International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas

Politics, Economy, Society - Transdisciplinary Perspectives

Maciej Kurcz

Urban Now

A Human in the Face of Borderlineness and Urbanisation in Juba, South Sudan

11

PETER LANG

The subject of the study is the spontaneous city spreading process of Juba after the end of the civil war in South Sudan (2005). The book presents the complex dynamics of transformations within the new urban settings of post-war Juba. The viewpoint taken while describing these phenomena is the adaptation of an average migrant to a new urban environment. This was not an easy task. At that time the city was characterised by extremely harsh living conditions, harsh even for post-war South Sudan. Despite the difficulties, the city's development was visible. The phenomenon of borderlineness – the closeness of the state's borders – appeared to be helpful in this process. It influenced the effectiveness of human activities, it is an answer to the spontaneous city spreading processes – it brought danger, but most of all, infinite possibilities. The presented material comes from the author's ethnographic research conducted in Juba in 2007 and 2008.

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Urban Now

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Translated by Krzysztof Zarzycki

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Preface to the English Edition

My decision to publish the translation of my ethnographic observations in Juba in 2007 and 2008 stems from my wish to introduce my book to English-speaking readers. The first, Polish edition had a very limited reception and is practically unavailable today.

I wrote the book more than a decade ago. This means light years in the modern world. The main character of my monograph – Juba – is today the capital of the independent South Sudan. However, the country is far from stable. In fact, nothing went the way it should have. Suffice it to mention the destructive armed conflict between two feuding dictators: President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar. This conflict cost the lives of dozens of thousands of people. Over two million people had to flee abroad to survive. Now, the provisions of a fragile agreement from several months ago are in the process of implementation, so it is difficult to foresee what the coming days will look like. The future of South Sudan remains uncertain.

From today's perspective, the period from the Naivasha Agreement in 2005 until South Sudan proclaimed its independence in 2011 – when the events I described occur – seems to be one of the best periods in the history of South Sudan. Who could have expected that at the time? The transitional period was like a moment of waiting, resembling the calm before the storm, which in the tropics is probably something nearly certain, unavoidable. Unfortunately, reality confirmed those predictions as the entire country – still before separating from the North – found itself in a spiral of local wars and revolts. When I write these words, I do not give in to hopeless fatalism but simply want to emphasise a fact. Today, I consider my take on this fleeting period in the history of Juba – and partially also of all South Sudan – to be the greatest value of my study. This is another reason why I decided to republish the book.

Will the re-edition give my book "a second life?" This is not for me to judge. I do, however, believe that the book has not lost much of its currency. The book shows in quite a broad fashion what Juba was like at a very specific, ephemeral period of its development; suffice it to mention the Customs Market – once of the most important city markets – that was suddenly liquidated by the local authorities in 2009. Therefore, I decided to slightly change the title of my book. The book focuses on the "urban now," suspended somewhere between unfulfilled dreams of post-colonial past and still unaccomplished promises of neoliberal future. Hence why I took the liberty of presenting a slightly outdated

convention of ethnographic research in the present tense in my book. I believe that presenting my story in this specific time frame will even better highlight the ethnographic nature of my explorations of Juba, which – I firmly emphasise – are neither fully exhaustive nor objective in terms of space, time, nor the subjectivity of assessment. The "ethnographic present" seemed to me important for one more reason. The image of the city I created in the monograph must suffice, unfortunately. It may be valid ("present") since the political situation disallows any subsequent one… This image must suffice – sadly – since the political situation still prevents a repeated, in-depth examination of this dynamically developing African city, against the all the odds. As long as this gap exists, my book may be exceptionally important from the viewpoint of science, but also ordinary knowledge about the world, as an independent contribution to a more detailed presentation of the history and culture of South Sudan, although originally designed as an element of an ethnographic description of urbanisation processes.

From the perspective of time, I believe that my research in Juba should have "never" succeeded. At the very beginning, when drafting an outline of my plans for field research in Juba, I demonstrated exceptional naivety. I adopted a thesis that having learned some of the realities of North Sudan, I would easily manage to conduct my research in the South. This was a serious mistake as I really did not know much about the region. I refer here not to anthropological or historical knowledge but the knowledge of current nuances at the interface of politics and culture. Unlike most foreigners travelling to Juba via Nairobi or Kampala, I decided to travel via Khartoum. This was a much more difficult and time-consuming project. I had no contacts on site, no starting points. No organisation or friend waited for me in Juba. I left the plane with an address of a hotel that no longer existed… Thus, my mental image of the first days in the city clearly demonstrated my "recklessness," which caused a lot of unexpected difficulties. Putting it bluntly, this all could have ended for me as a disaster. However, by a stroke of good luck, I managed to start my research and return to the city twice. Being an outsider to foreigners who stayed in Juba at that time added originality to my work. Finally, my case proves that sometimes "recklessness" pays off. It is thanks to that very recklessness that we may conduct projects otherwise unfeasible. After all, some plans can be pursed only by those who do not know that they are unachievable.

Compared to the first edition, published in 2012, I deleted chapters devoted to anthropological research into the African city of Juba and the history of urbanisation in Africa. These topics are well-known and much better elaborated than in my monograph. I updated the chapter on borderlands and African borders, and

I added additional small passages in the chapter devoted to spatial structures, which includes my reflections after the publication of the first edition.

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Maciej Kurcz

Summer 2019

For Hanna, Leon, Roch and Beata

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Introduction

Africa looks totally different than it did ten years ago. It is enough to mention that many lengthy conflicts ended. Many countries have made a clear turn towards democracy. Africa is not stabilising as much as it is exuberantly developing. This can be seen, for example, from the perspective of an ordinary person. People – quite literally – are becoming wealthier: the culture of consumerism is omnipresent, particularly electronic mass media. Ordinary observers would say that this is the result of having adopted a western development paradigm: democracy and a liberal economy. True: in the 1990s Africa adopted many elements of the Western model, often under compulsion, according to the principle: "assistance, but only in return for reforms." However, we should remember that those reforms were conducted at a huge cost, which my fellow countrymen, citizens of the former Eastern Bloc, never even dreamed of in their darkest dreams. What is more, the policy of former metropolises more frequently brought about the strengthening of authoritarian rule than the promotion of democracy. So, in fact, the changes observed are a bottom-up process enforced, for example, by the deformalisation of the economy and the development of spontaneous entrepreneurship. This activity – while a necessity in the period of structural reforms in the 1990s – enabled entire segments of the society to move up the social ladder, especially the most marginalised groups: women and young people. As the greatest beneficiaries of the development of informal economy, these groups are really changing Africa.

Although the situation in many areas has considerably improved, many problems still remain relevant. Democratisation – meaning regular and multiparty elections – is not tantamount to the creation of a democratic society. Democratically elected representatives do not rush at all to ensure the greater transparency of political life in their countries. The need to redefine democracy in Africa is considered about right now: moving from purely ostensible forms to greater participation in social processes of broad masses of the society. The rise of extremism on the continent is a cause for concern, especially in connection with the popularity of "new" religious movements: Pentecostal churches or Islamic fundamentalism. The redefining of democracy also consists in breaking away from the dichotomous perception of African culture, the division into what is "traditional" and "modern." Today, the former is more frequently appreciated, since scholars noticed that traditional institutions – such as the *gacaca* people's courts in Rwanda or village purification rituals in Mozambique – are much more

important for African democracy (Arnfred and Utas 2007). Africa does not have to learn democracy; the renaissance of traditional culture suffices.

A common consensus prevails among the majority of scholars that the future of Africa is connected with the city, especially large capital cities.[1] This is where the life of the continent concentrates now. Looking at such cities as Cairo, Addis Ababa, or Khartoum is enough. All of them are metropolises of several million inhabitants. They are also unquestionable centres of the most important processes for contemporary Africa. Both good and bad. Through them happens intercultural communication. Africa is connected to a global system. As a result, the dynamics of change is usually greatest here. Cities are also laboratories of modernisation, areas of transformation that undergo the processes of negotiation, adaptation and transmission. In turn, HIV/AIDS, extremism, homophobia, poverty, and crime are just a few of the many negative phenomena usually met in cities. They are, above all, urban phenomena. Therefore, African cities are an extremely fascinating testing grounds.

Despite an unlimited number of problems, an African city has become an area of positive changes, largely in the economic and social spheres. The city generates poverty, but it also is the best way to avoid poverty. The city offers for the most part decent education and healthcare. It is an arena of political demands and grassroot activism, which truly changes the African reality for the better. The city is a space of multiple possibilities where, like nowhere else, one can climb up the social ladder. To some extent the African city may be compared to a new "Wild West;" a borderland of progressing expansion and colonisation where people can change their fate in a good direction. Like many years ago in the American Wild West, what happens in the African city is a "clash of cultures," styles, and worldviews A new, urbanised society emerges from these processes in the form of a new, urban Africa. The reality of the city is not easy or even just. Iron rules govern here, in this case sanctified by capitalism. Not everyone will become someone here, but some will succeed. This is the work of belief in the power of money and entrepreneurship. The city is also a borderland as an escape from the gloomy and hopeless reality of the African province. A young man may feel in the city like a man of the world, drink bottled beer, and fulfil artistic yearnings. Finally, the city is a place of disorder, but also of numerous adventures, where

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1 It is worth mentioning that some African scholars are critical towards contemporary urbanisation trends. For them, the future of Africa should be connected with rural life – more natural from the point of view of Africans. "A return to rural life" is perceived as one of the elements of the revival of African culture. For more, see Ake 1996.

something happens all the time; the city never falls asleep, never ceases to surprise, and hence may satisfy the expectations of practically everyone.

Since the beginning of my professional career, I have dealt with only one country, Sudan. I found myself there for the first time in 2000, still as a student of Ethnology and Archaeology of Jagiellonian University. At the beginning, I performed scientific observations in villages on the Nile of Northern Sudan, in cooperation with Polish archaeologists and, later, independently. I returned there several times: in 2002, 2004 and 2005. The most visible outcome of my trips were two MA theses (in Archaeology and Ethnology) and a doctoral dissertation. I conducted ethnographic research in Sudan again in 2007 and 2008. However, that time the area of research was Juba: the capital of the rebelled South and one of the southernmost city centres of Sudan.

The more I know Sudan, the more it interests and fascinates me. Half-jokingly: this is MY African country. However, I do not consider this as a weakness or an expression of unhealthy fascination. Is the largest political organism of Africa not the best place for long-term African studies? In my opinion – IT IS. Not without reason referred to as "little Africa," Sudan offers nearly unlimited possibilities to study African cultures. Moving from the North, we come across a zone of deserts that gradually changes into a savannah and, finally, in the South the landscape is dominated by swampy wetlands of the Nile, overgrown with rich tropical vegetation. The ecology of Sudan corresponds to its cultural diversity. For instance, suffice to consider the shepherding culture that we meet here both as pastoral nomads engaged in camel breeding – characteristic much of the Sahara areas – and semi-nomads, herders of longhorn cattle, typical of African pastoralists south of the desert zone. In old-fashioned terms of race, one finds there Caucasoids (who call themselves Arabs and represent the white population living in these areas before Islam appeared) and Negroids are among them: the latter are burly Nilots from the Upper Nile basin, whose "kin" live in neighbouring African countries.

My research in Sudan was a slow process of discovering the culture of North-Eastern Africa, an intellectual and empirical north-south journey. A British author of Sudanese origin, Jamala Mahjouba, once compared Sudan to a multi-layered anatomical atlas in which, page after page, a new set of meanings appears (Piskała 2010: 180). The same was my experience. The discovery of one "layer" revealed the richness of subsequent layers and made me continue intensive studies within the area. An ancient cultures' "page" became a reason for becoming interested in the "page" of North Sudanese peasants' daily life. In turn, this page disclosed the one called "South Sudan" to me. This path is not particularly exceptional; I would call it "orientalist" or "postcolonial." Many researchers followed

it, along with typical globetrotters or characters of adventure novels. From colonial times, the road to Sudan led from North to South, from the antiquity and steep pyramids in the middle of the Nile valley to the diversity of cultures of Sudan's South.

Modern Sudan is a fruit of colonialism. It is also true that from time immemorial this area – extremely diversified in terms of ecology and culture – seems to function as a certain whole: an always open route linking the African interior with the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, but also with West and East Africa (for more about Sudan's historical relationships with countries west of Darfur, see Fadl Hasan 2010). In the past, this corner of the continent was an arena of turbulent events, often full of xenophobia and chauvinism towards the African population from the South; for many decades a slave-hunting region for the Muslim world. Irrespective of its character, these contacts were always extremely stimulating for both sides North and South Sudan, while their outcome was an extremely diversified, sometimes even unique, culture. In 1977, a famous work by the British historian W. Y. Adams was published, *Nubia: The Corridor to Africa*, and it seems to me that Sudan is still "the corridor to Africa."[2] Less figuratively, it is a country with multidimensional features of a borderland, where meet "white Africa" and "black Africa," Arabic- and English-speaking, Muslim and Christian Africas, but it also is an Africa of nations and ethnic groups. Sudan connects these worlds, but it also separates them. I believe that the dialectics of a "borderland" better corresponds to the reality of Sudan; it better fits analyses of its cultural phenomena (a similar view is presented by Mazrui 2006). For instance, let us consider the issue of circumcision of female genitals, locally called "pharaonic circumcision." This is a symbol of identity that visibly separates South from North Sudanese. At the same time, it is a frontier institution, which literally and figuratively protects against influences of the external word, in this case: the African interior. At the same time, customs set the boundary between moral principles of one's own and a stranger's group. For the Muslim population, it means the cult of virginity and extreme patriarchalism. The men's costume – the snow-white *jalabiyya* – is less radical but equally meaningful in this respect. This type of clothing is such a strong carrier of identity and status that even today Muslims from the North are called *jalaba* in South Sudan. Each borderland is a marginal area – located on the outskirts of a culture or society – where the influence of individuals is subject to distortion and mutation. There is a commonly

2 In literature, one comes across such phrases as "little Africa," "gates to Africa," "a bridge to the Arab World," "[a] transitional country," or"African crossroads" (Beshir 1960: 34).

known notion of the "marginal man," introduced in the context of migratory processes by American urban sociologist Robert E. Park. The "marginal man" is an individual of lowered status, rooted in cultures of two different groups. This man seeks acceptance: a possibility to participate in the life of the main society. This is not an easy task, though. He does not fully feel a member of the new community, since he cannot or does not want to break away from his original identity. As a result, he lives – as it were – on the margin of two cultures and two societies (Park 1928: 892). In many respects, many of Sudanese citizens – and the state itself –identify themselves precisely with this model. However, this is not the case of any sort of exclusion or lack of acceptance. In the case of Sudan, marginality is abeyance between two cultural circles, "bulwark" status, that of a frontier – with all its consequences: the continuous need for self-determination but also an extended and variable identity. Sudan is an African country – and it simultaneously strongly aspires to be part of the Middle East. Due to its geographical location, it remains on the margins, too far away to fully participate in the Middle Eastern reality to which it wants to belong. Sudan does not have a solid enough legitimacy to enable its full cultural participation in this system. This apparently hopeless situation motivates Sudanese cultures and makes them unique: a variation of Middle East culture, unusually conservative and hybrid at the same time.

In common imagination dating back to the colonial times, Sudan is a two-part country, informally disintegrating into two different wholes in terms of ecology, ethnicity, culture, and even race (North and South).[3] With its whole diversity, North Sudan is inhabited by the peoples of Caucasian origin, mostly calling themselves Arabs, and professing Islam in its entirety. In turn, South Sudan has a decisively more complicated ethnic structure: it is composed of an enormous mosaic of peoples largely still following "traditional" family and tribal relationships. People of that area, in great majority black, are culturally and politically connected with the African interior, East Africa in particular. Finally, in opposition to the North, South Sudan citizens are mostly followers of the Christian faith.

3 In reality, the cultural situation of that country seems to be much more complicated. There still is Darfur, a land in the western part of Sudan, mainly inhabited by a non-Arab Muslim population (Fur). For decades, the region was included in the "Muslim North Sudan." Today, in the light of a protracted conflict in Darfur, it seems that this bipolar, Nile-centric vision of Sudan is only a myth.

There is no symmetry in the history of contacts between these areas. One of the centres – let us call it "northern" – has always tried to dominate. The history of areas within the boundaries of modern Sudan is marked with this phenomenon. This is also a fact of considerable importance for the understanding of the cultural landscape of past and present Sudan. Modern Sudan is not a totally artificial creation. Since ancient times, we have seen attempts at building a political organisation in the Middle Nile valley with its centre near the Nile. Kerma, Napata, Meroe, Christian Nubia, or, ultimately, colonial and modern Sudan, are all tangible evidence of the viability of this idea throughout centuries.[4] A close link between geography and politics – characteristic of the entire African oecumene – influenced social relationships by strongly linking status to space. Most of pre-colonial Africa countries were not uniform, so Sudan is no exception. The state was usually composed of a metropolitan region, a political centre that usually possessed natural assets such as a strategic location. However, each state also consisted of much more extensive peripheries. Recruits, food, or natural resources came from there. State power was sporadic on the peripheries. These were areas conquered during military raids. The main export "goods" of those areas were slaves who were mostly intended for long-distance trade or as separate slave guards. The peripheries also benefitted from this arrangement. They could enjoy all sorts of privileges, from security to participation in profits from trade. Many countries of pre-colonial Africa were organised this way (e.g. Mali, Songhai, or Kanem-Bornu; Tymowski 1999: 96–99). The situation was similar in the case of Sudan. During the Funj Sultanate, such peripheries were undoubtedly the Nuba Mountains, southern Gezira, the borderland with Abyssinia, and the swamps and lagoons of White Nile. In turn, the Fur Sultanate (Darfur) – organised in the western part of Sudan in the seventeenth century – had its peripheries in the very south of Dar Fartit (today's western Bahr al-Ghazal; Johnson 2011: 2).

Slavery is another key to understanding the social relationships within the areas of Sudan. Slavery on the African continent had a broader social and political context. In Africa, it was tying people not to land – as in medieval Europe – but

4 Modern Sudan is an heir to Ancient kingdoms: Napata (Kush) and Meroe. In the Middle Ages, Christian monarchies developed in the Middle Nile valley: Nobadia, Makuria and Alodia. In the sixteenth century, their successor was the Funj Sultanate, which sealed the rule of Islam in this nook of Africa. During the Turkish and Egyptian occupation (1821–1885), Sudan was enlarged by Darfur (Funj Sultanate) and areas south of the tenth parallel. The borders established then have survived with small changes until today (Yusuf 2010: Preface).

to a ruler. Hence slavery, violence and restriction of liberty were tools with which rulers exercised power. Slavery guaranteed wealth to the state, and thanks to it, the state could reproduce itself: it increased its human resources. However, a certain number of slaves always integrated or even assimilated, for instance through religion. Therefore, slavery affected African societies in two ways: through slavery people were deprived of their status, but they were also given a totally new status, one that was extremely relative.

A dichotomous division was perpetuated into the centre and peripheries, privileged and marginalised groups, white and black, masters and slaves already in the pre-colonial period. The nineteenth century is particularly important in this respect as it was a time of great changes. In the ideological dimensions, certain areas of Sudan became something we may call a slavish borderland. Slaves in northern provinces came mostly from the South, hence the local colloquial use of the words "slave" and "black" became synonymous. This brought about a polarisation of the society based on race and the common identification of non-Arab and non-Muslim part of the population with low status, or even its absence. Slavery became a part of the "stranger" concept. In other words, there emerged a nearly closed system of hierarchy (Makris 2000: 26).

Hence, due to reasons outlined above, the "Greater Sudan" project will most probably never come to fruition. After many years of war, the state is disintegrating and, in the nearest future, South Sudan will declare independence. The tradition of the North's domination over the South is the main source of the division, by acting from the position of strength, but only dressed in more modern clothes: nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Thus, the secession of the South will be the end of one of the stages in the history of Northeast Africa. It may break not only the ring of violence and aggression against the inhabitants of southern peripheries but also the dynamic culture-forming processes, which since the ancient times have decided about the specificity of those regions (Figures 1–2).

The main "protagonist" of this monograph – Juba – is at the heart of the events setting the course of reality of modern Sudan. During the recent civil war in South Sudan (1983–2005), it was a shabby little town inhabited by a group of several thousand haggard people. It constituted the main administrative and police centre of Khartoum within the rebelled area. Recently it became a big city – practically overnight – and the capital of autonomous South Sudan. Since 2005, a wave of migrants has been incessantly flowing into the city.[5] Among them are officials of the administration under construction, small businesspeople who

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5 Since the signing of the peace agreements in Naivasha, Kenya, on 9 January 2005. This event sets the official end of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005).

saw good economic conditions here, or the rural population pushed into the city by primitive conditions existing in the countryside. However, the ones who migrate here are mostly former refugees who previously stayed in other parts of Sudan. They are the main driving force of the changes taking place in Juba and its sudden urbanisation processes.

The fundamental matter for a great number of migrants is to adapt to the new environment. This is not an easy task. Since extremely harsh conditions prevail in the city. There is not enough water and no sewage system, not to mention electricity. As a result of the underdevelopment of the region's transport infrastructure, prices are dramatically rising. On top of that, there is the multiethnicity and multiculturalism of the migrants, combined with the traditionalism and conservatism of particular individuals. This is a mixture evoking a feeling of alienation in most inhabitants. What is worse, various traumatic war experiences only add to the mix. From our perspective, Juba is a dysfunctional city. It may be colloquially called a waiting area, a place where – at least for now – the chances to survive in post-war South Sudan are the greatest. Hence, it resembles a refugee camp more than a city.

Despite quickly piling problems, a newcomer tries to tame the hostile environment: settle in the city, find a job, organise lodgings, tames the landscape, plan the time, struggle against loneliness and alienation, and finally blend in with the surroundings. In other words, the newcomer tries to survive and simultaneously break with the past of a rural migrant or repatriate.

A large part of the present study presents the vivid process of forming Juba. Urbanism is a set a features typical for the urban environment (Wirth 1938), which emphasises the initiative and skill of creating own social and political niche. A person in the city faces numerous options, incomparably greater than in the rural environment. A person must be pragmatic and apply various methods – both formal and informal – to be effective, or simply to survive. In the common opinion of scholars, the African city plunged into a crisis. It is not as it used to be, no longer a sphere of wellbeing that clearly offers more opportunities than threats. On the contrary, this is now an ominous oppressive space, unfriendly to man. A place where the most serious problems of the continent concentrate on a small space.

This book will investigate how one operates in this very unfriendly reality. Can one turn his or her situation around? These are the fundamental issues to which I shall seek answers. For this purpose, I will consider various strategies adopted by people. I define these strategies here as methods of satisfying vital needs in such aspects as housing, employment, entertainment, or consumption; that is, general human needs in an urban environment. I will be interested to

know how, in practice, representatives of various urban groups adapt to life in the city and whether they improve their position in life. I will present it in the context of two phenomena: multidimensional borderline-ness and vigorous urbanisation processes. I will describe and analyse the experience of those omnipresent phenomena and demonstrate how they affect different groups of citizens. I will try to find an answer to the following question: in the context of modern African reality, can these two phenomena contribute to positively changing human existence?

Juba is a mosaic of cultures inhabited by migrants from nearly all of Sudan, who belong to ethnic groups that often were objects of classical ethnographic monographs: the Shilluk, the Nuer, the Azande and the Nuba peoples. The urban problem of the region has not been discussed so far. It was hindered by the war, but also by the fact that the urbanisation of South Sudan moved at a snail's pace. The situation changed in the inter-war period (1974–1983). With the return of the refugees, the region entered a phase of sudden urbanisation. Its best example was, of course, the capital city of Juba. However, even then, in the period of relative stability, the urban areas of the region failed to receive the necessary attention. The work of Richard L. Hill (1981), *Migration to Juba: A Case Study*, is of an exceptional nature. Due to his use of rigorous quantitative procedures and concentration on only one issue – migration – it constitutes a valuable, yet limited, source of information. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Juba is experiencing a renewed phase of sudden growth. A flood of migrants from all over the country and abroad is flowing there. Since 2005, the population of Juba has increased several times. The pace of changes – along with all of Sudan's south – is dramatic. Within a few years, the city of a garrison size transformed into a global metropolis, the capital of a semi-independent state entity. The dynamics of changes constitute an extremely important factor of the centre's functioning: Juba is a city in the phase of creation, of permanent change. Thanks to it, we may have a closer look at various urbanisation processes with which we often deal now in other African areas. Thus, this book will attempt to find answers to more fundamental questions: are modern urbanisation processes clearly connected with modernisation? Can they also mean cultural regression? Finally, can modernisation in a city be a trap for its inhabitants?

Particular chapters were written in various contexts, resulting from the evolutionary nature of my research in the field. Initially, I wanted to outline the broadest possible panorama of a city rebuilding itself after a war. However, I did not have any comparative input material for more detailed considerations that could show the entire spectrum of changes. In the course of field work, attempts taken by people to overcome numerous difficulties in the city's environment came to the foreground. These seemed to me to be the most important from

the viewpoint of Juba's citizens, but also from the current discourse in global African studies. Currently, researchers' special attention focuses exactly on this problem: adaptation to life in difficult conditions of an African city. This seems to be the leading topic in modern anthropology of the African city (Flynn 2005, Undelsmann 2007, Bryceson and Potts 2005, Tostensen and Vaa 2001, Simone and Abouhani 2005 et al.).

Seeking answers to these issues, I noticed the key importance of the phenomenon of the borderland: the proximity of state border. This phenomenon has an overwhelming impact on the effectiveness of its inhabitants' efforts, it is responsible for the spontaneity of urbanisation processes and it carries risks, but above all unlimited possibilities. Thus, this book touches upon the problem of "the African borderland," which belongs to the increasingly popular subjects in African studies (Kopytoff 1987, Nugent and Aiswaju 1996, Little 2003, James 2007, Merkx 2000, Coplan 2010, Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). My book is a part of this trend. As a side note in this regard, allow me to remark that cooperation within the framework of ABORNE (African Borderlands Research Network) was extremely inspiring in this respect (cf. www.aborne.org).

One of the strategic areas where these transformations are taking place most clearly is a city in a borderland. It is here where crystallise the most significant economic and social phenomena accompanying borderland experience. The separation of borderlands – i.e. transition zones between two or more political entities – impacts urbanisation processes in contemporary Africa. Since progressing, Westernisation or cross-border entrepreneurship contributed to the vigorous development on outskirts of urban centres. They make a sort of "contact fairs" – near-the-frontier centres of exchange of complementary goods coming from neighbouring, culturally or ecologically different regions (for more, see Vorbrich 1996: 211). In many border areas we are dealing with "twin cities," which are sort of "springboards" for all those who wish to cross a national border (e.g. see Coplan Siamses 2010). For this simple reason, these cities are developing particularly dynamically, becoming new centres of African capitalism and utilising cross-border contacts. Their influence quite often emanates onto other metropolitan areas. In fact, they are extremely diversified phenomena and vary from large capital metropolises (e.g. Kinshasa) to small peripheral centres where cross-border entrepreneurs of all provenance settled. Seeds of urbanism also appear in borderlands. As a result of rapid cultural transformations, the local population is acquiring the characteristics typical of an urban environment; for example, in terms of work or leisure activities. Due to natural reasons, this has an enormous impact on the urbanisation of African borderlands, the concentration

of life of those regions in municipal centres and their vigorous development. A borderland city is a strategic place for Africans deprived of control over their own lives, as it enables them to come into existence and gain subjectivity, even if they do not have actual power. As I already signalled, Africa is playing an increasingly important role in modern studies on borderlands. Despite the growing popularity of such problems, not so much attention has been devoted yet to the "borderland city" as a specific form of African urbanism. This book offers an important step towards greater interest in this field.

Juba is located on the border with Uganda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The effects of such a location are visible with the naked eye on many levels of the city's functioning, from economics to issues of identification or culture. This phenomenon is of considerable importance for city dwellers' living conditions and their efforts to move effectively within the reality of intensively urbanising Juba. Due to the current situation in the region – the emergence of an independent South Sudan – the city constitutes an extremely interesting object of research throughout the entire continent. In the book, I will look at various forms of borderland manifestations in the city; not only as a vigorously urbanising borderland centre but also as the capital of a semi-independent state entity of South Sudan. Here, I wish to remark that a borderland may possess not only a literal – spatial – dimension but may also be understood figuratively, as a liminality, a threshold, and a heterogenous existence. The borderland nature of this area of South Sudan corresponds to the "liminality" (threshold quality) of this moment in the history of Juba and of the entire South Sudan, suspended somewhere between crisis and stability, war and peace, chaos and order. In the case of Juba, this phenomenon is intensified by vigorous urbanisation processes. Juba is a city in the moment of creation. What is more, the intensive influence of transforming phenomena such as globalisation or deformalised trade happens here as well. All this results in the maintenance of a special culture – in a semantic and processual dimension – similar to the central, liminal phase of rites of passage according to Arnold van Gennep (1909, 2006). In this case, associations arise with one more distinguished ethnologists, Victor Turner (1974), and his theory of liminal rite. Both dimensions – literal and symbolic – are equally responsible for the creation of specific cultural phenomena in these areas. In this book, I will present the specificity of local urbanism, formed under the influence of a multidimensional borderland, understood both literally and symbolically.

The basis for writing this study was on-site research. Juba was my ethnographical research area three time: from January to March 2007, from January

to March 2008, and from August to October 2008. These studies were conducted as part of the "Juba – a centre of cultures and conflicts" project financed from a grant of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland. In my research, I dealt with four urban areas: Jalaba, Amarat, Munuki and Gabat. Since 1983 and the outbreak of the Second Civil War, these have been one of the first – if not the first – ethnographic studies in South Sudan. Proper field work was always preceded by a short stay in the capital of Sudan, Khartoum. This time was devoted to preliminary query in archives and library collections, along with consultations with representatives of the local scientific community.

As I have just signalled, Juba is a liminal place in many respects. The specific realities of Juba impact the lives of all people currently living in the city, including myself, an anthropologist conducting his research alone. The decadent, anti-structural reality of Juba left a profound impression on the research I conducted: it enforced the correction of research objectives and had a far-reaching impact on them in terms of methodology. It made me elaborate new research attitudes. Above all, I realised that I was an integral part of the community under investigation: a "stranger" in a place full of people just like me. Almost everyone was a "migrant" there. Almost everyone declared they were here only for a moment. My identity of an outsider did not hinder but made life in this city even easier. It was a binding factor. Unfortunately, at the same time I also remained extremely alienated. The reality of Juba affected me in a similar way it affected its other inhabitants. The city also evoked negative emotions in me: fear, loneliness and disgust. Under no circumstances was I able to identify myself with this place. On the contrary, every day constituted evidence for me of the extreme otherness of this world. The local system was for me – like for many other residents – to some extent the opposite of normality. This conviction was all the stronger, as it was shared by a large number of Juba's inhabitants. My actions were finally subordinated to the same goal: SURVIVAL. In summary, explorers of a post-war African city must be aware of the following conditions: they are members of the investigated community whether they like it or not. It is difficult for them, therefore, to carry out observations from the outside. It is not easy to keep distance. Thus, they are no longer masters of their situation. They must be ready to review their research plans to a degree greater than usual. Work is not the only task. It often recedes into the background. It is more important – quite simply – to survive in a completely unfriendly and thoroughly alien reality.

Before I discuss specific issues, I wish to present the parts of the book. In the first chapter, I will deal with the phenomenon of the migration to the city on the example of one of the most numerous groups migrating to the city: former refugees and the internally displaced. Then, using the analytical perspective of

space, I will present selected aspects of urban landscape transformations happening under the influence of sudden urbanisation processes. In the third chapter, I will deal with the urbanisation process in the context of changes in the institution of family. The fourth chapter discusses economic practices undertaken by representatives of various urban groups. Finally, I will address the issue of ethnicity and urban religiousness in the following two chapters.

It remains for me to thank all those, both in Poland and in Sudan, who helped me to get information in any way and made it possible for me to get access to materials, places and people. This would not have been possible without their kindness.

Figure 1. A Nubian woman with scarification (Ed Ghaddar 2010, M. Kurcz).

Figure 2. A Nuer (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Juba on the Political and Cultural Borderland: African Borderlands

The problem of the borderland is not particularly new in science. On the grounds of ethnology, for instance, the issue was considered by German diffusionist Friedrich Ratzel in the second half of the nineteenth century (Labuda 1971, qtd. after Staszczak 1978: 18,19). Borderlands were described in various contexts, sometimes by applying extremely different theoretical perspectives. Some anthropologists became interested in social boundaries constituting links or the sense of collective unity, others in cultural borderlands that established semantically different systems, still others understood them as specific phenomena in the world of geopolitics (Wilson and Donnan 2007). For the diffusionists, it was interesting how particular ideas moved through cultural barriers and penetrated from one system to another. Meanwhile, for functionalists, the two systems were extreme points that permitted outlining the frameworks of societies under examination. The border was not so much a point of interest but rather practices or institutions enclosed within its outlines. Some believed that cultural diversity may be partly explained by geographical or social isolation. Many monographs of tribal societies were created based on this paradigm. Today, some of them are considered classics of the discipline, like in the case of the West African Tallensi people, discussed by Meyer Fortes. With time, a change in research direction occured: from the interest in what accompanies the border to the border as such (Wilson and Donnan 2007: 40, 41).

At the beginning of the 1990s, scholars return to the problems of the borderland in the context of new phenomena and new interpretative models (Wilson and Donnan 2007: 24, 25). In the light of these theoretical inspirations, a dialectic category of "space" gained renewed popularity. Analytical relationships between people's ideas concerning space and prevailing economic and political conditions constitutes the core interest of contemporary anthropologists (Wilson and Donnan 2007). This turned out to be particularly inspiring on the grounds of African studies. This term was used among anthropologists, sociologists, historians and geographers as a factor that explains nearly any area of culture (Howard and Shain 2005). Not without a reason, since on the African continent we observe that special growth of spatial mobility of its inhabitants. Various factors affect this situation but especially globalisation processes and internal problems. In Africa, there is happening a deterritorialisation process that covers migration, globalisation (the transnational transfer of goods and

people), subnationalisation and reterritorialisation processes expressed in the occurrence of micro-regions or the separation of borderlands. Various "actors" participate in these processes: local entrepreneurs, warlords, aid workers, international corporations, political elites and many others. As a consequence, a new spatial order of the continent emerges, one of its components being the separation of borderlands (Cohen 1997, Howard and Shain 2005).

The beginnings of modern studies on borderlands (i.e. complex analyses of the issue in an interdisciplinary perspective) are to be associated with North American researchers, focused on the problem of the Mexican borderland. The first works on the topic appeared in the 1920s (one of the pioneering works was Bolton 1921). We should especially mention here Frederick Jackson Turner (1921), a populariser of the frontier category in American historiography (Coplan 2010: 79). For Turner, who chose the North American case as his prototype, the borderland was a place of contact between civilisation and barbarism, a zone of interaction of two "worlds." His understanding of the term was close to the meaning of *kresy* – former Polish Eastern borderlands – and related to the American "Wild West," but also to Southern Africa, Siberia or South America; that is, everywhere where at some time we dealt with progressing European colonisation and a "clash of cultures." In the 1980s, together with the growth of political economy, illegal migration and international relationships, the Mexican border found itself again in the research centre. Thanks to this fact, it has been the best studied borderland in world science so far (Coplan 2010: 79, 80). In the 1990s, together with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the sudden broadening of the European Union, these problems gained permanent interest in the "Old Continent." At the end of the twentieth century, the geopolitical landscape of Europe changed radically: old borders became less important but new ones appeared in their stead. At the same time, spontaneous globalisation – intensifying transnational contacts – made borders, their crossing or the issue of identity particularly interesting for researchers (Wilson and Donnan 2007: 17, Coplan 2010: 79, Paasi 2005: 17–33). The borderland may be understood and described in many ways. In Polish (like in many other languages), the term *pogranicze* (borderland) is associated with *granica* (border). The border draws a line of division, while the borderland (frontier, marchland) describes an area (zone) near borders. The border is linear, while the borderland is zonal. The borderland does not have clear outlines, it is characterised by numerous transitional areas (Staszczak 1978: 15, 16). Therefore, the border is in a sense a contradiction of the borderland. One culture cannot simply be disconnected from another. A bridge is needed, a transitory space that connects the two worlds. In this sense, the border may be called an established order, while the borderland a natural

one (Kurczewska 2005, Szyfer 2005: 53, 54). In reality, the semantic scope of the phrases is much greater. Suffice it to mention that terminological problems are a permanent difficulty for Polish studies on borderlands; for example, problems occur when translating basic terms from the Anglo-Saxon literature such as "boundary," "frontier" or "border."

African Borderlands Yesterday and Today

The currently existing African borderlands usually emerged during colonial times, within the period of a dozen or so years after the Berlin Conference (1885). Then, by means of diplomatic agreements or faits accomplis, most of present borders and borderlands were established. Until recently, a view prevailed among Africanists that the "old" Africa did not have clear "internal borders" and that rule over people was more important than rule over space. This was justified by the thesis of considerable geographic mobility of societies of pre-colonial Africa. When land was abandoned, the territory and its borders were not as important as dominance over the human potential. Spatial mobility, being "on the move," is one of the most considerable elements of the social life and history of Africa (Adepoju 1995: 89). This does not mean, however, that the Africans are not interested in space. In pre-colonial Africa – like elsewhere in the world – borders and borderlands did, in fact, exist. Oral traditions of Africans known to us attest to this fact. From them, we learn that a lot of attention was paid to territory also in old Africa. Moreover, oral traditions inform us about the places where clans were formed, about how an uninhabited area became "civilised" or where particular clans or tribal totems came from (Howard and Shain 2005: 4). In northern Sudan, the Nile is a physical and metaphorical boundary till today; it constitutes the basis for the geographical and cultural concept of *orbis interior*. The river, above all, separates the village (*hilla*) from the surrounding world, while simultaneously strongly shaping local traditions and customs, binding them with crucial, breakthrough borderline moments in human life. The river is an "edge," a zone separating two realistically existing worlds that are in permanent conflict with each other. What really counts is what is on the other side. Something is either to the left or to the right of the Nile. The reality on the opposite bank, though alien and mysterious, is at the same time needed, or even necessary, for the functioning of the world called one's "own" (for more, see Kurcz 2007a: 169–181).

Insufficient knowledge on this subject results from the lack of proper interest of Africanists in these phenomena and an unfair reduction of research into problems of colonial and post-colonial political structures. African borderlands

were hardly considered "formed" or "atypical." With time, a change of this idea occurred. Some also noticed that not all African borderlands are totally arbitrary artificial creations. What is equally important, they were unjustly considered as incomparable with the broader global context. Like in the case of other continents, the borderland theory is one of the ways of spatial representation of the African culture. It belongs to particularly popular topics in modern African studies.

Researchers look at "margins" of the African oecumene in different ways. For some, the margins are artificial barriers imposed years ago by colonial powers and, as a consequence, they are conflict-triggering zones, sources of exclusion and marginalisation of the local communities. For others, inspired by works of postmodernist researchers, a margin rather means cross-border trade, migrations and a dynamic identity. Recently, the concept of a "fertile frontier" has also become particularly popular, which clearly refers to the works of such scientists as Anthony Aiswaju, Paul Nugent or Fredrik Barth. The peripheries of a state are perceived here as natural resources that may be exploited in the economic, identity or political dimension (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010: 1–22).[6] In my view, Sudan or South Sudan prove a considerable research potential for this concept. Within the last decades, borderlands of the "Greater Sudan" have become incubators of new identities and subversive movements. And so, the borderland with Chad played a role of a "hotbed" of the Darfur rebellion thanks to which – much like in the case of Sudan People's Liberation Army – this movement could last and renew itself. Finally, in the "new South" – as the Sudanese call the borderland with South Sudan – we deal with a typical situation for this corner of Africa. This is another centre of rebellion of communities affiliated more with Juba than Khartoum. Border-setting processes – the physical and symbolical determination of borders –stimulate the creation of separate identities. For the Nuba community of Southern Kordofon, the border remains artificial, it is not a true being. They are linked by a long history of contacts and alliances formed against Khartoum with the inhabitants of South Sudan. The real border runs elsewhere, more to the north, where Khartoum-affiliated communities live. An example of this community demonstrates that the border ignoring local identification structure or a network of intragroup contacts is contested and constitutes a source of violence. Exceptional relations link South Sudan with the

6 A work of the American anthropologist Igor Kopytoff "The African Frontier" of 1987 was a turning point in these studies, while the study by Nugent and Aiswaju (1996) is also very significant in this area.

category of border. This newly established political creation is, in fact, the fruit of its borders (Schomerus, de Vries, Vaughan 2013: 2). During the recent war, it was on the borderlands with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, outside the reach of Khartoum, that the Sudan People's Liberation Army had its bases; recruits were also acquired there, mostly among the refugees. Finally, thanks to cross-border contacts, the resistance movement acquired supplies and funds. Today's border with Sudan played an equally important role during the war. This was the place of the heaviest combat, exclusion, marginalisation; in short, a place of key importance for the formation of the Southerners' identity. As Professor Paul Nugent – director of the famous Centre of African Studies in Edinburgh – rightly notices, the case of South Sudan is interesting because of at least three reasons: (1) borders and their determination on site were preceded by the emergence of the state *per se*; (2) the state (its apparatus) is more visible at the borders than in the centre; and (3) borders play a fundamental role in the country's economic life; in other words, cross-border trade is a driving force of South Sudan's economy (Nugent 2013: xi, xii).

The borderland not only divides but also connects. It is this feature that seems to be very characteristic for pre-colonial Africa. In the past, the African borderland was more an open area, naturally favouring migrations and interpersonal contact. In the introduction to *The African Frontier* of 1987, Igor Kopytoff explains his concept of "the internal African frontier." Probably under the influence of Victor Turner (and partially maybe also Max Gluckman and the idea of "rituals of rebellion"), Kopytoff remarks that many political organisations of Black Africa took their origin from a schism, a split. A group separated from the "tribe" (most frequently as a result of unsuccessful succession) and settled in a different "deserted" place. A good example of this were warlike Azande kingdoms, which existed on the territory of today's South Sudan at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to the oral traditions of the Azande people, their original home was the savannahs of the south-eastern part of what is today called Central African Republic. It is from there where the two groups were said to begin, when they separated from the "tribe" after a succession unfavourable for them. Both gave birth to two main families of the Azande people. Since then, it was a rule that after the death of a king, his sons fought for inheritance. The losers left the country with their supporters and established their own political organisation not too far away (Seligman and Seligman 1932: 495–539). Kopytoff calls this area of exile "the internal African frontier." Hence the phrase "internal," because located within the boundaries of a territory. This is the area where the influence of the metropolis was disturbed and local structures weak. It was situated between greater political organisations or on peripheries,

in the "no man's land." Refugees could find an institutional vacuum that could be the starting point for building one's own society. The original political organisation was always a model to follow for them. Hence, according to Kopytoff, "the internal frontier" is an area of cultural conservatism or ethical continuation. There were no attempts to build a new society, which was to undergo permanent changes within such a borderland. In Africa, we frequently deal with the continuation and reproduction of existing structures.

Those types of borderlands were often areas where African states emerged. And so, the Mopti-Ouahigouya micro-region in West Africa was the cradle of the Bambara kingdoms of Ségou and Kaarta, or the Peul theocratic (Fulani) state (Tremolieres 2007: 9). Similarly, on the middle Nile – most probably the cradle of the Makuria kingdom – the region of the Fourth cataract was once the mightiest in medieval Nubia. As a peripheral and "uninhabited" area, it was a perfect "shelter" for peoples pushed by migrations or – on the contrary – for those who were just trying to settle in that area. Then, in conditions of certain isolation, a new political or ethnic unit could have formed.[7] In colonial times, many African borderlands underwent politicisation, becoming interstate entities and, as a consequence, new cultural creations. The separation of those areas with political borders brought about the transformations of political and ethnic systems. It became a source of divisions (according to the criterion of ethnicity) but also one of the intensification of cooperation and tightening bonds across formally existing borders.

New borderlands crystallised at that time, arbitrary, often drawn with a proverbial ruler, used to determine (set) zones of European influences on the continent, from the viewpoint of their effective management as part of particular micro-regions (the Uganda Protectorate, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan). As a whole, thirty colonies and protectorates were set up. Allow me to remark here, however, that not all borders were totally artificial creations. It was important for the colonisers to legitimise their power. It was similar with the borders, so they sought solutions that were lasting and as broadly acceptable as possible. Michel Ben Arrous estimates that more than forty percent of the borders had precolonial roots (Arrous 1996, after Coplan 2010).

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7 In a sense, the fate of this region was sealed at the beginning of the twenty-first century with the creation of a giant reservoir lake in this section of the Nile; ultimately, it was to exceed the area of Lake Nasera from Egyptian Nubia. This event may be also considered as one of the dominance strategy of the contemporary African state on its peripheries.

When setting the borders of European dominions in Africa, colonisers referred to local settlement geography or ecological conditions. Often, former ethnic and political borderlands were re-used in some form. They were also determined in "deserted" areas, inaccessible or economically worthless; that is, peripheral at that time from the viewpoint of colonisers or more metropolitan centres (Kopytoff 1987).

Independent African states accepted the colonial borders. Paradoxically, African states already at the threshold of independence strongly identified themselves with their borders – or, more broadly, with "colonial geography" – though this identification did not prevent them from emphasising their "unnatural nature." These countries saw in it the success of nation-building or the detribalisation process of the society. Thanks to passports, permits or complex procedures, the state demonstrated its power and practically enforced citizenship, one's membership in a specific political entity (Kopytoff 1987, Merkx 2000: 2, Cohen 1997). In reality control of the state over its borderlands was illusory and insufficient (Adepuju 1995: 93). What is more, the centralistic policy of independent African states – promoting the development of central areas, capital cities in particular – resulted in huge disproportions. In the case of borderlands, it became the basic reason for their marginalisation and autonomisation at the same time. The African state did not so much want to but was unable to effectively manage its borderlands. The "collapse of the state," characteristic for most of the countries on the continent in the 1980s and 1990s, meant that the geographical peripheries were not managed from the centre but were left on their own. Therefore, some sort of vacuum was commonly generated within borderlands, which created space for various social and political experiments. The inhabitants of borderlands become their authors.

Wilson and Donnan (2007) notice that the identity of some African borderlands was formed under the influence of the restrictiveness and oppressiveness of the state. When the state pursues an ambivalent policy in relation to its peripheries, it often gives rise to violence and is a source of additional marginalisation of those areas. In contemporary Africa, we usually observe internal conflicts. The following oppose each other: the state and the society from the peripheries who is acts against marginalisation (e.g. Darfur, Ogaden, Kivu, the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali and Niger).[8] These conflicts are characterised by unexpected vigour. The chronic ineptitude of the African state in controlling

8 On the other hand, border conflicts of an interstate nature, just like in the case of the Eritrean–Ethiopian War, are rather atypical for modern Africa (Merkx 2000: 4).

its marchlands is responsible for such a state of affairs. The South Sudan borderland is one of the examples here. In recent decades this nook of Africa was an arena of endless conflicts between the state and the revolting local community. I must emphasise here that not only the political centre became the source of violence but also all sorts of guerrilla forces operating on the outskirts of African countries. The African borderland is not only a profitable "cross-border capitalism" but also a refugium for various types of armed organisations. Suffice it to mention Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an organisation that for a dozen or so years has been terrorising the borderland of Uganda, South Sudan and even of nearby Congo and the Central African Republic. Apparently, it seemingly had no right to exist. It has no formal support from the outside, at least now. However, it is still smouldering, waging a total war both against neighbouring African countries (South Sudan, Uganda) and ordinary inhabitants of the borderland areas. So far, none of the nearby countries was able to ultimately curb this subversive and terrorist armed formation. Interestingly, the LRA has no foundation in any clear political or religious idea. It refers only a bit to Christian and Islamic Messianism, and in the political dimension, it generally strives for overtaking power in Uganda. This seemingly mysterious organisation is – in my opinion – one of the typical manifestations of the African borderland reality. It shows how a border can be exploited, and also what the border means for an inhabitant of that continent. For the LRA, the borderlands of South Sudan, Uganda, Congo and the Central African Republic are an "ethnic territory." Thus, LRA's crossing the border is simultaneously a survival strategy and a stimulus of a powerful metaphysical force. In fact, this is responsible for LRA's successes and persistence.

Borders and borderlands are connected with violence not only because of state power but also because of the complex semantics of these places. The people there undergo a metamorphosis: they ethnically embody not so much themselves but also individuals. As a result, violence in this area is dehumanised. It is an action aimed not at people but at an ethnic stranger, and in this respect, it is of a profound, symbolic nature. Donnan and Wilson (2007) write extensively about this topic, also in the context of the African borderland.

We should notice the relativism of the category of the border or marginality itself. A border is a physically and metaphorically distant place, but one also located in the centre of state activities. The case of South Sudan demonstrates that national borders may a source of power. At its frontiers, the state can act as a defender of the local community, be its representative vis-à-vis a hostile community from abroad. It is one of the factors that legitimise power (Schomerus, de Vries, Vaughan 2013: 10–12).

The border may be an area of aggression and violence, while simultaneously demonstrating virtually unlimited possibilities of changing one's living conditions for the better. Marginality may mean not only exclusion but also a chance for a greater independence or renegotiation of the relationship between an individual and the state. Thus, economic factors today are of enormous importance for building the position of African borderlands. With the problems of the urban economy and the decline in the importance of market crops, trade exchange to a large extent occurs across borderlands. Foreign investments come to the aid of the intensive cross-border economy: roads are being built and industrial plants are being set up. As a result, African borderlands are changing: they are becoming centres of exchange, driving forces of the economies of individual countries from economically backward and marginalised areas. Hence why not that much attention is paid to the "borderland economy" or "cross-border capitalism," if one so prefers. Just to mention, MacGaffey (1991), Bennaffa (2002) and Walther (2005) all highlight the vigour of the borderland economy. However, so far there has been no synthesised study about this extremely important topic, its characteristics and its connection with analogous problems in other parts of the oecumene. At the moment, we nevertheless possess many field studies from various parts of Africa.

In the post-colonial period, African borderlands above all constituted "traffic and passage corridors" (Tremolieres 2007: 8). Such understood, a borderland is connected with spatial mobility. In turn, this turns out to be a very profitable a rule today (Wilson and Donnan 2007). Such actions as smuggling or economic migration are particularly profitable. They can compensate people for humanitarian crises or the fact of being away from the centre. The borderland is a peripheral and marginalised area but it is also free and not fully controlled, thus perfect for economic development and small business. In Africa, these areas have become breeding grounds of informal economy: the African grey economy. Wilson and Donnan (2007) write in this context about "subversive economy," which is a profitable trade activity beyond the formal control of state. Smuggling, prostitution and the undocumented movement of employees are the permanent elements of any national border reality, which turn out to be particularly profitable. Periodic economic migrations became common on the continent already on the eve of independence. Although still little known – as in the modern history of Africa the main focus was on migration to the city – this phenomenon is documented in many African countries (the borderlands of Benin and Nigeria or Togo and Ghana; Adepuju 1995: 93). Common colonial traditions and a similar political and economic history of entire regions were also important in this respect. The colonial period made many areas permanently integrated into larger

cultural units (the Frankophone West Africa or the Anglo-Saxon East Africa). In the post-colonial period, this fact is a significant incentive for the formation of borderlands.

South Sudan's Borderlands

Without a doubt, Equatoria – the southernmost point of South Sudan – is an area with very old borderland traditions. Since time immemorial, it was an area with clear borderland features for the people of North Sudan (oriented towards the Middle East culture). On one side it bordered Subsaharan Africa, and on the other side, it was extremely peripheral: inaccessible, unknown, ominous, and formed by ecological factors such as infinite, swampy, river-flooded areas; the so-called *Sudd* ("barrier," "obstruction"). Thus, the terrain hindered contacts with the North, also in cultural terms. In colonial times, what added to this was the region's neglected infrastructure. Today, its condition still leaves a lot to be desired. Roads to the North are dangerous and only periodically passable. River transport – traditionally most certain – has not been fully reactivated since the war. Ultimately, aircraft is the only regular means of transport to the interior of Sudan, although few can afford it. In fact, even this means of transport fails during the rainy season, as I could have witnessed myself. Therefore, to this day, the underdevelopment of the region's means of transport affects contacts between the two parts of the country, condemning the South to contacts with abroad and, as a result, to political and economic autonomisation. While this region is inaccessible from the north for most of the year, it naturally opens from the south to the African interior, through extensive flat areas of savannahs between Lake Victoria and the Congo Basin. More precisely, the region creates a geographical triangle within the boundaries of today's South Sudan, Congo (DRC), Uganda and Kenya. Today, it is inhabited by culturally diversified communities, as it had been in the past. Additionally, the region was often the stie of migrations, again due to ecological reasons and, this time, the lack of natural barriers. Its ethnic structure was particularly dynamic; it was here that the elements of genetically diverse cultures constantly crossed each other.

From the mid-nineteenth century, the area was penetrated by slave traders from the Turkish-Egyptian Sudan. The first Europeans appeared not much later (Emin Pasha, Henry Morton Stanley). At the end of the century, it was not clear who the area would belong to: the Belgian Congo, the British Protectorate of Uganda or the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Finally, in 1914, it was divided between the latter two countries. On the basis of the Sudan-Uganda Boundary Commission's recommendations, a four hundred and thirty-five-kilometre

border was established. Despite their efforts, the British failed to set a border corresponding to the cultural realities of the peoples of Kuku, Kajo Keji, Madi and Moro. Although in 1913 an exploratory mission of the future border area was undertaken, only parts of it were penetrable. In fact, for a dozen or so years, the region remained one of the least known in Africa, which considerably contributed to the marginalisation of that borderland. The influence of Uganda, Congo or Sudan was for a long time very weak, and even in 1910 the region was left without any state jurisdiction. Real power in the region was exercised by ivory traders, hence it enjoyed a bad reputation and was unwillingly incorporated by the British into Sudan (Leopold 2005: 109). Major Stigand, the author of a book about the Lado Enclave, had a rather unfavourable opinion about local "tribes," and favoured the solution of handing over this "insubordinate" part of tropical Africa to Uganda. Allow me to add that a threat from sleeping sickness, which prevailed there until the 1950s, contributed to the ominous reputation of the area. Peoples living there were considered by the British as exceptionally susceptive to this tropical disease, and the entire region as particularly dangerous for people's health. A similar situation existed on the Ugandan side of the border. The English were interested in the better developed southern Uganda, where there were state-like structures on which they could employ a model of indirect rule. And it was there where – with time – appeared investments in agriculture. Meanwhile northern Uganda was classified as wild and "backward," with its main potential being agricultural workers for the more "developed" South. Uganda's liberation did not change much in this relationship. The peoples of this borderland – both in Sudan and in Uganda – were treated with contempt and as strangers. What is symptomatic of these images is the assessment of the rule of Idi Amin, to whom some attributed despotism, sadism and even cannibalism. These features were linked to his "Sudanese" origin (Leopold 2005: 57, 58). Tim Allen (2009: 118) reports that the Madi community in Uganda is classified as "Sudanese," and the Acholi as "Nilot." In both cases, these phrases have a decisively pejorative tone. The matter does not look differently in Sudan: the borderland peoples are also perceived as strangers, particularly wild and primitive. During the recent South Sudanese Civil War, they were treated suspiciously by both parties to the conflict, so the borderland peoples were often murdered under the slightest assumption of treason. While in refugee camps, they were refused the right to humanitarian aid based on the argument that they were no refugees but locals.

