Lisa Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte,
Jonas Tallberg, and Soetkin Verhaegen

CITIZENS, ELITES, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

OXFORD

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Book Series Preface

Legitimacy appears crucial if global governance is to deliver on many key challenges confronting contemporary society: climate change, economic development, health pandemics, and more. Yet current trends suggest that the legitimacy of global governance may be increasingly contested. Britain's decision to leave the European Union, disillusionment with United Nations climate negotiations, pushback against the World Health Organization's handling of COVID-19, and the general rise of anti-globalist populism all signal substantial discontent with global governance institutions. An important research agenda therefore arises concerning legitimacy, legitimation, and contestation in global governance.

This book series seeks to advance that agenda. The three volumes explore to what degree, why, how, and with what consequences global governance institutions are regarded as legitimate. The books address this question through three complementary themes: (1) sources of legitimacy for global governance institutions; (2) processes of legitimation and delegitimation around global governance institutions; and (3) consequences of legitimacy for the operations of global governance institutions.

The series presents the combined theoretical, methodological, empirical, and policy takeaways of the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) program. LegGov was a six-year endeavor (2016–21) involving 16 researchers at Stockholm, Lund, and Gothenburg Universities. The program was funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and coordinated by Jonas Tallberg at Stockholm University. LegGov has previously published the volume *Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences* with Oxford University Press in 2018. Whereas that work set out LegGov's agenda and strategy, this series presents the program's extensive findings in three integrated books.

The first book, *Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance*, is co-authored by Lisa Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte, Jonas Tallberg, and Soetkin Verhaegen. This volume addresses patterns and sources of legitimacy in global governance: how far, and why, do citizens and elites around the world regard global governance to be legitimate? The book offers the first full comparative study of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, covering multiple international organizations, countries, and sectors of society. The analysis builds on two parallel surveys of citizen and elite opinion, which enables a unique comparison between levels and drivers of legitimacy beliefs in the two groups. The book identifies a consistent gap between elite and citizen assessments

of global governance, and attributes this divide to systematic differences between elites and citizens in terms of socioeconomic status, political values, identity, and institutional trust.

The second book, *Legitimation and Delegitimation in Global Governance: Practices, Justifications, and Audiences*, is co-edited by Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson, and Anders Uhlin, with additional chapter contributions from Karin Bäckstrand, Farsan Ghassim, Catia Gregoratti, Nora Stappert, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Soetkin Verhaegen. This book addresses processes of legitimation and delegitimation in global governance: through what dynamics do global governance institutions obtain or lose legitimacy? The volume offers a uniquely comprehensive analysis of such processes through its coverage of three features: the practices that actors use to boost or challenge the legitimacy of global governance institutions; the normative justifications they draw on when engaging in such practices; and the audiences that are influenced by and react to these practices and justifications.

The third book, *Global Legitimacy Crises: Decline and Revival in Multilateral Governance*, is co-authored by Thomas Sommerer, Hans Agné, Fariborz Zelli, and Bart Bes. This volume addresses the consequences of legitimacy in global governance, in particular asking: when and how do legitimacy crises affect the operation of international organizations? The book offers a novel theoretical framework and a comparative focus on legitimacy's effects for a large number of international organizations. Specifically, the analysis combines a statistical examination of more than 30 international organizations with in-depth case studies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the World Trade Organization. The book demonstrates that legitimacy crises develop in trajectories that are unique for each international organization, and that such crises can yield positive as well as negative effects.

Taken together, the volumes make three major contributions. First, the series offers the most comprehensive treatment so far of legitimacy in global governance, covering sources, processes, and consequences in one collective endeavor. Second, the collection is theoretically innovative, further developing a sociological approach to legitimacy through new conceptualizations and explanations. Third, the books pursue an ambitious comparative approach, examining legitimacy in global governance across countries, organizations, issue areas, and the elite–citizen divide. In addition to their own rich content, the three books are accompanied by supplementary data and analyses, available online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/leggov.

As detailed in acknowledgments in each of the three volumes, the LegGov program has benefited tremendously from stimulating internal discussions among the participants, as well as generous input from a large group of external colleagues, including the program's International Scientific Advisory Board. We thank you all. For indispensable assistance with the program and the book series, we are

indebted to Karin Sundström and Sofie Trosell at Stockholm University. We also extend our thanks to Matthew Collins for language editing of the three volumes.

We are most grateful to senior editor Dominic Byatt and the publishing team at Oxford University Press for their continuous support and professional handling of the book series. Three anonymous reviewers for OUP challenged us to further clarify theoretical standpoints, coherence in research designs, and the volumes' contributions to debates on legitimacy in global governance.

Finally, we extend great gratitude to Riksbankens Jubileumsfond for the generous funding that made LegGov and this book series possible, and we thank Fredrik Lundmark at RJ for valuable advice in the program's execution.

Jonas Tallberg, Karin Bäckstrand, and Jan Aart Scholte
Book Series Editors

Acknowledgments

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance is the fruit of six years of collaboration in the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) research program. Coming from different subfields of the social sciences (comparative politics, European studies, global studies, international relations, and political sociology), we authors were brought together by an ambition to better understand the patterns and sources of legitimacy in global governance. In particular, we were curious about whether citizens and elites differ in their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, and what could explain any such gaps. This aspiration led to an ambitious data collection project, involving uniquely coordinated surveys of citizen and elite opinion toward multiple international organizations in a diverse set of countries around the world.

Our research based on these data led to several journal articles and anthology chapters, for instance, in *American Political Science Review*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *International Affairs*, and *Global Policy*. However, we soon discovered that the article format was too constraining and simply did not give us the space required to convey the full richness of our findings. Hence, this book, which is our attempt to tell the more comprehensive theoretical and empirical story about citizens, elites, and the legitimacy of global governance.

For readers who want to take the exploration of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance one step further, our data are available for downloading at http://www.statsvet.su.se/leggov and on author homepages. At these sites, you can also find the supplementary online appendix for the book, as well as the replication material for the analyses in this study.

Co-writing this book has been tremendously rewarding. While we started this journey from diverse starting points, the process of collaboration turned these differences into complementarities. While this process has certainly involved some heated debates, those arguments have allowed us to learn from each other and to produce a piece of scholarship that none of us could have achieved on their own.

We have been fortunate to benefit from the intellectual generosity of a large number of people in our work on this book. To begin with, we are particularly thankful to our other colleagues in the LegGov program for extensive and constructive feedback throughout the writing of this book: Hans Agné, Bart Bes, Magdalena Bexell, Karin Bäckstrand, Farsan Ghassim, Catia Gregoratti, Kristina Jönsson, Thomas Sommerer, Nora Stappert, Fredrik Söderbaum, Anders Uhlin, and Fariborz Zelli. In addition, we extend our gratitude to a number of colleagues

who have generously commented on this project: Karen Alter, Michael Barnett, Steven Bernstein, Sarah Bush, Mark Copelovitch, Nicole Deitelhoff, Simone Dietrich, Andreas Kruck, Joost de Moor, Ken Scheve, Henning Schmidtke, Bernd Schlipphak, Christina Schneider, Theresa Squatrito, Mike Tomz, Lora Viola, Erik Voeten, Stefanie Walter, Bernhard Zangl, and Michael Zürn.

Our work on this book has benefited from seminars and workshops organized by GIGA Hamburg, Maastricht University, Stanford University, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Södertörn University College, University of Copenhagen, University of Duisburg-Essen, University of Edinburgh, University of Gothenburg, University of Toronto, and Yale University, as well as panels held at conferences of the American Political Science Association, the European Consortium for Political Research, the European International Studies Association, the International Studies Association, and the Political Economy of International Organizations.

A key feature of this project is the LegGov Elite Survey that we conducted in 2017–19. In executing this survey, we benefited from indispensable collaborations with partners at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow, the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) at the University of Pretoria, and CivicPulse in the United States. At the same time, we underline that these partners have had no influence over survey responses and bear no responsibility for the data analysis. Our thanks also go to the elite respondents to this survey, who took time out of their busy schedules to be interviewed and thus provided us with crucial data for this study.

For research assistance, we extend our thanks to Karin Sundström, as well as the student assistants at Stockholm University who helped to conduct the many interviews for the elite survey.

Finally, we thank our families and friends for their love and support throughout the whole process, as well as one another—as co-authors—for a highly fulfilling intellectual journey together.

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List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAPI	computer-assisted personal interviewing
CAWI	computer-assisted web interviewing
EU	European Union
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
G4	Group of Four
G20	Group of Twenty
GAL	green-alternative-liberal
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	international organization
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
KP	Kimberley Process
LegGov	Legitimacy in Global Governance research program
MERCOSUL	Mercado Comun do Sul
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OLS	ordinary least squares
PAPI	paper-and-pencil interviewing
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TAN	traditional-authoritarian-nationalist
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy research program
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WVS	World Values Survey

PART I

INTRODUCTION AND DESIGN

1
Legitimacy in Global Governance

Contemporary society has experienced major growth in both global governance and its contestation. Proliferating transboundary challenges have encouraged notable expansions of global policy, but the legitimacy of governing beyond the state also remains deeply in question. Think only of disputes around virulent health pandemics, stalled climate agreements, gridlocked trade negotiations, fragile arms control frameworks, and fragmented approaches to refugee crises, financial instabilities, and internet security.

Legitimacy—the belief that a governing power has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately—has considerable implications for global policy. Without the durable foundational support conferred by legitimacy, global governance institutions may struggle to obtain resources, attract participation, take decisions, obtain compliance, and generally advance with handling critical transboundary problems. It is therefore crucial to determine the levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance around the world, as well as to identify the forces that generate and shape these beliefs.

A particular headline issue around the legitimacy of global governance is the relationship between elites and citizens at large. Episodes such as Brexit, street protests against international economic institutions, and the rise of populist forces suggest a possible divergence in the views of global governance between political and societal leaders on the one hand and the general public on the other. A common argument purports that today's elites, as the main winners of globalization, are out of touch with ordinary citizens, who bear the brunt of its burdens. The alleged result is a significant political disjuncture, as well as a major obstacle to effective and democratic global cooperation.

These observations provoke a key research question: *To what extent, and why, do citizens and elites around the world regard global governance to have legitimacy?* This overarching question encompasses three sub-questions. First, what levels of legitimacy do citizens at large give to global governance institutions, and what explains those citizen beliefs? Second, what levels of legitimacy do elites accord to global governance, and what explains those elite beliefs? Third, how much do levels of citizen and elite legitimacy toward global governance diverge, and what explains any such elite–citizen gaps?

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Solidly grounded knowledge of this issue is quite thin. Existing studies of legitimacy in global governance, while by now notable in number and quality, still have limited coverage of countries, issues, and institutions. We therefore have only a narrow picture of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Moreover, we have no systematic measure whatsoever of possible divides between leaders and publics on this matter. We also still have much to learn about the factors that drive citizen and elite legitimacy perceptions toward global governance. In particular, no previous research has systematically examined why the legitimacy beliefs of citizens and elites toward global governance might differ.

This book addresses these lacunae in knowledge. We aim to offer the first systematically theorized and empirically grounded cross-national comparative study of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Specifically, our study makes two core contributions.

Empirically, this book provides the most comprehensive comparative analysis thus far of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, building on two uniquely coordinated surveys executed in 2017–19, covering multiple countries and international organizations (IOs). While previous studies have mostly examined single countries/regions and single global governance institutions, our analysis covers five diverse countries—Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States (US)—and six global IOs in different policy fields—the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, our coordinated data allow us to offer the first comparative analysis of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

Theoretically, this book develops an individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy in global governance. While previous research has largely examined sources at organizational and societal levels, we focus on the circumstances of the individual. Specifically, we theorize how an individual's characteristics in respect of socioeconomic standing, political orientation, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust shape legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Our individual-level approach thereby advances the theoretical frontier on global governance legitimacy and complements other perspectives on its sources.

The central findings of our research are threefold. First, there is indeed a notable and general elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites on average hold moderately high levels of legitimacy toward the studied IOs, the general public on average is decidedly more skeptical. This gap holds for all six IOs, four of the five countries, and all of six elite sectors. Second, individual-level differences in interests, values, identities, and trust dispositions provide significant drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, as well as the gap between them. Most important are differences in the extent to which citizens and elites trust domestic political institutions, which systematically shape

how they assess the legitimacy of IOs. Third, both patterns and sources of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs vary across IOs and countries. These variations suggest that, alongside the individual drivers, organizational and societal contexts also condition attitudes toward global governance.

Beyond its conclusions on legitimacy in global governance, this book's findings have implications for three broader issues in research and politics. First, we show how the notoriously elusive concept of legitimacy can become empirically tractable through carefully designed survey research. Second, our findings shed light on future opportunities and constraints in international cooperation, suggesting that current levels of legitimacy point neither to a general crisis of global governance nor to a general readiness for its expansion. Finally, our observations fuel debates on whether global governance confronts a problem of democratic credibility, as the elites who have most access to and influence in global governance accord notably more legitimacy to IOs than the affected public at large.

The remainder of this opening chapter expands on each of these components of our book: the central research problem; the state of existing knowledge; our conceptual and theoretical approach; the study's research design; our main results; and the implications of these findings for research and politics. We finish this introductory chapter with a plan for the rest of the book.

Global Governance and the Problem of Legitimacy

As we write this book, humanity is immersed in the comprehensive global disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The virus itself has spread to every corner of the planet. Its repercussions for health, economy, culture, and politics encompass the globe. The development and distribution of vaccines is suffused with global-scale cooperation and competition. Long-term societal recovery from the pandemic, too, will have prominent global dynamics and consequences. Plainly, COVID-19 is a global problem that demands a substantial measure of global governance. Local, national, and regional measures are not enough.

Similar needs for global governance arise well beyond viruses. Indeed, most headline challenges of contemporary society have pronounced global qualities: climate change, migration flows, economic welfare, identity politics, financial crises, food and nutrition, peacebuilding, cybersecurity, cultural heritage, and more. Each of these issues has a planetary reach and may require a planetary response. Not surprisingly, related political mobilizations such as Amnesty International, the antinuclear campaign, Fridays for Future, the Global Right, the Internet Governance Forum, la Vía Campesina, and various religious alliances also extend worldwide. Like it or not, we live in a global world that elicits global politics.

How we govern global affairs is therefore crucial—and contested. For over a century, people have debated what kinds of ideas and institutions should order

global politics. After the First World War, the League of Nations vied with the Communist International to be the guiding path for global politics. The Second World War shifted the locus of struggle to liberal versus fascist designs of world order. The third quarter of the twentieth century saw clashes at the UN over decolonization and a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Around the turn of the millennium, a so-called "anti-globalization movement" filled the streets of major cities across the planet with protests against established global economic governance institutions. "Occupy" camps in over 80 countries followed in 2011–12. At the present time, liberals, populists, environmentalists, fundamentalists, and others compete for the soul of global politics.

At the heart of these debates lies the question of legitimacy. In a word, do people believe that global governance institutions have a right to rule and exercise that rule appropriately? For instance, how far do people perceive the UN, the WHO, or the World Bank to be legitimate? Moreover, what drives people to hold lower or higher levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance institutions? If people doubt global governance in its current forms, what kinds of changes might raise their legitimacy beliefs in the future?

These questions are crucial. Legitimacy is a core issue for politics. To the extent that legitimacy prevails, a governing arrangement (whether local, national, regional, or global) tends to have greater stability and power. When people find a governing institution legitimate, they are generally more ready to participate in its processes, contribute to its resources, follow its policies, etc. (Parsons 1960; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tyler 1990; Dahl and Lindblom 1992). Legitimacy means that people buy into the system, even if they might oppose a particular policy measure or a certain political leader. In global governance, for example, legitimacy can help an institution like the WTO to attract members, obtain funds, produce policies, achieve compliance with its rules, affect problems, and generally hold its own against potentially competing regulatory arrangements, such as unilateral protectionism or bilateral trade agreements.

In contrast, to the extent that legitimacy is lacking, a governing apparatus (on whatever geographical scale) tends to face greater volatility and dysfunction—or relies more heavily on stealth and coercion in order to retain power. When people question the legitimacy of a governing institution, they sooner opt out, break the rules, or even dismantle the regime. Illegitimacy beliefs have fueled many a revolution across the centuries and around the world (Bukovansky 2002; Giglioli 2017; Sultany 2017). In global politics, shortfalls of legitimacy at, say, the WHO could discourage participation, restrict funding, limit decision-making, hamper policy implementation, lead people to rival venues such as multi-stakeholder organizations, and possibly even close down the IO itself. We witnessed such difficulties with the Trump Administration's denunciations of the WHO during the COVID-19 pandemic.

To be sure, the relationship between legitimacy and global governance is complex. Legitimacy is not the only force that shapes how global institutions handle the major policy challenges of our day. Also in the mix are the capacities of the various organizations, political circumstances of the countries involved, conditions in the world economy, personalities of leading decision-makers, pressures of crisis situations, etc. Moreover, as a companion volume to this book shows, the consequences of legitimacy are not necessarily straightforward (Sommerer et al. 2022). For example, a global governance institution that enjoys high levels of legitimacy could become complacent as a result and actually perform less well. In contrast, a legitimacy crisis might actually spur a global institution to become more innovative and effective (Bes et al. 2019). Yet, within these intricate dynamics, legitimacy is always a key ingredient that shapes the amounts and types of global governance that do and do not transpire. It is therefore crucial to determine levels and patterns of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance around the world, as well as to identify the forces that generate and shape these perceptions.

As a next question, one may ask *whose* legitimacy beliefs toward global governance matter. Certainly important are the views of elites, since leaders in politics and society are the main makers and shapers of global policies. Elite engagement is key to the functioning and indeed the very existence of global governance institutions. Levels and drivers of elite legitimacy can affect participation in, resources for, and compliance with global governance (Bes et al. 2019; Uhlin and Verhaegen 2020). It is often also elites who spur delegitimation attempts vis-à-vis global governance, for example, from dissident governments, oppositional political parties, disaffected civil society associations, and critical journalists and academics.

It is also important to consider the legitimacy beliefs toward global governance of citizens at large. Whereas the general public was previously assumed to be mostly passive toward global governance, with "a-legitimacy" (Steffek 2007: 190), recent decades have witnessed considerable politicization of the question (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Zürn 2018). In particular, we have seen a backlash against international cooperation among many citizens (e.g., Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hobolt 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Moreover, some normative theories argue that it is important for democracy that publics affected by global governance perceive these institutions to be legitimate (Held 1995; Gould 2004; Archibugi et al. 2012; Scholte 2014).

A question that follows from this elite–citizen distinction concerns possibly different assessments of global governance. How much legitimacy do elites accord to global governance arrangements as compared with citizens at large? In particular, is there a gap in legitimacy beliefs between leaders in politics and society on the one hand and the general population on the other?

Elite–citizen tensions are a recurrent theme in the long history of global governance. A hundred years ago, critics alleged that liberal elites were out of touch with proletarian masses over the League of Nations (Carr 1953; Petruccelli 2020).

After the horrors of the Second World War, a new generation of IOs enjoyed general popular support, with what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) called a "permissive consensus." However, by the 1970s and 1980s, elite-supported structural adjustment policies from international financial institutions provoked popular resistance in many peripheral countries, as well as a debt crisis movement in the Global North (George 1988; Walton and Seddon 1994). In the 1990s and 2000s, large citizen demonstrations against "neoliberalism" became a regular feature at meetings of global economic institutions and the World Social Forum (O'Brien et al. 2000; Smith et al. 2015). With the 2010s, citizen critiques of IOs extended beyond economic institutions, as voters delivered Brexit in the UK and anti-globalist governments in Brazil, India, the Philippines, Russia, the US, and elsewhere (Hobolt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Each scenario seems to place elites on one side and general citizens on the other.

If indeed an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy toward global governance exists, it could be highly problematic, both normatively and practically. Normatively, such a divide could present challenges for political representation and accountability, if we take the view that elites should reflect the opinions of, and answer to, citizens, yet pursue global governance based on beliefs that diverge from the overall citizenry. Practically, an elite–citizen legitimacy gap in global governance could render international cooperation more difficult to achieve, with negative consequences for the capacity to address problems such as climate change, financial instability, and transnational conflict. If citizens do not find global governance legitimate, then elites (who need to consider public opinion) could find it more difficult to agree on new global policies and institutions, thereby encouraging further gridlock around meeting global challenges.

Yet what is the actual situation? To what extent, and why, do citizens and elites around the world regard global governance to be legitimate? Do the two groups indeed hold different overall views of the legitimacy of global governance institutions? If so, what generates the gap? These are vital questions for academic inquiry and, potentially, political response.

State of the Art

While legitimacy historically has had a marginal place in the study of world politics, the past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a substantial body of research, partly in response to public contestation of regional and global governance. Research on the subject began to grow in the 1990s (Franck 1990; Held 1995; Niedermeyer and Sinnott 1995; Hurd 1999; Scharpf 1999). A fuller theorization of legitimacy and legitimation in world politics unfolded after the turn of the millennium (Clark 2005, 2007; Steffek 2003, 2004; Zürn 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Clark and Reus-Smit 2007; Hurd 2007; Hurrelmann et al. 2007; Black

2008; Chapman 2009; Mayntz 2010; Nullmeier et al. 2010; Quack 2010; Bernstein 2011; Brassett and Tsingou 2011; Zaum 2013; Bexell 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Gronau and Schmidtke 2016; Sabrow 2017; Lenz and Viola 2017; Oates 2017; von Billerbeck 2017; Whalan 2017). Recent years have brought important synthesizing work, so that we are now well placed systematically to examine the meaning, sources, processes, and consequences of legitimacy in global governance (Tallberg et al. 2018; Zürn 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Dingwerth et al. 2019; Scholte 2019).

The Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) research program, conducted in 2016–21 at Stockholm, Lund, and Gothenburg Universities, has taken one step toward a further integration of different theories and approaches to researching legitimacy. The present book is one of a set of three works that complete the LegGov endeavor. While this volume explores the patterns and sources of legitimacy in global governance, a second volume examines processes of legitimation and delegitimation in global governance (Bexell et al. 2022), and a third volume considers the consequences of legitimacy for global governance (Sommerer et al. 2022).

As regards the specific concern of the present book, existing scholarship indicates three alternative ontological starting points for studying sources of legitimacy in global governance: the individual, the organization, and the social structure (Tallberg et al. 2018: Chapters 3–5). The predominant approach to date has focused on sources at the organizational level. This perspective assumes that legitimacy beliefs arise from the features of governing organizations, such as their purposes, procedures, and performances (e.g., Scharpf 1999; Hurd 2007; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Lenz and Viola 2017; Anderson et al. 2019; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020; Verhaegen et al. 2021). A second approach, usually informed by constructivist or critical theory, has located the sources of legitimacy beliefs in characteristics of the wider social structure, such as cultural norms, economic systems, and political regimes (e.g., Bernstein 2011; Gill and Cutler 2014; Scholte 2018).

This book proceeds from a third ontological starting point from the individual level. This approach attributes legitimacy beliefs to characteristics and circumstances of the person holding them, such as interest calculations, political values, social identification, and institutional trust (e.g., Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Dellmuth 2018). In recent years, this approach has informed research on attitudes toward international issues in comparative politics (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2018), international relations (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), and studies of the European Union (EU) (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016).

Yet, thus far, the systematic study of individual sources of legitimacy beliefs has been hampered by poor availability of comparative data (Dellmuth 2018). With regard to public opinion, substantial literature addresses attitudes toward the EU,

typically using data from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey (for an overview, see Hobolt and de Vries 2016). More recently, a growing body of research has examined public opinion toward other IOs, including the UN, making use of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) or more specific surveys (Edwards 2009; Norris 2009; Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015; Bearce and Joliff Scott 2019). However, data for these studies have tended to cover only a single IO, such as the EU or the UN, a single policy field, such as economy or security, and a single country or region.

Existing research is still more limited when it comes to elite attitudes toward global governance. Several general studies have theorized about elites in global politics (Van der Pijl 1998; Sklair 2001; Rothkopf 2008; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2012; Philips 2018; De Wilde et al. 2019). Other works have considered how elites affect certain aspects of global governance processes (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Haas 1992; Scholte 2011; Binder and Heupel 2015; Goetz and Patz 2017; Tallberg et al. 2018; Dür et al. 2019; Schmidtke 2019). Further studies have mapped characteristics of elites worldwide (Gerring et al. 2019) or examined the attitudes of elites in a certain country or region toward a particular topic, such as globalization (Rosenau et al. 2006; Strijbis et al. 2019). A substantial body of literature has investigated elite views of regional governance through the EU (Hooghe 2002; Best et al. 2012; Sanders and Toka 2013; Persson et al. 2019; Goldberg et al. 2020; Cilento and Conti 2021; Tatham and Bauer 2021). However, we mostly lack systematic research on elite opinion toward IOs more generally (for exceptions, see Binder and Heupel 2015; Schmidtke 2019). No previous research has collected and analyzed large data on elite views of global governance, covering multiple countries, multiple sectors of society, and multiple IOs.

As for systematic comparisons of public and elite opinion on global governance, existing empirical work is extremely limited. One study has compared elite and citizen views of European integration (Hooghe 2003). Another investigation has compared elite and public opinion on international human rights law (Kim 2019). Finally, several studies have examined elite–citizen divides regarding US foreign policy (Page and Bouton 2007; Kertzer 2020). In each case, the coverage is limited to a single country, a single issue, or a single IO. Thus, earlier research offers no cross-country measurement of possible divides between elites and citizens on the legitimacy of global governance, and no previous empirical work has rigorously examined the forces that might generate cleavages on this issue between leaders and publics.

Our research for this book moves beyond these limitations in existing scholarship. We develop an individual-level approach to legitimacy that attributes variation in such beliefs to characteristics of citizens and elites. We examine our theoretical expectations through systematically coordinated data on public and elite opinion in multiple countries toward multiple IOs. Yet, before we expand on theory and research design, some conceptual pointers are in order.

Concepts

This book examines "citizen" and "elite" views of "legitimacy" toward "global governance." We understand our first key concept, "global governance," to refer to processes of societal regulation that operate on a planetary scale (Weiss and Wilkinson 2019). Global governance "institutions" are the bureaucratic organizations which formulate and administer policy measures that apply to actors and locations around the world. Global governance institutions have traditionally taken form mainly as IOs: that is, formal permanent treaty-based bodies with state members, such as the UN and the WTO (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Pevehouse et al. 2020). While IOs tend to be the most visible sites of global governance, nowadays one also sees other institutional forms, including transgovernmental networks, private global governance mechanisms, and global multi-stakeholder initiatives (Slaughter 2004; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Scholte 2020).

We operationalize the notion of "global governance" in this study by focusing on traditional IOs which, in many areas, function as core pillars of global governance and play frontline roles in addressing transborder problems. One need only think of the WHO and disease control, the IMF and financial crises, the UN in various conflict settings, and the WTO in trade politics. In addition, such IOs are relatively better known to citizens and elites around the world, making them more suitable for a study of legitimacy beliefs than less known forms of global governance.

Taking the various institutional forms together, global governance has grown considerably in volume and diversity in recent decades (Barnett et al. 2021). Across all policy fields, many consequential governance measures today emanate from institutions with a worldwide remit. That said, the size and resources of IOs and other global governance institutions remain modest overall, with far less budgets, staff, remits, policy measures, and sanctions than most states. Skeptics favor these modest proportions and, if anything, advocate a future contraction of global governance (Miller 2007), while proponents underscore regulatory deficits that require major expansions of global policy (Hale and Held 2017).

As for our second key concept, "legitimacy," we already indicated earlier its quality as a belief that a governing institution has the right to rule and exercises this right appropriately (Weber 1922; Suchman 1995). Legitimacy thereby entails stable, diffuse, foundational approval of a governing institution, as distinct from contingent support that depends on certain officeholders or particular policies (Easton 1975; Hetherington 1998).

Here it is important to distinguish between legitimacy as a perception of appropriate rule and other conditions that might be its causes or consequences. Hence, for example, perceptions of well-functioning democracy are a possible source of legitimacy but are not equivalent to legitimacy itself. After all, many situations arise where people believe in the rightful rule of non-democratic regimes (Weber 1922). Likewise, it is important to distinguish between legitimacy and its possible

results, such as participation in elections and compliance with rules. After all, a person can vote under compulsion and can follow instructions without believing in the rightfulness of the authority behind them. In short, legitimacy is an attitude or a belief and must not be confused with the circumstances that produce it or the situations that might flow from it.

In this book, it is also crucial to differentiate between normative and sociological legitimacy. Normative (or philosophical) legitimacy refers to the right to rule based on conformity to certain philosophically formulated values and principles, such as justice or fairness (Caney 2005; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Christiano 2010; Archibugi et al. 2012; Erman 2016). In this case, a theorist identifies generic criteria for evaluating the normative appropriateness of governance and then applies these standards to a concrete arrangement in order to judge whether it is morally worthy of legitimacy according to the specified principles. In contrast, sociological (or empirical) legitimacy refers to perceptions of rightful rule that are established in an observed empirical population (Reus-Smit 2007; Zürn 2018; Tallberg et al. 2018). In this case, a researcher develops a measure of legitimacy beliefs and examines the extent to which people in a given audience consider a governance arrangement to be legitimate.

This book undertakes a sociological-empirical analysis of the legitimacy perceptions held by citizens and elites in various concrete contexts around the world. Our primary aim is to understand whether, how, and why people have these legitimacy beliefs, not to evaluate whether the IOs we study should be judged as legitimate in view of certain normative theories about rightful rule. That said, we recognize that sociological and normative conceptions of legitimacy may be empirically related while still being analytically distinct (Keohane 2006; Bernstein 2011; Beetham 2013). The normative may shape the sociological if people's legitimacy beliefs toward a governing institution are shaped by the philosophical principles that circulate in a given historical context. Conversely, the sociological may shape the normative if the development of political philosophy is sensitive to broader trends in societal views and norms.

Our third key concept, "citizens," refers to the overall population in a country. Citizens are political subjects: i.e., persons with an age and wherewithal to have rights and responsibilities as members of a collective life, or a "public" (Dewey 1927). Hence, in this book, we speak interchangeably of "citizens" and "the general public." In modern political theory, citizenship is mostly associated with the territorial state, so that "citizenship" is equivalent to "nationality." In this book, we understand citizens to be the collective of people who are subject to and affected by global governance arrangements, irrespective of their nationality. In effect, this conception more or less covers all of contemporary humanity, since, for example, WTO rules impact the prices in shopping baskets around the world, and WHO (in)actions touch everyone exposed to global diseases. Bodies like the World Bank also have near-universal membership from countries all over the planet.

A fourth key concept in this book, "elites," refers to people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential (Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Khan 2012). Most studies of elite opinion in world politics focus exclusively on political elites (e.g., Hooghe 2002; Binder and Heupel 2015; Persson et al. 2019); however, our study also encompasses wider societal elites, since both governmental and nongovernmental actors aspire to shape global governance. In this conception, "political" elites occupy the formal decision-making positions in governance. Political leaders include both the senior officials who operate the institutions of governance and the politicians who decide upon the policies that the bureaucracy elaborates and implements. Meanwhile, "societal" elites hold leadership positions outside of governance institutions. These players include senior academics, civil society organizers, business executives, and media commentators. Societal elites feed prominently into policy deliberations—and sometimes also participate more directly in governance processes.

Elites merit particular attention in the study of global governance. These leaders generally have the greatest access and inputs to the process. Elites are primary players in shaping opinions (Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021), providing research (Haas 1992; Allan 2017), injecting or withholding funds (Goetz and Patz 2017, Dellmuth et al. 2021), lobbying for influence (Scholte 2011; Tallberg et al. 2018), and making and executing policies (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Hawkins et al. 2006). In short, no global governance can transpire without the engagement of elites, and these leaders heavily influence the particular directions that global governance takes.

To be sure, elites are also citizens. Political and societal leaders are part of the citizenry rather than a separate category. However, elites are but a small proportion of the general public, since most people are not policymakers, corporate executives, media influencers, civil society mobilizers, and academic experts. Thus, although citizen beliefs include elite beliefs, the vast majority of citizens are so-called "ordinary people," and measures of public opinion relate overwhelmingly to non-elites.

Theory: An Individual-Level Approach

In this book, we develop an individual-level approach to explaining citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We start from the assumption that individual-level factors can explain social outcomes such as legitimacy. Consequently, we theorize why individuals with varying characteristics think differently about IO legitimacy, and attribute variation in citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs to differences in characteristics that matter for attitudes toward IOs. As described earlier, we distinguish this individual-level approach from organizational- and societal-level explanations, which locate the sources of legitimacy in the

features of governing institutions and in the wider social order, respectively (Tallberg et al. 2018: Chapters 3–5). At the same time, our selection of IOs and countries allows us to assess individual-level explanations in diverse organizational and societal contexts. Thus, in the interpretations of our results, we discuss the role that IO and country conditions may play in shaping explanatory patterns observed at the individual level.

Our individual-level approach has several advantages. First, it recognizes that legitimacy is a belief in the minds of individuals and varies between individuals, thus calling for an examination of the individual conditions that shape people's attitudes. Second, this approach provides significant distinctive insights, complementary to but also different from organizational and societal explanations. It adopts the individual as the basic building block, theorizes the individual characteristics that shape people's legitimacy beliefs, and explains variation among citizens, among elites, and between the two groups based on the distribution of individuals with these theorized characteristics. Third, this approach allows us to engage in a dialogue with scholarship in comparative politics, international relations, and EU studies about the types of individual-level features that matter for international attitudes (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017).

Within this individual-level approach, we focus specifically on four lines of explanation, relating respectively to socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. We select these four angles, as each emphasizes one central dimension of an individual: their material standing, value orientation, social identification, and institutional trust. Bringing these complementary explanations together in one integrated framework also favors comprehensiveness, as we cover perhaps the most important ways that individuals differ from each other with implications for legitimacy beliefs. However, in order to account for the possibility that other individual-level characteristics might influence legitimacy beliefs as well, our empirical analysis also considers a number of alternative explanations.

To elaborate briefly on our framework, a first line of explanation considers the role of socioeconomic factors in shaping legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. This argument draws on research that emphasizes utilitarian calculation and people's position in the economy as central to the formation of opinions on global issues (Gabel 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Rodrik 2018). We build on this logic to suggest that the ways in which people are positioned to benefit materially from IOs can help to explain their legitimacy beliefs toward these organizations.

Thus, we would expect that citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs vary depending on an individual's socioeconomic (dis)advantages. When citizens or elites are more well endowed in terms of socioeconomic resources such as

education and income, they are better positioned to benefit from globalization and more likely to regard IOs as legitimate. Similarly, attention to differences in socioeconomic status may help us explain any gaps in legitimacy beliefs between citizens and elites. If elites are more socioeconomically advantaged than citizens, and more often belong to the winners of globalization than citizens, such differences should translate into systematic differences between elite and citizen views of IO legitimacy.

Our second line of explanation looks at political values. Here we build on a literature which argues that attitudes toward global governance arise from ideological orientations (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; de Wilde et al. 2019). On the one hand, we examine political values in relation to the classic left–right spectrum; on the other, we consider a more recent ideological axis in society and politics which captures issues that often fit poorly on the left–right continuum. This distinction juxtaposes green alternative liberal (GAL) values and traditional authoritarian nationalist (TAN) values. Extending earlier theorizing, we suggest that individuals who hold left-wing and GAL values are more likely to be supportive of international cooperation than individuals who hold right-wing and TAN values.

Based on this logic, we would expect that legitimacy beliefs among citizens and elites vary depending on whether individuals hold left-wing rather than right-wing values and/or GAL rather than TAN values. By the same token, this logic would attribute gaps in legitimacy beliefs between elites and citizens to systematically different political values in these groups. If elites are more prone to hold left-wing and GAL values compared to citizens, they are expected to find IOs more legitimate than citizens. The recent wave of right-wing and TAN populism around the world suggests that the contemporary general public may indeed be more susceptible to anti-globalist ideology.

Our third line of explanation focuses on geographical identification. It suggests that legitimacy beliefs toward IOs are a function of the geographical spheres to which individuals feel attached. This expectation draws on research concerning social identity in general, and political-geographical identification in particular, as a source of attitudes toward global issues (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Rosenau et al. 2006; Norris 2009; Verhaegen et al. 2018). Individuals with a more global identification are assumed to favor global governance more, because it links political authority with the global community to which they feel attached, whereas individuals who feel closer to their country tend to view IOs as a lower priority or even as a threat to national identity and autonomy.

In line with this logic, we would expect that citizens and elites hold stronger legitimacy beliefs toward global governance when they feel closer to the world and less close to their country. In a similar vein, this logic would explain elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs by pointing to systematically more global identification (and less national identification) among elites as compared to citizens at large.

Elites are more likely to gain global exposure than the average citizen, which may foster greater global identification, and people who already identify more with the global sphere are probably more likely to seek elite positions.

Our fourth line of explanation emphasizes political trust, in particular, linkages between trust in domestic and international governance institutions. Here we draw on a literature that shows strong correlations between levels of trust in domestic political institutions and IOs: the more that people perceive their national political system to be legitimate, the more they perceive IOs to be legitimate as well. Previous research attributes this link to a variety of mechanisms, including people's use of heuristics to form opinions about institutions they know less well and people's general trust predispositions (e.g., Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Harteveld et al. 2013; Voeten 2013; Persson et al. 2019; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021).

Based on this logic, we would expect differences in domestic institutional trust to translate into corresponding differences in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Citizens and elites who are more trusting of domestic political institutions are also more likely to find IOs legitimate. Extending this logic to the issue of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs, we would expect such divides to derive from systematic differences between these two groups in terms of their respective trust in domestic political institutions. Because of their advantaged positions in politics and society, elites are more likely to have positive views of domestic governing institutions than citizens in general. Elites, after all, have more access to those institutions and greater possibilities to influence them.

Our framework conceives of these four lines of explanation as complementary. It is common in current debates in comparative politics, international relations, and EU studies to pit these accounts against each other, as if explanations around socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust are in competition. In contrast, we are open to the possibility that all four arguments contribute explanatory power and show the benefits of an individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs.

Research Design: Coordinated Surveys

Our book offers the first large-scale empirical study of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, covering multiple countries and multiple IOs. To obtain data in respect of the research questions and theories elaborated above, we undertook two coordinated international surveys between 2017 and 2019. We collected evidence regarding citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance by placing a set of questions in the 7th Wave of the WVS (WVS7). We gathered data for elite attitudes by conducting our own elite survey, in the context of the

LegGov program. Coordinating questions between the two surveys means that we ask identical questions to both citizens and elites and can thereby directly compare the results, in particular whether, how and why citizens and elites differ in their levels of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis global governance.

In terms of IOs, the surveys examine citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward six organizations: the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. Given our focus on IOs as pivotal players in global governance, we have selected these six IOs because they exhibit certain key similarities and differences. All are global IOs with worldwide membership, and all qualify as leading institutions within their respective policy domains. At the same time, these IOs vary in ways that may matter for legitimacy beliefs. Notably, three of them are involved in economic governance, broadly defined (IMF, World Bank, WTO), while another three are engaged in human security governance, broadly defined (ICC, UN, WHO). In addition, these IOs have diverse procedures and varying performances, which may influence how people perceive their legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

As for our country selection, we examine citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward these IOs in five countries: Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. Our original intention was also to cover South Africa, but unfortunately the WVS7 did not happen in this country as planned. As we have collected elite data in South Africa, we discuss patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs in this country in the descriptive analysis of elite legitimacy beliefs in Chapter 4. The selected countries offer diversity in multiple contextual conditions that may impact citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as differences between them. These societal-level factors include widely varying economic conditions, political regimes, geopolitical positions, and specific experiences of the six IOs in question. Within each country, the WVS7 polled a nationally representative sample of the citizen population, while the LegGov elite survey used quota sampling to examine the opinions of leaders in the spheres of business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research.

To capture perceptions of IO legitimacy, the two surveys measure respondents' "confidence" in the organizations. The confidence measure of legitimacy has two distinct advantages. First, it aligns well with our conceptualization of legitimacy as the belief that a governing institution has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately. "Confidence" taps into respondents' general faith in an institution, beyond short-term satisfaction with specific processes or outcomes. Second, the confidence measure allows us to link our study to a large body of literature on public opinion that uses this indicator of legitimacy. Confidence, along with trust, has emerged in political science research as a common way to measure legitimacy beliefs (e.g., Caldeira 1986; Newton and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2009; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011; Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth et al. 2019).

Other survey questions for our study relate to the respondents' socioeconomic situation, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. The surveys thereby provide us with the data necessary to examine the lines of explanation in our individual-level approach to legitimacy. Further survey items gather information on matters such as age, gender, and knowledge about global governance that serve as controls in our analyses. Our research methods are further elaborated in the next chapter.

Findings and Implications

The central findings of this book are threefold. First, our analyses reveal a significant and consistent elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites overall hold moderately high levels of confidence toward the studied IOs, the general public on the whole has relatively lower assessments. On average, elites have substantially higher levels of confidence in IOs than citizens. This gap between elite and citizen views exists for all six IOs, for four of the five countries, and for all six elite sectors. Yet these elite–citizen differences in confidence are not unique for IOs: similar gaps prevail in attitudes toward national governments. This pattern indicates that both global and national politics experience a divide in the legitimacy that elites and citizens accord to governing institutions.

Second, we observe strong support for our individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs. Across all of the analyses, we find substantial verification of our four theorized individual-level drivers of legitimacy beliefs: socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. These results indicate that the legitimacy beliefs toward IOs of both citizens and elites are shaped by the same array of individual-level factors. Moreover, the gap in elite–citizen legitimacy toward IOs can also be attributed to systematic differences in these four factors. In contrast, we do not find support for a range of other individual-level factors that are sometimes expected to shape legitimacy beliefs, including gender and knowledge about global governance.

Overall, domestic institutional trust enjoys the broadest explanatory power of the four individual-level explanations. Particularly among citizens, and often also among elites, trust in domestic political institutions is strongly related to confidence in IOs. In addition, differences between citizens and elites in their respective levels of trust in domestic political institutions provide the most consistent explanation of corresponding gaps in IO confidence.

Socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identities also help to explain variation in IO confidence among citizens and elites. While these three accounts generally hold less systematic explanatory power than domestic institutional trust, they are all relevant in several country and IO contexts and

sometimes present the strongest explanations. These results suggest that our four individual-level drivers are complementary rather than competing in accounting for IO legitimacy beliefs.

Third, we find interesting variation in patterns and sources of legitimacy beliefs across IOs and countries, suggesting that organizational and societal contexts condition attitudes toward global governance alongside the individual factors. We observe such variation in terms of average confidence in specific IOs and countries, and with regard to the drivers of confidence levels in particular IOs and countries. Both citizens and elites differentiate between organizations when expressing their confidence in IOs. IOs engaged in human security governance (ICC, UN, WHO) tend to enjoy more confidence than IOs engaged in economic governance (IMF, World Bank, WTO). Among the six IOs, citizens as well as elites have the most confidence in the WHO and the least confidence in the IMF. Likewise, the confidence of citizens and elites in IOs varies across countries. Citizens in the Philippines and Germany generally have more confidence in IOs than citizens in Brazil, the US, and especially Russia. The pattern among elites is broadly similar to that among citizens, with the exception that elites in Brazil have the most confidence in IOs, and the Philippines drops to third place.

IO and country contexts also shape the explanatory power of our four individual-level sources of legitimacy beliefs. With respect to IOs, the distinction between human security and economic IOs again comes to the fore. Political values have explanatory power mainly in relation to the three economic IOs, likely because the policies of these organizations evoke people's ideological sentiments. Socioeconomic status and geographical identification, too, tend to matter most in relation to the economic IOs. In contrast, domestic institutional trust has explanatory power across all IOs.

Notable differences in explanatory power across our four logics also arise with respect to countries. Socioeconomic status is a particularly powerful explanation in the US. Political values are especially important in explaining IO legitimacy beliefs in Brazil and the US. Geographical identification is a particularly prominent explanation of IO legitimacy beliefs in Russia and the US. Domestic institutional trust matters in four of the five country contexts, with the exception of the US.

In sum, our analysis shows that citizens on average accord moderately low legitimacy to IOs, while elites on average hold moderately high legitimacy beliefs. This difference in perspective produces a notable elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. To explain this gap in legitimacy beliefs—as well as variation among citizens and among elites—all four of our posited individual-level drivers are relevant, albeit to different extents depending on the IO and the country in question.

These findings have several important ramifications for research and policy. Starting with a significant methodological implication, our study shows the rich possibilities for worldwide comparative survey research on legitimacy in global

governance. To be sure, surveys have limitations, for example, by applying uniform question formulations to culturally diverse circumstances and by generating rough quantitative measures that gloss over fine-grained qualitative details. Still, this book shows that global survey data offer great rewards in terms of directly comparable evidence that covers multiple countries and social sectors in relation to multiple IOs. While legitimacy perceptions are less readily observable than many conditions in world politics, surveys present a way of making these complex beliefs empirically tractable. Going forward, research would benefit from a broader survey coverage of countries and global governance institutions, as well as more extended time series.

Turning to theoretical implications, our findings speak against research that sets different explanations of legitimacy beliefs in contention with each other. In this vein, for example, international relations features a debate on whether economic or non-economic factors drive public opinion about international issues (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017). Relatedly, scholars in comparative politics debate the sources of contemporary anti-globalist populism, distinguishing between an economic and a cultural explanation (e.g., Mudde 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Rodrik 2018). In contrast, our study suggests that individual-level drivers related to socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust coexist and complement each other. Thus, the question for future research is not so much which explanation is most valid, but how several forces combine.

Another larger theoretical implication relates to levels of explanation. In this study, we have privileged explanations at the individual level and have discovered that the characteristics of individual citizens and elites significantly shape their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Thus, it is not enough, as much literature to date has done, to examine only institutional-level drivers of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, such as the purpose, procedures, and performance of the organizations (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020). Nor can we explain legitimacy in global governance exclusively in terms of societal-level factors, such as cultural norms, economic systems, and political regimes (e.g., Bernstein 2011; Gill and Cutler 2014; Scholte 2018). The individual level of explanation is (very) important. That said, the prevalence of variation in the significance of individual-level drivers between IOs and between countries suggests that institutional-level and societal-level factors also play a role in shaping legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Hence, the question for future research is perhaps not how individual, institutional, and societal forces compete for preeminence, but instead how they interrelate with each other.

Moving to political implications, our findings suggest neither a crisis for global governance nor a readiness for expansion. As we have shown, overall levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance are quite moderate. These levels do

not appear to indicate a profound legitimacy crisis for global governance, among either elites or the general public. Average confidence toward most IOs in most countries studied here is slightly higher than average confidence toward national governments. In addition, existing longitudinal assessments do not point to a secular decline in attitudes toward global governance (Tallberg 2021; Walter 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg forthcoming). At the same time, these levels of legitimacy are far from a full political endorsement of IOs: in certain countries and in relation to certain IOs, citizen legitimacy beliefs are starkly low, and even elites are skeptical in some settings. Thus, while current levels of legitimacy might not present a crisis, they also provide little ground for the expansion of global governance, however much pandemics, ecological changes, technological innovations, and other world-scale challenges might seem to call for such enlargement.

A particular political challenge going forward concerns the consequences of the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy. As suggested by the portrayal of international cooperation as a two-level game (Putnam 1988), citizen skepticism can be a major obstacle to enhanced global collaboration. Unless the elites who negotiate international rules can count on citizen support, they will be more reluctant to formulate ambitious policy goals and less able to secure domestic ratification and compliance. In addition, citizen skepticism toward existing IOs also clarifies why populist politicians can find it profitable to use anti-globalist discourse. In particular, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs offers a political resource for populist movements who charge that ruling circles are out of touch with "ordinary people."

Indeed, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, so clearly depicted in this book, may present a challenge for political representation. We see that the elites who lead the global governing generally have substantially more positive assessments of IO legitimacy than the citizens who are governed. Just how troubling this situation is from a normative perspective depends on one's conception of political representation and how elites handle this disconnect in legitimacy beliefs. If we expect elites to represent the views of citizens, in line with notions of substantive representation (Pitkin 1967; Achen 1978), then this elite–citizen gap poses a potential problem. However, it only becomes a normative deficiency if elites do not recognize these differences and fail to adjust governing accordingly, but instead pursue their own visions of global governance regardless of divergent public opinion.

In this sense, the elite–citizen gap vis-à-vis legitimacy in global governance poses a conundrum for democratic accountability. In a working democracy, political and societal leaders obtain and retain their power by answering to the publics whom they (the elites) affect. Accountability entails that the holders of power are transparent toward, consultative of, and monitored by impacted citizens—and make due reparations when their actions cause the public harm. The difficulty is that accountability relations are generally underdeveloped in global politics (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007; Black 2008; Scholte 2011, 2014).

Democratic deficits arise when insufficient mechanisms are in place to ensure that those who hold power in global spheres engage with and respond to citizens at large. If elites regard global governance differently than citizens at large—and lack adequate accountability to the general public—then the resulting citizen frustrations can nourish political unrest, as witnessed in a succession of resistance movements over the past century.

In terms of political responses, our research underlines an urgency for change in global governance. Medium levels of legitimacy do not help—and sooner hinder—the generation of increased resources, decisions, and compliance that are required to make global governance more effective. A substantial general elite–citizen legitimacy gap can work against democratic global governance. Yet the multiplicity of individual-level forces behind legitimacy beliefs—not to mention their likely complex interconnections with institutional- and societal-level drivers—suggests that any formula for positive change is probably multifaceted and varying across contexts.

Plan of the Book

The remainder of this book is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2, elaborating the research design, sets out how we empirically study legitimacy beliefs by surveying citizens and elites. In line with our individual-level approach, the chapter identifies and discusses different ways to measure legitimacy beliefs in the existing literature and opts for the indicator "confidence." The chapter then presents the selection of IOs and countries for the empirical investigation and provides background about how the chosen IOs and countries vary in ways that are potentially relevant for the formation of legitimacy beliefs. Informed by this selection, we then introduce the citizen data drawn from the WVS7 and the elite data based on the LegGov Elite Survey, and address questions of data quality and validity.

Chapter 3 is the first of six empirical chapters and focuses on citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Using data from the WVS7, it describes levels of, and variation in, citizen confidence toward our six focal IOs. Although mainly examining our five focal countries, for a broader comparison the chapter also considers evidence on confidence in IOs for a larger group of 45 countries in the WVS7. We first examine citizen legitimacy beliefs in the aggregate, covering all IOs and countries combined. Then we disaggregate the data in turn by IO, by country, by IO within each country, and by social groups of class, age, and gender.

Chapter 4 examines levels and patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs. It uses data from the LegGov Elite Survey on the same focal IOs and countries. Mirroring the descriptive analysis for citizens in Chapter 3, we start with elite legitimacy beliefs in

the aggregate, combining all IOs and countries, and then disaggregate the evidence by IO, by country, by IO within each country, and by elite sector. Since the LegGov survey covered a broader set of IOs than the WVS7, we are able to compare elite legitimacy beliefs toward our six core IOs with eight additional global governance institutions of various types. As mentioned earlier, this chapter also incorporates additional data on elite legitimacy beliefs in South Africa. In terms of elite sectors, the chapter compares the confidence levels toward IOs of business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research.

In Chapter 5, we build on the data from Chapters 3 and 4 to examine the size and patterns of the gap between elite and citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. As in the other two descriptive chapters, we first examine the elite–citizen legitimacy gap in the aggregate, covering all IOs and countries combined. Then we disaggregate the figures to identify variation in the size of the gap by IO, by country, by IO within country, by elite sector, and by IO within each elite sector.

