This book focuses on the development of bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam since the late-1980s. It offers a comparative analysis that considers both similarities and differences, drawing on historical, social scientific, and religious studies perspectives. The authors address how Jewish-Muslim relations are related to the historical and contemporary context in which they are embedded, the social identity strategies Jews and Muslims and their institutions employ, and their perceived mutual positions in terms of identity and power. The first section reflects on the history and current profile of Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam and the development of relations between Jews and Muslims in both cities. The second section engages with sources of conflict and cooperation. Four specific areas that cause tension are explored: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; antisemitism and Islamophobia; attacks by extremists; and the commemoration of wars and genocides. In addition to ‘trigger events’, what stands out is the influence of historical factors, public opinion, the ‘mainstream’ Christian churches and the media, along with the role of government. The volume will be of interest to scholars from fields including religious studies, interfaith studies, Jewish studies, Islamic studies, urban studies, European studies, and social sciences as well as members of the communities concerned, other religious communities, journalists, politicians, and teachers who are interested in Jewish-Muslim relations.

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Conflict and Cooperation, 1990–2020
*Sipco J. Vellenga and Gerard A. Wiegers*

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Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam
Conflict and Cooperation, 1990–2020

Sipco J. Vellenga and Gerard A. Wiegers
This study is the final product of the research programme Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London with project number 327-25-001, which is financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO), the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, and the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
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Preface

This book is a comparative study of contemporary relations between Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam. These relationships are affected by many sensitive issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antisemitism in Muslim circles, and Islamophobia in Jewish circles. As well as being sensitive issues between Jews and Muslims, widely divergent views on these topics are held within Jewish and Muslim circles, prompting much debate. There is also much that unites Jews and Muslims such as similar ritual customs and a long history of living together in the Middle East and parts of Europe. In this study, the fragility of contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations is linked partly to the vulnerable positions experienced by Jews and Muslims as minority groups. Within the Jewish community, memories of the Second World War and a history of exclusion, persecution, violence, and murder are never far away. This makes many Jews cautious about entering into contact with groups they do not know well and/or which they suspect of being antisemitic. In Western European countries, Muslims are still a relatively young minority seeking an established place in society and encountering a great deal of social resistance in the process. This also makes many Muslims cautious about entering into contact with groups in which they suspect attitudes of rejection.

This study is part of the Dutch Research Council (NWO)-funded project Delicate Relations. Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London, which was launched in 2014. This research project was conducted by a team consisting of the present authors and project leaders and PhD students Suzanne Roggeveen and Susanne van Esdonk. Prof Judith Frishman (professor emeritus of Jewish Studies at Leiden University) also contributed to the team’s work.

The project consisted of two phases: in the first phase, between 2014 and 2019, Suzanne Roggeveen and Susanne van Esdonk conducted research on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and London, respectively, which they both completed with a dissertation in 2020. In this phase, both project leaders started the research for the present study. Several joint publications were published in this context. In these years, the project team was supported by a number of student assistants who were involved in a lot
of the preparations, conducted interviews for the team, and helped organise public meetings and conferences. Specifically, we mention Jon Barry, who kept us informed about developments in London, and also Sakina Loukili, Shannon Witlox, and Emma Post. We are very grateful to each of them for their commitment and enthusiasm.

During the 2014–2019 period, the project had a user group that served as a sounding board and provided us with valuable advice. The user group consisted mainly of representatives of social institutions, namely: Prof Paul Abels and Menno Donia (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, NCTV), Ilona Votel (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment), Pieter Jan van Slooten and Frederique Windhorst (City of Amsterdam), Michael Minco (Central Jewish Consultative Committee, CJO), and Rasit Bal (Muslims and Government Liaison Committee, CMO). In addition, the researchers Prof Judith Frishman (Leiden University), Dr Ulrike Popp-Baier (University of Amsterdam), Prof Maleiha Malik (King’s College London), and Dr Edward Kessler (Woolf Institute, Cambridge) were involved in the user group.

In the second phase, the synthesising study was written, concluding the project. Approaching Jewish-Muslim relations from a social scientific and religious studies framework, the present study builds on the aforementioned published dissertations. For the purpose of this study, we did research in the archive of the Board of Deputies of British Jews at the London Metropolitan Archives and the archive of CIDI, conducted interviews in London and Amsterdam, and developed new lines of research. We thank the Board of Deputies and CIDI for allowing us to conduct research in their archives and the respondents for their willingness to speak candidly with us.

We hope that this study will give the reader a deeper understanding of relations between Jews and Muslims in contemporary Western European countries and the multitude of complex factors that influence them, and that it contributes to a better understanding of their actions and motives.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Explanation in Dutch</th>
<th>Explanation in English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIVD</td>
<td>Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst</td>
<td>General Intelligence and Security Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPG</td>
<td>All-Party Parliamentary Group</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Cooperation</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Cooperation</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions</td>
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<td>BDS</td>
<td>Bij Leven en Welzijn</td>
<td>Foundation Life and Welfare</td>
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<td>BLEW</td>
<td>Bij Leven en Welzijn</td>
<td>British Muslim Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMF</td>
<td>Board of Deputies</td>
<td>Board of National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Centraal Joods Overleg</td>
<td>Board of Deputies of British Jews</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid</td>
<td>Muslims and Government Liaison Committee</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Community Security Trust</td>
<td>Collective Against Islamophobia and Discrimination Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>ChristenUnie</td>
<td>The Christian Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Church Urban Fund</td>
<td>Department for Communities &amp; Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Een Ander Joeds Geluid</td>
<td>A Different Jewish Voice</td>
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<td>EHRC</td>
<td>Equality and Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>EK</td>
<td>Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal</td>
<td>Senate of the States General</td>
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**Abbreviations**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMCEMO</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterraan Centrum Migratie en Ontwikkeling</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAIR</td>
<td>Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBF</td>
<td>Faith &amp; Belief Forum</td>
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<td>FF4L</td>
<td>Faiths Forum for London</td>
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<td>FvD</td>
<td>Forum voor Democratie</td>
<td>Forum for Democracy</td>
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<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMD</td>
<td>Holocaust Memorial Day</td>
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<td>HMDT</td>
<td>Holocaust Memorial Day Trust</td>
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<td>IFN</td>
<td>Inter Faith Network for the UK</td>
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<td>IHRA</td>
<td>International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamitische Staat</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISB</td>
<td>Islamic Society of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCM</td>
<td>Jewish-Christian-Muslim conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism</td>
<td></td>
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<td>JDL</td>
<td>Jewish Defence League</td>
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<td>JMNA</td>
<td>Joods Marokkaans Netwerk Amsterdam</td>
<td>Amsterdam Jewish-Moroccan Network</td>
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<td>JIF</td>
<td>Joseph Interfaith Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPR</td>
<td>Institute for Jewish Policy Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMAN</td>
<td>Kommittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland</td>
<td>Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTIQ</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer</td>
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<td>LJG</td>
<td>Liberaal Joods Gemeente Amsterdam</td>
<td>Liberal Jewish Community Amsterdam</td>
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<td>MAB</td>
<td>Muslim Association of Britain</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Muslim Engagement and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHCLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing, Communities &amp; Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministerie AZ</td>
<td>Ministerie van Algemene Zaken</td>
<td>Ministry of General Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministerie BZ</td>
<td>Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerie BZK</td>
<td>Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerie JenV</td>
<td>Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerie SZW</td>
<td>Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</td>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Explanation in Dutch</th>
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<tr>
<td>MJF</td>
<td>Nederlandse Omroep</td>
<td>Dutch Broadcasting Foundation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stichting NBK</td>
<td>The Netherlands Confesses Colour</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nederland Bekent Kleur</td>
<td>The Netherlands Confesses Colour</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCTV</td>
<td>Nationaal Coördinator</td>
<td>National Coordinator for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorismebestrijding</td>
<td>Counterterrorism and Security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Veiligheid</td>
<td>National Coordinator for</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterterrorism and Security</td>
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<td>NIK</td>
<td>Nederlands-Israëlitisch</td>
<td>Organisation of Jewish Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kerkgenootschap</td>
<td>in the Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIW</td>
<td>Nieuw Israëlitisch</td>
<td>New Israelite Weekly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weekblad</td>
<td>New Israelite Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOS</td>
<td>Nederlandse Omroep</td>
<td>Dutch Broadcasting Foundation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stichting</td>
<td>Dutch Broadcasting Foundation</td>
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<td>NPK</td>
<td>Nederlands Palestina</td>
<td>Dutch Palestine Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Komitee</td>
<td>Dutch Palestine Committee</td>
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<td>NVPJ</td>
<td>Nederlands Verbond</td>
<td>Dutch Union for Progressive Judaism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>voor Progressief</td>
<td>Dutch Union for Progressive Judaism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jodendom</td>
<td>Dutch Union for Progressive Judaism</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJCM</td>
<td>Overlegorgaan Joden,</td>
<td>Consultative Body of Jews, Christians</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Christenen en Moslims</td>
<td>and Muslims</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Onderzoek, Informatie &amp;</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistiek</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Platform Stop Racisme &amp;</td>
<td>Platform Against Racism &amp; Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uitsluiting</td>
<td>Platform Against Racism &amp; Exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid</td>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RvK</td>
<td>Raad van Kerken in</td>
<td>Council of Churches in the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nederland</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sociaal en Cultureel</td>
<td>Social and Cultural Planning Office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planbureau</td>
<td>Social and Cultural Planning Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMN</td>
<td>Samenwerkingsverband</td>
<td>Alliance of Dutch Moroccans</td>
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<td>van Marokkaanse</td>
<td>Alliance of Dutch Moroccans</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nederlanders</td>
<td>Alliance of Dutch Moroccans</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Platform Islamitische</td>
<td>Scriptural Reasoning</td>
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<td>Organisaties Rijnmond</td>
<td>Platform for Islamic Organisations in</td>
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<td>SPIOR</td>
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<td>Platform for Islamic Organisations in</td>
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<td>Tell MAMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks</td>
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<td>3FF</td>
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<td>Three Faiths Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Tweede Kamer der Staten</td>
<td>House of Representatives of the States</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generaal</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMMON</td>
<td>Unie van Marokkaanse</td>
<td>Union of Moroccan Mosque</td>
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<td>Moskeeorganisaties in</td>
<td>Union of Moroccan Mosque</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nederland</td>
<td>Organisations in the Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid</td>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>en Democratie</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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Introduction

On 22 February 2015 the Jewish-Muslim friendship group Salaam Shalom organised a ‘Walk of Solidarity’ in Amsterdam in collaboration with the Al Kabir Mosque and the Liberal Jewish Congregation. Beginning at the Portuguese Synagogue (the ‘Snoge’) on Jonas Daniel Meijerplein and ending at the mosque on Weesperzijde, the walk was a protest against recent attacks on places of worship and against antisemitism and Islamophobia in general. An estimated 300 Jews, Muslims, and others took part. At the start and end points, flowers were laid and speeches delivered.¹ While leaders from various Jewish denominations took part, according to a report in ‘New Israelite Weekly’ (Nieuw Israëlitisch Weekblad, NIW), Rabbi Pinchas Toledano of the Snoge, where the walk began, did not join in because his synagogue board had advised against it.² That was because it “had a bad feeling” about Salaam Shalom and in particular about Fatima Elatik, one of the initiative’s founders, as she had participated in a pro-Gaza demonstration in 2014 at which swastikas had been displayed and the Nazi salute used. Elatik herself had posted a photograph on Facebook in which she could be seen arm in arm with a woman wearing a T-shirt reading ‘Free Palestine. Stop genocide. Help!’³

In the autumn of 2017, plans to establish a Shia Muslim centre at the Golders Green Hippodrome, a former concert hall located in a traditionally Jewish neighbourhood in north-west London, evoked a mixed response in local Jewish circles and beyond. According to The Independent some of the reactions on social media were out-and-out Islamophobic. “Who are they praying to and what are they plotting? … Beware the Islamic takeover”. “Islamic colonialism – in the heart of what was the only uniquely Jewish area in the UK”. “I am the only one with the guts to say what everybody else is thinking. It has nothing to do with parking or traffic. We don’t want a mosque there and who can blame us? Those Muslims purposely picked Golders Green because it’s a Jewish area. They want to stamp us out ... It’s one of the only Jewish areas left in London and we don’t want it polluted and destroyed by a bunch of Jew-hating Muslim terrorists”.⁴ Various Jewish leaders publicly distanced themselves from these statements.⁵ Among them Laura Marks, chair of Mitzvah Day and the Holocaust

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Memorial Day Trust and co-chair of Nisa-Nashim, who in a letter to the editor of The Jewish Chronicle condemned such Islamophobic language, pointed out that Jews and Muslims “have a similar experience of opposition and prejudice, a similar focus on family and festivals” and called for a warm welcome for the “new neighbours”.6

I.1 About This Book

Current Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam are multi-faceted and complex, as the two events described above illustrate. Numerous issues are at stake in these intercommunity relationships. Some themes unite Jews and Muslims, such as the perceived similarities between their religions and cultures and their common position as minority groups, with the resulting comparable experiences of vulnerability and threat. Other themes divide them, though, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and antisemitic statements by some Muslims and Islamophobic views held in some Jewish circles, although these factors do not affect all Jews and all Muslims in the same way. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a case in point. While this issue divides many Jews and Muslims, and is a reason for some to avoid each other, or even clash, it brings others closer together – specifically, those who stand up for Palestinian rights and are extremely critical of Israeli policy towards them. There are also Jews and Muslims who, while taking very different positions on this conflict, are united by the conviction that everything possible must be done to prevent it spilling over from the Middle East into their own cities, and are working together to ensure this. What makes Jewish-Muslim relations in both London and Amsterdam even more complex is that they occur at different levels. Not only between individual Jews and Muslims, but also between local mosques and synagogues and between national Jewish and Islamic organisations, which are often based in these capital cities.

This book focuses upon contemporary structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam. The primary aim is to gain a better understanding of these complex relations. To that end, we compare the situations in the two cities since the late 1980s and then analyse our findings in order to throw the nature of the Jewish-Muslim relations there, and the factors influencing them, into sharper relief. Our central question concerns the development of these bilateral relations in London and Amsterdam, and more broadly in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands in the case of national organisations, since the 1980s. What similarities and differences can be observed between them, and to what factors are they attributable? We answer this question from a combined historical, social scientific, and religious studies perspective.

In this study we analyse Jewish-Muslim relations in terms of ‘co-operation’ versus ‘conflict’. As such, we critically question the commonly held idea that, particularly as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
these relations are strongly polarised and that Jews and Muslims are each other’s opposites. In fact, our work reveals a great variety in Jewish-Muslim relations and also provides insights into the factors that influence them. For a correct understanding of the actual situation, it is important to realise that most Muslims and Jews in London and in Amsterdam do not maintain any kind of relationship with members of the other community, either because they avoid doing so or because they simply live a long way apart, or alternatively they do have mutual contact but without their ethnic and/or religious identity playing a role. In that case, neither ‘co-operation’ nor ‘conflict’ is the appropriate term, but ‘co-existence’.  

I.2 Definitions

Muslims and Jews and their organisations in Amsterdam and London each form their own community. These have no sharply defined boundaries. In fact, they consist of all the people, groups, and institutions which call themselves ‘Jewish’ or ‘Muslim’; or, in other words, which assign themselves a Jewish or Muslim identity. The communities include those who are members of a synagogue or mosque community, but also ‘unaffiliated’ persons who have no connection with organised Judaism or Islam respectively. Moreover, definitions of the terms ‘Jew’ and ‘Muslim’ vary widely. For many Jews, for instance, the designation ‘Jew’ under ‘halacha’ – Jewish religious law – refers exclusively to individuals who have a Jewish mother or have converted to Judaism. Others also include those with only a Jewish father. The term ‘Muslim’ also has different meanings. For many Muslims themselves, the term refers primarily to those who identify with and seek to adhere to the beliefs and precepts of Islam. But to others, both Muslims and non-Muslims, it applies to anyone from a Muslim family.

The Muslim and Jewish communities in both London and Amsterdam not only have diffuse external boundaries, they are also very diverse in their internal composition – for example, in terms of philosophical outlook or religious affiliation and origin. One important distinction across the board is between religious and non-religious Jews and Muslims; that is, between those for whom the Jewish or Islamic faith does or does not have personal meaning. And on the non-religious side there is a further distinction between ‘cultural’ and ‘secular’ groups – those who do observe certain customs or practices, such as partaking in the ritual seder meal at Passover or eating only halal food, and those who do not. Influenced by international developments in Judaism, among practising Jews in both cities we encounter the full spectrum of strands, from ultra-orthodox to liberal, alongside traditional ‘moderate’ orthodoxy, with often sharp divisions as a result. Likewise, the Muslims in the two cities vary widely in their religious affiliations, which again range from highly orthodox movements to liberal groups.

Ethnically, too, the communities are diverse. One important historical distinction is between Sephardic Jews, whose forefathers came originally
from the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, and Ashkenazi Jews with their roots in Central and Eastern Europe. As for Muslims, London has large groups originating in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. In Amsterdam, by contrast, the principal groups are of Moroccan, Turkish, and Surinamese origin. In order to reflect this great diversity, henceforth we refer to the Jewish and Muslim ‘communities’ – in the plural – in both cities rather than to a Jewish or Muslim ‘community’ in the singular.

One key term in this study is ‘identity’, so it is essential that we clarify how it is used here. Crucially, there is an important distinction between ‘avowed identity’ (or ‘self-identity’) and ‘ascribed identity’; that is, between the identity an individual, group, or institution adopts for itself and the one outsiders give it. These can differ quite substantially. People may define themselves (self-identify) as Jewish or Muslim, for example, but choose not to reveal that identity in the public arena so that others do not recognise (ascribe) them as such – as when Jewish men decide not to wear a kippah in public, or Muslim women a headscarf, for fear of being harassed. The opposite also happens if, say, a Londoner or Amsterdammer of Turkish origin is addressed as a Muslim because of the prevailing stereotype that all Turks are Muslims, whereas he considers himself to be secular. As already noted (see footnote 9), in this study we define Muslims and Jews on the basis of avowed identity.

People do not have one single identity, but several intertwined identities and subidentities. A person can be Jewish and female, a daughter, single, a friend, highly educated, an architect, a neighbour, a clarinet player, a Londoner, and British. Or Muslim and male, a partner, a father, a son, a friend, a neighbour, a university graduate, an accountant, an amateur footballer, an Amsterdammer, and a Dutchman. Depending upon the context in which people interact with each other, certain of their sub-identities are more or less important and are expressed more or less actively. Ethnic and/or religious identities, for instance, generally play a greater role in the personal sphere than at work. In the public discourse about Muslims and Jews, there is a widely held misconception that the ethnic and/or religious identities of members of these groups are all-important to them and so largely explain their behaviour in just about every area of life, whereas in fact that is often influenced primarily by other identities or subidentities. Although of course we focus in particular upon specifically Jewish and Muslim identities in this study of Jewish-Muslim relations, we do realise that other subidentities also play a role in them.

We can further distinguish between ‘individual identity’ and ‘collective identity’. The former refers to the identity of a particular person, the latter to that of a group, institution, or community. And in social and public life, one’s individual identity is regularly overshadowed by one’s collective identity. In other words, a person is judged – and sometimes condemned – according to the group, institution, or community to which he or she is seen
as belonging to. In his Remembrance Day speech on 4 May 2020, the Dutch Jewish writer Arnon Grunberg warned of the awful consequences this kind of generalisation can have when taken to extremes:

And it’s also logical that, when certain segments of the population are talked about in a way that hearkens back to the darkest years of the twentieth century, sooner or later people will feel empowered to talk about Jews in the same way. For me, it was clear from the start: when they talk about Moroccans, they’re talking about me. “I can’t understand, cannot tolerate it when a person judges another person not by what he is but by the group to which he happens to belong,” Primo Levi wrote to his German translator in the 1960s. These are words we should repeat to ourselves on a weekly, perhaps even daily, basis if only to remind ourselves how toxic words can be.  

This study centres on Jews and Muslims not as individuals, but as members of communities. By always considering the great diversity within both groups, we endeavour to acknowledge that their respective individual members come in many shapes and forms and cannot all be categorised under one common heading.

When referring to Muslims and Jews, the terms ‘religion’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘race’ are frequently used. The definitions of these words are not fixed, but contextual. That is, what they mean depends upon the historical, social, and cultural context in which they are applied. The context in which we use them in this study is the UK and the Netherlands of today. In the contemporary Western context, the term ‘religion’ is often associated not only with ‘major’ faith traditions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam but also with ‘minor’ ones such as Jainism and Sikhism, as well as with new forms of religiosity and individual spirituality which involve engagement with a reality experienced by believers as transcendent. In line with Gloria Wekker, we define ‘ethnicity’ as “the social system that gives meaning to ethnic differences between people – to those differences that can be made on the basis of people’s origin, appearance, history, culture, language and religion”. The term ‘race’ refers to assumed biological and related cultural differences between people, and ‘racism’ can be defined as “a set of assumptions about the superiority or inferiority of ‘races’ marked by visible physical differences”. Although ‘race’ is not a meaningful concept in a scholarly sense, it is one used in the public arena. In the UK, ‘race’ is a very common term in everyday speech; in the Netherlands it (the Dutch word ‘ras’) has not been heard widely since the Second World War, although that has been changing in recent years. In relation to Jews and Muslims, in practice the terms ‘religion’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘race’ are often used interchangeably.

The term ‘Jewish-Muslim relations’, the core theme of this study, covers relationships between individual Jews and Muslims, between local Jewish
and Muslim organisations and groups, including synagogues and mosques, and between national Jewish and Muslim bodies. Although we do consider all the various constellations in which Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions interact, among them trilateral and multilateral contexts, our primary interest is bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations. When it comes to Jewish and Muslim organisations, we can draw a broad distinction between ‘umbrella’ bodies – generally alliances of ethnic and/or religious institutions – and ‘grassroots’ organisations whose members are usually individuals. These can also take the form of ‘networks’.

In themselves, Jewish-Muslim relations are all patterns of interaction and/or communication between individual Jews and Muslims or their respective organisations. These can take a wide variety of forms, shaped by such factors as the type of initiative (top down, bottom up, external, internal) and its strength (strong, weak), focus (opinions, practices, interests, objectives), form (activities, discussion), institutionalisation (incidental, structural), duration (short, long), geographical scope (local, citywide, regional, national, international), subject matter (religion, culture, civil society, science, education, economy, politics, public debate), and style (conflict, co-operation, neither). Relations of this kind are never fixed, but constantly evolving.

In particular, we characterise Jewish-Muslim relations in terms of ‘co-operation’ and ‘conflict’. Lewis Coser defines conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals”. And the Norwegian sociologist of law Vilhelm Aubert highlights an interesting distinction between two types of conflict: the conflict of interest and the conflict of values or identity. Which, he argues, differ not only in their nature and course, but also require different methods of resolution. Conflicts of interest are associated with scarcity, the classic example being the wage dispute between employers and employees. This can usually be resolved through bargaining, a process of give and take in which the two sides eventually negotiate an outcome acceptable to both. Rarely though, if ever, does this mechanism work in conflicts of values or identity. When trying to settle a fundamental disagreement about the status of women, say, efforts to reach a compromise are unlikely to produce a satisfactory outcome. Rather, the two sides are most likely to adopt entrenched positions they regard, on principle, as non-negotiable. Identity conflicts therefore have to be resolved using other mechanisms. Aubert points to the law as one, but also mentions in passing – and without elaborating any further – the option of ‘agree to disagree’.

In this study, by contrast, we consider that and other ‘social identity strategies’, as we dub them, at length. Specifically, we explore which of these strategies are deployed in Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam, and what role they play in them.

Conflicts can range in intensity from peaceful to violent. When the differences between groups escalate to such an extent that they find themselves
diametrically opposed to one another, we speak of polarisation.\textsuperscript{29} In this kind of situation, members of the groups concerned often end up airing negative, prejudice-driven stereotypes about each other.\textsuperscript{30} When these target Jews, they can be classified as ‘antisemitic’ and in the case of Muslims as ‘Islamophobic’. In a nutshell, these terms refer to discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence towards Jews as Jews and Muslims as Muslims, respectively.\textsuperscript{31} If the antagonism between groups further descends into a deep-seated sense that it is ‘us versus them’, then opponents easily metamorphose into enemies and the danger of violence rears its head.\textsuperscript{32}

The opposite of conflict is co-operation.\textsuperscript{33} Here, groups join forces in order to achieve certain goals. When it comes to Jewish-Muslim co-operation, two particular forms can be distinguished: dialogue or ‘talking together’ and collaboration or ‘working together’.\textsuperscript{34} The dialogue may concern religious matters, but also cover cultural, social, or political issues. Collaboration, meanwhile, may focus upon the promotion of common religious or cultural interests in the public domain such as the right to ritual slaughter or to obtain kosher and halal food; but it can also address secular matters such as joint efforts to improve the local area, the city, the country, or the world.\textsuperscript{35}

The term ‘social capital’ refers to the relationships people, groups, and organisations maintain with each other, and to the resulting standards of reciprocity and mutual trust. As such, social capital is fundamental to the effective functioning of a community or society. The American sociologist Robert Putnam distinguishes between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, with the former denoting the relationships within a group or organisation and the latter those between groups and institutions.\textsuperscript{36} It will be clear that, in addressing relations between Jews and Muslims and between their respective institutions, the focus of this study is ‘bridging’. Jewish-Muslim co-operative relations vary in strength. In this respect, the American sociologist Mark Granovetter distinguishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ ties.\textsuperscript{37} The strength of a relationship, he claims, is determined by a combination of “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie”.\textsuperscript{38} Strong ties are usually found within groups, weak ones between groups and institutions. Weak ties allow for the building of bridges between different groups; in this context, Granovetter talks of “bridging weak ties”.\textsuperscript{39} In the Jewish-Muslim relationships we are investigating, we are probably dealing mainly with weak ties which in certain cases develop into strong ones.

With regard to the concept of co-operation between religious groups, terms such as ‘inter faith’, ‘interfaith’, ‘interreligious’, and ‘intercommunal’ are often used. In the British context a distinction is sometimes drawn here between ‘interfaith’ (one word) and ‘inter faith’ (two words).\textsuperscript{40} The latter then refers to co-operation whereby each group retains its own individuality, whereas under the former the collaboration is so intense that their identities may eventually merge to form a new religious identity.\textsuperscript{41}
Most UK institutions therefore prefer the term ‘inter faith’ to refer to their activities in the field of relations between religious groups. In the Netherlands, by contrast, this distinction is not generally made and both types fall under the heading ‘interreligious’ (‘interreligieus’). That said, not all the forms of co-operation investigated in this study are covered by the term ‘interreligious’. We also explore situations in which Jews and Muslims – practising and/or non-practising – co-operate on the basis of factors other than religion; as neighbours, for example, as residents of the same city or as citizens of the same country. For these cases, we use the term ‘intercommunal’.

As already mentioned, we define Jewish-Muslim relations in terms of ‘co-operation’ and ‘conflict’. In our view, every such relationship is the outcome of a specific combination of forces, some of which bring together Jews and Muslims or their respective organisations and some of which drive them apart. Just as there are usually elements of division even within co-operative relationships, so there are frequently unifying factors even in conflictual ones. It is just that the integrative forces prevail in the former, while the separating forces are predominant in the latter. And because the interplay between these conflicting forces is changing constantly, the relationships themselves are always in flux.

I.3 London and Amsterdam Compared

In this study we compare current Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam. Our choice of these two particular cities may seem rather odd at first glance, since they are so unlike one another in terms of their size and importance, and also because their Jewish and Muslim communities differ greatly in their religious and ethnic identities, as well as other factors. London, for example, has ten times as many residents as Amsterdam: 8.95 million compared with 875,000 in 2020. It is also far more dominant a metropolis within its own country; although both cities are national capitals, for example, London is also the seat of government of the UK whereas in the Netherlands that is The Hague rather than Amsterdam. As the leading city of a major power and the former British Empire, moreover, London today occupies a more prominent place on the world stage than Amsterdam.

When it comes to their national Jewish communities, the proportion of British Jews who consider themselves religious is about 66 per cent. Among Dutch Jews, this figure is much lower – an estimated 15 per cent or so. The majority (56 per cent) of British Jewish households are members of a synagogue, compared with only a modest minority (about 20 per cent) of their Dutch counterparts. Meanwhile, the Muslim communities in the two cities are very different in background. Whereas London has large groups originating in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, the bulk of those in Amsterdam have their roots in Morocco and Turkey. This difference is
reflected in the religious signature of the Islam practised in each city; in London it is coloured by currents with South Asian origins, such as the Deobandi and Barelvi movements, while in Amsterdam is characterised by forms of Moroccan Islam and by official and unofficial Turkish Islamic movements.\(^\text{46}\)

On closer inspection, however, there are also a number of important similarities between the Jewish and Muslim communities in London and in Amsterdam respectively, as well as parallels between the two cities which make a comparison of Jewish-Muslim relations in them very worthwhile. First of all, the communities are all of considerable size. According to UK census data, in 2011 there were almost 150,000 Jews living in London and more than a million Muslims – representing 1.8 per cent and 12.4 per cent, respectively, of the city’s total population.\(^\text{47}\) The number of Jews (religious and non-religious) in Amsterdam is estimated to be around 25,000 and the number of Muslims almost 90,000; rounded off, these figures respectively equate to some 3 per cent and 10 per cent of the population.\(^\text{48}\)

In addition, the communities in both cities, or rather both countries, are well-organised through extensive networks of local, regional, and national institutions covering a wide variety of domains, such as religious provision, education, care services, welfare and the media, retail and hospitality sectors, as well as combating antisemitism and Islamophobia respectively.\(^\text{49}\) In both countries they also have national organisations representing their interests in the public sphere and government circles. In recent decades, this has enabled relationships to develop not only between individual Jews and Muslims but also between local Jewish and Muslim institutions, including synagogues and mosques, and between national Jewish and Muslim organisations.

Thirdly, the respective communities in both cities have similar histories. In the Jewish case this goes back to the arrival (or return) of the first migrants from other parts of Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa in the seventeenth century. For Muslims, the history of large-scale settlement in both capitals began, on the other hand, after the Second World War.\(^\text{50}\) Historically, however, there is also one huge difference between the Jewish experience in London and in Amsterdam. Although the community in the British capital certainly did suffer during the Second World War, numerically speaking it came through the conflict relatively unscathed.\(^\text{51}\) The Jews of Amsterdam, by contrast, had to endure the full horror of Nazi occupation and the Holocaust, which drastically reduced their number from an estimated 80,000 to just 6,000 in the years 1940 to 1945.\(^\text{52}\)

In London and Amsterdam alike, we find hugely diverse populations in terms not only of nationality, ethnicity, and faith, but also lifestyle, sexual identity, social networks, and legal status. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf refer to this as ‘superdiversity’.\(^\text{53}\) Moreover, it is a phenomenon further nourished by the transnational networks of which many residents are a part. In both cities, the population is made up of more than 180 nationalities. In Amsterdam, approximately half of residents have a non-

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Dutch background. Some 20 per cent are from another Western country, 9 per cent from Morocco, 7 per cent from Suriname, 5 per cent from Turkey, 1.5 per cent from the Dutch Antilles, and 14 per cent from another non-Western country. According to the 2011 UK census, about 45 per cent of Londoners are White British, 15 per cent White other, 6.5 per cent of Indian ethnicity, 2.7 per cent of Pakistani ethnicity, 2.7 per cent of Bangladeshi ethnicity, and 7 per cent ‘Black, African, Caribbean or Black British’. As for faith, 38 per cent of Amsterdammers said they were religious in 2012. Taking all its various denominations together, Christianity is the largest religion in the Dutch capital (18 per cent). Next comes Islam (13 per cent). As for other faiths and beliefs, Judaism included, none could claim the adherence of more than 1 per cent of city residents. In the 2011 British census, 71 per cent of Londoners said they were religious. More than half (53 per cent) describe themselves as Christian, 13.5 per cent as Muslim, 5.5 per cent as Hindu, 2 per cent as Jewish, 1.7 per cent as Sikh, and just over 1 per cent as Buddhist. Because of the renewed visibility of religion in Amsterdam and in London, due in part due to the relatively recent arrival in large numbers of non-Western immigrants with a recognisable religious conviction, we can characterise both as ‘post-secular cities’.

In both cities, furthermore, the coexistence of different population groups – Jews and Muslims among them – brings with it frictions and tensions. And these sometimes escalate in response to ‘trigger events’. They may be local or national, such as attacks on Jewish or Muslim targets or expressions of antisemitism or Islamophobia, but can also be international in nature. One example is the escalation of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the summer of 2014, which fuelled tensions in both cities between supporters of the two sides, including many pro-Israel Jews and pro-Palestinian Muslims. Amsterdam’s then mayor, the late Eberhard Van der Laan, addressed the situation in his city on 21 September 2014 in the 25th Abel Herzberg Lecture.

Reactions around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are fierce. Social media act as accelerators of action and reaction, and make the world even smaller. This summer there was a pro-Israel demonstration one week, a pro-Gaza one the next. The debate flared up. Who is the perpetrator, who is the victim? Is criticism of Israel the same as criticism of Jews? Is hatred of Jews part of Islam? Is antisemitism on the rise? There have been many accusations thrown back and forth, especially about double standards. ‘Why doesn’t the Netherlands take a stand against Israel’s crimes against the inhabitants of Gaza?’ ‘Why don’t Amsterdam Muslims distance themselves from antisemitic slogans and the IS flag?’

Another common factor is that the local governments in both London and Amsterdam are important actors in shaping the environment in which their Jewish and Muslim communities live. Their respective municipal
administrations are each striving to create an open and tolerant city. In the Dutch capital, for example, we find this ambition set out in the action plan ‘We Amsterdammers’ (Wij Amsterdammers) launched by the city council in response to the murder in 2005 of film-maker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist extremist, but also in the diversity and inclusiveness policy of the current council. In a policy memorandum submitted on 18 December 2018, the city executive informed the council that it is dedicated to defending, maintaining, and on certain points possibly re-evaluating Amsterdam’s culture and tradition of “individual freedom, liberalism and tolerance”.61 We find much the same aspiration expressed by the London administration. In response to the British decision to leave the European Union in 2016, Mayor Sadiq Khan stated that London is and will remain a city of openness where differences are valued and celebrated. Launching the #LondonIsOpen campaign, he said:

We don’t simply tolerate each other’s differences, we celebrate them. Many people from all over the globe live and work here, contributing to every aspect of life in our city. We now need to make sure that people across London, and the globe, hear that #LondonIsOpen.62

If frictions between groups in their city do occur, the governments of both are committed to containing them. They share broadly the same policy of promoting social cohesion and, should intercommunal tensions flare up, of de-escalation.

Besides these similarities, though, there are also important differences between the two cities. We have already pointed out the great contrast in their sizes and importance, but now we mention two more.63 First, the difference between the roles of the large Christian churches in the two cities. What is striking is that the Church of England, in particular, occupies a far more prominent place in public life in London than either the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PKN) or the Roman Catholic Church has in Amsterdam, which may have an impact upon the development of Jewish-Muslim relations. The difference here is related to the distinctive models governing the relationship between church and state in the UK – and specifically England – and the Netherlands respectively, as we shall see later on.64

Secondly, there is a big difference in the way the British and the Dutch governments, including the local authorities in London and Amsterdam, approach policy in respect of religious communities – and especially the Jewish and Muslim communities. Since New Labour took office in 1997, British governments have to a greater or lesser extent focused upon ‘partnerships’ with religious groups.65 Dutch governments in recent decades, by contrast, have tended to adopt a rather strict interpretation of the principle of the separation of church and state, and so have not maintained an ongoing co-operative relationship with religious communities with a view to facilitating the implementation of their policies.66 Only during the time of Job Cohen’s mayoralty (2001–2010) did Amsterdam city council focus...
upon active co-operation between the municipal government and religious communities.\textsuperscript{67}

I.4 Academic and Social Relevance

This study fills a gap in our academic knowledge of contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in the Netherlands and the UK, and Amsterdam and London in particular. These relations have never previously been the subject of thorough empirical research. In the Netherlands Remco Ensel, Evelien Gans, and Annemarike Stremmelaar have undertaken valuable work on antisemitism in Muslim migrant communities, while the historian Bart Wallet has conducted an in-depth study of Jews in the postwar Netherlands, in passing touching upon the theme of Jewish-Muslim relations.\textsuperscript{68} Much the same applies to the UK, too, where anthropologists Yulia Egorova and Fiaz Ahmed have produced a fascinating analysis of the influence of antisemitism and Islamophobia on relations between Jews and Muslims.\textsuperscript{69} Also valuable is the publication by Mel Prideaux and Andrew Dawson on interfaith activities in Leeds.\textsuperscript{70} Until now, however, there has been no thorough examination of Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK, and in London in particular, or of the factors influencing them. Through this study – or rather, more broadly through the entire project \textit{Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London}, of which this study is a part, as we describe briefly below – we hope to contribute towards closing this gap.

This study is socially relevant, too. First and foremost, it should be useful for Jews, for Muslims, and for their respective institutions. We hope that it will offer them more insight into their mutual relations and the forces that influence them. It should also provide Jewish-Muslim partnerships with background knowledge and insights into the various ‘themes of connection’ and ‘themes of division’ which frequently play a role in these relationships, and into possibilities for dealing with them in a constructive manner. The study is relevant for ‘bystanders’ as well, such as interreligious networks, Christian churches, political parties, and governments. It can help them develop a better view of Jewish-Muslim relations and their own role in this arena. Finally, we hope that it will help improve the quality of the discourse on this theme in the media, education, discussion forums, and parliaments.

As well as being academically and socially relevant, moreover, the topic of contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations is also extremely interesting in a broader perspective. How? Since the late 1980s we have been living in an era in which ‘diversity’ and ‘identity’ are core themes. Under the influence of trends like accelerated globalisation, migration and individualisation, the diversity of the populations of many countries, and certainly of Western metropolises such as London and Amsterdam, has increased substantially. To quote Vertovec:

\begin{quote}
Compared to [earlier decades], the 1990s [and] early 2000s have seen more migrants from more places entailing more socio-cultural
\end{quote}
differences going through more migration channels leading to more, as well as more significantly stratified, legal categories, and who maintain more intensely an array of links with places of origin and diasporas elsewhere.\textsuperscript{71}

At the same time, and in fact influenced by the same developments, identity has also become an important theme.\textsuperscript{72} Numerous movements have organised themselves around particular aspects of identity, including gender, race, and sexual orientation, but also ethnicity, religion, and nation. Take the MeToo, Black Lives Matter, and LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer) movements, for example.\textsuperscript{73} Within Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, too, there are currents in which identity plays a prominent role.\textsuperscript{74} And then there has been the rise of Trumpism in the United States, of renewed nationalism in countries such as Brazil, India, and Russia, and of populist movements across Europe, all advocating a strongly nationalist agenda often linked with anti-immigration, pro-assimilation, and anti-Islam policies.\textsuperscript{75} In the 2016 Brexit campaign of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) led by Nigel Farage, for instance, the nationalist sentiment of ‘English exceptionalism’ was a central element.\textsuperscript{76} Many of these movements feel that the identity they represent is insufficiently acknowledged, if at all, by ‘the establishment’ and wider society and so are waging a struggle for recognition in the public arena. Addressing the huge importance of ‘identity’ as a theme in world politics today, the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama writes:

Identity is the theme that underlies many political phenomena today, from new populist nationalist movements to Islamist fighters to the controversies taking place on university campuses. We will not escape thinking about politics and ourselves in identity terms.\textsuperscript{77}

The themes ‘diversity’ and ‘identity’ raise big and complex questions. How can people, groups, movements, and institutions with different identities interact with each other in a peaceful manner? How do they experience mutual differences and similarities, and how do they ‘manage’ these? When do forms of conflict develop? And forms of co-operation? What factors play a role here? How do ‘social identity strategies’ relate to ‘social positions’? What influence is exerted by third parties such as the media, political parties, religious groups, governments, and transnational bodies?

In the quest to answer these big contemporary questions, our study of Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam makes very interesting reading. These relations involve a variety of issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antisemitism and Islamophobia and attacks on Jewish and Islamic targets, which are directly linked to the respective identities of the groups concerned. And are also potentially particularly sensitive because they touch on the one hand upon the traumatic history of peril and
persecution affecting Jewish communities, and on the other upon the dis-
advantage and exclusion experienced by many Muslims. We hope that this
study will contribute towards a better understanding of these important
questions in the current era of ‘diversity and identity’.

I.5 Means of Comparison
In this publication we compare Jewish-Muslim relations in London and
Amsterdam. In recent anthropology, a distinction is drawn between ‘lateral’
and ‘frontal’ comparison. The former compares phenomena in two con-
texts, neither of which the researchers are part of, whereas in the latter they
are part of one context but not the other. This study uses frontal com-
parison, because both researchers are part of the Dutch context but not of
the British one. In order to compensate for the asymmetry inherent in this
position, we have made a particular effort to familiarise ourselves with the
British situation. In addition to our research activities on the ground, for
which we regularly visited London and the UK, we subscribed to the
newsletters of numerous British Jewish and Islamic organisations – among
them the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Muslim Council of Britain
(MCB), the Community Security Trust (CST), and Tell MAMA – and fol-
lowed various British media, including the BBC, The Jewish Chronicle, The
Guardian, and Muslim View, on a daily basis. We also included a British
student assistant in our research team. In analysing our comparison of
contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam, we
followed the ‘portable analytics’ strategy proposed by Cymene Howe and
Dominic Boyer, using the following steps: delineating the case in London;
observing and analysing that case; identifying a comparable (homologous
or analogous) case in Amsterdam; observing and analysing that second
case; and finally establishing and then analysing the similarities and dif-
ferences between the two cases. The method of comparison applied is
contextual, has no universal pretensions, and meets the objections long
raised against ‘the’ comparative method, namely that it ignores the local,
lived context of phenomena and assumes the superiority of one’s own (read:
Western) society and culture.

I.6 Sources and Methods
This study is the final product of the Dutch Research Council (NWO) project
Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London, that
started in 2014. As part of this project, Suzanne Roggeveen conducted an
extensive ethnographic study of contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in
Amsterdam and Susanne van Esdonk its equivalent in London. These efforts
resulted in two PhD theses. Each study is based upon many dozens of in-
terviews and participatory observations, supplemented with data derived
from written sources such as newspaper articles and archive documents. The
researchers processed and analysed this source material using an iterative process, alternating between inductive and deductive approaches. The ‘synthesising study’ presented here concludes the NWO project and compares the findings from Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s individual endeavours in order to gain a clearer insight into Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam and into the factors to which they can be attributed. Supplementing Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s studies, this publication not only examines Jewish-Muslim relations at the grassroots level but also explores relations between national Jewish and Islamic organisations. It also takes a much more explicit look at the ‘themes of connection’ and ‘themes of division’ which play a role in Jewish-Muslim relations and the strategies Jews and Muslims apply to deal with them. The study addresses the social positions Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions perceive each other as occupying and at how this helps shape their mutual relations. Furthermore, it goes into far greater detail about the historical context in which contemporary Jewish and Muslim communities and their mutual relations in London and Amsterdam are rooted, as well as about certain factors relevant to the current context of those relations, such as the prevailing models of church-state relationships in the UK and the Netherlands and other mechanisms for the governance of religious diversity in the two countries.

Our aim is to describe Jewish-Muslim relations and the factors influencing them in a ‘thick’ manner, combining observations of behaviour, the attribution of meaning by those involved and placement in context. To achieve this, as well as Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s studies we make use of various other sources, including historical papers, policy documents, speeches, books, newspaper and magazine articles, annual reports, documents on websites, social media posts, our own observations, and interview data. In all, we interviewed a total of 26 people either orally or in writing.

I.7 Structure

The study is structured as follows. Part I sets out the framework, background, and subject matter. In Chapter 1 we present the theoretical framework from which we approach the theme of Jewish-Muslim relations. This is based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, the social identity theory, and Jan Thurlings’ theory of the social position, attitude, and strategy of minorities in relation to their environment, as well as insights derived from existing research on contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe.

Chapter 2 outlines the history of the Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam from the seventeenth century until the Rushdie affair in 1988–1989, which gave rise to the first structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim contacts in London. In Amsterdam, however, these did not take off until more than ten years later.

In Chapter 3 we describe the contemporary Jewish and Islamic communities in London and Amsterdam. The chapter ends with a comparison
between these communities on five salient points: size, recognisable identity, degree of organisation, social position, and transnational ties.

In Chapter 4 we explore the development of structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam, starting with an outline of the early history of these developments that leads up to the Rushdie affair. This chapter concludes by taking stock and comparing the development processes in the two cities, highlighting the most important similarities and differences between them.

In Part II we delve into the sources of conflict and of co-operation in Jewish-Muslim relations. Chapters 5–8 concentrate in turn upon four themes that cause tensions between Jews and Muslims or their respective organisations: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; antisemitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews; attacks by extremists on Jewish and Muslim targets; and the commemoration of wars and genocides in Europe such as the Holocaust and Srebrenica. With each theme, we are interested in its influence upon Jewish-Muslim relations. This may be direct or indirect; for example, through responses to it by government or in public discourse. Intended and unintended consequences are distinguished from one another. In each of these chapters we compare the situations in London and Amsterdam, and each begins with an explanation of the key terms used and ends with conclusions about the consequences of the theme in question for Jewish-Muslim relations.

In Chapter 5 we look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We note in particular that there is far more variety in the views held on this issue, among Jews and Muslims alike, than is often assumed in public opinion. The key question is why, when it comes to Jewish-Muslim relations in both cities, this conflict is considered the ultimate ‘elephant in the room’.

Chapter 6 discusses the theme of antisemitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews since the late 1980s in the UK, including London, and the Netherlands, including Amsterdam, as well as its effects upon Jewish-Muslim relations. After first providing a description and analysis of these phenomena, we turn to the responses to them by Jews and Muslims, in public opinion, by Jewish and Muslim institutions and by the British and Dutch governments. This reveals some striking differences.

In Chapter 7 we focus upon attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets in the West and ask what effect these have upon Jews, Muslims, and their mutual relations in the two cities. In the responses in the public arena to such attacks, we identify three discourses: one of ‘distinction’, one of ‘distancing’, and one of a ‘suspect community’. We then discuss how Jewish and Muslim leaders have responded to attacks of this kind, and also consider the anti-terrorism and anti-extremism policies adopted by the national and local city governments in the UK and the Netherlands.

Chapter 8 explores the commemoration of wars and genocides which have taken place in Europe, and their impact upon Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and London. Our focus here is commemorations of events.
affecting Jews prior to and during the Second World War, namely Kristallnacht and the Holocaust, and of the 1995 genocide of Muslims near Srebrenica, Bosnia.

In Chapter 9 we examine sources of co-operation between Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations. These can be found in three broad domains: perceived similarities between Jews and Muslims in terms of their religions, cultures, and social positions; the promotion of common interests, such as defending religious rights and the fight against anti-semitism and Islamophobia; and joint efforts to improve the neighbourhoods, cities, countries, and world they share.

In Part III we analyse, partly based on the first part and the second part, the development of bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam and examine the factors influencing them. Chapter 10 looks in detail at three types of factors affecting Jewish-Muslim relations: institutional factors, which are related to the actions of Jews and Muslims and of their organisations such as ideology, social identity strategies, and resources; positional factors, which are related to the positions Jewish and Muslim communities believe they occupy vis-à-vis each other; and contextual factors, which are related to the historical and contemporary context in which these relations are embedded. In particular, we look at the influence exerted by historical factors, by ‘trigger events’, by public opinion, by ‘mainstream’ Christian churches, by media, and by governments. We note that there are significant differences between the British and Dutch governments in the way they approach religious communities, in their policies to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia and in their attitudes towards radicalisation and terrorism affecting Jewish-Muslim relations.

Finally, in Chapter 11 we summarise the results of this study and draw a number of conclusions. We then discuss the significance of our findings for the theories presented in the theoretical framework (Chapter 1) and for the further study of Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe. The study ends with some reflections upon the future of those relations in London and Amsterdam.

Notes

1 Algemeen Dagblad, 23 February 2015.
2 NIW, 27 February 2015.
3 Ibid.
4 The Independent, 17 October 2017.
5 The Jewish Chronicle, 11 October 2017; 29 October 2017.
6 The Jewish Chronicle, 11 October 2017.
7 Ethan Katz characterises the history of relations between Jews and Muslims in North Africa and then in France using two basic terms, ‘conflict’ and ‘coexistence’ (Katz 2015, 20–21, 314–318). We have chosen to use three principal terms in this respect: ‘conflict’, ‘co-operation’, and ‘coexistence’. To distinguish between the latter two. The term ‘co-operation’ is used when Jews and Muslims engage actively in building mutual relationships, in dialogue and/or in working
together. We reserve the term ‘coexistence’ for situations in which the two
groups live peacefully alongside each other, but without any mutual contact in
their ethnic, religious, or cultural capacity as Jews and Muslims respectively.

8 For the use of the term ‘community’ in sociology, see: Beckford 2015, 228–230.

9 For definitions of the terms ‘Jew’ and ‘Muslim’, see: Mandel 2014, 7–10; Katz
2015, 4–6; Roggeveen 2020, 9–11; Van Esdonk 2020, 23–24.


11 When it comes to self-definition, we apply a restrictive condition: this must be
the self-definition people use in relation to their own ethnicity and/or religion.
So, for example, supporters of the Amsterdam football club Ajax or of the
Tottenham Hotspur football club in London who call themselves ‘Jews’ as a
form of ‘tribal signifier’ fall outside this definition (Lucassen 2014, 66–67).

12 Chapter 3 looks in more detail at the religious and ethnic composition of the
Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam.


14 Huijnk 2018, 53.


18 Grunberg 2020, 30.

19 Baumann 1999; McKinnon 2002.

20 This description is in keeping with the definition of the term ‘religion’ given by
the American anthropologist Melford Spiro: “... an institution consisting of
culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated super-human beings”
– although we, like Peter Worsley, prefer to replace ‘beings’ with ‘realms’, be-
cause not every form of religious conception and practice involves, as in deism,
the worship of an animate being (Spiro 1966, 96; Worsley 1978, 234). There are
numerous stories, images, and opinions in various religions about the supposed
‘super-human realms’ and about the interaction between them and humans.
That said, religions generally involve much more than this; they often also have
practical aspects in the shape of rituals and religious experiences, moral aspects
in the form of values and norms about how people should live and how society
should be organised and social aspects associated with community building and
organisation.

21 Wekker 2016, 22. We apply a broad definition of the term ‘ethnicity’. This
concept applies not only to minorities with a migrant background, for whom the
term is usually exclusively reserved in public and political discourse, but also to
population groups in the UK and the Netherlands who are of ‘native’ British and
Dutch descent respectively.


24 Prideaux & Dawson 2018.

25 Coser 1956, 8.

26 Aubert 1971; Schuyt 2006, 37–42.

27 Aubert 1971, 161.

28 See, in particular Section 10.2.2.


30 Koomen and Van der Pligt define ‘stereotypes’ as the traits considered char-
acteristic of a particular group and ‘prejudices’ as the generalised negative
opinions held about a specific group (Koomen & Van der Pligt 2016, 12–36).

31 For the definitions of these terms, see 6.2. Cf. Vellenga 2018, 177.


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35 For more on this, see Chapter 9.
38 Granovetter 1973; 1361.
41 Pearce 2012, 155.
42 For consistency with the style for prefixes used in this publication, henceforth we render ‘interfaith’ as one word without a hyphen.
43 GLA November 2020; Gemeente Amsterdam 2021a.
44 The figure of 66 per cent for religious Jews in the UK is based upon data from the 2013 National Jewish Community Survey (Graham, Staetsky & Boyd 2014, 15–17). About two-thirds of respondents indicated that they were involved in one of the various religious strands of British Jewry, while slightly more than a third defined themselves in the ‘secular/cultural’ or ‘just Jewish’ categories. For the proportion of religious Jews in the Netherlands, see Van Solinge & Van Praag 2010, 57–58.
45 Casala Mashiah & Boyd 2017, 2; Wallet 2017, 473. For more detailed descriptions of the Jewish communities in London and Amsterdam, see Sections 3.1 and 3.3.
46 For more detailed descriptions of the Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam, see Section 3.2 and Section 3.4.
47 ONS 2013.
48 The figures for the size of the Jewish community in the Netherlands and Amsterdam are taken from the study ‘Jews in the Netherlands 2009’ (De Joden in Nederland anno 2009) by Van Solinge & Van Praag (2010, 26, 32). The figure for the number of Muslims in Amsterdam is taken from a survey conducted by the City of Amsterdam in 2018 (Gemeente Amsterdam 2019, 125).
49 For more information on Jewish and Muslim organisations in the two cities, see Chapter 3.
50 For the histories of the two communities in both cities, see Chapter 2.
52 These numbers are mentioned in Cohen 2009, 239.
53 Vertovec 2007; Wessendorf 2014a,b; Van Esdonk 2020, 47–49. Besides appreciation, there is also criticism of the concept of ‘superdiversity’ (Back & Sinha 2016; Crul 2016; Duyvendak 2017). Our main objection is that this notion seems to fail to do sufficient justice to the fact that people do still like to belong to groups and that, to a greater or less extent, those groups still guide their behaviour and choices. ‘Superdiversity’ emphasises the great heterogeneity in identities, statuses, backgrounds, and lifestyles found in cities like Amsterdam and London, but ignores the fact that, even in such cosmopolitan contexts, people are often engaged in social relationships from which they derive aspects of their identity, however temporary, diverse, and fluid those relationships may sometimes be. In this context, Jan Willen Duyvendak and Menno Hurenkamp make an interesting distinction between ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ communities (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2004). Many people in these two cities seem to live in ‘light’ communities.
54 Gemeente Amsterdam 2021b.
55 ONS 2013.
57 ONS 2013.
Both cities have two tiers of local government. Since 2000 the upper tier in London has been the Greater London Authority (GLA), led by the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. The first mayor, Ken Livingstone (Labour), was succeeded in 2008 by Boris Johnson (Conservative), who then gave way in 2016 to the current incumbent – and the first Muslim to hold the post – Sadiq Khan (Labour). The lower tier consists of London’s 32 boroughs, with their own elected councils, and the City of London. Between 2004 and 2012, the Conservative Party was the largest political group in the London Assembly. Since then, Labour has been in the majority. The upper tier of local government in Amsterdam consists of the city executive, chaired by the mayor, and the elected city council. Amsterdam also has seven city districts, each with its own executive and district committee. The Labour Party (PvdA) was the largest group on Amsterdam City Council in the decades after Second World War until that position was taken over by the liberal democratic D66 in 2014 and then by the Green Left (GroenLinks) in 2018. Between 1946 and 2017, all the city’s mayors were members of the PvdA. The holder of the position since 2018, Femke Halsema, is from GroenLinks.
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Documentation on Israel (CIDI) (12 May 2017); Maureen Arnhem, Policy Officer for Diversity at Amsterdam-Zuid city district (8 February 2021); Erwin Brugmans (d. 2021), representative of synagogue Sjoel West and active in Jewish-Muslim initiatives in West Amsterdam (3 February 2020); Jaap Fransman, chair of the Central Jewish Consultative Committee in 2014 (CJO) (7 October 2014); Maarten Jan Hijnmans, active in anti-racism organisation NBK, Stop Racism and Exclusion (PSRU) and the Kristallnacht Remembrance Committee, 2009–2018 (21 June 2019); Abdou Menebhi, director of the Collective against Islamophobia and Discrimination (CTID) and of the Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Migration and Development (EMCEMO) (8 May 2017); Henk Meulink, chair of the Council of Churches in Amsterdam (31 August 2020); Ronny Naftaniel, former director of CIDI and vice-chair of CJO (19 October 2018); Walter Palm, former Senior Coordinating Policy Advisor at Dutch ministries (9 November 2018); Roemer van Oordt, project office Zasja and editor of the website Republiek Allochtonië (1 February 2021); Pieter Jan van Slooten, Strategic Adviser at the City of Amsterdam (16 March 2018); Judith Frishman, professor of Jewish Studies, Leiden University, and rabbi Edward van Voolen, Rabbinic Director Abraham Geiger College, Potsdam University (18 March 2020); Ilona Votel, member of staff of the Directorate for Society and Integration at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) (17 July 2017); and Bart Wallet, historian of Judaism in the Netherlands (4 February 2018, 12 February 2021). We also interviewed the following Britons: Harriet Crabtree, executive director of the Inter Faith Network for the UK (IFN) (25 April 2017); Paul Hackwood, executive chair of the Church Urban Fund (CUF) (24 October 2017); Dilwar Hussain, former vice-chair of the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (HMDT), former president of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), trustee of the Faith and Belief Forum (FBF, previously Three Faiths Forum (3FF) and chair of New Horizons in British Islam (26 April 2017); Harun Khan, Secretary-General of the MCB (26 October 2017); Natan Levy, rabbi, interfaith and social action consultant and head of operations of the Faiths Forum for London (FF4L; 27 April 2017); Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Faith Matters and Tell MAMA (28 August 2013); Hilary Patel and Sally Sealey, both members of staff of the Faith Engagement and Countering Hate Crime Team in the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (24 April 2017); Phil Rosenberg, a nationally-recognised interfaith activist who was, at the time of the interview, Director of Public Affairs at the Board of Deputies of British Jews (26 October 2017); Dave Rich, Deputy Director of Communications of the Community Security Trust (CST) (17 February 2016, 29 May 2017); Stephen Shashoua, former director of 3FF (31 March 2017); and Julie Siddiqi, co-chair of Nisa-Nashim (26 April 2017).

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**Internet Sources**

The internet sources used are listed in the endnotes. These were consulted in 2020 or 2021.
Part I

Framework, Background, and Subject
1 Theoretical Approach

As noted previously, this study is about contemporary bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam. Our core research question is how these relationships have unfolded in the two cities and what factors have influenced the similarities and differences between them. In this chapter we take the first step in answering that question. We begin by developing a theoretical framework for the study of Jewish-Muslim relations in the two cities, drawing upon three complementary social-scientific theories: Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Section 1.1), social identity theory (Section 1.2), and Jan Thurlings’ theory regarding the social position, attitude, and strategy of minorities relative to their environment (Section 1.3). Together, these offer us a comprehensive and clear perspective on Jewish-Muslim relations and on the factors influencing them. We then turn our attention to empirical research already conducted into contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe (Section 1.4). We conclude the chapter by taking stock and indicating what factors, based upon the theoretical and empirical literature we have reviewed, may influence Jewish-Muslim relationships in London and Amsterdam in particular (Section 1.5). In so doing, we distinguish between three types of factors: institutional, positional, and contextual.

1.1 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice

The Jewish-Muslim relations we are investigating are not played out in a social vacuum, but in the specific context of two ‘modern’ Western cities—or, to put it more broadly, societies. The work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) offers a fruitful perspective on this type of society. In his ‘theory of practice’, five concepts play a central role: ‘field’, ‘position’, ‘capital’, ‘strategy’, and ‘habitus’.¹ Here, ‘field’ and ‘position’ are closely related. Bourdieu defines a ‘field’ as “the set of all the possible objective relations between positions”.² In a field, there are various actors. These can be people, groups, and institutions. Moreover, Bourdieu’s conception of a field is flexible in application. For example, we can speak of a ‘cultural field’ in the United Kingdom, but also of the ‘British cultural field

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of commemorations of wars and genocides’. Or of a ‘political field’ in the Netherlands, but equally of the ‘Dutch political field of parliamentary decision-making on ritual slaughter without stunning’. Fields can be identified at a local, regional, national, and international level.

Actors strive to strengthen, or at least maintain, their position in a given field and to acquire ‘capital’. Bourdieu distinguishes between various forms of capital, such as economic (money, property, shares, etc.), political (political influence, power building, etc.), social (familiarity, contacts, networks, etc.), cultural (education, knowledge, skills, etc.), and symbolic capital (recognition, prestige, legitimacy, etc.). This latter category includes religious capital, within which a further subdistinction can be drawn between “religious symbolic systems (myths and ideologies), on the one hand, and religious competencies (mastery of specific practices and bodies of knowledge), on the other”. These various types of capital are convertible. Economic capital, for example, can be converted into social capital. Conversely, social capital can be ‘redeemed’ for economic capital – as can cultural or symbolic capital. Although a ‘field’ usually involves various forms of capital, in general one or other of them is dominant. The business world, for instance, is primarily concerned with the acquisition of economic capital, politics with the acquisition of political capital, and religion with the appropriation of religious capital.

Actors adopt various strategies in order to achieve their objectives in respect of positional improvement and capital acquisition. Not only consciously, but sometimes also subconsciously. They may forge coalitions with other actors to strengthen their own position, for example, or alternatively engage in conflict with them. The strategy they follow is influenced by the position they occupy. In his book Distinction, Bourdieu highlights a number of strategies employed by dominated groups to ‘climb’ socially. For example, they may try to demonstrate to more powerful groups that the capital they possess can also be of value to them, or they may imitate the dominant groups in order to gain their favour.

In addition to the objectives they pursue and the strategies they use, the functioning of actors in a field is also influenced by the capital or resources they are able and willing to deploy. The ‘habitus’ factor is also important here. This refers to “a system of durable transposable dispositions” that actors have made their own. In other words, their internalised ability to move flexibly within a field. At the institutional level, this refers to the competencies and skills institutions have mastered in order to operate successfully in a particular field. Actors who have been active in a field for a long time generally have an advantage over newcomers in this respect, because they tend to know the rules of its game better, as well as how to make effective use of them. For example, it is quite apparent that Jewish organisations in the UK and the Netherlands alike usually find it easier than Muslim organisations to operate in civil society and the corridors of power,
simply because Jews have been living in these countries for centuries whereas Muslims are relative newcomers.

Bourdieu’s theory of practice mentions several general factors which influence the ‘game’ played by the actors in social fields. To wit: their objectives in respect of positional improvement and capital acquisition and their strategies, capital, or resources and habitus. The position actors occupy within a field is important, too, and their functioning there is also determined in part by the actions of other significant players. In the case of Jewish-Muslim relations, these can include Christian churches, the media, governments, and transnational actors.

Bourdieu’s theory of practice analyses relationships between people, groups, and institutions in terms of ‘capital’, ‘power’, and ‘interest’. This is a fruitful approach when it comes to mapping dependency relationships, but falls fundamentally short when we try to analyse how groups that differ from one another primarily in terms of ethnic and/or religious ‘identity’ interact. To use Vilhelm Aubert’s terminology, between them there are often not so much ‘conflicts of interest’ as ‘conflicts of values’ or ‘conflicts of identity’. In order to properly understand the dynamics of the relationships between such groups, Bourdieu’s theory is therefore of little help and so we turn instead to social identity theory.

1.2 Social Identity Theory

In relationships between individuals, groups, and institutions, the mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ inevitably plays a role. People draw a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and organise their social lives accordingly. Social identity theory states that this mechanism is rooted in the human need for a positive and stable identity. People generally attribute more favourable qualities to the ‘ingroup’ they belong to than to the ‘outgroup’ they are not part of, as this contributes towards the development of a positive self-image. Moreover, they tend to underestimate the differences and overestimate the similarities within the ingroup, while at the same time overestimating the differences and underestimating the similarities between it and the outgroup. Consequently, ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ can easily fuel prejudice towards and stereotypes about ‘the other’.

Individuals, groups, and institutions are not compelled to succumb to the temptation to draw a polar distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, however. As the anthropologist Gerd Baumann points out, this differentiation can also be approached in other ways. Or, to use his own terminology, there are different ‘grammars of identity/alterity’. Besides a ‘binary’ grammar (‘we’ are good and ‘they’ are bad), he identifies three other types: the ‘grammar of orientalisation’ (‘we’ and ‘they’ are each other’s mirror images, in both positive and negative respects), the ‘grammar of segmentation’ (depending upon the context, ‘we’ and ‘they’ either do or do not belong together), and the ‘grammar of encompassment’ (depending upon our point of view, ‘they’
either are or are not part of ‘us’). To these, Vellenga later added the ‘grammar of disregard’ (the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are negligible and not worthy of consideration). \(^\text{10}\) Andreas Wimmer, meanwhile, lists five so-called social identity strategies used by ethnic minorities, both consciously and also often part-subconsciously, in their dealings with a dominant majority: ‘expansion’ (‘we’ are part of ‘them’), ‘contraction’ (‘we’ are no longer part of ‘them’), ‘normative inversion’ (‘we’ are morally superior to ‘them’), ‘repositioning’ (‘we’ join ‘them’), and ‘blurring’ (the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is of secondary importance). \(^\text{11}\) In his overview of social identity theory, Rupert Brown echoes Marilynn Brewer and Norman Miller in pointing out two possible strategies to improve the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’: the ‘decategorisation model’ (deconstruction of perceived differences) and the ‘common ingroup identity model’ (creation of a shared identity making the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ of minor importance). \(^\text{12}\)

A substantial body of sociopsychological research indicates that interpersonal contact between members of an ‘ingroup’ and an ‘outgroup’ often contributes towards lessening prejudice and stereotypes. \(^\text{13}\) Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp, in an article reviewing this so-called contact hypothesis, point out that that effect is due mainly to a decline in perceived threat and an increase in mutual understanding as a result of the contacts. \(^\text{14}\) And their quality seems to be more important than their quantity, \(^\text{15}\) their emotional impact more decisive than any exchange of knowledge. \(^\text{16}\) Studies by J. Eric Oliver and Janelle Wong as well as by Melissa Marschall and Dietlind Stolle support the contact hypothesis: people living in heterogeneous neighbourhoods in the United States appear to have more positive opinions about outgroups than those who reside in relatively homogeneous ones. \(^\text{17}\) Research by Mérove Gijsberts, Tom van der Meer, and Jaco Dagevos has failed to confirm this hypothesis in the Dutch context, but their results are contradicted by Bram Lancee and Jaap Dronkers, who found that having neighbours from a different ethnic group does appear to increase interethnic trust. \(^\text{18}\)

According to social identity theory, people and groups are more inclined to stereotype members of an outgroup if they feel threatened by it. \(^\text{19}\) Wim Koomen and Joop van der Pligt distinguish three types of threat: ‘realistic’, ‘symbolic’, and ‘social’. \(^\text{20}\) The ‘realistic’ category includes socio-economic threats, the threat of deprivation and discrimination, and/or physical threats due to vandalism, aggression, criminality, or the possibility of terrorist attacks. Symbolic threats are those endangering values and beliefs, while social threats are those perceived as challenging group esteem. All three types can contribute towards the formation of negative stereotypes and prejudice regarding an ‘outgroup’. Research shows that prejudice against Muslims in the Netherlands is rooted mainly in a perceived symbolic threat which is stronger than any sense of realistic threat; that is, it is derived from the perception that Muslims are a menace to Dutch identity.
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and culture. Ideologies can provide stereotypes and prejudices with a justification and thereby imbue them with greater stability.

Research indicates that the experience of threat also underlies the popularity of conspiracy theories. One of the most famous examples of an antisemitic conspiracy is *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. This document, first published in Russia in 1903 but still a popular vehicle in antisemitic discourse in the West as well as the Arab world, claims that Jewish leaders are out to overthrow Christian society and establish world domination. An example of an Islamophobic conspiracy theory can be found in the book *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* by the Anglo-Swiss writer of Jewish Egyptian origins Bat Ye’or, pseudonym of Gisèle Littman. According to this work, collaboration between (left-wing) European politicians and Arab leaders since the early 1970s has led to the mass migration of Muslims to Europe, which will eventually transform it into Islamic continent, ‘Eurabia’. In part, the aim of this ‘project’ is to destroy the state of Israel. In conspiracy theories, the negative characteristics and the power of the hostile ‘outgroup’ are greatly magnified. Marvin Zonis and Craig Joseph describe such a theory as “the belief that a number of actors join together in secret agreement, in order to achieve a hidden goal which is perceived to be unlawful or malevolent”.

Research indicates that two elements in ‘intergroup relations’ are important predictors of susceptibility to conspiracy theories. The more strongly people feel a connection with the supposedly threatened group and the greater the perceived threat, the more likely they are to accept theories accusing the ‘threatening’ group of being engaged in a conspiracy. Groups which perceive themselves as disadvantaged are, on average, the most receptive when it comes to conspiracy theories. This hypothesis has been confirmed by research among members of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands.

Studies into the mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ highlight the influence of such factors as contact, threat perception, and ‘social identity strategies’ upon the development of relationships between individuals, groups, and institutions. There is one important question they do not address, however: how do the social identity strategies utilised by groups in their dealings with each other relate to the mutual social positions they adopt? To answer this, we turn to Thurlings’ theory concerning the relationship among minorities between their perceived social positions, attitudes, and strategies.

1.3 Thurlings’ Theory of the Social Position, Attitude, and Strategy of Minorities

Dutch sociologist Jan Thurlings’ hypothesis is that the attitudes ethnic and religious minorities adopt towards their environment – and the resulting strategies – are influenced strongly by the position they occupy in relation to it. This is not so much their ‘objective’ position as their ‘subjective’ one; that
There are two key dimensions to this: perceived sociostructural and perceived sociocultural position. A minority group’s attitude towards its environment is influenced strongly by the differences it experiences from that environment in terms of power and identity. “One aspect”, Thurlings explains, “is the degree to which the group in question feels itself *relevantly different* from its environment. The other aspect is the degree to which this group feels itself *threatened* by the environment”. In the matrix formed by these two dimensions, we can distinguish four distinct positions, each linked to a particular attitude and associated behavioural strategies: open-mindedness and co-operation; militancy and conflict; fear and avoidance; and indifference and renunciation (see Figure 1.1). If the assumed power difference and perceived identity difference are both small, an attitude of open-mindedness is likely; the minority approaches its environment without prejudice and tends to adopt strategies of co-operation and dialogue. In the case of a small perceived power difference but a large perceived difference in identity, an ethnic or religious group generally has the confidence to confront the supposed hostile environment and an attitude of militancy is most likely, probably in tandem with strategies of conflict and ‘territorial acquisition’. If a group feels relatively weak and significantly distanced from its environment, an attitude of fear is to be expected and it will tend to withdraw, making strategies of avoidance, preservation, or flight the most logical to pursue. Finally, with a large apparent difference in power but a small perceived

![Figure 1.1](image-url)

*Figure 1.1 Classification of attitudes and strategies in relation to differences of power and identity with the environment.*
identity difference, an attitude of indifference is likely since a group in this position experiences no great distinctness from its surrounding cultural environment while also realising that that is hard, if not impossible, to change; this results in compliance based upon strategies of renunciation, whereby the group eventually surrenders its own identity in some or all areas of life and thus no longer distinguishes itself from its surroundings.

Thurlings’ theory establishes a link between a minority’s perceived social position on the one hand and, on the other, its attitudes towards its dominant environment and the strategies it thus adopts. We shall be applying this theory specifically to relations between the two minorities which are the focus of our research: Jews and Muslims. In line with Thurlings, we hypothesise that the attitudes they adopt towards one another are influenced strongly by the way they perceive their mutual positions in terms of ‘identity’ and ‘power’. At the various intersections between these positions are the four attitudes mentioned above: open-mindedness, militancy, fear, and indifference. And we further hypothesise that these attitudes influence the social identity strategies used by these groups in dealing with the perceived similarities and differences between them. We go into this in more detail in Section 10.3.

It would be a misunderstanding to assume that the way in which minorities – in our case Jews and Muslims – view each other is shaped exclusively by background factors pertaining specifically to their own communities, such as average educational attainment, generation or mutual contacts, and specific experiences with each other. In fact, perceptions are also influenced by external actors such as the media (traditional and social), politicians, governments, and transnational networks. As an example, if the differences in identity between Jews and Muslims are systematically magnified in the mainstream media, then there is a good chance that the two groups will also perceive those differences more acutely. Which in turn, according to the theory, will reinforce the tendency of each to adopt an attitude of fear and/or militancy towards the other and so further widen the perceived gap between them.33

The above classification should not be read as set in stone, however. The four attitudes described, and the associated strategies, are conceptual ‘ideal types’. In practice, hybrid forms are far more common. Moreover, not only can attitudes change over time but, as we shall see, the Jewish and Muslim communities at the heart of this study are so diverse in their composition that a variety of attitudes and strategies shaping their mutual relations can be found side by side within them.

1.4 Research on Contemporary Jewish-Muslim Relations in Europe

The theme of Jewish-Muslim relations has attracted increasing scholarly interest in recent years. In the past decade alone, four comprehensive
anthologies and textbooks have been published on this theme – or, more broadly, on interreligious relations. The encyclopaedic survey *A History of Jewish-Muslim Relations* was published in 2013, *The Routledge Handbook of Muslim-Jewish Relations* in 2016, and the book *Jewish-Muslim Relations: Historical and Contemporary Interactions and Exchanges* in 2019, and the same year also saw a special issue of the *Annual Review of Sociology of Religion* entitled *Interreligious Dialogue: From Religion to Geopolitics*.

Nevertheless, there has been relatively little thorough empirical research into contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in European countries, although two in-depth studies have been published about Jewish-Muslim relations in France, namely *Muslims and Jews in France* by Maud Mandel and *The Burdens of Brotherhood* by Ethan Katz. Both of these are historical in their approach. After first discussing these, we then turn our attention to various smaller-scale publications on contemporary bilateral relations between Jews and Muslims in European countries and cities. We also look at a number of studies on the phenomenon of antisemitism, including Muslim antisemitism, and Islamophobia, including Jewish Islamophobia, in Europe.

In *Muslims and Jews in France*, Mandel argues that since 2000 relations between these two communities have been characterised by tensions and polarisation, which have manifested themselves in the form of antisemitism among young Muslims and intolerance of ‘Arabs’ among French Jewry. According to Mandel, this development is not simply a side-effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but needs to be understood as the outcome of the interplay between developments in the Middle East, the positions of Jews and Muslims in North Africa under the French colonial regime and their respective positions in present-day postcolonial France. Regarding the historical background to the present conflict, Mandel points to the great inequality between the two groups in French North Africa, where Jews enjoyed far greater privileges than Muslims and maintained stronger ties with the French colonial power. During decolonisation, many hundreds of thousands of North African Muslims and 240,000 Jews immigrated into France. And once on French soil, they encountered the same inequality. According to Mandel, this inequality is a major source of the current tensions between the two groups, which often run high under the influence of violent confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians.

In *The Burdens of Brotherhood*, Katz emphasises that Jewish-Muslim relations in everyday life in France are far more rich and varied than a conflict-based narrative can satisfactorily explain. His study focuses upon, in our terminology, manifestations both of conflict and of cooperation. He points out that Muslims and Jews have similarities as well as differences. Themes of division include the often different treatment of Jews compared to Muslims in the Magreb by the French colonial government and after the end of colonial rule in France by the French government,
divided views on the Israeli-Arab conflict and contemporary antisemitism among Muslims in France. Themes of connection include shared political visions of conflict in the Middle East, resistance to xenophobia and common culinary and musical traditions. Many Jews and Muslims maintain personal ties as neighbours, friends, and sometimes as lovers. Katz seeks to understand the complex and layered history of relations between French Jews and Muslims from the end of the First World War onwards in the context of each group’s relationship with the French state and the question of ‘national belonging’ in the French republic. He writes:

(...) their interactions were always triangular, with France as the third party. That is, Jews and Muslims related to one another through their respective relationships to the French state and society and to definitions of French national and imperial belonging.\(^{39}\)

In his analysis, Katz emphasises the importance of four factors: the respective positions of Jews and Muslims in the days of the French colonial empire, their positions now as religious minorities in today’s officially secular French republic, their relationships to the French state, and the complex connections with transnational networks maintained by members of both groups.

Other researchers, such as the French anthropologist Paul Silverstein, the British anthropologists Yulia Egorova and Fiaz Ahmed, the Dutch historian Bart Wallet, and the German sociologist Gökçe Yurdakul, also highlight the influence of the historical context and of the current social positions of Jews and Muslims upon the formation and development of Jewish-Muslim relations. In 2010 Silverstein published an essay on antisemitism and Islamophobia in contemporary France.\(^{40}\) He analyses these two phenomena as products of the same historical context. In his view, both stem from structural tensions in French society which have their roots in the nation’s violent history in North Africa, decolonisation and the marginalisation of ‘Franco-Maghrebis’ in present-day France. Tensions are expressed through discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia by members of ‘established’ groups. Many young Muslim immigrants are politically very engaged with the lot of the Palestinians because in it they recognise their own situation in France. In certain situations, their opposition to the French state as an ‘ongoing’ colonising power manifests itself as anti-Zionism and antisemitism, “with Jews being iconically held up (via a false alliance with Israeli soldiers) as icons of French bourgeois success and Islamophobic practice”.\(^{41}\)

Egorova and Ahmed conducted ethnographic research between 2013 and 2015 into relations between Jews and Muslims in the UK.\(^{42}\) From this they conclude that those relations are strongly influenced by the histories of the two communities, by the prevailing discourses concerning minorities in the UK, and by local experiences. The combination of a history of disadvantage
and persecution, contemporary experiences of antisemitism and the prevailing discourse that Muslims, in particular, are a threat to their safety makes many British Jews apprehensive of contact with Muslims. And because of actual experiences of discrimination in conjunction with the discourse that Muslim immigrants are in many respects a social problem, a portion of British Muslims do not feel safe engaging freely in contact with the outside world, including Jews. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as a source of division. While many Jews are pro-Israel, partly because they see that nation as their ‘last chance’ or ‘survival kit’, many Muslims are pro-Palestinian – not least because they see the position of the Palestinians as a reflection of their own disadvantaged status in the former south Asian colonies and in present-day British society. The resulting mutual division and mistrust have prevented them from establishing contacts.

Dutch historian Wallet also points out the importance of the social-position factor. In his publication ‘Between Margin and Centre: Jews in the Postwar Netherlands’ (*Tussen marge en centrum: Joden in naoorlogs Nederland*), he draws a connection between the development of Dutch Jewry since the Second World War and shifts in the social position of Jews. Shifts which have affected relations between them and Muslims. Following a period of postwar reconstruction and social restructuring, the 1960s saw the emergence of a dominant discourse asserting that the Netherlands was a multicultural society. The Second World War, and especially the persecution of the Jews, came to steer the public moral compass as a measure of good and evil, with the tenet ‘Auschwitz never again’ one of its guiding principles. This placed the Jewish community at the heart of the multicultural Netherlands and made it the ‘moral conscience’ of the nation. In the prevailing discourse of the time, there was an almost natural affinity between Jews and other minority groups.

The idea of the multicultural society also meant that Jews and other minorities were linked almost automatically … Many Jews did feel a close connection with new minorities and saw the fight against discrimination and racism as an integral part of their own Jewish identity. In many cases antisemitism was still referred to as a separate category, but nevertheless it was one directly linked to the racism experienced by Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans in Dutch society.

Since the turn of the millennium, however, a redefinition of the Dutch national identity has taken place. The nation’s self-image as a multicultural society has been receding in favour of a view of the Netherlands as a ‘secular’ and ‘progressive’ country. In this picture, Jews are assigned a new position, albeit an ambiguous one: sometimes they are seen as an exemplary case of integration into Dutch society, but at other times as members of a religious community with values, rites, and customs more or less at odds with the majority morality. According to Wallet, this ambivalence also affects
relations between Jews and Muslims. On the one hand many Dutch Jews identify primarily with broader Dutch society and underline the need for further integration and forms of assimilation by Muslims, but on the other some feel a connection with Muslim community as a related minority.45

One specific example of the influence of the (perceived) social positions of Muslims and Jews on relations between these two groups can be found in Yurdakul's research into the debate on the practice of ritual male circumcision in Germany.46 This custom has been under pressure there for some time now; a broad alliance of lawyers, politicians, opinion leaders, and scientists want it banned because they allege that it damages the child's health and violates his right to self-determination in matters of physical integrity. Many Jews and Muslims, however, regard circumcision as an integral part of their ethnic and/or religious tradition and feel assailed by criticism of it. This shared experience of being a minority under fire brings them closer together.

Ethnographic research in Antwerp, Belgium, provides a deeper insight into the everyday relations between Jews and Muslims at the local urban level. From 2008 to 2011, anthropologist Anick Vollebergh conducted fieldwork among residents of two diverse Antwerp neighbourhoods: Oud-Borgerhout and the adjacent ‘Jewish Quarter’.47 In her research she focused upon the impact of the prevailing ‘culturalistic and secularistic politics of difference’. This has resulted on the one hand in a discourse arguing that the national and ‘native’ ‘we’ need to be protected against supposed cultural and religious ‘aliens’ and thus seeking to exclude non-white migrants and their descendants, but on the other hand in a ‘politics of cohabitation’ which encourages residents to live harmoniously with their culturally ‘different’ neighbours. Contemporary ‘culturalism’ confronts local residents with difficult questions about who ‘the other’ is, but also who they themselves are, and it influences mutual perceptions and hampers communication and interaction between groups. This also affects relations between residents with a Jewish and a Moroccan background; neither side can escape the binary distinction between ‘Belgian/Flemish/native’ and ‘foreign/Moroccan/immigrant’, which complicates their mutual communication. In this schema, Antwerp’s ultra-Orthodox Jews are sometimes classified as ‘native’ and sometimes as ‘immigrant’.

Various studies explicitly investigate how people respond to ‘trigger’ events. For example, Samuel Everett explores how Jews and Muslims in Paris have responded to the 2015 attacks there on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket by Muslim extremists.48 They, he argues, have given a strong impetus to collaborative efforts between members of the two communities: the number of initiatives to improve relations has been rising sharply, as has the number of people interested in becoming involved in them. Everett focuses upon one project in particular, instigated by the East Paris branch of the French Liberal Jewish Movement (Mouvement Juif Libéral de France, MJLF) and the Association of Muslims

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in Aubervilliers (Association des Musulmans d’Aubervilliers, AMA). In the end, however, this proved unsuccessful. Everett attributes its failure primarily to a lack of practical knowledge about establishing a dialogue on the part of the MJLF initiative group, a mismatch of religious signatures between the liberal MJLF and the orthodox AMA and the two groups’ differing agendas for the initiative.\(^49\)

Dirk Jacobs and his colleagues studied the impact of the violent Gaza conflict in December 2008 and January 2009 on ‘intergroup relations’ in Belgium.\(^50\) From a statistical analysis of a national database of reported antisemitic incidents, it appears that their number increased sharply at that time but declined again afterwards and has had no lasting effect upon relations between the various population groups in Belgium, including Jews and Muslims. A substantial proportion of the reports concerned postings on the internet.

In an article tracking registered incidents of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands since the turn of the millennium, Vellenga reaches a similar conclusion.\(^51\) Overall, since 2000 their number in the Netherlands has risen year on year, but considerable fluctuations are also observed. These correspond with ‘trigger events’ such as outbreaks of violence in the Middle East or violent attacks in the West by Muslim extremists, while the general increase in incidents is related to factors including a more acute perception of threat in the context of the Dutch multi-ethnic society and shifts in national self-image. The effects of the ‘trigger events’ upon the number of expressions of antisemitism and Islamophobia reported each year are of limited duration.

Some studies highlight the role of specific external factors such as media and governments. Media scholar Sabine Schiffer, for instance, draws attention to the influence of mass media on relations between Jews and Muslims in Germany.\(^52\) These outlets play a major role in the prevailing public framing of those relations. Schiffer has examined various statements she considers prototypical of the discourse in the German media about Jews, Muslims, and the relations between them and concludes that they often portray the two groups as homogeneous communities diametrically opposed to one another. Some media stereotypes support conspiracy theories claiming that either Judaism or Islam is striving to achieve world domination. Overall, the media statements studied by Schiffer tended to be detrimental to the establishment of dialogue between Jews and Muslims.

Mel Prideaux and Andrew Dawson have investigated relations between interfaith organisations and the government in and around the English city of Leeds.\(^53\) Their research is not so much concerned with relations between Jews and Muslims per se as with government policy on religion and its implications for interfaith organisations, which often have Muslims and Jews as members. Since the mid-1990s the UK government has sought to co-operate with religious institutions in three policy areas: sociocultural empowerment, social service provision, and social order, with an increasing
emphasis upon the last two as time has passed. According to Prideaux and Dawson, the policies of regional and local governments with regard to interfaith institutions are quite variable, which means that many of the activities undertaken by these institutions are only temporary in nature.

Finally, there are studies of collaborative efforts between Jews and Muslims in a variety of large, multicultural European cities. Elisabeth Becker has conducted ethnographic research on two organisations in Berlin: the Kreuzberg Initiative against Antisemitism (Kreuzberger Initiative Gegen Antisemitismus, KIGA), founded in 2003 by Turkish immigrant Aycan Demiral; and the Salaam Schalom Initiative, founded in 2015 by Armin Langer, a Jew born in Germany but raised in Hungary, which aims to improve relations between Jews and Muslims. Becker argues that these two local initiatives are in fact about the formation of a ‘cosmopolitan habitus’. When she then examines what factors influence this, she finds that they are in fact very similar in the two organisations. In both, for example, the leadership is aware of the difficult aspects of interfaith co-operation, there is a focus upon local or national issues with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receiving only limited attention, direct contact between Jews and Muslims is encouraged, and Jewish history in Germany, including the Holocaust, is seen as a warning against processes of exclusion affecting all kinds of minorities, including Jews but also Muslims.

In 2017 Salam Shalom was launched in Barcelona, Spain, with the aim of strengthening interfaith relations and Jewish-Muslim dialogue there. According to Zouhair El-Hairan and Rosa Martinez-Cuadros, writing in 2019, this initiative inspired by Berlin’s Salaam Schalom project was already showing promise in the short time it had existed. They expect it to make an important contribution towards combating prejudice and stereotypes in Barcelona. But to be successful, they add, it is important that the venture’s leadership leave enough room internally for ideological differences with regard to such issues as the Palestinian-Israeli question, that it continues to emphasise perceived similarities in the fields of religion, culture, and social position and that it takes account of the ethnic, philosophical, and social differences between – but also within – the diverse Jewish and Muslim communities in the city.

Roggeveen, Vellenga, and Wiegers investigated Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in the years 2014–2016. Following the war in Gaza in the summer of 2014, violent attacks on Jewish targets in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015), and Copenhagen (2015) and local incidents of online, verbal, and sometimes physical discrimination, tensions between the two groups were increasing. At the same time, though, these events actually prompted some Jews and Muslims to join forces and launch new collaborative projects or revive existing ones. The researchers draw particular attention to the way in which sensitive themes are dealt with in collaborative projects. They observed three social identity strategies being employed, depending upon the context: ‘searching for similarities’, ‘decategorising’, and ‘avoidance’.
Van Esdonk and Wiegers examined the interreligious practice of ‘scriptural reasoning’ among Jews and Muslims in London.\(^{58}\) This first emerged in the 1990s, having evolved from a Jewish tradition of studying scripture at an academic level into a bilateral or trilateral interfaith activity by Jews and/or Christians and/or Muslims at the ‘grassroots’ level. With this shift, the primary emphasis also moved away from ‘reasoning’ and more towards ‘devotion’. Even though certain Jewish and Muslim religious authorities reject the practice, scriptural reasoning is attracting growing interest, especially among liberal Jews and both progressive and more conservative Muslims. Its success is largely due to the fact that it has come to appeal to a much wider audience than the academically-minded group for whom it was originally intended.

1.5 Conclusions

In this chapter we have developed the theoretical framework within which we will analyse Jewish-Muslim relations in the Netherlands and the UK. This is based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, social identity theory, and Thurlings’ theory of the position, attitude, and strategy of minorities. From Bourdieu we derive the general perspective that Jewish-Muslim relations need be understood in relation to the contexts (‘fields’) in which they develop and the places (‘positions’) Jews and Muslims and their institutions occupy within those contexts. The theory of practice analyses their actions mainly in terms of ‘capital’, ‘power’, and ‘interest’, although it is fundamentally flawed when it comes to analysing the dynamics between groups concerned primarily with issues related directly to their own identity. It is in this light that we have turned to social identity theory, which shows that the mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ applies to Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions, and furthermore that their mutual relations are influenced by the social identity strategies they make use of in order to deal with perceived differences and similarities between them. Social identity theory does not link these strategies to the positions Jews and Muslims occupy vis-à-vis one another, however, and so in order to gain insight into that aspect we have drawn upon Thurlings’ theory concerning the relationship between the perceived positions, attitudes, and strategies of minorities and the majority. We apply this to relations between two minorities, Jews and Muslims, our assumption being that the attitudes they adopt towards one another – and the associated social identity strategies – are influenced by their mutual perceptions in terms of ‘identity’ and ‘power’.

As mentioned earlier, those factors of potential importance identified in the literature can be divided analytically into three categories: institutional, positional, and contextual factors. Institutional factors relate to the characteristics and the activities of Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations,\(^{59}\) and they include ideology, social identity strategies, and practical matters such as initiators, the formation of organisations and resources.
Positional factors relate directly to the perceived sociostructural and sociocultural positions Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations adopt with respect to each other. And contextual factors are forces affecting Jewish-Muslim relations from the wider environment, including historical influences, mainstream Christian churches, the media, and governments. Moreover, specific happenings in the contextual field can function as ‘trigger events’.

