A CULTURAL HISTORY OF YOUTH IN THE MODERN AGE

Edited by Kristine Alexander & Simon Sleight
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF YOUTH IN THE MODERN AGE VOLUME 6

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Aptly enough, this collection began in London’s storied district of Bloomsbury. Over dinner on the eve of the inaugural conference of the Children’s History Society in 2016, series co-editor Stephanie Olsen approached us to lead on the Modern Age volume. We thought about it, and quickly said yes, perceiving the possibilities to do something at once collaborative and innovative. We are enormously grateful to Stephanie and her series co-editor Heidi Morrison for the opportunity afforded us, as well as for their thoughtful suggestions and encouragement during the writing and publication process. Sincere thanks are also due to our chapter authors for their acuity, enthusiasm, collaborative spirit, and willingness to engage with big questions. Such questions were debated at further gatherings of the Children’s History Society and also the Society for the History of Children and Youth, where through roundtable discussions we explored the possibilities and pressures of researching, writing and teaching global histories of youth, and enjoyed informal exchanges within what is a markedly friendly and dynamic field of scholarship.

A Connection Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), along with support from the Canada Research Chairs Program and the Faculty of Arts & Science at the University of Lethbridge, allowed us to discuss our chapters-in-progress at a memorable in-person workshop in summer 2019. Jenny Oseen provided important administrative support for this event, and University of Lethbridge students Liam Devitt, Hanna Fantin, Ryley Gelinas, and Danica Renke assisted us at various points along the way. SSHRC funding also facilitated the production of an open-access version of the book, which is especially important given its global scope and some of the barriers to learning that we acknowledge in what follows. Adrian Mather compiled the index skilfully, and in record time.
We have been fortunate to work with an impressive team at Bloomsbury and Integra, and want in particular to thank Sophie Campbell, Dawn Cunneen, Emily Drewe, Megan Harris, Maddie Holder, Abigail Lane, Beatriz Lopez, Joanne Rippin, and Faye Robinson. The crucial work of colleagues at publication houses can often go unrecognized, but nothing would happen – or happen very well – without their care and skill.

Producing this volume has been a truly collaborative endeavor, and Kristine is especially thankful to Simon for his generous and creative approach to editing and writing together. She also wishes to thank her colleagues and students at the University of Lethbridge, Janine Marchessault and Phil Hoffman, Bruce and Linda Alexander, JP Marchant, and (last but certainly not least) feline companions Brittany and Reggie.

Simon wishes to thank his co-convenors of the ‘Life-Cycles’ seminar series at the Institute of Historical Research in London for their steady encouragement and shared Thai dinners, the Department of History at King’s College London for its intellectual vibrancy and ever-supportive atmosphere, and Monash University in Melbourne, where Simon is also an Adjunct Research Associate. Finally, Simon also wishes to thank and acknowledge his bright-eyed travel companion on trips to Japan, Hayley Maher (with whom the cover photo for the book was taken in 2017), and a constellation of academic colleagues, friends and loved ones including Jennifer Altehenger, Eureka Henrich, Razan Al-Hadid, Brian, Stephen and Catherine Sleight, and Lyra the spirited calico cat. Thanks also to my most excellent co-editor, Kristine – it has been a pleasure, and I look forward to our continued endeavours overseeing the new ‘Routledge Studies in the Histories of Children and Youth’ monograph series.
A Cultural History of Youth reflects multiple visions of youth as they exist and have existed over the longue durée. Youth is decidedly a significant vector of historical change, but it also has trans-historical characteristics and implications, both at the categorical level and at the level of individual experience. Over its six volumes, this series explores not only how people thought about youth but how youth was lived as well. This age category has, however, no fixed definition, nor did we want to impose one. Each volume has its own range of possibilities for the age limits of this term, and what it means as it intersects with other analytical categories like race, gender, sexuality, class, and region. This series affirms the need to separate children and youth into distinct research categories, yet recognizes that age boundaries are porous. The difference between how adults conceive of youth and how youth conceive of themselves often reflects larger concerns within a society and through time.

Our chapter titles, repeated throughout the six volumes, integrate these categories and themes, showcase cutting-edge historical research, and push new research agendas forward: Concepts of Youth; Spaces and Places; Education and Work; Leisure and Play; Emotions; Gender, Sexuality, and the Body; Belief and Ideology; Authority and Agency; War and Conflict; and Towards a Global History.

We hope that readers will explore the contents of volumes outside of their particular periods of specialization and will also read thematically across volumes. One benefit of a series such as this, which covers vast periods of human history, is to juxtapose change over time with surprising continuities, and to challenge ideas that the experience of youth is a long, progressive march “forward” to the present day.
From the start, we intended to build a truly global history of youth, the first of its kind. As general editors we had the enviable task of inviting leading scholars from around the world to lend their expertise to these volumes, creating an innovative resource for specialists and non-specialists alike. While this series does not cover every region of the world, we have put into dialogue different regions and different historiographies on youth. This dialogue not only demonstrates diversity but, countering a singular view from center to periphery, also strongly signals the multidirectional impacts various regions have on one another. Authors have been attentive to language choice, trying hard not to homogenize vast areas. The last chapter of each volume highlights the global reach of and intersections between preceding chapters, constructing new intellectual and conceptual bridges between them, and reflecting on the gaps that remain. While we recognize that conforming to Bloomsbury’s standard European/Settler-colonial periodization across these volumes remains an impediment to a true global history of youth, we are keen to amplify alternative ways of framing history as much as possible.
Meet Malala and Greta. Or, most likely, renew your acquaintances, for each is a modern celebrity. Since turning fifteen years of age, in 2012 and 2018 respectively, these two remarkable young women have attracted extraordinary international attention. Indeed, by virtue of their eloquence, activism, and popular appeal, in many places Malala Yousafzai and Greta Thunberg are sufficiently famous for their first names alone to announce the causes they champion: advancing female education and combating climate change. Hailing from Pakistan and Sweden respectively, Malala and Greta started out local and very quickly became global. Their activities and the reception of their ideas reveal much about the abiding power of youth to act as a lightning rod, channeling wider forces.

