Spaces, too, have a history. And history always takes place in spaces. But what do historians mean when they use the word “spaces”? And how can spaces be historically investigated?

Susanne Rau provides a survey of the history of Western concepts of space, opens up interdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenon of space in fields ranging from physics and geography to philosophy and sociology, and explains how historical spatial analysis can be methodologically and conceptually conceived and carried out in practice. The case studies presented in the book come from the fields of urban history, the history of trade, and global history including the history of cartography, but its analysis is equally relevant to other fields of inquiry.

This book offers the first comprehensive introduction to the theory and methodology of historical spatial analysis.

Susanne Rau is professor of spatial history and culture at the University of Erfurt, Germany, and distinguished visiting professor at the École normale supérieure de Lyon, France.

Michael Thomas Taylor works as a translator in Berlin. From 2007 to 2012 he taught as assistant professor of German at the University of Calgary (Canada), and from 2012 to 2017 as assistant, then associate professor of German and humanities at Reed College in Portland, Oregon (USA).
History, Space, and Place

Susanne Rau

Translated by Michael Thomas Taylor
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A whole series of people were involved in the creation of this book. The idea for the book can be traced to a suggestion made several years ago by Gerd Schwerhoff, which I decided not to follow at first. Yet little by little, the idea grew in my mind to write a methodological introduction to historical questions of space—not least of all because of a constantly increasing number of theses about everything that might be meant by the term “spatial turn.” In the fall of 2008, I then thought seriously about a conception for the book, which was accepted by the editors of this series with a few critical comments and some good suggestions. At the time, I still had no idea how much work it would ultimately prove to be. Without the help of hard-working student assistants (Sarah Mintchev, Stefan Kaufmann, Alena Minchenia), two excellent proofreaders (Monika Leetz, Anika Höppner), colleagues from Germany and abroad who supported me with advice and encouragement (especially Jacques Lévy, Natalie Davis, Eric Piltz, Martina Löw, Jean-Marc Besse, and Angelika Epple), the network “Social Sites” (Beat Kümin, Wolfgang Kaiser, Gerd Schwerhoff, Christian Hochmuth, James Brown) that enabled us to organize five workshops, and a patient editorial team (Tanja Hommen and her successor Jürgen Hotz, as well as Frank Böscht, who was responsible for the volume within the series), the book would never have taken shape. I also benefited from my students in Erfurt, especially in the seminars “Cultural Geography for Historians,” “Readings on the History of the Mediterranean,” “History and Anthropology of Space,” and “Theories of Spatiality and Temporality.” Discussions related to dissertations on topics related to space in the context of two summer schools that I organized (2009 at the German Historical Institute Paris and 2011 at the French School of Rome) also helped me make progress, as did the meetings of the “Erfurt Spatio-Temporal Studies” working group that regularly took place beginning in the summer of 2011 and my participation in workshops at various PhD programs (in Basel, Dresden, Erfurt, and Heidelberg).

Last but not least, I want to emphasize two important research organizations. I owe thanks first to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), which has developed an amazing tool for supporting research with the Heisenberg Program. I’ve learned one important thing from Heisenberg—whose research into physical space I admittedly do not yet completely understand—that can be applied to the present topic and this book project:
if you begin a process, you will not be able to determine with certainty all the forces that will allow you to predict the result. This indeterminacy (which for Heisenberg primarily applies to electrons) need not—or at least not for most of the areas typically examined by the discipline of history—produce ontological imprecision or uncertainty. Especially in cultural studies, we need to ask what in fact we mean, exactly, by “localization” and whether the term as it is used is not perhaps imprecise for the objects of our study. A second thank you goes to the École normale supérieure de Lyon, which not only gave me the gift of time (!) as a visiting professor in early 2012 but also provided me with a space in the library—which remained open until 3 a.m.—and thus allowed me to finally complete the last sections of the book.


Susanne Rau
Introduction
What is historical research into space?

When I attempt to describe my current field of research to friends, acquaintances, or relatives and, for the sake of simplicity, use the term “research into space,” the reactions range from amazement to smirks. “That’s a field for architects or urban planners,” they often reply. Or they ask whether this has something to do with space exploration. There is something to be said for this kind of conceptual test with a non-academic audience, or at least an audience whose interests are not focused on research into society and culture. It makes clear that, at least initially, the wider public does not tend to associate this relatively new direction in our disciplines with anthropology, history, or culture. And it also allows us to see that space is chiefly conceptualized as something three-dimensional: spaces are taken to refer primarily to landscapes, cities, houses, apartments, etc., and occasionally to the entire world or to outer space. These associations may be understandable in an age of satellite communication, and urban and spatial planning is a long-established discipline that refers to the term “space” in its name, and for which degree programs and governmental institutions exist at all levels—in Germany, for example, with the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR).

The one-sided localization of this research field between the living room and the universe is instructive in many respects: it is evidence for the polysemous quality of the term “space” and also for the need to more clearly work out the additional dimensions of spaces that must be considered—namely, their constructed nature and mutability, their origins in imagination, their virtuality, and similar modalities—if they are to be integrated beyond specialist disciplines into a wider discourse. Since spaces can—successively or simultaneously—assume different modes, and since spaces ultimately have individual or social relevance only as social constructions, we should speak of (historical) research into space only with caution. My suggestion would be to choose the somewhat awkward-sounding phrase “analysis of spatial dimensions of society.” This phrase can refer to both contemporary and historical societies. It aims to communicate an insight that concerns us all: that we simultaneously live in three-dimensional spaces and in other, non-Euclidean spaces, such as virtual spaces.
Why historical research into space is not new

We certainly do not owe the insight that history happens in space and time to what is often called the spatial turn, a development in cultural studies and social research from the late twentieth century. Not even considering the much-older genres of cosmography or topography, whose texts are organized according to geographic or localized perspectives, voices in history and neighboring disciplines from the late nineteenth century onward repeatedly advocated for research into the spatial aspects of history. This book retraces the appearance of these early voices—not least of all in order to follow occasional instances of political instrumentalization, which were rooted in the deterministic approaches of their time. The book also returns to other approaches from the past, for example, to those of the Annales school or postwar social geography, or to the works of several urbanologists who thought in terms of spatial analysis, especially Henri Lefebvre. Astonishingly, these methods play hardly any role in current debates about space. Those of us who are familiar with this earlier work may smirk at the permanent invocation of a spatial turn over the last twenty years, but the silence about older and no less influential traditions is definitely frustrating for scholarship.

Still, not all work from the past is equally useful today. These older approaches often lump together spatial concepts that are geographic, culturally constructed, and metaphorical, and offer no tools for spatial analysis. And, of course, the inconsistent and occasionally somewhat unreflective use of these concepts persists in more recent work, for example, when events, institutions, or social groups are simply localized without any further reflection on the relationships between places, people, and events. Hence it seems high time to compile analytical approaches and reflections developed in recent years in order to bring a bit of order into this field.

Why historical research into space is, in fact, new

The increased attention that space has garnered in recent years, including in the discipline of history (Schlögel 2007, 33; Bachmann-Medick 2007, 288), is evident, to give some examples, from large conferences and a number of special issues of journals devoted to spatial topics and the question of their innovative potential. In Germany, we can point to the biennial Meeting of German Historians (Historikertag) in Trier in 1986, which was organized under the motto “Spaces of History—History of Spaces” with strong impulses from medieval regional history, or to the same conference in Kiel in 2004 under the title of “Communication and Space.” Looking beyond Germany, we could point to the 2006 Congress of the Association of French Medievalists on the “Construction of Space in the Middle Ages: Practices and Representations.” Journals such as Geschichte und Gesellschaft (History and Society), the Quaderni storici (Historical notebooks), the German Historical Institute Bulletin, the Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften (Austrian journal for history), Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines (Journal of history of human sciences), Social Science History, the online MOSAIKjournal, History and Theory, Historical Social
Research, and Material Religion have published issues on topics related to space. Beyond this, we can find examples of conferences and conference volumes with approaches that are often interdisciplinary. Since 2007, the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, or DFG) has funded an “excellence cluster” focused on research into space called “TOPOI: The Formation and Transformation of Space and Knowledge in Ancient Civilizations,” in which representatives from various disciplines (archeology, geography, history, philology, philosophy, etc.), albeit mainly from classics, work together (Märtin 2012). The DFG has also funded other collaborative research centers such as that which was newly established in Leipzig in 2016, “Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition.”

The spectrum of meanings denoted by the term “spatial turn” is relatively wide. Its definitions range from a label for legitimizing both a new research question and the aforementioned increased attention to the spatial dimensions of contemporary and historical societies, to the positioning of geography as the leading discipline for new socially critical scholarship on space (Soja 1989; Lévy 1999) and to arguments for developing a critical scholarly understanding of space (Bachmann-Medick 2007, 289). Other uses of the term seek to overcome the “placelessness of historiography” (Dipper and Raphael 2011, 40) or consider the spatial turn to be a paradigm for the social sciences (Jacob 2014). Still, it is evident that this theoretical–methodological reorientation consists of not one but many “turns,” that different disciplines understand this label to mean very different things (see Tiller and Mayer 2011), and that these disciplines carry out very different kinds of research under its rubric. Finally, national research cultures have reacted in different ways to these developments (and sometimes they have not reacted at all).

Approaches vary even within disciplines—something that is also true for the discipline of history. Given the scope of the thematic field, it’s no wonder. And this diversity of methods is also fundamentally to be welcomed. Yet some studies have appeared that are theoretically opposed to the critical trend initiated in recent years in social and cultural geography, cultural anthropology, and sociology. Specifically, we can already see the first examples of re-essentialization, reification, and reterritorialization: these reactions consider spaces to be something given; space is understood more as an object than a method; and political or cultural spaces or regions are examined all too reductively or only with a view to their territorial components. Given this situation, I fully agree with the assertion of two colleagues that it would be false to say the spatial turn has managed to become established in the study of history (Dipper and Raphael 2011, 28). Critical historical research into space should not limit itself to viewing spaces as places or as framings of events or social developments. Moreover, it should not render spaces absolute, because spaces do not provide us with either the sole or the real access to history, as Karl Schlögel’s beautiful, essayistic city portraits sometimes suggest. It would furthermore be a misunderstanding to assume that the spatial turn intends to resurrect older forms of regional history, geography, or research into historical (urban) construction, with their three-dimensional, territorial concepts of space, to be used in history. This would not really get us any further.
What is historical research into space?

The opportunity offered by historical research into space that operates with an analytical spatial concept lies in

- illuminating processes of producing and constructing spaces
- looking more closely at spatial practices
- working out differences and relations of coexistence among spatial conceptions
- observing localizations and spatializations of social relations
- analyzing spatial self-representations and structures of order of groups and societies and tracing their effects
- pointing to the spatiotemporal transformations of social processes.

All of this can be achieved only with a conceptually reflective and methodologically precise approach to space—and this book is intended as an emphatic plea for such a project.

That means that if the spatial turn is to be more than just a label, or a politically motivated research strategy for legitimizing a new research question, we must describe an exact method. It must be possible to demonstrate where this approach brings added value—both in relation to older spatial notions and also in the possibility of gaining new knowledge. The goal of this introduction is thus to present analytical spatial concepts and methods for examining space or spatialities and thereby establish them within the discipline of history. To this end, we must learn how to differentiate various spatial notions (physical, astronomical, theological, psychological, cultural, etc.) and to recognize and realize the advantages of interdisciplinary research. In the process, we should no more forget the interrelatedness of space and time, or of temporality and spatiality, than we should the historicity (meaning the contingency and ephemerality) of spatial theories and concepts. It is exactly these aspects that hold added value for the historical consideration and analysis of space and spatiality, and which are often missing in other books intended as introductions. The *Einführung in die Stadt- und Raumsoziologie* (Introduction to urban and spatial sociology) by Löw, Steets, and Stoetzer (2007) is a good introduction for sociologists and urbanologists or for (prospective) urban planners. For historians who work on earlier eras, however, this work quickly proves inadequate. *Raumtheorie* (Spatial theory), published by Suhrkamp Verlag, offers what is effectively an anthology of—more or less classical—excerpts from literary, philosophical, and historical texts about spatial terms and concepts (Dünne and Günzel 2006), and it contains wonderful readings for historians looking for an entryway into the discourse. Yet scholars working with these texts should not shy away from consulting the originals or—even better—critical editions. The *Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l’espace des sociétés* (Dictionary of social geography and social space) (Lévy and Lussault 2003) is an exceptionally helpful lexicon, written primarily by and for geographers, and containing a series of entries that are also of interest for scholars in history and cultural studies such as *espace, espace public, lieu, spatialité, urbain, urbanisation* (space, public space, location, spatiality, urban, urbanization). Yet as a lexicon, this work is a kind of
synthetic treatment that is largely oriented toward the present day or, at the very least, toward contemporary history, and which follows aims that differ from those of a single-authored introduction. The *Dictionary of Human Geography* (Johnston et al. 2009) offers another lexicon that is primarily written by and for human geographers and cultural anthropologists, but which must be consulted as it is now in its fifth edition. The handbook *Raum* (Space) from Metzler Verlag (Günzel 2010) and the *Lexikon der Raumphilosophie* (Lexicon of the philosophy of space) (Günzel 2012) are more recent. The handbook is an introduction to the most important concepts and theories, focusing on philosophy and sociology and authored by appropriate experts. Yet it, too, is only barely historical in its orientation and hardly engages possibilities for applying its ideas or offers examples of such research. Finally, a series of edited volumes with individual studies relating to space have appeared mainly in the cultural and social sciences over the last ten years or so (Dartmann et al. 2004; Hochmuth and Rau 2006; Döring and Thielmann 2009; Glasze and Mattissek 2009; Stock and Vöhringer 2014; Friedrich 2014), with introductions that often discuss spatial concepts or with individual articles that demonstrate how these concepts might be employed in practice.

The introduction to these issues that is offered by the present book begins with a brief history of spatial concepts. This is followed by a discussion of everyday, scholarly, and analytical spatial notions. Chapter 2 gives an overview of selected approaches in geography, cultural anthropology, sociology, and history. The main part of the introduction to discourses of space offered by the book is the third chapter. This chapter reflects my proposed framework for analyzing spaces and spatial practices:

- determination of spatial types and configurations (Section 3.1)
- analysis of spatial dynamics such as emergence, transformation, and dissolution (Section 3.2)
- analysis of the subjective construction of spaces: perceptions, memories, and representations (Section 3.3)
- analysis of spatial practices and especially of the uses of space (Section 3.4).

Both the dynamic aspects and the subjectively grounded approaches noted here point to the necessity of considering time as a factor in spatial analysis: only thus is it possible to understand and explain processes of constitution as well as duration, rhythms of use, and transformations. It will not be possible to analyze every historiographic topic by applying this framework; sources for every aspect are not always available, and I will not always engage with every aspect but sometimes intentionally only with one. For this reason, this framework should be an aid for differentiating various levels and modes of space.

The area where historical spatial analysis can be applied is accordingly broad: it ranges from the history of bodies that constitute space through their movement to the history of public or sacred spaces, the history of settlements and regions (or areas), and the history of globalization; it includes the history of religion, politics,
media, knowledge, trade, and economics, as well as agricultural history, urban history, and global history. It makes it possible for us to ask about the constitution of spaces, whether they are microspaces (such as rooms or coffee shops) or macrospaces (such as territories or regions), and also how people move through spaces and how spaces themselves move or change. Taking interest in the spatial dimensions of historical societies furthermore entails asking about the meaning that people attribute to their spatial environment, whether they develop positive or negative relationships to the spaces they experience, and what effects these socially constructed spaces in turn have on the constitution of subjects or groups. On a meta level, we can ask about media (for example, texts, images, maps, or atlases) that are used to represent spaces, what these tell us about the self-images of societies, or what power-interests hide behind their production or application. And finally, the history of gender can also use the category of space to ask about the role of gendered agents in the process of constituting and using spaces; about mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (not only in the intersection of space and race or class, but also precisely in the intersection of space and gender); or about the transformation of spatial representations into gendered allegories, for example, in the sixteenth-century representation of the continent of Europe as an empress (see Source 15 in the Appendix). From an analytical perspective, the single term “space” thus reflects a broad heuristic spectrum and a multitude of possibilities for investigation.

If we could overcome the ways in which the term “space” is semantically underdetermined, both by using theoretical and methodological tools and by precisely observing and describing social practices, we would not only get away from a simple, geospatial understanding of space but would also recognize differences, overlappings, simultaneities, and breaks that make visible the complexity of social relations. It is in the differentiated analysis of both spatial orderings and temporal processes, in equal measure, and in the analysis of associated discourses and practices, that the potential of history as a critical social science lies.
1 Historical and systematic approach

In order to understand and evaluate the arguments advanced by spatial theories current in today’s discussions, as well as the theoretical basis of spatially oriented historical studies, we are well advised to look at the history of spatial concepts and theories. In the following section, “Prehistory,” I very briefly address the most important Western spatial theories since antiquity, as subsequent discourses constantly referred to them and continue to do so. Moreover, it is important to cast light on the problematic history of some notions of space—especially biological and deterministic concepts that were instrumentalized politically and have thus become discredited. Since these concepts occasionally return and reappear in current discourse in new garb, we should develop a sensitivity for recognizing them. The spatial theories that have been formulated in the course of history are so diverse and varied that it makes sense to order them into groups. Names for some of these groups were suggested by the historical theoreticians of space themselves (Section 1.1). How can scholarly and everyday spatial concepts be reconciled? And what exactly is meant by an absolute, relative, or relational concept of space (Section 1.2)? This first chapter aims to answer these questions. The perspective I have chosen means that I will mainly engage with philosophical and physical theories. Premodern geographies or cartographies—with their understanding of world and space—deserve to be considered on their own (on this point, see Brodersen 1995; Dueck 2012; Harley and Woodward 1987–2007; Lestringant 1994; Besse 2003a; Schleicher 2014).

1.1 Prehistory

On the history of Western concepts of space

The diversity of spatial notions in antiquity, which ranges from mythical conceptions to attempts to define space and sophisticated theoretical approaches, is immediately apparent alone from the relatively large number of terms that ancient Greek offers for place and space. The Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Historical dictionary of philosophy), for example, lists six different words. Focusing on Plato (427–347 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) as Greek philosophers of space is thus a radical reduction that is nevertheless justified, inasmuch as these authors were the most often-cited theoreticians until the conception took

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Historical and systematic approach

hold in the course of the early modern period that the cosmos is infinite and that physical space is perhaps not quite as homogeneous and uniform as had long been assumed. In antiquity, too, there were many who spoke and wrote about space, but only a few of them developed a consistent theory. According to Aristotle, Plato was the first to produce a clear definition of the concept (Zekl et al. 1992, 68). Considerations of space from antiquity are usually embedded within more general reflections about the cosmos or models for explaining the world.

Aristotle, who mainly expounded his thoughts about space in his doctrine of the categories and his Physics, engaged with Plato’s understanding of space as presented in Timaeus, which itself built upon the considerations of Pythagoras and Democritus. Space, moreover, received a place of its own in Plato’s doctrine of ideas: as the “third kind” between what is ideal and empirical, space (χώρα) mediates between these two fields.

According to Plato, space is the “midwife of becoming.” It is what makes transformation possible at all. Aristotle, furthermore, shared some of Plato’s opinions—for example, that space must be a category, that there could be no such thing as empty space, and that the heavens must be shaped like a sphere since this represented the most perfect form. Aristotle brought the question of whether the world is finite or infinite back to the level of physical reality, because it was here that he thought it would be possible to answer the question. Since he believed that the attempt to think of bodies as infinitely extendible encountered limits, he concluded that space in the physical world must be finite. By contrast, space in the atomistic physics propounded by Leucippus and Democritus could certainly be infinite (Zekl et al. 1992, 72–75). As these thinkers saw it, the universe consisted of the very tiniest particles in motion in infinite space.

Strictly speaking, Aristotle’s theory of space is a theory of place, for his question is aimed at the “natural places” of bodies and their movements. This belief assumed that only living beings move of their own accord and that a moving force—or resistance against it—is necessary for movement (Gosztonyi 1976, vol. 1: 90–110). Ulrich Beuttler’s theology has recently taken a position against this unequivocal definition, arguing that Aristotle presented no closed doctrinal system of a spatial theory (Beuttler 2010, 74–82, especially 76). Regardless of which view one takes, Aristotle performed several differentiating categorizations that were influential in determining subsequent debates and that, with a certain amount of abstraction from their original context, continue to be useful today:

1 Aristotle distinguished between place and bodies. (This implies that bodies can change their position, and that the same position can—adjacently or successively—be occupied by different things.)

2 He distinguished between space and place. (Whereas place stands for the ability of things or bodies to be localized, space is constituted by the movement of these bodies from one place to another. If space were identical with bodies, it would move together with their motion. The continuity of space is guaranteed by the continuity of bodies, since, according to Aristotle, there can be no empty space.)
But the concept of the infinite expansion of space, which certainly also existed in antiquity (for example, with the atomists Leucippus and Democritus), collided with the biblical account of creation. Considering this fact, Augustine (354–430 BCE) held that there could be no space outside the world, meaning there could be no other world. Even if philosophers from both the Christian and Arab worlds introduced further distinctions, and medieval theology reflected on many different questions (for example, the relationship of space to things, its changeability and movability, its geometric structure, or its ability to be perceived or to effect other things), the impossibility of space’s infinite expansion largely remained the cutting edge of medieval conceptions of space. Christian thought was further buttressed by the late-medieval reception of Aristotle’s theories, which accorded no extension to space and considered a vacuum in nature to be logically impossible (Zekl et al. 1992, 82–88; Breidert 1995).

This situation only changed gradually with several critics of Aristotle who no longer saw empty space as a logical impossibility. One of these was Hasdai Crescas (ca. 1340–ca. 1410), a Spanish Jew who pointed to the role and necessity of a vacuum, defined its physical space according to its volume (and not according to the limitation of a body), and was even able to think of space as infinite because of the possibility of extending it. That it was specifically a Jewish scholar who formulated the connection between god and infinite space appears to be no accident. The Hebrew word for place (makôm) is also one of the many designations for god; it is thus no longer a great leap to the thought that the omnipresence of god can also be expressed in space. Another pathbreaking critic was Nicole Oresme (ca. 1325–1382), who justified the existence of an extracosmic, extended space with the omnipotence of god, which would be limited by the conception of a closed space (as in Aristotelian theory) (Jammer 1980; Breidert 1985; Wertheim 2000, 102–125). Yet these and other critics were not immediately received. Much time passed before the idea was superseded that the universe is filled, immovable, and limited, and a three-dimensional void was recognized. The Italian physicist and astronomer Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) also encountered difficulties because of his opinions that the movement of bodies in space could be determined only in relation to other bodies, and his view of physical space as a formless three-dimensional void did not garner much approval, either.

According to Margaret Wertheim, however, the theological physicists weren’t at all the ones able to sufficiently justify and bring about the revolution in thinking about space (Wertheim 2000, 110, 122–123). Rather, she argues, that path went through painting and the discovery of linear perspective (see also Edgerton 2009; Belting 2008). Renaissance painters did not develop a theory of space, but some of them who were theoretically ambitious (such as Leon Battista Alberti, Piero della Francesca, or Leonardi da Vinci) developed theories of representation based, among other things, on optics and geometry. These considerations enabled a spatial depth that had never before been seen in images, which were now painted from the point of view of a specific place, namely, the standpoint of the observer. In their practice, these painters thus found a way to give sense and meaning to the idea of an extended physical void and so made an important contribution to
the further development of the physical concept of space in the early modern period. For the cultural-studies scholar Annette Vowinckel, the construction of pictorial spaces must be seen as closely connected to relational individuality in the Renaissance (Vowinckel 2011).

While Plato’s notion of space was received by the Cambridge Platonists, and the atomic view of space (of Democritus and Leucippus) was still being read by theologians in the early seventeenth century, it was Aristotle’s theory of place that proved influential for Isaac Newton (1643–1727), and it was through Newton that this theory was introduced into classical mechanics. For the foundation of classical mechanics was a law of motion in space that presupposed an absolute spatial system of reference. This means a physical space that is independent from both the observer and the movements of bodies or objects that occur within it. As a scientist teaching in Cambridge who was favorably disposed toward Arianism, which combined the cosmological insights of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a grand synthesis, Newton did not attempt to understand space outside of a theological system. Rather, for him it precisely represented the intersection of theology and natural science. Being imperceptible through observation, space for Newton took on the role of an ontologically necessary condition of the possibility for the first law of motion. In his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, often referred to simply as the Principia, Newton formulated three fundamental laws of motion. The first says that a body can change its condition of rest or motion only through the influence of forces (Zekl et al. 1992, 87; Gosztonyi 1976, vol. 1: 329–354). Newton conceived of absolute space—which he also always called “true space” because he considered it to be unchangeable and an attribute of God—as infinite, homogeneous, and absolute in the sense of existing independently from bodies.

These theories of Newton not only meant that the conception of infinite empty space prevailed, but also that the entire cosmos was unified: wherever the force of gravity exists, matter rules—which means everywhere in the cosmos, on earth and in the heavens (on the consequences of this conception, see Wertheim 2000, 162–163). Yet one inconsistency in this conception—and something his contemporaries already criticized—was that Newton allowed this absolute space to have movable parts, in other words, that he had thus recognized the relativity of spatial systems of reference without allowing for their validity.

Among those arguing against the Newtonian conception of (absolute) space was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). Leibniz, like Aristotle, was concerned with exactly determining (geometric) locations, the mutual connections of which he used to define space. For Leibniz, space ultimately reduces to an order of relation. Leibniz was not interested in a more precise determination of the nature of space but rather considered the concept of relation—the positions of different bodies standing in relation to each other—to be a sufficient characterization. In its essential points, Leibniz’s concept can be deduced from his exchange of letters with the theologian Samuel Clarke, who advocated for the Newtonian position. The correspondence, which was published in 1717, is furthermore a historically interesting document inasmuch as it allows us to see just how controversial
discussions about concepts of space were at the time and the specific opposition characterizing theologians and natural scientists or philosophers. Here is an excerpt from the last letter that Leibniz wrote to Clarke on August 18, 1716 (Fifth Exchange, Section 47).

Leibniz’s relational concept of space

That which comprehends all those places, is called space. Which shows, that in order to have an idea of place, and consequently of space, it is sufficient to consider these relations, and the rules of their changes, without needing to fancy any absolute reality out of the things whose situation we consider. … It may be said also … that place is that, which is the same in different moments to different existent things, when their relations of co-existence with certain other existents, which are supposed to continue fixed from one of those moments to the other, agree entirely together. … space is that which results from places taken together.

(Alexander 1956, 69–70)

The positions that can be reconstructed from the correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz (space/time as absolute or relational values) are fundamental for current debates about basic principles. Leibniz has become a new focus of interest in history as well as the natural sciences (Linhard 2008) and for art historians who work on concepts of space from the baroque period (Leonard 2006).

Another modern conception of space that is no longer physical but rather epistemological is that of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). With space (as well as time), Kant distinguishes between empirical reality and transcendental ideality. From a transcendental perspective, space is not something perceived by the senses but a necessary precondition, given a priori, for sensual perception—in Kant’s own words, a form of intuition of the cognizing subject (Gosztonyi 1976, vol. 1: 400–456). Kant’s conception of space is frequently rejected by contemporary discussions in cultural studies, but the fact remains that the transcendental-philosophical method influenced nineteenth-century idealist philosophy and psychology of perception. And these, in turn, were the foundation for the subject-based, constructivist methods of the twentieth century, which assume that the spatiality of reality is dependent upon the experiencing subject. These subject-based methods were formulated in philosophy (chiefly in phenomenology and existential philosophy) since the beginning of the twentieth century. But anthropology, social or human geography, and environmental psychology did not let much time pass, either, before conceding a higher priority to perceptions and interpretations of space over mathematical or objective space. These concepts can be recognized in terms such as space of perception, space of imagination (Vorstellungsraum), experienced space, and space of action.

Another interesting position was that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), who formulated a concept of space in the context of natural law. According to
this position, space is fundamentally defined through a human being’s sphere of action. This begins in the body of each and every reasoning being who acts in the world. The sphere of action is thus a product of this action, the extension of which is determined by “drawing lines,” or making differentiations. “In just this manner the sphere we are discussing here is produced in lines and thereby becomes something extended” (Fichte 1991, 58; translation Bauer 2000, 55). Furthermore, a limit to the space of action is set where the space of action—and with it, the freedom—of another person is limited. This is where the claims of one’s own actions are no longer legitimate. This view leaves unclear where to draw the boundary in cases of conflict. But the absolute boundary is the body of the other: I may not extend my freedom onto it (Fichte 1991, 123–124).

Despite Newton’s criticism on the one hand, and the mathematician Bernhard Riemann’s nineteenth-century work on higher-dimensional geometry on the other, it wasn’t until Albert Einstein (1879–1955) formulated his theory of relativity that physics and cosmology finally rejected the absolute concept of space. Through the integration of the concept of space into a concept of space–time–matter, space lost importance, meaning it was subordinated to the concept of field. One important experimental prerequisite for Einstein’s theory of relativity was the discovery of the principle of the constant speed of light of approximately 300,000 km/s in a vacuum, which also represents the greatest possible speed at all. The moment Einstein discovered that space and time are also relative phenomena and vary according to the speed of an observer, it was no longer a problem that light propagates with the same speed relative to everything. The theory of special relativity (TSR) says that all physical laws of an inertial system—meaning a coordinate system in which bodies move uniformly—must be valid in another system of reference. This invariability, however, only holds true when these physical values do not refer to an absolute space or an absolute time but rather always to a space-time unity or its relation.

Only with the theory of general relativity (TGR), which describes the influence of inhomogeneous gravitation fields on masses through the bending of space-time geometry, was this limitation to inertial systems, and hence to uniform movement, lifted. According to TGR, gravitation is conditioned by the geometric structure of space-time (i.e., space with four dimensions). This theory attempts to describe the effect that matter has on space-time and, conversely, the consequence that space-time has for the movement of matter. And this conception of the unity of space (three dimensions), time, and matter only became possible on the basis of the concept of field, which does not presuppose space, time, and matter as existing next to each other but rather as originally co-constituting each other (Gosztonyi 1976, vol. 1: 595–635; Wertheim 2000, 178–192). Einstein added, as it were, a temporal coordinate to being. One thing he did not even initially intend with his equations, but which was generated to a certain extent as their by-product, was a theory of galactic expansion, i.e., the theoretical proof for Edwin Hubble’s discovery that the stars are becoming more distant from us and that the universe must therefore be expanding.
The details of the TSR are likely intelligible to only a few very people, making space-time—the curved, deepened space of the universe—something almost inconceivable. (To describe space-time, physicists often employ the image of a rubber blanket into which a sphere of matter falls.) Yet what matters most for thinking about space is that this theory made it possible to refute the idea of space as a “container” in which material elements are located. Both physical and cosmic space were no longer a passive stage but an active component of the cosmological project, reacting to all changes in matter. And conversely, there can be no matter at all without the membrane of space: space is dynamic, active, expansive, and curved (meaning deep). The direct consequences of Einstein’s theory for everyday life can be judged to be relatively minimal, but its effects on physics (following an initial reluctance), astronomy, and cosmology to be that much more significant. This new image of space and the world ultimately also had medium-term consequences for the production of novels and films that were set in the universe or on extraterrestrial worlds. And we shouldn’t forget that these theories were produced at a time when painting was turning away from three-dimensional spaces, and abstract painting was being invented.

The philosophical consequence of the theory of relativity, however, is that no place in infinite space remains more important than any other. Since space extends infinitely, there is no destination and no place toward which one could strive. Only the beginning moment of the Big Bang holds something like a cosmic act of creation. Already in 1921, in a study on Einstein’s theory of relativity, Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) called for a consideration of the implications of this theory for epistemology and history (Cassirer 2001, 123–124). With the concept of chronotope, the classicist Mikhail Bakhtin suggested more strongly considering the categories of space and time in the analysis of novels (Bakhtin 1981; on this point, see Meyer, Rau, and Waldner 2017). At the systemic level, the concept made it possible to explain how poetics and aesthetics emerge in each literary or cultural epoch within a certain spatiotemporal framework of reference. The transferal essentially depends, of course, on the construction of an analogy between the cosmos and the social world. But we can generally assume that non-physicists can better learn to see how space and time are interdependent in the world of everyday life, and how it is only for analytical purposes that they are separated into temporal and spatial determinations, by reading novels (rather than Einstein’s texts or a book on physics). In any case, the examination of historical-anthropological concepts and practices of spatiotemporality still holds significant potential.

The history of philosophical and physical theories of space, which almost always touch upon the great questions regarding the emergence of the world and the nature of heaven and earth, and hence of the universe, is of course just one of many spatial stories that can be told. Only when we incorporate other fields of knowledge and especially the practices of their agents—with their often-inexplicite theories of space—does the entire possible spectrum of spatial stories unfold.
**Space: On the German history of a concept**

Considering history only in spatial terms is as one-sided as considering it only in temporal terms. The fact that history happens in space *and* time has been emphasized in the discipline of history at least since Kant’s epistemology and Herder’s philosophy of history. This insight is, moreover, reflected in its practical consequences, meaning in the representation of history. No doubt it was chiefly world histories that instituted divisions of geography or global empires, despite the intensifying narrowing toward the perspective of the nation-state that can also be observed in the nineteenth century. Such divisions can be found equally in the *Histoire des deux Indes* (History of the two Indias) written by Guillaume-Thomas Raynal (1713–1796) and in the nine-volume *Weltgeschichte* (World history) written by Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). If today’s scholars emphasize—often with recourse to Michel Foucault—that the nineteenth century was the century of time (Foucault 1986, 22) in order to thereby point toward the primacy that was ostensibly accorded to time over space, they usually overlook the fact that this assertion actually refers above all to evolutionary theory and historical-philosophical treatises or, to go one level deeper, to principles disseminated in textbooks.

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**Textbook opinion: Events as changes in time**

Ernst Bernheim (1850–1942), whose influence partially extended to introductory textbooks from the late twentieth century, defined events as changes in time.

The nature of historical material is such that it does not allow a systematic division. Its characteristic and most general form of appearance is that of temporal succession: events are changes in time; upon these changes, it is possible to base a general—but not systematic—division. The spatial form of appearance is of such less significance for scholarly consideration that one generally makes no attempt to base a general division upon it, but rather subordinates what is spatial to what is temporal. Certainly, it is possible to distinguish between the history of Europe, Asia, etc., or the history of the Old and New World. But that corresponds to such a small degree to the essential course of history—which does not remain confined to the borders of continents and national territories (*Volksgebiete*)—that what results from these kinds of differentiations is equivalent to an arbitrary, merely thematic limitation.

(Bernheim 1889, 37)

Bernheim, however, does not indicate here at all that a division according to “continents” or “national territories” (*Volksgebiete*)—as these were called at the time—would be impossible. Quite the opposite: in what follows, he continues by explaining that the division of material always depends upon the selection of
Historical and systematic approach

And yet he also assumes that the most general division is best served by following the temporal series of events, since he believes that history takes place in this form and that it is the task of historians to reconstruct these changes.

Parallel to the establishment of a temporal narrative, of course, attention was certainly being paid to the notion of space—although more intensively in geography, which was being established at the time as a discipline, than in history.

In addition to theories of place, spaces of movement, and spaces of action, the history of spatial concepts also offers the concept of the surface of the earth (*Erdraum*) or the so-called natural environment, which is bound up with the emergence of geography as a science in the nineteenth century. The invention of this concept coincides with the measuring of the surface of the earth that was carried out in geographic research voyages or disseminated by geographic institutes and publishing houses (for example, by Bertuch’s *Landes-Industrie-Comptoir* in Weimar or the Perthes Verlag in Gotha). Both the gradual measuring of the surface of the earth and the exploration of the interiors of the non-European continents brought with them a metric spatialization of the image of the world (see Lentz and Ormeling 2008; Weigel 2011; Christoph and Breidbach 2011).

Next to Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), Carl Ritter (1779–1859) is often named in the German-speaking world as a founding father of what Ritter called *Erdkunde*, meaning geography or a knowledge of the earth. From 1820 until his death, Ritter held the first chair for modern geography at what was then the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin. While there, he shaped geography in an entirely new way. In order to differentiate the area of activity of geographic science from geography as a pure description of the earth as it was usually practiced since the sixteenth century, Ritter introduced the term *Erdkunde*. His understanding of this term is already evident in the title of his main work, which he published in 1817 and revised and expanded many times over the next forty years: *Die Erdkunde im Verhältniß zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen, oder allgemeine, vergleichende Geographie, als sichere Grundlage des Studiums und Unterrichts in physikalischen und historischen Wissenschaften* (Geography in relation to nature and the history of humankind, or general, comparative geography as a sure foundation for study and teaching in physical and historical sciences) (Ritter 1817–1818). Ritter understood *Erdkunde* both physically (as a science of measurement) and historically (as a history of the knowledge of the physical character of the earth and its changes). Moreover, he believed that geography should take interest in the relations between both sides—in the language of the time, between nature and culture—and that it should thus examine the influences of the physical environment on human activities.

According to this point of view, *Erdkunde* was in one sense a study of the surface of the earth. Yet as Ritter saw it, this study needs to go beyond an inventory of places and localized events to include the study of their connections to each other. The entire program rested, above all, on empirical work. But Ritter’s interest in spatial relations also showed that he did not have an atomistic conception of space. He viewed the surface of the earth as the great framework of reference
within which places become differentiated from each other and are connected to each other (Schultz 1980; Werlen 2009, 148–149). And yet Ritter’s understanding of *Erdkunde* contained one element that disappeared in the following years from many geographic schools of thought—its connection to history. Since he believed that geography must take an interest in the dynamics of places, their changing accessibility, and their relative positions, he considered history and geography to be closely related; he even assumed that geography is always also a history of space.

On the path toward the universal geography of the nineteenth century: Physical, general, and comparative geography

Carl Ritter himself categorized his *Erdkunde* among the field of historical sciences or the “sciences of experience” (Ritter 1817, vol. 1: 20). The knowledge he compiled about the earth consists of a collection of observations through time that he believed later generations would have to continually expand.

This science is named physical because it concerns natural forces to the extent that they act in space, condition certain forms, and produce changes. Yet we cannot speak here merely of the effects of mechanical and chemical forces and effects but must also consider organic, less calculated forces and effects, which become manifest only in time and also permeate intelligent and moral natures. That is why the traditional expression of “physical geography” must be put aside as a sphere of the concept that is too narrow; and that of “physiological geography,” the unusual concept that comes closer, must be put aside as too foreign and polysemous. But its nature is adumbrated by the two characteristic expressions.

This is generally called “world description” (*Erdbeschreibung*) not because it strives to describe everything, but because it strives to explore the nature of every part of the earth and each of its forms—whether in the waters or on the dry land, in far-flung parts of the earth or in the fatherland, be they a setting for a civilized people or a desert—with equal attention and without any particular purpose. For a natural system can only be developed from basic types.

We are tempted to call this discipline comparative in the same sense in which others before it developed into such instructive disciplines, for example, as with comparative anatomy.

In our knowledge of the individual places of the globe, we stand—at least here and there—at a point from which it is possible and advisable to compare analogous forms and their modes of action. It was Herodotus, richly intuitive and well traveled, who first hinted at this idea for the discipline of geography (II c.33), and, from the same place, applied this idea in the most magnificent way to compare Libya and Europe by way of the Niger and Ister rivers [as well as the Hister, the lower course of the Danube, S.R.].
Ordering less material can thus be more instructive than tirelessly compiling individual, unconnected details, since our memory is not capable of holding more when it cannot condense its contents, through reciprocal interpenetration, into larger laws and groups, ideas and intuitions. It was the world-observer A. von Humboldt, the new founder of comparative world description, who demonstrated, in many scientific disciplines, the benefit that can result from this process for all kinds of science. Comparative world description opens an entirely new field for this discipline upon which this work attempts to build with feeble strength. Universal geography can be the fruit that ripens only late in the season.

(Ritter 1817, vol. 1: 21–22)

According to the historian Iris Schröder (2007), Ritter’s geographic vision of Europe from 1804 to 1807 already shows the transition from a descriptive to an exact science with its obsessive love of detail. According to Schröder, Ritter’s study of the surface of the earth already included the exact consideration of the people acting on the surface of the earth and the “products” that they created (Schröder 2007). This may still be a far cry from the social geography of the late twentieth century. But in any case, an understanding of the interactions between human beings and nature/the environment/space is already present in Ritter’s work (see also Goßens 2011).

In the twentieth century, the early Annales historians, especially Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel, took up Ritter’s method of geohistory and his plea for a view of places as products of human beings (Goßens 2011; for a more detailed treatment of geographic protagonists and global geographies from the nineteenth century, see Schröder 2011). The further development of the study of the surface of the earth into an early form of social research into space is, however, already evident with Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), the founder of anthropogeography.

Ratzel, who came to geography only gradually, after studying geology and zoology (in 1876 he was appointed to an extraordinary professorship at the Technical University of Munich, and 1886 to the chair for geography at the University of Leipzig), thought like Ritter in terms of “interactions.” But he replaced the reference to nature with a reference to space. It has thus been argued, not incorrectly, that Ratzel was the first key thinker on space in geography (Matthis Stock, “Friedrich Ratzel,” in Lévy and Lussault 2003, 763–765). If we more closely consider the concept of space that he first developed in his two-volume work *Anthropogeographie* (1882–1891), we can see two characteristics. First, space is conceived as an agent, meaning a variable influencing how humans live together. Second, space is understood in biologic terms as *Lebensraum* (living space) (on the development and use of the concept of *Lebensraum*, see Jureit 2012, 127–157). Ratzel’s works from the late 1890s on political geography also borrowed biological terminology to describe the development of states (Werlen 2009, 148–149). This concept of *Lebensraum*, however, still dragged along the conception of space as a container as developed by Newton. Several years earlier, the biologist and ecologist Ernst Haeckel, to whom Ratzel refers here, had made
this spatial concept productive for biology as a concept of *Lebensraum*, while also integrating it into a social-Darwinist theory. Translated into the language of space, *Lebensraum* becomes a causally acting container for forms of culture, society, and the economy. Ratzel himself was not disinclined toward Darwinist ideas and interpreted the struggle for existence as a “struggle for space” that also existed for “state-organisms” (Lang and Debus 1980, 146).

We cannot make Ratzel—who died in 1904—solely responsible for what later generations did with his concept of space and his political geography. Yet we must point out that Ratzel’s theory of space made a certain semantics available that was easily susceptible to practical and political adoption, and that his deterministic conception of space in fact became an important component of National Socialist *Lebensraum* ideology. The geographer and founder of German geopolitics Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), who hailed from Munich, explicitly situated his political geography in the tradition of Ratzel. Adolf Hitler must have been familiar with the writings of Ratzel and Haushofer. Haushofer visited Hitler and Rudolf Heß (who was Haushofer’s student and assistant in the early 1920s) at Landsberg Prison, where *Mein Kampf* was written (1925–1926). The direct contact between Haushofer and Hitler was one pathway through which the word *Lebensraum* entered into National Socialist vocabulary and quickly became an important term for National Socialist policies of space and expansion. The title of Hans Grimm’s novel, *Volk ohne Raum* (A people without space; 1926), gave rise to a slogan that popularized the term, including in its inverted form—“a space without a people” (Lang and Debus 1980, 146; Köster 2002, 22, 123–128; Sprengel 1996). Looking at this history, the media studies scholar Werner Köster argues that the National Socialists found an already-existing spatial vocabulary and thus had no need to invent one (Köster 2002, 10). Haushofer—no keen supporter of National Socialism—must have recognized the political consequences of his deterministic approach and the geographic politics he advanced too late, for even in 1940, he still edited a selection of Ratzel’s writings. Haushofer’s son was executed in 1944 as an accessory to the assassination attempt on Hitler of July 20, 1944. After Haushofer had been interrogated, imprisoned, and lost his right to teach, he and his wife—who was half Jewish—committed suicide in 1946 (on the reception of Haushofer’s theories, see Spang 2013).

Ratzel’s reception in other countries, including the United States, can be described somewhat more positively. His method was introduced into geography in the United States by way of Ellen Churchill Semple (1863–1932) (Keighren 2010). As a student from Kentucky at the University of Leipzig, at the time Semple was not allowed to complete a degree. But after returning to the United States, she achieved a certain fame on the basis of several field studies and publications and was at first recruited by the University of Chicago, where she began her academic career and published the well-received book *Influences of Geographic Environment* in 1911. The influence of the physical environment—such as climate and geographic location—on the forms of life and patterns of behavior of human beings is a central topic of Semple’s work; and she, too, adopted the
interpretation of states as biological organisms. Already by the 1920s and 1930s, some—including the American geographer Carl O. Sauer (1889–1975)—had already criticized environmentally deterministic methods in geography as unscientific. Yet Semple defended herself in her later work by emphasizing the significance of environmental influences on culture in contrast to deterministic effects of the physical environment. Together with the historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932), Semple is in any case considered to be a founder of the American geohistorical school (Block 1980). The central term for Turner’s engagement with the history of settlement across the American continent is that of the frontier. His famous frontier thesis from 1893 argues that the particular culture and the political institutions of North America were essentially formed through work performed along an expanding boundary of settlement. A frontier in Turner’s sense is a movable boundary and rests upon the idea that a civilized group of settlers are able to penetrate into an untouched wilderness. The idea that the physical environment determines the behavior of human beings, in this case the settlers, thus also played a role for Turner (Turner 1996; on more recent debates that continue to be inspired by Turner, see Osterhammel 1995; Marx 2003; Riekenberg 2003; Hochgeschwender 2005).

The view that climate or geographic location has an effect on forms of life is still widespread today. There is no need to deny that these are possible factors. But we would be underestimating the freedoms of human action if we were to consider the influence of environmental factors on collective forms of life and individual patterns of behavior to be necessary or inevitable.

If Haushofer was Hitler’s “private tutor” in geography, it was the jurist Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) who played this role in matters of international law. Schmitt’s central monograph Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht (The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum) did not appear until 1950, but Schmitt’s engagement with space goes back to 1939. It was then that he gave a lecture at the annual conference of German jurists in Kiel on the topic of “Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte” (The Großraum order of international law and ban on intervention by external powers) (Schmitt 2009). This lecture, which was also quickly published, provoked a broad response including from some voices who were quite critical. In his lecture, Schmitt interpreted the Monroe Doctrine—the principles of US foreign policy formulated in 1823, which included a demand for an end to all colonialist endeavors in the West and the non-interference of the United States in European conflicts—in his own way. He transferred these principles to the Eastern European space of his day and interpreted the “ban on intervention by external powers” to apply to England and the United States. This interpretation received Hitler’s approval, who promptly used it in a Reichstag speech and prohibited the Americans from all intervention into Eastern Europe, making Schmitt’s theory a part of geopolitical discourse, at least at that point in time (Köster 2002, 210–211).

Schmitt was no theoretician of space. Yet the category of space represents one central pillar in his doctrine of international law—antidemocratic and antiliberal,
just like himself—as a law of self-determination by nations or peoples (*Völker*). Concretely, space for Schmitt denotes either national territory or what he called *Großraum*. The concept is not, however, identical with the realm of political authority or governance. Rather, it describes a sphere into which political ideas “radiate” and from which the intervention of external powers therefore ought to be excluded. When examined more closely, the concept becomes more diffuse, since for Schmitt space is also both a spatial figure and an objective formation. The latter, according to Schmitt, is not constituted socially but should primarily have a constitutive effect (Köster 2002, 215–216).

Dichotomies such as open/closed or ordered/dynamic also play a role in Schmitt’s writings about international law. He considered *Großraum* (as exemplified by the German Reich) to be closed, but also open through its “radiance.” And he believed that a viable international order rested primarily on a stable spatial order, even though the *Großraum* would also have to be what Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan translate as an “achievement space,” or *Leistungraum* (Minca and Rowan 2016, 173). Schmitt adopted this concept, by contrast, from the biologist Viktor von Weizsäcker, whose theories viewed space as the product of active biological organisms and their movements (Schmitt 2009, 14, 76–77; see also Köster 2002, 214, 216). Space thus gained a dynamic quality through a transferal from biology, although of course Schmitt understood these “movements” to be National Socialist activities, as the word itself might indicate. As an antonym to dynamic-qualitative space, Schmitt repeatedly invokes the “mathematical-physical-natural scientific” concept of space, which he believes must be overcome because of its “neutrality” and emptiness (Schmitt 2009, 76).