Chapter 6 provides a full elaboration of our individual-level theoretical approach, as well as the four explanations that focus respectively on socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. For each explanatory logic, the chapter spells out expectations about citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as the gap in elite–citizen legitimacy. The final section of the chapter operationalizes each of the four logics in terms of a pair of indicators, which are then tested in the subsequent three empirical chapters. Whereas the first three empirical chapters describe levels and patterns of legitimacy beliefs among citizens, Chapters 7–9 turn to explaining this variation.

Chapter 7 examines the four individual-level explanations in relation to citizen data from the WVS7. The chapter begins by describing how the independent variables that operationalize these respective logics vary, and then presents the regression model that tests for significant associations. The explanatory analysis proceeds with a similar structure as the descriptive analysis: that is, we first examine the sources of citizen legitimacy beliefs in the aggregate (covering all IOs and countries). Then we disaggregate by IO, by country, and by IO within each country. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

Chapter 8 examines possible individual-level explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs. Using LegGov survey data, the chapter first describes variation in the measures used to operationalize the four main logics of explanation, and then presents the regression analysis by going through the same steps as Chapter 7. In addition to testing whether and how socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust are related to confidence in IOs, the chapter also investigates how elites' professional characteristics (i.e., sector, issue focus, work orientation, and IO experience) are related to confidence in IOs. We conclude by discussing the main insights against the backdrop of the findings for citizens in Chapter 7.

Chapter 9 examines individual-level sources of the elite–citizen gap that was described in Chapter 5. How far do our four privileged logics (regarding socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust) explain why elites on average consider IOs to be more legitimate than the overall population? Empirically, we employ a dyadic modeling strategy whereby each elite respondent from the LegGov Elite Survey is matched to each citizen respondent from the WVS7 in the country in question. The analysis then assesses whether differences between elites and citizens in these four sets of characteristics have a statistically significant relationship with elite–citizen differences in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

To conclude the book, Chapter 10 recapitulates the overall findings of our study and discusses their broader implications for research and policy. We particularly focus on lessons for the empirical study of legitimacy, for explanatory theories of legitimacy beliefs, for democracy in global governance, and for the future of international cooperation.

2
Researching Legitimacy Beliefs

Studying citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance involves a number of key decisions on research design. How to identify and measure legitimacy beliefs? How to select the coverage of IOs and countries? How to collect evidence of citizen and elite opinion, and ensure that the data are comparable? This chapter discusses how our study has handled such methodological questions.

The core of our method consists of standardized survey interviews. While other tools are available for collecting information on legitimacy beliefs—including in-depth personal interviews and content analysis of public statements—the survey approach has several advantages. First, this method allows us to cover—and look for patterns in—a large number and diverse range of people. Second, asking standardized questions across several surveys enables direct comparisons, in this case, between elite attitudes and overall public opinion. Third, surveys conducted under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality are more likely to reveal privately held views than speeches and interview "performances." Fourth, carefully formulated survey questions provide evidence of general assumptions and values, whereas remarks in public statements and open-ended interviews often relate to specific situations. To be sure, standardized surveys with quantified response categories also have certain limitations. For example, we cannot know exactly how respondents interpret closed questions, nor what experiences they draw upon when selecting their answers. However, large-n surveys are superior to other methods for identifying a broad phenomenon (in this case, legitimacy beliefs across the general population) and determining overall dynamics behind that phenomenon (in this case, the drivers of legitimacy beliefs).

The rest of this chapter elaborates on our formulation and execution of the survey design in four respects. The first section addresses our choice of measure for capturing legitimacy beliefs. We discuss four alternative ways to conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy beliefs: namely, justification, approval, acceptance, and multidimensional approaches. We then give our reasons for preferring the approval approach, including its operationalization in terms of "confidence" in IOs. We indicate the advantages of this measure of legitimacy beliefs, in terms of conceptual fit, research purpose, and scientific accumulation.

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The second section of the chapter focuses on our selection of IOs and countries. We indicate why our study concentrates on the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO, as well as why we examine country contexts in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States. Broad diversity in the selection of IOs and countries enables us to pursue multidimensional comparisons in our descriptive and explanatory analyses.

The third section of the chapter reviews our collection of data on citizen legitimacy beliefs. We describe our cooperation with the WVS Association on a new battery of survey questions concerning global governance and discuss the methodology of the WVS7. We elaborate how the survey was implemented in our five focal countries in terms of sampling, timing, and interview process. We discuss the demographics of the sample (age, gender, education), as well as levels of citizen knowledge about global governance.

The fourth section offers a similar overview of our data collection on elite legitimacy beliefs. We describe our own elite survey, whose questions match relevant items in the WVS7. We implemented this survey through a combination of in-house work at LegGov and collaboration with partners in the countries concerned. We detail the choices that informed our construction of the elite sample, as well as the execution of the elite interviews. As with the citizen survey, we discuss the demographics and knowledge levels of the elite sample.

Measuring Legitimacy Beliefs

A first-order issue for any empirical research on legitimacy is to operationalize this key concept. Previous studies have adopted multiple approaches to this challenge. Each alternative has its strengths and weaknesses, and all involve an element of simplification. In the words of another research team, "'legitimacy' belongs to the family of abstract concepts that are hard to measure directly" (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 790). Yet, as another legitimacy researcher puts it, "[T]he complexity of a concept is neither a valid objection nor an insuperable obstacle to its measurement" (Gilley 2006: 500).

Here we distinguish between four alternative ways that researchers can conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy beliefs.[1] While all four focus on individuals and their attitudes, each approach arises from a different conception of legitimacy, which leads to different suggestions of measures to use in empirical research. We conclude by explaining why we prefer the approval approach and, relatedly, why we select the confidence measure as our prime indicator of legitimacy beliefs.

[1] A fifth approach conceives of legitimacy in terms of institutional loyalty. This perspective stresses that opposition to fundamental structural and functional changes to an institution captures the deep-seated institutional commitment inherent in the concept of legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 1995; Gibson et al. 1998, 2003). We omit further discussion of this approach since, thus far, it has only been used in relation to national high courts.

First, with a *justification approach*, researchers understand legitimacy as a person's perception that a governing power conforms to certain normative criteria. In this perspective, legitimacy involves the endorsement of a governance arrangement through moral justification of its rule (Beetham 1991; Agné 2018). With this approach, scholars draw on normative political theory to determine which justifications constitute grounds for legitimacy. Researchers then undertake empirical studies to examine whether individuals believe that one or the other governing power (e.g., a state or an IO) conforms to these justifications. For example, in this vein, Esaiasson et al. (2012) measure legitimacy beliefs as subjects' perceptions that a governing institution's procedures are fair. Using different indicators, Bernauer and Gampfer (2013) examine subjects' assessments of transparency, representation, skill, and expertise in global climate governance. Agné et al. (2015) look at subjects' perceptions that an IO conforms to (or violates) standards of representation, deliberation, and accountability.

Second, with an *approval approach*, researchers understand legitimacy as a deep-seated endorsement of a governing power. This approach reflects Easton's (1965, 1975) conceptualization of legitimacy beliefs in terms of diffuse support, as distinct from specific support. Diffuse support refers to "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed" (Easton 1965: 273). This foundational faith in a ruler is distinct from specific support for an authority that rests only on particular policies or actions. From an approval perspective, legitimacy beliefs involve more durable and fundamental backing of a governing power. The grounds for this approval lie with individuals' subjective attitudes rather than with a political theorist's judgement of what counts as the "right" reasons for support, as in the justification approach. Empirical research following the approval approach has usually operationalized legitimacy in terms of "confidence" or "trust." While asking individuals about their "support" for an authority presents an alternative indicator, it is usually discarded in research on legitimacy, as "support" can involve self-interest and short-term specific concerns rather than deeper attachment (Dellmuth and Schlipphak 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

Third, with an *acceptance approach*, researchers conceptualize legitimacy beliefs in terms of willingness to defer to a governing power. This notion of legitimacy emphasizes consent, acceptance, deference, obedience, and compliance (e.g., Bodansky 1999; Tyler 2006). In this vein, Levi et al. understand legitimacy as "a sense of obligation or willingness to obey authorities (value-based legitimacy) that then translates into actual compliance with governmental regulations and laws (behavioral legitimacy)" (2009: 354). These researchers then proceed to measure legitimacy beliefs as the extent to which people are willing to defer to ruling authorities. In a similar way, Anderson et al. (2005) examine the legitimacy of political systems based on the degree to which losers in elections accept outcomes and extend their consent to the new regime.

Fourth, with a *multidimensional approach*, researchers combine the other three approaches. This perspective holds that legitimacy incorporates several aspects, including justification, approval, and acceptance, and therefore cannot be reduced to a single measure. This approach was particularly influential in comparative politics studies in the 1990s and 2000s that sought to explain a perceived decline in the legitimacy of national political systems around the world (Weatherford 1992; Norris 1999; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson 2009). In the context of the UN, Norris (1999) measures five components of political legitimacy: attitudes toward political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors. Similarly, Gilley (2006) examines three components of "state legitimacy" when testing indicators of legality, justification, and consent in domestic politics. In the study of global climate governance, Anderson et al. (2019) measure legitimacy using five items that capture substantive support, principled approval, and deference.

In this book, we rely on the approval approach in general and the confidence measure in particular. Across all descriptive and explanatory chapters, we use individuals' confidence in IOs as our preferred measure of legitimacy beliefs. This choice does not reflect a principled rejection of alternative strategies, but rather a recognition of the comparative advantages of this operationalization in terms of conceptual fit, research purpose, and scientific accumulation.

Regarding conceptual fit, the confidence measure aligns well with our understanding of legitimacy as the belief that a governing power has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately. By capturing individuals' underlying commitment to a governance arrangement, "confidence" taps into a reservoir of foundational support. Confidence entails a sense of deeper faith in and attachment to a ruling authority. In this vein, Gibson et al. show empirically that confidence in the US Supreme Court reflects diffuse support and not specific support for certain rulings (2003: 361).

Regarding our research purpose, the confidence measure has advantages when studying drivers and/or outcomes of legitimacy, because it does not integrate into the indicator either potential sources of legitimacy (such as fairness or effectiveness) or potential consequences of legitimacy (such as acceptance or compliance). Relying on an approval approach and the confidence measure thereby avoids a conflation of the content of legitimacy with its causes or effects (Mishler and Rose 2001: 40–1; Booth and Seligson 2009: 12).

Regarding scientific accumulation, using a consistent indicator of legitimacy facilitates the growth of knowledge (Dellmuth 2018). A large existing literature employs the confidence measure; hence, using this indicator enables us to relate the findings of our current study to wider research (e.g., Caldeira 1986; Newton and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2009; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011; Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2021). In addition, the confidence measure aligns our design with other parts of the LegGov

program, which analyze processes and consequences of legitimacy (Bexell et al. 2022; Sommerer et al. 2022).

We measure confidence through questions in the WVS7 and the LegGov Elite Survey. In each case, respondents are asked:

> *I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: a great deal of confidence (3), quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence (1) or none at all (0)?*

The interviewer then specifies in turn the UN, the IMF, the ICC, the World Bank, the WHO, and the WTO. Thus, the surveys yield six confidence measures, one for each IO, on a scale of 0–3. We proceed to calculate a respondent's overall confidence in IOs by adding the six values for individual IOs and dividing by six. As identical questions measure confidence in IOs in the citizen and elite surveys, we can compare responses between the two groups and uncover a possible elite–citizen legitimacy gap.

Selection of IOs and Countries

We analyze citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance based on a careful selection of IOs and countries. With these samples, we aim to ensure diversity in contextual conditions that may matter for legitimacy beliefs. When we observe commonalities in findings across diverse IOs and diverse countries, we can be more confident that we are capturing general dynamics. Conversely, when we note differences in results between IOs and between countries, we explore contextual conditions that could generate such variation. Yet our samples are not construed to be representative. Our six selected IOs are well-known and politically important global IOs, but people's attitudes toward these prominent cases do not necessarily reflect their views of global governance in general. Likewise, a selection of five countries—even when they differ across multiple dimensions—cannot encompass the world's full diversity.

Selection of IOs

Around 330 institutions meet the three standard criteria of an intergovernmental organization: namely, a *formal* entity with *states* as members and a level of *institutionalization*, such as a permanent secretariat (Pevehouse et al. 2020). IOs vary widely in terms of membership and policy scope. Some IOs have universal or cross-regional membership (global IOs), while others involve member states from the same world region (regional IOs). Likewise, some IOs address a broad

range of policy areas (general-purpose IOs), while others focus on a particular field (issue-specific IOs).

Our study focuses on citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward six IOs: the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. This selection derives from six considerations: global scope, significance, visibility, contestation, issue coverage, and institutional features. The six IOs show relevant similarities on the first four points, while they show important differences on the last two.

First, regarding global scope, all six organizations have worldwide (and in most cases nearly universal) membership. They present instances of genuinely *global* governance. A focus on global (to the exclusion of regional) IOs helps if we wish to compare legitimacy beliefs toward the same set of organizations in countries spread across different world regions. All of our six selected IOs are parts of the UN system, as either core institutions (UN), specialized agencies (IMF, World Bank, WHO), or related organizations (ICC, WTO).

Second, regarding significance, all six IOs are leading global governing institutions in their respective policy domains of development, finance, health, human rights, security, and trade. These organizations have wide-ranging and deeply felt effects. Thus, the legitimacy or otherwise of these six IOs has particular consequence for the capacity of global governance to impact critical societal problems.

Third, regarding visibility, all of our selected IOs are relatively conspicuous to both elites and citizens at large. They appear regularly in the media and public discussion. Awareness of a governance institution's existence is required in order for individuals to form legitimacy beliefs toward it. True, the precise degree of familiarity can vary with contextual circumstances, such as the extent to which an IO is active in one's country. Still, our data (detailed later in this chapter) confirm general citizen and elite awareness of these six IOs.

Fourth, regarding contestation, all of these IOs have attracted notable political debate, making them particularly interesting cases for a study of legitimacy. Sometimes these disputes over legitimacy have prompted parties to reject membership (of the ICC), withhold resources (from the UN and WHO), reduce participation (in the WTO), or take to street protests (against the IMF and World Bank). Given such contestation, we can expect variations in levels of legitimacy beliefs toward these six IOs among survey respondents, differences that are then interesting to explain.

Fifth, regarding issue coverage, our six selected IOs govern different policy fields, raising the question whether levels and sources of legitimacy beliefs vary by issue orientation. Three of the IOs address economic concerns: money and finance (IMF), development (World Bank), and trade (WTO). The three other IOs handle human security concerns: health (WHO), peace (UN), and criminal violence (ICC). Our selection therefore invites comparisons between economic and

human security IOs, as we indeed repeatedly undertake in the empirical chapters of this book.

Sixth, regarding institutional features, our six focal IOs vary in the nature of their authority, their decision-making procedures, and their policy outcomes. Concerning authority, for example, the IMF derives power particularly from economic conditionality, the UN particularly from resolutions, and the WTO particularly from dispute settlement. Concerning decision-making procedures, these IOs have different voting arrangements. Concerning policy outcomes, the six IOs differ in their capacities to develop ambitious programs, secure compliance, and achieve problem-solving impact. Our selected IOs variously struggle with deadlocked decision-making (UN, WTO), unequal distributional consequences (ICC, IMF), and limited impact on the ground (World Bank, WHO).

We now briefly introduce our six focal IOs, in alphabetical order. The ICC began operations in 2002 as a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. The ICC is open to all states and currently has 123 members. It is governed by an Assembly of States Parties, in which all member states have one vote. Among our five focal countries, Brazil and Germany are members of the ICC, while the Philippines, Russia, and the US are not. The US and Russia signed the founding treaty, but then did not ratify it. The Philippines became a member of the ICC in 2011, but withdrew in 2019 amidst President Duterte's claims that the court was prejudiced against him. As of 2021, the ICC has tried 30 cases (ICC 2021). Several governments in Africa have criticized the ICC for disproportionately prosecuting African leaders (Ssenyonjo 2018).

The IMF emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and serves as the principal IO for international cooperation on monetary and financial matters. The IMF supports countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties, provides technical assistance, and monitors the macroeconomic policies of its 190 member states. All five of our focal countries are members of the IMF. Brazil, the Philippines, and Russia have undergone Fund-sponsored structural adjustment programs, while Germany and the US have not. Votes in the IMF's decision-taking bodies are distributed in relation to a state's share in the capital of the Fund. On this formula, the US has the largest voting weight (currently 16.50 percent) (IMF 2021). Germany also holds a substantial voice (5.31 percent), while smaller votes go to Russia (2.59 percent), Brazil (2.22 percent), and especially the Philippines (0.43 percent). Since the 1980s, the IMF has regularly faced criticism about its conditionality, (mis)handling of financial crises, and policymaking processes (Woods 2007).

The UN was founded in 1945 and currently has 193 member states, including our five focal countries. As a general-purpose IO, its mandate inter alia covers peace and security, human rights, social issues, and sustainable development. The UN often spurs the development of new global norms, but frequently lacks the

means to deliver on expectations regarding implementation (Weiss and Thakur 2010; Roberts et al. 2021). The organization is governed by a General Assembly, involving all member states with one vote each, and a Security Council, where five states have a permanent seat and a veto, while ten further states are elected for two-year terms. Among our five focal countries, Russia and the US hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), while Brazil has acted as a nonpermanent member ten times, Germany six times, and the Philippines four times (UN 2019). Together with India and Japan, Brazil and Germany make up the Group of Four (G4) that has long demanded reform of the Security Council that would give them permanent seats.

The World Bank was also established at Bretton Woods, alongside the IMF, and currently has 189 member states, including our five focal countries. Originally mandated to help rebuild economies following the Second World War, its main focus subsequently shifted to development in the Global South. Today's World Bank Group comprises five bodies: the original International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and four subsequent additional agencies. Like the IMF, the World Bank distributes voting power in its main decision-making bodies based on the capital subscriptions of the member states. On this basis, the US has the largest proportion of votes (15.61 percent), followed by Germany (4.13), Russia (2.62), Brazil (2.11), and the Philippines (0.41). This voting arrangement, as well as many World Bank policies and projects, have regularly generated political controversy, particularly in the late twentieth century (Fox and Brown 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000).

The WHO was founded in 1948 as the principal global IO for promoting public health. It currently has 194 member states, including the five focal countries of our study. While the WHO is perhaps best known for its work fighting outbreaks of infectious disease, its activities also include monitoring public health, providing technical assistance, and developing health guidelines. The principal decision-making body of the WHO is the World Health Assembly, in which each member state has an equal vote. The WHO has received much credit for quelling once rampant diseases such as smallpox and polio, but its responses to epidemics and pandemics have often attracted debate (Hanrieder 2015).

The WTO started work in 1995 as the principal global IO for the regulation of international trade, building upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been in place since 1948. The WTO currently has 164 member states, including all of our five focal countries, and 25 observer governments. Its principal decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference, where all member states carry equal formal weight and decisions are taken based on consensus. The WTO has faced considerable contestation during its first quarter century, as manifested in mass street protests, the stranded Doha Round of trade negotiations, the spread of bilateral and

minilateral trade arrangements, and debates over its dispute settlement system (Gill 2015).

Selection of Countries

We now turn to our country selection of Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. As mentioned in Chapter 1, our original intention was also to cover another continent with South Africa, but the WVS7 did not transpire in that country as planned. Still, we include our elite survey data from South Africa in the descriptive analysis of Chapter 4.

In choosing these six countries we have sought to encompass a high degree of diversity. Most previous empirical studies of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance have focused on a single country or on several countries mainly in Europe and North America (e.g., Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). By covering a greater diversity of countries, we can be more confident that similar findings across dissimilar situations indicate general patterns, while divergent findings across different settings would suggest the importance of contextual factors in shaping legitimacy beliefs. Our selection of six countries covers diversity on six dimensions in particular: regional location, geopolitics, geo-economics, domestic regime, populism, and involvement with IOs.

First, with regard to world regions, our sample spans Africa, Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and North America. The supposition is that different regions may have distinctive positions in IOs, and people in these regions may have distinctive perspectives on IOs, for example, as a result of language, cultural heritage, geographical distance from IO head offices, and so on. In most cases, our selection involves a major country in the respective regions, though we also found it important to include a less prominent regional player with the Philippines.

Second, in geopolitical terms, the six countries include several established major states (Germany and the US), several (re-)emergent powers (Brazil, Russia, South Africa), and a peripheral state (the Philippines). The intuition is that people could view global governance differently depending on the relative influence of their state in IOs. In particular, established powers might wish to maintain a status quo in IOs that reinforces their traditional dominance, while (re-)emergent powers might oppose inherited IO arrangements that, in their eyes, fail to reflect changed geopolitical circumstances.

Third, with respect to geo-economics, following World Bank classifications, our selection includes high-income countries (Germany and the US), upper-middle-income countries (Brazil, Russia, and South Africa), and a lower-middle-income country (the Philippines). Our assumption is that the general material welfare of one's country could shape perceptions of global governance (Edwards 2009),

particularly economic IOs. For example, institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO could gain people's confidence for seeming to promote economic development or, on the contrary, could attract opposition for allegedly underpinning global inequalities.

Fourth, concerning domestic political regime, our sample countries have different degrees of democratic or authoritarian arrangements. On the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) spectrum, Germany and the US qualify as liberal democracies, Brazil and South Africa as electoral democracies, and the Philippines and Russia as electoral autocracies (V-Dem 2021). The suggestion is that people could regard institutions of the liberal international order differently depending on the character of their national political system. Our sample includes traditional champions of liberal multilateralism (Germany, US), as well as hardened critics (Russia).

Fifth, in relation to a more particular contemporary political trend, our surveys rolled out at a moment of rising populism around the world. Indeed, with Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Donald Trump in the US, three of our focal countries had just elected leaders with a pronounced anti-globalist rhetoric. In addition, albeit in a less pronounced fashion, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Jacob Zuma in South Africa periodically played populist anti-western and anti-imperialist cards. At the time of the survey, Germany witnessed the rise in its political fringes of a far-right populist party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). Our selection of countries therefore invites closer examination of the possible implications of populism for low citizen confidence in IOs and an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Finally, as discussed in the above descriptions of IOs, our six sample countries have had different engagements with global governance. The countries occupy contrasting institutional positions in the IOs, with some holding dominant roles and votes, while others inhabit the margins. Consequently, people in the respective countries may have different perspectives on specific IO policies, such as prosecutions by the ICC, disease control through the WHO, and neoliberal economics from the IMF.

Of course, we could have selected other countries to achieve our intended diversity of contexts: e.g., Argentina instead of Brazil; France instead of Germany; Nigeria instead of South Africa; and so on. In making the final selection between one country and another, we considered which countries would be included in the WVS7. In addition, our own personal acquaintance with the settings had some bearing, as did our professional networks in the countries that could support us, especially in executing the elite survey. Conceivably, we could have examined still more countries, in order to address still more variation in societal circumstances. However, our sample of six very diverse settings is already highly ambitious and

goes further than earlier studies. For additional country coverage, we urge further research.

Citizen Data

We now discuss how we have assembled data about confidence in our six selected IOs in our five chosen countries (plus South Africa in the elite survey). For data on citizens at large, we have relied on the WVS7 (May 2020 release) (Haerpfer et al. 2021). In this section, we describe how this survey was constructed and executed. We also provide a demographic overview of the WVS7 respondents in our five sample countries, as well as evidence concerning citizen knowledge of global governance.

The WVS7

As indicated in Chapter 1, we conceive of "citizens" as the overall adult population of a country. This pool of respondents includes people who reside in the country, but who are not formally citizens in the sense of legal nationality. Of course, the general public also includes elite persons, but since political and societal leaders form a small minority of the population, we can assume that the overlap between our citizen and elite surveys is minimal.

The WVS is the world's largest exercise in cross-national data collection on public opinion and is a widely used resource of survey data. Since its launch in 1981, the WVS has executed seven cycles, or "waves," of data collection. Over the years, the WVS coverage has expanded from 30 to 80 countries. Our citizen data come from the seventh wave of the WVS, carried out from 2017 to 2021. The interviews for our five focal countries were conducted in 2017–19, as detailed later.

Until the seventh wave, WVS coverage of IOs mainly addressed regional institutions. For instance, respondents in Germany were asked about the EU, while respondents in the Philippines were asked about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In terms of IOs with wider membership, the WVS previously only considered the IMF, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN. Even then, data for the IMF and NATO did not cover all countries (Dellmuth 2018). Thus, a full cross-national comparison of confidence in global IOs was previously only available in respect of the UN.

To overcome this limitation, we have contributed questions to the WVS7 on confidence in five additional global IOs: the ICC, IMF, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. Hence, for the first time, we have directly comparable public opinion survey data from around the world on six important global IOs.

Respondents

In each country, the WVS7 surveyed nationally representative samples of residents aged 18 or older through random probability sampling (Haerpfer et al. 2021). As an exception, Brazil had a lower cutoff age of 16 years. Random probability sampling gives all individuals in a population an equal chance to be selected for an interview.

More precisely, the WVS used multistage territorially stratified random selection in our five countries. Territorially stratified sampling is a technique that divides the entire population into different (territorial) subgroups or strata, in order to adequately cover the different regions in a country. Within each stratum, respondents are randomly selected proportional to the population's age and gender distribution. Nonresponses can still bias the sample. To overcome this issue, we use poststratification weights based on age and gender when analyzing the data so as to increase the representativeness of the samples.

The WVS7 sample sizes in our five countries comprise 1762 respondents in Brazil, 1528 in Germany, 1200 in the Philippines, 1810 in Russia, and 2596 in the US. While unequal sample sizes do not affect our ability to estimate confidence levels for each country individually, we reweight the samples when we pool (i.e., combine) the data for all five countries together. Otherwise, for instance, the 2596 responses in the US would weigh much more heavily in pooled averages than the 1200 responses in the Philippines.

Our five focal countries had different rates of interview completion: i.e., the percentage of invited respondents who took the full WVS7 survey. The rates were 88.1 percent in Brazil, 26.1 percent in Germany, 32.6 percent in the Philippines, 58.4 percent in Russia, and 48.3 percent in the US. Completion rate is an important indicator of data quality, since a lower rate of completion involves a higher risk of biased results (Dillman et al. 2014). However, the key point is whether the people who took the survey and the people who opted out differ in characteristics that affect the study results. As explained above, using weights for key characteristics such as age and gender can partially alleviate this issue. Additionally, carefully designed sampling and contacting procedures are important for limiting bias.

Survey Implementation

The survey mode varied somewhat across our five countries. In most cases, WVS country teams use face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). However, other methods include paper-and-pencil interviewing (PAPI), computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI), and regular mail. In the WVS7, interviewers used CAPI in Brazil; a mix of CAPI, CAWI, and regular mail in Germany; PAPI in the Philippines; a mix of CAPI and PAPI in Russia; and CAWI in the US.

Table 2.1 WVS7 methodology

	Brazil	Germany	Philippines	Russia	US
Interview Mode	CAPI	CAPI, CAWI, and regular mail	PAPI	CAPI and PAPI	CAWI
Sample size	1762	1528	1200	1810	2596
Field phase	15 May 2018–11 June 2018	25 Oct. 2017–31 March 2018	3 Dec. 2019–9 Dec. 2019	7 Nov. 2017–29 Dec. 2017	28 April 2017–31 May 2017
Languages	Portuguese	German	Bikol, Cebuano, Tagalog, Ikolo, Tausug, Waray, Hiligaynon	Russian	English

Note: For further information on methodology, see the online documentation of the WVS7 and the country reports (WVS 2020). See also Haerpfer et al. (2021).

The choice of survey mode is important. Many studies have found that self-administered modes such as CAWI tend to generate higher rates of socially undesirable behaviors or attitudes and lower rates of socially desirable answers (see Schaeffer and Presser 2003 for an overview). However, recent research suggests that surveys about politics produce remarkably similar results, irrespective of whether they are conducted online (such as CAWI), via telephone (such as CAPI), or via regular mail (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014). Given that our research addresses political issues, we are confident about the comparability of data collected using different survey modes.

The WVS7 fieldwork in our five countries spanned the period from October 2017 to December 2019. The interviews were completed within one week in the Philippines, four to seven weeks in Brazil, Russia, and the US, and five months in Germany. As seen in Table 2.1, the time frames do not coincide exactly. This divergence raises the issue of whether answers could be conditional upon the precise moment of the interviews. If so, this time sensitivity could limit our ability to compare legitimacy beliefs between citizens surveyed at different points in time.

However, our WVS7 data collection occurred during a period when no major events happened that could significantly alter attitudes toward IOs. All five country surveys were conducted well after the 2007–12 global financial crisis, and well before the COVID-19 pandemic. Domestically, none of the five countries experienced a crisis or change of government during their respective periods of WVS7

data collection. Hence, we can credibly compare responses within and between the country samples.

One exception arises in the Philippines regarding the ICC. On March 14, 2018, President Duterte announced his country's withdrawal from this organization, which was completed one year later on March 17, 2019, despite two petitions to the Philippines Supreme Court to halt the move. While the WVS team fielded the survey in the Philippines nine months after the withdrawal, we should bear in mind possible effects of this action on Philippine citizen confidence in the ICC (which showed to be quite solid, as we will see in Chapter 3).

Demographics

Further dissection of the WVS7 data shows the distribution of respondents with regard to age, gender, and level of education. In terms of age distribution, Figure 2.1 shows that WVS7 respondents are skewed toward people under 50 in four of our five focal countries. In contrast, the distribution across age categories is more even in the case of Germany.

With regard to gender, Figure 2.2 indicates that samples are relatively equally distributed between females and males in Germany, the Philippines,



Fig. 2.1 Age of WVS7 respondents
Note: Poststratification weights used.



Fig. 2.2 Gender of WVS7 respondents
Note: Poststratification weights used.

and the US. Relatively more women than men completed the questionnaire in Brazil and Russia, in the latter case probably reflecting the lower proportion of men relative to women in age groups over 40. Note that the WVS coding system for gender is binary and does not record other gender identities.

In terms of formal education, citizen respondents in the Philippines generally tend to have less qualifications, at lower secondary school or below. Brazil and Germany have the greatest concentrations at upper secondary level, although Brazil has a larger proportion of lower educated citizens, while Germany has a larger share of higher educated citizens. Russia and the US have the greatest concentrations of university-educated citizens (Figure 2.3).

Knowledge

Discussions of public opinion on global governance often raise the issue of citizen knowledge about the subject: How aware and informed are people when they evaluate the legitimacy of governance beyond the state? To explore this issue, the WVS7 includes a short quiz on this subject. An analysis of nonresponse to the questions about confidence in IOs provides an additional indication of citizen knowledge about global governance.



Fig. 2.3 Education level of WVS7 respondents

Note: Poststratification weights used. International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories: early childhood education (0), primary education (1), lower secondary (2), upper secondary (3), post-secondary non-tertiary (4), short-cycle tertiary (5), BA or equivalent (6), Master or equivalent (7), PhD or equivalent (8). In Brazil, codes 4 and 5 were not included in the questionnaire, and code 8 was not included in the Philippines. In the US, values for code 1 are missing (see the country documentation at www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

The WVS7 quiz comprises three items. The first question asks: *"Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India."* The second question asks: *"Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva."* The third question asks: *"Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments."* In order to be useful as a measure that can distinguish between more and less knowledgeable respondents, questions need to vary in difficulty (Pietryka and MacIntosh 2013). Respondents' answers on each item are coded as 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect), with "don't know" answers coded as incorrect (cf. Jessee 2017).

Around 43.7 percent of the citizens in the five countries correctly answered the question about the UNSC. Around 29.7 percent correctly answered the question about the location of IMF headquarters. Around 61.1 percent correctly answered the question about Amnesty International. Across the five countries, around 12.2 percent correctly answered all three questions, and 45.9 percent correctly answered two of the three questions. As seen in Figure 2.4, in each of the five focal countries except in Brazil, more respondents had two or three correct answers



Fig. 2.4 Number of correct answers on global governance knowledge quiz, WVS7 respondents

Note: Poststratification weights used.

than zero or one correct answers. On this evidence, citizens on average show notable levels of basic knowledge about global governance, perhaps more than skeptics might assume.

An analysis of the frequency with which WVS7 respondents express no opinion on questions of confidence in IOs also suggests that citizen awareness is sufficiently high for meaningful surveys of public opinion toward global governance. The WVS7 questions on confidence in IOs allowed respondents to skip a question if they did not want to indicate a substantive answer. In all of our focal countries, the interviewer coded such responses as "don't know." In the part of the WVS that was conducted in the US as an online survey without any interviewer involved, respondents could skip questions as well. We observe in Table 2.2 that 73.8 percent of the respondents in the five countries answered the confidence question for all six IOs. Yet there is considerable variation across the five countries, from 47.3 percent in Brazil to 93.1 percent in the Philippines, which suggests that some cultural contexts may encourage nonresponses more than others. With regard to individual IOs, the response rate was highest for the UN (88.3 percent) and lowest for the ICC (81.8 percent). These results indicate that we succeeded in our aim to select IOs that are relatively well known.

Still, a substantial proportion of WVS7 respondents did not express an opinion when asked about their confidence in IOs. Studies of item nonresponse in survey

Table 2.2 Proportion of citizens answering questions on IO confidence

	All IOs*	ICC	IMF	UN	WB	WHO	WTO
All	73.81	81.76	83.16	88.32	84.03	88.20	82.94
Brazil	47.33	57.04	64.76	71.51	65.38	76.33	65.44
Germany	70.75	86.06	84.16	91.56	84.69	89.99	80.56
Philippines	93.17	95.17	94.17	99.92	97.58	98.50	97.00
Russia	61.60	73.09	75.30	81.44	75.58	79.34	74.42
US	93.14	95.84	95.45	97.27	95.92	96.61	95.65

Notes: The percentage of respondents across countries and IOs who answered the confidence question in the WVS7. *The category "All IOs" shows what proportion of respondents answered the confidence question for all six IOs.

research show that expressing no opinion can mean various things. In some cases, the respondent really does not have an opinion. However, in other cases, the person may find the question too sensitive or may lack the motivation to think through a question that they find hard (Krosnick 1991).

Elite Data

Turning to our data on elites, here we could not tap into an existing survey such as the WVS for citizens, so we developed our own LegGov Elite Survey. In this section, we discuss the construction and execution of this survey, including our use of an applied quota sampling strategy. (For a full technical report, see Verhaegen et al. 2019.) As with the citizen data above, we provide information on the demographics of the elite sample, as well as evidence concerning levels of elite knowledge about global governance.

The LegGov Elite Survey was administered between October 2017 and August 2019 to 722 individuals across six elite sectors in six countries, with South Africa in addition to our five focal countries. We include the data from South Africa in our elite descriptive analysis (Chapter 4), as they broaden the coverage to another world region. However, we exclude the South Africa elite data from other parts of the book that involve comparisons with citizen data (Chapters 5, 8, and 9). There we concentrate on evidence from 599 elite interviews in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. To allow for direct comparison between citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, the LegGov survey asked exactly the same questions as the WVS7 on confidence in IOs and concerning other attitudes that, as elaborated in Chapter 6, we theoretically presume to be relevant for legitimacy beliefs in global governance.

Respondents

As introduced in Chapter 1, our study defines elites as "people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential." This conception encompasses both political leaders (in government bureaucracies and political parties) and societal leaders (in business, civil society, media, and research). Our elite survey covers not only specialists in global governance, but also political and societal leaders more generally.

Based on this conceptualization of elites, we obtained our survey respondents using a quota sampling strategy, in contrast to the random probability sample used in the WVS. Quota sampling is a suitable alternative in situations where it is impossible to compile an exhaustive database of the population (in this case, political and societal elites in the five selected countries) from which a random probability sample could be drawn. Our quota sampling procedure ensures that the respondents cover a wide variety of positions and contexts. However, unlike a random probability sample, we cannot extrapolate findings from a quota sample to the whole population in question (in this case, all elites in the respective countries).

We undertook our quota sampling in two steps. First, we selected relevant organizations in each country. Here we sought the advice of country specialists to complement our in-house expertise. In addition, we used inter alia participation and accreditation lists for the global governance institutions that are central to our study, and statistics on audience size for media organizations.

In the second step, we used a targeted selection procedure (Hoffmann-Lange 2009) to identify individuals holding coordinating or strategic functions in the selected organizations. We further aimed for people working on substantive issues, so excluding purely administrative management. Thus, for example, in the party-political category, we interviewed elected politicians or their senior advisors. In government bureaucracies, we invited senior figures in the civil service, the diplomatic corps, the judiciary, and the military. In business circles, we interviewed company managers, international relations officers, and senior communication staff. For civil society organizations, we addressed directors, strategic advisors, and leading activists. In the media arena, we approached editors and senior journalists. In the research category, we included professors and senior researchers at universities and think tanks.

We interviewed at least one hundred elites per country. Those hundred persons comprise at least 25 political party elites, 25 bureaucratic elites, 12 media elites, 13 civil society elites, 13 research elites, and 12 business elites. The quotas for the political elite sectors are higher than the societal elite sectors, since politicians and government officials are usually most directly involved in decision-making vis-à-vis IOs. In total, we interviewed 124 elite individuals in Brazil, 123 in Germany,

122 in the Philippines, 108 in Russia, 123 in South Africa and 122 in the US. The distribution of respondents across sectors in each country closely approximates the prescribed quotas. We also strived to achieve diversity in terms of the main orientation of the respondents' work (subnational, national or international) and the policy issues that they handle. Regarding political parties, we covered a broad ideological spectrum for each country, but conducted most interviews with the largest parties in the respective national legislatures.

The overall response rate for the elite survey was 31.2 percent. By country, the levels were 22.0 percent in Russia, 25.6 percent in the US, 35.0 percent in Germany, 37.8 percent in Brazil, 39.7 percent in South Africa, and 56.2 percent in the Philippines (Verhaegen et al. 2019). Response rates do not have implications for representativeness in the context of quota sampling. However, we record them as an indicator of the process of the elite survey. For an elite survey, our response rates are relatively high (Walgrave and Joly 2018).

Survey Implementation

We rolled out the elite survey mostly concurrently across the five countries (see Table 2.3). Four of the five countries started in October–November 2017, the exception being Russia, where it took longer to lay the groundwork. Quotas were reached for Germany in May 2018, Brazil in June 2018, the Philippines in October 2018, South Africa in November 2018, the US in May 2019, and Russia in August 2019.

These timings corresponded roughly with the execution of the WVS7 in the respective countries. In Brazil and Germany, the two surveys overlapped more or less exactly. In the Philippines, the elite survey took place one year before the citizen survey. In Russia and the US, the citizen survey occurred around a year before the elite survey. In the three countries where the timing of the two surveys did not match, no significant events happened during the in-between period that could affect the results.

The one notable exception, already mentioned earlier, concerns the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC. Our elite survey in the Philippines partially coincided with the departure process, while the citizen survey took place nine months after its completion. Moreover, Duterte announced the withdrawal midway through our elite survey. For this reason, we undertake additional analyses in later chapters to check whether elite attitudes in the Philippines toward the ICC shifted after this announcement.

Regarding language, we used the English version of the elite survey questionnaire for the Philippines, South Africa, and the US. Interviews in Brazil, Germany, and Russia used translations into Portuguese, German, and Russian, respectively. For the elite survey questions that also appear in the WVS7, we used verbatim

Table 2.3 LegGov Elite Survey methodology

	Brazil	**Germany**	**Philippines**	**Russia**	**South Africa**	**US**
Mode	CATI + CAWI	CATI + CAWI	CATI + CAWI	CATI + CAWI	CATI + CAWI	CATI + CAWI
Sample size	124	123	122	108	123	122
Field phase	October 2017–June 2018	October 2017–May 2018	November 2017–October 2018	November 2018–August 2019	November 2017–November 2018	October 2017–May 2019
Language	Portuguese	German	English	Russian	English	English
Research team	LegGov team in collaboration with researchers at the State University of Rio de Janeiro	LegGov team	LegGov team	LegGov team in collaboration with researchers at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow	LegGov team in collaboration with researchers at the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) at the University of Pretoria	LegGov team and online survey of political elites in collaboration with CivicPulse

Note: For further information on methodology, see the complete technical report on the LegGov Elite Survey (Verhaegen et al. 2019).

translations from the Portuguese, German, and Russian versions of the WVS7 questionnaire. For other items that are specific to our elite survey, we obtained translations from two independently working native speakers for each language. Where these two translations differed, we took the wording that came closest to the English original.

We conducted the elite survey interviews under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality in order to encourage candid responses and to respect the political exposure of individuals who often have high public visibility. Our preferred survey mode was by telephone (CATI) (77.5 percent of the interviews), with a backup self-administered online option if the respondent requested it (CAWI) (22.5 percent of the total). The full technical report on the elite survey provides further information on how we contacted the respondents (Verhaegen et al. 2019).

Demographics

Age, gender, and education distributions in the elite survey samples differ from those in the citizen samples. As seen in Figure 2.5, the mean age of the entire elite sample is 50 years and differs little across the five countries. However, the age distributions diverge somewhat, being more evenly spread in Brazil and



Fig. 2.5 Age of LegGov Elite Survey respondents

Note: Mean age per country: 51.2 in Brazil, 48.0 in Germany, 51.2 in the Philippines, 48.7 in Russia, 50.9 in the US.



Fig. 2.6 Gender of LegGov Elite Survey respondents

Note: One respondent identified as neither male nor female. This respondent is included in the "female" category as this is the non-dominant group.

Russia and more concentrated around middle age in the other three countries. Through a comparison with Figure 2.1, we see that the elite samples are generally older than the citizen samples from the WVS7. Not surprisingly, this contrast reflects a situation where people tend to reach elite positions at an older age.

In terms of gender, we observe in Figure 2.6 that just over two-thirds (68.1 percent) of respondents in the elite survey identify as male, in contrast to the more even gender distribution in the citizen survey. The elite sample in each of the five countries includes more male than female respondents. The imbalance is greatest in Brazil and Russia, while the Philippines comes closest to gender parity. As such, our survey reflects the generally observed gender inequality in elite circles.

Figure 2.7 presents the highest level of education completed by elites. Here, too, we observe stark contrasts with the citizen sample. In each of the five countries, the average level of education for elites lies at Master or equivalent, clearly higher than the average for the general population, as depicted earlier in Figure 2.3. We also observe some difference in elite levels of education across the five countries. Whereas virtually all interviewees in Germany and Russia have a Master's degree or higher, a substantial proportion of elites in the other three countries has not proceeded beyond a Bachelor's degree.



Fig. 2.7 Education level of LegGov Elite Survey respondents

Note: ISCED categories: early childhood education (0), primary education (1), lower secondary (2), upper secondary (3), post-secondary non-tertiary (4), short-cycle tertiary (5), Bachelor or equivalent (6), Master or equivalent (7), Doctor or equivalent (8).

Knowledge

To evaluate the elite survey respondents' awareness of global governance, we asked them the same three knowledge questions as presented in the WVS7. Figure 2.8 shows that in each country a clear majority of the respondents correctly answered all three questions. Across the five countries together, 61.9 percent of the elites did so. As one might expect, a comparison of Figures 2.4 and 2.8 shows that the elite respondents generally have greater knowledge about global governance than citizens at large.

Additionally, we evaluate how frequently the elite survey respondents did not express an opinion on the confidence questions regarding IOs. Table 2.4 shows that the vast majority of the elite respondents answered all of these questions, much more than the general public. Also, in contrast to the citizen samples, we observe no striking variation in levels of elite nonresponse across countries or IOs. This result could show that elites are sufficiently aware of IOs to form an opinion about them; yet it could also point to greater hesitation among elites to indicate that they do not have an opinion.

To explore the latter possibility, we examine elite responses to survey questions about confidence in an additional range of lesser-known global governance institutions. Here, we observe that far fewer respondents expressed a level of



Fig. 2.8 Number of correct answers on global governance knowledge quiz, LegGov Elite Survey respondents

Table 2.4 Proportion of elites answering questions on IO confidence

	All IOs*	ICC	IMF	UN	WB	WHO	WTO
All	87.81	92.65	96.83	99.17	96.99	97.33	96.49
Brazil	86.29	87.90	99.19	100.00	99.19	97.58	97.58
Germany	93.50	98.37	96.75	100.00	95.93	99.19	99.19
Philippines	86.89	92.62	95.90	99.18	96.72	97.54	94.26
Russia	85.19	90.74	95.37	99.07	96.30	94.44	96.30
US	86.89	93.44	96.72	97.54	96.72	97.54	95.08

Notes: The percentage of respondents who expressed a level of confidence in an IO. *The category "All IOs" shows what proportion of respondents answered the confidence question for all six IOs.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

confidence in the Kimberley Process (KP) (40.7 percent), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (50.8 percent), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (53.3 percent). This outcome suggests that respondents were quite ready to indicate if they did not have an opinion about a global organization.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how we have researched legitimacy in global governance for this book. As seen above, the design of our study has involved

important judgments and choices that affect the research process and its results. While other investigations of legitimacy in global governance can and have selected different methodological options, this chapter has detailed our particular decisions and the reasons behind them.

The chapter has particularly highlighted five points of research design. First, we selected synchronized standardized surveys as an advantageous method to research legitimacy beliefs across large populations with carefully formulated indicators and under relatively controlled conditions. Second, we decided to approach legitimacy in terms of approval—rather than justification or acceptance—and operationalized the concept with the indicator of "confidence." Third, we studied global governance in terms of international organizations and identified six IOs for particular attention. Fourth, for our pool of survey respondents, we focused on five/six countries that reflect broad cultural, economic, geographical, and political diversities in the contemporary world. Fifth, we took a host of further decisions when constructing and executing the surveys, for example, in the selection of the samples and the mode of interviewing.

The surveys yielded the evidence of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance that we now proceed to analyze in the rest of the book. To provide some general context for this analysis, the present chapter has sketched certain demographic patterns of the sample, including distribution of age, gender, and education levels. We have also examined the respondents' knowledge of global governance, in order to assess how informed their expressed opinions of IOs may be. Finally, we have considered how the timing of the survey might have affected its results.

In sum, our research design is, as it should be, careful, deliberate, and—by means of this chapter—transparent. The synchronized standardized surveys have generated an unprecedented breadth and precision of data concerning citizen and elite confidence in IOs. The next three chapters describe these findings about, respectively, citizen legitimacy beliefs, elite legitimacy beliefs, and the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy perceptions toward global governance.

PART II

MAPPING LEGITIMACY BELIEFS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

3

Mapping Citizen Legitimacy Beliefs

We now embark on our book's detailed descriptive empirical analysis of legitimacy beliefs in global governance. This chapter examines how far *citizens* accord legitimacy to IOs. The next chapter asks the same questions concerning *elite* perceptions of IOs, before Chapter 5 compares levels of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs to establish the extent of a possible gap between elite and citizen assessments of global governance. Across these three chapters, our survey evidence mainly focuses on the same six IOs and the same five countries.

As indicated in Chapter 1, we understand "citizens" to cover the overall adult population in society. We therefore refer interchangeably to "citizens" and "the general public," where "citizen beliefs" is equivalent to "public opinion." Certainly, the category "citizen" includes elites, the political and societal leaders whose legitimacy beliefs receive separate attention in Chapter 4. However, the vast majority of citizens are the "rank and file" of "ordinary people" who constitute the bulk of voters in elections, employees in business, consumers of media, participants in civil society, and subjects for research.

Citizen views of global governance have come into sharp relief in recent decades. IOs rarely attracted popular contestation between the 1940s and the 1960s, amidst raw memories of the Second World War, fears of nuclear annihilation, and broad support for UN sponsorship of decolonization and development. Since the 1970s, however, public debate around global governance has grown, starting with multilateral economic institutions and spreading to international cooperation more generally (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Walton and Seddon 1994; O'Brien et al. 2000; Colantone and Stanig 2019). Today, policymakers cannot afford to ignore citizen views on global governance. High levels of citizen legitimacy for global institutions could facilitate their expansion and impact, while low levels of citizen legitimacy could constrain governments' participation in multilateralism and complicate the local and national implementation of globally agreed policies. Hence, it is important to measure levels and patterns of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

Although the significance of citizen assessments of global governance is evident, systematically collected data on the subject are limited, as indicated in Chapter 1. Our battery of questions concerning confidence in IOs placed in the WVS7 provides a previously unavailable extent of evidence for citizen legitimacy beliefs

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance. Lisa Maria Dellmuth et al., Oxford University Press.
 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192856241.003.0003

toward global governance, covering multiple organizations, multiple policy fields, multiple countries, and multiple social categories (such as age, class, and gender) (Haerpfer et al. 2021). Thus, we are able not only to measure levels of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, but also to trace patterns of variation in these perceptions across different organizational, country, and group contexts.

The focal IOs in this chapter are the same as elsewhere in the book: namely, the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. In addition, for comparison we examine citizen legitimacy beliefs toward national government, to see whether and how far public evaluations differ between the territorial state and global governance. The focal countries in this citizen analysis likewise remain consistent with the rest of the book: namely, Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. For broader comparison, we include confidence perceptions of IOs from a "global population" that encompasses 45 countries in the wider WVS7 dataset. As explained in Chapter 2, we measure legitimacy beliefs in this research with the indicator of "confidence" on a scale of 0–3, where "a great deal of confidence" is scored 3, "quite a lot of confidence" is scored 2, "not very much confidence" is scored 1, and "none at all" is scored 0.

The WVS7 data suggest that, overall, citizens today hold medium levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The macro aggregate confidence score (i.e., covering all six IOs in all five countries) lies just below the midpoint of our measurement scale. However, this composite average encompasses considerable variation: with regard to particular IOs, specific countries, certain IOs within countries, and different social categories. The highest of these disaggregated averages come close to "quite a lot of confidence" (score 2), while the lowest fall below "not very much confidence" (score 1). That said, relatively few averages reach either of these extremes. The general picture of citizen assessments of IOs leans toward modest skepticism. Little evidence suggests popular enthusiasm for contemporary global governance, but few signs point to full-scale rejection either. All in all, average citizen legitimacy beliefs more or less tolerate the status quo, neither urging expansion of global governance nor demanding its contraction.

The rest of this chapter elaborates these main findings in five steps. First, we present the overall aggregate scores for citizen confidence in IOs, looking both at the core sample of five countries and at the wider WVS7 sample. The very similar results for these two aggregates suggest that our smaller subset of five countries suitably reflects citizen legitimacy beliefs in the world at large.

Second, the chapter disaggregates our citizen data by the six IOs and uncovers notable variation. We see that average citizen confidence levels for the ICC, UN, and WTO come close to the overall aggregate score; however, the mean lies considerably higher for the WHO and notably lower for the World Bank and IMF. Examination of the distribution of organizational scores (i.e., percentages

of answers that are 0, 1, 2, and 3) further confirms a generally more negative citizen assessment of the economic IOs (IMF, World Bank, and WTO) compared to the human security IOs (ICC, UN, and WHO).

Third, we disaggregate the survey evidence by country and find even greater variation than across IOs. Citizens in the Philippines present average confidence in IOs that is far above the overall mean, while the average for citizens in Russia comes out much lower than the aggregate. Between these extremes, the average for Germany matches the aggregate mean, while country scores for the US and Brazil are moderately lower. Further considerable variation in citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance appears within the same country regarding different IOs.

Fourth, we disaggregate the citizen data with social cuts by class, age, and gender categories. Anticipating the elite–citizen gap that we fully describe in Chapter 5, substantial variation in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance appears on class lines, particularly between citizens who self-identify as "upper class" and those who self-identify as "working class." Age categories show modest differences in average confidence toward IOs between younger and older generations. No significant gender variations appear between men and women, even regarding specific IOs.

Fifth, the chapter conclusion consolidates our overall findings regarding citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. In particular, we stress that the considerable variation in these views—between IOs, countries, and social groups—indicates much nuance. Public opinion on global governance is not a simple picture of a universal backlash against globalization, but rather a bricolage of many assessments that fluctuate by context.

