Accustomed to Obedience?
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Classical Ionia and the Aegean World, 480–294 BCE

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University of Michigan Press
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For my grandmothers,
Charlotte Nudell and Charlotte Spaulding
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Maps

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A Note to the Reader

The transliteration of Greek names into English is a chronic problem. I have anglicized names and terms except where common usage dictates otherwise. Translations of ancient sources are identified in the notes; all unattributed translations are my own. All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated. Journal titles are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique*.
Abbreviations


BNJ  *Brill’s New Jacoby*. Edited by Ian Worthington. Leiden: Brill, 2007–.


IG  *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1873–.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>SEG</td>
<td><em>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</em>. Leiden: Brill, 1923–.</td>
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Acknowledgments

This book began as my dissertation project at the University of Missouri. I had already gone through several possible ideas when my adviser, Ian Worthington, asked if I was interested in writing a book on Caria. He had been talking with an editor who asked him the same question about his next book. Ian was not interested, but he knew a graduate student then casting about for a topic.

I had no particular interest in Caria, but I set about doing my due diligence with a review of the current literature. In that process, my attention drifted to other regions in Asia Minor before settling on Ionia. There was no lack of scholarship, but it seemed overwhelmingly focused on the Archaic period, when Ionia was one of the epicenters of Greek culture, or the Hellenistic period, when the region once again flourished. Between those two periods of cultural prominence, Ionia was treated as having gone through a long fallow period during which the region was subjected to the demands of a succession of imperial powers. The result was that Ionia usually appeared in conjunction with other, external developments.

What, I thought, would a history of Greece centered on Ionia look like?

That simple question drove the research that became my dissertation, but the first draft of these ideas looked quite a bit different from the version in this book. They were shaggier, more repetitive, and included false starts. But the core idea was there. On the day that I defended the dissertation, my committee of Ian Worthington, Anatole Mori, Jeff Stevens, Mark Smith, and Ted Tarkow wanted to know what the book version of the project would look like. This is very nearly the book I pitched.

Getting here was easier said than done. Where I had modest research support at the University of Missouri, including a dissertation writing fellowship in my penultimate year, most of the revisions took place while I worked at a succession of part-time, contingent faculty jobs, teaching as many as six classes a semester—on top of the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

These circumstances make me even more grateful for the people whose sup-
port both directly and indirectly made this book possible. Some offered guidance and support during years of tenuous academic employment, some gave feedback on parts of this project, and others provided opportunities to develop underproofed ideas. Prominent among them are Ian Worthington, Yossi Roisman, Anatole Mori, Jeanne Reames, Jeff Stevens, Aaron Hershkowitz, Matt Simonton, Joel Christensen, Dan Leon, Aggelos Kappelos, and Christine Plastow. To these and many more: thank you.

I also need to thank Ellen Bauerle for taking a chance on my first book and championing it through the chaos of a global pandemic, as well as the production team at the University of Michigan Press and the anonymous reviewers whose careful and generous feedback improved the book in a myriad of ways. The maps were created by Beehive Cartographers and made possible with support from Truman State University.

Lastly, several close friends and family deserve special recognition. My parents and Bubbie have been unfailingly supportive of my academic journey, even at its most quixotic. Josh Klindienst and Hana Akselrod have been a constant source of encouragement, and Hana once took time away from saving lives to translate an article for me from Russian. I also owe my deepest gratitude to my partner Elizabeth, who was there from the beginning of this project, watched it through its ups and downs, and was very glad when it was done.

Joshua P. Nudell
Kirksville, MO
Map 1. The Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean
Map 2. Ionia and its environs
CHAPTER 1

Prologue

The Land of Ionia

Introduction

The first decade of the second century BCE saw a showdown between the Seleucid king Antiochus III, so called Antiochus Megas, and a Roman Republic fresh off its victory in the Second Punic War. The Romans defeated Antiochus in battle after battle, all the while echoing generations of Hellenistic warlords and kings in declaring that their armies in the Aegean were the guarantors of Greek liberty (Livy 34.57). Thus, they stipulated, Antiochus had to accept the freedom and autonomy of all Greek poleis as a condition for peace. Rome had won the war and Antiochus had little leverage, but the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Apamea in 188 stretched out anyway. At one point, the historian Appian tells us, Antiochus relented, announcing to the Romans that he would relinquish his claim over the European Greeks, as well as the Rhodians, Byzantines, Cyzicaeans, and all the other Greeks, “but he would not release the Aeolians and the Ionians, since they had long been accustomed to obey the barbarian kings of Asia” (Syr. 12.1).1

This is a curious passage. Antiochus sets himself as the heir to the non-Greek kings in an ill-fated gambit to preserve part of his realm, but his explanation for wanting to keep control over Ionia—that the region’s history meant that it forfeited the right to autonomy—provides an insight into the consensus opinion about Ionia.

In some ways, Antiochus’ assessment is astute. Ionia had become subject to “the barbarian kings of Asia” at least by the early sixth century BCE, and that subordinate relationship had continued throughout the Classical and early Hel-

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1. Αἰολέας δὲ καὶ Ἴωνας οὐ συνεχώρει ως ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις βασιλεύσι τῆς Ἀσίας εἰθισμένους ὑπακούειν.
lenistic periods, regardless of formal declarations of autonomy. However, there are also two significant problems with Antiochus’ statement. First, Ionia was subordinate not only to barbarian kings, but also to Greek poleis and Macedonian kings. Second, although Antiochus referred to the Ionians as accustomed to obedience, they were anything but.

Histories of Classical Greece tend to follow well-trod paths. A series of political and military events like the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars mark the trail and point out a standard set of sights. Athens is well represented, for reasons of evidence as much as anything, and puncturing the Spartan mirage has done little to blunt popular fascination, while Thebes and Macedonia make grand appearances in the fourth century. And yet, if one were to complete this metaphor, most of Greek history takes place elsewhere in the forest and only obliquely intersects with the usual paths.

That is, the story of ancient Greece is not the history of Athens or Sparta or Macedonia, but the history of more than a thousand independent poleis scattered across the breadth of the Mediterranean and Black Seas bound by language, culture, genealogy, and Panhellenic institutions that together created an imagined community of “Greeks.” Recent scholarship has begun to reflect this reality. The recent wave of regional histories, polis histories, and studies that either evaluate the Greek world at the intersection of poleis or set Greek history in light of its interactions with non-Greeks has dramatically enriched

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2. The Copenhagen Polis Center, directed by Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen, identified 1,035 communities as “poleis” between c.800 and 323 BCE. I have borrowed the term “imagined communities” from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso Books, 1983).


our understanding of ancient Greece. To date, though, there has not been a dedicated study of Classical Ionia.

My aim in this book is to use Ionia to offer a new perspective on Classical Greece. Consisting of twelve poleis on and immediately off the coast of Asia Minor, Ionia straddled the border between the spheres claimed by Athens and Persia, which made it central to the imperial conflicts of the period. It is tempting to present the Ionian poleis as the prizes of imperial competition, but closer inspection reveals that this characterization is deeply misleading. The Ionians were active partners in the imperial endeavor, even as imperial competition constrained local decision-making and exacerbated local and regional tensions.

The remainder of this chapter offers an introduction to Ionia before sketching its early history down to the revolt of 499–494 BCE. Scholarship on Archaic Ionia has long used the Persian suppression of this revolt as the lens through which to interpret the region’s history. Certainly, the revolt marked a traumatic rupture in the history of Ionia, but this approach both overrates Ionia’s importance in the earlier developments of Greek history and underrates its continued importance through the Classical period. The Ionian revolt did not conclude a story so much as turn over a new page.

The Geography of Ionia

“Ionia” and “Ionian” are terms with multifarious definitions. Yauna—Ionian—was what much of the world called Greeks in antiquity, and common meanings range from ethnic terminology, a linguistic dialect, and an architectural style to a general label for Greeks who lived on the coast of Asia Minor between Sinope in the north and Phaselis in the south. However, Ionia also had a concrete referent from the sixth century: the region inhabited by citizens of poleis that belonged to the Panionion and whose ancestors had participated in the Ionian Migration at some point in the distant past (Hdt. 1.142; see below, “The Poleis of Ionia”).

that the polis ought not be the fundamental unit of analysis Greek history and offers examining the intersection of the polis and the region as one profitable direction of inquiry.


8. In earlier periods this region was known as Asia (e.g., Homer II. 2.461), perhaps connected
Herodotus claimed that Ionia was the best land in Asia, but it makes little sense as a discrete region. Two mountainous horst ridges bisect Ionia from east to west, forming peninsulas that jut into the sea in the form of Mount Mimas (modern Çeşme) in the north and Mount Mycale (modern Samsun Dağı or Dilek Dağları) in the south. Large rivers snaked through the valleys between the ridges, carrying alluvium from far inland Anatolia that led to rapid silting of Ionian harbors even while creating fertile farmland and fishing grounds. In the south, the Maeander River (modern Büyük Menderes), from which we get the English word “meander,” emptied into the Aegean Sea near Miletus, Myus, and Priene, while, on the other side of Mount Mycale, the Cayster River (modern Küçük Menderes) passed near Ephesus. Beyond Mount Mimas to the north, the Hermus River (modern Gediz) by Smyrna ostensibly marked the divide between Ionia and Aeolis.

These ridges facilitated east-west communication by allowing people to move along the peaks, but they interrupted north-south movement. Herodotus’ description of Ionia clearly reflects this fragmentation (1.142.3–4):

They do not regularly use the same tongue but have four dialects. Miletus lies furthest to the south, and afterward Myus and Priene. These reside adjacent to Caria with their own dialect, while those adjacent Lydia, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, and Phocaea, those poleis share a dialect among them that is distinct from the former one.
Herodotus goes on to say that Erythrae shared a language with the large island polis of Chios, while the Samos had a unique dialect. In addition to these divisions, there were numerous smaller islands such as Milesean Leros, Halonnesus in the territory of Erythrae, and the polis Clazomenae that has since been joined to the mainland.

These distinctions lead the archaeologist Alan Greaves to characterize the sea that surrounded, separated, and connected the poleis as the medium that allowed Ionia to be considered a single region. But the sea around Ionia was dangerous. Strong currents run through the region, particularly in the straights between the islands and the peninsulas, and rocky coasts created dangers not only from Aegean storms, but also from the pirates. And yet most Ionian poleis consisted of a patchwork of noncontiguous territories, scattered across the mountains, islands, and valleys, that contributed to political fragmentation. Even the two large island poleis, Samos and Chios, had peraeae, or holdings on the Anatolian mainland. By the same token, the sea held Ionia together and contributed to its prosperity since it was exactly here that one of the principal north-south maritime routes turned west to cross the Aegean.

The Poleis of Ionia

“To think of Ionia is to think of cities,” writes Alan Greaves. He goes on to explain that he means cities in the modern sense of an urban center (the Greek

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17. Colophon, which had an acropolis situated some fifteen kilometers inland from the sea, is the exception that proves the rule about the centrality of the sea, but the frequent conflicts over the status of the port Notium demonstrate that it was not exempt; see Chapter 3.
18. Recent maritime excavations off Fourni, a small island that in antiquity belonged to Samos, have revealed more than fifty shipwrecks; see Campbell and Koutsouflakis, “Aegean Navigation.”
Accustomed to Obedience?

ἄστυ) rather than πόλις. The latter term is often glossed as “city,” but was inclusive of its citizens (demos), the urban center, and the territory (chora). While Greaves is correct that it is impossible to think of Ephesus without drawing to mind the spectacular facade of the Library of Celsus, it is not those urban centers, but the twelve member poleis of the Panionion, that sit at the center of this study.

The membership rolls of the Panionion did not remain entirely stable, but Herodotus provides the canonical list from north to south: Phocaea, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Chios, Teos, Lebedus, Colophon, Ephesus, Samos, Priene, Myus, and Miletus (1.142). A thirteenth polis, Smyrna, requested membership in the Archaic period but likely only received admission in the Hellenistic. These poleis lay scattered across the geographical landscape but maintained a sense of collective identity through participation in the Panionion on Mount Mycale, which was established after a common war against Melie. However, this memory of cooperation did little to blunt the rivalries. In fact, Naoíse Mac Sweeney characterizes the Panionion as a “fight club” because “inter-Ionian competition became not just a sideshow—it was the fundamental principle underlying the Ionian League.”

These twelve poleis ostensibly traced their lineage back to the Ionian Migration. Many ancient accounts claimed that there was a wide-scale migration of people from the northern Peloponnese and led by Athenian settlers across the Aegean (e.g., Hdt. 1.142–50; Paus. 7.2–5; Plato Ion 542d). However, there is little to suggest that these stories represent historical fact. Mac Sweeney has recently demonstrated that only roughly half of the foundation stories mention the Ionian Migration and many of those that do frame it as one of several possible origin myths. Moreover, the archaeological remains from Ionia show not


24. Mac Sweeney, “Separating Fact from Fiction.” Cf. Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths, where she evaluates competition between these early foundation myths and Ferdinando Ferraioli, “Tra-
only that these sites were occupied from an early date, but also that there was significant cultural continuity. Mac Sweeney concludes that it was only in the early sixth century when the standard term for this region shifted from “Asia” to “Ionia” and the first traces of collective activity at the Panionion can be identified. Thus, she suggests, these stories about common descent developed to set these communities apart from their neighbors.

I evaluate the history of the Classical period principally in light of the happenings of this narrow set of poleis, and focus unevenly on them even then, but the story of Ionia would be incomplete without considering the other people who lived in the region. There were numerous small communities scattered throughout Ionia that existed in the shadow of their more famous neighbors. Just as the members of the dodecapolis negotiated their position between imperial powers, so, too, was a parallel dance taking place within Ionia, where Teos, Colophon, Ephesus, and others sought to dominate their small neighbors like Cyrbissus, Notium, and Pygela. Borders in and around Ionia were contested spaces, and the relationships between these communities were disputed in terms of legal status and identity, which created the conditions for a fluid political environment.

**Archaic Ionia**

The Archaic period is generally regarded as the high point of Ionian history, and with good reason. As early as the eighth century, intrepid settlers from Ionia had begun to found colonies on the shores of the Bosporus and around...
the Black Sea.29 Miletus alone was said to have founded more than ninety settlements (Pliny H.N. 5.122), while Phocaea established colonies as far away as Massilia in southern France.30 Ionian merchants also helped establish the emporia Naucratis in Egypt and Posideion in Syria.31 These overseas connections led many Ionians to seek fortune abroad. Graffiti at Abu Simbel listing the names of men from Teos and Colophon testify to the Ionian mercenaries in the pay of Egyptian pharaohs, and an inscription records the gifts given from Pharaoh Psammetichus I (r. 664–620) to one Pedon of Priene (SEG 37, 994).32

This interaction with the wider eastern Mediterranean world also contributed to the development of Ionia as an epicenter of Archaic Greek culture. Mary Bachvarova has argued that Hittite religious festivals created a poetic ferment out of which developed Greek epic.33 It should not be a surprise that no fewer than three Ionian poleis, Chios, Colophon, and Smyrna, claimed Homer as their own (Strabo 14.1.35; Suda omicron 251). Other stories linked Homer


30. The Milesian colonies are typically identified in that they shared government structures and religious calendar with their mother city, but Alan M. Greaves, in “Milesians in the Black Sea: Trade: Settlement, and Religion,” in The Black Sea in Antiquity, ed. Vincent Gabrielsen and John Lund (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2007), 9–21, and in Land of Ionia, 134, argues that rather than being foundations composed of Milesians, they were colonies sanctioned by the oracle at Didyma.

31. Greek distinguishes between two types of colonies, apoikia (new settlements) and emporia (trading posts), though Greaves, Land of Ionia, 123–27, notes the challenges of distinguishing between the two in the archaeological remains. For Naucratis and Posideion, one key characteristic was collaborative foundation.


with Creophylus of Samos, who claimed to have hosted him, but was variously said to have been Homer's teacher or emulated him (Strabo 14.1.18). This same ferment produced an unusual concentration of philosophical and scientific luminaries, including Bias of Priene (Strabo 14.1.12), Pythagoras of Samos (Strabo 14.1.16), Anaximenes and Thales of Miletus (Strabo 14.1.7; Suda theta 17), and Heraclitus of Ephesus (Strabo 14.1.25). Thales was said to have been a Phoenician by descent if not birth (Hdt. 1.170.3). Lyric poetry also found fertile ground in the aristocratic culture of Archaic Ionia, much as it did in Aeolis to the north. Nor were the fruits of Ionian engagement with Western Asia limited to literary culture. These interactions both shaped material culture in the region and likely accelerated the development of monumental architecture, particularly in the temples that began to appear during this period.

However, it is a mistake to identify Ionian autonomy as the cause of these achievements. From the mid-seventh century, the Mermnad dynasty had consolidated and strengthened the Lydian kingdom centered at Sardis. The growth of Lydian power led to conflict with the nearby Ionian poleis. The lyric poet Mimnermus composed verses about battles between the Lydian king Gyges and the people of Smyrna in the 660s (BNJ 578 F 5), and Herodotus says he attacked Miletus and captured Colophon (1.15). Herodotus' subsequent chapters paint a picture of continued conflict between Lydia and Ionia. The

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34. There are poets attested through fragments or testimony from Miletus (on Phocylides, see M. L. West, "Phocylides," JHS 98 [1978]: 164–67), Ephesus (Callinus and Hipponax; Strabo 14.1.25), Teos (Anacreon, Strabo 14.1.30; Suda alpha 1916), and Colophon (Xenophanes and Mimnermus, Strabo 14.1.28), with at least one of those, Mimnermus, possibly hailing from Smyrna. West, "Phocylides," describes Phocylides' gnomic verses as "wisdom of the east," while Walter Burkert, The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influences on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Period, trans. Margaret E. Pinder and Walter Burkert (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) posited that Greek culture owed a significant debt to engagement with the eastern Mediterranean.

35. Wilson, "What's in a Name?", 155–64, makes the case that Ionian sacred architecture diverged from its Anatolian neighbors over the course of the sixth century, both as a product of these maritime connections and as a way of staking out a distinct Ionian identity; cf. Chapter 9. On the Lydian influence on material culture, see Michael Kerschner, "Die Lyder und das Artemision von Ephesos," in Die Archäologie der ephischen Artemis: Gestalt und Ritual eines Heiligtums, ed. Ulrike Muss (Vienna: Phoibos, 2008), 223–33.


second Mermnad king, Ardys, raided Miletus again and captured Priene (1.16). Herodotus passes over the reign of the third king, Sadyattes, but subsequently credits him with beginning a war against Miletus that raged for twelve years and only ended when a fire started by the Lydians burned a temple of Athena of Assesos (1.17–19). According to Herodotus’ tale, Alyattes would only recover when he had rebuilt the temple, so the king ended up suing for peace—helped in no small part by a scheme concocted by the tyrant Thrasybulus that tricked Alyattes into not recognizing how desperate things had become in Miletus (1.20–22). Throughout this period, Alyattes had also raided Clazomenae and captured Smyrna, and his son Croesus followed in his footsteps by raiding Ephesus and other Ionian poleis (Hdt. 1.26).

Unsurprisingly, these attacks prompted a wave of construction on defensive fortifications, but, while the Mermnad kings of Lydia posed a common threat to Ionia, the region nevertheless remained fractured. The only attested example of one polis offering aid to another was Chios to Miletus, and then only because the Milesians had extended aid in an earlier war against Erythrae (Hdt. 1.18.3). Once Croesus had captured the mainland Ionians, Herodotus says, he began to prepare for a naval campaign against the large island poleis, only to be dissuaded by Bias of Priene or Pittacus of Mytilene (1.27). What developed from these campaigns was a hegemonic relationship that is striking for its similarity to the relationship between Ionia and the imperial actors of the Classical period. The Ionians paid tribute (Hdt. 1.6.1, 1.27.1) but were left to govern themselves while the Lydian kings made conspicuous dedications at Ionian sanctuaries and employed Ionian craftsmen (Hdt. 1.22, 92; cf. Nikolaos of Damascus BNJ 90 F 65).

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38. Alyattes also engaged in other diplomatic endeavors. One of his wives was an Ionian woman, the son of whom was enough of a threat to the throne that Croesus, whose mother was Carian, had him executed when he took the throne (Hdt. 1.92.2–4). These relationships were not unusual. The tyrants of Ephesus traced their descent back to Gyges through Alyattes (Aelian VH 3.26), while Nikolaos of Damascus records that “Miletos” was both descended from Melas, the brother-in-law of Gyges, and married to the sister of Sadyattes (BNJ 90 F 63).


40. On the dating of Archaic walls, see Rune Fredericksen, Archaic City Walls of the Archaic Period, 900–480 BCE (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), particularly 50–69; Greaves, Land of Ionia, 156–63. Greaves suggests that the Ionian fortifications were built not just as protection against incursions, but also in emulation of Lydian fortifications. Even after the Ionian revolt, Artaphernes required the Ionians to make treaties with each other (Hdt. 6.42), though Cross, ”Panonia,” 15, regards this as a suppression of the Ionian League, but see Appendix 1.

41. Walter Burkert, “Gyges to Croesus: Historiography between Herodotus and Cuneiform,”
When Cyrus toppled the Mermnad dynasty in 545–543, the Ionians were on the losing side. According to Herodotus, Cyrus tried to divide Croesus’ army by persuading the Ionians to defect (1.76.3). He offers no explanation for why the Ionians chose to stay with Croesus, but they adamantly held out even after the fall of Sardis. Where the Lydian conquest had taken place piece-meal, the Persians were methodical in subjugating Ionia. Cyrus’ general Harpagus systematically besieged the Ionian cities excepting only Miletus, which had made an earlier treaty with Cyrus (Hdt. 1.162–69).

Herodotus characterizes this turn as the second time that the Ionians had been enslaved (οὕτω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον Ἰωνίη ἐδεδούλωτο, 1.169.2), but it is worth asking what had actually changed. The Persian imperial state that Cyrus introduced to western Asia Minor came with traditions of centralized control inherited from the Medes, who themselves had adopted them from Assyria. However, early Persian rule in Ionia was no more immediate than Lydian rule had been. The Ionians owed tribute and were required to supply men and ships to Persian campaigns such as Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt in 525 (Hdt. 3.1.1), but their location on the imperial frontier gave considerable leeway to local actors. On Samos, Polycrates seized control of the state and not only maintained open relationships with both the Persian king Cambyses and the Egyptian Amasis (Hdt. 2.192; 3.39–44; Diod. 1.95), but also waged war on Miletus (Hdt. 3.39) and, ultimately, contributed ships to Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt—even if he also allegedly used the expedition to eliminate potential rivals by requesting Cambyses not send them home (Hdt. 3.44).


42. For a narrative of the Persian conquest, see Jack Martin Balcer, Sparda by the Bitter Sea: Imperial Interaction in Western Anatolia (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1984), 95–109.
43. Roosevelt, Archaeology of Lydia, 26, characterizes these Ionian soldiers as mercenaries, but it is better to interpret their service as an obligation to the Lydian empire, as the Ionians would later provide to Persia.
44. Herodotus modifies his language, referring to the first as a καταστροφή (1.91.6), which marks a subjugation or ruin, but not quite slavery.
46. Balcer, Sparda, 107, argues that Cyrus’ tribute demands were less regular than Croesus’, based on Herodotus’ description of the subjects owing “gifts” (3.89.3). Herodotus marks the change to fixed tribute as a sign of Darius’ miserliness, but Cyrus’ demands had likely placed greater emphasis on symbolic submission.
47. Shipley, Samos, 97, observes that in this version of the story, Polycrates volunteered his
explained the last action as a clear sign of “Samos’ vassalage status within the Persian Empire,” but this description does not entirely square with the portrait of Polycrates negotiating his position in the eastern Aegean.48 When necessary, he acknowledged his subordinate position toward the king; where possible, he flaunted demands from the king’s representatives and flagrantly raided the king’s subjects. Indeed, it was this very activity that forced Miletus to bind itself closer to Persia in return for protection.49

The structure of the Achaemenid empire changed in 522 after the accession of the third Persian king, Darius. In some ways a second founder of the Persian Empire, Darius’ path to the throne was not straightforward. Both his imperial propaganda and historical sources suggest widespread opposition to this upstart related to Cyrus only through marriage (e.g., Hdt. 3.88, 133). The Persian succession crisis and Darius’ measures to secure his empire are beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth noting that although Oroetes, the satrap of Sparda (which included Ionia), was one of Darius’ opponents (Hdt. 3.127), his rebellion does not appear to have drawn the Ionian poleis into the conflict.50

Once Darius secured his throne, he set about overhauling the loose administrative structures he inherited. In practical terms, this meant two changes: creating twenty satrapies and regularizing the assessed tribute that subjects owed to the Persian throne (Hdt. 3.89). Under this new organization, Darius grouped the Ionians with the Magnesians, Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans, and Pamphylians, who, together, owed four hundred talents of silver (Hdt. 3.90). Darius also conscripted labor from around the empire for his ambitious building projects. Evidence from Susa and Persepolis reveals the presence of Ionian artisans on the Iranian plateau.51 Likewise, Classical sources attest to

49. As Guth, “Rise and Fall,” convincingly argues.
50. On the rebellions at the outset of Darius’ reign, see Balcer, *Sparda*, 123–43; Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 107–22. Darius recorded his victory in an inscription at Behistun. The monument includes Lydia and the Greeks among the subject people but does not include them among the rebellions.
51. See Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 429–39, for the lives of these craftsmen, with 422–25 on the nature of the evidence. The foundation inscription at Susa (DSf) proudly lists the Ionians as stonemasons working on the project; see Pierre Lecoq, *Les Inscriptions de la Perse achéménide* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 237. The Persepolis Fortification Tablets (PFT) reveal mothers (1224), grain handlers (1942, 1965), and other Ionians (1224, 1798, 1800, 1810, 2072) in this labor force. Persian accounting did not distinguish between the Yauna of Ionia and those of other Greek poleis, but it is likely that a significant portion of these workers came from Ionia proper. Carl Nylander, *Ionians in Pasargadae: Studies in Old Persian Architecture* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1970), remains the classic study of Ionian building techniques at the Persian palaces and is broadly accepted by Margaret Cool Root, *The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art: Essays on the Creation of an Iconography of Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 9–14, with the caveat that these styles were in the
the presence of Ionian artists and engineers in Persian employ, including Telephane, an artist from Phocaea (Pliny H.N. 34.68), and the Samian engineer Mandrocles, who built the bridge across the Bosporus for Darius’ first expedition to Europe (Hdt. 4.87–89).

Darius’ administrative changes connected Ionia more closely to the imperial center, but their effect on the political life in the region was mixed. Darius conquered Samos at the behest of Polycrates’ brother Syloson, who, Herodotus says, he owed a favor stemming from his generosity during Cambyses’ campaign in Egypt (Hdt. 1.139). When the Samians resisted the installation of this client ruler, the Persian general Otanes ordered his soldiers to take no prisoners and handed the island devoid of men over to Syloson (Hdt. 3.146–49). This portrait of a desolate island is likely exaggerated but reflects the historical reality that the Persians brooked no opposition and reserved the right to relocate their subjects. Nor was Syloson the only tyrant that the Persians installed. During Darius’ campaign in 513, the Scythians tried to persuade the Greeks to destroy the bridge across the Danube and strand the Persian king, but Histiaeus of Miletus persuaded the Greeks present, including Strattis of Chios, Aeaces of Samos (Syloson’s son, Hdt. 6.13), and Laodamas of Phocaea, not to follow this advice on the grounds that it was through Persian power that each of them held power—without Darius, he said, their people would choose democracy (Hdt. 4.137). Beneath this rubric of Persian-backed tyrants, local politics continued abreast until the eruption of the Ionian revolt in 499.

A Region in Revolt: Ionia 499–494

By the year 500, Ionia had been subordinated to more powerful neighbors for generations. That year, exiles from Naxos and Paros approached Aristagoras, Histiaeus’ cousin and the new client ruler of Miletus, asking that he restore service of an “Achaemenid programmatic vision” where Greeks were just one part; but cf. Alan M. Greaves, John Brendan Knight, and Françoise Rutland, “Milesian Elite Responses to Persia: The Ionian Revolt in Context,” *Hermathena* 204–5 (2020): 87–89, who argue that there are few Ionian artistic influences in Achaemenid art. The workers may have stayed only for a short time before returning home, but Richard T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 6, suggests that the ration texts indicate that most travelers to Persepolis remained there.

52. On Syloson as a client ruler, see Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 140; Shipley, *Samos*, 103–6.

53. For instance, the Milesian aesymnetes list (*Milet* I.3 no. 122), inscribed in the 330s, records a plausible list of eponymous executives that begins in this period and Teos was refounded during this same period; see Chapter 2.

54. Histiaeus had been detained at Darius’ court since 511/0 (Hdt. 5.24).
them to power (Hdt. 5.29–30). Aristagoras lacked the resources to carry out the plan but brought the proposal to the Persian satrap Artaphernes, who agreed to provide him a fleet with which to capture the Cyclades (Hdt. 5.30–32). The following spring, Aristagoras and the Persian general Megabates sailed for Naxos at the head of a large fleet that included a significant number of Ionian ships and soldiers levied by Persia (Hdt. 5.32–44). Far from an easy conquest, the siege dragged on for four months, sapping the allotted funds and much of Aristagoras’ own money (Hdt. 5.34). According to Herodotus, Aristagoras began to doubt his ability to deliver on his promise and feared that the consequence of his failure would be the loss of Miletus (5.35.1–2).

About the same time, he allegedly received a secret message from Histiaeus tattooed on the head of an enslaved man and hidden beneath his hair, instructing him to foment revolt (Hdt. 5.35.3–4). Aristagoras, Herodotus says, then gave up his tyranny and seized the other tyrants and handed them back to their cities (5.37–38) before sailing to Sparta and Athens in search of allies (5.38–55, 97–99). Naturally, most of the deposed tyrants fled to Persia.

Such was the genesis of the Ionian revolt, an event that has traditionally been treated as the final punctuation mark on Archaic Ionia. Of course, Herodotus does not ask the same questions as modern historians and thus does not offer satisfactory answers. The result has been a lack of consensus on the actual cause of the revolt. The two most common proposals are both unsatisfactory. In the one, the Persian conquest gradually eroded Ionian prosperity, whether through excessive tribute demands or preferential treatment for Phoenician merchants, which, in turn, caused resentment of Persian rule. And yet the Persian economic system did not favor Phoenician merchants and, as Pericles Georges points out, the Ionians had already lived within a tributary regime for at least a half century. In the other proposal, the Ionian

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56. Although Herodotus makes it clear that Aristagoras formally handed back power to the Milesians and dissolved other tyrannies in the eastern Aegean, he presents Aristagoras a demagogue who manipulated his audiences, both in Miletus (5.36.1–2) and abroad (e.g., 5.97.2) with misleading words that appealed to what they wanted to hear.

revolt erupted because of a developing sense of “nationalism.” 58 However, interpreting the Ionian revolt as a general anti-Persian conflict is misleading even when eschewing the anachronistic term “nationalism.” 59 Recent scholarship has begun to consider how the local political conditions in the Ionian poleis might have caused the revolt, looking at popular opposition to the tyrannies and how the obligations these tyrants owed to the Persian king changed their relationship with the people they ruled. 60 This interpretation thus brings Aristagoras back to the fore as a proto-demagogue who was able to turn a wave of underlying resentment toward his own ends.

But what is meant by “Ionian revolt”? Without question, there was a general uprising in western Anatolia, and, while Herodotus opens this section by describing the events simply as “evils” that came to Ionia (κακά, 5.28), he later refers to it as a revolt either in Ionia (6.1) or of the Ionians that then spread to neighboring regions (5.104.2, 117). Aristagoras’ role in the outbreak and the coordination at Panionion ensured that the revolt remained centered on Ionia, but there is ambiguity as to who was involved. In fact, the “Ionian revolt” was not a general uprising of a unified Ionia. 61 Consider the case of Ephesus. Some Ephesians helped guide the raid to Sardis in 498 (Hdt. 5.100), but Ephesus itself remained conspicuously detached from the revolt. While the poleis of Lesbos sent seventy ships to fight alongside the Ionians at the battle of Lade in 494 (Hdt. 6.8), the only Ephesian contribution to the battle was to kill some Chian survivors whom they allegedly mistook for raiders (Hdt. 6.16). For later chroniclers, an uprising that met in council at the Panionion could indicate Greek

While the evidence makes it impossible to offer a comparative assessment of Ionian prosperity, Georges, “Persian Ionia,” 10, is undoubtedly correct that “the Persian presence . . . redirected, rather than depressed, the Ionian economy.” Erik Jensen, The Greco-Persian Wars (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2021), 18, offers a modified version of the economic thesis, that Darius’ expansionist policies had dramatically increased the demands on Ionia.


61. J. Neville, “Was There an Ionian Revolt?,” CQ2 29, no. 2 (1979): 268–75, takes this argument to the extreme in rejecting altogether that Herodotus saw an ”Ionian” revolt, but he goes too far in his zeal to counteract pernicious ideas about Ionian “nationalism.”
antipathy toward Persia or a coalescence of regional identity, but the description of the events demonstrates regional fissures.62

Despite the stunning raid on Sardis in 498, the inevitability of Persian power quickly set in. Darius’s generals regained supremacy on land where they harried the force that captured Sardis (Hdt. 5.116) and hammered a Milesian army in the Maeander plain (Hdt. 5.120). Artaphernes and Otanes soon turned their attentions to Ionia itself, capturing Clazomenae (Hdt. 5.123). For his part, Aristagoras abandoned the revolt and fled to Thrace (Hdt. 5.124–26). The war dragged on for more than four years before the Persian fleet and army finally converged on Miletus. The rebels met the Persians by sea near the island of Lade (Hdt. 5.7–16), but the battle quickly turned sour for the Ionians. All but eleven of the sixty Samian ships deserted, which caused others to follow suit. Moreover, the remaining crews were exhausted from a week of strenuous training, so those who held firm were soon overwhelmed. Persian forces tightened the noose around Miletus after the battle (Hdt. 6.18). Herodotus spares readers the gruesome details of the capture, but it was so traumatic that when Phrynichus produced a play at Athens called The Capture of Miletus not only did the whole theater weep, but the Athenians also fined him a thousand drachmae and banned its performance (Hdt. 6.21.2).63

Persian forces stamped out the remaining embers of revolt over the next year, recapturing and executing Histiaeus (Hdt. 6.30), easily (ἐὐπετέως) subduing Chios (Hdt. 6.31), and exacting revenge by putting temples to flame, castrating boys, and carrying away young women (Hdt. 6.31). Those who could fled (Hdt. 6.22–24), probably to escape retribution more than out of an aversion to living under Persian rule, and the Persians deported people from Miletus to the Red Sea (Hdt. 6.20).

And yet taking Persian actions in their entirety reveals a commitment to mitigating the circumstances that incited the revolt. First, Artaphernes brought the Ionian leaders to Sardis to compel them to stop fighting among themselves and setting a precedent for Persian arbitration between conflicting parties (Hdt. 6.42.1). Then he conducted a survey of Ionia that regularized the tribute payments at a level no higher than it was before (Hdt. 6.42.2).64 Pericles Georges observed that this tributary burden fell upon fewer citizens than before the revolt, but the fact that Artaphernes based the obligation on the agricultural

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63. Balcer, Sparda, 245, suggests that the Persian fury against Miletus was because it had held a privileged position, but it is more likely that this was the center of opposition. It is also likely that reports of the destruction of Miletus were hyperbolic; see Chapter 2.
64. These two measures were linked; changes to the territorial holdings of one polis meant a change in its tributary obligation; see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 494–96.
output of each polis meant that it was the contrary of vindictive. Likewise, while Artaphernes initially restored the tyrants to power in the Ionian cities, his successor, Mardonius, reversed that decision and turned local rule over to democracies (Hdt. 6.43). In his account of the end of the Ionian revolt, Diodorus Siculus includes an exchange between Artaphernes and the Milesian historian Hecataeus (10.25.4). Artaphernes muses that he is concerned about the Ionians resenting the Persians for their treatment during the revolt. Hecataeus responds that if suffering evils had engendered mistrust, then good treatment will engender amity (εὐνοούσας). The exchange is likely pure invention, but it is telling, nevertheless. Persian officials gave Ionia considerable latitude for self-governance. When it came time for an invasion of the Balkans just over a decade later, the Ionians numbered among the Persian forces (see Chapter 2).

Archaic Ionia was a dynamic place, but this efflorescence did not take place in isolation. Rather, it developed in tension and cooperation with first Lydia and then Achaemenid Persia. The ruthless suppression of the Ionian revolt must have represented a collective trauma for the people who lived through it, but it is also unfair to describe the last half century of the Archaic period in terms of decline. The imperial regime had changed, but the way that the Ionians interacted with this world had not. In fact, the revolt was largely the result of Ionian elites exploiting an imperial system for their own gain, which we will see again and again throughout the Classical period. Thus, when the Hellenic League “liberated” the region in 479, it was not at all certain that freedom was anything more than a political slogan designed to win support for a new form of hegemony.

65. Georges, “Persian Ionia,” 34. Diod. 10.25.4 says that Artaphernes assessed tribute to each according to its ability to pay (τακτοὺς φόρους κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπέταξεν). Darius subsequently empowered Mardonius to relieve half of the assessed tribute (Polyaenus 7.11.3; Plut. Mor. 172F).

66. Persian support for democracies should not be a surprise. It was, after all, one of the tyrants who had incited the revolt. My interpretation runs contra Georges, “Persian Ionia,” 34, who characterizes Artaphernes as “a vindictive incompetent,” evidence for which he provides in the restoration of the tyrants.

67. On Persian governance of Ionia, see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 493–97; Georges, “Persian Ionia,” 34–35.
Chapter 2

Orienting toward Athens and the Aegean System

480–454

Ionia was firmly ensconced in the Persian Empire at the start of Xerxes’ ill-fated campaign in 480. When Xerxes mustered his forces, therefore, the Ionians came. A contemporary observer would be hard-pressed to imagine that the next two years would see Persian power rolled back or that this development created the playing field that would shape the region for the next two centuries. And yet that is exactly what happened.

Ionia had long been constrained by its relationships with its imperial neighbors, so the development of Athenian hegemony was novel primarily in that the new power in the region was a Greek polis rather than a king. The year 480/79 also marked a subtle change in that Athens held Persian authority at bay without sweeping Persia entirely away, thereby leaving the Ionian poleis to chart a course that accounted for a multipolar imperial arena. Analyzing Ionia within this new environment reveals two recurring themes. First, Ionians were complicit in the practice of empire in the Aegean, both in the Persian system and in the developing Athenian one. This is not a shocking conclusion, but the ebbs and flows of imperial competition offered new avenues to exploit power dynamics, including at the expense of other Greek poleis. Second, imperial competition threatened to exacerbate the long-standing factional conflicts in Ionia, the consequences of which began to appear already in the first half of the fifth century.

Fighting Badly? Ionia and Xerxes’ Invasion of Greece

Despite the prominence of the Ionian revolt in Herodotus’ history (5.28–55, 97–126, 6.1–42), the Ionians are largely subsumed into the mass of the Persian forces in his account of the campaign in 480. He refers to them as Ionians, as
distinct from Greeks, at once highlighting concerns over their loyalty and demonstrating them to be among the most efficient units in the Persian fleet. The result is a tension that closer evaluation reveals to be the result of two competing forces: faction within Ionia at the time of the invasion and a web of pressures around how the Ionian contribution to the Persian invasion ought to be remembered.

According to Herodotus’ catalog of the Persian force, the Ionians furnished a hundred ships (7.94; cf. Diod. 11.2.8). The description of this contingent is frustratingly vague and, despite already having described events in Ionia at length, Herodotus hews to the formula in the rest of this section in providing only an ethnographic snapshot about the contingent, saying that they were “equipped like Greeks” (ἐσκευασμένοι ὡς Ἕλληνες, 7.94). Numbers reported by Herodotus are notoriously problematic, but, while the one hundred ships may be inexact, only the Phoenicians supplied more.

In describing the Persian naval forces, Herodotus says Ariabignes, a son of Darius, commanded the Ionian and Carian ships, all of which carried Persian, Median, and Sacae marines (7.96–97). However, it would be a mistake to assume that the Ionians at this moment fought for Persia only under the threat of death and were merely awaiting an opportunity to break free. In fact, Herodotus offers a rare moment of insight into their motivations at the start of the battle of Artemisium, when the Persian fleet had the Hellenic League ships surrounded (8.10.2–3):

Now, all those among the Ionians sympathetic to the Greeks were sailing involuntarily. They became greatly distressed seeing [the Greeks] surrounded and believed that none would ever return home again, so weak did the Greek position seem to be. But others relished the situation, competing with each other to see who could seize an Attic ship first

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1. Most of the ships were probably triremes, but this number may have also included biremes and pentekonters. On the composition of Archaic fleets, see Thomas J. Figueira, “Archaic Naval Warfare,” Historika 5 (2015): 499–515. Herodotus later notes that he omits the names of the leaders of individual contingents on the grounds that they are not soldiers so much as slaves (ὡσ’ ὁι ἄλλοι στρατεύόμενοι δοῦλοι, 7.96). Herodotus also describes the Samothracians as Ionians at 8.90, but see below, n. 8.

2. Herodotus’ catalog includes no Greeks among the infantry, and O. Kimball Armayor, “Herodotus’ Catalogues of the Persian Empire in the Light of the Monuments and the Greek Literary Tradition,” TAPhA 108 (1978): 7, argues that it has a sense of “predetermination” that reflects the people of the Persian Empire. The presence of Ionian individuals at Plataea, such as the Ephesian Dionysophanes who buried Mardonius after the battle (Hdt. 9.84; Paus. 9.2.2), serves as a reminder that there were people with the campaign other than soldiers.

Accustomed to Obedience?

In order to receive gifts from the king since there was the most talk in camp about the Athenians.

Herodotus only specifies that some of the Ionians felt sympathy the Greeks, thereby leaving open to interpretation the identity of the ship commanders who were eager to attack the Athenians because they saw potential reward, but the parallel construction of his language also suggests that all of the viewpoints described here belonged to Ionians. Indeed, Graham Shipley has argued that the Samians enthusiastically participated in the campaign because they had come to see the Ionian revolt as a mistake, while a strand of historiography suggests that serving in the Persian fleet empowered traditionally disenfranchised classes of people in Ionia in much the same way that ascendency of the navy in fifth-century Athens endowed the thētes with increased political power.

Equally important, though, is Herodotus' explanation for the Ionian sympathy: not out of kinship, but at the seemingly hopeless situation of the Greek fleet.

A similar slippage occurs in the description of Themistocles' bid to separate the Ionians from Persia before the battle. Themistocles reportedly believed that the Ionians and Carians were the key to defeating the Persians (Hdt. 8.19.1) and so discretely sailed to locations where the Persian ships would put in for water and there left a message for the Ionians (Hdt. 8.22; Plut. Them. 9.1–2). In the Herodotean version, Themistocles wrote:

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6. Plutarch adds that Themistocles asked the Ionians to foul the Persian forces in battle, but that seems like later embellishment. Polyaeus 1.30.7 contains an abbreviated account of the message.
Ionians! You are not acting justly taking up arms against your fatherland and bringing slavery to Hellas. It would be best if joined with us, but if that is not within your power you could still withdraw from this conflict yourselves and beg the Carians to go with you. But if you can do neither of these but are so powerfully compelled such that you cannot resist, then deliberately feign cowardice when battle is joined, remembering that you are our offspring and that these hostilities with the barbarians were your fault from the beginning.

Commentators from Herodotus onward have explained this gambit by saying that Themistocles had hoped either to lure the Ionians away from Xerxes' fleet or to sow the seeds of mistrust so that the king would hold them back from battle (Hdt. 8.22; cf. Plut. Them. 9.2). Themistocles' actions make for a good story—bravery, risk, and a dramatic flourish appealing to a common heritage—but there is no indication that they made a significant contribution to the Greek cause. Much like Leonidas' “sacrifice” at Thermopylae, Themistocles' attempts to incite a mass defection from Persia held more weight as propaganda and in memory than they did in practice.

After three days of indecisive fighting and a destructive storm (Hdt. 8.9–18; Diod. 11.12–13), the defending ships withdrew south and Xerxes' fleet advanced toward the climactic battle at Salamis.

On the day of battle, the Ionian contingent held the Persian left wing, nearest to Piraeus and facing the Spartan ships, while the Phoenicians faced the Athenians across the strait. Herodotus describes the hours that followed as a tangled and desperate struggle in which the Persian fleet fell to ruin under the eyes of the king himself. However, Herodotus also points out that parts of

the Persian fleet demonstrated conspicuous bravery amid the carnage. At the
height of the battle, the Phoenicians approached Xerxes to accuse the Ionians
of treason (προδόντων), only for the king to witness a Samothracian vessel
sink an Athenian ship and capture an Aeginetan one in quick succession and
therefore dismiss the accusation (8.90). 8 Herodotus also identifies two Sami-
ians, Theomestor, the son of Androdamas, and Phylacus, the son of Histiaeus,
who received honors from Xerxes on account of their bravery (8.85). Finally,
in describing the Ionian conduct, he once again invokes Themistocles’ appeal,
only to say that most simply ignored it (ἐθελοκάκεον μέντοι αὐτῶν κατὰ τὰς
Θεμιστοκλέος ἐντολὰς ὀλίγοι, οἱ δὲ πλεῦνες οὔ, 8.85).

There is reason to be suspicious of Herodotus’ account of the Ionian role in
the fighting. He singles out Greeks whose conduct in the battle was less than
ideal and includes praise for the duplicitous skill of Artemisia of Caria, but
the general shape of his narrative extols the naval prowess of the Greeks and
the failures of the non-Greek ships. For the Ionians he thus suggests that they
exceeded the barbarian contingents and those few who fell short did so only
because they heeded Themistocles. While allowing that some of the Ionian
ships may well have performed better than the Phoenicians at Salamis, Herodo-
tus’ explanation also suits a politically correct memory about the battle from a
time when the Ionians were integral members of the Delian League. 9 Herodo-
tus thus redeems those Ionians for the defeat at the battle of Lade even as they
fought on the wrong side of the conflict. Diodorus confuses the issue further by
preserving the tradition that the east side of the Persian fleet, composed of the
Greek contingents, put up the stiffest resistance, but adds that before the battle
the Ionians dispatched a Samian man to relate Xerxes’ battle plans to the Greek

8. Although Paus. 7.4.3 suggests that Samothrace was a colony of Samos and thus “Ionian,”
Herodotus more likely picked up the language of his sources for this story since the common Per-
sian word for all Greeks was “Yauna” (Ionian).

9. Contra Wallinga, Xerxes’ Persian Adventure, 41–42, who argues that the tradition was
Athenian slander because Herodotus records only two Samians as orosangai (8.85) and the actual
fighting would have been done by the Persian marines stationed aboard that prevented sabotage. Herodotus likely published his history in installments throughout the 420s, though the exact chronology is debated; see Justus Cobet, “Wann wurde Herodots Darstellung der Perserkriege publi-
(1979): 145–49; J. A. S. Evans, “Herodotus 9.73.3 and the Publication Date of the Histories,” CPh 82,
Studies 10, no. 1 (1985): 1–9; Rosalind Thomas, “The Intellectual Milieu of Herodotus,” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Herodotus, ed. Carolyn Dewald and John Marincola (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), 60–75. James Romm, Herodotus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1998), 48–58, lays out the challenges to understanding Herodotus’ biography.
commanders, promising to desert during the battle—which they proceeded to not do (11.17.3–4).  

In fact, if we trust Herodotus, Xerxes only began to suspect the loyalty of the Ionians after suffering defeat at Salamis. Recalling a parallel episode where Ionians were tasked with guarding Darius’ bridge over the Danube (Hdt. 4.133–41, 5.23), Herodotus says Xerxes feared that the Ionians would put it into the minds of his enemies to destroy the bridge over the Hellespont and so decided to withdraw his royal person from Europe (8.97). And yet, not only is there no record of Xerxes punishing any Ionian for disloyalty, but he also appointed two Samians orosangai. A careful reading of Herodotus’ account of Xerxes’ campaign thus underscores the continued factionalism in Ionia writ large. The evidence that Ionians fought against people they considered their kin only under compulsion is far slimmer and likely emerged from a need to rehabilitate them for having been on the wrong side of a war branded as a defense of Greek liberty. 

Local and regional conflicts in Ionia meant that the potential for rebellion and revolution bubbled just beneath the surface throughout the Classical period. When the Greek ships mustered at Aegina after Salamis, they were approached by six Chians who had participated in a conspiracy to murder the tyrant Strat- tis, asking that the Greek fleet sail immediately to Ionia (Hdt. 8.132). Nevertheless, the region was still firmly Persian in the winter of 480/79. Xerxes dispatched Artemisia to convey his family to Ephesus (Hdt. 8.106) and followed through on his promise to appoint Theomestor tyrant on Samos, where part of the Persian fleet spent the winter (Hdt. 8.130; Diod. 11.27.1). When spring arrived, the Persian fleet, including the Ionian ships, mustered at Samos in order to guard against a potential rebellion, Herodotus says, while adding that “they did not expect the Greeks to come to Ionia” (οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ προσεδέκοντο τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλεύσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην, 8.130.3). They could not have known that 479 would be a year that displayed all of the features that defined Ionia for the subsequent two centuries.

10. This seems to be an inversion of Themistocles’ activities as described by Herodotus (8.22). Lazenby, Defense of Greece, 185 calls the story “faintly ridiculous.” On the contested traditions about the order of battle, see Lazenby, 183–87.  
11. In the earlier incident the Ionians remained loyal to Darius, albeit because he ensured their political power; see Chapter 1. In the latter, Herodotus credits Themistocles with the plan to attack the bridge without mentioning the Ionians (8.108.2).  
12. Herodotus conspicuously does not use the language of liberty to describe this episode. The Greek commanders were only willing to go as far as Delos.  
13. Diodorus also comments on the specter of agitation in Ionia (ὡς ἀλλότρια φρονούντων τῶν Ἰωνῶν, 11.27.1).
Buried near the end of Herodotus’ history is his account of the battle of Mycale (9.90–107; cf. Diod. 11.34–36), an engagement that ancient tradition implausibly sets on the same day as Plataea (Hdt. 9.90; Diod. 11.24.1). \(^{14}\) Despite acknowledging the battle’s significance in securing the victory over the Persians, Herodotus sets it in the denouement of the war. However, for Ionia, Mycale, not Salamis, led to the “liberation” that framed the rest of the fifth century. Before turning to the battle and its aftermath, it is worth considering what can be gleaned about the regional political currents in Ionia from these passages. Both Herodotus and Diodorus frame Mycale as a moment of liberation for Ionia and put those words in the mouths of the ambassadors from Samos. Persian-appointed officials ruled at least at Samos, Chios, and Miletus, but their positions became increasingly tenuous as the year wore on.\(^ {15}\)

Herodotus records both subversive actions and Persian suspicion. Immediately before the battle, he says that “the Samians” sent Lampon, son of Thrasyclès, Athenagoras, son of Archistratides, and Hegesistratus, son of Aristagoras, to make an appeal to the Spartan commander Leutychides on Delos, where Hegesistratus declared (9.90):\(^ {16}\)

Should the Ionians only see you, they will desert from the Persians and the barbarians will not remain, but if they do, you will never again have such a hunt.

Herodotus continued that the Persian ships were unseaworthy and implored the Greeks to liberate them from slavery by defeating the barbarians. Of course,

\(^{14}\) Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 533, offers a more likely chronology whereby the Greek fleet sailed to Delos before Plataea (Hdt. 9.90) and only went on the offensive afterward.

\(^{15}\) Mardonius was supposed to have deposed all Ionian tyrants in 492, replacing them with democracies (Hdt. 6.43). While allowing that Xerxes may have simply made a new decision to appoint Theomestor, it may well be that labeling him and the Chian Strattis (Hdt. 8.132) “tyrants” is slander on account of their collaboration with the Persian authorities.

\(^{16}\) Diodorus 11.34.2 says that the “worthy ambassadors” (πρέσβεις ἀξιούντες) came from Samos. Shipley, *History of Samos*, 109, identifies these names as belonging to the other families who had been suppressed and exiled during and after the reign of Polycrates; cf. Sara Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 59–69.
Leutychides rejected both the impassioned plea and all arguments in favor of viewing the name “Hegisistratus” as an auspicious omen, whereupon the two sides bound themselves with an oath of alliance (Hdt. 9.91–92). The Samians had also liberated five hundred Athenian prisoners, whom they supplied with provisions and sent back to Athens, which in turn led to suspicion from the Persians (Hdt. 9.99.2). Herodotus thus establishes Samos as the leading polis in the fight for Greek liberty, a status that is paid off both by having the Samians turn on the Persians at the height of the fighting and with Samos’ prominent position within the Delian League. Diodorus’ account strengthens this picture not only by saying not only that the Samians dispatched the ambassadors (11.34.2) and had unanimously decided to turn on the Persians, but also that their attack turned the tide of the battle (11.36.2, 4).17

Persian suspicions peaked immediately before the battle of Mycale when Leutychides had a ship sail close to shore and repeat Themistocles’ ploy from the leadup to Artemisium, with a herald tell the Ionians to turn against the Persians (Hdt. 9.98). The Persian commander Tigranes ordered the Samians stripped of their arms and armor (ὅπλα) and stationed the Milesians on the heights of Mycale away from the battlefield (9.99).18 Nevertheless, Herodotus says, at the climax of the battle the Ionians effected a second revolt. The Samians led the way by turning on the Persians, causing them to retreat, and then the Milesians, who were ostensibly guarding the passes and guiding the Persians to safety, directed them right back to their enemies (Hdt. 9.103–4).19 The Ionian role in leading the Greeks of Asia against the Persians and turning the tide of the battle is undoubtedly exaggerated, once again redeeming Greeks who had fought on the “wrong side,” but there is no reason to reject more modest contributions.20

17. Diodorus’ use of Ephorus as his source for Mycale and its aftermath likely accounts for the differences from Herodotus.

18. Shipley, History of Samos, 109, doubts that the disarmed soldiers were hoplites on account of his contention that Samos had fewer hoplites in proportion to the size of its population than other poleis, but recent scholarship has begun to challenge the primacy of the hoplite at the time of the Persian wars altogether; see, in particular, Roel Konijnendijk, “Neither the Less Valorous nor the Weaker: Persian Military Might and the Battle of Plataia,” Historia 61, no. 1 (2012): 1–17.

19. Herodotus’ mention of the Milesians here is notable because he had implied that the entire population of Miletus was killed or deported following the Ionian revolt (6.19). As Alan M. Greaves, Miletos: A History (New York: Routledge, 2002), 132, suggests, the destruction of Miletus was likely exaggerated, while Vanessa B. Gorman, Miletos, the Ornament of Ionia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 146–51, plausibly connects a series of isopoliteia treaties between Miletus and its colonies during this period and thus suggests that the new citizens returned from the colonies; see below, “Ionia within the Early Athenian Arche.”

Whether a spontaneous uprising against the Persians as in Herodotus or a premeditated plot as in Diodorus, the Greek sources present the events as the result of a revolutionary sentiment against Persian rule, but there is little evidence from the Ionians specifically that supports this picture. It was this rationale that prompted Jack Balcer to argue that the primary issue was not revolution, but “to find successful means by which to revitalize the particular poleis in order to prevent further disintegration, and to preserve and reorganize the social and political order.”

In the immediate aftermath of Mycale, the leaders of the Hellenic League convened a council on Samos to determine what to do with the Ionians since they believed it would only be a matter of time before they faced another threat from the barbarians (9.106.2). The topic at hand was who would give them land. The possibility of relocating the Ionians was not new; Bias of Priene had allegedly made the same proposal in 546, and some of the Phocaeans and Teians had actually followed through (Hdt. 1.164–70). However, the scale of the proposed operation would have dwarfed the earlier proposals and the paucity of the surviving details invites questions about its veracity, in either Herodotus’ account or the more exaggerated version in Diodorus, where the Athenians scuttled the plan only after the Ionians and Aeolians had prepared because they would then cease to be the Ionian mother city (11.37). Herodotus does not mention the Aeolians or other Greeks of Asia, for instance, or whether the proposal included islands like Samos and Chios that had been no more successful than their neighbors on the mainland at warding off Persian power. Thus, Herodotus’ discussion foreshadows the coming rivalry between Athens and Sparta more than it records a serious proposal. Thucydides blames the violence of Pausanias for the demise of the Hellenic League, but the failure to resolve the underlying tension between its aims of liberating the Greeks and its unwillingness to commit to protecting them spelled its doom.

Irwin, “Herodotus and Samos: Personal or Political,” CW 102, no. 4 (2009): 395–416, argues, persuasively, that Herodotus’ interest in Samos comes from its parallel with fifth-century Athens. She rejects earlier arguments that it was personal, but only brushes on how memory and politics shaped his presentation of Samos (416 n. 65), which necessarily would have included not just Athenian memories, but Samian ones.


2. Shipley, History of Samos, 109. On these myths see Chapter 1.

Herodotus does not record the fate of Theomestor but concludes by saying that the Greeks enrolled the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians in the Hellenic League before sailing to the Hellespont to dismantle Xerxes’ bridge (9.106.4). Through the campaign season of 478, ships from Samos and Chios, at least, sailed with Pausanias first to Cyprus and then to Byzantium, where Spartan leadership collapsed (Thuc. 1.94–95). Persian power remained at Sardis just over the horizon, but, for the moment, Ionia was free.