If Schmitt’s concept of *Großraum* already showed indications of determinism, then this tendency is even more apparent in his concept of nomos.⁵ Many of Schmitt’s earlier writings found their way into his main work *Nomos der Erde* (*Nomos of the Earth*; 1950), including the text *Land und Meer* (Earth and sea; 1942), in he which interprets the events of the war as a conflict between these two powers, and the war itself as an inevitable and apocalyptic event. With the concept of nomos, moreover, the trend of subordinating the course of history to a spiritual principle becomes even stronger. This tendency makes it possible to legitimize every seizure of territory that is intended to found the nomos, resulting in a kind of moral law, and of course also to legitimize war itself. Schmitt did exactly that when he changed his thesis after the Second World War to argue that war, in the medium term, serves to secure peace. If, according to this theory, real-historical events “ultimately only” follow more fundamental principles and the components of space are anchored in a metaphysical law, we have reached the point where Schmitt wanted to see a “revolution in space” like that of Copernicus: as Schmitt saw it, the primacy of the principle of spirit would bring an end to the confusion within spatial concepts that had hitherto been developed (Schmitt 1940). Schmitt’s theoretical and historical justification for this view would sound quite harmless had it not served to justify the war begun by the National Socialists.
The revolution in space according to Carl Schmitt (1940)

In the weekly newspaper *Das Reich*, Schmitt published an article in 1940 from which the following excerpt is taken:

The transformation in spatial conceptions that is underway everywhere on the earth and with all peoples (*Völker*) is profound and its effects are incalculable. Everyone knows that our spatial dimensions and standards have quickly changed as a consequence of new technological means of transportation and communication, making “the earth smaller.” But unfortunately, the implications of this insight usually amount to no more than impressions of passengers in express trains and airplanes and drivers of automobiles who become aware of the fact that it is possible today to get from one place to another more quickly than it was, for example, in the time of Charlemagne. Theories and programs like Baron Coudenhove’s ‘Paneurope’ or those originating with the Geneva-League-of-Nations pacifists, for whom the entire earth almost seemed to be one single cosmopolitan hotel, remained at the same level of insight. [Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) was the founder of the Pan-European movement, which hoped to prevent another world war through a federation of states.—S.R.] This sleeping- and eating-car philosophy is not what I mean here. The present transformation of our conceptions of the earth’s space is infinitely more profound. In its revolutionizing and reorganizing effects, it can be compared to but one single event in history as we know it, namely with the change in the image of the world that took place four centuries ago when, following Columbus’s discovery of America and the other discoveries and inventions of the time, the medieval image of the world sank into oblivion and the European system of states that persisted between 1648 and 1914 was established. Indeed, the revolutionary force that new technological developments will have for space will change our previous image of the earth’s space even more than at that time. A true revolution in space is underway. It is having an effect both in the dimensions of today’s geopolitical events and in the totality of modern war. Today, the outlines of the continental *Großraum* are already visible as its inevitable consequence.

Some of Schmitt’s formulations are reminiscent of the airplane-philosophy (to take up his polemical term) of some business journalists of that time who believed that modern media and transportation technology had made the world shrink or become smaller. (Of course, the world has not in fact become smaller; at most, the ability to more quickly overcome distance makes it feel like this is so.) But Schmitt believed to have recognized even more: for him, technological progress had geopolitical significance. And the area of a new continental *Großraum* was ostensibly making itself known. What followed from this conclusion was a thesis about the lesson to be drawn from the Treaty of Versailles—that there could be no true peace without a European spatial order; Schmitt’s view was that the
European spatial order had been inexorably expanding since the outbreak of the war, indeed, that this “war for the order of space” had geopolitical meaning. This interpretation of the concept of space should serve us as a warning about speaking of the “effects of space,” all the more so because this concept also seems to imply a notion of absolute space (Schmitt 1940, 3, column 1). It would also be worth more closely examining the interrelationship of Schmitt’s concept of space with that of National Socialist ideology and spatial politics, as well as its popular reception (individual aspects are addressed in Münk 1993; Sprengel 1996; Leendertz 2008, 107–216; Müller 2009).

Of course, the trajectory from Ratzel to Haushofer, Hitler, and Schmitt does not tell the whole history of space and the sciences that engaged with space as an object in Germany during the first half of the twentieth century. This is shown by contemporaneous developments in physics (Albert Einstein), advancements in non-Euclidean geometry, and discussions about the intuition and experience of space in philosophy (Edmund Husserl, Oskar Becker), as well as the reception of Ratzel in the United States and France (more on that follows later). Furthermore, Ratzel did not have the same effect in founding a school of thought as did, for example, Paul Vidal de La Blanche. There were other geographic concepts, as well. We could think here of Alfred Hettner’s chorographic method (Wardenga 1995) or Otto Schlüter’s settlement geography (although Schlüter was a member of the Alldeutscher Verband [Pan-German League] and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei [German National People’s Party]). This history nevertheless demonstrates the dire consequences that can follow from a spatially deterministic method, especially if it is politically instrumentalized and space is stylized to become a subject that is itself capable of making claims, or if metaphysical forces are ascribed to space. Apart from warnings, then, there is not much that we can retain from Schmitt’s spatial bricolage. What remains is his historical analysis of the emergence of statehood and, in particular, of the emergence of the early modern territorial states that he saw as representing something like the prototypes of the strong state after which he sought.

In any case, the notion of space was initially discredited after the end of the Second World War and largely disappeared from view in Germany. Geopolitical discourse also lost standing (Köster 2002, 28, 33). Only in recent years has this strand of thought been cautiously reestablished within geography—without its occasional political claims (see Gebhardt, Reuber, and Wolkersdorfer 2003, especially 47–66). The term geopolitics has also been reappearing lately in the press and in politics.6 It is used to describe strategies that modern states use to assert control over areas that they do not necessarily politically or territorially rule. Other, image-generating slogans from advertising or politics that communicate a position of the center or periphery—for example, the expression that Germany lies “in the middle of Europe” or that Thuringia lies “in the middle of Germany”—are intended more metaphorically but nevertheless take recourse, presumably completely naively and unawares, to geopolitical vocabulary. What substantive quality, exactly, is this geographically central location meant to imply? And what does this mean for German or European “peripheries”?
Finally, with the work of Hans Bobek and Wolfgang Hartke, a social geography has become established in the German-speaking world since the middle of the 1950s that specializes in reconstructing the social spaces of various groups without geodeterministic premises (Werlen 2009, 151).

**Alternative paths: Febvre—Braudel—Lefebvre**

The spatialization of political thought in the course of the nineteenth century is not a unique German development but a more general, or at least European, tendency that accompanied the development (and competition) of nation-states and the formation of national economies. Nevertheless, it is in Germany that the political consequences—authorized by the idea of given spaces and space as an agent capable of making claims—were the most extreme, if not to say disastrous. This section, which mainly engages developments in France, is intended to demonstrate that there were also critics of the German school, or at least approaches that were less politicized.

The French counterpart to Ratzel can be seen in Paul Vidal de La Blache (1845–1918), the founder of French anthropogeography, which Vidal de La Blache established under the name of *géographie humaine*. As the founding father of French geography as an academic discipline, despite being originally trained as a historian, Vidal de La Blache possessed an influence that lasted beyond the generation of his students into the 1960s. His theories, however, still have influence in schools even today through handbooks, textbooks, and maps that were prepared under his direction (Berdoulay 1995). In addition to human geography, which he saw as examining the connection between human beings and their milieu, Vidal de La Blache had a distinct interest in regional studies. He was definitely not interested in universal laws or a deterministic method. Rather, he emphasized the diverse possibilities of using the physical and biological milieu (for which he coined the term “possibilism”) and the active role of human beings in shaping and changing this environment. After successfully transforming the milieu, so he argued, human beings would again be forced to adjust to the new situation.

Lucien Febvre (1878–1956), probably best known in the Western world through his study on the problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century and as the founder (together with Marc Bloch) of the Annales school, belongs to the first generation of students to study with the geographer Vidal de La Blache. His geographic introduction to history (published in 1922) was a serious engagement with the thesis of many nineteenth-century geographers that history and geography belonged together (Febvre 1938). He nevertheless sharply criticized any approaches that—especially following Ratzel—wanted to see the physical-geographic environment as an important factor for human development, especially if they viewed the influence of geography on history or society quasi mechanistically. Febvre’s introduction demonstrates the complexity of everything that he thought must be comprehended under the term “geographic influences,” and then goes on to problematize the term “natural setting” (*cadre naturel*) and show how
such settings (climate zones, forests, etc.) can change over the course of history. Again and again, he emphasizes human initiatives for shaping the landscape, as exemplified in projects such as the construction of settlements or roads. The central part of his book sets the possibilism of his teacher Vidal de la Blache against Ratzel’s determinism.

Febvre: The earth and man

We have analysed the two complexes “the earth” and “man” about which there is so much vague talk. We have replaced the indistinct and confused notion of “the Earth” by that of a cosmos, a great harmonized whole made up of climatico-botanical zones, each one forming an organic unity and all of them placed symmetrically on either side of the Equator. Then for the notion of “Man” we have by an analogous process substituted that of human society and endeavoured to explain the true nature of the action of such a society in its relations with the animal and plant communities which occupy the various regions of the earth. The main problem, of the value which the natural regions of the cosmos have for man, remains. We have already confronted it—or rather it has confronted us—without any effort. We must now consider it again.

Let us make clear the terms and the data. Some speak of natural regions—climatico-botanical regions—as reservoirs of forces which act directly on man with a sovereign and decisive power, and leave their mark on every manifestation of their activity, from the smallest to the most important and complicated, and in a great measure are at the same time the cause and the subject of these manifestations. This is the determinist theory. We have already pointed out its difficulties, and have urged that natural regions are simply collections of possibilities for society which makes use of them but is not determined by them.

But we had not then formulated a theory of human society and of its special mode of activity; moreover, we had only stated the problem in general terms. We must now give attention to the details.

(Febvre 1938 [1922], 203–204; translation Mountford and Paxton 1925, 171–172)

This is not only a clear rejection of the deterministic thesis—you can practically feel Febvre’s excitement in taking it ad absurdum. Geographic conditions are the consequence, not the cause of the development of societies. For Febvre, geography thus does not entail subordination to naturally given facts but rather the use of given possibilities (Febvre 1938, 425). And these possibilities are exceedingly diverse, able to be combined, and in no way inevitable. The fact that he sees neither the state (État) nor the soil (sol) as a container (boîte) in which society develops (Febvre 1938, 357), is additionally a statement that fits well with the program of recent transnational history.
Febvre’s study on the Rhine (Febvre 1997) can be interpreted, continuing his arguments cited earlier, as an application of the insight that he gained from his engagement with human geography: the study is centered on a geographic object that is not, however, interpreted as something given by nature but created by human beings. The book about the Rhine—less an *histoire totale* than an essay—focuses on the following topics: (1) The Rhine as a product of human history. (2) The Rhine and its function as a political border, which it nevertheless assumes only beginning in the sixteenth century. All *völkisch* or national attributions of his day, he argues, are therefore unacceptable, since they argue from a modern state of affairs, which they project back in time. (3) The history of the Rhine as a history of urban culture. (4) The Rhinelanders were “crushed” between France and Germany. In this context, Febvre also insists that the Rhine is a European river that connects languages, cultures, and economic systems with one another.

Jacques Rossiaud later modified this thesis to argue that the question of whether the river should be seen as a border that divides or connects is itself a mistake, since a river—like any other border—is always both a dividing line and point of connection (Rossiaud 2007, 114–115; cf. Jameson 1989; Rüther 2007). We can nevertheless conclude that Febvre’s essay about the Rhine inspired a great deal of research on the great rivers of Europe (the Danube, the Rhône, the Oder, etc.) that then took up one of two topics: the theme of the border, or the relationships between nature–space and culture–mentalities (Bernhardt 2016a). While Febvre criticized the concept of so-called natural borders as early as the 1920s, and his studies showed that ideas about the border had also changed significantly since the sixteenth century, German geographers (Ratzel, Haushofer) emphasized the geopolitical-strategic aspects of the border and ascribed biological qualities to it (Haushofer 1927).

There is almost no one who contributed more to the advancement of a spatially oriented historiography in France than the historian Fernand Braudel (1902–1985). As a student of Febvre, and thus also indirectly of Vidal de La Blache, Braudel integrated geography into his historical research, choosing to write his doctoral thesis on the greater region of the Mediterranean at the time of Philip II, which Braudel also analyzed from a spatial-geographic perspective. Braudel’s study *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, drafts of which he began before the war but which was only published in 1949 (Braudel 1966; translation Reynolds 1992), is divided into three parts corresponding to three temporalities. The first part analyzes the geographic milieu (chiefly in the form of a history of the Mediterranean landscape) and therewith the “almost imperceptible movement of history” (Braudel 1966; translation Reynolds 1992, 1). The second part is devoted to large movements, the formation of groups, and the development of the economy. This is the history of slower rhythms, also known under the term of *longue durée*. The final part then takes up “restless history,” which Braudel understands to mean the history of politics and events. On the one hand, his work was thus decidedly aimed against a pure history of events. And on the other hand, he wanted to show how geographic methods could be made productive for historiography. The crux of
his work on the Mediterranean was to consider the region’s history in its different rhythms or temporalities. The foundation for the nearly immobile temporality is the natural milieu or space. Beginning with a geographic spatial concept, space at first appears in the work largely as something given that impinges upon human beings and their actions. In the middle part of the work, space then transforms into something created by human beings, and then finally into space as inhabited and traversed by humans.

Braudel, the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean world—The overture

The first part of this book, as its title suggests, is concerned with geography: geography of a particular kind, with special emphasis on human factors. But it is more than this. It is also an attempt to discover a particular kind of history. … The resulting picture is one in which all the evidence combines across time and space, to give us a history in slow motion from which permanent values can be detected. Geography in this context is no longer an end in itself but a means to an end. It helps us to rediscover the slow unfolding of structural realities, to see things in the perspective of the very long term. Geography, like history, can be asked many questions. Here it helps us to discover the almost imperceptible movement of history, if only we are prepared to follow its lessons and accept its categories and divisions.

(Braudel 1966; translation Reynolds 1992, 1)

Braudel also engages questions of space in his later works such as Civilization matérielle (1979) and L’identité de la France, his unfinished final work that appeared posthumously in three volumes, the first of which was titled Espace et histoire (Braudel 1986). On the one hand, he takes up the concept of the économie-monde (global economy) from his student Immanuel Wallerstein, and on the other, the question that had been previously posed by Jules Michelet (1798–1874) of whether France had been invented by geography. What remains problematic is the lingering orientation toward Vidal de La Blache, who at the time should have already been considered obsolete given how urbanization and migration streams were constantly changing the world. What is also worth criticizing is the imprecision in his spatial concepts, the many instances in which he transforms space into a metaphor, and the resulting lack of a consistent spatial theory.

In an issue of the journal Annales devoted to Braudel (no. 41, 1986), Bernard Lepetit did not shy away from reminding readers of the long final chapter of the first part in the first edition of Méditerranée, “Géohistoire et déterminisme,” in which Braudel was unwilling to completely dismiss a deterministic position. (This section had been cut from all further editions and all translations.) For Lepetit, it was the concept of space in Braudel’s late work (Civilisation matérielle and Identité de la France) that acquired the necessary complexity through its possibilities of combination and the overlapping of different levels, and which thus enabled Braudel to successfully move beyond determinism (Lepetit 1986, 1190).
Yet others have also noted that the invitation to write a géohistoire comes more from reading Braudel’s studies than his own theoretical remarks, which simply do not produce a precise methodology (see Burke 1998, 44–45; Christian Grataloup, Braudel, Fernand, in Lévy and Lussault 2003, 118–120; Piltz 2009, 90–91, 96). What is also worth mentioning is Braudel’s role as an academic organizer. He cofounded the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) out of the sixth section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE) and the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (MSH), and he also established a graphics laboratory at the EHESS, which produced maps (by Jacques Bertin) that he had already integrated into the second edition of his work on the Mediterranean. Braudel thus contributed to making maps a medium of French historiography (which are much more intensively integrated into history books than in many other countries, such as in Germany) and a particular way of thinking.

While Braudel’s work on the Mediterranean operated with three levels of time, with space playing a role as a central category on at least one level, his works on economic history engaged much more intensively with spatialities—which were always placed in a hierarchy, and always intermeshed with each other. As one of the few historians to think about the emergence of premodern capitalist structures and of the European global economy (économie-monde) (on this point, see Garner and Middell 2012), he had clear, and in particular spatial, criteria for describing the ways in which the economic systems of medium- and large-scale regions function:

1. Every economic zone possesses borders that change only slowly, as well as a center, or at least a financially powerful city in which information, goods, and workers converge. In the early modern period, these cities were principally Venice, Antwerp, Genoa, Amsterdam, and London.

2. Within this zone, a hierarchy usually exists, represented by a decrease in economic power from the city with its strong central zone toward the peripheral areas with their weaker economies.

3. Finally, every global economy also possesses peripheries located either at a great distance or within the interior of the zone (economically weak regions that are poorly connected to the center).

This system of economic center–periphery sounds quite similar to the theory of central places propounded by the German geographer Walter Christaller (Christaller 1968; on Christaller, see Fehn 2008). Contemporary economic history considers both systems to be obsolete, and both are being gradually replaced by network theory or gateway models. Braudel’s spatial model of organization is nevertheless interesting from an analytical point of view. His way of playing with these levels becomes even more pronounced in his analysis of the economic organization of preindustrial France (Braudel 1986). He argues there that a network of villages, cities, and streets connecting various places is superimposed over a “Russian doll” of the urban, regional, and national economy. This causes the formation of different zones over which yet other spatial orders are
superimposed: those of the interior of the country and the periphery, of north and south, of mountains and plains. This multilayered spatial arrangement of territory corresponds to a complex temporal order, although specific temporalities and rhythms correspond to the different zones. These coexist according to their development at different points in time, and with differing temporal extension. Yet, Braudel argues, the entire system gradually collapsed during the eighteenth century because the spatiotemporal levels do not continue to fit together when they dissolve the old hierarchies. Braudel’s interpretation is now slightly outdated due to recent research and the development of new approaches, but what remains is his attempt at using spatiotemporal categories to explain how economic systems function.

A scholar who stands apart from the tradition of Vidal and is not easily assigned to either a school or an institution (apart from a neo-Marxist way of thinking), but who is still a powerful thinker of space with an analytical set of tools—this is one way of characterizing the French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991), who developed and applied his spatial theory primarily in relation to the city as an object of investigation (on this point, see Schmid 2005). Lefebvre began his academic research quite late and was over sixty years old when he became a professor of sociology, yet he had enormous influence on public debate during the student revolts, until he made critical remarks about the student movement. His influence persisted, above all, in critical urban research and social geography (especially in its form of radical geography; see Belina and Michel, 2008; Belina 2013) and also partly on political science and literary studies, even if to some extent he was met with heavy criticism (from Manuel Castell, for example). Until now, Lefebvre’s reception among historians has been relatively muted, although this is gradually beginning to change (see Hochmuth and Rau, 2006, 29–30; Deffner 2010). Comprising more than sixty books, his work is enormously extensive and difficult to describe with an overall summary. Yet two concepts are especially interesting here: that of the “production” of space (production de l’espace) and of his triad (triplicité). The thesis that space is “produced” derives from Lefebvre’s Marxist thinking and always refers to social space or the space of society. That is to say: every society produces its own space. This space is the product of respectively available capital, technology, labor relations, ways of thinking, ideas, knowledge, and practices. Lefebvre presents his argumentation in the introduction to his foundational work on the theory of space (Lefebvre 2000), where he introduces a concept of space into Marxist technology, in the form of theses.

Two theses on the social production of space and its implications according to Lefebvre:

1. (Social) space is a (social) product.
   First implication: … (physical) natural space is disappearing.
   Second implication: Every society … produces a space, its own space. …
   [example:] … the ancient city had its own spatial practice: it forged its own—appropriated—space.
In reality, social space “incorporates” social actions, the actions of social subjects both individual and collective who are born and who die, who suffer and who act.

**Third implication:** If space is a product, our knowledge of it must be expected to reproduce and expound the process of production.

**Fourth implication:** If space is produced, if there is a production process, then we are dealing with history … The history of space, of its production *qua* “reality,” and of its forms and representations, is not to be confused either with the causal chain of “historical” (i.e. dated) events, or with a sequence, whether teleological or not, of customs and laws, ideals and ideology, and socio-economic structures or institutions (superstructures). But we may be sure that the forces of production (nature; labour and the organization of labour; technology and knowledge) and, naturally, the relations of production play a part—though we have not yet defined it—in the production of space.

(Condensed from Lefebvre 2000, 35, 39, 40, 43, 46, 57; translation Nicholson-Smith 1992, 30, 31, 33, 36, 46)

When, conversely, Lefebvre analyzes cities, he does not simply describe their constructed forms but also interprets these forms (for example, churches, skyscrapers, suburbs) as materializations of specific social systems. Spatial analysis thereby proves exceptionally well suited for an analysis of power (since, according to Lefebvre, states and other institutions of power also use space to exercise their power). In examining space through the process of its production, Lefebvre proceeds analogously to Marx’s analysis of the production of goods. In so doing, he combines a genealogical level of analysis with a synchronistic-structural level, which he summarizes together as a triad. This enables him to move beyond dualistic thinking (for example, between material space and mental space or thought space). His aim is rather to think physical, mental, and social space in connection to each other. To each epoch—and here he largely follows Marx’s divisions—he at first assigns a type of space: absolute, sacred, historical, and abstract-capitalistic. Each of these epochs is then assigned to three levels that mutually penetrate, reinforce, or contradict each other: *espace perçu* as space that is experienced, perceived, and used (which is also the space of everyday experience); *espace conçu* as space that is thought, planned, and conceived (or the representation of space); and, finally, *espace vécu* as lived space (or the spaces of representation) (Lefebvre 2000, 48–49).

The latter is the space of signs, images, and symbols that accompany the space of everyday experience, or it is space as described by artists, writers, or philosophers. Lefebvre finds concrete examples of this third type of space in public (squares, churches, cemeteries, etc.) or private spaces (the bed, room, apartment, house), and also in passions and habits (rhythms) that are bound to spaces.

Lefebvre quite intentionally uses three concepts to define space. In his view, the dualisms or oppositions that are common in structuralist thinking lead to unproductive static oppositions that do not accurately correspond to the complexity and
fluidity of reality. Space must therefore be grasped as something that is simultaneously perceived, conceived, and directly experienced or lived. This makes it possible to join together physical, mental, and social or corporeal aspects of space. With a second triad of concepts, Lefebvre then also simultaneously views space as spatial practice, representation of space, and space of representation. According to Lefebvre, social relations are always also spatial relations since bodies enter into relation with each other through the medium of space, and since the uses of space provide information about the relationship of human beings to their spatial environment.

The linearity that Lefebvre incorporates into his description of the development of spatial concepts and spatial formations comes, no doubt, from his Marxist view of history, which many historians today would no longer support. But we can also see advantages in his view. For one thing, Lefebvre is actually attempting to uncover a developmental perspective, meaning his apparatus contains a dynamic component—which is not always the case for all heuristics of space with a social-scientific orientation. And for another, the spatial formations that he attributed to different epochs can also be read simply as dominant or defining forms (without any claims of exclusivity). Lefebvre’s theory certainly considers the fact that the end use of space need not necessarily correspond to its planning or production. He was fascinated, for example, by the owners’ appropriation of the housing development for factory workers, called Pessac (near Bordeaux), that was planned by Le Corbusier in 1926. In some cases, the workers had redesigned the monotonous facades to such a degree that they became unrecognizable (Boudon 1969).

Yet as we can see with Lefebvre, the concept of lived space (espace vécu, lifeworld; more on this concept in what follows later) in no way implies a transitory world of experience, but a much more complex concept: a space shaped by habitualized practices and images that have been produced by human beings and that, in turn, make available to those people a certain identificatory potential. Nearly simultaneously, in the beginning of the 1970s, a French geographer worked with this same concept in defining the region as a kind of lifeworld: La région, espace vécu is the title of the book that Armand Frémont first published in 1976. Frémont was not interested in determining a region through its landscape (its flora, fauna, or objective, measurable values) or in situating its people as neutral objects therein. That is why he conceived of the region, conversely, in terms of those interactions between human beings within the extension of space that they could theoretically reach every day (which could be quite different for different people depending on their age and profession), and further in terms of their emotional and psychological attachment to this area.

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Region as lived space according to Frémont

“Lived space,” in all its thickness and its complexity, thus appears as the revealing agent of regional realities. These certainly have many components—administrative, historical, ecological, economic, but also, and more
fundamentally, psychological. The region is therefore not an object having any reality in itself, any more than the geographer or other specialists are only objective analysts of a universe as it might exist outside the observer itself. … The region, if it exists, is a lived space. Viewed, perceived, felt, loved, or rejected, modeled by human beings and projecting back onto them images that model them. It is a reflection. Rediscovering the region thus means seeking to seize it where it exists as seen by human beings.

(Frémont 1999, 58, translated by Michael Thomas Taylor)

Parallel to Frémont's work, one concept circulating in the Anglo-American world, especially in human geography, was that of the lifeworld, which was also intended as a means to turn away from neopositivistic geography. Scholars working in human geography based their work to a greater extent in phenomenological approaches, which is why we should distinguish between the two concepts (espace vécu and lifeworld). For the sake of completeness, however, it is worth mentioning an even older concept of lived space. This concept was formulated in the 1930s by Karlfried Graf von Dürckheim (1896–1988), a psychologist who also served the National Socialist government as a diplomat in Japan. Dürckheim began with the assumption that space is not something given externally but something that exists only through bodily experience (Hasse 2005). Almost at the same time, the Russo-French psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) used such a concept of space in his psychopathological study on lived time (Minkowski 1995). Minkowski argued that, in its importance for the self, space is not limited to geometric relations, which he considered at most to play a role in a qualitative sense. What he considered much more important for living and acting subjects were the shades and moods of space. This is what then transforms space, as Dürckheim had put it, into a medium of bodily realization. These concepts were adopted in the new phenomenology of the 1960s, partially also in pedagogy, and most recently in theology (Bollnow 2004; Beuttler 2010; on the integration of spatially analytical concepts into German regional history, see Bavaj 2006).

With Lefebvre (and his epigones), in any case, we have finally moved beyond the deterministic spatial concepts that developed since the end of the nineteenth century; similarly, we have bid farewell to the conception of space as something given. Speaking of the “production” of space means insisting on a view of spatial order as something “made” by human beings, of spaces as perceived and shaped by humans, and of spaces as something that humans can individually or collectively appropriate.

1.2 Concepts

In order to avoid the “mistakes” of previous research into space and navigate around pitfalls, it is advisable that we accustom ourselves to using these concepts in a very intentional way. An entire set of attributes and adjectives is available for indicating, with relative precision, the space about which we speak at any given moment. Even if an exchange remains at a conceptual or abstract level,
we should make clear whether we are speaking about space in a psychological, philosophical, physical, or everyday sense.

The constant emphasis on the social construction of space can easily sow confusion in everyday situations, since we must certainly take our spatial environment to be real and objective or otherwise risk causing a whole series of accidents. Yet such a confrontation between constructedness and objectivity is no contradiction at all, as the following section of this chapter will show. A look at the field of conceptual history will then show which spatial concepts have been articulated by Western discourse over the course of history—both in their diversity and also in their limits. By no means must something that can be expressed in one language be the same in other languages. In this way, problems of translation reveal the limits of what can be said and thought. In order to finally shine light into the jungle of spatial theories and different disciplinary approaches, another section of this chapter will offer an introduction to several basic concepts for spatial analysis. What is an absolute space, what is a relative or relational space? What is a Euclidean space? And why might it make sense to distinguish between place and space?

**Everyday and scholarly concepts of space: Not a contradiction**

If these pages are an attempt to find a more nuanced way of speaking and writing about space—that is, of sharpening the awareness of historians for why we must always specify which space we are speaking about—we cannot simply reject the idea that sometimes when we speak of space all of us mean something quite objective. This can be explained by the fact that the term can refer—entirely correctly, lexically speaking—to a room, a hall, or the entire cosmos. Exactly these meanings of the word correspond to our everyday understanding: space as a more or less firmly limited extension of matter. This is how we see, hear, or experience space, while usually not thinking about the fact that it can be constructed—although we generally take seriously its limitation or extension. And it’s a good thing that this is the case, since we might otherwise run into a wall or accidentally fall from high places. We need not relearn the laws of geometry and physics every day, which we should respect as our bodies move through the world; our body generally learned these laws in an early stage of our childhood. The fact that the spaces through which we move are simultaneously constructed, meaning individually perceived or socially formed, is no contradiction. It can easily be reconciled with a scientific concept of space. For if we look more closely, we can see the complexity of spatial relations even in our everyday lives—for example, in the interpenetration of spatial levels: a room is part of an apartment, an apartment is part of a building, and this building belongs to a city district, etc. Similarly, we can observe that these same spaces can be differently perceived or remembered by different persons. And then, of course, we have other sensory perceptions in addition to seeing and feeling that contribute to spatial perception: hearing and smelling, which—when noticed—once again make other impressions. If someone attempted to make a drawing of these impressions, it would doubtless look
Quite different than if a technical draftsman were to sketch the same area using their tools for measuring and scaling. This diversity of concepts, apparent even in everyday experience, should be taken seriously and made productive for research.

Yet this reference to everyday reality should in no way suggest that the theoretical formulation of a concept can be derived from the everyday use of a word. For, like any theory, a theory of space must first be internally consistent. At the same time, this is where a problem arises that is relevant for scientific practice: internally consistent theories are often not especially easy to operationalize for the discipline of history, especially when they concern dimensions that cannot be perceived by the senses. When today’s physicists, for example, think about a tenth or eleventh dimension of space (on this point, see Wertheim 2000, 205–242), even if one day they were to be proven to exist, it would have no particular impact on how we live our lives or on our everyday spatial practices. These theories can expand our conceptions of possible spaces, for by studying (new and old) spatial theories, we can acquire a specific body of knowledge; and ultimately, theoretical debates about space can be analyzed from the perspective of the history of science or discourse. But analytical concepts are much more important for recognizing historical spatialities (configurations, perceptions, practices) than knowledge of all mathematical, physical, and similar theories of space.

Scientific concepts of space can help us to see “more space” and to recognize the levels, modalities, or constitutive processes that become visible from perspectives beyond the bare necessity of survival. In order to recognize spatial phenomena in their full diversity, we need to deconstruct our habitual ways of thinking.

**Conceptual history**

Thoughts about reality are expressed in the medium of language. The language that we speak is what determines the kind of spaces we are capable of seeing. But language—or concretely, words—always already imply concepts that we can then articulate in their application as speech, or not. Sciences working with historical methods must take into consideration the fact that language and vocabulary both change, that some words fall out of use, others are added to the vocabulary, and yet others change their meaning. In examining historical texts from the perspective of spatiality, we should always be aware of these two issues: (1) Which concept is connected to a certain spatial term? and (2) How does the meaning of a word change over the course of time? This is naturally the case for all fields of meaning, not only for spatial meaning.

This section cannot undertake such an analysis for the entirety of spatial vocabulary. It aims, rather, to point to the historical roots of the words space (Raum), place (Ort), and site (Platz) and to their everyday meaning. Additionally, a comparison with the semantic field of words related to space in other Indo-European languages will allow us to see several particularities of national languages that can also lead to problems in translations. This analysis is essentially based on entries from the most common lexical or etymological dictionaries, which are usually monolingual. The following exposition is intended as a first point of departure for
further historical linguistic research into the vocabulary of space (on this point, see Sources 1 and 2 in the Appendix).

The roots of the most of the words that today express spatial content in Indo-European languages lie in Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages. Both the English word space and the French espace (Spanish: espacio; Italian: spazio; etc.) derive from the Latin spatium, which also contains the Latin word for step, passus. This entails the idea that one can pass through space or that space can be measured in steps. By contrast, the Greek chôra (territory or space) and the word chorós (a dancing place), which can be found today in the words chorography (description of space, description of landscape) or choreography (dance design), are associated with the conception of a void, or at least with the idea that space can be filled with people and perhaps also with actions. The German word Raum derives from the Middle and High German rūm; as with the English word room or the Swedish rum, it is a nominalization of the common Germanic adjective raum (far, spacious). This noun was the root for the German adjectives geraum (which today has kept only its temporal meaning of “for some time”) and geräu-mig (with its spatial meaning of “spacious” or “ample”). The associated German verb räumen means to make space or to leave a place. And the abstract German noun Räumlichkeit (spatiality) did not appear for the first time until the seventeenth century; a Raumpfleger or Raumpflegerin (literally, someone who cares for a space, meaning someone who works as a cleaner) and the Raumsonde (a space probe) do not appear—depending on context—until the twentieth century.

To briefly stay with the meanings of space: in German and other languages that have integrated German roots, we find, on the one hand, a notion indicating spaciousness, expansiveness, a lot of space; and on the other hand, we also find a notion for a space that is quite precisely limited, namely, a room that is defined by walls, a floor, and the ceiling. English and the Romance languages can more precisely distinguish between room/space, chambre/espace, cuarto/espacio, etc.; these are synonyms at most in a metaphorical or subjective sense. The words espace/espacio, derived from Latin, stand for distance (between two points, lines, objects), for extension (usually in space but sometimes in time—for example, with espace de temps/period of time), for volume, and, finally, for atmosphere or outer space.

The temporal meanings of spatial notions and their shifts are also interesting. Space in the sense of duration can be found in French as early as the twelfth century. In German, the adjective geraum was initially used only for local determinations; from the fifteenth century onward, it was also used temporally and the local meaning was gradually suppressed, so that the adjective today really only makes sense in expressions such as seit geraumer Zeit (for some time). This development also partially reflects the history of the interrelatedness of space and time. In terms of a lifeworld, both dimensions appear to belong together, but we are able to think or to speak about this coexistence only with the help of compound forms: Zeitraum, espace de temps, space of time, chronotope.

The development of the German word Ort has a different, unique history independent of Latin. Old High German already adopted ort from Old Saxon ord, with
the meaning of point, corner, edge, end. In New High German, this edge position has been lost, but the meaning of being spatially pronounced or emphasized has remained. By contrast, the English site derives from the Latin situs (situation, position, place), while place (meaning both location and site or position) derives from platea (a wide path, road, open space, especially in the city). In most of the Romance languages, the word for place developed from the Latin locus (place, location, position, a specific part of a space; Italian: luogo; Spanish: lugar; French: lieu). Accordingly, locality is expressed as località, localidad, and localité; English also has the adjectival form of local in addition to placeness (for the locality of existence). As with the German word Ort, the Latin word locus (and its vernacular derivatives) indicates a specific, emphasized position in a space. The meaning can be both general and abstract, symbolic (as a sacred space, a space worthy of remembrance) or concrete. For this meaning, other words such as position or situation are also available. On an abstract-logical level, we also have the terms derived from the Greek τόπος κοινός: locus communis, lieu commun, lugar común, luogo commune. These denote the “places” for holding arguments defined in Aristotle’s theories of argumentation and also adopted by the Roman rhetoricians. By the eighteenth century at the latest, the German translation of these terms, Gemeinplatz (English: commonplace), acquired the meaning of common knowledge, a mnemonic, or even a trivial saying.

This cursory representation of the development of spatial terms in various European languages shows, first, that the roots of spatial notions in Romance languages almost always lie in Latin and thus indirectly in ancient Greek. By contrast, spatial notions in the Germanic languages tend to derive from common Germanic or Old Saxon roots. In German, it is almost exclusively foreign words, such as Territorium, that derive from Latin (with the exception of Platz, which comes from the Latin platea). (Lokalität is even a Latinized borrowing from the French localité.) In English, there tends to be more of a mix of Saxon or German words existing next to terms with Latin roots: place, space, surface, level, territory, etc. This synopsis of spatial notions in the various languages shows, second, that their respective fields of meaning do not always coincide. Only when one considers the usual contexts of usage and special semantic significance does it become possible to decide whether the German word Ort is best translated into English as site or place; whether Grenze should be border or boundary or frontier, or whether frontière or confin is a better fit in French. And third, we see that the term “space” (Raum, espace, espacio, spazio, etc.) possesses a very broad spectrum of meaning. The word can equally indicate a surface or a three-dimensional space, as well as a space that is not primarily physical (such a social space or economic space), which can then nonetheless have geographic anchor points. Especially with terms for spatial configurations or with spatial terms that can have both a territorial and a cultural (social, political, aesthetic, etc.) meaning, such as Land or Landschaft (land, country, landscape; on this point, see the study by the geographer Gerhard Hard from 1970), these kinds of comparative investigations into the history of concepts provide interesting insight into the spatial dimensions and functions ascribed to these terms in their respective contexts.
Those conceptions or subjective perceptions of spatial reality that lie hidden in the medium of language are also worth examining more closely, as they may already provide guidance or directions for how to act. This approach thus also shows that it is not the external world per se (that is, the world as described by geographers) that stimulates and guides our behavior (Hard 1970, 17).

Names of places function in the same way as names of persons: they assign a designation to the object of reference and thus also a possibility of being identified. As a rule, we seldom have the opportunity to originally name places or spaces. More often, we are confronted with names of streets, villages, cities, countries, and provinces that have already existed for a long time. Some names of places reveal something about their origin (the context of their founding or their position at a river crossing) and thus tell a bit about the history of a place (or at least the history that has been passed down by tradition and given credence). Yet even if the etymology of a place’s name is not clear, names remain laden with meaning. For they carry all of the meanings that were shaped by previous speech acts. And herein, exactly, lies the problem. The more ancient, normal, or beautiful a place name sounds, the more this suggests that places “naturally” exist or are given as real objects. In other words, toponymies open up a perspective that tends toward essentialism and is precisely not constructivist. Most names of places—with a few exceptions such as Budapest, which unites the names of two previously independent cities—suggest that a place represents an objectively given and unchangeable unity. The conception of space as a container is further strengthened by the fact that we often use the preposition “in” for local designations: something happens “in Hamburg,” “in Italy,” “in Europe,” or “in Asia.”

Since we can hardly escape everyday language, the social geographer Antje Schlottmann has suggested analyzing the homogenizations that accompany such language and the images of space hidden within it, as well as its argumentative strategies (Schlottmann 2005). And we ourselves can also pay more attention to the spaces we construct when we speak, thereby endeavoring to more carefully differentiate our use of language. The language of the discipline of history is generally permeated with these notions of space as a container. The same holds true for debates about globalization and—unfortunately, also frequently—for global history if it is not based on an interactionistic or network approach. Often, continents and areas or regions are spoken of as if they were given entities (on this point, see the critical approach of Epple 2012a). The criticism that curriculum at schools and universities contains too much European history also insinuates that historians of Europe treat Europe as a block in which no processes of exchange have occurred, either internally within Europe or beyond Europe’s borders (see Sachsenmaier 2009b, 2010, although this work also adopts some perspectives that deserve criticism, such as a notion of space that remains rooted in a continent). The debate that is already underway about “area studies vs. global history,” as well as the first attempts to productively bring together approaches from global history and the spatial turn, need to be engaged and advanced in an open debate (Middell 2005; Schäbler 2007; Middell and Naumann 2010).
Analytical concepts

What follows presents and explains several basic concepts for spatial analysis. In terms of meaning, the conception of an absolute space already existed in antiquity. We find it in Democritus and Aristotle. Einstein’s use of the word “container” for this conception of space articulates the idea that something exists in a container. But the idea already appears de facto in the reception of New Platonism in the Renaissance (for example, with Francesco Patrizi), where space was described as an unchanging receptaculum (container) of bodies (Beuttler 2009). It was Newton, however, who first definitively formulated this idea with his view of space as infinite, homogeneous, and existing independently from bodies. This concept of space was subsequently the foundation for classical mechanics, in which the first law of motion presupposes an absolute spatial system of reference. This implies the conception of a container. Despite Einstein’s polemics against the absolute understanding of space and time found in classical mechanics, the understanding of space as a container persists—for example, when a social system is described in terms of space. Formulations such as “the space of the city” or “the space of the economy” also presuppose this kind of homogeneous spatial system of reference. The use of this concept partially extends to politics: it can be used to support national immigration policies or to define the “space of Europe” and justify programs of study in history (Jureit and Tietze 2015).

Relational space must be differentiated from such an absolute concept of space—a distinction that Leibniz already emphasized in his arguments against Newton. Leibniz argued that space possessed no existence of its own but was rather defined by a system of positional relations between simultaneously existing material objects (ordo coexistendi). Leibniz was unable to prevail with this view while he was alive. And thus it was not until the development of a non-Euclidean geometry (Bernhard Riemann, Henri Poincaré) at the end of the nineteenth century that classical mechanics became less influential. Speaking of space as something relational also means assuming that space does not exist as such, as a container for bodies, but rather as a structure of relations (between places, things, or people). When the concept of relationality appears in sociological theories of space, it (usually) means something slightly different (see Löw 2001, 156, 166–167). It refers to the thesis that space and society mutually constitute each other, that is, that social cohabitation produces space and that spaces conversely influence the behavior of human beings. This thesis also rests on the idea that human beings are not located in a homogeneous social space but rather first produce and shape this space through their actions and speech. In this conception, human beings and things enter, as it were, into positional relationships; they construct relations and hence space. Occasionally, the concept of relational space refers to the relationship between a space on the one hand and a society on the other, the members of which act in a certain way in relation to a space. Yet this designation is more dualistic than relational, and it presupposes space as something physical or substantial that first exists independently from the thought and actions of human beings.
The concepts of relational and relative or relativistic space are often used as synonyms. But they can certainly be distinguished from one another. “Relative” means, first of all, that something can be spoken of or exists in one way or another only as dependent on something else, or in relation to this other thing. Relative space is thus conceived in opposition to absolute space because it presupposes no permanent, fixed system of reference. We are familiar with this conception from Leibniz, who saw space solely in terms of positional relations. The concept of relative or relativistic space is often associated with the name of Albert Einstein. With Einstein’s theory of relativity, physics finally turned away from absolute space: space is connected to a concept of space–time–matter, meaning space no longer exists independently of matter or its energy. Although both of Einstein’s theories of relativity center on questions of gravitation, speed, and the manner in which the universe operates, their principles were nevertheless quickly generalized, in spite of their initial rejection in the context of the National Socialist German climate and in criticism from scientists working in experimental physics. According to Einstein’s theory, indications of space and time are never generally valid but always depend upon observers and their standpoint. The relativity and perspectival nature of perception and interpretation (including of space and time) is, in some sense, the sociological vulgarization of Einstein’s highly complex theories of relativity; conversely, physics could learn from the social sciences and cultural studies that the social world is sometimes even more complex—that is, more contradictory—than can be described in natural laws.

As the name indicates, Euclidean space refers to the Greek mathematician Euclid (ca. 360–ca. 280 BCE), who created a theory of geometry, or rather compiled the knowledge of his time from this field. A central component of his theory is the so-called parallel postulate, his fifth postulate (learned in school to construct triangles, though perhaps not in connection with Euclid’s name). This postulate says that for every straight line g and for every point A not lying on g there is at most one straight line that runs through A and is parallel to g. Exactly this parallelism was later questioned during the nineteenth century (by mathematicians such as Carl Friedrich Gauss, János Bolyai, and Nikolai Lobachevsky). These mathematicians developed axiomatic systems in which Euclid’s fifth postulate was not valid (Pulte 2009). This is the case on the surface of spheres, in curved spaces, or in the universe, where gravitational fields can similarly curve space. These systems, which are internally consistent and do not refer to two-dimensional spaces, or planes, are called non-Euclidean geometries.

Why is this important for approaches in cultural studies? When non-Euclidean spaces or systems are invoked in this context, we are usually dealing with a figurative, metaphorical use of the concept. Indeed, scholars in cultural studies don’t investigate non-Euclidean spaces (except as part of a history of the physical surveying of land). This term is generally used to mean spaces that cannot be measured with a ruler, or for the description of which quantifiable or measurable values such as length, width, and angle play no part. This can mean networks, imagined spaces, spaces distorted in dreams, spatial experiences, spatial practices, or spatial constellations that are constantly in motion. Yet because this usage can
mean social spaces, the concept is also imprecise—nothing more than a collective term for everything in society that does not function according to Euclidean-mathematical laws. (And what doesn’t belong to this?)

Some theories in the social sciences and cultural studies distinguish between places and spaces. In many contexts, this is quite useful. Everyday language also tends to associate the term “place” with a village or a city, especially when this indicates a position or site that can be exactly localized. By contrast, spaces are usually of a larger scale, more extended, and depend less upon an exact determination of location. If this distinction is to be made fruitful for scholarly investigations, we ourselves need to specify how these terms are to be used or indicate the theory to which we are referring, since theoreticians have not uniformly defined this conceptual pair. I note here just three examples that I will engage in more detail in my presentation of methods: the place/space distinctions found in the work of Yi-Fu Tuan, Michel de Certeau, and Martina Löw.

The Chinese-American geographer Tuan distinguishes between space and place. Space requires a movement from one place to another. Place, by contrast, requires a space in order to be a place. The two concepts are thus complementary, and both are often necessary in order to adequately describe situations (Tuan 1977). For the cultural philosopher, historian, and Jesuit Certeau, the relationship is somewhat different. For Certeau, place (lieu) is an order among elements that stand in a relationship of coexistence. This is a situation of being located “beside one another” (Certeau 1990, vol. 1: 117). He sees space (espace), by contrast, as the result of activities or as a place where one does something (Certeau 1990, vol. 1: 173). And in Löw’s sociology of space, space is the result of a process of constitution in which human beings or goods are first placed into an arrangement in order to then be synthesized together through a process of intuition or remembering. Place, by contrast, is for Löw the place of spatiality, meaning the place where a space is constituted—although multiple spaces can also exist at one place, for example, through the presence of multiple groups that use a place in different ways (Löw 2005). This brief representation already makes it easy to see that the conceptual pair can be understood differently—which is yet one more reason to specify the source of one’s inspiration for any distinction being used in research. This distinction also fundamentally helps us distance ourselves from a naive understanding of space that views spaces as frameworks or backgrounds.

In order to also consider scale when differentiating spaces as products of social processes of construction, the urban and regional economist Dieter Läpple has proposed the typology of micro, meso, and macro (Läpple 1991, 43–44). In this typology, microspace is defined as being connected to the corporeality of the human being. This applies, above all, to the space in which one lives or works or to spaces of sociability (the gym, theater, bar, apartment). Mesospace arises from the area that an individual does not walk through daily, but which is nevertheless constituted by the horizon of everyday relationships of life and work. Generally, this applies to a city or a region (on the concept of region, see also Paasi 1986 and Frémont 1999). Macrospace, by contrast, can no longer be experienced by the body or the senses but only as an abstract magnitude. This concept can include

### Typology of Social Spaces:

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the nation-state of which a person is a citizen, or the worldwide capitalist system created through the network of the globalized division of labor. These spatial types can build upon each other hierarchically. Even more important, the three levels can be more or less pronounced depending on the person and context, and they can be intermeshed. Especially in analyzing cities as social mesospaces, the potential simultaneity of the three levels must be given due consideration (see Konau 1977, 219). In a society that is networked together through communication and information technology (Manuel Castells), cities are connected with each other in many different ways, meaning not only through personal relationships or subjective practices. Many places in a city are thus situated in translocal and transregional entanglements. At the same time, this does not mean that every place dissolves into transregional or global space: for even if a place is part of this larger space, a local specificity can form that is expressed in special relations of class or power (see Sassen 1999, 2002).

With another definition of space—as an organizational form of existing beside one another that makes visible synchronicity or simultaneity—we reach a point where we must ask what history we are actually writing when we continue to ignore aspects such as succession, sequentiality, and diachronicity. It would of course be worth attempting to write a history in a purely locative mode, as a kind of experiment. But as long as we human beings experience time as passing and spaces as changing, this would hardly make sense. We should thus continue to combine spatial and temporal aspects. It is not at all easy to formulate a theoretical basis for the precise relation of spatiality and temporality, as I will show later; from an anthropological point of view, however, it makes a lot of sense to consider these two aspects together. Yet in order to do justice to this (anthropological) indivisibility of spatiality and temporality, in what follows I will speak of temporality as a dimension of spatiality.