The Overall Picture

We begin our analysis of citizen legitimacy beliefs in global governance by calculating an umbrella aggregate average confidence score: that is, a single figure that encompasses all six focal IOs and all five focal countries. We arrive at this meta-measure in two steps. First, we compute a composite score for each IO (i.e., covering the five countries together) on our confidence scale of 0–3. As indicated in Chapter 2, in this process we weight the five countries equally. Thus, although the WVS7 interviewed different numbers of respondents in the various countries, each country accounts for one-fifth of the composite mean. Then we add up the composite means for the six IOs and divide by six.

This equation yields an overall aggregate score of average citizen confidence in IOs of 1.43. This number falls a little below the midpoint of our scale, between 1 ("not very much confidence") and 2 ("quite a lot of confidence"). It indicates

neither popular enthusiasm for global governance nor a full-scale legitimacy crisis. Rather, 1.43 leans toward moderate citizen skepticism regarding IOs.

Next, we check how well our aggregate for the sample of five focal countries reflects world public opinion as a whole. We can approximate the global population by examining confidence scores for the six IOs in a larger WVS7 sample of 45 countries. As with our sample of five countries, we weight the 45 countries equally. The meta-measure of citizen confidence in the six IOs for the wider WVS7 comes out at 1.43, identical to the average for our five focal countries. In general terms, then, our core sample appears to be a good approximation of world public opinion on IOs.

The WVS7 also asked citizens to indicate their level of confidence in their respective national governments (i.e., of Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US). At 1.38, the composite average citizen confidence in national government across these five countries leans toward "not very much confidence." The figure is 0.05 points lower on the scale than the 1.43 for IOs, a difference that is statistically significant ($p<0.000$, paired t-test), albeit of limited magnitude. For a larger WVS sample of 44 countries (this question was not asked in Egypt), the average confidence in national government is, at 1.35, again effectively the same as for our core five countries. Tellingly, these findings regarding national government suggest that today's citizens are not especially "anti-globalist," in the sense of focusing their discontent on IOs. Rather, overall citizen wariness toward governing authority extends more broadly, to national as well as international institutions.

Moreover, we might surmise that, in general, citizens hold their opinions of national government more intensely than their assessments of IOs, so that negative assessments of national authorities may have more consequence for political behavior (e.g., in terms of participation and compliance) than skepticism toward global governance. Recall from Chapter 2 that respondents in our five focal countries did not respond to the confidence questions regarding IOs in around 15 percent of cases. In contrast, the question on confidence in national government attracted no response in only a little more than 2 percent of cases. These proportions indicate that higher numbers of citizens have opinions (and presumably more strongly held opinions) about national relative to global governance.[1]

Yet it is equally noteworthy that around 85 percent of the citizen survey respondents *do* express a view about their confidence in these six prominent IOs. This high rate of giving an opinion suggests that the public is not unaware of and indifferent to governance beyond the state. To be sure, follow-up research could usefully probe how far these citizen assessments of IOs (whether positive

[1] While not responding to a question may capture several phenomena, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, we use no response as an indicator for holding no opinion on IOs.

or negative) have a level of intensity that substantially influences their political behavior. However, for now, the high rate of response to these questions confirms that policymakers cannot ignore citizen evaluations of global governance.

To summarize the most macro picture, then, most citizens have legitimacy perceptions of some kind vis-à-vis IOs, and the overall average level of these beliefs is medium, with a slight leaning toward low. That said, such sweeping averages can obscure much variation, as becomes evident when, in the successive sections below, we disaggregate the citizen data by organization, by country, and by social category. To speak of a single citizen perspective on the legitimacy of global governance therefore proves to be a great oversimplification.

Patterns by Organization

We first disaggregate citizen confidence by IO. For each of our six focal IOs, we pool the confidence data from our five focal countries, weighted equally as above. How much do the resulting levels of average citizen confidence diverge between one IO and another? Between-organization variation would suggest that, in forming their opinions, citizens react to something about the particular IO at hand, such as its (perceived) mandate, modus operandi, or impact.

As seen in Figure 3.1, notable variation exists in average citizen assessments of the six IOs. At the high end, average citizen confidence in the WHO (at 1.67) falls well above the umbrella aggregate figure of 1.43.[2] At the low end, the mean for citizen confidence in the IMF (at 1.24) falls nearly as far below the overall aggregate. The difference between these two extremes is a striking 0.43 points on the 3-point scale. Average citizen confidence scores for the UN (1.44), the ICC (1.42), and the WTO (1.39) are close to the overall mean of 1.43. Meanwhile, average citizen confidence in the World Bank (1.31) dips 0.12 points on the scale below the overall mean. Note that only one of our six focal IOs, the WHO, averages in the upper half of the 0–3 scale. Paired *t*-tests show that all of these between-IO differences are statistically significant, with the exception of the divergence between the ICC and the WTO.

Interestingly, in our five focal countries taken together, the three IOs addressing human security issues (WHO, UN, and ICC) score decidedly higher than the three economic IOs (WTO, World Bank, and IMF). Perhaps citizens on average respond more positively to "nurturing" mandates around health, peacebuilding, and human rights, relative to "competitive" mandates around trade, money, and finance.

[2] Although our survey transpired before the COVID-19 pandemic, recent data suggest that the high approval ratings for the WHO persisted also during the pandemic, at least in high-income democracies. When publics in fourteen such countries were asked about WHO's handling of the coronavirus outbreak, a median of 63 percent thought the organization had done a somewhat or very good job (Pew Research Center 2020a).



Fig. 3.1 Citizen confidence in IOs (individually), five countries pooled

Notes: Based on data from our five focal countries. Poststratification weights were used, and countries were equally weighted. The category "All IOs" was created by summing up the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to arrive at the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

In addition, the economic IOs have more obvious consequences for resource distribution and associated discontents around inequality.

Variation across IOs also appears in respect of nonresponse. The proportion of people not answering the confidence question is lowest for the UN (11.7 percent) and the WHO (11.8 percent), presumably the IOs of which citizens are on average more aware. The other four IOs attract notably higher item nonresponse rates of between 16.0 percent (for the World Bank) and 18.2 percent (for the ICC). In contrast, the proportion of missing answers from elites is much lower than the item nonresponse rates from citizens, suggesting higher levels of awareness and concern about IOs among political and societal leaders relative to the general public. These observations correspond to the higher levels of knowledge about global governance observed among elites relative to the citizen sample (see Chapter 2).

For comparison across levels of governance, we again include the average citizen confidence score for national government, which, at 1.38, is lower than average citizen confidence in four of the six IOs (Figure 3.1). Across our five focal countries taken together, only the World Bank and the IMF obtain less average confidence than national government. This result again underlines that IOs are not attracting particular citizen discontent and indeed in many cases attract more public confidence than the national government.

As done earlier in respect of the aggregate mean, we examine whether the findings for between-IO variation are specific to our five focal countries or whether

they also hold for the global WVS population (N=45). We find that the numbers for our subsample of five countries and the full sample of 45 countries effectively match for the WHO, at 1.68. Average confidence scores for the UN and WTO, both at 1.42, and for the ICC (at 1.38) also fall close to the same level in the subsample of five countries and the sample of 45 countries. However, scores in the larger sample are 0.06 higher for the IMF (at 1.30), and 0.07 higher for the World Bank (at 1.38). These modest differences show that patterns of citizen legitimacy beliefs in our subsample of five countries do not always mirror views in the global population. Moreover, we see that the contrast between human security IOs on the one hand and economic IOs on the other—so clear in our subsample of five countries—is less evident in respect of the wider WVS.

Between-IO variation in citizen confidence also appears when we examine the distribution of response categories for the confidence question. Figure 3.2 depicts the percentage of the five countries' collective population that indicates a specific level of confidence in an IO. Tellingly, only one IO (the WHO) receives a higher percentage of positive scores ("quite a lot of confidence" and "a great deal of confidence") than negative scores ("not a lot of confidence" and "none at all"). Indeed, the three economic IOs and the ICC receive only 29–37 percent of positive scores, as against 44–54 percent of negative scores. The UN, too, obtains more negative



Fig. 3.2 Distribution of citizen confidence in IOs, five countries pooled

Notes: The numbers are percentages of the citizen samples in our five countries. Poststratification weights used, countries weighted equally. On the confidence scale, "a great deal of confidence" is scored 3, "quite a lot of confidence" is scored 2, "not very much confidence" is scored 1, and "none at all" is scored 0.
Source: WVS7.

assessments (45.8 percent) than positive evaluations (42.5 percent). These numbers further reinforce the thesis of moderate citizen skepticism toward IOs.

The distribution of confidence scores shows again a general difference between core human security IOs and core economic IOs. While the ICC, UN, and WHO attract more "quite a lot" answers than "not very much" responses, the opposite pattern holds for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. The economic IOs also attract decidedly lower levels of "3" scores than the human security IOs.

Yet the picture is not one of strikingly polarized citizen opinion either. Confidence in each of the IOs is close to a normal distribution, with most responses concentrated in the middle two answer categories. All six IOs attract 60–64 percent of responses toward the middle, with a much lower 19–25 percent of responses at the extremes. That said, a striking 16–18 percent expresses "none at all" confidence in the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF. In contrast, only one IO (the WHO) obtains "a great deal of confidence" from more than 10 percent of respondents. The other five IOs attract just 4–9 percent of top scores. Such observations, too, point toward moderate-to-low citizen legitimacy beliefs overall vis-à-vis IOs.

The distribution of scores also reinforces our earlier observation that citizen skepticism is not exclusively directed at IOs. On the contrary, national government attracts a considerably higher proportion of negative citizen evaluations ("0" and "1") than any of our six IOs, including many more "none at all" scores than even the IMF and the World Bank. Citizen opinion is also much more polarized toward national government than vis-à-vis IOs, with more than one third of responses in the categories "none at all" and "a great deal of confidence." These findings suggest that, if anything, citizens debate the legitimacy of national government more (and more passionately) than that of global governance.

That said, observations regarding between-IO variation become more nuanced if one disaggregates the IO data further by country, as in Figure 3.3. Here we see that average citizen confidence in a particular IO can vary considerably between our five focal countries. The range is from 1.09 to 1.74 (0.65 points) for the ICC; from 0.97 to 1.75 (0.78 points) for the IMF; from 1.07 to 1.87 (0.80 points) for the WTO; from 1.26 to 2.15 for the WHO (0.89 points); from 0.98 to 1.93 (0.95 points) for the UN; and from 0.99 to 1.94 (0.95 points) for the World Bank. Thus, for example, while the IMF and World Bank attract "not a lot of confidence" in Russia, they obtain close to "quite a lot of confidence" in the Philippines. That said, between-IO variation across countries is generally less marked between Brazil, Germany, and the US than between the extremes of the Philippines and Russia.

Between-country comparison of citizen confidence scores for individual IOs also reveals some notable variation in the rank orders of the six institutions. There is consistency inasmuch as the WHO attracts the highest rating in all five countries, the IMF always ranks last or next to last, and the WTO always falls in the middle (third or fourth place). In contrast, the UN shows considerable fluctuation, ranking second in Brazil and the US, third in Germany and the Philippines,



Fig. 3.3 Variation between countries in citizen confidence in IOs, by IO

Notes: Based on data from our five focal countries. Poststratification was used, and countries were equally weighted. All differences in means shown in the top and bottom panel between confidence in different IOs are statistically significant at $p<0.001$. The category "All" was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing by six to arrive at the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

and joint fourth in Russia. The World Bank stands as high as second in the Philippines and as low as sixth in Germany. The greatest irregularity in rank order appears regarding the ICC, which places second in Germany and Russia, fourth in Brazil and the US, and last in the Philippines. These variations within variations underline that there is no universal citizen view of any given IO.

Nor does the overall pattern (seen earlier) of higher confidence in IOs than national government prevail in each individual country. In Brazil and the US, the average citizen confidence in national government is lower than for any of the six IOs. Yet the exact opposite situation prevails in Russia, where average citizen confidence in national government substantially exceeds that for any of the six IOs. In the Philippines, only the WHO attracts higher average citizen confidence than the national government. In Germany, the three human security IOs attract higher average citizen confidence than the national government, while the three economic IOs attract lower confidence scores than the national government. Thus, the macro picture that IOs obtain more citizen confidence than national government becomes more nuanced on closer inspection by country.

In sum, an examination of citizen confidence patterns by IO suggests that organizational context often matters for public assessments of global governance. Among our six focal IOs, citizens generally accord the greatest legitimacy to the

WHO and the least to the IMF. With the exception of the WHO, all IOs obtain more negative than positive scores from citizens, and outside the Philippines few IO-specific scores come close to "quite a lot of confidence." Thus, our analysis of variation by IO confirms: (a) the overall picture of moderate-to-low citizen legitimacy in global governance; and (b) the proposition that organizational features matter for citizen legitimacy beliefs. Exactly which institutional qualities matter, and how, invites further research that would complement the explanatory analysis of individual factors that is undertaken in Part III of this book.

Patterns by Country

Following the above first cut into the data by IO, we now shift our focus to variation in citizen legitimacy beliefs for global governance by country. Do levels of citizen confidence vis-à-vis our focal IOs (the six collectively as well as individually) differ among our five focal countries? If so, then we could surmise that varying circumstances in these countries contribute to divergent perspectives on IOs. We might then relate patterns of citizen confidence in IOs to, for example, the respective countries' political conditions, socioeconomic situations, geopolitical interests, and specific experiences of the six IOs.

Figure 3.4 shows average citizen confidence by country in all six IOs taken together. We see that the aggregate country score is highest in the Philippines (1.89) and lowest in Russia (1.05). This variation between the extremes by country is a hefty 0.84 points on the confidence scale, considerably more than the maximum variation of 0.43 points by organization observed earlier.[3] That said, the large spread is mainly due to the Philippines as an outlier: variation between the other four countries is a maximum 0.37 points. Mean citizen confidence in the six IOs is second highest in Germany (1.42), a level that is more or less even with the all-country aggregate average of 1.43. Meanwhile, the US (1.30) and Brazil (1.27) join Russia with a level of average citizen confidence in IOs that falls below the composite score. Paired *t*-tests show that all of these between-country differences are statistically significant, with the exception of the gap between the US and Brazil.

Certain broad patterns emerge when comparing these aggregate country averages of citizen evaluations of IOs, although the picture is rarely completely tidy. For example, we might suppose that countries whose domestic politics took a populist turn in the 2010s could return lower average citizen confidence scores in IOs. Anti-globalism tends to be part and parcel of the populist rhetorical package. Indeed,

[3] The variance decomposition analysis in Online Appendix A reinforces this point: IO random effects comprise approximately 4 percent of the total residual variance, and country random effects about 9 percent of the variance. The remaining variance is cross-individual variance.



Fig. 3.4 Citizen confidence in IOs (pooled), by country

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, country weighted equally when pooled. The IO index was created by summing up confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

the election of Donald Trump in the US in 2016 and of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018 may have encouraged lower citizen confidence scores in IOs for these two countries. The WVS7 was conducted in the US during Trump's first months in office and in Brazil during its presidential election campaign. In addition, a more modest rise of populism in Germany during this period fits its medium average score, higher than the US and Brazil. However, the 2016 election of a populist president in the Philippines does not prevent citizens in that country from having an average "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs, even though Rodrigo Duterte specifically and vociferously denounced the ICC and the UN. Moreover, Russia returns the lowest average score, near "not a lot of confidence," without any particular rise of populism during the survey period. Thus, the evidence is somewhat mixed for a link between levels of citizen confidence in IOs and a country's level of populist domestic politics. In any case, we do not have a time series that would allow us to compare the WVS7 data on six IOs from 2017–19 with evidence from before the recent populist upsurges.

Some connection also appears between a country's regime type and its average citizen confidence in IOs. We might expect that citizens from liberal democracies would tend to have higher average confidence in IOs of the liberal international order. Such an association is broadly borne out if we compare the order of average citizen confidence in IOs (Philippines-Germany-US-Brazil-Russia) with the order of strength of democracy, as assessed by the V-Dem research

program (Germany-US-Brazil-Philippines-Russia) (V-Dem 2021). Here, too, the Philippines is an outlier.

Geo-economics seems to play no particular role in these average country scores, inasmuch as we see no clear divergence in citizen confidence levels for IOs between the "developed" Global North and the "developing" Global South. Survey results from the five countries do not fall neatly into North and South camps. Moreover, hardly anything separates the figures for Germany and the US (Global North joint average of 1.37) from Brazil, Philippines, and Russia (Global South joint average of 1.40). Thus, among our five focal countries, the purported North-South divide in the global economy does not manifest itself in divergent levels of citizen confidence in the IOs taken collectively. Perhaps citizens in the Philippines, the country in our sample with by far the lowest gross domestic product per capita, associate IOs positively with development assistance. Indeed, we have previously seen that Philippine respondents give the World Bank a much higher score and ranking than citizens in the four other countries.

Geopolitics may also figure in variation between countries. A gap of 0.22 points on the scale prevails for citizen confidence in IOs between the established powers Germany and the US on the one hand (joint average 1.36) and the (re)emergent powers Brazil and Russia on the other (joint average 1.16). To place these numbers in a wider setting, we look at WVS data from Mexico (mean confidence of 1.34) and Turkey (1.25) among (re)emergent powers and for Australia (1.48) and Japan (1.58) among established powers. These patterns underline that the findings for the five countries reflect a larger geopolitical pattern, although there is country variation within these categories. Possibly this lower average rating among citizens in the rising powers reflects discontent that existing IOs do not give their countries due influence. Indeed, the composition of the UNSC and votes at the Bretton Woods institutions structurally favor the established powers, who also dominated the formation of the ICC and the WTO in the 1990s. True, given the generally low levels of citizen knowledge about IOs documented in Chapter 2, we may doubt whether most WVS7 respondents are aware of details about the institutional workings of IOs. Nevertheless, many citizens in (re)emergent powers could still have a generic feeling that current global governance does not adequately respect the international status of their countries.

Such negative public perceptions in Brazil and Russia also have deeper historical roots. Many (especially older) citizens in these two countries may associate IOs with an unpopular US hegemony after the Second World War. Narratives of "Yankee imperialism" circulated widely in Brazil throughout the twentieth century as well as in the Workers' Party (PT) governments of 2003–16. Spying on President Dilma Rousseff by the US National Security Agency (revealed in the highly publicized "Snowden Affair" of 2013) reconfirmed many Brazilian suspicions of a US-led world order. In Russia, Soviet discourse of the Cold War often depicted the

global multilateral system as a tool of the West. At the time of our survey, too, the Russian government regularly rehearsed a narrative of Western threat, especially pointing to UN resolutions and Western economic sanctions over conflicts around Crimea and Donbas.

Geopolitical logics are somewhat confounded by the US' relatively low average citizen confidence in IOs (1.30). After all, these six IOs largely stem from US triumphs in world order during the 1940s and 1990s. Moreover, the US has major power advantages in the everyday workings of most of these IOs, inter alia with a permanent seat and veto in the UNSC, the largest shareholdings at the IMF and World Bank, and the greatest budget contributions to the WHO. Nevertheless, the US public has historically shown considerable ambivalence toward the international adventures of its more liberal governments, and the WVS7 in 2017–20 coincided with a moment of heightened "America First" attitudes in US politics. At the time, the Trump Administration, with enthusiastic backing from its grassroots supporters, retreated from the UN-sponsored Paris Agreement on climate change, largely abandoned multilateral trade governance through the WTO, and continued to reject US membership of the ICC. To be sure, contemporary public opinion on IOs is sharply divided in the US. For example, in 2020, only 38 percent of all conservatives had a favorable opinion of the UN, while 80 percent of all liberals held positive views toward this IO (Pew Research Center 2020b). In line with this ideological divide, the 1.31 average for the US contains many higher and lower scores.

Then there is the puzzle of the Philippines: why does its public have so much more confidence in IOs than the other four focal countries? The Philippine overall average of 1.89 rises so conspicuously above Germany in second place with 1.42. Recall also from Chapter 2 that the Philippines had a very high response rate (93 percent) to the IO confidence questions in the WVS7, so it is not that silent skeptics yielded artificially raised scores. In addition, respondents in the Philippines gave the UN distinctly high ratings in earlier waves of the WVS; hence, the latest elevated scores for IOs fit a longer historical pattern, and apparently do not reflect certain time-bound circumstances of the late 2010s, such as positive macroeconomic indicators. Moreover, we will see in Chapter 5 that overall Philippine citizen evaluations of IOs are—uniquely among our five focal countries—higher than the corresponding elite assessments.

The sources of this strikingly greater Philippine citizen confidence in IOs are not obvious. In contrast to Brazil and Russia, the Philippines underwent direct US colonial administration, and US military bases in the islands served the frontline of the Vietnam War. Yet this intimate experience of US hegemony has not translated into general public skepticism for US-sponsored multilateralism. Maybe, as previously suggested, many citizens in the low-income Philippines associate IOs with sorely wanted poverty reduction efforts. Perhaps we need also to consider the

implications for legitimacy in global governance of the strong cultural force of the universal Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. Clearly, the conspicuous case of the Philippines invites further study.

For the rest, between-country variation in average citizen confidence in IOs may reflect national experiences of particular organizations. To explore this issue, we disaggregate the country data further by the six IOs, as depicted in Figure 3.3. The results indicate that average citizen confidence in IOs in a given country can vary considerably depending on the IO in question. Differences between highest and lowest scores for our six focal IOs can run to as much as 0.29 points on the confidence scale in Russia, 0.42 points in the US, 0.43 points in the Philippines, 0.47 points in Brazil, and 0.67 points in Germany. These variations between IOs for the same country (between 0.29 and 0.67 points) are generally smaller than the variations presented earlier between countries for the same IO (between 0.63 and 0.95 points). Nevertheless, the within-country spreads are sufficiently large to show that in none of our five focal countries do citizens hold a consistent national opinion of international cooperation that applies across all IOs.

Thus, to speak of a "Brazilian," a "German," a "Philippine," a "Russian," or a "US" public view of IOs would be an oversimplification. For example, while citizens in Germany on average regard the WHO with close to "quite a lot of confidence," they on average view the World Bank with "not much confidence." In Brazil, citizens on average accord the UN one third more confidence than the IMF. The Philippines sees substantial divergence between average citizen confidence in the ICC and the WTO. In the comparative picture, the rank order of aggregate country scores for average citizen confidence in all six IOs (Philippines-Germany-US-Brazil-Russia) is not replicated in the rank order for each individual IO.

Within-country variation in respect of IOs also further qualifies our earlier macro-level observation that human security IOs tend to obtain greater citizen confidence than economic IOs (Figure 3.5). This pattern holds precisely for Germany, where the WHO, ICC, and UN attract the three higher citizen confidence levels, while the WTO, IMF, and World Bank get the three lower scores. The distinction between human security IOs and economic IOs also holds up fairly well in Brazil, Russia, and the US, although in each of these cases the WTO rises to third place, while the ICC or the UN falls into fourth or fifth place. Yet the divide between the two issue areas breaks down in the Philippines, where the World Bank as an economic IO obtains the second highest citizen confidence score and the ICC as a human security IO ends up in last place.

In addition, we may consider that specific country experiences of a particular IO may influence average citizen confidence in that country for that IO. For instance, the relatively low score for the ICC in the Philippines may show the effects of the Duterte government's withdrawal from this IO nine months before the survey period. That said, the 1.74 average citizen rating of the ICC in the Philippines



Fig. 3.5 Citizen confidence in IOs (individually), by country

Notes: Poststratification weights were used. The category "All IOs" was created by summing up confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

is still higher than all but one of all other IO scores for the other four countries, exceeded only by 1.80 for the WHO in Germany.

Also inviting some detailed examination are varying country scores for the IMF. Low average ratings for the Fund in Brazil (1.01) and Russia (0.97) may reflect the public's unhappy memories of IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programs in these countries. That said, citizens in the Philippines, which experienced extensive IMF conditionality from the 1960s to the 2000s, on average still rate the Fund with nearly "quite a lot of confidence" (1.74), even if this score is low for the Philippines. Meanwhile, the IMF also attracts an average "not a lot of confidence" from citizens in Germany (1.14) and the US (1.19), even though these countries have avoided Fund loans and enjoy privileged voting positions on the IMF board. Perhaps much of the public in Germany and the US still associates the IMF with "neoliberal" economic policies that roll back a valued welfare state. Indeed, the Fund has often recommended austerity measures to all member countries, Global North as well as Global South, through its periodic Article IV reviews of national macroeconomic conditions.

In sum, comparative analysis by country of citizen confidence in IOs reveals notable variations: between country aggregate scores and between IOs in the respective countries. Such divergences suggest that not only organizational features of IOs, but also country contexts have a bearing on citizen opinions regarding global

governance. Our interpretive comments above have identified some possible links of these country variations with conditions of domestic politics, country positions in the world order, and specific country experiences of the IOs in question. Determining precisely which country circumstances matter—in what ways and to what extent—for citizen views of IOs goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, variation by country intimates that societal conditions play a role in generating legitimacy beliefs in global governance, in conjunction with the individual-level factors that we emphasize in Chapters 6–9.

Patterns by Social Group

Having compared levels of citizen confidence in IOs across organizations and across countries, we now turn to a disaggregation of the WVS7 data by social categories. Do average citizen assessments of our six focal IOs (collectively and individually) vary in relation to the respondent's position in society? For example, do citizens who identify with "higher" classes tend to have different confidence levels in IOs than citizens who identify with "lower" classes? Do older citizens incline toward different confidence levels in IOs compared to younger persons? Is there a gender divide between men and women regarding confidence in IOs? To the extent that the evidence reveals patterns by social category, it could suggest that circumstances associated with class, age, or gender have some influence on levels of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Class

With regard to social class, the WVS7 asked respondents to describe themselves as belonging to the "upper class," "upper middle class," "lower middle class," "working class," or "lower class." Hence, the assignments of class categories result from self-identification rather than level of income or formal education, although these objective conditions no doubt influence subjective self-perceptions. As with the overall aggregate citizen confidence score and the disaggregated IO scores earlier, we weight the class data so that each of our five focal countries has an equal influence on the resulting average figure.

As seen in Figure 3.6, average citizen confidence in IOs varies between classes by up to 0.52 points on the confidence scale, from 1.28 to 1.80. This extent of difference is higher than the maximum variations seen earlier between IOs (0.43 points) and between countries, apart from the outlier of the Philippines (0.37 points). Citizens who identify themselves as "upper class" hold, at 1.81, an average that nears "quite a lot of confidence" in the six IOs. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this figure is quite close to the aggregate average confidence score of 1.78 from our elite



Fig. 3.6 Citizen confidence in IOs (pooled), by social class

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The IO index was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

survey. In contrast, citizens who identify themselves as "working class" have, at 1.28, an average that inclines toward "not a lot of confidence" in the six IOs. This finding lends support to previous research that links anti-globalist populism to working-class environments (Rodrik 2018; Voss 2018).

Average confidence in IOs for the two "middle class" categories falls more or less halfway between "upper class" and "working class." Average "upper middle class" confidence in the six IOs is 0.28 points below that for "upper class" (1.52 vs. 1.80), while the average "lower middle class" score is 0.17 points above that for "working class" (1.45 vs. 1.28). Interestingly, the average confidence score for citizens who self-identify as "lower class" also falls in the middle, with a mean of 1.49. With the exception of the "lower class" score, average citizen confidence in IOs for our five focal countries rises as one moves up the class strata, foreshadowing the elite–citizen gap that we fully describe in Chapter 5.

Next, we look more specifically at class patterns of citizen confidence in relation to each of our six focal IOs. Figure 3.7 shows that average scores can vary noticeably between IOs in most of the class categories. The spread ranges from 0.21 to 0.48 points on the confidence scale in respect of "lower class," "working class," "lower middle class," and "upper middle class" groups. In this regard it would be an over-simplification to speak of, for example, a "lower class" opinion of IOs, since the WHO with a mean of 1.68 attracts moderate confidence in these circles, whereas the IMF with an average of 1.24 drops decidedly toward "not a lot of confidence."

Fig. 3.7 Citizen confidence in IOs (individually), by social class

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The category "All IOs" was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

In an interesting contrast, variation in confidence between IOs is more limited among "upper class" citizens, with a maximum spread of only 0.21 points on the scale. To this extent, we might cautiously begin to talk of an "upper class" opinion on IOs. Yet we should not speak too soon, as our elite survey results, elaborated in Chapter 4, show that average elite confidence across the same six IOs varies by 0.63 points, ranging between 1.54 and 2.17.

In terms of rankings between the six IOs, we see certain striking consistencies across the class groupings. The WHO ranks first in average confidence for all five class categories, the IMF always last, and the WTO always in the middle. However, the UN ranks second for the three lower classes, but fifth for the upper class. Conversely, the ICC comes in second for the upper classes, but progressively falls to third, fourth and fifth place for the lower classes. The general "make the world a better place" mandate of the UN apparently attracts the lower classes relatively more than the "punish crimes against humanity" agenda of the ICC. For the upper classes, the order of appeal between the UN and the ICC is the opposite.

Looking again at the distinction between views of human security and economic IOs, all five social classes tend to have more confidence in the former than the latter. The division is sharpest for the "upper middle" and "lower middle" classes, where the WHO, UN, and ICC are ranked in the first three places,

while the WTO, World Bank, and IMF are ranked in the bottom three places. The picture is somewhat more mixed for the "lower," "working," and "upper" classes, where the rank ordering and differences follow this pattern less clearly, or not at all. Nevertheless, the general distinction between views of IOs in the two policy fields remains striking. That said, the "upper class" returns a much higher average confidence in the three economic IOs than the "working class." Presumably, this gulf reflects the two groups' contrasting assessments of the existing distribution of resources, an issue that we address more fully in the explanatory analysis in Part III.

Finally, it is interesting to compare levels of average class confidence in the national government. In the case of the "lower class," the national government obtains a lesser score (1.30) than all but one IO. The four other class categories place the national government more toward the middle. Again, we can underline that public opinion (and the opinion of less advantaged citizens in particular) does not particularly direct discontent toward IOs, but more toward governing authority in general, national as well as international.

Age

Turning to age categories, we might anticipate some variation inasmuch as age groups tend to develop common attitudes and beliefs based on their life experiences (Meredith and Schewe, 1994). We divide the WVS7 respondents for our five focal countries into three groups: 15–29 years, 30–49 years, and 50 years and over.

As seen in Figure 3.8, younger citizens between 15 and 29 years on average have more confidence in IOs than persons in the other two age categories. Paired *t*-tests confirm this statistical significance.[4] That said, these differences are much smaller than other variations observed previously in this chapter: only 0.07 points on the confidence scale between youth and the 30–49 age group; and only 0.11 points between youth and the over-50 age group. Moreover, the 0.04 difference in average confidence in IOs between the two older age groups is not statistically significant. These results reinforce findings from earlier research that do not show consistent effects of age on attitudes toward international affairs (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Edwards 2009; Johnson 2011; Brewer et al. 2004; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

Breaking down the data by the six IOs, Figure 3.9 reinforces the general pattern observed throughout this chapter that citizens have the most confidence in

[4] This evidence is supported by two paired *t*-tests comparing average confidence across the youngest and the 30–40-year age group ($p<0.05$), and between the youngest age group and people aged 50 years or older ($p<0.05$).



Fig. 3.8 Citizen confidence in IOs (pooled), by age group

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The IO index was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.



Fig. 3.9 Citizen confidence in IOs (individually), by age group

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The category "All IOs" was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.

the WHO and the least confidence in the IMF. The UN attracts relatively more confidence among the under-50s than among people aged 50 years and over, suggesting that faith in this core IO either declines with age or is subject to generational differences. The distinction between higher confidence for human security IOs compared to economic IOs appears again across all three age categories.

Strikingly, younger people across our five focal countries have an average confidence in national government of only 1.32, lower than their mean confidence in five of the six IOs. The situation is not much different for the 30–49 age group, where average confidence in national government at 1.36 only barely exceeds the ever-weak scores for the World Bank and IMF. The picture changes for the older generation, for whom confidence in national government comes ahead of all IOs except the WHO. Yet, even for the 50 and over age group, the average of 1.43 for national government remains below the midpoint of our confidence scale. This result confirms other research that shows limited variation in trust of national government across age cohorts (Pew Research Center 2018). Hence, from the perspective of age, too, we see that citizen wariness of political authority is not particularly directed at IOs, but in general applies equally, if not more, to national government.

Gender

As a third cut of the data on social lines, we analyze gender differences in IO legitimacy between men and women. Much literature in recent decades has underlined the impacts of gender structures on world politics, including differential benefits from and experiences of global governance (Meyer and Prügl 1999; Runyan 2018). We examine our citizen data only in terms of men and women, since the WVS7 only included the two gender categories "male" and "female." Moreover, in contrast to self-identification by class, the WVS instructed the interviewers to "code respondent's sex by observation, don't ask about it."

As seen in Figure 3.10, the survey results for our five focal countries taken together show effectively no difference between average female and male confidence in the six IOs taken collectively (p=0.26). Likewise, a breakdown by the six individual IOs and the national government in Figure 3.11 shows very little variation by gender. The scores for men and women are almost identical for each institution. The largest gap is observed for the UN, for which the average confidence of women is 1.47 compared to 1.42 for men, a difference that is not statistically significant. The gender data thus stand out from the age, class, country, and organization data for showing no variation whatsoever.

These non-results add to other research that has not observed consistent gender effects on international attitudes (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Brewer et al. 2004; Edwards 2009; Jongen and Scholte 2022). An exception is Johnson (2011), who



Fig. 3.10 Citizen confidence in IOs (pooled), by gender

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The IO index was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS7.



Fig. 3.11 Citizen confidence in IOs (individually), by gender

Notes: Poststratification weights were used, five countries equally weighted. The category "All IOs" was created by summing the confidence scores for all IOs and dividing them by six to get the mean score.
Source: WVS 7.

finds, using Asia Barometer Survey data, that women support the UN more than men; however, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015), using World Values Survey data, do not replicate this significant effect. A study of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) shows that women on average see larger gender inequalities than men in that global governance institution, and find those hierarchies more problematic, but that these concerns have no association with their confidence in ICANN (Jongen and Scholte 2022).

To be sure, the WVS7 evidence does not refute arguments that global politics involve gender power hierarchies and generate differential gender effects, often to the disadvantage of women. However, any such dynamics apparently do not cause women and men on average to regard global governance with different levels of legitimacy. The "average citizen" may well lack awareness of the gendered impacts of IOs, given that the issue receives little public discussion. Most citizens, women and men alike, may prioritize other matters besides gender considerations when evaluating IOs. Whatever the reason, our data show no significance of female/male distinctions for confidence in IOs.

Conclusion

As the first of three detailed descriptive analyses, this chapter has examined levels and patterns of *citizen* legitimacy beliefs towards global governance. Using data from the WVS7 collected in 2017–20, we have focused on public confidence in five focal countries toward six focal IOs. Along with aggregate results that cover all of the IOs and countries together, we have disaggregated the data by specific IOs, by individual countries, and by several social categories. Our descriptive interpretation of the citizen data points to five general conclusions.

First, we see that, during the survey period, citizens in the five countries regard the six IOs with an overall average of medium confidence, a little below the midpoint of our measurement scale. Most of the disaggregated scores by IO, country, and social group also fall in the mid-range of our scale. On the whole, average citizen assessments of IOs lean somewhat more toward "not a lot of confidence" (score 1) than "quite a lot of confidence" (score 2), but the overall center of gravity lies toward the middle between these poles.

Second, as just indicated, the macro aggregate average citizen confidence in IOs incorporates much variation. The spread in scores can be quite considerable between one IO and another, between one country and another, and between one class category and another. Additional significant variation appears in average citizen confidence within the same country, class, or age group toward different IOs. Only gender classifications show no significant variations in average confidence toward global governance, at least in our sample of six IOs and five countries. Given these many and often large fluctuations, it becomes difficult to speak of

blanket "citizen," "Russian," "working class," or "youth" confidence in IOs. Any attempt at generalization requires substantial qualification.

Third, citizens in our five focal countries tend to regard the three human security IOs with greater confidence than the three economic IOs. This pattern recurs in the disaggregation of the data by the six IOs, as well as in most disaggregation by countries and by social groups. Apparently, citizens in our sample countries generally regard the purposes, operations, and outcomes of the three human security IOs more positively than the perceived agendas, procedures, and impacts of the three economic IOs.

Fourth, the citizen survey data consistently show little difference between average public confidence in IOs and in national government. If anything, citizens more often give higher mean confidence scores to IOs (especially the human security IOs) than to their national government. These findings indicate that citizens today are not singling out global governance for particular skepticism, but rather tend to have limited confidence in authority at both national and international levels. The challenge of bolstering citizen faith in IOs therefore probably cannot be separated from a broader issue of strengthening public trust in governance overall.

Fifth and finally, given this book's particular interest in citizen and elite views of global governance, we should underline again the large difference between average "upper class" and "working class" confidence in IOs. This chapter's initial look at social stratification suggests that there could indeed be a significant gap between elite and citizen legitimacy perceptions vis-à-vis global governance. However, we need first, in Chapter 4, to examine elite views with the kind of detail and nuance that we have given citizen opinions in this chapter. Then we can systematically map elite–citizen legitimacy gaps in Chapter 5.

4

Mapping Elite Legitimacy Beliefs

Having in the preceding chapter scrutinized *citizen* legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, this next chapter focuses on how far *elites* have confidence in IOs. We examine the legitimacy beliefs of elites toward six IOs in different policy fields, in six diverse countries, and in six varied societal sectors. The chapter thereby covers a wide array of elite positions. In Chapter 5 we go on to measure gaps between these elite legitimacy beliefs and the citizen opinions that were previously examined in Chapter 3. Together, Chapters 3–5 offer a systematic description of legitimacy perceptions toward IOs among citizens and elites across the world today.

As previously specified in Chapter 1, elites are understood in this study as persons who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that seek to be politically influential (Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Khan 2012). In this conception, elite circles include politicians, government officials, business executives, civil society organizers, media commentators, and senior researchers. These six categories therefore cover leaders in both politics and wider society, in governmental as well as nongovernmental circles. While a number of theorists have portrayed elites as a single cohesive category of privileged and powerful persons (e.g., Pareto 1935; Mills 1956), we follow others in conceiving of different elite groups with distinct power bases and values (Dahl 1963; Gulbrandsen 2018). We expect elites in these different sectoral positions to have different levels of average legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

Given elites' prominent role in society—including in policy processes around global governance—their assessments of IO legitimacy warrant specific and careful attention (Scholte et al. 2021). How far leading figures in politics and society regard IOs to be legitimate can affect the operations, the outcomes, and indeed the very existence of these governance organizations. For example, to the extent that elites hold high levels of legitimacy for IOs, they can be more willing to create and participate in these institutions, to increase the competences and resources of IOs, to comply with IO policies, and to defend IOs against critics and competitors (Uhlin and Verhaegen 2020). In contrast, insofar as elites hold low levels of legitimacy for IOs—or indeed regard them as illegitimate—these leaders can be more reluctant to engage, even to the point of advocating the dissolution of these bodies. In between, with neither positive nor negative legitimacy beliefs, the effects of elite

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance. Lisa Maria Dellmuth et al., Oxford University Press.
 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192856241.003.0004

perceptions could be more neutral: neither promoting invigoration and expansion of global governance, on the one hand, nor encouraging crisis and contraction, on the other. Hence, it is important to measure levels and patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, little previous research has closely examined elite attitudes toward IOs, apart from an extensive literature on elite views of the EU. In particular, no previous study has systematically collected and analyzed large-*n* data on elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, covering multiple IOs, multiple countries, and multiple sectors of society. In this respect, the LegGov Elite Survey, conducted in parallel with the WVS7 for citizen opinion, is unique.

In pursuing our mapping of elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, this chapter largely mirrors the analysis of citizen legitimacy beliefs presented in Chapter 3. We focus on the same six key IOs: ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. We also document elite legitimacy toward national governments in order to compare evaluations of different levels of governance. In terms of countries, we again examine Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. In addition, we include South Africa as a country covered in the LegGov Elite Survey, but where the WVS7 unfortunately did not materialize during our time window of 2017–20. Evidence from South Africa is cited in this chapter for between-country comparisons; however, it is excluded from our pooled country data in order to allow direct comparison with pooled data from the other five countries for public opinion in Chapter 3 and for the elite–citizen gap in Chapter 5.

To recall from Chapter 2, our elite survey covers 722 respondents divided more or less evenly between the six countries. Within each country, half of the respondents are political elites (from government bureaucracy and political parties), and the other half are societal elites (from business, civil society, media, and research). The sample is also diverse in terms of the levels of institutions where elites work (subnational, national, and international) and the policy issues that they handle. Regarding political parties, our survey covers a broad ideological spectrum for each country, but most responses come from the largest parties in the respective national legislatures. For reasons elaborated in Chapter 2, we measure legitimacy beliefs using the indicator of "confidence," on a scale from 3 ("a great deal of confidence") to 0 ("none at all").

Overall, our survey results suggest that contemporary elites hold moderately high levels of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs—in contrast to the average medium levels seen in the previous chapter for citizens at large. However, as in the case of public opinion, the composite elite average encompasses numerous notable variations: with regard to particular IOs, individual countries, specific IOs within countries, and different elite sectors. That said, only a few of these disaggregated scores reach the level of "quite a lot of confidence" (score 2), and none fall below the level of "not very much confidence" (score 1). In general, then, our evidence

suggests that there is at present neither a legitimacy crisis among elites regarding global governance (as might encourage its decline), nor a legitimacy boon (as could spur its expansion).

The chapter elaborates these core findings in five steps. The first section below presents the aggregate elite confidence score, encompassing all of the examined IOs, countries, and elite sectors. We compare this aggregate score for IOs with the aggregate average elite confidence scores for national governance institutions and find the two means to be relatively similar. As with the citizen data, we see little difference in elite assessments of different levels of governance.

The second section of the chapter disaggregates the elite confidence data by the six focal IOs. Like the WVS7, our elite survey generally finds higher scores for human security IOs than for economic IOs. Here we also bring in evidence for a wider array of global governance institutions and discover that elites generally tend to accord greater legitimacy to older intergovernmental organizations than to newer alternative institutional designs.

The third section of this chapter disaggregates the elite data by the six countries. As in the citizen analysis, we find significant between-country variations, but the sizes of country differences and their rank orders are often different for elites compared to citizens at large. We reflect on why elites in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, and the US generally ascribe more legitimacy to IOs than elites in Russia and South Africa, as well as why country elite confidence scores vary for particular IOs.

The fourth section slices the elite survey evidence by the six elite sectors. We consider why, in general, bureaucratic, research, and business elites show higher legitimacy beliefs toward IOs than media, party-political, and civil society elites. The chapter conclusion considers, in relation to elites, the five broad issues with which we finished Chapter 3 on citizens.

The Overall Picture

Our elite survey generates a composite average confidence score for all six IOs and all five countries (less South Africa) of 1.78 on a scale of 0–3. Here we have summed up the average elite confidence scores for the six IOs and divided that total by six to arrive at the mean score. Thus, overall, the surveyed political and societal leaders have in between "not very much confidence" (score 1) and "quite a lot of confidence" (score 2) in IOs, yet lean more toward the latter assessment. The overall confidence toward IOs among elites is thus moderately high, but not exuberant.

As a point of comparison, the elite survey also asked respondents to indicate their level of confidence in their respective national governments. At 1.67, the composite average elite confidence in national government across our five core

countries is 0.11 lower on the scale than the 1.78 for IOs. This difference between elite scores for IOs and national government is statistically significant ($p<0.01$, paired t-test)—a finding that is similar among citizens in Chapter 3.

To highlight an important secondary observation, almost all of the surveyed elites express an opinion on these matters. The proportion of nonresponse regarding confidence in IOs ranges from a low of 0.8 percent for the UN to a high of 7.4 percent for the ICC (see Chapter 2). The nonresponse for elite confidence in national government is a negligible 0.3 percent—only two persons in the entire sample. To be sure, these data do not show how *intensely* elites hold their confidence assessments of governance institutions. However, the very low numbers of nonresponse suggest that most contemporary elites do hold legitimacy beliefs toward IOs (as well as regulatory organizations at other levels). Recall from Chapter 3 that citizen item nonresponses to corresponding questions in the WVS7 are notably higher, though also a large majority of citizens expressed an opinion.

To summarize the most aggregate picture, then, average elite legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis global and national institutions are moderately high, with little difference in elite confidence for these two levels of governance. The overall picture leans in the direction of "quite a lot of confidence," though also falling notably short of an average of "2." From this macro perspective, elites are substantially but not strongly behind the current status quo of governance, international as well as national. Yet sweeping aggregate numbers can hide considerable variation, as we indeed discover upon disaggregating the elite data below by organization, by country, and by elite sector.

Patterns by Organization

As in Chapter 3 for citizen legitimacy beliefs, we first disaggregate the overall average elite confidence score for global governance with a comparison across the six individual IOs. How much does elite confidence differ depending on the IO in question? Variation on these lines would imply that certain features of an IO (such as its aims, institutional design, policy performance, etc.) influence the levels of elite confidence that this IO obtains.

As depicted in Figure 4.1, our survey data do indeed show considerable divergence in elite confidence scores by IO. The range stretches from as high as 2.17 for the WHO (strongly in the "quite a lot of confidence" range) to as low as 1.54 for the IMF (in the middle of the spectrum). This 0.63 difference gives the WHO clearly greater average elite confidence than the IMF. In between these extremes, the UN (at 1.89) and the ICC (at 1.86) rise slightly above the overall average of 1.78, while the World Bank (at 1.67) and the WTO (at 1.60) fall below the aggregate average. Paired t-tests show that—with the exception of the small disparity between the UN and the ICC—all means differ significantly ($p<0.05$). The levels of 1.54–2.17



Fig. 4.1 Elite confidence in IOs (individually), five countries pooled

Notes: Based on data from our five focal countries. The category "IOs" in the figure sums up the confidence scores for the six IOs and divides by six. "Gov." refers to confidence in the government of one's country.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

by IO for elites is clearly higher than the levels of 1.23–1.68 by IO seen in Chapter 3 for citizens at large, foretelling the elite–citizen gaps that emerge more sharply in Chapter 5.

We can further note that three of the six IOs attract markedly higher elite confidence than national government, while two other IOs score somewhat lower than national government, and the World Bank score is even with that for national government. Hence, as in the composite scores discussed earlier, we do not see a clear rank order by level of governance, where elite confidence in global IOs is systematically higher or lower than elite confidence in their national government.

The order of the six IOs suggests that elites, like citizens, tend to hold higher confidence in IOs that work on human security issues (composite average of 1.97 for the ICC, UN, and WHO) as compared with economic IOs (composite average of 1.60 for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO). The difference amounts to 0.37 points on the confidence scale. Indeed, over recent decades the "neoliberalism" of the economic triumvirate has received pointed critiques from many governments, politicians, civil society associations, media commentators, and academic researchers. A more favorable view of the market-friendly economic IOs might be expected from business leaders, as our later discussion of variation by elite sectors indeed confirms.



Fig. 4.2 Distribution of elite confidence in IOs, five countries pooled

Note: Figures are percentages of the elite samples in our five focal countries.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

This general difference between core human security IOs and core economic IOs also comes out starkly when we examine the distribution of elite confidence scores, as shown in Figure 4.2. The ICC, UN, and WHO attract decidedly more "3" answers ("a great deal of confidence") than the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. The three economic IOs also have a much higher proportion of negative replies ("none at all" and "not very much confidence") than the three human security IOs.

For all six IOs, a clear plurality of responses (44–56 percent) fall into the "quite a lot of confidence" category, reinforcing the conclusion that contemporary elites accord moderately high legitimacy to global governance. Strikingly, fully one third of respondents give the WHO the highest score of "a great deal of confidence." In contrast, the proportion of elites who assign "a great deal of confidence" to the economic IOs is much lower, at 9–15 percent. Likewise, while very few of the surveyed elites answer "none at all" regarding their confidence in the WHO and the UN, this figure averages close to 10 percent for the three economic IOs.

In most cases, elite survey responses for confidence in IOs cluster toward the middle scores of "1" and "2," suggesting neither strong legitimacy nor strong illegitimacy beliefs among elites for IOs. The WHO again stands out as an exception, with 83 percent of positive scores "2" and "3." (In this context we should recall that our survey preceded the COVID-19 pandemic.) The ICC attracts the most polarized elite opinion, with 29 percent at the extremes of "0" and "3." The other four IOs show less polarization, with 73–78 percent of responses concentrated in the middle categories of "not very much" and "quite a lot" of confidence.

The distribution pattern for elite confidence in national government broadly mirrors that for the IOs. Here, too, a plurality of responses (49.3 percent) indicate "quite a lot of confidence," and a large majority of scores (77.80 percent) are clustered in the middle scores of "1" and "2" rather than at the extremes. Interestingly, in Chapter 3 we saw that citizen opinion on national government is much more polarized, with three times more "none at all" answers than elites. For elites, the proportions of "a great deal of confidence" and "none at all" are most similar between national government and the economic IOs. This evidence, too, suggests little difference between patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs for global and national governance.

To put these findings in a broader context, we can compare average elite confidence toward our six focal IOs with assessments of a wider range of 14 global governance organizations covered in the elite survey. Figure 4.3 and paired *t*-tests ($p<0.001$) show that the WHO and UN still rank highest in this larger company of institutions, ahead of, for instance, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Meanwhile, the World Bank and the WTO fall in a similar medium range with ICANN, the FSC, UNSC, and the Group of Twenty (G20). Lower average elite confidence goes to the KP and the International

Fig. 4.3 Elite confidence in global governance institutions, five countries pooled

Notes: Based on data from our five focal countries. The category "IOs" sums up the confidence scores for the six IOs and divides by six. The category "Region." presents confidence in the regional governance organization for each country.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

Federation of Association Football (FIFA). The composite average of elite confidence across this larger array of 14 institutions (1.67) is 0.11 scale points lower than that for our six focal IOs (1.78). A paired *t*-test confirms this difference to be statistically significant ($p<0.001$).

In this wider comparison we also include average elite confidence in regional governance institutions. The elite survey asked respondents to indicate their level of confidence in a major regional governance organization of which their country is a member. For Brazil, this institution is the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL); for Germany, the EU; for the Philippines, ASEAN; for Russia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and for the US, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The aggregate confidence score for these five regional institutions is, at 1.77, effectively identical to the average for the six global IOs. As with national government, then, we see little difference in average elite confidence between levels of governance.

From this wider comparison we see that, albeit within a limited sample of 14 global bodies, older intergovernmental organizations generally attract higher levels of elite confidence than newer institutional designs, such as transgovernmental networks (G20), private global governance (FIFA), and multi-stakeholder arrangements (FSC, ICANN, and KP). The average for the nine IOs is 1.74, as compared with 1.60 for the three multi-stakeholder bodies, 1.54 for the transgovernmental network, and 0.81 for the private institution (albeit that scandal-ridden FIFA could be an outlier in this regard).

We should also note that, even among elites, levels of nonresponse are strikingly high for several of the new-generation global governance institutions, including 46.7 percent for ICANN, 49.3 percent for the FSC, and even 59.3 percent for the KP. The somewhat higher response rates for ICANN may reflect that organization's major public relations efforts in 2014–16. Recall the much lower elite nonresponse rate for the six focal IOs, at between 0.8 percent and 7.4 percent. These results indicate that elites are generally more familiar with the major traditional IOs and have much less awareness of other arenas of global regulation.

The broader range of global governance institutions reduces the contrast in elite assessments between human security and economic issue areas. ICANN takes the average elite confidence score for economic organizations a little higher (from 1.60 to 1.66), while the addition of the UNFCCC, UNSC, NATO, and KP substantially lowers the average score for human security institutions (from 1.97 to 1.75). In this context, we might recall that the UNSC has long faced criticisms from many governmental as well as nongovernmental elites over its membership and veto arrangements. As for NATO, its score not surprisingly falls due to low confidence averages from elites in the nonmember countries Brazil (1.42), the Philippines (1.37), and especially Russia (0.63). This evidence underlines that comparisons across issue areas can vary depending on the particular institutions being considered.