In practice, these three types of factors interact. To take one example: Jewish-Muslim relations in London or Amsterdam are influenced by an interplay of many different factors in response to outbreaks of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The effect of these contextual ‘trigger events’ is shaped first of all by their portrayal in the media. ‘Framing’ and ‘priming’ occur. On top of that, the choices made by the Jewish and Muslim communities in these cities as to whether or not to allow that conflict to affect their mutual relations are hugely important. These choices may in turn be influenced by the positions they adopt in respect of one another. If each feels threatened by the other, opposing views concerning the events in question are more likely to lead to tensions than when there is no perceived threat. If the communities are on good terms and in open contact with one another, such events can even act as a stimulus to strengthen their ties. How the leaders of one community talk about the other also determines whether its members feel threatened. And the attitude of the local authorities is important, too. They may simply follow reactions in their city to events in the Middle East from a distance, but they may also decide to summon representatives from the local Muslim and Jewish communities for talks in order to prevent the conflict spreading to their own city. Their position, in turn, is dependent in part upon the information they receive from these communities about the internal tensions the events have generated. In short, the institutional, positional, and contextual factors mentioned above interact: in practice, Jewish-Muslim relations are the outcome of a dynamic interplay between all three types.

Notes
2 Bourdieu 1987, 121.
3 Verter 2003, 157. For the application of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework to the functioning of religious groups in pluralistic contexts, see Lene Kühle 2012.
4 Bourdieu 1979, 384–386.
5 Bourdieu 1990, 53.
6 Aubert 1971, 152–177.
9 Baumann 2004, 18.
10 Vellenga 2008.
11 Wimmer 2008a; 2008b.
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14 Pettigrew & Tropp 2008.
16 Pettigrew & Tropp 2008. This finding confirms the role that emotions, particularly fear and anxiety, play in intergroup relations. Cf. Miller, Smith & Mackie 2004.
17 Oliver & Wong 2003; Marschall & Stolle 2004.
19 Riek, Mania & Gaertner 2006; Koomen & Van der Pligt 2016, 37–47.
24 See the 2006 edition by Marsden.
26 Bat Ye’or 2005.
27 Other examples of Islamophobic conspiracy theories can be found in Bawer (2006), Caldwell (2009), Phillips (2006), and Solomon & Al Maqdisi (2009).
31 The importance of the ‘subjective’ rather than the ‘objective’ position is confirmed by research on the so-called integration paradox in respect of minority groups. Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy describe this in their study of radicalisation among young Muslims in the Netherlands as follows: “The more a person is oriented towards ‘native’ society and wants to integrate, the more he or she is sensitive to cultural conflicts and phenomena of exclusion” (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy 2006, 202). See also the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) report ‘Difference in the Netherlands’ (Verschil in Nederland) (Dagevos & Huijnk 2014, 270–276). The more integrated members of minority groups are, and the more they orient themselves towards the dominant majority, the more strongly they experience exclusion and discrimination by members of that majority and so the more likely they are eventually to turn their back on it. The ‘subjective’ position is more important than the ‘objective’ one in explaining their behaviour.
33 Vellenga 2009, 26; Shadid 2009.
34 Meddeb & Stora 2013; Meri 2016; Aslan & M. Rausch 2019; Giordan & Lynch 2019. See also Hughes 2019.
36 Mandel 2014.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Katz 2015.
39 Ibid., 5; Katz 2013, 501.
41 Ibid., 4.
43 Wallet 2017.
44 Ibid., 446.
References


2 Historical Roots

In this chapter we describe the historical context of the Muslim and Jewish population groups in London and Amsterdam, and of the relationships between them. In so doing, we try to do justice to the complex pattern of interdependent local, national, and transnational developments which form that context. We distinguish four time periods: the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Section 2.1), the nineteenth century (Section 2.2), the twentieth century up to and including the Second World War (Section 2.3), and the remainder of the century from the war until the Rushdie affair in the late 1980s (Section 2.4). It was out of that that the first structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations developed, particularly in the United Kingdom; in the Netherlands, as we shall see, this moment came more than ten years later.

2.1 The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Both London and Amsterdam have histories giving them something of a distinctive status within the nations of which they are a part. For Amsterdam, this began as the city developed into the commercial, financial, and maritime centre of the world during the seventeenth century, with mercantile links to all quarters of the globe, a substantial commodities market, and the world’s first stock exchange.1 Due largely to immigration, the population grew rapidly from 50,000 people in 1600 to 200,000 in 1700.2 Among the newcomers were Sephardic Jews, who had fled from Portugal and Spain, and Ashkenazi Jews hailing from central and eastern Europe.3 Each group formed its own religious congregations.4 Their arrival marked a new beginning for the history of Judaism in the Netherlands; its previous Jewish community had disappeared in the Middle Ages in the face of segregation, oppression, and persecution.5 Although Jews were not fully integrated in the Dutch Republic and did not enjoy full civil rights, they were able to practise their religion openly in a number of places, including Amsterdam, first at home synagogues and later by constructing prominent places of worship of their own. In 1671 the Ashkenazi Synagogue was built.
near present-day Jonas Daniël Meijerplein and in 1675 the Portuguese Synagogue, the Esnoga – or Snoge for short – opened across the street. On the other side of the North Sea, London was experiencing comparable economic and demographic growth. By 1700 it had become the largest city in Europe, with 550,000 inhabitants. Here, too, there was a history of medieval oppression resulting in the disappearance of the Jewish community. After the English Civil War (1642–1651), however, Jews again began to settle in the country. This new start to London’s Jewish history was actually closely linked to the revival of Amsterdam’s Sephardic community: the Amsterdam rabbi Menasseh ben Israel (1604–1657) played an important role in obtaining permission from the authorities for Sephardic Jews to settle in the English capital. In 1701 the Sephardic Bevis Marks Synagogue was consecrated there, built on the model of the Snoge in Amsterdam. Both cities also had a Muslim presence in the seventeenth century, in the form of merchants, diplomats, and even converts to Islam (so-called renegades), but no Muslim communities as such formed in them – with a few exceptions, such as the brief settlement in Amsterdam of the so-called Moriscos, who had been expelled from Spain around 1609.

In 1602 the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) was founded with its headquarters in Amsterdam and ‘chambers’ in several other provinces. Its activities brought the Republic into close contact with Muslims in India and the East Indies. The VOC’s English counterpart, the East India Company (EIC), had received its charter from Queen Elizabeth I in 1600. Both organisations initially focused primarily upon trade, but over time also established and governed permanent colonies in Asia. They also brought migrants to Europe; settlers in London, for example, included ‘lascars’ (Indian sailors employed by the EIC), servants, and members of the Indian elite.

The Republic had a so-called public church, the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church (Gereformeerde Kerk), but this was not ‘established’ in the way the Church of England was, with its close ties to the state and crown. In both cases, though, other religious groups were treated as ‘dissenters’. These included Christian denominations such as the Lutherans in the Republic and the Puritans in England, but also the Jews in both countries. Indeed, government relations in Great Britain with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, established in 1760, were modelled on those with Christian dissenters. Muslims in the Republic, too, while small in number, were also treated as dissenters.

The Amsterdam of the seventeenth century evolved into a cosmopolitan city where diversity and freedom of religion were important characteristics. This tolerance was based upon a mixture of ‘sentiment, tradition and expediency’. Jews, in the Republic as well as in England, were able to live according to their own legal and religious systems under the auspices of their own governing councils, the Ma’amad in the case of the Sephardic congregations and the Kahal, its Ashkenazi equivalent. Unless they
converted to Christianity, those banished by one of these bodies found themselves in a sort of religious limbo. Perhaps the most famous case of this kind is the philosopher Baruch de Spinoza: excommunicated by Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jewish community in 1656, he became probably the first person not to belong to a religious community in a public sense.

The Sephardic community in Amsterdam was in close contact with Jews in the Islamic world. Indeed, about 7 per cent of its members came originally from the Middle East and North Africa. A number of rabbis in Amsterdam originated from Istanbul and Fez.

During the course of the eighteenth century, Amsterdam lost its economic importance and London took over as the world’s financial centre. With its decline, and that of the Republic as a whole, many of the city’s Jews fell into poverty. In 1796, under the new Batavian Republic, Jews were finally formally granted the same civil rights as all other Dutch citizens.

2.2 The Nineteenth Century

The Muslim histories of Amsterdam and London alike changed dramatically when the Netherlands and the UK gained large numbers of Muslim subjects during the colonial period. In 1816, under the terms of the Treaty of London of 13 August 1814, the British restored the East Indies to the Dutch following their occupation during the Napoleonic wars. Amsterdam played an important role in relations with this far eastern colony, not least as home to the headquarters of the Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, NHM), which from 1800 had replaced the VOC as the most important mercantile organisation in ‘the East’. In 1858 the British Crown took over the government of India and the other former EIC colonies in south and south-east Asia.

Not much is known about the Muslim presence in Amsterdam during this period. There seems to be no evidence that any mosques were established. The city’s Jewish community was by now well-established, though, and continued its process of emancipation over the course of the nineteenth century. With the foundation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, the equal rights granted to Jews under the Batavian Republic were confirmed. Their position was further strengthened by Prime Minister Johan Rudolph Thorbecke’s constitutional reform of 1848. It would be a long time, however, before they were fully able to exercise these rights. For many years Jews remained excluded from certain organisations such as learned societies and social clubs. Antisemitism was an everyday phenomenon, albeit in a relatively mild and moderate form compared with the situation in many other European countries. And many Dutch Jews lived in miserable conditions. Destitution did decline from about 1870 onwards, but it never disappeared completely.

In the early nineteenth century, much of the British Jewish community also lived in abject poverty. Many managed to escape this condition,
however, and by 1875 the majority could be categorised as middle class. In the middle of the century, large numbers of Jews emigrated from Germany and the Netherlands to the UK in search of a better future. A group of Jews originally from Amsterdam took the initiative to found the Sandys Row Synagogue in the East End of London. Then, from 1881 onwards, a huge wave of refugees began arriving. The 120,000–150,000 eastern European Jews who settled in the UK between 1881 and 1914, driven by poverty and fleeing pogroms, resurrected the image of the British community as one of impoverished immigrants. And their arrival provoked resistance. The historian Hugh McLeod writes, “Negative stereotypes of Jews were widespread in Victorian England, and at certain times and places, for instance in London at the time of anti-immigration panic of 1900–1905, these could inform a vigorous antisemitic polemic”. Meanwhile, the number of Muslims in the UK also rose, partly due to the arrival of sailors and traders from Arab and other Muslim majority countries, to an estimated 10,000 or so by the end of the nineteenth century.

Under the influence of imperialism and colonialism, relations between population groups in the Middle East changed between the middle of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The traditional dhimmi/millet system was replaced almost everywhere by one in which minorities became citizens of nation-states. Jews and Christians were emancipated, but new questions arose about their role as citizens of the emerging states. In Europe, meanwhile, Zionism began to flourish in response to new waves of antisemitism and under the influence of rising nationalism, prompting a wave of Jewish migration to Palestine. Theodor Herzl’s The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) appeared in 1896 and the First Zionist Congress took place in 1897. Zionist societies were founded in both the Netherlands and the UK. Initially, there was little support for this movement among Jews in either country; in Britain, the Board of Deputies proved a particular bastion of resistance. Around the turn of the century, Sir Abdullah Quilliam, a convert to Islam, spoke on several occasions about the relationship between Muslims and Jews as well as the position of Jews in the Islamic world. He also repeatedly expressed his support for the Zionist movement, for which the movement was grateful.

During the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century, the process known as ‘pillarisation’ (‘verzuiling’) began in the Netherlands: Roman Catholics, Protestants, and, to a lesser extent, socialists and liberals each started organising their own wide-ranging and parallel, but strictly separate, networks of social and political organisations. No distinctive Jewish ‘pillar’ formed, however, due to the relatively modest size of the community, although there was certainly a Dutch Jewish ‘subculture’. The position of Muslims in the Netherlands did not change much during the nineteenth century; their numbers were always very small. The Dutch census of 1879 is the first to mention them, revealing that 13 male and 36 female ‘Mahomedans’ were living in the country in that year. In the UK, too,
denominational identities played an increasingly important role in society towards the end of the nineteenth century and in early years of the twentieth. Deep divisions emerged between ‘church’ (the Church of England) and ‘chapel’ (Protestant nonconformists), as well as between both of these strands of Protestantism and Roman Catholics.29 But this did not lead to the emergence of ‘pillars’ as in the Netherlands. British Jews had their own organisations in a variety of domains and the first Islamic organisations were also founded at about this time, among them the Pan-Islamic Movement, the Islamic Society, the Woking Muslim Mission, and the British Muslim Society.30

2.3 The Twentieth Century up to and Including the Second World War

From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, the nature of the Muslim presence in European countries, including the Netherlands and the UK, started to change. Informed by discussions among modernist Muslims in Europe, ideas of a ‘European’ Islam began to emerge and the First European Muslim Congress was held in Geneva in 1935.31

In the interwar period between 1918 and the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940, small numbers of Muslims settled in the Netherlands as students, traders, and Ahmadi missionaries and formed their first associations.32 But not until ten years after the Second World War, in 1955, would the country’s first mosque be built, in The Hague.33 The following year, a second opened in Balk, Friesland, for a group of some five hundred former colonial military personnel of South Moluccan origin.34

While the Netherlands remained neutral during the First World War, the UK was one of the principal combatants. Soldiers of Muslim origin joined the British and imperial armies in large numbers. The community’s geographical distribution in Britain also began to change as, in addition to port cities, industrial and textile towns in the Midlands and the north began to attract Muslim workers and their families.35 Around the end of the nineteenth century, several prominent British aristocrats converted to Islam, including Sir William Henry Quilliam (1856–1932), Sir Archibald Hamilton (1876–1939), and Lord Rowland Headley (1855–1935).36 In 1926 the Fazl Mosque in Southfields, Wandsworth, became London’s first purpose-built Muslim place of worship; between 1984 and 2019, this would house the headquarters of the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, an Indian modernist Islamic group.37 The East London Mosque was consecrated in 1940 and four years later, in exchange for an Anglican cathedral in Cairo, King George VI donated land for the Regent’s Park Mosque.38 But that only finally opened more than three decades later, in 1977.

The end of the First World War, which among other things heralded the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, drew new dividing lines in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration, named after British Foreign Secretary Arthur
James Balfour who signed it in 1917, contained pledges to two groups: Jews on the one hand and predominantly Muslim and Christian Palestinians on the other. For the former it promised “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and for the latter “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. During the interwar period, these two positions were not necessarily incompatible. Some Jews and Muslims regarded a shared society in Palestine as an ideal solution. Others, however, saw an inherent contradiction between the political ideals being expressed by Zionists and those of Arabic speakers, both Muslim and Christian. In short, during this period different models were circulating among both Jews and Muslims with respect to the relationship between nation, religion, and ethnicity in Palestine and the wider Middle East. The rise of Nazism and antisemitism in Europe, however, drove a wedge between Jews and Muslims in the region. Emerging revivalist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which sought to halt secularisation and moves to separate Islam and state in Middle Eastern countries, also turned against Zionism and the Jews. Jews in Europe followed these developments, being kept informed by their coreligionists in the Arab world through their own media and other channels, just as Jews in the Middle East were closely monitoring events in Europe.

Between the wars, substantial numbers of British Jews managed to escape poverty to become part of the lower-middle and middle classes. Many moved from the East End to neighbourhoods in North London. In Amsterdam, a similar movement took place: upwardly mobile Jews relocated from the old ‘Jewish Quarter’ in the eastern part of the city centre to adjacent but more comfortable parts of east Amsterdam or the Rivierenbuurt neighbourhood. More affluent German Jewish refugees in the 1930s preferred the south of the city. Between 1933 and September 1939, some 55,000 Jews fled to the UK to escape the Nazis, whose reign of terror against them reached its apotheosis on Kristallnacht, 9 November 1938. Although Dutch government policy was to stem the flow of refugees and keep their numbers as low as possible, which included barring many from entering the country, approximately 15,000 Jews with German nationality were living in the Netherlands by the time war broke out with the May 1940 invasion.

Throughout Europe, Nazism and fascism were disastrous for the Jews. In the territories occupied by Nazi Germany, the Jewish population was marginalised, forced into ghettos, and eventually transported to the death camps, where a total of six million Jews were murdered alongside Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, people with mental disabilities and political prisoners, including many communists. At the outbreak of the Second World War, approximately 140,000 Jews were living in the Netherlands – more than 80,000 of them in Amsterdam. The majority of this community was deported and killed. After the war only 28,000 remained in the entire country,
including about 6,000 in the capital. This persecution did not go entirely unopposed, though. As well as armed resistance, which included the Jewish resistance movement, Amsterdam was the scene of a unique public protest against the anti-Jewish measures imposed by the occupying forces: the February Strike of 25 and 26 February 1941. The prominent role played by communists in that confrontation afforded them a great deal of legitimacy in Jewish circles in the postwar years, as we shall see in Chapter 8. By contrast, although the Jewish community in London suffered greatly from the German bombing of the city, it was spared the Shoah. During the conflict, this community emerged as a beacon of support for fellow Jews in occupied Europe.

2.4 From the Second World War to the Rushdie Affair

After the war, both countries entered a period of recovery and reconstruction. Prewar structures, such as the ‘pillarised’ sociopolitical system in the Netherlands, were largely restored. Many Dutch Jews returning from the camps or from hiding places encountered a chilly reception from their fellow countrymen and the government; there was no question that officialdom would afford them any special treatment because of the particular suffering they had been through. Within the framework of pillarisation, the badly battered and traumatised Jewish community was expected to rebuild its own infrastructure. In this endeavour, the Organisation of Jewish Communities in the Netherlands (Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap, NIK) would play a central role. In the UK, London included, the Jewish community had a smoother resumption of its activities after the war. Synagogues were repaired and prewar Jewish refugees became permanent settlers. A trend of migration from the countryside to the city made London, even more than before, the heart of British Jewish life. In 1950, some 58 per cent of British Jews were living in the metropolis. By 1995 this figure had risen to 72 per cent. Despite Nazism’s defeat in Europe, British Jews continued to encounter fascism and antisemitism after the war.

Meanwhile, both countries were also dealing with a process of decolonisation. Indonesia – the former Dutch East Indies – declared its independence from the Netherlands on 17 Augustus 1945. India gained independence from the UK in 1947 and was partitioned, with Pakistan becoming a separate Islamic state. Later, in 1971, East Pakistan became the separate republic of Bangladesh. In all these countries the proclamation of independence instigated flows of migration, which included Muslims – and sometimes small numbers of Jews – coming to the UK and the Netherlands.

The proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948 heralded a new phase in relations between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East and Europe. For most of the former it meant the creation of their own national ‘homeland’ and was thus greeted with great joy. Large numbers of those living in the
Netherlands and the UK joined the *aliyah*, the wave of immigration to Israel, to build up the new state. For the Palestinians that same proclamation meant fleeing, displacement and a life in refugee camps in neighbouring countries or in the diaspora, or alternatively accepting minority status in Israel. Significantly, the events of 1948–1949 are referred to by many Muslims as the ‘Nakba’ or ‘catastrophe’ and are commemorated as such each year.\(^5^9\)

In the immediate postwar years, secular nationalism remained the dominant ideology in both Israel and Islamic nations. On all sides, proposed solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were rooted in nationalist thinking. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded in 1964. For many Palestinians and their allies, armed struggle against Israel became their preferred means of resolving the situation.\(^6^0\) During the Six-Day War in June 1967, however, the armies of the neighbouring Arab states proved no match for the Israeli forces and they occupied not only the Sinai peninsula and the Golan Heights, but also Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount. More than a million Palestinians came under Israeli control. This conflict, a disaster for the Islamic countries involved, marked a turning point in the legitimacy of secular nationalism in the Arab world.\(^6^1\)

For many in the UK and the Netherlands, the outcome of the Six-Day War heralded the beginning of a shift in their perception of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. No longer was Israel seen as an ‘underdog’ – it was now a ‘top dog’.\(^6^2\) Since then, criticism of Israel has not always been limited to the political policies of its government but has sometimes also questioned its very legitimacy as a nation.\(^6^3\) Particularly in left-wing political circles, there is disagreement about whether Israel should be seen as an isolated democracy struggling against a preponderance of authoritarian, corrupt, and oppressive Arab regimes or as an imperialist power intent on colonising Palestine.\(^6^4\) It was from this latter perspective that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 3379 on 10 November 1975, stating that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”.\(^6^5\) That resolution was revoked in 1991.\(^6^6\) In the wake of the 1982 massacres by the phalangists in the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila during the Israeli siege of Beirut, broad support for Israel further declined in both the UK and the Netherlands.\(^6^7\)

By the end of the 1950s, the economies of the UK and the Netherlands were booming and both were suffering severe shortages of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. In response, they began to encourage large-scale immigration, in part from Islamic countries. Until 1962 citizens of the British colonies and Commonwealth nations were able to enter the UK freely, but from then on barriers were put in place to restrict migrant numbers.\(^6^8\) The first immigrants from India and Pakistan were mainly men who came alone to the UK to work, although from the late 1960s their wives and children began to join them. Large numbers also arrived
from Cyprus and sub-Saharan Africa. From the late 1970s they were followed by Iranians, Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and later refugees and asylum seekers from Bosnia, Uganda, Somalia, and other African countries, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Syria.\(^69\)

Starting in the early 1960s, tens of thousands of male Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers arrived in the Netherlands every year.\(^70\) After the Family Reunification Act entered force in 1974, immigration by their wives and children also began in earnest.\(^71\) When the Dutch government announced in the early 1970s that the colony of Surinam would become independent in 1975, the number of Surinamese Muslim immigrants, mostly of Indian and Javanese descent, increased sharply as well.\(^72\) Since the end of the 1970s, in addition to these economic and ‘colonial’ migrants the Netherlands has seen a steady influx of refugees and asylum seekers from Islamic regions and countries, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Syria.\(^73\)

For these newcomers, migration from an Islamic country of origin to the UK or the Netherlands represents a major transition in terms of cultural, social, political, and religious environment.\(^74\) Since the Muslim migrants in the UK largely originate from former British colonies, they are generally familiar to some extent at least with the mores and the language of their new home. The same does not apply to their counterparts in the Netherlands, though, the majority of whom come from Turkey and Morocco – nations with which the Dutch have no particular historical ties, except for the treaties of friendship concluded between the Republic with Morocco (1610) and the High Porte (1611) in the framework of the joint struggle against Spain. But at neither destination are those coming from Islamic countries likely to be familiar with its prevailing politico-religious principle – ‘partial establishment’ in the UK or ‘principled pluralism’ in the Netherlands – with its right to freedom of religion and belief or with the right to criticise religion.\(^75\)

The arrival and settlement of large numbers of immigrants from the Islamic world has gone hand in hand with a process of institutionalisation in both countries.\(^76\) This began earlier in the UK than it did in the Netherlands. Networks of organisations started emerging in various domains, including religion, education, and political representation, initially mainly at the local level but later also nationally. The religious networks are generally organised along ethnic lines and by denominational affiliation. Jan Rath and his colleagues have compared the conditions for institutionalisation in the two nations up until the 1990s and conclude that they were more favourable for Muslims in the Netherlands than in the UK, where in practice the central government “more than once adopted an intransigent and dismissive attitude”.\(^77\)

During the 1960s, the postwar social structures and cultures of both countries came under pressure. In the Netherlands the system of ‘pillarisation’ went into rapid decline. The Netherlands and the UK experienced
democratisation and the emergence of an ‘expressive individualist’ ethos, which promoted such values as individual freedom of choice, equality in interpersonal relationships, and freedom in the field of intimate relations and sexuality.\textsuperscript{78} As a result of large-scale migration, the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of the population increased and both nations developed a policy of multiculturalism, with the aim of integrating newcomers rather than assimilating them. According to the UK’s then Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, integration does not mean “the loss, by immigrants, of their own natural characteristics and culture” but “equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”.\textsuperscript{79} Under multiculturalism, the Jewish and recent immigrant communities alike are considered ethnic groups with their own cultures. In the Netherlands, the Second World War – and especially the persecution of the Jews – was central to the new public moral consensus.\textsuperscript{80} The moral tenet ‘Auschwitz never again’ became the benchmark for much of the discourse around political and ethnic questions. Resistance against totalitarianism, the exclusion of minorities, and social inequality were consistently set against the backdrop of the Shoah.

The Dutch Jewish community was subject to the same broad trends as the rest of the nation from the 1960s onwards: individualisation, secularisation, generational conflicts, and the rise of dissenting movements. The number of ‘halachic’ (observant) Jews remained relatively stable, at around the 35,000 mark.\textsuperscript{81} As the community followed developments in the wider Jewish world, so the number of different currents within it grew. At the same time, individualisation was also on the rise and Jewish identity was becoming less tied to religion.\textsuperscript{82} Jewish cultural life, in which both religious and non-religious Jews participated, flourished. The memory of the horrors of the Second World War, the bond with Israel, the commitment to support oppressed Jews in the Soviet Union and concerns about antisemitism were shared by all Jews, even though divided on religious matters. Jews were found predominantly in the upper socio-economic strata of the Dutch population.\textsuperscript{83} In the first few decades after the war, about 40 per cent of them voted for parties of the ‘left’: Labour (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) or Communist (Communistische Partij Nederland, CPN) and its successor, the Green Left (GroenLinks). Roughly 40 per cent voted for the ‘right’, usually meaning the liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), and around 20 per cent ‘other’ or not.\textsuperscript{84} The PvdA has traditionally been strongest in the large cities, the VVD in smaller towns and rural areas.

British Jewry, too, has faced much the same cultural and religious developments since the 1960s: secularisation, individualisation, activism, and generational conflict.\textsuperscript{85} Todd Endelman characterises its postwar evolution using the term ‘fracturing’.\textsuperscript{86} The UK’s Jewish population shrank from approximately 410,000 in the 1950s to about 300,000 by the year 2010.\textsuperscript{87} Bucking the trend of secularisation, the ultra-Orthodox movement has
actually been growing, though. The community as a whole experienced an enormous social and economic uplift in the second half of the twentieth century, resulting in the average educational attainment and income levels of British Jews in the 1990s being significantly higher than those of the population as a whole. These advances have been accompanied by a shift in political preferences. In the interwar and immediate postwar years, most British Jews backed the Labour Party at a time when the Conservatives were viewed as standing for antisemitism, anti-Zionism, social privilege, and inherited wealth. But due in part to their own rise up the socio-economic ladder, but also in part because of Labour’s more critical attitude towards Israeli policy after the Six-Day War, a section of British Jewry subsequently distanced itself from that party. Particularly during the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, many switched their allegiance to her Conservative Party. Not only because it pursued a strongly pro-Israel foreign policy, but also for its emphasis upon ‘middle-class’ values such as self-reliance, hard work, and loyalty to one’s fellow man. Jewish leaders including the then chief rabbi, Immanuel Jakobovits, explicitly supported Thatcherite Conservatism.

In the 1980s, support began to grow in the Islamic world for the introduction of ‘new’ politicoreligious constitutional models and the ‘old’ secular ones lost ground. These new models implied that the answers to political problems should be sought in a faith-based system of governance. Or, as the Muslim Brotherhood put it, ‘Islam is the solution’. Secular nationalism was increasingly seen as outdated. Emergent politicoreligious movements gave this line of thinking a radical twist of their own; no longer did they rule out rising up against political leaders who, in their eyes, were failing to abide by Islamic religious law. As far as the radicals were concerned, those leaders were not properly fulfilling their duty to let Islam prevail in political matters. In Israel, too, the secular views of the Labour Party gave way to the more religiously oriented ideas espoused by Likud. In 1987 the First Intifada broke out in the Palestinian territories, although this subsided after 1990. It was just as the uprising was beginning that the Islamic resistance movement Hamas was founded.

Radical Islamic ideas developed in both Sunni and Shia circles. The Iranian revolution of 1979 resulted in the establishment of a Shia religious regime in Teheran. ‘Governance of the religious scholar’ (wilayat al-faqih – a ‘faqih’ is an Islamic religious scholar) was the slogan under which it overthrew the secular regime of the shah and, after an internal struggle, brought the ayatollahs to power. In 1981 Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The ‘fatwa’ (Islamic legal advice or ruling) issued in 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini, calling for the killing of the British Indian author Salman Rushdie over his novel The Satanic Verses, caused shock waves throughout the world, including the UK and the Netherlands. Muslims in various British cities demonstrated their support for the Iranian leader’s appeal and set fire to
Rushdie’s book. In the Netherlands a few hundred people took to the streets in The Hague and Rotterdam to back the fatwa, burning an effigy of the writer and carrying a banner reading ‘Death to Rushdie’. The fatwa, but even more so the demonstrations, evoked huge indignation in both countries. According to Sophie Gilliat-Ray, the long-term importance of the Rushdie affair cannot be overstated. First of all, it set in motion a process of awareness-raising among Muslims and non-Muslims in both countries. Immigrants from Islamic countries have since become more aware of their religious identity and non-Muslims have often realised for the first time that the great majority of these newcomers – who have now settled permanently – are practising followers of a relatively unknown religion, Islam. In addition, the affair made it clear that there is a great deal of misunderstanding between the different groups involved. Philip Lewis shows the extent of this in his analysis of the events in Bradford, with, for instance, Muslims often being portrayed as barbarians by non-Muslims unable to understand their sensitivity in religious matters. Thirdly, the Rushdie affair shows that the legal systems in the UK and the Netherlands which regulate free speech, blasphemy, and equality before the law have proven inadequate in resolving the conflict to the satisfaction of any of the parties involved. According to the historian Eliza Filby, in the UK the Rushdie affair unequivocally revealed “the lack of legal redress for the nation’s second largest religious minority, the limitations of multiculturalism and the problems concerning the privileged place for Christianity on the statute book in a secular plural nation.”

Notes
3 Israel 2017.
4 The Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews were very different: they shared neither a language nor a geographical origin, and they also belonged to different social classes. Most Sephardim (‘Hispanic’ Jews) spoke Portuguese and could be categorised as relatively upper class; the Ashkenazim (‘German’ Jews) were mainly working-class Yiddish speakers. Over time, each of these groups developed its own synagogues and cemeteries in Amsterdam, as well as its own meat market (Penninx & Schrover 2002, 288).
5 Speet 2017.
7 Braudel 1990, 343.
8 Endelman 2002, 15–16.
9 Ibid., 20–26.
10 Matar 1998; De Koning, Ryad & Wiegers 2022 (in press).
12 Langham 2010, 8–20; Elshayyal 2018, 92.
13 De Koning, Ryad & Wiegers 2022 (in press)
14 Van Rooden 2001, 132.
16 García-Arenal & Wiegers 2014, 41.
62 Framework, Background, and Subject

18 Ibid., 2017, 287.
20 Wallet 2017a, 226.
22 McLeod 2016, 228.
23 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 32; 42.
26 Geaves 2010, 142–143.
28 CBS, undated.
29 McLeod 2016.
30 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 34.
31 Ryad, 2012.
32 Ryad 2013; Stutje 2016.
33 Ryad 2013, 76.
34 Ibid., 77.
35 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 43.
36 Ibid., 39–43. Sir William Henry Quilliam was the founder of the Liverpool Muslim Institute and Lord Rowland Headley played an important role as president of the British Muslim Society. As a representative of British Muslims, in 1916 he advocated the establishment of a mosque in London, to be funded by the British government, in memory of fallen Muslim soldiers (Elshayyal 2018, 45–48).
37 The first purpose-built mosque in Britain, in Woking, was completed in 1889 (Ansari 2018, 138–148).
38 Elshayyal, 2018, 19.
39 Smith 2017, 93.
40 Admiraal 2021.
42 Santing 2020, 392–406.
48 The figure of 140,000 Dutch Jews is taken from Blom & Cahen 2017, 280–281. That of 80,000 Amsterdam Jews comes from Cohen 2009, 239.
49 These figures are cited in Wallet & Berg 2010, 12; Cohen 2009, 239.
52 Wallet 2017b, 409–412.
53 Ibid., 427–430;
54 Endelman 2002, 231.
55 Ibid., 232–233.
56 The Netherlands refused to recognise the new republic. Bloody military confrontations followed. Not until 27 December 1949, by an act known as the ‘transfer of sovereignty’ (Soevereiniteitsoverdracht), did the Dutch finally accept Indonesia’s independence.
57 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 44–552; Aussems 2016, 3. Before the war, the small Jewish community in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia was estimated to number
3,000–5,000 people. Following the declaration of independence, many of these Jews moved to the Netherlands, the United States, or Israel (Wallet 2017b, 472).

58 Smith 2017, 162–257.
59 Ibid., 197–203; 561.
60 Sayech 1970.
61 Laron 2018.
63 Alderman 1989, 117.
64 Alderman 1989, 117; Wallet 2017b, 450. One example of a Dutch group on the political ‘left’ which explicitly advocates Palestinian political rights and expresses solidarity with the PLO is the Netherlands Palestine Committee (Nederlands Palestina Komitee, NPK). Founded in 1969, this organisation sees itself as part of a global movement against exploitation, oppression, discrimination, and racism. From this perspective, the NPK supports the Palestinians’ struggle to secure their rights as enshrined in international law and human rights treaties. It regards the Zionist project in Palestine as a systematic colonisation of the territory, inextricably linked to the expulsion, oppression, and marginalisation of the indigenous Palestinian population and the destruction of its society. See: https://palestina-komitee.nl/over-ons/
69 Gilliat-Ray 20011, 44–53.
70 Landman 2002, 98–100; Bouras 2012; Aussems 2016.
71 As far as immigration from Morocco is concerned, Asis Aynan questions the idea that migrant workers came to the Netherlands with the intention of staying only temporarily. In his book ‘One Pea Doesn’t Make a Soup’ (Een erwt maakt geen snert, 2020), he points out that a substantial number of them were Rifians for whom emigration was an opportunity to flee the Moroccan regime after it had crushed the Rif uprising of 1958. In his view, because of that they never had any intention of returning to Morocco in due course.
72 Around 1975, some members of the small Jewish community in Surinam, of both Sephardic and Ashkenazi origin, also emigrated to the United States, Israel, and the Netherlands (Wallet 2017b, 472).
73 Aussems 2016, 4.
74 Olivier Roy, the French political scientist and expert on Islam, points out that immigration from Islamic countries to secular or Christian Europe has had far-reaching consequences for the way Muslims experience their religious identity. He describes this in terms of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘deculturalisation’ (Roy 1994, 257–289). In their Islamic countries of origin, religion is usually totally intrinsic to the nation and its culture. Migration breaks the link between religious identity and nation, region and culture. Among Muslim immigrants in Europe, and certainly for the second and third generations, religion has transformed – in Roy’s words – from a ‘culture’ to a ‘code’; that is, in principle something Muslims can experience anywhere, independently of place and culture, so also outside the Islamic world (Roy 1994, 265–270).
78 De Rooy 2009,55–64; McLeod 2013, 257–265.
79 Jenkins 1967.
References


3 Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam

Now that we have outlined the histories of the Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam up until about 1990, in this chapter we sketch portraits of each of these groups. First Jews in London (Section 3.1), then Muslims in London (Section 3.2), Jews in Amsterdam (Section 3.3), and Muslims in Amsterdam (Section 3.4). In order to better highlight the similarities and differences between them, we end with direct comparisons on a number of key points: size, recognisable identity, organisation, social position, and transnational ties (Section 3.5). The next chapter describes the development of Jewish-Muslim relations in the two cities.

3.1 Jews in London

According to the 2011 census, just over 260,000 Jews live in England and Wales, representing 0.5 per cent of the population as a whole.¹ Almost two-thirds live in London: nearly 150,000 people.² Of these, around 15,000 reside in the borough of Hackney and 54,000 in Barnet.³ There were 454 synagogues in the UK in 2016.⁴ Three-quarters of these are found in Greater London (64 per cent) and in neighbouring south Hertfordshire and south-west Essex (10 per cent).⁵ Although membership of synagogues is falling, in 2016 more than 56 per cent of Jewish households – that is, those with at least one Jewish member – were affiliated to one.⁶ In 2014 over a quarter (28 per cent) of British Jews attended synagogue at least once a week. On the other hand, almost a quarter (24 per cent) never visit one.⁷ The British Jewish community comprises slightly more women than men, and within it the youngest (under nine years old) and the oldest (over 60) age groups are overrepresented by comparison with the British population as a whole.⁸

In a sharply divided Jewish religious landscape, we find six broad strands: ‘central Orthodox’, ‘strictly Orthodox’ or ‘Haredi’, ‘Sefardi’, ‘Reform’, ‘Liberal’, and ‘Masorti’.⁹ The first three are classified as ‘Orthodox’, the latter three as ‘non-Orthodox’. Just over half of Jewish households affiliated with a synagogue identify as central Orthodox.¹⁰ While their number is declining, however, the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community is growing.

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rapidly. The category of ‘secular’ Jews is also growing. A quarter (26 per cent) of British Jews call themselves ‘traditional’, another quarter (24 per cent) ‘secular/cultural’, and a sixth (16 per cent) ‘Orthodox/Haredi’. Some 18 per cent describe themselves as ‘Reform/progressive’ and 10 per cent as ‘just Jewish’. Within the Jewish community, the Haredi form a highly distinctive group. They live mainly in the London boroughs of Hackney, Haringey, and Barnet, and in Salford (Greater Manchester) and Gateshead (Tyne and Wear). Their birth rate is very high and, compared with other British Jews, Haredim tend to live in rented accommodation, have lower levels of education, and are more likely to be unemployed.

Within British Jewry, ‘factionalism and fragmentation’ are the norm rather than the exception. Jews are deeply divided not only over religious issues, but also over the question of who can call themselves Jewish, their relationships with other minorities and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Keith Kahn-Harris, since the turn of the century the divisions over this conflict have grown and become more public. In addition to major established organisations such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC), other institutions have also been making themselves heard. On the one side of this coin are ‘old’ Zionist groups like the Zionist Federation (ZF, founded in 1899) and the Jewish National Fund (1939), which support Israel unconditionally, on the other ‘new’ bodies including Peace Now (1978), Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJP, 2002), Independent Jewish Voices (IJV, 2007), the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN, 2008), and Yachad (2011), all of which are critical of Israeli government policies towards the Palestinians. Overall, though, essential aspects of postwar British Jewish identity include a strong commitment to Israel as well as the memory of the Holocaust and the struggle against antisemitism.

The community has an extensive institutional network: synagogues, Zionist societies, educational institutions, aid organisations, women’s groups, facilities for senior citizens, welfare charities, youth clubs, student organisations, music groups, shops, kosher food and drink establishments, cultural centres, and so on. The Jewish Chronicle is the most prestigious British Jewish newspaper, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) conducts research with a view to strengthening Jewish life and the Community Security Trust (CST, founded in 1994) works to ensure the safety of British Jews and to combat antisemitism. The most important bodies within this constellation are the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Office of the Chief Rabbi, and the JLC. The Board of Deputies, established in 1760, claims to be ‘the voice of the British Jewish Community’. It comprises nearly 300 elected delegates from synagogues and Jewish institutions, although it is not recognised as a representative body by Haredim and many ‘unaffiliated’ Jews. The Board of Deputies maintains good relations with the British government and provides secretarial services for the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Jews, which aims to strengthen the relationship between Parliament as a whole and the Jewish community.
In the first four decades after 1945, Jewish leaders followed what Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley call a ‘strategy of security’. This aimed to improve the community’s social position by emphasising the importance of adapting to British culture. Adherence to this strategy was maintained even as the UK as a whole was evolving into a multicultural society. And it paid off: by the late 1980s, in general Jews could be considered fully integrated into British society and, on average, they had climbed a good way up the social ladder. “In one generation”, writes Eliza Filby, “Anglo-Jews rose from working-class tradesmen of the East End slums to professional middle-class men of the suburbs”. This upward social mobility was accompanied by a shift in political affiliation. As we saw in the previous chapter, while most British Jews in the 1940s and 1950s held broadly ‘left-wing’ views, in the 1980s – the decade of Margaret Thatcher’s government – many made the switch from Labour to the Conservative Party. This preference for the ‘right’ has persisted ever since, as confirmed by a poll commissioned by The Jewish Chronicle on the eve of the 2015 general election which found that 69 per cent of British Jews favoured the Conservatives and only 22 per cent Labour. Other parties, such as the Liberal Democrats and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), received hardly any backing.

At the beginning of the 1990s, under the leadership of the newly appointed chief rabbi, Jonathan Sack and others, the ‘strategy of security’, which emphasised Anglo-Jewry’s secure British belonging and citizenship, gave way to a ‘strategy of insecurity’, which emphasises the threats and dangers Jews face communally and individually. Sacks stated that the predominant concern for Jews had become the continuity of Jewish identity against the background of assimilation, inter-marriage, and secularisation. According to him, the adaptations required by the strategy of security eventually undermine British Jewry’s very existence and so instead it is essential to cherish and cultivate the specific identity of Jews as a minority in spirituality, family life, and education.

That renewed focus upon religious and spiritual identity has been further reinforced by the increased emphasis placed upon religion in the dominant British discourse surrounding multiculturalism, in particular in the wake of the Rushdie affair. According to Malory Nye and Paul Weller, that “marked a watershed in which religious identity ceased to be submerged with a previous emphasis upon ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’”. The image of ‘multifaith Britain’ has become more prominent, at the expense of ‘multicultural Britain’. This shift has made religious identity more central to British Jewry and its representation.

### 3.2 Muslims in London

The Muslim population of England and Wales has more than doubled in recent decades. In 2001 it numbered 1.5 million, in 2011 it was 2.7 million, and by 2018 the number in the UK, excluding Northern Ireland, was
estimated to have reached 3.4 million.\textsuperscript{30} As of 2011, almost half (47 per cent) of British Muslims were born in the UK.\textsuperscript{31} A third (33 per cent) of those in England and Wales were under the age of 16, compared with 19 per cent of the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{32} A large minority (38 per cent) have a background in Pakistan, 15 per cent in Bangladesh, 8 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 7 per cent in India.\textsuperscript{33} Many Muslims maintain a link with their countries of origin by marrying partners from these nations, remitting funds and visiting and receiving relatives and friends. Sophie Gilliat-Ray estimates the number of converts to Islam in the UK in 2010 at 20,000–21,000.\textsuperscript{34} The proportion of poorly educated Muslims in Britain fell sharply, from 39 per cent to 26 per cent, between 2001 and 2011.\textsuperscript{35} The proportion with ‘degree level and above’ qualifications is now similar to that of the population as a whole, at 24 per cent versus 27 per cent.\textsuperscript{36} Some 43 per cent of Muslim students are women.\textsuperscript{37} The proportion of Muslim women ‘looking after home or family’ is 18 per cent, compared with 6 per cent of all UK women.\textsuperscript{38} Muslims are found in all sectors of the labour market and hold positions at all levels. Six per cent are in ‘higher professional occupations’, compared with 8 per cent of the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{39} However, more than one-fifth (21 per cent) of Muslims have never worked; in the general population, that figure is just 4 per cent. Unemployment among Muslims was nearly twice as high in 2011 as in the general population, at 7 per cent versus 4 per cent.\textsuperscript{40} Related to this are issues of poverty and inadequate housing. As many as 46 per cent of Muslims live in the 10 per cent of ‘most deprived’ neighbourhoods in England.\textsuperscript{41} And the general political preference of British Muslims is left of centre; in the 2017 general election, for example, 85 per cent voted Labour and 11 per cent Conservative.\textsuperscript{42}

London is a very important centre of Islam in the UK. More than a million Muslims live in the capital, representing 37 per cent of all those in the country.\textsuperscript{43} And large numbers are concentrated in inner London; in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham, more than 30 per cent of the population is Muslim.\textsuperscript{44} The composition of the metropolitan community is diverse compared with other British cities, like Birmingham and Bradford, where its origin is predominantly South Asian. Two high-profile centres of Muslim worship and cultural life are the East London Mosque, along with its associated London Muslim Centre, and the London Central Mosque in Regent’s Park and its Islamic Cultural Centre. Many national Islamic organisations have their headquarters in the British capital, too. In particular, a number of movements with their origins in the Middle East are based there.\textsuperscript{45}

Islamic life in the UK is structured largely according to country of origin, ethnicity, and religious identity.\textsuperscript{46} The great majority (85 per cent) of the community is Sunni, with the remainder predominantly Shia.\textsuperscript{47} Within both categories we encounter Sufism.\textsuperscript{48} British Shiites are mostly either Ithna’Ashariyyah (‘Twelvers’) or Ismailis (‘Seveners’). The Al-Khoei Foundation (established in 1989) represents Shia interests to the government and is also
active in the field of education.⁴⁹ Most British Sunnis follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law; they endorse the importance of the ulama (religious scholars) and the sharia (the Sacred Law), and accept secular government and law.⁵⁰ Among South Asian Sunni Muslims in the UK, we find at least five distinct movements: the reformist Deobandi, the quietist Tablighi Jamaat, the conservative, mystical Bareli, the moderate Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami and the Ahl-I Hadith.⁵¹ Of these, the Deobandi movement is the largest. Each movement has its own institutions. Jamaat-i-Islami, for instance, operates the UK Islamic Mission (founded in 1962), the Islamic Foundation (1973), Markfield Institute of Higher Education (2000), and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB, 1990).⁵² Other Sunni movements to which some British Muslims adhere have their background in the Middle East, including Salafism and Wahhabism.⁵³ Four orthodox reformist and radical movements are the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Muhajirun, and Jamiat Ihyaa Minhaj al-Sunnah. The most prominent institution linked to the Muslim Brotherhood is the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, founded in 1997).⁵⁴ Alevis are also represented in the UK.⁵⁵ The importance of religious identity to people originally from Islamic regions has increased since the late 1980s.⁵⁶ It is a factor more likely to define the way non-Muslims interact with them in everyday life, and at the same time something they tend to express more strongly than in the past. According to Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja’far, the emergence of ‘Muslim consciousness’ in the UK is linked to the introduction of a religious identity policy by the British government, the establishment of national Islamic organisations to speak on behalf of British Muslims, and increasing media coverage of the community.⁵⁷ An estimated 60 per cent of British Muslims attend a religious service or gathering once a month or more.⁵⁸ Although Muslims in the UK share a common religious identity – not for nothing do they all (with some exceptions, such as Alevis) call themselves and each other Muslims – there are divisions over the question of what exactly it means to be Muslim, over ties with Islamic countries of origin and over attitudes towards British society – or, more broadly, the non-Islamic West.⁵⁹ On this last point, the historian John Voll draws a useful distinction between three ‘styles of action’ when it comes to confrontations with modern culture: ‘conservative’, ‘adaptationist’, and ‘fundamentalist’.⁶⁰ To these we would add a fourth, which seeks to integrate religious identity with characteristics of Western culture: ‘openness’. Or, to use Sadek Hamid’s terminology, ‘integrationist’.⁶¹ In practice, various hybrid forms occur and we encounter different attitudes even within particular movements. In Salafism, for instance, three distinct currents can be discerned: withdrawal, or ‘quietist’ Salafism; ‘political’ Salafism, which seeks to accrue political power in order to bring about change; and ‘jihadist’ Salafism pursuing violence to overthrow the political order in Muslim societies in order to impose its own version of Islam.⁶²
The diversity of Islam in the UK is apparent from the huge number of Muslim institutions and other entities found there, from mosques to shops and businesses, and from educational institutions to youth and women’s groups and charitable organisations. The Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR, founded in 2001), Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks, 2012), and Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND, 2014) focus upon recording and/or combating Islamophobia. With the growth of Islam, the number of mosques has increased significantly. In 1963 there were 13 registered in the UK, in 1970 there were 49 and in 1990 there were 452. According to Mehmood Naqshbandi, by 2017 the number had risen to nearly 2,000. As of 2013, the UK also had 156 Muslim schools. Estimates of the number of active ‘sharia councils’ vary widely, from a few dozen to nearly a hundred.

Many mosques are organised into local umbrella groups, which promote the interests of their member organisations at a community level. From the 1970s onwards, various initiatives were undertaken to establish national organisations. In 1988 the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was established to co-ordinate Muslim responses to the publication of *The Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie. Building upon UKACIA and encouraged by the government, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was founded in 1997 along the same lines as the Board of Deputies. It now co-ordinates a wide range of more than 500 Islamic organisations, including umbrella groups, local mosques, Islamic centres, charities, and schools. However, not every Islamic movement feels represented by the MCB. In 2005 the British Muslim Forum (BMF) was formed to give a voice to Barelwi Muslims in the UK, and the following years saw the establishment of the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). Also set up in 2006, the Mosques and Imams Advisory Board (MINAB) represents several hundred mosques and Islamic centres and is supported by the Shia Al-Khoei Foundation, the BMF, the MAB, and the MCB. After some years of intensive cooperation, relations between the British government and the MCB later cooled, “whether over the invasion of Iraq or the shift in government policy away from cohesion to security”.

Since the early 2000s, the Muslim community has occupied an ambiguous position within the UK. On the one hand it fits in squarely with the image of ‘multifaith Britain’ which has arisen partly in response to the Rushdie affair, forming an integral part of British society. On the other, though, the radical currents harboured by some sections of the community are excluded from the picture on the basis of the assumption that, either in whole or in part, they do not subscribe to basic British values. These include “democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity and treatment, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind”. Because there are doubts among parts of the non-Muslim British population about the extent to which the community as a whole rejects radical Islamic thought and because the British government itself has
accused at least one major nation Muslim organisation, the MCB, of failing to distance itself sufficiently from such thinking, there are widespread concerns about the how much of the community really does ‘belong’ to British society.

3.3 Jews in Amsterdam

In 2009, the number of Jews in the Netherlands was estimated at 52,600. Of these, approximately 16,000 had only a Jewish father and about 9,000 were Israeli immigrants. Some 85 per cent of all Jews in the country say they are non-religious, with half following at least some Jewish customs – such as participating in ‘seder’, the ceremonial meal at the beginning of Passover – and the other half not. Of all Dutch Jews, only approximately 20 per cent are members of a Jewish congregation. Or, to put it another way, 80 per cent are ‘unaffiliated’. Many of these do still feel a connection with Judaism, however, often through their parents. For them, Jewish culture, remembrance of the Second World War, ties with the state of Israel or concern about antisemitism are important themes. Also in 2009, almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of Jewish men and more than two-thirds of Jewish women (69 per cent) had attended higher education – considerably more than the national average. Almost half (47 per cent) of all Jews in the Netherlands live in Amsterdam; that is, some 25,000. According to a 2018 survey by the City of Amsterdam, the number of religious Jews in the capital fluctuates around the 5,000 mark. Many Jews live in the city centre, south Amsterdam, and the adjacent municipalities of Amstelveen and Badhoevedorp. Amsterdam’s Buitenveldert neighbourhood is home to many Jewish amenities, recreational clubs, kosher shops, and places to eat and drink. Jewish institutions there include Rosj Pina primary school, Maimonides secondary school, and Cheider, a group of orthodox schools, as well as the Beth Shalom care home and the Sinai Centre for Jews with mental health problems. The Amstelveen hospital Amstelland has a Jewish ward. During the second half of the twentieth century, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the right-of-centre VVD and the social-democratic PvdA were the most popular political parties in Jewish circles. In the past 25 years, however, backing for the PvdA has declined, probably due in part to the party’s critical stance with regard to Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, while support for the VVD has increased. A smaller proportion of Jews sympathise with populist parties of the right such as the Party for Freedom (PVV) and – at least until it became embroiled in a controversy concerning antisemitism in November 2020 – Forum for Democracy (FvD).

Within Judaism in the Netherlands, we find three distinct denominations: the Organisation of Jewish Communities in the Netherlands (Nederlands-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap, NIK), the Dutch Union for Progressive Judaism (Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom, NVPJ), and the Portuguese Jewish Community (Portugees-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap,
The NIK is the largest of these, with just under 5,000 members, followed by the NVPJ with some 3,700 adherents and the PIK, which only has a congregation in Amsterdam, numbering 600. The NIK, founded in 1814, is the umbrella organisation for some 30 congregations and two distinct strands can be distinguished within it: a broad traditional group and a strictly orthodox one. Most NIK rabbis belong to the international Lubavitch or Chabad movement. The Amsterdam community of the NIK is called the Dutch Jewish Main Synagogue (Nederlands Israëlitische Hoofdsynagoge) and has nine active ‘shul’ (synagogue) congregations in Amsterdam and the surrounding area. The NIK is a member of the European Jewish Congress, which in turn is part of the World Jewish Congress. The NVPJ, representing reform Judaism in the Netherlands and a member of the World Union for Progressive Judaism, is an umbrella group for ten liberal congregations as well as several charitable foundations. These include the Robert A. Levisson Foundation, the Sha’ar Foundation, and the Living Jewish Faith Foundation. By far its biggest community is the Liberal Jewish Congregation (Liberaal Joodse Gemeente, LJG) in Amsterdam, based in the south of the city, with approximately 2,000 members. The NIK and the NVPJ are both active in a wide variety of domains; as well as holding religious services, these include strengthening Jewish culture, spiritual care, youth and children’s work, looking after Jewish cemeteries, Jewish education, and advocacy work. The small group of ultra-orthodox Jews in the Netherlands is partially organised in groups and bodies of its own.

The NIK and NVPJ emphatically do not co-operate in any way on religious matters. Both, however, are members of the Interchurch Contact Group for Government Affairs (Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken, ICO) and are represented in the Consultative Body of Jews and Christians (Overlegorgaan Joden en Christenen, OJEC, founded in 1981). Together with the PIK, they are also members of the Central Jewish Consultative Committee (Centraal Joods Overleg, CJO). Established in 1997, the purpose of this body is not to be a ‘Jewish parliament’ or a Dutch version of the British Board of Deputies, but rather an organisation of limited size and scope to uphold the external interests of the Jewish community in the Netherlands. Religious matters are not part of its remit, and nor are topics beyond the Dutch border such as Israel. The other members of the CJO are the Centre for Information and Documentation Israel (Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël, CIDI), the Federation of Dutch Zionists (Federatie Nederlandse Zionisten, FNZ), the Jewish Social Work (Joods Maatschappelijk Werk, JMW), the Foundation Life and Welfare (Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn, BLEW), and two Jewish youth organisations. The mission of the CIDI, founded in 1974 by Robert Abraham Levisson, is to “uphold the right to peace and security of Israel and the Jewish people, wherever they are in the world”. Since the demise of the Foundation for Combating Antisemitism (Stichting Bestrijding Antisemitisme, StiBA), monitoring and combating antisemitism has become an important area of
work for the CIDI. BLEW, established in 1972, provides and advises on security for the Jewish community in the Netherlands.

That community is deeply divided not only on religious issues, but since the early 2000s also over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2001 Anneke Mouthaan and Harry de Winter took the initiative to found the campaign group A Different Jewish Voice (Een Ander Joods Geluid, EAJG), out of dissatisfaction with what they saw as the uncritical way in which the CIDI, and the Jewish community more broadly, debated and formed opinions about Israel.

The wider public image of the Dutch Jewry is shaped in part by prominent figures of Jewish descent. They include politicians, scientists, and sportspeople, but also businesspeople, authors, and television personalities. It is particularly noteworthy that a significant number of Amsterdam mayors during the postwar period have been of Jewish descent: Ivo Samkalden (1967–1977), Wim Polak (1977–1983), Ed van Thijn (1983–1994), and Job Cohen (2001–2010). Lodewijk Asscher, who was acting mayor for a brief period in 2010, is also of Jewish origin. Among well-known contemporary Jewish writers are Leon de Winter, Jessica Durlacher, Arnon Grunberg, Judith Herzberg, and Marcel Möering, while familiar Jewish faces on television include Sonja Barend, Frits Barend, Hanneke Groenteman, and Clairy Polak. The Jewish community is very prominent, too, in the current Dutch culture of remembrance of the Second World War. It is, for example, visibly represented at the National War Commemoration on 4 May. Jewish locations associated with the Holocaust, such as the Anne Frank House and the Hollandsche Schouwburg, as well as memorials including the Auschwitz Monument, the Holocaust Names Monument, and the Stumbling Stones (Stolpersteine) placed outside the former homes of those deported to the concentration camps and murdered, keep alive the memory of the horrors experienced by the Dutch Jews during the war.

Relations with government, both nationally and in Amsterdam, have improved considerably since the immediate postwar period. From the 1960s onwards, the Dutch authorities became more aware of the unique suffering of the hard-hit Jewish community and also gradually came to realise that they had been seriously negligent towards it. Not only during the Second World War, but also in the years immediately following it. Two events in particular illustrate how the legacy of that conflict continues to resonate, even 70 years and more after its end. In 2015 the then mayor of Amsterdam, Eberhard van der Laan, commissioned an investigation into the city government’s policy of collecting unpaid rent, rates, and other arrears accrued after their deportation from returning survivors of the concentration camps. Van der Laan called that policy a disgrace to the city and its administration, and following the investigation paid the Jewish community €10 million as ‘collective compensation’. And during the National Holocaust Commemoration on 26 January 2020, Prime Minister Mark Rutte finally apologised to the
survivors on behalf of the Dutch government for its actions during and after the war. “All in all”, he declared, “it was too little. Too little protection. Too little help. Too little recognition”.

The social position of Jews in Amsterdam has changed significantly in recent decades. During the ‘multicultural’ phase of the late twentieth century, the Jewish community played a core role in that aspect of the Dutch self-image. Since the turn of the millennium, however, the idea that the Netherlands is a multicultural nation has given way to the notion that it should be a ‘secular’ and ‘progressive’ one. ‘Secular’ and ‘progressive’ Jews continue to occupy a central place in this new self-image, but their orthodox peers have been pushed to the margins. They are viewed, at least by a substantial section of the population, as a religious group upholding ‘traditional’ values in a number of areas – such as male-female relationships, homosexuality, and even animal welfare – which are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the ‘progressive’ ones espoused by the nation as a whole. The dichotomy with regard to animal welfare, for example, was highlighted in 2011 by a parliamentary debate on ritual slaughter without stunning, when parties which had previously defended the practice as a ‘crown jewel’ of multiculturalism – the VVD, the PvdA, the liberal democratic D66, and the ‘green left’ GroenLinks – voted for the first time to ban it.

3.4 Muslims in Amsterdam

An estimated 950,000 Muslims currently live in the Netherlands, representing almost 6 per cent of the entire population. The majority are first or second generation migrants. About 70 per cent were born in Turkey or Morocco or have at least one parent originally from one of these countries. Other significant countries of origin are Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia. The vast majority of Turkish (80 per cent) and Moroccan (84 per cent) Muslims are Sunni. Very small proportions of both groups call themselves Salafists: 0.3 and 0.5 per cent, respectively. The proportion of Shia Muslims in the Netherlands is estimated at around 10 per cent of its Islamic population. Six per cent of those of Turkish descent call themselves Alevis. A substantial proportion (46 per cent) of Dutch Muslims say that they experience discrimination occasionally, frequently, or very frequently. It is estimated that almost 13 per cent of Amsterdam’s population is Muslim, which corresponds with about 90,000 people. The largest concentrations of Dutch Turks and Moroccans are found in the Nieuw-West (‘New West’) and West city districts, followed by Oost (‘East’) and Noord (‘North’); this is due in large part to the availability of social housing in these areas, the drift of their ‘native’ Dutch residents into the suburbs and municipal housing policy. Although these groups still lag behind the national averages in terms of educational attainment, paid work and income, the gaps are closing. The socio-economic position of the second generation is
significantly better than that of the first. There are indications that the political preferences of Dutch Turks and Moroccans lie mainly with ‘left-wing’ parties and, since its inception in 2015, the ‘multicultural’ DENK.¹⁰²

Starting in the late 1980s, and especially since the turn of the century, two trends have emerged in the Netherlands with regard to the religious identity of immigrants with roots in Muslim countries. On the one hand, in everyday life others now engage with them far more frequently in terms of their religious identity; on the other, they are much more likely to express themselves primarily as believers.¹⁰³ Among Muslim women, for example, it has become more common to wear a headscarf. Young Muslims discuss their Islamic principles and the accompanying rules and regulations intensively on popular internet sites. Hand in hand with this strengthening of Muslim consciousness, mosques have become increasingly important for the communities concerned.

However, this certainly does not mean that all Muslims attend one on a daily or even a weekly basis. In fact, only about two-fifths of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims alike (40 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively) go at least once a week. And a fifth (20 per cent) of Turkish Muslims and a quarter (25 per cent) of Moroccan ones never do.¹⁰⁴ Approximately 7 per cent of Turkish Muslims and 2 per cent of their Moroccan counterparts consider themselves ‘secular’.¹⁰⁵

Since the 1960s, Muslims in the Netherlands have formed hundreds of organisations, often along ethnic, religious, and political lines.¹⁰⁶ These include mosques, of course, but also religious, educational, care, welfare, and charitable institutions as well as hospitality and retail outlets. Many Dutch Islamic organisations – especially mosques – are affiliated to umbrella groups, which exist at the national, regional, and local levels. With the growing diversity within ‘the’ Muslim community, a desire arose in the final quarter of the last century to establish a single body to represent the interests of all Muslims in the governmental and political arenas. Its formation was given a powerful boost by the Rushdie affair, which prompted ten national Muslim organisations to found the Islamic National Committee (Islamitisch Landelijk Comité, ILC), chaired by Abdulwahid van Bommel, in February 1989. This positioned itself as an interlocutor for the government on religious issues. In 1992 it was succeeded by the Islamic Council of the Netherlands (Islamitische Raad Nederland, IRN), with the following stated goal: “to secure an equal place for Islam in Dutch society alongside Christianity, Judaism, Humanism and other spiritual ideologies”.¹⁰⁷ The same year also saw the establishment of the Dutch Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslimraad, NMR), with affiliates including Ahmadiyya and women’s organisation Al Nisa. The IRN was succeeded by the Muslims and Government Liaison Committee (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO), a broad umbrella organisation which was recognised by the national government as an official discussion partner in 2004, and
the NMR by the Islam Contact Group (Contact Groep Islam, CGI), established in 2005. The CMO brings together ten mosque federations, including national bodies representing both Turkish and Moroccan places of worship, and through them speaks for more than 380 individual mosques. The Barelwi movement’s Surinamese umbrella organisation World Islamic Mission (WIM) and the Bosnian mosques in the Netherlands are also affiliated. As well as upholding Muslim interests, the CMO is also the designated ‘appointing organisation’ in the Netherlands for Islamic chaplains and spiritual counsellors in healthcare institutions, prisons, and the armed forces. The CGI comprises bodies which do not feel represented by the CMO or are excluded from it, such as the Union of Lahore Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (ULAMON, a Ahmadiyya group) and the Turkish Alevi association HAK-DER.

De facto, however, the CGI has ceased to exist.

The Netherlands has more than 475 mosques, of which approximately 240 are Turkish, 180 Moroccan, and 50 Surinamese. In Amsterdam in 2014, a total of 42 mosques were known to the local government. Half of these were Moroccan and a quarter Turkish. Most Turkish mosques in the Netherlands are affiliates of a national organisation. The Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN), with 148 member mosques, is closely associated with Diyanet İşleri Baskanlığı, or Diyanet for short, the Turkish state Presidium for Religious Affairs. Various ‘unofficial’ strands of Turkish Islam also have their own umbrella bodies. For the Milli Görüş movement that is the Dutch Islamic Federation (Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie, NIF) and Milli Görüş Northern Netherlands (Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland, MGNN), for the Suleymanli movement the Foundation of Islamic Centre The Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, SICN), for the Gülen movement Platform INS and for Turkish Alevi groups HAK-DER and the Dutch Alevi Federation (Nederlandse Alevitische Federatie, HAF). Gülen and Suleymanli are mystical movements with a modern basis; other mystical groups active in the Netherlands and Amsterdam include the Turkish Menzil Cemaati and the Moroccan Boutchicha, and there are also looser networks engaged in the dissemination of mystical ideas. Abdulwahid van Bommel, for example, has translated the work of the thirteenth-century Persian mystic Rumi into Dutch.

Whereas the Turkish Muslim networks in the Netherlands are characterised by strong cohesion, their Moroccan equivalents are much looser. Most prominent at the national level are the Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties in Nederland, UMMON), which claims to represent about 90 mosques, and the rival Council of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands (Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeëin in Nederland, RMMN). Many Moroccan Dutch mosques, however, have no desire to join a national organisation. Some are members of regional federations, though. In and around the capital, for example, about 20 are
affiliated to the Union of Moroccan Mosques in Greater Amsterdam (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Amsterdam en Omstreken, UMMAO).

There are many other Islamic organisations, too.\textsuperscript{115} They include two national bodies focusing respectively upon women and converts: Al Nisa and the National Platform for New Muslims (Landelijk Platform Nieuwe Moslims). The Collective against Islamophobia and Discrimination (Collectief Tegen Islamofobie en Discriminatie, CTID), which grew out of the Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Migration and Development (Euro-Mediterraan Centrum Migratie & Ontwikkeling, EMCEMO), founded in 1998, concentrates upon combating Islamophobia. A number of mosques and Islamic centres, including El-Tawheed in Amsterdam, Al-Fourkaan in Eindhoven, and As-Soennah in The Hague, are regularly associated with Salafism.\textsuperscript{116} Hizb al-Tahrir is also represented in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{117}

The social position of Muslims in the Netherlands has shifted in recent decades. In the early 2000s the Netherlands abandoned multiculturalism and the dominant discourse became that of a ‘secular’ and ‘progressive’ society. Within this, Muslims occupy a place on the periphery. They are often seen as bearers of ‘traditional’ values incompatible with the ‘progressive’ ones the Netherlands now stands for in such domains as male-female relations, parent-child relations, homosexuality, and the relationship between church and state. The fiercest criticism of Muslims comes from populist political parties, especially the PVV and FvD. Convinced that the Islam is “the most violent political ideology there is”, the PVV especially has waged a relentless crusade against Islam, ever since its establishment in 2006.\textsuperscript{118}

3.5 Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam Compared

In order to bring more perspective to the differences and similarities between the four groups we are considering, all of which are very diverse in their make-up, we end this chapter by comparing them briefly on five significant points: size, recognisable identity, organisation, social position, and transnational ties.

3.5.1 Size

The first thing to note is that the Jewish and Muslim communities in London are both significantly larger than their counterparts in Amsterdam. While the Jewish community in the British capital is estimated to comprise 150,000 people and the Islamic community more than a million, the number of Jews in Amsterdam is roughly 25,000 and the number of Muslims is 90,000. This difference means that there is in theory considerably greater capacity for the development of Jewish-Muslim initiatives in London than in Amsterdam.
3.5.2 Recognisable Identity

Since the 1980s, all four communities have placed a greater emphasis upon the importance of displaying a recognisable identity of their own. On the Muslim side, in both cities a process we can call the ‘Islamisation of identity’ has occurred, meaning that the significance of Islam as a marker of identity has been increasing.\(^{119}\) There are two aspects to this. On the one hand, in their social interactions people with roots in Muslim countries are more often called to account for their religious identity. The same people who were referred to as ‘Pakistanis’, say, or as ‘guest workers’ in the 1970s and as ‘immigrants’ in the 1980s are now, since the Rushdie affair in 1988–1989 and especially the attacks of 9 September 2001, more likely to find themselves being called ‘Muslims’. On the other hand, their own religious identity has also become more central to their self-image and so they more often manifest themselves explicitly as ‘Muslims’. These developments have increased the importance of mosques and other Islamic institutions in London and Amsterdam alike.

In the past few decades, the significance of a distinctive Jewish identity has also been emphasised within organised Jewish communities in both cities. In the early 1990s the leadership of the community in the UK, under the auspices of the newly appointed chief rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, shifted course; in the terminology used by Kahn-Harris and Gidley, its previous ‘strategy of security’ gave way to a ‘strategy of insecurity’.\(^{120}\) This new approach emphasises the importance of Jewish spirituality, Jewish family life, and Jewish education for long-term survival as a community. A similar development can be observed in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. After a period during which Dutch Jews were concerned primarily with the reconstruction of their own community and with further integration and emancipation, in more recent decades Jewish organisations have focused strongly upon the preservation and cultivation of a Jewish identity. Ruben Vis, secretary of the NIK, says the following about his organisation’s specific role in this process:

> The integration of the Jews is complete; the work of the NIK, however, is not. The most important task of the organisation today is to strengthen Jewish identity. Yiddish as the spoken language of Dutch Jews has disappeared. The Hebrew in the liturgy, however, has remained. In order to participate at the shul or to say the Jewish prayers at home, it is important that Jews learn to read Hebrew or that materials be translated. In this, we play an important role.\(^{121}\)

3.5.3 Organisation

As we have seen, the Jewish and Muslim communities in the Netherlands and the UK are all well-organised, with widespread networks of groups and
institutions active in many areas of society. In all four communities, however, only sections of the ‘membership’ participate in these formal structures. In other words, a substantial proportion of individual Muslims and Jews are ‘unaffiliated’. The degree of participation is lowest in Dutch Jewry, at about 20 per cent. We have no precise figures for the other three communities, although there is some indicative data on participation in religious meetings. In the UK, 33 per cent of Jews and 60 per cent of Muslims attend such a gathering at least once a month. In the Netherlands, almost half (46 per cent) of Muslims of Moroccan origin and just over half (52 per cent) of those of Turkish origin visit a mosque once a month, or more often.

Within each of the organised communities, we encounter different cores. Muslim communities tend to organise themselves along lines reflecting their country of origin, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. In the UK, Muslims of Pakistani, Iranian, Nigerian, Somali, and Bosnian origin each have their own mosques, cultural centres, associations, and institutions, all aligned with their particular religious signature. In the Netherlands, the same applies to Muslims of Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese origin. Within the Jewish communities in both countries, the Sephardic and Ashkenazi groups have traditionally maintained their own distinct institutions. And in addition to this divide, we also find separate networks based upon religious orientation, ranging from ultra-orthodox to liberal.

Each of the four overall communities under discussion has organisations which straddle the different cores such as schools, facilities for the elderly and interest groups. The most prominent umbrella bodies seeking to promote the interests of their communities as a whole in the public sphere are the Board of Deputies and MCB in the UK and the CJO and CMO in the Netherlands. These four organisations differ in terms of their history, size, structure, objectives, and relationship with the public authorities. All maintain good relations with their own government, apart from the MCB: after an initial period of very intensive co-operation, a series of controversies led to it ceasing to be an official discussion partner of the British government in 2009. And although each of the four represents a significant proportion of its national community, none is accepted universally. As well as ‘unaffiliated’ Jews and Muslims, in all cases certain organised sections of the community feel that the umbrella body claiming to represent them does not actually do so, or only to a limited extent. In the case of the Board of Deputies, for instance, these are “progressive Jews, Haredi Jews, secular Jews, Zionists and anti-Zionists”.

3.5.4 Social Position

Jews and Muslims in the UK and the Netherlands are all minorities with distinct ethnic and/or religious identities. However, the social positions they occupy differ widely. In this respect, it makes sense to distinguish between
sociostructural and sociocultural positions. When it comes to the first, in particular, the differences are stark. While most Jews in both countries are generally middle or upper-middle class, Muslims are still generally close to the bottom of the social ladder – although, as we saw earlier in this chapter, in recent decades they have caught up considerably, especially in terms of educational attainment and to a lesser extent paid work and income.

As for sociocultural position, the places Jews and Muslims occupy within a country’s national identity or self-image is important. In the UK and the Netherlands alike, the 1970s and 1980s were dominated by a discourse of multiculturalism in which both groups were accorded a full place on the national stage. In the UK, however, the Rushdie affair led to a transformation of the national self-image into that of ‘multifaith Britain’ at the expense of ‘multicultural Britain’, particularly during the New Labour period. In this new situation, Jews and immigrants from Islamic countries and their descendants continue to occupy a central position – although now not so much as ethnic and/or racial groups with a specific culture, as in the multicultural self-image, but more as religious groups. And because the values advocated by some currents within Islam are considered to be at odds with such values as democracy, the rule of law and freedom of speech, they are marginalised.

In the Netherlands, a somewhat different development has taken place. Partly due to the events of ‘9/11’ and the rise of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, the discourse of multiculturalism in Dutch politics has given way to one based upon the country being a ‘secular’ and ‘progressive’ nation. This regards religion as a private matter and such values as personal autonomy, freedom of speech, the equal treatment of men and women and equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals as fundamental ‘progressive’ principles, which the Netherlands upholds as nation. ‘Secular’ and ‘progressive’ Jews still occupy a central position in this discourse, but Islamic groups in particular, and often orthodox Jewish groups as well, are viewed as propagating ‘traditional’ values incompatible with the ‘progressive’ Dutch ones. These groups are thus consigned to the periphery, their customs and practices frequently being labelled ‘outdated’, ‘outmoded’, ‘medieval’, or sometimes ‘backward’.

Despite the fact that both Islamic and orthodox Jewish groups are now considered morally problematic in certain respects in the Netherlands and the UK, there is a difference in the way the two are treated. This is not only because of the bonds many people feel with the Jews as a result of the Holocaust, but in part is also down to postwar public perceptions, which assume that European culture has a closer affinity with Judaism than with Islam. Whereas Judaism, including the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud, is seen as an important source of that culture, Islam is regarded as an ‘alien’ religion which needs to adapt to European culture. Indicative of this is the relatively frequent use of the term ‘Judeo-Christian culture’ and the near complete absence of any references to ‘Judeo-Christian-Islamic culture’. 
3.5.5 Transnational Ties

Many local Jewish and Islamic communities in London and in Amsterdam have transnational connections. On the Jewish side, for instance, we see participation in international networks and a strong interest in developments affecting fellow Jews elsewhere in the world. And not only among internationally oriented British Jewry, but also in present-day Dutch Jewry. As Bart Wallet writes:

However modest in size Dutch Jewry may have been, its religious and cultural diversity fully reflected the pattern also visible internationally. Instead of a community with a strong unitary identity, in which moderate orthodoxy and Dutch nationalism went hand in hand, there was now a multiplicity of Jewish communities, each embedded in international networks.\(^{134}\)

Equally, Muslims in both cities are affected by developments in the Islamic world. On the one hand this is related to the fact that they feel connected to the ‘ummah’, the Islamic community worldwide, or to specific movements within Islam with which they align themselves, but on the other hand it also has a lot to do with efforts by the governments in various countries of origin and by transnational movements try to exert influence over Muslims in Europe. The religious and political ideas being propagated vary widely, from political to apolitical Islam, Sufism to Salafism.\(^{135}\) For example, the report ‘In/visible influence’ ((On)zichtbare invloed) by the Dutch Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into Undesirable Influence by Unfree Countries (Parlementaire Ondervragingscommissie Ongewenste Beïnvloeding uit Onvrije Landen, POCOB) states that governments in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have deliberately been seeking to spread ‘Salafist’ ideas among European Muslims since the late 1970s.\(^{136}\)

Looking specifically at the commitment of the Jewish communities in London and Amsterdam to the state of Israel on the one hand and, on the other, at the engagement by Islamic communities in these same cities with their countries of origin, it is striking just how strong both often are. As an indication of the very close attachment British Jews feel with Israel, for example, as many as 93 per cent say that it is part of their identity.\(^{137}\) Further evidence of the depth of these commitments, on the part of Muslims to their countries of origin as well as Jews in respect of Israel, can be found in the frequency of visits and the scale of financial remittances to family and friends there, not to mention holidays, home ownership, charitable donations, interest in local political developments and other news and consumption of local media. Many Muslim migrants want to be buried in their country of origin.\(^{138}\) It does seem, though, that Muslims’ personal ties with ‘home’ depend in part upon where that is and upon their own gender and class.\(^{139}\) As migrants become more successful in building a life and a world
where they have settled, so their manifest links with the place they originally hail from tend to decline.\textsuperscript{140}

Efforts by Israel to influence the Jewish communities in the UK and the Netherlands and by countries of origin to influence Muslim communities occur at three levels: through government institutions, organised movements, and individuals.\textsuperscript{141} Here we confine ourselves to the first of these, governmental influence. Little can be said with any certainty about efforts on the part of the Israeli government with respect to Jewish communities in the UK and the Netherlands, but more is known about the so-called long arm of Ankara and Rabat. According to the POCOB report, countries such as Turkey and Morocco deliberately try to exert religious and political sway in order to keep a grip on ‘their’ communities abroad.\textsuperscript{142} The report looked specifically at activities by the Turkish government in the Netherlands. These emanate in part from Diyanet, its Directorate for Religious Affairs, and extend down to the 148 individual mosques affiliated with the ISN. The president of this foundation and the imams who preach at its affiliates are all on the Diyanet payroll, and it determines the core text of their Friday sermons. The full extent of state interference by Turkey includes attempts to influence Dutch elections, the intimidation of Kurds, Alevis, and Gülenists in the wake of the 2016 coup attempt and intelligence gathering on Gülen sympathisers by Diyanet staff in 38 countries, including the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{143}

According to Nadia Bouras, in the period 1960–2010 Morocco’s policy towards its diaspora evolved from a ‘long arm’ into an ‘extended hand’.\textsuperscript{144} Nevertheless, its underlying policy objective has always remained more or less the same: “the Moroccan government wanted to stimulate the flow of money to Morocco and to suppress political (and later religious) threats”.\textsuperscript{145} The authorities in Rabat like to present themselves as guardians of a ‘moderate’ Islam and Morocco as a country where Muslims and Jews have lived together peacefully for many centuries, and their mission is to ensure that Moroccan Muslim communities abroad remain true to this form of Islam.

Notes

1 Graham, Boyd & Vulkan 2012, 2. In his contribution to the volume \textit{Religion and Change in Modern Britain}, Graham arrives at a slightly higher number of Jews in Britain: almost 300,000 (Graham 2012, 90).
2 Graham, Boyd & Vulkan 2012, 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Casala Mashiah & Boyd 2017, 2.
5 Ibid., 19–21.
6 Ibid., 2.
7 Graham, Staetsky & Boyd 2014, 8.
8 Graham 2013, 5.
10 Casala Mashiah & Boyd 2017, 11.
13 Graham 2013.
14 Graham 2012, 93.
15 Ibid., 91.
16 Kahn-Harris 2014, 34.
17 Ibid., 32–38.
18 Endelman 2002, 229.
19 Graham 2012, 94.
20 Cf. Langham 2010. See: https://www.bod.org.uk/who-we-are/
21 Graham 2012, 94.
22 Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 26–27.
23 Ibid., 27–33.
24 Filby 2015, 250.
26 *The Jewish Chronicle*, 7 April 2015.
27 Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 38–135.
28 Nye & Weller 2012, 39. The anthropologist Ralph Grillo concurs with this observation and aptly speaks of the transition from ‘race’ to ‘faith’ (Grillo 2009). By this he means that religion’s importance in British public life is increasing at the expense of the categories ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. Cf. Warsi 2018, 23.
29 Filby 2015, 255–266; Ganiel & Jones 2012, 301–302. One important and concrete first step in the transition to the ‘multifaith society’ was the establishment in 1992 of the Inner City Religious Council (ICRC), backed by the UK government to the tune of £2.5 million (Beckford 2015, 229).
30 MCB 2015, 22; ONS 2018.
31 MCB 2015, 22.
32 Ibid., 27.
33 Ibid., 24.
34 Gilliat Ray 2011, 118.
35 MCB 2015, 60.
36 Ibid., 60.
37 Ibid., 62.
38 Ibid., 63.
39 Ibid., 64.
40 Ibid., 58.
41 Ibid., 46.
42 See: http://www.brin.ac.uk/religious-affiliation-and-party-choice-at-the-2017-general-election/
43 MCB 2015, 25.
44 Ibid., 26.
45 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 83.
49 Gilliat-Ray 2011, 63.
50 Rex 2002, 58.
52 Gilliat-Ray 2011,100–105.
54 Gilliat-Ray 2010, 75; Bakker & Meijer 2012.
56 Mirza, Senthilkumaran & Ja’far 2007.
Ibid., 21–28.
58 ONS 2020.
59 Gilliat-Ray 2012, 115.
60 Voll 1994.
63 Nielsen 2010, 46.
65 Association of Muslim Schools UK 2013, 6. See: file:///C:/Users/sipco/AppData/Local/Temp/AMS-Brochure.pdf
69 Lewis & Hamid 2018, 108.
70 DCLG 2012, 5.
73 Wallet 2017, 473.
75 Ibid. 2010, 32.
76 Gemeente Amsterdam 2019, 125.
77 Roggeveen 2020, 65.
79 Van Solinge & Van Praag 2010, 35. According to a poll by Kieskompas, VU Amsterdam and the Nieuw Israëlitisch Weekblad (NIW), on the eve of the 2017 general election 10 per cent of Dutch Jews said they would be voting PVV. This figure is lower than for the Dutch population as a whole (NIW, 9 March 2017). See also: https://benjaminmagazine.wordpress.com/2020/12/01/joden-en-de-nederlandse-politiek-1/
80 Vellenga & Wiegers 2011, 175–176.
82 Sanders 2010, 92.
84 Wallet 2017, 450.
85 Mouthaan 2003, 63.
87 Gemeente Amsterdam, 18 July 2018, see: https://lokaleregelgeving.overheid.nl/CVDR612568/1; Het Parool, 10 July 2019.
88 Ministerie AZ, 26 January 2020, see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2020/01/26/toespraak-van-minister-president-mark-rutte-bij-de-nationale-auschwitzherdenking-amsterdam
89 Wallet 2017b, 468–470.
90 Vellenga 2015; Wallet 2017, 469.
91 Forum 2012, 8; Huijnk 2018, 6.
92 Forum 2012, 8.
93 Huijnk 2018, 25.
94 Ibid.
95 Van den Bos 2011, 562.
96 Huijnk 2018, 25.
97 Ibid., 65.
98 Schippers & Wenneker 2014, 12.
99 Gemeente Amsterdam 2021.
100 Van der Laan Bouma-Doff 2007; Uitermark & Bosker 2014.
102 Etnobarometer, February 2017; Van Dalen 2021.
103 Buitelaar 2008.
104 Huijnk 2018, 33.
105 Ibid., 55.
109 Ibid., 62–63.
110 Aussems 2016, 7. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into Undesirable Influence by Unfree Countries (POCOB) states in its report ‘In/visible influence’ ((On)zichtbare invloed), that there are about 500 mosques all in the Netherlands. Of these, 148 of are associated with Diyanet. The committee also estimates that about 5 per cent of Dutch mosques are ‘Salafist’ (2020, 72).
111 Schippers & Wenneker 2014, 17.
113 Until the failed 2016 coup d’état in Turkey for which Fethullah Gülen is held responsible by the Erdogan government, the Gülen movement in the Netherlands was active primarily under the name Islam and Dialogue (Islam en Dialogoog). See: Vellenga & Wiegers 2011, 105–110.
114 Vellenga & Wiegers 2011, 64–72.
117 In the Netherlands, Hizb al-Tahrir runs the website https://deoemma.nl/ and publishes Umma Magazine, previously Expliciet.
118 PVV 2021, 7.
119 Mirza, Senthilkumaran & Ja’far 2007; Buitelaar 2008; Cesari 2003; Sunier 2005.
120 Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 56–70.
121 Reformatarisch Dagblad, 22 April 2014.
122 Wallet 2017, 473.
124 Huijnk 2018, 33
125 Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 3.
126 Anderson 2006; Verkaik 2009; Katz 2013. By national self-image we mean the prevailing view within a country, including its political arena, about what its national community is and should be. Associated with any such self-image is a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion (Sengers & Sunier 2010; Vellenga 2015) determining which population groups are seen as the ‘true British’ or ‘real Dutch’ and which as ‘semi-detached’, ‘outsiders’, or ‘foreigners’. In other words, who in the imagined community of the nation belongs at its centre and who is on the margins.
128 In practice, the British government recognises nine religious communities as partners: Christians, Jews, Muslims, Bahá’ís, Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians. Beckford points out that the government tends to take only limited account of the often great diversity within these communities and, moreover, that the choice of these nine implies the exclusion of others, such as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Ahmadiyya, thereby in effect consigning them to a more marginal position (Beckford 2015, 230–232). Secular humanist groups are also denied a full place in the UK government’s strategy, which is particular striking given the growth in the number of people there who consider themselves ‘secular’. The Humanists UK have openly objected to this (Humanists UK 2020).

129 DCLG 2012, 5.
130 Kennedy 2005; De Koster, Houtman & Van der Waal 2010; Wallet 2017b, 467–470.
131 Houtman & Duyvendak 2009, 105.
133 Elshayyal 2020, 95–97.
134 Wallet 2017b, 475.
135 Hamid 2018.
136 POCOB 2020, 24.
137 Miller, Harris & Shindler 2015.
139 Bouras 2012, 189–246.
140 Ibid., 258.
141 Bouras 2012.
142 POCOB 2020, 74.
143 Ibid., 161–180.
144 Bouras, 2012, 127.
145 Ibid., 127.

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4 Developments in Jewish-Muslim Relations

Having outlined the histories of Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam (Chapter 2), as well as their current characteristics (Chapter 3), we now turn our attention to the development of structural Jewish-Muslim relations in the two cities from time of the Rushdie affair in 1988–1989 onwards (Section 4.2). First, though, we describe the origins of those relations, when Jews and Muslims sometimes had incidental contact or met in trilateral (Jewish-Christian-Muslim) or multilateral contexts, but without that resulting in structural bilateral relationships (Section 4.1). And we end this chapter by taking stock and comparing the developments in London and Amsterdam since the late 1980s (Section 4.3).

4.1 Origins

The first initiatives on a global scale around interreligious dialogue and cooperation emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century.¹ The World’s Parliament of Religions convened for the first time in Chicago in 1893, an event which can be seen as marking the beginning of the worldwide interfaith movement aimed at promoting religious pluralism and tolerance.² This was followed in 1900 by the establishment of the International Association of Religious Freedom (IARF), which held its first congress in London a year later. In 1924 the Religions of the Empire Conference took place, also in London, as a satellite meeting of the British Empire Exhibition. And in 1936 the World Congress of Faiths (WCF) was founded, again in London. All of these interreligious initiatives can be viewed as critical of European colonialism, with their message that all faith communities worldwide have the right to maintain their own religious traditions and should treat each other in a respectful, understanding, and tolerant manner.³

In the United Kingdom, Abdullah Quilliam was probably the first person to speak specifically about the relationship between Jews and Muslims – and between Judaism and Islam – in the spirit of the interfaith movement. In a number of lectures, he set out his vision of that relationship; this rested on the one hand upon the theological pillar that both groups are ‘People of
the Book’, and on the other upon a political pillar of ideas derived from the ‘millet’ system, which regulated relations between religious minorities and the Muslim majority in the Ottoman Empire. Direct contacts between Jews and Muslims in the UK and in the Netherlands prior to the Second World War were virtually non-existent, however, because – as previously discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 – the Muslim communities in both countries were still very small.

That situation changed after the Second World War, when large numbers of migrants from Islamic regions and countries began to arrive, first in the UK and somewhat later in the Netherlands. The first contact between Jews and Muslims in their two capitals took place in the neighbourhoods where both groups lived, such as London’s East End and probably the city districts Oost and Rivierenbuurt in Amsterdam. Rabbi Herschel Gluck has described the initial encounters between Jews and Muslims in the Stamford Hill district of Hackney, north London:

Relations between the two communities date back to the 1950s when Muslim migrants from South Asia arrived at Stamford Hill and were initially welcomed and helped settle by Hindi-speaking Indian-born Jews.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Jews and Muslims also encountered each other in and around abattoirs. In both traditions, the slaughter of animals is subject to conditions derived from their religious sources. Jewish kosher slaughter is called ‘shechita’, its Islamic halal counterpart ‘dhabiha’. In both the Netherlands and the UK, the kosher form has been permitted since ancient times. And halal slaughter was always permitted in the predominantly Muslim Dutch East Indies. In the Netherlands itself, Islamic ritual slaughter was legalised in 1977. That was a few years after the UK, where Parliament passed a new Slaughterhouses Act in 1974. Prior to that, Muslims had to rely upon Jewish butchers for ritually slaughtered meat.