However, let us return to the times of European rule. In the colonial period, the foundations of the political and economic opportunism emerged locally. It was then that they learnt to make use of the political vacuum that emerged

within that area; some "tribes" lived in Congo but kept their cattle in Uganda to avoid taxes. As I wrote above, the region was also a reservoir of cheap labour for the plantations in southern Uganda. While, in Sudan, the local population was forced to work on cotton plantations. As is the case of many other marginalised areas, the local population was very keen to choose a military career, with time creating a "military ethnocracy." For example, on the onset of Uganda's independence, the representatives of the Acholi were the core of its military forces. This situation continued in the later years, as testified by the rules of such dictators as Idi Amin and Tito Okello (Leopold 2005: 12). Additionally, the peoples of that borderland in Sudan (the Acholi, the Azande) supplied the ranks of the government army in large numbers. In the now independent South Sudan, this is a reason for reproach and discrimination by other "tribes" that sympathised with the SPLA during the war.

The colonial border intensified the spatial mobility of the local people. Thus, for example, agricultural tools were in high demand in Uganda; among other things, they were used as a marriage fee. The driving force of migration were also visiting clan sanctuaries or funeral rites; according to the traditions of the Madi and Moro peoples, the deceased must be buried in their native village. Moreover, all sorts of natural disasters made people migrate, such as droughts, diseases or the disintegration of kinship community. Finally, an important incentive for cross-border contacts was ecology. As I indicated above, contacts with Khartoum were considerably hindered by swamps of the White Nile – the so-called *Sudd* (from the Arabic "barrier," "obstruction") – which despite enormous efforts of the British, became navigable for good only after the First World War. The inhabitants of today's Equatoria were thus forced to keep constant contacts with nearby Uganda, not Khartoum.

Changes in social organisation also occurred in the colonial period. The British appointed their representatives among the borderland "tribes." Quite often, this meant the establishment of previously unknown institutions or hierarchies. In turn, in connection with preventing sleeping sickness, the British conducted resettlement and concentration actions. As a result, the local population was artificially divided and deployed to both sides of the border. This is what happened to the Acholi, who found themselves in Sudan and Uganda (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 4). Likewise, in other parts of Africa, new entities or tribes were brought to life, with distinctive elements such as language, territory or name being assigned to them. Thus, the ethnonym Acholi was introduced by the British from the Luo language, in which it meant nothing else but "black." What is more, the Acholi were defined as "warriors." In turn the Madi, culturally close to them, were considered as nearly pacifistic, peace-loving peoples (Leopold

2005: 123). Additionally, the Madi became an object of "special care" due to their alleged inherent susceptibility to (Muslim) influence and diseases (sleeping disease), so they were isolated by the British from the other "tribes." A ban was also introduced on using Lugbar, a language they had known earlier, and English was introduced in its stead. After decolonisation, the process of ethnicisation continued. It was in the interests of the Ugandan regime of Obote, Okello or Amin to maintain animosity among the borderland "tribes." In this context, allow me to mention that the marginalised peoples of this area fascinated British anthropologists of the post-war period: John Middelton (the Lugbara), Aidan Southall (the Alur) or Girling (the Acholi; Leopold 2005: 10–12).

The further marginalisation of the borderland occurred after decolonisation. Equatoria and the West Nile became "peripheries of peripheries." Migrations were still generated by economic factors. Already in the 1950s, the Sudanese in large numbers were leaving for work in the Ugandan cotton industry. This experience soon turned out to be priceless when they left for their own country again. However, this time as refugees (Merkx 2000: 10). Soon the same refugees had to be hosts themselves because at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s Sudan became a refuge for the Ugandans. They fled Uganda due to unrests after the fall of Idi Amin. "Amin's army" recruited mainly from such ethnic groups as Alur, Lugbara, Kakua and Madi, so after the change of the political situation in 1979 – i.e. the fall of the Amin regime – they fled to South Sudan (Merkx 2000: 11). In the 1980s, the situation turned around again. The Sudanese sought refuge in nearby Uganda on a massive scale as a result of the outbreak of another civil war in the south of Sudan in 1983. In the 2000s, when military actions in South Sudan ceased, the Kenyans, Ugandans and Congolese sensed good economic situation over there and began to flow into South Sudan borderland. However, not all were economic migrants. A new stimulus of forced migration – both to and out of Sudan – were the Lord's Resistance Army's actions.

In Africa, the experience of crossing a border is associated with forced migration. Mobility due to threats is of a special nature. Destination is often irrelevant, unclear and indefinite. The border changes the "identity" of a person or group, and the abandoned places are no longer relevant. Only the space between is important as it shapes one's personality and influences relations with others (James 2007: 234).

Cross-border migrations of people from South Sudan's Equatoria are associated with conflicts and aggression of a long-term and multi-faceted nature. Hence why it is impossible to boil them down to one set of factors in a specific period of history. These phenomena formed people's identity and inter-group relationships. In this difficult world, one had to learn to be flexible, develop

various sorts of strategies of survival, resistance and renewal of identity. Who are the inhabitants of that borderland? It depends. They are members of ethnic communities: the Madi, the Moro or the Acholi. If they head towards the border, however, they become the Sudanese, the Ugandans, refugees, businesspeople or members of subversive armed organisations.

As a result of historic experiences, the identity of an inhabitant of Equatoria is dynamic and variable. This identity consists in identifying with the fate of both a refugee and a host person who offers hospitality. Here we encounter contextual identity, also known as multiple or situational identity, which consists in identifying with different groups (ethnic, national or religious) depending on the situation. Migrations of the population of that region across formally existing boundaries contributed to the establishment of a heterogenic culture of local communities and their sense of "multi-state" membership. These people acquired the ability to live at the interface between various state entities, wandering from country to country depending on the economic situation (Allen and Turton 1996: 5–9).

Juba and Its Surroundings

Juba is a city in South Sudan on the White Nile, locally referred to as the "Mountain Nile," from *Bahr al Jabal*, between 4- and 5-degrees latitude. Juba is located on the left bank, gently sloping towards the river (Figure 1). Heaps of oval, often monstrous rocks belong to the natural landscape of the city. Some of them have names and were apparently the objects of cult in the past. They have a characteristic ferruginous colour.[9] In some places, the rocks disturb the line of urban development, affecting the network of streets or arrangements of houses. Juba is situated more than twelve hundred kilometres away from Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and about two hundred kilometres from the border with Uganda (Hill 1981: 71). Since colonial times, the region has been called Equatoria, and it constitutes the southernmost part of Sudan.[10] The city lies on a flatland overgrown with lush grassy vegetation, occasionally decorated with small clusters of trees or bushes. In relation to the local vegetation, an adequate term seems to be "bush," meaning thick, most frequently thorny, one-layer thickets or low forests typical of the subequatorial climate (Plit 1996: 18). In the case of Juba, this rather monotonous landscape is disturbed by a picturesque mountain massif, small yet dominating from afar: the Jaral Marata. The subequatorial climate is characterised by large amounts of rainfall. The rain season lasts here for the most part of the year. The highest land humidity is in July and August – the lowest in December and January. The annual rainfall does not exceed 700 mm (Skuratowicz 1965: 160, Plit 1996: 34). Thanks to nature – including the Nile – water is abundant here. In other words, there is more of an overabundance rather than a deficit, as water also carries a risk, sometimes becoming the source of disastrous floods. However, the marshy soil is ideal for cultivation, even at a considerable distance from the river. That is why land has been cultivated in the city since its establishment. Urban agriculture is for consumption: it was and is the food basis for the local oecumene. This is nothing out of the ordinary in

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9 Due to such a characteristic rocky base, the land is sometimes referred to as the "Ironstone Plateau" (Skuratowicz 1965: 12).

10 It appeared for the first time in 1870 as the southernmost province of the Turkish-Egyptian Sudan. Initially, apart from the upper section of the While Nile valley, it also encompassed part of today's Uganda, including Lake Albert. During the Egyptian rule in Sudan, it was managed by Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon and Emin Pasha (Gray 1961).

Africa. As I mentioned above, urban farming is one of the distinct features of the continent.

The city's location at the crossroads is of key importance for the city. On one side, there is a road to Yei, Mundri and Rumbek, while on the other side – to Torit, across the only bridge in the area. There also is a stop for river transport, ideal for the connection with the North.[11] What is more, a small distance from the border with Uganda, Kenya and Congo makes Juba an extremely important centre for international contacts. The ecological conditions in the form of extensive flat stretches of savannah between Lake Victoria and the Congo basin make contacts with the neighbouring African countries easier than with the Sudanese interior. As I mentioned above, this is a traditional migration corridor, artificially divided in colonial times. In other words, despite its political history, the region is in many respects integrally linked to East Africa. This is of primary importance for the realities of life in this corner of Sudan, which I will discuss below.

Ecological conditions make this area convenient for both agriculture and animal husbandry. The local communities have traditionally run a mixed economy: from hunting and gathering to soil cultivation and pastoralism.[12] Equatoria is inhabited by a true mosaic of nations. In linguistic terms, the most numerous is the East Sudanese family[13] and peoples that belong to it: the Taposa, Latuko, Lango, Lokoja, Bari and Mandari. Next, we come across a series of ethnicities linguistically related to Bari (the Nyangwara, Fajulu, Kakua and Njefu) and a totally separate linguistic group: the Moro-Madi (the Moro, Kaliko, Lugbari, Madi and Lulubo).[14] Individual tribal groups of the Murle, Anuk, Didinga or Acholi also appear in that area. Most of them live not only within

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11 River transport connects Juba with Kosti in the North, a journey on this route takes about a week, from there on, the journey to Khartoum takes several hours by car.

12 In the past – mostly in the areas West of the Nile – cattle breeding was partially impossible due to the presence of the tsetse fly (the Glossina species), transmitting sleeping sickness, dangerous to both humans and animals (trypanosomiasis in humans and nagana in cattle). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of an intensive campaign of eradicating the tsetse using various methods, the risk they caused has considerably declined (Nalder 1937: 3, Plit 1996: 24).

13 According to Greenberg, the inhabitants of Sudan belong to two large language families: the Niger-Congo, which we find from Senegal to Mozambique, and the Nilo-Saharan that extends from Tanzania in the South to Tibesti in North Chad. The latter (the Chari-Nil group, a Nilotic subgroup) is decisively the largest one, and it is divided into three groups: Eastern Sudanic, Central Sudanic and Eastern – the Adamawa (Geenberg 1965, qtd. after Akol 2007: 7).

14 This is, in turn, the Central Sudanic subgroup of the Nilotic languages.

Equatoria but also in other parts of South Sudan or – what is particularly important now – in the neighbouring African countries. And so, the Karamoja and Turkmana also cover with "their territory" parts of Kenya and Uganda, the Madi and Acholi also live in Uganda, while the Kakua in Uganda and Congo (Nalder 1937: 4, Holt 1961: 49, Akol 2007: 7–9).

The most numerous are the Bari (Figure 2), and Juba is part of their "ethnic territory." According to customary law, the Bari are Juba's legitimate owners. Additionally, they are of special importance due to the fact that elements of their culture appear in the culture of other peoples, not necessarily akin to them: the Fajulu, Kakua, Kuku, to list but a few. Contrary to other ethnic groups – initially involved mostly in hoe-farming – the Bari are also conservative cattle breeders, like those we know from different corners of South Sudan (Nalder 1937: 53). The "cattle syndrome" is characteristic of them, generally meaning gathering animals just to have them, as their attitude to cattle verges on the brink of a cult. Cattle indicates prestige to them, and it is an absolutely required gift that allows for marriage (Figure 3). Alhough, as I described above, other peoples of the region are not as devoted to cattle breeding as the Bari, they share the same pastoral ethos. Cattle in Equatoria, like in all of South Sudan, is a universal symbol of prestige and affluence, which enables, for example, to customarily formalise a marriage.[15]

Figure 1. The White Nile ("the Mountain") in the area of Juba (2007, M.Kurcz).

15 Cattle is customarily a wedding gift given to the girl's family for consenting to her marriage. It is paid in instalments, from engagement till the woman's death. This topic is further discussed in the following chapters.

Figure 2. The marks characteristic for Bari people (Juba 2008 M.Kurcz).

Figure 3. The cattle on the pasture near Juba (Juba 2007 M. Kurcz).

The City of Juba: Its Foundation and Modern History

The city of Juba was established in 1929 by the British[16] in connection with the reorganisation of colonial administration and the extension of river transport system. The plan was for the city to become a modern cosmopolitan city, the capital of the Afro-Arab South Sudan. In the colonial authorities' intentions, the city was to considerably contribute to the political and economic integration of the birth of an independent Sudan, a country ethnically and culturally divided between the "white" Muslim North and the "black" (mostly) Christian South (Holt 1961: 249, Hill 1981: 71). The core of the development was the uppermost area, the so-called Juba Town. It was intended for official development, and it was initially occupied by an elite group of foreign origin (mostly Greeks). The natives were given land below Juba Town, partially in the flood terrace, in the vicinity of today's airport. After its construction in 1934, the dwellers were moved to the Malakija district. Despite the colonisers' restrictions – such as the forcible removal of unemployed natives on the onset of the rain season – the numbers of the black population were increasing. By the end of the 1930s, other settlement areas appeared: Kosti, Nimra Talata, Malakal and Jalaba. However, the population was not impressive. In 1940, the city had only 1625 inhabitants (in 1930 there were about 1000 of them). By 1956, there were four schools there, including one educating native mid-level administrative staff. Apart from a small tobacco plant and a repair base for the river and car transport, no other serious industrial centre was created (Hill 1981: 73–75). The city experienced small industrial growth after the lifting of the ban on migration of the Muslin population from the North.[17] As a result, a group of Arab merchants arrived from the North. Their descendants live here to this day,

16 Earlier the area belonged to the province with the capital in Mongalla (Collins 2008). The Rejaf village was the closest to today's Juba. Among other things, it had a police station and a catholic mission. At the moment, Rejaf is an informal part of Juba, a suburbanised rural part inhabited by the local rural population.

17 Having conquered the territories of today's Sudan, the United Kingdom announced three provinces of South Sudan zones closed for Muslims from the North. They became separate administrative areas. Until the 1930s, this was made a Pax Britannica in this region of Africa. This was to prevent conflicts and the Islamisation of these areas. However, the solution only deepened the division between the animistic and Christian South and the Muslim North. In the longer perspective, it turned out to be one of the reasons for the civil war (Ząbek 1999: 125, 130). This phenomenon considerably

engaged in trade and services. The famous roundtable discussions called the Juba Conference in 1946 concerning the future of the South were also important for the development of the city. As a result of this event, its importance as the "capital" of the South increased considerably.

Further development occurred after the decolonisation of Sudan. However, the first years of independence brought stagnation to Juba. The reason was uncertainty as to the future of the South. Only the period between 1959 and 1964 brought about a series of investments. New schools emerged and military infrastructure was developed. The city became an independent post of government forces. At that time the Atla-bara and Kator districts appeared (Hill 1981: 79). The largest Christian church – now a cathedral – was built in the latter. However, Juba deserved its rank at that time mostly thanks to its multifunctional transport hub (road, river and air traffic). In 1956, on the eve of Sudan's independence, Juba was inhabited by a bit more than 10,000 citizens. The employment structure was quite diversified, without any clear dominance of any profession (El Sayed 1969: 76). Therefore, in the first years after decolonisation, Juba was a typical provincial city, strongly linked by the political and economic realities of the previous period.

Only with time did Juba become a strategically important centre for Khartoum in managing the South. Its development was strictly connected with a new administrative order of the country. After decolonisation, Juba shared in functions of a provincial administrative centre of the Eastern Equatoria State and, from 1972, as the capital of the entire region of South Sudan. In the inter-war period, it was the seat of regional government. Many ministries had their offices in the city, nearly parallel to those in Khartoum. Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century, the status of the city was gradually growing. It was connected with the new administrative policy of central authorities and with separatist tendencies of the southern provinces.

Intensive Arabisation and Islamisation actions were undertaken since the beginning of the 1950s. Their apogee was the expulsion of Christian missions, both from Juba and the entire region. Islamic schools and clerks from the North appeared in the city (Collins 1971: 3, 4). At that time, numerous military personnel from Khartoum was stationed in Juba. This was not only an elite-replacement effort but – in the intention of central authorities – a broad-scale action of building a new, Afro-Arab identity of the black South (Skuratowicz 1965: 116, 117). Regardless of the success of these intentions, the city largely underwent Arabisation in its public sphere. Among other things, this resulted in

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contributed to the Christianisation and westernisation of South Sudan, more than in other parts of the country.

the emergence of a specific dialectic variety of Arabic, the Juba Arabic. Cultural patterns of the Arab world started to be applied in daily life. Despite the negative attitude to Islam of a considerable part of the population and Sudanese Arabs, these cultural patterns gained strong rooting in the urban culture and were not eliminated by the changes after 2005.

City development was stopped by the outbreak of the rebellion against Khartoum (1964).[18] Actually, before Juba managed to fully develop, it had become a bastion of the hated central authority within the rebellious area. During the war, Juba had several thousand inhabitants, and its area was limited to a small city centre, called Juba Town. For the city, the most dramatic was the end of the Abbuda regime's rule (1964). While in 1964 the number of citizens was about 19,000, in 1965 it decreased to nearly 5000. It was also at that time when a part of the urban development burnt down. The local population then sought shelter in the bush or abroad (Hill 1981: 79).

The next stage in the city's history was set by the signing of the 1972 peace agreement in Addis Ababa. In fact, this event ended military conflict in the South, the First Sudanese Civil War of 1964–1972. According to the peace agreement, Southern provinces were granted autonomy, and Juba became their capital, nearly as important as Khartoum. Of course, this contributed to the dynamic development of the city on an unprecedented scale in its previous history. In 1973, the urban population of Juba amounted nearly to 57,000 so as to grow to about 100,000 at the beginning of the 1980s because of former South Sudanese asylum-seekers in the neighbouring African countries. Just like today, foreigners from countries like Uganda or Kenya constituted a considerable group. In the 1970s, in a short inter-war period, attempts were made again to develop the city; among other things, a university was opened. However, the efforts concentrated on government infrastructure, particularly in the city centre, providing a base for regional administration corps that was being created. Despite investments and a period of relative prosperity, the situation of the most part of the population did not improve. For the incumbent citizens, this period also meant a deterioration of their living conditions compared to the pre-war period. Juba became overcrowded but no changes in the urban infrastructure followed. Already back then, residential housing was one of the greatest issues of the city. People – like they do now – had to draw nearly on their own resources. Traditional housing became a characteristic element of the landscape: round clay-made huts covered

18 A guerrilla army was established under the name *Anja Nja* ("Snake Venom"), which started offensive actions against Khartoum in the southern provinces.

with straw (Hill 1981: 79–80). The symbol of dramatic changes was the newly created district of Munuki, which appeared on the north-western outskirts, with temporary development, mostly illegal. This section of the city was settled mainly by repatriates, and it was developing most dynamically at that time. Thus, in the 1970s, Juba again seemed to be a typical African city. It underwent a sudden urbanisation, but at the same time turns out to be incapable of providing the citizens with the basic necessities. It is still an area of many opportunities, especially for the lucky ones having government jobs, but also a place of exclusion and lost opportunities. The situation in the city became even more dramatic after the outbreak of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983.

At that time, Juba became a symbol of intolerance and xenophobia towards the native population, a place of slaughter of many thousand people, a militarised area, resembling a military camp more than an urban centre. The city was converted into a fortress of government forces, though no fortifications were erected. However, it was surrounded by settlements of interned native population. In the occupiers' intention, the dwellers of those districts were hostages. They were human shields used as the city's protection against guerrilla forces' attacks. A reminder of this period is, for example, a fragment of buildings located within the old riverbed, in the vicinity of the airport, the so-called Gabat. It was established for the local Bari and Mondari tribes interned in the city. As a result of those changes, the population of the city, despite the war, was successively growing. Extremely harsh conditions were prevailing in the city during the last war, particularly during the intensification of fights at the beginning of the 1990s. The city was besieged many times by the resistance movement; it was practically cut off from the outside world. The airport was the window to the world. Weapons, food and other necessities were all transported by air from Khartoum. People were forced to be self-sufficient. Everybody, regardless of their background, started to produce food or a small business. Men usually dealt with fishing, women with agriculture. All the empty space was cultivated. It was not an easy task; the areas near the river – best suited for this purpose – had been requisitioned by the army. At that time, food serving points and alcohol brewing flourished in the city, both monopolised by women. This was undoubtedly the most tragic period in the short history of the city, but it was nevertheless of colossal importance for the integration and strengthening of interpersonal contacts, often going across traditional descendances. Certain features of the urban ethos, such as entrepreneurship, industriousness or philanthropy, may also have to be connected with the time of the war.

Juba entered into the new century as a shabby little town, devastated by many years of war. Currently, it grows into a large city – nearly overnight – as the capital of autonomous southern provinces. This growth began rapidly after a period of

peace began in 2005.[19] The city was handed over to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Juba became a capital again; institutions of the autonomous government of South Sudan were installed (the Government of South Sudan, GoSS).[20] At the moment it is the largest political and administrative centre of Sudan after Khartoum. Since the armistice, Juba has housed representative offices of international aid organisations that operate in the entire region.[21] A huge administrative structure is also being created there, both central and local in nature. Moreover, the city plays a primary economic role in South Sudan, becoming a catalyst for the economic boom, financed mainly from funds coming from oil trade.

Contemporary Juba is composed of three districts (*payam*) that extend on the area of about thirteen kilometres from the centre (11,300 hectares): Juba Town, Munuki and Kator. Furthermore, there is Greater Juba, an area of considerably extended borders that covers villages in the radius of several dozen kilometres. In turn, Greater Juba is divided into four subunits: Dolo, Rejaf, Kowrijik and Lokiliri. What is characteristic of these subunits is that they are inhabited by the native peoples of this part of Equatoria: the Bari, Lokoya, Lolubo, Niambara, Mundari and Pajulu (Juba Assessment 2005: 8, Long Road Home 2008: 1). Moreover, Juba is divided into smaller units: quarters, called *hai* from Arabic. Each *hai* has its own name – usually of Arabic origin – and quite often pejorative in relation to the local population. The heart of Juba is made up of the following quarters: Juba Town, Hai Jalaba and Malakija, with the large Konjo Konjo market in the Juba Town district (Map 1). This is a city centre of sorts, of a highly urban nature. The remaining parts of the city were established relatively recently in result of systematic immigration of the rural population. These are satellite units of the city. Each of the quarters is in its own way independent and self-sufficient. A high degree of ruralisation is characteristic for all them. They apparently resemble a fully rural landscape. Juba is also a place to which former war migrants are heading. Although they do not stay here forever, they significantly shape the socio-cultural situation in the city. I discuss this issue in the next chapter.

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19 The peace agreement was finally made on 9 January 2005 in Kenya. Its signatories were the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government in Khartoum. It consists of a set protocols governing the relationships between the North and the South – especially the division of power and proceeds from the sale of oil – jointly referred to as the Agreement or the Naivasha Agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, www.unmis.org/English/cpa.htm).

20 Since 2005, Juba has also been the regional capital of the state of Central Equatoria and Juba County.

21 The "OCHA Camp," among others, is found in the city. This is a base of UN-related organisations or NGOs providing humanitarian aid in South Sudan.



Map 1. City plan based on UN OCHA IMU.

Juba: A City that Attracts Migrants

Migration to the City

Juba is a migration destination today. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the city has been flooded with migrants, which started in 2005 and reached its peak in 2007. Crowds of former refugees wander to Juba: those who stayed in camps in the borderlands between Kenya and Uganda and those displaced internally,[22] whom that war threw into different corners of Sudan.[23] Juba is only a stop for them on their way home or a place to wait for relatives from their village. Masses of rural people also head towards the city. In turn, they seek shelter and better living conditions since the countryside remains dangerous. Robbery attacks of organised bands are a common phenomenon. Outside the city, people still struggle with shortages of basic articles. Moreover, there is no water or medical care outside of Juba. Due to the condition of rural settlement and production infrastructure, the life of black South Sudanese will have to concentrate in cities for a while. In the case of Juba, the important fact is the availability of all sorts of assistance from international organisations whose seats – as I mentioned above – are located in the city. Another group are economic migrants, mostly people who work for state administration. This is a group of educated people, hungry for power and money. The fourth group of arrivals to Juba are foreigners – Africans and African Indians – attracted by lucrative businesses in the dynamically developing urban economy.

The assessment of the scale of migration is impossible – at least at present – as there are no official statistical data available, and the attention of aid

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22 Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) are people or entire groups of people who were forced to leave their homes as a result of an armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural disasters, and who have not crossed a state border (Motasim 2008: 2, qtd. after Cohen and Deng 1999). Their situation differs from that of refugees mostly due to the fact that they stay under the jurisdiction of the state that may be the direct reason for their exile. Hence, they may become objects of further negative actions. Sudan belongs to the countries with the largest number of internally displaced persons (more than 5 million; Motasim 2000: 2).

23 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, the Sudanese sought shelter in Uganda (204,400), Ethiopia (90,500), Kenya (74,000), Congo (69,400), Central African Republic (36,000) and Egypt (30,324; Return and Reintegration 2005: 9).

organisations mostly focuses on former refugees.[24] However, it is not difficult to notice that in 2005–2007 the number of citizens of Juba increased several times and – at the moment – amounts to several hundred thousand. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in 1993 the city was inhabited by 114,980 people so as to increase in 2005 to about 163,000. At the moment, the number of citizens is estimated at half a million (Juba, Wau and Malakal 2007: 28). There will be more and more of them, since tens if not hundreds of thousand people will still return.[25]

Juba is a city whose overwhelming majority are recent migrants. Their number is staggering. However, no one can clearly state how many people settled in the city after 2005.[26] In 2009, there was still no answer to that question. The situation is a repetition of the inter-war period (1973–1983). Then, migrants constituted more than two-thirds of the total number of Juba citizens (Hill 1981: 129).

However, in the case of contemporary Juba, urbanisation is mainly driven not by provincials (rural-urban migration) but above all by refugees and internally displaced persons. At present, many recent migrants still have rural roots, but their migration to the city was preceded by a longer or shorter wandering; in the case of many it meant temporary residence in another urban centre. The majority of former asylum seekers in Juba have such an experience.

On the example of Juba, we can observe how migration processes to African cities has changed during the last few decades. Earlier, the tone was set by the migration of the rural population, while now it is rather produced masses of returning former refugees. This is a problem in the majority of countries on the continent. In 2007, some two million refugees decided to return to their homeland, mostly to Burundi, Congo, Liberia and South Sudan (the UNHCR, Regional Operations Profile-Africa). This problem is often wrongly brought down to

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24 The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS/RRR) estimate the number of refugees to be around 2 million in the entire country. Most of them go in the first place to Juba (Long Road Home 2008: 5).

25 In February 2007, the International Organisation for Migration recorded 500,000 people ready to return to South Sudan in Khartoum alone (*The Juba Post*, 2007 Vol. 3, issue 7). In turn, according to Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) data, there are about 170,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda (Vuni 2007).

26 In 2005, on the basis of aerial photographs, Juba population was estimated at a bit more than 163,000, in 2006 humanitarian organisations determined the population at about 250,000. At the turn of April and May 2008, a census was carried out throughout the country. However, its results were officially rejected by the South Sudanese authorities. In 2009, it was said unofficially that the city had more than one million inhabitants.

humanitarian aspects – which do not exceed the "final stage" of re-settlement – while it is much broader and with much more serious consequences (Cohen and Deng 1999, Merkx 2000, Nilsson 2000, Agier 2002). One of these consequences undoubtedly are the urbanisation processes that now occur in Africa. Moreover, forced displacement contributes to deep socio-economic transformations. A new society emerges based on a specific identification, models of behaviour and culture.

Economic pressure is not the current main motive for migration to cities, as it once was. It seems that in the case of former asylum seekers, it is culture that decides: affiliation with a typical city lifestyle. Former refugees are basically people who were already partially "urbanised." This is the effect of specific conditions of life in exile. Suffice it to mention here the fact of living in a camp, within a specific space in which we are dealing with "a relatively large, compact and fixed settlement of socially-diversified individuals" (Wirth 1979, after Agier 2002: 322). This is a reality resembling a city, one that is quasi-urban in spatial, social and economic terms. This a *camp-ville* (Agier's phrase), a "camp urban community," in which within a strictly determined territory, one meets people with different ethnic or social backgrounds, builds a network of social relationships or is forced to entrepreneurship; shortly speaking, one becomes a participant of a model urban community. For the majority of former South Sudanese displaced persons, city life is not a new experience. The problem, at most, are differences in living standards between their places of departure and Juba. They often had better living conditions in internment camps. The emergence of seeds of urbanism in the peripheries is a broader phenomenon because it is connected with the general cultural changes that happen as a result of globalisation.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

For nearly half a century, Africa has been struggling with the growing problem of refugees,[27] present in the majority of countries of that continent. The problem of

27 "A refugee is a person who has left his/her country of affiliation or residence due to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion and who has lost protection from the country of habitual residence or country of affiliation" (Nowa Encyklopedia PWN 2004). The basis for all sorts of aspects of the phenomenon are two legal acts *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (1951) and *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* (1967), both available on the UNHCR website (www. unhcr.org).

refugees is often unjustly boiled down to humanitarian aspects, while it is actually a much broader, and with much more serious consequences. The problem of refugees overlaps with a broad spectrum of economic, political or cultural phenomena. What is more, it contributes to deep socio-economic changes. A new society is being created based on a specific identification, models of behaviour and culture.

Within the last decades, the approach to the problem of refugees has changed radically. For years, the refugees and internally displaced persons have been treated thoroughly negatively, as anomalies of social life or – using Mary Douglas's term – as "displaced objects" (cf. Motasim 2008, Nilsson 2000). "Functionalists" considered refugees and forced migrants to be "anomalies" in the stable model of settled societies (Agier 2002, after Motasim 2008: 3, Grabska 2006, Nilsson 2000 et al.) What is more, refugeeship was diagnosed not so much as a cultural problem but more as a psychological problem (Motasim 2008). Therefore, all sorts of asylum seeker were treated as people with trauma, weak, suffering from all sorts of identity disorders; shortly speaking, as unable to decide about their own fate. Of course, this had a considerable impact on the perception of the phenomenon, especially on the aid projects addressed to forced migrants. In the 1990s, this "paradigm" underwent a fundamental change. The accelerating globalisation brought about serious changes in the social sciences and humanities in theorising about modernity and post-modernity. Suffice it to mention here the works of postmodernist anthropologists such as Appadurai, Clifford, Hannerz, Said, Robertson and many others. All of them in unison criticised how we perceive people in the globalised world: as permanently assigned to places or structures, with all manifestations of their mobility considered as anomalies and phenomena with a negative effect (cf. Donnan and Wilson 2007, Appadurai 2005, Giddens 2001). In the anthropological discourse, these ideas have been popularised by Richard O'Brien's phrase "the end of geography," i.e. the liberation of modern man from spatial limitations and affiliations (Pucek 2005: 13). Human existence in the area of postmodernity – if not always – is characterised by variability; it is a dynamic process which – echoing distinguished American anthropologist Victor Turner (2005: 16) – is characterised by *becoming* and not by *being*. This "new" view on human existence in the era of impetuous globalisation was further perfectly presented by Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (2007) in *Transnational Connections*.

In studies on refugees, the new trends proved particularly inspiring. Hence, scholars observed that a large group of such phenomena does not entail the eradication, disintegration or loss of identity. Resettlement and forced migration are to be connected now with general tendencies on the African continent;

for example, growth in the spatial mobility of citizens whose consequences are complex and not necessarily negative (Munzoul 2003: 104, 105, Malkki 1995: 504–512). A refugee is more and more often perceived not as a wastrel but an entrepreneurial, cosmopolitan or simply resourceful person, who in the face of increasing difficulties, finds a solution tailored to own needs and abilities and can turn a negative life situation in the right direction (cf. Elnur 2009, Assal 2003, Nilsson 2000).

Sudan was both a country of exile and a place of refuge for people from almost all the neighbouring countries, and even those not bordering Sudan (e.g. Somalia). This is particularly true of the southern provinces. Since the 1960s, apart from short periods of peace, a civil war was pending there. In 1983–2005, the years of the Second Sudanese Civil War, about 600,000 Sudanese saved themselves by fleeing to neighbouring African countries and more than four million found refuge in other parts of Sudan. At the same time, citizens of the neighbouring countries sought shelter in Sudan. In the 1970s and 1980s, when a brutal war was raging in Ethiopia, many of its citizens fled to Sudan. At a certain moment, the number of refugees from Ethiopia who had taken refuge in Sudan exceeded one million people. Since the 1970s, the number of refugees in the South of Sudan from Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia or Uganda was also growing.[28] These were waves of migration after migration. When the situation in the home country stabilised, the migrants returned home (cf. Hill 1981).

Following the signing of the peace agreements in 2005 and the end of war in South Sudan, what increased was the migration of the Congolese and inhabitants from the border areas of the Central African Republic to this region. The reason for this was the activity of Ugandan guerrilla forces: the Lord's Resistance Army. The number of refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea is also growing in this region. South Sudan is again becoming a refuge for Africans from neighbouring countries.[29] Among other things, this happens because Sudan constitutes a very interesting case for the studies on migrations in Africa. Despite political instability

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28 In 2007, refugees and asylum seekers in the entire Sudan were estimated at 296,000. A substantial majority of them were the Eritreans (230,000), then the Chadians, Ethiopians, Ugandans or Congolese (Socioeconomic and political dimensions 2010).

29 Suffice it to mention that during the colonial times, South Sudan very often provided shelter for citizens of neighbouring territories that were under the more oppressive rule of the French or Belgians. Cf. Holt 1961.

and local conflicts, it accepts a constant number of refugees from abroad.[30] What is more, refugees from countries where the standard of life is on a much lower level (e.g. Uganda) have been migrating to Sudan for several decades now. Of course, this is partially due to Khartoum's weakness in controlling national borders. However, it also results from a clear and coherent migration law. This does not mean that all asylum seekers in Sudan enjoy full rights under the Geneva Convention of 1951. However, they can count on some support, namely the tolerance of authorities and normal citizens regarding employment or permanent residence (Socioeconomic and political dimensions 2010).

"Returnees" as Migrants to the City of Juba

The notion of a "former refugee" is hardly precise; it refers to a relatively broad group of people with a very different background; who often share only the fact of coming back to their homeland after years of emigration. And so, they included representatives of South Sudanese diaspora who live as far as in the USA or Cuba (Long Road Home 2008: 6). Their return is often only a reconnaissance or also an introduction to a political or economic career. Above all, however, these are the former refugees from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda or Congo – both people staying in camps in the borderlands – and Internally Displaced People (IDP) whom wars threw into various corners of Sudan.[31] For them, as I mentioned above, Juba is only a stop on their way home or a place to wait for relatives. Only ten percent originate from Juba (Long Road Home 2008: 6). Most of these people come from various regions of Equatoria and decide to stay in Juba due to different opportunities. A strong factor pushing them to return is a hope for the improvement of their material situation in the new democratic Sudan, Juba in particular. Finally, it is getting rid of the stigma of asylum seekers with the simultaneous application of skills acquired abroad. This is an opinion of the majority of former refugees who migrate to the city. At the same time, the migrants do not give up their plans to "return home." However, they first want to earn some money. This is a returning element of their plans. Only the young generation openly rejects plans to return to the countryside. The perspective of returning to the countryside

30 Sudan has nearly 300,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time, 636,800 people has a refugee status in the neighbouring countries (Socioeconomic and political dimensions 2010).

31 According to UNHCR data, the Sudanese sought shelter in Uganda, (204,400), Ethiopia (90,500), Kenya (74,000), Congo (69, 400), Central African Republic (36,000) and Egypt (30,324; Return and Reintegration 2005: 9).

frightens them. They are particularly attached to city life. The former refugees most of all fear repatriation, which in most cases means returning to rural life. Educated abroad, they hardly know their homeland. They do not have good feelings about such a return. For them, Juba seems to be an optimal opportunity to continue the life they became accustomed to during exile.

Moreover, larger groups of migrants are reaching the city. Their journey is organised and coordinated by humanitarian missions and region authorities. In 2008, an increase in that type of repatriation occurred. The reason for it was a population census and the accompanying political pressure.[32] However, this type of repatriation does not enjoy popularity. The "returnees" were convincing me that they had not taken advantage of the possibility of returning offered by humanitarian organisations and the state due to the sluggishness of those kind of actions. However, the truth may be different, too. Many returnees were simply afraid of a forcible return home. They did not see their future in a return to a traditional ethnic community. Instead, individual repatriation provides former asylum seekers with a possibility to choose their place of residence.

The influx of "returnees" to Juba happens mostly spontaneously. From the beginning to the end, the returnees organise their returns on their own and can count for the support of assistance organisations, particularly the UNHCR, only after having been registered on site. Then, a repatriate may receive a tent or other utensils necessary to survive – but *not food*. They receive food rations only for some time from the World Food Program.

The return of an average former refugee – now a repatriate – is rarely planned. One simply decides to return. He does not heed the opinion of family or employer. Without saying anything to anyone, he heads home. At the beginning, he conducts a reconnaissance. On site, he seeks relatives and in the case of people coming from the city: a family home. When the situation stabilises – meaning he finds own accommodation– he brings his family in. I will deal with this topic more broadly in one of the following chapters. The Internet or social media – Facebook in particular – have begun to play an increasingly important role in the planning of a return or any longer trip. It is impossible not to mention mobile

32 According to UNHCR data, since 2005, a total of around 14,500 former refugees have reached Juba, including 2510 in organised groups, 59 through assisted self-repatriation and 11,840 through spontaneous return. The data do not cover the returnees from Khartoum. Since 2007, their number has been estimated at about 9700 (The Long Road Home 2008: 6). These data, however, do not reflect the truth. It is obvious for everyone that the number of returnees in the city is many times higher. The lack of more accurate statistical data results mostly from the nature of the returns.

phones at this point. In fact, all these tools provide migrants with all the information they require. Thanks to them, they can plan their journey down to the tiniest detail, from choosing a route to accommodation on site. The Internet also facilitates making first acquaintances or enables contacting relatives.

Former refugees initially settle on the outskirts of Juba's suburban districts, such as Munuki or Kator, which are experiencing the greatest population growth. In the area of Dar as Salam in Hai Munuki, the number of migrants has exceeded the number of settled inhabitants. For larger groups, temporary camps are being created, which are refugee camps. These are also their toponyms; they demonstrate the origin of the people living there, in this case the place of recent internment. With time, they become homely. Tents change into round huts made of clay and bulrush. Shops are opened on site, and most importantly, there appears a local market. This is a manifestation of normality. With time, the migrants start wandering into the city. The point is to move as close to the city centre as possible. Life is lighter there in every respect. Moving to any of the quarters of the proper city is treated in terms of social promotion.

First Accommodation

An individual migrant spends his first days in a tent or in the open. He takes advantage of the hospitality of a relative or an ethnic fellow. With time, due to obvious reasons, he tries to procure himself with a more reliable roof over his head, particularly when –in the meantime – his wife and children turn up. Sooner or later, everyone faces a dilemma of finding own accommodation. In 2005, it was not especially difficult; at least not as difficult as today. The migrant could have decided to rent a house and even find one in city centre quarters. Rents were low. After the war, the city was depopulated. However, the situation changed quickly. Prices soared drastically, forcing even settled dwellers to move out.

This is what happened to one of my interview partners. In 2008, after years of living in the city, he was forced to move out by a drastic increase of rent. The fact that the house owner was his fellow tribesman did not help. After several years, tribe affinity ceased to have any significance whatsoever. He moved to the absolute end of the city, to Gudeli, a region that only recently started to be developed. At the moment, rents are the lowest over there. Like most migrants, he cannot afford to buy a plot in the city.

Another of my interlocutors, a repatriate from Kenya, had to abandon his first dwelling even earlier. He took advantage of the hospitality of his "uncle," a

high-ranking officer of the SPLA (Southern Political Liberation Army).[33] Despite appearances, the situation at home was unenviable. The uncle offered accommodation to many like him. He slept in a tent still purchased in Nairobi. After several months, my interview partner had to leave the uncle's house. His place was taken by another relative who just turned up in the city. For some time, he managed to put up a tent in the close vicinity of the airport; only there, on a swampy plain, was a chance to find a vacant and free piece of land. After several more months, he started to live with a group of Dinka, "brothers" from the same "age group"[34] as he.

The returnees who have their homes in Juba or who – due to various reasons – managed to come into possession of a plot are in a totally different situation. Ownership problems are extremely important and interesting alike, and I will deal with them in the next chapter, among other matters.

33 The resistance movement of South Sudan from the times of the civil war; at the moment the main military formation of South Sudan.

34 This is an additional method of age-based identification; it is characteristic of the majority of pastoral societies of Tropical Africa. I write more about it below.

Spatial Structures

The Dialectics of Space

In Africa, space is assigned a slightly different meaning than in Europe. In Africa, the perception of cultural space is different, perhaps broader, simply unlimited. Markets, traffic arteries, residential districts, sacred places and even undeveloped spaces belong to a complex network of social relationships. Life happens outside, beyond the four walls of one's house. Space receives a particularly strong dimension in a modern African city. There, the importance of this phenomenon is best seen. An African lives, works, and rests in autonomous enclaves of the city. Their diversity seems to have no limits. The enclaves are cities within cities. Sometimes, they differ quite considerably from one another. There are cosmopolitan, commercial and residence zones, along with districts of poverty, in which life means a decisive step backwards compared to rural areas. Success in the urban environment depends on access to public spaces: markets, all sorts of institutions or main roads. It is there where life truly happens. These are zones of social interactions that in a real manner determine the frameworks of human existence. We already know that a modern African city is informal in such sectors as housing, right to land or economy. This is a response to the crisis of state structures and the realities of free market. In Africa, we commonly see the bottom-up phenomenon of building the urban space by its citizens. Therefore, let us now consider African urbanisation processes from the viewpoint of its participants.

In this chapter, I will present selected aspects of urban landscape transformations that happen under the influence of violent urbanisation processes by using the analytical perspective of space. I will focus on the most important fragments of the city tissue, from the perspective of life strategies. I will be interested in how people change the urban space under the influence of violent urbanisation, how they adapt it and whether they use it to satisfy material and social needs.

In anthropology, we know many instruments that enable theorising about culture. One of them is the dialectics of space. Maybe one of the first to pay attention to space as an analytical tool was the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). Henri Lefebvre, famous French philosopher and sociologist, the author of the well-known *The Production of Space* (1991[1974]), was also a supporter of this approach. This scholar initiated the first research programme on space. According to Lefebvre, (social) space is to be treated as a product and at the same time as a tool expressing ideas and action. Space is to be a means of production,

but also of control, power and domination (Lefebve 1991: 26). However, only the 1990s introduced permanent interest in the category of space. At the end of the twentieth century, postmodernist scholars like David Harvey, Edward Soja or Anssi Paasi started interpreting space in a similar way as history, on the one hand, and social relations and institutions on the other hand (Paasi 2003, qtd. after Engel and Nugent 2010: 2). This approach today inspires specialists who represent various fields of science. A specific turn towards space is visible, among other fields, in history, sociology, philosophy or geography. In the first place, however, it is characteristic of contemporary anthropology. Noteworthy, the interest in this category is not new at all. Anthropologists have been interested in spatial aspects of traditional cultures for a long time. Ethnographic monographs included descriptions of landscape or material conditions of human existence, sometimes in great detail; in short, they have dealt with the territorial base of culture. The notion of space and location also has a long tradition in the political sciences. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, space has been integrally linked with the notion of the national state, an area in which specific political power is exercised; that is, the state as an analytical unit. At the end of the twentieth century, the re-conceptualisation of the notion of space occurred; among other things, a conviction was criticised that the world is composed of territorial units ("territorial trap;" Paasi 2005). Scientists representing "new political geography" like Anssi Paasi have outstanding achievements in this regard. According to Paasi and other representatives of this new school, space is nothing given or fixed, but it is subject to ongoing changes: processes of creation, reproduction and destruction made by individual and social actions (Paasi 2005).

Today, the perspective of space is decisively more important than ever, quite often having a priority in interpreting cultural realities. The change is not so much a matter of paying more attention to this category but of the conviction that space is one of the basic components of the socio-cultural theory (Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2004: 1).

At present, a "spatialisation" inspires all of the humanities and social sciences (for Polish context, see Banaszkiewicz and Czech 2010, Jałowiecki and Szczepański 2009). All of them try to answer one question: how does man use space? And so, David Harvey, Manuel Castells or Seth Low treat space as an arena of conflict of diverse powers, often culturally, economically or socially antagonised. Suffice it to mention the issue of "minarets" in Switzerland, "Polish houses" in Belarus. World events demonstrate that space is a zone of contestation ("contestation space") in which concentrate social tensions. Africa is no exception. In this context, we may interpret the problems of modern Somalia: the actual disintegration of the Somali state into three separate organisms. The post-election conflict

in Kenya in 2007–2008 also disclosed all its power in the territorial dimension; at that time, it became an arena of battle for political influence, but also a huge mobilising factor (Engel and Nugent 2010: 3). A similar case occurred with the so-called Arab Spring. The revolution happened literally on the streets of Middle Eastern cities. Urban space became a tool of struggle for power, as in the case of the "Tahrir square uprising." The rebellion won because its participants managed to keep control of the main squares and transport arteries. These turned out to be weapons in their fight for power. For Michel Foucault (2001), there is a close link between power and space. The human body, space arrangements or architecture are treated as tools of exercising power: a spatial sewage system of daily life. This point of view is shared by Paul Rabinow (1995 [1989]) who combines architecture with political phenomena. He shows how the French colonial power used architecture to demonstrate the civilisational superiority of francophone culture (Low 2005: 113), for example with modernist architecture of "new cities" versus the traditionalism of medinas in colonial North Africa. This thread is developed by American anthropologist James Holston (1989), who considers social housing in Brasilia as a new form of political domination (Low 2005: 113). Pierre Bourdieu (1998, 2003) also explores the threat of domination, but he is particularly interested in how social arrangements are expressed in the architecture of the Algeria-based Kabyle people. And so, Bourdieu interpreted the Kabyle house as a model in which bodily and cosmic order are metaphorically integrated at the same time, they co-inhabit a series of dualistic categories: male/female, private/public, day/night, under/above, right/left. Therefore, through a spatial symbolism, social structures undergo naturalisation or embodiment (Low 2005: 114, Bourdieu 1998, Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003).

As I signalled above, urban space acquires a particularly strong dimension in urbanised centres as cultural melting pots and places of ongoing interaction of various social and cultural factors. According to Seth Low (2005), culture in the city undergoes "spatialising;" it sets itself, both physically and metaphorically, in the socio-cultural space of the city (Low 2005: 111). In the case of Africa, the "spatialisation" is inseparably connected with radical changes in urban morphology and processes of re-management: the informalisation of particular spheres of life, especially of housing, land rights and the economy. At the same time, city culture results from the impact of traditional cultural patterns that give special meaning to space.

When using the notion of space, we must emphasise that it is socially generated. The space that surrounds us is no longer the work of nature – but of people. People use space to create optimal living conditions for themselves in villages, cities, arable land, or factories. These are technical and useable goods with which

the world is filled. Space is also social following forms of human activities like work or rest. Moreover, this phenomenon has a symbolic dimension: space is a meaningful zone, which means it possesses a specific sense, and it is subject to the process of judgement valuation (Jałowiecki and Szczepański 2002: 304, 322–336). Due to the aforementioned phenomena, space may be perceived from two mutually complementary perspectives: the social *production* of space and the social *construction* of space. The former covers all these factors: social, economic, ideological or technological – which serve people to create a material basis for life. In turn, the *interpretation of space* refers to symbolic and phenomenological experiencing of space that expresses itself indirectly in such social processes as exchange, conflict and power (Low 2005: 112).[35] One may analyse the urban space of Juba from such a perspective, and it will provide an insight into the cultural processes that happen there, along with their consequences for an average person's life.

Juba is a city under continuous creation. During the last war, it belonged to the hostile, oppressive world. In its essence, Juba's functioning was directed against the local population, subordinated to police and propaganda objectives: it was a symbol of state persistence within the rebellious area. Literally – but also metaphorically – Juba became a "degraded space." At the moment, we may observe the process of a novel cultural space being created in the city. New inhabitants create fresh "urban geography;" they categorise and reinterpret urban space. Spontaneous urbanisation processes mark Juba's design and its organisation. The efforts and aspirations of ordinary people materialise. We register the process of their growing into the urban environment on the basis of space: the urbanisation of migrants. Social, political or cultural changes can be seen in the urban

35 The notion of "space" may be understood in many ways. Above all, this concept has a geographical and social (cultural) dimension. The boundary between the two dimensions is very vague and fluid; in some respects, as it is in the case of "nature" and "culture." For R. D. Sack, "space" means what is "out there," i.e. everything defined and shaped by culture (Howard and Shain 2005: 27, after Sack 1997). In turn, according to Donnan and Wilson (2007: 25), space is a conceptual map according to which social life is organised. Space is to be the place of human life, encompassing both ideas and a real order by referring to where specific things are located. For Howard and Shain (2005: 27), such an understanding of space is too restrictive. Instead, they propose to perceive space in three dimensions: (1) literally, as the territory within which people move; (2) as a "social space" that is generated physically, mentally, and through interaction with others; and (3) as an abstract representation, such as a "region," constituted by specialists on the basis of selected specific properties.

landscape. The growth of social inequalities or phenomena of exclusion can be interpreted through the prism of changes in city space. They are excellent objects to observe socio-cultural changes under the influence of urbanisation processes. This perspective provides a possibility to have an insight into the formation of local urbanism in its spatial dimension. Moreover, this becomes a space for efforts aimed at adapting to a new environment or organising one's life. Illegal development, traditional housing or informal service points are manifestations of these activities. At the same time, diversified life experiences emerge. In the case of former refugees or internally displaced persons, these are often cultural changes that occurred during their exile. Thus, observing changes in city landscape gives them an insight into the complex process of its formation.

The Legal Situation of Urban Lands: "Struggle for the Rights to the City"

In Juba, like in many rapidly developing urban centres in Africa, the main problem is housing deficit. There is extreme asymmetry between housing needs and the actually existing infrastructure. The authorities of most African cities – and Juba is not an exception here – seek to at least satisfy the current housing needs of citizens. There is no holistic spatial development strategy that could effectively react to impetuous urbanisation processes, especially the sudden influx of immigrants.

Moreover, problems of legal nature persist. Anachronous and mostly ineffective land regulations are generally responsible for the situation in which housing stabilisation is an unattainable goal for the decisive majority of city dwellers, not only the poorest. All this affects the progressing informalisation of life in terms of housing, ownership rights and sanitation infrastructure. The distinctive manifestation of this is illegal and unregistered settlement – *squatter settlement* – which is an expression of citizens' helplessness, as they are nearly always forced to find solutions on their own.

The system in force in Juba is based on lease of plots from the state, which excludes land ownership (Juba Assessment 2005: 14). A citizen may receive a plot of land for lease from the city in one of three parts of the city (Juba Town, Kator and Munuki). Different land category is valid in each part, which affects plot size, rental fees tariffs and even development type (Table 1). And so, within the city centre – the so-called Juba Town – there is a regular intersecting network of streets and bricked development on spacious, quadrilateral plots (Figure 1). This is a residential and commercial space. However, most importantly, this is the most urbanised part of the city – intended for settled citizens permanently

employed within municipal structures like administration or trade. The Kator and Munuki districts are basically second and third category lands. Mixed development (traditional and modern) is permitted there, the area has been partially divided into blocks of flats which form settlement fragments of a regular plan. This is a living space of the native population, once residents of rural areas. Kator and especially Munuki are worlds still strongly connected with the rural way of life.

The system – widely met in Africa – remains the outcome of colonisers' policy to control the development of city populations, especially to keep a specific stratification of citizens and their "clients:" the unadapted rural population is often treated in this place as necessary evil. In Juba, the system prevails at its best like nothing every changed. In principle, the system is responsible for the uncontrolled development of the city, especially the existence of huge disproportions among different parts of the city, which in turn, indirectly contributes to the pauperisation of a part of the urban oecumene. All investments in infrastructure still focus on the city centre. Peripheries are left to themselves, as belonging to a completely different reality than the urban one. In such a way resurface former colonial politics. What is more, the current system does not function as it should. Suffice it to say that no new lands are demarcated for development. The last action of this type was carried out in 1997. Back then, plots of land were demarcated in the area of Gudel, at the north-western edge of the city. However, the city has grown enormously since then, and this area is unable to satisfy its current housing needs. The deficit of land, with binding legal regulations, generates corruption and high prices.

Table 1. Plot classification.

CLASS	PLOT SIZE	LEASE TERM	MATERIAL	ANNUAL FEES PER PARCEL
Class 1	650–900 m^2	50 years (+30)	Permanent	USD 50
Class 2	500–635 m^2	30 years (+20)	Basic	USD 37.5
Class 3	300–400 m^2	20 years (+10)	Removable	USD 25

Source: Long Road Home 2008.

