The Battle at Mamusa

The Western Transvaal border culture and the ethno-dissolution of the last functioning Korana polity

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PUBLISHED BY SUN BONANI SCHOLAR – DEDICATED TO EXCELLENCE IN RESEARCH AND ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

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First edition 2015
978-1-920382-76-6 (Print
978-1-920382-77-3 (electronic PDF)

Set in Arno Pro 12/14
Cover design, typesetting and production by Sun Bonani Scholar
Scholarly, professional and reference works are published under this imprint in print and electronic format.
This printed copy can be ordered from Sun Bonani Scholar: Tel: 051 444 2552.

The e-book is available at the following link: https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928424499
This printed copy can be ordered from Sun Bonani Scholar: Tel: 051 444 2552.
Acknowledgments

I wish to thank everyone that had assisted me in one way or another:
Cobus Dreyer, Marinda Cilliers, Menan du Plessis, Garneth Sauls, Tobi Swart,
Ron Bester and all the informants listed below.

Informants

Schweizer-Reneke
Kobus Reneke, Chris van Rensburg, Pieter Van Rooyen, Tienie Roos,
Lenie Terreblanche, Hennie Kotze, Frans Seane, T.E. Koloi, Jeremia Kgosieng,
Michael Taaibosch, John Taaibosch, Maria Taaibosch (i), Maria Taaibosch (ii),
Gert Taaibosch, Boois Taaibosch, Jan Taaibosch, Vies Taaibosch, Maria
Taaibosch (iii), Mirrham Taaibosch, Fakiso Taaibosch, Poloke Taaibosch &
Hennie Koekemoer

Taung
Kgosim Mankuroane, Oneboy Sedumedi & Goodright Gasekoma

Heidedal (Bloemfontein)
Ephraim Stilo, Cornelius Stilo, Rayno Taaibosch, Brenda Tiger, Sara Taaibosch,
Marie Taaibosch, Jacob Taaibosch, Jaftha Taaibosch-Davids, Tony Pietersen,
Raymond Beddy & Roedolf Dodds

Kimberley
Josiah Kats

Welkom
Gert Taaibosch, Robert Meyers, Boetie Watersoek, Miriam Taaibosch,
Piet Van Eck & Louis Pietersen
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Preface

The inspiration for this project was drawn from the many struggles that the Korana people over generations had fought against domination, oppression and the deprivation of their right to self-determination. It is said that history is written by the conquerors. At the battle of Mamusa the Korana people were the voiceless ones. Therefore, I want to tell their side of the story and wish to dedicate this book to my Korana friends who are still fighting for their right to be recognised.
Chapter 1

Introduction
The grave of Chief David Massouw Rijt Taibosch. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]
Orientation

‘Kom uit my volk onder de Boeren’ (‘Rise, my people, from under the Boers’) were the last words of the Korana chief, David Massouw Rijt Taibosch, as he fell on 2 December 1885 during an attack on his stronghold Mamusa by Commandant General P.J. Joubert of the South African Republic (S.A.R.) (Delport 1968:72; Mouton 1957:146). The battle of Mamusa is regarded as important to the South African military history only inasmuch as it testifies to Afrikaner nationalism through commemorating the death of two ‘brave’ Boer soldiers, Captain C.A. Schweizer and Field-Cornet C.N. Reneke, in Mamusa’s current name Schweizer-Reneke. The suffering of the Korana, however, was without measure. In addition to the loss of life (regardless of whether they were armed or not, women, children, the elderly, everyone was shot at, without exception), the Korana people lost everything else: their homes were razed to the ground, their personal belongings plundered, their crops ravaged, all their livestock looted, their lands confiscated, and they themselves were carried off as ‘apprentices’, which really meant that they had been swallowed by a system of slavery. In fact, this ‘minor military skirmish’ led to the final disintegration and disappearance of the only Korana polity that was still left in South Africa, and this eventuality was allowed to pass by without observation.

There is no general agreement in the literature about what constitutes war. In order to understand why people wage wars one must consider the complex interaction of a number of variables. There are not always obvious causal relations between economic and political factors, self-interest and resources. There is however an inevitable process that precedes war, and this is the conversion of wants and needs into moral rights and duties. Ferguson (2008:38) writes about this as follows: ‘In many cases, perhaps the great majority, advocates of war come to believe their rationale themselves. What is good for them becomes the “right” thing to do’. Thus, apart from the physical violence associated with war there is the concomitant hegemonic practices, the formation of perceptions and the discourse of name-calling and labelling. The ‘other’ or the ‘them’ must of necessity be typified

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1 After the Pretoria Convention of 1881 the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Z.A.R.), or South African Republic (S.A.R.), was renamed the ‘Transvaal State’. The London Convention of 1884 saw to the restoration of the name to the S.A.R. The appellation ‘Transvaal State’ was never accepted by the Boers who would always refer to the entity as the S.A.R. Thus we will mostly use this label in this book.
as different from ‘us’, that is, as evil, mean, underhand, and so on in order to act decisively; a very clear line of division must be drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In the S.A.R.’s decision to wage war against the Korana self-interest came first. To the Boers it was their duty and right to defend their national safety (as they understood it), to limit lawlessness (but not among their own people) and to keep up the law that they had formulated to promote their own good. These observations do not suggest that the Korana were innocent or passive victims of the S.A.R’s aggression and cruel oppression, neither do I want to deny the complexity of the interaction between the different role-players. The precise suggestion I wish to make is that the factors contributing to the battle of Mamusa were much more complex than allegations made in ‘white literature’ of ‘Korana misdeeds’, of ‘certain irregularities on the part of the Korana’ or of the so-called ‘insolence of David Massouw’ (cf Maree 1952:9; Grobbelaar 1957:203; Hoon 1950:7). The last allegation was often made when the Boers had trespassed on David Massouw’s territory and outspanned in areas they were not meant to use and were ordered to leave. Almost without exception the trespassers would go and register a complaint with the authorities, referring to Massouw as insolent (TAB SS V914-R1483-1884). After decades of the two groups’ cohabitation in the Western Transvaal the Boers saw no reason to respect the Korana people. The Boers’ conduct during the eventual battle – poor discipline, outrageous violence and rapacity – lay in the border culture that prevailed next to the Harts River in the former Western Transvaal. The battle of Mamusa will be analysed and interpreted in terms of the prevalent border culture and border representation. It must be emphasised that this book is not about war per se, but it strives to investigate the role of violence in this border culture and its contribution to the final destruction of the Korana people.

2 When the S.A.R. was established in 1852 the western border was left undetermined. On three occasions after the establishment of the state it was officially delimited (See Map 2) and there was also more than one attempt by the S.A.R. to effect a one-sided change. It is thus difficult to define a specific borderline between the different indigenous communities (Korana, Batlhaping and Baralong) and the S.A.R. Our focus is, first, the interaction between these indigenous communities that were up to that moment in time independent and, second, the S.A.R.’s influence in this region due to their political and military domination.

3 In the South African context ‘frontier studies’ and ‘border studies’ are well developed fields of academic interest (cf Coplan 2000; Legassick 2010; Penn 2009).
The question in this book, which uses the lens of border culture as magnifying glass, is how the challenges were handled. In answering this, one must keep in mind that borders are political in nature and that they are determined from within specific contexts of power. A border is never a neutral demarcation line. It is a symbol of power, imposes inclusion and exclusion and it ‘un-represents’ or ‘mis-represents’ some sections of a particular population or populations.

Against this background I have looked at the current theoretical strands in the consideration of border culture and borderlands. I briefly point out the following considerations that are noteworthy to us here. First, there is a gradual move away from the initial strong focus on themes such as conflict and paradox, the inequality of power, economics and human conditions in the borderland (cf Alvarez 1995:453; Zúñiga 1999:36-37; Chang s.a.:2).

Second, early perspectives on border culture held that the literal border was a construct based on geopolitical demarcation separating cultures, peoples and defined boundaries according to assumptions of the existence of a shared history, a homo-ethnic identity and an identifiable national culture, economy and politics. The notion of the existence of one distinct culture for each separate society suggests fixed boundaries for a specific culture, often frozen in time; it implies that one culture represents a society and vice versa. The argument implies the possibility of abstracting a homogenous patterned prototype of a culture, often cast in images of the ‘other’, and, finally, that culture is something shared by all the members of a society. The rhetoric of this territory-based concept of border culture rests on an essentialist view of culture. This approach has fallen into disuse because of the non-repetitiveness of its basic assumption, namely that culture, nation or state and national identity can be demarcated epistemically (cf Konrad & Nicol 2011:71-72; Chevrier 2009:169-170; Minkov & Hofstede 2012:133-137).

Third, the multiple realities and conditions of a globalised world imply a constant migration of individuals, goods, ideas and symbols across borders. The suggestion is that social relationships are deployed on both sides of the borderline, that identity is now regarded as a much more fluid concept and, in the final instance, that communities construct meanings as well as structures of power through their discourse and discursive practices (cf Konrad & Nicol 2011:71-75; Chevrier 2009:169-172; Amante 2010:101). Acknowledging that there are multiple meanings equals recognition of the fact that the power of defining, redefining and making choices about identity is made on an individual basis. The emphasis in current border theories therefore shifts away from society or culture towards
individual persons. Essentialist rhetoric that cannot explain the dynamics involved in these processes has been replaced with a constructivist view.

In the fourth place, the efficiency of the use of metaphors in exploring border cultures is increasingly appreciated by various scholars in the field (Kurczewska 2009:166).

These four components will be the points of departure of our exploration of the border culture that prevailed in the nineteenth-century Western Transvaal as its conditions and settings do not make it possible to exclude any one of them. Nevertheless, it is not possible, and not always feasible, to explore all of them in the same depth. An attempt is made to be as inclusive as possible and to take the interaction between the various components into account. It is necessary to consider the following in order to understand this approach. On the one hand, there is the need to deal with the strong essentialist perspective or rhetoric of the Boers; Boers and Africans were viewed by the former group as essentially unequal and, apart from providing labour, Africans had to be kept at a distance. They were unwelcome, they did not belong and were thus marginalised by the Boers. This view had the direct consequence of encouraging and reinforcing the image of these communities as bounded communities. Whereas borderlands are often seen as a terrain of contact, interaction and mixture so that existing identities are transformed and new identities created, this was not true of the view entertained by the Boers in the Western Transvaal. The Boers saw and defined themselves in terms of the permanence of the God of the Old Testament in whom they found equilibrium, balance, truth and security. On the other hand, the whole becoming, essence and existence of the Korana people lay in fluidity, pragmatism, and the production of hybrid and new identities. In effect, the metaphor of ‘blending’ would be very apt here and this can clearly not be explained or accepted from within an essentialist perspective of culture. It must thus be stressed that the reality of the nineteenth-century border culture in the Western Transvaal was made up of different opposing perspectives that could never be understood by choosing an essentialist perspective above a constructivist one or vice versa.

Furthermore, it is possible to point out structured contradictions in the border culture of the Western Transvaal and this resulted in a broader societal landscape where personal relationships were characterised by ambivalence. For example, when Joubert received the order to bring the Korana to book prior to the battle of Mamusa, he was unsure about how to act towards and against David Massouw whom he regarded as his friend. The appointment of G.J. Van Niekerk as administrator of Stellaland was due to David Massouw whom he often consulted in times of trouble.
But Van Niekerk had to perform the task of restricting the Korana people and of seeing to it that everyone would stay in their own area as determined by him. While writers such as Chang (s.a.:1) and Zúñiga (1999:38-39) in their consideration of border theories turn away from the societal and cultural towards the individual, that is, towards an insider perspective with its many points of view this does not mean we can exclude constitutional and ideological frameworks. Neither can the values and perceptions underlying the individual’s behaviour be disregarded. It is true that the unconnected and dysfunctional society under consideration gave individuals ample rope for opportunism in their actions. Obscure characters were in fact allowed to exercise an influence far above the value of their contribution to society. In order to fully comprehend the border culture from within which the demise of the Korana was systematically effected one has to pause at certain individuals and their conduct, all the while keeping in mind the society and culture whose products they were.

The image one forms of the Western Transvaal by studying various sources is that it was a space of extreme violence. There was a complex interaction between the different groupings, fluidity with regard to relations between groups; the broader society was characterised by discord and inter-communal violence, opposing constructed perceptions, assumptions and prejudices while limiting ecological factors created a border landscape that, in turn, constructed a certain way of life. The concomitant rhetoric and the epistemes that gave it meaning were determined solely by the Boers. While the discourse between Boer and Korana fluctuated, now vacillating towards cooperation, now veering to subjugation of the other, it was always the Boers who dictated and determined the ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘who’ and ‘when’. For the better part this meant domination, conquest and subjugation of the other. Conflict is therefore of the utmost importance in our discussion.

Metaphors of the Western Transvaal border culture of the time are: land and territory – stonewalls, stone beacons and boundaries – battlements and defences – river – Korana. Territory and everything associated with it on the political, economic, social, juridical and symbolic level dominated the Western Transvaal border culture. This is what defined personal and group relations, as territory was associated with certain rights while perceptions about the ‘other’ determined the right to own land. In the words of President S.J.P. Kruger: ‘Natives may not have land in their own name as long as they are so uncivilised’ (Bergh 2000:52). Territory meant control over resources and directed a certain kind of lifestyle of domination and violation. Wars were waged in the name of territory and land in order to stay in control and have access to resources.
Stone beacons were the absolute symbol of the right of might; they were built by the powerful in order to reinforce borders, to exclude or include. Demarcation and the staking out of land aimed at preventing invasion by the other while moral and military rhetoric was produced for expedience and the promotion of self-interest by the powerful S.A.R. Dichotomous concepts such as ‘us/them’ and ‘inclusion/exclusion’ go hand in hand with outlining borders and the construction of military metaphors (Zúñiga 1999:37). The same was true of the stonewalls and defences erected by the Korana people; these, in their turn, had to keep the Boers out. It is interesting to note that hero-worshipping the fallen Schweizer for his role in the Mamusa battle was motivated by his success in scaling the ‘unconquerable’ defences of the Korana to penetrate their stronghold. To the Boers the fact that he acted on his own as an undisciplined soldier fell by the wayside.

In the barren Western Transvaal water was a precious commodity and those who had control over it could generate wealth and exercise power. While the Harts River was a natural demarcation line between the S.A.R. and the Korana people it was a less rigidly observed border due to the vicissitudes of rainfall and changeable relations between Boer and Korana. Whoever had control over the river at a given time dominated and dictated who could cross this Rubicon. In order to force the Korana people to surrender during the battle of Mamusa they were circled and cut off from the river. Water, the symbol of life in most cultures, was thus instrumental to the demise of the Korana.

‘Korana’ was largely the construct of colonial and S.A.R. discourses. The creation of what was meant and understood by this label in the colonial discourse is discussed in detail.

**Construction of the colonial Korana**

The image we retain today of the Korana people in the colonial times is largely a construct of institutions and powerful figures of the time. Colonial institutions (and mission churches are by no means an exception) had the necessary means (political, economic and military power, science and technology) to justify and rationalise their actions towards indigenous peoples, and to construct identities, histories and images for and of these groups on the level of ‘grand narratives’. These representations acquired such remarkable permanence and became standard stereotypes. Identities lost their fluidity and history became something fixed, something that could no longer be reinterpreted. Today, these images have gained such authority and have
become so dominant that they are now all but the only passage to the past for indigenous peoples. The European sense of superiority and their metaphorical association between Africa and darkness generally assigned indigenous communities the negative element in binary classifications (Adhikari 2010:21; Dietrich 1993:iii; Johnson 2007:529). Lee (2003:85) writes that the Khoekhoe and Bushmen ‘were positioned on the bottom rung of the scala natura of humanity, serving as a text for ruminations on who may or may not be part of the human family’ and Marks (1981:16) summarises the stigmatised view of these peoples’ character as follows: ‘Bold, thievish, and not to be trusted’. Cope (1967:32-33) quotes the Rev. E. Terry’s deprecatory depiction of the Korana people: ‘Beasts in the skins of men rather than men in the skins of beasts [...] as may appear by their ignorance, habit, language, diet with other things, which make them most brutish’ whereas their speech is described as ‘inarticulate noise rather than language, like the clucking of hens’.

Abrahams (1997:38) refers to Linnaeus’ classification of human species into four subgroups, Europeans, Asians, Native Americans and Africans, and she points out that the Khoekhoe and Bushmen were seen as belonging to a separate species: Homo Monstrosus. According to her this kind of classification freed white settlers of any guilt about genocide. The innuendos in the title of two Huisgenoot articles by one C.J. Strydom, dated 29 November and 20 December of 1929 clearly illustrate the point: ‘Boesmans en Korannas [sic] Hoe die Noordwes van hulle gesuiwer is’, that is, Bushmen and Korana – How the North-West was purified of them.

Moving back in time again, Jan Van Riebeeck already judged the Khoekhoe to be ‘wild’ and ‘brutal’ after only three days in the Cape (Moolman 1980:29). In probably the first colonial reference ever to the Gorachouqua (Korana people) they are called the ‘Tobacco Thieves’ for having stolen Jan Van Riebeeck’s tobacco plants (Dapper 1933:9-10; Nienaber 1989:667). In general, the Gorachouqua were depicted as an uncivilised, morally degenerate and lazy people, with an innate desire to steal cattle. Theal’s (in Marais 1968:91) opinion was that: ‘if all South Africa [...] had been searched, a more utterly worthless collection of human beings could not have been got together than these ragamuffin vagabonds’, while Anderson (1888:62) voiced the opinion that they were: ‘a dirty and dishonest tribe, not to be trusted in any way’.

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4 Contributions by authors such as Coertze (1983:111), Buys (1989:65), Kies (1972:32), Van Aswegen (1971:67-77), Malan (1929:372-385), Van Heerden (1908:15-44) and Pretorius (1963:36) corroborate the negative characterisation of the Korana people. An eighteenth century commentator who is an exception to the rule is Peter
Rev. C.F. Wuras of the Berlin Mission Society (B.M.S.) contributed to the colonial discourse over the Korana in the course of about fifty years. In his view, which was regarded as authoritative at the time, the Korana were the ‘weakest branch of the entire Hottentot nation’ (Van der Merwe 1985:63). They were also ‘indolent’, ‘slothful’ and ‘unfit to be converted’ (Schoeman 1985:65). In the same derogatory vein Wuras (1929) wrote an article entitled “An Account of the Korana” for a journal devoted to ‘Bantu Studies’ from which I cite two assertions and comment briefly on them:

‘The Korana have not any kind of worship of the Supreme Being’

Kolb. Kolb visited the Cape from 1704 to 1712 to make astronomical observations and in 1719 his book of more than 840 pages namely Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum was published. One section of this book deals with the Khoekhoe. This was considered an authoritative text on the Khoekhoe as it was based on his personal experiences and allowed Khoekhoe voices to talk back to European culture. It was later translated into various languages (Good 2006:62, 82, 85). Kolb’s discussion of the Khoekhoe is regarded as a balanced one (Raum 1997:37-40) and he was soon regarded as the leading authority on the Cape and the Khoekhoe and his work remained so for a century (Schrire 2009:13). In the preface Kolb says that he was convinced that he should write about the Khoekhoe because of all the mistakes, contradictions and negative assessments he had found in other works (Good 2006:79). Since Chapter 2 will draw on some information given by Kolb it is important to note that questions have been raised about his personal reliability as well as the plausibility of some of his conclusions. The astronomer, Abbé de la Caille – who was at the Cape fifty years later – called Kolb unreliable and inaccurate, and claimed that everything he had written about the Khoekhoe came from the well-educated Cape official, J.G. Grevenbroek, whose papers were sent to Kolb after his death, and Kolb simply pieced them together. De la Caille’s editor provided more details, asserting that Kolb was incompetent, lost his job and had done nothing but drink and smoke while at the Cape. O.F. Mentzel, resident in Cape Town between 1732 and 1741, was so infuriated by what Kolb had written, that he wrote his own book A Complete and Authentic Geographical and Topographical Description of the Famous and (All Things Considered) Remarkable African Cape of Good Hope. He refutes various claims regarding the Khoekhoe culture made by Kolb and accuses him of superficiality, slovenliness, affectation and plagiarism (Schrire 2009:14-15). Kolb’s critics, however, do not question the usefulness of the bulk of the ethnographic material whether they be collected by him or in reality by Grevenbroek. In fact, one source refers to Grevenbroek’s integrity and by implication to that of the material collected by him. Reference to Kolb’s book will thus be made with the necessary circumspection.
Nineteenth-century missionaries often held up an exaggerated and distorted image of the dark and evil forces they had to fight with an eye to enhance their credibility in the opinion of the European society (Harris 2007:239-240). This is one possible explanation for Wuras’ claim above. But it may also simply be due to ignorance; the disdain and dismissal with which Europeans treated Khoekhoe beliefs made the latter reluctant to respond to questioning about religion (Good 2006:86). Wuras’ assertion is in actual fact incorrect and literature confirms that the Korana people recognised four deities. Tsūi-ǁGoab, for example, was regarded as the Supreme Being who created the first man and woman, and they prayed to him (Schapera 1965:387; Shillington 1987:5; Barnard 1992:256).

‘The villages which are near each other exchange their wives at certain periods, but the details of this transaction are too immoral to describe.’

Missionaries commonly held the view that indigenous peoples were immoral and promiscuous. In the citation above Wuras describes the proceedings during the reed dance of the Korana people. Rev. Zerwick, the B.M.S. missionary stationed at Pniel shared Wuras’ horror of this ritual and related how he once went to break up its enactment (Kirby 1933:332-333). He sermonised at length against this ‘evil’, trying to scare those present with God’s vengeance. But instead of moving the people to ask for forgiveness, the only reaction to Zerwick was that a Korana man asked him for tobacco.

Many early travellers also reported on the reed dance of the various indigenous groups. But, where it was seen as ‘love play’ among these other groups, Kirby (1933:379) maintains it was actual ‘sex play’ among the Korana people. Nevertheless, there is call for a more nuanced interpretation than a mere moral condemnation of the practice and I briefly point out a couple of aspects regarding their morality. The Khoekhoe, or Korana, cannot be seen as promiscuous. Illicit sex between unmarried people, for example, was rare under the Korana people (Barnard 1992:174). And although it was more common between married people, it was to some extent institutionalised. For example, the custom of raising seed for a deceased brother (levirate) was practised (Engelbrecht 1936:34). Schapera (1965:241-242) also points out that the sexual life of the Khoekhoe was strictly regulated; ‘in the old days’, the punishment for rape was severe and incest was punishable by death. Maree

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5 According to Dietrich (1993:74-75) Europeans’ obsession with the sexuality of Africans ‘could be viewed as arising from the fear of giving expression to the uncontrollable and irrational characteristics of their own sexual impulses’.
(1969:10) states that promiscuity was not tolerated and that transgression meant expulsion from the community. Visiting French priests also remarked upon the positive moral qualities of the Khoekhoe and felt that they were thus indeed suitable candidates for conversion to Catholicism (Johnson 2007:529).

According to Barnard (1988:39) the society of the Korana had a patrilineal orientation and they practised polygamy. Women were assigned an inferior position to men, although this gap was not as wide as with the African people. Now, Stow (in Kirby 1933:379-380) maintains the reed dance was for married women only. Women from one kraal would invite women from another kraal to meet them halfway and would take in position opposite one another. Should the men of the visiting women try to follow them it would be considered a grave breach of privilege, because ‘it was the day of the women asserting their prerogative of unlimited freedom’. The women from the different kraals would compete with one another playing on their reed flutes during the feast. The visiting women would try to lure and sexually excite the men of the host kraal and would eventually go right up to them. Soon the women of the visiting kraal would return the compliment. These occasions gave married women the chance to escape their social subjection for a while and to break down gender inequality symbolically through the reed dance. I will return to this socially symbolic act later in the chapter as it illustrates other important aspects of the Korana society.

From the discussion of the two citations above it is clear that the myth of the ‘noble savage’ was not seen as applicable to the Korana people; a certain kind of abhorrence of the behaviour that was typically associated and expected of them is reflected. However, I do not ascribe to the same standpoint in this book; I hold that there is no such thing as uniformity of personality type within a specific culture. Another ‘typical’ characteristic ascribed to the Korana was their aggressive and war-like nature and this is our next focus.

The ‘warrior nation’

The Korana people are generally associated with war. Strauss (1979:16), for example, writes: ‘Warfare amongst the Korana was endemic’. According to Swanepoel (2009:7) recurring discord and conflict were characteristic of Korana communities. Ross (1975:562) expresses the opinion that they were ‘the most significant non-“Bantu” adversaries of white expansion’ and Maingard (1932:108) asserts that the Korana were the first indigenous people who rebelled against colonialism. This last statement is, however, not wholly correct. When the First Khoe-Dutch War broke out
on 19 May 1659 after Van Riebeeck and his council’s decision to carry out a surprise attack, a number of the peninsula’s Khoekhoe groups including the Goringhaikona (the *Watermans*) and the Goringhaiqua (the *Kaepmans*, that is, Capemen) in addition to the Gorachouqua took part, while the Cochoqua stayed neutral (Elphick 1982:75; Marks 1972:64, 66; De Villiers 1972:203-205). It is illuminating to note that the Dutch attacked first. This followed on a series of incidents that whipped up emotions on both sides. In 1656, for example, the Dutch told the Goringhaiqua to move their cattle further away beyond the Lion Mountain and out of the sight of the company’s settlement and, by 1660, the Khoekhoe were firmly ordered to stay on the laid-out footpaths when passing through the Table Bay settlement (Worden 1999:75). In 1657 the Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C.) started settling in the Liesbeek Valley and circled resources with military posts by means of which the Khoekhoe were forced from the area where they formerly got their food supplies (Sleigh 1989:5). Initial Khoekhoe protest against this kind of treatment at the hand of the Dutch, as well as against the symbols of Dutch presence (gardens) and power (fort), was non-violent. The Cochoqua, for example, reportedly ‘came with thousands of cattle grazing in the vicinity of the fort, indeed almost entering through the gate and being kept out of the gardens with difficulty’ (Worden 1999:74). And in February 1655

> it happened that about 50 of these natives wanted to put up their huts close to the banks of the moat of our fortress, and when told in a friendly manner by our men [the Dutch soldiers] to go a little further away, they declared boldly that this was not our land but theirs and that they will place the huts wherever they chose (Worden 1999:75).

In all probability the Gorachouqua played an important role in this war, because Kora, their chief, was at the head of peace talks with the Dutch on 5 May 1660 (Cope 1967:150; De Villiers 1972:205). For the first time ever horses were used in warfare in South Africa, but the Dutch could not conquer the Khoekhoe who liked to fight at dusk, or during stormy or rainy weather (De Villiers 1972:204).⁶ This was a clever strategy to neutralise the effectiveness of the Dutch muskets. They fought the war with such fervour that the Dutch did not know where to turn. During the peace talks the Khoekhoe complained about how the Dutch treated them and pointed out that the settlers, or free burghers, who were spreading

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⁶ The first horses were imported in April 1653 from Batavia.
out in all directions were encroaching upon the best Khoekhoe territory.\textsuperscript{7} To the pastoral Khoekhoe territory and water were of the utmost importance.\textsuperscript{8} Kolb (in Cope 1967:150-151) reports that the agreement between the parties stipulated that ‘the Hollanders might sow as much ground as lay within the compass of three hours’ journey; but with the proviso, that they should not plough any more land than was already ploughed’. This episode clearly illustrates that the initial idea of the D.E.I.C. to establish only a refreshment station at the Cape quickly made way for colonisation. The peace treaty, however, was not respected by the settlers and they continued with their colonial expansion to the north and east of the country.

Confrontations with the Dutch settlers thus continued and there was a growing resistance under the Khoekhoe people against the development of a colonial community. This led to the Second Khoe-Dutch War (1673-1677) which the Dutch won. Because the Khoekhoe could not oppose the gunfire of their

\textsuperscript{7} Through an ever-widening system of outposts the D.E.I.C. gradually expanded their territory. Sleigh (1989:1-14), for example, identified 57 of these outposts and he speaks of a First, Second and Third Border Territory that developed as the border shifted each time. Killian (2009:17) refers with regard to the complaints of the Khoekhoe to an entry in Jan van Riebeeck’s journal: ‘They strongly insisted that we had been appropriating more and more of their land which had been theirs all these centuries. [...] They asked if they would be allowed to do such a thing supposing they went to Holland’.

\textsuperscript{8} Mitchell (2002:432) and Laidler (1936:60), for example, point out that the violent confrontations between Khoe-San and colonists were not only about competition for general resources and broad reaches of territory, but were also about access to specific geographical features such as perennial springs, defensible shelters and control of mountain passes, many of which had ritual significance for Khoe-San. In this regard Guelke & Shell (1992:804) state: ‘That the Khoikhoi valued water is made abundantly clear from the multitude of words they used to describe it.’ This is probably a bit of an overstatement. Although the Khoekhoe, according to the orthographer and translator Dr M. du Plessis, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Linguistics at the University of Cape Town, naturally had terms for various bodies of water, such as a river, a spring, a well or a vlei, they did not have any more than – and even seem to have had rather fewer than – most other languages of the region (personal communication). What certainly is true is that the importance of watering stops for their nomadic pastoral lifestyle is strongly reflected in the great number of South African place names for rivers, springs and pools that are of Khoekhoe origin.
enemies in open combat, they changed tactics and developed strategies of elusive guerrilla warfare (Strauss 1979:iv; Marks & Atmore 1971:518; Ross 1997(a):93). Guerrilla warfare became their strength; they prepared ambushes and used their knowledge of the terrain. They made use of hit-and-run tactics. Firearms, however, gave the colonists an advantage over the Khoekhoe and ensured a Dutch victory. The Khoekhoe realised that they had to get access to firearms if they wanted to fight the colonists. While some Khoekhoe individuals procured guns, the so-called abuse of firearms by the Khoekhoe led in 1677 to the first of a number of bans on their possession by Khoekhoe people. This, however, in no way prevented the settlers from illegally exchanging firearms for Khoekhoe cattle.9

The war had dire consequences for the conquered. The livestock resources of the Western Cape were all but depleted as the seventeenth century drew to a close (Sleigh 1989:8). Loss of livestock, in part due to raids by the settlers, impoverished the Khoekhoe people and there was a food shortage. Less than a century after the establishment of the settlement at Cape Town, the herder economy and the social order of the Khoekhoe people were broken down completely (Klein 1986:5).10 The colonists drove the Khoekhoe communities further and further out of the good grazing areas and the Khoekhoe also lost occupation rights. Formerly pastoral, the Khoekhoe people now had to eke out a miserable life through hunting or stealing and they had to keep to territory passed up by the settlers. Their only other option was accepting the lower economic and social rung by becoming servants to the colonists, or free burghers, whose labour needs were growing. Ongoing military action with an eye to suppress all Khoe-San resistance and to ensure a subservient labour force for the free burgers followed.11 The Khoe-San were also restricted through customs and laws as to where they could reside, how they could live, what

9 With regard to the possession and use of firearms by the Khoekhoe we can mention these examples. Two Huguenots were reportedly prosecuted in 1696 for the illegal arms deals with the Khoekhoe people (Bredekamp 1989:26). And, in 1673, one of chief Gonnema’s followers, was provided with a gun which he apparently knew very well how to use (Marks & Atmore 1971:518).

10 In this regard Marks (1981:19) mentions: ‘The documentary evidence suggests a fairly close correlation between cattle-seeking expeditions, which tipped easily over into raiding expeditions when the Khoi were reluctant to barter a sufficient number of cattle on the terms offered, and Khoi counter-raids to recover their stock’.

11 Johnson (2007:530, 533) refers to the perception in colonial literature of the Khoekhoe as lazy and relates how their livestock were confiscated and how they
employment was available to them and which compulsory services they had to deliver. The Khoe-San were left with the choice to resist, assimilate, or escape beyond the confines of the white settlements. And, over time, these options were exercised. There was in the first place a long period of resistance by the Khoe-San. In 1788, for example, there was the revolt of Jan Parel, known as Onse Liewen Heer (Our Good Lord) in the vicinity of Swellendam, then there was the resistance of Klaas Stuurman on the eastern border, the Kat River Rebellion in the Eastern Cape against the colonial governments and English settlers took place between 1851 and 1852 (cf Viljoen 1994; Giliomee 1973; Ross 1997(a)).

Apart from their resistance to Dutch domination the Korana people also rebelled against British colonial rule. In 1847 the northern border of the Cape Colony was pushed further inland from the Buffels up to the Gariep (Orange River). This meant that the Korana communities along the Middle Gariep were also exposed to colonial expansion, and the concomitant pressure on the available grazing, water and fields was a threat to the survival of these communities. It was inevitable that confrontation would take place and two devastating wars followed between 1868 and 1869 and then again between 1878 and 1879 against the colonial authorities. The Cape government wanted to drive the Korana people permanently from the Lower Gariep or Koranaland, as it was then known. Hundreds of the ‘ringleaders’ were taken into custody in the Breekwater Jail. The leadership, Jan and Klaas Springbok, Klaas Papier, Gert Perkat, Jan Jacob, Willem Swartbooi, Piet Rooy and Klaas Lukas, to name a few, were exiled to Robben Island while the rest of the community were placed on farms as farm-hands. The Korana people of the Lower Gariep no longer existed: a high price to pay for resisting British domination. Nevertheless, the ongoing resistance of the Khoe-San against Dutch and British colonial suppression should not be judged, according to Marks (1972:80), in terms of military success or failure, but in terms of the profound influence it had on Bantu-speakers in the Cape’s eastern and northern frontiers towards resisting white domination in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Most authors are in agreement about Khoe-San resistance against colonialism, but the question about the existence of intra-Khoe-San conflict is more problematic.

were further denied access to grazing and water unless they were prepared to work for the colonists (cf also Guelke & Shell 1992:808, 812).

12 It was only with the Ordinance 50 of 1828 that civil rights were conferred to Khoekhoe people and other persons of colour.
According to Abrahams (1995:27) Western aspirations for power and domination, as well as the role war plays in achieving these goals, have generated a ‘problem of a cultural bias towards conflict’ in Western historiography. In other words, Western historic writing sees conflict as the norm. She therefore questions the hypothesis underlying *Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa* by Elphick (1977), namely that the relation between hunters and gatherers at any given moment, whether it was predominately cooperation or conflict, depended on ecological constraints. Leśniewski (2009:167) in his review of Penn’s *The forgotten frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the eighteenth century* offers a similar view.

Abrahams argues against a Western view of inter-group relationships based on conflict and maintains the Khoe-San people could live without entering into conflict with each other. Indeed, war originated relatively late in human history, that is, about 14 000 years ago (Barfield 2010:488). Sources on indigenous peoples often refer to their ‘quiet withdrawal’ instead of a display of direct confrontational behaviour. Conflict is in fact rare in small egalitarian societies as there is simply no need for it. Speaking specifically of the Khoekhoe Goodwin (1952:87) says:

> All tales of wars between Hottentots and their neighbours [...] are mere fables. Hahn, too, shows the Hottentots to be an amazingly pacific people, even affecting the tribes with whom they mixed.

Two officers on the D.E.I.C. ship, the Nieuwe Haarlem, which stranded in 1647 in Table Bay, also sketched a peaceful, non-violent image of the Khoekhoe. The two officers, Leendert Janssen and Nicholas Proot, who survived for about a year together with some other crewmen before they returned to the Netherlands wrote:

> Some will say that the natives [Khoekhoe] are cannibals, and brutal, from whom no good can be expected, and that we will have to be continually on our guard, but this is a vulgar error, as will [be] shown further on. We do not deny that [...] some boatmen and soldiers have been killed by them, but the cause is generally not stated by our people, in order to excuse themselves.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) Without having any knowledge of the Khoekhoe whatsoever, Van Riebeeck, upon reading the report, commented in a rather colonial tone: “Though “Sieur” Leendert does not seem to have any fear of the natives [Khoekhoe], I beg to state as my opinion that they are not to be trusted, being a brutal gang, living without any conscience” (Pearse 1956:17-18).
The belief in passive intra-Khoe-San relations does not have to be taken as an absolute, that is, it does not mean that violence and conflict were completely absent from intra-Khoe-San relations. It is rather a case of low frequency or that conflict was not the norm. Although they refrain from suggesting that all relations between hunters and herders were hostile, Smith (1986:36-41) and Mitchell (2002:434) present archaeological examples of how conflict was used to resolve competition for resources. It is thus not possible to exclude the possibility of intra-Khoe-San warfare. In order to interpret the Korana people’s decisions regarding strategy as well as their military action during the battle of Mamusa, it is necessary to have some background of the question regarding war and this is the next focus.

In general, it can be said that the Khoekhoe were, per se, not martial; they had no standing armies, no professional soldiers or police, and no military leaders apart from their chiefs. They apparently did not admire valour nearly as much as wealth or success in the hunt, nor were they, on the whole, bloodthirsty (Elphick 1977:53). Although wars under the Khoekhoe themselves were fought vigorously and although they were not without incidents of brutality, it seems that there was not much loss of life. Marais (1968:280), for example, points out that

*the wars between Korana for cattle were designed to make as much noise as possible, and to get possession of their cattle with as little risk to themselves as possible; for their intention was evidently to capture and feast, and not to fight and die.*

Kies (1972:33) does not share this opinion. He points out that there was a huge loss of life in the battles at Bethany where the Buffelbout Korana were involved. The same is true for battles between the *Links Korana* (Left Hands) and the Taibbosch Korana, between the Springbok Korana and the Kats Korana, and between Goliat Yzerbek (from the Right Hands) and the *Links Korana*. Opinions regarding the violence involved in these conflicts thus diverge as much as opinions about the existence of intra-Khoe-San warfare. There is, however, more clarity on traditional weaponry. Up to the early nineteenth century the Korana mostly used bows and perhaps poisoned arrows, assegai, stones and short sticks (used like darts), while oxen served either as ramparts or they were driven forward as a flying wedge.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) The assegai was the traditional weapon of the Khoekhoe, while they probably borrowed the bow from the Bushman. According to Engelbrecht (1928:4), the arrows were not poisoned.
For our purposes it is necessary to understand that the opposing parties gathered opposite each other at a ‘fighting place’ and attacked *en masse*, while, and this is very important, women and children were safe from the fray in their huts (Elphick 1977:100). It was characteristic of the Korana people, right from the earliest times, to enter into alliances during wars (Wadley 2001:158). For example, during the Second Korana War along the Lower Gariep (1878-1879) Klaas Lucas writes to Willem Christiaan (dated 10 October 1878):

*I want to know from you whether you are Hottentot, and if you are Hottentot, then I ask you for help and strength, and if you are not Hottentot, then you must let me know* (*Imperial Blue Book* G.-61, 1879:xvi).

Jan Pienaar Ganga also writes to Willem Christiaan (dated 18 October 1878) and points out to him: ‘so you must see that the white nations are united, so you must rise this day so that we also may become united’ (*Imperial Blue Book* G.-61, 1879:xvi).

Alliances were not only concluded with fellow Khoekhoe people but also with non-Khoekhoe groups. Here I can point out that a number of Korana chiefs (Jacobus Izaak, Klein Cupido and Jan Jacob) approached the Batlhaping to ask for help during the Second Korana War. Gert Taabosch and Sekonyela (from the Batlokwa) joined forces in the Free State against Moshweshwe and Moletsane while the Taabosch Korana aided the Batlhaping in their struggle against the Barolong. In many of these cases it meant joining forces against one form or another of colonial meddling in domestic affairs or outright colonial oppression.

Elphick (1977:53) relates all causes for war to two conspicuous characteristics of the Khoekhoe society, namely, the great fluidity of wealth and prestige and a deeply ingrained zeal for vendettas. To understand Korana society, Strauss (1976:14) and Smith (1986:40) argue, one has to understand the vital role played by cattle as their only measure of wealth, prestige and power. For this reason the Khoekhoe were initially hesitant about trading with the Dutch, but gradually they parted with more of their breeding stock in this trade than they could actually afford, and this led to

15 The area that is known today as the Free State was known as the Orange River Sovereignty from 1848 to 1854, the Orange Free State from 1854 to 1900 and the Orange River Colony from 1900 to 1910. We will refer to it mostly as the O.F.S.

16 Ross (1997:92) also points out that the Khoekhoe associated respect and honour with possessions, especially with stock. The Khoekhoe used cattle for dairy products, the transportation of goods and people. They also used cattle during wars, but they rarely used it for meat.
a rise in raids and wars among them (cf Klein 1986:5). Apart from raiding cattle in order to acquire wealth, raids were also carried out deliberately in order to spark off quarrels (Elphick 1977:193).

The general impression from the literature is that the Bushmen were constantly stealing cattle from the Korana people, forcing the latter to retaliate. In the Korana folk-tale ‘How the Bushman lost his cattle’ it was in fact the Bushmen who originally had cattle and the Korana people who swindled the former to acquire their cattle (Maingard 1962:52). This folk-tale sheds light on the fluidity of the relationship between the Bushmen hunters and the Khoekhoe herders and changes the perspective about the so-called cattle thefts by the Bushmen. Regardless of the exact origin of the conflict between these two groups, it was largely fuelled by issues about cattle and access to water resources. In Bushman folklore there are many references to various violent incidents between them and the Korana people (Bleek 1929:309-310). Marais (1968:276-285), however, mentions only three big wars between them and the reason for each was cattle raids. The first war with the Bushmen took place when the Korana migrated northward and arrived at the hills nearby Backhouse at a drift called ‘Go-'koolume. The Bushmen attacked the Korana in large numbers and drove off their cattle. The Korana regrouped and in the battle that ensued they overpowered the Bushmen and killed many of them. Three years later the second war with the Bushmen broke out. This time the Bushman came from the Langberg and they were again killed in great numbers. The Korana then moved away from Campbell and settled at Klipdrift, today’s Barkly West. Here the third and last war with the Bushmen, the so-called War of the Pack-Ox, broke out when the Bushman seized a favourite pack-ox of the Kats Korana and slaughtered it. The Kats Korana, together with the Sorcerers, defeated the Bushmen, abducted their women and persuaded them to live among the Korana (cf Parsons 2011:5-6; Stow 1905:285; Engelbrecht 1936:7, 31, 67). Because the

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17 These folktales were dictated to Lucy Lloyd by Jjoaxob (or Piet Links) from the Taalbosch Korana. He was born at Mamusa and wandered from there to Kimberley. Here, he and his family were mistaken for Bushmen and they were sent to Lloyd in Cape Town. In another narrative with similar inclinations the Left Hand Korana chief, ‘Hari’na, relates how the Korana outsmarted the Bushmen and gained sole proprietorship of cattle that were considered their mutual property (Ellenberger 1992:314-315).

18 There was, however, another reason for attacks against the Bushmen. It was not only to punish them, but also to capture their children or to sell them to the Boers (Wadley 2001:158).
Korana had made progress in the art of warfare and had started to equip themselves with more efficient weapons, they virulently fought on against the Bushmen.\textsuperscript{19} Theal (1915:307) recorded that the Korana

\begin{quote}
\textit{hunted the Bushmen and shot them that there might be peace in the land, for the wild beasts and the Bushman were alike, they could not be tamed. And the Koranna cleared the land, and then there was quiet.}
\end{quote}

Bride capture, apart from cattle raiding, was yet another reason for conflict (Stow 1905:241). Women were scarce in frontier societies, but there is also a cultural explanation. The Korana practised clan exogamy (Schapera 1933:vii). Upon reaching puberty boys received some cattle and were sent away to make their own living elsewhere. Since they could not take girls from their own clan with them, their only option was to capture brides, usually from the nearby Bushman tribes.

The title of this section refers to the ‘warrior nation’. Two explanations are given for the so-called bellicosity of the Korana nation. On the basis of ethnobiological considerations Grobbelaar (1956:99) maintains that

\begin{quote}
\textit{their particular character, their hostile nature and propensities for indolence and plunder were paralleled by the presence of a racial component in their make-up, reminiscent of remote ancestors and not found to the same degree in the other Hottentot tribes.}
\end{quote}

The tenets of this doctrine, that cultural behaviour is dictated by biology, are no longer subscribed to and it is accepted that human beings do not have an inborn propensity to violence (Ferguson 2008:33-34). There are, on the other hand, various writers who refer to the warlike culture of the Korana (cf Ellenberger 1992:213). In other words, culture is seen as the origin. But, to Snyder (2002:29, 30) there are ‘serious theoretical and empirical problems’ when it comes to explaining war in terms of culture and he proposes that it is nearer to the truth that ‘war may shape culture rather than the other way around’. To him it is often a case of psychological explanations revealing little about the culture under consideration. Ross (in Snyder 2002:30) is of the opinion that the relation between war and culture

\textsuperscript{19} In the Warren report (1880:8) we read: ‘So long as the Bushmen had only to fight tribes armed with the same weapons as they themselves possessed, they were a match for their neighbours; but, on the introduction of firearms from Cape Town […] they were obliged to retire’.
is best predicted by the harshness of a society’s child-rearing practices, the socialization of children to generalized mistrust of others, and the level of male gender-conflict. The last variable manifests in such forms as aloof relations with fathers, severe rites of passage to manhood, and male ambivalence in relationships with women, exemplified by […] separate housing for men and women.

While the idea of an exclusive Korana culture is problematic, proof of the above criteria could not be found in Korana ethnography. In fact, the reed dance I have referred to above illustrates that there was no absolute male dominance. Although the Korana people were indeed involved in many conflicts over the years it is not possible to classify them as bellicose according to ethnobiological or cultural considerations.

**Methodology**

There is ample documentation of conflict on the south-western border of the former S.A.R. during the latter half of the nineteenth century. A central theme of many of these texts is the conflict between Brit and Boer, between British imperialism and Boer nationalism. While the Korana were an important role-player on the interactive stage of the Cis-Molopo territory reference to their role and contribution in this region is limited. There are various reasons for this and they expose the European reporting priorities of the time. The ‘other’ is usually less important in ‘our’ memory bank of history (cf Schrag 2006:151). ‘They’ are the marginalised who are judged in ‘our’ documentation and ‘they’ are exposed in the light of ‘our’ official, premeditated interests, ideologies and standpoints. Current hegemonic structures and the domination of one group over another group, or groups, lend authors the power to

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20 It was the region south of the Molopo River, to the east of the edges of the Kalahari Desert, to the north of the Cape Colony and to the west of the S.A.R., principally the later Bechuanaland and British Bechuanaland. In March 1885 the British extended the boundary from beyond the Molopo River to the longitude marking the boundary of the German protectorate. Proclamation No. 1, British Bechuanaland, 1885 (dated 30 September 1885) divided the area in the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland (the area south of the Molopo River, consisting of the districts of Mahikeng (formerly Mafeking or Mafikeng), Vryburg, Kuruman, Gordonia and Taung and the Bechuanaland protectorate north of the Molopo River. The Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland was transferred to the Cape Colony by virtue of the British Bechuanaland Annexation Act, 1895 (Act No. 41 of 1895, Cape of Good Hope, 11 November 1895).
engage in a certain kind of discourse and to produce a certain kind of knowledge. The result is often disinformation and a biased image of the ‘other’.

As Marks (1972:55) points out, history tends to be the history of the successful and it is exactly the case with the bulk of the archival information presented here. Archival research has been done in Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein. In these documents the events pertaining to the battle of Mamusa are not sketched from the point of view of the Korana; they are the voiceless, defeated and suppressed. To write under these circumstances about people who were not responsible for the sources about them is very challenging, especially when one is an outsider. In an effort to get to the ‘régime of truth’ of the events of Mumusa, in Wessels’ (2010:37) words, it was decided to shift the epistemic imperative of this study to David Massouw and the Taalbosch Korana. This means that I want to generate truthful and valid descriptions and explanations about Mamusa by giving an interpretation of the social, institutional and political contexts (together with the rules and parameters constructed within these contexts) of S.A.R.-ism on the Korana. The available ethnographic material has been used in order to do so.

Despite the ethnographic and historic character that this book may seem to present, it will nevertheless not be possible to speak about a ‘historical ethnography’; nor would it be correct to refer to it as an ‘ethnohistory’. Ethnographic and historic material on the Korana and the Boer will be explored in order to shed light on the specific role of the Korana in the making and shaping of the former S.A.R border culture. At the same time I will reflect in a more focused and more accurate way on the ethnic ramifications of a single historic incident, namely the battle of Mamusa. Like archival material ethnographic material also has its own limitations and pitfalls, and this is perhaps true to an even greater degree with the Khoekhoe ethnography. Klein (1986:6), for example, writes as follows about this:

*contemporary European accounts of the Khoi lack ethnographic objectivity and thoroughness, and many important aspects of Khoi culture and ecology cannot be reliably reconstructed from published sources.*

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The most problematic aspects of dealing with ethnographic material are perhaps those of selective or inattentive citing, those dealing with the question: ‘Who speaks for whom?’ (the narrator, the collector, the reader or the interpreter), and the danger of creating or perpetuating the perception of the existence of a radical difference between the ‘other’ and the ‘civilised human being’. In the presentation of the ethnographic material it is my endeavour to take cognisance of these issues. During the research process I have become all too aware of the great disadvantage I face with respect to a limited access to the Korana oral history, which has largely slipped beyond my reach and is irretrievably lost.

Most of the ethnographic material on the Korana people has been sourced from Engelbrecht (1936), Schapera (1965) and Barnard (1992). Because each community has their own history that is repeated through oral traditions, a number of research trips were made to Kimberley, Taung, Vryburg, Schweizer-Reneke, Welkom and Bloemfontein in order to find informants who could help record narratives on the war, be they on the run-up to the war or about the incidents occurring during the war itself. The events I am exploring took place more than a century and a quarter ago, and the Korana were driven from their territory. This meant that only a few suitable informants could be found. Nevertheless, valuable information could be collected, while one visit (described in Chapter 8) resulted in the most unexpected research coincidence I have ever experienced.

**Terminology**

The archival documents of the period contain terms such as *kaffer* (*kaffir*) and *meid* (referring to a black or coloured woman servant) that are offensive and unacceptable today. These terms reflect a specific historical use and, moreover, they reflect the social context that gave rise to them. In other words, they are reflections of the worldview of the Boers of that time. In this regard Van Onselen (1990:101-102) refers to the language usage of the Boers towards Africans in the Western Transvaal and how it reveals the Boers' attitude towards Africans. Butler (1900:48) makes the following comment about this issue:

> the Boers regard the natives, all of whom they contemptuously call Kaffirs [...] pretty much as the ancient Jews regarded the Philistines and others whom they expelled from Palestine.
For this reason, it has been decided to retain the original terms, but to place them in inverted commas because of their offensiveness.

There is scarcely any publication on the Khoekhoe or the Bushmen without a discussion about preferences of certain labels and terminologies. Guenther (1977:2) remarks: ‘It is probably impossible to arrive at any one term that does not carry some negative connotation among one or another Khoisan group’. I therefore treat this subject briefly and explain how terms will be used.

The etymology of the name ‘Hottentot’, a collective name given to the indigenous people of the Cape, is not entirely clear and there are several possible origins for this name.22 ‘Hottentot’ could have its anecdotal origin in the Dutch referring to this group as the Hüttentüü, because of the, to them, incomprehensible, staccato clicks of the Khoekhoe language, or it could apparently derives from the South African Dutch word for stutterer. Jeffreys (1947:163-165), however, accepts that ‘Hottentot’ is not of Dutch origin, but that it probably derives from a Khoekhoe word. This is confirmed by Boonzaier et al (2001:1) when he writes: ‘In 1620 a French commander reported [...] that the ‘usual greeting’ of the Cape people was to dance a song, of which the beginning, the middle and the end is hautitou; a little later, this expression was recorded by a Dane as ‘Hottentot’.

Because ‘Hottentot’ has acquired derogatory connotations the collective term Khoekhoe, which is regarded as a more accurate linguistic rendering than ‘Khoikhoi’, will be used. The term ‘Khoekhoe’ means ‘men of men’ or ‘people’. In Africa it is a widespread practice for peoples to describe themselves by the name of an ancestor, a country, or by saying: ‘We are men’. It is therefore not so singular for the Khoekhoe to refer to themselves as ‘men of men’.

The generic term Khoekhoe includes people like the Nama, the Griqua, the Korana as well as various so-called revivalist associations such as the Inqua, the Chonaqua, the Attaqua, the Chainoqua, etc.

As is the case with the term ‘Hottentot’ there is no certainty about the etymology and meaning of the word ‘Korana’. After thirty pages of discussing the issue Nienaber (1989:647-677) could not come to a satisfactory answer. A general opinion is that ‘Korana’ derives from the common gender plural form of chief Kora’s name (Stow 1905:268-270 and Maingard 1932a:111). While this cannot be ruled

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22 According to Cope (1967:25) the Portuguese mariner, Antonio da Saldana, threw anchor in 1503 in Table Bay and named it after himself. This is why the Khoekhoe are sometimes referred to as the Saldanians (Saldanars).
out, it must be remembered that Kora was the chief of the Gorachouqua, and in the
next chapter we will see that the entity referred to as the ‘Korana’ developed through
a process of intermingling between different people, including the Gorachouqua.
Vedder (in Grobbelaar 1957:202) explains the origin of the word ‘Korana’ as follows:

The Nama word !Koran is the plural of the masculine singular !Korab and
the feminine singular !Koras. !Korana is the accusative plural and signifies ‘the
people that attack and rob other people’.

According to Engelbrecht (1936:1-2), the term ‘Korana’ derives from !Orana
meaning ‘pure and true people’, or !Gora meaning ‘naked’. It is also suggested that the
name Korana could mean ‘the real thing’, signifying that they thought of themselves
as pure-bred Khoekhoe. Maree (1952:15) is of the opinion that the Korana could
rightfully make claims to be called ‘Khoikhoi’, that is ‘people’, because of their rich
culture. There is thus no clarity over the meaning and origin of the name ‘Korana’. It
has, however, come to reflect a stereotyped idea of these people. It is sufficient to say
that, stripped from the negative connotations it has acquired, ‘Korana’ was the name
these people ascribed to themselves. This is then the way I will think of the term
Korana and use it in this book: a name chosen by the people themselves.

The terms ‘San’ and ‘Bushman’ have equally derogatory histories. Many
scholars prefer to use ‘Bushman’ to refer to the early inhabitants of Southern Africa
who spoke click languages and lived by hunting and gathering in contradistinction
to Khoekhoe-speaking herders. Meinhof (1930:890 gives saku and sana as meaning quite
simply ‘Buschmänner’, while Bank (1997(a):289) explains the meaning of ‘San’ as
‘thief’. Many San descendants prefer being called ‘Bushmen’. Guenther’s (1977:2)
impression about this is that the ethnic label ‘Bushman’ no longer has the pejorative
connotations of the early pioneering days. This is how I will use the term in this book.

There was a very complex relationship between the Khoekhoe and the
Bushmen in terms of class, ethnicity and culture. They were earlier viewed as belonging
to different races, but recent research (discussed in Chapter 2) shows the opposite to
be true. Differentiation between the two groups is chiefly made as a result of linguistic
and lifestyle differences. The so-called Kalahari debate opposes the notion of ‘pure’
(traditional) hunter-gatherers and the ‘impure’ (or acculturated) ones who moved up
the socio-economic ladder by obtaining wealth and became herders. The terminologies
discussed here are, however, not fixed or absolute and the exact relationship between
the Khoekhoe and the Bushman remains arguable. Because this issue is not pertinent
to our particular focus reference to it will be minimal. In the current South African
context the term ‘Bushman’ refers to different language groups among the JU (or Northern Khoesan) and TUU (or Southern Khoesan) (Vossen 2013:1-12).

The fluidity in distinguishing between ‘Bushman’ and ‘Hottentot’ is not always accepted or recognised in colonial historiography and the term ‘Hottentot’ has been used in many cases to refer to both groups.23 This blurring of the boundaries between the Khoekhoe and Bushman gave rise to many authors’ preferring the coined term ‘Khoisan’ which is attributed to Leonard Schultze to refer to the ‘Hottentots’ and the ‘Bushmen’ collectively (Schapera 1965:5). In this book the term ‘Khoe-San’ will be used instead of Khoisan. Hyphenating the two terms takes into account the objection by Bushmen that they should not be subordinated to, or subsumed within Khoekhoe groupings (Besten 2011:188). Where language matters are concerned the term ‘Khoesan’ is used as a cover term for all the click languages.

As is true for most terms, the conventions regarding the use of ‘Batlhaping’ and ‘Barolong’ are not always self-evident. While both groups are multi-ethnic, both practised similar lifestyles and shared to a certain degree the same history (touched upon briefly in Chapter 2), they established two separate polities. This is also how they will be treated.

The reason for using the term ‘Boer’ is based on the following considerations. Not all burgers of the S.A.R. spoke Dutch-Afrikaans and it was important to distinguish this part of the population clearly from the rest. The Boers were to a great degree a homogeneous group with regard to their shared system of symbols (culture) giving meaning to their history, values, shared destiny and ethos, and which identified them too. Strictly speaking, Afrikaner nationalism has only come into existence in the last decade of the nineteenth century and it is therefore not possible to speak about the Boer population of the S.A.R. as Afrikaners.

First references to individuals will be done by including their appropriate position or title and initials when these are known. Subsequent references will mainly be to the surname only. Where it will be necessary to distinguish between individuals with the same surname, initials will be indicated. I will further distinguish between David Massouw Rijt Taibosch and his father Massouw Rijt Taibosch by referring to the former as ‘David Massouw’ and to the latter as Massouw Rijt Taibosch. In the final instance I would like to draw the reader’s

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23 The Bushmen, for example, are not mentioned in the Cape records as a separate people until about 1682 (Schapera 1963:20). See also the remarks of Stow (1905:239) in this regard.
attention to the fact that historical sources often mention African chiefs only by one name (for example, Mankuroane) or refer to African individuals by a first Westernised name (for example, Field-Cornet Hans), practices which would not be followed were these individuals ‘European’. I will follow this same pattern, in order to reflect something of the world-view of the time I am writing about.

The representation of Khoesan words

In older texts, where the click sounds of the Khoesan languages were not simply omitted, they were indicated only roughly, typically by an improvised symbol such as k? or t?, or ‘k. Click accompaniments such as nasalisation, voicing, aspiration or velar friction were not always detected by early writers, and where attempts were made to indicate them, these were usually not consistent. A greater understanding of the sound system of Khoesan languages only started to emerge in the early part of the nineteenth-century, when missionaries began to study Nama; while standard symbols for clicks – and conventions for indicating the accompaniments – were only introduced in the middle of the nineteenth century, and started to be taken up by missionaries such as Krönlein from the 1860s onwards. Where older sources are quoted, any Khoesan words they may include are left as they were originally represented. One notable exception arises in the case of the numerous clan names recorded by Hendrik Jacob Wikar in 1779. For these, standardised modern Kora equivalents were extrapolated on the basis of well-informed guess work by Engelbrecht (in Mossop 1935:221-237).

Structure and composition

The book is constructed along both chronological and subject lines. This choice has been made based on the following: Boers, freebooters and indigenous leaders such as Mankuroane (of the Batlhaping), Montshiwa and Moshete (both of the Barolong) all contributed to a certain degree to the construction of the border culture of the Western Transvaal and were involved, in one way or another, in the fate of the Taaibosch Korana. I will discuss these leaders only inasmuch as their influence and actions shed light on the border culture or the Korana people. Other Korana groupings such as the Left Hand Korana are discussed in Chapter 3 because of the genealogical and historical connection with the Taaibosch Korana.
Where it was about the history of the origins of the Korana (Chapter 2), the intergroup relations and quarrels that led up to the establishment of Stellaland (Chapter 6), but especially in the discussions of the course of the events leading up to the battle of Mamusa and the battle itself (Chapter 7), chronological order predominates. However, it was not always possible to determine dates with absolute certainty. On the one hand, narratives lack precision and it becomes increasingly difficult with the passing of time to obtain certainty. On the other hand, one gets the idea that the ‘other’ was simply not judged important enough to report accurately upon in official documentation.

Chapter 4 (the frontier policy and ethos of the Boers) and Chapter 5 (the role of some individuals) are ordered thematically. The Korana revival is dealt with in the penultimate chapter. Some of the questions that are treated are indigenous status, representation, self-definition and primordiality. Here the focus of the discussion is to clarify whether the eighteenth and nineteenth century Korana culture, identity and social relations could contribute meaningfully to the current revival process.