**Founding the Delian League**

Sparta might have led the Hellenic League against Persia, but Athens dominated the fifth-century Aegean. From the outset, the Ionians received an outsized amount of blame for undermining the Spartan alliance. Thucydides says that it was the Ionians as a group (οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες, 1.95.1) who came to resent the violent (βίαιος) leadership of Pausanias and therefore requested that Athenians lead a new alliance that would better serve their interests, while [Aristotle] says that Aristides stoked the flames of frustration on the part of the Ionians after Pausanias’ fall (Ath. Pol. 23.4). However, from this early date it is unclear how many of the Ionian poleis had joined the Hellenic League (see above, “The Year of Liberation”). Ancient sources present conflicting evidence, oscillating between naming Samos and Chios as specific poleis brought into the league and making general pronouncements about the Ionians being involved in league activities. This contradiction is most pronounced with regard to the Milesians, whose actions at Mycale Herodotus characterized as a second Ionian revolt, but who no ancient source included on the list of poleis enrolled in the Hellenic League.28

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24. Herodotus expands the list of enrollees to “all other islanders who had served with the Greeks,” τοὺς ἄλλους νησιώτας, οἵ ἔτυχον συστρατευόμενοι. Distinguishing between the islanders and the mainland poleis is a repeated issue throughout the Classical period.

25. Balcer, *Sparda*, 327–30, frames the campaign to Sparta as a bid to maintain hegemony over the Hellenic League in the face of a challenge from Athens.

26. Plutarch elaborates on Pausanias’ violence, describing the punishments he meted out to non-Spartans in contrast to the moderation of the Athenians Cimon and Aristides (Arist. 23.2–3).


28. This question of original enrollment in the Delian League and, by extension, the Hellenic League, was a debate in the early twentieth century, for discussion see particularly Raphael Sealey,
Presenting Ionian antagonism to Sparta as the driving force behind the creation of the Delian League also leads to the false conclusion that this was an Ionian alliance built on kinship. Ancient sources almost universally point to Athenian activities spearheaded by Themistocles and Aristides that caused poleis throughout the Aegean to reject Sparta, leaving Athens as a natural alternative (e.g., Diod. 11.41–46; [Arist.] Th. Pol. 23.4–5). Plutarch identifies commanders from Samos, Chios, and Lesbos generally and Uliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chios specifically as instigating the conspiracy (Th. Pol. 23.4–5). He is almost certainly wrong to exonerate his upright subject Aristides on the charge of conspiring against the Spartans, but his suggestion that the non-Athenian actors included only men from the large islands that had joined the Hellenic League after the battle of Mycale is more likely true than is the implication that the Delian League was the result of a general Ionian uprising.

Similarly, no ancient source preserves a list of poleis that inscribed their oath to have the same enemies and friends on lumps of iron before casting them into the sea to render it unbreakable ([Arist.] Th. Pol. 23.5). Subsequently, ancient tradition held, Aristides assessed the allies for tribute, likely preserving the rates that the Persians had set ([Arist.] Th. Pol. 23.5; Plut. Th. 24).

Recreating the original roster of the Delian League is complicated further still by the processes of historical memory that surround the purpose of the league and the relationship between the league members and Athens. In Ionia, Chios and Samos were charter members and Miletus likely was as well, but Myus was supposed to have been given to the exiled Themistocles by the Persian king as late as 465 (Plut. Them. 29.7). Evidence in either direction for the rest of the

“The Origin of the Delian League,” in Ancient Societies and Institutions, ed. Ernst Badian (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), 242–48. However, Gorman, Miletos, 215, declares that the Milesian contribution at Mycale must have meant its inclusion.

29. Gorman, Miletos, 215, highlights the parallel with 499 in the appeals to Athenian kinship even though Aristogoras had also appealed to Sparta before traveling to Athens. Gordon Shrimpton, “Horton Hears an Ionian,” in Epigraphy and the Greek Historian, ed. Craig Cooper (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 129–49, takes a wider view of Ionian identity suggests that Athens chose Delos as the focal point of its new confederacy because of its religious importance to Ionia, citing it as the birthplace of Artemis and Apollo. However, this is misleading since other traditions located the birth of both deities in the vicinity of the Ionian dodecapolis or Lycia.


32. Complications with this donation abound. First, the gifts may not be real, given that they fit into a metaphorical schema for a complete diet. Second, by the 460s Myus, located on the Bay of Mycale, may not have been in the power of the king to give except as a symbolic gesture, though see
region is limited. Ephesus remained a crucial transit point for people moving between the Persian Empire and the Aegean world, but it, along with the rest of Ionia, was firmly in the Athenian orbit by 454, and there is no evidence for a military expedition coercing the Ionians to join, as there was elsewhere (Plut. Cim. 12.4; see below, “The Tides of War”). Placing the Ionians collectively at the inauguration of the Delian League elides a more complicated reality. In these early years the entire region was likely assessed for contributions even when they were only tenuously within the league’s orbit before gradually and spasmodically they joined in earnest.

The process by which Ionia became fully integrated into the Delian League is bound up with its original purpose. Athenian propaganda asserted a league mandate to liberate and protect the Greeks of Asia Minor from Persia (e.g., Thuc. 3.10.1; Diod. 11.41.4), but these were mere words. Closer to the mark is the formulation of Raphael Sealey: “The original purpose of the League was piratical.”33 Indeed, liberation by the Delian League was conquest by another name—its recipients had no choice but to sign on.34 Athenian willingness to compel obedience tempered any protection it offered and is therefore an inadequate explanation on its own for how Ionia became integrated into this Athenian-Aegean system, regardless of the potential of kinship diplomacy.

In a discussion of Ionian motivations, lodged between the usual explanations I just characterized as inadequate on their own, Jack Balcer offered a third possibility.35 At least by the reorganization of the Persian Empire under Darius I, and arguably earlier, Ionian commercial prosperity had stemmed from

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34. As Sealey, “Origins of the Delian League,” 241–42, points out. Hunter Rawlings III, “Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian League,” Phoenix 31, no. 1 (1977): 1–8, argues that Thucydides meant to imply an ulterior motive behind the Athenian actions in 478/7 and that they only accepted leadership to assert control. While there was more Athenian activity in the coup to topple Pausanias than is sometimes acknowledged, the position that Athens was aiming for an empire from the jump is too aggressive and not supported by Thucydides; see A. French, “Athenian Ambitions and the Delian Alliance,” Phoenix 33, no. 2 (1979): 134–41. Balcer, Sparda, 330–31, holds that the eastern Greeks sought an alliance, which was frequently true but too strong as a blanket statement.

35. Balcer, Sparda, 331.
its extensive trading networks throughout Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean. These markets were closed to Ionian merchants following their “liberation,” meaning that this region where the poleis were still recovering from the revolts of the 490s had to reorient its commerce. The positive incentives of promised plunder from military campaigns against Persia and economic opportunity in the Aegean bound the Ionians into this new system more tightly than did kinship or promises of protection. In fact, Ionian interaction with the Delian League in these early years appears most clearly in the campaigns against Persia.

The Tides of War: 478–454

The details of the early history of the Delian League are scarce, which complicates our understanding of how the Ionians interacted with it. Thucydides, for instance, uses his account to examine the growth of Athenian power to support his thesis about the origins of the Peloponnesian War. He covers the early Delian League campaigns to Eion, Scyros, Carystus, and Naxos in a few short sentences that demonstrate the growth of Athenian power, before recounting Cimon’s campaigns in southern Anatolia and Cyprus that captured Phaselis and won a victory at the Eurymedon River (Thuc. 1.100; Diod. 11.60–61; Plut. Cim. 12.4). By the end of this period, Thucydides concludes, the allies were the cause of their own subjection because they met their obligations with money and shirked military service. When the time came to fight back, he explains, they were both “unprepared and inexperienced” (ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι, 1.98–99). Athens had expanded the league by force, and the subjugation of Naxos both demonstrated a willingness to compel allies to remain in the league and temporarily ended any debate about how long it would exist. But Athens

36. E.g., Miletus, which Herodotus says was left desolate of Milesians (Μίλητος μὲν νῦν Μιλησίων ἠρήμωτο, 6.22.1), though other poleis likely recovered more quickly. The time between the end of the revolts and 478 is the same as the time between the plague at Athens and the launch of the Sicilian expedition, when Thucydides suggests that the Athenians had finally recovered from the first catastrophe.


39. Thucydides’ abbreviated chronology is compressed. These campaigns ranged from the 477 into the 460s. Ron K. Unz, “The Chronology of the Pentekontaetia,” CQ 36, no. 1 (1986): 69–73, provocatively rejects Thucydides’ relative chronology, accepted by most scholars, on the grounds that it fails to explain why the Naxians would have believed the league no longer necessary and therefore places the revolt after the battle of Eurymedon. For a traditional order of events, see
did not operate alone, so we need to ask what role the Ionians played in the growth of the league power.

At some time in the first half of the 460s, the Athenians elected Cimon, son of Miltiades, strategos and empowered him to wage war against Persia in order to liberate the Greeks of Asia, as Diodorus characterizes it (11. contents). The highwater mark of Cimon’s success and, indeed, of Athenian expansion was a decisive victory over the Persian fleet off Cyprus that he followed up with a second victory over the Persian army at the Eurymedon River (Diod. 11.60–62; cf. Thuc. 1.100.1). Diodorus reports that Cimon captured 340 ships, twenty thousand prisoners, and a sizable amount Persian gold and credits Cimon (11.62.1) and the Athenians (11.60.6) for the victories. Indeed, the two hundred Athenian triremes Cimon had upon leaving the Piraeus formed the core of the fleet, but league forces swelled its size by half again, bringing his total force up to three hundred ships (Diod. 11.60.3; cf. Thuc. 1.100.1). Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus lists the allied contingents individually, but Diodorus specifically says that ships from Ionia joined Cimon’s expedition. Determining what he meant by “Ionia” is another matter.

There is always a risk that casual invocations of Ionia in ancient historians merely to refer to the Greeks of Asia Minor (see Chapter 1). Diodorus distinguishes between Ionians and Aeolians elsewhere, but, writing in the first century BCE, he was beholden to sources that, on top of choosing not to elaborate on the non-Athenian contingents, could have applied their own definition of “Ionian.” Despite these limitations, there is good reason to believe that a significant portion of the allied ships came from the cities of the Ionian dodecapolis and that most of those came from Chios and Samos, two large island poleis that still maintained substantial fleets at this time. Identifying these poleis as integral to Cimon’s expedition is not purely speculative. In his biography of Cimon, Plutarch includes an anecdote about Cimon’s ferocity in attacking Phaselis because the city refused Athenian liberation (Cim. 12.4). The Chians, he says, were traditionally on good terms with the Phaselites and therefore appealed to Cimon while passing notes to the besieged by shooting arrows over the wall. The details of this episode strain credibility, but an Athenian decree that established a judicial relationship with Phaselis likely uses the relationship between


40. ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἠλευθέρωσαν. Despite a continued tendency in some corners to frame Greek history in terms of freedom from oriental oppression, there is a lack of freedom in these Athenian liberations; see Sealey and Robertson above, n. 33. Azoulay, Pericles, 51–60, stresses the violence of the Delian League.
Accustomed to Obedience?

Athens and Chios as a model (\(RO\) 120 = \(IG\) I\(^3\) 10, ll. 10–11), and the broad outlines of an Athenian expedition bolstered by Ionian forces fit neatly within the consensus picture of the Delian League in this period.

Much the same picture emerges in the Athenian expeditions to Egypt. In c.464, shortly after the accession of Artaxerxes, the Egyptian Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, solicited Athens for support for his rebellion against Persia (Thuc. 1.104; Diod. 11.71).\(^{41}\) The Athenians responded enthusiastically (Diod: μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας) and dispatched hundreds of ships to Egypt. Thucydides’ narrative foreshadows the catastrophe in Sicily a half century later, right down to the loss of a second fleet sent to relieve the first (Thuc. 1.110.4), so recent scholarship has cast doubt the enormous size of the expedition.\(^{42}\) Thucydides’ reliability is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but this expedition in particular is often seen as a wheel on which he could sharpen his political axe about the foolishness of democracy.\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, the Athenian enthusiasm for the campaign found in all of the available sources is generally explained by the combination of a fervor to strike a blow against Persia combined with the economic opportunity that might be found in Egypt and it is worth considering how far beyond Athens these motivations spread.\(^{44}\) The Ionian poleis had long had close commercial relationships with Egypt. Chios, Teos, Phocaea, and Clazomenae were among the nine that contributed to a Hellenion at theemporium Naucratis, while two others, Samos and Miletus, established their own precincts for Hera and Apollo, respectively (Hdt. 2.178.2–3).\(^{45}\) Ionia also

\(^{41}\) These dates are contested. I follow Daniel Kahn, “Inaros’ Rebellion against Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Disaster in Egypt,” CQ\(^2\) 58, no. 2 (2008): 424–40, in seeing a short rebellion that started after the accession of Artaxerxes I in 465 and concluded in 457 following the Persian victory at Prosyma, with a second Athenian expedition to Cyprus c.450.


\(^{44}\) Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 95 and n. 3, points to evidence for a grain shortage in Athens that made Egypt particularly attractive, though his principal grounds for an early date for the inscription IG I\(^3\) 31.6, the three-barred sigma, is obsolete.

\(^{45}\) The origins of Naucratis are unclear, but Strabo’s story about a Milesian foundation
lay on the eastern edge of the confederacy, making ulterior motivations likely. For some, a blow against Persia kept a threat on its heels; for others, a campaign legitimized their regime by unifying the community against a common enemy.

Both ancient and modern authors overwhelmingly focus on the Athenians. Inarus invited their participation, after all, and Athenian ships comprised the largest part of the expedition, but Thucydides makes it clear that the fleet included both the Athenians and their allies (1.104.1). An honorific epigram for Hegesagoras, son of Zoilos, found on a statue base at the Heraion on Samos commemorates the Samian capture of fifteen Phoenician ships on the Nile near Memphis (IG XII 6, 279). Despite Westlake’s cavalier assertion that this inscription does not substantially revise what we know about the campaign, it is an important reminder that the selective survival of evidence from this period belies the extent to which Athens relied on its allies to fight its wars. The capture of fifteen vessels, a number more reliable than those given for the total size of the Greek fleet, suggests a substantial number of Samians in Egypt!

Unfortunately, this murky picture already strains the limits of our evidence since the sources frequently omit even the mention of Ionian allies. Jack Balcer reasonably “suspected” wider participation in the Athenian campaigns from Chios, which continued to field a fleet until the last decade of the fifth century, and perhaps Erythrae and Miletus, which were among the wealthiest in the region as judged by the assessment on the Athenian tribute lists, but there is little concrete evidence outside of the inscription on Samos and the anecdotal tradition about the capture of Phaselis.

I opened this section with Thucydides’ claim that the Athenian allies grew complacent and thereby fell increasingly under the Athenian yoke. Thus, in the terminology of modern scholars, the Delian League metastasized into an Athenian empire. However, we might tentatively challenge Thucydides’ authoritative

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46. The most common acknowledgment of non-Athenian forces comes in the calculations for how many Athenians might have died in Egypt; see Holladay, “Hellenic Disaster,” 179; Robinson, “Thucydidean Sieges,” 149–50.

47. This inscription was first published by Werner Peek, “Ein Seengeficht aus den Perserkriegen,” Klio 32 (1939): 289–306. His reconstruction has largely been accepted, with subsequent scholars debating how much this changes the picture of the campaign found in the textual tradition.

48. Westlake, “Thucydides.”

49. Balcer, Sparda, 377. For a discussion of these lists, see Chapter 3.
Accustomed to Obedience?

declaration even beyond the usual caveat that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were exceptions to the rule. Unlike Herodotus’ account of the battle of Lade, where he enumerates contingents from the individual poleis, down to the three triremes each outfitted by Phocaea and Myus (6.8), none of the surviving sources for these Athenian operations offers a roll call. Any evidence for their participation emerges instead from ancillary evidence. This alone is hardly proof that Myus, for instance, contributed even a solitary ship, but underscores that, if Myus did, we would likely not know.

Throughout the early years of the Delian League, most of the Ionians were not idle witnesses to the growth of Athenian power, but actively complicit in it. Much as the Chians sought to profit from the Athenian war against Samos in 440/39 (see Chapter 3, “The War Between Samos and Miletus”), both Chios and Samos likely aided in the campaign against Naxos. Similarly, Pausanias records that the inscribed shield the Spartans dedicated at Olympia after the battle of Tanagra in 457 read that it was a “gift from the Argives, Athenians, and Ionians” (δῶρον ἀπ’ Αργείων καὶ Ἀθαναίων καὶ Ἰώνων, 5.10.4).50 Once more the question whether “Ionian” was merely a shorthand for the Athenian allies rears its head, but we should not be quick to dismiss the presence of the men of Ionia: they certainly fought in the Peloponnese during the Peloponnesian War (see Chapter 3). The development of the Athenian tribute lists supports Thucydides’ argument, but the fixation on naval warfare erases other military contributions, and the earnest declaration about complacency obscures that this was a period during which the Ionians were continually at war.

Ionia within the Early Athenian Arche: Desolation and Renaissance

In the two decades between the start of the Persian wars and the Athenian expedition to Egypt, Ionia had gone from being embedded in the Persian Empire to being embedded in an Athenian one. The surest sign of this entanglement is the evidence for participation in Athenian expeditions, but there is also copious evidence from this period for the migration of both people and intellectual traditions to Athens. This movement helped construct that city’s reputation as a center of learning, even as the influx of immigrants to Athens likely contributed to legislative changes like the Periclean Citizenship Law of 451/0 ([Arist.] Ath.

50. Fragments survive from an inscription at Olympia that likely was part of the same monument; see P. J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions, 478–404 BC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 70–73.
Thus far I have focused on how Ionians navigated the changing currents of imperial competition, but, just as imperial actions responded to and reflected regional and domestic developments, imperial actions had an impact on what happened in the region.

Already in the Archaic period Ionia was filled with traditions about internal conflict, some the residual legacy of interactions with the indigenous Carian and Lydian inhabitants, others stemming from economic inequality. Nowhere are these traditions more evident than at Miletus, where the women allegedly swore an oath to never sit at a table with their husbands or call them by their names because the Milesian men married them after killing their fathers, husbands, and sons (Hdt. 1.146.3; see Appendix 2). However, two other accounts of factional conflict at Miletus describe it along economic lines. In one, [Plutarch] says that Miletus was divided between the aeinautai ("forever sailors") and the cheiromachai ("manual workers," here perhaps farmers), which might indicate a growing conflict in the sixth century between the burgeoning commercial interests and the traditional landed stratum of society (Mor. 298c–d; cf. Hdt. 5.28–30). In the other, Athenaeus preserves a fragment from Heraclides of Pontus about a conflict between the wealthy and the Gergithai, whom he refers to as the δημότης (common people), during which the Gergithai expelled the citizens and had their young children trampled by oxen on the threshing floor (Athen. 12.26 [524a]). When the wealthy regained the upper hand, he says, they smeared the Gergithai with pitch and set them on fire, which caused a

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53. The story of the Gergithai plausibly suggests that the poorest people in Ionia were the indigenous Carians, since the name resembles Gergithos in the Troad of Herodotus 7.43.2 and Gerga is attested as a town name in Caria; see G. E. Bean, “Gerga in Caria,” Anatolian Studies 19 (1969): 179–82, though the Roman-era graves and foundation houses at the site could mean that it received its name from these stories rather than vice versa. The Carians around Miletus were more usually called Leleges (Hdt. 1.171; Strabo 14.1.1). Gorman, Miletos, 103–8, rejects the story and evidence for a Carian population altogether, while Greaves, Miletos, 25, only mentions it in conjunction with the threshing of grain. Cf. Eckart Schütrumpf, Heraclides of Pontus: Texts and Translations (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 80–83.
sacred olive tree to burn and thus the oracular powers to be withdrawn from the Milesians.

Noel Robertson juxtaposes the evidence of Heraclides with a reference in the Suda that “Gergethes” was a derogatory term the wealthy used to refer to manual laborers (Γέργηθες gamma, 189; cf. tau, 1192). “It is clear that the Gergethes are country-folk,” he declares, noting the particularly agrarian methods used in the reprisals and comparing them to another group of village-dwelling noncitizens in Ionia, the Pedieis at Priene.54 His proposal, therefore, is that the Gergithae “occupied some of the best land near Miletus,” which prompted violent conflict between them and Milesian landowners.55 Robertson’s evidence for the connection between the Gergethes and the countryside is the Suda definition of καὶ οἱ χειρώνακτες οὕτως καλοῦνται παρὰ τοῖς Μιλησίοις τοῖς ἐν περιβολῇ (“the handworkers, as they are called among the Milesians”), where he interprets τοῖς ἐν περιβολῇ as “used by the Milesians living in the periphery.” However, taking τοῖς ἐν περιβολῇ literally mistakes the meaning of the passage, in that it may better refer to those in rarefied circles, as the entry continues τουτέστατοι τοῖς πλουσίοις (“that is to say, the rich”) who dismissively call the craftsmen Gergithae. In other words, the Suda does not invalidate an economic interpretation of this conflict.56

These traditions reflect generations of conflict rather than individual moments. Herodotus explains that arbiters from Paros surveyed Miletus after two generations of strife and ushered in a period of prosperity by giving rule to those citizens with the best-managed farms (5.28–30.1). This arbitration is often tentatively dated to 525 because that year inaugurates the list of names on an early Hellenistic inscription that purports to record the polis’ eponymous officials (aesymnetes; Milet I.3, no. 122).57 However, as with almost all evidence for this period in the history of Miletus, the dates are a problem. For the purposes of this discussion, the list includes no hint of a period between 494 and 479, when some scholars have suggested that Miletus was left desolate

56. This is not meant to deny that the Milesians clashed with their neighbors over farmland since, as Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 376, rightly points out, there is evidence for a conflict with Lydia that resulted in the desecration of sacred property and subsequent withdrawal of oracular privileges in the first half of the sixth century (Hdt. 1.19.1), an episode that appears to remember the mirror image of the one preserved by Heraclitus.
after the Persians ended the Ionian revolt with fire and blood. This inscription instead offers an unbroken list of names that represents an artificial memory about Milesian history more than its historical reality. Inasmuch as the ruined Didyma came to represent Ionian opposition to Persia, the desolation of Miletus bloomed in Greek propaganda. In fact, Milesians likely began to rebuild Miletus probably as early as 492, establishing what Alexander Herda terms a “copy” on the same footprint of the late-Archaic city.

These stasis narratives are filtered through the lens of the Classical period, as Dina Guth has recently demonstrated, but I believe that is even more reason to take seriously their importance to Classical Miletus. The public ritual calendar at Miletus may also reflect statutes designed to preserve the unity of the community, with the Molpoi Decree establishing protocols for the procession from the intramural Delphinion to the sanctuary of Didyma that began the year. Although it resided in the Milesia, Didyma had only come under control of Miletus in the late seventh or early sixth century, and the sanctuary maintained its autonomy under the control of the Branchidae, a non-Greek priestly family (Hdt. 1.157.3; Paus. 7.2.6). According to tradition, the Branchidae betrayed the city to Persia at the conclusion of the Ionian revolt, leading to the sack of the temple and their own deportation (Hdt. 6.19). And yet, even in ruin, the nominal inde-


59. There are multiple difficulties. The list masks known periods of conflict and equally may skip years or include multiple names for a single year. Likewise, the annual reckoning is based on a count back from Alexander that could belong in either 334 or 332. Cf. Chapter 7.

60. Herda, “Copy and Paste.” In a recent chapter, Hans Lohmann, “Miletus after the Disaster of 494 B.C.,” in The Destruction of Cities in the Ancient Greek World, ed. Sylvian Fachard and Edward M. Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 50–69, argues that Miletus shrank as a result of the sack and that the diminished urban center took on characteristics like the orthogonal grid only after 479, but also that the continuity of cult institutions argues against an actual “refoundation.”


62. As with many pieces of evidence for early Ionia, the date of the Molpoi decree is unknown. The extant inscription is a Hellenistic copy of a decree dated to 450/49 based on juxtaposing the named aesymnetes with the evidence from the aesymnetes list (Milet I.3 no. 122), but the core text of the decree likely belongs to an earlier period, perhaps even before the inauguration of the list; see Alexander Herda, Der Apollon-Delphinios-Kult in Milet und die Neujahrsprozession nach Didyma (Darmstadt: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2006), 15–20, with bibliography.

63. See Chapter 9.

64. N. G. L. Hammond, “The Branchidae at Didyma and in Sogdiana,” CQ2 48, no. 2 (1998): 339–44, argues that the betrayal belonged in 479, when the retreating Persians destroyed the temple, largely because some early Hellenistic sources name Xerxes as the king responsible. However, this date is unlikely for several reasons. Retributive destruction of sacred precincts was part of the motivation for the Persian campaigns, and Herodotus mentions the oracle at the close of the Ionian revolt, but not again after Mycale, making it more likely that any betrayal and subsequent destruction took place during the reign of Darius.
Accustomed to Obedience?

These provisions did not ensure internal stability. A fragmentary decree from the middle of the fifth century records a partial list of individuals banished in perpetuity, along with declarations that they had forfeited their property and establishing provisions to reward any citizen who would kill them should they ever return (RO 123 = Milet VI.1, no. 187). The context of this inscription defies capture. Scholars traditionally interpreted it as evidence for an oligarchic challenge to the nascent Milesian democracy in the 450s led by the powerful Neleid clan that traced its lineage back to the mythical founder of the city. Indeed, among the exiles were the sons of Nympharetus, a Milesian whose name appeared on the aesymnetes list, possibly for the year 503/2 (Milet I.3 no. 122, l. 24), which creates a tidy picture of the domestic instability in the 450s that would have explained this date for the Athenian regulatory decrees at Miletus that most likely date to several decades later (see Chapter 3). The circumstantial evidence for dating this inscription has led Noel Robertson to push its date to just after 479 and plausibly identify the Nympharetus of this inscription with man named on the aesymnetes list. Although most of the critical information about this decree, including the authorities who passed it, the identities of the perpetrators, and the nature of their threat to Miletus, remain unknown, it is a powerful reminder that the deep domestic divisions that existed in Miletus throughout the Archaic period remained unresolved into the Classical.

We should be cautious about regarding the domestic turmoil at Miletus as typical given the relative surfeit of evidence elsewhere in Ionia, but neither should we dismiss it as entirely unusual. An imprecation inscribed at Teos offers a counterpoint the Milesian example. According to both Strabo and Herodotus, the Teians opted to leave Ionia rather than submit to Persian rule in 545, and instead sailed to Abdera where they founded a new city, only to return to their original settlement sometime later (Hdt. 1.168.1; Strabo 14.1.30). Much like the dating of the Milesian stasis, the return date relies on inference and suppo-
sition. The Teians equipped seventeen ships at Lade in 494 (Hdt. 6.8), leading to the suggestion that refoundation took place shortly after Darius conquered Thrace between 512 and 510 on the grounds that, if they had no choice but to accept Persian rule, they preferred their home to constant struggle against Thracian and Paeonian tribes attested by Pindar's Second Paean.69 This set of motivations and chronology is improbable, though, given that Teos began minting coins at least by 520–515—that is, before Darius’ invasion of Thrace.70

The Teians likely suffered at the end of the Ionian revolt. Herodotus says that the Persians deported young men and women and set fire to the Ionian poleis along with their holy places (τὰς πόλιας ἐνεπίμπρασαν αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι ἱροῖσι, 6.32). But there is nothing like Herodotus’ description of Miletus (6.25.1) to suggest that Teos was left depopulated in 494. Nevertheless, the close relationship between Teos and Abdera likely resulted in a reciprocal relationship by which some Abderans returned.71 Any Persian-imposed tyranny in this period was likely short-lived since Mardonius installed democracies in 492 (Hdt. 6.43.3). This official decision to support democracies may strain belief until one recalls that it was in fact Ionian tyrants who had stirred up the Ionian revolt. However, we might question how democratic these democracies were given that the overhaul seems designed to offer the appearance of local control while undermining the position of potential troublemakers. Most likely these constitutions included limited suffrage, and the prominent leaders could count on the backing of Persia. In Teos, the eponymous official in this period was probably the aesymnetes, paralleling the office at Miletus. Association with factions that rose to prominence because of Persian power set the stage for the charge that they abused their position, and, in the wake of the battle of Mycale in 479, the Teians established a set of imprecations against those who would abuse the position of aesymnetes to set themselves up as tyrants (RO 102 = SIG3 37, 38).72

71. Pin-
72. Paul J. Kosmin, “A Phenomenology of Democracy: Ostracism as Political Ritual,” CA 34, no. 1 (2015): 133, compares this inscription to the imprecations read out at every assembly meet-


It is thus tempting to interpret domestic conflicts in Ionia as responses to the changes in the imperial landscape. Jack Balcer, for instance, regarded Ionian history as the result of its location at the intersection of competing imperial systems such that whenever one imperial power became too onerous there was another power waiting in the wings to offer an attractive combination of protection and autonomy. This might have been true on a larger scale, but it does not adequately explain either the complicity of the Ionians in the development of the Athenian empire or the domestic turmoil of the sort on display at Miletus and Teos. Rather, the imprecation at Teos speaks more to the general instability in the form of piracy and threats to the grain supply than to imperial competition, while the domestic conflicts at Miletus ran deep and predated the appearance of these imperial systems. To be clear: imperial competition did not improve local stability in Ionia and often constrained local decision-making, but neither should every local action be interpreted in light of imperial competition. Just as Persian imperial policy required working with local notables, so too did Athenian hegemony respond to the preexisting conditions on the ground in Ionia. This period saw Ionia excised from Persian hegemony only to become entangled in an Athenian one and, as Athenian control tightened, the consequences of the local conditions, rivalries, and demands only became more apparent.

73. Balcer, *Sparda*, 19–25. Balcer’s model is flawed when it comes to Ionia, and overly reliant on a clash of civilizations given that his stage 1 “defensive” phase was allegedly driven by “a fear of foreign military intervention and fear of foreign domination of the institutions of art” (19–20). More recently, scholars such as Kostas Vlassopoulos, *Greeks and Barbarians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), have challenged some of the assumptions about these interactions.
CHAPTER 3

Under the Athenian Empire

454–412

The Delian League drew the Ionian poleis into an Aegean system in the aftermath of the Persian wars, but Athens exerted progressively more control over league institutions and members as open conflict with Persia ground to a halt (Plut. Cim. 19.1–2).¹ What had begun ostensibly as a defensive alliance guided by Athenian hegemony became frozen under Athenian imperial control (Thuc. 1.96). The relationship between Ionia and Athens changed in the 450s, in step with the evolution of the Delian League.² Any history of Ionia in the second half of the fifth century must therefore begin with development of an Athenian empire. The metastasis took place over the course of the years 454–449, which inaugurated a period of conspicuous building projects and the apogee of Athenian power.³ Nevertheless, it was not primarily the renaissance in Athens, but

¹ The change is often attributed to the Peace of Callias, which has inspired an extensive bibliography debating its existence and its date, with Klaus Meister, Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Calliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1982), 124–30, tallying a since-superseded list of 162 contributions. The general, albeit not unanimous, consensus is that some sort of treaty did take place. Ernst Badian, “The Peace of Callias,” JHS 107 (1987): 38, declared, “It is time scholars stopped disputing the authenticity of the peace at excessive length and started discussing its cardinal importance both in the history of relations between the King and the Greeks and in the history of Athens.” John Hyland, Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 15–35, has recently argued the cessation of hostilities only makes sense from the Persian point of view if the king presented it as his delegating authority over the Aegean to a client state, which would have required a formal treaty. I am sympathetic to Hyland’s argument and accept a possible diplomatic resolution even though the positive evidence for the treaty stems from fourth-century anachronisms. On the Peace of Callias in the fourth century, see C. L. Murison, “The Peace of Callias: Its Historical Context,” Phoenix 25, no. 1 (1971): 12–31, and Wesley E. Thompson, “The Peace of Callias in the Fourth Century,” Historia 30, no. 2 (1981): 164–77.

² Noel Robertson, “The True Nature of the ‘Delian League’ II,” AJAH 5, no. 2 (1980): 110–33, argues convincingly that the key changes happened quickly and in the 460s. I follow a conventional chronology here because it is after 454 that evidence of the evolution appears in Ionia.

the intersection of imperial systems with local and regional tensions that pre-dated the Delian League, that shaped the direction of Ionia in the fifth century.

The Development of the Athenian Empire

One of the first outward signs of a change in the Delian League’s operating procedure was the transfer of the league treasury. The coffers had been in the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos from the league’s inception, but in 454 they were moved to Athens (Diod. 12.38.2; Plut. Arist. 25.2). Apologists and defenders of the decision pointed to the strategic vulnerability of Delos after the naval disaster in Egypt (Thuc. 1.104, 109–10; Ctesias 32–37), and there were plausible rumors that Artaxerxes ordered a raid on the Aegean in retaliation for Athenian attacks.4 Others, including the Athenian Aristides, cautioned that while the move would be expedient, it was unjust (ὡς οὐ δίκαιον μὲν, συμφέρον δὲ τούτ’ ἐστί, Plut. Arist. 25.2).5 Moreover, the Periclean building program began in earnest after the transfer of the treasury, and Plutarch records twin complaints, from the allies that Athens was misappropriating the funds and from political enemies that Pericles was ornamenting Athens “like a shameless woman” (ὡσεὶ ἀλαζόνα γυναῖκα, Plut. Per. 12.1–2).6 It is important to note, however, that Plutarch also describes these claims as slander (διαβάλειν), which suggests that the accusations were politically motivated hyperbole.7


5. Aristides had died in 467, but the statement could have been delivered in the original deliberations about where to establish the treasury, since he is said to have made the first assessment (Arist., Ath. Pol. 23.3–5; Plut. Arist. 24).


7. Modern opinions on whether the Athenians used league funds to pay for the domestic
The symbolism of moving the league treasury to Athens could not have been lost on the allies, but neither was it necessarily a unilateral decision. Ancient tradition, in fact, has the proposal coming from the Samian delegates (Plut. Arist. 25.2). Samos did not pay the phoros, and it is certainly possible that the Athenians used the delegates as a proxy to soften opposition to the move, but the surrounding circumstances provided sufficient cause that one need not posit ulterior motives or cloak-and-dagger political maneuvering. Nor is there anything in the contemporary record to suggest a particular significance to the transfer of the treasury even though it represents a clear, identifiable change to the league structure. The pattern connecting the transfer with other signs of imperial control emerges only in hindsight.

Athens installed a variety of regulations on the league and on individual members in the two subsequent decades, but none of these immediately followed the transfer of the treasury. The only contemporary development that warrants mention was the creation of the so-called Athenian Tribute Lists, marble stelae on the Acropolis that record aparchai (first-fruit offerings) from the annual phoros (tribute) payments made by league members. The dedication of aparchai was probably regular part of league ceremony, with the offerings originally dedicated to Apollo. While there is no evidence for comparable inscriptions on Delos, the Delian lists might have been inscribed on wood that has since decayed. On the Athenian Acropolis, the marble tribute lists stood as a monument to Athenian hegemony and undoubtedly could have provided fuel for the building program vary widely. Lisa Kallet, “Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?,” CA 8, no. 2 (1989): 252–66, argues that the passage should not be dismissed, as do A. Andrewes, “The Opposition to Perikles,” JHS 98 (1978): 1–8, and Walter Ameling, “Plutarch, Perikles 12–14,” Historia 34, no. 1 (1985): 47–63, but also that the tribute did not fund the Parthenon, while Loren J. Samons II, “Athenian Finance and the Treasury of Athena,” Historia 42, no. 2 (1993): 129–38, argues that the treasury of Athena became the war chest of the league. Adalberto Giovannini, “Le Parthenon, le tresor d’Athena et le tribut des allies,” Historia 39, no. 2 (1990): 129–48, emphasizes the Parthenon as a Hellenic monument to victory over the barbarians, and, as Azoulay, Pericles, 65–66, points out, the building was a treasury and monument rather than a temple. Jeffrey M. Hurwit, The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 94–102, identifies at least one public work, a well-house in Athens, built solely from tribute. Recently, T. Leslie Shear, Trophies of Victory: Public Building in Periklean Athens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 21–26, connected the transfer of the treasury with the building program, but he also suggests that Plutarch did not understand the economics of Greek temple building. See Kallet, “Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?,” n. 1 for a list of works that accept as fact that the Parthenon was funded with allied tribute payments.

for outrage throughout the Delian League, but this does not explain the conditions in Ionia, where the thesis of local anti-Athenianism is poorly supported in isolation.9

Accustomed to a prominent role in the league, the Ionians are generally thought to have chafed at the new regulations, with the discontent resulting in a series of revolts between 454 and 449.10 This interpretation, however, rests on shaky foundations. The regulatory decrees that were long seen as a metastasizing of Athenian hegemony have been down-dated away from this period,11 and the remaining evidence for local resistance to Athens emerges from a simple reading of the tribute stelae, which are lacunate and inconsistent. Only Colophon and Clazomenae appear on each of the first three lists, but every Ionian community is recorded making phoros payments on at least one. Scholars nevertheless often isolate Miletus and Erythrae for special scrutiny.12


12. Colophon is a third polis subject to Athenian regulations, which probably date to a later period; see below “Chaffing at the Athenian Bit.”
Milesians from Leros and Teichoussa both appear apart from Miletus proper in 454/3, inscribed among the very last entries on the inaugural list. Similarly, Boutheia on the Mimas peninsula made a payment independent of Erythrae in 453/2 but was grouped with the rest of the Erythraean syntely in the 440s. What should be made of these contradictions?

Miletus and Erythrae were both subject to Athenian regulatory decrees, so the orthodox interpretation links these inconsistencies in the 450s to the Athenian impositions. I follow a later chronology for these regulatory decrees, but it is nevertheless appropriate to review them here in brief. Although the two decrees conform to the unique contexts of the poleis in which they appear, they share a common structure. Both were meant to resolve social conflict in the respective citizen bodies, with one group having appealed to Athens for support and the other to Persia. From the Athenian perspective, much as John Hyland has recently argued for Persian policy, local stability was a means to an end because it ensured a steady flow of tribute. Losers in Ionian political conflicts appealed to Persia, and the resolving of these conflicts not only protected Athenian interests, but also supported the Athenian claim to leadership because the very existence of the Delian League in this early period was predicated on resisting Persia. Persian satraps regularly offered refuge to political exiles, but only in rare instances did they extend substantial military or financial support.

The problems regarding these decrees stem from the twin pillars that support the traditional chronology for Athenian intervention in Ionia. The first pillar is composed of letterforms. Both inscriptions contain the so-called three-barred sigma that was thought to have fallen out of use in Athenian inscriptions by c.450. The second is formed of lacunae and inconsistencies on the early tribute lists. Both arguments are porous. Scholarly opinion about letterforms has begun to shift, confirming Harold Mattingly’s old thesis that the three-barred sigma remained in use while, simultaneously, the lacunae in the early tribute lists have begun to be filled in. Thus, at the same time that the possibility of a

15. On the three-barred sigma debate see Rhodes, “Three-Bar Sigma Controversy,” 503–
later context for both decrees became fashionable, the validity of dating regulations based on the lacunae on the tribute lists was called into question. Most likely, decrees of this sort only became common after the Samian crisis of 440.16

If the regulations were not put in place in the 450s and the resistance to the phoros is not necessarily supported by the tribute lists, then it is necessary to reconsider the Ionian responses to the development of the Athenian empire. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ionian poleis were unstable even without the Athenian decrees. Earlier inscriptions from the region record imprecations against individuals and families that threatened domestic harmony (e.g., RO 123 = Milet I.6, no. 187),17 but these were local inscriptions addressing local problems. Further, the records of Athenian phoros collection in Ionia changed shape, and while Erythrae and Miletus are unique in that the lists continue link the satellites in connection to the polis, they are not the only instances where communities that had previously paid along with a larger neighbor began to do so on their own.18 By 443/2, for instance, the Ephesian aparche fell from 750 drachmae to 600, while Pygela and Isinda, both former dependents of Ephesus, appear on the Athenian Tribute Lists for the first time, with a combined phoros slightly less than the difference in the Ephesian levels.19 This change inaugurated a period of nearly two centuries during which Ephesus tried to regain control over Pygela and the Pygelans appealed to Miletus and local dynasts in order to remain independent. There were undoubtedly Ionians who approached Persia for support, but probably because they were on the losing side of local power struggles rather than out of anti-Athenianism.

The consequences of the development of the Athenian empire were not immediately evident in Ionia and probably remained hidden though much of

4; Mattingly, “Epigraphically,” 284–85; Papazarkadas, “Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire,” 77. Reevaluating the dates does not require inscriptions with the three-barred sigma to be down-dated but opens a wider range of possible contexts. For the lacunae, see, e.g., Paarman, “Aparchai and Phoroi,” 125–37.

16. There are still strong grounds to date two comparable inscriptions relating to Euboea (IG I3 39 and SIG3 64) to the mid-440s; see Ostwald, “Athens and Chalkis,” 134–43.


19. Pygela’s aparche was one hundred drachmae and Isinda fourteen and four obols. Creating a larger number of payers in time resulted in higher tribute levels, but, since it did not make a significant financial impact in the short term, this was more likely an administrative response to local discontent.
the 440s even as resistance to Athenian hegemony cropped up in places like Euboea (Thuc. 1.114). In short, an Athenian alliance still served the purposes the ruling classes in Ionia. This situation would not last. A storm loomed on the horizon: the resumption of a regional conflict between Samos and Miletus that threatened to shatter the precarious balance in Ionia.

**Domestic Factionalism and the Specter of Persia**

Persian power continued to cast a long shadow over the eastern marches of the developing Athenian empire, and so it is necessary to examine the relationship between Ionia and the neighbors to the east before turning to the domestic conflicts. Despite the tradition that Athenian arms and diplomacy made it impossible for Persian forces to approach the Aegean littoral, satraps remained firmly installed at Sardis and Dascylium and in a position to meddle in Greek affairs. Xerxes never relinquished his claim to Ionia, leading Pierre Briant to argue that Artaxerxes I encouraged the satraps of western Asia Minor to test Athenian weakness and, if possible, to recover these revenues. Thus, scholars frequently interpret domestic friction in Ionia as the result of a pro-Persian fifth column.20

Anecdotal evidence such as Pissouthnes’ intervention on Samos supports this argument, but it is usually based on a structuralist interpretation of Ionian politics most fully articulated by Jack Balcer whereby each community consisted of two groups: the demos, or citizen body that both gravitated toward and was supported by Athens, and a landed aristocracy with an affinity for Persia.

These categories rely on intellectual pirouettes. First, there is an assumption that these categories were unified and determined geographically or ideologically, rather than both riven by their own rivalries and feuds and capable of finding common ground with their “natural” opponents. Here there is a tendency to interpret domestic politics primarily in terms of factionalism exploited by imperial politics. Regional competition over land and in matters of prestige plays a subordinate role in these interpretations even though it continued to play a critical role in the history of Ionia. Second, this paradigm implies that

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Athens supported democratic governments, while Persia sought to install oligarchies.\textsuperscript{21} Like the model of American foreign policy during the Cold War that inspired this interpretation, Athenian actions were more complex in practice. Despite the ancient testimony of Diodorus Siculus (12.27), there is no contemporary evidence for a formal Athenian policy of promoting democracy within its fifth-century empire.\textsuperscript{22} In Ionia, for instance, Chios in the fifth century never had a democratic constitution, and the anonymous “Old Oligarch” explicitly says that Athens threw its lot in with oligarchs at Miletus ([Xen.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 3.11). The primary case where a formal conflict between democrats and oligarchs is attested in the ancient evidence is on Samos in 411, when the demos enacted a bloody coup primarily because the leadership proposed to break with Athens (Thuc. 8.14), but years of increased inequality lay behind this democratic revolution (see Chapter 4, “Contempt for Athenian Hegemony”).

While the structuralist paradigm of Ionian politics needs to be abandoned, the specter of Persia remains central to understanding the political situation in Ionia. In every instance for which evidence exists, the intervening Persian satrap did so at the behest of a group in, or recently exiled from, an Ionian polis. The significance of Persia therefore lay in its potential to widen preexisting regional and domestic conflicts rather than in creating factions by suborning otherwise loyal citizens. Put another way, if regional conflict and the growth of Athenian power provided the kindling and fuel for a fire in Ionia, Persia could provide a spark.

\textbf{The War between Samos and Miletus}

One of the most brutal episodes in fifth-century Ionia began one night in the spring of 440. Under the cover of darkness, Thucydides says, exiles from Samos crossed back to the island with seven hundred mercenaries and staged an uprising with some popular support. With the backing of the Samian demos and aid from the Persian satrap Pissouthnes, the erstwhile exiles rescued their hostages then held on Lemnos (Thuc. 1.115.4–5; Diod. 12.27.3; Plut. 25.3). Both moves flouted Athenian hegemony; in short order, Athens and Samos were embroiled in a war that lasted for more than nine months.

\textsuperscript{21} Matthew Simonton, \textit{Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017) articulates the significance of “oligarchs” as a political category in classical Greece, but the idea that Persia universally supported them in Ionia is based on a flawed hypothesis of oligarchy’s “natural” opposition to Athens.

The seeds of this war were planted more than a year earlier. In 441, war broke out between Samos and Miletus, probably the resumption of a long-standing conflict over farmland near Priene on the Mycale peninsula.\(^{23}\) No details about this conflict survive, but it went poorly for the Milesians, who appealed to Athens for arbitration as hegemon of the Delian League. According to Thucydides, they were joined by private Samian citizens who wanted regime change (1.115.2). There was nothing untoward about the Milesian appeal or the Athenian decision to intervene according to Greek interstate norms, but there was, no doubt, gossip.

Pericles, the first man at Athens, had a notorious relationship with a Milesian woman, Aspasia. Poets referred to the relationship as developing out of love or lust such that Pericles was supposed to have kissed her affectionately when both leaving and arriving home (Plut. *Per.* 24.5–6), and Aspasia is adorned with slanders frequently given to women in the ancient world, including that she perverted men she was involved with, supplied Pericles with free women as prostitutes, and, eventually, became a new Helen.\(^{24}\) There was a practical explanation for the relationship, though. Aspasia’s sister was married to Alcibiades (the grandfather of the Peloponnesian War’s scandalous general and turncoat of the same name), so becoming involved with Aspasia was a way for Pericles to shore up political alliances.\(^{25}\) In 451/0, Pericles had enacted a citizenship law that granted full rights only to children with two citizen parents, meaning that although he could marry Aspasia, his own actions limited the options of their children.\(^{26}\) The Samians were probably not interested in the nuances of Athenian imperial policy, but the perils of Aspasia’s political connections remained a point of contention.

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23. The traditional reading of this conflict is that Samos and Miletus fought over control of Priene, but see Joshua P. Nudell, “The War between Miletus and Samos περὶ Πριήνης (Thuc. 1.115.2; Diod. 12.27.2; and Plut. ‘Per.’ 25.1.),” *CQ* 66, no. 2 (2016): 772–74.
26. Diodorus the Periegete, *BNJ* 372 F 40, refers to her Pericles’ γυνὴ (wife). On Aspasia’s posi-
nian citizenship laws, but, if Pericles were smitten with this Milesian woman, as people were no doubt saying (e.g., the jokes in Aristoph. *Acharn.* 525–34), then, surely, the arbitration would be biased against them (Diod. 12.27.1; Plut. *Per.* 25.1).

Blaming Aspasia is malicious libel. Not only was Plutarch’s source, the early third-century historian Duris of Samos, hardly a neutral commentator, but apparent partiality was just one of the underlying causes of the conflict. There had been a gradual change within the hierarchy of the Delian League that gave Athens ever more power. This evolution had not yet resulted in revolts in Ionia, but tensions were growing. Samos still had a fleet of at least fifty warships in 440 (Plut. *Per.* 25.3), which gave it both an advantage during its conflict with Miletus and a privileged place within the league. The Samians therefore rejected the Athenian offer to arbitrate the conflict; in so doing, they asserted their independence and challenged Athenian hegemony. There was just one problem: under Greek interstate norms, arbitration did not require the consent of the disputants. When the Samians spurned Athens, the conflict ceased to be between Samos and Miletus and became one that would shape the future direction of the Delian League.

In June or July 441, an Athenian fleet sailed to Samos and toppled the government that had rejected the arbitration, installing in its place a faction that had been looking for an opening to take power (Thuc. 1.115.2). The leading Samians surrendered hostages, whom the Athenians deposited on Lemnos. Lastly, among the measures to smother the inchoate resistance, the Athenians installed a garrison on the island (Thuc. 1.115.3–4; Diod. 12.27.1–3). As was common for political exiles in ancient Ionia, the deposed Samians fled to Persian territory, where they appealed to the satrap Pissouthnes for aid. There they plotted their return, which they accomplished about eight months later with the seven hundred mercenaries paid for by the satrap.

The Athenian policies designed to pacify Samos, including meddling in local politics and installing a garrison, probably did not have their intended effect. Thucydides notes that the exiles schemed with the most powerful people remaining in the polis and undermined any potential popular opposition

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28. Marathesium appears on the ATL for the first time in 442/1 (List 13, col. 1 l. 6), when the brewing conflict might have offered an opportunity for the Marathesioi to break away from Samos; see Jensen, “Rethinking Athenian Imperialism,” 205–7; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, 428.
to their plans. His terminology is vague, using a markedly oppositional word meaning “to raise an insurrection against” (ἐπανίστημι) for how they behaved toward the demos. It is clear from this word choice that Thucydides regarded the conspirators’ return as a revolution, but there is no evidence for the mechanism they used to enact the coup. The revolutionaries had some popular support and quickly overcame the Athenian garrison, turning them over to the care of Pissouthnes (Thuc. 1.115.5). Moreover, the rebels must have been confident in their position because they immediately prepared an expedition against Miletus, thus resuming the original conflict.

When news of the coup reached Athens, the Athenians immediately dispatched a fleet of sixty ships and the entire board of strategoi to the eastern Aegean.²⁹ Most of the ships in the first wave sailed directly to Samos, but some carried orders to other league states to muster for war, and others sailed south as a precaution against the possible arrival of a fleet from Phoenicia (Thuc. 1.116.1).³⁰ After defeating the Samians returning from Miletus off the island of Tragia, the Athenians disembarked on Samos and lay siege to the city. However, before reinforcements arrived, Pericles took most of the fleet south toward Caria, supposedly because of a rumor that the Phoenician fleet was approaching (Thuc. 1.116.3), but also to make a show of force that offered reassurances to the Milesians and other league members. With the bulk of the Athenian fleet gone, the Samian commander Melissus attacked the Athenian camp, destroying the guard ships and seizing control of the sea around the island for the two weeks until Pericles returned to close the siege and reinforcements from Athens, Chios, and Mytilene swelled the besieging fleet to as many as 239 ships (Diod. 12.28).³¹

The siege of Samos lasted for more than eight months and, despite a notable silence in Thucydides’ narrative, was bitterly fought. Both sides allegedly branded captured enemy soldiers, the Samians marking Athenians with an owl, and the Athenians using the Samaena, which perhaps caused Aristophanes to joke in Babylonians of 426 that they were a “lettered” people (Plut. Per. 26.3–4). However, as Vincent Azoulay has recently pointed out, the real significance lay


³⁰. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 23, questions the tradition that this fleet was meant to confront a Persian fleet, calling it a “token” force. The show of force was certainly directed at Athenian tributaries in southwest Anatolia.

³¹. For this calculation, see Bolmarcich, “Athenian Regulations for Samos,” 52.
in transforming captives into monetary symbols. Pericles is also reputed to have brought more siege engines to bear against Samos than had ever been used in Greek warfare (Diod. 12.28.3; Plut. Per. 27.3), and the Athenian supremacy on both land and sea made the surrender of Samos inevitable.

According to Duris of Samos, Pericles ordered the Samian trierarchs and epibatoi (marines) chained to planks in the Milesian agora after they surrendered. There, he says, they were exposed to the elements for ten days before Pericles ordered their heads destroyed with clubs and their bodies disposed of without burial rites (BNJ 76 F 67). Plutarch, whose biography of Pericles preserves the story, accuses Duris of embellishing the horrors suffered by the Samians and therefore dismisses its veracity (Plut. Per. 28.1–2), but he is being overly exculpatory to Pericles. Modern scholars tend to attribute this episode to an extension of the siege’s brutality, but the Milesian agora was an odd choice of venue if the display was meant as a warning for the Samians or as punishment for the atrocities during the war (Duris calls it a warning to the rest of the allies). More likely, this punishment was the conclusion of the regional conflict between Samos and Miletus. Almost nothing is known about the raid on Miletus, but the trierarchs were likely among its leaders and the epibatoi some of the mercenaries employed in the coup. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Pericles ordered the crucifixion, execution, and disposal of the bodies of these individuals for crimes committed in Miletus.

Samos retained its independence in the aftermath of the war, free of both phoros and garrison, but its challenge to Athenian hegemony was not without consequences. First, the Samian ringleaders were once more forced into exile and hostages were surrendered. The Samians were also forced to tear down their walls and give up their fleet (Thuc. 1.117.3; Diod. 12.28.3; Plut. Per. 28), as well as repay the Athenian war expenses, which totaled more than fourteen hundred talents, in annual installments of fifty talents (ML 55 = IG I$^3$ 363).

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32. Azoulay, Pericles, 58.
33. Armand D’Angour, Socrates in Love: The Making of a Philosopher (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 127, speculates that Melissus would have been among the executed Samians, but there is no evidence either way.
35. There are three sums recording cost of the war, which Fornara in Fornara and Lewis, “Chronology of the Samian War,” 12–14, argues corresponds to the three consecutive boards of treasurers responsible for the expedition, while Benjamin D. Meritt, “The Samian Revolt from Athens in 440–439 B.C.,” PAPhS 128, no. 2 (1984): 128–29, holds that the largest refers to the war
Finally, the Samian boule swore a loyalty oath to defend both its own demos and Athens (ML 56 = IG I3 48, l. 22), which set the precedent for the resolution of future conflicts in the Delian League.36

Samos had been one of the staunchest supporters of the league before 454, and it had held pride of place as one of three members outside Athens to retain its fleet when the rest of the league transitioned to providing phoros payments. In the absence of evidence for increasing discontent with Athenian hegemony, it is necessary to ask what changed. Samos had traditionally been one of the dominant poleis in the Aegean, and the tipping point was simply that the Samians called the Athenian bluff concerning its willingness to intervene in disputes between Delian League members. Thucydides’ brief narrative elides that Samos’ challenge posed a real threat that nearly broke Athenian hegemony. The war was not only a demonstration of Athenian will, but also of its ability to exert power over the league members.37 After 439, Samos fell into an anomalous position, no longer a naval power, but also explicitly paying reparations to Athens rather than a phoros to the Delian League. Despite the lingering resentment toward Athens that some Samians must have harbored on account of the financial demands, time heals most wounds, and Samos would become Athens’ staunchest ally again before the end of the Peloponnesian War. Those Samians who refused to surrender took refuge at Anaia in the Samian peraea.

A Horse Not in Need of a Whip: Chios and Athens

Chios had also held a special position within the Delian League after 454. Like Samos, it was wealthy because of its strategic position astride maritime trade routes and was therefore able to maintain a fleet of warships. Once Samos sur-


37. This is one of the strongest points of evidence in favor of Hyland’s revisionist argument that Persian satraps were under orders not to interfere in the Aegean. Pissouthnes supported the Samian exiles in their domestic conflict but stopped short of giving them aid against Athens.
rendered in 439, Chios alone among the Ionian poleis continued to provide ships to the Delian League. But did the Chians watch the resolution of the war around Samos with trepidation? Looking back from the twenty-first century, it is hard to imagine that they did not recognize the metastasis of Athenian imperialism as it was happening, but money is a powerful drug. Pottery shards from amphorae demonstrate the extent of the Chian commercial reach, including in the Athenian Agora and the Black Sea, and Chian merchants were deeply involved in the slave trade, particularly from the Caucasus.38 Chios profited from Athenian campaigns, not only through its share of the booty, but also by victualling the forces on league expeditions.

Chian ships joined the Athenian blockade, and its merchants likely provided supplies to the besiegers (Diod. 12.27.4). Anecdotes from the siege, such as the Athenian proxenos at Chios, Hermisilaus, hosting a dinner party attended by Sophocles and Ion of Chios (Ion, BNJ 392 T 5b, F 6), suggest that personal, as well as economic, relationships caused the Chians to turn a blind eye to Athens crushing resistance to its hegemony. Certainly, the power of personal relationships should not be dismissed, but Thucydides suggests an alternate explanation. In an encomium of Chios in 411, he says that it was the only community other than Sparta that grew more stable as it grew larger and attributes this situation to its reluctance to act rashly (8.24.4). This combination of internal stability and caution was probably equally important in the lack of resistance to the expansion of Athenian hegemony since Athens never had cause to intervene in its domestic affairs the way that it did on Samos.