In sum, we see that macro aggregate scores—the composite average elite confidence levels—can hide considerable organizational variation: between one IO and another; between one institutional form of global governance and another; and between one issue area and another. It goes beyond the present discussion to specify the institutional features that might account for these variations, but the general point is that organizational contexts matter for levels of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Patterns by Country

Greater complexity in elite opinion of IOs also arises when we take a geographical cut and disaggregate the data by country. To what extent and in what ways do elites in different countries have varying legitimacy beliefs toward our six focal IOs? Such divergences would suggest that elite views of global governance (partly) reflect country-specific conditions, possibly including domestic politics, economic circumstances, geopolitical positions, and different historical experiences with IOs. As indicated earlier, in the country comparison we include our elite survey data from South Africa.

Figure 4.4 shows that, with pooled data for the six organizations, average elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs range from close to "quite a lot of confidence" for Brazil (1.91) and Germany (1.89) to nearly the midpoint for Russia (1.55) and even lower for South Africa (1.43). In between, the Philippines at 1.77 and the US at 1.74 are closer to the overall aggregate elite confidence score of 1.78. Paired *t*-tests show that average elite confidence in IOs is significantly higher in Brazil and Germany compared to the other four countries, and that mean confidence levels are significantly higher in the Philippines and the US than in Russia and South Africa. The 0.48 difference between the highest and lowest country scores is somewhat less than the 0.63 difference between the highest and lowest organization scores seen earlier, but it still represents a substantial amount of variation.[1]

A comparison of these country-based elite averages with the country-based citizen averages presented in Chapter 3 shows clear elite–citizen gaps that Chapter 5 examines in detail. In addition, though, we may here note differences between the two sets of data in the rank order of countries. For example, while the citizen survey gives the Philippines by far the highest average IO confidence score, the elite survey puts the Philippines in third place. While Brazil has the second lowest average IO citizen confidence score, its average elite confidence score comes in the

[1] The variance decomposition analysis presented in Online Appendix B confirms that more variation is situated with IOs than with countries: IO random effects comprise approximately 27 percent of the total residual variance and country random effects about 3 percent of the variance. The remaining variance is cross-individual variance.



Fig. 4.4 Elite confidence in IOs (pooled), by country
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

top place. With more consistency, Germany sits in second place for both citizens and elites, while Russia takes fifth place in both surveys. The gap between the US and the Philippines is negligible (0.03 scale points) for average elite confidence in IOs, but substantial (0.59 scale points) for average citizen confidence in IOs. Such observations reinforce the importance of considering country contexts.

In interpreting these results, the aggregate country scores for elite confidence in IOs do not suggest much association with domestic politics. For example, we do not find any particular relationship between the elite scores and regime type, in the way that, as seen in Chapter 3, higher citizen confidence in IOs corresponds fairly well with the degree of liberal democracy as measured by V-Dem. In contrast, the average elite ratings of IOs do not align with the strength of liberal democracy. Such a logic would have placed Germany and the US at the high end, the Philippines and Russia at the low end, and Brazil and South Africa in the middle.

In comparison with the citizen data, where evidence is somewhat mixed for a link between levels of citizen confidence in IOs and a country's level of populist domestic politics, the elite figures show even less association between a lower level of country confidence in IOs and a rise of populism. Elites in Brazil, the Philippines, and the US—three countries that experienced significant populist upsurges during the survey period—return aggregate scores of close to "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs. Also Germany, which witnessed some notable "alt-right" mobilization at the time of the survey, still returns an average elite assessment of nearly "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs. Perhaps some reverse dynamics are at play in these

countries, where populist challenges at the grass-roots level prompt reassertions of liberal internationalist values among elites. In contrast, President Jacob Zuma's populism may have influenced South Africa's lower level of elite confidence in IOs, and populist anti-west rhetoric from Vladimir Putin may have encouraged some lower Russian elite confidence in IOs.

Turning to world order considerations, the elite confidence scores by country do not reveal an obvious geo-economic pattern. Like the citizen data, the elite evidence does not show a consistent so-called "North–South divide" that is often discussed in relation to global governance. While South Africa in the Global South presents a strikingly lower elite average than Germany and the US in the Global North, Brazil returns the highest elite mean of all, and the Philippines comes in third, ahead of the US.

As for geopolitics, our data show a modest 0.19-point divide in elite confidence for IOs between "established powers" Germany and US, on the one hand (joint average 1.82), and "(re)emergent powers" Brazil, Russia and South Africa, on the other (joint average 1.63) (Tallberg and Verhaegen 2020). Recall from Chapter 3 that, without South Africa, the citizen data indicate a similar difference between the two "old powers" (joint average confidence 1.37) and the two "new powers" (joint average confidence 1.15).

To seek further clarification of between-country variations in the elite data, we may examine within-country breakdowns by IO, as shown in Figure 4.5. Indeed, we see that differences between the lowest and the highest IO confidence scores in each country are generally quite considerable: 0.44 points on the confidence scale for the US; 0.64 points for Russia; 0.75 points for South Africa; 0.83 points for Germany and the Philippines; and 0.85 points for Brazil. Hence, in respect of elites as well as citizens, it would be overly simplistic to speak of a "Brazilian," "German," "Philippine," Russian," "South African," or "US" view on the overall legitimacy of global governance. Much depends on the IO in question (and, as we will see later, on the elite sector under consideration).

For certain IOs, elite scores and rank orders are quite consistent between the six countries. Thus, the WHO is always toward the top end and the IMF is, with the exception of the US, always toward the bottom. The WHO everywhere attracts "quite a lot of confidence" or more, regardless of the country's particular experiences of global health matters. Meanwhile, elite skepticism toward the IMF arises both in countries with large votes at the institution and no experience of IMF loans (US, Germany), as well as in countries with small votes and intense experience of IMF conditionality (Brazil, Philippines, Russia, South Africa).

For other IOs, elite confidence scores and rank orders can be quite divergent between countries. In a particularly striking case, average elite confidence in the ICC ranges from highs of 2.45 in Germany and 1.99 in Brazil to lows of 1.38 in Russia and 1.20 in South Africa. The very high score in Germany may reflect a strong elite faith there in a liberal-cosmopolitan world order. In contrast, many



Fig. 4.5 Elite confidence in IOs (individually), by country
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

elites in Africa have charged that the ICC works on double standards between their continent and other parts of the world, while many elites in Russia have accused "the West" of using human rights for geostrategic purposes (Vilmer 2016).

Conversely, elites in Russia give the UN a comparatively high average confidence score, arguably since their country holds greater status in that IO. Moreover, the UN tends to operate in a realist power politics mode to which Russian foreign policy is historically accustomed. Not surprisingly, the three economic IOs obtain the highest confidence scores from elites in the US, given that their country plays a leading role in these organizations and tends to benefit from their policy frameworks. Somewhat unexpected is the low confidence score in South Africa for the UN, given that organization's prominence in the anti-apartheid struggle, but perhaps historical memories have faded after 30 years.

Importantly also, these within-country between-IO figures show that, however low the overall country average, elites in each country give at least one IO "quite a lot of confidence," something that we do not see in the citizen data. At the same time, no matter how high the overall country average, elites in each country also give at least one IO a score near the midpoint of the confidence scale. Hence, again, the overall aggregate score of 1.78 for elite confidence in IOs encompasses very substantial variation.

The importance of country context also comes to the fore if we reorganize the country data by IO, as in Figure 4.6. Now we see that none of the six IOs obtains a consistent level of elite confidence across the six countries. Instead, the



Fig. 4.6 Variation between countries in elite confidence in IOs, by IO
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

country-based IO averages vary by at least 0.39 points (in the case of the IMF) to as much as 1.25 points on the confidence scale (in the case of the ICC).

The distinction observed earlier at aggregate level between the three human security IOs and the three economic IOs generally holds up in the disaggregated country data. Elites in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines give their three highest mean confidence scores to the WHO, UN, and ICC, while their lowest three averages go to the WTO, World Bank, and IMF. The broad pattern also applies to Russia and South Africa, except that third place goes to an economic IO in these countries, and the ICC drops to fourth and sixth place, respectively. Further qualifying the general tendency, US elites put the World Bank in second place and the ICC last.

Fluctuations between countries are not limited to IOs, as average elite confidence in national government varies by 0.75 points, with Brazil at a low of 1.33 and Germany at a high of 2.08. Also note that elite confidence in national government is higher than in five of the six IOs in South Africa, but lower than in all six IOs in the US. Elite confidence scores for national government also rank higher than most IOs in Russia and lower than most IOs in the Philippines. Hence, while

our aggregate elite survey data show that confidence in international and national institutions is quite similar, disaggregation by country indicates much divergence between the two levels of governance.

In sum, the preceding discussion underlines that average elite confidence in IOs varies considerably by country. These differences amount to as much as 0.48 points on the confidence scale between one country aggregate and another; up to 0.85 points between one IO and another in the same country; and as high as 1.25 points between one country and another for the same IO. While it goes beyond the present discussion to establish whether certain country circumstances consistently generate such variations, we can draw the general conclusion that country context matters for elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Patterns by Elite Sector

After the preceding breakdowns of the evidence by organization and by country, our third main cut into the aggregate data on elite confidence in IOs follows social-sectoral lines. Here we distinguish between the six categories of elites covered in our survey: namely, leaders in business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research. The motivating proposition is that elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance can vary by vocation: i.e., that academics, activists, entrepreneurs, journalists, officials, and politicians could assess IOs differently because of the diverse aims and mindsets that mark their respective occupations. In this case, sectoral characteristics might also influence elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, much as social categories revealed variations by class and age groups in the citizen data in Chapter 3.

Indeed, as indicated in Figure 4.7, average legitimacy beliefs toward our six IOs by elite sector range from a high of 1.94 ("quite a lot of confidence") in the case of government bureaucracy to a low of 1.55 (near the middle of the scale) in the case of civil society. In between the extremes, we find research leaders (1.85) and business leaders (1.83) around the aggregate mean of 1.78, while media elites (1.70) and political party elites (1.69) fall somewhat below the overall average. The difference between the highest and lowest confidence scores by elite sector amounts to 0.39 scale points. While this figure is less than for organizations (0.63) and for countries (0.48), the variation remains notable and statistically significant (confirmed by paired *t*-tests, $p<0.001$).

These between-sector differences in elite confidence toward IOs are perhaps not so surprising. For example, since IOs are regulatory bureaucracies, we might expect government officials to view sister organizations with a degree of sympathy (either built-in or as a result of government involvement with the IO in question). Meanwhile, substantial liberal-internationalist dispositions in academic circles might help to boost the relative legitimacy beliefs for IOs in research



Fig. 4.7 Elite confidence in IOs (pooled), by sector
Note: Based on data from our five focal countries.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

quarters. Conversely, greater skepticism toward (international) bureaucratic authority could reflect the watchdog role of civil society activists, as well as political parties and journalists. Thus, certain elite sectors are vocationally more disposed than others to endorse or criticize IOs.

As seen in Figure 4.8, further within-sector disaggregation by IOs reveals still more variation in elite confidence levels, much as we saw earlier regarding within-country breakdowns by IOs. The spreads between IO scores in the respective elite groups amount to as much as 0.49 scale points for government bureaucracy, 0.51 points for business, 0.64 points for media, 0.70 points for research, 0.84 points for political parties, and 0.93 points for civil society. Thus, while civil society leaders across the five countries on average regard the WHO with "quite a lot of confidence" (2.09), they view the WTO with "not very much confidence" (1.16). Given such divergences, it is overly simplistic to speak of an "academic," "bureaucratic," "business," "civil society," "media," or "political party" view of legitimacy in global governance: much depends on the IO at hand.

Indeed, every elite sector regards certain IOs (especially the WHO and the UN) with "quite a lot of confidence." In addition, over half (19 of 36) of the sectoral confidence scores for our six focal IOs come in at over 1.80, once again giving an overall picture of moderately high elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Yet almost a fifth (19 percent) of the sectoral scores for IOs fall at or below the midpoint of 1.50. These numbers include some of the lowest confidence scores, especially among civil society elites vis-à-vis the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, for



Fig. 4.8 Elite confidence in IOs (individually), by sector

Note: Based on data from our five focal countries.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

which the averages are close to "not very much confidence." In contrast, and as anticipated earlier, business elites give the market-friendly economic IOs among the highest scores, near to "quite a lot of confidence."

Business circles are thereby the only sector to deviate from the pattern whereby elites have higher confidence in human security IOs than economic IOs. For the other five elite sectors, the WHO, UN, and ICC obtain the three highest scores, while the WTO, World Bank, and IMF receive the three lowest scores. Even business elites rate the UN and WHO highest among the six IOs; the issue divide only breaks down because of decidedly lower business confidence in the ICC.

Turning to comparison between international and national levels of governance, political elites (from government bureaucracy and political parties) accord relatively high confidence scores to national government, just as they do to IOs. In contrast, all four sectors of societal elites (business, civil society, media, and research) have substantially lower average confidence in national government, according between 0.22 and 0.31 points more confidence to IOs (the combined average).

To round off, the foregoing analysis indicates that average elite confidence in IOs varies notably between the six categories of elites covered in our survey. The variation runs as high as 0.39 points between one elite sector and another, and as much as 0.93 points between one IO and another within the same elite sector. While it goes beyond the scope of the current analysis to determine whether certain features of the respective elite sectors systematically produce these variations, we can

conclude that sectoral affiliation matters for elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed levels and patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, based on data from the LegGov Elite Survey undertaken in 2017–19. To be sure, the evidence base for this discussion has its limitations, focusing on only six IOs (plus a wider range of 14 bodies), six countries, six elite sectors, and one moment in time. Future surveys will hopefully expand the institutional, geographical, social, and historical scope of the data. For now, though, the LegGov Elite Survey has no equal in its breadth, such that the picture presented in this chapter offers unprecedented detail and nuance about how political and societal leaders assess global governance.

The analysis in this chapter leads to five general conclusions on elite views of global governance, on the same points discussed for public opinion in the conclusion to Chapter 3. First, we have seen that, overall, the sampled elites from six sectors in six countries today regard six IOs with moderately high levels of legitimacy. This general contemporary elite evaluation of global governance is definitely positive, in spite of an environment marked by stagnant multilateralism, an unstable world order, and widespread populist anti-globalism. That said, the composite picture is not one of elite exuberance about current global governance, either. In terms of the most encompassing aggregate—i.e., the umbrella average of 1.78—contemporary world elite opinion shows neither a legitimacy boon nor a legitimacy crisis toward IOs, and instead suggests moderate satisfaction with the status quo.

Second, this chapter, like the previous chapter on public opinion, has underlined that macro aggregates of average elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance contain many and often very substantial variations. Elite confidence scores for IOs range from quite negative to highly positive, depending on the IO, the country, and the elite sector in question. It is therefore a simplification to speak even of a "Brazilian elite" opinion or a "business elite" perspective on IOs in general. Context matters, a lot. Hence, we must exercise substantial caution when contemplating how future developments might influence elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Given the large variations described in this chapter, it is most unlikely that all elite legitimacy perceptions will respond similarly to one or the other event or institutional reform. Thus, those who seek to enhance (or to undermine) general elite legitimacy toward global governance face a complex task.

Third, as in the citizen data, we observe a broad distinction in average elite legitimacy beliefs between the three human security IOs and the three economic

IOs. Higher confidence scores go to the WHO, UN, and ICC relative to the WTO, World Bank, and IMF in the full elite sample, as well as in most country and sector subsamples. However, this difference between issue areas narrows considerably when the elite survey looks beyond the six focal IOs to a larger sample of global governance institutions.

Fourth, as with the public opinion data in Chapter 3, elite legitimacy beliefs generally do not show a major difference between international and national institutions. Average elite confidence for the two levels of governance differs by only 0.11 points (in favor of the international level). Disaggregated averages by IOs and by elite sector consistently place national government toward the middle of the rankings, with slightly more IOs receiving higher mean scores than national government. Larger contrasts between views of the two levels of governance appear in relation to countries: elites rate national government higher than most IOs in Germany, Russia, and South Africa, but lower than all IOs in Brazil and the US. On the whole, though, we can say that IOs attract neither higher nor (in particular) lower elite legitimacy beliefs than national government.

Fifth and finally, some initial comparisons in this chapter have shown that elite and public opinions on IOs often diverge. For example, elites and citizens often rate IOs in different rank orders. Most importantly for this book, the LegGov survey data on elite confidence in IOs deliver consistently higher figures than the WVS7 data on citizen confidence. The next chapter elaborates on the nature and extent of this evident elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

5
Mapping the Elite–Citizen Gap

The preceding two chapters have examined the legitimacy beliefs toward global governance of respectively citizens and elites. We have observed that, within both populations, levels of legitimacy for IOs vary across organizations, countries, social categories, and elite sectors. We have also seen that patterns of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs often differ between citizens on the one hand and elites on the other. In particular, a comparison of figures in Chapters 3 and 4 points to the existence of a "gap" between generally higher elite approval for IOs relative to the general public. The present chapter explores the extent and variation of that legitimacy gap in detail.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the question of an elite–citizen divide in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance has considerable prominence today. In particular, the current wave of populism includes a marked rejection among many citizens of the purported globalism of establishment leaders in politics and society. Mobilization of public opposition to globalization and global governance has figured conspicuously in the saga of Brexit, the growth of right-wing nationalist parties across Europe, and the presidencies of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Donald Trump in the US, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

To be sure, the gap could in principle fall on opposite lines, with citizens according global governance greater legitimacy than elites. For instance, situations could arise where certain elites feel acutely threatened by global governance, say, because of sanctions that specifically target them. Or elites in especially weak states could feel deeply frustrated by their incapacity to influence global governance. Or citizens at large might in some circumstances perceive IOs as a more legitimate arena of governance when they are strongly disillusioned with their national political system and its elites. However, in most cases we expect (for reasons theorized in Chapter 6 and empirically tested in Chapter 9) that elites would on the whole attribute more legitimacy to global governance than the general public.

A notable gap between higher elite and lower public legitimacy vis-à-vis global governance could have substantial problematic consequences. For one thing, communication between leaders and citizens at large about global governance can be complicated if the two groups have markedly different perceptions of the issue. Moreover, elites who mainly do the global governing can face greater difficulties to construct and implement global policies when public opinion gives those

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance. Lisa Maria Dellmuth et al., Oxford University Press.
 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192856241.003.0005

endeavors decidedly lower approval. Normatively, too, an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy for global governance raises critical questions about political representation and democratic accountability, as elaborated in Chapters 1 and 10.

Yet, important as this elite–citizen gap may be, it has received little research attention. As indicated in our review of "the state of the art" in Chapter 1, hardly any existing academic literature specifically addresses the elite–citizen divide regarding legitimacy in global governance (Kim 2019; Kertzer 2020). In particular, systematic empirical evidence to compare citizen and elite views of global governance is lacking. No previous study of this issue has assembled large-*n* data that covers multiple IOs, multiple countries, and multiple social sectors, as we do here. Establishing how far elites and citizens diverge in their perceptions of IO legitimacy—and how the size of that gap varies across different organizational and societal contexts—can contribute importantly to knowledge and policy for future global governance.

This chapter assesses whether we indeed observe substantial gaps between elites and citizens in terms of their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. We further enquire whether such a gap is larger for some IOs than for others, for some countries than for others, and for some elite sectors (i.e., government bureaucracy, political parties, business, civil society, media, research) than for others. When presenting such differences, we reflect on contextual circumstances of the IOs, the countries, and the sectors that might shape the variation.

In detailing levels and patterns of an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, this chapter draws on the same survey data regarding the same six IOs and five countries that inform our analysis throughout this book. We thus examine how populations in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US may exhibit an elite–citizen divide in their assessments of the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. Data on citizen views come from the WVS7, while data on elite opinion derive from the LegGov Elite Survey, both undertaken during the period 2017–19. As elsewhere, we measure legitimacy with the indicator of "confidence," on a scale from 0 ("none at all") to 3 ("a great deal"). Recall Chapter 2 for a full elaboration of the research design.

In relation to these data, we indeed find that a notable difference exists between average elite confidence and average citizen confidence vis-à-vis global governance. The gap arises in the aggregate data (pooled across all IOs, all countries, and all elite sectors), as well as separately in respect of each of the six IOs, four of the five countries, and each of the six elite sectors. That said, the size of the gap differs considerably between one IO and another, one country and another, and one sector and another.

The remainder of this chapter specifies these findings in the same five steps as the preceding chapters on citizen and elite opinion taken separately. Thus, we first calculate the aggregate gap from the composite data and find that, overall, elites on average accord distinctly more legitimacy to the six IOs collectively than

citizens. An elite–citizen confidence gap of broadly similar size prevails in relation to national government. We further discover that elites are generally aware of the existence of this gap in legitimacy beliefs and realize that citizen approval of IOs tends to be lower than their own.

Second, the chapter disaggregates data for the elite–citizen gap by the six IOs and, as in the citizen and elite analyses of preceding chapters, discovers variation. In general, the gap is larger with respect to IOs in the area of human security (UN, WHO, and ICC) than the economic IOs (World Bank, IMF, and WTO). Interestingly, elites in general *under*estimate the extent of the gap in relation to the human security IOs, believing that citizen evaluations are closer to elite views than they actually are, but *over*estimate its size in relation to the economic IOs, believing that public opinion is further from elite perspectives than it actually is.

Third, we disaggregate the evidence by country and in this respect also find notable variation. The gap between average elite and citizen confidence in IOs is considerably larger in Brazil than in the other four countries. In the Philippines, meanwhile, the difference is actually negative, with citizens on average having slightly *more* confidence in IOs than elites. Further variation in the size of the legitimacy gap arises when we examine the six IOs individually in each country. Here the distinction between human security IOs and economic IOs becomes more nuanced, with sometimes a larger elite–citizen gap in relation to the IMF and the World Bank and sometimes a smaller gap in relation to the ICC, UN, and WHO. The size of the elite–citizen legitimacy gap vis-à-vis their national government also varies between countries, sometimes being larger than the gap vis-à-vis IOs and sometimes being smaller.

Fourth, the chapter disaggregates the data by elite sector to reveal variation in the size of the legitimacy gap toward IOs depending on the type of elite in question. The gap is larger for bureaucratic, research, and business elites than for media, partisan-political, and civil society elites. Comparing across issue areas, leaders in civil society, media, political parties, and research follow the general pattern of having a larger legitimacy gap with citizens in respect of human security IOs relative to economic IOs; however, the opposite holds for business elites, whose gap with citizens is decidedly larger regarding the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Strikingly, civil society elites on average have similar or less confidence relative to citizens in the three economic IOs.

Fifth and finally, the concluding section of the chapter consolidates our analysis with five general findings about the size and patterns of an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

The Overall Picture

We begin by examining our data as a whole, in regard to three points. First, we assemble evidence covering all six focal IOs and all five focal countries to determine

whether and how far an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance exists in this overall aggregate. Second, we compare this composite confidence divide vis-à-vis IOs with the overall elite–citizen gap in confidence vis-à-vis national government (pooling data from the five countries), in order to see how far the elite–citizen divergence in attitudes is particular to global governance. Third, we examine at the aggregate level how elites perceive that the general public in their country assesses the IOs. In this way we can compare elites' estimation of their gap with citizens regarding confidence in IOs with its actual extent.

Overall, we observe in Figure 5.1 that elites have significantly more confidence in IOs than citizens at large. While elites on average lean toward "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs (1.78), citizens on average are situated a little below the midpoint between "not very much confidence" and "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs (1.43). The gap for the aggregate sample therefore amounts to a striking 0.35 on the 3-point scale. On this measure, elites across the five countries accord global governance notably more legitimacy than citizens at large.

Yet this confidence gap is not limited to IOs. Figure 5.1 also shows an elite–citizen divide in our five focal countries pooled with respect to confidence in



Fig. 5.1 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by IO, five countries pooled

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all five countries, comparing elites with citizens in their respective countries. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Due to rounding, some numbers for the average gap may not correspond with the difference between the elite and citizen averages. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data, equally weighing the countries. Across all IOs, differences in mean confidence between elites and citizens are statistically significant (Wald tests, $p<0.001$).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

national government. The average confidence level for political and societal leaders (1.67) is again decidedly higher than that for the general population (1.38). The gap of 0.29 for national government is somewhat smaller than the gap of 0.35 for IOs, but still substantial. This evidence suggests that the elite–citizen gap is not particular to governance at the global level, but extends also to governance at the national level.

Turning now to elite perceptions of their confidence gap with citizens, Figure 5.2 shows that, taking all six IOs and all five countries in sum, political and societal leaders are generally aware that they hold global governance in higher regard than the public at large. While the elites give the IOs a mean confidence rating of 1.78, they on average estimate citizen confidence in those IOs to lie at 1.65. Yet this perceived gap of 0.13 is considerably less, by 0.22, than the actual divergence of 0.35. On this measure, too, elites would appear to be "out of touch" with their wider society. In contrast, elites' supposition about citizen confidence in the national government is, on average, close to the actual mark. Indeed, the estimation by the sampled elites of citizens' confidence in their national government (1.33) is statistically not significantly different from the actually observed level (1.38).



Fig. 5.2 Elite estimation of citizen confidence in IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all six elite sectors, pooling elites and citizens from all countries. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data, equally weighing the countries. The difference between citizens' confidence and the estimation of their confidence by elites is significant for the WHO, UN, WTO, IMF, and for the six IOs on average (Wald test, $p<0.05$). The nonsignificant Wald tests suggest that the elites accurately estimated citizen confidence in the ICC, World Bank, and their national government.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

To summarize the macro picture, then, we do find an elite–citizen gap of some magnitude regarding legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, and elites in general underestimate the extent of that gap by some measure. Yet, as our analyses in other chapters repeatedly show, aggregate calculations can mask considerable variations in relation to specific IOs, specific countries, and specific social categories. We now turn to such more nuanced perspectives on the elite–citizen gap.

Patterns by Organization

As in the previous two chapters, we first disaggregate the overall elite–citizen gap in confidence vis-à-vis global governance with a comparison across the six IOs taken individually. How much does the gap diverge between one IO and another? Moreover, how much do elites' estimations of their gap with citizens differ between the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO? Variations of this kind would suggest that certain qualities of the IOs, such as their issue areas of concern or their modus operandi, affect the size of the elite–citizen confidence gap.

Looking again at Figure 5.1, we see that an elite–citizen legitimacy gap prevails for each of the six IOs, with data pooled across the five countries. Yet, although a gap exists for every IO, the extent of the divergence ranges from well above to well below the aggregate average of 0.35. Thus, while the difference between average elite and citizen assessments of the WTO is a more modest 0.20, the average gap regarding the WHO is a more substantial 0.50. In respect of the other focal IOs, we find gaps on the 3-point scale amounting to 0.30 for the IMF, 0.36 for the World Bank, 0.44 for the ICC, and 0.45 for the UN.

Again, for comparison the aggregate figure for the elite–citizen gap in confidence vis-à-vis their national government is 0.29. Thus, in terms of individual IOs, only the WTO at 0.20 has a smaller divide between elite and citizen assessments than national government. For the IMF at 0.30 the gap is similar to that for national government. Evaluations of the other four IOs show a larger elite–citizen divergence than for national government.

Comparing these levels across the six IOs, we see that the elite–citizen confidence gap tends to be relatively larger in respect of the three human security IOs and relatively smaller in respect of the three economic IOs. On the 3-point scale, differences between average elite and citizen assessments are narrower (0.20–0.36) regarding the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, but wider (0.44–0.50) regarding the ICC, UN, and WHO. This pattern suggests that, on the whole, elites come closer to sharing public misgivings about the economic IOs, but have decidedly more enthusiasm than citizens at large for the human security IOs.

Still more between-IO variation appears if we compare the elite–citizen gap for each IO broken down by country, as shown in Figure 5.3. We then see that



Fig. 5.3 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by IO, five countries individually

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all five countries, comparing elites with citizens in their respective countries. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Due to rounding, some totals for the average gap may not correspond with the difference between the elite and citizen averages. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data, equally weighing the countries. All differences in mean confidence between elites and citizens are statistically significant at $p<0.001$ (Wald test), except for the ICC, WTO, and national government in Russia; the World Bank in the Philippines ($p<0.01$); and the ICC, UN, and WHO in the Philippines.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

the aggregate gap for the WTO of 0.20 encompasses a range from 0.50 in Brazil to −0.37 in the Philippines. Thus, while elites in Brazil on average accord the WTO substantially more confidence than the general public in that country, in the Philippines it is the citizens who accord the WTO substantially more confidence than the political and societal leaders in that country. The difference between the two extremes is no less than 0.87. A similar pattern emerges regarding the IMF, for which the aggregate gap of 0.30 covers country variation from 0.54 in Brazil to −0.31 in the Philippines, or a spread of 0.85. For the World Bank, the size of the elite–citizen divide ranges from 0.58 in the US to −0.25 in the Philippines, again widely contrasting observations by 0.83.

Similarly large between-country variations also appear in respect of the size of the elite–citizen gap for the human security IOs. Regarding the ICC, the elite–citizen divergence ranges from a meagre and not statistically significant gap of 0.03 in the Philippines to a full 0.80 in Brazil (difference of 0.77). For the UN, the gap varies from a not statistically significant divergence of 0.09 in the Philippines to a whopping 0.94 in Russia (difference of 0.85). For the WHO, the divide stretches from another not statistically significant gap of 0.12 in the Philippines to a very sizable difference of 0.92 in Brazil (difference of 0.80). Hence, between-country variations in the extent of the gap are more or less equally big for both economic and human security IOs.

However, if we remove the Philippines from consideration, then between-country fluctuation in the size of the gap reduces considerably in respect of the economic IOs: to 0.23 for the WTO; 0.15 for the IMF; and just 0.10 for the World Bank. In contrast, between-country variation in the extent of the elite–citizen gap remains more substantial for the human security IOs: at 0.51 for the ICC; and 0.59 for both the UN and the WHO. Hence, leaving aside the Philippines as an outlier yields a different picture, where elite–citizen gaps are relatively similar across countries for the economic IOs and quite varying for the human security IOs. This observation suggests that country-specific circumstances matter as well as IO-specific conditions—something for further reflection in the next section.

Comparing the international and national levels, we observe even larger between-country variation in elite–citizen gaps regarding confidence in the national government. In the Philippines, elites have substantially *less* confidence in their national government than citizens (a difference of −0.54). At the other extreme, elites in Germany have considerably *more* confidence in their national government than citizens (a difference of 0.76). Removing the Philippines as an outlier, we observe an average confidence gap vis-à-vis national government for the other four countries (0.52) whose extent is similar to that regarding the human security IOs.

Turning to elite estimations of citizen confidence in the individual IOs, as shown in Figure 5.2, we again see a variable picture. Elites on average considerably

*over*estimate citizen confidence in the WHO (1.99 versus 1.67) and the UN (1.58 versus 1.36). In contrast, their assumptions correspond closely to actual citizen views of the ICC (1.43 versus 1.42) and the World Bank (1.28 versus 1.31). Meanwhile, elites *under*estimate citizen confidence in the WTO (1.30 versus 1.39) and, especially, the IMF (1.00 versus 1.24). Thus elites' underestimation (by 0.22) of their aggregate confidence gap with citizens regarding IOs, noted in the previous section, is mainly driven by major overestimations of citizen confidence in the WHO and the UN, which are only partly offset by the major underestimation of citizen confidence in the IMF.

These divergences between perceived and actual views are interesting. Elites in general appear to assume that the public at large is more drawn to the health and peace agendas of the WHO and the UN than prevails in practice. Conversely, elites anticipate that citizens are still more critical of the "neoliberal" IMF than proves to be the case.

In sum, much as we see that citizen confidence varies by IO in Chapter 3 and elite confidence varies by IO in Chapter 4, so the extent of the elite–citizen confidence gap also varies by IO. The difference in gap size between one IO and another can be as much as 0.30 (between the WTO at 0.20 and the WHO at 0.50). Often, albeit not always, the variation in gap size shows distinct patterns for economic IOs on the one hand and human security IOs on the other, as we also see on several occasions in previous chapters with respect to citizen and elite evaluations viewed separately. Taken together with evidence from the preceding two chapters regarding patterns by organization, these data suggest that institutional qualities play a role in shaping legitimacy beliefs in global governance, alongside the individual-level factors that we give more particular attention in Part III of this book.

Patterns by Country

We now switch our primary focus of comparison from IOs to countries. Do the level and patterns of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance differ depending on the country in question? Do elites in certain countries make more (or less) accurate estimations of citizen views of IOs? If so, then country-related circumstances could influence the particular contours of the gap. For example, the between-IO comparisons above have already indicated that the Philippines deviates from the other focal countries in our study by showing an overall reverse gap between elites and citizens.

Looking at Figure 5.4, we indeed see marked divergences from the aggregate elite–citizen confidence gap of 0.35 when we examine the five countries individually. In fact, the average gap by country is larger than the aggregate gap in four of the five cases: namely, 0.43 in the US; 0.48 in Germany; 0.51 in Russia; and 0.63 in Brazil. The overall mean comes down to 0.35 owing to a highly contrary result in



Fig. 5.4 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by country, pooled IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all five countries, comparing elites with citizens in their respective countries. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Due to rounding, some totals for the average gap may not correspond with the difference between the elite and citizen averages. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data. Across all countries, differences in mean confidence between elites and citizens are statistically significant (Wald test, $p<0.05$ for the Philippines, $p<0.001$ for the other countries).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

the Philippines, where elites on average have slightly *less* confidence (−0.12) in the six IOs pooled relative to the general public.

Variation in the extent of the elite–citizen gap between Brazil, Germany, Russia, and the US shows no clear and obvious pattern. True, the two traditional-power, higher-income, and more liberal-democratic countries (Germany and the US) have smaller gaps than the two emerging-power, middle-income, and less liberal-democratic countries (Brazil and Russia). However, the difference of 0.03 between the average elite–citizen gaps for Germany and Russia is negligible. Moreover, the smallest elite–citizen gap of all appears for the Philippines as a geopolitically marginalized, lower-middle-income, and less liberal-democratic country.

How exceptional is the result for the Philippines? We might surmise that the populist Duterte government brings elite views closer to citizens, but then we should expect a narrower gap also to arise in Trump's US and Bolsonaro's Brazil, which does not appear, unless those two countries previously had an even greater gulf between leaders and the general public. Perhaps the Philippines represents a broader pattern of smaller elite–citizen differences vis-à-vis IOs among lower- and

lower-middle-income countries, or among countries in (East and Southeast) Asia. Yet only research of further such countries could answer these speculations.

Next we look more specifically at within-country differences in the size of the elite–citizen confidence gap by IO, as depicted in Figure 5.5. Here we see that, in Brazil, the average gap of 0.63 for the six IOs together encompasses a range from a low of 0.50 for the WTO to a high of 0.92 for the WHO. The pooled IO average gap of 0.51 in Russia contains IO-specific gaps that are as little as 0.27 for the WTO and as big as 0.94 for the UN. In Germany, the gap of 0.48 for the aggregated IOs includes a smallest elite–citizen divergence of 0.33 for the WHO and a largest divergence of 0.76 for the ICC. The overall country gap of 0.43 in the US incorporates a narrower gap of 0.35 for the UN and a wider gap of 0.58 for the World Bank. In the Philippines, the aggregate gap of –0.12 comprises a range from –0.37 for the WTO to 0.12 for the WHO. Hence, between-country variation in the size of the elite–citizen confidence gap is quite considerable in respect of individual IOs.

These within-country comparisons do not show the consistent distinction between economic IOs and human security IOs that appears in our earlier aggregate analysis of IOs. The issue-area difference does hold up in Brazil, where the elite–citizen confidence gaps for the WTO, IMF, and World Bank are all clearly smaller than those for the UN, ICC, and WHO. In the Philippines, a negative gap prevails for the three economic IOs (i.e., elites are more skeptical than citizens), while no statistically significant gap appears for the three human security IOs. However, the issue-area distinction breaks down in Russia, where the elite–citizen gap for the ICC is smallest, alongside the WTO. Data from Germany also go against the aggregate pattern, as here the UN and the WHO have among the smallest elite–citizen gaps, while the IMF and the World Bank have among the largest gaps. The US deviates even more, with elite–citizen divides for the two Bretton Woods institutions being the largest, while the gap for the UN is the smallest. Thus, as on earlier occasions in Chapters 3 and 4, a broad pattern between economic and human security IOs in the aggregate data holds up less consistently when we examine more particular contexts.

Country-specific circumstances may clarify these deviations. For example, in the US elites may perceive larger political and economic advantages from the IMF and the World Bank than citizens at large, who more usually see these institutions as purveyors of austerity. In contrast, many elites in the Philippines have long voiced vociferous criticisms of the main global economic institutions, as reflected in their more negative assessments than citizens of these two IOs. In Russia, elites may see especially greater advantages than citizens in their government's powerful position at the UN, and the enhanced international security that is perceived to result for their country. Meanwhile, elites and the general public in Russia are more similarly critical of the global economic institutions that both groups perceive to have historically harmed their country. Liberal elites in Germany are, given



Fig. 5.5 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by country, individual IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all five countries, comparing elites with citizens in their respective countries. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Due to rounding, some totals for the average gap may not correspond with the difference between the elite and citizen averages. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data. All differences in mean confidence between elites and citizens are statistically significant at $p<0.001$ (Wald test), except for the ICC, WTO, and national government in Russia; the World Bank in the Philippines ($p<0.01$); and the ICC, UN, and WHO in the Philippines.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

historical experiences of Nazism and the Nuremberg Tribunal, perhaps especially positively minded toward the ICC as an international force against war crimes, a disposition that maybe does not weigh as heavily with the general public in that country. Possibly, experiences with military dictatorship similarly incline liberal elites in Brazil toward more positive views of the ICC than the general population. For the ICC, the gap is much larger in the two member states (Brazil and Germany) than the nonmembers (Russia and US), and the former member (the Philippines).

Finally, variation across countries also appears with respect to the size of the elite–citizen gap in confidence vis-à-vis national government. As we saw earlier, the overall aggregate gaps for IOs (0.35) and national governments (0.29) are fairly close, suggesting that divergences in elite–citizen assessments are broadly similar for global and national governance. Such similarity also arises at the country level in Brazil (0.63 versus 0.62) and the US (0.43 versus 0.46). However, more divergence between levels of governance occurs in the other three countries. For example, in Russia the elite–citizen gap for confidence in national government (0.24) is considerably smaller than that for the collective IOs (0.51) and much smaller still than the gap for particular IOs such as the WHO (0.73) and the UN (0.94). Conversely, in Germany the gap vis-à-vis national government (0.76) is notably larger than that for the pooled IOs (0.48) and much larger still than the gap for individual IOs such as the WTO (0.35) and the WHO (0.33). In the Philippines, too, the elite–citizen gap in confidence is larger for national government than for the collective IOs (−0.54 versus −0.12), albeit with a negative difference where the general public on average has *more* confidence than elites in governance institutions, both national and global.

Turning to elite perceptions of citizen confidence in IOs, compared across countries, Figure 5.6 shows mostly larger mismatches than in the overall sample. Thus, while elites in aggregate overestimate citizen confidence in IOs by an average of 0.22, the extent of this "out of touch" misjudgment rises to 0.25 in the US, 0.30 in Germany, 0.35 in Russia, and no less than 0.56 in Brazil. In the latter case, elites believe that citizen assessments of IOs are quite close to their own (1.91 versus 1.83), when in fact a large gulf prevails (1.91 versus 1.27). The Philippines is once more an outlier, where elites tend to assume that citizens at large have a bit *less* confidence than them in IOs (a difference of 0.07), when in fact the general public accords IOs a bit *more* legitimacy (a difference of −0.12).

In sum, as in the examinations of citizen opinion and elite opinion in previous chapters, we find considerable variation by country in the extent and even direction of the elite–citizen gap regarding confidence in IOs. The difference in gap size between one country and another can be as large as 0.75 (with Brazil at 0.63 and the Philippines at −0.12). Looking at particular IOs in particular countries, the maximum variation in the elite–citizen gap can be as large as 1.31 (with the UN in Russia at 0.94 and the WTO in the Philippines at −0.37). Once more, then,



Fig. 5.6 Elite estimation of citizen confidence by country, pooled IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all five countries, comparing elites with citizens in their respective countries. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data. All differences between citizens' confidence and the estimation of their confidence by elites are significant (Wald test, $p<0.01$).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

our descriptive data suggest that country circumstances shape legitimacy beliefs in global governance, alongside the individual-level factors that we highlight in Chapters 6–9.

Patterns by Sector

As in Chapters 3 and 4, our third main disaggregation of the data takes a social cut. In the present case we examine whether the elite–citizen legitimacy gap varies in size by the elite sector involved. Thus, do some circles of elites differ more from the general population than others when it comes to assessments of IOs? And how far do the respective elite sectors on average under- or overestimate the extent of their distance from public opinion?

As seen in Figure 5.7, the elite–citizen gap in confidence regarding IOs is indeed not uniform across the six elite sectors. In relation to the six IOs pooled, the gap is larger than the overall mean of 0.35 in the case of business elites (0.40), research elites (0.42), and, especially, elites in the government bureaucracy (0.52). The average gap is smaller than the overall mean for the other three elite sectors: at 0.27 for media elites, 0.26 for political party elites, and just 0.12 for civil society elites. On this evidence, journalists, politicians, and civil society activists have, on average,



Fig. 5.7 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by elite sector, pooled IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all IOs, comparing elite types with citizens. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data, equally weighing the countries. Differences in mean confidence are statistically significant for each elite sector (Wald test, $p<0.05$ for civil society, $p<0.01$ for media, $p<0.001$ for all other).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

evaluations of IOs that are closer to those of citizens at large, as compared with entrepreneurs, academics, and bureaucrats. That said, even the gap of 0.12 for civil society is statistically significant. Moreover, being a mean score suggests that also some civil society leaders regard IOs with considerably more confidence than the citizen average, while others probably give IOs less approval than average public opinion.

Next, in Figure 5.8, we break down the sectoral data further by IO. Here we see that the confidence divide between bureaucratic elites and citizens at large is quite consistent, at between 0.52 and 0.59, apart from a smaller gap of 0.38 in relation to the WTO. For the other five elite sectors, the gap varies more markedly depending on the IO in question. The divergence between the evaluations of business elites and citizens at large can be as little as 0.09 (for the ICC, not a statistically significant difference) or as big as 0.60 (for the World Bank). In respect of political-party elites, the gap with citizen assessments of IOs ranges from a not statistically significant 0.11 (regarding the WTO) to 0.54 (regarding the WHO). Between-IO variations



Fig. 5.8 Elite–citizen gap in confidence by elite sector, individual IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all six elite sectors, pooling elites and citizens from all countries. The gap size indicates the differences between elite and citizen means on the 0–3 scale. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data, equally weighing the countries. All the indicated differences in mean confidence between elites and citizens are statistically significant at $p<0.05$ (Wald test), except the ICC for business; the IMF for civil society, partisan-political, and media; the World Bank for civil society; and the WTO for media and partisan-political.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

in the size of the confidence gap with citizens are more moderate in the case of research elites (a difference of 0.30 between the highest and lowest gap) and media elites (variation of up to 0.28). The largest fluctuation by IO appears in the gap between civil society elites and public opinion. Interestingly, while the overall gap for this sector is minor at 0.12, that aggregate average incorporates an enormous range from a difference of 0.60 (in relation to the ICC) to a difference of −0.23 (in relation to the WTO). Particularly noteworthy here is that civil society elites on average have considerably *less* confidence in the WTO than citizens at large.

The elite–citizen confidence gap in relation to national government also varies by sector. Leaders in business, media, civil society, and research tend to assess their national government quite similarly to the general public. In contrast, the elite–citizen confidence gap for national government is (perhaps not surprisingly) much larger in respect of bureaucratic and political-party leaders. In other words, this gap is more substantial when the elites in question work in the national government or seek to hold national office. The main difference compared to the confidence gap vis-à-vis IOs is that party-political elites diverge more from citizens in their evaluations of the national government than in their assessments of IOs, where the party-political leaders hold opinions more similar to the general public. For bureaucratic elites, we observe that the gap with citizen opinion is relatively large for both national government and IOs.

Turning to a comparison of the human security IOs and the economic IOs, all but one of the six elite sectors follow the aggregate pattern discussed above. Thus, the gap with citizen confidence is generally larger in respect of the ICC, UN, and WHO—and generally smaller in respect of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. This difference between gaps for human security IOs and economic IOs is particularly stark in the case of civil society elites. Leaders in this sector on average have a much more positive assessment than citizens of the human security IOs, but a similar or more negative evaluation than public opinion of the economic IOs.

As in Chapter 4, an opposite alignment appears in respect of business elites. In this sector the *bigger* gaps with citizen opinion tend to arise regarding the economic IOs: 0.51 for the WTO, 0.56 for the IMF, and 0.60 for the World Bank. True, at 0.59 the confidence divide for the UN is also large between business leaders and the general public. However, the gaps are strikingly smaller for the WHO (0.27) and the ICC (0.09, a statistically insignificant difference). Business leaders therefore deviate from the pattern whereby elite evaluations tend to lie relatively closer to citizen assessments of the three global economic institutions. Business elites may endorse the market-facilitating policies of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO much more than citizens at large.

Finally, we examine estimations of the confidence gap with respect to elite sectors: that is, how do the different elite groups perceive the level of citizen confidence in IOs? Figure 5.9 shows that elites on average substantially overestimate citizen approval of IOs in the case of business (0.35), government bureaucracy



Fig. 5.9 Elite estimation of citizen confidence by elite sector, pooled IOs

Notes: Graph shows mean values for all IOs, comparing elite types with citizens. Poststratification weights are used for the citizen data. The difference between citizens' confidence and the estimation of their confidence by elites is significant when elites are from the bureaucratic, research, business, and partisan-political sectors (Wald test, $p<0.05$). The nonsignificant Wald tests for media and civil society suggest that elites in these sectors accurately estimated citizen confidence.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey and WVS7.

(0.32), research (0.21), and political parties (0.15). The large misestimation by business elites is all the more striking since this sector tends to assume that citizens at large have assessments of IOs that are similar to its own. In contrast, the difference between elite perceptions and actual citizen confidence in IOs is not statistically significant in the case of media and civil society. Thus, these elite sectors on average accurately assess levels of public confidence in IOs.

In sum, variation in the extent of the elite–citizen gap regarding global governance legitimacy arises across social arenas as well as across IOs and countries. The differences can be as large as 0.40 between one elite sector and another, and as much as 0.83 between one IO and another within the same elite sector. As in the previous two chapters, then, we find that social categories matter for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Conclusion

This last of the three descriptive analysis chapters in this book has looked in detail at levels and patterns of an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global

governance. We have brought together carefully coordinated citizen data from the WVS7 and elite data from the LegGov Elite Survey. This systemization allows us to undertake an unprecedented large-scale comparison of views on global governance held by political and societal leaders on the one hand and the general public on the other. As in the previous two chapters, our analysis leads to five general conclusions—and on largely parallel themes.

First, we have established that a pervasive divide indeed prevails between citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. This gap is observed in our aggregate data as well as more specifically for all six IOs, in four of the five countries, and in all six elite sectors. In general, political and societal leaders tend to accord IOs moderately high confidence, whereas the general public regards them with medium levels of legitimacy. To speak of elite–citizen polarization would be hyperbole, but a substantial divergence in perspectives is clear.

Second, as in the analyses of citizen legitimacy beliefs in Chapter 3 and elite legitimacy beliefs in Chapter 4, we observe notable variation when we disaggregate the data. The size of the elite–citizen confidence gap differs, often markedly, depending on the IO, the country, and the elite sector in question. Still more variation in the extent of the gap arises between IOs within each country and between IOs within each elite sector. In a few cases, such as civil society assessments of the WTO and the overall situation in the Philippines, the gap is actually negative, where citizens have greater confidence in global governance than elites. Thus, the general picture of a sizable elite–citizen legitimacy gap vis-à-vis global governance encompasses many fluctuations between different contexts.

Third, as in the citizen and elite data viewed separately, we find a general distinction between human security IOs on the one hand and economic IOs on the other. In most contexts, the elite–citizen divide is decidedly larger for the ICC, UN, and WHO than for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Exceptions to this overall tendency do arise, particularly in more fine-grained analyses within countries and elite sectors, but the overall pattern remains conspicuous.

Fourth, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance does not, on the whole, differ markedly from the elite–citizen divide in confidence vis-à-vis their national government. The aggregate gaps are similar in size. That said, in Russia the legitimacy elite–citizen gap for national government is smaller than for any IO, whereas in Germany the gap for national government is larger than for almost all IOs. Thus, noteworthy variation by context is again evident.

Fifth, while political and societal leaders are in general aware that citizens at large hold less confidence in IOs (and national government) than elites, those elites tend to underestimate the extent of that gap. As ever, we see variation, including certain situations where elites overestimate the size of the gap, such as in respect of economic IOs. Still, on the whole, elites assume that citizens give global governance more approval than they actually do and may as a result make political miscalculations. Perhaps such a scenario transpired in the Brexit referendum, for

instance, where elites anticipated levels of citizen approval for the EU that did not play out at the ballot box.

Indeed, the existence of a pervasive elite–citizen gap in legitimacy toward global governance has significant implications for politics and policy. Practically, governments need to be aware that citizens often assess global governance differently than they do, while political activists can tap citizen discontent with "out of touch" elites to mobilize resistance. Normatively, this legitimacy gap raises major issues of political representation and democratic accountability vis-à-vis global governance, to be further elaborated in Chapter 10. Before discussing such implications, though, we turn from our descriptive interpretations of Chapters 3–5 and proceed to our explanatory analyses in Chapters 6–9.

PART III

EXPLAINING LEGITIMACY BELIEFS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

6

Explaining Legitimacy Beliefs in Global Governance

An Individual-Level Approach

What determines the legitimacy beliefs of citizens and elites toward global governance, as mapped in Chapters 3 and 4? Why do citizens and elites hold different views of the legitimacy of IOs, as detailed in Chapter 5? As we have seen in Part II, there is extensive variation in the perceived legitimacy of IOs among citizens and among elites, as well as between these two groups. In this chapter, we elaborate the theoretical approach that we deploy in Chapters 7–9 to explain such differences in legitimacy beliefs.

As noted when we introduced our theoretical argument in Chapter 1, scholarship suggests three alternative ontological starting points for explaining legitimacy in global governance: the individual, the organization, and the social structure (Tallberg et al. 2018). Individual-level explanations attribute legitimacy beliefs to the circumstances of the person holding them, such as interest calculations, political values, social identification, and trust dispositions (Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Dellmuth 2018). Organizational-level explanations suggest that legitimacy beliefs arise from the features of governing institutions, such as their purposes, procedures, and performances (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: Chapter 6; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020). Societal-level explanations locate the sources of legitimacy beliefs in characteristics of the wider social order, such as cultural norms, economic systems, and political regimes (Bernstein 2011; Gill and Cutler 2014; Scholte 2018).

Our framework reflects an individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy beliefs. This approach has several strengths. First, it recognizes that legitimacy is a belief in the minds of individuals and varies between individuals, thus meriting careful examination of the conditions of individuals (Easton 1975). Second, an individual-level approach allows for a coherent argument that starts from individuals as the unit of analysis, theorizes why individuals with varying characteristics think differently about legitimacy in global governance, and attributes variation

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance. Lisa Maria Dellmuth et al., Oxford University Press.
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in legitimacy beliefs to the distribution of individuals with such varying characteristics (cf. Kertzer 2020). Third, an individual-level approach makes it possible to assess a variety of factors from debates in comparative politics (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2018), international relations (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), and EU studies (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). This literature often presumes that different individual-level factors present competing explanations of legitimacy beliefs, but our integrated perspective also allows that the determinants could be complementary.