Finally, before I turn to the next chapter, I want to touch upon the issue of genocide. According to Adhikari (2010:78) there is ‘a growing corpus of scholarly literature that has interpreted colonial exterminations of indigenous peoples as genocide’. He supplies the following working definition of genocide:

*Genocide is the intentional physical destruction of a social group in its entirety, or the intentional annihilation of such a significant part of the group that it is no longer able to reproduce itself biologically or culturally, nor sustain an independent economic existence (Adhikari 2010:12).*

If one considers the violent institutional actions of the S.A.R. against the Korana with its utterly destructive consequences it is clear that this is a case of genocide. This matter will, however, not be elaborated on any further.
Chapter 2

The origin of the Korana and their early history
Note: There is no consensus among researchers about genealogical data. In collecting and recording the data above, attempts were made to verify information with the help of informants.
Introduction

The history of the origin of the Korana people is complex and there are many uncertainties. Theories and dates from different sources are often contradictory, making it impossible to interpret in a unified or unifying way. Data are thus treated with circumspection and it must be understood from the start that it would be possible to draw conclusions other than those I present in this chapter.

Although this book is about the Korana faction headed by David Massouw Rijt Taibosch, their existence was closely tied up with that of the Batlhaping and Barolong. Theirs was a complex relationship of intermarriage, extensive trade relations and even armed conflict. These two groups will thus be discussed insofar as light can be shed on the Korana people by doing so.

I will discuss the history of the Taibosch faction that established themselves in the O.F.S. in the next chapter, together with the history of the other Korana communities.

‘I invented the Korana’: Notes on the origin of the Korana people

There are quite a number of theories concerning the origin of the Khoekhoe; even a shipwreck theory, which postulates that the Khoekhoe were actually the descendants of the survivors. The story goes that the tear in the hulk of the ship was only big enough to let small children escape and, since the children grew up without parents, the language they developed, that is, the Khoekhoe language, sounded like the noises produced by little children (Chidester 1996:46-52, 63-67; Schrire 2009:16-17).

An earlier general hypothesis was that the Khoekhoe people originated from mixing that took place between the Bushmen and the Hamites from East Africa. This hypothesis was based on the perceived link between the origination of pastoralism in Southern Africa and the arrival of a group of supposedly cross Khoe-San/Hamitic peoples from East Africa (Morris 2003:85). Proceeding from this viewpoint, Conder (1887:78) writes as follows about the Korana:

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24 ‘I invented the Korana,’ was the tongue-in-cheek reply of the physical anthropologist Broom when he was asked in the early 1900s to tell the ‘full and true story’ of the Korana people (Štrkalj 2000:121).
I was very much struck with the strongly Turanian type of the race. The broad cheek bones, the small eyes, wide apart and slightly oblique, the small mouth (somewhat projecting) and short nose, and even the colour, which is much lighter than that of the Kafirs, called to my mind both the Japanese and also the Turkish peasantry of Asia Minor.

I have heard it stated that the practice of excision, which occurs among the Copts and, I believe, among the Abyssinians, is also existent among the Korannas, as well as circumcision.

Genetic studies suggest that the Khoe-San split off from other modern humans about 100 000 years ago and a division into a northern (ǃXun or ǃXũ and Jul’hoansi) and southern (Tuu, ǂKhomani and Nama) group took place about 35 000 years ago (Schlebusch et al 2012:374-375). The genomic variation between the northern and southern Khoe-San groups implies that they are not a homogeneous group and that their origin cannot be pinpointed to a specific place. Late Stone Age peoples speaking Khoe languages could have gradually spread southward through Tanzania to the southern regions of Central Africa, that is, the north of Botswana and the bordering southern part of Zimbabwe, where they settled about 2 000 years ago (cf Liebenberg 1990:2; Marais 1968:267; Molema 1920:29; Stow 1905:267; Johnson 2004:xvi). Another hypothesis, which is proposed by Barnard (1992:32) and Morris (2003:89), is that it is here, in the southern regions of Central Africa, where the Khoe-San originated in the first place. At any rate, genetic and fossil research confirms that modern humans originated in Africa (Stoneking 2006:21-30; A. Smith et al 2004:4).

According to Henn et al (2008:10693) an independent migration of Early Iron Age Bantu-speaking famers took place along the same route the Late Stone Age Khoe speakers took to the southern regions of Central Africa, presumably through a tsetse-fly free corridor. Humphreys (1981:4), who is in agreement with historical

25 From a linguistic point of view the different Khoesan languages fall into a number of families: JU languages are sometimes referred to as ‘Northern Khoesan’, but the label ‘Southern Khoesan’ languages only applied to the ǃUi-Taa or Tuu languages. Nama belongs to the Khoe family, sometimes also referred to as ‘Central Khoesan’, while Tuu is the family that contains ǂKhomani within the ǃUi branch (Vossen 2013:1-12).

26 Opinions diverge about possible dates.
linguists such as Westphal (1963), accepts that these two groups made contact in the southern regions of Central Africa, as this is where Tshu-Khwe, a language related to the Dama, Nama and the Cape Khoekhoe languages, is found. Authors such as Smith (1986:37), Klein (1986:9) and Crawhall (2006:109-124) point out the problematic relation between linguistic, genetic and archaeological research in this specific case. One of the reasons they offer is that language cannot be attached to race in a one-to-one relation. While the Khwe language, for example, belongs to the western Kalahari division of the Khoi people's genetic make-up is distinct from that of other Khoi-San groups (Schlebusch et al 2012:375). Another is that the languages or dialects spoken by the Cape Khoekhoe peoples had been badly decimated or had disappeared before adequate linguistic records could be made. This seems, however, a bit of an overstatement. The fact of language change is not a debatable issue: all languages slowly change over time, and it is this process that steadily erodes the traces of those systematic affinities involving phonetics, morphology and typology that provide the substance of a linguistic family identity. The question in this regard is thus whether all varieties of ‘Cape Bushman’ had disappeared before they were documented. The answer to this is ‘no’. According to Dr Menan du Plessis, useful fragments of these languages dating from the late eighteenth century onwards survived. These fragments were sufficient to indicate that there was very little dialectal proliferation across the !Ui spectrum, and also that they had universally incorporated a number of Khoe words – which implies that speakers of early Tuu must have been in contact with Khoe speakers before the break-up of the group into the Taa and !Ui dialects (personal communication).

Archaeologists accept that the Late Stone Age hunter-gatherer communities who were Khoe speakers acquired first sheep and later also cattle from the Early Iron Age Bantu-speaking farmers about 2 200 years ago. The point is that it was

27 The term ‘Tshu-Khwe’ is no longer in use. It was a term invented by Westphal to describe the ‘Bushman’ languages now known as the eastern and western Kalahari varieties of Khoi.

28 It seems that no physical remains of domestic animals dating from roughly before 2 200 have been found in Southern Africa (Smith & Ouzman 2004:501). Research also seems to indicate that cattle were a much later introduction than sheep (Mitchell & Whitelaw 2005:214). There are still many unanswered questions regarding these issues. For example, there is no consensus among authors whether the people practising the Early Iron Age culture were indeed Bantu speakers. Hammond-Tooke (2004:71) believes they
in all probability due to outside influence that pastoralism was introduced in the southern parts of Central Africa. The question now is how this transmission took place. There are several points of view and I outline briefly. Henn et al. (2008) aims to clarify whether pastoralism arrived in the southern parts of Central Africa because of population movement from eastern Africa or whether it was transmitted with little to no population movement, as peoples passed livestock and pastoral practices on to each other. The authors referred to accept the latter proposition (Henn et al. 2008:10696). It is also the opinion of others such as Sadr (1998:127) and Smith (1990:65-67). Klein (1986:9) and Mitchell (2002:435), in their turn, come to the conclusion that acculturation, diffusion and migration could have been equally important in the distribution and promotion of pastoralism. Fauvelle-Aymar (2008:89) is convinced that it was a process of expansion by segmentation and amalgamation with surrounding peoples, that is, through a process of percolation. Bousman (1998:147) does not want to exclude the possibility of an independent Late Stone Age Khoe-San herding phase predating the Early Iron Age in the southern parts of Central Africa and says ‘it is possible that some Early Iron Age groups acquired livestock from Khoisan herders’. Mitchell and Whitelaw (2005:216-217) also point to the possibility that the communities owning sheep in the Western Cape before circa 900 were not at all from Khoekhoe extraction. In spite of the differences in opinion with regard to the way in which domestic livestock was introduced into the southern parts of Central Africa, authors agree that the front-line Early Iron Age Buntu-speaking people had a long and involved interaction with the Khoe-speaking peoples in this region.

From the southern parts of Central Africa the Khoe-speaking herders migrated further south. Most of the sources accept that one of two basic routes was followed. Barnard (1988:35), however, refers to three options while the possibility of multiple introductions of herding along different routes at different times cannot be excluded entirely. Where the school of thought proposing two basic routes is concerned, it is accepted, on the one hand, that the Khoekhoe migrated in a south-westerly direction until they reached the Atlantic coast from where they moved southward to the Western and Eastern Cape (Stow 1905:236; Cooke 1965:263-285; were while Cornwell (1988:96) excludes the possibility. There is, however, a certain degree of consensus about the fact that these people herded cattle, sheep and goats; cultivated sorghum, millets and other crops; that they manufactured iron tools and copper ornaments and that they lived in settled villages.
Molema 1920:29; Engelbrecht 1937:9). This claim is based on two considerations. There are archaeological records of distinctively Khoekhoe pottery as well as of sheep bones (and possibly cattle bones) along the western parts of Namibia, the Western Cape and along the southern coast of the Cape (cf Mitchell 2002:436). This points to outside influences foreign to the hunter-gatherer population who first inhabited the area for millennia. Support of this idea of a south-westerly route is also based on the hypothesis that a basic knowledge of grazing and livestock diseases is required for successful farming. Willcox (1966:437), for example, builds his argument on the different needs of sheep and cattle with regard to grazing and water; a more easterly route would have implied passage through a wide belt of Mopane scrub with little grass, which is unsuitable grazing for sheep, while there were open grasslands, that is, far better pastures for sheep to the west. Furthermore, the westward route was also less given to livestock diseases and parasites than the wetter easterly route. In addition to archaeological proof, there are thus also ecological considerations that favour the south-westerly route.

On the other hand, researchers also present ecological and archaeological considerations in support of their theories that migration took place in a more south-easterly direction. Elphick (1972:43-44) is one of the writers advancing this view, pointing to the better grazing and the more abundant water sources in the south-easterly areas. He is of the opinion that the Khoekhoe probably followed the tributaries, the Harts (ǂKaob), Vaal (Gij !Garib or |Hei !Garib), Riet (’Gumaap), Modder (’Gij ’Gumaap) and Vet (Gum !Garib) in the central parts of the country. According to his initial calculations (he later changed his view), they reached the southern tip of Africa not long before Bartholomew Dias sailed around the Cape in 1488. The occurrence of geometric rock art in the more central parts of South Africa, testifying according to Smith and Ouzman (2004:508-509), to the presence of the historical Khoekhoe, favours the argument for this route of migration (cf also Mitchell & Whitelaw, 2005:215).

Regarding the possible southerly route of migration for the Gorachouqua – later to be known as the Korana – Elphick (1977:19-20), Ouzman (2005:102) and Wuras (1929:290) believe that, coming from their historical abode along the Gariep, they settled in a region more or less west of the present-day Stellenbosch, possibly during the fourteenth century. However, according to Legassick (1990:374) and

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29 The fact that it was the Korana people who gave the name Gariep or !Garib or !Arib to the river confirms this view (Lange 2006:373; Nienaber 1989:323).
Maingard (1932a:114), it is not possible to establish which Korana groupings were inhabiting the Transoranga or Trans-Gariep on a permanent and long-term basis and which groupings migrated back to this area from the Cape during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.30

Kora (also referred to as !Kora, Gora and Chora in the literature) was the chief of the Gorachouqua in Jan van Riebeeck’s time (the 1650s) and it is said that he was the first indigenous chief with whom the Dutch entered into treaties (Stow 1905:269).31 Cope (1967:152) calculates that the Gorachouqua could have been about 10 000 in number at the time. Van Riebeeck himself estimated that there were between 600 and 700 able-bodied men and he described them as the second most powerful group, rich in cattle (Nienaber 1989:682). Schapera (1965:330) accepts that the Gorachouqua were to a large extent autonomous at this time, but according to O. Dapper (1668) (in Schapera 1933:23-25), the Cochoqua (or Saldanhars, after Saldanha Bay) were under a king (Koehque) named Oldasoa with Gonnomoa as his viceroy or second in command. In Dapper’s opinion the Cochoqua further exercised authority over the Gorachouqua and the Goringhaiqua. Elphick (1977:49-50) opposes this view and believes that the Goringhaiqua, Gorachouqua and other groups near Table Bay were united in allegiance to Gogosoa, chief of the Goringhaiqua. According to Engelbrecht (1937:10-11) the Gorinhaikona were a subgroup of the Goringhaiqua and they were

30 This is generally taken to refer to the area between the Vaal River and the Gariep, but it could also be taken to refer more specifically to the area between the Modder and the Gariep.

31 Kora, according to Cope (1967:149), is thought to be the son or grandson of Xhoré. (It is not quite clear what Cope intends by this spelling, which implies a rather unlikely aspirated fricative.) The latter was abducted by Captain Gabriel Towerson on board of the Hector in May 1613 and taken to England. There was, apparently, also someone else abducted with him, but this person died on the ship. The motivation for the abduction was apparently to teach Xhoré English, so that the English East India Company could get information from him regarding inland trade as well as about the availability of water and minerals on the African continent. Xhoré did not want to cooperate and was sent back after about six months aboard the Hector. He stepped ashore in the Cape again on 17 June 1614. It is said that Xhoré realised how freely available copper, brass and iron were in England, and thus how sailors were exploiting the Khoekhoe’s ignorance while bartering livestock against these articles. To the frustration of sailors the price the Khoekhoe demanded for cattle suddenly escalated upon Xhoré’s return and he was blamed for this (cf Cope 1967:86–92; Marks 1972:61–62).
related to the Cochoqua and the Gorachouqua. He also mentions that there was an especially close relation between the Goringhaiqua and the Gorachouqua. Stow (1905:241) and Marias (1968:268) share this opinion as they see these two groups as subdivisions of the same tribe. Historical sources thus do not paint a clear picture of the political status of the Gorachouqua in the Cape. However, when one takes the important role Kora played in the peace negotiations after the First Khoe-Dutch War into account, the above-mentioned opinion of Schapera is probably correct.

The political significance of the concept of a ‘chief’ in the context of the previous paragraph must be made clear. In her discussion on the so-called failure of Khoe-San chiefs to unite and organise their people Abrahams (1995:29-30) maintains that there was no history of leaders in the Khoe-San society at all. According to her it was the D.E.I.C. who wanted to subjugate the Khoe-San under their rule who started appointing chiefs from 1679 on. She argues that it was because the European settlers in the Cape had a cultural preference for hierarchical systems and so preferred to deal with individuals rather than collectives that they did so. In other words, they identified a particular group with a particular individual. Adhikari (2010:62-63) holds a similar opinion and mentions that

the British sought to identify or appoint suitable chiefs among the Bushman with whom they could negotiate and through whom they could assert authority.

Because of its small scale and egalitarian structure, Bushman society did not have the hereditary leaders, or chiefs of any sort.32

This view is not universally accepted as correct. According to Budack (1972:250-258), for example, all Khoekhoe tribes (!Haos) had a tribal government (!Haos di #hanub) with a chief (Gao-aob) at its head. Kolb (in Schapera 1933:328) too affirms the existence of a hereditary chieftainship among the Khoekhoe and explains that the chief’s duties were to lead the army in war, to govern the kraal and to settle disputes (cf also Guelke & Shell, 1992:804). It must also be pointed out that the date Abrahams (1995) proffers in her argumentation, viz. 1679, elicits various questions, such as: Why would the D.E.I.C. wait twenty-five years before implementing the practice of chieftainship? Where did Khoekhoe leadership come from when Van Riebeeck negotiated with the Khoekhoe in 1659 after the First Khoe-Dutch War?

32 Compare also Smith et al (2004:41-43) and Bleek (1929:310) who hold that the Bushmen had no word for ‘chief’.
With regard to chieftainship among the Korana, Barnard (1992:166) mentions a hereditary chief (Gao-kxaob or Nu:sab) who exercised authority over the territory and its inhabitants and who was the sole decision-maker with respect to declarations of war. Strauss (1979:13-14) disagrees. She describes the Korana as a highly individualistic society with decentralised political powers and a weak institution of chieftaincy, a view supported by Marks (1981:17) and Van Tonder (1952:148). She further explains that, although hereditary chieftainship did exist, the chief had no judicial rights over his followers, and was assisted by a council. It was rather a case of tolerating the chief more than of obeying him in all matters. His authority derived from his wealth, skills in hunting and cattle-raiding in addition to his personal leadership qualities. Engelbrecht (1936:39), in his turn, distinguishes between Korana chiefs that were made chief and those that were born so. Apparently the Korana people would apply the title of chief to the man who happened to have the most wealth and influence despite the hereditary chief being alive.

In considering and comparing the different points of view regarding leadership among the Khoe-San peoples, it must be remembered that the Khoe-San had no or very little say in the production of colonial sources on this subject. Schapera (1965:328) indicates his awareness of having to depend on colonial sources and, by implication, on the colonial interpretations and creations when he writes about such issues: ‘For information as to their original form of government we must therefore refer mainly to the accounts of the earlier writers’. While it is clear that further research on Khoekhoe chieftainship is necessary, it is possible to say that, in the case of David Massouw, some of these elements can be accounted for; his chieftainship was indeed hereditary, he had considerable wealth at his disposition and he ruled together with members of his council (See Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Furthermore, it was definitely not a weakened institution, because the S.A.R. acknowledged his judicial powers, he made proclamations, negotiated with other leaders and concluded treaties with them. It is also true that various indigenous leaders, beside the Boers, recognised his leadership. Later in this book I will also show that David Massouw displayed qualities of a truly remarkable leader.

Returning to the interior

After the Second Khoe-Dutch War the worsening of the situation in the Cape for the Khoekhoe led to the rebellion of some factions and the decision of others to leave the Cape. It was the Gorachouqua, the Goringhaiqua and possibly also the
Returning to the interior

Cochoqua (Marks 1972:77) who exercised the second option.\(^{33}\) Already before the outbreak of the Second Khoe-Dutch War the Gorachouqua started leaving and they were probably the first group to do so. Buys (1989) reports that Kora and his brother Gaking regularly visited Van Riebeeck at the Fort to get tobacco and wine.\(^{34}\) But when Van Riebeeck left the Cape in 1662 the frequency of the Gorachouqua's visits to the Fort diminished; they visited it for the first time again only on 4 December 1663. The next year the Gorachouqua moved inland on 23 February and returned only on 5 September 1664 during the dry months to barter livestock against alcohol and tobacco. On 6 July 1666 the governor Z. Wagenaar was informed that the Gorachouqua and the Cochoqua intended to move into the interior for good. Wagenaar responded by saying that it was because the Chainnouqua enjoyed the favour of the D.E.I.C. On 1 August 1668 sergeant Cruythoff who had been on an inland trade expedition reported that he had traded livestock from the Gorachouqua beyond the Tijgerberg (or Tierberg). Buys (1989) further asserts that the Gorachouqua were outside the influence of the D.E.I.C. by 1677. According to Stow (1905:268) the Gorachouqua left the Cape between 1661 and 1686.

This information confirms that the Gorachouqua did not leave the Cape at a specific point in time, but that there was a gradual decrease in the frequency of contact with the colonial government. The Gorachouqua were at the forefront of the northward migration, but it was not, as Grobbelaar (1957:202) claims, only they who migrated northward. The reason Grobbelaar (1957:202) gives for the Gorachouqua's migration, that it was 'probably on account of their aggressive character and racial pride', is also at variance with the available information.

As will be shown, there is no certainty about the directions of the routes into the interior. The westward settler expansion after the Khoe-Dutch wars did not only render taking the usual seasonal migration route along the west coast up to the mouth of the Gariep impossible, but it meant that the Khoekhoe could

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\(^{33}\) By 1795 there were about 14 000 Khoekhoe still living in the Cape colony (Giliomee 1973:4) so that, clearly, some Khoekhoe people did remain in the Cape.

\(^{34}\) Kora’s fate is unknown, but it is said that he had died young (Stow 1905:269). Ellenberger’s (1992:212) claim that he was slain in a battle against the Dutch is probably not correct, as the Gorachouquu already have left the Cape before the Second Khoe-Dutch War.
not take the western route along which they probably migrated southward. This means that the central interior was the most probable area for migrations to take place. Grobbelaar (1957:202) and Maingard (1932a:108-112) speak of several waves of migration. Bredekamp (1989:22) emphasises that groups left at different times; as territory was made available for private farming purposes to settlers the Khoekhoe were gradually forced to the periphery. The opinion of Nienaber (1989:692) that the various Khoekhoe migrations from the Cape took place over a period of about 100 years between 1680 and 1775 endorses Bredekamp's (1989) view. There was thus definitely no question of one big organised migration from the Cape at a given time, or that all of them had left the Cape at a certain point.

It appears that various Khoekhoe groups stayed in the vicinity of Schietfontein (today's Carnavon) and Victoria West for a while. According to Nienaber (1989:686) it is here, in a 'new land' that they consolidated a 'new nation' with a 'new unifying name'. From Victoria West there were a First Trek (Voortrek), a Main Trek (Hooftrek) and various subsequent treks (see Map 1). Nienaber (1989:687) specifies that the First Trek was made up from the Kats, that is, the !Hoän, the Bitterbosch, that is, the !Gumtena and the Sorcerers, that is, the !Geixa !eis. This combined group migrated from the Brak River past Carnavon and Victoria West and south from the confluence of the Gariep and the Vaal rivers into the Northern Cape. From there they migrated along the Vaal up to Warrenton and Fourteen Streams and then made Campbell, Pniel, Delportshoop and Riverton their dwelling places (Kies, 1972:31-32).

Maingard (1964:59), however, believes that the Kats and Sorcerers left at a later stage. According to him the Swartvolk (the ‘dark people’ or the ‘black people’), that is, the #Nu: !eis, split into the Right Hands or the Kx?am ?oákwa and the Sorcerers who settled at Brandewynsfontein on the Riet River. The Sorcerers were later forced to retreat to the Modder River and then settled at the Platberg (Mothlanawapitse), north of Warrenton on the Vaal River. Later on they were joined by the Right Hands.

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36 It is not possible to accept Nienaber’s (1989) view uncritically because of historical facts as well as the impossibility of ethnogenesis occurring overnight.
Returning to the interior

The Main Trek would have consisted primarily of the Taabosch and the Left Hand Korana (or the ǁRɛbeis, or the ǁAremã†is) factions. I summarise the different views on what course the Main Trek followed.

- Ross (1975:563) believes that it was possibly a passage from the Cape across the Sak River and Hartbees River valley of the Hantam and Karreeberg Mountain to the Gariep.
- Leśniewski (2010:12) is convinced that the Gorachouqua consciously retreated to their kin, the Einiqua, who occupied the islands beyond the Augrabies Falls, between Kakamas and Upington, from the middle to the late eighteenth century (cf also Nienaber 1989:326; Penn 2005:160; Hart 2003:4).
- Based on information from Massouw Rijt Taabosch in 1869, Penn (1995:44) and Maingard (1932a:109) accept that the Gorachouqua fled into the Hottentots Holland Mountains, and from there to the Goup, through the Nuweveld Mountains, to Spitzkop and then, finally, up the course of the Great Brak River.
- The Gorachouqua, according to Parsons (2011:5), first sought shelter with the Inqua on the Camdeboo plains south of the Sneeuberg Mountain range where Eikomo (or Et’komo, that is, Kora’s son succeeding him as chief) was killed by an elephant.
- Strauss (1979:2) maintains that Eikomo and his followers were driven to the Brak River from where they proceeded northward until they reached the Gariep. Here they came upon Bushmen and obtained the lands around Klaarwater (Griquatown) where they settled (cf also Buys 1989:17; Van Tonder 1952:149).
- Stow (1905:298) claims that the Gorachouqua reached the Gariep in about 1750 under the leadership of ‘Knou-bib Taabosch.37 Nienaber (1989:688) mentions that Wikar came across the Gorachouqua and the Goringhaiqua in 1779 at Kheis, near Groblershoop, on the Gariep.

The descriptions supplied by these writers do not have much in common apart from agreeing that the movement was predominately northerly and westerly, and that the groups reached the Gariep at different points. From Sanddrift the Main Trek passed along the Gariep in an easterly direction and they arrived in the

37 Should one accept that ‘Knou-bib took over as leader after the murder of ‘Kun’ap-soop by the Barolong, this would imply that the latter had been genealogical the senior of the two and could not be the son of Kora’s third wife Gaauw-Gauw as Maingard (1932a:154) alleges.
vicinity of Prieska. From here the Gorachouqua took different routes and settled in different places. The groups of the Lower Gariep areas; the Springbok or Kúbêku, the Hoogstanders or Kurin Kêiku, the Hartebeest or Kama-xaku and the Pampiers or Kaniku diverged into the regions of Olijvenhoutsdrift (Upington), Kakamas and Keimoes.\(^{38}\) The Taalbosch and Left Hand Korana factions made their way along the Gariep in an easterly direction and they reached the Harts River between 1796 and 1804 (Maingard 1932a:59) from where they went further up north to Bloemhof, Christiana and Mamusa, on the Harts River (Kies 1972:31-32). At that time the only inhabitants of this region were the Bushmen.\(^{39}\) The elderly informants Engelbrecht (1928:3) interviewed in the 1920s – and of whom one was judged to be older than 100 years – were adamant about it that the Gorachouqua had settled here before any white or African people did.

Other groups also followed later, such as the Scorpions or Hu:-kx?ein who settled east of Dithakong and later at Barkly West, the Hippopotamuses or !Xau-ǁeis who lived in Riverton, and the Buffelbout Korana who settled at Rietfontein on the Modder River (Kies 1972:31-32; Engelbrecht 1936:52).

**The interior**

After the initial northward migration of the Gorachouqua various other groups and individuals such as fugitives and convicts, runaway slaves, people of mixed origin,

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\(^{39}\) According to Liebenberg (1990:2) the Bushmen inhabited this area about 35 000 year ago. Tools of stone, dating from the Early Stone Age, as well as a great variety of paintings and engravings on rocks found in the vicinity of Mamusa are presented as proof to the fact. Although the presence of stone tools does not necessarily prove the presence of people speaking Khoesan languages, it is generally accepted that before land was occupied by the Boers the interior of Southern Africa had already been inhabited for centuries by the ancestors of the Khoe-San. While contemporary researchers are apparently beginning to assign an age of only around 2000 years to South African rock art (Bonneau et al 2011:419–428), the high concentration of rock art to be found in this area confirms that this was a place of importance to the Khoe-San on a ritual and social level; its importance cannot only be attributed to available resources and a strategic location.
The interior

(farmer-hunters or emigrant farmers) followed. The interaction between these groups and individuals resulted in an anarchist, loose society characterised by large-scale mixing and blending as well as the development of a rather uniform lifestyle. Within this context the Korana emerged and one should guard against an essentialist conception of them as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous entity.

The lifestyle on the northern frontier of the Cape Colony

The absence of any government on the northern frontier of the Cape created a region where various groups could occupy territory indiscriminately. A turbulent and reckless population was established here and the entire northern frontier of the Cape Colony erupted in violence (Marks 1981:19). The colonial government applied desperate measures in an attempt to close the northern border by controlling the trade in firearms. However, the illegal trade in firearms flourished and, together with liquor, the illegal weapons penetrated deeper into the northern frontier region. The availability of firearms and horses, together with the doubtful commando system, had a disruptive effect on the region with regard to the manner in which disputes were settled. These elements also made an impact on the control of trade routes and resources; they determined how wealth was gained and led to the destruction of the ecology as different game species, so important to the lifestyle of the indigenous groups, were killed off by the thousands. Naturally, all of this had a detrimental effect on the existence and lifestyle of the indigenous groups. And, in

40 Van Schoor’s (1947:2) opinion that the Trans-Gariep was uninhabited except for a couple of insignificant Bushman tribes (‘n paar Boesmanstammetjies) is incorrect.

41 This region is described very aptly by authors like Legassick (1990:379–386) and Leśniewski (2010:14) as the ‘firearm frontier’.

42 Guelke & Shell (1992:13) point out that the commando system was implemented as early as 1715 and it was, according to Adhikari (2010:39), the main institution of military force at the Cape under Dutch rule as well as the main instrument of war against the Khoe-San. It was, however, also a form of social organisation, a hegemonic tool used by local elite groups; it was a means of redistribution of goods and a way of forcing captured women and children into labour on settler farms.

43 From the Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette (Vol. XXII (1110), 8 February 1872) one gets an impression of the scale on which game were systematically destroyed in the Free State. During 1871, for example, 174 340 hides of antelope, quagga and wildebeest were exported from Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal) alone.
this whole scenario, it was especially the Trek Boers who played a significant role.\textsuperscript{44} They introduced new forms of technology and methods of economic exploitation as well as alien concepts of exclusive access to land, individual landownership and sovereignty. And all of this changed the ecological, demographic, political, social, economic and cultural situation to the north of the Cape Colony drastically. The arrival of the Trek Boers intensified competition for limited resources as the country to the south and north of the Gariep always had a very unstable rainfall and sparse vegetation. There were bitter disputes over conflicting land claims, confusing land transactions, hunting and grazing rights, water sources and trade between them and the still increasing number of Trek Boers.\textsuperscript{45} The Trek Boers’ superior military technology allowed them to control the scarce permanent water supplies and to usurp the best grazing. As nomadic cattle herders and hunters, the Gorachouqua were, for example, no longer able to practice their traditional cyclical, seasonal use of territory and they were systematically forced to move yet further northward and westward. It is unmistakably true that, prior to the establishment of the Dutch settlement at the Cape, the Gorachouqua had never experienced anything like this.

The different groups living in this frontier area had much in common in terms of material culture, artefacts and social usages. Anderson (1888:62), for example, remarks as follows about his visit to the Griqua leader Nicolas Waterboer: ‘Waterboer lived in a nice house, well furnished, and the family live respectably as any Boer family’. Penn (1995:45) and Ross (1975:562) also both emphasise the

\textsuperscript{44} Unlike the Voortrekkers, who left the Cape Colony because of political reasons, the Trek Boers left because of economic reasons (cf Frere 1889:225; Van Schoor 1950:xiv). As was propagated later with respect to the supposed consequences of the difaqane (see Chapter 4), the Trek Boers also preferred to view the northern frontier of the Cape as uninhabited, that is, territory that could be seized and dealt with at will (Guelke & Shell 1992:804). Initially their lifestyle was nomadic, but permanent structures were erected later and they settled permanently. There were no central or local government structures, no educational or ecumenical institutions and the civil magistrate of Colesberg was the sole link with the Cape government.

\textsuperscript{45} According to Van Schoor (1950:xiii) the estimated number of Trek Boers in the Trans-Gariep was about 200 families, that is, about 2 000 individuals in all in 1832. Cf also Keegan (1987:193–192), Legassick (1990:376), Deacon (1997:10) and Ouzman (2005:102).
fundamental similarity of lifestyle of the communities in the Trans-Gariep and I quote the latter with regard to the indigenous peoples:

In the fluid situation of the interior of South Africa in the nineteenth century, anyone who chose a roving, raiding mode of existence, as opposed, for instance, to the more settled, mission-influenced life of the Griquas or the Bastards, was likely to be called a ‘Korana’ regardless of his ancestry.

Leśniewski (2010:20-23) treats the same subject and argues that the Korana people could not be singled out as being responsible for wreaking all the havoc and destruction in the Trans-Gariep, despite their having clearly led a raiding mode of existence. It must be taken into account that, in the light of the ecological factors referred to earlier, the agricultural practices of these communities were insufficient for their subsistence. This can thus be seen as an additional reason for all of them to raid communities for cattle and apprentices or slaves to sell to farmers in the Cape Colony, or for them to barter these commodities for firearms.46

By 1786 the Korana communities living along the Gariep were in possession of firearms which were acquired through bartering twelve heads of cattle for a gun from Boers and traders. Illegal firearm peddlers such as Coenraad Bezuidenhout, Cobus Vry, Gerrit Coetzee and Coenraad de Buys were actively trading in the interior (cf Buys 1989:27; Maggs 1971:57-58; Beddy 2007:62). The horse replaced the ox to ride on and the remarkable swiftness of the Korana raiders on horseback became their hallmark during raiding expeditions (cf Engelbrecht 1928:4; Atmore et al 1971:545-546; Schapera 1965:300, 353-355; Giliomee 1973:7).47 The adoption of guns and horses gave them a considerable

46 While the impression is that it was often the Bushmen who were at the receiving end of these raids, the opposite was also true. Bushman bands, mounted and armed – and these did not exclude multiracial or multi-ethnic members – were at the order of the day (Guenther 1980:134-135; Engelbrecht 1937:14). One of the best documented cases on the history of the Bushmen who, in the nineteenth century, made their living in the Kwazulu-Natal Drakensberg Mountain and adjacent highlands through a combination of hunting, gathering, herding, raiding and trading, is the study by Wright (2007:119-129).

47 Ouzman (2005:104-109) is therefore not surprised that the horse, often represented with a rider is a ‘signature motif’ in Korana rock art and he remarks that some riders have ‘a thin horizontal line proceeding from their shoulders that may represent a gun’. He argues that these examples of rock art exuded a ‘magical militantism’
advantage over other indigenous communities such as the Batlhaping and in the process effectively blocked any further southern Sotho-Tswana migration. The Korana were no longer a fugitive horde, but a progressive and formidable polity of hunter-herdsmen and they made an enormous impact on the central parts of Southern Africa. The Korana bands were in fact at the zenith of their power in the 1820s in the Trans-Gariep region. But by the 1830s the growing presence of the other groups in the region initiated the decline of the domination of the Korana.  

Because of the discovery of coal in the Trans-Gariep in 1840, the British government decided in 1845 to place the region under English rule through the proclamation of the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act and Captain H.D. Warden was appointed as British Resident. This brought about a more ordered and stable region although the Korana people would still play a significant role in the actions and events in the Trans-Gariep for a number of years.

To summarise, while it is difficult to distinguish the lifestyle of the Korana from those of the other groups who also roamed the Trans-Gariep – all these groups practised raiding – it was the Korana who were singled out and labelled as the ‘bad and wicked tribe’ (Anderson 1888:85).

Miscegenation

It is important to note that the Gorachouqua of the Cape, while they were an important constituent of the Korana, cannot be equated with the Korana of the interior. The two groups were different entities. According to Marks (1972:77), Stow (1905:241) and Maingard (1932a:111) the different fragments of the Gorachouqua, Goringhaiqua and the Cochoqua who left the Cape became mixed, but also mixed with a number of other groupings along the Gariep, and the Korana people were the result of this mixing. It is not possible to identify when exactly the transition took place and this fact somewhat problematises the use of terminology and labels in previous sections. There were socio-cultural factors which could have encouraged miscegenation, such as the practice of clan exogamy, the loose social organisation of the peoples from whom the Korana people descended, the openness characterising these societies which predisposed them to welcoming others and, finally, the fact that

and that it was a way of consolidating Korana identity in the very specific frontier conditions of colonial South Africa.

48 Warden was the British Resident of the Orange River Sovereignty from 1848 – 1852.
the separate communities were small in number, unstable, and incapable of unity for any length of time (cf Marks 1972:77; Waldman 2007:164; Strauss 1979:13).

Considerable mixing of the Korana and Bushman peoples took place; so much so that there is an appellation for their offspring as a separate group: the so-called Korana Bushmen (Oosthuizen 1991(a):1). As regards the miscegenation of the Kats Korana and the Bushmen, Engelbrecht (1937:13) maintains that it led to two groups of Bushmen, the Bitterbosch or Bastard Bushmen and those who were ‘not bitter’ (Kx?au-tama-ǁ?eis). While it is not clear why Engelbrecht (1937) links race to ethnicity, he views this last group as a tribe because of their relative pureness (ǁ?eis) and he refers to the first group only through the use of the undetermined plural suffix n(a). Other Korana groups who mixed considerably with the Bushmen are the Sorcerers and the Right Hands (Engelbrecht 1937:13).

While Korana men often had Bushman wives the opposite seems to have been a rare occurrence although the reason is unclear (cf Ellenberger 1992:308; Strauss 1979:19; Engelbrecht 1937:16). It is known that Bushman males were used as herdsmen, messengers and magical practitioners when they were taken prisoner, but it is not clear if they were seen and treated as subordinates (cf Engelbrecht 1936:68-73; Marks 1972:61; Ouzman 2005:110). Engelbrecht (1936:70) maintains that the Left Hand Korana took in Bushman children who were kidnapped as family and not as slaves or servants, but Wadley (2001:158) disagrees. Nevertheless, we do know that, while there had been Bushmen among the Korana people of Mamusa, they did not keep slaves and that the Korana society was not characterised by a strict hierarchical stratification (cf Bailie 1883:4). This limits chances of Bushman men being incorporated as lower-class members.

49 They have also been identified on three different occasions by informants as the Sonsitters (those who sit in the sun). This last label is somewhat derogatory and has been employed by Setswana-speaking informants each time.

50 Mr Josiah Kats of the Korana Royal House, Kimberley, whose mother was a Bitterbosch Bushman confirms the close association between the Bitterbosch Bushmen and the Korana, but he claims they never gave up their Bushman heritage. According to him the blood of the Bushmen women that were raided by the Korana men turned bitter due to a curse of the Bushmen to prevent the Korana men from living together in peace with their stolen wives.

51 The male Bushmen, for example, like elsewhere (cf Wadley 2001:154), had horses and firearms at their disposal.
Thus, one cannot necessarily conclude that it would have involved a possible loss of social status for Korana women should they have married Bushmen.

Another group with whom there was considerable mixing, was the Einiqua (also Eynicquoa or Eynikkoa). Wikar (in Mossop 1935:21) said that the Einiqua were the ‘people of the river’ and that ‘Eyn’ was the name for the Gariep (cf also Lange 2006:373). The nucleus of the Einiqua was made up of the ǂOxoku (also called the Aukokoa, Cochoqua or Smalwange, that is, the Hollow cheeks) of Kanoneiland under Gert Ruyters, the ǂNamniku (also called the Namnykoa or Karosdraers, that is, the Kaross wearers) of Paardeneiland under Cupido Pofadder and the!Kaon (also called the Kaukoa or Snyers, that is, the Cutters) of Skanskopeiland under Jan Kievdo. There were a great number of Bushmen among the Einiqua. Nienaber (1989:326) describes the relation between the Bushmen and the Einiqua as solid. Intermarriage took place and the Bushmen depended on the Einiqua whom they served as herders, soldiers and servants. The Einiqua kept livestock, lived in one geographic area and there was a degree of ‘managerial cohesion’, to translate from Nienaber (1989:326). Sixty years after R.J. Gordon and Wikar visited them in 1779, the Einiqua had, in all probability, already been absorbed by the Korana and stopped existing as a separate group.

Due to physical assimilation and association the composition of the frontier communities changed all the time. Thus their composition was fluid and there was no ethnic or racial homogeneity. Penn (1995:35), for example, describes the Namaqualand and Gariep as ‘the crucible where different races were mixed’, while Lange (2006:372) maintains that it was the rule rather than the exception for Boers in the Namaqualand and Gariep areas to take Nama women as their wives.52 The following statement of Anderson (1888:51) about the Korana people also confirms that there was a gradual assimilation of these groups as a result of intermarriage or sexual relations between them: ‘[M]any of the younger ones [are] almost white and with rather pleasing countenances’. Anderson (1888:51) also remarks as follows: ‘I know of several other similar cases [interracial marriages],

52 Compare also Marks (1981:20). Some Afrikaner academics, however, disagree with the viewpoint that is put forward by the authors quoted here. Van Dyk (1955:2), for example, writes that the Hottentots were so uncivilised and such a ‘dirty’ race that the Boers always had a great loathing for them. Mixing from the side of the Boers would thus be highly improbable to his mind. Coertze (1983:135) voices a similar opinion.
and most of the Transvaal Boers are of this breed’ (cf also Strauss 1979:18; Van Onselen 1990:107).

Cultural interchange and social dominance also took place. Legassick (1990:242) points out that, in the case of the Griquas for example, the political dimension of their identity, that is, identification based on allegiance to a Griqua chief, or membership of a Griqua polity, facilitated the accommodation of ‘outsiders’ as Griqua. Many individuals who were not born Griqua would have been incorporated first as Griqua dependants and later as full members of the group. Many individuals who moved into Griqua polities for the sake of the sanctuary provided by such polities also tended to become full members of the group. For example, by 1804 the leading men of Griquatown were Griqua, while it is certain that Korana people formed the bulk of the community (Warren 1880:8). In 1813 it was estimated that there were 1 266 Griqua in Griquatown and its outposts, and 1 341 Korana ‘who consider[ed] themselves connected with [the] Griquas, for the sake of protection’ (Campbell 1974:256). People such as these Korana tended to develop a Griqua identity on the basis of their association with the Griqua in the settlement and their identification with the polity.

To summarise, Korana identity developed gradually in the interior and it changed continuously. Writers such as Legassick (1990:374) and Ouzman (2005:102) emphasise that the dynamics in the central interior of Southern Africa was such during the last part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century that it is impossible to relate political groupings among the Khoe-San of this time with their earlier political history in an unambiguous fashion. Penn (2005:163-164) sees the label ‘Korana’ as somewhat of a ‘catch-all’ term used to describe a diversity of fragmented peoples of predominantly Khoekhoe origin who had been severely dislocated by the expansion of the colonial frontier.

In his inaugural lecture Engelbrecht (1937) attributes the ‘disappearance’ of the Korana to their mixing with, first, the Bushmen and, subsequently, with the Batlhaping and the Barolong. My understanding of the history, however, is that the Korana were precisely the crystallisation of this mixture of peoples. In other words, miscegenation was not the cause of the disappearance of the Korana people, but it was in fact their genesis.
Korana modalities

Where language is concerned, Maingard (1964:60-66) identifies two distinct Korana dialectal entities. The eastern dialect (Kx?am ḃākwa) was spoken in the S.A.R. and the O.F.S. and it includes the Bloemhof and Left Hand dialect (Aremän ṛeis). The western dialect (Oxoku, Namniku and !Kaon) was spoken by the Einiqua of the Lower Gariep region. The latter, because of the close relationship between the Einiqua and their Nama neighbours, has some important features which link it with Khoekhoegoawab, but was nevertheless essentially Korana. The division that Wikar makes between the Einiqua and the Korana people on social grounds is thus in Maingard’s opinion (1964:66) fully vindicated on the basis of linguistic evidence. The Nama, Einiqua and Korana people living along the Gariep belonged to the same broad language family and the Einiqua had affinities with the Nama as well as with the Korana people.

The different entities found among the Korana were classified as the Kei (Great) Korana or the Little Korana. There is, however, no agreement among writers as to who should be placed in which category. Stow (1905:298) regards the Taaibosch Korana as being the Great Korana and the Left Hand as the Little Korana. He alleges that the ancient name of the Great Korana signified ‘sorcerer’, that all other groups sprang from the Sorcerers and that the name of their paramount chief was Taaibosch (Stow 1905:294). Nienaber (1989:425), however, accepts with reasonable certainty that the name of the fifth great-grandson of Kora, chief Gon-naap, (see genealogical chart) is the same as the Korana word for the plant Passerina filiformis, and this plant is called the taaibos in Afrikaans. In addition to the plant’s medicinal value, the tough bark was also used for binding purposes. Marais (1968:275-278), Engelbrecht (1936:3-7) and Maingard (1932a:114-120) accept Stow’s (1905) explication and identifies the Taaibosch Korana as the Great Korana and the Left Hand Korana as the Little Korana based on genealogical considerations.

Initially Parsons (2011:5) identified the Great Korana as consisting of the Left Hand and the Right Hand Korana. But a little later on he mentions that the Great Korana consisted of the Taaibosch and Left Hand Korana (Parsons 2011:12). Penn (2005:163) refers to the Great Korana as the Right Hand Korana and to the Left Hand Korana as the Little Korana. In another publication, however, he voices the opinion that it is very likely that the Little Korana were not the Left Hand Korana, but in fact the Einiqua that had been partially absorbed into the loose associations of the intrusive Great Korana (Penn 1995:45). To him it is
reasonable to assume that the Little Korana were that branch of the Korana people who did not migrate either to or from the Cape, but who remained at the Gariep. He also mentions that all traditions of migration came from the Great Korana and that no such traditions were found among the Little Korana (Penn 1995:163).

According to Nienaber (1989:691-698) different groups were known as the Little and the Great Korana during the Cape period and during the time of the Trans-Gariep. To complicate things, Lye (1970:113) and Lye and Murray (1980:40) use the labels the Bolanders for those who reached the Gariep first and the Ondervelders for those who arrived later to distinguish between the different Korana groups. It is evident why Barnard (1992:165) would remark that the different terminologies contribute to the confusion with regard to the origin and make-up of the Korana people. And, as with other aspects concerning the Korana people, it is not likely that consensus will be reached.

Quarrels about water and grazing, women, livestock and the weak national bond of the Korana groups led to various instances of fragmentation and division. By the 1850s there were, according to Tobias (1955:263) and Schapera (1965:47), about 17 different groups among the Korana people, whereas Nienaber (1989:688-690) maintains that there could have been anything between four and thirty factions. Grobbelaar (1957:203) is of the opinion that each of these groups accounted for at least 200 individuals. Barnard (1992:165), Buys (1989:33), Stow, (1905:295) and Engelbrecht (1936:55) identify the following groups as the most important ones in the 1820s: the Cloetses, the Left Hands, the Right Hands, the Kats, the Springboks, the Scorpions, the Pampiers (Papers), the Karosdraers (Kaross wearers), the Afrikanders, the Sorcerers, the Slaparms (Weak arms), the Bitterbosch and the Taabosch Korana.

It is not possible to give a satisfactory etymological account of each name. Sometimes names refer to specific skills; the Karosdraers and the Kats Korana made themselves clothes from the skins of wild cats and other animals. Some names, such as the Smalwange (Hollow Cheeks), Hoogstanders (‘the proud people’), Swartvolk (the ‘dark people’ or the ‘black people’), refer to prominent physical characteristics. Then again, when parties split up they sometimes assumed the name of their leader or, as is the case with the Hartebeest, they were named after a place where they lived for some time. Finally, names can have an anecdotal significance such as in the case of the Buffelbout Korana who are the descendants of a man who had a close encounter with a buffalo and who sustained a thigh wound during the unfortunate incident (Engelbrecht 1936:52).
The exact socio-political nature of the above-mentioned divisions is not always clear. Whereas Budack (1972:249-251) sees a clear distinction between the concept of a tribe (ǂHaos) and a clan (ǂHao-ǂnati), Engelbrecht (1936:2-7) views the term ǁís as vague and maintains that it can be applied to refer to a clan, a tribal division or a tribe itself. The distinction between tribe and clan is therefore problematic. Elphick (1977:44-45) deals with the same issue and according to him Khoekhoe political units were unstable; societies were in a state of constant flux; and names could change more than once. Given this situation, he concludes that it would be futile to try to employ the concepts tribe and clan with anthropological precision.

In this book I will regard the various factions of the Taibosch family, such as those under David Massouw, Jan Taibosch II and Gert Taibosch, as different political entities with discrete hegemonic powers. Succession of leadership was hereditary while underlying kinship ties, associations and shared aspirations defined them. The followers of David Massouw, for example, consisted of related and non-related residents. The latter group included mainly Bushmen and Sotho-Tswana descendants, but we will see that these non-related residents associated them to such a degree with the fate of the Korana people in their opposition to the Boers that they would finally fight on the same side as the Korana people.

Nienaber (1989:677) is convinced that it is a case here of people who displayed a Korana ‘awareness’ and who saw themselves as a ‘separate unity’. If this had been a clear-cut truth, it would have been much easier to characterise the Korana people and the many confusions about them would be easy to put aside. The outline of the literature given above clearly problematises claims that there was a ‘separate unity’ and it confirms the futility of reaching clarity or agreement on many issues.

The community at Mamusa

Massouw Rijt Taibosch and his people encountered the first Wesleyan missionaries as early as circa 1822 (Krüger 1972:452). After Jan Taibosch II and the Wesleyan missionary T. Jenkins moved to the O.F.S. (See Chapter 3) in 1833, Massouw Rijt Taibosch visited Robert Moffat in 1834 and again early in 1835, or perhaps in early 1836, in Kuruman. On the insistence of the Korana leader Moffat visited Mumusa end 1836. Because of the great distance between Kuruman and Mamusa, Moffat’s colleague, P. Lemue, of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (P.E.M.S.) was appointed to minister to the spiritual needs of this settlement from 1845. In March 1845 he reported that 250 people attended services in Mamusa. By
1846 the congregation had between 200 and 300 members. Under the leadership of Massouw Rijt Taibosch a temporary church was built with reeds in the settlement and plans were made to build a permanent church building. There is no certainty as to whether these plans ever went ahead.

Liebenberg (1990:18) sees a definite link between Massouw Rijt Taibosch’s positive attitude towards Christianity and the religious fervour among the Korana people of the time. The same is said of David Massouw, Jan Taibosch II and Gert Taibosch, and their influence over the Korana people (cf Parsons 2011:15; Mears 1979:21). This view is in stark contrast to the generalisation of Wuras (1929:291) that the Korana could not be converted, as well as Van Aswegen’s (1993:230) statement that ‘the Korana did not have much affinity for Christianity and were more interested in the material advantages they could get from the coming of the missionaries’. It is true, though, that the followers of Massouw Rijt Taibosch did not all share his enthusiasm and the missionary Backhouse (1844:461) reported that many of his followers abandoned this Korana leader upon his conversion to Christianity.

Writers such as Elbourne (1992:4) are of the opinion that the earlier Khoekhoe communities in the Cape ‘made use of’ the Christian missions for political and economic reasons. Ross (1997(a):94) makes the observation that the speedy conversion of many Khoekhoe people was instigated by the fact that the missions’ version of Christianity provided them with certainties and a dignity they were denied as servants on Boer farms. It is further interesting to note that the indigenous groups of Southern Africa often procured firearms with the go-between of missionaries. In fact, it was apparently often a condition that missionaries had to obtain firearms for the indigenous groups from a given area before they were allowed to do their mission work there (Dachs 1972:648; Comaroff & Comaroff 1986:3). It is also said that the missionaries were seen as a kind of talisman against attacks by Mzilikazi during the difaqane (Parsons 2011:18). Nevertheless, no such motives could be found in the case of Massouw Rijt Taibosch’s conversion.

It must be taken into account that legislation in the S.A.R. and the O.F.S. prohibited the possession of firearms by indigenous peoples (Atmore et al 1971:547; Besant 1880:2).

It is common knowledge, for example, that Moshweshwe invited missionaries to Lesotho in the expectation that they would be able to stem the devastating raids of the ‘marauding’ Korana. See Chapter 4 for more about the difaqane.
The settlement of Mamusa was on the west bank of the Harts River (see Map 3). The Harts River, a very important artery to the indigenous peoples and their way of life, has, according to Stow (1905:181), been given the following three different names. 'Kolong' is the name that was given to the Lower Harts, the middle section was known as the 'Hhou' and the upper part, where Mamusa was located, as the Malalarene. A number of explanations are given to explain what the name of the settlement on the Upper Harts River means. Some sources say 'Mamusa' is a tree name while others maintain it is an imitation of the sound of wind going through reeds. Then, Bester and Van Eeden (1999:413) are of the opinion that it is a compound and flexion of the words Mansa Musa. With mansa meaning king, the name is taken to refer to the Malay ruler King Musa.

Informants, on the other hand, explain that the name Mamusa is of Tswana origin and derives from mma (noun = mother) + amusa (verb = to breastfeed). Two accounts of which the details differ slightly are given to support the case for this as the true origin of the settlement's name. First, because the Taaibosch Korana could resist Mzilikazi’s attacks successfully (See Chapter 4), fugitives from the south-western part of the Transvaal sought refuge in Mamusa. For example, the Left Hand Korana fled there in 1829 and by 1836 various people of Sotho-Tswana descent had also found shelter there (Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:8; Du Plessis 1993:71-76; Liebenberg 1990:14). The Taaibosch Korana faction was particularly

55 Stow (1905:181) maintains that the first two names are of Bushman origin and the last is of Tswana origin. He uses the name ‘Kolong’ again on p. 213 and on p. 286, where he spells it without the apostrophe. However, ‘Kolong’ does not fit the typical profile of any !Ui word, while the Setswana Dictionary of Brown (1982:439) confirms that Kolong was indeed the Tswana name for the ‘Hartz River’. The word Hhou without the apostrophe is said to be Kora and not Bushman (Cambell 1974:236). Wikar recorded the name kamkoa for the ‘Harte River’, where the first part is interpreted by Engelbrecht as ŋxama ‘hartebeest’ (in Mossop 1935:18). The term kao may have been intended to represent the name ikaob given by Tabab for the ‘Hart’s River’ (Maingard 1932a:135).

56 In his description of the reed-flute ensembles of South Africa Kirby (1933:373) states that the reeds used by various Tswana groups to make their flutes were acquired from the Korana of Mamusa. While one can accept that there were reeds along the river, it is doubtful that the name Mamusa was derived from this fact.

57 Musa was an honoured Malay ruler of East Africa from 1312 to 1337 (Davidson 2003:100ff). This is the most improbable etymological explanation.
The community at Mamusa

wealthy and possessed many thousands of cattle (Bailie 1883:4). It enabled them to provide meat and milk to fugitives whose response to their generosity was, as the story goes, to say the place was like a mother breastfeeding her children. The idea of a ‘fertile earth’ with plenty of water and good grazing has also been brought up in interviews.

The second narrative tells about the Batlhaping chief Mahura and his followers who settled temporarily in Mamusa between 1846 and 1850. On their arrival he told his people to unharness and set up camp so that the mothers could breastfeed their children. The next day the women were told to have said: ‘Here we breastfed our children and the place must be called Mamusa.’ However, the place already had its name before Mahura and his company made it their stopover and this story cannot be seen as an authentic explanation.

The Mamusa section of the Taaibosch family first settled here under the leadership of Rijt Taaibosch between 1813 and 1820 (cf Krüger 1972:452; Maingard 1932a:121; Schapera 1965:47). Rijt Taaibosch was born in Griquatown and was the father of Massouw Rijt Taaibosch. The latter was born circa 1769 at Platberg, and passed away on 11 June 1878 to be succeeded by his son David Massouw (cf De Kock 1972:451; Lindley 1873:12; Liebenberg 1990:18). According to Engelbrecht (1936:39) the Korana name of Massouw Rijt Taaibosch often found in documents, that is, //Eiab, derives from //ei, meaning ugly.

Bailie (1878:287; 1883:4) writes that Massouw Rijt Taaibosch gathered a number of followers besides his own relatives and gradually spread his influence until he was regarded as head of all the Korana north of the Vaal River. He further mentions that Massouw Rijt Taaibosch exercised authority over about 5 000 followers in 1877, a number confirmed by Conder (1887:77). As has been mentioned before, the inhabitants of Mamusa, although predominately from Korana descent, were not homogenous.

The Korana polity of Mamusa underwent radical social, economic and structural transformation over time. Whereas their initial existence was that of nomadic herders, supplemented by foraging, they later established permanent settlements with various cattle posts, while they built up considerable wealth through raiding and trading ivory (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1 and Jacobs,
The Korana community at Mamusa also started to practise agriculture at some point and they had vast fields of cultivated land (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1 and TAB SS V1205-R1892-1886). They probably took over this practice through diffusion or acculturation from their Tswana neighbours with whom they were in close contact. One must keep in mind that the great number of Korana women who married into the Tswana communities had to accept the responsibility of practicing husbandry, in keeping with Tswana traditions. Thus, the new agricultural skills and knowledge these women acquired could have been passed on to their Korana relatives through their continued contact with them.

The Korana people’s relations with the Batlhaping and Barolong

The collective appellation ‘Tswana’ was framed in the context of colonial encounter; it is of relatively recent origin and largely reflects modern political and administrative convenience (Starfield 2008:45; Cornwell 1988:96; Humphreys 1998:23). Originally the Tswana people were thought to have originated from the area of the great lakes of East Africa and it was believed that they reached Southern Africa in three migratory movements during the 1300s and 1400s. Our current understanding of what is referred to as the ‘Bantu expansion’ has changed this idea considerably. Cornwell (1988:96), for example, writes as follows:

[T]raditional Tswana histories refer only to migrations over relatively short distances within the south-western Transvaal. It now seems more likely that the complex

58 The Korana and Tswana cattle owners kept their animals spread over great expanses of grazing at different cattle posts in order to limit the damage incurred as a consequence of raids.

59 The first of these migration groups supposedly consisted of the Kgalagadi and the Ghoa. But Schapera (1953:14) questions the supposed link between the first group and the Tswana, while the Ghoa disintegrated completely and were absorbed by other ethnic groups. The second migration group consisted of the Barolong tribal complex who settled on the Malopo River in the Mahikeng environment. When the Barolong state disintegrated between 1750 and 1800 various groupings consolidated to form entities such as the Batlhaping. The Bahurutshe-Bakwena who were also subdivided into various subgroups were the third group to migrate (cf Hailey 1950:24; Breutz 1955:17, 1959:30; Van Warmelo 1974:75-76; Ziervogel 1972:439).
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occurrences that resulted in the mixture of cultural and linguistic characteristics we now call Tswana, occurred for the most part on the Transvaal Highveld.

While the Tswana complex consisted of different chieftainships, it is only necessary to refer to the Batlhaping and the Barolong in the context of this book. The relationship between the Korana people and the Batlhaping is especially complex. There was always some or other alliance or bond between David Massouw and Mankuroane, chief of the Batlhaping at Taung, but the hang of the matter cannot be determined clearly.

The Korana made contact with the Batlhaping in their initial northerly and easterly migration in circa 1750 (Maingard 1932a:115). These groups lived together at Nokaneng, established extended trade relations and together they raided groups such as the Tswana chiefdom of Ngwaketse (TAB SS V1142-R6231, 1885:part 2; Lye & Murray 1980:41-42; Shillington 1987:17). 60 Jacobs (1999:352-353) expresses the view that the Batlhaping clans ‘were a cluster of dispersed Bantu-Khoisan clients whose autonomy as a single chiefdom dates only from the disintegration of the Rolong state’. Massouw Rijt Taibosch (in Lindley 1873:11) himself once described the identity of the Batlhaping as ‘a mixture between Barolong and Bushmen’ and, in his eyes, they could consequently ‘claim no distinct nationality’. Coming from Massouw Rijt Taibosch this remark is somewhat strange, for the Korana themselves mixed freely with the Bushmen while it was no secret that there was intermarriage between themselves and the Batlhaping. 61

The relationship that was established between the Korana and the Batlhaping as a consequence of this blending was such a close one that their offspring were known as the twin people, that is, as ‚Gesikwa (Engelbrecht in Mossop 1935:222; Maingard 1964:57). Maingard further points out that the Batlhaping’s name for the Korana was Bakxoto (or Bagothu). The use of the plural prefix ba in this word apparently indicates that the Korana were viewed as a kindred people and not as strangers; outsiders were identified by the used of the singular prefix le. 62 According

60 While trade expanded considerably in order to meet the needs and demands of white people, it was in no way an unknown concept among the indigenous peoples of the Highveld (Manson 1992:88).

61 I shall explore Massouw Rijt Taibosch’s remark in Chapter 9 more completely.

62 According to Batlhaping-informants, Bagothu is a derogatory term used by Tswana people to refer to the Khoekhoe. Brown’s Setswana Dictionary (1982:14) however, gives Bakgotu or Bakgoto as meaning simply ‘people of the Korana race’ without
to Humphreys (1998:20-21) and Buys (1989:27), the Korana, in turn, called the Batlhaping Briqua, the goat people, (bri means goat) as it was the Batlhaping who had first introduced them to goats.63

Apparently, the Batlhaping chiefs had a predilection for taking Korana brides and various marriages between Batlhaping chiefs and Korana women were concluded (Engelbrecht 1936:77; Stow 1905:297). When a section of the Batlhaping under Mahura, the third son of Molehabangwe, for example, left Seoding at Kuruman in about 1830 and settled at Taung in 1839, he married a daughter of Massouw Rijt Taaibosch and became his son-in-law (Du Plessis 1993:32). Mahura’s grandfather, Mashwe, also married a Korana woman by whom he had Molehabangwe. The latter had a Korana woman as his ‘great’ or first wife, and she bore him Mothibi and Molale. Mothibi also married a Korana woman, Kegogile (Shilllington 2011:14), who gave him the son Jantje Mothibi, the father of Luka Jantje (Du Plessis 1993:32 and Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:36).