It is possible that the progression of Athenian imperialism was evident to people on Chios after the war on Samos made clear the limits of allied autonomy, but this does not necessarily mean that they would have launched their

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own challenge. In fact, there is no evidence of growing concern on Chios. Commerce continued between the two poleis and intellectuals such as the playwright Ion and the mathematician Hippocrates frequented Athens, attending and giving lectures and, in the case of Ion, winning dramatic competitions (Ion, BNJ 392 T 1, 2).39 Chian forces also continued to accompany Athenian military expeditions (e.g., Thuc. 2.56.2, 4.129.2, 5.85, 7.57.3). From an Athenian perspective Chios was the perfect subject, such that in 422 the Athenian comic poet Eupolis quipped that Chios was like a horse that did not require a whip because it obediently provided ships and men whenever needed (Poleis, F. 232).40

Chaffing at the Athenian Bit

Signs of stasis began to appear with increasing regularity throughout Ionia starting in the 430s. The first incident was at Erythrae. An Athenian regulatory decree c.434 installed an Athenian-style democracy with a council approved by the Athenian phrourarchos (garrison commander, RO 121 = IG I3 14, l.13–14).41 Another decree addressed the issue of exiles, specifying a group that had taken refuge with Persia and requiring Erythrae to seek Athenian approval before any new expulsions or restorations (RO 122 = I.Ery. 2, l. 27). These decrees conjure the specter of Persia along with the mention of exiles, so the conflict that Athens intervened in is often interpreted as being between Athenian loyalists and a faction that intended to turn Erythrae over to the Persians. Thus, the standard line goes, the Athenian garrison was intended to “protect Erythrai from mediz-


ers,” even while acknowledging that it was part of a broader policy of protecting Athenian imperial interests.42

Before examining the local conditions at Erythrae in more detail, it is necessary to question the usual characterization of conflicts of this type as a direct outgrowth of a cold war between Athens and Persia.43 The inscription erected at Erythrae invites a reading of a conflict stirred up by meddlesome Persians and a handful of malcontents, but there is reason to be skeptical. It was in the Athenian interest to exonerate most of the population, blaming the people who had already gone into exile, and implying that the current impositions were protection against barbarians and tyrants. The display was itself a piece of rhetoric. The exiles had taken refuge with Persia, and it is an easy leap to paint them as patsies working to undermine Greek freedom by inviting in the Persians, which thereby justified the Athenian intervention. And yet, Persia was a common destination for Greek (including Athenian!) political refugees banned from the Delian League, and Persian territory was just a few kilometers from Erythrae. It is therefore natural to have expected the Erythraean exiles to decamp for Persia in 434 without their actions necessarily having been motivated by either gold or Persian sympathies.

What, then, do these decrees indicate about the local political situation in Erythrae? First, the provisions concerning government were designed to circumvent several local problems at once. The Athenian-style democracy would in theory make it more difficult for a few individuals to seize power, while the phourarchos’ power to vet the incoming council provided Athens a measure of control over prospective legislation. This new arrangement, combined with the provision concerning exiles, also gave the phourarchos authority to mediate local disputes. Despite the benevolent veneer of the decree, the combination of restrictions and garrison indicates that the crisis at Erythrae went beyond just a group of malignant medizers and extended into the population at large.

Panning back from Erythrae reveals a similar pattern throughout Ionia. In 430, a faction in Colophon called for and received aid from Persia, forcing their rivals to flee to the port of Notium (Thuc. 3.34.1). There, the refugees again split into factions, with the Persian satrap Pissouthnes sending merce-

42. Meiggs and Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions, 92; cf. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 579, 581; Rhodes, “Delian League,” 56–57. Curiously, the medizing faction is typically described as "small."

43. Samuel K. Eddy, “The Cold War between Athens and Persia, ca. 448–412 B.C.,” CPh 68, no. 4 (1973): 241–58, draws the parallel between his modern setting and the ancient world, but the basic relationship is implicitly accepted elsewhere. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 24, rightly critiques Eddy as mistaking “sporadic episodes for an overarching strategy.” I agree with Hyland that the decree does not record active Persian involvement.
naries to support one side. Once the conflict broke out in Colophon, Pissouthnes took advantage of the schism, but Thucydides gives no indication that he had actively been working to cause the conflict. With their backs to the wall, the other faction appealed to the Athenian admiral Paches, who detained the mercenary commander during a parley and immediately attacked and defeated the Persian force (Thuc. 3.34.2–3). Paches restored the exiled Colophonians and established them in a new settlement at Notium with other refugees from around the Aegean (ML 47 = IG I 3 37; Thuc. 3.34.4). In 427, there were thus two Colophons, one in Notium and one in the original astu, because this was the most expedient solution for Athens to resolve a deep rift in the Colophonian citizen body.

Another regulatory decree appears on an inscription from Miletus, probably from 426/5 (IG I 3 22). As at Erythrae, the Athenians installed a garrison and restrictions on the Milesian political and legal systems (ll. 28–51), as well as installing five archons (officers), one for each of the five natural divisions of the Milesian territory. Other than the number of archons, which was probably no more significant than a practical consideration in terms of the Milesian civic structure, the most notable difference was that the Milesian officials swore to uphold the decree, rather than swearing an oath of loyalty to Athens. This is a significant change, but one that even more strongly reflects the need to resolve a bitter internal conflict, rather than to quell a nascent revolt.

Domestic conflicts in Ionia did not exist in isolation, and imperial competition over Ionia exacerbated the conflicts because factions could exploit the imperial actors for local ends. These conflicts became deep-seated in time, but they should not be taken to reflect a political preference on the part of the community. Looking at the Athenian regulations in Ionia as an outgrowth of local conflict moreover avoids the trap where every local development is a reaction to specific imperial actions in Athens. The signs of unrest extended even to Chios, but before turning to these, it is necessary examine the only incident where fighting from the Archidamian War spilled across the Aegean into Ionia.

In 427, a Peloponnesian fleet under the command of the Spartan Alcidas crossed the Aegean to support Mytilene, which had revolted from Athenian leadership. According to Thucydides, the Peloponnesians did not sail with

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44. As with the other regulatory decrees for Ionia, the date of this inscription is debated. It is frequently dated as part of a series in the 440s, but see Papazarkadas, “Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire,” for the connection to Thucydides.


46. For the importance of these Milesian districts, see Robertson, “Government and Society at Miletus,” 356–98.
enough urgency and arrived in Asia Minor unaware that Mytilene had fallen about a week earlier. The fleet thus put in at Embata in Erythrae to debate a course of action. An Elean named Teutiaplus proposed an attack, anyway, claiming the Athenians could be taken unawares (Thuc. 3.30). Alcidas was unimpressed, and Ionian exiles and Lesbians who had joined the expedition urged him instead to capture a city in Ionia or Cyme just into Aeolis to use as a base to incite revolution throughout the region. The exiles reassured Alcidas that the Ionians would welcome Spartan intervention and that their plan was prudent because they could induce Pissouthnes to support them and it would deprive Athens of a significant part of its revenue (πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην, Thuc. 3.31.1).47

Alcidas was ultimately not persuaded, but the proposal is revealing about the circumstances in Ionia in 427. First, this war council took place at a town in Ionian territory, which is clear indication that the capture of outlying settlements was well within the capacity of the fleet. Second, the proposal was made by unnamed and unprovenanced Ionian exiles. Thucydides does not indicate when they joined Alcidas, but the fact that among them were Lesbians and the ostensible aim of the expedition was to relieve the siege of Mytilene, it is reasonable to assume that they had accompanied it from the Peloponnesus and thus had a voice in the deliberations. Third, the basic structure of the plan, from using an Ionian polis as a Spartan base to appealing to the Persian satrap to envisioning widespread popular support for revolution is identical to the outcome fifteen years later during the Ionian War (see Chapter 4). While it cannot be ruled out that Thucydides meant this debate to foreshadow the later revolt, it still invites the question whether it is an accurate assessment of Ionian popular opinion.

The exiles were overly optimistic in more than one respect. There is no indication that, when news spread that a Peloponnesian fleet was in the Erythraeid, any other Ionians approached Alcidas. On the contrary, Thucydides says that the Ionians reacted with fear and immediately sent messengers to Paches and the Athenian fleet (3.33.2). It was ultimately continuous intervention on the parts of Tissaphernes and Cyrus the Younger during the Ionian War that pried Ionia away from Athens. The exiles also misjudged Pissouthnes, who received support from Athenian mercenaries when he went into revolt soon after Artaxerxes’ death in 424 (Ctesias, F 52).48

47. Examination of the Athenian Tribute Lists does not support their boast. The Ionian-Carian district was one of the poorest. 48. On Pissouthnes’ revolt, see Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 591; D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 80–81; Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 349; Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and James Robson, Ctesias’ History of Persia: Tales of the Orient (Routledge: New York, 2009), 194–95.
But if Pissouthnes was no Cyrus, neither was Alcidas Lysander. With Mitylene fallen, Alcidas decided to return to the Peloponnese. Thucydides preserves a compressed sketch of Alcidas’ voyage, but it began with a tour of Ionia. Setting out from Embata, the Spartan fleet sailed south along the shore to the Teian town of Myonnesus. During the expedition, Alcidas’ fleet had been conducting piratical raids on Chios and other Ionian communities. Mistaking the Peloponnesian vessels for Athenians, the Ionians had come up to the ships and been captured (Thuc. 3.32.3). At Myonnesus, Alcidas ordered most of these prisoners executed. Continuing southward, Alcidas put in at Ephesus, where he received envoys from the Samian exiles at Aneae who rebuked him for executing the prisoners, saying that they were Athenian allies under coercion and that his current actions were turning potential friends into enemies (Thuc. 3.32.2). After releasing the remaining prisoners, probably in return for ransoms, Alcidas’ fleet beat a hasty retreat from Ephesus.

So ended the only Spartan expedition to Ionia during the Archidamian War, but local conflict continued. According to Thucydides, one of the factors working in Alcidas’ favor in 427 was that Ionia was unfortified (3.33.2). The lack of defensive walls is clearly explained in some instances, such as on Samos, where they were destroyed as part of the resolution to the war in 440/39. In others, the information is sketchier. It is possible that the Ionian communities were without walls because of because of imperial mandate, either by Persia or Athens. Indeed, a fragment from the lost comic poet Telecleides chides the Athenians for giving Pericles power over the walls of their subjects (Plut. Per. 16.2), and other evidence indicates that Athens intervened when local conditions threatened its interests, including at Chios in 427 (Thuc. 4.51). Little is known about this local conflict, but a fragmentary inscription from Athens dated to 425/4 honors Philippus and Ach[illes], two Chians plausibly from the poet Ion’s family who preserved the pisteis between Chios and Athens. 


Ionian poleis may have been unfortified because they were decentralized and walls were expensive to build, rather than by imperial fiat.

Alcidas’ meeting with Ionian emissaries at Ephesus in 427 also poses a riddle. There is no direct evidence for the political leanings of fifth-century Ephesus before 411, but indirect evidence leads to several divergent interpretations. On the one hand, the tribute lists indicate a stable record of phoros payments, and no evidence suggests that Ephesus was subject to special regulations or a garrison. On the other hand, Ephesus stood apart from the Ionian revolt, even slaughtering Chian survivors after the battle of Lade (Hdt. 6.16; see Chapter 1). There was no such thing as a “purely” Greek culture anywhere in the eastern Aegean, least of all in Ionia, but acculturation was particularly pronounced at Ephesus. These processes are epitomized by the Persianization of the cult of Artemis, where the priest took on the title “Megabyxos” (Xen. Anab. 5.3.6), Persian items appeared among the dedicatory offerings, and friezes show figures in Persian garb participating in the rituals. What should be made of this disparate evidence? Was Ephesus a quiescent subject or a hotbed of anti-Athenian medism?

The answer is, of course, both—and neither. Ephesus was a natural port for Sardis and therefore had deep, long-standing ties the Lydian capital. Moreover, after Cyrus II annexed Lydia in the mid-sixth century, Ephesus became integrated into the Persian royal road system (Hdt. 5.54; Strabo 1.6). The fame of the

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53. Other ports in the region, including Cyme and Smyrna, also had close ties to Sardis, but Ephesus may have served as the harbor for Croesus’ fleet (Hdt. 1.27; Diod. 9.25.1–2; Friederike Stock et al., “The Palaeogeographies of Ephesos [Turkey], Its Harbours, and the Artemision: A Gearchaeological Reconstruction for the Timespan 1500–300 BC,” Zeitschrift für Geomorphologie 98, no. 2 [2014]: 33–66). Croesus lavished dedications on the Artemision (see Chapter 9), and the sanctuary shows numerous votives of Lydian make; see Michael Kerschner, “Die Lyder und das Artemision von Ephesos,” in Die Archäologie der ephischen Artemis: Gestalt und Ritual eines Heiligtums, ed. Ulrike Muss (Vienna: Phoibos, 2008), 223–33; Sabine Ladstätter, “Ephesus,” in Spear Won Land: Sardis from the King’s Peace to the Peace of Apamea, ed. Andrea M. Berlin and Paul J. Kosmin (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), 191–92. For the identification of the Ephesian harbors and the evolution of the coastline, see Stock et al., “Palaeogeographies of Ephesos.”

sanctuary of Artemis, which had prominent Anatolian features despite its Greek name, made it a natural magnet for dedications from prominent Persians. Processes of acculturation and religious propaganda, however visible at Ephesus, are not synonymous with political sympathies. Where local conflicts drove factions in most other Ionian poleis to appeal to Persia for support, there is no indication that the same happened at Ephesus. The significance given to the acculturation of the Ionian poleis emerged from the later historiographical record that created an east-west cultural binary that defined Greeks in opposition to the barbarian Persians. Only after years of war and increasing financial demands when all of Ionia was ripe for revolt did Ephesus reject Athenian hegemony.

### Ionians and the Peloponnesian War

Excepting only Alcidas’ expedition in 427, Ionia was spared the direct effects of the Archidamian War. Nevertheless, the years of conflict between Athens and Sparta affected the region in two ways.

The first was economic. War likely led to an uptick in piracy in the Aegean, at least with expeditions like that of Alcidas, which, in turn, had an immeasurable, but certainly deleterious effect on Ionian commerce. The same can be said about the relationship between Ionian trade and the Greek states in European Greece. The war would have restricted commercial opportunities with, for instance, Corinth, but there is no balance sheet recording the actual change. Further, the effects of the war on Ionian commerce were not constant. Not only did Ionian merchants continue to ply the sea-lanes, fulfilling both military and civilian demands for goods irrespective of the war, but also the Peloponnesian War was in fact a series of interconnected conflicts punctuated by truces, so the interruption of trade was neither constant nor complete.

Somewhat more detail is known about the evolution of the Athenian impe-
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Every four years since 454 Athenian officials had conducted a new assessment that revised the levels of phoros due for the next period. During the Archidamian War, however, the new assessments came more frequently and at irregular intervals. The most infamous of these assessments was the ninth (A9), conducted in 425/4. The changes in the ninth assessment have traditionally been attributed to the malice of Cleon, who used it as an opportunity to double or even treble the imperial revenue because the war fund had been depleted (ML 69 = IG I3 71).

Benjamin Meritt and Allen West, two of the original editors of the Athenian Tribute Lists, believed that the sum of tribute payments on A9 could be reconstructed as either 960[---] or 1460[---] talents based on a lost first digit, which is either five hundred or one thousand. (The reconstructed inscription is also missing the final three digits of the total.) The inscription recording this assessment is lacunate, and many of the figures, including all of those from Ionia, are lost, but the surviving amounts regularly reveal a substantial uptick in phoros obligations. The ATL editors took the increased obligations in places such as Thrace as confirmation of the larger sum and inferred exorbitant increases in the assessed phoros in Ionia, some as high as fifty talents. They nevertheless conceded that the Athenian income from tribute payments never exceeded about one thousand talents, so either the system was wildly inefficient or, more likely, support for the larger figure is misplaced. The ninth assessment did constitute a substantial overhaul of tribute levels, but, as Lisa Kallet has recently demonstrated, this did not mean an across-the-board increase. Moreover, there is no evidence, either in surviving phoros payments in the years after 425 or in the form of new unrest, for particularly onerous obligations in Ionia. This is not to say that this assessment did not increase the Ionian phoros obligations. Most likely, the overall assessment was close to 960 talents, and Ionian obligations remained at or near their historical maximum levels.

It is tempting to see the assessment of 425 as the cause of the Milesian revolt against Athens described above. The problem with this interpretation is the chronology. The regulatory decree is dated 426/5 based on the archon in whose

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59. Meritt and West, Athenian Assessment, 89.
61. The exception to this general trend did not appear until 415/4 when Clazomenae’s payment was a staggering fifteen talents (EM 6653), before dropping to a more typical five and a third talents the next year.
term it was enacted, while the assessment was in 425/4. The two periods overlap, but face in different directions. Where the assessment took place in 425/4, the regulatory decree in 426/5 records the resolution of a conflict that had been going on before that year. The two decrees therefore took place consecutively and were not connected. With this explanation eliminated, it opens the door again for the regulatory decree to be considered in light of chronic factional conflict that plagued fifth-century Miletus. The Ionians almost certainly availed themselves of the special appeals court created in the decree since, as still holds true when it comes to taxes, there were great financial rewards to crying poverty in the fifth century BCE, but there is no reason to interpret local stasis as anti-Athenianism in the wake of a cruel assessment.

Although the assessment of 425 did not lead to substantial changes in Ionia, two other wartime measures did. The first, the so-called Standards Decree (ML 45 = IG I3 1453), is traditionally dated to the mid-440s as part of the tightening imperial regulations, but recent scholarship has revised this date to either the mid-420s or, more likely, c.415/4.62 While the revisionist argument began on the basis of the character of Athenian leaders, namely to exonerate Pericles and pin the blame on the “bloody-minded” Cleon,63 there is nevertheless good reason to read the decree as wartime financial expediency. The Standards Decree itself is a misnomer in that it was a body of regulatory decrees concerning economic activity and erected on stelae in markets throughout the Delian League.64 These

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63. Loren J. Samons II, “Periklean Imperialism and Imperial Finance in Context,” in Hegemonic Finances: Funding Athenian Domination in the 5th and 4th Centuries BC, ed. Thomas J. Figueira and Sean R. Jensen (London: Bloomsbury 2019), 14, has recently pointed out the weakness of this premise, declaring that “the imperialists were the Athenians themselves.” He argues that Pericles was only moderate in contrast to the normal extremes.

64. There are no extant copies of the inscription from Ionia, but the district is mentioned specifically (ll. 25–26), so the decree took effect there. For epigraphical reconstructions of the decree, see Thomas J. Figueira, The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 319–423; for a synopsis of debates, see David M.
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decrees had two primary effects. First, they mandated that all economic activity in Delian League markets had to use Attic weights and measures and, second, they required that allied coins used in tribute payments be reminted into Athenian Owls, the famous silver tetradrachmae. The decrees likewise installed procedures for carrying out the new regulations and penalties for infractions.

The fundamental question is how much of an imposition these policies were on the Athenian allies. The Ionian poleis had produced some of the earliest Greek coinage, but they had an inconsistent record of minting coins in silver, electrum, and perhaps smaller denominations in the fifth century. The comparatively rich evidence from Chios reveals an unexpected pattern. Starting in the mid-fifth century, Chian mints abandoned the production of staters in favor of tetradrachmae marked with a Chian amphora, but on their own standard. Then there was a transition in the 430s in the amphorae type produced on Chios that brought the amphora into closer alignment with Attic measures, and the iconographic representation on coins follows suit. The pattern, then, is that Chios made a spasmodic and irregular transition toward Attic measures and denominations over the course of the second half of the fifth century, but never completed the process.


The Athenian regulations therefore likely formalized the de facto situation in Ionia where the weights and measures had come into alignment with the Attic standard over the course of the fifth century and Athenian Owls had largely supplanted local issues. Coins of many denominations continued to circulate in the Aegean, and the economic standards had changed already before the enactment of these decrees, but the regulations were nonetheless regarded as ham-handed imperialism. It was in this context that Aristophanes in *Birds* of 414 lampoons the Standards Decree by having a decree-peddler demand that the citizens of Cloudcuckooland use the same measures, weights, and decrees as the Olophyxians (1040–41). The economic effect of the Standards Decree on Ionia is difficult to measure, particularly if, as I have suggested, it was not as onerous as is frequently assumed, but it nevertheless needs to be interpreted as a factor contributing to Ionian frustration with Athenian hegemony by the time of the Sicilian Expedition in 415.

The second wartime change was the replacement of the *phoros* with a 5 percent harbor tax in 413 (Thuc. 7.28.4). The change replaced an indirect levy on the communities with direct taxation on merchants, but, more importantly, was designed to raise revenue for the war. In short, the symbolic capital in which the allies acknowledged Athenian hegemony through tribute became less important than the money direct taxation could bring. Arable land and natural resources had probably constituted the largest part of the previous assessment, so the transition to taxation based on commercial activity that affected all harbors in the league, including Chios and Samos, significantly increased the imperial burden on Ionia and was likely a contributing factor in the outbreak of the Ionian War in 411.

The Peloponnesian War also affected Ionia more directly: while Thucydides focuses on the triumphs and tragedies of Athens, Ionians fought. Milesians went on the Athenian expeditions to Corinth and Cythera in 425 (Thuc. 4.42, 4.54); Chians accompanied the invasion of the Argolid in 429 (Thuc. 2.56.2), helped Nicias subdue Mende and Scione in 423 (Thuc. 4.129.2), and aided in the capture of Melos in 416 (Thuc. 5.84.1); and Chians, Samians, and Milesians contributed to the invasion of Sicily in 415 (Thuc. 6.31.2; 7.20.2; 7.57.3). The Athenians may have been true from the Persian perspective, but there is nothing to indicate that the Athenians took this symbolism into consideration. Gorman, *Miletos*, 236–37, argues that the tax was in addition to the *phoros*; cf. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 3, 594–95.

67. Kallet, *Money and Power*, 195–226. Hyland, *Persian Interventions*, 45–46 describes the change in Athenian economic policy as symbolically giving up the *phoros* collection that had been granted by the Persian king. This may have been true from the Persian perspective, but there is nothing to indicate that the Athenians took this symbolism into consideration. Gorman, *Miletos*, 236–37, argues that the tax was in addition to the *phoros*; cf. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 3, 594–95.

68. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 3, 226–28, argues that the Ionians happily participated in expeditions like the one to Melos to coerce Doriens, but there is little evidence for ethnolinguistic tribalism during the Peloponnesian War outside of the written histories.
nian soldiers and sailors made up the bulk of the fighting forces, and Athenian commanders may not have trusted Ionian soldiers since, at least in the battle at Cythera, they played no role in the fighting, but their repeated appearance as well as the size of the contingents (two thousand Milesian hoplites at Cythera) indicates a substantial contribution to the Athenian war effort. Moreover, the Ionian casualties, particularly in the expedition to Sicily, likely contributed to growing anti-Athenian sentiment. Too, Athenian honorific decrees testify to the presence of Ionians who collaborated with the Athenian imperial state, such as Apollonophanes of Colophon, who was rewarded for his aid of Athenian troops in 427 (IG I3 65), and Heracleides of Clazomenae, who received honors for his cooperation with an embassy to the king of Persia in perhaps 423 (RO 157 = IG I3 227). However, even before the disaster in Sicily, Pisistratus in Aristophanes’ *Birds* (414) quips that he likes the custom of always adding Chios to things (Χίοισιν ἥσθην πανταχοῦ προσκειμένοις, 879–80). It is possible that these lines were a polite echo of Eupolis’ commentary about the nature of the alliance, but that is not the way of Attic comedy. More likely, they were a dark joke referring to the scarcity of Athenian allies and therefore to actions that marked Chios as unique. Aristophanes was not celebrating Chios’ special relationship but poking at a grim situation. The Athenians in 414 were concerned that the Chians, and by extension the other Ionians, were not so well trained.

The relationship between the Ionian poleis and the Athenian empire in the second half of the fifth century swung between extremes. It was here that the greatest threats to Athenian hegemony emerged, but also where Athens often found collaborators for its imperial project who saw opportunities for profit and power. The Sicilian Expedition marked the end of Athenian hegemony over Ionia, but these were also the last years of the fifth century when Ionia itself was largely untouched by war. What is more, the long-simmering stasis in Ionia only grew more pronounced as the Athenian grip weakened.

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70. These honors, which included making Heracleides *proxenos*, likely made it a target of the Thirty. It survives in a copy made after the restoration of the democracy.
Athenian control over Ionia crumbled close on the heels of the disaster in Sicily. Diodorus Siculus connects the two developments, saying that the failure created contempt for Athenian hegemony (τὴν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτῶν καταφρονηθῆναι, 13.34.1). However, the unraveling of Athenian power had multiple causes. While Diodorus intimates that the Chians, Samians, Byzantines and others had a nearly primal sense of Athenian weakness, the defeat in Sicily had also sacrificed their men and ships for what is presented in our sources as Athenian ambition. At the same time, Athens increased the financial burden on the league through the imposition of the harbor tax, which, John Hyland has recently argued, led to a change in Persian imperial policy to reclaim the tribute from Ionia that had, at least tacitly, been granted to Athens.\(^1\)

These conditions seem to support Thucydides’ framing, that the Ionians were primed (ἑτοῖμοι) to reject Athenian hegemony when presented with the opportunity (8.2.2). Scholars have traditionally followed this interpretation, based both on the earlier challenges to Athenian rule and because we know the outcome: the Ionians did break away from Athens.\(^2\) The question is, what happened?

This chapter examines how Ionia became disentangled from Athenian

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hegemony only to be caught up in a convoluted snarl of rapidly changing power relationships in the eastern Aegean that continued until the King’s Peace brought them to a sudden halt in 386. The Ionian War also marked a change in how Ionia interacted with imperial powers. For the next quarter century the Ionian poleis oscillated between allegiances as the strength and interest of the competing powers waxed and waned, usually for reasons entirely separate from the machinations over Ionia. In this period, Ionia was a setting for military campaigns designed to reclaim the Ionians as subjects or that used the region as a beachhead to reach another enemy, and ambitious men set their sights on the Ionian cities, once again making the region a cornerstone of the Aegean system.

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In 412, an embassy arrived in Sparta (Thuc. 8.5.4). The ambassadors included representatives of the Persian satrap Tissaphernes and conspirators from Chios and Erythrae. In a reprise of the start of the Ionian revolt of 499 (Hdt. 5.39–41, 49–51), these Ionians intended to draw the Spartans into a war in Asia Minor, but, bypassing the king Agis at Decelea, they went directly to Sparta. Once there, though, they discovered that the real challenge was not inciting the Spartans to action but persuading them to sail to Ionia. At about the same time, Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus had come to Sparta on behalf of Pharnabazus, another Persian satrap (Thuc. 8.6.1).

The two embassies made the same argument: support the liberation of the eastern Aegean and join with Persia because it will cripple Athens. The criti-
cal difference was the destination of the campaign, the Hellespont or Ionia. Choosing Pharnabazus and the Hellespontine Greeks would have severed the Athenian lifeline, the trade route that brought grain from the Black Sea, and Pharnabazus’ emissaries brought with them a sweetener of twenty-five talents (Thuc. 8.8.1). A campaign in Ionia did not offer such immediate rewards. The Chians, however, talked up the strength of their fleet in order to demonstrate their importance to the Athenian war effort. The Spartans were still skeptical, according to Thucydides, but the Ionians had the support of Alcibiades and, through him, the ephor Endius (8.6.3; 8.12). Rather than rushing into action, the Spartans discreetly dispatched Phrynis, a perioikos, to reconnoiter and discover whether the Chians were exaggerating their strength (Thuc. 8.6.4). Satisfied with the report in the summer of 412, the Spartans agreed to send Chalcideus in command of a fleet and with Alcibiades in tow.

Haste was of the utmost importance, despite the delay. The Chians had traveled in secret, and every additional day increased the risk of discovery. The expedition, however, required conveying ships across the isthmus of Corinth, which would have required the Corinthians to violate the Isthmian truce, and they simply refused. It was during this final delay, when their representatives to the Isthmian games saw preparations for an expedition (Thuc. 8.10.1), that the Athenians became suspicious (Thuc. 8.9.2). They sent the general Aristagoras to Chios with accusations of treachery. Most of the Chians had no knowledge of the plot, and the conspirators, whom Thucydides describes as the few in the know (οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες), were unwilling to act without Spartan support, so they roundly denied the accusations and agreed to send seven ships to join the Athenian fleet as a demonstration of good faith (8.9.2–3).

Their initial efforts were thwarted by Athenian blockades, but the Spartans persisted, and the fleet eventually arrived in Ionia. At the behest of the Chian conspirators, they sailed directly into the town of Chios, where the council was in session. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, Thucydides says, gave speeches to the assembled Chians and, with the promise of more Peloponnesian ships on the way, persuaded them to revolt from Athens before doing the same in Erythrae and Clazomenae (Thuc. 8.14.2–4). The revolutions in Ionia unfolded quickly, but this is not necessarily a sign of popularity. The Spartans remained suspicious of the Chian resolve, and probably for good reason since the rebellion had been carried out through a conspiracy that circumvented any popular opposition. Since the Chians were also more experienced sailors than his Pelopon-

6. On the debate at Sparta, see Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 774–76.
nesians, Chalcideus elected to kill two birds with one stone by forcing the Chians to man his ships while arming his Peloponnesians and leaving them behind on the island as a garrison (8.17.2).

The Athenians responded swiftly by recalling the seven Chian ships, arresting the free crews on the charge of being involved in the conspiracy, and emancipating the enslaved rowers (Thuc. 8.15.2). The Athenians then authorized up to forty-nine warships to be sent to Ionia in the hopes of turning public opinion again before the dominoes all fell.

What followed was a period of moves and countermoves during which Ionia was up for grabs. The first Athenian squadron, eight ships under the command of Strombichides, arrived at Samos and tried to interrupt the cascade by sailing on to Teos (8.16.1). Their arrival, Thucydides says, at first had the intended effect on the Teians, who closed their gates against the Erythraeans and Clazomenaeans who had arrived by land (8.16.1). When Chalcideus arrived from Chios with his twenty-three ships, Strombichides put to sea and was chased back toward Samos. Deprived of Athenian support, Teos capitulated and the Erythraeans, Clazomenaeans, and mercenaries in Tissaphernes’ pay began to dismantle the walls (Thuc. 8.16.3). Chalcideus and Alcibiades sailed next from Chios to Miletus, their fleet reinforced with twenty ships from Chios, arriving just ahead of two Athenian squadrons under Strombichides and Thrasyycles (Thuc. 8.17.2–3). Alcibiades had a family connection to influential Milesians and therefore believed that he would be able to induce a revolt and thereby claim credit for winning the war (Thuc. 8.17.1).8 Failing to intercept the Peloponnesians, the Athenians established a blockade of Miletus from the island of Lade until reinforced by thirty-five hundred additional troops under the command of three generals, Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides (Thuc. 8.17.3, 24.1).9 The subsequent battle between this Athenian force and combined forces of Miletus, Tissaphernes, and a handful of Peloponnesians ended in a draw, with Thucydides noting that each sides’ ethnic Ionians triumphed over the ethnic Dorians (8.25.5). Despite being prepared to besiege Miletus, the Athenian forces withdrew when a larger Peloponnesian fleet threatened to cut them off from their allies (8.27).10 Other Chian ships fomenting rebellion in

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10. Curiously, Thucydides says that the setbacks at Miletus so enraged the Argives who made
Ionia were less fortunate and took refuge in Ephesus and Teos when they ran into Athenian reinforcements.

But what did the Ionians think of this turn of events? It is a common position of modern historiography that the Ionians invariably turned away from Athens out of a desire to restore their liberty lost in the development of the Athenian empire. This position, however, fails to appreciate the complexities of the Ionian polities and the role of regional interactions. Thucydides’ narrative for the outbreak of the Ionian War makes it clear that the Ionians were anything but of one mind. At Chios, the people conspiring to use Sparta and Persia as counterweights to Athens were not doing so from exile, but as prominent members of the community who arranged for the boule to meet just when Endius and Alcibiades arrived (Thuc. 8.14.1–2). In Thucydides’ telling, moreover, the general population was hesitant to make a rash move, but also was not set against the idea. Most other Ionian poleis did not play as active a role, but between dissatisfaction with Athens and the threat of force from Sparta, Persia, and their fellow Ionians, the choice was easy. And yet the situation was not irreversible. At Erythrae, a particularly decentralized polis, Athenian vessels continued to use Sidoussa and Pteleum as bases from which to harass Chios (Thuc. 8.24.2). When the Athenian commander Diomedon arrived at Teos sometime after its walls were demolished, the citizens received him and offered to rejoin Athens (Thuc. 8.20.2). Similarly, when Athenian forces captured a fort at Polichna and forced the men who caused the revolt at Clazomenae to flee (τῶν αἰτίων τῆς ἀποστάσεως), the city reverted to Athens (Thuc. 8.23.6). In the end, almost every polis in Ionia left the Athenian orbit, but this brief survey reveals considerable reticence already in 411/0. Far from a popular uprising against tyrannical Athenian overreach, this was a rebellion that broke out in fits and starts, complicated by long-standing internal tensions and the threat of force.

The lone Ionian polis never to abandon Athens was Samos, which served as the primary Athenian outpost in the eastern Aegean for the remainder of the war. But neither was Samos exempted from the schisms erupting throughout the region. Diodorus includes Samos in the list of poleis that felt contempt at Athenian hegemony (13.34.1), and its leadership in 411 was suspected of plot-

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...ting with Sparta, as had happened in Chios. The result was a brutal coup. The demos took it upon itself to overthrow the men in power, summarily executing two hundred and sending another four hundred into exile after confiscating their property (Thuc. 8.21; cf. Xen. Hell. 2.2.6). Later in 411, the Samian demos with Athenian military aid defeated an attempted countercoup carried out by three hundred oligarchic conspirators, executing thirty more and banishing three ringleaders. When he heard about the factionalism on Samos, the Spartan navarch sensed an opportunity to appease discontents within his own ranks by making an assault on the island. He launched his entire fleet and instructed the Milesians to meet them on the Mycale promontory across from Samos, but a brief show of force from the Athenian fleet and reinforcements from the Hellespont prompted him to withdraw without offering battle (Thuc. 8.78–79).

Some modern scholars look at these events on Samos as a constitutional crisis between oligarchs and democrats, but it is reductive to treat it exclusively in these terms. The conflict as described by Thucydides was along class lines, with the poor strata of society overthrowing the ruling landowners and instituting new laws to deprive them of their position, which, in turn created new schisms within the Samian state (Thuc. 8.73). But equally important was the orientation of Samos toward Athens and Sparta. Since 439 and as late as 412, the authorities in Samos had been in step with Athens to maintain leverage against the exiles at Anaea. This situation had preserved a status quo for more than a quarter century, but as Athenian power in Ionia waned, the ruling class on Samos considered seeking Spartan support toward the same end. Unlike on Chios, where the presence of Spartan ships and the honeyed tongue of Alcibiades persuaded the citizen body to abandon Athens, popular sentiment on Samos, supported by three Athenian ships, ran the other way. The result was a


13. Ionia had a long history of endemic political conflict between those with land and those without it; see Alan M. Greaves, The Land of Ionia: Society and Economy in the Archaic Period (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 91–94; and Chapter 2 in this volume. Thucydides labels the targets of this purge as οἱ γεόμοροι and τῶν δυνατωτάτων. The γεόμοροι are often identified as the landed aristocracy on the suspect evidence of Plutarch’s Graec. Quest. 57; see Marcello Lupi, “Il duplice massacro dei ‘geomoroi,’” in Da Elea a Samo: Filosofi e politici di fronte all’impero ateniese, ed. Luisa Breglia and Marcello Lupi (Naples: Arte Tipografica Editrice, 2005), 259–86. Cf. the discussion in A. Andrewes, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 79, and Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 809. On regime breakdown and the development of this oligarchic faction, see Simonton, Oligarchy, 239–41.

14. Andrewes, Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 44–49.
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bloody purge that Thucydides says the Athenians took as a sign of loyalty. They legitimized the new leadership and sent the fleet to the island to ensure that it remained in the Athenian orbit.

The Spartan decision to precipitate a general uprising in Ionia paid off. The Chians, in particular, threw themselves into the Spartan venture, even sending an expedition of their own ships to Lesbos to incite a revolution there (Thuc. 8.22.1). The response was more muted, even tepid, elsewhere in Ionia, but neither was resistance stiff except on Samos, which remained an Athenian ally to the bitter end.

Battlefield Ionia

After the initial wave of revolutions in 411 and 410 Ionia became a battlefield. The conflict between Athens and Sparta took center stage in this development, but the situation was rarely that simple. Already in 412/1, Tissaphernes began to recover Persian suzerainty over Ionia by building and garrisoning a fort in Milesian territory, which may have been interpreted as a precursor to a regime change (Thuc. 8.84.4). Outraged, the Milesians drove the Persian forces out, to the acclaim of their Greek allies—except Sparta. The Spartan commander in Miletus, Lichas, chastised them, saying that because they lived in Persian territory, they ought to obey the satrap (τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρα καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν, Thuc. 8.84.5).

Lichas’ admonition followed official Spartan policy based on the treaty established in 411. Although never ratified, the first iteration of the treaty negotiated between Chalcideus and Tissaphernes framed terms of debate. According to Thucydides, this agreement read (8.18):

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15. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 83, is skeptical that “reintegration” of Miletus to Persia alone would have been enough to create this violent reaction, while the possibility of regime change might have. On Tissaphernes’ defensive strategy, see John W. I. Lee, “Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Defense of Western Anatolia, 412–395 BC,” in Circum Mare: Themes in Ancient Warfare, ed. Jeremy Armstrong (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 264–69.

16. Cnidus also expelled a Persian garrison (Thuc. 8.109), while the Greek sailors were angry with Tissaphernes over money; see Lee, “Tissaphernes,” 268; Hyland, Persian Interventions, 80–83.

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Whatever land and cities the king has and that the ancestors of the king had are the king’s. And whatever money or other profit came to the Athenians from these cities, the king and the Lacedaemonians and their allies together shall intercept, such that the Athenians receive neither money nor anything else. The king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies shall wage war in tandem against the Athenians. . . . Should any [poleis] revolt from the king, then they are enemies of the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and if any revolt from the Spartans and their allies, they are enemies to the king.

ὁπόσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἐστώ: καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοίτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλα τι, κωλυόντων κοινῆ βασιλεύς καὶ Λακεδαίμονιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνωσιν Ἀθηναίοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν. καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίοις κοινῆ πολεμοῦντων βασιλεύς καὶ Λακεδαίμονιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι . . . ἢν δὲ τινες ἀριστώνται ἀπὸ βασιλέως, πολέμιοι ὄντων καὶ Λακεδαίμονιοι καὶ τοῖς ξύμμαχοις: καὶ ἤν τινες ἀριστώνται ἀπὸ Λακεδαίμονιν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, πολέμιοι ὄντων βασιλεῖ κατὰ ταῦτα.

Delegates revised this agreement the following year, adding provisions that forbade the Spartans from collecting tribute from the territory belonging to the king, thereby making them more reliant on Persian patronage. The new language that explicitly prevented the Spartans and their allied forces from attacking Persian domains testifies as much to the strained relationships between the Peloponnesian forces and the Persians as it does to their acquiescence that Ionia now belonged to Persia. 18 Following a topos in fourth-century Athenian rhetoric, modern treatments of these treaties often focus on whether Sparta sold out the Ionians in its haste to defeat Athens. 19 Compounding this interpretation

18. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 63. On the awkward phrasing of this treaty at Thuc. 8.37.5, see Hyland, Persian Interventions, n. 76. He is certainly correct that the τις τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ is limited to poleis beyond Persian territory, meaning that most Ionians, once more claimed as Persian subjects, were not considered to have signed on to this treaty. Chios was in a different category.

is the implication found in Thucydides that, for as much as the Spartans conceded, Tissaphernes was unprepared to hold up the Persian side of the bargain (Thuc. 8.59; 87). John Hyland has recently reexamined these treaties, showing that they reflect the standard expression of a benevolent, just, and exacting king now reclaiming territory that was rightfully his.20 There are ultimately no grounds to vilify the Spartans for betraying the Ionians to Persia with this treaty because their motivation for inciting revolts in 411 was to cripple Athens, not to liberate Ionia. As was often the case, declarations of freedom were little more than hollow-point rounds in a weapon aimed at another target. However, as the example from Miletus demonstrates, this does not mean that the Ionian poleis were without a role to play.

As Sparta and Persia negotiated these treaties, Athenian squadrons sent to Lesbos under the command of Diomedon attacked a fort at Clazomenae (8.23.6) and proceeded to raid Chios (8.24.2–3). They defeated the Chians in three battles on the island, and the Chians afterward refused to give battle. This occasion prompted Thucydides to provide a eulogy for the prudent decision-making that had made Chios wealthy (8.24.4–5).21 His praise falls immediately after a description of the spoliation of the countryside, implying that the economic complications stemmed from agricultural devastation. However, although repeated attacks shattered any sense of inviolability, the more severe consequences came from the disruption of trade routes and the loss of their enslaved people after the Athenians fortified Delphinium on the north side of the island (Thuc. 8.40).22 These reverses strained the relationship with Sparta, and some in Chios entertained second opinions about the wisdom of their choice. When the men who had led Chios into revolt caught wind of a conspiracy against Sparta and, by extension, against them, they summoned aid from the Spartan navarch Astyochus. According to Thucydides, Astyochus tried to resolve the conflict with minimal bloodshed by taking hostages (8.24–25), but the situation continued to deteriorate.23 Their plight was also complicated by

20. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 71–74. He is also likely correct to largely redeem Tissaphernes of his alleged duplicity.
22. Mark Lawall, “Ceramics and Positivism Revisited: Greek Transport Amphoras and History,” in Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, ed. Helen Parkins and Christopher Smith (New York: Routledge, 1998), 86–89, 95, notes a decline in datable Chian finds at both Athens and Gordion in this period. The Athenians also liberated the rowers on Chian ships (Thuc. 8.15), and Thucydides notes that there was a larger number of enslaved people in Chios than in any polis other than Sparta (8.40.2).
23. Astyochus is often blamed for early Spartan setbacks, but Caroline Faulkner, “Astyochus, Sparta’s Incompetent Navarch?,” Phoenix 53, nos. 3–4 (1999): 206–21, explains his actions and points out both the possible sources of Thucydides’ biases and the extreme difficulties facing any Spartan commander.
the relationship between Astyochus and the harmost Pedaritus, who kept Chios in line with a reign of terror. Pedaritus executed one Tydeus, a leading citizen and possibly the son of the poet Ion, allegedly for conspiring to restore the Athenian alliance (Thuc. 8.38).\(^{24}\) When Astyochus ordered the Chians to send ships to Lesbos to encourage rebellions on that island, Pedaritus informed him that none would go (Thuc. 8.32.3). Despite Pedaritus’ intervention, Astyochus nevertheless blamed the Chians, repeatedly threatening them that he would not come to their aid should they ever require it (8.33.1). When some Chians expressed a lack of confidence in their forces and Pedaritus’ mercenaries to protect the polis after Athenian reinforcements landed on the island, Astyochus was good to his word (Thuc. 8.38).

Regional tensions also continued to influence Ionian behavior. When Athenian forces under the command of Thrasyllus besieged Pygela, a small community that had once been dominated by Ephesus, it was Milesian hoplites who came to their relief. The two hundred Milesian hoplites chased the scattered Athenian light troops upon arriving at the scene but were almost entirely wiped out when confronted by a contingent of Athenian peltasts and hoplites (Xen. Hell. 1.2.2–3; Diod. 13.64). Despite some attempts to use this episode to deride the military capacities of the Milesians,\(^{25}\) disciplined peltasts posed a particular threat to hoplites, and it is probable that the Milesians were both outnumbered and disorganized, having pursued the first Athenians they came upon.\(^{26}\) From a military perspective the more important question is why relief came from so far away.\(^{27}\) The answer lies in the regional politics of Ionia. The Milesian hoplites were two or three days’ march from home when they clashed with Thrasyllus’ forces, but requesting help from Ephesus would have given it an opening to recapture its erstwhile dependent, something it would repeatedly aspire to in the fourth century, leading the Pygelans to use Miletus and Mausolus of

\(^{24}\) Pedaritus is never referred to as ἁρμοστήν, which is a rare word that appears just once in Thucydides’ text (8.5.1, in reference to Euboea). Xenophon uses it once in the Anabasis (5.5.19) and eleven times in the Hellenica, including in reference to Lysander’s appointment to put down the revolt against the Thirty (2.4.28) and in reference to Thibron’s appointment in Ionia (3.1.4). Xenophon makes it clear that this was the standard term for Spartan governors, so we can reasonably assume that this was in fact Pedaritus’ position. On harmosts and decarchies, see below, “Enter Lysander.”

\(^{25}\) E.g., Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 26, 34.


Caria as a counterweight to Ephesian ambitions. As John Lee characterizes it: “Thrasyllus had hit a weak spot in Tissaphernes’ defenses, where local politics trumped military practicalities.” Almost all of the Ionians might have sided with Sparta, but this did not mean that they were on each other’s side.

The anti-Athenian forces ultimately defeated Thrasyllus at the foot of Mount Coressus, just outside of Ephesus. However, while the Ephesians contributed to their own defense and subsequently awarded honors to the Syracusans and Selinuntines whose ships were stationed at Ephesus at the time (Xen. Hell. 1.2.10), the bulk of the credit for the victory belonged to Tissaphernes. When the satrap heard that Thrasyllus was planning a return to Ephesus, Xenophon says, Tissaphernes mustered his forces with the rallying cry to defend the sanctuary of Artemis (Xen. Hell. 1.2.6–10). The sanctuary was a natural focal point for this effort given its regional prominence, and Tissaphernes capitalized on the victory with a series of bronze coins that included an image of Artemis. Unlike at Miletus, Tissaphernes did not attempt to install a garrison at Ephesus. Lee reasonably explains his decision as a calculation that protecting a local religious institution would be more effective at securing loyalty than would a garrison, but this also allowed him to maintain maximum flexibility to respond to Athenian hit-and-run raids in a theater characterized by multiple river valleys. Although Lee is correct that Tissaphernes’ deft touch at Ephesus ruffled fewer feathers than at Miletus, Xenophon offers no indication that his defense of Artemis and Ephesus won him any affection from the citizens.

The situation in Ionia began to change in 408 when Sparta ratified a new treaty that set the terms for cooperation in the war against Athens (Xen. Hell. 1.4.2–3). In the wake of the treaty, Darius II appointed his son Cyrus as karanos over western Anatolia, a position akin the Greek strategos. This office gave the prince broad powers to oversee the war effort that to this point had been limited by competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 1.4.3, 5.3; cf. Anab. 1.9.7). According to Xenophon, Cyrus arrived in Asia Minor

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30. The coins may be reflected by a series from Astyra in Aeolis, which also had a shrine for Artemis. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 102, shows that the series was designed to associate this small shrine with the famous sanctuary at Ephesus. This coin series was traditionally dated to Tissaphernes’ second stint in Ionia, 400–395; see Herbert Cahn, “Tissaphernes in Astyra,” AA 4 (1985): 592–93, but has been redated by Jaroslaw Bodzek, “On the Dating of the Bronze Issues of Tissaphernes,” Studies in Ancient Art and Civilization 16 (2012): 110–15.
32. On competition between satraps and the limited resources available to Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes compared with Cyrus’ wide remit, see Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A His-
bearing the king’s seal stamped on a letter addressed to all “those who dwell by the sea” (πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ, Xen. Hell. 1.4.3), which certainly included the Ionians. It is unknown whether the letter addressed specific actions or the renewed status of Ionia as subjects of Persia because Xenophon only preserves part of the text. Tissaphernes had, to the Greeks at least, coordinated the war against Athens piecemeal, on his own terms, and always with a sense that he anticipated that if Athens and Sparta exhausted each other, it would further his position. Certainly, these were the charges the Spartans leveled against Tissaphernes when Cyrus arrived (e.g., Plut. Lys. 4.1). However, it was the resources available to Cyrus, not the attitude toward the Ionian poleis or relationship between the poleis and the Persian satrap, that changed. Greek authors ascribe a cunning malice to Tissaphernes, but with respect to Ionia he was following orders.33 His methods aroused more enmity than did Cyrus’ flattery, but the expectation of the Great King throughout the fifth century had been that he was sovereign over Ionia. Accommodations about revenue could be made to support the Spartan war effort, and the treaty negotiated in 408 was aimed at this end, not toward securing new freedoms for the Ionians. But the war over Ionia was entering a new phase in 408, one powered by the personality of the new Spartan navarch, Lysander.

Enter Lysander

Lysander took command of the Spartan war effort in Ionia in autumn 408, initiating wide-ranging changes in the region that would shape its history for a decade. One of his first actions was to move the Spartan base of operations from Miletus to Ephesus (Plut. Lys. 3.2). Plutarch makes a big deal about the move because he claims that Lysander rescued Ephesus from barbarity, but this is exaggerated.34 The absence of a Persian garrison might have contributed to

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Lysander’s decision, but other considerations were likely more important. Miletus was the southernmost Ionian city and was separated from the other centers of Spartan activity by the Athenian fleet on Samos. Ephesus neatly sidestepped a repeat of 411, when Lichas ordered the Milesians to accommodate Tissaphernes, but it also put the Spartan fleet in a better position to counter Athenian activities. More important, though, and critical for the history of Ionia, was the close connection between Ephesus and Sardis, where the Persian prince Cyrus had recently taken up residence. With these regional and strategic considerations in mind, Lysander assembled the Spartan fleet at Ephesus.

Lysander’s primary concern when he assumed command was to secure a steady supply of money to pay for the naval war. John Hyland has recently estimated the Persian subsidy, including direct payments and the Ionian tribute remitted in 405/4, at between 3,272 and 3,672 talents over the course of roughly seven years. These resources, in turn, allowed Lysander to inaugurate a massive stimulus project at Ephesus that brought merchant vessels to convey supplies to the city and dispensed contracts for trireme construction (Plut. Lys. 3.3). Even absent the remission of tribute, these contracts brought an infusion of wealth to Ephesus that likely lay behind an honorific statue erected at the Artemisium (Paus. 6.3.15).

However, Persian money proved unreliable, which led to Spartan demands that the Ionians themselves underwrite the costs of the fleet. In turn, these demands reignited preexisting tensions. Already in 411, for instance, the Spartan navarch Mindaros demanded that the Chians pay each of his sailors three “fortieths” (Thuc. 8.101.1), an amount that totaled about 4.5 talents, opment in Ionia. Margaret C. Miller, “Clothes and Identity: The Case of Greeks in Ionia c.400 BC,” in Culture, Identity and Politics in the Ancient Mediterranean World, ed. Paul J. Burton (Canberra: Australasian Society for Classical Studies, 2013), 18–38, however, demonstrates that Persian and Anatolian features had become inextricable from local identity, where the Priest of Artemis held the Persian title Megabyxos (Xen. Anab. 5.3.4; Pliny N.H. 35.36, 40), cf. Chapter 9 and Appendix 2.

35. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 118–21. His calculation excludes ancillary costs like mercenary salaries and pay for loggers and shipbuilders.

36. On this honor, which is usually tied to Ephesus’ oligarchic regime, see Westlake, "Ionians in the Ionian War," 41; Nakamura-Moroo, "Attitude of Greeks in Asia Minor," 570; Kagan, Fall of the Athenian Empire, 302–3.

37. Most of the Ionian contributions to the so-called Spartan War Fund (RO 151 = IG V 1, 1) likely belong in this context, as suggested by Piérart, "Chios entre Athènes et Sparte," 253–82, but Rhodes and Osborne observe that there is no one date that works for all entries. They follow Angelos P. Matthaiou and G. A. Pikoulas, "Ἑδον Λακεδαιμονίοις ποττὸν πόλεμον," Horos 7 (1988): 77–124, in suggesting that it was inscribed in phases starting in c.427 and concluding in the c.409. Cartledge, Agesilaos, 72–73, maintains a later date c.403, but the relatively small amount in the inscription (maybe just over thirteen talents total), as William T. Loomis, The Spartan War Fund: IG V 1, 1 and a New Fragment (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), notes, suggests that it belongs in an early phase of Spartan fiscal management.

38. What, exactly, Thucydides meant by “fortieth” (τεσσαρακοστός) is a matter of heated
and the demands for cash steadily grew as the war dragged on. In 408/7, Dio-
dorus reports, the Spartan navarch Cratesippidas took a bribe to restore Chian exiles to their home, where they exiled six hundred of their political oppo-
nents in turn (Diod. 13.65.3–4). The new exiles seized Atarneus, from whence they continued to harass Chios. But these strains also extended beyond the endemic factional conflict and further drained Ionian resources. Lysander’s immediate successor after his first term as navarch, Callicratidas, convinced the people of both Miletus and Chios in 406/5 to give him additional money when he thought that Cyrus was balking at providing what he promised (Xen. Hell. 1.6).39 Xenophon says that he demanded from Chios a pentedrachmia (πεντεδραχμία) for each of his sailors, probably about 23.1 talents of silver in sum, that would pay the wages for just ten days (Xen. Hell. 1.6.12).40 The sol-
diers serving under the Spartan Eteonicus had been forced to work for hire in the winter of 406, but they subsequently planned a coup against their supposed ally when the seasonal employment dried up (Xen. Hell. 2.1.1–5).41 Eteonicus thwarted their plan and restored discipline, but also demanded that the Chians give him up to some fifty talents of silver to appease the soldiers.42 The Chians paid up, but they also joined the other Ionian allies to formally petition Sparta for Lysander’s return (Xen. Hell. 2.1.6–7).

The Spartans had entered the war against Athens woefully ignorant about how much money was required to operate a fleet and about the mechanisms of finance. Recent research has demonstrated how their approach to financ-
debate because this term does not correspond to any denomination of coin used in the Greek world. N. M. M. Hardwick, “The Coinage of Chios, 6th–4th century BC,” in Proceedings of the XI International Numismatic Congress, ed. Catherine Courtois, Harry Dewit, and Véronique Van Driessche (Louvain: Séminaire de Numismatique Marcel Hoc, 1993), 211–22, proposes that “fortieth” was in effect an exchange rate where forty of a given Chian coin was equivalent to a single coin, in the case probably a Persian daric. Aneurin Ellis-Eva, “Mytilene, Lampsakos, Chios and the Financing of the Spartan Fleet (406–404),” NC 176 (2016): 11–12, identifies this Chian coin as likely being a third-stater coin.

39. According to Plutarch, Lysander had returned to Cyrus the money he had not yet spent and told Callicratidas to ask for it himself (Plut. Lys. 6.1). Diodorus paints a portrait of Callicratidas as an upright young Spartan, saying that he punished anyone who tried to bribe him (13.76.2), and both Diodorus and Xenophon describe him as an energetic commander whose fleet aggressively pursued the war in Ionia.

40. Like the “fortieth” (see n. 38), “pentedrachmia” is a term without correspondence to a denomination of Greek coin. Ellis-Eva, “Mytilene, Lampsakos, Chios,” 12–14, reasonably sug-
gests the term indicates the amount paid rather than the denominations distributed.

41. The lack of money to pay the soldiers is often attributed to a personal conflict between Lysander’s replacement Callicratidas and Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 1.6.6–7; Plut. Lys. 6.5–6), but Hyland, Persian Interventions, 112, argues that the tension arose because Cyrus’ readily available money was depleted.

42. On the estimate of fifty talents, see Ellis-Eva, “Mytilene, Lampsakos, Chios,” 14, who astutely notes that Eteonicus’ forces had already been depleted by losses at Arginusae earlier in the year.
ing the war both slowly evolved over the course of the conflict and ultimately allowed them to eventually emerge triumphant. By the time that Lysander returned in 405/4, the Spartan fiscal system had reached maturity, funneling Persian subsidies, ad hoc requisitions from allied poleis, and the tributes from Persian subjects in Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14) into pay for the maintenance, upkeep, and operation of fleets throughout the Aegean. The enforcement of this system resulted in the widespread adoption of the Chian weight standard to facilitate conversion between the coinages of different poleis and the so-called ΣΥΝ coinage minted at Rhodes, Iasus, Cnidus, Ephesus, Samos, Byzantium, and Cyzicus.

But where did these changes leave the Ionians? The second century CE travel writer Pausanias records an Ionian proverb about their political loyalties saying that they preferred to “paint both sides of the walls” because “the Ionians, just like all men, do service to strength” (τοὺς τοίχους τοὺς δύο ἐπαλείφοντες . . . καὶ ἵωσιν ὡσαύτως οἱ πάντες ἀνθρωποί θεραπεύουσι τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τῇ ἰσχύι, 6.3.15–16). They paid court to Alcibiades, he says, with the Samians erecting a statue of him in the Heraion, as easily as they did to the Spartans, since the Ephesians erected statues not only of Lysander, Eteonicus, and Pharax, but also of Spartans of no particular repute! Indeed, there is little unambiguous evidence that the Ionians as a whole favored one side over the other, which fits in a world where nobody was altogether on the side of the Ionians. These statues therefore need to be interpreted as early examples of honorific statues that became a prominent feature of diplomacy in the Hellenistic period, while paying court was the surest way to minimize property damage. Spontaneous displays of support for the war against Athens disappeared after the first years, and poleis without strategic importance had been allowed to slip from Spartan control. Teos, for instance, which had lost its walls in 411, had subsequently readmitted Athenian forces, ostensibly in return for protection (Thuc. 8.20), only to see Callicratidas sneak his forces inside the restored fortifications and plunder the city in 406/5 (Diod. 13.76.4). Being forced to turn over increasingly large sums of money for the Spartan war efforts could not have been popular,

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but neither those demands nor the fact that the Spartans symbolically curtailed Ionian liberty by betraying them to Persia resulted in widespread uprisings and Ionian ships and sailors remained essential to the Spartan fleets throughout the war (e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.3; Diod. 13.70.2). When Lysander erected an ostentatious monument at Delphi to commemorate his victory at Aegospotamoi, he paid tribute to these contributions with statues of not only three Chians, but also men from Ephesus, Miletus, a Samian from Anaea, and likely an Erythraean (Paus. 10.9.9)—nearly a quarter of the twenty-nine naval commanders honored in the monument, in all.