There is a large disparity between government and market lease prices. In 2005, the cost of a class three plot (20x20 metres) was $400, while in 2008 it was as much as $10,000–15,000 (Long Road Home 2008: 32). People buy the right to lease land from profiteers – who often have no title to the land or real estate – or acquire it from tribal chiefs. According to customary rules and the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, land not belonging to the state is owned by the local community, i.e. the Bari people. All decisions in this matter have to be consulted with representatives of this community. Thus, if one acquired rights to build a house – expecting at the same time that in the future the land status will change – it will be entered into the register as belonging to the city and not the tribal community. However, in the light of law these tenants remain squatters, that is dwellers who occupy the site illegally. Very often, there appears a situation in which two lawful owners start a land dispute. During the war, the central government used the land at its own discretion, partially ignoring earlier legal acts. It gave land to people loyal to Khartoum. The unregulated status of large parts of lands creates other problems. Quite often, I observed the following scenario: a returning citizen met new tenants in his own home. Although he was convinced that he had lived there before 1983, he had no notarial evidence to prove it. Most frequently, he could not have it as the land was not officially in zoning plans. Cases of forced removal from plots by "unidentified" perpetrators also occur. Single women are especially exposed to that sort of abuse. Referring to Muslim regulations, they are considered without any rights to possess real estate. In such a case, the woman is practically helpless, even more so as the new elites – nearly always linked to the SPLM and the Dinka community – turn out to be their enemy. Many of those land grabbers are former members of the resistance movement. They treat land in the city as a payment for having taken part in the victorious movement. They argue that they fought for that land so they are now entitled to it. They deserve it. Regular unrests occur on this ground, often with a tragic end. At the moment, land is the basic plane of fight for influence, which in the case of Juba, is waged between the Bari and the foreigners; that is, mostly influential newcomers, but originating from the Dinka. For the former, land constitutes one of the last bulwarks of economic and political position. The Bari are aware that authority structures have already been monopolised and the battle moved into the economy. The possible loss will become their final marginalisation. This fact considerably affects the spatial development of the city. The Baris disagree to sell land to the city. The land conflict also occurs in the context of transition from community to individual forms of ownership. The process seems unavoidable, as it is connected with the rapid development of the city. At the moment, however, we come across both forms of ownership.

In Juba the struggle for land assumes its sharpest form in all of the post-war South Sudan. The city, in fact, is the arena of struggle for land within the entire region. For example, a conflict broke out between the SPLA and the Madi community in October 2008 in Nimule. A high-ranking officer (Dinka by origin!) sold tribal land to a businessman from Somalia. A message of the event

immediately reached the city, where an anti-government (anti-Dinka) manifestation was organised. I must emphasise here that the war brought about serious changes in the ethnic geography of the South. Entire tribes changed their seats depending on the situation on the front. At present, repatriates are finding other tenants in their homes, who have already settled in them and have no intention of moving.

However, let us come back to the problem of lands in the city. In Africa, illegal settlements take on the following forms: (1) illegal occupancy that affects both public and private property; (2) the illegal use of land in the light of official spatial policy; and (3) constructing or using properties against valid legal regulations (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 9). In Juba, we see all varieties of these phenomena. In fact, every empty space in Juba has already been occupied by squatters. They even annexed lands or properties belonging to public institutions: schools, churches, even ministries. The division of plots and allocation for various – most frequently commercial – purposes became widespread. Since no one actually takes the construction law into consideration. Various structures – from a toilet to a petrol station – are constructed as simply as possible, with the use of the cheapest and most easily available materials. Smaller and larger areas of illegal development spread from city centre areas to the peripheries quite distant from the centre. But they do not make up any homogenous sociocultural complex. This includes slums areas. The same regards the social infrastructure: there are ethnically (or culturally) homogenous areas, often inhabited by former migrants, and there are multicultural areas with many more settlers.

In the city, we deal with an informal war for land, with a diversified set of actors. On the one hand, the parties to the conflict are ethnic groups, on the other hand, the state and squatters – illegal tenants – who dominate the city. In the first case, the authorities try to act as a mediator – due to their dominating ethnic nature – with little success. In the latter case, the authorities are determined to act so as to physically remove illegal development from the city landscape.

Citizens of Juba – like in other African cities – break administrative and political barriers by developing wild settlement and construction. Authority structures run an ambiguous policy in relation to those phenomena: they may approach them indifferently or even friendly, if they care for the people's sympathy, that is. Often, however, illegal settlements and developments become a source of direct conflict between the local authorities and ordinary people (Konings, van Dijk and Foeken 2006). A decisive action to remove illegal owners was initiated by the authorities in the first half of 2009. The city "clean-up" action covered clusters of illegal development in the area of Na-Bari ("Tonpiny"), Mere Lotor ("Jebel Dinka") and in the vicinity of the mausoleum of Vice President Garanga.

The area was levelled with the use of heavy equipment and uniformed services, while their citizens were chased away. As a result of those actions, 20,000–25,000 people lost their homes. Despite the appeals of aid organisations, the authorities did not provide them with alternative housing. In the officials’ opinion, they were mostly former rural migrants or refugees whose presence in the city was problematic, or even undesirable.

Rather extensive literature about this matter shows that access to land for housing purposes has become particularly difficult in view of the rapidly growing population of African cities. This fact is responsible for the informalisation of the major part of urban spaces in Africa. In other words, informal development or land management is a characteristic feature of each African city (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 7–25, Konings, van Dijk and Foeken 2006).

Housing is an area in which frictions between the authorities and ordinary people – formal and informal structures – are most visible. Despite such decisive actions of the authorities as the forcible eviction of illegal tenants, hopes for the final resolution of the problem are bleak. The evicted do not disappear from the city landscape for good but build their quarters in other parts of town instead, where they attract less attention from the authorities, for now. This is proven, for example, by the case of the Customs market, dominated by traders from neighbouring African countries. In 2007, the market was liquidated as illegal, but also as inappropriate for one of the most sacred places in the city: the mausoleum of Vice President Garanga. It was obvious for everyone that the action was aimed at illegal foreign traders who are currently making fortunes in Juba. People accuse foreign traders of all evil – from unemployment to prostitution and diseases like AIDS – while forgetting that, without them, many necessities would be unavailable or would cost a fortune. The Customs market ceased to exist, so a huge undeveloped space suddenly appeared in the heart of the city. However, illegal trade did not disappear from the city. It moved to other parts of Juba. This gave rise to ambivalent consequences from the viewpoint of view of an ordinary person. On the one hand, trade reached areas previously devoid of various trade exchange. On the other hand, product prices rose sharply. From the point of view of the local authorities, it was a success to acquire land in a very attractive location of the city. However, this did not solve the issue of trade businesses belonging to foreigners. What is more, the city made it difficult for itself to control this process, including deriving informal profits. I will write more about this market below.

We may assume that the "right to the city" idea is manifested in such actions as those presented above:[36] the need of ordinary citizens to control the process of "city creation" and at the same time – of its operations; that is, "physical access, residing and using the urban space" (Purcell 2002, qtd. after Korling 2009: 2). This process can be seen as an expression of a bottom-up democratisation of urban life, being a reaction to the marginalisation of entire segments of the society (Amin and Thrift 2002, qtd. after Korling 2009: 2).

Formal and Informal Structures

The "City"

This is a historical and financial core of the city: the very centre, with commercial services, still remembering the British rule. It covers the area of the market, a road and several crossroads on the opposite side (Figure 2). The centre is flanked by two impressive mosques from two sides. Closer to the river is the *soi-disant* "mosque of merchants" (al Atiq Mosque), which is the oldest Muslim temple in the city, built in 1939 for Muslim traders. On the opposite side resides a decisively younger but grander building, commonly referred to as the "mosque of politicians." Juba Town's market is not particularly impressive, though it grew nearly double in the years 2007 and 2008. The market is mainly a transport hub, linking the city centre with two large city markets: the Customs market and Konjo Konjo. The place is also a base of catering and service facilities for the citizens working near the centre. Hence why the range of goods offered here is not particularly diversified. Only basic foods and industrial products are sold here. On the opposite side of the road, the most important commercial and service points of the city are located on several streets: banks, currency exchange offices, forwarding and logistics companies, airline offices, food wholesalers, points officering IT services and several popular catering outlets. This is the area belonging to foreigners, mostly Muslims from the North and, recently, more and more other foreigners who sensed an upturn in the economy in the city (Indians, citizens of the Middle East or neighbouring African countries).

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36 "The right to the city" appears for the first time in the work of Henrie Lefevbre *Le Droit a la ville* from 1968. In recent years, the slogan has been re-discovered by geographer and sociologist David Harvey, who defines it not so much as the right of an ordinary citizen to city benefits but as their complete control over the city. Only in this way, a modern urbanisation model may be friendly and just for an average person (Harvey 2009[1973]).

Hai Jalaba

Hai Jalaba is a residential district established many years ago by wealthy Arab traders who did business in the neighbouring Juba Town. This part of the city is characterised by wide streets and a regular layout. Houses are located quite sparsely, on spacious parcels. They are also rather commodious. They are rectangular, ground-floor structures built of stone or red brick. In the design of particular rooms, they demonstrate clear Islamic influences (the separation of genders). The district was most successfully developing in the 1950s. It was also then when it grew considerably. At that time, foreigners settled there, among them a group of Greek construction workers. Until today, several descendants of those immigrants live there. During the war, in the 1980s and 1990s, the area fell into disrepair and was nearly depopulated. Within years, the district changed its ethnic character. The majority of original citizens left, renting out their houses to the new city elite. At the moment, the local rich, high-level officials, ministers, military men and businessmen took a special liking to the area, one rarely witnesses ordinary people living here. This is an ethnically mixed area, although one cannot fail to notice that it is gradually yielding to one ethnic element: the Dinka. There is nothing strange in it as, now, they are the most influential inhabitants of the city, holding high positions in the army and administration. This is one of the reasons why rents here are breaking record highs. The average rent in this area is several hundred dollars a month, and it is said that in some cases the tenant has to pay two thousand US dollars. In general, none of the tenants is particularly concerned about this. Most of them are people employed in high-ranking state positions. The money for renting a house and buying and maintaining a luxury off-road vehicle comes from the public purse.

Despite the seeming prestige, life is not easy here. The area is far removed from its past glory. It is only partially electrified, and most must rely on own electric power generating unit. It is even worse with running water and sewage system. The condition of the houses leaves a lot to be desired. Everything clearly bears the marks of war. Most houses are usually deprived of old stone fences and have incomplete roofing. There is a large group of buildings among them that is nothing more than a pile of rubble. Due to the state of the buildings, their inhabitants build traditional huts or tents beside them. There is also a high degree of ruralisation in this area. Each family tries to keep animals within the household: ducks, turkeys, hens or goats. Characteristic elements are the already mentioned various types of extensions made of straw and clay. This place has partially become a slum area due to the low level of sanitation infrastructure,

with makeshift or partially ruined buildings and with no access to basic services such as electricity.

Informal Development: The Example of Munuki and Gabat

The object of my in-deepth studies were two urban areas: Gabat and Dar as Salaam (a part of the Munuki district; see Figure 3. They are residential areas attached to the city not so long ago, as a result of the rapid inflow of the rural population. Despite genetic similarities, there differ considerably.

Hai Gabat occupies the north-eastern edge of the city directly adjacent to the river. The district was established not so long ago, at the turn of the centuries, as a result of the internment of the local population by government forces during the war. It is relatively ethnically homogeneous and inhabited by the Bari and peoples belonging to the same language group: the Mondari, Ku Ku or Niambara. In turn, the settlement in Dar es Salaam dates back to the 1950s and is connected with the first wave of immigration, immediately after the outbreak of the First Civil War (1981). Later, depending on the situation, this place either became deserted or an area of increased migration. Today, just like the entire city, it is experiencing a rapid growth in inhabitants. Ethnically mixed, Dar es Salam hosts the following peoples: the Moro, Madi, Acholi, Niambara, Azande, Ku, Ku, Pojulu, Kakau, Latuko, Kokaja; most of them coming from Eastern Equatoria. Due to the scarcity of land, these communities do not form any distinct ethnic clusters. The district is divided into subunits, called *hilla* from Arabic. Each has a separate headman (*sheikh al hilla*) who represents the residents outside and is responsible for security. The headman of Dar as Salaam comes from the Moro peoples, the most numerous in this part of Munuki. According to his information, at the beginning of 2008, Dar as Salaam was inhabited by about two thousand people. However, this number is said to be constantly changing, as some residents leave and new ones immediately appear in their place.

There are a few Christian churches in Munuki, the most important being the Catholic and Anglican congregations, as in the entire city. Local Catholics are organised in the St. Kizito parish. It is a small chapel with a parish house and a school next to it. Missions of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the African Inland Mission are in the vicinity. There are no Muslims in this area. They once used to have their shops here. However, after the war, due to the boycott by Christians, they moved out to parts inhabited by larger Muslim groups (to Malakia in particular).

There is virtually no organised religious life in Gabat, although all of the respondents from this area declared themselves Christians. I recorded only one

chapel for services there. Most of the active believers attended mass in one of the churches in the city centres. Common prayers in private homes enjoyed huge popularity. They were initially organised by the Born Again Christian churches. They assumed the form of expressive night-time prayers, often lasting continuously from dusk to dawn.

Munuki enjoys a very good reputation. It is considered beautiful and safe. Many interview partners declared their willingness to move to that region. In fact, the area is picturesquely situated: located on a flat land, in the shadows of the mangrove forest. What is interesting from a formal point of view, it is a peripheral area, overcrowded, highly ruralised, with a makeshift traditional development, mostly with unregulated legal status (Figure 4). Juba citizens perceive Munuki differently. For them, as I mentioned above, it is an integral part of a relatively high standard of life as safety, ethnic structure or ecological conditions are far more important for citizens than distance from the city centre or the condition of infrastructure. From the citizens' point of view, this area is not particularly overpopulated, with primitive infrastructure. This is a place where people created optimal living conditions themselves. This proves that cohabitation of the urban and rural lifestyles is possible. The perception of a slum as an unambiguously bad or pathological phenomenon is not always proper. Often, what looks like slums to our eyes appears completely different to the local population. Many wild and spontaneous urban settlements turned into prosperous areas in terms of the conditions of life often surpassing those located more centrally. Particular attention should be paid to the internal dynamics of such phenomena and their importance in satisfying the life needs of inhabitants.

Gabat appears completely different in the eyes of Juba citizens. This is a dangerous area, pathological, into which nobody will venture without a special reason. The place owes its awful opinion to its dwellers, mostly former cattle breeders, allegedly not well accustomed to life in the city. They are frustrated, alienated people and mostly jobless, although this place is not far away from the city centre. Regular abuse of alcohol is also characteristic of them.

Both districts have a highly rural and traditional character. The simplest houses are makeshift quadrilateral or oval structures covered with bulrush (Figure 5). In the arrangement of the living space and its aesthetics, one can observe how people perceive the surrounding world, whether they feel safe in it or alien and unfriendly. There are considerable differences between the two areas in this respect. In Munuki, homesteads are definitely well maintained. One can see efforts of decorating not only in exterior design – in drawings referring to current solemn events like Christmas or Valentine's Day – but also in the arrangement of space around the huts. For example, courtyards are filled

with ornamental plants (Figure 6). While for Gabat, what is characteristic is care for the closest surroundings. Makeshift houses made of cheapest materials often remain unfinished. There are hardly any green areas, waste lies just behind the house, on the neighbouring street. The lack of latrines enhances the unpleasant smell of the place. Integralism is characteristic in Munuki in terms of the layout of the farmstead. Houses are rarely fenced, at most separated by a small hedge. According to my interview partners, fences appeared during the war for security reasons. Interestingly, people feel safe here. For example, it is not customary to lock the house when tenants are out. The increasing density of the city population is more important in this respect. By enclosing their homestead – with a small hedge or a row of branches – people protect themselves against the uncontrolled flow of passers-by. This phenomenon is responsible, among other things, for the formation of "street germs," meaning public transport arteries. In Gabat, houses are separated from the street, even from one another with high bulrush fences. Most of them can only be accessed through a wooden, padlocked gate. Here, unlike in Munuki, nobody unwanted will see what is happening inside the homestead from street level. The most meaningful, however, were buildings belonging to former soldiers, natives – but those who fought on the side of Khartoum. They form a compact settlement complex separated from the rest of the buildings by a high fence: characteristically, their huts are semi-dugouts, partially buried in the ground. According to one interlocutor, this was due to their obsessive fear of mob law.

Both districts are characteristic of the suburban spaces of Juba. At the moment they definitely dominate over the typically rural areas, such as Hai Jalaba or Hai Malakal. At the same time, they are developing most rapidly. All of them are sort of Juba's satellites, created as a result of particular waves of migrations to the city and resided by recent incomers from rural regions. At first, they were connected with the city by a sense of security, but now mostly for various opportunities like gainful employment or aid of humanitarian organisations. They are self-sufficient in institutional terms, as they have their own authorities, markets, chapels, police stations and sanitation points. These peripheries suffer particularly severely due to the lack of basic infrastructure. The sanitary conditions are terrible, even as for local standards. There is no running water, no sewage system, not to mention electricity. An additional problem is the ricketiness of the local transport system. This limits contacts with the city, forces citizens to be enclosed within their own world. It also results in no social promotion prospects for people from the peripheries as it prevents them from finding decent jobs. Hence why the mobility of citizens is small, as I surmise on the basis of gathered questionnaires. People regularly travel to other parts of the city, mostly because

of gainful employment or, in special cases, like to larger shopping needs or a visit to the hospital.

Residential Space Arrangement

The simplest house is a makeshift quadrilateral structure covered with bulrush, with a canvass thrown on a slightly inclined roof. This is the accommodation of the poorest citizens, usually those who have just arrived in the city. A family of a dozen or so persons can be cooped up in such a structure. Highly ranked officials with jobs in the created administration of South Sudan live in totally different conditions. Immediately after their arrival, they move into bricked homesteads in the city centre that previously belonged to Arab merchants – the former elite – just refurbished by Chinese workers, particularly in Hai Jalaba and Amarat. Their houses do not look particularly impressive to our eyes. For the locals, however, these houses are obvious indicators of their new status thanks to their solid finishing and spaciousness. They generally do not worry about high rents since these are paid from the state purse, together with a car and security. Of course, owners of the most magnificent houses are dignitaries of the regional government. Their particularity, clearly demonstrating the importance of their owners, is the fact that they are multi-storey structures. At the moment, such buildings are practically absent from all other districts. Therefore, like in many other cities of the continent, we are dealing with a specific social verticalisation through architecture.

Traditional housing, as I wrote above, is definitely more popular. Material problems of the vast majority, combined with the extremely high prices of building materials, enforce the simplest housing solutions. An average house is a round clay hut covered with bulrush. A homestead is usually oval and made up of several clay huts. The hut of the "head of the family" and the hearth is in the central part. The rooms of the remaining members of the family are on the sides. All are turned facing one another. This is a traditional development model, characteristic of rural areas. The urban peculiarities include, on the other hand, erecting extra accommodation structures within the homestead. They are intended for relatives who are to appear in the city in the future, but for now, the structures are rented out. Thus, in addition to its own members, the urban family also includes a group of total strangers and autonomous persons.

There is a tendency to replace traditional architecture with quadrilateral buildings in the urban landscape; the buildings are clearly divided into two parts: men's and women's. The precursor of these solutions is the development of the Arab Hai Jalaba district. Contrary to the previous type, houses are made

of sun-dried bricks and covered with galvanised sheet metal. Such structures prove better in urban conditions. They are more spacious and better satisfy the enlarged urban families' needs. This type of housing is becoming more common also in suburban areas, like Munuki. It should be considered a sign of the adaptation of migrants, which means they are settled in an urban environment, and the urbanisation of areas only nominally belonging to the city. This model partly characterises former refugees. Traditional models of architecture are alien to this group.

The living quarters are rather small, meaning that there is not much more than a bed, a pair of chairs and clothes hanging on the walls (Figure 7).

Apart from bedrooms, a typical homestead contains a kitchen, which is usually formed from several clay hearths located in a courtyard or directly in one of the huts. In cases of more impressive homesteads, I saw kitchens under a special structure of a *zeriba*[37] type: two hearths, a water jug dug into the ground or placed in an old tyre, with a nearby two-level wooden structure for drying kitchen utensils. One can hardly ever see a separate hut adapted for the kitchen.

Each house has a toilet-bathroom. The structure is located near the street, so that waste can be disposed of there. It is a screen covered with jute bags or bulrush. It should be emphasised that this is not the rule everywhere. And so, for example, in Gabat a large group of homesteads does not have toilets at all. Their functions were met by the nearby wetlands, or in fact, any vegetation-overgrown nook. However, it is also true that the number of such cases clearly decreased between 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless, they are still present. We should also mention that one may often find makeshift livestock buildings in an average house.

The space arrangement is based on traditional patterns, an unrivalled way to build a house. However, these are slowly becoming an element stigmatising the rural migrant, hence why traditional housing is replaced by quadrilateral structures, based on the residential buildings of the city centre.

Infrastructure Underdevelopment and Its Condition

A citizen of Juba struggles with many problems of infrastructural nature. But they do not apply to peripheral areas only. Paradoxically, the situation there in the peripheries can be in many respects better than in the more centrally located parts of the city, often thanks to the activities of non-government organisations. However, this is a problem that for now must be faced by everyone, regardless of their place of residence. One of the most serious problems is the lack of running

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37 A makeshift stockade-type structure constructed of thornbushes or bulrush.

water, a peculiar paradox in the face of the city's location on the banks of the Nile. Water is available in certain spots only, from ground sources. It is drawn by means of hand pumps or is transported in water tankers filled directly in the river. Limited access to water is an inconvenience, particularly for women, who customarily are responsible for supplying the homestead with water. They are often forced to travel long distances for this purpose. The deficit of water is one of the most frequent reasons for arguments among neighbours or even more serious unrests. Epidemiological hazard only adds to the troubles. Cholera outbreaks appear regularly in the city with the onset of the rain season.[38] Bathing in the river is an urban ritual here. In the evenings, crowds can be seen at informal bathing points. This becomes an opportunity for complex hygienic procedures, including the washing of clothes. As I have been informed, bathing in the river is one of the most popular entertainment for the young generation. Unfortunately, this decreases the quality of water in the river even further. In turn, this is connected with another still unresolved problem: environmental pollution. There is no sewage system in the city. Septic tanks once in existence have become littered. Home toilets are provisional or, in fact, non-existent. Therefore, anyone who has to relieve themselves goes by the river or the nearby bushes. Although, there has been some progress since 2007 as each homestead has now a makeshift bulrush structure that plays the role of a toilet-washbasin. However, the issue of septic tanks depth and their distance from drinking water collection points persists. As a consequence, water quality decreased considerably. Out of nine boreholes in Hai Manuki, in the Dar as Salam district, only five had water fit for drinking. The lack of potable water affects the health of residents and increases the costs of living in the city. Thus, foreigners and locals alike must buy bottled water imported from Uganda. It is even worse with normal waste: it is thrown unceremoniously on the street, which in some places is covered with a compressed layer of rubbish. Organic waste is not a problem. It is quickly decomposed or eaten by domestic livestock. The real nightmare, however, is the rubbish not subject to quick decomposition. So far, the only way to deal with its accumulation that I observed was to burn it regularly. In the morning and at sunset, the reek of burning plastics rises above the city. The only, as of yet, systematic cleaners of the city are informal groups of young collectors specialising in gathering plastic bottles or anything that can be re-purposed. It can be said that poverty – to some extent – saves the city from being totally polluted with municipal waste.

38 Between January and November 2007, 3,256 cases of cholera were reported (The Long Road Home 2008: 26).

Cleaning services have already been launched in the city, but their operations is only visible in the markets, where waste accumulation is the most grevious. This waste is transported beyond the bounds of the city and dumped on the savannah.

In the dry season, Juba is extremely often beset with fires. In particular, they are a nightmare for the markets, where no week passes without at least one. The most frequent reason is burning rubbish. However, this is considered to be rather the workings of magic tricks by the locals, ordered by unfriendly neighbours or competitors. Fires and their conceptualisation may be the sign of growing animosity in a dynamically heterogenising society, especially between the Sudanese and foreigners.

On the example of Juba, we see that electricity remains a luxury reserved for but a few. In Africa, since colonial times electricity has been a symptom of social stratification, drawing a line of division between spaces reserved for the elite modern people and those occupied by less developed provincials. Decolonisation has changed this situation only to a small degree. Electricity still sets a dividing line in the African society, this time between new elites and new marginalised groups. Hence why, for years, the energy policy – a "fight for electricity" – was and still is perceived as a part of discourse on the development in all of Africa (Winther 2008: 41).

In the entire city, households usually have no electricity. Only ministries and public buildings have it, and a small group of houses located near the city centre. In fact, in February 2007, even the areas near the centre were deprived of electricity due to a new power line being installed. So far, this problem has not been resolved either. Even if there is electricity, it is supplied from a collective generator. This is not the most cumbersome problem for citizens of this part of Africa. People are accustomed to going without electricity. What is worth emphasising is that the lack of electricity intensifies human cooperation and social contacts. The latter are generated, among other things, in this very context. A house having electricity, along with a fridge or a TV set, automatically becomes a meeting place, a club for the local residents – what is important – regardless of their ethnic origin. Thus, electricty contributes to the breaking of traditional social arrangements.

Urban Transport

One of the most serious problems that an inhabitant of an African city has to struggle with is related to mobility. This is of great importance for the condition of existence in the city. To a large extent it is up to it whether a person finds a well-paid job, develops a network of relationships or decreases the costs of

living – e.g. by shopping at the cheapest places of the city – so a person's mobility has an overwhelming influence on the adaptation to life in the city and on the efficiency of struggling with daily life problems. A city resident must be in permanent movement. Otherwise, they are bound to be defeated.

The city does not favour public transport. The condition of road infrastructure is a problem. Juba only has several kilometres of asphalt roads. Even those few are usually full of ruts and potholes, so that traffic usually moves along the hard shoulders. A vast majority of what exists is, at most, periodically hardened. In the dry season, a thick cloud of dust hangs above roads, while in the rain season – they change into a muddy quagmire (Figure 8). As a consequence, Juba streets are extremely unpleasant – and even dangerous! Heavy traffic, which has recently increased even further, is to blame for this problem. Regardless of the condition of the infrastructure, the city is experiencing an automotive boom. An endless string of rickety vehicles, most often imported from nearby Uganda or Kenya, strings along the roads. The heaviest traffic is on roads connecting the main markets (Juba Town, Konjo Konjo and Customs). This artery connects three main parts of the city at the same time: Juba Town, Munuki and Kator. Public transport drives on this route in terribly battered minibuses. It is along this route that the greatest number of shops and service points are located. A client stops the car and places an order directly from it. Curb side shopping is popular as an alternative to time-consuming markets, it offers the possibility of comfortable loading. Meanwhile, someone may wash the car or check tyre pressure. The assortment of local restaurants is prepared to suit the taste of a large city client. Local residents complain that the goods do not meet their needs but the needs of the more affluent groups. One can look for foodstuffs in shops along the road to no avail. Instead, there is a wide selection of cold beverages, including imported beer. There is a concentration of commercial and service space in places of informal stops or institutions of special importance, such as a hospital or church. This is where the economic life concentrates: shops and workshops are installed, and people wait for work or transports here. The situation does not change even after dusk. Then, these fragments of the city are vibrant with life and transform into zones of social life. Crowds of residents settle themselves along the road, on chairs they bring with them. Innumerable candles and kerosene lamps illuminate the darkness. This is the time for small, makeshift service points: TV rooms or equally tiny restaurants, run by women. When the dawn comes, they all disappear. The only trace left of their existence will be piles of rubbish. For an average person, main arterial roads are the essence of the city, which can virtually fully satisfy their daily needs. They are particularly important for them for another reason. As Michel de Certeau observes, main streets

break the privatisation and individualisation of the urban space (de Certeau 1980, qtd. after Agier 2002: 329). Contrary to the remaining city tissue, the main streets are open to all. These are areas that are truly no man's land, in which one's presence will not arouse much interest. This is of enormous importance in a city in which the average person is a former migrant. It is for this very reason that the main roads constitute the key arteries of the city organism. Among the inconveniences, I should mention the presence of vagabonds and petty thefts. The strangers who wander every day along the nearby road are charged with both these phenomena. The noise and air pollution are a problem; although, the latter is as bad as it is in the entire city. There is a lot of waste as well. More than in other parts of the city. Waste lies in ditches and on street corners. It is worse only in the city markets. The only noticeable group collecting waste is an army of city beggars, but most is scattered around the area by the wind.

An exception, in terms of the urban transport infrastructure, are two streets: the *Airport Road*, which leading to the airport, and the *Ministries Road*, along which the most important state institutions are located: ministries, the garrison, seats of the largest aid organisations, residences of local notables and fashionable restaurants. These two roads are covered with brand new asphalt and have spacious hard shoulders for pedestrians. A line of roadside acacias provides shade, always nice in these areas. There is no buzz or noise of other city streets. The only danger are speeding luxury off-road vehicles with registration plates bearing the letters GoSS (Government of South Sudan). Paradoxically, an asphalt surface has recently contributed to the increase of car accidents along the new section. Local owners of cars, often luxury ones, manage not with the traffic on the asphalt road. They frequently exceed speed limits, which often results in accidents with tragic consequences. There is no public transport and no need for such since everybody has at least a motorbike. For ordinary residents, it is an elite area; a dream job and the accompanying *high life*. The *Ministries Road* fills at dawn with crowds of mostly young people who are looking for work. They gaze at notice boards or queue to some influential person for hours.

Due to the elite nature of the airport and aircraft as a means of travel, a street leading to the airport is also of great importance. In the common perception, it is obviously used mostly by the rich. That is why it is an area particularly important for itinerant roadside retailers. The rank of the place finds its reflection in the range of products offered by shops. Contrary to the citizens of the West, Africans do not see an airport as a facility disturbing the peace or polluting the environment. An airport in itself is a complex of enormous importance, often the true heart of the city, around which function industry, trade, services and logistics. Juba is a good example of this phenomenon. Due to the regions' weak transport

infrastructure, this is the only window to the world, without which the city would be unable to function. In modern Africa, this is also a place of huge strategic importance, deciding about the fate of the residing authorities. No-one has to be convinced about this in Juba. During the war, as I learned, the airport was the only link with the world. It was also most fiercely attacked by the resistance movement besieging the city. For the modern elite, the airport is still a matter of comfort but – above all – of safety. Maybe this is the reason why, despite the noise, the local notables took a liking in the airport neighbourhood. It is in this area that the elite Amarat district is located, where villas for the highest-ranking state officials are constructed.

The urban transport leaves a lot to be desired. As I mentioned above, it does not reach many parts of the city, and what is worse, it is not cheap; regardless of the route the fee is half a dollar. This fact limits the mobility of citizens, forcing them to be bound to the world of their own district. This is one of the reasons for the marginalisation or exclusion of crowds of residents – suburban areas in particular – and the autonomisation of particular city fragments.

Commercial Spaces

In city centre districts, commercial spaces are located nearly on every street, while in the peripheries, they are positioned along the main roads. An average shop is composed of a wooden frame covered with galvanised sheet metal. Apart from a small opening, the seller and the buyer are separated by a wire mesh. This is to prevent small thefts. This kind of point is usually a family investment, though it may happen that a group of neighbours invest in it; however, they always belong to the same "tribe." Business does not require any special financial outlays. A piece of land is important. A shop is organised directly at the owner's house. As a rule, the seller is a teenage boy who looks after the business on behalf of one of his kin. He has a group of peers to help him, ready to replace him at any time just for a possibility to stand behind the counter. The guarantee of profitability are old customers. The one who manages to attract customers from outside his kinship or tribal group is successful. The owner's authority helps. It is good when he is a likeable person and influential above all, a man of success. Then, the store will most probably enjoy interest among neighbours. Other chief assets include marketing campaigns and, for example, the possibility of a deferred date of payment. The shop must have electricity supplied by a nearby generator. A mandatory element is a battery-powered freezer with cold drinks. It is because of electricity and related attractions that shops are places of local men's social gatherings in

the evenings. After nightfall, when boredom consumes people, a TV set with a portable DVD recorder is installed in front of the tin shed.

Customs Souk and Konjo Konjo

Mosques, rulers' seats or shepherds' camps were urban centres in pre-colonial Africa. In modern Africa, this role is mostly played by all sorts of commercial spaces (Falola and Salm 2005: 1). It is no different in Juba. From the perspective of an average citizen, the areas of the greatest importance are two large marketplaces, from Arabic called *souks*: the Customs souk and the Konjo Konjo souk. They are the commercial lungs of the city without which life in it would be unimaginable. These are places of work and rest. In fact, their role cannot be overestimated.

The Konjo Konjo souk is older. It is located in the Muslim district of Malakal, in the south-eastern part of the city. It has a very convenient transport location since it is situated right next to the Nile, which has a river port. Barges that sail from the North land there. This is also the place where begins the exit road to Torit and then further to Nimule, on the border with Uganda. Konjo Konjo is associated with the Arabs. Actually, most of the shops belong to merchants from the North, even though African traders gain in numbers recently.

The Customs souk occupies an extensive area on both sides of the road leading to Yei, in the western part of Juba. The souk was established at the beginning of the century, in connection with the liberalisation of the economy, in particular with the expansion of trade from the neighbouring African countries: Uganda, Kenya, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. This is an area dominated by foreigners, with several thousand petty traders who sensed good business here. After the war, the traditions of contacts between the borderland communities revived. After many years of war, Sudan can again be an economically attractive area for the people from the neighbouring counties.[39] Trade of all sorts is in the hands of Africans here. It offers a wide range of goods, including vegetables, fruits, clothes and legal drugs. Even fish is delivered from nearby Uganda. Apart from that, it is an enormous entertainment centre: numerous cafes, restaurants, service points open 24/7 meet the city's new needs halfway. The market starts

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39 Noteworthy, during colonial times, South Sudan very often was a refuge for citizens of neighbouring territories who were under the more oppressive rule of the French or Belgians (Holt 1961: 249). As we already know, even after decolonisation the city became a typical shelter for refugees from neighbouring countries like Ethiopia or Uganda, even despite permanent instability in the region.

its second life after dusk, when it becomes a place of social gatherings and entertainment. The status of this place is ambivalent. On the one hand, it is an extremely important and attractive place for city dwellers, while on the other hand, it is associated with all sorts of negative phenomena like prostitution or alcoholism. In the residents' opinion, it is an attractive place, but also dangerous, nearly pathological. The bad reputation of the Customs souk is so strong that it affects the nearby city districts. In connection with a close neighbourhood of the market, these districts do not enjoy a good reputation. The presence of African immigrants in the city does not only result from economic conditions but also from a general economic and cultural focus of the South of Sudan on the African interior instead the Muslim North, which was its previous focus.

The market owes its reputation of the most popular shopping area in the city not only to reasons of objective nature, such as the variety of the offered goods or their prices, but also because citizens like the fact that it better reflects their African identity. This is an area of autochthonous business. Contrary to the times of war, salespersons are Africans and not foreigners from the North. Befitting Sub-Saharan Africa, this is the world of women-traders. This is an area near totally overtaken by women. Men are degraded here as if to auxiliary functions or to service decisively less numerous sectors (fish or meat sellers). This is a place of African entertainment – co-created by music and alcohol – which wakes up after dusk. Just like during daytime, trade is women's business at night as well.

Juba's markets play an important role for the functioning of the city. They are mostly true commercial and service centres that compensate the citizens for the poverty of the local economy. Otherwise, numerous shops in other parts of the city only satisfy the demand for the most basic products. So far, markets are the only places where complex shopping is possible and – what is equally important – at the of lowest prices. Extensive markets ease the slightly high prices prevailing in the city. Urban transport is organised based on marketplaces. The local markets are one of the symptoms of urban ruralism: the organisation of life according to the rural life model. Genetically, the pattern clearly comes from the northern, Muslim provinces of Sudan. In this respect, Juba is not much different from other Sudanese cities.

Sacral Places

These are mostly spaces connected with churches or mosques. Despite the years of war and Arab dominance, relatively many Christian temples remain (Figure 9). There are about sixty chapels within one parish of Saint Joseph's alone. Churches

of other Christian denominations should be added to this. However, for the most part, they are small buildings only holding several dozen people.

City churches "burst at the seams" usually during Sunday service. They are rather deserted on weekdays. The local Christians do not have a habit of going to church on weekdays. What is more popular are common evening prayers at home, particularly characteristic of Evangelical churches. It is different in the case of the Muslim diaspora. You can find the faithful in a mosque not only on holidays. This is clearly a place to meet and rest for the Muslims residing in the city, which looks the same in the North and other areas with Islam's dominance (for more, see Kurcz 2007). Here, however, the rank of the mosque is decisively greater, about which I will write more below.

However, due to the religious structure of the city, the places of worship belonging to Christians are decisively more important. These are undoubtedly local urban centres, landmarks known to everybody, where urban transport always stops. Credit is due also to the extensive infrastructure around the churches, especially parishes. St. Joseph's Catholic Parish is, apart from the church itself, a series of buildings holding various functions. They are home to the parish administration but also to staff associated with various aid institutions. The neighbourhood is also home to a pharmacy, a bookstore, a primary school (*Comboni Primary School*) and a catholic radio station – *Bakhita* – all owned by the Church. Due to the variety of services, the place is vibrant with life from dawn till dusk and works like a magnet on black residents: they find employment here or simply something to do as pastoral activities of the parish require the presence of extended staff. Cafes and shops are open for the clients of parish offices. City transport always stops here. The city centre parish of St. Joseph has an exceptional character, even if in any other case the local chapel plays the role of a local centre.

A separate category of a local sacral place is the mausoleum of the late Vice President of Sudan, John Garang.[40] It is located on a broad square called the Freedom Square, near the Customs market (Figure 10). It is a place of the highest celebration, particularly on the anniversary of signing the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* and the tragic death of the leader of the South. Then, it becomes a

40 John Garang de Mabior (1945–2005), a South Sudanese leader, founder of the Sudan's People's Liberation Army during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1982–2005), organiser of the resistance movement (SPLA) against Khartoum, one of the signatories of the peace in Naivasha in 2005 – called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – ultimately the Vice President of Sudan. Died tragically in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005.

place of political meetings during which the highest authorities of the Autonomy appear, obligatorily. This is the centre of official, lay rituals.

The urban sacred is connected with the issue of the city's cultural memory. These are primarily various places of remembrance connected with the recent war. Some of them have been officially recognised by the authorities, but most function only in the collective memory of the long-time residents. First of all, these are all properties connected with the former security apparatus, such as the garrison near the University, former fortifications near the bridge (Mudarat) or the area in the immediate vicinity of the airport. According to my interview partners, the latter area used to be the place of execution of people suspected of cooperating with the SPLA. All these sites are referred to as "bad." Some undergo a specific reinterpretation and become places of secular rituals. This is what happened with the "Buluk Square." On 7 July 1992, the local clerical staff were arrested there and transported to an unknown location. The place is a symbol of the misery of the Juba citizens under the Khartoum rule. Hence, it is part of the route of marches of all kinds of manifestations (sudantribune.com/Widows-demand-to-know-fate-of,22943). All great religious (Easter) and secular (CPA anniversaries) events are celebrated in this way. This route also becomes a place of contestation, a fight for the rights of various city groups like the activists of women's rights movement.

The process of reinterpretation of urban space can be observed on the basis of sacral spaces. Places once belonging to a completely ominous reality are now becoming backdrops of collective urban rituals, especially those used in the struggle for transparency in the public life of Juba or the entire South.

Islam Versus Christianity

In South Sudan, the issue of religion is the basic dividing line that categorises a person on the social plane as a "stranger" or "own." Citizens of Juba are perfectly aware that the city life is integrally connected with the necessity to get in touch with people from various backgrounds, including representatives of various religious communities. What is stabilising in this respect is also the conviction about the negative repercussions of religion-based tensions for the peace process. Nevertheless, antagonisms do exist. They reappear within the urban space. In this context in such a context the demolition of merchants' shops by the mob after the tragic death of Vice President Garang. Thus, urban space provides both communities with the opportunity to manifest the relationship to each other, without running the risk of an open conflict. Hence, among other things,

it is currently the clearest level of rivalry between the followers of Christianity and Islam.

In the unanimous opinion of non-Arab residents of the city, markets and mosques in their vicinity set the boundaries of the micro-world belonging to the Muslim diaspora. These are the spaces to which – after the war – the Muslim minority "withdrew." The professional and social life of the Muslim diaspora concentrates within these areas. An impressive mosque is located near the market. There happen the meetings and shared meals of local Muslims, after Friday prayers. This is a redoubt of the Muslim population in the city in which their influences have clearly decreased recently. Only here do they seem to feel comfortable and secure. Contrary to other urban areas, here they strongly emphasise their identity and faith with costume and traditions. Always dressed in their best white *jalabiyya* and magnificent turbans or equally characteristic caps similar to a zucchetto (I will discuss clothing in detail below). It is for them, above all, that the small cafes are open, serving tea, coffee and water pipes or second category restaurants offer dishes of broad beans in their menus – the so-called *ful* – a national delicacy of the Sudanese from the North.

Places of worship mark group territories. This phenomenon is common for many cities worldwide, wherever we encounter symptoms of conflicts on religious grounds. Within this informal territory – yet clearly marked in imagination – the local Muslims may feel at ease and secure. This is a piece of space that is a gap in the potentially hostile surroundings. This is also a sort of redoubt around which the life of Islam believers happens. A Quranic school and several utility rooms is usually present within the premises of a Muslim temple. Shops or service points belonging to local Muslims are located in the vicinity (Figure 11). What is also characteristic is that the homeless put their makeshift shelters in the area of the Mosque so as to increase their opportunity to receive alms, which is one of the duties of all Muslims. Adherence to this informal rule is the guarantee of proper relationships between the two religious communities, strongly antagonised in this area.

Despite formal prejudices and grievances, the true arena of contact and rivalry remains the area of the very city centre: the Juba Town. Due to its rank, it is the place of rivalry for various city groups. After the end of the war the simplest way of showing aversion was for the Christian population to boycott Muslim shops and goods. Muslim entrepreneurs, however, quite quickly became specialised in deficit goods or offered very attractive prices. With time, the mutual manifestation of aversion evolved into more symbolic forms. Muslims boycott Sunday as a day off, while Christians ostentatiously shop on Fridays, which is known as the day of a considerable slow-down of business

life due to the obligatory common prayer in a mosque. A different way of expressing mutual relationships was language: signs or advertisements talked a lot about the owner's religious affiliation. Shops belonging to Arabs usually had inscriptions in two languages – Arabic and English – while those owned by Africans: only in English. Customarily, Arab sellers were addressed in English, so they usually replied in Arabic. This fact quite often became a reason for small quarrels.

Movement in Space

In an Urban Street

An ordinary city street in Juba is not a space where one walks. It does not belong to pedestrians but to cars. The entire road – even the sandy hard shoulder – is managed by all sorts of vehicles; the street has nothing that resembles a pavement. Therefore, one must always be on guard. A pedestrian cannot feel safe even on the hard shoulder. Since even this space is used by smaller vehicles – minibuses or motorcycles – to speed, often driving in the wrong direction. The hard shoulder is also a "natural" parking place for cars. Nobody is bothered by blocking pedestrian traffic. The hard shoulders are no space for pedestrians also because of ditches along the roads, filled with rubbish and water. Often non-secured, they constitute a real trap for an inexperienced walker, which I once had a chance to experience myself.

Crossing the street to the other side also creates a lot of difficulties. There are no special crossings for pedestrians. You can get to the other side anywhere – but on your own risk. This is probably the greatest challenge, considering the density of the traffic and its extreme unpredictability. The road has lanes only in theory, one in each direction. In reality, the cars overtake one another from the right, and from the left, using any available vacant space to do so. There is a special system to cross the road to the other side. First of all, you need to cross the road by walking a bit diagonally and against the direction of the traffic. As a result, you always have cars in front of you and not on the side or – God forbid – behind you. Second, you cross the street in two stages. Here and there in the middle, a pedestrian may stop on some sort of a high pavement dividing the road into two parts, used to prevent cars from driving onto the opposite lane. In this place, a pedestrian may take a breather for a moment before covering the second part of the road.

We may talk about a hierarchy among cars. The most important are government cars, usually impressive off-road vehicles with "GoSS" on their registration plates. They drive quickly, without paying any attention to other road traffic

participants, not to mention pedestrians. They have an informal (or maybe even formal) status of privileged cars. However, they should not be connected with any specialised services. Their users simply are government or party dignitaries. Public transport comes later in the hierarchy, as Juba consists mainly of one type of vehicle: minibuses.

Within the last decades in Africa, we have observed the disappearance of public transport, created generally on the eve of independence in most cities on the continent. Private entrepreneurs took on meeting the transport needs of municipal centres. Public transport moved into private hands, while becoming more informal – so as to be fully profitable – and a part of the grey economy (Konings 2006: 52). The situation is no different in Juba. Transport is based on minibuses belonging to small, private, informal transport companies. One vehicle takes from ten to fourteen persons. Everybody pays the same fee, regardless of distance. Transport, as I mentioned above, runs between the largest city markets. Informal stops-terminals are also located there. The system does not rely on a timetable. A vehicle sets off when it has a full set of passengers. What counts is people, not time. The lack of formalised and centralised management is a universal feature of public transport in Africa. For that reason, transport services are very much associated with social interactions. Everything is negotiated on current basis: from the start of the travel through loading to the final stop. But the process is usually extended in time. The taxi crew is composed of a driver and an usher-beater (usually a minor). Despite many imperfections, this means of transport belongs to the most popular in the city. This is the cheapest and, at the same time, the most popular means of transport in the South Sudanese capital. The greatest concentration of trade is at the changing places. Waiting for your transport, you may be tempted to get a snack or buy socks. Entire masses of traders live on transport, from sellers of cigarettes to restaurant owners. Among other things, this is the reason why this means of transport enjoys so much respect on the road. Drivers of the minibuses park wherever they want, cut in or quarrel with other drivers to impertinently instruct them. Like in other African metropolises, for some it is an opportunity to have one's own, more or less official business, while for others – without a chance to own a vehicle – it fully satisfies the need for mobility, which is necessary in the conditions of the African city (Organising in the Taxi Industry 2003: 8, 9, Boudreaux 2006).

We should mention here the *boda boda* drivers here: the motorcycle taxis that arrived from nearby Uganda. This is also an extremely popular means of transport. Their drivers, usually teenagers, are professionals for whom the street is mainly a place of work. What is more, they also consider themselves superior to other road users. The main reason is that their work is the most dangerous. Since

they have no chances in a “clash” with most of vehicles. In fact, they are the most injured in most accidents. For an average person, however, it is they who create the risk. Their audacity and carelessness probably stem from their young age. Indeed, a motorcycle driver is ready to break any rule just to avoid traffic jams or cover a distance at a record time. This is not, however, only bravado but also the matter of profitability. As a rule, the driver is not the owner of the vehicle but only its lessee. Every day, he must transfer a part of his income to the owner. It is not much but his vehicle has considerable limitations. And yes, it runs on short distances only. Finally, the price may be negotiated. Their advantage is efficiency in overcoming city traffic jams. A three-wheel rickshaw has a similar role in other African cities, Khartoum for example, although it is not as controversial but extremely important from the point of view of transport needs of a citizen of an African city.

In an Urban Minibus

Travelling by such a means of transport is governed above all by rules that for us are not very tangible and seemingly trivial: for the Sudanese, these rules constitute a ritualised code of conduct characteristic of the urban environment and the culture of travelling. Many researchers already highlighted city transport in Africa as a specific cultural phenomenon. For most of them, complex phenomena occur in a city minibus, a process of ritualised interaction during which relations specific for the city are fixed. From the social and cultural perspective, it is a type of experiment: a testing ground of various, typically urban behaviours (cf. Goffman 2008 [1963]).

A minibus is densely filled with seats (Figure 12). There are foldable seats even in the aisle. Among other things, this makes passengers stay in permanent movement. When someone gets off, others have to make room. Each time, the passengers move into the inside of the vehicle as far from the aisle seats as possible. This is one of the basic rules all passengers are bound by. Inside the vehicle, all are homeless wanderers, exposed to the ongoing change of seats or even their lack. The reason for and consequence of this state of affairs is the collective nature of the journey. In Sudan, as in probably the entire Sub-Saharan Africa, travelling has always been a collective and mass activity. During a journey, people joined in groups. This was not only a matter of safety but also culture, in which membership in a given community was a dogma. This habit seems to remain valid, but it is conditioned above all by the underdevelopment of transport infrastructure. Informal cooperation is required not only to take a seat but also to pay a fee for the ride. Money moves from hand to hand to the ticket collector. And so,

all passengers are forced to participate in the community, often in establishing close relationships. And in this way, the collective nature of travelling in Africa manifests itself.

In such a means of transport, there is no premium or economy class. All travellers are equal, including myself. Once I became a minibus passenger, I acquired the same rights and obligations as others. Thus, I paid a fee – symbolic from my point of view – for which I could get out and get in wherever I wanted but – at the same time – I had no seat guarantee. Moreover, I had to move according to the rhythm of the aforementioned order. For that reason, it was often difficult for me to use this means of public transport. I simply was not entitled to it as a European. In a flat structure of social collectivity of a city minibus, a driver, or also his helper, enjoys an exceptional position. In fact, in this democratic means of public transport these two persons rule with absolute power. They decide about the loudness of music, the stopping place or the moment of staring a journey.

A minibus is a public space in permanent movement in which there is a "civilisation of indifference" (Goffman's phrase). Thanks to it, a person may retain privacy or keep distance, always comfortable in this place. During the journey, a language of non-verbal communication is valid. The ticket collector shows those waiting for transport, in which direction the minibus is going, with a simple yet understandable gesture, he shows whether the vehicle will turn or will go straight ahead at the nearest junction. Then a passenger stops the vehicle with their hand. Then, they take seat in silence. In a hushed voice, they greet all the travellers, audible at least to one of the nearest co-passengers. Noisy, nearly unbearable music "enlivens" the journey. It allows for the embarrassing silence to be overcome. At the same time, it effectively makes any conversation impossible. The moment of fee collection is the culmination point. It happens when there is a set of passengers inside the vehicle, and the vehicle is already hurtling along the street.

The ticket collector snaps his fingers in a characteristic manner towards the passengers. They reach for change. If they do not do so, the helper will repeat the gesture, but in a way giving no doubts as to whom it is addressed to. "Self-restraint" is recommended in this situation. It is not appropriate to react at once to the ticket collector's signals, and certainly not to pay the fee immediately after boarding. It is better to do so when getting out. This specific stalling for time is not deprived of a deeper sense. The rule "service first, money later" is very much in force. It is also about making an impression that you are condescending. What is demonstrated through this is the hierarchy in the relationship between the service provider and recipient. It reflects the customs in trade. Travelling – being a

passenger in particular – is creating socially conscious roles or an entire package of performative practices (Adler 1989, Vannini 2009).

Let us return, however, to transport. A traveller informs the ticket collector that his journey is just coming to an end. Clicking is also used for this purpose. They give a signal to the driver, hissing in an equally characteristic manner; a behaviour typical for camel breeders from the North. Only then does the car stop. And here we have another crisis moment. It is important for the car to stop where the passenger wants. This is not always easy. The theatricality of the entire situation makes itself visible again. The ticket collector pretends he does not hear the passenger's demand. This usually happens when they have lingered or has not made an appropriate payment yet.

These and other customs derive genetically from the area of the Middle East culture and are characteristic of North Sudan (segregation of gender, Arabic). There is nothing strange in it, as in those centres has been forming for decades the urban culture of this part of Africa. In the city minibus, therefore, Arabic customs are in force. This situation is, however, slowly changing. Just like in the sphere of culture of contemporary Juba, also here Arabic is being replaced by English. This fact is often the source of misunderstandings or even small quarrels between the vehicle servicemen (usually speaking Arabic) and passengers (often wishing to communicate only in English). Thus, dramatic changes in the culture of this part of Africa make themselves known in the minibus.

The city transport is also an element of social education, a peculiar "city pedagogy." Each vehicle, without exception, is decorated with an original slogan: for instance, "No Gain without Pain," "God Knows," "I Believe," "I Trust in God," "Do Your Best, God will Do the Rest," "If God Says Yes, Who Will Say No," "Water is Life."[41] Almost all slogans propagate ardent religiosity, but also activity and resourcefulness; features certainly indispensable in an African city. The slogans bring to mind the ideas preached by Christian organisations, especially Pentecostal churches. They call for hard work and methodical improvement. These ideas, inseparably connected with the local variety of Christianity, constitute the foundation of the identity of the African bourgeoisie, which I will discuss later below.

When writing about minibuses, it is impossible not to mention their decorative setting. Each driver wants his car to be the most beautiful. Citizens of Juba, however, cannot count for beautiful brand-new vehicles. Like citizens of many

41 Incidentally, they are also some sort of identification marks, characteristic of the given taxi.

other African cities, they are doomed to run-down models, about which hardly anyone remembers in Europe. What is more, the Sudanese car is always undergoing progressive and inevitable degradation. This is the result of extremely difficult conditions and the lack of spare parts. When it comes to repairs, the driver relies on his own ingenuity or a local car repair shop. For this reason, everyone must improvise. There is no undamaged car, without a dent or broken glass. There is a problem with each vehicle. The driver tries to compensate for these deficiencies with – one may say – treatments of a decorative nature. These are the hallmarks of a given car on an equal footing with the licence plate. The main decorative space is the driver's box ornamented with decorations often so elaborate that they sometimes limit visibility through the windscreen. The box is a "delightful place," hence photo wallpaper or colourful covers appear on the ceiling, walls, the steering wheel, the rear panel, even including the upper zone of the windscreen. They are to please the eye, making up for the long hours of the journey. These accessories have at least one practical function: they protect plastic elements of the inside from overheating. As regards the style of decorations, we may talk about three types: paradisiacal and infantile (artificial flowers plus plush toys), patriotic (state symbols, including the President) and religious. In the latter case not only aesthetic or identity aspects appear but often also devotional objects to provide metaphysical protection. Please remember that for the Africans, travelling is always an activity connected with some risk associated with what Adeline Masqueline (2002: 831) defined as "moral geographies." Road is a space of desire and fear. Travelling by car means "being on the road" (sic!), which is associated with potentially positive phenomena: business, interpersonal contacts and a higher social status; but it also carries numerous hazards, including the loss of life. For this reason, Africans rely in this case on the help of traditional experts and their talismans. They do not trust safety belts or luck only (Beck 2009). Not only the interior but also the external layer of each vehicle is the object of decoration. Illuminations on the roof of the driver's box or the bonnet are particularly eye-catching. These efforts are not only a manifestation of excessive affirmation of commonly desired goods but also of rivalry for status under conditions of spontaneous consumption, in which everyone – at least theoretically – has equal chances. It seems that everyone today can be the owner of any product. However, not everyone can turn it into an artistic masterpiece. The most important thing in "street capitalism" is to draw attention to oneself. This is the key to success. The rest is a proverbial piece of cake. That is why entrepreneurship in Africa is about playing smart roles, a kind of performance or – as in the case of city vehicles – one of decorating activities.