Engelbrecht’s (1936:78) explanation for the Batlhaping’s predilection for Korana women is quite revealing. The Batlhaping, after suffering several defeats against the Korana, apparently came to regard their adversaries as exceptionally brave and the Batlhaping reasoned that, through marriage with Korana women, their descendants would have the same good qualities as the Korana people.

Tobais (1955:267) concludes on the basis of genetic analyses that it was less common for Korana men to marry Batlhaping women. Engelbrecht (1937:17) reasons that the Korana men initially disapproved of Batlhaping women, although he does not explain on what grounds this would be. It was supposedly only through social interaction and through the conclusion of alliances between the two groups that it became acceptable for Korana men to take Batlhaping women

any suggestion of a derogatory connotation. The Tswana people also used the term Masarwa to refer to speakers of Khoesan languages. ‘Basarwa’ is the official designation for the Bushman in Botswana and, according to Guenther (1977:2), the Bushmen were still regarded as servants of the Tswana in some areas of Botswana in the 1970s.

63 The appellation ‘Batlhaping’ itself derives from specific circumstances when drought forced this group of people to eat fish. While the fish is generally regarded as the totem of the Batlhaping because of this historic occurrence, Pauw (1955:1) points out that it is actually not all Batlhaping who identify with this totem. Apparently, some of them regard the kudu, the totem of the Barolong, also as theirs and, in so doing, they acknowledge the fact that they once formed a single tribe.
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as brides. Jacobs (1999:354) expresses the idea of a gradual transition in how these communities viewed each other when he says that

*communities on both sides of the frontier were consolidating and conforming to cultural standards, and that especially the Batlhaping, as a young chiefdom, was still coming into conformity with Sotho-Tswana patterns in general.*

The process of ‘coming into conformity with Sotho-Tswana patterns’ naturally did influence the social stratification of the Batlhaping. According to Conder (1887:82, 89-90) the Batlhaping society was divided into four social classes (*cf* also Bailie 1883:3; Holub 1881:10). The chief and the wealthy and influential class consisting of his sons and councillors (usually relatives) were on the same level. Then followed the agricultural population living in towns, then the herdsmen at the cattle posts and, lastly, the lowest level of the society was made up by the *Makalahari* – the slaves.

At the end of the 18th century conflicting trade interests destroyed the peaceful relations between the Batlhaping and the Korana. The Korana nearly exterminated the Batlhaping and drove them from their settlement at Nokaneng out to Dikgathong in the Kuruman valley (TAB SS V1142-R6231 1885:part 2; Lye & Murray 1980:42; Language 1942:124; Legassick 1990:376-377). In 1816 Mothibi, the successor of Molehabangwe, was persuaded by the missionary Read to remove his capital to a more suitable site near the Kuruman River which was called New Lattakoo. Mothibi and a part of the Batlhaping left Kuruman in 1829 or thereabouts to settle at the confluence of the Vaal and Great Riet rivers, while his uncle Lephoi went on to the O.F.S. Jantje, one of his sons settled at Dikgathhong and another son, Gasebone, settled at Phokwane (Van Aswegen 1971:77; Pauw 1955:2-4). Molale the first-born son from the second house of Molehabangwe (*Imperial Blue Book* C.-4889, 1886:36) remained at Kuruman. His eldest son, Mankuroane, was still a minor when a lion killed Molale in *circa* 1826 and Mahura the younger brother of Molale, became regent for the young Mankuroane (Language 1942:126). Not long after, Mahura and the majority of the Batlhaping left Kuruman to settle along the northern banks of the Vaal River from the point of its junction with the Harts River in a south-easterly direction at Taung (Arnot & Orpen 1875:189; De Jager 1994:5). According to Stow (1905:300), Taung was then under Korana occupation under the chieftainship of ’Knoubib (Jan Taabosch I) and it was with his permission that several large kraals of
Batlhaping settled in the same area. In a letter addressed to President T.F. Burgers of the S.A.R., Massouw Rijt Taibosch, together with Johannes Links and their councillors, said that it was the Korana who had given the Batlhaping permission to establish themselves there (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Mahura’s opinion that the whole Harts River area belonged to the Batlhaping and that he ruled over the Korana (Engelbrecht 1936:39) is incorrect. His action to establish himself in 1846 for about four years in Mamusa was in all probability a calculated attempt to expand his territory. However, his action forced the Korana to leave Mamusa temporarily and to roam the area between Sterkfontein, near Bloemhof, and Zendelingsfontein, between Klerksdorp and Wolmaransstad. In 1861 the relationship between the Korana and the Batlhaping deteriorated further when Massouw Rijt Taibosch confiscated cattle that belonged to Mahura who was, as has been said, also his son-in-law. Although Krüger (1972:452) describes the relationship between father- and son-in-law as cordial, Mahura threatened to kill Massouw Rijt Taibosch over the cattle incident. The threats were taken seriously as is testified by a letter to Nicolas Waterboer in which Massouw Rijt Taibosch bemoaned his lot. ‘From then on,’ writes Parsons (2011:14), ‘the tensions between the two tribes grew until it led to a war later’.

When Mahura died in 1869 after a reign of 40 years, Mankuroane succeeded him and ruled for 23 years until his death in 1892. He was succeeded by his son Molala (Bourne 1898:7). During the 1880s the number of Mankuarane’s followers fluctuated roughly between 12 000 and 18 000 or 19 000, not including the estimated number of 20 000 slaves (cf Bailie 1883:3; Macfadyen 1908:11; Du Toit 1983:44; Conder 1887:78; Bourne 1898:7). Before the war against David Massouw Mankuarane was wealthy and possessed thousands of cattle, wagons, ploughs, slaves and cultivated lands. By the 1880s Batlhaping cattle herds had increased to tens of thousands. Mankuroane’s claim that his people lost up to 50 000 head of cattle during the war against David Massouw from 1881 to 1884 (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:43; Shillington 1985:129-130) is probably not inflated.

The Barolong trace their origin from king Morolong who founded his kingdom in approximately 1400 (Ramoroka 2009:22). Their most powerful and

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64 Jan Taibosch I was murdered by Bushmen and he was succeeded by his son Hanto (Maingard 1932a:120).

65 David Massouw was also of the opinion that all the Korana living in the environment of Coligny, Ottosdal, Mareetsane and Setlagoli were his subjects (Maree 1969:14).
famous leaders were Thibela and his son Tau. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Barolong country stretched from Phitshane (which falls inside today’s Molopo Reserve) up to Molemabe (that is, Ottoshoop in the Marico district) in the north, then to Klerksdorp in the south-west and Morokweng (in the Vryburg district) in the west (Ramoroka 2009:22). According to Massouw Rijt Taaibosch the Batlhaping were the slaves of the Barolong (Lindley 1873:11). The cruelty of Tau caused the Batlhaping to flee (Starfield 2008:49). However, Tau still considered them as his subjects and ordered them to return to Taung so that he could exercise his authority over them (Language 1942:120-121). The course of subsequent events is not clear. Some versions given by historians and anthropologists report that the Batlhaping chief, Mashwe, refused to heed Tau’s order and that war broke out. The Taaibosch and the Left Hand Korana rushed to the aid of the Batlhaping and drove the Barolong from Taung (cf Lye 1970:14, 114; Engelbrecht 1936:33). In what Marais (1968:286-287) describes as ‘an act of treachery’ Tau murdered the Korana leader ’Kun’ap-soop. ’Knou-bib Taaibosch took over as leader and full-scale fights broke out. Tau was killed (circa 1760 to 1770), the Barolong defeated and driven northward to Setlagodi (Cornwell 1988:98).

Massouw Rijt Taaibosch (in Lindley 1873:11) gave a different account of the events. According to him the Korana lived in Griquatown and the Barolong in Taung. Tau visited the Korana who saw it as a friendly visit. Later Tau and some of his men returned to Griquatown for another visit. But this time they hid assegais of which the shafts were shortened under their karosses and the Korana leader ’Kun’ap-soop Taaibosch was murdered. Under the leadership of ’Knou-bib Taaibosch the Korana reorganised and attacked the Barolong. At Taung the Korana fought four mighty battles against the Barolong who were finally defeated and driven to Setlagodi.

After their defeat the Barolong broke up into five branches each named after one of Tau’s sons: Ratlou, Ratshidi, Makgetla, Seleka and Rapulana (Ramoroka 2009:24). These branches settled in different places. For example, Canyesa was the capital of the Barolong boo Ratlou, under Moshete with his 2 500 followers. The Barolong boo Rapulana made Bodibe, near Lichtenburg, and Lotlhakana their dwelling places. The Barolong boo Seleka lived in Thaba ’Nchu and the Barolong boo Ratshidi under Montshiwa had different outposts. Each of Montshiwa’s settlements was under the chieftainships of one of his brothers. Selere established a settlement at Ditlhakong, Saane at Modimola, Lekoko at Sebowana, Motshegare at Mareetsane, Montshiwa himself at Sehube and Molema at Mahikeng. Montshiwa had about
In 1881 there were a lot of rumours about wars breaking out between the various indigenous groups in the Cis-Molopo Territory. One of the threats of war stemmed from the fact that the hatchet had not yet been buried after the rebellion in Griqualand West in 1878. While the Griqualand West Government made off the rebellion as ‘merely a branch of Colonial Kaffir War’ and the missionaries saw it as ‘the product of Sotho incitement, ignorance of the grossest kind, worked upon by lying reports, skilfully fabricated’ (Dachs 1972:650-651), it was in reality a show of resistance to the missionaries’ penetration of Tswana society [...] for they deliberately aimed at a transformation of the very foundations of tribal life and the nature of chieftainship (Cornwell 1988:100).

In a bid for independence and power Botlasitse Gasebone and Luka Jantje placed themselves at the head of a group of traditionalists. On the other side Mankuroane and his followers were to be found; they turned changing conditions to profit and were clever enough to benefit from the missionary reforms. To Dachs (1972:651) the rebellion was therefore ‘a clash between old and new, between customary and reformed orders of southern Tswana society’.

Colonel W.A. Lanyon was sent to deal with the ‘troublemakers’ and carried out a raid on Pokhwane (or Pokwani), the main settlement of Botlasitse Gasebone. In the subsequent events some white people were killed by the followers of Botlasitse Gasebone and Colonel Charles Warren was called upon to lead a British force against the ‘rebels’. Mankuroane sided with the British and was willing to cede his country to the English, thus declaring: ‘I proved myself a loyal ally’ (Bailie 1883:1; Imperial Blue Book C.- 3381, 1882:50). Botlasitse Gasebone was taken prisoner by Mankuroane, handed over to the British and sent to jail in Kimberly. Luka Jantje fled to Kuruman

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66 Lanyon was administrator of Griqualand West from November 1875 to April 1878 (Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette Vol. XXV (1295), 25 November 1875).

67 Botlasitse Gasebone was the son of Gasebone. He was detained for more than two years and his son Galeshewe served four years’ imprisonment in Cape Town for their role in the Griqualand West Rebellions. Galeshewe was imprisoned again after the Langeberg Rebellion. After the British confiscation of the whole of Phokwane as well as Galeshewe’s farms in 1898 he and his followers had to settle at Magogong. They were placed under the chieftaincy of Molale.
and was later captured by Warren (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:35). So, when Botlasitse Gasebone later asked his old ally, Luka Jantje (who lived at Dikgatlhong) to assist him with his and David Massouw’s planned attack on Mankuroane (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:22), the latter gladly complied with the request.

Then, bad blood was provoked by Mankuroane’s concessions to his white allies regarding land belonging to Luka Jantje (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:43). It was also with the aid of Mankuroane that J.G. Donovan (the son of G. Donovan) started to sell timber permits on farms that were already being exploited by Luka Jantje’s people (Shillington 1985:143). In the impoverished countryside with its declining economy it was very profitable to trade firewood on the diamond fields (Shillington 1985:129-140; Van Onselen 1990:103). By 1879 the demand for wood in Kimberley was about fifty wagonloads a day and, as wood became scarcer still, the competition and conflict increased considerably (Shillington 1985:137-138; TAB SS V914-R1483-1884).

The confrontation between the two half-brothers Moshete and Montshiwa sprung principally from the fact that both laid claim to the chieftainship of the Barolong. Their respective supporters were the S.A.R. and Britain (See Chapter 4).

The enmity between David Massouw and Mankuroane was of a long date and still smouldering (Goldman 1927:57; Metrowich 1970:31 and Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:24). By the 1880s the Taibosch Korana’s grazing had shrunk to a mere 55 000 morgen, that is, to 50 274 hectares (See Chapters 4 and 6). From the west they were threatened by Mankuroane and from the east there was the threat of the S.A.R. Boers. David Massouw tried to avoid confrontation with the S.A.R. and so kept his livestock mostly on the western banks of the Harts River, which meant greater competition with regard to grazing with Mankuroane.

According to accounts the last straw that broke the camel’s back and that started the war between David Massouw and Mankuroane was as follows. Mankuroane’s son Molale and some other herders were at Morokane where they slaughtered one of David Massouw’s cows after chasing away his herders. David Massouw was informed about this and went to Morokane to investigate for himself. Finding that some of his cattle had indeed been slaughtered, he demanded from Mankuroane’s herders the kidneys and other intestines of a dead cow; traditionally he was indeed entitled to it.68 But the herders informed him that they had sent these

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68 Chapter 6 takes its heading from this incident. The Korana folktale ‘The Jackal and the Porcupine’ makes specific mention of how sought-after the kidneys of an
to their chief, Mankuroane. David Massouw took this as a sign of defiance and confiscated meat by force. This triggered revenge by Molale and the other herder boys who went on a killing spree of Korana children and cattle. Mankuroane was informed of this outrage and went to visit Morokane. He, however, judged that it was wrong of David Massouw to take the meat of the cow as it was his cow and not David Massouw’s. He thus indicated his approval of the herders’ conduct and decided that he had had enough of David Massouw’s behaviour; he would thus punish him. So, a dispute about the kidneys of a cow was the final trigger to the war that erupted between David Massouw and Mankuroane.

**Conclusion**

From this chapter it is clear how difficult it is to pin down the Korana people in terms of origin, genetic make-up, migration routes, identity and way of life. Apart from incomplete and often conflicting data, the fact that other communities were similar in terms of make-up and lifestyle makes it impossible and even irrelevant to rely on ethnic characterisations. There is thus no clear-cut answer to the question regarding the exact identity of the Korana people. Nevertheless, the information set out in this chapter confirms that there were individuals with a common language, ethnic identity, oral history and a memory culture who lived in many different parts of Southern Africa, calling themselves Korana.

I have highlighted the fact that, in the crystallisation of the Korana, associations and alliances were continuously negotiated; dissimilar elements came together and were mixed. The ability to adapt, the metaphor of a chameleon that cannot be defined once and for all, springs to mind.

As the Korana’s previous nomadic way of life was curtailed as land changed owners and through the establishment of new patterns of exploitation there was fast no longer any place for the Korana people in the central interior and Strauss (1978:iv) remarks that, by the mid-1800s their way of life had become ‘almost an anachronism’. The fact that the Korana people were forced to manage their changing circumstances and to develop a fluidity of identity allowed them to acquire new skills to survive – a fact that would be very important in their current revival (See Chapter 8) later.
Chapter 3

The fate of the remaining Korana communities in the central interior
The landdrost of Windburg’s report of the battle with Kousop Kousopson.
[Source: TAB SS V21-R2166/52-1858]
Introduction

While the focus of the preceding chapter was on the Taibosch Korana of Mamusa, it is clear from the discussions so far that there were other groups in the central interior of Southern Africa. The Mamusa faction had ties with these other groups, for instance the Taibosch Korana community of the O.F.S. and the Left Hand Korana faction, but the direct long-term relations between the groups were not always free from strife and conflict. There are especially two reasons why it is necessary to take cognisance of these other groupings in the context of this book. The first is, of course, to place the Taibosch Korana of Mamusa in a more complete historical perspective. Moreover, it is important to prove, through examining the historical facts, that the Korana community in Mamusa was indeed the last functional socio-political unity of Korana people. I shall thus present an outline of the disintegration of the Taibosch faction in the O.F.S. and of that of the Left Hand Korana community. I will look at the fate of the faction associated with Kousop Kousopson (alias Skeelkoos, Skeel Cobus or Koos Squint) and I will discuss the communities of Brandewynsfontein and Pniel. The fate of the Korana community on the lower Gariep has already been pointed out in Chapter 1 and I feel it is unnecessary to review their case here.

A brief word about the exact place of this chapter. It could not form part of the previous chapter as this was not practical while its inclusion in a separate chapter might compromise the intended syncretic representation of the Korana to a certain degree. After much thought I have decided for the practical to rule in the division of chapters, but I wish to emphasise the fact that this chapter slots very firmly into the previous chapter where content and intention are concerned.

The Taibosch Korana of the O.F.S.

In 1833 the brothers Jan Taibosch II (or Hanto), Johannes Taibosch and Gert Taibosch (see genealogical chart) decided to leave the area of the Harts and Vaal rivers and to settle in the O.F.S. What motivated their decision is not entirely clear. Liebenberg (1990:15) and Stow (1905:313) allege that their action was motivated by feuds among groups. Feuds between different Korana factions were quite general phenomena (Lindley 1873:12; Van Tonder 1952:148; Stow 1905:301).
explanation (cf also Bergh 2000:53). Jan Taibosch II and his Korana followers were visited by Rev. John Edwards from the Wesleyan Mission Society’s (W.M.S.) station at Buchuuaap (modern-day Boetsap) between Barkley West and Vryburg, the main seat of the Griqua leader Barend Barends. It was thus decided by the church, in 1833, that Rev. Thomas Jenkins should go and take up residence with the community. After the reverend’s arrival, Jan Taibosch II decided to move to a part of the country that was more suitable for establishing a mission station. At the same time Moroko, the Seleka Barolong chief, was persuaded by the Wesleyan missionaries Archbell and Edwards to leave their overpopulated mission station at Platberg near Warrenton on the Vaal River and to move to the depopulated areas west of the Caledon River and along the Modder River valley. Jan Taibosch II, a certain Carolus Baatje and his people as well as Barend Barends decided to go with Moroko. So, about 1 000 Korana people followed Jan Taibosch II initially. However, a number of these Korana people decided to return to Massouw Rijt Taibosch, who was seen as head of all the Korana people north of the Vaal River, as they felt that they no longer saw eye to eye with Jan Taibosch II. Jan Taibosch II and his people eventually arrived on 1 November 1833 via Boshof at Umpukani, 10 km to the north-west of Clocolan where a mission station was established (cf Dreyer 2001:92; Schoeman 1991:46; Engelbrecht 1936:35; Kriel 1982:27). Four years later Jenkins established another mission station for the Korana people at Merumetsu, meaning ‘Black Forest’ in Sesotho, on the northern slopes of the Koranaberg between Excelsior and Marquard. Here the Korana chief Jan Bloem (II) temporarily joined them from across the Vaal River in 1846 (Wadley 2001:161).

Jan Taibosch II was attacked by a lion during a hunting expedition and later died of his wounds. Schoeman (1991:56-57) indicates June 1836 as the date for this incident, while Backhouse (1844:393) and Buys (1989:51) claim that it happened in 1839. As the son who had to succeed him was still under-age and attending school

70 Mears (1979:39) described Baatje and Barends as descendants of ‘Dutch famers who had cohabited with Hottentot women’.

71 Genealogically Massouw Rijt Taibosch was more senior than Jan Taibosch I. In Chapter 2 I have mentioned that the grandfather of Massouw Rijt Taibosch on his father’s side, that is, ‘Kun’ap-soop Taibosch, was leader of the Taibosch Korana and that it was only after his murder by Tau that Jan Taibosch I took up leadership.

72 Buys (1989:17), however, claims that they settled on Umpukani only in 1834.
at Farmerfield, Albany, the chieftainship of the O.F.S. Taibosch family was assumed by Gert Taibosch, the uncle of the boy. Soon afterwards Gert Taibosch, then living in the Witberg area, challenged the leadership of Massouw Rijt Taibosch but was driven back to the O.F.S. where he later became a well-known figure in the Trans-Gariep (cf. De Kock 1972:452; Germond, 1967:165).

According to Kriel (1982:27) as well as Lye and Murray (1980:48), the Korana had launched a number of raids against Moshweshwe and his followers by 1836. This forced the Sotho leader to respond with violence and he drove them off in different directions. While beating a retreat the Korana raiders attacked the Batlokwa under Sekonyela who was reportedly quite impressed by the Koranas’ display of military prowess. He immediately saw the possibility of profiting from their skills in his own conflict against Moshweshwe and thus invited them to teach his people horse-riding and shooting. But quarrels broke out between him and the Korana people who then relocated to the Koranaberg (Schoeman 1985:53). However, the Korana succeeded in driving Sekonyela across the Caledon River and they made off with almost all his cattle. A year later there was another clash between the Korana and the Batlokwa and Sekonyela was driven deep into the Maluti Mountains and his cattle were, once again, looted. However, Gert Taibosch and Sekonyela were reconciled sometime in May 1849, and the Korana chief actively took part in the struggle between Sekonyela and Moshweshwe (Kriel 1982:32; Barnard 1965:414).

In terms of the treaty signed by Sir George Napier on behalf of Britain and Moshweshwe on 13 December 1843, the region between the Caledon and the Gariep would remain under the authority of Moshweshwe. Moshweshwe was to benefit hugely from this treaty (Barnard 1965:369). However, Gert Taibosch and the Griqua chief Pieter Davids also laid claim to areas in this region, and the treaty could not be implemented (Germond 1967:167-170; Kriel 1982:29). Three years later, that is, with the Maitland treaty of 1846, it was the claims laid by Gert Taibosch that were officially acknowledged (Buys 1989:64). There were probably several factors that played a role here, one being the good mutual understanding between Gert Taibosch and the British Resident Major Henry Douglas Warden (Germond 1967:187-192; Buys 1989:83). In fact, Gert Taibosch came to

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73 At that time Gert Taibosch was living at Nieuweland (Engelbrecht 1936:37; Maingard 1932a:127; Buys 1989:101). This was the region around the Wesleyan mission station New Platberg, south of Ladybrand (Schoeman 1985:53).

74 He was the British Resident of the Orange River Sovereignty from 1848 to 1852.
Warden’s aid on more than one occasion. In 1846 he helped Warden in a skirmish with Jan Kock of the Winburg Republic at the Vet River, he came to his assistance again in September 1850 against the BaTaung of Moletsane,75 as well as against Moshweshwe, Moletsane and the Korana chief Gert Links during the battle of Viervoet that took place on 30 June 1851.

Gert Taabosch and Sekonyela launched various attacks on Moshweshwe and Moletsane. After their attack on the Basotho settlement near to the Phuthiatsana River in July 1849, Warden intervened and tried to bring about a peaceful agreement. A meeting was scheduled to take place in Bloemfontein on 27 August 1849, but the most prominent role players, that is, Moshweshwe, Sekonyela and Gert Taabosch, did not turn up (Attree 1949:230). Instead of attending the meeting Sekonyela and Gert Taabosch launched an offensive on the Basotho on the very same day. Three days later Moletsane took revenge by attacking Merumetsu, killing 12 of Gert Taabosch’s followers, burning down a number of huts and raiding cattle (Orange Free State Monthly Magazine, June 1879:808).76

On 1 September 1850 Warden was granted permission to take military action against Sekonyela in order to end the frequent attacks against the Basotho and the BaTaung. But no military action was in fact taken by Warden as Gert Taabosch and chief Moroka mediated discussions between the English officer and Sekonyela. Sekonyela expressed remorse and agreed to pay a fine of 300 cattle.

After the battle of Berea on 20 December 1852, Gert Taabosch and Sekonyela attacked the BaTaung of Tulu in the Winburg district and the Kgolokwe under Wetsi in the Harrismith district (Kriel 1982:34). Moshweshwe saw this as an opportunity to unite the opposing chiefs of the Orange River Sovereignty under his authority, and decided to take action against them. In the battle of Khoroe-Betloa against the Batlokoa of Sekonyela that ensued at the end of October 1853, Gert Taabosch was killed at Dawidsberg (Schoeman 1991:121; Germond 1967: 217-221; Buys 1989:82).77 The Friend of the Sovereignty and Bloemfontein Gazette

75 Sekonyela, Jan Bloem (II) and Yzerbek also offered assistance to Warden on this occasion, which he gladly accepted (Barnard 1965:425).

76 The feud between Moletsane and the Korana people was an old one, dating back to 1827 when Moletsane launched a surprised attack on them (Ellenberger 1992:214).

77 Dawidsberg, also known by the name Yoalaboholo, was the home of Sekonyela’s mother Mantatise. It is situated not far from Marabeng which was Sekonyela’s hill fortress near Ficksburg (Dreyer 2001:89).
(Vol. IV (198), 11 February 1854) reported that Gert Taibosch was found wounded by the Basotho, and killed. He was succeeded by his son Jacob Taibosch who moved closer to Thaba ‘Nchu (Buys 1989:100). But after the destruction of Merumetsu by Moletsane and the death of Gert Taibosch at Dawidsberg the group gradually disintegrated. Many retired to the Vaal River, while others entered into the service of Boers.

As was shown in the previous chapter, the Left Hand Korana were genealogically junior in rank to the Taibosch Korana. Gert Links was the first son of Kora by his sixth wife.78 While some of the Left Hand Korana formed part of the Main Trek from the Cape Colony, some of them stayed behind and others broke away during the trek to settle in different places, the Khamiesberg being one of these locations (Engelbrecht 1936:42). There is more than one etymological explanation of the surname ‘Links’. It was possibly a reference to ‘those of the left stem’ or ‘those standing to the left’, but there is also a possibility that it indicated that the leader of the original group was left-handed (Maingard 1964:57; Nienaber 1989:709-710). Grobbelaar (1957:203) and Engelbrecht (1936:24-25) proffer an explanation regarding a supposed conflict between twin brothers. Accordingly, succession was resolved by one of the twin brothers settling on the left bank of the Vaal River and the other one on the right bank. However, such an explanation does not accord with genealogical evidence showing that the Taibosch and Left Hand families came from different houses of Kora nor with the fact that there were Left Hand Korana even before the Korana reached the Vaal River.

When the Main Trek reached the Harts River the Left Hand Korana under chief ‘Hari’na Links and the Taibosch separated (Maingard 1932a:121; Krüger 1972:452). It is not certain when this happened, although Maingard (1932a:121) calculates that it was at some point between 1813 and 1820. There is also no indication as to the reason for the separation or as to the place where the Left Hand Korana eventually settled (Engelbrecht 1936:33). According to Maingard (1932a:121) they settled where the Vet River joins the Vaal River, whereas Engelbrecht (1936:34) is of

78 The Korana practiced polygamy and the claim Anderson (1888:63) makes that a Korana man would have only one wife at a time is incorrect.
the opinion that they settled in the vicinity of Kuruman and the Langeberg. Archival documents, on the other hand, indicate that the Taibosch and Left Hand Korana agreed that the Left Hand Korana would settle in the vicinity of Bloemhof and Christiana (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part. 2). Because the Left Hand Korana did not stay in one place for long and broke up into smaller bands, it is difficult to reconstruct their history accurately. There is, however, certainty about the fact that a section of the Left Hand Korana under Johannes Links took refuge in Mamusa because of the difaqane and they assisted the Taibosch Korana during the battle of Mamusa. A section of the Left Hand Korana, under leadership of Gert Links, the son of Johannes Links, established themselves in the O.F.S. where they were, as indicated above, involved with the internal events of the O.F.S.

In 1841 a group of the Left Hand Korana under Abraham Links and his sons Gert (Hareip) and Johannes returned from the O.F.S. to the Bloemhof area and established themselves on Saltpan, situated between Kopje Enkel and Christiana in the Western Transvaal. Rev. Johann Schmidt of the Berlin Mission Society (B.M.S.) founded the Saron Mission Station for this group in June 1847. Due to growing tension between the Korana people and the Boers over permission for the Boers to access the salt pans, Gert (Hareip) Links and his followers left Saron in March 1854 to establish themselves in Nieuweland at the foot of the Maluti Mountains.

A faction of the Left Hand Korana under Hermanus Links returned in 1876 from the O.F.S. to the Bloemhof area, situated in the disputed Keate award territory (See Chapter 4). Hermanus Links again requested the B.M.S. to establish a mission station for them at Saltpan and on 5 November 1878 officially declared large parts of the Bloemhof area theirs. Warren, the Commissioner for the Settlement of Land Claims in Griqualand West and also the commanding military officer, was unhappy with the role the B.M.S. played in order to lay claim to land in a ‘deceitful way’. He requested Rev. Brune to leave Saron and for Hermanus Links to withdraw the

79 Maingard (1932a:124–125) confirms that the Left Korana indeed stayed there for some time.

80 Maingard (1932a:154), for example, distinguishes between the following chiefs among them: Sitsop (Gert Links), Harup (Johannes Links), Burip (Hermanus Links) and ǂKanas.

81 The Austrian physician and explorer E. Holub who reported in 1881 that Saltpan and its surroundings were under the authority of the Taibosch Korana of Mamusa indirectly confirms the fact that they had left Saron (Maingard 1932a:129).
proclamation. In the meanwhile Hermanus Links used force to resist the arrest of one of his followers for stock theft. Warren decided to act upon this and a military skirmish took place at Saltpan. The outcome was that all able-bodied Korana men were taken prisoner and most of the stock raided. The infirm, women and children, together with some cattle, were left at Saron (Maingard 1932a:130-132). What their eventual fate was is not known.

**From Slypklip to Prisonierskop: Kousop Kousopson**

*Internal conflict: Kousop Kousopson and David Danser*

Apparently the Boer name for Kousop Kousopson was ‘Skeelkoos’ (Koos Squint) because he was blind in one eye or, according to another explanation, because he had a squint eye due to chicken-pox. He lived in the area between the Modder and the Vaal rivers and was either of Korana Bushman descent as Oosthuizen (1991(b):1) suggests or, as Buys (1989:46) would have it, he was, like his father Kousop, of Korana African descent. Kousop Kousopson was the leader of the Bushmen known as theǂOn-ǁxona, but they included a number of Korana people from the Scorpion and Hippopotamus factions (Engelbrecht 1937:14). He claimed that he was related on both father and mother’s side to Tgongoup, a well-known Bushman leader of the time in the Trans-Gariep (Oosthuizen 1991(b):1). After his death, Tgongoup was succeeded by Horingkap who, in turn, was succeeded by David Danser (or Danster) and, finally, Swart Jan Danser would succeed David Danser in August or September of 1858 (Buys 1989:96).

Kousop Kousopson did not acknowledge the leadership of David Danser because he regarded himself as having ‘more Bushman blood’ in his veins than David Danser. David Danser supposedly was either the child of a Korana father and Bushman mother (Engelbrecht 1936:68-69) or he could have been of Korana African descent (Buys 1989:46). Korana African descent, of course, does not exclude ‘Bushman blood’, so it must be understood that the real issue between Kousop Kousopson and David Danser was not so much the ‘Bushman blood’ in their veins, it was a political issue.

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82 In the previous chapter I mentioned that the peoples of the Trans-Gariep had mixed freely, making the use of ethnic markers to some extent irrelevant.
The conflict between Kousop Kousopson and the O.F.S.

The conflict between Kousop Kousopson and the O.F.S. Boers was of a long date. It started on 15 May 1839 when David Danser sold Vanwyksvlei, which was to become Boshof, to David S. Fourie for the price of a horse and 70 sheep. Kousop Kousopson contested the validity of the transaction as he regarded the land as his and because, as has been mentioned, he did not recognise David Danser’s authority (Allen et al. 2012:19). Warden was sent to investigate and he found Kousop Kousopson’s claim to be invalid. But the Korana leader did not give up and ordered the Boers to leave his territory. Consequently, in July 1850, Warden again acted as arbitrator. He offered a piece of land of about 72 square miles, that is, about 186 km², along the Vaal River close to Winderton to Kousop Kousopson in exchange (Malan 1958:33). While the latter did move there initially, he later divided this land into three farms he sold to Boers for mostly brandy and gunpowder (Van Heerden 1908:13-14). The result was that, by 1855, Kousop Kousopson no longer had any territory left. But, apparently, Kousop Kousopson had no realisation that the land he had sold was no longer his and he made an appeal to the O.F.S. government about it.

In order to understand the politics involved here, it must be explained that the Republic of the Orange Free State came into being on 23 February 1854 with the signing of the Bloemfontein convention. Article two of the convention determined the internal policy of the new government concerning the regulation of the relations between the various population groups. The Volksraad (House of Assembly) of the O.F.S. accepted responsibility for, among other matters, the termination of the continual migration of the indigenous groups. Within this policy framework the Volksraad appointed a land commission to investigate land claims. This commission found that Kousop Kousopson’s sale of land to the Boers was indeed valid (Allen et al. 2012:20). But the leader was convinced that he had been done in and he directed several writs to the O.F.S. Volksraad in which he objected to the transaction conducted by David Danser in 1839. In early 1856 the Volksraad gave him final notice of the fact that his land claims were without any base. Out of a sense of frustration and helplessness Kousop Kousopson, together with his Korana men as well as some of Gasebone’s men, attacked the farm Benauwdheidsfontein on 8 May 1858 at a time when many burghers were conscripted to fight in the First Basotho War. Quite a few Boers, among them Jacobus Coetzee, Roelof du Plooy, Zacharias Swanepoel and Jacob Diedericks, were either killed or wounded while
huge numbers of livestock were raided and some carriages stolen (Henderson, 1997:36 and TAB SS V20-R2072/58-1858).

On 14 June 1858 the O.F.S. Volksraad gave orders that a commando be formed to act against Kousop Kousopson. A commando was rallied under Commandant Hendrik Venter and the landdrost of Winburg, J.M. Howell, on 21 June 1858 at the farm Zoutpan. There were 240 Boers, 160 Korana men from the camps of David Danser, Jan Bloem (II) and Gert and Stoffel Links as well as a certain Captain O’Brien with a number of Fingo men. Slypklip, the stronghold of Kousop Kousopson just south of Windserton, was well prepared with trenches dug underground while the topography with its hidden river inlet as entrance favoured the defenders. Since the Korana leader was expecting an attack from the Boers he had appealed to the Tswana leaders Gasebone and Mahura, as well as to Barend Barends and Jan Bloem (II) and Adam Kok III, to lend him a hand. The last three leaders, however, did not see their way clear to assist him in the matter (Buys 1989:92-94). Venter, on the Boer side, decided to divide the commando into three groups so that they could attack on three fronts. The separate divisions took in position during the night and surrounded Slypklip. At daybreak, on Monday 5 July 1858, the Boer commando directed a surprise attack on the stronghold. However, Kousop Kousopson was not expecting the attack to take place before 12h00, the time he and Gasebone had agreed upon for help to arrive. Kousop Kousopson cut a rather puny little figure, but he was tough and courageous, fighting with all his might for every square centimetre of land (Oosthuizen 1991(b):4; Henderson 1997:36). The Boers made use of a light cannon, thereby obliging Kousop Kousopson and his men to retreat over an arid plane to their next stronghold. Before help from Gasebone and Mahura could arrive, Kousop Kousopson, his brother Ryk Klaas (Rich Klaas) and about 129 of his followers, including women and children were killed on top of the about 70 men of Ryk Klaas (TAB SS V21-R2166/52-1858). On the Boers’ side there were one fallen and four wounded men. When Gasebone arrived later on, the battle was already over. Nevertheless, the O.F.S. commando attacked Gasebone too, but in their haste to get back home they let him off the hook rather lightly with only two of his men dead.
The S.A.R. enters the fray

At this stage, as we have mentioned, the O.F.S. was also at war with Moshweshwe. The latter had an army of 20,000 well equipped men compared to the 3,000 men on the side of the O.F.S. (Theal 1964:248). According to President M.W. Pretorius this was a dangerous situation for the S.A.R. with the result that Commandant General Paul Kruger of the S.A.R. was sent to aid the O.F.S. Rumours went around that Gasebone had attacked some S.A.R. border farms in the Western Transvaal, looted stock and abducted a white woman, Mrs Opperman, and her grandchild (Van Heerden 1908:40-41). In August 1858 Kruger, who was still in the O.F.S., received orders from the S.A.R. to punish Gasebone. Kruger was informed that the woman, child and some cattle were with Mahura. He demanded that Mahura surrender them together with ten men who were accused of having murdered Boers. Mahura let the woman and the child go, but refused to comply with the rest of the demand. In the meanwhile, on 13 August 1858, fighting broke out between Gasebone and Kruger. Gasebone fell at Rooidam and a Boer, H. Vermaas, cut off his head and took it to Kruger (Allen et al 2012:21). Kruger sent Gasebone’s head to Mahura in a bag as a warning to comply with his demands and to make peace. Kruger also exacted an exorbitant punishment from Mahura: 8,000 heads of cattle, 300 horses and 500 guns.83 Ironically the S.A.R. left the Opperman family who had lost everything through Gasebone’s attack on them to their fate. Mrs Opperman did not receive any share of the fine laid on Mahuru nor did she benefit from the looting. A writ from H.A. Swart of Hartbeestfontein directed to President Pretorius in which Swart stated that he could no longer look after Mrs Opperman and the child and asking for help from the state was met with no response (TAB SS V22-R2471/58-1858).

The repercussions of Kruger’s action for Massouw Rijt Taaibosch

It is notable that the fight between Kruger and Gasebone had certain repercussions for Massouw Rijt Taaibosch, although the latter had no hand in the events. For some or other reason Kruger expected him to deliver some cattle to the commando to be slaughtered. Massouw Rijt Taaibosch refused to do so. Despite being recognised by the S.A.R. as an independent chief, he was summoned to Potchefstroom in February 1859. He refused as he had done the previous year

83 Mahura was appointed as regent until Gasebone’s under-aged son Botlasitse Gasebone could take over leadership (Z.A.R. 164-8:26; Du Plessis 1993:88; Language 1942:127; Van Aswegen 1971:77-81; Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:34).
(TAB SS V32-R3517/60-1860). He did explain, however, that heeding Kruger’s demand would certainly lead to a combined campaign against him by Gasebone and Mahura, something he would be unable to deal with (TAB SS V24-R2578-1859).

**The sequel to the action against Kousop Kousopson**

The sequel to the action against Kousop Kousopson by the O.F.S. was somewhat bizarre and need to be told. Forty-three men and fifty women and children were taken captive by the Boers. The women and children appeared before a council of war and were placed out as apprentices on farms as punishment for the so-called part they had in the fight. The council of war decided that the forty-three men had to be taken to Bloemfontein as prisoners of war. Captain O’Brien and 30 of the Fingo men received this order. About 9 km outside Boshof the convoy was met by thirty Boers who pretended to have been given the order to escort the prisoners of war further to Bloemfontein. O’Brien handed the prisoners over and he and his company were on their way back to Boshof when they heard shots. Upon investigation it appeared that the prisoners were summarily executed behind a hill as, reportedly, they had tried to escape. President J.N. Boshof and the O.F.S. Executive Council discussed the issue and appointed the state prosecutor A.B. Roberts and a member of the O.F.S. Executive Council J.J. Venter to investigate the incident. After the investigation in Boshof it was decided to prosecute three of the alleged culprits. The bailiff of the Bloemfontein court was sent on 31 January 1859 to arrest these men. That night his carriage was tipped into a dam and, upon investigating what the commotion all was about, a shot was fired at him as he appeared in the doorway of his hotel room. He was allegedly warned as follows: ‘I missed, because that was my intention. But my next shot won’t miss.’84 The bailiff apparently returned to Bloemfontein without having laid any charges and the government abandoned the case (Buys 1989:92-95; Van Heerden 1908:30-32; Henderson 1997:37; Volksblad 29 November 2006). The place where the massacre took place is referred to as Prisonierskop since that day.85

We have referred to the B.M.S. and its role in the disintegration and fragmentation of the Left Hand Korana of Saltpan. But the B.M.S. was also instrumental to making two other Korana communities, the one of

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84 ‘Ek het mis geskiet omdat ek wou. Die volgende skoot is egter raak.’ (Mr G. Wessels, Boshof – personal communication).

Brandewynsfontein in the O.F.S. and the one of Pniel in Griekswaland West suffer the same fate. We look at these two cases in detail below.

The Korana of Brandewynsfontein

The first missionaries of the B.M.S. at Brandewynsfontein were A. Gebel, A.F. Lange, D.A. Kraut, R.T. Gregorowski and J. Schmidt and they arrived on 17 April 1834 in the Cape (Van der Merwe, 1985:42). Accompanied by a Setswana interpreter, Richard Miles, they left for the interior with the idea of working under the Tswana people. For this reason they visited Adam Kok II at Philippolis in August 1834, but the Rev. G.A. Kolbe of the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.) convinced them to go and work under the Korana people at Brandewynsfontein on the Riet River instead. Adam Kok II gave them permission to alter their plans and allocated five hectares to the B.M.S. On 24 September 1834 the mission station Bethany, that is, the ‘House of the Poor’, was founded (Volksblad, 14 November 1998). But the disputes and power struggles that sprung up between the missionaries led to the

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86 The decision of the B.M.S. to change course was possibly motivated by two considerations. First, the Griqua leader had already given permission to J.J. Pellissier of the P.E.M.S. to establish a mission station under the Tswana people near the confluence of the Gariep and Caledon rivers the previous year (Keegan 1987:192). Second, Van der Merwe (1985:44-45) claims that Kolbe wanted to ensure the continued existence of the Griqua state by bringing the Korana under Griqua rule. In exchange for land from Adam Kok II to establish Bethany the missionaries of the B.M.S. would acknowledge the Griqua state and try to bring the Korana under its rule. This would be cause of major conflict between the Korana and the mission society.

87 Bethany is about 65 km south of Bloemfontein and 20 km north of Edenburg in the Southern Free State. Zöllner and Heese (1984:15-16) relate as follow about Bethany’s name: ‘[a]t the end of a long and tiring journey [the first missionaries] found themselves in the middle of the lonely African wilderness without a single soul to convert to Christianity. To make matters worse it started raining the next morning and, not being accustomed to the suddenness with which rivers rise in Africa, they narrowly escape drowning. They then had to search for their cattle and horses (more than one of which had fallen prey to lions) which were scattered across the plain. They comforted one another with the words “Zion born of misery”, and named the place Bethany, which according to Zöllner and Heese means “House of misery”’.
recalling of Gregorowski and Schmidt by the mission society in 1836. In the course of 1837 the other three men were found guilty of dereliction of duty and dismissed, and Rev. C.F. Wuras was appointed as the new chairperson of Bethany (Brammer 2008:46; Du Plessis 1911:213; Van der Merwe 1985:41-42, 50-51).88

During this time, about 20 000 nomadic Korana grazed their livestock between the Gariep and Vaal rivers (Trail 2002:35; Fock 1971:57). The B.M.S. thought that it would be easy to persuade the Korana to give up their land because the settling of Trek Boers increasingly hampered their traditional nomadic lifestyle (Fock 1971:57). However, it did not sit well with the Korana that the B.M.S. mission station was established without the missionaries’ seeking their approval and permission and they resisted the missionaries’ moves (Buys 1989:87; Van der Merwe 1984:52). Piet Witvoet (Piet White Foot), leader of the !Geixaǁ eis (Sorcerers) and his two brothers, Klaas Witvoet and Stefanus Witvoet, for instance, were furious about expectations that they should acknowledge the authority of the Griqua. When the missionaries Gebel and Kraut received a title deed for Bethany from the Griqua Council at the end of 1835, Piet Witvoet was so outraged that he and most of his followers left Bethany on 22 January 1836, although they would return from time to time (cf Schoeman 1985:38). The Buffelbouts Korana also left Bethany at the same time, because of strife with the Korana faction of Piet Witvoet.89

Wuras indeed showed himself eager to consolidate the authority of the Griqua Council at Bethany, but Yzerbek, leader of the kx?amǁõãkwa (that is, the Right Hands) and cousin to Massouw Rijt Taibosch, opposed him strongly (cf Van der Merwe 1984:53; Stow 1905:298). Yzerbek and Wuras travelled to Philippolis on more than one occasion to have discussions with Adam Kok III about the land dispute (Schoeman 2002:100). It was agreed in 1844, during one

88 Wuras was born on 9 June 1809, and he died on 20 May 1891 on the farm Vaalbank, Bloemfontein (VAB MHG V0-R453-1891). His marriage to his first wife, Johanna Sass (the daughter of a missionary of the L.M.S.), was concluded on 25 July 1838 at Graaff Reinet (Schoeman 1985:46). After her death on 19 July 1849, the Rev. C.E.H. Orpen remarried Wuras to Elizabeth Harriet (29 November 1821 – 12 July 1889), eldest daughter of Mr M.R. Every of Colesburg on 19 November 1850 in Colesberg (cf VAB MHG V0-R.228-1889, Grahamstown Journal, 1849 and Zöllner & Heese, 1984:477).

89 Ellenberger (1992:213) describes Piet Witvoet as ‘a brigand of the worst possible type’. He was notorious for his raiding expeditions and was eventually defeated by Moshweshwe in 1836.
of these visits, by the parties that Bethany did belong to the Korana people and that the B.M.S. was merely entitled to a standing for a mission station.\textsuperscript{90} Wuras now recognised Bethany as Korana territory and promised to safely keep Yzerbek’s copy of the agreement. But Wuras also considered Bethany too small for all the Korana people and persuaded some to go and look for other land, giving them the assurance that he would keep their land in safe custody for them (Buys 1989:87). So, Yzerbek, together with Piet Witvoet, consented and moved away from Bethany in 1846 (Engelbrecht 1936:235; Maingard 1923a:119-120, 1963:37). But when he later returned for a visit to Bethany, Yzerbek learnt that Wuras had actually sold some land contrary to their agreement and without his permission to a certain Jan Cloete. Yzerbek was furious with Wuras and stationed Stephanus Buffelbout at Bethany as vice-chief to prevent Jan Cloete from taking possession of the farm.\textsuperscript{91} In

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\textsuperscript{90} Article 7 of the Maitland treaty of 1846 states in particular that ‘the lands heretofore enjoyed by the Korana, under chief Goliat, and by the Missionary Station at Bethany, shall be considered as excepted, which lands shall be preserved inviolate for the said Chief and station’ (in Pretorius 1963:38). Refer also to Buys (1989:64) and Schoeman (2002:167) in this regard. A map which illustrates Warden’s demarcations of the Orange River Sovereignty, confirmed that Bethany was allocated to Yzerbek (‘\textit{Kaart van die Oranjerivier Souwereiniteit om die Biografie van Majoor H.D. Warden, deur B.J. Barnard, te illustreer – Grensreëlings’}. [Map of the Orange River Sovereignty to Illustrate the Biography of Major H.D. Warden, by B.J. Barnard – Border Demarcations.] Map S2/1106, National Archive, Pretoria).
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\textsuperscript{91} Yzerbek expressed his utter dissatisfaction and bitter disappointment at length: ‘The missionaries first told me that their proposed objective was solely to seek the souls of the barbarians and to do so for the benefit of the Lord, whose servants they were; and since my people and I were heathens – as they solemnly impressed on me – they wished to come and teach us the way of salvation. They told me that it was their intention to know nothing, other than that Jesus Christ was crucified. Goliat (they said), you are still too foolish; the boers will simply take away your land, because they are against God’s word; they are only after land, but we are your ministers – trust in us alone; we will take your land into our care. But there is surely one thing that you know: that your ministers would never be capable of cheating you like a whore. Moreover, the Society does not want any land; rather, we wish to take care of you, out of love. Chief, you have no understanding of these “high-up” people; and they speak a language that you do not understand. We, your ministers, will stand up in your defence, and you will keep your land.’ Despite these assurances, the Korana lost all their land, leading Yzerbek to conclude that: ‘If this is the situation, then I say that the Berlin Missionary Society is not the heir of the
an attempt to defuse the situation Warden designated an area of 200 square miles (that is, 518 km²) for the Korana people to Yzerbek and David Danser on the Vaal River in 1849 (Malan 1958:34).

When Sir Harry Smith confirmed the authority of Britain over the Orange River Sovereignty after the battle of Boomplaats on 29 August 1848, Warden saw this as a golden opportunity to divest the Griqua of their authority over Bethany by placing it under direct British rule. Wuras hastened to point out to Warden that the British government had already recognised Bethany as an independent station since 1846. With his subsequent visit to Bethany in 1850 Warden acknowledged the station's independence and consented to granting its residents a high degree of self-government (Van der Merwe 1984:56).

In the meanwhile the Republic of the Orange Free State was established in 1854. As has been mentioned, the Volksraad of the O.F.S. accepted responsibility for, among other matters, the termination of the continual migration of the indigenous population groups. While working towards this goal, the Volksraad decided to buy out the land Warden had previously awarded David Danser and Yzerbek with an eye to giving it to Boers (Malan 1958:34). The action taken by the Volksraad understandably made it urgent to settle issues of ownership and Wuras and Rev. Schmidt requested finality with regard to their situation in Bethany in a letter to the Volksraad. After the Volksraad's session of 4 September 1854, the missionaries were informed that the B.M.S. would be subject to O.F.S. laws and would fall under the jurisdiction of the regional field-cornet. Wuras' reaction was to request that the Bloemfontein government place Bethany under its protection. On 2 October 1854 President J.P. Hoffman visited Bethany and upheld the ruling made by Warden in 1850; Bethany was thus confirmed as being the lawful property of the B.M.S. (Van der Merwe 1984:56).

On 8 March 1856 Wuras informed the O.F.S. government in writing of difficulties between himself and some of the Korana people, namely Yzerbek and David Danser (Engelbrecht, 1936:55). Despite a long history of mutual raiding and confrontation between Yzerbek and David Danser they were now united in their struggle against the domination of the B.M.S. (Engelbrecht 1936:46). Upon

Korana, and does not obtain the right to land through the preaching of God's Word. If that were so, then we Korana and Kaffirs and Griqua could just as easily send out people of our own nation, in order to take possession of the land of other nations in the name of the Lord.' (Buys 1989:90).
their pointing out to Wuras that the land had been promised to the Korana in terms of the Maitland agreement, he berated them for their ‘devilishness’ and drove them off the land with the aid of sixty men. Yzerbek sent representatives to Philippolis to find out why Wuras had been allowed to buy Bethany from the Griqua for one pound sterling. Adam Kok III denied this and referred to the Maitland agreement in his reply (Buys 1989:88). On 24 August 1861, however, Wuras once again drove all Korana people who were not members of the B.M.S. off the land. It must also be noted that, since 1846 Bethany had been opened up to newcomers and hundreds of Tswana, Griqua and ‘Bastards’ came to settle there. In 1852, for example, only 80 Korana individuals were found compared to 179 Tswana whose presence in the region was practically unknown before 1846 (Maingard 1931:128). At the end of 1856 there were 150 Tswana huts compared to only 15 Korana huts (Van der Merwe 1985:62). In the light of this information it is fair to say that there was a deliberate process of reducing the Korana numbers.

Acting upon Wuras’ letter the O.F.S. Volksraad ruled that the Korana faction under Yzerbek had no claim to Bethany. The Volksraad resolution was ratified in 1862 when field-cornet S. Marais of the then Kaffir River district was sent to Bethany by the O.F.S. government in order to drive Yzerbek off the land (Buys 1989:90-91). Van der Merwe (1985:40-41, 51, 57, 60) argues that it was for purely pragmatic reasons that Wuras and the B.M.S. changed allegiances between the Korana and the Griqua and finally turned to the O.F.S. government for support. In other words, his view is that the B.M.S. did not care about the well-being of either group; they just wanted their property to be under the protection of the most influential polity. And, indeed, the B.M.S. did amass possessions and property on a grand scale. Under the leadership of Wuras the B.M.S. succeeded in increasing their original land tenure of five hectares at Bethany through land accessions to an

92 Sir Peregrine Maitland (Governor of the Cape colony from 1844 to 1847) made this treaty with Adam Kok III in 1846. Kok’s territory was divided into an inalienable and alienable part and it was also decided that: ‘From and out of the last mentioned division the lands heretofore enjoyed by the Korannas, under Chief Goliat, and by the Missionary Station at Bethany, shall be considered as excepted, which lands shall be preserved inviolate for the said Chief and station’ (Pretorius 1963:38).
enormous area of 42,000 hectares. Needless to say that it was the Korana who paid the price in this regard.

The Korana of Pniel

Jan Bloem (I) was a German sailor who left ship in Table Bay in about 1780. Here he got married, but after murdering his wife he fled from the Colony to the Trans-Gariep where he became the leader of the Springbok Korana or //Kübe ku (Engelbrecht 1936:56; Giliomee & Elphick; 1990:379; Penn 2005:198). He had between 10 and 12 wives, some of whom from Kats and Springbok Korana origin (Engelbrecht 1936:57; Fock 1971:58). The Springbok Korana were a prominent Korana group on the Vaal River in the vicinity of Klipdrift, the present-day Barkly West.

During the 1790s Jan Bloem (I) was a powerful disruptive force among the societies of the eastern and middle sections of the Trans-Gariep and he lived in a number of places, namely, Kheis, Langberg, Blinkklip and finally Lekatlong. Bloem met his end as he and his followers started to attack Sotho-Tswana communities to the north. After having mounted a failed expedition against the BaNgwakete in 1799 he was poisoned on his return (Penn 2005:198).

Jan Bloem (II) became the nominal head of the Korana group after his father’s death. In 1837, he settled near Klipdrift one of his father’s previous abodes. The Diamond Fields Advertiser (22 July 1895) printed the following sketch of Jan Bloem (II):

He was feared far and near. His manners were full of heathenish vices, as those of all Korana. Towards the missionaries he was very indifferent and averse to God’s word. Most of his people[,] as very many Korana[,] were of a rough, insensible and stupid nature, hardly knowing anything about God or about conjugal faithfulness, full of pride and laziness, and given to dancing and uncleanness.

Engelbrecht (1936:61) provides us with a similar description of Jan Bloem (II) and his people at Pniel:

93 The original land tenure was made by Adam Kok II in 1834, as I have remarked before. However, there is confusion about the surface of the land originally assigned to the B.M.S. Van Schoor and Moll (1962:28), for example, claim that it was 12 square miles (31 km² = 124 hectares). The surface area given here (42,000 ha) is what is indicated by Agri-Business Consultancy (S.A. Department of Land Affairs, Free State Province, Bethany Land Claim. Reference number AJO FS/151/1996:3-4).
There was little to remind the missionary that this same people had once listened to the preaching of men like Sass and Anderson: they are described as coarse, indifferent, conceited, lazy, given to drink and ignorant of all fidelity in marriage.

It was nevertheless the same Jan Bloem (II) who visited Wuras at Bethany in the year 1843 and who indicated his willingness to welcome a missionary among his people (Van der Merwe 1985:58). Wuras visited the area three times and considered it very suitable for the establishment of a mission station because of the availability of water and wood (Engelbrecht 1936:60-61; Fock 1971:58-59). The invitation from Jan Bloem (II) was thus accepted and Wuras established the Pniel mission station.

In the late 1850s, Cornelius Kok was selling off lands in the Pniel area of which he claimed ownership (Engelbrecht 1936:63). Wuras recognised the opportunity, stepped in and purchased lands adjoining the station from Cornelius Kok on 27 August 1857 for £ 75 (Fock 1971:60). Cornelius Kok concluded the deal, however, on condition that the land ‘was given over with a servitude that it should be used as a mission station, and that the Koranas should be kept on the ground’ (Warren 1880:81). But the B.M.S. did not respect their obligation to keep the Korana at the mission station.

As in the Bethany case, there were some Korana who regarded the sale as unlawful and as a violation of their rights. Jan Barend and Petrus Bloem were two of these leaders. Barend and Bloem also expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that Pniel was owned by the B.M.S. and not by the Korana when Dr H.T. Wangemann visited Pniel as inspector of German missions in 1867 (Engelbrecht 1936:65).

Griqualand West was declared a British territory on 27 October 1871 (See Chapter 4). Proclamation 67 of 1871 determined that no land rights would be jeopardised. Further, because the British Government disputed the transaction between Cornelius Kok and the B.M.S., Warren was tasked with the investigation regarding this issue. In his report Warren (1880:82) referred to Wuras’ view that the Korana people

*cannot be christians [sic] [and that the land] must belong to the church of the Berlin Mission, otherwise they [the Korana] must be turned off their lands and make room for others.*

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94 This sale brought the extent of Pniel up to 29 422 morgen (26 893 hectares) (Warren 1880:81). The Deed of Sale was concluded on 27 August 1857 and registered in the offices of the O.F.S. on 29 October 1857.
In Warren’s (1880:82) opinion, this was a reflection of ‘a species of missionary enterprise totally at variance’ with anything he had encountered before. He observed in his report:

This is a case in which the old inhabitants of the land are to be turned out, and working natives brought in for the good of the missionaries, instead of the missionaries working for the good of the people. Mr. Waras [sic] may possibly be quite correct in his statement that the Koranas cannot be christianised, and [that] therefore he must turn to the Batlhaping, but surely this system of his is foreign to the true spirit of missionary enterprise, and in violation of the terms under which he obtained the land …. [I]t does seem a remarkable method of carrying on missionary work, that this society should first obtain a grant of land, where natives are located, for the purpose of evangelizing them, and as a sequence to turn them out of their own lands, because the missionary body could not succeed in gaining their confidence (Warren 1880:82).

He continued that the desire of the B.M.S. to do as it pleased with the Pniel land and the people who inhabited it induced the B.M.S. to attempt to obtain full title to the property

in defiance of the rights of the Koranas, for whose benefit they obtained the land, with the power to drive them off the land, and with the will to drive them [off] if they will not become members of their church and work for the benefit of the mission (Warren 1880:82-83).

After repeated representations to the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, also by the German Chancellor Bismarck (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 5 February 1983), a grant was finally registered in the name of the Committee of the B.M.S. on 24 August 1881 on a perpetual quitrent basis (Land Register Folio 58, Audit Office No. 40 B, Folio 205). Over the course of years various evictions and forced removals took place. The considerable amount of money generated by the B.M.S. and its treatment of the inhabitants brought the mission society into conflict with both residents as well as with the Cape Government who sought measures to control the station (Erasmus et al 2008:25-31).95

95 For instance, the phenomenal diamond discoveries in January 1870 at Pniel contributed to the wealth of the B.M.S. According to the monthly newspaper of Barkly West Die Visarend (issue 15, January 2008:9) and the Diamond Fields Advertiser (5 February 1983), 25% of all findings had to be paid over to the B.M.S.
Pniel followed the same path as Bethany; it started out as a mission station for the Korana and ended up as a melting pot for various groups with Tswana and Griqua people making up the majority. According to Engelbrecht (1936:65) there were between 300 and 400 Korana in and around Pniel at the time of its establishment. By 1880, however, the Korana people were already outnumbered by Tswana and Griqua people. The marriage registers of Pniel show that the number of those considered to be Korana declined significantly in the course of the 1890s (Erasmus et al 2008:23). The drastic drop in numbers of Korana people at Pniel through the agency of the B.M.S. meant that they lost their claim to the land.

**Conclusion**

The data outlined here confirm that Korana polities in the O.F.S. had become fragmentary and had completely broken up by the 1870s. This was to a large degree a result of the disastrous fights with the Basotho, conflict over territory with the Boers, the policy and action of the Volksraad of the O.F.S. regarding the movement of indigenous groups and, finally, the specific treatment of the Korana people by the B.M.S. Three times the B.M.S. played a decisive role in the destruction of Korana communities and that for financial gain. Each time it was the mission society’s priority to lay claim to land and the Korana people were powerless in the face of the machinations of the B.M.S. In his book *Caput Bonae Spei Hodiernum* Peter Kolb (1719) voices the opinion that the biggest stumbling block in the way of

The B.M.S. was also criticised for exploiting residents in the area. In the opinion of W. Hall, Inspector of Native Locations, the ‘large number of Natives’ that were ‘scattered’ over Pniel land contributed ‘a considerable amount towards the finances of the B.M.S.’. They had to pay ‘10/- per annum rent, 10/- per annum towards the Church, and grazing fees ranging from 2/- per 10 sheep per annum to 3/- per horse per annum’ (*Diamond Fields Advertiser* (5 February 1983)). In an undated extract from the *Diamond Fields Advertiser* (NTS 153–4, 10/30) Mr J. van Praag also declared that: ‘The mission of such a Mission as this should be to settle natives on the land. The grant of land was made to them with that intention, and to educate the natives; but instead [their] mission seemed to be to collect as much revenue as they possibly could. They had never turned a single sod; never educated the natives in agricultural pursuits. They had simply looked upon the Mission ground as a milk cow for the benefit of Berlin, and the contractors and lessees even had to remit, under agreement, their money to Berlin’.
the conversion of the Khoekhoe was indeed the example set to them by Christians, a viewpoint later echoed by Yzerbek (cf Good 2006:89). The same could be said of the attitude and actions of the B.M.S. with regard to the Korana. Moreover, their lust for land played an important role in alienating land from the Korana, which in turn led to the disintegration and diaspora of the Korana.