Space, namely, cannot be understood at all in its complexity if we do not include the factor of time and multiple temporalities. This interrelatedness of spatiality and temporality can be founded both theoretically and practically, in relation to our everyday lives, since we would not even be able to think or live in just one category or the other. Whoever wanted to remain standing at just one place, to neither move nor develop further? The same goes for the historical subjects and the spatial phenomena that we are examining. Hence if we take interest in a comprehensive, human sense in historical subjects and their environment, there is no way we can avoid considering both dimensions. If the intention is to capture subjects in their complex relations to their environment—and not, in other words, only through their spatial relation to their surroundings—everything suggests that we should designate our considerations as historical-anthropological. The second reason for choosing this designation of historical-anthropological is that these relationships are precisely not anthropologically constant but change over time, diachronically, and these changes are in no way simply linear. This perspective thus differs from many historical-geographic approaches to the extent that, in these approaches, time appears to stand still, or because changes are represented as linearly homogeneous (for example, in a scheme of before–after).
Historical and systematic approach

seen, for instance, in topographic maps of cities. A third reason is that historicity also means considering the potential otherness of spatial constructs and constellations in different cultures or contexts. But this does not yet suffice to ground the thesis that spatiality and temporality are inseparable.

The reason for why both aspects are seldom skillfully combined is to be found on a theoretical level that we need to briefly consider. What, exactly, is the nature of the relationship between time and space? Are they opposites? Do they form a dichotomy? Are they symmetrical? Most aspects of this relationship (synchronicity, diachronicity, sequentiality, simultaneity) present us with oppositions. A further difference is that time appears to be characterized by irreversibility, whereas in space, by contrast, a reversal is possible. If we travel from point A to B, we can retrace our path, at least geographically. But after time has passed, we can never return to the point of departure, meaning we cannot turn back the clock. The analytical tension between these two poles easily hides the fact that, in their practical relevance, the two phenomena—spatiality and temporality—form neither a purely oppositional nor a complementary relationship. Jacques Lévy described this as “fausse symétrie” (false symmetry) (Lévy 1998; see also Buléon 2002).

For the social sciences and cultural studies, this results in the following program: we should examine spatial phenomena in their temporal variety and the course of their development. This is what we will call the temporality of space. The opposite cannot be easily articulated, precisely because we are not dealing with a symmetrical relationship. What we can investigate, however, is the spatialization of social processes. This takes diverse forms of expression: it is manifest in the city halls that burghers constructed throughout the late Middle Ages to symbolize their newly won governing rights and create a place where they could hold councils and make decisions (Albrecht 2010), and equally so in the tennis courts that were constructed in the context of a developing urban leisure culture (Schattner 2014). It is manifest in the social topography of cities, which has often resulted from processes of social distinction and hierarchization but also continues to change. (To achieve an appropriate visualization, we would need to further develop techniques for producing chronotope maps, meaning maps that are capable of representing spatial ensembles as they change across time, or as differentiated according to cyclical periods of activity or inactivity.) The spatialization of social processes is manifest in spatial relations of center and periphery and their implications of inequality (Rau 2013; Rau and Schönherr 2014) and in short-term, even ephemeral usages of spaces; it is furthermore visible in processes of subjectification that are revealed in the creation of certain public or private spaces or in corporeal (i.e., also spatial) practices. Each of these cases represents processes of spatialization that take time, possibly very different lengths of time.

Despite their “false symmetry,” spatial and temporal aspects of society remain interrelated. Every spatial constellation that is created or thought by human beings takes place at a given time, has a rhythm, a specificity, and hence also a historicity of its own. For spaces are not just thought once. They develop, emerge, expand, shift position, diversify, shrink, or again disappear. All of these are movements that cannot be explained without the factor of time. More complex processes can
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be examined—in the case of markets, for example, the outsourcing of branches of production that have been created across great distances through technological progress, changed possibilities of communication, and the development of the ability to transfer capital. It is the recognition that we are dealing with multiple (functional) rhythms, with different spatial dimensions, and (usually) with multipolar networks that makes it possible for us to adequately examine the social formation of the market.

We probably need analytical instruments that are much more highly differentiated to examine such complex systems from a spatial and temporal perspective. But the appeal of conducting historical analyses of space should come precisely from analyzing these kinds of complex social formations. And it is easy to see that simple, methodologically one-sided, monodisciplinary procedures of analysis are inadequate for this purpose. For as we know from the anthropologist and theorician of science Edgar Morin, correctly understanding complex systems requires complex, multistage methods (Morin 1992).

We need not start at zero as we invent such methodological instruments, since various nonhistorical disciplines have already produced interesting approaches to this problem upon which we can build. For geography, we have the Swede Torsten Hägerstrand (1916–2004), who developed a time-geography beginning in the early 1970s. Through the translation of Hägerstrand’s works into English, his approach has become internationally known and has been adopted by no less a scholar than the sociologist Anthony Giddens, who incorporated it into his structuration theory. On the one hand, Hägerstrand intensively engaged with large-scale geographies. And on the other, he examined movements of people in what he called action spaces, defined as the set of spatial opportunities and limitations of action available to an individual (Hägerstrand 1970). As a geographer, he wanted to examine all spatial and temporal levels that play a role in the life of an individual—from living quarters to the globe, from a single day to the span of a lifetime. Further considerations about the interrelationship of spatiality and temporality (“timing space and spacing time”) can be found in the work of Tommy Carlstein, Don Parkes, and Nigel Thrift (1978). These authors examine the temporalization of space from the following perspectives:

a. limitation of use
b. specification of duration
c. elasticity of activities.

They understand the spatialization of time, by contrast, as the “patterning of time” by individuals who are in turn dependent on the distribution of spatial opportunities (Carlstein, Parkes, and Thrift 1978, 3; see also Thrift 1977; May and Thrift 2001; on space-time structures see also Henckel 2005; for a historical cultural studies perspective, see Meyer, Rau, and Waldner 2017).

A brief review of the terms introduced in this chapter shows that most of the suggested analytical concepts (absolute, relative, Euclidean, etc.) come from the natural sciences and were then adopted and adapted, more or less convincingly,
by the social sciences and cultural studies. In order to get out of this—not exclusive, but partial—position of secondary utilization, the social sciences and cultural studies need to work to expand their tools for spatial analysis. Becoming aware of work in our respectively neighboring disciplines is a first step in this direction. Discovering and coining further analytical concepts as required for knowledge would be a second necessary step.

Notes

1 For Aristotle, the most general qualities of objects or people (for example, substance, quantity, or quality), limited in number to a total of ten.
2 For a comprehensive bibliography of research about Leibniz (comprising more than 30,000 titles), see http://www.leibniz-bibliographie.de (accessed May 12, 2017).
3 Immanuel Kant fundamentally defined transcendental philosophy in his Critique of Pure Reason. This work examined the conditions of possibility of cognition insofar as these constitute a priori structures of consciousness, meaning that they are given before any experience (in a transcendental, not temporal, sense).
4 Although Großraum literally means a large space and is often used in urban contexts to denote a greater area, Schmitt uses the term in a figurative sense to signify what the translator of Nomos der Erde glosses as a “large spatial sphere” (Schmitt 1988; translation Ulmen 2006, 55).
5 The term comes from ancient Greek and means something like law, commandment, or order of norms. Carl Schmitt introduced it into modern legal theory in 1934. In so doing, he emphasized thoughts or acts that establish order in contrast to norms. Nomos fulfilled the connection that Schmitt sought between law and space; Schmitt saw the concept as a process of spatial division that constituted the legal order between European states.
2 Disciplinary approaches

Space is both an object and category of analysis for many disciplines. And within these disciplines, there are discussions about the terms being used that open up methodological pathways. That makes it even more important to indicate the origin of the scholarly concepts we use when we speak or write about space. Many disciplines have announced a spatial turn, although the pragmatic effects this has had on research practices have not always been the same. The interdisciplinary nature of this research is evinced by conferences and edited volumes (Warf and Arias 2009; Döring and Thielmann 2009; Günzel 2009; Baumgärtner, Klumbies, and Sick 2009; Rau 2010c; Tiller and Mayer 2011; Friedrich 2015; Kaupp 2016); and the fact that historical research into space cannot proceed except through interdisciplinary methods is founded in this field’s object: research into historical societies, which possess a complexity that needs to be adequately addressed. The following considerations are concerned with a selection of approaches from geography, cultural anthropology, and sociology that appear particularly worthwhile for historical investigations or that have already been taken up by scholars. I am not offering, in other words, a history of disciplinary spatial concepts but an account of their history in relation to how they are used. The choice of which approach or approaches we might choose depends on the concrete questions we want to ask and what we want to know.

2.1 Geography

Discussions about spatial semantics and concepts have been taking place in geography, a discipline that was established at universities around 150 years ago, for a long time. The widespread impression that geography is not a theoretically oriented science depends in part on the view of geography and cartography communicated in schools; by contrast, the impression that geography is not compatible with historical-anthropological questions comes mainly from the fact that geography departments at universities are often not situated in faculties of humanities, cultural studies, or the social sciences but rather in faculties of natural sciences, where there is increasingly an expectation of research with practical applications.

My intention here is to push back against the impression that geography and history cannot communicate with each other (for an apt treatment of this idea, see DOI: 10.4324/9780429056383-3
Baker 2003). Since my introduction has already focused on concepts from traditional geography centered on the surface of the earth, in what follows I will focus more on concepts inspired by social or human geography.

The Chinese-American geographer Yi-Fu Tuan (born 1930) has taken a particularly special form of attention toward the spatial dimensions of human existence as the object of his research. To describe the “affective bond between people and place or setting” (Tuan 1974, 4), Tuan coined an expression that means “love of place”: topophilia. This allows him to express an idea that was already central to the new forms of phenomenology preceding him, and that similarly interested the philosopher Gaston Bachelard in his *Poetics of Space*: using what Tuan called “topoanalysis” to examine the “affect,” meaning the preferences, of human beings for their places. In a chapter about the house, in which Tuan sees a large part of our memories being located, he writes:

> Topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives. In the theater of the past that is constituted by memory, the stage setting maintains the characters in their dominant rôles. At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being’s stability—a being who does not want to melt away and who, even in the past, when he sets out in search of things past, wants time to ‘suspend’ its flight. In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for.

(Bachelard 2004, 27; translation Jolas 1994, 8)

Tuan completed his entire education in England and the United States. He published his first book *Topophilia* in 1974 as a professor of human geography at the University of Minnesota, where he began working in 1968. As the combination of the ancient Greek words for place (tópos) and friendship/love/inclination (philia) might suggest, the book is concerned with the relationship of human beings to their physical environment (Tuan 1974). These relationships are diverse. Tuan includes bodies, senses, and emotions, and he examines the perceptions and values attributed to spatial environments (city, landscape, wilderness) from the perspective of three levels: the human species, groups, and individuals. He begins by assuming, similar to Martin Heidegger, that the relation of human beings to places is a fundamental characteristic of human existence. In a second step, he then turns to examining the perceptions, values, and emotions that groups or individuals connect with places, both geographically and emotionally. In the discipline of geography, this approach is also called ecological. Over the following years, Tuan took up space and place in essays and books. In his view, space requires a movement from one place to another. Place, by contrast, requires a space in order to be a place. The two concepts are thus interdependent—one of many distinctions that have been made between space and place.

The *Love of Place* would be an ideal title to establish the beginning of a spatial turn—equally indicating both the object of study and the program of investigation. A closer look, however, reveals that Tuan’s concept of space is
quite physical. He may be interested in emotional attachments and values, but the point of reference is the—natural or human-created—environment comprised of the physical surface of the earth. Newer approaches, including those in geography, also take additional, entirely different spaces and spatialities into account; above all, these approaches consider what they call the environment to also be capable of undergoing transformation. Yet those for whom Tuan proved influential also included the “critical geographer” Harvey (who is the subject of what follows), especially in his view that different societies produce qualitatively different concepts of space and time. If we also consider how spaces can transform, we can use Bachelard’s or Tuan’s concept of topophilia to analyze historical societies. The greatest difficulty surely lies in finding sources that provide information about the “affective attachments” individuals or groups have to places.

David Harvey, who taught for most of his life in Baltimore, belongs to a group of human geographers who have integrated their engagement with space into a social theory—and occasionally even into a social critique. As with Lefebvre, spaces for Harvey are the result of social struggles. The questions that have concerned Harvey since at least 1969 are the influence of capital on urban or rural spaces and the emergence of social inequality. For this reason, his interests early on included studies on the emergence and development of the capitalist market for land in Baltimore, which he at first framed in terms of classical spatial economic theory only to shift quickly to Marxist theory. His extensive work includes a series of essays and especially one book that is important for us.

In *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1989), Harvey describes the production of capitalist spatialities since the Renaissance. His fundamental assumption is that spatialities and temporalities depend, first, on their respective cultural contexts and, second, on an interrelation between money, time, and space as elements of a modern constellation of power. Within this intellectual framework, he describes the gradual “compression” of space and time in multiple phases from the Renaissance (voyages of discovery, geometrization, total aesthetic perception of the world) to the so-called postmodern age, which is characterized by an extremely high mobility of labor and capital. Developments in travel and communication technology (railway, airplane, telecommunications, Internet) made it possible, so Harvey argues, to more quickly overcome distances, thus generating a feeling of compression and acceleration. Harvey additionally operates with three concepts of space that he adopted from physics and applies to social practice: absolute, relative, and relational space. This is a distinction he had already developed in *Social Justice and the City* (2009, originally 1973; see also Harvey 2006, 117–148, especially 143, fig. 2).

Because of Harvey’s own historical interest, bridging the gap to the discipline of history is relatively easy, even if some of his hypotheses provoke objections. For example, it is easy to criticize the history of space that he tells as being Eurocentric. He might even accept this criticism, since he is primarily interested in the means through which Europeans’ spatial relationalities (such as occupying,
surveying, ordering) were generalized. But that does not relieve us of the necessity of examining the particular spatial rationalities and practices of those peoples that the Europeans encountered. Another problem is that Harvey’s acceleration thesis is closely connected to a linear development. The consequences—not only for Harvey—have included hypostatizations such as the “disappearance of space” (for example in the work of Paul Virilio, the French philosopher and theorist of speed). But spaces do not disappear (certain places only move together more tightly from a subjective point of view, or can be physically reached more quickly), and we do not gain more time or free time as a consequence of acceleration (rather, we become more mobile or more often travel greater distances). We would thus need to examine the concrete implications of acceleration for the different regions of the world at different moments in time.

The counter term to “time–space compression,” and thus also the opposing position to the acceleration thesis, is the “spatial fix.” For Harvey, this means the inertial force generated by space that has become a material object (for example, real estate) (Harvey 2001, 284–311). Harvey argues that productions of space—especially in capitalism, the main object of his investigations—are always characterized by a tension between fixation and movement. *Spaces of Capital*, a collection of essays from a period of around thirty years, focuses on the laws of the production of space in capitalism and exemplifies Harvey’s efforts to view geography as socially critical, rather than positivistic, science (Harvey 2001). In addition to analyzing the production of specific spatialities and temporalities, Harvey was also concerned with developing a critique of spatial concepts found in older forms of geography, and with the question of the potential that geography holds for analyzing the production and experience of space and time within societies.

In his reply to the question of what time is, we find a pragmatic turn that demands unconditional agreement—including from historians: “The problem of the proper conceptualization of space is resolved through human practice with respect to it. In other words, there are no philosophical answers to philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space—the answers lie in human practice. The question ‘what is space?’ is therefore replaced by the question ‘how is it that different human practices create and make use of distinctive conceptualizations of space?’” (Harvey 2009, 13–14).

Derek Gregory, a geographer who teaches at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, has taken up and discussed Harvey’s approach in his book *Geographical Imaginations* (1996). In this book, Gregory again reengages with the approach of Henri Lefebvre. Whereas Lefebvre had called for a total mapping of changes in the globalized world, Harvey focused his work on Europe. And while Lefebvre did not directly refer the representation of space to the forms in which it is reproduced, this is exactly what Harvey did. Gregory criticizes this incautious, hasty connection in Harvey’s work, as well as Harvey’s strong emphasis on the logic of capital (compared to the class positions of agents) and his tendency toward a reductionist Marxism, particularly given the fact that Marx himself
developed no distinct concept of space. But the intersection of power, gender, and sexuality, as developed by the British geographer Doreen Massey with recourse to Lefebvre and Ernesto Laclau, plays no prominent role in Gregory’s work. In developing his understanding of geographic imagination—a concept that both proponents of landscape geography in the 1960s and Harvey in *Social Justice* had employed (Harvey 2009 [1973])—Gregory then also went further than Harvey to include postcolonial theories, especially the works of the literary scholar Edward Said. Said, of course, also worked on imagined geographies of the Other (the Orient) and argued that geographic images of the world are capable of grounding hegemonic world views and shaping space (Said 1978). Gregory combines a postcolonial approach with studies from recent critical cartography (on this point, see Glasze 2009) that have critically unmasked the rhetoric of exactness claimed by maps and atlases, as well as the techniques of power inherent in cartographic representations of space. In the context of his ongoing work on political violence and geographies of violence, Gregory has proposed a tentative definition of geography that can be understood as being aimed not only at social scientists but also at historians. “But one possible definition of the contemporary discipline is: 

*(The study of) the ways in which space is involved in the operation and outcome of social and biophysical processes.*”

Edward Soja (1940–2015), who was professor for urban planning at the University of California (UCLA), was one of the most internationally well-known geographers among those who see themselves as instigators of a new attention to space and spatiality. Like Harvey and Gregory, Soja intensively grappled with the works of Lefebvre. Similarly prominent in his work are Michel Foucault (above all, Foucault’s concept of heterotopia) and the postcolonial theories of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Edward Said, and Homi Bhabha.

Soja’s book *Postmodern Geographies* (Soja 1989) is less a theory of space and more an essay on the history of how social theory has been despatialized, and how geography and its primary object, space, have been neglected, followed by a gradual reevaluation of space. He sees the new “reassertion” of space in the social sciences to be embedded in three different but convergent processes of “spatialization” that have occurred since the economic crisis of the 1930s: a post-historical process, a post-Fordist process, and a postmodern process. But his book also expresses a desire, or rather a plea, for the continuation and intensification of the liaison between space and social theory, which was still new at the time he was writing. Hence following the “Marxification” of geography (for example, in Harvey), he wants to bring about the postmodernization of Marxist geography. As a concrete example for a postmodern geography, he names the metropolitan region of Los Angeles, which he considers to be a city without a history despite its recent recentralization—a city whose land is largely owned by foreigners, which has become one of the largest economic centers of the world, and through which great flows of money pass. For him, Los Angeles is virtually the prototype of a postmodern geography. Like Lefebvre, Soja thinks beyond the concrete urban situation: urbanization is always a metaphor for a certain spatialization of the modern period and the increasingly strategic planning of daily life. Capitalism is
reflected in a specific spatial formation that also reproduces the relations of production and thus also keeps capitalism alive.

Building on the Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson, Soja defines postmodernism as both a cultural ideology and a historical (and thus socio-economic) reality. In postmodernity, Soja argues, a new culture of space and time develops; sciences are connected in a new way; and it becomes possible to reflect on political action. Soja seeks here to attribute a leading function to geography, especially to critical human geography. He orients his theories toward Lefebvre, but also toward Foucault’s heterotopias and assumption that space, knowledge, and power are linked, in urging that we lift the spatial veil that historical spatialities have laid over structures of power. Soja’s aim in connection with spatial analyses of power is to examine the origins, transformations, and influences of social oppression (meaning oppression based in class, gender, race, or sexuality), which he sees in all areas of social life, and to find suitable measures to eliminate forms of oppression and geographically unequal development (Soja 1996).

In no way does he understand *thirdspace*—at once the title and program of his book—to be an objective space. Rather, he understands it to mean another spatiality or a concept for another way of thinking about space. His first intention is to overcome bipolar concepts, such as historicity/sociability or reality/representation and produce an epistemological openness. In relation to spatial analysis, he also intends the term *thirdspace* as an appeal for us to recognize the constant shift of meanings, appearances, and contexts of ideas that constitute our understanding of spatiality. With *thirdspace* or a trialectic of spatiality it should become possible, he argues, to recognize that many spaces are real and imagined at the same time and, even more, could exist in yet a third way. Thirdspace is accordingly a hybrid spatiality (cf. Bhabha 2004) that can manifest in symbolizations or institutionalized forms of practices. An example: Los Angeles is a real city in which houses exist and people work and live and go about other everyday activities; but at the same time, LA is an idea, a place constructed through film, literature, stories, and images. This diversity of spaces, which change their appearance depending on the observer and point in time, shows the radical heterogeneity of space—which would be worth seeking out and examining in other types of space.

In the German-speaking world, the Swiss social geographer Benno Werlen, who teaches at the University of Jena, has made fundamental contributions to debates about space and to a critical renewal of geography. Werlen sees the turning away from traditional geography, which conceived of space mainly as the surface of the earth, as the consequence of multiple currents in the second half of the twentieth century: the radical geography that took recourse to Lefebvre in introducing the dimension of space into Marxist social theory; humanist geography, which he sees as responsible for ensuring that geography includes a subjective perspective of perceiving and experiencing the world; and, finally, social geography, the core interest of which lies in the relationship between society and space, and in whose tradition he places himself (Werlen 2009, 144–146).
The practice-oriented social geography of Gregory, Nigel Thrift, and Anssi Paasi is chiefly concerned with questions of how regions are formed (Thrift 1983; Paasi 1986). This work understands society as a whole through the institutionalization of regions that it considers to be dynamic and dependent on the actions of the people inhabiting them. Building on this work, Werlen coined the term “everyday regionalization” (Werlen 1995–1997). He understands regionalizations to be the results of thinking and acting subjects. His research accordingly focuses on analyzing these processes and the resulting geographies—the everyday geographies, as it were—that are thought and lived by these subjects. His analysis of these geographic practices is guided by Giddens’s analysis of structuration, that is, Werlen equally considers the political-normative field, the specific ties to the world in economic and cultural areas (knowledge, communication), and their—respectively contingent—forms of accessibility. Practices of producing ties to the world, which can reach the global level, thus encompass demarcations and territorializations of the earth’s surface as well as performative acts constituting everyday geographies and the formation of images of the world (Werlen 1997; 2009, 153). The expression Werlen uses for these practices—“geography making”—comes from older work in German social geography, whence Giddens also adapted the idea for his own social theory (Giddens 1984, 110–144, 355–368; Werlen 2010, vol. 1: 103).

Werlen recently formulated the following theses as research perspectives: (1) Research into space cannot be conducted from a social theoretical perspective alone. A turn toward geographic practice is necessary. (2) Social sciences and cultural studies should not simply take up traditional concepts from the geography of the early twentieth century. (3) The surface of the earth should not be viewed as a pretheoretical construct; rather, spatial conceptions must be developed for its analysis that are compatible with social theory (Werlen 2009, 151–152).

In focusing on Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault, my intention is to introduce two French geographers who tend to be less often situated within the mainstream of French geography. Yet they attach great importance to an epistemology of geography and to interdisciplinary approaches for analyzing space. What makes them equally interesting for us is that they both understand geography as a social science that attempts to comprehend space as social space. Moreover, both have critically engaged with the history of geography and with spatial theory (Lévy and Lussault 2000; Lussault 2007), not least of all in a very useful lexicon of geography and social space containing articles that are in some instances highly programmatic (Lévy and Lussault 2003).

Lévy, currently professor for geography and urban planning at the École polytechnique fédérale in Lausanne (EPFL), focuses his work on the areas of geopolitics, the microgeography of public spaces, urbanity in the world’s cities, Europe as a space, and globalization. He has additionally devoted his research to cartography, which he aims to renew through the use of largely forgotten historical techniques of representation (for example, from early American indigenous cartography) or with examples from contemporary art (Lévy 2015). Among other things, Lévy is responsible for coining the term *tournant géographique*
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In his book of the same name, he develops an epistemology of the discipline and a vision of its location within the social sciences. This is bound up with a rejection of geography in the tradition of Vidal and the simplifications that Lévy believes characterize geography as it is taught in schools. He replaces a somewhat amorphous unity of “nature and the human being/society” with a dialectic or dialogue between agents and systems. For him, the dialectic of space/spatiality is a central component of the complex social world—and spatial analysis is a key for deciphering it. We can confidently count Lévy among the key thinkers of space in geography, and as a scholar who strives to mediate between approaches in cultural studies and social sciences, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other.

Arguing more from the perspective of an urban geographer, Lussault’s book *L’homme spatial* captures several important basic features of a modern theory of space (Lussault 2007). The vision of his theory is not at all limited to geography in a narrow sense but draws inspiration from the neighboring disciplines of political science, philosophy, and anthropology, and repeatedly from Lévy. Lussault adds a fourth dimension to Lévy’s triad “level–scale–substance”: the category of configuration, which Lussault understands as a connection between spatial objects. Lussault distinguishes place (*lieu*), area (*aire*), and network (*réseau*) as types of space; he further explains how landscapes are made (*faire paysage*) and finally determines the transition from space (*espace*) to spatiality (*spatialité*). Beyond these topics, hybrid spaces and spatial imagery are important for his work. For him, space is both an ideal and material resource for agents, as he explains in part two of his book. In the third part of the book, he returns to the city and urbanity, especially to the problems of the city today. Here, he develops a grammar of urban spaces while also strongly making a case that we look toward the horizon of “urbanity” (and not the type of the premodern European city). As a geographer who is very familiar with the decision-making processes of politicians and urban planners, Lussault advocates for a pragmatic form of urban planning devoted to concrete projects for which the exact circumstances are known. Otherwise, he argues, these projects are doomed to fail.

2.2 Cultural anthropology, postcolonial studies

Anthropology’s contributions to spatial analysis can only be delineated here with difficulty, since—as the preceding chapters have made clear—geographers have also integrated anthropological aspects into their approaches. The same holds for the discipline of history in the form of historical anthropology and, partially, for sociology dedicated to the analysis of microsocieties. Moreover, approaches will be mentioned in this chapter that do not come primarily from the field of anthropology (Said, Foucault) but which nevertheless have been and still are of central importance for the anthropological discussion and theory of spatiality.

That the authors and approaches I present in the following all come from the non-German-speaking world has to do, in part, with the fact that a biological-medical orientation is still dominant in German anthropology and that the cultural-social
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orientation has not been able to firmly establish itself within this set of disciplines. Germany in the 1920s saw the emergence of philosophical anthropology with the works of Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and others, and a philosophical cultural anthropology with Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. Approaches characteristic of cultural studies and (historical) anthropology are most readily found within European ethology (Volkskunde) (see Rolshoven 2003). A reader published in English (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2006) opens up one entry point to anthropological studies on place and space, as does the journal Cultural Anthropology.

In the early 1990s, some anthropologists could still lament that the spatial aspect had been too little theorized in anthropology. They argued that big concepts such as culture, society, community, or nation rested upon implicit spatial assumptions—for instance, the possibility that these things could be located. This also meant that culture, identity, and space (whether of a village, region, or state) were tacitly regarded as congruent. Intending to challenge proponents of this view, two anthropologists—Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson—conceived an issue of the journal Cultural Anthropology (no. 7, 1992). What they considered to be pressing issues in need of a response were, on the one hand, phenomena such as mass migration and multiculturality and, on the other, theoretical problems of thinking space as a container. Such thinking arises, they argued, from ethnographic mapping or from such assumptions as, for instance, that Indian culture can only exist in India. The older anthropology still adhered to such presuppositions; only through what were, at the time, entirely new considerations of cultural hybridity and interstitiality (the concept of “in-between spaces”) was it possible to dispel this way of thinking. The appeal “beyond culture” is shorthand for Gupta’s formulation of “beyond culture as a spatially localized phenomenon” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 18). The appeal is thus directed at the search for alternative concepts and topics that cannot be referred to fixed topographic sites, for instance, borderlands, mass media, or public culture.

Less well known in the discipline of history, yet noteworthy because it represents an alternative to a geographically oriented “cultural space,” is work from Russian semiotics, in particular, that of Yuri M. Lotman (1922–1993). In an earlier period of his work, Lotman focused on the spatial organization of narrative texts (Lotman 1977). With the concept of the “artistic space,” he also directed his attention to spatial patterns of nonspatial representations. In a later period, he developed the concept of the “semiosphere”—a set of signs circumscribed, including spatially, by “borders,” the “center,” and the “periphery” encompassing the entirety of all simultaneously given users of signs, texts, and codes of a culture. According to Lotman, the unity of culture thus lies in its semiotic unity (Lotman 1990).

In sociological debates on the theory of modernization and globalization, the spatial dimension plays a role, if at all, in moments when processes of despatialization or of the dissolution of traditional spatial entities (such as the nation-state) are thematized. Only a few scholars—for instance, Ulrich Beck and Arjun Appadurai—have pointed out that globalization also produces novel
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locations and spatialities. A social and cultural anthropologist, Appadurai was raised in India but came to the United States for his university education. His work has focused on the production of exactly these novel translocal spaces in the epoch of late-capitalist, postnational societies (Appadurai 1995; 2008, Chapter 9). His observation of the production of new kinds of spatialities in a globalized world is part of his argument about the disjunctive “scapes” (ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, etc.) of cultural globalization (on his research, see www.arjunappadurai.org). This thesis essentially states that globalization not only leads to homogenization but also that many areas are rather separate (disjunct) and dependent upon particular points of view (hence the suffix -scape).

This assumption enabled Appadurai to observe the disintegration of the principles of territoruality and state sovereignty. Migration, transnational labor markets, and transformed social relations in a globalized world not only threaten the ethnic coherency of nation-states but also give rise to new, transnational orders and translocal communities. A locality—in whatever form—is for Appadurai a “dimension of social life,” constructed by subjects and structuring the emotions of individuals, as well as a lived “copresence” (Appadurai 2006, 338; 2008, 189). In his book he writes: “I view locality as primarily relational and contextual rather than as scalar or spatial. I see it as a complex phenomenological quality, constituted by a series of links between the sense of social immediacy, the technologies of interactivity, and the relativity of contexts” (Appadurai 2008, 178). He is particularly interested in the gaps that open between the concept of locality and the social formation of the neighborhood in today’s world.

Appadurai’s call for anthropology to develop concepts to describe phenomena such as multilocality, multivocality, and translocality (see also Rodman 1992), as well as his argument that locality is a fragile social achievement, are fully justifiable in the context of postnational societies. Yet restricting locality to this late epoch—and defining translocality as a locality that is no longer bound to the nation—is not at all necessary. Prior to the formation of territorial states in the early modern period, communities certainly also existed that were oriented toward neither the nation nor territorial borders. And the claim that translocal religious communities are something new to high modernism completely fails to recognize, for example, the Calvinist International or the existence of transatlantic Protestant networks of communication in the eighteenth century, not to mention the history of the Jewish diaspora.

Appadurai is not the only scholar who has deployed the concept of locality. The British geographer Doreen Massey did so in her theoretical work on space/place, and in her work on the geopolitics of power, thereby promoting a new interest in localities within British geography. She sees locality arising in situations of social interaction for which she believes a “strong sense of place” to be manifest, and that can also have a global component (Massey 1991). The relation to place is much stronger here than it is with Appadurai, who is more focused on the production of locality under conditions of modernity. Although Appadurai in this way conducts a diagnosis of the present, his approach is radically historical insofar as he is concerned with concrete spatiotemporal conditions and contexts.
for the production of locality. This makes his approach useful for historians after all. Cities (or particular locations within a city) or border regions, for instance, can be examined as translocal spaces.

The “Third Space” of the literary scholar and postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha is no geographically localizable site—or it can be localized, at most, only in a supplemental fashion. Bhabha’s notion of a “Third Space” (as he writes the term) has to be situated in the context of discussions about cultural identity. Bhabha’s analyses and examples are almost always taken from literature, although the “Third Space” is meant as thoroughly real. This space is above all a political concept or goal, and thus the vision for a project of postcolonial countermodernity. Coupled with the concept of the “Third Space” is the concept of hybridity. The “third” that arises out of the encounter between two positions should be something new—in the best scenario, an intermediary space, a free space of thought or action (Bhabha 2004; for a convincing and compact explanation of the concept, see Castro Varela, Dhawan, and Randeria 2010, 184–186). The process of hybridization can perhaps best be understood if it is placed in analogy to processes of argumentation in which the result of the encounter is not the one or the other starting point, but in which new insights or at least a modus vivendi result from the argument. “Third Spaces” arise, according to Bhabha, in situations of ambivalence and transgression; they are particularly productive when a rigid cultural difference is challenged and negotiations at the borders of cultural identity are enabled. This is then the “location” at which it becomes possible to talk about historical time and to remember the effects of colonial powers (as well as resistance to them).

Bhabha focuses on the borderlines of cultures because in his view it is from their perspective—that is, from the margins—that we can think about culture. And Bhabha connects “margins,” as well, with another concept that is once again not a location but a standpoint from which writing ought to originate. Even if it is meant metaphorically, the “location of culture” is, from a postcolonial view, tantamount to defining cultures from the perspective of their borders. Confrontations over cultural identity take place in situations of cultural difference. The resulting processes of negotiation between the cultures then define the spaces of the cultures. The fact that they are relational, in principle mutable, and by no means tied to one physical space also explains why, for Bhabha, they cannot provide a solid starting point for the analysis of culture.

Bhabha’s concept of hybridity applies well to the history of migration, colonialism, and globalization, and especially to situations and fields of cultural encounter in which the possibilities for selectively appropriating and shaping that are available to agents (in particular, to minorities) are to be examined.

Cultural anthropologists and postcolonial theorists of space both turn away from physical locations and instead repeatedly emphasize alternative spatialities. Postcolonial positions (Bhabha’s, in particular) reject every spatial fixing of culture and knowledge. One of the alternative concepts of space is the imaginative geography of Edward Said (1935–2003), a literary scholar famous for his study of Orientalism as an invention of Western modernity (Said 1978).
The Orient—at least as it is thought by the West—is such a geographical imagination for Said. This imagination is no mere notion, fantasy, or inconsequential appearance. For Said, “imaginative geography” is a discourse that is shaped by images and texts, primarily travel narratives, about the Orient as a cultural and geographical space in the East—a conception that formed over the course of centuries to eventually be consolidated and provide the basis for the legitimation of domination and political invasion. In addition to legitimizing and maintaining dominance, the image of the Orient also served to construct the Occident. Said argues that the self was constituted in the image of “the Other” and that a rigid and equally imaginary border was drawn between the two that still shapes the relations of the West toward the Orient today. The gradual formation of the image of the Orient and its transformation into political acts can be described as a matter of stages. A phase of study and contemplation was followed by one of appropriation, in which the space was entered and measured. Finally, the area was invaded, subjected, and cultivated according to notions of its colonizers.

Concretely, Said analyzed the British Empire and its imperialist arsenal—which for him also included “culture”—in their contributions to the establishment and long-term maintenance of hegemony over far-flung areas. Despite all the criticism raised against his choice of sources and his conclusions, his approach can be transferred to other areas and topics, as occurred, for instance, in the work of the geographers Gregory and Soja mentioned earlier. In this way, we can question our everyday conceptions of East and West (of Germany or Europe) or, to give another example, our conceptions of Greece within the framework of the European Union. Such images also exist for cities. What human beings think when they hear the names of particular cities varies depending on context and place in time. Whereas twenty years ago we might have associated the city of Bologna with spaghetti Bolognese, tortellini, or Umberto Eco, today we—or at least most university teachers and students in Europe—inevitably think of the controversial Bologna Process for reforming higher education. Such geographical constructions are often conceptions of homogeneous container spaces that are more often than not guided by ideology. It is also worth referring here to Julia Lossau’s study on Germany’s policies toward Turkey since 1989. Lossau showed just how far imaginative geographies, as images of the world that appear to be essentialist, can intervene in politics (Lossau 2002).

Said does not understand geography as physical geography, but as socially constructed. Although he is primarily concerned with empire-building, he is also more generally interested in the emergence of geographical conceptions. He is aware of the significance of memory for questions of identity and group formation, and of the significance of places and their memory: “As for geography … as a socially constructed and maintained sense of place, a great deal of attention has been paid by modern scholars and critics to the extraordinarily constitutive role of space in human affairs” (Said 2000, 180). Why are landscapes idealized, why are histories manipulated or invented, why are certain meanings and functions ascribed to places, countries, or regions, and why is it that certain images come to
mind whenever we hear the word Poland or Jerusalem? Said asked such questions in order to study the connection between history and memory on the one hand, and places and geography on the other.

Classifying Michel Foucault (1926–1984) as a cultural anthropologist is somewhat bold. Prima facie, Foucault was a philosopher associated with post-structuralism; nevertheless, he also worked historically and sociologically. Social geographers have taken up his reflections on the connection between space, knowledge, and power. Yet his entirely unique project was to discover structures of power within institutions and social relations, and to contribute to the history of the constitution and disciplining of subjects. Foucault’s concern with space absolutely touches on questions of historical anthropology. He formulated his stance toward geography in an interview with Yves Lacoste in 1976 on the occasion of the publication of the first issue of the journal *Hérodote* (Foucault 2003; see also Crampton and Elden 2007).

In any case, Foucault is one of today’s most-cited theorists in debates about space in social sciences and cultural studies. Paradoxically, he neither developed a theory of space nor even wrote a single consistent text on the topic—with the exception of a talk he gave in 1967 in Tunisia, but which he did not allow to be published until shortly before his death in 1984 (Foucault 1986). However, many of his texts contain observations about the spatial structure of society. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, for instance, he not only describes the transition from the medieval hospital to the modern clinic in the late eighteenth century. He also sees this new institution being connected to a praxis of localization through which illnesses are first identified with causes and effects on the body and then located within a three-dimensional space (Foucault 1994, 3–21). Foucault describes this transition in minute detail as a process divided into three types of spatializations: mentally, emerging in the systematization of illness and in analogy to a topological tableau; physically, concerned with the diagnosis of illness, that is, the projection of the name of an illness onto the body of the patient; and, finally, institutionally, giving rise to places and institutions such as the clinic.

Foucault coined the term “heterotopia” in the aforementioned lecture, which was titled “Des espaces autres” (Foucault 1986). Even though the essay is known in English by the title “Of Other Spaces,” a more correct translation would be “Of Different Spaces.” Foucault considers the space of modernity as a system of places (or “emplacements”) and their interrelations. Among a multitude of social places, he singles out utopia and heterotopia. Whereas utopia as an ideal or vision is a place without a real place, heterotopia exists in space but breaks with it: “There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society—which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (Foucault 1986, 24). As examples, he cites retirement homes, psychiatric wards, prisons, cemeteries, and also theaters, cinemas, gardens, museums, libraries, trade
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fairs, motels, and colonies, such as the early modern Jesuit colony (on the application of the concept to Christian catacombs, see Smith 2014).

Although the concept of heterotopia is not very precise, Foucault did attempt his own sort of definition:

1. Heterotopias are produced in every culture.
2. The functions of a heterotopia can change within a society.
3. Heterotopias enable multiple spaces to be adjacent or to overlap.
4. Heterotopias develop their own temporalities.
5. They develop a system of opening and closing that isolates them on the one hand, and enables access to them on the other.
6. They can assume functions of illusion or compensation.

Particularly with regard to point five, it has to be noted that basic access does not alone equal participation in the order of the heterotopia. This and other adjustments—for instance, the genesis of certain types of heterotopias at particular times or the transformation of a social, i.e., initially nonheterotopic, place into a heterotopia—must be considered before it is possible to refer to a concept of heterotopia, especially one that might be relevant to the discipline of history.

At root, both of Foucault’s topics—processes of spatialization and heterotopia—produce concepts that are more cultural-anthropological or sociological than philosophical or theoretical, and which can be applied to current and historical questions, but only if they are adapted to historically specific situations. Whereas the concept of heterotopia is well represented in debates within literary studies—for instance, in the context of the spaces of aesthetic experience—it has only been sporadically taken up until now in the discipline of history, mostly perhaps in the context of historiography of the clinic or prison.

2.3 Sociology

When a concept such as the sociology of space (Raumsoziologie) is used as the title of a book (Löw 2001), it’s clear that spatial analysis has become an established subdiscipline in sociology. Leaving aside the fact that analogous conceptualizations in geography or history are problematic for various reasons, the sociology of space is also a relatively young field. In the 1990s, more and more voices argued for the necessity of integrating the spatial perspective into sociology (Läpple 1991). In the following years, debates about sociological theories on space then intensified (Sturm 2000; Löw 2001; Schroer 2006), leading to the rediscovery of various “classic” theorists: Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Maurice Halbwachs, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, Alfred Schütz, and several others. These older approaches do not come away from more recent debates unscathed. It is nevertheless worth recalling them inasmuch as some more recent approaches aim to build on them or demarcate differences from them.

Around 1900, led by Henri Bergson (1859–1941), among others, a new philosophy of time was initiated that differentiated between time and duration. While
time for Bergson stands for succession, space is characterized by homogeneity, differences in position, and simultaneity. At the time, deliberations about temporal structures and the analysis of temporal experience were not at all limited to the field of philosophy. Phenomenologists and sociologists were interested in individual and collective experiences of time and in time as a social construct. The same could be said for space, even without a special philosophy of space serving as a guide. For instance, we already find the thesis in Émile Durkheim’s *Elementare Formen des religiösen Lebens (The Elementary Forms of Religious Life)* that space and time are social constructs (Durkheim 1912; for a critical view, see Dux 1992, 72–75). For the German-speaking world, it was Georg Simmel (1858–1918) who played the part of pioneer in the systematic engagement with the space of society. The problem of “historical time” is but one field where his contribution was central to new discussions. In a book published in 1916, he pointed to another central point upon which the entire recent discussion in sociology rests: that space is no entity independent of society but is constituted by the actions of its agents. Furthermore, he does not consider the concept of place to denote something substantial. Rather, it is a form of relation or, to follow the title of one of his essays, a “form of sociation” (Simmel 1992).

Simmel completed a PhD in philosophy on Kant’s concept of matter and, like Durkheim in France, endeavored to establish sociology as an academic discipline. He began working on the concept of space at the beginning of the twentieth century. Yet he would probably have resisted being designated as a sociologist of space, for as he made a point to note in the introduction to *Soziologie des Raumes* (Sociology of space), he was concerned with a theory encompassing more than just the spatial aspects of the forms of human sociability—namely, a general sociology. He considers space to be a form generated through concretely sensing or feeling (*Empfinden*) the world. Elsewhere, he argues that space arises only when a social group takes possession of it (Simmel 1992, 687–790). As fundamental qualities of space, he lists the following elements: exclusivity/uniqueness; unity (having boundaries), fixation of contents, creation of proximity or distance between persons, and the possibility of locomotion (Simmel 1995, 134, 138, 146, 154, 167).

At the same time, Simmel was also always interested in the repercussions of spatial forms for human beings and their actions. This is also the case in his works on urban sociology. In his famous essay “Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben” (“The Metropolis and Mental Life”) (Simmel 1903), he analyzes the effects of the city as a form of settlement on the mentality of its inhabitants. As a consequence of the city’s higher population density, the diverse and changing impressions it generated, and the speed and division of labor, so he argues, a more strongly differentiated mode of living dominates in the city in comparison to rural forms of settlement. In his analysis of cities, too, Simmel was interested in the power that space has to shape social life.

Even if Simmel thus considers space to be a sociological fact, meaning a social construction, an absolute concept of space sneaks back into his ideas at the very moment that he intends to emphasize space’s relational meaning, namely via the
putative effect of space on social life. But Simmel knows quite well how to distinguish between a physical or geometric space and a constellation that becomes unified as a space only through human senses and actions. In his essay “Der Raum und die räumlichen Ordnungen der Gesellschaft” (Space and the spatial orders of society), he writes that space in and of itself remains a form with no effects. For “Not space, but the psychologically consequential organization and concentration (Zusammenfassung) of its parts have social significance” (Simmel 1992, 688; translation Blasi, Jacobs, and Kanjirathinkal 2009, 544).

In this respect, Simmel argues, we may not ascribe any causal effect to physical space, such as a space defined only by its size. He makes this criticism of historians: “If an interpretation of history presents the spatial factor in the foreground to such an extent that it would understand the greatness or the smallness of the realm, the crowdedness or dispersion of populations, the mobility or stability of the masses etc. as the, as it were, motives radiating out from space to the whole of historical life then here too the essential spatial preoccupation of all these constellations runs into danger of being confused with their positive functional causes” (Simmel 1992, 687; translation Blasi, Jacobs, and Kanjirathinkal 2009, 543). Even though he does not say it directly, this statement hides a criticism not only of the historians of his time but also of the discipline of anthropogeography that had emerged only several years before (see Chapter 1).

Despite his somewhat strange language, and his proximity to both Kant’s philosophy and Völkerpsychologie (the nineteenth-century method of psychology invented by Wilhelm Wundt that sought to analyze national groups through historical, comparative methods), Simmel can be assigned to the modern sociology of space, the discourse of which he continues to shape today. Historians, too, can use his work if they make a few corrections to his conceptual framework—for example, in research on the history of sociability (and its specific spatializations) or in urban history that takes a spatial perspective.

Just as clearly as Durkheim recognized the socially constructed nature of space, so little did he develop a theory of social spatiality. It was only the next generation of sociologists who succeeded in this endeavor. Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) was a student of Henri Bergson and professor at several French universities. In May 1944, he was appointed to a chair at the Collège de France—the highest position that can be attained in France in the course of an academic career—just before the Gestapo arrested him for socialist activities and deported him to Buchenwald. Halbwachs was among the first scholars to disseminate Max Weber’s work in France; he also published a study at the beginning of the 1930s on “Greater Berlin.”

Over the last few years in the German-speaking world, Halbwachs has received attention especially in the context of debates about collective/cultural memory. Through his critical engagement with the work of Bergson and in particular with Bergson’s theory of memory, Halbwachs coined the term collective memory. For Halbwachs, this did not mean an enormous reservoir of social memory. Rather, he was much more interested in the social or sociospatial markings of individual memories that lead to a social, i.e., group-specific, construction of memory. He
explicated the principle of operation and meaning of the “social framework” of memory in his book Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (The Social Frameworks of Memory) and his posthumous work La mémoire collective (The Collective Memory) (Halbwachs 1994 [1925], 1950; see also Rau 2002, 37–40). Its central point is that the specific forms and contents of memory depend upon respective social conditions—current ideas, questions, and problems. Memory, Halbwachs argues, does not derive from the objects to be remembered, meaning from the past itself—but from the present, which selects, assigning importance and significance.

However, Halbwachs was not just a theoretician of social memory; he also worked on social morphology, collective psychology, and urban sociology. Indeed, his work on land speculation in Paris between 1860 and 1900 laid one important foundation for urban sociology. He also made decisive contributions to the conceptualization of social space (Jaisson 1999), formulating his first approaches in this direction beginning in 1938 in a book on social morphology. A second important step was his work on the sacred topography of the gospels in the Holy Land (Halbwachs 1941; translation Coser 1992). This book deals with the constitution of a religious collective memory, namely that of Protestant Christianity, which attaches its history, as it were, to places that are closely connected with the life of Jesus or early Christianity in the Holy Land. Unlike, say, an archaeologist or historian of his day, Halbwachs is not interested in the materiality of these places or in reconstructing the true events that transpired there. Rather, he is concerned with the conceptions and histories that Christians have connected to these places across centuries, and which repeatedly motivated Christians to travel to these places, be it as pilgrims or to wage war. In the medium of this imagined topography, Halbwachs argues, a conception of duration took shape—a topographic continuity that in turn made it possible to strengthen the unity of the group. At the time, the historian Marc Bloch accused Halbwachs of imagining a form of “finalism” with this conception. But again, Halbwachs was mainly interested here in the group’s memory (and precisely not its history—or what he understood as history), which draws its power to establish identities from its relation to places that had been invested with sacred meaning.

Halbwachs again took up the concept of social space in the final chapter of his book The Collective Memory, which remained unfinished when he died and was only published posthumously (Halbwachs 1950). As in his conceptualization of time, he proceeds from a binary concept: the space of the group (collective) and space in general. He thereby assumes that the social space of the group inscribes itself into social space. The concept is recursive: space stabilizes the group, and the group gives space lasting meaning by continually interpreting it. In contrast to Halbwachs’s Cadres sociaux, space in this work is no longer homogeneous (family/house, religion/church); and its basis is no longer material and permanent as it is in Topographies légendaires. Here, in his last work, space is conceived relationally. It comes about through the relations of human beings within the group and through the relations that the group maintains to certain places or spatial frameworks. Halbwachs shows, for example, that economic space is structured by activities in the stock market and also through the relations of stock traders to
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...each other. Moreover, both kinds of activities, which are related to each other, produce different temporalities. Halbwachs analyzes legal space and religious space in a similar way. He is always concerned with places, positions, and orderings, and with interactions—and always with the significance that people ascribe to them, and the construction of shared memories that function to stabilize the group.