By the last years of the Ionian War only Samos and pockets of Athenian-held territory resisted the overwhelming tide of Spartan successes. It is easy see an element of coercion in this continued resistance since Samos continued to be the principal Athenian naval base in the eastern Aegean, but this was not the only reason that Samos continued to fight alongside Athens. Xenophon associates the Samian loyalty to Athens with the fact that they had enacted a slaughter of the wealthy on the island (σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες) when those men had conspired to revolt (*Hell.* 2.2.6). The Samian *demos* had clearly wanted to keep its relationship with Athens and in 405/4 were rewarded en masse for their dedication with a decree of Athenian citizenship (*RO* 2 = *IG* I3 127, ll. 12–13), as well as receiving other honors and gifts, including the Athenian triremes on Samos (ll. 25–26). There was, however, another reason that the Samians looked to Athens. The Samian exiles living in Asia Minor make frequent appearance throughout the fifth century, including sending ten ships to fight with the Spartans at Arginousae (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.29). Thucydides and Xenophon present the bloodshed on Samos as a class conflict caused by the question of...

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47. The unusual features of this inscription, including its pictorial relief and its destruction during the period of the Thirty Tyrants and subsequent reinscription by the restored democracy, have received a great deal of recent scholarly attention. Jas Elsner, “Visual Culture and Ancient History: Issues of Empiricism and Ideology in the Samos Stele at Athens,” *CA* 34, no. 1 (2015): 33–73, and Alastair Blanshard, “The Problem with Honouring Samos: An Athenian Documentary Relief and Its Interpretation,” in *Art and Inscriptions in the Ancient World*, ed. Zahra Newby and Ruth Leader-Newby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19–37, are the two more complete treatments of the stele, incorporating both the inscription and the images. For a summary of approaches, see Elsner, 46–48.
Contempt for Athenian Hegemony

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loyalty to Athens, but this was only the proximate cause. These exiles were the root of the conflict.

Samos continued to hold out against Sparta after the battle of Aegospotamoi in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.6, 3.6) and the fall of Athens in 404, surrendering only in 403 after a long siege (Xen. Hell. 2.3.6–7). The long resistance may have worsened Lysander’s punishment of the Samians, but his actions nonetheless capture the new status of Ionia. Lysander returned the exiles to power, as well as installing a Spartan named Thorax as harmost, stationing a garrison on the island, and appointing a narrow oligarchy (Xen. Hell. 2.3.6–7).48 These arrangements also created a new wave of exiles, many of whom probably went to Athens, while others sought refuge nearby in poleis such as Ephesus and Notium (RO 2 = IG I3 127, ll. 49–50). On top of paying the Spartan war tax, the restored Samians offered ostentatious honors for Lysander, including a statue of him at Olympia erected at public expense (Paus. 6.3.14–15), couplets from poet Ion of Samos decorating his victory monument at Delphi (ML 95 = SEG 23.324b) and renaming the festival for Hera the “Lysandreia” (Duris, BNJ 76 F 26).49 The festival occurred under this name at least four times, probably only being abolished in 394 after the battle of Cnidus. While Lysander was unsuccessful in persuading the poet Choerilus of Samos to compose an epic poem about his triumphs (Plut. Lys. 18.4), multiple winners of the poetic competitions at the Lysandreia took up the theme of his greatness.50 It was in this context that Duris of Samos says that the Samians dedicated altars and a cult to Lysander as though he were a god (BNJ 76 F 71).51 While honorific statues became a normal diplomatic practice, the creation of the Lysandreia was likely indicative of more sinister processes at work.

48. Shipley, Samos, 131, highlights that Xenophon calls the new regime “its one-time citizens,” probably indicating the exiles at Anaia.

49. Shipley, Samos, 133–34, suggests that the epigram may have been added later.

50. Lysander likely intended Choerilus to compose a contemporary epic along the lines of his Persica that debuted in Athens to such acclaim that the Assembly allegedly awarded him a gold stater per line and decreed that it should be recited alongside the works of Homer (Suda s.v. Χοιρίλος). George Huxley, “Choerilos of Samos,” GRBS 10, no. 1 (1969): 13, correctly notes that there is no evidence that Choerilus ever began this poem. On Choerilus’ treatment of the contemporary in the form of epic, see Kelly A. MacFarlane, “Choerilus of Samos’ Lament (SH 317) and the Revitalization of Epic,” AJPh 130, no. 2 (2009): 219–34. The Lysandreia became one of the preeminent literary festivals in Ionia during this period and is attested by inscriptions recording victories such as IG XII 6.1 334. The Lysandreia attracted poets such as Antimachus of Colophon, who wrote an acclaimed Thebaid, about the Seven Against Thebes, and whose poetry was equated with Homer and Hesiod and sought after by Plato because it was unavailable in Athens. He evidently lost in his appearance at the Lysandreia, though perhaps not strictly because Lysander approved more of Niceratus of Heracleia’s poem, as Plutarch suggests (Lys 18.4).

The Spartan victory in 404 made Lysander arguably the most powerful man in the Aegean world, and our surviving sources suggest that he had been preparing for this moment since 407. According to one of these sources, Lysander summoned oligarchic-minded men to Ephesus, instructing them to form *hetaireia* in their communities and to integrate themselves into public affairs with the promise that he would appoint them to what Plutarch calls “revolutionary decarchies” (γενομένων δεκαδαρχῶν, *Lys.* 5.3–4; cf. Diod. 13.70.4). Thus, it is thought, Lysander cultivated supporters who would be loyal to him and used them as a seed to create a system of decarchies throughout the Aegean in 404/3. However, this tradition is riddled with source problems. The only polis in Ionia where we know that Lysander established a decarchy was Samos, which had remained allied with Athens throughout the war and thus was likely regarded as particularly suspect, though Chios, which lay outside of Persian territory, likely had one as well. Moreover, *hetaireia* were a normal part of elite Greek life even in the most radical of democratic poleis, so it is implausible that Lysander himself introduced a substantial, widespread change in Ionia. This is not to say either that Lysander did not build close relationships with Ionian aristocrats or that he did not support these allies in overthrowing what remained of the popular governments in Ionia (Plut. *Lys.* 7.2). Rather, this was a negotiated and reciprocal relationship that he never formalized on a wide scale. Lysander’s generosity won him allies who chaffed at Callicratidas’ frugality and therefore requested his reappointment.

Exemplary of these political currents was a particularly brutal coup at Miletus in c.405. According to Diodorus, events transpired as follows (13.104.5–6):

At the same time in Miletus certain men with oligarchic proclivities dissolved the demos with Spartan aid. First, during the Dionysia, they

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53. Xenophon says that Lysander went to Ionia in the 390s so that he could “restore with the help of Agesilaus the decarchies he had established in the cities and dissolved by the ephors” (ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἑφόρους . . . πάλιν καταστήσει μετ᾽Ἄγησιλάου, 3.4.2), but makes no mention of which cities had had decarchies. In reporting Lysander’s motivations for the campaign, Xenophon likely makes general a practice that had been more limited.
abducted their principal opponents from their homes and slit the throat of some forty men; then, after that, when the agora was full, they killed three hundred chosen for their wealth. The most accomplished of those who favored the demos, who numbered not fewer than a thousand, fled to the satrap [Tissaphernes] because they feared their situation. He received them generously, giving each a stater and settling them in Blaudos, a citadel in Lydia.

Diodorus notes that the conspirators had Spartan backing for their coup, but later traditions tie the entire episode to Lysander specifically, whether through his willingness to lull the people into a false sense of security (Polyaenus 1.45.1) or by saying that he provoked them to action when they seemed prepared to settle with their domestic opponents (Plut. Lys. 8). However, as Vanessa Gorman notes, contemporary sources for this coup, including Xenophon’s account of the period and the Milesian epigraphical record, make no mention of the atrocities—let alone attest to Lysander’s involvement. This incongruity creates a problem for understanding Miletus in this period. Oligarchic regimes as a rule did not produce inscriptions for public consumption, and the specificity of detail in Diodorus’ account generally follows the violence of contemporary

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54. Diodorus’ text says that the Milesian exiles took refuge with Pharnabazus, but A. Andrewes, “Two Notes on Lysander,” Phoenix 25, no. 3 (1971): n. 15 notes confusion and conflation of the Persian satraps, whom Diodorus at times calls “Pharnabazos” interchangeably, and thus reasonably amends the satrap in this passage to Tissaphernes. Lydia is also significantly closer to Miletus than Hellespontine Phrygia, and we hear of Milesian “friends” of Tissaphernes who formed part of his retinue until his death in 395 (Polyaenus 8.16).

55. The toponym “Blauda” is unknown, but Strabo locates a “Blaudos” in Lydia (12.5.2), making an identification likely; see Andrewes, “Two Notes on Lysander,” n. 15.

oligarchic regimes, both of which suggest that the massacre could have taken place. Further, it was followed by another round of exiles just a few years later (see below, “Persian Dynastic Politics”), and there was no democratic reconciliation that would necessitate public acknowledgment of events. At the same time, this is the last that we hear of the exiles at Blaudos specifically—in marked contrast to the exiles from Chios and Samos—and there is no indication of a regime change on the aesymnetes list (Milet I.3, no. 122).57 The coup at Miletus fits the wider context of political restructuring that took place throughout the Aegean, where local oligarchs took advantage of Spartan hegemony to seize power against their populist rivals.58 However, where both Samos and likely Chios were saddled with Spartan harmosts upon the conclusion of the war (Diod. 14.10), there is no evidence for a comparable arrangement on the mainland. Those poleis belonged to Persia.59

Domestic backlash against Lysander’s power ultimately caused the Spartans to withdraw support from his imperial arrangements in 403/2.60 The ephors declared their support for ancestral constitutions in Ionia (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2) and recalled Lysander’s appointed harmosts, ultimately executing Thorax, who held that position at Samos (Plut. Lys. 19.4). Both actions were strikes against the navarch, but we ought to be careful not to overstate how big a change this was in Ionia. The constitutions in question were unlikely to have been democratic, even in poleis with strong democratic traditions, and, regardless of how repugnant these oligarchic regimes were thought to be, there is no evidence that they entirely crumbled in the absence of Spartan support. The Samians for instance, held the Lysandreia for at least two more cycles after Lysander’s recall, while the only documented instance of imminent regime change was not a popular uprising, but an outgrowth of Persian dynastic politics. The change in attitude

57. As a source of evidence for specific trends in Milesian political history this inscription should be taken with extreme skepticism, but the second column (II.1.2) may begin with the repudiation of Athens, and the names could be read as a particular faction becoming ascendent since entries for Hegemon, son of Eodemos (II. 1.4, in perhaps 410/9), and Eodemos, son of Hegemon (II. 1.12, 402/1), two names that together appear only once elsewhere on the list (Eodemos, I. 1.90), may indicate a father-son pair. Recently, however, Eric W. Driscoll, “The Milesian Eponym List and the Revolt of 412 B.C.,” The Journal of Epigraphic Studies 2 (2019): 11–32, has argued that a new fragment of the list ought to be interpreted as indicating that the stele first went up in 412 as a way of galvanizing the divided community.” There is also a double entry, likely in 403/2 at II. 1.11, but should that quirk hold any significance it would be to the conflict between Tissaphernes and Cyrus. On the inscription, see Chapter 2 and Chapter 7.


59. Contra Andrewes, “Two Notes on Lysander,” 216, who argues that Cyrus allowed Lysander an entirely free hand throughout Ionia until it was no longer politically expedient.

in Sparta might have prompted a withdrawal from the eastern Aegean following the Peloponnesian War, but it neither caused widespread political upheaval in Ionia nor dissolved the relationships that had been formed.

**Persian Dynastic Politics, 404–401**

At the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War in 404, Cyrus and Tissaphernes reasserted Persian control over Ionia. Treaties between Sparta and Persia in the preceding years had recognized the legitimacy of Persian authority in return for military and financial support for the war, and the Spartan commander Lichas had chastised the Milesians for asserting their autonomy against Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.84.5). Cyrus’ arrival in western Anatolia changed the Persian hierarchy by giving him control over multiple existing satrapies (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3; *Anab.* 1.9.7) but did not fundamentally change the relationship between Ionia and Persia. For the Ionians, though, this situation was one of limbo. Spartan commanders were generally unwilling to support Ionians against Persia, but Lysander also enrolled the Ionians into the Spartan alliance system. When Spartan enthusiasm for projecting power into Asia Minor waned after 404, the Ionian poleis became embroiled in the Persian conflict between Cyrus, Tissaphernes, and, ultimately, Artaxerxes II.

Darius II died in 405/4, elevating Cyrus’ older brother Artaxerxes to the throne. The royal intrigues of Parsyatis, Cyrus, Artaxerxes II, and Tissaphernes and the campaign that culminated in the battle of Cunaxa in 401 are largely beyond the scope of this study, but they need to be addressed in brief since the campaign began in Ionia. Cyrus left Anatolia for a time in 405 before his father died, likely to answer charges that he had overstepped his mandate by executing a member of the Persian nobility (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.8). Cyrus was exonerated and, at the behest of their mother, Parsyatis, Artaxerxes II initially reaffirmed his brother’s position. When Tissaphernes accused Cyrus of plotting a coup, Artaxerxes reversed course and had him arrested (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.3; Ctesias F 19.59; Plut. *Artax.* 3.4). Parsyatis again intervened to prevent her son’s execu-

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63. Ruzicka, “Cyrus and Tissaphernes,” 207–8; Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and James Robson, *Ct-
Accustomed to Obedience?

tion, and Cyrus returned to Sardis, where he began in earnest to plot against his brother. Artaxerxes acknowledged Cyrus’ position in Sardis, but also created a new satrapy for Tissaphernes in Caria, to which he appended the Ionian poleis (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6).64 This situation in western Anatolia was an uneasy post hoc arrangement. The revenues from Ionia belonged to Tissaphernes on paper, but therein lay the rub.

Most Ionian poleis simply ignored Artaxerxes’ order to pay their tribute to Tissaphernes and instead submitted to Cyrus. Their choice was easy. The Ionians undoubtedly mistrusted Tissaphernes based on earlier interactions, while Cyrus entertained them lavishly, promising to remit their tribute should they support his cause. As Hyland notes, Xenophon also glosses over Cyrus’ coercive activities to present the prince in the most positive light (Xen. Anab. 1.1.8).65 Only Miletus resisted Cyrus’ charms, and not for want of enticement. When Tissaphernes learned that some Milesians were considering Cyrus’ offer, he seized the city, exiled Cyrus’ supporters, and installed men who would be loyal to him, perhaps by restoring those who had been exiled to Blauda in c.405 (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6–7). Once again, the stark divisions within a citizen body of an Ionian polis entered the realm of imperial politics. The opening move of Cyrus’ anabasis therefore did not entail a march upland at all, but a brief siege of Miletus with the stated aim of restoring the exiles. This campaign, however, was a feint, and Cyrus soon abandoned Miletus to embark on his campaign against Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 1.2.2).66

Liberation from Athens never actually aimed at an independent Ionia. Rather the intersection of local agendas with Spartan and Persian interests had brought about change. In this same vein, the Ionian ambivalence toward the project that appeared almost as soon as the fighting started can be better explained by the presence of war that most Ionians had no interest in than by dissolution at betrayed promises. The only respite came when events elsewhere meant that the imperial collaborators were too occupied to intervene in Ionia. Cyrus’ quixotic bid for the Persian throne drew both him and Tissaphernes toward the Persian heartland and left Ionia free from Persian intervention for a time. Following Cyrus’ death at Cunaxa in 401, Artaxerxes once more gave


Tissaphernes control over Ionia. Xenophon says, unsurprisingly, that the Ioni-ans feared retribution for having sided with Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 3.1.3). When Tissaphernes demanded their surrender, they responded with another appeal to Sparta. There had not been a clean break between the two, and the ties culti-vated during the Ionian War prompted a series of expeditions to Asia Minor in the 390s that only ended when the Corinthian War demanded Spartan atten-tion closer to home.67

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Tissaphernes returned to Ionia in triumph after Cyrus’ defeat at Cunaxa in 401 and demanded the immediate surrender of all Ionian poleis (Hell. 3.1.3). Despite the ultimatum, Tissaphernes refrained from attacking the Ionians. John Hyland explains his apparent hesitation by noting that most of western Anatolia did submit and express regret for supporting insurrection (e.g., Diod. 14.35.3). Thus, Tissaphernes waited.

According to Xenophon, the Ionians responded with alarm because they preferred freedom, and they were fearful about reprisals for having been loyal to a prince-turned-traitor (Hell. 3.1.3). However, Xenophon’s account of these events includes a severe rhetorical gloss between Tissaphernes’ imperial language that asserted control over both the Ionians loyal to Cyrus and those loyal to himself, and the “they” who desired freedom and feared retribution. The latter category does not include the entirety of the former, but conflating the two lent urgency to their plight. In fact, local political calculations likely played a bigger role than the ambassadors let on. Tissaphernes had already toppled the regime at Miletus at the outset of the conflict with Cyrus and installed men who would be loyal to him (see Chapter 4), while the revolutions of the Ionian War had created new groups of exiles. For the regimes at Ephesus and nearby poleis that had come to power with the support of Cyrus and the Spartans, therefore, Tissaphernes’ arrival posed dire risk. Thus, in 401/0, Ionian ambas-


2. Cf. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 128–29, who rightly challenges the assertion of David M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 121–22, 138–39, that the Ionian response was universal and based on the grounds that Tissaphernes overstepped his remit and trampled the Greek principle of autonomy. Hyland points out that out that paying tribute was not incompatible with political autonomy.
3. By the Hellenistic period it was common to refer to the Greeks of Asia as a corporate body that had one set of interests, but this is the earliest appearance of the slogan in a political sense; see Robin Seager and Christopher Tuplin, “The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: On the Origins of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan,” JHS 100 (1980): 144, with n. 37. This naturally introduces the question to whom it refers. Seager and Tuplin reasonably argue that it only encapsulated those Greeks in Asia who were making the appeal, though the contention of H. D. Westlake, “Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400–397 B.C.,” Historia 35, no. 4 (1986): 406 n. 6, that the appellants were the Greeks of Asia broadly seems misguided. Xenophon says that the request came from the threatened Ionians, who appealed to Sparta ostensibly on behalf of the rest of the Greeks of Asia.

4. Thibron also hired the mercenaries who had accompanied Cyrus (Diod. 14.37.4). On the makeup of the Spartan force, see John Buckler, Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 44–45; Peter Krentz, Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.8 (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1995), 159. Xenophon says that the newly restored Athenian democracy dispatched cavalymen who had served the Thirty. The neodamodeis are often characterized as emancipated helots based on Thucydides 4.80, but that is an oversimplification. R. F. Willetts, “The Neodamodeis,” CPh 49, no. 1 (1954): 28, characterizes them as one of several “underprivileged sections of the Spartan community, which together made up the great majority of the population.”

5. On the Spartan factions in this period, see Charles D. Hamilton, “Spartan Politics and Policy, 405–401 B.C.,” AJPh 91, no. 3 (1970): 294–314, though he likely overstates the influence of the conservative faction. Daniel Tober, “Politieiai and Spartan Local History,” Historia 59, no. 4 (2010): 414–20, follows Jacoby FGrHist 581 in identifying Thibron as the author of a Spartan politeia that claimed imperialism was the ultimate end of the Lycurgan constitution (Arist. Pol. 7.1333b12)—in marked contrast to Xenophon’s conclusions. The date of Thibron’s politeia is unknown. Jacoby suggested the text either advertised Sparta to the Ionian poleis or was a project of his exile. I follow Kenneth Nigel and Anton Powell “Thibron (581),” BNI, who prefer the latter context. For other chronological possibilities, see Tober, 415 n. 18 and n.19.
When Thibron arrived in Ionia, he instructed the poleis to raise soldiers, with some two thousand Ionians joining his expedition (Diod. 14.36.2; Xen. Hell. 3.1.5). The historian H. D. Westlake declares that the “significantly small number” of Ionians was “evidence of their inability to defend themselves,” but this is a hasty assessment. The ancient sources are vague about the origin of these troops, with Xenophon flippantly declaring that “at that time all poleis obeyed any order that a Lacedaemonian man might give them.” But it is nonetheless possible to provide the boundary for Spartan influence. Xenophon says that the Ionians came from the mainland (ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων), while Diodorus adds that Thibron enlisted them from his own (Ephesus) and other poleis (ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων). In the south of Ionia, Miletus and Magnesia near the mouth of the Maeander both remained loyal to Tissaphernes, so it is reasonable to assume that Myus stayed out of the conflict. In the north, Tissaphernes had recently raided the territory of Cyme in Aeolis and took prisoners (Diod. 14.35.7), which probably resulted in pushing Clazomenae and Erythrae toward Sparta. Thus, most of Thibron’s Asian Greeks likely came from Ephesus and the Ionian communities in the Cayster River valley and to the north. The only city in the Maeander River valley that certainly contributed soldiers was Priene, on the north side of the bay (Xen. Hell. 3.2.17). With these bounds established, some observations about the Ionians who joined the Spartan expedition are in order. First, there is no information about how many troops Thibron demanded from the Ionians or how many mouths he was prepared to feed. Similarly, these two thousand troops represented a muster from part of Ionia that excluded three of the four largest poleis in the region. Neither was this a mass conscription, which would have left the communities defenseless and fields uncultivated and caused more problems for Thibron than it solved. Finally, two thousand soldiers, more than a quarter of the entire expedition, was not an insignificant number. Westlake may be correct that the Ionians were unable to defend themselves against Tissaphernes, but their contributions to the campaign should not be dismissed.

Based at Ephesus, Thibron led his army north along the Aegean coast, capturing multiple settlements, including Pergamum, but when the campaign bogged down in an expensive siege of Larisa, the ephors ordered him to invade

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7. πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις ἐπείθοντο ὅ τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνήρ ἐπιτάτην.
8. Chios and possibly Samos were still within the sphere of Spartan influence and may have been garrisoned, but while they both supplied ships for Sparta at times in the 390s there is no evidence that either contributed to Thibron’s expedition.
Caria, which would threaten Tissaphernes’ estates and Miletus (Xen. Hell. 3.1.6–7). Before Thibron could comply he was recalled on the accusation that he had allowed his army to raid the territory of Spartan allies and was replaced by Dercylidas (Xen. Hell. 3.1.8). We are told that the new commander nursed a grudge against Pharnabazus that stemmed back to the Peloponnesian War and so led his soldiers from Ionia to campaign in the north Aegean, albeit while preventing them from pillaging friendly territory (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9–10).

It was not until the middle of the next campaign season, in 398, that Dercylidas led his soldiers back south toward Ionia. According to Xenophon, that spring began with Dercylidas meeting with inspectors from Sparta at Abydus on the Hellespont. He dismissed them to continue their journey to Ephesus content in the knowledge that they would see the Greek cities they passed through in a state of “well-governed peace” (ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς, Hell. 3.2.9). Nevertheless, Xenophon’s subsequent narrative puts a lie to that rosy characterization and hints at the lingering scars from the Peloponnesian War. After a brief foray into the Chersonese, Dercylidas returned south in the summer of 398, where he “discovered” that exiles from Chios held a well-defended fortress of Atarneus in Aeolis from which they had been raiding the rest of Ionia (Xen. Hell. 3.2.11).

Xenophon twice says that Decylidas believed the Ionian poleis to be at peace (Hell. 3.2.9, 11), downplaying the disruption caused by these exiles, but it is hard to believe that he did not know about them during his initial campaign through Aeolis. These exiles had resided at Atarneus since 408/7, when their political opponents bribed the Spartan navarch Cratesippidas to restore them to Chios. Diodorus says that they had continually been at war with Chios, at least implying that they disrupted Dercylidas’ imagined peace (13.65.3–5). This time, Dercylidas surrounded Atarneus and besieged it for seven months before the defenders surrendered (Xen. Hell. 3.2.11). Xenophon ends his discussion of Atarneus by noting that Dercylidas appointed Dracon of Pellene to command the post and supplied it with equipment for his own use. What happened to the Chian exiles is unknown.

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10. Dercylidas’ campaigns in Aeolis, Bithynia, and Thrace are largely beyond the scope of this inquiry, but Xenophon indicates their success. Dercylidas allegedly captured Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae in a single day and incited other settlements to revolt against Pharnabazus, mostly through diplomacy (Hell. 3.1.16). All three of Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae had recently been captured by Mania, whom Pharnabazus had appointed to rule Aeolis (Xen. Hell. 3.1.11–13). Xenophon also explains Dercylidas’ decision to campaign in the north as a means of not burdening his allies with feeding his soldiers (Hell. 3.2.1).

11. Alexander’s so-called letters to Chios between 334 and 332 attest to the continuing problem of exiles in the region (see Chapter 7), but there is little explicit evidence for its redress in the new Chian constitution established after the battle of Cnidus in 394.
According to Xenophon, the Ionians sent emissaries to Sparta in 398/7 saying that it was within Tissaphernes’ power to leave Ionia autonomous and urging a campaign against Caria to gain favorable terms (Hell. 3.2.12). This claim, however, introduces more questions than it answers. On the one hand, it is easy to label the Ionians here as being credulous regarding promises made by Tissaphernes. Further, Xenophon goes on to say that the king had to ratify the treaty that would guarantee Ionian autonomy (Hell. 3.2.20), which indicates a limit to the satrap’s power and suggests that the Ionians misrepresented the situation to their own advantage. Tissaphernes might have been able to follow Cyrus’ example by remitting tribute from the Ionian poleis and making up the deficit in his obligation to the king elsewhere, but this guarantee would have come as a privilege of acknowledging his suzerainty, not one of autonomy. On the other hand, Xenophon does not specify who these ambassadors were, saying only that they were from the poleis of Ionia (πρέσβεις εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἰωνίδων πόλεων). While it is possible that these ambassadors were exiles or dissidents from poleis like Miletus that were under Tissaphernes’ control, the most likely scenario is that they came from the communities that had sent soldiers to join Thibron and Dercylidas and who were concerned because the Spartans had not yet attacked the man who threatened them.

Dercylidas led his army south into the Maeander plain only after learning that the Persians were on the offensive. Nevertheless, the army marched unprepared to fight, believing that the Persian force was advancing toward Ephesus (Xen. Hell. 3.2.14). It was therefore a shock when they blundered into the combined Persian army of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus arrayed for battle across the road. Dercylidas ordered his soldiers into a battle formation, and while the Peloponnesians prepared in disciplined silence, Xenophon says, the Ionian hoplites dropped their weapons in the grain fields and fled, while those who remained looked as though they would soon run away (Hell. 3.2.17).

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13. Dercylidas’ target was one of Tissaphernes’ residences. For an evaluation of the Persian and Spartan moves in this campaign, see Hyland, Persian Interventions, 131–32, with John Hyland, “The Aftermath of Aegospotamoi and the Decline of Spartan Naval Power,” AHB 33 (2019): 25, for the small-scale naval operation that operated concurrently. There is no evidence for naval contributions from the Ionian allies before Agesilaus ordered them to construct 120 new vessels in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.28).

14. The ancient sources that describe this showdown are contradictory. Xenophon provides the most detail, but Diodorus 14.39.4–6 places it in the vicinity of Ephesus and claims that the Persian satraps outnumbered Dercylidas’ army by nearly 3:1.

15. ὅσοι δὲ ἦσαν ἀπὸ Πριήνης τε καὶ Αχιλλείου καὶ ἀπὸ νήσων καὶ τῶν Ἰωνίων πόλεων, οἱ μὲν τινὲς καταλιπόντες ἐν τῷ σίτῳ τὰ ὅπλα ἀπεδίδρασκον: καὶ γὰρ ἦν ῥαβδὸς ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῷ Μαιάνδρῳ πεδίῳ: ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἔμενον, δήλοι ἦσαν οὐ μενοῦντες. Krentz Xenophon, 170, suggests that Xeno-
Fleeing before the start of battle in their territory was not a good look for the Ionians, particularly because Tissaphernes and Dercylidas proceeded to negotiate a truce. This episode is potent evidence to support the long-held view that the Ionians were weak, yet, curiously, Xenophon offers neither explanation nor condemnation for their cowardice. Instead, he focuses on the leaders, Dercylidas and Tissaphernes. Despite having commanded this army for the better part of a year, there is no evidence that Dercylidas took the time to train his comparatively inexperienced troops. His successes in Aeolis had demonstrated his diplomatic cunning and ability to organize the logistics to carry on a lengthy siege but had not tested his soldiers on the battlefield. When he took these raw soldiers into battle, he proceeded to put them at a disadvantage, which led to their flight. At the same time, Xenophon exaggerates the episode to deride Tissaphernes’ decision to negotiate despite having the upper hand.16

The truce struck between Dercylidas and Tissaphernes required the Spartans to withdraw their forces and harmosts from Ionia in return for a promise from both sides guaranteeing Ionian autonomy (Xen. Hell. 3.2.18–20).17 This proposal was a nonstarter. Reports immediately circulated that the Persians were assembling a new fleet in Phoenicia for war in the Aegean (Xen. Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 14.39.2–4), and Lysander asked his friends in Ionia to appeal for a new expedition (Plut. Lys. 23.1; cf. Plut. Ages. 6.1).18 Thus, in 396, King Agesilaus left Sparta at the head of a force of thirty full Spartans, two thousand neodamodeis, and six thousand allies. Xenophon indicates that Lysander’s true objective was to restore his decarchies (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2), while about the rest of the Spartans he says, “What was esteemed the most was not fighting for Greece but conquering Asia” (κάλλιστον δὲ πάντων ἐκρίνετο τὸ μὴ περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τὸν ἀγῶνα καθιστάναι, Ages. 1.8).19

Upon arriving at Ephesus, Agesilaus embarked on a propaganda campaign to win support for his expedition, declaring to Tissaphernes his intention that

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19. Where Lysander wanted to restore the decarchies is left unstated, suggesting that they existed throughout Ionia, but see Chapter 4, “Enter Lysander.” A campaign might present opportunities to expand his system beyond its original bounds, but Lysander returned to Sparta after a falling out with Agesilaus. Xenophon describes the campaign as revenge for the Persian Wars; see John Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (New York: Routledge 1995), 116.
the poleis in Asia would be autonomous, like those across the Aegean (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5). The surviving accounts of Agesilaus’ expedition depict him as an energetic commander determined to offer the Ionians more than just words. Like Thibron and Dercylidas, he instructed them, as well as the communities of Aeolis and the Hellespont, to send soldiers to Ephesus when he arrived in Asia in 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11–12; Xen. Ages. 1.14).20 Xenophon goes on to explain how the Spartan king transformed the city until it appeared as though it was a workshop of war (πολέμου ἐργαστήριον) and put his army through a rigorous training regimen before the start of his second campaigning season (Hell. 3.4.16–19; cf. Nepos Ages. 3).21 Xenophon marvels: “What a sight it would have been to see: Agesilaus first, and then the other soldiers processing, garlanded, from the gymnasion, dedicating the garlands to Artemis” (Xen. Ages. 1.27; cf. Hell. 3.4.18).22 While it is tempting to dismiss Xenophon’s description as hyperbolic, almost like a cinematic training montage, it is also representative of the extent of Sparta’s investment in Ephesus in particular, which complicated Ionian decision-making after his departure. Agesilaus also went further to cultivate a relationship with the sanctuary of Artemis, and an inscription bearing his name likely indicates an otherwise unattested building phase at the temple during and after the campaign.23

His army newly energized, Agesilaus won a victory over the Persians outside Sardis in early 395.24 The conduct of the Ionian levies is unrecorded, but Agesilaus intended to bring them to Europe when he was recalled later that year (Xen. Hell. 4.2.4–5). According to Xenophon, Agesilaus realized that many of the Asian Greeks did not want to fight against Greeks, but a more likely explanation is that most did not want to cross to Europe because it meant leaving their homes. Moreover, in his speech to these soldiers, Xenophon has the king address them as his allies (ὦ ἄνδρες σύμμαχοι, Hell. 4.2.3). Yet, in the same scene in his biography of Agesilaus, Xenophon says that the Ionians mourned the king’s departure not just as they would their ruler, but their father or close

22. ἐπερρώσθη δ᾿ ἄν τις κἀκεῖνο ἰδών, Ἀγησίλαον μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους στρατιώτας ἐστεφανωμένους τε ὅπου ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων ἴοιεν, καὶ ἀνατιθέντας τοὺς στεφάνους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι.
friend (οὐχ ὡς ἄρχοντος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς πατρός καὶ ἑταίρου, Ages. 1.38). Al
died forces were supposed to follow Spartan leadership, but Agesilaus gave
the soldiers the option, thus tacitly admitting an end to ambitions in Asia.
Some Ionians continued to serve with Agesilaus after he returned to Europe
and even fought at the battle of Coronea in 394, where they routed their oppo-
nents (Xen. Hell. 4.3.15–17). For all of Agesilaus’ successes on land, failures at
sea dictated the Spartan withdrawal from Ionia. The expedition had correspon-
ded with a surge in the size of the Spartan fleet, including 120 new triremes that
Agesilaus commissioned his allies to construct (Xen. Hell. 3.4.28). As Hyland
has recently noted, the cost of this new Spartan fleet would have been
staggering. According to Xenophon, the poleis, including those of Ionia, and
some private individuals paid for the initial construction out of a desire to please
Agesilaus, but the construction costs were only a fraction of the bill. The largest
cost of these operational costs for veteran crews, and not only did Agesilaus not ben-
efit from Persian subsidies, but also there is little evidence that he was able to
tap into the same fiscal systems that a series of Spartan commanders had estab-
lished in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (see Chapter 4). It defies belief
that Ionians would not have had any financial obligations during this period
given the expectations both before and afterward, but the Spartans’ sphere of
influence did not include all of Ionia, and their ability to coerce resources out
of their allies was decidedly more limited than when the pressure came from
both Sparta and Persia.

These fiscal and military limitations brought an end to Spartan intervention
in Anatolia. The Spartans recalled Agesilaus and his forces from Ionia in 395/4
because of the outbreak of the Corinthian War (Diod. 14.83.1), but the Spar-
tan presence continued into 394 when the fleet, still beset by financial prob-
lems that reduced the crew sizes, campaigned south of Ionia. This campaign
ended with the battle of Cnidus, where a Persian fleet under the command of
the satrap Pharnabazus and the Athenian exile Conon defeated the Spartans.
In the aftermath of Cnidus, Conon and Pharnabazus swept away the Spartan arrangements in Anatolia, accepting the surrender of Teos, Erythrae, Ephesus, and Chios, and dissolving the pro-Spartan governments (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–3; Diod. 14.84.4; see below, “Athens Resurgent”). These changes marked a watershed moment in Ionia and the end of the Spartan relationships that had governed its history for nearly two decades, offering an opportunity to evaluate this Spartan period. From the start, the purported principle behind Spartan actions was the cause of Greek liberty, but, for exactly as long, Ionia had been at the center of a political arena where principles were a tool rather than an objective. The result was that Persian and Spartan financial mechanisms replaced the Athenian *phoros* that was supposed to have been so reviled. Moreover, while the Spartan garrisons in Ionia during the Ionian War might have been explained as a temporary measure, intermittent evidence indicates a Spartan presence in the 390s. At Chios, the arrival of Pharnabazus and Conon in 394 resulted in the expulsion of the garrison that may have been in place continuously for more than a decade. And yet, I argued above, the oligarchic regimes that came to power after 411 did not collapse with Lysander’s recall in 403. Their continued existence explains not only the new wave of expeditions in the 390s, but also how a grievance against Thibron prompted a change in Spartan leadership. Likewise, the fact that Ionian soldiers during this period repeatedly campaigned with or at the behest of Spartan commanders is indicative of the reciprocal relationship that developed between factions in the Ionian poleis and Spartans with imperial aspirations. The Spartans bound the Ionians to them and expected contributions in return, the same as any other ally.

Although Xenophon provides evidence for concern about certain friends of the Spartans in Ionia (*Hell.* 4.8.23), the circumstances and course of the final,...


31. The soldiers who remained with Agesilaus in 394 were likely employed as mercenaries since even Sparta employed them in increasing numbers during this period; see Louis Rawlings, *The Ancient Greeks at War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 169–73; Harvey F. Miller, “The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion,” *G&R* 31, no. 2 (1984): 153–60.
abortive Spartan expedition to Ionia in 392/1 under the command of Thibron indicates how that relationship had been waning. Ephesus and Priene still aided the Spartan forces (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17–19), but only a passing reference in Diodorus Siculus suggests that he employed soldiers from Asia (14.99.2). There is also reason to doubt Xenophon’s claim that Thibron used Ephesus as a base, as he instead settled for seizing a fortified settlement, perhaps near Mount Solmissus, from which to raid Persian territory. Local factors shaped this reception. On the one hand, men who had profited from the deep Spartan investment in Ephesus were likely willing to help him, and he might have garnered support by promising to help the Ephesians recover dependencies lost in the fifth century, while others at Ephesus intended to stand apart in the face of renewed Persian power. One day, Xenophon says, Persian horsemen launched an attack on Thibron while he was exercising with a discus after breakfast (Xen. Hell. 4.8.19). Thibron lost his life in the attack, and his routed soldiers took temporary refuge in unnamed friendly cities, perhaps including Ephesus. So ended the Spartan presence in Ionia.

Athens Resurgent? 394–387

If the battle of Cnidus marked a watershed moment in Ionia, one might ask what came next for the region. John Hyland has thoroughly refuted the traditional interpretation that the Persian king’s primary objective in supporting either Athens or Sparta was a “defensive balancing strategy” designed to

32. ὁ δὲ διαβάς τε καὶ ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἐφέσου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ πόλεων Πριήνης τε καὶ Λευκόφρους καὶ Αχιλλείου, ἔφερε καὶ ἦγε τὴν βασιλέως.
33. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 161, suggests that Thibron’s forces consisted of mercenaries but offers no provenance for their origin.
34. Hyland, Persian Interventions, 161, with n. 94, makes this proposal based on the Ephesian participation in an arbitration called by Struthas at about the same time. Diodorus calls the fort “Ionda” and the mountain Cornissus, which might be corruptions of the erstwhile Ephesian dependency Isinda and Mount Solmissus, though both identifications are highly speculative and run contrary to the idea that he operated primarily in the Maeander River valley.
35. On the relationship between Ephesus and Isinda, see Chapter 3; for Ephesian imperial ambitions, see Chapter 6. It is tempting to ascribe Thibron’s cool reception in Ionia as the result of the Spartan betrayal of Ionians’ autonomy in peace negotiations the previous year, as Noboru Sato, “Athens, Persia, Clazomenae, Erythrae: An Analysis of International Relationships in Asia Minor at the Beginning of the Fourth Century BCE,” BICS 49 (2006): 26, but this fails to account for the continuing existence of Ionian “friends” of Sparta, for the waxing and waning of enthusiasm for Spartan intervention over the preceding two decades, and for the fact that the Persian authorities were taking actions meant to demonstrate that Persian rule would be less intrusive than the Spartan equivalent.
36. Diodorus 14.99 records a different, more heroic, account of Thibron’s demise, saying that Struthas caught up to him while he returned from a successful raid.
exhaust two warring states that might otherwise meddle with his subjects. Instead, Hyland and others have demonstrated that the king’s primary objective in the Aegean was to reassert imperial control over western Anatolia such that he put resources behind whichever contender was willing to recognize that authority. And yet Persian officials in the region, including Pharnabazus and Struthas, initially applied a light touch to the reins of imperial control in ways that allowed local and regional wounds to fester.

The minimal Persian presence and Conon’s campaign set the stage for Athens to play a leading role in Ionia during the last years of the 390s. Conon himself had a complex relationship with Athens. He had been one of the generals responsible for the catastrophic defeat at Aegospotamoi in 405 that broke Athenian power and had subsequently fled to Cyprus before entering Persian service (Xen. Hell. 2.1.29). Pharnabazus nevertheless dispatched him to Athens in 393, where he was greeted as a liberator and granted a statue (Dem. 20.69; Diod. 14.39). Conon’s return was not without issue, as it reignited an old political rivalry with Thrasybulus. Despite their hostility, both men shared the ambition of restoring Athens while conspicuously avoiding its being seen as a threat to Persian dominance. In 393 or early 392, these activities began with Conon reestablishing Athenian diplomatic relationships in Ionia in ways that neither precluded nor superseded the Ionian obligations to Persia, particularly on the mainland.

The clearest signs of the Athenian presence in Ionia at this time were the honors Conon received throughout the region. Ephesus and Samos erected

38. I follow Hyland’s interpretation of Persian policy, which sees the apparent inactivity as a deliberate choice, rather than byrian, From Cyrus to Alexander, 646, who characterizes the Persian triumph as “fragile and uncertain” and suggests that “the Persians, willy-nilly, were once again squeezed between Sparta’s desire to maintain its dominion and Athens’s wish to reestablish its own.”
41. On Conon’s activities, see Dem. 20.69; Diod. 14.39.3; Nepos Conon 5; Justin 6.3.4; Buckler, Aegean Greece, 137. George L. Cawkwell, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 168, suggests that the Athenians rejected Conon’s prudent advice and set about entirely restoring its empire.
statues of Conon (Paus. 6.3.16), and an inscription from Erythrae praises him for his benefaction \((RO\ 8 = I.Ery.\ 6,\ l.\ 3)\) and gave him a series of standard honors, including making him \textit{proxenos} (l. 4) and giving him front seats at the theater at Erythrae (ll. 4–6), immunity to import dues (ll. 6–9), and, if he desired it, citizenship (ll. 10–11).\textsuperscript{42} The Erythraeans also granted Conon the unusual honor of choosing where to erect the statue, which was a practice that only became common in the Hellenistic period (Dem. 20.68–71; cf. Paus. 1.3.2).\textsuperscript{43} Erythrae probably gave these honors to Conon for his liberation of the polis after Cnidus, but the decree cannot be securely dated to 394, when Conon was still in Persian service. There is no mention of Pharnabazus on the stele, which underscored that these were Greek honors, but also likely indicates that they were offered after Conon returned to Athens as part of strengthening economic relationships between the two poleis.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, rather than merely indicating the change in imperial power, this decree was a sign of restored diplomatic activity between Erythrae and Athens.

Nowhere was Conon’s presence felt more deeply than on Chios, where he sent the rhetorician Isocrates to rewrite its constitution ([Plut.] \textit{Mor.} 837b).\textsuperscript{45} Isocrates had no known connection to Ionia before this assignment, but he had close ties to Conon, whose son Timotheus was his most notorious pupil. While on Chios, he took students such as the local politician Metrodorus, who later trained the orator Theocritus (\textit{Suda} theta 166).\textsuperscript{46} The details of the constitution Isocrates designed are unknown, but internal conflict and exiles contin-


\textsuperscript{44} On honors being a regular commodity in Greek economic practice, see Darel Tai Engen, \textit{Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415–307 BCE} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), particularly 8–12.


\textsuperscript{46} Isocrates supposedly opened a school on Chios that did not outlive his stay on the island, but he likely had other Chian students both there and when he opened his Athenian school. Ancient tradition suggested that the historian Theopompus was his pupil, but Michael A. Flower, \textit{Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 62, argues that “the pupil-teacher relationship . . . was an invention of Hellenistic biography and literary criticism,” based on Theopompus, \textit{BNJ} 115 F 25, where he claimed to be Isocrates’ contemporary. Contra Gordon S. Shrimpton, \textit{Theopompus the Historian} (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1991), 9–10.
ued to be a problem. Perhaps in 394/3, Demasistratus, the father of the historian Theopompus, was forced to go into exile on the charge of *laconism* (ἐπὶ λακωνισμῶι, *BNJ* 115 T 2), and the son was able to return to Chios only after Alexander conquered the island in 334/3 and decreed the return of exiles.\(^{47}\) Equally important, though, Isocrates’ constitution empowered a new faction in Chios. A Chian embassy came to forge a new alliance with Athens roughly a decade later in 384, and Slobodan Dušanić posits that it consisted of “relatives, intellectuals and party friends who had entertained close relations and collaborated politically along pro-Athenian lines, with Isocrates after c.393.”\(^{48}\)

Developments like these on Chios fueled Spartan concerns that poleis like Ephesus and Priene might suffer repercussions for having welcomed Thibron (see above, “Sparta in Anatolia”).\(^{49}\) The official Persian policy might have been to proceed a light touch, but this did not preclude local actors from using the realignment to purge their opponents as had happened to them during the Ionian War (Chapter 4). The Spartans therefore dispatched a fleet to the eastern Aegean in late 391 or early 390 that they reinforced with additional ships when they determined that the initial effort was too small to help their friends (αὐτὸν ἐλάττω ἔχοντα δύναμιν ἢ ὥστε τοὺς φίλους ῥῇτοι, *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.22–23).\(^{50}\) The Spartan ships sailed first to Samos, flipping its allegiance once more and conscripting additional ships to reinforce the flotilla, before doing the same at Cnidus and Rhodes (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.23; *Diod.* 14.97.3–5). This Spartan fleet continued to operate in the eastern Aegean into the summer of 390, but primarily in the southern theater near Rhodes, while the Persian authorities confronted Evagoras’ rebellion on Cyprus.

While Hyland suggests that Struthas remanded Ionian ships to the control of the Carian dynast Hecatomnus for operations on Cyprus (*Diod.* 14.98.3–4; *Theopompos, BNJ* 115 F 103.4), the limited Persian oversight and Spartan

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\(^{47}\) The date that Demasistratus went into exile is unknown. *Flower, Theopompus*, 13–17, posits an earlier date in 394 after the battle of Cnidus, while Shrimpton, *Theopompus*, 4, puts it on the opposite end of the spectrum c.340. See additional discussions in W. Robert Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1968), 2; Simon Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 131; William S. Morison, “Theopompus of Chios (115),” *BNJ* biographical commentary. I believe a date c.394/3 is most likely, but the same domestic competition that led to exile in the 390s could also have led to exile in the 380s when Agesilaus again advocated for Spartan intervention in Ionia (*Diod.* 15.5.2). For the relationship between Theopompus, Theocritus, and Alexander, see Chapter 7.

\(^{48}\) Dušanić, “Isocrates,” 7.

\(^{49}\) Xenophon uses the verb ὑποδέχομαι, which was frequently used for the act of admitting, receiving, or welcoming into one’s home, as well as for harboring fugitives.

\(^{50}\) *Diod.* 14.97.3 records just one fleet with three commanders, whom he calls Diphilas (Diphridas), Eudocimus (probably Ecdicus of *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.20), and Philodocus.
activities opened the door to renewed diplomatic relationships with Athens.\footnote{51} The next phase of Athenian involvement in Ionia came in 390, when Thrasybulus began again to extend Athenian imperial and economic power.\footnote{52} The primary focus of Thrasybulus’ expedition, and the aim of Athenian imperialism, was securing the grain route from the Black Sea, but Diodorus explicitly says that his expedition sailed first to Ionia, where he collected tribute from the allies.\footnote{53} Thrasybulus’ collections may well have been extortionate, and he died in an attack on Aspendus in 389 (Xen. *Hell.* 14.99.4), but evidence from soon thereafter indicates the partial restoration of financial systems from two decades before. An Athenian decree for Clazomenae from 387/6, for instance, praises the Clazomenaeans for both their past and their present devotion (πρόθυμός) to Athens and lays down the terms of the relationship between the two communities (RO 18 = *IG II*² 28).\footnote{54} According to the decree, Thrasybulus had established a new 5 percent harbor tax on Clazomenae (ll. 7–8), but also suggests that once he was no longer around to demand payment, they had stopped remitting it regularly (ll. 5–6). Now, though, representatives from Clazomenae wanted Athenian help. The decree goes on to discuss a renegade faction at Chyton from whom they had collected hostages (ll. 9–10),\footnote{55} issues of who had the authority to create and readmit exiles (ll. 12–13), the imposition of garrisons and governors (ll. 13–17), and the importation of grain (17–20).\footnote{56} The inscription included additional provisions that are too fragmentary.


\footnote{54} I follow the Greek text of *AIO* 800, which includes fragment d published in Angelos P. Matthaiou, “Νέες Αττικές επιγραφές,” *Horos* 17–21 (2004–9): 14–15 no. 6 (l. 8–18 = fr. d) that confirms an earlier reading that the inscription refers to Athenian generals operating in the vicinity of Clazomenae. *IG II*² 28 includes στρατηγοὺς at l. 20, but not στρατηγ[ῶν] at l. 11. The surviving relief includes depiction of two sheep, perhaps to visually represent the treaty partner Clazomenae that frequently depicted rams on its coins.


\footnote{56} Stylianou, *Historical Commentary*, 467, argues that this clause means that the inscription...
Accustomed to Obedience?

to make much of, but the surviving sections reveal a slate of local concerns that must have been common in Ionia after the events of the previous several decades. Certainly, an inscription found at Erythrae at roughly the same period addresses similar provisions that both reveal the continuing presence of local stasis and an assertion that the local community had the final authority to resolve their affairs \((RO\;17=SEG\;xxvi\;1282)\). In return for Athenian support, the Ionian poleis had to submit to Athenian hegemony in the form of the harbor tax. Critically, both inscriptions make provisions against the assertion of Athenian power even as they reveal the presence of Athenian generals. Thus, they reveal the extent to which this new Athenian imperialism was contingent upon responding to local concerns.

It has been suggested that there was a great deal of goodwill in Athens toward Clazomenae at the time of the decree, particularly since it offered surety of autonomy in contrast to the treaty with Erythrae. Noburu Sato, however, shows that the Athenian decision stemmed from two distinct factors. First, in Clazomenae itself the faction looking to side with Athens was firmly entrenched, having received hostages from the dissidents in Chyton, meaning that the Athenians did not fear that reconciliation would undermine the polis’ alignment the way that the same policy in Erythrae might have. Second, Athenian propaganda could play up the magnanimous support of Clazomenaeans in freedom, particularly to Athenians who wanted to continue an aggressive anti-Persian policy, while also allowing them to avoid getting entangled in an unwinnable war. From the Ionian perspective, groups within both Erythrae and Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to Athens in exchange. Certainly not everyone in Erythrae and Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to Athens in exchange. Certainly not everyone in Erythrae and Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to Athens in exchange. Certainly not everyone in Erythrae and Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to Athens in exchange. Certainly not everyone in Erythrae and Clazomenae believed that they could use Athenian support to consolidate control of the poleis against factions supported by Persia and were willing to offer concessions to Athens in exchange.

57. The inscription at Erythrae also includes provisions against handing the city over to the barbarian.


61. Ferdinand Nolte, Die historisch-politischen Voraussetzungen des Königsfriedens von 386 v. Chr. (Bamberg: Universität Frankfurt am Main, 1923), 7–8. However, there is no evidence for
The Road to Peace

The honors visited upon Conon and the apparent restoration of Athenian power mask the larger consequence of the Cnidus campaign: that is, the restoration of Persian hegemony in Ionia. Sometime between 391 and 388 Miletus and Myus submitted a dispute over land in the Maeander valley to the satrap Struthas (RO 16 = I.Priene 458). The outcome of the arbitration was inscribed on a stele in Miletus.

Two fragments from the inscription survive. The upper fragment contains substantial lacunae along the left side, but the surviving text indicates the location of the disputed territory (l. 5) and the involvement of the Persian king and Struthas (ll. 9–10), and that a certain group of people assembled (l. 11). Rhodes and Osborne accept the reconstruction of line 11, where about twenty letters are missing as ὅπωσι τῶν Ἰωνῶν δικασταὶ συνελθόσι, translating it “so that the Ionians’ jurors may assemble.” Their reading is strengthened by the lower fragment, which includes a list of jurors from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedus, and Ephesus. Rhodes and Osborne plausibly speculate that the names of the jurors from Phocaea, Teos, Colophon, Samos, and Priene fall into a lacuna between the two fragments. Their list includes the entirety of the dodecapolis listed by Herodotus, excepting only the disputants (1.142), but it is equally plausible that the list also included Smyrna, or, conversely, that one or more of the poleis did not send jurors, and thus “Ionian” is used as a general description rather than a specific group. In principle, though, I agree that Struthas used the member poleis of the Panionion as arbitrators, thus following the Persian precedent set by Artaphernes (Hdt. 6.42). Before the jurors heard the case, the Myians dropped the suit, a fact the Milesians submitted as evidence (ll. 37–40).

regime change after the treaty and there was a difference between a small polis like Clazomenae and the larger Chios and Samos.


63. Greek Historical Inscriptions, 70–71.

64. Diodorus 15.49, lists nine poleis as members of the Ionian League; see Stylianou, Historical Commentary, 49. Thomas Lenschau, “Alexander der Grosse und Chios,” Klio 33 (1940): 220–21, suggests that Diodorus excluded the island poleis Samos and Chios (one of whom sent jurors) and that he records the Panonia taking place at Ephesus because Priene did not properly exist this point. Priene was refounded in the fourth century; see Hornblower, Mausolus, 323–26; cf. Nancy Demand, “The Relocation of Priene Reconsidered,” Phoenix 40, no. 1 (1986): 35–44, but since Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.17) mentions Priene by name during the Spartan campaigns there is no reason to assume that it had ceased to exist.

65. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 495, says that Struthas’ use of the other Ionian poleis confirms the quality of evidence in Herodotus. Cf. 646. For the interpretation that Struthas gave the arbitration to the Ionian League, see Frank Adcock and D. J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 213; Luigi Piccirilli, Gli arbitrati interstatali Greci: Dalle origini al 338 A.C. (Pisa: Marlin, 1973), 158.
Despite its limitations, this inscription is a remarkable document. It is the only positive evidence for the Ionian poleis resolving a secular dispute as a collective group, albeit at the direction of the Persian satrap. It is for this reason that it is suggested that the Ionian League, supposedly defunct since the Persian Wars, had been revived at least by the 390s, perhaps as part of the Spartan intervention in the region (see Appendix 1). Yet there is no indication that the league took on a new political substance at this time. It is more likely that Struthas did not delegate the arbitration to the Ionian League but used membership in the koinon to choose which communities would send arbitrators. His actions also shared the responsibility for the decision among the other communities, thereby giving a veneer of regional agency while maintaining imperial control in Ionia—even before the creation of the King’s Peace in 387.

A group of Spartans led by Antalcidas had been trying to bargain with Persia for an end of the hostilities in the Aegean since 392, and they had been willing to give up claim to the freedom of the Ionians to achieve that end (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12–15, Andoc. 3; Plut. Ages. 23.1–2). At the same time, Athens continued its imperial pretensions in the region, which the Ionian poleis were willing to indulge so long as it meant that they kept their autonomy. In 387/6 the warring parties agreed to the King’s Peace, which formally recognized a distinction between the Ionian islands, which were to be autonomous, and the Anatolian littoral, which belonged to the Persian king (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25–31; Diod. 14.110.3).

According to Xenophon, the King’s Peace read (Hell. 5.1.31): King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the poleis in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek poleis, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to

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68. Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 169. This formulation emphasizes the difference between the two groups in terms of autonomy but had greater significance for the two “autonomous” poleis than those on the mainland.

69. Diod. 14.110.2–4 preserves a truncated account of the treaty that does not contradict Xenophon’s version; see Dillery, *Xenophon*, 201. Xenophon translation adapted from C. L. Brownson in the Loeb edition.
the Athenians. I will make war upon whoever does not accept this peace in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενᾶς καί Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἀλλὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ίμρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ χρήμασιν.

Using the traditional language of benevolent imperialism, Artaxerxes declared his authority over the Aegean. As Hyland has recently argued, the King's Peace was not a bilateral treaty between equals, but one in which the king delegated authority over the Aegean to Sparta and made few concessions to Athens.70 The inclusion of Clazomenae among the king’s possessions stands out in the extant text of the treaty because this small Ionian polis situated on an island close by the coast is paired with the large island of Cyprus as exceptions to the rule that the islands would remain autonomous. Stephen Ruzicka offers the most thorough assessment, arguing that “Clazomenae naturally and necessarily accompanied the claim to Cyprus” because the Gulf of Smyrna was an essential staging ground for operations against the larger island.71 Athenian support for Evagoras on Cyprus in the early 380s that coincided with imperialism in the Gulf of Smyrna revealed the potential for meddling in Persian affairs, even as they acknowledged the king’s rights on the mainland (e.g., RO 18 = IG II² 28, l. 25).72 Ruzicka overstates the Athenian threat to Persian suzerainty in Ionia, but he makes an important point, that the inclusion of both islands stood as a clear warning to the Athenians about how far the king’s power extended.