The available data also confirm that the inhabitants of Mamusa had indeed been the last *functioning* socio-political Korana group. The outcome of the battle of Mamusa and especially the sequel to the battle thus determined the fate of the Korana in Southern Africa.

Despite frequent conflict in interests and confrontations between the different Korana factions the history also confirms an underlying bond and cohesion between these groups. As in the case of Yzerbek and David Danser, Yzerbek and Buffelbout or Jan Barend and Petrus Bloem, they could unite in the face of common dangers. As the next chapter points out, the S.A.R.’s land and ‘native’ policies represented such a common danger for indigenous communities and in order to survive it would be of great importance for them to stand together.
Chapter 4

The frontier policy and ethos of the Boers
LONDEN, 25 November 1883.

My lord.

De Deputatie van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek heeft de eer, ten vervolge op haar schrijven van 25 dezer 1) hierbij over te leggen:

1°. Een Ontwerp-Tractaat.

2°. Een Memorandum over de zuidwestelijke grenzen.

Ten aanzien van dit Ontwerp-Tractaat wordt nog opgemerkt:

a. dat, ter gemoetkoming aan de bedenkingen van Uw Lordschap, daarin geen gewag gemaakt wordt van de Conventie van Zand-rivier, hoewel de Deputatie daarmede niet geacht wil worden, haar vroeger ontwikkeld standpunt te hebben prijsgoegeven, noch ook de juistheid te hebben erkend van Uw Lordschaps opvatting van gemeld Tractaat.

b. dat de voorgestelde bepaling van Artikel 2 hare toelichting vindt in het Memorandum over de westelijke grenzen en te beschouwen is in verband met de denkbeelden aan het slot van dat stuk ontwikkeld.

c. dat de financiële kwestie en andere zaken van tijdelijken aard, naar ons oordeel, voegzamer te regelen waren in een afzonderlijk Protocol, dan in het Tractaat zelf.

d. Wat de voor Zuid-Afrika zoo belangrijke Naturellen-politiek betreft, meent de Deputatie, dat het zoowel in het belang der Inboorlingen-bevolking, als der blanke rassen is, dat de Regeringen der verschillende Koloniën en Staten hierin over een weder elkander vertrouwen en pogen te geraken tot eenparige regeling.

Reden, waarom de Deputatie bereid zou zijn, indien Uw Lordschap zulks begeeren mocht, hare gunstige overweging te schenken aan een regeling, waarbij bij voorbeeld bepaald wordt: a. dat de onderscheidene Gouvernements in Zuid-Afrika de verplichting op zich nemen, om elkander mededeeling te doen van hunne wetgeving en regeling in dit opzicht, en b. dat de verschillende Regeringen, behalve deze mededeeling, pogingen aanwenden, om door conferentie van gevollmachtigde Commissarissen tot eenparige regeling te geraken.

Wij hebben, enz.

(gest.) EWALD ESSELEN.
Secretaris.

(gesteekend) S. J. P. KRUGER.
S. J. DU TOIT.
N. J. SMIT.

Aan

den Hooggebornen Heer GRAAF DERBY,
enz. enz. enz.

1) No. 7.
Introduction

In the first chapter I have given an outline of ‘territory’ as metaphor in border cultures. The burning lust for land, together with what it represented and the attendant privileges of proprietorship, dominated the frontier policy of the S.A.R., and this will be the first focus of this chapter.

Apart from their land-hunger, the S.A.R.’s relations with the Africans were largely determined by their labour needs. These two factors dictated their so-called native policy, and this is the second topic that will be addressed. The issue of delimiting and of staking out borders was central to the native policy of the Boer republic. The Korana people were wholly opposed to this, and they also opposed the concomitant meanings, such as citizenship and nationality which were produced, established or transformed by the demarcation of land. It is important to stress that this question was brought up later as one of the main justifications of S.A.R. military action against the Korana community of Mamusa.

Like Tomaselli (in Lange 2006:372) Adhikari (2010:19) explains the nature of the encounter between white people and the Bushmen as one of clashing world-views. The settlers’ world-view was that the Bushman was ‘other’, different, and as such they had to be vanquished. The same can be said of the ethos shared by the broader Boer community of the Western Transvaal. S.A.R.-ism produced a border culture of excessive violence, a mechanism of systematic domination and control, and a hegemonic paternalism toward the other. Not only does the Boers’ world-view represent an important determinant in terms of which the inhuman and excessive violence against the Korana people has to be understood and explained, but it also gave the Boers the ‘right’ and power to constitute the society, to prohibit and exclude reinterpretations and to fix what will be regarded as right and wrong. The Boers’ world-view is thus the third focus of this chapter.

The land question

The land of the conqueror

Grave social, economic and political unrest in Southern Africa gave rise to forced migrations on a large scale during the first part of the nineteenth century. These migrations came to be known as the mfecane (in the singular form) or the difaqane (in the plural). Much has been written about the causes, consequences and
authenticity of the *difaqane*. The general view is that a chain reaction of attack, counter-attack, destruction and dispersion started under Mzilikazi in Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal). The wave of destruction that kept rolling on reached the south-western parts of the Transvaal during the 1820s and it blighted the entire Sotho-Tswana area. By 1832 the Western Transvaal was under direct Ndebele control and many Tswana captaincies had disintegrated and scattered to the four winds or, alternatively, been subjugated by Mzilikazi. According to Cornwell (1988:99) the fact that the Tswana were ill-equipped for war, that their occupied territories were difficult to defend and that there was no leadership to unite them in their resistance against the Ndebele leader contributed to this outcome. The Taibosch Korana were, like the Tswana people, targeted by these attacks.

It must be noted that some modern historians challenge the generally accepted explanation of the *difaqane* as outlined above. Etherington (2004:204), for example, believes that the legend of the *difaqane* with a sole Zulu origin is incorrect and a mere historical invention. He claims that many independent causes of disruption contributed to the enormous loss of lives and possessions even though there have never been any credible estimates. Etherington (2004:210) further claims that white people were also involved in the events and that the claim that African people were the sole instigators of the violence was made by white people wanting to cover up their involvement. It is indeed true that white people played a big part in the slave-trade in order to supply labour to the Cape Colony as well as to slave markets on the east coast of Africa. And the same can be said of Griqua and Korana people who, with their guns and on horseback, went raiding cattle and children and who disrupted food supplies (Manson 1992:87). The Korana leader, Piet Witvoet, was especially notorious for this kind of behaviour along the Caledon River and the southern and south-eastern parts of the O.F.S. (Engelbrecht 1937:18).

The great numbers of Trek Boers and Voortrekkers were, however, not as adversely affected by the *difaqane* as some other groups. The Boers believed and embraced the idea that the *difaqane* transformed the central interior into a wild,
empty wilderness ready for the taking. The fact that they were party to driving out Mzilikazi further meant that they could claim land on account of occupation rights as well as on the basis of the rights of conquest. Hoon (1950:5) remarks that in the light of native rights of conquest the Korana viewed the land where they lived as the lawful property of the Boers. Marais (1969:13) voices a similar opinion. But such views do not take all factors into account.

One has to remember that the Korana of Mamusa who stood under Massouw Rijt Taibosch were the only indigenous group of the Western Transvaal who had not been driven from their land by Mzilikazi despite several attempts of his to do so (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2; Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:8; Clark 1883:17; Liebenberg 1990:15). In fact, because the Taibosch Korana could stave off Mzilikazi’s threat, a number of fugitive groups, among whom the Links Korana and individuals from Sotho-Tswana extraction, took refuge in Mamusa. Like the Griqua the Korana, whose guns and horses put them in a favourable position, affected repeated raids on Mzilikazi’s cattle outposts (Lye & Murray 1980:33). Thus, in order to secure his cattle Mzilikazi had to deploy more soldiers at the posts with the result that there were fewer soldiers available for his war campaigns. Potgieter’s men, who attacked Mzilikazi in 1837, were reinforced on more than one occasion by Korana fighters under Gert Taibosch, as well as by a number of fighters from other indigenous communities such as the Griqua, the Baralong and the Bahurutshe. Without them Potgieter would not have had the same degree of success he finally claimed to have had (cf Engelbrecht 1936:36; Rasmussen 1975:277; Cornwell 1988:100; Manson 1992:88).

98 Perhaps the best way to illustrate this viewpoint is to refer to the argument used by the state attorney, Advocate F. Kleyn, before the Bloemhof Arbitration Court I will touch upon again later. In order to give proof of the S.A.R.’s occupation rights he argued that Europeans entering land occupied by Africans automatically became the masters of the territory. Kleyn firmly believed that Africans had no rights that could override the rights of white people. Everything belonged to white people and, whatever seemed to belong to African people, was theirs by the kind permission of Europeans (Minnaar 1938:45–46).

99 The Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette (Vol. V (253), 10 March 1855) reported in this regard that Mzilikazi, according to the missionary Robert Moffat, said: ‘having been made to suffer from Griqua and Coranna [sic] attacks […] he wishes them to keep at a respectful distance.’
But Potgieter and his allies did not have lasting success in driving back Mzilikazi. Potgieter’s attack on Mosega on 2 January 1837 was indecisive as there were mostly old men, women and children in the settlement while their real targets, Mzilikazi and his men, were elsewhere (Starfield 2008:72). During June 1837 Dingane meted out heavy losses for Mzilikazi so that the latter started moving his people and possessions northward (Cornwell 1988:101). The attack of Potgieter and Pieter Uys the same year in November against Mzilikazi’s already weakened stronghold at Kapain (Egabeni or Silkaatskop) was more successful, but again missed their quarry who had already moved his settlement northward (Starfield 2008:72). Thus, one must admit that the Korana people had a longer history of occupation than the Boers and that they were never subjugated by Mzilikazi. Moreover, like the Boers, they would be entitled to some degree to rights of conquest.

Arbitration

Next, the fact that the Boers were determined to occupy all available land forced indigenous leaders such as Mankuroane, Montshiwa and Nicolas Waterboer to defend their people’s diminishing land rights as best they could. In order to do so, they tendered their allegiance to Her Majesty’s Government in 1870. Sir Henry Barkly, the then High Commissioner of South Africa, however, declined to consider the tender of allegiance until the border with the S.A.R. and the land disputes had been settled (Manson 1992:89; Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette Vol. XXIII (1156) 20 March 1873). The discovery of diamonds in 1867 exacerbated the situation as various parties had come forward to lay claim to the diamond-rich fields. The different parties concerned agreed that an arbitration court should sit at Bloemhof and the sitting commenced on 5 April 1871 under the jurisdiction of two arbitrators: J. Campbell, a Cape of Good Hope Punishment Magistrate and A.A. O’Reilly, a Landdrost from Wakkerstroom. But at the end of the court’s sitting (19 June 1871) the two arbitrators differed in their findings. Thus, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, all the documentation of the court proceedings was submitted to Lieutenant-Governor R.W. Keate from Natal as referee (Minnaar 1938:4-5; LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:13). His verdict, commonly known as the Keate award, was published on 17 October of the same year (Maree 1952:7

100 The S.A.R., O.F.S., the Griqua, Batlhaping, Barolong, Korana and the B.M.S. were interested in this area.
and *Imperial Blue Book* C.-4889, 1886:35). And on 21 October 1871, almost directly after the publication of Keate’s verdict, Sir H. Barkly proclaimed the area to be a British crown colony as Waterboer had requested. It would be known as Griqualand West by virtue of the Griqualand West Proclamation No. 67 of 1871, dated 27 October 1871, and the boundaries of the British crown colony were set out in Proclamation No. 20 of 1873.101 Griqualand West was not immediately incorporated into the Cape Colony; this happened only later by virtue of the Cape Act No. 39 of 1877.

According to Theal (in Minnaar 1938:6) the S.A.R. ‘went into court utterly unprepared to conduct its case properly’ so that the Keate award had to favour Mankuroane and Waterboer (cf Agar-Hamilton 1929:21; De Jager 1994:7).102 Mahura and Andries Waterboer agreed upon a boundary line between them in circa 1828 (Arnot & Orpen 1875:7). This line was identical to the one used by Keate to divide the territories of the Batlhaping and the Griqua. Keate also defined the territory of the Tswana in general, as well as that of the Batlhaping in particular (*Bechuanaland, Batlhaping territory. Petition of Mr David Arnot*).

**The Korana people and land claims**

Although Massouw Rijt Taibosch also laid claim to the diamond fields, he was not given the opportunity to appear before the commission, and unlike the O.F.S. the Korana people would never receive compensation for any loss (cf Boon 1885:603). According to Clark, (1883:6-7), the Keate award gave away Massouw Rijt Taibosch’s land without his knowledge and without his being consulted in any way. Clark (1883:6-7) further states very firmly that the land in question did not belong to the Batlhaping at all, but to the oldest inhabitants, the Korana and this point also finds support in what other historians say about the verdict made by Keate (Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:8; Lindley 1873: 1-15).

But in 1872 Massouw Rijt Taibosch and his son David Massouw, together with Johannes Links and their councillors, objected strongly against the Keate award in a letter addressed to President T.F. Burgers as the successor of President

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101 Proclamation 67 of 1871 stipulated that no land rights would be jeopardised and that a land court would be instituted for the investigation of all claims (*Imperial Blue Book* C.-4889, 1886).

102 The validity of Theal’s statement was examined by Minnaar in his master’s dissertation.
M.W. Pretorius. According to them the territory north of the Vaal River belonged to the Korana and it could thus not be awarded to Nicolas Waterboer. Long before Andries Waterboer appeared on the scene the Korana people were inhabiting the area. It was in fact they, the Korana people, who had given Andries Waterboer, the ruler of the Griqua from 1821 to 1853, permission to live there. They emphasised that Waterboer was only given occupational rights. Apart from the historical depth of the claims made by the Korana people, Warren (1880:8) points out that the majority of people in and around Griquatown were in fact Korana people; Griquatown, owed its name to the fact that the leading men were Griquas, for it is certain that Korannas formed the bulk of the community. The town might with equal felicity have been called Korannatown, and the land Korannaland.

Paramount chiefs and expansion of territory

There were two other significant clauses in the Keate award. First, it indicated who the lawful paramount chiefs of the different indigenous groups were in the eyes of the British government. During the Bloemhof arbitration Mankuroane claimed to be paramount chief of the whole area and said that the Korana were his subjects (Clark 1883:27). It is not clear on which grounds these claims were made since he, together with Botlasitse Gasebone, Barend Bloem, Matlabani and Bogasieu, had made the following declaration at Taung the previous year (10 August 1870):

[We] came into this country and found the several territories since in our occupation, or claimed by us, in possession of Jan, Kapitein (Taaibosch), the Paramount Chief of the Korana people (Lindley 1873:14).

They also acknowledged Massouw Rijt Taaibosch as the rightful hereditary and territorial chief, stating that the Korana had won the rights to the territory north of the Vaal River by conquest; while they had received their rights of

103 When one reads TAB SS V1142–R6231-1885-part 2 against the open resistance of Yzerbek and Witvoet against Griqua dominion and the evidence laid before the Griqualand West Land Court (1877:9–11) it is clear that the Korana did not accept Waterboer or any other Griqua leader as their paramount chief (See also Chapter 3). Killian’s (2009:18) claim to this effect is clearly refuted.

104 The reference here is to Jan Taaibosch (I), that is, to ’Knou-bib. See the genealogical chart in Chapter 2.
occupation from the Korana they also wished to emphasise that they did not acknowledge Waterboer nor his claims to territory in any way (Lindley 1873:15). Less than a year later Mankuroane contradicted this declaration and his new statement was accepted by the Keate arbitration. Mankuroane and Montshiwa were acknowledged as paramount chiefs of the Batlhaping and the Barolong people respectively, a ruling that was rejected in the strongest terms by Botlasitse Gasebone of the Batlhaping, Moshete of the Barolong as well as by Massouw Rijt Taibosch (Williams 1885:5). The S.A.R., in fact, regarded Mankuroane as a subchief of Massouw Rijt Taibosch (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary). It must also be pointed out that some British officials also disagreed with Keate’s findings. In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection (1883:16), for example, reference is made to Mankuroane as ‘the so-called Paramount Chief of the Batlapins [sic] [...] over whom he had no authority according to native law’ (my emphasis). Warren (in Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883:30), writing to Colonel Lanyon on 17 November 1878 exclaimed as follows:

‘[T]he power hitherto assumed over other tribes by the Chief Monkoroane [sic], and which he has never been strong enough to exercise, has been a fruitful source of irritation among the natives of these territories, and I have to submit that if he were at once relieved of this position, general peace of those territories would be accelerated.

In his misappropriated capacity as paramount chief Mankuroane made a proclamation on 5 June 1877 in which he called his ‘rebellious subjects’ to order. He included a direct reference to the Korana and warned that he would take armed action against his subjects who did not heed the proclamation. This was an attempt by Mankuroane (in Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883:30) at masking his shaky position as the proclamation included this preventative ruling: ‘I do hereby prohibit the sale of Fire-arms and Ammunition throughout my country, with the exception of my chief place, “Taungs”. Mankuorane could not enforce this ruling and the other chiefs continued arming themselves.

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105 The diary of Klein Adriaan (A.J.G.) de la Rey, brother of General Koos de la Rey, sons of Groot/Lang Adriaan (also A.J.G.) de la Rey, has been a valuable source of information of the time and events I describe in this book. The diary entries reflect the border culture and fill in detail about crucial occurrences (See especially Chapter 5 to 7). A copy of the diary is currently in possession of Dr T. Roos, a resident of Schweizer-Reneke. Full information is given in the bibliography.
The Keate award further determined the western border of the S.A.R., and the territory of Massouw Rijt Taibosch east of the Harts River was declared part of Mankuroane’s territory (Du Plessis 1993:121) (See Map 2). Before the Keate award the western border of the S.A.R. was left undetermined by the Sand River Convention of 1852 (Delport 1968:8). Ramoroka (2009:40) gives the following reason for this:

the Boers were scattered all over the interior and it would have been too costly for the British to protect every indigenous community whose land was being encroached upon by the Boers.

But Britain insisted in the agreement that the territory of the S.A.R. could not be expanded, while they themselves revoked all treaties and alliances with the indigenous groups north of the Vaal River (Cornwell 1988:100). Britain’s understanding was that the S.A.R. would not be allowed to ‘carry out a native policy on any other line than those adopted by Great Britain’ (Bristol Selected Pamphlets (BSP), 1876:3). The S.A.R., however, did not respect their undertaking with respect to territorial expansion nor with regard to native policy. On 29 October 1868, just after the discovery of diamonds on the banks of the Vaal River, M.W. Pretorius, for example, issued a proclamation whereby he, on the grounds of the rights of conquest, rights of occupation and different agreements with indigenous leaders claimed almost the entire Bechuanaland, that is the area stretching from Langberg up to the Lake Ngami, Mamusa included, was declared S.A.R. territory (Staatscourant Z.A.R. 29 April 1868; Bellows 1900:2). The motivation for this proclamation was to have the gold fields of the Limpopo as well as the diamond fields along the Vaal River at Barkly West fall inside S.A.R. territory. M.W. Pretorius also wanted to control the trade route to the north and gain access to the sea (Delport 1968:9; Cornwell 1988:101). Although M.W. Pretorius was later obliged to retract this proclamation under British pressure and the protest of the diggers, he allowed S.A.R. Boers to settle in great numbers in this area by entering into agreements with indigenous leaders (Delport 1968:10; Du Plessis 1993:70; Krüger 1930:8-9). On 9 August 1870, for example, he entered into a treaty of friendship with Massouw Rijt Taibosch in which the latter signed away any claims to the territory between the Harts and Vaal rivers while M.W. Pretorius undertook, as if he were the lawful owner of the area, to give Mamusa to the Korana as their abode (Bester & Van Eeden 1999:414).
The borderline Keate proposed was about 320 kilometres east of the area claimed by the S.A.R. through the proclamation discussed above. It was thus not originally part of S.A.R. territory as Du Toit (1983:45) claimed it to be. Keate did what Britain did not initially do during the Sand River Convention, viz. he judged upon evidence brought before him that there were Boers who occupied farms to which they had no rightful claim (LSE Selected pamphlets, 1884:13). The S.A.R. did not recognise the borderline as decided upon by Keate and their disillusionment with the Keate award forced President M.W. Pretorius and Advocate F. Kleyn to resign (Agar-Hamilton 1929:21; Barrett 1989:10).

Like M.W. Pretorius did before him Burgers wanted to counter British imperialism and expand S.A.R. territory through treaties with indigenous leaders. However, since 1870 Montshiwa, who was at this stage the most influential of the Barolong chiefs according to Plaatje (1976), strongly resisted S.A.R. endeavours to obtain occupation rights to Barolong territory. The offer M.W. Pretorius made Montshiwa as his so-called ‘honoured friend and ally’ (WaardeVriend en Bondgenoot) should he renounce his claims to land was simply to be recognised as paramount chief by the S.A.R., an offer Montshiwa rejected outright (Starfield 2008:76, 79).

Burgers, however, ‘clever enough to mend the harm done’ (Cornwell, 1988:102) by the Keate award had found a way to exploit the differences between the Barolong chiefs. According to Ramoroka (2009:42-43)

> he made an oral survey into the history of the Barolong and learnt that Ratlou had been the king of all the Barolong after the death of his father Tau. He was thus the eldest legitimate son to ascend to the Barolong kingship. Urged by these findings, Burgers approached Moshete, who was the eldest son of Ratlou and an heir to the throne of the Barolong boo Ratlou chieftainship. At that stage Moshete was working on a Boer farm in Khunwana. The [S.A.R.] government intensely influenced Moshete with the notion of being ‘paramount chief’ over the entire Barolong because they wanted him to hand over land to them, thus paralysing Montshiwa’s resistance against Boer expansion.

During 1874 Burgers did indeed succeed in entering into an agreement about land with Moshete who, ironically, had earlier sought British protection against the Boers (Starfield 2008:93). In exchange for the Barolong renouncing land claims to territory to the north and to the west of the Vaal River he would be recognised by the S.A.R. as paramount chief of the Barolong.
Montshiwa reacted vehemently against this treaty and declared that Moshete did not have the authority to enter into agreements without his consent. While Moshete was indeed genealogically the more senior pretender to the Barolong throne, it was also true that the different Barolong tribes were independent polities and they were not willing to cede their independence (Ramoroka 2009:44). The recognition of Moshete’s paramountcy by the S.A.R. was thus nothing but empty flattery in order to manipulate the Barolong leader to help further the S.A.R.’s interests. Through their recognition of Montshiwa as paramount chief Britain, on the other hand, could manipulate the Barolong chief’s resistance to the Boers to their advantage.

**Land deals and increased strife**

The battle of Mamusa can be better understood against the background of similar land negotiations between the Korana and Burgers. The implication of the Keate line was that the Boers living between the south-western border of the S.A.R. and the Kalahari desert did so under the authority of the different Batlhaping, Barolong and Korana chiefs. After the Keate award G. Donovan of the S.A.R. helped to negotiate land claims of S.A.R. burghers with the indigenous leaders in the so-called Keate area (Du Plessis 1993:163-165; Malan 1958:142). He was thus acting as an agent of the S.A.R. carrying out orders from Joubert (TAB SS V690-R3945-1882). Massouw Rijt Taaibosch was aware of this and did not trust him. Thus, when G. Donovan encouraged Massouw Rijt Taaibosch in writing to defer to S.A.R. authority in exchange for territory, the Korana chief turned to the British magistrate Campbell in Barkly West and requested to become a British subject on 9 June 1871. In this request, which was drafted by D. Arnot on behalf of Massouw Rijt Taaibosch, the Korana chief declared that he wanted nothing to do with the S.A.R. and that the republic wanted to award him farms that already belonged to him. The British government did not want to heed this request and after G. Donovan had succeeded in convincing the Korana to appoint him as their agent he also convinced them to enter into an agreement with the S.A.R. government. Massouw Rijt Taaibosch, Johannes Links and their council (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2) wrote to Burgers on 29 February 1872 that their ‘voice was weak and their hands were paralysed’ (*ons stem is swak en ons hande is lam*), and that this was the reason why they had decided to place their territory under the authority of the S.A.R. The outcome of this request was that a special meeting
was held between Burgers and authorised representatives of the Korana people residing north of the Vaal River in November of that year. On 29 November 1872 the parties concerned (with David Massouw signing on behalf of his too weak father) publicly entered into a treaty of submission, fidelity and cession of land at Mamusa. According to the regulations of this treaty (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2):

- The Korana people ceded all their rights and claims to land north of the Vaal River, that is, an estimate of about 200 000 morgen or 182 815 hectares.
- The Korana would be faithful subjects of the S.A.R. from that date on. Burgers, in return, assumed authority over the territory concerned as well as over the faithful submission of the Korana and would do so with the assistance and upon the advice of the Executive Council of the S.A.R.
- Massouw Rijt Taaibosch was recognised as paramount chief of his people living in the territory and they were to be subject to his authority which included judicature except for the administration of the death penalty.
- Burgers and the Executive Council undertook to transfer two farms in the Bloemhof district, viz. Mooifontein and perhaps Wurmfontein which were the property of H.J.J. Louw as soon as possible to Massouw Rijt Taaibosch. Should this not be possible other suitable farms with the same value and extent would be found. (This was part of the territory that was originally alienated from the Korana when M.W. Pretorius proclaimed the Bloemhof district along the Harts River in 1869 (Krüger 1930:8). Captain Johannes Links lived there as was agreed upon with Massouw Rijt Taaibosch (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).)
- Unrestricted access to watering on the Harts River was granted to Massouw Rijt Taaibosch and this right would be conveyed to his successors.
- The Korana would be free of land taxation on land conveyed to them.
- The chief and his council would have the right to alienate land.

106 In a memorandum dated 26 January 1925 an official writes that mention was made in a secret Volksraad decision of the S.A.R. to the treaty of cession of land entered upon by Massouw Rijt Taaibosch and the S.A.R. on 25 November 1872 as well as to a letter by G. Donovan written on 22 May of that year. Both these documents were recorded in the register of letters received, but they were removed for some or other reason (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Among the documents found by H. Pretorius on 4 December 1885 in the house of David Massouw copies of these documents were found (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-deel 2).
The borderlines of land granted to the Korana had to be demarcated by a commission.

G. Donovan would act as representative of the Korana. (The irony is obvious: someone distrusted by the Korana and who was in actual fact an agent of the S.A.R. was forced upon the Korana people as their advisor and representative. G. Donovan was later employed by the S.A.R. to determine the border between them and the Korana (Malan 1958:142). He also received 60 000 morgen or 51 402 hectares of Korana land as compensation for securing the treaty with Massouw Rijt Taibosch (Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette Vol. XXV (1300), 30 December 1875)).

Maree (1969:29) concludes, based on this treaty, that the Korana people were subjects of the S.A.R. and that they submitted themselves to the republic’s authority willingly. The course of events that led up to this treaty, the fact that the Korana sought aid from Britain, the *modus operandi* of the S.A.R. and their agent G. Donovan, not to mention the fact that Burgers was intentionally campaigning to expand the S.A.R., all suggest that the Korana people were victims of an intrigue. As we will see, the S.A.R. did not keep to what they undertook in this treaty with the Korana people.

In the next year, that is 1873, Burgers employed a similar strategy as the one he had followed with the Barolong in his dealings with the Batlhaping by exploiting differences between chief Matlabane and chief Botlasitse Gasebone. In exchange for his land between the Vaal and the Harts rivers, Botlasitse Gasebone was recognised as paramount chief of the Batlhaping. He and his followers would become subjects of the S.A.R. and he could rule over them in demarcated locations in relative security (Cornwell 1988:102). Rev. John Mackenzie could not understand why the S.A.R. would recognise the paramountcy of Massouw Rijt Taibosch, Moshete and Botlasitse Gasebone (*LSE Selected pamphlets* 1884:14). The answer is, however, very simple: Burgers did it in exchange for land cessions and in order to profit from their lack of knowledge (Cornwell 1988:102). The territory Burgers gained in this way was proclaimed part of the S.A.R. and, in so doing, he expanded S.A.R. territory (Agar-Hamilton 1929:21). As in the case of M.W. Pretorius Britain refused to recognise the proclamation by Burgers (Krüger 1930:10).

Mankuroane was also targeted by Burgers. In a letter dated 19 January 1874 Mankuroane was informed by the landdrost of Christiana that Burgers would meet with him in this town on 9 February 1874. In answer to Burgers, Mankuroane strongly objected to the land treaties the former made with the Korana people as
well as with Moshete and Botlasitse Gasebone (TAB SS V179-R2007-1874). He refused to submit to the S.A.R. and invoked the Keate award in terms of which the land fell inside his territory and the leaders concerned were his subjects. Mankuroane also drew Burgers’ attention to his alliance with Britain. As in Mahura’s case, the S.A.R. and Burgers had no success with Mankuroane (Cornwell 1988:101). As a consequence Burgers could not resolve the quarrels over land between the Korana people and Mankuroane. Massouw Rijt Taalbosch was therefore compelled to write to the S.A.R. government on 22 April 1875. He accused the S.A.R. in this letter that they did not protect his land rights as was agreed upon in the 1872 treaty and he threatened to repudiate it. He also emphasised that his territory was not to be subdivided and confirmed that there was no hut tax payable (TAB SS V187-R937-1875). In other words, the view of the Korana people was that the territory had not been alienated from them by the 1872 treaty but was still theirs.

The persisting conflict and enmity between the different indigenous groups led to the High Commission in Cape Town’s requesting Warren to demarcate the borderline between the indigenous groups concerned, a task which kept him busy from 27 October 1878 up to the end of December 1878 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883:7). In 1880 Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Moysey was appointed to investigate land claims in the Keate award territory (Publication of the National Union, No. 110, 1884:1 and TAB ZAR V164-No. 8-1884). As has been mentioned, the fact that the Sand River Convention left the western border of the S.A.R. indeterminate gave the Boers the chance to expand their territory as they saw fit. Moysey thus found that between October 1869 and January 1871 350 farms had been inspected by the S.A.R. with an eye to confirm their burghers’ claims to them. Moysey took a strong stand against misappropriating land in this

107 Mankuroane played this card more than once when his position was endangered by the Boers, the Korana or any of his so-called sub tribes. This point was emphasised, for example, in 1872, 1878 and 1879 (cf TAB SS V290-R2319-1878; Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection 1883:31; Cape of Good Hope 1883; Imperial Blue Book A.-58, 1883).

108 Several factors contributed to Burgers becoming increasingly unpopular. He could not satisfy in the S.A.R.’s need for land, he planned to give free education and some degree of independence to the indigenous groups, and his military action against Sekukuni failed. This gave S.P.J. Kruger and Joubert the chance to get rid of him (Barrett 1989:15-26).
way and emphasised the necessity of proof of occupation before any claim could be allowed (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889 1886:38).

The indigenous leaders who were affected by this action of the Boers were highly troubled by the events. In May 1878 between 300 and 400 wagons with almost a thousand followers of Mankuroane, Matlhabane, Molema and Montshiwa were gathered together at Soutpan (north of Mamusa between the Hart River and the Pretoria Convention Line of 1881) while David Massouw was also asked to join them. The exact intention of this meeting is not clear but it is speculated that the indigenous leaders wanted to bring a friendly visit to the British Resident in Pretoria (TAB SS V277-R1266-1878). The following clues can possibly elucidate the situation. David Massouw signed a deed of submission to Britain on 3 September 1878 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883:23), while these same leaders petitioned six months later, on the 19 November 1878, to be placed under British rule in order to resist the westward expansion of the S.A.R. and its implications for the security of their lands (Cape of Good Hope 1883:12-13; Du Plessis 1993:137-140). Two conclusions can be made here. First, the indigenous leaders were willing to unite in the face of a common danger, viz. the S.A.R., despite mutual disagreements. This exposes the degree to which conflict between these leaders was artificially created and blown up. Second, David Massouw was, just as his father had been in 1871, initially in favour of submitting to British rule. He probably changed his opinion after he had to cede land to the S.A.R. in 1881 through British's action. The fact that he was seen by them as a subordinate of Mankuroane while the Transvaal government recognised him as paramount chief probably influenced him too.

By virtue of the Pretoria Convention, signed 3 August 1881, the British Government handed over the S.A.R. to the Boers. The convention, on the one hand, laid down a new boundary line on the south-western boundary of the S.A.R. This new boundary took a large portion of the Keate award territory away from the indigenous peoples and handed it over to the S.A.R. (See Map 2). On the other hand, the convention stipulated certain conditions, among which the protection of the ‘native races’ and an engagement not to encroach on ‘native territories’ (Bellows 1900:11). Although there were a great number of indigenous leaders from the S.A.R., Griqualand West and Bechuanaland attending the proceedings in Pretoria they were, to their dismay, never consulted about any issues nor given the chance to make any suggestions (Molema s.a.:59).
Moysey was tasked with demarcating the new borderline (Z.A.R. 164-8:29). But, because they had not been consulted about it, David Massouw and Moshete refused to recognise the proposed borderline. Where David Massouw was concerned, the new convention line divided his territory into two with Mamusa on the western banks of the Harts River falling outside Transvaal territory, but with the greater part of his grazing now falling within the borders of the new S.A.R. David Massouw also believed that the new line weakened his position and gave Mankuroane the opportunity to show his paramountcy over the Korana people by force (Bester & Van Eeden 1999:14; Clark 1883:30-31; Delport 1968:13; Liebenberg 1990:20). Thus, when Moysey arrived on 12 October 1881 at Mamusa to inform David Massouw of the new borderline, the latter made him (as he would later do in the case of the S.A.R.) to understand very clearly that he would destroy any beacons Moysey erected to stake out the land. The following day he arrived with about 80 armed men at Moysey’s camp and forced him to leave the area. David Massouw was thus ready on more than one occasion to act with rigour when it came to land questions.

The S.A.R. did little to respect or implement the regulations of the Pretoria Convention and continued with deliberate westward expansion of their territory at the risk of fanning conflict (Barrett 1989:56; Bellows 1900:4). In an attempt to establish peace on the western border, but also to prevent Mankuroane and Montshiwa from being driven from the area or absorbed by the S.A.R., the British government was forced to tend to these issues (cf Agar-Hamilton 1929:22; Hall 1973:184; Krüger 1930:28). The Earl of Derby thus undertook to receive a delegation from the S.A.R. in his capacity as Colonial Secretary. The delegation consisted of President S.P.J. Kruger, S.J. du Toit, Superintendent of Education and General N.J. Smit, and they visited London in November 1883. The basic argument of the S.A.R. delegation was that the Keate award caused unrest among the different indigenous groups on the western border, because of the position of the borderline and the recognition of chieftainships (Z.A.R. 164-8). This was, of course, a skewed perspective as the S.A.R. was directly responsible for the creation of this situation. The delegation argued that the S.A.R. should be allowed to expand its borders westward so that the fighting factions would fall inside S.A.R. territory thus allowing them to exercise their control and re-establish peace (Z.A.R. 164-8).

Within some circles in Britain, the S.A.R. delegation and their proposal were strongly censured. I mention some of the arguments that were voiced.
The existing borderline was not the reason for the conflict between the various indigenous groups as the S.A.R. tried to suggest (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:13). The S.A.R. did not need more land because there were at any rate only about 50 000 farmers (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:17). The S.A.R. had a weak government and would not be able to enforce peace among the indigenous groups as was their undertaking (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:10). Concerning the last point of criticism, it must be noted that the situation in the S.A.R. was truly chaotic (Manson 1998:491; Cornwell 1988:101). Political anarchy, social disunion and civil war were at the order of the day (BSP 1876:1; Barrett 1989:9; Morton 1992:100). Maladministration and commercial bankruptcy were staring the government in the face (cf Manson 1992:95-96; Botha 1900:17; Bellows 1900:3). The S.A.R.’s undertaking to establish peace among indigenous groups could indeed be questioned, especially since the S.A.R. was in some cases the instigator of the conflict.

The negotiations between the S.A.R. and Britain led to the signing of the London Convention on 27 February 1884. A new south-western boundary was proposed, the western border of the S.A.R. was pushed further westward from the Harts River to the Marokane hills and a British Protectorate was established to the west of the new S.A.R. boundary line (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:48). This meant that Mamusa would henceforth fall inside the S.A.R. (See Map 2). The Korana people lost their independence and would now be subjects of the S.A.R. under S.A.R. authority (cf Bester & Van Eeden 1999:415; Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:8; Delport 1968:18; Liebenberg 1990:21). David Massouw realised this and immediately raised objections through a proclamation on 10 March 1884 (Goldman 1927:79). In the proclamation, which was published in De Volkstem of 26 April 1884, David Massouw strongly protested against the fact that he was not part of any discussions or decisions regarding the establishment of the new borderline. He declared that he would not acknowledge, accept, or allow any part of his territory to be hacked off, and that the Korana would not submit themselves to any authority trying to usurp their territory (Imperial Imperial Blue Book C.-4194, 1884:19-20). Thus, as previously, the Korana were passed over in the determination of the new borderline. Captain Graham Bower, who was the private secretary of the High Commissioner Sir Hercules Robinson, predicted that this situation would cause problems with the Korana (Delport 1968:9).

On 24 January 1885 Kruger and Warren met at Fourteen Streams and agreed that both parties would appoint commissioners to demarcate the new
western border. Because the S.A.R. granted land of David Massouw to farmers the new line did indeed lead to confrontations between David Massouw and the S.A.R. Naturally, David Massouw did not recognise the S.A.R.’s rights to this land and he continued exploiting it as before. As a result, his subjects were prosecuted on the grounds that they were living ‘illegally’ on Boers’ land or were ‘illegally’ cutting down wood, and so on (TAB SS V1064-R2407-1885). This unrighteous way of dealing with David Massouw and the Korana people (and as a matter of fact with all indigenous people) was legitimised by a peculiar kind of ‘native policy’. The S.A.R.’s ‘native policy’ is thus the focus of the next section.

The ‘native policy’ of the S.A.R.

The S.A.R. Superintendent of Natives disposed over extensive and autocratic powers with regard to the administration of the ‘natives’. This was due to the fact that his office was tied to that of the head of the army (Commandant-General) and this gives a clear indication of the way in which the S.A.R. enforced its so-called native policy. Disgruntlement under the indigenous groups met with military action as was the case with the Matebele of Mokopane (1854), the Bapedi of Sekhukhuni (1876), the Ndebele of Ndzhundza (1882 to 1883), the Ndebele of Mapoch (1883) and the Bagananwa of Lebogo (1894 to 1895). Mamusa was thus in no way an isolated case.

The S.A.R.’s violent military implementation of their native policy can be explained to a large degree in the light of the underdeveloped en unstable democracy that existed in the S.A.R. (Marx 2008:55). The S.A.R. did not function like a modern state since the hegemony of the government over the judicial landscape was absolute. The constitution of the S.A.R., for example, placed the power of the judiciary below that of the Volksraad. A vote of the fifteen members of the Volksraad in a secret sitting could at any time override and annul a sentence of the high court. Judges of the high court were also deprived of the right to test the validity of any law in its relation to the constitution and they were compelled to accept as law, without question or reservation, any resolution passed by the Volksraad (Butler 1900:49).

The S.A.R. ensconced the principle of no equality between white people and African people in their constitution of 1858 and the vote was reserved for white people only. The relevant section of the Constitution of 1858 states: ‘The people will admit of no equality of persons of colour with the white inhabitants, neither
in Church nor in State’ (cf www.sahistory.org.za).\textsuperscript{109} The legislative implication for the indigenous groups was that they could not enjoy any rights that go hand in hand with citizenship; they had, in fact, no legal rights. They could not own any property, enter into a civil marriage, nor bring civil action against a white person in court and, finally, as has been mentioned, the right to own firearms was taken away from them (cf Starfield 2008:47-57; Bellows 1900:1; Butler 1900:48-49; Bergh 2000:50; Atmore \textit{et al} 1971:547; Besant 1880:2).\textsuperscript{110}

It is thus clear that the democracy in the S.A.R. was weakly developed and that indigenous peoples were excluded from decision-making processes. Researchers have shown that, under such conditions, the likelihood for genocide and war to erupt increases significantly (Colaresi & Carey 2008:41-43; Snyder 2002:23). Moreover, Boers saw themselves on their remote farms as free, independent landowners who did not have to submit to government rules and regulations (Besant 1880:7).\textsuperscript{111} Various sources also mention that the Boers asserted their will over indigenous people with aggression and that these people’s circumstances were indeed bleak (Storey 2008:5; Besant 1880:2; \textit{The native policy

\textsuperscript{109} This is a translation of the Dutch version which reads: ‘Het volk wil gene gelijkstelling van gekleurden met blanken ingezetenen toestaan, noch in Kerk, noch in Staat’. In line with this, Kruger undertook in his manifesto for the presidential election of 1883 that he would strive to maintain the government’s authority over the indigenous groups and that he would treat those groups who kept to their assigned locations in a cordial way (Rompel 1902:105).

\textsuperscript{110} While David Massouw, like the other indigenous leaders, was strictly speaking not allowed to be in possession of firearms, several factors contributed to a situation where the opposite was true. First, the S.A.R. government did not have the means nor the will to enforce the laws regarding firearms (Leśniewski 2010:108). Further, the S.A.R. government itself profited hugely from the trade in firearms (Marks & Atmore 1971:520-528). Marks and Atmore (1971:547) also point to the ‘demands of the diamond fields for African labour in the 1870s—demands which apparently could only be met by allowing the labourers to purchase guns—[which] greatly increased the availability of firearms to all the Highveld Africans’. The deficiency in law enforcement was also exploited by smugglers such as James W. Honey whose trade in (often stolen) firearms flourished (See Chapter 5). David Massouw was, for example, one of Honey’s clients (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885).

\textsuperscript{111} According to Botha (1900:12) the Boers were united only when it came to raiding or ‘grabbing’ territory.
By the 1870s the state of the S.A.R. was, according to Bergh (2000:48), in a process of consolidating itself. The aim was not so much to address the dysfunctional and undemocratic situation, but the need for consolidation was made clear through the number of petitions the Volksraad was receiving from Boers complaining about the lack of subservience of Africans. As a result the Volksraad appointed and constituted the Commission of Investigation on Native Affairs in 1871. This commission had to advise the Volksraad on how to tighten control over African labour and land as well as on ways to generate income through taxation of Africans (hut-tax, labour-tax and quitrent). According to Butler (1900:25) Africans were paying taxes at a rate of 3 per cent compared to the 7,5 per cent paid by the Boers, but they did not benefit from it at all in terms of receiving education, for example (cf also The native policy of the Dutch Boers in the Transvaal: Statement of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 1881:8).

An aspect of the native policy that caused great disgruntlement was the demarcation of the so-called locations, also referred to as reserves, locati, or stations (Bester & Van Eeden 1999:410; A.B. Delport 1968: 31). Bergh (2000:52) points out that, while the commission of 1871 did make suggestions as to the demarcation of land set aside for indigenous groups, this issue only got momentum after the Pretoria Convention of 1881. The Native Location Commission was appointed in order to assign land according to the regulations of the War Council, a fact that again highlights the role of military power in ‘native administration’. This was done in order to prevent inhabitants from settling outside locations and to facilitate taking census of inhabitants in order to determine taxes due to the state.

The first of two other instruments the S.A.R. employed in implementing their native policy was to compel the missions to aid the S.A.R. in subjugating the local communities. One of the conditions the S.A.R. set was that missions had to recognise and respect the S.A.R. policy of no equality between Boers and indigenes. For this reason German missions such as the B.M.S. and the Hermannsburg Mission Society (H.M.S.) were favoured; they were willing to be faithful subjects of the Boer state and, in their ministering, they emphasised the earthly duties of obedience and industry that were reconcilable with the Boers’ view of Africans as ‘woodcutters’ and ‘water carriers’. M.W. Pretorius thus personally invited the H.M.S. to do mission work in the Western Transvaal (Van der Merwe 1987:3-4; Manson 1992:85). Mission societies such as the L.M.S. and the P.E.M.S. whose endeavour it was to protect the
rights of the indigenous people were not allowed in the S.A.R. The L.M.S. openly called upon the British government to protect the indigenous population against the Boers’ abuse and usurpation of land. The S.A.R. retaliated by accusing the L.M.S. of supplying firearms to the indigenous groups and banned the mission society (Starfield 2008:79; Van dir Merwe 1987:3; Cornwell 1988:100). The request of the P.E.M.S. to build a bigger church in Mamusa was simply ignored by the S.A.R. (TAB SS V24-R2578-1859) (See Chapter 2).

The pass system was the second useful instrument the S.A.R. employed. Legislation was passed in 1873 in order to prevent African people from going to the diamond fields where better wages were earned; without a pass this was impossible. In order to qualify for a pass, African people had to be in the service of Boers for at least three months a year and this ensured cheap labour for the farmers (Bergh 2000:50). A further deterrent was the exorbitant price African people had to pay for this document in order to have the opportunity of bettering their lives on the diamond fields. Initially a pass cost £1, but the increase to £5 in 1874 had to be postponed. Incompliance with the pass laws was punishable by corporal punishment and a fine. Butler (1900:51) writes about this as follows:

\[\text{P}enalties\ under\ the\ Pass\ Law\ System\ mean\ lashes\ innumerable\ at\ the\ direction\ of\ any\ Boer\ Field\ Cornet\ or\ Landdrost.\ It\ is\ a\ most\ barbarous\ system\ [...]\ alone\ worthy\ of\ a\ Boer\ with\ an\ exaggerated\ fear\ of\ and\ cowardly\ brutality\ towards\ a\ race\ he\ has\ been\ taught\ to\ despise\ (cf\ also\ The\ native\ policy\ of\ the\ Dutch\ Boers\ in\ the\ Transvaal:\ Statement\ of\ the\ Aborigines’\ Protection\ Society:\ 4).\]

There indeed existed a culture of fear and mistrust of outsiders among the Boers. Snyder (2002:20) emphasises the fact that this kind of thinking easily acquires a momentum of its own and there is a strong correlation between such a mentality and a propensity for war. The Boers’ perceptions and predisposition towards war thus make out the focus of the next section.

**The die-hard perceptions of the Boers**

It is significant that the Korana people made an ontological distinction between ‘the white man’, meaning the Englishman, and the ‘Boers’.\(^{112}\) Furthermore, the Korana

\(^{112}\) This distinction is made in the Korana folktale ‘The Origin of Man’ (Maingard 1962:68–69).
ascribed characteristics such as ‘cleverness’ and ‘fairness’ to ‘the white man.’ To explain more clearly how the Korana arrived at making this distinction, I will focus on the Boers’ actions and attitudes towards indigenous people. In the first instance it must be noted that the Boers were mostly of Dutch extraction and they originally came from the Cape Colony. According to Giliomee (1973:3) slavery played an important role in shaping the character and world-view of the white people in the Cape society. This point is confirmed by other historians such as Moolman (1980:28-29). The Cape society developed an abhorrence of manual labour. So much so that Frere (1889:235) made the pronouncement about the Boers that they were either ‘too proud or too lazy to work’. The great number of Africans among the Cape slaves also created the impression among the white people that slavery was the ‘proper condition’ of the black race (Giliomee 1973:3). The colonists felt the same about the ‘Hottentot’ people who they believed to be heathen. As ‘descendants of Gam’ they had to be subservient to Christians and, by implication, white people or Boers. For this reason, the majority of Dutch-speaking whites from the Cape were opposed to missionary activities among the Khoe-San and slaves (Elbourne 1992:5; Frere 1889:229). Furthermore, they saw it as their right to discipline the ‘Hottentot domestics’. Giliomee (1973:5) refers to a conclusion made by Marais that ‘harsh and unjust treatment of Hottentots was fairly widespread in Graaff-Reinet’, an opinion that Frere (1889:223) confirms. Marks (1972:73) demonstrates that the defective administrative and judicial system, labelled by Frere (1889:232) as ‘backward’, meant that the Khoe-San were at the mercy of their masters. Bank (1997(a):261) emphasises that the Cape Dutch people’s ideas about race were formed by almost two centuries of forced labour and that they had little sympathy with liberal attempts at bettering the circumstances of the Khoe-San. Frere (1889:232) makes the following remark: ‘No general serious effort had been made to civilize the Hottentots’.

This world-view, described by Elbourne (1992:6) as ‘hierarchical and paternalistic Afrikaner piety’ and about which Frere (1889:229) says that ‘all pretence of respecting native rights to territory was abandoned [...] and there was not even the pretence of liberty’ accompanied the Boers on their trek to the interior. After the establishment of Stellaland in 1883 (See Chapter 6), Boon (1885:601-602) made the following comment on the Boers:

113 The ‘white man’ gave the Korana the following order: ‘But give them [the slaves] a fair deal’ (Maingard 1962:68) (emphasis added).
Dutch people moving on to repeat the same process [of land capturing] in Stellaland, and found a new Republic not based on the equality of man, but on the assumption that the earth is the Lord’s for the Lord’s people, and they being the undoubted tribe of whom Jehovah has sworn that their seed shall cover the earth as the sand of the seashores, and believing that He is their God, that cannot lie to them, they take possession of the interior and the people, and, in full confidence that they are the children of Jehovah, are ever on the ‘go’.

Writers such as Adhikari, Ramoroka and Butler concur. Adhikari (2010:52) writes as follows: ‘Trekboers from the outset saw themselves as unequivocally different and superior to indigenous peoples’. The Afrikaners, according to Ramoroka (2009:34-35),

missed the enlightenment on the frontier of South Africa and turned to the Old Testament. [...] [T]he Afrikaners pursued their middle ages life on the African soil and when enlightenment was brought at the Cape they resisted modernity.

And Butler (1900:53) judges the Boers as ‘ignorant’ and she makes the observation that they ‘read no books or papers – only the Old Testament’ (cf also Cloete 1969:14). Butler (1900:27) also writes:

Possessing for two centuries no book except the Bible, the South African Dutch communities are fond of comparing their lot with that of the ‘Chosen People’. Going forth, like the Jews, in search of a ‘Promised Land’, they never for a moment doubted that the ‘native’ populations were specially created for their benefit. They looked on them as mere ‘Canaanites, Amorites, and Jebusites’, doomed beforehand to slavery or death. [...] In general, the Boers despise everything that does not contribute directly to the material prosperity of the family group. Despite their numerous treks, they have contributed next to nothing to the scientific exploration of the land.

It would certainly be possible to dismiss these views as mere anti-Boer or even racist propaganda. But the ignorance of the people they speak about was an unfortunate given. Most of the D.E.I.C. employees were ‘illiterate destitute peasants roaming the streets of Dutch cities’ (Schrire 2009:13). This is why there was no need for the D.E.I.C. during its entire 143 years of rule to make provisions for a printing press, a post office, or proper education for the Cape society (Frere 1889:229, 232). Moreover, the Dutch Reformed Church was the only form of religion recognised by law at the time the rule of the D.E.I.C. ended, which meant...
that there was no religious freedom and that the inhabitants were exposed only to a very conservative dogma.\(^{114}\)

According to Steyn it is important that, where constructed contexts such as the one described above are concerned, ignorance should not only be seen as a 'failure of individual knowledge acquisition', but also as a 'social accomplishment'. With regards to the social construction of ignorance, she shows that ignorance and uncertainty can be manufactured, implemented and maintained through communicative practices (Steyn 2012:10). Steyn's (2012:11-12) conclusion is that ignorance as a collective accomplishment in a racially dominated society is an implicit agreement to misrepresent the world.\(^{115}\) As has been shown here, the S.A.R. was notorious for treating Africans with disrespect. Ignorance that was manufactured allowed for their dehumanising Africans and for treating them inhumanly.\(^{116}\) This is the point the writers referred to above are arguing.

One of the abominations illustrating their contempt for Africans is the system of slavery that they have carried out under the guise of child apprenticeship (\textit{LSE Selected pamphlets, 1884:26}; Ramoroka 2009:34-35).\(^{117}\) David Massouw and his people were also subjected to this (See Chapter 7). And, in order to shed more light on the Boer ethos this should be explored more fully. One of the conditions set by Britain during the Sand River Convention (article 4) for the S.A.R. to become independent was that slavery had to be abolished (\textit{BSP, 1876:3}; \textit{The native policy of the Dutch Boers in the Transvaal: Statement of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 1881:1}). Although the S.A.R., under Andries Pretorius, agreed to prohibit slavery

\(^{114}\) Nevertheless, the Lutheran Church, also a conservative protestant denomination, was allowed in 1780 (Worden 1999:77).

\(^{115}\) In order to illustrate this point one can refer to the presidential election campaign Kruger led against Burgers. It was especially the unschooled rural population Kruger incited against Burgers by holding up God’s punishment should they vote for Burgers with his liberal theological views (Barrett 1989:15-26).

\(^{116}\) In the \textit{LSE Selected pamphlets} (1884:25), for example, it is stated that ‘they [the S.A.R.] do not recognise a black man as a human being’. Molema (s.a.:94) remarks as follows on this issue: ‘But as you can be thoughtless or unkind or cruel to animals without actually hating them, so were some Europeans to Africans’.

\(^{117}\) The apprenticeship system was not peculiar to the S.A.R. It was a characteristic South African frontier practice and existed in the Cape as well as the O.F.S. However, the system was flagrantly abused in the S.A.R.
and, furthermore, articles 10 and 224 of the S.A.R. Constitution incorporated the abolition of slave trade, slave raiding took place with regularity (Butler 1900:17).

S.A.R. officials, including President M.W. Pretorius, the then Commandant-General Paul Kruger, described by Botha (1900:21) as ‘a very cute slave dealer’), and Commandant Piet Cronjé, who was instrumentally involved at the battle of Mamusa, all led several raids and owned slaves (Morton 1992:99, 104). Cronjé was later convicted and fined for human trafficking and this incident revealed a ‘less attractive’ and ‘undesirable’ side of the commandant with his display of ‘inveracity’ and attempt at defeating the ends of justice (Molema s.a.:22). All of these characteristics also came to the fore at the battle of Mamusa (See Chapter 7). Apart from the Korana, the Batlhaping of Mankuroane and the Barolong of Montshiwa also fell victim to the Boers’ slave raiding (Morton 1992:102, 104).

The people who were thus carried away were booked in at a landdrost office as so-called apprentices (inboekelinge). In the first ten years after the S.A.R.’s independence in 1866, the landdrost of Potchefstroom estimated the total population of apprentices to be at least 4 000 (Morton 1992:104). That this practice took place on a huge scale is apparent. This came down to the following. Grown men were usually killed while women were taken in as bound or ‘unfree’ domestic servants and the orphaned children as ‘apprentices’ for white households (Morton 1992:100; The native policy of the Dutch Boers in the Transvaal: Statement of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 1881:2). This is how a Boer worded his written application for ‘apprentices’ to the government of the S.A.R.: ‘One, two or more little kaffirs, with or without mother, from the tribe of the late Massouw’ (TAB SS V1144-R6356-1885).

The apprentices or ‘black ivory’ as they were referred to was sold from hand to hand as a marketable commodity between £5 and £20 per person (Morton 1992:100; Butler 1900:5). A child, on the other hand, fetched the exchange rate of a heifer or a horse (The native policy of the Dutch Boers in the Transvaal: Statement of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 1881:5). Apprentices were legally entitled to good treatment and eventually their freedom (children were supposed to remain in service until adulthood), but they were as a matter of fact abused and very seldom manumitted (Morton 1992:105). The individual Boer’s absolute authority over the apprentices was, furthermore, legally recognised.

The S.A.R. had adopted the system of apprenticeship in order to ‘supply the lack of field labour’ inside the S.A.R. (Butler 1900:15). Slave raiding increased because attempts were made at cash-cropping and more labour was needed (Morton
However, apprentices from the S.A.R. were also traded in the then Delagoa Bay (now Maputo) in Mozambique (Morton 1992:103). In other words, ‘apprentice’ raiding was done not only in order to meet Boer labour demands. According to Morton (1992:112) the system of apprenticeships continued at least until the Second South African War (1899 to 1902). Various authors see this system as having allowed the Boers to develop a rural proletariat; they broke up every political organisation of the indigenous people, destroyed all their ties of a common national feeling and tolerated them only in the capacity of ‘apprentices’ (cf Butler 1900:270; Conder 1887:77; Manson 1998:489).

The outcome of the battle of Mamusa confirmed the Boers in their misconception of the inferiority of the ‘other’. Williams (1885:14) described the Boers as ‘eager for plunder and thirsty for blood’ and this spirit of theirs was reinforced by the course of events of the battle. Moreover, the Boers’ interests in the Western Transvaal were consolidated in the new dispensation after the battle. Their racist freebooter spirit was given a physical, psychological and institutional space in which it could perpetuate itself and set the norm for future social and class relations. Higginson (2001:95), for example, is of the opinion that, after the Second South African War, the Boers of the Western Transvaal still coveted the kind of domination that they had enjoyed prior to it. He further asserts that: ‘Summary executions and atrocious instances of mutilation and torture cast a long shadow over the next generation of landlords and tenants’ (Higginson 2001:98). Spoelstra (1924:148) speaks of the ‘fatherly autocracy’ (vaderlike outokrasie) over natives and remarks that nowhere there were more favourable conditions for this to be exercised than in the Western Transvaal. Spoelstra (1924:149) continues to explain that this ‘fatherly autocracy’ meant that, when gentle persuasion no longer helped, the farmer’s only ‘recourse’ (toevlug) was the ‘cane’ (slaanding). The ‘kaffir’, however, never took it amiss, because he himself knew that a good thrashing made him ‘better’. If a farmer wanted to have a good ‘kaffir’ he had to feed him regularly, but he also had to thrash him regularly.

The practice of flogging ‘kaffir’ servants was not confined to men alone. Women were also flogged, as it has been seen as the ‘right’ treatment to make good

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118 It must be noted, however, that the contempt for the ‘other’ that the Boers displayed through this system was not reserved for Africans only. An English orphan was subjected to the same cruel apprenticeship system by a field-cornet of the Klein Marico (Manson 1998:489).
servants of them (The native policy of the Dutch Boers in the Transvaal: Statement of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 1881:5). However, the punishment for causing the death of one’s worker – for taking a life – when administering a flogging was a meagre 6 months’ imprisonment (Bellows 1900:2). To the life of the ‘other’ the label ‘zero value’ was attached, as is illustrated in the following examples: for the cowardly and cold-blooded killings of the Englishmen James Honey (See Chapter 5) and Christopher Bethell (See Chapter 6) the accused Boers got away scot-free while Groot Adriaan de la Rey served only three months in prison for attempted murder of the Englishman Frank John Wells (See Chapter 5).

Van Onselen (1990:104) describes the Boers of the Western Transvaal as the ‘militant republicans’, the ‘religious fundamentalists’, the ‘radical populists’ and the ‘die-hards’ of the Second South African War which produced a brand of ‘tough-minded Afrikaner nationalists’. More recent historical events also bear out the conception of Western Transvaal Boers’ having a die-hard attitude with regard to racial relations. On 7 August 1993, shortly before the first democratic election in South Africa in April 1994, the freedom of town to (the white part of) Schweizer-Reneke, formerly Mamusa, was given to Eugene Terreblanche, leader of the far-right Afrikaner Resistance Movement. In his acceptance speech he spoke of Schweizer-Reneke as ‘our’ land that was won through the rights of conquest, that is, when Mamusa was taken in by the Boers, and that the third ‘Boer War’ or ‘Freedom War’ would start there (cf www.sahistory.org.za).\footnote{119} In the same period General Constand Viljoen, then the leader of the Freedom Front, was working toward the idea of an Afrikaner volkstaat (national state) that would include parts of the Western Transvaal and the Northern Free State (Giliomee 2012:406-407).

