meetings, in addition to those already developed? What is the importance of the school council in your opinion? Some examples of questions addressed to professionals: What were the successful actions in your work at the center? How do you explain their success? What are the possibilities to overcome the difficulties encountered at work? Share some examples of what you consider democratic practice in daycare. How do you analyze the relationships between
educational managers, support staff, teachers, children, families, and community within the center? And what are your suggestions to improve these relationships? With regard to children, listening took place through observation of their interactions with their peers and adults at different times in the center’s daily life.

The answers obtained in each of the early childhood education centers were analyzed collectively by the work groups. In all training meetings, a coordinator and a reporter were elected from each group. While the coordinator was responsible for keeping the group focused on the work, the reporter was responsible for preparing a summary of the group’s discussions and referrals at every training meeting. During the meetings, trainers, who were responsible for a set of approximately 12 work groups, provided feedback with observations and problematizations related to the work group process and suggestions about theoretical references to deepen an investigation. The theoretical readings proposed by the trainers were geared to the needs demanded by managers from their experiences and the challenges found in their practices. As stated by Giroux (1983), theory cannot be sovereign over experience, as recipes for practice, but its function is to enable the reflective thinking of those who use it. This feedback procedure ensured a partnership relationship between the trainers and the managers. The role of the trainers in this perspective was not to transmit systematized knowledge, but to mediate, problematize, and participate jointly with the managers of the training process in a meeting of actors. Trainers and managers dialogued and collectively sought advances for the democratization of relations at their respective institutions.

As a final task, the educational managers prepared a report systematizing the research carried out in the institutions and presented them at the last meeting of the training program. The meeting turned into a seminar, with the purpose of socializing the reports and promoting collective reflections about the subthemes elected by the work group, their challenges, and the alternatives to promote the democratization of internal relations in the early childhood education centers. At the end of the presentation of each theme, the trainers presented guiding questions to stimulate the debate among the participants. To complete the training process, trainers organized a digital book containing all reports from the managers and a written review of the entire training process. The digital book was sent to all participants. In addition to enabling managers to analyze the training process and have access to reports from their colleagues, the training documentation and records produced by them also aimed to contribute to the construction of knowledge about democratic management in educational institutions.

The democratization of internal relationships, the focus of training, is a vital experience for learning new forms of dialogical relationships in the educational context. Collective work goes beyond the mere exchange of information and knowledge, as it makes it possible to build and cultivate a respectful relationship, believing that democratic work with young children is possible. The democratic management of education in early childhood education centers
must seek ways to democratize the relationships within them, having as its central axis the fundamental rights of children and the participation of all actors to reflect and decide on the organization of pedagogical work. To facilitate reflective processes in everyday life, there are three inseparable elements that must be permanently analyzed: the relationship between adults and children, between adults working in the institution, and between educators and families (Monção, 2019).

Advances and challenges of a dialogic methodology in training education managers in work groups: the findings

The experience in work groups challenged educational managers in different ways, such as collectively and reflexively debating about the early childhood education centers, looking at the centers from a perspective that is more distanced from everyday life, dialoguing with theoretical references, and listening to the different actors of the centers (e.g., children, professionals, and families) in the issues they identified as problems. Some of the managers highlighted that the research conducted by them encouraged collective work in institutions and provoked a deep reflection about the relationship between them, as managers, with teachers and support professionals, between professionals and families, and between adults and children. The research outcomes also identified how some professionals try to camouflage conflicts that occur and how it is necessary that education managers make explicit and mediate these tensions to transform them into positive experiences.

Delving into conflicts is one of the greatest challenges of collective work. Working collectively requires learning to deal with interpersonal relationships, learning to listen to the other, talking and dialoguing with differences, and debating ideas. According to Galvão (2004), it is essential to improve a way of seeing conflicts and looking for another meaning for them, elaborating or resolving them. Galvão analyzes conflicts as positive or negative and warns about the complexity of these dimensions, as the difference between them is almost imperceptible. The democratization of internal relations in institutions is one of the fundamental aspects of early childhood education to ensure its purpose, which is the education of children in partnership with their families. A tense environment, without reflection, without dialogue, and critical analysis regarding the quality of interactions, do not strengthen the constructive potential of conflicts. Also, it hardly guarantees well-being for children and educators, nor does it favor dialogue with families (Monção, 2013). During the dialogue, the professionals’ conceptions were revealed and conflicts arose many times. This shows the importance of reflecting on the issues of the centers, with a focus both on educational goals and on the fundamental rights of children. To deal with the differences and contradictions present in everyday life, the centers must be better prepared to guarantee a “subjectivity dialogue” and broaden the look at children, families, and professionals in
their life contexts. In addition, it is important to create an institutional culture where cooperation and participation are the guiding principles of all relationships between the actors that are established at the center.