Against the backdrop of an increasingly multicultural British society and the debate over proposed race relations legislation in the 1960s, there was a growing awareness within the Board of Deputies that it was important for its community to invest in relations with other minority groups. This led in 1968 to the Board’s establishment of a Working Group on Race Relations, which a year later issued the report *Improving Race Relations: A Jewish Contribution*. This publication resolutely rejected racism against ‘coloured immigrants’ and ‘black people’, and stressed the importance of positive interethnic and interreligious relations. The authors noted that, on a modest scale, Jewish groups had already established informal ‘intergroup’ contacts and went on to encourage the entire community to seek cooperation. The report was not universally welcomed, however. Some critics pointed out that anti-Zionism and antisemitism were common among
‘coloured’ groups and that caution was therefore required in establishing contacts with them.13

During the 1970s, in response to growing ethnic and racial diversity, both UK and the Netherlands saw radical nationalistic and militant xenophobic tendencies come to the surface within some sections of the Jewish community. Following the example set by the extremist Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane, for example, the Dutch arm of the Jewish Defence League (JDL) had no hesitation in intimidating political opponents with threats of violence.14 In the UK, this period saw a renaissance of the British racist extreme right, manifested particularly in the growth of National Front (NF). The cornerstone of that party’s ideology was a ban on any further non-white immigration into Britain, along with the compulsory deportation (repatriation) of those already in the country, and their descendants. While large sections of the British Jewish community condemned the NF, it did find support in some quarters. As the historian Geoffrey Alderman writes, “… there was explicit evidence of Jewish sympathy for and identification with National Front policies towards Black immigrants; a few Jews actually joined the Front, and stood on its behalf at parliamentary and local government contests”.15 The Board of Deputies sought to counter the influence of such extreme right-wing groups, but at the same time did not want to be drawn “into the world of left-wing pro-immigration policy, with which it was not, in any case, sympathetic and which it realised was hostile to Zionism”.16 In 1976 a Jewish Council for Racial Equality was formed.17 A year later the Board of Deputies decided, encouraged by its own Defence Committee, to establish and strengthen relations with non-white immigrant leaders and to participate in a new Joint Committee Against Racialism.18

In the 1970s and 1980s Jews and immigrants from Islamic regions found themselves standing shoulder to shoulder in resisting antisemitism, xenophobia, and racism19 – which were viewed as parallel phenomena. In the Netherlands the Anne Frank Foundation (which oversees the Anne Frank Collection and Museum) played a prominent role in this struggle. Its exhibitions and educational materials explicitly linked “the persecution of the Jews as [authors: inspiring] a new public morality and the fight against racism”.20 On 14 December 1980 a major anti-racism rally was held at the Jaap Edenhal in Amsterdam, with the aim of showing that there was no place for fascism and antisemitism in this ‘city of The Dockworker’ (Stad van De Dokwerker).21 This initiative was supported by 80 very diverse organisations, including the Liberal Jewish Congregation (Liberaal Joodse Gemeente, LJG) and ‘foreign workers’. The event began with a march from the statue of The Dockworker on Jonas Daniël Meijerplein, where a wreath was laid by Ronny Naftaniel, a member of the LJG and director of the Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel (Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël, CIDI), and Abdou Menebhi, representing the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands (Komitee van
Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland, KMAN) and the Moroccan community. Nevertheless, at times tensions also arose between Jewish and ‘migrant’ participants in anti-racism initiatives. In 1989, for example, a conflict arose around the establishment of a new municipal anti-discrimination bureau in Amsterdam when the KMAN refused a seat for the CIDI, which it regarded as a political organisation that “regards Arabs as terrorists”. Asked about the source of the problems between himself and KMAN leader Menebhi, Naftaniel replied, “Israel, I’m convinced of that. I think he found it unacceptable that he had to work with Jews who support Israel.”

Co-operation in the UK between Jews and non-white communities, including Muslims, began to falter in the early 1980s. As Keith Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley observe, “The Jews, on their side, distanced themselves still further from Black concerns, especially after April 1981 Brixton riots, which Jews generally condemned, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of the Lebanon, which evoked much hostility from Britain’s Muslim community”. Jews who did embrace the narrative of ‘multicultural Britain’ launched the Jewish Cultural and Anti-Racist Project in 1984. And to emphasise that it also intended to focus explicitly upon relations with other ethnic minorities and immigrant groups, the Board of Deputies’ Defence Committee changed its name to the Defence and Group Relations Committee.

In fact, one reason why the highly diverse Jewish and non-white immigrant communities failed to forge an enduring united front against racism in the 1970s and 1980s was profound differences in their outlook regarding Israel. For some the major divisive factor was Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, for others their view of Zionism: is it a form of racism or the necessary and justified answer to antisemitism in the world? Many people were unable to separate their perception of Israel from the fight against racism, but instead linked the two and could not or were unwilling to put any distance between them. According to Geoffrey Alderman, “The issue of Zionism was also a powerful factor inhibiting contact between Blacks and Jews. Afro-Caribbean and Asian radicals adopted the standard left-wing critique of Zionism, and this critique was bolstered by Islamic sympathy with the plight of the Palestinian Arabs. Moreover, Israeli’s friendly relations with South Africa could easily be presented as evidence of Jewish support for apartheid.”

The 1980s saw growing protests against Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter by animal rights activists, as well as by radical right-wing groups such as the Farmers’ Party (Boerenpartij, BP) and the Centre Party (Centrumpartij, CP) in the Netherlands and the National Front in the UK. Orthodox Christian parties in the Netherlands also spoke out against the practice. In their responses to this criticism, Jews and Muslims increasingly found themselves falling into the same camp. The major political parties in both countries, however, adopted a positive – or at least tolerant –
stance towards kosher and halal slaughter. In 1998, for instance, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok praised an amendment to the law on funerary rites and adaptations to the regulations regarding ritual slaughter as:

(...) changes that do justice to the multicultural society as it is now developing. Rules are being adapted to do justice to the normative views of newcomers. In this way, their integration into Dutch society is simplified without impinging upon essential values.\(^{33}\)

In 1987 the Inter Faith Network for the UK (IFN) was established, with numerous Jewish and Islamic bodies among its 60 or so initial participants.\(^{34}\) This ‘organisation of organisations’ brought together national religious and interreligious associations, local interreligous institutions, educational institutes, and academic centres. Among its ‘founding fathers’ were Rabbi Hugo Gryn and Mughram Al-Ghamdi of Regent’s Park Mosque.\(^{35}\) Its first director was Brian Pearce, who would be succeeded by Harriet Crabtree in 2007. “With the creation of the Network”, Pearce wrote, “national representative bodies of the major faith communities came together within a single framework for the first time: the Baha’i, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh communities and, two years later, the Zoroastrian community”.\(^{36}\) The IFN was born not only out of a desire to foster constructive relationships between religious communities, but also “to facilitate the active engagement in the ‘public square’ of faith communities newer in Britain”.\(^{37}\) In 1989 and 1990, in response to the Rushdie controversy, the INF and the Commission for Racial Equality jointly organised a number of seminars on UK blasphemy law, respect for religious identity, and the role of the media. According to Jørgen Nielsen, the IFN and the Christian churches were “the only major British institutions where Muslims found some degree of understanding for their concerns during the affair over Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*”.\(^{38}\)

In the Netherlands, in February 1986 CIDI director Ronny Naftaniel used a commentary in his organisation’s *Israel Newsletter* to call for the establishment of a bilateral Jewish-Muslim dialogue.\(^{39}\) This appeal came against the backdrop of moves at the time to separate the church and state, in particular severing the so-called silver cords which enabled state funding of the church, as well as out of concern about antisemitic statements made by some Muslims in the Netherlands. In his article Naftaniel asked whether it would not be wise for the government to extend its ongoing fight against prejudice to include Muslims as well, and he called upon representatives of the Jewish community to actively seek dialogue with their Islamic counterparts. Rabbis David Liliënthal and Edward van Voolen took up the challenge and did attempt to make contact with leading figures in Dutch Muslim communities.\(^{40}\) According to Van Voolen, Jews “as an older minority can help the Muslims as the youngest minority to find ways to gain their rights”.\(^{41}\) The conversation, he continued, should focus upon issues
Jews and Muslims have in common, such as entitlement to leave from work on religious holidays and ritual slaughter, rather than the political situation in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{42} He also stated that religion should form the basis for relations between Jews and Muslims, arguing that if that basis is in order then political matters, and particularly the issue of Israel and Palestine, can also be discussed constructively.\textsuperscript{43} In Jewish circles, two strands of thinking developed about how the dialogue between Jews and Muslims could take shape; one held that it should be organised independently of the existing Consultative Body of Jews and Christians (Overlegorgaan van Joden en Christenen, OJEC), while the other believed that that this organisation provided an ideal framework for its development. Within the OJEC, went the latter argument, room should be created for bipartite (Jewish-Muslim) or tripartite (Jewish-Christian-Muslim) consultations. In the ‘Israel News Letter’ (Israel Nieuwsbrief) of 27 February 1986 Naftaniel seems to have favoured the first model,\textsuperscript{44} a dialogue between Jews and Muslims outside the framework of OJEC, whereas Van Voolen – representing the LJG on the OJEC board – preferred the second.\textsuperscript{45} In the end, however, neither came to fruition and no dialogue of any kind, within the OJEC or outside it, was established between representatives of the Dutch Jewish and Muslim communities.

4.2 Jewish-Muslim Relations in London

4.2.1 The 1990s: An Auspicious Start\textsuperscript{46}

In 1989, as a reaction to the Rushdie affair, the Calamus Foundation was set up in the UK by Mohammed and Saba Risaluddin.\textsuperscript{47} This Muslim charity developed activities intended to improve the image of Islam in the UK, which had deteriorated considerably due to the Rushdie Affair. While its initial focus was Muslim-Christian dialogue, later it also turned its attention to Jewish-Muslim dialogue.\textsuperscript{48} The Jewish counterpart of Calamus is the Maimonides Foundation, established in 1985 by Richard Stone, Greville Janner MP, and Rabbi Hugo Gryn, all members of the reform branch of Judaism.\textsuperscript{49} Together with the Calamus Foundation, during the 1990s this group organised dinners four times a year at which substantive themes of interest to Jews and Muslims alike were discussed.\textsuperscript{50} The two foundations also developed other Jewish-Muslim initiatives.\textsuperscript{51} In 1994, for example, Saba Risaluddin and Richard Stone cowrote an article for The Guardian warning of the rise of Islamophobia in the UK.\textsuperscript{52} In 1997 Maimonides initiated the Alif-Aleph Foundation, intended as a forum ‘for businesspeople of both faiths’, and in 1999 it set up a long-term Interfaith Football Programme for Muslim and Jewish children in partnership with Arsenal Football Club.\textsuperscript{53} In 1998 the Calamus Maimonides Student Forum was formed with the aim of promoting dialogue between Jewish and Muslim students.\textsuperscript{54}
On Friday 25 February 1994 an Israeli, Baruch Goldstein, committed a massacre at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on the West Bank during Ramadan, killing 30 Palestinian Muslims. Several synagogues in London commemorated this tragedy. The West London Reform Synagogue, for instance, organised a memorial service attended by Jews, Muslims, and Palestinian Christians. In July of the same year, Palestinians carried out two bomb attacks on targets in London: the Israeli embassy and Balfour House, the headquarters of a Jewish charity. These were condemned by British Muslim leaders. A few weeks later Ḥizb ut-Tahrir (HT) organised the International Muslim Khilafa Conference at Wembley Arena, at which it promoted the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and the overthrow of the state of Israel. That event prompted fierce Jewish protests.

In 1994 Aubrey Rose, vice-president of the Board of Deputies, wrote the report *Ourselves and Other Minorities. A Brief Outline of Minorities and Our Relations with Them*. Rose was aware that the British Jewish community was very divided about establishing relations with other minorities. According to this report, there are some Jews, most of them orthodox, who are strongly self-centred and have no need of such relations. Then there are those who see other groups as antisemitic by definition, those who, looking at their own history, believe that no ‘outsider’ can be trusted and those who see their future in Israel and therefore consider the establishment of relations with other groups as unimportant. Rose, by contrast, saw a positive value in such relations based upon two arguments: protecting the community, or the ‘defence’ aspect, which includes defending against antisemitism; and offering a helping hand, building upon the idea expressed in the Tanakh that the Jewish community itself was once ‘foreign’. He also pointed out that the community in the UK was in fact already participating in such bodies as the IFN, the Inner City Religious Council (ICRC), and the United Campaign against Racism and thus already had a variety of contacts with other minorities. Rose observed that, “There is still a level of anti-Jewish feeling at grass-roots among Moslems [sic] based on propaganda in mosques and in literature, which emerges on campus and is often the result of extremist agitation”. But he then advised, “We have to maintain and develop links with the sensible moderate Moslems, who themselves see Islam condemned daily in the national media by association with terrorism”. The report assumed that attacks on Israel in the political sphere were reflected in attacks on the Jewish community.

As mentioned earlier, in 1997 the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was formed with the active encouragement of the newly elected New Labour government. This umbrella organisation became an significant Muslim interlocutor not only with Westminster, but also with the Board of Deputies. They met regularly and their joint lobbying work, in coalition with other religious and civil society groups, bore some fruit: a question on religious identity was added to the ten-yearly UK census, legislation on religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred was tightened and, despite
lobbying by Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) in 2003, no ban on ritual slaughter without stunning was introduced.\textsuperscript{61} In the wake the London bombings of 7 July 2005, however, the close co-operation between the British government and the MCB ended and the authorities instead reached out to other ‘representative’ national Muslim bodies such as the British Muslim Forum (BMF) and the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). The Board of Deputies also began distancing itself from the MCB, at first in part due to disagreements over the commemoration of Holocaust Memorial Day, first held in 2001; and later also over the so-called Istanbul Declaration of 2009, for instance. Signed by Daud Abdullah, the MCB’s deputy secretary general, this condemned Israel’s “malicious Jewish Zionist war over Gaza” and appeared to condone the use of force against the Israeli army and even against the British navy, should it be deployed in support of an arms blockade of Gaza.\textsuperscript{62}

The ‘race equality’ think tank the Runnymede Trust, founded in 1968, published the groundbreaking report \textit{Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All} in 1997. Richard Stone, active within the trust as well as chairing the Jewish Council for Racial Equality (JCORE), founded Alif-Aleph UK in 2004 together with Maqsood Ahmad. This organisation focuses upon the development of ‘positive contacts’ between Jews and Muslims at a grassroots level.\textsuperscript{63} Remarkably, in 1998 the JCORE and the Westminster Race Equality Council (WREC) arranged an informal conversation between Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks and members of the Nation of Islam, a group known for its antisemitic statements.\textsuperscript{64} In 1997 the Three Faiths Forum (3FF) was founded with the aim of improving understanding between people of the three ‘Abrahamic monotheistic faiths’.\textsuperscript{65} And in the same year the Lambeth Group was formed to prepare the religious programme for the millennium celebrations. Besides the Christian churches, Hindus, and Sikhs, Jews and Muslims were also represented on this body.\textsuperscript{66} The festivities it organised culminated in a ‘shared act of reflection and commitment by the faith communities in the United Kingdom’ in the House of Lords on 3 January 2000. In 2002 the events to mark the Queen’s Golden Jubilee included a Young People’s Faith Forum attended by Prince Charles.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{4.2.2 The 2000s: Explosive Growth}

The early 2000s ushered in a turbulent period, both nationally and internationally. Frustration over the failure of the Middle East peace process led to the outbreak in 2000 of the Second Intifada, which continued until 2005.\textsuperscript{68} In the summer of 2001 serious racial and ethnic violence erupted in various northern English cities, including Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley.\textsuperscript{69} On 11 September 2001 the terrorist network Al-Qaeda (‘the base’), led by Osama Bin Ladin, carried out devastating attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, killing nearly 3,000 people.\textsuperscript{70} These attacks prompted US President George
Bush to declare a ‘war on terror’. In October of that year troops from the US, the UK, Australia, and an alliance of Afghan opposition groups attacked Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which had been harbouring Al-Qaeda. In 2003 the US and the UK invaded Iraq under the false pretext – as it later emerged – that the regime of Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links with Al-Qaeda. This campaign prompted widespread criticism of Prime Minister Tony Blair and his government, both within his own Labour Party and beyond it, not least from the British Muslim community. The ‘9/11’ attacks were followed by a wave of terrorist incidents in Europe, including four bombings on public transport in London on 7 July 2005 which left 56 people dead and around 700 injured. These were committed by four ‘home-grown’ terrorists – young British citizens from Muslim migrant families. Moreover, the number of registered antisemitic incidents in the UK increased under the influence of the Second Intifada.

Throughout the early 2000s, London was the scene of numerous mass protests. In response to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel demonstrations were held. On 13 April 2002 the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) organised a large-scale march in support of the Palestinians; according to Metropolitan Police, some 10,000–15,000 people took part. On 18 May 2002 a smaller pro-Palestinian rally was held, attended by about 8,000 people including an estimated 300 members of Jamaat Al-Muhajiroun. On 6 May 2002 a large pro-Israel rally in Trafalgar Square, attracted 30,000 demonstrators. Among them were British politicians, rabbis, church leaders, and Israeli leaders. In his speech to the crowd, the later Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu equated Yasser Arafat with Adolf Hitler, to loud applause. The largest ‘stop the war’ march, on 15 February 2003, drew 750,000–1,000,000 demonstrators.

In these turbulent years, interreligious dialogue and co-operation in the UK grew enormously. According to a survey by the IFN, local interfaith groups mushroomed in the 2000s. While their number had been increasing gradually since the late 1960s, from about 20 in 1970 to 100 in the year 2000, over the subsequent ten years it more than doubled, to 235. A survey in 2009 showed that about three-quarters of all British synagogues and their leaders were involved in some form of ‘interfaith activities’. In the capital, the London Boroughs Faiths Network was established in 2003. That was complemented in 2010 by the Faiths Forum for London (FF4L), which covers all its boroughs and maintains close contacts with the Greater London Authority (GLA).

At the same time, bilateral Jewish-Muslim dialogue and co-operation also boomed. New ties were forged and old ones strengthened. Here are just a few examples. In 2001, at the instigation of Rabbi Herschel Gluck, the Muslim Jewish Forum of North London (MJF) was officially launched in Stamford Hill with the aim of promoting co-operation between Muslims...
and Jews in the neighbourhood and developing a strategic partnership around common themes.\textsuperscript{84} From 2003 onwards, An-Nisa, a Muslim women’s organisation founded in 1985, offered a series of Jewish-Muslim Text-Based Workshops in collaboration with the reform Jewish Leo Baeck College in London.\textsuperscript{85} In the same year the Jew’s Free School organised an education day involving people from Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) and Operation Black Vote.\textsuperscript{86} In 2004 the Jewish-Muslim Youth Theatre Group was established as one of the projects run by North-London’s Tricycle Theatre.\textsuperscript{87} Meanwhile, the Halal Food Authority and its Jewish counterpart, Beth Din, were strengthening their co-operation over the right to obtain halal and kosher food.\textsuperscript{88} Also in 2004, the \textit{Windows for Peace} project was launched to promote contact and understanding between ‘Jews, Arabs and Muslims living in the UK’, and in the same year the Building Bridges Forum for Arab-Jewish Cultural Exchange was established with the same aim and target groups.\textsuperscript{89} In 2006 the Centre for the Study of Muslim-Jewish Relations was set up under the auspices of the Woolf Institute in Cambridge; later that year Muslim scholars from this centre issued an open letter addressed to Jewish communities, entitled \textit{A Call to Peace, Dialogue and Understanding between Muslims and Jews}.\textsuperscript{90} In 2008, after resigning her directorship of the Maimonides Foundation, Mehri Nikham founded the Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF) to focus upon the education of schoolchildren, students, and religious leaders. In 2009 this organisation established a Council of Imams and Rabbis and four years later a Council of Muslim and Jewish Physicians.\textsuperscript{91} The Imam and Rabbis Council of the United Kingdom was also founded in 2009. Susanne van Esdonk has compiled an inventory of all bilateral Jewish-Muslim initiatives in London over the years and concludes that their number has risen to “several hundreds, if not thousands”.\textsuperscript{92}

Many of the initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue and co-operation between Jews and Muslims were supported by the British government. In 2004 the Home Office Faith Communities Unit published the report \textit{Working Together: Co-operation between Government and Faith Communities}, which made a long list of recommendations to strengthen effective co-operation between those communities and public agencies.\textsuperscript{93} Two years later the government set up the Faith Communities Consultative Council (FCCC) as the central body for communication between the government and religious groups.\textsuperscript{94} Another two years later, in 2008, the government further elaborated its ‘interfaith strategy’ in the report \textit{Face to Face and Side by Side: A Framework for Partnership in Our Multi-Faith Society}.\textsuperscript{95} For the implementation of its policy, moreover, the government freed up considerable sums of money. Between 2006 and 2008, some £13.8 million was spent through the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund. Under the strategy outlined in \textit{Face to Face and Side by Side}, another £7.5 million was set aside for the established of regional faith forums and to implement local initiatives and activities.\textsuperscript{96} These sums were modest, though, compared with the
£60 million budget allocated to the Prevent anti-radicalisation strategy in the years 2007–2010.

4.2.3 The 2010s: Stabilisation and Moderate Growth

In the 2010s the backdrop to the development of Jewish-Muslim relations in London has been coloured by the upsurge of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rise of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, attacks in the city and elsewhere on both Jewish and Muslim targets and the rise in the number of recorded incidents of antisemitism and Islamophobia across the UK. For many existing partnerships, these events have provided an additional incentive to work towards improving relations. And they have also prompted new initiatives. The London-based network Community of Jews and Muslims (COJAM), for instance, was founded in 2014. And from 2013 the Jewish organisation Mitzvah Day, set up by Laura Marks in 2005, began focusing explicitly upon interfaith activities. In 2015 Julie Siddiqi established the Islamic equivalent of Mitzvah Day, the Sadaqa Day organisation. In the same year Marks and Siddiqi cofounded the Jewish-Muslim women’s network Nisa-Nashim, which works to bring Jewish and Muslim communities in the UK closer together through the creation of “friendship and trust”. By 2017, Nisa-Nashim already had 20 local women’s groups. Another notable initiative was Stand for Peace; established in 2011 by Samuel Westrop and Hasan Afzal, this organisation aimed to be a platform “for rational discussion of the topics that drive the Muslim and Jewish community apart”. It opposed not only extremism in both those communities, but also very emphatically what it called the established ‘inter faith industry’ – which it believed had been infiltrated and exploited by extremist Islamic groups. Stand for Peace proved short-lived, however, and was defunct by 2017.

The Second Israel-Lebanon War broke out in the summer of 2006. More than two years later, in December 2008 and January 2009, and again in November 2012 and the summer of 2014, Israel conducted bloody military operations in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian protests on the Gaza border in the spring of 2018 were met by Israeli army violence, and in May 2021 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict flared up again. Escalations of violence in the Middle East repeatedly raised tensions in the UK and lead to numerous demonstrations in London at which protesters showed their solidarity with one side or the other. On 20 July 2014 more than 1,500 people, by police estimates, most of them Jews, participated in a pro-Israel rally. On 26 July and 9 August 2014 the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and allied groups organised two large-scale marches which, according to the organisers, respectively mobilised 45,000 and 150,000 protesters, including many Muslims.

Besides Jews and Jewish organisations supportive of military operations by the Israeli army and Muslims and Islamic organisations in unilateral
solidarity with the Palestinian cause, there are also groups and institutions which take different positions. Since the early 2000s, for example, several Jewish organisations highly critical of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians have been founded. They include Jews for Palestinians and Independent Jewish Voice (IJV). The Forum for Discussion of Israel & Palestine (FODIP), established in 2008, aims “to host and facilitate sensitively interfaith dialogue on the Israeli Palestinian conflict, within and between Jews, Christians, Muslims and others in the UK, and to promote co-operation through dialogue”. And on 27 August 2014 the MCB and the Board of Deputies jointly issued an ‘unprecedented’ statement on the war in Gaza. In this they stated that, on the one hand, “We acknowledge that our communities may disagree about the origins, current reasons and solutions to end the conflict” and on the other called upon British Jews and Muslims not to import the conflict into the UK but rather to export peace to the Middle East and to condemn any expression of Islamophobia and antisemitism or any form of racism:

We need constructive dialogue to limit our disagreements and identify the widest possible range of areas for co-operation. There are more issues that unite us than divide us. May the God of Abraham grant our world more peace, wisdom and hope.

This declaration was not to the liking of everyone in either Jewish or Muslim circles. On the Jewish side, a debate arose about its use of the phrase ‘targeting of civilians’, which was interpreted by critics as an accusation against the Israeli army. Nevertheless, a month after its release the statement was approved at a plenary meeting of the Board of Deputies with 124 votes in favour and 40 against.

In 2010 popular uprisings and revolutions against the ruling authoritarian regimes broke out in several Arab countries. In Syria this so-called Arab Spring culminated in a civil war which, by 2015, was estimated to have cost more than 220,000 lives. In the wake of that conflict and the bloody fighting in Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) was founded in 2014 and immediately proclaimed its establishment of a caliphate in the border region between the two countries. Five years later this was destroyed by a coalition led by the US. Significant numbers of European Muslims were radicalised under the influence of the Syrian conflict and the founding of IS, and an estimated 850–900 Britons left for jihadist combat zones in Syria and Iraq.

Following the establishment of IS, a second wave of Islamist attacks swept across Europe. Since the early 2010s. Jews and Jewish businesses or institutions have been frequent targets, as in Toulouse (11, 15, and 19 March 2012, a Jewish school), Paris (19 September 2012, a kosher supermarket), Brussels (25 May 2014, the Jewish museum), Paris (8 and 9 January 2015, a kosher supermarket), Nice (3 February 2015, a Jewish centre), and Marseilles (11 January 2016, a teacher at a Jewish school).
These incidents have instilled fear not only among Jews living close to the targets, but also those in other countries and cities – London included. And nine jihadist attacks have been carried out in the British capital itself since 2010.\textsuperscript{115} During the same period, right-wing extremists have orchestrated acts of violence against Muslims and mosques. Among their targets have been several sites in Sweden (December 2014 and January 2015), Valence (1 January 2016), Quebec (29 January 2017), and Oslo (11 August 2019).\textsuperscript{116} The bloodiest attack of all was on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019, killing 51 people.\textsuperscript{117} There have also been repeated incidents at mosques and Islamic centres in London. On 19 June 2017, for instance, a van attack on mosque-goers in the Finsbury Park area left one person dead and ten injured.\textsuperscript{118}

This violence has evoked feelings of insecurity; in response, security precautions at London’s Jewish and Islamic institutions alike have been enhanced. Umbrella organisations on both sides have repeatedly expressed their horror not only at attacks on their own community, but also those against the other. For example, the MCB strongly condemned the shootings at \textit{Charlie Hebdo} in Paris in January 2015 and the Board of Deputies did the same following the Finsbury Park incident.\textsuperscript{119}

In the UK, Jews face antisemitism and Muslims Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{120} These expressions of loathing and hatred do not seem to be limited just to football stadiums, the streets, and the internet, but even pervade the sphere of politics. Jewish organisations have accused the Labour Party, particularly under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn between 2015 and 2020, of antisemitism within its own ranks. Likewise, the MCB has claimed that the Conservative Party harbours an Islamophobic element.\textsuperscript{121} Immediately upon taking over from Corbyn as Labour’s new leader on April 2020, Keir Starmer stated that he wants to do everything possible to purge his party of antisemitism and restore the trust of the Jewish community.\textsuperscript{122} The accusations against both Labour and the Conservatives have been investigated.\textsuperscript{123}

Opposition to antisemitism and Islamophobia as related expressions of hatred is a domain in which Jews and Muslims and Jewish and Muslim organisations find common ground. On 27 February 2009 the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR), together with the Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF), issued a statement calling upon “Jewish and Muslim leaders and communities to work constructively together to defeat the evils of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism”.\textsuperscript{124} It is notable that in the 2010s Jewish organisations regularly spoke out against Islamophobia, and Muslim organisations against expressions of antisemitism. For example, in a joint statement the Board of Deputies, the JIF and rabbis “representing the United Synagogue, Masorti, Liberal and Reform Judaism” expressed their sadness and concern at the rise in Islamophobic attacks in response to the killing of soldier Lee Rigby by two jihadist extremists on 22 May 2013 in the London Borough of Woolwich.\textsuperscript{125} And on 29 December 2019 the
MCB condemned the antisemitic ‘hate crime attack’ on a synagogue and other Jewish buildings in north London earlier that day. Harun Khan, the Council’s secretary general, declared:

An attack on one faith is an attack on us all. We stand in solidarity with Jewish friends and colleagues, and all Jewish communities affected directly or indirectly by these attacks. We pray that the perpetrators of today’s crime are caught and prosecuted swiftly.  

Jewish charity the Community Security Trust (CST) and its Muslim counterpart, Tell MAMA, work closely together to monitor and combat antisemitism and Islamophobia. For example, the CST is helping Tell MAMA to develop a monitoring system. Both also participate in the Community Alliance To Combat Hate (CATCH) project, which provides support and legal assistance to victims of hate crime in London. The JIF, meanwhile, offers educational programmes on the Holocaust and the Srebrenica massacre. Their aim is to draw historical parallels between common experiences of genocide in order to promote better understanding and eliminate prejudice.

With the advent of a coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in 2010, British government policy regarding co-operation with religious communities began to change. In line with its new concept known as the ‘Big Society’, and also with a view to cutting budgets, the emphasis shifted from ‘centrally-led to locally-led action’ and from ‘the public to the voluntary and private sectors’. As stated in the policy document Bringing People Together in Strong, United Communities, links between the government and religious communities were loosened, with the focus no longer upon ‘partnerships’ with a select group of faiths but now upon promoting ‘community integration’ for everyone. The Faith Communities Consultative Council was dissolved in 2011. Under the new policy, however, religious groups and interreligious associations could continue to apply for government grants to encourage ‘integration and community cohesion’. Between 2015/2016 and 2018/2019, for example, initiatives such as Inter Faith Week, Together in Service, the Anne Frank Trust UK, the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, Tell MAMA and Remembering Srebrenica received government funding totalling almost £19 million. Another beneficiary was the Church Urban Fund’s Near Neighbours programme, which was supported to the tune of more than £7.2 million. Funds were also made available ‘to boost the capacity of faith groups’. In the capital, the Faiths Forum for London (FF4L) was tasked with delivering the Strengthening Faith Institutions programme.

In its Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper: Building Stronger, More United Communities, published in 2018, the UK government acknowledged the need to continue to support interfaith work as a means of breaking down the barriers between communities, strengthening mutual
understanding, and “removing the conditions which can allow intolerance and unequal treatment to flourish”. And in its response to submissions prompted by the green paper, the government stated that, “We will continue to fund programmes which help promote social mixing, such as Near Neighbours and Schools Linking, which show that bonds can be formed with people from very different backgrounds and that people often find shared values and concerns, regardless of background”. It also intended to continue and expand its support for the fight against antisemitism and Islamophobia.

The British Royal Family is very supportive of interfaith relations. As sovereign, the Queen has a special relationship with the Church of England; but as head of state and head of the Commonwealth she also seeks to maintain positive relationships with other religious groups in the UK and in other parts of the Commonwealth. On various occasions, such as in her Christmas and Commonwealth messages, she regularly stresses the importance of tolerance and constructive relations between all faiths. She or another member of the Royal Family often adds lustre to interfaith gatherings with their presence.

4.3 Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam

4.3.1 The 1990s: A Cautious Beginning

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new international balance of power emerged. This allowed for the start of direct talks between Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab nations. In 1993 these negotiations resulted in a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, and in 1993 and 1995 the so-called Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. Bart Wallet notes that in the Netherlands, too, this new situation resulted in contacts being established “between Zionist and Palestinian organisations”.

After Iraq had invaded and occupied neighbouring Kuwait in the summer of 1990, an international coalition led by the US and with the Netherlands as one of its members ejected the occupying forces in a short war in January and February 1991. During this conflict, Iraq fired Scud missiles at Tel Aviv. While the heads of government of many Arab countries backed the coalition, PLO leader Yasser Arafat expressed his support for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. To prevent the differences in the Middle East from spreading to the Netherlands, a meeting between representatives of the Jewish and Muslim communities was organised at debate venue De Rode Hoed in Amsterdam on 29 January 1991. They did not focus on religious and political issues, but rather matters of common interest, enemy images, experiences of discrimination and what it was like to live as a minority in the Netherlands. That conversation was never followed up, though. Driss el Boujoufi, looking back on the meeting, later said that the
main reason why no official relations had been established between the two communities in the Netherlands up until then was that “Islamic immigrants were too busy setting up their own organisations, such as mosques and cultural associations”. He does not mention any substantive barriers. These were discussed, however, at a seminar organised in the summer of 1992 at the Moses and Aaron Church (Mozes en Aäronkerk) on Waterlooplein in Amsterdam to mark the quincentenary of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. The final declaration on that occasion stated that the most important obstacles to Jewish-Muslim dialogue were “the colonial past and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”. This initiative also was never followed up.

In 1992 a campaign group called The Netherlands Confesses Colour (Nederland Bekent Kleur, NBK) was set up to “oppose any form of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism or any other form of discrimination” and to “further promote the multicultural society in our country”. From its inception, NBK organised an annual national Kristallnacht commemoration in Amsterdam for which Turkish and Moroccan migrant organisations provided support and with regular contributions by representatives of the Jewish community, including Ronny Nathaniel (CIDI) and rabbis Edward van Voolen and Awraham Soetendorp. In 1997 the Amsterdam Council for Beliefs and Religions (Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam, RLRA) was founded. And in 2000 Sami Kaspi, a Dutch citizen with Moroccan Jewish roots, established the Maimon Foundation (Stichting Maïmon) with aim of bridging the gap between Dutch citizens of Moroccan descent and Jews in the Netherlands by giving talks at schools, developing teaching materials, and organising study tours to old Jewish Morocco. This organisation has held for many years a gathering to mark the Mimouna celebration.

4.3.2 The 2000s: Strong Growth

The early 2000s was not only a turbulent period internationally, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the attacks of 9 September 2001 and the launch of the US war on terror, but also a time of upheaval in the Netherlands. By 2000 the doctrine of multiculturalism was being widely rejected. Paul Scheffer, an adviser to the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), spoke of the ‘multicultural drama’ and Paul Schnabel, director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), of the ‘multicultural illusion’. At the same time, criticism of Islam was growing. In 2001 populist Pim Fortuyn entered politics with an antimulticulturalist and anti-Islam manifesto. On 6 May 2002 he was murdered by an animal-rights activist and nine days later his Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) party won 26 of the 150 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives, instantly making it the country’s second largest parliamentary party. In the public debate on Islam, the politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali took
over from Fortuyn as the religion’s most outspoken critic. In the summer of 2004 she and filmmaker Theo van Gogh released the short film Submission, an ‘exposé’ of the mistreatment of women in Islam. On 2 November 2004 Van Gogh was stabbed to death in Amsterdam by Mohammed Bouyeri, a radicalised young Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent, causing a shockwave across the city and the nation. In response to this murder, 45 violent incidents targeting mosques took place within a period of two months. Of these, 18 were arsons or attempted arsons. In the wake of the LPF, other populist parties emerged: Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV) from 2006, Rita Verdonk’s Proud of the Netherlands (Trots op Nederland, ToN; 2007–2010), and Thierry Baudet and Henk Otten’s Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie, FvD) since 2016, followed in 2021 by JA21.

The intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 2000 to 2005 exacerbated the divisions between Jews and Muslims in the Netherlands. While many Dutch Jews tend to support Israel and view its military action as a legitimate form of self-defence against suicide bombings perpetrated by Palestinians against Israelis and Hamas rockets fired from Gaza, many of their Muslim compatriots side with the Palestinians and consider Israel a powerful aggressor oppressing them. In the year 2000 this divide became all too apparent at the annual national commemoration in Amsterdam of Kristallnacht. During the ceremony Jacques Grishaver, chair of the Dutch Auschwitz Committee, called upon Abdou Menebhi, present as a representative of the Moroccan community, to leave the stage because in his speech – despite also condemning all expressions of antisemitism in the Netherlands as unacceptable – he had denounced the actions of the Israeli army in the occupied territories, thus breaching an agreement not to mention the Middle East conflict. Menebhi’s actions drew criticism, particularly in Jewish circles.

At the same time, events in the Middle East could also provide a reason to co-operate. In March 2002, for instance, the Coalition of Peace (Coalitie van Vrede) was established at the instigation of several prominent members of the Jewish, Palestinian, and Muslim communities in the Netherlands. It called for an immediate end to the violence between Jews and Palestinians in Israel and demanded that Israeli troops withdraw to the positions they had held prior to the Second Intifada. Opponents, however, dismissed this initiative as a ‘coalition of deceit’.

During the years of the Second Intifada, several large-scale pro-Palestinian demonstrations were held in Amsterdam. These brought together ‘old’ organisations, such as the Dutch Palestine Committee (Nederlands Palestina Komitee, NPK) and KMAN (see above), and ‘new’ ones including Greta Duisenberg’s Stop the Occupation (Stop de Bezetting), Dyab Abou Jahjah’s Arab European League (Arabisch Europese Liga, AEL), and Young People for Palestine (Jongeren voor Palestina). A Different Jewish Voice (Een Ander Joods Geluid, EAJG) also joined this
Especially after demonstrators were seen carrying swastikas and banners comparing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with Hitler, and also heard chanting antisemitic slogans, EAJG’s participation attracted with strong criticism in some Jewish circles. Its members were denounced as “Hamas’ fifth column”, “the echo of the Palestinian Authority”, “self-hating Jews”, and “traitors to the Jewish people”. Rabbi Lody van de Kamp also described the EAJG in very negative terms, not so much because of its stance regarding Israel as for the fact that, during the pro-Palestine demonstration on 13 April 2002, it declared its solidarity with the other marchers and did not “walk away from this antisemitism very fast”.

From 2001 onwards, a wave of antisemitic incidents took place in Amsterdam. In addition to the slogans carried and chanted at pro-Palestinian demonstrations, there were instances of Jewish men wearing kippahs being abused by young Muslims in Amsterdam West. In 2003 and again in 2006, in several neighbourhoods the annual remembrance ceremonies for the victims of the Second World War on the evening of 4 May were disrupted by young people of Moroccan origin shouting antisemitic slogans and destroying wreaths. In response to these events, a number of initiatives were set up to help bring Jewish and Muslim Amsterdammers closer together. In De Baarsjes neighbourhood, for example, a Jewish-Moroccan dialogue group was set up which went on to organise a cross-community ‘MaJo’ football tournament, joint activities by youth organisations, exchanges between synagogues and mosques and an annual Moroccan Jewish Mimouna celebration. In 2002 reports emerged that it was proving difficult, if not impossible on occasions, to teach secondary school pupils about the Second World War and the Holocaust. In response, for 2003 and 2004 ‘social innovation agency’ Diversion developed a teaching programme entitled ‘The Second World War in Perspective’, which was taken up by several Amsterdam schools. That was followed soon afterwards by a second programme, ‘Equal = Equal’, about discrimination on the grounds of religion, culture, and sexual diversity. The murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 provided a further impetus for joint Jewish-Muslim initiatives, ranging from a Moroccan-Jewish women’s group to kosher ‘iftar’ meals during Ramadan and a rap project for Jewish and Muslim teenagers at a number of youth clubs. In 2005 M-Zine, FORUM and CIDI organised trips for Jewish and Muslim youngsters to the former Nazi concentration camps of Westerbork and Auschwitz, and the Classroom of Difference project was rolled out in schools. Following an antisemitic incident in Amsterdam’s Bos en Lommer neighbourhood in 2010, Rabbi Lody van de Kamp and youth worker Saïd Bensellam set up the Saïd & Lody Foundation (Stichting Saïd & Lody) to improve relations between young Jews and Muslims, in particular, through workshops, training, and advice.

Alarmed by incidents of antisemitism in Amsterdam, in 2003 leading figures in the Jewish community approached Mayor Job Cohen. In
response, he initiated discussions between representatives of the Jewish and Moroccan communities at his official residence, which resulted in the establishment of the Amsterdam Jewish-Moroccan Network (Joods Marokkaans Netwerk Amsterdam, JMNA) in 2006. Strikingly, the EAJG was excluded from this due to opposition from other Jewish participants.\textsuperscript{174} The JMNA had 27 members who, according to its founding document, “want to rework intolerance in the Netherlands into a climate of respect, and who collectively oppose expressions of antisemitism, Islamophobia or other forms of discrimination, as well as the hardening of the Dutch social and political climate, ‘us-against-them’ thinking and the stigmatisation of population groups”.\textsuperscript{175} Supported formally and financially by the City of Amsterdam, the network sought regularly to attract public attention by organising theme meetings, lectures with guest speakers and film evenings, and it also paid a working visit to Morocco. It eventually collapsed in 2014, however, due to a combination of ideological disagreements over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and personality clashes.\textsuperscript{176} In part at the instigation of Lody van de Kamp, Karima Belhaj, and Fatima Elatik, Salaam-Shalom Amsterdam was founded in that same year to take up the baton dropped by the JMNA and organise informal meetings between Muslims and Jews as well as cross-community gatherings with a focus upon arts and culture.\textsuperscript{177}

The JMNA was controversial. Some sections of the Jewish community had little faith in dialogue with Muslims of Moroccan descent, as indeed did some sections of the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{178} The AEL, for example, was a fierce critic; on its website it dismissed the JMNA as an initiative of the ‘Zionist lobby in the Netherlands’, the Jews involved in it as ‘Zionists’ and the Muslim participants in it as ‘people collaborating with Zionists’.\textsuperscript{179} Any attempt within or by the JMNA to build bridges was rejected out of hand: “You don’t build a bridge with Zionists, a gang that is raping, occupying and murdering the Arab world. You distance yourself from them in the Netherlands and everywhere else. Every bridge with Zionists will be destroyed by all possible means ...”\textsuperscript{180}

Suzanne Roggeveen has identified a total of 35 collaborative projects in Amsterdam in the years 2000–2015.\textsuperscript{181} These were mainly dialogue meetings, educational programmes, and interreligious and intercommunal initiatives. During her research in Amsterdam, she did not come across any local Jewish-Muslim groups devoted to joint theological or spiritual reflection about religious sources and scriptures. Instead, the projects tended to address such issues as prejudice, antisemitism, and Islamophobia, as well as religious and cultural similarities such as religious slaughtering, fasting, or some culinary traditions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a source of division, but also a common factor through which some Jews and Muslims made contact with each other.

The policy of Amsterdam’s city government with regard to diversity and integration during the time Job Cohen was mayor (2001–2010) can be
summed up using his own motto: “Keeping things together”. His efforts to bring together representatives of the Jewish and Moroccan or broader Muslim communities in Amsterdam perfectly typify this approach.\textsuperscript{182} Interestingly, Cohen saw a clear role for religion in this policy. In a number of speeches he emphasised its importance as a unifying force and argued for the involvement of faith communities in strengthening social cohesion in the city\textsuperscript{183} – a strategy not continued by his successors.

Partly in response to the murder of Theo van Gogh, interreligious and intercommunal networks were set up in most parts of Amsterdam at the instigation of local churches, synagogues, mosques, youth centres, and community workers, and with the co-operation of the relevant borough authorities, in an effort to improve relations between the various communities. The Bos and Lommer Interfaith Council/West Amsterdam Interfaith Network (Bos en Lommer Interreligieus Beraad/West Interreligieus Netwerk, WiN) and the East Amsterdam Broad Interfaith Forum (Breed Interreligieus Overleg Amsterdam Oost) were established in 2005, followed by the South Amsterdam Interfaith Network (Interreligieus Netwerk Zuid) in 2009, the Amsterdam Nieuw-West Broad Interfaith Forum (Breed Interreligieus Intercultureel Overleg Amsterdam Nieuw-West) in 2013, and the North Amsterdam Forum for Places of Worship (Gebedshuizenoverleg Amsterdam Noord).

\subsection*{4.3.3 The 2010s: Moderate Growth}

In the past decade the international context underlying the evolution of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam has been dominated by the Gaza wars of December 2008 to January 2009, November 2012, and the summer of 2014, the rise of IS, attacks by violent jihadists on Jewish targets such as those in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015), and Copenhagen (2015) and the shootings by a right-wing extremist at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019. There have also been terrorist incidents in the Netherlands. On 21 August 2015 a jihadist attack was carried out on the Thalys, a high-speed train between Amsterdam and Paris, on 31 August 2018 two American tourists were stabbed at Amsterdam’s central station and on 18 March 2019 four people were killed in a shooting ‘with terrorist intent’ on a tram in Utrecht.\textsuperscript{184} On 27 February 2016 petrol bombs were thrown at a Moroccan mosque in Enschede. In addition, more than 300 Dutch people are believed to have travelled to jihadist conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.\textsuperscript{185} At a pro-Gaza demonstration on 24 July 2014, some protestors were seen carrying IS flags.\textsuperscript{186} There have also been numerous incidents of antisemitism and Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{187}

During the Gaza wars, demonstrations in solidarity with both sides were a frequent occurrence in Amsterdam. The pro-Israel ones in 2014 were organised by the CIDI and Christians for Israel (Christenen voor Israël), while those in support of the Palestinians were backed by Youth for
Palestine, the NPK, the International Socialists (Internationale Socialisten),
trade union Abvakabo FNV and Women in Black (Vrouwen in het
Zwart). The EAJG was also involved. At the municipal level, concerns
about the events in Gaza led to disagreement in Amsterdam’s city council
about plans to twin Amsterdam with Tel Aviv and Ramallah. The rise in intercommunity tensions in Amsterdam and other cities as a
result of the Gaza war in the summer months of 2014, along with incidences
of antisemitism and discrimination against Muslims, prompted minister for
Social Affairs and Employment Lodewijk Asscher to invite religious and
faith-based institutions – Jewish and Muslim organisations among them – to
a gathering at the Ridderzaal, part of the national parliament complex in The
Hague, to discuss what they could do collectively to mitigate the situation. A second meeting, between Minister Asscher and key figures from the Jewish
and Muslim communities, followed on 15 March 2016. At this they again
discussed how to reduce the tensions generated in the Netherlands by the
Middle East conflict, as well as how to better build bridges between the two
communities in a polarised landscape.

In Amsterdam, meanwhile, in the autumn of 2014 Mayor Eberhard van
der Laan also initiated conversations at his official residence between
leading Jewish and Muslim figures. At these the participants exchanged
their concerns, feelings, and ideas on a variety of topical issues, which “very
often touch[ed] upon security issues”. One notable difference between
these meetings and those facilitated by Cohen several years earlier was that
they were now defined as a Jewish-Muslim dialogue rather than a Jewish-
Moroccan one. Also, the participants were not ‘representatives’ of their
communities but ‘key figures’ in them – the advantage of that being that
they did not have to report back to their rank and file, making it easier to
talk frankly. Working with such figures also has its drawbacks, though, as
encapsulated in a series of questions posed by Walter Palm: “What is a key
figure, how do you select key figures, how do you remunerate them, what
are their tasks and why them anyhow, and not someone else?”
Nevertheless, these discussions did result in the formation of working
groups which went on to develop concrete initiatives such as the diversity
project 180 Amsterdammers, by Chantal Suissa and Ahmed Larouz.

In order to protect Amsterdam’s Jewish community, immediately fol-
lowing the attack in Brussels on 24 May 2014 Mayor Van der Laan – in
consultation with Dick Schoof, the National Co-ordinator for
Counterterrorism – placed the Jewish Historical Museum, the Anne Frank
House, the city’s synagogues, and Jewish schools in the Buitenveldert
neighbourhood under police surveillance. Prime Minister Mark Rutte,
Minister of Security and Justice Ivo Opstelten, and Deputy Prime Minister
Asscher met representatives from Jewish organisations on 4 August 2014 at
the Catshuis, the prime minister’s official residence in The Hague, to discuss
their security and measures to combat antisemitism. These consultations
lead to Jewish institutions in the Netherlands receiving enhanced security
and the national government for the first time agreeing to bear part of the
cost, following the example set by the local authority in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{196}
Three and a half years later, on 8 February 2018, a second meeting again
discussed security and antisemitism but also featured the topic of kosher
slaughter.\textsuperscript{197} On the government side, Mark Rutte was joined by Deputy
Prime Ministers Hugo de Jonge, Kajsa Ollongren, and Carola Schouten and
by the new Minister of Justice and Security, Ferdinand Grapperhaus. In
2019, in response to a number of Islamophobic incidents involving right-
wing extremists, the City of Amsterdam decided to provide mosques as well
as synagogues with more security, and to contribute towards the costs.\textsuperscript{198}

Attacks on Jewish targets and antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands
usually attract widespread condemnation from Muslim organisations, and
conversely attacks on Islamic targets and Islamophobic incidents are de-
nounced by Jewish institutions. In its 2016 annual report, the Dutch Union
for Progressive Judaism (Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom,
NVPJ) discussed responses to threats and attacks of both kinds:

\begin{quote}
Declaration of sympathy with all Muslim communities and mosques
after a number of them received a threatening letter with a swastika at
the beginning of the year. The responses to this have been widely
accepted with thanks nationwide and have had a favourable impact
upon external relations, such as those with the press, the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Muslim leaders (several of whom have openly
spoken up for Jewish congregations: ‘Keep your hands off the
synagogues’).\textsuperscript{199}
\end{quote}

A desire to know more about each other and the fight against antisemitism
and Islamophobia are important areas in which Jews and Muslims in
Amsterdam, and their respective institutions, find common ground in the
2010s.\textsuperscript{200} In 2012 a number of those institutions joined forces with LGBTIQ
organisations to initiate a joint ‘Security Pact Against Discrimination’
(\textit{Veiligheids pact tegen discriminatie}), which takes a stand over violence di-
rected at individuals because of their sexual, gender, racial, ethnic, or re-
ligious identity and at buildings such as mosques or synagogues.\textsuperscript{201} In the
same year, as part of the project ‘Preaching in Mokum’ (\textit{Preken in Mokum} –
‘Mokum’ is an originally Yiddish name for Amsterdam, now in common
usage across all communities), imam Marzouk Aulad Abdellah from
Al Kabir Mosque addressed the congregation at the city’s Liberal Jewish
Synagogue and its rabbi, Menno ten Brink, delivered a sermon at Al Kabir.\textsuperscript{202}
In 2014 Chantal Suissa and Tofik Benyahia, a member of staff at Moroccan
youth centre Argan, initiated the network organisation Mo & Moos with the
objective of training young professionals aged 25–35 from the Jewish and
Muslim communities as ‘key figures’ to strengthen links between them.\textsuperscript{203} A
number of other projects aimed at youngsters were also launched at around
this time, among them the LJG’s ‘Get to Know your Neighbours’ (\textit{Leer je

buren kennen) for students in further and higher vocational education. The project ‘Discrimination, Antisemitism and Islamophobia’ (Discriminatie, antisemitisme en islamofobie), developed by the Turkish Participation Body (Inspraakorgaan Turken, IOT), the Anne Frank Foundation, EAJG and CIDI, was introduced in 2017, aimed primarily at young people from the Turkish and Jewish communities. And 2015 saw the establishment of the Amstelveen Jewish Islamic Platform (Joods Islamitisch Platform Amstelveen) and the interreligious network Together One Amsterdam (Samen ÉÉN Amsterdam).

On 7 December 2017 a man wearing a Palestinian scarf smashed a window at Jewish restaurant HaCarmel in Amsterdam. It was subsequently targeted again on a number of occasions. Partly as a result of these incidents, the so-called Amsterdam ‘Jewish Accord’ (Amsterdams Joods Akkoord) was drawn up to counter antisemitism in the capital. This was signed on 6 March 2018 by all the groups on the city council, with the exception of Bij1 and DENK. A year later the council adopted a plan of action against antisemitism, especially among young people. In 2020 Chantal Suissa, Fatima Akalai, Lody van de Kamp, and Raja Alouani formed the Jewish-Muslim network Yalla! to tackle mutual prejudices and to strengthen ties between the two groups. Rabbi Simon Bornstein, who is of Moroccan origin and closely associated with the Assadaaka community in east Amsterdam, has been consistently active for many years in the field of social work and interreligious relations. On 8 April 2021 he led his community’s traditional Moroccan-Jewish Mimouna celebration.

The executive bodies of Amsterdam’s city districts each have their own policies regarding support for interreligious links and activities in their areas. One example of a district that welcomes dialogue and co-operation and so facilitates the necessary interfaith network is Stadsdeel Zuid, covering the south of the city. It actively supported the relaunch of the South Amsterdam Interfaith Network in 2015 and has since played a coordinating role. According to the Stadsdeel Zuid executive, the goal of the relaunch was “to reconnect administratively with religious institutions and to encourage their mutual contacts”. On the Jewish side this network involves representatives of the LJG, the orthodox Gerard Dou Synagogue, and the Beth Shalom community, and on the Islamic side representatives of Selimiye Mosque, De Vrede Mosque, Al Kabir Mosque, and the Al Choura Foundation. It addresses both substantive and practical themes: youth and radicalisation, loneliness, the importance of faith, local social services, volunteer care, and domestic violence. The network is important for the district, too, as a source of information about its faith communities and sometimes as a channel for informing them. For the communities themselves, it is a means of finding out more about, learning from and helping each other, and where possible also developing joint activities.

Many national Jewish and Islamic organisations not only support intercommunity projects in Amsterdam but also work together on a national
level. In 2011, for example, the Dutch House of Representatives debated a bill tabled by the Party for the Animals (Partij van de Dieren, PvdD) to ban slaughter without stunning in accordance with the Jewish and Muslim rites.214 This was passed by a large majority of 116 votes to 30, prompting the Muslims and Government Liaison Committee (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO) and the Organisation of Jewish Communities in the Netherlands (Nederlands-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap, NIK) to join forces against what both saw as a threat to restrict their freedom of religion. And their joint lobbying efforts bore fruit: several months later the proposal was rejected by the Senate. In 2012 the government signed a covenant with the Dutch Association of Slaughterhouses and Meat Processing Companies (Vereniging van Slachterijen en Vleesverwerkende bedrijven, VSV), the CMO and the NIK, agreeing that any animal slaughtered without stunning should not remain conscious for more than 40 seconds. Because the PvdD in particular remains opposed to this and hopes eventually to persuade parliament to support a complete ban on ritual slaughter without stunning, the CMO and the NIK are in constant contact on the issue.

One important national initiative to promote trilateral co-operation is the Consultative Body of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Overleg Joden Christenen en Moslims, OJCM), established in 2012. Along with the Council of Churches in the Netherlands (Raad van Kerken in Nederland, RvK) its members are the NIK, the NVPJ, and the CMO. The OJCM has its roots in the so-called Cairo Group of representatives from Christian and Muslim communities who, following the release of the anti-Islam film Fitna by Geert Wilders, travelled to Cairo in 2008 to show that Christians and Muslims in the Netherlands live together in a constructive manner.215 Jewish organisations later joined as well. The OJCM has frequently responded to religiously motivated attacks and incidents with statements of support for the victims and condemnation of the perpetrators. It is also behind the ‘Building Bridges’ (Bruggenbouwen) project and the Faith in Living Together Foundation (Stichting Geloven in Samenleven), launched in 2019.216

Individual Jews and Muslims meet through national interreligious associations, too, including PaRDes – devoted to the study of ‘Jewish wisdom’ – and New Us (NieuwWij), which was established in 2008 as an online platform for diversity and interfaith dialogue. Three years earlier, in 2005, the partnership United in Freedom (In Vrijheid Verbonden, IVV) was formed by representatives of six religious and faith-based movements in the Netherlands, with Jews and Muslims, and including Alevis.217 It organises an annual gathering in Utrecht to celebrate mutual solidarity and freedom of religion and belief. Former Queen Beatrix (Princess Beatrix since her abdication in 2013) usually attends this event.
4.4 Jewish-Muslim Relations in London and Amsterdam Compared

When we compare bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations since the late 1980s in London and Amsterdam, and to some extent more broadly in the UK and the Netherlands, six key points stand out. We briefly summarise these below.

4.4.1 Beginnings

Firstly, it is striking that the development of structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London began earlier than in Amsterdam. The first permanent relationships of this kind were established in the British capital in about 1990, in response to the Rushdie affair of 1988–1989. In the Netherlands, by contrast, that did not have the same effect and it took more than a decade for such relations to start appearing there. The catalysts in the Dutch context were the Second Intifada, ‘9/11’, the US ‘war on terror’, the rise of an anti-Islam discourse in the Netherlands, antisemitic incidents in Amsterdam, and the murder there of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004. As for the development of Jewish-Muslim relations, in London we can distinguish three phases: an energetic start in the 1990s, explosive growth in the 2000s, and stabilisation with moderate growth in the 2010s and early 2020s. In Amsterdam, meanwhile, the 1990s were characterised by cautious attempts at rapprochement between Jewish and Islamic institutions without this resulting in systematic co-operation. However, some Jews and Muslims did find common cause in the struggle against racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism. Two phases can be distinguished in the process as it subsequently unfolded in the Dutch capital: substantial growth in the 2000s, then stabilisation with moderate growth in the 2010s and early 2020s.

4.4.2 Numbers, Size, Professionalism, and Specialisation

We also observe that the current bilateral initiatives to promote Jewish-Muslim dialogue and/or co-operation in London are larger in number, on average larger in scale, often more professional and also more specialised, in the sense that they cover a broader range of specific social fields, than those in Amsterdam. To begin with, the British capital has significantly more bilateral Jewish-Muslim alliances and these give rise to more initiatives for dialogue and/or co-operation. Van Esdonk estimates their number over the past few decades at many hundreds, if not thousands. By contrast, Roggeveen has identified a total of 40 collaborative projects in Amsterdam during the period 1990–2015. Some of these, moreover, never went beyond a single meeting; one example of this is the dialogue at the Moses and Aaron Church in 1992, another the Gerard Douplein meeting involving a synagogue, a church, and a mosque in 2011. If we...
count an average project as giving rise to five initiatives involving one or more meetings, events, or programmes, in Amsterdam we arrive at a total of no more than a few hundred initiatives over the years. That is significantly fewer than in London.

In addition, on average the size of the organisations dedicated solely or partly to the development of Jewish-Muslim initiatives is considerably larger in London than in Amsterdam. This is true of all three categories of organisation that can meaningfully be distinguished in this respect: joint Jewish-Muslim ones, Jewish or Muslim ones which invest explicitly in Jewish-Muslim initiatives, and non-Jewish, non-Muslim ones committed in whole or in part to supporting such initiatives. Mitzvah Day in the UK has seven employees, Saddaqa Day four, Nisa-Nashim three, and the Faith & Belief Forum (FBF; formerly the Three Faiths Forum, 3FF) twenty-one. Such numbers are not matched by comparable interreligious institutions in Amsterdam or anywhere in the Netherlands, never mind specifically Jewish-Muslim ones.

Related directly to the previous point, there are also more professionals working in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations in London than in Amsterdam. Many London-based Jewish-Muslim organisations and Jewish or Islamic organisations that invest in Jewish-Muslim relations employ staff specialising in this field. The Board of Deputies, for example, has a permanent ‘interfaith and social action officer’. This is significantly less the case in Amsterdam. At the local level in both cities, rabbis and imams are often key figures in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations. And in both cities external experts are sometimes hired to facilitate cross-community meetings. One interesting attempt to further professionalise the field of interreligious relations in the Netherlands, including those between Jews and Muslims, is the OJCM initiative Believe in Living Together, launched in 2019 with the aim of providing professional support for local co-operation between mosques, churches, and synagogues.

Finally, the Jewish-Muslim organisations in London and the UK are active in more specific social fields than those in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. In the UK, for instance, there is co-operation in the field of religious exchange in the form of ‘scriptural reasoning’, in the academic study of relations between Judaism and Islam as at the Woolf Institute’s Centre for the Study of Muslim-Jewish Relations and in monitoring and combating antisemitism and Islamophobia, particularly between the CST and Tell MAMA. We only rarely, if ever, encounter the same breadth of activity in the Netherlands. Moreover, there are also initiatives in the UK aimed at specific groups, and in some cases covering specific themes, of a kind also virtually non-existent in the Netherlands. For example, the Jewish-Muslim women’s network Nisa-Nashim, the Council of Imams and Rabbis, and the Council of Muslim and Jewish Physicians, which deals with issues of medical ethics.
4.4.3 Religious versus Secular Character

Thirdly, we note that many instances of Jewish-Muslim relations in London are religious in nature, whereas in Amsterdam they largely tend to be secular. Although there are a few occasions and activities in the Dutch capital where Muslims and Jews meet primarily as believers – for example, at dialogue sessions between congregants of the local LJG and Al Kabir Mosque around the initiative Preaching in Mokum – the number of encounters of this kind is very limited. In London, on the other hand, Jews and Muslims far more often meet in an explicitly religious context. For instance, at scriptural reasoning sessions devoted to interfaith reflection on religious sources.\footnote{221}

4.4.4 Themes

By contrast, it is striking that almost exactly the same themes of connection and of division play a major role in shaping Jewish-Muslim relations in London and in Amsterdam. Jews and Muslims on both sides of the North Sea find common ground on a number of points: perceived similarities of religion, culture, and social position; shared interests in the area of religious freedom with regard to such topics as ritual slaughter, dietary laws, male circumcision and religious education, and the fight against hate crime and countering radicalisation and attacks; and a shared desire to help improve their own neighbourhood, city, country, or world, whether or not motivated by aspects of their own tradition. We also encounter four sources of division in both cities: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Islamophobia among Jews and antisemitism among Muslims; attacks by extremists on Jewish and Islamic targets; and the commemoration of horrific events in European history such as the Holocaust and the genocide in Bosnia. The first of these, in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tends to encroach upon and inflame the sensitivities associated with the other three.

4.4.5 Impact

We further note that, in both cities, the themes of connection and of division mentioned above affect Jewish-Muslim relations in different ways. The former often give rise to co-operation but sometimes cause conflict as well, while the latter are frequently a source of conflict but on occasions can also lead to co-operation. So the same theme may result in different outcomes. For example, antisemitic incidents committed by Muslims and Islamophobic statements made by Jews tend to fuel negative mutual perceptions in some sections of the two communities, but at the same time motivate others to step up the joint struggle against such forms of hate crime.
Finally, one notable difference between the two cities is that Jewish-Muslim relations in London are embedded in a much broader social sector of religious and interfaith groups and institutions than those in Amsterdam. In the UK, mainly as a result of the policies of the New Labour governments (1997–2010), civil society has seen the emergence of a distinctive strand which Beckford has called the ‘faith sector’.\(^\text{222}\) One important part of this is a constellation of interfaith institutions, groups, and networks under the IFN umbrella. In the spirit of Bourdieu, we could describe this as an ‘interfaith field’. During the course of the 2000s, this British faith sector became increasingly engaged with the theme of ‘social order’, which in part is about community cohesion but also encompasses the fight against hate crime as well as preventing and countering extremism and terrorism.\(^\text{223}\) In the Netherlands, however, the government is reluctant to subsidise religious and interfaith institutions and their activities, nor does it wish to involve them in implementing its policy. Moreover, the total size of the religious and interreligious groups active in Dutch civil society is so limited that it cannot, or can only barely, be defined as a separate sector.\(^\text{224}\) And within this overall picture, interreligious groups occupy a very modest position.

Having taken stock of the similarities and differences between current bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam, the question arises as to what factors they can be attributed to. Why did such relations emerge earlier in London than in Amsterdam? Why are the alliances facilitating dialogue and co-operation larger in number in the British capital, and why are these on average more professional and also active in more social fields? Why are initiatives in London more religious in nature than their Amsterdam counterparts? Why do the same themes of connection and of division play a major role in both cities? And why then do these themes affect Jewish-Muslim relations differently in each of them? Finally, why are Jewish-Muslim relations in London embedded in a much larger faith sector within civil society than in Amsterdam?

Before answering these six ‘why’ questions, in the next five chapters we explore in detail themes which divide and connect Jews and Muslims and their respective organisations in the two cities. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 discuss the four sensitive issues mentioned previously: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; antisemitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews; attacks by extremists on Jewish and Muslim targets; and the commemoration of horrific past events, particularly in Europe such as the Holocaust and the genocide in Srebrenica. The influence of these themes upon Jewish-Muslim relations is sometimes direct, sometimes indirect; for instance, through the responses they generate in the national public debate or from governments.\(^\text{225}\) In Chapter 9 we turn to the connecting themes: perceived similarities of religion, culture, and social position; the promotion of common interests in the public domain; and the shared desire, often based upon
tradition, to help improve the neighbourhood, the city, the country, or the world. As noted above, though, the themes of division do not automatically fuel conflictual relationships and the themes of connection do not always result in co-operation; their actual effect depends very much upon the way Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations approach the issues in question. In other words, upon what social identity strategies they employ. These strategies are the subject of Chapter 10, where we also answer the question as to what factors influence Jewish-Muslim relations in London and in Amsterdam. Finally, in Chapter 11 we provide answers to the six ‘why’ questions posed above.

Notes
2 Brodeur 2005, 43–44.
3 Halafoff 2011.
4 Geaves 2010, 139–143.
5 Little is known about the development of early contacts between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London. A few clues about contacts in London can be found in the report Race Relations – A Jewish Contribution by the Working Party on Race Relations of the Board of Deputies (1969, 11–15).
6 The Express Tribune, 28 January 2015.
7 Driss el Boujoufi, the vice-president of UMMON at the time, pointed this out in a later interview on the development of Jewish-Muslim contacts in the Netherlands (NIW, 7 February 1992).
9 Juynboll 1930, 170–171.
10 In the Netherlands, Muslims have been advocating this legislation since the 1960s. Its introduction has been delayed by statements from some Muslims and external experts that stunning prior to slaughter is permitted in Islam, which would make separate legislation superfluous. Jewish media have also intervened in this debate. For the history of ritual slaughter in the Netherlands and Belgium, see Shadid & Van Koningsveld (2008, 151–158) and Wallet (2012).
11 Kahn Harris & Gidley 2010, 27–33.
13 The report notes “the unfortunate fact that a small number of coloured people in the UK have been indoctrinated with anti-Semitism” (1969, 9). In spite of this, it goes on to state, “Although these anti-Semitic manifestations and occasional anti-Israel attitudes by coloured people have partially prevented some Jews in this country from an active commitment to the cause of coloured people’s rights, it is essential that this should not deter the Jewish community from fighting discrimination and prejudice whatever its source and whoever its victims” (1969, 9). Armin Krausz, president of the Representative Council of Sheffield and District Jews, disagreed with this recommendation and stated in a letter to Samuel Fisher, chair of the Working Party on Race Relations, “I do not agree with all your conclusions. For instance, on page 9 you speak of antisemitism among the coloured people in ‘A small number’. And then, “Have you found many Pakistanis, or for that matter many Muslims, who are not anti-Israel? You know full well that in the end whosoever is anti-Israel and
anti-Zionist is also anti-Jew! Can you name any who speak up for Israel?” (Krausz 1969).

14 Wallet 2017, 448.
15 Alderman 1989, 120.
16 Ibid., 122.
18 Alderman 1989, 123. For ambivalence in the Anglo-Jewish stance towards immigrants and multicultural Britain, see: Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 28–31.
19 Alderman 1989, 122; Wallet 2017, 444–446.
20 Wallet 2017, 446.
21 De Waarheid, 12, 15, and 16 December 1980; Vellenga & Wiegers 2020, 9–10.
22 The statue The Dockworker (De Dokwerker) was erected in memory of the February General Strike which broke out in German-occupied Amsterdam in 1941. At the instigation of the banned communist movement, the city’s public transport workers and other workers walked out in protest against the persecution of the Jews – an event unique in Europe (Happe 2018, 74).
23 Vellenga & Wiegers 2020, 11.
24 Het Parool, 26 September 1989.
25 NRC Handelsblad, 26 September 1989.
26 Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, 19 October 2018.
27 Alderman 1989, 124.
29 Alderman 1989, 118.
31 Vellenga 2015, 216.
32 Various news sources indicate that there were consultations between Muslims and Jews in both countries about ritual slaughter in the 1980s (Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 4 February 1986; Israel Nieuwsbrief, 27 February 1986b). According to Dutch rabbi Rodrigues Pereira, there has been much more intensive contact around this issue in Britain than in the Netherlands (Israel Nieuwsbrief, 27 February 1986b).
34 Pearce 2012.
35 IFN 2007, 12.
36 Pearce 2012, 151.
37 Ibid., 153.
38 Nielsen 2010, 53.
40 Israel Nieuwsbrief, 23 October 1986.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Interview with Judith Frishman and Edward van Voolen, 18 March 2020. Van Voolen developed this view in the 1970s when, as students in London, he and his partner Judith Frishman became involved in interfaith initiatives by the liberal Jewish rabbi Jonathan David Magonet. On what attracted him to these activities, Van Voolen says, “We were interested in the Muslims from India and Pakistan who had come to live in London. We certainly didn’t see them as a threat. Our experience was that, while the Jewish-Christian dialogue was driven in part by the tensions associated with Christian antisemitism and anti-Judaism and the reactions to it, the same was not true of the Jewish-Muslim dialogue. The Jewish-Christian dialogue was also strongly theological, and
focused upon the figure of Jesus. This does not play such a role in the conver-
sation between Jews and Muslims”.

44 He concludes his call for a Jewish-Muslim dialogue with the following ques-
tion: “Why can’t a consultative body of Jews and Muslims in the Netherlands
be established according to the model of the OJEC?” (Israel Nieuwsbrief,
27 February 1986a).


46 For a comprehensive overview of bilateral Jewish-Muslim initiatives in the UK
in the 1990s, see: Van Esdonk 2020, 111–115, 393; Sharkey 2005. Cf. Alif-
Aleph & Sajid (2013).

47 Van Esdonk 2020, 111.


49 Van Esdonk 2020, 111.

50 Sharkey 2005, 1.


54 Van Esdonk 2020, 114.


56 This is pointed out by Aubrey Rose, vice-president of the Board of Deputies, in
the report Ourselves and Other Minorities (1994, 7).


58 Rose 1994, 5.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 8.

Welfare Council (FAWC), in its Report on the Welfare of Farmed Animals at
Slaughter or Killing, advised the British government to change the existing
legislation and to make stunning prior to slaughter compulsory. Not only did
the Board of Deputies and the MCB use their influence to block this initiative,
but “some 6,000 Muslims and Jews signed on to a petition urging no change in
the law” (Kochan & Kochan 2004, 290).


64 British Muslims Monthly Survey 1998, 12.

65 Sharkey 2005, 25. In 2018 the Three Faiths Forum (3FF) was renamed the
Faith & Belief Forum (FBF) in order to reflect the broader profile of the or-
ganisations involved.


67 Ibid., 12.


69 These riots were investigated by Ted Cantle. In his report he links them to the
existence of ‘segregated communities’ in the cities concerned, where residents
“live a series of parallel lives” (Cantle 2001).

70 Holloway 2008.

71 Chilcot 2016.

72 See: https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/tijdlijn-van-aanslagen-in-
het-westen; Tulloch 2006.

73 CST 2008.

74 Kahn-Harris 2014, 32–36.

75 BBC News, 13 April 2002.
In 2003 two Britons with links to Jamaat Al-Muhajiroun carried out an attack on a nightclub in Tel Aviv. In 2004 the organisation was banned in the UK (Lewis & Hamid 2018, 147–148).

The Guardians, 7 May 2002.


IFN 2010, 7–8.

Ibid.

Kahn-Harris 2009, 5.

The Faiths Forum for London (FF4L) is one of ten regional multifaith forums established in England and Wales in 2000 “to liaise between faith communities and regional governmental structures” (Van Esdonk 2020, 195).

For a comprehensive overview of bilateral Jewish-Muslim initiatives in the UK in the years 2000–2010, see: Van Esdonk 2020, 115–123, 393–394. Data on initiatives undertaken in the early 2000s can also be found in Sharkey 2005.

Van Esdonk 2020, 130–137.

Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 2. In this article, the authors also point to other initiatives around the practice of scriptural reasoning at the local level in London from the early 2000s onwards.

Van Esdonk 2020, 137–143. Since 2018 this venue has been called the Kiln Theatre.

Sharkey 2005, 12.

Ibid., 18–20.

An Open Letter (2008). According to Edward Kessler, director of the Woolf Institute, this letter referring primarily to the commonalities between Judaism and Islam was the first of its kind “in modern times” (Kessler 2011, 25).

The JIF was dissolved in December 2019.

Van Esdonk 2020, 129.


Pearce 2012, 154.

DCLG 2008.

Lewis & Hamid 2018, 108.

For a comprehensive overview of bilateral Jewish-Muslim initiatives in the UK in the years 2010–2016, see: Van Esdonk 2020, 123–125, 395.

Ibid., 124.

Ibid., 125.

Ibid.

Ibid. The quote is from the interview with Julie Siddiqi, 26 April 2017.

Interview with Julie Siddiqi, 26 April 2017.

See: http://standforpeace.org.uk/sfp/

Westrop 2013.

Van Esdonk 2020, 27. See: https://powerbase.info/index.php/Stand_for_Peace

The Times of Israel, 20 July 2014.

The Electronic Intifada, 28 July 2014; The Independent, 10 August 2014.

Kahn-Harris 2014, 34.

See: https://www.fodip.org.uk/goals-and-values


The Jewish Chronicle, 21 September 2014.

Alkarama Foundation et al. 2015.

Bakker, Sciarone & De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2019, 13, 36.
115 Ibid.
119 MCB, 7 January 2015, see: https://mcb.org.uk/mcb-updates/charlie-hebdo-attack/; Board of Deputies, 19 June 2017, see: https://www.bod.org.uk/bod-news/board-of-deputies-president-condemns-attack-on-muslim-worshippers/
120 CST 2020; Tell Mama 2019.
122 The Jewish Chronicle, 7 April 2020.
123 See Section 6.4 for a more detailed description of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the political domain in the UK, and the responses to it.
125 Board of Deputies, 26 July 2013. Phil Rosenberg states in his interview that strong condemnation of Islamophobic statements and actions is explicit policy of the Board of Deputies leadership: “We have made it our business to react strongly to incidents where we consider anti-Muslim hatred to be at issue” (interview with Rosenberg, 26 October 2017).
128 See: https://www.catch-hatecrime.org.uk/
130 Ibid., 194–197.
131 DCLG 2012b, 2.
132 DCLG 2012a.
133 Pearce 2012, 155.
135 Ibid.
136 Van Esdonk 2020, 195.
137 MHCLG, 14 March 2018, 60. See: file:///C:/Users/sipco/AppData/Local/Temp/Integrated_Communities_Strategy.pdf
141 Smith 2017, 398–443.
142 Wallet 2017, 452.
144 NJW, 1 February 1991, 7 February 1992. Participants in this meeting on the Muslim side were the Sunni Surinamese Hindustani World Islamic Mission (WIM, represented by A. Joemman), the Sunni Union of Moroccan Mosque
Organisations in the Netherlands (UMMON, El Boujoufi) and the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (Turks Islamitisch Culturele Federatie, TICF), which is closely affiliated with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet. On the Jewish side, the NIK (Rabbi Lody van de Kamp), the LJG (Rabbi David Lilenthal), the Jewish Social Work (Joods Maatschappelijk Werk, JMW; Fred Ensel and Wilma Stein), and the CIDI (Ronny Naftaniel) took part.

146 Leeuwarder Courant, 15 June 1992. Among the speakers at this meeting were the liberal rabbi Awraham Soetendorp and imam Abdulwahid van Bommel.
147 Leeuwarder Courant, 15 June 1992. The comment about the colonial past probably refers to the idea that the establishment of the state of Israel was a result of Western colonial policy in the Middle East.

148 NBK, undated. See: http://www.nederlandbekentkleur.nl/overnbk.html
151 Vellenga 2011, 12–16.
152 NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000; Schnabel 2000.
153 Vellenga 2011, 12–16.
154 Vellenga & Wiegers 2011, 44–45.
155 Buruma 2006. The murderer left a letter on the victim’s body, addressed to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in which she was branded ‘an apostate’. It also contained several antisemitic passages (Peters 2020).
156 Van der Valk 2012, 77.
158 Vellenga & Wiegers 2020, 12.
160 Trouw, 30 April 2002.
162 EAJG would later also co-operate with The Rights Forum, which was founded in 2009 at the instigation of former Dutch prime minister Dries van Agt. This foundation aims to be a ‘centre of knowledge’ about the Palestine/Israeli issue. It pays particular attention to Israel’s settlement policy, based upon the idea that “the continuous expansion of illegal settlements in occupied Palestine makes peace completely impossible” (https://rightsforum.org/over-ons/)
163 De Groene Amsterdammer, 23 March 2002.
164 Reformatorisch Dagblad, 26 April 2002.
166 Ibid., 295–304; Van Weezel 2017, 203–210. Referring to the events in West Amsterdam, Erwin Brugmans, a local resident and member of synagogue Sjoel West, recalls, “We had a lot of accusations thrown at us, by Moroccan youngsters in particular. ‘Fucking Jew, stinking Jew, you’re the ones who made those planes fly into the towers in New York.’ How do they come up with this stuff? A typical old-fashioned antisemitic reaction, as if we’d done everything. The then chair of Amsterdam West borough council called everyone together and said, ‘We don’t want this in our district. If someone’s abused, we have to stand up for each other. There’s no place for polarisation here’” (Interview with Erwin Brugmans, 3 February 2020).
167 For an overview of bilateral Jewish-Muslim initiatives in Amsterdam in the 2000s, see: Roggeveen 2020, 192–193, 288–290.


170 Ibid., 57.


172 Nathaniël & Sini 2013.


174 Ensel 2014, 323.

175 JMNA 2006, 3. Signatories included Karima Belhaj, Harry van de Bergh (CJO), Ruben Vis (CJO), Hadassa Hirschfeld (CIDI), Erwin Brugmans (Sjoel West), Harry Polak (LJG Amsterdam), Fatima Elatik, Sami Kaspi, Ahmed Marcouch, Sabi El Moussaoui (Argan), and Mohamed Sadek (UMMON) (Ensel 2014, 406).


178 Van Weezel 2017, 226.

179 AEL 2006. Consulted at: www.arabeuropean.org/dutch/article.php?ID=120 in 2015. This website has now been removed.

180 AEL 2006.


185 Bakker, Sciarone & De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2019, 13, 36.

186 Omroep West, 4 July 2014.


189 Ibid., 86–87.

190 RvK, 21 November 2014. See: https://www.raadvankerken.nl/nieuws/2014/11/impressie-gesprek-riddersaal/. Among the speakers at this meeting were liberal rabbi Awraham Soetendorp and imam Yassin Elforkani (CMO).

191 OJCM, 16 March 2016. See: https://www.ojcm.nl/minister-ascher-in-gesprek-met-joodse-en-islamitische-sleutelfiguren. Present at this meeting were representatives from the following networks and institutions: Mo & Moos, Salaam Shalom, Said & Lody, Platform for Islamic Organisations in Rijnmond (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond, SPIOR), Security Pact against Discrimination (Veiligheids pact tegen discriminatie), Get to Know your Neighbours (Leer je buren kennen), CMO, CJO, NVPJ’s National Committee for Dialogue (Landelijke Commissie Dialoog NVPJ), and OJCM.

192 Written interview with Roemer van Oordt, 1 February 2021.

193 Interview with Palm, 9 November 2018. In Amsterdam the approach of working with key community figures led to a controversy surrounding Saadia Ait-Taleb, the city council’s programme manager for radicalisation and polarisation. In 2017 she was summarily dismissed for an alleged conflict of interest after being accused of commissioning paid work from a key figure with whom she had a personal relationship (Trouwe, 7 December 2017). She was subsequently prosecuted for fraud, but acquitted in 2020 (Het Parool, 9 July 2020). The City of Amsterdam went on to formally revoke her dismissal – although she did not actually return to the job – and paid her compensation (De Volkskrant, 6 January 2021).
The public debate surrounding a topic can be imagined as an arena in which opinion leaders compete for discursive power over the matter in hand. A very wide range of people often take part in such a debate, including journalists, politicians, writers, academics, administrators, and practitioners. Moreover, different discourses can be distinguished within it. Hajer (1995, 59) defines a discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories that are
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical, social and mental realities”. The defenders of rival discourses try to gain support for their vision of reality and for the practices and actions which derive from it, thus engaging in a struggle for recognition and dominance. Dominance occurs when one particular discourse sets the agenda of the public debate and proponents of others therefore feel compelled to relate their arguments to it. The public debate often influences the political debate – or, more specifically, the parliamentary debate focusing upon legislation and upon influencing and monitoring government policy.

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Part II

Sources of Conflict and Cooperation
5 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

5.1 Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a striking example of a conflict involving
deterritorialisation or delocalisation.¹ Flare-ups of this conflict are generally
not limited to the Middle East, but, for example, also strain relations in
European cities, such as London and Amsterdam, between Jews who
sympathise with Israel and Muslims who stand up for the Palestinians.
Depending on the developments themselves and reactions to these tensions,
they either increase and culminate in open confrontation, or they decrease.

Notably, in both London and Amsterdam, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is considered a highly sensitive and controversial issue, not only between
pro-Israel Jews and pro-Palestinian Muslims but also between Jews and
Muslims in general. The prevailing discourse among Jews and Muslims, and
also in public opinion in the Netherlands and the UK, is that they are
diametrically opposed to each other on this emotionally charged issue. In
both cities, Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research shows that for Jews and
Muslims and their institutions, this conflict is ‘the elephant in the room’, the
issue that is so sensitive that nobody talks about it in order to avoid getting
into arguments and risk carefully cultivated positive relationships breaking
down. In her study on Jewish-Muslim relations in London, Van Esdonk
concludes: “Fieldwork data show that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seen
as ‘the elephant in the room’ and confrontation by heated issues risks ac-
tivating underlying fear and prejudice”.² About the situation in
Amsterdam, Roggeveen says: “(…) a frame emerged that described the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a central, delicate topic that should not be
talked about in direct contact with the Other”.³ Concerning public opinion
in Europe in general, Egorova and Ahmed observe: “The relationship be-
tween the Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe is often constructed
by public discourse as polarised due to the Israel-Palestine conflict”.⁴

In this chapter, we try to answer the question of what consequences the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict might have for Jewish-Muslim relations in
London and Amsterdam. In particular, we consider why this conflict is seen
as ‘the elephant in the room’ and what effect this might have on these

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relationships. To answer these questions, we first define the key terms used in this chapter (Section 5.2); we briefly describe the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Section 5.3); we characterise the connections that Jews and the Jewish diaspora in the UK and the Netherlands have to Israel, and Muslims to the Palestinians (Section 5.4); and we outline the variation in views and opinions held by Jews and Muslims in the two cities on the Israeli-Palestinian question (Section 5.5). Then, in Section 5.6, we answer the question of why, in spite of this variation, the impression prevails in the public debate that Jews and Muslims are diametrically opposed on this issue. In Section 5.7, we explore the answer to this question in depth, with insights from social identity theory, which was explained in detail in the theoretical framework (Section 1.2). In Section 5.8, we conclude by considering the effects of reactions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jewish-Muslim relations in both cities and, in particular, the effect of the dominant perception in public opinion that Muslims and Jews are diametrically opposed to each other on the emotionally charged issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

5.2 Terminology

In order to provide a good analysis of the theme of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in relation to Jewish-Muslim relations, it is important to clearly define what we mean by the terms ‘Zionism’ and ‘anti-Zionism’, ‘pro-Israel’ and ‘criticism of Israel’, ‘antisemitism’ and ‘pro-Palestinian’. ‘Zionism’ can be defined as the pursuit by the Jewish people of their own sovereign state in Palestine. The term is derived from the word Zion, referring to Mount Zion, which is located in Jerusalem. The opposite of this is ‘anti-Zionism’, i.e. the denial of the right of the Jewish people to have an own independent state. The Zionist aspiration was largely achieved with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. This aspiration was further fulfilled on 19 July 2018, when, despite furious opposition from Arab Israeli MPs, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, passed the Nation-State Law that defines Israel as an exclusively Jewish state. In this study, ‘pro-Israel’ refers to support for the independent State of Israel and for the current Israeli government’s policy towards the Palestinians. The term ‘criticism of Israel’ refers to criticism of the Palestinian policy of the Israeli authorities. Important themes in this policy are: the borders between the Israeli and Palestinian territories (the borders established in 1967, the actual borders today or something else), the nature of the Israeli state (exclusively Jewish or inclusive), the autonomy of the Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied territories of the West Bank, the Palestinian refugee issue, the status of Jerusalem, and the current human rights situation of Palestinians. We define antisemitism in accordance with the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) as: “(...) discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).” ‘Pro-Palestinian’ refers to support for
the Palestinians’ aspirations for their own independent state and for the policies of the Palestinian Authority and/or Hamas. Although the two are sharply divided and regularly at odds with each other, they share the political desire to improve the lot of the Palestinians and to have an independent Palestinian state, whether or not alongside an Israeli state. Anti-Zionism, criticism of Israel and antisemitism may go together, but this is by no means a necessity. People may be politically in favour of a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question or religiously opposed to an independent Israeli state, without having an aversion to Jews. They may be critical of Israel’s Palestinian policy without being prejudiced against Jews. Traditionally, there have been major differences of opinion regarding the State of Israel and Israeli policy towards Palestinians, not only among non-Jews but also among Jews.9

5.3 The Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest-lasting violent conflicts in modern history.10 The British government was at the start of this conflict when, on 2 November 1917, its foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, promised the Jewish people a national home in Palestine, and at the same time declared “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”.11 Partly against the background of the Holocaust, on 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the independent State of Israel on territory that the inhabitants of what was then Palestine considered theirs. This resulted in war, with the young State of Israel prevailing and the Arab Palestinians emerging as the biggest losers. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were driven out and/or fled the violence of war, to wind up in desolate refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank.12 Palestinians call this the ‘Nakba’, Arabic for disaster or catastrophe.13

If we look at how the balance of power has developed in the conflict, overall, we see that the conflict has increasingly become an ‘asymmetrical conflict’ in which Israel is dominant and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are the underdogs.14 A key turning point here was the Six-Day War in 1967, in which the Arab armies were overwhelmingly defeated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel annexed not only the Sinai and the Golan Heights, but also Gaza and the West Bank, and more than a million Palestinians came to live under Israeli rule. Since then, Israel has been superior to the Palestinians on virtually all relevant fronts. It dominates not only in terms of economy, military power, and security apparatus but also completely controls all basic services such as water and electricity in the occupied territories and determines what goes in and out of these areas and Gaza. However, its overwhelming dominance does not prevent regular rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza or the threat of suicide bombings in Israel itself.
The Oslo Accords were signed in the 1990s, offering the prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Partly out of frustration at the stagnation of the peace process, the Second Intifada broke out in 2000 and continued until 2005. In 2006, Israel went to war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Following an armed conflict between the Palestinian Authority's secular Fatah party and the Islamist Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The rise of Hamas, founded in 1987, is a manifestation of the Islamisation of Palestinian resistance to Israel. In late 2008 and early 2009, and in 2012 and 2014, the Israeli army conducted violent military operations in Gaza. In recent years, there have been regular clashes between Hamas and Israel, with the Palestinian side suffering the vast majority of casualties. Violence between Israel and the Palestinians broke out once again in May 2021, killing at least 10 people on the Israeli side and more than 230 on the Palestinian side. The violence takes place in Israel, on the West Bank, and in Gaza.

5.4 Connections to Israel and the Palestinians

In the UK today, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is an emotionally charged and controversial topic. Kahn-Harris characterises the British involvement in this issue as follows:

The UK also has strong non-Jewish pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian campaigns. Britain’s complex geo-political role in the world - as a country that is both attracted to and repelled by both Europe and the US, as a country that tries to ‘punch above its weight’, as a diverse multicultural nation with a significant Muslim minority and as the administrator of pre-1948 Palestine - makes it deeply invested in what goes on in Israel.