In Pakistan, a blog and then a bullet brought instant prominence for Malala; in Sweden a homemade sign and the subsequent spotlight of social media catapulted Greta towards stardom. As is well known, Malala’s determination to attend school in Pakistan’s Swat Valley despite a Taliban edict outlawing girls’ education—a resolve captured initially in an online diary for BBC Urdu—is credited with inciting a terrorist attack on Malala’s school bus. In spite of severe head injuries and ongoing threats, Malala redoubled her efforts to champion the cause of female learning, achieving international acclaim through speeches, writings and the launch of the Malala Fund, and earning accolades including the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded in 2014. Her own education continued throughout this time, with Malala attending high school and then university in England following her recuperation.
While Malala’s conviction to sit her school exams in Pakistan helped cultivate her global renown, Greta’s act of skipping classes in Sweden to sit instead outside the national parliament served to foster similar eminence. Alarmed by governmental inactivity in reducing carbon emissions, and encouraged by her success in prompting lifestyle changes among her own family, Greta produced a simple black-and-white sign bearing the words “SKOLSTREJK FÖR KLIMATET” (“SCHOOL STRIKE FOR CLIMATE”) and began to demonstrate. She then took to Twitter and Instagram with posts rapidly shared across Sweden and far beyond. Fast-forward just over a year, to August 2019, and Greta was sailing to New York to address the United Nations Climate Action Summit, delivering an impassioned speech upon arrival and sharing platforms with other youthful climate activists from around the world. Her public profile was by now truly international, capped by the bestowal of the title “Person of the Year” for 2019 by *Time* magazine, whose journalists described her as “a standard bearer in a generational battle, an avatar of youth activists across the globe” (*Time*, December 23 and 30, 2019).

Alongside the praise and the prominence came scolding and censure, however—criticism which revealed significant fractures based on gender and age. Just as Malala’s youthful determination and public voice had angered Taliban elders, a demographic cohort of older men appeared particularly threatened by Greta’s overt challenge to established structures, hierarchies, and modes of living. Subsequent online critiques featured misogynistic slurs and threats of violence, attracting further media commentary in turn (*Irish Times*, September 7, 2019; *Independent*, October 7, 2019; *Bristol Post*, February 29, 2020). Undaunted, in February 2020, Greta and Malala met face to face for the first time in Oxford, the former describing the latter on Instagram as her “role model.” Photos of the encounter featured on both Malala’s and Greta’s social media accounts, announcing the get-together to a global audience of millions. Followers had become friends; indeed “She’s the only friend I’d skip school for,” quipped Malala, neatly merging the causes and their champions.

The rise to prominence of these two young women and the ways in which they are variously depicted highlight a variety of themes relevant to readers of *A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age*. Central aspects include the harnessing of shared technologies to reach audiences at rapid speed, associated global grammars of curated social media profiles in which the English language retains its power, the shaping effects of peer groups and family structures (both Malala and Greta grew up in liberal households), the multivalent nature of transnational connections which move beyond outdated “West-and-the-rest” models, and the kudos, skepticism, and opprobrium which greet the arrival of girls seeking to challenge dominant systems. Malala and Greta hold up a mirror to a world controlled by adults, and at the same time demonstrate that young people can contest and exert influence in dynamic ways.
Amidst our collective ruminations on the shifting global, regional, and localized currents affecting the lives and representations of modern youth from 1920 to the present day, this collection seeks to showcase young people’s voices. In so doing, we aim to address one of the weaknesses of global histories: a tendency to focus on structures at the expense of actors. Malala and Greta may be exceptional young women, but their youthful self-assertion is far from unique. They are certainly not “silent types,” and with regard to young people’s lived experiences and associated cultural representations neither should be our histories. Whether in recounting the public activities of young firebrand Deodoro Roco in Argentina, or in assessing the inner thoughts, under the shadow of war, of teenagers Zhao Jinhua in China or Bessie Skea in Scotland, our band of historians has been proactive in tethering the macro to the micro, and in attempting to look outwards through adolescent eyes.

Together, the chapters in this volume make the case that youth needs to be taken seriously by all historians of the modern age. As the anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff have written, youth are the “historical offspring of modernity”: as flesh-and-blood beings and powerful symbols, they “embody the sharpening contradictions of the contemporary world in especially acute form” (2005: 19; 21). Paying closer attention to age in general and to youth in particular makes it clear that young people have been at the forefront of many of the major processes and events that shaped human history between 1920 and 2020. Caught between the culturally defined life stages of childhood and adulthood, modern youth have been studied and pathologized by new classes of experts; willing participants and tragic casualties in times of war; celebrated and mobilized by mass movements on the extreme left and right; and targeted as consumers and future citizens by multinational corporations and imperial/national states. Variously the first to benefit and the first to suffer from the shifts and contractions of global capitalism, young people continue to be both exploited workers and cutting-edge producers of cultural and technological innovation. Punctuated by excitement, pleasure, hope, disappointment, and anger, the history of youth in the modern age transcends national boundaries. It is a global story which, if approached with creativity and care, has the potential to open up vital new questions about power, difference, and scale.

What is “youth,” anyway? The key terms deployed in this book require careful discussion. Across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, new age-related descriptors gained popular currency and scholarly breakthroughs provided conceptual apparatus for addressing the diverse histories of young people. In 1920, our approximate starting point in this volume, “adolescence” was still regarded as a relatively recent discovery in industrialized Western societies, discernible through physical and emotional changes and manifesting in a period of so-called “storm and stress” for girls and boys: gendered
subjects thought to experience the duration of adolescence and the onset of maturity according to the rhythms of different biological clocks (Hall 1904). The modern concept of adolescence articulated so influentially by American psychologist G. Stanley Hall was racialized as well as gendered. Hall was primarily concerned with white youngsters, and saw the transition to adulthood as a process of recapitulation through which each individual would essentially repeat humankind’s evolutionary progress from “savagery” to “civilization.”