The theme of the democratization of internal relations, the axis that guided the work groups, had as its background the proposition of democratic management. It is understood that in democratic management, schools and early childhood education centers must become “welcoming spaces and multipliers of democratic tastes” in which listening, respect, tolerance, and adherence to the decisions of the majority occur, without disregarding the right to divergence (Freire, 1997, p. 60). However, while working with the groups, the trainers observed the paradox and contradictions present in this debate in a hierarchical education department with few spaces for participation, such as the one in São Paulo. Democracy is not just conceptual learning, but it requires knowledge from the experience of negotiation, collective reflection, explaining the actions and principles that guide them and having a dialogue as the engine of the whole process. (Monção, 2013). In this sense, the organization of work groups in which managers are in permanent dialogue and reflection on their practices and contexts can constitute powerful training experiences.

Another challenge observed by the trainers was the lack of understanding of the relationship between the role of director and pedagogical coordinator. Many principals still focus their work only on administrative issues, believing that this dimension is disconnected from pedagogical practice. Many coordinators, on the other hand, understand that their role is restricted to coordinating training, exempting themselves from any involvement with the center’s broader issues. Differentiating the role of the director and the pedagogical coordinator in a non-simplistic and divided way, in which one is considered responsible for the administrative demand and the other for the pedagogical one, was a challenge for the management teams. It is necessary to remember that the pedagogical dimension is the early childhood education centers’ and schools axis of existence, and all educational management has this dimension as its focus and purpose, since managing centers or schools is not the same as managing a company or a hospital. In this sense, all decisions are pedagogical and must be directly or indirectly at the service of the constitution of an institution that guarantees children’s rights to learn and develop with rich experiences.

The analysis of the training process and its implementation allowed us to observe some advances and possibilities that a proposal such as the working group methodology offers. The organization of educational managers in work groups allowed them to experience different dialogues (between educational centers, between educational centers and trainers, between different points of view, and with authors of theoretical references), as well as for them to experience autonomy in the groups, as managers decided the directions related to their training process. In addition, the training also made it possible for them to appropriate the chosen theme and use methodological tools necessary for
their daily work as managers, such as research, observation, recording, evaluation, and reflection.

However, there were difficulties on the part of the management teams in dialoguing and writing collectively. The constant interruptions caused by absences, leaves, the inclusion of new managers, and retirements were the main challenges of a training proposal that requires the formation of a group and the involvement of the participants. The monthly frequency of the meetings was another hindrance in the training process, once the groups needed to debate and write together. The four-hour period per meeting became insufficient and evidenced the need to deepen and continue this process, in addition to monthly meetings. Some work groups met beyond the meeting time to continue the reflections carried out during the face-to-face training.

During the training, the role of the educational managers in the definition, maintenance, and consolidation of the group’s principles and collective practices was evidenced. For this reason, the educational managers must adopt an observer and researcher posture of the group, establishing individual and collective dialogues with its team, and having a more comprehensive view on the phenomena, both from a social and historical point of view and from the point of view of the context in which the center is located.

The Sao Paulo Department of Education promotes constant administrative and bureaucratic demands and has, in general, a political orientation that does not prioritize or encourage democratic experiences in the institutions. However, even with the contradictions that permeate the performance of directors and pedagogical coordinators in a still highly hierarchical structure, such as that of this Department of Education, the training process showed that there are many possibilities in the daily life of educational institutions for managers to act to effect the democratization of internal relations in early childhood education centers.

It is necessary to promote a higher level of democratic participation by children, teachers, support staff, parents, and the local community. A public school needs to become popular, that is, for the people, which demands less bureaucratized, decentralized, and available structures for changes. The rigid structures, with centralized power, in which the solutions that need agility drag from sector to sector, serve only authoritarian, elitist, and, above all, traditional administrations. Without the transformation of structures, there is no way to think of popular or community participation. Democracy requires “democratizing structures and not structures that inhibit the participatory presence of civil society in charge of the res-public” (Freire, 1997, p. 92).