Although both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party support a two-state solution, the Conservative Party has been decidedly pro-Israel, especially since Margaret Thatcher became party leader, while the Labour Party has been a greater defender of the Palestinian cause. In recent decades, the foreign policy of the British government has been predominantly pro-Israel. The Dutch government pursues a similar policy. Dutch historian Peter Malcontent distinguishes between two camps in the European Union (EU): a pro-Palestinian camp and a pro-Israeli camp. According to him, the former is led by France and Spain, and the latter by Germany, the Netherlands, and – until its departure from the EU – the UK. In the Netherlands, the Israeli-Palestinian question is an extremely sensitive topic that evokes strong emotions. Malcontent aptly refers to it as ‘an open nerve’. While the Dutch government was initially reluctant to recognise the State of Israel in order to avoid antagonising not only the Arab countries but also the Muslim population of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, it
subsequently steered a predominantly pro-Israel course.\textsuperscript{22} This can be attributed to feelings of guilt about the Holocaust and acceptance of the leadership role assumed by the USA in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian question invariably results in fierce debate in the Dutch parliament and beyond. According to Malcontent, since Likud’s election victory in Israel in 1977, which resulted in the “Zionist project beginning to lose its socialist lustre” and rapidly growing criticism within the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) of Israeli action in the Occupied Territories, the positions adopted in this debate have become part of the classic divide between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in Dutch politics.\textsuperscript{23}

As well as being an emotional and delicate issue in the UK and the Netherlands as a whole, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a highly sensitive issue in the relationship between Jews and Muslims and their organisations in these countries. This is strongly linked to the connection Jews in these countries have to Israel and Muslims in these countries have to the Palestinians and Muslim countries in the Middle East. The relationship Jews have with Israel is multifaceted. Many Jews feel connected to Israel as the land of their forefathers. It is the land where, according to tradition, the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived and where Saul, David, and Solomon ruled as kings. The country is home to the city of Jerusalem, the holy city to many Jews.\textsuperscript{24} Israel is also home to a large part of the Jewish population, approximately 40 per cent of all Jews worldwide. In addition, against the background of the history of violent antisemitism, many Jews view Israel as the last safe haven against persecution. If anti-Jewish violence reappears anywhere in the world, Jews can, if necessary, seek refuge in Israel, the only country in the world where Jews are in the majority. For religious Jews, Israel also has a religious significance; they see present-day Israel as the promised land, the land given by God to the Jewish people. This does not apply to all religious Jews, however. A small number of them, including the Haredi Neturei Karta movement, are staunchly anti-Zionist and believe that only the coming Messiah may establish a Jewish homeland on earth.\textsuperscript{25}

A British survey conducted in 2010 showed that the vast majority of British Jews felt strongly connected to Israel: 77 per cent believed that Jews have a special responsibility to support Israel, 82 per cent that Israel plays an ‘important but not central’ or ‘central’ role in their Jewish identity, and 90 per cent that Israel is the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people.\textsuperscript{26} Ninety-five per cent of those surveyed had visited Israel.\textsuperscript{27} In a more recent survey, 95 per cent of British Jews stated that Israel plays some role or a central role in their Jewish identity.\textsuperscript{28} Ninety per cent said that Israel has the right to be a Jewish state, and 70 per cent see the two-state solution as the only way to achieve peace in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{29} According to a Dutch survey, Israel is an important part of the Jewish identity of Jews in the Netherlands. Among Dutch Jews, about one-third (31 per cent) feel ‘somewhat’ connected to Israel and almost half (46 per cent) feel ‘very
strongly, but critical’ or ‘very strongly’ connected. Nineteen per cent have ‘no special feelings’.  

The connection Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK have with the Palestinians is also multifaceted. First of all, many Muslims feel connected to Palestine and Muslim Palestinians on religious grounds. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the city that houses the Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), the Qubbat al-Sakhra (Dome of the Rock), and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which, along with the Sacred Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, is considered one of the three most important places of worship and pilgrimage destinations in Islam. In addition, there are many other places in Palestine that are of great significance to Muslims, such as Al Khalil (Hebron), home to the Ibrahimi Mosque and the Cave of the Patriarchs, which is a holy place for both Muslims and religious Jews. Muslim Palestinians are ‘brothers and sisters’ to whom they feel connected as fellow believers. There is more to this. Palestinians are not just fellow believers, they are fellow believers who suffer under the yoke of the Israeli regime. Muslims have an extra connection to Palestinians because of the oppression they have to endure. Some identify the subordinate position imposed on Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories with their own position in the UK or the Netherlands. Malcontent writes about Muslims participating en masse in the pro-Palestinian demonstration in Amsterdam on 13 April 2002: “Many of them felt connected to their Palestinian fellow believers who, like them, were condemned to live as second-class citizens in a society that gave them the blame for this”. Still, in Roggeveen’s study, only a few respondents who took part in Pro-Palestinian demonstrations in 2014 mentioned this element.

5.5 Diversity of Views

It is a misconception to think that the strong identification of Jews with Israel and Muslims with Palestinians results in a single shared view on the Israeli-Palestinian question in each of these groups. In fact, the views on this issue vary widely between the two groups. In both Jewish and Muslim circles, there are profound disagreements about the origins, development, current situation, and future of the conflict.

In his study Uncivil War. The Israel Conflict in the Jewish Community (2014), Kahn-Harris provides an overview of the wide-ranging views on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian issue that can be found in the Jewish community in the UK and also elsewhere in the diaspora. He argues that, until the year 2000, the general consensus in the Jewish diaspora was to publicly support Israel at all times, but that differences of opinion on this subject have increased since then and critics of Israel are no longer hesitating to express their views on Israel publicly. Since 2000, there has been great discord as well as bitter conflicts, with the supporters of the different positions insulting and trying to damage each other. Kahn-Harris
identifies no fewer than fourteen positions: “Public Supporters; Pro-Israel Pluralists; the Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace Left; Jewish Radicals; the Anti-Zionist Left; the Decent Left; the Neo-Conservative Right; the Jewish Religious Right; the Haredi Community; Authoritarian Zionists; Private Engagers; Zionist Youth Movements; the Apathetic; Non-Jewish supporters”.

Important issues in the Jewish debate are: whether it is acceptable to criticise Israel publicly, Israeli policy towards occupied territories, Zionism and anti-Zionism, and whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only a political issue and/or an ideological and/or a religious issue.

What Kahn-Harris writes about British Jews is familiar to Dutch Jews. Although Jews in the Netherlands overwhelmingly support the State of Israel and many prefer a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, there is strong division on the issue at the same time. At one end of the spectrum are Jews who agree with the Palestinian policy pursued by the Israeli authorities in recent decades and would perhaps like to see it taken further, for example, in Israel’s appropriation of Palestinian territories. At the other end of the spectrum are Jews who stand in solidarity with the Palestinians and believe that a new peace process should be started, also expressly taking their rights and interests into account. An emphatically pro-Israel voice can be found in Zionist circles, for example in Likud Netherlands, which passionately defends the Palestinian policy of the Netanyahu government, constantly points out the irreconcilable and militant attitude of Palestinians, and is of the opinion that it is not Israel but the Palestinians who hold the key to peace, but that they have a complete lack of will to resolve the conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterised as an ideological and religious conflict by Wim Kortenooven, who was a researcher and editor at the CIDI from 2000 to mid-2010. He stated in an interview:

The Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict is widely regarded as a purely territorial issue, to be resolved through the land-for-peace concept. However, there is a wealth of evidence that the root causes of the conflict are not territorial but ideological and theological. It’s not about territory at all but about Jews. It’s about the fact that for many Muslims - not just for the religious extremists - it is unacceptable for Jews to exercise political sovereignty in any part of the world, that is ultimately destined to come completely under Islamic rule - let alone in an area that has already been under Islamic rule, in this case Palestine.

An example of a Jewish voice expressing a position that is critical of Israel and pro-Palestinian is that of Dutch TV producer and programme maker Harry de Winter. Regarding his reasons for taking the initiative in 2001, together with Anneke Mouthaan, to found A Different Jewish Voice (Een Ander Joods Geluid, EAJG), which is critical of the Israeli government’s policy towards Palestinians, he says:
I observed the degeneration of the occupier [authors: Israel], his utter indifference and blindness, his conviction that the entire Palestinian people are terrorists and must be mercilessly eliminated. I became vehement about this. It angered me that the Dutch media had only one spokesman who informed them about Israel and that was Ronny Nathanaël [sic, the correct name is Nathaniel] of the CIDI, an highly nationalistic organisation that justified everything Israel did. This had to change (...).  

Among Muslims, we also find a wide variety of views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At one end of the spectrum are Muslims who, for political, ideological, and/or religious reasons, see Israel as an intruder in the Arab and/or Muslim world of the Middle East and believe it should disappear. An example of a religiously motivated anti-Zionist view can be found in the group Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands. In a statement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time of the flare-up of violence in and around Gaza in the summer of 2014, it said:

The conflict taking place in Palestine has been reduced to a nationalist conflict, namely a conflict between the Israelites on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other. Yet this is a purely Islamic issue, which is close to the heart of the Ummah for many reasons. 

The group sees the following as a solution:

The solution for Palestine comes from Islam and the solutions offered by Islam. And that is that Palestine, along with its inhabitants and its Holy Land, be liberated from its occupier by the armies of the Muslims and be added to the domain of Islam where both Muslims and non-Muslims will be protected and able to live together in harmony. 

At the other end of the spectrum are Muslims who, for practical-political, ideological, and/or religious reasons, accept the existence of the State of Israel. They recognise that Jews have the right to live in Palestine, the land that was also home to their ancestors, and to have their own sovereign state there, as do Palestinians. Recognition of this right does not detract from the fact that many people strongly condemn Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and oppression of Palestinians. 

In their studies in Amsterdam and London, Roggeveen and Van Esdonk encountered a wide variety of views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Based partly on their findings, Jews and Muslims can be divided into five categories:

1 Jews who predominantly support Israel and Muslims who predominantly support the Palestinians and have opposing views on key
elements of the Israeli-Palestinian question. A closer look sometimes reveals significant similarities between them. Both categories include, for instance, proponents of a two-state solution and people who believe the conflict in the Middle East must be prevented from spreading to London or Amsterdam.

2 Muslims and Jews who are sympathetic to both Israelis and Palestinians, are particularly concerned about the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and support and criticise both sides. They recognise that both Jews and Palestinians have a right to their own state, but criticise the policies of both the current Israeli and Palestinian authorities.

3 Jews and Muslims who do not have a clear position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and are committed to neither the pro-Palestinian nor the pro-Israel movement.

4 Muslims and Jews who take a mainly pro-Palestinian stance. Within this category, there are major differences of opinion regarding matters such as support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which was founded in 2005 and aims to force the Israeli government to respect the rights of Palestinians by means of an international boycott. Some support this, while others are in favour of an economic boycott but against a cultural and scientific boycott, and still others see no point in the sanctions against Israel called for by the BDS movement.

5 Jews and a small proportion of Muslims who adopt a pro-Israel position. Within this category, too, there are differing opinions, for example, on the desirability of a two-state solution or a one-state solution.

5.6 A Polarised Discourse

We have observed that both Jewish and Muslim circles in London and Amsterdam have very different views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, we have found that, despite this variation, in both the public discourse and the discourse within the Jewish and Muslim communities, the dominant image is that Jews and Muslims are unequivocally and diametrically opposed on the sensitive issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What factors can the dominance of this binary image be attributed to?

Firstly, the dominance of this image is linked to developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. Research into the ‘delocalisation’ of conflicts shows that the course of a conflict greatly influences the impact of that conflict on relations between groups in other regions. If a conflict de-escalates, it has a positive effect on inter-group relations elsewhere, but if it escalates, tensions elsewhere increase. This also applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Research by Mark Tessler and Alex Levy shows that the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have a positive effect on
the views of inhabitants of various Arab countries about Israel, while flare-ups of violence between them have a negative effect. Roggeveen and Van Esdonk note in their studies that the 2014 Gaza War and media coverage of it caused an increase in tensions between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London.

What also plays a role is that flare-ups of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mainly ‘trigger’ groups that hold outspoken pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian positions to mobilise and take to the streets. They organise demonstrations in support of either Israel or the Palestinians, often organised by coalitions. For example, the pro-Israel demonstrations held in Amsterdam in the summer of 2014 were organised by an alliance of the CIDI and Christians for Israel, and the pro-Palestinian demonstrations by an alliance of some fifteen organisations, including DocP, Youth for Palestine, Stand up for Palestine, International Socialists, EAJG and trade union Abvakabo FNV. The Free Palestine demonstration in London on 15 May 2021 was an initiative of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Friends of Al-Aqsa, Palestinian Forum in Britain, Stop The War Coalition, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). According to David Snow and Scott Byrd, mobilisation involves three forms of framing: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. The organisers are faced with the challenge of stating as clearly as possible what the problem is, how it should be solved and why it is important to come together. In the pro-Israel camp, Palestinian violence against Israel is seen as the main problem and Palestinians hold the key to peace. Conversely, in the pro-Palestinian camp, Israel’s aggression is seen as the biggest problem and Israel can solve the conflict. The organisers of both types of demonstration call on supporters and sympathisers to demonstrate in order to express feelings of solidarity and/or anger, and usually also to get their own government to take sides and speak out about the conflict.

Thirdly, certain elements of demonstrations, such as the symbols that are visible during them, are important. Pro-Israel demonstrations are attended by demonstrators waving Israeli flags and Jewish men wearing kippahs. During pro-Palestinian gatherings, many female protesters can be seen wearing hijabs and various types of Palestinian flags are carried. This visual image reinforces the impression that Jews and Muslims are diametrically opposed in the Middle East conflict. In London, this image is disturbed by the participation of supporters of the ultra-orthodox Neturei Karta movement in pro-Palestinian demonstrations. These Haredi Jews, whose men can be recognised by their long black coats, black hats, and side curls (payot), take a strongly anti-Zionist stance against Israeli politics and stand up for the Palestinians.

Another factor concerns the threats that Jews and Muslims sometimes experience from pro-Palestinian or pro-Israel groups. Sometimes pro-Palestinian demonstrations are accompanied by antisemitism. Some
participants chant antisemitic slogans or carry banners with the swastika and the Star of David intertwined or comparing Israel to Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{53} At a pro-Palestine demonstration in Amsterdam on 23 August 2014, rapper Rachid ‘Appa’ El Gazaoui (Appa) shouted “Fuck the Zionists, fuck the Talmud”.\textsuperscript{54} On 16 May 2021, a small convoy of cars draped with Palestinian flags made its way through the Finchley district in north London as participants chanted “Fuck the Jews, rape their daughters ... we have to send a message”.\textsuperscript{55} Such manifestations are insulting and threatening to Jews. Besides this, pro-Palestinian Muslims sometimes feel threatened in their freedom to criticise Israel because, in Jewish circles and in part of public opinion, criticism of Israel and its government is often equated with antisemitism. They have particular difficulty with “(...) the lack of distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, which limits Muslim’s freedom to criticise Israel’s action without being seen as antisemitic”.\textsuperscript{56} The threats that Jews and Muslims experience from both sides reinforce the perception that they are diametrically opposed on the subject of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Finally, the dominance of the polarised image is furthered by the media that – logically – widely cover the demonstrations of the pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups, but in doing so reinforce and spread the impression that Jews and Muslims are often at complete odds on this issue.\textsuperscript{57}

The Jewish and Muslim versions of the polarised image referred to above each have their problems of legitimacy. A major legitimacy problem in the Jewish version of this image is that Israeli military and security policy involves the use of violence – sometimes on a very large scale – by the Israeli army against Palestinians as well as flagrant violations of Palestinians’ fundamental rights. To justify this, Israel’s actions are often placed within the historical context of the long history of persecution and murder of the Jewish people, to which Israel is the answer. Since its establishment, the State of Israel and its people have been under constant threat, which forces Israel to take the security measures it does. This image is found not only among Jews who have little to do with Muslims but also among Jews who are explicitly committed to building good relations with them. One of them is Lody van de Kamp, a retired Dutch rabbi who is very active in inter-religious cooperation. In a public exchange of letters with Oumaima al Abdellaoui, a young Muslim woman, he writes what he has learned about this issue and how he views Israeli security policy:

I learned that there was finally new hope for Jews after the terrible destruction of the Second World War. Now - after 1900 years of exile - they had their own country again! (...) However, we were confronted with recurring ‘barbaric attacks’ by Arab countries on our Jewish State. I remember the Suez War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Lebanon War in 1982. On the one hand, we heard about Israel’s wartime grief; and on the other, about Israel’s
successes on the battlefield (...) There are fewer attacks in Israel now than there were years ago. But this is not because peace is near. It is because of the harsh security measures taken by Israel, such as the construction of a wall to separate Palestine from Israel. It is because of the constant readiness of an immense army that watches over that security.\textsuperscript{58}

The big problem his partner in this correspondence, Al Abdellaoui, has with this position is that Israeli security policy is accompanied by great unfairness and injustice. She says:

Although I’m not of Palestinian origin myself, I have always felt close to the Palestinians. We always had the Arab television station Al-Jazeera on at home. The images I saw broke my heart. (...) In all honesty, living in Palestine seems like sheer hell to me. Palestinians have hardly any rights in Israel today. There are checkpoints, weapons, fences and walls everywhere. You’re interrogated and watched, and arrested and imprisoned at the slightest infringement. The Palestinian economy has come to a virtual standstill, and the separated areas make economic development almost impossible. (...) And then there’s the wall you mention. The wall that sends shivers down my spine. You talk about it being a harsh security measure, but to me it comes across as a barbaric act on other people’s soil. (...) You also mention the immense army, an army that finds it perfectly normal to arrest children or even shoot them. (...) No, I don’t agree with you in this respect. That immense army may watch over the security of the Israelis, but in the meantime it massacres the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{59}

In the Middle East, Israel is not only a victim of actual and imminent Palestinian violence but also a perpetrator of perceived injustice. As the dominant party in the asymmetrical Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it takes measures and conducts operations that fundamentally violate the rights of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{60} This leaves pro-Israel supporters in particular with the uncomfortable question of how to legitimise this.

The Islamic version of the binary frame also has legitimacy issues. One problem concerns the selective focus among Muslims on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel’s role in it. Many London and Amsterdam Muslims are very sympathetic to the fate of the Muslim Palestinians, their ‘brothers and sisters in need’, and take to the streets because of this. However, there are many other regions in the Middle East where Muslim communities suffer greatly, sometimes much more than in Israel and Palestine, such as in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen during their civil wars, for which Muslims take little or no action. A non-religious Jewish respondent from Amsterdam said in Roggeveen’s survey:
I keep wondering about the preoccupation with the fate of the Palestinians, while in Iraq and Syria their fellow believers [Muslims] murder way more people. They don’t call it genocide or demonstrate against it. I always find that suspicious. I can’t grasp it.  

The fact that Muslims live in appalling, degrading, and unsafe conditions, not only in Palestine but also in various other regions in the Middle East, raises the question of why pro-Palestinian Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK seem to be selectively concerned about the Palestinians’ fate. One of the reasons for this is that many London and Amsterdam Muslims see Israel as an exponent of Western colonialism and, because of their support for Israel, hold Western countries partly responsible for the injustice done to Palestinians to this day.

These questions of legitimacy are separate from the fact that the prevailing image in Jewish circles, Muslim circles, and public opinion is that Muslims and Jews are diametrically opposed on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As we have seen, this dominance is attributable to the regular flare-ups of the conflict in the Middle East, the demonstrations organised by pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian activists in response, the Jewish and Islamic symbols visible at these demonstrations, the attention these demonstrations receive in the media, and statements by some pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli supporters that are perceived as threatening.

Escalations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as occurred during the Gaza War in 2014, for example, raise tensions between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London. In 2014, however, these tensions did not get out of hand but remained limited and even ebbed away over time. This can be attributed to a combination of international, national, and local factors. First of all, it is related to the course of this Gaza War itself which was relatively short-lived, lasting about six weeks. Media interest in this conflict also declined accordingly. In addition, as we have seen, there were major differences of opinion about the conflict among both Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London, which also tempered the development of tensions between the two population groups. Furthermore, the attitude of the leadership of the national umbrella organisations of the Jewish and Muslim communities also played an important role. In the UK, the Board of Deputies and the MCB issued a joint statement calling for this war not to be imported into the UK but instead to export peace to the Middle East, and in the Netherlands, the national Cairo Coalition (Cairo-overleg), the predecessor of the National Consultative Body of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Overleg Joden, Christenen en Moslims, OJCM), called for mutual respect for differences in solidarity with the Palestinians or Israel and to not denounce one another. Local authorities in London and Amsterdam prevented further escalation by keeping pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrators apart. In Amsterdam, then mayor Eberhard van der Laan went a step further by launching a new round of talks in his official residence to
which key figures from the Jewish and Muslim communities were invited.\textsuperscript{64} By choosing these participants, on the one hand, the municipal authorities confirmed the image that the tensions in Amsterdam could be traced mainly to disagreements between Jews and Muslims, but on the other hand, they helped to improve relations between Jews and Muslims, at least between the key figures in these communities.

5.7 ‘Selfing’ and ‘Othering’

We can fruitfully interpret the emergence and functioning of the dominant view that Jews and Muslims are diametrically opposed to each other on the Israeli-Palestinian issue from the perspective of the social identity theory described in Section 1.2. The mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ is particularly important.

According to this theory, people distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’, “every ‘us’ excludes a ‘them’”.\textsuperscript{65} Although the relationships between ‘us’ and ‘them’ can be defined differently, when a conflict escalates, the tendency is to interpret these relationships primarily in simple, polarised terms: “we are good, they are bad”.\textsuperscript{66} We also see this in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which a distinction is made in the Middle East between Israelis and Palestinians, and in European cities, such as London and Amsterdam, between those who are committed to Israel, including many Jews, and those who sympathise with the Palestinians, including many Muslims. Flare-ups of violence trigger polarisation between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East and between Jews and Muslims in European cities. They give impetus to the polarised view that Muslims and Jews in these cities are diametrically opposed on this issue. This image is reinforced by the fact that, as we have seen, many Jews and Muslims take part in pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations, the Jewish and Islamic symbols seen during these demonstrations, statements made during and in relation to these demonstrations that are perceived as threatening by Jews or Muslims, and that these demonstrations receive ample media coverage.

As the process of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ continues, group conflicts increase and develop into all-encompassing ‘us versus them’ conflicts.\textsuperscript{67} This manifests itself in various ways. Firstly, in the tendency in Jewish and Muslim circles to force those who do not identify with the pro-Israel or the pro-Palestinian camp to make a choice. They are asked, within their own communities, and sometimes also by the media or the general public, to take sides and to speak out in favour of one of two options.\textsuperscript{68}

Secondly, it is seen in the tendency of Jews and Muslims to close their own ranks and to leave less room for dissenters in their own groups. Dissenting views are seen as dubious, dangerous, and undermining. In response to his support of the Coalition for Peace (\textit{Coalitie voor Vrede}) in 2002, in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims speak with one voice and work for peace in the Middle East, Ahmed Aboutaleb was accused of...
deception by fellow believers. In Jewish circles, the EAJG group has been referred to as “the fifth column of Hamas”, “echo of the Palestinian Authority”, “self-hating Jews” and “traitors to the Jewish people”. According to Kahn-Harris, Jewish critics of Israel are personally attacked, damaged and turned into pariahs in the British Jewish community.

Thirdly, it is found in the tendency to abandon nuance in the image of the opponent. People lose sight of the fact that pro-Israel Jews and pro-Palestinian Muslims may also share the same views, such as the desirability of a two-state solution. Generalisations take over. There are suggestions that not just some Muslims and some Jews have opposing views on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, but that this applies to all Muslims and all Jews, and/or it is believed that only Jews and Muslims are opposed to each other on this conflict. Van Esdonk rightly warns:

> Although in many cases the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is viewed as between Jews and Muslims only - seemingly also the case among Jews and Muslims themselves regarding the heightened tensions that correlate to new outbreaks of violence - we should keep in mind that there are many non-Muslim and non-Jewish voices as well on both sides, and especially the pro-Palestinian side of the debate.

5.8 Conclusions

Various reactions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been reviewed in this chapter. The question is what consequences the reactions – in particular those of the British and Dutch governments and political parties, Jews and Muslims and their institutions and public opinion, in which the polarised discourse outlined above dominates – may have on Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam.

In recent decades, the British and Dutch governments have primarily pursued a pro-Israel policy. In both countries, this policy is supported mainly by right-wing parties, while left-wing parties are critical of this policy and advocate greater support for the Palestinian cause. Many Jews in the UK feel at home with the Conservative Party, partly because of its pro-Israel stance, while in the Netherlands, support for the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) in particular is decreasing in Jewish circles in favour of the centre-right VVD. The majority of Muslims in both countries identify with the position of left-wing parties. The support for their views that many Jews experience from their governments and the right-wing political parties and that Muslims experience from left-wing political parties reinforces the differences between the two and makes rapprochement between Jews and Muslims more difficult.

Nevertheless, there are also initiatives, especially at the local political-administrative level, that aim to bridge the dividing lines between Jews
and Muslims in this conflict. A notable example of this is the series of ‘official residence talks’ held between key figures in Jewish and Muslim circles from 2014, led by then Amsterdam mayor Van der Laan. This initiative has had a positive effect on relations between the various participants and through them possibly between the various groups from which they originate.

We have seen that Jews and Muslims feel very much involved in this conflict. A significant proportion of Jews are outspokenly pro-Israel and a significant proportion of Muslims are decidedly pro-Palestinian, but this is certainly not true of all Jews and all Muslims; we encounter a diversity of views and positions in both communities. We also find this diversity among Jewish and Muslim organisations. Some Jewish organisations are unequivocally pro-Israel, but there are also organisations that explicitly stand up for the rights of Palestinians, such as Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJP), Independent Jewish Voices (IJV), and Yachad in the UK and EAJG in the Netherlands. There are Muslim organisations that are explicitly pro-Palestinian, and there are also Muslim organisations that take into account the interests of both the Palestinians and Israel or which, when this conflict in the Middle East escalates, stress the need to prevent it from spreading to European cities, such as the MCB which, at the time of the Gaza War in 2014, joined the Board of Deputies in appealing not to ‘import’ the conflict into the UK. To the extent that Jews and Muslims and their institutions have like-minded views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or how to deal with it, the conflict may encourage further cooperation, but to the extent that they disagree, the conflict may result in further division and conflict.

Despite the diversity of views among Jews, Muslims, and their institutions, the dominant image in public opinion is that they are diametrically opposed on this sensitive issue. As we have seen, the dominance of this image is due to a combination of international, national, and local factors. What effect does this image have on Jewish-Muslim relations? The image leads many Jews and Muslims to assume that they can hardly talk to each other about the Israeli-Palestinian issue, if at all. Natascha van Weezel concludes in her book ‘At Home with the Enemy’ (Thuis bij de vijand) on Muslims and Jews in the Netherlands: “In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict always proves to be the elephant in the room. When emotions come into play, a rift can easily develop”. It gets in the way of open communication on this sensitive issue and is often an obstacle to the development of balanced and stable relations between the two population groups.

Notes
1 Demmers 2002.
2 Van Esdonk 2020, 311.
3 Roggeveen 2020, 253; 79–110.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

6 Harel 2020.
7 Van Veen & Batrawi 2018.
8 JDA 2021; See: https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/. We return to this description in more detail in Section 6.2.
10 Smith 2017.
11 Ibid., 93; Malcontent 2018, 17–21.
12 Smith 2017, 197–203.
13 Malcontent 2018, 9–11.
14 For a further analysis, see Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2007, 21–22. They consider this concept to be equally applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See pp. 181–184.
15 Smith 2017, 435–481.
16 Lassner & Troen 2007, 127–156.
17 NOS, 21 May 2021.
18 Kahn-Harris 2014, 19.
19 Middle East Eye, 1 June 2021.
20 Malcontent 2018, 251.
21 Ibid., 11.
22 Ibid., 44–52.
23 Ibid., 252.
24 Jenner & Wiegers 1996.
27 Ibid., 18.
28 Miller, Harris & Shindler 2015, 15.
29 Ibid., 15 and 18.
32 Roggeveen 2020, 94; Van Esdonk 2020, 164–168.
33 Malcontent 2018, 208.
34 Roggeveen 2020, 94. The connection Muslim immigrants feel to Palestinians may be influenced by their country of origin. Research by Günther Jikeli into antisemitism among young male Muslims in Europe found: “The identification with Palestinians is stronger among participants of Arab background, whereas most participants of Turkish or South Asian background are reluctant to identify with Palestinians” (Jikeli 2015, 114). However, this finding was not shared by research conducted by Egorova and Ahmed among South Asian Muslims in the UK, in which some respondents were found to identify more strongly with Palestinians because Palestinian history reminds them of their own community’s history “under British rule” (Egorova & Ahmed 2017, 293).
35 Kahn-Harris 2014, 87–122.
36 Ibid., 39.
37 See: https://likoed.nl/category/achtergronden/
39 De Winter 2003, 77.
41 Ibid.
43 In this context, see, for example, the Al-Quds declaration signed in May 2021 by thirteen regional and national Islamic umbrella organisations in the Netherlands
Some examples of British Muslims who take a pro-Israel stance are journalist Mohammed Mostafa Kamal and Hasan Afzal, who founded the group British Muslims for Israel under the umbrella of the Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy in 2011. (The Jerusalem Post, 22 July 2012; See also: https://more.bham.ac.uk/euro-islam/2011/04/18/british-muslims-for-israel/. In a 2009 article in the Middle East Quarterly, Muhammad al-Hussaini, fellow and lecturer in Islamic Studies at Leo Baeck Rabbinical College, London, argued that the Quran supports the Jewish claim on Israel as ‘the Holy Land’ but not the “view that Israel is now the property of the Muslims”. (Al-Hussaini 2009, 9; Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 33–35).

An interesting study in this context is Maud Mandel’s monograph on the impact of the 1991 First Gulf War on relations between Jews and Muslims in Marseille (Mandel 2010). Prior to and during this war, it was feared that it would spread to Marseille, a city with a large Jewish and Muslim community. In Marseille, most Jews supported the anti-Iraq coalition, while young Muslims in particular stood behind Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. In the run-up to the war, tensions between the Jewish and Muslim population groups increased rapidly, but in the end the city remained relatively calm. According to Mandel, this was attributable to local and national factors as well as international factors. Firstly, tensions in the city remained low as Jewish and Muslim community leaders strengthened ties and called for calm. Furthermore, it is important to note that, because they felt strongly supported by the French government that chose to join the international anti-Iraq coalition, Jews took a relatively reserved approach. As it became clearer that Saddam Hussein was losing the battle, Muslims had less and less reason to speak out openly in favour of him. Moreover, they feared that their pro-Saddam Hussein stance would be used against them and that they would face more racism and discrimination as a result. In addition to this, the French police had stepped up surveillance of Muslims in order to quickly quell any disorder.
64 Ministerie SZW 2017, 30–32.
68 Roggeveen 2020, 100–101.
69 Trouw, 30 April 2002.
70 De Groene Amsterdammer, 23 March 2002.
71 Kahn-Harris 2014, 18; 87–122.
72 Van Esdonk 2020, 167.
73 Regarding the development of political preferences among British and Dutch Jews, see Section 3.1 and Section 3.3.
74 See Section 3.2. and Section 3.4.
75 See in particular Section 4.3.
76 Pieter Jan van Slooten, strategic advisor for the City of Amsterdam, referred to this in our interview with him on 16 March 2018.
77 See Section 3.1
78 Van Weezel 2017, 220.

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6 Antisemitism and Islamophobia

6.1 Introduction
A second sensitive theme in Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK and the Netherlands is antisemitism and Islamophobia. We explore this theme in this chapter, which consists of two parts. The first part focuses on developments in antisemitism and Islamophobia, in terms of the number of recorded incidents as well as in the political domain, in the UK and the Netherlands since 1990. After explaining how we use the terms ‘antisemitism’ and ‘Islamophobia’ (Section 6.2), we describe these developments (Section 6.3 and Section 6.4) and compare them between the two countries. We are particularly interested in the proportion of Jews in the manifestations of Islamophobia and of Muslims in the manifestations of antisemitism. We analyse these phenomena mainly from the perspective of resource mobilisation theory and social identity theory, which focuses on the threat factor (Section 6.5).

In the second part of the chapter, we look at how people react to antisemitism and Islamophobia. First, we address how Jews and Muslims experience and react to antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively (Section 6.6), and then the public debate on Muslims and antisemitism (Section 6.7). The emphasis is on the first debate, which focuses on two themes: the extent of Muslim participation in antisemitism today, and the relationship between anti-Zionism, criticism of Israel and antisemitism. Then, we look at how Jewish and Muslim institutions respond to the development of antisemitism and Islamophobia (Section 6.8). The focus is particularly on institutions involved in monitoring and combating these types of hate crime. We then discuss the policy of British and Dutch governments regarding antisemitism and Islamophobia (Section 6.9). At the end of the chapter (Section 6.10), we take stock and determine in what way the theme of antisemitism and Islamophobia is a source of conflict and sometimes a source of cooperation in Jewish-Muslim relations in both countries.

In this study, we approach both antisemitism and Islamophobia as the result of aversion and hatred. They differ in terms of content, history, and

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context. Of course, the history of antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe differs considerably, with the Holocaust as the dramatic low point in the European history of antisemitism. The contexts in which current forms of antisemitism and Islamophobia manifest themselves also differ. While, for example, Muslims encounter a lot of discrimination in the labour market, Jews seem to be relatively unaffected by it. However, antisemitism and Islamophobia are similar in form. Both often stem partly from processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’, which, in the case of antisemitism, result in discrimination, prejudice, hostility, and/or violence towards Jews and, in the case of Islamophobia, in similar practices towards Muslims.

6.2 Terminology and Approach

In order to clearly analyse what has been happening in the field of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the UK and the Netherlands since the late 1980s, it is important to first define what we mean by ‘antisemitism’ and ‘Islamophobia’. There is no consensus on the meaning of these terms; they are contested concepts that are still being debated today.¹

The classic definition of ‘antisemitisms’ is “hostility to Jews as Jews” or “aversion to and prejudice against Jews as Jews”.² Analogously, ‘Islamophobia’ could be defined as “aversion to and prejudice against Muslims as Muslims”.³ To effectively combat antisemitism worldwide, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) launched a more detailed working definition in 2016: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities”.⁴ The explanation provides eleven examples, including “Applying double standards by requiring of it [authors: the State Israel] a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation”.⁵

The IHRA definition leads to much confusion and heated disagreement.⁶ On the one hand, it is accepted by many governments, political parties, civil society organisations, and academic bodies throughout the world, but on the other hand, it also evokes much resistance. First of all, the definition contains many ambiguities. What exactly is meant by “a certain perception of Jews” and by “which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews?” In addition, the definition, and in particular its elaboration, is unclear about the difference between antisemitism and anti-Zionism and antisemitism and criticism of Israel. Some interpret the definition as an attempt to silence critics of the Israeli government. The IHRA definition has therefore become a subject of political wrangling, which does nothing to help combat antisemitism.⁷

To simplify the definition of antisemitism and stay out of the political turmoil about the State of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) was published in March 2021.⁸ This declaration describes ‘antisemitism’ as: “(...) discrimination,
prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish). Among the two hundred signatories are prominent scholars in the field of antisemitism, the Holocaust, and Jewish studies. We adopt this definition and subsequently define ‘Islamophobia’ as: ‘discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Muslims as Muslims (or Islamic institutions as Islamic)’. We are aware that the Jews and Muslims referred to in these descriptions are not actual living Jews and Muslims but caricatures of them. Antisemitism is not directed against Jews on the basis of who they are but on the basis of stereotypes about them, and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of Islamophobia towards Muslims. About antisemitism Brian Klug says: ‘(…) a form of hostility towards Jews as Jews, in which Jews are perceived as something other than they are (…) Thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews’ is precisely the core of anti-Semitism’.

For a good understanding of the current manifestations of antisemitism and Islamophobia, it is important to realise that they are part of a long tradition. This tradition can be regarded as a ‘cultural archive’ – to use Edward Said’s term – built up since Antiquity or late Antiquity and filled with negative stereotypes, symbols, and caricatures about Jews and Muslims. This archive is passed down from generation to generation through texts, songs, sayings, images, jokes, traditions, rules, and customs. In their study, The Holocaust, Israel and ‘the Jew’, Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans show that the old stereotypes of ‘the Jew as the murderer of Christ’, ‘the rich Jew’, and ‘the obscene Jew’ recur regularly in post-war antisemitism in the Netherlands. New stereotypes often have a dual nature and are related to the Holocaust and Israel. ‘(…) the dual role of victim and perpetrator, victim of the Nazis and their collaborators during the Shoah, and perpetrator of injustices against the Palestinians in Israel and in Gaza and the West Bank’.

In their study ‘From Harem to Fitna’ (Van Harem tot Fitna), Marcel Poorthuis and Theo Salemink investigate the perception of Islam in the Netherlands in the period 1848–2010. They point out that the current hostility towards Muslims and Islam is part of a long tradition that goes back to ancient sources: the negative reception of Islam by Christianity, the fight against the ‘Saracens’, the ‘Moors’, and the ‘Turks’, and racist theories developed in the age of colonialism. In today’s opinion-forming, old images, such as that of the aggressive, dangerous, and warmongering Muslim, are recycled, and new ones, such as the image of fascist Islam, are created. According to Klug, in the UK “backwardness, callousness, bloodiness, an ethic of revenge, mindless worship of a merciless God and so on” are recurrent stereotypes of Islam and Muslims.

To get a clear understanding of how antisemitism and Islamophobia have manifested themselves in the UK and the Netherlands in recent decades, it is useful to distinguish between social, political, and religious antisemitism and social, political, and religious Islamophobia. Social antisemitism and social Islamophobia occur when, in the social and economic domain, Jews or Muslims are treated unequally, prejudiced, subjected to harassment or
hostility, or even confronted with violence. Political antisemitism and political Islamophobia occur when political movements, parties, or individuals aim to infringe the rights of Jews or Muslims, to exclude them socially or to cause them harm. Religious antisemitism and religious Islamophobia occur when religious communities, organisations, and individuals target Jews or Muslims. Clearly, these three forms can overlap in practice. When a fixed pattern develops in institutions, this is called ‘institutional antisemitism’ or ‘institutional Islamophobia’. In that case, it no longer concerns isolated incidents, but a culture of antisemitism or Islamophobia that brings about these incidents and is embedded in institutions.

Lastly, a note about how we approach antisemitism and Islamophobia in this study. As stated above, we assume that in many countries there is a ‘cultural archive’ filled with negative stereotypes, prejudices, symbols, and caricatures about Jews and Muslims. Images from this archive are regularly activated, renewed, and supplemented. On the one hand, this activation may be the result of deliberate mobilisation strategies by leaders of antisemitic or Islamophobic political parties, social, or religious movements. On the other hand, it may be caused by ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ processes that occur in a certain period of great uncertainty and perceived threats. These two types of factors may interact. The threats people experience from Jews or Muslims, for example, may partly be the effect of agitational activities by leaders of movements. The first-factor type is related to resource mobilisation theory, while the second is related to social identity theory. According to this theory, people distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’, usually attributing more positive characteristics to ‘us’, the ‘in-group’, than to ‘them’, the ‘out-group’. This reinforces their self-image. This theory states that in a situation where one group feels seriously threatened by the other group, people tend to think in ‘black and white’ and to stigmatise those who belong to the ‘out-group’ and treat them negatively, thus increasing group conflicts. If the ‘out-group’ consists of Jews or Muslims, we can speak of antisemitism or Islamophobia.

6.3 Trend in Numbers of Registered Antisemitic and Islamophobic Incidents

In the UK and the Netherlands, various sources are available that give us an indication of the trend in the annual number of manifestations of antisemitism and Islamophobia in both countries over the past decades. We focus here on four main reporters of data on this subject, namely CST and Tell MAMA in the UK and CIDI and Ineke van der Valk in the Netherlands. All four use their own operational definitions of antisemitism and Islamophobia to determine whether reports qualify as antisemitic or Islamophobic. The descriptions fall within the contours of our somewhat more abstract definitions of the terms ‘antisemitism’ and ‘Islamophobia’. In the reports of the four reporters, if possible, a distinction is made
between data on offline and online incidents. We focus on offline incidents here. Because the UK and Dutch sources use different categories of incidents, we only compare the total figures between the countries.

CST, and its predecessor the Community Security Organisation of the Board of Deputies, have collected data on antisemitic incidents in the UK since 1984. In the Netherlands, CIDI has published reports since the early 1990s. These reports show a slight increase in the number of incidents reported annually in the 1990s, except in the years 1996 and 1998 when the number remained the same. Because CIDI reports from 2000 onwards present figures on the total number of reported incidents, we take that year as the starting point for the comparison.

If we compare the developments in the UK and the Netherlands, a few things stand out (see Figure 6.1). Firstly, the fact that the number of incidents in both countries increased significantly in the early 2000s. In the Netherlands, the increase was even greater proportionally than in the UK. Both CST and CIDI attribute the increase to the Second Intifada. According to Dave Rich, CST Deputy Director of Communications:

The number of incidents peaked in October 2000 due to the beginning of the Second Intifada in Israel and the occupied territories at the end of September 2000. This was significant in two ways: firstly, as you have
seen, it marked a numerical ‘spike’ in incidents, which has since been repeated several times in correlation to events in the Middle East; and secondly, it was the moment when the type of incidents and of offenders changed, so that Muslim and left-wing offenders became more heavily represented than previously, and the discourse and motivation of antisemitic hate crime became more influenced by attitudes to Israel. I believe a similar phenomenon was experienced in other West European countries.²³

Secondly, the fact that, after the end of the Second Intifada, the figures in both countries peaked in approximately the same years, i.e.: 2006, 2009, and 2014, corresponding to upsurges of violence in the Middle East, namely the Lebanon War in 2006, the Gaza War in 2008–2009 and in 2014. The short-lived Gaza War in 2012 did not have much of an impact in either country.

Thirdly, the fact that, over the entire period, antisemitism figures in the Netherlands were more constant than in the UK, where the figures increased gradually and fluctuated more strongly. The increase is linked partly to the growing national awareness of CST throughout the UK and the improvement in cooperation and information exchange between CST and the police in various localities.²⁴

Fourthly, in both countries the number of incidents decreased after the peak in 2014 but then increased sharply in the UK from 2016 onwards, while the figures for the Netherlands remained much steadier. CST gives the following explanation for the increase in the UK:

The record totals in 2019 and the preceding three years were due to consistently high monthly totals, at a time when Jews, antisemitism and the Labour Party were the repeated subjects of national controversy. Debate surrounding Brexit also made this a politically contentious time during which recorded hate crime rose more generally, affecting many communities. These relatively lengthy contexts differ from the pre-2015 antisemitic incident highs, which were largely caused by temporary ‘spikes’ and sudden ‘trigger’ events.²⁵

CST and CIDI both attribute the decrease in offline incidents in 2020 to the lockdowns and absence of events due to the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁶ The two organisations note that the upsurge in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in May 2021 was accompanied by a spike in antisemitic incidents in both the UK and the Netherlands.²⁷

What part do Muslims play in the antisemitic incidents recorded? There are some figures available on this. CST has collected data on the political-ideological motivations of perpetrators of antisemitic incidents since 2008, and on religious motivations since 2010, checking in particular whether the incidents are related to Islam and Muslims. Within the political-ideological
motivation, in most monitors CST distinguishes between three main forms that may partly overlap in practice, namely ‘far right’, ‘anti-Zionist or anti-Israel’, and ‘Islamist’. To gain a deeper understanding of contemporary antisemitism, CST complements analyses of antisemitic incidents with analyses of different types of antisemitic discourse. The term ‘Islamist’ stands for the diverse Islamic movement that strives to organise social and particularly political life in accordance with supposed Islamic values which, in its view, are threatened by Western modernity. In 2005, Michael Wine referred to three key Islamist organisations in the UK, namely: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun, and Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK. All three organisations are guilty of “antisemitism and holocaust denial”. According to Dave Rich, “British Islamists, though, brought support for Hamas into the heart of the pro-Palestine activism in the UK”.

The CST reports show that the vast majority of reported incidents are not politically or religiously motivated. Among the politically motivated incidents shown in Table 6.1, by far the greatest percentage have been committed by people from the ‘far right’ over the years, except in 2009, 2014, and 2018, with ‘anti-Zionism and anti-Israel’ being the largest category. A relative small proportion of the reported antisemitic incidents were explicitly related to Islam, including Islamism. In the 2010s, this percentage fluctuated between one and eight per cent of the total number of reports.

Table 6.1 Total number of antisemitic incidents (offline and online) reported to CST per year since 2008, number of political motivated incidents, an overview of the specific political motivation of perpetrators, and number of Islam-related incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total reported incidents (n)</th>
<th>Far Right (n)</th>
<th>Antizionism or anti-Israel (n)</th>
<th>Islamist (n)</th>
<th>Islam or Muslims related (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CST 2008a–2021a.
See: https://cst.org.uk/research/cst-publications?categories=Antisemitic+Incident+Reports
In addition to Table 6.1, CST indicates that from 2015 to 2019, there has been a sharp increase in the number of antisemitic incidents that “were related to antisemitism in the Labour Party, or to arguments about allegations of antisemitism in Labour, either due to the language used or the context in which the incidents occurred”. CST recorded 148 such incidents in 2018, with the figure rising to 224 in 2019 and then dropping to 175 in 2020 and 30 in 2021. The CST reports also show that the vast majority of perpetrators are adult males. The victims are often Jews who are outwardly recognisable as Jews, Jewish men and adults. Over half of the incidents reported to CST take place in London.

CIDI does not generally collect data on the religious or ideological motivations of perpetrators of antisemitic incidents. However, in 2002–2006, it did attempt to determine the proportion of ‘perpetrators of North African origin’ – a category often linked to Muslim identity – in the entire population of offenders. The ‘CIDI Monitor of Antisemitic Incidents in 2006’ (CIDI Monitor Antisemitisme Incidenten 2006) states:

In last year’s report, CIDI stated that it was somewhat optimistic about the slight decrease in the proportion of antisemitic by perpetrators of North African origin. CIDI has tried to determine this proportion since 2002, because it was found that many of the antisemitic manifestations were perpetrated by people of North African origin. By identifying this, CIDI has been better able to set priorities and adjust policies. After all, Nazi sympathisers require a completely different approach from perpetrators of North African origin. The antisemitism of these perpetrators often stems from their aversion to the State of Israel, which is projected onto the Jewish community in the Netherlands. To overcome this aversion, the dialogue with Muslim communities in the Netherlands has become a spearhead of CIDI policy. In 2002, 41% of reported perpetrators were of North African origin. There was a slight increase in years 2003 and 2004, to 43.5% and 45%, respectively. There was a small decrease in 2005, to 38%, continuing in 2006 to 33.3%. The many dialogue projects developed by CIDI and others appear to be bearing fruit.

The ‘CIDI Antisemitism Monitor 2020’ states:

In large parts of the Muslim world, there is very broad support for antisemitism, and it is even propagated by governments. Hostile stereotypes of Jews are widespread in school books, media or the state propaganda of countries such as Iran and Syria. According to a 2014 survey, in most countries of North Africa and the Middle East, antisemitic views are held by some 74% of the adult population, more than three times that of the population of Western Europe or North America (...) The aforementioned survey found that antisemitic
views among Muslims in Western Europe are considerably less prevalent than among residents of the countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, there are many Muslims, both within and outside politics, who are committed to fighting antisemitism.\textsuperscript{38}

Clearly, Islamophobic incidents in the UK and the Netherlands are not as extensively and systemic monitored as antisemitic incidents. While CST and CIDI are two nationally known reporting centres for antisemitism in the two countries, there are no such nationally known reporting centres for Islamophobia. Tell MAMA does appear to be developing towards such a reporting centre in the UK – with the support of the British government, but no such development has taken place in the Netherlands. The first annual reports and analyses of the Islamophobic manifestations reported to Tell MAMA were made by researchers at Teesside University. Since 2016, Tell MAMA has published its own annual report on the registered incidents.\textsuperscript{39}

Figure 6.2 shows a sharp increase in the number of (offline) reports since 2014. Tell MAMA attributes this mainly to two factors.\textsuperscript{40} Firstly, the combination of attacks in the UK and abroad by persons claiming to act in the name of Islam and the conflation of Muslims in general with these attackers, which leads to Muslims being held generically co-responsible for the attacks. Secondly, the rise of an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse in British media, politics and public opinion in the run-up to and after the EU referendum of 23 June 2016, which has greatly lowered the

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figures/figure62.png}
\caption{Total number of anti-Muslim incidents reported to Tell MAMA per year since 2012/13.}
\end{figure}

Sources: Tell MAMA Annual Reports 2012/13–2018. See: https://tellmamauk.org/category/reports/
threshold for publicly expressing racist, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments and beliefs.

A discussion of ‘trigger events’ is incomplete without reference to the EU referendum vote on 23 June 2016. The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) reported a rise in hate crime reports to the True Vision website days later. Racist or religious offences recorded by police forces in England and Wales increased by 41% in the month after the referendum vote with 5,468 hate crimes recorded in July 2016, up from 3,886 such crimes in the same period a year earlier.  

The Tell MAMA analyses show that most street-based crimes are ‘gendered’: they are mainly committed by young, white men and mainly affect Muslim women who wear Islamic clothing, such as a headscarf, a veil, an abaya, or a combination of garments. One-third to half of the incidents reported to Tell MAMA were perpetrated in London.  

The Netherlands does not have a fixed national reporting centre for Islamophobic incidents such as the CIDI is for antisemitic manifestations. However, in recent years, researcher Van der Valk, often in cooperation with others, has very usefully collected a large amount of data on Islamophobia in the Netherlands and carried out her own research on the subject. A national survey shows that in the period 2005–2015, 39 per cent of the 475 mosques in the Netherlands were targets of aggression. Vandalism, graffiti, attacks, leaving a pig’s head or a threatening message were the most frequently reported forms. Thirty per cent of mosques had not been affected by aggression and 29 per cent did not know. The study ‘Islamophobia in Sight’ (Islamofobie in zicht), conducted by the Platform for Islamic Organisations in Rijnmond (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond, SPIOR) shows that Islamophobia as experienced by Muslims in the Rotterdam region is much more widespread than registered by the official authorities. The third ‘Anti-Muslim Discrimination Monitor’ (Monitor moslimdiscriminatie) focuses on the years 2014–2016. The number of aggressive incidents against mosques rose from 28 in 2015 to 72 in 2016. A survey conducted for the fourth Anti-Muslim Discrimination Monitor showed that three-quarters of the respondents have experienced discrimination in the labour market because of their alleged Islamic faith. Anti-discrimination agencies received a total of 165 complaints of discrimination on the basis of Islam in 2014, and 240 in 2015, an increase of 45 per cent. Reports to the police and internet discrimination reporting centres also doubled in these years. The Regional Centre for Discrimination Amsterdam (Meldpunt Discriminatie Regio Amsterdam, MDRA) indicates that the number of reports of anti-Muslim discrimination rose from 26 in 2018 to 36 in 2019 and reports of antisemitism from 13 to 19 in these years.

The fluctuations in the number of reported Islamophobic incidents in both countries are strongly influenced by ‘trigger events’. In the same way
as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important trigger for antisemitic incidents, attacks by violent jihadists trigger Islamophobic incidents. CST’s Mark Gardner states:

Jihadi terrorism from the 9/11 attacks onwards has been very damaging to the common perception of Muslims, increasing suspicion and racism against all Muslims.\textsuperscript{52}

The extremely violent attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019, also led to a spike in the number of recorded manifestations of ‘anti-Muslim hatred’ in the UK.\textsuperscript{53} According to Tell MAMA, debates surrounding Brexit have created a climate in which British people find it easier to express racist, antisemitic, and Islamophobic feelings and views.

There are no statistics available on the proportion of Jews in the registered incidents of Islamophobia in the UK and the Netherlands. However, this does not mean that there are no Jews who express Islamophobic views. Roggeveen and Van Esdonk both encountered Islamophobia among Jews in their research, albeit on a small scale.\textsuperscript{54} The lack of statistical data is related to the fact that the Jewish communities in the UK and the Netherlands are relatively small and – we suspect – manifestations of Islamophobia among Jews are limited.

\subsection*{6.4 Antisemitism and Islamophobia in the Political Domain}

In the UK, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have been frequently accused respectively of antisemitism and Islamophobia in recent years. Although members of the Conservative Party have also been accused of making antisemitic remarks, since 2015, it has mainly been the Labour Party that has been under fire for this.\textsuperscript{55} The allegation is that under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, there were numerous antisemitic incidents within the Labour Party, which the party leadership did not address forcefully or effectively enough. These incidents were said to have involved both Muslim and non-Muslim party members.\textsuperscript{56} The allegation was confirmed by research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which concluded “that antisemitism within the Labour Party could have been tackled more effectively if the leadership had chosen to do so”.\textsuperscript{57} There is no ‘institutional antisemitism’, at least according to the five academic authors who investigated antisemitism in the Labour Party, in their book \textit{Bad News for Labour. Antisemitism, the Party & Public Belief}.\textsuperscript{58} On the other hand, Dave Rich argues that a culture of antisemitism did emerge in the party under Corbyn. According to Rich, this culture had long existed mainly on the fringes of the British left-wing political spectrum, but spread to the centre of the Labour Party during Corbyn’s tenure.\textsuperscript{59} This culture is typified by a combination of antisemitism, anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel. A crucial
point in the development of this culture occurred in the early 2000s, when, despite major ideological differences, far-left and Islamist groups found each other in a shared desire to stand up for the Palestinian cause and aversion to ‘colonial Zionism’ and Israel’s policy on Palestine. Following the Labour Party’s dramatic defeat in the 2019 election, Corbyn was succeeded in 2020 by Keir Starmer, who, shortly after taking office, announced his intention to purge the party of antisemitism and “to seek to address the disgrace of antisemitism in our party as soon as possible”. In October 2020, Corbyn was suspended by the party leadership after refusing to fully accept the conclusions of the EHRC investigation.

The Conservative Party has frequently been associated with Islamophobia in recent years. In the 2016 London mayoral campaign, Jewish Conservative candidate Zac Goldsmith, who was later appointed to the House of Lords and Minister of State for Pacific and the Environment in Boris Johnson’s cabinet, made Islamophobic comments about Muslim Labour candidate Sadiq Khan by associating him with Islamic extremism. In early August 2018, Boris Johnson drew criticism by saying that full-face veils should not be banned, but it was “absolutely ridiculous” women chose to “go around looking like letter boxes”. A 2018 survey found that a sizeable proportion of the party’s electorate see Islam as a threat to ‘the British way of life’.

The anti-immigrant sentiment in the party has a long history dating back to Enoch Powell’s famous and controversial ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968. Criticism of the party’s handling of Islamophobia has mounted in recent years. For example, in 2018, former Conservative party chairwoman and minister Sayeeda Warsi accused the party leadership of not taking seriously Islamophobia in its own ranks. A major criticism of the Conservative Party and also of Conservative governments is the refusal to recognise the new working definition of Islamophobia of the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims, namely: “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.” In March 2020, the MCB asked the EHRC to investigate possible breaches of the rules under the Equality Act 2010. The request focuses on five points: “Islamophobia amongst Members of Parliament; Atmosphere of hostility against Muslim Conservative Party Members; Scale of Islamophobia in the Party; Failure of complaints process; Denial of Islamophobia.” The EHRC has not granted this request up to now because the Conservative Party announced that it would conduct its own independent investigation into complaints. Although this investigation led by former EHRC commissioner Swaran Singh found no evidence of institutional racism in the Conservative Party, it concluded:

Judging by the extent of complaints and findings of misconduct by the Party itself that relate to anti-Muslim words and conduct, anti-Muslim sentiment remains a problem within the Party. This is damaging to the Party, and alienates a significant section of society.
It also pointed out that the handling of complaints of discrimination in the party was substandard.

In the UK, the ‘hard core’ of extra-parliamentary political Islamophobia is found in ‘far right’ organisations such as the British National Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL). In the early 2010s, the EDL had a Jewish Division, which it said had around 100 members and was led by the activist Roberta Moore. Established Jewish bodies, such as the Board of Deputies and CST, explicitly distance themselves from this movement. The CST Antisemitic Discourse Report 2011 states:

The EDL does not fit the older model of a far right party as typified by the BNP. It promotes a clash of cultures between the West and Islam, and generally eschews overt anti-Jewish or anti-black racism, homophobia and the like, in favour of pushing Islamophobia. It has tried to promote gay, Sikh and Jewish branches to this end, and waves the Israeli flag in attempted provocation of Muslims. Jewish groups, including CST and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, have repeatedly warned Jews not to fall for the EDL’s anti-Muslim racism and the EDL’s so-called ‘Jewish’ branch has never amounted to more than a handful of members.

In the Netherlands, antisemitism has not, or has hardly, been politically organised until now. There is a broad consensus among almost all political parties that antisemitism is unacceptable and must be combated. Even in ‘left-wing’ parties that are strongly committed to the ‘Palestinian cause’, we encounter practically no antisemitism, although CIDI has doubts about the willingness of the parties DENK and Bij1 to tackle antisemitism, partly because these parties oppose the use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism. In 2014, the Socialist Party (SP), the most left-wing party in the Dutch parliament, withdrew from the organisation of a pro-Palestine demonstration because some of the invited speakers, such as Dyab Abou Jahjah and rapper Appa, had expressed antisemitic views in the past. However, an antisemitic undercurrent is discernible in the new populist party Forum for Democracy (FvD), led by Thierry Baudet. In November 2020, reports surfaced in the media about support for conspiracy theories and antisemitism by Baudet and the party’s youth organisation. Numerous prominent members left the party for this reason. At the beginning of 2021, CIDI concluded: “A cloud of antisemitic sentiment surrounds both FvD leader Thierry Baudet and the party’s youth division” and CIDI chairman Ronnie Eisenmann stated: “If you continue to support Baudet now, you are complicit in perpetuating antisemitism within that party.” It is striking that this party initially seems to have received broad Jewish support, probably due in part to its pro-Israel stance. In 2017, Baudet was declared the winner of the CIDI election debate at Amsterdam’s Rode Hoed debating centre, and, in 2019, Baudet and FvD MP Theo
Hiddema figured prominently during the CIDI #KeppelOp (‘Kippah on’) demonstration.\textsuperscript{78} The NIW wrote: “More than one CIDI employee spoke out as a big Forum supporter”.\textsuperscript{79}

In contrast to antisemitism, Islamophobia is strongly organised in Dutch politics. In parliament, Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in particular presents itself as an anti-Islam party. According to the PVV, Islam is not a religion but a malevolent ideology that should be fought by restricting the religious freedom of Muslims. Its latest election programme states that: “(...) reversing the Islamisation of our country is therefore the most important thing that has to happen in the Netherlands now.”\textsuperscript{80} Within this framework, the party aims to: “Ban the spread of Islamic ideology (Islamic schools, mosques, the Quran)” and “Ban the wearing of headscarves in government buildings”.\textsuperscript{81} One of Geert Wilders’ faithful supporters is his fellow party member Gidi Markuszower, secretary of the Organisation of Jewish Communities in the Netherlands (NIK) from 2014 to 2018. Forum for Democracy (FvD) is also against Islam. In its election programme for 2021–2025 it ‘frames’ Muslims primarily as a threat. In its proposal for a Protection of Dutch Values Act, it states: “Due to the arrival of large groups of (predominantly Muslim) immigrants, a number of achievements and core values of our society have come under great pressure”.\textsuperscript{82} Among Dutch Jews there is some support for the political anti-Islam movement. In the 2017 survey ‘Jewish Netherlands Votes’ (Joods Nederlands Kiest), for example, some ten per cent of respondents indicated a preference for the anti-Islam PVV party, just under 40 per cent agreed with the statement that Islam does not belong in Europe, and three-quarters agreed with the assertion that Islamic values are a threat to Europe.\textsuperscript{83} The FvD has also been able to count on Jewish sympathy, as we have seen, until it was revealed at the end of 2020 that some of the party’s staff were involved in antisemitism.\textsuperscript{84} Outside parliament, Islamophobic ideas are found in extreme right-wing groups and networks such as Pegida, Outpost (Voorpost), and Right in Resistance (Rechts in Verzet).

When we compare the situation in the two countries, it is striking that political antisemitism and political Islamophobia have become more ‘mainstream’ in the UK in recent years than in the Netherlands. As far as political antisemitism is concerned, this may be related to the fact that antisemitism continues to be more of a taboo in the Netherlands than in the UK because of its very fraught history with the Jewish community during the Second World War. As for political Islamophobia, this is probably related to differences in how the parliamentary systems are organised. While the Netherlands has a multi-party system with more than 15 parties in parliament in 2021, the British system is largely characterised by a two-party system. As a result, the two major British parties accommodate all kinds of currents that are organised in separate political parties in the Dutch context. In the UK, for example, Islamophobia is visible as an undercurrent in the Conservative Party, whereas in the Netherlands it is organised in
relatively young populist parties on the right wing of the political spectrum, namely the PVV and FvD.

In the UK, political relations have become more polarised, partly under the influence of the EU referendum on 23 June 2016. The nationalist and populist UK Independence Party (UKIP), which was founded in 1993 and had the exit from the EU as its spearhead, emerged as the big winner in this referendum. Influenced partly by this victory, the Conservative Party took a more nationalistic and populist course, while the Labour Party shifted to the left under Corbyn’s leadership. As a result, groups on the flanks of both parties have become more mainstream, resulting in more Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents. With the arrival of Starmer as its leader, the Labour Party appears to be shifting its course more towards the centre again.

6.5 A Closer Look at Islamophobia among Jews and Antisemitism among Muslims

We find that in the UK and the Netherlands, offline Islamophobia is found among Jews, albeit probably on a modest scale, and offline antisemitism is found among Muslims, probably to an above-average extent. However, the proportion of Muslim antisemitism in all antisemitism is limited.

Research shows that the development of these forms of hate crime in these groups is related to a multitude of factors, including the presence of a ‘cultural archive’ of antisemitism or Islamophobia, ideologies that feed into and legitimise antisemitism and Islamophobia, the attitude of leaders, the degree and type of contact between members of the groups and the occurrence of ‘trigger events’. From the perspective of social identity theory, manifestations of antisemitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews are mainly seen as the result of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ processes that are reinforced by the threat factor, which in turn is related to the history and perceived position of Jews or Muslims. Three types of threat are distinguished: real, symbolic, and social threats. What threats do Jews face from Muslims? We think of two. Firstly, the threat posed by antisemitism among some Muslims and the attacks committed by Jihadists on Jewish targets in Europe. These are real threats. These threats appeal to Jews’ long history of facing antisemitism in Europe. In addition, the threat posed by the fact that a section of Muslims have an aversion to the Israeli government and/or the State of Israel. Many Jews feel strongly connected to Israel and some experience this aversion as a dislike of the Jewish people in general. This concerns a social threat. The question of what threat some Muslims experience from Jews is more difficult to answer. After all, they are not directly threatened by Jews. Although Islamophobia does exist in the Jewish community, given its small scale, Muslims are likely to suffer little as a result. Furthermore, there are no known cases of Jews attacking Muslims or mosques in Europe. Nevertheless, the threat factor may well play a role in antisemitism among Muslims. So it is not about the threat Muslims
experience from Jews but about the threat they experience from British and Dutch society in which antisemitism is a taboo subject. In these societies, they are confronted with the real threat of discrimination and the symbolic threat of a discourse of exclusion that says they are not really British or Dutch.\textsuperscript{91} Some of them who do not accept this, realise that they can provoke these societies if they cross the boundaries of the taboo on antisemitism. They express antisemitic views as a reaction against the society that they feel marginalises them.\textsuperscript{92} A second threat also plays a role. Many Muslims feel a strong affinity with the Muslim Palestinians and consider them their ‘brothers and sisters’.\textsuperscript{93} Some assume that many Jews unconditionally support Israel and the Israeli government’s policy towards Muslim and other Palestinians. These Muslims hold them jointly responsible for the injustice and suffering inflicted by Israel on Palestinians belonging to the same group to which they count themselves. This too concerns a social threat. In line with our theoretical approach we stress that the perceived threats mentioned are not only the result of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ processes, but are also evoked by agitators, such as rapper Appa during a pro-Palestine demonstration in Amsterdam in the summer of 2014, and Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-Islam party PVV.\textsuperscript{94}

6.6 Experiences of Antisemitism and Islamophobia and Reactions

Manifestations of antisemitism and Islamophobia evoke similar feelings among Jews and Muslims, respectively. For both, they may instil fear of possible consequences of the manifestations or make them feel that they are not full members of society. In a Tell MAMA survey on the impact of Islamophobic manifestations on individual Muslims in the UK, many Muslims who have been the target of Islamophobia say that they were told “during their abuse” to “go back to where you came from”.\textsuperscript{95} A young Jewish person in Amsterdam said:

More and more, I feel that I don’t belong here. Most people are very nice to me, but they think I’m a foreigner with strange non-Dutch habits. When they hear that I used to live in Israel, it’s all wrong, because Israel is bad. I’m not allowed to be who I am here, and I’m not allowed to be there at all: really, I’m not allowed to be anywhere.\textsuperscript{96}

The statements evoke feelings of fear and insecurity among many Muslims and Jews, not only among those who experience anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish incidents but more broadly, among Jews and Muslims in general. The intensity of these feelings varies, depending on factors such as the type of incident (serious or mild), the type of experience (direct or indirect), the number of times a person is confronted with an incident (once or several times), as well as the reaction of bystanders (unsupportive or supportive).\textsuperscript{97}
For Jews, antisemitic incidents are easily associated with the antisemitism of Nazi Germany. A Jewish man interviewed in Amsterdam said:

> When you are second or third generation [post-World War II] you are always affected by your upbringing and the things that happened. We feel that daily. You see people afraid, they react differently, they ... well (...) take precautions. At a certain moment, people who’ve reached retirement age, who actually went through the war, they think of moving to Israel because they no longer feel safe here. For me, the Netherlands is a country where we should be able to live safely. And it’s slowly falling apart.

In the reactions of Muslims and Jews in the Netherlands and the UK to Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents and the associated feelings of insecurity, we recognise three basic reactions: ignoring, avoiding, and fighting. In the case of ignoring, the will not to be frustrated by incidents and not to let them influence one’s life prevails. There is a tendency to downplay events. A Muslim in Amsterdam said:

> Yes, but I’ve never heard of incidents taking place in Amsterdam, allegedly. Or any of that friction that’s supposed to be in Amsterdam. I say ‘allegedly’, because I always find it’s really not that bad. How many incidents have you really had? Yes, I heard of [one] ... Well, if there is someone and this person tells it to a hundred people, it will sound like there are a hundred incidents.

In the case of avoiding, people try to avoid the incidents in future. A Jewish man decides not to wear a kippah or a Muslim woman does not wear a headscarf, or people avoid places where they fear and suspect incidents may occur. The aforementioned Tell MAMA study on the impact of anti-Muslim incidents states:

> Victims would often talk of potentially moving to areas with high Muslim population (i.e. ‘Muslim friendly’ areas) to protect themselves from Islamophobia. Fear of further victimisation has caused some Muslim women to change their usual routines. In one case reported to our staff, a woman who now wears the niqab (face veil), no longer frequents her local park with her young child, fearing for her safety.

Dissatisfied and sometimes fed up with antisemitism and Islamophobia and the perception that politicians and the government are not taking enough effective action against them, some Jews and Muslims state that they want to emigrate to a country where they feel safer. Esther Voet, editor-in-chief of the NIW, wrote in 2019:
I have since come to the conclusion that it’s time to leave. Not just the NIW, but the Netherlands. With these ten years behind me, I know only too well that antisemitism is becoming mainstream again. I’m going to the only country in the world where I know that if I am called a ‘dirty Jew’, I just need to take a bath. Of course I’m concerned about the political developments there, but I am here in the Netherlands too. Just look at parties like Denk and Bij1.103

In the case of the fighting reaction, Muslims or Jews do not accept the incidents and actively resist them. The form of the reaction can vary greatly: from reporting an incident to a regional or national antisemitism or Islamophobia reporting centre to pressing charges against a public figure believed to be guilty of discrimination against Jews and/or Muslims to political activism.104 Dissatisfaction regarding antisemitism or Islamophobia can also be a component in a process of radicalisation that can ultimately lead to a form of militant resistance.105 The Tell MAMA research report We Fear for our Lives on experiences of anti-Muslim hostility emphasises the importance of this component when it states:

Anti-Muslim hate crime has affected Muslims. This is why Muslims are going to Syria. This is why they support ISIS. When people experience Islamophobic abuse, they will be easily radicalised. They feel weak, lonely, isolated, and rejected from British society. This is when these hate preachers pick them up and brainwash them. If you are constantly victimised, you are weak. Jihadi John and others who support ISIS are vulnerable. Vulnerability is the number one factor why Muslims go to Syria. These young people are groomed to go to Syria, groomed to become terrorists, groomed to blow themselves up.106

6.7 The Public Debate on ‘New Antisemitism’

In the current public debate on antisemitism and Islamophobia, links between antisemitism and Muslims are made far more often than between Islamophobia and Jews, although, for example, Hilary Aked has put forward the thought-provoking proposition that ‘right-wing Zionists’ play an important part in organised Islamophobia in Western countries.107 Here we concentrate on the debate about contemporary antisemitism, also referred to as the debate on ‘new antisemitism’.108 In this public debate, the question of what role Muslims play in contemporary antisemitism is a key issue. Views on this vary widely, with some pointing out that contemporary antisemitism comes from the far right, the far left, and also from Islamists. For example, Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks wrote:

It is coming simultaneously from three different directions: first, a radicalized Islamist youth inflamed by extremist rhetoric; second,
a left-wing anti-American cognitive élite with strong representation in the European media; third, a resurgent far right, as anti-Muslim as it is anti-Jewish.\textsuperscript{109}

Others, hold both Muslims and the ‘far left’ primarily responsible for the ‘new antisemitism’. This viewpoint is found in political right-wing and populist circles as well as in the Dutch and British Jewish communities.\textsuperscript{110} According to Daphne Meijer, journalist, former \textit{NIW} editor, and EAJG staff member from 2016 to 2019, there is a movement in Jewish circles in the Netherlands which believes that “the fight against antisemitism is de facto a fight against Muslims, since antisemitism, at least in this analysis, in its modern manifestation as anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism, originated first and foremost with Muslims”.\textsuperscript{111} In the UK, there is support among Jews for anti-Islam publicists such as Melanie Phillips and Katie Hopkins who hold Muslims mainly responsible for antisemitism today.\textsuperscript{112} Melanie Phillips takes her position a step further, not only attributing to Muslims a leading role in contemporary antisemitism but also referring to the term ‘Islamophobia’ as an antisemitic concept that Muslims use against Jews. In \textit{The Jewish Chronicle} she wrote:

But the taunt of Islamophobia is used to silence any criticism of the Islamic world, including Islamic extremism (...) “Islamophobia” was invented by the Muslim Brotherhood to mimic antisemitism, the concept which these Islamists falsely believe immunises Jews from criticism – itself an antisemitic belief (...) The concept of “Islamophobia” is thus profoundly anti-Jew.\textsuperscript{113}

The leaders of the Board of Deputies responded to this immediately, tweeting:

(...) that it was an “error” for the Jewish Chronicle to publish the article, entitled “Don’t fall for bogus claims of ‘Islamophobia’” and said “anti-Muslim prejudice is very real” and “on the rise” (...) “Our community must stand as allies to all facing racism”.\textsuperscript{114}

The discourse that, apart from the ‘far left’, it is mainly Muslims who are responsible for antisemitism in Western countries, risks overestimating the role of Muslims and underestimating the role of the ‘far right’ in contemporary antisemitism. We have seen that rates of antisemitism are above average among Muslims in these countries, but at the same time that the proportion of Islamic antisemitism in the total antisemitism today is limited. Figures from CST and others show that the role of right-wing antisemitism has certainly not been played out. On the contrary, ‘far right’ antisemitism continues to emerge in new forms, such as recently in conspiracy theories about the influence of Hungarian-Jewish philanthropist
George Soros. The growth of social media means that such ideas can spread quickly.

The second important theme in the public debate on contemporary antisemitism is the relationship between anti-Zionism, criticism of Israel and antisemitism. Views on this also vary widely. On the one hand, there is the view that antisemitism, anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel virtually coincide in the present day. Whereas in the past, antisemitism was mainly directed against the individual Jew and Jews were accused of adhering to the wrong religion or belonging to the wrong race, it is now directed against the ‘collective’ Jew, the Jewish people, Israel, and Jews are accused of being committed to the wrong state or government. On the other hand, there is the view that antisemitism, anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel usually have nothing to do with each other and the supposed ‘new antisemitism’ is an attempt to silence critics of Israel’s occupation policy. This position is supported by British-Pakistani historian Tariq Ali who said:

The campaign against the supposed new ‘anti-semitism’ in Europe today is basically a cynical ploy on the part of the Israeli Government to seal off the Zionist state from any criticism of its regular and consistent brutality against the Palestinians. (…) Criticism of Israel can not and should not be equated with anti-semitism.

The first position is widely held in Jewish circles in both countries. For example, the Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism 2006 concluded that, on the pretext of criticising Israel, Jews, and Jewish institutions are often targeted by “ethnically and religiously motivated hatred, violence and prejudice”:

It is increasingly the case that, because anger over Israel’s policies can provide the pretext, condemnation is often too slow and increasingly conditional. Regardless of the expressed motive, Jewish people and Jewish institutions are being targeted.

According to Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks: “Anti-Zionism is the New Anti-Semitism”. In the Netherlands, we find this view expressed by Likud Netherlands, for example, and also by Chief Rabbi Binyomin Jacobs. In his opinion: “Israel = Jews and Jews = Israel. Anti-Zionism and antisemitism are no longer brother and sister: they are one and the same, they are synonyms”. CIDI director Hanna Luden wrote.

According to many, anti-Zionism is something fundamentally different from antisemitism. But it often provides a cover for antisemitism. Those who reject Zionism as a form of nationalism, without judging other forms of nationalism in a similar way, are using a double standard.
The British CST takes an intermediate position and does not regard anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel as antisemitic by definition, and makes a distinction between antisemitic and non-antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel. Criticism of the Israeli government and the State of Israel may be motivated by antisemitism, but it is not necessarily the case. Antisemitic anti-Zionist or Israel-critical statements are those that, for example, use old anti-Jewish stereotypes or make comparisons to the Nazis or the Holocaust.  

6.8 Reactions by Jewish and Islamic Institutions

All major Jewish and Muslim umbrella organisations in the UK and the Netherlands take antisemitism and Islamophobia seriously and condemn them. The Board of Deputies, MCB, CJO, and CMO regularly issue statements of disapproval in response to incidents. The Jewish umbrella organisations also work to keep the topic of antisemitism high on the political agenda in their countries, and the Muslim organisations work to get the topic of Islamophobia higher on this agenda.

In response to the development of antisemitism and Islamophobia in recent decades, Jewish-Muslim cooperation between community-based organisations has been strengthened in terms of monitoring and combating these forms of hate crime. In both the UK and the Netherlands, people can report incidents to various organisations. In the UK, CST is the main national Jewish reporting centre for antisemitic incidents, and Islamophobic manifestations can be reported to Muslim Engagement & Development (MEND) and Tell MAMA, among others. In the Netherlands, CIDI is the main Jewish reporting centre for antisemitism and there are three important ‘community-based’ reporting centres for Islamophobia: the CTID reporting centre, Meld Islamofobie, and the SPIOR reporting centre. Reports can also be made to the Dutch Muslim women’s organisation Al Nisa. While CIDI has a national reporting centre, the three Islamophobia reporting centres are limited to certain regions.

In the UK there is intensive cooperation between several institutions in this respect. Notable examples include the cooperation between FAIR and the Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF) and the ongoing cooperation between Tell MAMA and CST. CST provided Tell MAMA with intensive support in setting up a professional monitoring method and Tell MAMA was led by former CST chief executive Richard Benson from 2014 to 2018. In 2018, Tell MAMA founder Fiyaz Mughal launched the ‘Muslim against anti-Semitism’ (MAAS) campaign, which culminated in the establishment of the charity of the same name. Tell MAMA and CST are also partners in the Community Alliance To Combat Hate (CATCH, which provides support and legal assistance to victims of hate crime in London. In 2019, Tell MAMA followed CST’s lead and became active in the field of security,
launching the National Mosques Security Panel to provide training and advice on mosque security in the UK.\textsuperscript{128}

In the Netherlands, there is less cooperation. There have been attempts in the Netherlands to establish cooperation between CIDI and reporting centres for Islamophobia, the most successful of which is the cooperation between CIDI and SPIOR. However, such cooperation in the Netherlands is more limited in scope than in the UK and takes place at the regional rather than national level. What is the reason for this? This is probably due to three factors. Firstly, it is related to the fact that the Netherlands simply does not have a national Islamophobia reporting centre, like MEND and Tell MAMA in the UK. The reporting centres for Islamophobia in the Netherlands all have only a regional scope. For the time being, it is therefore practically impossible to achieve a form of national cooperation in community-based monitoring of antisemitism and Islamophobic incidents.

Secondly, compared to the UK, cooperation in the Netherlands is complicated by the fact that, in addition to its objective of combating antisemitism, CIDI aims to provide information about and promote the interests of Israel. In discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, it tries to create understanding for Israel’s motives, or stands up for Israel, which is a sensitive issue for some Muslims and anti-racism activists. This makes cooperation more difficult, especially when the conflict in the Middle East flares up.\textsuperscript{129} CST links its objective of monitoring and combating antisemitism to the objective of physical protection of the British Jewish community, which is far less controversial.

Thirdly, a major difference is that the British government fully supports, (including financially) the establishment and development of Tell MAMA as an effective, national reporting point for Islamophobia, whereas for a long time, the Dutch government showed no initiative at all in this respect.\textsuperscript{130} Between 2016 and 2020, Tell MAMA received £2.5 million “to raise awareness on anti-Muslim hatred and to increase reporting of hate crimes”.\textsuperscript{131} In the Netherlands, however, the theme of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim discrimination has appeared on the agenda of the House of Representatives a little more often in recent years. Also, for example, in 2018, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment organised some consultations between different private Islamophobia reporting centres to improve mutual cooperation.\textsuperscript{132} As of the early 2020s, concrete measures have not yet been developed.

The cooperation between CST and Tell MAMA is controversial in British Islamic circles. In 2013, for example, Sufyan Ismail, Chief Executive of MEND, said:

\begin{quote}
We don’t want the Government to fob us off with some phony thing called Tell MAMA, which has got a pro-Zionist pretty much heading it, or in a very senior capacity, and is making all sorts of comments we
might not agree with when it comes to homosexuality, to be recording Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{133}

Mughal, the founder and first director of Tell MAMA, accused MEND and similar organisations, saying they “attack us daily because of our view we work with Jewish communities”, but MEND resolutely rejects this and similar allegations.\textsuperscript{134} In contrast to Tell MAMA, MEND is very critical of the British government, is not supported by it and does not work with CST.

6.9 The Policies of National and Local Governments

The UK government has a general policy of combating hate crime, aiming to take a similar approach to combat hate crime directed against various groups, such as LGBTIQ groups, gypsies, Jews, and Muslims.\textsuperscript{135} The policy, as expressed in the Hate Crime Action Plan 2016–2020, addressed several sub-themes: ‘preventing hate crime’, ‘responding to hate crime in our communities’, ‘increasing the reporting of hate crime’, ‘improving the police response to hate crime’, ‘improving support of the victims of hate crime’ and ‘building our understanding of hate crime’.\textsuperscript{136} The UK government is developing a new Hate Crime Strategy that will build on the work of the Hate Crime Action Plan, to be published in 2022. Antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred are dealt with to a high degree as equally as possible. The current British government is advised by the Antisemitism Working Group and the Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group, in which government officials, external experts, and representatives of the Jewish and Muslim communities work together.\textsuperscript{137} It supports the work of both CST and Tell MAMA financially.\textsuperscript{138} In response to the increase in hate crime reporting since 2016, the British government organises roundtable discussions on Islamophobia and antisemitism, provides additional funding specifically for online hate crime and, in July 2019, simultaneously appointed an independent adviser on antisemitism, John Mann, chair of the APPG against Antisemitism, and an independent adviser on Islamophobia, Imam Qari Asim, deputy chair of the Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group.\textsuperscript{139} London mayor Sadiq Khan and the London Assembly also place a high priority on tackling hate crime. They accept the IHRA working definition of antisemitism and the working definition of Islamophobia of the APPG on British Muslims and invest heavily in combating hate crime in the British capital.\textsuperscript{140} In response to the growth in reports of hate, exclusion, and discrimination in London since 2015, Khan announced at the start of National Hate Crime Awareness Week in October 2019 that an additional half a million pounds would be invested in “the hate crime victim advocacy service delivered by Community Alliance To Combat Hate (CATCH)”, “communities that suffered a spike in hate crimes incidents following the EU referendum” and “grassroots community organisations that help people
to stand up to hate and intolerance”. CST, Tell MAMA and other organisations work together in CATCH.

The Dutch government also actively combats antisemitism and Islamophobia within the framework of its anti-discrimination policy. The action plan ‘Combatting Discrimination’ (Bestrijding van discriminatie) was launched in 2010, followed in 2016 by the ‘National Anti-discrimination Action Programme’ (Nationale actieprogramma tegen discriminatie). Within these programmes, the Dutch government is developing numerous initiatives aimed at combating antisemitism and anti-Muslim discrimination, such as research into the causes and trigger factors of antisemitism and anti-Muslim discrimination, the addition of the Muslim category to the registration form for anti-discrimination services, consultations with key figures from the Jewish and Muslim communities, embedding the theme of World War II and the Holocaust in the secondary school curriculum, and programmes to combat discriminatory and antisemitic slogans at football matches. In October 2019, House of Representatives members Nevin Özütok (GroenLinks) and Femke Merel van Kooten-Arissen (independent MP) submitted a motion to establish an annual Islamophobia monitor following the example of the annual antisemitism monitor. The motion was carried. In 2018, MPs Dilan Yesilgöz-Zegerius (VVD) and Gert-Jan Segers (CU) took the initiative to make additional investments specifically in combating antisemitism. About his motion, Segers said:

On the one hand, for historical reasons: we have a debt of honour to the Jewish community, but it goes deeper than that. If they leave, you lose something fundamental to the rule of law, namely that you stand firm for the safety and freedom of the smallest minority.

The plan included the appointment of a National Antisemitism Coordinator. In Jewish circles, this initiative was met with enthusiasm by CIDI but criticised by, for example, Rabbi Lody van de Kamp. He believes that antisemitism should not be fought by sowing even more fear and that the appointment of a National Antisemitism Coordinator “confirms feelings of fear without solving the problem”. He would like the government to encourage the Jewish community in particular to think more broadly “than just in relation to their own backyard. This will make it more resilient in its own struggles. And then it will eventually be able to objectively return the phenomenon of ‘antisemitism’ back to the actual proportions”. In the spring of 2019, the Dutch government decided to provisionally allocate an additional three million euros for an action plan against antisemitism and, on 1 April 2021, Eddo Verdoner, vice-chairman of CIDI and chairman of CJO, was appointed National Antisemitism Coordinator. With effect from 15 October 2021, Rabin Baldewsingh is the new National Coordinator against Discrimination and Racism.

Amsterdam has a general anti-discrimination policy, which places a high priority on tackling discrimination in the labour market. In 2013, civil
society, political and religious organisations and individuals signed the ‘Safety Pact’ (Veiligheids pact) against discrimination against LGBT people, Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch people, and other minority groups. In 2018, an additional initiative, the ‘Jewish Accord’ (Joods Akkoord), was launched with the specific aim of reducing antisemitism in the city. This agreement was signed by all political parties except DENK and Bij1. Bij1 stated that it prefers to fight against discrimination of all minority groups rather than of one specific group and has issues with the IHRA definition of antisemitism used in the agreement, which in its opinion does not sufficiently distinguish between antisemitism and criticism of the politics of the State of Israel. A year later, in December 2019, the Amsterdam city council agreed on an action plan against antisemitism, especially among young people. In response to the fourth attack in two and a half years on the kosher restaurant HaCarmel in Amsterdam, Mayor Femke Halsema said: “This growing antisemitism deserves our attention. It is an old wound in our city (...) Antisemitic tweets, app groups and horrible incidents at HaCarmel spread fear in the Jewish community”.

If we compare the approach of the British and Dutch authorities to antisemitism and Islamophobia, it is striking that the British authorities, in Sarah Cardaun’s terminology, adopt a more ‘universalist’ approach and the Dutch authorities a more ‘particularist’ approach. The British authorities try to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia to a high degree in a similar way as much as possible. The national government is advised by working groups on both issues and simultaneously appointed independent advisers on antisemitism and Islamophobia in July 2019. It supports CST as well as Tell MAMA. In the Netherlands and Amsterdam, in addition to a generic policy against discrimination and hatred towards minority groups, the authorities have pursued a specific policy against antisemitism in recent years. For example, in response to initiatives by the parliamentarians Yesilgöz-Zegerius (VVD) and Segers (CU), the Dutch government introduced a package of additional measures to combat antisemitism and the Amsterdam city council decided to conclude a Jewish Accord in addition to the existing anti-discrimination policy. This difference in approach is probably due mainly to the fact that the Dutch and Amsterdam governments feel a special responsibility towards the Jewish community that suffered so terribly in the Second World War and regarding their own role in this. While the Dutch Jews experienced the Holocaust, the British Jews were spared it.

6.10 Conclusions

In the first part of this chapter, we explored the development of antisemitism and Islamophobia in the UK and the Netherlands. We found that, since the 1990s, the number of registered antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents in the two countries has developed largely in parallel. In both
countries, flare-ups of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict act as triggers for antisemitic incidents, and attacks by Jihadist extremists act as triggers for Islamophobic incidents. Since 2016, the number of recorded offline incidents of both forms of hate crime has increased significantly faster in the UK than in the Netherlands, and antisemitism and Islamophobia also manifest themselves more in mainstream political in the UK than in the Netherlands. In the Dutch political domain, Islamophobia is mainly organised in the PVV party and FvD. The Jewish component of Islamophobia in both countries is low. This is related to the fact that the Jewish communities in both countries are small and Islamophobia among Jews is likely to occur on a modest scale. Antisemitism probably occurs more than average in Islamic circles. However, the proportion of Muslim-related antisemitism in the total antisemitism in the UK and the Netherlands is limited. Islamophobia in Jewish circles and antisemitism in Muslim circles are related partly to perceived threats. For Jews, this concerns the threat of antisemitism and attacks and the resistance to Israel and the Jewish people to whom they feel connected, and for Muslims it is the threat of the society in which they experience discrimination and the threat to the Muslim Palestinians to whom they feel connected and for whom they hold Jews in their own country partly responsible.

In the second part, we focused on the reactions to antisemitism and Islamophobia. What consequences might these have for Jewish-Muslim relations? In the reactions of Jews and Muslims to experienced antisemitism and Islamophobia, three patterns can be identified: ignoring, avoiding, and fighting. The pattern of ignoring has no effect on relations between Jews and Muslims, the pattern of avoiding implies that existing relations are broken down and no new relationships are built up, and the pattern of fighting can have very different consequences depending on how one sees ‘the other’. If Jews and Muslims see each other only as opponents, the attitude of resistance leads to greater distance, but if they see each other primarily as potential partners who can help each other in the fight against hatred directed towards Jews and/or Muslim in or partly in each other’s circles, it can actually lead to cooperation. We will come back to this in Chapter 9 on sources of connection.

In the public debate, the main topic of discussion is the nature of today’s antisemitism and the role of Muslims in it. This debate focuses on two topics: the extent of Muslim participation in current antisemitism and the relationship between anti-Zionism, criticism of Israel and antisemitism. The discourse that, apart from the far left, mainly holds Muslims responsible for antisemitism today, can easily lead not only to an underestimation of the far right’s ongoing role in antisemitism but also to a stigmatisation of Muslims. It can form an obstacle in building relations between Jews and Muslims, especially among those who have no contact with each other in real life. Roggeveen concludes in her research:
Jewish and non-Jewish respondents emphasizing the role of Muslims as perpetrators of anti-Semitism thus could create problems for Jewish-Muslim relations. (...) it might contribute to the stereotyping of Muslims, as we have seen in a few cases when Jews spoke of Muslims as inhuman, or in regard to remarks about Eurabia.\textsuperscript{160}

The discourse that labels a critical attitude towards Zionism or Israel’s actions as antisemitic and therefore morally unacceptable from the outset makes a conversation between Jews and Muslims on this already sensitive topic almost impossible.\textsuperscript{161} In Van Esdonk’s study, a London Muslim woman said:

(...) that the main issue was the lack of distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, which limits Muslim’s freedom to criticise Israel’s actions without being seen as anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{162}

Conversely, this conversation is of course also blocked if Muslims combine anti-Zionist, Israel-critical, and antisemitic views in their statements, something that occurs regularly. On the situation in France on this issue, Ethan Katz states: “In a way that was not the case for earlier generations, for many Muslims in France today, Jews have become Zionist colonialists or their close allies”.\textsuperscript{163}

In both countries, Jewish and Muslim organisations work together in response to antisemitism and Islamophobia. What stands out is that cooperation in the field of community-based monitoring and combating of these forms of hate crime is much more intensive in the UK than in the Netherlands, especially between CST and Tell MAMA. In the Netherlands, there is no cooperation at the national level, if only for the simple fact that there is no national reporting centre for Islamophobia. The intensive cooperation between CST and Tell MAMA shows that constructive forms of cooperation between Jews and Muslims are indeed possible, and may serve as a role model. It may encourage Jews and Muslims to try to cooperate in other fields as well. CST staff member Dave Rich on the cooperation between CST and Tell MAMA:

If the positive example of Jewish-Muslim cooperation in tackling hate crime helps to build good relations between our communities, then this is an added benefit.\textsuperscript{164}

A section of the British Muslim community is reserved about the contacts between Tell MAMA and the ‘Zionist’ CST, and also between Tell MAMA and the current British government. This is partly because the same government does not recognise the MCB as a discussion partner and stands by its national anti-radicalisation strategy Prevent, to which many Muslims are opposed as we will see in the next chapter.
We have found that, to use Cardaun’s terminology, ‘universalism’ prevails more in the British government’s approach to antisemitism and Islamophobia, while ‘particularism’ prevails more in the Dutch approach, with additional investments in combating antisemitism. The Dutch approach can have a negative impact on Jewish-Muslim relations. It raises the obvious question of whether the Dutch authorities consider discrimination against Jews to be a bigger problem than discrimination against Muslims, and fuels the distrust of the government that already exists in Muslim circles to some extent. According to Rasit Bal: “This leads to the perception of ‘double standards’: while antisemitism is in the spotlight, the perception is that anti-Muslim hatred is not being tackled (…) ‘Jews are being helped, but we are not’”. To prevent this, the Dutch government would do well to employ the rule of “what’s good for one is good for the other” as a guiding principle in its anti-discrimination and hate crime policies, and treat Jews and Muslims in the same way. Nothing breeds mistrust like the thought of double standards.