Conclusion

The proverbial golden thread running through the preceding data shows up the lack of respect the Boer ethos allowed for the ‘other’, whether the other be indigenous peoples or the English. In fact, Holub (1881:8) concluded in this respect that the indigenous population ‘have obtained no benefit whatever’ from the hundreds of years contact with the Boers. Contempt was at the root of the events that led up

\footnote{119 A remark Botha (1900:9) made about a hundred years earlier regarding the Boers was still pertinent in 1993: ‘A loud talker and blusterer gets a better hearing than a quiet reasoner’.}
to the battle of Mamusa and the loss of the independence of the Korana people; it played a crucial role in sensitive land questions, the usurpation of land and it was the cornerstone of the ‘native policy’ of the S.A.R.

Relations between Britain and the S.A.R. were often tense, characterised by confrontation and opposition. The indigenous population was involved in these tense relations which, in turn, made a direct impact on the various indigenous communities in the Cis-Molopo Territory. Leaders were played off against one another and, when it was expedient to do so, the paramountcies of certain chiefs were acknowledged and old feuds stirred up again. The political position of the indigenous people was of course affected by this power struggle. The London Convention, for example, ruled without consulting the Korana people that they were subjects of the S.A.R. and this had dramatic consequences for the Korana people. David Massouw Taaibosch had been independent before this convention. In consultation with his council, generals and field-cornets, this leader wielded the sceptre, entered into or broke off treaties, declared war or peace and exercised his power every day. It goes without saying that David Massouw would not put up with this state of affairs that was forced upon him and his people.

The perception that there was not enough land for everyone, a strong incentive for war (Snyder 2002:20), influenced the S.A.R.’s modus operandi vis-à-vis the indigenous population. The S.A.R. employed their agent, G. Donovan, in order to persuade Massouw Rijt Taaibosch against the leader’s better judgement to enter into an agreement with the S.A.R. Massouw Rijt Taaibosch later realised that the S.A.R. could not or would not solve his problems with Mankuroane with regard to land claims and citizenship as he had initially believed. There was, therefore, no advantage for him in this treaty, but he could not go back on it and the S.A.R. had already claimed the territory for themselves. Next, a year after the Pretoria Convention there were considerable expansions of the S.A.R. territory to the west of the Moysey line into the Korana territory. This action was contrary to the articles of the convention and thus unlawful. The implication was that it became impossible for the largely pastoral Korana to continue with an independent existence in the face of the more dominant, pastoral society of the S.A.R., especially as the Boer state’s practices and views radically differed from those of the Korana people.

The S.A.R. disposed over a military power that enabled them to gradually penetrate deeper and deeper into the Korana territory and to claim it. They further exploited their legal apparatus to legitimise the occupation through title deeds.
and to restrict the Korana to certain areas. The Korana, on the other hand, had no power to stem the usurpation of their land by the S.A.R. and they did not have access to systems for registering title deeds in order to legitimise claims to land.

One cannot discuss land issues without pointing to the strategic importance of Mamusa in terms of its location on the so-called ‘road to the north’, whether David Massouw was aware of this fact or not. On the one hand, Britain desired to control the trade route to the north and, on the other hand, the S.A.R. desired to expand its territory to the west. The Korana of Mamusa got in the way of both powers.

The fact that the Korana expressed the wish on more than one occasion to stand under British rule rather than to be considered Transvaal subjects was largely due to the draconian ‘native policy’ of the Boer state. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate how the enforcement of this policy played a major part in the breaking out of war. Britain did not want to heed the requests of the Korana people for a multiplicity of reasons. Whether their fate would have been any different had Britain done so can, however, only be speculation.120

The significance of the metaphors ‘territory’ and ‘stone beacons’ in border culture comes clearly to the fore in this chapter. Territory symbolised division: those who owned land and who had access to it on the basis of their skin colour were in one camp, and those who were excluded from this privilege in the other. ‘Territory’ and ‘stone beacons’ were inextricably tied to one another, because whatever was constructed in the name of territory was either included or excluded by means of stone beacons. And, in the final instance, they freed some and limited others.

120 In terms of Hall’s (1973:185) examination of British rule over the indigenous peoples of British Bechuanaland, the answer is probably no. He argues in this regard that there was an ‘unusually large disparity between intention and practice, expectations and results’ when it came to regulating and implementing policy. Barrett (1989:52) also draws attention to the ‘belief that British rule would be beneficial to the African natives was based more on stated British policy than the recent history of British actions in southern Africa’.
Chapter 5

The drivers of the wheel of action
The Remains of J. W. Honey.

The remains of J. W. Honey were brought into Kimberley yesterday, and we understand will be interred in the Cemetery here. A more foul and cowardly murder was never perpetrated than that upon this unfortunate man who was cut off in the prime of life. We shall have something more to say on this subject, but, in the meantime, it may be observed that there is no doubt as to the identity. The saddle he used was found near his body (which was discovered in an ant heap), and his horse was found shot dead a little distance off. The clothes on the body were recognized, and some letters from his wife were found in his coat pocket. Not only are there proofs of several bullet wounds, but his skull was beaten in, and brains and hair scattered on his clothes. Whatever his faults were, he was found not guilty of the charges brought against him before the Landdrost of Christiana. The murderous gang who had him in charge was warned by this official that he was a free man in the Transvaal, and if they laid hands on him they would do so at their own peril, yet, they again took him away by force, and within a few hours he was brutally murdered in what is termed—Stellaland.
Introduction

It is said that war is an expression of domestic politics; it can therefore enhance or destroy a leader’s position, power and prestige. At the battle of Mamusa the leaders were David Massouw, P.J. Joubert and G.J. Van Niekerk. In Chapter 7 I will review the particular interests these leaders had in the war between the S.A.R. and the Korana people, what motivated them to enter into war and, finally, how they were affected by the outcome of the war. But to arrive at a complete picture of the culture in which such a war could breed, it is necessary to introduce these leaders of whom David Massouw is certainly, of the three, the least familiar historical figure in mainstream texts. Thus, in the first instance these leaders’ particular place in die border culture of the time will be reviewed.

But there were also other role-players whose actions should be taken into account, namely, the freebooters. Their involvement in various wars between indigenous groups, and in particular in wars where the Korana were involved, had far-reaching consequences for the region and its inhabitants. The establishment of the two Boer republics Stellaland and the State of Goshen was a direct result of their presence on the scene. Because the indigenous groups had to cede large parts of their territory as payment to the freebooters for their services, this had damaging consequences for the economy of the region. The political and economic heritage of the freebooters’ involvement in the region steered events straight to the battle of Mamusa, and it is important to take cognisance of the fact. Another important fact to note is that the farms the freebooters received for their services fell, after Stellaland’s partial incorporation into the S.A.R., within the Bloemhof district. The Bloemhof commando was one of those later called up to fight against the Korana people. It can therefore be stated categorically that it was David Massouw’s former allies that helped bring about his downfall.

The plucky David Massouw
The birth of David Massouw is generally thought to be on a date between circa 1800 and 1818 (Krüger 1972:451). Parsons (2011:15-16) gives the following description of him:

David Massouw Rijt Taibosch boasted a complex heritage that can be seen in his combination of English, Christian, Setswana, Dutch, and Korana names. He is said to have been a 'quite Christian old man ... very rich in cattle', but egocentric and sometimes drunk.

When one enquires about David Massouw in Taung or Schweizer-Reneke, very few people can tell you who he was. But should one ask about Pharatlhatlhe they will respond immediately. In various private documents David Massouw is indeed addressed by relatives, and also by others such as Mankuroane, for instance, as Paratlhatlhe (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

The noun pharatlhatlhe has two general strands of meanings. In the first instance, the noun derives from the verb pharatlhatlhanya, that is, to gallop (like a horse). Informants explain that someone with a quick and hasty nature, someone who thrives in touch-and-go situations, a person with pluck and savvy, or that causes trouble as soon as your back is turned will get the name Pharatlhatlhe. Then, the pharatlhatlhe is a traditional dance of Basarwa or Bagoto origin and Tswana boys reaching puberty performed this dance around a fire. The dance is very suggestive and includes movements that are provocative and daringly sexual, leading to sexual play. But the dance also communicates particular cultural practices such as hunting. One informant referred to the situation of gathering eggs from an ostrich nest: 'You have to be quick at it, or you won't get away with the eggs!' This explanation ties up with the connotations of quickness or hastiness pertaining to the first strand of meanings, of the touch and go, but it also contains the idea of daring and audacity. One could therefore make the deduction that David Massouw had a quick, hasty, daredevil personality. His descendents confirmed this in interviews. According to them he had a rather short fuse and was a fearless fighter; hence the saying: 'To fight like a Taibosch.'

David Massouw was also neat and tidy as a person, judging from what informants say about him. This is confirmed indirectly through 'Klein Adriaan' de la Rey who identified David Massouw’s body by the corduroy suit he was wearing (See Chapter 7). Maree (1952:5) describes him as short, about 1,7 m

121 Parsons (2011:15) claims incorrectly that David Massouw had a general of this name.
in height, overweight and with a light, yellowish skin tone. The Setwana spelling of his surname is ‘Mossweu’ or ‘Moshweu’, meaning ‘white’. This probably referred to the light skin colour, but it could also refer to the initial alliance David Massouw had with the (white) Boers against the Batlhaping. One of the informants referred to him as a Boer-boetie, that is, a brother to the Boers or a sympathiser with the Boer cause.

He lived a simple life on Kasiane, or Kasiyanaye Hill, as David Massouw’s settlement was known; he apparently preferred not to live in the expensive brick house that had been built for him but used it as a goat kraal instead (Parsons 2011:15; Van Onselen 1996:23). According to Maree (1952:6) the house, which was built by either a German or a French missionary, was on the north-eastern side of the hill. The descriptions of Maree (1952) and Parsons (2011) of the settlement made it possible to identify some of the ruins. First, the fact that Massouw’s house was of brick and not of stone like the others, made it possible to find where the two-roomed house (surface: 100 m², position: 27° 10’ 38” S / 25° 19’ 57” E; height 1319 m) once stood. The nearby stone rondavel (diameter: 4 m; position: 27° 10’ 37” S / 25° 19’ 57” E; height: 1331 m) he preferred to use as home as well as several ash holes were also identified (See Map 4 and Images 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4).

David Massouw’s kraals were about 20 metres to the south-west of his house (surface 2 475 m²; position 27° 10’ 40” S / 25° 19’ 56” E; height 1319 meter). Judging from the remains, Maree (1952:6) concludes that David Massouw was rich in cattle. The capacity of the nearest kraal would have been impressive: between 250 and 300 heads of cattle. There were several cattle pens on the hill, although, for the sake of security, David Massouw also placed his animals at other cattle posts.

Private documents found by Commandant H. Pretorius on 4 December 1885 in David Massouw’s house suggest that family ties were important to him and that he tried to keep them in place (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). There is, for instance, the letter from his sister Sofaia Taibosch, dated 13 April 1883 and written from Bloemfontein (probably Tafelkop – see Chapter 8), informing him about her health, the goings-on of the rest of the family and her desire that he

122 Maree’s second guess as to the nationality of the missionary is probably correct (See Chapter 2).

123 The formula in Dreyer (1992:372-373) was used for the calculations.
would be able to come for a visit (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). There is also correspondence between David Massouw and other members of the O.F.S. Taabosch family, making it clear that there were frequent visits. The letters testify to a warm relationship; members would open their hearts to one another ‘in the name of the Lord’ (‘in die naam van die Here’).

It is also clear from the documentation that relatives looked up to David Massouw and respected him as a leader (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). This being said, Anderson (1888:103) referred to David Massouw rather disparagingly as a ‘petty chief’ in Twenty-five years in a wagon. And another Scotsman, Rev. John Mackenzie, made the remark that he was ‘a person of no account in his own country’ (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:14). Mackenzie had close personal relationships with David Massouw’s enemies Mankuroane and Montshiwa and believed that Africans should have equal rights in a non-racial federal South Africa (Barrett 1989:84; Comaroff & Comaroff 1986:7). His opinion was thus in direct conflict with the general beliefs in the S.A.R. making him rather unpopular with the Boers (Shillington 1987:109). It is possible that Mackenzie’s anti-Boer sentiments could have influenced his opinion of David Massouw whom he regarded as an ally of the Boers. However be it, there are definitely hints that not all perceptions of David Massouw as leader were negative. David Massouw’s own words, as quoted by Couzens (1987:61) are quite revealing to the modern reader:

So let it be understood that every person in my dominion, whether a Black, a Hottentot, a Griqua or anything else, is one of us. My home is his home, my lands are his lands, my cattle are his cattle, and my law is his shield.

This testifies to an inclusive leadership style and, from within a racially dominated border culture, shows a remarkable understanding of equality of human beings. The fact that the Korana of Mamusa did not keep slaves in a time where it was the order of the day may also be seen as reflective of the leader’s ‘ideology of egalitarianism’ (See Chapter 2). On one occasion, when the western border of the S.A.R. was extended in 1884 with the result that his lands henceforth fell inside the Boer republic he issued a strongly worded proclamation in order to show his discontent and the strong sense of the independence of the Korana people. But even here the particular nature of his statesmanship is clearly visible; he appealed in this instance to ‘general principles of national rights, to law and to humanity’ (Imperial Blue Book C.-4194, 1884:19-20). Even in the elaborate rules David Massouw drew up for the freebooters in the war against Mankuorane he stipulated in accordance
with Khoekhoe practice that huts were not to be demolished or set to light, neither would he allow women or children to be molested (Schapera 1965:352; Metrowich 1970:33).

To summarise the data given so far, the picture I glean of David Massouw from the available information is neither of an autocrat, nor of someone ignorant about international political principles. And, least of all, can it be said that the information fits a person insensitive to and dismissive of the rights of women and children. I will show later that the same could not be said of the actions of the freebooters and the Boers (See Chapter 7).

There is, however, a tragic aspect to David Massouw’s life in that his insight into human nature and his judgment of people let him down on more than one occasion. The very people with whom he collaborated in the closest of relationships and whom he trusted the best would later be revealed to have had hidden agendas or would eventually contribute to his downfall. Joubert he considered as a friend, Van Niekerk was an ally; in fact, it was thanks to David Massouw that the latter had become administrator of Stellaland. As to the notorious German adventurer Theodore Doms who convinced David Massouw to appoint him as his private secretary and adviser was in actual fact collaborating with the S.A.R. In fact, in the war against Mankuroane that eventually favoured the Boers Doms played a prominent role. But during the war against the S.A.R., and the battle of Mamusa, he was, as the saying goes, conspicuous in his absence and left David Massouw to his own fate.

‘Cunning Piet’ Joubert

Petrus Jacobus Joubert was born on 20 January 1831 on the farm Damaskus, near Prince Albert in the Cape Colony and he died on 28 March 1900 (Boer 1900:3).125

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124 Doms succeeded David Arnot as advisor to Mankuroane in 1869. During this time, on 22 March 1874, President T.F. Burgers appointed him as a diplomatic agent with a special secret task for the S.A.R. He took an official oath, including one of secrecy, was paid a salary by the S.A.R. and met Joubert more than once in Mamusa (Du Plessis 1993:161-162; Malan 1958:129–134). Doms was further involved in a number of land issues in Griqualand West and the allegation that he was in it only for his own gain is confirmed by the exorbitant claim to 157 farms he submitted to the Warren Commission that had to investigate these issues (cf Shillington 1985:134; Du Plessis 1993:161-162; Warren report, 1880:46).

125 Sources differ from each other in this regard.
One could describe him as being from, for those times, a ‘typical’ Boer background. He was from Huguenot descent and had a strict religious upbringing by his missionary grandfather. In accordance with his beliefs, Piet Joubert was thus confirmed in the Dutch Reformed Church on 16 April 1848 (Meintjes 1971:4). His home language was ‘Dutch Afrikaans’ and like many of the Boers he received little schooling. His grandfather taught Joubert what he could in his early years, mainly to read and write (Meintjes 1971:9). The young Joubert later did attend a small school in Pietermaritzburg formally, but in a rather erratic fashion. However, according to Mouton (1957:8) and Meintjes (1971:9), Joubert was particularly eager to learn and expanded his knowledge through teaching himself. So much so that Meintjes (1971:13) reckons that he was better educated than most of his countrymen, that his intelligence was above average and that his practical abilities were considerable. Nevertheless, the correspondence between Joubert and Dr W.E. Bok, State Secretary of the S.A.R., reveals how the latter corrected and checked the former’s spelling and grammar so that one can guess at the limitations of Joubert’s education.

Joubert was a respected Boer leader in many circles, but not all that was said about him was flattering. Meintjes (1971:9ff), for example, has the following to say about him: He was small of stature and had a high-pitched voice. He was sensitive and moody, unusually emotional for a man, as much of a dreamer as an astute businessman and did not hesitate to take on anything that could fill his pockets, which he allegedly filled quite quickly. His eyes were shrewd, intelligent and suspicious. A sly little smile did no credit to his face, but those who knew him accepted his smile as a kind of nervous tic. A bad temper and rude behaviour alternated with extreme kindness and he could be kind-hearted to the point of folly. He went through his life eager to please, but seemed to have a gift for estranging people and he reacted bitterly to any form of criticism. His critics often called him Slim Piet, meaning ‘Cunning Piet’. His efforts to charm were perceived as rather sinister and people liked him more when he was out of sight; it was easier to give credit to his merits in his absence. The most off-putting aspects of Joubert seemed to be his self-defensive smile and his falsetto voice.126

126 Posthuma (2009:184), for example, comments as follows on a photo of Joubert: ‘Generaal Joubert glimlag selfversekerd en is duidelik baie ingenome met homself!’ which can be translated as follows: ‘General Joubert smiles self-assuredly and is clearly very pleased with himself!’
Joubert was a considerable landowner in the Wakkerstroom district where he lived on the farm Rustfontein. In the 1860s he was chosen to represent Wakkerstroom on the S.A.R. Volksraad and, when he was re-elected in 1870 his self-taught legal knowledge secured him the appointment of attorney-general of the S.A.R. In 1875 Joubert acted as president in the absence of Burgers who was in Europe at the time and he became Commandant-General during the First South African War. Joubert was re-elected as Commandant-General in 1883 and he was intimately involved with the Boer-African politics of the S.A.R. in this capacity (See Chapter 7).

Although Joubert was a member of the so-called triumvirate (S.P.J. Kruger and M.W. Pretorius being the other two members) that administered the provisional Boer government that was set up in December 1880 in Heidelberg, he was never successful as candidate for the presidency of the S.A.R. In fact, Joubert stood against Kruger in 1883, in 1893 and again in 1898 and his failure is said to have remained a thorn in the flesh for the general always (Meintjes 1971:13, 111; Wormser 1916:25). His political career can be summed up as containing instances of bitter humiliation and repeated electoral defeats while his unpleasant personality and the political differences between Joubert on the one side and the Volksraad and Kruger on the opposing side did nothing to alleviate matters. According to Meintjes (1971:111) all Pretoria heaved a sigh of relief when Joubert was called away on military duties to the western border of the S.A.R. Officially, he was instructed to deal with David Massouw, but one can but wonder if David Massouw was not perhaps a red herring, the real aim being to rid Pretoria of the troublesome Joubert.

Some people say that the true ‘spirit of a commandant-general’ was not in Joubert himself, but in his wife Hendrina Johanna Susanna Botha whom he married on 2 April 1851 in Potchefstroom. She loved firearms, the hustle and bustle of horses and soldiers, commando life and the odd battle. She was inventive, tough

Commandant P.A. Cronjé, who was sometimes on the receiving end of Joubert’s temper, said the following: ‘Ik weet niet waarom de Kommandant-Generaal zich zo tegenover mij gedroeg; somtijds wanneer hij veel zorgen had of opgewonden was had hij iets kortafs in zijn maniere; zijn stem werd schel en hij sprak snel en in een vechttoon’ that I translate as follows: ‘I do not know why the Commandant General acts the way he does. Sometimes, when he is very worried or excited, he is very abrupt, his voice becomes shrill and he speaks quickly in an aggressive way’ (Die Brandwag, 15 September 1913:238).
and completely fearless. Apparently, Mrs Joubert accompanied her husband on his campaigns, gave military advice and shared every experience with him. In fact, she was with her husband when the battle of Majuba broke out and it was Mrs Joubert who spotted the Rooibaadjies (Redcoats) and warned the general that they were approaching over the ridge (Lategan & Potgieter 1982:117). There is no report of Mrs Joubert’s presence during the battle of Mamusa, but in the light of the chauvinist culture of Boer war reporting such omission does not conclusively indicate her absence.

Reportedly, unlike his wife’s aggression, Joubert’s aggressive spirit was not of the military kind. According to various authors it was more of a personal nature (Meintjes 1971:11, 195; Metrowich 1970:53; Williams 1885:21; Wormser 1916:70-71). Joubert was notoriously cautious and he preferred negotiating above fighting. He found it difficult to commit himself and never took full responsibility for anything, whether it was glory or disgrace. Joubert’s dealings were not always straight, so that Van Niekerk was an obvious choice for an ally and the former’s rather notorious personality traits would also come clearly to the fore in the battle of Mamusa.

‘Double-dealer’ Van Niekerk

Gerrit Jacobus Van Niekerk was born on 6 June 1849 on the farm Poortje in the O.F.S. district of Fauresmith and he died on 23 October 1896 in Pretoria. He was a short, stocky man who married his bride Hester Cecilia Roos when he was nineteen and she only fifteen. They settled on the farm Kromellenboog between Christiana and Bloemhof in 1879. The couple had a shop on the farm and Van Niekerk was successful in prospecting for diamonds. Through his involvement in the war between David Massouw and Mankuroane Van Niekerk became a considerably wealthy landowner.

In the First South African War (1880-1881) Van Niekerk sided with Britain and would not fight against British troops. In order to be redeemed in the eyes of the S.A.R. government after the war many of the pro-British citizens, Van Niekerk included, entered the services of the republic with the ardour of new ‘converts’

The sad fate of the tough and reckless James W. Honey

Honey is described in the literature as one of the toughest and most reckless freebooters who enlisted under David Massouw. According to Williams (1885:40-41) and Metrowich (1970:41) Honey wanted to be in control of Stellaland, and had a bitter quarrel with some of his fellow freebooters over the distribution of the loot and the division of land. Because he thought he had been treated unfairly, he tried to persuade David Massouw to attack Stellaland. Metrowich (1970:41) writes about the follow-up to Honey’s actions:

Even though he did not succeed in his object, this was considered a very serious matter. When his former companions heard what he had done they held a meeting and decided that there was only one punishment for such a treacherous crime.

His murder took place on 10 February 1883, but his father requested the Border Royal Police to open an investigation to the murder only on 27 August 1883.129 Without consulting Sir H. Robinson, the High Commissioner, the by now Major-General Warren arrested Van Niekerk on 14 February 1885, together with Groot

128 It goes without saying that this incident is also a clear illustration of the border culture that reigned at the time.

129 Honey’s father, Jeremiah Honey from Winters Rush in Griqualand West, was not quite sure about the exact date of his son’s death (Government House 28/117: Enclosures to Despatches, September-December 1883).
Adriaan de la Rey, S.P. Cilliers, the Commandant-General of the War Council of Stellaland, H.P. Diedericks from the farm Kopje Enkel, H. Engelbrecht and Isaac Van der Linden on a charge of complicity in the murder of Honey. Because of the differences in the accounts of what had happened I have decided to reconstruct the chain of events from as many sources as possible and I will include the affidavits taken down by the landdrost of Stellaland, R. Muller, as requested by Warren (Imperial Blue Book: C. 4432, 1885-1886:189-192).

A chain of events was set in motion by Mankuroane’s delay tactics with regard to implementing the articles of the peace treaty with David Massouw (See Chapter 6). This led to Doms’ drafting a document, signed by him and Van Niekerk, in which a reward of £1 000 was offered for the heads of Mankuroane, Rasaco, Malala, Mahura and a few others in August 1882. A plan was adopted to kill Mankuroane and I outline briefly. Honey, together with some Zulu helpers, would go to Taung, ostensibly to offer their assistance as freebooters to the chief. The rest of David Massouw’s freebooters would surround Taung and draw out Mankuroane’s men in order to give Honey a chance to kill the chief. In fact, Van Niekerk called a meeting with his officers and informed them of his intentions to have Mankuroane killed on 12 September 1882. But when the territory demanded by David Massouw for his freebooters was indeed ceded on 19 September 1882, Van Niekerk realised that there was now no longer any reason to kill the chief. Doms asked Honey for the return of the document ordering the murder and he destroyed it. However, Doms was later informed by Van Niekerk that he had seen the document (perhaps a copy of it?) among other documents of Honey’s. When Van Niekerk asked Honey to return it, he refused.

On 3 February 1883 Van Niekerk ordered Cilliers to take statements against Honey. Cilliers caught two Basotho men who supposedly worked for Honey and he gave them over to H. Van Boegschooten, the secretary of Stellaland’s administration, to be examined. On the basis of their statements charges were lodged against one Erlank, a friend and partner of Honey, and he was arrested by Cilliers the next day. Erlank was allowed to turn state witness against Honey. Then Van Niekerk instructed Cilliers to take 25 men and to arrest Honey, but they could not find him and so returned to their laager at Wit Kopjes. Later that same day Honey, F. Wells, J. Streak, Horwitz and Drake turned up at Wit Kopjes. Apparently, Honey dismounted, went up to Van Niekerk and confronted him with the rumours he had heard about Van Niekerk’s wanting to take him in. Van Niekerk confirmed this and Boegschooten read out Erlank’s statement and Honey reacted by saying
that he would go to Vryburg to defend himself. On Cilliers’s advice Honey was not arrested and allowed to ride off.

Van Niekerk then decided to order some Boers, Jan Diedericks, Henderik Diedericks, one Ferreira, his son and some others, to arrest Arend, a servant of Honey’s, on a charge of stealing cattle as an accomplice to Honey. Honey’s servant had to be brought to Van Niekerk’s wagon at Commando Drift on the Harts River and Honey was summoned to attend ‘an important meeting’ on 8 February 1883. When Honey arrived he was questioned about some cattle that he allegedly had stolen at Sterkfontein in the S.A.R. Honey denied the accusations, but Van Niekerk falsely claimed that there was a warrant out for Honey’s arrest in the S.A.R. and insisted that he would have to send him to Christiana. After a private conversation between Van Niekerk and his companions, Honey was arrested and informed by Van Niekerk that he would send him over the border to be dealt with according to S.A.R. laws. To Honey’s direct query about Van Niekerk’s motives, Van Niekerk responded that it was what the Boers wanted and that he had agreed to it.\(^{130}\) Honey then asked Van Niekerk for an amount of £100 that he apparently owed him to which Van Niekerk replied, probably untruthfully, that he was unable to pay him.

Apparently Groot Adriaan de la Rey sent Nicholas Fourie to Landdrost Genis in Christiana to ask for a warrant for the arrest of Honey and Arend, but his request was refused. Even when De la Rey and Diedericks went to the landdrost themselves, he declined to take the case, but advised them to take the prisoners back to Stellaland and to deal with them there as there was no proof or any sworn declarations on which to base a case. Van Niekerk thus failed to get rid of Honey through his wheeling and dealing and the question of what to do with the man must have rankled with the administrator of Stellaland. On 9 February 1883 Van Niekerk and Cilliers thus went to David Massouw to ask advice. On their way there Van Niekerk told Cilliers that he was in great danger because Honey had revealed the abandoned plot to kill Mankuroane to the British Resident, and that the scandal could mean that the administrator would be driven from Stellaland. Cilliers, in turn, told Van Niekerk

\(^{130}\) In a writ from the S.A.R. to David Massouw, dated 19 February 1883, enquiries are made regarding Honey’s arrest and transport to Christiana. He is described as one of the main culprits in cattle theft and David Massouw is assured that the ‘necessary help’ would be made available to him to punish all such culprits (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).
that Erlank had informed him of Van Niekerk’s order to kill Honey in exchange for full freebooter rights, that is, in exchange for land.

David Massouw’s advice to Van Niekerk was that he should deal with Honey according to his own laws. On their way back Van der Linde rode up to report to Van Niekerk that Groot Adriaan de la Rey had shot Wells in the leg earlier that day, because he was under the impression that Wells wanted to rescue Honey. Wells made a statement about this incident to the British Resident on 12 February 1883 and identified Groot Adriaan de la Rey as the person who had shot him. In his testimony about the events H.P. Diedericks stated that Wells, Streak, Horwitz and Drake had arrived at the camp with an extra horse (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885). When Wells and his company were about 200 paces away De la Rey called out an order for them to stop, but they ignored it. As the group was only about 100 paces from De la Rey and his companions, he claimed to have heard Wells saying: ‘Go for it! Attack’. Wells’ company came galloping up to them and De la Rey said to Diedericks: ‘You shoot Streak and I’ll shoot Wells’. But De la Rey changed his mind and shot Wells’ horse in the shoulder. The bullet went right through and lodged in the inside of Well’s right leg. D. Mcdonald, a storekeeper from O’Reillys Drift, said in his affidavit that Wells could not make out what De la Rey was saying when he gave the order to stop and asked: ‘What does it mean?’ (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885). It stands to reason, taking Diedericks’ testimony of the distance between them and Wells’s company into account, that De la Rey’s words could not be clearly audible above the clatter of the horses’ hooves. Because the incident took place in the S.A.R., Groot Adriaan de la Rey was later brought to trial in the S.A.R. for attempted murder. He was sentenced to six months in prison of which he served three (Government House 28/117: Enclosures to Despatches, September – December 1883).131

Upon hearing the news about Wells, Van Niekerk immediately instructed Cilliers to bring Honey back across the border into Stellaland. To Cilliers’s question what he was to do with Honey, Van Niekerk replied: ‘My order is for Honey to be shot, and if you do not give that order, it is my life or yours for it’. Cilliers responded

131 Interestingly, this was not the only time ‘Groot Adriaan’ de la Rey would have a run-in with the law. Not long after his release he again stood trial in March 1884, this time for stealing three wagon-loads of wood from the farm Kareepan that belonged to the Englishman J. W. Fletcher, and apparently he had also bought stolen timber from David Massouw’s Korana (TAB SS V914-R1483-1884).
The sad fate of the tough and reckless James W. Honey

by asking for a written order to that effect, to which Van Niekerk acceded by writing his order to Cilliers in pencil.

On Saturday 10 February 1883 Cilliers, Groot Adriaan de la Rey and 26 other men escorted Honey and Arend from Kopje Enkel on the border of Mankuroane’s territory to Vryburg. The party did not travel by road, but took a footpath through veldt and scrub. When they came to an open area Honey jumped off his horse. When Groot Adriaan de la Rey confronted him, Honey showed his contempt for De la Rey by daring him to shoot. De la Rey called Diedericks and conferred with him briefly in private. Coming up to where Honey was standing, Diedericks then shot him in the shoulder from the back. The bullet went through his chest and Honey fell down into a sitting position. When he asked why they had shot him and who would support his family, De la Rey shot him in the leg. He fell down again, but was able to rest his body on one arm. De la Rey tied Honey’s arms behind his back and made him lie down on his side. De la Rey then picked up a stone and dropped it on Honey’s head. He finally crashed Honey’s head with a second stone bigger than the first. The murder took place at about 10 o’clock in the morning. Honey’s body was hidden in an anthill and his horse shot some distance from there. Honey’s saddle that was found nearby, letters from his wife and his bloodstained clothes made it possible to identify the victim who was buried in Kimberley (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 26 May 1883).

The day after Honey’s murder Van Niekerk was informed by Cilliers that his orders had been carried out. Van Niekerk freed Arend, gave orders that everything belonging to Honey had to be seized, that a meeting with burghers of Stellaland had to assemble on the next day (Monday 12 February 1883) at Losasa and, finally, that Diedericks had to keep Erlank in custody. Between 40 and 50 people were present at the gathering and were informed by Van Niekerk that Honey, Wells, Horwitz and Streak were to be regarded as outlaws. In the proclamation issued on 12 February 1883, signed by Van Niekerk, A.J.G. de la Rey and Doms, one reads: ‘Whereas the said James W. Honey, being on his way as aforesaid, under escort, was followed by certain mounted and armed persons, named James Streak, alias Campbell; Frank Wells, alias Captain Wells; Horwitz, a certain Basuto, by name Cetchwayo, son of August Rapport, with the intention of delivering the prisoner from his guard and out of the hands of the law, and with that object the above-mentioned persons attacked the escort. In other words, that Captain Wells and these persons had made an assault upon officers of the Stellaland Republic, the assault consisting of the fact that Captain Wells had been fired at,
in Sterkfontein were read out and the sentence for outlawry was promulgated to those present. Cilliers was further ordered by Van Niekerk to make a mock inquiry into Honey’s death and to obtain a declaration from Diedericks about Honey’s so-called escape. When Cilliers again asked for a written instruction, Van Niekerk asked for the first written instruction he had given Cilliers with regard to Honey. Van Niekerk tore this up without issuing another written order. Cilliers was also instructed to give Erlank £7 for a horse so that he could leave.

Honey’s murder is described by Captain Graham Bower, the deputy Commissioner for British Bechuanaland, as ‘brutal’ and ‘cowardly’. Bower admitted that both he and Cecil John Rhodes were cognisant of the facts, but they were indebted to Van Niekerk’s influence to solve the Stellaland issue (See Chapter 6). Van Niekerk allegedly once mentioned the subject of the murder to Bower and the latter reported as follows:

[Van Niekerk] did not refer to his own share in the matter, but spoke of it in connection with De la Rey. I was however, perfectly aware that the act had in some way been authorised by [Van] Niekerk. I informed him that I had no authority to promise him amnesty. I said, however, that I have good legal opinion to the effect that the matter was not, and could not be brought within any civilized jurisdiction [because the alleged crime was committed before the establishment of British Bechuanaland Protectorate]. Mr. [Van] Niekerk answered at once that he trusted implicitly in my verbal statement, and would give me his support [to establish peace between Stellaland and Mankuroane] (Imperial Blue Book C.-4432, 1885:55-56).

Van Niekerk was found to be a British citizen on technical grounds since Mackenzie had appointed him Assistant Commissioner of Stellaland (See Chapter 6) so that he was hurriedly brought to trial in a British court (Williams 1885:43-45). The Crown Prosecutor in Kimberley ordered Van Niekerk’s discharge in May 1885 based on his belief that Wells’s affidavit was just ‘hearsay’, this despite his intimate involvement in the events, while the evidence of Ockert Fourie was judged to be ‘utterly untrustworthy’ (Imperial Blue Book C.- 4588, 1885:31). There was however, no evidence that could lead to testing
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the allegations brought before the court under cross-examination. It must also be said that both the judge and the prosecutor were friends of Van Niekerk’s (Barrett 1989:108). And when Colonel F.A. Stanley of Downing Street heard that Van Niekerk had been discharged he expressed his relief to Robinson

> to learn that the criminal charge has not been established against a person with whom Her Majesty’s representatives have held friendly official relations (Imperial Blue Book C.- 4588, 1885:35).

Robinson’s own reaction was to conclude that

> the conduct of the prosecution in this case has done much to excite distrust in the British Government throughout the Dutch population of South Africa (Imperial Blue Book C.- 4588, 1885:30).

Apparently Van Niekerk’s legal fees impoverished the once rich man although this was not a permanent change in fortune; his good friend Kruger soon came to his aid. In September 1885 he was appointed to the Border Commission and thus replaced Commandant H. Pretorius and later in the same year he also became Commissioner of Native Affairs for the Bloemhof district at a salary that was not to be sneezed at (Maree 1969:25). In 1893 Kruger further appointed him as Chief Commissioner of Police of the S.A.R.

Moving back in time again, when the British Resident queried the S.A.R. about the prosecution of the accused for Honey’s murder, the S.A.R. replied by saying that the murder was committed by Stellaland burghers in Stellaland and that the S.A.R. was thus powerless to prosecute (TAB SS R1358/83-V868-RS524-1883). On Warren’s insistence Groot Adriaan de la Rey and his collaborators were therefore heard by Landdrost Muller in Stellaland to establish their part in Honey’s death. The hearing lasted for several days, but the accused had to be freed as there was no clear proof against them. The defence was based on the claim that Erlank, who was not standing trial because he had left Stellaland (on the insistence of Van Niekerk) was responsible for Honey’s death. To get a complete picture of the credibility of the trial it must be mentioned that Landdrost Muller was the son-in law of Lang Adriaan de la Rey (Dennison 1972:5). And Lang Adriaan was the brother of Jacobus Herculaas de la Rey, that is, he was the brother of Groot Adriaan de la Rey’s father. Muller was thus married to a cousin of Groot Adriaan de la Rey’s. In the final instance no-one was punished for James
Honey’s murder and, in spite of his criminal record, Groot Adriaan de la Rey was later appointed by Kruger as the police chief in Johannesburg (Barrett 1989:110).

The *de facto* and *de jure* situation was thus as follows. Honey was arrested by the authorities of Stellaland for an alleged crime that was committed in another country, the S.A.R., without the possibility of establishing any proof or finding any reliable witnesses (KAB GH V23/38-R277-1883). Although Van Niekerk was not present when Honey was killed and the court did not want to accept the testimony of Wells and Fourie who pointed to Van Niekerk as the instigator of the murder, he was definitely an accessory. Why else would he have tried to cover-up the murder through the decree of outlawry two days later? Nothing could be found to prove that there had been any political meddling in the case against Van Niekerk, but there was certainly political alleviation in setting Van Niekerk free.

With this I return to the role of the freebooters and their part in the border culture that reigned in the western Transvaal.

**The freebooters**

They were known as freebooters, filibusters, volunteers or mercenaries and they were lured by the dozen by various chiefs to fight in their wars with the promise of sharing in the loot and, above all, receiving land in the conquered areas. Their motives for fighting in the wars were doubtful and they were opportunistic enough to instigate wars. There is certainly nothing good about the practice of freebooting and it was thus widely condemned. 133 Bower described them as land sharks and judged as follows:

> They fostered the enmities of the ‘native’ tribes and manufactured exaggerated stories likely to excite indignation or apprehension. Their aim being so to work on the fears or animosities of the Chief that he may be induced to grant them farms in return for their engagement to render military service (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:36).

Plaatje (1976:16) remarks that ‘the southern territories were overrun by stray whites, whose land-hunger vied with their utter disregard of the vested rights

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133 On the other hand, some also spoke in favour of this practice. For instance, Dennison (1972:6) justifies it and credits the freebooters for the fact that ‘a considerable area of practically unused territory overrun with game of a description and a most valuable farming country especially for cattle, was secured for European occupation.’
of those whose territories they invaded.’ And Shillington (1985:139) cynically remarks that the prospects ‘of winning land and loot were sufficient enough to tempt men who do not look upon shooting Kafirs with any decided aversion’. Williams (1885:14), in turn, describes them as

*the lower-class farmers of the Transvaal, men whose abject poverty made them grasp at their neighbours’ good. Loot in the shape of cattle was their object, and, that obtained, they returned once more within the Transvaal border, to await an opportunity of a fresh attack.*

There is no certainty as to which indigenous chief initiated the practice of employing freebooters, but the (white) agents of the chiefs, the Boers and President Kruger of the S.A.R. definitely had a part in this ([*British Bechuanaland Land Commission* Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O and *Imperial Blue Book* C.-4194, 1884:6-7]). Ramoroka (2009:49-50) believes that both Boer and British freebooters contributed to the conflict.

According to Williams (1885:5-6), David Massouw and Moshete’s freebooters were for the most part Boers, while Mankuroane and Motshiwa’s were for the most

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134 After Warren withdrew his occupying force from Bechuanaland to Kimberley in 1878, he left officers behind to act as British agents and advisers to the Southern Tswana chiefs, while the agents also had to serve as link between the Imperial or Cape governments and the indigenous groups. For example, C. Bethell was sent to Montshiwa, S. Lowe to the Batlaros, C.H.C. King to Phokwane, the main dwelling-place of Botlasitse Gasebone, and, finally, Agénor Daumas was a paid agent of the Griqualand West government ([*Du Plessis 1993:160; Shillington 1985:132; Manson 1998:490*]). Barrett’s (1989:92) assertion that Mackensie appointed Bethell as Assistant Commissioner is in conflict with other sources. The Boers, or the S.A.R., did not have much time for these British agents. Both King and Daumas, for example, were regarded as scoundrels with no real function ([*Barrett 1989:62*]). G. Donovan, in turn, had the following to say about Daumas: ‘He is a Kafer, the only difference is that he is a white man [who] has forgotten his nationality [and] accepted a Kafer one’ ([*TAB SS V690-R3945-1882*]). Cronjé also referred to Bethell as trash, asking David Massouw to arrest him and hand him over to the Boers ([*Molema s.a.:56*]). However, the S.A.R. also saw to it that their own agents were, often secretly, appointed as agents to the indigenous leaders. The S.A.R. agents, unlike the British agents whose function it was to look after the interests of the indigenous groups, thus acted behind the scenes to advance S.A.R. claims to land which, in reality, belonged to indigenous groups.
part British. The statement is not completely correct, though, because Montshiwa’s six white men fighting for him against Moshete all lived in his settlement and cannot be regarded as freebooters (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:14).

Whatever the case, on the advice of Doms and with the support of Van Niekerk, David Massouw started enlisting white freebooters on a large scale. On 21 January 1882 he issued a notice stating that he was ready to enlist 300 freebooters.135 Agénor Daumas became aware of David Massouw’s plans and informed Mankuroane that Taung was in danger of attack.136 Mankuroane then sent a Hayward, a Taung trader to Kimberley to recruit under-employed white men from the depressed diamond fields for £4 or an ox a day, or, for a farm should they serve for a three-month period (cf Clark 1883:29; Krüger 1930:23; Shillington 1985:133, 141). But Mankuroane’s preparations did not run smoothly and the mercenaries sent to Kimberley with cattle to buy ammunition often simply disappeared with the goods (Shillington 1985:141). It is estimated that Mankuroane succeeded in procuring the services of no more than 30 freebooters (LSE Selected pamphlets 1884:14).

The Cape Government, trying to avoid antagonising the S.A.R., placed a ban on the recruiting of mercenaries to serve in the ‘native’ wars (Imperial Blue Book C.-4194, 1884:5). The British government, however, appealed to the S.A.R. government to ensure that its citizens would respect the borders as laid down by the Pretoria Convention and to ask them not to get involved in the matter (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:21; Delport 1968:15-16). Acting upon this, the S.A.R. issued a proclamation prohibiting its burghers to take part in the war between David Massouw en Mankuroane (Clark 1883:44; Delport 1968:15). But the burghers simply ignored the proclamation, which goes to show how little

135 According to the name list David Massouw enlisted 477 freebooters in 1882. Two were sent back due to illness and one deserted (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

136 Agénor Daumas was the son of a French missionary, Francois Daumas, from Basotoland and he married a relative of Mankuroane according to the Batlhaping custom (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:43). Daumas, the father, lost the Mequatling mission station in 1866 when it was annexed by the O.F.S. Boers. Expelled to Winburg, he was totally demoralised by the time of his death in 1871 (Dreyer 2001:66). The son had very little time for the Boers and one can imagine that his father’s experience did not predispose him to liking the Boers. G. Donovan assessed the son as follows: ‘Calculated to be a dangerous man to the whites’ (TAB SS V690-R3945-1882).
power the S.A.R. government could in fact exercise over its subjects (cf Rompel 1902:107). The S.A.R. was thus forced to send someone, and I have remarked above that it was Joubert, to order the burghers to return. But Joubert had little success, perhaps because he was, in reality, a supporter of the war and indirectly involved in it. In the Imperial Blue Book (C.-3841 1884:27) the opinion is raised that the S.A.R. government did not think it lay within their power to control David Massouw and his people and the field-cornets did not take efficient action to prevent Boers from crossing the borders.

There is also evidence from other sources showing that S.A.R. officials openly supported David Massouw and the system of freebooters. The Transvaal Advertiser of 10 February 1883 is a case in point. It reports that Commandant J.G. Fourie of the Pretoria district requested of Field-Cornet Theunis Snyman that ‘although men were badly needed on commando for the war against Mapoch [he should] exempt those burgers who served as freebooters against Mankuroane from service’ (TAB SS V790-R1082-1883). And, on 15 January 1881, Commandant A. Roux of Christiana wrote to David Massouw that he was indeed happy to learn that the Korana leader was prepared to stand by the S.A.R. against the enemies of the Boer state. He warmly approved of David Massouw’s actions and undertook to do all he could to assist the leader. Should Makuroane step out of line he asked David Massouw to bring him back into the fold with his weapons and the help of the S.A.R. (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). David Massouw thus also felt free, in a letter dated 22 September 1882, to express his appreciation for Kruger and the help he had received from the Transvaal freebooters in ‘establishing peace’ with Mankuroane and putting a stop to the loss of lives and possessions. He further asked Kruger to use his influence to give ‘volle pardon en vergeevenis aan enige vrywilligers’, that is, to give full pardon and forgiveness to volunteers who helped to bring about peace (cf TAB SS V725-R5432-1882). Against this background one cannot come to any other conclusion than that the S.A.R. was fully cognisant of the involvement of their burghers and preferred not to stop them; efforts to keep up a neutral front were clearly half-hearted and David Massouw did enjoy the full support of the S.A.R. (Krüger 1930:21-22, 33; Agar-Hamilton 1929:22). The next section will again emphasise this point.

Du Toit (1983:152) also confirms that many burghers were unwilling to fight in the war against Mapoch and chose to avoid conscription by joining the freebooters instead. We will see further down why this was regarded as a better option.
'Don’t get killed for kaffir cattle, if you want to fight, fight for land.' David Massouw’s original agreement with the freebooters was that they would only receive half of the cattle that were raided. When Kruger came to know about this he reacted by telling the Boers: ‘Julle moet julle nie vir kaffer vee laat dood skiet nie, as julle wil veg, veg vir grond’ (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary). In other words, the S.A.R. government, with the President himself as mediator, planted the seed that the burghers should be compensated for their efforts with land. Moreover, one cannot exclude the possibility that Kruger saw this, from the start, as a good opportunity to expand S.A.R. territory.

The Boers took up Kruger’s suggestion with David Massouw under Van Niekerk’s lead and Massouw, in turn, called together his council. The outcome of the negotiations was that G. Donovan drafted a contract stipulating that each burgher would get a farm of 3 000 morgen (2 742 hectares) and, should he be killed in action, his family would get two farms. Half of all the loot, be it cattle, horses, wagons, or grain also went to the freebooters (Imperial Blue Book C.- 4194, 1884:6). For his efforts of setting up the contract G. Donovan claimed 6 000 morgen, that is, two farms. Klein Adriaan and Groot Adriaan de la Rey took the contract to Pretoria where they discussed it with Kruger, Joubert, C. Bodenstein (chairperson of the Volksraad) and Judge E.J.P. Jorrison. Jorrison scrutinised the contract and scrapped the land claim made by G. Donovan who was, as I have remarked before, in fact an S.A.R. agent. When the amended document was submitted to David Massouw he signed it. Each freebooter would be provided with a good gun, a horse, a saddle, a bridle and at least 400 cartridges (Imperial Blue Book C.- 4194, 1884:7). But according to Krüger (1930:28) David Massouw was becoming a rather unwilling accomplice in the Boers’ fight against Mankuroane at this point. Two possible reasons stand out: the considerable costs of supporting the freebooters and the land he would have to cede.

The promise of land excited the cupidity of a number of men, who immediately enlisted to fight in David Massouw’s war. A council of war was formed, consisting of Cilliers and two field-cornets. In terms of a council of war decision taken on 17 March 1882 two additional members, a commandant and a field-cornet, were chosen. Doms, as representative of David Massouw, also had a seat on the council. Except for the council of war, a commission for management

138 Hence the title of this subsection.
The freebooters was also constituted to handle public issues. Groot Adriaan de la Rey was the first chairperson of the commission (Krüger 1930:50-52). The council of war was responsible for all war operations and elaborate rules of war were drawn up. Although David Massouw stipulated clearly, as I have mentioned before, that no huts were to be burnt and that women and children were not to be molested, Mankuroane, would later complain in a letter to Warren that the Boers had taken women and children captive (Imperial Blue Book C.-4588, 1885:112). It was in all probability true that the freebooters broke their contract with David Massouw in this way since capturing women and children was, as has been explained, a practice the Boers followed at the time. Discipline seems to have been lax generally, and cases of freebooters being fined for transgressions such as absence without leave or disobeying orders are mentioned in documentation (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

By freebooters' agreement

Most people would flinch from taking the risks associated with wars such as those in which the freebooters were conscripted so that one wonders what predisposed these men to get involved. Sources mention that Mankuroane's followers had apparently been stealing from the Boers for years and that the S.A.R. farmers thus saw Massouw's war as an occasion to get even (cf TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885; Krüger 1930:19). But there is also another answer to the question: the freebooters cleverly and calculatingly reduced the risks to their own person. In Sieberhagen et al (1952:1) it is pointed out that, although the freebooters succeeded in raiding thousands of heads of cattle, there was, surprisingly, almost no loss of life among them. Metrowich (1970:19-20) gives the following insightful explanation:

The fighting between the different tribes was usually spasmodic and not of a very serious nature. The white adventurers were able to devote most of their time

139 The other members were Lang Adriaan de la Rey, Klein Adriaan de la Rey (a son of Lang Adriaan), Gerrit van Niekerk, Hendrik Stroebel and G. Bezuidenhout (Klein Adriaan de la Rey's diary).

140 However, it must be noted that the freebooters did not only raid cattle from Mankuroane, but operated deeper into Griqualand West while the 'fighting' went on. The dealer Alfred Reader, for instance, lost 207 heads of cattle in May 1882 to the freebooters. His letters to the S.A.R. and to David Massouw to help him recover them were to no avail (TAB SS V687-R3822-1882).
and energy to making their own fortunes. In pursuance of this policy they even formulated a definite line of action which aimed at acquiring as much booty as possible at a minimum risk to themselves. In fact they went so far as to draw up a gentleman’s agreement that, if circumstances forced them to fire at one another, they would deliberately aim high. So meticulously was this convention observed that in my researches I have been able to discover the names of only two white men, a Louw and a Fourie, who were actually killed during these so-called battles and skirmishes [my emphasis].

Against this background Major Stanley Lowe of the Griqualand West Border Police made references to the ‘misplaced trust’ the indigenous leaders had in the freebooters:

*It is strange that in the fighting against the Boers, who are reputed good shots no white man on Mankuroane’s side has been hit, and those of the Boers who have been hit have been shot by natives* (Shillington 1985:135).

He voiced the opinion that the freebooters were in cahoots with one another, that they had made a pledge among themselves to bring about an independent republic consisting of the farms they would receive as compensation in the conquered land and that they had, in reality, no other interest in the war (Shillington 1985:135).

In comparison to the minimal loss of life among freebooters, Anderson (1888:97) reckons that half of the estimated 35 000 subjects of Mankuroane and Montshiwa died as a consequence of the freebooters’ action. He says the following about the events:

*Never was a more cruel and unjust war made against people than this, by a people professing Christianity, who have, by their cold-blooded and atrocious acts, stamped themselves as a nation of murderers and robbers* (Anderson 1888:98).

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141 The records kept by David Massouw regarding the freebooters in his service confirm that only two of them were killed and two wounded (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Burghers Louw and Fourie fell during skirmishes at Pudimoe in April 1882 while helping Klein Adriaan de la Rey to take possession of the ship’s canon Mankuroane’s freebooters used. The places where they died are since then known as *Fouriesgraf* (or, the grave of Fourie) and *Louwsvlakte* (that is, Louw’s plain) (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary).
In order to stake bigger claims many of the freebooters employed substitutes to act for them. Among the freebooters conscripted by David Massouw there were about 130 of these ‘substitutes’ (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Van Niekerk, for example, employed three substitutes in the war and was thus awarded four and a half farms by the Land Commission of 1886. Civil Commissioner Kimberley, writing to the Under Colonial Secretary on 26 December 1883, claimed that Kruger had become the owner of 13 farms in Stellaland through substitutes (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:2). However, no record could be found to confirm this allegation and Kruger himself categorical denied that he ever possessed land in Stellaland (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:4).

Apart from the underhand agreement among the freebooters not to shoot to kill they also acted as spies for opposing parties. One of the most notorious of the freebooters, Scotty Smith, was a point in case.

‘Secret agent’ Scotty Smith

Scotty Smith, whose real name was apparently George St Leger Gordon Lennox (1854-1919), was appointed by Mackenzie as an auxiliary Bechuanaland policeman and was stationed at Taung with Mankuroane (Barrett 1989:92). Although Smith gained prominence as a friend of Mankuroane, it seems, however, from Doms’ private journal that he spied extensively on Mankuroane for David Massouw’s freebooters (British Bechuanaland Land Commission Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O). In a document marked ‘Geheime Informatien’, that is, ‘Secret Information’, dated 10 April 1882, Doms referred to the ‘secret agent’ S. Smith who had just returned from Taung, reporting that Mankuroane was planning a war. Doms continued his report by noting that one Lowe had indirectly taken ammunition to Taung and that A. Yetty had also smuggled in two loads of ammunition. ‘Secret agent’ S. Smith also recommended that the border had to be guarded at all times as he judged, from the great secrecy in which Mankuroane was enlisting freebooters, that war could break out within three weeks. On 11 April 1882 Doms reported on another secret agent, one C. Meyers, also a former freebooter of Mankuroane and who was living on Massouwskop (Mamus in the currency of the Boers) (Maree 1952:5). Doms, however, regarded Meyers as ‘niet vertroubaar’, not trustworthy. Meyers reported that Mankuroane had called upon his subjects to return from Massouwskop to

142 Other sources indicate to his having received eight farms (Beyers 1981:453; Rosenthal 1964: 355).
Taung as quickly as possible, Massa or Mahura would return with their followers to Taung as soon as the harvest was in and hostilities would commence in three weeks’ time. Meyers was also of the opinion that Mankuroane was planning to take in Vryburg and wanted to know how to act as there were so few Boers there to defend the town. On 12 April 1882 Smith met Meyers who were unaware of the fact that Smith was ‘our secret agent’, as Doms wrote, and informed him that war would start in three weeks’ time.

The entry for the next day, 13 April 1882, refers to information Doms received of a visit by Mahuru and five of his men in Vryburg. They spread the story that Mankuroane was unaware of any ultimatum of David Massouw’s freebooters and that there was no question of war. Mankuroane and his people would be proponents of peace and Mahuru wanted to live in the Vryburg location with his wives and children. Mahuru was on his way to Kuruman and expected to be let through freely – God would punish ‘us’, Doms wrote, should his wives and children be murdered during his absence.

On 16 April 1882 the ‘kaffir spy’, probably Smith, was back from Taung and reported that Mankuroane was in fact continuing with war preparations and that his house was guarded by 30 Zulu men. Mankuroane undertook, in answer to questions raised by followers without gardens, to supply them with food during this time. There were seven white men in Taung to help Mankuroane, and Daumas went to look for more help the Saturday before. Piet Gasebone, who was a friend of the spy, enquired from Mankuroane about horses that had been stolen from him and he said that he was in no way afraid of Mankuroane. Daumas and C.H.C. King were in Griqualand West. Mankuroane asked the spy to pretend that he had gone to visit his friend in Taung, should he encounter Boers, and he had to assess the situation in Vryburg. On his return, the spy went through Morokane’s area and noticed that three of Mankuroane’s cattle posts were guarded by about 50 armed men. When the harvest was over in May, Mankuroane would order these people to leave the area. Molala, one of Mankuroane’s sons, reportedly went to Botlasitse Gasebone to ask for help under the pretence of going hunting, but help was refused. It is also reported that Massa had asked the spy if he did not want to live among the Boers. ‘Personally’ Doms thought Massa could not be trusted, but had left his wives and children on the station to throw dust in ‘our’ eyes; his real object being to get help for Mankuroane from the Barolong and the Batlaro in Kuruman. Under the pretence of visiting his wives and children Massa could also spy on the Boers.
'Agent' Smith who was supposedly an ‘ally’ of Mankuroane probably fooled Doms too and saw to it that he would come out a winner whatever the outcome of the conflict would be. In fact, Smith deviously and opportunistically submitted claims to two farms, one in Stellaland and the other in Mankuorane’s territory, before the Land Commission of British Bechuanaland (*Imperial Blue Book* C.-4889, 1886:59).

Smith, together with A. Yetty, Yankee Wright, Foster, F. Wells, and others actually ganged together as cattle and horse thieves. They were not freebooters in the true sense of the word, but Mankuroane allowed them to hide their stolen goods in his country. These men were mostly Brits and they did not usually drive the stolen animals away themselves, but employed and trained gangs of mostly Zulu or other African men from the Cape Colony to do this. Although the pillaging by these men continually provoked Mankuroane’s enemies, the African leader did not want to get rid of the gangsters as Bower urged him to do in 1884 (*Imperial Blue Book* C.-3841, 1884:35). There are two possible reasons. Barrett (1989:92) claims that Mankuroane was simply too scared to challenge Smith. But Metrowich (1970:34-35) advances a more sinister reason. According to him, Smith met Mankuroane at the stage when he was trying to recoup his losses by attacking David Massouw. Metrowich (1970:34-35) writes:

> It did not take him long to size up the situation and to realise the possibilities. He arranged an interview with Mankaroane on whom he made a great impression. With his stock at low ebb and smarting from his recent defeat at the hands of Massouw, the chief eagerly welcomed his new ally, and […] outlined the plan of campaign which he proposed to adopt. ‘We are too weak,’ he told Scotty, ‘to drive the Boers out of the country, so we must stop them from settling down. We must raid their camps. We must steal their cattle. We must rob them of their horses. We must keep them shut up in a laager. In this way they will be so busy protecting their own herds that they will have no time to attack us. When they find they cannot remain in peaceful occupation of the farms they have stolen from us, they will get tired and will return to their own country.’

No proposition could have been more to Scotty Smith’s liking and he certainly made the most of the opportunity. Before long, he had recruited a well-organised, well-armed ‘private army’ of about thirty whites and double the number of Africans. With this small force to back him, Scotty threw himself wholeheartedly into action. Scotty Smith made a clean sweep of the cattle of a
particular Boer encampment on more than one occasion and carried out the chief’s policy of attrition to perfection. Apparently, even at this early stage of his career in South Africa he could boast to have stolen over 750 horses. Metrowich (1970:42) summarises: ‘By means of diversionary raids and harassing tactics Scotty managed to hold Mankaroane’s enemies at bay for some months’.

The entry of characters such as Scotty Smith in the unstable Cis-Molopo stirred up trouble even further. Months later the same role-players would be involved in the battle of Mamusa where they tried their luck once more. But this time it was a real war and not ‘playing at war’.

**Conclusion**

The role of certain individuals in the western Transvaal gave rise to the establishment of a border culture in the nineteenth century in this region. The exposition in this chapter painted a picture of individuals who had no respect for the possessions or lives of others; they flourished on anarchy and dominated the border landscape by their actions. In addition, the defective S.A.R. government contributed largely to the situation as it provided a breeding ground for opportunism and an environment where people with doubtful intentions could thrive. These individuals succeeded in infiltrating the close and trusted circles of indigenous leaders, thus securing positions for themselves from where they could influence events. The border culture that was established by these individuals was also typified by constant movement or redefinition of relationships; new alliances were formed or broken all the time and conflict between individuals was fanned. Alliances could, at any time, transform into competition and violence. Whatever the reasons were for it, David Massouw was at once caught in and party to creating this proverbial snake-pit.
Chapter 6

The ‘Kidney War’
and its consequences
Map of the Republics of Stellaland and Goshen. [Source: Land Maps S2/1106, National Archive]
Introduction

The battle of Mamusa was preceded by a number of related events, among which the establishment of Stellaland. The establishment of the State of Goshen, on the contrary, did not concern the Korana people directly, despite having affected one of their allies and it will therefore not receive the same focused attention as Stellaland. The two freebooter republics, Stellaland and the State of Goshen helped to create and feed the border culture of the Western Transvaal just as much as the S.A.R. did.

As I have pointed out, the alliances between the various indigenous leaders determined the intergroup relations in the border culture of the time. Groups would get involved in scraps and skirmishes that had very little to do with them directly just because of their alliances. During the battle of Mamusa the question of alliances played a significant role, and it is therefore important to take note of them and to understand their historical relevance. The title of this chapter refers to the sometimes trifling issues, like refusing the rightful owner the kidneys of a slaughtered animal (See Chapter 2), that could fuel enmities between erstwhile allies. In the final instance, this particular chapter illustrates the violence brought on by the rapacity and greed that formed part and parcel of the border culture in the Western Transvaal, and it explains why this aspect needs to be emphasised in exploring the events leading up to the battle of Mamusa.