It takes time to mature ideas for learning to work collectively. However, after this training process that took place in 2010, in which an attempt was made to bring theory and practice closer together based on the challenges perceived by the managers of early childhood education centers, the Department of Education, disregarded this process, started the year of 2011 resuming the format previously proposed through thematic meetings. In this format, education managers discussed a different topic each month, many of them discussed
previously, without recovering what had already been accumulated in previous years and during the work groups, which we consider a step backward after this very significant training program and successful.

**Conclusion**

Children learn to exercise their citizenship based on the interaction models provided to them by the adults. Assuming a democratic society, the training of education professionals, in this case, managers, should focus on the establishment of a democratic environment in early childhood education institutions that guarantee fundamental rights to children, including the right to be heard and considered. Entering the daily life of the units from the perspective of the principals and pedagogical coordinators, realizing their challenges, difficulties, and ways of addressing the daily demands, makes it possible to reiterate the importance of continuing education that involves the actors in their process of reflection on their practice, articulated with the theoretical references and principles of a pedagogy that defends the fundamental rights of children.

To advance in education, it is necessary to have courage, as Paulo Freire tells us, to assume what we do not know, what we already know, and learn collectively, seeking to build new ways of coexistence between adults and children in educational institutions. Training spaces need to be valued to guarantee advances in the training of managers and their practices, constituting them as permanent forums for debates and reflections on democratic management experiences in early childhood education, starting from a perspective that privileges the participation of all. There is no way to accomplish this task without the exercise of dialogue and collective reflection.

It is living, no matter whether with slips, with inconsistencies, but willing to overcome them, the humility, love, courage, tolerance, competence, the ability to decide, security, ethics, justice, the tension between patience and impatience, and verbal parsimony, which I contribute to creating, to forge the happy school. The school, which is an adventure, is not afraid of risk and refuses to stop. The school in which one thinks, in which one acts, in which one creates, in which one speaks, in which one loves, one guesses, the school that passionately says yes to life. And not the school that is silent and silent.

(Freire, 2003, p. 42).

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Final Reflections
Introduction

This concluding chapter provides summative reflections on youth, education, and democracy in an era of global change and suggests new directions for citizenship studies in the field of comparative and international education. Citizenship’s convergences and divergences unearthed through the contributions in this book have enabled us to identify key conceptual categories in pursuit of a critical democratic global citizenship and education for the field. The conceptual categories present a new grammar for citizenship studies and offer a research agenda to guide future comparative inquiry. By valuing youth voice; viewing the global as local; and acknowledging diverse actors, theoretical perspectives, and citizenship spaces, we contest existing citizenship discourses rooted in locale, liberalism, and longevity to reimagine citizenship and citizenship education anew.

Valuing youth voice

The topic of youth, democracy, and education is of growing interest—and even more so in the post-COVID environment—as youth social movements and agency come to the forefront and challenge traditional understandings of citizenship in light of globalizing influences. Youth are not neutral in the world or in the environments they inhabit. Rather, youth are both impacted by, and influencers of, social inclusion, opportunity, and well-being. They are digital users and content producers, culturally and linguistically diverse, and represent persons from dominant and non-dominant cultures, as well as migrant, refugee, and indigenous populations. This focus on youth in our book has challenged several binaries for re-imagining citizenship and framing global citizenship education anew. The contested citizen binaries include: the public/private schism; the online/offline divide; the global/local division of space, place, and engagement; and systemic/individual spheres of responsibility and change.

In this book, we have argued that citizenship occurs in multiple locales, including that of the public and home; that citizenship must be informed by
theoretical and epistemic positions beyond liberalism; and that youth are not waiting for a future time to act as citizens but are already engaged in, and engaging, social challenge and change. Youth are leading the way in educating adults, including educators, about how to be active citizens. Thus, youth—in diverse locales and cultural contexts—are blurring the lines of what counts as citizenship or civic activity. In many ways, we are no longer seeing a public-private schism; rather, citizen identity and citizen action are being observed and undertaken in the private domain of the home, laptop, and smartphone. Technology is allowing youth to enter the public through the private. The COVID-19 pandemic has also increased working, schooling, and learning from home as opposed to public spaces. Although cultural difference plays an important role in how active citizenship is conceived and implemented, there is a lack of plurality within “the global” in terms of how global citizenship education is currently conceived.