Social consciousness of time more broadly had also been heightened and skewed by the Great War, an event that gouged young men of all stripes from the ranks of participating armies having thrown them together for extended periods of wait and worry. Living in and around central Paris throughout the war, budding poet Raymond Radiguet reflected that to his teenage sensibilities “months have the value of years,” and wrote in “Time Will Fade It” (composed in 1919, when he was sixteen years old) that “At my age, it looks dumb to cry; / I’ll climb near the sun, up in the attic, / So that my tears will quickly dry” (Radiguet 1920: 21). Hall would surely have been interested in such sentiments, for Radiguet was responding through his writing not only to the shock of war but to his own simultaneous sexual awakening, melding a self-confessed “reticence and hiddenness proper to the age at which they were written” with thinly disguised autobiographical tales of trysts with soldiers’ wives (Radiguet 1920: 7; 1923).

By the late 1920s, into the 1930s, and beyond, Raymond Radiguet’s impulses might well have been regarded as “delinquent”—a social science buzzword of the period, applied to adolescent street gangs and sexually precocious young people alike—but by then Radiguet was already dead, carried off by hard living and tuberculosis. His youth had burnt bright—Pablo Picasso, Jean Cocteau, and other Modernists were friends—but as F. Scott Fitzgerald would write of his own youthful artistic set in 1920s New York, “Young people wore out early. They were hard and languid at twenty-one” (1932: 20).

Throughout the years of international economic depression in the 1930s, “adolescence,” problematized by a focus on “delinquency,” retained its favored status. These concepts circulated globally and shaped adult responses to youth in widely varying local contexts. The influence of French psychologist Maurice Debesse—author of such texts as La Crise d’originalité juvénile (1936) and Comment étudier les adolescents (1937), and himself influenced by Hall—can be seen, for instance, in state and scholarly discussions of youth as a period of “peril and promise” that emerged in Egypt during the 1930s (El Shakry 2011). But with the expansion of industrialized mass consumerism and new forms of leisure in the aftermath of the Depression (forces amplified in America especially by the onset of the Second World War) another modern youth label—“teenager”—began to compete. Mass consumption went hand in hand with the new classification, and it was through the pages of print media
devoured by parents and offspring alike that “teenager” became established by 1944 in households across the United States, before fanning outwards. As historian Jon Savage explains: “Teenagers were neither adolescents nor juvenile delinquents… Naming something helps bring it into being: assumed by both youth marketers and youth itself, the Teenage was clear, simple, and said what it meant. This was the Age—the distinct social, cultural, and economic period—of the Teen” (Savage 2007b: 453). Acquisition was emphasized—“shop and show” was thought initially to have displaced “storm and stress”—but anxieties remained, both for youthful subjects coming of age and for parents who remembered the hardships of the 1930s and the sacrifices of war. The idea of a seemingly inevitable “generation gap” became ensconced in the collective American psyche, proving remarkably durable even when social scientists found consensus rather than conflict to be the more characteristic (Zuckerman 2011). “Teenagers” persisted, too; from the 1940s to the present a few niche descriptors—“juvenescent,” “kidult,” and “millennial” among them—would draw attention, but each was as ephemeral as the youthful cohort it purported to describe.

All of this brings us to the pre-eminent marker of “youth,” and beyond the English-language circuits of the previous paragraphs to its semantic siblings and forebears: “jāvanī”; “jeunesse”; “jugend”; “juvenoc”; “juvenita”; “masa muda”; “qīngnián”; “shābāb”; “ubutsha”; “vijana,” and many others. Unlike “adolescent” or “teenager,” the popularization of “youth” cannot be claimed as a modern phenomenon; instead (and as previous volumes in this series show) its roots run far deeper, back at the least to the first millennium. That said, in the modern era “youth” acquired specific inflections. Long considered as a description of the life stage between childhood and adult maturity, and as a mark of vigor, the association of “youth” with vice as well as virtue deepened and was amplified by new forms of media (Sleight 2009). It became more collective, too: in English “youth-movement” (coined in 1921), “youth club” (1940), “youth-culture” (1958), and “youth-oriented” (1977) all captured cohort-specific intent (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). Steven Mintz has identified the middle decades of the twentieth century as bearing witness to particularly intense age-consciousness within societies imperfectly grouped together as “Western,” and the flurry of new appellations helps demonstrate that “youth” was in the vanguard of this process (Mintz 2008: 92).

Yet that still leaves us without a nicely bundled definition for the modern era, one that might transcend Western enclaves. To wit, as well as representing a life stage, a shared experience, and a positive attribute or a failing, “youth” has also been deployed across the twentieth century and up to the present day to denote the relative age of an individual, a quality of being, an aspiration, a catchall term for anyone not considered adult, an ideology of difference, and a gendered norm often equated with male activities. As our chapter authors
elaborate, the very idea of “youth” has also served as a motor for twentieth-century globalization, possessing a salience closely linked to the experience of modernity and suggesting through its transnational universality a simultaneous, dialogical dimension to modern life. Furthermore, as well as harboring heavily gendered aspects, “youth” is also crosscut by an array of other social demarcations—among them caste, class, disability status, ethnicity, religious belief, and sexual orientation. A discrete section of life, it is hence nonetheless inherently intersectional.