"To Alleviate Boredom"

The city changes how one perceives time as it introduces a clear division into the time of work and non-work. In the case of a large part of citizens, the most important is the second category – because their problem is overwhelming boredom. This is much different to the past, when a working citizen did not have too much free time. During non-work, people tried to earn extra money or focused on social life, activities in self-help organisations, ceremonial or religious associations modelled on shared origin – all these were necessary to obtain all sorts of support in the urban environment. In mining regions of Zambia or South Africa, formal recreation was organised by the employer and was based on tribal folklore, for example through sports competitions or dance shows (Cheater 1989: 185). For now, modern Juba does not offer too much in terms of rest. There are no cultural institutions like a cinema or theatre. The situation is worsened by the condition of the city infrastructure, especially the lack of electricity. That is why, in fact, for many citizens the day ends at sunset. The problem is also – or maybe above all that most have been here for not very long. They do not know anyone or anything yet. Perhaps the only expression of formal recreation is football. There is one masonry stadium in the city where matches of the local league are held regularly. This is, without any doubt, one of the greatest forms of entertainment – for the male population at least – which has accompanied the city for decades, regardless of its history. Therefore, football is considered a typically urban way of spending free time (Figure 13).

The cultural and entertainment life underwent an informalisation. Local entrepreneurship comes to the rescue of the citizens. At the moment, the city's social life is based on markets and roadside shops or diners. Night also comes to the citizen's aid: time qualitatively different from day. Night-time has somehow always and in nearly all cultures been an important element of human activity, social or religious practices, be it entertainment or hygiene. In today's Africa, its importance has grown even stronger. Due to conflicts, overcrowding, the ugliness of the landscape, pollution, material poverty, social alienation – in other words: the greatest ailments of everyday life – night has become the time of multiple opportunities, the time during which people can, for instance, make a periodic correction of their life situation or they can simply imagine such a correction. This is particularly important for the most vulnerable social groups: the poor, women, young people and children or immigrants. Murray Melbin (1987) suggests the concept of night as a new borderland, which besides adventure and various economic opportunities, also offers modern man with a change for a bit of freedom. I believe that the space-time of night carries an escapist opportunity,

an escape from the often gloomy reality of an African city. Hence, night plays an important role in coping with problems of social live or, simply, with daily life. Night also has a considerable influence on the formation of typically urban social relationships. Night is the ideal time in which one may establish new relationships, form acquaintances or simply spend time with others. To summarise, the space-time of night is a natural resource that can be used by man in the economic or social dimension.

After nightfall, establishments located at markets or crucial transport arteries change into one enormous entertainment space. These places "under the cover of the night" wake up to a new life. Women install makeshift kitchens, roadside TV lounges emerge. In the middle of the road one, sometimes two, television sets, in front of which people sit on chairs brought by themselves. One part of the room watches a match, the other is preoccupied with a Nigerian soap opera. Candles and kerosene lamps give light. These fragments of the city create an illuminated gap in the interior of the South Sudanese metropolis, submerged in silence and darkness.

However, the true centres of entertainment are hotel restaurants and bars. These are the most important elements on the "map" of city entertainment. Their names – Addis, Asamra, Beijing – sometimes make it possible to learn something about their owners. Such an establishment is usually a counter and several plastic tables. During the day, a hotel may be deserted while, after dusk, it bursts at the seams. It fills up with an international clientele. At night, the local elites enjoy themselves here with a glass of vodka or a bottle of beer: young warlords of the resistance movement, frustrated state officials or businessmen of all descriptions. Elsewhere, such a situation would be at least strange. Here, the time between dusk and dawn is governed by its own rules. This is the time of fun, freedom and sex. One may vent his aspirations and desires. This is an excellent moment for a social performance. A person has also a chance to hide in the crowd under a temporarily assumed identity of a "participant" or "client." A specific nyctalopia ("night blindness") prevails: only certain things are invisible. This applies, for example, to male-female relationships. Regular customers of night bars share a sense of boredom, often also alienation and solitude. Everyone is a regular here. For many, the bar is a second home.

Hotels and restaurants connected with them appeared at the beginning of the twenty-first century, mostly with the incoming foreigners in mind. As I mentioned already, the city after the war is experiencing a housing deficit. Combined with extremely difficult housing conditions, this generates a huge demand for places where one can sleep and eat something. With time, the hotels also became places attractive for the natives coming from the upper levels of the

society. Former refugees from abroad – especially the young generation – associate hotels and restaurants with the world they have just left. The hotels and restaurants create a (small) possibility to continue the life they became accustomed to in exile. What is more, for a moment, they allow the refugees forget the miserable living conditions in Juba. The aesthetic quality and the comfort hotels and restaurants offer is important. It does not matter that an average native cannot afford a beer here. However, it is worth going for a walk to one of the favourite hotels, even if to observe only and, for a moment, be in a totally different world. This time it also seems important to be noticed. Presence in such places ennobles, indicates that one is a refined worldly person who can meet the challenges of the modern labour market. Who knows, maybe one's future employer will be met here.

The bar is a peculiarly neutral transgressive zone, a space where people of various backgrounds meet: representatives of different ethnic and social communities, often unfavourably disposed to one another. For example, a meeting may occur here between an Arab and a former guerrilla fighter of the black resistance movement. Elsewhere such a situation would be strange, to say the least. The neutrality of these places is strengthened by language. English rules in city hotels and restaurants. Having crossed the threshold of such an establishment, some part of a person's ethnicity becomes suspended. These places are for entertainment, but at the same time for communication of culturally strongly diversified citizens.

Neutral spaces have a considerable importance in all history of the ethnically diversified African society: they set boundaries, on the one hand, while facilitating communication, on the other hand. Places of trade or religious cult played that role in former Africa. Today, there is an even a greater need for places of this type in an extremely diversified urban environment. These are most frequently arterial roads, markets or all sorts of trade and service points. It is here that the life of each African city is concentrates.

Here, the unofficial life of Juba citizens focuses: this is a place of relaxation, but also communication. Food serving outlets and hotels considerably facilitate the period of adjustment of new citizens. The hotels play an important role in the formation of new social bonds connected with the urban environment. So far, this also means several clear entertainment spaces without which life in the city would be much more difficult. It is here that culture is "produced." It is within this area that a considerable part of a new city culture is created. Eating out is some sort of novelty. For those more conservative, such a situation covers both the husband and the wife with shame. Moreover, men and women now meet over a shared meal – such a situation would not have been thinkable in a

traditional society of South Sudan. A new diet and culinary traditions have also appeared. World cuisine, new in these areas, is served here. Meals are eaten with cutlery, and washed down with cold beverages. Visiting restaurants and bars at lunch time and having a good time at parties with lavish booze, on Friday and Saturday evenings, are without a doubt, urban rituals.

In Search of Urban Beauty

In modern world, everything is subject to radical aestheticisation. Everything must be spectacular like a display window, an aesthetic masterpiece. An African city is no exception. On the contrary, it is also subject to intensive and diversified beautifying treatments. Their part are green areas, places of entertainment, modern architecture or material remains of local heritage. In this respect, Juba seems to be at the very beginning of this path. In the citizens' eyes, the city belongs to the extremely unpleasant and unaesthetic ones. In the case of most migrants, Juba presents itself much worse than their previous place of stay; regardless whether it was Khartoum or the Kakuma camp in Kenya, the urban development of Juba appears to be in ruins. The landscape has been dominated by makeshift structures made of metal plates and clay. There are basically no asphalt roads in the city. As a result, a smog cloud of dust and sand hangs over the city all the time. There is no greenery either. It was nearly totally destroyed during the war. Therefore, it is no surprise that the respondents unanimously stated that, in fact, there were no fragments in it that we could call nice. For the majority, the only relatively pleasant places were hotels and bars that I already mentioned. This fact in makes the acclimatisation of the population migrating to the city very difficult. At the same time, this fact co-creates the ominous aura of the city.

It is a paradox, considering Juba's location by the While Nile. The city has been minimally connected with the river for nearly a decade. During the war, the land located directly on the riverbank was a militarised zone, with practically no access for civilians. There were posts of the Sudanese army defending the city against guerrillas, who fired from the opposite bank. Until today, in the area of Konjo Konjo market, a cemetery of armoured vehicles reminds people of those times. After 2005, the role of the land by the river started to change. It was re-incorporated into the city. As a result of urbanisation processes, the Nile banks were subjected to revitalisation. Above all, they have become important from the economic point of view. There are several small fishing ports on the river and one main harbour intended for large river transport (the Konjo Konjo area). Massive, rusted barges land here from Kosti, located downstream. River

transport is of fundamental importance for the functioning of Juba as the main means of transport with the North of Sudan. The alluvial terrace is intensively used for cultivation. In addition, wild fruit is harvested here seasonally, and it is also used for fishing. Places located directly by the river are slowly becoming recreational areas. The pleasant climate and charming landscapes drastically contrast with the charmless urban development. That is why my interview partners unanimously mentioned this part of the city as the most beautiful. For many, it was a place of regular excursions and walks. It is true that, in the afternoon, crowds of citizens flock to the river in hope to do their washing. The washing is then dried on hangers hastily constructed from sticks. When it is drying, people enjoy bathing. Among the branching mangroves crowds of young people hang out regularly. They pass their time there, sipping alcohol or taking drugs. It is because of them that this area also enjoys a bad reputation among some people and functions as a risky place, associated with drug addiction.

The Nile plays an extremely complex role in the functioning of the city. On the one hand, it naturally grows to be a fragment associated with leisure. On the other hand, due to the existing realities, it cannot be overestimated in economic terms. After all, it is the main reservoir of drinking water and additional food supply.

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Juba is an extremely interesting case of an African city. We are dealing here with an example of a city in the growth phase, with all the wealth of accompanying socio-cultural phenomena. With its roots, the city reaches colonial politics, but its development is basically connected with the phenomena of the post-colonial period. It owes its prosperity – and stagnation – to the recent civil war. Then, it was either a place of immigration or exile. At the moment, it is experiencing the greatest development in its history, which is conducive to a wide inflow of immigrants. This brings about enormous changes in the urban tissue of the city.

The city continues its colonial structure, characterised by a dichotomous division into the urban and suburban space. The former is still connected with foreigners. With the one difference that Europeans were replaced by Arabs and Indians. The rest of the areas is a totally African world. The continuation of the model of rural life is equally characteristic. It is omnipresent within this area. I should remark here that it does not result from the fact of citizens' origin but is rather the working of extremely harsh living conditions in Juba. It is a strongly atomised area, made up by dozen of districts-villages. Each of them is independent to a certain extent, having its own public interest establishments. The city provides special services to this wide system of unspecified spatial limits. The link connecting it with the city itself is – for the time being – a sense of security

or the possibility of support from aid organisations. These fragments of the city, established after 2005, also have the clear nature of refugee camps. They are characterised by a specific layout and even development. This is an extremely interesting phenomenon, which nevertheless requires in-depth observations.

Juba is to a large extent a dysfunctional city; it does not satisfy even the most basic needs of its citizens. The lack of sanitation infrastructure, electricity, easy access to potable water and transport – combined with other municipal failures (suffice it to mention unemployment or crime) – make life in Juba extremely cumbersome. So, how does an ordinary person cope with these adversities?

The city is developing despite these difficulties. This is happening more from the initiative of ordinary citizens that the local authorities. People themselves created institutions of social life or a specific urban culture, as evidenced by restaurants and bars. The response to the housing deficit and ineffective land policy is the progressing wild settlement. This is a world laboriously built with the hands of its inhabitants themselves, according to their aspirations and possibilities. Traditional models, both in terms of construction and social organisation, prove helpful in this respect. Moreover, the builders of these places draw extensively on their rich experiences, especially those related to life in exile, but also to a specific African urban vision. Unfortunately, this world remains an object of repression, treated as a threat for the development of Juba and as hostile by the authorities and by some aid institutions. The perception of the city is changing. People know the city more and more, and they identify themselves with it: they have their favourite places where they are ready to live or spend their free time. They have learned to use the city to satisfy material and social needs. Commercial spaces and transport arteries play the main function in this respect. These are the areas where life is really happening. This is the world of spontaneous entrepreneurship, but also of symbolic meaning, strongly linking a culturally heterogenic urban oecumene. Hence, crowds of young people can be met on city markets. They have fun, eat, but also earn by offering various services. On their example one can see most clearly how great opportunities are offered by those places. To better understand the processes that happens here, however, we must take a wider look at the life of citizens of Juba. Let us consider family in this city.

Figure 1. Hai Jalaba area (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 2. The very centre of Juba (Juba 2007 M. Kurcz).

Figure 3. Munuki area (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 4. The house of Munuki (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 5. A typical house (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 6. A house with mini-garden (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 7. An interior of the ordinary hut (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 8. A road to Customs (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 9. A cathedral in Kator (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 10. A mausoleum of John Garang (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 11. One of the old-established citizen of Juba in front of his shop (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 12. Inside a minibus (Soba 2020, M. Kurcz).

Figure 13. A football match (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz)

Urban Family and Its Dynamics: The Growing Importance of Marginalised Groups

Since colonial times, the African city has been an area of complex social changes. These processes are one of the oldest fields of interest for the urban anthropologists of Africa (Schaper 1947, Mitchell 1956, Schwab 1961, Little 1966, Gutkind 1974 and others). According to Marek Szczepański (1984: 44), "the intensive migration processes, the growth of cities, changes to the urban economy affect three types of transformations:" (1) family and kin groups, (2) tribe and supratribal organisations, (3) emerging social layers and classes. In this chapter, I will focus on the first group, the most interesting from the point of view of contemporary Juba citizen's life strategies. I decided to include the problems of transformations of urban microstructures in the following points: family, relics of traditional models of social life and the institution of marriage. Additionally, I found it appropriate to pay attention here to the situation of two still extremely marginalised social groups: women and children and young people. I will use one of them to consider the topic of *voluntary associations*.

In Africa, a family is not only the basic unit but, in fact, a supreme social entity, affecting nearly every aspect of life and playing a considerable role in societies. In a rural world, the family life model was strictly connected with agricultural activity. The family constituted the basic production unit. Arable land or a herd of animals was the fabric of family functioning. The socialisation of the young generation was also conducted by this unit: social contents were transmitted, roles and obligations assigned to everybody were taught. The structure of a traditional family was hierarchical, everyone had a specific function and position in it. Finally, its members constituted real support for one another in resolving daily life problems (Gutkind 1974: 104, 105). In the context of urbanised centres, attention is often paid to a difference between rural and urban microstructures (Szczepański 1984: 44, Gutkind 1974). In fact, traditional kin relationships usually consisted of several generations and were very numerous, while the urban ones are usually characterised by a two-generation structure and a much smaller number of members. The reason are the realities of contemporary economy. Scholars often write about a dysfunction or even an "erosion" of the urban family. The most important from all the reasons for this state of affairs is the instability of the urban population, the periodic nature of the settlement of Africans in the city, and the demographic disproportion in terms of age and gender (Wilson 1942, after Hannerz 2006b: 147, 148). Indeed, the family is undergoing numerous

transformations. Their consequences are ambivalent as some mean a change for the better and some – for worse. The city is changing the structure of the family, it often democratises the relationships among its members, particular genders or age groups. It forces families to redefine their relationships and strengthens cooperation among them. At a time, the same processes compromise the family's integrism and give rise to conflicts. However, the family still plays the most principal social role. Many spheres of human activity still overlap with this institution. Many aspects of the functioning of the traditional model are visible in the urban context. In the intensively urbanising centres, we deal with processes of restitution of former models of family life. This is the result of strong links between the city and the countryside. Recently, it has also been connected with the change in the functions of urban centres, which often become an area for the reintegration of societies that have lived in exile for years. The fundamental social structures are characterised by large variability and the emergence of many specific, often ephemeral variants.

The Dynamic Structure of the Family

During the war, the South Sudanese family underwent considerable disintegration. Nearly everybody lost someone dear, and the survivors were dispersed throughout different parts of the world by the war. The process of family reunification started with the return of the former refugees. For many, the city is a place of waiting for loved ones. However, not all managed to join their kin. What is worse, new circumstances appeared that make this process more difficult. Like in other African cities, these include unemployment and a housing deficit.

As I already mentioned, the man appears first in Juba. Initially, he conducts a reconnaissance. On site, he tries to find relatives or, like in the case of people coming from the city, a family home. When the situation stabilises – meaning he finds lodgings – the remaining relatives come. Very often, however, this decision is shifted in time. In the case of former refugees, the most frequently quoted reason was the education of children that still attended schools in Uganda or Kenya. Poor educational perspectives are still one of the reasons to keep the young Sudanese from returning home. This is different than among the rural population who finds decisively better conditions in Juba in nearly any respect.

As is often the case, however, there are still other reasons for not bringing the family around. The man very often does not want to burden himself with an additional load. It may happen that he became involved with another woman on site, thus starting a "new life." This situation is, in a way, the consequence of the turmoil of war. The former period contributed to the intensification of polygamy.

Customary bride prices were reduced or even suspended. Additionally, the Sudanese staying in exile had an opportunity to marry foreign women, whose ethnic entities often followed formal bride prices, at most. For example, during his exile in Uganda, one of my respondents married for the second time. However, he was not wealthy at all. He married a woman from the Baganda peoples, giving her family only a symbolic wedding gift: one cow. At the same time, the years of war brought about the degeneration of the institution of marriage. Permanent wandering from country to country resulted in entering into periodic or even hidden polygamous marriages. It happened that a woman did not know about her husband's other wives. After some time, she was also abandoned without a formal divorce.

Due to problems with sustenance, a man usually brings only one wife to Juba, while the remaining ones are left abroad or in the countryside. In fact, it is a very old practice of the male part of the population. This is integrally connected with the fact of urban life. We know that – already on the eve of independence – a man left one wife in the countryside and took another to the city. The first one ran the household, the other maintained the house in the city (Gutkind 1974: 110). In the cities and in agglomerations, the most numerous remain monogamous marriages, although formally, they do not belong to such. For economic or moral reasons, a man becomes a periodic monogamist for the duration of his stay in the city; he only lives with one wife. However, he frequently decides to have a new relationship without formalising it. The institution of an informal wife is another "peculiarity" of this environment (Shorter 2001: 92). Many Africans do not legalise marriages, arguing that they are too "expensive," "complicated" or "inappropriate." Indeed, the city offers the opportunity for greater independence in the organisation of personal life. It is no different in Juba. However, most often a man is not interested in the fate of his wives whom he left behind somewhere else. Their material needs are at the tail end of a man's budget. Such an uncomfortable situation for the abandoned women is widespread, and a significant number of Juba's women live in such circumstances. Their husbands stay elsewhere; they are still in exile or their absence is caused by work. These are often women who have been abandoned or who have abandoned their husbands themselves; many such women migrate to the city now. The vast majority of them were once in polygamous marriages, while their husbands ceased to perform their duties. The exile experiences had a negative impact on the condition of the South Sudanese family.

However, we should that a relationship with a woman is a fundamental matter for men. In the modern realities of the African city, a woman has an enormous value. Apart from running a home and duties connected with it, she

also earns – providing an income for the family. Looking for a woman is simply an element of the adaptive strategy of a migrant in the city.

With time, the city family gets extended by a group of distant relatives, often normally absent within a traditional family. This situation belongs to extremely uncomfortable ones, if only because of the presence of relatives who should customarily keep distance from one another, like a son-in-law and a mother-in-law.[42] There were few such cases, yet they did happen. A man staying in his wife's house has reduced rights. His position is reminiscent of the status of a minor. Although he is a married and professionally active person, he has to take the traditional tribulations on the part of his in-laws into account. He should bear them meekly. According to traditional rules, the lack of respect for in-laws is one of the greatest offences for which an individual or her family may suffer supernatural consequences.

An extremely common phenomenon is the presence of offspring of one of the brothers or sisters, the so-called charges. It often happens that are orphans but often the children still have their biological carers who are unable, however, to satisfy their needs. So, it is a tradition to put them under the care of relatives who have such possibilities. In the city, at least officially, the most frequent reason for it were educational prospects for the youngest. This is not a local phenomenon in Juba, but I have come across it in the Khartoum agglomeration. In the latter case, this is nothing extraordinary. Kinship has not only a biological but also social and classificational dimension, and the role of the father or mother can be played by various relatives, like the father's brother or mother's sister. In other words, in Sudan – like in many areas of Africa – we may speak of "extended parenthood." All members of a given community take part in the process of socialisation of an individual. That is why, among other things, the old tradition of giving children away to be educated by a distinguished patron is practiced here. They are often religious sheiks under the banner of Sufism who are involved in running traditional Quranic schools. The Quran and Arabic are taught in these schools, along with the arcane knowledge of popular religiousness. Tuition is free but boys have to provide all sorts of services for their master, most frequently serve at his home or work in the field.

42 In the traditional culture of the Baris, a man is obliged to avoid direct contacts with his mother-in-law, see her face to face or enter into her hut. Regardless, at the same time he should treat her with respect manifested by special behaviour towards people related to her, the so-called *moken* (e.g. a sister or the mother-in-law's brother; Seligman and Seligman 1965: 262).

The structure of such an urban family, typical at the moment, has a dynamic character. As new relatives continually join the community. They take the place of old tenants, forcing them to move out. This is the consequence of the adaptive strategy of new migrants who, on their first days in the city, make use of kinship bonds. This situation is also becoming the source of serious tensions and the crisis of traditional bonds. Such a family has been practically reduced to living functions, providing its members with a roof above their heads. This is all the new migrants can count on. They have to organise food and incidental expenses in their own capacity. The house becomes a night shelter only. The day fills their life in the city. If they do not find their own accommodation soon – and permanent employment – they must consider moving out.

Continuation of the Traditional Models of Family Life

Despite clear changes or distortions, the urban family also tries to continue the traditional models of social life. Generally speaking, they are based on the separation of roles and duties between man and woman, both in the social and economic domains. The oldest man in the house is the head of the family. He represents it outside. The responsibility to support the family also rests on his shoulders. The woman is responsible for the "hearth and home," she concentrates on family matters and runs the household. This is a kind of model of family life in the city whose roots can be traced back to the Muslim culture. It is hardly ever fully implemented, if only because of the great spatial independence of women, expressed through their professional activity.

The rule of man is being limited in many aspects of life. For example, regarding the right to land or the marriage of his charges, he must also take the opinion of his kinship and family elders into account. This occurs even if they do not physically live nearby.

An average urban family is nuclear, composed of a mother, father and children who have not yet married (Figure 1). Everyone's ambition is to move to their own house immediately after marriage. This is especially important for the woman since she does not accept the customary discourtesies from the mother-in-law. And so, according to the local custom, for the first days in a new house, a woman is not allowed to sit "at the table" with her mother-in-law. What is more, she is not entitled to any meat dishes or even seasonings like salt. She should simply avoid her mother-in-law and father-in-law alike. It is no surprise, therefore, that the possession of one's own accommodation is the basic condition of any young, self-respecting woman entering into marriage. Living in the city gives an individual a chance to renegotiate norms or customs that are harming

from a woman's point of view. This is of particular importance for traditionally marginalised groups like women.

Not everyone can run their own homestead straight away. Such a married couple lives in the husband's family home, creating a large patrilocal family. This is a traditional family model for the majority of tribes of North and South Sudan, which is also allegedly common in the countryside (cf. Seligman and Seligman 1965). The respondents do not distinguish a "nuclear family" from "extended family." Both types are referred to with one phrase taken from Arabic: *usra*. This results from the fact that the "extended family" still functions as a fundamental social unit. Despite the physical absence of elders, they are declared as unquestionable leaders. In aspects of daily life, the family functions as a typical nuclear unit. In special matters, however, it turns out to be a part of a larger whole.

As I already mentioned above, monogamous relationships prevail in the city. This does not mean, however, that polygamy belongs to exceptionally rare phenomena. On the contrary, it is quite popular. Noteworthy, there are no limitations in this respect among peoples of that part of Africa. A man may have as many wives as financial conditions allow him to. Still, it is a common situation among the black establishment to have several or even a dozen or so wives.

Both in the past and now, a large percentage of polygamous marriages are levirate marriages. The customary law ordering the deceased man's family to care for his wife and offspring is still carefully followed. This is the obligation resting in first order on the deceased's brother. The widow officially becomes his wife, but still the children from this marriage bear the deceased man's name.

Traditionally, the first wife is endowed with the greatest respect. From Arabic, she is called *mara kabira*, which means "the big wife." She is the true lady of the house. This is explained by the fact that it was she who had created the household and dowered the basic goods. She commands the other women in the house. During the husband's absence, she decides matters. When the husband dies – regardless of anything – it is known he will be buried at the first wife's hut. Wives may stay together in one household. However, they should have separate huts and kitchens. But this hardly ever happens in Juba's conditions. A kitchen nearly always remains shared, and women work in it in turns. The largest hut is owned by the first wife. The husband should treat wives equally, both in material and emotional sense. However, in practice, their relations tend to be different. In order to limit arguments, wives' huts are never located next to each other but on the opposite sides of homestead. Despite typical fears in this respect, the relationships between the women are usually appropriate. With time, a strong bond is created among them, generated by shared worries and joys. They are also linked by shared work and care for children. The first wife often not so much

seeks but participates in the finalisation of the husband's next marriage. She believes that another wife is not a risk to her position. On the contrary, she may relieve her in household chores.

The city changes the system of identification. Bonds of kinship become loosened, while relationships of an individual and random nature appear in their stead. Despite new patterns being fixed, various forms of nepotism or "family parasitism" are still observed (Szczepański 1984: 45). In the centre under examination, we are also dealing with other relics of traditional social arrangements.

Age groups are still an important identification plane for a part of the population. They are relics of "age classes" or "age groups," institutions well known to the communities of this nook of Africa, but especially to those that are engaged in animal husbandry. These institutions created formalised age-based teams, often preceded by a special ritual, and were subject to internal discipline, solidarity and a sense of separateness in relation to other social layers. The following age groups were usually differentiated: (1) children look after goats, (2) the youth (before the initiation) serve the elders (warriors in particular), (3) warriors (on the basis of initiation) fight and hunt, (4) elders are an advisory and educational body, and (5) old people have no specified functions. Of course, the "group of warriors" has the greatest importance. Novices were subjected to collective initiation. In most communities, such a celebration was organised every four years. During the celebration, a man obtained scarification tattoos characteristic of a given clan, sometimes he was also circumcised. Sawing or removing a part of front teeth was, however, more popular. The initiated youth formed an additional social group, with its own name and characteristic attributes (e.g. dancers' costumes). Above all, however, its members were obliged to reciprocal solidarity and to perform small courtesies for one another, especially on the occasion of important moments in life. Every day, their relationships resembled true kinship. For example, marriage with a "class brother's" sister was perceived as incest (Nalder 1937: 19–21, Seligman and Seligman 1965).

At the moment, at least in the city, we are dealing with, at best, relics of this institution or, if you prefer, its re-conceptualisation. It has basically undergone an informalisation: the idea is based on traditional models, age-based solidarity; however, the way it functions is already new. Modern "age classes" gather boys of a diversified ethnic composition, whose binding element is basically a shared experience or a living situation. Access to such an association is not preceded by any special ritual. One of such groups is made up of the so-called lost boys, a generation of orphans, most frequently of Dinka origin, educated in refugee camps. For them, age, family and tribal bonds are important, but so are shared experiences from the times of war. An extremely important binding element is

the current situation in the city: the lack of work, friends or housing problems. Such spontaneous associations serve mutual assistance, especially to young people. In fact, these are self-aid institutions. “Brothers” from the same age group share their meagre income and rent flats together. They also spend their free time together.

Marriage Rules

Marriage is an institution in which we still observe the rules of former social life. At the same time, these rules express elements that are the measure of a typically urban style of life. This is the effect of dichotomous legal relationships. Two forms of marriage co-exist in the city: “modern” and “indigenous.” Godfrey Wilson in Broken Hill rightly noticed that the traditional matrix cannot easily become a part of relationships existing in the city. An extended system of marrying in the countryside, consisting in the establishment of kinship bonds with a considerable group of persons, based on economic grounds, was being replaced by a union made faster and in a more independent manner (Wilson 1942, qtd. after Hannerz 2006b: 149, 150). What is also important in this matter are aspects of moral nature and modes of life inspired by Christianity, but also connected with typically urban economic conditions. In short, marriage is an institution of social life that in a considerable manner is modified by a specific urban reality. At the same time, in an African city, native forms of marriage have been recognised since pre-colonial times. Until this day, African traditions also govern the rules of marrying within urbanised areas. In the last decades, the asymmetry in the number of men and women and the instability of the urban settlement have favoured the strengthening of the phenomenon.

Finally, it is also a fragment of a cultural reality in which the contamination of “local” and “foreign” elements appears the most. The culture of African cities is strongly inspired by African elements, but it is also (or, maybe, above all) co-created by foreign elements, from outside the continent, particularly those belonging to the American and European civilisation. This fact is to be considered one of the main components of the urban lifestyle in Africa. In the case of Juba, native traditions and those from North America and the Middle East make themselves known. They all constitute the basis of the local variant of urbanism. The rules of marriage of different peoples living in the city are similar in many respects. This is the result of the dominance of the pastoral cultural circle.

Marriage is a duty of any person. Not being married is considered a deviation from the norm and punished with social ostracism. The age of marrying men is diversified. It usually does not happen before the age of twenty. While bachelors

around forty are a rule. Material problems, particularly excessive bride prices, are responsible for this state of affairs. Political stability has contributed to the outbreak of consumerism, which is directly connected with a gradual decrease in the "price of a wife."[43] The complexity of the economic situation in the city is also important in this matter. On the one hand, the traditional forms of fees are still valid – breeding animals – while on the other hand, cash is indispensable as well. All this makes a boy wait patiently until his sisters have married. Only then a family will have proper capital. Delaying a marriage decision is also caused by social changes. The young generation simply wants to be independent. As I already mentioned, women were arguing about the necessity for a man to have his own house. They do not want it as before, to live together with the husband's parents. Naturally, financial independence is important too; that is, the man's permanent job. The family no longer wants to participate in bride prices as much as before. Instead, it would be ideal if the family contributed only symbolically.

What is interesting is that while men get married later and later, the age of marrying women has fundamentally decreased. Among middle-aged women, the average age of marriage was about twenty-five. In the case of their daughters, the age of twenty-five was the ultimate limit of marriage. In fact, today in the city, fifteen-year-old girls are considered ready to marry. Poverty is responsible for this, and the desire to get rid of the burden and temptation to get a bride price. The early marriage of a daughter is also an opportunity to avoid the costs associated with her education and the risk of her becoming pregnant. These arguments are common among the lowest levels of the urban society. In the case of better-off families – at least declaratively – the ultimate limit is the completion of an education by the girl (secondary school or university).

The times of extreme gender asymmetry in cities are over. On the eve of the postcolonial times there was a shortage of women in cities, and a man was forced to look for a life partner in the rural environment (Gutkind 1974: 108). In Juba, such situations are rather rare. On the basis of concluded marriages, we may consider that – at least in the centre examined by me – the number ratios between men and women are more balanced. My observations evidence that school usually is the place of establishing male-female relationships. It was there where very

43 An interview partner from the Madi people claimed that, before, in the rural environment, it was enough to offer from six to eight cows, a dozen or so goats and several other gifts like arrows or agricultural tools. Today, two to three times more is demanded. Additionally, cash is needed, which is treated as an equivalent of traditional gifts like a hoe.

many interview partners met their "other half." For others, a refugee camp was such a place. It was not difficult to notice that a Sunday service regularly offered such opportunities. This is an excellent place to meet a girl. Since there nobody would be suspected of bad intentions. I managed to note down the following information: after several Sunday dates, a boy asks for the possibility of paying a visit at his chosen one's home. If she likes him, she agrees. It is a tradition that a visit does not take place earlier than at 3 p.m. This is the time of friendly visits of self-respecting city residents. After work and lunch, you can finally devote yourself to rest and entertainment. If the parents have nothing against it, such meetings will be repeated. It is said that a boy and a girl should keep meeting this way for at least a year. Writing letters is very popular during this time. This is another city peculiarity, most probably inspired by Muslim influences. Lovers express their feelings in letters, again, so as not to expose themselves to disgrace. Settled residents are relatively puritan regarding male-female relationships. Thus, they oppose indecent – in their opinion – customs generated by westernisation but, what is interesting, those also prevailing in the countryside. These also seem to be too liberal. In my opinion, Muslim influences and Christian churches propaganda make themselves known in this respect. In the male-female relations, both centres are rather hostile towards the "traditional" African culture. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that dating outside of the house is usually not practiced. It would ruin the girl's reputation. An exception is Valentine's Day, which is becoming more and more popular in Juba. According to tradition, a boy offers his girlfriend a small gift. It is also possible – as an exception – to officially go out with the girl to a restaurant or cafe.

With time, the moment ultimately comes to formalise the relationship. If the boy and girl want to get married but have no consent of the family, they have two options. The first one is for the girl to escape, if she turns out to be pregnant. She should find shelter at the lover's home. He sends a letter to her parents, the so-called *juab*. He informs in it that he is responsible for the pregnancy. He should also attach a customary amount of 3000 Sudanese pounds (USD 1500!). The next step is to set up a meeting. The girl's parents pay a visit to the boy's house (he is obliged to pay for their transport). Once there, if they want to resolve the crisis amicably, they present financial demands. Money is considered compensation for customary wedding gifts which are due to the girl's family. But these demands should rather not be subject to negotiations (a "price for the wife" is negotiated according to a normal procedure). This is an absolute condition. If the lover's family accepts it, further developments follow the course of a conventional marriage. The other way means an escape, too, but of both lovers. As a rule, however, the girl acquaints her grandmother with the entire situation. Three days

after her disappearance, the grandmother announces to all and sundry that the girl has escaped with such and such boy and she is in no danger. Then, again a letter is sent, with a cash attachment. Everything depends on the attitude of the male part of the girls' family. I was assured, however, that this manner is extremely effective in convincing the parents to allow their daughter to marry.

What happens, however, if things do not go as planned? If the boy has informed the girl about his plans and she has nothing against it, the next step is to talk to his own family. During the series of talks, the fellow's financial capacities are discussed in first order. It is important for him to have at least half of the marriage payment. Then there is an opportunity that the remaining part will be added by uncles, members of the same clan as his. Formerly, in this matter, a suitor could count on the help of "brothers" from the same "age class." So, in fact, their proverbial brotherhood made itself known on the occasion of weddings. Generally speaking, "age brotherhood" provided various forms of support. Co-brothers accompanied during marriage rites, for example in the ceremony of transferring the bride price. They also helped in choosing the best candidate for a wife.

And so, the desiderata included beauty, young age, but also an ability to cook and brew beer (Beaton 1937: 128, 134). Today, the girl's reputation is discussed above all. It is important that she represents the same material status as the boy. During the talks, the degree of intimacy between the two families is also agreed. This is one of the basic issues for all the local communities. The future spouses must come from separate clans! As far as other traditional valid rules are concerned, ethnic endogamy is not so important anymore in urban conditions. If a boy and a girl come from the same community, it is a kind of an ideal situation.[44] The degree of such marriages is relatively high. Nevertheless, the number of marriages made outside the ethnic unit is not so small either. I noted particularly many such unions among young people. These cases, in fact being further urban peculiarities, do not arouse any special controversies any longer. They are generally accepted with understanding. What is more, people seek positive their aspects. Inter-ethnic marriages are often an opportunity to avoid excessive bride prices. More important, as I have been assured, is the position and reputation of the family. Today, however, there are hardly any marriages between Christians

44 From the reports of early researchers of the region, we also know that in the past, mixed marriages were not rare. For example, the rainmakers of the Latuka tribe customarily chose their wives from outside their ethnic group. This practice was even more common among the Moro and Niambara (Nalder 1937: 18).

and Muslims. For the majority of my interlocutors, giving a daughter away as wife to a Muslim would be a reprehensible act, bordering on betrayal and apostasy, not so much religious, but a break with their own family and tribal community. This is the result of political changes in the southern provinces of Sudan and the related decline of the importance of Islam, which I will discuss later below.

When a boy receives consent from relatives, he informs the girl's parents about his intentions. For this purpose, he writes a letter to them. This is the most common form of communication at the initial phase of negotiations. It is considered an expression of the candidate's high culture; in other words, according to my respondents, this is a characteristic feature of a true city dweller. The form is important also for another reason. The point is not to jeopardise one's reputation. A feature of the entire pre-marital negotiations is the fear of losing face. This is understood in a specific manner. It is important not to get a direct refusal. For this purpose, an entire series of activities is performed, probing the other party's attitude. This is why all sorts of messengers are important. This mission is undertaken by various persons, most frequently, however, the mother or a sister. Fixing the date of a meeting is a clear signal that the matters are gaining momentum. The boy goes alone to a meeting with the girl's parents, which happens in a narrow circle, only among the closest family. According to the tradition, the boy should bring some gifts like traditionally brewed beer. At present, however, this hardly ever happens. During the meeting, the parents express their preliminary consent; if they had had any objections, the meeting would not have taken place. However, the parents inform the youths that they have to discuss the matter with their clan relatives. The eldest clan member has the final word.

The main role in marriage negotiations is played by the clan. This is the level on which the delicate art of pre-marital negotiations occurs. The conditions of a premarital agreement are negotiated by the eldest in the family. The father's role is often minimal. The marriage contract is made between two groups of men – and not two individuals (Figure 2).

At this stage, demands are agreed above all: the value and the nature of the "bride-price." An important issue is also to properly distribute gifts; who and how much should be given. The marital payment will go to the girl's parents in part only. Its considerable part is distributed among clan members. Particular relatives, men and women, receive a separate part on the basis of their position and merits; the "principle of reciprocity" is valid. The system takes the form of exchange and is extremely complicated (for details, see Seligman and Seligman 1965). It is to be treated not as gambling but evidence of kin bonds and the validity of social norms sanctified by tradition ("principle of reciprocity").

The agreement has a form of a written statement in which the value of the bride-wealth is specified, along with the time of its presentation to the girl's side. The bride payments are paid in instalments: before the formal nuptials, after the birth of children and after the woman's death. The contract is signed by all adult clan members, thereby they guarantee the contract. The last instalment, as a rule, is transferred after the woman's death but no later than on the day of the funeral. Some interview partners claimed that the final date is set by the end of the mourning ceremonies, which in the case of a woman happens on the fourth and, in the case of a man, on the third day after the funeral. It is considered that by that time, all obligations should have been settled. This is, however, often impossible. I personally witnessed a certain family row. A woman died suddenly, leaving the husband with unpaid payments. Her relatives demanded immediate payment. When the man refused, they threatened that the funeral would not take place. The situation was disputable since the deceased was in the prime of her life, so she still could give birth to children. Therefore, according to tradition, a man did not so much have to, but he himself had the right to demand redress – a refund of part of the "bride-price" or to expect a marriage proposal from one of his wife's sisters. The crisis was finally finalised with a promise to pay the dues, again in the form of a written statement. It was signed by all present adult men from the widower's clan (Figure 3).

The "bride-price" is still specified in animals, cows in particular.[45] It does not matter that the family lives in the city and has not been engaged in breeding for a long time. Nobody is expected to work for the bride's family by hoeing, building and thatching, as it was in the past. It is obvious that the relatives would expect the traditionally most expensive good, i.e. cows (Figure 4). Apart from that, as I have informed, the role of money as a wedding gift is growing. The father in this respect tries to calculate the expenses spent on the daughter's education as reliably as possible. And so, one of the interview partners argued that he would demand a candidate to reimburse him for the costs of his daughter's education, which he estimated at thirty thousand dollars. It is understandable considering the economic conditions in the city. In the urban environment, following the Muslim model, other gifts are also given, handed over from the time of match-making until several months after the wedding. Cows remain the most important. In a ceremonial procession, often assisted by an armed escort, the cows are

45 One of my female interview partners (from the Bari people) got married in return for 200 cattle and twenty-four goats. All the animals were kept by her father. Her mother got a dairy cow and a calf. Additionally, each of her uncles was given seven goats each.

given to the bride's relatives during a special ceremony that may be considered the culmination point of the wedding. Afterwards, the girl typically moves into the boy's house. In the past, this moment could happen a bit later, depending on the number of transferred animals. Many communities practiced a specific nato-localism, i.e. keeping the spouses in their homes after the wedding. Such peoples included, for example, the Acholi from the borderland of Sudan and Uganda. A young married woman stayed at her family home for several more months. Similar traditions prevailed at their neighbours, the Moro, among whom a woman stayed with parents even for several years after the wedding, living with her husband only from time to time (Nalder 1937: 48). This so-called "visiting wife syndrome" is a very widespread practice in this part of Africa. Let me only add that its variants were seen among the Nubians from the Middle Nile. Today, it still happens that a woman goes back to her family home during the post-natal period and stays there till the end of the forty-day ritual quarantine (Kurcz 2007b).

In turn, in the city the so-called bride-service is not practiced. This, however, is still in force in the countryside. Beaton (1937: 134) recollects that a suitor, if he was not rich enough, had to work hard for the girls' hand in the field or in hut building. All the works were carried out for the benefit of the future mother-in-law.

Paradoxically, church weddings are not particularly popular. This is surprising due to the number of declared Christians. The fact that commonly in African cities the church wedding institution is very popular is also surprising. As church wedding is a measure of "urbaneness" that is characterise a city resident (Gutkind 1974: 111, 112). I was informed that costs are the main reason for such a situation. A family, regardless of its religious views, must organise traditional ceremonies, above all the ceremony of transferring the bride price must be held. For that reason, no-one can afford another ceremony, this time in a church. It is also connected with considerable costs. The Africans have taken over this institution with the entire cultural background, including flowers, wedding rings, a "white dress," an exclusive limousine, a photographer, confetti and a festive meal (Gutkind 1974: 112). All to make the ceremony be close to the "ideal model" and be as cosmopolitan as possible. Polygamy is another reason. As I was informed, the war has contributed to the intensification of this phenomenon. According to my findings, only more affluent residents of the city stood before the altar and people of advanced age, usually when their marriage became monogamous again.

A divorce, like in many other post-traditional cultures, occurs extremely rarely, among other things because (or, maybe, above all) it gives rise to a crisis in relationships between the two families. Invariably, the bride price remains a stabilising factor. In the event of a divorce, the price should be returned at the latest by the time the woman remarries. This is a sufficient reason for a marriage to be dissolved rarely. The only objective reason for a divorce is a childless marriage. Nearly always the woman was and is blamed for it. The duty of every person is to have children, but boys are excessively favoured. They are the guarantee of the continuity of family. Marriage is the means to achieve this objective. Its basic function is contained in it. Offspring is still so important that "ghost marriages" are continued to be practiced. In the event of childless death of a man, the duty of one of his relatives is to get married on his behalf. All this to satisfy the desire for having offspring. Children born from this union are treated as the deceased's offspring. This way he will be included in the group of ancestors, and his family will not die out. Going back to divorce, however, even childlessness does not automatically have to be connected with the dissolution of marital bonds. A frequent though extremely welcome solution is for a man to take another wife. Other circumstances, such as infidelity or inappropriate behaviour, are resolved by means of family negotiations rather than divorce. I know a case of a woman who ran away from her husband and got involved with another man (by the way, elopement, as I was assured, is a frequent manner of enforcing divorce by a woman). The husband, however, decided to get her back. Aspects of emotions or ambition were not the case, though. The woman left the man behind with several children. And the man had no other wife. Ultimately, the marriage was reintegrated. Relatives and compensation (USD 500) from the woman's lover helped.

Formal divorces are a rarity. This does not mean, however, that marriages are particularly lasting. It happens that spouses, both the man and the woman, simply leave each other and live in separation – in our sense of the word. From their perspective, this is the best solution. I recorded many such marriages in the city. I already mentioned single women in the city, and this is not a coincidence. The city may be an escape from an unsatisfactory marriage for both sexes. As I mentioned, the city becomes a "pretext" to rebuild personal relationships. A conviction prevails that a traditional marriage model is not maintainable in the urban environment.

Single Women: The Feminisation of the Urban Family

It has been a tradition dating back to colonial times to associate migration to the city in Africa nearly only with men. In fact, initially a considerable percentage of migrants to the city were men, and the demand for their work was the main stimulus for urbanisation in the colonisation period. They left homes seasonally, from several months up to several years, leaving their children and wives behind. This does not mean, however, that among the first generation of migrants there were no representatives of women. As we know, there were both men and women among the migrants from South Rhodesia. A periodic migration of men to the city also made their wives follow. Some women did not feel like waiting for the return of their husbands and – just like them – they moved into the cities, starting a new life with their original or new partner. The phenomenon became so alarming that traditional leaders forced colonisers to impose a more restrictive policy in relation to women migrating to the city. In 1916, the Native Adultery Punishment Ordinance was introduced, an act aimed at preventing adultery among women, then a ban appeared on women's marriages without their official guardians' consent, and in the 1930s single women were also forbidden to migrate to the cities. However, this did not prevent women's migrations to cities. A sudden development of cities at the threshold of colonisation resulted in including entire segments of the society – men above all, but also young women – in the working force. A permanent demand stays high for the services of the latter. Commonly in the urban environment of Africa women specialised in new, usually less profitable, spheres of industry and services (Feierman 2003: 678–680). For decades, women were a helpless and nearly invisible city group.

Today, in the common imagination, a woman in the city, particularly the one outside a formal marriage, is treated thoroughly negatively (e.g. she is linked with prostitution). Despite the enormous progress in gender equality on the African continent, women in the city still face discrimination both at a family level and in public institutions. An African city still is not neutral in terms of gender, as this is to predominantly be an area of the operation of men. There is enormous literature about this subject. A female African working in the city is still an anomaly that constitutes a serious threat to the stability of the traditional family model. However, at the moment, she is playing nearly the same role as a man in the urbanisation processes. We know that, now, the migration of young women to the city is growing (Champion and Hugo 2004). In fact, the city needs women. Together with processes of informalisation and the demand for low-paid jobs, their importance for the functioning of a modern city cannot be underestimated. We know that through home produced goods, they generate income that is an important supplement of the man's earnings. A woman is extremely entrepreneurial in city conditions and a lot

depends on her in sectors such as agriculture and food catering. The city, however, is not only an area of her professional work but also of resistance and fight against the social arrangements that discriminate her. It is here where she must face them to the greatest degree. At the same time, only in the city is where she can overcome them. Generally speaking, a woman's life most fully illustrates the opportunities that living in a city is connected with, since women are present in all groups of migrants to the city. Their migration to the city is often individual, as a result of an autonomous decision. It is no different in Juba. A considerable percentage of migrants to the city are women. They represent all groups of the population that migrates there. Among them are returnees from the neighbouring countries or South Sudan, migrants from rural areas, workers of the administration of the autonomy under creation, and crowds of female migrants from the neighbouring African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic of Congo).

There is a striking number of single women in Juba. They include widows, whose husbands died during the war, but also women whose husbands stay elsewhere; they are in exile or their absence is caused by work. Finally, a considerable group is made up of women who left or were left by their husbands. A vast majority of them were once in polygamous marriages, and their husbands ceased to perform their duties.

The situation of a lone woman – particularly of an unclear marital situation – is obviously a problem. It is uncomfortable both for her and her relatives. Nevertheless, she is treated with great understanding, treated as transitory and characteristic of post-war Sudan. For many women, it is positive, as it gives them at least temporary independence.

A certain group of female interview partners who stay in Juba assured me also that they did not want to be bound with any man, at least for now. Their main reason is economic self-sufficiency. In the world of spontaneous entrepreneurship, a woman can support herself more than ever before. Periodic life outside a formal marriage in the conditions of modern Juba turns out to be a better solution in many cases. It offers the possibility to use income for own purposes, and not as in the "traditional" model according to the husband's will. This phenomenon is not particularly new, even though strongly linked with a local context of modern Juba. In the Copperbelt, Nairobi or other intensively urbanising regions of Africa of the colonial era, women provided all sorts of services for men like cleaning or cooking. However, they lived without formal guardians. The earned income allowed them to establish themselves in the city and achieve a more independent position (Feierman 2003: 681).

Women in Juba have also other reasons for not entering into new formal marriages. As soon as the abandoned woman decides to re-marry, the original husband appears, and the entire situation becomes the source of a serious

conflict. Such a matter can only be resolved with usual compensation in cash. However, children from the first marriage become a problem. The new husband usually demands they are to be sent back to their father's family. Thus, he does not want to assume the obligation to maintain them but – above all – he escapes from the prospect of participating in the "bride-price" for the sons of the woman. Of course, this becomes the source of serious tensions and even family dramas. It also prevents unions from being effectively formalised.

A single woman, like other migrants, usually manages to find accommodation in the house of clan relatives. However, apart from living with them under one roof, she has nothing to do with the other tenants. If they are members of a close family like a brother, she does not have to pay for the roof over her head or food. For everything else, however, along with education of children, she has to pay from her own pocket, which forces her to take up gainful employment.

In Juba, I was surprised by the large number of families headed by women (Figure 5). They had the final word. They managed the budgets of their households. Most often, they led families broken as a result of war, less frequently due to the prolonging absence of a man. One of them, from the Amarat district, is a good example here. Her man died during the war. His duties were totally taken over by the wife. She had her relatives installed in Juba; she had an enclosure built and created a small garden with several basic plants. She found a job that was atypical for her gender: not a temporary job with low profitability, but a permanent job in one of the humanitarian aid organisations. Thanks to the job, she maintains a family of a dozen or so people. Her children, including a son with his wife and their offspring all live together with her, under one roof. When the wife left her alcoholic brother, she took his children. In this example, we see how an African woman, as a result of a tragic fate, takes over the burden of managing a family. For this purpose, she combines the role of a man and woman, which is a novelty in the life of the Sudanese society. I saw a similar case in a different part of the – extremely peripheral – area of Gudeli. A widow with two daughters-in-law and their children lived there. Husbands of all three women had died. The system of functioning was nearly identical as the one described above. The oldest woman was the head of the household. She represented it outside. She was also the main breadwinner. She was the only one to have a permanent job. In the city, I could meet families in which the majority of members were women. A family from the Munuki district may be an example. It was made up of a mother and three daughters. One of the daughters' four children were also at home, while another was expecting a baby. This subsequent urban peculiarity did not give rise to any special embarrassment among the nearest neighbours.

A feminised family does not particularly surprise anyone anymore in Juba. Maybe it has an ephemeral nature, typical for a post-war reality. Nevertheless, it

is certain that it will contribute to the change of the previous position of African woman in traditional social structures. In rural areas, we observe a struggle for new relationships between men and women. Many actors participate in it: NGOs, Christian churches, state authorities, finally the men and women themselves. Despite the enormous progress in the transparency of social life and the enormous support from outside, women still feel discriminated against and do not participate in the public and economic life on an equal footing with men. We should note that in Africa a debate is going on about the roots of this phenomenon, whether it is the result of traditional culture or the colonial period when – through education and Christian proselytism – the "true" patriarchalism was installed (Arnfred and Utas 2007). This extremely fascinating debate – which in fact does not concern the perception of African culture in toto – is not only a domain of scholars but also a basic subject in the public debate in many countries on the continent (suffice it to mention the well-known case from several years ago, of the former South African President Jackob Zuma accused of raping a minor). In this debate, the accusation of anthropologists is fundamental: whether they, led by conscious or hidden Eurocentrism, have not distorted (and still are not distorting) the image of the African culture. For that reason, so much is changing now in modern African studies that many of the issues encompassed by it are undergoing a specific reinterpretation. The gender issues probably illustrate this process best.

A Day in the Life of a Woman

A married woman is the first one in the house to get up. She starts her day from sweeping the farmyard. Next, she sets off to get brushwood and possibly water – supplying water is the task for the strongest women at home, in first order for the adolescent girls – which is available only in some places in the vicinity. It is drawn by means of hand pumps. A female citizen of Juba sometimes has to cover considerable distances and her share of standing on site, particularly during the morning rush hour. As I was assured, water is one of the main reasons for arguments among neighbours. During the day, women go to get water three times: at dawn, at noon and in the evening. This activity, on average, takes from one to two hours. In the rain season, when there is basically no shortage of water, they get it from house tanks filled by rain water pits. After her return, she prepares breakfast for the children and tea for the men. Then, she does the dishes. Later she starts gainful work. She portions charcoal brought from the market the previous day. She packs it into foil bags and distributes it in the area or puts it outside the house. She has at least the youngest of the children with her at all times.

Wherever she goes, the little one will be accompanying her, strapped to her back. I had an opportunity to observe mothers transporting water on their heads, with a child tied to her back many times. Around noon, she sets out to the market to cash the products of the house farm (eggs, straw) and to do the shopping. Upon her return, she prepares dinner, which is the main, often the only meal for adults in a considerable majority of farmsteads. The family eats dinner together, with each of the members of the household being given a serving strictly determined by the mother. Various types of leguminous plants are eaten (broad bean, okra) or *assida*, a dish made up of a cooked wheat flour lump dough. Meat appears in the menu very rarely, once a month on average. Above all, however, it is the crowning event of festive family and religious celebrations. After dinner, she washes the dishes and does other housework. In all the activities, she usually receives help from the children. Daughters are responsible for washing and dish cleaning after meals, while sons help in trading or work on the land. She usually manages to find some free time in the afternoon, to rest or to take up embroidery, a very popular activity among African women today. This is also the moment for social work; in a way, another one of the duties imposed upon her by tradition. Allow me to remark that many women's routine activities are of a partially social nature. Going for water or work on the land are activities performed collectively along with other women. In the afternoons, women meet in one house. They pleasantly pass time over a cup of tea, but above all, they devote themselves to the time-consuming ritual of doing hair. Evening is the time of tea and listening to the radio with the entire family. Due to the lack of electricity, the day ends soon after sunset.

The Generation of Young Women

This is a crowd of young girls, most often returnees, who stay in the city under the care of closer or more distant relatives. They soaked in the big-city culture of Nairobi or Kampala. On their example, we may notice how the South Sudanese culture is changing and how these changes are perceived. Previously unseen elements start to appear in their clothes, like a short skirt or tight jeans. Painted nails, dyed hair, vivid colours are also extremely popular among them. However, the use of skin-whitening cosmetics by girls evokes social outrage. The girls from the city want to become similar to their peers from East Africa, who have a bit brighter carnation, at any cost. This group clearly distances itself from peers who never left Juba or Sudan. They circulate entirely within the community of former repatriates. They do not belong to the city underclass. They have a roof over their head and do not have to worry about the necessities. The problem is the total lack

of interest on the part of the relatives under whose care they remain. According to my respondents, the reason is the progressing liberalisation of customs, and the right of the young to taste the freedom they lacked during the war. They live a rich social life. Their main job it to wander at night through city clubs. There, they dance and drink beer. They also become the object of men's adoration. The scenario is usually the same. A girl meets a boy at a disco. If she likes him, she goes to bed with him. He gives her money for a new dress or a hairdo. With time, as my interlocutors assured me, one of the men will decide to marry her. The problems appear when the young woman turns out pregnant. In such a situation, the boy usually runs away and leaves the city afraid of complications. Besides ostracism from the family, the girl faces no additional dangers. According to tradition, she should be punished with banishment in such a situation. In practice, however, she is most frequently allowed to stay at home, like in the case of the daughter of one of my female interview partners. When she got pregnant and everyone learned about it, the boy ran to Khartoum. The girl's family finally managed to get in touch with him, but the boy did not want to assume responsibility for the young mother and the child, using the excuse of being jobless to shield himself. The relatives decided to take care of the girl and her child. African females like her do not have an easy life, though. Their status lowers. They do no not have great prospects of finding a good candidate for a husband either. No one in difficult urban conditions wants to bring up somebody else's children.