Understanding the conceptions that young people have about the exercise of citizenship and how these are acquired is key to imagining the new ways in which this is manifested. The conceptions of citizenship in their traditional frameworks, anchored to the idea of the nation-state, already present a series of challenges and limitations in their relationship with the youth population, both in the school stage and in young adulthood. This book shows that these challenges and limitations are even greater when citizenship is considered from a global perspective. For example, Treviño et al. in this book show that a large majority of young people are aware of global economic, environmental, and sociopolitical threats, although with important variations between world regions. Along the same lines, Villalobos et al. in their chapter show how civic norms are constructed contextually, influenced by social, political, and territorial factors. In this sense, the challenges experienced by the new generation to global problems imply a permanent movement toward critique of the limits of what is possible by traditional forms of citizenship toward agency in exercising their role as citizens, which is no longer solely in a community within nation-state limits but as citizens in the world.

Yet, in reimagining and perhaps even transgressing the limits of citizenship, children and youth still struggle within the constraints of national and global power structures. Bickmore and Barrero Jaramillo illustrate how the realities of global power asymmetries and resource exploitation produce persistent anxieties among economically marginalized youth in Canada and Mexico. In Liberia, Blanks Jones and Juaquellie show how the theater activism of youth performers is deeply shaped by legacies of colonialism, conflict, and international development regimes. Thus, the new generation negotiates and renegotiates their belonging as members of a global community, under vastly different circumstances. The traditional forms defined normatively from the adult and institutional world meet the understanding, experiences, and appropriation that young people make of their role, as Fahning in this book shows in a rural community in the American Midwest.
To reconceptualize citizenship by taking account of youth voice has been undertreated in the field. Our text introduces new themes to citizenship studies, including the shape of youth social movements, engagements with environmental conflicts, the notion of spatial politics of citizenship, pockets of belonging, as well as data about young people’s constructions of citizenship. In our view, the strength of the text lies in its ambition to address how, in an era of global change, social diversity is being affected and how diverse young people are responding. In some cases, the concept of citizenship is being reframed; there are diverse spaces in which citizenship is being enacted, and young people are negotiating citizenship and social change in diverse ways. Another line of interest that is still on the margins, but extremely important, is the relationship of young people to new global citizenships through digital worlds and social media. How does this reshape their civic identities, engagements, and activism? The book seeks to enrich the comparative and international education literature with the focus on reimagining citizenships from the perspective of youth and with sophisticated cross-cultural perspectives and a range of quantitative and qualitative methodological choices. The scholarship displays the range of methodologies that can be used to research young people’s civic identifications, negotiations, and activism. The aim is to strengthen recognition of the roles, positionalities, agencies, and actions of youth so that the field of global citizenship education studies changes.

Peter McInerney (2009) argues that

if we deny subjectivity, silence student voices, show scant respect for children and their culture, suppress the creative capacities of individuals and close down spaces for inquiry, we are likely to reinforce existing patterns of alienation and disaffection amongst young people.

(p. 28)

Interestingly, however, youth are especially using digital spaces to assert their voices and to engage in issues that interest them. Dyrness (2021), for instance, is doubtful that an assimilative, state-led citizenship education designed to “civilize” migrant youth will allow social critique of how state power and violence operate globally. Dyrness (2021) uses the notion of “diasporic citizenship” to explore youth membership and belonging for transnational youth. From this stance, citizenship is viewed as lived experience as opposed to juridical status, thereby highlighting the cultural processes of identity formation (Dyrness, 2021). The work on lived everyday citizenship is a growing field (Kallio et al., 2020) and could be usefully employed in a critical democratic global citizenship education framework.

Recognizing that youth behave differently as citizens in different locales, there is indication of a conceptual turn toward a particular kind of global citizenship and agency. The chapter authors suggest that, in some cases, young people are pushing against traditional nation-state understandings of citizenship. The contestations and tensions associated with citizenship lead us to
consider what global citizenship education beyond the local-global binary might look like. The meanings youth assign to citizenship, and the kinds of citizenship action in which they engage, requires a new social imaginary toward citizenship. Because democracy is contested and does not mean the same thing everywhere and to everyone, what are the implications for developing democratic values and citizen agency in youth? What does a re-positioned, re-imagined, and non-bifurcated citizenship and global citizenship education informed by youth perspective look like? How might this new conceptualization of citizenship orient citizenship studies in the field of comparative and international education?