Systems of power orbit and imbue “youth.” Conceptual awareness concerning these has grown markedly in recent years, most usefully through scholarly attention to epistemologies of age. It is now well established that “age structures everyday experience in overt and subtle ways,” and merits consideration as a fundamental force in shaping society (Sleight 2013: 3). “Far from being a neutral fact,” Corinne Field and Nicholas Syrett assert, “age emerges as a paradigmatic case study of how people in particular regions and periods impose socially constructed categories upon the messy realities of lived experience, how individuals meet and resist these external requirements, and how they take up such categories to make sense of their own experience” (2020: 378). In delineating both social construction and lived realities, here Field and Syrett emphasize the same blend of the cultural and the social pursued in this volume. Importantly, they also call attention to how a focus on age can illuminate the workings of wide-ranging phenomena not always subject to such scrutiny, including state formation, colonialism, and military power (384).

Our thematic chapter structure embraces this invitation, generating fresh perspectives on central aspects of modern life. With regard to colonialism, for instance, keeping the categories of youth and age in mind helps us understand attempts to re-inscribe international hierarchies even as direct rule fell quickly out of favor following the Second World War. The language of age is writ large in efforts—such as those by United States President Harry Truman in 1949—to cast large parts of the world as “underdeveloped,” lagging behind on an imaginary global growth chart forever privileging industrial economies deemed “advanced” (Truman 1949). Eluding the language of developmentalism and the social hierarchies it implies requires constant vigilance, for the focus on becoming rather than being has been applied relentlessly both to nations and individuals in the modern era. Youth is no “mere staging ground for adulthood,” insist Richard Jobs and David Pomfret (Jobs and Pomfret 2015a: 15). We agree. Despite the predilections of biographers and social scientists, of presidents or of preachers, youth merits historical scrutiny on its own terms.

In a 1962 article entitled “Youth in the Context of American Society,” sociologist Talcott Parsons—who had popularized the term “youth culture” some twenty years previously—posited “that the twentieth century will
be characterized by future historians as one of the centuries of turmoil and transition” (1942, 1962: 47). While perhaps rather optimistic in his assessment of the modern age as an era marked a “long series of ‘emancipations’ … [including] women’s suffrage and the rapid decline of colonialism,” Parsons did identify a number of issues—including urbanization, education, sexuality, changing work patterns, and peer culture—which have been central to the academic study of youth over the past hundred years. Scholarly research about youth as a distinct and knowable entity developed in tandem with the modernization and growth of universities, and it continues to be shaped by broad social and geopolitical power structures and inequities. Surveying the history of research about modern youth, as the next few pages will do, makes these disparities especially clear.

Professional historians had little to say about youth during the first half of the century covered by this volume (c. 1920–1970), but the historiography of youth bears the imprint of the insights of a number of foundational social scientific studies that were published during these years. The modern idea of “generation,” for example, often discussed in popular and scholarly contexts in terms of conflicts or gaps between young people and their parents, was a product of the 1920s. It was the experiences of youthful combatants and civilians in the First World War—men like Raymond Radiguet, in other words—that inspired German sociologist Karl Mannheim to write “Das Problem der Generationen” (1928, published in English as “The Problem of Generations” in 1952), in which he defined the term “generation” as a group of people of similar age who had lived through a major historical event in their youth (Mannheim 1952).

We can trace the influence of Mannheim’s framework, which considered youth and generation in socio-historical context, in anthropological studies of coming-of-age rituals and life stages, as well as in more recent studies of the generations of young people whose lives have been shaped (as illustrative examples) by second-wave feminism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Mannheim was one of a number of early twentieth-century social scientists who took the study of young people seriously, asking how the experience of youth shapes the rest of the life course. These early studies, produced in Europe and the United States in the wake of the First World War, share a sense of curiosity about rapid social change, the differences of experience and expectation that separated young people from their parents, and what all of this might mean for future social stability. The most influential of these works include Frederic Milton Thrasher’s rich and panoramic sociological study of the history, geography, and “primitive democracy” of Chicago youth gangs (1927: 3) and Margaret Mead’s 1928 book *Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization*, an ethnographic study of Samoan girls that Mead described as an “experiment” through which she had hoped to discover whether the rebellions, conflicts, and “mental and emotional distress”
which “vex[ed] … [American] adolescents” were in fact natural and universal (Mead 1928: 11). (Spoiler alert: they were not.)

Young people in the liminal stage between childhood and adulthood also played a central role in Robert Staughton Lynd and Helen Merrill Lynd’s enormously influential *Middletown: A Study in American Culture* (1929), a sociological examination of the town of Muncie, Indiana (pop. 38,000). Based on extended fieldwork and analysis of textual sources like government records and the census, *Middletown* was an attempt to understand how work, leisure, family life, education, and religious observance had changed in an “average” American community between the late nineteenth century and the 1920s. The young inhabitants of Middletown, the Lynds observed, enjoyed movies and dating, and many of them participated in youth-focused organizations like the Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Association and the Boy and Girl Scouts. In a context marked by significant changes in the influence of family and peer cultures, they also noted that “the high school, with its athletics, clubs, sororities and fraternities, dances and parties, and other ‘extracurricular activities,’ is a fairly complete social cosmos in itself … [a] city within a city [on which] the social life of the intermediate generation centers” (Lynd and Lynd 1957: 211).

Whereas Margaret Mead had characterized modern American society as heterogeneous (in opposition to what she saw as the “simple” homogeneity of Samoa), the Lynds acknowledged class differences but were reluctant to discuss race. As historian James H. Madison has written, “the Lynds deliberately excluded African Americans from their study … and thereby missed the biggest story” (2001: 3). Five percent of the population of Muncie, Indiana was African American (a larger proportion than bigger cities like New York and Detroit), and the Lynds’ decision to ignore this demographic fact distorted their conclusions. It also implicitly gave license to many subsequent scholars of youth to limit their analyses, in often unselfconscious ways, to the study of white people.