It is worth noting that extramarital pregnancy is often used by a young woman to formalise the relationship with a chosen one, most often a returnee like herself. In other words, extramarital pregnancy is a chance for a relationship that is more satisfying to the life aspirations of a young woman. In such a case, the family usually agrees to have the relationship formalised and the marriage price is postponed in time.

Katarzyna Grabska (2011) observes that a woman coming back from exile has a particularly difficult matrimonial situation. On the one hand, emigration is used to demand excessive marriage prices. She is considered a well-educated person or, simply, perfectly prepared for all activities necessary in the urban environment, and at the same time caring for her own appearance in the spirit of world models. In summary, a modern woman. On the other hand, she has the reputation of being a bit too emancipated, difficult to live with for a man paying attention to traditional values. This is because of the manners she has acquired abroad. Both these phenomena effectively prevent young female returnees from getting married well and quickly, thus standing on the way of full re-integration with the original society. For these reasons, among other things, the generation of young women coming back from exile chooses the city – and not the

countryside – as their place of repatriation. For the same reasons, they very often look for partners in their community.

The practices described above can basically be called hidden prostitution. This is sex in return for consumer goods. Women sleep with men in return for what counts in the urban environment: entertainment and consumer goods. All this is not attainable for an average young person. That is why it is not prostitution in their eyes, since no money is mentioned, and it is not necessary to return the favour for sex each time either. This is a risky yet extremely attractive form of coping with the problems of financial nature by the generation of young women. Karen Coen Flynn (2005) noticed a very similar phenomenon among the poor women of Mwanza, a city in Tanzania. In that environment, the phenomenon functioned as a specific life strategy ("sex for food"). The situation is similar in Juba, although it applies to a totally different group of unmarried women who come from city families that were considered ordinary, neither poor nor rich. In both cases, we are dealing with a way of coping with problems. In the case of Juba, they concern the young generation, one of the most impoverished groups in the modern African society.

Voluntary Associations: Forms of Women's Organisations

Various types of voluntary associations are extremely important in the process of integration of the urban society and in the provision of economic welfare. The spectrum of their activity is enormous: "self-help," "charity," "the intensification of economic activity," "religion," "safety" and "education," to name just a few. Some represent particular group interests – teachers, students, workers or ethnic groups – while other implement a broader programme, for example the fight for gender equality. Political, economic or social purposes are their basic binding elements. Researchers suggest that, in this respect, a mechanism of human cooperation depends on three factors: political (political emoluments resulting from a collective action or the fight against oppression by formal structures), created structures (formal and informal organising cooperation) and initiated processes (interpretations, assigning creation, which mediate between potential opportunities and real actions). All three must occur to make a collective action possible. Voluntary associations are pan-African phenomena with a very old tradition. However, in recent years, they have gained special relevance in Africa as a result of lasting economic and political problems. Most importantly, voluntary associations have become an opposition to incompetent authoritarian authorities. In contrast to them, associations as a rule function in a more transparent and democratic manner and are focused on human needs. This is because of these differences that

they often become the objects of authorities' attacks. At the same time, voluntary associations constitute an effective mechanism of controlling state institutions or are simply responsible for the harmonisation of the human life environment. Some are initiated from the outside (e.g. by foreign NGOs). However, most are established following the initiative of Africans themselves. They are organised by and for ordinary people. Researchers emphasise that the driving force of voluntary associations is not only state institutions but also resistance against the hegemony of free market rules. In extreme cases, religious, gender or ecological foundations may assume a strong anti-western and anti-globalisation nature. These are places of contestation and resistance, but also of spontaneous creativity and co-operation (including with state institutions). These sorts of associations enjoy special popularity in African cities, where people's expectations are the greatest, and the authorities demonstrate their imperfection with full force (for more, see Tonstensen, Tvedten and Vaa 2001: 7–27, Arnfred and Utas 2007: 18, 19).

Associations established by women experience the most spectacular boom in the cities. These are both organisations associated with all sorts of institutions (charitable, but also state or political),[46] and less formal entities, being grassroots initiatives. I have already described the informal cooperation of women in the field of entrepreneurship. In fact, both these realms are strictly interconnected. Work is also an important part of women's social life, which is forms a certain subculture. After all, working together also involves plaiting hair, gossiping, or taking care of the children.

Women's cooperation is an added value: a factor organising their social life and expressing their sense of collective unity. At the same time, it becomes a guarantee of economic efficiency. Women help each other earn a living. Without each other's support, their labour activity would require much greater effort on their part or would even be doomed to failure. Women cooperate strongly, since they struggle with similar problems on a daily basis. They can often overcome these problems only by working together. For it is only together that they constitute a power which can oppose the authoritarian dominance of men or ruthless realities of an African city. As I have showed earlier, in the urban environment a woman does not have the support she gets in the countryside, in a tribal community. There she could count on various, more or less formal, groups of "relatives." In the city, she still has to find such forms of being identified. These forms, as we know, are something natural and necessary for a woman in South Sudan.

46 Women's Union, Working Women Association, Al Asada, SPLM Women Association, Mother's Union are just a few examples of formally operating women's organisations.

In the Juba environment, such an opportunity is created by various types of associations operating at local parishes or aid organisations. I personally had an opportunity to become acquainted with several women's groups belonging to local chapels and Catholic parishes. One of them was "the Legion of Mary," known in many other places all over the world, in the city-centre parish of Saint Joseph. It gathers fifteen women. They stand out wearing characteristic white clothing. Their duties also include taking care of the church, preparing services, as well as joint prayer, saying the rosary. They also organise fund raising for the purposes they choose. They are rather women of advanced age, married and widows. They originate from various ethnic backgrounds. Women belonging to this religious organisation can be met at all catholic churches in the city centre. At a local level, prayer circles also function around particular chapels. They also look after churches and organise collections of money. Some of them are associated with a specific ethnic group (Madi at the Holy Rosary church).

The so-called Women's Working Groups operate in a secular realm, but in agreement with the church (parish). Contrary to others, they deal with specific matters, not necessarily related to religion. Several such groups specialised in, among others, evangelisation, gender issues, professional development, motherhood, and education are present at Saint Joseph's parish. They meet regularly, once a week, at the local level, and several times a year at the parish level. As part of their activity, talks are led for women in parish houses or special professional development courses are organised. Such women's groups act in all urban religious communities.

International aid organisations also foster the establishment of various associations, as they collaborate only with such institutions. Sometimes associations are of a less formal nature: they simply gather women who are friends, who share difficult experiences. Such a group was established by my female interview partner, a widow, an employee of a humanitarian organisation. Women meet at her home en mass once a week, on Saturday afternoons, and discuss entrepreneurship-related matters. Each participant is involved in some professional activity: the production of traditional jewellery, embroidering of table cloths, sale of charcoal, or running a coffee shop. During the meetings, they not only talk about the promotion of entrepreneurship but also share their – often intimate – problems. This is one of the association's assumptions: to help one another in all matters, from an often traumatic war experience to a complicated family situation. All this resembles some sort of a therapeutic session. The group has a relatively broad reach. It is divided into three territorial subgroups: Juba Town, Munuki and Kator. Interestingly enough, the group is of a trans-religious nature, as it also includes Muslims. They cooperate, among others, with the

Italian catholic humanitarian organisation, *Italia Solidale*. During my research, the group focused on the popularisation of a programme of affordable loans for the development of entrepreneurship.

Several women's self-help organisations function in the city. Their roots date back to the war times and are connected with a tragic situation of the civil population residing in the city in the 1990s. I had an opportunity to take a closer look at one of such organisations, namely Mama Lucia Self Help. It was established in 1992 on the initiative of an African woman called "Mama Lucia." At the beginning, its members collected fruit and were involved in farming. However, their activity was often hampered by close governmental control and bureaucratic requirements. Their major challenge concerned government permissions – which, of course, were required for any kind of activity. At that time, it proved even harder to get such permissions, as the city had become a fortress of government forces, protected against guerrillas by mine fields surrounding the city. Female residents of Juba, cultivating land or collecting straw at the city's outskirts, were exposed to serious dangers. Later, in cooperation with UNICEF, orphan care was added. The activity was gradually being extended: medical care for young mothers and children started being organised, there was also a campaign of planting fruit trees near the river (during the war the city was virtually cleaned out of plants). In the course of time, the association also took up vocational training for women. At the moment, it is its core activity. For this purpose, in agreement with local authorities, meetings are organised with women in various parts of the city. They are taught there how to run their own business, how to raise money for it, and how to invest the money. During my latest stay, a subgroup composed of five women was additionally organised. For several weeks, they were trained in the scope of running a small restaurant. In addition, they were obliged to save one Sudanese pound every day of the course. The collected amount was supposed to be enough for them to start their own business.

At the moment, eight women, middle aged, holding at least a secondary education, belong to the association. They run a restaurant in which, among other things, the cooking of new dishes from Eastern Africa (the most highly valued at the moment in the city) is taught. Additionally, a bakery and a sewing room also operate at the association's seat, and fruit tree saplings are sold. As a consequence, the association is already a dynamic women's corporation.

It is worth adding that, in the city, like in the entire South, the "Women's Union" political organisation is present. It is strictly associated with the SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement). It enjoys huge support. Upon its initiative, political meetings are organised and regular gatherings of women associated in it are held.

Juba is experiencing the development of various female associations. They have become a part of the identity of women residing the city. They are a result of their individual, yet shared at the same time, experiences. That is why the phenomenon is of a universal character. It concerns various ethnic, religious and social communities. These various associations are a meaningful manifestation of African women organising themselves in urban conditions as well as of breaking traditional systems. This is also an important part of their social life. As a rule, during such meetings they eat together, often sing and dance. A celebration on the association's patron day and meetings organised around Christmas and Easter are reported to have a particularly loud setting. Each is accompanied by joint prayer. Friendships also result in cooperation in the professional area. In the parish of Saint Joseph, women from one of such groups cultivate land together in the season. Others offer loans to one another in the *sandak sandak* system, which I will discuss later.

Most associations of this type in the city are associated with the operations of aid organisations. These are to be considered the main incentive for the functioning of institutions of this kind. It is worth mentioning that a rich association life of Africans is not short. Formalised unions associating traders, women or religious formations are found in the majority of the countries on the continent. In the post-colonial period, credit associations, like *sandak sandak,* became a common form of acquiring cash outside the official economic system. In Sudan, Sufi brotherhoods commonly deal with that sort of activity. The so-called "Needlework Houses," dealing with education of women in cities, have existed there, from at least the beginning of the twentieth century (Haga 2009: 86–89). In the mining areas of Central and Southern Africa, special units dealing with the burial of their members and shipping the dead to their home villages existed. Finally, spontaneous associations are characteristic for the citizens of cities of South Nigeria – they have constituted support for women in mundane activities of daily life for many years (Nugent 2004: 347).

"Street Children." The Situation of the Youngest and the Youth

In modern Africa, "street children" is a phenomenon nearly of the same importance as refugees (Figure 6). There is nothing strange in it since the majority of Africans are young people, under the age of twenty five. Extensive literature about them exists as well (de Boeck and Honwana 2000, after Konings and Foeken 2006: 5, Abbink and van Kessel 2005 and others).[47] The term "street

47 In 1993, 58 percent of the population was under 18 in South Sudan (Sudan's Children at Crossroad 2007.

children," though generally accepted and commonly known, is hardly precise, especially in relation to the geographical extent of the phenomenon.[48] This global phenomenon has been looked at differently from a local perspective for only a short period: it is treated as a phenomenon taking up a variety of forms. Street children come both from city slums and rural areas alike. Some are forced to move out onto the "street," some decide to do so on their own. These include children who work and live on the street without any care or support, the so-called "street children," and those for whom the street is only an area of economic and social activity. In the second group, there are many children involved in prostitution – some do it on a regular basis, others are engaged in "sex for food" (Flynn 2005: 173, Children Working 2000).

The attention of researchers and ordinary observers focuses basically on two matters: the youth as a subversive element and the protection of rights of children considered homeless. In the former case, we observe interest in the youth between 15 and 24, 30, or even 35 years of age due to their participation in various armed formations (the so-called "child soldiers"). In the latter, care for children, prevailing globally, makes itself heard, with a particular emphasis upon homelessness and abuse. In both cases, the interpretation is based on international legislation concerning human rights. On these grounds, it is deemed that children (under the age of 18) should have an education and home guaranteed; they should not stay on the street or take up gainful employment (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 21). In general, "street children" have been treated in purely negative terms: as anomalies of social life or what one may describe – following Mary Douglas – as "displaced objects." At the moment, this approach is rightly undergoing a thorough review. Since in reality, it was observed that a large group of this sort of phenomena does not carry eradication, disintegration or loss of identity with it (Marrus 1995, after Flynn 2005: 176). On the contrary, in many cases, instead of helping, the aid organisations' activities contribute to the deterioration of the situation of the youngest Africans. Suffice it to mention forced repatriation here – the deportation of homeless children from the city to the countryside or placing them in special social rehabilitation centres. This often results in the deterioration of their living conditions, truly disintegrates them from the community they voluntarily affiliate themselves with, and which often provided them with real support in solving the problems ailing them. Aid institutions

48 In the international humanitarian literature, terms such "Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances" or "Children in Need of Special Protection Measures" (UNICEF 1999) are used.

are basically not interested in the motives as to why a child has abandoned its original community. This is one of the reasons for the criticism of the previous policy of aid organisations. "Street children" are not always "abandoned." Very often, the contrary is the case: it is the children who abandon their guardians and decide to live a more independent life (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 21). In *Childhood and Migration. From Experience to Agency*, Jacqueline Knorr cogently criticises the currently valid structural interpretation of the migration processes of the youngest. Instead of looking for socio-economic motives for their migration, she draws attention to the decision-making processes of the migrants themselves. Thus, she appreciates their role in taking these sorts of decisions. Thanks to this shift in perspective, she succeeded in highlighting the resourcefulness and life activity of migrants, especially the youngest ones – the most creative members of society (Knorr 2005). At present, it is increasingly more often that scholars seek to explain the phenomenon of the "street children" in its entire complexity, with particular attention paid to the local context. However, the needs of children and youth are related not only to age but also the conditions in which they live.

The problem of "child soldiers" seems to be similar. It is true that, in Africa, we are dealing with an increasing brutalisation of the lives of the youngest members of societies. This is manifested by their participation in various types of armed organisations or criminal groups. The phenomenon manifests itself in all recent conflicts and also concerns each and every metropolis on the continent. The reason for this state of affairs is quite evident: the societies in African countries are young and dissatisfied. They are ordered to work, often exploited like slaves. However, they receive nothing in return. The contribution of the youth and the youngest residents in the functioning of the African economy is not followed by the change in their position. They are treated as minors by the society. They have no right to decide about their own fate. This basically gives rise to their frustration and aggression. This, in turn, pushes them to various kinds of subversive organisations. Through them they manifest their dissatisfaction, at the same time having a chance to have an independent life and everything desired by their peers in the countries of the global North. An extremely interesting case of the "struggle against marginalisation" of young Africans was recorded by Belgian ethnographer Filip de Boeck (2014) on the basis of his research in the slums of Kinshasa ("the cemetery of Kitambo"). The researcher established that the youth from the "cemetery city," through cohabitation with death and the generation of new forms of funeral rites, conceptualise their life on the margins of the society. An unpleasant environment becomes an important element of identity and a culture-forming factor. In Africa, like in many other areas (e.g.

the Middle East), we observe the growth of conflicts connected with intergenerational differences.[49]

That is why, basically, at least the previously valid "paradigm" must be reviewed. For, according to it, the youth staying outside the traditional, well-established social models (family, tribe) should be treated as a traumatised generation: "abandoned" or "lost," being "exceptions" to the rule. But the true picture is much more complex: children and the youth belong to very diversified social categories, modelled by age, gender, ethnicity, education, urban or rural background. Although they are often associated with pathological phenomena (crime, prostitution, homelessness, HIV/AIDS, etc.), they are not to be placed exclusively as if outside the "normal" society.

Juba, like dozens of metropolises in the world, also has a considerable number of children wandering through the streets and deprived of any formal care. They are mostly between the ages of 8 and 13. They are orphans whose parents died or went missing during the war. Others are victims of war raids whose additional trophies were in fact the children. When they finally became "useless," they were transported to the city and left to fend for themselves.[50] Above all, however, they are abandoned children, victims of the crisis of the institution of the family. They come from homes in which the family does not fulfil its basic duties in relation to children, such as food or education. Children are forced somehow to manage on their own. They are pushed from home onto the street by difficult conditions. There they find the care and entertainment they for which sought. In time that world becomes extremely attractive for them, since it offers many opportunities. These new, urban opportunities make children from normal homes choose street life. A child simply stops going to school, takes up some job instead, usually as a helper in urban transport. He or she comes back home only to sleep and late at night at best. What is interesting, parents' persuasions are of no avail. I had a chance to meet several cases like these. The phenomenon is, among other things, an expression of the generation gap: on the one hand, there are people still brought up in a traditional culture, while on the other hand – their children who were born or became adolescent during the war, usually in exile, e.g. a refugee camp.

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49 Information from Filip de Beock.

50 It is estimated that, in South Sudan, more than fifty thousand children are war orphans, another hundred seventy thousand do not have their biological guardians. Thousands of children were recruited to various armed formations, both governmental and guerrilla (Sudan's Children at a Crossroads 2007).

Many "street children" come from excluded families. During the war, many women had illegitimate children with government soldiers. These women are often left alone with their children from the "barracks relationships." These children, just like their mothers, are treated with contempt, which probably impacts them being abandoned or having the lack of proper care. Many such, in fact, unhappy women earn a living by running road-side cafes, working from dawn to dusk. They have no time to look after their offspring. That is why I could see so many such children within the Old Mosque. Maybe their parents were the Muslims who once stayed in the city. The Muslim community cares for some of these children, offering them free meals or running a Quranic school. They can, above all, find a place to rest or play during the day within the mosque. The local population treats this, in fact, humanitarian act with contempt, accusing the Muslim community of disguised proselytism.

Interestingly enough, most of the children wandering on the streets are boys. The phenomenon of abandoning girls practically does not exist. It is puzzling given the existence traditional patriarchal arrangements. It turns out that, in modern Juba boys, are an unnecessary trouble. The duty to find the bride price is one of the reasons. In the case of girls, the situation is different. At the moment, they present a great value. Educating them is a guaranteed profitable investment. The situation, though it may be surprising, corresponds to other centres of Sudan. It is estimated that about eighty three percent of "street children" in the Khartoum agglomeration are boys. A tradition also still persists in this respect. To be more specific: differences in raising boys and girls, or the perception of one and the other gender. In a patriarchal social system, existing in the majority of societies of Sudan, a male child is excessively valued. A contrast in the process of socialisation of boys and girls is clear. In practice, a male child has more freedom, and his life is less restrictive. In a common imagination: a boy must be up to mischief as it lies in his nature. Apart from this, it is deemed that the social consequences of that are not too serious, and he will always manage on his own. It is different in the case of a girl. She is taught about the norms and duties bound with her gender at an early age. For the same reason, she very quickly starts playing a large economic role as considerable help to her mother and other adult women. A specific protective umbrella is opened above the girl. She is, in fact, a delicate and helpless creature.

City markets are the centre for "street children." They are open to young and homeless and we should rather call them, at least in the case of Juba, "the children of the markets." It is the easiest for them to survive there. They wander through city markets looking for food or anything of value. They make up age-based bands specialised in collecting bottles. For a full box, they get an equivalent

of a half dollar from petrol or citrus juice street sellers. The older children usually start a "career" in the urban transport. Initially, they work as solicitors to be later promoted to ticket collectors in city minibuses. The older ones are also shoe shiners, operating in road-side cafes. They are usually managed by older colleagues whom they give the earned money. They obtain food mostly from nature and kind-hearted people. During the rainy season, they are engaged in fish catching. They can also find fruit growing on wild trees nearby. It is worse during the dry season. Then, they have to rely on people or, more specifically, on leftovers left by them in restaurants and bars, rather than on nature. Some sort of symbiosis can be observed between minor orphans and the owners of some food-serving points. In return for small works, like washing the vegetables or brining water, they were allowed to eat the leftovers left by clients.

These children are also responsible for the growth of crime, including thefts within the markets. According to the local police, they operate in organised bands of up to twenty persons. They pass the stolen money to one another to make finding the perpetrator impossible. It is not hard to see that drinking alcohol and taking drugs (most frequently inhaling glue used to repair tyres) is a problem.

We already know that the youngest age groups are the object of permanent interest of modern researchers. Children and the youth are particularly important in urbanised centres. At the moment, they constitute a considerable percentage of migrants to the city. They migrate to the city to visit relatives, start their education, or simply earn a living. They are basically attracted to the city by the same factors as other migrants. However, there are also other reasons too. Many of them were orphaned as a result of war or AIDS/HIV. They look for shelter in the city. Basically no one in Africa perceives the phenomenon as a strange or dangerous one. The city, as for other groups, carries an opportunity for a better life (e.g. getting professional qualifications outside the traditional areas of economy). Migrating, they oppose an obligation to work in agriculture or, as in the case of girls, very early and arranged marriages. In this way, they negotiate their social position. At the same time, due to the demographic disproportions – extremely young nature of the population of the entire continent or general socio-economic changes (e.g. the boom of spontaneous entrepreneurship, followed by the economic activisation of the youngest) – these are the groups without which the urban economy would not be able to exist in practical terms. Never before had so much depended on the young generation in Africa. They are particularly influential groups. In recent decades, as a result of existing wars and the economic crisis, a young generation of Africans has become a group of considerable importance. Huge prospects have opened up before young Africans: in

the world of politics – for instance, as a tool of "the culture of violence" – or in the sector of spontaneous entrepreneurship.

Nevertheless, all this has not triggered the improvement of their social position so far. Young Africans still do not participate in the official social life, outside the family circle. Nor are they subject to any formal protection, which is why they often fall victim to exploitation or all sorts of pathologies. Their work is often characterised by high health risks, poor working conditions, and extremely low wages. It is for this reason that we are observing an increase in tensions and intergenerational conflicts. They occur at different levels and institutions of social organisation, from family to politics. Unlike years ago, they do not result, generally speaking, from the viewpoint differences, or from having or not having a modern education (Marris 1969). Nowadays, at least from the perspective of the centre under study, they have a deeper background, and this is partly due to economic, partly social or even political reasons. Young people and children often manage to fight effectively against manifestations of marginalisation, threatening pathologies, or a low social status. At the same time, they turn out to be a vital part of social or political structures or the informal economy (I will provide more evidence of this in the next chapter). It is also worth mentioning that they are significant carriers of a cultural transformation, the Westernisation of the African culture in particular. This is especially visible in urbanised areas. There, they prove to be particularly influential. Due to their number, but also subversiveness typical of youth, they effectively compete for influence in the city. They make it impossible not to take them into account. "Street children" or "child soldiers" are, at the same time, phenomena depicting the scale of pathology affecting the youngest and constituting an expression of their struggle for a significant position in the contemporary political and social set-ups of Africa. The latter, in particular, has not received the necessary attention yet.

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Due to the recent war and rapid urbanisation processes, the city family is experiencing serious, often dramatic, transformations in South Sudan. As a consequence, traditional models of family life are increasingly modified. However, in the transformative reality the urban family is still the basic element of the social organisation. It is also the crucial vehicle of dealing with the most important life problems. For this reason, it takes up a specific structure, basically nuclear, but often periodically extended to closer or more distant relatives. Their presence is associated with a migration strategy – to find support among the members

of the kin group during the first period of stay in the city. A family structure is, to a large extent, formed by production capacities of its members. In the urban world, you cannot forget about the necessity of generating income. Indeed, it is also for this reason that the family of the examined centre has a rather dynamic character.

Pragmatism does not fully eliminate the traditional values, which are still a benchmark. This is not a homogeneous unit. After years of occupation, local traditions are back in style. At the same time, however, a Muslim culture has taken a deep root in the region, particularly within the boundaries of the city. At the family level, we are dealing with the contamination of genetically different cultural traditions (African, Muslim, and Christian), which have grown together into a uniform whole, nearly to the point of indistinction. One of the institutions perfectly illustrating this situation is marriage. In this case, a dialogue is seen between various traditions, between “the old” and “the new reality.” The diffusion of foreign elements is not perceived with hostility at all. On the contrary, we see the tendencies to give the most cosmopolitan expression to what is local. This is nothing else, but making globalisation local (glocalisation). This phenomenon is one of the measures of African urbanism. This is an African city, but must be cosmopolitan as well.

The present changes in the social structure of South Sudan are of a multifaceted nature. They concern, among other things, the life situation of a Sudanese woman in the South, which was profoundly affected by years of war. During that time, the final disintegration of traditional structures occurred. In the refugee camps, many women also got an education or underwent some sort of indoctrination. Suffice it to mention that it was then when Christianity finally triumphed among the Sudanese from the South. For women, it brought an opportunity to increase their position in the patriarchal society. The driving force of changes are also the modern realities of life in South Sudan. A local woman cannot come back to the previous roles or models of social life mostly as a result of extreme living conditions after the war. She must be much more active and independent. A suggestive example of this phenomenon are women from Juba – the city in which the cultural transformations taking place throughout the region are focused as in a lens, in their entire diversity and due intensity. Compared to other regions of Africa, these processes are not marked with particularly specific features. The fates of local women present themselves quite unremarkably compared to other African countries (Falade 1963, Little 1974, Hjort 1979, Kenyon 1991). However, the Sudanese woman from the South seems to be starting her “march” towards modernity. Time frames, but also the dynamics of transformations, make her

different from the African females from other countries. In a modern, globalised world, the changes are occurring much faster than a decade ago. Still, changes in the life of local women are of an ambivalent nature.

On the one hand, the new circumstances activate them, forcing them to become resourceful. Compared to the society's average, they are characterised by unique professional activity. Women are already reaping the fruits of their work. Their position is growing and at various levels of the social life. In short, the city would not be able to function without them. (In the next chapter, I will deal with this phenomenon more broadly). Women constitute an extremely important element of the post-war reality of the South. It is largely thanks to them that the situation in the region is stabilising. Women in Juba are characterised by diligence, perseverance, but also high morals and enthusiasm for organic work. For this reason alone, they should attract greater attention of the aid organisations than they receive now. As the most active individuals, they deserve to become the primary target of humanitarian projects. So far, the success of local women in trade has depended mainly on their collective action. As a result, they make do in economically difficult conditions of the city or effectively defend their rights against men. It is worth adding that, thanks to women, interpersonal relationships in the city are becoming tighter. Indeed, women are the first to break traditional ethnic, social, or religious barriers. They give an impulse to the formation of new urban identities based on arbitrary relationships. In a city where most of the inhabitants are migrants, this is of great importance.

On the other hand, the life of a woman is still unenviable in many respects. She is overloaded with work which, in Juba conditions, often becomes a struggle for survival. In urban conditions, she is deprived of the support of traditional institutions as, for example, a clan or an age class. This makes her life much more difficult. This also often impacts other realms such as the matter of the husband's contribution to the basic expenses of the family. Still, the sectors connected with power and prestige remain inaccessible for the majority. Due to the popularity of the discussed issues, it is worth mentioning here that a woman is discriminated both by the relics of the traditional culture and the new patriarchalism originated from the Western world, passed down from the era of colonialism by means of Christianity and education. At the moment, the society of South Sudan is conducting a specific reinterpretation of its own culture. After the years of war and immigration, it must define its identity anew. The local woman stands at the centre of the process. Her example clearly shows how dramatic is the process of understanding of one's own past. It is obvious that irreversible changes have occurred in the South after many years of war, including transformations of the

lifestyle or aspirations of local women. These transformations arouse the greatest controversies and give rise to serious social conflicts. They also often become a source of violence against women. What should the modern woman of South Sudan be like? A clear answer to this question is still missing.

Despite a difficult life, women perceive their situation in a surprisingly positive manner. Compared to the times of war, they emphasised, above all, that safety had improved. Women assured that they finally felt safe. According to them, the financial situation of their families has also improved. Compared to the previous period, life has indeed become less expensive, salaries are paid on a more regular basis and additional income opportunities have appeared. Sexually transmitted diseases and marriage problems, usually generated by the husband's alcoholism and unemployment, are most frequently mentioned as the biggest problems currently bothering them. The example of the female inhabitants of Juba shows a wide spectrum of changes in the culture of Southern Sudan occurring after the end of the civil war. We can see that this process is far from being congruous. The diffusion of a new culture often arouses controversies in the post-war society. The woman – who, during the time in exile, reorganised the model of her own sexuality – is at the centre of this phenomenon. Upon her return, the society demands another change from her: to become a South Sudanese woman once again.

The problem of urban children and youth is extremely important. This problem attracts our attention due to many different reasons. Suffice it to mention that the global public opinion is, to some extent, sensitive regarding this point. In Africa, however, this is more a question of demographic and social changes. All result in the growth of importance of the youngest ones. Today we have to clearly review the way of looking at this social group. We should, above all, look at it as at other marginalised societies, women and refugees more than anything else. Like these groups, children and the youth also play an increasingly greater role, particularly in the area of economy. At the same time, this entails changes in their social situation; still, this group falls under the category of the socially excluded and discriminated. The problem of children, especially in urban areas, should be considered in the context of the general growth in mobility of Africans. Children migrating to the city should not always be treated as victims, and their wandering as something peculiar and specific. Children and the youth in the city are an extremely complex and comprehensive problem.

We see that the social set-ups in the city are characterised by the co-dependence of various social groups. Never before was a life in the city so dependent on cooperation and involvement of all members of the family in

income generation. This phenomenon makes itself visible at the highest levels of social identification. In entire Africa, various sorts of voluntary associations have become a response to a structural crisis. Nowadays, it would be difficult to separate any one area of their operations. They deal with very different issues, they provide people with what the state does not supply. Juba is no exception. It is a place of an intense social life. Women play a leading role in this field. On the one hand, cooperation is a must for them to overcome everyday problems, on the other hand, they are motivated to cooperate by the presence of aid organisations for which they are the "most valuable" partners. Given the importance of this social group for characterising the contemporary socio-cultural realities of Africa, I will return to it once again in the next chapter, discussing the economic strategies of the city's inhabitants generated by the diversity of choices offered by the African city.

Figure 1. A family from a Gabat area (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 2. Pre-marital negotiations (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

MUNUKI DRASALAM A...
Date 4th SEP 2008

AGREEMENT WITH THE IN-LAWS

... THE PARENTS OF DAVID BATU HAVE A...
... THE PARENTS OF LATE ROSE MESIKU ...
... BURIAL OF OUR WIFE TO PAY TH...
...WING: AT THE LATER PERIOD.

(1. THE BRIDE PRICE OF 3 CHILDREN
ONE COW EACH = 3 COWS

(2 FINE OF 3000 (ONLY THREE THOUSANDS SUD. POUNDS)
... WHICH 2500 (TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED)
... PAID. THE BALANCE IS 500, (ONLY FIVE
HUNDRED SUDANESE POUNDS)

(3 INTRODUCTION FEE (TIZI) OF FOUR THOUSANDS
SUDANESE POUNDS (4,000)

(4) ...RY OF 15 COWS (FIFTEEN COWS)

... HANDED OVER OUR THREE CHILDREN
... THE IN-LAWS DUE TO OUR FAILURE OF
...ING THE THREE COWS. THEY WILL BE GIVEN
BACK AFTER PAYING THE THREE COWS.

* WITNESS FROM BRIDE ... *WITNESS. FROM BRIDE GROOM
...ACIO ABUNI (LA)A 1- SANTO MILLA ERASIMO
... JOHN ... 2- DAMIANO ANDRUGA
...MA FELEX ... 3- HENERY AKERI

Figure 3. Copy of a customary agreement after the death of woman, Juba-Munuki 2008.

Figure 4. Cows to be presented as bride price (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 5. A woman and her dependents from Gudeli area (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 6. Children on the streets of Juba (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

THE PROFESSIONAL SITUATION OF THE CITIZEN AND ECONOMIC STRATEGIES OF THE FAMILY

In the Light of Previous Research on the City of Africa

Specific economic conditions, manifesting themselves in the manner of production, work, or consumption, determine the organisation of the urban society. As a result, it is possible to provide maintenance to a considerable group of people or support public institutions. They are the ones that form social relationships typical for a city.

For many years it has been (rightly) considered that life in an African city has been relatively affluent. Particularly when compared to rural areas, a person could count on many opportunities, from decent wages through subsidised food to facilities like health care or education. These "urban opportunities" were responsible for vigorous urbanisation on the eve of the postcolonial period. Nonetheless, this situation rapidly changed already at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. Poverty, malnutrition, economic instability – characterising rural communities for decades – have become typically urban phenomena. Many factors have contributed to the strengthening of urban poverty: spontaneous urbanisation, demographic growth, political instability, national debt, but also structural reform programmes, commonly carried out on the continent under the auspices of international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s.[51] The cities, with their top-down access to food products, were the major source of social exclusion: sudden growth of prices and the top-down controlled economy became the main objectives of radical, neoliberal aid programmes. As

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51 The so-called *Structural Adjustment Programs* (SAP) or a development model elaborated by the IMF and the World Bank, aimed to fight against the economic crisis (debt crisis in particular) in the developing countries. It consisted, in short, in the implementation of structural adjustment programmes by the creditors as the basic tool of combatting the crisis. The programmes were inspired by a neoliberal economic doctrine and provided for: deregulation, reduction of public expenditure, tax reduction, privatisation of the state sector, liquidation of trade barriers, export promotion, increasing attractiveness for foreign investors (Bunikowska 2009, http://www.psz.pl/tekst-20950/Joanna-Bunikowska-Pulapka-zadluzeniowa-czyli-co-skutecznie-blokuje-rozwoj-krajow-najubozszych). Cf. Tade Akin Aina, Chachage Seithy L. Chachage, Elisabeth Annan-Yao 2004 *Globalization and Social Policy in Africa*.

a consequence, life in the city became even more expensive and even employment in the official sector ceased to guarantee survival (Simone 1997, Rakodi and Lloyd-Johns 2002, Stren, White and Whitney 1992). That is why so much attention was devoted to economic issues in African studies.

We have a lot of field research, particularly from the period of implementing liberal reforms. Quite a lot of efforts were invested in the proper diagnosis of the material foundations of the city life. And so, for example, it was determined that urban poverty was not so much a developing phenomenon, but had been existing for many years. The first researchers made some sort of a diagnosis of the problem, they demonstrated that an urban family spent from sixty to eighty percent of its budget on food. It was established that though a complex phenomenon, urban poverty manifested itself above all in the real weakening of the value of money (Ruel, Haddad and Garrett 1999). What is more, it was observed that material poverty was of a universal nature, as it concerned, for instance, the "workers' aristocracy," meaning regular employees, traditionally one of the most materially stabilised urban groups. Anthropologists examined how the city economy functioned without efficient political structures. They also tried to find out, how an African city resident managed with the living problems or how they exploited the city, tried to use the potential latent opportunities. In this chapter, I will try to provide answers to these fundamental questions as well.

The key to learn the professional life of a city dweller is the phenomenon of an "informal" economy or an organised system providing income outside the state control. The notion of an informal economy was introduced by British anthropologist Keith Hart on the basis of research in Accra, the capital of Ghana, at the end of the 1960s. He demonstrated how migrants to the city were acquiring means of subsistence, officially being unemployed. In other words: many from the crowd of the officially unemployed were, in fact, professionally active. The phenomenon took on various forms, from "earning extra money" by civil officials to permanent, organised business activity. The spectrum covered both legal practices, like beer brewing, and smuggling or crime (Hansen and Vaa 2004: 10). Those sorts of activities are nothing new on the continent. A specific economic dualism, the combination of modern and informal expressions of business activity, has existed in Africa since the early years of colonialism (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988: 299). Nevertheless, at present its scale is surprising – it is true that a much larger percentage of the population is involved in it. New professional groups join the sector of the "alternative economy:" skilled manual workers or even intelligentsia or businesspeople (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 19).

Together with the deepening of studies from this perspective, a considerable change occurred in the perception of residents of an African city. Unlike earlier,

more frequently they were now shown not as a minimalist or an economic parasite, but as an extremely resourceful and entrepreneurial person, being able to effectively exploit the world of the urban economy. This view proved inspiring for the researchers of not only the African city but also other regions of the oecumene. They were finally accepted by international organisations, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (Hann 2000: 72). Earlier, their reaction to that sort of phenomena was fundamentally different – the informal sector was generally left without any support and treated as a transitory phenomenon, without any greater importance for macroeconomics. For many years, it was referred to as a "modern jobs gap" or also as "marginal professions" in the international vocabulary. The "gap," instead of shrinking, was growing, becoming a dominant force of the economy which, most importantly, generated a considerable economic growth. Uganda provided an extreme example of this process, when in 1981 "the other economy" generated two-thirds of the gross national income and pulled that country out from a deep economic collapse. It turned out to be a sort of breeding ground for entrepreneurship not only in Uganda but also in other countries of the continent. In fact, everywhere in Africa in the last decade of the twentieth century, people developed alternatives and, more importantly, effective ways of generating income. This phenomenon is particularly visible in urbanised centres where a considerable percentage of the population is self-employed. Moreover, such activity turns to be pro-social: it strengthens human cooperation and improves the position of traditionally marginalised groups (e.g. women) (Iliffe 2001: 264). In the 1970s, instead of supporting large government projects, aid institutions started promoting those "bottom-up" initiatives, which could turn into official entrepreneurship (Hann 2000: 72). Today, the informal sector in Africa does not arouse such controversies as it once did. This is a decisively positive phenomenon in the opinion of external commentators, which can count on steady support from international aid organisations. Finally, the concept of an informal economy entered the paradigm of development, although at the same time it does not stop emphasising its negative consequences for the general labour standards. From the very beginning, this phenomenon has been elusive, and it is becoming more and more difficult to deal with, as it now covers the entire world with its reach.[52] Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it is developing

52 For example, in the former communist bloc a new type of informal economy appeared at the beginning of the system transformation. Some individuals, active in the so-called "underground economy," became capitalist entrepreneurs. As a result of the state's weakness, the phenomenon of "spontaneous entrepreneurship" often took a form of mafia structures (Hann 2000: 73).

and constituting a vital strength of the developing countries' economies. It is not only connected with the backwardness of these areas, but also results from general trends in the global economy, especially of the urban areas. The emergence of new forms in the structure of consumption, an increase in the number of low-income consumers or the profusion of small businesses, are just some of the processes connected with it (Sassen 2007: 148–157). The African "informal economy" is now to some extent integrated into international trade. It generates enormous benefits for the continent. At the same time, however, it increases the dependence on global economic markets (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 19). In connection with this and other ambivalent consequences, the informal sector is characterised by huge diversification – in it we can find "people of success" – qualified with relevant capital and influences. The majority, however, balances on the verge of profitability. They slog away to make ends meet. The growing competition among the poorest lowers the profitability of their work. This applies, above all, to the previously marginalised groups, overrepresented in the least profitable sectors of the economy: women and children. This, in turn, results in the diversification and collectivisation of taken practices or the intensification of spatial mobility. Africa surprises with the pace of its economic growth. We cannot forget, however, that at a local level the liberal economic and social trends change life both in the good and bad direction alike. Decisively more attention should be paid to those negative consequences now.

In this chapter, I will present various expressions of "spontaneous" business activity of a Juba citizen – strengthened by the advantage of a state border. This fact creates additional opportunities for informal entrepreneurship. It is an additional incentive for it. It establishes a particular ambiguity which allows exploiting the local economy by means of both legal and illegal practices. In the South Sudanese borderland, we are dealing with the boom of the "subversive economy" – a specific form of the "informal" economy which, to quote Janet MacGaffey (1988), is: "an organised system providing income from the activity which deprives the state of taxes and revenues from foreign trade." "Some of such activities are illegal"– Flynn adds – "others, in turn, are acceptable, but conducted in a manner to avoid taxation" (Flynn 1997, after Donnan and Wilson 2007: 122).

In the case of Juba, the authorities turn to be totally helpless in relation to those practices. Illegal upstarts get support from everyone: international organisations, local communities, churches, and ordinary people. (Nearly half of the employees of a church organisation hosting me came from Uganda). These practices are not even embarrassing for the formal state structures. For they are a kind of necessity in the region destroyed by the war. In a sense, they constitute the support for the

state in building economic independence from Khartoum. They have become a type of secession activity of the society as a whole – a contestation of everything coming from the North. Smuggling or the flow of illegal employees are responsible for normal life in the city: for the availability of basic products or services, from mineral water to petrol. In 2008, during the tensions in Kenya after the presidential elections, the cross-border traffic stopped for some time – this paralysed the functioning of Juba. The prices of some products skyrocketed, and what is worse, at a certain moment there was no petrol in the city.

The urban economy is considerably affected by globalisation processes. At least from the early 1990s, the phenomenon of globalisation has belonged to one of the most important ones in the modern world. Globalisation as I use it is a world-wide process and consisting in the multiplication of contacts at least among national communities, and preferably linking various continents. Limiting oneself only to the economy, it is an intensifying network of transnational links, covering a wide range of phenomena, from the use of modern computer and telecommunications equipment to global corporations, and investments, production systems and legal procedures implemented by them in various parts of the world in particular. For many years Africa was on the margin of the global oecumene. It was categorised as a "global ghetto" – an area of economic and cultural exclusion. With its backward economy, unstable political situation or material poverty of Africans, it was not so much unable to take an active part in the global exchange system as it was not even able to play its traditional roles in it: a reservoir of natural resources and a place of import of goods of the highly developed world (Hannerz 2006a, Simone 2004c, Freund 2007: 170,171). In recent decades, Africa has been mentioned as an example of the area where we are dealing with "deglobalisation" – the rejection of transnational contacts as a result of the complete decomposition of local political and economic structures (e.g. Somalia) (Hannerz 2006a). The case of Juba runs afoul of those generalisations, or at least proves that they are obsolete. The centre under examination is no "ghetto." On the contrary, it is an integral part of the global bloodstream. In this chapter, I am going to present the symptoms of the globalisation processes impact and their consequences in the life of various city groups.

We know that large city areas of the entire world are centres where processes co-creating modern globalisation are located. Their dominance in the world of cross-border links has been very rightly called "geography of centrality" by professor Sassen (2007). In my opinion, many African cities, including Juba, are to be treated in a similar manner.

Primary Livelihood Strategies in Juba

Each citizen faces the necessity to earn a living, as without proper funds they will surely face the spectre of famine. Livelihood in the rural environment is possible due to various forms of a traditional economy: cultivation, livestock production, fishing, gathering or hunting. Cash becomes indispensable in the city. One has to pay cash for most of the daily necessities, from food to medical care. However, employment is not always necessary to satisfy these needs. The city's resident gets funds to live using various methods: from official employment through informal business and food production to various forms of freelance.

The citizen of Juba struggles with the problem of asymmetry of income and expenditures, typical for an African city. Compared to the rural areas, the city offers high income. In the city, however, in most of the cases they do not even guarantee survival. A lot could be written about the reasons for this state of affairs. Disregarding the global conditions, it is undoubtedly affected by the underdevelopment of the urban economy. As I have signalled before, prices have skyrocketed. What is worse, wages for the simplest works have also decreased (Long Road Home 2008: 13) (Table 2). The city residents could compensate this fact by looking for better paid jobs connected with the emerging modern urban economy. They would, however, have to have, relevant qualifications. However, in the majority of cases they do not have them. (In other words: The ones they have basically do not work in the urban environment). Many current city residents are former migrants from rural areas: young, uneducated cattle breeders or farmers, who can possibly use weapons (the majority of the male population went through various military formations). The cultural realities deteriorate the situation even further: laziness and contempt for manual work, typical for local shepherds. This results in a paradox. The labour market offers many opportunities. Entrepreneurship flourishes in the city, stimulated, for instance, by the emerging government administration. Thus, there is also a high demand for employees of all sorts. At the same time, an average citizen is jobless. In fact, the only group actively looking for a job are former refugees. These people usually have the best professional qualifications anyway. This contrasts with the migrants from the province who would be satisfied only with a job in government administration or in an international organisation, preferably as a manager. In fact, however, they do not have the slightest qualifications for the job.

Table 2. Simplest works with daily rates.

Simplest works	Wage rate/day
Washing dishes in Custom Market	USD 2
Washing dishes in hotel	USD 5
Digging pit latrines, collecting firewood, washing clothes	USD 5

Source: Long Road Home 2008: 14.

The problem was to determine what the citizens of Juba really do for living. An average man does not have a permanent job, and can count at best for temporary employment, earning extra money on construction sites or finding job as a security guard or a messenger. Of course, they use skills once acquired wherever possible. One of my interview partners did some small electrical works in the area where he lived. He learned the skill while in exile in Uganda. What is interesting, he tried to turn this activity into his permanent job. With his skills, it was not particularly difficult. I noticed a similar phenomenon among construction workers. Most quit their job before it was completed. They stopped working when the current financial needs were satisfied. They worked as much as was absolutely necessary. The work rhythm was also a problem. It could be disturbed by unexpected family obligations, for example, funeral ceremonies, but also weather conditions (e.g. a drizzly day). For many citizens of Juba this was something obvious. They are still mentally connected more with the rural than with the urban world. Who you were supposed to work with also became a problem. Of course, people were most eager to take up those jobs which involved staying with their tribesmen. On the contrary, they were less interested in cooperation with representatives of different ethnic groups. It was not only about ethnic animosities but also the customary understanding of work, which also serves to cultivate social ties.

Summing up: the rhythm of work in the province proves untranslatable into the urban realities. The seasonality of the work, combined with the non-economic ceremonial activities is irreconcilable with the requirements of the modern economy (Gutkind 1974: 79,80).

Other cultural conditions also prove to be important in this respect. The relics of the pastoral ethos complicate the situation for a considerable part of Juba's residents. For many, manual work, or a subordinate position, is a disgracing last resort. A person without special qualifications can count on temporary employment. The most frequently conducted works include: stone-breaking, firewood collection, construction, mechanics, brick-making, digging pit latrines, and security guards. Modern economic realities do not let anyone, absolutely,

be inflexible in the matter of employment. Extremely high costs of livelihood in the city mean that people do not so much want to, but simply cannot permanently help their kin who are in need. Regardless of the social background or qualifications, anyone, sooner or later, is forced to take up a job. This is the fundamental difference between the 1960s and the 1970s. At that time permanent employment, e.g. in the state administration, created possibilities to live a nice life, not only for the working person but also their closer and more distant relatives. The system of patronage – sponging off richer clan relatives existed only during the first several months of a migrant's stay in the city. But even then it did not guarantee livelihood. From the patron, the migrant, as a rule, was given a roof over their head. While the rest was on their own head.

An urban family income depends on various economic practices taken up at the same time. These actions are sometimes associated with a social position. The rural migrants managed differently – the representatives of the urban middle class differently: settled residents of the city, employed in the public sector. Above all, in families with such a background nearly always only the man works. In their case, the syndrome of the second job is also characteristic. This is forced upon the man as wages in the public sector are extremely low – and paid irregularly. "The second job" is therefore something fundamental. Teachers earn extra money working in two or even three places at the same time (this causes their practically total absence at home). State officials, in turn, not having such opportunities, invest in family-run small business, from the Arabic called *hobolija*. This is usually a store, and located, as I have already written, at the house, on the outside of the fence. Minor relatives are engaged in selling (then business is most profitable) (Figure 1). Another popular way is to buy a motorcycle and lease it to a minor to be used as a taxi.

Woman and the Family Budget

In the 1990s, we observed the renaissance of women's studies. "Women need development" – the slogan of the 1980s was replaced in the 1990s by "Development needs women." They ceased to be perceived merely as "victims." Now, more and more often, they exist as an influential group, especially in the context of the economy (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 33). Not only postmodernist scholars have contributed a great deal to the strengthening of the new perception of the situation of African women, but also non-governmental institutions dealing with aid in Africa, which, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, directed the lion's share of their projects to this, the most entrepreneurial group. This has naturally lead to the considerable growth of the importance of African women, especially in economic terms.

In fact, it is the woman who is responsible for the stability of many family budgets. When the man does not have permanent work or does not get a regular wage, the burden to run the house falls on the shoulders of women living with him. Peripheral and ruralised Munuki is characterised by the highest percentage of working women, while this phenomenon is no longer so common in the city centre.

A female resident of Juba is extremely mobile and entrepreneurial. The vocational activity of women is somewhat a result of traditional social arrangements existing within large areas of Tropical Africa. However, it is also a consequence of processes which have taken place in the last fifty years. During the war, only women could move relatively freely throughout the city (between districts), or take trips outside its borders to cultivate land. For men, it was too dangerous, as they were treated as potential guerrillas and allegedly often killed on site. The situation was so absurd that in certain areas of the city, in markets among other places, they did not turn up at all. A reminder of those times is the name of one of the markets – the so-called *Rajul Mafi* ("No men"). Women were the sole providers of their families: they took care of the necessary food items; set out to the jungle to get straw, harvested wild fruit, brought charcoal and were busied with agriculture along the Nile. At that time, they also monopolised any catering business in the city. After the war, the situation, of course, changed for the better in many respects. Nevertheless women's entrepreneurship has not decreased. It has not ceased to be important, too. Female interview partners complained that their husbands did not want to participate in their family budgets. They considered their income as private property and use it for their own whims. While a woman, as before, should care for the basic matters, such as food or things for the children. In the urban conditions, this is tantamount to the necessity of taking up income-generating work.

The reasons for women's work may be also different. A certain woman abandoned her alcoholic husband and moved out to her parents' house. Unfortunately, neither of them works. So she decided to open her own business. She runs a kind of canteen for children at one of the schools in the city centre. Having deducted the costs, she is left with around seventy five dollars a month. She has to support a family of six with this money. I also very frequently came across a situation where the husband earned, but irregularly, being employed on a clerical position. Then the money earned by the woman were spent on the family's daily needs. In fact, the house budget relied on it. Interestingly enough, all the women asked about their professional work answered in the negative manner, indicating that it is the man who supported the family. In practice, it very often turned out that, in fact, they were the only ones who earned.

Almost every woman deals with traditionally women's activities related to running the household and providing it with the necessary products (Table 3). Most of them cultivate land: not only the migrants but also women from families settled in the city for long, often officially employed, work this way. One of my female respondents is employed with one of the NGOs. Although it is a well-paid job, she does a little home garden. She cares for the plants together with women living in the house: daughters and a daughter-in-law. Possessing such a garden is something obvious for a woman – in the situation where only good conditions exist in the area of establishing it. In no case is it a task for an adult male. What is interesting, women living in the city for years are involved in farming more frequently than those having rural roots. Maybe this is the outcome of life strategies from the times of war. At that time, as I have observed, women were almost entirely on their own when it came to food. Although the situation in the city has improved considerably, it has not discouraged women from cultivation. However, it has become more difficult. The reason is the scarcity of land and the resulting increase in tensions between the inhabitants of the city and the indigenous communities from the surrounding rural areas. Many female interview partners had to give up farming for this reason. Since agricultural production is no longer just a matter of life and death, it has become a profitable activity. Let me add that it is highly profitable (the growing population of the city needs more and more food). Local communities have started limited access to land – in this case the natural richness of a strategic importance. The Bari women practically monopolised areas of cultivation in the river valley and on the outskirts of the city. Women coming from other ethnic groups are forced to cultivate the plots within the city limits where land usually belongs to the state or is in private hands. Agriculture in the city is particularly profitable – since it has not yet been possible to start professional agricultural production in the province, the city is doomed to import food from abroad and produce it on its own accord. Mostly for that reason any vacant space at the moment, in particular a strip of land on the river, is subject to cultivation (millet, maize, cassava, greens or sweet potatoes). Both banks of the Nile are perfect for cultivation, as well as several small islands and the valley of the nearby Luri river.[53] Also some seasonal streams flow through the city. Women cultivate both small home gardens and larger plots on the river or on the outskirts of the city. Urban agriculture is used, above all, to satisfy food needs. As a rule each housewife manages to produce a small surplus as well. This is immediately converted into cash or exchanged at a nearby market.

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53 One of the tributaries of the White Nile.

Female citizens of Juba use a day's takings for the current needs of their families. A menu of a given day depends on it. What is characteristic, when a housewife is officially employed, the surplus is the income of the woman's female relatives who are formally unemployed.

It must be remarked here that a considerable number of families, regardless of the resided area, have their own, smaller or larger, livestock: chicken, goats, ducks, or turkeys. This small husbandry also belongs to women. Naturally, it becomes a source of an additional income whenever possible.

Table 3. Work most frequently done by women.

Domestic help	Stone breaking
Clothes washing	Alcohol brewing
Grass cutting (for straw)	Making and selling food products
Charcoal sale	Wild fruit harvesting
Firewood collection	Catering

The urban cultivation of land is a very popular way of providing a family with basic food items in Africa – to a smaller degree a source of additional income (though in the case of Juba this factor is often of considerable importance). Various urban groups are involved in it, depending on the general economic situation. In Zambia or Kenya, this is rather the domain of the poorest city residents. In Tanzania, a poor proletariat is not the only one engaged in agriculture, higher levels of the urban society are as well (Flynn 2005: 148–150). Juba resembles the latter case the most. So far, due to profound economic difficulties of the entire region, city residents have to avail themselves with their own food production. Otherwise, even those having permanent employment would be hungry, due to high prices, and would not be able to afford to fully satisfy the food needs of their families.

Modern urban agriculture arouses the continued interest of researchers. In its vast majority, it is a domain of women coming from very different urban groups. This is a common phenomenon, conditioned, however, upon many factors such as: the size of the farmstead, the availability of land, the family's income or housing stability. For Carole Rakodi, who is interested in this phenomenon in Lusaka, Zambia, its development in the 1970s should be linked to the rise in prices – resulting, especially in the case of larger families, in a household budget deficit (Rakodi 1988, after Flynn 2005: 131). In Harare, the importance of agriculture has increased since the decline of Zimbabwe's formal economy in 1987. At that time nearly sixty percent of agricultural products came from cultivations

in the city. B. Mbiba was of the opinion that it had saved entire families from the spectre of famine and absolute poverty (Mbiba 1995, after Flynn 2005: 131).

Agriculture in the city is a phenomenon much older than the Africa's economic problems in the last decades of the twentieth century. As I have informed, with its roots it reaches deeply into the history of African urbanism. It proves the strong, timeless bonds linking urbanised centres with those located in the province. In the case of Africa, the separation of agriculture from an urban lifestyle is unjustified, not only economically but also – or perhaps, above all – due to a centuries-old tradition.