Valuing youth voice in this book has also meant exploring new methodological approaches and representational politics in our engagements with children and youth. As youth around the world powerfully articulate their own ideas and visions for the future through youth-generated media content, digitally activated movements, community-based organizations, and myriad forms of grassroots leadership, as a field, we are called to center youth not merely as research subjects but also as interlocutors and collaborators. Several contributions in this book offer methodological interventions that may serve as a guide for future directions in research on youth citizenship in its varied and emerging expressions. In their study of economically marginalized youth in Mexico and Canada, for instance, Bickmore and Barrero Jaramillo’s centering of how youth make sense of environmental and economic resource conflicts surfaces “critically-global-minded dimensions of (peacebuilding) citizenship education” that push us beyond dominant/neoliberal narratives. Similarly, in Blanks Jones and Juaquellie’s contribution, the emphasis on youth performances, which served a critical intermediary role between global development actors and local communities during the Ebola epidemic, permits a view of youth as “civic actors” in their own right. In Nafziger’s work with Nigerian youth navigating and discovering histories of ethnic and religious conflict in their community, we see the generative possibilities of collaborative youth research approaches. With empowering democratic collaborative pedagogies, Maudonnet and Monção offer a work group training model that engaged educators in São Paulo, Brazil, in an exploration of the relationship between different actors (i.e., teachers, support staff, and children) in a public early childhood education center for purposes of educational improvement. In sum, these methods direct us toward decolonial and participatory practices that create more space for young people to guide research and theory building.

The global is local

The issues impacting youth and of concern to them, such as environmental degradation, diversity, and inequities, reinforce the notion that the global is local. The findings from the studies detailed in this text reveal several things. First, environmental concerns, and their attendant social and economic aspects, are not only national challenges and global problems but experienced
by youth at the local level. Consideration must be given to how human well-being is linked to the planet’s well-being and how suffering of humans and non-humans might be ameliorated (Sant et al., 2018). Because the global is local, a global citizenship education to be promoted is likely to include ecological and planetary conceptions. There is desire, especially on the part of globalists, to portray the global community as one where citizens, regardless of location and borders, recognize a shared purpose and commonality (Sant et al., 2018). However, in any knowledge project, there must be an examination of differing worldviews and cultures, especially in light of histories and current relations of domination within and between countries (Ermine, 2007).

Conceptions of global identity circulated worldwide are the result of power relations within and between countries. Global citizenship education invokes different interpretations as a result of different histories, geopolitical contexts, motivations, and positionalities among people (Andreotti & de Souza, 2008). There is a great need to guard against the universalism imagined in Western thought and subsequently applied to global identity and global citizenship education. In addition, the oxymoronic nature of “global citizenship” is found in the paradoxes of spatial boundaries and scales, namely that the global is associated with the international sphere and transnational relations, while citizenship is demarcated by a jurisprudential boundary of the nation-state (Swanson, 2015). The detachment of elites from issues of poverty often signifies that elites in various locations of the globe may have more in common with each other than with individuals in their own communities and countries. Global citizenship education as currently conceived and taught is guided by colonial and neoliberal assumptions and positions students unequally. Comparative educators will not only need to recognize the disjunctures between neoliberal aims and global citizenship education but also advocate for a global citizenship education that is more transformational in mission and intent. A formal citizenship education that ignores inequalities is unlikely to develop agentic citizenship or help citizens address conflicts because the global is local.

Conceptual frameworks focused almost solely on individual responsibility, volunteerism, and charity, without analysis of social and political forces, perpetuate an incomplete understanding of a critical democratic global citizenship. Connecting the directly experienced violence and injustice that youth face to their systemic causes and remedies requires a democratic citizenship focused on participatory (political) representation, inclusive (cultural) recognition of diverse and non-dominant identities and ideologies, and redistribution (social-structural) of resources and power, as advocated by Bickmore and Barrero Jaramillo in this text. Moreover, we argue that the migration of peoples and circulation of ideas worldwide necessitate attention to citizenship identity hybridity(-ies). The chapter by Harris et al. reported how young people who adhere to diasporic identities have formed productive transnational networks of connection and belonging, signaling movement beyond traditional models of political and cultural identity transmission. Formal citizenship education continues to be embroiled, however, in structures and policies of
economic and social reproduction rather than critical aims and transformational purposes.