Our account of legitimacy beliefs suggests that individuals vary systematically in characteristics that matter for their attitudes toward global governance. Specifically, we highlight four features of an individual: their socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. We focus on these four characteristics because each trait relates to a major dimension of an individual: their material standing, value orientation, social identification, and perception of institutions. We thereby address a range of prominent aspects of an individual's experience that conceivably could matter for legitimacy beliefs. Indeed, earlier research has found each of these characteristics to shape attitudes about international issues in specific empirical settings, thus making these factors reasonable candidates for our account of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as any gaps between them (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hooghe and Marks 2005; de Wilde et al. 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). When addressing these four features together, we cover in one integrated approach perhaps the most important ways that individuals differ from each other with implications for legitimacy beliefs. Yet, recognizing that other theories might privilege other individual characteristics, our empirical analysis in Chapters 7–9 also considers age, gender, social trust, and knowledge about global governance as alternative explanations.

We rely on our four privileged individual-level logics to explain variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens and elites. In addition, we explore whether these accounts can help us explain gaps in legitimacy beliefs between citizens and elites. We assume that elites and the general public display compositional differences in socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust due to prior processes of selection and socialization (Hooghe 2005; van Zanten 2010). For instance, in terms of selection, people who have a stronger socioeconomic position and have greater trust in existing governmental institutions may be more likely to seek and secure elite roles in politics and society. Similarly, in terms of socialization, people in elite positions may be more likely to assume a liberal political outlook and develop a global identification. Together, these processes make elites, as a group, different from the general population, with implications for their attitudes toward IOs.

While taking the individual level as our focus of explanation, we recognize that persons are socially embedded, such that organizational and wider societal conditions may also shape their legitimacy beliefs. This insight informs our theoretical

framework in two respects. First, we acknowledge that a focus on individual characteristics at a given point in time involves bracketing the broader processes that may have led a person to hold a certain socioeconomic status, political ideology, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. Second, we are open to the possibility that individual-level explanations may vary in form and strength across organizational and societal contexts. We therefore build on our unique comparative design to explore such variation. Thus, in the interpretations of our results in Chapters 7–9, we discuss the role that IO and country circumstances may play in shaping explanatory patterns observed at the individual level.

We now turn to the four individual-level explanations of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. In the remainder of the chapter, we elaborate on why we expect that socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust could matter for how citizens and elites conceive of the legitimacy of global governance. For each account, we describe the general theoretical logic, review its explanatory power in previous studies, and indicate why it is reasonable to expect that this factor shapes IO legitimacy beliefs among citizens and among elites, as well as any gaps between them. We conclude the chapter by describing how we operationalize these four explanations for the empirical analyses that we undertake in Chapters 7–9.

Socioeconomic Status

Our first line of explanation suggests that differences in socioeconomic status generate variation in people's perceptions of legitimacy in global governance. This approach reflects a broad theoretical tradition that explains society and politics in terms of economics: i.e., the material processes of producing, distributing, and consuming resources. International and comparative political economy have flourished in the study of politics since the 1970s. Among the various subfields, neoclassical economic theories emphasize various macro- and microeconomic dynamics, while Marxist and Weberian accounts underline the pivotal role of capitalist processes of surplus accumulation (O'Brien and Williams 2016).

Applied at the individual level, the political economy account emphasizes utilitarian calculation, cost–benefit assessments, and economic effects of globalization as key to the formation of opinions on international matters (e.g., Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Lake 2009; Curtis et al. 2014; Rodrik 2018). Global governance arrangements produce uneven economic consequences for affected parties, and these differential effects lead people to adopt varying attitudes toward, for instance, trade policies, immigration measures, foreign aid, and globalization generally. Based on this rational actor logic, people who perceive themselves to gain more from a global governance institution are

expected to have more favorable attitudes toward that organization than people who perceive themselves to benefit less (or even to lose).

Over the past two decades, this individual-level socioeconomic logic has become highly influential in research on international relations and comparative politics. Hooghe and Marks (2005) develop a convenient typology of this approach, distinguishing between four strands of theorizing based on two intersecting dimensions: egocentric vs. sociotropic and objective vs. subjective. The classic *egocentric-objective* argument focuses on the concrete costs and benefits of particular policies or institutions for individuals and assumes that individuals are able to evaluate those costs and benefits and then act in their material self-interest. This research often starts from economic models of distributive effects and then derives the policy preferences of individuals based on their position in the economy. Other studies in the egocentric-objective genre formulate expectations of attitudes based on observed economic effects (Lake 2009). For instance, several studies build on the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to argue that international trade affects people differently based on the relative factor endowments in their national economy, which should then determine the attitudes of individuals toward trade agreements and institutions (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Mayda and Rodrik 2005).

Other socioeconomic research has extended this classical argument in three directions. First, *egocentric-subjective* accounts suggest that assessments of economic self-interest may rest on subjective perceptions of costs and benefits rather than objective deductions or measures. In this case, such calculations could result more from people's assumptions and trusted channels of information. For instance, Simpson and Loveless (2017) argue that people's perceptions of their personal economic prospects shape their attitudes toward international policies and institutions.

Second, *sociotropic-objective* explanations argue that individuals form attitudes based on objective consequences of international policies and institutions for their societal group or country, rather than for themselves individually. In this vein, Anderson and Reichert (1995) suggest that people adopt varying attitudes toward EU membership depending on whether their country gains more or less (or even loses) from intra-EU trade and EU fiscal transfers.

Third, combining these two extensions of the classic socioeconomic logic, *sociotropic-subjective* arguments maintain that people can form attitudes toward international policies and institutions based on how they themselves perceive the consequences for their societal group or country. For instance, Verhaegen et al. (2021) contend that people's perceptions of country benefits from international cooperation shape their attitudes toward global institutions.

Socioeconomic approaches feature prominently in the large literature on public opinion toward the EU (for overviews, see Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and De Vries 2016). One reason is that the first decades of European cooperation strongly focused on economic issues and market integration. Another reason is

that people tend to perceive tangible and large economic effects of EU policies, making it more likely that material self-interest shapes their attitudes toward this institution. This literature generally argues that economic impacts of European integration differ between individuals and countries, which leads people to hold varying attitudes toward the EU. Anderson and Reichert (1995) find that individuals who personally benefit more from European integration, and who live in countries that benefit more from it, tend to have more favorable attitudes toward the EU. Gabel (1998) argues that utilitarian appraisals of European integration well explain people's attitudes toward EU membership, based on objective measures of occupational skills, income level, educational level, and proximity to a national border. Burgoon (2009) invokes utilitarian logics to explain support for welfare compensation in the EU, finding that individuals in countries with more generous national welfare systems are less supportive of EU-level redistribution.

Socioeconomic logics have also been invoked to explain attitudes toward international policies and institutions beyond Europe. Regarding the US, for instance, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b) find that an individual's relationship to the factors of production influences their attitudes toward cross-border trade and immigration in ways that are consistent with the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem. A cross-country study by Mayda and Rodrik (2005) arrives at similar results, establishing that attitudes toward international trade are related to an individual's level of human capital, the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed, and an individual's relative economic status. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find less support for the egocentric factor endowment model and instead invoke sociotropic logics to show that people's perceptions of how international commerce affects their country overall matter for trade preferences. Curtis et al. (2014) analyze attitudes toward sovereign debt resettlement and find that material self-interest matters greatly for people's preferences, in terms of borrowing costs, dependence on fiscal transfers, and investment assets. Edwards (2009) concludes that both egocentric and sociotropic subjective evaluations matter for public support in developing countries for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO: people with more negative assessments of the economic situation of their household and their country tend to hold more negative opinions of the economic IOs.

A common theme in research on socioeconomic logics is the importance of education as an objective determinant of people's attitudes toward international policies and institutions. For Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b), as well as Mayda and Rodrik (2005), education is the principal component of an individual's human capital, making them better or worse positioned to benefit from international trade and immigration. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007) and Mansfield and Mutz (2009) also find a strong relationship between level of education and attitudes toward international economics but suggest that part of this effect is driven by the socializing effects of education, rather than economic self-interest. Controlling for this possibility, Bearce and Jolliff Scott (2019) nevertheless

establish a positive relationship between level of education and support for IOs, using data from around 30 countries over two decades. Edwards (2009), too, finds robust empirical support for a link between education levels and evaluations of economic IOs.

Consistent with our individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs, we are interested in how the socioeconomic conditions of individual citizens and elites shape their attitudes toward global governance. For these purposes, we draw on the egocentric version of utilitarian logics to formulate two theoretical expectations. We focus specifically on how an individual's socioeconomic resources make them better or worse positioned to benefit from international cooperation through IOs. We expect this position to shape utilitarian cost–benefit calculations, which in turn affect legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We formulate these expectations in general terms here and then in the empirical analyses in Chapters 7–9 explore how more specific IO and country circumstances may contribute to the explanatory patterns we observe.

The first expectation conceives of socioeconomic status as a determinant of legitimacy beliefs in global governance for citizens at large, as well as for elites. According to this expectation, differences in socioeconomic status between individual citizens (or between individual elites) contribute to variation in these citizens' (or elites') perceptions of legitimacy in global governance. *The more an individual citizen or individual elite is endowed with socioeconomic resources, the more that citizen or elite will accord legitimacy to global governance.* Conversely, when individuals can draw on fewer socioeconomic resources, and are worse positioned to benefit from economic globalization, then we expect them to be less supportive of global governance. We evaluate this expectation empirically in Chapter 7 (regarding citizens) and Chapter 8 (regarding elites).

The second expectation pertains to how socioeconomic status may help to explain the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. This expectation suggests that elites and citizens generally hold varying socioeconomic positions, which can help explain corresponding differences in their perceived legitimacy of IOs. Elites are commonly believed to gain more from economic globalization than the general population when it comes to employment opportunities, financial investments, and so on. On average, elites tend to have greater human and financial capital, making them better placed than the broader public to benefit from a globalized economy (Rodrik 2018), which may help explain why elites generally tend to conceive of global governance as more legitimate. Compared to citizens, elites more often belong to the winners of contemporary globalization—a situation that existing global governance arrangements both reflect and help to generate. Accordingly, we expect that *an individual elite who is better positioned socioeconomically than an individual citizen will regard global governance as more legitimate than that citizen.* We evaluate this conjecture in Chapter 9.

Political Values

Our second line of explanation suggests that varying legitimacy perceptions toward global governance are a function of differences in political values. In contrast to the material focus of socioeconomic logics, explanations in terms of evaluative principles and normative judgments highlight ideational conditions. Political values refer to "abstract, general conceptions about the desirable or undesirable end-states of human life," which provide people with a "general evaluative standard for confronting the world" (Jacoby 2006: 706; see also Rokeach 1973). This tradition maps political values along one or several lines of ideological conflict. Comparative politics scholarship has related these value oppositions to societal cleavages, party systems, voting behavior, and political attitudes (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Thomassen 1999; Jacoby 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2018).

Applied to world politics, a body of research has documented the impact of political values on a person's attitudes toward international matters (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019). According to this logic, people hold political values that can be ordered along certain conflict dimensions, and positions on these dimensions are related to particular attitudes toward international policies and institutions.

The classic formulation distinguishes between "left" and "right" political values. The left-wing end of this dimension is typically assumed to support a more egalitarian distribution of income and greater government intervention in economy and society, whereas the right-wing end is usually assumed to consider inequality a natural condition and to support a more laissez-faire approach to politics (Downs 1957; Bobbio 1996). The ordering of people's political values along the left–right spectrum is reflected in the dominant role of socialist and conservative parties in many party systems (Thomassen 1999; Mair 2007). In addition, the left–right axis has been found to predict individual attitudes toward domestic political issues such as social welfare (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) and government spending (Jacoby 2006).

More recently, research on political values has supplemented the left–right dimension with another axis that distinguishes between GAL values on the one hand, and TAN values on the other (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2018). This GAL–TAN scale captures attitudes on a range of social, cultural, and environmental issues that fit poorly on the left–right dimension, but have become more prominent in contemporary politics, including immigration, gender equality, ecological concerns, and national sovereignty.[1] Other

[1] The "N" (nationalist) in "TAN" suggests a potential overlap between the explanation of political values and the explanation of geographical identification, insofar as people with nationalist attitudes also have a national identification, while the opposite might not be the case. To avoid an overlap of the two explanations, we minimize indicators of national identification in our operationalization of GAL–TAN values, as explained below.

theorists make related distinctions between materialist and postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990), old and new politics (Franklin 1992), and libertarian and authoritarian orientations (Kitschelt 1995). A core claim in this literature is that growing contestation along the GAL–TAN dimension has contributed to a restructuring of party systems, manifested in the growing importance of green parties and, especially, new nationalist parties (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2018).

Other research has linked these value dimensions specifically to international attitudes. Several studies argue that the left–right dimension structures attitudes not only in domestic politics, but also in the international sphere. This literature proposes that left-leaning and right-leaning people have differential evaluations of international economic impacts on society (Hooghe et al. 2002; Noël and Thérien 2008). Other studies suggest that the GAL–TAN dimension increasingly shapes contestation over international issues, not least when they concern policies on immigration, environment, and trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007; Hooghe et al. 2019). Overall, this literature finds that individuals who hold right-wing or TAN values tend to have more negative attitudes toward international cooperation than individuals who espouse left-wing or GAL values.

A left–right divide in political values is a recurring explanation of public opinion toward the EU (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Indeed, debates about European governance often unfold on left–right lines of intervention versus liberalization vis-à-vis the market. Many left-wing critics portray European integration as a right-wing project to undermine social welfare provisions, while many right-wing critics regard the EU as a left-wing project for suprastate market regulation. On other occasions, however, left-wing supporters see the EU as a way to tame global capitalism, while right-wing supporters see the EU as a way to liberalize markets that, in their eyes, are overly regulated at the national level. Several earlier studies find that supporters of left parties tend to be more critical of the EU than supporters of right parties (Inglehart et al. 1991; Hooghe and Marks 2005). However, recent research suggests another relationship, finding that more moderate left- and right-wing sympathizers tend to be more supportive of the EU, while people with more extreme left- or right-wing opinions tend to be more critical (Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015).

Other explanations attribute attitudes toward the EU to value conflicts along GAL–TAN lines, particularly as European integration has deepened, invoking issues related to border controls and state sovereignty. For instance, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) establish that anti-immigration sentiment is positively associated with skepticism toward the EU. More recently, policies promoting "traditional values" from more authoritarian governments in Hungary and Poland have sparked conflict with the EU. Other studies have examined the impact of nationalism (the "N" in "TAN") on European integration, but as that research particularly concerns geographical identification, we discuss it in the next section.

Research has also shown political values to matter beyond Europe for attitudes toward international matters. For example, Edwards (2009) finds that public opinion in developing countries toward the major economic IOs follows a left–right pattern, where individuals on the left are more critical of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO than individuals on the right. In contrast, a study on elites in the US concludes that liberals and Democrats are more in favor of international cooperation than conservatives and Republicans (Holsti and Rosenau 1990).

We draw on the above logics to present two expectations about the importance of political values for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The first expectation conceives of political values as a source of variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens and among elites. On this argument, differences in political values between individual citizens (or between individual elites) produce variation in these citizens' (or elites') perceptions of legitimacy in global governance. *When an individual citizen or individual elite holds political values that are more supportive of international cooperation, that citizen or elite will accord more legitimacy to global governance*. Conversely, when individual citizens or elites hold values associated with greater skepticism toward international cooperation, they will extend less legitimacy to global governance. We evaluate empirical evidence regarding this proposition in Chapters 7 and 8.

The second expectation pertains to how political values may contribute to an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We suggest that this gap may arise when citizens and elites systematically hold different political values. If elite individuals more often hold left-wing and GAL positions, supportive of international cooperation, this political value orientation may explain why they also accord more legitimacy to global governance than citizens at large. The recent wave of right-wing and TAN populist movements in many countries suggests that contemporary publics may be more prone to anti-globalist ideology, with its skepticism of global governance, while elites on average are more inclined to ideological positions sympathetic to global governance. Accordingly, we expect that *an individual elite who holds political values supportive of international cooperation to a greater extent than an individual citizen will accord more legitimacy to global governance than that citizen*. We evaluate empirical evidence regarding this proposition in Chapter 9.

Geographical Identification

Our third line of explanation suggests that variation in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance arises from differences between people in terms of the political-geographical spheres to which they feel attached. This expectation relates to a broader vein of constructivist theory that explains social relations in terms of the ways that people form and express group identifications. Whereas

preceding approaches explained politics as a function of economics and ideology, respectively, from this third perspective politics boils down to identity politics.

Social identity theory argues that individuals develop political opinions based on a sense of who they are, defined in terms of the groups to which they belong and identify with (Sears 1993; Sniderman et al. 2004). These collectives variously relate to class, ethnicity, faith, gender, language, nationality, sexual orientation, and more. Such group identification is frequently portrayed as the principal alternative to utilitarian calculation as a source of political attitudes and behaviors (Sears et al. 1980).

Here we are particularly interested in the sense of belonging to political-geographical units. According to this argument, geographical identification (e.g., with a locality, a country, a region or the world as a whole) is a powerful force shaping how individuals think and act in politics, including international politics in particular. Indeed, the very notion of "international" rests on a geographical distinction between the "inside" and the "outside" of a country (Walker 1993). Certainly, some people invoke nongeographical groupings such as class and faith when they engage with world affairs; however, more or less everyone constructs their collective identity on international matters prominently in geographical terms as, say, "New Yorker," "Japanese," "African," "global citizen." Substantial research has confirmed geographical identification as a source of attitudes toward international issues and institutions (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Norris 2009).

According to this logic, an individual's sense of belonging to this or that geographical unit shapes their legitimacy beliefs toward the corresponding levels of political authority (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Verhaegen et al. 2018). Thus, a person who holds a primarily local geographical identification would be more inclined to accord legitimacy to local authorities. Likewise, a person who identifies most with their country would more tend to direct legitimacy to the nation-state, while a person who identifies with the world as a whole would sooner confer legitimacy on global governance.

Simplifying matters somewhat, research on geographical identification in international politics typically emphasizes a twofold distinction between national affiliation (covering both a country and the localities within it) and global affiliation (covering supranational regions as well as the global sphere). Individuals are then assumed to identify with a national community (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991) and/or a world community (Norris 2000; Furia 2005; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2011). Some theorists have suggested that global identification has been growing with contemporary globalization (Cabrera 2010), while others on the contrary have underlined the continued resilience of nationalism and other territorial identifications (Scholte 2005; Tomlinson 2007). Linking these points to legitimacy beliefs, individuals with more national identification are assumed to view global governance as a lower priority or even as a threat to their identity and autonomy.

In contrast, individuals who identify with a world community are assumed to favor global governance because it links political authority with the supranational sphere to which they feel attached (McLaren 2006; Verhaegen et al. 2018).

Research on public opinion toward the EU includes multiple studies regarding geographical identification. Classic contributions depicted European integration as a process involving a transfer of identities from the nation-state to the emerging European polity (Haas 1958). However, contemporary studies typically treat European identities as complementary to local and national identities (Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2010) or as reinforcing those smaller-scale attachments (Van Kersbergen 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004). The principal finding of this literature is that individuals with a stronger European identification are more supportive of the EU than individuals with a stronger national identification (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006; Harteveld et al. 2013; Clark and Rohrschneider 2019; for an overview, see Hobolt and De Vries 2016). This result is consistent with the logic of geographical identification.

Studies on other contexts besides the EU also provide support for geographical identification as an explanation for attitudes toward international cooperation. For example, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that people with stronger attachments to their locality or country tend to have less support for international trade. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015) examine WVS data covering 1999–2004 and show that geographical identification is a significant determinant of public attitudes toward the UN, albeit that this positive relationship is not robust to the addition of country-level controls. Bearce and Jolliff Scott (2019) explore survey data covering several dozen countries over the period 1995–2013 and find that indicators for global and national identification are strongly and robustly significant in the expected directions.

We draw on this logic to articulate two expectations about the importance of geographical identification for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The first expectation presents geographical identification as a determinant of variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens and among elites. On this reasoning, differences in geographical identification between individual citizens (or individual elites) produce variation in these citizens' (or elites') perceptions of legitimacy in global governance. *When an individual citizen or individual elite holds a more global, or less national, identification, then that citizen or elite will accord more legitimacy to global governance.* Conversely, when a citizen (or elite) has a lower level of global identification, or higher level of national identification, they are likely to bestow less legitimacy on global governance. We evaluate this conjecture empirically in Chapters 7 and 8.

The second expectation concerns how geographical identification may explain the gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance between citizens and elites. We suggest that a greater prevalence of global identification among elites relative to citizens at large could help to account for the gap between their average

legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. It is reasonable to expect that elites, on average, hold global attachments more than citizens in general. Individuals in leadership positions likely gain more global exposure than the average citizen, through greater international travel, higher education, larger competence in foreign languages, and so on (Rosenau et al. 2006). In addition, individuals who already identify more with the global sphere are more likely to seek and obtain elite positions in today's increasingly globalized academia, business, civil society, government, media and politics. This higher salience of global identification makes it more likely that elites will identify more strongly with global governance (Oakes 1987). Accordingly, we expect that *an individual elite who holds a more global identification than an individual citizen will attribute more legitimacy to global governance than that citizen*. We evaluate this expectation empirically in Chapter 9.

Domestic Institutional Trust

Our fourth line of explanation suggests that variations in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance result from differences in people's levels of trust toward domestic political institutions. This explanation fits within a wider theoretical tradition that highlights the role of trust (rather than economics, values or identity) in shaping social and political circumstances (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Uslaner 2018). This literature conventionally distinguishes between social (or generalized) trust and institutional (or political) trust. Here we are particularly interested in institutional trust, i.e., the extent to which people have confidence or trust in political institutions, and the consequences of people having higher or lower levels of such institutional trust.

In developing this explanation, we specifically draw on research that highlights strong positive linkages between trust in national and international governance institutions (for an overview, see Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). According to this logic, people who have greater trust in domestic political institutions are also likely to consider global governance more legitimate. Conversely, people who distrust domestic political institutions to a greater extent are also likely to be more skeptical of global governance.

Three types of mechanisms could explain this link between domestic institutional trust and legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, some research suggests that individuals use their trust in domestic political institutions as a heuristic. Since most people have less awareness of global governance, they draw on their trust in domestic political institutions, which they know better, as a shortcut to opinions about international arrangements (Harteveld et al. 2013). In this vein, Armingeon and Ceka (2014: 82) conclude that "support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy, which Europeans know far better than the remote political system of the EU." Similarly, Dellmuth and Tallberg

(2015: 471) submit that "[f]or many citizens, IOs are complex and distant organizations, whose legitimacy is best approached via heuristics and cues derived from the more familiar national political context." This interpretation is also favored by Schlipphak (2015: 367), who suggests that the national-international legitimacy link reflects "general satisfaction with or broad trust in domestic political actors that is extrapolated to a more diffuse trust of political actors operating at other levels beyond the national level."

A second mechanism could be that trust in both national and global governance institutions is driven by a common antecedent factor: social trust. On this account, people rely on their overall trust predisposition when forming opinions about governing arrangements, domestic as well as international. For instance, Harteveld et al. (2013: 561) suggest that the association may reflect a general "syndrome of trust." Dellmuth and Tallberg (2020) find similar empirical support in a comparative study of public opinion toward the IMF, UN, and WTO in Germany, the UK, and the US. They suggest that the key mechanism linking social trust and legitimacy beliefs is expectations regarding cooperation: people who are more trusting more readily expect cooperative behavior from other people. This general disposition makes it easier for an individual to have confidence in political institutions, domestic as well as international (Brehm and Rahn 1997).

Third, the driver of the association between domestic and international trust could lie with people's assessments of the role of their government in a global governance institution. If an individual greatly (mis)trusts their national government, and this government is influential within an international body, then the person will also (mis)trust the international institution. This argument features in some early studies of public opinion in the EU, which claim that people tie their support for European integration to their support for their government, which is responsible for negotiating policy in the EU (Franklin et al. 1995; Gabel 1998). A more recent example is Harteveld et al. (2013), who suggest that the domestic–international link may be due to people trusting their national political institutions, which in turn partly control the EU.

In contrast, a few studies theorize a negative relationship between trust in domestic and international institutions. On this logic, people "compensate" for lower (or higher) trust in their domestic political institutions with higher (or lower) trust in international institutions. According to this argument, evaluations of domestic economic and political circumstances form a benchmark against which people develop attitudes toward IOs (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Muñoz et al. 2011; De Vries 2018).

Yet empirical research mostly finds a strong positive correlation between individuals' trust in domestic political institutions and their confidence in IOs. This relationship has been established in IO contexts as diverse as the AU, EU, ICC, IMF, UN, and WTO (Johnson 2011; Muñoz 2011 et al.; Harteveld et al. 2013; Voeten 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg

2015, 2020). This finding is consistent across issue areas, time, country samples, and alternative measures of legitimacy (such as confidence, support, and trust). Moreover, domestic institutional trust is usually the strongest individual-level predictor of an IO's legitimacy, even when controlling for other potentially relevant factors.

Research on opinions toward the EU offers multiple examples of this finding. For instance, Harteveld et al. (2013) study the sources of trust in the EU and find that trust in domestic institutions has by far the greatest impact. Armingeon and Ceka (2014) find a similar relationship when seeking to explain the decline in support for the EU during the Eurozone crisis, using data from all 27 member states at the time. Persson et al. (2019) show how this relationship also extends to political elites, establishing that, among officials involved in civil protection, there is a strong and robust association between trust in relevant institutions at national and European levels.

Several studies beyond the European setting establish a similar relationship between domestic institutional trust and perceptions of IO legitimacy. For instance, Schlipphak (2015) finds that trust in domestic institutions has the strongest effects on public support for the AU and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Likewise, in a comparative study of confidence in the UN across a broad range of countries worldwide, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015) find more support for confidence in domestic institutions than for any alternative explanation. Johnson (2011) establishes that trust in the domestic government has the strongest effect on trust in the UN, WTO, and IMF among a broad range of tested factors. Voeten (2013) shows that trust in the European Court of Justice (in EU member states) and the ICC (in Uganda) is primarily associated with trust in domestic courts.

We draw on this logic to formulate two expectations about the importance of domestic institutional trust for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The first expectation considers domestic institutional trust as a determinant of variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens and among elites. On this conjecture, differences in domestic institutional trust between individual citizens (or individual elites) contribute to variation in these citizens' (or elites') legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. *When an individual citizen or individual elite has more trust in domestic political institutions, that citizen or elite will accord more legitimacy to global governance.* Conversely, when a citizen (or elite) has less trust in domestic political institutions, they will confer less legitimacy on global governance. We evaluate this conjecture empirically in Chapters 7 and 8.

The second expectation pertains to how domestic institutional trust may account for the gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance between citizens and elites. If elites in general have higher levels of trust in their domestic political institutions than citizens at large, this difference would translate into a gap in their respective legitimacy beliefs toward international institutions. It is reasonable to assume that elites and citizens would generally differ in their level of

domestic institutional trust. Given their advantaged positions in politics and society, elites likely have more positive views of domestic governing institutions than citizens in general (Bowler and Donovan 2002). Elites have more access to governing bodies and thus more opportunities to influence them. Indeed, elites rather than citizens at large do the actual governing through domestic political institutions. Elites therefore ought to find domestic institutions—and, by extension, global governance arrangements—more legitimate than citizens. Accordingly, we expect that *an elite individual who has higher levels of trust in domestic political institutions than an individual citizen will regard global governance as more legitimate than this citizen*. We evaluate this conjecture empirically in Chapter 9.

Operationalization

Having laid out our four lines of individual-level explanation, we now turn to operationalizing logics related to socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. For each of our four approaches, we identify two related empirical indicators that we then examine in the next three chapters of explanatory analysis. The following paragraphs discuss indicators for each explanation in turn. The exact wording of the relevant survey questions can be found in Appendix A.

We operationalize the expectation that *socioeconomic status* shapes legitimacy beliefs toward global governance with two indicators that respectively capture objective and subjective egocentric considerations. First, we include an individual's level of education, which is a standard objective indicator in egocentric accounts of public opinion toward international issues (e.g., Edwards 2009; Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019). We use a measure of education ranging from 0 (no completed schooling) to 8 (doctoral or equivalent degree), using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Second, to capture subjective egocentric calculations, we consider the degree to which an individual is satisfied with the financial situation of their household. Using this indicator, Edwards (2009) finds that people with more negative assessments of the economic situation of their household have less support for economic IOs. This measure ranges from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 9 (completely satisfied).

We operationalize the expectation that *political values* matter for legitimacy in global governance with two indicators, one for each of our two main value dimensions. First, we measure left–right ideology by asking survey respondents to place themselves on a scale from most left (scored 0) to most right (scored 9). Second, since no standard indicator yet exists for GAL–TAN attitudes, we build a measure based on several survey items that tap related values (cf. Bauhr and Charron 2018). These items cover respondents' attitudes to ethical issues (abortion, homosexuality, sex before marriage, and divorce), immigration, and the relative importance

of maintaining social order. From these questions we create a composite dummy variable that distinguishes between GAL (=1) and TAN (=0) positions.

We also use two measures to operationalize the expectation that *geographical identification* affects legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, regarding global identification, we ask survey respondents how close they feel to the world, a question that is often employed in studies of public opinion toward IOs (Torgler 2008; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). Second, regarding national identification, we ask respondents how close they feel to their country. We measure both indicators on a scale from "not close at all" (scored 0) to "very close" (scored 3).

Two indicators also operationalize the expectation that *domestic institutional trust* drives legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, we measure an individual's confidence in their national government, as done in several previous studies of public opinion toward IOs (e.g., Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Hobolt 2012; Harteveld et al. 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021). The scale ranges from "none at all" (scored 0) to "a great deal" (scored 3). Second, we measure an individual's satisfaction with the political system of their country. Earlier research has used this indicator to study public support for an EU-wide government and satisfaction with EU democracy (Rohrschneider 2002). We measure satisfaction with the national political system on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 9 (completely satisfied).

Finally, we control for several potential alternative individual-level explanations. First, we control for age using a continuous variable, as younger or older people may be more inclined to regard IO legitimacy more positively (e.g., Norris 2009). Second, we control for gender using a dichotomous variable (0=female, and 1=male), since men and women may assess the legitimacy of IOs differently. Third, we control for social (or generalized) trust, as several studies suggest that this factor may impact IO legitimacy beliefs (e.g., Harteveld et al. 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). This dichotomous indicator captures whether the respondent considers that "most people can be trusted" (1) or that they "need to be very careful" (0). Finally, we include an indicator for political knowledge to account for the possibility that an individual's knowledge about global governance influences their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. For this purpose, we use an additive knowledge index, constructed from the three measures of knowledge about global governance described in Chapter 2. We include the first two factors (age, gender) as controls in all the main analyses, while we consider the final two factors (social trust, political knowledge) in the robustness checks in each chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has developed our individual-level theoretical approach to explaining citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, as well as the

gap between the two. We have successively laid out our four privileged individual-level explanations, focusing respectively on socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. For each line of explanation, we have described the general theoretical orientation, spelled out the causal logics, reviewed the relevant existing research, and formulated expectations of how the driver in question may affect legitimacy beliefs toward global governance among citizens and among elites, as well as the gaps between them. In addition, we have specified how we operationalize each of these explanations for empirical research.

Our theory discussion has not a priori favored any of the four logics over the others. We observe that previous research has given notable support to all four accounts. Thus, we remain open to the possibility that the data analyses which follow in Chapters 7–9 can substantially verify each of the four explanations. On this scenario, socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust would not be rival accounts, but could involve parallel drivers. In this sense our approach reflects trends in general theory which consider that economics, ideology, identity, and trust can be joint determinants of social and political life (Mann 1986; Giddens 1987; Sum and Jessop 2015).

Ambitious though our theorization may be—covering four logics, as well as other possible determinants through controls—of course, no explanatory account is complete. For one thing, we have not theorized how our four drivers might be integrated into an explanation that also specifies the logics of combination, interconnection, and mutual effects of the various determinants. In addition, as indicated at the outset of this chapter, with our focus on the individual level we have bracketed possible alternative and/or complementary explanations at the organizational and societal levels, although we bring these aspects into our empirical analysis as contextual influences. Thus, while we push the boundaries of theory, especially in developing a multifaceted individual-level approach, inevitably some questions remain unanswered.

We now put our theoretical expectations to the test. In Chapter 7, we focus on explaining citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, examining how variation across citizens in respect of our four privileged factors could account for differences in their legitimacy perceptions of IOs. In Chapter 8, we conduct the same analysis for elites, exploring whether and how differences between elite individuals in our four privileged factors could explain variation in their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Finally, in Chapter 9 we evaluate whether and how these four explanations could offer insights into the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs.

7

Explaining Citizen Legitimacy Beliefs

We now turn to our three empirical explanatory chapters, starting with citizens. What explains the extent to which general public opinion perceives of IOs as legitimate, as mapped in Chapter 3? In the following chapter, we explore the sources of legitimacy beliefs among citizens, with a focus on the four individual-level explanations laid out in Chapter 6: socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. As throughout this book, the analysis centers on our six focal IOs (ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO) and our five selected countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US).

The drivers of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs are a contested issue, which in recent years has received growing attention due to the rise of anti-globalist populism and a perceived public backlash against international cooperation (for overviews, see Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Copelovitch et al. 2020; Walter 2021). Our analysis in this chapter examines this issue in a comparative perspective, offering novel insights into the sources of citizen legitimacy beliefs—both in general and in relation to specific IOs and countries. In addition, this chapter lays the ground for a unique comparison between the drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, as we test the same explanations in Chapter 8 with a focus on elites.

To recall, our explanations present four sets of expectations regarding the individual-level sources of citizen legitimacy beliefs. The first logic suggests that citizens who have greater socioeconomic resources such as education and income are better positioned to benefit from globalization and are therefore more likely to regard IOs as legitimate. The second account, invoking political values, expects that citizens who hold left-wing or GAL values are more likely to find IOs legitimate than citizens who hold right-wing or TAN values. The third explanation emphasizes geographical identification and submits that citizens who feel closer to the world and less attached to their country are more likely to hold positive legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Finally, the fourth explanation expects that citizens who have more trust in domestic political institutions are more likely to regard IOs as legitimate.

Our main findings in this chapter are fourfold. First, the evidence supports our choice to adopt an individual-level approach to explaining IO legitimacy: we find

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some validation of all four theoretical logics. Second, the data lend more support for some individual-level explanations than others. Notably, we find that citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs most consistently relate to domestic institutional trust, which provides the foremost explanation in relation to all IOs and all countries except the US. Third, we find that socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification also have some explanatory power vis-à-vis citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, with most evidence among these three explanations supporting socioeconomic status. Fourth, differences in the relative explanatory power of these individual-level logics across IOs and (especially) countries suggest that organizational and (particularly) societal contexts also matter, by conditioning the importance of individual-level factors in a given setting.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the specific research design used in the chapter in terms of measurement and modeling. The second section presents the results of the analysis. We begin by examining the overall picture regarding drivers of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We then compare the explanatory findings across IOs and across countries. The third section discusses how these results reflect on the explanatory power of our four theorized logics. The chapter's conclusion summarizes the findings and considers their broader implications.

Measurement

As detailed earlier in Chapter 2, our proxy for legitimacy is "confidence." Our dependent variable captures a citizen's confidence in an IO, measured on a scale from 0 ("none at all") to 3 ("a great deal"). Recall from Chapter 3 that the aggregate average citizen confidence (covering all focal IOs and countries) comes out at 1.43. Mean citizen confidence in particular IOs ranges from a low of 1.24 for the IMF to a high of 1.67 for the WHO. Mean citizen confidence in IOs across our five focal countries varies from a low of 1.05 in Russia to a high of 1.89 in the Philippines. Thus, while overall levels of citizen legitimacy toward global governance average a little below the midpoint of our measuring scale, the aggregate covers much variation.

To test our four individual-level explanations for legitimacy beliefs in IOs, we use data from the WVS7, also fully described in Chapter 2 (see also Haerpfer et al. 2021). As laid out toward the end of Chapter 6, we operationalize each of the four logics with two indicators. Measures of these indicators are survey questions in the WVS7. These form our independent variables.

Our first indicator of *socioeconomic status* is education, for which we use a measure ranging from 0 (early childhood/no education) to 8 (doctoral or equivalent). Mean education for citizens is lower in the Philippines (2.22) and Brazil (2.81) than in Germany (4.07), Russia (4.85), and the US (4.67). Second,

we measure the degree that citizens are satisfied with the financial situation of their household, ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 9 (completely satisfied). Mean financial satisfaction among citizens is lowest in Russia (4.53), followed by Brazil (5.06), the US (5.21), the Philippines (5.35), and Germany (6.11).

Our first indicator of *political values* is left–right self-placement on a scale from 0 (most left) to 9 (most right). This indicator distributes close to normal in all five countries, but the means differ across countries. Average scores are 3.76 in Germany, 4.32 in the US, 4.41 in Brazil, 5.07 in Russia, and 5.64 in the Philippines. As a second indicator, we look at GAL–TAN attitudes, using a dummy variable that distinguishes between GAL (=1) and TAN (=0). The use of TAN as a reference category means that a positive coefficient for this measure indicates that people with a GAL orientation are more likely to have confidence in IOs. This measure varies considerably across countries. For example, the share of citizen respondents with GAL values is 24.8 percent in Russia, 30.2 percent in the Philippines, 39.3 percent in Brazil, 52.3 percent in the US, and 64.7 percent in Germany.

Our first indicator of *geographical identification* is global identification, measured in terms of how close citizens feel to the world on a scale from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close). The lowest level of global identification among citizens is found in Russia (1.03), followed by Brazil (1.17), the US (1.44), Germany (1.70), and the Philippines (2.04). Our second indicator is national identification, measured in terms of how close citizens feel to their country, using the same scale of 0–3. Contrary to what some might expect, variation on national identification and variation on global identification are only moderately correlated (r=0.380). National identification among the general public is lowest in Brazil (1.63), followed by the US (2.02), Russia (2.09), the Philippines (2.33), and Germany (2.34).

Our first indicator of *domestic institutional trust* is confidence in the national government, on a scale ranging from 0 (none at all) to 3 (a great deal). Citizens in Brazil have the least average confidence in their national government (0.71) and citizens in the Philippines the most (2.15), with citizens in the US (1.13), Germany (1.38), and Russia (1.52) scoring in between. The second indicator measures satisfaction with the political system of one's country, on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 9 (completely satisfied). Citizens in Brazil are least satisfied on average (1.58), followed by citizens in the US (3.48), Russia (4.42), Germany (5.34), and the Philippines (5.36).

Finally, we control for age and gender in the main models, as well as for social trust and knowledge about global governance in the robustness checks. These measures were described in Chapter 6, but it is worth reiterating that the reference category for the gender variable is female, such that females are coded 0 and males 1. A positive coefficient for this measure indicates that males are more likely to have confidence in IOs. For descriptive statistics and multicollinearity diagnostics regarding the independent variables, we refer the reader to Appendices B and C.

We use regression analysis to evaluate our theoretical expectations of the relationships between possible driving factors (our independent variables) and confidence in IOs (our dependent variable). Our unit of analysis is an individual citizen. Regression analysis allows us to estimate whether citizens' confidence in an IO is likely to be associated with other factors, using conventional levels of statistical significance ($p<0.05$). After measuring the associations, we interpret these results in light of whether the findings corroborate or challenge our theoretical expectations.

More specifically, we rely on linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. All models are estimated using the poststratification weights provided in the WVS7, since these weights make it possible to assess whether the observed associations are likely to be found in the full population.[1] We run separate models for each IO and country, as well as models that pool data across IOs and countries. In the models that pool data across countries, we add so-called "equalizing weights" so that each country figures in the calculations to the same extent. All models were tested for potential violations of the assumptions underpinning linear regression analysis.

Results

This section presents the results of our empirical explanatory analysis of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, we examine the aggregate results, covering the pooled sample of IOs and countries. We then compare the explanations of citizen legitimacy beliefs with regard to the six focal IOs. Finally, we compare the results with regard to the five focal countries.

The Overall Picture

Model 1 in Table 7.1 presents our results for the analysis of citizen confidence when all IOs and countries are pooled. These findings at the aggregate level yield support for all four explanations, which confirms the relevance of an individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy beliefs in global governance.

The results offer support for both indicators of domestic institutional trust. A citizen with more confidence in their national government tends also to have more confidence in IOs. Satisfaction with the political system of one's country is not

[1] Such sampling weights are included in the dataset to approximate the distribution of those variables in the population from which the sample was drawn. The distribution of variables in an unweighted sample can differ from the distribution of these variables in the overall population for two reasons. First, the probabilities of being selected in a sample might differ for different subjects. Second, there is an element of chance in the random sample selection done for our WVS7 countries. The sampling weights are constructed in order to address these potential problems. Thus, using these weights enables us to estimate the certainty with which we expect to find effects on IO confidence in the population at large of the respective countries.

Table 7.1 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs, five countries pooled

	(1) All IOs[a]	(2) ICC	(3) IMF	(4) UN	(5) WB	(6) WHO	(7) WTO
Socioeconomic status							
Education	0.018***	0.016*	0.007	0.023***	0.012	0.038***	0.011
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Financial satisfaction	0.022***	0.023***	0.023***	0.015**	0.025***	0.016**	0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Political values							
Left–right orientation	−0.022***	−0.024***	−0.011*	−0.035***	−0.012*	−0.019***	−0.018***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.127***	0.156***	0.110***	0.173***	0.076**	0.145***	0.081***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Geographical identification							
Global identification	0.086***	0.099***	0.084***	0.098***	0.080***	0.082***	0.078***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
National identification	0.025	−0.009	0.030	0.024	0.005	0.047**	0.039*
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)

Domestic institutional trust							
Confidence in government	0.214***	0.229***	0.214***	0.239***	0.238***	0.189***	0.201***
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political satisfaction	0.009	0.005	0.015**	0.004	0.012*	0.009	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Controls							
Age	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.002**	−0.003***	−0.002***	−0.002**	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (Female is ref.)	−0.032	−0.014	−0.037	−0.073**	−0.021	−0.002	−0.032
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Intercept	0.975***	0.920***	0.683***	1.151***	0.851***	1.086***	1.082***
	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.062)
N	5177	5578	5624	5882	5670	5829	5623
R^2	0.299	0.186	0.200	0.213	0.249	0.200	0.189

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Poststratification weights were used, and countries were equally weighted. Country fixed effects included. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. [a] The dependent variable is the average confidence in all six IOs.

significantly related to citizen confidence in IOs in this model. Yet, as this second indicator is moderately correlated with confidence in government (r=0.465), we perform a robustness test which includes satisfaction with the political system while excluding confidence in government (see Online Appendix C). Then we observe that the more satisfied a citizen is with the political system of their country, the more confidence they have in IO. As we shall see later, this explanation also receives most consistent support in the context of specific IOs and countries.

We also find considerable support for socioeconomic status as an explanation at the aggregate level. Both indicators are statistically significant in the expected direction. The more educated a citizen, the more confidence they have in IOs. Likewise, the more satisfied a citizen is with the financial situation of their household, the more confidence they tend to have in IOs.

We find clear support for political values as an explanation of citizen confidence toward IOs. Left–right orientation is associated with IO confidence as expected: the more left-leaning a citizen, the greater their confidence in IOs. Similarly, we find that GAL-oriented individuals have greater confidence in IOs.

The analysis of the overall citizen sample yields mixed evidence for the logic of geographical identification. As expected, a citizen with a more global identification tends to have greater confidence in IOs. However, we do not observe the expected reverse relationship whereby a greater national identification would associate with lower confidence in IOs.

Among the control variables, the coefficient for age is statistically significant and negative, indicating that older people in our overall citizen sample tend to have less confidence in IOs than younger people. We find no significant difference regarding confidence in IOs between men and women in the composite data.

Comparing across IOs

We now turn to Models 2–7 in Table 7.1 to explore how the four explanations of citizen legitimacy beliefs perform at the level of individual IOs. The results are very similar to the findings from the pooled IO analysis. Domestic institutional trust receives consistent support across IOs, as a citizen's confidence in government and satisfaction with the political system are positively and significantly associated with their confidence in individual IOs (but only under certain conditions with respect to political system satisfaction, as we explain below). Likewise, the two indicators of socioeconomic status are positively associated with citizen confidence in individual IOs and statistically significant across almost all six organizations. Political values, too, show the same pattern as in the pooled IO analysis: more left-wing and GAL-oriented citizens tend to have greater confidence in each IO. We see mixed results for geographical identification: while global identification

is consistently positively associated with legitimacy beliefs toward specific IOs, national identification is not statistically significant in most cases.

These extensive similarities across IOs in patterns of explanatory power for citizen legitimacy beliefs are particularly interesting in view of our findings in other chapters of this book. The descriptive analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that citizens and elites tend to accord greater legitimacy to the three human security IOs compared to the three economic IOs. Likewise, we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9 that there are notable differences between economic and human security IOs in how well our four logics explain elite legitimacy beliefs and elite–citizen legitimacy gaps.

However, there are some exceptions to the predominant pattern of limited variation of explanatory factors across IOs, as seen in Table 7.1. For example, education, one of the indicators of socioeconomic status, is not statistically significant for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Another exception is that the second indicator of geographical identification—national identification—is positively associated with confidence in the WHO and the WTO, contrary to our expectations. Finally, we see that the second indicator of domestic institutional trust—satisfaction with the political system of one's country—only appears to be significant for the IMF and the World Bank, but not for the other IOs. However, as noted earlier, the two indicators of domestic institutional trust are moderately correlated. If we rerun the analysis without confidence in government, we find that satisfaction with the political system is statistically significant for all six IOs, as reported above (Online Appendix C.1). Among the control variables, gender is insignificant for all IOs except the UN, while age is significant for all six IOs.

Looking more closely at the first exception, the economic IOs stand out as the cases where education is no predictor of average citizen confidence in global governance. Apparently, more educated people do not necessarily accord the economic IOs more confidence than less educated people. The economic IOs score low in terms of citizen confidence irrespective of educational level. However, financial satisfaction, the other indicator of socioeconomic status, is positively associated with citizen confidence in the economic IOs.

Turning to the second exception, greater citizen national identification might associate with greater citizen confidence in the WHO to the extent that this IO's work on health promotion is perceived to serve one's national community, as well as global humanity in general. Likewise, today's publics may have widely absorbed neoclassical economic theories that trade liberalization, the core mandate of the WTO, benefits all countries including their own, thereby encouraging an association between attachment to one's country and confidence in the WTO. In contrast, citizens may be less inclined to perceive connections between an IO and national betterment in the case of the ICC (war crimes are usually associated with countries other than one's own), the UN (whose benefits are usually framed in universal terms), and the IMF and the World Bank (whose connections to one's

own country may often seem remote). In any case, as we will see later, these unexpected links between greater closeness to country and greater confidence in IOs do not resurface in the results for our five countries examined separately, except for the US.

Comparing across Countries

We now turn to Table 7.2 to examine the citizen explanatory findings by country. We compare how the four explanations perform in respect of the five countries when data for the six IOs are combined. We then examine the country data in relation to the IOs individually.

In this pooled analysis, we find that the logic of domestic institutional trust enjoys support across all five countries. Citizens' confidence in their national government associates positively with their confidence in IOs across the board. In Germany and the US, a significant result also arises for the second indicator, satisfaction with the political system of one's country. When the analysis is rerun without the moderately correlated indicator of confidence in government, we also observe a positive association for Russia in relation to political system satisfaction, albeit not for Brazil and the Philippines (Online Appendix C.2). Figure 7.1 shows that the bivariate relationship between confidence in one's national government and confidence in IOs is positive in the pooled country model (r=0.318), and in all countries but the US. Indeed, Model 5 in Table 7.2 shows a lower—yet significant—coefficient in the US. Meanwhile, Figure 7.2 indicates broadly the same (if somewhat weaker) relationship between political system satisfaction and confidence in IOs (r=0.182 in the pooled sample); yet the association is not statistically significant in Brazil and the US.

Support for the other three explanations in pooled samples by country is patchier and involves greater variation. Socioeconomic status is an important driver in the US, with both education and financial satisfaction being positively associated with IO confidence in this country. However, support for the socioeconomic explanation is very weak in the other countries. Only financial satisfaction in Germany and the Philippines returns a positive association with citizen confidence in IOs. This outcome indicates that the US sample heavily drives the positive results for socioeconomic status in the pooled country analysis (Table 7.1).

The logic of political values only receives support for explaining citizen confidence in pooled IOs in the US. For this country, citizens who are more left wing, and who are GAL oriented, tend to have more confidence in IOs. Thus, the statistically significant associations with political values that are present in the aggregate analysis (Table 7.1) again appear to be driven by the US sample and dissipate in the pooled IO analyses for other countries.

Table 7.2 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs, by country

	(1) Brazil	(2) Germany	(3) Philippines	(4) Russia	(5) US
Socioeconomic status					
Education	0.019	0.011	−0.003	−0.014	0.054***
	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Financial satisfaction	0.021	0.014*	0.018**	0.003	0.026**
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Political values					
Left–right orientation	0.002	0.012	0.010	0.012	−0.073***
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.008)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	−0.026	0.062	0.030	0.069	0.180***
	(0.065)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.039)
Geographical identification					
Global identification	−0.021	0.031	0.027	0.170***	0.127***
	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)
National identification	0.035	0.008	0.043	−0.001	0.080**
	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Domestic institutional trust					
Confidence in government	0.391***	0.278***	0.248***	0.323***	0.064*
	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Political satisfaction	−0.004	0.048***	0.004	0.006	0.020*
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Controls					
Age	0.001	−0.003***	−0.005***	−0.005**	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender (Female is ref.)	−0.078	−0.020	−0.015	0.019	−0.132***
	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.038)
Intercept	0.835***	0.673***	1.238***	0.571***	0.780***
	(0.151)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.160)	(0.091)
N	510	963	1115	722	1867
R^2	0.217	0.343	0.162	0.219	0.200

Note: The dependent variable is confidence in all six IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Finally, geographical identification varies in explanatory power across our five countries for citizen confidence in the pooled IOs. In two countries—Russia and the US—we find a tendency for greater confidence in IOs among citizens with a stronger global identification. In none of the five countries is national identification negatively associated with IO confidence. Instead, contrary to our expectations, in the US stronger national identification is positively associated with greater confidence in IOs.



Fig. 7.1 Citizen confidence in six IOs by confidence in government

Notes: Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.

Next, we look more closely at the full results for each country individually. Tables 7.3–7.7 show results for each of the six IOs in each of the five countries. By considering this level of detail, we can offer a more nuanced picture of the explanatory power of the four logics with regard to organizational and country contexts.

For Brazil (Table 7.3), we see that domestic institutional trust offers the strongest and most consistent explanation across the six IOs. The indicator of confidence in government is significantly and positively related to citizen confidence in each IO. However, the indicator of satisfaction in the political system is insignificant, and remains so when we exclude the moderately correlated indicator of confidence in the national government, except in the case of the World Bank, where it turns statistically significant (Online Appendix C.3). Further evidence suggests that political values matter in Brazil for citizen confidence in the IMF, albeit not in the way that our theory expects. People in Brazil who are more right leaning tend to have *greater* confidence in this IO. Supporting the socioeconomic logic, we observe that more educated citizens in Brazil tend to have more confidence in the



Fig. 7.2 Citizen confidence in six IOs by satisfaction with domestic political system
Notes: Satisfaction indicator ranges from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 9 (completely satisfied). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.

ICC and the WHO. Age and gender do not appear to matter in Brazil for citizen confidence in IOs.