If not keeping her own farmstead, the female citizen of Juba is an agent in selling agricultural products (Figure 2). She buys the most frequently eaten vegetables and fruit and then resells them at a profit in her area. In the season, it is possible to earn twice as much. Apart from fruit and vegetables, they sell their home-made bread, flour, and cakes. Straw is also a source of income, used to build a roof. As a result of a boom in construction, the demand for the cheapest materials is never ending. Charcoal is also an essential product, used for stoking the fire in the kitchen. In this case the earnings range from five to eight dollars a day, depending on the season of the year. This is the simplest method of earning extra money by a woman. So it is no surprise it is extremely popular.

In the area of Dar as Salam, nearly every housewife is also engaged in alcohol brewing: brewing millet beer (the so-called *merissa*) and production of vodka from dates (the so-called *siko*) – Figure 3. This is not a degrading procedure. On the contrary, this is yet another speciality typical for women. Within a week a woman generates quite a considerable income, within the range pf twenty dollars. Clients are usually neighbours, a group of the husband's friends, and the house is an informal place for drinking alcohol. An identification mark of such a point is a plastic bottle stuck on a long stick. It must be added, however, that income from that sort of activity has recently declined compared to the war period (Long Road Home 2008: 14). Reason: the cheap contraband from Uganda. Spirit products from abroad, from bottled beer to moonshine, are considered more sophisticated.

Works connected with the specificity of the urban life are, however, becoming more and more popular. Above, all catering and services like washing or cleaning are referred to here. A considerable role in their popularisation is played by assistance organisations, which encourage women to take up that sort of activity.

In all these activities she is not usually left alone. Other women, who in the context of income-generating work show unusual solidarity, come to her rescue (Figure 4). This is the guarantee of economic efficiency. They help one another to earn. Without this, their effort would have been much greater, if not deemed

to fail at all. This often results in the establishment of informal companies. One of the self-help forms is *sandak sandak*. It is a kind of savings and loan fund. It is important here for women to trust one another. In this respect the situation is not as comfortable as in the rural community where you can count on, for example, on relatives. Nevertheless an African woman quickly overcomes these difficulties based on new identifications. They can be, for instance, female neighbours. One of my female respondents established a company with her work colleagues. The system is very simple. It relies on reciprocity. The one in need may count on the support of relatives or colleagues (mostly in the form of cash, but also food or all sorts of equipment). In the future, however, she must be ready to return the favour – an equivalent returnable loan. Apart from that, members of the "fund" agree an amount everyone should pay a month. It is decided by a draw who and when will get a loan. The urban catering, such as roadside cafes serving tea, or even large diners, hinges on those sorts of companies. These kinds of services has been entirely monopolised by women. For this purpose, they join together to form two- or five-person companies, depending on the scale of the project. They share the works so that everybody has her own separate earnings.

It is worth noting here that men do not mind women's entrepreneurship, often supporting it too (e.g. giving money to start up the business). Men treat it as an investment into their own family. The condition, however, is the fulfilment of home duties, including, above all, care for the children.

For years, the African city has been largely associated with men – women with other marginalised groups did not have full access to it, at most she was its temporary resident. Her world was identified with the countryside and traditional models of social life. In the post-colonial period, as a result of intense field research and, most importantly, the appearance of feminist theories, a bit more attention started being paid to women.[54] It was noticed that, contrary to the discriminating social arrangement, she manages to function effectively within the won niches. In the post-colonial city, women suffer from poverty and struggle to feed the family. In this respect, participation in informal entrepreneurship opens huge opportunities for them (Low 2005: 9, Iliffe 2005: 265). Today we have quite

54 Sudanese women appeared in the anthropological and sociological literature at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s on the rising tide of global interest in cultural gender studies (Mahmud 2002: 155). Most of the studies concerned the realities of the woman's life in a rural environment. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the following works: *Women of Omdurman: Love and Virginity Cult in the Sudan* by Cloudsely (1983), *Five Women of Sennar. Culture and Change in Central Sudan,* Kenyon S.M (1993) or *Civilizing Women. British Crusades in Colonial Sudan*, Janice P. Boddy Janice P. (2007).

extensive anthropological literature on the subject (Falade 1963, Little 1974, Hjort 1979, Kenyon 1991, and many others). The authors highlight the fact that women are virtually deprived of formal employment opportunities. To survive independently of men, they often search for income through self-employment in the grey zone.

However, women living in a modern African city can also run profitable operations, selling products and services traditionally assigned to married women (Cheater 1989: 103). In the 1990s, which is to say, in the period of neoliberal reforms, this activity proved particularly profitable. At the moment, we are witnessing an intesification of the process – feminisation of entire informal economy sectors (e.g. market trade or catering). It is no different in Juba. This factor affects the democratisation of urban life, including the improvement of the African woman's position within the patriarchal structures. Women's professional work influences the economic stability of an urban family, but also contributes to a greater financial independence of African women in the city. Since they possess their own capital – most importantly, cash – which sometimes makes her a fully-fledged decision maker in the family. In some families, the professional autonomy of female residents of Juba is so large that a man has to finance some essential products, like charcoal, from his own pocket. Although his wife has it in abundance.

Unfortunately, in many cases such entrepreneurship of a woman is also a source of her misery – the sponging of the surrounding males. For an unemployed man, his partner's work means an ability to live at her expense and vegetate in the urban environment – to cultivate pastoral ideals. For others, in turn, this is an opportunity to have a comfortable life in the atmosphere of a big town. The man spends his earnings in full on a social life or his own whims, while the woman's earnings must cover basic, daily needs of the family. This is an outcome of a new, urban perception of a male and female roles. For the very same reason, looking for a female life partner is an element of the adaptation strategy for a lone migrant. Having found accommodation, a woman seems to be another indispensable step on the way to stability: she will take care of the house and will let get through the difficult times. Maybe this is why the female relatives are brought from the place of exile first.

The following example from life illustrates it well. One of the male respondents "shacked up" with a woman. He was not permanently employed in any profession. Instead, he was hired on and off to electrical works. In fact, he lived off the work of the woman with whom he lived. She was busy selling charcoal. Every day she bought the bulk raw material from a door-to-door seller, then portioned and packed it into plastic bags. She sold it directly from home or distributed it in

the area. Her female relatives helped her to do it. The small income was enough for her to run an informal bar for neighbours. In the house, unlike in the neighbourhood, there was electricity, which means that there was a working TV set and a fridge, too! She quickly took advantage of those chief assets. She organised an informal club for her neighbours. She served cold beer or orangeade to the partner's guests. Leaving their emotional relationships aside, the man – a former refugee to Uganda – quietly adjusted to life in the city thanks to his partner. Without her, the process would have been much more difficult. I was confirmed in this belief when the woman finally left him. She got pregnant – for her family she crossed the line. Solemn promises to pay the bride price did not help. After the churching, the woman with the child was taken by force to her family home. It was clear for all that she will not come back to her lover soon. His material situation did not raise any doubts about this. The man, however, did not stay alone for long. He brought his sister with children to the city. She utterly took over the duties of her predecessor. In terms of his living standards, nothing really has changed.

In fact, the discussed phenomenon is not new, this is a strategy developed by men long ago to function in urbanised areas. As it turned out already at the very beginning of the twentieth century, there was a permanent demand for typically female occupations. Thus, some women produced or traded food, while others – those deprived such opportunities – dealt with the provision of various services. For a man, the possession of a woman was often connected with real benefits. We know that, in mining settlements in former Northern Rhodesia, men with wives were given their own room by the employer. As a rule, women were also allocated a plot of land to cultivate, thanks to which the mining families did not suffer from shortages of food and often, based on "home gardens," went as far as to open their own businesses like diners or bars (Feierman 2003: 680,681).

An alarming phenomenon is also the competition between men and women as regards spontaneous entrepreneurship. Female activities are sometimes referred to as "criminalisation" by men and state bodies that are sympathetic with them. Alcohol brewing, prostitution or even economic migration are treated as illegal and oppressed by the authorities (Cheater 1989: 103).

Female residents of Juba are engaged not only in traditional professions, but more and more often take up jobs in the modern economy sector. This is not a very common phenomenon. However, its scale is larger than ever before in the region. Women are employed mainly in administration, health care and police. The autonomy authorities have declared that their ambition is to give women twenty-five percent of jobs in the public sector. This is still "wishful thinking." Nevertheless, the mere fact of such declarations is already evidence of the

changing position and the role of women in the South Sudanese society. I have had an opportunity to meet women in various state offices. Nearly always, however, they held subordinate positions: secretaries or pencil pushers. The same problem as in other African countries (Little 1973: 30,310). Women are decisively less educated than men. Even among former refugees – one of the best educated groups of society – many women, and regardless of their age, are illiterate or semi-illiterate. In this society, a conviction still exists that the education of girls is a futile effort. Since sooner or later they leave their family home and nobody returns the money invested in them. Instead of sending them to school, it is better to marry a daughter off earlier. You avoid unnecessary costs and gain capital coming from the bride price. In the conditions of modern Juba, this is an absolutely obvious matter for many families. Therefore, the contemporary urban reality has contributed to the lowering of the age at which Sudanese women get married.

Gathering and Motorcycles

The youngest ones also considerably affect the living situation of the family. Children join together into informal peer groups. The nearest street is the playground, particularly waste lying on it. It is from waste that children build their toys (Figure 5). They are often handicraft masterpieces. The art of finding attractions among the municipal waste often changes into the first business activity. Children under the age of 10, in groups of several kids, comb the city looking for objects that can be reused: plastic bottles (in which later petrol or citrus drinks are sold), tyre elements (which can be used to make footwear), or simply anything else that might be useful to someone else. But each of the groups collects one specific group of objects. Children, incidentally, constitute the only organised group cleaning the city from unimaginable heaps of rubbish. With time, children become door-to-door sellers of household products. They wander through the streets selling eggs or juice made of mango, the fruit of the tree growing on nearly each urban courtyard. Many minors are shoe shiners, but also roadside sellers of petrol (in plastic beverage bottles which are provided by their younger colleagues). They give the money back to their mother, and she leaves them a small sum for their expenses. With time, the boys become owners of *senke* motorcycles imported from Congo. This is every kid's dream. This dream comes true quite often, considering the number of two-wheel vehicles in the city. The motorcycle is funded by the father, but more often, however, by an entrepreneurial sponsor. Later, the boy starts working as a taxi driver. In return, he gives twenty-five dollars daily to the investor.

The city has a rickety transportation system. Transport, as we know, functions only on routes connecting the main city's markets – the demand for private transport is, therefore, enormous. So this business (called *boda boda*) is profitable for both parties. The boys are a true nightmare of the city streets (Figure 6). They break speed limits on potholed streets. They are also a frequent reason for accidents with tragic consequences. So what? They are the cheapest and the most effective means of transport…

The largest part of the money earned this way is given away to the father (or a sponsor) – the boys keeps the remaining part in his pocket. This part, in principle, is immediately converted into the goods which are desired most by the young generation: mobile phones, fashionable clothes, electronic equipment, or going out for a beer to a city bar. The situation changes in time. It is not known when a young man already works on his own. At any rate, the first sign is that he starts appearing at home less and less frequently. The world of a big city turns out to be more attractive. Paid work often makes young people leave their family home and join the ranks of the so-called "street children." Given my observations, it is evident that this phenomenon is mainly connected with it the prospect of making a more decent living. The problem of "street children" is not about the lack of guardians, but it is about the lack of proper care. In urban conditions, teenagers completely disappear from the horizon of parents' interest. The community that takes control over them is their peers. They work mainly to have fun and consume in the spirit of the big city.

Motorcycle taxis are a phenomenon well known probably in all African cities. Everywhere it turns out to be particularly attractive for the young people – a very numerous, but marginalised group. Unlike other sectors of the urban economy, it is open to the youth. What is more, as in the case of Juba, working as a taxi driver is generally considered to be a typically youthful profession, and an extremely attractive one, as it offers opportunities of living a more independent life at a relatively high material level (Konings 2006: 57).

For young Africans, it is also a sort of a livelihood strategy, the way of functioning in urban conditions both in the economic and socio-cultural domain. The work of a taxi driver is a considerable source of income, but also constitutes the foundations of group solidarity, with age being its binder. Young taxi drivers strongly compete with one another on a daily basis. However, in an event of some external conflict – for instance, with uniformed officers – they turn out to be very loyal to each other. In the face of a risk, they constitute a real power which is to be considered in the conditions of the modern city. As a result, young people overcome marginalisation, prove their usefulness for the functioning of

both the family and the city as a whole (providing the cheapest form of transport). Nobody in the city has any doubts about this.

Children and young people have a powerful influence on the economic stability of the family. Their work is a common phenomenon and basically does not raise any objections of all the local observers. It is so because of a number of factors, including widespread poverty and dynamic demographic growth among the youngest urban groups. Although it is exactly for these reasons that the phenomenon of child labour is becoming dynamised throughout Africa, it should not be considered particularly young. Children play a significant economic role in a traditional social model. Children participate in mundane daily activities, some of them become their duties (e.g. caring for younger relatives) after some time. Even the colonial authorities used minors as a labour force. At that time it was a common custom to employ persons from the age of 14 (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 21). At present, the fact that the phenomenon of work of the youngest ones should be legalised to some extent instead of being considered a pathology and prosecuted as before is being heard more and more frequently. This was most clearly expressed by the African Union. In the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, attention was paid to work of children and youth and its impact on the economic and social situation of the African family. In Article 31, we read: "The child, subject to his age and ability … shall have the duty: (a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to assist them in case of need" (www.africa-union.org/root/auDocuments/Treaties.htm). Additionally, the Charter imposes an obligation upon the state authorities to make sure the child rights are observed by setting a minimum wage or regulating the conditions of their work. While the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is a fact, a similar document applicable to the young people has not been adopted yet (Arnfred and Utas 2007: 22).

Regardless of the optics in force, it is important to be aware that the work of youngest children often has a negative impact on their lives: it makes education difficult or impossible, overloads them physically and mentally, and contributes to the development of pathological practices. Initially, children are a support for their mothers' activity and then they finally take up more independent work. In Juba, they dominated some sectors of small business: motorcycle transport, street trade, shoe cleaning, or car washing.

Child labour is a serious problem, especially affecting developing countries. According to the World Labour Organisation (ILO 2009), at least 120 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 work full-time. Most of them live in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Former Refugees and the Labour Market

We already know that within the last decades the approach to the problem of refugees has changed radically. A refugee is not a wastrel, but also an entrepreneurial person, cosmopolitan and resourceful who, in the face of difficulties piling up around them, finds a solution tailored to their needs and abilities, is able to turn a negative life situation in the right direction for themselves.[55]

Former refugees considerably differ from the remaining citizens in terms of their situation on the labour market. They are, as I have already mentioned, educated and often hold all sorts of certificates or diplomas earned abroad. Illiteracy, at least among men, practically does not exist. The period in exile finally allowed them to get professional qualifications. The reality forced them to acquire practical skills. The refugees took on any activities. They worked in the field or got hired as construction workers. Many have acquired new skills in carpentry, locksmithery or repair of mechanical equipment. The aforementioned Ibrahim Elnur (2009: 99,100) showed how the refugees from the South monopolised the construction sector in other parts of Sudan in the 1990s. The Nuers have specialised themselves in the production of bricks, bricklaying and other construction works, while locksmithery has become the domain of the residents of the Nuba Mountains. These people have successfully tried to apply the skills acquired in exile in the new reality. And so, one of the respondents staying in Uganda worked for a Korean construction company. There, he learnt to be a welder. It allowed him, very quickly, to be on the mend in Juba. After several years of working in various workshops, he is just getting his locksmith's workshop going. His success is practically certain. Since this is one of many very highly demanded specialities. The city is experiencing a dynamic construction boom. There is still, however, a shortage of qualified master craftsmen who can manage the tasks of a modern construction industry. Another refugee invested in a small DVD showroom – an extremely popular form of collective entertainment now. He brought over the idea for the business from a refugee camp where he ran that sort of business.

It is important to note here that I have recorded the highest number of self-employed persons among former refugees. They take matters into their own hands and decide to open their own business most eagerly from all citizens. This is a huge advantage. The public sector is not able to offer employment to

55 In the context of Sudan, in this perspective, the resettled were described by Ibrahim Elnur (2009) or Desiree Nilsson (2000).

everyone. In this respect, for example, former refugees can serve as a model for all other urban groups.

Former refugees are valued due to their predispositions to work. They are career-oriented. They see the achievement of this objective in, among others, professional development. And at the same time they are not groundless. Thanks to them the educational market is thriving in the city, offering all sorts of courses and training. Work is not only a necessity for them, but also a value. Hence these people look for a job in the city most actively. This uneasy activity has grown into a daily ritual. Early in the morning, an unemployed person stands in a queue to get the local paper, then conducts a reconnaissance in the institutions usually offering vacancies. Announcements are placed on boards in front of their seats. Having read the offers, they start collecting the relevant documents. As a rule this is an impressive set of papers, usually including a dossier, an application, a recommendation letter (mostly the point is to confirm the immaculate morals of the candidate), two photographs, a photocopy of their ID card and a document confirming their education. This is not an easy task in the conditions of Juba. The last two documents create the largest problems. The returnees often do not have a Sudanese ID card. This, on the onset, shatters the ability of finding a legal job. Another serious problem is the lack of proper documents confirming one's education. They never had those, because they discontinued their education or the documents simply got lost during the turmoil of war. And in fact probably nobody expected they would ever be needed. When the applicant had the relevant copies, then the employer often questioned them. The ideal solution was to have one's foreign diplomas recognised in Sudan. Let us go back, however, to the rituals of looking for a job. If you are looking for a computer (often with a person competent in all sorts of official letters), you have to find a point where everything can be printed and copied. And take the photographs at the end. All this takes the applicant at least half a day.

The entire situation is absurd. Modern recruitment procedures and extremely excessive requirements rule on the labour market (for example, knowledge of English is commonly required regardless of the type of employment). The decisive majority of citizens have problems with legalising their stay in Sudan or obtaining the basic required documents.

For instance, thanks to their skills, former refugees may constitute a vital power of the developing South. They are the people this country needs to raise itself from the unimaginable underdevelopment. They may be models for the remaining Sudanese on how to live in the realities of post-war Juba. Many residents of the city still do not know how to respond to this question. It is worth adding that the former refugees belong to the most socially and politically active urban

group. Suffice it to mention that they do not have to be convinced about the benefits stemming from active participation in social life. They are active in all sorts of religious or charity associations. Political indifference is usually alien to them. They are familiar not only with free market mechanisms but also with the foundations of hygiene or environmental protection.

Unfortunately, this sort of potential is still used only to a small degree. Due to commonly prevailing nepotism and aversion of other city groups, paradoxically they constitute a group with a high unemployment rate. It is common to employ relatives and tribesmen in administration without any competition. The returnees often have no relatives in the city. Thus, they are often on a lost position and thereby have the full right to feel discriminated. Their presence is hardly noticeable in the state administration. Their employers are various international organisations, particularly of a humanitarian nature, which I will discuss later.

Among the former refugees, looking for a job in non-governmental organisations is the continuation of practices from the time of exile – then those institutions both provided material support and, moreover, were the only opportunity to take up more or less official employment (Agier 2001: 330–331).

Therefore, it is not hard to see that a change in the policy of local authorities would greatly improve the economic integration of the former refugees. After all, they now tend to treat, this group of illegal city residents, at best, as a temporary element, which will be repatriated to the countryside in the future.

Many authors stress people's activity in the borderland (Szczepański, Znaniecki, Thomas, and others). Marek Szczepański calls such an individual "homo creator" or "creative man," going beyond the set schemes, ready for new, unconventional social and economic actions (Szczepański 1999, after Szyfer 2005: 98). And this is also the case with respect to the former refugees. Activity on the labour market is an important feature of their identity, formed during the refugee's exile.

Writing about the professional situation of the former refugees, it should be also added that not all of them demonstrate a high level of education. You can also find people without any special professional qualifications among them. They are the people who did not manage to take advantage of the camp educational system or stayed abroad in rural areas. This is the most frustrated group. They have no chance of finding a permanent job. That is why they resort to desperate actions which, as I suspect, can also be considered a city resident's livelihood strategy. In Juba, suicidal threats of unemployed returnees have become a rule. On 12 June 2008 a desperado climbed up a 100-metre telephone mast and threatened to kill himself. He demanded to see a representative of the local authorities, the Central Equatoria State governor, immediately. He complained,

among other things, about the lack of employment and possibilities of paying the bride prices. The governor appeared on site and promised to positively resolve some of the desperate man's problems. A year earlier two similar cases had occurred.

Mobility of Repatriates

Here, I would like to pay attention to one more matter connected with the "returnees." The entire urban population of Juba is characterised by huge mobility. This is particularly a feature of former refugees. The readiness to travel is an element of their identity. Leaving for a different city or abroad is not a problem whatsoever for them. You travel under any pretext. It may be a family ceremony, or simply a wish to visit loved ones. And neither money nor time is of any importance. A decision is made suddenly, overnight. It seems this is the outcome of the refugee's fate – incessant, situation-dependent migration waves from country to country.

Many former refugees come back to their native land for the second time. They had already been repatriates after the end of the first civil war (1972). During the last war most of the refugees wandered from camp to camp, from country to country. One of the former refugees from the Dinka peoples, for example, started his exile from Ethiopia. After the political changes in that country in the early 1990s, he had to flee from there quickly. He came back to Sudan for a while, then looked for shelter in Kenya. Finally, like most of the Sudanese refugees, he found himself in the Kakuma camp in North-western region of Kenya. Another one looked for shelter in Uganda, where he changed refugee camps seven times in the years 1993–2004. He returned to Sudan in 2005, immediately after signing the declaration of peace. He decided he had to verify the news about the end of the war himself. These are very typical cases.

Former refugees travel, above all, to the countries of their former exile, mostly to urban agglomerations of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Uganda's Kampala is most the popular due to distance. A bus journey, depending on the time of the year, takes a dozen or so hours. There are most frequently two reasons for the trip: meeting a family or doing some business.[56] Going abroad is not a problem. No documents are required, only money is needed to pay the border guards from the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) and the Ugandan army.

56 This is not a new situation. Akol (1994: 90) mentions that in the early 1980s, many Sudanese who had stayed in exile enjoyed benefits from the illegal trade in Uganda and Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo).

A considerable group of travellers are young people, learning in schools of East Africa, which enjoy good reputation in South Sudan.

One of my interview partners, a former refugee seeker in Uganda, travels to that country twice a year on average. In 2008, he was in Kampala for business – he acted as an agent in buying a car. He is planning another trip when the rain season is over, this time of a family nature. Since his first wife lives in Uganda with the children, and his second wife's parents, who have not seen their grandson, stay there. As he was born after they had moved to town. Another direction of travel is a Sudanese province. Former refugees leave Juba because their family cannot take care of them any longer. They are most frequently women without any prospects of getting a permanent job and children.

Permanent migrations of this region's population across formally existing boundaries contributed to the establishment of a heterogenic culture of local communities and their sense of "multi-state" membership. One of their features is the ability to live at the interface of various state entities, wander from country to country depending on the economic situation (Allen and Turton 1996: 5–9, Wilson and Donnan 1998). It offers various benefits (e.g. cross-border trade) which enliven the local economic relationships, constitutes an important element in the survival and enrichment strategy in post-war Juba.

Itinerant fates of the Sudanese refugees are of great importance for the process of repatriation and their reintegration to the forming post-war society of South Sudan. The problem of identity of its citizens in the aspect of "borderliness" of that area should become the topic of in-depth studies. Despite considerable interest of researchers both in the problem of "borderliness" and "exile," we know little about the relationships between these two phenomena.

Trips abroad are a considerable source of income for many city residents. Everything is imported from abroad: from food to cars. For modern Juba, urban centres of the neighbouring African states are of primary importance. Without them, the city would not be able to function.

Modern Africans are very mobile people, "perpetually on the move." They travel due to many different reasons: humanitarian crisis ("forced migration"), but there are also other motivators; in most general terms, they travel equally often to change their life in a good direction ("voluntary migration"). Observing the contemporary population movements on the continent, we must consider mobility, and not the settled forms of existence, to be the African "standard." This is what characterises today's citizen of Africa the most. These migrations neither break the previous social relations nor are they perceived by Africans as dangerous or harmful. For them, spatial mobility is a complex of various

opportunities, or one of the strategies of life and operation in the modern world (Hahn and Klute 2005: 11).

Humanitarian Organisations and State Administration. Hierarchical Structure of Professions in the City

The largest employer in the formal sector is the state and assistance organisations. An enormous bureaucratic machine is being established in the city, being a back office for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the local authorities: the State of Central Equatoria. A large number of jobs is being created which anyone may get, at least in theory. This fact alone is sufficient for many people to move to the city. In 2005, the South Sudan's state sector employed sixty two thousand employees; in 2008 the figure nearly doubled. In 2005, the number of civil service employees (employed mostly in health care, education and state administration) of the state of Central Equatoria went up from around 12,000 to around 17,000 (Long Road Home 2008: 18). At the moment, this figure must be increased by the administration of the Government of South Sudan which includes another dozen or so jobs (in twenty four ministries!). Despite such an extended public sector, it is extremely difficult for an average person to find a job there. Above all, the vacancies are taken by employees of the SPLM who held various public functions during the war in the areas controlled by the resistance movement. In 2005, an integration process was carried out to merge the central staff and the structures of the "SPLA state." Generally speaking, new positions within entire administration are reserved for a strictly defined group of people: members of the ethnic establishment of South Sudan. They are people related to the narrow SPLM elite, being Dinkas by origin, or Nuers and Shilluks. In state institutions, this group is additionally extended upon local communities, Baris and Mandaris, above all. They include former state employees from the inter-war period. Also specialists or simply "relatives" from all over Sudan, or even from abroad, are imported to fill a large number of jobs. It is important, however, that they are people of an appropriate ethnic and political background. Despite huge opportunities, the state structures play a small part in creating employment opportunities for the city's residents. For many city groups, such as former refugees, this work is simply inaccessible, though.

Naturally, it is managerial jobs that stir greatest emotions in this sector. Salaries in such positions often amount to several thousand US dollars a month. On top of that, they gain access to a car (often a luxurious SUV) and comfortable accommodation. All expenses are covered by the state. It is therefore a small wonder that such work is a dream of absolutely every adult male. This is a position which

belongs to the "active" category, creating an opportunity for closer or more distant relatives. In fact, it was said to be a rule for directors to employ their relatives. When there was physically no more room in the office, relatives were only mentioned in the payroll. As "ghost employees," they collected monthly salaries without leaving their homes. New governments, having the task of fixing the new order, also contribute to the intensification of corruption and nepotism. This is one of the greatest problems of the newly born sovereign South Sudan.

There are serious difference in remuneration between central and state officials. In the former case, the salaries are high and paid out regularly. In the latter, this is no longer the rule. Teachers, doctors, and policemen receive very low wages – and what is more, they are irregular. In March 2008, many employees of the city public sector were three months in arrears (Long Road Home 2008: 19).

Numerous humanitarian aid organisations have their seats in the city. The most important ones are specialised agencies of the United Unions such as: UNICEF, WFP, UNOCHA, UNMIS (South Sudan is one of the oldest areas of their operations in Africa).[57] Others are the so-called Non-Government Organisations (NGO) – private or legal entities acting for a selected public interest, not getting any subsidies for it (e.g. Amnesty International, International Red Cross) (Łatoszek and Proczek 2001: 38, Zaleski 2002). Among them, there are both organisations with a global reach (Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children, NDI) – the so-called North NGOs or International NGOs, and those coming from Sudan – the so-called GROs (in the case of Sudan: Sudanese Indigenous NGO) (Nugent 2004, Rieh 2005). They are involved in broadly understood humanitarian aid; at the moment, they assist primarily in the repatriation and reintegration of former refugees and displaced persons and offer assistance in emergency situations (e.g. of attacks of the Lord's Resistance Army guerrillas), but they also carry out numerous projects connected with promotion and democracy, hygiene, free market economy, gender equality, prevention of AIDS/HIV, or even proselytism (as in the case of religious NGOs: Catholic Relief Service, Lutheran World Relief).

They are very important for the local labour market. They support small business: organise training courses, associations gathering small businesspeople,

57 These are the so-called intergovernmental organisations (IGO). Their members are states (at least three) represented by special representatives holding authorisations and instructions from them. This sort of organisations include, among others: UN and United Nations System, European Community or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Latoszek and Proczek 2001: 38).

or help establish own businesses. They are the only institutions offering micro loans for small business (SUMI and BRAC, above all).[58] In this respect, it is important to promote typically city ethics: hard work and entrepreneurship. They also contribute to the tightening of interpersonal relations: for example, in the form of various associations. This is also the second largest employer in the city, after the state administration. Materially, it is often connected with better emoluments than administrative jobs. Salaries are decent, and most importantly, regular. The drawback: the periodicity of employment. The Sudanese are employed in various natures: from porters to specialised employees, directly related to specific projects. This work stabilises a person, usually their nearest family as well. It was within the ranks of assistance organisation that the largest number of small business people could be found, who, thanks to permanent work, have additional funds to develop their own business.

In Sudan, the presence of NGOs is inseparably connected with a civil war in the South, and to be more specific: with the peace process in the 1970s. Just like today, international organisations assisted in the return of refugees and supported the establishment of local structures of authorities. Since 1983, the outbreak of the second civil war, they have focused on providing aid to civilians. Together with the aid programme – Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) – their activity converted into the greatest humanitarian operation ever (Rieh 2001: 5,6, after Vesely 1999). At the end of Gaafar Nimeiry's rule, the importance of aid organisations in Sudan clearly increased. In fact, they united forces in the country. For instance, Darfur fell to Save the Children Fund, Kordofan to Care, and Central Sudan, in turn, to World Vision. They covered the entire country with their influence, and not only conflict-affected South Sudan. Their employees could move freely across the country and, most importantly, distribute aid according to their own criteria, independently of the authorities' control. Thanks to a specific humanitarian patronage, their influence became invaluable (Abdel and Alsir 2005: 100,101). A specific political vacuum was created in the areas controlled by the resistance movement, referred to as the "New Sudan" since 1999, without a modern political organisation. Aid organisations took up a broad quasi-administrative activity. In the territories outside Khartoum's control they dealt with education, health

58 SUMI is a Sudanese non-government organisation established in 2003 with the support of USAID. BRAC is an international development organisation dealing with fight against poverty in Asia and Africa. Both specialise in providing free loans for small business. Unfortunately, the criteria of those initiatives exclude persons who have just come to the city, like refugees. A problem for them is, for instance, to find guarantors (The Long Road Home 2008: 17).

care or even environmental protection. The structures they created became not so much an alternative for the state authority, but a system functioning in parallel, the "second power," with the existing legislation, own institutions and staff (Rieh 2005: 6). According to Tvedt, during the civil war they became "local substitutes of the state administration" (Tvedt 1994, after Rieh 2005: 4). For this reason, among others, aid organisations play such an important role in post-war South Sudan.

The ruling elites treat them as an integral element of the functioning of the state – its natural support. They are still expected to provide assistance, giving them as if some space in such areas as infrastructural investments, education or health care. Suffice it to mention that residential buildings are rebuilt or wells dug thanks to their assistance. The modern political class in South Sudan would still like international organisations to be actively involved in the reconstruction of South Sudan. Interestingly, as in many other African countries, the authorities expect help from these organisations, but at the same time they are sensitive to all of their attempts at influencing the current policy issues. In Africa, we observe a continuous struggle between aid organisations and real power structures as where to build a well, or how a public office should function (Arnfeld and Utas 2007: 4).

The operation of aid organisations has ambivalent repercussions for the local population. On the one hand, it contributes in a real way to the improvement of the crisis-stricken area. On the other hand, they often destabilise it permanently, hindering the process of the return to normalcy. It creates the features of multidimensional dependence. On a more metaphorical plane, they stigmatise the Africans as incompetent, ill-adapted to life according to the rules of the modern world. Only the label of a victim makes it possible for a person to take advantage of "the second power." These institutions establish new divisions, hierarchise the local social arrangements anew. They form "a new person." Unlike the majority, they are soaked in Western culture, the rules of democracy and the capitalist economy are particularly close to them. This person is at the same time an "active" person, who can, in a real way (e.g. by aid management), affect the improvement of other people's life situation. In this sense, the charity of the countries of the North creates a new elite in Africa. It is worth remarking here that assistance organisations also have considerable achievements in the empowerment of South Sudan, clearly being involved in the support for one side of the conflict only. It is enough to mention that without their support the Sudan Liberation Army would not have been able to carry on the effective fight against Khartoum. Who knows what the political situation in South Sudan would be like today without their help?

Work in humanitarian organisations is important for the local labour market as it offers employment opportunities for discriminated or excluded groups. In contrast to the state apparatus, representatives of minorities and, above all, former refugees, find employment here. Assistance organisations are the only ones to create an opportunity for fair labour competition. The traditions of contacts between former asylum seekers and humanitarian organisation workers are important too. The former are perfectly aware of the specificity of assistance organisations' work and also have well-rooted ways of communicating with their employees, most frequently foreigners. They know how to deal with foreigners. These are undeniably their assets. It should be added that assistance organisations were also "filled" by representatives of the Sudan's People's Liberation Army. Already during the wartime, the assistance organisations agreed to give away some influential positions within their structures to members of the SPLA/SPLM. In return, the assistance organisations received permissions to operate in areas under the resistance movement's control.

The abovementioned employment opportunities cast some light on the social structure in the city. A profession in the urban environment affects a person's rank and status. A hierarchy of urban social arrangements is strictly related with new employment opportunities. They are becoming new markers of prestige and power (Gutkind 1974: 86). Political changes in the South brought about a drastic extension of state institutions. As a consequence, this gave rise to the establishment of new, higher layers of society, highly remunerated with numerous privileges and the like influences. And so: Higher-level state officials and high-rank military men are on the very top of the social ladder. This is, at the same time, a new city elite of the entire South. Former tribal leaders, former guerrilla commanders or re-immigrants from America or Europe are among them. Apart from obvious regional differences, there are serious differences in the level of education among them. Former members of the diaspora abroad, graduates of foreign schools, often having gained professional experience there too are the best educated. They are characterised by considerable self-identification. They establish friendly and social relationships on its basis. Apart from the place of work, they can be met in hotel bars or restaurants. Additionally, they are characterised by specific habits. In them, they clearly refer to the culture of the West. Their visible sign is clothing, culinary habits, or language (English). They are characterised by a lavish lifestyle. Always impeccably dressed – a well-cut dark suit, a shirt with a collar, and a tie around their neck. They often have a hat on the head – similar to the headgear of North American cowboys (extremely popular nowadays all over East Africa among men identifying themselves with the pastoral ethos (Figure 7). While at the belt, an obligatory mobile, often two

or three (in the extended version it will be a phone in the Sudanese, Uganda network and a satellite phone). Another popular set is an oversized shirt with a collar, buttoned at the neck, worn loose outside, with straight trousers. All in one bright colour: blue, green or cream-coloured. This is official attire popular in all of Sudan. Accompanied by gold jewellery and an elegant cane, a pan-Sudanese attribute of a mature man. These people not only dress like men of the world but also consume in this style. They can be recognised by certain consumption habits, like drinking bottled water or dining in luxury restaurants. The latter is to be considered a daily ritual of the managerial staff of the state administration. When the clock struck one, their offices became deserted. Together with their subordinates, they would go to one of restaurants located in the city centre (let me add that their prices made well-to-do Europeans ill). They move around in SUVs – they always sit in front rows in church.

Employees of NGOs, especially international ones, are one level lower in the hierarchy. Work of this type elevates individuals: puts them in a totally different world: of hotels and restaurants, in short – of the international society. It also opens simply unlimited opportunities before a person. It may contribute to the improvement of one's own fate, but also that of his or her family or even friends. Thanks to this type of employment, a person may move up the social ladder in the fastest possible way.

The third professional group is the public sector employees, employed in administration, education, health services, or uniformed services. These people enjoy a high status – they are the most respected individuals. This is partly due to their service to the community. It is among the members of this group that you can meet the largest number of settled citizens of Juba, having their own four walls here. They are soaked up in Arab culture. They differ depending on the degree of influence associated with the held function – that is, due to real influence, the ability to effectively take care of a matter. And so: according to the professional stratification criterion, a policeman is ranked in higher layers, you can find a teacher in the lower ones. Friendliness of the representatives of "active" professions can be won with a gift (money or food) or in a more ceremonial form: for example holding a party for them, less frequently giving a cow. Relics of the old patronage relationships could often be found in them. These relationships are to be treated as a key mechanism in building social relationships, cooperation between less and more influential citizens. As in a traditional social model, they are connected with benefits for both parties. For the patron, this is the way to build a position in the urban society. At times this is also compensation for a low material position or traditional aversion from other urban groups (as in the case of the Muslim population). For the client, in turn, this is often the

only opportunity to survive: finding a job, accommodation, or simply a sense of security.

This group belongs to the best organised ones. Most officials belong to various types of voluntary associations. They gladly fulfil themselves in philanthropic, religious or social areas. This activity is also a source of their power. It makes them a relatively influential group. The world of a man is outside the home. That is where most of his friends come from. They can be recruited, for example, from the same workplace he is. In establishing voluntary associations, common experience also plays an important role (e.g. war wandering or service in the army). The war, as I have mentioned, has played a significant role in the integration of the urban society. Tragic circumstances made people cooperate, regardless of a political orientation or ethnic origin. Women produced food together, men jointly searched food, e.g. by fishing. Many such acquaintances later changed into long-lasting friendly relations.

School played an important role in establishing various types of acquaintances. Like in earlier times, today it still provides an opportunity to extend a group of friends by people from outside the family. For instance, one of the interview partners from the Bari tribe met his best friend, a Dinka by origin, during studies. He gave him private tuition. In time, they developed friendship in spite of traditional animosities between the two communities. Now, they both regularly attend a card club. These are basically relationships which involve no contacts with women – in a male fraternity. It is different in the case of neighbourly relationships. Here both husbands and wives are parties. But it is women who carry the burden of maintaining contacts of that type. In this respect, men should keep self-restraint, typical in such circumstances, boiling down to certain ritualised actions, as, for example, weekend friendly visits – the most appropriate time for this sort of practice in the urban environment. It is different on weekdays. Then it is mostly women that deal with caring for ties with neighbours; this basically happens through small neighbourly pleasantries. Neighbourly relations are basically situated across ethnicity. More important in this respect is education, a profession or material status. The degree of being rooted in a given place is a matter of primary importance. Many phenomena foster the extension of a group of contacts. The most visible is the integrism of children and youth. Playing football or simply playing pranks within the neighbourhood are all practices that informally integrate a local urban community. Another opportunity to strengthen the ties are funeral celebrations. They usually involve all local residents regardless of the relationship or ethnicity. Women again play a crucial role here. They help in organising mourning ceremonies.

Unfortunately, a material situation of the majority of the public sector employees regardless of the above criterion puts them basically on an equal footing with the poorest residents. They differed in a social position, but also in cultural, a typically urban lifestyle.

At the very bottom, we have officially unemployed people, without any special qualifications. They earn a living doing manual labour in an informal sector as small entrepreneurs, often as clients of better-off relatives. This is the most diversified group. It includes both rural migrants, without special qualifications to live in the city, as well as former refugees, often holding a sound education. What they have in common is also a critical attitude to reality. This mostly refers to a sense of alienation, caused by a clash of life experiences with the cultural realities of life in Juba.

A separate social category is made up by people of broadly understood business – mostly foreigners. This is, in a considerable majority, an immigrant population in which two basic groups can be distinguished. The first includes settled traders from the North: Arabs, Copts and Greeks. This is a community of financial and merchant elite. They are soaked up in Arab culture. The latter are visitors from neighbouring African countries, including a meaningful population of African Indians, all sorts of entrepreneurs who, in recent decades, with good results have been trying to satisfy the demands of the growing city. They are usually characterised by affluence; however, they usually stay here illegally and temporarily. For such reasons, they do not enjoy the special respect of the indigenous population.

Foreigners and the Monopolisation of Trade and Services

Several thousand small business people from other African countries live in the city: from Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia or the Central African Republic, who sniffed out a good local economic situation. After the war the traditions of contacts between borderland communities became renewed. After many years of war, Sudan can again be an economically attractive area for people from the neighbouring counties (Figure 8). All sorts of goods are coming through their agency. Beverages, vices such as tobacco, coffee or tea, and agricultural produce (pineapples, bananas, potatoes, pepper, aubergines) are the most abundant. The spirits sector is particularly profitable. Foreigners import not only western alcohols to the city, but also those of the local origin, produced according to native, African recipes. According to the estimates, every day hundred trucks packed with products to the brim come from Uganda (http://www.sudantribune.com/East-Africans-drive-business-in,16175). Moreover, foreigners have

managed to nearly monopolise some sectors of the local economy within several years without any problem. And so: the sale of agricultural and food stuffs is in the hand of Ugandans, the Kenyan have taken control of logistics and construction, and Ethiopians the restaurant and hotel industry. In this respect, they replaced Arabs, who were once an economic elite. They have both the capital and experience which, in turn, the natives could not boast about.

As I have already observed, it is for cultural reasons that trade does not earn much esteem among the local communities. They still most eagerly dealt with cattle breeding or would be satisfied with jobs in administration or in the army. That is why sectors like trade or services, as if in the qualifying round, were given to foreigners. This is nothing new. For a long time it was foreigners or lower status classes that were involved in broadly understood trade. At the moment we can observe attempts to restore the traditional customs in this respect. According to the new old model of the indigenous population, of pastoral roots above all, the structures of power and natural riches (the land in the event of the city) should be reserved for them. The remaining sectors, classified as relatively worse, may be given to strangers. Interestingly, however, this is not a situation satisfactory for the entire native population, particularly for the unemployed part. Foreigners are blamed for unemployment, crime rates increase, a robber economy (export of capital abroad, above all), or the degradation of local communities. These are the main charges of people, but also flagship issues taken up by the daily press. Perhaps, this will finally lead not so much to the growth of chauvinistic or nationalistic attitudes, but will contribute to the development of entrepreneurship among the local population – at least a partial decomposition of traditional cultural models. Naturally, it would be beneficial in every respect for the process of transformations in the Sudanese South.

Trade with neighbouring countries is in the hands of Africans. Local markets are its centres and they are almost entirely dominated by foreigners. With time, the activity of visiting entrepreneurs has also become visible in the service sector. Ugandans and Ethiopians are leaders in this field. The city's social life is vibrating in the hotels and restaurants they open. During the weekend evenings the international clientele enjoys themselves at parties with lavish drinks, in the rhythm of Kenyan or Ugandan hits. During the week, these places become full at lunch and in the evenings since they serve cold drinks and specialities of global cuisine. Prostitution is also at the top of the list of services.

It is impossible to estimate the number of foreigners. Most of them were here illegally and, above all, periodically. In 2008, the Ugandan consulate said that about 5,000 citizens of this country were staying in Juba (Nakkazi 2007, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19758). This is official data. In reality there

were several times more. The presence of African immigrants in the city does not only result from economic conditions, but also from a general economic and cultural focus of this part of Sudan on the African interior, unlike, as earlier, in the Muslim North. As we know this is not a new situation. Due to ecological and cultural reasons, the communities of South Sudan have always been heading towards the inside of Africa.

Since 2005, the city has been experiencing a real flood of foreign investors and businessmen craving for profits from the reconstruction of post-war South Sudan. Despite shortages in the urban infrastructure and an uncertain political situation in the city, entire residential regions belonging to Egyptian, Indian or Chinese companies grew overnight. Western investors are hardly unnoticeable. The appearance of investors from abroad positively affects the local economy – in a real manner it contributes to the mitigation of consequences of unimaginable underdevelopment of this corner of Africa. At the same time, however, the transnational flow of people and money brought about many negative phenomena such as: corruption, crime or price increase. Foreign investors' ventures are focused exclusively on immediate profit. After all, no one knows whether the war in South Sudan will reappear or not. What is more, mostly foreigners find employment in created jobs. Additionally, foreign employees wander to the city together with the proverbial *know-how* – unrivalled in the extremely backward, deprived of qualified staff, South Sudanese society. Foreigners in majority satisfy the demand for qualified employees. If a Sudanese finds a job with a foreign employer, he or she would have to take into consideration the lack of legal guarantees, such as a contract, minimum wage or working time. This, in turn, is because of the lack of modern labour law and (or maybe above all) the weakness of the state.

Women from Neighbouring Countries. Criminalisation of Economic Strategies in the Borderland City

Many female residents of modern Juba are foreigners. They come from practically all the neighbouring countries. They are attracted by the prospects of quick earnings. In principle, they do not dream of staying here. They simply want to make a fortune quickly. The prospects are really tempting. In a month, you can earn as much as in Uganda or Kenya during the entire year. Female immigrants take advantage of the economic boom in the city and the trend for everything that is East African. These are official reasons for their migration. Those more intimate include the entire range of problems the African woman is coping with at the moment. They are mentioned, inter alia, in the context of North Kenya

by Hjort (1979: 167–171). Women run away from unhappy marriages, usually polygamous, in which there was simply no room for them. Others are abandoned women or divorcees who have nobody to come back to or to live on. Many of them had to leave their homeland because they got pregnant before marriage. Then they migrate to Sudan with illegitimate children. South Sudan creates many opportunities for women from the neighbouring countries. It offers them an economic opportunity, but also (or maybe above all) life independence. In the event of a young generation, in turn, migration to Juba is also an element of education, acquiring necessary skills such as entrepreneurship or a refined taste. Such women, according to my interviewees, have better prospects for marriage later.

Female foreigners find employment in the hotel or catering industry. Their assets are attractive, exotic beauty and big-city manners. Middle-aged female Africans earn extra money at local markets, selling vegetables and fruit (mostly pineapples and bananas imported from Uganda). This is a diversified group. They are both citizens of cities, like Kampala, and immigrants from rural areas. I have come across uneducated women as well as students of Uganda's Makerere Collage.

In the common imagination of Sudanese, African female foreigners are *femmes libre*, women of easy virtue. Prostitution, it is true, is at the top of the list of services offered by women from abroad. This procedure seems to be a particularly attractive source of income for an African female migrating to the city. Since she is practically without any chance of finding employment in modern structures of the city. The only thing she can get profits from are traditional female specialisations, such as catering or the sale of food. Capital is, however, needed for this. Every lonely African woman is looked at suspiciously, she is considered unhappy, of an uncertain reputation, often simply a prostitute. A female resident of the city in the face of life uncertainty, threat of forced deportation, sells her body. She treats sex as a life strategy. This activity offers opportunities for the fastest income, saving relevant funds for one's own business. It will let her live an honest life when she starts getting older (Little 1973, Hjort 1979: 171, Flynn 2005: 154–168).

Many African women coming to Juba are kind of forced to take up this profession. They are not so much unable to find employment as they are unable to put aside a satisfactory sum of money. The reasons are the high costs of living in the city. This usually makes many of them additionally become prostitutes. The most profitable is work at hotel bars and restaurants where only the wealthiest turn up, mostly foreigners. They work there in dual role: waitresses and "comfort women." They do not accost clients. This would be decisively inappropriate

and inelegant. None of them consider themselves to be professional prostitutes. This is, in fact, a universal feature of Africans engaged in this profession. All over Africa, they attribute a private, friendly nature to this profession (Flynn 2005: 156). Regardless of the circumstances and involvement in this profession, a woman, above all, cares for her image. She tries at any price to keep decency and traditional cultural models in male and female relationships. That is why there is no question of impropriety or directness. Everything hinges upon an informal convention and a kind of window dressing. Everybody knows perfectly well what this is all about. However, before a woman gives in, she must always be conquered. For that reason, advances have a nearly standard course. For the most part of the evening, prostitutes served and whiled away the time of the bar clients. They joined them at the tables, talked, making sure all the time that their potential clients have glasses full of beer. As a rule, after several glasses had been drunk, they went together to one of the hotel tents. Thanks to a specific strategy hardly any man can resist the charms of the female hotel employees. It is worth adding that their clients come from a relatively homogenous group of men, mostly lonely (staying in the city without any relatives), frustrated state officials. Everyone who just recently moved here. What they have in common is a sense of boredom and alienation. They generally experience no financial problems. Their problem is a sense of alienation and loneliness. These people spend any free moment in a local hotel bar. This place is their proverbial "second home."

A different form of sex services is work at a market restaurant. Indeed, prostitution, consumption of alcohol, and catering services go hand in hand in Juba. This fact is nothing unusual and results from a universal semantics of eating in Africa. Most of food serving points belong to companies run by women, mostly Ugandans, coming from one region or even clan. They rent kiosks made of metal plates on markets. There, they run beer bars, most often small restaurants, serving dishes of East African cuisine. Their fellow countrymen are their clients, but also Sudanese – former refugees to Kenya or Uganda. Women running such businesses extended their activity to include escort services after dusk. Those places, as I have already remarked, are the true centres of social life.

Prostitution is part of the border economy of nearly the entire world. It does not exist at all political borderlands; nor does it limit itself to any particular areas (it is, for example, characteristic also for urbanised areas). Here, however, there are favourable conditions for having illegal sex. One of them is the business characteristics of these areas. A well-developed grey market, asymmetry of business development between the neighbouring countries or, finally, spatial mobility are only some of the factors supporting "sex marketisation" (Donnan and Wilson 2007: 127). The scholars emphasise also that prostitution is flourishing in frontier

cities due to impersonality prevailing there and a contempt for the representatives of foreign societies (Price 1973, after Donnan and Wilson 2007: 127). The problem, of course, is more complicated – it has been discussed, for instance, by Donnan and Wilson (2007). The cross-border prostitution in Juba is not about the differences in the economic development between the neighbouring countries (as, for example, at the Mexican or Czech borderland). For an East African woman it is simply one of the more profitable ways of earning money – repairing a home budget or getting money to start their own business. This is one of manifestations of the African woman's informal activity at the African borderland. In a social dimension, prostitution is an opportunity to improve their social position in the native country. This profession here is not the same as at home. Here it is just one of the services assigned to foreigners – temporary and extremely profitable. For local men, mostly prostitutes' clients, they are attractive because of the price. They are desired here for the culture they impersonate, but, above all, their origin. According to the interview partners, making use of local women's sexual services would not so much be impossible as immoral and dangerous (due to extramarital pregnancy and family revenge). For the Sudanese, local women could not be involved in this practice. They have a totally different temper and, above all, a totally different morale. The popularity of foreign women does not prevent blaming them for the moral decline of the city and spreading various serious diseases. HIV/AIDS in the citizens' common imagination is an ailment which must be entirely connected with foreign migrants. These are the diseases whose sources are outside: in Kenya or Uganda. In South Sudan, as in other places in Africa, all the evil, be it supernatural or not, must come from strangers. One may contend that, in Africa, we are dealing with some sort of "demonological geography." For example: *chwezi* – local spirits in Uganda, arouse fear in the citizens of nearby Tanzania; in the same country, people are afraid of *migawo* – spirits coming from Congo. In the area of the Great Lakes, the category of possessing spirits include Arab genies, the belief in which could be originally met at the Indian Ocean coast (Shorter 2001: 70). The situation is no different in the case of *zaar*, the cult of spirits in Northern Sudan.[59] It is commonly believed they are of foreign origin and they are said to come either generally from the African interior or from Saudi Arabia. Contemporary traditions associated with possessing spirits are, to some extent, in the perception of some diseases, HIV in particular, the greatest misfortune of modern Africa. In Sudan, it is commonly

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59 *Zaar* is a cult of being possessed by spirits (*zaar*) and at the same time the exorcising practices which enable to get rid of them.

believed that the disease had been brought either by the Europeans or Africans from the South. In Uganda, it is linked to soldiers and traders from Tanzania, drivers from Kenya or, like in Sudan, to foreign tourists (Lyons 1996, after Donnan and Wilson 2007: 177).

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A citizen of Juba in fact deals with financial problems in a similar manner to the citizens of other African cities. To survive they look for employment guaranteeing priceless cash and get involved in the production of food (Hjort 1974, Potts 1997, Rogerson 1997, Piermay 1997, Owuor and Foeken 2006). To balance the home budget and acquire priceless cash, they become involved in many additional, informal activities (petty trade, food production, cross-border trade). In majority, they participate in several professions at the same time, involving all the house residents in the commercial activity. The diversification of sources of income is to be considered a universal strategy. An economic crisis and inefficiency of the public sector brought about the diversification of the earning method practically at each level of the urban economy. Regardless of a social position, in no case does one source of income guarantee survival. Nor does the work of one person only. In an urban family all are involved in formal and informal economic practices, men and women, not excluding the youngest ones. No-one is economically worthless. At present, this is a universal strategy of existence in urbanised centres. Another of the strategies (well documented by scholars): intensification of contacts with the countryside is rather not adopted in Juba. Communication between the city and the countryside is minimum. The still unstable situation in the province of the state of Equatoria is responsible for this. The state of the agricultural infrastructure in the region also leaves a lot to be desired. For these reasons, among others, the population of South Sudan will, for a long time, concentrate in cities and the countryside will play a provisioning role, as it happens in other parts of Africa (Potts 1997, Owuor and Foeken 2006 et al.).

Citizens of Juba save themselves through contacts with urban centres of neighbouring African countries. These turn out to be particularly profitable in modern Juba. This type of economy is also an excellent example of multi-locality of the urban life – that is life activity outside the direct context of the place of residence. To survive, a resident of an African city must be extremely spatially mobile – not only go outside the limits of their own district, but also leave the city regularly. Of course, the fact of proximity to the state border is very important in that sort of practice. It should be remembered that spatial mobility is also responsible for some negative phenomena, such as unemployment and the growth of prices.

Former refugees are leaders in cross-border contacts. These people are the actual intermediaries between Sudan and the neighbouring African countries. Through their mobility, they transmit a new culture, elements of democracy and a free market. This knowledge is extremely useful in the realities of modern Juba. The city sharpens the usefulness of knowledge they acquired while in exile, which may constitute evidence that Africans, despite traumatic war experiences, can turn them to their favour. And they are far away from the stereotype of a submissive, unadjusted victim. In fact, they are often the leaders of entrepreneurship, determined to change, alongside the internal stability of their home country, their fate for the better.

The economic situation of Juba provides an insight into the consequences of globalisation processes in modern Africa. First, globalisation is not only a process coming from the outside, but also those generated on the African continent. The case of Juba shows that the influence of African centres in this respect is at least the same as of the American and European circle. Second, the consequences of transnational contacts are of an ambivalent nature. They operate both in the good and bad direction alike. In the case of Juba, however, it must be emphasised that they are a considerable development incentive and contribute to the decrease of a civilisation gap separating this corner of Africa from more metropolitan centres of the modern oecumene. Globalisation is not a hostile or alien process. On the contrary, people see great hopes in it. For them, it is a guarantee of propitiousness, stability. In the common imagination of the citizens, it is the positive consequences that have the greatest significance. Thanks to globalisation, Juba is an integral part of the global system. This is an African city, but a global one as well.