A slight broadening of focus, to an incident that took place in 1930—the year after the publication of *Middletown*—in another Indiana community, reveals just how much was missed by the Lynds’ purposefully narrow approach. It also provides devastating proof of the still-underappreciated ways in which the history of youth in the modern age is intertwined with the history of racial hierarchies and violence. As the sun set one August evening in Marion, Indiana (some 40 miles away from Muncie/Middletown), three Black teenagers, Thomas Shipp (eighteen), Abram Smith (nineteen) and James Cameron (sixteen), were locked in separate prison cells, accused of raping an eighteen-year-old white woman and murdering her twenty-four-year-old boyfriend. As news of the arrests spread, an angry white mob broke into the prison, dragging Shipp and Smith out of their cells before stabbing and beating them to death and hanging
their corpses from a tree near the Monroe County courthouse. The fifteen thousand white men, women, and children who came to witness and celebrate the lynching of these two Black adolescents filled the streets, streaming past cinemas, soda shops, and ice cream parlors—the same commercialized leisure spaces that had become the hallmarks of modern American youth culture.

Lawrence Beitler, a professional photographer whose usual subjects were schoolchildren, wedding parties, and church groups, snapped a photograph of the two young Black men’s hanging bodies and the white crowd who stood beneath them. The image depicts an intergenerational group of white spectators including several young women wearing the bobbed hair and modern fashions that by the late 1920s had been embraced by youthful flappers and “modern girls” around the world. Mary Ball, the eighteen-year-old white woman who had accused Shipp, Smith, and Cameron of sexual assault and murder—and whose hair was also cut into a fashionable “flapper” bob—expressed her thoughts about the lynching in the pages of the local and national press, telling a reporter from the New York Times that she “only wished that she could have pulled the rope [herself] and would do the same for the other one James Cameron” (Madison 2001: 65). The lynching of Shipp and Smith, like that of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi in 1955—kidnapped and murdered after being accused by a twenty-one-year-old white woman of whistling and grabbing her waist while he and his cousin were shopping for candy—is part of a broader pattern of anti-Black racism and white supremacist violence that has yet to be fully considered as part of the history of modern youth.

As Audra A. Diptee and David Trotman have written, it is incumbent upon historians to recognize that modern “childhood and youth existed in a colonial framework, were informed by a racial hierarchy ... and [were] grounded in networks which were global” (2014: 438). Our discipline has been relatively slow to recognize this fact, and global perspectives on the effects of colonialism and racial hierarchies were far from the forefront of the first academic books and articles about the history of young people published in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1960, when Emmett Till would have been nineteen years old, French historian Philippe Ariès published L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime (translated in English in 1962 as Centuries of Childhood). Centuries of Childhood is at once a flawed and a foundational text—widely acknowledged as the first scholarly study of the history of childhood—and it is especially valuable for its central claim that adult understandings of young people have changed over time (Ariès 1962; Heywood 2010). Two years later, Walter Laqueur, a historian of German Jewish origin whose parents had been murdered in the Holocaust while he was in his early twenties, published Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement, a detailed study of the literature and lifestyles of the “Free Youth Movement” (the Wandervögel and
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the *Bunde*) that had flowered in Germany between the late nineteenth century and the start of the Nazi regime in 1933 (Laqueur 1962). This was another influential early historical study, drawing attention to cultural projections as well as to practices: a sociocultural blend.

Laqueur’s decision to focus on young people as vibrant social actors resonated closely with key social scientific works from the 1960s, a decade characterized by youthful activism and self-assertion, the growth of countercultures, the beginning of second-wave feminism, and the establishment of new independent nation-states in Africa and Asia. Sociologist David Matza focused on rebellion and the “subterranean traditions” of delinquency, radicalism, and bohemianism embraced by American youth (1961), for example, while the influential German-American psychologist Erik Erikson insisted that adolescent rebellion was a necessary part of the human journey toward adulthood and individual freedom (1968).

The spectacular styles and public acts of intergenerational defiance performed by British teddy boys, mods, rockers, and skinheads during this time were the subject of several path-breaking studies of youth subcultures, most of which were associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), founded by Richard Hoggart and directed in the 1970s by pioneering Black sociologist and theorist Stuart Hall. In a series of working papers and edited volumes, scholars associated with the CCCS argued that the music, dress, slang, rituals, and territoriality of youth subcultures were central to overarching questions about class, generation, power, and hegemony (Cohen 1997). The youthful acts and aesthetics that inspired the field of subcultural studies need to be understood as the products of a particular historical moment in Britain, the main characteristics of which included “slum clearance” and the replacement by tower blocks of older forms of working-class geography and community; economic shifts that had led to white working-class young men being faced with few prospects other than “routine, dead-end, low-paid and unskilled jobs”; and the influx of individuals and families from Commonwealth countries in South Asia and the Caribbean (Cohen 1997: 53). Under the aegis of the CCCS, the last of these themes coalesced into an analysis in *Resistance through Rituals* (1975) that included a discussion of young white skinheads “defending” their stamping grounds from the incursion and emergence of those they detested, Pakistani immigrants and gay youth in particular. Here still, however, racism and homophobia were downplayed in favor of celebrating solidarities among white working-class young men—something of a running theme in many of the early writings associated with the CCCS, and surprising given Hall’s involvement.

More recently, a number of the contributors to these foundational studies of British subcultures have recognized that their initial project was characterized and somewhat limited by a “romantic idealization of ... white male working-
class youth” and an “embarrassingly obvious” “gender blindness” (Cohen 1997: 11; Hall and Jefferson 2006: xvi). The first major studies of modern youth written by historians, also published in the 1970s, largely shared this unselfconscious focus on white masculine subjects (Gillis 1974; Springhall 1977). At the same time, however, a small number of scholars had begun to include girls and young women in their historical analyses. Paula Fass’s foundational work on American “white, urban, middle-class college youth” in the 1920s—research based in part on the Lynds’ Middletown study—was significant in its recognition that “while the behavior of all youth was cause for concern, a special apprehension was reserved for the manners and attitudes of young women” (Fass 1977: 8, 23).