Youth interconnectedness and mobilization around concerns of a global nature reveal a moral impetus to address social ills from new spaces and places and citizen diasporic identities encompassing race, ethnicity, class, gender, and migration. While current approaches to global citizenship education have taken many forms (e.g., character education, global education, peace education, diversity education, and education for sustainable development, the latter due in large part to the United Nation’s sustainable development goals), there is an urgent need for a **critical democratic global citizenship education** that challenges the singular nature of such approaches. What is needed is scholarly engagement in the merits, faults, and possibilities of such a citizenship that reimagines a new conceptual landscape for the study of citizenship and global change that centers youth experience and voice. Toward that end, we support Andreotti’s (2021) call for a global citizenship education “otherwise,”—to face humanity’s wrongs by interrupting the usual citizenship discourses (e.g., ideologies, stories, politics, and desires) embedded in modernity and walking the “tightrope between naive hope and desperate hopelessness” with humility and self-reflexivity (p. 506). What is desired is a democratic future for all, everywhere.

**Key concepts for a critical democratic global citizenship and education**

From the major contestations of citizenship identified—locale, liberalism, and longevity—arise key conceptual categories that serve as an emergent agenda for a critical democratic global citizenship and education. The following terms provide a new grammar to guide studies of youth, citizenship, and education in the field of comparative and international education:

- Fluidity and hybridity
- Interconnectedness and belonging
- Identities and identifications
- Diverse theoretical and philosophical traditions
- Empowerment and engagement
- Agency and activism
- Globals (plural)
- Contestations
- Value convergences and divergences
- Justice-oriented ideologies and pedagogies

In their discussion of the participants’ actions and locals, authors pointed out the importance of fluidity and hybridity as indicators of the new ways that youth are defining citizenship and negotiating difference. The actions taken by youth were not restricted to a particular segment of society (e.g., political
sphere or educational sphere), but rather spanned a range of spaces within society in which individuals attempted to create change or, at the very least, highlighted differences or addressed injustices. When labels or barriers are removed from participation and action, youth help paint a broader picture of what citizen engagement means when we are able to include them in a broader range of civic activities.

There is no doubt that the most crucial aspect of these fluid actions was the emphasis placed on creating inclusive environments. Diverse contexts include the locale of the activity such as homes, workplaces, and educational institutions, and are supported and shaped by people with varying perspectives and ideologies. These spaces have been developed as a result of deliberate and unintentional efforts to create a landscape that embraces and includes a diversity of ideological perspectives, technologies, and geographical places. By focusing on creating inclusive environments among the actors, feelings of belonging and trust were bolstered, and connections were strengthened. The development of inclusive environments also necessitated a commitment to honoring and respecting individual identities. This was done by ensuring that their narratives were front and center when developing these environments. Other tenets that were prevalent in these global landscapes of democratic citizenship were resistance to the status quo and a push for normative change, usually spearheaded by young people along with supportive stakeholders.

In the vast majority of cases, the large number of young people who chose to participate in their communities, schools, or other public spaces view their participation as a positive experience that makes them feel proud of themselves. Additionally, many youth also see their participation as an opportunity to develop a greater sense of responsibility towards society as a whole. As a result of this empowerment, many of their actions were influenced by their voice, as well as their participation in the process. As a result of their deep commitment to the cause, their actions were given a whole new meaning because of their dedication. Additionally, the youth were aware that they had assets that served as a platform for community creation, an asset that is too often undervalued or underutilized. A common theme noted in all the chapters is that young people pursue and create change when they are involved in projects dealing locally with global problems, when they work collectively and collaboratively with other people, and when they are part of organizations that enable youth voices to be heard in their communities and know their efforts are regarded and valued.

Youth contestations of the terms of citizenship show us that it is not enough to merely include “diverse” communities and experiences within the frame of belonging. They challenge us to engage decolonial perspectives, which unsettle the category of the “citizen” itself and the desirability of “global citizenship” if it is formed within the global power regimes that continue to center Western epistemologies and knowledges and imperil indigenous and marginalized knowledge systems. Tan’s exploration of a Daoist interpretation of global citizenship offers one tangible example of the theoretical and philosophical
terrain of global citizenship that must continue to expand. We are not say-
ing that Western knowledge is not to be valued, but rather that there must
be room for other theoretical positions to challenge and inform citizenship
discourses at large.