Notes

1 Important subjects of discussion are: 1. the meaning of the words ‘antisemitism’ and ‘Islamophobia’, 2. the components of religion, ethnicity, and race in these concepts, 3. the differences and similarities between antisemitism and Islamophobia, 4. the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ antisemitism, and 5. the operationalisation of the concepts (Meer 2013, a, b; Klug 2014a; Roggeveen 2020, 151–158).

2 Feldman 2013, 4; see also Evelien Gans in Vrij Nederland, 29 November 2003.

3 The term ‘Islamophobia’ is also a subject of intense debate. This term has become much more common due to the influence of the publication of British thinktank The Runnymede Trust in 1997, entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (Runnymede Trust 1997). That study defines Islamophobia as “the dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims” (Runnymede Trust 1997, 7). While the term is now widely accepted and used, the manner in which it was espoused in this report has resulted in a long and heated debate (Allen 2010; López 2011). Most of the criticism is related to the following four points: “1. the restriction of the definition of the phenomenon to the emotional component of hatred and aversion; 2. the difficulty in making a distinction between a prejudiced attitude towards Islam and Muslims on the one hand, and justified criticism of the religion on the other; 3. the observation that discrimination is directed at Muslims and not at Islam; 4. the Trust’s approach towards Islam is to treat it as an essentialised whole and Muslims as a homogenous group in the same way that Islamophobic rhetoric, against which it is aimed, does” (Van der Valk 2015a, 12; cf. De Koning 2019c).

4 IHRA 2016. See: https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/stories/working-definition-antisemitism-0

5 Ibid.

6 See e.g. Klug in The Nation, 1 April 2021, Cf. Klug 2014b.

7 The recriminations in the controversy over the IHRA definition are sometimes mercilessly harsh. For example, in 2019, the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA)
adopted the IHRA definition of antisemitism. A motion was passed at the PvdA congress in March 2020 calling on the parliamentary group in the Lower House to “continue to reject the link between criticism of the policies of the State of Israel and hatred of Jews, and to speak out actively against undermining the IHRA definition of free speech with regard to the policies of the Israeli government”. (The Rights Forum, 13 April 2020, see: https://rightsforum.org/nieuws/pvda-is-broeinest-van-antisemitisme-volgens-de-israel-lobby/). This motion prompted Bart Schut, deputy editor-in-chief of the NIW to write: “Yes, the PvdA is today a party full of Jew-haters who are still in the closet, or to use the fashionable term: institutionally antisemitic. (…) You can bet that next year they will all be back at the Dock Worker monument again, those champagne socialists on the wrong side with their red crocodile tears. Also and especially in the PvdA: we love dead Jews, the living ones can be driven into the sea. Preferably the Mediterranean, but the North Sea will do” (NIW, 15 March 2020).

8 JDA 2021. See: https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/
9 Ibid.
10 Klug 2003, 124–125.
11 Said 1994; Nirenberg 2013; also useful are the articles by Bart Wallet in NIW on 25 and 27 December 2019.
13 Gans 2017, 49.
16 Klug 2014a, 450.
17 Julius 2012; Vellenga 2018.
18 Mobilisation theory dates back to the seminal article by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory (1977). The basic idea of this theory is that there are always feelings of dissatisfaction and threat among population groups, but what it comes down to in movements is that there are initiators who set things in motion and initiate processes of mobilisation. Moreover, according to the theory, these feelings of discord and threat are often more the result of the agitational activities of movements than actually forming the basis of movements. Some more recent publications in line with this theory are Snow & Byrd (2007) and Eltantawy & Wiest (2011). For more about social identity theory, including the role of threats in the mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’, see Section 1.2.
19 These sources provide an indication of the trend in the annual number of manifestations of antisemitism and Islamophobia, not an exact description of them. They are based on reports of the number of incidents reported per year. However, the number of reports is influenced not only by the number of incidents that actually occur each year, but also by other factors, such as awareness of the reporting centres among victims, perceptions of the usefulness or risks of reporting, and the accuracy of the registration systems. This implies that the reports do not provide us with precise information on the exact number of incidents that actually occur each year. However, they do give a good indication of the trend in the number of incidents over the years.
20 CST uses the following definition of antisemitic incidents: “An antisemitic incident [is] any malicious act aimed at Jewish people, organisations or property, where there is evidence that the incident has antisemitic motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted because they are (or are believed to be) Jewish” (CST n.d., see: https://cst.org.uk/report-incident). CST qualifies the
The aforementioned IHRA definition as “a helpful set of guidelines to help identify different examples of possible antisemitism”, but, unlike the CIDI, does not apply it in its work (CIDI n.d., see: https://www.cidi.nl/antisemitisme/wat-is-antisemitisme/). As a result of its cooperation with CST, Tell MAMA has adapted the CST working definition of antisemitism into a working definition of ‘Islamophobia’ or ‘anti-Muslim hate crime’, two terms it uses synonymously. This adaptation reads: “TELL MAMA classifies an anti-Muslim incident as any malicious act aimed at Muslims, their material property or Islamic organisations and where there is evidence that the act has anti-Muslim motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted because of their Muslim identity. This also includes incidents where the victim was perceived to be a Muslim” (Tell MAMA 2020a). Some reports use this definition while others use the IHRA definition adapted from antisemitism to Islamophobia. The adapted IHRA definition is: “A certain perception of Muslims, which may be expressed as hatred or outward hostility towards Muslims. Hatred may take the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric and physical manifestations that are targeted towards Muslims (or non-Muslim individuals considered to be sympathetic to Muslims) and/or their property; or towards Muslim community institutions or religious and other related social institutions” (Tell MAMA 2018b, 3). In her monitors of manifestations of Islamophobia in the Netherlands, Van der Valk uses her own description, namely: “(...) islamophobia (...) is a socio-historically determined ideology that systematically and consistently gives a negative meaning to ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ with the help of images, symbols, texts, facts, and interpretations. This way, people’s perceptions, the meanings they give, their understanding, their attitudes and their behaviour towards Islam and Muslims promote the social exclusion of Muslims as ‘different’, and ultimately lead to discriminatory and unequal treatment in the cultural, social, economic and political domains” (Van der Valk 2015a, 37–38).

In addition to the presented figures on offline antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents, there are data on online incidents in both countries, particularly on social media. The reports on this show that, in general, the number of online incidents increased in the course of the 2010s, which is related to the fact that the use of social media has become more commonplace and the threshold for expressing antisemitic or Islamophobic views on the Internet is low, partly because of the possibility of posting messages anonymously. Through social media, opinions that were previously expressed only in private are now expressed publicly, and niches are developing where like-minded people confirm and reinforce each other’s antisemitic or Islamophobic views. (Sacks 2003, 38).

The annual CSO/ CST figures for antisemitic incidents in the years 1984–1999 are:

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Source: The figures were provided by Dave Rich, CST Deputy Director of Communications.

CST 2011a, 11.
CST 2019a, 4.
CST 2020a, 4, 14; CIDI 2020, 3.
According to CST, there must be explicit indications for registering motivations. For example, to register a Muslim-related or Islamic incident, it is not enough that the perpetrator is Muslim; he/she must indicate that he/she acted from the perspective of Islam or Islamic beliefs. The most difficult category is ‘anti-Zionism and anti-Israel’. CST does not consider anti-Zionism or criticism of Israel to be antisemitic by definition; in other words, it distinguishes between antisemitic and non-antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel. Whether antisemitism exists depends on “the interaction of the following factors: target (…) motivation (…) content (…) response (…) repeat behaviour” (CST 2019b, 14).

There are several studies that indicate that antisemitism occurs more frequently than average among British Muslims. Participants in the study Unsettled Belonging: A survey of Britain’s Muslim communities by the Policy Exchange think tank were asked who was responsible for the attacks on 11 September 2001. The study found that: “When asked who was responsible for 9/11, a majority of respondents (52%) said that they did not know. Even more remarkably, 31% of Muslim respondents said the American government was behind the attack. More people said that the ‘Jews’ were responsible (7%), than said al-Qaeda or some other analogous group (4%). The significance of these results becomes apparent when seen in comparison with results from a control survey. With regards to the latter, only 10% of people claimed the American government was behind 9/11 and just 1% blamed the Jews, whereas 71% of respondents said that al-Qaeda or some analogous group was responsible” (Frampton, Goodhart & Mahmood 2016, 75). The control group consisted of respondents representing the UK population as a whole. The study Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain. A Study of Attitudes towards Jews and Israel van het Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) showed that: “Levels of both antisemitism and anti-Israelism are consistently higher among the Muslim population of Great Britain than among the population in general. The presence of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is 2 to 4 times higher among Muslims compared to the general population” (Staetsky 2017, 6).
We note that the reports do not include the numbers of reports of Islamophobia to other agencies, such as the police forces, which are sometimes higher than those recorded by Tell MAMA (Tell MAMA 2019, 5; 97–100).

Tell MAMA 2019, 55.


Tell MAMA 2018c.

Tell MAMA 2019, 30–33.

Van der Valk 2015b; Van der Valk & Törnberg 2017; Vellenga 2018.

Van der Valk 2015b, 158; Van der Valk 2019.

SPIOR 2016. According to this study, the lack of willingness to report experienced Islamophobic incidents to politicians or other government bodies is related to the fact that people have little faith in what is done with the reports. It concludes: “Lack of faith in the government (and general institutions) is a commonly cited reason. People think nothing will be done with their experiences anyway. They also assume that the SPIOR report will ultimately not be taken seriously by government, politicians, and the police. There is a strong belief that double standards apply and that Muslim welfare simply is not considered important” (SPIOR 2016, 37). The Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016 mentions the same reason: “Research conducted into hate crime victimisation found that the most common reason victims of hate crime do not report experiences of hate crime in the past is that they did not feel the police would take their report seriously” (Tell MAMA 2017, 51).

Van der Valk & Törnberg 2017.

Ibid., 71.

Butter, Van Oordt & Van der Valk 2021, 104.

Ibid. Incidentally, the Dutch police discontinued the separate registration of anti-Muslim discrimination in 2019 (Butter, Van Oordt & Van der Valk 2021, 26). This means that the Dutch police does currently register antisemitism but no longer Islamophobia as a separate category.

MDRA 2020, 24.

Hamodia, 11 August 2019.

Tell MAMA 2020b.


CST 2016a, 12–13; 2017a, 13; CST 2018a, c13, 14, 41; CST 2019a, 12–13; CST 2020a, 14–16.


Philo et al. 2019.

Ibid., 284.

Ibid., 159–193.

The Guardian, 7 April 2020. In April 2020, shortly after Keir Starmer replaced Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party, an internal party report concerning the workings of Labour’s internal disciplinary unit in relation to antisemitism was leaked to the media. This report was over 850 pages long and was intended to be submitted to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which was conducting an inquiry into allegations of antisemitism in the Party. However, Labour’s lawyers refused to allow it to be used. Subsequently, Starmer ordered an inquiry to investigate independently the contents of the Leaked Report and its subsequent unsanctioned release to the media. One of the conclusion of this inquiry with regard to the scale of antisemitism in the Labour Party, led by Martin Forde QC, was: “There is nothing in the Leaked Report (or elsewhere in the evidence we have seen) to support the conclusion
that the problem of antisemitism in the party was overstated.” (Forde Inquiry Panel 2022, 21. See: https://www.fordeinquiry.org/)

64 *The Telegraph*, 5 August 2018.
65 The Hope not Hate poll, conducted in July 2018, shows that 49 per cent of those who voted Conservative in the 2017 general election thought Islam was generally a threat to the British way of life, compared with 21 per cent who said it was compatible. Among Labour voters, 22 per cent said Islam was generally a threat, and 43 per cent thought it compatible (Hope not Hate 2019, 23). See: state-of-hate-2019-final-1.pdf.(hopenothate.org.uk); Tell MAMA 2019, 93–95.
68 APPG on British Muslims 2018, 11.
69 MCB 2020.
71 Allen 2010, 88–93
73 CST 2011b, 28.
74 See CIDI, March 2021: https://www.cidi.nl/dossiers/tweede-kamerverkiezingen-2021/
75 *Het Parool*, 22 August 2014.
76 *Het Parool*, 21 November 2020. See also: https://www.geenstijl.nl/5156539/het-onverholen-antisemitisme-van-thierry-baudet-een-tijdelijk-van-getuigenissen/
77 CIDI, March 2021. See: https://www.cidi.nl/dossier/forum-voor-democratie/. See also the publication CIDI, 4 March 2021 at https://www.cidi.nl/fvder-in-opspraak-wegens-complottheorieen. For a journalistic overview of antisemitic statements in Forum for Democracy (FvD) circles, see Bleich & Van Weezel 2021, 131–155; 181. In the autumn of 2021, CIDI, CJO and four Jewish war survivors instituted preliminary relief proceedings against Baudet because of, among other things, his assertion on social media that: “The unvaccinated are the new Jews, the exclusionists are the new Nazis and NSB members”. On 15 December 2021, the Amsterdam preliminary relief court ruled in favour of the Jewish plaintiffs (Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Rechtbank Amsterdam), 15 December 2021). See: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2021:7392. Although Jaap Hamburger, chair of Another Jewish Voice (EAJG) believes that it is right to reproach Baudet for misusing the Holocaust, he accuses CIDI in particular of hypocrisy on this issue, claiming that it frequently misuses the Holocaust itself for its own political agenda (NRC Handelsblad, 18 December 2021).
79 NIW, 5 December 2020.
80 PVV 2021, 8.
81 Ibid., 9. On 4 September 2020, Wilders was convicted on appeal of group defamation by the Hague Court of Appeal. The case revolves around the question posed by Wilders during an election meeting in The Hague on 19 March 2014 as to whether his supporters wanted more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands. “Fewer!”, his supporters chanted, to which the PVV leader replied: “Then we will

82 FvD 2021, 19.
83 NFW, 9 March 2017.
84 An extremist, Zionist organisation with a political anti-Islam agenda is the international Jewish Defence League (JDL), founded in 1968 by radical Rabbi Meir Kahane. This has also manifested itself in the Netherlands. On 21 September 2003, fifteen members of the Holland Jewish Defence League walked through the streets of The Hague in uniform carrying Israeli flags to express their opposition to the international roadmap that then US president George Bush said could lead to peace in the Middle East (Trouw, 22 September 2003).

85 Iganski & Kosmin 2003; Bunzl 2007; Allen 2010; Esposito & Kalim 2011; Linehan 2021; Julius 2012; Jikeli 2015; Rosenfeld 2015; Renton & Gidley 2017. With regard to the ‘trigger events’ factor, we have seen that, just as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important trigger for antisemitic incidents, attacks committed by violent Jihadists trigger Islamophobic incidents. At the local level, the extent to which Jews and Muslims come into contact with each other acts as a ‘trigger event’. Two examples: In June 2013, the council of the Finchley Reform Synagogue in North London decided to make its synagogue available to accommodate the Somali Bravanese Muslim community after its community centre in the borough of Barnet was burnt down in a suspected arson attack by a far-right group. When the members of the synagogue heard about this, some of them made Islamophobic comments (Van Esdonk 2020, 176). In the spring of 2019, the City of Amsterdam announced plans to accommodate 70 undocumented asylum seekers, some of whom came from Muslim countries, in the Buitenveldert neighbourhood, which has a large Jewish community. This announcement sparked concern in the neighbourhood, including among some parents of the Cheider Jewish school. Herman Loonstein, chair of the school board, said he was against the City’s plans because he feared there would be antisemitic people among the asylum seekers. He stated: “You shouldn’t let a pyromaniac work in a match factory” (AT5, 13 April 2019. See: https://www.at5.nl/artikelen/193163/veel-verdeeldheid-in-buitenveldert-door-opvang-ongedocumenteerden)

86 For a description of this theory, see Section 1.2.
87 Koomen & Van der Pligt 2016, 41–47.
88 Vellenga 2018, 184–186.
89 In this context, see also Section 7.4.
90 For the close connection of British and Dutch Jews to Israel, see Section 5.4.
91 We note here once again that the ‘subjectively’ perceived position and the related threat is more important than the ‘objective’ position and threat. This is reinforced by Maria Komen’s research into political radicalisation among young Moroccan-Dutch people (Komen 2014). Although older Moroccan-Dutch people have far fewer opportunities on the labour market than their younger counterparts, the younger people experience much more tension and threat. Komen clearly summarises the results of her research when she writes: “Young Dutch Moroccans have better prospects than their parents, but their opportunities on the education and labor market, and hence their chances of achieving prosperity, are less than those of their ethnically Dutch peers.
Meanwhile, their position within Dutch society is stronger than in the past, and this ironically generates more tension. Especially more highly educated Dutch-Moroccan youths are sensitive to discrimination, bashing and inequality, and appear to be quicker to react than past generations. They are more susceptible to radicalization and extremism than their parents—and more than their Dutch-Turkish peers—because they are more like ‘us’” (Ibid., 53).

93 For the close connection British and Dutch Muslims have to Palestinians, see Section 5.4.
95 Tell MAMA 2017, 50.
96 CIDI 2011, 39.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 166.
101 Tell MAMA 2017, 48.
102 Roggeveen 2020, 167.
103 NJW, 19 March 2019.
104 Ibid., 2020, 167–168.
105 Koomen & Van der Pligt 2016, 73-72.
107 Open Democracy, 29 September 2015.
108 For the scholarly debate on this, see e.g. Iganski & Kosmin 2003, Bunzl 2007, and Rosenfeld 2015. For criticism of this concept, see also Klug in The Nation, 15 January 2004.
110 An example of a Dutch politician who takes this position is Frits Bolkestein, former VVD leader and European Commissioner. In his speech at the CJO Kristallnacht commemoration on 10 November 2003, he pointed mainly to Muslims as being primarily responsible for the increase in ‘new antisemitism’. (CIDI, 20 November 2003; see: https://www.cidi.nl/bolkestein-moeilijk-antizionisme-en-antisemitisme-nog-te-scheiden/)
111 Nieuwwij, 28 October 2015. See: https://www.nieuwwij.nl/themas/kristallnacht-herdenkingen/
112 The Times of Israel, 28 July 2019.
113 The Jewish Chronicle, 16 December 2019.
114 Middle East Eye, 17 December 2019.
117 Counterpunch, 4 March 2004.
APPG against Antisemitism 2006, 18.
Newsweek, 4 March 2016.
See various contributions on the Likud Netherlands website: https://likoed.nl/?s=antizionisme.
Jacobs 2020.
Luden 2020.
CST 2019a, 21; 26–29; CST 2019b, 14.
In the UK, Islamophobic or antisemitic incidents can also be reported to the police. Local police data on registered hate crimes are collected by the Association of Chief Police Officers and published on the True Vision website.
In addition to these ‘community-based’ facilities where antisemitic or Islamophobic incidents can be reported, in the Netherlands they can also be reported to government-related institutions: antidiscrimination centres, including RADAR, which operates in the provinces of Zuid Holland and Noord Brabant, the police and the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights. The Dutch police stopped registering anti-Muslim discrimination as a separate subcategory of discrimination in 2019. Incidents of discrimination on the Internet can be reported to the Internet Discrimination Hotline (Meldpunt Internet Discriminatie, MIND) and the Dutch Complaints Bureau for Discrimination on the Internet (Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet, MDI).
See: https://muslimsagainstantisemitism.org/
Tell MAMA, 5 April 2019. See: https://tellmamauk.org/national-mosques-security-panel/
This factor is recognised by the Antisemitism Prevention Foundation (Stichting Antisemitisme Preventie) established in 2019, whose Committee of Recommendation consists of Chief Rabbi Binyomin Jacobs, Joel Voordewind (Christian Union, CU) and Bas Belder (Reformed Political Party, SGP). Its 2019 policy plan states: “This foundation does not wish to be a competitor of the other organisations [authors: including CIDI] involved in this. It will be able to bring together, draw attention to and strengthen the other activities. Some schools and other groups are reluctant to invite organisations that are in some way politically or religiously linked to Israel. We therefore expect these schools to be more likely to invite an independent foundation for guest lectures, and when organising conferences, for example, people from various political or religious backgrounds will be able to participate” (Antisemitisme Preventie 2019).
Van der Valk & Törnberg 2017, 73.


137 Based on information received from DCLG. Although at first glance these two working groups are very similar, they are also different. The main difference is that the Antisemitism Working Group includes organisations that are highly representative of the organised Jewish community, whereas the Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group does not include, for example, the MCB as a result of the non-engagement policy towards this organisation since 2009, which limits the authority and effectiveness of this group in the British Muslim community (Van Esdonk 2020, 196).

138 Home Office, July 2016; MHCLG, 23 July 2018. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/tell-mama-annual-report-launch. The British government supports many civil society organisations that work to prevent hate crime, such as the Anne Frank Trust, Solutions Not Sides, and Forum for Discussion of Israel and Palestine. However, it is selective in the support it provides with regard to combating hate crime and especially anti-Muslim hatred. For example, it supports Tell MAMA, but not MEND, both of which have a reporting centre for Islamophobia. Based on information provided by DCLG, Tell MAMA receives financial support from the government because of its commitment to fighting anti-Muslim hatred and also because it strives for a constructive relationship with the government and rejects not only Islamophobia but also other forms of hate crime, such as antisemitism and homophobia. Moreover, it does not reject the Ahmadiyya.

139 Home Office, 16 October 2018; MHCLG, 23 July 2019a,b, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/john-mann-appointed-as-independent-adviser-on-antisemitism and https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-expert-appointed-to-tackle-islamophobia; 15 September 2019, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/communities-secretary-commits-funding-to-tackle-online-hate. As an aside, the APPG against Antisemitism was founded in 2005 and the APPG on Islamophobia in 2010, which became the APPG on British Muslims in 2017. The APPG on British Jews was launched in 2013. All of these cross-party groups conduct research in their areas of activity and advise parliament. According to Cardaun, the establishment of the APPG against Antisemitism in 2005 “can be identified as a first turning point in the fight against anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain” (Cardaun 2015, 177). Two important reports published by this APPG are APPG against Antisemitism 2006 and 2015.

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141 Mayor of London, 12 October 2019.
142 Ministerie BZK 2010; 2016.
143 Ministerie BZK 2018.
144 TK, 31 October 2019, 35 300-VII, nr. 17. See: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-35300-VII-17
147 Algemeen Dagblad, 7 February 2018.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 CIDi, 28 May 2019, see: https://www.cidi.nl/coalitie-3-miljoen-voor-antisemitismebestrijding/; Ministerie VenJ, 5 March 2021. See: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/03/05/eddo-verdoner-wordt-nationaal-coordinator-antisemitismebestrijding
152 See: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/benoeming-nationaal-coordinator-teen-discriminatie-en-racisme. We notice that recently, coalition partner Christen Unie (CU) and opposition group Groenlinks took the initiative for a new law which makes it possible to punish hate crimes with heavier sentences (TK, 29 June 2022. See: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-1037640)
154 Veiligheidsact, 4 February 2013. See: https://veiligheidsact.wordpress.com/?fbclid=IwAR2JpLU9_0dNi1ouDFJZ3R93oip0Ys2vwd73DfVQlrgUl4nStXvDrirgw4
155 Gemeenteraad Amsterdam, 6 March 2019. See: https://client-webor-niwi.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/Poster-Amsterdam_1.pdf
157 Gemeente Amsterdam, 11 December 2019. See: file:///C:/Users/sipco/AppData/Local/Temp/19_01_23_iv_antisemitisme_mp.pdf
158 Trouw, 30 May 2020.
159 Cardaun 2015.
160 Roggeveen 2020, 173.
161 Bobako 2018.
162 Van Esdonk 2020, 165.
163 Katz 2015, 320.
165 Cardaun 2015.
166 Bal 2019, 138; Roggeveen 2020, 143. Bal is of the opinion that double standards are also sometimes applied in Islamic circles themselves in this respect. For example, umbrella organisations affiliated with CMO expect others to show solidarity with them in the fight against Islamophobia, but are themselves “very reluctant to cooperate with parties from the Jewish or LHTBQI communities, because this could damage their internal credibility” (Bal 2019, 138).
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7 Attacks on Jewish and Muslim Targets

7.1 Introduction
The third sensitive issue in Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK and the Netherlands that we discuss is the attacks on Jewish targets by Islamic or right-wing extremists in the West and attacks on Muslims, mosques, and Islamic centres by the far-right and the anti-Islam movement. In this chapter, we examine how terrorist threats have developed in both countries since the 1980s (Section 7.3). Next, we determine how Jews and Muslims experience and react to these attacks (Section 7.4) and we explore the public debate on these attacks, distinguishing between three discourses: the discourse of distinction, the discourse of distancing, and the discourse of suspect community (Section 7.5). We then consider how Jewish and Islamic institutions and British and Dutch governments are trying to combat these attacks (Section 7.6 and Section 7.7). Finally, we take stock and examine in what way the topic of attacks has a divisive and sometimes a unifying effect on Jewish-Muslim relations (Section 7.8). We start out by explaining what we mean by the terms ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, and ‘radicalisation’ in this study and how we approach the subject of violent attacks (Section 7.2). This includes literature on the social effects of terrorist attacks.

7.2 Terminology and Approach
The terms ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, and ‘radicalisation’ are all context-related and controversial concepts. What this means is coloured by place, time, and position. What is most controversial is the scope of these terms – for example, there is a profound difference of opinion as to whether terrorism can be perpetrated by states – but there is broad agreement on its essence. According to most definitions, terrorism involves violence or the threat of violence, has ideological, political, racial, or religious motives and seeks to influence the public, the government, and/or transnational associations. These elements are also found in the working definition of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD):

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Terrorism is the ideologically motivated commission of violence or the threat to commit violence aimed at human life and/or the infliction of serious material damage disrupting social processes with the aim of undermining and destabilising society, creating serious fear among the population and/or influencing political decision-making.\(^2\)

The same elements are found in the UK government’s definition of ‘terrorism’:

Terrorism means the use or threat of action which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and must be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.\(^3\)

Terrorist attacks are motivated by very different ideologies, such as anarchism, separatism, left-wing extremism, right-wing extremism, animal rights extremism, and religious extremism. In Islamic tradition, the term ‘jihad’ has various meanings ranging from the armed struggle in the way of God to expand or defend the territory of Islam to the peaceful, internal struggle against evil urges.\(^4\) Terrorism in the name of Islam is sometimes referred to as ‘jihadist terrorism’. Muslims who take up this struggle today often do not see themselves as terrorists but as fighters who are fighting a just battle in the name of their religion for which they will be rewarded in the hereafter. The term ‘jihad’ is widely used by groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, who also regard their struggle as such. In 1998, the leaders of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates called upon all Muslims of the world to wage a jihad against “Jews and Crusaders”.\(^5\) Against the background of the US presence in the Arabian Peninsula during and after the First Gulf War and the Israeli “occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there”, their “fatwa to all Muslims” is:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.\(^6\)

‘Salafism’ traditionally stands for the broad and diverse movement in Islam that seeks a return to the ‘pure’ Islam of the Prophet and his companions.\(^7\)
Salafists try to model their lives as much as possible on the image they have of these pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih). Contemporary Salafism presents a strict puritanical form of Sunni religious doctrine that is often opposed to many other Islamic groups, especially Shiites. Within contemporary Salafism, three currents are usually distinguished: quietist, political and jihadist Salafists.\(^8\) The term ‘Islamist’ originally referred to an intensification and radicalisation of Islamic religious practice accompanied by an activist attitude.\(^9\) In many cases, this activism is of a socio-political nature, with a distinction between peaceful Islamists and Islamists prepared for armed struggle.\(^10\)

Historian Beatrice de Graaf has recorded and analysed the life stories of 25 people convicted of terrorism in mainly Dutch prisons, 23 of whom are jihadists and two with right-wing extremist views.\(^11\) These two were convicted of the arson attack on the mosque on the edge of the working-class Pathmos neighbourhood in Enschede on 27 February 2016. A typical characteristic of the extreme right is the pursuit of a culturally or ethnically homogeneous state by excluding ethnic and/or religious minorities.\(^12\) What links those convicted to right-wing extremism is “their opposition to newcomers and their fear that Islam would overtake the Netherlands”.\(^13\) In the life stories of almost all the convicted terrorists she interviewed, De Graaf recognises the same structure of the experience of deprivation, the decision to surrender to physical or virtual struggle, the pursuit of redemption by means of a reward or otherwise, and the immersion in the world of images and virtual realities.\(^14\)

The Dutch security authorities describe ‘extremism’ as:

> Extremism is the phenomenon whereby persons or groups, motivated by ideology, are prepared to seriously break the law or carry out activities that undermine the democratic legal order.\(^15\)

The British government defines ‘extremism’ as opposition to fundamental British values and thus ascribes to ‘extremism’ a more ideological, broader, and vaguer definition than the Dutch government authorities when it says:

>(...) vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.\(^16\)

According to both governments, ‘radicalisation’ refers to the process that precedes extremism and terrorism and that can result in them.\(^17\) This process can develop along different paths and is usually non-linear. ‘Deradicalisation’ occurs when people become less extremist and
‘disengagement’ occurs when people distance themselves from extremism and/or extremist groups in their behaviour but not in their beliefs.18

In this study, we approach the process of radicalisation partly from the perspective of social identity theory.19 In addition to the threat factor (realistic, symbolic, and social) that we discussed in the previous chapter on antisemitism and Islamophobia, other factors play a role. Based on an extensive literature study, Koomen and Van der Pligt identify the following factors: social identity processes (emphasis on ‘us and them’ – distinction, polarisation), social environment (social disruption), group processes (isolation, strong leadership), and justification processes (dehumanisation of others, denial of responsibility for the violent solution chosen).20 Other literature reviews point partly to the same and partly to other factors, such as recruitment strategies and the effect of social media.21 The factors mentioned in the reviews can be grouped into three categories: ideological, social, and contextual factors. The ideology factor concerns processes of motivation and legitimacy. In the case of jihadist radicalisation, a distinction is made between the religious dimension and the political dimension (for example, resistance to perceived injustice). The combination of these two dimensions increases the likelihood of radicalisation.22 Extreme right-wing ideologies are often motivated by a sense of threat to the perceived ‘native’ population.23 Social factors include processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ as well as the different recruitment strategies used by extremist networks of various kinds. Leadership is also important.24 With regard to environmental factors, a distinction can be made between international, national, and local factors, such as the rise of ISIS in the case of Islamist radicalisation, the national discourse on Muslims as a problem, and the integration and diversity policies of the local authorities. Government policy towards migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees is often a factor in far-right radicalisation.25

There is disagreement about the extent to which each type of factor contributes to the process of radicalisation. Some researchers stress the importance of the ideological factor. For example, French political scientist and Arabist Gilles Kepel sees the radical ideology of Islamist groups as an important driving force behind jihadist radicalisation.26 Based on a literature review, Madeline Morris and her colleagues conclude that ideology “is not the primary - or perhaps a primary - motivating factor for participation in terrorist organisations” and that social factors are often more important.27 In his analysis of contemporary jihadism, French political scientist Olivier Roy sees ideology as a secondary factor that legitimises radicalisation but does not drive it.28 He therefore prefers not to refer, as Kepel does, to ‘radicalisation of Islam’, but to ‘Islamisation of radicalisation’. From our theoretical perspective we can agree with Roy’s approach, but without neglecting the importance of the religious ideology factor.

Terrorist attacks can have far-reaching social consequences. For example, they can trigger the further escalation of an existing conflict. According to Dutch sociologist Kees Schuyt, how a conflict progresses depends on four
complex factors: the relationship between collective identities and personal identities, the perceived group contrasts, the possibilities people see for reaching a solution and the role of unrecognised or unacknowledged emotions. Conflicts escalate when the parties involved close ranks and tolerate less and less criticism internally, increasingly view each other in all-encompassing black-and-white terms, see no solution to the conflict and cannot find a way to channel negative feelings about the other party. Attacks can trigger these factors and thus stimulate conflict.

Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister investigated the impact of the British government’s antiterrorism measures on the perception of various dimensions of citizenship among different population groups in the UK. Based on focus group research, they concluded that these measures are not only detrimental to the experience of citizenship among Asians and Muslims in terms of “participation, identity, obligation and rights”, but also among members of other minorities, such as black Britons. The white British population is hardly inconvenienced by these measures at all.

Research conducted by Sadi Shanaan and Lasse Lindekilde among 825 British Muslims shows that the willingness to respond to an appeal from the British government or the MCB to take action against Islamic extremism is strongly influenced by the trust factor. Some 62 per cent of Muslims surveyed said they would probably, very probably, or almost certainly act on such an appeal from the government or the MCB. A small proportion of those surveyed, three to four per cent, ‘strongly distrust’ the government and are not prepared to take action against Islamic extremism if called upon to do so by the government. Because they do trust the MCB, according to the researchers it would make sense for the British government to work with Muslim civil-society organisations like the MCB and to let go of its current non-engagement policy.

Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton show that in the UK, Muslims have taken over from the Irish as a ‘suspect community’ since the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. In response to these attacks, the British government has drawn up a security agenda aimed at Muslims. According to the researchers, a political discourse has developed in connection to this, referring to Muslims as ‘the enemy within’. British security policy and this discourse have far-reaching consequences: the disruption of the flow of information between police forces and the Muslim community, the development of a context that promotes radicalisation and the emergence of a social climate in which anti-Muslim hatred is tolerated.

Research by Masja van Meeteren and Linda van Oostendorp into the parliamentary debate on terrorism in the period 2004–2015 in the Dutch House of Representatives ties in with this. They found that in this debate terrorism was increasingly seen as:

- a problem that originates in Islam and which needs to be addressed by the ‘Muslim community’. All members of that ‘Muslim community’ are
now considered as potentially ‘suspect’ when they do not openly and explicitly adhere to Western values and take action to distance themselves from the ‘Jihadist enemy’.\(^{35}\)

According to the researchers, this has three serious consequences: the deterioration of relations between the police and Muslims, the emergence in the public debate of a discourse that views Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ and the further development of a climate that contributes to radicalisation.\(^{36}\)

Margaretha van Es points out that the violent jihadist attacks in the West since 9/11 have resulted in a public debate in which Islam is regularly characterised essentialistically as a violent religion or, on the contrary, as a peaceful religion.\(^{37}\) In the Netherlands, they have also led to the development of a discourse that requires Muslims to constantly answer for and condemn these attacks, in other words, a ‘discourse of denouncing’.

Didier Fassin analysed the impact of the 7 January 2015 jihadist attack on *Charlie Hebdo* on French society.\(^{38}\) In French public opinion, this attack is mainly framed as an attack on the French values of *liberté* and *laïcité*. In response to the terrorist attack, the *je suis* Charlie movement emerged and demonstrations and commemorations celebrated French unity. Fassin points out that every French citizen is expected to engage with this movement. Muslims who do not live up to this expectation are looked down upon and viewed with suspicion.

### 7.3 The Development of the Terrorist Threat since 1990

Modern nation-states have had to deal with extremism and terrorist attacks since their inception.\(^{39}\) Inspired by a wide range of ideologies, violent attacks are carried out to instil fear in the population and bring about political and social change. In the post-war period, the Netherlands has been confronted with terrorist attacks several times, including two train hijackings by South Moluccans in the 1970s and bombings by Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action (RaRa) in the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, violent actions have been carried out by foreign groups, including the separatist Irish Republican Army (IRA), the far-left Red Army Faction (RAF), and Palestinian movements. In the post-war period, the UK has been rocked by terrorist violence much more often than the Netherlands. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, the IRA carried out hundreds of bomb attacks in the UK outside Northern Ireland, killing a total of 125 people.\(^{40}\)

Since the end of the 1980s, in addition to extreme right-wing, extreme left-wing, and separatist groups, political movements within Islam have increasingly been regarded as a threat to national security.\(^{41}\) In the Netherlands, the National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, BVD) published the report ‘Political Islam in the Netherlands’ (*De politieke islam in Nederland*) in 1998, warning against the development of political
Salafism. The foundations of the Salafist infrastructure in the Netherlands were laid in 1986 when the Saudi charitable organisation Al-Haramain established the El Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam. In the 1990s, three mosques were added: the Al Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven, the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague, and Imam Ahmed Salam’s mosque in Tilburg-Noord. In addition, several Salafist youth and charity organisations were set up. Although the composition of Salafist groups is diverse, young Moroccan-Dutch people are over-represented in them.

In the UK in the 1990s, there were security concerns about the followers of various 'radical' foreign preachers, including Abu Hamza, Abdullah el-Faisal, and Omar Bakri. In the UK, ‘radical’ Islam is organised into movements, such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun, and other ‘salafiya-oriented’ groups. In the 1990s, hundreds of Muslims left the UK to take part in the fighting in Algeria, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Yemen.

At the start of the twenty-first century, terrorism, especially jihadist terrorism, was placed high on the political agenda in many Western countries. This is directly linked to a series of jihadist attacks in these countries, including the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC on 11 September 2001, the attacks on commuter trains in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and the attacks on three underground trains and a bus in London on 7 July 2005. In the Netherlands, Theo van Gogh was murdered on 2 November 2004 by Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old man of Moroccan origin who was born and raised in Amsterdam. Bouyeri exemplifies the homegrown terrorist who grew up in a Western country and became radicalised there. In addition to jihadist attacks, there have also been attacks motivated by the ideology of eco-extremism and right-wing extremism. In the Netherlands, for example, Pim Fortuyn was murdered on 6 May 2002 by environmental activist Folkert van der Graaf, and there were various attempts to set fire to mosques after the murder of Theo van Gogh. In Germany, between 2000 and 2007, the neo-Nazi group National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU) committed a series of murders, mainly of Turkish business owners. In the UK, more than a dozen terrorist attacks were foiled between 2001 and 2010, and over 200 people were convicted of inciting, planning, or supporting terrorist acts between 2001 and 2008.

The terrorist threat in the Netherlands and the UK declined in the second half of the 2000s and the early 2010s. In relation to the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria and the proclamation of the caliphate by IS, besides the threat of homegrown terrorism, from 2013, a new threat was posed by potential jihadist fighters who wanted to travel to the Middle East but were unable to do so and by returning foreign fighters. More than 300 Dutch citizens and 850 Britons left for jihadist conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. In addition, there have been a number of attacks by ‘lone wolves’, individuals who operate alone,
with no apparent links to existing terrorist networks. On 31 August 2018, a young Afghan man stabbed two American tourists at Amsterdam’s Central Station out of anger at the fact that PVV leader Geert Wilders had just launched a competition for drawing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On 18 March 2019, Gökmen Tanis, a man of Turkish origin, carried out an attack on a tram in Utrecht, with a terrorist intent. In the UK, British soldier Lee Rigby was killed by two jihadist-inspired attackers in Woolwich, London, on 22 May 2013. This attack was followed by a new series of jihadist attacks from 2017. On 15 October 2021, Conservative MP David Amess was stabbed to death by Ali Harbi Ali, a 25-year-old British man. Police identified the stabbing as a terrorist incident potentially motivated by Islamic extremism. In Europe, Jews and Jewish-owned properties were often the target of jihadist terror in the 2010s. Examples include Toulouse (19 March 2012; Jewish school), Paris (19 September 2012; kosher supermarket), Brussels (24 May 2014; Jewish museum), Paris (9 January 2015; kosher supermarket), Nice (3 February 2015; Jewish centre), Copenhagen (14 February 2015; synagogue) and Marseille (11 January 2016; Jewish school teacher).

The 2010s also saw a number of attacks inspired by right-wing extremist ideology. In the Netherlands, a mosque in Enschede was attacked with Molotov cocktails on 27 February 2016. In the wake of the murder of Lee Rigby, the community centre of the Somali-Bravanese community in North London’s Muswell Hill was set on fire. On 16 June 2016, Labour MP Jo Cox was murdered by Thomas Mair, a 52-year-old white nationalist, and on 19 June 2017, a bus was driven into a group of Muslims worshippers outside Finsbury Park Mosque. The attacks by Anders Breivik in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011, by Alexandre Bissonnette at a mosque in Quebec, Canada on 29 January 2017, by Robert Bowers at a synagogue in Pittsburgh on 27 October 2018, and by Brenton Tarrant at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019 attracted a great deal of attention internationally.

When we compare the development of the terrorist threat in the UK and the Netherlands in recent decades, we find that both the number of attacks and the number of victims are many times higher in the UK than in the Netherlands. Since 2001, there have been about fifteen terrorist incidents in the Netherlands, while in the UK, hundreds of terrorist acts have taken place since then, killing dozens of people.

Britain has faced a far greater threat from jihadi terrorism than other European countries and was forced to reconsider how existing terrorism policies - developed originally to address terrorism stemming from the conflict in Northern Ireland - worked in this new context.

Whereas many attacks have been carried out by Islamic extremists in Europe in recent years, to our knowledge, there have been no attacks by Jewish extremists.
7.4 Experiences of Attacks and Reactions

Terrorist attacks often result in deaths and injuries. The events are a dramatic and often very traumatic experience for the survivors, witnesses of the attacks and the victims’ relatives. Many suffer from long-term mental health problems that affect their social functioning. In addition, as Barbara Perry and Shahid Alvi point out, the attacks often also have a major impact on the identity groups to which the victims belong. Their 2011 study of the *in terrorem* effects among seven vulnerable communities, including Jews and Muslims, in Canada found that hate crime and attacks on individual members of these groups all resulted in “shock, anger, fear/vulnerability, inferiority, and a sense of the normativity of violence”. The effects of the attacks do not stop at the borders of the countries where the attacks take place, but, as shown by Saman Rashid and Anna Olofsson, extend to the entire “geo-cultural region” of the attacks. This is also what we have found in our research. Jews in Amsterdam and London were deeply shocked by the deadly attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels, Belgium on 24 May 2014, and Muslims in these cities by the bloody attacks at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019. Traditional and, increasingly, social media play a crucial role in this process. The influence of the media is even greater in times of crisis than in times of stability. The frequency, nature, and framing of media coverage influence the way people experience the attacks, feel connected to victims, think about perpetrators and also about the communities to which the perpetrators belong. Perry and Alvi note:

Responding to questions about how they felt when they heard about victimization of others in their community, respondents overwhelmingly (over 75%) indicated that: they feared such incidents could happen to them or members of their community again; they lost trust in communities to whom the perpetrator(s) belonged (...).

Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research shows that Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London experience the attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets in Western countries in very similar ways. These attacks evoke feelings of sadness, anger, and insecurity and instil fear. Individual Jews and Muslims are shocked by the attacks and fear that they themselves, a relative or a member of their own community will be a victim of a next attack. Roggeveen’s research shows that the degree of fear of being affected by an attack oneself is influenced by at least two factors: recognisability and degree of contact. The less recognisable someone is outwardly and the more contacts he/she has with members of the group to which the perpetrators belong, the less fear he/she will have. Among Jews, we find three types of reactions to Muslims in general in the case of jihadist attacks, namely: Jews who make a clear distinction between Muslim extremists on
the one hand and Muslims in general on the other, Jews who have difficulty making this distinction and are unsure whether Muslims in general are also capable of committing an attack in the name of their religion, and Jews who believe that Muslims in general are also capable of doing so.\textsuperscript{65} In the case of the latter, no distinction is made between Islamic extremists and Muslims in general. According to a British rabbi: “Islam is a religion of extremism”.\textsuperscript{66} It seems obvious that Muslims exhibit similar reactions towards members of the anti-Islam groups to which the perpetrators of the attacks on Islamic targets belong.

7.5 The Public Debate on Attacks

There has been an ongoing debate in the Netherlands and the UK about the place of Islam in Dutch, British, or, more broadly, Western society since the Rushdie affair in the late 1980s. Since 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 and the London bombings on 7 July 2005, the relationship between Islam and terrorist violence, or more specifically, the relationship between Muslim extremists who legitimise violence and Muslims in general, has been an important theme in this debate. In the public debate in the UK and the Netherlands, we identify three discourses around this theme: the discourse of distinction, the discourse of distancing, and the discourse of suspect community. Combinations of these discourses occur in practice.

The discourse of distinction is characterised by a clear distinction between Muslim extremists on the one hand and Muslims in general on the other. Responsibility for the attacks is not placed on Muslims collectively, but specifically on Muslim extremists. We find this discourse, for example, in the reaction of then Prime Minister Tony Blair to the attacks of 9/11 and later 7/7 in which he made a clear distinction between Muslim terrorists and the vast majority of Muslims who abhor terrorism.\textsuperscript{67} In his initial reaction to 9/11, Blair stated:

\begin{quote}
We do not know the exact origin of this evil. But, if, as it appears likely, it is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know that they do not speak or at for the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims through-out the world. I say to our Arab and Muslim friends: “Neither you nor Islam is responsible for this; on the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism, and we ask you as friends to make common cause with us in defeating this barbarism that is totally foreign to the true spirit and teachings of Islam.”
\end{quote}

In the context of discussions in the Netherlands in 2014 about IS terrorism as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and racism, then Amsterdam mayor Eberhard van der Laan firmly distanced himself from any form of
generalisation and argued in favour of continuing to make a strict distinction between ‘Muslims’ and ‘jihadi fighters’. He said:

We will always have to beware of generalisations. A pro-Palestinian organisation that - like last week - disrupts a performance by an 89-year old singer at an Israeli cultural festival holds her and all those present jointly responsible for the suffering in the Gaza Strip. So does the person who believes that all Dutch Muslims should publicly denounce the barbaric killings by IS. Nobody wants to be pigeonholed except extremists - and they very much want to be. No one wants to be lumped together with extreme others. Not Muslims with Jihad fighters, not Sinterklaas celebrators with racists, not lovers of Israeli culture with Israeli commanders.69

A similar attitude can be found among many British and Dutch experts on Islam, some of whom also concern themselves with ‘radical’ Islam, such as Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Sadek Hamid, and Philip Lewis, as well as Martijn de Koning, Roel Meijer, and Joas Wagemakers.

The discourse of distancing requires Muslims to explicitly distance themselves from Muslim extremists and condemn their terrorist acts.70 In the Netherlands, we find this discourse with Halbe Zijlstra, for example, the then VVD parliamentary group chairman in the House of Representatives, who in 2014 said:

Perhaps it is time for people associated with Islam, imams and Muslims, to say out loud that this [authors: IS] is not Islam. And if they don’t, they are implicitly stating that it is.71

According to British human rights activist Sara Khan, many young British Muslims see “Islamism” as an authentic form of Islam and she calls on Muslims “to speak out against extremism”.72 Although Prime Minister David Cameron clearly distinguished between Muslims and “Islamist extremism” in his 2015 speech on extremism, he invited Muslims to join the British government in taking a stronger stand against extremism.73 Van Esdonk states in her study: “(...) over the years Muslims in Britain and elsewhere were pressured to denounce the terrorist acts of Islamic extremists, while struggling against being conflated with terrorists and being targeted by national processes of securitisation”.74

The suspect community discourse relativises the distinction between Muslims in general and Muslim extremists and argues that not only the ideology of Islamism but also Islam has violent traits.75 It makes all Muslims suspects. In the Netherlands, this discourse assumed large proportions in the early 2000s under the influence of the ‘Fortuyn revolution’.76 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, one of those who played an important role in the Islam debate in those years, wrote:
The true doctrine of the pure Islam, as laid down in the Quran and hadith, calls upon believers to take violent action against infidels, apostates and for example homosexuals, while an unfriendly attitude against women is a given.\textsuperscript{77}

Research conducted by Van Meeteren and Van Oostendorp’s in 2019 shows that this discourse has gained even more significance in the Dutch parliamentary debate since the early 2000s and that the current “dominant discourse on terrorism constructs the ‘Muslim community’ as a ‘suspect community’”.\textsuperscript{78} In the Netherlands we find this discourse among journalists, such as Gerry van der List, Bart Jan Spruyt, and Jaffe Vink, and in academic circles it is supported by academics such as Paul Cliteur, Afshin Ellian, and the late Hans Jansen.\textsuperscript{79} In the UK, the unadulterated version of this discourse can be found in ‘far right’ organisations, such as the British National Party (BNP) and the English Defence League (EDL).\textsuperscript{80} Following 7/7, BNP launched a ‘Crusade against the Islamification of Britain’. The brochure \emph{Islam: A Threat to Us All} states: “Only the BNP speaks out against both Muslim extremist terrorism and the threat that ’mainstream’ Islam poses to our British culture, heritage and way of life”.\textsuperscript{81} The suspect community discourse is promoted by intellectuals, such as Melanie Phillips who argues that London is in danger of turning into ‘Londonistan’, and Bat Ye’or who introduced the term ‘Eurabia’.\textsuperscript{82} According to Arun Kundnani, this discourse is also stimulated by publications of British think tanks, such as Policy Exchange, the Social Affairs Unit, and the Centre for Social Cohesion.\textsuperscript{83} Several studies suggest that British government policies on combating extremism and terrorism have also contributed to the framing of Muslims as a suspect community.\textsuperscript{84} We discuss this in detail in Section 7.7. In a survey commissioned by Hope Not Hate in 2017, 42 per cent of the English population indicated that “their suspicion of Muslims has increased following the recent terror attacks” and a quarter believed that Islam is “a dangerous religion that incites violence”.\textsuperscript{85}

An interesting parallel can be drawn between the public debate in both countries on Muslims and jihadist terrorism and on Jews and Israel’s actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Three similar discourses emerge in that debate, namely the discourse that Jews and Israeli politics are two totally separate categories, the discourse that Jews should openly distance themselves from the repressive Israeli Palestinian policy, and the discourse that Jews are partly responsible for the ‘outrages’ of the Israeli army in this conflict.\textsuperscript{86} Just as Muslims were publicly called upon to condemn IS in 2014 and 2015, in the same years, Jews were pressured to distance themselves from Israeli action in Gaza.\textsuperscript{87}

If we compare the public debate on the relationship between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general in the UK and the Netherlands, we see that the suspect community discourse emerged earlier and is more dominant in the Dutch debate than in the British debate. This is partly due to the fact that, in
the early 2000s, influenced in part by Pim Fortuyn’s arrival on the political scene, the discourse of the Netherlands as a multicultural society gave way to the discourse of the Netherlands as a secular and progressive country in which Islam, and especially its public, orthodox and conservative forms, was viewed as problematic. In the UK, the discourse of Britain as a multicultural country still occupies a prominent place in the public debate in which Islam is accepted in public life, albeit after some substantial adjustments, in the variant of Britain as a ‘multiracial, multifaith society’. In 2008, Vellenga analysed the reactions to the murder of Theo van Gogh in the public debate in the Netherlands, and to the London bombings in the UK, and observed that:

In the Dutch debate, the dominant opinion-makers cited Islam as the main underlying cause of the killing of van Gogh. Echoing the religious justification provided by the perpetrator for his deed, they considered ‘true’ Islam as the instigating factor for this crime. Additionally, the failure of the policy of multiculturalism is often put forward as a cause. Within the British debate, the most prominent participants rejected the idea that Islam itself was the main cause. Blair and many others made a clear distinction between Islam in general and the Islamic ideology of the terrorists, and the latter was seen as a contributing factor. They also considered segregation as a contributing factor. Opponent of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tended to see the British involvement in these wars as the main cause, while politicians and intellectuals of the right of the political spectrum identified the failing policy of multiculturalism as one of the chief causes.88

Although the debate on Islam and terrorism in the Netherlands was tempered somewhat in the 2010s, perhaps due in part to the absence of new extremist attacks, with the exception of the attack at Amsterdam Central Station in 2018 and in Utrecht in 2019, the suspect community discourse still has a strong voice in the public sphere. In the UK, this discourse has become more important since 2016. This is presumably related to the outcome of the Brexit referendum in 2016, which gave a strong impetus to nationalist sentiments that create a contrast between ‘native’ Britons who supported the ‘British way of life’ and first, second, and third generation immigrants, in particular Muslims, who were said to threaten it, as well as the ongoing series of jihadist attacks faced by the UK. Many British Muslims also experience the British government’s counter-extremism policy and its Prevent anti-radicalisation strategy as a programme that makes them suspects. We will come back to this in Section 7.7 and Section 7.8.

7.6 The Reaction of Jewish and Islamic Institutions

How do Jewish and Muslim institutions react to terrorist attacks? Many British Jewish, Muslim, and ‘interfaith’ institutions react to these attacks
with shock and condemnation. On 18 July 2005, the British Muslim Forum (BMF) issued a fatwa, also on behalf of 500 British Muslim leaders, strongly condemning the 7/7 attacks:

Islam strictly, strongly and severely condemns the use of violence and the destruction of innocent lives. There is neither place nor justification in Islam for extremism, fanaticism or terrorism. Suicide bombings, which killed and injured innocent people in London, are haram - vehemently prohibited in Islam, and those who committed these barbaric acts in London are criminals not martyrs. Such acts, as perpetrated in London, are crimes against all of humanity and contrary to the teachings of Islam.\(^{89}\)

A report by the European Monitoring Centre of Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) on the reactions of Islamic circles to these attacks states:

Muslim leaders in the UK reacted at once by condemning the bombings and stressing that such acts ran counter to Muslim belief. They engaged in dialogue with Government, Police and local authorities showing their support for efforts to root out terrorism and to avert a backlash on Muslim communities.\(^{90}\)

In the 2010s, British Jewish, Muslim and interfaith organisations also regularly expressed their horror at attacks. Van Esdonk wrote about the reaction to the attack on Charlie Hebdo:

\[\text{\ldots} \text{after the attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015, the Board of Deputies, Joseph Interfaith Foundation, Muslim Association of Britain and the Faiths Forum for London all issued extra newsletters condemning the attack. And in September 2014, hundreds of imams signed a letter appealing for the release of Britons taken hostage by IS.}^{91}\]

Jewish and Muslim leaders reacted to the terrorist attack on mosques in Christchurch on 15 March 2019 in a similar way.\(^{92}\) Sometimes attacks lead to a special kind of contact. For example, after the jihadist murder of Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013, the number of anti-Muslim incidents in London grew rapidly, and the Somali-Bravanese community centre in North London’s Muswell Hill was set on fire. After this arson attack, the Somali-Bravanese community was hosted by the Finchley Reform Synagogue.\(^{93}\)

In the Netherlands, the major Jewish and Islamic organisations also frequently express their horror at attacks committed in the name of Islam, as well as at attacks on Muslims and mosques. Regarding the condemnation by leaders of Islamic institutions of 9/11, the murder of Pim Fortuyn, and the murder of Theo van Gogh, \textit{NRC Handelsblad} reported:
Just as after the attack on American targets on 11 September 2001 and after the murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, the condemnations by the leaders of Islamic organisations and mosques were not long in coming. They all condemned the murder of the filmmaker and columnist in joint press releases and gatherings.94

Several national and regional Islamic umbrella organisations reacted with horror and condemnation to the bloody attacks in Paris on the Bataclan theatre and other targets on 13 November 2015.95 The CMO, which is estimated to represent 380 (over 80 per cent) of the Dutch mosques, stated:

The Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO) condemns these barbaric, cowardly, inhuman terrorist attacks against French society and, in fact, against the whole of humanity. The Dutch Muslim community is intensely sad and feels connected to all victims and to the French nation.96

Jewish institutions also frequently express their abhorrence of attacks. This not only concerns attacks against Jewish targets but also, for example, terrorist attacks against two mosques in Christchurch.97 The Consultative Body of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Overlegorgaan Joden Christenen en Moslims, OJCM) also sees it as its duty to respond to attacks. It often combines an expression of sympathy and condemnation with a visit to the embassy of the country in which the attacks took place to pay tribute to the victims.98

In the UK, CST has not only helped Tell MAMA set up a professional registration system for Islamophobic incidents but has also advised mosque organisations on the security of their buildings. In 2018, it worked with the Faith Associates (FA) foundation to secure mosques prior to Ramadan.99 In 2020, Tell MAMA launched the National Mosques Security Panel offering security training and security measures to mosques in the UK.100

To our knowledge, in the Netherlands, there is no cooperation between Jewish and Islamic institutions with regard to protection and security.101 The BLEW Foundation (Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn, BLEW) has been advising and assisting synagogues, Jewish schools, Jewish events, and Jewish institutions on security since 1972. BLEW also provides advice and training to young Jewish people about assertiveness and safety. BLEW is an initiator and member of the Crisis Management Team of the Jewish community in the Netherlands. It publishes an annual threat report providing an overview of the threat to the Jewish community in the Netherlands. Hundreds of volunteers are involved in BLEW.102 BLEW’s activities are limited exclusively to the Jewish community in the Netherlands.

If we compare Jewish and Muslim reactions to attacks in both countries, we find that in both countries the major umbrella organisations unanimously and firmly condemn terrorist acts in general and against Jewish and
Muslim institutions in particular. In the UK, the Jewish CST supports mosques and Islamic organisations on a modest scale in securing their premises. To our knowledge, there is no such form of cooperation in the Netherlands.

7.7 The Policies of National and Local Governments

Against the background of 9/11 and the subsequent attacks by Islamic extremists in the West, combating jihadist terrorism was placed high on the political agenda of Western countries. In many countries there has been a process of ‘securitisation’, with an increase in priority given to national security by the government, the resources it makes available and the scope of the national security domain. Islam, and radical Islam in particular, have become subjects of national security.

In the Netherlands, the growing threat of jihadist terrorism and the rise of the populist anti-Islam movement has turned the existing security policy completely upside down. In politics, national security policy is given top priority and immigration and integration policy is subordinated to it. The definition of terrorism used by the security services has been broadened and these services have been given significantly more powers in tackling terrorism. The budget and capacity of the National Security Service (BVD), which was renamed the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in February 2002, has been expanded considerably. In April 2004, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) was appointed and given the task of streamlining all parties involved in counterterrorism policy and developing a shared strategy. In 2011, this organisation was renamed the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). A ‘broad’ and comprehensive strategy for dealing with terrorism was developed, which was further defined in 2011 in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011–2015, and, following an evaluation and several adjustments, in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016–2020 which focuses on five partly overlapping ‘intervention areas’: Procurement: timely identification and interpretation of (potential) threats; Prevention: prevention and disruption of extremism and terrorism and thwarting of attacks; Protection: protection of people, property and vital processes from threats; Preparation: being prepared for extremist and terrorist violence and the consequences thereof; and Prosecution: maintaining the democratic rule of law against extremism and terrorism. A consequence of this ‘broad’ strategy is that more government agencies and social institutions are given a role in national security. Although Dutch counterterrorism policy is aimed at all forms of terrorism, the emphasis has been on ‘radical’ Islam and jihadist terrorism the last two decades. In December 2004, the AIVD published the report *From Dawa to Jihad* and, in 2007, the report *The Radical Dawa in Transition*, which focused on the threat posed by homegrown Islamic terrorism. Salafism in particular is seen as a threat to national security. In 2009, the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations (Ministerie BZK) published a ‘Guide to Façade Politics’ (Wegwijzer façadepolitiek) booklet to help local authorities and social organisations recognise the suspected façade politics of Salafist organisations.111 With this publication, the Dutch government in principle placed all Salafist organisations under suspicion.112 The policy regarding ‘jihadist travellers’ was set out in the ‘Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism’ (Actieprogramma integrale aanpak jihadisme) in 2014.113

In response to the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair drew up a twelve-point plan against terrorism. The plan comprised a tough crackdown on individuals who encourage or defend terrorism, disruption of recruitment and training of potential terrorists, and strict rules on immigration and emigration.114 In 2006, the Terrorism Bill 2006 came into force, giving government agencies more powers in the fight against terrorism. This was followed two years later by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.115 The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was established in 2003. The budgets and capacity of the relevant police, intelligence, and security services were expanded tremendously.116 In the London area, MI5 worked closely with the Counter Terrorism Command or SO15, a division of the Metropolitan Police Service. The National Security Council was created in 2010 to oversee all matters relating to national security, intelligence, and defence. The UK’s ‘broad’ national counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, was launched in 2003, consisting of four workstreams: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.117 Pursue focuses on stopping terrorist attacks, Prevent on preventing terrorist attacks from being prepared, Protect on protection against attacks, and Prepare on mitigating the impact of attacks. The CONTEST strategy has been adapted a number of times. In addition to government actors, non-governmental actors are actively involved in the implementation of counterterrorism policies. The Home Secretary has ultimate responsibility for the CONTEST programme and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism of the Home Office is responsible for coordinating the programme. A separate Counter-Extremism Strategy was launched in 2015, focusing on countering extremist ideologies, building partnerships with all those who oppose extremism, disrupting extremists, and promoting togetherness through the Cohesive Community Programme.118

As stated above, both the Dutch and British governments take a ‘broad’ approach to counterterrorism, combining repressive and preventive measures. The preventive approach is aimed at early detection and combating radicalisation. In the Netherlands, the approach to radicalisation was set out in 2005 in the policy document ‘Radicalism and Radicalisation’ (Radicalisme en radicalisering, 2005) and the policy framework ‘Tackling Radicalisation Sources’ (Aanpak radicaliseringsbaarden, 2005).119 The Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007–2011 (Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007–2011) was published in 2007, focusing on ‘Islamic radicalisation’ and ‘right-wing extremist radicalisation’ as the most
important threats. In the 2010s, the anti-radicalisation policy became part of the Prevention intervention area of the comprehensive National Counterterrorism Strategy, which focuses on: preventing fear, preventing growth, disrupting threats, and thwarting attacks. There are three key objectives in the ‘preventing growth’ focus area: increasing the resilience of vulnerable groups and their environment, timely intervention in the event of radicalisation of individuals, and undermining extremist and terrorist propaganda. The local municipal authorities play a crucial role in the implementation of the anti-radicalisation policy. They have been tasked with working with their local partners, such as educational institutions and social organisations, to promptly identify radicalisation and, if necessary, draw up and implement a tailor-made plan of action to prevent further radicalisation. Sometimes community-based organisations take the initiative themselves in this area. In 2015, for example, the Alliance of Dutch Moroccans (Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkaanse Nederlanders, SMN) started a telephone helpline for parents of radicalised children.¹²⁰

The way in which the radicalisation policy is sometimes implemented arouses great suspicion within the Dutch Muslim community. On 16 October 2021, NRC Handelsblad revealed that at least ten Dutch municipalities have had private agency investigate mosques and Islamic institutions in recent years.¹²¹ The investigators neither identified themselves nor applied the principle of hearing both sides. Notably, the investigations were funded by the NCTV, which also put the municipal authorities in touch with the relevant agency. The investigations have seriously damaged the trust of the mosque boards in question, as well as that of organisations like SMN and SPIOR, in the local governments and the NCTV.¹²² The chairman of a mosque in Zoetermeer that was secretly investigated said he felt deceived:

We have worked so incredibly hard in recent years to ensure that the police and the municipality could enter our mosque freely. We always told the critical young people: you can trust the government, they trust us too. Now what should I tell them?¹²³

And the investigations also had another effect: they created distrust between mosque members themselves. “In some mosques there are calls to stop cooperating with the government. Distrust has also arisen among mosques; people suspect each other of passing on information for secret investigations”.¹²⁴

Initially, Britain’s CONTEST counterterrorism policy concentrated on threats ‘from outside’. Following the 7/7 attacks, committed by homegrown terrorists, the policy’s emphasis was shifted to Prevent, the prevention of terrorist violence ‘from within’.¹²⁵ A prominent part of Prevent is the Channel Programme, which aims to make contact with individuals identified as being vulnerable to radicalisation early on and to provide them with
guidance. The Prevent strategy has been thoroughly revised several times. The current strategy has three specific objectives:

(...) respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it, prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address.\textsuperscript{126}

The implementation of Prevent involves many different parties, such as the police, aid agencies, health organisations, educational institutions, religious groups, probation services, and prisons. With the introduction of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Prevent was placed on a statutory footing, as a result of which government-affiliated institutions, including schools and health facilities, have a duty to report suspicious behaviour. Prevent is characterised by its community-oriented approach.\textsuperscript{127}

According to the government, it is important: "(...) to work in partnership with Muslim communities to prevent young people from being radicalised in the first place, and to ensure that communities were resilient enough to respond to, and challenge, extremists from within".\textsuperscript{128}

Prevent 2011 states:

It follows that faith institutions and organisations can play a very important role in preventative activity. They can lead the challenge to an ideology that purports to provide theological justification for terrorism. They will often have authority and credibility not available to Government. They can provide more specific and direct support to those who are being groomed to terrorism by those who claim religious expertise and use what appear to be religious arguments.\textsuperscript{129}

In order to make Muslim communities more resilient to radicalisation and to improve the organisational structures of these communities, Prevent contributed to the establishment of the (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) in 2007 by the Al-Khoei Foundation, British Muslim Forum (BMF), Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). The CONTEST programme is regularly evaluated by an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Prevent is not part of this evaluation and has not been evaluated externally in recent years.

The Prevent programme has been highly controversial right from the start.\textsuperscript{130} The main criticisms are that Prevent is not effective enough, that Prevent does not clearly define the concepts of radicalisation and extremism, that Prevent unilaterally points to the religious ideology factor as the most important source of radicalisation, and that it does not take sufficient account of social and environmental factors.\textsuperscript{131} Initially, the government was mainly blamed for cooperating with ‘radical’ Muslims and supporting them financially.\textsuperscript{132} After the review of Prevent in 2011, this
criticism subsided and was replaced by the criticism that Prevent wrongly places the Muslim population under suspicion.\textsuperscript{133} Distrust is growing in Muslim circles. Research has shown that three segments can be distinguished in these circles: the ‘angry and alienated’ who feel that the government does not take them seriously and places them under suspicion, the ‘frustrated but open to dialogue’ who share these frustrations but are willing to talk, and the ‘engaged and concerned’ who recognise the importance of dialogue with the government and let it prevail in their attitude.\textsuperscript{134} According to David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in 2015, much of the resistance in Muslim communities can be attributed to the feeling that Prevent is primarily a tool of the government to control Muslims in general.

There is a strong feeling in Muslim communities that I visit, that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, at least a programme that is targeted on them. In some cases, it is even felt it is targeted not just at Islamist terrorism or extremism, but at the practice of Islam. People who pray or who wear the veil, for example, are sometimes felt under suspicion. Now, I’m sure those fears are exaggerated, and they are certainly not what the programme is supposed to be about, but the fact is that they are real. Now, it is frustrating for me to see a programme whose ideal are so obviously good, failing down on the delivery to the point where it is not trusted in the community where it principally applies.\textsuperscript{135}

To overcome this mistrust, according to Anderson it is essential that Prevent be subject to regular independent evaluation and that contact between the government and Muslim communities be greatly improved. “It is extraordinary to me that there is no dialogue, for example, between the Government and the Muslim Council of Britain”.\textsuperscript{136} It is also important that Prevent is regularly evaluated independently. Prevent was last evaluated in 2015, and a new evaluation has been awaited for some time now. On 26 January 2021, the British government appointed William Shawcross as the new ‘Independent Reviewer of Prevent’.\textsuperscript{137} The MCB calls this appointment part of the ‘Government Whitewash’.\textsuperscript{138}

A specific theme in counterterrorism policy concerns the protection of Jewish and Islamic institutions.\textsuperscript{139} Following the jihadist attack on the Jewish museum in Brussels on 24 May 2014, the police and the military police scaled up the security of Jewish buildings and institutions in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{140} In Amsterdam, white police booths were positioned in front of the doors of the Jewish Historical Museum, the Hollandsche Schouwburg theatre, the Anne Frank House, synagogues and Jewish schools in the Amsterdam-Zuid and Buitenveldert districts. A delegation from the Jewish community was received at the Catshuis, the official residence of the Dutch Prime Minister. The Dutch government set aside 1.5 million euros for security for Jewish institutions over a four-year period.\textsuperscript{141}
The City of Amsterdam made available more than 2 million euros for grants to provide security for threatened religious and social institutions, in addition to the 750,000 euros it received from the state government for this purpose.\textsuperscript{142} Initially, the grants appeared to go almost exclusively to Jewish institutions.\textsuperscript{143} In 2017, the City of Amsterdam and Jewish business owners shared the costs for extra security of their businesses, amounting to 100,000 Euros.\textsuperscript{144} When threats to Islamic institutions in Amsterdam increased, the City of Amsterdam committed to providing security to the mosques in 2019.\textsuperscript{145} The council letter on measures to counter radicalisation and extremism states:

There is an increased conceivable threat to Islamic institutions in Amsterdam. This means that the risk of an attack is considered real. Meanwhile, the structural condition of these properties is often poor. For institutions under threat, the general principle is that the owner is primarily responsible for measures to increase resilience. At the same time, the Municipal Executive has decided to take a number of necessary, additional security measures in the short term, as was previously done for Jewish institutions.\textsuperscript{146}

The British government has contributed financially to the security of Jewish institutions since 2010, and also to that of other religious institutions since 2015.\textsuperscript{147} In the ‘Action against Hate’ plan launched in 2016, 2.4 million pounds was reserved for protective security measures for vulnerable religious groups over a three-year period.\textsuperscript{148} The amount for the protection of exclusively Jewish institutions, which was allocated through CST, was significantly higher at 13.4 million pounds for 2016/2017.\textsuperscript{149} In response to the attacks in Christchurch, in 2019, the UK government doubled the grant ceiling for religious groups, excluding Jewish properties, to 1.6 million pounds and also provided an additional 5 million pounds for a new security training programme.\textsuperscript{150} In 2020, this grant ceiling was increased further to 3.2 million pounds for 2020/2021.\textsuperscript{151} From 2019, the contribution to the protection of Jewish institutions increased to 14 million pounds.\textsuperscript{152} On 22 March 2019, London Mayor Sadiq Khan met with representatives of Muslim communities in London to discuss mosque security. On that occasion, he also stated that he embraced the APPG on British Muslims’ definition of Islamophobia and called on the British government to follow suit.\textsuperscript{153} In 2020, the Home Office invited all religious groups to a consultation on the protection of their institutions in response to threatening incidents in the UK and abroad.\textsuperscript{154}

Amsterdam’s antiterrorism policy is in line with the national Dutch policy in this area. Like the national government, the Amsterdam authorities use a ‘broad’ approach in which repressive and preventive measures go hand in hand. After the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, the City, under the leadership of Mayor Job Cohen, developed the action
plan ‘We Amsterdammers’ (Wij Amsterdammers), with the aim of countering radicalisation partly by combating exclusion and discrimination, preventing polarisation and mobilising positive forces. In 2007, this programme became ‘We Amsterdammers II’ (Wij Amsterdammers II). The programme explicitly sought cooperation with social and religious groups in the city, including the Muslim community. In 2008, the memorandum ‘Separation of Church and State’ (scheiding kerk en staat) was published, providing legitimacy for cooperation with religious groups.

Eberhard van der Laan succeeded Job Cohen as mayor of Amsterdam in 2010. Influenced by the reduced threat, the assumed increased resilience of the Amsterdam population and budget cuts, the existing knowledge, expertise, and capacity were scaled down in the early 2010s, only to be built back up again in 2014 under pressure from the rise of IS and increasing social polarisation. The new policy focused on three objectives: building connections between Amsterdam’s residents, protecting vulnerable groups and individuals, and dealing those in the city who pose the greatest risks.

The latter objectives include the comprehensive individual-oriented approach to radicalisation carried out by the Action Centre for Security and Care (Actiecentrum Veiligheid en Zorg, AcVZ) in which the municipal authority, police, Public Prosecution Service, and support agencies work together. The municipal authority works together with key figures who have a network in their own communities, are trained in recognising signs of radicalisation, are able to act as discussion partners for friends and family members of people who radicalise, know their way around the municipal authority and are able to bring people together. In 2018, two external researchers, Beatrice de Graaf and Daan Weggemans, critically reviewed Amsterdam’s policy. The researchers found that, since about 2014, Amsterdam’s policy had not been sufficiently developed in dialogue with academic experts, was characterised by ‘religious cramp’ and was not clearly communicated. Furthermore, the checks and balances left much to be desired, there were internal operational issues, the responsibilities of the key players were unclear, and the functioning of the feedback loop was inadequate. On the City’s relationship with communities, including Islamic groups, the relevant Quicksan stated:

The ‘divide’ between organisation and perception appears to have degenerated into a rift between the key figures, their networks and communities on the one hand and the City of Amsterdam on the other, particularly since reports of violations of integrity within the municipal authority. Accusations of opportunism, double standards and hypocrisy are expressed by the communities against the ‘City’.

In 2019, part of the policy was revised under the leadership of the new mayor Femke Halsema. In line with the previous policy, the new policy focuses on three objectives: strengthening the democratic resilience of the
city, identifying and combatting radicalisation and extremism, and preventing and protecting against extremist behaviour and terrorist violence.\textsuperscript{161} Contrary to the previous policy, ‘key figures’ no longer play a role in the new policy. The City is putting extra effort into setting up two networks: Women in Amsterdam and Young Amsterdam Leaders.\textsuperscript{162} Structural consultation structures with religious, and particularly Islamic, institutions in the city is not taking place.\textsuperscript{163} As far as jihadist extremism is concerned, the Municipal Executive is very concerned about the growth of Salafist networks in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{164}

London’s approach to countering extremism and terrorism is in line with the UK’s national policy in this respect. Both the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the boroughs have important responsibilities in the implementation of the Prevent Strategy in London. The report \textit{Preventing Extremism in London}, which evaluates this implementation, was published in 2015.\textsuperscript{165} There are major differences between the boroughs in terms of the level and quality of Prevent activities. The London CONTEST Board was set up to promote exchange between the boroughs. One recommendation was to involve the public more “in discussions about the best ways to prevent extremism and how to achieve it across London”.\textsuperscript{166} Partly in response to the 2017 terrorist attacks at Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park, and Parsons Green in London, the Greater London Authority established a revamped ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ programme, whose key objectives are: “(...) to identify opportunities to renew and improve work to strengthen London’s minority and marginalised communities from extremism, to safeguard vulnerable people from radicalisation, and to stop the spread of extremist ideologies”.\textsuperscript{167} The programme strongly emphasises cooperation between the municipal authority and “stakeholders, families and communities”.\textsuperscript{168}

If we compare the reactions of the authorities in the Netherlands and Amsterdam with those in the UK and London, the following similarities stand out first. These authorities all take a ‘broad’ approach to the issue of extremism and terrorism, which combines repressive and preventive measures. Although the approach in both countries and cities focuses on different forms of extremism and terrorism, in practice the emphasis is on their jihadist manifestations. Foreign fighters and Salafism, and in particular Jihadist Salafism, are regularly cited as threats to internal security.\textsuperscript{169} In both countries, a trend towards securitisation has been noticeable since the early 2000s, with the government trying to strengthen its grip on ‘radical’ Islam in particular. However, this trend is not linear in either context, depending partly on the assessed threat level. In both countries, the relevant authorities contribute financially to the security of synagogues, Jewish schools, and institutions, as well as buildings and centres of other religious communities. The British government does this earlier than the Dutch or Amsterdam governments. In both countries, the funding made available by
the authorities for the protection of Jewish institutions is much higher than that for the security of mosques and Islamic centres.

There are also significant differences between the two countries in their approach to extremism and terrorism. For example, in the UK, in combating radicalisation there is a greater emphasis on disproving the narratives of jihadist ideologies than in the Netherlands, where the focus is more on social and environmental factors. Although both countries have an integrated approach to prevention in which various governmental and non-governmental institutions work together, the British approach is more comprehensive and compelling. In the UK, since 2015, education, health, and prison workers have had a formal duty to report suspicious behaviour to the relevant police forces. Although government and Islamic institutions in the Netherlands and Amsterdam also consult one another on security issues, the British approach to radicalisation among Muslims is more focused on cooperation with Islamic communities than the Dutch approach, not including the community-oriented policy in Amsterdam during the mayoral tenure of Job Cohen from 2001 to 2010. At the same time, this approach is also more controversial among British Muslims than among Dutch Muslims. We will come back to this in the next section.

7.8 Conclusions

The key question in this chapter is how attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets affect Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam. Attention is focused mainly on the divisive effects of these attacks. Bearing this in mind, after two preliminary sections on the terminology and approach used and the development of the terrorist threat since 1990, we examined the reactions of Jews and Muslims, in the public debate, of Jewish and Islamic institutions, and of the national and local governments in both countries to these attacks. The key question is what effect these reactions have on Jewish-Muslim relations in both cities. We reviewed the various reactions.

Among Jews, we find three types of reactions to jihadist attacks on Jewish targets: Jews who make a clear distinction between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general, Jews who have difficulty making this distinction and wonder whether Muslims in general are also capable of committing an attack in the name of their religion, and Jews who believe that Muslims in general are also capable of doing so. The effect of these reactions on Jewish-Muslim relations varies. In the case of the first reaction, attacks have no effect or even encourage Jews to make contact with Muslims in order to break down existing prejudices among Jews about Muslims. An example of this is an Orthodox rabbi from North London who visited a mosque with his family in the wake of the attacks on Jewish targets in Brussels, Paris, and Nice. About his motivation for doing this, Van Esdonk wrote:
In the case of the second reaction, Jews are unsure whether Muslims in general are peaceful and Jews can feel comfortable associating with them. According to another London rabbi, the Jews he knew did not so much become afraid of their Muslim neighbours in the wake of the attacks, but did find:

(...) it difficult to differentiate between Islam and Islamism and that “a lot of people are not quite sure where the line lies; is Islamism really a complete aberration and misuse of Islam, or is there something in Islam, which is somehow allowing it to happen?”

The third reaction has a strong divisive effect on Jewish-Muslim relations. The Jews in question see Muslims as potential terrorists from whom they should keep their distance. Roggeveen concludes: “Distrusting Muslims in general can hinder the relations between Jews and Muslims and create a threshold to joining cooperation projects”.

Hate crimes and violence directed at Muslims or Muslim buildings evoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and fear among Muslims, just as the attacks on Jewish targets evoke feelings of fear among Jews. Muslims who are outwardly recognisable as Muslims are often particularly affected by this. Because the majority of such acts of violence are not committed by Jews, they do not directly affect the attitude of Muslims towards Jews and the relations they have or seek with them. However, they do have a general effect on the attitude of Muslims towards their social environment. In the study, *We Fear for our Lives* about the impact of experiences of anti-Muslim hostility among British Muslims, Imran Awan, and Irene Zempi conclude: “Affective responses that were common amongst our participants were isolation, depression, loneliness, and a sense of rejection from wider society. In this regard, experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime have long-lasting effects for victims including making them afraid to engage other communities and feeling like social outcasts”.

As social identity theory suggests, experiences of threat strengthen ties to the ‘in-group’ and often weaken ties to the outside world, to which Jews belong for most Muslims. However, as we have seen in the case of the first reaction, there are also examples of Muslims who feel attacked and then build up contacts with Jews because they see Jews as potentially important allies in the fight against prejudice, hatred, and violence towards Muslims. We discuss this in more detail in Chapter 9.

In both countries, we find three discourses in the public debate on the relationship between Muslim extremists and Muslims in general: the
discourse of distinction, the discourse of distancing, and the discourse of suspect community. The suspect community discourse is more dominant in the Netherlands than in the UK. The discourse of distinction makes no connection between Muslims and jihadist terrorism and it has little to no effect on Jewish-Muslim relations in principle. The discourse of distancing can have a negative effect because it requires Muslims to repeatedly and openly distance themselves from Islamic extremists and condemn the committed attacks. If they find this unpleasant or do not feel called upon to do so, for example, because they do not have any affinity with the relevant ‘radical’ groups, this discourse can stand in the way of open and free contact between Muslims and other population groups, including Jews. The suspect community discourse creates an additional barrier between Muslims and other citizens, including Jews, because it sees Muslims as suspects who may pose a threat. In both countries, there is a parallel between the public debate on Muslims and jihadist terrorism and on Jews and Israel’s actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and we find three very similar discourses in both debates.

In the UK and the Netherlands, the leaders of the major Jewish and Muslim umbrella organisations are united in their condemnation of terrorist attacks. In the UK, the Jewish CST assists mosques with the security of their buildings on a modest scale, and supports, for example, the Faith Associates (FA) foundation with security for Islamic institutions. To our knowledge, there is no such form of cooperation in the Netherlands. The united condemnation of attacks limits the fear of ‘the other’ and promotes a climate in which cooperation between Jews and Muslims can flourish.

Government policies on the threat of extremism and terrorism in both countries and cities have – unintended – effects on Jewish-Muslim relations. We point out three. Because British policy is even more controversial among British Muslims than Dutch policy is among Dutch Muslims, the impact of this policy on these relationships is likely to be greater in the UK.

Firstly, a section of Muslims in both countries feel that the government treats Muslims as a suspect community. Many Muslims feel they are regarded as suspects and stigmatised by the government. The MCB says:

‘Suspect communities’ are created, fuelling Islamophobia: focus on Islamist extremism leads to Muslim communities specifically being targeted and viewed, almost exclusively, through the lens of security; and the expansion of the of the Prevent duty and the fear engendered by politicians and the media exacerbates the perception of a suspect community within the wider society, stoking Islamophobia.

Rasit Bal, co-founder, board member, and chairman of CMO from 2012 to 2018, points out the same notion among Dutch Muslims:

After and because of 9/11 and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the position of Muslims was placed in a security framework.
Religious radicalism and violence began to take centre stage in the public and political debate, so that Islam became strongly associated with threat and violence. The relative reservedness of Muslims and Muslim organisations was increasingly seen in the context as a threat in the context of Islam. (…) Islam and Muslims were mentioned in the same breath with extremism, religious fundamentalism, jihadism and religious violence.\textsuperscript{179}

The distrust of the government among Muslims was given an additional boost in the Netherlands following the revelation in October 2021 that mosques and Islamic centres in at least ten municipalities had been secretly investigated by a private agency in recent years with the cooperation of the NCTV. The notion of being part of a suspect community can easily lead Muslims to withdraw from wider society. This feeling can be an obstacle not only in dealing with the government but also in entering into relations with other groups, including Jews.

Secondly, a section of Muslims in both countries feel they are treated unequally by the government. They feel that the government applies double standards on various issues and puts Muslims at a disadvantage. Specifically in relation to Jews, in her 2014–2015 field research, Roggeveen encountered this sentiment among Amsterdam Muslims with regard to the security of mosques.\textsuperscript{180} They felt that Jewish institutions were better protected than mosques, which were also the target of threats. Roggeveen’s analysis showed that this feeling could probably have largely dissipated if there had been clear communication about the City of Amsterdam’s policy between the municipal authority and Amsterdam’s Muslim groups.

Although the local government did have contact with some mosques and Muslim communities, the accounts of Muslims show that it is not clear why Jews got protection, while they did not. Moreover, only protecting Jewish property and not Muslim buildings contributed to their feeling like second-class citizens.\textsuperscript{181}

As we have seen, since 2019, mosques in Amsterdam have received conditional subsidies for security. In London, mosques have received subsidies for this since 2016.

Thirdly, a section of British Muslims in particular find it very hard to accept that they are expected to keep an eye on one another and report suspicious individuals to the police. This undermines the status of the mosque as a safe place where Muslims can freely interact and experience their faith.\textsuperscript{182} It creates distrust not only in relations between Muslims themselves but also in relations between Muslims and members of other communities, including Jews.\textsuperscript{183}

Regular, open, and constructive consultation between the government and Muslim communities, including groups that are critical of the government, is
of great importance in counteracting these three negative effects. Contacts between the government and these communities have left much to be desired over the past decade in both contexts. In the Netherlands, consultation takes place between the government and CMO at the national level, but such consultation is lacking at the local level in Amsterdam. Based on De Graaf and Weggemans’ *Quickscan*, in Amsterdam there is distrust of the municipal authorities mainly by Muslim communities. Yassin Elforkani, imam of Amsterdam’s Blue Mosque at the time, said in 2018: “We are taken ridiculously unseriously, which is a very bad thing”. In the UK, the broad umbrella organisation MCB has been ignored by Gordon Brown’s Labour government, the Coalition government, and subsequent Conservative governments since 2009. The government pursues a non-engagement policy. Improving relations in both contexts requires a structural dialogue between the government and representatives of the diverse Muslim community, in which open and critical discussions about security policy, its implementation, and its intended and unintended effects can be held. Lewis and Hamid advise:

The problem of extremist radicalisation will not move towards resolution until all the stakeholders - government and community - begin a self-critical dialogue, develop a consensus and start to work across ideological and social divides that are currently preventing them from effectively dealing with this issue. An effective approach to this highly complex problem requires a holistic, comprehensive evidence-based approach in consultation with the diversity of groups within the Muslim communities including those organisations that are critical of Prevent.

Notes

1 Borum 2011; De Graaf 2018; Fadil, De Koning & Ragazzi 2019.
2 NCTV 2016, 6. See also AIVD, n.d.: https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme
4 For the term ‘jihad’, see Roy 2017. A brief summary of contemporary British jihadism can be found in Lewis & Hamid 2018, 134–154.
6 Ibid.
8 Wiktorowicz 2006; De Koning et al. 2014, 50–56.
10 The ideologies of the various groups that devote themselves to jihad in Europe in particular differ and are the subject of research. The scope of this study cannot do full justice to this research. For the ideology of ‘radical’ Islamic groups emanating from the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, see Meijer & Bakker (2012), Hamas Bartal & Rubenstein-Shemer (2019), Al Qaida Riedel.
(2010), ISIS Dallal (2017) and for the ideology of the perpetrator of the attack on Theo van Gogh, Peters (2020).

11 De Graaf 2021.

12 For a more detailed definition of the terms ‘extreme right’ and ‘right-wing extremism’, see Nikki Sterkenburg (2021, 25–40). This study also provides a brief overview of the post-war history of the diverse and diffusely organised radical and right-wing extremist movement in the Netherlands (2021, 41–92). A clear and concise overview of the current global development of the far right is provided by Cas Mudde (2019).

13 De Graaf 2021, 240.

14 Ibid., 256–259.

15 NCTV 2016, 5.


17 The NCTV and AIVD use the following definition: “Radicalisation is the process of growing willingness to accept the extreme consequence of a way of thinking and to convert that into action, violent or otherwise. This is also seen as the process leading from activism to extremism and then to terrorism” (NCTV 2016, 6; see also AIVD, n.d.: https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/over-de-aivd/inlichtingenwoordenboek). The British government states: “Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups” (Home Office, 1 April 2021). For a critical analysis of the use of this term, see Fadil, De Koning & Ragazzi 2019.

18 Noricks 2009.

19 For a detailed description of this theory, see Section 1.2.

20 Koomen & Van der Pligt 2016.


22 Slootman & Tillie 2006.

23 Koehler 2016; Mudde 2019.


26 Kepel 2017.

27 Morris et al. 2010, 4.


30 Jarvis & Lister 2012.

31 Shanaan & Lindekilde 2019.

32 Ibid., 402.

33 Pantazis & Pemberton 2009.

34 Ibid., 659–661.

35 Van Meeteren & Van Oostendorp 2019, 525.

36 Ibid., 537–539.

37 Van Es 2018.

38 Fassin 2015.


40 Sutton 2018.

41 Cesari 2010; De Graaf 2011; Elshayyal 2020.

42 BVD 1998.


44 Ibid., 160.

45 Lewis & Hamid 2018, 144–149.


47 Noordegraaf et al. 2016.
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48 Briggs 2010, 972.
49 Bakker et al. 2019, 13; 36.
51 *Algemeen Dagblad*, 14 October 2019.
52 AIVD 2020.
53 Ibid.
54 NCTV 2018.
56 Sprang 2003; Muldoon 2003; Williams & Tregidga 2014.
57 Perry & Alvi 2011, 57; Rashid & Olofsson 2021.
59 Rashid & Olofsson 2021.
61 Pfefferbaum 2003; Rashid & Olofsson 2021.
66 Van Esdonk 2020, 180.
67 Prime Minister’s Office, 14 September 2001; *The Guardian*, 11 July 2005. See: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2001-09-14/debates/315f1cda-64e9-4b83-beff-fd5791bf728e/InternationalTerrorismAndAttacksInTheUsa
68 Prime Minister’s Office, 14 September 2001.
69 *Trouw*, 21 September 2014.
70 Van Es 2018.
71 GeenStijl, 18 June 2014. See also Roggeveen 2020, 136–142.
72 *Todayonline*, 30 August 2016.
74 Van Esdonk 2020, 172.
75 Pantazis & Pemberton 2009.
76 Peters & Vellenga 2007.
77 *Trouw*, 8 October 2005.
78 Van Meeteren & Van Oostendorp 2019, 536.
81 BNP 2005.
82 Phillips 2006; Bat Ye’or 2005.
83 Kundnani, 2 September 2008.
84 Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Jarvis & Lister 2012.
85 Hope Not Hate 2017, 42; 66.
86 Roggeveen 2020, 137–142.
87 Van Weezel 2017, 137.
88 Vellenga 2008, 463.
90 EUMC 2005, 4.
91 Van Esdonk 2020, 124.
93 This case is described in detail in Van Esdonk 2020, 144–151.
94 *NRC Handelsblad*, 3 November 2004.
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95 Republiek Allochtonië, 15 November 2015. See: https://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/blog/opinie/vele-moslim-koepel-organisaties-veroordeelen-aanslagen-parijs. This concerns the national umbrella organisations: the Foundation of Islamic Centres in the Netherlands Foundation (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland, SICN), the Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN), the INS Platform, the Dutch Islamic Federation (Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie, NIF), Milli Görüs North Netherlands (MGN), the Council of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands (Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën Nederland, RMMN) and the Alliance of Dutch Moroccans (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders, SMN).