The King’s Peace formally divided Ionia, drawing a line between Clazomenae and the mainland cities on one side and Chios and Samos on the other. Poleis on the mainland, including Ephesus and Miletus, formally became Persian subjects; Chios and Samos, in contrast, received autonomy, extracted from their preexisting relationships with Athens and Sparta and protected by the general peace (koine eirene).73 This arrangement was one that Sparta, Athens,
and Thebes wielded like a bludgeon against each other, by the grace of the Persian king, but these wrangles had limited impact on the eastern Aegean. Artaxerxes had a strategic motivation to break the Athenian sway over Clazomenae, but Chios and Samos stood as testaments to the Persian resolve to uphold Greek autonomy, even though they too had been conquered by Persia in the Archaic period. The statuses of Chian and Samian territories on the continent is unknown, but they were likely held in arrangements that acknowledged Persian suzerainty through taxes even as the owners had citizenship within an autonomous polis.74

Thus, the stage was set for the next half century in Ionia. The Spartans, erstwhile allies of the Ionians, could be accused of abandoning the Greeks of Asia, even if this allegation was a rhetorical trope more than a political reality. With the King’s Peace still in effect three decades later in 354/3, an inscription testifies to an Erythraean dedication of a gold crown on the Athenian Acropolis (IG II2 1437, l. 12). Even more tellingly, there continued a lively trans-Aegean intellectual community that freely crossed the imaginary line drawn by the King’s Peace. Kings and dynasts around the Aegean, including the Hecatomnids of Caria and the Argeads in Macedonia, patronized Greek intellectuals, and Ionian elites continued to frequent Athens for education. On one occasion, Heraclides of Pontus made the trip from Athens to Colophon to acquire works by the poet Antimachus unavailable in Athens.75 The complete picture is in this way disjointed. Athenian authors, and particularly Isocrates and Demosthenes, place great rhetorical stock on the political landscape of the Aegean, but the King’s Peace did not radically alter the situation in Ionia.76


76. On these Athenian discourses about Ionia, see Joshua P. Nudell, “‘Who Cares about the Greeks Living in Asia?’: Ionia and Attic Orators in the Fourth Century,” CJ 114, no. 1 (2018): 163–90.
CHAPTER 6

A Region Divided

386–336

The wars of the 390s ended with a whimper in Ionia. After Spartan hegemony ebbed back toward the Peloponnese, Ionian political establishments looked once more to Athens for support. The result was a piecemeal restoration of Athenian economic hegemony over Clazomenae, Erythrae, and other poleis in northern Ionia in the early 380s. Even so, Persia maintained political control, as demonstrated by the appeal to Struthas to mediate between Miletus and Myus (see Chapter 5). The King’s Peace of 386, generally heralded as a triumph for the king, established new ground rules for political activity. The treaty stipulated that the mainland, including those mainland territories of Chios and Samos, belonged to Persia, but mandated the end to all other political arrangements in the Aegean under the banner of protecting autonomy. The half century that followed is commonly regarded as the darkness before the dawn in the eastern Aegean. With the Persian Empire decaying and the Greek poleis exhausted from decades of war, the fourth century was seen as a nadir in Ionia that would only pick up again with the conquests of Alexander the Great.

This characterization is misleading. The King’s Peace did constrain Ionian activity, but it did not mark as substantial a sea-change as is sometimes thought. Persian satraps continued to respond to local pressures in Ionia, and the Ionian poleis like Chios continued to find ways to work around the new restrictions. The years that followed the King’s Peace were turbulent, with the Athenian conquest of Samos and Ionia becoming engulfed by the Satrap’s Revolt, but it also saw the first phases of revitalization. Regional competition continued with hardly an interruption, but, unlike in European Greece, where new forms of regional cooperation also emerged, nothing of the sort took place in Ionia.
Chios and the Second Naval Confederacy

Chios had a long history of alliance with Athens, punctuated by a period of extreme hostility. It had been one of the few Delian League states to continue providing ships until the outbreak of the Ionian War in 412 and had been an Athenian ally again in the Corinthian War after 394. The King’s Peace formally ended the second period of alliance in 386, but the separation lasted just two years. In 384 Chios and Athens ratified a defensive alliance that reaffirmed Chian autonomy (RO 20 = IG II² 34, ll. 19–20) and created a mutual defense pact (ll. 25–29) to last in perpetuity (l. 35).¹ This treaty between Chios and Athens was constructed to exist in the new world of the King’s Peace, but it owed its creation to the earlier relationships between the two communities. The inscription concludes with a list of four members from the Chian delegation, Bryon, Apelles, Theocritus, and Archelaus (ll. 42–43).² Bryon and Theocritus belonged to a cadre of influential Chians who had collaborated and studied with Isocrates when he established his school on the island in 393 ([Plut.] Mor. 837C), which indicates a continuity of the political regime supported by Athens from the 390s.³ Yet the fact that a treaty of this sort might have been construed as contravening the new peace—hence the careful language explaining that it did not do so (ll. 21–23)—makes it necessary to ask whether something happened in 385/4 to prompt an embassy to Athens.

Diodorus Siculus claims that the Athenians sent embassies to Chios and other cities subject to Sparta, encouraging them to join a cause of liberty (15.28.1–3), but his account is confused. The inclusion of Byzantium and other Greek poleis clearly indicates that Diodorus describes the foundation of the Second Naval Confederacy in 379, but those poleis, including Chios, were not Spartan subjects.⁴ There is no reason to doubt that there was Athenian initiative behind the foundation of the Second Naval Confederacy, but Diodorus’ source skews heavily toward an anti-Spartan agenda and thus should be accepted

¹. A similar alliance appears in the fragmentary IG II² 35 without the Athenian partner, which, if it refers to the same treaty, may be a copy or a reaffirmation several years later.
². There is a lacuna in the inscription, meaning that the names Apelles and Theocritus are restored.
warily when considering the motivations of the new members, let alone Chios in 384.5

Another possible explanation is the threat of war in the eastern Aegean. In his *Panegyricus* of 380, Isocrates warned of the Persian threat to Chios along with Samos and Rhodes should they strengthen the garrisons in the coastal poleis (4.163).6 Slobodan Dušanić, however, has highlighted the inconsistencies behind this declaration. While Isocrates warns about the Persian threat, he also obscures a more complicated reality. The most pressing threat to Chios came in the person of Glos, a rebel Persian admiral with Spartan support who may have been called “Persian” (Diod. 15.9.5).7 Moreover, if Isocrates is correct that there was a Persian military buildup in mainland Ionia in the second half of the 380s, it was part of the campaign against Glos and his successor Tachus, rather than one designed to threaten Chios.8 Dušanić’s interpretation is attractive because he supplies a clear and present danger that the Chians reacted to and explains the lengthy duration of the Persian military presence in Ionia. Further, he reconciles the statement from Isocrates that Chios would join Persia with Diodorus’ claim that the Chians wished to rebel from Sparta and clears the Persians of any violation of the peace. There is just one difficulty: the dates.

Dušanić argues that the fighting in Cyprus, which began in 386/5, lasted no more than two years, and that it was during that time that Tiribazus was arrested and Glos led his rebellion. This argument generally accepts the Diodoran chronology and places Glos’ revolt early in 384,9 but it runs counter to the consensus of modern scholarship, which pushes the end of the Cyprian War and Glos’ revolt into the last years of the 380s, sometimes as late as 380/79 and

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7. Slobodan Dušanić, “The Attic-Chian Alliance (‘IG’ II 2 34) and the ‘Troubles in Greece’ of the Late 380’s BC,” *ZPE* 133 (2000): 22–28. Glos was probably an Egyptian who had inherited from his father estates in Ionia and married the daughter of the Persian satrap Tiribazus, whose patronage had helped secure his position in the campaign against Evagoras. After Tiribazus was arrested, Glos took the soldiers under his command and tried to set himself up as an independent dynast in western Anatolia. Cf. Simon Hornblower, “Persia,” in *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 6, ed. David M. Lewis, John Boardman, Simon Hornblower, and Martin Ostwald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 81–82; Stephen Ruzicka, “Glos, Son of Tamos, and the End of the Cypriot War,” *Historia* 48, no. 1 (1999): 23–43. Stylianou, *Historical Commentary*, 161, suggests that he was Carian. Dušanić argues that that sudden reversal of Spartan policy was the result of internal divisions and a party in Sparta led by Agesilaus that had not been in favor of the peace to begin with, which also corresponds with Diod. 15.5.2, who says that the Spartans began encouraging stasis in poleis throughout Greece in the latter half of the 380s; see Stylianou, 168–74.


thus after the treaty between Athens and Chios. Diodorus places two years of fighting in Cyprus in between the battle of Citium, in which Glos played a critical role, and when Evagoras was bottled up in Salamis, with other events that took place between 386 and 384. But Evagoras had begun his revolt in c.390 and did not finally surrender until 380, so some scholars have moved the date of Citium to 383 to align the two years of fighting attested by Ephorus (by way of Diodorus) with the two years immediately preceding Evagoras’ surrender. Gordon Shrimpton, like Dušanić, supports the Diodoran chronology and argues that the war in Cyprus had effectively ended in 384. However, he maintains that Evagoras negotiated a conditional surrender with Orontes and the two men conspired to have Glos’ father-in-law Tiribazus arrested that year, which both prompted Glos’ rebellion and bought Evagoras several years of a cold war in which to negotiate for a lenient surrender with Artaxerxes. Thus Shrimpton dates Glos’ rebellion late in 384 or 383, still postdating the new Chian-Attic alliance.

Glos did threaten Chios in the late 380s before he was assassinated in 383/2 (Diod. 15.18.1), but, even if his revolt was underway in 384, the Chian-Attic alliance was not a response to that specific threat. The eastern Aegean in the 380s was particularly volatile. There had been a Persian civil war within recent memory, there were multiple ambitious satraps with various levels of independence from Persia conniving against one another, and Evagoras schemed against Persia on Cyprus. In other words, as soon as the peace was established the threat of war emerged. Likewise, the Spartan imperialist party centered on Agesilaus probably began to fan the flames of existing domestic tensions as early as 386/5 (Diod. 15.5.2), before Glos’ revolt, and could equally have caused the Chians to seek an alliance with Athens. Once Glos went into revolt, the


11. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 653; Ruzicka, “Glos,” 23–43.


13. Diodorus’ account of the end of Glos’ rebellion ends abruptly with an aside about the dispute between Clazomenae and Cyne, probably because his source for this section, Ephorus, related the story about his native community losing to the tricky Ionians; see Stylianou, Historical Commentary, 208–9.
Chians would not have sought an alliance because they saw a war brewing, but because a war was upon them. The circumstances were therefore ripe for Chios to look for an alliance in 384, without needing to tie the cause to the appearance of Glos.

The wording of the Attic-Chian alliance of 384 makes it clear that its composers intended to abide by the terms of the King's Peace (RO 20 = IG II² 34, ll. 7–22). There are parallels between this treaty and the alliance between Athens and Corcyra in 433 (Thuc. 1.44) that incited conflict even though it did not violate the letter of the Thirty Years Peace, and it is tempting to see an instance of Athenian imperial policy repeating itself. However, the Chians declare in the treaty that “they have come offering good things to the people of Athens and to all of Greece and to the king; be it decreed by the people” (καὶ ἥκοσιν ἀγαθὰ [ἐπαγγελλόμενοι τῷ] δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηνα[ῖων καὶ ἀπάση τῇ Ἑ]λλά[δι καὶ βασιλεί, [ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δ]ήμι|[ω, RO 20 = IG II² 34, ll. 13–16]. They, at least, had a particular interest in making sure that the treaty did not antagonize Persia. Further, both parties treated 386 as a watershed, so while the preexisting relationship between Chios and Athens helped lead to the treaty in 384, they meticulously avoided that justification for the alliance in the treaty’s language. Reverting to an earlier alliance would have violated the peace by retying the knot of animosities that had drawn Greece into the Corinthian War and risked Persian retaliation. Isocrates may have claimed, in an Orwellian moment, that Chios and Athens had never not been allies (14.27–28), but the sentiment was, predictably, mere rhetoric.

The Attic-Chian alliance of 384 established the diplomatic framework for the Second Athenian League. In 378, Chios and Byzantium, along with Rhodes and the Lesbian poleis Methymna and Mytilene, renewed their treaties with Athens under the framework of the new confederacy (Diod. 15.30.2). A stele

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Accustomed to Obedience?

from the Athenian agora (RO 22 = IG I2 43) establishing the prospectus for the new league states that the terms would be the same for new allies as they were for Chios, in a callback to the treaty in 384 (μήτε φρορὰν εἰσδεχομένωι μήτε ἄρχοντα υποδεχομένωι μήτε φόρον χέροντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐφ᾽ οἴσπερ Χῖου, ll. 21–24). Appropriately, Chios appears at the head of the list of member states (l. 79; cf. Diod. 15.28.3). Moreover, in the same way that the Attic-Chian alliance had explicitly described how it did not violate the King's Peace, the new confederacy professed to be defensive in nature and in accordance with the peace (ll. 9–15):19

So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live in their own territory in security, [and so that the peace and friendship sworn by the Greeks and the king in accordance with the agreements may be in force and endure,] be it decreed by the people.

The decree is especially lacunose, but there is general agreement about the thrust of the text. In the early years of its existence, the confederacy was guided by the


synedrion chaired by one of the delegates. The synedrion met in Athens, but the Athenians stood apart from it, holding no vote. In principle, the confederacy was a voluntary association to protest high-handed Spartan actions such as garrisons in Boeotia (e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10) and Sphodrias’ raid on the Pireaeus in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20; Diod. 15.29.5–6). The council had legal protections, and the Athenians likely swore to abide by the decisions of the koinon, but a long Athenian shadow lay over the league. Not only did the synedrion meet in Athens, but it was also created by a decree of the Athenian Assembly. The league also established a syntaxis (contribution) required of the allies, changing the term from phoros to avoid associations with the fifth-century empire. The league also afforded certain protections, particularly against piracy. Everyone outside this racket was still covered by the King’s Peace in theory, but their security depended on the willingness and ability of the Persian king and his proxies in the Aegean to enforce the agreement. In practice, this was a paper shield, as the Samians would discover in 366.

The Destruction of Samos?

Samos never joined the new Athenian alliance. As early as Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* in 380, there was a possible estrangement between the two, since Isocrates groups Samos with Chios and Rhodes as communities with the potential for


24. Rutishauser, *Athens and the Cyclades*, 168–69, notes the issues in interpreting the syntaxis, including that there is contradictory evidence for who set the rates, the synedrion or the Athenian ecclesia, and that its existence is not securely dated before 371, though Dreher, *Hegemon und Symmachoi*, 41–89, concludes that it was in place from the inception. On the syntaxis, see Patrice Brun, *Eisphora-Syntaxis-Stratiotika: Recherches sur les finances militaires d’Athènes au IVe siècle av. J.-C.* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1983), 74–142, with 100–105 on how the allies received the shift. Most of the evidence for the syntaxis postdates Chios’ departure from the league, so I will not explore the issue in depth here.
Persian sympathies (4.163). Isocrates’ inclusion of Chios, an ally for multiple years at the time of publication, underscores the potential threat to Athenian interests in the eastern Aegean and might imply otherwise unattested domestic tensions on the island. Rhodes, moreover, was a founding member of the new Athenian confederacy. It might be expected that Samos, an Athenian ally to the bitter end of the Peloponnesian War, might follow suit, but nothing of the sort happened.

Sometime in the early 360s, Tigranes, a Persian hyparch, fulfilled Isocrates’ prophecy by establishing a garrison on Samos. The circumstances of this garrison, which Athenian sources present as a violation of the King’s Peace (e.g., Dem. 15.9), are unknown. The most probable suggestion is that Tigranes was a deputy of Mausolus, the satrap of Caria, and that the garrison was an early instance of his imperial ambition. It is also possible that Tigranes worked for another satrap who installed the garrison in response to either Mausolus’ aggression or the overtures of Ariobarzanes, a satrap then in revolt. The picture changes somewhat when considering the Samians. The competing satrapal agendas combined with the lack of evidence for a regime change in support of exiles makes it likely that this garrison was invited rather than imposed. Nevertheless, in 366, Timotheus led an Athenian fleet to the eastern Aegean. Nominally he was there to support Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phyrgia, but in fact he landed on Samos and captured it after a ten-month siege (Isoc. 14.111; [Arist.] Oec. 2.1350b; cf. Polyaeus 3.10.9–10).

Timotheus’ capture of Samos in 366/5 had long-lasting effects on Ionia. Within a year, the Athenians dissolved the Samian demos and established the first-wave cleruchies, placing an estimated six thousand to twelve thousand new residents on the island over the next decade (Philochorus, BNJ 328 F 154; Strabo 14.1.18).


Heraclides Ponticus that Aristotle quoted in the *Samian Politeia* (οὶ δὲ ἐλθόντες πάντας ἐξέβαλον, Arist. F. 611.35 Rose), a common assumption is that these cleruchs displaced the entire population of Samos. In time, this action came to be regarded as a grave injustice committed by Athens, and inscriptions testify to individuals and poleis that gave aid to the exiles during this period, while the Athenians maintained that they liberated the island. Before turning to the consequences, it is worth examining in more detail the circumstances of how this conquest came about. In capturing Samos, Timotheus violated the King's Peace but not the charter of the Second Naval Confederacy (Dem. 15.9). Where the King's Peace had guaranteed protection for every polis, the Athenian treaty offered protection only to members of the confederacy (*RO* 22 = *IG* I² 43; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2). The lack of sources for the event complicates any attempt at reconstruction in that it requires parsing convoluted historical memory that offers little plausible causality. Most scholars interpret the expedition as naked imperialism against a polis outside of the league, rightfully mistrusting Athenian protestations of Panhellenic altruism. Nevertheless, there is another interpretation that considers the local conditions on Samos.

up oppressed or in exile after 352. There is no evidence of a Samian polis after 365 until Alexander's decision in 324/3. Shipley, *Samos*, 141–42, suggests many now-disenfranchised citizens retreated to the mountains and lived on the fringes of society. All scholars accept that some of the cleruchs were ancestral Samians and that the exiled population centered on those who had resisted Athens. Thus Shipley, *Samos*, 140: “Only the ruling oligarchs had anything to fear.” The differences of opinion come from where one sits on the sliding scale of the two extremes. The larger the ancestral Samian component, the smaller the number of exiles, and vice versa. Cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 198–200; Shipley, *Samos*, 141–43; Raphael Sealey, “IG II² 1609 and the Transformation of the Athenian Sea-League,” *Phoenix* 11, no. 3 (1957): 95–97, 108; Raphael Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 106. The cleruchy is also attested by a partial list of settlers, *IG* II² 1952. Cf. *IG* II² 108; Isoc. 15.111–12; Dem 15.9; Nepos *Timaeus* 1.2.


29. There were two competing cultural memories about Timotheus' conquest at work, with the anti-Athenian one winning out in part because it was a tool to reunify the polis after the return of the exiles in 323/2; see Joshua P. Nudell, “Remembering Injustice as the Perpetrator? Athenian Orators, Cultural Memory, and the Athenian Conquest of Samos,” in *The Orators and Their Treatment of the Recent Past*, ed. Aggelos Kapellos (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2022), 447–63.


31. Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 12. It has been posited that the Athenian takeover of Samos was a response to the Theban naval construction at about the same time; see J. M. Cook, “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” *JHS* 81 (1961): 70 n. 81, and Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 198, but such an explanation reverses the causation.

32. This would have been in keeping with fifth-century practice except that the Athenians enrolled "liberated" poleis into the Delian League instead of dissolving the polis.
An Athenian Decree at the end of the Peloponnesian War granted Samians Athenian citizenship, which they reinscribed after the original stele was destroyed by the Thirty (RO 2 = IG I3 127, ll.12–13; see Chapter 4). Further, Timotheus’ family had long had close ties to Ionia. After a triumphant campaign in 394 his father, Conon, had received honorary statues at Erythrae (RO 8 = SIG3 134), Ephesus, and Samos (Paus. 6.3.16) and had commissioned Isocrates to establish a new constitution on Chios ([Plut.] Mor. 837b), but a subsequent Spartan campaign had overturned the regime on Samos again (Xen. Hell. 4.8.23; Diod. 14.97.3–5; see Chapter 5). There is no further information on the Samian constitution, and Shipley believes that the expulsion of the Spartan decarchy might have still not put to rights the preceding decades of social upheaval. By 366/5, therefore, it is entirely plausible that Timotheus responded to a direct appeal from a group of Samians who benefited from the close ties to Athens and felt threatened by the presence of Tigranes. Instead of restoring Samos, though, subsequent Athenian actions created a hybrid community where ancestral Samians, some with Athenian citizenship, mingled with Athenians in the subordinate polis on Samos.33 The transition created Samian exiles, and their numbers likely grew in step with the arrival of additional cleruchs, but an arrangement of the sort I just described helps explain why there is no evidence for the widespread consequences one might expect from the complete expulsion of a polis with the population of Samos.

Where does that leave the exiles, whom Hornblower describes as “Samians who had been put on the streets of Greece by Athens, [who] were walking mementoes to the power of Fortune, τύχη, no less than of the πλεονεξία, the Greed, of the Athenians”?34 Shipley notes that the Samians did not form a community in exile in their mainland περαια, perhaps because most of the land no longer belonged to them.35 Instead, the exiles dispersed, possibly settling as far away as Sicily.36 Most probably took refuge in nearby cities, including Ery-
thrae and Miletus, which received decrees of thanks after the Samians recovered their island after 322 (see Chapter 8). The Samians might have received an outpouring of pan-Ionian generosity, but there is only evidence for aid from cities within Mausolus’ sphere of influence, suggesting that they did so out at his behest. Timotheus had supported his rival Ariobarzanes, and the gesture cost Mausolus nothing. Exile and oppression by Athens were powerful stories to help forge a viable polis in the early Hellenistic period, but they give a misleading impression of what happened on Samos in 366/5.

The Satrap’s Revolt

The Persian Empire was facing imminent doom in the late 360s and early 350s, at least according to Diodorus (15.90.3). He claims that the entire Mediterranean coast from Anatolia to Egypt went into revolt, cutting off a full half of the annual tribute, and that the problems caused by the death of Artaxerxes II and the accession of Artaxerxes III in 358 compounded these crises (15.90.3–4, 93.1). Diodorus’ pronouncements of Persian weakness are greatly exaggerated. The empire remained structurally sound, though that fact was probably difficult to tell from Ionia on its fringes. There was a fracturing of royal control in Anatolia, troubles that Pierre Briant declares “had always been there in latent form.”

The so-called Great Satrap’s Revolt erupted into open warfare in the early 360s. Far from an organized coalition of rebel satraps led by Orontes, Artaxerxes II confronted a series of local uprisings. Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, may have quietly renounced his loyalty to Persia as early as the 370s, but he openly declared his revolt sometime before 366, and Datames, the satrap of Cappadocia, joined him. Artaxerxes ordered the satrap of Lydia, Autophradates, and the Hecatomnid dynast Mausolus to defeat the rebels and, at this juncture, Orontes, a Persian possibly in disgrace for slandering Tiribazus in Cyprus in the 380s (assuming it is the same man), expanded his position in Mysia. Diodorus implies that this was a spontaneous rebellion, but “revolt”

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37. On the contradictions in this passage, see Stylianou, Historical Commentary, 527–36.
41. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 662; Simon Hornblower, “Asia Minor,” in Cambridge
was endemic in Anatolia, where semiautonomous satraps and dynasts contended with Greek poleis.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, Maria Brosius describes Persian diplomacy within and beyond Persian territory as guided by “pragmatism and political expediency.”\textsuperscript{43} Among the exaggerated number of regions in revolt listed by Diodorus is Ionia (15.90.3–4), but this is a feature of the relevant satraps going into revolt rather than any action taken by the Ionian poleis. When the Ionians were ordered to pay tribute to a loyal satrap, they readily did so, and, since the satrap was the representative of the king, the communities were not subject to punishment.\textsuperscript{44}

The Rising Power in the South: Caria and Ionia

Mainland Ionia was unambiguously part of the Achaemenid empire in the 360s, but administration of the region was split between the Autophradates, the satrap at Sardis, and Mausolus of Caria. The two rivals undoubtedly both recruited mercenaries from Ionia (Diod. 15.91.2–4). However, while rivalry between satraps was nothing new, the fact that Mausolus was also the hereditary dynast over Caria, which had increasing exchange with Ionia in this period, put him in a unique position to exert influence in ways not often seen before. In this way, the Satrap’s Revolt manifested as another competition over Ionia. Mausolus played an ambiguous role in these events, first helping the loyal Persian forces, and later withdrawing from the campaign, and then supporting the Spartans, and Diodorus lists him among the enemies of Artaxerxes (Diod. 15.90.3). Similarly, it is possible that Mausolus withdrew from the campaign because he needed to safeguard his own territory from Athenian attacks while Timotheus besieged Samos.\textsuperscript{45} The most probable explanation is that the Carian dynast hedged his bets by supporting both sides of the conflict, joining the

\textsuperscript{42} Briant, \textit{From Cyrus to Alexander}, 663.
\textsuperscript{44} Brosius, “Persian Diplomacy,” 163, notes that the only revolts punished by Persia were those that threatened the Persian peace.
\textsuperscript{45} Ruzicka, \textit{Politics of a Persian Dynasty}, 69.
revolt but not so deeply that he could not return to being loyal, while also trying to enhance his local position.46 Between the conclusion of the Satraps' Revolt in the late 360s and the start of the Social War in 357 there is no clear evidence for Mausolus' activity in Ionia, but he likely used the pretext of the revolt to plant his seeds, the fruits of which he reaped in the 350s. There is a frustrating lack of chronological detail for Ionia during these years, but they were dominated by interaction with Caria.

One example of this interaction comes from Erythrae. Sometime in the mid-fourth century, the Erythraeans abandoned the first site of their polis and moved some nineteen kilometers around the bay.47 Simon Hornblower suggests that the relocation was prompted, or at least had been enabled, by Mausolus, whose relationship with the polis blossomed shortly thereafter.48 In either c.365 or c.357, Erythrae granted honors to Mausolus and his sister-wife Artemisia because he was an aner agathos (RO 56 = SIG3 168, l. 3).49 The decree declared that Mausolus was an euergetes to the polis, and awarded notable honors in making him proxenos and citizen and giving the right to sail into and out of the harbor without needing permission through a treaty (ll. 5–8).50 The Erythraeans also erected a bronze statue of Mausolus in the agora and a stone one of Artemisia beside the temple of Athena, both with crowns, albeit hers at a lesser expense (ll. 10–13). Whether the decree ought to date to Mausolus' first spate of activity in the gulf of Smyrna in the 360s or the second in 357, which I prefer, it points to his direct involvement in local Ionian politics. The rhetor Naucrates

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47. J. M. Cook, "Old Smyrna," *ABSA* 53–54 (1958–59): 21–22; Hornblower, "Asia Minor," 224–25. Philip Kinns, "Ionia: The Pattern of Coinage during the Last Century of the Persian Empire," *REA* 91, nos. 1–2 (1989): 186, identifies series of coins minted in c.350–340 that may be associated with the need for a new public works program, noting that Erythrae did not have widespread coinage before this series. However, this series could have been used to pay for ongoing construction.
48. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 100, 108. Mausolus is, notably, granted the honors by the Erythraean boule, not the demos, indicating that a narrow faction in Erythrae dominated the political decision-making.
49. Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 267, and Debord, *L'Asie Mineure*, 392, date the inscription vaguely to the mid-350s at the same time that Mausolus sent aid to Chios, though Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 110, and Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 73, plausibly suggest that it may date to the mid-360s after the Athenian conquest of Samos, when the Erythraeans offered aid to refugees. The terminus ante quem for the honors must be 353, when Mausolus died. I generally follow Ernst Badian, "A document of Artaxerxes IV?; " in *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in ancient history and prehistory*, ed. Konrad H. Kinzel (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977), 44 n. 6 in believing that there is not enough evidence to positively date the decree.
50. Mack, *Proxeny and Polis*, 230, observes that premier Hellenistic kings did not receive proxenia, which makes this honor for Mausolus particularly of note, and citizenship was even more substantial than proxeny. I believe it speaks to various avenues through which Mausolus approached the poleis of Ionia. His willingness to project conspicuously Greek symbolic language set him apart from other Persian administrators.
from Erythrae was one of the Greek intellectuals who gave an encomium at Mausolus’ funeral, which was also attended by the exiled Chian Theopompus (Theopompus, BNJ 115 T 6a and b).\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the close relationship between Erythrae and Mausolus, as early as the mid-360s Timotheus probably sent ships to the city. The result was a naval battle against Carian ships off Chios (Isaeus 6.27; cf. Dem. 8.24).\textsuperscript{52} The mission of this flotilla is unknown, but it could have been for the purposes of extorting funds for his campaign war chest, to enact regime change, or, most likely, both. Timotheus had a family connection with Erythrae where the citizens had honored his father Conon after the battle of Cnidus in 394 by making him proxenos (RO 8 = SIG\textsuperscript{3} 134), a position Timotheus would have inherited.\textsuperscript{53} It is likely that Timotheus’ contacts in Erythrae were marginalized by Mausolus’ activities and that he promised Timotheus resources in return for his support, which also explains why Mausolus was willing to commit to the defense of Erythrae. This did not, however, mean that Erythrae ceased to be in contact with Athens, where its citizens dedicated a crown on the Athenian Acropolis in c.350 (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1437, l. 12).

Though less well documented, Mausolus’ relationship with other Ionian poleis parallels the one with Erythrae. Miletus, the Ionian city closest to Caria, must have been within the Hecatomnid sphere of influence from an early date, albeit with its government propped up by the Hecatomnid dynasty rather than direct rule.\textsuperscript{54} Polyaeus records that Mausolus sent one Aegyptus to Miletus, but his scheme to capture the polis failed (6.8). Hornblower surmises that Mausolus wanted to annex the Milesian hinterland,\textsuperscript{55} but that he acted through a subordinate so that he was not directly implicated. It is impossible to know when, if at all, the plot took place, but the story fits plausibly before 365, when Mausolus first asserted his influence in Ionia. Another stratagem records how Mausolus captured Latmus.\textsuperscript{56} Polyaeus says that Mausolus first returned Latmian hostages and appointed others to his bodyguard and indulged the community in all ways (7.23.2).\textsuperscript{57} He then pretended to lead his forces to Pygela,

\textsuperscript{51} Hornblower, \textit{Mausolus}, 109–10, 334, with n. 9.
\textsuperscript{54} Hornblower, \textit{Mausolus}, 111; Ruzicka, \textit{Politics of a Persian Dynasty}, 72–73.
\textsuperscript{55} Hornblower, \textit{Mausolus}, 111.
\textsuperscript{57} Cf. Polyaeus 8.53.4, who attributes the same trick to Artemisia. The ploy more plausibly belongs to Mausolus; confusion stems from the name of his sister-wife, another Artemisia. There
which took him past Latmus. When the citizens came out to greet him, his forces captured the community. Many details about this episode are vague, but it demonstrates not only that Mausolus was already active in the region, but also that he sought to strengthen his position through flattery and force.

And yet Miletus must have been on friendly terms with Caria by Mausolus’ death since, shortly thereafter, the citizens honored his successors Idreius and Ada with statues at Delphi (Tod 2 161B = SIG3 225). Moreover, silver coins of a Milesian type that date to the fourth century and bear the letters EKA and MA, probably abbreviations of MA[αύσσολλος] and EKA[τόμνος], have been discovered between Halicarnassus and Miletus. Simon Hornblower believes that these coins, rather than mimicking the Milesian type, are the Milesian type, indicating that Miletus minted Hecatomnid coinage. Miletus, like Erythrae, aided Samian refugees, perhaps at the behest of Mausolus, and Hornblower posits that Miletus may have introduced the worship of the Carian deity Zeus Labraundeus during this same period. Much as was the case in Ephesus, however, seeking a purely Greek culture in Miletus is a fallacy. Miletus contained a large Carian population (Hdt. 1.146) so the appearance of a Carian deity need not have been introduced by Mausolus.

Hecatomnid influence also manifested in Priene, but the nature of this interaction is subject to debate. Excavations at Priene in the early twentieth century did not discover evidence of a settlement on the site before the Hellenistic period. They concluded that the polis was refounded in the middle of the fourth century, perhaps moving from the port city of Naulochon, which produced coins in its own name around this period. Supporting their hypothesis was that the early fourth-century Oxyrhynchus Historian said that Priene was situated near the mouth of the Maeander River (12.3), while Strabo said that the city in his day (and still today) lay more than forty stadia from the sea.

are several places in the region that carry the toponym “Latmus.” While one of those belonged to Miletus, this episode more likely refers to a separate polis of the same name that was later absorbed into Heracleia; see Pernille Flensted-Jensen, “Caria,” in An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, ed. Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1126–27.

60. Hornblower, Mausolus, 111.
61. Hornblower, Mausolus, 111–12.
Although not every scholar accepts the relocation hypothesis, the predominant issue was whether the excavator’s thesis that Alexander refounded the city in the 330s should be accepted or whether the facts that Priene contributed delegates to the Amphictyonic Council in 343 (Aesch. 2.116) and that the temple of Athena was nearing completion when Alexander passed through the region indicate Hecatomnid influence. As Nancy Demand aptly notes in her rejection of the refoundation hypothesis, much of the scholarship on fourth-century Priene is based on the absence of evidence.

The most recent analysis of the monuments suggest that the Hellenistic foundation level was established c.370. This chronology rules out both Mausolus and Alexander as the driving force behind the rebirth of Priene, but it nevertheless fell within the Carian sphere of influence. There is no direct evidence connecting Mausolus and his successors to the new building projects, but Priene was a beneficiary of the Ionian renaissance that saw widespread cultural exchange between Ionia and Caria. It was during this period that work began on a new temple of Athena Polias, and Vitruvius identifies its architect as Pytheus, who also worked on the Mausoleum in Halicarnassus. Yet it is precisely the establishment of this cult that leads Simon Hornblower to deny Mausolus a role in patronizing the city on the grounds that it, and others with Attic implications such as Demeter and Kore, would have run counter to the

63. See also Pseudo-Skylax 98.
64. See particularly Nancy Demand, “The Relocation of Priene Reconsidered,” Phoenix 40, no. 1 (1986): 35–44, who raises pertinent objections, particularly about how the silting of the Maean-dar would have changed the distance between the city and the sea.
Carian interests. Nor is the name Pytheus appearing in both contexts concrete evidence that Mausolus or Ada financed both projects. But these projects nevertheless fit within a larger context of civic projects undertaken in Caria around this same time. Eloisa Paganoni has recently proposed a new explanation for Hecatomnid influence, connecting it with a concerted effort on the part of Mausolus to gain influence at the Panionion sanctuary on Mount Mycale, of which Priene was a traditional supervisor. This thesis accounts for neither Ionian competition over the sanctuary nor the absence of evidence for direct patronage, but offers an attractive explanation for why the Hecatomnids might have taken an interest in the city. Moreover, Hecatomnid patronage of Priene did not mean that the citizen body was completely beholden to the Carians.

However, not every Ionian polis fell under the sway of Mausolus. Ephesus had become a regional power in its own right. Under the leadership of one Heropythos in the 350s, the Ephesians began to reassert their claim over neighbors such as Pygela, which, in turn, appealed to Mausolus for political support (Polyaeus 7.23.3). For his efforts in restoring the prominence of Ephesus, Heropythos received the unusual honor of a tomb in the agora, which was desecrated during the unrest in 335/4 (Arr. 1.17.11). Probably with the support of the satrap in Sardis, Ephesus remained the largest producer of silver coinage in the eastern Aegean. Indeed, the economic strength of Ephesus in the fourth century was on display after the temple of Artemis burned in 356, when the Ephesians were in a position to carry out the restoration without needing extravagant dedications from wealthy patrons like Mausolus or Alexander the Great.

70. These reorganizations, see Bean and Cook, “Carian Coast,” 141; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 78–105.
72. Polyaeus records the name as "Herophytus," but this is probably mistaken; see T. Corsten, *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, vol. 5A (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.
73. On the limited production of Persian sigloi, which may have led to an increased production in Ephesian coins, see Ian Carradice, “The Regal Coinage of the Persian Empire,” in *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires*, ed. Ian Carradice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 73–95. Cf. Chapter 1 on the relationship between Ephesus and Sardis.
74. In fact, Dieter Knibbe, *Ephesos-Ephesus: Geschichte einer bedeutenden antiken Stadt und Portrait einer modern Großgrabung* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1998), 88–89, suggests that the temple administration sabotaged the temple as an excuse to move its location because the sanctuary had been struggling against the rising floodwaters of the Cayster River. On the restoration of the temple of Artemis, see Chapter 9.
The Social War

War in the eastern Aegean resumed in 357 when Chios, Byzantium, and Rhodes formed an alliance against their erstwhile ally Athens. The origins of this conflict are not well understood, and Diodorus Siculus introduces it with a perfunctory announcement that the war had begun (16.7.3). But spontaneous revolts tend to have underlying causes, and the pressures that led to the Social War had been gestating for about a decade. The battle of Leuctra in 371 had broken the Spartan hegemony over Greece, and the Athenians had perhaps begun to incrementally strengthen their grip over the league with increases in the syntaxis. At the same time, it was during this period that Athens conquered poleis like Samos that remained outside its protection racket, thereby raising the specter of Athenian imperialism once more. There is no evidence for a wave of revolts from the Second Naval Confederacy the way there was from the fifth-century Delian League, so Jack Cargill is probably right that the organization remained generally fair to the weaker members of the league. The same cannot be said for the larger members like Chios that had entered this arrangement first through bilateral treaties with Athens and became targets for those who wanted to render the league toothless.

The Theban leader Epaminondas himself sailed to Ionia in 364/3. He chased away the Athenian general Laches and persuaded the Chians to flip their loyalties (Diod. 15.79.1), but his death at the battle of Mantinea in 362 ended Theban efforts to wrest control of the sea from Athens. Stephen Ruzicka also suggests that, despite the testimony of Diodorus, Chios and Rhodes formed an alliance with the Thebans in hope of avoiding war with Persia. They probably had not actually yet withdrawn from the Athenian confederacy, but the arrival of Laches’s squadron must have given another indication that Athens was willing to compel compliance. At the same time, the incident at Samos likely prompted Mausolus to put garrisons on the mainland opposite the island.

Throughout the 360s the Athenians took an increasingly presumptive attitude toward the allies in the new confederacy; Isocrates even records that some Athenians advocated denying allies that had fallen behind on payments

77. Stephen Ruzicka, “The Eastern Greek World,” in The Greek World in the Fourth Century, ed. Lawrence A. Trite (New York: Routledge, 1997), 121. Hornblower, Mausolus, 131; Sealey, Demosthenes, 103; and Stylianou, Historical Commentary, 494–97, argue that Byzantium withdrew from the confederacy in 364, while Chios and Rhodes remained until 357. But, as Cargill, Second Athenian League, 169, argues, neither is there evidence that Theban efforts incited revolts. The connection between Mausolus and the rejection of Athens is clearer.
78. Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 120.
access to the sea (8.36). There is also other evidence that, unsurprisingly, the other poleis believed the Athenians to be plotting against them in the early 350s, which, in turn, became the pretext for the Social War (Dem. 15.3).80 Chios and Rhodes broke with the confederacy in 357, having concluded an alliance with Byzantium, Cos, and the Hecatomnid dynast Mausolus the year before. While it is possible that the root cause of the Social War lies in the alliance between the eastern Greek poleis and Thebes under Epaminondas, as is implied by Diodorus, Ruzicka persuasively argues that they would have yielded to Athenian pressure to return to the league in 357 had it not been for new alliances with Mausolus.81 Mausolus manipulated the concerns over Athenian actions in the Aegean islands in order to start the war and shatter Athenian influence in the region,82 while the cities that left the confederacy were merely waiting for Athens to be occupied somewhere besides Samos.83

Athens attacked Chios twice in 356. Each time Mausolus came its defense, and in the lull between attacks he raided Samos and other Athenian territories (Diod. 16.7.2–4) and won a battle over the Athenian fleet at Embata near Erythrae (Diod. 16.21).84 By 354, Athens was forced to again recognize the autonomy of Chios and Rhodes, but those poleis maintained their defensive alliances with each other and, more importantly, found themselves within the Carian sphere of influence until the entrée of Macedonia into the eastern Aegean.85

Carian garrisons, while not common, did exist, but, perhaps more telling of the new status quo is that hoards of Carian coins depicting Mausolus and Pidxodarus have been discovered on Chios.86 Among these is a Mausolan drachm minted on the Chian standard, which Simon Hornblower posits as a sign of

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82. Hornblower, Mausolus, 183, 208–9, and Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 93–94, follow Demosthenes’ claim (15.3) that Mausolus started the conflict. Buckler, Aegean Greece, 379, suggests that though Mausolus benefited from the war, he was not the instigator.

83. Cawkwell, “Notes on the Failure,” 55. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive; see Sealey, Demosthenes, 106–7.

84. Hornblower, Mausolus, 212; Ruzicka, “Eastern Greek World,” 121; Sealey, Demosthenes, 104–5; Worthington, Demosthenes, 65–67. The raids on Athenian territory were probably not possible without the aid of Chian ships since the Athenians returned in force later that year. On the fallout from the battle of Embata at Athens, see Raphael Sealey, “Athens after the Social War,” JHS 75 (1955): 74–81.


86. Hornblower, Mausolus, 132.
political interference, declaring that “the coin is not likely to be a mere stray.” Hornblower’s suggestion is certainly possible, but too little is known about the series or context to infer direct interference even though it offers clear indication of a general orientation toward Caria.

A Calm before the Storm

Mausolus died in 353 and was succeeded in turn by his sister-wife Artemisia until 351, Idrieus (351/0–344/3) and his sister-wife Ada (until 341/0), and finally another brother, Pixodarus (340–336). Carian power did not disappear in this period, but the arrival of new figures such as Hermias of Atarneus and the satrap Rhosaces led to renewed imperial competition for influence in Ionia that gradually eroded the Hecatomnid position. Idrieus, like Mausolus before him, patronized building projects in Ionian poleis and the Milesians dedicated statues of him and his sister-wife Ada at Delphi in the 340s, which indicates that plans to rebuild the sanctuary at Didyma were not yet formed (Tod 2 161 B = SIG 2 225). At Erythrae, an inscription records grants of honors to Idrieus, perhaps displayed next to the inscription for Mausolus. Like Mausolus, Idrieus became euergetes, proxenos, and citizen, and received freedom from commercial taxation and rights in the courts. Shortly after 351, however, Artemisia had installed a garrison on Chios (Dem. 5.25), indicating that the Carian ability to coerce Ionians by means other than force was on the wane. Chios was exceptional, however, and the garrison also reflects that it was the Ionian polis best positioned to assert its independence.

The weakening of Hecatomnid power was also on display beyond Ionia. In c.351, Rhodian ships sailed to and attacked Halicarnassus and were paid back

88. The Athenians may have used his passing as an opportunity to reinforce their position on Samos and thus sent new cleruchs in 352/1. See Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 106.
89. Hornblower, “Asia Minor,” 216; Hornblower, “Persia,” 94. Rhosaces probably governed the territory formerly known as Sparda from the regional capital, Sardis, since he is described as the satrap of both Ionia and Lydia (Diod. 16.47) and receives mention in a Lydian inscription from 343/2; see Christopher H. Roosevelt, *The Archaeology of Lydia, from Gyges to Alexander* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 30. His son Spithridates inherited the post.
in kind by Artemisia (Vitruv. 2.8.14–15). This demonstration of force may have also prompted the outpouring of honors and dedications for the dynasts, lest other poleis suffer a similar fate. Carian coercion, along with continued patronage, worked in the short term, but resentment at the treatment and fear of heavy-handed Carian policies encouraged the Ionian poleis to look for new friends. At this juncture, the one most forthcoming was Hermias of Atarneus.

At around the same time that they honored Idrieus, the Erythraeans concluded a treaty with Hermias (RO 68 = I.Ery. 9), who was in the process of extending his diplomatic influence. The treaty assured both parties of economic rights and protections in the case of war. It has also been suggested that Chios negotiated a treaty with Hermias to recover its lost peraea, largely based on a fragment from Theopompus (BNJ 115 F 291). This passage is opaque and thus obscures the relationship between Chios, Mytilene, and Hermias, but it preserves Theopompus’ scorn for how the dynast treated the Ionians (κ(αὶ) προεπηλάκισε πλείστους Ἰώνων). A close relationship between Chios and Hermias is, however, unlikely, since Atarneus had been part of the Chian peraea until 387.

In 342, Artaxerxes III assigned Mentor to Anatolia with the instructions to defeat Hermias. After luring the tyrant out under false pretenses and arresting him, Mentor reestablished royal control over the entirety of western Anatolia (Diod. 16.52.2–7). According to Diodorus, Mentor managed this peacefully, writing to cities using Hermias’ seal, professing that he and the king were reconciled. Convinced that the hostilities had ended such that yesterday’s protector was about to become today’s enemy, they surrendered.

The account of these events preserved by Diodorus is compressed, but it does show that the Persian territorial boundaries in Anatolia were the same in 336 as they were at the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 386. Yet it also indicates that Carian hegemony over Ionia weakened in the 340s to the point

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95. Hermias had formed an alliance with Philip as early as 348 (Dem. 10.32; Diod. 16.52.5–8). Buckler, Aegean Greece, 473, argues that Hermias did not possess sufficient resources to provide a bridgehead to Asia, as Philip’s opponents claimed was the motivation behind the alliance. Cf. Ruzicka, Politics of a Persian Dynasty, 122–23; Ian Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 127; Worthington, Demosthenes, 224–26; Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 688–89; Peter Green, “Politics, Philosophy, and Propaganda: Hermias of Atarneus and His Friendship with Aristotle,” in Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander the Great, ed. Walde-mar Heckel and Lawrence A. Tittle (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003), 29–46.
97. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 688.
where it was virtually nonexistent outside Miletus. The decline made it possible for factions within an increasing number of Ionian polities to break free and consider themselves independent. Hermias was a useful ally to help them resist Caria, but this was a practical, rather than ideological, decision. This process probably included expelling the faction that had benefited from Persian or Carian rule in some instances, but it seems it was frequently just a shift in policy. Chios, for instance, sent ships to aid its old ally Byzantium in 340 after the Athenian ambassador Hyperides persuaded Chios to join a coalition against Philip of Macedon. The expedition was a fiasco and resulted in the Chian ships, including a grain fleet, being captured. When Philip released their ships, the Chians withdrew from the conflict.

The period from 386 to 336 in Ionia began with the cities off the coast technically autonomous and those on Anatolia both de jure and de facto part of the Persian Empire. The intervening years were tumultuous, with periods when powerful dynasts, not all of whom were Persian vassals, were able to exert a great deal of control over both the mainland and the islands. In addition, there were periods when anti-Persian factions in the mainland poleis were able to draw on their contacts from the wider Greek world to exert their own independence. Multiple competing imperial powers vied for control of Ionia during this period, which led in turn to extended periods of stasis, but in 336 Macedonia was poised to radically change the balance of power.

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CHAPTER 7

Free at Last?

336–323

Ionia had been subject to the King’s Peace for more than fifty years by the spring of 336. This half century had seen the waxing and waning of the Hecatomnids’ hegemony in Ionia. Their last foothold in the region was in Miletus, which may have helped pique Philip’s interested in an alliance with Pixodarus in 337/6.¹ Hecatomnid power was diminished further that year when the new Persian king, Darius III, replaced Pixodarus with the Persian Orontobates (Strabo 14.2.17; Arr. 1.23.8).² The same spring, Philip II launched his invasion of Persia by sending a vanguard to Anatolia (Diod. 16.81; Justin 9.5.8).³ The introduction of new forces to both the north and the south exposed old fissures within Ionia that threatened domestic stability.

Philip’s and Alexander’s campaigns to Asia Minor were presented under the banner of liberating the Greeks from Persian subjugation (Diod. 19.91.1, 17.24.1). This propaganda was a useful rallying cry for some Ionians, but Mace-

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³. Worthington, By the Spear, 111.
donian freedom was not markedly different from either Athenian freedom or Persian subjugation. This chapter examines the transition from the opportunities and risks presented by an unstable and divided imperial system in the last days of the Persian Empire to the domestic challenges of a unipolar Macedonian system that lasted less than a decade.

Pressures on Ionia

The Macedonian invasion of 336, the first sustained military incursion from Europe in more than half a century, destabilized the strategic situation in the eastern Aegean. Philip’s vanguard troops crossed into Anatolia with the mandate to secure the freedom of the Greek poleis (προστάξας ἐλευθερούν τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις) before Philip would follow with the main expedition later that summer (Diod. 16.91.2). Philip had already been negotiating with the Greeks in Asia Minor, so there must have been the expectation that the Macedonians would receive them as liberators. In time, this assumption would be proven false.

The campaign began in northern Anatolia near Abydus, and its primary theater of operations was Aeolis to the north of Ionia. Nominally, Philip ordered the advance force to liberate the Greek communities in Anatolia. In practice, this meant encouraging factions to enact coups and join the Panhellenic crusade against Persia or taking them by force if they did not. “Liberation” from Persia was not optional. Diodorus records that the Macedonian general Parmenion undertook two sieges in Aeolis, a successful one against Grynium, where he sold the inhabitants into slavery, and one against Pitane that Memnon, a Rhodian mercenary commander in Persian service, relieved (Diod. 17.7.9). Memnon then defeated the Macedonians in a pitched battle.
near Magnesia on the Sipylos (Polyaenus 5.44.4) and retook Grynium, forcing the Macedonians back toward the Troad. In July 335, Memnon attacked Cyzicus, probably because it had sided with the Macedonians, but settled for ravaging its territory after he failed to take the city (Diod. 17.7.8; Polyaenus 5.44.5).

The Persian leadership met the Macedonian invasion head-on with a counteroffensive in Aeolis and the Troad. Led by Memnon and other Persian commanders, this strategy was successful, but it also meant that they did not spend time shoring up the loyalty of anywhere not directly threatened by Macedonian forces. Although the Macedonian expedition never reached Ionia, it nevertheless led to upheaval in the region.

Evidence for the domestic situation in the Ionian poleis in 336 is fragmentary. Complicating matters is that Alexander's campaign in 334 exerts a powerful magnetic force on circumstantially dated evidence. Take, the so-called Philites Stele, probably from Erythrae, which records two decrees regarding care and upkeep of the statue of the tyrannicide Philites (SIG 284). The actual stele was inscribed in the third century, but clearly refers to an earlier episode where first Philites received an honorary statue for killing a tyrant and then the civic aristocracy removed its sword because they saw the statue as targeting their position. It was originally held that the tyrannicide that precipitated the chain of events recorded in the decrees coincided with the Macedonian expedition and thus that the tyrant was a Persian puppet. Despite loose parallels with events in Ephesus in the 330s, there is nothing in either decree that mentions Alexander, Persia, or democracy, which Heisserer rightly argues should appear, and so he dates the decree to the early Hellenistic period.

Somewhat more is known about the situation in Ephesus, where deep factional divides erupted into open conflict. No historical source records an embassy between Philip and Ephesus, but there is good reason to believe that some sort of negotiations took place. Probably in 336, the Ephesians commissioned a statue to be erected in the sanctuary of Artemis (ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, Arr. 7. There are multiple sites named Magnesia, but Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 817, and Badian, "Alexander the Great," 127 n. 20, are correct that the site of this battle was the Magnesia on the Sipylos river in Aeolia, rather than Magnesia on the Maeander to the east of Ionia. Buckler, Aegean Greece, 519–20 n. 31, doubts the existence of the battle on the grounds that the campaign was mostly limited to the Troad.

8. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 818.


This statue is sometimes considered to be Philip's supposed divine pretensions playing out in an Anatolian milieu, but this is misleading. The statue is attested as a likeness (eikon) rather than cult statue (agalma) and was an honor afforded Lysander, Timotheus, and others in the fifth century. The contexts for the earlier offerings of honorific statues varied. Lysander used Ephesus as his base of operations and as a connection to Cyrus the Younger, but, despite expanding Athenian power in the eastern Aegean, Timotheus did not. Moreover, excavations at Ephesus have revealed a veritable topography of urban dedications in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but Archaic and Classical honors, including grants of citizenship, were limited to the Artemisium. The statue probably also included a dedicatory inscription. The inscription did not survive its damnatio, but, paradoxically, there is reason to believe that it would have been no more enlightening, since a comparable Milesian dedication for Ada and Idreius at Delphi offers no insight other than the origin of the monument and the names of the honorands (Tod 2 161B = SIG3 225). John Ma has demonstrated that such dedications were part of the world of Hellenistic politics, and Philip's diplomacy in the eastern Aegean is evident from as early as 337 in his negotiations with Pixodarus, so there is no reason to attribute this statue to extraordinary circumstances of divine pretentions, the presence of Macedonian soldiers, or premature honors in expectation of Philip's victory.

But what does this mean for Ephesian domestic politics? Scholars frequently assume that the appearance of Macedonian forces in Asia was the catalyst for a political coup that brought to power the demos. Indeed, the supposed revolution offers a neat explanation for the dedication to Philip, but the evidence for it is a house of cards built on three pylons, all of which emerge from Arrian's

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15. On the diplomacy of honorific dedications, see Ma, *Statues and Cities*.

account of the upheaval surrounding Alexander’s capture of Ephesus in 334, at which point a Persian-backed junta controlled the city (1.17.9–12). Arrian describes how people dragged Syrphax and his family from the temple of Artemis, lynching them because they invited in Memnon. In the fighting that ensued after the Persians arrived, they destroyed the eikon of Philip in the sanctuary of Artemis and tore up the tomb of Heropythos in the agora. Heropythos is a shadowy figure in fourth-century Ephesian history but receiving a tomb in the agora is an unusual honor. Arrian calls him the liberator of the polis (ἐλευθερώσαντος τὴν πόλιν), which frequently leads to the assumption that he was a leader of the imagined democratic coup, died in the fighting, and was thus honored.\(^\text{17}\) Heropythos, however, has also been identified with a military and political leader from the middle of the fourth century who oversaw the restoration of Ephesian prominence and may have fought against Mausolus of Caria (Polyaenus 7.23.2).\(^\text{18}\) In this context, then, reading Arrian’s declaration that Heropythos liberated Ephesus as a reference to 336 is an overly literal interpretation of the evidence. His role in making Ephesus great again could easily be remembered as liberation.

Although the evidence for Ephesus at this critical juncture is particularly fragmentary, several observations can be made about its domestic situation. First, Arrian does not indicate that the men calling for Memnon’s support were in exile. Nor is there an increase in the number of published decrees until after 334, which Krzysztof Nawotka reasonably argues reflects a political change from oligarchy to democracy.\(^\text{19}\) Thus, I believe that there was no coup in 336. Rather, the lax Persian oversight that had allowed the Ephesians to assert their regional power in the middle of the fourth century also presented an opportunity for them to receive Philip’s entreaties. Heropythos’ death left the leading Ephesians in a precarious position, particularly when they opted to let their bet on the Macedonians ride, dispatching an orator, Delius, to advocate on behalf of the expedition (Plut. Mor. 1126d). Alexander needed no persuading, but this was a piece of political theater designed to demonstrate that the Greeks in Asia


\(^{18}\) Polyaenus records the name as “Herophytus,” which is probably a corruption of Heropythos; see T. Corsten, Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, vol. 5A (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 261.

\(^{19}\) Krzysztof Nawotka, “Freedom of Greek Cities in Asia Minor in the Age of Alexander the Great,” Klio 85, no. 1 (2003): 18–24. What democracy meant at this point in the fourth century is a fraught issue because it could refer to any type of constitution that was not a tyranny; see Jeremy LaBuff, Polis Expansion and Elite Power in Hellenistic Caria (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 8–11, but see Matthew Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), for the characteristics of oligarchic regimes.
Accustomed to Obedience?

were primed to rise up against their barbarian overlords as Isocrates had predicted (4.135).

At the same time, an opposition party that included Syrphax disapproved of the alliance with Macedonia and exploited the situation to call for support from Memnon, who was then securing the Persian hold over Asia Minor. This coup resulted in the exile of the Ephesians who had negotiated the Macedonian alliance, but probably should not be seen as the outgrowth of a particular loyalty to Persia. Syrphax and his associates orchestrated a power grab that, if the retributive purges in 334 are any indication, was bloody and brutal.

There is a dearth of evidence from elsewhere in Ionia, but there is no reason to assume that Ephesus was unique. The upheaval that followed the appearance of the Macedonian army in Asia stoked the flames of domestic conflict, both as a debate over the future of each community and as an opportunity to strike at political opponents, using imperial forces as a bludgeon to expel or kill them. Between 336 and 334, Memnon restored Persian control over Ionia, temporarily smothering the possibility of revolt and exacerbating domestic conflicts even though much of the region remained only lightly garrisoned.

Alexander in Ionia

In 334, Alexander III led his army across the Bosporus and into the Troad. After defeating the Persian satrapal armies at the Granicus River, he led his army to Sardis and from there along the royal road to Ephesus (Arr. 1.17.9–12). The small Persian garrison seized two Ephesian ships and fled, allowing the citizens to open the gates to Alexander (Arr. 1.17.9). The king restored Ephesian exiles and declared Ephesus a democracy, thereby demonstrating that his was a campaign to liberate the Greeks. Arrian concludes, “Never did Alexander achieve such acclaim as for what he did at Ephesus” (καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἐφέσῳ πραχθείσιν Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῷ τότε εὐδοκίμει, 1.17.12), but the situation was not so simple.

Around the time of Alexander’s entrance to Ephesus the citizen population dissolved into an orgy of retributive violence against the people who had invited in Memnon. The family of Syrphax had sought asylum at a sanctuary, but the citizens dragged them from the temple to stone them to death and looked poised to kill others until Alexander ordered an end to the violence.

While this violence was clearly political in nature, the connection to Persia is incidental. The Persian-backed coup had forced prominent Ephesians into exile, stolen from the temple of Artemis, and desecrated public monuments, meaning that in this context they were simply receiving their just deserts. We are told, however, that Alexander ordered an end to both inquiry and punishment (ἐπιζητεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι) to prevent the Ephesians from exploiting the situation to punish private enemies (Arr. Anab. 1.17.11–12).