For Germany (Table 7.4), the most consistent explanation of citizen confidence in IOs is, again, domestic institutional trust, even more so than in Brazil. In Germany, both confidence in the national government and satisfaction with the domestic political system relate significantly and positively to confidence in each of the six IOs. The evidence is mixed for the other three explanations. Socioeconomic status appears to partly matter in Germany, as more educated citizens tend to have greater confidence in the ICC, UN, and World Bank, and citizens with more financial satisfaction are likely to have higher confidence in the ICC. Likewise, some evidence from Germany suggests that political values matter, although not entirely as our theory expects, since right-leaning citizens have more confidence in the World Bank and the WTO than left-leaning citizens. We do find, as expected, that GAL-oriented citizens have greater confidence in the ICC, UN, and WHO than TAN-oriented citizens. Finally, geographical identification receives limited support in Germany, as citizens with a stronger global identification only tend to have greater confidence in the UN. Among the control variables, the results for age indicate that older people in Germany have less confidence in the UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. In addition, men in the German sample express less confidence in the World Bank than women.

Table 7.3 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs in Brazil

	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.052*	0.005	0.032	0.016	0.058**	−0.001
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Financial satisfaction	0.017	0.016	0.002	0.021	0.015	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.005	0.025*	0.002	0.018	−0.016	−0.018
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	−0.009	−0.124	−0.007	−0.116	0.128	−0.077
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	−0.014	−0.003	−0.102*	0.041	−0.020	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
National identification	−0.042	0.017	0.058	−0.009	0.066	0.012
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.378***	0.441***	0.369***	0.468***	0.261***	0.332***
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Political satisfaction	0.000	−0.007	−0.004	0.011	0.011	−0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Controls						
Age	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	−0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (Female is ref.)	−0.060	−0.109	−0.164*	0.002	0.047	−0.013
	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Intercept	0.707***	0.609***	1.126***	0.570***	0.857***	1.283***
	(0.191)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.175)
N	583	653	699	651	707	649
R^2	0.124	0.184	0.125	0.196	0.090	0.115

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Also, in the Philippines (Table 7.5), citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs appear to be mainly associated with domestic institutional trust. Confidence in the national government is significantly and positively related to confidence in each of the six IOs. However, the second indicator of domestic institutional trust, satisfaction with the political system, is insignificant and, as in Brazil, remains so when we exclude the moderately correlated indicator of confidence in government from the analysis (Online Appendix C.5). Evidence for the other three explanations is mixed for the Philippines and sometimes contrary to our expectations.

Table 7.4 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs in Germany

	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.029**	0.011	0.025*	0.022*	0.013	−0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Financial satisfaction	0.020*	0.016	0.005	0.007	0.008	0.016
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.009	0.021	−0.001	0.034**	−0.006	0.027*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.210***	0.014	0.102*	0.016	0.115**	0.039
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.048	0.033	0.082**	0.031	0.017	0.002
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
National identification	0.035	0.041	0.034	0.010	0.009	0.049
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.319***	0.252***	0.321***	0.269***	0.215***	0.257***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Political satisfaction	0.031**	0.071***	0.039***	0.049***	0.035***	0.023*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Controls						
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.003*	−0.003*	−0.005***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (Female is ref.)	0.037	−0.065	−0.040	−0.076*	0.016	−0.018
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Intercept	0.577***	0.164	0.548***	0.341**	1.359***	0.820***
	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.113)
N	1135	1120	1192	1119	1172	1075
R^2	0.237	0.220	0.224	0.187	0.150	0.149

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Regarding socioeconomic status, citizens with greater financial satisfaction tend to have greater confidence in the ICC, World Bank, and WTO. However, against our expectations, citizens in the Philippines with a higher education tend to have less confidence in the ICC and the IMF. With regard to political values, citizens who are more right leaning tend to have greater confidence in the IMF and the WHO, which also runs counter to our expectation. Finally, we only observe one significant relationship in the Philippines for geographical identification: citizens with a stronger global identification tend to have greater confidence in the

Table 7.5 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs in the Philippines

	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	−0.029*	−0.042**	0.014	−0.004	0.021	0.021
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Financial satisfaction	0.024*	0.014	0.009	0.025*	0.010	0.026**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.001	0.020*	−0.002	0.016	0.025**	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.051	0.038	0.072	0.038	−0.042	0.024
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.071*	0.018	0.035	0.014	0.020	0.010
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)
National identification	0.014	0.074	0.081	−0.003	0.026	0.039
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.195***	0.238***	0.373***	0.251***	0.209***	0.202***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Political satisfaction	−0.005	0.010	−0.001	0.007	0.009	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Controls						
Age	−0.007***	−0.004*	−0.003*	−0.003*	−0.005**	−0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Gender (Female is ref.)	0.015	0.012	−0.015	0.010	−0.050	−0.039
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Intercept	1.409***	1.034***	0.936***	1.257***	1.549***	1.277***
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.151)
N	1139	1127	1195	1168	1179	1161
R^2	0.080	0.091	0.142	0.078	0.076	0.070

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

ICC. Regarding the controls, older people in the Philippines consistently have less confidence in IOs, while gender does not appear to matter.

Our results for Russia (Table 7.6) show consistent support for two of the explanations: domestic institutional trust, as in all other countries, but also geographical identification. Regarding the first explanation, citizen confidence in government is associated with confidence in each of the six IOs. In addition, the other indicator of domestic institutional trust—satisfaction with the political system—becomes significant in Russia for every IO when the moderately correlated indictor for

Table 7.6 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs in Russia

	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	−0.014	0.008	0.004	−0.042*	−0.021	−0.030
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Financial satisfaction	−0.001	0.002	0.014	0.009	−0.011	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.013	0.017	0.014	0.002	0.016	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.049	0.099	0.152*	0.062	−0.013	0.029
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.172***	0.142***	0.196***	0.144***	0.216***	0.201***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.034)
National identification	−0.070	−0.006	−0.016	0.039	0.060	0.015
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.039)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.339***	0.289***	0.288***	0.310***	0.397***	0.338***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Political satisfaction	0.014	0.009	0.011	0.018	0.006	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Controls						
Age	−0.004*	−0.005*	−0.003	−0.006**	−0.005*	−0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (Female is ref.)	−0.015	0.036	0.032	0.017	−0.007	0.050
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Intercept	0.644***	0.432*	0.256	0.647***	0.584**	0.547**
	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.173)
N	806	815	859	818	846	826
R^2	0.161	0.129	0.164	0.155	0.213	0.193

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

confidence in government is excluded from the analysis (Appendix C.6). Russia also presents consistent evidence in favor of geographical identification, inasmuch as citizens' degree of global identification relates positively to confidence in each of the six IOs. However, national identification gives no significant result. We illustrate this finding in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, which show the bivariate associations for global identification (r=0.271 in the pooled sample) and national identification (r=0.139). Finally, it is striking that socioeconomic status and political values barely matter in Russia. We only observe that more educated citizens tend to have less confidence in the World Bank, contrary to our expectation, and that GAL

Table 7.7 Regression analysis of citizen confidence in IOs in the US

	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.048***	0.054***	0.031*	0.055***	0.088***	0.048***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Financial satisfaction	0.014	0.034***	0.023*	0.027**	0.027**	0.030**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.073***	−0.068***	−0.106***	−0.073***	−0.066***	−0.059***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.188***	0.153***	0.196***	0.083	0.289***	0.175***
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.132***	0.134***	0.136***	0.128***	0.123***	0.127***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)
National identification	0.045	0.091**	0.102**	0.052	0.103**	0.092**
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.105**	0.063	0.015	0.103**	0.047	0.082*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Political satisfaction	0.013	0.021	0.014	0.022*	0.017	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Controls						
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.004**	−0.001	0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (Female is ref.)	−0.132**	−0.154***	−0.236***	−0.109*	−0.039	−0.142**
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.045)
Intercept	0.889***	0.598***	1.310***	0.720***	0.619***	0.674***
	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.109)
N	1915	1909	1937	1914	1925	1912
R^2	0.133	0.157	0.196	0.127	0.176	0.135

Notes: The dependent variable is confidence in IOs. OLS regression analyses using WVS7 data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses using poststratification weights. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.



Fig. 7.3 Citizen confidence in six IOs by global identification

Notes: Scale ranges from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.



Fig. 7.4 Citizen confidence in six IOs by national identification

Notes: Scale ranges from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.

citizens tend to have more confidence in the UN. Regarding our controls, older citizens in Russia tend to have less confidence in IOs, with the exception of the UN, while gender plays no role for any of the six IOs.

Finally, for the US (Table 7.7), we find quite different dynamics behind citizen confidence in IOs compared to the other four countries. The US presents the most consistent evidence for socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identity, but weaker evidence for domestic institutional trust. Both indicators of socioeconomic status obtain consistent support: education and financial satisfaction relate positively to citizen confidence in each of the six IOs. We illustrate these findings through Figures 7.5 and 7.6, which show a positive association in the US for both indicators (respectively, r=0.197 and r=0.142, p<0.001), while the picture for the pooled sample is less clear-cut. With regard to political values, we find consistent support in the expected direction for left–right orientation, as left-leaning citizens in the US tend to have more confidence in all six IOs (Table 7.7). GAL–TAN orientation in the US matters for citizen confidence in all IOs except the World Bank. We illustrate the US distinctiveness regarding the significance



Fig. 7.5 Citizen confidence in six IOs by level of education

Notes: The numbers on the x-axis correspond to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels: early childhood education (0), primary education (1), lower secondary (2), upper secondary (3), postsecondary nontertiary (4), short-cycle tertiary (5), Bachelor or equivalent (6), Master or equivalent (7), Doctor or equivalent (8). In Brazil, codes 4 and 5 were not included in the questionnaire, and in the Philippines, code 8 was not included. In the US, values for code 1 are missing (see the country documentation at www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.



Fig. 7.6 Citizen confidence in six IOs by satisfaction with household financial situation

Notes: The indicator ranges from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 9 (completely satisfied). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.

of political values by showing the bivariate relationships in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. For the pooled sample, the correlations are statistically significant but very weak (r=−0.039 for left–right; r=0.099 for GAL–TAN). In contrast, in the US sample, there is a clearer negative correlation (r=−0.296) between left–right orientation and confidence in IOs. Also, GAL-oriented citizens in the US have more confidence in IOs than TAN citizens. As in Russia, geographical identification also appears to matter in the US: citizens with a stronger global identification consistently have more confidence in all six IOs. However, we also observe, contrary to our expectation, that citizens in the US with a stronger national identification have more confidence in the IMF, UN, WHO, and WTO.

In contrast to the other four countries, domestic institutional trust does not obtain support in all cases for citizens in the US. Citizen confidence in the national government is related to confidence in the ICC, World Bank, and WTO, but not the IMF, UN, and WHO. When excluding the moderately correlated indicator of confidence in government, satisfaction with the political system is significant in the US for all IOs except the UN (Appendix C.7). With regard to the control variables, age only matters in the context of the UN, where older people in the US have less confidence, while gender matters more broadly, as men in the US tend to have less confidence than women in all IOs except the WHO.



Fig. 7.7 Citizen confidence in six IOs by left–right orientation

Notes: The indicator ranges from 0 (most left) to 9 (most right). Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.



Fig. 7.8 Citizen confidence in six IOs by GAL–TAN orientation

Notes: Estimates use poststratification weights. Countries are equally weighted in the "all countries" distribution.
Source: WVS7.

Robustness Checks

We conducted a number of additional analyses to check whether our results hold when using other model specifications. Taken together, these additional analyses underpin the robustness of the results presented above.

As a first check, we rerun the analyses without the variable confidence in government, while keeping the indicator for satisfaction with the political system, since this indicator is moderately correlated with the variable confidence in government (r=0.465). Our results remain robust, with the important difference that the political satisfaction variable—which tends to be insignificant in the main tables—becomes statistically significant throughout when replicating Table 7.1. With respect to country-specific results, political system satisfaction was statistically significant only in Germany and the US in Table 7.2. When replicating the analysis without the confidence in government indicator, political system satisfaction becomes significant in Russia as well, while it remains insignificant in Brazil and the Philippines. This robustness check thus provides some further support for the explanation of domestic institutional trust (Online Appendix C).

As a second robustness check, and conversely to the first, we rerun the analyses without the variable satisfaction with the political system in one's country. The moderate correlation between indicators for confidence in government and political system satisfaction implies that the latter variable's inclusion in the regression analysis may weaken the association between confidence in government and confidence in IOs. The results for confidence in government remain robust, as do the vast majority of all other results (Online Appendix D).

Third, we redo the regressions leaving out national identification, as the two variables for geographical identification are moderately correlated (r=0.380), potentially leading to a conflation of their effects. Again, our main conclusions remain unchanged, both for the identification explanation and for the other three explanations (Online Appendix E).

Fourth, and conversely, we rerun the models by leaving out global identification, to examine whether national identification might be a significant predictor in the absence of the first indicator. Results suggest that there is some evidence for this in the Philippines and Russia, and strong evidence in the US (Online Appendix F).

In a fifth robustness check, we consider the potential role of social trust as a driver of the relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs. Recall from Chapter 6 that earlier research has found associations between social trust and confidence in both national governments and IOs. Thus, social trust could be an antecedent factor, accounting for the relationship emphasized by the explanation of domestic institutional trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). We explore this possibility through a mediation analysis in three steps (Baron and Kenny 1986), which examines if social trust mediates the relationship between domestic

institutional trust and confidence in IOs. We check first if there is a relationship between social trust and confidence in IOs by replacing the confidence in government indicator with social trust in the analysis conducted for Table 7.1. Since we find there to be such a relationship, we proceed to step two, which consists of similarly replacing the indicator political system satisfaction with social trust. Again, we find strong evidence for a relationship between social trust and IO confidence. In step three, we include all variables in the model, which means that we replicate Table 7.1 with social trust as part of the analysis. Since the inclusion of social trust does not weaken the relationship between confidence in government and confidence in IOs in the overall model, we can conclude that social trust does not mediate the relationship between the two. However, when running these models separately by country, we find that social trust mediates the relationship between confidence in government and confidence in IOs in the US (Online Appendix G). With the exception of the US, social trust thus does not appear to be a driver of the relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs.

As a sixth and final robustness check, we examine whether the positive findings for domestic institutional trust may instead be due to the mechanism of heuristics (see Chapter 6). To this end we interact the confidence in government indicator with an indicator of knowledge about global governance (see Chapter 6). We test for both a direct effect of political knowledge and for an interaction effect (Online Appendix H). The overall findings for our four explanations remain robust, and the results for this indicator suggest that knowledge about global governance has no systematic effect on citizen confidence in IOs. However, political knowledge does appear to have a moderating effect on the relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs in the pooled analysis, and in some IOs in Brazil and the US. Thus, in some contexts, citizens with less knowledge about global governance are more likely to use their attitudes toward domestic political institutions as a heuristic when forming opinions about IOs (Harteveld et al. 2013; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021).

Discussion

In short, the evidence covered above provides support for each of our four explanations of citizen confidence in IOs, underlining the importance of these individual-level drivers. However, certain of these four explanations receive more support than others. In addition, we observe a number of variations in explanatory power across IOs and countries, indicating that organizational and societal contexts can condition the impacts of individual-level drivers.

The domestic institutional trust explanation for citizen confidence in IOs obtains the most consistent empirical support: in the aggregate data, across IOs, and

across countries. Its explanatory power does not appear to depend on domestic political regime type, since it is just as relevant in Germany as in Russia, or on the issue orientation of IOs, since it performs equally well for economic and human security IOs. This finding reinforces earlier research, which shows that domestic institutional trust is a reliable predictor of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs (Johnson 2011; Harteveld et al. 2013; Voeten 2013; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). The partial exception to this pattern is the US, where our evidence for domestic institutional trust is more mixed.

It is possible that the US partial exception reflects dissatisfaction with the US government under President Trump at the time when the WVS7 data were gathered in this country (April–May 2017, see Chapter 2). Recent data suggest that trust in government was at a historical low in the US in April 2017, when only 19 percent of respondents trusted their government (Pew Research Center 2017a). The level of trust varies slightly with partisanship. Among those identifying with the Democratic Party, trust in government stood at 15 percent in April 2017, comparable to exceptionally low levels of trust in government at the end of the George and George W. Bush administrations in 1992 and 2008, respectively. Among Republican Party supporters, trust in government stood at 28 percent in April 2017, which while considerably higher than among Democrats, is lower than Republican trust levels in government during the (Democratic) Clinton and Obama administrations (Pew Research Center 2017b).

Our findings regarding domestic institutional trust also challenge accounts that theorize a negative relationship instead, based on the logic that IOs present an "escape" from ineffective domestic institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Muñoz et al. 2011). As discussed in Chapter 6, this research finds that the performance of domestic institutions in a country and citizen support for IOs tend to be inversely related. Our results do not support this logic, but instead provide strong evidence of a positive association between attitudes toward domestic and international institutions.

Our robustness checks suggest that this consistent relationship between citizens' domestic institutional trust and their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs may sometimes be due to people's use of heuristics. Our analysis shows that the positive association between citizens' confidence in government and their confidence in IOs is weaker at higher levels of knowledge about global governance in Brazil and the US, albeit not in the other countries. This result suggests that, in some contexts, citizens with less knowledge of global governance may use their attitudes toward domestic political institutions as a heuristic when developing views about IOs (Harteveld et al. 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Schlipphak 2015). In contrast, the robustness checks did not provide support for the mechanism of social trust as an antecedent factor that could drive the association between confidence in domestic and international institutions.

The logic of socioeconomic status receives the second most consistent support as an individual-level explanation of citizen confidence in IOs. This approach provides the foremost explanation of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs in the US, where both education and financial satisfaction positively relate to confidence in each of our six focal IOs. Supporting evidence for this explanation also appears in Brazil and Germany in the context of some IOs. Data from the Philippines show the opposite relationship for education, while data from Russia show no significant relationship. These findings lend mixed support for the expectation that people's socioeconomic position shapes their formation of opinions on international issues and institutions. This relationship appears to exist in the US, but not consistently in the other countries investigated here. Notably, too, this explanation does not vary depending on the issue orientation of an IO. After all, one might reasonably have expected that the socioeconomic logic would be more relevant in relation to economic IOs than human security IOs.

Evidence supporting the socioeconomic explanation in respect of the US ties in well with earlier research on this country (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a). Yet the mixed or lack of support for the socioeconomic explanation in other countries challenges an account that is very prominent in public opinion research. This political economy tradition theorizes citizen attitudes toward IOs as a function of self-interest, be it related to one's personal benefits or the benefits for one's country. This logic has been a standard explanation in EU public opinion research (e.g., Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998) and has been shown to have explanatory power in the context of other IOs, such as the UN (Edwards 2009; Kiratli 2022). Socioeconomic arguments also lie at the heart of research on individual attitudes toward international economic issues (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Curtis et al. 2014). Moreover, a more recent strand of research locates the origins of the popular backlash against the liberal international order in economic globalization, which allegedly makes it easier for populist actors to mobilize people who are experiencing economic insecurity (e.g., Rodrik 2018; Engler and Weisstanner 2021; Mansfield and Rudra 2021).

Our analysis also offers mixed support for drivers connected with geographical identification. We find the most consistent evidence for this logic in Russia and the US, where citizens with a more global identification have more confidence in all of our focal IOs. In the case of the US, we also find some evidence that national identification matters for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, albeit in a positive rather than a negative direction, and thus contrary to our expectation. The logic of geographical identification obtains little or no support in the context of public opinion in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines.

These results regarding geographical identification underline the usefulness of comparative analysis by countries and IOs when investigating legitimacy beliefs. Earlier studies that have found support for geographical identification as

an explanation of legitimacy beliefs have focused exclusively on the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Verhaegen 2018) and the UN (Torgler 2008; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). By expanding the range of IOs, and by examining a diverse set of countries, our study shows that this explanation carries varying significance across organizational and societal contexts.

Finally, political values appear to be the least consistent driver of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. To be sure, political values figure centrally in the US, where left- and GAL-oriented citizens perceive greater legitimacy for all IOs. Moreover, in Germany, GAL-oriented citizens have greater confidence in the ICC, UN, and WHO. However, political values obtain very limited or no support in Brazil, the Philippines, and Russia.

Nor do the data regarding political values show consistent variation across IOs. One might reasonably have expected that economic IOs would evoke citizens' political values to a greater extent, especially along the left–right dimension; yet we do not observe this pattern. For all the talk that value shifts in mass publics would drive a backlash against IOs (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2019), our study finds the values-based explanation to matter the least. Indeed, our mixed findings for the political values logic challenges accounts that present ideology as central to the contestation over international issues and institutions (e.g., Hooghe et al. 2019). According to this earlier research, people who are more left leaning and GAL oriented tend to have more positive attitudes toward global governance than people who are more right leaning and TAN oriented. Yet in our five-country study only the US shows consistent evidence to support the claim that the left–right and GAL–TAN dimensions are central for attitudes toward IOs.

Conclusion

What explains variation in citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance? This chapter has presented a first systematic effort to examine this issue in a comparative analysis covering six IOs in five countries around the world.

The chapter yields four central findings. First, the analyses offer evidence in support of all four theoretical logics, confirming the importance of an individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy beliefs. Second, among our four logics we find the most consistent support for trust in domestic institutions. This line of explanation receives most support across all IOs and in all countries, except the US. Third, evidence is more mixed for the other three individual-level explanations, pertaining to socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification. Fourth, variation in the explanatory power of our privileged logics across IOs and (especially) countries suggests that organizational-level factors and (especially) societal-level factors shape how individual-level factors matter for citizen legitimacy beliefs.

We end this chapter by expanding on this fourth general finding. Two patterns stand out in this respect. First, very limited variation appears across IOs in the explanatory power of our logics. With few exceptions, the explanations perform equally well (or poorly) across our six IOs. Whether socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, or domestic institutional trust drive variation in citizen legitimacy beliefs does not appear to depend on the IO in question. In terms of issue area, no distinction appears in explanatory logics between economic IOs and human security IOs. As we shall see in the next chapter, this pattern is particular to citizen legitimacy beliefs, since the type of IO does matter more in explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs.

As a second broad pattern, we observe quite extensive variation in the explanatory power of our four individual-level logics across countries. The partial exception is domestic institutional trust, which performs well across all countries, albeit with somewhat more mixed evidence in the US. Regarding explanations in terms of socioeconomic status, we find consistent support in the US, but also some support in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines in the context of specific IOs. In contrast, socioeconomic logics enjoy no support at all in Russia. Geographical identification appears to matter most for citizen legitimacy beliefs in Russia and the US, while this explanation attracts very limited or no support in the context of Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines. Finally, only in the US do political values consistently drive citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Explanations in terms of political values gain mixed or no support in the other four countries. These patterns suggest that societal contexts in these five countries shape the extent to which legitimacy beliefs toward global governance are driven primarily by considerations of socioeconomics, values, identity, or trust.

In the next chapter, we explore these issues in relation to elites in the same countries. Are elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs driven by the same factors that shape citizen legitimacy beliefs, or are elite attitudes toward IOs formed in unique ways?

8

Explaining Elite Legitimacy Beliefs

Having examined the drivers of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance in the preceding chapter, we now examine our individual-level approach (as set out in Chapter 6) in relation to elite attitudes (as mapped in Chapter 4). This chapter explores the sources of legitimacy beliefs among elites, with a particular focus on socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. In addition, we consider how elites' professional characteristics relate to their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. As in previous chapters, we examine these matters in relation to our six focal IOs (ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO) in our five selected countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US).

By testing the same four explanations as in the citizen analysis in Chapter 7, we can assess whether elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance are shaped by similar or different constellations of individual-level characteristics compared to those for citizens at large. Elites, after all, are a particular subset of the general population. They also hold specific positions and experiences with regard to international issues. So it is an intriguing question whether the same or different factors drive citizen and elite opinions.

To recall, we have theorized four distinct individual-level explanations. The first logic suggests that elites who are more socioeconomically advantaged are more likely to regard global governance as legitimate. The second logic highlights the importance of political values, suggesting that elites who hold left-wing or GAL orientations are more likely to consider global governance legitimate. The third explanation emphasizes geographical identification and submits that elites who feel closer to the world and less attached to their country should perceive global governance as more legitimate. Finally, the fourth logic expects that greater domestic institutional trust strengthens elite beliefs in the legitimacy of global governance.

Since elites occupy varying positions in politics and society, this chapter also explores whether professional characteristics systematically shape their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. To begin with, we consider the sectors where elite persons are active. Chapter 4 showed intriguing variation in legitimacy beliefs between elites in political parties, government, business, civil society, media, and research. We saw that, overall, bureaucratic, business, and academic elites express

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greater confidence in IOs than civil society, political party, and media elites. Later in this chapter we examine whether this sectoral variation in confidence relates to that sector per se, or whether these differences relate to a concentration in the respective sectors of elite persons with certain individual characteristics.

In addition, we assess whether elite legitimacy beliefs are shaped by the issue areas that they address, the orientation of their work (subnational, national, or international), and their experience of a particular IO. Elites may find IOs more legitimate when these organizations handle issues that elites address in their work, or less legitimate when IOs pursue purposes that are in tension with their work. Likewise, elites whose vocation is more internationally oriented may have greater appreciation of global governance and consider its institutions more legitimate than elites who operate nationally and subnationally. In addition, elites may have higher legitimacy beliefs toward an IO of which they have greater prior experience, or instead have lower legitimacy beliefs if that experience is negative. It is also possible that elite positions relate to legitimacy beliefs because individuals with particular characteristics gravitate toward elite jobs that deal with a certain issue, are more internationally oriented, and involve more experience with IOs.

Our explanatory analysis of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance yields five central findings. First, as in our explanatory analysis for citizens in Chapter 7, all four of our privileged logics obtain some support in respect of elites, further confirming the pertinence of an individual-level approach. Second, the results for elites indicate the same relative explanatory power of the four logics as for citizens. Thus, overall, domestic institutional trust most consistently relates to elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, followed by socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification. Third, the applicability of these four explanations for elite opinion varies across IOs and countries. For example, political values specifically associate with elite confidence in economic IOs, while socioeconomic status especially explains confidence in IOs among US elites, and regarding economic IOs in Brazil and the Philippines. As previously in the citizen analysis, this variation in the elite results suggests that organizational and country contexts matter for the explanatory power of our individual-level logics. Fourth, professional characteristics to some degree shape elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Notably, the issue areas in which elites work and their experiences of particular IOs partly shape their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Fifth, comparing the results of the elite and citizen explanatory analyses, some findings are similar, while others are notably different. This pattern suggests that elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance may have certain distinctive dynamics that set leaders in politics and society apart from the general public.

The chapter starts by describing the measurement of our theorized drivers using LegGov Elite Survey data. Next, we present our explanatory results, which comprise both regression and bivariate correlation analyses. We begin by presenting the overall picture and then compare the findings across IOs and countries. The

chapter's conclusion summarizes the results for elites and the comparison with results for citizens from Chapter 7.

Measurement

To test the four individual-level explanatory logics developed in Chapter 6, we use data from the LegGov Elite Survey, as detailed in Chapter 2. The evidence is drawn from quota samples of elites in bureaucracies, business, civil society, media, political parties, and research in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. The total sample comprises 599 respondents, spread more or less evenly across these five countries.

As with the citizen explanatory analysis in Chapter 7, our elite explanations treat confidence in IOs as a dependent variable that taps into respondents' legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. As indicated in Chapter 2, we measure confidence on a scale from 0 ("none at all") to 3 ("a great deal"). Recall from Chapter 4 that the aggregate average elite confidence (covering all six focal IOs and all five focal countries) computes to 1.78. Mean elite confidence in specific IOs varies from a low of 1.54 for the IMF to a high of 2.17 for the WHO. By country, mean elite confidence in the six IOs taken collectively runs from a low of 1.55 in Russia to a high of 1.91 in Brazil. Thus, while overall levels of elite legitimacy toward global governance lean in the direction of "quite a lot of confidence" (score 2), this composite figure contains much variation.

Our elite explanatory analysis also operationalizes socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, domestic institutional trust, and control variables in the same way as the citizen explanatory analysis in Chapter 7.

We use two measures for socioeconomic status: a respondent's level of education and their degree of satisfaction with the financial situation of their household. As in the citizen sample, elite respondents were asked about their highest educational attainment on a 0–8 scale ranging from early childhood/no education to doctorate or equivalent. However, almost all elite respondents (97 percent) have a Bachelor's degree or higher. We therefore use three education categories in this chapter: Bachelor or lower, Master, and Doctorate. Around one third of the elite survey respondents in Germany and Russia hold a doctorate and around two thirds a Master's degree. In the other countries, around one quarter of the elite respondents hold a Doctorate, one half a Master's degree, and one quarter a Bachelor's degree. Mean elite satisfaction with the financial situation of their household is lowest in Russia (4.89 on a scale of 0–9), followed by Brazil (5.55), the Philippines (5.90), the US (6.20), and Germany (7.17).

We measure elites' political values with two variables: self-placement on the left–right scale and whether elites mainly hold GAL or TAN values. On average, the surveyed elites in the US describe themselves as most left leaning (3.08 on a scale of

0–9), followed by Germany (3.33), Brazil (3.59), the Philippines (4.20), and Russia (4.26). In Brazil, Germany, and the US, around two thirds of the respondents hold GAL values. In the Philippines and Russia, a majority of elite respondents hold TAN values (respectively, three quarters and two thirds).

Regarding geographical identification, we include two measures that capture respondents' global and national identification. Global identification is lowest among elite respondents in the Philippines (1.66 on a scale of 0–3), followed by Russia (1.69), the US (1.92), Brazil (1.94), and Germany (2.33). National identification is higher than global identification among elites in all countries, starting with the US (2.24 on a scale of 0–3) and rising further for the Philippines (2.42), Germany (2.45), Brazil (2.52), and Russia (2.55).

Finally, as indicators of domestic institutional trust, we measure respondents' confidence in their government and satisfaction with the political system of their country. Average elite confidence in the national government is lowest in Brazil (1.33 on a scale of 0–3), followed by the US (1.59), the Philippines (1.61), Russia (1.76), and Germany (2.08). Respondents in Brazil also express the lowest average satisfaction with the political system of their country (1.87 on a scale of 0–9), followed by the US (2.25), the Philippines (3.25), Russia (3.70), and Germany (5.88). Note that only elites in Germany score on the positive half of this scale; all others regard the domestic political system (whether democratic or authoritarian) quite negatively.

In addition to these indicators for our four privileged explanations, the analyses in this chapter include data about the sectoral affiliation of the interviewed elites, the issue areas that their work addresses, the subnational, national, or international orientation of their work, and their experience of particular IOs. The LegGov Elite Survey set hard quotas for the minimum number of respondents per elite sector in each country (bureaucracy, business, civil society, media, party politics, research). The survey also aimed for diversity regarding the level where respondents' work is oriented (subnational, national, international), and the issue area of their work (economy, security, sustainability, generalist). Our technical report of the survey shows how respondents were coded, as well as their distribution across these categories (Verhaegen et al. 2019, Appendix B). Finally, the elite survey asked respondents how much they had interacted with each of the six IOs, with response options ranging from no experience at all (0) to a lot of experience (3). Although relatively low overall, average experience with IOs is highest among respondents from Brazil (0.93), followed by the US (0.86), the Philippines (0.84), Germany (0.71), and Russia (0.51).

As in the citizen explanatory analysis, our elite explanatory analysis controls for age and gender in the main models, as well as for social trust and knowledge about global governance in the robustness checks. For descriptive statistics and multicollinearity diagnostics, we refer the reader to Appendices B and D.

Our modeling strategy in Chapter 8 also mirrors that of Chapter 7. This consistency allows for direct comparisons between the explanatory results for citizens and for elites. Our preferred method for testing the four individual-level explanations is OLS regression analysis, which allows us to assess the likelihood of an association among respondents between an individual-level factor (such as education or national identification) and confidence in IOs, while controlling for potentially confounding factors.

Results

In this section, we present the results of our explanatory analysis of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, we examine the results for the pooled sample, covering all six IOs and all five countries together. Then we compare the results across the six IOs. Finally, we compare the results across the five countries.

The Overall Picture

Model 1 in Table 8.1 presents the results for the explanatory analysis of elite confidence when we pool all IOs and countries. At this aggregate level, we find support for three of our four privileged explanations—domestic institutional trust, geographical identification, and socioeconomic status—which underlines once again the promise of our individual-level approach. We find no support in the pooled analysis for the expectation that political values matter for legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Nor do we observe a systematic relationship to confidence in IOs with regard to the professional characteristics of elites, with the exception of bureaucratic elites having more confidence in IOs compared to party-political elites.

The aggregate analysis shows empirical support for domestic institutional trust as an explanation of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. A clear positive relationship exists for confidence in government: namely, the more an elite person has confidence in their national government, the more they have confidence in IOs. We initially observe the absence of a relationship with elite confidence in IOs for our second indicator of domestic institutional trust, i.e., satisfaction with the political system. However, this result may occur because confidence in government and political satisfaction are moderately correlated (r= 0.539). We therefore rerun the models by excluding confidence in government, at which point the results suggest that respondents who tend to be more satisfied with the political system in their country tend to have more confidence in IOs. Conversely, when we exclude satisfaction with the political system from the analyses, the conclusions on

Table 8.1 Regression analysis of elite confidence in IOs, five countries pooled

	(1) All IOs[a]	(2) ICC	(3) IMF	(4) UN	(5) WB	(6) WHO	(7) WTO
Socioeconomic status							
Education (BA is ref.)							
MA	−0.023	−0.153	0.008	0.036	−0.051	−0.001	−0.014
	(0.070)	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.096)
Doctorate	0.076	−0.082	0.161	−0.028	0.148	0.111	0.065
	(0.083)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.104)	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.115)
Financial satisfaction	0.045***	0.041*	0.046*	0.019	0.052**	0.036*	0.049**
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Political values							
Left–right orientation	0.028	−0.007	0.085***	−0.036*	0.063**	−0.028	0.065**
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	−0.005	0.110	−0.060	0.018	−0.132	0.034	0.030
	(0.057)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Geographical identification							
Global identification	0.092**	0.089	0.097*	0.220***	0.100*	0.022	0.071
	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)
National identification	−0.083*	0.052	−0.170***	−0.085	−0.107*	−0.021	−0.086
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Domestic institutional trust							
Confidence in government	0.179***	0.181***	0.222***	0.181***	0.252***	0.079	0.177***
	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.051)

Political satisfaction	0.006	−0.045*	0.006	0.025	0.018	−0.000	0.037
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Professional characteristics							
Experience with IO	0.078	0.082	0.121**	0.067*	0.116**	0.017	0.102**
	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Issue area (Generalists is ref.)							
Economics	−0.118	−0.070	−0.113	−0.199*	−0.230*	−0.071	−0.145
	(0.074)	(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.104)
Human security	−0.080	−0.044	−0.091	−0.229*	−0.109	−0.020	−0.018
	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.094)	(0.109)	(0.104)	
Sustainable development	−0.144	0.033	−0.209*	−0.151	−0.340**	−0.031	−0.234*
	(0.075)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Elite sector (Party politics is ref.)							
Bureaucratic	0.164*	0.158	0.300**	0.051	0.251*	−0.063	0.236*
	(0.079)	(0.116)	(0.108)	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Civil society	−0.051	0.187	−0.062	0.028	−0.032	−0.178	−0.146
	(0.092)	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.114)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Media	−0.018	−0.084	0.081	−0.181	0.096	−0.229	0.077
	(0.089)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Business	0.095	−0.206	0.367*	0.237	0.338*	−0.364*	0.397**
	(0.107)	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Research	0.176	0.190	0.186	0.208	0.276	−0.111	0.346*
	(0.104)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.143)

Continued

Table 8.1 *Continued*

	(1) All IOs[a]	(2) ICC	(3) IMF	(4) UN	(5) WB	(6) WHO	(7) WTO
Orientation (Subnational is ref.)							
National	−0.058	0.049	−0.134	0.016	−0.120	−0.016	−0.158
	(0.113)	(0.161)	(0.153)	(0.121)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.159)
International	−0.053	0.049	−0.015	−0.077	−0.055	0.008	−0.113
	(0.121)	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.134)	(0.169)	(0.166)	(0.170)
Controls							
Age	−0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gender (Female is ref.)	0.094	0.023	0.075	−0.030	0.030	0.138	0.161*
	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Intercept	1.313***	1.173***	0.712**	1.435***	0.818**	2.306***	1.029***
	(0.207)	(0.296)	(0.275)	(0.232)	(0.285)	(0.284)	(0.280)
N	470	495	514	542	514	517	512
R^2	0.250	0.270	0.276	0.192	0.268	0.104	0.248

Notes: OLS regression analyses using LegGov Elite Survey data. We show unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects included. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$. [a] The dependent variable is the average confidence in all six IOs. In Model 1, the variable *experience with IO* is the average experience with all six IOs. For each model, the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates no multicollinearity problems.

confidence in government remain robust (Online Appendices I and J). As we shall see later, this explanation also receives most consistent support in the context of specific IOs and countries.

We also find some support in the pooled analysis for socioeconomic status as an explanation of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. In particular, elites who are more satisfied with the financial situation of their household tend to have more confidence in IOs. However, we do not observe a statistically significant relationship between confidence in IOs and level of education, our second indicator of socioeconomic status.

Geographical identification explains some variation in the aggregate analysis as well. Elites who identify more with a global community tend to have more confidence in IOs. In addition, and consistent with our expected logic, elites who identify more with a national community tend to have less confidence in IOs.

In contrast, we find no support in the pooled model for political values as an explanation of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Nor do we find associations between confidence in IOs and the professional characteristics of elites, with the exception of a positive relationship for elites who work in the bureaucratic sector. Neither of the control variables age and gender is statistically significant.

These results of the aggregate analysis for elites often parallel the outcomes of the aggregate analysis for citizens in Chapter 7, but also manifest some differences. Notably, the elite analysis yields weaker support for the explanations of socioeconomic status and political values, and stronger support for the logic of geographical identification, compared to the citizen analysis. Whereas the elite analysis shows no relationship between level of education and confidence in IOs, the citizen analysis does. Likewise, whereas the elite analysis shows no relevance for political values, the citizen analysis shows relevance for left–right and GAL–TAN orientation. Conversely, whereas national identification has an association with confidence in IOs in the elite analysis, no such association emerges from the citizen analysis.

Comparing across IOs

We now turn to Models 2–7 in Table 8.1 to explore how the four explanations perform comparatively across IOs. Are socioeconomics, values, identities, and trust predispositions equally relevant for explaining elite legitimacy beliefs toward individual IOs that vary extensively, for instance, in terms of issue orientation?

In some respects, the results disaggregated by IO are similar to those for the aggregate elite analysis; however, we also observe that the overall pooled model masks interesting variation in explanatory power that emerges when we examine IOs individually. The logic of domestic institutional trust receives the most

consistent support, albeit not in relation to the WHO.[1] Socioeconomic status is consistently related to confidence in IOs with respect to financial satisfaction (except in relation to the UN), but not with respect to education. While the logic of geographical identification gets support in the aggregate analysis, it only matters in relation to three of the six IOs taken individually. Conversely, whereas political values did not matter in the aggregate analysis, the logic attracts support for three of the six IOs taken individually.

The findings for elites indicate several notable differences between the three IOs engaged in human security governance (ICC, UN, WHO) and the three IOs active in economic governance (IMF, World Bank, WTO). In particular, elite confidence in the economic IOs relates quite consistently with political values. More right-leaning elites have more confidence in these IOs. Strikingly, the direction of this relationship runs contrary to our theorization in Chapter 6. We find no such association for the human security IOs. Instead, more left-leaning elites have more confidence in the UN. Moreover, both measures of geographical identification matter as expected in relation to the IMF and the World Bank (albeit not the WTO), whereas, among human security IOs, only global identification is relevant in the context of the UN. Comparison of the disaggregated explanatory analyses by IO between citizens and elites shows some interesting patterns. Most notably, while there is limited variation in the explanatory power of our four logics across IOs in the citizen analysis, the elite analysis indicates differences in support depending on the issue-area orientation of an IO. Among elites, political values and geographical identification matter more extensively in relation to economic IOs, while we observed no such systematic variation among citizens.

Looking beyond the four main lines of explanation, we note statistically significant relationships for several of the variables that capture the professional position of elites. We observe that elite respondents who have more experience with the IMF, UN, World Bank, and WTO tend to have more confidence in these IOs. Hence, working with these organizations may foster greater confidence in them; alternatively, elites may engage more with IOs in which they already have more confidence. We also observe less confidence in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO among elites who work in the field of sustainable development, compared to elites with an unspecific policy profile (generalists). Interestingly, elites who specialize in economic issues have less confidence in the World Bank. In addition, we find that generalist elites tend to have more confidence in the UN than elites who focus on economic and human security issues. Looking at elite sectors, we find that bureaucratic and business elites tend to have greater confidence in the three economic IOs, and that business elites have lower confidence in the WHO,

[1] When confidence in government is excluded, satisfaction with the political system is positively and significantly related to elite confidence in all IOs, except the WHO and ICC. Conversely, the results for confidence in government are robust to excluding political system satisfaction from the models. See Online Appendices I and J.

compared to party-political elites. Elites' work orientation (subnational, national, or international) and age show no relationship to their confidence in individual IOs. Finally, we observe greater confidence in the WTO among male elites.

Comparing across Countries

The number of observations per country in the elite survey is too small to perform fully-fledged country-specific multiple regression analyses. Instead, we conduct bivariate correlation analyses to establish whether the evidence supports our theoretical expectations about individual-level sources of elite confidence in IOs in each country (Tables 8.2 and 8.3). While these analyses do not enable us to control for other factors, they give some indication of how different factors are associated with elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

As with the citizen analyses in Chapter 7, the elite explanatory results differ greatly across countries. First, we pool the country data for all six IOs (Table 8.2). We see that domestic institutional trust receives support in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines, but not in Russia and the US. Socioeconomic status is positively associated with IO confidence in Brazil, the Philippines, and especially the US, but not in Germany and Russia. Geographical identification matters in the Philippines, Russia, and the US, but not in Brazil and Germany. Finally, political values matter in Brazil, the Philippines, Russia, and the US, but not in Germany.

A comparison between elites and citizens of these patterns in explanatory power across countries yields several observations. Overall, the differences between elite and citizen drivers are most marked in Brazil, the Philippines, and Russia. For instance, with regard to political values, left–right orientation matters for elites in Brazil and Russia but not for citizens in these countries, while GAL–TAN orientation matters for elites in the Philippines but not for citizens in this country. In contrast, elites and citizens in Germany and the US show more similarities in drivers of confidence in IOs.

We now further dissect the country findings by examining the elite results for the six individual IOs in each country (Table 8.3). Starting with Brazil, the association between domestic institutional trust and elite confidence in IOs is the most consistent finding. Both the respondents' confidence in their national government and their satisfaction with the domestic political system correlate with their confidence in five of the six IOs, the exception being the WHO. We illustrate this pattern in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. Socioeconomic status and political values also appear to matter for elites in Brazil, albeit almost exclusively in relation to the three economic IOs. Elite respondents in Brazil who are more satisfied with the financial situation of their household tend to have more confidence in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, as well as the UN. Contrary to our theoretical expectation, right-leaning elites in Brazil tend to have more confidence in the economic IOs,

Table 8.2 Bivariate analysis of elite confidence in IOs (pooled), by country

	(1) Brazil	(2) Germany	(3) Philippines	(4) Russia	(5) US
Socioeconomic status					
Education	−0.074	0.064	0.054	0.089	0.202*
Financial satisfaction	0.296**	0.099	0.275**	0.122	0.304**
Political values					
Left–right orientation	0.258**	0.065	0.192	0.304**	−0.391***
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	−0.200*	0.073	−0.229*	0.045	0.190
Geographical identification					
Global identification	0.035	0.066	0.224*	0.156	0.390***
National identification	−0.053	0.131	0.068	−0.306**	0.117
Domestic institutional trust					
Confidence in government	0.456***	0.492***	0.247*	0.171	0.131
Political satisfaction	0.456***	0.279**	0.263**	−0.082	−0.091

Notes: The reported correlation coefficients are Pearson's *r*, except for the coefficient for education, which is a 3-point ordinal variable for which we report Kendall's *tau-b*. The dependent variable is the average confidence in all six IOs. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

while GAL-oriented elites have less confidence, as shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6. Geographical identification appears to be irrelevant in Brazil for elite confidence in IOs.

In Germany, too, we observe an association between domestic institutional trust and elite confidence in IOs for five of the six organizations (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2), the exception in this case being the ICC. With regard to political values, more right-leaning elites in Germany tend to have greater confidence in the IMF and the WTO, contrary to our expectation, while more left-leaning elites tend to have greater confidence in the UN and the WHO, consistent with our expectation, again indicating a difference in drivers of legitimacy beliefs between economic and human security IOs. Support for the other two explanations is limited for Germany. Regarding socioeconomics, satisfaction with the financial situation of one's household correlates with elite confidence in the ICC and the UN, while level of education yields no associations. Global identification correlates positively with elite confidence in the ICC, while national identification correlates positively with confidence in the WTO.

For elites in the Philippines, we find some support for all four explanations, albeit with important differences depending on the issue-area orientation of the IO. Statistically significant but weak correlations exist in the Philippines for the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in respect of both indicators of political values. Correlations also exist with regard to domestic institutional trust and one indicator of socioeconomic status (financial satisfaction). Yet none of these factors is relevant

Table 8.3 Bivariate analysis of elite confidence in IOs (individually), by country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Brazil	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.000	0.075	−0.155	−0.011	−0.094	−0.089
Financial satisfaction	0.177	0.326***	0.220*	0.255**	0.081	0.367***
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.026	0.440***	−0.037	0.325***	−0.042	0.299**
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.069	−0.314***	0.139	−0.262**	0.004	−0.245**
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.113	0.135	0.158	0.020	−0.007	0.048
National identification	0.080	−0.052	0.056	−0.004	−0.069	−0.060
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence government	0.319***	0.413***	0.308***	0.514***	0.096	0.353***
Political satisfaction	0.195*	0.322***	0.234**	0.337***	0.164	0.370***
Germany	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Socioeconomic status						
Education	−0.087	0.166	−0.051	0.133	0.053	0.045
Financial satisfaction	0.227*	0.031	0.215*	−0.038	0.072	−0.005
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.033	0.212*	−0.223*	0.118	−0.181*	0.243**
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.181	−0.078	0.206*	−0.077	0.191*	−0.063
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.264**	−0.114	0.148	0.058	0.124	−0.065
National identification	0.173	0.095	−0.075	0.053	−0.018	0.210*

Continued

Table 8.3 *Continued*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Brazil	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence government	0.161	0.414***	0.353***	0.355***	0.261**	0.379***
Political satisfaction	0.043	0.208*	0.197*	0.199*	0.145	0.330***
Philippines	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Socioeconomic status						
Education	−0.077	0.046	0.028	0.039	0.025	0.002
Financial satisfaction	−0.161	0.341***	0.112	0.350***	0.107	0.272**
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.177	0.276**	0.049	0.315***	0.075	0.252**
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.128	−0.305**	−0.210*	−0.364***	−0.052	−0.227*
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.188*	0.139	0.251**	0.120	0.204*	0.090
National identification	0.126	0.015	0.145	0.021	0.014	−0.071
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence government	−0.046	0.366***	0.154	0.360***	0.129	0.281**
Political satisfaction	−0.086	0.318***	0.167	0.376***	0.202*	0.294**
Russia	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.026	0.145	0.075	0.228*	0.146	0.141
Financial satisfaction	0.119	0.026	−0.024	0.133	0.115	0.003
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.106	0.356***	0.294**	0.237*	0.003	0.335***

GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.136	−0.080	0.021	0.042	−0.000	−0.062
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.058	0.220*	0.350***	0.160	−0.201*	0.036
National identification	−0.099	−0.396***	−0.145	−0.317**	0.085	−0.195*
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence government	0.128	0.070	0.142	0.104	0.123	0.154
Political satisfaction	−0.244*	−0.074	0.049	−0.005	−0.096	−0.009

US	**ICC**	**IMF**	**UN**	**WB**	**WHO**	**WTO**
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.141	0.056	0.200*	0.121	0.163*	0.271**
Financial satisfaction	0.110	0.282**	0.149	0.335***	0.030	0.288**
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.390***	−0.149	−0.390***	−0.216*	−0.417***	−0.194*
GAL–TAN (TAN is ref.)	0.164	0.044	0.287**	0.042	0.147	0.184
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.247**	0.175	0.427***	0.279**	0.222*	0.275**
National identification	0.117	0.103	0.047	0.136	0.045	0.150
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence government	0.069	0.141	0.169	0.173	−0.071	0.155
Political satisfaction	−0.161	−0.071	0.076	−0.072	−0.162	−0.072

Notes: The reported correlation coefficients are Pearson's *r*, except for the coefficient for education, which is a 3-point ordinal variable, for which we report Kendall's *tau-b*.
Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.



Fig. 8.1 Elite confidence in six IOs by confidence in government
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

for elite confidence in the human security IOs, with the sole exception of political system satisfaction in the case of the WHO. Conversely, geographical identification has no association with elite confidence in the economic IOs, but matters for all three human security IOs. Political values matter in the Philippines in the same way as in Brazil and Germany: namely, elites who are more right leaning tend to have greater confidence in the economic IOs, while elites who are more GAL oriented tend to have less confidence in these IOs.

Among elites in Russia, we find the most consistent support of any of the five countries for the logic of geographical identification. Elites in Russia with a stronger global identification tend to have more confidence in the IMF and the UN (and less in the WHO, surprisingly), while elites with a stronger national identification tend to have less confidence in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. The finding with regard to national identification is particularly distinctive for Russia, as illustrated by Figure 8.8, and might reflect the particular sensitivity of Russian elites to perceived threats and the lack of respect from "Western-dominated" IOs (White 2007). Political values appear to matter in Russia much as in other countries: thus, elites who are more right leaning have more confidence in the three economic IOs, as well as the UN. In contrast, logics around socioeconomic status



Fig. 8.2 Elite confidence in six IOs by satisfaction with domestic political system
Note: Satisfaction ranges from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 9 (completely satisfied).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

and domestic institutional trust obtain almost no empirical support with regard to elites in Russia, the sole exception being an association between level of education and confidence in the World Bank.

Finally, for elites in the US, we observe support for our theoretical expectations regarding socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification, but not for domestic institutional trust. The finding regarding socioeconomic status stands out, since the US is the only country where both education and financial satisfaction have an association with elite confidence in several IOs, as illustrated by Figures 8.3 and 8.4. In addition, political values matter in the US context in ways that are consistent with our expectation, but different from the other four countries, i.e., the more right leaning the elites are, the less confidence they have in IOs (see Figure 8.5). Finally, global identification, too, stands out as particularly important in the context of elites in the US, as shown in Figure 8.7.

Robustness Checks

As in Chapter 7 for citizens, we have conducted additional analyses to check whether our results for explanations of elite confidence in IOs are consistent when using alternative model specifications. Taken together, these extra analyses confirm the robustness of the results set out above.



Fig. 8.3 Elite confidence in six IOs by highest level of education attained
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.



Fig. 8.4 Elite confidence in six IOs by satisfaction with household financial situation
Note: Satisfaction ranges from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 9 (completely satisfied).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.



Fig. 8.5 Elite confidence in six IOs by left–right orientation

Note: Left–right orientation ranges from 0 (most left) to 9 (most right). One respondent in the Russian sample indicated a value between 5 and 6 on the left–right scale. We rounded this response to 6.

Source: LegGov Elite Survey.



Fig. 8.6 Elite confidence in six IOs by GAL–TAN orientation

Source: LegGov Elite Survey.