98 See: https://www.ojcm.nl


100 Tell MAMA, 5 April 2019. See: https://tellmamauk.org/national-mosques-security-panel/

101 BLEW 2020.

102 Vrij Nederland, 30 October 2014.


104 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 25; Graaf & Eijkman 2011, 34.

105 De Graaf 2011.

106 Ibid., 71.


108 Abels 2012.

109 NCTV 2016, 9. In May 2022 the NCTV published the National Counterstrategy 2022–2026 which builds on, to a high degree, the previous strategy. (NCTV 2022).

110 De Koning 2019b.

111 Ministerie BZK 2009.

112 Anthropologist Martijn de Koning showed that Salafist groups in the Netherlands do not undergo the trend of securitisation passively, but actively respond to it. According to De Koning, this trend is part of, to use Michel Foucault’s terminology, a specific form of ‘governmentality’ in which certain beliefs, practices, and public manifestations of Islam are considered a threat not only to security but also to social cohesion and national identity and culture. Salafists oppose this. De Koning sees three forms of ‘counter conduct’: spiritualisation (transcendence), reversal through political and social intervention (reversal) and departure to, for example, ‘Islamic’ neighbourhoods in British cities such as London, Birmingham or Manchester or to areas of conflict in the Middle East (exit). (De Koning 2019b).

113 Ministerie VenJ, NCTV, Ministerie SZW 2014.

114 Feikert-Anhalt, 13 May 2013. See: https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2013/05/the-uks-legal-response-to-the-london-bombings-of-77/

115 Ibid.; Wittendorp 2017 et al., 45–51; 77–81.


117 For the most recent version, see: Home Office, 20 August 2018. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018
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120 Wittendorp et al. 2017, 61.
121 NRC Handelsblad, 16 October 2021.
122 Ibid., 18 October 2021.
123 Ibid., 16 October 2021.
124 Ibid., 22 October 2021.
127 Klausen 2009; Briggs 2010.
128 Briggs 2010, 971.
129 Home Office, 7 June 2011, 83.
130 Klausen 2009; Briggs 2010.
132 See Bill Durodié in Spiked, 19 March 2015: https://www.spiked-online.com/2015/03/19/prevent-a-very-risky-strategy/
134 Briggs 2010, 977.
135 The Independent, 6 October 2016.
136 Ibid.
139 This theme was touched upon previously in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. See there.
140 Vrij Nederland, 30 October 2014.
141 Ibid.
142 Gemeente Amsterdam, 28 May 2015. See: https://amsterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/
143 Gemeente Amsterdam, 16 December 2015; cf. Roggeveen 2020, 125–126.
146 Gemeente Amsterdam, 25 January 2019, 12.
149 Ibid.
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155 Gemeente Amsterdam 2005.
156 Gemeente Amsterdam 2007.
157 Gemeente Amsterdam 2008.
159 De Graaf & Weggemans 2018.
160 De Graaf & Weggemans 2017, 9. For the debate on and the complications surrounding the policy of key figures in Amsterdam, see Section 4.3.
161 Gemeente Amsterdam, 25 January 2019, 5; cf. Gemeente Amsterdam, 22 August 2018.
163 In its response to the Quickscan by De Graaf and Weggemans on 21 June 2018, the Municipal Executive led by acting Mayor Jozias Van Aartsen announced an investigation into the possibilities of cooperation with Islamic, including Salafist, organisations in the city (Gemeente Amsterdam, 21 June 2018, 5–6). A few months later, the Municipal Executive led by the new mayor, Femke Halsema, informed the municipal council that it had withdrawn the investigation (Gemeente Amsterdam, 22 August 2018, 7).
164 Gemeente Amsterdam, 22 August 2018, 5–6.
166 Ibid., 28.
168 Ibid.
169 For the list of banned terrorist groups and organisations in the UK, see the Home Office, 23 April 2021. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations–2. The following list is used in the Netherlands: https://kennisbankterrorisme.nctv.nl/organisaties
170 Wittendorp et al. 2017, 92.
171 Van Oordt refers to the contacts between government and Islamic institutions in Amsterdam regarding security issues in our written interview with him, 1 February 2021.
172 Van Esdonk 2020, 178.
173 Van Esdonk 2020, 177.
174 Roggeveen 2020, 131.
176 Ibid.
177 Pantazis & Pemberton; Abbas 2019.
178 MCB 2016, 5.
180 Roggeveen 2020, 132–133.
181 Roggeveen 2020, 132.
182 Abbas 2019. The revelation that mosques and Islamic centres in at least ten municipalities in the Netherlands have recently been secreted investigated had the same effect (NRC Handelsblad, 16, 18, 22 October).
183 MCB 2016, 14.
186 Het Parool, 19 May 2018.
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8 War Commemorations

8.1 Introduction

On 4 May 2020, the Dutch writer, Arnon Grunberg, delivered the ‘4th of May lecture’, the annual speech to commemorate victims of the Second World War, held in The New Church in Amsterdam. The church is close to the National Monument on Dam Square where two minutes’ silence is observed and wreaths are laid. In his lecture, Grunberg linked the way in which Jews in the Netherlands were stigmatised and marginalised prior to the Second World War with the way in which certain circles talk about Moroccans in the Netherlands nowadays. A central passage was this:

And it is also logical that, when certain segments of the population are talked about in a manner that harkens back to the darkest period of the twentieth century, if that becomes common, then sooner or later people may talk about Jews in the same manner again. For me, it was clear from the start: when they talk about Moroccans, they are talking about me.  

When he said ‘me’, Grunberg was alluding to his Jewish background. This sparked huge protests on social media and in the press. Far-right, populist politicians took particular offence. They believe that they are justified in labelling ‘Moroccans’ in evocative terms such as ‘problem’ and ‘adherents of violent ideology’ and that it is totally unwarranted to equate this way of talking about Moroccans with antisemitism. Some of them therefore resent Grunberg’s making this statement precisely because of his background. However, in the book Grunberg published later that year, which contained his lecture, he emphasised that he had not been drawing a historical parallel between Jews and Moroccans (and he is unsure whether there is a parallel) but that he had been talking about the discourse about minority groups as a ‘problem’ and saying that “they who turn against a certain minority eventually turn against all minorities”.  

In more ways than one, Grunberg’s commemorative speech and the ensuing debate about it relate to the central theme of this chapter, in which we

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discuss Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and London through the lens of war commemorations. As we have seen in Chapter 4, London’s Jews were affected by the Second World War and its atrocities in a different way to the Jewish community of Amsterdam. The involvement of Amsterdam’s Jews in commemorations is hence also of a different nature to those in London. Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London are also responding to commemorations regarding the genocide in Bosnia, as we will see below. In the case of the Srebrenica genocide, groups of Bosnian Muslims both in the UK and in the Netherlands have been victims themselves. The atrocities and their impact on survivors and post-war generations of Jews, including a writer such as Arnon Grunberg, who is a second-generation survivor, may also explain why the commemorations are so sensitive and full of emotions. In relation to such sensitivities, the psychologist Nico Frijda points out that the emotions associated with anxiety about the possible repetition of a traumatic event that happened in the past can have massive implications for the way in which present-day developments are observed and perceived.4

This chapter focuses on commemorations of wars and genocides which have taken place in Europe.5 We have chosen to discuss these commemorations because our discussion of the development of Jewish-Muslim relations in Chapter 4 shows that this is a delicate issue in both cities, leading to several incidents and long- or short-term conflicts which are relevant for Jewish-Muslim relations.6

There has been a development in war commemorations in both countries. Remembrance Day in the UK and the 4 and 5 May commemorations in the Netherlands aim to function as a unifying force for all citizens commemorating the World Wars. The commemorations in both countries initially had a Christian character and focused on British soldiers and Dutch soldiers who had been killed in combat. In later years, the scope of these commemorations broadened, but that process led to several conflicts. The increasing awareness of the Holocaust also brought about separate commemorations: of the February Strike of 1941 against the anti-Jewish measures imposed by the Nazi occupiers in Amsterdam, of the Kristallnacht, and especially of the Holocaust itself. The genocide at Srebrenica in 1995 started to be commemorated in the UK and the Netherlands some years after the genocide took place.

After describing the central concepts in this chapter and explaining how we have approached the theme of commemoration (Section 8.2), we will give a brief historical review of the commemorations which are at the centre of this study, focusing on aspects that are relevant for Jewish-Muslim relations in London (8.3) and in Amsterdam (Section 8.4). We go on to compare the differences and similarities between the UK and the Netherlands on this point (Section 8.5). In the concluding analysis of this chapter (Section 8.6) we answer the question of how the commemorations discussed serve as sources of cooperation and sources of conflict between Jews and Muslims.
As far as we know, no attempt to compare the relations between Jews and Muslims in the UK, i.e. London, and the Netherlands, i.e. Amsterdam, through the lens of war commemorations and memory cultures has been done before, although the subject is touched upon by various scholars. Roggeveen and Van Esdonk only briefly touch on commemorations. Below, we will base our discussion on document analysis, interview data, and the existing secondary studies about each country.

8.2 Terminology and Approach

We define ritual commemorations as a part of collective remembrances by particular communities. These communities can vary from nation-states to religious groups, political parties to cities, from sports clubs to families. Through ritual, the memory of certain events is re-enacted on a regular basis, thus contributing to a sense of continuity between the community and its past. Here, we focus on war commemorations in Europe. What is remembered during commemorations changes over time; there is evidence of ‘dynamics of remembrance’. Frank van Vree and Rob van der Laarse describe this as:

(...) a process of continual change in interpretation and attribution of meaning, in which other aspects and events are repeatedly brought forward and the perspective of history in museums, novels, films, education, commemoration rituals and heritage sites is reshaped.

Various elements are important in commemorations of violent conflicts. Firstly, it is important who is being commemorated and remembered in terms of victims and perpetrators. Whoever is designated as such is subject to the present-day dynamics between groups. In the case of the Second World War, supporters of the Nazi regime and the Japanese are ranked as perpetrators, while the victims are usually separated into military victims, civilian victims, and victims of the Holocaust. In general, for a long time, there was little scope for commemorating those such as German civilians who were victims of the Nazis. In recent years, this position has started to shift. Secondly, pausing and thinking about the past and commemorating those who suffered and fought. The important distinction here is between passive and active victimhood. Thirdly, Jan Assmann’s distinction between the communicative and cultural memory is important in order to understand the dynamics of remembrance and commemoration. Communicative memory is when living witnesses are able to tell their stories about the past. The emphasis here is on oral communication. When such witnesses are no longer around, monuments and designated areas, but also books, photographs, and film material are the most important means of communicating about the past. We call this cultural memory. Shifts in remembrance cultures can be elucidated by making this distinction.
A fourth element, and probably the most relevant here, is the transformation of the commemorations and lessons learned from the past events being commemorated. The ideas about which groups and individuals are deemed worthy of commemoration change over time and with the passing away of older generations. And what counts as a lesson is often the subject of debate and even conflict.¹³

Various groups of people are involved in commemorations, each with their own ties to what is being commemorated. If we take the example of the commemoration of the Shoah in the Netherlands, a distinction can be made between the following groups: survivors (Dutch Jews who survived the camps or being in hiding), eye-witnesses/bystanders (Dutch people who lived through the war and who – under protest or silently – allowed the deportation of Jews), surviving relatives (children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of Jews who experienced the war), children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of eye-witnesses/bystanders and outsiders (for example, migrants who had no part whatsoever in the Second World War in the Netherlands or in the fate of the Jews). There are significant differences in emotional involvement in the Shoah between these groups, who in themselves may actually be very diverse. The different groups involved in a commemoration help to define the culture with respect to what is being remembered. The historian Wulf Kansteiner points out that a remembrance culture is the ever-changing outcome of continuous negotiations between ‘remembrance producers’, ‘remembrance consumers’, and cultural traditions.¹⁴ Besides authorities and commemoration organisations, all the stakeholder groups play a role in the dynamics of remembrance cultures.

We have approached these commemorations partly from the perspective of the work of Bourdieu.¹⁵ Looked at from this perspective, the commemorations we examined, as already discussed in Section 1.1, are in the cultural field of the commemorations of events prior to, during, and after both the World Wars. While one of the stated aims of the organisers of the commemorations of war and genocide in question is to mourn victims, bring about respect and unity, learn from the violent past and show ways to a future in which such conflicts can be avoided, such ritual commemorations are often also occasions of conflict and struggle for domination and authority.¹⁶

The conflicts in this area are often about what place different groups occupy in the commemorations and, furthermore, what groups are to be included or excluded. When new groups, such as migrants, for example, become new citizens the question arises how to include such a new group at commemorations which seek to include as many citizens as possible. This can be very controversial.¹⁷ The conflict often plays out at the level of narratives about the past, the present, and the future. Hegemonic narratives meet with competition from counter-narratives. This is where social identity theory becomes relevant.¹⁸ These narratives are closely allied with the
social identities people perceive. A narrative of this type reflects the relationship between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’, such as newcomers, with the ‘out-group’ often being depicted in a negative light. The more threat an ‘out-group’ is felt to pose, the more the group which feels threatened places an emphasis on its own identity.

In some cases, the tensions between groups and institutions involved in a commemoration mount to such an extent that the decision is taken to organise separate commemorations. A situation of this nature implies that the organisations of commemorations have become each other’s rivals who are intent on acquiring the same ‘cultural capital’. They compete with each other for media attention, public appreciation and recognition, and for legitimacy. There is often a ‘spiritual’ dimension to this cultural capital as well.\textsuperscript{19}

8.3 Commemorations in the UK and the Involvement of Jews and Muslims

8.3.1 Remembrance Day

Remembrance Day, originally Armistice Day – after the armistice which ended the hostilities of World War I on 11 November 1918 – is celebrated throughout the Commonwealth. In the UK, it takes place on 11 November. The Sunday closest to Remembrance Day is called Remembrance Sunday. The central ritual on that day takes place at the Cenotaph on Whitehall, London, with a religious service and two minutes’ silence at 11 am. The ritual has remained very much the same since 1920.\textsuperscript{20} Britons commemorate all war victims in the British Commonwealth since the First World War. Officials lay wreaths, an act which is preceded by the playing of the Last Post and two minutes’ silence. Apart from the two minutes’ silence observed throughout the country, a central symbol of the rituals is the wearing of the poppy, symbolising the red blood shed by the fallen, and immortalised in the poem \textit{In Flanders Fields}, written by Lieutenant-Colonel John McCrae.\textsuperscript{21} What has changed in the last decades, is that the number of representatives of religious traditions and philosophies of life (such as humanists) present at the remembrance has increased, which does justice to the UK’s increasing plurality of religions and philosophies of life.

Historically, the character of the rituals was Christian and nationalistic. With the said increasing diversification of the population, more space was given to the remembrance of, for instance, Jews and Muslims, whose contribution to war efforts is increasingly recognised.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, greater emphasis is being placed on those who have died in modern conflicts in which the British have been involved. Not everybody in the UK is aware of this. More than 400,000 Muslim soldiers fought in the First World War, yet a recent survey by British Future, a think-tank dedicated to ethnic integration, has revealed that only 22 per cent of people know of their role and only two per cent of them were aware of the scale of it. In Birmingham,
the Muslim groups \textit{British Future} and \textit{New Horizons In British Islam} are raising awareness about the role of India’s Muslims in the Great War. They believe that “Commemoration is a force of good in the community because it brings people together. It gives a sense of belonging in this country. It gives young people a stake in this country.”\textsuperscript{23} The MCB encourages the Muslim community to take part in the commemorations, to remember the active role that Muslims played, and the sacrifices they made in two World Wars. To this end, the MCB has produced an informative leaflet explaining why Remembrance is important for all parts of the community.\textsuperscript{24} In 2013 a survey found that 62 percent of ethnic minority Britons said they would wear a poppy on Sunday. That included 69 percent of people of Indian heritage, 53 per cent from Pakistani backgrounds, 46 percent of Bangladeshi heritage, 74 percent of Black Caribbean, and 55 percent from Black African backgrounds. Although not measured, it is thought that the white community would show similar figures.\textsuperscript{25} The general consensus amongst Muslim organisations is that Muslims should support the wearing of poppies and the commemoration of Remembrance Day.

Over the years, Remembrance and Armistice Day have been an occasion for protests, including by Muslims, the background of which seems to be to draw attention to injustice done by the British to Muslim victims during their war efforts. Indirectly, such protests also draw attention to the place of British Muslims in British society. In 2010, for example, a radical Muslim group, Muslims against Crusades, led by Anjem Choudary (born 1967), the notorious Islamist activist of the al-Muhajiroun and convicted IS sympathiser, burned large poppies during a demonstration on Armistice Day, disturbing the two minutes’ silence and using it to publicly attract attention, urging that the victims of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan be remembered, and allegedly uttering antisemitic insults directed against Mike Freer, MP.\textsuperscript{26} This, in turn, led the Islamic Society for Britain (ISB) to organise a counteraction. It had a poppy hijab designed and urged British Muslim women to wear this symbol on their clothes. According to the ISB’s then president, Sughra Ahmed, “this symbol of quiet remembrance is the face of everyday British Islam - not the angry minority who spout hatred and offend everyone”.\textsuperscript{27} As far as we can see, the focus of the debates was on the role of the British in foreign conflicts involving Muslims. In other words: the protest aimed at drawing attention not to the British military as active victims of a war but to their role as perpetrators, taking innocent Muslim lives, and as colonialist allies of the Zionists/Israel/the Jews.

The Jewish community has always been aware of the role Jews played in both the World Wars. In 1917, the British Army agreed to the formation of its first Jewish battalion, the Jewish Legion, which saw action against the Ottomans and participated in the critical Battle of Megiddo in September 1918. In the UK, Jewish commemorations are led by the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and Women (AJEX). Its purpose is to show the country the contributions and sacrifices of the British Jewish community in
the war. AJEX has a current membership of over 4,000 individuals who served in the British Armed Forces, during or after the Second World War. It is a matter of respect, honour, and pride to show them solidarity in synagogue services on or close to 11 November, and to support them in the AJEX parade at Whitehall and the Cenotaph.28

8.3.2 Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD)

Another important commemorative event since 2001 is Holocaust Memorial Day, which takes place on 27 January, the day on which the concentration camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated by the Russians in 1945. Before 2001 there had been many other commemorations, including the commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and Holocaust remembrance in Hyde Park in London, where a Holocaust memorial was created in 1983.29 Following these earlier Holocaust commemorations, which had started later in the UK than in other European countries, it was officially given the name ‘Holocaust Memorial Day’ by the UK Parliament on 27 January 2001, following the declaration of the intergovernmental Stockholm Forum which the UK Parliament supported and promoted, the so-called Stockholm declaration.30 Against the background of diminishing interest on the part of young people and a growing concern to demonstrate the unity of the Jewish community, the Blair government introduced, promoted, and supported one central commemoration.31 Its architect was lawyer Michael Mitzman, who introduced it on behalf of the Home Office.32 Since 2001, an official ceremony has been held annually, with speeches and a moment of silence.33

The introduction of this single memorial day took place partly against the background of Jewish concerns about rising antisemitism.34 The Jewish communities, however, were divided about introducing it. Many feared a possible backlash. Geoffrey Alderman was concerned about the wish to “include the 1948-9 ‘self-inflicted’ Palestinian Arab Holocaust in it”.35 Others, such as the Jewish educationalist Ronnie Landau, argued that the suffering of the Palestinians and the victims of other tragedies should be remembered together with the Holocaust. Some British Jews mistrusted the motives of the Blair administration. They feared that they would have to support a narrative of British superiority, while UK governments had not been that supportive of the Jews in the past. It seems clear that it was always the intention of the government that HMD would not be a ‘Jewish’ day of remembrance, but rather of both the Holocaust and victims of other genocides, although the Holocaust would occupy an important place.36 And so it started, but aside from unity, the day also caused tensions and disunity among British Jews. The Home Office funded HMD between 2001 and 2005.37 In 2005, the government also decided to fund the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (HMDT), which was henceforth entrusted with organising HMD. During our fieldwork in London in 2017, the vice-chair of
the trust was Dilwar Hussain, one of the driving forces of the ISB, already discussed above. In 2005, the United Nations adopted the resolution to organise its commemoration worldwide.

HMD gained significance for Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK because of the boycott of the commemoration by the MCB between 2001 and 2007 and in 2010. The MCB did not send official representatives to any of the commemorative events associated with HMD. In a press release dated 26 January 2001, the Council listed two points of contention that prevented them from attending the event; these were that it “totally excludes and ignores the ongoing genocide and violation of Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere” and that “it includes the controversial question of the alleged Armenian genocide as well as the so-called gay genocide”. This policy has been generally referred to as a boycott, although the MCB leadership has objected to the use of that term. In 2005, MCB member Iqbal Sacranie suggested that Palestinians who had been killed should also be remembered in it. The boycott is one of the reasons that the government severed its relations with the MCB. The government has maintained a ‘non-engagement policy’ to this day in spite of the fact that the MCB has attended HMD again since 2010.

Nowadays, the website of the HMDT reminds us that HMD is “a time for everyone to pause to remember the millions of people who have been murdered or whose lives have been changed beyond recognition during the Holocaust, Nazi Persecution and in subsequent genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur”. A new Holocaust Memorial is to be built in London in the coming years.

8.3.3 Kristallnacht Commemorations

During Kristallnacht (‘the Night of Broken Glass’), which took place in Germany on 9 November 1938, the windows of Jewish businesses and shops were smashed and 1,500 synagogues were destroyed. That night and in the following period, around 1,500 Jews were killed and 30,000 Jews were imprisoned in concentrations camps by the Nazis. Kristallnacht was the scene of the first mass public eruption of violence against Jews in Nazi Germany and, with hindsight, a forerunner of the systematic persecution and murder of Jews that would follow.

The effects of Kristallnacht were immediately felt in the UK. British Jewish community organisations and charities, including World Jewish Relief, called on the UK government to allow the transport of children from Germany and Austria to the UK. Less than a month after Kristallnacht, on 2 December 1938, the first group of children arrived to be placed with foster families. Ultimately, 10,000 child refugees entered the country in what came to be known as the ‘Kindertransport’. Just days after Kristallnacht, the Dean of Westminster Abbey included the following words in his Armistice Day prayers: “Let us remember in
silence and sympathy the Jewish people in their troubles”. Kristallnacht commemorations continue to take place to this day but as far as can be seen from the very scarce documents available to us these are commemorations organised by Jewish communities, focusing on general themes such as racism, forced displacements of fugitives, and human rights in addition to the atrocities and the fugitives from Nazi Germany.  

Further research is needed.

8.3.4 Srebrenica Remembrance Day

The Srebrenica mass murder occurred in July 1995. The murder of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys (Bosniaks) by the paramilitary Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska was officially declared genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2004 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2007. Occurring in a United Nations ‘Safe Area’, a Dutch Army battalion under UN command failed to prevent the capture of the enclave and the resulting massacre. In 2019, the Netherlands Supreme Court ruled that the Dutch State had failed in its responsibility to 350 Bosnian male fugitives after the fall of the city. The genocide is still the single largest mass murder in Europe since the Second World War. The UK played an important role in peacekeeping actions in Bosnia, but as we will see, not the same role as the Dutch in the case of Srebrenica.

The institutionalisation of Srebrenica Memorial Day followed the adoption of a resolution by the EU Parliament in January 2009 to institute 11 July as the day of commemoration of the genocide at Srebrenica and Potočari. The initiative to implement this resolution in the UK was taken by Muslim organisations, and in particular Waqar Azmi, a civil servant, who left the Cabinet Office to do this private charitable work. With the support of the Muslim member of the House of Lords, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, among others, he received funding for this initiative from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and others. Since its foundation, his charity, Remembering Srebrenica, has played an important role in coordinating the activities around HMD.

Members of the National Council of Imams and Rabbis, which was part of the Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF), took part in the commemoration by travelling to Bosnia in 2016, where JIF director Mehri Nicknam laid a wreath at the memorial at Potočari and the delegation met survivor and eye-witness, Hasan Nuhanović. The genocide at Srebrenica has led to discussions among Jews for and against its inclusion in HMD, which many Muslims support. A number of Jewish communities, including the West London Synagogue, support Srebrenica Remembrance Day (organised by Remembering Srebrenica) on 11 July, under the banner of ‘Never Again’.
8.4 Commemorations in the Netherlands and the Involvement of Jews and Muslims

8.4.1 4 and 5 May

Compared to other European countries, including the UK, the Netherlands does not have a long tradition of national war commemorations. The country remained neutral during the First World War, and has no public rituals commemorating it. It was only after the Second World War that a war commemoration tradition started and when it did so, it included some elements from other traditions such as the two minutes’ silence from the British example. Nowadays, the nationwide commemoration on 4 May remembers: “(...) all citizens and military personnel who have perished or been murdered in the Kingdom of the Netherlands or elsewhere in the world since the outbreak of the Second World War, in war and in peacetime”. But this has not always been the case. The commemoration sites and those who are remembered have undergone considerable changes in the course of the years. We will briefly discuss them.

Nowadays, the main national ritual takes place on Dam Square in Amsterdam. At the centre of the nation’s attention is the National Monument. Similar commemorations are organised simultaneously in other towns and villages. Apart from Dam Square, one of the most important sites is the Waalsdorpervlakte, a place in the dunes very close to The Hague, where prisoners from the Dutch resistance movement were executed by the Nazis. This is also the place which, historically speaking, started the commemoration. Each year, officials lay wreaths followed by two minutes’ silence at 8 pm which is observed throughout the country. This is a moment in which the entire country is united.

Official remembrance on two consecutive days, with 4 May focusing on mourning and 5 May on liberation and liberty, is unique to the Netherlands. The present form originated from two different movements, the first a bottom-up initiative by a member of the former resistance, and the other top-down, following initiatives taken by the national authorities. The commemoration on 4 May originally started with a silent procession to the Waalsdorpervlakte. The focus only later shifted to Dam Square in Amsterdam. In the first years after the war, the national commemorations on 4 May were dedicated to the resistance fighters and military personnel who had fought and paid the ultimate sacrifice during the Second World War. The focus was therefore on active victims, those who sacrificed themselves (sacrificium), and no attention was reserved for the passive, civilian victims (victima). An important influence for commemorating the latter was the February Strike on 25–26 February 1941, which had started in Amsterdam and spread to other places. This was the only known public act of resistance against the occupiers. We will discuss it in more detail below.
Since the Communist Party and the citizens of Amsterdam had played a central role in organising and supporting the February strike, the national authorities, including Queen Wilhelmina, decided that a future National Monument would have to be built in the city. As a symbol of its role, the queen allowed the city of Amsterdam to use the motto ‘Heroic, Resolute, Merciful’ (Heldhaftig, Vastberaden, Barmhartig). In 1947, the future monument on the Dam was seen as the symbol in which monarchy, democracy, and Christianity would be united in a commemoration of mourning and national heroic resistance. The national monument would, after the example of London’s Westminster Abbey, contain the ashes and blood of the ‘martyrs’ from all over the Kingdom.

The political atmosphere in those days was dominated by the Breakthrough: the idea that the entrenched pre-war political situation could and would be replaced by a model that allowed for more flexibility and less ‘pillarisation’ or denominational segregation. Very soon, however, the ideal would be shattered in the rising tide of renewed pillarisation and political segregation. In this period the commemorations had a strongly Protestant Christian character, and were preceded by religious services. The commemorations were concentrated on the Second World War and those who had died actively fighting.

The Netherlands’ liberation from the Germans is celebrated throughout the country on 5 May. In 1980, the government decided that 5 May would be a national holiday. However, it only had the power to grant holidays to civil servants, not those working in private enterprises. The social partners (employers, employees, and trade unions) were responsible for decisions about days off. A national committee was established in 1987 and made responsible for both the commemorations on 4 May and celebrations on 5 May. This national committee replaced both the bottom-up committee that was responsible for the commemorations on 4 May and the top-down committee that had so far organised events on 5 May. Henceforth, the government would officially no longer play a role.

Next, a shift occurred from a focus on the Second World War to other wars in which the Dutch had been involved since 1945. The first was the war waged in the Dutch East Indies, euphemistically called ‘police actions’; this ended with the acknowledgement of Indonesian independence and sovereignty in Amsterdam in 1949. After 1952, veterans from the Dutch East Indies, who had fought against the Indonesian nationalists, felt that those who had died in these military actions were unjustly excluded from the commemorations (the so-called ‘forgotten victims’) and organised protest commemorations on 27 December. This struggle ended with the inclusion of these fallen soldiers in the commemoration of 4 May. These veterans were followed by other categories of military victims, for example, volunteers who had served in the Korean War and soldiers who had died in peacekeeping operations in the service of the United Nations in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Since the
1990s, the controversial question of whether German soldiers might be included in the commemorations has arisen.\textsuperscript{65}

Between 1961 and 1975 a shift took place from commemorating active victims of the wars to the inclusion of ‘passive’ or civilian victims. The fascination with the past and a growing interest in the psychological aspects of suffering to the detriment of the political aspects.\textsuperscript{66} In particular, remembering Dutch Jewish victims of persecution and the Shoah became important.\textsuperscript{67} Some crucial factors that explain this shift were the Eichmann process in 1961, the Dutch television series ‘The Occupation’ (\textit{De Bezetting}), and the publication of Jacques Presser’s book ‘Ashes in the Wind. The Destruction of Dutch Jewry (1940–1945)’ (\textit{De Ondergang. De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom (1940–1945)}) in 1965, and the American series \textit{Holocaust} (1979).\textsuperscript{68} This brought about a huge change in the public conscience. The inclusion of the Shoah as a major element in the commemorations 1970s and 1980s has become the most important shift so far. It became a marker, a true touchstone.\textsuperscript{69} Later on, other groups such as homosexual victims of the Nazi regime were included, again after they demonstrated and protested publicly causing a scandal.\textsuperscript{70}

A final shift related to the extension of the concept of war into other types of conflict, for example, the violation of human rights. This shift was closely connected to the question of which values were at stake in the commemoration and how these might be applied to the present-day context. Increasingly, and with a growing distance in terms of time from the Second World War, the idea was launched that it was vital to commemorate values which were felt to be at stake, for example, the fight against injustice, oppression, and persecution and those who fight for human rights. But this would also lead to discussions about the role of Dutch soldiers not only as victims, but, in the case of the Dutch East Indies for example, as perpetrators. This last element is also relevant for our discussion since it touches upon the relations between the Netherlands and its Muslim communities. The commemorations also became more pluralistic, less nationalistic, and less Christian/religious. The former three religious services were reduced to one in 1970.

In the early 2000s, another group which made itself heard in connection with National Remembrance Day was made up of a number of Dutch youths of Moroccan descent (between 10 and 16 years old), as we saw in Section 4.3. What matters here is that they disturbed the commemorations in Amsterdam and other places by breaking the two minutes’ silence, chanting antisemitic slogans, and on one occasion playing football with wreaths.\textsuperscript{71} These actions caused a lot of indignation in the Dutch and international press. Although, as far as we know, no empirical research has been done among the groups concerned, we can say that from the available studies, the unrest seems to have been caused by experiences of Israel’s policies towards the Second Intifada, fuelled, according to Ensel and Gans, by antisemitic prejudices in the Dutch-Moroccan communities, and the
perceived double standards concerning Israel and the Palestinians in the Netherlands. They also expressed dissatisfaction with their own position in Dutch society as young people of Moroccan descent. Members of an older generation of Dutch-Moroccans tried to counter the protests by organising events such as screening a film about Moroccan soldiers’ contribution to the allied cause in the Second World War in order to educate their young people about aspects of the war with which they were probably less acquainted due to their migration background. The interaction with other protests, such as the anti-Israel protests on Dam Square indicates an atmosphere in which 4 May was used to protest publicly.

During the time of the war in Gaza in 2014, a group of Salafi Muslims in Hilversum united in the Muslim Aware Platform (Platform Bewust Moslim) caused public commotion by announcing that they intended to commemorate the ‘ethnic purification of Palestine’ on 4 May in the Amal mosque in Hilversum. Guest speakers would be Abou Hafs (Fouad el Bouch) and Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven, two well-known Salafi activists. The mayor of Hilversum tried to persuade the organisers not to go ahead. Members of the Jewish community turned against it as well, arguing that 4 May was not the right day for such a commemoration. Lody van de Kamp wrote an article in the Moslimkrant persuading them not to do so, to which we return below, in Section 8.5.

We have seen at the beginning of this chapter how a public debate was sparked in 2020 about the discourse on Moroccans as a ‘problem’, prompted by comments by the writer Arnon Grunberg. This debate flared up again in January 2021 when the Dutch writer of Moroccan descent, Abdelkader Benali, was invited by the National Committee for 4 and 5 May to give the 4th of May lecture in the New Church in Amsterdam. The reasons for asking him included his authorship, his Moroccan origins, and his earlier participation in the dialogue between Jews and Muslims, as a result of which he was deemed to “engage people who have not had the tradition of commemoration passed down to them by their families”. By extension, this invitation served the wish to widen the commemoration. A few days after the announcement that Benali had accepted the invitation, national uproar erupted about comments he had made many years earlier, in 2006, in a personal conversation with a journalist about Jews in Amsterdam-Zuid, and which had now again been brought to public notice. Benali subsequently withdrew. He referred to the affair several times in the media in the period that followed. In a response, Chaja Polak did not refer to the comments themselves, but to Benali’s reaction to the allegations as a missed opportunity to “build a bridge between Dutch Jews and Dutch Moroccans”. The responses from Jewish circles revealed two types of reaction. Firstly, the reaction in which the expansion of the commemoration to include the narratives of people with an Islamic background in the 4 May commemoration was broadly welcomed and secondly, the reaction of those who had considerable reservations about the expansion. Benali
considered this discussion in Jewish circles to be a matter which, in reality, was detached from the role played by Muslims in public debates on the commemorations and the role they play as citizens in Dutch society. He emphasised that this group is practically outlawed in the public debate, citing himself as an example. He accordingly agreed with Grunberg’s sharp observations with regard to the stigmatising of Dutch people with a Moroccan background in the current debate.

In ‘The silence of the other’ (De Stilte van de ander), the book in which Benali published his retracted 4th of May lecture, he addresses the expansion of the commemoration of the Second World War by quoting other similar stories. He explains how his Moroccan forefathers from the Rif Mountains in Morocco joined the armies of Francisco Franco in Spain and how, fighting on the side of the fascists, Hitler and Franco, they became embroiled in the horrors of the Spanish Civil War in the Iberian Peninsula. He subsequently explores his own ignorance of the Holocaust when he was a boy growing up in Rotterdam. He considers the inclusion of Dutch-Moroccans in Remembrance Day in the Netherlands to be something granted by the group of recipients: “It has the cultural capital to grant you a place. That place can be acquired by means of lectures, assignments, what you will. Many Moroccans would benefit from that”. The debate about Muslims and Islam takes place against the background of a public debate about generalising the National Commemoration on 4 May, a debate in which Jews also participate. The specific issue is the involvement of people with a Moroccan-Islamic background, who have completely different memories of the Second World War and the Shoah, by means of remembrance and educational activities.

8.4.2 The National Auschwitz Commemoration and Holocaust Memorial Day

We have seen above that until the 1960s barely any attention was paid to the fate of the Jews in the 4 and 5 May Commemorations. In order to draw more attention to the deportations and murder in the camps, the Auschwitz Remembrance Committee (Comité Herdenking Auschwitz) was founded in 1956. Its initiators, including Jacques Grishaver (who still presides over the Committee today) were secular Jews who in 1956 had travelled to Poland and visited the camps. They returned to the Netherlands with ashes and urns from the camps, which they wished to solemnly place in a future monument dedicated to Auschwitz. In order to bridge the time until that monument would be a reality, they sought to deposit the ashes in the Oosterbegraafplaats cemetery in Amsterdam and then in The Dock Worker (De Dokwerker) monument. In 1977 the simple stone at the Oosterbegraafplaats was replaced by the Mirror Memorial (Spiegelmonument; made by artist and writer Jan Wolkers). This monument was enlarged and transferred to Wertheim Park in 1993. Since then, the national Auschwitz commemoration has been organised in Wertheim Park.
on 27 January, the day on which Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated. The inaugu-
ration of the new Holocaust Name monument (Holocaust Namenmonument) finally took place in 2021, in the heart of Amsterdam; it bears the names of the 102,000 Jews, Roma, and Sinti who had been murdered.

Since 2006, the National Holocaust Commemoration has been combined with Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), following the resolution adopted by 104 member states of the United Nations and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005 to establish 27 January as a day of Remembrance and as a warning that such genocide should never happen again. Together with the Auschwitz Committee, the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD), affiliated to the Netherlands Academy for Sciences and Arts (KNAW), carries out secretarial tasks for HMD in the Netherlands and co-organises it together with other organisations. The associated activities, including lectures, span an entire week, in which attention focuses on the Holocaust and other genocides.

Reviewing the evidence available to us, the Dutch HMD seems, unlike its UK counterpart, to be dedicated mostly to the remembrance of the Shoah/Holocaust. Mention is made of other genocides but they do not seem to receive much attention. According to an official government letter to the Dutch Parliament written in 2012, the Dutch government does not play a role in organising it. This same letter also makes clear how the Dutch government sees its own role in the Dutch landscape of remembrances of the Second World War in general. The main role is reserved for societal organisations. The use of the adjective ‘national’ may be freely used by anyone who wishes; its use primarily reflects the scope the organising bodies attach to their activities. National, Raaijmakers explains, refers to the unifying character of the ritual. The Dutch government therefore leaves as much as possible to self-organisation. However, Raaijmakers, in her study of 4 and 5 May, makes it clear that over time, the Dutch government and the House of Orange did interfere with the organisation of 4 and 5 May quite a few times. According to Whine, Muslim organisations in the Netherlands participated in the commemoration. Unfortunately, Whine does not mention the names of these organisations.

8.4.3 The February Strike Commemoration

The February Strike – a protest organised by the Communist Party of the Netherlands against the Nazi persecution of the Jews in Amsterdam which took place on 25 and 26 February 1941 – has been commemorated each year in Amsterdam on 25 February since 1952. This commemorative event includes a march-past and the laying of wreaths, followed by speeches and moments of silence.

As Annet Mooij shows, the commemoration became the focus of a long discussion between several parties, including the local Communist Party, the Social Democrats, and the Jewish community. According to Ensel and
Gans, it was the involvement in the late 1970s and 80s in the organisation of the February Strike commemoration of the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands (Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland, KMAN), a secular and left-wing Moroccan organisation, led by Abdou Menebhi, which played an important role in the marginalisation of the Jewish community.\textsuperscript{88} That Jews felt marginalised is correct, but we cannot confirm that this should be attributed to the KMAN. What we have observed with respect to the KMAN, is that the secular and left-wing ethnic Moroccan element of the KMAN has always been much stronger than its Muslim component.\textsuperscript{89} In that sense, the KMAN followed the communists, who had always stressed the anti-fascist and socialist nature of the strike, not the struggle for the Jews as a group, or against antisemitism. As Mooij shows, the divisions and conflict came to an end in 1991.\textsuperscript{90} We will return to the KMAN in the next section.

\textbf{8.4.4 Kristallnacht Commemorations (1992–2019)}

Because the Kristallnacht commemorations in the Netherlands originated in quite a different context than in the UK and gave rise to a complex conflict with Jewish-Muslim aspects, we will deal with this in some more detail here. Since 2010, two Kristallnacht commemorations have been held almost simultaneously in Amsterdam each year. One was organised by the Platform Against Racism and Exclusion (Platform Stop Racisme en Uitsluiting, PSRU) up to 2016, and by the Kristallnacht Commemoration Committee (Comité Kristallnacht herdenking) in 2017 and 2018; the other is organised by the CJO.\textsuperscript{91} The first commemoration dates back to 9 November 1992, when a ceremony was held in the centre of Amsterdam by the anti-racism platform known as The Netherlands Confesses Colour (Nederland Bekent Kleur, NBK), the precursor of the PSRU and the Kristallnacht Commemoration Committee. The organisers’ immediate reason for launching this commemoration was the attack on an asylum seekers’ centre in Rostock (in former East Germany) and the firebombing of a mosque in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{92} That it was violence against asylum seekers and Muslims that gave rise to the commemoration remains important to this day. Antisemitism, anti-fascism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia have always played a central role in the commemoration. The two leaders and founders of NBK were René Danen and Abdou Menebhi, both of whom had a history of activism.\textsuperscript{93} The NBK commemoration was first held at the Monument to the Jewish Resistance (1940–1945) on Zwanenburgwal, close to Amsterdam’s city hall (the ‘Stopera’) and the former Jewish Quarter and, in a later period at other locations, such as the Perdu theatre. Wreaths are laid, there are speakers – such as Jaap Hamburger (A Different Jewish Voice (Een Ander Joods Geluid, EAJG)) in 2016, former Prime Minister Dries van Agt (the Rights Forum) in 2017 and the historian Nadia Bouras in 2018 – music is performed, and there are text and poetry readings. With
the exception of the year 2000 (when the organisation participated in a
national Kristallnacht demonstration) and the years 2004–2007, this
commemoration has been held annually without interruption.

A second commemoration has been held by the CJO since 2003 – that is,
nine years since the start of the NBK commemorations. Founded in 1997,
the CJO aims to promote the interests of the Jewish community in the
Netherlands. In addition to the three Jewish denominations, the NIK,
NVPJ, and PIK, the following organisations participate in the CJO: the
FNZ, JMW, and CIDI. The CJO advocates on such issues as the restitution
of Jewish assets seized during the war, commemorations, security, anti-
Semitism, and dialogue with other religions. As we shall also see below, the
fact that the CJO is keen to limit its activities to issues within the
Netherlands is a key point. According to the CJO, issues relating to Israel,
for example, fall within the remit of organisations such as CIDI and
the FNZ.

In 2000, the CJO supported a national demonstration to commemorate
Kristallnacht that was organised by the City of Amsterdam. After a number
of incidents with the organisers of the NBK commemorations, the CJO
organised its own commemoration for the first time in 2003. It repeated this
in 2008 and from 2010 it held its own annual commemoration; an event
that, with the growing sidelining of the other commemoration, it has in-
creasingly been described by its organisers as the ‘official’ commemoration
since 2014, and as the ‘National Kristallnacht Commemoration’ since
2017.\textsuperscript{94} The CJO’s commemorations are held in and around the Portuguese
Synagogue, the \textit{Esnoga}, followed by a wreath-laying ceremony at the
building of the Hollandsche Schouwburg theatre, which had served as an
assembly point for Jews who were deported to the concentration camps
during the war. Many politicians and administrators have spoken at these
commemorations in recent years, including Prime Minister Mark Rutte in
2016, the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Khadija Arib, in
2017, and the former Speaker of the House of Representatives and then
chair of the National Committee for 4 and 5 May, Gerdi Verbeet, in 2018.

\subsection*{8.4.5 National Srebrenica Day}

The last commemoration we will briefly discuss in this chapter is National
Srebrenica Day (\textit{Nationale Srebrenica Dag}), which has been an ‘official’ rem-
embrance day in the Netherlands since 1997, ten years before the EU
adopted the resolution mentioned earlier. It commemorates the catastrophic
execution of between 7,000 and 8,000 Muslim men and boys by troops of
Bosnian Serbs following the collapse of the Srebrenica enclave which had
been under the protection of Dutch troops (Dutchbat).\textsuperscript{95} The Dutch in-
volve in this genocide had a profound impact on Dutch society.

The first commemoration was held in 1996. Nowadays, the com-
memoration takes place annually in The Hague, starting with a peace
march from the nearby village of Wassenaar to the Plein, a square in the city centre of The Hague. This venue was chosen by the organisers (see below) in view of the controversial role of the Dutch government in the events in Srebrenica with regard to its responsibility for the troops that were sent there. The Plein is next to the office of the Prime Minister and the Parliament buildings.\textsuperscript{96}

The Srebrenica commemoration is organised every year by a partnership of organisations including the Muslim Association for Bosniaks in the Netherlands (Islamitische Vereniging voor Bosniaks in Nederland, Islamske Zajednice Bosnjaka u Nizozemskoj, IZBN, est. 1991) and the survivors’ association, Association of Survivors of the Srebrenica Genocide (Vereniging van Overlevenden van de Srebrenica genocide, est. 1995).\textsuperscript{97} Initially, the Dutch government did not endorse the call of the organisations involved to institute a day of commemoration on a national scale, by designating a particular day or by flying flags at half-mast, nor did they observe the EU parliament’s call to commemorate the day.\textsuperscript{98} In 2015, Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the then Minister of Defence, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, announced that the Ministry of Justice would fly flags half-mast on the Plein on 11 July, and that this would henceforth be done annually.

We have found no indication of any involvement by Jewish organisations in the Netherlands. We have seen above that the Dutch government’s attitude towards commemorations is to leave them to societal groups. Government representatives may assist events. This may explain why the government also refrained from interfering in this case.

8.5 A Comparison of Jewish-Muslim Relations with Regard to War Commemorations in the UK and the Netherlands

Remembrance Day in the UK and 4 and 5 May in the Netherlands were originally dedicated to those who fought in the service of their country. The focus in the UK is on both the First and the Second World War. In the Netherlands, due to the fact that the country did not take part in World War I, there has traditionally been a focus on the Second World War and the war in the Dutch East Indies, which ended in 1949. In the UK, the focus is on the fallen of the two World Wars including Jewish and Muslim soldiers. The Dutch state nowadays keeps its distance, allowing society and its different constituents to organise the commemorations, including the 4 May Commemoration. In the Netherlands, the term ‘national’ may be freely used for an event, although the government views national commemorations as those that ritually unify the nation.

The dual form of mourning and liberation on 4 and 5 May is unique to the Netherlands and is not found in the UK, which was neither occupied nor liberated, with the exception of the Channel Islands, which were occupied by the Nazi regime during the Second World War. A key moment is
the two minutes’ silence, which, against the background of globalisation and pluralisation has become a ‘sacred moment’: those who infringe upon this sacred moment of unity in the entire nation are met with stern responses in both countries.99 Jewish citizens fought against the enemy in both countries’ armies and are remembered. Jews in the Netherlands also participated in the resistance against the German occupying forces. Compared to British Jews, the Dutch Jewish population suffered tremendous losses as a result of the Shoah. And yet, as we have seen, it took until the 1960s before the attention of the Dutch 4 May commemoration shifted and their fate began to be commemorated. The Holocaust has become one of the central themes in the 4 May commemoration in recent decades.

Muslims in both countries have demonstrated on Remembrance Day. The public anti-Jewish utterances by Muslim youngsters in the early 2000s may explain why many Dutch citizens were shocked and action was taken both at local as well at national level. Local and national Muslim organisations played a part in remedying the behaviour of young Muslims. The JMNA (Jewish-Moroccan network in Amsterdam) came into being as a result as of a Jewish initiative. When it was disbanded, it was replaced by several other initiatives that were supported by the city council and the mayor of Amsterdam. We have already seen that during the time of the war in Gaza in 2014, a group of Salafi Muslims in Hilversum united in the Muslim Aware Platform (Platform Bewust Moslim) caused public commotion by announcing that they intended to commemorate the ‘ethnic purification of Palestine’ on 4 May in the Amal mosque in Hilversum.100 Members of the Jewish community turned against it as well, arguing that 4 May was not the right day for such a commemoration. Orthodox rabbi Lody van de Kamp wrote the following in the Moslimkrant:

Jews and Muslims in our country benefit tremendously from working together, sharing, talking and listening to each other. I have witnessed this in recent years. Amsterdam West, Amsterdam Noord, Amsterdam Oost: these are places were our meetings could be recast as friendships. The first steps were often the most difficult, but they opened the way to making further progress together. There were moments when we had to talk and we had to share. There were other moments when we had to learn to listen and we had to learn to keep silent. In recent years, Muslims and Jews had to learn when those moments had come. It was not only the moments in time which were important. Choosing what we were going to talk about, at which moment, on which occasion, were crucial. On one of those days, at one of those places, everything could be discussed. On another occasion, it was better not to raise certain issues. We were expected to take great care to understand each other’s anger at times, and each other’s sorrow at others. Hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, we took steps forward. In recent years, I have
stood next to Islamic youngsters on 4 May. In those two minutes silence, we shared our thoughts for a better future for our city. Could the ideals our parents or grandparents had cherished in those days in May 1945 still be fulfilled? Could we work together to ensure that they - whom we were commemorating in two minutes - had not died in vain? Now, more than 70 years after the war, an Islamic organisation is calling for attention to be paid to Palestine, the shadow Holocaust on 4 May, by means of a symposium in Hilversum. Reconciling differences between us, solving internal conflicts and learning to deal with history together are immensely important if we are to be able live together in peace. How we are going to achieve that depends on whether we are able to comprehend each other’s anger and each other’s grief. That comprehension depends on the place and time. Muslims and Jews will obviously have to tackle the question of whether the founding of the Jewish state of Israel was deliverance or a catastrophe (Nakba). Was the blessing for the Israelis also a blessing for the Palestinians? By jointly addressing these issues, we might eventually be able to work things out. There are moments when that must not happen. The day of 4 May is not one of those moments. Remembrance Day, 4 May, is for jointly sharing the grief of the past. After 4 May we can and must proceed. Talking about what divides us on 4 May will only lead to greater alienation: alienation that will first have to be wiped out before we can finally take the next steps forward. That at least is what I have learned in the last few years.101

This long quotation summarises some of the most important points in Jewish-Muslim relations, and the entanglements between protests and cooperation which proceeded from them, by juxtaposing 4 May, Holocaust and Nakba and the stories of Muslims and Jews. Remembrance Day in the UK has also seen disturbances and controversies. Here, radical Islamists demonstrated for the inclusion of the victims of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, poppies were burned and anti-Jewish statements were observed as well. An interesting role was played by the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) to contradict these Islamist voices.

The February Strike Commemoration (since 1957) is part of the Dutch memory culture of the Second World War, and more specifically Amsterdam culture, and plays no role in the UK. The people of Amsterdam commemorate the unique strike against the German occupiers. The KMAN, as a secular and progressive Moroccan migrant organisation, took part in the commemoration in the past in the context of its socialist struggle against fascism but does so no longer. The KMAN’s engagement in the February Strike commemoration has a lot of similarities with its engagement in the Kristallnacht commemoration in the 1990s.

With regard to remembrances dedicated to the Holocaust, the Netherlands witnessed the bottom-up initiative by Jacques Grishaver and
the later Auschwitz Committee to start the Commemoration of Auschwitz and the Holocaust in 1957. In the 1970s and 80s, remembrance of the Holocaust became an important part of the 4 May commemoration, but the Auschwitz Committee continued to organise its own commemoration and still does so today.

Unlike Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) in the UK, International Holocaust Memorial Day in the Netherlands – initiated as a result of the United Nations call in 2005 – is integrated into the Auschwitz Commemoration devoted primarily to the memory of Auschwitz, viz. the Holocaust. There is no involvement of Muslim organisations nor has it led to Muslim activity. In the UK, as we saw above, the dominant Muslim-Jewish aspect of HMD was the boycott by the MCB between 2001 and 2009. The MCB boycotted HMD for the first time in 2001, the same year that it was introduced as a national commemoration. It continued to do so until 2007, and it again boycotted HMD in 2009 as a protest against Israel’s actions in the Gaza war. The boycott came to an end in 2010. Harun Khan, president of the MCB at the time of our interview with him, told us in 2017 that he viewed the MCB’s boycott of the HMD as a thing of the past that had continued to affect the image of the MCB in the eyes of Jewish communities, the government and the public at large. Dilwar Hussain sees the MCB as an organisation that has tried to improve relations with other groups and has attempted to enter into interfaith dialogue during its twenty years of existence. It came as a surprise to him and many British Muslims that the MCB wanted to boycott HMD. It led to huge media frenzy. Hussain was working at the Islamic Foundation at the time, an organisation affiliated to the MCB. At the request of the director, he wrote a memo arguing against it, but to no avail. Hussain thinks the MCB wanted to make a statement against Israeli policies, and denied being antisemitic, but the damage to ‘community relations’ was enormous. The said event led to Hussain joining the HMDT to show that not all Muslims think the way the MCB did. As a trustee of HMDT at the time of our interview with him in London, Hussain cooperated with Remembering Srebrenica, and so did HMDT. Due to the MCB’s boycott of HMD and other things, the government severed its relations with it. Relations between the Board of Deputies and the MCB declined for the same reason. According to Philip Rosenberg, who was working at the Board of Deputies at the time of the interview:

[…] it is fair to say that it has been a challenge at a national level for a long time because of the nature of some of the national bodies, questions about their representative nature or concerns about the views they hold. And so, whilst we have tried at various times to engage at a national level, and we continue to try, it is difficult. The government, for example, has frozen relations at a ministerial level with certain leading Muslim groups, which makes it very difficult for us, to do everything we would ideally want to do at a national level. We might
get on personally with individuals in these organisations, but if the government, with all the information it has at its disposal, won’t engage with them, how can we justify doing anything different? And in some cases the issues with these organisations are very well known and in the public domain. However, we haven’t let that deter us from engaging with the Muslim community. We have been engaging very, very strongly at a local level, sending our leadership into mosques and madrassas to model the desirability of building warm relations with our Muslim neighbours.105

Groups such as the ISB stress their respect for HMD. But they also value the inclusion of other genocides in it. The ISB wants its adherents to be loyal British citizens. Other Muslims have used HMD to protest against Israeli politics towards the Palestinians and the sole focus on the Holocaust. MCB and Board of Deputies clashed here, as did the government and MCB about an event that matters so much to the Jewish community in the UK and London.

To the best of our knowledge, no such clashes have occurred in the Netherlands among Jewish organisations and such bodies as CMO. No Muslim organisations in the Netherlands are known to have boycotted any Holocaust commemoration. In general, it seems that the level of interaction in the commemorations discussed is lower between Jewish and Muslim organisations in the Netherlands than in the UK. Right from the start, the HMD was meant to commemorate other genocides (clearly to accommodate other groups in multi-religious Britain at the instigation of the government), while in the Netherlands, HMD continues to focus on Auschwitz as part of and strongly connected to HMD.

8.5.1 Kristallnacht Commemorations

Kristallnacht commemorations in the UK differ from those in the Netherlands with regard to their history and background. While the UK commemorations go back to the pre-war period, Kristallnacht only started to be commemorated in 1992 in the Netherlands, and in particular in Amsterdam, at the initiative of The Netherlands Confesses Colour (Nederland Bekent Kleur, NBK) because of a growing concern about xenophobic and racist attacks on Muslim migrants and asylum seekers. The organisations that supported the initiative over time included trade unions, Moroccan and Turkish migrant organisations, the Dutch Auschwitz Committee, the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (Protestantse Kerk in Nederland, PKN), Kerk in Actie, the Anne Frank Foundation, and the International Socialists, as well as the Jewish organisations Habonim, BBJo (Jewish youth organisation) and A Different Jewish Voice (Een Ander Joods Geluid, AJG). Jewish Holocaust survivors including Mirjam Ohringer, also participated, as well as rabbis, such as Edward van Voolen
and Awraham Soetendorp. Jewish musicians often provided the musical accompaniment. In the 1990s, the commemorations took place without incident. The participants radiated unity in their abhorrence of antisemitism, but also of other forms of racism and xenophobia. Interest in the commemorations grew. Moreover, Amsterdam was no longer the only place where Kristallnacht was commemorated. Commemorations were also held in Groningen, Leeuwarden, Breda, at the former camp of Westerbork, and at the National Liberation Museum. All of the Dutch commemorations were supported by the NBK and each had its own local character (demonstrations, music, torchlight processions, etc.). The NBK played a leading role but cooperated with many organisations, principally the Amsterdam 4 and 5 May Committee and Amsterdam's discrimination helpdesk, Stichting Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam. From the end of the 1990s, tensions emerged that had historical roots, especially the conflict between the KMAN and Jewish individuals and groups. In 2000, a national demonstration was organised instead of the usual commemoration. In 2010, the dynamics and rivalry in the organisation and rituals of remembrance entered a new phase. In that year, the CJO decided to hold its own annual commemoration, in protest against the character of the existing ceremony. According to the then director of CIDI, Ronny Naftaniel, this happened “because we cannot accept that persecution of Jews is being exploited by organisations and individuals for their own political ends”.

The PSRU was reproached for the fact that, by highlighting abuses abroad, it was engaging in unilateral criticism of Israel whilst passing over the situation in numerous countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, where Muslim minorities, Jews, and Christians were discriminated against and sometimes persecuted. The discussions between the CJO and the PSRU became deeply polemical during this period. Since then, the PSRU has continued to hold its commemoration, and it continues to argue for an agenda that includes Islamophobia and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as anti-Semitism and racism. In the last few years, the commemorations organised by CJO have attracted far more attention, while the PSRU attracts far less.

8.5.2 Srebrenica Memorial Day

Srebrenica commemorations and Srebrenica Memorial Day have been organised in the Netherlands since 1997 and in the UK since 2005. While the British commemoration has been encouraged by the UK government we observe no clear involvement of the Dutch government in the Dutch commemoration, which only very reluctantly cooperated with the organisers. In the UK, both the Muslim and Jewish Communities value this commemoration and both participate in activities connected to it. Several Jewish-Muslim dialogue groups have organised events around it, such as trips to Bosnia by the imams and rabbis of the Joseph Interfaith Foundation
(JIF). In the Netherlands, Jewish communities are not known to be actively engaged in it, but the Muslim community is, as shown by the involvement of the Muslim Association for Bosniaks in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{108} To the best of our knowledge, the commemoration in the Netherlands has no relation with or significance for Jewish-Muslim relations in the Netherlands.

The difference between the UK and the Netherlands with regard to the Srebrenica Commemoration can be explained by the fact that Jewish-Muslim engagement in the UK was already more established when it was introduced.

8.6 Conclusions

The migration of Muslims to the UK and the Netherlands has had implications for war commemorations as a cultural field of study. Jews in the UK have been involved in ‘national’ commemorations of the First and Second World Wars in a completely different way to Jews in the Netherlands. The UK mainland was never occupied by Nazi Germany; its Jewish community survived the war relatively unscathed and British Jews helped Jews from other European countries. The Jewish community in the Netherlands came out of the war severely weakened. The reception returning Jews received was cold and distant, as pertinently described in Marga Minco’s books, and it was not until the 1960s that the Shoah and the Jewish community were given a more central role in the annual national commemoration on 4 May. In the years following 2000, young Dutch-Muslims with a Moroccan background began causing trouble in Amsterdam and a few other cities. Explicitly or implicitly, the targets of their protests are Jews as the presumed ‘accomplices’ in a policy which oppresses and victimises Palestinians.\textsuperscript{109} These protests prompted the Jewish community in Amsterdam to co-operate with leaders of the Islamic community in doing something to counteract them. The incidents in Amsterdam around the commemorations on 4 May at the beginning of this century contributed to the Jewish community initiating round table talks in 2004 between representatives of the Jewish and Moroccan communities under the leadership of the then Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen. These talks led to the founding of the Jewish Moroccan Network Amsterdam (JMNA) in 2006. Older members of the Moroccan community have likewise made efforts to persuade younger members of their community, who were responsible for the disturbances, to change their behaviour.

The controversies around Kristallnacht commemorations in Dutch society similarly revolve around the inclusion of Islamic, i.e. Palestinian victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the commemoration, but here too, the controversy about the role and place of Islamophobia figures prominently in the increasingly polarised public debate. The parties’ opinions differ on the question of whether Islamophobia in general can be seen as
being on the same level as antisemitism and on the question of whether victims of Islamophobia can be commemorated.

Remembrance Day (Armistice Day) in the UK, in which the Shoah plays a more minor role as a topic of commemoration compared to the National Commemoration on 4 May in the Netherlands, has been the object of a totally different protest: that of supporters of the extremist al-Muhajirun and Muslims Against Crusades which opposed the British government’s Middle-East policies in 2010. Antisemitic ideas figured prominently in these protests. In the UK, the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) reacted to figures such as Anjem Choudary to demonstrate that Muslims are loyal citizens. We observed that Muslims who belong to this organisation are prepared to co-operate with British Jews. These groups are in close contact with Jews for that purpose.

Debates have taken place in Dutch society in recent decades about widening the commemoration on 4 and 5 May in order to involve new groups and keep the commemorations alive, now that the generations who witnessed the Second World War are gradually passing away. In this context, Gerdi Verbeet, then chair of the National Committee for 4 and 5 May, explained why she had chosen Abdelkader Benali as a candidate to give the 4 May lecture in 2021:

You must have asked him [i.e. Benali, authors], because he is a Moroccan. “Not because he is a Moroccan. He is part of a new group whose grandparents did not witness the war in the Netherlands. These new groups are very important. Edgar Davids once said to me: ‘if you want to stand on the Dam Square with a small group of people, don’t change anything. But if you want us to be there too, please make sure that you think inclusively’”.

These debates aroused a feeling of trepidation among Jewish organisations. The CIDI supported the call by the MP’s Dilan Yesilgöz-Zegerius (VVD) and Gert-Jan Segers (CU) on the Dutch State Secretary of Public Health, Welfare and Sport to make efforts to “oppose further expansion of commemorative events so that the Holocaust can be specifically commemorated when no one is left to recount events.” Constantly expanding and generalising commemorations threatens to push the events of the Second World War into the background. For that reason, the initiators are calling on the State Secretary to make efforts to oppose it. We came across this fearful attitude in the UK in the case of HMD, but not with reference to Remembrance Day.

This difference in attitude may relate to the difference in position of the Jewish community in the UK and the Netherlands. The Jewish community in the Netherlands suffered far more under the Shoah than the Jewish community in the UK; its suffering was disregarded for a long time after the war, and the community is under more pressure, partly because of its small
size and its low level of organisation. The consequence of this relatively weaker position is that many organised Jews focus squarely on safeguarding the commemoration of the Holocaust as a unique event, as reflected in the approach of the organisations which seek to serve their interests.

The introduction of HMD has had a different impact in the UK than in the Netherlands. From the beginning, HMD in the UK was not thought of as only a commemoration or remembrance of the Holocaust, but was intended to have a broader focus to include later, contemporary genocides. The long-lasting boycott of HMD by the MCB was aimed mainly at the lack of attention at HMD to the Nakba and the suffering of the Palestinians. Conversely, other Islamic organisations support HMD and Muslims are also prominently present in the HMDT. HMD is not commemorated separately in the Netherlands but is included in the already established Auschwitz commemoration, coordinated by a number of organisations. The focus in the Dutch HMD is on commemorating the Shoah, although reference is also made to other genocides. There seems to be no involvement in HMD by Islamic organisations. However, neither is there any opposition or protest.

The Kristallnacht commemorations have their origins in 1992 as a context for co-operation between Jewish and Islamic organisation in combatting xenophobia and the revival of racism. Conflicts only appeared later, the dividing lines of which run through the Jewish and Islamic organisations. Here too, expansion is under discussion. To all appearances, the continuing demise of the PSRU commemorations and the sustained focus of the Kristallnacht commemorations organised by the CJO on the history and contemporary significance of the Holocaust and the emphasis on contemporary antisemitism mean that, here too, the trend towards expansion is failing to materialise. This gives rise to a variety of reactions. In response to the Kristallnacht incident in 2000, Rabbi Raphael Evers talked about a missed opportunity. “Our aim was to show unity to the outside world and take a stand against racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. It is a great shame”.112

An example of a commemoration which has led to co-operation, in the UK at least, is the Srebrenica commemoration. Although Jewish organisations do not participate in this commemoration in the Netherlands, they do in the UK. In the more inclusive British climate of commemorations, partly supported by the British government, Srebrenica is seen as a binding theme in Jewish-Islamic relations.

Notes
1 Grunberg 2020, 30 [authors’ translation].
3 Grunberg 2020, 16.
There are some other commemorations outside Europe which are also relevant here because they are also observed in London and Amsterdam and have led to demonstrations by Jewish and Muslim groups there. Such demonstrations, which may serve as an illustration of competition and rivalry and often express solidarity either with Israel or the Palestinians and as such, also serve to express the respective ethnic and religious communities’ supra-national ties. Al-Quds Day, held on 15 May, was started by Iran in 1979 to stimulate action against Israel. Rallies connected to Al-Quds Day have led to protests in London. Its counterpart is Jerusalem Day, which is also commemorated in London. Then there is Nakba Day, see Bashir & Goldberg 2014. Nakba Day was inaugurated by Yasser Arafat in 1991. It takes place one day after Independence Day in Israel. For a Nakba Palestine solidarity campaign versus Israel protest in London, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_G4bnBdObo/. Furthermore, there is Yawm al-Naksa, the day of setback, whose context is the Six Days War. It is on 5 June.

The bibliography on the subject is extensive; see for example Whine 2013.

Roggeveen 2020, 85; Van Esdonk 2020, 116.

For example Tilmans, Van Vree & Winter 2010; Berman 2004; Ensel & Gans 2017.

Bottici 2010, 345.

Van Vree & Van der Laarse 2009, 8.


Ibid., 221.

Ibid., 20.


Bourdieu 1986; 1990. See Section 1.1.

Raaijmakers 2018; Burke 2010, 108.

Van Ginkel 2011, 725vv; Raaijmakers 2018.

See Section 1.2.

According to Verter 2003, 152.


See Schaffer 2009 and Danilova 2015 on War Commemorations in the UK.

Visitors to the Field of Remembrance, opened annually at Westminster Abbey and at other places can make a donation or dedicate a cross or other commemoration symbols, such as a Star of David for Jewish fallen or a wooden cross with red poppies for Muslims (Danilova 2015, 109).

Birmingham Mail, 13 November 2016.


The Independent, 6 November 2013; British Future, 31 October 2011.


Daily Mail, 30 October 2014.


Berman 2004, 58.

Berman 2004, 61; See: https://www.hmd.org.uk/what-is-holocaust-memorial-day/the-stockholm-declaration/.


Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 160.

For a description of the ritual see Berman 2004, 54.

Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 150; Berman 2004.

Quoted in Berman 2004, 64.
36 Berman 2004, 61.
37 See: https://www.hmd.org.uk/what-is-holocaust-memorial-day/the-stockholm-declaration/; https://www.hmd.org.uk/
38 The website page of HMDT currently mentions Naved Siddiqi, a New Horizons in British Islam member as well, as a Muslim trustee, and also Laura Marks, a member of the Jewish community and very active in building Jewish-Muslim relations. Dilwar Hussein is no longer a trustee. See: https://www.hmd.org.uk/about-us/our-people/trustees/.
45 Berman 2004, 66–67, mentions the commemorations in note 8 but does not go into them.
48 Interview with Dilwar Hussain, 27 February 2017. See Warsi 2018.
50 Interview with Philip Hackwood 24 October 2017; see Huffington Post, 15 July 2016.
51 See:https://www.reformjudaism.org.uk/events/west-london-synagogue-remembers-srebrenica-never/
52 Raaijmakers 2018, 55.
53 Raaijmakers 2018, 56.
54 See: https://www.4en5mei.nl/; Raaijmakers 2018.
55 Raaijmakers 2018, 199.
56 Ibid., 5.
57 Van Ginkel 2011, 68.
58 Mooij 2006; Oosterbaan 1998.
60 Ibid. 80.
61 Raaijmakers 2018, 63.
62 Ibid., 176.
63 Ibid., 197.
64 Ibid., 82–91.
65 Ibid., 12–14, 219.
66 Ibid., 168–169.
67 Ibid., 115–119.
68 Ibid., 148–154.
69 Ibid., 61–62, 119.
Sources of Conflict and Cooperation

70 Raaijmakers 2018, 118, 133ff.
72 Ensel & Gans 2017, Ensel & Stremmelaar 2013, and see Section 4.3.
73 Ensel & Gans 2017, 491.
74 De Moslimkrant, 30 April 2014; Jonet.nl, 29 April 2014.
75 NRC Handelsblad, 2 April 2021.
76 NRC Handelsblad, 9 April 2021.
77 Benali 2021, 17.
78 Ibid., 23–39.
79 Ibid., 19.
83 Ibid., p. 12.
84 Raaijmakers 2018, 112.
85 Whine 2013, 34.
86 Mooij 2006; Van Ginkel 2011; Ensel & Gans 2017, 477ff.
87 Mooij 2006, 158.
88 Ibid. 2006; Ensel & Gans 2017, 480–482. For the KMAN, see Bouras 2012, 143–144; Van Heelsum, Feddema & Tillie 2004; Van der Valk 1996.
89 Van Weezel 2017, 55, quoting Menebhi: “The KMAN was a left-wing progressive organisation”.
90 Mooij 2006, 161.
92 Ensel & Gans (2017, 485) state that the commemoration was also a response to the attack in the German city of Solingen, in which five Turkish migrants died. However, this was on 25 and 26 May 1993, a year later. In Ensel 2014, 195, the attack in Rostock is named as a reason for the first commemoration.
93 Abdou Menebhi is of Moroccan background and had been chair of the KMAN, a left-wing, secular workers’ organisation with communist sympathies in the 1980s (Van der Valk 1996). Menebhi later became the chair of the City Moroccan Council (Stedelijke Marokkaanse Raad) in Amsterdam, and became active in Amsterdam’s Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Migration and Development (Euro-Mediterraen Centrum Migratie en Ontwikkeling, EMCEMO). This organisation runs an Islamophobia reporting desk.
94 PSRU organiser Maarten Jan Hijmans (interview 21 June 2019) states on the Kristallnacht commemoration controversies. “but again, the problem of Israel plays a role at the background, and that role cannot really be discussed of course”.
95 NIOD 2002.
97 See: http://www.srebrenica-herdenking.nl.

99 See Benali 2021, 18.

100 De Moslimkrant, 30 April 2014; See Jonet.nl, 29 April 2014.

101 Ibid.


103 Interview with Harun Khan, 26 October 2017

104 Interview with Dilwar Hussain, 27 February 2017.

105 Interview with Philip Rosenberg, 26 October 2017.

106 Het Parool, 10 November 2010.

107 Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, 19 October 2018.

108 In her study on the women of Bosnia (Leydesdorff 2008), historian Selma Leydesdorff draws parallels between the massacre at Srebrenica and the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War as examples of European persecutions of minorities.

109 See also Chapter 4.

110 NRC Handelsblad, 29 April 2021.


112 NRC Handelsblad, 10 November 2000.

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9 Connecting Themes

9.1 Introduction

In Chapters 5 to 8 we have described and analysed the four sensitive themes in Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antisemitism among Muslims and Islamophobia among Jews, attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets, and the commemoration of events preceding and during the Second World War and the genocide in Bosnia. In this chapter, we focus on themes in Jewish-Muslim relations that connect the two groups. We examine situations in which, to use terms from social identity theory, members of one group identify with the other in terms of certain representations, values, ideals, rituals, or customs. This is not about ‘othering’, then, but about identification. We also look at perceived similarities in respect of interests and positions, to which Pierre Bourdieu devotes a great deal of attention in his work.¹

In Section 9.2, ‘Perceived Similarities of Religion and Culture’, we look at practices with a focus on cooperation between Jews and Muslims, within and outside their own circles, such as interreligious and intercultural dialogue activities. These include the joint intertextual reading of religious source texts known as ‘textual reasoning’ or ‘scriptural reasoning’ (SR). We also explore forms of cooperation drawing on rituals and celebrations, as well as joint cultural expression in theatre, music, film, and so on. Some of these forms of cooperation in part involve interactions with other groups in society, too.

In Section 9.3, ‘Promotion of Common Interests in the Public Domain’, we study areas in which Jews and Muslims cooperate because their interests coincide. Prominent here are joint activities to defend or bolster religious freedoms, which are often fuelled by perceived similarities of religious and non-religious culture and cover such topics as ritual slaughter, male circumcision, religious holidays, and other areas of shared concern. These include the fight antisemitism and Islamophobia, as well as their common position as minorities in London and Amsterdam, and more broadly in the UK and the Netherlands.²

Section 9.4, ‘Contributions to Neighbourhoods, Cities, Countries and the World’, deals with joint projects by Jews and Muslims through which they,
as residents of London or Amsterdam and based on their moral ideals, aim to make a positive contribution towards their immediate or wider environment: a clean neighbourhood, social cohesion in the city or peaceful relations in a national and transnational context.

Finally, Section 9.5 provides a summary analysing the similarities and differences between London and Amsterdam in respect of the themes discussed in this chapter.

As we shall see, the forms of cooperation described and analysed in this chapter overlap in a number of cases because one particular collaborative venture may, and frequently does, give rise to various different types of activity. The studies by Van Esdonk and Roggeveen again form the starting point for this chapter.⁴

9.2 Perceived Similarities of Religion and Culture

The first of the perceived areas of common ground we can discern in the interaction between Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam is religious experience and practice in a fairly narrow sense. Shared conceptions of God and of holy figures such as prophets, for example, as well as commonalities in the ethical and legal spheres (halacha and sharia) around ritual slaughter, male circumcision, dietary rules, gender roles, rituals, and festivals. Also within this category fall contacts related to a common geographical and cultural origin, such as those based on language (the relationship between Hebrew and Arabic, for instance) and culinary traditions. We begin this section with interreligious dialogue in perhaps its narrowest sense: the joint study of texts and discussion of religious matters.

9.2.1 Interreligious Dialogue: Practices around Texts

9.2.1.1 London

We have seen in Chapter 4 that Jewish-Muslim dialogues have been underway in the UK since the late 1980s, when the Rushdie affair motivated Jewish and Muslim organisations to initiate them on a more structural basis than had previously been the case.⁴ As well as bilateral Jewish-Muslim meetings, Jewish-Christian-Muslim student dialogues – or ‘trialogues’, as they are sometimes known – were also organised. The London-based Reform rabbi Jonathan Magonet, who was a trustee of the Maimonides Foundation at the time, played an important role in arranging these dialogues. The dialogue-based activities in which he was involved were directed mainly at students.⁵ In an interesting interview conducted on 20 December 2016, Magonet explained that he had been involved in Jewish-Christian-Muslim trialogues and Jewish-Muslim dialogues organised on behalf of London’s Leo Baeck College for almost forty years, since about 1978.
“Q. Your biography said that you are active in Jewish-Muslim dialogue and are a trustee of the Maimonides Foundation. Do you feel as though that ‘dialogue’ is actually happening and changing perspectives on both sides positively?

A. I have retired from the Maimonides Foundation, but my main work in Jewish-Muslim dialogue was in co-organising on behalf of Leo Baeck College an annual International Jewish-Christian-Muslim student conference (JCM) that has taken place in Germany for over forty years and continues today. My work in this area can be found in my book *Talking To the Other: Jewish Interfaith Dialogue with Christians and Muslims* (I.B. Taurus, London 2003). When the JCM began, the idea of such an encounter was hardly even considered, but the intervening years have seen an extraordinary rise in programmes, conferences, publications, religious, and political initiatives aimed at promoting just such a dialogue. So, it is happening, and, from my own experience, anyone who becomes personally engaged with it does change their perspective. The problem is educating a larger public on all sides about the rights and wrongs of past attitudes, correcting lingering prejudices, but above all in offering an alternative to the political misuse of all three faiths by people with their own power agendas”.

These remarks raise some interesting points. First of all, there is the choice of Germany – to be exact Berndorf in the Eifel region – as a place to convene Jewish, Christian, and Muslim students. This stems from the historical roots of Leo Baeck College (LBC) and its connections with Berlin’s Higher Institute for Jewish Studies (Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums). Rabbi Werner van der Zyl, the founder of the Jewish Theological College of London for the training of Rabbis of Reform and Liberal Judaism, the institute later renamed after Leo Baeck, was a German Jew who had fled the Nazis in 1938. Secondly, Magonet tells us that, to guarantee that such meetings cannot be hijacked for political ends, in his view it is important that they remain outside the public domain. And his procedural description of JCM conferences shows that this is indeed the case. By mutual arrangement, nothing of what happens at these events is revealed to the outside world; everyone participating is free to take what they want back to their own community. Thirdly, the procedure also includes joint prayers before the meetings in an attempt to express the theological common ground they are built on. This indicates a genuine theological engagement in a ritual sense.

Historically independent of Magonet’s JCM conferences are text-oriented dialogues between Jews, Christians, and Muslims, which originated in attempts by like-minded supporters and founders of dialogical events to overcome the competing claims to ‘the truth’ made by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and so to meet in harmony rather than in conflict. This phenomenon originated in Jewish academic circles in the early 1990s as ‘textual reasoning’ and later became known as ‘scriptural reasoning’ (SR). Under that name, it has spread widely throughout the UK.
Van Esdonk’s fieldwork on Jewish-Muslim relations in London reveals that joint activities there include numerous dialogue projects, SR ones among them. As already mentioned briefly elsewhere in this study, these projects involve the philosophical interreligious study of foundational texts. According to Van Esdonk, in June 2002 30 Jewish, Muslim, and Christian students joined the first SR session in London, organised by the Three Faiths Forum (3FF) in cooperation with Leo Baeck College, to discuss foundational texts about and practices of sacrifice. Most of the participants came from Leo Baeck College itself, from the Centre for Jewish-Christian Relations in Cambridge, and from the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Birmingham. In 2003 the Muslim women’s organisation An-Nisa began a series of Jewish-Muslim text-based workshops, also in cooperation with Leo Baeck College. Van Esdonk describes how these meetings were, and still are, organised biannually and have been facilitated by the same ‘sheikha’ and female rabbi ever since. In a paper on her personal experience with SR, the sheikha, Halima Krausen, states that it should be seen as a “process-oriented rather than result-oriented” initiative and a “personal learning process” for those taking part. During the sessions, she says, “participants and facilitators need to find a balance between addressing both unifying and potentially divisive issues”.

In addition to these workshops, in their research on SR practices Van Esdonk and Wiegers have come across such initiatives as the Marylebone Scriptural Reasoning, organised and coordinated by the West London Synagogue, and the work of London’s Saint Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace. The latter both work from a trilateral perspective, involving Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Van Esdonk and Wiegers have further found that London mosques and synagogues, as well as individual Jews and Muslims, have also organised SR sessions independently. And not always are the texts discussed purely theological in nature; the meetings may also be geared towards discussion of halacha and sharia law, for example.

In short, in London SR can be regarded as an established interreligious practice. It seems that the first public manifestation of Jewish-Muslim interfaith dialogue in this form took place at St Ethelburga’s in 2004. Before that, as we have seen above, it was essentially an academic practice – first between Jews and Christians and only later between the three groups as well as bilaterally between Jews and Muslims. Sometimes such sessions are standalone meetings, but on other occasions they occur in conjunction with a ritual such as the iftar meal or that combined with a celebration of Shavuot or the Seventeenth of Tammuz. Another dialogue-led initiative is the British Forum for Discussion of Israel & Palestine (FODIP), founded in 2008 and aiming to “host and facilitate sensitively interfaith dialogue on the Israeli Palestinian conflict, within and between Jews, Christians, Muslims and others in the UK, and to promote cooperation through dialogue”. 

282 Sources of Conflict and Cooperation
While mutual religious understanding between participants is the goal of triological and dialogical activities, they also raise a number of concerns. We can identify several different issues here. First of all, there is the fear that one’s own religious ideas may be threatened and the forum used for missionary, proselytising, or political ends. This is why, over time, in ‘responsa’ and ‘fatwas’ respectively, Jewish and Muslim scholars have formulated norms intended to regulate such dialogues. Among these is the rule that texts should not be discussed detached from certain interpretational traditions. Van Esdonk and Wiegers discuss the fatwa issued by London’s Regent’s Street Mosque with the aim of guaranteeing the involvement of Islamic scholars in dialogues of this kind.\(^{17}\) The scholar Muhammad al-Hussaini played an important role in formulating such caveats in the London context, and in his writings has focused in a critical way on Muslim attitudes toward Israel. Similar concerns have been voiced in Jewish circles. On the other hand, we also find positive recommendations to establish dialogue with Muslims (in the case of Jews) and with Jews (in the case of Muslims).

Secondly, there is the issue of power. Magonet refers to this sensitive issue in the interview quoted above. Who is in charge of a dialogue or a triologue? What role does its funding play? And what about politics, national and international? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is undoubtedly a factor lurking in the background whenever participants in such interactions refer to ‘international politics’ and issues of power.\(^{18}\) By ‘not engaging in politics’ they mean that they do not want that political conflict to play a divisive role in their conversations. This attitude also reveals, however, that part of what interests participants is the attempt to reshape – and to overcome – religious, political, and juridical barriers. Natan Levy observes that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict nevertheless represents such a barrier writ large, and that bringing it up easily sparks discord. For this reason, he considers food, culture, and the like as safer themes to meet around than religious doctrine or texts.\(^{19}\)

Some imams and rabbis from Amsterdam and London meet during trips to the US, for example in response to invitations from the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding (FFEU), established by Rabbi Marc Schneier in 1989 to improve Black-Jewish and Muslim-Jewish relations.\(^{20}\) An article in The Jerusalem Post of 25 July 2009 reports on such a visit.\(^{21}\) Imams and rabbis from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and the UK had travelled to the US to learn about the Muslim-Jewish interfaith programme developed by Schneier with a view to helping introduce it in Europe. The report announces a forthcoming partnership programme in Europe and the US, starting in November 2009 with a conference at which local mosques and synagogues will be represented. Schneier is quoted as saying that there is a lot going on at the leadership level, but not yet on a “people to people” scale. In addition to setting up the joint programme, the intention is that the participants will work together to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia. “Together with the Muslim
community”, says one rabbi, “we can preserve our religious rights”. The article also quotes the abovementioned Sheikh Dr Muhammad al-Hussaini from the UK as saying, “It’s absolutely critical at this juncture that there are Muslim voices that are willing to stand firmly and practice in opposition to Islamic-inspired antisemitism”. He also states that it is important that the dialogue be “grounded in scripture”. In a presentation delivered during the visit (probably the paper he published in 2009), he addressed the importance of ‘text’ in Muslim-Jewish relations: “Hijacking of scripture is an essential part of what’s going on in the battlegrounds of the Islamic world”. Scriptural reasoning, ‘havruta’ style, he continues, “enables us in powerful ways to challenge extremist interpretations”. The clerics’ itinerary also included a number of excursions, among them visits to the White House and to Ground Zero in New York, where joint prayers were offered.

9.2.1.2 Amsterdam

Turning to Amsterdam, we find a picture different in various respects. In their article on Jewish-Muslim cooperation in the Dutch capital, Roggeveen, Vellenga, and Wiegers mention a total of 40 cooperative initiatives begun between 1990 and 2015. These range from joint social action projects to dialogue-based approaches. None focus on scriptural reasoning (SR), however, or on more general discussion of religious texts. There does at one time seem to have been one all-female interreligious and interethnic Jewish-Muslim group, which started out as an autonomous initiative but was later absorbed into the women’s group of the Amsterdam Council for Beliefs and Religions (Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam). This, according to Roggeveen, is the only circle to have engaged in interfaith textual study for any length of time.

No equivalent of the outreach undertaken by the Cambridge Interfaith Programme exists in the Netherlands. Its nearest counterpart is found at VU Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), originally an orthodox Calvinist Protestant institution and long active in the field of interreligious relations. Special mention should be made in this respect of the work of the late Rachel Reedijk. There is no evidence, however, that the activities at VU Amsterdam have had any effect on Jewish-Muslim relations elsewhere in the city or the country.

A typical example of cooperation in the field of interfaith dialogue can be found between Al-Kabir Mosque and the Liberal Jewish Community Amsterdam (Liberaal Joodse Gemeente Amsterdam, LJG). The mosque is located on Weesperzijde in Amsterdam, where it occupies a number of buildings along the River Amstel. The LJG has had its own synagogue on Zuidelijke Wandelweg, about 2.5 kilometres away, for some years. The imam and the rabbi have long had a good personal relationship and this has been further strengthened since they started addressing one another’s congregations as part of the Preaching in Mokum (Preken in Mokum) project,
involving a variety of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian groups. In addition, the two congregations both participate in the city’s ‘Safety Pact against Discrimination’ (Veiligheidspact tegen discriminatie) and members attended the interfaith conversations organised in 2014 by former mayor Eberhard van der Laan at his official residence. Although actually situated in the East Amsterdam urban district (Stadsdeel Oost), Al-Kabir’s ‘catchment area’ includes the nearby Rivierenbuurt and De Pijp neighbourhoods in South Amsterdam (Stadsdeel Zuid) and it – like LJG Amsterdam, whose synagogue is in that district – is affiliated with the South Amsterdam Interfaith Network (Interreligieus Netwerk Zuid). As discussed in Section 4.3, this was revived in 2015 with the support of the district authorities. Both congregations, each with about 2,000 members, are thus part of the same interreligious constellation.

The current Al-Kabir Mosque was opened in 1982 and is a member of the National Union of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands (Unie van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties in Nederland, UMMON). Mohamed Echarrouti, the founder in 1974 of one of the country’s first mosques, also helped set up Al-Kabir and sits on its board. He taught the current imam, Marzouk Aulad Abdellah, Arabic, and Koranic recitation (‘tajwid’). The mosque is affiliated with Ibn Khaldoun and Al-Maarif, foundations with a focus on educational activities. Echarrouti, together with Idris El Boujoufi, plays an important role in UMMON. At various times over years the mosque has attracted unwelcome public attention. In 1983, for instance, a conflict arose over an imam’s refusal to say a prayer of blessing for the King of Morocco during his sermon. And in 1985 there was consternation in some quarters in Amsterdam when a planning application was submitted for the construction of a minaret, although in the end this was never built. The name ‘al-masjid al-kabir’ – literally ‘the big mosque’ – refers to its aspiration to serve as ‘the’ Friday house of prayer for Amsterdam’s entire Moroccan Muslim community.

The family of the current imam is from Tangier. Born in 1965, Marzouk Aulad Abdellah came to the Netherlands at the age of nine. He received his first religious training from Echarrouti and then went on to study in Cairo at Al-Azhar University, where he obtained his doctorate. He was appointed imam of Al-Kabir in 2000, a role he combines with teaching Islamic Law and Islamic Theology at VU Amsterdam. Rabbi Menno ten Brink of LJG Amsterdam, born in 1959, studied law and then worked for several years at the Association of Dutch Local Authorities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) before following the rabbinical training course at Leo Baeck College in London. Between 1993 and 2004 he served as rabbi of the LJG congregations in Rotterdam, in Amsterdam, and at the Dutch Ministry of Defence. At present, he is the full-time rabbi for the congregation in the capital. He also sits on its dialogue committee, on behalf of the rabbinate, along with a member representing the congregation’s governing board.
In a 2015 interview, Abdellah stated that his collaboration with the Jewish community began in about 1989 when he attended meetings in Paris organised by the FFEU – the Jewish-Muslim cooperative organisation founded in the US in response to tensions between the Jewish and African-American communities (see above) – along with Amsterdam rabbi Raphael (Rav) Evers.

Marzouk Aulad Abdellah and Menno ten Brink regard combating mutual prejudice as their most important common task. According to them, it is mainly because of perceptions that Jews and Muslims find themselves in conflict. Abdellah points out the favourable position enjoyed by Jews in Morocco and Islamic Spain in the Middle Ages. The collaboration between the two spiritual leaders is based on mutual sympathy and friendship, but they have also chosen an emphatically cordial approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: they agree to disagree on this issue and prefer instead to focus on good cooperation in the Amsterdam context. Building on this relationship, from time to time members of the two congregations (or at least their imams and rabbis) participate in each other’s rites and customs – by delivering sermons, for example – as well as joining in with other rituals and celebrations such as ‘dialogue seder’ meals organised by LJG Amsterdam at Passover.