Although research on collective or cultural memory has by now mostly reached the limits of its productivity, or in any case hardly continues to be theoretically inspiring, there are still some things left that we can gain from Halbwachs’s concept of space. But if we want to work with this concept, we need to consider its genesis, which I have only adumbrated here. Although Halbwachs’s career and work remained unfinished, his research continued to inspire sociology into the second half of the twentieth century. His interest in agents (groups), in the working conditions of human beings (and the effects of these conditions on the formation of a specific culture), in sociability, and in consumer behavior return, for example, in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002).

Bourdieu came to anthropology and sociology from philosophy only through his field research in Kabylia in the north of Algeria. Coming from the humblest of circumstances, Bourdieu stylized himself as more of an academic outsider, though he was inducted into the Collège de France in 1980. Over the course of his career, he increasingly understood himself as a political intellectual who did not shy away from participating in public protests staged by workers. Engaging with the work of Max Weber, he supplemented theories of class and stratification with a theory of capital that made the concept of class more flexible. Among an entire series of terms that Bourdieu coined—economic, social, and cultural capital; as well as habitus, field, theory of practice, etc.—we also find the concept of social space. Bourdieu did not invent this term, but he gave it a somewhat different meaning than Halbwachs did. Bourdieu was interested neither in memories nor primarily in the materiality of spaces to which symbols can be attached. Rather, he was mainly interested in positions—meaning social positions, the positions of individuals within a social field—and in structures of distribution for social, economic, and cultural capital that provide important information about access to social resources.

Bourdieu’s use of the concept of social space cannot be understood without the concepts of social field and habitus. These fields as Bourdieu uses them have occasionally come to function as synonyms for social areas such as politics, economics, education, or art; but in each case, they are areas characterized by interactions and power struggles. Agents do not always act consciously in these fields but rather by incorporating schemes of behavior, or to use Bourdieu’s language, by following a habitus.

As a collective system of differentiation acquired primarily through socialization, and an ensemble of socially shaped ways of acting that is principally contingent but has a coherent effect on agents, habitus allows agents to quickly but flexibly manage situations in a given social field. The concept is intended to capture social distinctions between individuals or groups and the acquisition of material or symbolic capital. In the first chapter of his book *Practical Reason*...
Disciplinary approaches (Bourdieu 1998), Bourdieu writes: “Social space is constructed in such a way that agents or groups are distributed in it according to their position in statistical distributions based on the two principles of differentiation which, in the most advanced societies, such as the United States, Japan, or France, are undoubtedly the most efficient: economic capital and cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1998, 6).

Accordingly, social space emerges from the “field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it” (Bourdieu 1998, 32). Bourdieu continues by explaining how social agents can position themselves in this social space and create differences in relation to each other. Precisely these “gaps”—relational social characteristics of distinction—can be transposed into a spatial coordinate system as he already demonstrated, so he reminds his readers, in his book Distinction (Bourdieu 1998, 6–7). These gaps are primarily the result of social differentiations; but they can also be transposed to geographic positions, as can be seen, for instance, in the importance accorded in some societies to whether one sits in the first (rather than the last) row of a church or the decision to live in the favorable parts of town on a hill (rather than near the slaughterhouses, as was the case in the city of Lyon).

At a later point in the book, Bourdieu again underscores that social space is always a field of power (Bourdieu 1998, 31–34). But he points out that social space is not to be confused with a political field: “It is the space of the relations of force between the different kinds of capital or, more precisely, between the agents who possess a sufficient amount of one of the different kinds of capital to be in a position to dominate the corresponding field, whose struggles intensify whenever the relative value of the different kinds of capital is questioned (for example, the exchange rate between cultural capital and economic capital); that is, especially when the established equilibrium in the field of instances specifically charged with the reproduction of the field of power is threatened (in the French case, the field of the Grandes Écoles)” (Bourdieu 1998, 34).

Following Bourdieu’s theory of practice, then, it does not at first seem possible to mediate between his concept of space and a physical concept of space. Things are somewhat different with his essay “Physical, Social, and Appropriated Physical Space,” in which—as the title already indicates—he not only distinguishes between three types of space but also makes a suggestion for how to mediate between physical and social space: “Social space is inscribed both in the objectivity of spatial structures and in the subjectivity of mental structures, which are in part the product of the embodiment of these objectified structures” (Bourdieu 1991, 28; translation Wacquant 2018, 108). Bourdieu attempts here to apply this approach to topics in urban sociology (such as the power of architecture, the apartment as appropriated space, the sociology of city quarters, etc.). But his approach could be equally well applied to architecture (on this point, see Fischer and Delitz 2009). In his sociological studies on the Parisian banlieues, Bourdieu then further expanded on the idea that physical and social space might correspond to each other. He used the term effect of place (effet de lieu) to describe the fact that the position of an agent in social space can be reflected in the place where he or she is physically located or lives, as well as how physical space is inscribed into
social space. This includes the fact that social groups are concentrated in specific spaces from which they cannot so easily get away.

Even if Bourdieu’s focus generally lies on social factors and on agents, the insight of his later works is that what is social is also always spatial. Bourdieu’s instructions are thus to analyze (physical) spaces in regard to the symbolic markings and competing relations of power that they represent and express.

Beginning in the 1980s, the English sociologist Anthony Giddens moved toward a concept of place/space anchored in his “theory of structuration.” This theory is not yet an integral sociology of space because Giddens does not recognize space as an element of structure in its own right but only in the concrete forms it takes in places (where something happens) or as conditions or aspects (see Löw 2001, 37–38). Giddens nevertheless calls for including social-geographic knowledge in social theory, working himself mainly with the time-geography of Torsten Hägerstrand (1916–2004) (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). Giddens’s approach was ultimately taken up in particular by the Darmstadt school of the sociology of space, by Martina Löw, Markus Schroer, Helmut Berking, and Peter Noller.

How should we more precisely picture what Giddens means with a theory of structuration? And what role does the category of space play therein? Giddens’s theory is a social theory that attempts to mediate between structures and action. He considers social structures to be powerful social factors, but he also grants agents a power to act. In relation to space and time, which he incorporates as dimensions of order, this means that spatial structures predetermine a certain framework for action but can also be produced or reproduced by agents. His example is the “power container of the school” (Giddens 1984, 136)—an institution that is characterized, on the one hand, by control and discipline and also, on the other, by a conflict between teachers and students. Kajetzke and Schroer argue that by examining these conflicts, Giddens shows how rules can be bent or new possibilities of action can be created. Spaces are accordingly produced by the organization and positioning of social goods. Spaces also emerge through interactions between individuals and groups. Giddens calls this an act of “spacing” (Giddens 1984, 76; Kajetzke and Schroer 2010, 200–202).

Löw has taken up this term in her approach of “spacing” and “synthesis.” Yet she criticizes Giddens for not having consistently thought through the role of space for the constitution of society. She argues that he ultimately remains in a duality of action and structures in which neither space nor time can influence structure because he does not consider spaces to be the results of actions, meaning he does not—as does Löw herself—conceive of spaces and actions relationally (Löw 2001, 36–44, especially 43).

Löw furthermore criticizes Giddens’s conception of the “power container of the school.” She notes that Giddens emphasizes the components of power within institutionalized spaces, in contrast to Hägerstrand. Yet as she reads Giddens, the school still remains an absolute space because he does not recognize the diversity of different—competing and hierarchically arranged—spaces (meaning interpretations and uses of space) that can form at this place (Löw 2001, Chapter 6, Section 6.1). Of course, this criticism raises the question of whether it was Giddens’s intention to work through these issues. It is nonetheless easy to recognize that
Giddens would not have been able to see this spatial diversity at all, since it is not at all inherent in his one-track concept of space (which is interested in places and localizations of action, but not in spatial overlappings).

In those works where he addresses the present day, Giddens postulates that place loses significance in modernity as a framework for action mainly because of technological developments. He names the “time-space distanciation” as a basic characteristic of the globalized age (see Kajetzke and Schroer 2010, 201). This he understands to mean the separation of social relations from contexts and situations of “co-presence” that are bound to places. This means that interactions in face-to-face situations become less frequent as they are replaced by interactions that take place over greater distances. This need not, however, mean a loss of quality for these interactions, as relationships can regain meaning through this quantitative reduction.

The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) has no prominent reference to space. Rudolf Stichweh, a student of Luhmann who is himself now a well-known sociologist, clearly pointed out the problem of this neglect (Stichweh 1998). Luhmann basically argued that the development of transportation and communication media make space less important in the modern age (Luhmann 2008). The reason for Luhmann’s neglect, however, was not only historical but systematic: Luhmann decidedly conceived systems theory in a way that makes it unnecessary to refer to time and space in determining social boundaries (Stichweh 1998, 341). One appealing aspect of this view is that Luhmann abandoned the nation-state and thus a territorial notion of space as a category for analyzing society in favor of a concept of communication. Yet at the same time, by equating space with physical space or the spatial environment (to which Luhmann grants no influence on society), this blanket rejection of the category of space for analyzing society reveals an amazing lack of knowledge about discussions in social geography and anthropology. Or it might be that this rejection rests upon a misunderstanding. In his later work on globalization and global society, Luhmann must have experienced doubts about this matter, since he believes it is in fact necessary to consider spatial differentiation in order to describe recent developments or explain the production of worldwide social inequality (Luhmann 1995).

Stichweh, too, points to a passage in Luhmann’s work that characterizes space and time as “media for measuring and calculating objects” as an attempt to make this idea productive for analysis (Stichweh 1998, 342–343). For Stichweh, these objects include social objects formed and determined through a process of communication. Here, at least, we might find a starting point for using Luhmann’s work to understand space as a medium of perception.

Following Luhmann’s ideas, social geographers indeed expanded the theory of social systems to include a spatial perspective, subjecting it to critical reflection (Werlen 2009, 146–147; see also Hard 2009). Helmut Klüter views spaces as media of social communication and identifies specific spatial abstractions for individual systems of communication (Klüter 1986). Roland Lippuner has shown how and which spatial metaphors pervade social theories (Lippuner 2005). And Marc Redepenning has also investigated the functions and implications of semantics referring to space in the context of everyday social practices (Redepenning 2006).
In an unpublished lecture given at a conference in 2004, the historian Rudolf Schlägl from the University of Konstanz suggested using Luhmann to understand space as a universal medium in the early modern city. Taking the perspective of a history of communication, Schlägl distinguished in this lecture between architecturally marked, ephemeral, and virtual spaces in the early modern city. He argued that these spaces should be differentiated from orderings of space characterized by permanence and claiming validity for whole social areas (religion, economics, etc.)—orderings of space, in other words, that can also overlap with each other. In an essay also inspired by systems theory, another historian suggests that in analyzing the Middle Ages we should not begin with a functionally differentiated spatial concept, but rather speak of an “integral spatial concept” or “undifferentiated spaces” to describe a society that, from today’s perspective, did not yet appear to consider different functional areas as distinct (Arlinghaus 2006, 101–103). The essay exemplifies this thesis through an analysis of communal courts, focusing on the city of Cologne.

As we can see, there are thus certainly methods for thinking space in terms of systems theory and empirically implementing these methods. Yet one limitation remains: this approach only ever allows us to observe spatial observations, in other words, to examine how space (in historical societies) has been communicatively constructed. In addition to spatial communications, it would also be possible to investigate the spatial rhetorics of societies, as Gerhard Hard has suggested (Hard 2009, 308). Hard’s suggestion is connected to an appeal for us to always engage first with the respective epistemological model, meaning with the conceptions of possibilities that exist for perceiving and shaping space. Historicizing these conceptions is, not least of all, the task of history.

In Germany during the last decade, several urban and regional sociologists in Darmstadt have been the main figures to develop theoretical tools for analyzing space and begin a scholarly discussion about them. Martina Löw, who is now working in Berlin (she worked in Darmstadt from 2002–2013) and whose distinction between place/space I already addressed in Chapter 1, developed her sociology of space by engaging with a series of older approaches since Georg Simmel. In recent discussions, she has chiefly built her work on Anthony Giddens, Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, as well as several sociogeographic approaches. Her concept is that of a relational model of space, distinguished above all by the following hypothesis or characteristics:

1. Space and action are not opposed.
2. Space is considered dynamic, not static, meaning the focus is on the process of constituting spaces, which occurs in two procedures—an act of “spacing” and an act of synthesis—that constitute a process of ordering followed by an aesthetic and cognitive act carried out by human beings, which can also be supported by communications technologies.
3. In the act of spacing, both human beings and things are ordered, living beings as well as social goods.
Löw writes: “In order to avoid assuming two different realities, space and action, my intention is to build on relativistic conceptions of space to develop a working hypothesis that understands space as a relational order(ing) of bodies that are continuously in motion, which constantly changes the order(ing) itself. This means that space is also constituted in time. Accordingly, space cannot be a fixed container existing independently of social and material relations. Rather, space and the world of bodies are interwoven. The concept of order(ing) [(An)Ordnung], with this chosen spelling, emphasizes that there is both a dimension of order pointing to social structures and a dimension of action, i.e., the process of ordering, inherent in spaces” (Löw 2001, 131; for an interim statement of this working hypothesis, see Löw 2015).

The geographer Gerhard Hard sees a return to an older geographic concept of space, with all of its epistemological implications and obstacles, in the connection between things and human beings, between what is material and what is social, characterizing Löw’s theory (Hard 2006, 273–277). Hard’s criticism is somewhat polemical. But sociology, which at first glance appears to be so easily operationalized, is revealed upon closer examination to have the disadvantage that it no longer allows material, social, and communicative levels to be clearly distinguished. In using these tools, it would be necessary to thematize the respective levels of facts and observers. Another problem is the emphatic stress on the relational concept of space. This concept presumably applies best to modern society—which is something, however, that could still be discussed. But this virtually normative charging of the concept stands at cross purposes to historical analysis, which cannot be based in ideals, prescriptions, or norms but must be able to ask quite openly which spatial concepts were dominant in a specific society. Löw’s concrete questions about spaces—which she never views as given but attempts instead to comprehend in their dynamic nature—nevertheless remain useful: What is being ordered? Who is ordering (with what right, with what power)? How do spaces come to be and how do they again dissipate (Löw 2001, 151)?

Another Darmstadt sociologist, Helmuth Berking, emphasizes place and space as two spatial concepts that must be distinguished from each other. He is less interested in the processes of constituting spaces as in the question of the significance of what is local in a globalized world. This places the dichotomy—or even dialectic—of the local and the global at the forefront of his thinking. Berking wants to show that what is local has not lost its significance in the global age—a thesis that is already apparent in the title of a volume he edited: *Die Macht des Lokalen in einer Welt ohne Grenzen* (The power of the local in a world without borders; Berking 2006). For Berking, emphasizing this idea also means questioning those concepts of the global and globalization that cause the local to disappear. This is why he accentuates, against theories that thematize globalization as strategies of deterritorialization and denationalization, the fact that territoriality and territorial states continue to represent powerful forms of organization even today. Furthermore, he argues that what is local need not be exclusively bound to territorial forms of sociation, just as what is global need not be exclusively bound to a deterritorialized “space of flows” (the term Manuel Castell uses to describe the information age). And third, he ultimately argues, the terms local and global
need not be understood as either opposites or synonyms for place and space. In the place of binary oppositions, then, we would need to pay attention to alternative forms of intermeshing and mutual influence. Even global financial systems, as Doreen Massey has consistently pointed out, cannot function without places (with characteristics that are thoroughly local, such as in the stock exchanges in London or New York).

So wherein lies the power of the local? This power is manifest, for instance, in how our knowledge about the world is related to place, and further in the fact that globality can also be produced from places: equally so in the office of a salesman as in a cartographic workshop making maps of the world. The significance of what is local also becomes visible, however, when we look at the heterogeneity of local contexts instead of simply assuming that globalization unifies everything and primarily devalues places.

Analyzing paradoxes inherent in theories of space and globalization is certainly illuminating. But in order to apply this analysis to concrete cases, both its spatial types (from global microspaces to the globe/the universe) and levels (local, global) must be more concretely specified, and its theories of globalization, themselves already different from each other, must be distinguished from various forms and tendencies of globalization in history. Befitting their discipline, sociologists rather ask about the spatial organization of social relations in contemporary societies. But it is not only these questions that can be transferred to historical societies and their specific characteristics. Historians can also work with the dichotomy of local and global by examining, for instance, the connections and coexistence of global thought and local practices in the past (and by examining both of these as they change through time). Examining different regions, ranging from very far in the past to quite near to the present, allows historians to gain a view of the diversity characterizing historical agents’ culturally defined forms of life and their experiences. This includes moments of resistance and forms of idiosyncratic, individual appropriation of universalistic claims in world cultures. And ultimately it concerns the observation of entanglements, overlappings, and in-between spaces for which the portmanteau glocalization was coined.

Though it does not belong to the branch of sociology centered on agents, the actor–network theory (ANT) cofounded by the French sociologist of science and technology Bruno Latour is playing an increasingly prominent role in contemporary debates. Latour’s concept of the “actant” ascribes force of action to both human and nonhuman agents (things, norms, discourses, spaces, microbes). Spaces—possibly originating themselves from norms—appear in this theory as agents inasmuch as they regulate action, codetermine social practices, or participate in the production of knowledge (Latour 2010; for an introduction, see Ruffing 2009).

### 2.4 Spaces and spatialities as a new historiographical topic

The field of historical research concerned with space is relatively disparate overall. Some scholars continue to speak about space as if it simply existed, others take up approaches from sociology, and others build upon the spatial theories
that were newly revived in the wake of the spatial turn in cultural studies. As I see it, the genuine historiographic contribution to debates about space appears to lie in analyzing and precisely determining culturally and historically specific spatial terms, concepts, perceptions, and practices. In what follows, I will present selected approaches that are invigorating current historical debates about space or that have already given rise to schools.

Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006), known chiefly for his studies in conceptual history and for his work as coeditor of the lexicon Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Basic concepts in history), did not leave behind any comprehensively conceived method for historical research into space. He was much more interested in the temporal structures of human history. That said, he also delivered the keynote address at the biennial Meeting of German Historians (Historikertag) in 1986 in Trier, which engaged historical spaces and spatial concepts even before the spatial turn. In that keynote, he noted that a rigorous conceptual history of space was lacking despite a series of studies presenting the philosophical or natural-scientific history of the concept of space (Koselleck 2000, 79; on the essay published from this keynote, see Dipper and Raphael 2011). It is telling that the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe does not contain an entry on space, either. In the written version of the lecture, Koselleck begins by sketching how several historians from the nineteenth century dealt with space and time; he complements this by recalling developments in contemporaneous geography. He perhaps too strongly separates the development of the concept of space in the natural sciences and philosophy from that in history and historical geography. Yet he remains decidedly committed to one thesis: “Categorically speaking, space and time belong equally to the conditions of possibility for history. But ‘space’ itself also has a history. Space must be metahistorically presupposed for every conceivable history and must itself also be capable of being historicized because it undergoes social, economic, and political changes” (Koselleck 2000, 82). Koselleck’s usage of the phrase “metahistorical conditions” does not refer in this context to scholars such as Hayden White, with whose work Koselleck also intensively engaged, but to Ratzel’s “metahistorical situations” (see Chapter 1).

Hence Koselleck uses a bifurcated concept of space—both metaphysical and constructivist (as we would say) or historical (as he would have said). He considers everything to be metaphysical that can become a condition for human action, that escapes the grasp of human beings but influences how they think and act. Although he distances himself from older forms of geopolitics because he believes they have made natural conditions into something like ontological premises (Koselleck 2000, 88–89), his own “metahistorical conditions” still remain wedded to an a priori way of thinking about space. Ratzel biologically conceived of space as Lebensraum (living space) in which society, culture, etc., take place. We should remember this when we engage with Koselleck’s two-dimensional concept of space.

To some extent, his thoughts on the relationship between space and time are also interesting: he argues that space must always have a temporal dimension in order to be capable of being experienced or controlled. He argues that the term Zeitraum (a period of time, literally: timespace) is thus not to be understood merely as a
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metaphor but as an analytical concept for investigating the “mutual relatedness of time and space in their respective historical articulations” (Koselleck 2000, 90). As his arguments progress, Koselleck then lays out a slightly irritating division of around ten million years of human history into three phases, each of which would have corresponding spaces of its own. He sees the overall development as based on a law that governed how temporal-spatial relations changed with increasing acceleration over the course of history—in periods of time that continually grew shorter and within which new developments arose. One may follow these macro-historical considerations, inspired as they are by natural history, or not: despite his plea for a closer analysis of spaces and periods of time or “timespaces,” Koselleck reveals himself here to be a historian of time and not an (analytically conceptual) historian of space.

As with Koselleck, we find faint echoes of Ratzel in the work of Karl Schlögel, a historian of Eastern Europe and essayist. As far as Schlögel’s visibility across period boundaries and disciplines is concerned, he is the most well-known historian of space in Germany today. He does not understand himself as a theorist of space. Yet the introductions to his books and essays (Schlögel 2003, 2007) contain shorter and longer passages about his concept of space or the concepts upon which he bases his own thoughts: Edward Soja, Derek Gregory, Henri Lefebvre, Yi-Fu Tuan. Reading his books—about Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg), for example—you sometimes get the feeling that he has taken you on a journey. The highly praised and multi-award-winning book Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit (In space, we read time) is not only a plea to intensify sensory perception but in particular to more intensely perceive the spatial dimensions and sites of history (Schlögel 2003, especially 68). The book is concerned with images of cities and landscapes, with mobility and overcoming distance. It also talks about wars and terror. For instance, Schlögel sees 9/11 as precisely that event reminding us that spaces can disintegrate and that local knowledge is necessary even in the age of cyberspace (Schlögel 2003, 30).

The methodological elements of Schlögel’s essayistically written book can be summarized as follows:

1 Schlögel borrows his concept of space from the anthropogeographer Friedrich Ratzel but then clearly distances himself from Karl Haushofer’s reception of Ratzel. From recent research, he builds on Edward Soja and Soja’s plea to spatialize historical narratives.

2 In his book, he points out a whole series of possible sources for a spatially oriented form of history. These primarily include visiting places where history happened and finding lost traces in our immediate surroundings. It is because places create a connection to the past that they are centrally important to him at all. His analyses also incorporate old maps and landscape paintings as well as timetables, address directories, and telephone books.

3 He demonstrates how vanished places or other spatial constellations can be reconstructed and again made visible with the help of these sources.

4 He aims to recover space and time. Spatial and temporal dimensions should equally be objects of analysis.
Ultimately, Schlögel also proves to be a friend of the flaneurs he accompanies through cities even though—or precisely because?—he occasionally resorts to an artistic trick and allows ghosts to go for a walk: Herodot in 1937 in Moscow and Walter Benjamin posthumously in Los Angeles. It is Benjamin from whom he adopted his concept of place and the motif of the flaneur.

Despite all its admirable and broadly appealing essayistic virtuosity, Schlögel’s work is essentially a history of places where history has been staged. He is mainly concerned with concrete spaces, landscapes, historical scenes, and places where actions were performed. He moves through and across these spaces and encourages his readers to do the same: to perambulate spaces, explore, read traces, interpret surfaces, or use relics to reconstruct spaces that have disappeared from view. Schlögel describes history as a science of reality, and this is also how we must understand his references to geography. For this reason, criticism of his approach has focused on his tendency to reessentialize spaces, especially the space of the city (Piltz 2011, 225). At any rate, Schlögel is not interested in analyzing complex spatial constellations; he does not really ask about historical spatial perceptions (apart from considering representations of space in paintings) or about the scope that agents have to shape their own world. Readers walk alongside the flaneur for many pages as he explains what he sees. That’s already quite a lot—but certainly not everything—that can be achieved with historical spatial analysis. Since for that, we still need other, additional sources and other tools.

Even with all the criticism that has been directed at Schlögel (Döring and Thielmann 2009, 19–24), we should note he has invented a way of writing history that attempts to once again more closely connect history and geography, precisely in connecting the analysis of spatial morphologies and strolls through historic sites. The fact that this approach has also proven to be widely popular contributes, on the one hand, to the popularization of history and, on the other, to the spread of questions concerned with space, especially within Eastern European history (Schlögel 2011). These include, for example, how the concept of Eastern Europe emerged as a regional and disciplinary concept and of its associated mental map (Schenk 2006).

Michel de Certeau (1925–1986) was not only a historian but also a cultural philosopher, sociologist, and doctor of theology. In 1950, he became a Jesuit, originally intending to work as a missionary. In reading Certeau, we should always keep in mind his work on the history of mysticism, his engagement with phenomenology (especially with Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and with psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan). This holds true, as well, for his work in history, where he repeatedly examined the transition between what is visible and hidden, the border between language and silence. As a historian, he is known mainly for his book, written in 1975, *L’écriture de l’histoire* (*The Writing of History*, 1988); he is less well-known for his truly sociological book from 1980 about everyday human practices: *L’invention du quotidien* (*The Practice of Everyday Life*, 1998), which is at once an analysis and sociological theory of everyday human practices such as walking, writing, speaking, inhabiting, cooking, etc. One of the fundamental distinctions he makes in this analysis is between strategy and tactics. Strategy is a kind of calculation, such as when a subject possessing power intentionally
plans to do something; tactics, by contrast, consist of a calculus that cannot count on a concrete result. Tactics tend to be deployed more situationally; they attempt to exploit gaps and inconsistencies.

Strategy and tactics are basic concepts for describing everyday practices in a consumer society. Certeau grants consumers a power of their own to shape their world; he uncovers their tricks and stratagems, points out their subversive behavior and adaptations. His theory of everyday life itself already contains historical elements, retrospective moments, and comparisons; in other words, he certainly considers changes over time and cultural differences. Even though most of his works were written in the 1970s and 1980s, it is only recently that historians have in fact begun to draw from him, appropriate his work, and, in particular, transform his concept of practice (which he expresses in French as faire: to do, make, act) into something productive for their own research (Füssel 2007). Not least of all, this reception has focused on his analysis of walking and his differentiation between place and space (Rau 2011).

Certeau addresses the theme of place/space in the part of his book about spatial practices that is found in the first volume of The Practice of Everyday Life, Arts de faire (Certeau 1990, 170–191; translation Rendall 2011, 115–130). He begins by distinguishing two practices of appropriating the city: the panoptic gaze, and walking or wandering through the city. This leads him to deliberations about the concept of the city as it arose in utopian and urbanistic discourse (production of cleanliness, uniformity, universality). He opposes this concept to urban practices. Walking through or, more generally, using the city is like actualizing a system; according to Certeau, concept and practice belong together like a speech act and language. This explains why he wants to analyze statements made by pedestrians, or the fact that he investigates rhetorics of itineraries, forms of usage, figures of movement, designations for places, symbols, and metaphors—as well as things worthy of memory, legends, and dreams that are connected to places. Ultimately, he brings together spatial practices and spatial stories: but the term récit d’espace does not just denote spatial stories; it also implies the thesis that “narrative structures have the status of spatial syntaxes” (Certeau 1990, 171; translation Rendall 2011, 115). Narratives “organize” places; they single them out and connect them with each other. Certeau writes: “Every story is a travel story” (Certeau 1990, 171; translation Rendall 2011, 115), a spatial practice. Narratives, in other words, do not simply transpose steps into the level of language. They organize these steps, make the “journey,” and create geographies of action.

Certeau makes a systematic distinction between place and space. He associates place with orderings, relationships of coexistence between elements, and stability. And the regime of place is governed by the law of particularity: elements are located next to each other, and two things cannot occupy the same place. He connects space, by contrast, to directional vectors and temporal variability. Space is related to place as the word to its instances of being uttered. This culminates in the often-cited sentence: “En somme, l’espace est un lieu pratiqué” (Certeau 1990, 173), that is, “Space is a practiced place” (translation Rendall 2011, 117), a place where things are done. In Certeau’s view, place is not something external
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to this doing, as one might take from the English translation. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty carried out a similar differentiation when he spoke of a geometric (homo-
geneous, isotropic) space and anthropological space. Yet Merleau-Ponty was less
interested in distinguishing between system and practice as between a spatial out-
side and a spatial existence, meaning an experience of being-in-the-world.

As analytical categories for spatial stories, Certeau introduces the terms parcours (path or itinerary) and map, which he adopted from the linguists Charlotte
Linde and William Labov. Both concepts designate the narrative structure of texts
that, according to Certeau, stand for two different spatial practices. The parcours
corresponds to walking (in a certain direction), while the map stands for the activ-
ity of seeing. The parcours tells the story of human actions (to go through a door,
follow a path), while the map shows location (this is found at this place, next to
that place). And here, too, it is the speech act that distinguishes the parcours—in
a linguistic sense—from the map (Certeau 1990, 175). Seeing gives evidence for
knowledge of a system of order; walking is an activity that creates space. The
former constitutes an overview; the latter is movement. And for Certeau, over-
views, like modes of walking, also have a history (Certeau 1990, 178–179). Over
the course of the early modern period, both iconographic elements and elements
connecting places together, such as itineraries, disappeared. The map developed
to become a system of geographic places, that is, a topography in the strict sense.

Finally, those practices bound to places also include demarcations (bornages):
wherever people (or things, animals) interact, share a place, they demarcate them-
selves from each other. Boundaries are drawn via encounters, they shift accord-
ing to the increasing appropriation and movement of agents. But the same is true
the other way around: wherever there is difference, commonalities also quickly
become apparent—borders are also always passages. Divisions (rivers, walls,
fences) can also always create connections. Certeau describes this observation
with the figure of frontiers and bridges (frontières et ponts) to then cite a poem by
Christian Morgenstern:

Es war einmal ein Lattenzaun / mit Zwischenraum, hindurchzuschauen.
One time there was a picket fence / with space to gaze from hence to thence.
(Certeau 1990, 187; translation Rendall 2011, 127)

In German, the word for fence, Zaun, rhymes with schaun, to look, and is a near
rhyme with space, Raum. With their (near) rhymes, the words mark both a fig-
ure of “closure” (or clôture, as Certeau translates Zaun) and a gap, an opening
between a series of elements that do not quite fit or align. This picket fence allow-
ing one to look through, enabling communication and interaction, is a vivid meta-
phor for a cultural interstice or third location.

As a final point, Certeau introduces the concept of deviation or delin-
quency (délinquances). Here, too, he argues from a linguistic level: “the story
is delinquent” (“le récit est délinquant”; Certeau 1990, 190; translation Rendall
2011, 130), he writes, only to transfer this idea to the societal level, to social
delinquency. Delinquencies, Certeau writes, originate through movement, by
undermining the order that is more or less flexible or permeable in different societies. Delinquencies begin with writing the body into the ordering text. In moving, gesticulating, running, the body becomes transparent; it continually generates its own self in contradistinction to the other. In this way, movement repeatedly reorders space. This also means, Certeau emphasizes, that these new orderings or individual everyday arrangements need not be illegal. These movements can be more playful, function as remonstratives, or sometimes even be carnivalesque without fundamentally expressing opposition to an established order. This offers a good point of contact for examining everyday spatial practices.

Relatively uninfluenced by Certeau, an engagement with spaces as historical objects and cultural constructs developed in the context of research into French urban history and the *Annales* of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, it was even less common to speak of social constructions. And yet these are the beginnings of writing history from an agent-centered perspective, a new impulse that was fundamentally influenced by the Italian school of *microstoria* connected to the names of Carlo Ginzburg and Giovanni Levi. The focus on spatiality was only one aspect of this process and was hardly able to gain traction, for example, in historical anthropology in the German-speaking world. But to the extent this aspect was received in urban studies, we can definitely speak of a relational approach: the proponents of this view assume that a city’s residents play a part in shaping the city in which they live through their ideas and actions.

Some forty years ago, Jean-Claude Perrot interpreted cities as a result of deposits left, on the one hand, by different historical layers and by appropriations and reinterpretations, on the other. Since historical agents acted according to quite different social logics, they operated simultaneously in diverse spatial relations. This presents us with a discontinuous formation (on this point, see Kaiser 2005). Hence to speak of cities in terms of “fossilized time” (Perrot 1968, 255) is not a metaphor but rather a tool for analyzing space similar to the method that Bernard Lepetit (1948–1996) also used in following Perrot (Bourdelais and Lepetit 1986; Lepetit 1986, 1996). This understanding of the city persists even today in research in cultural studies into cities that emphasizes the simultaneity of nonsimultaneous elements, historical deposits and breaks, and diverse and often competing ways of appropriating urban spaces.

In an issue of *Quaderni storici* edited together with Biagio Salvemini and devoted to the topic of spatial perception in history (1995), Lepetit makes a plea to think of space from the perspective of agents. For historians, this not only means reconstructing the logic that agents follow but also their perceptions and knowledge of space and their spatial practices. It ultimately comes down to reconstructing the plurality of available possibilities of practices that refer to space. For it is this reconstruction that makes the distinction between determinism and possibilism, and thus between Braudel and Febvre, superfluous in the first place, by showing that beyond these two possibilities there still exists the category of the unpredictable.

The concept of landscape (*Landschaft*) has also since developed into an analytical concept (see most recently Ender et al. 2017). Seen in terms of spatial
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analysis, we should understand this to mean a spatial formation that needs not necessarily be a unified, demarcated area but that differs from other areas because of its specific (geographic, political, demographic, or cultural) characteristics. In order to mark a difference from the German concept of Landschaft, which is usually bound to territory (and which, at least in older research, was primarily considered to be a “container” for law and customs), as well as from the English concept of landscape, which has in part become merely symbolic and cultural (in the work of Denis Cosgrove, Simon Schama, and others), the Italian historian Angelo Torre developed a new, integrative approach. This approach engages elements from microstoria and French research into urban history (Lepeitit), from Certeau and Appadurai, and from cultural geography and environmental history.

This approach is suited for application both to natural/environmental landscapes and to localities or places that are more strongly culturally determined. As Torres sees it, we should not separate the botanical universe, social and cultural practices, and legal values, but consider them together in their process of producing landscapes and localities (Torre 2008a; see also Torre 2001). Taking northwestern Italian municipalities since the sixteenth century as an example, Torre again recently demonstrated how a locality forms and also changes over time to the present day through shared practices (understood as modes of doing, working, exchanging). In the process, he considers both conflicts over space and human interactions as integral parts of the process through which locality is formed and transformed (Torre 2011). He assumes, in other words, that localities are constituted both in discourse and through practices.

His preferred sources are legal files, as he believes that interesting insight into how humans deal with space can be gleaned from conflicts and confrontations that are negotiated in court—insight about the formation of territory (acquisition, use, border practices) and how practices of religion, trade, and law shape a place. He considers the latter to be particularly important, since these practices never refer to codified law alone. On the contrary, microstoria assumes that different institutions, standing in conflict with each other, constitute their own forms of law and thus their own places. Torre shows how this happens concretely by examining the Catholic fraternal order in Piedmont, which was able to escape both ecclesiastical and municipal control and created laws and spaces of its own through this kind of resistance. Locality in such a case is both a geographic territory—not given, but rather created, negotiated, made—and an area of common practices, meaning practices formed by the people or groups who act for and against each other. Locality here becomes a kind of perpetual (but not unchanging) social and cultural construction (for research in German, see Sonnabend 1999; Gugerli and Speich 2002; Dix and Schenk 2005; Schramm 2008).

Motivated by the shared interest in examining the spatial dimensions of historical societies, historians from the universities of Aix/Marseille (later replaced by Paris I–Panthéon-Sorbonne), Dresden, and Warwick created an international network called Social Sites–Öffentliche Räume–Lieux d’échanges (1300–1800). These scholars articulated the network’s central aim as fostering a greater
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awareness for spatial uses and perceptions that develop in this period, both on the macrolevel of cosmological order and the microlevel of how human beings experience locality or public spaces such as churches, markets, or taverns. The term “social sites” is borrowed from the research of the political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott on oppositional behavior among the lower classes in Asia, but it calls for much more: the analysis of specific rules and rituals, interpretative patterns that have been incorporated into social life, and deviant behavior together with its sanctioning.

Another of the research network’s aims was to test the viability of theoretical models as applied to history. Central theoretical reference texts included the works of Georg Simmel, Henri Lefebvre, and Martina Löw: concretely, these texts’ relational concept of space, their view of space as a social construction, and their distinction between place and space. Specifically, the network set out to examine the particular characteristics of places/spaces in three different fields during premodern times—political, religious, and economic. This enabled the network to gain a new view of these chosen historical fields (politics, religion, economy). The results from this international research group were documented in three edited volumes (Rau and Schwerhoff 2008; Kümin 2009; Kaiser 2014) and in essays and dissertations published by network members. One of the project’s central theses is the multifunctionality of places in the premodern period. Their respective profiles were much less distinct than often seems to be the case with places in the modern period, to which concrete functions are often assigned. This produced many possibilities for using and shaping these spaces, the coexistence of opposites that were founded in religion, gender, or society, and possibilities of access that were de facto limited by institutions of authority. This practice-oriented approach also showed, however, that at a time in which an absolute spatial concept was dominant on a theological-cosmological and physical level, people’s actions reflected a relational spatial concept of space: individuals could participate in shaping places, create spaces by connecting places with each other, and make arrangements to negotiate conflicts. The network concentrated on social spaces and spatial practices and on modern spatial theories, and less on spatial theories or spatial concepts from the science of that time.

The approach of places of memory (lieux de mémoire), known in German as Erinnerungsorte after the publication of a three-volume work by Hagen Schulze and Étienne François (François and Schulze 2003), is more closely linked to antique tópoi in their meaning as places for storing thoughts or memories than to modern spatial notions. The foundation for this approach was laid by the French historian Pierre Nora, who set out to examine the cultural memory of the French people in a project conceived between 1978 and 1981 in a seminar at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Nora 1998). The resulting monumental work—more than 5000 pages from over 40 authors published between 1982 and 1992—brought together in mosaic-like fashion what the project defined as an inventory of the places of memory in which French identity crystallized or was embodied (Nora 2004). Yet the work does not primarily
understand places of memory as localities (although this is one possibility). These much rather comprise a range of diverse phenomena such as buildings, memorials, celebrations, and landscapes, as well as textbooks, encyclopedias, and even gastronomy, sayings, songs, and similar topics in which, the authors believe, the French nation and republic, as well as French cultural identity are culturally embodied or have left behind mental or material traces. Despite its immediate success, not least of all abroad, the work also encountered strong criticism that was focused, among other things, on its suppression of the less glorious aspects of France’s past. One consequence of this engagement with the work has been increased ongoing research into transnational places of memory and the collective memory of groups that are not bound to nations—thus building once again more strongly on Halbwachs.

In the German counterpart to this model, the editors François and Schulze have consciously chosen to use the term Erinnerungsorte or places of remembrance: “place” is meant here primarily metaphorically or, if seen as real, as something that is interesting only because of its symbolic function for a group. The editors explain that they chose the concept of remembrance over that of memory because it allowed them to better emphasize the variability and respective contexts in which the points of crystallization for collective memory emerge. “We thus understand ‘place’ as a metaphor, as a topos in the literal sense of the word. Yet we do not view this place as a closed reality but on the contrary as a place in a space (be it real, social, political, cultural, or imaginary). That is to say: we are speaking of a place that gains its significance and meaning only through its references to and its position within constellations and relationships that are constantly being reshaped” (François and Schulze 2003, vol. 1: 18).

It may be the case that the German translation of lieux de mémoire (places of memory) as Erinnerungsorte (places of remembrance) is neither correct nor especially illuminating if we assume with Halbwachs that it is always only individuals (and never groups or collectives) who remember. But with their choice of term, the contributors to Deutsche Erinnerungsorte (German places of remembrance) wanted to emphasize the dynamic, contextual nature of these places. Their concept of place, however, is substantially different from the concept of space current in cultural studies that has been discussed elsewhere in this book. The concept of place associated with cultures of memory is primarily a symbol or a metaphor for something that a group has negotiated. This concept can designate a locally fixed place such as Oberammergau, to give one example. The designation as a “place of remembrance” does not, however, just refer to the village itself but to the setting or scene for the world-famous passion play.

As we can see in these approaches, and in a series of excellent studies that cannot be specifically introduced here (Iogna-Prat 2006; Jureit 2012; Nübel 2014), the concept of space has gradually become established in the discipline of history, too. Nevertheless, history has not yet completely adopted the critical approaches from the social sciences. History still has some catching up to do. At the same time, these social scientific methods cannot simply be applied one-to-one to historical material, especially because respective contexts and agents must be taken
into consideration. The following chapter thus attempts to draw up a matrix for historical spatial analysis that incorporates the critical potential of recent debates, and that allows us to simultaneously consider both historical and cultural context.

Notes

2 Quoted from http://web.mac.com/derekgregory/iWeb/Site/On%20Geography.html (accessed August 18, 2011); this page and particular text are no longer available, but similar ideas can be found at https://pwias.ubc.ca/profile/derek-gregory (accessed June 14, 2018).
3 I would like to thank Charlton Payne for initially translating some parts of Chapter 2.
4 Most of Simmel’s texts can also be read online at http://socio.ch/sim/.
5 The French Grandes Écoles are specialized universities educating future elite leaders, admission to which is limited to a small number per year available only by taking a difficult entrance examination. In order to be admitted to the examination itself, candidates must have completed two years of preparatory classes. Bourdieu himself worked on the sociology of the Grandes écoles and their graduates, and he characterized their members as a state aristocracy (noblesse d’État).
6 See the network’s homepage: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/socialsites.
3 Spatial analysis

Before we can carry out an examination based on a spatial analysis, we must not only determine whether the right sources are available, meaning whether the question, with all of its accompanying aspects, can even be answered at all. Additionally, we must always begin by asking two, more fundamental questions: What do we gain from an approach based in spatial analysis? And—would our question also have been relevant for the historical subjects? Even if we must answer no to both, it does not mean that we cannot pursue the question any further.

I believe that an approach based in spatial analysis will generally help us to see more. This “more” is comparable, for example, to viewing political history from the perspective of gender. At the very least, we can once again look at history differently, and perhaps even recognize entirely new connections.

To put it more concretely: whereas a traditional perspective in political history might ask how a city council—for instance, of a municipality in upper Italy—was elected and on what basis it made which decisions, a perspective based in spatial analysis asks which decisions were made in which spaces or how the council staged its power through the design of spaces (the city hall, the church, etc.) or through spatial rituals (on this point, see Meier 2004; Albrecht 2010). Henri Lefebvre described the added value of an approach based in spatial analysis as follows:

L’histoire de l’espace ne peut se contenter d’étudier ces moments privilégiés: la formation, l’établissement, le déclin et l’éclatement de tel code. Elle ne peut laisser de côté le global: les modes de production comme généralités, les sociétés particulières qu’ils englobèrent avec leurs singularités, événements, institutions. L’histoire de l’espace périodisera le processus productif, d’une manière qui ne coïncidera pas exactement avec les périodisations admises.

(Lefebvre 2000, 59)

The history of space cannot be limited to the study of the special moments constituted by the formation, establishment, decline and dissolution of a given code. It must deal also with the global aspect – with modes of production as generalities covering specific societies with their particular histories and institutions. Furthermore, the history of space may be expected to periodize

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the development of the productive process in a way that does not correspond exactly to widely accepted periodizations.

(Translated by Nicholson-Smith 1991, 48)

This statement refers to the epochal divisions of Marxist historiography. Yet it can be easily applied to the conventions of other schools. Lefebvre is firmly convinced that a history written from a spatial perspective will lead to other periodizations, that is, to other temporal divisions in historical narrative: to other epochal divisions as far as macrohistorical events are concerned; and to other ways of structuring processes, as far as individual events, particular histories, or institutional histories at levels beneath that of the epochal dimension are concerned. The prospect of such a result, namely, a new division of history, itself makes it worth considering history from a spatial perspective or taking another look at familiar phenomena from spatial points of view.

The answer to the second question—about the relevance of these questions for historical subjects—will perhaps more frequently be negative. But this is frequently the case for questions posed in the discipline of history.

For example, the question of whether medieval trade in silk was already global in scope (see Ptak 2007) did not, in this form, interest any contemporaries. It is nevertheless legitimate to ask such a question out of historical-analytical or comparative interest. For without such comparisons it would not be possible to precisely determine the specific characteristics of modern processes of globalization. Of course, it would be more appropriate, meaning closer to the thinking of the time, to ask how a fifteenth-century merchant accessed the Silk Road on land or at sea, what categories he used to describe his journey, and what understanding he had of proximity and distance. That being said, we should naturally always keep in mind the point of view from which a question is being asked—whether it is from a particular time in history or from the present, whether the perspective be Chinese or European. Indeed, in the course of our investigation, it will eventually become clear that spatial components in societies or even only in the context of particular phenomena played a central role that up to now has been given much too little attention. This is the claim currently being made again and again in debates about the spatial turn. But the assertion has been far from proven for all epochs and regions.

As with all other topics, the analysis of historical spatialities also requires a precisely formulated question. Usually, originality and relevance to the field of research are the considerations guiding the development of such a question. But this also requires a knowledge of the state of research. A precise question is even more helpful if it also structures the course of the investigation and proves helpful in choosing appropriate sources. From the perspective of an analysis concerned with space, where an event took place is only one of many possible questions. The question of localization is interesting mainly in connection with the significance that the agents who are acting attributed to the place of action. Other aspects of spatial constitution are the formation or decline of a spatial constellation, the perception or representation of a spatial configuration, or the use and transformation of spaces.
In order to find the right sources for a topic or chosen focus—meaning sources that allow us to work with the question—it can be useful to have foreknowledge of what can be expected from a certain genre of source and when suitable sources began to exist. In what follows, I aim to briefly list several of the sources that are suitable for our topic (material sources, texts, images, maps, plans).

We should start by noting that there are no special sources for historical spatial analysis since, in principle, spatial dimensions may become visible everywhere (what matters is the information that interests us). The spectrum of sources that comes into question may be most limited with an inquiry oriented toward the materiality of spaces or with thought concerned with the surface of the earth. Of course, these kinds of inquiries usually constitute an attempt at reconstruction by means of material traces or illustrations such as drawings, maps, or plans. For research into space inspired by cultural studies, this is generally no longer the case, since this research tends to be focused on the treatment, narration, and differing perceptions of spatial relations.

In order to nevertheless start with material spaces, the analysis of which can readily be combined with questions about their emergence or use, we could equally turn to archaeological findings or reconstructions (on this point, see MOSAIKjournal 1, 2010; Stock 2015), historical buildings, city squares, gardens, parks, streets, or transportation infrastructure (Baudoux-Rousseau, Carbonnier, and Bragar 2007; Schweizer 2008; Szabó 2009; Laitinen and Cohen 2009; Nova and Jöchner 2010; Horscher, Schentz, and Schuster 2013; Ananieva 2016), and to all kinds of spatial ensembles (plots, quarters, complexes of buildings such as monasteries and the like) that we can see and inspect if we simply leave the library and go out into the streets, into the world. The history of buildings, architectural history, art history (which is likewise concerned, for example, with the design of cities or city squares, or of palace complexes) and, finally, archeology, which is generally concerned with material remainders that are no longer visible, are the indispensable neighboring disciplines to a cultural history based in spatial analysis. Archeology views space as a “fundamental category and, at the same time, a mode of argumentation in the stratification, the spatial distribution of artifacts on the surface, and the location of objects” (Lang 2009, 30). It moreover strives to produce a spatial “visualization of artifacts” (Lang 2009, 30), which also means that its thinking is based less on actions and interpretations, or social relations. If we want to more precisely know how social relations have emerged or materialized spatially, we need to pay more attention to processes of emergence and to the intentions and practices of agents.

Corresponding to the findings of architectural history or archeology, we sometimes also find—in archives or other collections of sources at other places (libraries, museums, private collections)—drawings of these materialized spaces, perhaps even plans, that allow us to reconstruct planning phases or stages of development. Plans or maps—of buildings, cities, regions, or the whole world—belong most generally to the sources that bear witness to the representations and medial dissemination of spatial configurations (on this point, see the digitalization project
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of large-format plans and drawings, www.digipeer.de). In addition to physical remains of buildings and building plans, what is especially relevant are logs or other written sources that provide information about discursive formations, verbal disputes, and mechanisms of power that accompany processes of design and realization (Rau 2015).