Globalisation in the city is manifested by the presence of numerous aid organisations. These institutions should be considered as tools of globalisation. In the name of fight against the crisis, they transmit various contents, not only related to the economy. In this context too, their activity can be considered controversial. They contribute to profound changes within the local culture. These transformations often go beyond the assistance activity (e.g. Christian proselytism). They strive for comprehensive changes, following the example of the American and European civilisation. The influence of the charity organisations cannot be emphasised enough. This is a new quality, a structure alternative to authorities, satisfying many basic needs of Juba citizens (health protection, education, social welfare, just to list a few). This is also the second largest employer, after the state administration. And not only does it provide additional jobs but it also provides a chance for employment to marginalised groups, especially returnees. Reducing the problem of charity in Juba to the strategies adopted by regular citizens, huge achievements of aid organisations in this respect should be emphasised. People have learned how to make use of these and other

opportunities, which, now at least, decisively help them in improving their life for the better. Assistance organisations in the eyes of Juba citizens are not foreign institutions by any means. On the contrary, they act in concert with the fragmented and deterritorialised reality of modern Africa. They constitute a link between the time of war and peace, or the countryside and the city.

At this point, it should be stressed that globalisation, with its liberal economic trends, is responsible for the professional mobilisation of women – traditionally marginalised in the urban society. New opportunities contribute to the improvement of their situation, to the change of relationships between men and women.

It is a woman who is, in many cases, responsible for the economic stability of a family. In the period of dynamic urbanisation, economic problems particularly connected with it and the crisis of traditional social bonds, she took over the burden of providing the family with basic products. This was particularly visible in the case of the poorest families, where the man did not work on a regular basis. A woman was involved most in the sector of informal entrepreneurship, being the development of traditionally female domestic production (alcohol brewing, food production, etc.). In order to be more effective, women intensify cooperation in the form of various self-help associations, sometimes inspired by the activities of NGOs. These associations constitute a significant link of social life in the city – integrating various groups within the framework of one urban community. Other phenomena (e.g. ethnic and religious affiliations) also play a considerable role in the aspect of cooperation between particular groups. In what follows, I will deal with several such phenomena.

Figure 1. A Nubian woman with scarification (Ed Ghaddar 2010, M. Kurcz).

Figure 2. A bazaar in Munuki area (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 3. A liquor producer (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 4. A group of women distilling of liquor (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 5. A boy and his wire car (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 6. A youth and his “mobile business” (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 7. South Sudan`s cowboy (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 8. Entrepreneurs from Somalia (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Changes of Ethnicity

Ethnicity in urban conditions is an issue extremely often addressed by Africanist scholars (Gluckman, Mitchell, Epstein, Cohen et al.). And rightly so. This phenomenon, about the meaning of a certain type of relationships between group identifying themselves as separate in a specific socio-cultural context, is of fundamental significance for the social relationships prevailing in the city (Cohen 1974: 11). The scholar's attention focuses, in particular, around the phenomenon of detribalisation i.e. the disintegration of higher levels of the tribal social structure. Despite violent transformations, the migrant to the city does not forget their origin, and the tribalism still lasts. Ethnicity is undergoing a change. This is not, however, a process going on coherently, in one direction only. Abner Cohen (1974: 12) observes that ethnicity in the conditions of an African city is, to a smaller degree, the issue of politics or economics, and to a larger degree a tool enabling movement within an extremely heterogenic world. An African uses it, categorising co-citizens according to narrow ethnic affiliations. For this reason, among other things, distinguished British anthropologist Max Gluckman (1971) postulated that a city and its citizen are to be looked at as a system governed by specific laws. The city resident's behaviour, therefore, should be considered only in the category of roles dictated by that environment. In anthropology, a famous phrase has become a synonym of this view: "an African townsman is a townsman, an African miner is a miner" (Hannerz 2006b: 164). Common agreement prevails that a city changes traditional identifications, while at the same time either strengthening or weakening ethnicity, often introducing totally new identities. The following processes can be observed in the urbanised environment: growth of ethnic particularism and interethnic rivalry, the emergence of new identities and anti-ethnic behaviours. All serve to survive in the urban environment – adapt to it and optimally use the opportunities hidden in it. In this chapter I will deal with the characteristics of ethnicity changes under the influence of violent urbanisation processes.

Ethnic Structure of Juba

Most modern cities are ethnically heterogenic – they are inhabited by an entire mosaics of peoples characteristic for a given political organism, often also by a considerable diaspora of foreigners (Freund 2005: 89). There are cities, however, dominated by one (autochthonic) ethnic entity, like, for example, in south

western Nigeria dominated by Yoruba. Nairobi was characterised by a specific ethnic continuum between a city and a province surrounding it; the city which was originally dominated by the Kikuyu, an indigenous population of this part of Kenya. And so: Arusha in Tanzania was inhabited by a relatively small percentage of the Arusha, the core population there were foreigners, Europeans and Asians (Freund 2005: 89).

Juba, due to its capital nature, has been an ethnic and cultural mosaic since the very beginning. Black peoples dominate in it – native residents of the state of Equatoria. The most numerous among them are the Bari and the peoples linguistically related to them: Mundari, Niambara, Kakua, Pajulu and Kuku (Figure 1). In fact, however, for at least a decade representatives of all folks of this part of Sudan have lived here: Madi, Moro, Azande, Latuko, Acholi or Toposa) (Table 4). They all make up an informal group of basic residents of Juba – the so-called Equatorians. They do not belong, however, to the most influential ones. Since the signing of the peace agreements, the actual power has been exercised by the Nuer, the Shilluk, and especially the Dinka – traditionally the strongest folks of the South (Table 5) (Figures 2,3,4).

Table 4. Main ethnic groups by respondents (with the region of origin).

Bari (Central Equatoria).
Dinka (Shimal Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei).
Mundari (Central Equatoria).
Kakua (Central Equatoria).
Moro (Western Equatoria).
Madi (Central and Eastern Equatoria).
Kuku (Central Equatoria).
Latuko (Eastern Equatoria).
Nuers (Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal).
"Arabs" (Northern Sudan).
Shilluk (Upper Nile).
Acholi (Eastern Equatoria).
Niambara (Central Equatoria).
Azande (Western Equatoria).
Pajulu (Central Equatoria).
Toposa (Eastern Equatoria).
Balanda (Western Bahr el Ghazal).
Murle (Jonglei).

Table 5. Ethnic groups by the criterion of influence.

Dinka	Army and politics (GoSS)
Neur	Army and politics
Mundari	Army
Bari	Administration and natural resources (land, straw, wood, etc.)
Shilluk	Army and administration
Ugandans, Kenyans and Arabs	Trade

In one of the earlier chapters, I have already informed about the migration of upstarts to the city from the neighbouring African countries. Due to economic reasons the city is becoming home to Asians too. In first order they are Indians from the neighbouring African countries. They are people very well up on the local conditions. They are involved in big business (logistics and real estate) and are hired as engineers or simple construction workers. They create several small communities in various parts of the city. Interestingly enough, they do not separate themselves from the native citizens. They rent houses in parts of the city inhabited by the locals and keep proper neighbourhood relations with them. Mixed marriages occur among them – or rather, more frequently, types of informal relationships.

The most numerous is decisively the Chinese population. They, in turn, have taken control of the construction industry. They are hired as workers for all sorts of work of this kind. Above all, however, they erect comfortable mansions for the black establishment. They are valued, above all, because of their diligence and additionally small requirements, particularly those of an economic nature. They live in closed workers' complexes, which constitute a substitute for their home country. Their contacts with the locals are kept to a minimum. They are limited by, for example, the lack of knowledge of Arabic. Primitive English replaces communication – using a set of basic words. They cannot be seen in the streets or in city diners. They spend their free time only within their own group. They use their own cuisine and restaurants serving Asian food. Incidentally, there were quite a lot of them in the city. Oriental cuisine enjoys surprising popularity both among foreigners and the black elite. I was informed that there had been no mixed marriages so far. At most, the Chinese brought over their families. This specific racial endogamy does not prevent them, however, from using the local prostitutes' services regularly. In the natives' eyes they awaken antagonistic feelings. On the one hand, their diligence and economic minimalism inspire

admiration. Additionally, their political, or more generally ideological indifference is also appreciated. They are not interested in politics or cultural issues. They have not come here to spread any ideas. They are here only to earn money. They do not intend to settle here for good either. Therefore they do not constitute a threat to the status quo for the indigenous population. The Africans treat this as evidence of tolerance – partnership and acceptance of their lifestyle. On the other hand, Beijing's military assistance for Khartoum during the civil war is remembered. Anxiety, or even embarrassment, is aroused by some of their habits (for example, allegedly only drinking hot water). The Africans from the South Sudan, as I have already mentioned, have not gotten used to the sight of this nation. In their mind they have a fixed image of an Indian or a European. As a consequence, they have a formed opinion and a specific contact strategy in relation to them.

The European community has once constituted the core of any urban agglomeration of Africa. It was no different in the case of Juba. The city was established by the Europeans and as long as till the mid-1950s they constituted a considerable community in it, for which the city centre was reserved –today's Juba Town. At the moment, there are no traces of their settlement in the city. Time and the war erased them. The Europeans staying here at present are mostly employees of all sorts of assistance organisations, such as WFP or UNHCR. They basically moved into the city after 2005. They occupy the city's hotels and closed residential areas referred to as "*camps*." Due to the existing procedures, no-one from the outside has access to them. They are, in a sense, self-sufficient areas. The Europeans, like other foreigners, are characterised by extreme separation from the Africans. Their day is organised according to the following scheme: *camp*/hotel – place of work – camp/hotel. They move between these places only in cars. I barely ever met a "white" person in the street. The places of contact were, above all, hotel restaurants and cafes, possibly a church and the very city centre (*Juba Town*). In other parts of the city the presence of a white person is met at least with a surprise, about which I have informed in the introduction.

The imagination of a white person generates a specific position and a contact strategy. *Hauja* (a word common in entire Sudan for a foreigner, a European in particular) is an influential person, in the urban category belonging to the category of active. This is a potential employer or a person who may solve the native's problems. They may, therefore, turn out to be a sought patron, who will facilitate a good start in the city. Many interview partners have found employment through contacts with foreigners. The Europeans are valued above all for that reason. They are considered as those it is worth hanging around with – having friends among them. In the natives' opinion they are not corrupted and not

greedy people. Therefore it is necessary to gain favour with them through friendship and kindliness, the incentive of which are the native's stories full of personal tragedies from the recent war.

The "whites" are also a community interesting from a different reason. This is one of the groups in whose behaviour and manners it is possible to see the specificity of the local reality. They are characterised by a specific morality and conduct, atypical in terms of morals. Sexual promiscuity or drunkenness can be attributed to them. All is associated with stressing work, far from home, in unimaginably extreme conditions. The reality of post-war Juba makes a visitor from the global North suspend their identity here, instead working out a specific morality and morals, and all this is basically subordinated to one objective: to survive. The phenomenon, though it applies most of all to "whites," is not alien to other groups migrating to the city either. This is the achievement of the multidimensional borderliness (liminality) of Juba in relation to which no one remains indifferent.

Strengthening of Ethnicity. The Struggle for Influence Between Particular Communities

South Sudan is an area in which traditional social bonds have survived extremely strongly. Many factors have contributed to this. Without any doubts, they include cultural reasons: pastoral and the related conservative nature of the local culture. Others are historical and political conditions: first of all, the form of the colonial governments ("indirect governments"), combined with isolation of the area even in relation to other parts of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the later years of the civil war, which successfully separated this area from the contacts from the outside. Finally, South Sudan is an area in which an adjective "traditional" is often overused. After all, we have to remember that many social institutions or distinctions were established during the colonial times, often upon the initiative of the British colonisers. Such categories as "a tribe" or "chieftainship," commonly used nowadays, are not rooted in all the communities inhabiting this area to the same degree.

The ingenious citizens of Juba still seem to be attached to their ethnic roots; they are proud of them and usually remember them well. It is natural that based on them, it is easiest to set up in the city, find accommodation or work. A considerable majority of interview partners survived the first period only thanks to the support of tribesmen, particularly clan relatives. Ethnic nepotism is a feature of everyday life and does not particularly shock anyone. This is, in fact, a natural consequence of strong traditional social bonds. As people adopt to life in the

city, and integration of particular groups, the revitalisation of family and tribal structures takes place. This is particularly visible in the case of the strongest folks, like the Dinka, the Nuer or the Bari. Strengthening the sense of solidarity, in real terms they possess a greater power in the fight for political and economic advantages. These groups, strongly integrated with one another, occupy the top levels of the urban social ladder. In the case of the strongest communities, the strengthening of the group identity serves the policy of dominance. In the event of minority groups, it provides protection against stronger and more expansive groups.

Ethnicity in the city is, however, undergoing fundamental changes – it is becoming a new structure. This is associated with the fact of co-existence of various human groups and their competition for social or political advantages. As a consequence, ethnicity is acquiring a broader dimension. This is no longer a family or tribal structure any more, but a "supertribal," agglomerating all those who identify with a given "ethnic group" (Freund 2007: 90).

The manifestation of this phenomenon in Juba are ethnic associations. Some operate at local shrines, as in the case of the Madi association, which had its seat at the Our Lady of the Holy Rosary Church. This is not a rule, however. An association is a body representing all members of a given ethnic group. Its task is to care for the interests of the entire community, e.g. as regards the ownership issues. Through its intermediary, interethnic disputes are resolved. Additionally, it runs charity activity, which is enabled by cooperation with all sorts of global assistance organisations. The association's task is also to cherish the cultural tradition, including to organise collective tribal celebrations, mostly on the occasion of state and religious holidays and funerals of outstanding individuals. The vitality of culture of a given community within the city is manifested this way. In this field, one may even seek competition between particular communities, especially during official state ceremonies. The echoes of this rivalry can be found in the daily press, which in detail evaluates the performances of ethnic groups. That is why, inter alia, informal folk groups of dancers and musicians, operate at most of the organisations. Members of the association, mostly heads of families, meet at least once a month to discuss current problems of the community. The association is usually headed by a man not associated with traditional structures. As a rule it is a professionally active representative of the city's local intelligentsia. The most influential in the city (during my stay there) was "Bari's Community Association."

We possess quite extensive literature on the groups of that type (Banton 1947, Mitchell 1956, Gutkind 1974, Scotch 1964 et al.). Ethnic associations are integrally associated with the urban environment and we can come across them

in many other parts of Africa (Lentz 2006, Szczepański 1984: 47,48). The serve practical purposes: to organise festivities, but also to protect the interests of their members or provide them with financial assistance. In urban conditions they express nostalgia for former structures, fully substituting them at the same time (Szczepański 1984: 47). According to A. Cohen (1969: 192), these are the symptoms of transformation of ethnicity in the urban environment. He has rightly observed that ethnic associations are established to join people in the struggle for the same political or economic objectives. They appear everywhere where ethnicity is still strong and vital. They are dynamic there and, most importantlu important, extremely influential in the fight for power in the urban environment (Freund 2005: 90). From the perspective of this study, they can also be considered as one of the strategies for obtaining specific benefits. Access to those sorts of organisations create a sense of comfort in relation to the problems emerging in the urban environment (e.g. alienation or loneliness), but also brings along a possibility of material support – real improvement of existence. They are usually of a short-term nature. They are subject to disintegration together with the weakening of their functions or change in the economic situation, Those which prove more durable, with time get converted most frequently into political organisations, lobbying-type, or trade unions (Szczepański 1984: 48).

Interethnic relationships are not antagonistic. The experience of a city life is associated with a conviction about the necessity to co-exist or communicate with the "strangers." These relationships, however, are not free from prejudices or grudges. Above all, old feuds and disagreements still smoulder in reciprocal relations. Prejudices manifest themselves here due to the military dominance of an ethnic group in the past. The warlike Dinka are meant here above all, whose looting raids onto neighbouring ethnic groups were simply war rituals. This group, in many respects, deceptively similar to the Massai, are conservative cattle breeders. They are characterised by extremely developed pride and specific ethnic chauvinism. Moreover, they still cherish an aggressive and warlike ethos. These features have even got sharpened as a result of the recent war. In the past the Dinkas fought against all their neighbours: Mundari, Bari, Murle and, above all, the Nuer. These folks are particularly distrustful towards the Dinka, especially since the traditions of reciprocal thefts of cattle and women have revived together with the political stability. In Juba most conflicts break out between the Dinka and the Mundari. They often end with gory brawls. The scheme has always been the same. An apparently trivial misunderstanding gives rise to a street fight of a dozen or so people – fellow tribesmen of each party. Only a police intervention ends the quarrel. A form of resolving (or rather cultivating) conflicts is also

to organise wresting competitions. Both communities have had rich traditions in this sport (Figure 5).

New animosities, generated by the times of war as well as the current situation in the region, are put upon the network of former ones. Some of them overlap: This means: the Dinka blame the Bari for small involvement in the war against Khartoum. They accuse them of chicken-hearted passivity. Meanwhile, the Bari address accusations against the Dinka of dominance and seizing their lawful property – Juba (which is located in the area belonging to the Bari community). Dinka's immigration to the city is perceived as new colonialism. The Dinka, holding the reins of government, are additionally accused of corruption, nepotism and chauvinism. The animosities among the remaining communities basically concern the times of war. For example, the Acholi still have a grudge against the Madi people. The reason was the former's sympathising with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and the former's with a pro-government militia. The Acholi themselves also meet with the distrust of other communities. The reason is a real threat on the part of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army guerrillas, whose forces are supplied mostly by the representatives of this ethnic group. The years of war were a period of brutal interethnic fights, mutual pogroms and looting. The war saved nobody. Members of the same family at the same time could belong to two conflicted parties. The power relations were very complicated and extremely dynamic. That is why the current situation only apparently seems to be stabilised. In fact it is being shaped by individual experiences marked by the recent war. Let's not forget that it had, among others, the nature of an ethnic conflict.

Closer relations bind groups which represent a similar culture or a style of life. For the Bari, natural allies are linguistically-related: Kakua, Niambara, Kuku or Mundari. The same goes for the communities: Latuko and Lakoya or Moro and Madi. These communities often live together and often enter into kinship relations.

The economy plays an important role in ethnic categorisation, likewise in other parts of Africa. It is a source of polarisation of the urban oecumene into cattle breeders and hoe farmers. Both groups treat each other with mistrust, reinforced by a lot of negative stereotypes. At the same time, however, in some cases the same factor – the economic model – also becomes a cause of conflict. However, this applies almost exclusively to pastoral communities which are neighbours and have a tradition of stealing cattle from each other.

In communication, the degree of contacts between particular groups is also important. the relationships of communities in constant contact with each other – or having contact strategies (like, for example, in the case of Sudanese

and Indian people or Sudanese and Arabs) are completely different. It is different with groups directly unknown to each other. This is particularly visible in the case of the Chinese – the nation that was practically absent in this part of Africa not that long ago. Paradoxically, I observed a closer communication intimacy of the natives with the Muslim population (let's add: former enemies) than with the Chinese diaspora.

The criterion of activity or passivity of a given community, what kind of influences it has in the city is extremely important within the network of comprehensive interethnic relations. Again, this criterion often cuts across the official alliances, divisions: own-stranger or friend-enemy And yes, an excellent candidate for a friend is the "white" Man. Thanks to them is possible to, for instance, find employment. For the same reasons it is good to maintain contacts with Arabs. They are influential and wealthy people. They are sought patrons, as in the case of one of the interview partners who, having considerable personal problems, deprived of the family's and tribesmen's support, finally received temporary help from a Muslim neighbour.

In the city, I observed a struggle for influences between the parties which represented particular tribes. Local ethnic groups are fighting fierce battles for a position in the power structures and natural resources. I have earlier talked about the interethnic competition for land. Each of the indigenous communities also wishes to have the greatest possible influence in the power structures (state offices and the army). In fact, however, only the Nuer, the Shilluk, and especially the Dinka – as we know traditionally the strongest communities in the South – manage to do so. They are all particularly warlike and expansive and in the recent war they were the core of the resistance movement. Apart from the military staff, there are many educated people among them. Therefore, it is no surprise that they monopolise the structures of the autonomy being born. These groups hold the largest number of jobs in the central administration, while at the state or city level their presence is not overwhelming any more. The predominance of the Dinka in uniformed services, in the SPLA in particular, is enormous. The Non-Dinka are removed from the army as part of demobilisation. Those who decide to stay are discriminated and, for example, not paid on a regular basis. Similar mechanisms existed in administration. The ethnic nepotism there was very probably even stronger.

According to the Dinka themselves, the struggle for power in post-war Sudan is some sort of "a national mission." This is a part of the modern political theory of the peoples. Their political theory is the theory of expansion and dominance.[60]

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60 Cf. Lienhardt (1961) *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka*, Oxford: Clarendon.

Nowadays it means taking control of the structures of power of emerging South Sudan. In their opinion, they are a modern, fully formed nation! For this reason, among others, they deserve the helm of government, all prominent positions. To this, again in their view, they are prepared best of all. With this argument they explained their over-representation in the state apparatus. They claim this was not a result of their rapacity for power, as other communities argued, but rather of unrivalled predispositions. Traditional social systems are continued this way, characterised by a hierarchical structure, in which warlike shepherds were a dominating layer, while hardly expansive farmers the subordinated one.

The consequence of the ownership right is the professional specialisation in the city. Some professions are reserved for the indigenous people of this corner of the South. For example, the Mundari are the only ones who are involved in butchery and the sale of milk, as they are the only ones who had the right to keep cattle in the city. Building materials such as straw and wood are, in turn, the prerogative of the Bari – the rightful owners of the bush surrounding the city. All attempts to break these monopolies sooner or later ended with a decisive reaction of the communities.

The urban environment often becomes an arena of the interethnic competition, and both on a local (city) and national scale. The city, particularly the capital one, is the reflection of ethnic relations within a given area. Moreover, this is the place where these relations acquire special meaning. They are carried out on the basis of new, wider identifications, modelled by the specificity of the urban life. Juba is no exception in this respect. This phenomenon is also well known from other African cities (Freund 2007: 91). Baladier, in the context of Brazzaville, wrote about the formation of new ethnicity in the city. Additionally, the city spatial arrangement corresponded to a general division of former French Equatorial Africa into North and South.

Non-Ethnicity

While certain structures get re-vitalised, others are subject to the process of decomposition or simply undergo a transformation. This is basically enforced by the specificity of urban life. And so, for example, the consequence of housing problems is the absence of clearly ethnic spaces within the city. The multitude of immigrants, with a simultaneous lack of an appropriate infrastructure, made people settle wherever they can find a piece of vacant land, paying no heed to the neighbours' ethnic or religious origin. Therefore in each part of the city it is possible to meet representatives practically of all communities living here. At most, they form dispersed ethnic clusters. This fact naturally has a huge impact on the

strengthening of interethnic contacts and the establishment of new, urban identities. At the local level, keeping good neighbourly relations, like, for example, participating in joint family celebrations, is a daily occurrence. Women, regardless of ethnic descendance, cooperate with one another at different levels of everyday life. A rule is, as I have already written, the shared preparation of meals or child-rearing. They cultivate land together as well and ship products to a local market. They often decide to run businesses together – usually of the catering type. These phenomena do not surprise anyone any longer. In particular quarters, they try to continue the traditional models of rural life, especially those located far away from the city centre. Local and neighbourly identifications replace the ethnic origin. A local football league is also an example of this. Representatives of various ethnic communities play in it, representing, above all, their local community – their quarter.

Ethnicity is undergoing specific "concealment." This is the consequence of war experiences in the collective memory of the black South. They are afraid of it as a conflictual factor. People are oversensitive about a negative impact of ethnicity. Each conflict is considered according to this key. It is subject to specific ethnicisation. As a result, any row involved not so much the city residents as representatives of specific ethnic communities. (A real life example: once I witnessed a row in a bar. For me, it was two men grappling with each other in a beer cellar; for the natives in the bar, it was a scuffle between a representative of the Dinka and the Acholi). That is why ethnicity is basically not manifested within the city. It is important, alive, strongly made aware of, but does not appear in the public sphere outside the household walls. It is undergoing privatisation. Makes itself known at the level of a clan or family, and this is usually during solemn events. The ethnic language is not used outside the family home. Not only are the language differences the case, but also a conviction that it is better to communicate in Arabic, or to be more specific, pidgin *Juba Arabic,* but preferably in English. According to a popular belief, people speaking their native tongue are uncouth – they are simply yokels. Spaces of a clearly ethnic nature are commonly avoided. Places open to everyone are preferred. This fear is particularly strong among the Dinka living in the city, the most heated by residents. This phenomenon is to be associated with the popularity of hotel bars and restaurants. As I have already observed, there is no ethnicity there. These are neutral spaces – open to all. Resistance warlords and Arab merchants meet over a glass of vodka or a bottle of beer. This picture does not surprise anyone much. This is a place where you can hide behind a fictitious, cosmopolitan identity.

The perception of the city as an ethic-free space, which is inhabited not by representatives of various ethnic groups, but, in the first place, by the city residents,

is also important. Contrary to the province, there is no tribalism likewise there are no traditional customs and rituals. Ethnicity, tribalism are manifestations of ruralism, factors stigmatising a rural migrant. That is why scarification tattoos, reddish hair coloured with cow urine or fashionably shaved hair apart from a narrow stripe on the top of the head is visual evidence of "parochialism," and "traditionalism."

"Ethnicity concealment" is a behaviour typical for the urban environment. As American anthropologist Lissa Malkki (1995) observed, a fear-motivated conviction that the original identity does not fit the place the person has just found themselves in. The hiding of ethnicity or hiding behind a fictitious identity provides protection. This phenomenon was also observed by British anthropologist Gaim Kibreab based on Eritrea refugees in Sudan. He noted that the refugees settling in cities try to be more cosmopolitan than those coming from camps. It happens so because they do not feel confident with their original identity. That is why the refugees changed their names, language, clothing or even religion. All to become as much like the environment as possible. This did not prevent them, in Kibreaba's view, from considering themselves still as Eritreans – this identification was, however, dormant in a sense (Kibreab 1999, after Agier 2002: 333).

In my opinion this is perfectly valid in also in relation to the current situation in Juba. "Ethnicity concealment" in the city is evidence of its vitality, and not decay. This is a specific "invisibility strategy" of the resident of the violently urbanising centre. People in a heterogenic urban environment are afraid of ethnicity. They see a conflictual force in it. Citizens of South Sudan became clearly convinced about this during the recent war. (This was partly an ethnic conflict). Or while in exile as well. Due to the "ethnicity concealment" the city is rather extremely safe. This is not the achievement of uniformed services, though, but the fact that people are afraid even of the smallest argument with neighbours. It could develop into the size of an ethnic conflict.

Language and the Overcoming of Ethnicity

I have already remarked that language similarities have a huge impact on the ethnic categorisation in the city. They influence, for example, the degree of intimacy or entering into different types of alliances. Above all, however, they are the basis for the feeling: "own" –"stranger." In that sense, they contribute to the strengthening of ethnicity – consolidating people of a similar culture in action. At the same time, however, a language may play a role neutralising ethnicity, act towards the establishment of a facade identity, or become an irrefutable proof of urbaneness. A language for a city migrant is the basic obstacle in adapting to

a new situation. This affects not only the degree of communication, but is also a social classification. Finally, it enables finding well-paid employment. Thus it contributes in a real way to the improvement of a person's living conditions.

Many years ago, linguist Joseph Greenberg (1965) remarked that an African city was an area of dramatic language changes. As early as in the colonial period, together with intensive urbanisation, a need appeared to develop forms of communication able to cope with a strongly culturally heterogeneous urban environment. Former vehicular or "national" languages, officially used in a given area, were often used for that purpose. However, they were most often subject to "pidginisation" – adjusted to the dialectical form or used to form a totally new language creation (Greenberg 1965: 52).

At present, as a result of violent globalisation and westernisation, we can observe a growing popularity of European languages in African cities (French and English in particular) (Vigouroux and Mufwene 2008).

The language of Juba and its environs is the so-called *Juba Arabic (*sometimes also referred to as"Creole Arabic"). This local variety of Arabic is used above all in the region of Equatoria, to a smaller degree at Bahr el Ghazal and the Upper Nile. For the residents of that area it is not the first language, but is used occasionally in the interethnic communication. In this sense, *Juba Arabic* may be treated as a local lingua franca. It is not a consolidated and separated language form. However, it is characterised by a specific pronunciation, vocabulary and grammar (Smith and Morris 2005). In the *Juba Arabic* used in the city, words from local languages (of the Bari group mostly) appear, and recently also from English. This is a colloquial language, understood by all the settled city residents. This is the language of tuition in the majority of schools. It is also used by local radio stations and newspapers. *Juba Arabic* is the language of an ethnic and cultural borderland in Juba, for the recent years serving as a medium of interethnic communication.

In urbanised centres of Africa, most frequently only one language appears as a lingua franca. It happens, however, that there may be more of them in one city. This usually happens so due to the rivalry between particular folks. We are dealing with such a situation in north-eastern Nigeria, in which the palm of priority in interethnic community is held by the languages: Kanuri and Hausa. The reason is a traditional rivalry between the Kanuri and the Hanusa, the background of which are economic and historic issues. Let me only mention that in the pre-colonial times, the Hanusa language was used at the court of the Fulani Sutanate of Sokoto. Its rival was the Kanem-Bornu Empire, connected, in turn, with the Kanuri people. According to Greenerg (1965: 52,53), traditional

animosities between the two communities stand in the way of establishing one dominating language within the cities of north-eastern Nigeria.

We are dealing with a similar case in Juba. Apart from dialectic Arabic, English is another extremely important language of the city. This is the second official language of the Autonomy. Official regulations and communications are issued in it. The street follows the authority. Shop signs or street advertisements are only in English, replacing Arabic in this respect. Returnee from other African countries, who had mastered the language while in exile, support the popularisation of English. Christian churches also have considerable achievements in this matter, for which, from the very beginning, it has been the language of liturgy, or generally, pastoral activity.

Africa, as it is commonly known, is an area where an enormous variety of languages exist. South Sudan is no exception in this respect. A language of inter-ethnic communication has always been needed here. Arabic initially played that role. Then, together with the emergence of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the palm of priority went to English. Both proved excellent ways of communication. Excellent, because alien for all native communities. Therefore nobody had to accept a compromise, accept the dominance of one of the ethnic groups. A colonial policy supported their sustainability – basically making use of English and Arabic in public life (in administration, education or religious practices). After decolonisation, Arabic became the official language, English was limited to the Christian liturgy. A new situation affected the position of Arabic in an ambivalent way. On the one had it became the system of communication of prime importance – its knowledge was the best ticket to the world of politics, business or simply a normal life. In the postcolonial period, as Ibrahim Elnur (2009: 102) noticed, Arabic was used as a widely applied life strategy of residents of southern provinces. It was a ticket to well-paid jobs in administration. On the other hand, together with the escalation of the conflict between the North and the South, its prestige was clearly declining. It became a tool of oppression for the residents of the rebelled provinces. It was some sort of politicisation of Arabic, linking with the policy of Arabisation and Islamisation, that stopped its development within this area. Today it clearly bears negative connotations: with forced Arabisation and occupying forces. This is what the growing popularity of English must be associated with today. It is relatively well-known, and, what is most important, does not evoke negative emotions. This is a neutral language, what is more, it clearly expresses the South's cultural orientation to the African interior and the American and European civilisation. In this latter aspect, it should be considered as one of the manifestations of the impact of globalisation. Since it is commonly known that globalisation "speaks" English.

A language is a point of social reference, it classifies a person either at lower or upper parts of the urban social ladder. Arabic and English – two main city languages – enjoy the greatest prestige. They compete for the priority as regards the matter of official communication. Despite different connotations, they meet the same important functions, they let an extremely diversified ethnic community communicate. Thanks to both, a city resident may like as a city resident. The bottom of the hierarchy is occupied by ethnic languages. Practically they limit themselves to the domestic environment. They stigmatize a rural migrant – practically make communication or well-paid employment impossible. Paradoxically, nearly half a century of independence has not contributed to the common rehabilitation of African languages.[61] As during the rule of the Europeans, they placed a person in the lower sections of the social ladder, becoming a reason for their pauperisation. Interestingly, though, this is a process which meets with common understanding, both on the part of authorities and ordinary people. Reason: overcoming tribalism, integrating an extremely ethnically diversified society. In the city, we also have Swahili, which is used by migrants from East Africa and a considerable part of former refugees. This is a language of business, used mostly on markets and in hotels.

The language of the city is at the stage of forming. At the moment we see the co-existence of at least two systems: English and Arabic. They express the divisions in the city's social structure. On the one hand, we have elite groups using English, while on the other hand – there are urban masses, which still communicate only in Arabic. We also have Arabic-speaking settled residents and English-speaking returnees. Attempts to overcome those divisions are also visible in the city. Perhaps they will contribute to the creation of an urban newspeak: Arabic and English pidgin. It is already characteristic to spontaneously mix Arabic and English in daily communication. Repeating words or entire sentences in one and the other language.

New Identities. Examples of Former Refugees and Displaced Persons

We already know that territorial relocation does not have to result in the loss of identity, culture or ethnicity, but in their transformation (Turton 1996, Donnan

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61 In the newest history of Africa there have been attempts of top-down re-Africanisation (mostly in terms of languages) of entire societies, like, for example, in Congo (former Zaire) at the times of Mobutu Sese Seko. They were not successful, however, and the majority of introduced changes were sooner or later reversed.

and Wilson 2007: 156, Hahn and Klute 2005). The traditional sociological approach, treating spatial mobility and migrations as exceptions to a normal, settled lifestyle, is going out of date. Research of British anthropologist Wendy James (1979) among the Uduk community at the border of Sudan and Ethiopia prove that a displaced person's experience is included to the "group's cultural archive." As a result a group can continue functioning. Seeking asylum after many years of exile became an integral element of this community's identity. Lissa Malkki (1997) dealing with Hutu refugees in Tanzania drew similar conclusions. We also observe perception of exile as a significant and positive element of group identity among them. Refugees' experiences are used to achieve real benefits, they are sources of practical knowledge and are handed down from generation to generation. This is a cumulative experience, the question of becoming, acquiring relevant experiences. Malkki has also rightly noticed a dissonance between how the refugees perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others, assistance organisations in particular. And so: the latter have a tendency to treat a refugee as an absolute victim: alienated and uprooted. According to this perspective, territorial relocations result in losing identity and culture (Donnan and Wilson 2007: 157,158). Exile understood this way has ambivalent repercussions for the displaced persons themselves. On the one hand it guarantees them various profits – hence it is to be treated as a strategy of obtaining benefits during and after the period of migration. On the other hand, however, it disturbs and complicates looking at one's own identity, in fact hinders the return to normalcy.

The war experiences of Juba residents are the foundations for creating new social groups. One of them are the former exiles. This is a group with a well-developed identity and sustainable loyalty. It is divided into a series of smaller oecumenes, modelled by ethnicity, age or a place of exile. Cosmopolitanism of the exiles staying in cities is in contrast with ethnic nationalism (growth of political aspirations within an ethnic community) of residents staying in camps.

We can differentiate a generation of twentysomething year olds, war orphans who were raised in camps in Kenya. They call themselves the "Lost Boys" – from the memorable action of rescuing thousands of Sudanese orphans who were fleeing to neighbouring African countries in 1992. With time, the phrase "Lost Boys" have become an eponym of the entire generation of orphans – refugees. They do not feel fulfilled. They left the world they knew and they fully identify themselves with, abroad. They are irritated by the inconveniences of urban life, like the shortage of water or high prices. Even the climate seems more oppressive to them. They feel alienated and this feeling is strengthened by cultural realities.

They were educated in the spirit of the cult of ancestors. They know the ethos of pastoral life and tribal rituals. For them they are associated with a family home,

an idyllic tribal life. They were not given a chance to learn that world directly. What they know about it, was given to them already in exile, in refugee camps. This is an idealised culture, nearly fable-like, extremely mismatched against the modern realities of the South. The "Lost Boys" generation particularly suffers from the lack of authorities. The so-called family is a blend of closer and further relatives who, in fact, share a roof above their heads. The one who has a regular job and supports everybody becomes its leader.

It is characteristic that this group of former refugees is less attached to the traditional institutions, such as a family, clan or tribe. They want to earn money and live a free, big-city life. The relics of old believes and customs do not arouse much enthusiasm in them, and are rather a source of disappointment. Traditional values give way to the pursuit of money or consumerism. The Sudanese realities are something alien to them. Yesterday's big-city world of Kampala or Nairobi, where they actually grew, remains a model of conduct for them. They give expression of this in the manner the dress, in daily habits and the language being a sort of East African, slang variety of English. Despite financial problems, they do not skimp either on beer or discotheques. They identify themselves with subcultures stemming from North American ghettoes. They struggle with financial difficulties, but they do not starve. It happens they live on money brought from abroad. In majority they are jobless and they do not look for work at all. Many think that this is pointless, since the only reasonable way to improve one's own situation is to go abroad, return to Kampala or Nairobi and get a higher education or proper start-up capital there. Thinking about their future, they ask themselves a question: what next? Most come to the conclusion that they have to leave Sudan.

At first glance their life seems carefree. Before noon they usually run some errands, the afternoon is mostly time for rest and entertainment. And in fact, they spend their days on games of domino, whiled away wandering through the city and emptying one or two bottles of beer. A mandatory bath in the river in the evening, and afterwards, till late at night, staring at a TV in one of the bars, particularly TV clips from the music stage in exile. In this way they abreact the years of war. For many it is most likely a time of repeated childhood – to be precise, the childhood they did not have.

Company is provided by their peers who nearly always have similar war experiences. The groups resemble the former age class institutions. They are used in order to form new types of organisation in the urban environment – resembling youth gangs of big-city centres, with their stratification and relationships between particular members. A peer staying in the same camp is a brother. You can always count on him, you have to be always ready, however, to provide help

in return. In fact they function due to reciprocal help, being loyal in sharing irregular income.

A place of exile is also a bond for a group identity. On this basis it is possible to distinguish asylum seekers in various parts of Sudan, as well as those who found shelter in the neighbouring East African countries. These two are two main subgroups. However, there are also other ones. Former refugees to the US or Australia are extremely active ones.[62] This is the elite among the returnees. Regardless of the facts, they are considered to have won the proverbial lottery. It is true that in majority they are well-educated people, often having capital or contacts abroad. It is not easy for them, however, to find themselves in the city. They belong to a particularly alienated group. They are embittered and with aversion to the surrounding reality. The greater the aversion, the greater the nostalgia for the country of immigration. This, in turn, is the beginning of a specific lifestyle, strongly referring to the place they have come back from.[63]

A special distinction characterises the so-called internal refugees, who were interned in the North of Sudan, mostly in the vicinity of the Khartoum agglomeration. Their characteristic feature is the Arab culture they soaked in while in exile. This is seen most clearly in their costume or every day habits and it is a source of their stigmatisation. The remaining city groups call them "Jalaba" – a derogatory term for "Arabs."[64] They are isolated by the remaining Sudanese, to which their relatively poor knowledge of English is a contributing factor. Arabic, commonly used by them, is evidence of their foreigness, particularly if they had acquired capital or an education while in exile.

The settled population often treat former refugees with contempt. The street addresses accusations of cowardice towards them – it is claimed that instead of fighting they preferred to flee, while in exile they lived a comfortable life. For this reason alone they come across difficulties in their daily life. They are treated as a separate category of residents. They are not strangers, but not local either. They are referred to with pejorative phrases of East African origin or, what is more painful, "Arabs." In relation to the refugees who stayed abroad in rural areas, insults like "primitive" or "provincial" (Long Road Home 2008: 11) are used. On markets, higher prices are permanently demanded from them. They are accused

62 During the last war these countries accepted many refugees from South Sudan.

63 Special entertainment events are organised in the city, devoted to the countries in which the Sudanese got asylum (e.g. Australia's Day).

64 In classical Arabic, "a small trader," among the Black Sudanese a phrase referring to a slave trader, follower of Islam at the same time (Yusuf 2010: 67, 68).

of "bringing" pathologies to Juba, like: prostitution, alcoholism or HIV/AIDS – since they are half foreigners! Similarly, the growing city crime rate is associated with subcultures "from abroad." These criminals are generally called "Niggers" or "Outlaws." The former refugees, in turn, consider themselves more harmed by fate. The stay in exile is a matter of pride for them, this is evidence of the fight against "Arabs," the price they had to pay. In their opinion, those who stayed did not demonstrate bravery (it relates mostly to the residents of Equatoria). The roots of that antagonism date back to the times of war and have a political background. Since, on the one part, we have the population of Equatoria, which for the most part of the war was under the control of the government in Khartoum, while on the other part the population of other South provinces (mostly the Dinka and the Neur), who had to flee abroad due to their involvement in the resistance movement. Theses antagonisms also result from cultural differences. Those who did not leave Sudan are more conservative and traditionalist. Controversies are stirred up by the matter of dress and conduct of women returning from abroad. They are considered less sophisticated, criticised, among others, for wearing jeans and low-cut blouses as well as overly direct behaviour towards men.

What is interesting, the former refugees, disliked and criticised, at the same time become the carrier of culture the entire city aspires to. They impersonate the culture everybody desires at the moment. This is the culture of the West, basted with East African sauce, which is becoming a foundation of the emerging new culture of Juba. The big-city experience of returnees makes them a model for the remaining city dwellers.

English – the basic language for the majority of returnees – is the second, as we know, after a local variety of Arabic, language of the urban population and all of South Sudan. The influence of the foreign culture is also seen in dress or diet. As regards fashion, three East African models are valid. In the case of men, it is a wide, patterned, short sleeve shirt, put on over the head – the so-called *kitenga*. Similarly, patterned, but decisively longer *kitengas* are worn by women, among which scarves forming a sort of bonnet, characteristic for a large part of Black Africa are also popular. The young generation, among which Western and East African influences are most visible, with the former refugees at the forefront, wears totally differently clothing. Young men most frequently wear colourful T-shirts with baseball emblems, jeans, track suits, shorts. Plus various types of headgear: baseball caps, peaked caps or colourful berets with Rastafarian elements. Young girls prefer various dresses and blouses – sometimes boldly exposing the assets of the female body. The way young people dress stirs up controversies among the older generation, especially as, for example, the Sudanese customarily consider jeans to be an attribute of women of easy virtues. Therefore, not

all young women dare to wear jeans every day. The place where they have even become an obligatory outfit, however, are hotel discos. There young people can fully express their cultural aspirations. The popularity of various types of entertainment venues is more proof of the diffusion of the East African culture. The demand for this kind of entertainment is driven by former refugees.

Traditional cuisine is pushed aside to the limits of a household. Dishes of East African or global cuisine, like chicken with chips or pizza, enjoy popularity. Specialities of East African cuisine appear, such as *matooke*[65] or *chapati*[66] in restaurant menus, as well as more and more frequently in home menu. These are some examples of dishes which make an outstanding carrier in Juba. Eating them at the city's bars or restaurants is the elite's new ritual. Offices become deserted at lunchtime, the office staff go to city centre restaurants. All sorts of joints constitute, as of yet, the only centres of cultural life. These are new phenomena, connected with urbanisation processes, but also with the return of the local intelligentsia from exile, accustomed to big city customs.

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For the last two centuries, regardless of the political situation, South Sudan has been permanently marginalised. Its exclusion was of a holistic nature. This resulted from the deeply rooted, chauvinistic ideas of the Muslim population from the areas of Sudan located more to the north. In their eyes, the inhabitants of the South were indicators of primitiveness, barbarity and backwardness. The 2005 agreement at least ended the period of physical confrontation between the North and the South. It is not known yet whether the established peace will be lasting. Regardless of this, however, the event itself contributes to significant changes; among other things, it leads to the awakening of the identity of communities inhabiting the southern provinces of Sudan. The struggle for political and economic advantages became an additional stimulus in this process.

The ethnicity of Juba is, in a natural way, associated with the specificity of urban life. It is important and exhibited in certain planes (e.g. politics, area of culture). It is marginalised or even camouflaged on others. The city is creating new identities, but is also keeping, reproducing or even strengthening the old ones. Ethnicity is dynamic and becoming relativised – it depends on the person's situation, their needs in the urban environment. Basically, however, a city is a place in which there is no ethnicity. In this, among others, the specificity of an urban

65 A dish (or maybe rather their entire series) prepared on the basis of cooked green bananas.

66 A type of wheat flour flatbread. Eaten with an egg, vegetables or meat.

life is seen. The city in the imagination of its inhabitants is constructed on the principle of opposition to the traditional world. Unlike the province, the city is modern, cosmopolitan and the culture of western origin is preserved there. From the point of view of African cultural traditions, it is a completely foreign reality. This all becomes irrelevant, if this is the universal vision of the city and its culture.

The recent war has accelerated the process of detribalisation – disintegration of traditional institutions of social life. These, in majority, are but a memory now. At the same, however, it created new, broader identifications. It is based on them that the residents of the South organise their life, but also fight a fierce battle for the influence in the region. They are acquiring a new, real face in the urban environment. On the example of Juba it is possible to observe how ethnicity is changing, becoming, among other things, a tool of political mobilisation.

Ethnicity in Juba is, above all, a tool for obtaining various benefits: financial assistance, accommodation, employment or protection in the face of threat. Finally, it provides a sense of comfort towards life in an ethnically strongly diversified community. The Dinka is a group of the strongest identity. This is nothing strange. For at least half a century they have dominated in the region, running the resistance movement against Khartoum. The recent war became an incentive for integration for them, but also resulted in the extension of their ideology of power in post-war Sudan. It is of an absolutist and chauvinistic nature and contains messianic elements (which will be discussed later). Juba, I think, is an interesting example of the development of identity of this group. Until recently, the Dinka, as other communities in the Sudan's South, did not have a single shared identity. They felt loyal, above all, to family and clan structures. Today, however, this situation seems to be changing rapidly. After the years of war, we are dealing with Dinka nationalism at the threshold of independence of South Sudan,. Should this group be treated as a nation? I think that at the moment there is no clear answer to this. However, there is no doubt that, in the case of this group, this process has recently suddenly accelerated. Similarly, however, other ethnic groups have also awakened. The driving force of their activity is fear against further marginalisation, this time caused by the dominance of the Dinka. Therefore, the situation is serious. Let us hope this will not end as it did in the early 1980s – with the outbreak of another civil conflict.

Contrary to what might be expected, the intergroup relationships do not belong to antagonistic ones. People are strongly convinced about the need to suspend disputes and co-exist. That is how life in the city is perceived. The tool to preserve the urban social order is the strategy of "concealing" one's ethnicity. This is the evidence of its vitality, and not decay. Moreover, it constitutes a manifestation of the transformative activity of the city. Ethnicity in South Sudanese conditions cannot be completely hidden. In this respect, language is also

important. English language, once used in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, works perfectly well as a neutral communication system. It does not evoke negative associations, on the contrary, it is ideal for many tasks: to "conceal ethnicity" or manifest a political reorientation of South Sudan. The usefulness of this language for transnational contacts is also worth mentioning.

New, broader identifications are being created in the city. Their bond in first order is that of wartime wandering. The exile results in fundamental cultural transformations. They are visible from the perspective of both communities, the original and hosting one. Migration forms a new culture in a person. Georg Klute and Hans Peter Hahn, editors of *Cultures of Migration: African Perspectives* rightly postulate to see this phenomenon this way – as a dynamic process of creating culture, which are contextualised in the societies of origin as well as in the host societies (Hahn and Klute 2005: 16). One of its symptoms is the acquisition by migrants of elements of typically urban culture. The centres of such transformations are refugee camps. The germs of urbanism are there: a characteristic way of spending free time, social relationships, economy (Agier 2001). Refugeeship is currently of great importance for the rapid pace of urbanisation in Africa. On the one hand the combination of these two, extremely important phenomena, makes the process of former refugees' repatriation difficult. On the other hand, it has the same significance for the functioning of such centres as Juba.

Figure 1. A Mondari folk (Juba 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 2. Dinka (Omdurman 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 3. A Nuer from fish market in Omdurman (Omdurman 2010, M. Kurcz).

Figure 4. A Dinka boy presenting his tribal marks (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 5. A wresting match (Khartoum 2020, M. Kurcz).

Figure 6. A citizen of Northern Sudan (Omdurman 2008, M. Kurcz).

Figure 7. A trader from Northern Sudan (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Figure 8. A pastor of Dinka Episcopal Church (Juba 2007, M. Kurcz).

Religion in the Modern City

The city *in toto,* due to the phenomena accompanying it, is an area of sudden transformations in the sphere of religiousness. Alongside urbanisation, the religious reality, or more broadly ideological, is undergoing a far reaching change. This is a consequence of many factors: concentration and the growth of the population, social diversification, migration, intercultural contact, religious conversion, education, or generally the emergence of a wide spectrum of other innovations (Gutkind 1974: 121). Transformations of religiousness in the urban environment are of an ambivalent nature. On the one hand, the traditional forms of religiousness are weakened by means of depersonalisation of interpersonal relationships, social diversification, secularism or promotion of non-conformist attitudes. On the other hand, however, the city is generating new religious phenomena, which are perfectly in concert with an urban lifestyle. Urbanised centres are not only "temples of consumption," but also places of ardent religiousness, unique in its type. The city is a specific incubator of new, hybrid or otherwise "creolised" religiousness, expressing an entire spectrum of reactions at the dynamically changing world, from the total negation of modernity to the complete participation in it.

Christianity and Urbanisation in Africa

Since the beginning of colonialism, the African city has been an area of impetuous development of various religious movements: from traditional to Christian and Muslim, although at the beginning the effort of missionary groups focused above all on rural communities. In many African cities a progressing dialogue occurred between Christianity and tribal religions (Freund 2007: 89, Shorter 2001: 37). Its outcome turned out to be numerous independent, indigenously African "Churches,"[67] being a contamination of tribal and Christian beliefs. The

67 These are both the so-called African independent churches (also referred to as the African-initiated or Zionist churches) – they stay totally separately from the American and European communities, they often constitute contamination of tribal and Christian beliefs, and the African churches referred to as the Ethiopian churches as well, which, although they keep a doctrinal cohesion with Christian communities from outside the continent, but function in total institutional independence from them (Vansina 2003: 640, Anderson 2001). For details, see for example: Turner H.W. (1967) *History of an African Independent Church*, Clarendon Press, Vol. 1 and 2).

majority, like the Kimbanguists in Congo, were of an anti-system nature, they questioned European imperialism and its achievements. Their popularity did not weaken throughout the entire twentieth century. New ones are still emerging at the beginning of the new century,– and what is extremely important they are not subject to social ostracism any more, some of them have even succeeded in getting a status of official churches. Many managed to attract the followers from among broader masses of the society, like, for example, the Aladura movement in West Africa. These are, above all, decisively city movements, linking together the lowest social groups, all disappointed or simply uncertain of life in a new environment (Gutkind 1974: 130). Only few have encountered problems on the part of the post-colonial authorities (e.g. the Jehovah's Witnesses).[68] In my feeling, these various "independent" religious communities constitute, to some extent, a measure of a specific "bourgeois" variety of Black Africa's Christianity.

Islam took advantage of the initial weakness of Christianity in many urban centres. In such cities like Ibadan or Lagos, it managed to acquire the status of a "traditionally urban" or "people's" denomination. This has attracted (and is attracting) crowds of faithful from among the migrants to the city. However, in many cases the expansion of Islam in the urban environment has paved the way for Christianity. It happened so on the eve of the independence era together with a wider influx of the rural population to the cities. East Africa was one of such areas. After decolonisation new migrants to the cities strengthened the dominance of Christianity, thus bringing about the marginalisation of Muslim residents (Freund 2007: 89). Since the 1950s, in entire Africa south of Sahara, an expansion of Christianity in rural areas has started, and the centre of the religion is moving from the province to the city (Shorter 2001: 37).

The rapid development of Christianity (but also Islam) in cities is a consequence of its strong links with the urbanisation processes in the post-colonial period. As the importance of the cities increases, so does the position of Christian churches. What is extremely important, in the post-colonial period they had to demonstrate the activity not seen elsewhere. Reason: the crisis of the African state. Christianity takes up the tasks that have not been its domain in Europe for a long time, and even in Africa were abandoned at the end of the colonialism era (Gifford 1998: 328). The churches, above all, are associated with humanitarian work, are the source of a real support for the masses of migrants coming

68 Recently, in South Sudan this community has encountered various insults from the authorities, including a temporary ban. Reason: refusal of its members to participate in the latest presidential elections and in the independence referendum.

into the cities. Health service, education or even employment are just a few of numerous forms of the Churches' activities in African cities. Commonly, for the migrants to the city, they become one of the adaptation strategies, enabling "smooth" access to the urban culture – supporting, at the same time, in coping with negative phenomena such as HIV/AIDS or alcoholism (Shorter 2001: 37). Moreover, Christianity has commonly been interpreted as an additional plane of identification – of social solidarity, eliminating traditional divisions (Iliffe 2005: 265). For the authorities, and ordinary citizens alike, religion has become a specific counterbalance for the "tribalism," somehow making its neutralisation possible. And so: the parish seat has become a symbolic and literal centre around which life in the city started to focus. The urbanisation processes have made Christianity an extremely attractive ideology because of another reason as well. The Africans migrating to cities wanted to be "modern" or, as Jim Ferguson has put it, "cosmopolitan" (Freund 2007: 146). Christianity has become a natural "measure" to attain this intention. It is integrally connected with the culture of the West. Simply: in the conditions of an African city, Christianity is a universal measure of urbanism, typical of the urban lifestyle. It strongly contributes to the consolidation of the African bourgeoisie. This has been all the more possible since religion is becoming fully localised (indigenous African denominations have emerged – commonly, regardless of the community, the clergy and liturgy undergo Africanisation). Christianity is becoming the religion of Africa, but in fact it is usually some version of native religion, at most within some Christian motifs and general framework.

Muslims of Juba. Strengthening Group Solidarity in Juba

A new political situation did not fail, of course, to influence an Arab diaspora (generally people coming from Northern Sudan) in the city. From a relatively large group of citizens, the well-established and most influential residents stayed. Others, being afraid of insults, chose immigration to Khartoum, but even those who stayed decided to send their families North. What is interesting, new migrants started coming to the city as the situation continued to stabilise. It is a generation of young entrepreneurs, mainly from the Khartoum agglomeration. They follow the beaten track of their predecessors. They often rent their former premises or act as partners. Just like one Copt from Khartoum who moved to the city in 2005 to support his friend in business, a well-established Arab from Kosti. They both run a citrus juice bar in the city centre. The Copt decided to stay in the city for good. Others, however, mostly travelled between Juba and Khartoum, and had no plans to settle more permanently in the South.