While there is now a rich and growing body of historical and interdisciplinary scholarship about girls and girlhood in the twentieth century, “the belief that girls’ culture is no culture at all”—to quote American scholar Sherrie Inness—has proven to be remarkably tenacious, both within and beyond the academy (Inness 1998: 1). In June 2020, for instance, Angela McRobbie, Professor of Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London, co-author of the only chapter about girls in Resistance Through Rituals, and a singularly important voice in the study of girls’ cultures in modern Britain, used her Twitter account to highlight the persistence of this problem: “All my academic life,” she wrote, “apart from B’ham CCCS and a few other brave souls, a common response by ‘mainstream’ academics to my topic of research ie girls’ magazines, fashion industry, popular fiction/media has been to stifle a giggle, or make a joke, it still happens to me aged 69” (Twitter, June 6, 2020, @AngelaMcRobbie).

Studying young people in the twenty-first century, then, is a serious and contested business—and there remains much to be done in terms of drawing attention to and challenging scholarly and societal assumptions, hierarchies, and exclusions. The historiography of youth is now a broad and vibrant field, the contributors to which have consistently used the lenses of class, gender, and generation to examine subjects like leisure, consumption, public space, schooling, sexuality, moral regulation, and resistance. There are simply too many excellent works to cite here, but looking at even a couple of book titles—Hooligans or Rebels? (Humphries 1981) and Young, White, and Miserable: Growing Up Female in the 1950s (Breines 1992), for example—can provide a sense of the subjects and approaches that were favored by historians of youth in the 1980s and 1990s.

The past two decades have witnessed the publication of a critical mass of historical studies that focus on subjects and places beyond white youth in the industrialized West—a reflection, we suspect, of the fact that many countries in Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East are currently experiencing an unprecedented “youth bulge,” in which young people comprise the numerical majority within national populations. Interested readers can now learn about
girls, labor, and schooling in colonial Lagos and Zanzibar (Decker 2014b; George 2015); girlhood, adolescence and the age of consent in India (Pande 2020b; Tambe 2019); youth and sectarian violence in mid-twentieth-century Lebanon (Baun 2021); the urban lives of African American girls (Chatelain 2015; Hartman 2019; Simmons 2015), and miniskirts, music, and youthful mobility in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Ivaska 2011). These recent studies have opened up new sources, methods, and possibilities for studying the lives of young people. Saidiya Hartman, for instance, writing about young Black women in early twentieth-century Philadelphia and New York, advocates “breaking open” and “pressing at the limit[s]” of documents including parole and prison records, slum photographs, and sociological surveys to find and acknowledge the power of what she calls her youthful subjects’ “beautiful experiments” in living—namely their “waywardness and the refusal to be governed” (2019: xiv–xv).

Waywardness—a lack of respect for rules, boundaries, and fences—also characterizes a number of important recent studies of the transnational and trans-imperial histories of modern youth (examples include Alexander 2017; Ellis 2014; Jobs and Pomfret 2015a; Robinson and Sleight 2016). Looking beyond the nation-state, as every chapter in this volume does, is imperative for scholars seeking to understand young people’s lives and cultures between the 1920s and the present day. Education and activism, capitalism and consumption, media and mobility: understanding these subjects, and others explored in the following pages, requires a global frame, and wide reading. And while they share an important commitment to geographical breadth, the current generation of youth historians share with their predecessors a general reluctance to engage with the events and developments of the past fifty years. Advancing our understanding of the history of modern youth beyond the late 1960s and into the twenty-first century is therefore another of the important contributions of this book.

Researching the lives and cultures of young people between 1920 and 2020 requires historians to engage with textual and non-textual evidence across a dizzying range of media. Over the past century, rapid technological changes have yielded new ways of representing youth, new domains of engagement for those able to enjoy access, and new means with which to study young people’s lives. Our starting point of 1920, it should be emphasized, was no technological “dark age” for youth—by that time certain young city-dwellers of sufficient means could tour illuminated entertainment quarters, visit cinemas and funfairs featuring rollercoasters, take Kodak photographs of their activities and their mass-produced clothes, ride on bicycles and occasionally in cars, listen to records, and—if they were nearby—tune in to college radio stations like that overseen by Wendell W. King, a pioneering African American student in upstate New York.
The ensuing decades witnessed an acceleration of such engagements, although young people’s geographical location, coupled with socioeconomic leverage and level of access to consumer goods, continued to shape experiences. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, waves of technological innovation and associated marketing strategies have focused on youth as noted “early adopters.” From portable record players to amplified sound systems and the Sony Walkman (a miniature cassette tape player with a tellingly gendered name); from souped-up mid-century cars to skateboards and BMX bikes; from pinball machines and Space Invaders to online gaming through a smartphone: young people have long positioned themselves—and been depicted—as in the vanguard of change. That several of these innovations are non-Western merits comment. Alongside such pop culture formulations as anime or manga and their associated devotees, they are a reminder, in the words of anthropologist Merry White, that it is “misleading to assume that the export model of the teen is a Western monopoly” (1993: 29). Circulations have often followed the contours of Western global power, but they have also cut across them through an array of channels.

Youthful adaptations of imported technologies, moreover, are notably common in the “Global South”—another imperfect label, this time for a collection of countries considered “low income” and in which, it so happens, the majority of the world’s population live (Twum-Danso Imoh, Bourdillon, and Meichsner 2019: 1–6). In 2001 in Malawi, for example, fourteen-year-old William Kamkwamba built a domestic wind turbine using salvaged mechanical objects before fashioning a solar-powered water pump to supply his village with drinking water. His engineering feats were recently depicted in a feature film, The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind, based on Kamkwamba’s memoir of the same name (Kamkwamba and Mealer 2009). Proving himself equally precocious, fellow engineer Kelvin Doe, then aged thirteen, made batteries from scratch in Sierra Leone in the late 2000s. Using scrap materials, he then constructed a generator to provide electricity for his Freetown neighborhood and for a local radio station that he also initiated and on which he broadcast under the name “DJ Focus” (HuffPost, November 20, 2012).