This threefold sample of sources (text sources, image sources, material objects) is the most that can be expected and is likely to be achieved only in ideal cases. This depends on the will to documentation found at any given moment in history, the history of its preservation, and also the historicity and cultural specificity of certain sources that societies produce, both in form and content. Sources such as the plans mentioned earlier (for urban planning or for the construction of buildings) will only exist for modern history. Other types of sources may exist in certain regions or territorial dominions but not in others; they may appear only much later or have not been preserved or have been burned. The accounting scrolls of the late medieval Savoy castellany, for example, which contain a rich treasure trove of information about the construction and use of market halls, are probably unique.1 By contrast, the files of the French Court of Auditors in Paris—at least equally important—were largely destroyed in a fire in 1871.

Maps are another important source for historical questions about space. The history of maps and cartography has experienced an upswing in the last few years; discussions are taking place about maps as media, instruments of power, or spatial representations, and we should take the resulting insight into consideration (Harley and Woodward 1987–2007; Dipper and Schneider 2006; Edwards 2007; Dünne 2011). The most recent research has moved beyond the idea that maps are an illustration or true-to-scale representation of a (existing, geographic) space. Today, maps are rather understood as sign systems (Casti 2000) that visualize spatial relationships or processes, (usually) on a two-dimensional level. For the editors of the multivolume History of Cartography, maps are “graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes or events in the human world” (Harley and Woodward 1987, vol. 1: XVI). It is moreover argued that even if a map cannot represent space as such, it is itself a space, generally a two-dimensional tableau on which images, signs, geometric forms, scales, and toponyms are arranged (Lévy and Lussault 2000, 128–132). Maps thus also create new spaces—symbolically, visually, and on the medium of paper. The same is true for atlases as a hybrid metaform of maps or for books of maps or collections of maps. A glance at various specialist lexica uncovers a whole series of definitions, all of which emphasize the constructed or symbolic nature of maps. As a summary, here is the representative definition of “map” provided by the International Cartographic Association (ICA): “A map is a symbolized image of geographical reality, representing selected features or characteristics, resulting from the creative effort of its author’s execution of choices, and is designed for use when spatial relationships are
of primary relevance.” This definition again emphasizes, first, the representa-
tional character of maps, and second, the aspect of their production (creative
effort and decisions on the part of cartographers). What is less apparent in
this definition is the observation that maps themselves create spaces, construct
knowledge, exercise power, and can be a medium for social change, as propo-
nants of critical cartography tell us (Wood 1992; Crampton and Krygier 2006;
Glasze 2009; Farinelli 2009).

Additional obvious sources for investigating spatial dimensions are historical
topographies, chorographies, or historical-geographic descriptions of cities or
regions (Esser, Rau, and Stercken 2010) that were common mainly during the
Renaissance. We should further consider statistics, which emerged during the
seventeenth century to survey the territory of a dominion (Behrisch 2006); for
rural regions, there are so-called land consolidation regulations that, along with
land registries, were intended to guarantee that a territory could be governed.
In the first half of the eighteenth century, César François Cassini de Thury, a
member of the Royal Academy of the Sciences, worked together with his son
Dominique Cassini to survey all of France and represent it on eighteen sheets.
This is the first topographic map (Carte de Cassini) representing all of France
true to scale (and on a geodetic basis). The project was continued and, in 1793,
the academy was able to issue a new Carte géométrique on 182 sheets (see also
Godlewska 2000). As land surveyor of the Prince-Bishopric of Augsburg, Ignaz
Ambros von Amman surveyed significant parts of southwest Germany at the end
of the eighteenth century, publishing the Charte von Schwaben together with
Johann Bohnenberger (Wolfart 2008).

One source for exploring the space of certain groups, and also for how individ-
ual persons experienced space, can be travel reports. Travel guides or geographic
descriptions of landscapes already existed in ancient times (Pausanias), and in
the Middle Ages, it was mainly pilgrims who reported on their journeys to the
Holy Cities (Wettlaufer 2007; Reichert 2001). In the sixteenth century, the genre
was increasingly secularized; especially printed travel reports from the middle of
the sixteenth century onward tell more about journeys taken outside a religious
context (Gotthard 2007). These developed into the genre of the travel guide (from
the “travel books” of journeys to the Holy Land to modern products such as the
Baedeker, which was first published in 1828; on this point, see Müller 2012).
Directories of roads and streets were produced that—like directories of postal
routes—could be presented as tables (Behringer 2006). In addition to the maps
that were occasionally included with these books, and to the astrolabes and com-
passes, these instructions and reports helped provide spatial orientation for travel-
ers to explore, wander through, or pass through spaces while traveling on foot or
via the usual means of transportation of the day, similar in principle to how we use
OpenStreetMap or GPS devices today.

The entire group of sources of self-testimony (diaries, family books, memoirs,
letters, etc.), which are distinguished in the German-speaking world from “ego-
documents” (all documents in which traces of a historical subject can be found),
are also principally suited for spatial analysis: we can ask about the significance
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of spatial surroundings for writing or analyze which locations are thematized at all in a self-testimony (ranging from a simple mention to a detailed description). We can examine social and imaginative acts of self-location. We can discuss the question of whether the self is not comprehended as a space of inner reflection—in French, this is fittingly labeled “for privé” (exemplary analyses can be found in Pils 2002, and in Bähr, Burschel, and Jahncke 2007).

In order to examine the efforts of authorities to produce public order, we can turn to police ordinances from cities or larger political territories, which contain, among other things, references to behavior on streets and in public squares, to times and places of markets, or the opening hours of guest houses. Breaches of these ordinances are found in registers of fines or penalties and, if extant, in the somewhat more detailed police reports, and also partially in the logs or official diaries of police commissioners.

All legal conflict culture belongs to the area of deviance and is documented in the judicial files of all authorities possessing legal decision-making powers. Neighbors quarreled with each other in court about relationships of ownership or rights of use, defendants and witnesses were questioned for offenses ranging from slander and fraud to murder. Offenses (including alleged offenses) often occurred at the locations that had been designated since early modern times as public space or lieu public: city squares, fountains, weekly markets, inns and taverns, or coffee houses. Court files allow us to reconstruct not only the scenes of crimes and the significance accorded to them but also—especially in the longer statements given by witnesses—daily routes, places of work, and sociability. Already beginning in the early modern period, judicial files are produced in nearly mass quantities. When using these files, in other words, one is well advised to make a selection after a first quick examination.

In order to analyze another public space that is probably the most important public space in Christian Europe during premodern times, namely, the church and its cemetery, we can use building plans, ecclesiastical orders, files from visitations, and—where the aspect of deviance or conflict is concerned—once again, judicial files.

We can also get information about seating arrangements, the arrangements of persons or things, seating plans, courses of meals, and other arrangements that are very important in societies organized according to estates and that remain important in diplomacy even today—from ceremony books, treatises on the entrance of sovereigns or processions, menus, cookbooks (such as the Grand cuisinier from the sixteenth century), literature on proper behavior, and occasionally also images (etchings, paintings).

Sources that have not yet been mentioned at all or only in passing in connection with maps and plans are those for the field of imagined spaces. To examine these spaces, literary works (Dante’s Divine Comedy, or utopias such as that of Thomas More) can be equally as helpful as images (which often contain fictive, synthetic, projective, or allegorical elements), visions of world domination or plans for military conquest, narrations of dreams, documents about life after death, or future visions of religious groups. Photographs can have a particular way
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of capturing spatialities, as demonstrated, for instance, by the Hamburg Summer of Architecture.5

We can furthermore evaluate last wills and testaments and inventories of papers left to estates (which often contain references to property ownership and inheritance strategies), purchase contracts (in relation to valuables and their changes), urbaria (registers of property rights of a manor), toll books and emigration books (which document migration manor), records of city council meetings (which document discussions or at least decisions of city councils regarding construction in the city and contain information about the defense and control of the city space), as well as lexica, encyclopedias (for investigations in conceptual history, for example, regarding the common knowledge of a certain moment in time), geographic journals or periodicals (La Géographie, since 1822; Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, since 1855; Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, since 1831; and others), and textbooks (history books with maps or school atlases such as Spruner-Menke, Diercke, or Putzger). And finally, films and—if we enter the realm of soundscapes—audio documents are centrally important for the history of the twentieth century.

This is a long and incomplete list because spatial dimensions were important in nearly all areas of society and have left traces in many contexts. Often these sources must be superimposed upon one another, meaning that many questions cannot be answered at all with only one source or kind of source, as is also true of many other questions. The implications go so far that certain spatial structures or developments cannot be directly read from sources anyway, regardless of whether the data are counted, measured, or gleaned through interpretation. We must first carry out an analysis or interpretation. In any case, it is only after conducting a thorough social and cultural analysis that we will gain insight into a specific context, such as concert visits or places of consumption and social belonging (race, class, gender, age) in a city or a region. And we will probably never be able to glean answers to questions about how social structures are spatialized or how a space becomes sacred directly from a single source.

Finally, the emergence or transformation of a certain type of source related to space can become an object of investigation. For example, the question of when maps of the world first emerge and of the forms, scale, and aesthetics they have taken in different cultures not only tells us about their historicity but also about the cultural specificity of world maps as a genre, and thus about a certain cultural technique for appropriating the world. In this vein, the medieval mappae mundi fulfill entirely different functions as maps of the world than does the Mercator projection that became widespread beginning at the end of the sixteenth century. Images of the world that have been produced since the middle of the twentieth century with the help of satellites are something else again. And today it is not only the case that everyone with access to a computer and the Internet is able to view the entire earth or parts of it. With the right technical know-how, we can also participate in shaping these images. This trend, which was first developed for urban planning contexts to bring affected residents into decision-making
and design processes, is called participatory or collaborative cartography (on this point, see Sources 9–15 in the Appendix).

Similarly, the emergence of city views or vedute was connected to a specific urban culture, mainly that of the Italian Renaissance, before these then gradually spread across Europe. Independently of this history, city views also existed in pre-Columbian America, although they were constructed according to different codes. These were less like topographic maps and more like itinerary maps or symbolic views of cities, illustrated with historic events or genealogies of the city founders (Mundy 1996; Dym and Offen 2011).

Once we have considered the state of current research in order to develop an exciting question and a body of related sources, we can begin with the actual analysis. To carry it out, I suggest an investigatory schema in four steps. The schema can be carried out completely or partially. After investigating the constitutive processes of spatial configurations, which includes identifying the spatial formation (1), the next step is an investigation of spatial dynamics (2), which involves processes of appropriation and shaping, on the one hand, and aspects of transformation, on the other. The third step is concerned with the subjective side, or to put it more precisely: with perceptions, memories, and representations (3), and then finally a fourth step is concerned with uses of space and spatial practices, and not least of all with movements in space (4).

Historical theories of space intentionally do not appear in this investigatory schema as a subpoint of their own. Yet we should not leave them entirely to philosophers. Rather, we should also always ask to what extent they are reflective of their time or what effects they might have had on different societies. For it is from this perspective (their relation to society) that they are important elements for better understanding societies and social practices.

It can generally be said in this regard that the result of a historical study of space will be more differentiated the more steps are carried out. The calculation is simple: if we can see how an urban or village square was used for markets or celebrations, we simply know more about this place than if we had considered it only from the historical perspective of its architecture or its regulatory role. For the sake of brevity, in what follows I will abbreviate the individual steps of investigation for analyzing the spatial analysis or spatial configurations with these designations:

1 Spatial types or configurations
2 Spatial dynamics
3 Spatial perceptions (plus memories and representations)
4 Spatial practices and uses of space.

The following four sections will explain these steps in greater detail and, at the beginning of each section, the corresponding analytical concept. Following a general introduction to the analytical concept and its scope, I will present examples from research or look at sources to thematize possible investigations.
However, I would like to make one more observation before engaging with spatial types: physical, mathematical, and astronomical spatial terms and concepts will not play a central role among the spaces I thematize here, which will generally be socially constructed or individually appropriated (on this point, see Wertheim 2000; Linhard and Eisenhardt 2007). Spatial concepts from the natural sciences would certainly be interesting for historical research oriented toward the social sciences and cultural studies, albeit in the framework of a history of spatial concepts in physics that reconstructed the social place of early modern physical theories; the same would hold true for a history of theological or scholarly debates that considered their social effects. We might think of the debates about the geocentric or heliocentric view of the world between representatives of the church and astronomy that began around 1500, or of the trial that Galileo Galilei faced after he published his dialogue about the two world systems in 1632. These are topics from the history of knowledge or science that have recently begun to address the spatiality of knowledge in addition to its cultural modes of construction.

3.1 Spatial constitution and configurations

Even if we assume that spaces originate in social interactions—as is done in human geography, the sociology of space, and increasingly also in history—this hardly means that these spaces only come about in face-to-face communication or in what are often called “societies of face-to-face-interaction” (Schlögl 2008). Translocal relationships, and with them the constitution of spaces of medium or larger size, are possible even in societies without the Internet, telephones, and airplanes. In addition to size (microspaces/macrospaces) and range (near/far), there are yet other categories that can help us to differentiate spaces. These are, in particular, locality/translocality, concreteness/abstractness/representation, position/routes/surface, and permanence/fluidity. Moreover, it is possible to decode structural or cultural topographies, in the sense of institutionalized spatial semantics and processes carried out by individuals or groups, that become apparent in texts or everyday practices.

Not least of all to avoid losing sight of several macrohistorical processes while reflecting on space, we should begin by examining the largest space that human beings constitute or can imagine through their actions and movements, and which they have represented time and again: the world. The world is understood as the most extended space that human beings regularly occupy. This does not primarily mean occupation in the physical sense, since bodies occupy certain spaces that can be exactly determined and named with the help of a coordinate system (latitude and longitude). Rather, it means the idea of being present or finding oneself (at a place) in the world. And this, in turn, presupposes that the world is an object of experience and part of a shared representation. Depending on the definition, this world does not just refer to the surface of the earth. It can also include what is underground or in outer space. These two areas are actually explored though deep-sea diving, mining activities, space flight, and the like.
However, these subterranean and supraterrestrial worlds are more relevant for social imagination than for concrete exploration, which remains reserved to only a few individuals.

**Macrohistorical processes**

In a narrow—physical or astronomical—definition, this largest of human spaces refers to the planet earth. On the earth, we find clearly concentrated inhabited zones (the continents) and zones that are less densely inhabited, as well as uninhabited and at most temporary transit spaces (the areas near the poles and the oceans). Human beings have appropriated this planet earth over the course of many thousands of years (see Lévy’s concept of “mondialisation,” in Lévy and Lussault 2003, 637–642).

If we take *Homo sapiens* as the beginning of human development and society, then the settlement of the earth began around 200,000 years ago in Africa. This settlement is not only a form of world appropriation in the sense of taking possession—physically and symbolically, though not legally. The gradual spread of human beings to other continents, the social and political formation of groups, and the installation of these groups in individual houses, settlements, or villages and later in cities (these are all different spatial configurations) first create the preconditions for later networks of commercial, political, or sociocultural interests. The act of occupying a place carried out by groups, and the development of different social and spatial configurations (building, settlement, village, city), together with the necessary communication infrastructure and possibilities of mobility, form important preconditions for globalization in a sense that is not purely economic. The different ways of dealing with land (ranging from its settlement to a process of surveying, subdividing, and shaping it into more or less regular forms, and the construction of buildings) are signs of planning, be it sporadic or systematic, that are manifest above all in phases of colonization: for southwest Europe in the course of the *Reconquista*, likewise for the founding of medieval cities east of the Elbe.

Urbanization is a special process within this long development, out of which a spatial configuration with its unique characteristics (dense building construction and central functions of place) crystallizes. Even if economists today speak of the “triumph of the city” (Glaeser 2011), urbanization is in no way the teleological endpoint of a development in human history. Given regularly recurring famines, epidemics, or wars, even into the nineteenth century it remained unimaginable or at best a utopia to think that fifty percent of the world’s population would live in cities or urban agglomerations, as is the case today. Moreover, we must distinguish between different forms and phases of urbanization. For one thing, the term denotes different phases of urban construction (Rau 2014, 21–40, 405–406). We are thus concerned here with moments in history in which certain regions experienced intense city-founding activity. These moments include the *poleis* structure of ancient Greece and the Mediterranean coasts as well as the cities founded in the Roman Empire, which provided the initial spatial
arrangement for many cities in southern Europe and central Europe (Augsburg, Cologne, Trier). In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, we see a large wave of cities being founded across Europe, concomitant with a transformation of ancient cities as they were adapted to the new needs of handcraft production and trade; finally, outside Europe, there are the cities founded by the Spaniards and the Portuguese in colonial America.

The second sense of the term “urbanization” refers to a process of city development—in other words, to a transition process, usually conditioned by migration, from rural to urban societies, which can be measured by an increase in a region’s level of urbanization. To give a few points of reference: if we take 2000 inhabitants as a threshold, the degree of urbanization in Europe increased in the early modern period from around 11.5 percent (1500) to 26.5 percent (1800). In 1900, the continent reached a level of urbanization of 50 percent. However, these developments played out quite differently in individual regions of Europe. And for non-European regions, we would have to describe entirely different processes. Despite this unequal and discontinuous development, the process of urbanization is also a form of taking possession of the world and shaping it. Urbanization makes the world habitable and structures it through cities and their connections to each other, just as cities themselves are composed of and structured by different spatial components. The newest form of this process is the formation of metropolises, which can be closely associated with modern globalization.

Another way of appropriating the world is through voyages of discovery. Seen from a Western perspective, these are the voyages that took place beginning in the fifteenth century. They were followed by the colonization of the world carried out by Europeans and the establishment of world empires (or attempts to do so). The significance of this process must be relativized, even if we admit it was through these new sailing routes that the spherical shape of the world was in fact perceived as a reality, and that the connection of a new continent to the Old World made it possible to join more regions of the earth together into networks. However, the phase of the great European discoveries was essentially a further stage in a process of interconnection between Europe, Africa, and Asia that had been developing since antiquity in the voyages the Europeans undertook to Asia. This process was the reward for the courage it took to push against the strong headwinds, cross the Atlantic, and thus expand the known space of interaction to integrate areas beyond the Atlantic and, soon thereafter, from the southern part of the Indian Ocean.

Of course, we cannot view this process only from a European perspective. Europe was conversely discovered by the other areas of the world, even if this did not necessarily happen at the same time. Moreover, as historians we are faced with the problem of an unequal balance of information. The economic historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam, who teaches in Los Angeles, has turned this usual perspective around by examining how Portugal was discovered by non-European traders and rulers (Subrahmanyam 2007). And Dipesh Chakrabarty makes a plea for a general shift in perspective by arguing that we decenter Europe in historical research and the social sciences (Chakrabarty 2008, 2010). In a similar vein, the
French geographer Christian Grataloup calls for us to decenter Europe in historical narrative (Grataloup 2011).

The second reason to relativize the great voyages of discovery stems from an epistemological consideration of the phenomenon. Seen in this light, the concept of the earth is not the consequence of voyages by ship and discoveries. Rather, the relationship is precisely the other way around. In order to see the new worlds, they had to be created in thought first (Besse 2000). These thinkers of worlds were chiefly cosmographers and geographers, but even beginning in the thirteenth century, travelers already expressed their amazement about the size of the world—for instance, the observations that the Franciscan monk Guillaume de Rubrouck made about his twenty-five-month journey to Central Asia to see the great Khan. It’s almost as if we could say people had suspected for centuries that the earth was in fact larger than its hitherto-known parts.

However, the strategies of world appropriation not only included discourses of knowledge, navigation instruments, and gunpowder. They also included the intention to produce images and narratives about this world, which then circulated in travel reports, travel collections, images, and sequences of images, where they themselves then produced further ideas about the distant areas they represented. To quote Stephen Greenblatt: “Struggling to grasp hold of the immense realms newly encountered, Europeans deployed a lumbering, jerry-built, but immensely powerful mimetic machinery, the inescapable mediating agent not only of possession but of simple contact with the other” (Greenblatt 1991, 40). The question of whether travel reports are fictive, quasi-fictive, or indeed authentic doesn’t play such a decisive role here. What is important is only that these reports of travel and of travelers’ experiences succeed in suggesting that the journey took place and that explorations of the unknown world (cities, countries, landscapes) be considered relevant.

Parallel to this development, geography took shape as a science of the inhabited earth. The discipline is connected to schools of thought in Sagres (Portugal), Nuremberg, Florence, and Saint-Dié. In any case, the travel literature of the early modern period, together with iconographic representations of the new world and maps (especially maps of the world and of continents), are the media that produced these new world images and that enabled the European public to take ownership of this world in its greater dimensions, even if its members did not themselves travel or work in the business of importing new goods. The third element of the “machinery” of which Greenblatt speaks is the newly emerging publishing industry with its accompanying book market, as well as publishers specialized in producing travel collections, some of which were elaborately illustrated (on this point, see Burghartz 2004).

The dissolution of the spatial structures that were built up in the course of colonization is described under the process of decolonization, which some thinkers also characterize as the late phase of colonization (for an introduction to this idea, see Jansen and Osterhammel 2014). A first wave of decolonization can be observed beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, as the British, then the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the New World,
successively declared independence from their mother countries. The second wave of independence (settler colonies, Egypt, Iraq) followed from the end of the nineteenth century onward, lasting in part to the period after the Second World War (India, Indonesia, Indochina, Africa). These not infrequently violent processes by which the colonies separated from the colonial powers are usually, and entirely correctly, described as a process of winning political independence; they were not infrequently coupled with nascent nationalism. They did not occur without social, economic, and cultural changes. Decolonization can also be considered from the perspective of changes in spatial constellations. From one perspective, namely that of the colony, this is a process of reappropriating territory that has been shaped by its inhabitants; from another, global perspective, the connections and networks are of course not dissolved all at once. Quite the contrary, the dissolution of political-hegemonic structures merely defines these connections and interactions in a qualitatively different way.

Processes of globalization contribute to building networks between people and places worldwide. They create networks of the most diverse kinds: markets, diplomatic connections, communication networks, etc. This is not a process that proceeds uniformly. Moreover, agents can come from different world regions. The slowing and decline of networking processes, meaning the apparent dissolution of the global space of exchange and movement, are accordingly characterized as decolonization. Decolonization is caused by political violence, (re)nationalization, or regionalization. But it can also be the consequence of an interrupted production chain (of raw materials or their processing and sale) or an economic crisis: terms such as global currency crisis or global economic crisis also indicate a high degree of networking. The period of the World Wars (1914–1945) was such a phase of a strong decline in networking. It was not until the 1970s that global economic interconnectedness again reached the level that existed before 1914. Places do not disappear because of deglobalization; a connection is merely removed. Processes of dissolution are not per se irreversible. Old connections, of any kind, can be taken up again, and new constellations can be established at a later point in time.

Discourses and practices of exploring and appropriating the world, the circulation of goods and people, the production of connections and their dissolution, and finally practices of reflecting on all of these make the world into a new epistemological object in the early modern period—claiming the world as a profane object of knowledge and human action rather than as something transcendent or divine. In this way, the world becomes the place of human beings, equally so for the inhabitant of a village as for the resident of a metropolis. How this world is constituted in each case and the relevance it is given depends on specific historical constellations. This is exactly what we must investigate. In any case, the moment spatiality can be thought on multiple levels, possibly also nested within each other, it becomes possible to be present at a place and in the world. The form and intensity in which agents realize the respective world relations are, of course,
something that remains as a question and topic of research. Yet considering a world relation to be impossible for a person in traditional societies from the very beginning would also mean presupposing a notion of the world that is exclusively modern. Accordingly, we must not fail to recognize the diverse possibilities that elites, at least, have always had to establish relations to other people or objects in distant places. Face-to-face is not opposed to face-to-the-world, and it does not exclude such a (parallel) relation.

**Spatial types, spatial formations**

The term “spatial type” (*Raumtyp* or *Raumtypus*) is a simplified way of saying spatial constellations, configurations, or formations. Of course, the reduction to an everyday notion of space that comes with the idea of spatial types holds a danger. One might think that the term refers to concrete, tangible, three-dimensional objects, perhaps different rooms of a building or different types of buildings (such as skyscrapers, apartment buildings, or duplexes). But this ultimately represents only the surface of the kinds of spaces that society can produce. These particular types are the material results of a culture of living and building. If we understand spaces to include all social objects that are characterized by a spatial dimension, then these precisely do not include only material objects but also objects that are immaterial, ideal, or hybrid. Regardless of the physical state that spaces might possess, the task as seen from the perspective of spatial analysis is first to examine how spaces have been made, meaning socially constructed. The concept of social construction has been especially criticized by medievalists (see Méhu 2007, especially 277–278) because, so they argue, the tendency has been to consider social facts not as being created by human beings but as given by a divine being. That being said, we can ask which agents were involved in producing spaces.

Spatial formations or spatial constellations (or in short: spaces) are the result of social processes of negotiation, meaning an intellectual or material activity of construction, or of efforts to create order carried out by participating agents. Our languages possess quite a large repertoire of terms allowing us to differentiate the results of such social processes of constitution. We should make use of it. The most obvious way of doing so would be to differentiate according to size and form. An initial consideration already suggests a division into places, city squares, buildings, cities, and territories. These could be systematized as follows:

*Points* or *localities*: All spaces that refer to a concrete, clear site. This could be a bus stop, a meeting point, or the place where something happens, such as an accident.

*Way-spaces*: These generally create connections between two or more places or serve to overcome distances. They include pathways, streets, avenues, pilgrim trails, trade routes, and motor vehicle highways. Abstracting from the earth as a substrate and from architectural aspects, we could also include routes taken by ships or airplanes. And there are still other pathways that create connections.
between two or more points. We could think here of letters, the telephone, the Internet (which offers not only correspondence via email but diverse possibilities of communication). These create virtual spaces of communication. In order to linguistically differentiate these two areas with precision, it would be better to speak of the latter category in terms of communication media (media for communication not mediated by the human body).

**Building spaces:** All more or less closed spaces that are generally fixed in place, such as rooms, buildings (with all of their subtypes according to size and function), towers, palaces, places of worship, and halls. If we look beyond human construction, we can also include caves; and if we look beyond the condition of being fixed in place, we could also include mobile homes or tents (though these are less stable).

**Surface spaces:** In contrast to points or localities, these are more extended and generally two-dimensional, such as city squares, football fields, battlefields, or larger territories (dioceses, provinces, regions, countries, continents).

This typology is only a first step toward a more differentiated way of perceiving spaces. Many of these spatial types intermesh, overlap, or appear in reality as part of an ensemble. Beyond their size and form, they are furthermore characterized by a series of attributes that point even more directly to their social construction than does their material construction. Additional criteria to consider are their substantive (political, religious, economic) or symbolic functions.

There are also spaces not defined primarily by their materiality. Following Bhabha, spaces created through intercultural exchange are called third spaces. We speak of spaces of transition or spaces of passage when people are moving from one place or country to another place or country. Such spaces of passage include the countries and cities through which people pass when fleeing or, more generally, migrating; places or lodgings where people might stay for a time but not settle down, and where they do not feel as if they have arrived. And to recall Lefebvre’s three spatial concepts: he suggested spatial representations (coupled with the espace conçu) as the level of observation, meaning all spaces or spatial conceptions that are thought, conceived, or fixed by means of signs. These range from maps that illustrate or formulate spatial relations to dominant world images within a society (on this point, see also Section 3.3). More complex spatial arrangements that link together movements, social uses, and possibly also their written or iconographic representations can be labeled with the term “(cultural) topography.” In no way does this mean a pure description of situation (as in classical cartography), but rather a spatial constellation perpetuated by regular use or the publicly disclosed description (of place), such as is expressed in migration movements, patterns of movement of people and goods within a city, the transportation system of a region and the accompanying transport behavior (with congestion that continually recurs at the same spots), or processions on the occasion of religious or political ceremonies.

Yet as I already suggested, there are additional attributes or instances of social structuring that characterize space. These categories allow us to determine spatial configurations even more specifically in our analyses.
Guiding differences for analysis

**Dichotomies related to space or social structuring**

**Inside/outside**
1. Interior spaces can refer to rooms, buildings, or cities; what is required is an architectural or symbolic boundary or threshold for differentiating both areas.
2. A principle of the psychology of consciousness (in the tradition of Descartes); in this sense also applicable to the history of the self (is the interior of the self comprehended as space? to whom is it accessible? can it be influenced by the external world?).

**Open/closed**
1. Spatially: can overlap with the inside/outside dichotomy, but generally refers—pars pro toto—to a passageway (door, window, threshold) between inner and outer spaces.
2. Temporally: a space can be temporally open or closed. The open/closed space is often the result of efforts to establish order (opening hours regulations) or processes of negotiation (visitor frequency, user behavior). These processes as well as the shift between both conditions are aspects of the temporalization of space.

**Public/private**
One of the most important dichotomies structuring society. Public space need not be reduced to the concept of bourgeois publicity formulated by Jürgen Habermas, not least of all because this publicity refers less to spaces than to a (ideal) communicative sphere.

Spaces are designated as public when they serve the common good (*bonum commune*) or are generally accessible. A public space can be local (a city hall or politics in the premodern city) or translocal (republic of scholars).

In differentiating between public and private, it is furthermore important to consider the time and context since privacy was for a long time almost exclusively a legal concept and becomes important as an attribute for the family or intimate relationships only beginning in the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the conceptual antonyms to public are secret, closed, and exclusive.

**Near/far**
Dichotomy for describing relations of distance. Distance, meaning the gap between two or more realities, is relative and depends on context, ranging from zero to infinity. In order to overcome distances, mobility (on foot, by means of other transportation) or telecommunication is required. Attributes of distance also serve to express social practices that are grounded in a relation of distance (long-distance trade, distance learning). The eradication of distance can also be read as densification (producing proximity).

**Built (up)/unbuilt**
Used to distinguish spatial constellations with and without material constructions. Construction tends to refer to building construction and civil engineering. A place that has been endowed with constructed elements (fountains, benches) is thus not a built space but belongs rather to the category of unbuilt spaces, the limits of which are marked off by buildings.

**Solid/fluid**
This dichotomy refers less to an opposition of two spatial types as it does (1) to the result of a process constituting a material space (becoming solid) that can stand, in its relative immobility, as a symbol for permanence, and (2) to the fact that spatial formations can also be mobile and fluid (rivers, demonstrations).
Ephemeral/lasting

Another dichotomy that emphasizes the temporality of spaces. In this case, the dichotomy concerns the difference between ephemeral (meaning singular, passing) spatial constellations and those that are made to last or be institutionalized. These more lasting spaces can be achieved through buildings, regularity, and rules (such as regulations, constitutions). They express a spatialization of time, which is thereby (more or less, depending on the form) immobilized.

Male/female, or spaces given a gendered connotation

We ought to do without the dichotomy of male/female for various reasons, mainly because spaces have no gender. What seems more adequate is to speak of spaces as being given a gendered connotation or spaces as having been appropriated by the respective genders. Work in the history of gender mostly connects this dichotomy to the wiggle room that agents have to act, which is quite ambivalent. Still there are also spatial constellations (areas of households, managerial levels, professions) that are given a gendered connotation as the result of legal, religious, or political mechanisms of exclusion.


Sacred/profane

This dichotomy originated with the religious studies scholar Mircea Eliade, who understood sacred and profane as two different kinds of being-in-the-world. The distinction remains important as a guiding difference for analyzing religious spatial order. Yet it needs to be historicized, and we need to consider it as something practiced by or ascribed to participating agents (on this point, see Schwerhoff 2008b). Overlaps as well as the temporary intrusion of the sacred into the area of the profane (and vice versa) are manifest in houses of worship that are used by multiple confessions, in pilgrim journeys, in desecrations of the sacrament, and increasingly in public ecclesiastical events (so-called Kirchentage or public church gatherings, papal appearances in stadiums, etc.). For studies of space and religion, see Knott (2005a, 2005b, 2010).

Center/periphery

The center/periphery model presumably comes from Werner Sombart’s work on capitalism (1902), where it was used to characterize a hierarchical relationship of two spaces based in asymmetrical interactions. Hierarchical, static, and fixed around a center (as the more advantageous position per se), the dichotomy is less fruitful if it is not historicized, considered to be mutable; and if the relationships between the positions are not seen as relational (viewpoints of historical agents, an organically circular form as an alternative model). Can be applied to city–country relations, to interregional and intercontinental relations.

The list of dichotomies or attributes related to space could certainly be extended further. However, these dichotomies do not always lead to a productive result. They have the advantage of allowing us to more precisely determine respective components through juxtaposition. And yet sometimes a third category is necessary in order to correctly understand a phenomenon. Examples are the meeting points of late medieval and early modern noble drinking societies (Geschlechtergesellschaften)
Spatial analysis

or the workmen’s taverns (Trinkstuben) (on this point, see the contributions in Fouquet, Steinbrink, and Zeilinger 2003). These cannot be designated as either public (because they were not open to every town burgher) or private (because the rooms were sometimes located in the city hall, sometimes in the spaces of an urban innkeeper, sometimes in houses that the societies themselves purchased). The term “exclusivity” has prevailed as fitting to describe the sociability of these spaces (since access was limited to a select, male public belonging to the upper class or to certain occupational groups). Another critical point is that some dichotomies appear to be anachronistic in certain historical contexts. These dichotomies, too, originated at some point in history; they are meaningful in a certain historical constellation and are conceptually articulated and yet also transformed under the influence of new events or new discourses. The question of whether these dichotomies can be transferred to non-Western cultures is a similar epistemological problem that can often be solved only through comparison or a careful approach. Despite all these reservations, it is helpful to use these dichotomies as analytic instruments or guiding differences in order to understand the formation and structure of spatial orders. This also includes the fact that it is only through the lens of these supposedly strict differentiations that we can see there have sometimes been and continue to be large zones of transition or spatial overlap in practice.

In addition to the differentiated consideration of spatial formations and the analysis of word pairs or dichotomies related to space, another instrument exists for examining the spaces of historical societies. These are spatial figures as they were introduced into the discussion by Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault, among others, even though the terms come from older philosophical or literary traditions. These have been complemented by terms from geography, usually from more recent, methodologically reflective work in geography, that serve to capture and describe phenomena that are adjacent or overlap. Spatial figures are based in structures that are somewhat more complex than those of dichotomies rooted in binary thinking; they are in part dynamic or at least consider the factor of time, which is hardly separate from spatial relations when a lifeworld is concerned.

Spatial figures

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Borders, markings</th>
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<td>Borders represent an important spatial figure to the extent that they help to differentiate groups who use them in order to assign spaces to themselves. Borders need not always be material; they can be symbolic (drawn by routes traveled on horse or by foot) or exist only in the imagination. We can distinguish the following types: linear borders, border regions (or zones), national borders, customs borders, developmental borders, marches, endings (for a temporal border), mental/cultural borders. The term “natural border” (for borders that follow mountains, rivers, forests) is misleading, because it easily allows one to conclude that borders are naturally given, causing their constructed nature to recede from focus. Important studies: Sahlins 1990; Medick 1995; Osterhammel 1995; Pohl 2000; Serrier 2005; Deger and Hettlage 2007; François, Seifarth, and Struck 2007; Herbers and Jaspert 2007; Roll, Pohle, and Myrczek 2010; Duhamelle 2010; Wagner 2012a; Rutz 2018.</td>
</tr>
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Isotopes  Term used by Henri Lefebvre to observe that modern city centers resemble each other through similar places (such as office buildings, hospitals). Can be transferred—going beyond a critique of capitalism—to apply to other phenomena of similarity (sacred architecture, urban forms in the case of planned cities).

Utopias  Moments of constituting places that do not (yet) exist (occurs in processes of planning), specifically, a philosophical-political vision of an ideal society that lies in the future or a distant region of the world. The classic work: Thomas More’s *Utopia*, from 1516.

Heterotopias  Places of the others, the excluded classes at the margin, of non-city-dwellers, suburbanites, wagoners, half-nomads (Lefebvre 1972); counterplacements, abutments to the utopias realized in society (Foucault 1986). Examples: cemeteries, psychiatric clinics, slaughterhouses. Sometimes heterotopias are also understood as places beyond the everyday world, as spaces of freedom from factual, everyday constraints.

Copresence  Confluence of multiple spaces or social realities at one place or in close proximity. Because of spatial proximity, copresence is prone to conflict, but it can also engender intensive interaction (example: a dance club). Regulations and rules are thus necessary.

Simultaneity  Alternative expression for copresence, with emphasis on time, which is annulled here to an extent but manifests in a spatialized form. Example: the cityscape of Dresden, in which elements of the Baroque, prefabricated architecture from the German Democratic Republic, and reconstructed baroque styles from the twenty-first century are visible in a single vista.

Cospatiality  Overlapping or intermeshing of spaces; presumably the social norm, especially in dense spaces such as cities. Examples: bed < room < apartment < apartment building < block of buildings < city quarter, etc. (on this point, cf. the image of a rhizome or the *Mille plateaux* from Deleuze and Guattari 1987); the overlapping of multiple cities in one city, depending on the observer’s point of view or the group of users.

Network(s)  Space with a topological structure. It is useful to distinguish here between geographic networks and spatial metaphors (social networks, actor–network theory, network society with its usually ambivalent usage). Examples of geographical networks: technological networks (systems of canals), transportation networks, networks of cities. When viewed independently from technological considerations and territorial ties, a network can also function as a reference space that—possibly for only a limited period of time—is connected to other spaces and other networks. This allows dynamic and discontinuous elements to be better integrated. Interactions and materializations can produce more permanent structures.

Chronotope  Spatiotemporal figure: materialization of time in space. Category coined by the literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin to examine the relations of time and space in literature. Could be extended to apply to the changing spatiotemporal structures of images of the world and of humankind. Example: the development of new epochs in connection with geopolitical transformations (the fall of the Berlin Wall).
Global spaces: Spatial transformations in the course of processes of globalization

Seen from a global historical perspective, the beginning of the early modern period is characterized by discoveries and the production of maps and globes, even if we must admit that these processes only impacted a small proportion of humanity. It was more the consequences of these processes, such as in terms of trade and the history of consumption, that had effects on wider groups of people. To give an example: on the one hand, potatoes and tomatoes or coffee, tea, and chocolate became available in Europe (Menninger 2004); and on the other hand, countries were conquered, their surviving population subjugated and forced to work for plantation owners.

Even if “global history” appears connected terminologically to the globe, this does not mean that we should restrict our examination of phenomena covered by this label to processes that encompass the entire globe (this is the argument made by Wenzlhuemer 2017, among others). A consideration based in spatial analysis is helpful insofar as it allows us to underscore, as it does on other levels, the plurality of global spaces—their production, transformation, perception, and use. New spaces originate in processes of globalization—just as agents can conversely engender and manage processes of globalization from certain places. For examples of these global—or translocal—places, we can think of exchanges, fondeks, hostels, fairs, and markets or counting houses, but also places of the diaspora, or, in late modernity, telegraph stations, airports, or (temporary) G-20 summits. It follows that globality in a praxeological sense arises when people travel between these places; through transporting goods to other, distant places; or through communication networks, whether via post, telegraph, or satellite. But the emergence of a global space does not mean that another space disappears in turn, since even spaces created through media or trade relations are and remain dependent to a large extent on a geographic location or locality. What we are dealing with in the wake of processes of globalization is thus less the disappearance of spaces (through acceleration) as the transformation of existing spaces and the emergence of new spaces and spatial constellations—and so, de facto, an increase of spatial types.

Of course, people cannot be physically present at two different spaces at the same time. But they can certainly be located simultaneously in a multiplicity of different spaces or within a multiplicity of spatial relations while being physically present at one place. Only with the age of the telegraph—and, later, of the Internet—are we dealing with a partial dematerialization of information flow (Wenzlhuemer 2017, 88–89), in which the information encrypted in digital codes and also the nodes in the network become invisible.

If we devote our attention to a global history that gives space a prominent role, we must also consider the processes by which global spaces are produced, as well as their transformations, perceptions, and uses. Since macrospaces especially cannot be perceived with the naked eye, we would do well to also examine spatial representations (visualizations in the form of images or maps). From the agent perspective, what is interesting is not only the profile of the agents or groups of
agents in processes of spatialization, but also the question of how it is possible for these agents to simultaneously occupy different spaces with global dimensions—sitting in an Internet café in a world city, communicating with friends on another continent, while watching both the goings on out beyond the window on the square at the local market and the stock prices on Wall Street.

The city: A changing spatial configuration

The city is a field well suited for investigating spatial forms and dynamics. The history of this social formation can be ideally understood as a complex spatial phenomenon that is at once distributed worldwide and regionally differentiated. This does not preclude the existence of similarities based on the circulation of technological knowledge or the attempt to export urban models under colonial conditions. And in no way does this mean that the city is a uniform phenomenon. Rather, it is to be considered in its irregularly developing phases of institutionalization and stabilization or in the manifestations of its disintegration. The city has a long history and is accordingly an established field for research using historical methods. At the same time, and especially in historical research, the diverse spaces of the city have until now been understood primarily as “absolute”: from a material point of view (in terms of architectural history), according to form and arrangement (above all in Italian architectural history), in regard to the spatial organization of administration and parishes, in consideration of open spaces such as city squares and parks, or with a view toward infrastructure (streets, subways).

What we still lack are studies of the city that work with a consistently analytical spatial concept, as well as monographs that reveal the complex interplay of spaces, spatial practices, spatial conflicts, and agents. To a large extent, we likewise lack an analysis of spatial figures and of the emergence and development of spatial hierarchies in relation to the city, even if several monographs and edited volumes have already made a start in this direction (Hochmuth and Rau 2006; Groos, Schiewer, and Stock 2008; Ehrich and Oberste 2009; Morscher, Scheutz, and Schuster 2013; even more social-geographic and “territorial” in approach: Roncayolo 1997; on the basis of land registries: Teisseyre-Sallmann 2009; consistently analytical in its approach to space: Rau 2014). The research into the history of rituals that developed during the 1980s in the context of Italian urban history has also participated to some extent in this turn toward space (on this point, see the work produced by the “excellence cluster” called “Religion and Politics” at the University of Münster; additionally: Boschung, Hölkeskamp, and Sode 2015). This work examines procession routes and urban sacred topographies of cities, as well as real and hybrid spaces created during these processions (Good Friday processions, processions at the Feast of Corpus Christi).

The city is eminently suited for examination as a spatial social formation. In comparison to the settlement or the village, it is one of the most complex spatial configurations. Viewed more closely, it actually consists of a great many spatial configurations coexisting or nesting within each other. A building is part of a neighborhood, which is part of a district, which is in turn part of the entire city.
Lévy uses the term “geotype” to describe such an ensemble of interactive spatial configurations (Lévy and Lussault 2003, 412–413). A geotype is not made up of only one space but is characterized by the interspatiality of at least two spaces, hence by cospatiality. A geotype is additionally characterized by the fact that it appears, at first glance, to consist of a single, homogeneous space. This is the case with the term “city”—suggested by the city’s name (which gives it a fixed identity) and the use of singular (a city), and supported by various ways of constructing images. Yet if we look closer, we see that “city” is a synthetic term. A city possesses an outer form, which in the Middle Ages and the early modern period was usually demarcated by a city wall. In modern times, one might think that cities have lost their form because they appear to have lost cohesion as they have grown farther and farther into their periphery. Yet in addition to its form, a city also possesses an inner structure consisting of infrastructure, buildings, and open spaces. It is often the respective composition of a city—the intertwining of buildings, streets, and spaces and the connections that are created through agents’ use of these spaces—that defines its specific characteristics. Spaces or an ensemble of spaces are also socially structured in the sense described earlier—in ways that are sometimes more open and sometimes more closed, at times more or less strictly regulated.

For every point in time that we can access by means of sources, we can investigate the spatial types that exist in a city—its outer form and inner structure, meaning the intermeshing of different spatial types and its social structures, which allows us to then compare these types in a diachronic perspective or to reconstruct transformations that have occurred. For the epochs in which land registries did not yet exist, this reconstruction is extremely difficult to carry out. For earlier epochs (before 1800), there are only a few cities for which it is possible to carry out such a reconstruction comprehensively and diachronically, with no gaps. At the same time, the fact that cities (such as Görlitz or Venice) already established tax registries (to collect property taxes) or land registries beginning in the late Middle Ages (on Quedlinburg, see Wozniak 2013) is not widely known. It is also possible to work selectively with some city maps that show not only streets but also individual buildings, as is the case, for example, with the sixteenth-century map of Cologne.

The European City Atlas project works more on the basis of archival transmission. Maps of large, medium, and small cities at different historical points in time are reconstructed by national research teams guided by the basic program of the Commission internationale pour l’Histoire des villes from 1968. The atlases mostly contain reproduced and corrected original maps, as well as topical maps, for example, of the settlement history of the respective city. Yet the project ultimately consists only of static images of the city in which neither contemporary perspectives nor spatial relations are taken into consideration. The maps are nevertheless an important precondition for any more far-reaching historical spatial analyses.

A further stage is represented by 3-D models or films of cities at a specific historical point in time generated with the use of digital technology. Architectural
historians, in particular, are making progress in this direction—often for the simple reason that they have the necessary technical devices and programming knowledge. For example, the Laboratorio de Modelización Virtual de la Ciudad (LMVC) at the Polytechnical University of Catalonia recently created a virtual model of the city of Barcelona as it existed in 1714. The model was primarily conceived in order to show the events surrounding the battle of September 11, 1714, in an animated film on Catalan television (TV-3). But architectural historians also used it to construct a virtual model of a greater urban area at a past moment in time, which can also be used for other purposes, especially to show the development of urban forms in the eighteenth century (Muñoz Salinas and Garcia Almirall 2010). Getting there takes multiple steps:

1 Collection of historical data, especially about the buildings in the city during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
2 Collection of historical city maps, above all from the eighteenth century, and their transfer onto a modern map.
3 Construction of a digital elevation model (the result: a reconstructed city map from the eighteenth century).
4 Projection of the reconstructed map onto the digital elevation model (grid), followed by constructing buildings with computer-aided design (CAD) and envisioning facades with the use of digital photography and Photoshop (the result: a 3-D model).

The animation produced in this way then makes it possible to view the city from multiple perspectives or to take a stroll through it. The effort in time and personnel that is required to create such a model is enormous. Of course, this kind of objective reconstruction can only be a partial goal of historical research. Even a kind of cinematic journey into the past becomes possible with the use of these new technologies. Yet these possibilities replace neither an investigation into spatial relations (and their displacements) nor an analysis of the social relations or power relations in the city (on this point, see Sources 3–7 in the Appendix).

**Trade: Interactive relationships that create spaces**

Like the city, trade is a complex spatial configuration. But what is different with trade, as compared with the city, is that we cannot speak of one geotype that might be supported by the suggestion of a spatial unit. Practices of trade are manifest instead as actions, and precisely not as immediately objectified or materialized. It is true that the turning away from a perspective that reduces markets to mechanisms of supply and demand, together with the integration of economic-sociological and cultural anthropological approaches, has led to an emphasis on the interaction of agents (Braudel 1979; Prodi 2009; Häberlein and Jeggle 2010). The result is an understanding of markets as culturally determined social configurations. Yet here, too, we still lack a differentiated, spatially analytical perspective. The thesis advanced by the economist Paul Krugman (who founded
the movement known as New Economic Geography) that international trade is
to be understood only by considering its spatial components may get us further
(Krugman 1993), even if the spatial components in his theory are basically limited
to categories such as center/periphery, localization of production, or nations and
regions. An example of how we might investigate spatial aspects of trade and eco-
nomics can also be found in the writings of the national economist August Lösch
(1906–1945) (Lösch 1962). His categories of analysis included location factors,
market areas and networks, the spatial order of economic areas, and the transfer
of goods. A good starting point is also to be found in research on the historical
trade fair industry, which is especially characterized by its spatial distribution
and temporal rhythms (Margairaz 1988; Johanek and Stoob 1996; Lanaro 2003;
Bonoldi and Denzel 2007).

Even if we cannot dismiss aspects of pricing, the circulation of goods, and the
interaction of participating agents—not to mention regulations and dispute set-
tlement procedures—as constitutive for spaces, spatial components also play a
part in the production of markets. Trade and space are relationally connected to
the extent that this (specific) trade produces (specific) spaces, and that (future)
agents must appropriate the spaces constituted in this way. This relationality is
a first good reason to include a spatially analytic perspective in an investiga-
tion of the complex world of economic interrelations. The second reason to
focus an investigation on the spatial dimensions of economic action is con-
nected to the observation (or hypothesis) that economic relations of interaction
produce and constitute a series of spaces to begin with—or at least to a greater
degree than a neoclassical view or a perspective oriented toward the pricing of
economic systems might suggest. Seeing the diverse spatialities of economic
action nevertheless requires a nuanced, spatially analytical perspective, such
as that suggested by proponents of radical geography. And this perspective,
in turn, is well suited to being combined with a cultural studies approach. One
suggestion for analyzing economic spaces would be to distinguish between spa-
tial types, spatial practices, spatial conceptions, merchants’ geographic spatial
knowledge, and the production of spaces (through these practices or through
governance).