The agency and leadership of children and youth, highlighted in the pages
of this book, invite us to adopt a more critical theorization and research prac-
tice of youth “empowerment” and “engagement.” As Heggart and Flow-
ers insist in their contribution, attention to youth practices, especially those
involving digital tools and organizational forms that youth themselves create,
illuminates ways that young people are positioned to educate adults in more
active and expansive forms of citizenship. Embedded in their intervention is
a “calling in,” which we wish to amplify, that invites the field of comparative
and international education to challenge the power dynamics of research that
position adult researchers as the authority figures. Instead, we must continue
to ask ourselves and each other, how does the recognition of youth agency in
the current era of global change require new research models that center col-
laboration, reciprocity, and the leadership of children and youth? We are not
saying that adult views and elder wisdom are not important, but that greater
room must be made for youth voice and agency to inform citizenship and
citizenship education discourses.

If we are, indeed, in an unprecedented era of global change—in which our
material and ecological conditions are reaching a tipping point at the same
time as youth have taken their place at the forefront of social movements,
which envision radical alternatives for the future—how might our intellectual
and pedagogical approaches bend toward these resounding calls for justice?
Heggart and Flowers in this book offer concrete implications of digital tools
and practice for citizenship education, which center the specificities of how
digital platforms are used for social action, how online and offline activism
are always already interdependent, and how youth activists must be empow-
ered and supported in educating adults. Moreover, Nafziger reminds us of
the significance of historical consciousness development in fostering relations
across lines of ethnic, religious, and political conflict. Art and performance,
indigenous philosophies, social media, and local histories all offer resources
for pedagogical practices that support and extend the justice-oriented ideolo-
gies that youth themselves are already developing collectively and worldwide
through shared social, cultural, and political practices.

Diverse actors, theoretical perspectives,
and citizenship spaces

In addition to the usual actors studied by citizenship education scholars (e.g.,
the state, formal education systems, and educators), more studies are needed
in relation to the growing role of non-state actors, such as nongovernmental
organizations and international development agencies and various stake-
holders, in shaping the conditions for youth citizenship and agency. Greater
attention is also needed to institutionalized and creative arenas for citizenship practices, including performance arts, media making, and digital contexts. A host of diverse actors, theoretical traditions, and citizenship spaces must be studied to understand the possibilities of participatory methods and practices in creating contexts for youth to articulate and forge frameworks of belonging. For instance, the online/offline environment is a binary being challenged by youth. Contributors Heggart and Flowers contend that such a division is becoming less useful in understanding how modern social movements operate and engage. While youth-led movements predate digital technologies in addressing global issues, much more comparative research in civic and citizenship education is necessary to ascertain the efficacies and specificities of digital platforms used by youth and the interdependencies of online and offline youth activism. How digital platforms are enmeshed in student social action and how youth deploy digital activism deserve greater attention by comparative educators. Our book suggests that youth are leading the way with social media and digital technologies for social action and may be able to teach educators and community members what active citizenship looks like in the present age.

By attending to varied practices and arenas of citizenship, the geographic and spatial breadth of contributions to this book affirm the continued need to examine (contestations of) citizenship in diverse global contexts, if we are to keep in focus the range of sites in which re-imaginations of citizenship are taking shape. Across the contributions, we see the affordances of different scales of analysis: nations of the Global South and North; large-scale cross-national datasets; post-colonial, post-conflict, and post-military contexts; social media platforms online and on mobile devices; social movements; formal and informal learning environments at all education levels; urban, rural, and suburban or peri-urban settings; and communities where different racial, class, ethnic, religious, social, and political interests are expressed. Future research directions must look for negotiations of citizenship in established arenas, emerging frontiers, and in the margins of everyday life.

The expressions and contexts of citizenship, and the diverse actors enacting citizenship practices, illustrate not only the range of ideas of citizenship but also points of conflict and divergence, ideological and otherwise, even among the chapter contributions themselves. In Villalobos et al., we see how nation, history, culture, generation, and gender converge in, at times, vastly different ways to shape formations of the “good citizen.” Understandings of, and aspirations towards, citizenship adopt different perspectives on the centrality of justice and the need to recognize histories of injustice. For instance, Daoist traditions examined in Tan’s chapter explicitly name liberation from oppression and human-environmental balance as key to shared humanity, as is common within many indigenous cultural traditions. In the contributions of Treviño et al. and Bickmore and Barrero Jaramillo, the threat of local and global sociopolitical and environmental forces expands young people’s perspectives on the knowledge and capacities required for global citizenship today, which challenge norms of citizenship that are taken for granted in other
contexts. The Heggart and Flowers and Harris et al. chapters both powerfully argue that digital citizenship is central to young people’s understandings and practices of citizenship. Their insistence of the centrality of digital tools to contemporary citizenship raises questions about what analyses that do not grapple with digital contexts may be missing about everyday youth experiences and practices. Similarly, contexts that have not traditionally been the focus of studies of citizenship—creative arts programs, out-of-school contexts, and digital platforms, for instance—are important domains for future research.