In the digital realm, while young people’s access to online spaces continues to be shaped by geographical and socioeconomic factors, the vast majority of twenty-first-century youth have only known a world that is saturated and, in many ways, produced by social media. Making sense of these digital generations’ engagements with platforms like YouTube and TikTok is a work very much in progress. As media and youth expert David Buckingham notes, scholars should not assume that all young people enjoy the same digital “affordances” or are indeed tech savvy; instead, a “digital divide” has historically affected young and old alike (Buckingham 2013). “Old tech” has also long persisted—even alongside shiny new innovations, circumstance and choice have entailed the
continued use by young people of products portrayed as yesterday’s news by marketing departments (Edgerton 2006).

With regard to recent youth media production, too, Buckingham cautions that it is rash to interpret—let alone celebrate—resultant output as a neutral form of youthful self-expression. Mediation is always present, and even seemingly open digital platforms have hidden constraints that sponsor the reproduction of certain scripts (Buckingham 2013, 2011). For instance, TikTok forces users to publish only short, attention-grabbing video clips (often of dance routines or staged comedic mishaps), and all social media platforms inherently encourage users to attract ever more followers through posting engaging content. One’s prior knowledge of observing others serves to shape the types of content young people upload, it has been argued, and this process can also operate subconsciously. As Katie Davis found from a study of over two thousand high school students in Bermuda, some degree of exploration of self-identity was encouraged by online observers of social media platforms, “but wholesale identity experimentation is generally regarded by peers with suspicion and disapproval” (2014: 12). Content is hence filtered at source, and the temptation to portray sunny, settled dispositions can curtail the sharing of more frank and questioning material.

Across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, adult anxiety has commonly accompanied such youthful engagements with technology. All of the types of interaction outlined above have attracted worry—from interwar concerns about young people’s predilections for the silver screen of cinema, to campaigns against comics in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States during the 1950s, and onwards—ever onwards—through so-called “video nasties,” console games depicting violence and the use of mobile phones for “sexting” (sending and receiving explicit content) (Finnane 1989; Gabriel 2014; McLean and Griffiths 2013; Springhall 1998a). Young users of technology have also been credited with influencing political events, including the “Arab Spring” uprising of the 2010s and the riots and looting that spread across England following the police shooting of a Black man named Mark Duggan in 2011. In these cases, political leaders and commentators pointed to social media discussion and the circulation of encrypted messages through Blackberry mobile phone devices as contributory factors (Passini 2012). Young people’s production of and engagement with amplified protest music during the Vietnam War has also drawn sustained attention (and indeed much popular mythologization), while the links between digital technologies and youth-led environmental campaigning are well known, and elaborated above (Bindas and Houston 1989).

As well as yielding new ways for young people to engage with the wider world, to be represented, and to represent themselves, technological innovations have also bequeathed new modes and methods for researching their lives. The ongoing mass digitization of textual records such as newspapers
has proved especially transformative for historians, allowing quicker access via keyword searches to useful material from archives around the world—though obstacles to understanding remain, depending on access credentials and the ability to contextualize search results (Putnam 2016). Websites like Tumblr and YouTube have also been treasure troves of material for scholars interested in young people’s identities, communities, and performances of self.

But these easily accessible, user-driven digital spaces are also at risk of becoming endangered archives. One relevant example for our purposes is the case of MySpace, a precursor to Facebook and the world’s most visited social media site between the years 2005 and 2008. In 2013, MySpace executives decided to rebrand the site—and in the process deleted millions of photos, music, blog posts, and messages that had been uploaded by users from around the world. As awareness of this problem of preservation has grown, so too has the number of solutions (Milligan 2019). Historians of online youth culture can now avail themselves of sites like the Wayback Machine and Archive-It (which allow users to sift through earlier iterations of the world wide web), as well as efforts by collectives including the Museum of Youth Culture, based in Britain, to curate youth-specific content. A number of the contributors to *A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age* engage critically with digital sources and associated histories, placing them in conversation with textual evidence, material culture, and oral evidence from contemporary and earlier periods.

The book before you is structured thematically, mirroring the template established for the six volumes of the Bloomsbury series in which it sits. All such collections are products of their time, and ours is no different. A decade ago, for instance, the inclusion of a chapter on youthful emotions would have been unlikely, but the analysis of such dispositions of feeling here reflects both recent methodological breakthroughs and the gathering momentum of expertise on this topic. In that chapter as well as the others, light confronts shadow. Given that the celebrated historian Eric Hobsbawm defined much of our century-long period as “The Age of Extremes” this will likely come as little surprise (Hobsbawm 1994), and in the pages of the present volume readers will encounter sobering dissections of the impact of war, coercive ideologies, scientific misadventure, and an array of inequities, alongside more hopeful assessments of youthful self-assertion, survival, enjoyment, and even ecstasy. For each of the chapters, our authors have been alert to these countervailing tendencies not with the intention of producing some sort of “balance sheet” of the past, but instead to help color an atlas of historical youthful representation and experience. Turning the pages of this book will hence transport readers far and wide: from Asia to the Americas; from Australasia to the Middle East; from Africa to Europe. And by the time the book is closed, we hope that at least some readers will feel ready to pick up the baton and embark upon their own research, informed by what they have learned and ready to challenge orthodoxies and mount new arguments.
In seeking such truly international coverage for our themes, we have as co-editors performed for several chapters a service akin to scholarly matchmaking: introducing historians with knowledge of one or more global regions to co-writers with corresponding understandings for other areas. In all instances we are delighted with the results, which to us display the virtues of historical writing that is at once comparative and connective. Solo-authored chapters also break down borders through ranging widely, and when all are taken together we hope that readers will perceive the effects of a hidden gyroscope, working to balance the many case studies into an elegant and counterweighted whole. We thank our authors for their willingness to extend themselves, to break out of comfort zones, and to collaborate.