Indeed, markets don’t just produce prices but also obvious spatialities (see
Kaiser 2014), namely, different spatial types such as building spaces—for exam-
ple, loggias, fondaci, factories, hostels, customs houses, exchanges, or exhibition
halls; additionally, surface spaces such as market squares, or way-spaces such as
specific transportation routes or routes for trade by sea or land. Whereas today a
business person can take care of many activities via the telephone or the Internet
(up to the transportation of the goods themselves), traders in earlier times often
had to carry out extensive correspondence, undertake distant and often difficult
journeys, or commission forwarders in order to overcome greater distances. These
are different forms of spatial practices. For some of these practices, especially for
traveling, the traders also had to possess a certain spatial knowledge or to acquire
this knowledge with the help of geographic literature or maps, or often by asking
(experts).
Before utilizing infrastructure and undertaking journeys into foreign countries, in other words, traders occupied themselves with the question of reaching their goal, with the local specifics of certain trading places, their position in the market, the quality of the products being offered at one place, and the spatial constellation of the markets overall. Since the late Middle Ages, this topic has had its own literature, summarized under the term of merchant handbooks (*ars mercatoria*). Other sources quickly become important for appropriating knowledge about certain markets, including newspapers (initially handwritten, later printed), the flow of information about exchange rates and values of goods, and the resulting discourses and notions of markets that must be identifiable for market participants (or those who want to participate). Finally, economic spaces are also created through governance (sets of rules, supervisory institutions), the control of space, and not least of all through the interpretation and practical appropriation of spaces by agents.

The networks arising through trade, often multilayered, are ultimately the most complex configurations. They are not configured purely spatially but initially take shape on the basis of communication and the exchange of information, goods, and persons. Current approaches in the social sciences chiefly take recourse to the network model of Harrison C. White (White 2002; Aspers 2011). This model assumes that markets develop from social interactions and networks, although, of course, not every social relationship immediately produces a market. Competition and relationships of exchange play a further important role. Yet spatial aspects must be given just as much consideration, since trade networks need local anchors, places for meetings to occur, trading posts or transshipment points, and localized nodes (on cultural exchange and networks between 1400 and 1700, see Bethencourt and Egmond 2007; Calabi and Christensen 2007).

A better understanding of market constellations is already facilitated by the analysis of economic theories and policies of the respective epochs and regions. Guillaume Garner, for instance, has examined the understanding of space in the economic theories of cameralism and the origins of national economics, positing a relationship between three levels of the state, the economy, and territory (Garner 2005). He argues that the term “territory” played a central role in the theory of cameralism inasmuch as it functioned, in a time that lacked a completely formed concept of the market (as an economic sphere), to allow the connection between the state and the economy to be thought of, not least of all, in a spatial dimension. Economic policies have long referred to a framework of the state or the nation, but in the modern period they become increasingly transnational, as we can see in the emergence of trade zones—not least of all in the European Union, which at least partially understands itself to be an economic and currency union.

These categories provide a basis for structuring and analyzing the spatial dimensions of (pre)modern long-distance trade markets, which comprise concepts and conceptions as well as practices, formations, and uses.

Beginning about 1500, it is increasingly evident that traders also became interested in geography and cartography, or at least that they should have been. Cartographers such as Martin Waldseemüller (ca. 1470–1520), who is famous
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for having first depicted and named the American continent on a world map, also designed travel maps or route maps. Even Sebastian Münster (1488–1552), writing in the middle of the sixteenth century in his universal cosmography, touted maps and geographic works to traders for use in their trading. This knowledge was not enough for the traders to constitute a market; what we are primarily dealing with is orientational knowledge and information about the origin and quality of goods. At the same time, this kind of spatial knowledge represents a foundation for the development of markets that span the globe; this knowledge was increasingly preserved in writing and collected, and these publications increasingly became collections of knowledge, compendiums, and encyclopedias. The *Merchants Map of Commerce* by Lewes Roberts (1596–1641) is one of the first “compendiums” bundling together expert knowledge in geography, economics, and ethnology that had been amassed at the time by British overseas merchants. It is telling that this work presents this knowledge in a spatially structured form, arranged according to countries and cities, describing the respective situation of each. Roberts was himself a merchant and member of various British trading companies (Company of Merchant Adventurers, Levant Company, East India Company) and for this reason interested in developing British trade. His *Merchants Map* was published many times through the eighteenth century and continually expanded in the process. The first page of the book, following a series of prefaces and dedications, emphasizes the connection of trade and geography (see Source 8 in the Appendix for an excerpt of the book, including the first page).

Precisely in the area of the commercial world, such differentiations as those between places that are solid or ephemeral appear to be useful: because the materialization of spaces in this area of social action is fundamentally less strongly pronounced, we must accordingly pay more attention to the short-term nature of certain places of trade, and thus also to their temporal components. Concrete markets for goods (poultry markets, cattle markets, herb markets, fish markets, etc.) often materialize for only a few hours a day or week. Except for waste and perhaps equipment for setting up the market stalls, they leave no visible traces where they happen. Trade fairs happen even less frequently (sometimes only one to four times a year).

Yet both forms—markets and trade fairs—possess a certain institutional quality because of the regularity with which they occur. In this sense, too, they are connected to (often polyvalent) places (city squares, halls), meaning that market activity is hardly imaginable without these kinds of places. Foucault already introduced fairgrounds as examples of temporary heterotopias (Foucault 1986, 26). Yet in addition to these intentionally designed spaces that appear and disappear with a certain regularity, we should also consider markets that arise spontaneously and with unpredictable regularity. Anyone who has ridden the Paris Metro knows what this means. Markets for freshly imported mangos and stolen electrical goods pop up there just as unexpectedly as a basic awareness of their existence is certain. Independent of markets’ regularity or fixed location, their existence therefore appears to be connected to an idea or expectation held by market participants.
This imagination or knowledge of the spatial and temporal appearance of markets marks one side of a space’s constitution (in this case: an economic space). On the other side, this constitution expresses knowledge, ideas, and experience in writing or as visualizations, allowing it to be passed on. The practice of visualization and knowledge constitution is articulated, for example, in the merchant handbooks mentioned earlier, as well as in maps, economic lexica, or trade journals. Here, too, spaces are the result of practices, ascriptions of meaning, imaginations, or the production of knowledge.

The social interactions of market participants thus produce many different spaces, economic spaces that are anchored in various levels (whether in a city, region, territory, or the world), various spatial formations, a set of rules for regulating and controlling space, and creative mechanisms for bypassing these rules. Finally, it is market participants who generate short-term or permanent spatial structures.

3.2 Spatial dynamics: Emergence—transformation—dissolution

By introducing the term “spatial dynamics,” my intention is to account for the observation that spaces or spatial constellations neither are, nor stay, fixed but rather undergo transformation. They do this under the influence of people who appropriate these spaces, shape them, reorganize them, and perhaps also again dissolve them. Observing these dynamic processes thus also underscores that spaces are not simply a passive, immobile frame or background for things that happen but are themselves part of them, because they stand in close relation to agents, events, and social processes. Under the term “spatial dynamics,” we can examine individual phases or all phases of a process of spatial formation, from emergence to dissolution. Since this is not a purely formal process, it is also important to describe more than the transformation of forms. In the case of spatial dynamics, we are also always dealing with questions of power (who is involved in these processes?) and success (who prevails in a dispute about a rightful place or about the right to occupy a place, or in designing a space?). To a certain extent, such processes of negotiation are dynamic per se because here, in dialogue or dispute, the constellations change constantly up until the moment of decision. Yet it also becomes clear in these cases that the observable processes and dynamics pertain to different moments of spatial constitution. Constitution includes deconstitution. It would be best to differentiate between these two moments: this makes it possible to describe the large arc of emergence, transformation, and dissolution of spatial structures, forms, and constellations. Both discursive and creative processes (of a more hands-on kind) play a part here.

**Emergence/formation**

Describing the processes by which spatial formations originate first presupposes that we identify these formations in their physical states, which is not limited in a process of spatial analysis carried out according to methods of cultural studies—as
it is in physics or chemistry—to the states of liquid or gas but can be described as material/substantial, fluid/liquid, imaginary/virtual/ideal, and hybrid. In this respect, a “social space” in the sense often used in sociology and history does not belong to the description of such a physical state. Rather, it merely emphasizes the significance of social relations, in the emergence or the result (a social gathering around a table, a housing development, a trade network based on interactions between its market participants).

The next step is to identify the participating agents. In the case of urban planning processes, these are—depending on historical epochs and contexts—princes, city councils, architects, landowners, often the church or monasteries, financiers, and, of course, the inhabitants, the subsequent buyers, renters, and other kinds of users of these spaces who possibly also make claims to them. With imagined spaces, the question of the agents is, at first glance, more easily answered: the designer of the three worlds beyond this life in the *Divine Comedy* is the author Dante Alighieri; Thomas More is the person who constructed the ideal society of the Island of Utopia. As historians, we will ask less about the activities of these fictive persons from Utopia or hell or paradise. Still, we can also take recourse to the spatial thinking and acting in these texts in order to clarify which political or religious circumstances resulted in Dante or More describing such spaces in their books, and which social forces or agents contributed to making it possible for visions of the beyond or of just societies to arise.

A third kind of formation is the emergence of unintended spaces or spaces that were not intentionally planned. This can be a dinner party of people who, just moments before, did not individually know that they would form a group, and who arrange themselves around a table in a certain way and thereby express a hierarchy or demonstrate a sense of community, perhaps through singing together and thus creating an acoustic space. Spaces can, however, also arise when initially sporadic practices take a more permanent shape: such instances can often be observed in connection with the emergence of religious movements or reformation movements. An interested crowd of people regularly comes together at a place—an open field, a city square, or in a monastery—in order to hear a preacher or itinerant evangelist who has a new message to proclaim. If there are no counterforces to suspect this new group of heresy, the regularly chosen place is more permanently established, perhaps at first with the addition of a cross, later perhaps with a chapel or a small church.

Many processes of formation involve processes of negotiation. Conflicts over space are carried out verbally, yet also not infrequently physically, militarily, or in court. As an elementary part of events and as producers of discourses and documentation, conflicts over space are an innovative and insightful field of research (see the introduction in Dartmann, Füssel, and Rüther 2004; on gender conflicts in urban planning processes, see Frank 2003). If we have good documentation, it is possible not only to reconstruct the different positions and intentions of the participating agents but also to see that intentions and original aims often change. Even the entire discursive field of power can change. This certainly does not always happen because the better argument won out but also because someone
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with resources of power was able to prevail against someone else. Even the most banal architectural processes of formation unfold differently in reality than as originally planned, since unexpected things such as technical difficulties, shortages of materials, financing problems, labor strikes, and even sometimes a natural catastrophe can interrupt and change the process. The Cologne Cathedral is just one of the more well-known examples. It took around 600 years before it was completed.

Transformation/appropriation

Spaces continue to remain dynamic after they have emerged. One such dynamic is transformation, another is appropriation. If we are dealing with materialized spaces, the changes tend to be aesthetic: processes of aging that show the passage of time if nothing is done to counteract them, such as measures for beautification, maintenance, or renovation. Many spatial constellations are also reorganized or rearranged over the course of time in order to adapt them to meet new social, political, or aesthetic needs. Residences or capital cities are moved (from Paris to Versailles, from Bonn to Berlin); transportation systems are expanded due to changed traffic volumes; the European currency area (the so-called eurozone) is successively expanded, and, at the same time, the currency crisis prompts many people to consider making it smaller again. The European economic area has changed not least of all because many internal borders were abolished, while external borders were strengthened in response. This makes clear that changing or abolishing a border as an element ordering space also immediately changes the spaces it orders. To the extent that part of the plant kingdom represents a constitutive spatial element, biological rhythms (blossoming, growth, wilting) also play a role. Spaces that depend in particular on social agents for their existence show their dynamic nature in the fact that relationships or activities intensify or become increasingly dense. Cities express their demographic changes in different spatial ways. In the case of demographic growth, they expand, become increasingly dense (meaning the number of inhabitants per surface area increases), or grow upward (meaning the buildings are built with more stories). In the case of demographic decline, however, previously inhabited city areas are abandoned and buildings decay. The communicative space of a social network—no matter if we are dealing with an early modern network of scholars or Facebook—shows its changes in the intensity of information exchange via information carriers.

The second kind of spatial dynamic is designated with the term “appropriation.” The appropriation of previously constituted spaces by different individuals or groups already belongs to the area of the uses and reuses of space (see Section 3.4). Such practices of appropriation, which are often idiosyncratic, are also often procedural, meaning they can once again change spaces that have been constructed. Appropriations are thus rarely passive in the sense that agents simply accept the material world and its imagery. Places can be connected with each other in new ways through special uses, for example, through movement through the city. A group of teenagers may not exactly appropriate the administratively
suggested version of a city district but instead construct a zone of their own through movement, play, and control of an area. When the first pan-German parliament was installed in St. Paul’s Church in Frankfurt in the wake of the revolutions in 1848, this didn’t necessarily correspond to the traditionally prescribed use of a church, either. At least this new kind of appropriation took place on a consensual basis, which cannot be said of every form of “occupation” (of a church, a building, or a country). In any case, it’s important to recognize that established spatial arrangements can also change as they are appropriated by individuals or groups.

**Dissolution**

The decay, disappearance, or dissolution of spaces or spatial constellations is a further phase of spatial dynamics, specifically, a form of deconstitution or decomposition. The focus here is not on causes but rather on the role of agents, who can be more or less active or passive. The most extreme form of active participation in the dissolution of a space is its destruction. This can be done materially, verbally, or symbolically: a building is torn down, a church can be desecrated or profaned through the words of a bishop or blasphemer, or social relationships (marriages, circles of friendship, business partnerships) can be dissolved. Afterward, the place or network of this relationship usually also ceases to exist. In these processes, the intentional destruction or dissolution of spatial matter can happen in an orderly or disorderly fashion, or it can be desired by only one or by all parties. At the other end of the scale, we find inactivity or passivity, withdrawal of attention, and nonuse, which lead to the disappearance of a spatial constellation. For example, literary salons were places of bourgeois sociability primarily in the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth century they changed according to political and cultural circumstances, until they then completely disappeared in the First World War because the culture of entertainment and sociability had developed in a different direction. Other kinds of spaces can dissolve, too: following the destruction of cultivated areas, deserts arose in the Middle Ages, including in places where there had previously been settlements. After the first gold rush in California, many settlements became ghost towns with a reduced population and the typical image of derelict buildings familiar from Western films. Islands or halligen (small islands without protective dikes) can also disappear. And places, countries, or kingdoms can disappear from the map, either because a cartographer forgets to sketch them in or intentionally omits them, or because a kingdom is dissolved and abolished, as happened in 1806 with the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation when Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor, abdicated the Imperial throne.

In historical research, the perspective of emergence has dominated until now. The focus is usually placed on formation, rise, and development—the making, l’apparition, and el ascenso. The fact that spatial constellations or materialized spatialities eventually disappear again is often not taken into consideration, or in any case, it is examined far less often than processes of constitution.
Beyond formation–transformation–dissolution, the history of space also includes what can be called the spatialization of social processes. When social processes or social relations take a spatial form, this is usually a sign that something is being established or set up permanently. Inasmuch as the social group or institution gives itself a spatial order or space of its own (Eigen-Raum), this is also an attempt to escape constant change (Rehberg 1998). Processes of becoming autonomous are often expressed in the desire for spaces and buildings of one’s own, for identifiable places. Eigen-Räume belonging to groups conversely show the degree of these groups’ institutionalization or the power that is expressed in their permanent, visible presence. These spaces reflect the social practices of their users or the power structures and power strategies in which they are implicated. Social processes can also take spatial form in the sense that they produce spatial symbolizations, to give one example, which is to say that they endow spaces with certain meanings or determine their uses. Religions or confessions may decorate their houses of worship with certain material symbols or signs clearly indicating to whom the building belongs. But these spatializations extend into the practices and formation of subjects, for example, when it comes to praying, confessing, singing, or processions. The practices can generate certain postures or distinct behavior. At the same time, there are spaces that have not been constructed but for certain groups of people. We could think here of worker’s houses or hospitals. People who temporarily spend time in these buildings or live in them are then subjected to discipline in the context of these spaces’ respective intentions and possibilities, and aligned—including in their resistance and self-will—toward uniform behavior.

There can thus be hardly any doubt that spaces are dynamic. Arguing against this thesis with the example of a building would mean being deceived by the surface of things. For buildings, too, are not something given but constructed, concretely and literally, by many involved people. And who could doubt that buildings decay or can be restored over the course of time? A mountain or other element of inanimate nature would not be a good counterexample, either. To be sure, geological processes of formation extend over millions of years and are unobservable with the naked eye, with the effect that a common mountain does in fact give the impression of solidity and immutability. But there are other kinds of natural dynamics that research in cultural studies has been investigating for several years. For example, the Alps have been the object of scientific exploration since the eighteenth century. Horace Bénédict de Saussure (1740–1799), a natural scientist from Geneva, was one such figure in this history. The discovery of mountain landscapes by researchers, painters, locals, or tourists has also elevated this or that mountain to a group, if not national, symbol. Another aspect is the transformation of the mountain world through leisure activities such as hiking or skiing: paths are laid out and ski lifts are constructed, to say nothing of the damage sustained by mountain meadows that comes with the excessive erosion caused by the ski runs and the use of artificial snow. An extremely dynamic side of mountains is revealed in natural catastrophes (avalanches, landslides, and the like) (see Dix and Schenk 2005). These are of course limited and extreme examples of
the transformation and dynamic nature of landscapes. Yet here, too, the focus is mainly on the relation of people to these changes, and on people’s perceptions of and reactions to these changes, which can range from overcoming fears to preventing and providing protection from catastrophes.

3.3 The subjective construction of spaces

Perceptions—memories—representations

To a much greater extent than with the first two categories (spatial information and spatial dynamics), the subjectivity of spaces—that is, subjective perceptions, memories, and representations—are a topic for history and cultural studies (see Burkert 1996; Stockhammer 2005; Deger and Hettlage 2007; François, Seifarth, and Struck 2007; Werlen 2010). The term “subjective spatial construction” once again emphasizes, first, that it is historical subjects (be they individuals or groups) who constitute their own spaces. And second, it addresses spatial perceptions and memories that result, which can themselves also be constructions inasmuch as their reproduction is usually selective and oriented toward the present. Representations, whether oral, written, or iconographic, can also deviate yet again from an initial perception if they are connected to legitimation, promotion, or other representational intentions.

These subjective constructions are not subjective in an individual sense, as the term might suggest; they are rather based entirely in social conventions and discourses, making them social constructions. Their functional place lies in the mediation of structure and action, at least as long as we assume that spaces and bodies are not separate realities (see Bollnow 2004, 16–18; Löw 2001, 24–35). On the one hand, spaces need observers to exist socially; they are dependent on recipients who perceive, use, and remember them, as even one sociologist of space inspired by systems theory suggests (Nassehi 2002). On the other hand, we cannot reinvent daily the spatial world that we observe. We therefore need learned patterns of recognition and action; we need markings, signs, and indications from our social surroundings—ultimately the symbolic orders that reconnect individuals to society and enable them to be spatially competent at all. People need spatial competence both in their cognitive processes and for physical movement. Perceptions, conceptions, and memories or their representations are thus a crucial part of how spaces are constituted, and not something external, a posteriori, or supplemental.

Which analytical concepts do we choose for these facts? German compounds formed from the word “space” (Raum) and a term designating a sensory or cognitive process can principally be formed in two ways—with “space” either in the first or second position. Placing space first, as with Raumvorstellungen (spatial conceptions or spatial representations) or Raumwahrnehmungen (spatial perceptions) is somewhat problematic insofar as these terms have already been claimed by medicine, psychology, and pedagogy. In these disciplines, “spatial conception” or the capability of conceiving space means the ability of living beings to recognize the position and relation of bodies in a three-dimensional space. Historians usually understand “conceptions” or “representations” to
mean something else. Following the *histoire des représentations* of the French Annales school or the concept of a history of concepts (*Vorstellungsgeschichte*) established by the medievalist Hans-Werner Goetz, these would include the conceptions, perceptions, and interpretations of space/spatiality of respective contemporaries.

Things are equally problematic for the term “perception,” since here, too, the social sciences and life sciences ask about what really happens in binocular and acoustic spatial perception, meaning what happens with sight or hearing, with the eye or the ear and the brain. How people thought about this in earlier times could, of course, also be a question for history, even more so for a history of science. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of perception was strongly influenced by the psychology of consciousness (*Bewusstseinspsychologie*) and gestalt psychology. Yet regardless of whether we follow these approaches or not, we must also make a philosophical decision and position ourselves somewhere between the two poles of realism (signs are grounded in objects) and idealism (the human mind produces knowledge). Generally speaking, however, we should avoid a naive concept of perception presupposing that it is a reflection of the lived world. Perception operates like a filter between the external world and the individual. What is seen, heard, and felt (or what historical agents claim to have seen) is only one part of perception. The activity of the senses is supplemented by a cognitive activity. What we or historical agents mean to have seen is generally also influenced by what we or they already want to know or see. This may not have been true at all times. Yet if we conceive of perception in this way, we must also consider this filter in our criticism of sources. In the case of written sources, an additional factor is that we cannot always know whether what is narrated corresponds to what happened. Here, then, a second filter exists, a second hurdle that bars our access to the authenticity we are always seeking. Two things follow from these facts:

1. To demarcate our use of the terms “spatial conception/spatial representation” or “spatial perception” from a medical-psychological use, we should always indicate the precise (historical, cultural, or social-scientific) interest of our investigation or, even better, always speak of perceived or conceived spaces.

2. We should indicate whether we understand perception to be an activity possessing only sensory or also cognitive elements. The historical analysis should be carried out accordingly. Of course, this is true not only for studies based in spatial analysis but also for studies of all other phenomena carried out under the label of a history of perception.

**Spaces of imagination and other spaces**

The compound term can, however, be constructed in German in the reverse order: terms such as *Vorstellungsraum* (space of imagination, imagined or imaginative space), *Erinnerungsraum* (space of remembrance), *Repräsentationsraum* (space of representation, representational space), *Wissensraum* (space of knowledge)
have likewise become analytical concepts for research into space that is being carried out in cultural studies.

*Space of imagination:* This term is closely aligned with Lefebvre’s thought in his use of the term “conceived space” (*espace conçu*) to indicate space as envisioned by scholars, planners, urbanists, or technocrats, which Edward Soja later categorized in his reception of Lefebvre as second space. But there are other imagined spaces in the historical world, not only those conceived on the drawing board. If we distinguish between imagined spaces with and without a real reference, we can also include paradise or hell (as imagined spaces of Christianity). The category could also apply to utopias, ideal spheres of communication, or dreams of individual persons. In a certain sense, even the heavens remained a space of imagination for a long time, that is, for as long as the stars could be observed and measured solely from the surface of the earth. Astronomical and metaphorical interpretations still overlapped in early modern celestial cartography, religious elements disappeared only gradually, and these staged images of the heavens were hardly lacking in theatrical qualities (Juliane Howitz, “Multiple Räume,” in Rau 2010c). Although imagined spaces are, to a certain extent, second-level spaces, they can also be analyzed in terms of their spatial formations and spatial dynamics. Although they can assume a completely new functional position, it is worth considering their connection to a world that is real or capable of being realized in a distant future.

*Space of remembrance:* The terms *Gedächtnisort* (place of memory) and *Erinnerungsraum* (space of remembrance) have by now become established in debates in literature and cultural studies in large parts of Europe (see the discussion at the end of Chapter 2, in Section 2.4). These spaces are increasingly understood to be transnational, yet in many cases, the term is used exclusively or in part metaphorically. In order to make these terms fruitful for spatial analysis, they first need to be tested according to the criterion of spatiality. Places of memory—not considering those from antique mnemonic fulfillment of the criterion of locality when they are taken to include memorials, epitaphs, or comparable places that memorialize a shared event or where remembrance is regularly staged. Other place-types identified by theories of memory that have been developed in cultural studies—such as historical events themselves, great literary works, or flags as national symbols—do not fulfill this criterion; the same holds true for spaces of remembrance in the sense defined by Assmann if this is more or less taken to mean the experiential memories belonging to contemporaries of a certain epoch (Assmann 1999). For the subjective constitution of spaces, memories of spaces are centrally important. That is why the site, place, space, or spatial arrangement where something is remembered, alone or together, is only one kind of space of remembrance. The second kind, which is at least equally important for the subjective construction of spaces, is space or spatiality as remembered by individuals, which becomes integrated into the subject in the act of being represented or made present, thus stabilizing this spatiality and influencing future actions (and processes of thought) in relation to this space.

*Space of representation:* In a widespread but methodologically limited understanding, spaces of representation are spaces that serve to represent something:
representative spaces in the sense of a magnificent display (the burghers’ hall of a
town hall or the reception room of a university president or company director) or
spaces where people meet to represent an institution or a group. Accordingly, it
is possible to analyze material furnishings and symbolic messages (for example,
from paintings or coats of arms that decorate a space), as well as their inclusion
in performative acts. Lefebvre conceived of the space of representation in a more
discerning way. The difference is, first, that Lefebvre’s concept of this space does
not carry the attribute of being of high value. Furthermore, this space is to be
understood more as a layer covering a socially used space. It is conveyed through
images, signs, and symbols that cannot always be clearly decoded by those who
see and describe the space but which those individuals perceive quasi as physical
space. According to Lefebvre, this is where the power of representation becomes
manifest, existing in a certain sense in its own concealment. When the codes of
this space of representation are interpreted, when the space is used and described
more or less in the sense in which it was intended, this is simultaneously a sign of
its having been successfully embedded in a culture, having been interwoven into
a lived culture. Such spaces result from individual experiences or feelings, which
can be expressed when someone says “a young city” or “a creative city.” Or they
can be judgments that are collectively shared, which can also be the result of suc-
cessful image management: “a baroque city,” “a Catholic city,” “a technological
city,” “an environmentally friendly city,” “a city on the water.” In any case, they
should be statements about spaces that have been perceived and experienced, and
furthermore over a longer period of time. The fact that situations experienced
earlier are included in this category shows, not least of all, that time is implicated
in spaces of representation.

Finding perceptions, concepts, and experiences to be congruent is, however,
more of an ideal case (which Lefebvre nevertheless believed to be possible).
Because of the potential simultaneity of the levels in a spatial representation, and
also because of its essential openness and mutability, Soja also adopted this term
in his trialectic of spatiality, where he called it “thirdspace.” A spatial analysis
of representation could consist of tracing how such a congruence of concepts in
urban architecture and lived spatiality arises or, probably more often the case,
which incongruities and contradictions exist.

Space of knowledge: This concept is associated with the thought that a complex
reciprocal relationship exists between space and knowledge. It includes the spatial
structure of places where knowledge is constituted. On the one hand, spaces of
knowledge can be places where knowledge is produced and given lasting forms:
laboratories, academies, collections, cabinets of curiosities, libraries. Examples of
places where geographically spatial knowledge, in particular, is produced include
state surveying offices or publishing houses specializing in maps. And on the
other hand, this category can be taken to include places where a certain knowl-
dge—whether temporary or for a longer period of time—is practiced, thereby
giving certain characteristics to these places: clinics, courtrooms, or houses of
worship. Finally, the concept of spaces of knowledge considers the spatial organi-
zation of knowledge: in maps, atlases, and tables, or concretely in the various
ordering systems of archives or libraries (research examples: on Gotha as a space of knowledge, see Brogiato 2008 and Livingstone 2003; on spaces of knowledge, see Raj 2007; on museums and libraries, see Felfe and Wagner 2010, Tiller 2015, and Jacob 2007–2011; on cabinets of curiosities, see Beßler 2012; on borders and contact zones as spaces of knowledge related to the state, see Dauser and Schilling 2012).

**Spatial stories, spatial media, mental maps**

In one sense, spatial stories are initially all those representations that take historical discourses and practices regarding space into consideration. In a more specific sense, they are the representations of history accompanied by maps and graphic animation that have recently, in particular, enriched the discipline of history through engaging or partnering with cartography and geographic information systems (Knowles 2008; see also Bodenhamer, Corrigan, and Harris 2010; Goodchild 2013; Historical GIS Research Network). In the best case, they also represent added value over the traditional way of writing history. Following Michel de Certeau’s *récits d’espace*, I suggest the term “spatial stories” for sources that provide us access to the spatial practices of historical subjects. These can be spatial observations, spatial readings, spatial drawings, spatial explorations, and the representation of these things in writing or in spatial narratives. They can also include visits of rulers or their officials in order to survey land in their possession (already manifest in the Middle Ages); consult the people; prepare an inventory of goods; and then finally represent their results in tables, maps, and reports. The category covers descriptions of cities, chorographies, descriptions of territory, and even travel reports if they are focused on pathways and places, which is certainly not always the case. Even diaries can give information about how people move from one place to another and create connections between them, whether they are the same connections every day or new ones each time. Finally, spatial representations in literature also belong to spatial stories.

For the perception, production, and representation of spaces, we must ask about the media with which spaces are mediated or first created. We can disregard here the possibility that space itself is sometimes a medium or can be interpreted as such (the house of worship as an intermediary to god), since these instances do not concern the object itself but the possibility of mediation. We will not be able to entirely avoid defining “media” here, even if intense debates have not produced true consensus (see Bösch 2011, 13–15). If we begin with the broadest possible definition of media as intermediaries (of words, information, meaning, or even goods), the term must be sharpened in a next step in relation to the epoch, context, or situation of its use; in other words, we must determine the specific conditions of possibility of medial communication. Let us then begin by asking how spaces are perceived—whether they are visible, audible, or tangible, whether they can be perceived exclusively through one or multiple sense organs. Spaces are indeed visible not just directly but also in visual media; this may come as no surprise. However, sound spaces still don’t...
garner enough attention, whether they be background noise or concert halls, which are sound spaces in a medial sense only when sounds are resonating. In this regard, we should actually call these spaces “temporal media”: for they are just as transient or temporary as the moving images that represent spaces. They can be reproduced only if they have been recorded. When people hope for sounds to go away, especially uncomfortable sounds, it shows that they are conditioned to the temporal (ephemeral) character of sound spaces. Yet precisely because of this transience, these sound spaces and the accompanying sensations are only direct, meaning they can be analyzed only when they are written down or documented in maps (for example, in noise maps). Spaces in visual media, by contrast, are somewhat easier to examine: they can be found on mosaics, vedute, representations of landscapes, maps, atlases, and many other media for spatial images. Moreover, “spatial media” has recently become a specialized term denoting new digital forms of work; concretely, it designates geographic data represented with the help of digital media. Scholars working historically will find new possibilities here to adequately represent the results of their research and, not least of all, disseminate them to a wider audience.

The area of imagined spaces (those with real reference) also includes what are often called mental maps—a term that was originally developed by behaviorists to later be integrated, in the course of the “psychological turn” in human geography, into the analysis of spatial configurations. At the time, special significance was accorded to individual conceptions of space and to the perception of the environment. In using this concept, it is wise to not completely forget the context of its emergence in order to meaningfully transfer it to methods in the social sciences and cultural studies, since these approaches are less concerned with individual mental schemata (those that can be drawn with a pencil) as with the conceptions of space that are constructed through social discourses and practices (i.e., mental maps). For historical analysis (which as a rule can no longer survey historical agents), this approach ultimately even has advantages.

It is also possible to work additively with the concept of the mental map to analyze the relationship or mutual influence of real—meaning materially existing—and imagined maps. For example, the historian of Eastern Europe Frithjof B. Schenk has shown how the Russian Empire was newly mapped in the nineteenth century as the railway network was expanded. Maps and plans played an important role in this expansion, and cartographic knowledge was used as an instrument of politics since it ultimately made it possible to govern the vast territory in new ways, just as it made it possible for travelers to experience the area differently than before (Schenk 2011; see also Schenk 2002, which describes the long path of the concept into the discipline of history). Of course, mental maps are not automatically congruent with historical or political regions. Border regions specifically show that mundane regionalizations form quite differently—and thus also become quite “real”—in thought and practice than do regions defined politically and nationally. Angelika Hartmann, a scholar of Islam, also suggests a renewed approach to mental maps in connecting them to the concepts of space and memory; she uses them as tools for cultural studies and cultural sociology by applying
them, to give an example, to examinations of Near and Middle East civilizations (Damir-Geilsdorf, Hartmann, and Hendrich 2005). Two historians from the modern period have also recently argued for the integration of the concept (Dipper and Raphael 2011, 36–39). In their view, the term “map” is somewhat misleading, since what we are dealing with is images, conceptions, or orders created in thought, which it is our task to decipher. But in pragmatic terms for our research, they argue, we must ultimately ask: “How did the so-called mapping come about? who shared its results and what were the consequences?” (Dipper and Raphael 2011, 37). This approach then also implies a definition of mental maps: as spatial orders that shape consciousness and guide action.

A concluding point of this chapter concerns the connection between subject constitution and spatiality (Steigerwald and Behrens 2010). The subject—as a part of society—appropriates spaces through perception or use; but it also creates them, shapes or changes them, as we have seen. Accordingly, spatial constitution and subject formation are closely related. This subject formation, which is connected to spatial constitution, can be easily buttressed with Bourdieu’s praxeological concept of the subject, which assumes that the subject is not the precondition but the consequence of social action. The schemes of action that an agent mobilizes in a certain situation are mediated via the habitus as a point of interaction that is anchored mentally and physically in the agent between the self and society. Two realizations of history as lived experience meet in the subject’s action: on the one hand, history objectified in objects in the form of institutionalized rules and structures of the social field, and on the other, history incarnated as bodies in the form of habitus, meaning inscribed experience. The encounter between subjects or groups shaped by experience and the fields or spaces shaped by rules, laws, relations of power, or directives for action produces different possibilities: either the action is successful, that is, institutions and their symbolic orders are once again stabilized, or the systems of experience and order are called into question and reorganized. Because of these appropriated spaces and inscribed spatial experiences, agents are not always free in how they act, for the subject remains the sole instance capable of mediating between perceptions, concepts, and experiences. The connection of spatiality and subject constitution—by no means foreign territory for literary studies (Steigerwald and Behrens 2010)—needs to be much more intensively explored in the discipline of history. Suitable fields for research are the history of sociability or the history of sports (Peters 2007; Mallinckrodt and Schattner 2016).

### 3.4 Spatial practices—uses of space

Following the analysis of spatial formations and spatial dynamics, and of perceptions, memories, and representations, a fourth and final step considers the uses of space. These practices are closely connected with two concepts, space of experience and space of action, that are occasionally used as synonyms (on this point, see Dürr and Schwerhoff 2005; Transversale 2, 2006). We can associate space of experience with Lefebvre’s concept of lived space (espace vécu). Yet the term also
Spatial analysis

denotes how spaces can be experienced. Ecclesiastical spaces, which during the early modern period mediate political and religious experience, are an example from historical research (Dürr and Schwerhoff 2005, 365; Dürr 2006; Hacke 2008).

What is crucial to this point is, first, that spaces are “made” through practices; and, second, that these practices can have their own logic, and that they may follow prescribed norms but can also deviate from them. The phrase “spatial practices” is being chosen here as an umbrella term in the sense of (individual or collective) actions that follow practical (not theoretical) rules. Furthermore, the various forms of spatial practices are then divided into uses, reuses, parallel uses, etc. The entire potential of spatiality lies in these divergent uses of whatever kind: they need not follow and do not establish guidelines for actions, or at least any guidelines that would be nonnegotiable. This makes the analysis of spatial practices the key for rebutting spatially deterministic positions.

Whereas the concept of spatial experience has something passive about it—as something given to a subject, even if individuals experience this givenness differently—the term “spatial practices” emphasizes the more active side of spatial action: the traversing, shaping, changing, or creation of connections, and other doings that create spaces, change them, or cause them to again disappear. In addition to the aspect of activity, the concept of practice has two more unique characteristics. First, it emphasizes the (social, cultural, political, economic, or religious) practices of agents. These might be the individual practices of single agents, or they may take on collective dimensions, allowing us to then speak of a (spatial) culture. What matters is understanding that practices do not simply follow norms, rules, or discourses, as the Italian microstoria (centered on Giovanni Levi, Carlo Ginzburg, and Angelo Torre; see also Kaiser 2005, 437–440) never tires of emphasizing. To a certain degree, spatial practices may also follow norms or discourses, but not everything can be deduced from that fact, since practices also demonstrate instances of ambivalence and contradiction that are not captured in norms or discourses. This nondeducibility—and this is the second unique characteristic of the analytical concept—also poses a pragmatic difficulty for research. For these more or less deliberate practices, which are born situationally from a necessity of action or which follow a collected wealth of experience and are thus not always fully deliberate—are difficult to comprehend, especially when these things, as with practices from the past, can no longer be directly observed and agents can no longer be consulted.

The general question is, of course, whether agents are always human or whether agency can also be ascribed to nonhuman agents (Latour). Conversely, spatial practices can themselves become a rule or norm. Yet this is a far cry from meaning that the written norm (or discourse about it) reflects these practices. The difficult relationship between what is discursive (norms, concepts) and nondiscursive (practices, materiality, practical rules) must be examined in concrete cases, and it probably cannot always be completely described. A first step in this direction is to examine spatial practices in terms of uses.

In the same way as perceptions or experiences, uses are an essential component of spatial constitution. It is through uses that spaces are, as it were, socially
activated at all. Uses of space manifest themselves in very different ways: in occupying a space by sitting in one place or debating in another, for instance; and in the process, one can follow prescribed suggestions (rules, customs) such as listening to a speaker, playing football, working, learning, eating, or praying. Performing this activity every time one is located within the same spatial constellation also causes patterns of use or regularities to develop.

We can speak of deviant or divergent uses if the uses no longer follow customs, suggestions, regulations, or original intentions. This deviant behavior need not be immediately prosecuted and sanctioned. Quite the contrary, it can continue to occur as long as it is tolerated by the co-users of a space. Making music on the street is not an intended use but is usually tolerated, if not welcomed, by most residents or passers-by, as long as the music isn’t bad. If someone were to begin playing loud music in a library, however, the co-users or the library staff would relatively quickly bring them to reason. But this, too—the conditioning that we should be quiet in a library, museum, or church—depends on how we have been socially or culturally shaped. This conditioning is often the result of long-term processes of discipline, making it historically contingent, mutable, and negotiable.

The space in which the least amount of divergence from the norm is initially imaginable is probably ecclesiastical space. But it was precisely that space, at least in the Middle Ages and early modern period, where many (secular) things took place that had nothing or little to do with worship. Churches were places of refuge for pilgrims and asylum seekers, they served as places for assembly, political announcements, and financial transactions, likewise for administering justice, or for instructing pupils or young Christians. They were places to feed the poor, places where goods were sold by itinerant merchants, and sometimes also places for eating, drinking, and sleeping. Many churches since the late Middle Ages, or at the very latest since the Reformation, housed the church library and were used to provide storage. They were a place where music was made in celebration, where theater was produced, or dances were sometimes held. The nave of London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral served not only as a passageway but—in accordance with mandates issued beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century—as a marketplace, a place to borrow money, and a rumor mill. For a time during the middle of the sixteenth century, the crypt of the same church housed the workshops of Flemish and French religious refugees, who set up their looms in one half and worshiped in the other (Rau 2008, 13). Depending on the time and context, many of these divergent uses were deplored, tolerated, or accepted.

The fact that spaces are an organizational form of adjacency or simultaneity is demonstrated by the possibility of parallel or simultaneous uses. Many spaces were in fact used simultaneously or successively by different groups or for different purposes. Here, again, early modern ecclesiastical spaces can serve as an example. In the wake of confessional schisms, there were churches in several cities of the Old Empire, as well as the Swiss Confederation, that were used simultaneously—usually by two confessions. This simultaneous use was organized by either temporally or spatially dividing the space (Rau 2008, 22; Hacke 2008). We also find the reuse and repurposing of houses of worship: violent takeovers in the
course of phenomena connected to the Reconquista, the adoption of churches that had been abandoned, or their purchase and conversion by other religious communities; and finally, in the age of dwindling churches, nonreligious uses, including commercial uses, become common. This is more and more apparent today, especially in England. It is not only a religious-ecclesiastical problem, but at the same time a problem of historic preservation.

Finally, there remains the ephemeral uses of spatial constellations, which become more transient and unnoticeable the fewer traces they leave behind. The only way for these uses to be any fainter would be to leave behind no traces at all, for the reason that no one had used the space at all: nonuses can at best lead to deterioration, but they still bring about a transformation; ignorance, by contrast, usually leads directly to oblivion. Spatial practices—whether active and passive, individual or specific to groups, occurring once or recurring—are thus an equally crucial part of how spaces are constituted, and not something external, a posteriori, or supplemental.

Another form of use consists of appropriations of previously constituted spaces by different individuals or groups. But first, here is an example of group-specific appropriations of spaces: following the confessional clashes of the early modern period, conflicts over the use of space (both urban and ecclesiastical) became increasingly frequent in cities. In the sixteenth century, a Catholic burgher in Lyon noted indignantly how protesters were “conquering” the city by holding assemblies, passing through the streets while singing and arming themselves. In order to curb these activities, five Swiss Protestants were burned as heretics in 1553. The place of the public execution was the moat next to the city’s pig market.

The “scandal” of the Protestants in the city (around 1550)

In said month [June 1551], a crowd of common people, assembled by heretics, came together in Lyon. These heretics began to hold meetings, conventicles, and gatherings of 300 to 400 persons, as many men as women, whereby the men carried swords and weapons. And they all sang together, old and young, singing the Psalms of David as translated by Clément Marot, and all of it was done to the scandal and blasphemy of God and his Holy Catholic Church, because they thereby violated their oath to the church and their religion and mocked and defiled its pastors and servants, in order to win over yet more people to their damnable sect. Thereupon they were strictly and expressly forbidden from again singing these Psalms or holding any kind of further gatherings and conventicles. However, the named malefactors did not refrain from their wickedness and stubbornness, which is why large-scale surveillance by the city was then ordered. This at least allowed several of them to be caught and they were thrown into prison while one waited for messages from the King about what should be done with them. … On Tuesday, May 16, 1553, five heretics claiming to be from Lausanne were burned; they had
been supported in this city in prison for a long time by burghers from Bern, who thought they would be able to save them. All five were burned together at 3 o’clock in the afternoon in the city moat next to the pig market; they died holding on so obstinately to their dishonesty and madness that many of the people and others praised their truly great steadfastness.


Even though these events are described through the lens of the Catholic burgher and city chronicler Jean Guéraud, it becomes clear how the Protestants appropriated the city: by holding gatherings and singing Psalms as they walked through the streets, thereby creating a space of resonance; and if what Guéraud reports is true, also inasmuch as the men armed themselves and mocked the Catholic priests. The Protestants received support from beyond the city of Lyon, from the Canton of Bern, which was one of the first to join the Reformation. And yet one thing becomes clear in this document that comes from a city noble (notable): the practices of the people, even if they are described in a disparaging way. Despite the lack of “egodocuments,” then, we should not despair, for there are certainly sources to give us information about what the people did with the space that they appropriated. Even the Lyon city council records give us a clear picture, several years later, of how the Protestants took possession of part of the developed areas of the city.

If we begin with Certeau’s concept of space (as a place where something is done), then we can conversely also ask what exactly people actually do with spaces. Take, for instance, a street or a complex city space. This is something that people can describe, draw, or photograph, in which they can live, through which they can walk. These are mediating activities in a certain sense, since a person uses these spaces, appropriates them, adapts them, changes them, or in other words must always do something with them (but can never become one with them). What exactly people do with these spaces, however, depends on individual preferences as well as on historically or culturally specific conditions. This can be seen in the example of the spatial type of the street. People passed through streets for a long time on foot or with the help of a beast of burden. Viewed from the perspective of the history of civilization, the automobile is quite a late invention. Yet there is more to be said about this spatial type. What is much more interesting is the fact that there are very different forms of passing through streets.

According to recent research, for instance, strolling through the city appears to be an invention of the modern period. In any case, the travelers of the time write that the inhabitants of European cities would promenade on city squares, in forests near the city, or along rivers. The Thuringian lawyer, philologist, and geographer Justus Zinzerling (ca. 1580–ca. 1620), who traveled through half of Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was a witness with an eye for these kinds of occupations practiced by local residents (Zinzerling 1859). It was in the same century that the first itinerary guidebooks, art travel guides, and street directories appeared for the great European cities, soon supplemented with
maps, giving visitors instructions for how to explore the city (Rau 2011, 165–66). Material objects (for example, cobblestones or lanterns), discourse, and practice thus come together here, and sidewalks and protected areas were also laid out as needed. Laurent Turcot has shown how a kind of leisure activity developed in the eighteenth century that naturally also included putting oneself on display, adopting a certain posture, leading one’s dog on a leash, frequenting certain places, and thus mingling among Parisian society (Turcot 2007). In this regard, the urban stroller is also a protoform of Walter Benjamin’s flaneur, another urban figure constructed under specific historic conditions. Today, the cultural practice of walking through city streets has continued to change and likely differs in its rhythms from city to city. In premodern times, it is rather civil-religious processions, occasionally also entrances into the city by rulers, that represent a specific form of appropriating the city space.

If it can be said that spaces or certain spatial constellations are created through human practices and appropriated by people in differing ways, the same holds true for places. The fact that localities can be embellished or endowed with meaning is an established finding of scholarship, if not a banality that needs no special theory of space. At least since Halbwachs’s considerations of the Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land, cultural anthropology has been familiar with the idea that groups can construct an identity through a real or imagined relationship to a place (Halbwachs 1941; Iogna-Prat 2011). Yet we also need concepts for the observation—which becomes increasingly obvious in the modern period—that people rarely stay at just one place, that they can construct intensive relationships to different places because they live at multiple places (such as a second home or in separate households) or at least carry out the basic activities of their lives at multiple places. The integration of places into interactions thus means that spaces must no longer be thought of as exclusively local, but as translocal. This brings us to a concept of locality like that shaped by Appadurai, who understands locality not in terms of measuring space but as relational and agent-centered (Appadurai 1995, 2008).

In reverse analogy to the concept of cospatiality (the overlapping of spaces at one place), it is possible to speak of multilocality from the perspective of action when people are active at different places and at different times and when this form of work or other activity is an essential part of their lives. The ethnologist Johanna Rolshoven chooses this term to emphasize that everyday mobility or living and working at two or more places is today often no longer a secondary function but can be a substantial part of how people live their lives (Rolshoven and Winkler 2009). This insight can also be applied heuristically to earlier epochs. The hypothesis would be that people always live or act multilocally. In each case, then, we would have to ask which activities are carried out at which places and what radius of movement they establish. Another form of life is to be constantly itinerant, which is found both in the traditional nomadic society and in the context of global interconnectedness and labor migration. Here, the social anthropologist James Clifford has pointed to the significance of “routes” for cultural self-definition (Clifford 1997; see also Kath and Rieger 2009).
Meanwhile, translocality has also developed to become a central concept for research into migration, although it is also useful for the history of trade and for urban history—always where we are dealing with the interconnectedness of places, whether this means multilocal labor, itinerant trade, city–country relationships, urban networks, economic interactions, or multinational companies. The concept of translocality thus encourages us to examine how places are integrated into regional and supraregional structures on the one hand (as exemplified in urban places: Rau 2005, 2011; as a way of approaching the history of global integration: Freitag and von Oppen 2010; Dorsch 2016), and how people deal with this fact, on the other, meaning how they actively or passively behave in relation to it. Stimulating investigations of various trans-phenomena—ranging from life in border regions to city partnerships, relations between states, migration that occurs with retirement, multilocal living, and culinary landscapes of taste in metropolises—can be found in an edited volume of work by young scholars (Hühn et al. 2010). The prefixes *trans-* and *multi-* have the disadvantage that their references are ambiguous; in contrast to dichotomies such as “local/global,” however, they have the decided advantage of openness.