While at Ephesus, Alexander led his army in a procession before the temple of Artemis, made the appropriate dedications, and, according to Arrian, ordered the Ephesians to pay their phoros to the sanctuary. This simple statement has elicited consternation for several reasons. First, Alexander relieved the phoros from the rest of Ionia and replaced it with a syntaxis to pay for the campaign (see below, “A Macedonian World”) and, second, because a later ancient tradition records that the Ephesians rebuffed an offer from Alexander to pay for construction and upkeep of the sanctuary. The combination of these two issues led Ernst Badian to argue that the fickle king turned hostile to the prideful Ephesians, refusing to relieve the phoros and levying a syntaxis in addition.21

Although the temple of Artemis had allegedly burned on the day of his birth (Plut. Alex. 3.3), there is nothing in Arrian’s account of Alexander at Ephesus that marks the sanctuary as special to the king. The first extant connection between the birth and the conflagration comes from the work of Hegesias of Magnesia, a third-century rhetorician whose work was accounted perverse and puerile in antiquity (e.g., Cic. Brut. 83.286–87).22 Similarly, the evidence for Alexander’s offer to pay for the construction and upkeep in perpetuity appears only in a comment attributed to the first century BCE geographer Artemidorus of Ephesus, who praised his predecessors for not accepting a dedication from one god to another (Strabo 14.1.22).23 While this rationale would be a good way of flattering Alexander, it reads like a later invention. The Ephesians had already


23. Strabo 14.1.26 records that Artemidorus was awarded a golden eikon in the sanctuary after a successful embassy to Rome in 104; see Guy Maclean Rogers, The Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos: Cult, Polis, and Change in the Graeco-Roman World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 93. If the Ephesian response is genuine, then Alexander’s offer must have come later than 334, but I am skeptical of its historicity; see Boris Dreyer, “Heroes, Cults, and Divinity,” in Alexander the Great: A New History, ed. Waldemar Heckel and Lawrence A. Tittle (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 225–26; cf. Bosworth, Historical Commentary, 132–33.
raised money for the construction by selling the columns from the old temple and dedicating private jewelry, as well as allegedly stealing Persian gold, the last of which I believe was the *phoros* that Alexander retroactively directed to the sanctuary (see Chapter 9).

Ephesus nevertheless played a pivotal role in Alexander’s campaign. It was the first large Greek polis that he came to in Asia Minor and thus an opportunity to put into action his declarations of Panhellenic liberation. But Arrian records two additional strategic decisions. First, embassies from Magnesia and Tralles approached Alexander while he was at Ephesus. Although Ernst Badian took these embassies as evidence for Greek uprisings against Persia, it is more likely that this was yet another example of internal divisions and political exiles making an appeal for political support. Alexander indulged their requests and dispatched two forces to liberate the rest of the region (Arr. 1.18.1). Second, Alexander formally abolished the *phoros* payments, installing instead a *syntaxis* (contribution). By replacing tribute with a contribution, he symbolically liberated the Greeks of Asia in a stroke. The change may have carried some weight among the Ionian audiences given that it implied that the payments would last only as long as the campaign against Persia, but, in practice, it was a semantic distinction for propaganda purposes.

Arrian records these decisions at Ephesus with customary surety, but behind his words are questions with few clear answers. First is the question of

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Alexander’s intentions toward the Greeks of Asia. Despite the presentation of the campaign as a crusade for Panhellenic liberty against the barbarian oppressor, Alexander did not have a predetermined strategy for managing conquered territories but responded to issues as they arose.²⁷

Priene, which lay close by the route from Ephesus to Miletus on the north side of the Gulf of Latmus, poses additional complications for understanding Alexander’s passage through Ionia. The problems arise, ironically, because there is an unusually rich epigraphical record for Alexander’s interactions with Priene. One inscription records that “King Alexander dedicated the temple to Athena Polias” (SIG³ 277),²⁸ a second inscription indicates both the introduction of a garrison and the remission of their financial obligations (RO 86B = I.Priene² 149), and the original editor of the inscriptions from Priene, Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, assigned an additional seven inscriptions to Alexander’s reign (I.Priene² 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 107). However, recent scholarship has liberated these inscriptions from Alexander’s gravitational pull, down-dating many of them to the early Hellenistic period, leaving only the dedication at the temple of Athena Polias and the remission of the phoros.²⁹ Neither of these two decrees can be positively dated on their own grounds, in no small part because they were reinscribed as part of a Hellenistic archive,³⁰ and thus the dates are subject to controversy based on circumstantial evidence. Some scholars maintain that Alexander would not have used the royal title in dealing with the Greeks before the battle of Gaugamela in 331, while others argue that either it was part of the Macedonian royal stylings or that he assumed it while in Asia.³¹ Another debate puts Priene’s apparent willingness to accept

²⁸. Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος | ἀνέθηκε τὸν ναὸν | Ἀθηναίηι Πολιάδι. Joseph C. Carter, The Sculpture of the Sanctuary of Athena Polias at Priene (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983), 30, notes that this is the same dedicatory formula used by Croesus at the temple of Ephesus, but this may be more the result of formula than conscious imitation.
Alexander’s largesse in direct contrast to Ephesus, suggesting that Priene’s compliance won the king’s favor where the Ephesian intransigence won his enmity.32 Although Alexander would have passed near Priene on his way to Miletus, he probably never visited the polis. Without a Persian garrison, the people of Priene probably did not resist the Macedonian expedition, but these inscriptions likely belong to a later period in Alexander’s reign after the conclusion of the war in the Aegean in 332, and so I treat them below (“A Macedonian World”).

When Alexander arrived at Miletus, the southernmost Ionian polis, he had every reason to expect it to capitulate without a fight. The rest of the region had accepted Macedonian liberation and, moreover, the garrison commander, Hegistratus, had promised to surrender (Arr. Anab. 1.18.4). The imminent arrival of the Persian fleet caused Hegistratus to have a change of heart, however, so Alexander found the gates closed to him. With his characteristic impatience and decisiveness, Alexander had his fleet seize the island of Lade, which controlled the harbor of Miletus, and forced the Persian fleet to anchor on the opposite side of the bay near Mount Mycale, where it was vulnerable to the Macedonian army (Arr. Anab. 1.18.7–11). He then launched an immediate attack but failed to take the walls (Diod. 17.22); once the siege train arrived, Miletus fell in just one day (Arr. Anab. 1.19.2; cf. Diod. 17.22.4–5).33

On the day before the final assault, a Milesian named Glaucippus approached Alexander on behalf of the citizens and the mercenary garrison, suggesting that Miletus would be open to both Persians and Macedonians (τά τε τείχη ἔθεθη τοὺς Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς λιμένας παρέχειν κοινοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Πέρσαις, Arr. Anab. 1.19.1).34 Bosworth plausibly argues that Glaucippus was a senior member


33. Bosworth, Historical Commentary, 138–39; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 46; Worthington, By the Spear, 153. Engels, Alexander the Great, 33–34, suggests that Alexander initially left behind the siege train because the promontory where Miletus sat could not support a large force.
34. Bosworth, Historical Commentary, 138; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 46. Glaucippus
of the ruling faction and hoped to find a workable solution for the polis, but it is hard to imagine that he thought that Alexander would agree to his proposal. The king told the Milesians to prepare for battle. A bloody slaughter ensued, with only a small part of the garrison escaping the sword (Arr. Anab. 1.19.4–6; Diod. 17.22.4–5). In his account of the assault, however, Arrian draws a distinction between the Persian garrison at Miletus and the Milesian soldiers and indicates that both groups resisted the Macedonian onslaught. Some Milesians were killed in the initial clash, but Alexander spared the rest because they surrendered once the walls were breached (Arr. Anab. 1.19.6; cf. Strabo 14.1.7).

Much as with Ephesus, Alexander’s attitude toward Miletus is a subject of some uncertainty. The crux of the matter is whether the fact that this polis, alone to this point in the campaign, had to be taken by storm nullified the general grant of the freedom for the Ionians. Brian Bosworth rightly points out that Arrian refers to freedom of the specific prisoners captured during the assault and not to Miletus as a whole. The second stele of the list of annual eponymous officials contains a dedication thanking Antigonus Monophthalmus for establishing the democracy and granting Miletus freedom and autonomy (Milet I.3, no. 123, ll. 2–4; see Chapter 8). These inscriptions are, however, an imperfect record. The praise for Antigonus heads a second stele that likely begins with the year 313/2, while Alexander’s entry appears on the first stele that was probably erected in 332 at the conclusion of the war in the Aegean. This distinction has several consequences. As we shall see, declarations of freedom and autonomy were a regular feature of Hellenistic propaganda, and these reciprocal thanks given to Antigonus belong in that Hellenistic context. However, the absence of a comparable inscription for Alexander should be regarded as a performed respect for Milesian liberty. There is thus nothing about the circumstances in Miletus to indicate different treatment after its capture.

After settling affairs in Miletus, Alexander went on to Caria. Before leav-
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ing Miletus, though, Alexander disbanded the Hellenic fleet (Arr. Anab. 1.20.1; Diod. 17.22.5–23.3). This action has been subject to scrutiny in terms of Alexander’s strategic planning, but more relevant for Ionia than contrafactual armchair generalship is what that fleet had done in the first year of the campaign.

The Macedonian Naval Campaign in Ionia

There is scant mention of the Hellenic fleet until it arrived off Miletus (Arr. Anab. 1.18.5–6). To this point it had been conducting a campaign among the Aegean islands, parallel to that of the army. The best evidence for their activities comes from inscriptions recording Alexander’s letters to the island communities. Most importantly for Ionia are the so-called First and Second Letters to the Chians (RO 84 A and B = SIG3 283 and SEG XXVII 506). Both documents, as well as a third fragmentary decree that Maxim Kholod dates to the same period, primarily concern the relationship between the citizens and returning exiles. The “First Letter” declares that the Chians are to be autonomous and be governed according to their democracy, probably referring to the constitution created in the late 390s, but also requires the Chians appoint men to write new laws and stipulates that they be approved by the king (RO 84 A = SIG3 283, ll. 3–7). However, its principal provision, being both the first (l. 3) and last (ll. 17–19) point addressed, is the return of the exiles. This inscription shows an awareness of the potential for domestic disruption with the return by establishing a garrison to preempt conflict (ll. 17–18). However, the uncertain date of these documents introduces problems for the interpretation.

There are two proposed dates for the First Letter: 332, at the conclusion of the war in the Aegean, or 334, between the capture of Chios and the dismissal


40. On the text of the first decree, see Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 80–81.


42. Gustav Adolf Lehmann, Alexander der Große und die “Freiheit der Hellenen” (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 93. Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 92–93, though, declares that the section regarding the betrayers is the most important.

43. Two subsequent decrees belong later; see Kholod, “New Chian Inscription,” 21–32; Lehmann, Alexander der Große, 97–99. RO 84 B = SEG XXVII 506, in particular, should be read as a response to the questions of an embassy in 331.
of the league fleet at Miletus. The orthodox date for the inscription is 332, after Hegelochus captured Chios again from the Persian fleet (Arr. Anab. 3.2.3).\(^44\) This date is reached based on the interpretation of two points, the installation of a garrison (ll. 17–20) and the return of the exiles (ll. 5–6). The decree refers to individuals who betrayed Chios, so, in this thesis, these are the same men whom Hegelochus took to Elephantine in Egypt (Arr. Anab. 3.2.3–4; Curt. 4.5.14–17), while the triremes to be provided are those conscripted for the siege of Mytilene (Curt. 4.8.12). In contrast, Heisserer argues that the decree belongs in 334, envisioning the situation on Chios as parallel to that of Ephesus (Arr. Anab. 1.17.11).\(^45\) The strongest point in favor of this view is that the decree specifies that the people who betrayed the population were to be tried by the league *synedrion* and those who fled were banned from entering those communities (ll. 10–15).\(^46\) Heisserer rightly, I believe, argues that the constitutional reorganization of Chios is more likely to have taken place in 334 since the restoration of the constitution in 332 would have been a continuation of this process rather than a new revision.

While I agree in principle with Heisserer’s early dating of the First Letter, I believe that his reading is flawed. Both dates for the inscription assume that the order to supply triremes “so long as the rest of the Greek fleet sails with us” (ταότας δὲ πλεῖν μέχρι ἂν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ναοτικὸν τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν συμπλῆ, l. 9–10) indicates that the decree came near the end of the campaign.\(^47\) In Heisserer’s interpretation, the decree was issued after Alexander had decided to dismiss the fleet at Miletus (Arr. 1.20.1), with the instructions providing a limit for the term of service. However, the inscription does not specify when the ships will be dismissed, and thus likely indicates an open-ended mandate. A date for the inscription between 334 and 332 is usually excluded because it is often assumed that Alexander did not order the reconstitution of the fleet until he was in Gordium, when Arrian first mentions Hegelochus’ command (2.2.3).\(^48\) This evidence comes after Arrian narrates Memnon’s capture of Chios (2.1.1) and Curtius introduces the new fleet by describing Amphoterus’


charge to liberate the island from Memnon (Curt. 3.1.19). However, two points indicate that Alexander had already ordered the reassembly of the Macedonian fleet before Chios fell to the Persians.49 First, Arrian uses the pluperfect (προσετέτακτο), which suggests that the order had come earlier than where it appears in the narrative, and second, he says that the assembly of the fleet was already underway. Further, Curtius records that the new fleet included Greek ships, not just Macedonian (Curt. 3.1.19). I believe, therefore, that the letter to the Chians should be dated to the very end of 334 or start of 333, at the outset of Hegelochus’ command rather than at the end of it, but before Chios had fallen.

During his march south through Ionia, Alexander offered two competing but not contradictory visions for the region. First, the official message delivered by the campaign was that he was liberating the Greeks from Persia.50 Henceforth the Ionians were to be autonomous (e.g., RO 84B = SEG XXVII 506, ll. 3–4), they would have liberal governments under their ancestral, democratic, constitutions, and exiles would return and have property restored to them. Underlying this propaganda was a second message: that the Ionians were now Alexander’s subjects. Despite the measures taken at Chios and Ephesus to ensure that the returning exiles did not disrupt domestic stability, the Macedonian conquest led to considerable turmoil amid a situation ripe to be exploited.

War in the Aegean

While Alexander’s relentless assault east continued through 333 and 332, Persian operations continued in the Aegean.51 In Caria, the Macedonian forces faced prolonged resistance from Orontobates, while a Persian fleet threatened coastal and island communities and the remnants of Darius’ army retreated into Anatolia from the east after their defeat at Issus in a pass linking Cilicia and Syria in November 333.52 Far from ending the Persian threat, Alexander’s

49. Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 87–89, argues implausibly that Hegelochus’ fleet was categorically different from Alexander’s fleet.
52. On the battle, see Diod. 17.32.2–35; Arr. 2.8–11; Curt. 3.9–11; Plut. Alex. 20; Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 55–64; Worthington, By the Spear, 165–71. For the subsequent Persian retreat, Curt. 4.1.34–35, Billows, Antigonus, 41–45.
victory intensified the war in Anatolia until defections crippled the Persian fleet in early 332.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite the general impression of Alexander’s headlong rush to the east, he was not wholly neglectful of this threat. He had disbanded the league fleet after capturing Miletus (Diod. 17.22.5–23.3; Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.20.1), but probably soon recognized the strategic error and ordered its reconstitution before the spring of 333 (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.2.3; Curt. 3.1.19–20), and had garrisoned much of western Anatolia, including Priene.\textsuperscript{54} Until the new Macedonian fleet arrived, however, the Persian forces, consisting of the ships that had failed to prevent the fall of Miletus and a sizable army under the command of Memnon of Rhodes dominated the eastern Aegean (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.2.1).\textsuperscript{55} Greek sources for this campaign attest to fears that the Persians were preparing to cross the Aegean, but these proved unfounded (Diod. 17.29.3, 30.1; Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.2.4–5). The Persians instead continued to threaten the Bosporus and worked to secure control of the Anatolian coast, which placed Ionia front and center.

Early in 333, Memnon recaptured Chios, which Arrian says was given over to him by treason (προδοσία, \textit{Anab.} 2.1.1; cf. Diod. 17.29.2, 31.2, Curt. 3.1.19).\textsuperscript{56} He turned Chios over to those who had opened the gates, but probably refrained from installing a garrison since we hear of a later date when the Persians did garrison the island (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.13.4–5),\textsuperscript{57} instead relying on the proximity of the Persian fleet at Mytilene to dissuade a counterrevolution. After the Macedonian fleet captured Tenedos in the Hellespont the Persian commanders Autophradates and Pharnabazus established a garrison of fifteen

\textsuperscript{53} For this phase of Alexander’s campaign, see Bosworth, \textit{Conquest and Empire}, 64–65; Worthington, \textit{By the Spear}, 172–78.

\textsuperscript{54} Alexander had forces in Caria where the region was split between the Hecatomnid Ada, who turned over her fortresses to Alexander and adopted him as her son in return for his support (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.23.6; Strabo 14.2.17; Diod. 17.24.2–3; Plut. \textit{Alex.} 22.4), and the citadel of Halicarnassus, which held out until the defeat of Orontobates about a year later (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.5.7). On events in Caria, see Maxim M. Kholod, “The Garrisons of Alexander the Great in the Greek Cities of Asia Minor,” \textit{Eos} 97 (2010): 252; Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 135; Matthew A. Sears, “Alexander and Ada Reconsidered,” \textit{CPh} 109, no. 3 (2014): 211–21.

\textsuperscript{55} Greek sources probably overstate Memnon’s importance in the Persian command structure; see Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 133–34, 138; and Briant, \textit{From Cyrus to Alexander}, 826–27, who independently reach the conclusion that there is an overemphasis on Memnon in the Greek sources. However, Diodorus’ declaration that Darius gave him overall command of the Persian defense of Asia Minor may be accurate given the death of the satrap Spithridates at Granicus and his family connections to the Persian aristocracy. His nephew Pharnabazus took up the command after Memnon died in 333 (Arr. \textit{Anab.} 2.2.1; Curt. 3.3.1).

\textsuperscript{56} Heisserer, \textit{Alexander and the Greeks}, 92–93, suggests that there were individuals who would have been seen as traitors both before and after this time, so this episode need not correlate to Alexander’s First Letter to the Chians. There is reason to suspect bribery; see Diod. 17.29.4.

\textsuperscript{57} See Bosworth, \textit{Historical Commentary}, 223–24.
hundred mercenaries on Chios that was later reinforced (Arr. Anab. 2.13.5; Curt. 4.1.37). Even less is known about the Persian capture of Miletus, where Pharnabazus exacted money (Curt. 4.1.37). There is no evidence for a garrison, but Miletus’s long-standing ties to Caria ensured that it did not revert to Macedonian control until after the defeat of a Persian force near the city in 332 (Curt. 4.5.13). About the same time, the new Macedonian fleet arrived at Chios and laid siege (Curt. 4.5.14). The Persian garrison initially prevented Chios from surrendering, but with the writing on the wall the citizens sided with the Macedonians, slaughtered the garrison, and turned over the commanders, mercenaries, and pirates (Arr. Anab. 3.2.3–5; Curt. 4.5.17–18). Curtius and Arrian share a general outline for the events on Chios but differ in key details. Where Curtius says that the citizens waited until the gate was breached to join the Macedonians, Arrian records that they opened the gates for them. Macedonian operations against Persian forces in the Aegean continued after the capture of Chios, but Ionia itself was spared from those conflicts.

There is no evidence to indicate that the Persians had recaptured any poleis other than Chios and Miletus, but it strains credulity to believe that the rest of the region was simply passed over, regardless of whether they had Macedonian garrisons. But neither is there evidence for Persian garrisons in Ionia. Peter Green advances the argument that some of this was because the Ionians harbored latent hostility toward Alexander’s impositions and therefore welcomed the Persian fleet as their true liberators. Certainly, the Ionians did not universally adore Alexander, but the Persians were the other side of the same coin, and Memnon’s intrigues Ephesus in 336 had resulted in bloody purges. Most likely, every polis in the region was subject to extortion or raids from Persian forces and opportunistic neighbors that are attested as pirates, depending on which side of the fence it chose to sit (Arr. Anab. 3.2.5; Curt. 4.5.18). The war opened the door again to domestic infighting that Alexander had curtailed in

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58. Ruzicka, “War in the Aegean,” 141, rightly notes that the passages recorded in Curtius and Arrian must refer to the same events despite a discrepancy in chronology.
60. On Macedonian garrisons, see Kholod, “Garrisons of Alexander,” 252.
61. Green, Alexander of Macedon, 211–12.
63. J. E. Atkinson, A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 330, sees the reference to pirates in these sources as indicative of increased activity after the Social War. The Ionians had a particular reputation for “painting both sides of the walls” (τοὺς τοῖχους τοὺς δύο ἐπαλείφοντες, Paus. 6.3.15); see Chapter 4.
Ephesus and is attested in Chios, but in many places any change of allegiance was easily reversed as the Macedonian forces regained the upper hand.64

When the dust settled in 332, Ionia was again firmly under Macedonian control. Those deemed traitors were sent to Alexander in Egypt for trial, accompanied by embassies from Ionia. Nevertheless, the creation of a new unipolar Macedonian world only managed to paper over domestic fault lines that would begin to rupture again before the end of Alexander’s life.

A Macedonian World

The conclusion to the war in the Aegean took place a year later across the Mediterranean in Egypt (Arr. Anab. 3.5.1; Curt. 4.8.12–13; Strabo 17.1.43). The overall outcome of the embassies unclear. Arrian concludes that Alexander left no one unsatisfied (καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅντινα ἀτυχήσαντα ὧν ἐδεῖτο ἀπέπεμψε) and Curtius largely matches this declaration. He says that embassies from Chios, Rhodes, and Athens brought before Alexander concerns about the fate of the prisoners and complaints about the imposition of Macedonian garrisons. Alexander, he says, found the requests reasonable.

By contrast, the first-century geographer Strabo preserved a record of embassies from Miletus and Erythrae described by Callisthenes in conjunction with Alexander’s visit to Siwah. Not interested in the social and political consequences of these embassies, Callisthenes includes them as additional prodigies that supported Alexander’s divinity, a confluence of interests that frequently leads scholars to suggest Alexander solicited favorable oracles.65

The suspect nature of both oracles lends plausibility to this thesis. Didyma, the oracle at Miletus, had been silent from the time of the Persian Wars, when the Branchidae, its hereditary priestly clan, allegedly betrayed the sanctuary to the Persians and had subsequently been deported to central Asia (Hdt. 6.19.2–20).66 According to Strabo/Callisthenes, the Milesians declared that

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64. As noted by Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, 855.
66. Alexander’s interaction with the Branchidae is an impossible historiographical problem. N. G. L. Hammond, Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-Called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin, and Curtius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 141; Pearson, Lost Historians, 240; and W. W. Tarn, “The Massacre of the Branchidae,” CR 36, nos. 3–4 (1922): 63–65, argue that it was introduced to contextualize the punishment of Greek traitors, while other scholars believe that
the sacred spring miraculously reappeared after Alexander liberated them and with it returned the gift of prophecy, complete with utterances about his divinity, a revolt stewing in Greece, and the final victory over Persia. The prophecies that appear in Strabo are not recorded verbatim and the specific events such as the battle at Gaugamela were likely later amendments to general pronouncements.

But what about this alleged connection between Alexander and the foundation of the oracle? There is no evidence that Alexander patronized Didyma, either in the guise of Panhellenic piety or as a reward for declaring him divine, so another explanation is needed for this series of events. Much as elsewhere in Ionia, there had been a new wave of public construction in Miletus in the 340s and 330s that was disrupted by the wars before, during, and in the wake of Alexander’s expedition. Work had not progressed on restoration of the new temple of Apollo, probably on account of its exceptionally steep cost, but plans for it were likely formulated in this same period. The miraculous rebirth of and alleged responses from the oracle therefore developed in a milieu where the restoration was already in the works but was accelerated through its capacity for political exploitation. The oracular responses allowed the embassy to simultaneously offer a performance of loyalty to Alexander as recompense for lapses during the war and to deliver a not-so-subtle petition for funds to restore the temple (see Chapter 9).

A similar picture appears when looking at the Erythraean Athenais. Strabo describes her as like another Erythraean prophetess, the Sibyl (Strabo 17.1.43), which served to legitimize this largely unknown woman. And yet, in his study of north Ionian cults, Fritz Graf concluded that, in the fourth century, prophetess of the Erythraeid was a contested position with multiple communities claiming to have the heir of the Erythraean Sibyl. Moreover, Erythrae was another community whose loyalty to Alexander during the months of the war in the Aegean was suspect. In this context, then, the declaration of Alexander’s divinity again served double duty, demonstrating that Erythrae was loyal to Alexander while, if accepted, also staking a claim to legitimacy as the genuine heir to the Sibyl.

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Alexander’s decision regarding Ionia that invites the most questions is regarding the fate of the Ionian *phoros*. Alexander officially relieved the region of its tributary obligations in 334, changing it into a *syntaxis* (contribution). What this looked like in practice is more opaque but, given that the new payments were contributions for a collective war, the contribution was likely released upon the symbolic end of the war against Persia in 330. An inscription from Priene offers additional insight as to this change (RO 86B = *I.Priene*² 1).⁶⁹ The inscription, which addressed Priene and its port, Naulochon, drew a distinction between the presumably Greek citizens of Priene in both locations and the Myrseloi, Pedieis, and land that belonged to noncitizens, which Alexander claimed for himself (ll. 8–13).⁷⁰ The former received autonomy and relief from their contributions, while the latter continued to owe their *phoros*. The explicit removal of the *syntaxis* leads scholars to regard this as a special grant to Priene, perhaps, in contrast to the “non-Greeks” in Naulochon.⁷¹ It is this sort of leap that leads to the conclusion that this edict was a unique grant for Priene. The citizens of Priene also received a favorable ruling from Alexander regarding a long-running border dispute over the Samian *peraea* that they referred to as evidence when the case came up again in the third century (*I.Priene*² 132), but there is nothing that marks Priene as uniquely important and this edict could have been repeated throughout the region after 330 to formally record the autonomy of Ionia and to remit the *syntaxis*.

The evidence for Ionia during Alexander’s reign after 331 is particularly fragmentary, which makes it difficult to evaluate Macedonian rule. It is clear, however, that Alexander remained involved in decisions that affected Ionia. Plutarch, for instance, says that Alexander wrote a letter to Megabyzus about how to handle a situation where a servant staged a sit-in in the temple, encouraging him to lure the protester out of the sanctuary to avoid impurity (Plut. *Alex.* 42.1).⁷² Alexander’s specific correspondent here is unknown, but the name resembles the title held by the priest at the temple of Artemis in Ephesus, mak-

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⁷¹. See particularly, Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 435.

⁷². The status of the person is unclear. Plutarch uses θεράπων, which usually refers to an attendant or worshipper, but was also a word used for enslaved people.
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ing this connection likely. At the same time, Alexander largely left the preexisting administration intact, but limited its power by appointing his own financial and military officers. In the case of western Anatolia, Philoxenus received the position of hyparch that appears to be roughly synonymous with the position held by Cyrus the Younger some four score years earlier. Philoxenus was first responsible for collecting tribute in the region and later imposed a garrison in Ephesus when officials there refused to arrest Anaxagoras, Codrus, and Diodorus, three brothers who assassinated Hegesias (Polyaenus 6.49). There is no clear date for these events, but the fact that when Alexander died Diodorus was awaiting trial after an injury thwarted his escape attempt suggests that it took place in the 320s. Nor is there much information about any of these four men, and Hegesias is variously identified as either one of the men pardoned by Alexander in 334 or a leading member of the pro-Macedonian junta that governed Ephesus on the basis that Polyaneus refers to him as the tyrant of Ephesus (6.49). The importance of this episode is clear because it escalated until Philoxenus became involved, but there is insufficient evidence to say more. While Polyaneus’ account points to internal conflict in Ephesus, it says nothing about on whose order the brothers were supposed to be arrested. He implies that first the brothers and then the Ephesians flouted Macedonian rule, but it is equally possible that that the assassination had nothing to do with Macedonia since Perdiccas ultimately returned Diodorus to Ephesus for trial.

Despite the lack of evidence about the political situation in Ionia during the 320s, it is nevertheless possible to trace the broad strokes of cultural change in the region. Perhaps the biggest development was the influx of money, which would only accelerate in the early Hellenistic period. The infusion of capital came from several sources, all of them linked to individuals. In addition to the inscription for Alexander’s dedication of the temple of Athena Polias at Priene, he is said to have commissioned a massive portrait of himself wielding lightning bolts at the cost of twenty talents (Pliny H.N. 35.36). Apelles, the artist of that portrait, offers a common Ionian story of this period. He was born in

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73. Philoxenus likely accumulated powers as the years passed. Heckel, *Who’s Who*, 220, follows Bosworth, *Historical Commentary*, 280–82, in distinguishing this Philoxenus from the one who inherited the satrapy of Caria after the death of Ada ([Arist.] Oec. 2.31, 1351b), on the grounds that former was too eminent an individual to be considered “some Macedonian” (τις Μακεδών). This argument is not wholly convincing given how little we know about Philoxenus. Arrian *Anab.* 7.23.1 mentions Menander as the satrap of Lydia and Philoxenus in Caria, but this could have been the result of an administrative shuffle after Alexander returned from India.


Colophon but moved to Ephesus and even before Alexander’s reign had taken commissions to paint portraits at the Macedonian court in Pella (Pliny H.N. 35.86). Prior interaction may have contributed to Alexander’s special patronage, but Apelles was hardly alone in following financial opportunities presented by Alexander’s conquest. Andron of Teos was appointed trierarch on the Indus in 326 (Arr. Ind. 18.4–8), and his brother Hagnon was a member of Alexander’s inner circle who was said to have particularly indulged in the luxuries of the east, such as by wearing gold studs in his footwear (Plut. Alex. 22, 40; Athen. 12.55 [539c]). And yet, where Alexander’s campaigns opened lucrative opportunities for individuals that caused money to flow back to Ionia in some places, his regime on balance extracted resources. In one extreme request, Alexander demanded that the Ionians send him purple dye, prompting the acid-tongued Theocritus to quip that he had seized purple death and mighty fate.

Exiles in Ionia

One consequence of the new unipolar Macedonian world that deserves broader consideration is the relationship between the Ionian poleis and political exiles. Political exiles had been an endemic problem throughout the Classical period, and frequently a subject of negotiation between the Ionians and the cycle of imperial powers in the region. Thus, while Alexander only made a general ruling about exiles in 324 with the Exiles Decree (Diod. 18.8.4–6), he had been arbitrating this issue in Ionia since the outset of his campaign in ways that established the framework out of which developed his general policy.

76. There is an anecdote that Alexander’s gave Apelles a commission to paint Pancaste (see Heckel, Who’s Who, 189), his favorite courtesan, nude and then gave her to him (Ael. VH 12.34; Pliny H.N. 35.36). If this episode is not apocryphal, it likely took place in Pella, not later in Alexander’s reign.

77. Martine Cuypers, “Andron of Teos (802),” BNJ T 1, commentary; Heckel, Who’s Who, 128; Billows, Antigonus, 286–88. Heckel argues that the two men are the same, but it is equally possible that they were brothers; see Cuypers, “Andron of Teos (802).” After Alexander’s reign, Andron wrote histories, including a Periplus of the Black Sea, though Cuypers’ biographical essay suggests that the surviving fragments indicate “time spent in the library more than a navy career.” Hagnon received Ephesian citizenship in 322/1 for petitioning Craterus on behalf of the community (I.Eph. 1437) and by 316 was a navarch under Antigonus Monophthalmus (IG II2 682).

78. ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος | θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα | κραταιή, Athen. 12.55 [539c]. This was probably a Homeric reference where there is an association between purple and death. Theocritus was known for his biting wit, which ultimately cost him his life when, told he would have to plead for his life before the Antigonus Monophthalmus’ eyes, he quipped that that was impossible to do with a one-eyed king ([Plut.] Mor. 633c). Duane W. Roller, “Theokritos of Chios (760),” BNJ, biographical essay, dates this exchange to 319/8, when Antigonus came into possession of the island, but if it is appropriate to refer to Antigonus as king, then it belongs in 306–301.
The Exiles Decree was formally announced at the Olympic Games in 324, where, Diodorus says, tens of thousands of Greek exiles had assembled (Diod. 18.8.4–6). The decree declared the repatriation of all exiles, excepting only those who were exiled on religious grounds. In other words, Alexander was issuing a general amnesty and mandating the end to all domestic political conflicts in the Greek world, and, importantly, giving Antipater, his representative in Europe, authority to enforce the decision. Diodorus says that most Greeks approved of the decree. The primary exceptions, he says, were the Athenians and Aetolians, who resented Alexander’s interference with their domestic affairs and prepared to resist. However, Alexander’s death less than a year later makes most interpretations of how the decree affected the relationship between the king and the Greeks speculative, and the revolts against Macedonian control came during the turbulent years after 323.

There is no evidence for how the Exiles Decree affected Ionia. This silence leads to multiple speculative interpretations. First and most directly, Diodorus’ naming of Athens and Aetolia as particular malcontents may serve as a framing device to foreshadow the Lamian War. Indeed, he concludes by saying that fortune soon provided them an opportunity, namely after Alexander died. Further, Diodorus provides this information in a passage in Book 18, among the events surrounding Alexander’s death. His focus on Athens and Aetolia causes further problems for considering the reception of the Exiles Decree but does suggest that opposition elsewhere was muted or nonexistent.

A second possible interpretation is that the Exiles Decree simply did not apply to Ionia. This position is not supported by the ancient evidence but is built from assumptions about the relative political statuses of different communities. This argument would hold that Alexander observed a qualitative difference between the members of the League of Corinth, which were formally autonomous, and the Greek poleis he captured from Persia, which were formally his subjects. If the Exiles Decree applied to the former and not the latter,

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79. The Athenians may have resented the Exiles Decree, but the explanation Diodorus gives for their preparations for war is Samos, which was a separate decision.

80. Sviatoslav Dmitriev, “Alexander’s Exiles Decree,” Klio 86, no. 2 (2004): 348–81, goes further, arguing that the Exiles Decree allowed Greek poleis to enact its mandate through local legislative processes and therefore was not as much of an imposition as is sometimes assumed.

81. I do not believe that Alexander used the league as an administrative mechanism in Asia, but whether Alexander enrolled the Greeks of Asia into it is a question without a clear answer. Recently Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos, “Perception of the Self and the Other: The Case of Macedonia,” in Ancient Macedonia, vol. 7 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2007), 51–66, tried to draw new conclusions based on the description of Alexander’s triarchoi in India (Arr. Ind. 18.3–8), but his argument is refuted by Maxim M. Kholod, “Arr. Ind. 18.3–8 and the Question of the Enrollment of the Greek Cities of Asia Minor in the Corinthian League,” in Koinon Doron: Studies and Essays in Honour of Valery P. Nikonorov, ed. Alexander A. Sinitsyn and Maxim M. Kholod (St. Petersburg:
ter, this would provide an explanation for why there is no evidence that it had any effect in the region. And yet the problems with this position are manifold. First, the ancient evidence for the decree suggests that it was a blanket pronouncement that applied to all Greek poleis, without indicating that Alexander distinguished between those he had power over such as Athens and those he did not, such as Syracuse, let alone between European and Asian Greece, which were both artificial categories. Second, while Alexander did exert more authority over the Ionians than over his “allies,” I believe it was a distinction without a difference.

If there was no distinction made between Ionia and the other Greeks in the text of the Exiles Decree, why is there no evidence that it was enacted on the region? The answer lies in Alexander’s earlier rulings regarding Ionian exiles. Ionia had served Alexander as a laboratory for policies regarding exiles since 334. At Ephesus near the start of the campaign he restored people who had been exiled on his account (δι᾽ αὐτὸν, Arr. I.17.10), thereby claiming responsibility for them and making clear that their loyalty to him would be repaid as a form of reciprocal obligation. As with the assembled throngs at Olympia in 324, this declaration curried goodwill with the exiles being restored, but also made loyalty a precondition for repatriation. This situation had probably continued through much of 334 when Alexander received supplication from other exiles in and around Ionia and agreed to restore them to their communities.

When Alexander’s considerations ceased to be primarily given to exiles already loyal to him and expanded to include people who would be loyal on account of their restoration is unknown, but there is evidence that it also dates to the early part of his reign. The first sign of this change comes in Alexander’s First Letter to the Chians from 334/3, which created a new category of exiles (those who betrayed the polis to the barbarians, RO 84A = SIG3 283, ll. 10–12) and otherwise instructed the Chians to restore all other exiles along with its constitutional transition to a democracy.82 Together with the so-called Second Letter, these inscriptions from Chios indicate extensive interference in an autonomous community.

The immediate restoration of exiles threatened domestic stability, as is evi-

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82. The Second Letter makes a specific exception for Alcimachus, who it says was Alexander’s friend and was not working for Persia of his own volition. This man is probably a Chian, rather than the Macedonian officer in charge of capturing Aeolis in 334; see Francis Piejko, “The ‘Second Letter’ of Alexander the Great to Chios,” Phoenix 39, no. 3 (1985): 245–47; contra Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 108–11.
enced by the bloody purges that took place at Ephesus, and the broader the amnesty, the more issues threatened to crop up. A third inscription from Chios, plausibly from c.332/1, addressed the return of property and made the state liable for damages if it could not be returned to the original owner (SEG 51, 1075 ll. 3–7). The decree established a board of ten judges to resolve disagreements between the returning exiles and those who remained (ll. 9–11), but the exact composition of this tribunal is unknown. At around the same time at Mytilene, though, Alexander established a local board of arbitrators composed of equal numbers of men who returned and men who had stayed to resolve property disputes (RO 85B = IG XII2 6, ll. 21–34).

Although the provisions on Chios demonstrate an awareness of the complications that accompanied the return of exiles, conflicts did not only arise from legal disputes over property. The case of Theopompus provides an illustrative example. Perhaps the most famous repatriated exile in Ionia, Theopompus was a prolific writer and historian whose father had been exiled from Chios on the charge of laconism, probably in the 390s. He had been familiar with the Macedonian court in his adult life but did not receive preferential treatment and only returned after the general amnesty in 332/1. Theopompus became involved in politics upon repatriation and the surviving fragments of his letters to Alexander reveal that he resumed what might be called the family grudge against Theocritus, whose relatives had led Chios into an alliance with Athens in the 390s. In particular, he accused Theocritus of having amassed a great deal of wealth to the detriment of the state and perhaps at the expense of the returned exiles (BNJ 115 T 9, F 252; Strabo 14.1.35). The veracity of these accusations is unknown, but they are likely libel meant to denigrate his rival and enhance his position on Chios. At the same time, the best lies contain a kernel of truth. Theocritus may well have used his prominent position and the opportunity presented by returning exiles to make money, but the mechanics of this and whether it was as corrupt as Theopompus implies is unknown. What is

83. I have followed the text in Kholod, “New Chian Inscription,” 22–23.
84. None of the fragments mention Alexander, but the decree is missing the first line, which is where Alexander’s name most likely would occur; see Kholod, “New Chian Inscription,” 22–32.
85. Theopompus’ exile has been variously dated; see Chapter 5.
clear, however, is that Theopompus’ complaints came to naught, and, after Alexander’s death, he was again exiled, was refused entry to Egypt allegedly on the charge of being a meddlesome busybody (πολυπράγμων), and only just avoided execution (BNJ 115 T 2). 87

Specific evidence for exiles in Ionia beyond Chios is frustratingly absent, but there is no reason to assume that comparable processes were not at work. There were few crimes (sacrilege and sedition on behalf of Persia) that kept a person in exile, while Alexander offered everyone else an amnesty that heralded an era. In propagating the Exiles Decree of 324 the principal change was the absence of reference to those who collaborated with Persia, but otherwise formalized and extended an ad hoc policy that had developed in Asia Minor nearly a decade earlier. Although the Exiles Decree did not have immediate consequences for Ionia, it indirectly led to war in the region, ironically over an issue that it did not address: ownership of Samos.

Samos

The elephant in Ionia in the last years of Alexander’s reign was Samos, which had been occupied by Athens in the 360s. In his compressed account, Diodorus Siculus states that the principal Athenian grievance with Alexander over the Exiles Decree was that they had to give up Samos, which they had divided into cleruchies (18.8.7). Despite this evidence, Diodorus is mistaken, though perhaps preserving the Athenian interpretation of events. From Alexander’s perspective, however, these were probably two unconnected issues. Nevertheless, in a near-contemporaneous decision to the Exiles Decree, Alexander demanded that the Athenians cede Samos to the displaced Samians. 88

These Samians held an anomalous position. They considered themselves to be exiles (ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, RO 90 B = SIG 3 312, l. 6), but there was no polis to return to at that time, and any restoration required extricating thousands of

87. This biographical detail is revelatory for the outcome of his political career, but factually suspect; see Flower, Theopompus, 17; William S. Morison, “Theopompus of Chios (115),” BNJ T 2, commentary. Cf. Shrimpton, Theopompus, 8–9.

88. The separate ruling is attested by Ephippus, BNJ 126 F 5; see Graham Shipley, A History of Samos, 800–188 BC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 165. The precise date of this decision is controversial. For a date in 324, see Heisserer, Alexander and the Greeks, 184; Ernst Badian, “Harpalus,” JHS 81 (1961): 30; Christopher W. Blackwell, In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 14, 145; for the clarification in 323, see Shipley, Samos, 297.
Athenians from the island. The Samians had also probably petitioned Alexander unsuccessfully in 334 when he passed areas where many of the refugees settled, only to witness him confirm Athenian possession of the island. The situation at Alexander’s court had changed by 324, when the Samian cause found advocates, particularly in the person of Gorgus of Iasus. Gorgus’ motivations are hard to reconstruct. Ancient sources present him as a particularly implacable enemy of Athens to the point that he pledged ten thousand suits of armor and an equal number of catapults for an attack (Ephippus, BNJ 126 F 5), and the loss of Samos constituted a significant blow to Athens. Lurking behind this immediate political concern, however, may be an additional motivation. Iasus was a Greek polis in Hecatomnid Caria, making it a likely destination for Samian refugees after their expulsion. It is likely, therefore, that Gorgus had long familiarity with their plight, which led him not only to champion their cause in Alexander’s court, but also to offer his own money to finance their restoration (RO 90B = SIG 3 312). Samians began to return to the island late in 324 or early 323, and more gathered at Anaea, where some had likely lived since 365. To dissuade emulators, the Athenian assembly responded by ordering the strategos on Samos to arrest any persons making the crossing and to send them to Athens as hostages, where they were ultimately condemned to death until Antileon of Chalcis paid their ransoms.

Alexander’s conquests temporarily created a unipolar Macedonian world that lasted only about a decade. But this reset in the imperial playing field only created new problems in both the regional and domestic spheres that were
ready to boil over when Alexander suddenly died. The fissures in the Aegean at the end of Alexander’s life are most visible in the dispute over Samos, but this was not an isolated incident. All was not well, and the Ionians were forced to adapt to a new geopolitical dynamic that once again threatened to expose old fault lines. And yet with the upheavals in the political landscape also came new opportunities.
Ancient historians suggest that the world waited for Alexander’s death with bated breath and careful preparation, and that the news was met with a flurry of activity. In Europe Athens instigated the Lamian War, in Asia Minor Rhodes expelled its Macedonian garrison (Diod. 18.8.1), and in central Asia colonists settled by Alexander refused to stay in place (Diod. 18.7.1–5). In Ionia, there was no revolt against Macedonian rule and, with the notable exception of refugee Samians returning to their island in the face of Athenian resistance, the Hellenistic period began with a conspicuous calm at the eye of the storm overtaking the eastern Mediterranean. That calm did not last, and Ionia was soon caught up in the conflicts and rivalries that defined the end of the fourth century.

Richard Billows has characterized this period in Ionia as a time of rebirth, in which the rulers considered the region to be of central importance and therefore planted the seeds of prosperity with favorable policies. As is typical of recent scholarship, Billows here challenged a tradition that treated the early Hellenistic period as a destructive time in Ionia. Mikhail Rostovtzeff, for instance, described the wars of this period as an unstoppable force that “stunted and then gradually atrophied” the economic capacity of the Greek poleis, and Michael Austin described the Diadochoi as pirates who used wars to gather money to pay soldiers and legitimize their rule as “spear-won territory” in emulation of Alexander. On one level it is hard to disagree with Billows: Hellenistic rulers offered tax exemptions, favorable statuses, and donations to gain influ-

ence with the Ionians that laid a solid foundation for renewed prosperity, while also allowing some of the tribute payments to stay in the community. Even the outlay of resources for urban walls proved invaluable during the Galatian wars of the 270s (I.Priene 17; I.Ery. 24). However, the dissolution of the Macedonian empire after Alexander’s death made for an unstable situation, and the same central geographic location that made the Ionians worth courting put them firmly in the middle of the early wars of the successors. This environment of competition allowed the Ionians to manipulate the imperial contenders, but in its own way this perpetuated the situation that the Ionians had been living under for two centuries. Only after the wars moved away from Ionia in the 290s did the Ionian renaissance begin in earnest.

Samians Restored

After the Athenian conquest of Samos in 365, refugees had scattered across the Mediterranean. Most found a new home nearby through the patronage of the Hecatomnid dynasts and existing networks of relationships, but a few found themselves as far away as Sicily. Some individuals may have received citizenship where they settled, but most would have lived as metics. Despite lacking a polis, the Samians appear to have maintained something of a coherent identity after their displacement, and even competed in and won events in Panhellenic festivals. This situation where the Samians preserved their identity and never gained full protections of citizenship elsewhere explains why when Alexander reversed his ruling on Athenian ownership of Samos in 324, the refugees began to flock to Anaia on the mainland across from the island.

Refugees began to return to Samos late in 324 or early 323, and an Athenian decree issued instructions for the strategos on the island to arrest those who made the crossing and send them to Athens as hostages. Despite the official ruling in their favor and support from foreign patrons, including two ships provided to them by Nausinicus of Sestus, the short voyage to Samos was a dan-

3. Christian Habicht, “Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit,” MDAI(A) 72 (1957): nos. 25 and 30 dated to 306/5, probably recording honors for Syracuseans. Another inscription (no. 23) records honors for a man from Heraclea, but it is unknown whether this was the polis of that name in Sicily or Heraclea under Latmus; see Graham Shipley, A History of Samos, 800–188 BC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 164 n. 52, who prefers the latter identification.
5. BNJ 76 T 4; Robert B. Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon, Duris of Samos (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1977), 7. There are complications in this evidence for a coherent polis-in-exile.
gerous proposition. Athens enjoyed temporary naval supremacy in the Aegean at the outset of the Lamian War, but Samos was just one of its concerns, and the Samian position was enhanced when the Athenian fleet suffered defeats near Amorgus in 323/2, and then near Abydus (IG II² 398; II² 493) and off the Lichades islands in 322. When the war turned against the Athenians, they condemned the Samian hostages to death but relented after Antileon of Chalcis stepped in to pay their ransoms.

Antipater, the governor of Macedon, referred the issue of Samos to the kings Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV after the conclusion of the Lamian War, and the regent Perdiccas issued a decree on their behalf that confirmed Alexander’s decision to return the island to the Samians (Diod. 18.18.69). In return, the Samians established a new festival, the basilica, in honor of the kings, but official support did not return the island to them. The Samians still had to kill or physically expel the cleruchs, and the Athenians, impelled by the influx of displaced citizens, continued to regard the return as illegal. Several inscriptions may testify to additional Athenian attacks in the years after 321 (IG XII 6 51–52), but Samos never again fell to Athens.

However, physical security was just one of the difficulties facing the new community. A series of honorific decrees reveal the extent to which the new polis relied on foreign aid. In addition to the decree for Gorgos of Iasus, who financed the return of some Samians (RO 90B = SIG³ 312), and Antileon of Chalcis, who paid the ransom for those captured by Athens (IG XII 6 1:42), there are inscriptions detailing honors for citizens of Ephesus, Erythrae, Magnesia, Priene, and Heraclea, as well as the tyrant of Syracuse and Gela. The Spartans reportedly underwent a one-day fast, with the savings going to Samos (Arist. Oec. 2.1347b 16–20), and Sosistratus of Miletus offered a three-talent loan to the new community (IG XII 37).

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The Samian need is easily explained. The refugees were long absent from their land, which was the primary source of wealth in ancient Greece, and what little they had in the way of liquid assets was probably needed to equip and pay soldiers to defend against Athenian attacks. Moreover, once returned to Samos, they faced agricultural start-up costs for tools and seed at the same time as needing to purchase grain to feed the community because it is unlikely that the departing Athenians left much behind. A widespread grain shortage around the Aegean in these years complicated matters further (RO 96 = SEG IX 2; Dem. 56), and Samian inscriptions reveal the lengths that the community went to encourage merchants to bring grain. One decree from c.322/1 (SEG I 361), for instance, records honors for Gyges of Torone for bringing three thousand medimnoi of grain to Samos and offers him citizenship, either in accordance with a law that honored grain traders or in a bid to persuade Gyges to sell them even larger quantities.

In contrast, the motivations for the honorands are less clear. They might have sympathized with the refugees, but neither spite for Athens nor human rights considerations explain the outpouring of support. Priene, Ephesus, and Miletus, despite disputes with Samos that spanned generations, also had regional connections through institutions like the Panionion and local trade that would have encouraged investment in the new community. Likewise,


An Athenian inscription from 387/6 regulating trade at Clazomenae lists poleis that Clazomenaeans purchased grain from, including Phocaea, Chios, and Smyrna, demonstrating the robust regional trade in Ionia (RO 18 = IG II² 28, ll. 17–18).
honors are not mutually exclusive from straightforward economic motivations. Men like Gyges and Sosistratus undoubtedly saw in Samos an investment opportunity, which would reap dividends through straightforward monetary repayment and through an outpouring of honors.17

The leaders of Samos in the years after the restoration were the wealthy citizens who led the exiles back to the island. Notable among these was the family of Duris of Samos. Pausanias describes a statue at Olympia dedicated to Caius, Duris’ father, for his victory during the period of exile (νικήσαι Σκαίον ἤνικα ὁ Σαμίων δῆμος ἔφευγεν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, 6.13.5 = BNJ 76 T 4).18 The text continues, revealing that in due time Caius had something to do with the return of the Samians (τὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ὁ ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα τὸν δῆμον), but there is a critical lacuna that includes the verb of the clause. Modern scholars restore the text that he both led the exiles back and infer that he became a tyrant soon thereafter (BNJ 76 T 4).19 Graham Shipley has, however, called into question the source tradition about the early days of the new Samian state. He contends that Pausanias’ source for the importance of Caius in 322/1 is Duris himself, who had a reputation for exaggeration and a vested interested in burnishing his father’s reputation (BNJ 76 T 8 = Plut. Per. 28.1–3).20 The monument may record an authentic victory, but the inscription probably dates to after the restoration of Samos, which makes it impossible to know whether Caius represented himself as a member of a Samian community at Olympic games or, as I believe, this is an embellishment meant to show his dedication to his homeland.

The incipient state was heavily dependent on its wealthy citizens to function, for many of the same reasons that it was dependent on foreign aid. Robert Kebric argues that it was this dependence that led to a peaceful emergence of Caius’ tyranny out of what had been a de facto plutocracy.21 The question is what to make of this position called “tyranny.” If Duris is an unreliable narra-


18. The name Caius is remarkable for its parallel to the Latin praenomen, which is taken to buttress the case that his family spent the period of their exile in Sicily; see Kebric, *In the Shadow of Macedon*, 4; Frances Pownall, “Duris of Samos (76),” *BNJ* T 4, commentary, but this is a particularly tenuous connection so long before the First Punic War that established Roman control of the island.


21. Kebric, *In the Shadow of Macedon*, 8. See Pownall, “Duris of Samos (76),” T 4 commentary and biographical commentary, for arguments on the dates of Caius’ tyranny and the proposal that Duris’ reign should not be tied to the hegemony of a single Hellenistic king.
tor presenting an official account of this period, it is more difficult to reconstruct the political divisions on Samos. On the one hand, Caius and his sons undoubtedly held a dominant position in Samian politics. Duris’ name appears on Samian coins dating to c.310–300, which indicates that he held a monetary office during that period, and a brother Lysagoras introduced the honorific decree for Heraclea c.300. This confluence suggests that the family held a tight grip on the reins of power, but it is also possible that their position was not unlike that of Pericles in fifth-century Athens in that he was able to dominate the polis and be characterized as a tyrant without actually being one. This family’s prominence on Samos clearly existed under the leadership of their patriarch Caius, but its role in the restoration of Samos was expanded in memory through Duris’ writing and strategically erected monuments.

Samos and Diadochic Politics

The contested status of Samos made it particularly vulnerable to the political disputes of the early Hellenistic period. In 319 the new regent for Alexander IV and Philip III Arrhidæus, Polyperchon, tried to win Athenian support for his war against Cassander by offering among other things to recognize Athenian ownership of the island in the name of the kings (Diod. 18.56.7). This scheme came to naught when Demetrius of Phalerum seized Athens with Cassander’s support in 317, but this did not mean that the Athenians abandoned their insular ambitions. In 313, the Athenian assembly voted to award honors to the satrap Asander in return for warships (IG II² 450, ll. 19–20). The purpose of the gifts to Athens is unknown, but Lara O’Sullivan argues that Asander provided the ships with the understanding that they would be used against Samos and connects this with two inscriptions from the island that record a siege (IG XII 6, ll. 51–52).

These continuing threats against Samos had the effect of strengthening its

23. Cf. Thuc. 2.65 for Pericles’ power over Athens.
relationship with Antigonus Monophthalmus. Despite Perdicas’ support for the restoration of Samos, Antigonus was likely building his relationships there as early as 322/1. Certainly, after Triparadeisus, Antigonus’ sphere of influence as strategos of Asia was expanded to include Ionia, and his position as the protector of Samos was strengthened by Polyperchon’s support for the Athenian claim. Antigonus’ aid allowed the Samians to triumph against the attacks in 313, which cemented Samos within the Antigonid sphere of influence until 294.

The relationship between Samos and Antigonus is most clearly demonstrated in stone. Surviving inscriptions record numerous honors granted to members of Antigonus’ retinue, including a statue for Nicomedes of Cos.25 There is likewise evidence of Samian soldiers serving with Antigonus’ forces in various capacities. At the upper levels, Themison of Samos brought Antigonus forty ships at Tyre in 314 (Diod. 19.62.7) and served as a naval commander at the battle of Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.4). But more indicative of this relationship than a single highly placed individual is that the Samians inscribed their thanks for Hipparchus of Cyrene for his support for Samos and, in particular, his treatment of Samian soldiers in Caria.26 On the island itself, there are the remains of towers on the western side that were probably constructed under the Antigonid aegis.27 These towers plausibly indicate the presence of a garrison, but the threat of force was probably not overtly coercive because the unique situation meant that the Samians also stood to gain time to restore their community.

The Wars of the Diadochoi and Ionia

While the Samians were occupied with the restoration of their polis, the rest of Ionia was buffeted by the currents that swept across the Macedonian empire. The first Macedonian settlement, which took place at Babylon in the immediate aftermath of Alexander’s death in 323, confirmed the existing political structure of Asia Minor. Antigonus Monophthalmus received an expanded satrapy that included Pamphylia, Lycia, and Greater Phrygia, while Menander and Asander had their commands in Lydia and Caria confirmed (Diod. 18.3.1).28

27. Shipley, Samos, 246–47.
The settlement at Babylon did not have a significant impact on Ionia at face value, but it laid the groundwork for a showdown between Antigonus and the regent Perdiccas, who was bringing him up on charges.

Antigonus fled from his province in 322, seeking protection from Antipater and Craterus in Macedon (Diod. 18.23.3–4). When Perdiccas left Anatolia to invade Egypt in 321, Antigonus crossed the Aegean again, this time with three thousand soldiers and ten Athenian ships. It was at this point that Ionia joined the story. According to Arrian in his fragmentary history of this period, Ephesus and the other Ionian poleis followed the lead of the Menander and Asander in throwing their support behind Antigonus (Succ. F 1.2). Antigonus’ rapid success leads Richard Billows to speculate that he had struck a deal with the two satraps in advance of crossing back to Asia. Irrespective of when Menander and Asander committed to war against Perdiccas, diplomatic communication between them and Antigonus is all but certain. The same cannot be said with confidence about the cities of Ionia. Antigonus had accepted the surrender of Priene on Alexander’s behalf in 331, but then the evidence for continuing communication disappears. Nevertheless, there is reason to suggest that Antigonus laid the diplomatic groundwork to quickly gain their support. It is certainly possible that Asander and Menander served as proxies for him in their respective spheres, but, more directly, Antigonus’ satrapal retinue included at least one Ionian, Aristodemus of Miletus, and the Macedonian Theotimides, whom the Samians awarded honors.


30. Antigonus dispatched Aristodemus to the Peloponnese to recruit mercenaries. Dio- dorus (19.57.4–5) refers to him as strategos; Plutarch Demet. (17.2), calls him “first in flattery”
Yet it is worth asking how the Ionians received these entreaties. Samos and Ephesus had known grounds for sympathy for Perdiccas because the regent had rendered judgments in their favor. For the Samians, he had confirmed Alexander’s ruling against Athens (Diod. 18.18.6–9). They had appropriately decreed honors for the kings in whose name he issued the ruling but were unlikely to be ignorant of who stood as their benefactor. The situation at Ephesus was more complicated. Under uncertain circumstances in the last years of Alexander’s reign Philoxenus had arrested the three sons of Echeanax and taken them to Sardis (Polyaneus 6.49; see Chapter 7). The brothers planned a daring jailbreak, filing their chains and escaping over the walls dressed as slaves, but one, Diodorus, fell and was left behind, and so was sent to Alexander in Babylon for punishment. Perdiccas, however, returned Diodorus to Ephesus to stand trial, thereby demonstrating a deference to the local Ephesian institutions, particularly if, as I suggested in the last chapter, the root cause of this incident lay in local factionalism. This decision was just a small part of Perdiccas’ courtship of Ephesus, where his brother Alcetas, Cleitus the White, and another Ionian with ties to the Macedonian court, Hagnon of Teos, all received citizenship. Ephesian inscriptions in these years reflect a community in turmoil, and Andreas Walser describes the outpouring of honors as the result of fearful maneuvering, and with good reason. Polyaenus only provides the narrowest glimpse into domestic divisions in the city but concludes his anecdote by saying that Anaxagoras and Codrus returned to Ephesus to rescue their brother, almost certainly with the support of Antigonus.