For friendship’s sake

Chief Montshiwa of the Barolong boo Ratshidi (See Chapter 2) lived in the area around Sehuba, that is, Rooigrond (which translates to ‘red soil’), near Dithakong. This area was well known for its abundant water sources and fertile soil and the African leader’s followers succeeded in making good profits from the fresh produce they brought to the Kimberley market (Starfield 2008:90). From about 1853 the neighbouring S.A.R. Boers looked with envious eyes at Montshiwa’s lush and fertile area and his people were intermittently harassed by these neighbours who would have liked to occupy the land (Manson 1992:491-493; Higginson 2001:100).

143 Mackenzie reported as follows on their enterprising spirit: ‘Anyone looking at the Kimberley market of a morning will be able to bear testimony to what I might call the go-ahead spirit of the natives of that neighbourhood’ (LSE Selected Pamphlets, 1884:8).
Montshiwa’s strategy to deal with the Boers’ attacks during the 1860s was along three lines of action. While he was not Christian, he turned to some of the Cape mission societies asking for the establishment of a mission station on his territory. The expectation was that it would bring greater stability among his people and this, in turn, would mean a greater ability to defend themselves. The possibility of the missionaries’ giving them direct military advice was also not to be excluded. He also decided to establish Ratshidi settlements or outposts in different parts of the Molopo region. His aim was to show the Boers the error in their thinking that unoccupied land was unknown land and thus free for the taking. In the final instance, Montshiwa would appeal to Britain for protection (Starfield 2008:57-58).

When the First South African War (1880-1881) broke out Montshiwa found it self-evident to throw in his lot with Britain. After the war the Boers wanted revenge for this, while they also had a bone to pick with the African leader because he had refused to stand by them against Sechele in 1852 (cf Krüger 1930:19; Shillington 1985:129, 132; Manson 1998:495; Butler 1900:46; Cornwell 1988:100-101). Montshiwa and Matlaba (of the Barolong boo Ratlou and Barolong boo Rapulana factions respectively) were intimidated by the Boers to join them in an attack on Montshiwa (Starfield 2008:93). The resultant feud between Moshete and Montshiwa meant that Moshete did not need much encouragement to join the Boers (See Chapter 2). In the attack that followed Montshiwa and his people were driven from Sehuba and Mareetsane, while Moshete went to settle on Kunwana (or Kunana) previously a cattle post of Montshiwa’s.

In February 1881 Montshiwa led a counter-attack against Matlaba and Moshete and succeeded in driving them away. Moshete reacted by first getting aid from his old friend David Massouw, rallying about 1 000 Basotho mercenaries and a number of freebooter Boers before officially declaring war on 13 October 1881 against Montshiwa. Moshete promised the freebooters cattle and land as reward and enjoyed the open support of the S.A.R. In fact, the Boer republic supplied Moshete with ammunition, served as a base from which to lead attacks,

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144 Sechele was king of the Bakwena around Molepolole from 1829 to 1892. The Boers perceived him as a danger to their western border and the battle took place at Dimawe.

145 These Basotho people were dislocated by the difaqane and were, in Graham Bower’s opinion, quite ‘insolent’ and it would take some time before they would settle down to living ‘normally’ and ‘peacefully’ (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:43).
For friendship’s sake

and cattle that were looted were channelled to the republic (Plaatje 1976:17). Bolstered by their alliances, Moshete and Matlaba led an attack on Sehuba during November 1881.

Among those who assisted Montshiwa were his secretary and adviser C. Bethell and Resident Magistrate N. Walker. Bethell associated himself closely with the Barolong; he was in fact married to Tepo Boapile, a Barolong woman (Manson 1998:500). Bethell, who openly demanded support from Britain in the war against Montshiwa, managed to obtain a licence from the Cape Government to export a wagonload of ammunition to Sehuba, and tried to enlist freebooters as well (Shillington 1985:132-133; Ramoroka 2009:9-50). Unfortunately for Montshiwa’s people, Moshete got wind of Bethell’s activities, ambushed him on his way home and seized the wagon (Manson 1998:498). Both Montshiwa and Mankuroane appealed on several occasions to the British and the Cape governments for protection against the Boer invaders, but neither Britain nor the Cape Colony wanted to get involved in any way in these squabbles and prohibited their burghers to serve as freebooters (cf Shillington 1985:109).

After T. Hudson, the British Resident in Pretoria, complained to the triumvirate of the S.A.R. about the assistance they gave to the freebooters in the attacks against Montshiwa, High Commissioner H. Robinson sent Captain G. Nourse to investigate the complicity of the republic with Montshiwa’s enemies. Nourse received confirmation that Moshete and David Massouw stood almost wholly under Boer leaders, but he could not succeed in ending the hostilities (Clark 1883:64-65). The Boer freebooters were dissatisfied with the number of hectares given to them up to that point in time and demanded more from Montshiwa (Williams 1885:12). When the African leader refused C. Weber, one of the freebooters, together with his sons, reacted by encouraging Moshete to re-launch hostilities against Montshiwa. Moshete thus appointed N.C. Gey Van Pittius as his agent and, with his assistance, the African leader took to the offensive once more on 21 January 1882. With an army of 100 freebooters who were armed to the teeth and with the full support of the S.A.R. a crushing defeat was inflicted on Montshiwa; his capital Sehuba was laid waste and he retreated to Mahikeng (where Molema had his seat), one of his wives was shot and 15 prisoners were murdered in cold blood (Publication of the National Union, No. 110, 1884:6; Manson 1998:496). In this regard Williams (1885:12) wrote:

146 One of the prominent S.A.R. officials who openly supported the offensive was Joubert (Agar-Hamilton 1929:21).
We have heard hideous stories of cruelties perpetrated by the Boer filibusters during this war; of prisoners invariably murdered in cold blood, of women and children massacred while engaged in their peaceful avocations, and of horrors almost untold.

The subsequent peace treaty of 24 October 1882 was between Montshiwa and the S.A.R. freebooters with the implication that it was no longer a simple instance of civil conflict between two Barolong factions. In terms of the treaty a massive indemnity of £16 000 was imposed on Montshiwa. He also had to cede all his land south of the Molopo River, that is, almost three-quarters of his territory, as well as all cattle looted from him. He was spared only 30 000 morgen (27 422 hectares). Montshiwa refused to accept the strict terms of the treaty, but the freebooters showed him a document with his name signed at the bottom. There is no certainty as to whether the signature was forged or if Montshiwa had been fooled into signing the treaty. Shillington (1985:133) and Manson (1998:498) are of the opinion that the first scenario is the more probable of the two.

Moshete did not receive any better treatment from the Boers. He signed a document he thought was the peace treaty, only to realise when the document was read back to him that he had signed away large parts of his territory to the S.A.R. and the freebooters (Du Plessis 1993:184-187; Molema 1966:128; Metrowich 1970:22). After this, an area of 10 400 km² was set aside and the State of Goshen, named after the Biblical country, was established in December 1882. Robinson expressed his opinion regarding its establishment very clearly by calling it the ‘Robber Republic’ (Cloete 1969:118). Van Pittius, formerly Moshete’s agent was voted president of the republic, while H.G. Weber, one of the instigators of the war, became its Commandant-General (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:70; Du Toit 1983:133). The State of Goshen and Stellaland were later unified under the name of the United States of Stellaland. Apparently Piet Joubert was the principal driving force behind the unification of the two states, because he believed that a bigger territory would be in a better position to take a stand against the British government (Meintjes 1971:105).

147 Molema (1966:123-126) discusses the treaty in detail.
148 The State archivist in Pretoria, Goldman (1927), could not determine the exact date of unification from the archival documents, but some sources give the date as 6 August 1883.
Nevertheless, the treaty did not ensure peace as the Boer freebooters continued with their raids against Montshiwa and his people. On 31 July 1884 Bethell and about 300 Barolong were on their way to drive a number of Boer freebooters off Barolong territory and to take back the more than 3 000 heads of cattle that had been stolen by the freebooters. Israel Molema, a nephew of Montshiwa, was in Bethell’s company. During the skirmish Molema’s horse was shot dead under him and he was wounded in the shoulder. Bethell raced to his assistance and tried to lift him onto his own horse, but he himself was wounded in the attempt to help his companion (Manson 1998:485-486; Molema 1966:141). The two of them looked for a hiding place under a bush and noticed a group of Boer freebooters nearby. Molema crept away and pretended to be dead, while Bethell, in the expectation that the freebooters would give him medical care, started coughing to get their attention. Some of the Boers, Joel van Rooyen and a De Bruin among them, rode up to where Bethell was. The Boers started making fun of Bethell and his dire position, boasting of their own successes. Van Rooyen picked up Bethell’s gun and asked how it functioned. The unsuspecting Bethell explained the gun’s mechanism to Van Rooyen who loaded the gun, put it against Bethell’s head and pulled the trigger. The post mortem found that the first wound Bethell sustained during the skirmish was not grave enough to have led to his death (Williams 1885:19-21). Resident Magistrate Walker was also killed and his head was cut off (Publication of the National Union, No. 110, 1884:8). During March 1885 Warren tried to arrest Van Pittius for the murder of Bethell, but Kruger refused to extradite the freebooter for him to be called to trial (Barrett 1989:109).

In the meanwhile, Mankuroane, who was one of Montshiwa’s allies, saw David Massouw’s absence from Mamusa to help Moshete as the perfect opportunity to attack the settlement. Clark (1883:29, 48-49) is convinced that the reason for Mankuroane to initiate such an attack was his intention to disarm David Massouw’s people. However, as we will see, the consequences of Mankuroane’s involvement were devastating for his people.

“Not for love of the ‘kaffir’”

On 31 May 1881 J.J.H.L. Kock, the commandant of the Christiana district, informed the acting landdrost of Bloemhof that Mankuroane was planning to attack various tribes, David Massouw’s among others, in the Bloemhof district (TAB SS V533-R1788-1881). Five months later A. Daumas confirmed to the
On 21 November 1881 Mankuroane and his followers, together with some white settlers in his territory, went over to the offensive. However, it was soon clear that there was no intention of bringing about peace, but that the aim was to retrieve cattle that had supposedly been raided from Mankuroane’s people by David Massouw. Mankuroane bribed Kock to allow him to drive the cattle over the S.A.R. border at the Bloemhof district. The estimated number of cattle was between 18,000 and 20,000 and Kock would receive 1,000 for his trouble.

Thus Kock, together with about fifty Boers, helped Mankuroane to drive David Massouw’s cattle across the Harts River and then burnt down several Korana outposts along the way. Mankuroane’s strategy nevertheless failed. To be able to surround Mamusa, Mankuroane was forced to cross the border to the S.A.R. with a group of horsemen. But as soon as the Batlhaping did this, they were shot at by Boers on the S.A.R. side and they were forced to retreat to Taung. This allowed David Massouw’s men to recapture their cattle and it meant that Kock could not claim any compensation from Mankuroane. Joubert suspended Kock, who vehemently denied everything, and especially that he had lent a hand to Mankuroane, because the African leader was not on friendly terms with the S.A.R.

When David Massouw returned from the attack on Montshiwa, he sought assistance to follow up the initial victory of his men over Mankuroane. He merely informed Kruger of his intention, a fact that points towards his independence, and asked for ammunition for the planned counter-attack. At the same time G.J. van Niekerk helped him to get together a band of white freebooters, and so, on 1 January 1882, David Massouw launched a counter-attack with the help of these freebooters, 500 of his own men and 400 Basotho.
failed to take Taung, a distance of about 82 km from Mamusa, but David Massouw regrouped and immediately started reorganising.

By mid-March 1882 David Massouw’s preparations to enlist freebooters were completed. Botlasitse Gasebone, a sworn enemy of Mankuroane (See Chapter 2), had also joined forces with David Massouw at this point in time. The march to Taung started when their combined laager was moved from the Harts River to Pudimoe, about 26 km from Taung. David Massouw has a considerable army but, according to Shillington (1985:141), he and his Boer freebooters also had the advantage of unlimited supplies of ammunition from the S.A.R. The *Imperial Blue Book* (C.-3841, 1884:22) refers to Van Niekerk’s receiving occasional supplies directly from Joubert.

On the other hand, ammunition was rumoured to have been scarce in Taung even though David Massouw complained about a constant flow of ammunition to Mankuroane (Correspondence between British Resident, Transvaal, and Chief Massau, *British Bechuanaland Land Commission* Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O). Despite his supposed short supply of ammunition, Mankuroane went over to the offensive by attacking David Massouw’s camp at Pudimoe. David Massouw and his armed forces staved off the attack and, driving Mankuroane back, they laid siege to Taung on 3 April 1882.

The beleaguered Mankuroane’s position was deteriorating rapidly and there was nothing but ‘disease, starvation, and death’ in his territory; even children were wounded and killed (Publication of the National Union, No. 110, 1884:5). An affidavit by one N. Lucas before the resident magistrate of Barkley West on 15 July 1882 reveals that the freebooters were considering it to intensify attacks on Mankuroane’s territory and to take it all by force (TAB SS V697-R4265-1882). Mankuroane was forced to approach Robinson in Pretoria to ask for help. Robinson thus visited Taung and asked Klein Adriaan de la Rey to meet there in order to discuss peace. De la Rey answered Robinson in this way: ‘You should know that we do not fight for love of the kaffirs like Smit and King are doing’ (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary). This answer made it crystal clear that loyalty to David Massouw was not a major consideration for the freebooters (TAB SS V690-R3945-1882).

150 In Chapter 5 we saw that at the end David Massouw had a force of more than 470 freebooters at his disposal.

151 The original entry reads: ‘U moet weet ons veg nie vir liefde vir die kaffer nie soos Smit en King hulle nie’. [De la Rey is referring to C.H.C. King and G.D. Smith]
‘Gentle treatment’

Then G. Donovan suddenly arrived at the Pudimoe freebooter camp and demanded to meet with the war council. Even though he acted under orders of Joubert (he showed his written orders to Van Niekerk and Doms on their request) the council of war wanted nothing to do with him. He had to repeatedly demand a meeting before they finally agreed to see him. Joubert’s notorious cunning is apparent in the letter. He argues that the freebooters would be unable to establish an independent state, first, because of the instability brought about by white and black cattle thieves in the region, and, second, because (and this shows deliberate bad faith on Joubert’s part) Britain would possibly get involved in the skirmishes. In actual fact, Britain had declared on more than one occasion that they did not have the slightest intention or desire to get involved in this situation, and they did keep their word on this. Joubert continued his exposition by stating (again in bad faith) that a defeat by the freebooters would have a direct and negative influence on the security of the S.A.R. Joubert’s military knowledge could not have left him ignorant of the fact that the freebooters’ prepotency in terms of numbers and ammunition excluded such an outcome. These were the reasons Joubert advanced for convincing the war council of the necessity for official involvement of the S.A.R. in the warfare. Van Niekerk’s reaction equally revealed his opportunist nature. Knowing full well that the freebooters had the upper hand over Mankuroane (partly due to the behind-the-scenes involvement of the S.A.R.) he answered G. Donovan that the S.A.R. had no claim to this territory which belonged to David Massouw and Botlasitse Gasebone.

The next day, that is, on 25 June 1882, a Captain Ferreira turned up from Taung to report that he had succeeded in negotiating a fourteen-day cease-fire with Mankuroane and that the field-cornets had agreed to honour it. The council of war studied the document and approved it. Through this the possibility of a profitable entry into the war for the S.A.R., together with G. Donovan’s chance to serve the S.A.R. through his negotiations, was definitely cut short. Words were now flying back and forth between G. Donovan, Van Niekerk and Doms with the argument becoming heated at times. G. Donovan argued that the S.A.R. would be dissatisfied with the peace treaty and Van Niekerk and Doms did not mince meat telling him that the peace was none of the Boer republic’s concern.

G. Donovan finally realised that he was getting nowhere with the war council and decided to visit Taung. Here he met King and A. Daumas, setting aside his dislike for the latter. G. Donovan tried very hard to persuade A. Daumas that Ferreira
did not have a mandate to negotiate peace since he himself had been instructed to do so. But A. Daumas explained that Mankuroane would, understandably, only be prepared to engage in conversation with the S.A.R. should the republic recognise their independence and their territorial rights. Further, there should be some advantage for Mankuroane in the negotiations and a guarantee that he would not have to cede any part of his territory. To this, G. Donovan answered that, should Mankuroane recognise the sovereignty of the S.A.R., the Boer republic would appoint a commission to investigate the land needs of Mankuroane and his people and the Boer republic would assign land to them. He further undertook that this land would belong to the chief and his tribe, that they would be exempt from taxes and would receive military assistance from the S.A.R. against David Massouw and Botlasitse Gasebone, as if these two allies had not just themselves benefitted from the military assistance of the S.A.R. in their fights against Mankuroane. Once Mankuroane and his people were inside the borders of the S.A.R., G. Donovan continued, the Boer republic would ensure that they had a peaceful existence. Thinking to make hay while the sun was shining, G. Donovan offered to have the contract drawn up immediately. He undertook to make his influence with the S.A.R. count to have the contract approved and would write to the war council of the freebooters to ask them to cease hostilities. A. Daumas was not fooled by G. Donovan’s absurd proposals and said that Mankuroane would never accept such a dispensation, that the land of David Massouw and Botlasitse Gasebone was in any case Mankuroane’s and that he was prepared to fight to the end. In fact, A. Daumas concluded that Mankuroane was busy talking to other chiefs about an alliance with an eye to destroying the S.A.R.

Thus G. Donovan’s projects came to a dead end, both with the war council and Mankuroane. Without a scrap of good news to report to his master, he chose to disparage the freebooters and told Joubert that Mankuroane had had few losses, had enough provisions and that the morale was high. He supplied unasked-for military advice to Joubert on how to conquer Taung which he described as a defenceless open space (TAB SS V690-R3945-1882).

The British Resident in Pretoria requested David Massouw to extend the armistice until 12 noon on 24 July 1882 (Correspondence between British Resident, Transvaal, and Chief Massouw, British Bechuanaland Land Commission Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O). In his letter to the British Resident dated 8 July David Massouw pointed out that hostilities could already have been suspended completely from as early as 19 or 20 June had there not still been a constant flow
of ammunition to Mankuroane (Correspondence between British Resident, Transvaal, and Chief Massouw, British Bechuanaland Land Commission Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O). A peace treaty was drawn up by Doms and the document was signed at Taung on 26 July 1882 by Mankuroane, David Massouw and the freebooters on both sides (Boon 1885:603; Goldman 1927:60; K. Shillington 1985:134). Although David Massouw had defeated Mankuroane he thought that he treated the African chief gently (met sagmoedigheid) in making peace the way he did it (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885). The peace treaty stipulated that David Massouw’s war expenses had to be paid by Mankuroane and that the freebooters would receive land as compensation, irrespective of the side on which they fought (cf Boon 1885:604; Shillington 1985:134; Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary). In the terms of this treaty a commission constituted by three representatives from both sides would stake out the boundaries between Taung, Mamusa and Phokwane. Mankuroane was represented by G.D. Smith, his secretary, King and A. Daumas while David Massouw was represented by Doms, A. Lavertino and B.E. Landmeter (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885).

Robinson regarded the number of hectares of land Mankuroane had to cede to the freebooters as a contravention of the Pretoria Convention. He felt that the Cape government should set aside their neutrality and that they should not apply the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 as strictly as they did up to that moment. This would mean that Mankuroane would be allowed to obtain weapons and ammunitions legally and he would be allowed to enlist freebooters. Mankuroane assumed, based on this, that the British government would come to his assistance should he become involved in a new war. Thus when David Massouw’s freebooter corps and his war council were dissolved a few days after the declaration of peace, Mankuroane decided to delay the process of staking out the borders, and rumours were heard that he was starting to enlist about 400 Zulu mercenaries and a few white freebooters.

152 The fact that David Massouw and his freebooters agreed to the freebooters on Mankuroane’s side also receiving land as compensation strengthens suspicions of behind-the-scenes agreements among the freebooters.

153 However, after the war Smith and King would decide to side with the victors and they would serve, together with Doms, in the Stellaland government (Barrett 1989:62 and Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:52).
In the meanwhile, the border commission did not make any headway. Not only did they have to deal with the delay tactics of Mankuroane, but David Massouw’s freebooters were just as quick to object to any borderline Mankuroane suggested and which they thought disadvantageous to their own interests. On the insistence of the disbanded war council David Massouw’s summoned Mankuroane on 13 September 1882 to come and see him, and the meeting took place two days after (TAB SS V725-R5432-1882). On 19 September 1882 an Act of transfer and territorial cession to the government of the South African Republic (Akte van overmaking en Territoriaale Cessie aan het Gouwerment den Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek) was signed in Taung by Mankuroane, David Massouw and Botlasitse Gasebone. This testifies to the fact that the S.A.R. must have somehow found a way of getting a share of the cake. In the act Mankuroane admitted to having disregarded the articles of the peace treaty and undertook to honour them henceforth. As guarantee he gave his person and his territory. Mankuroane undertook to revoke all title deeds and to declare them void, except for those of King and Smith. This was clearly aimed at making sure that there would be enough land for all the freebooters. In order to ensure peace, Mankuroane placed himself, his territory, his people and freebooters under the protection of the S.A.R. and he undertook to accept and respect the laws of the Boer republic. Other conditions were that the freebooters from both sides would be compensated according to the laws of the ‘Administration’ (the use of the term is not clarified in the document but it probably refers to Stellaland) with land and this had to happen as soon as possible. All stolen cattle (there is no explanation as to how cattle would be identified as such) had to be returned while Mankuroane had to recognise the right of ownership of the freebooters with regard to everything looted from his people. He finally authorised the border commission to act on his behalf and they had to start their task within four weeks (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary).

On 16 October 1882 the S.A.R. informed David Massouw that they accepted the above-mentioned act. In order to implement it a commissioner would be sent to Christiana as representative of the S.A.R. (TAB SS V725-R5432-1882). Apparently having put aside former squabbles with the S.A.R., Van Niekerk informed Kruger in November 1882 that there had not been much progress with the implementation of the act. He blamed G. Donovan for this, but did not motivate his statement.

Looking only at the loot in terms of livestock, one notes that it came to about 8 000 heads of cattle (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary).
While Van Niekerk undertook to stake out the borders himself, the various parties involved succeeded in scheduling a meeting for the border commission early in December 1882 (TAB SS V747-R6402-1882). Nevertheless, it could not go ahead as no representative for Mankuroane turned up. The Administration of Stellaland thus decided to call up the freebooters in order to persuade Mankuroane change his views. The first meeting of the border commission took place in Boribing, on 13 December 1882 and they managed to complete their task by the end of the month (TAB SS V1110-R4867-188 and Imperial Blue Book C.- 4194, 1884:3).

Although Mankuroane refused to recognise the line of demarcation, the Korana Council proclaimed it as border on 16 January 1883 (Boon, 1885:603).

In April 1883 the Administration of Stellaland sent a letter to Kruger about the content of an intercepted letter written by Mankuroane. Information the Administration had received from the secret agent, probably Scotty Smith, in Taung, was included (See Chapter 5). Mankuroane seemed intent on starting a war in three weeks’ time. Allegedly wagon-loads of ammunition were being transported to Taung and the Griqualand border police were allowing the wagons of ammunition to cross the border at Griqualand West. Mankuroane’s plan of action was to start raiding cattle in Stellaland. When the freebooters would come to retrieve their cattle, the African chief would claim that they had intruded on his territory and that he had no choice but to defend his people. The Administration of Stellaland thus demanded that the S.A.R. would lend their assistance in terms of the above-mentioned act of 19 September 1882 should war break out.

The letter referred to here is Mankuroane’s letter to L.G. Lee (a prominent leader in Stellaland) dated 10 April 1883. However, this letter nowhere mentions war or suggests that plans were made to provoke Stellaland, nor does it contain any reference to ammunition. The assertions discussed above must thus, for whatever reason, have originated from the ‘secret agent’. Mankuroane’s letter deals with the premise that the borderline that were demarcated by the two parties’ commissioners was subject to the approval of the S.A.R. Mankuroane thought that this was in direct conflict with the British government’s rulings and that Britain would not allow this to happen. The African leader explained that he had gone to Mamusa with his commissioners to negotiate about the borderline, but that this had failed. He confirmed that he had not breached the peace treaty and gave Lee the assurance that he had ordered his people to leave the outposts in the conquered area. Regarding cattle theft, Mankuroane knew only of 13 heads of cattle A. Daumas had found and these had already been returned to their Basotho
owners. He also stated categorically that he was not enlisting freebooters (TAB SS V810-R1833-1883).

The aftermath of the conflict had dire consequences for the Batlhaping. They were forced to give up so much of their best land that their basic subsistence needs could no longer be met (Conder 1887:95; Publication of the National Union, No. 110, 1884:5). The resultant famine forced them temporarily out to Mahikeng where Montshiwa was chief in order to find some way to survive (Conder, 1887:87). One thing is clear: one cannot refer to the war without taking into consideration the underhand dealings of the S.A.R. Although they had given Britain and the Cape Colony the assurance that they would stay neutral, they could not resist the temptation to try and expand their territory in contravention of the Pretoria Convention, indirectly and directly.

**Stellaland: Land of the comet**

David Massouw’s proclamation of 16 January 1883 stated *inter alia* that the territory of Stellaland (comprising a surface area of 15 500 km²) ‘shall be governed under civilized laws in our name and on our behalf’ (*Imperial Blue Book C.*- 4194 1884:8) (emphasis added). This proclamation also made it clear that it was David Massouw who had appointed Van Niekerk in his position: ‘*We constitute and appoint you [...] to be Administrator*’ (*Imperial Blue Book C.*- 4194 1884:8) [my emphasis]. Van Niekerk accordingly acknowledged in Proclamation 3 of 1883 of Stellaland, published on 18 September 1883 in the *De Volkstem*, that he officiated by virtue of the act of appointment ‘*door het Territoriaal groot Opperhoof David Massouw Rijt Taaibosch*’, that is, by the territorial great Paramount chief David Massouw Rijt Taaibosch (*British Bechuanaland Land Commission Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O*). Molema (s.a.:73) states that David Massouw viewed the Boers as ‘his subjects and tenants inasmuch as they had called him their chief’. The

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155 The name Stellaland was chosen in reference to the comet that was visible during the wartime even though the Latin word *stella* actually means ‘star’ and not ‘comet’. According to the entries in Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s dairy, the name was originally ‘Sterreland’, that is, ‘Land of stars’.

156 Language (1942:128) states incorrectly that Stellaland was established after Mankuroane had gone to the Boers for help, attacked Mamusa and laid it waste, because they themselves were eager to put ‘Moshweo’, that is David Massouw, in his place. Based on such unverified narratives, this author wrongly concludes
logical conclusion is that David Massouw was under the impression that he was in control of Stellaland.

Stellaland’s coat of arms reflected the victory over Mankuroane and the subsequent establishment of Stellaland. In the left upper corner (Quarter I) there was a Black korhaan (Eupodotis afra) with spread-out wings (volant), grasped by a firm hand symbolising the victory over Mankuroane. In the right lower corner (Quarter IV) there were two fish, the totem of the Batlhaping, pierced by a dagger emphasising the defeat of the Batlhaping (KAB A1646).

Van Niekerk was the first and last administrator of Stellaland. He governed the country not from Vryburg, which was the headquarters of Stellaland, but from his farm, Niekerksrust, which was situated in the S.A.R. on the Harts River. Van Niekerk was assisted by an administration elected for this purpose. Whereas information varies from source to source, the Stellaland Administration was probably constituted as follows: Lang Adriaan (A.J.G.) de la Rey (Commandant); Klein Adriaan de la Rey, a son of the first member (Executive Councillor); C. Genis (Registrar of Deeds); F. Ludorf (State Prosecutor); J.P. Minaar (Auditor General); H. Van Boegschooten (Secretary) and Doms, representing David Massouw as was the case with the War Council (Boon 1885:604; Goldman 1927:98; Sillery 1971:84). Some sources also list H. Stroebel, G. Nieuwoudt and Groot Adriaan de la Rey.

The proclamation of January 1883 also allowed for the appointment of six lands and surveys commissioners. Once all the farms had been surveyed according to the time it took for a horse to cover the distances measured the commissioners returned to Losasa where the farms would be given to farmers by means of a lottery the next day. However, they discovered that only 341 farms had been surveyed instead of the required 390. Since there was no more time to lay out more farms a new sketch plan was drawn up and the farms were divided into 461 new ones and renumbered.

that Mankuroane afterwards kept his promise faithfully to hand over unoccupied land to the Boers.

157 Upon permission of David Massouw the Administration selected a site for a town in the conquered territory on the banks of the Huhudi (meaning ‘running water’ in Setswana) (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary). A total of 381 erven were laid out. One erf was given to each burgher with a farm and the village was named Vrijburg, or Vryburg, on 7 December 1882.

158 The Civil Commissioner of Kimberley’s claim to the Under Colonial Secretary that ‘at least 1 500 new farms’ were allocated, was completely inaccurate (Imperial
The farms titles deeds were registered at the Deeds Office in Vryburg on 26 June 1883. Stellaland promulgated their own laws where possible, but they did not have their own government gazette. Promulgation of laws took place by the administration's simple act of drawing up a document stating that a certain law was adopted and by circulating the information among the Stellaland residents as widely as possible (Cape of Good Hope 1896:18). It also often happened that Stellaland did not draw up its own laws, but that the administration proclaimed the laws of the S.A.R. or those of the O.F.S. to be applied in certain cases (Cape of Good Hope 1896:xxii). The laws of the S.A.R. were, for example, adopted regarding the issue of Grondbrieven or land grants and the payment of transfer duty. On the other hand, the occupation laws of the O.F.S. were applied in order to make sure that there was a Boer to occupy each and every farm. These laws required that each farm owner had to report to the field-cornet of the district and no farm owner was allowed to leave his farms without written consent from his commandant (Cape of Good Hope, 1896:v; TAB SS V725-R5432-1882).

Documents handed in by order of David Massouw on 5 May 1883 to the British Bechuanaland Land Commission (Vol. 38, 1883-1886, section O) give the impression that, initially, David Massouw’s position was treated with respect and that working relations between him and the Administration of Stellaland were harmonious. The Executive Council met, for instance, more than once in Mamusa, David Massouw signed documents, reports were made to him and he asked for certain issues to receive attention. So, for example, David Massouw asked a Field-Cornet Nieuwoud to free six of his followers who were held for alleged timber theft so that they could appear before him in Mamusa (TAB SS V1064- R2407-1885). However, this relation soon changed and the power structure became typically

*Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:2). In Bower’s report to Robinson (dated 7 April 1884) the following information regarding these farms can be found (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:45):

- After the conclusion of the peace treaty 402 farms were granted to David Massouw’s freebooters.
- At Mankoroane’s request thirty-five farms were granted to his freebooters.
- Thirty farms were given by David Massouw to the officers of the freebooters. Fifty-four farms were given by David Massouw as unoccupied government farms.
- Of the total of 566 farms, 94 were cut into the Transvaal by the Convention line of 1884, leaving 472 farms inside Stellaland’s borders.
colonial. The Stellaland Administration included David Massouw less and less in the decision-making process until his status was all but that of a puppet (Krüger 1930:54; Williams 1885:6). The relationship between the Korana people and the freebooters became strained; so much so that, in August 1883, David Massouw complained that he and his people were being oppressed by adventurers who were cutting off land for themselves and he thus refused to sign any more documents. A factor contributing to the deterioration of the relationship between the Korana people and Stellaland was the suspension from 22 August 1883 of their seat on the Stellaland Administration and their right to vote during meetings with Doms acting as their representative (Goldman 1927:86).

In the end David Massouw could only reserve the area around Mamusa (about 55 000 morgen, that is, about 50 274 hectares) for him and his people. According to entries in Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s dairy it appears that David Massouw quickly realised that his territory was too small and that he was probably unaware of how much land he had ceded to the freebooters initially.159 The Boers’ system of using substitutes in order to get access to more land contributed greatly to this (See Chapter 5). Not only does this system illustrate the Boers’ lust for land, but it also relates to their agricultural practices. It was general practice to have more than one farm so that livestock could be moved on a seasonal basis to areas where grass and water were available. The economical exploitation of the Boer farms was thus low. The Korana people who were now confined to Mamusa did not have this luxury and they had to make do with the land that was available and, naturally, this limited the number of cattle they could keep.

Thus problems soon erupted between the Korana people and the Boer freebooters. The Korana people were bitter and saw the freebooters as the origin of their problems. Mamusa was in the middle of freebooter territory and this meant that the Korana people were not only bounded, but the surrounding Boers were systematically stealing Korana livestock (TAB SS V1110-R4867-1885; Molema s.a.:74). Delport (1968:17) alleges that the Korana were also angry about the

159 So, Klein Adriaan de la Rey notes in his dairy that David Massouw was dissatisfied with the land available to him and that there were negotiations between him and the S.A.R. for more. According to the dairy the S.A.R. had been willing to cede more land to David Massouw, but the ‘insolence’ of David Massouw made negotiations fail. While there is no confirmation for Klein Adriaan’s claim, the entries illustrate the alacrity with which the Boers blamed David Massouw’s so-called insolent behaviour when things did not go according to their plans.
damage the *verdomde* (damned) Boers was doing to the farms allocated to them and that they hated the Boers for it.

The anger about the damage done to farms shows clearly that the Korana people still viewed the land as theirs and so it is logical to remark briefly on the traditional landownership system of the Khoekhoe as well as the conditions for title deeds on the farms. Schapera (1965:290) notes that, in the Khoekhoe tradition, land was communal and inalienable. The chief did not have the right to alienate land and where it was ‘sold’ to colonists, it was more a case of granting usufruct; the ‘purchase money’ was analogous to a tribute paid for its use.

Next, the titles deeds of the farms David Massouw issued all contained the following three articles, namely, that existing roads were to remain open, that there had to be free outspans on every farm for all people, and that there was a quitrent of 10s per 1 000 morgen (that is, 914 hectares) due per annum (Cape of Good Hope, 1896:18). According to Van der Merwe (1979:421), quitrent originated and lapsed in more or less the same way as usufruct. Quitrent was alienable and could be retracted should the leaseholder fail to pay quitrent for three consecutive years. The leaseholder was also bound to exploit the land wisely and to improve it. It is important to emphasise the following aspects. Quitrent did not grant title to the land, but only permission to use the land. It was based on the consideration of annual payment and the conservation of the land. The nature of quitrent is short-term; it does not deal with perpetuity. In other words, the legal implication of quitrent on a farm is that it deals with a limited land claim.

In the light of the information above, it is probable that, to the Korana people, the allocation of land came down to a situation where the Boers could use the land, but where the Korana had a prior (overriding) claim to it. While it is true that the Boers and Korana people’s land practices and views on property rights did not coincide and that the Boers’ attached ownership to land, it would be a doubtful to argue and explain the Boers’ land claims one-sidedly, that is, only in terms of their own views. I will show that one of the later sore points of the Stellaland question was whether it should be incorporated into the S.A.R. or rather into the Cape Colony. Most of the Stellaland Boers favoured incorporation into the S.A.R. as the Boer republic was prepared to accept their land claims unconditionally, while the Cape Colony wanted to appoint a commission to investigate the validity of the claims. Recognition of the Boers’ land claims was thus more certain should they be governed by the S.A.R. government instead of that of the Cape Colony. In
addition, should it be possible to get rid of David Massouw, claims would be made even more secure.

On 23 May 1883 the Cape Parliament appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Rhodes to look into and report upon the northern boundary of Griqualand West. Because the Stellaland freebooters were not satisfied with what they already had, they proffered all kinds of reasons for renewed hostilities with Mankuroane (Williams 1885:6). Mankuroane immediately took advantage of the appointment of the Rhodes’ commission and on the 25 May 1883 he addressed a petition to His Excellency the Governor and the Executive Council, ‘praying’ for annexation to the Cape Colony (Du Toit 1983:168; Goldman 1927:78).

Mankuroane’s plea to be annexed by Britain made the Stellalanders turn blue in the face. Two other incidents fanned the heat. First, in September 1883 Botlasitse Gasebone informed Van Niekerk of a so-called meeting between him and Mankuroane in Phokwane. Mankuroane supposedly informed him of plans to invade Stellaland and asked Botlasitse Gasebone’s help. Mankuroane would allegedly soon gather with his council in Taung and all the Batlhaping and Batlaros would be there to give assistance. On 5 October 1883 Van Niekerk informed Kruger about this in the following words: ‘Zaken moeten spoedig een einde krygen want nu wordt het my al te moeigelik’ (Things have to end soon, because they are becoming too difficult for me to handle) (TAB SS V855-R4759-1883). The truthfulness of Botlasitse Gasebone’s allegations was, however, doubtful; the two chiefs were after all sworn enemies and one wonders what Botlasitse Gasebone wanted to achieve. Did he perhaps hope that Stellaland would fall for his allegations and thus act against Mankuroane? When this did not transpire, Botlasitse Gasebone addressed himself to the S.A.R. Secretary of Native Affairs in a letter dated 14 January 1884 to complain about constant thefts by Mankuroane’s followers and the white men from Taung (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:14). Botlasitse Gasebone saw war coming and sent a messenger, one Wessels, to the O.F.S. to enlist freebooters at any cost in order to be ready for war (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:18).

When the Civil Commissioner in Barkly West became aware of the situation the Under Colonial Secretary was informed in a letter dated 27 February 1884 about developments and the O.F.S. government was asked to do everything possible to prevent its citizens from participating in the war (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:18). In his reply dated 27 February 1884 to the High Commissioner, the President of the O.F.S. instructed the landdrost of Boshof to enforce the O.F.S. Neutrality Act, 1882 (Act no. 13 of 1882) strictly and to inform the field-cornets,
the commandant of Boshof and the landdrost of Hoopstad accordingly (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:21).

The second incident had to do with Mankuroane’s son Molale and his followers who, in contravention of the peace treaty, still occupied the fertile Morokane range and the dry Harts Valley stretching up to about 10 miles short of Vryburg. In a letter to Mankuroane dated 7 November 1883 David Massouw warned him to remove his son from Morokane (Boon 1885:606). But Mankuroane ignored the demand and the Government of Stellaland thus sent a letter dated 9 January 1884 from Vryburg ordering Mankuroane to see to it that his people retired to the area south of the Stellaland borderline, failing which, the Government of Stellaland would have no choice but to remove them forcefully (KAB, CO, D4: Memorial J.C. Donovan, Thieving in Stellaland).

Despite the disintegration of the relationship between the Korana people and the Stellalanders, the Administration of Stellaland persuaded David Massouw once again to attack Mankuroane’s outposts at Morokane. By complying with their request David Massouw could certainly expect to relieve his dire position in Mamusa and hit out at his old enemy at the same time. Nevertheless, this also illustrates the degree to which David Massouw had become a pawn in the hands of the unscrupulous freebooters. On 4 February 1884 it was reported that David Massouw’s Korana and about 1 000 Basotho had raided the Morokane outpost, capturing cattle, disarming men, stripping women and wounding one child (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:27). In the meantime, the Boers were forming a laager at Madibeng with the intention of attacking Taung (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:22).

The situation in Taung was not ideal for its inhabitants. Mankuroane had only about 800 ill-fed men of whom only 400 were armed and there were about 20 to 30 white men who could lend assistance (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:27). Mankuroane thus appealed to the High Commissioner of the Cape Colony for assistance, but was informed once again that he would have to defend himself should he be attacked (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:9). Thus Mankuroane tried to mobilise freebooters from the Cape Colony and he asked the High Commissioner permission to enlist freebooters through his agent J.G. Donovan (the son of G. Donovan) (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:63).  

160 Shillington (1985:142) describes J.G. Donovan as a ‘notorious land speculator and law agent from Barkly West’. Lowe expresses a similar opinion to Warren: [Y]ou
colonial government, wishing to remain neutral about disputes beyond their borders, replied that Mankuroane should defend himself. Because the situation was daily becoming more critical, Mankuroane signed a document on 3 March 1884 giving J.G. Donovan power of attorney to raise a force of 150 white freebooters and to allot them each a farm of 3 000 morgen (2 742 hectares).

War seemed inevitable and the High Commissioner considered it advisable to send his private secretary Bower to explain their decision about remaining neutral to Mankuroane and Montshiwa and to ascertain the exact number of freebooters the African chiefs had in their service (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:10). Bower reached Taung on 12 March 1884 and found the defence of the town imperfect; only a small force of men was available and it seemed that they were dispirited and without confidence. The next day Bower met Van Niekerk at Commando Drift and ‘professed for himself and his people the greatest anxiety to preserve peace’ (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:36). In stark contrast with the Administration of Stellaland’s persuasion of David Massouw to drive Molale from Morokane and Mankuroane’s threats against Stellaland, Van Niekerk not only undertook to use his influence with David Massouw to prevent the breach of peace, but in the event of failing to persuade David Massouw, he promised to call up 30 Stellalanders to protect Mankuorane (Imperial Blue Book C.-3841, 1884:36).

Due to Bower’s intervention J.G. Donovan promised not to enlist any more than the 40 freebooters that he had already recruited by then. However, on 28 March J.G. Donovan obtained power of attorney from Mankuroane yet again and issued

knew [J.G.] Donovan; that everything he did was for himself and not for the natives’ (Imperial Blue Book C.-4588, 1885:113–114). Lowe’s judgment of J.G. Donovan was borne out by the fact that he had laid claims to 45 000 morgen (that is, 41 133 hectares) in the Batlhaping territory, to a half share of all timber harvested in the western part of the country, to one-third of quitrent paid on all farms, as well as 32 000 morgen (that is, 29 250 hectares) for his own family in 1886 (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:65). The relationship between the Batlhaping and the agent turned sour in the end and, despite J.G. Donovan’s attempts to restore it, Mankuroane publicly informed him that there was no further need for his services on 5 May 1884 (Imperial Blue Book C.-4194, 1884:13; C.-4588, 1885:112–114).

161 It was during this meeting that Van Niekerk made diplomatic enquiries to Bower about Honey’s murder and his part in it (See Chapter 5).
about 150 certificates for farms to whites (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:64). These events led to Robinson’s order to Rev. J. Mackenzie, dated 12 April 1884, to prevent Mankuroane from granting parts of subordinate chiefs’ land to Europeans and to discourage him from giving any of his own tribal land away.

Over the next twelve months the political future of Stellaland dominated the scene and the strife between David Massouw and Mankuroane was pushed to the background. In March 1884 a British protectorate was proclaimed over Bechuanaland and Mackenzie was appointed as Her Majesty’s Deputy Commissioner. In May 1884 he visited Vryburg and declared Stellaland part of the Queen’s protectorate. Van Niekerk accepted the protectorate and was duly appointed Assistant Commissioner.

There were two opposing factions in Stellaland due to the uncertainty about whether Britain would recognise the Boers’ land claims and because there were allegedly dishonesty in the disposal of money and land by the Stellaland Executive Committee (Imperial Blue Book C.-4889, 1886:25; Dennison 1972:13). The Harts River Party had the support of the greater part of the Stellaland population. They were mostly Boers or from Dutch extraction and they requested the S.A.R. government to annex the country (Williams 1885:8; Meintjes 1971:105; Wormser 1916:84-85). Members of the Volks Committee, however, did not want to fall within S.A.R. jurisdiction. These residents were principally from the Cape Colony and the O.F.S. and they had bought farms from freebooters who had no wish to farm (Shillington 1985:141). On 26 June 1884 the Volks Committee declared themselves to be the supreme legislative body and worked towards becoming part of the Cape Colony.

Both parties lobbied for support from Van Niekerk and, although he was initially in favour of incorporation with the Cape Colony, he changed sides because of pressure from Piet Joubert and Rev. S.P. du Toit (Imperial Blue Book C.-4194, 1884:10-12; Krüger 1930:122). On 30 July 1884 Van Niekerk and his supporters

162 It must be taken into account that there was a strong faction in the O.F.S. with more rather moderate views, their sympathies leant more towards the colonial than towards the republicanism of the S.A.R. (Van Schoor 1947:25).

163 Giving way to pressure from those favouring Stellaland’s incorporation into the S.A.R. Van Niekerk refused to pledge allegiance to Britain. Consequently, Mackenzie replaced Van Niekerk with Maurice Hasset, a former resident of the Cape Colony of British decent (Williams 1885:7; Barrett 1989:89).
gathered on Niekersrust and decided not to accept Mackenzie’s proposed protectorate. They decided to meet again in a month’s time in order to reclaim stolen livestock from Mankuroane, David Massouw, Botlasitse Gasebone and the chief of the Batlhaping of Manthe, Matlhabane. How they related the question of stolen livestock to the political future of Stellaland is not clear. However, this reveals that at this stage Van Niekerk and his clan no longer regarded David Massouw and Botlasitse Gasebone as allies. The Harts River Party was on the warpath; apart from wanting to confront the indigenous chiefs they also threatened the Volks Committee and the government of the Cape Colony with taking up arms. Groot Adriaan de la Rey did not want to negotiate at all, and shouted, ‘Blood must flow!’ in order to make his views clear (Cloete 1969:119). Finally, despite the fact that the S.A.R. had nothing to do with Mackenzie’s appointment, they were asked to take steps to relieve him of his position (TAB SS V965-R3619-1884).

By mid-1884 the state of affairs in Stellaland had become so critical and the prospect of a collision between the two factions was so imminent that the High Commissioner recalled Mackenzie to Cape Town and appointed Rhodes as Acting Deputy Commissioner on 30 July of that year (Dennison 1972:13; Sillery 1971:102-104; Comaroff & Comaroff 1986:8; Goldman 1927:79). Britain did not want renewed conflict with the S.A.R. and hoped that the responsibility for Bechuanaland would be assumed quickly and smoothly by the Cape (Shillington 1985:160; Manson 1998:504; Barrett 1989:93). In the meanwhile the S.A.R. government decided not to annex Stellaland, because of the protestations of the British government on the basis of the stipulations of the Pretoria Convention (Goldman 1927:77). The S.A.R. was nevertheless so directly and closely involved in the issues and events in Stellaland that Joubert, despite the articles of the London Convention and the decision of the S.A.R., personally campaigned for the incorporation of Stellaland into the S.A.R. (Clark 1883:49; Du Toit 1983:219).

On 4 December 1884 Warren arrived in Cape Town with the instruction of the Imperial Government to move to Bechuanaland as soon as he had enough soldiers and supplies. Warren thus obtained enough supplies to conduct a major campaign and he arrived in Kimberley on 30 December 1884 with an army numbering 5 000 men. On 14 February 1885 he called for a mass meeting at

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164 According to various authors it was Rhodes himself who managed to displace Mackenzie, because he was anxious to bring peace to the territory for the sake of his diamond interests in the area.
Vryburg and declared martial law. The majority of the people present wanted Van Niekerk removed. They informed Warren of the alleged role Van Niekerk played in Honey’s murder and agreed to testify against him (Barrett 1989:104-108). Warren arrested Van Niekerk on the same day. Rhodes, who disagreed with Warren’s actions, however, tendered his resignation eight days later. On 23 March 1885 the High Commissioner proclaimed the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland and the Kalahari while Warren lifted martial law on 25 April (Goldman 1927:81). On 30 September 1885 part of the British Protectorate was proclaimed as British Bechuanaland by the High Commissioner (See Chapter 1). Thus, about two years after Stellaland had come into being, it ceased to exist. It was divided into two parts, the western section fell, according to the proclamation of 23 March 1885, under British Bechuanaland while the eastern section was incorporated as the Harts River ward of the Bloemhof district by due proclamation of the president of the S.A.R., dated 2 March 1885.¹⁶⁵ Some of the Stellalanders whose farms subsequent to this fell in British Bechuanaland were, according to an entry in the dairy of Klein Adriaan de la Rey, so bitter that they sold their farms for next to nothing. One Boer is said to have exchanged his farm for a horse, a saddle and bridle, while another accepted a wagon and a team of oxen.

Conclusion

As in the previous chapter, we have seen again how easily former allies could turn on each another or stab each another in the back. Points of view were changed with alacrity in this opportunistic, fluid, unstable and violent border society. In addition, this chapter has illustrated the direct implications the border culture had for the Korana people. Because of the establishment of Stellaland the Korana people arrived at a dead end, both economically and politically. David Massouw soon had no more say in the Administration of Stellaland. He and his people were swindled and used while the misinterpretations with regard to the nature and meaning of quitrent put the parties involved on an inevitable path of war. Nevertheless, while the Korana had nothing to lose, so to speak, it was the repeated

¹⁶⁵ The line that divided Stellaland into two parts traversed it as follows: From Fourteen Streams to the right of Border, Pokwani, Taung, Vryburg to Mahikeng. The smallest section of Stellaland, the area east from this line, became part of the S.A.R. (Klein Adriaan de la Rey’s diary).
application of violent elements of the border culture by the S.A.R. that led to the battle of Mamusa.

The border culture of the western S.A.R. produced its own set of narratives. The title of this chapter derives from one such narrative. It is appropriate to end this chapter with another one, especially as far as it reveals the understanding the Bathlaping had of the reasons for the battle of Mamusa. The war with the Bagothu, that is, the Korana, still forms part of the oral history of the Bathlaping of Taung. Tradition has it that David Massouw had a special liking for braaivleis or barbecued meat. After the successful defeat of Mankuroane, David Massouw and the freebooters celebrated the victory with braaivleis. Mankuroane was bitter and he felt that Britain and the Cape Colony had let him down while his own father-in-law David Massouw had conspired against him with the Boers. Mankuroane looked for a means to get revenge, but had to look for an alternative to military action as he had been sorely defeated on this score. He skinned a live buck and cursed it so that anyone eating its meat would die. He sent some of his men to drive the poor animal over to David Massouw’s camp. They left the animal near the fires of celebration and it stormed bleating towards them. David Massouw and his company fled in terror when the desperate animal ran into the fire, and then they approached the scene again. David Massouw and his company could not believe their ‘luck’ and feasted on the meat. The curse of Mankuroane was soon to be fulfilled: conflict broke out between David Massouw and his former allies, and during the battle of Mamusa, our focus in the next chapter, David Massouw died.
Chapter 7

The curse
The spoils of war: A government notice in the *Staatscourant* der Z.A. Republiek after the battle of Mamusa. [Source: TAB SS 11-41-R6231-1885-part 1]
Introduction

Ferguson (2008:43) points out that where most wars are concerned there are within the basic political units instances of differences in interests, disagreements over actions, unequal abilities to influence the course of events, and of long discussions and debates. This was also true of the battle of Mamusa and the broader structure of this chapter has been determined accordingly.

The reasons for this war, the strategic planning and preparation, the fighting in itself and the consequences of the war for the Korana people as well as for the S.A.R. are presented in a detailed, chronological order. This was done to highlight the social processes involved in resolving the conflict, or rather, in the failure to resolve the conflict situation. I will point out how personal relationships changed or received the final blow while the ways of dealing with the situation at Mamusa will shed light on the border culture of the region. In the fragmentary white vs. black community of the S.A.R. with its poor record of upholding and respecting human rights there was a lack of social cohesion and relations so that there were next to no attempt at arbitration, mediation or reasonable two-party negotiations. There could be no other conclusion to the events than a win-lose state of affairs. Throughout this chapter I will also feel the presence of the metaphors of the Western Transvaal border culture (See Chapter 1) in all their force: land and territory – stonewalls, stone beacons and boundaries – battlements and defences – river – Korana.

The run-up to the war

From the conclusions of Chapters 4 and 6 it is clear that the S.A.R. and the Korana polity of Mamusa had had a longstanding cooperative relationship for several decades and considered one another as allies at the crucial time just before the battle of Mamusa was fought. The S.A.R. recognised David Massouw, and before him Massouw Rijt Taaibosch, as paramount chief of the different sections of Korana people (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). David Massouw acted in this capacity to conclude treaties with the S.A.R. or Boers and there was regular correspondence between them (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Moreover, a number of S.A.R. government officials referred to themselves as friends of David Massouw’s while Piet Joubert contacted the Korana chief on more than one occasion to ask for help (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). The fact that David
Massouw, as we have seen, could declare war against Mankuroane without seeking permission from the S.A.R. is probably the most obvious and certain proof of his independence from the Boer republic. It would be acceptable to say, against this background, that David Massouw saw himself as an ally and not as a subject of the S.A.R. Archival documents further confirm, that the initial relationship between the S.A.R. and David Massouw was not characterised by conflict (See Chapter 6).

We have also seen how David Massouw’s political and economic independence was gradually eroded by the S.A.R. and the freebooter Boers up to the point where the Korana people were regarded as subjects by the S.A.R. and where they struggled to keep head above water in the economic circumstances brought about by the limitation of their territory. This process was accomplished without subjecting the Korana people in the martial sphere or through deliberation. In fact, David Massouw’s objections were simply passed over and ignored. It is understandable that David Massouw would find it unthinkable to give up his privileges as an independent chief; it is natural that he would find it strange when he started realising that it was expected of him to act like a subject, to obey foreign laws and to pay taxes. It is not difficult to imagine why David Massouw did not accept this situation, but continued to live according to the traditions the Korana people had become accustomed to over centuries.

To the S.A.R., on the other hand, the earlier alliance with the Korana people was something of the past. They had squeezed from David Massouw what they wanted: his territory and his military services to do their dirty work. He had served his purpose and was no longer useful to the S.A.R. To them it was clear that the Korana were now subjects of the S.A.R., so the so-called location had to be delimited and the community had to pay taxes to the S.A.R. government (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

The question of delimitation was a sensitive issue. Already in 1871 Massouw Rijt Taibosch had refused to have his territory staked out after it was included within S.A.R. borders after the one-sided proclamation of M.W. Pretorius in 1868 (TAB SS V132-R321-1871). David Massouw refused, in similar fashion, to allow any such attempts. It must also be pointed out that paying taxes was an alien concept to the Korana people as no chief had ever demanded taxes from his subjects (Schapera 1965:334). Moreover, the S.A.R. expected from the Korana people what they themselves found unacceptable: paying taxes to a foreign country.166

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166 The Boers always had a reputation of being averse to paying taxes (Barrett 1989:14). In fact, it was precisely this question that gave rise to the First South African War. More than 8 000 Boers gathered at Paardekraal on 13 December 1880
when David Massouw refused to comply, it was interpreted as insolent behaviour warranting military action.

The situation on the western border was extremely tense in 1884 and, while he was on his annual tour through the S.A.R., President S.P.J. Kruger summoned David Massouw to Niekerksrust. Just as Massouw Rijt Taibosch had refused to be summoned to Potchefstroom by M.W. Pretorius in 1860 so David Massouw refused to heed Kruger’s call now (TAB SS V32-R3517-1860). As I have remarked on several occasions, the reaction of the Massouws in such cases was regarded as insolence by the S.A.R. To the Korana leaders, however, this equalled a show of their independence as well as of distrust in the S.A.R.

Thus, the president went to Mamusa, but the talks and deliberations leading nowhere, Kruger ended them by threatening David Massouw. I translate from Maree (1952:9): ‘Next year I will send Piet and he is not me’. Kruger is of course referring to Piet Joubert who acted as Superintendent of Native Affairs from 1880 to 1889. Now, Molema (s.a.:93) remarks that: ‘It cannot be said that Joubert showed any remarkable qualities as Superintendent of Native Affairs’, but during Joubert’s term he did succeed in gaining notoriety for acting violently towards indigenous peoples. Boer (1900:30) summarises as follows:

De kaffers hadden voor den Generaal vrees als voor niemand. Reeds als zij zijn naam hoorden noemen, sloegen zij op de vlucht, zij denkende, dat hij een hooger wezen was, voor wien zij, in geen geval, stand konden houde.167

Shillington (1985:111-112) and Barrett (1989:15) make similar references to Joubert’s harsh treatment of the Ndzundza Ndebele in 1883 and the aggressive policies followed by the S.A.R. under his leadership in order to subject the indigenous peoples. One could therefore conclude that Kruger already envisioned military action against David Massouw at this early stage.

after a dispute with the British government’s attempt to collect overdue taxes from a Potchefstroom farmer, Piet Bezuidenhoudt. The Boers decided to restore the Republic, three leaders were appointed and as a result of this, the First South African War broke out three days later on 16 December 1880 (Preston 1989:75; Besant 1880:6-7; Van den Bergh 1996:28-30).

167 Boer’s (1900:30) summary can be translated as follows: ‘The kaffirs had a fear for the General like they had for no other person. Just the mention of his name already made them flee. They thought he was a higher being whom no one could abide.’
The next year, on 26 October 1885, the Volksraad indeed sent Joubert to the western border in order to investigate the situation (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). One of the issues that received prominence was the letter H.C. Weber addressed to Kruger on 21 September 1885 to complain about David Massouw’s behaviour with respect to the farm Mooilaagte and in which H.C. Weber demands action from the government as the farm fell, according to the farmer, within the 1884 convention line (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). It is thus necessary to give some background knowledge of this issue before turning to Joubert’s campaign and his involvement in border issues.

Trouble on Mooilaagte

According to H.C. Weber he was molested by some of David Massouw’s allies, the Basotho chiefs Tampoor, Philipolis, Orpen and Ratschan, among others, ‘right from the start’, while a certain Jeremias, by the authority of the Korana leader whose general he was, had given H.C. Weber written notification to vacate the farm. One of David Massouw’s field-cornets, Hans, and about 300 families established themselves on Mooilaagte, erecting huts, ploughing fields, harvesting timber and making it difficult for H.C. Weber to let his cattle graze there. On 9 September 1885 H.C. Weber demanded damages in the sum of £1 000 from David Massouw for the use of Mooilaagte by the Korana and the Basotho from 1876 to 1885 (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). David Massouw flatly denied that he had sold Mooilaagte, he refused to leave the farm and gave H.C. Weber, on the same day he received the claim, written notification to vacate the farm (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). H.C. Weber also claimed that David Massouw threatened him in a second letter with violence the day after. In retaliation H.C. Weber asked Field-Cornet C.J. Faul to remove the Basotho from Hamburg, his other farm. H.C. Weber said that he had settled on Hamburg in May 1885 for which he had paid £750 on 19 October 1876.

168 A notable fact is that H.C. Weber was the chairperson of the Bloemhof Land Commission in 1871. Thus, Weber had to stake out the land belonging to Massouw Rijt Taibosch in his capacity as chairperson of this commission. And, as has been said, Massouw Rijt Taibosch prohibited him from doing so (TAB SS V132-R321-1871). There was thus a long history of discord between H.C. Weber and the Korana people regarding land issues.
According to Delport (1968:44) there is no doubt that H.C. Weber’s claim to the farm Hamburg was legitimate and he gives the following explanation. According to S.A.R. legislature, ‘civic rights’ or *,burgerregte* were certificates issued to eligible people allowing them to choose a farm on ‘uninhabited land’. Any farm selected in this way could be registered at any landdrost office and an extract from the register could be obtained in which the description of the property given by the applicant was copied down from the register. A surveys commission would later approve the extract after which it was advertised over a period of three months. Should no objection be made during this time, the property would be legally the fixed property of the applicant.

However, besides the fact that Delport (1968) does not give proof that said procedure had been followed by H.C. Weber, the process would have been unjust with respect to Hamburg. I explain. As has been mentioned before, the nomadic existence of the Korana people meant they practiced a seasonal exploitation of land (Strauss 1979:13). In other words, land would not be occupied on a permanent basis. It would thus have been easy for a prospective farm-owner to identify land as unoccupied in his opinion at a time that it was not being exploited. It was certainly not reasonable or just to expect indigenous peoples to be informed of a foreign set of official advertisements that appeared ‘somewhere’. At any rate, H.C. Weber could not produce the deed of purchase or other documentation proving his claims afterwards (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

H.C. Weber sent his two sons-in-law, J.H. Vorster and A.S. Engelbrecht, to settle on Mooilaagte on 28 September 1885, but they were banned from the farm. According to Vorster he was met by a group of about 25 armed Korana men under the leadership of Field-Cornet Hans who ordered him off the farm. While H.C. Weber admitted that the Korana and the Basotho people had lived on the farm before him, he repeated that Mooilaagte fell within the 1884 convention line and that the farm had been his property for ten years. He had further paid up all the required levies, but could not occupy it because of resistance by the Korana and Basotho people.