Although the years of glory of the Arab minority are rather over, it still plays a significant role in the functioning of the city. It owns, as I have informed, a considerable percentage of food-serving points, particularly those located on markets (especially *Konyo-Konyo* and *Juba Town*) and in the city centre. They are also owners of the majority of shops and warehouses there – offering a wide assortment of goods and services. Their professional and social life concentrates within this area. The city's main mosques are located near the markets. There, after Friday prayers, meetings and shared meals of the local Muslims take place. These places, as I have informed earlier, are naturally connected with the followers of Islam.

The settled Muslims from the North are "borderland people." To be more specific: this is a small group, met probably at any political borderland, which feels the affiliation only with the state, the metropolis. At the same time they alienate themselves from other residents of the borderland, whose ethnic affiliations are less clear. This has a considerable impact on their identity, culture or relation to the religion. The resident Arabs consider themselves the pioneers of civilisation – "sowers" of the high-class culture on these lands, as well as true initiators of the local economic life or local urbanism. They treat themselves as the missionaries of Islam (though they do not belong to particularly religious). Just like their Arab ancestors in the Middle Ages, they came to live among the pagans. In their eyes they constitute a sort of bridge between one and the other part of the country, between civilisation and barbarism, order and chaos. In their eyes they have been abandoned by their fellow countrymen and own state, their life is extremely difficult – variable, full of hazards and misery. Perhaps, this is why it is the Arabs who strongly emphasise their identity and faith with costume and customs. The native citizens of Northern Sudan wear white *jalabiyyas*, impressive turbans (or equally characteristic zucchetto-type caps) as well as, mandatorily, a knife attached to the left arm (just in case). Their costume is, at the same time, a symbol of their origin and culture (Figure 6). That is why by the locals Arabs are called"Jalaba" – the term, as I have already written, coined on the basis of a costume characteristic for them. It is for them, above all, that small cafes are open, serving tea, coffee and water pipes, or second category restaurants having dishes of broad bean in their menus – the so-called *ful* – a national delicacy of the Sudanese from the North. These are transplants from their native world. For a long time the conservatism and traditionalism have been permanently desired values. On the one hand they were manifestations of aspirations, on the other, of a person's self-presentation, They moved closer to the ideal. In Sudan, a new society emerged together with Islamisation and Arabisation. This was, however, to a large extent, a creation with of an imaginary, fragmented and contact in nature (Makris 2000: 28). A decisive

majority of the society pretended various identities and stayed in a client relation to the vaguely defined privileged class: Arabs, Nubians, followers of Islam. Each of the communities adapted the Arabicness or Islam in their own way, in fact creating totally new cultures at the same time, being a compromise, but also a form of opposition, like in the case of the *zaar* cult, extremely popular among the migrants to the city till the present day. That is why the identity, and the prestige that follows, were not based on origin, race or even religion, but on specific institutions of culture, such as language, religious practices or social norms. The process was carried out in a selective manner. Just as Frederik Barth (1969) observed, some differences were taken into account, and others were not. All depended on what was profitable or important for a given community at a given moment. Such institutions as: the language, forms of buildings and "unique" moral values have become the symbols of identity. They were reactions to a contact ("acculturation") and were of an oppositional nature – extreme. Hence, one of the most important elements of the Muslim and Arab identity in Sudan is, till the present day, the circumcision of female genitals, locally referred to as the "pharaonic circumcision."

The Arabs are an influential and wealthy group. Apart from the aforementioned capital, they have connections in trade and politics, and above all, invaluable experience for years doing business in this territory. Their shops, as I have had an opportunity to see myself several times, are the best places to discuss or finalise business.

More strongly than other urban communities, the followers of Islam support themselves, offering hospitality, sub-renting commercial space, transferring clients or, finally, using deferred forms of payment. This is the main strategy of their successful existence in the city – on the area decisively hostile for them now. Their solidarity is the compensation of the lost position.

Muslims of Juba are a diversified community and at least on two levels: political and racial. The division into "white" and "black" Muslims is particularly visible. The first category refers to native Muslims, stemming from the North, usually calling themselves Arabs. While the other are representatives of southern" societies, mostly from Equatoria, who decided for a religious conversion relatively not so long ago, particularly during the latest war. Then all sorts of encouragements waited for the converts, like financial assistance or simply guarantees of security. What is interesting, the sign of their conversion to Islam is a crescent-shaped birthmark burned on the buttock (perhaps so that the man could no longer re-convert). The situation of such people is difficult. The apostates are treated with equal distrust by the Arabs as the local Christians. They live on the margins of society as clients of "true" Muslims. I used to meet them on city markets,

where they were hired to work in shops belonging to the Arabs. Conversion or reidentification never determined in Sudan the acquisition of a full status. A man could call himself an Arab, Nubian, or simply a Muslim, but others did not stop calling him names meaning a lower status. As Wendy James noted (2006: 197), the ethnic categories in Sudan, such as Arab, Baqqara and Funji have always been extremely relative. They did not place a person permanently on the map of social hierarchies, but changed due to particular needs and local networks of interpersonal connections. Ethnic affiliation expressed the identity aspiration of a person or an entire group rather than being a reflection of the facts.

The other line of division is politics. According to this key, the Islamic diaspora is divided into well-established traders, often staying in the city for several generations and a "political" staff, seconded to the city from Khartoum. They are all sort of employees of administration, uniformed employees, teachers and "clerics." Their task is to represent the interests of Khartoum. Both groups are distrustful of each other – simply put: they do not like each other much. The Arabs – the traders blamed the Arabs-politicians for involving them in their own games. They did not want to do anything with them, being afraid they may become a source of trouble. Events from several years ago were vivid in their mind when the Vice-President of Sudan John Garang died tragically. Then a sudden escalation of violence against Muslims took place. During several days of riots most of the premises belonging to Arabs burned. Many of them were brutally murdered by the furious mob. Khartoum did nothing to save those people from the uncontrolled aggression of the crowd. Unrests of that type are not particularly frequent (smaller or larger ones happen regularly at the time of the anniversary of Garang's death) – nevertheless for all Muslims in the city it is clear that the situation is far from stable, is strictly dependent on the current affairs between the North and the South. They, like some sort of a barometer, affects their lives. Each growth of tensions between the two parts of the country resulted in the profusion of hatred on the streets of Juba. This way the lawful citizens of this area manifested their strong will – independence from the centre. Thus the Muslims' suspicion towards people delegated here by the authorities is not surprising. This phenomenon may be also looked at from the perspective of a specific adjustment to the current political situation. The settled Muslims understand that their well-being or even physical safety in this area will depend on the distance from Khartoum. They perceive their presence in the city as purely economic (Figure 7). Thus in a sense they emphasise their "homeliness," "indigenousness." Each of the said groups is oriented around their own mosque. For the "merchants" the cultural and religious centre is the so-called "old mosque" – also called the "merchants." The seat of the others is the largest mosque in the city, the

so-called “politicians.” Both are located in the very city centre – on the opposite sides of the market.

The role of Islam, as could be expected, has clearly weakened. The recent dissenters returned back to the church being afraid of the ostracism of neighbours or a boss at work. Muslim names are also replaced with Christian ones. From the assurances of the interview partners it was evident also that there are no mixed marriages – allegedly quite popular not so long ago. The followers of Islam do not flaunt their religious beliefs outside the area of the centre and the market. It may be said that they have withdrawn to their “natural enclaves.” Outside those places they are practically invisible. Even the muezzin’s calls seem now to be more toned down and quieter than in other parts of Sudan. It is thanks to this basically informal arrangement that they enjoy peace in the city and the interreligious relationships are not of the antagonistic type.

Christianity under Attack. Situation of Tribal Beliefs

South Sudan belongs to the regions of Africa where Christianity has been developing particularly dynamically in the last half-century. The history in Christianity in South Sudan, even as for the African standards, is rather short. This religion in fact developed within this area only after the emergence of the British and Egyptian Sudan, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was then when the progressing Islamisation of Southern provinces was managed to be halted – in return the area opened its doors to Christian missions (Catholic, Anglican or Presbyterian), though Christianity, just like Islamisation earlier, did not take a particularly dynamic nature even then. Despite a political stability and various types of support from colonial authorities, Christianity met with a moderate interest of the local population. The most unfriendly towards the new faith were cattle breeders, such as the Dinks or Neurs. By the end of the colonial era, most of the residents stuck to traditional beliefs, at most being only under a bit formal influence of Christianity. The situation changed drastically at the threshold of Sudan’s independence. Between 1956 and 1964, from gaining independence to the outbreak of the first civil war, the local population made a mass conversion. Reason: The dominance of the Muslim North, and in particular brutal and “military” Islamisation and Arabisation of this nook of Africa. In the period after 1956, Christianity in Southern provinces of Sudan united the culturally and ethnically diversified society in the fight against an oppressive central authority (Baur 2005: 286, Iliffe 2005: 266). Christianity, regardless of denomination, played a significant role in the fight for the rights of the South’s population, among others participated in the formation of “*Anja Nja*” in 1964 – in

the year of the first resistance movement against Khartoum, or took an active part in peace negotiations in Addis Ababa ending the first civil war. When the war returned to this area for the second time, the Christian clergy demonstrated steadfast solidarity with the local black population, incessantly bringing it assistance and hope. That is why it should be no surprise that Christianity left the last war strengthened and unquestionably at the moment holds the rank of the official religion of this part of Africa. For the residents of Juba and the entire black South, religious affiliation most clearly demonstrates the group membership and political orientation at the same time. The example flows from the highest state officials, with the vice-president in the forefront. They all exemplarily emphasise their religiousness. Christianity in this area has undergone polarisation, which means: it is used to build the sense of collective unity, but also to legitimise the post-war political arrangements. It was for this reason, during Sunday services, that churches burst at the seams. Every Sunday the Catholic Church of St. Joseph's or St. Theresa Cathedral are approached by luxury off-road vehicles, from which, together with numerous bodyguards, the entire political elite of the South get out. The attractiveness of the city's cathedral is, above all, connected with the potential presence of the first person in the state, President Salva Kiira. The church often becomes a place of the leader's fiery speeches, absolutely always rewarded with thunderous applause. Each time they later become a source of discussion, either on the pages of the local press ort among the city's common folk. They comment on the current affairs of the state on their bases. There is a strict correlation between the turn-up during Sunday services at saint Theresa Cathedral and particularly exciting moments in South Sudanese politics. In a sense, the church is a mouthpiece for the authorities to communicate with the citizens.

Religious membership is of fundamental importance for the divisions and social relationships. It basically affects the blurring of ethnic divisions and the establishment of new, macro-identifications: Catholics, Protestants or Muslims. For the ingenious population, Christianity is the most important in this respect. Energetic pastoral activity in the city is carried out by many Christian churches, not all are registered in official records (e.g. Evangelical Covenant Church of Sudan). The largest ones are associated in the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). It includes: the Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church of the Sudan, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan, the African Inland Church, the Sudan Pentecostal Church and, according to some sources, also the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church and the Sudanese Church of Jesus.

Christianity, as I have already mentioned, only strengthened during the war. Contrary to traditional beliefs, its structures did not get disintegrated. On the

contrary, the religion launched an offensive – started developing rapidly, reaching broad masses of the society. They generally got convinced to Christianity, for example at the places of relocation, where Christian churches were associated with humanitarian aid. This is one of the main reasons for the mass conversion of the South Sudanese to Christianity. The Church considerably helped people in exile, not only providing the necessities, but also organising elementary education, vocational courses, provided financial help or offered employment (Nikkel 2001: 235–237).

On the other hand the religion is growing in strength due to its steadfast activity in the war time, on the other hand as a result of decomposition of traditional institutions. These in turn broke down as a result of warfare, disintegration of local communities, emigration, or the physical elimination of family and tribal leaders (chiefs, sorcerers, prophets, etc.). In short: the war finally sealed the fate of the old tribal traditions. It made them totally irreproducible now. This does not mean, however, that "small traditions" have ceased to be important or have undergone total eradication. In the urban environment former traditions and beliefs turn out to be extremely useful for the entire population as they explain all the negative phenomena a person has to cope with in an everyday life in a satisfactory manner (Gutkind 1974: 128). For example: herbal medicine, or generally traditional medicine, compensates for the shortages of the city health care, above all in the treatment of common "urban" ailments such as AIDS/HIV or malaria. What is interesting, globalisation lets itself be known also in this respect. In the city, in first order, healers from abroad are in high demand: from Tanzania, Kenya or even far-away Nigeria. They are considered more competent than the so-called Fellata[69] – known in in all of Sudan from times immemorial for popular medicine (including witchcraft). These people are now paying the price for a decrease in the authority of the Muslim culture in this region. In the city one can also hear suspicions of black magic – it is used to explain all negative phenomena, such as: unemployment, homelessness, or natural disasters. I have already written how the city residents explain the pandemonium of fires in the city. In the common imagination, they are the result of scheming of a sorcerer being at the foreigners' service. A long time ago, anthropologists (e.g. Marwick 1965, Mitchell 1956) already noticed that belief in witchcraft and black magic was closely connected with conflicts and tensions in social relations. Witchcraft

69 They are generally migrants from western Africa who settled (and are still settling) in Sudan, while on their pilgrimage to Mecca. They make up a considerable and separated group marked by a lowered status.

in Africa is used, among others, to smear rivals, a way to fight for leadership. In rivalry, a sinister power is generally under the control of a competitor, and it is he who is accused of any misfortune (Douglas 2004: 150) Such structures existed in traditional social models, but they can be seen today as well. Urbanisation or globalisation intensify competition in the field of the economy or social systems, thus are also responsible for the increase of tensions within the urban society (Gutkind 1974: 129,130, Middleton and Winter 2004).[70] In such communities witchcraft continues to flourish. The vitality of these traditions in the city should also be associated with the closeness of the state border. It is there that intensive contacts take place, but also rivalry between individual communities. Not so much cultural but economic differences now become its foundation. Witchcraft is very often helpful in the perception of inequality between the inhabitants of both sides of the border. This phenomenon is clear in the context of Juba, but also in the context of other contemporary African borderlands, such as Niger and Nigeria (Pawlik 2000: 201–203).

Christianity as a Factor Supporting the Struggle with Everyday Life

The activity of the Christian Churches in such areas such as health service, education and social care has influenced the popularity of this ideology, as well as the way it is perceived in this area. Assistance to migrants is provided by relatives or fellow tribesmen. It may equally well come from religious groups. Today, it is clear for everybody that the Churches are the only of the "active" institutions that can in a real way contribute to the improvement of people's life condition. This is particularly visible in the initial period of a person's stay in the city. Many respondents found a job or accommodation thanks to the help of a clerical friend. For a migrant to the city, the institution of the Church is the link between a village (or a camp) and a city – the old and new realities. After all, it is, to a large extent a universal organisation, operating everywhere in more or less the same way. Therefore, it constitutes a natural source of support – one of the first places to go for help. Later the bonds between the resident and the church do not weaken, they only change their character a bit.

The clergy, regardless of skin colour, is an active group in the urban hierarchy, having an enormous influence on the reality. At the same time, in a common

70 In Poland the subject of witchcraft in contemporary Africa was dealt with, among others, by: J. Pawlik (2000).

imagination, they are neither greedy or corrupted –and have a mission to serve people with various help. A city resident appeared at the vicarage more often with a problem of a prosaic nature than the one connected with their faith. What is interesting, it is met with a mixed acceptance of the clergy themselves. The clergy, as in Europe, see their mission much more broadly, and at any rate would like not only to play humanitarian roles.

In the event of modern Juba, Christianity is an additional element strengthening the urban identity. A native resident of the city is an ardent Christian who will not miss any Sunday service and actively participates in the life of their parish. This is something obvious to everyone. In fact, Christianity is manifested wherever it is possible: in costume or external decorations of the house. This is a proof visible for every one of the existence of a trans-social bond, but also of a culture thanks to which, people can feel united in a highly diversified environment. Perhaps this is why Christianity, at least in the city, is minimally associated with tribalism, although sometimes one can get an impression that ethnicity is connected with the variety of the Christian faith This is rather the outcome of the geographical division of an area of influence at colonial times between Catholic and Anglican missions. And so: the tribes from Eastern Equatoria usually belong to the Catholic church, while the citizens of the western part of the state will rather be protestants.[71] In practice this means, however, that one community is divided into several Christian churches. In fact, only the Anglicans refer to traditional bonds, associating people in separate ethnic sub-churches (e.g. within the Episcopal Church). This boils down, in fact, to the celebration of masses in the ethnic language by a priest, also coming from that community (Figure 8). Hence they compete with Catholics, open in turn for all. Nevertheless, in Catholic churches masses are also celebrated in the most numerous ethnic languages in the city. This fact, however, does not meet with too much enthusiasm of the representatives of those folks. The rank of the temple, or the way to travel to get to it is much more important. It basically does not matter which community a person belongs to. In my opinion, this is the result of the reinterpretation of Christianity as a power which neutralises ethnicity. This is

71 According to the imperial thought "divide and rule," the authorities of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan divided the southern provinces among three Christian communities: the western part of the Upper Nile Province (Rumbek) and western Bahr el Ghazal were allocated to Catholics (Combonis), Equatoria to Anglicans, and the western part of Upper Nile to American Presbyterians. In this way each of the communities could have a full monopoly on "its" territory for the missionary work, not being afraid of any competition at the same time (Baur 2005: 286).

yet another manner to "hide" ethnicity – introducing an urban culture into the world at the same time. The religion creates an illusion of the total compatibility of a person with an urban life style.

Christianity is the foundation of an urban culture. This is a complex system guiding various aspects of life. Choirs, parish councils, groups of various support operating under the auspices of the Church in a way set the frameworks of local urbanism. The Church is a super-organisation, being one of the foundations of social relations, with the maintained hierarchy: clergy, leaders of associations or work groups (e.g. Mother's Union), lay liturgical staff or crowds of employees associated with the Church's assistance activity. This is not without significance for urban social relations characterised by a complex structure. This is finally a plane for the existence of various types of urban associations and voluntary unions, particularly connected with a female community. One can also try stating, after Ryszard Vorbrich (2012), that Christian churches are the seedbed for the civic society.

The role of women in the church should not escape our attention. They belong to the most religiously ardent ones. It is they who fill up churches with children at the time of a Sunday service. (Men go to church irregularly). Also, through various associations, they are strongly involved in parish life. This all, in my opinion, is the evidence of the emancipation of local women, for which, among others, Christianity gives them an opportunity. A religion gives a Juba female resident an opportunity for self-fulfilment – at the same time it compensates for a low, from the point of view of traditional arrangement, position. On this plane we may talk about a specific religious leadership. Women clearly have priority in the field of practicing Christianity, both on the level of the family and the local community alike. Nearly every woman looks after the religiousness of her family. She feels personally responsible for it. That is why she exemplarily goes with children to church. She often organises home prayers or religious talks in which neighbours participate. Thanks to her religious holidays are celebrated at home. She prepares a holiday meal or decorates the farmstead with religious symbols. This may be explained by the specific continuity of the woman's role in traditional arrangements. However, this is not all. In the urban environment, in the religious life the woman goes a step further. She acts, as we know, equally intensively at the parish level: she looks after the church, helps during the liturgy, participates in pastoral activities or attends the choir rehearsals. The importance of Christianity within the city helps in being involved in religious life. Religion becomes a part of the urban identity, a factor differentiating a city resident. Hence their activity in the religious field meets with general understanding and approval. The phenomenon applies to all Christian denominations present in the

city. Finally, Christianity is also a source of urban entertainment – the greatest holidays of the religious calendar, such as Easter or Christmas, are at the same time the greatest city holidays. Christian accents even accompany apparently lay and private events, for example birthday parties. I had an opportunity to participate in one such event in Amarat quarter. And so: it was started with a prayer conducted by the head of the family, together with a clergyman deliberately invited for the event. The majority of songs were also religious, the most noticeable Christian element was a Christmas tree, being the main decorative element of the reception (let me only add that it all happened in September).

"Born-Again Christians"

The action of Christianity in the urban environment is also manifested in a sudden inflow of "new" religious ideas. In the 1980s, "the new Christianity," associated above all with the North American Pentecostal churches, reached Africa. The popularity of those communities was growing quickly. At the end of the 1990s, there were nearly as many members of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA) as Catholics (Nugent 2004: 375). The emergence of those churches in Africa should be associated with globalisation. Together with the inflow of neoliberal economism, new religious ideas also started spreading, and what is extremely characteristic, mostly of Western origin. Unlike years ago, the diffusion of the new culture has not led to the revitalisation of traditional institutions (as in Nigerian Godianism or Ghanaian Afrikania). It has not become a source of contestation either – as years earlier in the event of the Pentecostal communities in South Africa (Hann 2000: 166).[72] The Africans' reaction to modern globalisation is a progressing interest in "exotic religions," mostly of North American origin. Sources of fascination are to be sought in the Africans' reaction to the contemporary globalisation processes. New religious communities offer a possibility to "get connected" to a broader global system (Coleman 2000: 4–6, Gifford 1998: 321, Anderson 2001). In the world we can basically distinguish two tendencies in religious reactions to globalisation. The first is the formation of revitalistic, particulate movements: religious fundamentalisms. The other consists in the crystallisation of broader, transnational formations – the so-called "global theologies." Unlike the former, they take up the eschatological issues, of the beginnings and participation in the global

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72 In Polish literature see: Kaczyński G.J. *Bunt i religia w Afryce Czarnej*, Wrocław: Ossolineum 1979.

oecumene, especially the issue of cultural and social identity (Coleman 2000: 5; Robertson 1989, after Beyer 2005: 69). It is this variant we deal with in Juba right now. "The new denominations" enhance the reception of Christianity as a transnational ideology – combining all in one global oecumene. In doing so, they meet the expectations of contemporary Africans who want to compensate for their civilisational backwardness halfway – they constitute a clear link between the First and the Third World.

Contemporary Juba is a place of dynamic proselytism of new Christian movements. On the one hand they take advantage of liberalisation of life in the region, on the other they make use of some sort of "religious hunger" in the people coming into the city. The previous period was marked, as I have mentioned, with the disintegration of the traditional culture, its eradication in the literal and metaphorical sense. The war, in a special way, brought about the disintegration of religion in its traditional form. At the same time during the last war the Sudanese were intensively acculturated (refugees and internally displaced persons, in particular) by various religious ideas (Agier 2001). As it has been said earlier, the period was characterised by progressing Christianisation. Regardless of the level of absorption of new ideas, for the majority they have become comprehensible and very attractive. Finally, the present situation in the city is important, for many equally difficult as at the times of the war. Sudden social and economic transformations give rise to a sense of alienation, fear or bitterness. For these reasons, among other things, South Sudan is, at the moment, an ideal place for new churches and sects. They expand together with consumer goods from nearby Uganda and Kenya. Some, like, for example, "the United Church of Christ," appeared in the city together with the returnees. While the local population in general is somewhat neutral towards them, they evoke strong dissatisfaction among the established Churches – Catholics or Anglicans. Their fears are fully understandable. New Churches gain supporters. As in other African cities, "Born-Again Christian" movements enjoy the greatest popularity. In literature they are referred to as the Pentecostal or Charismatic churches or, to differentiate from the old-time denominations: "Newer Pentecostal Churches." In Juba, they are usually generally called" "Born-Again Christians," less frequently with particular names (e.g. "Full Gospel Church").

These are basically new phenomena which have gained enormous popularity in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last two decades, and particularly in rural areas (Gifford 1998: 334, Anderson 2001: 18,167). They have been developing from small, local communities to huge organisations like the Niger's "Deeper Life Church," Zimbabwe's "Assemblies of God African" or "Grace Bible Church" from the South Africa, to list just a few. Their leaders are basically young charismatic,

both men and women alike, who have gained recognition due to their preaching and leadership skills and good education – not necessarily in theology (Anderson 2001: 19). This is a series of more or less independent communities deriving formally from the broadly understood Pentecostal movement. In fact, however, that are to be looked at as an African variety of this global phenomenon, and not as its true copy (Anderson 2001: 18). The extreme valorisation of the Holy Spirit in faith and in practice is common. Preaching the need for conversion and rebaptism is also similar.

The African Pentecostals decisively oppose the relics of traditional beliefs, like, for example, the cult of ancestors (what is interesting, in the majority with the exclusion of polygamy) or even local practices in the Christian liturgy. However, they are not distant from the African culture in everything.

New Churches meet the African concept of unhappiness half way, identifying it with the operation of evil powers, witchcraft in particular. They win the battle for the soul of local Christians by helping them in the fight against witchcraft (in the case of the Pentecostals: being possessed by demons). As we know, for the Africans this phenomenon is basically responsible for all evil (Nugent 2004: 375).

The cult is far from being simple. A lot of attention is paid to emotionality, spontaneity and communality of religious experiences. A notion of “trance,” “seeing,” or “possession” appears – thus in fact they have a lot in common with the independent African Churches. Just like them they accept miracles, but miracles are considered as a direct result of divine grace, and not of any instrument. Miraculous properties are ascribed to collective prayer. It allows the state of the supreme exaltation, or as you will, miraculous purification to be achieved. In this state a person losses consciousness and has no control of what is happening with them. A believer goes into a trance which is considered proof of divine integration. More specifically: following the Pentecostal example they identify themselves with the Holy Spirit. And thanks to this divine inspiration a person acquires the gift of understanding, clairvoyance or purification.

In many aspects, these movements are characterised by puritanism, understood as getting rid of any weaknesses such as addiction (alcohol, tobacco, etc.) and instead developing such features as: honesty, discipline or diligence. Finally, they are extremely Westernised movements – they use English or French in liturgy. Western music is also used in the liturgy. That is why, among others, they are considered sophisticated and cosmopolitan (Gifford 1998: 334, Anderson 2001: 19–20). Their expansion, as I have already mentioned, should be connected with spontaneous globalisation, including directly with the activities of non-governmental organisations, the expansion of Western culture, the diffusion of religious literature, or the missionary journeys of charismatic preachers

(Gifford 1998: 335). The truths proclaimed – including, above all, I believe, the so-called "theology of success" – a theological attitude based on the conviction that person's material and personal success is the God's will – as a consequence it should become the fundamental goal of everyone are also important. Thus, as Gifford noted (1998: 335), these movements resemble the expansion of evangelicalism in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s – that is in the period of sustained economic growth in that country.

In a similar way, Africa today is at the stage of dynamic development – that is: it offers a person, particularly the one living in the city, a nearly unlimited opportunity, only if they prove to be entrepreneurial.[73] That is why, in my opinion, religiousness in this version is so successful in modern Africa, taking away the faithful from both traditional "independent" and "orthodox" churches. The fact of popularity of Born-Again Christians in urbanised centres should also be no surprise. These are moral renewal movement, people's movement, condemning the sins of ordinary people and of the authority alike. Their theology, with the emphasis on economic factors, corresponds more to the realities of the urban life. A person finds truths in it, precious in the urban environment: "No Pain, no Gain" or "Do Your Best, God will Do the Rest." That is why these slogans decorate, as I have mentioned earlier, urban transport vehicles. Success is proposed (in a material sense to a large extent), attained by means of individual entrepreneurship and hard work. Broadly understood success is a virtue, while poverty – a sin. A person of success should actively compete in social life, in the spirit of western democratic ideas. Apart from professional activity, its expression is manifested in participation in various types of associations and in charitable activities.

New, global religious communities are phenomena characteristic for the entire modern world. They appear everywhere because of different reasons. And so: In Latin America we are dealing with new, liberal Christian communities as a result of social problems dating back as long as the colonial times. There, the incentive for the spreading of new religious ideas is the so-called liberation theology – that is, generally speaking, an ideology indicating a need for greater egalitarianism, inclusion into the society of people previously impoverished due to various reasons (Beyer 2005: 157). In Africa, similar religious phenomena in many ways are connected with totally different conditions and needs. There, economic factors are important, above all. New communities stimulate

73 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, most of the African countries were characterised by a high economic growth.

the possibilities to improve human fate. They propagate ideas that find practical application in daily life. What is more, they help understand the modern world, provide comfort in relation to the culture of consumerism, or life in an increasingly globalising world. That is why you can meet wealthy people who make up the emerging higher levels of the city's society in churches. For them the preached ideas are the most comprehensible. Thus, this is what differs these phenomena from the African Independent Churches of the last century, which recruited their followers from recent rural migrants, conservative and unwilling towards the outside world (Gutkind 1974: 126). Today, this still characteristic city group is now rather mostly composed of the followers of the Christian communities that settled a long time in the city. While new Christian churches and sects are becoming the measure of being rooted in the city. According to Signe Arnfred and Mats Utas (2007: 10), the sources of popularity of new religious groups are to be sought in the growing need for the alternative moral communities, being an alternative for "traditional" entities, such as a clan or a nation, or the social and economic patronage as well. In this sense new religious formations are to be treated as an element of deformalisation processes, an additional and fractional structure compensating the existence of a neoliberal order.

Millenaristic (Messianic) Ideas

The Christian tradition in the city, or within considerable areas of the South, is used also to cope with problems of a different type: the post-war trauma and some sort of temporariness of the current political situation in the region. In the context of these problems, millenaristic ideas are witness to a true boom.

Millenarism (messianism) are religious and social movements, promising paradise on Earth, the second coming of the Messiah and the beginning of the Millenial Kingdom of God (Nowa Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN 2004). Africa has experienced a lot of millenaristic movements in its history, for example the movements of: J. Chilembwe, E. Kamwana in Central Africa, or W. Wade Harris and G. Braid in West Africa (once the term "Millenarsim" was excessively associated with the majority of new religious movements in colonial and post-colonial Africa). The first movements of this type should be associated with the indigenisation of Christianity and the development of nationalism and anti-colonialism on the continent. Nowadays, movements of this type seem to be more the consequences of the post-colonial state crisis and an attempt to conceptualise the tragic experiences (Gifford 1998: 339, Anderson 2001).

The tragic fate of South Sudan in the last fifty years have left a profound impression on the collective psyche of its inhabitants. Indeed, these recent events have

significantly influenced the conceptualisation of history of this corner of Africa. Already during the war, analogies with the fate of the Israelites, contained in the Bible, were begun to be sought. Initially the core of the concept were single, yet charismatic, individuals: politicians, war lords or the clergy. With time, the idea also became clear for the masses. It helped, probably, to answer the questions bothering people, above all why it was they who had been so terribly experienced by fate. It is also worth mentioning here that numerous analogies in the culture of the local black peoples with ancient Israelites (circumcision, animal sacrifices, the concept of "impurity," special treatment of milk, extreme patriarchalism, levirate, to name but a few of the most common ones) were significant. Messianic ideas are the strongest among the Dinks, the community, as we know, of a very clear identity. Messianism has become a spiritual respite for them – at the same time a binder for a common identity of "the defeated people," bearing the stigma of war. The conceptualisation of the exile fate also serves the demanding policy of this community. This is some kind of ideology of power. Today, despite the war being over, the faith in messianism has not weakened at all. On the contrary, it is still alive because of the extremely difficult realities of life in post-war Sudan. It helps ordinary people treat the post-war trauma. It is an element of the omnipresent transitoriness. For others, it is an element of the ideology of power –the rule of souls, enjoying divine help, which is supposed to lead to a specific goal.

The Sudanese in exile in neighbouring African countries identify themselves with the history of the Israelites in Egypt. They treat their return to the mother country as an exit from Egypt. One of the interview partners mentioned that when coming back with a group of refugees from Ethiopia, he climbed the border mount – Jebel Buma. He hoisted the flag of South Sudan there and made an offering to God (sacrificed a cow) with others. All to commemorate the return of the Israelites to Canaan.

The analogies go much deeper. Some referred to the comparisons of Jews with the fate of particular tribes which, like them, were brought to this area by God himself. The conference of 1947, at which an idea of independent South Sudan appeared and then soon the establishment of the *Anja Nja* movement, was to have a prophetic dimension.

The analogies focusing on the figure of John Garang, the leader of the resistance movement and finally the Vice President of Sudan are extremely interesting. He is identified with John the Baptist. He made people start being patriots and joined the resistance movement on a massive scale. After Garang's death, in turn, references to Christ or Moses appeared. I could hear: God called him to himself when his mission had been fulfilled. Even the details of his tragic death are evidence of the validity of biblical references for people. Garang died

in a plane crash on his way back to Uganda (cf. the analogy to Moses' return to Canaan). His helicopter allegedly crashed into a mountain on the border with Uganda. And just like Moses, before his death, he had the opportunity to see his homeland.

Parallels to the contemporary situation can be found in the Book of Jeremiah, which deals, among others, with the reconstruction of Jerusalem. The new political situation in South Sudan is seen in the light of this biblical message.

The messianic vision of one's nation is nothing else than an old tradition rooted in Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. It accompanied various turning points in history, often tragic ones, becoming in fact an attempt of "lost societies" to reconcile with fate. It has always been associated with the hope for a better tomorrow. The present belonged to the oppressors, but the future belonged to the oppressed. In a non-European world, Messianism is also a special concept of salvation. It talks about the imminent arrival of the earthly, materialised time of happiness through the interference of supernatural forces. It is combined with the syncretisation of culture, especially in the sphere of religion (reinterpretation of the content coming from the great monotheistic religions), with the simultaneous revitalisation of some traditional values. In non-European areas, it often contributed to revolutionism and political awakening, played an integrating role, aroused ethnic or national awareness (Dictionary of Ethnology 1987). Basically it relied on the truths of the Revelation of St John the Divine, and in particular: the dualistic understanding of the world, the corruption of modern systems, their inevitable disintegration, the suffering of ordinary people, the divine intervention and the establishment of a new, perfect order (Gifford 1991: 339). Essentially, contemporary South-South Sudanese messianism also seems to be like this. This is an attempt to understand the tragic history of the country, both from the perspective of the entire community and single individuals. It is a part of the historical memory that permits not only the survival of individual communities, but also contributes to their consolidation as part of wider structures. Among others, British anthropologist Wendy James, mentioned earlier, wrote about it.

From the human perspective, millenarism creates an opportunity to restore balance, simultaneously in the situation of dramatic war experiences and the life in conditions of extreme poverty and an uncertain tomorrow. It is a manifestation of syncretisation of religious ideas – repeating after Chris Hann (2000: 175) – a "rationally contextual" reinterpretation of the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, the relics of traditional beliefs, like for example in the institution of tribal prophets or ethnocentrism, particularly strong among the pastoral peoples of this part of Africa are also visible here. This is also a phenomenon significant

in terms of consequences for local Christianity. Religion in this areas is relatively young. In any event, only now it is becoming indiginised; reinterpreted for the needs of local cultures. Its manifestation is, as I think, millenarism. It may will lead in the future to the creation of some kind of a separatist movement, gathering "losers" who will not be able to find themselves in the post-war reality. Let us remember that in this part of Africa, even in the territory of Sudan, there are armed organisations which draw on Christian or Muslim messianic ideas, such as the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army mentioned earlier. The issue of political messianism, the propagator of which is the state is also extremely interesting. The political class of the South, headed by the incumbent president, uses messianism as an ideology that legitimises their power and politics (analogy to the construction of new Jerusalem – a "city on rock"). This will be of considerable importance in building the identity of the South, as well as for the events after the 2011 referendum. South Sudanese millenarism is not a consolidated religious and political movement, it is more a collection of loose ideas, functioning among various urban groups (returnees, politicians or individual ethnic groups). It has different functions for each of them: it helps to conceptualise war experiences, or constitutes an ideology of power.

It is worth mentioning that messianic ideas were developing particularly strongly within urbanised centres. This is the achievement of negative phenomena a person had to cope with: economic poverty, political instability, extreme social stratification, disintegration of traditional social life institutions, just to list a few. Through messianic ideologies it was possible to contest first colonial, then postcolonial systems. These movements took various forms. So far, the bloodiest of its kind developed in Kano, Nigeria, in the 1970s. Its organiser was a charismatic Islamic teacher, Mohammed Marwa. He grouped the poor, mainly young people, former rural migrants, around a radical religious and political ideology. He died during an anti-government revolt he incited in 1980 As its consequence four thousand people died (Iliffe 2005: 265).

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The conflict in South Sudan had features of a religious conflict. It brought about, among other, the politicisation of the faith, categorisation "own" –"stranger." The consequences of this phenomenon make themselves visible in post-war Juba – the city of cultures and conflicts. The religion was elevated here to the rank of group identity. The group, in which it is seen most clearly, are local Muslims. At the threshold of South Sudan's independence, this population is in a very difficult political situation, formerly privileged, now marked with a label of the occupier and racist. Despite the decisive decline in the importance of Islam, this religion

can be a source of pride, a binder of unity and solidarity for the North Sudanese diaspora in the city. Its role as a determinant of identity has grown significantly in recent times. This is a result of the cultural diversity of the inhabitants of Juba, and especially of the separatist tendencies strongly manifested now. Local Muslims are a clearly defined group. In my opinion, they fully deserve to be called people of the borderland. They are suspended between two cultures, they live in one, and with the other – and regardless of whether they want it or not – they have a lasting relationship. They are characterised by a specific "culture of pride" – a sense of superiority resulting from the relationship with a sophisticated civilisation (Islamic world). This affects their lives, for example their way of dressing or customs. In all of this one can see conservatism and traditionalism in relation to the culture from which they originate. By strengthening the sense of their own identity, the Muslims of Juba compensate for the real decline in their social position after the end of the civil war. It is a life strategy that enables them to live successfully in an uncertain everyday situation.

Religion (Islam and Christianity) in the studied centre is used to blur the ethnicity. It opens up some sort of an umbrella above the people representing various ethnic communities migrating to the city. It offers a possibility to enter into the city's oecumene quickly. In the case of Juba, Islam and Christianity are religions having an urban status, unlike in rural areas, where rather traditional beliefs are followed.

The religion of the greatest significance is Christianity. This is a result of political changes in this part of Africa. Christianity is, for all, a natural source of urban culture, entertainment or simple lay rituals. In this respect it is replacing the Muslim culture which had this function for decades. We cannot forget about the meaning of various Christian churches in coping with the everyday necessities. They facilitate finding one's accommodation or work. They play a special role during the first stage of urban life when a person needs support most. In this respect Christian churches are a type of a bridge between the countryside and the city. Their role does not end here, however. Through a religious life a person builds a network of voluntary relationships, which are a must in the city. Based on them, they make friends and build a network of social support.

Women are a group that manages perfectly well in using various opportunities resulting from the operations of Christian churches. Through their activity in the religious field, they demonstrate that they are fully capable of playing a considerable role in the social life. Thus, they also proof that a harmonious combination of tradition with modernity is possible. In fact, the observed religious activity of women from Juba does not breach a traditional social model.

It was noticed long ago that the city contributed to the disintegration of traditional beliefs. However, it does not definitively eliminate them. As John Mbiti (1991: 216) remarked, traditional beliefs are connected with individual practices of everyday life, the way of looking at the world. To a smaller extent they are collective actions, transferred through formal institutions. In the urban environment, they make themselves known in times of crisis, create an opportunity to understand and counteract phenomena (AIDS/HIV or unemployment) hostile to an ordinary person.

The city is an area of proselytism of new Christian communities. At the moment, they originate, in most cases from the Pentecostal movement from North America. Their dynamic expansion may be interpreted as one of the effects of globalisation processes or as a tool making it possible to understand spontaneous changes, used at the same time to solve real problems (for example by accepting the rules of the neoliberal worldview).

Another manifestation of religious transformations in Juba is millenarism. The war had a major impact upon the collective memory of ethnic groups living in the South. It has contributed to the conceptualisation of their history. As a result it has become the foundation of their identity, as well as a matrix of inter-ethnic relationships in post-war Sudan.

CONCLUSION

The main task of this book is to take up topics of consequences of the modern urbanisation processes for the life of an average African. The city is a place where a lot can be changed. getting an education, money, or, in the simplest terms, find a bit of life independence. Let us remember, though, that this is a place full of dangers. The city turns out to be a trap for many; life in it may turn into an ordeal, especially since the results of structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have made themselves known. Nothing is certain in this world. A human being is left only to their own devices. So, does the city affect a person more in the good or bad direction? In my study there is no clear answer in this matter. A modern African city does not carry unambiguous benefits. However, it is not an area of hopelessness. It affects human fate both in a good and bad way. The African city may turn into a source of exclusion, meaning a slump and become a sort of trampoline, enabling a decisive movement up the social ladder. Everything depends on the person's individual activity, on how they move within the "ocean" of urban opportunities. To a large extent this is also conditioned on their social background. Despite all the "pros and cons," an African does not face a dilemma whether to migrate to the city. Regardless of whether they want it or not – they are already there. They were pushed into the city by war or hopelessness of the rural existence. While the fundamental issue remains: how to live in a word full of opportunities, yet the uneasy world of the African city.

Many of the quoted works rightly focus on the thoroughly negative context of contemporary urbanisation in Africa. The African city is in fact an extremely hostile environment for a human. This piles up all sorts of difficulties before a person in nearly every respect, connected with housing, health care, education or an official source of maintenance, just to list a few. It is also true, however, that Africans have learned how to cope with these inconveniences. They have tamed and reorganised this reality, releasing impressive processes of creation and transformation in themselves. As AbdouMaliq Simone (2004) has remarked, a modern African city is the total of unlimited opportunities of recreation visible in the infrastructure, in architecture, in social practices or the economy. The crisis of life has released incredible layers of creativity, the manifestations of which are the alternative life strategies described in the book. What is more, an African city resident can not only make ends meet, but effectively explore this environment. Life is not only a struggle for survival, but more and more often building a better future, fulfilling the dreams of a civilisational advance.

In the first chapter, I have dealt with migration to the city. In Africa, we witness a noticeable growth in the spatial mobility of people. Various factors make Africans wander. In the recent decades, the most frequent were armed conflicts. At the moment we are dealing with a wave of comebacks – migrations of masses of former refugees and internally displaced persons to their homelands. In no case is it an easy process. "Returnees" chose life in the city due to many reasons. Most frequently they are not interested in integration with the original community. For this reason they are the ones responsible for sudden urbanisation in many places. Forced displacement is a phenomenon of high-rank also for the socio-cultural situation of Africa. This does not mean the loss of identity so much as it forms a totally new person. Equally the fact that this person seems to move perfectly well within the post-war reality of Africa is important.

In chapter two I presented selected aspects of the urban landscape transformations under the influence of the galloping urbanisation processes. Looking from the perspective of space, one of the social categories closest to a human, people's efforts to create a material foundation to live are clearly visible. A common, multifaceted deformalisation – life outside the official circulation – is a response to the ineptness of the authorities and the quick pace of changes. This phenomenon does not apply to economic practices only, but also covers other spheres as well, such as housing or people's behaviour. These are the areas on the example of which one can best see the Africans' creativity. They create their world by means of imagination and a wish to get out of the state of deep poverty. After Bourdieu, Giddens, Harvey or Low, I have interpreted an urban space as an arena where various, sometimes antagonistic, forces, representing various sphere of life, clash. In other words: I have assumed that in the city culture is subject to spatialisation (Low). As a result, I think, I have managed to show the internal diversity of this environment. The African city is composed of an unlimited number of separate and specific realities. It is extremely fragmented, we have forgotten areas of wild development in it, as well as oases of wealth, reserved for a handful of the lucky ones. Today it is not the authorities or racist regulations, but the space is becoming a source of exclusion. A person's success is conditioned upon mobility between urban microcosms, it is in particular associated with access to the spaces which offer the largest number of opportunities. For this reason, among others, the meaning of space in the modern African city cannot be overestimated.

In the third chapter I presented a situation of the urban family, with a special emphasis on two groups: women and children. Reason: the importance of these two communities is clearly growing. It is seen best on the basis of the urban family's life situation. They are vital actors of a new, deformalised urban reality. Without them, life in it would be decisively harder. Although we have more

information on the situation of these groups, more attention, in my opinion, should be paid to them in the context of migration processes. Let's take children and youth. At present their migration more and more frequently does not result from the adults' decision, but is their own free choice. To what extent, however, does the migration of the youngest ones resemble the one of the adults? In this part I also touch one more important issue: an association life. According to some specialists on Africa, various voluntary associations have become a response to the crisis of urban life. In fact their role in stabilising the life situation is enormous. Some have their own names, while the majority is established ad hock, to attain particularistic objectives. The wealth of this area of life is admirable. Please remember that these institutions are the creations of globalisation, of the assistance organisations above all. Nevertheless, traditional models turn to be important in their popularisation.

In chapter four, I focused on the economic life. The citizens of Juba represent an entire spectrum of behaviours in the situation of vigorous urbanisation: from abnegation, through inactivity, to creativity and entrepreneurship. Most react positively, maximally taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the city (free market, cross-border trade, help of NGOs). Migrants to the city, often despite traumatic war experiences, are able to work effectively. Paradoxically, the most skilful and active are the "returnees" – former refugees and internally displaced persons. It is they who make up a vital part of the urban economy. Unfortunately, untapped to a large extent. For this reason, for example, we should devote even more attention to refugees and internally displaced persons, we should not treat them as losers and see positive aspects of their exile experience more. Paying attention to the process of reintegration is equally important. For them often as difficult as seeking asylum. Repatriates play an important role in cross-border contacts, they link Juba with the places of internment. For some, cross-border trade is a sign of weakness of the state or a common crime, while for others, it is a mechanism of spontaneous entrepreneurship, definitely pro-development one. For me, looking from the perspective of the centre under study, there is no doubt that foreign trade contacts are the basis for the urban economy – they are its driving force. For an ordinary person they are a tool for survival or accumulation. They are also a great stimulus for urbanisation processes, in this case migration of workers from neighbouring African countries such as: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda or Congo. The diversification of sources of maintenance, division into formal and informal forms of employment, development of small businesses and tightening of social ties are the basis for survival in the city. It must be added that everybody is involved in professional work, not excluding the youngest. This is the only thing that guarantees survival. Which social layer someone represents is

irrelevant. The difference lies in the nature of the performed works. The diversification of employment methods is also responsible for the aforementioned spatial mobility. This too must be included in the necessity. Spontaneous entrepreneurship is flourishing in the city. This is neither an old nor new phenomenon. Its support is a family, clan or tribe, meaning institutions of traditional social organisation. Some practices are connected with a former professional specialisation (e.g. alcohol brewing or the sale of agricultural products). In majority, however, they are private initiatives, resulting from the imagination and real opportunities, and put into practice entirely in the grey zone economy. Not only do they provide income, but also play other functions: supply with water, provide public transport or education. All this makes these phenomena a new quality, a tool for survival, but also an element binding the multicultural oecumene of the African city. Small business is the most serious consequence of structural reforms. This is an institution that sets the tone for life in urbanised centres.

I devoted chapters five and six to (ethnic and religious) identification. An African city is an unusual cultural mosaic to which migrants of various ethnic and religious backgrounds come every day; they try to improve their life or simply to survive. In such an environment the need to coexist with various, sometimes antagonised groups, is a must. The city intensifies social relationships. At the same time it also gives rise to frictions and divisions. So, every city is a centre of cultures, but conflicts as well. A part of the urban life is a strategy of "invisibility" – hiding one's original identity behind the fences of a household or a kin group. This goal is basically supported by full participation in a typically urban culture, which, in practice, is manifested by the use of a special language, valorisation of neutral spaces or, finally, belonging to one of the universalistic religious communities. It was noticed some time ago that ethnicity does not disappear in urbanised centres, but undergoes a reinterpretation. Achieving specific objectives of an economic or political nature are important in this case. Ethnicity in urban conditions constitutes a sort of "symbolic capital" (Cohen) in the struggle for all sorts of benefits. For that reason it is, in fact, something variable and dynamic, subject to the ongoing processes of creation and reinterpretation. After decolonisation, the further expansion of Christianity in Sub-Saharan areas took place. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this religion continues to strengthen, but a part of this process is the Africans' turn towards Pentecostalism. Pentecostal churches should be given more attention, particularly the relationship linking them with the social and economic changes. A question still remains open: why is this version of Christianity so popular in Africa today? The radical variants of this movement should not escape our

attention either. They are responsible for new, serious social conflicts (e.g. intolerance towards sexual minorities).

At the end we should come back to the phenomenon of borderlineness for a moment. One of the leading thoughts contained in the work is a thesis that the fact that experiencing borderlineness plays an important and a positive role for a modern African in coping with problems piling up around them. Each African city, with its ethnic and cultural mosaic, is to some degree a borderland area. Of course, the closeness of the state border is also important. Political borderlands form new urbanisation variants. Life within these areas starts concentrating in the cities. They, in turn, become new centres of a free market and a deformalised economy. It is also here that a specific climate for testing democratic rules of social life is emerging. In short: these are places convenient to live in, full of manifold opportunities; new centres located on the outskirts.

The inclusion of the borderland in the analysis of the realities of modern Africa's life has some conceptual consequences. It reorganises the previously valid cultural geography of the African oecumene, the dichotomous centre-peripheries system. Due to various phenomena, especially spontaneous globalisation, the African peripheries are no longer areas of poverty, hopelessness or chaos – they are not peripheries in the literal sense. Paraphrasing the distinguished American sociologist Roland Robertson (1992) – they are centres which are located on peripheries, and the former centres are often the new peripheries.

Over twenty years have passed since American anthropologist Igor Kopytoff (1987) drew the attention of scholars to the issue of the African borderland. Since then a lot has been written about it. Yet, the topic still surprises with the richness of meanings. My work, I trust, makes a significant contribution to becoming familiar with this phenomenon. The case of Juba is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it is a centre strongly contributing to the autonomisation of the region. It is a kind of centre of separatist movement or cultural reorientation of the Sudanese South. Until now, from the point of view of political geography, the city has been a peripheral centre. Now it is becoming a fully-fledged metropolis, the capital of independent South Sudan. Does the borderlineness still remain its asset? It is difficult to unequivocally evaluate this as of yet. However, information appears that the capital of the young state should be moved somewhere, to a more centrally located place (e.g. to Malakal). The supporters of this concept argue that the overcrowded, spontaneously built Juba is not suitable for a modern capital city, it will be a stain on the reputation of the statehood being built.

There is also something else that makes this place extremely intriguing. It is, in my opinion, is a key to its understanding. Borderlineness possesses not only

a literal dimension, spatial, but may be understood figuratively – as a sense of liminality or heterogeneity of existence. Both these factors are equally responsible for the creation of specific cultural phenomena in these areas. The borderland nature of this area of South Sudan corresponds to the "liminality" of the period of history of Juba – likewise of all of South Sudan, suspended somewhere between crisis and stability, war and peace, chaos and order. In the case of this city, these phenomena are intensified by vigorous urbanisation processes. Juba is a city in the phase of being created. What is more, the intensive influence of transformative phenomena, such as globalisation or deformalised trade, is also happening here. All this results in the maintenance of a special culture, in a semantic and processual dimension, similar to the central, liminal phase of the rites of passage of Arnold van Gennep (1909, 2006). In this case, associations arise with one more distinguished ethnologist, Victor Turner (1974, 2005) and his theory of liminality

Juba, as one of modern African cities, is a place of creation of ephemeral, reversed and variable cultures, that is what Turner called liminality. The city is one large anti-structure, generating a specific bond. A person suspends their identity there and enters the world of a reversed cultural reality: specific culture, morality or social arrangements. Everything they come across here is in conflict with normal social hierarchies and institutional norms and ideas. This means something different for each individual. For a rural migrant it is basically associated with the decomposition of a traditional social organisation, for a citizen of a global North in turn, rather with the material deficiencies of human existence and the concentration of pathology, hopelessness and suffering of the native population. The local reality is therefore antistructural, creative and transformative at the same time. It breaks the monotony, presents unlimited possibilities or ultimately serves godly purposes (e.g. getting rich). Thanks to the persisting cultural microclimate, the city is living and even developing. A manifestation of this is, for example, the vigorous flourishing of spontaneous entrepreneurship or a mass influx of foreigners. The proximity of the state border is important in this respect. The bond among citizens is also equally important. The war-devastated landscape, the war trauma and the vigorous pace of urbanisation changes evoke a sense of alienation in everyone. A sense of uncertainty is also important. Employees have to take evacuation into account at all times. The regulations they are bound to follow require them to possess a pre-prepared special set of basic necessities. Just in case. Paradoxically, similar rules are followed by the local population. Nobody knows what is going to happen tomorrow. So people do not think about the day to come. At any moment a disaster may strike. The country will plunge into war again. In such a situation one of the most needed things

is a gun. The majority treat the city as a place of temporary residence. Nobody takes it into account when planning their future The former refugees plan to return to their home land or go abroad. Rural migrants generally plan to improve their life situation. Foreigners employed in humanitarian organisations are here for the time of the projects. Sooner or later they will have to leave this place. Temporariness is felt at each step, from people's behaviour to the decorations of their homes, and the condition of city roads. In such an environment all is subordinated, in fact, to one objective: survival. Other are moved to the back burner. It does not matter if one is a rural migrant, returnee or a charity worker. In addition, there is a flood of migrants, a spontaneous and uncontrolled influx of human groups of various racial, ethnic and social backgrounds. The city is a centre of various cultures, yet just several years ago practically no one had heard of it. The proximity of the state border is also favourable. It, however, evokes the same, antagonistic feelings in everyone: hope, but fear as well – of the unknown and alien world with which, as if intuitively, all evil is associated. This is a place of real opportunities, but of the metaphysical fear as well. The expression of the latter is, for example, a belief in hostile, supernatural powers at the service of sorcerers–foreigners persisting in the city. All this, basically, is responsible for a specific, decadent climate of the local culture. Only what is here and now counts. Nobody knows anyone – everyone here are strangers, *tabula rasa* – a blank slate. This is a great discomfort, but also a constructive factor, facilitating the creation of social relationships. This is a binding factor. In my research, I could experience it personally, as I have written in the introduction. As in the case of pilgrimage rituals described by Victor Turner, people excluded from the frameworks of society are united by a common goal. An ephemeral, temporary, yet a binding, extremely diversified, city allowing both a rural migrant and a foreigner from a non-governmental organisation to survive in it. Turner (2005), in the case of pilgrimage rituals, put an emphasis on the rite as a praise of rejection and the violation of social conventions. In Juba, the point is rather to survive in a strongly urbanising city. The social function of the phenomenon is expressed in it.

The studies on the African city still provide exciting topics. They are neither specific nor typical on a global scale. This is simply an African city. It requires an intensive, interdisciplinary interest, new perspectives or research methodologies and an interpretation of the reality which will enable learning the cultural reality evading easy examination. The expressions (both traditional and modern) of a normative reality say little about true life. As never before, there is a need for multidisciplinarity, but it is also important to look at the bottom-up processes of creation of what is "here and now." I am convinced that ethnological research may be a significant contributor in this respect.

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