The political map of the Macedonian world shifted again in 320 when Antipater, Antigonus, and the survivors of Perdiccas’ invasion of Egypt convened a meeting at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18.39.2–6). Asander was con-
firmed in his position as satrap of Caria, but Cleitus the White replaced Menander in Lydia (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. Succ. F 1.41) and while Antipater formally became the new regent, Antigonus became strategos of Asia.34 The new arrangement lasted about a year before Antipater died in 319, leaving the regency to Polycrates (Diod. 18.48.4). The following year Cleitus prepared for war by installing garrisons in poleis in his territory, including at Ephesus, before crossing the Aegean to denounce Antigonus to Polycrates. Antigonus promptly marched on and captured Ephesus with ease because a faction inside the walls opened the gates to his army (Diod. 18.52.7). Diodorus says that Antigonus seized six hundred talents of silver being carried from Cilicia to Macedonia when the ship put into the harbor at Ephesus, thereby formally renouncing his allegiance to the kings. However, this episode is generally not considered for what it meant for Ephesus. Antigonus’ presumption marked a new phase in the unfolding Macedonian drama, but the appearance of rival factions who exploited that same drama for their own local ends remained business as usual in Ionia.

After Antigonus left Ephesus to chase Eumenes into the interior of Asia, there was a period of respite for Ionia until 315 when the Third Diadochic War returned the fighting to the eastern Aegean. This war set Antigonus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes against Ptolemy in Egypt, Cassander in Macedonia, and Lysimachus in Thrace, and the fighting extended from the European side of the Aegean to Gaza and Babylon.35 Ionia was not a stronghold for any of the principal warlords, but nevertheless was exposed to attack by virtue of being in the middle of this wide-ranging war. One campaign in particular brought the war to the region. In the autumn of 315 Seleucus, having fled Babylon after arousing Antigonus’ ire earlier that year, led a Ptolemaic fleet to the Aegean and laid siege to Erythrae (Diod. 19.60.3–4).36 Antigonus responded by sending his nephew

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34. Anson, Alexander’s Heirs, 70–74; Errington, “From Babylon to Triparadeisos,” 67–71; Heckel, Who’s Who, for Asander 57, for Menander 163, for Cleitus, 87–88; Heckel, Marshals, 58–64; Waterfield, Dividing the Spoils, 66–68. The two other appointments at Triparadeisus with ramifications for Ionia later in the Hellenistic period were Ptolemy in Egypt and Seleucus in Babylon.


36. Billows, Antigonus, 113; Champion, Antigonus, 80. John D. Grainger, Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom (New York: Routledge, 1990), 58–59, speculates that Seleucus’ siege of Erythrae was a distraction to give his troops something to do while he negotiated with Asander.
Polemaeus to the region to deter Ionian communities from capitulating, and Seleucus quickly abandoned the siege (Diod. 19.86.6).

Polemaeus’ campaign put additional pressure on Asander, the satrap of Caria, who concluded an alliance with Ptolemy in 314/3 and subsequently sailed to Athens seeking support from Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum (IG II² 450). Both Ptolemy and Cassander offered him military assistance, but both expeditions suffered disastrous defeats (Diod. 19.68.2–7), and Asander agreed to surrender his armies to Antigonus (Diod. 19.75).³⁷ When he reneged on this deal and called for support from the Ptolemaic fleet still under the command of Seleucus, Antigonus recalled his forces from their winter quarters, divided them into four columns, and conquered the region in a matter of weeks (Diod. 19.75).

The nature of the sources for the Third Diadochic War make it difficult to reconstruct its effects on Ionia. For instance, Diodorus records that Seleucus besieged Erythrae in 315, but offers scant detail about the polis other than that it held out against Ptolemy’s fleet. Diodorus also paints a simplistic picture of the situation at Erythrae where the resistance was more likely an Antigonid garrison than general opposition from the citizens. The exception to the general dearth of sources for Ionia during these years is at Miletus, which, although particular to the conditions there, also helps to shed light on the relationship between Ionia and the Macedonian warlords.

There is limited evidence for Miletus after 334, when Alexander captured it, but, at some point, the walls punctured by Alexander’s siege weapons were repaired and reinforced. Like the other Greek poleis in Asia Minor, Miletus slipped into limbo after Alexander’s death, but it remained deeply connected to Caria, which Asander received in the Macedonian settlements. In the wake of his agreement with Antigonus in 313, Asander installed a garrison in Miletus, allowing Antigonus’ forces to encourage the Milesians to assert their freedom (τοὺς τε πολίτας ἐκάλουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, Diod. 18.75.4).

Yet there are signs that the Milesians were not passive victims of Hellenistic predation. Two years earlier, in 315, leading Milesians probably opened negotiations with Seleucus, then besieging Erythrae. The details of these negotiations are unknown, but in later years Seleucus would claim to have received a favorable oracle in the exchange. The problem, though, is that the oracle at Didyma had fallen silent when its hereditary priests were deported to central Asia a century and a half earlier. The Milesians had delivered alleged oracles

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...to Alexander in Egypt in 331 as a veiled request for money (Strabo 17.43) and may have done so again with Seleucus. These negotiations therefore reveal a community trying to recover its lost prominence in this new world. The political and diplomatic activity was mirrored by a renewed spate of monumental construction that included the Delphinium and plans to restore the sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma. But there are signs of discontent and difficulty beneath the surface. One of the smaller pieces of monumental construction was the publication of inscriptions that record the list of asemynnetes (the eponymous officials; cf. Chapter 2). The second list begins after Antigonus’ capture of Miletus in 313/2 with the declaration that, in the term of Hippomachus, Antigonus restored autonomy and democracy to the polis (Ἰππόμαχος Θήρωνος, ἐπὶ τούτου ἡ πόλις | ἔλευθερα καὶ αὐτόνομος ἐγένετο ὑπὸ | Ἀντιγόνου καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία ἀπεδόθη, Milet I.3, no. 123, ll. 2–4).39

The credulous reading of this inscription would accept that this was indeed how the Milesians thought of Antigonus, even though it invokes loaded terms such as “freedom” that became increasingly impotent missiles to be launched at opponents in the verbal wars of the Diadochoi. Further, the first entry to follow this declaration was Ἀπόλλων Διός, meaning that in the very next year the eponymous official was the god Apollo. Apollo appeared only twice on the list before this date, both in the tumult that followed Alexander’s conquest, but became a common occurrence in the early Hellenistic period, including four consecutive years in the 260s (Milet I.3, no. 123 ll. 53–56). The most common explanation for why the Milesians formally recorded Apollo as asemynnetes is that these were years in which Miletus was in a state of financial emergency, but it is equally possible that it records a moment of social strife when the typical mechanisms for selecting the eponymous official broke down. In both scenarios, it holds that the reference to Antigonus was representative of the warlord’s demands and not a celebration of liberty.

The inscription on the Milesian asemynnetes list was a local manifestation of Antigonus’ imperial policy. In 314, Antigonus had made a proclamation at Tyre that all Greek poleis were to be free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned, which...
was followed in short order by a decree from Ptolemy to the same effect (Diod. 19.61.3–5). Richard Billows puts the proclamation in the context of Antigonus facing four hostile dynasts and thus argues that “the primary motive . . . was clearly to incite mainland Greeks to rebel against Kassandros [and] one may conclude that it was purely a politico-military maneuver, devoid of any broader policy or idealistic content.” Likewise, Sviatoslav Dmitriev sees the policy in light of Antigonus’ urgent need to “break down a military alliance that had been forged against him.” He further declares: “All these words and deeds had nothing to do with the actual status of individual cities.” The autonomy of the Greeks, including the Ionians, was a cornerstone of Antigonus’ policy between 315 and 301. What set him apart from his rivals with reference to Ionia was that he was in position to act upon his words.

Antigonus’ actions toward Ionia between 318 and 315 were opportunistic, driving Cleitus the White’s garrison from Ephesus (Diod. 18.52.5–8), but also supporting Cassander against Polperchon, the latter of whom had promised the Greeks that he would remove Antipater’s garrisons installed after the Lamian War (Diod. 18.53.2–57.1; Plut. Phocion 31.1). In 318, Antigonus had a sphere of influence that was nominally limited to Anatolia, where he supported the Greeks against Cleitus. Since Polperchon had already issued a declaration of freedom of the other Greek poleis, Antigonus gained little by following suit. This was also a period in which Antigonus had only minimal contact with Ionia since he was in the interior of Asia in pursuit of Eumenes until 316. Antigonus probably saw more value in independent allied cities than in expending his own forces to secure their allegiance. His forces therefore “liberated” the rest of Anatolia, and he ensured that a clause guaranteeing Greek autonomy appeared in the treaty of 311 (Diod. 20.19.3–4). These actions gave Antigonus a reputa-

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42. Billows, *Antigonus*, 199.
tion for defending autonomy that Ionian poleis made reference to later in the third century when seeking royal benefactions, but he was also not opposed to creating garrisons when necessary (e.g., Diod. 20.111.3). Autonomy for Ionia served Antigonus’ purposes, but it was autonomy on his terms and always backed by the threat of force. The result was an upheaval in the human geography, as we will see at the end of this chapter.

The wars of the Diadochoi between the Peace of 311 and the Ipsus campaign of 302/1 largely bypassed Ionia. Ptolemy sent a fleet to the southern coast of Caria, capturing Phaselis, Xanthus, Caunus, Myndus and Iasus, but Demetrius prevented the fall of Halicarnassus, so the campaign stalled before reaching Miletus (Diod. 20.27.1–2). Ptolemy spent the winter of 309/8 at Cos, where he proposed marriage to Alexander the Great’s sister Cleopatra, but after her murder he sailed on to Europe without attacking Ionia (Diod. 20.37). At the same time, Ionians participated in these wars on all sides. Much like the Samian soldiers discussed above and individual philoi, there is scattered evidence for Ionian mercenaries serving abroad, including a list of 150 mercenaries at Athens c.300 that records at least seven Ionians from five different poleis (IG II2, 1956). However, only in 302, when Lysimachus’ and Cassander’s general Prepelaus crossed the Hellespont as part of the final campaign against Antigonus, did war return to Ionia.

Prepelaus led his forces south through Aetolia to Ionia, where, according to Diodorus, his siege struck fear into the Ephesians and they surrendered without a fight (τὴν δ᾽ Ἔφεσον πολιορκήσας καὶ καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ἐνδόν παρέλαβε τὴν πόλιν, 20.107.4). Prepelaus made a show of liberating Ephesus, confirming the tax exemption for the sanctuary of Artemis, freeing Rhodian hostages Demetrius had sent there, and declaring its freedom. At the same time, he burned warships in the harbor and, in a more galling move, installed his own garrison that either he or the garrison commander quartered in land belonging to the sanctuary of Artemis, from which they also requisitioned supplies (Diod. 20.107.4–5). Moreover, despite Diodorus’ mild language, Prepelaus enacted

48. E.g., C. Bradford Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934), no. 15.
50. On the marriage proposal, see recently Worthington, Ptolemy, 152–54, with bibliography.
51. There were one each from Ephesus and Priene, two from Colophon, three from Miletus, and an indeterminate number of Erythraeans. This is a small, but not insignificant, percentage of the total.
a domestic revolution within the ruling elite that rewarded the groups who opened the gates to him and toppled those that had been supported by Antigonus. When Demetrius recaptured Ephesus in 302, he replaced the garrison with one of his own and forced it back to its earlier condition (ἤναγκασε τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν ἀποκαταστῆναι, Diod. 20.111.3).53

There is a frustrating lack of information regarding what the Ionians thought about these shifting tides of war. Much as at the end of the fifth century, when Pausanias described the Ionians “painting both sides of the walls” (6.3.15; see Chapter 4), they seem to have fostered ties with both sides such that they were always victorious—or, at least, always in a position to minimize property damage.54 Certainly, the Hellenistic kings went to lengths to present their conquests as liberations, but their armies still needed to be fed, which placed strains on the Ionian economies.55 It is therefore not a surprise that the most common type of honorific decrees from early Hellenistic Ionia were those given to men who helped supply food, such as the Samian grant of citizenship for Gyges of Torone in 322/1 (SEG I 361)56 and the Ephesian decree for Archestratus of Macedonia in 302 (OGIS 9).57 Although the necessity of supplying grain to the Ionian poleis had governed the relationship with imperial powers in the past, the ubiquity of these honors reflects both the changing epigraphic habits in the early Hellenistic period and an evolution in how these negotiations took place. Where before Clazomenae might have received exemptions from regulation to ensure the grain supply (see Chapter 5), poleis now offered honors to individuals who might procure food for the community. Pausanias’ proverb about the Ionian flip-flopping represents a whitewashed memory of a divisive period in Ionian history when the contests over control of the region required poleis to court anyone able to help.

Prepelaus concluded his campaign in northern Ionia by accepting the surrender of Teos and Colophon but had to settle for raiding the territory of Clazomenae and Erythrae when they were reinforced by Antigonid soldiers. Such was the situation in Ionia in 301 when a coalition army under the command of Seleucus and Lysimachus defeated Antigonus and Demetrius at the battle of Ipsus.

After Ipsus

According to Plutarch, the victors of Ipsus carved up Antigonus’ kingdom as though it was a slaughtered animal (Demet. 30.1). Ionia nominally fell into the haunch claimed by Lysimachus north of the Taurus Mountains, but the situation on the ground was less certain. Immediately following the battle, Demetrius led nine thousand soldiers from the interior of Asia Minor to Ephesus (Plut. Demet. 30). He did not remain there long, but took steps to ensure its loyalty, including that he prohibited his soldiers from desecrating the sanctuary of Artemis. There is also evidence from Ephesus that Lysimachus encroached on Ionian territory, resulting in a low-intensity war after which the Ephesians gave citizenship to Thras[—] of Magnesia because he paid ransom for their captured citizens (I.Eph. 1450). (The final letters of his name are unfortunately lost.) Another inscription from after 299 records honors granted to Nicagoras of Rhodes, who relayed a joint declaration from Demetrius and Seleucus reaffirming their commitment to the freedom of the Greeks against Lysimachus—and gives Demetrius pride of place despite then being a political prisoner of Seleucus (OGIS 10).

Concurrent with this apparently positive relationship between Demetrius and Ionia was the reality that the key to control of the region was Demetrius’ garrisons. According to Polyaenus, Lysimachus sought to claim Ephesus by bribing Diodorus the commander garrison in 301/0, but Demetrius ended this threat by luring him onto a boat in the harbor and killing him along with his supporters (4.7). Nor was Ephesus unique, and another decree granted honors to Archestratus, Demetrius’ strategos in Clazomenae, for protecting the ships carrying grain (OGIS 9).

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60. Lund, Lysimachus, 84 n. 14 points out that the dearth of evidence makes it equally possible that Lysimachus’ attack could be dated to 301 in the immediate aftermath of Ipsus or to 298. Cf. Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 53–54.
Lysimachus was not the only king with ambitions toward Ionia. Ptolemy’s forces captured Miletus in c.299/8, though Demetrius appeared on the aesymnetes list for 295/4, indicating that he continued to wield influence there (Milet I.3, no. 123 l. 22). It was in this same period that Seleucus’ relationship with Miletus flourished. Seleucid propaganda promoted the story that the oracle at Didyma had foretold his rise and backed up this claim with a set of massive offerings to adorn the new temple (I.Didyma 479), as well as with dedications from his son Antiochus and wife Apame that defrayed the construction costs (SEG 4 470 and SEG 34 1075). The Milesians duly offered honors for the royal family, but these benefactions did not prevent the reappearance of Apollo on the aesymnetes list for 299/8 (Milet I.3, no. 123, l. 18).

Demetrius sailed to Athens in 296/5, and Lysimachus took the opportunity to seize Ionia. Although Demetrius temporarily regained control of the region in 286/5, Lysimachus’ campaign in 294 was the denouement of the war in Ionia that reached its bloody climax at Ipsus.

Ionia and the Kings: Euergetism and Human Geography

The early Hellenistic period in Ionia was defined by its relationship with the kings, both for good and for ill. On one side of the ledger, Richard Billows has argued that royal favor in the form of tax exemptions and donations laid the foundation for a renaissance in Ionia. On the other side, though, the wars of the successors imposed economic costs that stunted growth. Apollo appears with increasing regularity on the Milesian aesymnetes list in this period, for instance, and there is an Ephesian debt law of c.297 that was likely directed at ameliorating the consequences of property destruction. Nor were taxes the only financial demand made on Ionia. Poleis were expected to contribute to the upkeep of the garrisons, and while they benefited from royal building programs, they were also frequently expected to both leave alone sacred funds and pick up the tab for civic projects.

The toll war took on Ionia is taken as a truism in scholarship, with the question then being which of the kings is to blame for impoverishing the region, because that might give some indication of political sympathies. Lysimachus is

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the traditional villain because he demanded new taxes after he captured Ionia in 294. Moreover, Lysimachus was uncommonly honest about his taxation, leading to the assumption of his miserliness that exposed him to denunciations from the other kings about how he deprived the Greeks of their freedom. Helen Lund has persuasively argued that Lysimachus’ impositions were neither novel nor excessively harsh and therefore blames Antigonus and Demetrius instead.\(^{64}\) Stanley Burstein likewise relieves Lysimachus of sole blame but more plausibly accuses all the Diadochoi of extorting the Ionians.\(^ {65}\) There are also examples of euergetism from kings courting Ionian poleis while they were subject to a rival. These donations were symbols that marked out an ideological claim to space, while simultaneously performing elaborate courtship rituals that paid homage to the fiction of the autonomous polis.\(^ {66}\)

The reciprocal relationship of taxation and benefaction only tells one part of the story. Ionian poleis offered the kings a variety of honors, including festivals and grants of ateleia (tax exemption). These awards went out to a king for his euergetism on behalf of the community. Samos founded a religious festival for Antigonus and Demetrius after 306 and renamed one of its existing tribes Demetrieis to proclaim its allegiance to Antigonus and his son. Similarly, the Samians voted honors for an associate of Demeterius’ wife Phila, whom they petitioned about an unknown issue in 306 (SIG\(^3\) 333, ll. 8–9).\(^ {67}\) On the mainland, Ephesus awarded the traditional founder cult honors to Lysimachus when he moved its location in c.294 and by 289/8, Seleucus asked for libations from the temple of Apollo at Didyma for his continued good health (OGIS 214, ll. 11–12).

The politics of reciprocity demanded that the kings exchange something in return even if the privileges were frequently more symbolic than practical. In rare instances the benefits included tax exemptions such as Antigonus granted to Erythrae (I.Ery. 31 and 32) and Ephesus,\(^ {68}\) but these were the exception. In other cases, the kings prescribed new civic building projects, such as walls at Colophon, Erythrae, and Ephesus, but left a significant portion of the expenses to the

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\(^{64}\) Lund, *Lysimachus*, 128–52. Ptolemy is excused for the purposes of this discussion because his interaction with Ionia came later in the Hellenistic period.

\(^ {65}\) Burstein, “Lysimachus and the Greek Cities,” 73–75.

\(^ {66}\) The clearest example of this was Seleucus’ interactions with Miletus, which Paul J. Kosmin, *The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 61–67, has shown marked the far northwestern bound of his territory.

\(^ {67}\) Shipley, *Samos*, 173.

citizens. There was a proliferation of increasingly expensive defensive fortifications, including circuit walls, forts, and watchtowers, built in nearly every Ionian polis, which marked a departure from the fifth and early fourth centuries, when Ionia was famously unwalled. The impressive circuit walls of Ephesus and Colophon dated to the early Hellenistic period, and Anthony McNicoll characterizes the technical details as a response to the increasing sophistication of Macedonian siege warfare, but these structures were part of a longer continuum of Ionian history. At Priene, for instance, the fortifications that Rostovtzeff characterized as “unsurpassed in technical efficiency and sober beauty” show clear parallels with contemporary Carian examples, suggesting that they were established earlier in the century. Inscriptions also record the appointment of civic officials to oversee maintenance on the walls (e.g., I.Ery. 23). More importantly, though, are inscriptions recording private donations for wall construction, with fragments from Erythrae revealing contributions of more than sixteen thousand drachmæ for one part of the construction (two and half talents; I.Ery. 22A and B) and an inscription at Colophon recording contributions of more than two hundred thousand drachmæ (thirty-five talents).

The human geography of Ionia also changed in the early Hellenistic period. Either Antigonus or Lysimachus refounded Smyrna by combining four small towns, though tradition gave credit to Alexander (Pausanias 7.5.1–3; Aelius


71. This inscription from Erythrae specifically deals with the official designated with protecting the walls against moisture damage, a process called ἀντιπλάδη. The name of this office varied by polis, being τειχοποίοι at Miletus and Priene, ἐπίσταται τεῖχον at Teos and Erythrae; cf. Chaniotis, War in the Hellenistic World, 32.

72. For the estimated amount for Erythrae, see Léopold Migeotte, Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques (Paris: Editions du Sphinx, 1992), 336. The contributions range from as little as twenty drachmæ (l. 125) to as many as five hundred (ll. 38 and 40), and one entry that might have been more than a thousand (l. 48). For Colophon, see Migeotte, Les souscriptions publiques, 337.
Aristides 10.7, 20.20), and it was likely at this time that it received admission to the Panionion.\(^\text{73}\) Although local identities proved an intractable problem in some of these *synoikisms*, the reshuffling made sense for the kings. The patchwork of small towns made each community vulnerable, while consolidation made control over the region easier.\(^\text{74}\) The nucleated settlement at Colophon moved between 315 and 306, which is attested by a new set of walls built by Antigonus that enclosed both the new and old settlements.\(^\text{75}\) What makes this civic project notable beyond that the community soon relocated is a partial list of donors who contributed funds for construction. In addition to many citizens, the list includes four men identified as Macedonians. One Stephanus offered one of the largest single donations: three hundred gold staters.\(^\text{76}\) Although there is no information about these people outside this list, other Ionian poleis offered the Macedonians citizenship,\(^\text{77}\) so the listed individuals likely had close connections to the community, perhaps even living there. In c.303, there was also a proposed *synoikism* of Teos and Lebedus that, if it was not the brainchild of Antigonus, was pursued under his direction (\textit{Ager} 13, ll. 5–15).\(^\text{78}\) An earthquake in 304/3 had caused considerable damage in Ionia, so Billows posits that both poleis suffered damage and sought Antigonus' help, perhaps unaware that the king would instruct them to merge and to send joint representatives to the Panionion.\(^\text{79}\) In contrast, the citizens of Myus voluntarily relocated to Miletus because the gnats in the surrounding marshes became unbearable (Pausanias 7.2.11; Strabo 14.1.10).\(^\text{80}\) The story that insects defeated the polis is probably hyperbolic, but the silting up of the Gulf of Latmus likely

\[^{73}\text{Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 34; Billows, \textit{Antigonus}, 213; Lund, \textit{Lysimachus}, 175–76. The site of the new community was likely the suburb Ephesian Smyrna; see Lene Rubinstein, “Ionia,” in \textit{An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis}, ed. Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1071. Ryan Boehm, \textit{City and Empire in the Age of the Successors} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), continues to credit Alexander.}\]

\[^{74}\text{Boehm, \textit{City and Empire}, 29–87. Smyrna would come to rival Ephesus in time but it was far enough away that the immediate impact was minor since most conflicts between Ionians involved borders.}\]

\[^{75}\text{Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 35; Billows, \textit{Antigonus}, 213; I.Ery. 22.}\]


\[^{77}\text{For instance, Leucippus, son of Ermogenous, and one Calladas at Ephesus; see Tataki, \textit{Macedonians Abroad}, 140, 335. Rogers, \textit{Mysteries of Artemis}, 56, notes that Ephesus sold citizenship to raise money.}\]

\[^{78}\text{Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 36.}\]

\[^{79}\text{Billows, \textit{Antigonus}, 213–14, 217; Welles, \textit{Royal Correspondence}, no. 3; Sheila L. Ager, \textit{Inter-state Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 B.C.} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 61–64.}\]

\[^{80}\text{Alan M. Greaves, \textit{Miletos: A History} (New York: Routledge, 2002), 137.}\]
caused the farmland at Myus to turn to marsh and provides a salient reminder that the Ionian communities faced natural as well as human challenges in the early Hellenistic period.\(^{81}\)

The largest Ionian polis to undergo a transformation was Ephesus, which moved to a new site shortly before 294 because the original location ceased to have access to the sea due to the silting of the Cayster River (Paus. 1.9.7).\(^{82}\) According to Strabo, the Ephesians found the idea of moving distasteful, but Lysimachus literally flushed them from their homes by blocking the sewers in advance of a torrential downpour, thereby flooding the original settlement (Strabo 14.1.21). Strabo’s story is far-fetched, but the flooding was most likely real. The contemporary poet Duris of Elaia composed an epigram about a deluge sweeping all into the sea (Stephanus, Greek Anthology 9.424) and Ephesus had long been combating the rivers, including a project to dam the Silenous in order to prevent it from flooding the sanctuary.\(^{83}\) Guy Rogers therefore convincingly argues that Ephesus moved location before Lysimachus captured the region and that blaming him for the deluge was a story started by Demetrius’ allies in the polis.\(^{84}\)

In addition to renaming Ephesus “Arsinoeia” after his third wife, Lysimachus added to it the populations of Colophon, Lebedus, and probably Pygela (Paus. 1.9.7, 7.3.4–6).\(^{85}\) The capture of Colophon prompted the iambic poet Phoenix to compose a lament (Paus. 1.9.7), and Pausanias cryptically adds that the Colophonians were the only people to fight against the new foundation of Arsinoeia (7.3.4). How the evidence for the sack of Colophon and temporary relocation of the citizens to Ephesus correlates with the earlier synoikism of the

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old and new settlements in the reign of Antigonus is unknown.86 The Lebedians maintained a coherent identity at Ephesus, though, and refounded their polis in c.266 with the blessing of Ptolemy II Philadelphus in exchange for naming it “Ptolemais,” once again using imperial politics for local ends.87 Arsinoeia (Ephesus) flourished at the new location even though some of its new populations left after Lysimachus’ death, but it reverted to its traditional name and continued to struggle with the silting of the Cayster River (Strabo 14.1.21, 25).88 Although the traditions surrounding Lysimachus’ refoundation of Ephesus are suspect, he did have a lasting impact on Ephesus by neutering the power of the Artemisium, perhaps because it was closely associated with Demetrius. The sanctuary itself was untouchable, so Lysimachus instead underwrote the costs of a new temple complex at Ortygia for Artemis Soter. The cult was multidimensional. Ortygia, near the boundary between Ephesus and Pygela, was one of the traditional birthplaces for Artemis, and this martial avatar commemorated Lysimachus’ victory and alluded to his protection of Ephesus, while calling to mind the Ephesian claim to Pygela even if the community was in the process of being incorporated into Arsinoeia. But the most important feature of the cult was that Lysimachus took for himself some of the religious authority and delegated to the Arsinoeian Gerousia the right to oversee the festivals and mediate between the two sanctuaries of Artemis, which gave Ephesus unprecedented control over its sanctuary.89

The kings also intervened in the Ionian poleis through arbitrations.90 When Antigonus presided over the proposed synoikism between Teos and Lebedos, he appointed Mytilene as an arbitrator in cases that dealt with the special agreement he instructed the two states to develop, but both the new laws and unforeseen disputes were to be referred to Antigonus himself, following the model established by Alexander, which in turn, followed the example of the

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88. Strabo refers to Ephesus as the largest emporium east of the Taurus Mountains and writes about the construction of a mole to narrow the harbor entrance with the idea that it would keep the harbor deep enough to accommodate large merchant ships. Engineers working for Attalus Philadelphus (r. 160–138) only succeeded in trapping the silt in the harbor (Strabo 14.1.25).
89. As argued by Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 81–88. It was in this same period that the Milesians subordinated Didyma to the polis, but there the process accompanied the restoration of the cult; see Nudell, “Oracular Politics,” 53–56.
90. Lysimachus continued to arbitrate between Ionian poleis beyond the scope of this inquiry, including between Magnesia and Priene in 287/6 and Samos and Priene in 283/2; see Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 87–93; Sheila L. Ager, “Keeping the Peace in Ionia: Kings and Poleis,” in Regionalism in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, ed. Hugh Elton and Gary Reger (Pessac: Ausonius, 2007), 45–52.
Persian satraps. The king framed his decision in the language of a neutral arbitrator, but royal suggestions carried the force of commands. Antigonus also likely established regulations for the arbitration of a border dispute between Clazomenae and Teos c.302 (SEG XXVIII 697). Though the inscription is heavily reconstructed and both the name Antigonus and the regulations open to debate, Clazomenae and Teos shared a small peninsula, and Sheila Ager reasonably argues that population growth from the result of the inchoate synoikism between Teos and Lebedos prompted the Teians to expand their territory and thus ran into conflict with the Clazomenaeans.

Finally, the kings supported the Ionian League, which took on a new political importance (see Appendix 1). The league served the kings by providing a system of organization. When Lysimachus conquered Ionia he appointed strategoi to oversee the league, perhaps in parallel to Philoxenus during the reign of Alexander, but there is no evidence for a comparable appointee under Antigonus. The relationship between strategos and league is largely unattested; Helen Lund speculates that he had the authority to intervene in the judicial and financial affairs, but she also posits that the absence of evidence for strategoi later in Lysimachus’ reign indicates that the position was an extra security measure for an important region that was neither routine nor entirely unique.

The question remains what can be said about the state of the Ionian poleis between 323 and 294. They were clearly subordinate to and, in many respects, at the mercy of the Diadochoi, even while they maintained some level of autonomy. In other words, whereas the early Hellenistic period saw a radical reorientation on the imperial playing field, there was a great deal of continuity in Ionia. The replacement of satraps and imperial poleis with kings increased the asymmetrical power relationships, but it did not stop the Ionian poleis from negotiating their existence within this sphere. Characterizing the Ionian poleis as simply subordinate to the Diadochoi also obscures the local and regional political activity taking place, as Jeremy LaBuff has recently shown for Hellenistic Caria. Likewise, in addition to circuit walls around the nucleated settlements, the chorae of Hellenistic Ionia contained forts garrisoned by citizen-soldiers, which John Ma has demonstrated indicates an ongoing militarism.

91. Ager, Interstate Arbitrations, 61–64; Ager, “Keeping the Peace,” 46; Billows, Antigonus, 213–14; Welles, Royal Correspondence, no. 3, II. 24–40, 43–52.
93. Lund, Lysimachus, 143–44.
94. On Lysimachus’ other administrative measures, see Lund, Lysimachus, 144–46.
96. Ma, “Fighting Poleis,” 341–44; cf. John Ma, “Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellé-
Miletus and Teos were two of the earliest poleis outside Athens to institute formal *ephebeia*, and an inscription found at Smyrna records regulations and pay for the Teian garrison in the citadel of Cyrbissus, a nearby town whose inhabitants gained citizenship at Teos in the third century (*SEG* XXVI 1306). Likewise, a late fourth-century inscription records a treaty of *isopoli* between Pygela and Miletus (*Milet* I.3, no. 142), giving Pygela rights in Miletus, but equally important, offering protection against the ongoing encroachment of Ephesus that culminated in Pygela being absorbed by Arsinoeia. Even as the Ionians were subject to the demands of the Hellenistic kings, they continued to play out regional competitions that had existed for as long as their cities had.

CHAPTER 9

The Ornaments of Ionia

Temple Construction and Commercial Prosperity

The monumental temple came to define ancient Ionia in popular memory.¹ A poem attributed to Antipater of Thessalonica in the Palatine Anthology compares the temple of Artemis at Ephesus to other man-made wonders (9.58):

The rocky walls of Babylon on which carts can drive
And the statue of Zeus by Alpheus, I have gazed upon,
And the hanging gardens and the Colossus of Helios,
And the tall pyramids piled with great toil,  
And the mighty memorial for Mausolus, but when I looked upon
The house of the goddess Artemis that reached even into the clouds
Those others dimmed, and I thought: excepting only Olympus,
Helios has never illuminated anything such as this!

καὶ κραναᾶς Βαβυλῶνος ἐπίδρομον ἁρμασὶ τεῖχος
καὶ τὸν ἐπ᾽ Ἀλφεῖῳ Ζάνα κατηυγασάμην,
κάπων τ´ αἰώρημα, καὶ Ἡελίοιο κολοσσόν,

¹. Most cults had small temples or rural shrines like the ones detailed in the Molpoi Decree at Miletus (Milet I.3, no. 133). The Molpoi Decree is preserved in a Hellenistic inscription erected in the late third or early second century BCE professing to detail the annual procession from the intramural Delphinion to the sanctuary at Didyma. Although scholars have long assumed that the inscription celebrated and preserved archaic rituals, Anja Slawisch has recently suggested instead that the inscription belongs in the set of invented traditions about Didyma that legitimized new ideas by casting them into the Archaic past. On the decree, see, particularly, Alexander Herda, Der Apollon-Delphinios-Kult in Milet und die Neujahrsprozession nach Didyma (Darmstadt: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2006); Alexander Herda, “How to Run a State Cult,” in Current approaches to religion in ancient Greece, ed. Matthew Haysom and Jenny Wallensten (Stockholm: Stockholm Universitet, 2011), 57–93; Anja Slawisch, “Epigraphy versus Archaeology: Conflicting Evidence for Cult Continuity in Ionia during the Fifth Century BC,” in Sacred Landscapes in Anatolia and Neighboring Regions, ed. Charles Gates, Jacques Morin, and Thomas Zimmermann (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2009), 29–34.
καὶ μέγαν αἰτεινάν πυραμίδων κάματον,
μνάμα τε Μαυσώλοιο πελώριον· ἀλλ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἐσεῖδον
Ἀρτέμιδος νεφέων ἀχρι θέοντα δόμον,
κεῖνα μὲν ἡμαύρωτο ἀκεκρινδε νόσφιν Ὀλύμπου
ἀλιος οὐδέν πω τοῖον ἐπημυγάσατο.

Despite Antipater's extravagant praise that put the temple of Artemis at Ephesus at the pinnacle of the seven wonders of the ancient world, it was neither the oldest nor the largest such structure in Ionia,2 where commercial interaction with Egypt may have contributed to the early development of the colonnaded temple.3

But if Ionian culture was shaped by interaction with the eastern Mediterranean, how did the inhabitants afford these monumental structures? Scholars often suppose that Ionian commerce begat prosperity, which created a surplus that they invested in temples.4 Auditing the books of modern sports stadiums

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2. Ionian monumental temples underwent multiple phases of construction and reconstruction in what Robin Osborne, “Cult and Ritual: The Greek World,” in Classical Archaeology, ed. Susan E. Alcock and Robin Osborne (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 256, characterizes as a process of local competition; see below, “Classical Ionia and Temple Construction,” The Heraion on Samos was probably the earliest of the monumental temples, though the cult of Artemis may have predated it, and the Heraion's fourth iteration just surpassed the temple of Artemis (6,038 m² to 6,017 m²). The Hellenistic temple of Apollo at Didyma surpassed both at 7,115.78 m². Nevertheless, the sanctuary of Artemis was particularly famous, as indicated by the silversmith Demetrius in the biblical book of Acts, who boasts: “Who among men does not know that the polis of Ephesus is the custodian of this temple for the great goddess Artemis?” (Anδρες Εφεσίοι, τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐ γινώσκει τὴν Ἐφεσίων πόλιν νεωκόρον οὖσαν τῆς μεγάλης Ἀρτέμιδος, 19.35).


would reveal the extent to which they are paid for taxpayer-funded programs, but comparable accounts for Greek temples are rare. The connection between commerce and temple construction is a logical inference, reinforced by the supposition that Ionia suffered from a deep financial depression throughout the Classical period, the sign of which being that the temples destroyed at the close of the Ionian revolt in 494/3 were not rebuilt, while Pericles decorated Athens with their money. Since the remaining evidence for the relative prosperity of Ionia is circumstantial, the resulting argument is a closed loop that depends entirely on the record of temple construction.

Commerce, then as now, could make individuals wealthy enough to make lavish displays of piety, and a unified citizen body with ample resources of stone, workers, skilled artisans, and draft animals was necessary for erecting large, monumental temples. Polycrates (c.538–522), we are told, paid for a series of engineering projects on Samos, including the final phase of construction at the Heraion, through piracy (e.g., Hdt. 3.39; Thuc. 1.13.6), but this is also a testament to his ability to centralize resources and manipulate foreign relationships. By contrast, the fact that Chios, a polis with a history of commercial prosperity that extended into the Classical period, never built a temple on a scale comparable to those of its peer polities should give us pause. Commercial prosperity was an important part of the story of temple construction, but the economic hypothesis both overstates and misunderstands Ionian wealth in the Archaic period and poverty in the Classical.

Interstate diplomacy of the Hellenistic world often involved royal euergetism, but reverence for Classical Greece as the age of the autonomous city-state obscures that the same held true during the earlier periods in Ionia. Indeed, John Boardman declares, “The great Ionian building programmes owed no little to Lydian gold,” but scholars tend to overlook the implications of this
observation for Classical Ionia. Locating Ionian temple construction in the Classical period within a network of interstate relations reveals that the story of these monuments is not primarily one of commercial prosperity, but rather the intersection of local initiative and external investment.

Monumental Temples in Archaic Ionia

Already in the Archaic period the largest temples in Ionia had a series of reconstructions that represented a form of peer-polity competition, with communities leapfrogging one another in a race to construct the largest and most magnificent edifice. Thus Robin Osborne observes, “It is hard to believe that it is a mere coincidence that the fourth temple of Hera at Samos just surpasses the first temple of Artemis at Ephesos in ground area (6,038 m² compared to 6,017).” The temple of Apollo at Didyma also went through multiple phases, including two stone temples in the seventh and sixth centuries, and the intramural temples of Aphrodite and Athena at Miletus were both rebuilt shortly before the sack in 494. Competition did not result in a uniform style. While the earliest known Greek peripteral temple was the eighth-century Artemisium at Ephesus, that form was not used at the site on Mount Mycale identified as the Panionion. Likewise, instead of the simple fluted columns that were later associated with the “Ionic” order, the Panionion had smooth columns, while the column bases at the temples of Artemis at Ephesus and of Apollo at Didyma were decorated with human figures.

In addition to developing in a milieu of regional competition, Ionian sanctuaries were inextricably linked with their Anatolian setting (e.g., Paus. 4.31.8; 7.2.7–8). Some sanctuaries, including Didyma at Miletus, were set near to sites that show evidence of “Phrygian” cult activity, 13 while excavations at the Archaic sanctuary at Kato Phano on Chios have turned up numerous Bronze Age finds. 14 More directly, the use of amber at the temple of Artemis at Ephesus and in votive offerings at the sanctuary of Hera at Samos are linked to the continuity of cult practice. 15 The deities themselves also show evidence of being Anatolian. The image of Artemis Ephesia, for instance, was a “many breasted” deity that Christian authors condemned and modern scholars see as a representation of fertility. But these iconic bulbs likely were not breasts. Comparable iconography is found on the images of other Anatolian deities such as a Carian Zeus, leading to skepticism about connecting them simply with gender. 16


local epithets for Apollo and Artemis also identified them as Anatolian-born, Lycian and Ortygian, respectively, and scholars have speculated since the nineteenth century that the Greek deity Apollo originated as an Anatolian sun god homonymous with the Trojan Appaliunas.17

This Anatolian context for the extramural sanctuaries complicated the relationship with their associated polis. Take Didyma and Miletus. Both the sanctuary and the oracle predated their later Greek identity (Paus. 7.2.6) and, unique among the sanctuaries in the Greek world, were administered by a single family, the Branchidae. This family became so associated with the sanctuary that in Roman times it was designated by their patronymic even though their relationship with the site had ended in the Archaic period.18 It is only possible to speculate about the origins of the Branchidae. Joseph Fontenrose proposes that a mixed Hellenic and Carian population calling itself “Ionian” founded Didyma as a sanctuary of Apollo, but Greek genealogies that identify the eponymous Branchus as the beloved of the god only develop in the Hellenistic period.19 Moreover, the name does not have clear Hellenic parallels, making the most probable suggestion that the name derives from a non-Hellenic Anatolian language and therefore that the family was not Greek. Didyma’s location in the chora also meant that it was ideally suited to unify the Milesia, serving as a common ritual space for the Greek and non-Greek populations, as well as between Miletus and the other urban settlements such as Teichoussa.20 Around

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19. Fontenrose, Didyma, 8; cf. Parke, “Massacre of the Branchidae,” 60, with n. 7. In the Hellenistic iteration of the myth, Branchus was the son of Smikros, the son of a Delphian man and a Milesian woman who, while pregnant, dreamed of the sun entering through her mouth and exiting through her genitals. Branchus was so named for her throat (Conon FGrH 26 F 133). Conon’s version represents a manufactured genealogy for the new Hellenistic oracle to derive legitimacy through a link to Delphi; see Greaves, “Divination,” 181–83.

20. The accounts of the Ionian Migration at Miletus are particularly violent and preserve memories of rape that link the conquerors to the land, though I believe “Greek” and “non-Greek” are not useful categories of analysis in Ionia (see Appendix 2). On Didyma as a locus of ritual unification, see Greaves, Miletos, 122–23.
the same time that the earliest stone buildings went up in the late seventh or early sixth century Miletus formally took control of the sanctuary, and Apollo Delphinius became the patron god of the polis. However, the subordinated sanctuary still exerted a measure of autonomy even as the oracle began to be a tool in Miletus’ diplomatic toolbox.\textsuperscript{21} Construction continued into the Achaemenid period, possibly continuing until the Ionian revolt, leading Elspeth Dusinberre to suggest that the Achaemenids had taken over patronage of the cult.\textsuperscript{22} The oracle fell silent with the deportation of the Branchidae in the late 490s,\textsuperscript{23} but the unrestored sanctuary continued to fulfill its local political and symbolic roles and was the destination in an annual procession involving the Molpoi.\textsuperscript{24} The relationship between city and sanctuary was thus not straightforward, once again complicating the economic thesis that draws a causal connection between prosperity and the construction of temples.

Sacred ways between the poleis and the extramural sanctuaries completed the religious topography. The purpose here is not to review the religious and ceremonial functions of the sacred ways or to review their construction and upkeep, but to identify the panorama of features connected to the sanctuaries that contributed to the overall cost and note what can be said about the sources of funding.\textsuperscript{25} Each route took the procession to rural shrines, tombs, natural sanctuaries, and statues that marked them as monumental arrangements in and of themselves. The route from Miletus to Didyma included two additional sanctuaries from the Archaic period that fell into disuse about the same time

\textsuperscript{21} Herodotus links Didyma to Miletus, but also specifies the Branchidae (1.46, 1.92, 2.156, 6.19). One of the goals of the Hellenistic revisions to the foundation myths was to bind the sanctuary more clearly to the city; see below, “Kings and Cities.” The extent to which the polis managed the sanctuary in the Archaic period is a matter of some debate. Klaus Tuchelt, “Die Perserzerstörung von Branchidai-Didyma und ihre Folgen-archäologisch betrachtet,” AA, no. 3 (1988): 427–38, argues that while Didyma belonged to Miletus in name it fell under its administrative diktat only after its reconstruction in the fourth century, while Norbert Ehrhardt, “Didyma und Milet in archaischer Zeit,” Chiron 28 (1998): 11–20, argues for a closer connection. I side with Tuchelt. On the oracle’s importance to Miletus’ relationships with other states, see Greaves, Miletos, 124–27; Catherine Morgan, “Divination and Society at Delphi and Didyma,” Hermathena 147 (1989): 17–42; H. W. Parke, The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor (New York: Routledge: 1985), 14–19.

\textsuperscript{22} Dusinberre, Empire, Authority, and Autonomy, 220–21.

\textsuperscript{23} The date at which the Branchidae “betrayed” Miletus is a matter of debate. The \textit{communis opinio} places it at the close of the Ionian revolt (e.g., Greaves, “Divination,” 179; Parke, \textit{Oracles of Apollo}, 21), but N. G. L. Hammond, “The Branchidae at Didyma and in Sogdiana,” CQ\textsuperscript{2} 48, no. 2 (1998): 339–41, proposes a date of 479.

\textsuperscript{24} See Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{25} For a survey of the sacred ways in Ionia, see Greaves, \textit{Land of Ionia}, 180–88. We have little evidence for either the road surfaces, which leads Slawisch and Wilkinson, “Processions, Propaganda, and Pixels,” to propose that the term “the sacred way” is a misleadingly anachronistic. They deconstruct the sacred way between Miletus and Didyma into its component parts, revealing an assemblage with discrete chronological and spatial clusters that suggests an absence of a fixed processional route until perhaps as late as the Roman period.
as did Didyma.26 Unlike the temple proper, but quite like other aspects of the sanctuary, monuments along the sacred ways did not adhere to a central plan but went up as piecemeal dedications by the community and prominent individuals. The most famous statue from the route to Didyma, the Chares group, proclaims in an inscription “I am Chares, son of Kleisis, archon of Teichioussa. This statue is for Apollo.”27

In short, the operation of a sanctuary and its adjacent features, including upkeep for the staff, constituted an enormous outlay of resources from the Archaic period onward. Before turning to the revenue streams available to a sanctuary, there is one more expense to examine: the temple itself.

The Costs of Temple Construction

The most detailed accounts of temple construction in the Greek world come from the fourth-century Asclepium at Epidaurus.28 The cult had been founded at the end of the sixth century and came into prominence in the 430s or shortly thereafter, but construction at the site did not begin until the 370s.29 Intermittent warfare and limited funding hampered construction, but Alison Burford points to a scarcity of skilled labor during a period of economic depression that resulted in few public works anywhere in the Greek world.30 It is unknown how widely skilled workers traveled, but warfare and recession must have reduced mobility, and surviving ethnonyms for the workers at Epidaurus came overwhelming from elsewhere in the Greek world.31 Since much of the cost of building temples was bound up in human and animal labor, it

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26. On the archaeological evidence for these sanctuaries falling into disuse, see Slawisch, “Epigraphy versus Archaeology.”
29. Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 32, connects the international prominence to the plague at Athens, but a date in the 430s puts it somewhat earlier.
30. Burford, Greek Temple Builders, 33–35, also noting that the lack of evidence for an uptick in offerings in the 370s.
varied widely depending on the distance from the source of the stone to the sanctuary.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite the accounts at Epidaurus, estimating the cost of construction is an inexact science owing to factors that ranged from the variable costs of materials and labor to fluctuation in currency values to interruptions in the work. At the Asclepium, Burford estimates the total cost between 240 and 290 talents spent over more than a century.\textsuperscript{33} The temple went up first, with the contracts showing straightforward payments for services rendered, while later contracts frequently show payments in installments, indicating that project had depleted the initial appropriation.\textsuperscript{34} The cost of the Asclepium was not exceptional; construction on the sixth-century temple of Apollo at Delphi cost c.300 talents, and the fifth-century Parthenon at Athens, which was larger than the temple at Delphi but less than half the size of the temples in Ionia, between 460 and 500 talents.\textsuperscript{35}

The circumstances for construction at each Greek temple were idiosyncratic and dependent on the relationship between temple and polis, but interstate politics frequently contributed both positively and negatively to the pace of construction. The Asclepium was famed as a center of healing, which meant that it could count on a stream of offerings.\textsuperscript{36} The case of the temples at Panhellenic sanctuaries is equally telling. The temple of Apollo at Delphi collapsed in an earthquake in 373/2 and construction needed to begin before the oracle could be active (Xen. \textit{Hell}. 7.1.27).\textsuperscript{37} The Amphictyonic commission for the project met annually between 370 and 356 to approve special taxes, and the sanctuary possessed a large amount of collected wealth from oracular consultations and dedicated plunder (e.g., Xen. \textit{Hell}. 4.3.21; Plut. \textit{Ages}. 19.3),

\textsuperscript{32} On the labor costs, see Salmon, “Temples the Measures of Men,” 200–201. Ionia had few local sources of stone, and a late-Hellenistic shipwreck carrying a column drum that matches those of the temple of Apollo at Clarus suggests the need to move building materials by sea; see Deborah N. Carlson and William Aylward, “The Kizilburun Shipwreck and the Temple of Apollo at Claros,” \textit{AJA} 114, no. 1 (2010): 145–59.
\textsuperscript{34} Burford, \textit{Greek Temple Builders}, 109–18, discusses the differences in the inscriptions.
\textsuperscript{35} The accounts for the construction of the Propylaea and Parthenon together totaled about two thousand talents; see RO 145 = IG I\textsuperscript{1} 449 and ML 60 = IG I\textsuperscript{1} 366. IG I\textsuperscript{1} 449 is a well-preserved example of inscriptions (IG I\textsuperscript{1} 433–97) that record accounts for public works in the fifth century, so the total expenditure could have been higher. For the temple at Delphi: Michael Scott, \textit{Delphi: A History of the Center of the Ancient World} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 145–62; the Parthenon: Burford, \textit{Greek Temple Builders}, 81–85. The Parthenon was 2,147.55 m\textsuperscript{2}, with columns rising just over 10 meters, compared to 6,038 m\textsuperscript{2} and 18.3 m at the Artemisium and 7,115.78 m\textsuperscript{2} and 19.71 m at Didyma.
\textsuperscript{36} Burford, \textit{Greek Temple Builders}, 18–39.
but the project progressed slowly. The picture at Delphi is a consensus that the temple needed to be reconstructed, but since the temple lacked fungible assets, the members of the Amphictyonic Council exploited the crisis for political maneuvering. The pace of construction only picked up after the end of the Third Sacred War in 346, when the Phocian indemnity payments began to arrive. The Amphictyonic Council imposed unique conditions on the sanctuary of Apollo that did not exist at sanctuaries that belonged to a single polis, but this case is nevertheless instructive: reconstruction offered an opportunity to articulate or rearticulate the history of the sanctuary.

The Wealth of Sanctuaries

Operating sanctuaries was expensive in ancient Greece, with costs that included maintenance and pay for priestly personnel in addition to the initial outlay for construction. And yet prominent sanctuaries also concentrated wealth such that they served as banks whose resources a polis might draw on in times of need. Beyond civic appropriations, sanctuaries frequently owned land, both in their immediate vicinity and in the *chora*, from which they received a portion of the profits. Land around the Ionian sanctuaries was often marginal, though likely suitable for animal husbandry and collecting timber. Gifts from wealthy individuals expanded these holdings, as evidenced by Xenophon's purchase of land in the Peloponnese, where he created a temple modeled on the cult of

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38. The largest contribution, just over three talents, came from the Dorians of the Peloponnese; see Davies, "Rebuilding a Temple," 219. The commission included delegates from Athens, which was then boycotting the Pythian games.

39. The Phocians plundered the temple to pay for the war; see Diod. 16.23.1. Davies, "Rebuilding a Temple," 219, notes the increased speed of construction, though Scott, *Delphi*, 156–57, argues that the influx of funds caused a corresponding growth of ambitions for the magnificence of the sanctuary. The sanctuary of Apollo prominently features an altar dedicated by the Chians that was already a reference point for Herodotus (2.135), but that was rebuilt in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods.


42. Though the details varied from case to case, the use of sacred land was subject to regulation. A fourth-century inscription from Chios, for instance, records a prohibition against sheep and pigs from entering the sanctuary to prevent them from defecating there, while a first-century one from Samos prohibits collecting timber in the vicinity of the sanctuary. See Franciszek Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris: De Boccard, 1969), 116.5–6, 11–12; Matthew P. J. Dillon, "The Ecology of the Greek Sanctuary," *ZPE* 118 (1997): 120–22, 125.
Artemis at Ephesus (Anab. 5.3.7–13). Endowed properties, while increasing the holdings of the sanctuary in the long run, also hid taxable assets from the dedic- ator since there were laws against taxing farmers on sacred land, and sanctu-
aries frequently leased the land back to the original owner at reduced rates.⁴³

Sale of votive offerings, aparche (first-fruit offerings), and fees from visitors provided additional revenue streams. One stream was the thesauros (offering box). By the Hellenistic period it was common practice for visitors to a sanctuary to make a preliminary offering by dropping coins into the box. Traditionally, this practice was interpreted as a cult fee imposed to make up for budget shortfalls and therefore either repealed when the endowment was restored or kept in place simply to maximize profit.⁴⁴ More recently, however, Isabelle Pafford convincingly has argued that the inscriptions regulating the deposit, storage, and use of the coins drew a distinction between money that would be used for the priestly sustenance and salaries and the income used for religious purposes.⁴⁵ The thesauroi offerings in the Hellenistic period, she argues, standardized the purchase of sacrifices and other religious items such as clothing for the cult statue.

Inscriptions also demonstrate how sanctuaries had broad economic pur-
view to collect and manage their resources. At Delos and in the Acarnanian League in the third century there were specific taxes on luxury items such as enslaved people and on harbor commerce for sanctuary use, and a decree from the Acarnanian League specifies that harbor dues were charged during the fest-
ival at Anactorium in order to help rebuild the temple.⁴⁶ There is no com-
parable decree where an Ionian sanctuary received a portion of harbor fees, but it is reasonable to assume that the method of funding sanctuaries none-
theless existed. At early third-century Miletus, Antiochus dedicated a stoa and instructed that the profits be given to Apollo at Didyma (I.Didyma 479; see below, “Kings and Cities”).

The last and, in my opinion, most important source of Ionian temple rev-
enue came from prominent noncitizens. I separate these from private votives as far as the evidence allows for several reasons. First, conspicuous offerings

were large enough that ancient authors and Hellenistic inscriptions made note of them. Ionian temples had particularly close ties with the kings of Lydia and Phrygia, for instance, where kings were proverbially wealthy on account of their unusually ready access to gold.47 Second, these gifts were not strictly signals of piety, but also demonstrations of power that give some indication of the prominence of that sanctuary in the world.

According to Herodotus, Midas of Phrygia made the first foreign donation to a Greek sanctuary when he dedicated his throne to Delphi (1.14.2–3). Herodotus likely did see Phrygian offerings at Delphi, which, as a prominent oracle, had particular appeal to non-Greeks, but attempts to identify specific material remains with the semimythical donations of Midas are quixotic.48 However, the most famous—and likely more historical—offerings at Delphi were those of the Mermnad kings of Lydia. Gyges (c.699–c.644) dedicated heaps of silver and six kraters made from thirty talents’ worth of gold in the seventh century (Hdt. 1.14; Athen. 6.20 [231e–f]), which Strabo says were melted down during the Third Sacred War of 356–346 (9.3.7–8).49 The fourth Mermnad king, Alyattes (c.619–c.560), dedicated a magnificent krater made by the Chian craftsman Glauclus (Hdt. 1.25; Athen. 5.45 [210b]) and his son Croesus dedicated a silver krater made by Theodorus of Samos (Hdt. 1.51.2–3).50 But Delphi was not the exclusive recipient of the largesse of the Lydian kings. Alyattes obeyed an oracle to rebuild the temple of Athena at Assessus in Miletus, which he had plundered (see Chapter 1). Croesus offered two golden cows and columns at the Artemisium at Ephesus (Hdt. 1.92) and, more infamously, made offerings at Didyma to purchase favorable oracles (Hdt. 1.46–56). Some of these dedications were ornamental, and Hecataeus proposed melting down the ones at Didyma to pay


49. For discussion of these offerings, see Kaplan, “Dedications to Greek Sanctuaries,” 130; Jon D. Mikalson, *Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 115–16. All dates for the Mermnad kings are rife with problems; see Anthony J. Spalinger, “The Date of the Death of Gyges and Its Historical Implications,” *JOS* 98, no. 4 (1978): 400–409. I accept Spalinger’s argument that the date of Gyges’ death in the Classical sources is too early but have left the dates as approximates because they do not change my argument.

for a fleet during the Ionian revolt of 499–494 (Hdt. 5.36), but others were more functional. Excavations at the Artemisium at Ephesus, for instance, have turned up column drums with Lydian inscriptions that speak to the monarch underwriting the costs of construction of the enormous building. Likewise, Elspeth Dusinberre recently suggested that the Achaemenid administration took up the patronage of these cults in the second half of the sixth century based on the intensity of work at both Didyma at the Artemision.

There is no reason to doubt the evidence for Ionian commerce with Egypt, Lydia, and beyond during the Archaic period, but I am skeptical that individual, private prosperity would have resulted in the concentrated expenditure necessary to create monumental temples, particularly in the absence of inscriptions that show as much. Indeed, sanctuaries were powerful foci for diplomatic activity and royal euergetism during the early phase of Ionian temple construction, even if the vocabulary for these relationships was not as developed as it became in the Hellenistic period. The critical question, however, is whether analyzing temple construction in the Classical period along these same lines changes how we should think about Ionia.