**Notes**

1. On the digitalization and transcription of these files, see the homepage of the cooperative project carried out by archives and universities from the region, http://www.castellanie.net (accessed July 16, 2017).
4. The digital version can be found at http://idb.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/digit/FhXIV1aq.
6. For an interesting postcolonial perspective on such an export of European architectural and urban models to colonial India, see Sen (2010); for a compact overview of European colonial cities on all continents beyond Europe, see Goerg and Huetz de Lempes (2012).
7. Ferdinand Opil has compiled a list of the city atlases that have already been completed: http://www.stadtgeschichtsforschung.at/index.html (accessed December 20, 2012).
10. Clément Marot (1496–1544): poet and translator of the Psalms from Lyon, whose translations were set to music and formed an important element of the Huguenot liturgy.
4 Conclusion and outlook

The topic of space has enjoyed great popularity for several years now—and not only in the discipline of history. The analysis of the spatial dimensions of historical societies, in particular, still offers many rich questions. Every attempt to produce an overview would very likely be doomed to fail, since there are spatialities at all times in all cultures: these range from the smallest point to infinity and include different dimensions, configurations, perceptions, and practices. In fact, it’s not possible to tell the history of space unless we limit ourselves to one partial aspect, such as a history of ideas focused on the development of spatial concepts.

Space, it ought to have become clear, is no subfield but rather a central dimension of society and human action. There is essentially nothing that cannot be described spatially. And this is why we should consider spaces neither as objects nor as stages upon which actions unfold. Defined very broadly, spaces are social objects characterized by at least one spatial dimension. These dimensions are not simply limited to the physical or geographical level but can also be conceived, constructed, or socially arranged or ordered. And we must apply different methods of analysis to different spatial dimensions. An important task for research is to analyze the plurality of these spatial dimensions in their respective contexts. The advantages of such a consideration lie, first, in not reducing spaces to materiality or localization. In considering them as essentially conceived or created (and of course also as misused or individually appropriated) by agents, we do not ascribe to them any deterministic effect on action. Considering spaces as social constructions—which may of course always also have a material or geographic dimension—means asking about processes of emergence and transformation. And since borders, as spatial configurations, are also a social or political construction, history should not be written within national borders. Depending on the questions we are asking, it should instead adopt transnational or global perspectives (on this point, see Conrad 2006; Epple 2012b) or specifically examine the construction and significance of national or regional spaces. Finally, the benefits of such a spatially analytic approach also consist of being able to better recognize and describe how different levels overlap, or how levels, dimensions, and actions intermesh.

The added value of a historical-anthropological spatial analysis ought to have become clear by now. Yet even with all of the methodological gains that historical
analyses can glean from the reception of theories and methods in the social sciences, the discipline of history should first more intensely consider historical concepts of space—though the reason why is more epistemological than historical. For example, the relational concept of space currently being propagated in sociology is not adequate for all historical epochs and phenomena. There certainly have been, and still are, epochs and contexts in which space was construed as an absolute concept, and not only in physics—for example, in politics, practices of surveying or administration, and the fortified architecture of early modern states (see Bitterling 2009). The fact that spatial terminology and concepts must be historicized, which also means that a relational understanding of space cannot be sacrosanct, is being emphasized elsewhere by now (Jacob 2014; Löw 2015; Bachmann-Medick 2007; translation Blauhut 2016, 234–235). The problem is situated somewhat differently when it comes to borrowings from geography, since we will not be able to overcome the oft-deplored placelessness of history by returning to concepts of traditional geography focused on the surface of the earth. We should instead take recourse to methods from more recent social sciences or critical geography (radical geography, critical cartography). Still, the genuinely historiographical contribution here would be to examine historically geographical concepts, meaning the respective spatiotemporal concepts of natural relations or the history of the construction of spatialized images of the world (for instance, in maps), as well as tools and practices of spatial orientation and surveying. Second, historical spatial analysis should not simply adopt macrohistorical interpretative paradigms available from the social sciences or philosophy. Rather, it should question these methods and develop more nuanced explanatory models. This applies, for instance, to Michel Foucault’s frequently cited claim that we live in a spatial age (Foucault 1986), to the information-age replacement of a historical space of places with a space of streams described by Manuel Castells (Castells 1999, 2002), or to Hartmut Rosa’s thesis about the connection between modernization and acceleration (Rosa 2005).

In order to achieve more differentiated perspectives on the spatial dimensions of historical societies, as well as new—or at least less linear—periodizations, I have suggested here an adaptive analytical framework focused on a process by which spatial configurations are constituted: (1) spatial formations, (2) spatial dynamics, (3) spatial perceptions, and 4) spatial practices and uses of space. Analytically separating out these dimensions has the advantage of distinguishing between spatial discourses and practices, or between concepts and uses, since these are in no way congruent: uses, for instance, cannot be derived directly from concepts.

Especially if we intend to include a consideration of dynamic transformations or spatiotemporal practices in our investigations, presenting the results of a historical spatial analysis can lead to a representational problem. The usual form of historical narrative, i.e., the story, is not always suitable for representing spatiotemporal transformations. This is why we should also consider visualizations, for instance in the form of maps—in the best-case scenario even dynamic maps stored on digital media. This does not immediately require that we construct
Conclusion and outlook

an elaborate geoinformation system. Visualizations created with the help of a vector-based graphics program are sometimes enough.

What, then, would be the future questions and research fields, holding potential for further development, for spatial analysis in history and cultural studies? The most recent historical-spatial studies, which are certainly something we can build upon, also point to various lacunae. Much too often, scholars write about “space” without precisely indicating whether they mean a spatial configuration, a concept, an idea, or a practice. In order to come to a critical, scholarly understanding of space, those of us working in cultural studies and the social sciences must work in ways that are even more interdisciplinary (as Bachmann-Medick, among others, has argued; see Bachmann-Medick 2007, 289). A classical architectural history, for instance, can be given a spatial turn, or literary scholarship can examine not only places or spatial ideas in fictional texts but also the places of literary production.

On a methodological level, we should come to an agreement about what exactly we mean in distinguishing between place and space, since at least the three definitions currently being used in scholarship (those of Michel de Certeau, Doreen Massey, and Martina Löw) partially contradict each other. To me, it seems the best solution here is to also take recourse to contemporaneous interpretative models or terms in order to then decide whether these guiding differences for analysis are meaningful at all in a given context. And this brings us, again, to conceptual history. The examination of historical spatial vocabulary and the fields of meaning of terms is not only instructive for acquiring better knowledge about historical spatial conceptions. Investigations in conceptual history also sharpen our awareness for different spatial levels and dimensions; they are suitable tools for critiquing ideology and analyzing the power of interpretation (acts of naming, geographic determinations); and not least of all, they can make us aware of our own presuppositions.

In order to achieve the new periodization that Henri Lefebvre called for, we can ask about the existence of epochally specific spaces (see Geisthövel and Knoch 2005). We would need to determine their specific characteristics in relation to specific temporal features, although temporalities are also social constructions and thus valid only in a specific context. One desideratum would continue to be the connection between subject formation and spatiality, or seen another way, between group formation and spatial constitution, which would need to be described as a mutual process. These social groups range from elites to socially marginalized groups, from individual families to religious groups or associations as well as ephemeral groups formed for specific occasions. What significance do spatialities hold for group constitution and self-image? Which ideas guide these groups, and what practices do these ideas perform (acts of positioning, symbolically occupying places, making arrangements of order, creating inclusive/exclusives spaces, establishing traditions in relation to places)? Another important area is the mediality of spaces. This concerns, first, the analysis of pictorial spaces (in paintings, on maps, in atlases); second, the medial construction of spaces, meaning the process of construction itself (how do spatial conceptions
become part of a map, how is the map produced, and what effects do iconographic spatial representations have, for instance, on the production of images of the world); and finally, third, the process of constituting space through medial communication (written correspondence, telegraphy, mobile phones).

This is only a selection of open questions—which show that there are still many exciting spatial stories to be written. If we appropriately consider relevant historical contexts, our readings of space will also become readings of society.
5 Appendix of sources for the historical study of space

Sources for the analysis of spatial dimensions of historical societies

As of September 2018

Contents

Part A: Conceptual history

Materials for investigating spatial vocabulary, conceptual history, and the (un)translatability of spatial concepts.

1. Bibliography of monolingual and etymological dictionaries used.
2. Article on “Raum” (Space) in Zedlers Universallexikon (Zedler’s universal dictionary).

Part B: Sources on urban history and the history of trade

The sources in this section can be used to examine how space has been constructed, especially in cities. In the context of urban planning processes, for example, space (including space in a material sense) has been sold, measured, and developed. But urban spaces have also been arranged, walked upon and through, inscribed, or otherwise appropriated by people.

3. Ildefonso Cerdá, Plan to Expand Barcelona, 1859.
4. Johann Peter Frank, System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey (System of a comprehensive medical regulation), 1783.
5. Johann Andreas Romberg, Der Stadtbau (City building or city planning), 1836/37.
6. Police ordinances (laws aimed to ensure the good governance and order of a state).
7. Walking in the city—A stroll through Barcelona.

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Part C: Maps as media for representing spatial relations, creating spaces, and disseminating images of the world, and as instruments for orientation

This selection of historic maps gives a view of the development of the medium and the variety of its forms. For several years now, and especially since the “critical turn” within cartography, research has focused less on the question of what maps display or how exact they are; rather, maps are understood as sign systems, as evidence for historically specific perceptions or constructions of spaces, and as forms of organizing knowledge.

9. T and O map.
10. Circular map.
11. Arabic maps of the world.
12. Portolan chart.
14. Maps of the world since 1500.
15. Images of Europe since 1500.

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Part A: Conceptual history

Source 1

Bibliography of monolingual and etymological dictionaries used

See “Lexicon entries” section of the Selected Bibliography.

German:

English:

French:
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space

Italian:

Spanish:

Latin:

Classical Greek:

For an introduction to German, the following works can be recommended:

For German:

For other modern languages:

See also the practical compilation of dictionaries and terminology databases from the Institute of Translation and Interpreting at the Zurich University of Applied Sciences at http://www.linguistik.zhaw.ch/linguistik/iued/links-tools/woerterbuecher-und-terminologie-datenbanken.html (accessed August 29, 2011).

Source 2

Article on “Raum” (Space) in Zedlers Universallexikon (Zedler’s universal dictionary)

“Space, spatium. Philosophers do not agree on how to explain space. Some argue that space is no different from things as they exist next to each other and
their location but instead consists only in an abstraction, being thus an *ens imaginarium*, a thing that has no reality beyond thought. Cartesius [René Descartes] says in *Principiis part 2, section 10*: There is no real difference between space or the internal place and the corporeal substance contained in it, but only in how they are usually conceived by us.”


*Commentary:* The bookseller and publisher Johann Heinrich Zedler published his *Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste* (Universal lexicon of all sciences and arts) in the eighteenth century. With sixty-four volumes and four supplementary volumes that appeared beginning in 1732, it was the most extensive German-language encyclopedia of the time. This article sketches the philosophical–theological debate of the time about the nature of space, which turned on the questions of whether space was something mental or corporeal, whether it was a relationship of position or a container, and finally whether god could be called a place or a space.¹
Part B: Sources on urban history and the history of trade

Source 3

Ildefonso Cerdà, *Plano de los alrededores de la ciudad de Barcelona y del proyecto para su mejora y ampliación* (Map of the surroundings of the city of Barcelona and the project for its improvement and expansion), 1859 (copy from 1861)

See the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, “The city: A changing spatial configuration.”

Commentary: Barcelona’s population grew from the middle of the eighteenth century onward due to long-lasting economic growth and the city’s nascent industrialization. Between 1759 and 1859, the number of its inhabitants increased threefold from 53,000 to 150,000 (1787: 95,000; 1830: 110,000). This meant that by the middle of the nineteenth century Barcelona was one of the most densely populated cities in Europe. In order to enable an expansion of the city’s territory, the city began demolishing the early modern defensive fortifications in 1854. Since 1849, the engineer Ildefonso Cerdà had already been working on a plan for expansion. In 1859, the city administration announced a competition for projects to expand the city in order to prevent Cerdà’s project from being realized. The competition was won by a design by the architect Antonio Rovira y Trias, but
the Madrid Ministry for Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) finally pushed through Cerdà’s project in 1860.

The plan to expand the city and reform its old city center is one of the great design models for European urban expansions. The strict matrix of Cerdà’s streets and the freestanding blocks of buildings (manzana) were intended to make unlimited city growth possible in principle. At the same time, the notion of a city center that is clearly defined architecturally was dissolved. The constitutive objectives of the expansion plan were (1) increasing hygiene and thus improving living conditions, especially of the poor population; (2) securing traffic flows (especially of the railway); (3) the principle equality of the city’s residents. To accomplish these objectives, the plan envisioned the creation of three broad streets in the historic center of Barcelona, which were only partially realized, however. Similarly, the project was realized in the areas of the expansion only with substantial changes. For example, significantly fewer open areas and green areas were constructed than were envisioned in Cerdà’s plan. Moreover, the “democratic” principles upon which it was based were unable to entirely prevent land speculation and social segregation.

Text: Ekkehard Schönherr

Sources:
Cerdà, Ildefonso. 1859–1861. Teoría de la construcción de las ciudades. Barcelona: Ministerio para las Administraciones Pública (vol. 1); Madrid: Ministerio para las Administraciones Pública (vol. 2).
Cerdà, Ildefonso. 1867. Teoría general de la urbanización y aplicación de sus principios y doctrinas a la reforma y ensanche de Barcelona. Madrid: Imprenta Espanõla.

Additional literature:
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space

Source 4

Johann Peter Frank, System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey (System of a comprehensive medical regulation), 1783

“Part Four, Section Two: On the Healthy Way of Constructing Human Habitations” ...
Paragraph 3 On Public City Squares
“Open squares, market squares, etc. not only serve a city by providing decoration and making it more leisurely. Rather, when set at the right place, they create a reservoir of air supplying all streets. So much depends on making sure that these locations stand in a direct line with the city gates and that they are not too overloaded with trees which—however pleasant they may be to the eye of a person who is on foot and looking for shade—cannot in fact stand together in long rows without preventing the free movement of air from here through all adjoining streets.”


Additional literature:

Source 5

Johann Andreas Romberg, Der Stadtbau (City building or city planning), 1836/37

On Planning Cities
A plan for a city essentially depends on the existing terrain, and using this terrain in a rational manner is not always an easy task—especially when there is already a city that should only be expanded, and where the new part of the city should then be rationally connected to the old part of the city. If the new part of the city is separated from the old part through city squares, as was done in Munich, for instance, the layout of the new city is subject to fewer difficulties. This makes the poor layout of the streets in Munich even more glaring; and when we look at the plan for the new part of the city,
what we seem to have before us is the reason for an English garden. The plan for an entirely new city should be given a regular form, namely that of a square, an oval, etc. Here, the streets can intersect at right angles. The hexagon, octagon, dodecagon, etc. offers a good shape for large cities. The circle, half-circle, or oval is to be avoided, and there is even more reason to avoid wavy lines in delineating the city’s limits. A square shape allows cities to be rationally expanded. But shapes with many corners are beneficial for a city’s appearance. If a city is shaped like a circle, expansions are subject to difficulties. There is something tiring and boring about too much uniformity. Moreover, it is also difficult to navigate in such cities, and foreigners can easily get lost.

The following rules should guide the planning of a city: …

City squares

City squares are divided into main city squares, which should lie in the center of the city, and market squares, which should exist in every city district, or wherever many streets come together or intersect. City squares should be established at gates and anywhere there is heavy traffic. The size of a city square should correspond to its purpose or the size of the population. Its shape can vary; it can be square or oblong. The shape of a hexagon and octagon is to be used only for large city squares; just as a circular city square must always be large in size, since smaller city squares having these shapes would result in irregular construction for the buildings located on them. City squares that are much too large make a city unnecessarily expansive; three times the height of the buildings located on a city square should be the smallest scale and six times the height should be the largest scale for the width of city squares. And regarding the decoration of squares, this is likely achieved in the most excellent way through the buildings on the square.

An earlier way of decorating city squares in German states used to be Roland columns or Rutland images [Rutlandbilder]. These are rough, poorly formed ornamented columns made of stone; they usually represent a man holding a sword in his hand and serve as a sign of the city’s legal autonomy, which also gives them a function like that of a landmark for city neighborhoods.

In Greek and Roman cities, the city squares were decorated especially beautifully.

Police ordinances (laws aimed to ensure the good governance and order of a state)

**Commentary:** Police ordinances or *Policeordnungen* were not police regulations in a modern sense, but laws issued to ensure the good governance and order of a community (a city or a sovereign territory). They frequently also include regulations about how to behave in public space: on streets, at wells, on bridges, in guesthouses, or in churches (see the directory of early modern *Policeordnungen* at Landwehr 2000, 335–337; and Härter and Stolleis, 1996–2010). Of course, we cannot read these ordinances as reproductions of reality. But they sometimes reflect conditions that were taken to be unacceptable or irregular and at least offer us proof of authorities’ intentions to regulate and discipline their subjects. Naturally, rules were often broken, and this was punished or prompted authorities to re-publish, change, or tighten the regulations, and so on. This means that we can interpret the structuring of public space as a process of negotiation between authorities and subjects or users.

In Berchtesgarden, attempts were made since the middle of the sixteenth century to keep squares and streets clean. Wood and manure were not to be left on squares and streets for more than three days; fathers, as heads of the household, were to take responsibility for clearing the streets in front of their house (Kissing 1999, 179–182). In Europe’s larger cities, streets were paved already beginning the late Middle Ages. This was not only a measure to beautify the streets but also prevented the roads from becoming mud pits when it rained (Iseli 2009, 72–73).

In Erfurt, attention was paid to keeping the water clean. Here, too, concerns about uncleanliness played a central part:

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L1. On Keeping the Water Clean.

We also find / and have witnessed / that in defiance of our often-declared order /

people are not keeping the water clean / but are shamelessly, almost more often now than before / dumping into it / what they have swept up and their manure / as well as dead pigs / dogs, cats, and the like / which then in times of death / and emergencies of fire / cause great damage to everyone. 

We therefore hereby order as a serious matter and do desire / that no one should dump and throw / filth and dead animals into the water / making it unclean / or hindering it in its usual course.

If, however, someone should be accused of this / they should, for every time / that this occurs, / pay a fine of five shillings, / which we will then enforce through the diligent surveillance of the prescribed municipal overseers of the poor (*Bettelkönige*) / and other special agents / if a person does not keep the water in front of their door clean.

We also command as a serious matter / that no one should let their pigs into the streets / or their geese and ducks swim on the Gera River / but should
let them be driven by the common shepherd / or keep them in their house / But if these are found on the River Gera / our overseers of the poor (Bettelkönige) shall be authorized / to drive them into the infirmary.


Behavior in city spaces was also meant to be regulated by Policeyordnungen (and their enforcers). For example, we read in an order from Carinthia:

Dancing and playing in public squares.

Herewith, it is our intention to have prohibited journeymen / from dancing with common women / in public squares / or from setting up gaming tables / and operating them / or playing in the public square / or otherwise, in a game, / playing in a way that is not honorable and decent / by using false dice or cards / or having them / And if a journeyman should / become aware / of any transgression against this law of ours / or of other misdeeds and sacrileges / committed by another journeyman / he should lodge a complaint / with a mayor or judge / and in this matter / experience no negative consequences of any kind / from the other journeyman.


Additional literature:

Source 7

Walking in the city—A stroll through Barcelona

Commentary: Michel de Certeau, among others, has pointed to the different ways of walking in a city. Travel reports, city descriptions, and sometimes travel guides are suitable sources for examining the various ways in which people appropriate urban spaces: by looking, walking, painting, or describing. In the report chosen here, there are also passages that tell of measures for urban reconstruction, i.e., changes to the material structure of the city. The report also contains multiple meanings of a “walk” or “promenade”: (1) the person taking a walk (the report also speaks of “flanieren,” i.e., strolling); (2) walking as an activity; (3) the path on which people walk.

Friedrich Wilhelm Hackländer’s journey began on October 8, 1853, in Stuttgart, where he set out by train—via Ulm, Lake Constance, and Switzerland—for Italy (Milano, Genoa, and Florence, where he left his family), and then to Carrara and Marseille. Here, he met the painter Theodor Horschelt, with whom he visited If Castle. On December 4, 1853, they boarded a steamer in Marseille to Barcelona. In Barcelona, they were then joined by the architect Christian Friedrich Leins. The following passages are taken from Hackländer’s description of the city of Barcelona. After this stopover, the journey continued via Valencia and Albacete to Madrid, and from there to Granada, Sevilla, and Cadiz all the way to Gibraltar. Sections of the route were traveled alternatingly by post coach, railway, mule, or horse. In April 1854, Hackländer and Leins returned to Stuttgart.

In Barcelona, the visit began at Montjuïc, the city’s main local hill. After that, the men went to the harbor and visited the neighborhood of Barceloneta:

The city that lay before us was small, but with such unremarkable houses, looking so humble, that we shyly asked: Is this supposed to be Barcelona? To which, to our relief, the hired servant happened to reply with a gentle smile: this is only the suburb Barceloneta; but that being said, it is not unimportant, it is newer than the big city, and its streets all run in straight lines and intersect at right angles. Here is where the fishers’ and sailors’ quarters are located, there are many bars and tobacco shops here, with arched passages between them filled with colorful sailor shirts and red mantas—a color that seems to be fashionable here in Catalonia for this piece of clothing.

The streets looked quite bleak and empty, as did the buildings; most of their windows were closed, some of them were also covered only with white curtains, and now and then a female figure would lean out of the balcony, full-bodied, with a pale face and very dark hair that was done up with silver hairpins.

Barceloneta, founded between 1755 and 1775 by the Marquis de la Mina, is quite drawn out in length, and we needed a good quarter of an hour to reach the graves and walls of the well-fortified large city. The gate that we approached appeared especially interesting, even already from quite
far away—contrasting quite brightly to the dirty mass of buildings that we passed, and because of its strange structure of forms and the pretension of its entire arrangement, which betrayed it to be an entirely modern building. The two archways next to each other—one for entering, and one for exiting—appeared to have a completely closed circular shape, fixed in between a forest of Greek Doric columns; and upon closer inspection this, in fact, almost seemed to be the case, for from the lower half of the circle the piece that was cut out was just large enough to make a flat threshold. The effort that had been taken to create rich architectural forms and the precision of their execution deserved a better overall arrangement.

Behind this Puerta del Mar, things suddenly looked entirely different and more like a big city. Before us, we had a broad, well-paved square, and at that moment in the middle of the square someone was intent upon erecting some kind of memorial for which the considerable, cube-shaped supporting base was already finished. On one side of the square, there are four to five-story houses, and next to these there is the quite meager-looking lonja or market; to the left there is a large building with arcades, under which there also happens to be a coffee house called “At the Seven Gates.” This is what the inscriptions said on the same number of entrances, in seven different languages, including one inscription in German. This is the palace of an American in which Espartero lived after the Civil War, when the Court was still here, and the balcony of the victorious duke was directly across from that of both great queens, for to the right on the square is the Royal Palace, a red building in a style that is intended to be medieval; but the decorations—in part quite tasteless—are only painted on. What had been attempted was an imitation of the Doge’s Palace in Venice, but only of its appearance and not of its being: the simulated incrustations of colorful marble slabs, the half-Gothic, half-Arabian details, and the jagged wooden coping give the entire construction quite a Baroque appearance. The only thing that was pretty was the balcony enclosed in glass extending along the entire length of the building on the main floor, which was something quite new to us in its scale, and which we would find again only in the more southern parts of the country, in many diverse kinds. It is impossible here for me to not mention two sentry boxes painted blue and white, in the form of a tent, since it would be hard for me to say that I have ever seen something of the sort that was clumsier. …

When I set foot into a foreign city, I find it a true pleasure to wander about without any aim or purpose, turning this way or that, letting chance lead me where it will. Of course, such a stroll always lasts many hours, for I wander about steadfastly, looking at people, buildings, streets, and warehouses. This gives me a fresh, original overall impression that does not later blur but remains, even after a long time, like a bright stripe amid the image of the city that is already beginning to fade in my memory. …

It would be difficult for a foreigner to find their way in the streets of Barcelona if they didn’t have two main axes—as with the Seine or the
boulevards in Paris, for example—to which they return again and again in wandering about, the Muralla del Mar and the Rambla. The latter intersects with the former at a right angle and divides the city into two unequal halves; the half facing the Monjuich could be called old Barcelona, and that facing the Citadelle could be called new Barcelona. The latter is much more brilliant and livelier; here, stores, warehouses, and archways are stacked up next to each other, and these are the signs of the aspiring great city. ... The traffic that this produces in the streets is exceptional, and there are city districts that are, in this regard, the equal of the liveliest areas of Paris. The elegant archways and warehouses of which we spoke earlier are mainly located in Ferdinand VII Street, which leads from the Rambla to Constitution Square. Earlier, this used to be only a narrow alley, but already many years ago the inhabitants started to widen it considerably; and this was done to meet a pressing need that had been apparent for a long time. For it was the case that Constitution Square, set quite high up and no longer in the immediate proximity of Monjuich’s cannons, was the heart of the rebellion in the numerous and bloody uprisings that have long troubled the city; this is where the palace of the provincial deputies was located, and usually also the leaders of the rebels, who could agitate there quite freely since the narrow streets made it impossible to move against them with cavalry and artillery. With the new street, a good-sized gap was opened up leading into this area; it runs in a direct line to the Rambla and has a width of approximately fifty feet. Even though work was still ongoing to lay a splendid paving of wide stone slabs, as well as gas lines, which made it difficult to cross the new street, the residents of Barcelona often made use of it; indeed, a constant stream of people strolled by in front of the brilliant warehouses, often making it difficult to push through the flow.

In this way, we passed many days wandering through the city, some of which I spent together with H., and some of which I spent alone, before, as we returned home one evening to dinner, we saw, to our great pleasure, our long-awaited third companion, the architect Leins, hurrying to meet us on the steps of the hotel. ...

Looking around in such a way, and stopping now and then, here or there, we come to a broad sidewalk planted with a double row of trees, el Paseo Nuevo, which runs parallel to the Rambla but lies comparatively very alone and bleak; it is too far away from the center of the city to be used by high society. However, it seems that this is where the younger generation or, much rather, its caretakers and attendants come to meet; for as in the Tuileries Garden in Paris (at a place that is known as le petite Provence because of its sunny position), you see here a large number of decked-out children tumbling about beneath the trees and playing all kinds of games. ...

From the glacis of the Citadelle, it is not far to the Puerta del Mar with its large squares, which we traverse, passing the Café of Seven Gates
that I already mentioned and coming to the Muralla del Mar via a broad ramp, where we have now happily escaped the bustle and noises of the city, the spectacle of the filing, chiseling, and hammering, the buzzing of the looms, the rattling of the machines, the utterly ceaseless din from the hard work of industry that you hear in all corners of the city, and where the eye, no longer blinded by the brightly colored stream of people pushing through and around each other, can finally rest. The Muralla del Mar, which is actually a magnificent terrace leaning up against the parapet of the harbor wall with a width of sixty feet, is one of the most pleasant promenades in Barcelona. Before us, we have the cliffs of Monjuich, to our left we have the harbor, the harbor roads, and the beach, the last of these with its characteristic life, further out we have Barceloneta and before us an immeasurable stretch of the Mediterranean Sea; stretching out behind us, however, are long rows of buildings and palaces, house upon house, divided from the terrace by a street that is connected in only a few places—for example, at the Governor’s Residence—by bridges leading into the first floor. …

On Sundays like today, i.e., in the coldest time of the year, between two and four p.m., the Rambla (which leads upwards from the fortifications I have mentioned for a good quarter of an hour in a direct line to the Puerta Isabella II) is now covered with wagons, riders, and pedestrians. The pedestrians use the middle path planted with trees; others travel to the right and left of this path on the paved street along the buildings. Everything that is out and about to see or be seen, or that aspires to be wearing an elegant outfit and to beauty, comes together here on the Rambla. The eyes are blinded by the colorful stream that rises and falls in chatter and laughter, but the body is quickly exhausted from the eternal maneuvering, the slow walking and constant winding through and around these pressed masses of people. …

In order to gain a beautiful new market square for Barcelona, a number of old buildings were torn down approximately across from Ferdinand VII Street, and the space these occupied together with their courtyards were unified to form quite a large whole. This produced a stately four-sided city square surrounded on all sides by magnificent new buildings with a spacious concourse of narrow stone columns running all around it in the ground floor of the buildings, which also contains small shops for daily needs. …

This market square, to the east of the Rambla, belongs to the old city, which differs markedly from the parts of the city through which we previously strolled. Here the buildings are even darker, higher, and standing so close together in most of the streets that in some of them you could shake hands from one balcony to another without much effort. And these balconies alone give all of these facades, with their innumerable windows, a very
particular look; each of the windows has one balcony, and almost all of them have the same black iron grate, which makes the view here indescribably monotonous. And yet these parts of the city have little traffic. You can wander through entire streets without seeing anything except the gloomy, high, dark walls with closed-up windows, with a wilted geranium here or there, a few dogs on the street, a cat jumping by, and beggars of both sexes huddled together. At the very most, we might meet a scrawny horse loaded with little caskets and led by its owner who, in a piercing voice, is trying to hock the most excellent vinegar. The monotony of the streets in the old city is also caused by the many monasteries that used to be located here, and even if their interiors were completely changed, the dark and frightening appearance of their exteriors was not. …

The view [from Montjuïc] from the upper, very broad platform surrounding the inner quadratic courtyard is fantastic and lovely. Laid out before you is the enormous sea, to the left Barcelona with the many small villages surrounding it, and the rich plain bordered by mountains of beautiful shapes which, mixed with other valleys and new mountain ranges, rise up higher and higher to finally unite on the horizon with the tremendous line of the Pyrenees. To the rear, you have a view into the hilly countryside, which here has a different, less magnificent character. However, the mountains there are covered more heavily in green growth, crowned with small villages, individual churches, and ruins of old castles; in the valleys, little lakes gleam, and a yellow strip through the green land reveals a short section of the road toward Madrid and Valencia.


Additional information about the life and work of the merchant and writer Friedrich Wilhelm von Hackländer (1816–1860), as well as bibliographic information, can be found on the website put together by Taro Breuer.²

Source 8

Lewes Roberts, The Merchants Map of Commerce, 1638
“The Description of Countries conducible to the Description of Cities and Towns of Traffick” (University of California Libraries, Los Angeles)

The discourse about the usefulness of geographic knowledge for trade had an impact on writings about the geography of trade, as in this book by Lewes Roberts (see the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, “Trade: Interactive Relationships That Create Spaces”).
THE

MERCHANTS

MAP

OF

COMMERCE.

CHAP. I.

The Description of Countries conduceable to the Description of Cities and Towns of Traffic.

BEFORE I descend to the particular parts of this Treatie, and before I describe the situations of the towns and cities of traffic, which here I intend to handle, I must of necessity for method’s sake, first, by a copious draught describe the countries, kingdoms and principalities, whereof the towns are found to be situated and places in which to do the same cities and towns of traffic, orderly, and as the subject requires, it is fit I should survey the means whereby the same is or may be performed, according to the opinion of the learned, is usual only to be done by the knowledge of geography, which in it self is esteemed to be a knowledge so useful and requisite for a merchant, factor, or any other active person whose occasions may draw him into foreign parts, that it may not be neglected nor omitted. Neither is it held only necessary to such as manage private affairs by merchantsizing, as merchants or factors, who are led thereto by the mean profit; but also to such persons as are more eminent, and such as are of greater quality, whose motions are the publique affairs of princes, as ambassadors or plenipotentiaries and delites, by travelling, as commanders, whose motions may be properly termed curiosity and taste of nations, which is seen among the desires of divers nations, and the government and policies of those kings, do not only very much benefit themselves, but better their understandings thereby, making their knowledge more capable of either public or private employments, when they return to their native place.

The like I conceive the ingenious merchant or factor may (if he please) do, for being in his younger years employed abroad in merchandising, he may by well judging his merchandise, employment and time, pay a future benefit of mind, to a present profit of estate; and by a provident judgment, and a judicious providence, so manage his idle hours, and vacant time, that he let his capacity, not only only to undertake and direct to where, but also skilfully to perform the greatest employments that are incident to the service of a state or kingdom, either is it a rare or extraordinary thing to find those that have had their education thus, to have proved not only good common-mediate-men, but also excellent statesmen; our own country hath afforded some examples in all ages, but in other countries many more are daily found, for it must be acknowledged, that from this school those ripe and mature judgments have sprung up, that in many countries abated, have given sufficient testimony to the world of their excellent abilities this way; and that the art of merchandising, together with the frequenting of foreign countries, at the first to that end, hath afterward rather furthered, than any way hindered their abilities to undertake, and judiciously to perform the same.

The ancient palaces and present flourishing continuance of the state of Venice, the republic, merchant, and rich states of the Netherlands, the opulent and eminent quality of the Doge of Tyre, among the first the wealthy well-governed Hanse-Towns in Germany, (and many more which I could name,) make good this assertion, for in all these, merchandising is found to be the school whereof from whence they gather their first principles, and indeed the chief foundation upon which many countries, of political government is raised: the rules by which their commerce are framed, and the precedents by which the same is taken to be supported and maintained.

How excellent it is thus for a merchant (that hath another proper and peculiar end of his travels,) to employ his time and find his hours, as that he may at pleasure, without cost or charges, reap the benefit of-hand all which others purposely come to learn and painfully labour for, with great expence of time and money; and yet for all this, are perpetually deficient of those helps and furtherances, which merchants and factors by reason of their abode b
The Map of Commerce.

Geography.

or vocation do continually enjoy, and who return as ignorantly home (perchance) as they went out or hastily furnished with some few things necessary for their use, as much not into the depth of such politics of Government, as the real intent of their travel doth truly require; whereas the

Meridians that comes thither, not purposely to that end, but to benefit himself as a Merchant, may gather and lay up there his Observations obtained as Passages, and collected as Recreations, which will further and entice him afterward, either with desire for pleasure, or by necessity for profit and commodity, when he shall please to publish his secret treasure and put the same into practice.

Geography (by what hath been said,) being then granted to be both a profit and a pleasure to all, and specially to the Merchant, it must necessarily be granted to be useful also: for though we live in this Island acknowledge none for Merchants but such as adventure their Estates at Sea, and are by this means accounted for real Merchants; yet these that are versed in this Navigation, and find in this Art, know also that there be Merchants likewise that have their residence in Continents, where neither Sea are known, nor yet Navigable Rivers found, yet for all this, supply with Land-Carriages of Horses, Mules and Camels, by industry and labour, what Nature and our Habitation both freely afford unto us, by the commodity of the incommoded Sea in shipping, and these are observed and found to travel by Land in Companies and Caravans with their Merchandise from one Country to another, (as we do by Sea in Ships and Frets,) paying their Duties, Customes, and Tolls upon the entry, and confines of every several Princes Dominions.

Have then shall this Land-traveling Merchant know whose Kingdom he is in? what Prince commands, or who is Lord of that ground he travels upon, but by a Speculation herein? Whereby shall he know what way he hath rid and travelled, where neither Miles nor Leagues are accounted, or in Sea, but by the? How shall he know which way his coude lies, where neither paths nor highways are found to direct him, nor guide to inform him, or how far he hath yet to go in that Princes Dominion, but by the? How shall he know what Rivers run in his way, what States or Mountains he hath to pass over, but by the? Nay, hereby he is instructed whether those streams be great or small, and whether passable by Boat, Bridge or Foot, and by the what Plains, Woods and Hills, with their extent, fertility, and convenience, the better to provide for his accommodation, and the necessities of his Journey: as also what Cities and Towns of Traffick stand in his Road, the limits and bounds of Kingdoms, the disposition of the Inhabitants, the alteration of the Climates, the Laws of those several Raignes, the Commodities that those Countries do afford for Merchandizing: the plenty and barrenness thereof, and Lastly, how they are supplied with foreign Waters and Merchandizes, either by Lands, Sea, or Navigable Rivers; and all these (besides many other needful things) may be more learned and observed, which laid up in memory both in the court of his life and Traffick, may in after-times much profit and advantage him. The benefit reaped thereby being thus briefly expected, the thing it fell challenging in the next place to be handled; which according to my skill and insight, I shall with that so far as is needful to my present purpose.

Geography in brief then, is an Art that doth demonstrate by rules in a flat, level or Plane, the whole Sea and Earth, and the division thereof, setting down by a certain method, the limits and extents of Countries, Provinces and Dominions of Princes the situation of Cities, Towers, Hills, Rivers, Woods, & c. The bounds of Sea, Coasts, Islands, &c. All which is performed and illustrated by apt lines, numbers and parts of the Earths: and Lastly, it gives rules to know the distances of the said places, either in leagues or miles from one Country to another, so that all which being also necessary to be known by the Merchant, I will in few words declare the same.

First then to make the same more evident, the ground of this Art is ordinarly demonstrated and best exprest in Maps and Cards, which do comprise both the Earth and Waters, of which making one entire body, the Geographers do envision with five Circles: the first is the Equinoctial, then the two Tropics, and last the two Polar Circles; thereby dividing the whole, which now we call the World, into five Zones, two thereof are found to be cold, two warm, and one extreme hot: all which in th'o' our days are found to be habilitable, contrary to the opinion of some ancient Geographers: of which Circles and their particular parts, divisions, demonstrations and descriptions, it will not be improper I should briefly handle, as an entrance into this work, and for the better understanding of what is to follow hereafter.

Every Map or Card then for the most part is commonly traced with two sorts of lines or circles, that is, Meridians and Parallels: the Meridians are either Right or Circular lines, falling through both the Poles of the World, and are imagined to be drawn right up and down from the head to the foot of the Map, and called Meridians, because that when the Sun comes to touch any of those lines, it is mid-day to those that dwell under the same.
And Parallels are either right or circular lines, imagined to be equally distant one from another, which do cut the aforesaid Meridians with right Angles, and in the very midst of the Universal Maps and Cards, are most commonly drawn, from head to feet a right line, which signifies not only the first Meridian, but also the Antarc of the World, the upper end of which line is called the Pole-Antarctic, or the North-Pole, and the lower end is called the Pole-Articular, or the South-Pole, and this line is credited in the very midst between the two Poles, with and Antarctick, another great circle, or rather right line called the Equinocial, because, that when the Sun Equinocial, comes to touch this line or circle, the day and night is equal throughout the whole World, the one half of which line towards the right hand, is called the East part, and the other half towards the left hand, is called the West part of the World, so as those two lines, the first Meridian and the Equinocial, do point out the four Quarters of the World, East, West, North, and South, from whence the four principal winds do blow, between which winds are set down in all general Maps, and generally in all Sea-Charts, the other division of the winds, which is not so much pertinent to my present purpose, I willingly omit.

Further, it is to be noted that both the Equinocials and the Meridians circles, or lines, are divided each of them into 360 degrees, so as every quarter of them containeth 90 degrees; and in the Equinocal are set down the degrees of Longitude, which is the length of the World, round about from High to Low, and from East by West home again. The first degree whereat beginneth the first aforesaid Meridian coeth the Equinocial, in the very midst of all Universal Maps in general, and doth proceed Eastward unto the number of 150 degrees, which is as far as you can go Eastward: for from thence by reason of the roundness of the Earth, you must return back again Westward, until you come to the 360 degrees, which is the half degree of Longitude, and cœneth where the first degree beginneth.

Moreover, in the said first Meridian are set down the degrees of Latitude, that is, breadth of the World, both in Northern and Southern, for from the Equinocial to the North Pole, are contained in the aforesaid Meridian 90 degrees, and that is called the North Latitude; and from the Equinocial to the South Pole are contained in the said Meridian, other 90 degrees, which is called the South Latitude, and in most Maps the Equinocial line is divided and ceoth with 18 Meridians, on each side of the said Meridian, dividing the Equinocial into 72 several distances, every distance containing 10 degrees, and every degree containeth 60 Italian miles of length.

Again, between the Equinocial and each of the Poles are drawn certain Circles or Lines, Circles Articular which I said before, are called Parallels, of which most commonly it is found, that four are pointed with red ink, signifying, the four corner Circles, the highest towards the North Pole, is called the Circle-Antarctic, which is 23½ degrees distant from the Pole; and the lowest towards the South Pole is called the Circle-Articular, which is also distant 23½ degrees from the Pole; and as touching the other two said Circles, the one lying betwixt the Circle-Articular and the Equinocial, it is called the Tropic of Cancer; and the other lying betwixt the Equinocial and the Circle Articular, that is called the Tropic of Capricorn, and each of these two Tropics is distant from the Equinocial 23 degrees, 23½, which is the greatest declination of the Sun; for betwixt these two Tropics the Sun continually melteth his course, and returneth, mounting never higher than the Tropic of Cancer, nor descending never lower than the Tropic of Capricorn; for which cause some do set down to their Maps the three Tropics betwixt the two Tropics of Capricorn; which are divided into five Zones: one hot, two temperate, and two cold.

Furthermore, by help of the said four Circles, the Earth, (as I said before,) is divided into five Zones, one hot, two temperate, and two cold. The hot zones are betwixt the Tropic of Cancer, and the Equinocial, the one lying betwixt the Tropic of Cancer, and the Circle Articular, and the other betwixt the Tropic of Capricorn and the Circle Articular, and of the cold zones, the one lying betwixt the North Pole and the Circle Articular, and the other betwixt the South Pole and the Circle Articular.

Moreover, besides the four special Parallels, there be also divers other Parallels drawn on each of the Equinocial, both Northward, and Southward, which crossing in certain places, the first Meridian marked with degrees, do shew the true Latitude of every place, and under what Climate or Parallel it is; and also how many hours the longest day of any place under every Parallel is, beginning to account the same, either from the Equinocial upward, towards the North Pole, first marked with degrees of Northern Latitude, or else from the first Equinocial downwards towards the South Pole, marked with degrees of Southern Latitude.

Also this World in all common Maps and Cards is divided into four parts, Europe, Africa, Asia, and America; which will not be amiss here to be observed, and how many miles of the World containeth, as well in Longitude as in Latitude, according to the opinion of such parts of the World as are not contained in the aforesaid Parallels.
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Europe then is bounded on the North with the North Ocean Sea, and on the South with the Mediterranean Sea; on the East with the Flood Tanae, and on the West with the West Ocean; and Europe in measuring with a right line from the farthest part of Ireland on the West unto the Flood Tanae, on the East, both places having 53 degrees of Latitude, hath in Longitude 2166 miles, and in measuring with a right line, from the farthest part of Mona on the South, where Latitude is 37 degrees unto the North Sea side, having 72 degrees of Latitude, hath in Longitude 5220 miles, or thereabouts.

Africa is bounded on the North with the Straight Sea Gibrarther, and with the Mediterranean Sea; and on the South with a Sea which divideth Africa from the South Land, not yet so fully known; and on the East with the Red Sea, and on the West with the great Atlantic Ocean; and in the measuring of Africa with a right line, from Gambia on the West, unto the Cape de Goodes on the East, both places having 10 degrees of North Latitude, hath in Longitude 4425 miles, and in measuring with a right line from the 50 degree of the Equinoctial unto the Mediterranean Sea, it hath in North Latitude 32 degrees, which multiplied by 60, maketh 1920 miles, and in South Latitude measuring with a right line from the 60 degree of the Equinoctial unto the Cape of bona Esperanza, it hath 35 degrees, which also multiplied by 60 maketh 2100 miles, which maketh the whole Latitude of Africa to be 4020 miles, or thereabouts.

Asia is bounded on the North, with the North Ocean Sea; and on the South, with the Red Sea; and partly with other Seas and Gulphs adjoining thereto; on the East, with the East Indian Ocean, and the Straight Sea of Arabia; and on the West with the Flood Tanae and Pasa of Mora, with the Common and Turkish Ioffeurn, the Issus and Mediterranean Sea, and part of the Arabic Gulph; and Asia then in measuring with a right line from the mouth of the Flood Tanae, to the Promontory Taurus, both places having 50 degrees of Latitude, hath in Longitude 4284 miles, and in measuring with a right line from the 150, degree of the Equinoctial, unto the Promontory Taurus, it hath in North Latitude 75 degrees, which being multiplied by 60 maketh 4500 miles.

America is bounded on the North with the North Ocean Sea, and on the South with the Magellan Sea; on the East with the Atlantic Ocean, and on the West with the West Indian Ocean, and the Straight of Arabia, and in measuring with a right line from the Straight of Aessa to the farthest part of Elberland upon the 64 degree of Latitude, hath in Longitude 166 degrees, which maketh 9960 miles, and in measuring with a right line from the 270 degree of the Equinoctial unto the North Sea, it hath in North Latitude 76 degrees, which maketh 4560 miles, and in measuring with a right line from the 305 degree of the Equinoctial unto the Magellan Sea, it hath in South Latitude 53 degrees, which makes at 60 miles the degree, 3310 miles.

Thus for full suffice to have spoken in general of the Lines, Circles and Divisions of the Universal Maps, and Cards found to be made by our Modern Geographers. That which cometh in the next place to be handled, is the more material and useful part, belonging to my present work, is the knowledge and situation of every Kingdom, Region, City, Mountain, Flood and Lake found in this circumstancè: also the knowledge of the Seas, together with the Islands, Ports, Capes, Points and Bays which do belong to every one of the above-mentioned parts and divisions of the World, and that are found therein comprehended, which principally is manifestly and learned by the Longitude and Latitude thereof; in it all, which teacheth three particulars: First, The very situation of the place; Secondly, The very distance from one place or City to another; Thirdly, How one place lieth from another: And lastly, With what wind you may fall from one Point, Capes or City on the one toward another, in which four things the chief use of Maps are found principally to consist. First then, The degree of Latitude or the situation of the Pole (being both one thing) is accounted from the Equinoctial to either Pole which is 90 degrees, and the degree of Longitude accounted upon the said Equinoctial from the 1st of Cape Verde towards the East, and 90 round about the Earth till you come to the number of 360 degrees; where it is to be noted, that the Provinces and Territories found under one and the same degree of Latitude, have at the same time like hours of the day; but those that are situated under divers degrees of Longitude do differ in number of hours; and that is the cause that when it is one Terra noon-tide, it is another Terra different these 30 degrees towards the East two a clock in the afternoon, and so consequently for every 15 degrees distance, it is then found to differ one hour in time.

Also those that dwell under one and the same degree of Latitude have equal quantity of days and nights; but yet so as they which dwell on the South Pole of the Equinoctial have the shortest day, when we have the longest, and have their Winter when we have Summer; and those that are under divers degree of Latitude, have inequality of days and nights; for the night that any place is situated towards any of the Poles, the more hours the longest day of the year in that place hath; and those that dwell under the Equinoctial have always their days and nights of like quantity; but I understand here by the day, the space between Sun-rising and Sun-setting.
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Geography. The Map of Commerce.

Setting 5 so that when the have 30 degrees of Latitude, the longest day is about 14 hours, and the night the Pole, the longer, informed as those that dwell under the Pole, and whole

Zamb is the Pole, their year is but a day and a night, that is to say, they have six months day, and six months night.

It is also to be noted, that the Meridians are found to have many necessary ails in the general and common Maps, for thereby is learned that it is noon-tide or mid-day sooner in one place than in another, by observing that Meridian that is most towards the East, which the Sun travel down always sooner than that Meridian which is more towards the West.

By the Meridian is also known how the Eclipse of the Moon appears sooner to one place than to another, and likewise what variety of time, for why the whole Meridian is towards the

West, do see the Eclipse of the Moon sooner than they whose Meridian is more towards the East, whereas indeed the Eclipse of the Moon is seen at all places (where it can be seen) at one very instant of like manner, and yet move to be seen later or sooner by reason of the diversity of the time of the day, in places standing one East or West from another and if the Moon when distance between those two Meridians do contain 15 degrees of the Equinocial, then the Eclipse seems to be sooner to one than to the other by one whole hour, according to my former alteration, for every 15 degrees make an hour, and therefore observe how many 15 degrees you find between the two Meridians, in so many hours are to be accounted, and if fewer degrees be found, then the time of the Eclipse is to be esteemed accordingly, attributing four minutes of an hour to one degree, etc.

As for the Eclipse of the Sun, it is seen neither generally nor fully at one self-time, but Eclipse of the yet of the same geocentric in all places; indeed it appears sooner to the Western Countries than to the Eastern countries, but the diversity of the time of appearance does depend not only on the number of Meridians between the two places, but also of the twist or throw motion of the Moon, which coming between us and the Sun takes the light of the Sun away.