This book allows dimensioning the value of diverse methodological perspectives for understanding youth global citizenship. On the one hand, the use of data from large-scale studies enables the identification of broad patterns around normative conceptions of citizenship, as observed by Villalobos et al., or on awareness of global threats, as observed by Treviño et al. Both of these chapters give an account of the predominant profiles on both accounts in a large number of countries. However, the same authors acknowledge the limitation of these approaches; although the approaches detect general patterns, they do not reveal how the relationships between variables can be transformed or deepened. Villalobos et al. assert that a future task for citizenship studies is the investigation of the mechanisms of influence between civic norms to provide understanding of how youth experience them. On the other hand, the use of qualitative approaches allows a depth of understanding of youth experience in relation to negotiation and experiential development of citizenship, as shown in Fahning’s chapter. She discusses how youth from a rural community in the American Midwest relate to structures as they experience belonging to the broader community. She highlights the perspective of rural communities around the construction of citizenship of the local in relation to the global, where the experience of belonging is key. Additionally, the value of theoretical-philosophical reflection as an approach is reflected in the chapter by Tan, which reflects on how Daoist philosophy can illuminate the challenges of global citizenship. In their contribution, Maudonnet and Monção remind us that teaching and learning must be guided by democratic models of collaboration for educational change and reinforce that learning can be gained, even from the very young. Thus, the different methodological and pedagogical approaches across the chapters shed light on various aspects of the ongoing challenge.

Comparative educators must also continue to examine how social media may simultaneously serve to exclude and oppress some, while including and empowering others. There is growing interest in the field of citizenship studies and citizenship education regarding the experiences of marginalized youth (e.g., refugees, indigenous, and the poor) and how youth cope with ambiguous and unstable relationships to national citizenship and discriminatory tensions over what are their rights, their treatment, and participation in communities and politics. The contributions in this book offer a unique perspective that opens up the traditional definitions of citizenship and how young people engage as citizens. Our work suggests that citizenship’s dominant discourses
need to be revisited in light of recent youth social movements and events, and in light of long-standing philosophical orientations and theoretical perspectives outside the Western hegemon that have not received sufficient attention in the larger citizenship and education discourses. Thus, we advocate for comparative educators to become much more aware of how young people define, imagine, and practice citizenship.

Conclusion

The intent of this book has been to consider the complex ways in which global and national change is being understood and negotiated, but also accommodated and resisted, by youth in various countries. The studies herein reveal the ways that contemporary youth in their diversity are trying to unsettle aggressive systems and suggest emergent forms of civic identity and engagement. While we were intentional about including scholars from diverse geographical regions across the globe, we recognize that no one book, including ours, can provide a holistic portrait of geographic diversity. Thus, more research studies on youth and citizenship education are needed from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa, to name just a few. More ethnic diversity of scholars, ontological positions, and geographical locales is also needed in books of citizenship education. We recommend, therefore, that the field of comparative and international education pay more attention to non-Western philosophical traditions and theoretical orientations to inform the discourse on critical democratic global citizenship education. More qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods studies are needed to confirm or disaffirm that globally aware students adhere to a critical global citizenship as opposed to more traditional forms. If pandemics continue and the crossing of physical borders continues to be challenging for many people, are information and communications technologies enough to share cultural knowledge and foster international understanding?

Future comparative research on citizenship will need to consider what youth-centered approaches to critical democratic global citizenship education look like and to recognize that youth are located in multiple and globally connected spaces of obligation and belonging. Indeed, the global has become local. Unfortunately, most forms of citizenship and civic education have been complicit within geopolitical power relations and reproduced inequalities and global asymmetries. As Harris et al. found, there is a widening gap between policy framed in relation to human rights and global citizenship and school-based programs oriented toward safety, risk management, and social cohesion to guard against youth. A central task for comparative education researchers is to analyze civic norms with other values to understand how citizenship and identity is experienced by youth. Thus, some questions to guide future comparative study include: What would citizenship education models grounded in the everyday citizenship practices of youth look like? How do youth draw upon cultural and other identities in civic and political spheres? Does cooperation
on shared values of global citizenship imply compliance? And, is there room for all to engage in critique of “the global”?

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