Fig. 8.7 Elite confidence in six IOs by global identification
Note: Identification ranges from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

First, we exclude confidence in government from the analyses in Table 8.1 to see whether the moderate correlation with political system satisfaction (r= 0.539) might explain why this latter indicator obtains less support than confidence in government. Indeed, as previously in the citizen analysis, with this exclusion the indicator for political system satisfaction turns positively significant in most models, while the other results remain robust (Online Appendix I).

Second, conversely, we exclude political system satisfaction in a similar fashion. The results from this test show that the coefficients of the confidence in government indicator remain statistically significant for all IOs except for the WHO. In the case of the WHO, the coefficient of the confidence in government indicator was insignificant in the main tables, and it remains insignificant in this robustness check as well. In sum, this indicates that the results are consistent even if we exclude the political system satisfaction indicator (Online Appendix J).

Third, we perform a mediation analysis of social trust on the models in Table 8.1. As discussed in Chapter 6, previous research suggests that social trust may be associated with confidence in both national government and IOs, which can help to explain the association between these two indicators and thus the broad support for domestic institutional trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Indeed, we find that social trust is positively associated with confidence in most of our six IOs and with confidence in government. However, social trust does not mediate the relationship between domestic institutional trust and IO confidence: adding this variable



Fig. 8.8 Elite confidence in six IOs by national identification
Note: Identification ranges from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close).
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

does not weaken the relationship between confidence in domestic and international institutions, as the social trust mechanism would have predicted (Online Appendix K).

As a fourth robustness check, we examine whether the positive findings for domestic institutional trust could be due to a heuristics mechanism, as also discussed in Chapter 6. In other words, domestic institutional trust could be associated with confidence in IOs because respondents use their attitudes about domestic politics as a heuristic when forming their opinion about IOs. To check for this possibility, we multiply the confidence in government indicator with indicators for knowledge about global governance and experience with IOs, respectively. If heuristics were in play, then we would expect to observe a negative interaction effect, which shows that the relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs is weaker for elites who know more about global governance or who have more experience with IOs. Our analyses show no evidence of a moderating effect of either political knowledge or experience with IOs on the relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs (Online Appendix L). We also tested for a direct relationship between knowledge about global governance and confidence in IOs, but this association is not significant. A test of the direct relationship between experience with IOs and confidence in IOs is included in the main models (Table 8.1).

Fifth, we run an additional analysis of elite confidence in the ICC in the Philippines. As President Duterte announced the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC during the elite survey period, a robustness test is carried out to

compare results from the interviews that took place before and after this announcement. The results are consistent across the two time periods, with the exception of left–right orientation. Left-leaning elites have more confidence in the ICC after the withdrawal announcement, while this association was statistically insignificant before (Online Appendix M).

Discussion

Drawing together the many results covered above, we find some evidence in favor of all four of our privileged explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs. However, the data support some accounts more consistently than others, and the explanatory fit also varies across IOs and countries.

We find most support for domestic institutional trust as an explanation of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Elites' trust in their domestic political institutions matters for their confidence in our six IOs combined, as well as for their confidence in five of these six IOs when analyzed individually, the exception being the WHO. However, domestic institutional trust does not associate with elite confidence in Russia and the US. This pattern differs from our citizen analyses in Chapter 7, where domestic institutional trust is associated with confidence in IOs in all countries. The observed relationship between domestic institutional trust and confidence in IOs reinforces other research findings on the link between trust in domestic political institutions and attitudes toward international institutions (Harteveld et al. 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Persson et al. 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020).

As discussed in Chapter 6, this link may result from three different mechanisms. One argument suggests that individuals use attitudes about the national level as a heuristic and take cognitive shortcuts to form opinions about more distant governance institutions (Harteveld et al. 2013; Schlipphak 2015). Another argument holds that this relationship is due to a more general predisposition to trust people (i.e., social trust) that drives trust in both domestic and international institutions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). A third argument attributes this link to national governments as influential actors in IOs; hence, if individuals (mis)trust their government, they will also (mis)trust IOs in which this government is influential (Gabel 1998; Harteveld et al. 2013).

To explore which mechanism might drive this relationship in the case of elite confidence in IOs, we test the first two expectations. (Our data do not permit us to test the third proposition.) Yet our robustness checks find no evidence that either mechanism is operating among elites. Regarding heuristics, elite respondents who know less about global governance, or who have less experience of the IOs in question, are not more likely to rely on their trust in domestic institutions when evaluating the legitimacy of IOs. In contrast, Chapter 7 did find support for this

mechanism in the citizen data, suggesting that citizens and elites differ in the extent to which they rely on heuristics. Regarding social trust, too, we find no evidence that it functions as an antecedent factor contributing to elites' level of confidence in both domestic and international institutions. This negative result corresponds to similar findings in our explanatory analysis of citizen legitimacy beliefs.

We also find support for socioeconomic status as an explanation of elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. In particular, the country-specific analyses show that socioeconomics is an important correlate of elite legitimacy beliefs toward our three economic IOs: the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. This result supports the general expectation that people who are better positioned socioeconomically are more likely to benefit from globalization as promoted by (especially economic) IOs (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hooghe 2003; Fligstein 2008; Rodrik 2018). This dynamic may explain why we find a distinction between economic and human security IOs as regards the relevance of socioeconomic logics. The IMF, World Bank, and WTO have been intimately tied to contemporary economic globalization, and their policies may especially benefit people with a higher level of education and greater financial satisfaction. Our three human security IOs—the ICC, UN, and WHO—have less obvious differential impacts on the lives of elites with varying socioeconomic status. That said, in the US, we do observe that socioeconomic status is associated with elite confidence in both economic and human security IOs. In Chapter 7, we draw the same conclusion for citizens in the US. Thus, as with the results for domestic institutional trust, elites in the US also deviate from the general pattern regarding the socioeconomic explanation.

Another key point concerning the socioeconomic logic pertains to the weak explanatory power for elite legitimacy beliefs of our indicator of education. When we find empirical support for socioeconomic status, it is almost exclusively for the indicator of financial satisfaction. Only the US data show a relationship between level of education and elite confidence in various IOs. This weak result for education confounds widespread assumptions that level of education strongly affects attitudes toward globalization, either because the more educated are better positioned to benefit from globalization (Rodrik 2018) or because they are more exposed to arguments about the benefits of globalization (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). One potential explanation for this result is the weak variation among elites in terms of education. As noted earlier, nearly all elite persons in our sample completed university-level education.

In addition, our elite explanatory analyses often provide support for the logic of geographical identification. On average, the more that elites identify with a global community, the greater their confidence in IOs. Conversely, the more that elites identify with a national community, the lower their confidence in IOs. These relationships apply particularly to elite confidence in the IMF, UN, and World Bank, and to elites in Russia and the US. Taken together, these findings support

the expectation that people consider governance arrangements more legitimate when the level of the organization corresponds to the political-geographical sphere with which the individual identifies (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009; Verhaegen et al. 2018). Indeed, elites in our study on average identify significantly more strongly with a global community than citizens at large, except in the Philippines (Appendix B). This observation ties in with observations from previous research that political elites tend to identify more strongly with the EU than the general public (Sanders and Toka 2013). We will return to the issue of systematic differences between elites and citizens regarding global identification in Chapter 9.

We find mixed support for political values as a driver of elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. The pooled analysis yields no support for our expectations regarding this relationship. However, the disaggregated analyses by IOs and countries suggest that political values do matter for elite confidence in IOs in some contexts. We see that right-oriented elites tend to have more confidence in the three economic IOs, while GAL-oriented elites in Brazil and the Philippines tend to have less confidence in IOs. These findings suggest that value conflict primarily affects elite confidence in respect of economic IOs. Yet the direction of these relationships is contrary to our theoretical expectation.

This contrary outcome may reflect how political value dimensions play out in specific country contexts. Specifically, our expectation that left-oriented elites have greater confidence in IOs holds well in the US context, where Democrats typically embrace international cooperation more than Republicans (Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Volkens et al. 2020). Likewise, our analysis finds that elites on the left in Germany tend to have higher confidence in the UN and WHO. Yet we see the reverse relationship in other countries with different party-political configurations. In Brazil, the Philippines, and Russia, right-wing elites are more likely to have confidence in economic IOs. This finding corresponds with the positioning of economic liberals on the right-wing side of the political spectrum in these countries (Volkens et al. 2020). On a similar pattern, GAL-oriented elites in Brazil and the Philippines tend to have less confidence in economic IOs. In sum, country context apparently shapes the precise relationship between political values and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Looking beyond our four privileged explanatory logics, the professional positions of elites appear to matter mainly for their confidence in economic IOs. We observe higher confidence in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO among elites who have more experience of these IOs and among business and bureaucratic elites. In contrast, elites working in the field of sustainable development tend to have less confidence in the economic IOs compared to generalists. These results suggest that experience with IOs and issues of concern sometimes shape elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

In sum, while our explanatory analyses for elites provide ample support for our four privileged logics, individual-level factors do not fully account for elite

legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Our findings suggest that country contexts matter greatly and that the context of particular IOs can matter as well. Moreover, the professional position of elites appears to shape their attitudes toward economic IOs.

Conclusion

What factors explain variation in the legitimacy beliefs of elites toward global governance? This chapter has offered the first systematic and comparative examination of this issue, drawing on the unique data of the LegGov Elite Survey. Our results and discussion have elaborated five main findings.

First, our elite explanatory analyses show some support for all four of our privileged accounts: socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. This outcome further underlines the relevance of our individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The result also indicates a need to recognize the explanatory power of several individual-level accounts rather than to treat the four logics as competing arguments.

Second, we observe that the four logics hold to differing extents in our elite analyses. Overall, domestic institutional trust shows the most extensive explanatory scope. Socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification generally relate less consistently to elite confidence in IOs.

Third, the relevance of our four explanatory logics often varies depending on the IO and the country in question. Hence, accounting for elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance requires that we appreciate how organizational and societal contexts shape the importance of individual-level logics.

Fourth, this chapter has shown that professional characteristics (such as the issue area of concern, experience with IOs, and sectoral affiliation) can also relate to elite confidence in IOs. Thus, our four privileged accounts do not exhaust the individual-level circumstances that could influence elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. On the other hand, controls and robustness checks indicate that age, gender, social trust, and knowledge about global governance are rarely associated with elite confidence in IOs.

Fifth, a comparison of the results of the elite and citizen explanatory analyses brings out extensive similarities, but also notable differences, indicating that elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance have certain distinctive dynamics that set leaders apart from the general public. Given our book's particular concern with comparing citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, we finish this chapter with a summary of these similarities and differences.

The main findings from the explanatory citizen and elite analyses share many commonalities. Both analyses show support for all four individual-level

explanations of IO legitimacy beliefs. Both analyses find most consistent support for domestic institutional trust, while the evidence in favor of socioeconomic status, geographical identification, and political values is more variegated. Finally, both analyses show some variation in the explanatory power of these logics across countries and IOs, sometimes in ways that are similar for citizens and elites.

However, notable differences between the findings of the citizen and elite explanatory analyses arise as well. One key point in this regard is that domestic institutional trust offers a less comprehensive explanation among elites than among citizens at large. This lower relevance especially marks the elite country analyses for the Philippines, Russia, and the US. This difference may arise because citizens in general are less knowledgeable about IOs than elites (Appendix B) and therefore rely more extensively on domestic institutional trust as a heuristic. This proposition is confirmed by the robustness test that includes knowledge about global governance, which is significant in the citizen analysis, but not in the elite analysis.

Likewise, socioeconomic status generally performs better in explaining citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance than elite legitimacy beliefs. The relevance of financial satisfaction is generally similar in the two sets of analyses; however, the results for level of education often diverge. While education hardly ever matters for elite confidence in IOs, it regularly appears relevant for citizens. This outcome likely arises because, as we saw early in this chapter, elites have less variation in level of education compared to citizens at large.

In the case of geographical identification, both the citizen and the elite analyses offer some support for the expected logic, albeit in some different ways. In general, global identification matters in more contexts for citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs than for elites. Meanwhile, the expectation that greater national identification associates with lower legitimacy beliefs toward IOs is confirmed for elites, but not for citizens.

With regard to political values, the explanatory analyses for citizens and elites partly point in different directions. The results show that left–right orientation matters consistently across IOs for citizens, but only for legitimacy beliefs toward the economic IOs and the UN among elites. Likewise, GAL–TAN orientation matters for legitimacy beliefs toward all IOs among citizens, but only for specific countries and IOs among elites. The country patterns show great differences, indicating that political values are clearly important for both citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs in the US, while in the other countries they are important for elite legitimacy beliefs, but not for citizen beliefs.

These divergences between citizens and elites with respect to all four explanatory logics suggest that the dynamics of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance differ in some respects between political and societal leaders on the one hand and overall publics on the other. The factors that drive legitimacy beliefs toward IOs in these respective populations are sometimes different. Hence, it is important to study elite opinion on global governance separately from public

opinion. In practical terms, too, policymakers and activists who wish to change levels of elite and/or citizen legitimacy toward global governance need to realize that the same strategies may not always work for the two types of audiences.

In comparing citizens and elites, this chapter has examined the drivers of legitimacy beliefs in each group taken separately. We have not yet undertaken the more specific task of identifying the sources of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We now move on to this exercise in the next chapter.

9

Explaining the Elite–Citizen Gap in Legitimacy Beliefs

Having examined our theoretical propositions for citizens and for elites separately in the preceding two chapters, we now turn our attention to evaluating individual-level explanations for the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Our descriptive analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated the existence of a substantial gap between elite and citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Elites on average tend to consider IOs more legitimate than the general public—a pattern that prevails for all six of our focal IOs, four of our five focal countries, and all of the six elite sectors that we examine. This contrast in attitudes need not be so surprising, since elites and the wider population tend to inhabit different lifeworlds (Hartmann 2006; Gerring et al. 2019). Yet what, more specifically, explains why elites on average find IOs more legitimate than the overall population?

To answer this question, we need to move beyond our prior analyses. While Chapters 7 and 8 explore the factors that could help explain variation in IO legitimacy beliefs among citizens and elites respectively, the present chapter seeks to account for *the gap* in legitimacy beliefs between citizens and elites. To this end, we invoke our four privileged individual-level explanations (Chapter 6) to examine whether gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs are a function of differences between elites and citizens regarding socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. Methodologically, as explained later, we shift to a dyadic modeling strategy, which allows us to explore individual-level determinants of the elite–citizen legitimacy gap.

To recapitulate briefly, we theorize in this book that elites and the general public are composed of individuals who vary systematically in characteristics that matter for the attitudes they develop toward IOs, resulting in the observed elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs. We assume that elites and the general public display such compositional differences due to prior processes of selection and socialization (see Chapter 6). Starting from this assumption, we lay out four explanatory logics. First, the gap in legitimacy beliefs may be caused by differences between elites and citizens in terms of socioeconomic status. Since elites normally have higher levels of human and financial capital, they are likely better positioned to benefit

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from globalization than the general population. Second, the legitimacy gap may result from differences between elites and citizens regarding political values. Anti-globalist populism suggests that citizens at large more often hold political values that are skeptical of international cooperation than elites. Third, the gap in legitimacy beliefs may reflect differences in geographical identification. Elites likely hold greater global attachments than citizens due to their greater global exposure. Fourth, the legitimacy gap may result from elites and citizens having different levels of domestic institutional trust, which usually strongly correlates with attitudes toward IOs. Because of their leadership positions in politics and society, elites likely hold more positive views of national governing institutions than citizens in general. For each of these four lines of explanation, we evaluate empirically whether differences between elites and citizens in the respective characteristics relate to a gap in their legitimacy beliefs.

This chapter presents three key findings. First, the legitimacy gap is associated with systematic differences between elites and citizens regarding all four of our privileged characteristics. Differences at the individual level therefore figure importantly in explaining the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy. Second, the specific individual-level characteristics that figure most prominently vary across IO and country contexts. Domestic institutional trust is a key explanation in all countries except the US. Socioeconomic status and political values matter especially for economic IOs and in the US. Geographical identification is particularly relevant in Russia. This variation suggests that organizational and societal conditions shape the explanatory relevance of our individual-level logics, and thus complement our individual-level approach. Third, the four explanatory logics often operate concurrently. Elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward a particular IO and in a certain country typically involve several drivers. This insight challenges common portrayals of these individual-level explanations as opposed and competing (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

To elaborate these points, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: We begin by discussing our choice of a dyadic modeling strategy and our approach to measuring our posited individual-level drivers of the elite–citizen legitimacy gap. We then present our results from the dyadic analysis, covering the pooled evidence, as well as breakdowns by specific IOs and countries. The third section discusses these findings in light of our four privileged lines of explanation. We end with a brief conclusion that summarizes the results and identifies their broader implications.

Measurement and Modeling Approach

A dyadic modeling strategy is best suited to test our individual-level explanations of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. In a dyadic modeling

strategy, each individual elite respondent is matched to all individual citizen respondents in their country (cf. Lindgren et al. 2009). The unit of analysis is thus an elite–citizen dyad, and not an individual on their own. The analysis tests the extent to which differences within these elite–citizen dyads regarding socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust associate with differences within the same dyads regarding confidence in IOs.

For our dyadic analysis, we use data from the WVS7 and the LegGov Elite Survey, as described in Chapter 2 (see also Haerpfer et al. 2021; Verhaegen et al. 2019). Each citizen and each elite respondent figure multiple times in the dataset. For example, a sample of 1000 citizens and 100 elites yields a dataset comprising 100,000 dyads, with each elite paired with each of the 1000 citizens.[1]

The dependent variable *confidence gap* is constructed by, within each dyad, subtracting a citizen's confidence in an IO (j) from an elite's confidence in the same IO (i). The average of gaps in legitimacy beliefs between elite i and citizen j for all six IOs (k) is then calculated as follows: $y_{ij=} \frac{\left(\sum_{k=1}^{6} i_k - j_k\right)}{6}$.

The independent variables are elite–citizen differences in, respectively, socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. These differences between elites and citizens are calculated in the same way as differences in legitimacy beliefs, namely, by subtracting scores for each citizen from scores for each elite.[2] We use the same survey questions as in Chapters 7 and 8 to operationalize these four logics and to calculate the differences between elites and citizens. Since the dyadic design requires that we adapt the operationalizations, we discuss these measures in some depth.

We operationalize socioeconomic status using two indicators. First, we measure respondents' highest level of formal education on a scale from 0 to 8. Within each elite–citizen dyad we subtract the education level of the citizen from that of the elite. In our sample, citizens at large have less formal education (mean of 3.98) than elites (mean of 7.04): so an average difference of about three points. However, the standard deviation of 2.1 indicates that the difference in level of education varies considerably between dyads. Second, we estimate the difference between elites and citizens in their satisfaction with the financial situation of their household, using a scale ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 9 (completely satisfied). Here we find little difference between citizens (mean of 5.18) and elites (mean of 5.96), while a standard deviation of 3.1 indicates much spread across dyads.

[1] This data structure means that the observed dyads are not independent of each other. To correct for this issue, we include robust standard errors clustered at the level of both citizens and elites by using *cgmreg* in Stata for multiway clustering (Gelbach 2009; Gelbach and Miller 2011). We report results without any weighting, since our unit of analysis is a dyad and not an individual.

[2] See Appendix A for the wording of survey questions, Appendix B for the descriptive statistics for all included variables, Appendix E for the distribution of the dependent variable, and Appendix F for bivariate correlations between all independent variables.

We also operationalize political values with two indicators. First, we include left–right self-placement on a scale from 0 (most left) to 9 (most right). Elites lean slightly more to the left (mean of 3.68) than citizens at large (mean of 4.53). Yet, a standard deviation of 3.0 indicates considerable difference across dyads. Second, we build two measures based on several survey items that tap respondents' values on the GAL–TAN scale (Bauhr and Charron 2018). These items cover attitudes on immigration, the maintenance of social order, and certain matters of personal morality (abortion, homosexuality, sex before marriage, and divorce). From these questions we create a composite variable that distinguishes between GAL (=1) and TAN (=0) positions. For each dyad we calculate whether a citizen and an elite have the same position, or whether the citizen is TAN while the elite is GAL, or vice versa. Elites are GAL and citizens are TAN in 23.8 percent of the dyads, and elites are TAN and citizens are GAL in 22.6 percent of the cases.

We include two measures for geographical identification. The survey asked respondents how close they feel to the world and to their country, each on a scale from 0 (not close at all) to 3 (very close). Elites feel closer to the world (mean of 1.91) than citizens (mean of 1.43). A standard deviation of 1.2 indicates much difference across dyads. With regard to the second indicator, elites feel somewhat closer to their country (mean of 2.43) than citizens (mean of 2.04). Yet a standard deviation of 1.1 suggests considerable divergence across dyads.

We operationalize domestic institutional trust through two indicators. The first indicator measures confidence in the national government. The scale ranges from 0 (none at all) to 3 (a great deal). Overall, elites have greater confidence in their national government (mean of 1.67) than citizens at large (mean of 1.29), though the standard deviation of 1.2 indicates considerable divergence across dyads. The second indicator expresses elite–citizen differences in satisfaction with the political system of their country on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 9 (completely satisfied). On average, elites are somewhat less satisfied with the political system of their country (mean of 3.38) than citizens at large (mean of 3.85), though the standard deviation of 3.3 indicates much divergence across dyads.

Finally, we control for differences in age and gender in all models, and additionally for differences in social trust and knowledge about global governance in the robustness checks. For further descriptive statistics and multicollinearity diagnostics, we refer the reader to Appendices B and F.

Results

In this subsection, we begin by looking at the overarching results, when pooling data across IOs and countries. We then proceed by comparing the results first across IOs and then across countries.

The Overall Picture

Model 1 in Table 9.1 shows the results for the analysis of the elite–citizen legitimacy gap when all IOs and countries are pooled. We find support for all four of our individual-level explanations.

First of all, the logic of domestic institutional trust receives extensive support as an explanation of the elite–citizen legitimacy gap vis-à-vis IOs. Elite–citizen differences regarding confidence in government have a statistically significant association with the gap, and in the expected direction. In contrast, elite–citizen differences regarding satisfaction with the domestic political system lack a significant association with the gap. However, replicating the analysis while excluding confidence in government, which is moderately correlated with political system satisfaction (r=0.431), also yields a significant positive relationship for the second indicator of domestic institutional trust (see Online Appendix N.1).

Moreover, we see that differences in socioeconomic status present an explanation of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The more educated an elite is relative to a citizen in a dyad, the more confidence in IOs that elite has relative to that citizen. Likewise, elite–citizen differences in satisfaction with the financial situation of one's household associate with differences in their respective confidence in IOs.

The results also suggest that political values matter for the elite–citizen gap. Differences in left–right orientation associate with differences in IO confidence as expected: the more left leaning an elite is relative to a citizen in a dyad, the greater confidence in IOs that elite has, relative to that citizen. Moreover, in dyads where the elite is GAL oriented and the citizen is TAN oriented, that elite tends to have more confidence in IOs relative to that citizen, when compared to dyads in which elites and citizens have the same GAL–TAN orientation.

The logic of geographical identification, too, generates significant findings, albeit only regarding global identification. As anticipated, we observe that the stronger an elite's global identification relative to that of a citizen in a dyad, the more confidence in IOs that elite has relative to that citizen. However, we do not observe an association between elite–citizen differences in national identification and an elite–citizen gap of confidence in IOs in the pooled analysis.

Among the control variables, we note that age differences between an elite and a citizen in a dyad are related to gaps in their respective confidence in IOs. An elite who is older relative to a citizen in a dyad tends to have less confidence in IOs relative to that citizen. By contrast, we do not observe that gender differences matter systematically for the elite–citizen gap in confidence.

In all, these results at the aggregate level provide strong support for our individual-level approach. That said, as we have seen in other chapters, a composite analysis may mask important differences across IOs and across countries. We now explore those potential contextual variations in turn.

Table 9.1 Dyadic analysis of elite–citizen gaps in confidence in IOs, five countries pooled

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) All IOs[a]	(2) ICC	(3) IMF	(4) UN	(5) WB	(6) WHO	(7) WTO
Socioeconomic status							
Education	0.036***	0.023*	0.029**	0.028***	0.032***	0.059***	0.034***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Financial satisfaction	0.034***	0.023**	0.040***	0.020**	0.042***	0.019*	0.039***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Political values							
Left–right orientation	−0.029***	−0.047***	0.000	−0.053***	−0.007	−0.051***	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)							
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.016	−0.084*	0.043	−0.121**	0.057	−0.079	0.001
	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	0.067*	0.162***	0.011	0.080*	−0.022	0.124***	0.035
	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Geographical identification							
Global identification	0.114***	0.111***	0.105***	0.177***	0.112***	0.079***	0.098***
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
National identification	−0.011	0.033	−0.049*	−0.041	−0.039	0.023	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Domestic institutional trust							
Confidence in government	0.179***	0.186***	0.212***	0.184***	0.237***	0.132***	0.193***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Political satisfaction	0.007	−0.015	0.011	0.018*	0.012	0.004	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Controls							
Age	−0.002**	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002*	−0.001	−0.001	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)

Continued

Table 9.1 *Continued*

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) All IOs[a]	(2) ICC	(3) IMF	(4) UN	(5) WB	(6) WHO	(7) WTO
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)							
Elite female and citizen male	0.000	−0.026	0.015	−0.081**	0.012	0.048	0.038
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Elite male and citizen female	−0.051	0.027	−0.115*	0.078	−0.085	−0.080	−0.103*
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Intercept	0.282***	0.451***	0.237**	0.292***	0.208*	0.454***	0.165
	(0.070)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.091)
N	557,515	641,185	670,077	716,132	674,039	702,069	663,226
Adjusted R^2	0.199	0.135	0.149	0.160	0.165	0.118	0.142

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as the dependent variable (higher values indicate greater confidence in IOs for the elite than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Country fixed effects included. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
[a] The dependent variable is the elite–citizen difference in average confidence in all six IOs.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

Comparing across IOs

In most cases, results for the six IOs taken individually mirror the overall picture (Models 2–7 in Table 9.1). Elite–citizen differences regarding domestic institutional trust, socioeconomic status, and global (but not national) identification relate consistently to the elite–citizen gap in confidence vis-à-vis all six IOs. The evidence regarding political values is more mixed, with left–right and GAL–TAN differences each playing a role for three of the six IOs.

More specifically, we observe several interesting complications when we compare the findings across IOs. Starting with political values, elite–citizen differences in both left–right and GAL–TAN orientations are significantly associated with elite–citizen gaps in confidence toward the three human security IOs (ICC, UN, WHO), but not toward the three economic IOs (IMF, World Bank, WTO). The more left oriented an elite is relative to a citizen in a dyad, the more confidence in a human security IOs that elite has, relative to that citizen. When an elite is TAN and a citizen is GAL, that elite is less likely to have more confidence in the ICC and the UN than that citizen, compared to a dyad in which the elite and the citizen have the same GAL or TAN orientation. Likewise, when an elite is GAL and a

citizen is TAN, that elite is more likely to have more confidence in the ICC, UN, and WHO than that citizen. This pattern indicates that it is primarily the human security IOs that drive the results for political values in the pooled analysis (Model 1). Interestingly, despite all the public ideological contestation that we have witnessed around the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, neither left–right nor GAL–TAN differences between elites and citizens relate significantly to gaps in their confidence vis-à-vis these economic IOs. That said, the next subsection will show that this result is partly explained by the pooling of data from countries with contrasting results regarding these indicators.

In the case of geographical identification, we find only one deviation from the overall pattern of support for global but not national identification. In this exception, elite–citizen differences in national identification associate negatively with elite–citizen confidence gaps regarding the IMF. Thus, the more that an elite feels close to their country relative to a citizen in a dyad, the less confidence that elite tends to have in the IMF relative to that citizen.

Finally, with regard to domestic institutional trust, we see that elite–citizen differences regarding satisfaction with the political system of their country only appear to be significant for elite–citizen gaps in confidence vis-à-vis the UN, and not for the other five IOs. However, as noted earlier, the two indicators of domestic institutional trust are moderately correlated. If we rerun the analysis without confidence in government, then we find that elite–citizen differences regarding political system satisfaction are statistically significant for elite–citizen gaps in confidence regarding all of the IOs except the ICC (Online Appendix N.1).

Comparing across Countries

Turning to the results by country, we first discuss the models that pool confidence in all six IOs (Table 9.2). We continue to find support for all four explanations, albeit to different degrees and with much variation across countries.

A key finding is consistent support for the logic of domestic institutional trust in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, and Russia, but not the US. Elite–citizen differences regarding confidence in government are thus significantly associated with elite–citizen gaps in confidence in the pooled IOs in four of the five countries. Moreover, when the confidence in government indicator is removed from the analysis, because of its moderate correlation with political system satisfaction, this second indicator becomes significant as well in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines (see Online Appendix N.2).

Evidence for socioeconomic status shows striking contrasts across the five countries. Differences between elites and citizens at large in terms of socioeconomic status associate with differences in their respective confidence in the pooled IOs:

Table 9.2 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs (pooled) per country

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) Brazil	(2) Germany	(3) Philippines	(4) Russia	(5) US
Socioeconomic status					
Education	0.022	0.018	0.014	0.021	0.062***
	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Financial satisfaction	0.041***	0.009	0.030**	0.012	0.039***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Political values					
Left–right orientation	0.009	0.025*	0.012	0.049**	−0.089***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)					
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	0.119	−0.028	−0.010	−0.002	−0.030
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.060)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	−0.087	0.059	−0.085	−0.005	0.092**
	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.035)
Geographical identification					
Global identification	0.035	0.028	0.109**	0.139***	0.134***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.030)
National identification	−0.027	−0.001	−0.038	−0.124**	0.061*
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.029)
Domestic institutional trust					
Confidence in government	0.329***	0.312***	0.191***	0.273***	0.059
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Political satisfaction	0.022	0.032**	0.008	−0.018	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Controls					
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.004*	−0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)					
Elite female and citizen male	−0.038	0.009	0.044	0.051	−0.057
	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.036)

Elite male and citizen female	0.044	−0.049	−0.063	−0.121	−0.027
	(0.090)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.071)
Intercept	0.335***	0.148**	0.018	0.406***	0.045
	(0.100)	(0.057)	(0.133)	(0.080)	(0.071)
N	63,860	112,887	111,600	68,112	201,056
Adjusted R^2	0.254	0.287	0.147	0.186	0.248

Notes: OLS regression using *difference in average confidence in all six IOs* (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

on both indicators for the US; on one indicator for Brazil and the Philippines; and on neither indicator for Germany and Russia. Thus, the socioeconomic logic clearly matters for the elite–citizen gap in the US, has mixed support in Brazil and the Philippines, and no support in Germany and Russia.

The logic of geographical identification has explanatory power for the elite–citizen gap in IO confidence on both indicators in Russia and the US, as well as on one indicator in the Philippines. Differences between elites and citizens in respect of geographical identification have no association with elite–citizen differences regarding confidence in IOs in Brazil and Germany.

Evidence for the logic of political values, too, shows considerable variation across our five focal countries. Differences between elites and citizens regarding left–right orientation associate with elite–citizen gaps in IO confidence in Germany, Russia, and the US, but not in Brazil and the Philippines. Differences between elites and citizens on the GAL–TAN dimension matter for the gap in confidence vis-à-vis IOs in the US, but not in the other countries.

We now examine these findings more closely with a breakdown by individual IOs in relation to each of our five focal countries, starting with Brazil. In this country (Table 9.3), domestic institutional trust offers the most consistent explanation of elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy. Elite–citizen differences regarding confidence in the national government relate significantly with elite–citizen confidence gaps regarding all six IOs. Political values, too, appear to matter substantially in Brazil. Differences between elites and citizens in terms of GAL–TAN values matter for the three economic IOs. In addition, but contrary to our expectation, an elite in a dyad who is more right wing relative to a citizen tends to have more confidence in the IMF and the World Bank relative to that citizen. Socioeconomic status also receives some support in Brazil. Differences in satisfaction with one's financial situation are associated with elite–citizen gaps in confidence in the IMF, UN, World

Table 9.3 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs in Brazil

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.046	0.047*	0.002	0.036	0.044	−0.005
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Financial satisfaction	0.032	0.043**	0.029*	0.043**	0.019	0.059***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.019	0.049***	−0.018	0.035*	−0.017	0.015
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.010	0.300***	−0.075	0.241**	−0.059	0.233*
	(0.099)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.092)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	−0.017	−0.244***	0.003	−0.199***	0.077	−0.172**
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.018	0.093*	0.016	0.042	0.003	0.059
	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.047)
National identification	−0.024	−0.071	−0.007	−0.036	−0.011	−0.054
	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.327***	0.374***	0.277***	0.470***	0.174***	0.293***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.049)
Political satisfaction	0.026	0.019	0.023	0.027	0.020	0.025
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Controls						
Age	0.004	0.001	−0.000	0.002	0.004*	−0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite female and citizen male	−0.008	−0.046	−0.091	−0.016	0.034	0.022
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.062)

Elite male and citizen female	−0.009	0.008	0.098	0.075	0.046	0.021
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.098)	(0.132)	(0.108)	(0.124)
Intercept	0.393*	0.166	0.446**	0.113	0.531***	0.342**
	(0.156)	(0.111)	(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.129)
N	73,944	92,452	99,801	92,684	100,970	92,345
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.247	0.116	0.271	0.061	0.162

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as a dependent variable (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

Bank, and WTO, while difference between elites and citizens in level of education matter for the gap in their confidence vis-à-vis the IMF. Our data yield very limited support for geographical identification as an explanation of elite–citizen gaps in Brazil. Only in the case of the IMF do we find some evidence that elite–citizen differences in global identification are positively related to gaps in their confidence in an IO. In sum, in Brazil elite–citizen gaps in IO confidence appear to be driven by differences in domestic institutional trust, political values, and socioeconomic status, but not geographical identification.

Also in Germany (Table 9.4), domestic institutional trust appears to be the most powerful explanation of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Confidence in the national government is associated with gaps in confidence toward all six IOs. In addition, a positive association arises in Germany between elite–citizen differences in political system satisfaction and confidence gaps regarding the IMF and the WTO. The results for political values are mixed in Germany. In dyads where the elite is GAL oriented and the citizen is TAN oriented, the elite tends to have more confidence in the ICC and the WHO relative to the citizen, compared to a dyad in which the elite and the citizen have the same GAL or TAN orientation. In the case of left–right orientation, elite–citizen differences appear to matter for gaps in confidence regarding the three economic IOs: an elite who is more right wing than a citizen in a dyad tends to have greater confidence in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO than that citizen, which runs counter to our expectation. Socioeconomic status receives limited support in Germany. Elite–citizen differences in education are positively related to elite–citizen gaps in confidence regarding the IMF and the World Bank. However, elite–citizen differences in financial satisfaction only associate with gaps in confidence regarding the ICC. As in Brazil, geographical identification receives weakest support among the four explanations in Germany. This logic only matters when elites who experience a greater sense of belonging to the world than citizens tend to have greater confidence in the ICC and the UN. In sum, elite–citizen legitimacy gaps in Germany appear to be

Table 9.4 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs in Germany

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.014	0.047*	0.003	0.042**	0.010	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Financial satisfaction	0.034**	0.002	0.028	−0.012	0.011	−0.000
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.010	0.063***	−0.023	0.053**	−0.022	0.067***
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.128	0.046	−0.099	0.085	−0.161	−0.031
	(0.075)	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.093)	(0.097)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	0.181***	0.020	0.077	−0.002	0.120**	0.055
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.101**	−0.033	0.087*	0.047	0.037	−0.030
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.038)
National identification	0.055	0.001	−0.048	−0.028	−0.018	0.094
	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.240***	0.369***	0.325***	0.350***	0.241***	0.306***
	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Political satisfaction	0.009	0.039*	0.028	0.032	0.022	0.035*
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Controls						
Age	−0.001	0.000	−0.003	−0.000	−0.005**	−0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite female and citizen male	0.025	−0.058	−0.048	−0.037	0.089	0.043
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.049)

Elite male and citizen female	−0.014	0.016	0.066	−0.022	−0.143	−0.130
	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.084)
Intercept	0.443***	0.056	0.020	0.138	0.064	0.112
	(0.072)	(0.101)	(0.087)	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.085)
N	140,476	136,572	149,292	133,392	146,133	132,008
Adjusted R^2	0.163	0.202	0.193	0.158	0.133	0.184

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as a dependent variable (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

driven by differences in domestic institutional trust, while support for our other three explanations is mixed or weak.

Moving to the Philippines (Table 9.5), here as well domestic institutional trust appears to be the most consistent of our explanations of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Confidence in the national government is positively associated with confidence in five of the six IOs, the exception being the ICC. The second most validated account in the Philippines is geographical identification. For all IOs except the World Bank, we find that the stronger an elite's global identification relative to a citizen in a dyad, the more confidence that elite has in IOs, relative to that citizen. For national identification, we find the opposite association in the case of the WTO: that is, the more an elite has a national identification than a citizen in a dyad, the less confidence that elite tends to have in the WTO, relative to that citizen. With regard to socioeconomic status, in the Philippines we find that elite–citizen differences in financial satisfaction relate positively to gaps in their confidence regarding the three economic IOs. Finally, elite–citizen differences in political values barely associate with gaps in their respective confidence in IOs in the Philippines. Elite–citizen differences on the left–right spectrum only relate with gaps in confidence regarding the World Bank. Likewise, elite GAL and citizen TAN differences only matter for the confidence gap in relation to the World Bank. Moreover, both of these associations operate contrary to the expected direction. Meanwhile, elite TAN and citizen GAL differences only matter in regard to the elite–citizen gap vis-à-vis the ICC. In sum, in the Philippines, elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs appear to involve elite–citizen differences in domestic institutional trust and geographical identification more than differences in socioeconomic status and political values.

As in the previous countries, results for Russia (Table 9.6) show that elite–citizen differences in domestic institutional trust offer a powerful explanation of elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs. Differences between elites and citizens regarding confidence in the national government associate with elite–citizen gaps

Table 9.5 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs in the Philippines

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	−0.015	−0.022	0.015	−0.005	0.039	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Financial satisfaction	−0.001	0.046***	0.009	0.047***	0.019	0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.030	0.028	−0.007	0.037*	0.017	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.099*	−0.012	−0.011	0.033	0.019	0.009
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	0.144	−0.202	−0.182	−0.304*	0.064	−0.118
	(0.124)	(0.129)	(0.107)	(0.147)	(0.104)	(0.136)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.123*	0.113*	0.124**	0.070	0.105*	0.113*
	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.046)
National identification	0.056	−0.077	0.036	−0.049	−0.065	−0.149*
	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.069)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.111	0.260***	0.208***	0.260***	0.164***	0.210***
	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Political satisfaction	−0.016	0.017	0.008	0.026	0.012	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Controls						
Age	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite female and citizen male	−0.006	0.108	−0.005	0.011	−0.014	0.153*
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.071)

Elite male and citizen female	0.011 (0.096)	−0.127 (0.082)	0.006 (0.075)	−0.011 (0.084)	0.010 (0.072)	−0.202* (0.088)
Intercept	0.140 (0.164)	0.120 (0.146)	0.220 (0.137)	0.093 (0.155)	0.107 (0.134)	−0.210 (0.153)
N	121,980	124,080	135,261	129,759	130,980	124,334
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.157	0.089	0.161	0.077	0.120

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as a dependent variable (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

in confidence toward all six IOs. In addition, elite–citizen differences in Russia regarding satisfaction with the domestic political system relate significantly with elite–citizen gaps in confidence in the ICC and the WHO. Yet here, contrary to our theoretical expectation, we find that an elite who is more satisfied with the political system than a citizen tends to have relatively less confidence in those two IOs. Russia also diverges from the other countries regarding the extensive support for the logic of geographical identification. As in the Philippines, elites in Russia with a stronger global identification than citizens have greater confidence than citizens in five of the six IOs, the exception in Russia being the WHO. Going further than the Philippines, however, national identification also matters for several IOs in Russia. Elites who have a stronger national identification relative to citizens have less confidence than those citizens in the IMF, UN, and World Bank. Political values appear to matter in Russia for the elite–citizen gap in IO confidence, but only regarding left–right orientation, and in a direction contrary to our expectations. In Russia, elites who are more right wing relative to citizens tend to have greater confidence than those citizens in the IMF, UN, World Bank, and WTO. Finally, the results for Russia offer no evidence to support the socioeconomic logic. In sum, in Russia, elite–citizen gaps in confidence regarding IOs appear especially to involve elite–citizen differences in respect of domestic institutional trust and geographical identification, along with some limited effects from political values and no relevance of socioeconomic status.

Results for the US are distinct from the other four countries in several respects (Table 9.7). For one thing, the socioeconomic logic figures more prominently in the US than elsewhere for explaining elite–citizen gaps in IO confidence. Elite–citizen differences in level of education associate positively with elite–citizen gaps in confidence toward all IOs except the IMF. In addition, elite–citizen differences in financial satisfaction relate positively to confidence gaps in respect of the three economic IOs. Political values also matter more systematically in the US than elsewhere. As hypothesized, elites who are more left wing than citizens tend to have more confidence in all six IOs. Moreover, in the US, when elites hold GAL

Table 9.6 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs in Russia

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.006	0.031	0.032	0.017	0.021	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Financial satisfaction	0.037	0.002	−0.005	0.020	0.016	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	0.033	0.082***	0.058**	0.055*	0.010	0.083***
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.082	−0.019	−0.031	−0.025	0.013	0.039
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	0.170	0.025	−0.143	0.093	−0.018	−0.082
	(0.155)	(0.131)	(0.099)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.126)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.138*	0.197***	0.299***	0.157**	0.007	0.153***
	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.046)
National identification	−0.090	−0.242***	−0.153**⋆	−0.166**	0.117	−0.103
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.057)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.360***	0.259***	0.251***	0.242***	0.295***	0.284***
	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Political satisfaction	−0.073**	−0.017	0.010	−0.007	−0.047*	−0.017
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Controls						
Age	−0.003	−0.001	0.000	−0.002	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite female and citizen male	0.004	0.018	0.064	0.009	0.036	0.084
	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.066)

Elite male and citizen female	−0.074	0.005	−0.137	−0.001	−0.173	−0.165
	(0.142)	(0.121)	(0.099)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.128)
Intercept	0.131	0.281**	0.752***	0.387***	0.531***	0.163
	(0.120)	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.119)	(0.106)
N	82,119	87,203	95,950	87,514	89,434	88,200
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.151	0.203	0.110	0.101	0.148

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as a dependent variable (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

values and citizens hold TAN values, elites have greater confidence than those citizens in the UN, WHO, and WTO, compared to dyads in which the elite and the citizen have the same GAL or TAN orientation. In dyads where the elite is TAN and the citizen GAL, the elite tends to have less confidence in the UN compared to the citizen. The logic of geographical identification also receives consistent support in the US. Elites with a stronger global identification relative to citizens have more confidence relative to those citizens in all six IOs. Elite–citizen differences in national identification also matter in the US for the gap in confidence toward the ICC, WHO, and WTO. Yet the association operates contrary to the expected direction: namely, elites with a stronger national identification than citizens appear to have greater confidence in these three IOs. Finally, in the most striking contrast with the other four countries, the logic of domestic institutional trust attracts the least support in the US. Elite–citizen differences regarding confidence in the national government associate with gaps in confidence only in the case of the World Bank. Meanwhile, differences regarding satisfaction in the domestic political system show no relevance at all for the elite–citizen gap in confidence toward IOs. In sum, and in notable contrast to the other four countries, elite–citizen legitimacy gaps in the US relate prominently with socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification, while domestic institutional trust plays a negligible role.

Robustness Checks

As in our other explanatory analyses regarding citizens and elites viewed separately, we conduct a number of additional analyses to check if our results regarding the elite–citizen gap hold when using alternative model specifications. These various tests all indicate that our results are robust.

First, we replicate Tables 9.1–9.7 by including an indicator for elite–citizen differences in social trust (Online Appendix R), as several studies suggest that this

Table 9.7 Dyadic analysis of difference in confidence in IOs in the US

Differences between elites and citizens in:	(1) ICC	(2) IMF	(3) UN	(4) WB	(5) WHO	(6) WTO
Socioeconomic status						
Education	0.050**	0.027	0.044**	0.042**	0.114***	0.081***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Financial satisfaction	0.025	0.056***	0.022	0.055***	0.010	0.050**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political values						
Left–right orientation	−0.100***	−0.075***	−0.122***	−0.078***	−0.114***	−0.062***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
GAL–TAN (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite TAN and citizen GAL	−0.037	0.009	−0.194*	0.065	−0.058	−0.108
	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Elite GAL and citizen TAN	0.082	0.085	0.187***	0.014	0.113*	0.133**
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Geographical identification						
Global identification	0.106*	0.088*	0.209***	0.131***	0.117*	0.124**
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.044)
National identification	0.090*	0.056	0.010	0.055	0.092*	0.097*
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Domestic institutional trust						
Confidence in government	0.079	0.067	0.066	0.106*	−0.004	0.093
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Political satisfaction	−0.009	0.005	0.024	−0.002	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Controls						
Age	−0.001	0.000	−0.001	−0.001	0.002	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (ref. elite and citizen same)						
Elite female and citizen male	−0.106*	−0.002	−0.202***	0.008	0.039	−0.069
	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.050)

Elite male and citizen female	0.114	−0.190	0.186	−0.179*	−0.128	−0.019
	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.096)	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.101)
Intercept	−0.002	0.232**	0.000	0.228*	−0.022	−0.075
	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.083)
N	222,666	229,770	235,828	230,690	234,552	226,339
Adjusted R^2	0.162	0.126	0.255	0.151	0.202	0.164

Notes: OLS regression using *Difference in IO confidence* as a dependent variable (higher values indicate greater elite confidence in IOs than the citizen in the dyad). Entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of citizens and elites. Significance levels: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

factor may impact legitimacy beliefs toward IOs (Harteveld et al. 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Our results remain robust throughout. Interestingly, in Russia, the US, and to some extent Germany, social trust contributes to explaining the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs, in the sense that an elite in a dyad tends to hold greater confidence in IOs relative to a citizen when that elite is relatively more trusting than that citizen.

Second, we control for elite–citizen differences in knowledge about global governance, as such differences may matter for the elite–citizen gap in IO confidence. For this purpose, we utilize three items in our survey that measure knowledge about global governance (Appendix A). Around 61.9 percent of elites correctly answered all three questions, as compared to around 12.2 percent of citizens. The main results remain robust, and the indicator for differences in knowledge is insignificant in most of the models (Online Appendix S).

Third, we rerun the analyses without the variable regarding difference in satisfaction with the political system in one's country since, as mentioned earlier, this indicator is moderately correlated with differences in confidence in government, which may affect the estimates. All results remain robust, including those for the confidence in government indicator (Online Appendix O). Conversely, we rerun the analyses without the variable concerning confidence in government, retaining satisfaction with the political system (Online Appendix N). Our results remain robust, with the adjustment that political system satisfaction—which tends to be insignificant in the main regression tables—becomes significant in the pooled model as well as results for Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines, while remaining insignificant for Russia and the US. This additional check thus provides further support for the explanation of domestic institutional trust.

Fourth, we redo the analyses leaving out differences in national identification, as the two variables capturing geographical identification are moderately correlated (r=0.284), potentially leading to a conflation of effects. Again, our results

are robust, for both the geographical identification explanation and the other explanations (Online Appendix P). Conversely, we rerun the models leaving out differences in global identification. The results are consistent with those in the full models (Online Appendix Q).

Finally, we control for variation by elite sectors by adding the elite sector dummy variables in the respective countries, using party-political elites as the reference category. This move also does not change our main results, although we observe some interesting variations. For example, in the pooled analyses we observe that in dyads where an elite works in government bureaucracy, that elite tends to have more confidence in IOs relative to the citizen in the dyad, compared to dyads where the elite works in party politics. In addition, a business elite in a dyad tends to have more confidence in the economic IOs than a citizen in that dyad, compared to when the elite in the dyad works in party politics. Elite sectors also have varying impacts on the elite–citizen gap in different countries. For example, in all countries except Russia, the elite–citizen gap is often smaller when the elite is from civil society than when the elite comes from political parties. Meanwhile, results for the US show virtually no variation in the elite–citizen gap by elite sector (Online Appendix T).

Discussion

Taken together, the findings elaborated above suggest three general insights regarding explanations of the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. First, individual-level factors have important influences on these gaps. We find corroborating evidence for all four individual-level logics, in both the pooled and the disaggregated analyses. Second, the general explanatory patterns are not always consistent when we examine specific IOs and countries. This suggests that circumstances at the organizational and societal levels shape the role that individual-level drivers play in a particular context. Third, support for all four explanations indicates that the respective drivers operate in parallel rather than in opposition. The issue is therefore not one of choosing between rival explanations, but exploring them together.

Elaborating in more detail, our analysis accords broadest support to the expectation that elite–citizen differences in domestic institutional trust help to drive the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The analysis of pooled country data shows strong and consistent support for confidence in government as a determinant of legitimacy gaps for all IOs. In addition, our robustness checks indicate similarly broad support for satisfaction with the domestic political system, when this factor is taken on its own.

This broad support for the logic of domestic institutional trust remains largely intact in relation to each country separately. Evidence consistently validates this

explanation in four of the five countries. In Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, and Russia, elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy for all IOs (except the ICC in the Philippines) significantly relate to one or—as the robustness checks show—usually both indicators of domestic institutional trust. This consistency sets this logic apart from the other three explanations of the gap, for which support at the country level is more varied. The exception is the US, where we only observe a significant relationship for the World Bank. The US exception may relate to the contextual circumstance that, with a polarized two-party system, trust in national government is more deeply a function of left–right political values, particularly during our survey period, when Donald Trump was president.

Taken as a whole, these results suggest that elite–citizen differences in domestic institutional trust are a profound driver of gaps in their respective legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Thus, domestic institutional trust contributes not only to variation in citizen legitimacy beliefs (Chapter 7) and elite legitimacy beliefs (Chapter 8), but also to gaps between citizens and elites in their views of IOs. These results reinforce the explanatory power accorded to this factor in earlier chapters of this book, as well as previous analyses of public opinion toward IOs (e.g., Harteveld et al. 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020).

Evidence is substantial, albeit somewhat less consistent, for our expectation that elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs result from differences in their respective socioeconomic status. The pooled analysis of five countries together shows that elite–citizen divides with regard to education and financial satisfaction consistently contribute to differences in their legitimacy beliefs toward all six IOs.

However, the picture around socioeconomic status becomes less regular when we consider our five countries individually. Elite–citizen differences in level of education matter greatly for the legitimacy gap in the US, as well as for a few IOs in Brazil and Germany, but not at all in the Philippines and Russia. Elite–citizen differences in financial satisfaction contribute to the legitimacy gap in Brazil, the Philippines, and the US, particularly in relation to economic IOs. However, this factor barely figures in Germany, and not at all in Russia. Taking the two indicators together, socioeconomic status is strongly associated with elite–citizen gaps regarding IO legitimacy in the US, matters less consistently in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines, and appears wholly irrelevant in Russia. Corroboration of the socioeconomic explanation in the US reinforces earlier research that supports this logic in this country (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a). Overall, our results provide some backing for commonly made assertions that advantages in socioeconomic status make elites, as the winners of globalization, more positively disposed to IOs than citizens at large (Rodrik 2018).

Our analysis offers even more mixed support for political values as a driver of elite–citizen legitimacy gaps vis-à-vis IOs. The pooled analysis for five countries together presents variable evidence regarding both indicators: left–right and

GAL–TAN orientation. Somewhat paradoxically, the pooled analysis shows significant relationships between elite–citizen differences in left–right orientation and confidence gaps toward human security IOs but not economic IOs. However, the country-specific analyses show that this unexpected result regarding the IMF, World Bank, and WTO arises from combining relationships in the five countries that go in different directions for these organizations.