In his capacity as border commissioner G.J. van Niekerk first visited H.C. Weber on 29 September 1885 and he subsequently visited David Massouw in Mamusa on 8 October 1885. Van Niekerk reported on the same day to Joubert (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). According to the report the Korana people were insolent and Van Niekerk expressed the hope that the government would send the 25th Artillery soon to solve the situation. Without discussing the
consequences Van Niekerk pointed out that the 1881 S.A.R. borderline left David Massouw without arable land. He reported at length about the events in Mamusa during his visit. He and his company were left waiting for about an hour at the tree where meetings customarily took place. When he ordered one of his men to fetch the horses so that they could leave, David Massouw turned up and asked why the horses were being fetched when he had been informed that they wanted to speak to him. Without giving Van Niekerk time to respond the interpreter, his lips trembling with emotion, said that David Massouw feared no one and would not subject himself to anyone. Van Niekerk reported that he tried to pour oil on troubled waters by explaining the reason for his visit to David Massouw who responded by saying: ‘I’ve heard much about you Mr van Niekerk! And now I see that what I’ve heard is true’ (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

**Piet Joubert on the western border**

State Secretary W.E. Bok’s hefty order shows that Joubert’s visit to the western border required him to do a number of things. Joubert first had to determine and stake out the borders of David Massouw’s station. Then, no longer referring to David Massouw as the great ‘paramount chief’, the S.A.R. required Joubert to explain the power they would lend the Korana chief and he had to set out the changes and stipulations regarding ‘good management’ of the station. All Korana people or any other natives accepting David Massouw’s authority had to go and live within the borders of the station or risk being relocated elsewhere. Anyone trespassing on land allocated to David Massouw and Moshete would be removed ‘for their peace of mind’ (It could not be determined if Joubert did in fact try to fulfil this part of his order.) Finally, Joubert was ordered to determine the nature of taxes to be paid by the Korana people which meant, by implication, that there was a one-sided annulment of the exemption of taxes in terms of the 1872 treaty with President T.F. Burgers. In his capacity as superintendent of ‘Native Affairs’ and as commandant-general Joubert was also invested with the power to call up officers and burghers of the district to assist him in carrying out his instructions (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Where the S.A.R. is concerned there was thus, right from the start, a preparedness to make use of military power to deal with this situation.

On 31 October 1885, that is, five days after the Volksraad’s order, Joubert left Pretoria to arrive on Niekerksrust, which served as his basis. While he thought that decisive action had to be taken against David Massouw, Joubert felt that the
'new' relationship with the Korana leader was not clear (cf Liebenberg 1990:21; Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:9; TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). He was, for instance, unsure whether David Massouw and Moshete had to be treated in the same way as other indigenous leaders whose territory fell within S.A.R. borders and who were also recognised by the S.A.R. as independent paramount chiefs.

Liebenberg (1990:21) holds that Joubert’s uncertainty was the reason why he asked Captain C.A. Schweizer to organise an interview for him with David Massouw; a request the latter ignored. To Liebenberg (1990) it was thus clearly David Massouw who refused to cooperate and who put spanners in the works. Archival documents, however, tell a different tale (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). David Massouw did write to Van Niekerk on 8 November 1885 in which he requested a meeting at the customary meeting tree at his settlement. Under orders of Joubert, Van Niekerk visited David Massouw the next day. Hans interpreted for the Korana people and Simon for the Basotho people. David Massouw was informed that there was no bad faith on Joubert’s side, that he did not want to insult the chief, but that he wanted to investigate the issues correctly, resolve all problems and report back to his government. Van Niekerk also informed David Massouw that Joubert was in a hurry and wanted the Korana leader to meet with him as soon as possible. David Massouw expressed his thanks to Joubert for his willingness to determine whether the ‘white or the black person’ (die blanke of die swarte) was in the wrong (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). He also asked that H.C. Weber be present in order to find closure regarding his land claims. Van Niekerk, in turn, expressed his thanks for David Massouw’s forthright and wise behaviour and undertook to see to it that H.C. Weber would be present. Van Niekerk gave David Massouw the assurance that he had not spoken ill about the Korana chief and that the borderline would be sorted out and respected. Should there be white people living on his land illegally, they would be asked to leave. Once the line had been determined, no one would be able to enter another’s land except for visits. David Massouw declared that he would be present at the meeting and that he would say what he had on his chest. Van Niekerk asked if David Massouw could see Joubert the next day, but the leader preferred Joubert to rather come to him as he could not go on horseback. He also mentioned that his uncle Hermanus Links had been ‘caught’ in this way and this made him fearful. He could not go to Joubert, but was willing to meet him on the south side of the Mafrans school hut in the valley from where he would accompany Joubert to the meeting tree.
That very day, that is, on 9 November 1885, Joubert let David Massouw know that he would come and see him in order to examine the problems and to establish peace. Van Niekerk and about six to eight men would accompany him. Everything they discussed would be minuted and there should be an interpreter for both the Korana and the Basotho people. Joubert also gave David Massouw the assurance that the S.A.R. meant well and that the government wanted justice to be done by him and by his people; they would not allow injustice to the Korana people. Joubert cautioned David Massouw, in a fatherly way, not to pay attention to troublemakers, but told him that the Korana people would do better to obey the law (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). It is notable that, despite the importance of the H.C. Weber case in the preamble to Joubert’s commission to investigate the situation on the western border, Joubert did not mention anything in his letter to David Massouw about his request for the presence of H.C. Weber at the planned meeting. One can but speculate if this had to do with the article in the S.A.R. constitution that indigenous people were not allowed to bear witness against white people (See Chapter 4).

Joubert was notorious for his devious nature and he was not sincere in the undertakings he made to David Massouw. On the same day he had written the above-mentioned letter to David Massouw to explain his intentions to find a peaceful solution to the problems Joubert also wrote to Kruger at 17h00 that he found the situation to be critical and difficult. When he refers to the conversation between Van Niekerk and David Massouw his version completely differs from the one of Van Niekerk himself and the possibility of supplying deliberate misinformation, as Joubert did in the war between David Massouw and Mankuroane, cannot be ruled out. In Joubert’s version of the events David Massouw said to Van Niekerk that he had heard that Joubert had come to make war. While Van Niekerk was at David Massouw’s place, about 750 Basotho men arrived on horseback, hemming him in on all sides and pulling him from his horse. Joubert was informed that all the Basotho kraals were empty and that they had gathered with Moshete at Mamusa. (This assertion was devoid of all truth.) In Joubert’s opinion this ‘looked ugly’ (nie mooi nie) and he could not return to Pretoria before settling the issue. This was why he was waiting for further instructions from the government (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). The resolution 367 of 13 November 1885 taken by

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169 Joubert’s letter to Kruger was thus written on 9 November 1885 at 17h00.
The run-up to the war

the Executive Council of the S.A.R. in response to Joubert’s queries reached him three days later (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

While the S.A.R. had indeed requested Joubert on 10 November 1885 to try and persuade Moshete and David Massouw peacefully to subject themselves to the laws of the S.A.R., and although various documents show Joubert to have preferred peace above war, one does get the impression that negotiating a settlement was not the issue here; a ‘solution’ was prescribed and applied by the S.A.R. (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Documents, and especially the tone of the documents, reveal that Joubert expected David Massouw to give in to his demands or to expect violent reprisals. The viewpoint held by authors, such as Liebenberg (1990), Delport (1968) and Mouton (1957), that Joubert strove towards finding a peaceful solution and had no choice but to finally resort to war overlooks the critical fact that the power the S.A.R. wielded over the indigenous peoples was violent in nature, was exercised over a long period of time, and left no prospect of negotiating issues with them.  

Joubert’s later actions can be read as supporting the view that he did not intend to find a solution to the border problems through dialogue. Before the planned meeting with David Massouw could take place, Joubert sent Piet van Vreeden to Mamusa to stake out the borders on 10 November 1885, thereby rendering both the reasons for the meeting and Joubert’s words about finding peaceful solutions void. David Massouw and his followers were strongly opposed to the S.A.R.’s autocratic ways of allocating and staking out lands since this could affect their traditional lifestyle as well as their claims to land outside the ‘location.’ While Van Vreeden was busy reading out Joubert’s orders to David Massouw, one of the latter’s field-cornets, Koeraan, and his second-in-command, Dawid Links, turned up saying that they would not send any commission to stake out land. They added that the General should come to see for himself what they would do: ‘[L]aat Genl. Joubert zelf komen dan zal hij zien wat wij doen zullen’ (Delport, 1968:29). And the answer shouted out three times by David Massouw, who was after all expecting further discussions to take place, when he realised the implications of what was happening was completely understandable: ‘Ik verdom om iets er mede te doen te hebben. Liewerste dot, maar g’n bakentjes niet’ (Delport 1968:30; Maree

170 Compare the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection (1883:11), Spoelstra (1924:149) and the testimonies heard before the Royal Commission that was appointed to enquire into the internal state of affairs of the S.A.R. in 1881.
1969:31).\textsuperscript{171} The once loyal David Massouw had now been alienated to a point where war was inevitable.

David Massouw’s stalwart resistance to the S.A.R.’s attempts at forcing his people down also brought to light the fact that the surrounding chiefs, such as Moshete and Ratschan, were also dissatisfied about locations and taxes. Thus, when Joubert ordered Van Niekerk to take a census of Ratschan’s people, who lived south of Mamusa near Kopje Enkel, he refused and demanded that Joubert called a meeting instead where he, David Massouw and Moshete should be present. To Van Niekerk’s question of whether Ratschan knew that Paul Kruger was his ‘paramount chief’, he responded: ‘Ik weet dat Paul Kruger de kapitein van die Boere is’ (Maree 1969:32-33).\textsuperscript{172}

More trouble on the western border

According to Joubert the issue with David Massouw had reached such a low by 21 November 1885 that the Boer general regarded it as his duty to call in the help of the S.A.R. burgher forces (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). In the days following his decision he heard allegations from different sides strengthening his resolution to call in the burgher forces. In the first place there was the affidavit made by one August, possibly a worker of H.C. Weber, before Justice of the Peace Van Niekerk on 22 November 1885. H.C. Weber was also present while the affidavit was made and the tone is so similar to the Boer’s own, that the veracity of what is being said must be called in question. August testified that he was living on Mooilaagte and that, the day before, 12 armed Korana men and two Basotho men had arrived under the lead of the Field-Cornets Simon and Hans, all on horseback. He was accused of being a traitor and that it was through his doing that H.C. Weber had come to claim Mooilaagte. He was taken to Mamusa as their prisoner. Here it came to his knowledge that all the Korana and Basotho people who were living south of the Harts River had arrived in Mamusa in wagons. A huge number of Basotho and Bushmen attended the council meeting with shopkeeper C.H. Edmundson acting as secretary. The Basotho people of Mooilaagte were getting impatient and said that it was the last time they would come to Mamusa. If David Massouw wanted to make war he had to do it soon, because they did not want to wait. The council then decided to refuse to pay taxes.

\textsuperscript{171} Or, in translation: ‘I’ll be damned but I won’t have anything to do with this! Rather dead, but no stakes’.

\textsuperscript{172} Or, in translation: ‘I know that Paul Kruger is the captain of the Boers’.
The run-up to the war

and they would also not allow the location to be staked out. But David Massouw had to play for more time so that they could ask help from Basotholand. Even if help was not forthcoming, they were prepared to engage in war. August added that, while he was in Mamusa, three armed Bushmen arrived on horseback to report that a big Boer commando had been spotted nearby. David Massouw reportedly responded by saying that if that was what they wanted he was happy about it, all his people had to gather in Mamusa and they should spy on the commando. The Basotho, judging there be no peaceful option left, were now inciting all present to murder and steal (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). While it is impossible to ascertain the accuracy of August’s affidavit from other sources, it does nevertheless show towards traditional Khoekhoe procedures whereby the chief did not make decisions without seeking advice from his council (Schapera 1965:332-333). David Massouw can thus not be made out as the scapegoat; there were clearly feelings of strong communal antipathy to the autocratic behaviour of the Boers and responsibility for future action was assumed collectively.

Another report to Joubert deals with the burghers of the Harts River vicinity, viz. G.A. Van Zijl and J.G. Streicher. They informed Joubert that the Korana men from Bulpan, about five hours on horseback to the north of Mamusa, had gathered around the Basotho chief Orpen who, according to reliable resources, was mobilising an army of 300 men to march to Mamusa (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). The Boers feared for their safety since they had heard (they do not say where) that Orpen planned to kill and loot as they advanced. Because there was no field-cornet near them Joubert was asked to either send one or to give them permission to elect one on a temporary basis. Pleas were made to Joubert to take preventative measures against the ‘kaffirs’ before acting against Mamusa. Joubert thus sent Commandant P.C. Hoorn to go with as many men from the Lichtenburg and Bloemhof commandos as possible to Bulpan in order to disarm the ‘mutinous’ Korana and Basotho by force, if need be (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Force was, however, not necessary and the only incident reported was when a certain H.C. Vermaas tried to disarm a member of the Orpen family. The man resisted initially and threatened to shoot. When he then handed over his firearm and ammunition belt he reportedly told his children in kaffertaal (the language spoken by ‘kaffirs’) to leave him; he could have killed one Boer at least, but he had let himself be captured like a coward instead (Delport 1968:64-65). Eighty-nine ‘kaffirs’ were taken prisoner and taken to a farm on the Harts River; there was thus nowhere near the alleged 300 armed men reported to be advancing to Mamusa. The
following assets were confiscated from them: 209 horses, 2 111 sheep, 965 heads of cattle, 80 guns and 1 revolver (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). It is not clear on what basis this action was justified since these assets could not be regarded as spoils of war. There was no declaration of war, battle nor revolt: only hearsay and the allegations of two Boers. In fact, this incident shows a close resemblance to a case of raiding – committed by the Boers!

The ultimatum

Schweizer left for Mamusa on 26 November 1885 together with 12 men to give David Massouw Joubert’s ultimatum. In order to ward off a possible ambush, he sent two of these men to H.C. Weber’s farm and he placed out four of them at Edmundson’s shop. He and the remainder of the men found it expedient to announce their arrival in Mamusa with the sound of trumpets. Schweizer sent Van Niekerk to request David Massouw to come and see him. Joubert’s ultimatum was thus read out and explained in the presence of Van Niekerk, David Massouw and a couple of his council members (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1; Delport 1968:61).

The ultimatum given to David Massouw reflects how the dispute had come to take on a rather personal colour in Joubert’s eyes and how his former ‘friend’ had become an enemy. The General put it that David Massouw had treated him and the government of the S.A.R. with contempt and that this was seen as an indication of the detrimental influence he had on his subjects and other ‘natives’ of the district (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). This situation was fast becoming unbearable and David Massouw would expose himself to grave punishment should he not do everything possible to end it. Joubert counted on David Massouw’s cooperation, although his actions actually gave proof to the contrary. He drew David Massouw’s attention to the following: Excepting certain thefts where the tracks could be followed to the immediate vicinity of the kraals and cattle posts inhabited or guarded by David Massouw’s people, but where the animals could never be found and that can therefore not be explained, Joubert kept himself to the following ‘facts’ and ‘deeds’:

- On or round about 17 Augustus 1884 there arrived 47 armed Korana and ‘kaffir’ horse riders (of whom some were inhabitants of Mamusa) on the farm Nooitgedacht in the Bloemhof district where N. Neveling and others lived, and 16 heads of cattle were captured and taken. This was done under orders
of David Masouw and the cattle had not been returned to their lawful owner. (Sources furnish different names for the farm and are not always in agreement as to the number of cattle concerned (Maree 1969:30).)

- During or round about August a number of armed Korana and ‘kaffirs’ arrived under orders of Simon, one of David Massouw’s field-cornets, on the farm Koetzeevallei of L.M. Louw where 15 heads of cattle and one horse were taken from the coloured man Tamboer who lived on the farm, and one of the cows was found slaughtered in Mamusa. Only nine heads of cattle were finally returned to Tamboer. (Tamboer’s own affidavit of 26 September 1885 before the landdrost of Christiana gives the name of the farm as Vuurfontein where the incident took place and the owner of the farm was Commandant J.F. de Beer. Tamboer further declared that he went to David Massouw four times to get his cattle back and to ask why he had been raided. David Massouw apparently told him that the farm was not De Beer’s, but his own and that he did not like Tamboer’s continuous threats to report him to De Beer and the landdrost (TAB SS V1120-R5412-1885). Joubert thus clearly did not trouble himself about the accuracy of his ‘facts’ and ‘deeds’ and the possibility of other blunders cannot be disregarded).

- During or around April 1885 some coloured ‘kaffirs’, among whom April, felled trees on the farm Geluk, belonging to E.P. Blignaut, and took the timber. David Massouw prevented Christiana’s bailiff and Field-Cornet Bender from arresting one of the accused and from recovering Blignaut’s damages. (Here, too, is a case of a doubtful land claim; according to David Massouw he had given six of his followers orders to harvest timber on land belonging to the Korana people. The followers were taken into custody and the repeated requests of David Massouw to free them on the grounds that they had only obeyed orders fell on deaf ears (TAB SS V1064-R24078-1885).)

- A number of Basotho people were living on the farm Mooilaagte, the ‘property’ of H.C. Weber, and they had harvested all the timber on the farm. They were still on the farm and ploughed there. (As has been pointed out by Van Niekerk himself, the Korana people had little choice in this matter since the 1881 S.A.R. borderline meant that the Korana people were without cultivated fields.) The Basotho people lived and acted under orders of David Massouw and they caused great damage to property.

- Round about 28 September 1885 the H.C. Weber’s children were barred from Mooilaagte. When they arrived on the farm, they were met by an armed group
of 20 to 25 Korana and Basotho men under leadership of Hans, one of David Massouw’s field-cornets, and Weber’s family were molested and prevented from occupying the land, suffering huge losses as a consequence.

- A murder and a theft were reported on 31 October 1885. Schweizer heard, on Mamusa, from A. Dillner that James Thomson shot dead a Korana man, Champagne, and fled afterwards. Schweizer reported the incident to Van Niekerk who investigated it on 2 November 1885. It appeared from the investigations that Thomson was robbed of £250 in cash and of goods in the sum of £150. According to Joubert’s charge sheet they had well-founded suspicions that Dillner perpetrated the burglary after Thomson’s flight, that the wagons belonged to A. Wilson and that these were hidden on the farm Krompan in the Bloemhof district. Dillner, Thomson and P. Dogle were arrested on Mamusa. Under orders of Van Niekerk Corporal Laing confiscated the wagon and he had to take it to Niekerksrust. Near Mamusa Corporal Laing was attacked, ‘brutally’ kept prisoner and prevented from carrying out his orders. The culprit who prevented Laing from taking the wagon with the stolen goods to Niekerksrust was ‘Klein’ David Massouw (that is, the son of David Massouw). His actions made it impossible to produce any proof against the thief and are thus considered a serious instance of defeating the ends of justice (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

- On 12 November 1885 Joubert sent Van Niekerk and Field-Cornet B.J. de Beer, together with lieutenant Bosman and four artillerists, to count the indigenous people residing inside the 1881 convention line and to inform them of the hut tax they had to pay according to S.A.R. laws. When they arrived at one of the kraals where David Massouw’s people lived they were prevented from executing their task by Field-Cornet Hans and four armed Korana men who insulted them and made ‘upsetting allegations’ (onrusbarende bewerings). David Massouw should be ashamed of these and similar action of his subjects as they were viewed as contempt for the government as well as a violation and in breach of the law.

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173 Delport (1968:40) reports that Thomson had been burgled on several occasions by the followers of David Massouw and that the latter had given Thomson permission to kill the culprits. Thompson wounded one of the thieves who then died two days later from his injuries.
In the final instance, what the government had hoped for by staking out the land that David Massouw had reserved for him and his people was to clearly mark it as such in order to prevent further misunderstandings and avoid trespassing. (This is an example of deliberate misrepresentation since the Korana had had no say in how the borderline was fixed by the S.A.R. or Britain in 1881 and 1884 and in how their territory was gradually alienated from them.) The commission Joubert appointed for this purpose had, however, been insulted and treated uncivilly by David Massouw who had made it impossible for them to finish their task.

Joubert further indicated that he did not have the power to ‘acquit’ David Massouw and his followers. He was constrained to accuse them and to find them guilty of the ‘complaints’, ‘known facts’ and ‘deeds’ brought before him and he held them accountable for these crimes (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). That Joubert’s erudition is merely self-acquired, quasi-legal knowledge is made obvious by the structuring and wording of the ultimatum (See Chapter 5). But it is especially the fact that he accused David Massouw, found him guilty without having discussed the allegations with him, without hearing his side of the issue, without testing evidence before a court that underscores his lack of legal knowledge and the farcical nature of his ‘justice’. Another glaring feature of the ultimatum is the mix-up about who had claims to which lands. Since it was the responsibility of the state to establish certainty in these matters, the dragging of feet in clarifying the situation must be laid squarely before the door of the S.A.R. The racist and hierarchical character of the border landscape is also starkly obvious from the repeated references to the supposed ‘insults’ to the Boers made by the Korana people, how the Boers had been ‘humiliated’ or ‘hindered’ by the Korana people.

David Massouw indicated that he understood the content of the ultimatum and that he and his people would respond to it on the following day, that is, on 27 November 1885. He was informed that failing to give his answer before 10h15 would mean that the negotiations were over and military steps would then be taken to re-establish law and order. There were about 80 Korana people present at this meeting, but no Basotho people. The Korana leader’s attitude was reportedly not insolent, uncivil or violent in any way, but he appeared depressed and scared (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1 and Delport, 1968:61). The fact that David Massouw did not respond to the ultimatum was interpreted in official documents as a show of defiance and provocation so that military action against him was justified. It is not clear, however, if the Korana people did in fact understand the
concept of an ultimatum and if there was not perhaps some misunderstanding about it. Schapera (1965:351-352), for instance, points out that when the Khoekhoe had reached a decision to wage war they would ‘proceed without further delay’. In other words, when there was reason for war it had to be addressed immediately (See Chapter 1).

Before the ultimatum had expired, Joubert was informed by Cronjé that a number of ‘kaffir’ horsemen had mobilised on the opposite side of the Harts River from where they were advancing to Mamusa (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Joubert immediately went over to action by ordering Cronjé and Commandant J.F. de Beer to relocate their laagers and artillery, operated by professional soldiers, as close as possible to Mamusa (Mouton, 1957:145). At the same time he informed David Massouw in writing that he had called up armed burgher forces and ordered them to take in position in the immediate vicinity of Mamusa in order to enforce law and order. He further stipulated that no one from the ‘opposition’ had the right to carry or be in possession of any weapons, no one would be allowed to enter the area on horseback and the followers of David Massouw found carrying weapons would be seen and treated as enemies. Firearms would be confiscated with ‘matter-of-factness’, ‘pleasantness’ or ‘violence’ as need be and all problems stemming from this would be for David Massouw’s account; should blood flow this would be on the heads of David Massouw and his leaders (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Joubert was determined to stake out the borderlines of Mamusa and to levy taxes. He was willing to answer violence with violence should David Massouw be uncooperative. And David Massouw was just as determined not to give in to Joubert’s demands.

**Fire power**

As is the case in other frontier communities power relations in this particular border landscape were fixed, first, through ownership of and access to firearms and, second, by the technical level and development of these weapons (Storey 2008:7-9). It is not possible to determine the exact number of firearms or their quality at the disposal of the two sides because the reality of the situation was such that illegal imports were made from Mozambique and because obtaining permits for importing firearms did not require stipulating the eventual buyer. What could be established with reasonable accuracy from archival documents was that the S.A.R. had greater numbers of firearms at their disposal and that they were
better equipped with more advanced weapons. It confirms, on the one hand, the advantage in terms of number and technology the S.A.R. enjoyed. And, on the other hand, it is a sinister point in case for research pertaining to the link between military expenses and genocide (Colaresi & Carey 2008:40).

Joubert called up the commandos from Lichtenburg (led by Commandant J.H. de la Rey174 and assisted by Field-Cornet H.L. Vermaas), Potchefstroom (led by Commandant P.A. Cronjé and assisted by Field-Cornets C.J. Campher and A.J.P. Cronje), Bloemhof-Christiana (led by Commandant J.F. de Beer and assisted by Field-Cornets B.J. de Beer, J.H.L. Bosman and C.J. Faul) and Marico (led by Commandant J.D.L. Botha).175 It is not certain how many men he had under him in the end. The available sources indicate different numbers and not all burghers who were called up arrived; those who failed to turn up were later fined (TAB KG V15-CR631-1886 at CR558-1886). According to Liebenberg (1990:21) there were about 800, while Delport (1968:66-67) and Maree (1952:10) make mention of 950 men of whom 150 were volunteers. In Joubert’s report to the S.A.R. government, however, he mentioned 870 without accounting for the dead and wounded or referring to volunteers (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). The list compiled for the purposes of paying out the spoils of war, and here the wounded and dead are included (they and their kin received extra compensation) as well as those who deserted or were dishonourably discharged (these received no compensation), refer to 861 men (TAB SS V2860-R6639-1891; R2380-1891). By contrast, David Massouw had, according to Delport (1968:67) and Maree (1952:10), fewer than

174 The well-known General Koos de la Rey of the Second South African War.

175 The commando system, which originated in the Cape under Dutch rule, was central to the military organisation of the S.A.R. The Boer republic was divided into 22 districts that were in turn divided into a number of wards. At the head of each ward was a field-cornet and he was elected by the residents for a period of three years. A commandant, elected for a period of five years, was in charge of each district with the commandant-general right at the top. All male citizens from the age of sixteen were liable for military service and could be called up when necessary. Commandos usually operated in its members’ area and they were thus familiar with the area where they served. Burghers who were called up had to report with a horse, saddle, a bridle, some rounds of ammunition and provisions for a couple of days (TAB KG V15-CR782-1886). Besides the addition of the landdrost to the administration of the ‘natives’, the same military structure was used to administrate the ‘natives’ (Malan 1958:43–54).
half the number of men at the disposal of the S.A.R., that is, about 400 armed men. And Moichela (2002:52) speaks of only 300 armed Korana fighters.176

Considerable volumes of ammunition were requisitioned by Joubert and were consigned from different depots. The Boers were armed with a wide variety of firearms and this must certainly have caused logistical problems. From the storekeeper in Lichtenburg the following ammunition was consigned for distribution (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2):

- 10 000 x Westley Richards paper caps.177
- 10 000 x small caps.
- 10 000 x cartridge caps.

To the landdrost of Christiana the following was delivered (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2):

- 30 000 x Westley Richards paper caps.
- 7 750 x small paper caps.
- 3 040 x Martini-Henry cartridges.178
- 4 000 x Martini-Henry cartridges.
- 6 000 x Westley Richards No. 1 and 2 cartridges.
- 1 625 lbs (738 kg) gunpowder.
- 1 116 lbs (507 kg) lead (bullets).

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176 Beddy’s (2007:189) claim that David Massouw confronted the Boers with five thousand soldiers during the battle of Mamusa is completely inaccurate and can be dismissed without further discussion.

177 The 1858 Westley Richards Capping breech-loader (or the so-called ‘Monkey Tail’) was used by the S.A.R. up to the 1890s. It was loaded with a combustible paper cartridge, a loose cap was pressed on the cone nipple and the hammer cocked with the thumb (Lategan & Potgieter 1982:101).

178 The Boers had become well-acquainted with the Martini-Henry since the First South African War. It was a ‘modern’ 1871 British rifle 1871 used on a great scale during the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). It was a breech-loader, using single-shot black powder cartridges with a gas-tight metal case. Cronjé preferred the long muzzle-loading Martini-Henry rifle, whereas H. Pretorius preferred the so-called Majuba type Martini-Henry carbine (Lategan & Potgieter 1982:94, 101, 119). With the two entries of Martini-Henry cartridges one lot would probably be for rifles and the other for carbines, or one lot could be coiled cases and the other solid drawn cases.
To the landdrost of Zeerust the following delivery was made (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2):

- 1,800 lbs (363 kg) gunpowder in bags.
- 2,000 x Westley Richards paper caps.
- 10,000 x Westley Richards No. 2 copper caps.

H. Pretorius departed on 20 November from Pretoria together with 24 artillerists, 2 x 6-pounder cannons and a Krupp quick-firing cannon with a calibre of 12 cm. He took the following ammunition for the battle with him (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2):

- 600 x Krupp shells.
- 625 x Krupp shell cases.
- 400 x 6-pounder shells.
- 1,200 x cannon shells.
- 1,250 x 6-pounder gunpowder K.C. No. 12.
- 500 lbs (227 kg) gunpowder S.H. and K.F. to fill shells.
- 6,000 x Westley Richards cartridges.
- 1,000 x muzzle-loader cartridges.

From Rustenburg 2,824 lbs (1,282 kg) dynamite was delivered (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

As to the weapons possibly at the disposal of the Korana people the following deductions can be made. When one considers the firearms, ammunitions and equipment looted from the Korana people there were definitely flintlock muskets, the so-called ‘trade guns’. According to Lategan and Potgieter (1982:90) these guns were still in use late in the nineteenth century in the interior of Southern Africa by indigenous groups. At the time of the battle these guns were outdated as they were time-consuming to reload and less accurate than the rifle. The Korana would therefore not be able to match the Boers’ rate of fire.

The only indication of the number and quality of weapons at the disposal of David Massouw is to be found in the official documentation of what was

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179 A 6-pounder fired missiles of 6 pounds, that is, missiles of about 2.7 kg.

180 Plates in Lategan and Potgieter (1982:152) are of a Khoekhoe man with a long flintlock rifle, or Brown Bess, and his powder horn, a Tswana man at Lake Ngami with his flintlock and a Griqua hunter with his musket.
looted (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). The following were listed: 196 x rifles, 8 x revolvers, 3 x poaches of gunpowder, 12 x powder horns, 1 x barrel of gunpowder, 80 lbs (36 kg) gunpowder 3 x tins of caps, 1,5 x boxes of U.H. bullets, 1 x box of N. Nordt bullets, 3 x bandoliers with cartridges, 3 x bags of bullets and 1 000 x Martini-Henry cartridges. This shows clearly that David Massouw was not heavily armed and one can speculate about whether he had been prepared for war at all. According to the number of firearms confiscated it is also doubtful that he even had 400 armed men on his side. Sillery’s (1971:138) remark that only a ‘handful of tribesmen fought back’ is probably more correct. Besides the references to ‘old’ guns in official inventories of war booty, it is also questionable whether they were suitable for war. The landdrost of Christiana later sold some of these weapons to burghers for between 5 and 10 shillings, depending on the condition, and he motivated his pricing by saying that the burghers could shoot birds with them (TAB KG V40-CR 227-1892). They were thus clearly unsuitable for war. Captain George Puzey’s conclusion that David Massouw was neither prepared for war nor eager for warfare seems fully justifiable (Imperial Blue Book C.-4839, 1886:9-10).

Strategic planning

Joubert’s strategic planning, or rather the lack thereof, was influenced by at least five factors. First, the fact that government officials and political leaders from Pretoria issued orders without the head of the army’s awareness definitely hindered Joubert in his decision-making and planning. Writing to Bok on 12 November 1885 Joubert reported on the problems with David Massouw and he also explained his plans and needs ‘should’ they go over to military action (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). But, on 18 November 1885, that is, before Joubert’s decision to take military action against David Massouw had been made, Commandant Theunissen received orders from Bok to advance on Mamusa with 450 men since the Korana leader had transgressed the laws of the country (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). David Massouw had thus already been found guilty and it had already been decided to punish him at this very early stage. Joubert was highly surprised and upset when he heard that Theunissen was already on his way to Mamusa (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). It appeared to him as if there were some kind of misunderstanding or mistake and he sent Van Niekerk with a letter in which he ordered that the commando should stop their march immediately and
await further orders (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). On another occasion, on 21 November 1885 in fact, Joubert told J.H. de la Rey that he had heard that the government had ordered Cronjé to go to Niekerk in order to protect Van Niekerk. Joubert described this as ‘onversigtigheid waaruit kwaad kan voorkom’ (carelessness that could lead to trouble); Joubert was aware of Cronjé’s reputation, of his poor leadership and meddling in political issues during the first South African War (Van den Bergh 1996:30). He did not trust or like Cronjé and thus decided to stop him (cf Meintjes, 1971:195 and TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).181

A second strategy of Joubert was that he decided to cut off the water flow from the Harts River to Mamusa in order to force David Massouw and his people to surrender because of thirst (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1; Delport 1968:63, 67; Mouton 1957:145). While this may have made sense from a military perspective, it was a breach of the 1872 treaty between the S.A.R and the Korana people as they were assured of having free access to the river in this document.

A third aspect to the planning related to the challenges posed by a terrain that advantaged the Korana people and which Joubert had to first explore. The hilltop on which Mamusa was built rears its ragged top not far from the winding Harts River. It is surmounted by two sandstone kopjes with a narrow poortjie, Kwaaiskans (sheer cliff) in between (Van den Bergh 2000:42). Both kopjes were occupied by David Massouw’s people, villages had been built, and the hills fortified by trenches, partly natural and partly built by massive boulders (See Image 7.1).182 Mamusa could not be reached from the river as its banks were too steep. It was equally dangerous to attack Mamusa from a northerly or north-westerly direction as the terrain was craggy, open and without much protection. Should the Boer forces reach the narrow ridge from there, they would be exposed from both sides to the firing of the Korana from the two nearby kopjes.

With his last two moves Joubert showed that he understood the possible intentions of the Korana and that he could come up with successful pre-emptive countermeasures. The fact that he could speak an indigenous language, as Meintjes (1971:9) mentions, meant that he probably had enough knowledge to anticipate the actions of the Korana. By laying siege to Mamusa Joubert succeeded in overcoming a fourth difficulty; through this he neutralised their best weapon

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181 Cronjé, likewise, did not like Joubert and was jealous of him (Molema s.a.:73).

182 David Massouw’s dwelling was one the northern one of the two kopjes and was known as Kasiane (Kasianyane).
of attack, their ability to launch surprise attacks or to follow hit-and-run tactics. Whereas the Korana had always been assured of success through guerilla-like raids and their high mobility Joubert forced them to conduct a static war.

The final factor Joubert had to consider was the importance of forming powerful alliances during warfare; Joubert needed to prevent David Massouw’s allies from playing a role at all costs. According to Cronjé, David Massouw sent messages to Moshete, Montshiwa, Mankuroane and Basotholand to ask for help (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). He also turned to the British High Commissioner. He addressed a letter through Edmundson in which he said:

_I am in great trouble. I’m out of my head please come and help me as I Know [sic] you are my friend the land I live in was my fathers’ land it is my own property the Transvaal Gov. [sic] want to take it away but I can’t give it up I hear they are close by with a army to take my country from me. They almost stole everything from me and now the little that is left they also want it_ (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Stanley Shippard, the administrator of British Bechuanaland, did not have a very encouraging answer for Massouw from the High Commissioner. He answered that there was peace between Britain and the S.A.R. and David Massouw would not receive any aid from Britain. He warned the Korana leader that he should not cross the border with his followers and their cattle and pointed out that the inhabitants of British Bechuanaland also paid taxes. His advice would be that David Massouw immediately subjected himself to the S.A.R., he should ask forgiveness and pay his taxes (Delport 1968:57-58; Mouton 1957:144).

Taking the above factors into account Joubert requested on 21 November 1885 Commandant J.D.L. Botha from the Lichtenburg district to advance up to the point where the borderlines of Stellaland and the State of Goshen met and to pitch laager there. Botha had to preserve the neutrality with the border of British Bechuanaland at all costs and see to it that no armed burgher crossed it. He had to mobilise as many helpers from chief Gobasi’s people as was necessary with the help and advice of Native Commissioner Snijman. They had to come with their own wagons and oxen and had to bring their own provisions too (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

With an eye to avoiding the possibility of an ambush the commandant of Zeerust was ordered to call up 50 men who had to set up laager south of Mamusa in the most suitable place for patrolling the border and intercepting fugitives
Strategic planning

On 21 November 1885 Cronjé arrived with his commando at Bamboes Spruit where Joubert visited him two days later, explaining his strategy in this way (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2): As soon as the Lichtenburg commando under the lead of J.H. de la Rey arrived they had to deploy at the confluence of the Brak Spruit and the Harts River, north-northeast to Mamusa. The same day De Beer and the Bloemhof commando had to set up laager between Christiana and Monthe, about an hour or an hour and a half on horseback to the south of Mamusa. The remainder of the burghers had to await further orders at Niekerksrust. Joubert emphasised the absolute necessity of preserving the neutrality of the convention line with British Bechuanaland; armed burghers should not cross it (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

J.H. de la Rey received the order to persuade Mankuroane and Moshete to stay outside the war and not to aid David Massouw. As preventative measure De la Rey nevertheless had to redeploy his troops from the confluence of the Brak Spruit and the Harts River to a more south-westerly direction from where Botlasitse Gasebone and Mankuroane would come should they want to help the Korana leader. Moshete and Matjabi in any case had to supply between 50 and 100 troops with wagons to help to defend the western border should Botlasitse Gasebone and Mankuroane enter the war. They had to provide their own rations and had to pitch their laager just below Paardefontein or in the vicinity where there were enough water and vegetation. Joubert did not have complete faith in them and J.H. de la Rey had to leave 20 burghers there to supervise them (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Moshete refused to comply with Joubert’s request, giving the reason that his people were still busy ploughing and planting (Delport 1968:65).183 Joubert’s reaction to this was to let Moshete know that he was not in any way scared of Moshete’s going to help David Massouw, but that he feared that the women and children of Moshete and his people would pay the cost. The fact that Joubert could threaten Moshete by implying that the safety of the defenceless in Moshete’s community would be prejudiced casts an unflattering light on later accusations that the Boers indiscriminately shot at and killed women and children during the battle of Mamusa. As part of the agreement with Moshete regarding the staking out

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183 Actually Moshete was not happy with the way his location was staked out by the S.A.R. because the farm Paardefontein was excluded from it (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).
of his location, Joubert gave him the assurance that he would live ‘happily and in peace’ (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). Nevertheless, Joubert still thought it necessary to keep Moshete and a couple of his influential council members hostage in his laager (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). For his refusal to comply with Joubert’s request to help the Boers in the war he was fined with 2 000 heads of cattle (Molema s.a.:75). According to Conder (1887:96), military action against Moshete also figured high up on Joubert’s agenda. Fortunately for Moshete the quickly deteriorating relationship of the S.A.R. with Britain, the ‘foreigner’ question and finally the Second South African War that broke out shortly after prevented any such action against the African leader. What Moshete’s story teaches us about David Massouw’s own situation is that even if David Massouw had bowed down like Moshete to have his territory staked out and even if he did pay taxes this would not have safeguarded him from later military action by the S.A.R.

Joubert was unsure about what to expect from the Basotho who lived on the southern banks of the Harts River under Ratschan, especially after rumours, that were finally only rumours, started up about an army of 350 Basotho men gathered at Stroppan. In dealing with Ratschan, Joubert thus decided to follow the same strategy as with Moshete: Ratchan was also kept hostage together with four of his council members at Joubert’s laager (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). While it could be argued that Joubert succeeded through his preventative actions to isolate David Massouw from his allies it is ethically questionable to keep individuals who have not yet committed any crimes or yet declared their alliances prisoner.

The strategic planning of the S.A.R. also included making use of diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries. Kruger, for example, informed the British High Commissioner that Joubert was busy staking out locations on the western border and that he had been obliged to call up burghers because of problems cropping up with David Massouw and the Basotho people. The Commissioner sent the telegram to Shippard who, in turn, informed Kruger that he had placed patrols on the western border in order to prevent possible violations of the border by the ‘natives’ (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). Kruger also informed the president of the O.F.S. about Joubert’s action and asked the Boer republic to refuse help from Basotholand, which had apparently been requested by David Massouw, passage through their territory (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

In order to assure quick communication between him and the government Joubert had a post line laid between the western border and Pretoria and this was completed on 27 November 1885 according to the landdrost of Lichtenburg.
Strategic planning

(Delport 1968:73). The post line was probably not very effective as the first information that Pretoria received of the eventual battle of Mamusa reached them on 4 December 1885 through British officials of British Bechuanaland.

It cannot be determined with absolute certainty where Joubert finally stationed the various commandos. Nevertheless, Mamusa was indeed almost completely hemmed in (See Map 4):

- Cronjé arrived with field cannons and with Schweizer as second in command at the Bamboes Spruit on 21 November 1885 and they continued to Mamusa. He took in position east of the Harts River and about a mile, that is, 1.6 km, north of Mamusa.
- Joubert departed on Tuesday, 1 December 1885, at 14h00 from Niekerkrsrust and put up laager on the left banks of the river, about 2 miles or 3.2 km to the north of Mamusa. (The position of the laager was 27º 09’ 54” S / 25º 20’ 07” E. Height: 1 308 m). 184
- De Beer’s commando was south of Mamusa, east of the river. He took in position on 1 December 1885.
- J.H. de la Rey’s troops were stationed in a north-westerly to a south-westerly position with regard to Mamusa on the western bank of the Harts River (Delport 1968:67; Maree 1952:10).

There is not much information available as to David Massouw’s planning. Because Mamusa was hemmed in by the Boer forces, there was in reality not much he could do. It would be very difficult to get provisions, ammunition or help from allies and the Korana could do little more than start building defences (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Erecting defensive walls, especially on the sides of kopjes, was a common way of fortification among the indigenous peoples of the western Transvaal; it was also used against Mzilikazi. Conder (1887:88) writes about this:

*It is curious to note how complicated some of these systems of walls may be made, allowing of desperate resistance after the fashion of street fighting even if the enemy should gain the first line of defence.*

184 It was possible to pinpoint the position of Joubert’s laager with relative certainty because the so-called Schweizer Cemetery where the fallen Boers were buried has been laid out on the same terrain.
Klein Adriaan de la Rey also noted down in his diary that the entire Mamusa was enclosed by stonewalls and that there were smaller stone kraals inside (See Image 7.2). In effect Mamusa was well-fortified.

‘A hard furrow to plough.’

There are uncertainties as to how exactly the battle started, how long the shooting lasted and about how many people were wounded and died. In fact, J.H. de la Rey himself informed Joubert on 30 November 1885 that his field-cornets had disarmed all the inhabitants of Mumusa and took them prisoner without a single shot being fired (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). We know for sure that Joubert did not give orders to start firing, that there was poor discipline among the Boer forces, and that the Boers, who liked to think of themselves as fighters, were looking forward to the battle (Marx, 2008:46). We also know with certainty that unarmed men, women and children were killed. There are two general perspectives on the events, one from the side the Boer forces and one that is independent of the Boers.

From the sworn statements of Joubert, J.H. de la Rey and Cronjé the course of events to which Joubert referred as ‘a hard furrow to plough’ (‘n harde gekrap’) (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2) can be reconstructed as follows. Because David Massouw’s stronghold was well-fortified Joubert thought it ill-advised to attack it head-on. He preferred, as I have said, to deploy the forces in such a way that he could cut the Korana settlement from their water source, the Harts River, thereby forcing them to surrender. On 2 December 1885, in order to execute this plan, Joubert ordered J.H. de la Rey to move his laager to the other side of the river, that is, to the eastern bank of the Harts. J.H. de la Rey took 40 of his men to explore the area where they were required to set up camp. In the meantime Cronjé turned up at Joubert’s camp with 150 cavalrymen, all very young. Cronjé, who has been described as showing little talent and courage as a soldier seemed not to have known what was expected of him, because one of his adjutants dismounted swiftly and went up to Joubert to ask what the orders for Cronjé were (cf Van den Bergh

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185 The poor discipline among Boers during military exploits has been pointed out by various writers. Izedinova (1977:111), for example, refers to ‘a military organization peculiar to the Boers, with the absence of real discipline and sense of responsibility in their ranks’ while Molema (s.a.:50) summarises as follows: ‘Generally speaking, discipline, as understood in European armies, was conspicuous by its absence in Afrikaner forces’.
Joubert replied that J.H. de la Rey first had to take in position in order to cut off the Korana from water, according to the decisions taken.

The stubborn Cronjé wanted things done his way and, questioning Joubert’s military insight, he misunderstood, perhaps deliberately, Joubert’s response (Molema s.a.:48, 72-73). Cronjé stated in the affidavit he made after the battle that he had received orders from Joubert about half an hour after sunrise on 2 December 1885 to the effect that he had to keep the Korana people away from the water (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). (His affidavit thus conflicts what I have just mentioned.) He would have taken in position on the northern side of Mamusa and ordered his field-cornets to keep the Korana away from the water. Cronjé went scouting and came across J.H. de la Rey who was on his way back along the Harts River and who told him that he had given his field-cornets the order to keep the Korana people away from the water. When Cronjé returned to where his men were, he found that a great number of Korana and ‘Kaffirs’ were crowding before his burghers. He then told one of them he later identified as a son of David Massouw that they had to lay down their arms and he got the reply: ‘I’ll be damned’ (‘Dit verdom ik’). At that point he heard shots ring out from the front lines. As he turned his horse in order to see what was happening, shots were fired simultaneously from his left and right and his horse was hit. And then shots were being fired from all sides at the Boers (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Meanwhile, J.H. de la Rey and his men were approaching over a ridge from the south and saw from the crest how Assistant Field-Cornet Gert Olivier of the Cronjé commando was trying to disarm a Korana man. The man resisted and a scuffle broke out. A Korana woman (Korana meid) came up to help the man, hitting Olivier with a marrowbone against the neck. P.J. Delport, Olivier’s adjutant, gently nudged her out of the way with the butt of his rifle. This, according to J.H. de la Rey. Four shots hit Delport all at the same time – he was the first casualty on Boer side. These shots apparently corresponded to the shots Cronjé reported to have heard and which had led to shooting from all sides (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). However, according to Andreas Rijt Taaibosch (a nephew of David Massouw) who took part in the fighting, the first shot was fired from the Boer side and killed the wife of a man named Alie. The second and third shots were fired almost simultaneously and killed two old men in their huts, named Matlia and Lukas Links (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 29 June 1899). Although these two accounts differ on who were responsible for starting the war, both contain some
precise and detailed information which underlines the almost predictable need in war to justify your own actions by blaming the other for firing the first shots.

In his Herinneringen (Memories) that were published in five instalments in Die Brandwag in 1913, Cronjé provides information about this war that did not appear in other documentation. Given that he and his men were responsible for starting the shooting without an order being given by the commanding officer, it is necessary to also take note of this later version told by him.\(^{186}\)

The date Cronjé (Die Brandwag, 15 September 1913) provided for the war was inaccurate and he gave only one incident as the reason for the war, namely that David Massouw’s men had stolen cattle from a certain Jan Houwman. However, it strikes one that Joubert did not mention this incident in his official ultimatum to David Massouw at all. According to Cronjé, Joubert had requested David Massouw and his council members to meet with him and his men in order to put an end to the dispute with the Korana leader. Every time David Massouw would arrive at the set meeting accompanied by 600 men ‘die tot de tanden gewapend waren, en een uitdantende houding aannamen’, in other words, the entourage of David Massouw was armed to the teeth and defiant. Joubert, ‘a cautious man’, wanted to avoid a repeat of an incident such as the murder of Piet Retief and so withdrew each time. He sent a ‘very urgent message’ to Cronjé who, on his arrival, went to examine the positions of the Korana together with commander-general (Joubert). During a war council meeting that evening it was decided to attack the Korana the next morning. During the night, however, the Korana retreated into their mountain settlement. This resulted in Joubert’s instructing Cronjé to block the three routes to the mountain settlement. J.H. de la Rey offered to guard one of these routes.

Cronjé’s men waited impatiently for the command to attack and when it was given, they went after the ‘kaffirs’ at full speed. The first line of defence was, however, deserted and Cronjé and his men started ascending the slopes. Cronjé noticed some of his men standing around in groups and cautioned them to be more careful. At that moment, a number of Korana men came out of the bushes about 20 feet away and asked where Cronjé’s people were going. Cronjé’s answer was to tell the Korana to lay down their weapons. They allegedly swore at Cronjé and when he turned his horse around he was shot at. One bullet grazed the flank

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\(^{186}\) It appears that Cronjé’s command over his men was somewhat weak and uncertain. During the Jameson raid (1895), for example, his men also started firing without the command being given (Die Brandwag, 15 September 1913:236).
of his horse while another bullet went over his head, thanks to his brother who had knocked the barrel of the gun away. Before Cronjé could jump on his horse, it was hit by another bullet and a gunfight started in which Cronjé’s brother was one of the casualties (*Die Brandwag*, 15 September 1913:231-233).

In the first instance it is clear from the above that Cronjé’s memories differed from his official statement. It is thus likely that some sources are incorrect, and there may be a number of reasons for this. One such reason, unfortunately, is that Cronjé’s credibility should be questioned. When he was previously charged with human trafficking, he expected the facts to be changed to save his skin (See Chapter 4). A second point to be made is that the data in this second account support the idea that the Korana people had no plans to go to war. Why, for example, was their first line of defence deserted? And why did these Korana men approach Cronjé and his men when they were in an ideal position, out of sight, hidden by the bushes twenty feet away, for a surprise attack?

Joubert reported the fighting to have lasted about 50 minutes at which point the Korana people left the defences and fled over the open fields around the kopjes in a north-westerly direction (*cf* TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2; Van den Bergh 1996:42). Once in the open fields, the Korana people were clear targets and it gave the burghers the ideal chance to shoot at them or to chase them on horseback. H. Pretorius and his artillery were among those who went in hot pursuit after the fugitives, shooting five of them. Just as they were through the pass at Kwaaiskans H. Pretorius realised that a number of the Korana people were hiding on ledges and in crevices around them. Shooting was renewed. H. Pretorius himself shot and killed an armed Korana man while one of the burghers lost one of his arms. The resistance of the Korana fighters was crumbling and most of them had been killed or taken prisoner by then. A few of the Korana soldiers, however, got behind the erected defences and continued their resistance from there. Their hide-out was in a hollow so that the artillery had little success. By ten o’clock that night there was still fighting, but the defences still could not be taken in. Joubert ordered double watchmen to be placed out to make sure that David Massouw and his followers had no chance of escape (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2; Delport 1968:69-70).

Inside Mamusa fear reigned. Sarah Taaibosch, for example, related after many years how they had been told to lock the doors and were warned not to make

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187 On the other hand, Sillery (1971:138) holds that the fight continued for several hours.
fires or light tallow lamps, because that could give away their hiding-places. The children lay fearful in the dark. The grown-ups were quiet. In the distance they could hear the hustle and bustle in the Boer laagers. They did not know what the next day would have in store for them.

The next day Joubert sent Schweizer out with the order to withdraw the cannons so that they could be used more effectively. But Schweizer and three artillerymen disobeyed the order and decided to take in Mamusa. They went daringly right up to the foot of the defences where Schweizer was hit in the head by a Korana bullet. One of the cannons was positioned about 300 paces from the stronghold, but the gunfire was so ineffective that the Boers eventually ceased firing them (Delport 1968:69-70; Mouton 1957:146).

At 14h00 Joubert realised that the bombardment was of little help and he sent a Korana prisoner of war, Zaaibrand (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 29 June 1899), with a white flag to Mamusa to demand their surrender. He warned that further resistance would be useless and promised not to shoot at the women and children coming to surrender. 120 men, women and children, among whom one of the wives of David Massouw and two of his children aged 13 and 20 respectively, surrendered at 16h00 (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). A single cannon shot signalled the end of the fighting. Kruger’s version of the end, in which he gives a glorified version of the role played by his good friend Cronjé, is not accurate:

\[De\ \textit{welbekende\ Piet\ Cronjé\ stormde\ met\ zijne\ gewone\ onversaagheid\ de\ sterkte\ en\ na\ een\ kort\ gevecht,\ waarin\ David\ Massouw\ sneuvelde,\ werd\ diens\ stad\ genomen}\ (Rompel\ 1902:114).\]

188 Sarah Taibosch lived through the battle as a ten-year-old and sustained a head wound on her right. She told her grandchildren about her experiences and the grandchildren were my informants. Chapter 8 explores her stories about this time in more detail.

189 According to Maree (1969:30) David Massouw had four wives. Although informants confirmed that he had several wives, it was not possible to establish exactly how many he had, or what their names were.

190 Kruger’s words can be translated as follows: 'The well-known Piet Cronjé stormed in with his habitual fearlessness and after a short fight in which David Massouw fell the town was taken'.
The wounded and fallen

The numbers cited in different sources for the fallen and wounded (on both sides) vary. According to Kruger 14 Boers fell and the number of wounded soldiers was 30 (Rompel 1902:114). Maree (1952:10) gives the number as ten, while Joubert said the number of ‘brave’ burghers who died was nine with 14 wounded (cf TAB KG V15-CR782-1886 and TAB SS V2860-R6639-1891; R2380-1891). Apparently, seven of the fallen Boer soldiers were buried on 4 December 1885 at Mamusa in the terrain that would later be called the Schweizer Cemetery (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). While Maree (1952:10-11) indicates that all ten burghers had been buried there, only nine graves could be found in the fenced-in cemetery. The graves and the granite monument with the plaque commemorating the official proclamation of the town had been vandalised and all nameplates have been removed, probably for their value as scrap metal (See Image 7.3). It was thus not possible to determine who were buried where. According to Liebenberg (1990:146) one of the fallen had been buried on a farm which would explain why there are only nine graves at present.191

Joubert said that there were 130 Korana casualties, among whom about four or five women and three or four children (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). Among those who were killed was David Massouw, his son, Kateibe, as well as chief Jeremia Links, four field-cornets, among whom Hans, Simon and Koeraan, two members of David Massouw’s council and an ex-general (cf TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2; Mouton 1957:146; Maree 1952:10; Delport 1968:73; Engelbrecht 1936:47). On the death of David Massouw, Klein Adriaan de la Rey wrote as follows in his diary:

> I had also come over from Vryburg and was walking with my brother on the kopje and I saw, from a distance, a kaffir lying there. And I said to Koos: ‘There lies David Massouw,’ and he asked me, ‘How do you know?’ and I said, ‘It’s his

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191 Maree (1969:34) gives a list of the Boer casualties: Captain C.A. Schweizer (State Artillery), Field-Cornet C.N. Reneke (Makwassi), Field-Cornet C.J.J. Olivier (Lichtenburg), Adjudant P. Delport (Lichtenburg), P. Ernst (Potchefstroom), J. Jacobs (Makwassi), J.H. Homan (Bloemhof), H.P.N. Cronjé (Potchefstroom), J.C.C. Combrinck (Lichtenburg) and P. Du Plessis (Potchefstroom).
corduroy suit. I know it very well’. It looked as if Massouw was just about to climb over the low stonewall and then he got a bullet through the hips.\textsuperscript{192}

According to Sillery (1971:138) David Massouw had two bullet wounds. Andreas Taabosch mentioned that ‘David Massouw was killed in his own house, with three bullets through his body’ (Diamond Fields Advertiser, 29 June 1899). Despite the death of David Massouw Andreas claimed that ‘we fought on, firing from the “schanzes” and repulsed the enemy three times’. The fact that David Massouw had already fallen on the first day, however, probably precipitated the Korana people’s surrender.

The bodies of the Korana lay for a week in the hot summer sun before they were finally buried by the local inhabitants under supervision of the S.A.R. artillery on 8 December 1885. The position of the graves (See Map 4) confirms that the Korana people tried to flee over the fields in a north-westerly direction. It is not possible to determine the exact number of graves, because trees, shrubbery and other vegetation have taken over much of the terrain, obscuring the graves. There are more than a hundred graves, though.\textsuperscript{193}

One B. Makler was called up by Cronjé to be the commando’s Genees en Heijkundige (physician). The correspondence between Makler and Joubert does not indicate if he treated any of the wounded Korana people. Maree (1952:10) does, however, indicate that about 50 wounded Korana people were seen to by Dr Esselen who took over from Makler. According to Delport (1968:77-80) Joubert was very indignant about the fact that Esselen left two Korana people, one a very old woman, uncared for behind when he left Mamusa. While the government did pay for the medical costs of wounded burghers, Joubert ordered Field-Cornets Bender and De Beer to place out the wounded Korana people under the care of Boers so that there would be no cost involved for the government (cf TAB SS

\textsuperscript{192} The Afrikaans text paints a very poignant picture in its simplicity: ‘Ek het ook van Vryburg oorgekom en loop saam met my broer Koos op die kop en op ’n distansie sien ek ’n kaffer lê en ek sê vir Koos daar lê David Massouw, hy sê hoe weet jy dit en ek sê ek ken hom aan die ferweel pak klere wat hy aan het. Dit skyn asof Massou net wou oor die klipmuurtjie oorklim en toe kry hy die koeël deur die heupe’.

\textsuperscript{193} Delport (1968:73) estimates that the number of casualties on the Korana side was between 130 and 140. Mouton (1957:146) projects the numbers between 130 and 150, while Sillery (1971:138) records that 80 Korana died and that 20 were wounded. Metrowich (1970:54–55), on the other hand, records that about 150 were fatally wounded, and that another 100 sustained less serious injuries.
It must be noted that this was perhaps not the only reason as these people were eventually to work for Boers as so-called indentured apprentices after the war.

**Non-Boer eyewitnesses**

The independent reports, that is, reports made by non-Boers, contain insightful, but also disturbing information. In the first instance a Reuters report, dated 5 December 1885, was made based on ‘reliable information’ given by an ‘eyewitness’ of the battle of Mamusa (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). The report reads as follows:

> At Wednesday Joubert with about nine hundred men surrounded kopje the possession of David Massouw and hundred natives. Some forty Boers advanced and stated to natives they had come to disarm them. One Boer seized a native’s gun, accidentally a shot went off whereupon remaining Boers at foot of kopje opened heavy fire. Fifteen Korana took possession of kraal and opened fire caused Boers to retire; remaining kaffirs fled on to flat at foot of kopje and were shot indiscriminately without regard to age. Several Boers rode up to them actually blistering them while firing so close were they. About thirty natives and forty women and children were shot. One child of about twelve years old was found with five bullets wounds in him. Nine Boers were killed and fourteen were wounded but only three killed by Korana, the rest being killed by cross firing as stated by men of Potchefstroom laager. This has caused bitter feeling between them and Bloemhof contingent. Supply of water running short, natives surrendered after holding out twenty four hours – David Massouw was found shot. Dr Allport who attended from Vryburg was refused permission to render assistance to the wounded and several Englishmen who gave water to wounded natives were insulted by Boers. Appears natives had no intention of fighting as Boers were allowed on kopje and they shook hands with them, and guns and ammunition were afterwards found stored away inside their huts in usual peaceful manner.

It must be emphasised again that the Korana people were on top of a well-fortified kopje and, should it have been their intention, they would have been able to fight back the Boer forces with relative ease.

Another non-Boer report was the one compiled by Captain George Puzey for Colonel Carrington on 4 January 1886 and it drew on the information given by people who had been present at the battle (*Imperial Blue Book* C.-4839, 1886:9-10):
The natives had no intention of fighting.

- *This is shown –*

(a) by their sending their cattle to graze the morning of the fight [...];

(b) by the natives allowing the Boers to come on the kopje mixing and talking with them [...];

(c) by the number of guns found in the huts after possession was taken by the Boers.

- That there was no occasion for fighting, and that was known to the Boer leaders who had made arrangements for taking possession of the water supply. [...]

- That women and children were shot, though the actual numbers vary. [I]t was impossible to distinguish male and female in the rush, but as all who rushed down the hill were unarmed, there does not seem to have [been] any cause to have shot any. [O]ne who was there shortly after the fight [...] overheard two young Boers disputing as to which of them hit the woman. [...] Another told me that some miles from the kopje he saw the dead body of a boy of about 6 years shot through the back. [...] I was told by one who went over the field the day after the fight, and again after a week that during that time bodies of women and children that he had noticed had been moved, and afterwards found they had been buried. The bodies of the men had not been touched.

The claims of the Reuters report were rejected in Pretoria by De Volkstem of 10 December 1885. Since Kruger subsidised the paper, as Botha (1900:23) points out, it effectively had little choice in the matter of which side to take. Delport (1968:75), on the other hand, calls into question the correctness of the Puzey report. He bases this on the opinion of Lieutenant Lochner that a couple of the Korana were indeed armed, as well as on the version of H. Pretorius that he had shot and killed an armed Korana man. But the author undermines his own logic by finding evidence of only a few armed men. ‘A couple’ and ‘an armed’ clearly imply that the vast majority of the fallen were unarmed. Sillery (1971:138) comes to a similar conclusion.
Some questions relating to world-view and ethics

The question relating to the shooting of women and children is an important point that must be examined. That there were incidences of this in various skirmishes between the Boers and indigenous peoples is a point made by, for example, Manson (1998:504). Joubert knew full well that women and children would die as is evidenced by his warning to Moshete. The fact that Joubert was unsure about the exact number of women and children shot throws suspicion on the numbers he proffered. Metrowich (1970:54-55), for instance, is convinced ‘that a large number of women and children’ were among the dead and wounded. The explanation given by Rev. Radloff regarding the reason for the shooting of the defenceless and which is found repeated in Delport (1968:76), that some Korana men put on women’s clothes to mislead the Boers, is not satisfactory. One of the informants did confirm that there were men disguised as women; her grandmother had made dresses for her two sons and confectioned ‘breasts’ from scraps of fabric to help them escape. But the question remains how the Boers knew that the ‘women’ were actually ‘men’ when they targeted and shot them. Besides, if the vast majority of the fallen were unarmed, gender does not matter at all.