9.2.2 Interreligious Dialogue: Rituals and Festivals

Whilst the communication between the participants in a religious dialogue is related by definition to the realm of religion, often with religious ethics occupying centre stage in the performative acts of coming together and engaging in discussion, in many cases interactions of this kind are closely interwoven with ritual elements and incorporate aesthetic expressions. Iftars and Eid al-Fitr, for example, traditionally being rituals to which non-Muslims are invited, have long been used as opportunities to organise interreligious dialogues.

9.2.2.1 London

Van Esdonk points out that interreligious iftars are organised at and by mosques and synagogues in London, and that the same holds true for Hanukkah celebrations. Often, such events take place in particular neighbourhoods where Jewish and Muslim communities live in close proximity to one another. London-based orthodox rabbi Natan Levy, for instance, became well-known for his participation in the Ramadan fast. That was not something he did by chance, he explained, but as a means to improve interreligious relations. Levy, who is active in the organisation Strengthening Faith Institutions (SFI), which cooperates with the Faiths Forum for London (FF4L), sees the organisation of rituals in an interfaith environment as an important means of making the unfamiliar familiar in a
religous setting. In a similar vein, he has been active in setting up a ‘sukkah’ (a symbolic shelter) in a mosque for Sukkot and organising iftars at London synagogues during Ramadan.

Mitzvah Day and Sadaqa Day, two female-led social ‘ritual’ events with religious overtones organised in London Jewish and Muslim circles respectively, gave rise to Nisa-Nashim, the UK-wide Jewish-Muslim women’s network founded by Laura Marks and Julie Siddiqi in 2015. According to its website, as of 2021 this network has some 24 local groups, including several in London, which meet over home-made meals and engage in activities ranging from attending cultural events to social action. And also, as we shall see below, SR sessions. They are helped in that regard by the interfaith group at the University of Cambridge. Each local group is coordinated by a Jewish and a Muslim woman. The network is funded by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and supported by the Board of Deputies.

9.2.2.2 Amsterdam

For a while between about 2000 and 2015, interreligious iftars were sponsored by the local government in Amsterdam and many of these occasions were used to encourage dialogues between Muslims and Jews. Pesach has also provided such opportunities and, as we have seen above, LJG Amsterdam has promoted them as well. The West Amsterdam Interfaith Network (West interreligieus Netwerk, WiN) organised interreligious iftar meetings, too. Meanwhile, the Maimon Foundation (Stichting Maimon) has put the Mimouna celebration centre stage. This is originally a Jewish Moroccan festival marking the end of Pesach which is also observed by Moroccan Jews now living elsewhere, including Israel. The organisers of the Amsterdam version use it as an opportunity to invite speakers from Morocco, from the worlds of politics and scholarship.

9.2.3 Culture: Theatre, Music, and Film

9.2.3.1 London

As part of her London fieldwork, Van Esdonk has made an extensive study of artistic and cultural engagement – in particular with theatre, film, and music. For example, she discusses the youth theatre group MUJU (a reference to Muslims and Jews) and its comedies centring on Jewish-Muslim relations. It was established in 2004 as one of a series of educational projects at North London’s Tricycle Theatre. Audiences are actively involved in the group’s artistic process, for instance by inviting them to participate in rehearsals and previews. In this way, the performative ‘play’ become a ‘ritual’ event intended to change those participants and their communities rather than ‘merely’ entertaining them.
Van Esdonk mentions that a party from Nisa-Nashim attended MUJU’s production *Come In! Sit Down*, as did members of both London Central Mosque and West London Synagogue. The 2015 Jewish Comedy Festival also included an interfaith show, with the title *A Rabbi, a Vicar and an Imam Walk into a Comedy Club*.

Van Esdonk encountered narratives of Jewish-Muslim relations in London on the big screen, too. The year 2010 saw the release of the film *The Infidel*, a comedy written by the British Jewish writer David Baddiel. This tells the story of Mahmud Nasir, a London taxi driver of Pakistani origin played by the originally Iranian Baha’i actor Omid Djalili, who finds himself struggling with his identity after discovering by chance in his father’s papers that he was born Jewish and only later adopted into a Muslim family. This prompts him to start learning about Judaism with an American-born Jew, Lenny. The film satirises stereotypes about Jews and Muslims, especially in London, as well as their conflicts and differences. It also plays with religious identities of protagonists who are cultural Jews and Muslims, even though Mahmud and Lenny are still believers. *The Infidel* was later adapted into a stage musical, premiering at the Theatre Royal Stratford East in 2014. A second film comedy dealing with the theme of Jewish-Muslim relations appeared in 2015. It is called *Dough* and is about a Jewish baker who hires a young Muslim to work for him.

As well as theatre and film, music is also used as a medium for interreligious and intercultural cooperation. During Van Esdonk’s fieldwork, the University of London’s School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS) organised a concert at North London Synagogue specifically addressing Jewish-Muslim relations. ‘Songs of the Inner Heart’ was based on poems in the ‘muwashshah’ style, a literary form which flourished in medieval Muslim Iberia. They were sung by an Israeli woman and an Arab man, with lyrics in both Hebrew and Arabic. A similar form was used for the song *Between Darkness and Light*, performed at the launch of Sadaqa Day in 2015.

A final example of artistic expression found by Van Esdonk is storytelling. She came across several events featuring a Muslim woman relating traditional stories in both Islamic and interfaith contexts. The same performer has also provided programmes for schools on Islam and Judaism and has worked frequently with a Jewish storyteller at interfaith events. In 2015 the pair organised *Woven Threads and Torn Fabric* at St Ethelburga’s Centre (see above), telling the story of the prophet Joseph from both Jewish and Muslim perspectives. The Muslim storyteller also performed at the launch of Nisa-Nashim in 2015 and at an event entitled Female Voices, held by 3FF together with the London Jewish community centre JW3 and the venue Rumi’s Cave.

9.2.3.2 Amsterdam

Suzanne Roggeveen mentions several examples of ‘interreligious’ performers based in Amsterdam. Eran Ben-Michaël and George Elias Tobal, for
example, are a duo who create theatre about friendship, tensions between different ethnic and religious groups and the Middle East.© While the themes they engage with are close to the subject of this study, however, they themselves cannot be seen as a typical example of Muslim-Jewish relations even though they appear to be exploring this topic from experience. A Syrian refugee who came to the Netherlands with his parents at the age of 13, Tobal is not in fact a Muslim. Yet it is precisely the impression that he is one which they exploit in their performances:

Milan, tall and blond, is totally behind the statement the show is making, he says. What statement? The statement about the multicultural society. He knows it: I’m doing the right thing, I’m on stage with a Jew and a Muslim. He even seems a little proud of it. The well-intentioned white Dutchman. Who doesn’t know him? He has the best of intentions for migrants, for asylum seekers, for women, but the more he confirms their equality, the more his own sense of superiority shines though. And he’s narrow-minded, too. George isn’t a Muslim? But he looks like one, Milan thinks. And doesn’t he come from one of those countries? What’s more, to describe himself Milan uses the passé word blank (‘white’) instead of contemporary wit!©

The nub of the matter here is the perceived polarisation of Israelis and Arabs, Jews and Muslims. The idea that these groups are irreconcilably divided is portrayed as a (Western) stereotype which forces people into a ‘Muslim-Jewish’ frame even when they do not identify themselves in those terms.

Another example, in another branch of the arts, is ‘vocal music’. Roggeveen briefly mentions that, in about 2013, a singing duo started to address Jewish-Muslim relations in their work. Calling themselves Noam and Teema, they met in 2013 and perform songs in both Hebrew and Arabic. They describe their music as jazz and say that their songs are intended to bring about peace and cultural harmony. In an interview with the newspaper NRC Handelsblad, they tell an interesting and painful story about their work. Teema (not her real name), an Amsterdam woman from a Moroccan Muslim background, explains that she was inspired by her own artistic and cultural goals to collaborate with Noam. Together they recorded an album called EastWest.© Eventually, her work with Noam became quite well known in the Middle East. Following mediation by André Azoulay, at the time a Jewish adviser to Morocco’s King Mohamed VI, the pair performed inconspicuously at a festival in Morocco with the monarch’s approval. But once the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement heard about her work with Noam, an Israeli Jew, Teema tells us that she began to be pressured to end the partnership. The case led to much discussion in the Middle East and Teema received threats. This caused both singers great distress and in the end led Teema to move to Istanbul in
2015. In the interview she criticises the Muslim communities in the Netherlands for their conservatism.

One example of a Jewish-Muslim initiative which can be categorised as building on ‘perceived similarities’ is the Amsterdam ‘cultural circle of friends’ Salaam-Shalom. This was founded on 29 May 2014 to be, as we have seen earlier (Section 4.3), the successor to the Amsterdam Jewish-Moroccan Network (Joods Marokkaans Netwerk Amsterdam, JMNA). Its founders included Rabbi Lody van de Kamp, Karima Belhaj, Constantijn Vecht, and Fatima Elatik, their aim being to bring Jews and Muslims together and make it clear they are not rivals but can act together given that “the culture of Muslims and Jews has been intertwined for centuries in many countries of origin”. To achieve this, the ‘circle’ organises activities related to art and culture, such as excursions, reading groups, and themed meetings. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is taboo as a subject for discussion. There is structural cooperation with the LJG Amsterdam.

In 2020 Chantal Suissa, Fatima Akalai, Lody van de Kamp and Raja Alouani decided to found another Jewish-Muslim network, Yalla!, to tackle mutual prejudices, and to strengthen ties between the two groups. This is an independent foundation intended to be “the network for Jews and Muslims in the Netherlands, for an inclusive society in which you can visibly be yourself”. It goes on to state that “Together we look at what we can contribute in the fields of social debate, culture, education, music and positive exchanges and perceptions ...”. From the above ‘mission statements’ we can deduce that the initiators of these networks are attempting to avoid becoming mired in problems related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the fate which befell the JMNA (see Section 4.4), primarily by drawing on cultural sources to achieve and perpetuate mutual enrichment and good relations. A deliberate choice has been made in both cases to take historical cultural bonds as the network’s basis and principal theme, and to make its main ambition to contribute towards social and cultural life. This choice also implies that religion does not play a major role in the interactions within Salaam-Shalom and Yalla! – an approach well suited to groups in which non-practising Jews and Muslims are active alongside their more religious peers.

9.3 Promotion of Common Interests in the Public Domain

This section focuses on the promotion of interests common to Muslims and Jews at local, citywide, national, and transnational levels. Advocacy of this kind takes place primarily with regard to the mitigation of rising tensions between the groups, combating racism and exclusion – including antisemitism and Islamophobia, as well as violence against Jews and Muslims – and defending or strengthening religious freedoms. These cover such areas as dietary rules and ritual slaughter but also the right to male circumcision, the protection of religious holidays specific to the two groups and rituals
surrounding death: issues of medical ethics such as organ and tissue donation as well as autopsies and funeral rites, including the right to a quick, dignified burial and eternal rest. These forms of advocacy often also have educational components – the Amsterdam project Get to Know your Neighbours (*Leer je buren kennen*), for example, has this as one of its objectives. As ours is a study of Jewish-Muslim relations, we concentrate specifically on activities organised jointly by the two groups or by one of them for the purpose of joint promotion of such interests in the public domain and thus directed at a third party (the government, a political party, the general public).\(^{63}\)

### 9.3.1 London

The most telling example of local joint advocacy in the British capital is the Muslim Jewish Forum of North London (MJF), already briefly mentioned in Section 4.2 as one of several joint initiatives by Jews and Muslims to emerge between 2000 and 2010. In the press release announcing its establishment, shortly before the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US, the founders stated that the purpose of the forum was threefold: to provide a point of contact for each community, to work towards common goals, and to develop a strategic partnership.\(^ {64}\) One of those founders was Rabbi Heschel Gluck, knighted in 2013 for his achievements in promoting interfaith dialogue (both nationally and internationally) and currently the president of Haredi security organisation Shomrim (Hebrew for ‘watchmen’). The partners in this forum are representatives of the local ultra-orthodox Jewish community and the Muslim community in Stamford Hill (London Borough of Hackney), who meet from time to time to discuss their respective needs and how to articulate them towards the local council. The Jews of Stamford Hill began moving into the neighbourhood from East London, where they had originally settled (as described in Section 2.3), in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and early twentieth. From the 1960s onwards, Muslims from southeast Asia also settled in the area. Among them were a number of Burmese Rohingya, who had fled their country because of the ethnic persecution they faced. In Stamford Hill, they met Jews who also had southeast Asian backgrounds and spoke the same language. In one early example of cooperation, the newcomers were helped in converting a former synagogue for Islamic worship. The North London Forum attracted media attention in the wake of the 2005 London bombings, and again after the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in 2013, when the Shomrim turned out to protect a local mosque.\(^ {65}\) The Jewish and Muslim groups involved focus on what unites them, in particular local community and social issues such as housing, employment, security, and care for the elderly, who in both groups prefer to live with family rather than in old people’s homes, but also common religious interests. For example, they jointly oppose the compulsory weekend closure of local funeral parlours.
because of the threat it poses to Islamic and Jewish funerary rites. They also campaign on issues like halal and kosher food, and thus against any ban on ritual slaughter. Some matters, however, are deliberately not discussed. For example, they have agreed not to venture into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to avoid religious dogmas in a narrower sense. This decision may be related to the Jewish and Muslim notions concerning the limits of interreligious dialogue discussed earlier in this chapter.

Jointly countering antisemitism and Islamophobia is included explicitly among the objectives of this type of activity. One of Van Esdonk’s interlocutors, the director of an interfaith organisation, told her this in 2014: “There are some very strategic interests that [Jews and Muslims] have to work [at] together as minority communities, because the mainstream will not accept their views”. The same goes for issues around antisemitism and Islamophobia in British society, about which the same person said, “If the Jewish community is talking about Islamophobia, it is far more effective, and if the Muslim community is interested in antisemitic incidents, it is far [more effective]”. In Section 6.8 we saw how cooperation developed between the Community Security Trust (CST) and Tell MAMA in the fight against antisemitism and Islamophobia.

In 2008, after resigning her directorship of the Maimonides Foundation, Mehri Nikham founded the nationwide Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF) to focus on the education of schoolchildren, students, and religious leaders. In 2009 she launched the London-based charity the Council of Imams and Rabbis and four years later the Council of Muslim and Jewish Physicians. Over the course of its existence, the former has posted several statements on its website about topical issues, including Islamophobia and antisemitism, halal and kosher food and ritual slaughter.

Fighting antisemitism and Islamophobia is a concern not only for large representative organisations but also for some scriptural reasoning (SR) groups in London, with ramifications for the international Muslim-Jewish initiatives we discuss elsewhere in this chapter. Van Esdonk links this joint advocacy at the citywide level with more general shared ideals: leading a good life in a highly diverse metropolis, embedding small communities in local society and the cultivation of resilience within the groups concerned, a wish Van Esdonk claims is particularly prevalent among Jewish leaders in London. One idea is to build a network to fall back on should international conflicts flare up.

9.3.2 Amsterdam

One local project in Amsterdam with a national profile is Get to Know your Neighbours (Leer je buren kennen). As we have seen earlier, in Section 4.3, this was initiated in 2011 by LJG Amsterdam and is aimed at students – both Muslim and non-Muslim – in further and higher vocational education. It involves partners with an Islamic background, and there are
also links with the collaborative efforts we have discussed previously be-
tween the LJG Amsterdam and Al-Kabir Mosque. The project seeks to
overcome negative images of Jews by correcting stereotypes about them.
What originally prompted its launch was the opening of a regional further
education college with a large number of Muslim students near the then-
new LJG synagogue in South Amsterdam, which had given rise to a number
of antisemitic incidents. Evaluations have shown that the approach works
well.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, the project has proven so successful that it has since been
rolled out nationally and has been awarded several prizes.

At the Sjoel West synagogue, Erwin Brugmans – a man with an orthodox
background – long sought to counter mutual stereotypes.\textsuperscript{74} Looking back
to the early 2000s, he recalled his motivation for taking up this gauntlet:

There was a lot of commotion in the neighbourhood at the time. After the
9/11 attacks, we Jews had a lot of accusations thrown at us, by Moroccan
youngsters in particular. ‘Fucking Jew, stinking Jew, you’re the ones who
made those planes fly into the towers in New York.’ How do they come
up with this stuff? ... I said to people in my own Jewish community,
‘What are we doing? We’re here. Our synagogue has been here since
1957. We’ve led an unremarkable existence until now and here’s all this
fuss in New York. Now we’re being abused on Shabbat for wearing a
kippah on the way to the synagogue. There are two things we can do.
Either we leave with our tails between our legs or we say: no, that’s how
it was in the war, but ... this time we’re not going to let ourselves be
forced out ... ’ But how do you go about that? By talking with
Moroccans and Muslims and by working together. Then they realise
that Jews don’t have horns and are human, too. Eating together, playing
sports together, organising events together - that’s what work best.\textsuperscript{75}

Mo & Moos was also discussed briefly in Section 4.3.\textsuperscript{76} This project aims to
train eighteen young people from the Jewish and Muslim communities as
so-called ‘key figures’ capable of connecting the two groups at the grass-
roots level in order to prevent tensions arising between them. A second
objective is to coach the participants in such a way that they can “mean
something to society, the community and/or the media”.\textsuperscript{77} The woman
behind the initiative is Chantal Suissa -Runne of the LJG Amsterdam, and
local community centre Argan. One of those it has trained, journalist
Natascha van Weezel, has gone on to become involved in a VU Amsterdam
project entitled NEWConnective, which organises activities including in-
terreligious trips to Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{78}

Also worthy of mention here are the intercommunity discussions orga-
nised by successive Amsterdam mayors at their official residence. The first
series began under Job Cohen in 2004 and culminated then in the formation
of the JMNA (see above); the second series, convened by Eberhard van der
Laan, followed in the wake of the Gaza War of 2014, which had ignited
tensions between Jews and Muslims in the city. Key figures from both communities took part, meeting regularly and forming working groups to discuss their mutual relationships in terms of specific themes. Participants in those groups were also encouraged to develop new projects of their own. Among these was one entitled 180 Amsterdammers, involving Chantal Suissa and Ahmed Larouz. Another was ‘Children of A’dam’ (Kinderen van A’dam). The discussions themselves ended in the late 2010s, however.

9.4 Contributions to Neighbourhoods, Cities, Countries, and the World

In this section, we look at cooperative projects intended to make a positive contribution to the immediate or wider environment: a clean neighbourhood, social cohesion in the city, or peaceful relations nationwide, across Europe or in the rest of the world. What forms of cooperation do we find in London and Amsterdam?

9.4.1 London

We have already seen, in Section 4.2, how Julie Siddiqi created Sadaqa Day in 2015 as the Islamic counterpart of the Jewish Mitzvah Day, on which Jews and Muslims work together. Activist Laura Marks, a former officer of the Board of Deputies, plays an important role in this joint initiative on the Jewish side. Marks and Siddiqi also founded the Jewish-Muslim women’s network Nisa-Nashim in 2015. As well as meeting up and maintaining contacts over shared meals, as noted above, the participants dedicate themselves to the pursuit of social objectives. On this point, Siddiqi has the following to say:

The other thing I would just like to briefly mention ... is the importance of women doing things together for the benefit of wider society. So Jewish and Muslim, but generally [women] anyway ... . If you find a way to go and cook food and feed the homeless together, you’re not talking about religion, you are not talking about politics, you are just doing good. ... that is also a very powerful way of connecting. ... We did something on Sadaqa Day with Muslim and Jewish women ... , we could take Muslim volunteers to the old people’s home, they [the Jewish women] packed boxes, gave [them] to the homeless shelter, it’s great and powerful. You almost don’t need words, really.

The idea of joint social action is stimulated in the UK by government, directly and indirectly through such channels as the Church Urban Fund (CUF), as well as by leading figures in Jewish communities like former Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, whose 2007 essay *Face-to-Face, Side-by-Side* has had a demonstrable influence in shifting the emphasis in intercommunal
activities away from dialogue and towards engagement of this kind. Although this does not alter the fact that many face-to-face interfaith dialogue activities still take place. As far as scriptural reasoning (SR) is concerned, Van Esdonk and Wiegers’ research shows that there has been a move away from gatherings of an academic nature (the so-called ‘conference model’) in favour of joint meetings at grassroots level, in synagogues and mosques, at which texts are read in a less formal way (the ‘conversation model’) that is more appealing to a wider public. Strictly speaking, these are often not purely Jewish-Muslim forms of cooperation but in fact attract a broader group of interested participants, often from the same neighbourhood or district.

9.4.2 Amsterdam

Only a modest number of Amsterdam projects fall into the category being discussed in this section, the following among them. First, there have been several contributions at the local level. Following the Al-Qaeda attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, for example, a Jewish-Moroccan dialogue group was established in De Baarsjes – the neighbourhood where Sjoel West has been situated since 1957. This was an initiative by the leader of the local borough council, who was concerned that 9/11 would spark conflict between young people of Moroccan origin living in the area and its Jewish residents. One of its outcomes was the MaJo football tournament, which eventually expanded beyond this one locality to draw participants from all over the capital. Contacts between the various religious organisations in this part of the city would be formalised in 2012 under the umbrella of the multilateral WiN (see above).

Muslim youth worker Saïd Bensellam and Rabbi Lody van de Kamp began working together in 2010, their collaboration initially prompted by an incident in which a boy of Moroccan origin was seen giving a Nazi salute. Their foundation, Saïd & Lody, focuses on advice and policy, dialogue and unity, deradicalisation, training, and coaching, both within Jewish and Muslim circles and beyond.

Bensellam is also involved in another local initiative. In 2011, together with Amsterdam funfair operator Frans Stuy, he set up a joint Jewish-Moroccan heritage project to restore the Ashkenazi Zeeburg Cemetery in Amsterdam and making it accessible to the public. Jewish and Moroccan youngsters are working alongside one another on this task, with support from a number of organisations. Although the published sources do not explicitly say so, the underlying aim is to make young Moroccans more aware of the great similarities between Muslim and Jewish funerary customs and of the value of this religious and historical heritage, which is important for everyone living in Amsterdam.

Joint activities with a national focus as well as a local objective include those around the fight against racism, exclusion, and xenophobia, in
particular the cooperation on this theme from the 1980s onwards between Jewish and Moroccan organisations. In Amsterdam they included the LJG Amsterdam and the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands (Komitee van Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland, KMAN). We have already devoted substantial coverage to this struggle elsewhere. In the Netherlands as in other European countries, at around that time immigration by so-called ‘guest workers’ prompted debate in Jewish circles about their status as viewed from that community’s own perspective as one with a history of migration and with experience of suffering exclusion and persecution. As a symbol of the common struggle this was perceived as engendering, from 1992 Jews and Muslims worked together to organise the annual Kristallnacht commemoration in Amsterdam – an event of national as well as local significance. Relations gradually became more strained, however, until they ruptured altogether and by the early 2000s two different ceremonies were being held in parallel. The contributing groups found it impossible to collaborate any longer because of irreconcilable differences of opinion concerning the scope of the commemoration – specifically, whether it should centre solely on remembrance of the Jewish victims of Kristallnacht itself or also address exclusion and persecution on a wider scale, not just in the Netherlands but also elsewhere in the world, including the Middle East and Israel. Where the focus should lie, with the Shoah and antisemitism alone or with the oppressed and persecuted in general – Muslims included – had become a decisively divisive issue.

Muslim and Jewish participation in the Consultative Body of Jews, Christians and Muslims (Overlegorgaan Joden, christenen en moslims, OJCM) also transcend Amsterdam. As with its predecessor, the so-called Cairo Group, representatives of both groups use the platform provided by this forum to speak out on a wide range of social issues of national importance, among them discrimination and exclusion, but also religious freedom and respect for faith groups. The OJCM is one of the organisations behind the ‘Building Bridges’ (Bruggenbouwen) project and the Faith in Living Together Foundation (Stichting Geloven in Samenleven), launched in 2019.

9.5 Conclusions

In Section 9.2 we looked at interreligious dialogue in a narrow sense, focusing on practices surrounding religious texts and rituals and festivals, and found that the number of collaborative ventures in this field has grown more rapidly in London than in Amsterdam. But how can this difference be explained? The answer lies first of all in the fact that the Jewish and Muslim communities in London are both much larger than those in Amsterdam. The London Jewish community, moreover, has a far more religious character than the one in the Dutch capital, where the majority of Jews are secular and around 80 per cent have no affiliation with a synagogue. Also,
and unlike Amsterdam and the Netherlands, London and the UK have an extensive faith sector within civil society through which dialogue between religions and beliefs is not only encouraged but is supported financially by the government. Furthermore, with its established Anglican Church, England does not formally separate church and state in the way the Netherlands does. Religious institutions such as the Board of Deputies and the Church Urban Fund (CUF), Cambridge and other universities, institutes like Leo Baeck College and government departments including the MHCLG and the Home Office, along with numerous charitable funds, support dialogue-based interreligious activities by faith groups. The far more arms-length relations between religion and the state in the Netherlands make comparable government backing impossible in Amsterdam. We look at this topic in more detail in Section 10.4.

The aim of many forms of interreligious dialogue, including scriptural reasoning (SR) and similar methods involving the shared reading of religious texts, is to renew and improve relations between groups by taking a philosophically critical and interactive approach to scripture and other source materials. In London, from 2007 onwards we observe a move away from interfaith dialogue (‘face to face’ activity) in a narrow sense towards social action (‘side by side’ activity) – a shift reflected not only in the works of key religious leaders like Jonathan Sacks but also in the policies of the CUF. Sacks and other critics viewed interfaith dialogue in its narrower sense as a relatively élitist affair from which little real change could be expected, and which might even lead unintentionally to tensions and conflict – especially when the texts involved could also be read in a political context, in particular that of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. For this reason, various groups and individuals began advocating joint cultural activities and social action as an alternative. As Natan Levy puts it, culture and social action are “safe”. Consequently, in London as in Amsterdam – where interreligious dialogue has never been a major feature of Jewish-Muslim relations – there is now a strong emphasis on joint social action. As far as SR is concerned, moreover, Van Esdonk and Wiegers’ research shows that in London there has been a move away from gatherings of an academic nature (the ‘conference model’) in favour of joint meetings at grassroots level, in synagogues and mosques, where texts are read in a less formal way (the ‘conversation model’) more appealing to a wider public.

When it comes to interreligious dialogue in the most specific sense of the term (that is, confined to religious and moral themes), we have found here and in previous chapters that liberal and reform Jews play a particularly prominent role. In Amsterdam this means the LJG first and foremost, and in London rabbis associated with Leo Baeck College. Orthodox rabbis are also active in joint Jewish-Muslim activities, as shown above, but they are interested not so much in interreligious dialogue as in cultural and social exchanges and cooperation. One of these rabbis argues that this may be
related to the lack of attention paid to interreligious dialogue in orthodox rabbinical education. Liberal Jews, by contrast, seem to see more perspective in the enriching aspects of religious dialogue with Muslims than other groups. Interestingly, as noted above, the use of ritual and celebration is viewed by some informants as an independent, performative mode of interaction.

In both cities, we also find the use of art and cultural expressions, sometimes but not always as a result of or in addition to interreligious dialogue. The cultural histories of Jews and Muslims have created a wealth of common ‘repertoire’ they can draw on. From our survey above, we can deduce that members of both communities in London make greater use than their counterparts in Amsterdam of artistic forms of communication to better acquaint themselves with each other’s religions and religious and secular cultures, and in so doing perhaps do themselves and each other a greater service. Intercultural dialogue revolves primarily around the theme of perceived cultural and historical similarities, which both groups can relate to an experience of a ‘shared’ past. Depending on the historical backgrounds of those concerned, reference is made here to places as diverse as Morocco, the Iberian Peninsula, Tunisia and Algeria, the Middle East, and even India. Generally, these references concern the period before the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. The themes covered include literature, poetry, culinary customs, and positive historical interactions between the groups, such as the assistance provided to Jews by Muslims in the Balkans and the Middle East during the Second World War, about which an exhibition has been organised in London. As well as cultural events linked directly to the history and culture of Jews and Muslims, moreover, there are also artistic collaborations more remote from them. We have in mind here MUJU in London, for instance, and the singers Teema and Noam in Amsterdam. In London, we can also think of the film The Infidel and the theatre production which emerged from it. We find such cultural expressions in both cities. Whilst their aim is to reinforce mutual identification and break down stereotypes, such as the idea that conflict between Jews and Muslims always prevails over good relations, on occasions they also attract the attention of parties keen to draw them into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This happens in both London and Amsterdam.

In Section 9.3 we focused on the promotion of common interests in the public arena. Two categories were identified here, each rooted in different grounds: on the one hand interests related to the perceived religious and cultural similarities between Jews and Muslims, on the other those arising out of the socio-cultural and political positions of both groups as minorities in the Netherlands and the UK. Into these categories fall such issues as halal and kosher food and ritual slaughter. For Jews and Muslims alike, issues related to food touch on religious and cultural group identity in a very fundamental way. Above all, the freedom to slaughter livestock in accordance with the rules of sharia or halacha symbolises the acceptance of
their presence in society. In both the UK and the Netherlands, however, the right to ritual slaughter is coming under pressure and Muslims and Jews are united in their efforts to preserve it. The opposition is driven by a variety of motives, ranging from concern for animal welfare to an aversion to supposed ‘ritual torture’, but antisemitic and Islamophobic tropes have never been far away when this theme is discussed. Public contributions by Jews and Muslims concerning ritual slaughter take place mainly at national and international political levels, however, and local interaction on the topic between Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam has lagged behind. One of Van Esdonk’s informants regrets this; he wonders whether more attention should not be paid at the local level to improving mutual knowledge of the rules concerning halal and kosher slaughter.

In the British capital, we have highlighted the Muslim Jewish Forum of North London (MJF), and on the other side of the North Sea the project Get to Know your Neighbours developed by LJG Amsterdam, which is also a member of the local South Amsterdam Interfaith Network. Here, one of its partners in interreligious dialogue is the Al-Kabir Mosque. While the London forum avoids all discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or interfaith issues, to some extent these are addressed during the mosque-synagogue contacts in Amsterdam. The difference in approach in this case may be due at least in part to the religious orientation of the Jewish community involved: ultra-orthodox in the UK, liberal in the Netherlands.

There are also transnational aspects to Jewish-Muslim collaboration in both cities. In 2007 the Platform for Jewish-Muslim Cooperation was established by the organisation CEJI – Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe (CEJI). This initiative, aimed primarily at combating antisemitism and Islamophobia, is subsidised by the European Commission and the Ford Foundation. The World Congress of Rabbis and Imams for Peace has met several times: at Brussels in 2005, Seville in 2006, and Paris in 2008. The 2005 gathering was opened jointly by the kings of Belgium and Morocco, demonstrating the interest of these heads of state take in its work. The CEJI remains in existence and over the years has produced a number of publications charting and categorising Jewish-Muslim cooperative initiatives in Europe; its creation stemmed from the desire of European Jews, as a minority in Europe, to reduce tensions between Jews and Muslims and to jointly combat antisemitism and Islamophobia by strengthening and publicising initiatives at the local level. Then there is the youth-focused Muslim Jewish Conference, which has been convening annually since about 2009.

In Section 9.4 we homed in on contributions to the neighbourhood, city, country, and world. From their own experiences of antisemitism and Islamophobia, racial exclusion, and persecution, many Jews and Muslims see it as their common task as minorities to contribute towards combating such phenomena in their own city, their own country, and other parts of the world. Some remain focused specifically on this goal, but others translate
their shared experiences into joint social action in a broader sense. For example, they extrapolate their religious responsibility into work to alleviate poverty, to improve the position of women, refugees, the elderly and the lonely, to protect the environment, and to preserve heritage. We see this approach reflected very strongly in the activities of the members of Nisa-Nashim in London and the rest of the UK. In Amsterdam, by contrast, the number of initiatives within this category is small. One striking example, though, is the renovation of the Jewish Zeeburg Cemetery, in which young people with a Muslim Moroccan background are involved. This initiative is closely related to the projects developed by Said Bensellam and Lody van de Kamp, which are aimed in various ways at improving relations between population groups in the city of Amsterdam.

Notes

1 See Chapter 2; see also Wasserstrom 1995 and Hughes 2017.
3 Roggeveen 2020, 183–251; Van Esdonk 2020, 211–258. In this chapter we also make use of Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers 2017 and Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019.
4 The subsequent pages closely follow Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019.
8 Magonet 2003, 208. See also Appendix 1, ‘What is JCM?’ (Magonet 2003, 208–214), listing the themes of student conferences between 1972 and 2002.
9 Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 18.
10 Van Esdonk 2020, 118; see also Hussain & Kahn-Harris 2005, 10.
11 Hussain & Kahn-Harris 2005, 10.
12 Van Esdonk 2020, 118. For Halima Krausen, see: https://wisemuslimwomen.org/muslim-woman/halima-krausen-7/.
13 Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019.
14 Emon 2016.
15 Van Esdonk 2020, 243.
16 See: https://www.fodip.org.uk/.
17 Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 33.
18 See also Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 39.
19 Interview with Natan Levy, 27 April 2017.
22 A Jewish dialogical/dialectical form of reasoning.
23 See Al-Hussaini 2009.
24 Roggeveen 2020, 193, Appendix 4; Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers 2017.
25 Ibid.
26 Reedijk 2010.
Upon her appointment in 2012 as professor of Intercultural Theology at VU Amsterdam, Marianne Moyaert expressed her intention to construct an ‘Abrahamic tent’ there, in which Christians, Jews, and Muslims would practise scriptural reasoning (Ad Valvas, 28 November 2012).

Before that it used the synagogue on Jacobsstraat.

Interview with Marzouk Aulad Abdellah and Menno ten Brink in De Volkskrant, 17 August 2018.

For this project, see Ministerie SZW 2017, 34. See also Chapter 4 above.

Written interview with Maureen Arnhem, 8 February 2021.

Interview in De Volkskrant, 17 August 2018.

The association behind the mosque was established in 1972, according to Al-Kabir’s own website. See: https://moskeealkabir.nl/.


Ibid.

We have distilled the details provided here about Marzouk Aulad Abdellah and Menno ten Brink from the mentioned double interview in De Volkskrant, 17 August 2018.

See: https://www.ljgamsterdam.nl/nl/commissies-0.

See: https://ffeu.org/.

Observation by the second author at a dialogue seder he attended as a guest on 3 April 2018.

See Poorthuis 2020.

See, for example, Antoun 1968.

Van Esdonk 2020, 243–244.

Interview with Natan Levy, 27 April 2017.


For Mitzvah Day, see: https://mitzvahday.org.uk/vision-mission/, and for Sadaqa Day: https://mysadaqaday.org/. The name Nisa-Nashim, coined in 2015, is derived from the Arabic and Hebrew words for ‘women’.

See: https://www.nisanashim.org/about/about.html, and interview with Julie Siddiqi, 26 April 2017.

Interview with Julie Siddiqi, 26 April 2017.

See, for example, Levy 2021.

Since 2018 the Kiln Theatre, see Van Esdonk 2020, 244–246.

Van Esdonk 2020. The actors themselves were non-observant Jews and observant Muslims.

For the film, see Vellenga & Wiegers 2020a.

Van Esdonk 2020, 124.

See: https://www.jw3.org.uk/.

In Roggeveen 2020, Appendix 4.

See for their theatre company, George & Eran Productie: http://georgegeneranproducties.nl/over-ons/.

Interview in Trouw, 12 January 2019.

Roggeveen also mentions an informal network of Jewish and Muslim artists and an ‘art exhibition’, but provides no further details either in the text or in the list in Appendix 4.

Roggeveen 2020, Appendix 4: “Two female singers who sing in Hebrew and Arabic, Noam & Teema”; interview with Teema and Noam in NRC Handelsblad, 1 August 2018.

The second author is member of this Facebook group. See: https://www.facebook.com/groups/694804121181247.

The examples of advocacy in Amsterdam discussed here are based on Roggeveen 2020, Chapter 7 (on ‘Cooperation’), and the list of projects in its Appendix. In addition, we have drawn on a publication by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Ministerie SZW 2017) and a number of other sources. For London, use was made of Van Esdonk, 2020; see below.

“Provide a point of access for each community; work together on common aims; and develop a strategic partnership”. In: Van Esdonk 2020, 116.

For this, see Dominguez Diaz 2013.

Van Esdonk 2020, 133.

Ibid., 226ff.

Unfortunately, only a few documents made public by the foundation proved accessible for our research.

See also Van Esdonk & Wieggers 2019.


Ministerie SZW 2017, 56.

Van der Heijden & De Wit 2014, 9–10.

For Sjoel West, see: NIHS, https://nihs.nl/synagoges/sjoel-west/. This synagogue is also a member of the local interfaith network WiN (see above). This was established in about 2012 as the successor to the Bos and Lommer Interfaith Council (Bos en Lommer Interreligieus Beraad), itself founded around 2005. See Roggeveen 2020, 192, 288.

Interview with Erwin Brugmans, 3 February 2020. See also Section 4.3.

Ministerie SZW 2017, 34.

Ibid., 34–35.

Ibid., 35.

See Section 4.3 and Ministerie SZW 2017, 30ff.

Ministerie SZW 2017, 26. The discussions were confidential and are not accessible to our research team; the names of the participants have not been made public.

This culminated in the publication of the same name, which appeared in 2016.

See The Jewish Chronicle, 22 March 2018.

Interview with Julie Siddiqi, 26 April 2017.

The policy plan for cooperation with communities in multifaith Britain launched by the New Labour government in 2008 bears almost the same title: Face to Face and Side by Side, a Framework for Partnership in our Multi Faith Society (DCLG 2008).

Van Esdonk & Wieggers 2019, 40ff.

See Section 4.3.

Interview with Erwin Brugmans, 3 February 2020.

Ibid. See also: https://www.saidenlody.nl. According to this website, the project aims to help “improve the poor image of young Moroccans”.

This project is described as very important in Bart Wallet’s publication on the cemetery ((Wallet, Van Trigt & Van Huit-Schimmel 2014, 9; also photographs K 12 and 13 on p. 76). See also: https://www.saidenlody.nl/interview/jongeren-werken-mee-aan-eerherstel-joodse-begraafplaats-zeeburg/

Vellenga & Wieggers 2020b.

Vellenga & Wieggers 2020b. See also Section 4.3 and Chapter 8.

See Section 4.3.

Vellenga & Wieggers 2011.

Ministerie SZW 2017, 48–50 and see: https://geloveninsamenleven.nl/.
For more details, see Chapter 3.
Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019, 16ff.
Interview with Natan Levy, 27 February 2017.
Ibid.
Van Esdonk 2020, 117. Interestingly, Rabbi Lody van de Kamp subsequently brought a version of this exhibition to Amsterdam. It has since toured other parts of the Netherlands as well.
See Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
Van Esdonk 2020, 226.
Friedman 2008.
See for the first version of mapping reports of Jewish Muslim Dialogue in Friedman 2008 and the second version in CEJI – A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe 2013. See also Sharkey 2005.
Friedman 2008, 47.
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Publications


**Internet Sources**

The internet sources used are listed in the endnotes. These were consulted in 2020 or 2021.
Part III

Analyses and Conclusions
10 Jewish-Muslim Relations Analysed

10.1 Introduction

Having examined the sources of conflict in the current bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam in Chapters 5 to 8, and the sources of cooperation in Chapter 9, in this chapter we focus on the factors that influence these relations. In the previous chapters we have found that the sensitive themes in these relationships do not automatically result in conflict, just as the themes on which Jews and Muslims and their institutions often agree do not automatically result in cooperation. Whether they actually result in conflict or cooperation depends partly on how people in Jewish and Muslim circles deal with these themes, in other words, the social identity strategies used. In this chapter, we explore these and other factors that influence current bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in both capitals. We compare the factors at play in London and Amsterdam.

Before addressing this, we make two observations. Firstly, as mentioned, our focus in this study is on current Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam in terms of ‘cooperation’ and ‘conflict’. To put this subject in the right perspective, we stress once again that it is important to realise that relations between large parts of the Jewish and Muslim communities in these cities are virtually non-existent. There is neither cooperation nor conflict between them, they live alongside each other peacefully without much contact, or they do have contact as neighbours, citizens, or colleagues without their Jewish or Muslim identity playing a pronounced role. They are aware of each other’s presence. We refer to this mutual relationship as ‘coexistence’.

Secondly, based on our theoretical framework and the existing scientific research on Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe, we can divide the influencing factors into three categories: institutional factors, positional factors, and contextual factors. Institutional factors are factors related to the characteristics and actions of Jews and Muslims and institutions associated with them (ideology, social identity strategies, and practical matters such as initiators, organisation, and resources); positional factors refer to the positions that Jews and Muslims and their institutions experience in relation
to each other in terms of ‘power’ and ‘identity’; and contextual factors refer to the forces that affect these relations based on context (history, trigger events, public opinion, mainstream Christian churches, traditional and social media, national and local governments, transnational actors). The basic idea is that Jewish-Muslim relations are the result of the dynamic interplay between these three types of factors. We address these factors in more detail below.

10.2 Institutional Factors: Ideology, Strategy, and Practical Matters

10.2.1 Ideology

The views held by Jews and Muslims on, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the desirability of mutual cooperation or the importance of conflict are often embedded in a larger set of views, in other words, an ideology. We use the term ‘ideology’ here in the neutral sense of a more or less complete set of beliefs and values that gives meaning to the efforts of individuals, a group, or an organisation. An ideology can be religious, non-religious, or secular. Religious ideologies often refer to a presumed transcendent reality, whereas secular ideologies do not. It is useful to distinguish between two dimensions of an ideology: the philosophical or doctrinal dimension, which concerns ‘human life and its meaning’, and the political dimension, which concerns ‘social life and its organisation’. Views on ‘life and social life’ are often but not necessarily connected. Although, in line with our theoretical approach, we do not consider ideology to be the most decisive factor in Jewish-Muslim relations, it does influence them. It influences the specific meanings Jews and Muslims ascribe to ‘us’ and ‘them’, motivates them to cooperate with or fight each other, and legitimises the means they may use to do so. For example, it is used to justify militant groups resorting to violence in certain cases.

Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research shows that the philosophical orientation of Jews and Muslims influences the type of cooperative activity in which they may be interested. We can distinguish between different types of cooperative activities, namely ‘intercommunal activities’ and ‘interreligious activities’, with the interreligious activities being broken down into ‘social action’ and ‘dialogue’. In ‘intercommunal activities’ Jews and Muslims encounter each other as ‘members’ of a particular population group, while in ‘interreligious activities’ they meet as believers. In practice, these types of activities are often mixed together. ‘Social action’ is characterised by Jews and Muslims doing something together and ‘dialogue’ by them speaking to each other, on religious or other themes. A specific form of Jewish-Muslim dialogue is ‘scriptural reasoning’, in which Jews and Muslims exchange views on religious texts that are authoritative in their traditions. Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research shows that Jews and
Muslims of all denominations participate in intercommunal activities in Amsterdam and London, while – as expected – virtually only religious Jews and ‘practising’ Muslims participate in interreligious activities. Because the proportion of religious Jews in London’s Jewish community is much larger than in Amsterdam’s, London has a much larger ‘breeding ground’ than Amsterdam to allow interreligious Jewish-Muslim activities to flourish. Interreligious ‘social action’ activities draw religious Jews and Muslims of all denominations. In other words, there is no ‘selective affinity’ between these activities and certain currents within the Jewish and Muslim communities in the two cities. Roggeveen observes, for example:

Project participants came from mosques and synagogues all over the city, from all kinds of ethnicities and religious backgrounds. There were, for example, members of a mosque which caters to Muslims of Moroccan descent in Amsterdam East, others from a mixed mosque Amsterdam West, and from Milli Görüs or Diyanet mosques in the west and south parts of the city.9

The doctrinal factor plays a crucial role in the Jewish-Muslim practice of scriptural reasoning (SR). Van Esdonk and Wiegers studied four cases of grassroots-level Jewish-Muslim scriptural reasoning (SR) in London.10 On the Jewish side, they found only ‘reform and liberal Jews’ and no ‘Orthodox and Haredi Jews’, which they did identify in other interreligious activities. On the Muslim side, interest in this practice is very diverse. Van Esdonk and Wiegers write:

We have found both progressive and conservative Muslims participating, depending on the initiative (…) we did not observe a clear pattern in the involvement of Sunni versus Shi’i Muslims, other than that in some cases it is related to the local presence of particular Sunni or Shi’i mosques.11

Notably, scriptural reasoning (SR) plays virtually no role in Amsterdam. We suspect this is due to the absence of initiators and the relatively small size of the liberal Jewish community in Amsterdam.

The doctrinal factor affects not only cooperative relationships but also conflictual relationships. It influences the way Jewish and Muslim militants look at ‘the other’, the motivation to fight ‘the other’ and the legitimacy to use violence in this respect. There are probably no differences between the two cities on this issue. Specific examples of this in radical Islamic circles can be found in the jihadist perpetrators of attacks in Europe who display an anti-Jewish attitude.12 One of them is Mohammed Bouyeri, member and ‘ideologist’ of the ‘Hofstad Group’, who murdered Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam on 2 November 2004.13 Apart from his thinking being influenced by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi
(1903–1979), two important founding fathers of radical Islamism, the source material Bouyeri collected before the murder contains Salafi documents and video material, including images of the ‘oppression of Muslims’ in Palestine/Israel, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.\(^\text{14}\) Almost all collected texts are in English; Bouyeri did not master enough Arabic. The vast majority of the material comes from Abu Hamza al-Misri (ca. 1957–), imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, who emigrated from Egypt to the UK in 1979. In the 1980s, he fought in Afghanistan and lost his hands and one eye. According to Ruud Peters, three documents in Bouyeri’s possession played a decisive role in his decision to use violence: a fatwa by Ibn Taymiyya, who believes those who insult the Prophet deserve the death penalty, a fatwa by Hamid al-ʿAli, a radical Kuwaiti scholar, who declared Yasser Arafat an apostate because he was in favour of a secular state in Palestine, and a document written by Amir Sulayman, entitled *The Battlefield: The Safest Place on Earth*.\(^\text{15}\) Bouyeri wrote a number of open letters, one of which he left on Van Gogh’s body. In the letter he accused Ayaan Hirsi Ali of being an apostate and strengthening the ranks of the “soldiers of evil”, as well as being an instrument of Jewish (and allegedly Jewish) politicians, including Amsterdam’s mayor Job Cohen.\(^\text{16}\) Bouyeri quoted the Talmud, but the quotations actually came from a defamatory American antisemitic pamphlet. In another letter, the then alderman of Amsterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, was called a secular Muslim and, in the eyes of Bouyeri, an infidel or apostate (kāfir) who deserved the death penalty (like Arafat according to the aforementioned fatwa).\(^\text{17}\) In an open letter to the Dutch people, the Dutch government was accused of being dominated by “Zionist” Jews, supporting Israel in the fight against Islam and collaborating with the coalition in the war in Iraq.\(^\text{18}\)

The four perpetrators of the attack on the London underground in 2005 cannot be directly linked to anti-Jewish ideology.\(^\text{19}\) However, they were in contact with the aforementioned Finsbury Park Mosque, and the video message left behind by one of the suicide bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan, stated that they rejected national identities in favour of the global ummah, which they believed was under attack. On 24 May 2014, visitors to the Jewish Museum in Brussels were attacked, resulting in four casualties. The convicted attacker, Mehdi Nemmouche, denied responsibility. The attack was judged to be antisemitic. The perpetrators of the coordinated attacks on the Bataclan and other sites in Paris are believed to have had links to IS.\(^\text{20}\) Amédy Coulibaly, who attacked a kosher supermarket in Paris on 9 January 2015, two days after the Charlie Hebdo attack, killing four visitors, told a journalist during the attack that he did so “because they were Jews”.\(^\text{21}\)

In Europe, Jewish militants are much less prominent than Islamic militants. To our knowledge, there have been no violent attacks by Jewish militants in the UK or the Netherlands in recent decades, the period covered by our study. These militants mainly fall under what political scientist Cas
Mudde labels “far-right”. Within the far right, he distinguishes between “extreme right, that is, fascism and Nazism” and “(populist) radical right, that is, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism”. In the first category, Mudde includes the Kahanism movement and the associated Jewish Defense League (JDL), which does not shun the use of violence in principle, and in the second category, Likud, which according to him has developed from “right wing” to “radical right” in recent decades. Many “populist radical right groups and parties” are characterised by Islamophobia, about which he says:

*Islamophobia*, an irrational fear of Islam or Muslims, has become the defining prejudice of the far right of the fourth wave. In this view, Islam is equated with Islamism, that is, an extremist political interpretation of Islam, and Muslims are seen as hostile to democracy and to all non-Muslims.

The political ideology factor plays an explicit role in, for example, the sensitive matter of the Israel-Palestine issue. In Section 5.5, we saw that the views of Jews and Muslims on current events surrounding this issue, such as the Gaza Wars since 2008–2009, are often embedded in a broader political vision of this conflict and of the history of the Jewish people and the history of Islam and Muslims, respectively, also in relation to Europe and the West. We also noted in that chapter that the Jewish and Muslim communities in both countries have very different thoughts on this issue. Although the public perception is that Jews and Muslims are diametrically opposed on this issue, the views and opinions in both groups vary widely. In the British Jewish community, for example, Kahn-Harris identified no fewer than 14 ideological positions on this subject, ranging from “Jewish radicals” to “the Haredi community” and from “anti-Zionist left” to “Jewish religious right”.

As regards the relationship between doctrinal or philosophical and political views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among Jews and Muslims, two things stand out. Firstly, that Jews, and also Muslims, who are relatively close philosophically, sometimes have very different visions and positions politically. For example, at the time of the Gaza War in 2014, there were Orthodox Jews in the UK who fully supported the joint call of the Board of Deputies and MCB to end the war but there were also Orthodox Jews who were outspoken opponents of this call. Secondly, that Jews and Muslims, who differ greatly philosophically, are sometimes very close to each other politically. A notable example is that members of the ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta movement and members of some Muslim groups who differ greatly philosophically both oppose the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and, at the time of the Gaza Wars, demonstrated in London side by side against the Israeli army’s actions against Palestinians. In other words, among British as well as Dutch Jews and
Muslims, doctrinal and political views appear to be relatively independent quantities, at least with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.\textsuperscript{29}

10.2.2 Social Identity Strategies

We have found that the way in which Jewish-Muslim relations are actually affected by the sources of conflict described and the sources of cooperation mentioned depends very much on how Jews and Muslims and their organisations deal with these sources, or in other words, on the social identity strategies they use.\textsuperscript{30} Based on our theoretical framework, we identify four clusters of strategies: strategies of cooperation, strategies of conflict, strategies of avoidance, and strategies of renunciation.\textsuperscript{31} The first two lead to cooperation and conflict, respectively, as their names suggest, and the last two to ‘coexistence’. Cooperative strategies are used to forge relationships and curb tensions, and conflict strategies to fight ‘the other’. Avoidance strategies are used to avoid contact with ‘the other’. Renunciation strategies are characterised by people not using their own Jewish or Muslim identity to play a role in their associations with others. Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research focuses on cooperative strategies and pays almost no attention to the other three clusters. We do consider them, however, and thus address the whole spectrum of strategies used in associating with ‘the other’.

In her research, Roggeveen identifies three cooperative strategies: ‘searching for similarities’, ‘decategorisation’ and ‘avoidance’, and Van Esdonk: ‘agree to disagree’, ‘avoiding difficulties’, and ‘addressing difficulties’, in which she includes ‘providing a “safe space” for discussion and engagement’, ‘deconstructing prejudice by creating a better understanding’, and ‘using (professional) mediators to facilitate discussions and reduce tensions’.\textsuperscript{32} The three most important strategies are ‘emphasising perceived similarities’, ‘deconstructing negative stereotypes’, and ‘agree to disagree’.

Roggeveen and Van Esdonk’s research shows that in many Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects in Amsterdam and London, the focus is on the strategy of emphasising perceived similarities, of searching for and cultivating assumed similarities between Jews and Muslims. They usually concentrate on three areas: religion, including faith ethos, culture, and social position.\textsuperscript{33} Roggeveen writes about such projects in Amsterdam:

What they did more often is search for aspects of their identities that they felt comfortable to allow each other in. They sought and found similarities in what they felt shared religious practices and traditions, their minority status and cultural elements, including ritual slaughter, male circumcision, fasting, donating to charity (\textit{zakāt/zedakah}), shared cuisine, shared histories and experiences of being excluded by what they perceived as the majority population.\textsuperscript{34}
Often the emphasis on finding common ground goes hand in hand with avoiding the discussion of difficult differences. These projects therefore often skirt around the sensitive topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. People avoid talking about it because it is seen as “too complicated” or “too difficult”.35

Roggeveen and Van Esdonk encountered the strategy of deconstructing negative stereotypes several times in educational projects aimed at combating antisemitism and Islamophobia.36 These projects use various didactic methods to question and, if possible, break down prejudices regarding Muslims and Jews. This strategy is also used in theatre projects and community projects. Sometimes, a few conversations between Muslims and Jews are enough to break down stereotypes about each other. A respondent in Van Esdonk’s survey said:

There are lots of myths and misunderstandings about one another, and suddenly, when you talk to people, you find out it’s not really that bad.37

The ‘agree to disagree’ strategy is characterised by the fact that the Jews and Muslims concerned recognise that they have very different views on one or more issues, while at the same time engaging in talks and/or cooperating with each other on points on which they do agree. This strategy is often applied in cooperation initiatives with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.38 People recognise that they have very different views on this conflict in the Middle East, but do not let it get in the way of cooperation on common issues in the UK or the Netherlands. A striking example of this strategy at the national level can be found in the joint statement issued by the Board of Deputies and MCB following the Gaza War in 2014, in which they stated:

There is no doubt that Muslims and Jews have deeply held views about the conflict in Israel and Palestine. We acknowledge that our communities may disagree about the origins, current reasons and solutions to end the conflict. But there are also points of agreement. The death of every civilian is a tragedy, and every effort should be taken to minimise such losses. The targeting of civilians is completely unacceptable and against our religious traditions. We pray for a speedy end to the current conflict and for a lasting peace for all. In spite of the situation in the Middle East, we must continue to work hard for good community relations in the UK. We must not import conflict. We must export peace instead.39

Two important conflict strategies are ‘emphasising assumed differences’ and ‘deconstructing perceived similarities’. The first strategy emphasises differences. There is no consideration for possible similarities, and the focus
is on what people dislike about ‘the other’, with whom they want to fight. This strategy is used by very different groups who have resistance as a common denominator but differ greatly in terms of their goals and the means they use to achieve them. We see this strategy used by CST and CIDI, which want to use legal means to combat jihadist antisemitism, and also by jihadist groups that turn against Jews because they see them as allies of Israel, which as a ‘Zionist colonial power’ oppresses Muslims in Palestine, and are prepared to use violence in this respect.\textsuperscript{40} We also find this strategy at CTID, which fights against Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands, and also among Jews who support movements that see Muslims as having an ‘evil ideology’ that is advancing in Europe, posing an ever greater threat to Jews in European cities and Europe’s support for Israel.\textsuperscript{41}

The strategy of deconstructing perceived similarities is characterised by the challenging of supposed similarities with regard to religion, culture, or social position and the accentuation of differences. We encounter this strategy in militant Jewish and Islamic circles as well as among Jews and Muslims who do not directly seek confrontation with ‘the other’ but wish to keep their distance. For example, in the 2011 debate on ritual slaughter, it was seen among Dutch rabbis who were strongly resisting the general view that Jewish and Islamic slaughters are comparable practices and instead emphasised the differences. In her analysis of their attitude, Paulien Post writes:

Islamic and Jewish slaughter methods share a few similarities; both are practiced by a deep incision with a very sharp knife on the throat and both are generally carried out without stunning. Nevertheless, the choice has been made to emphasise the differences in particular. For example, Chief Rabbi Jacobs said about the Wageningen report: “The Wageningen report is about Islamic ritual slaughter. The footage presented by the Party for the Animals was filmed in a halal slaughterhouse. This isn’t about us.” The Chief Rabbi said that the Jewish slaughter practices could not be compared to Islamic slaughter practices because of the strict requirements that Judaism places on the training of the slaughterer and on the slaughter method. Rabbi Evers made a similar distinction.\textsuperscript{42}

Two important avoidance strategies are withdrawal and emigration. The first strategy can be found among Muslim women who deliberately choose not to wear a headscarf in public, or among Orthodox Jewish men who do not wear a kippah in neighbourhoods that are home to many Muslim youths, for fear that they might be harassed.\textsuperscript{43} We also see this strategy among Jews or Muslims who withdraw into isolation and try to create their own world. Contacts with outsiders are sparse. The strategy is also found among groups who may not feel specifically threatened by Muslims or Jews,
but more generally by their environment. For example, this strategy is prevalent among ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups, such as the Haredi communities, who live in their own neighbourhoods and are largely organised into their own associations, and among first-generation Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands and the UK, who mostly keep to themselves and lead a relatively isolated existence.\textsuperscript{44} People may also leave. In his research on Salafism, De Koning encountered this strategy among Dutch Salafis who, mainly in response to the practice of governmentality, emigrated to English cities with high concentrations of Muslims or to conflict areas in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{45} We also find this strategy among British or Dutch Jews who decide to move to Israel because of what they perceive as the increasingly anti-Jewish climate in Europe, partly as a result of what they view as growth of ‘new antisemitism’ among Muslims.\textsuperscript{46} An example is the Dutch rabbi Raphaël Evers who, in the summer of 2021, considered the time right for \textit{aliyah}.\textsuperscript{47} He mentioned the threat of rising antisemitism in Europe, which he attributes partly to “people from the Middle East”, as an important reason for his departure.\textsuperscript{48} He sees this development in a broader apocalyptic perspective of the dawning of the fifth \textit{galut} (exile), “the Galut of Ishmael, named after the Isaac’s half-brother, caused by inhabitants of the Middle East”, in which western and eastern peoples will fight against Israel, after which the Messiah will come.\textsuperscript{49}

Two renunciation strategies can be identified: partial and total renunciation. In the case of partial renunciation, the identity factor still plays a role in the associations between Jews and Muslims in some areas of life, for example, in choosing a partner or in family life, but not in others such as politics or public life. We refer to a ‘privatisation of identity’ if Jewish or Muslim identity remains relevant in the personal sphere but not in the public sphere and therefore plays no role in mutual contact in that sphere either.\textsuperscript{50} We find this strategy among both ‘liberal’ Jews and ‘liberal’ Muslims. In the case of full renunciation, Jews and Muslims do not allow their ethnic and/or religious identity to play a role in how they interact with each other in any area of life. We find this strategy among Jews who do not or no longer have any connection or experience with Judaism and among completely secularised Muslims.

In practice, the strategies mentioned are intertwined, and we see a combination of conflict strategies and cooperation strategies in many organisations. For example, CST is very militant in its opposition to antisemitism in Islamic and other circles, but at the same time it has a very cooperative attitude towards the Muslim organisation Tell MAMA, in which it sees an ally in the fight against antisemitism and other forms of hate crime. This applies \textit{mutatis mutandis} to Tell MAMA. Sometimes a shift in the application of strategies is visible over time. According to Roggeveen, at the time of the Gaza War in 2014 it was virtually impossible to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within cooperative
organisations in Amsterdam. Once this war was over and the tensions between Israel and the Palestinians subsided, there began to be room for dialogue again and the strategy of avoidance gave way to the strategy of decategorisation, in other words, the deconstruction of negative stereotypes and prejudices.\textsuperscript{51} Van Esdonk points out that in the women’s organisation Nisa-Nashim, difficult subjects are deliberately avoided in the first phase of the encounters between Jews and Muslims, with the emphasis placed on supposed similarities.\textsuperscript{52} Once a basis of trust has been established, these issues are also addressed in the contacts. A fruitful follow-up to this phase is the one in which the ‘agree to disagree’ strategy prevails.

We have not been able to establish whether, within the Jewish and Muslim communities as a whole, certain strategies are used more often in London than in Amsterdam. However, we do often see the ‘agree to disagree’ strategy recurring in, for example, the stance of the Board of Deputies. It can already be observed in the report \textit{Improving Race Relations – A Jewish Contribution} (1968), again in the paper \textit{Ourselves and Other Minorities} (Rose 1994), and also in the statement it issued with the MCB at the time of the Gaza War in the summer of 2014.\textsuperscript{53} In addition to this strategy, the MCB has also exhibited an activist and militant attitude when, for example, it decided on several occasions not to take part in Holocaust Memorial Day. CMO is sometimes very reluctant in its actions.\textsuperscript{54} CJO focuses primarily on the goal of representing Jewish interests in the Netherlands. We find a combination of more offensive and more defensive strategies in its approach.\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{10.2.3 Initiators, Organisation, and Resources}

Whether or not structural Jewish-Muslim relations actually come about depends not only on ideological and strategic factors, but also on practical matters. The three most important practical factors are initiators, organisation, and resources.\textsuperscript{56} Below, we discuss how these factors function in cooperative relationships in London and Amsterdam, based on the studies of Roggeveen and Van Esdonk.

\subsection*{10.2.3.1 Initiators}

Getting Jewish-Muslim activities off the ground requires initiators. Five initiator types can be distinguished in London and Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{57} The first type concerns individuals who take the initiative to organise meetings between Jews and Muslims. This could be a one-off activity, a temporary project, a network, or a more formalised organisation. An example of someone in Amsterdam who works tirelessly in the field of Jewish-Muslim cooperation is the Orthodox Rabbi Lody van de Kamp. As well as initiating numerous meetings and events in this area, he co-founded the Jewish-
Muslim institution Saïd & Lody in 2010, the Salaam-Shalom Amsterdam friends network in 2014, and the Yalla! Foundation in 2020. Examples of individual initiators in the UK are Mehri Niknam who, after her directorship of the Maimonides Foundation, set up the Joseph Interfaith Foundation in 2006; Laura Marks and Julie Siddiqi who established Nisa-Nashim together in 2015; and Fiyaz Mughal who founded the organisation Faith Matters in 2006, Tell MAMA in 2012, and Muslims Against Antisemitism in 2018. There are considerably more individual ‘entrepreneurs’ active in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations in London than there are in Amsterdam.

The second initiator type concerns people who develop initiatives from within a local Jewish or Muslim community. They can be religious leaders, such as Menno ten Brink, rabbi of the Liberal Jewish Congregation (LJG) of Amsterdam, and Marzouk Aulad Abdellah, imam of the Al Kabir Mosque, or, for example, members of the board or dialogue committee of a synagogue or mosque. The activities range from a one-off introductory meeting between Jews and Muslims to the implementation of an extensive educational project aimed at combating antisemitism among fellow Muslim youth, such as ‘Get to know your neighbours’ (Leer je buren kennen), which is implemented in Amsterdam by LJG dialogue committee member Chantal Sussa-Runne and others. Although Van Esdonk shows that many local religious leaders in London are actively involved in the area of Jewish-Muslim relations, there are also many who are not. She attributes this to two factors: low priority and fear of losing credibility in one’s own community. Of course, the latter factor only applies in communities where Jewish-Muslim contacts are a sensitive issue. To this we can add a third factor: the interpretation of duties and skills. Many rabbis and imams do not consider it their job to be active in the field of interreligious or intercommunal cooperation and are not trained for it either. The latter is particularly true for imams trained in the countries of origin of the communities they serve.

The third type are representatives or employees of mainly regional and national Jewish and Muslim organisations. These can be umbrella organisations that bring together regional and national Jewish and Muslim communities and institutions, as well as organisations with a specific objective, for example in the field of combating Islamophobia or antisemitism. In the Netherlands, for example, CIDI has been involved in various Jewish-Muslim projects since the turn of the century, and the national bodies of Jewish congregations and CMO regularly join forces to promote joint interests with regard to the fight against hate crime, ritual slaughter, spiritual care in institutions, and religious education. Although in the UK the relationship between the government and the MCB has been severely disrupted since 2009, there is some cooperation between the MCB and the Board of Deputies, for example when they issued a joint call to end the
Gaza War in 2014. Another example is the cooperation between CST and Tell MAMA.

The fourth initiator type includes the staff or representatives of interfaith organisations in which Jews and Muslims participate, and third-party organisations in which Jews and Muslims do not participate but which are involved in Jewish-Muslim initiatives. Examples of such interfaith organisations in the UK are the Inter Faith Network (IFN), Faith & Belief Forum (3FF), Faiths Forum for London (FF4L), and London Boroughs Faiths Network as well as Inter Faith Week, Mitzvah Day, Sadaqa Day, and ‘the Big Iftar’, which provide a framework for bringing Jews and Muslims together on regular dates throughout the year. The Anglican Church with its Near Neighbour programme and the London Citizens alliance are examples of third-party institutions. In Amsterdam and the Netherlands, interreligious and third-party actors play a modest role. However, there are a few interreligious networks in the city, such as Bos en Lommer Interreligious Consultation/West Interreligious Network (Bos en Lommer interreligieus Beraad/West Interreligieus Netwerk) and Interreligious Network Zuid (Interreligieus Netwerk Zuid), which encourage contact between Jews and Muslims. OJCM is an important interreligious association at the national level.

The final category of initiators we distinguish are government representatives or employees. They can be administrators, such as mayors or ministers, or civil servants. In the UK, it is mainly MHCLG civil servants who have contact with Jewish-Muslim partnerships, and the issue of conflict in these relationships falls within the remit of the Home Office. In the Netherlands, there has been a similar division of tasks between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Justice and Security since the early 2010s. There are also contacts at the local government level in both London and Amsterdam. In Amsterdam, former mayors Job Cohen (in 2003) and Eberhard van der Laan (in 2014) hosted talks between ‘Jews and Moroccans’ and ‘Jews and Muslims’, respectively, at the official mayor’s residence. At the Amsterdam district level, the Amsterdam Zuid urban district administration was involved in the relaunch of Interreligious Network Zuid in 2015, for example. An official of the urban district coordinates the network.

In practice, the distinction between initiators is not always clear-cut and initiatives often have several fathers (and mothers!). Former mayor Cohen took the initiative to set up the aforementioned official residence talks in response to representatives of the Jewish community who had expressed their concerns to him about antisemitic incidents in the city. Or, to cite another example, Tell MAMA was founded in 2012 by Fiyaz Mughal from Faith Matters with the support of the British government, which also encouraged it to work with CST to set up a professional registration system for Islamophobic incidents.
10.2.3.2 Organisation

In order to sustain an initiative, it is important to have a certain structure. Whatever its form, this structure is needed to develop new activities, mobilise participants, monitor the quality of activities, keep the connection to participants and interested parties alive, generate publicity, raise funds, and coordinate new activities with those of other actors. In the Amsterdam field of Jewish-Muslim relations, Roggeveen’s research shows that most Jewish-Muslim initiatives have the structure of a network and that only one initiative has the form of a formal organisation. Roggeveen writes:

A few initiatives were formalized into organizations, like the JMNA, but most were informal networks of people who occasionally organized dialog or interreligious or intercommunal meetings. The exception were the educational projects, which were more often developed and executed by established organizations, instead of in interreligious or intercommunal networks.65

The London Jewish-Muslim landscape is different: in addition to many informal networks, we find many more formal organisations such as the Maimonides Foundation, the Joseph Interfaith Foundation, the Muslim Jewish Forum of North London, and Nisa-Nashim.66 In other words, in London the field of Jewish-Muslim relations is considerably more institutionalised than it is in Amsterdam.

In the Jewish and Muslim associations that are active in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations, we can roughly distinguish between three types that correspond to the aforementioned initiator categories. Firstly, there are organisations that have not only been set up on the initiative of one or several enterprising individuals but are also run by these individuals. Two examples are Saïd & Lody in Amsterdam and Nisa-Nashim in London. Secondly, there are local Jewish or Muslim communities that engage in Jewish-Muslim activities in addition to numerous other activities. Examples include the long-standing cooperation between the Al Kabir Mosque and LJG Amsterdam, or the annual meetings between the Al Khoei Islamic Centre and the Brondesbury Park Synagogue in London.67 Thirdly, there are established, often regional or national organisations that initiate forms of Jewish-Muslim meeting and cooperation. This category includes Jewish and Muslim umbrella organisations, such as the Board of Deputies and CMO, and institutions with a specific mission, such as Faiths Forum for London (FF4L), CST, Tell MAMA, and CIDI.

Of these three types, the first is the most vulnerable. Although the departure of a leader, for whatever reason, is a critical time in any organisation’s development, it is particularly true of this type of organisation. They are often relatively small organisations that thrive on the leader’s energy, insight, reputation, and network. Without the leader, the
organisation is in danger of losing its foundations, putting its survival in jeopardy. Van Esdonk points to the vulnerability of Jewish-Muslim initiatives in London that rely mainly on the efforts of a few individuals when she writes:

The strong dependence of local engagement on individuals – often the same people in various initiatives – to initiate and sustain contact, makes initiatives fragile with little opportunities for survival once these people discontinue their work.⁶⁸

Van Oordt says about the vulnerability of interreligious networks in Amsterdam:

The functioning of the networks is largely dependent on one or more ‘drivers’. If they are no longer there, the network/consultation structure often ‘collapses’ (sometimes temporarily) … ⁶⁹

10.2.3.3 Resources

In addition to initiators and some form of organisation, resources are needed to bring about structural relationships between Jews and Muslims. Resources can include things such as manpower and finances as well as physical spaces or the knowledge, skills, and means to recruit participants, create publicity, and build a good reputation. Here we focus on three resources: finances, manpower, and professionalism, or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, on three types of ‘capital’: economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital.

In terms of finances, while small-scale, local Jewish-Muslim activities can often be organised almost free of charge, large-scale activities usually require more money. Often such an activity requires publicity, venue rental, and paying for a speaker. Food and drink are expenses at Iftars and Seder meals. The design and implementation of a comprehensive, long-term programme requires the appointment of a professional.

Roggeveen indicates that in Amsterdam the financial means for Jewish-Muslim activities are very limited: “Economical capital was, however, often quite scarce”.⁷⁰ Participants are regularly asked to pay a small fee; often the mosque, synagogue, or organisation concerned makes a financial or other contribution. Jewish-Muslim networks or organisations sometimes receive money from donors or private funds. Occasionally, the Amsterdam government will grant a limited subsidy. In general, the Dutch and Amsterdam governments are reluctant to subsidise religious institutions, due to a rather strict interpretation of the principle of separation of church and state. However, this principle meets with varying interpretations at the level of Amsterdam’s urban districts, with some of them providing subsidies to
In London, finances are less of a problem when it comes to organising Jewish-Muslim activities and various resources are available. An extremely important resource is the Near Neighbours programme, funded by the UK Government and offered by the Anglican Church through its Church Urban Fund (CUF). Organisations can apply several times for funding for smaller and larger interfaith and intercommunal projects up to a maximum of £5,000. Separately, MHCLG provides subsidies to large-scale activities, such as Mitzvah Day and Sadaqa Day, and institutions, including Tell MAMA and Nisa-Nashim. Other sources of support include other Jewish and Muslim organisations, private funds, philanthropists, and donors. Sometimes local synagogues or mosques will contribute to an activity financially or ‘in kind’ by providing a space free of charge. Admission fees are collected for certain activities such as theatre performances.

Not everyone views the receipt of subsidy from the British government in London as entirely positive. Subsidies also create a dependency that some respondents in Van Esdonk’s study found undesirable. One respondent said that government subsidy “on the one hand ‘limits your agenda’ and on the other hand might prevent the strong commitment from members that you will get when they have a ‘buy-in’ in the organisation”. The dependency also means that the project is at risk when the subsidy expires. Against this background, Abigail, Near Neighbours’ professional coordinator mentioned in Van Esdonk’s study insists that ‘professional organisers’ of projects should pay ample attention in their consultancy work to:

(…) teaching communities and individuals to organise initiatives and secure grants for themselves. She regards capacity-building as a way forward to creating sustainable engagement and sees the short-term scope of government funding as a hindrance.

The tight financial situation in the area of Jewish-Muslim relations, as we found in Amsterdam in particular, is not conducive to the success of cooperation projects. Research shows that negative stereotypes between population groups can best be tackled structurally by bringing people from different groups together not just once but repeatedly over a longer period of time. Lack of money may hamper this approach.

As far as manpower is concerned, many Jewish-Muslim activities rely on volunteers. Because the Jewish and Muslim communities, certainly the organised parts of them, are much larger in London than in Amsterdam, the number of current and potential Jewish and Muslim volunteers is much larger in London than in Amsterdam. The organised Jewish community in the Netherlands is by far the smallest of the four communities studied and therefore also has the smallest reservoir of potential volunteers. A respondent in Roggeveen’s study, who is a member of LJG Amsterdam and
who volunteers to teach about Judaism in schools, says about the difficult situation in the Netherlands:

Well, say there are 50,000 Jews and 700,000 Muslims in the Netherlands. Then all Jews have to visit schools five times a week to reach them. Just because of the numbers, it won’t work. And then you have a small number of what I call progressive Jews, who want to do it, who want to do dialog and will give their time to this cause. It’s very complicated.78

In addition, a small number of rabbis and imams are active in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, compared to many active rabbis and imams in London. Also, there are significantly more paid professionals affiliated with Jewish, Muslim, Jewish-Muslim, or interreligious institutions working in this field in London than in Amsterdam.

Professionalisation in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations is limited. However, the more ‘liberal’ training programmes for rabbis, imams, and Jewish and Muslim spiritual counsellors in Western countries usually include attention to the theme of interreligious dialogue. Many Orthodox rabbinical training programmes appear to lack attention to interreligious dialogue.79 Many imams in the Netherlands and the UK have received their theological training in the countries of origin of the communities to which they belong, where interreligious dialogue is dominated by apologetics and missiology.80 Dialogue with followers of other religions about truths of faith is not always seen as positive by religious authorities. Therefore, participation in interreligious dialogue activities by scholars or laypeople is often treated with caution. This is different when it comes to social action, as this does not involve discussion of religious views.

Professionals working in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations have an important task in advising, supporting, and training local coordinators and volunteers. They teach these ‘workers’ how to effectively apply different social identity strategies, and try to develop an intercultural and interfaith ‘habitus’, to use Bourdieus’s term, among them.81 The professional guidance of volunteers in this area is much more developed in the UK than it is in the Netherlands.82 In order to make progress on this point in the Netherlands, the Faith in Living Together (Geloven in Samenleven) foundation was established in 2019, partly on the initiative of OJCM, with the aim of “supporting and broadening local and regional practical cooperation between people of various religious and ideological traditions” by “mediating between local and regional initiatives on the one hand and expert trainers, coaches and/or facilitators on the other”.83

Comparing London and Amsterdam in terms of practical factors, we find that in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations, as well as many more initiatives being undertaken, in London, a significantly larger number of organisations are active, together deploying much more money, manpower, and expertise.
than in Amsterdam. Roggeveen summarises the relatively poor situation in this area in Amsterdam as follows:

(…) I found only one formal, interreligious organization in Amsterdam that includes Jews and Muslims. The remaining cooperation is carried out through networks or by religious organizations which make contact with others, without formalizing themselves in interreligious organizations. This might have to do with the lack of economic capital, because being an organization can be more expansive than a network. An organization might imply having people available to answer the phone or respond to e-mail, and that activities should be organized more often, while a network can be organized more ad hoc. It also might have to do with the limited time religious and community leaders have to organize projects, as well as already being asked to organize projects too often. Again, an organization might imply that there should be a structure, while there is only time for ad hoc activities.\(^\text{84}\)

The difference in institutionalisation and formalisation of Jewish-Muslim initiatives is partly due to the ‘economic capital’ that is much more readily available in London than in Amsterdam. This has to do with the difference in size of the Jewish and Muslim communities in the two cities and the fact that the British government provides much more subsidy for interreligious associations and activities than the Dutch government does. This, in turn, is linked to a fundamental difference in how the relationship between church and state is viewed. Whereas England has a system of partial establishment and the British government, in its view of Britain as a multifaith society, mainly sees religious and interreligious associations as partners when it comes to solving social issues, the Dutch government emphasises the importance of the strict separation of church and state and the neutrality of the state regarding religion and ideological beliefs. We will come back to this in Section 10.4.4 and Section 10.4.6.

10.3 Positional Factors: Perceived Positions, Attitudes, and Strategies

In order to properly understand the origins and development of Jewish-Muslim relationships, it is important – in line with Bourdieu’s view of the functioning of social life – to consider the social positions of Jews and Muslims in relation to each other in British and Dutch society. In Section 1.3, we presented Thurlings’ theory on the relationship between the different social positions occupied by religious and ethnic minorities in a social environment and their attitudes towards that environment and associated strategies.\(^\text{85}\) We apply this theory to the relationship between Jewish and Muslim groups and assume that the positions they occupy in relation to one another are reflected in the attitudes they adopt towards
each other and the social identity strategies that go with them. As mentioned above, social position is not so much about the ‘objective’ social position but about the ‘subjective’ social position, i.e. the position perceived or experienced by Jews and Muslims and their institutions. Two dimensions can be identified: the experienced socio-structural position and the perceived socio-cultural position. The attitude Jews and Muslims and their organisations have towards each other is influenced by the differences in power and identity they experience among themselves. Based on the intersection of the two dimensions identified, four perceived social positions can be distinguished and linked to four attitudes: openness, militancy, fear, indifferentism. Four strategies can in turn be linked to these attitudes: strategies of cooperation, strategies of conflict, strategies of avoidance, and strategies of renunciation. This classification of attitudes and strategies should not be interpreted too statically. The attitudes mentioned are extremes and ideal types; in practice, they are often encountered in a combined form such as the attitude of defensiveness and offensiveness between the poles of fear and militancy. Also, the attitudes that Jewish and Muslim communities have towards each other can develop over time. In addition, the composition of these communities is often so diverse that we find various attitudes coexisting within them simultaneously. We have also found this in our research, which shows that today’s Jewish and Muslim communities in London and Amsterdam have very different perceptions of the differences in power and identity in relation to one another. As we have seen, some Jewish or Muslim groups perceive ‘the other’ as a threat, while others experience no threat at all. Some groups experience a huge gap between themselves and ‘the other’, while others mainly see similarities in religion, culture, position, experiences, interests, and ideals. Due to the various perceptions of the differences in power and identity, we encounter all four distinct basic attitudes and resulting strategies in the Jewish and Islamic communities in London and Amsterdam.

10.3.1 Openness and Cooperation Strategies

If the assumed difference in power and the experienced difference in identity are relatively small, an attitude of openness is likely. Jews and Muslims approach each other with an open mind and take into consideration both the differences and the similarities between themselves and ‘the other’. Cooperation is the key word. This attitude fits with the identified strategies of seeking similarities within differences, deconstructing negative stereotypes, and agreeing to disagree. We encounter the attitude of openness in the position of Board of Deputies since the early 1990s, which Kahn-Harris and Gidley call ‘the strategy of insecurity’. This strategy navigates between the strategy of assimilation or renunciation and the strategy of avoidance, and is characterised by dialogue. Kahn-Harris and Gidley write:
What this means is a dialogical community: a community in dialogue internally, living with the differences and recognizing similarities with other groups – a Jewish community in dialogue with multiculturalism and with other multicultural communities. 89

We also find this attitude within the MCB in the UK, and in the Netherlands within CMO, NIK, and NVPJ as they cooperate in OJCM. Typical for the attitude of the members of OJCM is: “We do not choose polarisation, which offers false security. We choose optimism and therefore dialogue”. 90

We also find this attitude in local liberal or reform Jewish communities and the more ‘progressive’ Muslim groups and institutions in both countries such as New Horizons, SPIOR, and the Dutch Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslim Raad, NMR). In addition, we encounter this attitude among ‘pragmatic’ Orthodox Jews and ‘conservative’ Muslims who put all religious matters into the category of differences but seek and see similarities in practical matters.

10.3.2 Militancy and Conflict Strategies

The attitude of militancy is found among Jews and Muslims and their organisations who perceive each other mainly as opponents and have the faith and trust (in God) to actively confront ‘the other’. Strategies of ‘emphasising assumed differences’ and/or ‘deconstructing perceived similarities’ are applied. 91 We recognise this attitude in the activism around the theme of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as in CST and CIDI in their fight against antisemitism in Muslim circles and in Tell MAMA and CTID in their resistance against the anti-Islam movement, for which there is sympathy within some part of the Jewish community. We find a radical form of this attitude among militant groups in Jewish circles, such as the Jewish Defense League (JDL), which is not afraid to intimidate opponents, Muslim or otherwise, as well as in militant movements in Islamic circles that display an anti-Jewish attitude, such as some currents within Salafism and groups such as Al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir. 92 The means employed by ‘militant’ groups and organisations vary widely, from educational programmes to political action, from moral appeals to court cases, and from demonstrations to armed struggle.

10.3.3 Fear and Avoidance Strategies

The attitude of fear is found in Jews and Muslims who feel threatened by each other and do not believe they can actively defend themselves. The strategies of avoidance and emigration are related to this attitude. People try to escape from the perceived threat by no longer being recognisable as Jews or Muslims in public, by withdrawing into their own world as much as possible, or by moving to a country in which they feel safer, such as Israel.
for Jews and Islamic countries for Muslims. We find this attitude of fear, for example, among Jews who feel threatened by antisemitism and attacks from Muslim circles. Erwin Brugmans, member of Sjoel West and very active in the field of Jewish-Muslim relations for years, sees fear in many people within Amsterdam’s Jewish community. In our interview with him he said:

I often encounter Jews who are rather suspicious of contacts with Muslims or anti-Muslim. They say, “You hang out with the good Moroccans, but there are bad ones too. They can’t be trusted.” My response to that is, “Join me, stop being afraid, stop being a victim, get to know them.” (...)”Fear won’t get you anywhere. You shouldn’t withdraw, but enter into a dialogue with each other. Only then can you move forward and live together in harmony. Fear won’t get you anywhere."

We also find the attitude of fear among second and third-generation Muslims in both countries. This attitude is not prompted by a specific fear of Jews, but more generally by the combination of experiences of discrimination and Islamophobia, the dominant discourse that Islam and Muslims are a problem, and the lack of a perspective showing how the current situation can be resolved. Rasit Bal, chairman of CMO from 2012 to 2018, sees the distance between many Muslims and Dutch society increasing and with it the tendency among them to withdraw. According to him:

The gap is widening and Muslims feel increasingly frustrated. You hear a lot of people saying: “You see, society wants to get rid of us, we are constantly discriminated against.” Muslims as a whole are isolating themselves more and more.

10.3.4 Indifferentism and Renunciation Strategies

The attitude of indifferentism is likely when Jews and Muslims experience relatively few differences from one another nor see much opportunity of influencing the other even if they want to. People have a tendency to leave the differences that they still perceive for what they are. The strategies of renunciation are applied, with the identity factor playing no role in mutual contact in some or all areas of life. We mainly find the attitude of indifferentism among Jews and Muslims who no longer attach much significance to their Jewish or Muslim identity. In particular, these are ‘liberal’, ‘secular’, and ‘cultural’ Jews and Muslims. Differences do exist between these categories. Whereas for ‘liberal’ Jews and Muslim, the Jewish or Muslim religion often has no great value in public life, but is of personal value, this hardly applies to ‘secular’ and ‘cultural’ Jews or Muslims, if at all. The difference between these two is that while ‘cultural’ Jews and
Muslims do follow certain Jewish or Muslim customs, such as participating in a Seder or fasting during Ramadan, this is largely absent among ‘secular’ Jews and Muslims. In the Netherlands, the proportion of ‘secular’ Jews among all Jews was estimated at 44 per cent in 2009, and the proportion of ‘cultural’ Jews at 41 per cent, together accounting for more than 80 per cent. In the UK, almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of all Jews are ‘reform/progressive’ and about a quarter (24 per cent) are ‘secular/cultural’. In the two large Muslim communities in the Netherlands, the percentage of ‘secular’ and ‘cultural’ Muslims is relatively low. Among Moroccan Muslims, the proportion of ‘cultural’ Muslims is 8 per cent and ‘secular’ Muslims 2 per cent, while among Turkish Muslims these figures are 21 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively. We mostly find ‘secular’ and ‘cultural’ Jews and Muslims among those who are not or hardly affiliated with a synagogue or a mosque. In the UK, over a quarter of Jewish households did not belong to a synagogue in 2010. In the Netherlands, it is estimated that more than 80 per cent of Jews are not members of a Jewish congregation. Research from 2015 shows that, in the Netherlands, an estimated two-fifths of those who call themselves Muslims go to the mosque at least once a week, with over one-third going occasionally, and just under a quarter hardly ever attending.

It would be a misunderstanding to assume that perceived differences of power and identity are influenced exclusively by factors related to Jews and Muslims themselves such as level of education, generation, memories, or mutual contact. External factors, such as the media and the government, also play a role. In Section 10.4.5, we will explicitly address how the media influence the way Jews and Muslims experience their social positions and thus their attitude towards one another.

10.4 Contextual Factors

Current Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam do not function in a historical and social vacuum, but are embedded in a specific context that influences them. We can distinguish between historical factors, trigger factors, and factors emanating from significant actors in their current environment. Below, we focus on four actors whose influence we explain in more detail: public opinion, the mainstream Christian churches, traditional and social media, and national and local governments. We make a comparison between London and Amsterdam, starting with some historical factors.

10.4.1 Historical Factors

Jewish communities in the UK and the Netherlands have a history dating back to the early modern period and in fact even earlier, to the Middle Ages. Although both countries had large numbers of Muslim subjects
during the colonial period, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK remained low until after the Second World War. After the war, the number of Muslims in both countries increased rapidly due to large-scale migration. There are important differences in the wartime history of Jews and the migration history of Muslims in the two countries, which continue to affect Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam today. While London’s Jewish community was spared the Shoah, more than 70,000 Amsterdam Jews were separated, arrested, deported, and murdered in concentration and extermination camps during the Second World War. This experience is reflected in the attitude some of Amsterdam’s Jews have towards outsiders, including Muslims. Erwin Brugmans’ answer to the question of why some Jews are open to contacts with Muslims while others are reluctant is:

This is not a question of denomination. Although liberal Jews have more contacts with Muslims, among both liberal and orthodox Jews you will find people who are open to or who turn away from these contacts. It is a question of fear, and that has to do with what happened during the war, with the large numbers of Jews who were murdered during the war, and that as a Jew you were outlawed then (…) Even after the war, Jews were initially not welcome in the Netherlands. (…) People feel short-changed, they are anxious, prefer not to come out openly as Jews and are afraid of being called names.

There are also significant differences between the two cities in terms of the migration history of Muslims. Postwar migration and the establishment and institutionalisation of migrant communities from Muslim regions started earlier in the UK than in the Netherlands, allowing formal links to be forged with the Jewish community earlier. In addition, Muslim migrants in the UK have a different profile. Although the first generation of post-war Muslim migrants in both countries were mainly migrant workers, the majority of British migrants came from former British colonies and the Dutch migrants mainly from Turkey and Morocco, with which the Netherlands has no colonial ties. As a result, British Muslim migrants already had some familiarity with the language and government of the UK, whereas most Dutch Muslim migrants were completely unfamiliar with the country and the language, which further complicated the process of integration.

10.4.2 Trigger Factors

In London, the Rushdie affair in 1989 acted as a catalyst for Jewish-Muslim relations. The Maimonides Foundation and the Calamus Foundation initiated the first structural Jewish-Muslim contacts in response to it. The affair also accelerated the process of institutionalisation of Islam in the UK. This resulted in the establishment of the MCB in 1997, facilitating the first
contacts between the Board of Deputies and the MCB as major umbrella organisations of the British Jewish and Muslim communities. The Rushdie affair did not result in lasting Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, but it did give an important boost to the formation of national Muslim umbrella organisations in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, events in the early 2000s, such as the start of the Second Intifada, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the 9/11 attacks, and antisemitic incidents by youth of Moroccan descent in Amsterdam, were the main triggers. They led to the first structural Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and the formation of the CMO.

In both cities, Jewish-Muslim relations are stimulated by external events. Flare-ups of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not only result in growing discord about this conflict in both cities, but invariably also in an increase in antisemitic incidents, just as jihadist attacks result in an increase in Islamophobic incidents. On the one hand, these events put a strain on Jewish-Islamic relations, but on the other hand, they motivate parts of the Jewish and Muslim communities to put more effort into Jewish-Muslim dialogue and cooperation.

10.4.3 Public Opinion

Many issues in Jewish-Muslim relations are subject to public debate. This is especially true of the sensitive themes of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, antisemitism and Islamophobia, attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets and commemorations of wars and genocides in European history, as well as themes on which Jews and Muslims do agree, such as assumed similarities in religion and culture or the defence of common rights regarding ritual slaughter. As we have seen, events related to these themes often stimulate their public discussion.

We encounter several rivalling discourses in the public debates on the topics mentioned. The discourses in the various debates are interlinked. For example, the more general discourse that Muslims are called a ‘problem’ is seen in several debates. This originally mainly right-wing populist discourse can be seen in the discourse that claims that Muslims and the ‘far left’ are together responsible for the rise in antisemitism today, that Muslims are a potential security threat and the discourse that claims that Muslims have a religion and culture that is largely incompatible with aspects of Western ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture such as the separation of church and state and freedom of speech.