Classical Ionia and Temple Construction: The Artemisium

The prominence of Ionia’s Archaic temples is accentuated by Persia’s violent suppression of the revolt in 494 and an acute absence of new monumental construction throughout the fifth century. J. M. Cook explained this pattern by positing that Ionian “city life” went into eclipse after the Persian wars because the poleis were impoverished on account of paying tribute to both Athens and Persia. In a review of Cook’s *Greeks in Ionia and the East*, John Boardman offered a single-sentence rebuttal, saying, “Cook suggests that there was no substantial new building in Ionia . . . but there seems to be evidence for new temples or significant reconstruction in Chios, Samos, and Didyma,” but Robin

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53. Cook, “Problem of Classical Ionia,” 9–18; cf. Balcer, *Sparda*, 414–17. Rutishauser, *Athens and the Cyclades*: 233, likewise identifies Athenian tribute demands behind the absence of Cycladic temple construction in the fifth century. Without dismissing the stress that Athenian tribute imposed on Ionia, this alone is insufficient explanation. Construction projects began to appear in the fourth century at a time when they still owed tribute first to Persia and then to Alexander. If tribute were the limiting factor, then the absence of construction at Chios, which was never a tributary ally, once again stands out.
Osborne subsequently observed that if the field at large shared Boardman’s reservations of Cook’s thesis based on archaeological evidence, it did so quietly.\(^{55}\)

Indeed, while there is evidence of continued construction at some sanctuaries, there were no new colossal temples and only a few stone temples of any sort constructed in Ionia during the fifth century. But monumental temples were rare even in the sixth century, and thus Osborne argues that Cook misinterpreted the contrast between the sixth and fifth centuries and that the decision not to construct or reconstruct monumental temples indicates overall satisfaction with the Athenian empire because the Ionians willingly patronized Delian League cults at the expense of their own.\(^{56}\)

Osborne is likely correct that “both sixth- and fifth-century patterns of building make more sense in terms of competition within and between communities, of neighborly rivalry and ‘peer polity interaction,’ than in term of economic boom and slump.”\(^{57}\) But the Delian League did not eliminate peer-polity competition. Further, the refoundation of Miletus had explicit provisions for the construction of new monumental buildings such as the sanctuary of Dionysus and the intramural Delphinion,\(^{58}\) and yet the temple of Apollo at Didyma allegedly lay in ruins.\(^{59}\) Closer inspection of Ionian temple construction in the Classical period reveals both the orthodox economic thesis and Osborne’s revision inadequate on their own.

The Artemision at Ephesus offers a counterpoint to Didyma (Strabo 14.1.5). The Artemision’s relationship with non-Greeks was among the strongest in Ionia, and the cult itself shows signs of Persianization. In addition to the Persian items that appear as votives, mirroring the Egyptian goods at the Heraeum on Samos, one of the temple officials took the Persian title Megabyxos (Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.6), and friezes show figures in Persian garb participating in ritual activity.\(^{60}\) Non-Greek clothing is not unusual for figures in temple friezes,

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59. Herda, “Copy and Paste?,” 101, with n. 62, recently challenged the literary orthodoxy that the temple was destroyed by pointing out the absence of evidence for fire from the Archaic level of the temple and instead suggests that the temple was only demolished to clear the space for the Hellenistic temple.
but their participation in the rituals is. Moreover, there is evidence that this scene reflects common practice at Ephesus, including the satrap Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.109), who also used Artemis as a rallying cry (Xen. Hell. 1.2.5–6), and Cyrus the Younger (Xen. Anab. 1.6.7). Further, the so-called Sacrilege Decree, a late fourth-century inscription from Ephesus that sentenced to death a large number of Lydians for having assaulted emissaries delivering sacred objects to branch of the cult at Sardis, demonstrates its reach (I.Eph. 2).61 Beyond showing that the Ephesians were empowered to adjudicate the case, the names of the condemned hint at local connections, with the name “Ephesus” coming up in at least two patronymics (ll. 38 and 45) and the name Miletus appearing in one (l. 17). This regional prominence, along with the Ephesian ambivalence toward the Ionian revolt, helped the temple avoid destruction in 494, and its prominence was in turn redoubled by its survival, becoming the home to the Ephesia, Empire in Achaemenid Sardis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59–79, on the syncretism of Achaemenid rituals with the worship of Artemis. Despite Xenophon’s implication to the contrary, Megabyxos is not a name, but a title given to wardens at the sanctuary who oversaw financial management. The earliest reference to the Megabyxos may be Craterus’ comedy Tolmai F 37, while inscriptions from after Priene 334 offer honors to the Megabyxos of Ephesus for his support of the construction of the temple of the temple of Athena and name him “Megabyxos son of Megabyxos” (I.Priene 3 and 231). Jan Bremmer, “Priestly Personnel of the Ephesian Artemision: Anatolian, Persian, Greek, and Roman Aspects,” in Practitioners of the Divine: Greek Priests and Religious Figures from Homer to Heliodorus, ed. Beate Dignas and Kai Trapedach (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2008) plausibly suggests that the Ephesians adopted the name Megabyxos because of the Persian conquest, though he attaches the nebulous date of c.500 BCE. The early adoption, perhaps even several decades earlier, helps explain the apparent lack of controversy around acculturation at this cult, where a fourth-century frieze includes figures in Persian court dress participating in the procession; see Miller, “Clothes in Ionia,” 29–33. Evidence from the Roman period suggests that the Ephesians sought Megabyxoi from abroad because men in the position were castrated (Strabo 14.1.23). Artemis Ephesia had a distinctly Anatolian flavor (see especially Morris, “View from the East Greece,” 70–71), but the lack of early evidence for castrated Megabyxoi makes it difficult to determine whether this was part of the cult already in the Classical period, as Bremmer argues, or a development of the Hellenistic period, perhaps in tandem with the rising prominence of the cult of Magna Mater. Dusinberre, Empire, Authority, and Autonomy, 218–19, suggests that the Megabyxos was a Persian.

an athletic competition that drew contestants from around Ionia (Thuc. 3.104; Dionysius Ant. Rom. 4.25).  

Outside the few references testifying to the continued prominence of the sanctuary of Artemis, there is little evidence for construction from the fifth century. In the fourth century, however, it underwent two building phases. A column drum contemporary to the first phase of construction in the 390s bears an inscription saying that it was dedicated by “Agesilaus”—probably the Spartan king who campaigned in Asia Minor in 397/6.  

This identification is, ultimately, speculative, but accounts of the campaign indicate that Agesilaus paid particular attention to the sanctuary in his diplomatic efforts in the region (Xen. Ages. 1.27; Hell. 3.4.18). Dedications to subsidize repairs already begun plausibly fits into this setting where Agesilaus’ political needs matched the local project.

The evidence for the second phase of construction is clearer, but more controversial. The temple burned in 356, reputedly on the same day that Alexander the Great was born, with the goddess gone to oversee the momentous birth (Plut. Alex. 3.3). Herostratus took the blame for burning the temple, but the cause of the fire is a matter of debate, with suggestions ranging from a lightning strike (following Aristotle Meteorology 3.1) to deliberate sabotage by the temple administration because they want to move the sanctuary from the Cayster River floodplain to more solid ground. The next reference to the construction came in 334 when Alexander the Great allegedly offered to pay all costs for the temple in perpetuity, only to be rebuffed by the Ephesians (Strabo 1.41.22). The king responded by ordering the Ephesians to pay their phoros to the sanctuary (Arr. 1.17.10–12; see Chapter 7).

Scholars have traditionally placed too much weight on this sentence in Arrian. Since Arrian also explicitly says that Alexander relieved the other cities


64. In point of fact, the two events did not coincide.

of their *phoros* (tribute) payments and began to collect a *syntaxis* (contribution), the specific provisions for Ephesus seem pregnant with meaning for the interpretation of both Alexander and Alexander’s policy in the first years of his campaign. Ernst Badian, for instance, maintained that when the Ephesians turned away Alexander’s generosity, the fickle king turned hostile, not relieving the *phoros* and levying a *syntaxis* in addition.\(^66\) This thesis resolves the contradiction inherent in allowing the Ephesians to keep their tribute local while requiring the rest of the Ionians to help pay for the campaign, but it rests on shaky foundations.

Badian’s formulation is based on triangulating Arrian’s narrative with a passage in Strabo that paraphrases the first century BCE geographer Artemidorus of Ephesus (14.1.22):\(^67\)

Alexander [he adds] offered to the Ephesians to undertake all costs that had occurred and all those yet to come, in return for an inscription thereupon, but they were unwilling, just as they were unwilling to acquire renown for temple robbery. [Artemidorus] praises the Ephesian who said to the king that it was unseemly for a god to make dedications to gods.

\[\text{Ἀλέξανδρον \text{δὴ τοῖς Ἐφεσίοις ὑποσχέσθαι τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα \ἀναλώματα, ἐφ’ ὁ τε τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν αὐτὸν ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐθελήσαι, πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἂν ἔθελησαν τὰς ἱεροσυλίας καὶ ἀποστερήσεις φιλοδοξεῖν: ἐπαινεῖ τὸν εἰπόντα τῶν Ἐφεσίων πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, ὡς οὐ πρέποι θεῷ θεοῖς ἀναθήματα κατασκευάζειν.}\]

Despite its apparent simplicity, this bold declaration hides a murky history. For instance, he rebuts a claim put forward by Timaeus of Tauromenium that the Ephesians had stolen Persian treasures kept at the temple:

Artemidorus says that Timaeus of Tauromenium, being ignorant of these and generally being a slanderous sycophant, \ldots says that they achieved the restoration of the temple through the [gold] the Persians deposited there. But in the first place there was nothing deposited there

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\(^{67}\) The quoted Artemidorus fragment is criticizing Timaeus. Translation adapted after H. L. Jones in volume 6 of the Loeb edition of *Strabo’s Geography*. 
then, and if it had been, it would have burned together with the temple. After the conflagration it was missing a roof, and who would want to deposit such things lying in an open-air enclosure?

Strabo seems inclined to accept Artemidorus’ claim even though he opens the section by detailing how the Ephesians paid for construction:

When one Herostratus set it aflame they furnished another, better, one, gathering the women’s jewelry and private offerings, and disposing of the earlier columns. Contemporary decrees bear witness to this.

Timaeus was a historian with a particularly poor reputation in antiquity, but there is no reason to put any more faith in Artemidorus. Artemidorus was concerned with relieving his forebears of any hint of sacrilege that might have been associated with taking gold at the temple, but παρακαταθήκη, the word Timaeus uses, can mean either dedication or deposit. Artemidorus clearly applied the former definition, but what if Timaeus intended the latter? It is plausible that the gold stored at the temple seized by the Ephesians to pay for repairs was the phoros payment owed to Persia. Taking the passage in Strabo altogether, the Ephesians paid for repairs to the temple through private donations, the sale of old column drums, and redirecting tribute payments at a time when Persian power in the region had waned. This interpretation also offers

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68. Polybius dedicated an extended portion of his twelfth book to an extended ad hominem attack against Timaeus where he tears down the latter’s qualifications as a historian. Christopher A. Baron, *Timaeus of Tauromenium and Hellenistic Historiography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58–88, offers a thorough assessment.

69. On the ebb tide of Persian power, see Chapter 6.
a new resolution for Arrian’s apparent contradiction. Rather than punishing a prideful community or curiously rewarding a polis he had little other connection to, Alexander’s decision to direct the phoros to Artemis retroactively approved the local initiative that appropriated the tribute in the first place.

Material poverty must have contributed to the pace of temple construction in Classical Ionia, but it was not the defining factor. The sanctuary of Artemis demonstrates that the Ionian temples continued to play an important role in mediating the position of the polis in the larger political arena. Stabilizing southern Ionia might have brought enough prosperity that the Milesians began planning new construction projects, but more important than the hand of market forces in the new construction projects at poleis like Priene was the Hecatomnīd dynasty.70

Kings and Cities: Hellenistic Reconstructions

The Hellenistic period in Ionia is often presented as a new spring that followed a long, fallow Classical period, with Alexander’s liberation heralding a period of economic revitalization and thus new construction projects up and down the coast.71 The second half of the fourth century did witness an architectural renaissance in Ionia, but this traditional account buys into propaganda about the oppressive burden of Persian tribute now released by Alexander’s “liberation.” Alexander did formally abolish the phoros, though he soon replaced it with the more generously named, but equally onerous, syntaxis. Even more damning to this thesis than the flawed distinction between Persian and Macedonian rule is that the start of this Ionian construction boom began in the 340s, well before Alexander conquered the region. At Miletus, renovation in the city Delphinium began in the early 330s, and the plans for restoring the oracle at Didyma plausibly formed at the same time.72 Similarly, the temple to Apollo that Alexander dedicated at Priene was likely commissioned by Artemisia of Caria (Pliny H.N. 36.30–31; Vitruv. De arch. 1.1.12),73 and the Hellenistic sanc-

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70. For Mausolus and Caria, see Chapter 6.
71. E.g., Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 129, “a burst of prosperity.”
73. I follow an earlier chronology for the “refoundation” of Priene that places it during the
tuary of Apollo at Claros appears to have been begun at about this time. The Ionian renaissance began before Alexander’s conquest, but it flourished after his death by taking full advantage of the competition between the Diadochoi.

The most notable Hellenistic temple-building project in Ionia was the temple of Apollo at Didyma. The new temple would be the largest building in Ionia at 7,115.78 square meters, with monumental steps that served as grandstands overlooking the processional way and a double row of columns rising to the height of 19.7 meters. The new temple outstripped the famed temple of Artemis in size, and its interior was unique. The prodomos (entry chamber) led visitors to a wall nearly a meter and half in height, topped by an enormous window through which the naiskos (inner sanctuary) was just visible. The visitor entered the inner courtyard by first going down to an interior room at ground level and from there down a monumental staircase into the heart of the temple. The adyton (the inner chamber of the naiskos) was nearly 5 meters below ground and the inner courtyard, surrounded by solid walls that rose between 22 and 25 meters, contained a grove of bay trees. Although it has been thought that the general appearance was completed in the third century, construction continued for nearly six hundred years until the third century CE.

Oracles in antiquity had enormous financial potential. Archaic Didyma had a reputation on par with any in the Greek world, but by the late fourth century it


75. Pierre Debord, L’Asie Mineure au IVe Siècle (412–323 a.C.) (Pessac: Ausonius, 1999) shows how the Hellenistic period accelerated political changes in Ionia that had begun in the fourth century.

76. On the monumental steps, see Mary B. Hollinshead, Shaping Ceremony: Monumental Steps and Greek Architecture (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 69.

77. Parke, Oracles of Apollo, 53. Greaves, Miletos, 136, offers a parallel between Hellenistic Miletus and Didyma in terms of shared visions of grandeur that never came to pass. Slawisch and Wilkinson, “Processions, Propaganda, and Pixels,” 130–31, associate the first series of inscriptions that mention a sacred way at the end of the third or start of the second century BCE, with the near-completion of the temple and complete recovery of Miletus from its destruction in 494.
had been dormant for nearly a century and a half. This set of circumstances lay behind their delivery of an oracle to Alexander in 331 proclaiming his divinity, but while the king’s propagandist Callisthenes recorded the message in a list of favorable utterances, there was no financial reward, and plans for construction languished for decades.\(^78\) Although the oracle had officially been restored by 331, inscriptions recording the offerings at the sanctuary reveal that the new oracle was neither popular nor prosperous. The first signs of a change appear in the last decade of the fourth century. As early as 311 on his return to Babylon, Seleucus reputedly told his soldiers that the oracle at Didyma had predicted his eventual victory, probably in an imitation of Alexander (Diod. 19.90.4).\(^79\) Seleucus then declared that he found the Archaic cult statue in the Persian palace at Ecbatana and, starting in c.300, he and his family made a series of offerings, which both provided the sanctuary with funds to begin construction in earnest and, equally important, gave public support for the legitimacy of the new oracle. The Milesians took full advantage of this collaboration with Seleucus to rewrite the mythical genealogy of the oracle and cult procedures to bring them in line with the more familiar Delphic practice while simultaneously employing archaizing elements such as an old-style blood altar that made it look like the new oracle was the old one reborn.\(^80\)

Work on the temple at Didyma and the Seleucid relationship with Miletus flowered in the years after the battle of Ipsus in 301. Although Seleucus promoted the royal cult of Zeus in imitation of Alexander’s divine parentage early in his reign, Apollo served a similar political purpose by c.305 when the god began to appear on Seleucid coins from Babylonia.\(^81\) In time stories made Seleucus Apollo’s son. When Seleucus founded the sanctuary of Apollo at Daphne near Antioch in 300 he said it was at the urging of the oracle at Didyma.\(^82\) The years that followed saw a series of gifts from the royal family to the sanctuary. Antiochus donated a stoa and stipulated its revenues were to

\(^78\) For how Alexander became inextricably linked with the restoration of Didyma, see Nudell, “Oracular Politics.”

\(^79\) E.g., the “prophecy” came in a mistaken address, like one Alexander received at Siwah; see Nudell, “Oracular Politics,” 51–52. On the legend of Seleucus, see Daniel Ogden, The Legend of Seleucus: Kingship, Narrative, and Mythmaking in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 70–84.


\(^82\) On Didyma and Daphne, see Andrea De Giorgi, Ancient Antioch: From the Seleucid Era to the Islamic Conquest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 150–54; Ogden, Legend of Seleucus, 57, 138–51, 272.
go to furnishing the sanctuary (McCabe, *Didyma* 7 = *I.Didyma* 479, ll. 7–11) and Queen Apame dedicated funds for the construction of the *naos* (McCabe, *Didyma* 8 = *I.Didyma* 480, ll. 8–9).\(^83\) Seleucus himself made a lavish offering of sacrificial animals, ornately wrought bowls, and tons of precious spices such as cinnamon, frankincense, and myrrh (McCabe, *Didyma* 19 = *I.Didyma* 424). These gifts, which present a cohesive dynastic image, were an established part of Hellenistic diplomacy between kings and cities. The Milesians reciprocated with honors for Apame and Antiochus, including right to consult at the oracle (McCabe, *Didyma* 7 = *I.Didyma* 479, ll. 38–41) and an equestrian statue of Antiochus at Didyma (l. 30).\(^84\) The inscription honoring Apame thanked her for intervening on behalf of Milesian mercenaries (McCabe, *Didyma* 8 = *I.Didyma* 480, l. 6), and Demodamas, the proposer of both decrees, entered into Seleucid service, dedicating an altar to Didymaean Apollo in central Asia sometime after 294 (Pliny *H.N.* 6.49).\(^85\) Thus, as Paul Kosmin has recently argued, Didymaean

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83. The inscription for Apame appeared at the sanctuary of Artemis at Didyma, rather than at the one for Apollo, where a second inscription testifies to honors made on her behalf (McCabe, *Didyma* 182 = OGIS 745), as well as for Seleucus’ second wife, Phila (McCabe, *Didyma* 183 = *I.Didyma* 114), and Ptolemy I’s daughter Philotera (McCabe, *Didyma* 186 = *I.Didyma* 115).


Apollo symbolically came to represent the far northwestern and northeastern limits of Seleucid territory.\(^{86}\)

Evidence for contemporary construction at Claros near Colophon is more problematic. Archaic poetry associates Claros with Apollo from an early date, and its prophets claimed lineage from Teirisias through Mopsus, the son of his daughter Manto, which gave the site both legitimacy and antiquity.\(^{87}\) Throughout most the Classical period, however, the site is rarely mentioned and never associated with Colophon.\(^{88}\) In fact, H. W. Parke suggests that Claros’ mythic genealogy to an Aeolic prophetic tradition points to an Aeolian rather than Ionian foundation, in turn tying it to Notium rather than Colophon. Notion and Colophon had a strained relationship in the Classical period, with the former generally subordinate to the latter, but also with significant numbers of Colophonians living in Notium. By the middle of the fourth century, likely around the time when its coins began to feature Apollo’s tripod, Colophon annexed both Notium and Claros.\(^{89}\)

Colophon’s changed relationship with Claros coincided with the wave of monumental construction up and down the coast of Anatolia. It should be of little surprise, then, that the site shows a surge in activity that culminated in the construction of a new Doric temple of a size with contemporary Doric structures elsewhere, if still a fraction of the size of its colossal neighbors.\(^{90}\) The only Ionian polis without direct access to the sea, Colophon was not wealthy compared to most of its peers, so the decision to renovate the temple on a monumental scale requires explanation. Parke, for instance, proposes that its genesis belonged in “some burst of prosperity” that followed liberation from Persia, but that the wars of the Diadochoi meant that all available funds were redirected to the construction of a new set of fortifications.\(^{91}\) Circumstantial

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87. There is only one, likely apocryphal, prophecy attributed to Claros in the fourth century, associated with the founding of Smyrna, but Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 125–26, rejects the notion that the oracle only developed in the Hellenistic period on the strength of the legendary material that associated the site with Mopsus and Manto. This does not mean that the oracle was active. Recent finds have revealed Bronze Age material; see Nuran Şahin and Pierre Debord, “Découvertes récentes et installation du culte d’Apollon pythien à Claros,” *Pallas* 87 (2011): 169–204.

88. Herodotus mentions Colophon on five occasions, but never Claros. Thucydides (3.33.1–2) says that the Spartan fleet put in at Claros in 427 but uses the name only as a landmark.

89. Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 123.

90. Claros had a footprint of 1,027.68 m\(^2\), which was roughly the size of the temple for Zeus at Nemea and the temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus and half the size of the Parthenon; see Moretti, “Le Temple d’Apollon à Claros,” 172. The footprint of the Hellenistic temple was adjusted during the Augustan period; see Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 128–29.

91. Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 129.
evidence at Claros again seems to support thesis of early-Hellenistic prosperity. An inscription dated to 307/6 records a list of contributions to build Colophon’s walls and the late-Hellenistic column drums found at the Kızılburun shipwreck indicate that construction progressed slowly. Once again, though, chronology intrudes. Much as at Didyma, the plans for new construction at Claros predated Alexander and thus cannot be attributed to a sudden economic swing in his wake. Moreover, Parke undersells Colophon’s poverty in 307. The inscription in question records a long list of contributors to the construction of the wall (McCabe, Kolophon 6 = SEG 19, 698). The largest number of entries are for small donations of twenty or thirty drachmae, and the strain these sums posed is demonstrated by entries that list the donor as an individual and his son or brother (e.g., ll. 375, 393), but these donations are dwarfed by the entries at the top of the list that include large individual contributions of tens of thousands of drachmae, mostly from Macedonians (ll. 134–60). Construction at Claros was not a small project, and Lysimachus’ attempt to incorporate Colophon into Arsinoeia in c.294 temporarily halted construction. When it resumed, the plans were scaled back, probably for lack of funds, and ultimately never completed.

The sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus again provides a telling counterpoint to the other Ionian sanctuaries. It had served as a locus of diplomatic activity throughout the Classical period, and Ephesian honorific inscriptions were traditionally posted in the sanctuary. However, its continued operation and regional clout meant not only that the sanctuary did not require foreign patronage, but also that the sanctuary resisted subordination to Ephesus the way that the revisions to the mythic genealogy of Didyma changed the relationship between that sanctuary and Miletus. But even famous Artemision could not maintain its autonomy for long under the new pressures of the Hellenistic period. Guy Rogers has recently shown that coercion worked where flattery and bribes failed. When Lysimachus refounded Ephesus as Arsinoeia in the 290s, he changed the status of the Artemision, in part because its supporters had sided with Demetrius in 301 (see Chapter 8). Lysimachus could not be seen to commit sacrilege against such a prominent sanctuary, so he instead underwrote the costs of a new temple complex for Artemis Soter at Ortygia, near the border with Pygela. Patronizing a new cult of Artemis also gave Lysimachus an opening to oversee the Artemision. He took the final authority for

94. On the contentious relationship between Ephesus and Pygela, see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
himself but granted the Arsinoeian Gerousia the right to mediate between the two sanctuaries and therefore to oversee the management of the mysteries of Artemis.95

Conclusion

In the introduction to his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides compared what future commentators might think of Sparta and Athens if only ruins remained (1.10.2):

If the city of the Lacedaemonians should be laid to ruin, leaving only the foundations of its temples and permanent fixtures, I think there would be much disbelief in its power compared to its fame among those in the distant future. For, although it has two of the five parts of the Pelopon


95. For the development of the cult of Artemis in this period, see particularly Rogers, Mysteries of Artemis, 61–67, 80–88. The hypothesis of a cult reorganization in the early third century comes from a second century CE inscription (I.Eph. 26) that says as much (ll. 1–3), though Kevin Clinton, “Mysteria at Ephesus,” ZPE 191 (2014): 117–19, cautions that the identification of Lysimachus with the changes is an uncertain reconstruction. Clinton also distinguishes between the two aspects of Artemis, calling into question Rogers’ thesis that competing cults gave an opening for oversight. In a review of Rogers’ book, Jennifer Larson, “Review: The Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos,” AHR 120, no. 2 (2015): 692, expressed skepticism that the Artemisium ever had the autonomy that Rogers imagines, comparing it to the sanctuary at Eleusis. It is necessary to consider the sanctuary and the city as having a symbiotic relationship, but Didyma is a more apt parallel than is Eleusis, despite the rites in question being mysteries.
Thucydides was commenting on the crude power of political and military force, but his warning to not judge a city by its ruined temples is instructive: we would do well not to judge the power or, in this case, wealth, of a city from its ruins alone.

Every Ionian polis constructed temples and sanctuaries, but only three, Ephesus, Miletus, and Samos, erected the enormous temples for which the region was known. These were among the largest and wealthiest Ionian poleis, but Erythrae and Teos regularly paid as much in *phoros* as Miletus and Ephesus on the Athenian Tribute Lists and Chios was arguably as wealthy as Samos. And yet, excepting only the Panionion, the most prominent sanctuary outside the big three was the oracle of Colophon’s Apollo at Claros. Peer-poliy competition drove the successive phases of temple construction, and commercial prosperity shaped the landscape of religious offerings in each polis, but neither adequately explains the record of Ionian temple construction.

Taken in a broader perspective, the Ionian sanctuaries were not Greek in an isolated sense at least until the Hellenistic period, when there was a conscious effort to link Didyma to Delphi. Instead, these sanctuaries were part of Anatolian religious networks that included Caria, Lydia, and Phrygia, and were absorbed by the Persian administration. Viewed in this light, foreign gifts and regional influence that extended up the river valleys facilitated temple construction. The political environment that encouraged donations from foreign kings dried up during the fifth century but returned in earnest in the second half of the fourth century when the sanctuaries took on renewed importance as a locus of political interaction. Negotiating a balance between dependence and autonomy, the sanctuaries were a microcosm of Ionia itself.
CHAPTER 10

Epilogue

When the funeral games for Alexander ended more than two decades after his death, three large kingdoms and numerous small contenders had replaced his ephemeral empire. In some ways nothing had changed; in others, everything had. The Ionian poleis remained a keystone in the Aegean system and therefore continued to be courted by the kings and dynasts. However, rather than a contested zone conceived of as holding the “barbarian” world at bay, Ionia became a link in the chain connecting the new Hellenistic kingdoms to the world of “old” Greece.¹ The new world of kingdoms did not precisely replicate the situation that had preceded Alexander, where local and regional developments took place under the watchful eye of a Persian king who sought to manage conflicts on his imperial frontier, but neither was it wholly new. The following century may be characterized as a period of relative political stability, but Ionia remained contested between the kings and dynasts who jockeyed to performatively defend their autonomy while otherwise engaging in coercive practices.² The bands of Gauls that swept into Anatolia in early 270s gave kings new opportunities to build influence by touting their victories in defense of the Greeks (Justin 26.2).³

Ionia’s location connecting the Aegean world to the new kingdoms enabled


² Billows, “Rebirth of a Region,” 39, characterizes this autonomy as “a relatively painless favor for a king to bestow,” but the actual relationships were more complicated; see Angelos Chaniotis, Age of Conquests: The Greek World from Alexander to Hadrian (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 100–105; Svatoslav Dmitriev, The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³ Most notable was Antiochus I, who allegedly achieved an “Elephant Victory” over the Gauls that won him the epithet “Soter” (App. Syr. 11; Lucian Zeuxis), but see Altay Coşkun, “Deconstructing a Myth of Seleucid History: The So-Called ‘Elephant Victory,’” Phoenix 66, nos. 1–2 (2012): 57–73. Victory over the Gauls was also a foundational story for the creation of the Attalid dynasty at Pergamum (see Strabo 13.4.2) and again in the 160s; see Peter Thonemann, The Maeander Valley: A Historical Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 170–77.
it to flourish until Strabo, writing at the dawn of the Roman Empire, could characterize Ephesus as the foremost emporium in Asia (12.8.15). Richard Billows makes an important point in noting that specific actions also planted the seeds of these developments, but it would be a mistake to simply characterize this success as the product of “brute geographic fact” of location. In his formulation, location gave the Hellenistic rulers incentive to court the Ionian poleis through refoundations, donations, and tax breaks (e.g., I.Ery. 31 and 32). Billows is not wrong that the prosperity that emerged later in the Hellenistic period can be traced to the settlements and privileges first conferred by the Diadochoi, but his argument requires modification in several important ways.

Billows characterizes the early Hellenistic period as a time of rebirth, but change is not the same as rebirth, for rebirth necessarily requires death. It has long been assumed that after the vibrant Archaic period, the Ionian poleis experienced economic and cultural stagnation that lasted for nearly two centuries, when, in truth, the Classical period was a complicated time of continuity and persistence during which the developments usually thought of as Hellenistic had already begun to sprout. Further, the rebirth that Billows identifies largely bypasses the Ionians except in their service to the Hellenistic kings. Simply put, the argument of this book has been that the Ionian poleis were active agents in negotiating their position within the changing political landscape of the Classical Aegean. To neglect that fact is to overlook how local and regional issues intersected with these imperial projects. Thus, the restoration of the sanctuary at Didyma engaged not only the local community, but also Demodamas, a Milesian in the service of the Seleucid court, and the Seleucid kings who used Didymaean Apollo as a symbolic marker of territory (see Chapter 9).

When the king Antiochus III declared that the Ionians were accustomed to obedience to barbarian kings more than a century into the Hellenistic period, he appealed to a discourse about freedom (ἐλευθερία) and autonomy (αὐτονομία) in a bid to retain a part of his kingdom (App. Syr. 12.1). These ideals went to the heart of what it meant to be a polis, and, Antiochus claimed, the Ionians had forfeited them because of their tradition of servitude. Antiochus’ appeals fell on deaf Roman ears, but it should not be overlooked that his historical evidence in this moment is deeply flawed. Freedom and autonomy were characteristics of the ideal polis that have subsequently been picked up because they appeal to the Enlightenment values espoused by European and American commentators. But autonomy was not one-half of a binary that toggled on and off. Rather, it

4. Billow, “Rebirth of a Region.”
was an ideal that was not incompatible with the imperial systems of the Classical period—except when it was turned into a political slogan—and it is in this context that Ionian actions need to be interpreted. Although not always incorporated into a formal imperial apparatus, the Ionians were partners in the imperial endeavor, abetting or resisting the external powers for political, rather than ideological, reasons.

Throughout this book I have argued that Ionia offers a prism through which we might better understand Classical Greece. The tendency for many histories of ancient Greece to be centered on Athens sometimes leads to the unfortunate implication that the two are synonymous when the historical reality is much more diverse and heterogeneous. Ionia offers a cross section of these complexities that in many ways allows it to be metonymic for thinking about ancient Greece as a whole. It was a region with poleis of various sizes that possessed a common identity that did little to blunt conflict, and its location meant that it interacted with both Greek poleis like Athens and Persian administrative centers like Sardis. Focusing on Ionia thus illuminates not only regional interaction between the local poleis but also the interplay between regional relationships and the Aegean and Mediterranean worlds. The confluence of these levels of interaction in Ionia make it particularly useful for this sort of study, but its story at the confluence of obedience, exploitation, and resistance was common in its time.
Appendix 1

Whither the Ionian League?

Perhaps the single most intractable challenge to understanding Ionia in the Archaic and Classical periods is the nature of the Ionian koinon, usually referred to as the Ionian League. The early history of the koinon is almost entirely speculative and inferred from later sources.1 Meetings took place at the Panionion on the Mycale Peninsula, which housed the sanctuary of Poseidon Heliconius (Hdt. 1.148).2 The sanctuary was established on the site of Melie, which was either an Ionian or Carian community against which the Ionians waged a common war (Vitr. De arch. 4.1.3–5).3


3. The date of this event if, indeed, it is historical, is unknown. Recently, Lohmann, “Ionians and Carians,” and Jan Paul Crieleard, “The Ionians in the Archaic Period: Shifting Identities in a Changing World,” in Ethnic Constructs in Antiquity: The Role of Power and Tradition, ed. Ton Derks and Nico Roymans (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 57–60, both posit a date close to 600, though a date in the dimmer past is still more commonly applied. On the issue of Ionian ethnicity in the Classical period, see Appendix 2.
The two traditional lines of scholarship about the organization represent a chicken-and-egg problem. One treats the Ionian League anachronistically by envisioning it as a political organization along the lines of Hellenistic federal leagues that served to resolve debates and organize collective action against encroachment from foreign powers. Despite the irrepressible myth of the Ionian Migration, Ionian identity developed in situ in Anatolia. Although Wilamowitz-Moellendorff followed Vitruvius in seeing the original purpose of the league being a common war against Melie, the more commonly accepted position on this side of the ledger is the one proposed by M. O. B. Caspari, which suggests that the league formed for common defense against Lydian aggression. However, since they established the sanctuary on the site of Melie and held the common festival there as a commemoration of victory, the festival had to have followed from some sense of unity.

On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars hold that the league began as a religious network that had little or no political activity. While some adherents of this theory, such as Naoíse Mac Sweeney, suggest that the koinon bound its members only to a loose sense of communal identity, others, including Barbara Kowalzig and Nicholas Cross, have recently revived the argument that the Panionion laid the groundwork for a common Ionian identity and therefore that the koinon of the Ionians took on an incipiently political function by the end of the Archaic period.
Indeed, the textual evidence for the early Ionian League appears to support the second interpretation. Herodotus records at least four assemblies of the Ionian koinon that took place between c.550 and 494 (1.141.4, 1.170, 5.108, 6.7). Each meeting had a distinctly political flavor. In c.550, they met to discuss their options for collective action. Several years later, they met for a second meeting in which Bias of Priene, one of the legendary sages of ancient Greece, proposed that the Ionians sail away to form a common city in Sardo (perhaps Sardinia), while Thales, the Phoenician sage living in Miletus, proposed that the Ionians establish a single political seat (1.170, βουλευτήριον) located at Teos on the grounds that it was the center of the region. Although neither plan came to fruition, the Panionion remained an important locus for collective action such that leaders gathered there again decades later in order to coordinate the Ionian revolt. Thus, despite the “Ionian revolt” itself being a misnomer, scholars have nevertheless suggested that the revolt took place because of this developing sense of common identity.

Proponents of a political Ionian league in the Archaic period explain the absence of political institutions in the Classical period by arguing that the Persians dissolved the organization in 492. After the “liberation” of Ionia, they continue, Athens had little interest in reviving a rival koinon to the new Athenian League. While this argument follows in part from the undeniable geopolitical reality of the relative positions of the Ionian poleis and the succession of hegemons, it is based in part on a circular logic: the koinon’s political function in the Archaic period is confirmed because imperial powers saw fit to suppress it, while the suppression in the Classical period was made necessary because of its political function.

Reexamining the textual evidence for the political function also introduces serious issues for this interpretation. First, as we have seen, pressure from the

(W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 130, suggest that Herodotus believed Thales’ suggestion to be a genuine political unification because of the similarity between his language and Thucydides’ description of the unification of Attica (2.15.2–3). However, this parallel need not vouch for the historicity of the proposal.

See Chapter 1.

E.g., Donald Lateiner, “The Failure of the Ionian Revolt,” Historia 31, no. 2 (1982): 131–35, though he believes the league was not originally political. The Ionian revolt extended beyond Ionia and did not include every member the koinon; see Mac Sweeney, Foundation Myths and Politics, 175; J. Neville, “Was There an Ionian Revolt?,” CQ 29, no. 2 (1979): 268–75.

Delian League was anything but even. Not only did the Athenians tolerate regional hegemonies throughout their space, so too did its imperial institutions grow with time, and even in the mid-470s there is no evidence for a move to revive a political organization that was the Ionian League. Second, and even more telling, are the notable absences from the assemblies of the Ionian *koinon*. In c.550, Herodotus says, the Milesians did not attend because they had already agreed to a treaty with Cyrus (1.41.4). Likewise, in 499, the Ephesians appear to have stood apart from the revolt. The raid on Sardis employed Ephesian guides (5.100), but when the Persian counterattack caught up with the rebels in the Ephesian *chora*, the polis suffered no reprisals, and the Ephesians even attacked some of the survivors of the battle of Lade (6.16). In each of these cases the assembly of the Ionian *koinon* takes on a much more fluid composition, and thus it is more accurate to describe these meetings as taking place at the Panionion as a common space rather than being meetings of an inherently political Ionian League.

However, common identity is not easily unmade. The scant evidence for the Panionia in the Classical period introduces additional complications for understanding both the Ionian League and the Ionians during this period. Thucydides introduces an annual pan-Ionian festival at Ephesus, comparing it to a common Ionian festival on Delos (3.104.3–4). Simon Hornblower correctly distinguished this Ephesia from the Artemisia but proceeded to identify this festival as the Panionia on the grounds that Diodorus Siculus claims that at some point the festival had moved there because of war in the vicinity of Mycale (15.49.1). P. J. Stylianou responded to Hornblower, vehemently rejecting this interpretation and more plausibly dating the change in location to around 400, during the period of the Spartan expeditions to Ionia based at Ephesus (see Chapter 5). He therefore connects this reference in Diodorus to a decision to move the festival back to Mycale in c.373. While Stylianou's
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The argument for the date and length of time of the Panionian festivities at Ephesos is sound, he regards it as a revival of the *koinon*, even though Diodorus indicated a transfer. This sort of error is not beyond Diodorus given his propensity to project his contemporary context into his history, but the positive evidence for the interpretation is lacking.

There is only one datable inscription that suggests a revival of the Ionian *koinon* around 400, the record of an arbitration between Myus and Miletus. In either 392 or 388, the Persian satrap, Struthas, ordered jurors of the Ionians (*oι των Ιωνων δικασται*) to resolve this dispute, and the surviving fragments include lists of jurors from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedus, and Ephesus (*RO 16 = I.Priene 458; see Chapter 5*). The specification of Ionian jurors has led scholars to argue that he delegated the arbitration to the Ionian *koinon*, but nothing in the text of the inscription supports this conclusion. Struthas likely used membership in the *koinon* to choose the arbitrators, but this followed Persian practice in the region going back to the sixth century (Hdt. 6.42).

Other evidence is no more illuminating. The remaining inscriptions are only tenuously dated to this period, and surviving ancient histories offer no evidence for collective action. However, the absence of evidence for the existence of the Panionion in this period need not be evidence of absence if the *koinon* remained as it had been for much of its existence: a loose organization with limited substance—that is, if it lacked a political function.

The dearth of solid evidence for the Ionia in this period frustratingly makes any hypothesis little more than speculation, but treating the Panionion as a loose, largely symbolic organization rather than one that fostered strong ties in the region offers intriguing possibilities. In discussing the temporary relo-

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“Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 80–82. Maxim M. Kholod, “On the Ionian League in the Fourth Century BC,” *Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica* 26, no. 2 (2020): 199–211, argues for the complete restoration of the cult. The date 373 is supported by an earthquake that swamped Helice in that year after its citizens allegedly mistreated Ionian ambassadors. I agree with Kholod that the revived league was primarily a religious network.

17. Dating the revival to c.400 broadly follows Caspari, “Ionian Confederacy,” 182–83, who held that the league was again dissolved by the King’s Peace.


19. Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 495. Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 88–89, notes that the Myceans addressed the poleis, rather than the *koinon*, when they withdrew the suit, as one would expect if that were the adjudicating body. No other known case in Ionia used arbitrators from Ionia.

20. *I.Ery 16; I.Priene 139*. *I.Priene* 139 plausibly belongs before 335/4, when the eponymous magistrate changed from prytanis to *stephanephoros*, but the other two are undated. For a survey of these inscriptions, see Metcalfe, “Reaffirming Regional Identity,” 89–91.
cation of the Panionia to Ephesus, Diodorus says, “Nine cities in Ionia were accustomed to making a common assembly of all of the Ionians” (κατὰ τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἐννέα πόλεις εἰώθεισαν κοινὴν ποιεῖσθαι σύνοδον τὴν τῶν Πανιωνίων, 15.49.1). The confident declaration that nine poleis did this has caused no small amount of consternation on the grounds that twelve is the more common number associated with the sanctuary (e.g., Hdt. 1.145; Strabo 14.1.4). Scholars have offered various explanations for the discrepancy, whether as an error introduced by either Diodorus or his source (probably Ephorus) or looking for explanations for why some of the members would not have been included. The most common explanation is to strike Chios and Samos from the list on the grounds that they were formally independent of Persia and to suggest that Priene did not exist at the time of the transition, leaving nine poleis. Stylianou goes a step further, plausibly suggesting that the revival of the festival on Mycale corresponded with the refoundation of Priene with the support of Mausolus. However, while he is correct to suggest that Diodorus’ implication that the Panionion always had twelve members was an “injudicious epitome of Ephorus,” bringing Priene back into the picture for the restoration ticks the number back up to ten viable members outside of Chios and Samos. If Stylianou is right in identifying the return to Mycale as the result of Hecatomnid influence in the region, then Ephesus would be the more likely exclusion. This proposal is, admittedly, speculative, but it fits the geopolitical context of a showdown between Ephesus and Mausolus over their respective positions in the region in the late 370s and early 360s (see Chapter 6).

The relationship between the Ionians and Alexander in the 330s further supports the interpretation of a largely symbolic league. Much as Struthas and Agesilaus both treated the Ionian poleis individually rather than collectively, Alexander continued in the same vein.21 Further, while he made a procession at the Artemision at Ephesus and contributed to the building of the Temple of Athena at Priene (see Chapter 7), he made no comparable offer to the common Ionian sanctuary at any point during his reign. Once again, the absence of evidence does not positively confirm the nonexistence of a political league, but the preponderance of evidence points to the koinon of the Ionians remaining a religious network that created a loose sense of common identity among disparate poleis.22

21. Kholod, “On the Ionian League,” 206–7, speculates that Alexander’s cult in Ionia was celebrated at the Panionion, holding that the Alexandreia was created during his reign rather than by one of his successors. His argument is plausible, but by no means certain.

The changed political landscape of the early Hellenistic period breathed new relevance into the old cultic network. The earliest evidence for this change comes from an inscription dated to 289/8 that reads (SIG\textsuperscript{3} 368):

Resolved by the *koinon* of the Ionians. Whereas Hippostratos, son of Hippodamos of Miletus, a friend of King Lysimachus and strategos over the poleis of Ionia, continues to treat the cities generously, both each individually and the Ionians as a whole, with good fortune, [he receives] from the *koinon* of the Ionians praise for Hippostratos son of Hippodamus on account of his virtue and *eunoia* that he continues to have toward the *koinon* of the Ionians, and a tax exemption among all of the Ionian poleis and that these provisions apply to him and his descendants. And [it is resolved] to erect a bronze *eikon* of this man on horseback in the Panionion . . .

The decree concludes with instructions that each city inscribe and publicize it, as well as for a copy to appear beside the equestrian statue in the Panionion. The extant copy from Miletus also included two additional decrees related to Hippostratos and his honors, both of which speak to the ratification in the Pan-

oeicism of Teos and Lebedus in c.304/3 (Welles RC 3 1–3), but this inscription only testifies to the existence of the koinon. As Sheila L. Ager, “Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World: The Case of Lebedos,” *GRBS* 39, no. 1 (1998): 14, notes, Antigonus’ orders do not seem to have materially changed the Ionian League since the Smyrnean copy of *SIG\textsuperscript{3} 368* (*I.Smyrna* II 577) from 289/8 refers to *thirteen*-member poleis. This count requires the full roster of the original dodecapolis plus Smyrna.
ionion. Unlike the earlier evidence for a political function at the koinon, this inscription suggests that decisions made at the Panionion, at least in the case of certain exceptional honors, were binding for league members.

It would still be a bridge too far to say that the Ionian League had finally molted into a fully fledged federal league. Despite his position as strategos for Ionia and intermediary to the king, the decree presents Hippostratos as separate from the koinon, and as liable to treat the Ionian poleis individually as to treat them as a coherent group. Nevertheless, this regional network served as a point of contact for Hellenistic kings, issuing a decree in honor of the Seleucid king Antiochus I between 267 and 262 (I.Ery. 504)²³ and receiving an inscription from the Pergamene king Eumenes II in 167/6 (RC 52 = OGIS 763). In other words, the political function often identified in the late-Archaic Ionian League finally came into being in the Hellenistic period.

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Appendix 2

Greeks and Non-Greeks in Classical Ionia

[The Ionian poleis] were, so to speak, fragments of the western world on the fringe of the eastern, serving as connecting links between the two.
—Mikhail Rostovtzeff

If the Ionian Migration was not the seed that gave root to collective Ionian identity, it gave the inhabitants of the region an unimpeachable claim to Greekness. By the time of Hadrian’s Panhellenion in the second century CE, it was precisely this lineage that justified the inclusion of Ephesus, Miletus, and Samos. There is also no evidence that the numerous Ionian athletes participating in the Olympic Games ever had their Greekness challenged by the hellenodikai, whose task it was to certify that the athletes met the qualifications for competition. In terms of the Ionian self-identity, a similar process was at work where the charter myth for the Panionion was a collective war against the Carian community of Melie (see Appendix 1). With such a basis for collective

3. One of the qualifications, at least nominally, was Greekness, which led to a famous showdown between the judges and Alexander I of Macedonia until the hellenodikai ruled that he was in fact Greek (Hdt. 5.22). Cf. W. Lindsay Adams, “Other People’s Games: The Olympics, Macedonia and Greek Athletics,” Journal of Sport History 30 (2003): 205–17, though a curious story in Xenophon (Hell. 4.1.39–40) suggests that these rules were not absolute; see James Roy, “The Son of Pharnabazos and Parapita, a Persian Competing in the Olympic Games: Xenophon Hellenica 4.1.39–40,” C&G M 68 (2020): 119–34.
identity, one might expect a robust delineation between the Greek Ionian poleis on the one hand and the barbarians on the other. Indeed, Hyun Jin Kim has recently argued that the divide between Greeks and barbarians developed first in sixth-century Ionia.

Classical Ionia was Greek—in culture, in language, and in identity—but recent scholarship has clearly demonstrated that any assumption that it was purely so is untenable. Indeed, recent developments in postcolonial theory have shown that culture and identity are not static because they are constantly being negotiated. Whereas ancient authors offer trace evidence of violent expulsion or subjugation of the indigenous inhabitants (e.g., Philip of Thespiai, BNJ 741 F 2), others explain that the newcomers and existing inhabitants mixed together to form Ionians. Herodotus declares that Milesian women


neither dined with their husbands nor referred to them by name because the Ionians forced them into marriage after slaughtering their fathers, husbands, and sons (Hdt. 1.146.2–3), while Pausanias offers examples of more peaceful coexistence at Ephesus (7.2.7–8) and Teos (7.3.6). Moreover, the name Sadyattes appears three times on the Milesian *aesymnetes* list well into the Classical period, indicating that men with this name shared with a Lydian king operated in the upper echelons of Milesian society.

Material culture, too, reveals the inadequacy of considering Greek and barbarian as binary, oppositional categories in Ionia. Both the Apollo of Didyma and the Artemis of Ephesus were deities of Anatolian extraction that imbued their primary sanctuaries with a non-Greek flavor. These sanctuaries thus preserved traces of earlier practice, while also providing a locus of interaction


10. *Milet I*.3 no. 122, II. 1.55, 1.108, 2.55. Onomastic evidence is an imperfect barometer of cultural fusion. The name could have entered the family through political relationships, as Nicholas V. Sekunda, “Iphicrates the Athenian and the Menestheid Family of Miletus,” *ABS* 89 (1994): 303–6, argues, but marriages were likely common; see Coldstream, “Mixed Marriages.”

that was not limited to the citizen body. The Carian Branchidae family operated the sanctuary of Didyma, which served as a space of reconciliation for the diverse populations that lived in throughout the Milesia. Similarly, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus showed distinctly Anatolian characteristics such as its famous “breasted” cult statue, even before considering that its priests took on the Persian title Megabyxos (Xen. Anab. 5.3.6; Pliny H.N. 35.36, 40; see Chapter 9). Fragments from a Classical frieze from the temple of Artemis show both people in Greek clothes and a figure in Persian shoes taking part in a procession. While the temples show perhaps the clearest evidence of this intermixing, it also appeared elsewhere in Ionia, such as in both the pottery production at Clazomenae and a series of decorated sarcophagi dated c.500–470 that display images where the horsemen in Persian clothing fight alongside the hoplites, rather than against them.

And yet other evidence has been used to posit the existence of a stratum of “non-Greeks” in and around Ionia. Several inscriptions from Priene dated to the final third of the fourth century and first half of the third century testify to the presence of pedieis (πεδείες) in and around the polis. But just who were these pedieis? The subsequent inscriptions, all of which likely date to the early third century, testify to increasing conflict between the two groups and intervention from Lysimachus (I.Priere 14, ll. 5–6; with the response I.Priere 15). Likewise, I.Priere 16, which granted the Ephesian Megabyxos the right to purchase property, reveals the presence of pedieis who owned property in

Priene. However, these inscriptions offer no insight into the ethnic makeup of these people. While it might be tempting to regard these pedieis as necessarily non-Greek, this interpretation requires a clear binary between those two categories that is not supported by these inscriptions. In this context, pedieis was general term for the people who lived in the Maeander plain, as distinct from the people of Priene who occupied a raised position on the slopes of Mount Mycale, leading Peter Thonemann to suggest that the word held a connotation akin to the English “hillbilly.” Priene’s honors to Lysimachus because of his action against the pedieis, for instance, specifically mention “the Magnesians and the other pedieis” (τοὺς Μάγνης καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πεδιεῖς, I.Priene 14, ll. 5–6). Magnesia might have been a polis outside of the circle of the Ionian koinon, but it had every bit as much of a claim as Priene to being Greek.

In fact, the only evidence of a distinction between Greek and barbarian in Ionia comes from Thonemann’s recent reconstruction of I.Priene 1. This heavily reconstructed inscription records an edict of Alexander that established aspects of fiscal policy and land rights for the people of Priene. The inscription’s first clause referred to some group of people living in the port of Naulochon whose identity is entirely lost except for a final sigma (l. 3). The original editor, E. L. Hicks, reconstructed the name as [Πριηνεῖς], indicating that the edict governed the Prienians living in Naulochon. However, Thonemann is correct that A. J. Heisserer’s subsequent reconstruction of line 7 as ὥ[σπερ oi] Πριηνε[ῖς leads to a potential tautology that the Prienians at Naulochon had the same privileges as the Prienians, at least without some additional contortions. Thonemann’s solution is to replace [Πριηνεῖς] in line 3 with [Ἑλλήνες]—“of those living at Naulochon, as many as are [Greek].” The demarcation of “Greeks” is unusual in Classical Ionia but makes sense if understood as an outside imposition that presaged similar restrictive policies established in the Hellenistic kingdoms.

“Greek” and “barbarian” are on balance not useful categories for understanding local relationships in and around Classical Ionia except perhaps when referring to the Persian king and his deputies. Rather, these statuses ought to be interpreted as fluid legal categories. In his recent study of Hellenistic Caria, Jeremy LaBuff argued that “the distinction between polis and koinon may in fact depend more on discursive context than settlement reality.” Much the same held true in Ionia with respect to this terminology. The pedieis in these inscriptions referred to all the people of the plain who were not Prienian citizens, regardless of their background.

The very ambiguity of Ionian identity set the ideological stakes of defining Ionia as Greek, which imbued the categories with new significance in the writing of Ionian history. When local circumstances gave way to abstractions, it became possible to imagine a clear delineation between the Ionian Greeks beset by a tide of barbarity in Anatolia. Thus, Plutarch says, Ephesus was in a sad state when Lysander arrived to take control of the Spartan fleet in 408 (Lys. 3.2). In his telling, Lysander found the Ephesians enthusiastic for the Spartan cause, but in a wretched state on account of the poverty and “in danger of becoming barbarized” (κινδυνεύουσαν ἐκβαρβαρωθῆναι) by close contact with Persian and Lydian customs. What “saved” Ephesus from this grim fate was an economic stimulus package. Lysander immediately ordered merchant ships to Ephesus and gave contracts for trireme construction, which revived the economic prospects of the city and allowed it to achieve the grandeur that it had in Plutarch’s day (Lys. 3.3). Plutarch thus fully realizes the Greek-Barbarian antithesis in a way that elides that Greek, Anatolian, and Persian cultures were inextricably intertwined in Ionian identity.

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23. I.e., how Kim, “Invention of the Barbarian,” characterizes the term’s development.
26. Plutarch’s account of Lysander at Ephesus may have been drawn from Theopompus, see Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” 40. Theopompus wrote a Hellenica that picked up Thucydides’ narrative and included a long passage on Ionian history in his Philippica; see William S. Morison, “Theopompus of Chios (115),” BNI, biographical commentary. Plutarch’s interest in connecting his biographical subject to the contemporary city of Ephesus led him to embellish the consequences of Lysander’s activities.
Appendix 3

Long Ago the Milesians Were Powerful

What about luxurious and sumptuous Ionia,
Tell me how it faires.

τί γὰρ ἡ τρυφερὰ καὶ
καλλιτράπεζος Ἰωνία εἶφ᾽ τι πράσσει1

The Ionian migration was not, strictly speaking, a military campaign. Yet, as early as the late Archaic period, it, combined with the Meliac War, was taken for proof of Ionian superiority over the aboriginal Carian population (Mimnermus F 10; Hdt. 1.146.2–3; Diod. 5.84).2 One infamous version of the foundation of Miletus explained that Milesian women refused to eat or speak with their husbands because the invaders had slaughtered their families and forcibly took them as wives (1.46).3 In time, the power of Ionia became proverbial. “He put Colophon to it,” meant “to put an end to an affair,” according to Strabo, because of the quality of their cavalry (τὸν Κολοφῶνα ἐπέθηκεν, 14.1.28). Another saying, “Long ago the Milesians were powerful,” meant “Times have changed” (πάλαι ποτ᾽ ἦσαν ἄλκιμοι Μιλήσιοι, Athen. 12.26 [523f]).

Times did indeed change. Although the central thesis of this book complicates the straightforward relationship between Ionia and the imperial states

1. Athenaeus 12.28 [524f], citing the Cyclopes of the comic playwright Callias.
2. On the formation of Ionian collective identity, see Appendix 1.
of the Classical period, that does not change the reality that the Ionian poleis remained in a subordinate position within the power structure of the Aegean world. By the start of the second century BCE the Seleucid king Antiochus III even denied the Ionians the language of freedom and autonomy that had been granted to Greek cities in the Aegean for centuries. They were, he claimed, accustomed to obedience to barbarian kings (App. Syr. 3.12.1). Antiochus did not deny Ionia a glorious past, but he suggested that its long interaction with barbarian kings made Ionia incapable of self-sufficiency.

The appearance that Ionian power at the end of the Archaic period faded both implicitly and explicitly informs much modern scholarship on the region. Less well understood is how these attitudes toward Ionian impotence developed. The traditional approach to these Ionian memories suggests that Ionian wealth and power grew together until they reached a tipping point when wealth gave way to decadence and luxury that corrupted the society and led to its downfall. Certainly, through both local advantages and long serving as an intermediary with wealthy non-Greek communities, Ionia became associated with luxurious commodities. Herodotus also invokes Sybaris, which itself came to be a byword for excessive luxury, when recounting the fall of Miletus, using the verb ξενόω (enter a treaty of hospitality with) and saying that no two cities had ever been closer (6.21.1). Robert and Vanessa Gorman have recently demonstrated that the connection between luxury (τρυφή) and corruption, long thought to be a foundational principle in Greek literature, actually developed in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Thus, where Athenaeus’ sources might present economic inequality as a cause of social strife at Miletus, he declares that “when they were yoked by pleasure and luxury, all the valiant character of the polis disappeared” (ὡς δὲ ὑπήχθησαν ἡδονῇ καὶ τρυφῇ, κατερρύη τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀνδρεῖον, 12.26 [523f]).

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4. Αἰολέας δὲ καὶ Ἴωνας οὐ συνεχώρει ὡς ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις βασιλεῦσι τῆς Ἀσίας εἰθισμένους ὑπακούειν.
7. See Chapter 2 for the economic explanation for stasis in Miletus. On the preoccupation with
Throughout the Classical period, Ionia was dominated by more powerful neighbors, which forced the inhabitants of the region to adapt to this imperial reality. Contemporary commentators were frequently dismissive of their fighting capacity. Thucydides, for instance, concludes that the Athenian allies enabled the development of the empire by their own unwillingness to protect themselves (1.98–99), while Xenophon narrates both how a force of Athenian peltasts decisively defeated Milesian hoplites (Hell. 1.2.2) and how the Ionians under Dercylidas’ command simply dropped their weapons and fled in the face of a larger Persian army (Hell. 3.2.17). However, both authors frame these conditions in terms of preparation and training rather than indolence and weakness. It is also not as though the Ionians themselves were unaware of these factors, which led Miletus and Teos to be among the earliest poleis to institute ephetic educational programs.

The notion that different cultures have differing martial capabilities has a long and toxic history that was and is often intertwined with gender constructs. Ionia was no exception: it was there that King Agesilaus reportedly stripped Persian captives naked so that his soldiers would see that their enemies were fat and lazy (πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους) and therefore think that going to war against them would be like fighting women (εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι, Xen. Ages. 1.28). However, when explaining the Ionian inability to defend themselves, commentators of the Classical period looked to the lack of training, civil stasis, and political fragmentation. Any explanation that looked to indolence would have flown in the face of the reality that Ionian soldiers fought alongside their own. In time, the two strands of historical memory merged to offer a new interpretation about the decline and fall of Ionia that could serve as a warning for subsequent generations. Ionian power led to prosperity that gave way to decadence and indolence and, finally, irrelevance.

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8. Cf. Herodotus 6.11–12 on the battle of Lade, which Gorman and Gorman, *Corrupting Luxury*, 135–39, have convincingly demonstrated is a commentary about excessive last-minute training.


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