No evidence could be found in S.A.R. documentation that the Boers were responsible for six casualties among their own forces. The possibility of this having happened is, however, great. Discipline under the Boers was weak, as pointed out, and Cronjé and his troops should never have been where they were. The fact that the battle had started before the commandos were in their final positions and before an order was given to start the battle resulted in Cronjé and J.H. de la Rey’s commandos finding themselves facing one another, with the Korana people in the middle, when the shooting broke out.

President J.H. Brand of the O.F.S. praised the action taken at Mamusa and congratulated the S.A.R. in a telegram sent on 26 Desember 1885: ‘Mogen alle moeielykheden overwonnen worden zoo roemryk als die van Massouw’ (‘May all difficulties be conquered as gloriously as the one of Massouw’) (TAB SS V1145-R6419-1885).

‘Without form and void.’

Having burnt and broken down all huts and dwellings on Mamusa the Boers left a desolate landscape behind them (Conder 1887:77-78). Joubert’s described it as
woest en ledig’ (without form and void).194 With regard to the ‘clean-up’ afterwards, it was decided on a council of war meeting on 4 December 1885, attended by Cronjé as chairperson, De Beer and J.H. de la Rey, that the prisoners of war would be divided into two groups. The ‘rioters’ and ‘rebels’ would be in one group and those guilty of ‘lesser crimes’ against the State in the other group. The underlying assumption thus being that all prisoners, children included, were guilty of some crime; the only difference lay in their degree of guilt. Van Niekerk was appointed to conduct the preliminary investigations which took place on 7 December 1885 (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). Joubert was unsure about what should be done with the prisoners of war and, telling Bok that he was not ‘up to date’ and did not know ‘everything that you do under the laws’, asked for advice (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1)195. The first group consisted of 210 men, women and children who were sent to Pretoria to be heard in court. One of David Massouw’s wives was wounded, but she was sent to Pretoria instead of being placed with Boers like the rest of the wounded Korana people (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). The reason was possibly that she had taken part in the battle. Klein David Massouw was also in this group. The second group consisted of 369 women and children who allegedly did not participate in the fights. This group was indentured as so-called apprentices with Boers from Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom. They left on 8 December 1885 to their destinations (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

The first group departed on 9 December 1885 together with ten white prisoners, two cannons, some ammunition, some cattle and three wagons to Pretoria. They were accompanied by Assistant Field-Cornet Van Wyk from Schoonspruit and 60 burghers. The night of 13 December Adonis Orpen who had admitted his guilt before Van Niekerk caused great drama when he escaped (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). He pretended to be asleep and, about 2h00, he jumped among the herd of cattle grazing close to where the prisoners were sleeping. One of the two guards (Corporal Botes and Burgher Pollock) realised what was happening and ordered Adonis to come out. Three shots were fired after him, but the prisoner succeeded in getting away in the dark (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). The unfortunate

194 TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2. It is ironic that Joubert quotes from the Bible, Genesis 1 verse 2, when he describes the destruction. Joubert would have quoted from the Dutch Bible, De Statenvertaling, and I use the King James Version’s translation.

195 Joubert’s direct words were: ‘[Ek] is nie op hoogte van sake nie en ken nie elke ding wat julle onder die wette doen nie’.
man was, however, recaptured nine days later by Lieutenant Bosman on the road to Lichtenburg (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

After eight days the prisoners of war arrived in Pretoria. From the group of 210 only five men, namely Klein David Massouw, under-chief Dawid Links, Andreas Rijt Taibosch, under-chief Daniel Lastella and one Louw (a prisoner who escaped and informed David Massouw about the strength of Joubert’s army) were prosecuted for ‘insurgency and resistance against the law’ (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 29 June 1899). On 19 May 1886 they were found guilty and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The rest of the prisoners of war were not prosecuted, but the government decided that they would be indentured with Boers for three years for their ‘punishment’. A commission consisting of Joubert, J.P. Mare and Pretoria’s landdrost, J. de Villiers, was appointed to organise the apprenticeships. On 30 December 1885 the commission put their recommendations on the table and they were approved by the Executive Council of the S.A.R. on the same day. The commission suggested that families should not be separated. Thus, when the nine-year-old girl Perzena was placed out with H.R. Lemmer from Potchefstroom, without any relative, brother or sister it was contrary to the commission’s recommendations (TAB SS V1148-R61-1886). They also recommended that the dienstheeren, that is, the ‘employers’ should pay taxes on the indentures; in other words, the government would profit from the enforced labour of the Korana people. After three years the dienstheer had to pay £3 handgeld (pocket money) to the head of each family so that a family would, in effect, earn £1 per year. The dienstheer had to undertake to treat the apprentices well. We will see in Chapter 8 that the reality was such that many of the Korana people would try to escape from the farms (TAB SS V2678-R819-1891). The day for the indentures was scheduled for 8 January 1886, but there were so many requests for ‘one, two or more little kaffirs, with or without mother, from the tribe of the late Massouw’ (TAB SS V1144-R6356-1885) that placing was done by drawing lots (Delport 1968:86-88).

Could there be any truth in Mouton’s (1957:146) assertion that the indentures, which had spread the Korana people across the whole of the S.A.R., had a salutary or wholesome influence on them? Certainly not. The indentures brought an end to the last Korana polity that was still functioning as a socio-political unit; their inter-communal cohesion and kinship had been destroyed; this was the final death-knell of their independence (cf also Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:9; Metrowich 1970:54-55). In October 1890 David Massouw’s son Piet Massouw, who
was also called Kruiza, made one last, desperate attempt to bring his father’s followers together again. He applied to the S.A.R. for a farm on which his family, friends and followers could live. In his letter he pointed out that the British government had given clemency to Luka Jantje and Botlasitse Gasebone after they had served their time and they were given some land again on which they could live. But Piet Massouw and the Korana people were not to receive forgiveness nor land from the S.A.R. (TAB SS V2678-R819-1891). After his release Klein David Massouw quietly settled near Klerksdorp (*Diamond Fields Advertiser*, 29 June 1899). Officially the Korana no longer existed. It was the end of an era!

**Opportunities created by the war**

Farmer writes (2008:165): ‘War is good for something or someone, or it would not have persisted for millennia as a major staple of human interaction.’ And indeed, the war against David Massouw was ‘good’ for the S.A.R. Besides the ‘heroes’ it created in narratives around this war, it brought enormous financial gain. At a meeting of the war council on 8 December 1885 it was decided, for instance, that the considerable numbers of livestock looted from Massouw and his people (2 075 heads of cattle, 2 021 sheep and goats and 110 horses) should be declared forfeit to the state (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).196 According to the treasury regulations of the S.A.R. the war booty had to be distributed between the government and the burghers at a ratio of 70% to 30% (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). A week later the government gave permission for the livestock to be auctioned off and that the 21 burghers who had lost their horses be compensated

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196 Besides livestock, firearms and ammunition the Boers took anything on which they could lay their hands. According to the first inventory these included the following: 23 wagons, 1 cart, 2 ploughs, 1 chest with belts, 1 table, lot tools, trunk with clothes, 1 trunk with letters, 2 chests with letters and documents, 7 empty chests, 1 rifle case with a machine for loading cartridges, lot yokes and yoke pins, lot pots, half a can of grease, chairs, lot nipple wrenches. In the second list the following items were listed: 2 boxes with paper, 1 lot nipple wrenches, trunk with clothes, 5 weapon chests, lot bullet moulds, half a can of grease, 23 wagons, 1 cart, 1 steel chest with plates and knives, 1 table, wagons with draught accessories and chests, 2 ploughs, 1 saddle, lot tools. The third list contained the following items: 2 empty chests for clothes, 1 chest with books, 1 bowl, 3 yokes, 1 lot pots, 1 length of straps, chest with bowls, 2 small boxes (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).
from the looted horses (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). The Government Gazette No. 253 announced state auctions on Monday 4 January 1886 of about 300 heads of cattle at Christiana, on Saturday 9 January 1886 of 100 heads of cattle at Klerksdorp and on Tuesday 12 January 1886 of 100 heads of cattle at Potchefstroom (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

According to the financial statements Joubert submitted to the Volksraad on 14 May 1886 the war against David Massouw was a great financial success for the government and the burghers who had participated in it. Besides the £1 957.15.3 the auctions produced there were also the foruity of the harvests on the lands of which the S.A.R. got half and the 55 000 morgen (that is, 50 274 hectares) which had been Mamusa (cf TAB SS V2860-R6639-1891, TAB SS V1205-R1892-1886 and TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2). This land was declared state property where the government planned to lay out a town with a cemetery for the brave officers and burghers who fell during the war (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885-part 2).

Van Niekerk received strict orders to see to it that the land would not be occupied and that trees would not be felled or damaged (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). However, seven months later, on 15 July 1886, he had to confess to Joubert that he did not have enough power to keep the great numbers of people arriving even from the O.F.S. with their livestock from occupying David Massouw’s land. He also complained of G. Donovan’s meddling and domineering ways, saying ‘Donovan speeld ook de baas’ (TAB SS V1248-R3492-1886). By 1892 the occupation had taken on a character of permanence with structures being erected and ploughing and planting activities taking place. The squatters (it is not clear whether they were Boers or Africans) refused to pay rent and, according to Van Niekerk, the site had become a refuge for idlers. In order to resolve the problem the Volksraad decided to have the land demarcated for farms (TAB SS V3211-R2109-1892). Faul, who had overseen the removal of the Basotho from H.C. Weber’s farm Hamburg on his request, put in an application for a farm while J.H. de la Rey asked for three, one each for himself and his two sons (cf TAB SS V2525-R12943-1890, TAB SS V2525-R12936-1890 and TAB SS V2492-R11767-1890).

Here it is important to take note of the fact that the S.A.R. was on the brink of bankruptcy in 1885, just as the Transvaal had been in 1877 before Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s annexation. The state revenue for 1885 was a mere £177 000 and the S.A.R. could not raise the semi-annual amount of £3 227.8 they owed to Britain as tax to amortise the war debt after the First South African War (Imperial Blue Book C.-4643, 1886a:241). At this point gold had not yet been
discovered on the Witwatersrand while the government’s account with Standard 
Bank was in overdraft and the bank was refusing to advance any more money 
(Rompel, 1902:114). Thus, on the eve of the war against David Massouw, Bok 
had to inform Joubert of the dire situation with regard to the state treasury and 
asked him to be ‘close-fisted’ (suinig) with the shooting. Should Joubert need cash 
he was authorised to borrow money on behalf of the government from private 
individuals. The lack of funds was also reflected in the fact that some burghers 
did not receive their rations of coffee and maize during the war (TAB SS V1142- 
R6231-1885-part 2). They were also without planks, nails, saws, hammers and 
try squares to make coffins for their own fallen soldiers (TAB SS V1142-R6231- 
1885-part 2). However, the S.A.R. made such good profit from the war booty 
that they succeeded in paying Britain the remaining instalments towards war 
debt on 4 February 1886, in other words, in less than two months after the war 
(Imperial Blue Book C.-4839, 1886:4).

Various local shopkeepers, it seems, made up claims against the estate of 
David Massouw for so-called credit they would have lent him. No proof as to 
how these amounts were calculated was attached and the state prosecutor would 
certainly not have authorised the government to pay these debts. But some of the 
Boers stole from the war booty items such as wagons and livestock, and they were 
prosecuted under the relevant martial laws (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1). 

H.C. Weber also claimed against the war booty, asking that his losses be paid 
from it and that the Basotho who had been squatting on Mooilaagte compensated 
him; he asked that they would receive no mercy (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885- 
part 1). Although Ratschan did not take part in the war the government nevertheless 
confiscated, without stating any reasons for it, three wagons, 39 horses, 372 heads 
of cattle and 1 561 sheep from him and his people (TAB SS V1142-R6231-1885- 
part 2). The council of war decided to fine every Basotho man on Mooilaagte with 
one heifer, or with its equivalent, that is, one horse or six sheep. Half of this would 
go to H.C. Weber for damages, even though, as has been shown above, he did not 
have a valid claim to Mooilaagte. Ratschan and his followers were relocated to 
Paardefontein (TAB SS V1141-R6231-1885-part 1).

Creating the opportunities for war

We have seen above that the S.A.R. pretended to having several reasons for 
conducting a war against David Massouw, among others, that the land rights of
H.C. Weber were violated by the Korana people. Because these events led directly to the order Joubert had received to investigate the situation on the western border, it is necessary to discuss this in more depth.

Under the decision of the Executive Council of the S.A.R. of 13 November 1885 a commission consisting of Joubert and Van Niekerk was appointed to investigate Stellaland’s issuing of title deeds (TAB SS V1125-R5670-R5673-1885-part 1). The commission made their results available on 15 December 1885 and H.C. Weber’s name did not appear on the list of title deeds. The Boer had indeed submitted a document to the commission in which he claimed that David Massouw had given him a piece of land on 7 February 1883. The commission did not want to make any pronouncements regarding this claim, or some other allegations of land procured from David Massouw, because the documentation substantiating these claims was incomplete. Thus, the final report of the commission of 23 February 1886 did not make any recommendations in favour of H.C. Weber (TAB SS V1125-R5670-R5673-1885-part 1). But there was indeed mention of the alleged allocation of the same piece of land by David Massouw to Doms and also to J.J. Weber and that it was inhabited by H.C. Weber. On 21 September 1888 the S.A.R. government issued title deeds to former Stellalanders whose farms fell, according to the convention line, within the S.A.R. Even on this date there was no title deed issued to H.C. Weber (TAB SS V1125-R5670-R5673-1885-part 1).

According to the Report of the Commissioners appointed to determine land claims and to effect a land settlement in British Bechuanaland of 1886:

• There were three farms with the name Mooilaagte, none of which belonged to H.C. Weber.
• H.C. Weber was not one of the freebooters of David Massouw and it was thus improbable that the Korana leader would have given him a piece of land.
• H.C. Weber did indeed have a claim to an unidentified piece of land, but this he had already sold on 2 October 1882 to his son-in-law J.H. Vorster.

According to the farm registers in the current Registrar of Deeds Archive in Pretoria no proof could be found that H.C. Weber ever owned the farm Mooilaagte (Department Rural Development and Land Reform, Pretoria, Reference Number AA/06/06/01-245, dated 15/04/2011).

It can thus be concluded with relative certainty that H.C. Weber’s claims to Mooilaagte were invalid. There was thus also no violation of his land rights possible. It appears, on the contrary, that it was the land rights of David Massouw that had been violated by H.C. Weber and that David Massouw only acted in protection of
his rights. There is thus no proof of the existence of one of the core reasons for the war against David Massouw. One cannot but agree with Sillery (1971:138) when he asserts: ‘It was a purposeless affair, typical of the frontier Boers’ casual, trigger-happy contempt for killing kaffirs of any sort’.

Schweizer-Reneke

In March 1886 a petition was signed by 180 people in which a request was made to develop a town on the site of Mamusa. On 8 April 1886 an Executive Council decision was made in favour of the request and on 17 June 1886 the Volksraad approved the decision. On 1 October 1888 the founding of the town was published by means of a proclamation in the Staats-courant der Z.A. Republiek of 3 October 1888 (p. 576). To commemorate Captain C.A. Schweizer and Field-Cornet G.N. Reneke, who had lost their lives in the battle, Mamusa was renamed Schweizer-Reneke (Delport 1968:85; Birkhead & Groenewald 2005:9). The name of the town thus reflects the White (Boer) supremacy in the area and provides no insight into the pre-colonial history of the area.

Conclusion

This chapter spelt out the final outcome of the functioning of the Western Transvaal border culture for the Korana people. A detailed description of the context shed light on the role of individuals, the uneven distribution of power as well as on metaphoric aspects of land, stone beacons and stonewalls or defences. The Harts River figured here as the life force of the Korana people and structured contradictions in personal relationships in the political arena became clear.

The Korana people did not pose a physical threat to the functioning of the S.A.R. Nevertheless, this Boer republic advanced several reasons to justify their military action against the Korana people. Among these the recognition and the exploitation of land claims played an important and complicated role. It must be emphasised once again that directly opposite views were held about land claims. To the Boers their system was based on clear principles, the idea of exclusive and permanent use, fixed borders and the registration of title deeds. By contrast, the Korana people, despite the absence of beacons to stake out their land, clearly conceptualised their territory. The Korana people were familiar with the tracts of land they had been exploiting exclusively over generations, on which they had lived and which they regarded as theirs (Schapera 1965:286-287; Strauss 1979:13).
The allocation and registration of titles by the S.A.R. were hampered by an ineffective state structure, chaotic economic conditions and political anarchy; uncertainties regarding proprietorship were difficult to clear up and such processes dragged on. The only exchange for their ineptitude the Boer state could give their burghers was the backing of their military apparatus. Instead of taking responsibility for their own clumsy administration they blamed the conflict regarding land issues on the Korana people. This had the advantage that their action against David Massouw’s people could be thus ‘justified’ and the attention could be directed away from real issues in the S.A.R. There were various incidents where the Korana people and the Boers laid claims to the same piece of land with regard to occupation rights, usufruct and freehold rights (TAB SS V986-R4560-1884, TAB SS V1064-R2407-1885, TAB SS V914-R1483-1884 and TAB SS V913-R1474-1884). It is striking, though, that the farms were not occupied or used by the Boers in most of these cases, if not in all of them (TAB SS V719-R5162-1882). It is reasonable to deduct that, in all probability, the Boers did not really need the land. In other words, it cannot be said that the ecological system had reached the limits of its capacity and that this could have been one of the reasons for the war against David Massouw.

Certain economic and political imperatives led to the S.A.R.’s unwillingness, right from the start, to compromise or to look for consensus. They wanted war! Besides the considerable financial advantages the war posed they wanted to make an example of David Massouw to serve as a deterrent to other indigenous groups who were dissatisfied with the S.A.R.’s autocratic ‘native policy’ and their acts of land violations. The military struggle was uneven, but the Korana people resisted to the best of their ability. What finally tipped the scales in favour of the S.A.R. was not total military effectiveness or discipline on their side, but the fact that there were some professional soldiers on their side, that the Boer forces were considerably larger than the Korana forces, and that the Boers’ weapons were more modern than those at the disposal of their adversaries.

As in all wars there were also in this case various instances of untruths, rumours, misrepresentations and misinformation which the S.A.R. used to justify the war, a war, one has to remember, which completely destroyed the Korana people of the time prior to 1885. While it was an instance of conflict between the S.A.R. and the Korana people, other communities such as those of Orpen and Ratschan were punished with heavy ‘fines’ for no clear reason. One cannot escape the feeling that this was an event used by the S.A.R. for ‘legitimately raiding’ their neighbours.
When one asks among the descendants of Mankuroane at Taung what
the reasons were for the war, one is, however, met with the same answer every
time: ‘The Korana people looked for it, they were troublemakers!’ This indirectly
confirms the fact that perceptions often play a role in border cultures, and how
difficult it is for those perceptions to die out.
Chapter 8

The end of the warrior nation?
Sarah Taibosch (née Watersoek). [Source: ‘The Physical characteristics of the Korana’ by C.S. Grobbelaar, 1956]
The moon commissioned the hare to give mankind a message that man would die and rise again as does the moon. But the hare said to man that he would die and never rise again. On hearing this the moon was angry and struck the hare on its mouth and split it.

Adapted from the Korana myth ‘The moon and the hare’ in Maingard’s Korana Folktales.

Introduction

The title of this book contains the statement that the last functioning Korana polity was destroyed during the battle of Mamusa. There can only be agreement with this view; it is difficult to judge the action of the S.A.R. against the Korana people in a light where the outcome is not genocide. The intent of the S.A.R. with the war against the Korana people was indeed to eradicate them and to cripple their social life. Some of the consequences of the socially destructive actions of the S.A.R. included conquest, land expropriation, massacre, forced labour, forced migration, the destruction of the Korana people’s resources and the confiscation of their livelihood.

Fortunately, the question posed by the title of this chapter can be answered with a ‘no’. While it has been the intention of the S.A.R. to destroy the Korana people permanently, they are currently revitalising themselves in different ways.197 Despite the fact that the Korana lost the war and were displaced, they

197 In anthropology the concept of revitalisation is generally used in a context that links up with religion. For example, there may be a connection to the principle that society can be improved through the adoption of new religious beliefs and values (Linton 1943; Wallace 1956). In this book the term ‘revitalisation’ will be used as having a broader meaning. I shall use it to refer to deliberate attempts (which may, or may not, be religious in nature) by a group of people to revive their ethnic identity in order to achieve certain predetermined objectives. The revitalisation and manifestation of neo-Khoe-San cultural and ethnic identities were highlighted by the Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference, organised by the Institute for Historical Research, University of the Western Cape, and held at the South African Museum, Cape Town, 12 – 16 July 1997 (cf Bank 1997(b); Ross 1997(b)).
have succeeded to survive as a people, albeit sometimes in a rather secretive and underground way, and are now in a process of recovering their history and identity.

The empirical data that will be presented in this chapter deal with the processes of revitalisation among the Korana descendants in the North-West Province, the Free State and the Northern Cape. Because this study has dealt primarily with the destruction of the Korana communities in the central interior of South Africa I will also be dealing with the revitalisation of the Korana identity by focusing on these groups. But it is first necessary to conclude the story of the African community of Schweizer-Reneke.

The struggle was not futile

David Massouw was buried in Mamusa after the battle. His grave was left unmarked and his place no longer knew him. It was important to me to look for David Massouw’s grave and to return to this place some kind of historical or physical heritage connected with the man. Two leads were followed. The first was an old town plan of 1953 on which the grave was indicated as lying on the south of Massouws Kop, behind the actual hospital of today. Nevertheless, after several visits to this terrain the desired result was still not achieved. The second lead I followed was Maree’s (1952:11) assertion that David Massouw’s grave was situated at the north-western foot of Kasiane and that it was about 200 metres from the Gedenkhuis (Memorial House), directly west. But no one in the town had any knowledge of the so-called Gedenkhuis. One of the inhabitants, though, remembered that there was a building referred to as the Geloftefeessaal (Covenant Day Hall), but it no longer existed. The ruins of the building (See Image 8.1) could be found from directions given by informants and senior citizens in the town confirmed that this had been the Geloftefeessaal. Taking this as a beacon and following Maree’s (1952:11) description David Massouw’s unmarked grave was finally found.\footnote{The position of the grave is 27° 10’ 25” S / 25° 19’ 51” E and the height is 1 301 metres above sea level. According to Engelbrecht (1928:5) the Korana people buried their dead straightened out, that is, not in a foetal position on the side. The direction of the body will be east-west with the face looking towards sunrise. All of these details tally with the layout of David Massouw’s grave.} He was thus buried not far from where his house once stood. David Massouw’s grave, his house, his kraals and the graves of the other fallen Korana
people (See Map 4) were not marked, preserved or maintained in any way. It was not important enough to the authorities of the time to do so while the current government, although the local municipality has been informed of the position of the sites and despite an offer to help maintain this historical heritage, has not yet acted in a decisive way to correct past negligence.

In the later history of the African community of Schweizer-Reneke there is something to be read of the courage and temperament of David Massouw. In 1888, following quickly upon the foundation of the town Schweizer-Reneke, an African residential area which has become known as ‘Lokasie Een’ or ‘Location One’, developed about 85 m from the town (Bester & Van Eden 1999:416-419). Bester and Van Eden (1999) compares Location One with current-day squatter camps. It was not formally planned, there was never any proclamation, rent had indeed to be paid to the white town council for the stands but (as was true of the taxes Africans paid to the former S.A.R.) no services were rendered in turn. Water for household purposes had to be fetched from the Harts River while unhygienic conditions were worsened by animals roaming freely among the dwellings.

Location One was a health risk and the death rate of 36% for the Bloemhof district, the highest in the Transvaal after the flu epidemic of 1918, confirms this. As a result the town council decided to develop a new residential area, Location Two, a little further away from the town in 1920. History repeated itself. The town council decided unilaterally and autocratically about the borders of Location Two; it came down to a forced removal to a site that would mean more expenses and be more inconvenient for its residents, due to its being further away from town (Liebenberg 1990:58-60). General resistance built up among the indigenous population regarding the planned relocation and the relationship between them and the town council reached a low. The proclamation of Location Two was made in 1926, but it was only in 1959 that the slow relocation process was at an end. In the early 1970s the name was changed to Ipelegeng, meaning ‘independent’ or ‘we lift ourselves up’ – precisely what David Massouw wished for his people.

While nothing has been done, up to now, to actively protect or revive the memory of David Massouw, it seems as if, symbolically, something of the history or spacial meaning attached to this person remains or has been unintentionally recovered. Schweizer-Reneke falls currently under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Mamusa. Despite the fact that the Korana people have been scattered across the whole of the S.A.R., according to Van Onselen (1996:22) ‘the social dominance of the Korana around Schweizer-Reneke in general and the redoubtable Mossweu in particular’
could still be felt years after the battle. In the early 1930s Maingard (1932a:104-105) could trace some inhabitants (already elderly then) of Schweizer-Reneke who had lived in Mamusa. Nevertheless, although Moichela (2002:25) suspected seventy years later that there could still be direct descendants of David Massouw in the vicinity of Taung and Schweizer-Reneke he could not find any trace of such descendants. I traced, with difficulty, 12 individuals in Ipelegeng with the surname Taibosch and who indicated that they were directly descended from David Massouw. Should one ask around there are quite a few people who know people who are from Korana descent and others still who claim that David Massouw is their ritual or symbolic forefather.

Revival of the Korana

In the wake of the destruction of most of the independent Khoekhoe societies in the Cape colony by the 1800s (Chidester 1996:67), European interest in the Khoekhoe began to decline. The missionary T. Hahn and the philologist W.H.J. Bleek started using phrases such as ‘broken people’, ‘disappearing people’ and ‘dying-out race’ in reference to these people (Chidester 1996:68-69). Various authors endorse this view and maintain that by the early twentieth century the Khoekhoe people were, at least in their earlier guise, a disappearing group.199 A range of factors contributed to what Marks (1972:77) has called ‘the ultimate disappearance’ of the Khoekhoe as an ethnic entity. In all probability colonialisation was the single greatest reason for the disintegration of Khoekhoe communities, their absorption and assimilation into other societies, and thus their alleged ‘disappearance’. Already in 1798 John Barrow (in Hoernlé 1985:23), visiting the Little Namaqualand observed:

> These plains are now desolate and uninhabited. All those numerous tribes of Namaquas, once possessed of vast herds of cattle, are in the course of less than a century dwindled away to four hordes, which are not very numerous and in a great measure are subservient to the Dutch peasantry. [...] A dozen years more, and probably a shorter period, will see the remains of the Namaqua nation in a state of entire servitude.

Writers such as Ross (1974:29), Trail (2002:29) and Bleek (1862:5) bring to our attention that, within a hundred years after Jan van Riebeeck had settled in

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the Cape, the Western Cape Khoekhoe dialects had begun to disappear and was gradually being replaced by Dutch-Afrikaans as first language. Dealing with the same issue, Schapera (1965:49-50) reports that in the 1930s

*a few of the older people still [knew] their own language, but the great majority now speak only Afrikaans, which is the regular medium of intercourse even among themselves.*

The Eastern Cape Khoekhoe dialects, on the other hand, had been absorbed by the Xhosa through political incorporation.

In most cases colonialism gradually stripped the Khoekhoe of recognised leadership, their culture, identity and language, hence our current knowledge concerning the Khoekhoe culture, identity and language is very limited.

And, where the colonial destruction of the Korana left off, apartheid was quick to take the relay. Apartheid defined race, ethnicity and nation in very distinctive terms, producing a set of practices concerned with the boundaries between these categories. The implementation of the policy of racial segregation under apartheid held, inter alia, the following implications for the Khoekhoe. First, the Population Registration Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950) required South Africans to be identified and registered from birth as belonging to one of three distinct racial groups: ‘White’, ‘Bantu’ (African) and ‘Coloured’.200 Those who were not whites or Africans were regarded as coloureds.201 This was the category that embraced the ‘residue’: those who did not fit in anywhere else.202 The Khoekhoe

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200 Under the Act, as amended, Indians, that is, South Asians from former British India and their descendents were also included and various subgroups were identified: ‘Cape Coloured’, ‘Malay’, ‘Griqua’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Indian’, ‘Other Asian’ and ‘Other Coloured’.

201 According to Erasmus and Pieterse (1999:169), the notion of being ‘coloured’ had originated among freed slaves and their descendants between 1875 and 1910. In Jung’s (2000:168-169) view, the process started much earlier, as the social and political identities that had been created during the era of slavery were responsible for the development of coloured identities. Although the term was thus used long before the apartheid era, its meaning was more fluid in the nineteenth century (Lewis 1987:7-10).

202 Criteria used for separating coloureds from whites were: characteristics of the hair on the head, characteristics of body hair, skin colour, facial features, home language and knowledge of Afrikaans, area in which a person lived, friends and acquaintances, employment, socioeconomic status as well as eating and drinking
were consequently stigmatised as ‘coloureds’ and were politically, socially and economically constrained to renounce their origins (Jung 2000:168). Because they had no specific voice in the South African discourse prior to 1994 – not politically, culturally or otherwise – their aspirations, desires, needs and narratives were generally unknown.

Although there was no official reference to or acknowledgement of the Korana people during the Apartheid era, the notion of a Korana identity has never been completely dead or eradicated. Mr Raymond Beddy (2007:225-228), for example, describes how the Korana leadership in the Free State survived through taking up the office and function of church leaders. Descendants of the Right Hands family, the ‘Korana Royal Family’ in their eyes, hold annual meetings on 16 December at Mr Esegiël Meyer’s home (1599 Dilape Street, Batho, Bloemfontein) ever since their removal from Bethany. At these meetings they sing the traditional Korana ‘national anthem’: Sore-b si á-(b)ro-ku i, oa-ku i, oa-ku i, á-(b)ro-ku I. According to the elderly Mr Beddy they were taught this song by his grandmother on mother’s side. She was a daughter of Timothius senior, the younger brother of Goliath Yzerbek. Beddy tells that the Korana people sing this song when they have problems to resolve or when they have to turn to one another to work together. During such gatherings family matters are discussed and children are instructed with regard to Korana customs and traditions.

habits. The notorious ‘pencil test’ was a method of assessing the texture of the hair on the head. It was done by pushing a pencil through the hair to determine the degree of curliness. ‘African’ hair supposedly held back the pencil more readily while the pencil would glide through and fall from ‘European hair’. In other words, whether someone ‘passed’ or ‘failed’ the racial classification test depended on how easily the pencil fell out.

203 The first and last official reference to the Korana people was in the 1936 census. According to the findings the Korana people made up 0,6% of the coloured population (Christopher 2006:120).

204 The words can be translated as follows: The sun, (the moon) and the stars return to each other, return to each other, (the moon and) the stars. According to the orthographer and translator Dr M. du Plessis, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Linguistics at the University of Cape Town, the following alternative is also possible: Sore-b si _á-(b) b(u)ru-ku i, oa-ku i, oa-ku i, á-(b) b(u)ru-ku I.

205 Other informants referring to this song as the national hymn of the Korana people confirmed that it was also sung on full-moon nights as a tribute to the sun, the
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), addresses the historical injustices done to indigenous peoples such as the Khoe-San; it enshrines their right to self-determination and makes provision for the promotion and development of indigenous languages. In other words, the intellectual and political space that the South African constitution opens up has given people claiming to be of Khoe-San descent the right to determine their own means of linguistic and cultural development, as well as the right to determine their identity in the way they choose to do so. People have become increasingly active in asserting their respective identities, in reclaiming their cultural heritage and challenging previous definitions imposed upon them. It can thus be concluded, as various authors confirm, that bringing an end to apartheid has provided people with opportunities to self-identification and to experiment with their identities. In this regard Lee (2003:97) estimates that up to 2.5 million coloured South Africans would identify themselves as Khoe-San.

Different independent organisations have been established over the last couple of years with the aim of promoting Korana awareness, and I mention a few. There is the Free State Korana Community Committee (FSKCC), led by Beddy. The constitution of the FSKCC was approved by representatives of the Korana Royal Family on 22 January 2000. This organisation’s activities focus mainly on recording and reinterpreting Korana history, but one of the aspects they foreground is reclaiming their land at Bethany. The Bethany land claim of 1998 was the first to be successful in the Free State, but the beneficiaries who were represented by the Bethany Communal Property Association were from Tswana and Griqua communities only. The original residents of Bethany, the Korana people, were thus excluded from the claim. There is currently a determined effort to reclaim the remainder of the original farm Bethany, no 10, for the Korana people who were removed from the land.

Next, there is the Free State Korana Culture and Heritage Council (FSKCHC) registered by J. Taaibosch-Davids on 14 May 2002. Issues relating to Korana identity, religion, land and economic development are regarded as important by this group. The FSKCHC also has branches on the Free State moon and the stars.

206 Refer to Chapter 1 on languages, Section 6, Subsection 5a (ii).

207 These issues are explored by, for example, Lee (2003:100), Ruiters (2009:104), Besten (2011:176) and De Beer (1998:38; 2001:10).
Goldfields, in Gauteng and in the Western Cape and it thus claims to be a national movement. R. Dodds founded the movement known as Die Kinders van !Kora (The Children of !Kora). Its members focus strongly on what they regard as ‘authentic’ cultural activities. A children’s dance group was established, performing improvised traditional song and dance sequences at public events and festivals in traditional costumes. In the Northern Cape the Korana South Africa First Nation Organisation was established by Messrs H. Hoogstander and J. Kats in 1994. Land rights are high up on their agenda and claims are made to large parts of the Northern Cape. The North West Korana Council under the lead of Mr Michael Taaibosch has made it their priority to have the Korana people’s claim to Mamusa recognised. To him the Korana people in this province is in a kind of ‘discovery phase’ where they are learning about their Korana identity, their ancient customs and traditions again. They have representatives in Bloemhof, Vryburg, Schweizer-Reneke and Mahikeng.

In my opinion, there is no question of here being, in Gayatri Spivak’s (1987) words, a ‘strategic essentialism’ among the different revival movements and each of them compete for the same limited support base. There are mutual competition, distrust and conflict; accusations regarding other groups’ opportunism and manipulation are being bandied about. This division harms the case of the Korana people and makes it difficult to identify ‘true’ leaders or the issues needing attention. This state of affairs – that is not limited to the Korana ranks only – contributes to social scientists’ disagreement with regard to the distinctive ways in which collective Khoe-San identities are being transformed and given meaning in the post-apartheid era. Some authors are inclined to be sceptical. Adhikari (2005:186), for example, holds the view that the manifestations of Khoe-San identity tend to be episodic, and are mainly in evidence on festive and symbolic occasions. He asserts that Khoe-San revivalism is a movement only in the broadest sense of the word and that it is both ‘exclusionist’ and ‘coloured rejectionist’ in nature. It is rejectionist in that Khoe-San identity is proudly affirmed as an authentic culture of ancient pedigree, in place of ‘colouredness’. It is exclusionist, because of the claim that the Khoe-San are the only true indigenes of South Africa, and because, during the Khoisan Consultative Conference (NKCC) which took place in Oudtshoorn in 2001, there was general agreement that Muslims and Malays did not qualify as Khoe-San.

Sharp (1997 and 2006) sees the Khoe-San revival in more instrumental terms. Questioning the motives underlying recent Khoe-San revivalist actions he believes it is especially about staking claims in the political landscape. He thus
rejects the notion of a distinct, authentic culture for the Khoe-San and with it also the concept of a retention of pre-apartheid or colonial cultural patterns and institutions of self-identification.²⁰⁸ It is true that Khoe-San descendant have been increasingly ethnified the last couple of years in the media or through the support of NGOs and scientists. However, although ethnification does not differ much from essentialism, an essensialist, pre-apartheid or colonial view of culture does not provide the blueprint for all Khoe-San identity constructions. I will show later that there are definite nuances among Khoe-San ranks with regard to the specific meanings that should be assigned to culture and identity. Instrumentalist and strategic considerations should, in any case, not be seen as a final goal, but must be judged as actions carried out with the specific goal of obtaining or protecting scarce resources such as political power and to exclude others from it.

To Besten (2011:180-183), there is unquestionably opportunism in the post-1994 affirmation of Khoe-San identities, especially in the sudden ‘eruption’ of self-acclaimed chiefs. He points out how some claimants to chieftdom (their claims are mostly of recent date) deem it necessary to wear clothing with motifs that are indigenous and particular to African chiefs such as leopard markings in an attempt to project themselves as credible chiefs. By contrast, leaders of long-standing such as the leaders of the Griqua National Conference and of whom the legitimacy is less suspect within and outside Khoe-San communities do not have to resort to such measures. Nevertheless, to dismiss people who are embracing Khoe-San identities and making primordialist claims as mere pretenders or opportunists is too simplistic. Besten (2011) argues that, to varying and shifting degrees, the appropriation and deployment of primordialist cultural elements can in effect be a strategic response to public expectations, this may be an attempt to legitimise identities or to facilitate access to resources or, yet again, this may be an act of reclamation and reaffirmation of a people’s identity and heritage.

Øvernes (2008:267-268) maintains that, although the Khoe-San were written out of history in approximately the mid-1800s and so disappeared from the social map – although they basically ceased to exist with a traditional culture – Khoe-San self-ascription and self-naming did not stop. She emphasises that Khoe-San authenticity should not be defined too strictly in terms of distinctive traits and customs, because they have subsequently developed various new ways of living as Khoe-San.

²⁰⁸ To read more about these issues, refer to Sharp (1997), Sharp & Boonzaier (1994), Robins (1997) and Van der Waal & Ward (2006).
There are, as the writers I have discussed above suggest, numerous variables influencing and directing the complex, multifaceted revival processes among the Khoe-San. These processes of identification are continuous (that is, the product is not fixed) so that the following five conclusions must not be seen as suggesting final answers in these matters. First, the interweaving of language, culture and identity is probably at the root of most philosophical argumentations when it comes to the protection of group rights; it legitimises political claims for nationhood, it is the point of departure for many revival strategies and it is regarded as an important element in constructing identity (cf Berzborn 2003:327; Woolard & Schieffelin 1994:60-61; Urciuoli 1995:527). In fact, one will even find that, based on this point of view, assertions are made to the effect that ‘the demise of a language means the end of a culture’ (Ngulube 2012:12). The fact that the Korana language (Kora) has become virtually extinct to give way to Afrikaans as first language is therefore of paramount significance. Although it means that the traditional role allocated to an own distinct language is absent in the case of the Korana people, it does not mean that language as identity marker is not important in the Korana revival. Informants generally emphasise that attempts should be made to revive and preserve Kora, the lack of which is keenly felt in the cultural sphere as the following utterance of an informant suggests: ‘Hoe kan ek myself ’n Korana noem as ek nie eens die taal kan praat nie?’

Second, the Khoekhoe have developed heterogeneous and often very subtle ways of establishing such processes of self-conception. I give a couple of examples to explain this viewpoint. Stavenhagen (2005:7-8), in his capacity as Special Rapporteur for the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council, supports the idea of self-identification as a criterion by which indigenous people is defined. Self-identification does not necessarily depend on descent, but it can also be based on affinity, adoptive relationships and in opposition to Western modernity. Often, when self-identification is done in opposition to Western modernity, there is a tendency to return to or invoke primitivism and primordialism (Besten 2011:177). In the case of the Nama and the #Khomani San ethnic awareness strongly centres on land and culture (Besten 2009:142). The post-apartheid state recognises these peoples as distinct, cultural groups with certain land and cultural rights. Among the Griqua on the other hand, religion is, according to Waldman (2007:62-163),

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209 The informant’s words may be translated as follows: ‘How can I call myself a Korana if I cannot even speak the language?’
a core component of their identity. Belonging to a church has become the marker for allegiance to either one of the most prominent political factions in the various Griqua captaincies. Øvernes (2008:19, 261), to whom I have referred above, points out that the street-life of the bergies (mountain people) is one example of how new ways of being Khoe-San has been found. Abrahams (1997:34-35) who sees a connection between the historical Bergenaars (See Chapter 1) and the bergies of today also argues that street-life is important to the identity of these people. According to her this is seen by the youth who are too proud to become sell-outs and bend their backs under the yoke of the white man as an alternative life.

Third, Waldman (2007:168-170) points out that the Khoe-San people are involved in two simultaneous revival processes: one of participation in the broader South African nation-building process (homogenisation) and another of ethnic safeguarding (‘othering’) where the latter is largely based on the application of indigenous rights. Besides human rights the Khoekhoe people are thus demanding collective rights linked to group identity, self-determination, culture and indigenous minorities. The Khoe-San people and their leaders in particular thus face the challenge of positioning themselves within the Khoe-San landscape and within that of the broader, national socio-political landscape.

In the fourth instance I want to refer to the fact that the process of self-definition by the Khoe-San is considerably influenced by their (not unjust) perception that they are now just as marginalised by the ANC government as they had been by the previous régime.210 The consequences are twofold. On the one hand, this created a situation where the Khoe-San people tend to place a stronger emphasis on ethnicity than on citizenship. On the other hand, there is a growing concern among Khoe-San leaders that their right to effect their self-

210 Various informants voiced this view and the impression is that it is a relatively widespread opinion among the Khoe-San people. One of the informants expressed himself as follows: ‘Ek meen as ons moet teruggaan op die geskiedenis dan gaan ons kom kry ons se mense was eerste hier. En vandag word ons se mense uitgewerk. Ons is nie vry nie. Wel, die swartmense is trots. Ons wat Khoe-San mense is, is nie vry nie. Ons veg nou nog vir ons se vryheid. En dit is eintlik die main ding. Dat ons se mense moet ge-recogwisse word en so aan.’ (I mean if we were to go back in history then we are going to get to where our people got here first. And today our people are being worked out. We are not free. Well, the black people are proud. We who are Khoe-San people, we are not free. We are still fighting for our freedom. And this is the main thing. That our people must be recognised and so on.’)
representation and to select the criteria for giving expression to it is disregarded, denied, questioned, or even brushed aside as cheap opportunism.211

In the fifth place it is important to note, as a number of authors emphasise, that the resurgence of Khoi-San identities in South Africa in the 1990s coincided with a number of international developments that stimulated the growth of Khoi-San organisations and gave affirmation to their culture and identity. In fact, the contemporary international climate favours the recognition of indigenous linguistic, cultural and identity rights, and indigenism has emerged as a significant political discourse in the post-colonial world (cf. Darnell 1994:7; Kuper 1994:537; Lee 2003:99). In this the United Nations played and continues to play an enormous role; they declared 1993 the Year of Indigenous People, 1995 to 2004 was the First International Decade for the World's Indigenous People and 2005 to 2014 the Second International Decade, while the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was made in 2007. Other factors which encourage the assertion of Khoekhoe and San identities are the renewed Western fascination with and idealisation of indigenous cultures and the boom in cultural tourism.

In the revival processes of Khoi-San people these variables entrained a cultural renaissance among them with a concomitant cultural discourse. The cultural renaissance must of necessity be seen against the background of the mass cultural destruction of the past.212 Hence the considerable interest in learning more about traditional ethos and world-view, governance, subsistence, arts, dance, music, crafts, ethnobotany, healing, acquiring a Khoi-San language or at least learning some words and phrases, discovering Khoi-San names, finding clothing with Khoi-San motifs and participation in rituals (Lee 2003:99; Besten 2011:177). Unintentionally, this process has resulted in a certain class division among the Khoi-San ranks. It has brought about an inescapable division between those who look like (supposedly) real Khoi-San, speak Khoi-San languages and continue to practise (assumed) ancestral Khoi-San traditions on the one side and those who do not. Thus, while some would like to identify themselves as Khoi-San, they feel

211 This opinion has been expressed by Mr Cecil Le Fleur, chair of the Griqua National Conference, in a lecture at University of the Free State on 24 August 2006.

212 The explanation of the concept ‘cultural genocide’ in article 7 of the 1994 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples leaves little doubt that there was indeed ethnocide through colonialism and apartheid in the case of the Khoekhoe.
inadequate to do so. The reason for the creation of such a hierarchy of authenticity in the minds of those who identify themselves as Khoe-San is, according to Besten (2011:177), that they have often been treated exclusively as ‘specimens of the past’ whose authenticity will be lost or has already been lost through foreign cultural influences.

The discourse in this regard mainly asks questions about the meaning of culture and about who would have the right to make claims to indigenousness. In some circles, for instance, culture is approached by arguing that modern society is based upon rational hypotheses in terms of which it also functions and that we have passed the point where there is a need for culture. The Khoe-San reaction to this argument is to point out that they form a minority group whereas ‘rationality’ is determined by the dominant group in society. It is further also the dominant group that determines what the minority group can and cannot be, so that their rights to self-identification in a unique way are ignored and taken from them. Linking up, it is emphasised that their revival cannot and must not be explained or understood only by arguing that the disappearance of a culture, where this notion is defined in terms of language and practices, equals the extinction of a people.

It is especially the Khoe-San leaders who insistently put the question regarding who could rightfully claim to be labelled ‘indigenous’ on the table. Among the Khoe-San ranks it is most people’s conviction that they are, on primordial grounds, the only true indigenous peoples of South Africa (Besten 2009:135, 139; Ruiters 2009:121). Apart from the fact that the term ‘indigenousness’ is regarded as a subject for scrutiny in certain academic and activist circles the question as to who can make claims to being termed as such in South Africa is politically sensitive, complicated and confusing.213

There are many factors compounding the situation. In, for example, both the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act 55 of 1998) and the Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003 (Act 53 of 2003) the term ‘Black People’ is used to refer to African, coloured and Indian people. But the 1996 census refers by comparison

213 In my use of the term ‘indigenous people’ I have tried to avoid ideological contents and to acknowledge historical contexts. During the colonial period, for example, both Khoe-San and African people were subject to oppression and prejudice and thus I consider it justifiable to include both these groups under the same term when discussing that period. However, the dynamics of the current historical context offer different variables and African people are therefore excluded from the term indigenous people.
to ‘Africans/blacks’ as a group while this has been changed to ‘Black Africans’ in the 2001 census (Christopher 2006:121). Then, even though their claims do not line up with international practices and guidelines, some Africans and even some white Afrikaners claim indigenousness. And last, while some Khoe-San leaders may recognise the claims of Africans this will be qualified by saying, for example, ‘Yes, but we are the first indigenous people.’

It is clear that the current cultural discourse does not offer any final answers while there are certainly plenty of arguments and counter-arguments. The question should therefore be something in this vein: ‘Does the Khoe-San have the constitutional and moral right to be who they want to be?’ The answer to this question is certainly ‘yes’. But research shows that, since acts of Korana self-conception have political goals such as the building up of support bases and recognition, there is (inevitably?) a(n) (un)conscious construction of asymmetrical group relations and otherness; there is an act of dividing the ‘us’ and the ‘them’. There is, for instance, leaders who pressurise people to renounce their coloured identity and to take up a Korana identity. The popular supporting argument for this is something like the following: ‘Daar is nie ‘n ding soos ‘n kleurling nie. Hulle het nie ‘n kaptein, of ‘n koning, of ‘n land, of ‘n stam nie.’ 214 To be expected to willingly and readily renounce a life-long assigned identity for something that is in many cases amorphous has brought a lot of confusion among people with regard to their identity, humanity and acceptance in society. In my understanding of the Korana revival, it seems as if leaders sometimes lack clarity about the continuous process of self-identification and tend to focus too much on a predetermined idea of a fixed product.

At the origin of the Korana revivals

According to Moichela one of David Massouw’s wives took part in the war. She resisted the enemy heroically with a musket and ‘when she realised that “Mosweu” was dead [s]he threw herself and her baby on the streaming blood of war victims and swore that the Boers [would] never get his land and rule over it’ (Moichela 2002:55). Hers was not the only heroic action taken by a woman during the battle. There was also the Korana woman who came to the rescue of a Korana man with a marrowbone when Assistant Field-Cornet Gert Olivier wanted to disarm him.

214 ‘There is no such thing as a coloured. They don’t have a captain, a king, a land or a tribe.’
At the origin of the Korana revivals

The action of these women must have been of immense moral support to the men. For this, however, many women had to pay with their lives. For others the war led to hardships on the Boer farms as so-called apprentices while the perseverance of a young Sarah Watersoek (later Taabosch) today serves as inspiration for the current revival process among the Taabosch Korana of the Free State.

Sarah Watersoek experienced the battle of Mamusa as a girl of about ten years of age. She was one of many children that were wounded during battle; she was wounded on the right side of her head. She, her parents and two brothers (Jonas and Jan) were placed as apprentices on a farm in the Bloemhof district. They possessed only the clothes they were wearing; the rest had been taken by the Boers. The family could not take the abuse on the farm for long and so decided to escape that very first winter. They left under cover of night. They knew the Boers would organise a commando to look for them, so they fled into the broken country, hiding in the ridges by day and going further on foot by night. As during the siege of Mamusa, they dared not make a fire by which to warm themselves because it could reveal their hiding place. Their goal was to reach their relatives on the farm Tafelkop, near Bloemfontein, a distance of about 260 km away. They lived on veldkos (a wild fruit) and when they approached the local people they had to make sure that the Boers did not spot them. Once they crossed the border into the O.F.S. they were safer and could work on farms in order to support themselves.

Sarah married Thomas Taabosch of Tafelkop and the couple had six children. She passed away in July 1964 and was buried on Tafelkop. Her grandchildren,

215 There are many known cases where families fled from the farms and endured extreme hardships. In one case a family hid in holes for seven months before the Boers gave up searching for them. According to the informant concerned there was permanently someone on the lookout who whistled to warn people to return to the holes when someone was seen.

216 There were about 15 to 20 Korana families living and working on the farm Tafelkop. Among them were the Taabosch, Tiger, Louw, Fish, Minnie and Meyers families. The last two families listed were also from Mamusa and, like the Watersoek family, they had sought refuge on Tafelkop. Many of those who had lived on Tafelkop, including Sarah, were buried on the farm and their graves are visited regularly by relatives. As the older generation died the younger generation migrated to the cities, especially to Bloemfontein, and the small community disappeared. Besides the graves there are also ruins of the original stone houses. In front of the house where Sarah lived out her last years – and where she died – there are a huge palm tree and a fig tree.
Mrs Tiger (née Taaibosch), Miss Taaibosch and Mr Gert Taaibosch still recall how their grandmother told them about how her feet were hurting from the cold as she was walking barefoot across the frost-covered fields to take the Boer’s sheep to graze. In the afternoons, she had to lead them back to the kraal. When her feet were later almost too sore to walk, she got a pair of old white socks from the Boer’s wife to protect them from the cold.

The hardships of the war and the flight were too harsh for Ouma (Grannie) Sarah to speak about them often. When the grandchildren kept on nagging for more stories, she became angry and chased them away. She also decided that the children would not learn the Korana language, Kora, as she was afraid they would be stigmatised and even prosecuted for having fled from the farm in the Bloemhof district. In order to hide their Korana identity, the people from Tafelkop presented themselves as Griqua or coloured. The same trend has been confirmed by other informants from the North-West Province. From the details that are available about Sarah Taaibosch and others it would appear that these people consciously chose not to speak much about their experiences and did not want to remember their life stories. The fact that these individuals did not allow a process of remembering to take place deprived them of the opportunity to see the events of the war in perspective and to try to make sense of them. As is evidenced by their attempts to disguise their identity, this led to a state of affairs where they did not want to or could not recognise their cultural heritage.

But let us return to the story of Sarah Taaibosch and her grandchildren. In 1948 the biologist C.S. Grobbelaar was looking for Korana descendents in the Free State and the then Western Transvaal for his research on their physical characteristics. Wherever he went he took photographs as possible illustration material. One of the photos he took on Tafelkop was of Sarah Taaibosch. During an interview on 3 November 2011 while I was told the story of Sarah Taaibosch, I asked the family to show me a photo of Sarah, but they had none. Two months later, I discovered her photo in Grobbelaar (1956:137) and I immediately had an enlargement made and returned to the family. I asked, ‘Who is this?’ At first there was only the silence of disbelief. Then followed exclamations and cries of happiness. Tears flowed freely as the photo was gently and lovingly handled.

Of all the Korana movements I have mentioned in this book, the Taaibosch family is probably at the forefront of organising a renaissance among their people. To them, Sarah Taaibosch is a role model of Korana perseverance and their will to
survive. Her photograph is displayed proudly among them. Unintentionally, she has become instrumental in the revival of the Korana identity she had once rejected.

**Conclusion**

With the arrival of democracy in South Africa one hundred and nine years after the death of David Massouw the moon’s promise that man, the Korana, would die and rise again has been fulfilled, and the circle has been completed: David Massouw’s volk has risen from under the Boers!
Afterword
My inspiration for this book has been drawn from the current process of revitalisation among the Korana people. Speaking of revitalisation among these people means there was, of necessity, genesis and ethno-dissolution before this could happen. These processes are indissociable: one flows from and into the other. Just as ethnogenesis does not represent a completed phase, ethno-dissolution is not of necessity a final, completed historical event. In this book I have looked at the cycle of origination and evolution of the Korana people in general with a specific focus on the Taubitsch Korana of Mamusa.

Due to the focus on the Korana it was of course necessary to get clarity about who and what they are. We have seen that the literature points to a social openness among the Korana people, giving rise to mixing on a large scale with other peoples, especially with the Bushmen and the Batlhaping. The extent of this miscegenation was such that, in some circles, the degeneration of the Korana people has been ascribed to this process. I have acknowledged this mixing, but argued that their origination and not their degeneration or dissolution flowed from this. ‘Korana’ thus represents the result of mixing.

If one takes into account, in conjunction with this idea, that the make-up and lifestyle of the indigenous groups in the central interior of Southern Africa were very similar, questions like the following spring to mind: What makes them ‘Korana’? What makes the Korana people different from, for instance, the Batlhaping? Strikingly, though, we have seen that, in the processes of miscegenation or dissolution, Korana women did not partner with Bushmen men while the Korana men did associate with Bushmen women. Likewise there was an initial resistance under Korana men to take Batlhaping women while the opposite did not hold true. Despite the fact that the Korana and Bathlaping underwent similar processes of mixture, the Korana captain Massouw Rij Taaibosch reckoned that the Bathlaping could not claim a ‘distinct nationality’ because of their mixing with the Bushman people. There is not really a satisfactory answer in the literature in the way these phenomena are dealt with. To us it makes sense to argue that, in spite of the social openness of the Korana people allowing for mixing with other communities on a large scale, there existed a counterbalance; there was an internal ethnic imperative through which they could lay claim to a constructed consciousness. This conscious space provides for the construction of a shared oral history, the nurturing of affinities, the advancement of associations and the interpretation of an own framework in which to recognise the self. It was these factors, and not, first and foremost descent, kinship, or a supposed essentialist
cultural framework, that made it possible for individuals to call themselves 'Korana.' This ‘being Korana’ is also true of the current revival processes of which the essence is twofold: People would, first, like to renounce their forced association with the banner of ‘colouredness’ and, second, they want to be able to identify themselves in this process.

The ethno-dissolution of the Korana has been effectuated gradually in the former Western Transvaal through a border culture characterised by land usurpation, institutionalised discrimination, violence, contempt for the other and opportunist alliances. The theoretical base for this book was thus border studies. The interactive nature of the nineteenth-century border culture of the Western Transvaal was complex, fluid, full of contradictions and it was heading for a systematic implosion. In order to get a grasp on the interplay of factors influencing the situation it was necessary to approach it in a multidimensional way. It was not possible to concentrate on only one aspect, such as violence. Taking into account that the battle of Mamusa took place more than a century ago and that the perspective of the Korana people was not fully documented, our endeavour was to shed light on the interaction and effect the relationships between the various role players had on one another, and to point out the unequal power positions, violent actions and rhetorical and metaphorical meanings that were present in this environment.

To me, as a person who cannot claim a Korana identity, it was an epistemological challenge to give breath to the voiceless Korana of the past without falling into the dichotomous trap of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or of trying to absolve the Korana people of all blame. The modalities ‘them/Korana’ and ‘them/Boers’ have made it possible to maintain a greater level of reflexivity without compromising scientific enquiry. While I have pointed out the role cultural differences and world-views played, or could have played, in the events leading up to the final conflict between the Korana of Mamusa, it has not been presented as a kind of independent variable that could explain everything. I have made out a case for concluding that the dysfunctional, inadequate governance of the S.A.R. was the single most significant factor for the battle of Mamusa. This was why there was a chaotic, anarchistic situation within which thuggery and unconstitutional activities could take place unchecked. Notorious and opportunist personalities were allowed to make their mark in this society and to get off scot-free. Red herrings such as the supposed insolence of indigenous leaders were used to keep the citizenry satisfied and to conceal the state’s inability to govern. If it had not been for this, the battle of Mamusa would probably never have taken place.
The idea of the completion of a cycle is present on several levels in the existence of the Korana people:

- The death of David Massouw has become the inspiration for the later revival among the Taibosch Korana. The resistance of this community and their leader has provided a memory of struggle for the current generations with which they can identify and define themselves. To them the meaning of Mamusa certainly does not lie in historical facts and events that were archived and forgotten.

- In contrast with the cultural mixing and fluidity that characterised the genesis of the Korana people their revival has gone over in an apparent, almost misplaced emphasis of essentialist and primordial values. Our understanding of this situation is not that the Korana wish to negate the fact that they are part of the twenty-first century, but that they want to emphasise that Western modernity is not the only determiner in the way they can represent themselves. I have referred more than once to the fact that the Korana people have developed abilities and strategies of how best to survive over centuries. The emphasis on essentialist and primordial values in the current situation is but one of these strategies.

- To a certain degree the same variables that were present at the ethno-dissolution of the Korana can now be found in their revival. I can point to the need for institutional recognition, the symbolic meaning attached to land, the non-violent claim to indigenous rights and, in some cases, opportunist leaderships.

There are similar uncertainties and ambiguities present in both the genesis and revival of the Korana people, making it difficult to fully penetrate these processes or to arrive at a final understanding of them. There are in both processes contradictions and discrepancies so that I cannot pretend to having given any final answers in this book.

The factors leading to the destruction of the last functioning Korana polity in Southern Africa, namely xenophobia, intolerance, the abuse of power, racism and negative stereotyping are still part of our societies and still tell us what we are. And this is perhaps the final meaning of Mamusa.
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De Kock, W.J.
TJE CHRISTIANA.

Mitrent 800 boosten

op Maandag den 1de Januar 1880.

TE KLERKSDORP,

Prompt 1000 eieren,

op Zaterdag den 2den Januar inst.

TE POPPESTEORD,

Prompt 1000 boren,

op Dingsdag den 10e Januar 1880.
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MAP 2: BOUNDARIES OF 1871, 1881 AND 1884

LEGEND
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- Territories
- Primary Rivers
- South African Rivers
- Pedastria Convention Line 1881
- Konde Line 1871
- London Convention Line 1884

DRAWN BY: D.W. BOTHA

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Maps & Images

Image 5.1: Foundation of house. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]

Image 5.2: Stone rondavel. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]
Image 5.3: Objects found in ash heaps. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]

Image 5.4: Clay bricks. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]
Image 7.1: Stone trenches. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]

Image 7.2: Stone kraal. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]
Image 7.3: Schweizer Cemetery. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]

Image 8.1: Covenant Day Hall. [Image: Cobus Dreyer]
The Battle of Mamusa reflects the grievous event in the Western Transvaal border culture context that contributed profoundly to the dissolution of the last functioning Korana polity. The narrative presented in this work is exceptional for at least two reasons: Firstly, for the thoughtful manner in which the intriguing concept of metaphors is applied in this study of historical ethnography cum ethnohistory. Secondly, for the skilful way in which the author relates the battle of Mamusa to how present-day Korana and neo-Khoisan communities, in a new context, are relating to their future in a post-1994 constitutional dispensation.

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