Diametrically opposed to this discourse is the discourse that views Jews as a ‘problem’. This discourse, which argues that Jews in the UK and the Netherlands are partly responsible for the Israeli government’s allegedly repressive policies towards Palestinians and ignore the rights and interests of Palestinians, that anti-Zionism and criticism of those policies are equated with antisemitism and thus make criticism of the State of Israel difficult if
not impossible, and the discourse that states that they seem unwilling to connect the Holocaust to the experience of marginalisation and/or persecution of (other) minority groups, including Muslims in Europe and Palestinians in the Middle East.

In addition to these two discourses, in the discourses in various debates we recognise the more general discourse that does not directly designate Muslims or Jews as a ‘problem’, but does state that they must repeatedly and clearly speak out on a particular issue if they are not to be suspected of being a problem. We come across this discourse, for example, in the debate on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, in which Jews are expected to distance themselves from the oppressive policy of the Israeli government, and in the debate on attacks by Muslim extremists, in which Muslims are expected to explicitly distance themselves from the violence committed. This more general discourse can be called the ‘discourse of distancing’. In addition, in the public debate, we encounter the discourse that considers neither Muslims nor Jews as a ‘problem’. In this discourse, the problems caused by some Jews or Muslims are not blamed on all Jews or Muslims. This discourse is referred to as the ‘discourse of distinction’.

We recognise the more general discourses mentioned above in the public debate in both countries. The ‘Muslims are a problem’ discourse emerged earlier and is more dominant in public debate in the Netherlands than in the UK. In the Netherlands, this discourse grew with Pim Fortuyn’s rise in the early 2000s, and has largely determined the public and political debate on issues like integration and migration since then and, as we have seen, is also visible in discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, antisemitism, terrorism, and commemorations. In the UK, this discourse is less dominant in the public debate, although its importance increased in the course of the 2010s, partly under the influence of the increasing attention to themes such as extremism and terrorism in which Muslims are seen as a security risk. The ‘Jews are a problem’ discourse is not as prominent in the public debate in either country. This may be related to the fact that antisemitism is rejected by the vast majority of the population in both countries. However, we do encounter this discourse in radical Islamic circles in both countries, and, based on Dave Rich’s research, in far-left circles in the UK whose influence extended to the centre of the Labour Party at the time of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. A well as these two discourses, the discourse of distancing and the discourse of distinction are visible in the public debate in both countries.

The identified discourses influence Jewish-Muslim relations, with the ‘Muslims are a problem’ discourse and the ‘Jews are a problem’ discourse putting the most strain on them. These discourses result in a stigmatisation of Muslims and Jews and make it difficult to develop these relations, especially among those who have no contact with each other in practice and whose impressions of one another cannot be corrected by concrete experiences. The discourse of distancing, which requires Muslims or Jews to
speak out more clearly on certain issues, can also be an obstacle in the development of open contact between Jews and Muslims. The discourse of distinction, which does not define Muslims or Jews as a problem, has no effect on Jewish-Muslim relations.

10.4.4 Mainstream Christian Churches

There is a significant difference in the role played in Jewish-Muslim relations by the major Christian churches in Amsterdam and London, and more broadly, the Netherlands and the UK as a whole. Roggeveen’s research shows that the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PKN), either separately or in the context of the Council of Churches, have very little to no direct influence on these relationships in Amsterdam. However, they do influence them indirectly. On several occasions, they have been actively involved in the organisation of interreligious activities in which Jews and Muslims also participate. These include meetings, meals, and events. For example, they co-initiated the interreligious walk in Amsterdam on 9 February 2011, from the Moroccan An Nour Mosque to the Jerusalem Church and then to Sjoel West, in which Bishop Hans van de Hende (Council of Churches), Rabbis Raphael Evers (NIK) and Awraham Soetendorp (NVPJ) and Kursat Bal (CMO) participated. Mayor Eberhard van der Laan concluded the walk with a short speech. Sometimes, these churches help initiate interreligious connections in which Muslims and Jews are also active, such as interreligious networks at the Amsterdam urban district level and the Amsterdam Council for Beliefs and Religions (Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam, RLRA), which took the first steps towards the Together One Amsterdam (Samen ÉÉN Amsterdam) network, which has organised a number of gatherings and events to promote ‘meeting and connection’. In 2012, the Protestant Deaconry Amsterdam (Protestantse Diakonie Amsterdam) and the Roman Catholic Deanery (Rooms-Katholiek Dekenaat) joined the UMMON, the CJO, the LGBTIQ advocacy group COC Amsterdam, and several political parties in signing the ‘Safety Pact against Discrimination’ (Veiligheids pact tegen discriminatie), which is still active today. At the national level, Christian churches, organised in the Council of Churches (Raad van Kerken, RvK), co-initiated the establishment of OJCM and the United in Peace (In Vrijheid Verbonden, IVV) foundation. In all of the partnerships mentioned, Jews and Muslims come together, discussing substantive issues and/or developing joint activities.

In London and the UK, the major Christian churches, especially the Church of England, play a significantly greater role. Since 2011, Church of England’s Church Urban Fund (CUF) has offered the Near Neighbours programme through church Presence and Engagement centres and other community hubs. This programme is funded by the DHCLG and involves providing limited grants to local initiatives aimed at strengthening
ties between communities, including those between Jews and Muslims, as well as training young leaders. The annual Near Neighbours budget averages around £2.0 million. Paul Hackwood, Executive Director of the Church Urban Fund (CUF), has said about Near Neighbours:

So we give people grants of between £250 and £5,000 to work together on social and community projects. So, we get lots of mosques working with synagogues, we get churches working with mosques, churches working with synagogues, and what that does it facilitates local people engaging for themselves, building on the relationships that are already in existence locally and sort of expanding them. So, what we are effectively trying to do is create a multi faith multi-cultural civil society.\textsuperscript{123}

The Church of England is also active in setting up interfaith activities itself. It organises interreligious meetings and the Anglican community has played an important part in the development of the described practice of SR.\textsuperscript{124} According to Hackwood, however, there has been a visible shift in the Church’s interreligious work over the last two decades, from an emphasis on dialogue at the national church and academic level to an emphasis on social action at the local level, with a focus on supporting meetings and cooperation between ordinary people in relation to practical problems in neighbourhoods, villages, towns, and cities. About this development he says:

The Church Urban Fund and the work we have done with Near Neighbours has took it away from that sort of elite highbrow, intellectualist, academic approach, to ordinary people in ordinary communities coming together.\textsuperscript{125}

The Church of England, as well as many other British churches, are united in the organisation Churches Together in Britain and Ireland (CTBI), which promotes a message of dialogue. Many churches participate in the IFN, with which some 180 national and local bodies are affiliated and which organises many national and local interfaith activities, including the annual Inter Faith Week. Two other interfaith organisations, which are also very active in London and run extensive programmes, are the Three Faith Forum, which changed its name to Faith & Belief Forum in 2018, and the Faiths Forum for London (FF4L).

With regard to Jewish-Islamic relations, the major difference in the role played by the mainstream churches in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, and especially the role played by the Church of England in London and the UK, is strongly linked to the difference in the position of these churches in both contexts. In recent decades, this position has changed significantly under the influence of the trend towards increasing religious diversity and the process of church decline. In both cities and countries, as well as religious diversity

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increasing in recent decades in terms of the number of distinguishable religious traditions and movements within them, the mainstream churches have also been confronted with a major decline of church association. According to the longitudinal study ‘God in the Netherlands’ (God in Nederland), the percentage of members of the Roman Catholic Church among the Dutch population as a whole decreased from 21 to 12 in the 1996–2015 period, and that of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PKN) from 19 to 9. In Amsterdam, the proportion of Roman Catholics fell from 22 to 7 per cent in the 1990–2012 period. A similar development took place among members of the major Protestant churches. According to the British Social Attitudes survey, between 1983 and 2018, the proportion of the British population identifying themselves as ‘Christian’ fell from two-thirds (66 per cent) to just over one-third (38 per cent), and the proportion calling themselves ‘Anglican’ fell from 40 per cent to 12 per cent. The percentage of Catholics decreased from 10 to 7 during this period. In the Netherlands, and certainly in Amsterdam, the process of church decline has resulted in an enormous loss of income for the churches, a marked downsizing of the church organisation and a substantial decrease in the presence and visibility of the major Christian churches in public life. In Amsterdam’s increasingly diverse religious landscape, the mainstream Christian churches have taken on the position of modest minorities alongside other religious minorities.

Although in London and the UK, the ‘big’ Christian churches have also sustained considerable financial and public damage as a result of the process of secularisation, this development has not yet fundamentally affected the presence of the Church of England nor its formal position. Despite the fact that the presence of this Church is under pressure in many English communities, it is still present in the vast majority of local communities in England, with the parish priest’s care, according to the Church’s self-understanding, not limited to the members of the Church’s own religious community but extending to all people in the community concerned. The Church of England’s legal position as the ‘established church’ has also remained intact. However, the public role of the Church of England has changed as a result of the process of church decline, and especially as a result of how the Church of England has responded to the changed British religious landscape with a growing number of ethnic-religious groups. According to Filby, England has changed from a Christian nation to a multi-faith society in recent decades. The Church of England has responded to this transformation by no longer simply taking on only the role of the first representative of Christianity in British public life, but by also establishing itself as the first representative of all religions, thereby strengthening its position in multi-faith Britain. Filby writes:

The Church’s new position, as primus inter pares on a multi-faith platform, had the effect of reinforcing rather than undermining the notion of establishment. As Bishop John Habgood explained in a letter
to *The Independent* in the wake of the Rushdie affair, the Church of England was necessary precisely because it acted as a protector and enabler of religious pluralism within the nation. The rationale behind establishment was being reconfigured once more, the Church of England was no longer the spiritual head of a nominally Christian nation (as Habgood had argued in the early 1980s), but the chief religious representative in a secular plural society.\(^{133}\)

In practice, the Church of England’s revised public role is reflected in the fact that, in its contacts with the government and sometimes also in the public debate, it acts as a champion of the interests of other faiths, in its interreligious initiatives, in the interreligious alliances in which it actively participates, and in the Near Neighbours programme it has been running since 2011. By doing so, it contributes to the development of an interreligious climate in which Jewish-Muslim relations can flourish. These relationships are directly supported through the Near Neighbours fund.

### 10.4.5 Media

The media influence Jewish-Muslim relations in various ways. They influence the general impressions Jews and Muslims have of each other, which of course affects their mutual relations, and they also influence the perceptions that Jews and Muslims have of various aspects of the specific issues that arise between them. For example, they influence the perceptions Jews have of the practices of ritual slaughter by Muslims and, conversely, the perceptions Muslims have of slaughter practices by Jews, as well as the involvement of Muslims in the ‘new antisemitism’ or the support of Jews for the anti-Islam movement, which affects their relationships. In this context, we cannot go into a detailed analysis of the media’s role in all the themes we discussed in Chapters 5 to 9 and must therefore limit ourselves. Below, we first discuss the general portrayal of Jews and Muslims by the media in the Netherlands and the UK and the possible implications for Jewish-Muslim relations, followed by the role of the media in one specific case, namely the 2014 Gaza War and its implications on these relations, as addressed specifically in the studies by Roggeveen and Van Esdonk. This includes the role of social media.

#### 10.4.5.1 Portrayal of Jews and Muslims

Traditional and social media have a strong influence on the way Jews and Muslims ‘define’ each other, the attitude they adopt towards each other and, consequently, on their mutual relationships.\(^{134}\) In Section 1.3 and Section 10.3 we have seen that the attitudes Jews and Muslims have towards each other are strongly influenced by their subjective ‘definition of the situation’, with two aspects being important, namely the perceived difference
in power and the perceived difference in identity. These perceptions are influenced partly by the media. They influence how Jews and Muslims see each other and therefore the attitude they adopt towards each other, which in turn affects how they treat each other. This is especially true for Muslims and Jews who have never had any contact with each other and whose perceptions of each other are largely determined by the media.\(^{135}\) If the differences between Muslims and Jews are systematically magnified in the media, Muslims and Jews are likely to experience greater differences from one another, which reinforces the tendency of both sides to adopt an attitude of avoidance and/or militancy, which can in turn lead to alienation between Jews and Muslims. Conversely, if the media portray Jews and Muslims in a balanced way and systematically highlight similarities as well as differences, this increases awareness among Jews and Muslims of the connection between them, and promotes an attitude of openness or tolerance, which increases the chances of a rapprochement between Jews and Muslims.

It is known that, in addition to the Dutch and British media, Jews in the Netherlands and the UK turn to the Israeli media, just as Muslims in these countries turn to media sources in their countries of origin.\(^{136}\) According to Ofri Ilany, people regularly encounter expressions of Islamophobia in the Israeli media, which comprises a fairly broad spectrum of public and commercial news sources.\(^{137}\) Israel and Jews are often portrayed in a negative manner in the media in the Islamic countries of origin.\(^{138}\) Jews are repeatedly referred to in antisemitic terms and Israel is referred to as a hostile, imperialistic state that wants to dominate the Middle East. Research also shows that young Muslims in the Netherlands not only turn to these media, but use a variety of media sources, even significantly more and more intensively than non-Muslim young people. They read more newspapers in particular.\(^{139}\)

Research demonstrates that the portrayal of Muslims in the British media in recent decades has been predominantly negative. In a summary of studies on media coverage in the UK from 2001 to 2012, Chris Allen concluded that:

The evidence shows an overwhelmingly negative picture, where threat, otherness, fear and danger posed or caused by Muslims and Islam underpins a considerable majority of the media’s coverage.\(^{140}\)

On average, reporting on Islam and Muslims in tabloids, such as the *Daily Mail*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Sun*, and *The Star*, is more negative than in broadsheets, such as *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Times*.\(^{141}\) The Centre for Media Monitoring, a project of the MCB, analysed nearly 11,000 articles published in the fourth quarter of 2018.\(^{142}\) The analysis showed that ‘right leaning’ and ‘religious publications’, i.e. *Christian Today*, *The Jewish Chronicle*, and *The Tablet*, report more negatively on Islam and Muslims than other media. Although, according to the research group, 45 per cent of
the articles analysed in *The Jewish Chronicle* reflect an antagonistic bias, there are also articles that reflect a supportive bias.\(^{143}\) “On numerous occasions *The Jewish Chronicle* draws on points of relatability between Muslims and Jews, such as being subject to anti-semitic and Islamophobia respectively”.\(^{144}\) A study of headlines about Muslims and Jews in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* between 1985 and 2014 showed that they referred more positively to Jews than Muslims, which, according to the researchers, was linked to the higher group status of Jews.\(^{145}\)

Research shows that reports about Islam and Muslims in the Dutch media are also predominantly negative.\(^{146}\) Yet this was not so apparent from the study published by Leen d’Haenens and Susan Bink in 2006, in which they stated that the reporting on Islam in the *Algemeen Dagblad*, in particular, was fairly balanced, in the sense that events involving Muslims were discussed from various points of view. However, they did conclude:

> Journalists generally report on Islam in a balanced way, but the themes associated with Islam often have negative connotations. The choice of topics may therefore encourage stigmatisation of Muslims, since many articles deal with terrorism, fundamentalism and violence.\(^{147}\)

Research by Conny Roggeband and Rens Vliegenthart indicates that the frame of ‘Islam as a threat’ became dominant in the Dutch media in the year 2000.\(^{148}\) According to Wasif Shadid, there are four dominant frames in the Dutch media’s portrayal of Islam and Muslims: the ethnocentrism frame that uses an ‘us/them’ contrast, the stigmatisation frame in which Muslims are portrayed as a problem group, the laypeople frame in which Muslims are seen as ‘simple’ laypeople and not as ‘authoritative’ experts, and the cultural generalisation frame in which Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish origin are presented as a homogeneous group and as Muslims whose religious identity overshadows all other social identities.\(^{149}\) In her doctoral thesis on the history of the representation of Islam and Muslims on Dutch public television, Andrea Meuzelaar concluded that a rigid iconography of Islam developed in this medium, in which Islam is always presented in the same way with a limited number of images and in which it is constantly associated with social problems such as poor integration, fundamentalism, and terrorism.\(^{150}\) Muslims are frequently stereotyped in Dutch national newspapers, their corresponding online news sites and the blogs *Joop.nl* and *GeenStijl.nl*.\(^{151}\) According to research by Tayfun Balçik, *De Telegraaf* and *Algemeen Dagblad* newspapers print negative reports about Muslims more often than *De Volkskrant* and NRC Handelsblad.\(^{152}\)

To our knowledge, no research has been done into the portrayal of Jews in the British and Dutch media. However, it is known that online sites repeatedly feature antisemitism.\(^{153}\) The same applies to Islamophobia. Expressions of hatred of Muslims are regularly posted on social media, often anonymously.\(^{154}\) As we indicated at the beginning of this section, on
the basis of our theory on the relationship between the perception of and attitude towards ‘the other’, the negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims in both traditional media and social media contributes to alienation between Jews and Muslims and complicates rapprochement between them.

10.4.5.2 Media and the Case of the ‘Third Gaza War’

In the summer of 2014, the ‘third Gaza War’ broke out in the context of the long-running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. During that summer, members of an independently operating Hamas cell kidnapped and killed three young Israelis. In revenge, Jewish extremists abducted a Palestinian boy whom they subsequently doused with petrol and burnt alive.155 Following these horrific incidents, war broke out on 8 July 2014 and continued until 26 August. There were 73 deaths on the Israeli side and an estimated 2,100 on the Palestinian side. The Israeli military invasion of Gaza was carried out under the name ‘Operation Protective Edge’. The question is what role the media played in this case. An enlightening distinction can be made between their role in reporting on this war and in reporting on the reactions to this war, especially in their own countries.

The British and Dutch media were almost entirely dependent on third parties for coverage of this war. There were no British or Dutch journalists on the ground, so the bulk of the information came from the Israeli government, i.e. the Israeli army, and Hamas. Independent media played only a marginal role. However, some information on the course of the battle and especially its impact on civilians came out through telephone and internet contacts. The British and Dutch media made a selection from the reports and images available, and were thus largely responsible for how this war was perceived in the UK and the Netherlands, respectively. To what extent the media also influenced relations between Jews and Muslims is difficult to say. Both Roggeveen’s and Van Esdonk’s studies show that very different views of this war existed among both Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam and London.156 There were Jews and Muslims with opposing views on this, as well as Jews and Muslims who were sympathetic to both Israel and the Palestinians, Jews and Muslims who did not have a clear position on the issue, and Jews who were mainly pro-Palestinian and some Muslims with a pro-Israel viewpoint.157 Apparently, the reporting on this war did not work in such a way that people in Jewish and Muslim circles took a united stand on it; indeed, a multitude of opinions on the subject were found in both circles.

The British and Dutch media not only reported on the Gaza War but also on the reactions to this war in the Netherlands and the UK. Roggeveen’s and Van Esdonk’s research shows that the prevailing image in the public discourse in both countries is that Jews and Muslims oppose each other head-on and completely with regard to this war, resulting partly in this theme being considered ‘the elephant in the room’ in relations between Jews and Muslims.158 The media contribute to this by featuring mainly
pro-Palestine Muslims and pro-Israel Jews. The polarised view is also reinforced by the media images of pro-Palestine and pro-Israel demonstrations, which frequently depict Islamic and Palestinian symbols and Jewish and Israeli symbols. These images easily conjure up the black-and-white representation that Muslims are united in standing squarely behind the message of pro-Palestinian demonstrations while Jews are united in standing squarely behind the objectives of pro-Israel demonstrations, whereas, as indicated, there are diverse views on the Israel-Palestinian conflict in both circles.

An interesting topic is the role of social media in the theme of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its impact on Jewish-Muslim relations. In the studies by Roggeveen and Van Esdonk, apart from the role played by social media in the direct reporting on this conflict in the Middle East, three particular functions emerge. Firstly, social media is sometimes the main channel through which Jews and Muslims communicate. This applies, for example, to the network about which Van Esdonk said:

The Community of Jews and Muslims, an informal network in London set up in response to the 2014 Gaza War, occasionally organises informal get-togethers, such as a ‘winter tea’ in December 2015. Their main medium of communication is Facebook and apart from the steering group there is no formal membership.

Secondly, social media is often used as an important medium for mobilising participants in rallies, events, and demonstrations. The organisers of pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations use social media to invite people to join the demonstrations. Sometimes informal groups of like-minded people form on social media and create plans for new activities.

Thirdly, social media often functions as a platform on which people express their opinions, either positive or negative, sometimes antisemitic or Islamophobic, and post messages and images. The expressions on social media can be damaging to the relations between Jews and Muslims offline, in ‘real’ life. Roggeveen encountered this in her research and wrote about it:

Some Jews and Muslims were targeted and even threatened because of what they said on social media. Marike, a liberal Jewish woman, for example, told me she was threatened by Muslim acquaintances after she had posted about her holiday in Israel on Facebook. Similarly, but not necessarily of influence on Jewish-Muslim relations, Aysel, a Muslim woman who works for an organization that teaches parents and children how to use social media, told me that she had heard that children on the media training course had been sent offensive cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed as a reaction to the ‘Free Palestine’ flags on their Facebook pages. She thought they were sent by extreme right-wing individuals, but was not sure.
In terms of the media, the differences between London and Amsterdam appear to be limited. In other words, the media have a similar influence on Jewish-Muslim relations in these cities.

10.4.6 National and Local Governments

The governments of the UK and London as well as those of the Netherlands and Amsterdam influence Jewish-Muslim relations in different ways. We provide three examples here: the support of these governments for Jewish-Muslim dialogue and cooperation initiatives, the equal or unequal treatment of Jews and Muslims by these governments in various policy areas, and the treatment of Muslims in particular by these governments in their anti-radicalisation and anti-terrorism policies. We compare the British and Dutch governments in each example.

10.4.6.1 Support for Jewish-Muslim Dialogue and Cooperation

The British government provides considerably more financial support to building and developing constructive relations between Jewish and Muslim population groups than the Dutch government does. The British government makes a substantial contribution, both directly and indirectly, through grants to organisations such as Mitzvah Day, Sadaqa Day, Nisa-Nashim, Tell MAMA, the Near Neighbours programme, Faith & Belief Forum, and IFN. The Dutch government is much more restrained in this respect. However, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment does provide modest financial support to some initiatives, such as the IOT project ‘Discrimination, Antisemitism and Islamophobia’ (Discriminatie, antisemitisme en islamofobie), ‘Building Bridges’ (Bruggenbouwen), and Faith in Living Together (Geloven in Samenleven). Educational projects related to discrimination or the Second World War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can also count on government support. The NCTV contributed 130,000 euros to the film Echoes of IS – we share the scars. In addition, since 2017, it has subsidised artistic projects in the context of developing anti-jihad narratives through the Prince Bernhard Culture Fund. In 2017, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment conducted a survey of local initiatives between Jewish and Muslim communities, called ‘Investing in Dialogue and Connection’ (Investeren in dialoog en verbinding) to inform and inspire municipal authorities to improve the dialogue between Jewish and Muslim communities.

In recent decades, the government authorities of Greater London and the London boroughs as well as those of Amsterdam and its urban districts have broadly followed national government policies regarding religious and ethnic groups including Jews and Muslims, although they each have their own areas of emphasis. An exception to this rule was the period of Job Cohen’s mayorship in Amsterdam, from 2001 to 2010. Contrary to Dutch
national policy, Cohen put a much stronger emphasis on cooperation with religious institutions, including Islamic institutions, in dealing with social issues. Somewhat exaggeratedly, Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Rath characterised Amsterdam policy during that period as ‘governing through religion’. Cohen’s successors did not continue this policy and instead opted for a considerable distance between the municipal government and religious institutions. Under the current leadership of Mayor Halsema, there is limited contact between the municipal administration and Christian churches and religious organisations in the broad sense. However, the City of Amsterdam does provide occasional project subsidies to initiatives such as MO & Moos, the ‘Safety Pact against Discrimination’ (Veiligheids pact tegen discriminatie) and 180 Amsterdammers. Like his predecessor Cohen, Mayor Eberhard van der Laan hosted talks with leading figures from the Jewish and Muslim communities at his official residence in order to strengthen ties between these communities and to promptly identify and contain any rising tensions between them. There are contacts between the City of Amsterdam and Jewish and Islamic institutions in relation to security issues that often involve the police and safety authorities and also to, for example, the issue of graves in perpetuity. Notably, the policies of Amsterdam’s urban districts differ considerably in terms of subsidising religious and interreligious initiatives. A survey by Het Parool newspaper showed that while some of Amsterdam’s urban districts do not subsidise any activities of religious organisations at all, most of the other districts have no problem helping to fund Quran lessons, for example, or youth work by a Christian organisation. Some urban district administrations are in contact with interreligious networks in their districts while others are not. An example of an urban district that does have such contacts is Stadsdeel Zuid.

The big difference in financial support provided to cooperation initiatives by the British and Dutch governments has its origins in the way these governments approach the relationship with religious groups. Whereas England has a church-state model of partial establishment that “helps to sustain a cultural assumption (...) that it is appropriate for the state and church to cooperate in achieving common goals” and ‘partnership’ has been the keyword in the British government since Tony Blair’s New Labour government took office in 1997, the Dutch government has, in recent decades, mainly emphasised the principles of the separation of church and state and the neutrality of the state. The principle of separation of church and state means that there should be no institutional or direct substantive control in the relationship between church and state. According to a ‘strict’ interpretation of this principle, the government and religious groups should keep their distance from each other, while according to a more ‘flexible’ interpretation, they can work together provided that they both respect the limits of each other’s power. In recent decades, the Dutch government has tended towards a stricter interpretation and, in principle, does not subsidise...
religious or interreligious institutions, or, according to a somewhat broader interpretation, only subsidises activities of these institutions if they are not religious in nature and serve a social purpose. In Amsterdam’s diversity policy, religion and philosophy of life are regarded mainly as personal beliefs that belong in the private sphere. In the UK, from the late 1990s, the New Labour governments strongly emphasised partnership with faith communities in order to tackle social problems together. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and especially of 7 July 2005, the building and strengthening of community cohesion became the focus of this partnership. The most comprehensive framework detailing this cooperation is the ‘Face to Face and Side by Side’ report published by the DCLG in 2008 as a “framework for partnership in our multi faith society”. Beckford summarised the actions of the New Labour governments as follows:

What these examples show is that the thirteen years of New Labour governments between 1997 and 2010 produced massive investments in faith-based activities and groups. At the heart of these investments was the key notion of partnership - of government and faith-based groups working together to pursue shared objectives. But my main point is this: it was government that took the initiative to invite faith-based groups to join the partnerships; it was government that funded the partnerships; and the relationship between them was assumed to be more consensual than contractual, although power clearly lay unequally with government.

According to Beckford, British government policy has led to the emergence of a separate ‘faith sector’ in British civil society, consisting mainly of groups affiliated with the IFN, which combine their private religious views with respect for groups with other religious views. From 2010 onwards, the policies initiated by the New Labour governments were continued by the Coalition government and subsequent Conservative governments, albeit with significantly reduced resources under the influence of austerity measures and a shift in social order policy from community cohesion to counterterrorism. Paul Hackwood, Executive Director of the Near Neighbours programme, said about this shift:

When we went from 2010 to 2011, the last Labour Government spent 95 million on integration and this government has spent 10 million on integration. I mean, there’s been massive increase in spend on counter terrorism and counter extremism, but actually not on integration. So how do you create a positive narrative, rather than a counter narrative, has been much reduced. So, I think we spend something like 750 million on counter terrorism/ counter extremism last year, and only 10 million on integration. (...) That’s why it’s a shambles. Now I think counter
terrorism is very important, counter extremism is very important, but if you don’t actually positively facilitate connection, then the consequences for that is that you have to keep putting this budget up to deal with the fact that you have not managed integration.  

Around 2010, the British government approached the Church of England and asked whether it – through its extensive network of local congregations – could contribute to the issue of ‘community cohesion’. This gave rise to the Near Neighbours programme.

10.4.6.2 Equal and Unequal Treatment

The British and Dutch governments treat Jews and Muslims unequally in certain respects, at least in the experience of many Muslims. According to Bal, for example, quite a few Dutch Muslims have the perception “of ‘measuring with double standards’: while antisemitism is in the spotlight, hatred of Muslims is not being tackled (…)”. De Graaf and Weggemans, the researchers who reviewed Amsterdam’s anti-radicalisation policy in 2018, also encountered this perception among Amsterdam’s Muslim communities. “The communities accuse ‘the City’ of opportunism, double standards and hypocrisy”. Van Esdonk closes her analyses of the impact of British counter-extremism policies on in particular Muslims with: “(…) the counter-extremism policies targeting Muslims across Britain contribute to a suspicious attitude towards state funding among Muslims who accuse the state of enhancing stigmatisation and instigating Islamophobia by conflating Muslims with terrorists”.

The accusation that the government has double standards can be found in various areas, first and foremost with regard to combating terrorism, including the protection component, as was described in Section 7.8. In the years 2014–2015, the period of her field research, Roggeveen observed that some members of Amsterdam’s Muslim community felt that Jewish properties were better protected by the government than Muslim properties. According to Pieter Jan van Slooten, strategic advisor for the City of Amsterdam, the difference in protection is due to a difference in threats. Whereas Jewish institutions face a real threat from a jihadist angle, aimed at people’s lives, the threat towards Islamic institutions is mainly directed at buildings, “more in terms of vandalism and destruction, often at night”. According to him, this difference is recognised by mosque administrators, but not always perceived as such by the communities.

(…) I notice that mosque administrators in particular are actually very rational about this [authors: about the differences in threat and differences in protection] and that they don’t see it [authors: the unreasonable difference in protection] and don’t play it up themselves either, but it is an issue among their communities, certainly in relation
to double standards. This is, of course, an issue in many areas, and is a particularly strong issue in this area.¹⁸⁸

Roggeveen’s analysis shows that the perception of double standards could probably have been eliminated if there had been better communication between the City of Amsterdam and the Muslim communities about the government’s protection policies.¹⁸⁹ As stated above, mosques in Amsterdam have received conditional subsidies for security since 2019. In London, mosques have been able to apply for subsidies for this purpose since 2016.

A specific British issue is the perceived unequal treatment by the government of Muslim and Jewish courts. According to Muslims, the government scrutinises Sharia courts much more closely than Jewish Beth Din courts.¹⁹⁰ In an overview of frustrations identified in British Muslim communities, the MCB said:

Continuing unambiguous discrimination: targeting of Islamic Sharia councils but not Jewish Beth Din courts which work in a strikingly similar way.¹⁹¹

Furthermore, as we have seen in Section 6.10, some Muslims in the Netherlands feel that double standards are used in combating hatred of Jews and Muslims. There is a difference in how the British and Dutch governments approach antisemitism and Islamophobia. Whereas the principle of ‘universalism’ prevails in the British approach, the principle of ‘particularism’ prevails in the Dutch approach.¹⁹² In Amsterdam, in addition to the general anti-discrimination policy and the existing ‘Safety Pact against Discrimination’ (Veiligheids pact tegen Discriminatie), a ‘Jewish Accord’ (Joods Akkoord) was concluded in 2018. In recent years, the Dutch government has made additional investments in combating antisemitism, while no additional resources have been made available for combating Islamophobia. Also, the national registration system for hatred of Muslims, for example, is less organised than that for hatred of Jews.¹⁹³ This inequality is related to the fact that, during the Rutte III government’s term of office, two of the governing parties, CU and VVD, have taken up the position of combating antisemitism, while none of the governing parties has made any extra effort to combat Islamophobia. In addition, the entire House of Representatives supports the fight against antisemitism, whereas the fight against Islamophobia is more controversial and Islam is permanently under fire from the PVV. The broad parliamentary support for combating antisemitism is undoubtedly related to what Gert Jan Segers, CU leader in the House of Representatives, calls the “debt of honour” that the Netherlands owes to the Jewish community because of the hardships it suffered during and after the Second World War.¹⁹⁴ The inequality in the Dutch approach to antisemitism and Islamophobia feeds the perception
among some Muslims that the government treats Jews differently than Muslims. “Jews are being helped, but we are not”.\(^{195}\)

The perceived unequal treatment by the British and Dutch governments among Muslims easily provokes feelings of injustice and anger that can interfere with the development of open contact between Jews and Muslims.

10.4.6.3 The Treatment of Muslims in Anti-radicalisation and Anti-terrorism Policy

A third example of government policy affecting Jewish-Muslim relations is the national anti-radicalisation and anti-terrorism policy. This policy has inadvertently resulted in a strong alienation of parts of the Muslim community from the government. Although alienation seems to be an even bigger issue in the UK than in the Netherlands, it also occurs in the Netherlands.\(^{196}\)

In an essay on social exclusion and Islamophobia, Rasit Bal wrote that after and because of 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, the position of Muslims in the Netherlands was increasingly placed in a security context, changing from ‘guest worker’ to ‘security risk’.\(^{197}\) Partly because of this, many new generation Muslims do not feel ‘at home’ in the Netherlands.

The difference in the degree of alienation between the UK and the Netherlands is probably related to the different characters of the anti-radicalisation and anti-terrorism policies in the two countries. There is a tendency towards securitisation in both countries, both governments take a broad approach to tackling extremism and terrorism, and both have a strong focus on jihadism. However, the British approach is more focused on combating the ideological dimension of jihadism, it more urgently calls for employees of public institutions to cooperate and it also seeks cooperation with Muslim communities more strongly.\(^{198}\) Partly as a result of this approach, Muslim communities in the UK probably feel even more strongly than those in the Netherlands that the government mainly sees them as ‘suspect communities’ that need to be monitored. Muslims are expected to keep an eye on each other and report suspicious behaviour to the relevant police authorities.

David Anderson, the independent reviewer of the UK’s CONTEST counterterrorism programme in 2015, said of the development of the Prevent component in this programme: "There is a strong feeling in Muslim communities that I visit, that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, at least a programme that is targeted on them".\(^{199}\) To counter alienation, Anderson argues, it is important for the British government and Muslim groups to communicate with each other.\(^{200}\) In the Netherlands, the government regularly meets with the CMO, but in the UK there has been no structural consultation between the government and the MCB, Britain’s largest Muslim umbrella organisation, since 2009. Anderson further advised:

Significant reform is required. The first step is better engagement: Government needs to listen and speak to more British Muslims, in more
places and on topics other than just terrorism. Moves towards greater openness should be stepped up. Intervention criteria and training materials need to be published and debated, if standards are to be improved and rumours about discrimination dispelled.201

The British government does not appear to have done much with Anderson’s recommendations yet. In February 2021, Zara Mohammed, the new MCB leader, urged the UK government to reconsider its ‘non-engagement’ policy towards the MCB. In a response, the government said its policy remained unchanged.202 On 26 January 2021, the British government appointed William Shawcross as the new Independent Reviewer of Prevent. His appointment is controversial in the British Muslim community.203

The large gap perceived between the government and Muslim communities in the Netherlands and the UK reinforces the tendency of parts of the Muslim communities, as Thurlings’ theory shows, to withdraw or militantly defend themselves against the outside world, which is perceived as a threat. It reduces the likelihood of Muslims having an open-minded attitude towards the outside world, including Jews, certainly insofar as the Jewish community and Jewish organisations are associated with the Dutch or British governments.

Notes
2 Many ideologies consist of a combination of more religious and more secular views (Woodhead 2012). For the definition of the term ‘religion’, see the Introduction, Definitions.
3 Goudsblom 1985, 6.
5 Roggeveen 2020, 193.
7 Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019.
8 Roggeveen 2020, 197–198; Van Esdonk 2020, 274.
9 Roggeveen 2020, 198; see also Van Esdonk 2020, 270–272.
10 Van Esdonk & Wiegers 2019.
11 Ibid.
12 The anti-Jewish attitudes encountered among these attackers fit into a tradition of anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist attitudes that have been developing in the Islamic world since the 1920s, especially in anti-colonial Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Santing 2020). The message sent by Osama bin Laden a few weeks after the attacks of 11 September 2001 mentioned the following arguments: that, first of all, the world has been humiliated by the West for over 80 years, its sons killed, their blood shed and its sanctities attacked; that, secondly, millions of children were being killed in Iraq because of the UN boycott; and that, thirdly, Islamic holy places in Palestine were being destroyed by Israeli tanks. The goals of the struggle, he said, were twofold: to cleanse the Arabian peninsula of the armies of the disbelievers and to put an
end to the oppression of the Muslim world so that the Muslims in Palestine
could live in peace (Motzki 2002, 40–41). Such arguments were reinforced and
propagated by IS (Rickenbacher 2019).

13 The name ‘Hofstad Group’ was coined by the General Intelligence and Security
Service (AIVD), which caught sight of the first members of this group in The
Hague, known in Dutch as the ‘Hofstad’, or court-capital. Most members of
this group actually lived in Amsterdam.

14 Peters 2020. Peters was involved in Bouyeri’s trial as an expert witness. In this
capacity, he wrote a report on Bouyeri’s radicalisation process. His re-
construction was based on the source material collected by Bouyeri before the
attack and about 60 documents written by him.

15 Ibid., 657.
16 Ibid., 658.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 659.
19 Kirkby 2007.
22 Mudde 2019.
23 Ibid., 24.
24 Ibid., 89–90; 84.
25 Ibid., 28.
27 The Jewish Chronicle, 27 August 2014; 21 September 2014.
29 For more information on the diversity of views on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict among British as well as Dutch Jews and Muslims, see Section 5.5.
30 Baumann 2004; Wimmer 2008a,b; Roggeveen 2020, 210–225; Van Esdonk
2020, 291–315. See also Section 1.2.
31 See Section 1.3.
33 Roggeveen 2020, 210–222; Van Esdonk 2020, 292–297. See also Section 9.2
and Section 9.3.
37 Van Esdonk 2020, 305.
38 Roggeveen 2020, 221; Van Esdonk 2020, 290–292.
39 Board of Deputies & MCB, 28 August 2014.
40 For the views of radical Muslims on Jews, see Section 10.2.1. Cf. CST 2012,
41 See https://collectieftegenislamofobie.nl/ and Section 6.4.
42 Post 2016, 10.
43 See Section 6.6.; Tell MAMA 2017; De Volkskrant, 1 November 2003.
44 For information on this strategy among ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in
both countries, see: Flint Ashery 2020, 7–23; Van Trigt 2010 and Mock 2010,
and on the attitude of first generation Muslims: Lewis 1994 and Bal 2019, 129.
45 De Koning 2019, 91.
46 On 6 December 2010, Frits Bolkestein, former leader of the VVD and Member
of the European Parliament, stated that there was no future for ‘conscious
Jews’ in the Netherlands. NRC Handelsblad wrote: “By conscious Jews, I
mean Jews who are recognisable as such, such as Orthodox Jews’, said
Bolkestein. ‘I don’t see a future for them here because of the antisemitism particularly among Moroccan Dutch people, who continue to grow in number’ (NRC Handelsblad, 6 December 2010). This statement sparked fierce debate both inside and outside Jewish circles. Some shared Bolkestein’s analysis that the living conditions of Jews in the Netherlands and Europe were deteriorating, but many were particularly outraged by Bolkestein’s ‘solution’ that Jews would be better off leaving (De Groene Amsterdammer, 19 January 2011). CIDI conducts research into Jewish emigration figures to Israel in various European countries. On average, in the 2000s, 0.11 per cent of Dutch Jews went on aliyah, compared to 0.31 per cent of British Jews and 0.43 per cent of French Jews. CIDI concluded: “These statistics show that some European Jews are drawing the same bleak conclusions as Bolkestein. But they also show that, more than in other European countries, Dutch Jews continue to have faith in their future here and in their ability to overcome antisemitism” (CIDI, 27 December 2010). See: https://www.cidi.nl/de-toekomst-van-bewuste-joden-in-nederland/.

50 Distancing oneself from one’s Jewish or Muslim identity in public corresponds to the classic ideal of laicité, which is cherished in France: in public people are citizens of the French Republic, while in private they can profess their specific ethnic or religious identity if they so wish. For information on the historical development and complexity of the laicité concept, see: Baubérot (1998) and Jansen (2006).

51 Roggeveen 2020, 225.
53 Board of Deputies & MCB, 28 August 2014.
58 For a portrait of Van de Kamp, see De Groene Amsterdammer, 26 April 2021.
60 Ibid., 265–266.
61 Ibid., 266–270.
62 The predecessors of the MHCLG (2018–2021) are the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM; 2001–2006) and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG; 2006–2018). In September 2021, Boris Johnson’s cabinet renamed the department again, calling it the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC).
63 Gemeente Amsterdam Zuid, 18 November 2015.
66 Van Esdonk 2020, 115–126.
69 Written interview with Roemer van Oordt, 1 February 2021.
70 Roggeveen 2020, 199.
72 Van Esdonk 2020, 274–278.
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73 Ibid., 277.
74 Ibid., 321.
75 Pettigrew 1998, 76–77; Roggeveen 2020, 199.
77 For the size of the relevant communities, see Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.5.
78 Roggeveen 2020, 196.
79 Rabbi Nathan Levy mentioned this in our interview with him on 17 April 2017. See also Section 9.5.
80 For the development of the role of imams in various Western European countries, see: Hashas, De Ruiter & Vinding (2018).
81 In his research on the Kreuzberger Initiative Gegen Antisemitismus and Salaam Schalom in Berlin, Becker uses the somewhat broader term ‘cosmopolitan habitus’ (Becker 2019).
82 Van Esdonk 2020, 265–270.
83 Geloven in Samenleven 2019, 1; Gelderblom & Post Hospers 2019.
84 Roggeveen 2020, 202.
85 Thurlings 1978; Stoffels 1995; Vellenga 2009. See Section 1.3 and Figure 1.
86 Thurlings 1978; Stoffels 1995, 40.
87 See Section 10.2.2.
88 Kahn-Harris & Gidley 2010, 13.
89 Ibid., 176.
90 Gelderblom & Post Hospers 2019, 184.
91 See Section 10.2.2.
93 Jacobs 2010.
94 Interview with Erwin Brugmans, 3 February 2020.
95 Egorova & Ahmed 2010.
97 See Section 10.2.2.
100 The National Jewish Community Survey 2013 revealed the following: “A quarter (26%) of respondents describe themselves as being ‘Traditional’; a similar proportion (24%) as ‘Secular/Cultural’; and a minority (16%) as ‘Orthodox’ or ‘Haredi’. 18% describe themselves as ‘Reform/Progressive’” (Graham, Staetsky & Boyd 2014, 3). See also Section 3.1.
101 Huijnk 2018, 53. See also Section 3.4.
102 Graham 2012, 91.
103 Wallet 2017, 473. See also Section 3.3.
104 Huijnk 2018, 34.
105 To this we could add a fifth actor, namely transnational actors and, in particular, foreign governments. Nevertheless, little is known about the influence of the Israeli government on the attitude of the British and Dutch Jewish communities towards Muslims and, for example, of the Pakistani, Turkish and Moroccan governments on the attitude of the respective Muslim communities in the UK or the Netherlands towards Jews. The studies by Roggeveen and Van Esdonk mention little to nothing about this either. However, we did see in Section 3.5 that the Turkish government tries to exert influence on the Turkish-Dutch community, and the Moroccan government on the Moroccan-Dutch community. Generally speaking, these governments aim for the relevant communities to be politically and religiously in line with the policies they
advocate. It is well known that the Moroccan government likes to portray Moroccan Islam as a ‘moderate Islam’ that preaches tolerance towards Jews and Christians.

106 See Section 2.1.
107 See Section 2.3.
108 Interview with Erwin Brugmans, 3 February 2020.
109 See Section 2.4.
110 See Section 4.2.
111 See Section 4.3.
112 See Chapter 5, Section 6.7, Section 7.5, and Chapter 8.
113 Ibid.
114 See in particular Section 7.5.
115 Ibid. See also Section 6.7.
116 On the rise of the ‘Muslims are a problem’ discourse, see Section 4.3, and on the rise of the discourse of Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ from the point of view of security in the Netherlands and the UK, see Section 7.5.
118 See Chapter 5, Section 6.7, Section 7.5 and Chapter 8.
119 Roggeveen 2020, 186–205.
121 See also Section 4.3.
123 Interview with Paul Hackwood, 24 October 2017.
125 Interview with Paul Hackwood, 24 October 2017.
126 Bernts & Berghuis 2016, 23.
128 Voas & Bruce 2018, 5.
132 Filby 2015, 255–266.
133 Ibid., 263.
134 Parfitt & Egorova 2005; Allen 2012.
135 Hussain & Bagguley 2012. The 2002 YouGov poll *Attitudes towards British Muslims* showed that 64 per cent of the British public claiming to know at least something about Islam obtained this knowledge from the media (YouGov, 4 November 2002). See: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/01/28/attitudes-towards-muslims.
137 Haaretz, 21 September 2019.
139 Konijn et al. 2010; Jekeli 2015, 229.
140 Allen 2012, 10.
142 Hanif 2019.
143 Ibid., 21.
144 Ibid., 30.
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146 Butter 2020. See: https://ewoudbutter.wordpress.com/2020/08/26/dertig-jaar-onderzoek-naar-bijlpegving-over-moslims-in-nederlandse-media/. For information on how media coverage about the Amsterdam neighbourhood De Baarsjes has affected the relationship between the local government and Islamic institutions in this neighbourhood before and after the murder of Theo van Gogh, see: Uitermark & Gielen (2010).
147 D’ Haenens & Bink 2006, 362.
149 Shadid 2009.
150 Meuzelaar 2014.
152 Balçik 2019.
156 Roggeveen 2020, 97–98; Van Esdonk 2020, 163–171.
157 See Section 5.5.
158 Roggeveen 2020, 87-91; Van Esdonk 2020, 289.
159 On the influence of flags and symbols in this context, see: Roggeveen 2020, 102–103.
160 Van Esdonk 2020, 217.
162 Ibid., 96–97.
163 MHCLG, 24 July 2019.
164 NRC Handelsblad, 22 September 2017.
165 NRC Handelsblad, 13 June 2021. We do not know how long the NCTV will continue with this. In 2021, it will reflect on whether subsidies for cultural ‘counter narrative’ projects are appropriate.
166 Ministerie SZW 2017.
167 Uitermark, Duyvendak & Rath 2014.
168 Written interview with Henk Meulink, 31 August 2020.
170 Written interview with Roemer van Oordt, 1 February 2021. In 2016 and 2017, the City of Amsterdam developed plans for a ‘grey campaign’ to counter online radicalisation among young Muslims. This campaign was cancelled prematurely, partly due to objections to the content of draft films for the project by Mayor Van der Laan because religion played no part in them (Gemeente Amsterdam, 31 October 2017; NRC Handelsblad, 31 October 2017).
172 Written interview with Roemer van Oordt, 1 February 2021.
174 Van Bijsterveld 2015.
175 Maussen 2006, 76–78.
176 Beckford 2010, 126–130; Beckford 2015, 229.
178 DCLG 2008.
179 Beckford 2010, 129.
180 Beckford 2010, 130.
182 Interview with Hackwood, 24 October 2017.
183 Bal 2019, 138. See also 6.10.
185 Van Esdonk 2020, 207.
186 Roggeveen 2020, 132–133.
187 Interview with Pieter Jan van Slooten, 16 March 2018.
188 Ibid.
189 Roggeveen 2020, 132–133.
190 MCB 2016.
191 Ibid., 14.
192 These terms are taken from Sarah Cardaun’s study on ‘countering contemporary Antisemitism in Britain’ (2015).
193 For more information, see Section 6.9.
194 Algemeen Dagblad, 7 February 2018.
196 See Section 7.7 and Section 7.8.
197 Bal 2019. A paradox arises on this issue, particularly in the UK: on the one hand, the British government strives more than the Dutch government to achieve a ‘partnership’ with Muslim communities, but on the other hand, it alienates these communities even more than the Dutch government does, particularly because of its anti-terrorist and anti-extremist policies and the accompanying stigmatisation of Muslims. This paradox was pointed out earlier by Christian Joppke (Joppke 2009).
198 For more information, see Section 7.7.
199 The Independent, 6 October 2016. See Section 7.7.
200 Ibid.

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**Internet sources**

The internet sources used are listed in the endnotes. These were consulted in 2020 or 2021.
11 Conclusions, Discussion, and Looking Ahead

11.1 Introduction

One of the most burning social issues in contemporary democratic states is how groups with different identities, interests, opinions, and lifestyles can live together peacefully. On the one hand, these states want to allow space for difference, contrast, and disagreement, but on the other they need to prevent disputes from spiralling out of hand and ending in violence. Or, in the words of political thinker Chantal Mouffe, they want to provide scope for ‘agonism’ but at the same time prevent that from turning into ‘antagonism’.1 People draw distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which imbue them with their own social identity.2 Important markers of distinction include gender, age, nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, skin colour, profession, sexual preference, home town, district or region, and nationality. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf point out that the diversity of identity in metropolitan cities like London and Amsterdam has increased in recent decades.3 As a result of migration, diversity in terms of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’ in particular has increased; and linked to this diversity of languages, social networks, sexual identities, legal statuses and lifestyles. In this context, Vertovec and Wessendorf refer to the rise of ‘superdiversity’.4 Because one identity is generally considered more important than another in social interaction, diversity of identity goes hand in hand with inequality. Much social struggle is therefore aimed at limiting and reducing that inequality. Identity-based groups organise themselves and enter the public arena in order to be recognised and acknowledged, and to receive justice. Examples include the Black Lives Matter, MeToo, and LGBTIQ movements, but also populist currents claiming to stand up for the neglected interests of ‘original’ population groups.5 Consequently, one urgent social issue in today’s world is how communities with different identities and the associated interests, views, and lifestyles can interact peacefully with each other. The importance of this issue has only increased in recent decades.6

In this study, we focused upon the relationship between two (diverse) groups, each with its own ethnic and/or religious identity – Jews and Muslims – in two different European cities, London and Amsterdam. These

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are all communities sensitive to issues affecting their identity, which on the Jewish side may be related to a traumatic history of peril and persecution and on the Muslim side to its current disadvantaged position and experiences of exclusion and discrimination. The research question which gave rise to this study is this: what structural relationships – bilateral or multilateral – have developed between Jews and Muslims and between their respective institutions in London and Amsterdam since the late 1980s, what similarities and differences in these relationships can be observed in the two cities and to what factors are these attributable? In Section 4.4 we identified the following similarities and differences:

1. Bilateral structural Jewish-Muslim relations were established earlier in London than in Amsterdam: in about 1990 and in the early 2000s, respectively.
2. Jewish-Muslim dialogue and/or co-operative relationships are more numerous in London than in Amsterdam, in general more extensive and also often more professional and specialised.
3. Overall, Jewish-Muslim relationships in London have a more religious character than those in Amsterdam, where they are more secular.
4. Almost exactly the same themes of connection and of division play a role in Jewish-Muslim relations in London and in Amsterdam.
5. In London and Amsterdam alike, the themes of connection and of division in Jewish-Muslim relations give rise to varying outcomes: the former often result in co-operation, but sometimes in conflict, whereas the latter often lead to conflict, but on occasions to co-operation. And the term ‘co-existence’ can be applied to relations between certain sections of the Jewish and Muslim communities.
6. In London, Jewish-Muslim relations are anchored in a much more extensive social matrix of religious and interreligious groups than in Amsterdam.

In the remainder of this chapter, we look first at the causes underlying these six points of similarity and difference between Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam. What factors play a part (Section 11.2)? Based upon the results of our research, we then interrogate the existing literature on this theme (Section 11.3). Finally, we look ahead at the future of Jewish-Muslim relations in the two cities (Section 11.4).

11.2 Conclusions

1. Structural bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations were established earlier in London than in Amsterdam. This is due primarily to the fact that the British Jewish community began to reflect upon that theme much earlier than its counterpart in the Netherlands. As early as 1969, the Working Party on Race Relations of the Board of Deputies of British
Jews published the report *Improving Race Relations*, which called upon Jews to establish ties with ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ groups, including Muslims. In the Netherlands, Ronny Naftaniel (CIDI) and some liberal rabbis did suggest initiating a dialogue with Muslims in the second half of the 1980s, but their plea generated little response and more profound reflection on the topic failed to materialise within Jewish circles.

Another factor is that, following the Second World War, the migration, settlement, and institutionalisation of sizeable communities from the Muslim world started earlier in the UK than in the Netherlands. As a result, these communities were ready to orient themselves towards external relations rather sooner. In migrant communities, the emphasis in the first few years after arrival is usually upon ‘creating a home away from home’ – or, to use Robert Putnam’s terminology, ‘bonding’. Only later does scope arise to start building relations with other communities, or ‘bridging’. In the UK, this process began earlier. In 1992 Driss El Boujoufi identified the principal reason why no formal Jewish-Muslim relations had been established in the Netherlands up to that point: it was “because the Muslim immigrants were too busy establishing their own organisations, such as mosques and cultural associations”.

One important ‘trigger event’ in London was the Rushdie affair, which in the late 1980s made large sections of the UK population – including the Jewish community – aware for the first time of the presence of substantial Muslim groups in British society. It was as a result of this that, in about 1990, the first permanent bilateral initiative to establish links between Jews and Muslims was launched in London, instigated by the Maimonides Foundation and the Calamus Foundation. In 1994 Aubrey Rose, vice-president of the Board of Deputies, wrote the report *Ourselves and other Minorities*, which stated, “We have to maintain and develop links with the sensible moderate Moslems …”. The Rushdie affair also provided a strong stimulus for the further institutionalisation of Islam in the UK, which resulted in the establishment of the MCB in 1997. This paved the way for the first forms of formal co-operation between the national umbrella organisations representing the two communities, the Board of Deputies and the MCB.

Although the Rushdie affair did prompt a heated debate in the Netherlands about Islam and the position of Muslims in the Netherlands, and also led to creation of national Islamic umbrella organisations, the first structural contacts between Jews and Muslims were not forged until after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, some individual Jews and Muslims did ‘find’ each other in the 1990s in the struggle against racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism. In Amsterdam, in response to events such as the beginning of the Second Intifada, the attacks of 9 September 2001, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002 and the disruption of remembrance ceremonies on 4 May
2003 by young people of Moroccan origin, various Jewish-Muslim co-operative initiatives and ‘diversity’ projects were launched in the early 2000s. These events also gave an impulse to the process which culminated with the government’s recognition, in 2004, of a national council of Muslim organisations, the CMO. This opened up the possibility that contacts could be established at the national level between representatives of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and their counterparts in the country’s various denominations of Judaism and in the CJO, which itself was founded in 1997 to better represent the external interests of the Jewish communities to government and in the rest of Dutch society.

2 Jewish-Muslim dialogue and/or co-operative relationships are more numerous in London than in Amsterdam, in general more extensive and also often more professional and specialised, in the sense that they are active in a wider range of social domains. This difference is due, first of all, to the fact that many more resources are available in London, simply because the Jewish and Muslim communities there are much larger than in Amsterdam. Whereas the British capital is home to 150,000 Jews and over a million Muslims (by rough estimation), 25,000 Jews – including 5,000 religious ones – and 90,000 Muslims live in Amsterdam. As a result, London not only has much more funding available for Jewish-Muslim initiatives, but also more individual Jews and Muslims, more synagogues and mosques, and more Jewish and Muslim organisations in a position to back them. The difference in available financial resources is further reinforced by the fact that the British government – especially during the New Labour administration – has long made far more funding available for such initiatives than has the Dutch state. These factors, together with the longer history of Jewish-Muslim relations in the UK, mean that those relations are more institutionalised there – which in turn is also conducive to their professionalisation and specialisation. So, for example, we find a Council of Imams and Rabbis, a Council of Muslim and Jewish Physicians, and a Centre for the Study of Muslim-Jewish Relations in the UK, none of which exist in the Netherlands.

3 Overall, Jewish-Muslim relationships in London have a more religious character than those in Amsterdam, where they are more secular. The difference here is related directly to the fact that religious Jews form a significant majority of the London Jewish community (an estimated 80 per cent of the total), whereas Amsterdam’s Jewish community is predominantly secular (also an estimated 80 per cent). Our research indicates that intercommunal activities in both cities and countries are attended by Jews and Muslims of all religious inclinations, that religious Jews and practising Muslims from a variety of backgrounds take part in co-operative interfaith initiatives and that interfaith
dialogue activities mainly involve liberal Jews and ‘progressive’ Muslims, although some more ‘conservative’ Muslims also participate in these initiatives. There is a particular interest in such dialogue amongst Jews and Muslims with an open attitude to the culture around them and a focus upon associating their own form of worship with this cultural receptiveness.

Almost exactly the same themes of connection and of division play a role in Jewish-Muslim relations in London and in Amsterdam. The former are perceived similarities of religion, culture and social position, common interests, and shared social goals, whilst the latter include the Israeli-Palestinian question, antisemitism amongst Muslims and Islamophobia amongst Jews, terrorist attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets and the commemoration of wars and genocides in Europe. These themes of division are related to the fact that each group in the two cities finds itself in a very similar historical and sociocultural situation. For both Jewish communities, the prominent themes are the state of Israel, antisemitism, attacks on Jewish targets, and the memory of the horrors of the Second World War. For the two Muslim communities they are the fate of the Palestinians, Islamophobia, attacks on Islamic targets, and to some extent commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. And these do not stand separately but sometimes interfere. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict regularly plays a role in incidents surrounding commemorations of the Kristallnacht or the Holocaust, for instance, whilst, for example, views on the similarities between the Jewish and Islamic methods of ritual slaughter influence whether or not members of the two communities join forces in defending the right to these practices.

The themes of connection sometimes play different roles in Jewish-Muslim relations in the two cities and countries. During the 2010s, for example, ritual slaughter became a more important area of co-operation in the Netherlands than it was the UK. This was due to the fact a ban on unstunned slaughter had become a real prospect there because of the presence of and initiatives by the Party for the Animals (PvdD) in the Dutch parliament.

The themes of division mentioned above not only affect relations between Jews and Muslims directly, they also do so indirectly through the response they generate in public discourse, in political debate, or in government policy. Jihadist attacks on Jewish targets, for example, have such an indirect effect because of the resulting talk in the public arena of Muslims as a ‘suspect community’, which places a further burden upon Jewish-Muslim relations. In the opinion of Muslim organisations in the UK, the British counterterrorism programme Prevent contributes strongly to this negative discourse.
In London and Amsterdam alike, the themes of connection and division in Jewish-Muslim relations give rise to varying outcomes: the former often result in co-operation, but sometimes in conflict, whereas the latter often lead to conflict, but on occasions to co-operation. Moreover, there are Jews and Muslims – and their respective institutions – who either have no contacts whatsoever with each other or confine these to interactions in which they do not allow their Jewish and Muslim identity to play a role. We define this as co-existence.

How can we understand this great variety in Jewish-Muslim relations? First of all, we note that whether the themes of connection and division result in co-operation or in conflict depends very much upon the way in which Jews and Muslims and their organisations approach them. In other words, upon the ’social identity strategies’ they apply. In the groups we studied, we observed two kinds of strategy in this respect: strategies of co-operation (’emphasising perceived similarities’, ’deconstructing negative stereotypes’, ’agree to disagree’) and strategies of conflict (’deconstructing perceived similarities’, ’emphasising assumed differences’). The most fruitful of the former, in the long run, seems to be ’agree to disagree’: recognise that there are points of insurmountable disagreement but at the same time seek co-operation on those points where agreement can be reached. One striking example of this strategy in action is the joint statement by the Board of Deputies and the MCB on the Gaza War in the summer of 2014, which began by acknowledging that many Jews and Muslims are deeply divided over the conflict in Israel and Palestine but then called for peace, stating: “ … we must continue to work hard for good community relations in the UK. We must not import conflict. We must export peace instead”. In practice, different strategies are often used simultaneously or in turn. In co-operative projects, for example, we have seen that people often start by ’deconstructing negative stereotypes’ and ’emphasising perceived similarities’ and then, once a basis of trust has been laid, go on to explore sensitive themes and finally end up ’agreeing to disagree’. In addition to strategies of co-operation and of conflict, moreover, we have also encountered strategies of avoidance (withdrawal and departure) and strategies of renunciation (partial or total) amongst the groups studied.

The next question is how to understand the use of the four clusters of strategies mentioned above. In other words, how might they be related to the positions Jews, Muslims and their respective organisations adopt towards each other? The answer consists of two steps. Firstly, the strategies employed are often prompted by the stances the groups in question take towards each other. These in turn are products of the basic attitudes we encounter in all four groups: openness, militancy, fear, and indifference. Where openness corresponds with the strategies of co-operation, militancy with those of conflict, fear with avoidance, and indifference with renunciation.
Secondly, these four attitudes are related to the way in which Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions define each other in terms of ‘identity’ and ‘power’. When the perceived differences in these respects are small, openness is the obvious attitude to adopt – as indeed we find in those individuals and organisations eager to seek co-operation and dialogue. When people experience ‘the other’ as an opponent, but one they believe they can fight successfully – with or without God’s help – then militancy prevails. We encounter this attitude in very different degrees and forms, ranging from activism to combativeness and from moral appeal to, in its most extreme manifestation, the use of violence. Those who feel threatened by ‘the other’ and do not know how to avert the menace tend to adopt an attitude of fear; this is the stance dominant amongst Jews and Muslims who are afraid of each other, avoid mutual contact and generally try to stay out of each other’s way. If people perceive no major difference in identity, nor any possibility of changing ‘the other’ even if they wanted to, then indifference prevails. This attitude is found amongst Jews and Muslims for whom that identity is not so important in some or all areas of life, who may even have difficulty calling themselves Jews or Muslims and who do not allow this factor to play a role in their contacts with others.

6 In London, Jewish-Muslim relations are anchored in a much more extensive social matrix of religious and interreligious groups than in Amsterdam. In the UK, particularly under the influence of the New Labour government (1998–2010), a separate ‘faith’ sector – as James Beckford calls it – emerged in civil society. This has no equivalent in the Netherlands.14 The disparity here is due primarily to the fact that the two countries have different models of the relationship between church and state. The one prevailing in the Netherlands is known as ‘principled pluralism’, whilst in England it is ‘partial establishment’.15 A particular characteristic of the Dutch model is that, in principle, all religious groups are treated equally by the state in the public sphere. It also needs to be pointed out here that the distance between church and state has increased in recent decades and that Dutch governments are generally very reluctant to subsidise religious organisations or their activities. In England, it is enshrined in law that the Church of England is the established church. And through the Near Neighbours programme operated by its Church Urban Fund (CUF), the British government indirectly subsidises Jewish-Muslim initiatives. In addition, in recent decades the government has explicitly sought co-operation with and provided support for various religious communities with a view to implementing its policies. It is this approach with has created the so-called ‘faith sector’. Even in ‘multifaith Britain’, the Church of England still occupies a prominent place.
To summarise our findings, we can conclude that Jewish-Muslim relations we have investigated – in both London and Amsterdam – are influenced by the dynamic interplay of a multitude of institutional, positional, and contextual factors. Key institutional factors are ideology and practical matters such as initiators, organisational structures, and available resources, but above all the social identity strategies employed. These are closely related to the attitudes Jews, Muslims, and their institutions adopt towards each other, which in turn are associated with their perceived mutual positions in terms of identity and power differentiation. Contextually, meanwhile, in addition to developments that act as ‘trigger events’, such as the Rushdie affair, flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and antisemitic or Islamophobic incidents, what stands out is the influence of historical factors, public opinion, the mainstream Christian churches, and the media, along with the role of government. Through policy to facilitate Jewish-Muslim initiatives, as well as to combat antisemitism, Islamophobia, and other forms of hate crime, in both cities the government both intentionally and unintentionally exerts significant influence over the way Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions perceive each other in terms of ‘kinship’ or, conversely, ‘distance’. To take just one example, the recent intensification of efforts by the Dutch government to combat antisemitism, whilst its national monitoring of Islamophobia is far less well-organised, has reinforced the feeling amongst many Dutch Muslims that double standards are applied in the Netherlands. And this throws up an additional barrier hindering their contact with ‘outsiders’, including Jews.

There are also various differences, of greater or lesser significance, between London and Amsterdam. The most obvious are found in the areas of ideology (Jewish London is predominantly religious, for example, whereas Jewish Amsterdam is predominantly secular), initiators (the pool is significantly larger in London than in Amsterdam), organisation (Jewish-Muslim relations are more institutionalised in London), resources (far more abundant in London), historical factors (the tragic fate of the Jews during and after the Second World War has a left a greater impression in Amsterdam than in London, for instance), trigger factors (such as the Rushdie affair, which had a much bigger impact in London than in Amsterdam), the mainstream churches (the Church of England plays a far more prominent role in London than either the Protestant or the Roman Catholic church in Amsterdam) and the government (British administrations focus upon ‘partnership’, for example, whilst their Dutch counterparts favour neutrality and distance). On the other hand, similarities can be found in the social identity strategies applied by the Jewish and Muslim communities in the two cities; in both contexts these are related to the attitudes Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions adopt towards each other, which in turn are shaped by mutual perceptions of identity and power.
11.3 Discussion

Our study shows that it can be very fruitful to approach the subject of relations between two populations with their own very distinctive ethnic and/or religious identities, in this case Jews and Muslims, using a combination of insights derived from Bourdieu’s theory of practice, social identity theory and Thurlings’ theory of the relationship in minority groups between their own perceived social position and their attitude towards the outside world, plus the behavioural strategies linked to this. Bourdieu’s theory of practice provides us with the general perspective that Jewish-Muslim relations need to be understood in the context in which they are situated and in that of the positions Jews, Muslims and their respective organisations occupy therein, discussing these factors in terms of ‘field’, ‘position’, ‘capital’, ‘strategy’ and ‘habitus’. Bourdieu analyses strategic actions by groups in terms of ‘capital’, ‘power’, and ‘interest’. In many cases this approach is of great value, but it falls fundamentally short when it comes to analysing the dynamics of the relationships between groups which differ primarily in terms of their ‘identity’. These dynamics are influenced by factors such as ideology, and especially by the way in which the groups concerned deal with their perceived mutual differences and similarities in substantive terms. Or, in other words, by the social identity strategies they employ. This aspect falls outside the scope of Bourdieu’s analysis, so order gain to grasp of it we need to complement that with insights drawn from social identity theory.

Social identity theory analyses relations between groups in terms of the mechanism of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’, and traditionally focuses upon conflicts in intergroup relations although there are also studies that examine cooperation between groups. In our work we have identified five social identity strategies which are applied across the full spectrum of relationships from co-operation to conflict, namely: ‘emphasising perceived similarities’,...
‘deconstructing negative stereotypes’, ‘agree to disagree’, ‘deconstructing assumed similarities’ and ‘emphasising perceived differences’. We also distinguish several strategies of avoidance and renunciation, which result in coexistence. Social identity theory rarely, if ever, deals with other institutional factors influencing relations between groups, however, such as ideology, initiators or available resources, or with the influence of positional and contextual factors as addressed by Bourdieu’s theory of practice.

Thurlings’ theory provides an important enrichment to social identity theory by revealing how the social identity strategies employed by Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations relate to the attitudes they adopt towards each other, which in turn are associated with the way they experience their mutual positions in terms of ‘power’ and ‘identity’. This experience is not separated from the environment, but is in particular influenced by the way the dominant majority perceives these minorities. It is influenced, for example, by the ruling discourse within the majority about Jews and Muslims and by the way these minorities are predominately framed in mainstream media. On the other hand, it does not address other institutional factors likely to influence the dynamics between Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations, such as the type of organisations concerned or the resources available, or the influence of external factors such as the attitudes of mainstream churches and governments. As with social identity theory, then, with Thurlings’ theory we are in fact dealing with a partial theory.

Our findings echo the outcome of the analysis conducted by Mandel in her book *Jews and Muslims in France*, which found that tensions there are the result of an interplay of historical, transnational, national, and local factors, in particular Jewish-Muslim relations in former French North Africa, developments in the Middle East and national and sometimes local factors in postcolonial France. One important difference between Jewish-Muslim relations in France on the one hand and the UK and the Netherlands on the other, though, is that in France they are far more strongly influenced by earlier intercommunity relations in the former colonies. This is linked to the fact that the decolonisation of French North Africa went hand in hand with the migration of large numbers of both Jews and Muslims. Between 1944 and 1979, some 240,000 Jews from the Maghreb arrived in mainland France, doubling the size of its Jewish community. Meanwhile, the number of Algerian Muslims in France rose from 130,000 in 1930 to 600,000 in 1965 and 800,000 in 1982. In that same year, the Moroccan Muslim population in France reached 440,000 and the Tunisian 190,000. The decolonisation of the British Empire, by contrast, resulted in a large influx of Muslim migrants to the UK, but not of Jews. And in the Netherlands decolonisation did not result in the arrival of large numbers of either Muslims or Jews. The largest group of ‘colonial’ Muslims came from Suriname, which achieved independence in 1975; their number is estimated at around 30,000.

Our research confirms the significance of the ‘social position’ factor identified in Wallet’s work. First and foremost, however, we have found
that what is most important is the social position Jews and Muslims perceive themselves as occupying, rather than one viewed ‘objectively’. And because Jews, Muslims, and their respective organisations experience their social positions in very different ways, we find different attitudes within their various communities. How those perceptions come about, moreover, is in part influenced by the way in which the media report on Jews, Muslims, and their mutual relations. This is especially true for those on both sides who have no contact with each other and so are largely dependent upon the media to form their opinions.

Our findings are in line with those of the ethnographic study of relations between Jews and Muslims in the UK conducted by Egorova and Ahmed in 2013–2014,26 which shows that they are strongly influenced by feelings of threat. Some British Jews are apprehensive about forming relationships with Muslims because of their collective memory of the history of discrimination and persecution, contemporary antisemitism, and the prevailing discourse that Muslims represent a security threat, to Jews in particular. Conversely, some Muslims are reluctant to enter into relationships with the outside world, Jews included, due to a combination of actual experiences of discrimination and hostility and the public discourse that they form a ‘problem’ group. Our study largely corroborates this picture, although we have also found that feelings of fear play no role whatsoever in some sections of the Muslim and Jewish communities, which are able to cooperate or at least live alongside one another in relative harmony.

In his book *The Burdens of Brotherhood*, Katz analyses the complex history of Jewish-Muslim relations in France in the twentieth century in the light of the two communities’ respective relationships with the French government.27 Our study underlines the importance of government in shaping Jewish-Muslim relations, revealing that great disparity between London and Amsterdam in terms of the extent of Jewish-Muslim cooperative relationships is largely down to differences in the attitudes adopted by their respective national and local governments. Whereas the official position in the Netherlands in recent decades has been characterised by distancing, in the UK there is a focus upon partnership.

We can elaborate upon the issue of government dealings with Jewish and Muslim groups by looking at the current debate in the sociology of religion on the issue of how the interactions in question can best be described and analysed.28 Traditionally, such dealings have been understood using models of the relationship between church and state, but these have serious shortcomings in the current situation. In particular, as we have seen in this study, they offer insufficient insight into the way in which governments deal with ‘new’ religious groups – especially Islamic ones – at a time when they are so much in the news. As Erdem Dikici points out, “Today, the main concern of Western European states is not the relationship between the state and church, but how to deal with Islam and accommodate distinctive practices in public spaces”.29 To overcome the flaws in the models, the broad term ‘governance
of religious diversity’ has been coined to include the government’s dealings with Islam and the various currents within it.

Julia Martinez-Ariño identifies four means of regulating the governance of religious diversity, including ‘ethno-religious diversity’, in cities: regulatory documents such “ordinances, decrees and charters”, symbolic recognition of religious diversity, material resources and participation by religious organisations in political and administrative bodies. According to her, for the most part these four means involve interventions by ‘urban authorities’; but as our study shows, interventions by national governments with an impact upon the cities in question are also crucial. We encounter all four means of regulation with regard to the Jewish-Muslim relations we have studied in London and Amsterdam.

A regulatory element can be found at various levels, ranging from the ‘abstract’ one of British and Dutch legislation on the position of religious groups (such as the established church in England and the equal treatment of all groups by the government in the Netherlands) or religious freedoms (concerning religious holidays, food regulations, ritual slaughter, religious education, spiritual care and so on) to the ‘concrete’ level of detailed criteria under which synagogues and mosques in the cities concerned qualify for security protection or public-order decisions on where and when pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian demonstrations may be held. One specific form of ‘regulatory document’ is the covenant, examples of which include the Jewish Accord in Amsterdam and the Faith Covenant in the UK, developed by the APPG on Faith and Society with the aim of promoting contacts between local authorities and faith communities.

The ‘symbolic recognition’ element can be seen in the numerous statements made by officials and politicians in both cities and countries praising intercommunal, interfaith, and sometimes specifically Jewish-Muslim co-operative initiatives. Sometimes they even add lustre to meetings with their own presence. Once in a while, a member of the British or Dutch royal family pays a visit to an interfaith event. And occasionally officials play a key role in the development of a partnership, as when mayor Job Cohen helped set up the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam or Baroness Warsi, then Minister of State for Faith and Communities in the UK, backed the establishment of Nisa-Nashim.

Amongst examples of ‘material resources’ are the grants British and, to a lesser extent, Dutch governments make available to institutions for Jewish-Muslim activities. Sometimes these are provided directly and sometimes they are funneled through other channels, such as the Near Neighbours programme in the UK.

Finally, the ‘political participation’ element can be seen in the structures established to facilitate dialogue and consultation between governments and ethnic and/or religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. In both countries, an emphasis seems to be placed upon consultation at the national level on the one hand and the most local one – boroughs and city districts – on the other. When it comes to national consultations, it is noteworthy that the
British government has pursued a policy of non-engagement with the MCB since 2009. Two important bodies in facilitating contacts between the authorities and local communities in the UK capital are the Faith Forum for London and the London Boroughs Faiths Network.\textsuperscript{33} In Amsterdam, a number of interfaith networks are in contact with the executive boards of city districts. In addition to such fixed consultative structures, though, ad-hoc contacts are also important. On this topic in Amsterdam, Van Oordt has the following to say:

In addition, by invitation or otherwise the mayor and/or members of the city executive enter into ad-hoc consultations/contacts with Jewish and Muslims institutions (often schools or places of worship) in response to current events or incidents such as international attacks, discrimination (including acts of violence) against persons or institutions and other security-related issues.\textsuperscript{34}

In the governance of religious diversity, it is important to consider not only the intended effects of government interventions but also their unintended consequences. For example, our research shows that the Dutch and Amsterdam approaches to antisemitism, Islamophobia and other forms of hate crime inadvertently evoke feelings of injustice amongst Muslims, which in turn hinder the positive development of Jewish-Muslim relations. Likewise, in the UK the antiterrorism programme Prevent unintentionally reinforces Muslims’ perception that they are regarded as a ‘suspect community’, and this also complicates the initiation of Jewish-Muslim relationships.

11.4 Looking Ahead

An old joke has it that making predictions is always hard, especially about the future. That quip could have been devised specifically for attempts to forecast the prospects for Jewish-Muslim relations in London and Amsterdam, where so many factors are at play. So rather than venturing to make any concrete predictions, instead we shall conclude this study by offering some more general reflections.

Our research shows that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antisemitism amongst Muslims and Islamophobia amongst Jews, attacks on Jewish and Muslim targets, and commemorative events are significant sources of tension between (some) Jews and Muslims in London and Amsterdam. How their mutual relations unfold in the future will therefore depend very much upon the course these themes take. New outbreaks of violence between Israel and the Palestinians, for instance, are bound to increase frictions between certain sections of the two communities in both cities and so inhibit co-operation. Conversely, the prospect of a lasting peace in the Middle East would ease much of the tension and improve the chances of more relaxed relations emerging. As long as these sensitive issues are present, however, what is most critical is how to deal with them. In our
opinion, the most constructive social identity strategy to adopt if more long-term partnerships are to be forged now is ‘agree to disagree’. That is, Jews and Muslims accept that they differ on a number of issues but do not let this stand in the way of mutual co-operation with regard to such topics as combating anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, defending religious freedoms in the fields of ritual slaughter, male circumcision or religious education and improving relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

In order to be able to maintain and further develop co-operative relations between Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions in both cities, adequate resources are vital. We have seen that these are far more readily available in London than in Amsterdam. And there is no indication that the situation in the British capital is likely to change drastically in the near future – that is unless the UK government imposes cuts to community cohesion budgets as a result of the economic crisis caused by Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. The situation in Amsterdam, on the other hand, is more critical. Suzanne Roggeveen’s research reveals that the manpower and finances available there for current Jewish-Muslim co-operative activities are very limited. Little or no public funds are made available for this purpose, especially if the initiatives concerned are in any way religious in nature. Moreover, the situation is set to become even more dire as the organised Jewish community continues to shrink under the influence of processes of individualisation and secularisation, and so its capacity to invest in Jewish-Muslim initiatives further declines.

Much will also depend upon how perceptions by Jews, Muslims, and their respective institutions of their social positions in the two cities develop. Insofar as their ‘subjective’ positions are influenced by the ‘objective’ ones, our assessments of the four communities studied are as follows. In London we see no signs that the sociostructural and sociocultural position of the city’s Jewish community will change much in the near future; that appears solid and stable, so major shifts look unlikely. What might present a problem, though, is that Jewish religious adherence is declining in extent and intensity under the influence of the current dominant trends of secularisation and individualisation, a weakening with the potential to cause the community to become more inward-looking and lose something of its present characteristic openness.

Similarly, we do not expect any major changes to the sociostructural and sociocultural position of the Jewish community in Amsterdam to occur in the short term. Looking somewhat further ahead, however, a number of developments which could affect that position are starting to play out. As in London, continued individualisation and secularisation may well weaken it. On top of that, as time goes on and memories of the horrors of the Second World War fade, so the chances increase that the once deep-seated conviction in the Dutch body politic that the nation owes a ‘debt of honour’ to the Jews will dissipate. That, too, would erode their social position, possibly fuelling a tendency to focus more upon issues within the community and so reduce the priority they attach to building and developing relationships with other groups in society, including Muslims.
Given the strong improvement in the average educational attainment of Muslims in London and Amsterdam in recent decades, combined with the increasing influence of new generations born and raised in these cities’ Muslim communities, we expect a strengthening of their sociostructural positions. Whether this results in a more open or a more critical attitude towards other groups, Jews included, will also depend upon how their sociocultural positions develop. If Muslims feel more accepted – or, to put it another way, if they perceive the gap separating them from the rest of society as narrowing – then greater openness is likely. But if they feel less accepted, with that gap widening, then we can expect a more combative stance. Muslims influence this situation, of course, but so too do external players including the media, politicians, governments, and transnational actors. If the power and influence over the media and politics of the anti-Islam movements in the Netherlands and the UK increase, for example, then the perceived gap is likely to widen and with it the probability that Muslims will opt for an aloof or combative attitude. We believe that a thorough review of the UK’s Prevent antiterrorism programme and the restoration of ties between the British government and the MCB would contribute towards an attitude of greater openness in British Muslim circles. And that additional investment in the systematic registration and tackling of Islamophobia by the Dutch government, as has recently been done to combat antisemitism, would have the same effect amongst Dutch Muslims.

The future development of Jewish-Muslim relations in both settings will also be shaped in part by external actors – notably governments and, in the UK, the Church of England and ‘interfaith’ institutions. As for the ‘hands-off’ attitude of the Amsterdam and Dutch governments towards religious and interfaith contacts and initiatives is concerned, we do not expect this to change in the short term. That, after all, would require that the current strict official interpretation of the principle of the separation of church and state be relaxed, which is not on the table. The power and influence of organised religion in the Netherlands are waning and the liberal view that faith should primarily be viewed as a matter of personal preference and conviction enjoys widespread support in Dutch politics.

We have noted that, since the mid-1990s, a ‘faith sector’ has emerged in civil society in the UK as a product of co-operation between the British government and various religious communities, and also that this has provided a stimulating environment for Jewish-Muslim relations. We suspect that these co-operative arrangements will remain intact for the time being, even though there are various objections to the British system of ‘governing through religious communities’. For example, that it fails to do proper justice to the diversity of the communities concerned and excludes others altogether, along with humanist movements to some extent. Despite such objections, however, we do not expect this system to disappear any time soon as it fits in well with the very long tradition of co-operation between the British government and mainstream religious communities, originally meaning various Christian and Jewish denominations, in such
domains such as education, welfare, and spiritual care. It is also in keeping with the now long-established British policy of multiculturalism, which assumes that society consists of various communities with which citizens identify and engage and with which the government co-operates in order to achieve particular social goals. In the current system, moreover, the Church of England occupies a prominent position as the ‘primus inter pares’ institution of ‘multi-faith Britain’. This standing imbues the established church with partial legitimacy for the power, status, and privileges it enjoys over and above other religious groups, which it would be reluctant to relinquish. To what extent the privileged position of the Church of England will eventually be undermined by the ongoing process of ‘church decline’ it now faces is difficult to assess.

This study focuses upon two groups, both with a long-standing place in European history. The roots of the Jewish presence in Europe go back to Roman times, those of its Muslim communities to the seventh and eighth centuries. In the turbulent history of the Jews on this continent, periods of peace and relative acceptance have alternated with times of deprivation, persecution, and sometimes banishment and murder. The history of Islam in Europe is characterised by phases of struggle, of relative calm and of deprivation, and sometimes forced migration. The absolute nadir of Jewish history in Europe is the Holocaust or Shoah, in which millions of Jews were systematically persecuted and killed. Although their position generally improved substantially after the Second World War, antisemitism has by no means disappeared from Europe; an undercurrent has always remained, surfacing with some regularity and on occasions in new guises. In the post-war period, Muslim communities formed – or in some cases re-formed – in many parts of Europe as a result of large-scale migration. Acceptance of their presence has proven troublesome, with resistance in various European countries giving rise to anti-Islam movements and Islamophobia. European Muslims experienced a deep tragedy of their own with the 1995 genocide near Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, when 8,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered. As mentioned above, it is impossible to predict how relations between the Jewish and Islamic communities in Europe will develop in the near future, particularly in the cities of London and Amsterdam which are the focus of this study; there are too many contributory factors at play, and how they will unfold is also uncertain. What is clear is that, as minority groups, each can benefit from the other as a partner in the struggle for a public sphere in which they can continue to practise their religions in freedom and express their identities without coming under threat.

Notes
1 Mouffe 2009, 117.
2 This is the assumption further elaborated in social identity theory. See Section 1.2.
3 Vertovec 2007; Wessendorf 2014a, b; cf. Van Esdonk 2020, 47–49.
4 Vertovec 2007; Wessendorf 2014a, b.
5 See Introduction, London and Amsterdam compared.
References

Media Article


Publications


Board of Deputies & MCB (28 August 2014). *British Jews and Muslims Call for Peace, Wisdom and Hope over Conflict in Israel and Palestine*. London: Board of Deputies & MCB.


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Internet Sources

The internet sources used are listed in the endnotes. These were consulted in 2020 and 2021.
Appendices

Appendix I List of Institutions with Reference to Bilateral Jewish-Muslim Cooperation in London

In this list, we distinguish between three main categories of institutions with reference to bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in London, namely 1. Jewish-Muslim organisations, 2. Jewish and Muslim organisations that invest in Jewish-Muslim cooperation, and 3. third parties that explicitly facilitate Jewish-Muslim cooperation. Under each heading, the institutions are listed in chronological order of their year of establishment. The local London synagogues and mosques that are involved in Jewish-Muslim cooperation are not included in the overview.

1 Jewish-Muslim organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alif-Aleph Foundation</td>
<td>1997–unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calamus Maimonides Student Forum</td>
<td>1998–unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Jewish Forum North London</td>
<td>2001–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alif-Aleph UK</td>
<td>2003–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Jewish Forum</td>
<td>2003–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming Together/MUJU (since 2008)</td>
<td>2004–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Interfaith Foundation (JIF)</td>
<td>2006–2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Imams and Rabbis</td>
<td>2009–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imams and Rabbis Council of the United Kingdom</td>
<td>2009–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand for Peace</td>
<td>2011–2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Jewish and Muslim Physicians</td>
<td>2013–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Jews and Muslims (COJAM)</td>
<td>2014–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisa-Nashim</td>
<td>2015–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2 Jewish and Muslim organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>成立年份–至今</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Deputies of British Jews</td>
<td>1760–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Baeck College</td>
<td>1956–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maimonides (Interfaith) Foundation</td>
<td>1985–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calamus Foundation</td>
<td>1989–未知 (可能为2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Society of Britain (ISB)</td>
<td>1990–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community and Security Trust (CST)</td>
<td>1994–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam Awareness Week</td>
<td>1994–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)</td>
<td>1997–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)</td>
<td>1997–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Khoei Foundation</td>
<td>1998–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitzvah Day</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board</td>
<td>2006–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Horizons in British Islam</td>
<td>2015–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadaqa Day</td>
<td>2015–present</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### 3 Third parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>成立年份–至今</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England (via Church Urban Fund (CUF))</td>
<td>1534–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runnymede Trust</td>
<td>1968–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster Interfaith</td>
<td>1981–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter Faith Network for the UK (IFN)</td>
<td>1987–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Frank Trust UK</td>
<td>1991–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Faiths Forum (3FF)/ Faith and Belief Forum (since 2018)</td>
<td>1997–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Interfaith Centre</td>
<td>1998–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust Memorial Day UK (HMD)</td>
<td>2001–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society for Scriptural Reasoning (Cambridge)</td>
<td>2002–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace</td>
<td>2002–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Voice Europe</td>
<td>2002–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Boroughs Faiths Network</td>
<td>2003–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet Multi Faith Forum</td>
<td>2004–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Interfaith Network</td>
<td>2004–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith Matters</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for the Study of Muslim Jewish Relations (Woolf Institute, Cambridge)</td>
<td>2006–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexist Foundation</td>
<td>2006–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith Action</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for Discussion of Israel &amp; Palestine</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Blair Faith Foundation</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiths Forum for London (FF4L)</td>
<td>2010–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Community Secondary School</td>
<td>2010–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II List of Institutions with Reference to Bilateral Jewish-Muslim Cooperation in Amsterdam

In this list, we distinguish three main categories of institutions with reference to bilateral Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, namely 1. Jewish-Muslim organisations, 2. Jewish and Muslim organisations that invest in Jewish-Muslim cooperation, and 3. third parties that explicitly facilitate Jewish-Muslim cooperation. Under each heading, the institutions are listed in chronological order of their year of establishment. The overview also includes those Amsterdam synagogues and mosques that are most active in the field of Jewish-Muslim cooperation.

1 Jewish-Muslim organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maïmon Foundation</td>
<td>2000–2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Jewish-Moroccan Network (JMNA)</td>
<td>2006–2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said &amp; Lody</td>
<td>2010–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaam-Shalom</td>
<td>2024–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo &amp; Moos</td>
<td>2014–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amstelveen Jewish Muslim Platform</td>
<td>2015–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yalla!</td>
<td>2020–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Jewish and Muslim organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of Jewish Communities in the Netherlands (NIK)</td>
<td>1814–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard Dou synagogue</td>
<td>1892–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Union for Progressive Judaism (NVPJ)</td>
<td>1931–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Jewish Community Amsterdam (LJG Amsterdam)</td>
<td>1932–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sjoel West</td>
<td>1957–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kabir Mosque Amsterdam</td>
<td>1972–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Information and Documentation Israel (CIDI)</td>
<td>1974–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF)</td>
<td>1979–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Islamic Federation (NIF)</td>
<td>1981–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation of Islamic Centre The Netherlands (SICN)</td>
<td>1982–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands (UMMON)</td>
<td>1982–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Jewish Consultative Committee (CJO)</td>
<td>1998–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Moroccan Mosques in Greater Amsterdam (UMMAO)</td>
<td>2000–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2001–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Appendix III Interview Topic List

Background information about the organisation/project

Start and establishment
Founders/leaders
Objectives/goals
Types of activities
Recent developments
Religious affiliation(s) of founders, leaders, and members

Background information about the respondent

Position within the organisation/project
Experiences within the organisation/project
The organisation/project

Participants
Scope and reach
Leaders, staff members, volunteers
Working methods and practices
Strategies for dealing with commonalities and differences
Funding and finances
Evaluation
Plans for the future
Documents

The organisation/project and external organisations, groups, and networks

The organisation/project in the media (traditional and new)
Connections to (other) Jewish and/or Muslim organisations, groups, or networks
Connections to third parties: interreligious organisations, churches, etc.
Connections to national and local governments
Connections to transnational bodies

Notes

1 Source: Van Esdonk 2020, 393-394; interview with Hilary Patel and Sally Sealey on 27 April 2017; list of funding by DHCLG, 24 July 2019.
2 Sources: Roggeveen 2020, 288-293; Ministrie SZW 2017; written interview with Henk Meulink on 31 August 2020; written interview with Roemer van Oordt on 1 February 2021.
Note: *Italicized* and **bold** page numbers refer to figures and tables. Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes.

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