The latitude and Longitude of Cities and places may be found out by the Meridians also, but here it is observable, that the degrees of Longitude are in all places of like length, as making ever so much, but the degrees of Longitude proceeding from the Equinocial towards and of the two Poles, are unequal, and every one shorter than the other, and containing four

miles, so that if two ships were under the Equinocial 150 degrees distant each from other, and being to fall towards the North Pole, upon the time comes when they come to the 60th degree of Latitude, their distance shall be but 75 leagues, and the further they go towards the Pole, the less distance they shall be one from the other, informed as when they are both under the Pole it is, they shall all be nearer: but this part more particularly concerns Navigation, which so far forth as is requisite to a knowledge of a Mercator, I have handled in my Book of the Fates drups, which together with a Collection of the Stars, I intend (God willing) hereafter to publish.

Now for the rule of the simple latitudes and Longitudes is most necessary and needful in this Art, it is proper I should set down the ways whereby not only the latitude and Longitudes, but also the distances of all Cities and places by all universal Maps and Star-cards that are perfectly drawn and delineated, is learned and found out.

First then, To find out the longitude of any place, do thus: Extend a rond so as it fall through the Pole and through the place whose Longitude you seek to any Map or Card, even to Longitude of the very Equinocial and somewhat beyond, holding the ronde right, and then the number of do a place.

great written upon the Equinocial or Parallel will thine the Longitude.

Again, by the Meridians likewise we are known what Longitude any place in the Map hath: as thus: Set the one true of a point of Compass in the place of the, and the other in some Meridian, that is next unto it, whether on the right hand, or on the left hand matters not: from thence draw down your Compass-following bill that Meridian until you come to the Equinocial line, and there mark upon what degree of the Equinocial that foot of the Compass which you did last put in the place doth rest: then count how many degrees that is distant from the first Meridian, and that is the true Longitude of the place; and note, that that Longitude serveth to all the places that be under that Meridian, though they be never so far distant one from another North and South.

Now for the Longitude of that place or any other, do thus: Set the one foot of your Compass in the very Pole, extending the other to the Place or City whose Latitude you seek, and keeping your Compass at that wick, bring the movable foot to the first Meridian wherein the degree of Latitude are marked, and there lay it in the number of the degrees counting from the Equinocial upwards towards the Pole, will show the Latitude of the place brought and note, that the like Latitude have all they that dwell under that Parallel, how far forever they dwell nearer East and West, and by knowing the Latitude of any place, you may quickly also find in some Maps under what Line or Parallel such a place is situated, and of how many hours the longest day is there.

Now
The Map of Commerce. Geography.

Now to know how one place beareth from another, and with what wind your ship is to be directed from one Maritime Port to another, is needful here to be handled, as not pertaining to my task; but for what distance is between two several places many Cosmographers have found, by several ways taught the same; one only, the most common in use, I will pitch upon, as the most facile and easy.

To find out the distance between any two places, do thus: Set the one foot of your Compass on the one place, and the other foot on the other place, and apply that needle to the Equinoctial, and look how many degrees of the Equinoctial that needle is comprehended, and allowing 60 Italian miles to every degree, you shall have the distance by a right line of those two places demanded.

But if the said two places have both either North or South Latitudes, then halve the latter Latitude out of the greater, so shall you find the difference, which difference if you multiply by 60, the product will be the number of miles; and if to the whole degree of difference there be added any minutes, then you must add to the product for every minute a mile.

But if one of the two places have North Latitude, and the other South, then you shall first find their difference by Addition only, and not by Subtraction.

Now if you would find the distance of two places, differing only in Longitude, both places having either East or West Longitude; then make the letter out of the greater, so shall you have the true difference, which difference you must multiply by the number of miles belonging to their Latitude, which commonly is found on the North-West side of the Maps, or by the Table of miles unfriable, of one degree of every Latitude, and the product thereof will be the number of miles; whereby the one place is distant from the other; but if one place have East Longitude, and the other West Longitude, then you must find the distance as well by Addition as by Subtraction.

To conclude this point, I conceive it not much material to my purpose to further into this subject; for the diligent and ingenious will easily hereupon comprehend the benefit that may redound to him by a general inspection in this Art; referring what is here but briefly omitted to his own private researches, and to such Authors as have learnedly written on this subject more at large; and therefore from the universal knowledge of Maps that pointeth out the General Divisions of the World, I will come to the Particulars comprised therein, and view the Subdivisions thereof, as Twenty, Eighty and Seventy have prefered rules thereto.

This World then, confiding as I before noted for of the Principal Parts, and every part consisting of several Empires, Kingdoms, and Provinces in which many Commodities both natural and artificial are found for the Commerce, and Traffic, and also wherein are noted to be divers eminent Cities and Towns of great concourse of Shipping, Merchants and Traders; which Trade is maintained and driven by the said Commodities and Wares, and by the natural inclination of Mankind to enrich themselves by Invention, and Time, hath devised the Art of Merchandizing, and by the means of Weights, Measures, Coins, Exchanges and Accompyning, have drawn the frame to certain Heads and Principals, in this MAP OF COMMERCE I shall endeavor to demonstrate: But before I fall to Particulars, it is requisite I should first lay somewhat of the same in general.

CHAP. II.

Of the Art of Merchandizing, and the General Parts thereof.

MERCHANTIZING is truly considered in it self; and rightly professed may well be said to be an Art or Science invented by ingenious Mankind, for the public good, commodity and welfare of all Common-wealths; for thereby some Places and Kingdoms are supplied and furnished with those necessary things, whereas Nature her self hath proved deficient in, and which in some other Places or Kingdoms hath abounded, tending either to the need, ornament, or commodity of human life, and is performed by exporting the superfluities, that are found in the one, to furnish the defects and wants that are found in the other; and the Arts men that are feem to one another, and execute the same, and do thus transport the things from one place to another, are generally known to us and commonly termed by the name of Merchants, and the things themselves wherewith they Negotiate and Traffic are termed Merchandizes or Commodities.

Merchandizing then of it self, in effect, is nothing else but a Communication, Bargaining, Contracting or Exchanging of one man with another; and by giving by one, so much of one thing or Commodities, to have of the other, so much and the like value, of some one other differing Commodities and the things themselves subject to this Communication, or Exchanging, are principally
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space

Additional literature:

**Part C: Maps as media for representing spatial relations, creating spaces, and disseminating images of the world, and as instruments for orientation**

**Source 9**

**T and O map**
Example: T and O Map from the *Etymologiae* of Isidor of Sevilla (around 600 CE), first printing from 1472

Commentary: In the (Christian) Middle Ages, the image of the world was described and shaped above all by church fathers and clerics. One widespread form of medieval maps of the world (mappae mundi) were circular maps, of which the type known as the T and O map (having the form of a T in an O, for orbis terrarum, meaning “orb” or “circle of the lands”) was a special form. This relatively simply form of a round image of the world shows a limited world engulfed by an ocean; the interior is structured (in the form of a T) by a horizontal and vertical division marked by bodies of water (the Don, the Mediterranean, and the Nile) that represent the threefold division of the known world at the time into Asia, Europe, and Africa. This graphic representation of the world, which appears often in medieval manuscripts, refers to a passage in a text by Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636), who, as a bishop around the year 600 CE, composed a description of the world conforming to the Bible. According to this account, humanity descended from Noah, who divided the world among his three sons Shem, Japheth, and Ham. Although the conception stemming from antiquity of the earth as a sphere did not fully disappear, this image presented the world as round and flat, and these maps are usually oriented to the east (Asia lies in the upper part of the map). This conception and in particular the division of the earth into three parts shaped European thought up through the fifteenth century. This edition from Augsburg in 1472 is the oldest known printed geographic map from Europe.

Additional literature:
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Source 10

Circular map

Example: The Ebstorf Map of the World, from around 1300


The interactive map with translations offered by the University of Lüneburg is worth recommending: www.leuphana.de/ebskart (accessed September 21, 2018).

Commentary: The Ebstorf Map is one of the most famous, and certainly the most detailed, medieval mappae mundi. It is named after the place where it was found, the Benedictine monastery Ebstorf in the Lüneburg Heath. It was likely created around 1300 in the area of the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg, which was ruled by the house of Welf. It has a diameter of 3.57 meters and is sewn together from thirty sheets of vellum. Latin texts are placed outside the circle of the map: even if the Ebstorf Map is quite detailed compared to the schematic T and O map, it is not a map of the world in the modern sense (with scale and projection). What matters here are entirely different statements that become clear,
on the one hand, through the presence of different elements (texts, topographic elements, scenic images, humans, animals, mythical creatures), and on the other, through the map’s temporal narrative. Jerusalem stands in the center, and Rome and Babylon are emphasized as additionally significant cities. Paradise is located in the east (at the top of the map). The entire world is circumscribed by the figure of Christ with his head, feet, and hands that are visible at the map’s margins. In this regard, the map (the author of which is unknown) reflects the historical and theological knowledge of its time, or rather, it offers an interpretation of the world based upon this knowledge. Geographic, historical, and Christian-religious elements can exist next to each other just as easily as can temporal notions of past time, worldly time, and eschatological time.

The original, only rediscovered in the monastery in 1830, was lost to fire during the Second World War (1943). It was possible to make color reproductions of the map on the basis of older facsimile editions. As part of a project at the Leuphana University of Lüneburg, one of the reproductions has been digitalized and made available in interactive form (with explanations and transcribed, translated text fragments). Both the Internet version and the new edition edited and commented by Hartmut Kugler offer an ideal foundation for studying the legibility of the medieval world and for comparisons with other maps of the world.

Additional literature:

Internet resources:
**Source 11**

**Arabic maps of the world**

Example: The circular map of the world from the *Nuzhat al-mushtāq* of al-Idrīsī (twelfth century)

1. Idrīsī’s map of the world from a copy of *Nuzhat al-mushtāq*, fifteenth century (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Pococke 375, fol. 3v–4r).

Appendix of sources for the historical study of space


Commentary: This map of the world, which was prepared based on a copy from the fifteenth century, is part of the Nuzhat al-mushtāq fi-khitāq al-āfāq (“the pleasure of him who desires to traverse the lands”), a monumental description of the world that is also known as the Kitāb Rujjār (The book of Roger). It is considered to be the pinnacle of Arabian geography and cartography. In contrast to older, more schematically laid-out predecessors from the so-called Balkhī school, it evinces much more detail in its topographical names and coastlines. At the same time, the map is evidence of Christian-Muslim cultural contact apart from any religious conflicts. The text was composed on the order of Roger II of Sicily by the Arabic scholar al-Idrīsī (ca. 1100–1165), who probably lived at the court of the Norman King from 1138 onward. According to the preface, the work on the Nuzhat al-mushtāq lasted fifteen years and was completed only a few years before the death of Roger II in 1154.
In addition to the map of the world, the *Nuzhat al-mushtāq* consists of seventy regional maps and accompanying texts in which al-Idrīsī provides substantial topographical, historical, political, and cultural information about the countries and regions depicted in the map. He structures his work according to the conception that had already been developed in antiquity and was widespread in the Arab world of seven climate zones. According to this scheme, the northern hemisphere is subdivided into seven belts of differing climate. The first and hottest zone borders the equator, while the seventh zone—already characterized by icy cold—forms the transition to the Arctic polar region. The most balanced climate was to be found in the fourth zone, where al-Idrīsī also located Sicily. For his description, he again subdivided each climate into ten segments. By contrast, the southern half of the globe was considered to be mostly a desert and uninhabitable.

This world map, on which the seven climate zones are marked by oval lines in red ink, offers the viewer a total perspective. Like most Arabic maps, it is oriented with the south at the top of the map and, compared to the Latin *mappae mundi*, offers hardly any graphic symbols. It is marked by the landmass of Africa extending far into the east. Yet this is more a consequence of the round form of the map, which was the basic form for both Arabic and Latin depictions of the world. Together with the elliptical lines of the climate zones, the spherical shape of the earth is indicated. In the center of the African continent, the Ptolemaic “Mountains of the Moon” are disproportionately accentuated as the source of the Nile. The Arabic Peninsula with Mecca and Medina is also emphasized by its size in the middle of the map. The islands of the Indian Ocean point toward the intensive trade relationships between East Africa and India. Within Asia, the Caspian Sea stands out, surrounded by mountain ranges, which in contemporary Latin maps (such as the Ebstorf Map) was not yet depicted as an interior sea but as part of the all-encompassing ocean. Analogously to the *mappae mundi*, a mountain range in the northeast separates the apocalyptic peoples of Gog and Magog from the rest of the world. Europe in the northwest is hardly anything more than an appendage of Asia, although it is clearly marked by its characteristic Mediterranean coastline as well as the Alps, Pyrenees, and the Danube.

Despite the fact that the map is not found in all copies of the *Nuzhat al-mushtāq* and al-Idrīsī makes no explicit reference to it anywhere, scholars have long considered him to be its author. Since the discovery of the *Book of Curiosities* in 2002, however, this is no longer considered certain. This Egyptian cosmography, which was probably composed in the eleventh century in Egypt and exists today
in a thirteenth-century copy kept in Oxford, contains a very similar circular map of the world, suggesting that this type of map may have already been circulating earlier in the Arabic world.

Even though al-Idrīsī composed his work at a Christian court, it was apparently hardly known in Europe. It was not printed until the late sixteenth century. This was followed by the first Latin translation in 1619. It appears to be the case that this is the only type of circular world map that was known in Italy in the fourteenth century. For example, elements such as the Mountains of the Moon and the Caspian Sea found their way into the map of the world prepared by Pietro Vesconte in 1321 for the crusade treatise of Marino Sanudo. Yet the discovery of the Book of Curiosities suggests that this adoption must no longer necessarily be traced to a direct knowledge of the Nuzhat al-mushtāq.

Text: Stefan Schröder

Additional literature:
Source 12

Portolan chart

Example: Pīrī Re’īs Map (fragment, 1513)

Commentary: Portolan charts (Italian portolano, derived from Latin portus, harbor) were originally books containing information for sea voyages, including information about harbors (French: routier, German: Seebuch); nautical maps were only added later. Both are important instruments for knowing and controlling space. The term “portolano” supposedly appears for the first time in 1285, but in a 1995 study about the Liber de existencia, Gautier Dalché was able to prove that the cultural practice of describing the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic already emerged in the twelfth century, in the context of the urban culture of Italy and of crusade reports that also contained traces of nautical instruction. Portolan charts are recognizable, on the one hand, by their detailed naming of harbors and, on the other, by the network of lines laid out over the entire map. The lines do not belong to a grid but are rather so-called rhumb lines (rhombi) that intersect in a wind rose, usually with sixteen parts, the lines of which (the rhombi) represent the directions of the wind. They served to determine a ship’s course with the help of a compass. Further important elements of portolan charts are references to characteristics of the wind or currents. Usually, these maps were actually used for sailing, although most of the examples that have survived—for example, a large number of those held by the French national library, which has the largest collection of such maps—are to be categorized as prestige objects. Such charts then often also contain symbols for important cities (including cities located inland), illustrations of rulers or coats-of-arms of countries, and sometimes mythical creatures or elements of flora and fauna. They are thus not only an expression of a certain geographic reality and means of orientation but sometimes also evidence for the conception and representation of the Other and of other worlds that were still unknown, or for claims of dominion.

The map of the world of Pīrī Re‘īs, an admiral in the Turkish fleet, has survived only as a fragment. It was rediscovered in the library of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul only in 1929. However, survey technicians from the University of Duisburg-Essen were able to reconstruct the map on the basis of the still-recognizable rhombus-system and approximate the form of the lost original.

Additional literature:
Source 13

The *Catalan Atlas*, ca. 1375


*Commentary:* Before Prince Henry the Navigator founded the Royal Observatory around 1418 in Sagres in Portugal (at the southwestern-most point
of the European mainland) and appointed Jehuda Cresques to work there, the Catalan school of cartography was the leading school in Europe. Around 1375, an atlas of the world was produced in a map workshop on Mallorca (consisting of six double sheets) that shows the world as it was known at the time from the Atlantic Ocean to China. The first two sheets contain a Catalan translation of the *Imago mundi* by Honorius Augustodunensis (1080–after 1137), a widespread medieval description of the world, as well as a circular calendar and astrological signs. Read together, the remaining four maps form a map of the world. Two maps show the Orient from China to the Persian Gulf; two show the Occident from the Black Sea to England. The toponymy of the Asian part derives from classical and Asian sources and from the travel reports of Marco Polo. The structure, indications of wind directions, and Mediterranean place names refer to contemporary Catalan portolan charts (Vagnon, in Hofmann et al. 2012, 42). As with many late medieval sea charts, the *Catalan Atlas* also contains phantom islands (also known in English as “flyaway islands”; Weber 2009). The “Atlas”—or rather, collection of maps—was held by the library of the French king Charles V. Today, it is held by the French National Library in Paris (call number: BNF, Manuscrits, Espagnol 30); it is also available in a reproduction on a CD-ROM (*Mapa Mundí, une carte du monde au XIVe siècle*) and in a virtual exhibition.

Additional literature:

**Source 14**

**Maps of the world since 1500**

Beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, European cartographers found themselves faced with a new challenge: integrating the newly discovered areas and the continent on the other side of the Atlantic—which were more likely rediscovered than newly discovered—into their maps of the world. Martin Waldseemüller, a cartographer from Saint-Dié near Strasbourg, designed such a map. This is the first map of the world to give the name of “America” to the continent that Columbus glimpsed. Waldseemüller took this name from the Florentine sea voyager Amerigo Vespucci, who sailed along the coasts of the New World in 1501/02. The map recently acquired a certain fame because the only remaining copy of the first printing was sold to the Library of Congress.
The second challenge facing the cartographers of the sixteenth century consisted in the problem of finding the right form and scale to represent the world on the basis of existing knowledge. These attempts produced circular, oval-shaped, and heart-shaped (cordiform) maps; and in addition to two-dimensional surfaces, cartographers tried out three-dimensional spherical forms, books (atlases), and—around 1800—even a cube-shaped globe (on this point, see Christoph 2011).

**Example 1: Oronce Fine, map of the world in the shape of a heart, 1536**


**Commentary:** In the sixteenth century, the second Ptolemaic projection was advanced through developments in theories of mathematical projection to become a cordiform or heart-shaped projection. This new representational form was not only the first projection to be true in terms of surface area (meaning it correctly represented surface relationships) but also enabled a coherent representation of
the surface of the earth that extended beyond one half of the globe, so that the newly discovered areas of land in the New World could be added to the representations that were already common without any difficulty. The works of Oronce Fine (Latinized as Orontius Finaeus) significantly contributed to the spread of the heart-shaped projections, which Gerhard Mercator also used not much later. Whereas the heart-shaped maps took the north pole as the starting point for their projection (which thus appears in a central position in the map that is unusual for us), the equator prevailed in these elliptically shaped maps as the central line of orientation (for this reason, cartographers speak of “equidistant” projections) (see Eckert 1921, vol. 1, 119–142; Watson 2008). On the map of the world represented here, the Antarctic can be seen in a double heart-shaped projection, marked as Terra australis; it is possible that its coasts had been glimpsed by sea voyagers of the time. On the southern landmass, one can read: “Terra australis nuper inventa, sed nondum plene examinat” (southern land, recently discovered, but not yet completely explored).
Example 2: Abraham Ortelius, Typus orbis terrarum, ca. 1570

Commentary: This is a map of the world from the *Theatrum orbis terrarum* authored by the Antwerp merchant and cartographer Abraham Ortelius (1527–1598). He is considered to have created the first modern atlas in the sense of a collection of maps bound together. Around 1600, this atlas was a cartographic best seller (printed in forty-two editions in various languages between 1570 and 1612). As a map of the world, it also reproduces the modern European image of the world: the American continent including Tierra del Fuego is depicted, and the northern coast of Australia can be recognized; but the map also contains areas that remained unknown and unexplored. For example, the large mass of land in the south is labeled as “Terra Australis nondum cognita.”
Example 3: Gerhard Mercator, Map of the World, 1596


Title: Nova et aucta orbis terrae descriptio ad usum navigantium emendate accommodata.
Commentary: After studying in Leuven, Gerhard Mercator (1512–1594)—born in Flanders as Gerard de Kremer—had the opportunity to work with Gemma Frisius from around 1534 to 1537 in producing globes of the earth and the heavens. In 1552, Mercator moved to Duisburg to take up an appointment from the Duke of Jülich-Kleve-Berg, who wanted to found a new university in the city. Mercator created a series of maps during his time in Duisburg, of which two are especially important. In 1554, he created a map of Europe on which the relations of the European countries to each other were correctly represented for the first time, which amounted to a correction of the Ptolemaic image of the world. And in 1569, he created a map of the world on twenty-one sheets (size: 159 × 212 cm, i.e., a wall-sized map). The addition to the title “ad usum navigantium” points to this being a nautical map in the tradition of portolan charts. Sea voyages in particular require exact maps unless ships simply follow the coastline. But representing the surface of the earth on a two-dimensional map that can also be used for navigation is not that simple. Either distortions or gaps are the result. With his cylindrical projection, Mercator found a pragmatic solution for this problem. To best understand the classic cylindrical projection, one can imagine a cylinder being placed around the earth with the cylinder’s axis corresponding to that of the earth. In order to deal with the problem that the surface of a sphere (the earth) cannot be directly laid out on a superficial, i.e., two-dimensional map, Mercator closed the spaces created when the spherical surface is cut open and spread out by stretching the area. After a first elongation in the direction of east/west, the map is stretched again at every point in a north/south direction to recreate a unified scale at every stretched point. Consequently, the Mercator projection is conformal, meaning that the degree of any angle between two lines on the globe and on the map remains the same, but it is not true to surface area, meaning that countries near the equator appear smaller than those near the poles. This projection is used for sea maps and air maps where topographical exactness is not so important. Starting in the 1960s, the map attracted criticism. At the time, the German historian Arno Peters argued that most maps of the world reproduced social relations of power. He argued that the conformal projection used in the Mercator projection, in particular, distorted the surface areas of the earth and thus represented some regions of the world in a more dominant way than others. On maps of the world with a Mercator projection, Europe appears in the center of the earth, the equator has usually been shifted to the lower half of the image, and non-European states are represented in a significantly smaller scale. In Peter’s view, this geographic image of the world serves to “perpetuate the exaggerated self-importance of the white man … and keep non-white peoples conscious of their powerlessness” (Peters 1976; Glasze 2009, 183). Peters was not able to prevail in getting his own projection to be adopted, but he started an important debate that reached a wide public about the “claims of correctness” made by maps. Peters was familiar to English-language geography in which the paradigm of the social construction of maps was formulated and critical methods for examining the power relations they represent were developed.7
Example 4: Matteo Ricci, Great Map of the World of Ten Thousand Lands, from around 1602 (copy from 1604)

Commentary: Maps of the world were developed during the early modern period outside of Europe, too. One example is this *Great Map of the World of Ten Thousand Lands*, which was the fruit of a collaboration between a European missionary and a Chinese scholar. Matteo Ricci was active in China as a missionary (see Spence 1988). On the map, the Pope in Rome is labeled (in Chinese characters) as “the King of Civilization.” The style of the map has European elements, although Europe does not lie in the map’s center.

*Example 5: Stieler’s Hand-Atlas (Handy atlas), Map of the World in a Mercator Projection, 1891*

Scale: 1:98.000.000, copperplate (multicolored), 40 × 24 cm, scale: 1:98.000.000, prime meridian: Greenwich. With 3 supplementary maps: Average yearly air pressure and prevailing winds. Telegraph connections of the parts of the earth. Ocean currents. – With railway lines and shipping routes.

Source: FB Gotha SPA 2° 000037-05. See also a version in higher resolution at urn:nbn:de:urmel-49e67b50-fd7d-4ec8-af0b-d9ec5167f9934.

Commentary: The atlas of the world published since 1817 by Perthes in Gotha and edited by Adolf Stieler (1775–1836) would develop over the course of the nineteenth century to become the most important topographic atlas. Its main version appeared in ten German editions and in an international edition (which remained incomplete). There was also a Swedish edition, several French, British, US-American, and Italian editions, and various editions in Spanish, including one for Argentina. Pocket editions and smaller school editions of Stieler’s Atlas (Espenhorst 1995) were also produced. Planned originally with around fifty map plates, the first edition was already expanded by another twenty-five; the eighth edition from which this map is taken already contained ninety-five. The map of the world was still produced in “Mercator’s Projection.” Since Mercator’s map of the world in the sixteenth century, this projection had been further developed—for example, in the form of the transversal Mercator projection common today in surveying (in which the axis of the projection cylinder is perpendicular to the axis of the earth). The name “Mercator” still points to this projection’s historic roots but the projection itself has undergone fundamental modifications intended to minimize distortions (for critical views, see the comments to Example 3). This can be illustrated with the help of a Tissot’s indicatrix. Digital map services such as Google Maps and OpenStreetMap likewise use a projection derived from Mercator, often called “pseudo-Mercator.” Today, code numbers are used to precisely reference map projections. These are assigned by the EPSG (European Petroleum Survey Group Geodesy); pseudo-Mercator, for instance, is EPSG:3857.

Why was this projection still being used in the nineteenth century, that is, almost 300 years after it was invented? The answer is probably that it was a matter of convention. We find evidence of this in the Berichte und Erläuterungen zu Stieler’s Hand-Atlas (Reports and explanations for Stieler’s handy atlas), which describes the maps in the atlas and in particular notes any changes compared to the previous map. In the 1860 edition (the eighth), we find the following interesting passage:

Conversely, Mercator’s projection—not exactly the best but the most common way of continuously representing the surface of the earth—has the advantage of allowing a direct comparison of differences in latitude and longitude, despite the fact that the expansion of the latitudes makes a comparison of surface area impossible. For the double expression of the form, in arcs and degrees, it is illuminating that during the rotation of the earth all 360 degrees of the equator pass the meridian in twenty-four hours, meaning that 15 degrees of the equator cross the meridian in every hour, 15 arc minutes in every minute of time and 15 arc seconds in every second of time; and conversely, every degree of the equator takes 4 minutes of time to pass through the meridian, and every arc minute takes four seconds of time. The accordingly simple conversion of differences in arc measurements into measurements of time and distance of given arc lengths can be directly read in the map’s double margin. The time of day in New York thus differs from Hamburg (83° 59′) by 5 h 36 min, and Hong Kong differs from Hamburg (104° 11′) by 6 h 56 min 44," so that when it is noon in Hamburg, it is 5:30 a.m. in New York and around 7 p.m. in Hong Kong.

In the configuration of its coasts, this map—which appears here in the Hand-Atlas for the third time (in 1816 and 1824, as drawn by Ad. Stieler)—is consistently based on the state of nautical surveying up to the previous year; specifically, it was carefully reduced from the British Admiralty’s maps of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The interiors of the continents are no less precise in representing the contemporaneous state of cartography, at least to the extent possible given the small scale. To the north of Svalbard and Smith Sound, and toward the map’s southern edge, the limits are marked off up to where bold expeditions have advanced geographical knowledge toward the poles of the earth.

Since the Atlas has previously lacked an overview of the system of Christian states with its colonies, this map has been used to provide one. This overview is not provided merely as an index of the new geographic determinations recorded in the Atlas, but rather as a preface to the rest of the maps intended as a general overview of the division of the earth’s areas—although of course only the position of the states in relation to each other and their connections to the sea can be considered, while we must also forgo a comparison of their surface areas because the projection has been stretched. The reason for not individually distinguishing by color the states that were formerly colonies in the Western continent was not to obscure the affiliation of the neighboring colonies with the European states; rather, it aggregates them according to dominant nationality into states of Anglo-Germanic, Spanish, and Portuguese origin.

Among the changes in borders during the last decade that are significant for the small scale of this map, the following should be mentioned: 1) determination of the border of the area of Arizona that was incorporated into the United States through the Gadsden purchase (1850–1853); 2) the part of Bessarabia that was ceded to Turkey in the Paris Peace Treaty of March 30, 1856; 3)
removal of Buenos Aires from the union of the Argentine Confederation in 1853; 4) seizure of New Caledonia by the French admiral Febvrier Despointes (September 24, 1853); 5) recognition of the Orange Free State by England (1858); 6) seizure of the Cocos Islands by Capt. Freemantle in the name of the Queen of England (March 31, 1857); 7) founding of the colony of British Columbia by an Act of Parliament on August 2, 1858; 8) English seizure of Moucha Island in the Strait of Mandeb (1858) and the islands of Perim and Kamaran; 9) Disei Island in the Bay of Adulis [Gulf of Zula], in the possession of France since November 1859; 10) expansion of the Russian Empire to include the Amur region, as well as the division of that area into an Amur district and a coastal district, and its demarcation from Transbaikalia with the ukase of December 8, 1858; 11) the Chilean colony Punta Arenas on the Straits of Magellan, founded in 1853, which the Chilean Republic claims in addition to the entire Patagonian west coast and the Atacama region as far as 23 degrees of southern latitude; 12) the group of islands claimed by the United States in the Pacific Ocean between the Society Islands and the Sandwich Islands as authorized by an Act of Congress on August 18, 1856; 13) the enlargement of the Kingdom of Sardinia by the peace of Villafranca and the incorporation of middle Italy. (Bericht und Erläuterungen zu Stieler’s Hand-Atlas, 8th edition, Gotha: Perthes, 1860, 10)

Further evidence for the fact that Gotha’s cartographers consciously situated themselves in the tradition of Mercator can be found in Hermann Berghaus’s map of the world, which appeared between 1863 and 1924 in a total of sixteen editions. At the end of 1861, the press advertised for the volume by announcing that a “Chart of the World on Mercator’s Projection” would appear within several months (Haack 1925, 22). Already the first issue of the map was praised for its comprehensiveness and clarity. It depicted the most important sailing ship routes, the regular steamship lines, overland routes, and undersea telegraph lines (Haack 1925, 23). These lines of connection make this map of the world evidence for the cartographic visualization of globalization in the second half of the nineteenth century. Not least of all, this work is also a nautical map that was actually used in practice at navigation schools, among other places. It was widely used in Hansa cities, and it was also purchased by the American Navy (Haack 1925, 23).

In 1878, on the occasion of an unveiling of a Mercator monument in the city of Duisburg, an article appeared in the journal Die Gartenlaube (no. 36, 592–594) on the question of what was meant by the phrase “According to Mercator’s Projection” found on the maps of the world in the school atlases. Apparently, this was still a mystery to some.

“The Mercator projection,” Peschel writes, “is a cylindrical design. The earth is no longer conceived as a sphere but as a cylinder. If one imagines the axis of the cylinder to be as long as the pole of rotation, and its diameter to be the diameter of the earth, the result obtained when it is rolled is a rectangle that
needs to be tapered, twice as wide as it is high, and upon which the meridians run vertically and equidistant to each other; the latitudes form horizontal lines equidistant to each other, and the intersection of these lines define long rectangles. On a sphere, by contrast, we see that the meridians have almost the exact same distance as the circles of latitude near the equator, but that they become narrower and narrower the closer we get to the poles, until they reach zero at the poles themselves. Now, in order to express the progression of this law on a flat surface, Mercator retained the constant distances for the meridians but accordingly lengthened the latitudes, thus giving the image a strictly symmetrical expansion from the equator to the poles. The one unavoidable misfortune of this design is that it cannot be expanded well above the eightieth degree of latitude because the degree of latitude must increase too quickly in higher polar latitudes, and at the poles it must increase to infinity. The advantages of this design cannot otherwise be overestimated, for in every rectangle between two circles of latitude the relations remain correct, except for the fact that the scale changes with every circle of latitude. Only on a Mercator projection is it possible to correctly see all cardinal directions in which any point on the earth lies in relation to all other points on the earth, since all cardinal directions run through the image as straight lines. Without the Mercator projection, sea voyagers were not able to strictly determine their course, nor were they capable of more precisely calculating the distance they had traveled, except through astronomical determination of position. For all thermic or geomagnetic maps, for geographic maps of flora and fauna, for maps of tides, and indeed for all physical maps, the Mercator projection is indispensable; in a word, it has become the stone of geographic wisdom.

(Source: https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/„Nach_Mercator’s_Projection“, page 593 in the original, accessed September 21, 2018)

The Mercator projection remains important today. For example, the UTM System (Universal Transverse Mercator Projection, developed by the United States military in 1947) adopted the principle of representing the surface of the earth on a cylinder from the Mercator projection. Its axis, however, lies at a right angle to the rotational axis of the earth (hence “transversal”); moreover, the cylinder does not touch the surface of the earth but transects it. And third, not all regions of the globe are represented on the same cylinder. Rather, the earth is turned on its rotational axis in sections of six degrees (producing sixty different representational cylinders). These modifications serve to reduce systematic representational distortions, and UTM also uses its own coordinate system.8
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space

Additional literature:

Source 15

Images of Europe since 1500

**Heinrich Bünting, Europe as Imperial Queen, ca. 1588**

See the discussion at the conclusion of “Introduction: What is historical research into space?”
Commentary: Following the European Union’s emergence, there has recently been increasing talk of Europe as a space. As a political space, Europe appears in this discourse more as an ideal than a reality. By contrast, the Schengen area (in German: Schengen-Raum), the European Economic Area (Wirtschaftsraum), the European legal area (Rechtsraum), the European research area (Forschungsraum), or the Regions of Europe (in plural) are terms with concrete meaning. Historically speaking, the spatial component of Europe is a relatively new phenomenon. For a long time, Europe was more of an idea. The name comes from a figure of Greek mythology; in the Middle Ages, the term referred above all to Christian ecumenism. Strictly speaking, Europe does not constitute a continent of its own but is rather the western part of the Eurasian landmass, the borders of which to Asia were, moreover, a matter of negotiation, while its eastern borders also shifted multiple times over the course of history. Cartographers who made maps of the world and of Europe since the Renaissance contributed to the construction of images of Europe, and especially to the construction of Europe as a spatial constellation. On the new maps of the world that were created in the wake of the European voyages of discovery, differences can be seen in how Europe is visually staged within the map compared to the rest of the world, and in the attributes that were given to this part of the earth. But special maps of Europe were also capable of influencing perceptions in their own way and of conveying political messages. Here, we have two
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space  173
cartographic traditions running parallel to each other. On the one hand, we can observe attempts to achieve a correct, i.e., true-to-scale, representation—shown, for example, on Gerhard Mercator’s map of Europe from 1554. This map not only marks a corrective to the Ptolemaic images of the world that was, at the time, already long obsolete but also a successful attempt to correctly illustrate the position of European countries in relation to each other. Yet there was also another, parallel tradition of European iconography, the primary aim of which was not to realize geometric relationships. The map of Europe in the shape of a virgin is one of these iconographies. Here, anthropomorphic ideas and a spatial-geographic interpretation of Europe have fused together in one map. A map similar to this example was integrated into the travel book (*Itinerarium sacrae scripturae*, 1581 and further editions) of the Protestant theologian and chronicler Heinrich Bünting (1545–1606). The itinerarium is a geographic description of the places that appear in the Old and New Testaments. Bünting himself probably never journeyed to the Holy Land, but he drew the travel routes according to biblical figures, taking information from contemporary or older travel reports. In addition to the map of Europe, the travel book contains two further maps with emblematic elements, such as a representation of Asia as Pegasus and a map of the world with a three-leaf clover—an homage to his home city of Hannover, whose coat of arms contains a clover leaf. The representation of Europe as a virgin, or rather an Empress (with crown, scepter, and imperial orb), appears for the first time in 1537 in a map by the Tirolean cartographer Johannes Putsch. This map was dedicated to Ferdinand I, who inherited the imperial crown upon the division of the Habsburg empire: the head and crown are located in Spain and Portugal, and the heart lies in Bohemia, which Ferdinand had ruled as king since 1526. Bünting later integrated this map into an edition of his itinerarium in 1587. The explanations for the map were printed directly on the reverse side. In 1588, the map was also included in an edition of Sebastian Münster’s *Cosmographei*. In the context of the struggles in the Netherlands for independence from the Spanish crown, the figure of Europe as a virgin also appears on pamphlets and continues to be included in further editions of Bünting’s itinerarium (of which there were at least sixty through the middle of the eighteenth century).

Additional literature:
Appendix of sources for the historical study of space


Internet resources:


Notes

1 The entry on “Raum” (space) in the online edition (http://www.zedler-lexikon.de/, accessed October 13, 2012) can be accessed via the search function or the direct link: http://www.zedler-lexikon.de/blaettern/einzelseite.html?id=276176&bandnummer=30&seitennz=0566&supplement=0&dateiformat=1.


3 Alternately, see http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b55002481n/f1.zoom.r=atlas%20catalan (accessed September 21, 2018).


7 See also Ute Schneider and Stefan Brakensiek, eds., Gerhard Mercator: Wissenschaft und Wissenstransfer (Darmstadt: WBG, 2015), as well as the edition and translation of Mercator’s correspondence at https://www.uni-due.de/editionmercator/ (accessed December 3, 2018), including Ute Schneider’s essay “Erinnerungsort Mercator?”

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### Internet resources and portals


Journals or special issues of journals

Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002). Special Issue on “Mental Maps.”
History & Theory 52 (2013). “Forum: At Home and in the Workplace: Domestic and Occupational Space in Western Europe from the Middle Ages.”
Lexicon entries

For lexicon entries on the etymology of words for space and related words, see Sources 1 and 2 in the Appendix, “Bibliography of monolingual and etymological dictionaries used” and “Article on ‘Raum’ (Space) in Zedler’s Universallexikon (Zedler’s universal dictionary).”


Glossary

Central place  Term for the concept of central geographic places or sites formulated by Walter Christaller (1933) to describe and explain the relationships of interdependence between different agglomerations (or settlements) within a region; the concept was refined around 1940 by August Lösch. The central place is the agglomeration, usually a city, possessing the most functions and thus the strongest force of attraction within a regional system. Still used in economic and urban history, it has been strongly criticized because of its hierarchical, rigid structure and its homogeneous conception of space and is currently being replaced by more flexible network theories.

Chorography (from ancient Greek chôra, territory of a polis, and graphein, to write)  Geographic description of a region, a common genre in antiquity and the early modern period; in the twentieth century, viewed by Alfred Hettner as a preliminary stage to a science of the earth’s surface.

Contingency  This book advances the thesis that spatial theories are neither necessary nor immutable. Since any spatial theory emerged in a specific historical constellation or was produced in field of discourse, it always represents just one possible (not indispensable) interpretation of the world.

Determinism (spatial)  In general, a view or epistemological position according to which a fact is predetermined by external conditions or reasons. Spatial or geographic determinism was in fashion at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Geographers who subscribed to determinism (and, to some degree, politicians who listened to them) assumed that natural-spatial conditions determine different societies’ way of life and culture.

Eigen-Raum, a space of one’s own; a space that is proper or unique to its owner  A term from the Dresden school of institutional theory, which is largely based on the work of Arnold Gehlen and Karl-Siegbert Rehberg; denotes the space appropriated or constructed by an institution (a social relation that is given temporal permanence) in which the institution’s guiding ideas are expressed either symbolically or through social practices, and which thereby acquires the ability to found identity; corresponds to the third form of spatialization in Foucault, though with a wider application not restricted only to heterotopias.
**Eigen-Zeit (analogous to Eigen-Raum)** Denotes the time or temporal practice, such as the division of time or rhythms, that is constructed or appropriated by an institution; in his special theory of relativity, Alfred Einstein also gave a definition for the term Eigenzeit and so invented a concept for the respective time perceived by an observer in an inertial system.

**Erdraum (erdräumliches Denken), usually translated as the surface of the earth (and a corresponding way of thinking focused on this space)** A term for all spatial notions that take the surface of the earth or the inhabited earth and the oceans as a basic parameter or background.

**Euclidean space** Space of intuition, the space that surrounds us; was synonymous with physical space per se until new spatial concepts were developed in mathematics (for example, hyperbolic space, Minkowski space, or Riemannian space). The adjective “Euclidean” refers to *The Elements*, a work by the Greek mathematician Euclid summarizing and systematizing the knowledge of Euclid’s day in arithmetic and geometry, which was used as a textbook into the nineteenth century.

**Geotype** Complex spatial type that can be explained only through multilayered and cospatial qualities—for example, the city, or more specifically, the pre-modern European city or the modern metropolis/megapolis.

**Globalization** In respect to politics, business, society, or culture, a process in which national borders increasingly lose significance for the exchange of information, goods, or money. In respect to space, a process in the course of which the global dimension becomes a spatial dimension of its own. The discipline of history enriches debates about globalization, which are dominated by economic and geopolitical considerations, with the question of when globalization began (even avant la lettre). Suggestions include after 1800 (with the Atlantic crisis, the introduction of the railway and telegraphy), beginning in the late fifteenth century (with the first journeys of discovery across the sea), or even at the moment in time when human beings (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) began to spread across the earth in order to inhabit and shape its various parts. The resulting world-locations are considered preconditions for the later possibility of their interconnectedness.

**Glocalization** Portmanteau created by joining globalization and localization. The origin of the term is ascribed to a Japanese corporate context. The original meaning denoted a certain form of retail business: the adaptation and advertisement of goods and services on a global or nearly global scale for increasingly differentiated local and specialized markets. The term was then taken up by the British sociologist Roland Robertson and further developed for the social sciences. The concept makes it possible to view globalization as a spatiotemporal phenomenon by considering the relationship between different spatial dimensions (from local to global) in addition to the process of globalization as a whole (compression of the world). Economists use the term to describe the ways that transnational companies operate; sociologists (Robertson, Zygmunt Baumann, and others) use it to observe that globalization also elicits emphasis on what is particular or local.
Heuristic, heuristics  A form of coming to knowledge, a method or procedure of analysis. Since Johann Gustav Droysen, the discipline of history has understood heuristics to mean the first step of its work in developing the questions that will be asked and seeking out relevant sources. Extrapolated to the analysis of spatial dimensions of society, this means: (1) which spatial configurations or modes do I intend to examine? and (2) which sources are available to me?

Localization  Description of the position of an object, person, or reality in a place or within a spatial configuration.

Ort (Latin locus; French lieu; English place, site)  Localizable site or position where someone is situated or where something happens. In history, the term has been given absolute and relational meaning: place as independent from the things or people that surround it, or place that depends on the goods or people that are present. This fundamental differentiation can already be found in both Greek concepts for place, tópos and chôra. Modern theorists (Michel de Certeau, Martina Löw, and others) have once again made this fundamental differentiation productive by distinguishing between place and space.

Placeness (Örtlichkeit)  Can be a synonym for place or carry the meaning of the locality (Örtlichkeit) of existence (for example, in human geography). In the former sense, localities (Örtlichkeiten) denote a respectively individual or collective emotional or symbolic relation to place, which gives them a role to play in the construction of social identities.

Space (Raum)  Still considered by Kant to be a form of intuition of the cognizing subject, meaning a necessary condition given a priori for sensible perception; consequently, often interpreted as naturally given, unchangeable, or neutral. A concept now being discussed intensively in the social and cultural sciences, which can be considered as both a social dimension (the collection of near/far relations between social realities) and a social object characterized by its spatial dimensions (scale, metrics, location). Considered from the point of view of action theory, spaces are the result of processes of ordering and arranging carried out by social agents. Space as socially constructed in this way can be material or immaterial or even hybrid; it can be concretely present or exist as a form of mediation.

Space of action (Handlungsraum)  Term from the tradition of human geography oriented toward action theory that is used to examine the relationship between space and human action. Spaces and spatial configurations or representations can limit or enable action, and are thus never interesting in and of themselves but only in regards to their social significance or their relevance for human action.

Space for action or scope of action (Handlungsspielraum)  Could also be translated as “wiggle room.” The meaning of the term is primarily metaphorical in the sense of space for action in relation to posited norms, for example, the freedom to act within the space of established systems of social order, such as orders of gender.
Glossary

Spatiality (Räumlichkeit) A reality constructed by the spatial actions of agents, or the historical-anthropological consideration of space that is interested in the actions of agents (arrangement, movement, interaction, shaping, etc.). For the philosopher Martin Heidegger, Dasein is characterized by spatiality and temporality. Space is not essentially given but only exists when it can be experienced by subjects or when subjects act spatially in the world. In anthropology and in ecologically oriented schools of human geography, spatiality has therefore long been a focus of research.

Spatialization Foucault’s term for the observation that social formations or transformations are also expressed spatially, for example, in the form of buildings or in the localization of social objects. The first type of spatialization is mental or ideal (laws, classifications), the second is physical (diagnosis of disease, corporeal punishment), the third is institutional (clinics, prisons). For Edward Soja, the term “spatialization” denotes three converging processes of spatialization that have taken place since the global economic crisis of the 1930s.

Topography/topographies (1) A historical genre (description of a territory or of cities that concentrates on the description of places); (2) a technique of measurement; (3) cartography: description of the situation of objects on the surface of the earth; (4) in the cultural sciences, the term stands for the analysis of spatial semantics and spatial practices in texts and images, as well as in historical and present-day lifeworlds.

Urbanity Since Georg Simmel and Louis Wirth, the social sciences have defined urbanity as a way of life in large cities or metropolises that draws its specific characteristics from the size, density, diversity, heterogeneity, and mobility of that environment, and sometimes also from its instability and lack of security, or the condition of belonging to a multiplicity of social groups. The task of history as a discipline, however, is to more closely attend to and analyze changing semantics (from antique ideals of virtue and style to a courtly ideal of conduct in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period and lifestyle in modern times) and changing spatial relations (city, court, capital or Residenz, metropolis). Instead of giving a generalized definition for urbanity, we should rather define the concept in its respective historical or cultural context in regard to a way of life, sociability, forms of architecture, and spatial representations.
The publication of a second, updated edition is happening in the context of multiple occasions. An unchanged reprint might perhaps have been enough if the aim were to achieve good sales figures. But the fact that an update seems appropriate after five years is connected to an extremely dynamic research field. I reviewed a large part of the literature that has appeared since 2012—when the manuscript for the first edition of Räume was completed—and integrated it into the book (if not always directly into the text, then at least into the bibliography). My focus remained on historiographical literature and neighboring fields. Another occasion is the fact that the book was awarded a translation prize of the German Book Trade Association (for “international humanities”), which Annette Prassel at Campus Verlag successfully pursued. And in any case, it makes sense to update the English-language edition of the book.

The preparation of a second edition is thus also the occasion for joy and gratitude. My thanks go first to the many readers of the book, to the audiences at lectures I have given, and to discussion partners. I would also like to thank my students, who may rightfully wonder why they should spend time in their studies engaging with such a curious topic. Further thanks are due to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), which cooperated with the Indian Council of Historical Research to finance a series of lectures that I gave in India in the fall of 2015. I remain in contact with several people I came to know on that trip, and I look forward to carrying out joint research projects—specifically with Gopinath Ravindran (New Delhi), among others. I would further like to thank the reviewers of the book—who share my excitement for the topic, subjected the book to a thorough critical reading, and summarized its conclusions in part better than I could have done myself. I happily followed some of their more minor suggestions in my revisions. In the context of this revision, however, I could not incorporate their somewhat more fundamental objections, as this would have entailed a much more radical change to the structure of the book. For example, the suggestion to move the “conceptual history” and the “analytical concepts” to the beginning of the book in order to avoid later repetitions would have run contrary to my intention of first pointing toward the long “prehistory” of spatial thought—not least of all to show that even the analytical concepts or methodological toolkits used today have a “history,” meaning they are deeply
rooted in our culture. These redundancies might also have a useful pedagogical potential for readers who are just coming to this topic. If they are nevertheless bothersome to the reader, I would like to point out that the book need not be read in a “linearly progressive” way, but that a reader can instead begin in the middle of the book or can avail themselves of the tables and glossary. In response to the observation that the book should have better demonstrated the “real added value” of (historical) spatial analysis, I would like to note that the book does, in fact, contain a section devoted to the question of why historical research into space is not actually new. Put somewhat more simply, the added value exists in a more nuanced way of considering spaces and spatialities, even if this might quickly and suddenly transform, in a methodological introduction, into a “systematizing glee” that might not function solely to foster knowledge, as another reviewer noted. Moreover, I did not want to be the one to predefine (and least of all in a final way) what is “added” by spatial analysis. Rather, my intention was to leave enough “space” here for self-exploration and individual insight—and for the joy of discovering it. I accepted the consequences of my decision to pay less attention to literary theory because there is already a lively debate on this topic underway in literary studies (as also the neighboring field of media studies), which includes handbooks or companions to scholarship with exemplary scholarship (Dünne and Mahler 2015). I would like to express my special thanks to my colleagues in Erfurt in the research group Spatio-Temporal Studies, and in particular to Bärbel Frischmann, Sebastian Dorsch, Holt Meyer, Katharina Waldner, and Harry Maier (Erfurt/Vancouver), for providing important suggestions, and to Patrick Schaffel, Kathleen Kröger, and Monika Leetz for helping to update the bibliography.

Erfurt, July 2017, in expectation of further spatial stories …

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