Evidence regarding political values varies even more when we look at the five countries individually. Dynamics around left–right orientation only shape the elite–citizen legitimacy gap in the expected way in the US (for all six IOs) and Germany (for two non-economic IOs, the ICC and the WHO). All other country findings show either no support for the expected association or support for the reverse relationship. In Russia, for example, elites who lean more to the right than citizens have *more* confidence than those citizens in the three economic IOs, as well as the UN. This reverse relationship also prevails for the three economic IOs in Germany, for the IMF and the World Bank in Brazil, and for the World Bank in the Philippines. Hence, left–right orientation matters for the elite–citizen gap in contrasting ways in the five countries, which could help explain the weak results in the pooled analysis.

Indeed, the main contrast in findings regarding left–right ideological orientation arises between the US and the four other countries. Only in the US do elites who position themselves more to the left than citizens consistently give IOs greater approval than those citizens. In the other four countries, elites who are more right leaning than citizens have more confidence in certain (usually economic) IOs than those citizens. This situation may reflect the distinctive ideological cleavage in the US concerning international cooperation. Democrats (more left leaning) generally embrace multilateralism more than Republicans (more right leaning).

Turning to country findings regarding the GAL–TAN axis of political values, our evidence only validates the expected relationship vis-à-vis the elite–citizen gap for some IOs in the US and Germany. Hence, support for the expected relationship is limited. Yet, if we accept that political values can matter in the opposite direction than we expected, then more evidence testifies to their importance. GAL–TAN differences between elites and citizens have inverse effects on the gap in their legitimacy beliefs toward the World Bank in the Philippines, as well as the three economic IOs in Brazil.

Finally, our investigation yields mixed results for geographical identification as a driver of the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy. The pooled analysis presents contrasting evidence for the two indicators. As anticipated, elite–citizen differences in global identification matter for corresponding legitimacy gaps toward all six IOs. However, differences in national identification only have a significant association with the elite–citizen legitimacy gap regarding the IMF.

Our findings with respect to geographical identification are quite heterogeneous across country contexts. Elite–citizen differences in global identification

appear to be a major driver of legitimacy gaps in the Philippines, Russia, and the US. In these three countries, elites who experience a greater sense of belonging to the world than citizens consistently accord more legitimacy to IOs. In contrast, little evidence from Brazil and Germany verifies this expected relationship. As for national identification, differences between elites and citizens regarding this factor associate significantly with the gap between their respective IO legitimacy beliefs in the case of three IOs in Russia and one in the Philippines. Especially in Russia, then, elites with a stronger national attachment than citizens have more negative legitimacy beliefs toward IOs than those citizens. In the US, meanwhile, and contrary to our expectation, elite–citizen differences in national identification relate positively to the gap in legitimacy beliefs toward the ICC, WHO, and WTO. Thus, an elite in the US who has a stronger national identification relative to a citizen tends to have *more* confidence in these three IOs relative to that citizen. As this result indicates, the relationship between geographical identification and IO legitimacy beliefs can be complex. In particular, our evidence shows that one cannot explain the IO legitimacy gap simply and neatly in terms of a divergence between cosmopolitan elites and nationalist publics.

Taking all four explanatory logics together, our analysis in this chapter suggests that the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy has several individual-level drivers. All of our four privileged accounts receive some notable empirical support. The greatest validation comes in respect of elites' and citizens' varying trust in domestic political institutions. In addition, individual-level factors related to socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identification have explanatory power in a variety of contexts.

Conclusion

What explains the gap between elite and citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs? While this divergence of opinion is much debated, systematic empirical research of the issue is in short supply. In this chapter, we have sought to provide a rigorous comparative investigation of possible drivers of this elite–citizen divide. Building on theory and data introduced in earlier chapters, we have offered a dyadic analysis of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. This approach has allowed us to examine whether differences between individual elites and individual citizens in key characteristics—socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust—contribute to gaps between their respective legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Our central findings are threefold. First, the legitimacy gap appears to result from systematic differences between elites and citizens with regard to all four individual-level characteristics. Second, the particular characteristics that carry

the most importance vary across organizational and country contexts: while elite–citizen differences regarding domestic institutional trust offer a key explanation in nearly all cases, elite–citizen differences in socioeconomic status and political values matter especially for economic IOs and in the US, while elite–citizen differences in geographical identification are particularly relevant in Russia. Third, these factors typically operate concurrently in explaining legitimacy gaps, such that elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy are not explained by a single driver.

These results suggest several broader observations. For one thing, they reinforce the general conclusion that our individual-level explanations have varying explanatory power across contexts. We observed this variation in the significance of factors in earlier chapters with regard to citizen legitimacy beliefs (especially across countries) and elite legitimacy beliefs (across both IOs and countries). We can now conclude that varying patterns of explanation also apply to the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Here, too, we observe significant differences in the relevance of our four logics across countries, as well as some differences across IOs, including certain particular contrasts between economic and human security IOs. This variation in explanatory power across contexts suggests that organizational and societal conditions shape how individual-level factors matter for legitimacy beliefs.

In addition, our findings in this chapter, as in Chapters 7 and 8, highlight how our four explanations often work concurrently. Elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs arise from several sources, rather than from a single driver. This multiplicity should come as no surprise: elites and citizens at large experience a variety of different life situations that could influence their respective legitimacy perceptions. Those differences are not limited to one realm, be it cultural, economic, political, or social. While much existing scholarship has placed contrasting explanations in competition with each other, our findings urge to focus instead on theoretical complementarities.

Finally, the findings of this chapter have implications for policy and practice. As discussed in earlier chapters, the elite–citizen legitimacy gap vis-à-vis IOs can have important implications: for international cooperation that needs popular approval; for representation and accountability in global governance; and for populist politics. We can use improved knowledge of what drives this gap to inform political strategies. This chapter's diagnosis of the importance of socioeconomics, values, identities, and trust predispositions can point to ways to reduce the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy beliefs. We expand on these broader implications in the next (and final) chapter of the book.

PART IV
CONCLUSION

10
Legitimacy and the Future of Global Governance

Recent decades have witnessed a major growth in both global governance and its contestation. While transboundary challenges have led to an expansion of the authority of IOs, the legitimacy of these organizations also appears increasingly questioned. Street protests against international economic institutions, state withdrawals from multiple IOs, and populist mobilization against international authority suggest that the legitimacy of global governance may be in dispute. Yet, whether this is the case and, if so, why, are questions that research to date has been unable to answer satisfactorily. Tackling these questions is imperative: whether people around the world regard IOs as legitimate matters not only for the normative standing of these governing bodies, but may also affect their capacity to solve the critical transboundary problems for which they were created.

This is the task we have set ourselves in this book. Guided by the question of to what extent and why citizens and elites regard global governance to be legitimate, we have sought to map and explain legitimacy beliefs around the world. Breaking with earlier research, our approach has been comparative—across countries, across organizations, and across the citizen–elite divide. The core of our inquiry has been two uniquely coordinated surveys of citizen and elite opinion toward six important IOs in five diverse countries, undertaken during 2017–19. These original data have allowed us to establish key patterns in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, but also to identify drivers of variation in such beliefs. Theoretically, we have advanced an individual-level approach that privileges the characteristics of citizens and elites, rather than organizational and societal factors, as the principal sources of variation in IO legitimacy beliefs.

The main conclusions of this book are threefold. First, there is a notable elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites on average hold moderately high levels of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, the general public overall holds medium levels. Second, individual-level differences in interests, values, identities, and trust predispositions are key drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as the gap between them. Third, patterns and sources of legitimacy beliefs vary across IOs, countries, and social categories, indicating that organizational and societal contexts condition attitudes toward global governance.

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Our results offer both good and bad news for global governance. On the one hand, the situation is not as grim as it is often portrayed in contemporary analyses of contestation and populism in global governance. IOs do not appear to suffer from a profound crisis of legitimacy and actually often hold up better than national governments in this respect. On the other hand, these lukewarm legitimacy beliefs do not provide a political impetus for expanding global governance to tackle urgent transnational problems. Instead, the elite–citizen gap suggests that governors need to address concerns that make citizens more skeptical of global governance, or else risk popular rejection of future international cooperation initiatives.

Our intentions in this concluding chapter are twofold. In the first part of the chapter, we summarize the findings of our empirical analysis on citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs. In the second part of the chapter, we spell out implications of the book's results, with a particular focus on lessons for empirical research on legitimacy beliefs, for theorizing sources of legitimacy beliefs, for democracy in global governance, and for the future of international cooperation.

Summary of the Findings

In the following, we first summarize our key descriptive findings and then turn to our main explanatory findings.

Patterns in IO Legitimacy

To what extent do citizens and elites perceive of IOs as legitimate? Is there an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance? In what ways do these legitimacy beliefs vary across IOs and countries? In the book, we have addressed these descriptive questions in three steps, mapping legitimacy beliefs toward IOs among citizens, among elites, and across both groups compared to each other (Chapters 3–5). Our analysis points to four key conclusions.

First, *IOs overall attract moderate legitimacy*. While citizens hold medium levels of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, elites hold moderately high levels. In neither case do the overall numbers suggest a deep legitimacy crisis for IOs or an upsurge of approval.

Citizen legitimacy beliefs in our five focal countries are positioned in the middle of our scale from no confidence at all to a great deal of confidence in IOs. This level mirrors legitimacy beliefs in a broader sample of 45 diverse countries, indicating that our smaller sample captures a general pattern in this respect. Average citizen legitimacy toward IOs also slightly exceeds their confidence in their respective national governments. Regarding different social groups of citizens, people who identify as upper class and as working class tend to regard IOs as respectively

more and less legitimate than other classes in between. Younger people tend to perceive of IOs as more legitimate, but the differences are small. Our data give no evidence to suggest a gender gap in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs among citizens.

Legitimacy beliefs toward IOs among elites are notably higher than those for citizens, but still moderate. While approaching a level of "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs, elites still fall far short of having "a great deal of confidence" in these global governance institutions. Yet, like citizens, elites tend to have somewhat more confidence in IOs than in their respective national governments. However, important differences in IO legitimacy beliefs appear across elite sectors. The legitimacy of IOs is strongest among bureaucratic elites, followed by research and business elites. IO legitimacy is weakest among civil society elites, whose confidence in IOs is lower than that of media and party elites. These differences are perhaps not so surprising, since IOs are regulatory agencies for which bureaucratic elites might have certain in-built sympathies, while greater skepticism goes with the watchdog role of civil society and media elites.

Second, *some IOs are regarded as more legitimate than others*. To speak of a blanket "global governance legitimacy" is an oversimplification. Both citizens and elites differentiate between IOs when evaluating their legitimacy—and oftentimes in very similar ways. Citizens on average accord the WHO most legitimacy, followed by the UN and the ICC in joint second place. The WTO ranks closely thereafter, followed by the World Bank. The IMF is seen as least legitimate. This sequence is largely replicated among elites, who give the WHO highest legitimacy, followed by the UN and the ICC in shared second place, and then the World Bank, WTO, and IMF in descending order.

These findings point to a notable divide between IOs based on issue area: IOs engaged in human security governance (ICC, UN, WHO) tend to obtain higher legitimacy than IOs engaged in economic governance (IMF, World Bank, WTO). This divide may partly reflect the pointed critique directed at these three economic IOs over the past half century from governments, civil society organizations, and academics (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). Conversely, the three human security IOs perhaps benefit from their focus on issues that find more approval—prosecuting war criminals, ensuring peace and security, and building global health. A different selection of economic and human security IOs could possibly yield different results in this respect.

These patterns remain largely intact when we examine the legitimacy of these IOs within individual countries. Citizens and elites in all five countries consider the WHO to be the most legitimate of our six focal IOs—by a considerable margin. The only exception is elites in Germany, who accord the ICC the most legitimacy. Likewise, citizens and elites in all five countries, with the exception of US elites, find the IMF to be the least legitimate IO. These findings tie in well with other research showing that public sentiment since the 1990s has been more negative toward the IMF than the World Bank and the WTO (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021).

Third, *IOs are perceived as more legitimate in some countries than in others*. There is no uniform picture of the legitimacy of IOs across the world. In our sample of five countries, citizens in the Philippines accord by far the highest average legitimacy to IOs, followed by citizens in Germany, the US, and Brazil, while citizens in Russia show, by a considerable margin, the greatest skepticism. The pattern among elites is slightly different, as political and societal leaders in Brazil and Germany find IOs on average more legitimate than elites in the Philippines, the US, and Russia (in that order). These patterns defy expectations that IOs would generally be regarded as more or less legitimate depending on the level of democracy and anti-globalist populism in a country.

Patterns of legitimacy by country vary still more when we consider attitudes toward specific IOs, reflecting countries' particular experiences and expectations with regard to certain organizations. In the case of the ICC, exceptionally strong approval among elites (and to some extent citizens) in Germany stands out from the general picture. With regard to the IMF and the World Bank, elites in the US have conspicuously higher legitimacy beliefs. In respect of the UN, elites (but not citizens) in Russia and the Philippines break the general mold by according this organization greater legitimacy than the other IOs (with the exception of the WHO).

The ways that the legitimacy of IOs compares to the legitimacy of the national government also varies across countries in interesting ways. In Brazil and the US, both citizens and elites perceive of all six IOs as more legitimate than their respective national governments. Conversely, citizens in the Philippines and (especially) Russia consider IOs to be less legitimate than their national government. These patterns may partly reflect domestic political situations, as Brazil and the US have experienced significant turmoil in recent years, potentially reducing confidence in the respective national governments compared to IOs.

Fourth, *a notable general elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs prevails vis-à-vis global governance*. Leaders in politics and society tend to regard IOs as more legitimate than the general public. Elites on average have close to "quite a lot of confidence" in IOs, while citizens on average are situated midway between having "not very much confidence" and having "quite a lot of confidence" in our selected IOs. Expressed in numbers, the surveyed elites on average position themselves 0.35 points higher than the surveyed citizens on our confidence scale from 0 to 3. This divergence between elite and citizen assessments holds for all six IOs, for four of the five countries, and for all six elite types. However, these elite–citizen divides are not limited to IOs, since a similar gap in average confidence prevails vis-à-vis national governments. These findings indicate that global as well as national arenas experience a cleavage in the legitimacy that elites and citizens accord to political institutions.

In terms of variation, the elite–citizen legitimacy gap is largest in respect of the WHO, followed by the UN and the ICC. The gap is smaller with regard to

the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. While this differing size of legitimacy gaps between IOs is significant, markedly greater variation is observed across countries. The elite–citizen gap is largest in Brazil, followed by Russia, Germany, and the US. In the Philippines, the gap is actually inverted, as citizens in this country on average consider IOs more legitimate than elites (although a further breakdown shows this reverse gap to apply only to the economic IOs). In addition, the size of the gap varies across different elite sectors. The gap with citizens is larger for bureaucratic, research, and business elites and smaller for media, political-party, and civil society elites and citizens. This pattern may not be so surprising, as civil society organizations channel citizen engagement, and political parties have a representational function, while government bureaucracy, research, and business are construed to be largely independent of the vagaries of public opinion.

Our evidence further shows that elites generally underestimate the extent of their gap with citizens regarding legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. In most contexts, leaders in politics and society are aware that citizens on average hold less confidence in global governance than elites. However, the elites usually assume that the gap is smaller than it actually is.

Drivers of IO Legitimacy

Turning from description to explanation, this book has advanced an individual-level approach that emphasizes people's socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust as central to legitimacy beliefs. Yet to what extent are such individual-level drivers helpful in explaining variation in IO legitimacy beliefs? And in what ways do organizational and country context condition the explanatory power of individual-level factors? We have addressed these explanatory questions in three steps: first analyzing variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens, then among elites, and finally in the gap between citizens and elites (Chapters 7–9). Our analysis points to four main conclusions.

First, *individual-level drivers are key to explaining IO legitimacy beliefs*. Across all three analyses, we find substantial support for our four theorized individual-level drivers of legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that the legitimacy beliefs of citizens and elites toward global governance are largely shaped by the same set of individual-level factors, and that variation between these two groups in their attitudes toward IOs can be attributed to systematic differences in socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identities, and trust dispositions.

Among the potentially alternative explanations we also explore, we find almost no evidence that gender might be related to legitimacy beliefs among both citizens and elites, and the evidence is weak that gender differences drive the elite–citizen legitimacy gap. This indicates that legitimacy perceptions toward global

governance are not part of the gendered structure of politics. Age divides matter in the citizen sample, in that younger citizens are more likely to hold higher opinions of IO legitimacy than older citizens, while the same relationship does not appear among elites. Age has only limited power in explaining the gap. Elites and citizens trusting people in general also have more trust in IOs, but this relationship is only found in some contexts. There is some evidence that social trust differences between elites and citizens explain the elite–citizen gap. Finally, we observe that citizens' and elites' levels of knowledge about global governance are not systematic predictors of their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs or the gap in legitimacy beliefs between these two groups. However, elites' political experience and policy orientation matter in some contexts.

Second, *domestic institutional trust is a crucial source of IO legitimacy beliefs*. Across all three analyses, domestic institutional trust stands out as the foremost explanation of IO legitimacy beliefs. Our analysis of citizen legitimacy beliefs shows that people's trust in domestic political institutions is consistently related to their perceptions of IO legitimacy. Similarly, domestic institutional trust offers broad explanatory power regarding elite legitimacy beliefs in all countries except Russia and the US. Finally, differences between elites and citizens in their levels of domestic institutional trust provide the main explanation of corresponding gaps in legitimacy beliefs.

This finding ties in well with earlier research that identified a link between domestic and international legitimacy beliefs (Harteveld et al. 2013; Voeten 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Persson et al. 2019; for an overview, see Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Our results support a view of this positive relationship as an empirical regularity of unusual stability and strength in the study of global governance. By the same token, the results help dispel any suspicion that domestic and international legitimacy beliefs could be negatively related instead, as people seek refuge in IOs from poorly functioning national institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Muñoz et al. 2011), or judge IOs more harshly when satisfied with national institutions (De Vries 2018).

It is an important knock-on question why domestic institutional trust is so central for IO legitimacy. While our research was not set up to examine this question systematically, we used our data to explore the potential mechanisms behind this relationship. We find some support for the idea that this relationship reflects a reliance on heuristics, as people use their trust in domestic institutions as a cognitive shortcut to opinions about international institutions they know less well (Armingeon and Ceka 2014). As expected, the relationship between domestic institutional trust and IO legitimacy beliefs is stronger among citizens who know less about global governance. In contrast, we find no such pattern among elites. In addition, we examined whether the relationship between domestic institutional trust and IO legitimacy beliefs could be driven by a common antecedent

factor—social trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). We do not find support for this expectation.

Third, *interests, identities, and values provide complementary explanatory power*. While domestic institutional trust is important, it is not the sole individual-level driver of IO legitimacy beliefs. Our analyses show that socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identities, too, help to explain variation in legitimacy beliefs among citizens and elites. While these accounts have less systematic explanatory power, there are specific country and IO contexts in which interests, values, or identities are particularly central and sometimes present the foremost explanations. These findings suggest that our four individual-level drivers are complementary rather than competing in accounting for IO legitimacy beliefs.

Socioeconomic status receives some support as a driver of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. The evidence for this logic is particularly strong in the US. The analysis of both citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs shows that people who are more satisfied with their financial situation conceive of IOs as more legitimate in several contexts. Education matters less broadly for citizen and elite opinions toward IOs. When we analyze the drivers behind elite–citizen gaps in IO legitimacy beliefs, differences between elites and citizens in both education and financial satisfaction are predictors. Overall, these findings lend some support to previous research that emphasizes socioeconomic sources of international attitudes (e.g., Gabel 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Rodrik 2018; Bearce and Joliff Scott 2019).

Geographical identification, too, emerges as an explanation of IO legitimacy beliefs. Both the citizen analysis and the elite analysis show that people with a stronger global identification perceive of IO legitimacy in more positive terms in some contexts, especially Russia and the US. In addition, differences in global identification help to explain the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy beliefs. The evidence with respect to national identification is more mixed. While elites with a stronger national identification are more skeptical of IOs, as expected, we do not find the same relationship in the citizen analysis and the elite–citizen gap analysis. Taken together, these findings partly buttress expectations in existing research that people's identification with varying levels of governance shapes their attitudes toward IOs (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Verhaegen et al. 2018; Clark and Rohrschneider 2019).

Political values receive mixed support as well. We explored whether citizens and elites who hold more left-wing and GAL-oriented values have higher IO legitimacy beliefs. We find support for this expectation in the citizen analysis, as well as in the analysis of elite–citizen gaps. However, these results are primarily driven by the US samples. The elite analysis presents a more complex picture of how political values matter, showing that left-leaning and GAL-oriented elites, contrary to our expectation, consider (especially economic) IOs less legitimate in some contexts. In all, our research gives more qualified support to the widespread expectation

that political values shape attitudes toward global governance (Noël and Thérien 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021).

Fourth, *organizational and country contexts condition explanatory power*. An examination of the explanatory power of these four sets of individual-level drivers across IOs and countries shows them to be of varying importance in different contexts. These findings suggest that these individual-level drivers have comparative strengths in explaining IO legitimacy beliefs, but also that organizational- and societal-level factors affect their applicability.

With respect to organizations, our research points to some variation in explanatory power based on whether IOs engage in human security or economic governance, broadly conceived. This is a distinct pattern in the analysis of elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as in the analysis of the elite–citizen gap, while the issue orientation of IOs does not seem to matter in the citizen analysis. The issue focus of IOs shapes the explanatory power of political values, both with respect to left–right and GAL–TAN orientation. Simplifying slightly, right-leaning and TAN-oriented people tend to have more confidence in economic IOs, while left-leaning and GAL-oriented people tend to have more confidence in human security IOs. These findings suggest that the social purpose of IOs evokes ideological sentiments that shape people's perceptions of these organizations. In addition, there is some evidence that socioeconomic status and geographical identification have greater explanatory power in relation to economic IOs compared to human security IOs. Domestic institutional trust is an equally powerful explanation across all IOs.

With respect to countries, several differences in legitimacy drivers stand out. Socioeconomic status is a particularly powerful explanation in the US context, where it helps to account for variation in citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as the gap between them. In contrast, in Russia, socioeconomic status does not appear to matter at all for IO legitimacy beliefs. Political values are particularly important for IO legitimacy beliefs in the US. Geographical identification is an especially prominent explanation of IO legitimacy beliefs in both Russia and the US. Finally, domestic institutional trust has widest significance, with relevance in all country contexts, albeit more comprehensively in Brazil, Germany, and the Philippines than in Russia and the US.

Broader Implications

Our findings regarding citizens, elites, and the legitimacy of global governance speak to four broader issues: lessons for empirical research on legitimacy beliefs; sources of legitimacy beliefs; democracy in global governance; and the future of global governance.

Empirical Research on Legitimacy Beliefs

This book represents an effort to empirically describe and explain the legitimacy beliefs of citizens and elites toward global governance. As indicated in Chapter 2, legitimacy beliefs are commonly seen as a complex and elusive phenomenon that defies empirical identification. In the study of world politics, legitimacy beliefs are less readily observable than phenomena such as wars, treaties, and organizations, which presents a particular challenge for empirical research. So, what can we learn from our study's attempt to empirically measure and explain legitimacy beliefs toward global governance?

Research of the past decade has deployed several approaches to make legitimacy beliefs empirically accessible (Schmidtke and Schneider 2012; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Some have sought to measure legitimacy beliefs based on surveys and survey experiments (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009; Johnson 2011; Anderson et al. 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021). Others have sought to capture legitimacy beliefs with data on political communication, such as news media, social media, and parliamentary debates (e.g., Binder and Heupel 2015; Schmidtke 2019; Tokhi 2019; Rauh and Zürn 2020; Ghassim 2022; Sommerer et al. 2022). Yet others have identified levels of legitimacy with data on political behavior, such as patterns of participation and protest (e.g., Velasco-Guachalla et al. 2021; Sommerer et al. 2022).

Our study has pursued a unique strategy of coordinated citizen and elite surveys. This approach has had predominantly positive results. We see that global survey data offer great rewards in terms of directly comparable micro and macro evidence that covers multiple countries and social sectors in relation to multiple IOs. Relying on a scale of confidence as our indicator, we have been able to obtain large-*n* measures of legitimacy beliefs and to observe broad patterns of IO legitimacy. The use of standardized questions across surveys has also allowed us to assess the explanatory power of the same set of individual-level factors in relation to citizens and elites in diverse settings, while the comparative orientation of the study has made it possible to capture the influence of IO, country, and social context.

However, our use of coordinated and comparative surveys for studying legitimacy beliefs has also involved methodological challenges. Some of these difficulties are unavoidable and mainly call for awareness. Other problems can hopefully be resolved through future innovations in research design. Four methodological challenges merit particular attention.

A first concerns translation. However much care is put into translating standardized surveys, respondents may nevertheless interpret survey questions differently across contexts. Sometimes, linguistic terms with the exact same semantic meaning as the original survey text do not exist; other times, such words exist, but are interpreted differently by respondents because of cultural and

political context (Dahlberg et al. 2020). Next to efforts to achieve greater commensurability of survey questions, researchers should recognize that contextual knowledge is necessary in order to more fully interpret recorded quantitative patterns.

Second, the requirement that people must be sufficiently aware of an institution in order to hold legitimacy beliefs toward it effectively limits survey research on legitimacy in global governance to a set of well-known IOs. Moving beyond this sample of well-known IOs would involve less developed opinions, more "don't know" responses, and potentially less valid survey results. One strategy for addressing this challenge, pursued in Chapter 4 of this book, is to exploit elites' greater awareness of global governance compared to citizens at large in order to map legitimacy beliefs toward a broader array of institutions, also including transnational hybrid institutions, transnational private arrangements, and transgovernmental networks (see also Tallberg 2021). Yet, as seen in Chapter 4, even elites have considerably less awareness of these new types of global governance institutions. Another strategy to widen the range of institutions covered is to use other measures of legitimacy beliefs, such as media data (Sommerer et al. 2022). Yet this strategy raises questions about biases in media reporting and does not permit an assessment of individual-level sources of legitimacy beliefs.

A third methodological challenge pertains specifically to the surveying of elites. Since exhaustive lists of political and societal leaders in countries do not exist, identifying relevant organizations and individuals requires extensive knowledge about each country. Moreover, once a selection of prospective interviewees is compiled, elites can be particularly hard to access. Gatekeepers often shield their bosses from distractions. Some organizations also prohibit their personnel from responding to surveys in a professional capacity. We experienced such difficulties particularly in relation to party, business, and media elites. Once access *is* obtained, elites can be impatient with standardized survey questions, preferring to detail their specific personal experiences. We therefore learned to work imaginatively through multiple channels to reach elites and to accept that this process takes longer than expected. Working with partners who have knowledge of local networks and customs also proved essential for the elite survey.

Finally, the paucity of systematic time-series data limits survey research into the over-time development of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While the WVS is a tremendous resource, previous waves only covered the UN as a global IO, and each wave has covered a different set of countries (Dellmuth 2018; Haerpfer et al. 2021). Regional surveys like the Eurobarometer can offer longer time series, but each only covers a single (regional) IO. Thus, a high priority for future research is to invest in regular and consistent surveys of attitudes toward a given set of IOs in a given group of countries, thereby generating data to identify over-time trends in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance.

Theorizing Sources of Legitimacy Beliefs

Our findings also have broader implications for theory on the sources of legitimacy in global governance, and indeed politics generally. As noted in Chapter 1, previous scholarship has tended to adopt alternative ontological approaches to the forces that shape legitimacy beliefs. Some studies develop individual-level explanations, others organizational-level explanations, others societal-level explanations, and others process-oriented explanations. Research at each of these levels then tends to assess competing expectations within that approach (Tallberg et al. 2018). Our findings suggest four observations regarding "levels" for consideration in future research.

First, by highlighting the complementarity of different individual-level explanations, our results suggest that existing literature sets up false debates when it presents these accounts as competing. For instance, research in international relations typically speaks of economic versus non-economic sources of public opinion about international policies and institutions (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Rho and Tomz 2017). Scholarship in comparative politics conventionally pits cultural and economic explanations of anti-globalist populism against each other (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Rodrik 2018). Literature on public opinion toward the EU usually contrasts three main explanations—utilitarian calculation, social identification, and elite cueing—which build on alternative ontological assumptions about individuals (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and De Vries 2016). In contrast, our findings emphasize the substantial benefits of an integrated perspective that recognizes the complementarities of these factors.

Second, our results underline the interplay between individual-, organizational-, and societal-level factors in generating legitimacy beliefs. On the one hand, our findings suggest that people's individual circumstances shape IO legitimacy beliefs more than research in this field (with its predominance of organizational-level accounts) has generally recognized (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020). On the other hand, our findings also stress that individual-level drivers do not stand alone, being shaped by the surrounding organizational and societal contexts. A key challenge for future research is to devise research designs that allow us to explore the interrelation of factors across these three levels of analysis.

Third, while wide-ranging and integrative, this book has bracketed the fourth approach: namely, process-oriented explanations of legitimacy in global governance. Such accounts theorize that legitimacy beliefs are formed in dynamic exchanges between individuals. In this vein, some studies examine how elites seek to shape citizen opinion toward IOs through legitimation and delegitimation (Zaum 2013; Dingwerth et al. 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021; Bexell et al.

2022). Other studies explore the reverse relationship: how citizen opinion shapes the positions that political elites take in international fora (Schneider 2019). Yet other studies seek to untangle the mutual interplay between citizen and elite opinion on international cooperation (Steenbergen et al. 2007; Hellström 2008). Some recent research moves away from examining vertical processes between elites and citizens to study how citizens influence each other's attitudes in horizontal peer processes (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). While we found it prohibitively complicated to also integrate a process perspective into our theory and research design, we recognize that such dynamics are at play in the formation of legitimacy beliefs and regard it as a promising area of future research, particularly with comparative designs.

Fourth, our findings speak to drivers of legitimacy beliefs in politics generally. Since 1990s observations of declining trust in domestic governing institutions, comparative politics has devoted considerable attention to the patterns and sources of legitimacy (e.g., Norris 1999, 2011; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Hetherington 2005; Booth and Seligson 2009; for an overview, see Citrin and Stoker 2018). Recently, the rise of authoritarian populism has renewed attention to this issue (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Explanations of legitimacy beliefs in this literature typically cover the same broad approaches that we discuss in this book, but with an emphasis on organizational-level explanations invoking features of political institutions. In addition, explanations often extend to aspects which are particular to the domestic setting, such as political polarization and party cueing. One overview of this literature distinguishes between explanations pertaining to performance, processes, probity, priming, and polarization (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), while another refers to foci on persona, policy, performance, partisanship, and process (Citrin and Stoker 2018).

Our research offers three observations regarding this literature. To begin with, some drivers appear to be of particular relevance for attitudes toward IOs, notably, geographical identification. While varying identification with multiple levels of governance has been shown to also matter in the domestic context within federal political systems (Verhaegen et al. 2018), this dynamic is likely reinforced when regional and global layers of governance are added, and cosmopolitan versus national identity dynamics come to the fore. Another observation pertains to the link between domestic and international legitimacy beliefs. Our research shows how the very phenomenon that comparativists study—trust in domestic political institutions—is a key determinant of legitimacy perceptions toward international governance institutions. The domestic setting therefore feeds into the international setting, and explanations which are central to comparative politics merit more systematic attention in international relations. In particular, we see a need for research that examines the role of partisanship, polarization, and party cues in relation to IO legitimacy.

Democracy in Global Governance

Our findings also have implications for scholarship on democracy in global governance, including issues of representation, accountability, and populism. The past two decades have witnessed an intense normative debate on the democratic credentials of IOs (e.g., Dahl 1999; Scharpf 1999; Moravcsik 2004; Scholte 2011; Archibugi et al. 2012). While this debate has focused mainly on institutional conditions for democracy in global governance, our research offers important insights into attitudinal aspects of democratic governing. Four particular points arise in this regard.

First, the overall medium levels of citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs that emerge from our study are insufficiently strong to boost the democratic credentials of global governance. On the contrary, particularly in contexts where average opinion leans toward "not very much confidence," democracy in global governance could be undermined. While legitimacy alone is not enough for a political institution to qualify as democratic, being seen by subjects to govern legitimately strengthens claims to democracy (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998). Thus, regarding the EU, flailing public opinion, low participation in European elections, and negative referendum outcomes are often presented as indications of a democratic deficit. While it is problematic to determine normatively how much legitimacy a governance institution needs to qualify as democratic, levels of legitimacy can be telling. It hardly boosts the democratic credentials of IOs that citizens overall are lukewarm about their legitimacy. Yet neither are levels of IO legitimacy so weak as to undercut all claims to democratic anchoring. After all, national governments in the democratic countries that we have studied often attract even lower legitimacy beliefs than IOs, but people still generally see them as having basic democratic foundations. The larger takeaway is that both domestic and international institutions today struggle with the legitimacy component of democracy.

Second, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs that our research identifies suggests that global governance may confront problems of political representation. If we adopt a normative theory of substantive representation, then it is crucial for democracy that elites act in the interests of citizens (Pitkin 1967; Achen 1978). In the contemporary global arena, the "governing elites" arguably go beyond elected politicians as much global governance involves rule-making by bureaucrats, business, civil society, and researchers who operate outside of party politics. Indeed, some of these actors outside party politics even explicitly claim to "represent" (i.e., speak, act, and stand for) citizens at large (Warren and Castiglione 2004; Dovi 2018).

In this light, it is troubling that the elites who govern globally accord notably more legitimacy to IOs than citizens at large. While this gap is particularly large

for non-elected elites, it also extends to political-party elites. Just how objectionable this situation is from the perspective of substantive representation depends on whether elites govern based on their own attitudes or whether they recognize the divergent views of citizens at large and adjust policies accordingly. On an optimistic reading, our findings indicate that elites tend to be aware of the lower levels of IO legitimacy among citizens. Moreover, some recent research in the European context suggests that elites can be quite responsive to citizen views on international cooperation (Schneider 2019). However, on a pessimistic reading, our findings indicate that elites tend to underestimate the extent of their distance from citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Hence, even if elites would revise policies to meet (what they perceive to be) citizen assessments, the adjustment could still fall short of actual representation.

Third, looking beyond representation to broader questions of democratic accountability, our findings can reinforce widely voiced normative concerns that ruling circles in global governance do not sufficiently answer to affected people. Effective democracy entails that subjects have adequate opportunities to observe, participate in, evaluate, and control the governing powers in their society. If rulers have different perspectives than the ruled, and citizens lack adequate means to compel governors to respond to public will, then a significant shortfall of democratic accountability exists.

Certainly, many IOs and transnational governance institutions have over the past several decades pursued notable initiatives to improve their accountability channels, but on the whole these mechanisms remain weak, especially vis-à-vis the general public. Most of the measures for greater transparency, consultation, evaluation, and redress mainly seek to engage business, civil society, and research elites rather than the wider citizenry. That global governance accountability, inasmuch as it exists, mostly focuses on elites and less addresses the general public is already objectionable on democratic principle. Yet the situation becomes all the more normatively problematic if those elites have evaluations of global governance that diverge significantly from the views of citizens at large. Under these circumstances, accountability to elites is not a proxy for accountability to the public as a whole. To the extent that citizens perceive themselves disempowered in this way, discontent with and even open resistance to global governance can increase. Street demonstrations against various IOs may reflect such a dynamic.

Fourth, building on the last point about citizen disquiet, our findings shed light on the emergence of anti-globalist populism as a political movement in democratic societies. Research on this subject highlights how the success of populist parties depends on demand for their positions, rooted in economic and cultural change, as well as a supply of these positions by populist entrepreneurs who spot the electoral potential (Inglehart and Norris 2017; De Vries et al. 2021). Our findings suggest why some citizens are more skeptical toward IOs and why populists find it profitable to target IOs controlled by "out of touch" elites. Legitimacy beliefs

toward IOs are particularly low in the parts of the population that are economically less advantaged, hold more right-wing or authoritarian ideologies, have less globally oriented identities, and have less trust in domestic political institutions. When challenging the legitimacy of IOs, populists thus tap into a range of individual-level circumstances of many citizens. Sympathizers might argue that anti-globalist populists are democratic saviors who understand the broader population and represent their discontents. Yet critics cogently counter that anti-globalist populists tend to exploit gaps between citizens and elites, rather than mend them, and further undermine trust in political institutions, rather than repair it (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Grzymala-Busse et al. 2020).

The Future of Global Governance

Finally, the results of our study shed light on opportunities and constraints in the future development of global governance. Collaboration at a global level is necessary to address a range of transnational challenges, from climate change, disease outbreak, and financial instability to trade protectionism, arms proliferation, and violent conflict. We may debate the desirable extent and form of global policy, but we cannot deny the need for it. What role can legitimacy play in facilitating and steering global governance toward enhanced global public goods?

Exactly how pivotal legitimacy is for the effectiveness of global governance is not evident. A rich literature in law, political science, psychology, and sociology suggests that legitimacy is a crucial resource for governance, enhancing operations, stability, and compliance (Franck 1990; Tyler 1990; Dahl and Lindblom 1992; Suchman 1995). It is also a strong expectation in earlier scholarship in international relations that legitimacy is a particularly important feature of IOs, which rely on the benevolence of states and seldom have access to means of coercion (Hurd 1999; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). At the same time, recent empirical inquiries into the consequences of legitimacy crises for IOs yield mixed findings (Sommerer et al. 2022). Yet, assuming that legitimacy among citizens and elites, on balance, is positive for IOs, our findings suggest two conclusions about the future of global governance.

First, current overall levels of legitimacy for IOs neither suggest a crisis for global governance nor a readiness for expansion. With varying shades of moderate backing among citizens and elites, IOs appear to have sufficient legitimacy to continue their current functions. Our elite and public opinion data provide no obvious evidence of a legitimacy crisis for IOs in general—not even when compared to the levels of support that were enjoyed in the past. Existing analyses of over-time patterns in attitudes toward, and contestation of, global governance do not provide evidence of a consistent downturn (Tallberg 2021; Walter 2021; Sommerer et al. 2022; Dellmuth and Tallberg forthcoming). Yet neither do the generally lukewarm

legitimacy beliefs toward IOs among citizens and elites offer a political foundation for significantly expanding the authority of global governance. While humanity today may need stronger and more intrusive global institutions to tackle planetary-scale problems most effectively, popular support for such an expansion is currently lacking. A scenario of "muddling through" therefore currently appears to be the most likely forward trajectory.

Yet the picture is not uniform. Global governance enjoys significantly higher legitimacy among citizens and elites in some policy areas than in others. For example, as elaborated in other chapters, the WHO has attracted notably high levels of legitimacy among citizens and elites both prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pew Research Center 2020a). At the other end of the spectrum, the IMF faces substantial legitimacy challenges in many quarters, in spite of considerable adjustments to its policies. Similarly, global governance enjoys greater backing in some key countries than in others. Citizens and elites in Germany and the Philippines are generally much more positive toward IOs than their counterparts in Russia and the US. Importantly, these patterns defy simplified divisions of countries into established and emerging powers (Tallberg and Verhaegen 2020).

Second, the elite–citizen gap presents a particular challenge for global governance going forward. International cooperation has often been portrayed as a two-level game, in which state elites have to navigate the simultaneous demands of international counterparts and domestic constituencies (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1993; Martin 2000). From this perspective, if domestic constituencies support international cooperation, state leaders can more readily pursue ambitious policy goals, secure treaty ratifications, and ensure compliance with new rules. Yet many international initiatives have failed or never been launched because of insufficient popular support. Prominent cases include the International Trade Organization in the 1940s, the New International Economic Order in the 1970s, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the 1990s, and the Global Compact for Migration in the 2010s. While our data do not allow us to put the elite–citizen gap in a historical perspective, the size and consistency of this cleavage in our study raises obvious questions about the viability of elite-driven international cooperation.

What strategies are available to activists and policymakers concerned about the elite–citizen gap and its potential negative implications for the future of global governance? We close by outlining four complementary policy strategies. A first strategy is to bolster those features of global governance institutions that strengthen citizen legitimacy beliefs toward these organizations. A number of studies have pointed to the positive effects on popular legitimacy of institutional arrangements that are perceived as democratic, effective, and fair (Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020; Verhaegen et al. 2021). A second option is for proponents to speak up for global governance against those who contest it. The legitimacy of global governance is a discursive battlefield between those who seek to promote these arrangements through legitimation and

those who attack these organizations through delegitimation (Zürn 2018; Bexell et al. 2022). At present, it is the voices of discontent that dominate both news and social media (Schmidtke 2019) and more easily get through to citizens (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021; Ghassim 2022). Third, elites may navigate around the constraints on global governance posed by public opinion. Advancing global governance through soft law, private governance, transgovernmental networks, or other means that are less reliant on public endorsement can weaken the constraints posed by low public support. Yet the democratic implications and long-term consequences of this option are problematic. Finally, a fourth strategy is to address the gaps in lived experiences that, as our study shows, are an important cause of divergent citizen and elite perspectives on global governance. This task is by no means simple: socioeconomic conditions, political values, identity constructions, and trust predispositions often change slowly and are difficult to affect. But to the extent that political measures reduce inequalities, bolster cooperative values, nurture feelings of global belonging, and strengthen confidence in political institutions, they can have significant positive implications for popular support of global governance.

Appendices

A. Survey Question Wording and Coding
B. Descriptive Statistics Citizens and Elites (Chapters 7, 8, 9)
C. Pearson's Correlation Independent Variables in WVS7 (Chapter 7)
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APPENDIX A

Survey Question Wording and Coding

Variable	Question wording and coding of response options
Confidence in IOs	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? *(coded ranging from 3 to 0)*
Confidence in government	UN; IMF; ICC; WB; WHO; WTO The government
Education	What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 0 Early childhood education (ISCED 0)/no education 1 Primary education (ISCED 1) 2 Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 3 Upper secondary education (ISCED 3) 4 Postsecondary nontertiary education (ISCED 4) 5 Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5) 6 Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6) 7 Master or equivalent (ISCED 7) 8 Doctoral or equivalent (ISCED 8)

Variable	Question wording and coding of response options
Financial satisfaction	How satisfied are you with the economic situation of [your country]? You can choose a number between 1: completely dissatisfied, and 10: completely satisfied. *(recoded ranging from 0 to 9)*
Left–right orientation	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (10-point scale ranging from 1—left; 10—right) *(recoded ranging from 0 to 9)*
GAL–TAN	A dummy variable is created based on the sum of following variables: - Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. You can choose a number between 1: never justifiable, and 10: always justifiable. *(recoded ranging from 0 to 9)* Homosexuality; Abortion; Divorce; Sex before marriage - Now we would like to know your opinion about the people from other countries who come to live in [your country]—the immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of these people on the development of [your country]? 5-Very good, 4-Quite good, 3-Neither good-nor bad, 2-Quite bad, 1-Very bad *(recoded ranging from 4 to 0)* People sometimes talk about what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. I will list four of the goals which different people would give top priority. - If you had to choose, which one of the things would you say is most important? Maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, fighting rising prices, or protecting freedom of speech? - And which would be the next most important? Respondents who responded "Maintaining order in the nation" as first or second priority received code 0, all others code 1. *(In the sum scale, ethical values, attitudes about immigration, and importance of maintaining order in the nation weigh in equally. All respondents who score lower than the mean receive code "0," referring to a mainly TAN orientation, respondents scoring higher than the mean receive code "1," referring to a GAL orientation.)*

Geographical identification Global identification; National identification	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. How close do you feel to …? (Very Close; close; Not very close; Not close at all) *(coded ranging from 3 to 0)* The world; [Country]
Political satisfaction	On a scale from 1 to 10 where "1" is "not satisfied at all" and "10" is "completely satisfied," how satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days? *(recoded ranging from 0 to 9)*
Age	Year of survey minus respondents' birth year
Gender	Respondent's sex
Social trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted *(coded as 1)*, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people *(coded as 0)*?
Knowledge about global governance	Here are some questions about international organizations. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but if you do please tell me. - Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India - Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva - Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments *(Each item coded as 1 (correct) versus 0 (incorrect or "don't know"), and then added in an index ranging from 0 to 3.)*
Experience with IOs (only in elite survey)	How much experience do you have interacting with the following international organizations? Do you have no experience at all, little experience, quite some experience or a lot of experience? *(coded ranging from 0 to 3)* UN; IMF; ICC; WB; WHO; WTO

Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

APPENDIX B

Descriptive Statistics Citizens and Elites (Chapters 7, 8, 9)

Variable	Citizens	Elites
Confidence		
…IOs	1.375 (0.704)	1.780 (0.567)
…ICC	1.370 (0.856)	1.863 (0.864)
…IMF	1.190 (0.833)	1.536 (0.806)
…UN	1.399 (0.895)	1.887 (0.725)
…WB	1.256 (0.873)	1.673 (0.841)
…WHO	1.633 (0.877)	2.168 (0.746)
…WTO	1.347 (0.832)	1.597 (0.813)
Confidence in government	1.289 (0.968)	1.672 (0.813)
Education	3.975 (2.033)	7.042 (0.784)
	0 Early childhood or no education 1 Primary 2 Lower secondary 3 Upper secondary 4 Postsecondary nontertiary 5 Short-cycle tertiary 6 Bachelor or equivalent 7 Master or equivalent 8 Doctoral or equivalent	0 Early childhood or no education: 0% 1 Primary: 0% 2 Lower secondary: 0% 3 Upper secondary: 0% 4 Postsecondary nontertiary: 1% 5 Short-cycle tertiary: 1% 6 Bachelor or equivalent: 16% 7 Master or equivalent: 55% 8 Doctoral or equivalent: 27%
Financial satisfaction	5.181 (2.476)	5.964 (2.089)
Left–right orientation	4.530 (2.437)	3.676 (1.893)
GAL–TAN	GAL: 45% TAN: 55%	GAL: 51% TAN: 49%
Global identification	1.428 (0.941)	1.911 (0.828)
National identification	2.039 (0.837)	2.433 (0.696)
Political satisfaction	3.850 (2.732)	3.383 (2.536)
Age	45.16 (17.18)	50.032 (12.221)

Continued

Variable	Citizens	Elites
Gender	Female: 52% Male: 48%	Female/nonbinary: 32% Male: 68%
Social trust	Can be trusted: 26% Can't be too careful: 74%	Can be trusted: 64% Can't be too careful: 36%
Knowledge about global governance*	1.260 (1.023)	2.526 (0.681)
Experience with IOs	/	IOs pooled: 0.773 (0.593) ICC: 0.285 (0.598) IMF: 0.595 (0.835) UN: 1.383 (1.033) WB: 0.936 (0.998) WHO: 0.725 (0.852) WTO: 0.697 (0.928)
Issue area	/	Economics: 26% Human security: 20% Sustainable development: 22% Generalist: 32%
Orientation	/	Subnational: 8% National: 58% International: 34%

Note: Entries are means with standard deviations in parentheses, or proportion of respondents in each response category. * Knowledge about global governance is an additive index based on three items coded as 1 if correct answer and 0 if otherwise (both incorrect and "don't know"). No weights are used.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

APPENDIX C

Pearson's Correlation Independent Variables in WVS7 (Chapter 7)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
1. Education	1.000											
2. Financial satisfaction	0.062***	1.000										
3. Left–right orientation	−0.107***	0.028*	1.000									
4. GAL (vs. TAN)	0.154***	0.044***	−0.245***	1.000								
5. Global identification	−0.022*	0.141***	0.014	0.095***	1.000							
6. National identification	−0.032**	0.115***	0.152***	−0.053***	0.380***	1.000						
7. Confidence in government	−0.055***	0.121***	0.259***	−0.167***	0.142***	0.277***	1.000					
8. Political satisfaction	−0.045***	0.169***	0.176***	−0.029*	0.165***	0.273***	0.465***	1.000				
9. Age	−0.095***	0.052***	0.063***	−0.107***	0.013	0.175***	0.070***	0.057***	1.000			
10. Male (vs. female)	0.055***	0.044***	0.026*	−0.001	−0.002	0.044***	0.008	0.007	0.035***	1.000		
11. Social trust	0.265***	0.136***	−0.115***	0.195***	0.077***	0.086***	0.069***	0.149***	0.042***	0.058***	1.000	
12. Knowledge about global governance	0.223***	0.093***	−0.074***	0.162***	0.130***	0.083***	0.042***	0.084***	−0.029**	0.111***	0.156***	1.000

Note: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7.

APPENDIX D

Pearson's Correlation Independent Variables in LegGov Elite Survey (Chapter 8)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
1. Education	1.000											
2. Financial satisfaction	0.173***	1.000										
3. Left–right orientation	−0.043	0.082*	1.000									
4. GAL (vs. TAN)	0.075	−0.060	−0.361***	1.000								
5. Global identification	0.107*	0.192***	−0.155***	0.193***	1.000							
6. National identification	0.018	0.093*	0.057	−0.102*	0.146***	1.000						
7. Confidence in government	0.048	0.241***	0.147***	−0.162**	0.096*	0.189***	1.000					
8. Political satisfaction	0.135	0.286***	0.180***	−0.199***	0.119**	0.117**	0.539***	1.000				
9. Age	0.148***	0.076	0.014	−0.016	0.053	0.098*	−0.089*	−0.011	1.000			
10. Male (vs. female)	0.011	−0.059	0.055	0.049	−0.011	0.081*	−0.009	−0.069	0.064	1.000		
11. Social trust	0.151***	0.215***	−0.092*	0.049	0.197***	0.054	0.112**	0.241***	0.097*	−0.063	1.000	
12. Knowledge about global governance	0.046	0.077	−0.025	0.142***	0.217***	0.064	0.027	0.018	−0.097*	0.187***	0.076	1.000

Note: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: LegGov Elite Survey.

APPENDIX E

Distribution of Difference (Elite–Citizen Gap) in Confidence in IOs (Chapter 9)



Source: WVS7 and Elite Survey.
Note: Distribution of the dependent variable "difference confidence in IOs."

APPENDIX F

Pearson's Correlation Independent Variables in Dyadic Data (Chapter 9)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
1. Education	1.000													
2. Financial satisfaction	0.089***	1.000												
3. Left–right orientation	−0.047***	0.081***	1.000											
4. Elite TAN, citizen GAL	−0.056***	0.005***	0.196***	1.000										
5. Elite GAL, citizen TAN	0.058***	−0.019***	−0.207***	−0.302***	1.000									
6. Global identification	0.002***	0.111***	−0.038***	−0.095***	0.101***	1.000								

Continued

Continued

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
7. National identification	0.045***	0.089***	0.112***	0.037***	−0.034***	0.284***	1.000							
8. Confidence in government	−0.065***	0.159***	0.199***	0.048***	−0.073***	0.138***	0.209***	1.000						
9. Political satisfaction	0.030***	0.157***	0.212***	0.056***	−0.077***	0.113***	0.161***	0.431***	1.000					
10. Age	−0.040***	0.055***	0.050***	0.024***	−0.045***	0.016***	0.140***	−0.011***	−0.004***	1.000				
11. Elite woman, citizen man	0.026***	0.004***	0.048***	0.009***	−0.002***	0.012***	0.068***	0.023***	0.008***	0.042***	1.000			
12. Elite man, citizen woman	−0.008***	−0.002***	−0.048***	−0.012***	0.002***	−0.013***	−0.071***	−0.026***	−0.005***	−0.044***	−0.316***	1.000		
13. Social trust	0.080***	0.110***	−0.038***	−0.027***	0.046***	0.088***	0.050***	0.064***	0.114***	0.048***	−0.003***	0.009***	1.000	
14. Knowledge about global governance	0.209***	0.010***	−0.010***	−0.039***	0.045***	0.136***	0.110***	0.023***	0.028***	−0.060***	0.142***	−0.128***	0.056***	1.000

Note: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.
Source: WVS7 and LegGov Elite Survey.

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Supplementary Online Appendix

The supplementary online appendix provides comprehensive information about the reported analyses and robustness checks. This appendix is made available together with the code and data necessary to replicate the numerical results and figures in the book at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/leggov.