A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age opens with an expansive chapter on “Concepts of Youth” by David M. Pomfret, whose geographical expertise spans the French and British empires in East and Southeast Asia, and Nicholas L. Syrett, who has published extensively on chronological age and the history of youth in the United States. Chapter Two, “Spaces and Places,” which ranges widely across different national contexts and public, private, and institutional settings, is the result of a fruitful collaboration between Dylan Baun, a historian of the Middle East, and historian of Australia Carla Pascoe Leahy. In the third chapter, “Education and Work,” Abosede George uses her expertise in African history to ask important global questions about the impacts on youth of extractive and informal economies, mass education, neoliberalism, and contemporary crises of capitalism.

Chapter Four, “Leisure and Play,” combines the social history and material culture expertise of Sharon Brookshaw and Melanie Tebbutt in an investigation of the technologies, mobilities, acts of consumption and creation, and adult anxieties that have shaped modern young people’s experiences of “free time” over the past hundred years. In Chapter Five, Karen Vallgårda brings her wide-ranging expertise in the history of emotions to bear on a series of case studies including family, school, armed conflict, and the media. In the book’s sixth chapter, “Gender, Sexuality, and the Body,” historian of South Asia Ishita Pande follows the global circulation of expert knowledge about sex to analyze the emergence of a unitary epistemic understanding of youth during the twentieth century.

In Chapter Seven, “Belief and Ideology,” Europeanist Susan B. Whitney casts a wide geographical and conceptual net by investigating how young people and concepts of youth were mobilized for political and religious purposes between the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the end of the Cold War. In Chapter Eight, “Authority and Agency,” Valeria Manzano traces the emergence of youth as a political category through the University Reform Movement in 1920s Latin America, state-sponsored youth organizations in fascist Italy and Peronist Argentina, the global youth revolt of 1968, and the hip-hop cultures
and anti-globalization movements of the 1990s. The book’s ninth chapter, “War and Conflict,” is authored by Mischa Honeck and Aaron William Moore, a duo whose expertise includes American, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and transnational history. Offering valuable insights about the analysis of youthful life-writing, they also pose important questions about how the discourses and practices of youth and armed conflict have impacted each other.

The impressive breadth and depth of these chapters demonstrates that, as volume editors, we are fortunate to be working in a boom era for scholarship on youth. We outlined earlier some of the significant intellectual genealogies and global trends for our period, and having worked hard over a number of years—and through many successive edits—to bind together the strands of this collection, we appreciate even more the efforts of earlier editors of books on young people which championed global, or at least international, ambitions. The book’s tenth and final chapter, “Towards a Global History” (which we co-authored), introduces and evaluates several leading works in this regard. Only relatively recently, for example, has it been more commonplace to break away from an overriding focus on the Western nations located in the northern hemisphere as scholarship has bloomed on young people’s lives elsewhere—lives hitherto much less studied and every bit as important and surprising. Hence while often valid, some of the criticisms of earlier collections for their relative narrowness are in large part explainable by understanding the inequalities of global research, and the structures that afford and constrain historians across the world in studying youth. Not all historians can access historical datasets freely for instance, not all enjoy institutional backing or the personal finances to travel to meet their peers at international conferences, and far from everyone can write in English (or French, or German, and so on) to an academic standard: a significant, and often unacknowledged, hurdle.

Rather than rest too easily on our own existing circuits of affiliation and influence in selecting our authors, instead we spent our first year on this book scouting the field in the broadest possible terms, consulting widely, and drawing up captains’ picks of scholarly talent. We hope you enjoy reading the resultant chapters as much as we enjoyed editing them, bringing the authors of those words together for an intensive writers’ workshop (kindly funded by the Canadian government) and getting to know new faces in what is a tremendously supportive, and fulfilling, field of youth history.
On May 11, 1985 more than four hundred young people from Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe gathered at the Xiangshan Hotel in the western hills of Beijing. They arrived to participate in a United Nations (UN) program celebrating the “International Year of Youth.” Over two days the young delegates weighed in on matters of global significance, their words captured by the world’s press. One attendee, Larry C.Y. Cheah from Malaysia, described the meeting as “really inspiring,” not least because youth was “a party that goes beyond race, belief and occupation,” with the potential to overcome factionalism and achieve change (“World’s Youth Gather for Peace” 1985: 8).

The UN’s Peruvian Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, had used similar language only five months earlier as he launched the International Year of Youth, referring to “the imperative need to harness the energies, enthusiasms and creative abilities of youth” behind the goal of world peace (UN General Assembly 1984). In the months that followed this progressive discourse echoed from lecterns from Beijing to Kingston and Barcelona. But as the UN’s year of youth drew to a close its own Department of International Economic and Social Affairs punctured the mood of optimism with the admission that, if “youth” was understood as constituting the period between the end of childhood, on the one hand, and entry into the world of work, on the other, then for tens of millions of people under the age of fifteen, “it is manifest that youth does not exist” (United Nations 1986: 8).

This disagreement highlighted the ongoing conceptual elusiveness of “youth” towards the end of a century in which it achieved unprecedented levels of recognition on the global stage. There had been little indication that youth
might achieve such recognition in 1900, when the stability of age relations and continuities between and across generations appeared stronger in most societies than breaks between them. In turn-of-the-century China, for example, when the Xiangshan Hotel had still been an imperial hunting reserve, officials, literati, and commoners discussed youth little, and then usually in terms of its biological nature (in a similar way to the old and sick) as an element to be managed within the prevailing social order—the so-called “ring of life” (Song 2016: 294). In Africa, as scholars of that continent and its varied cultures have long emphasized, age was an important status defined by initiation ceremonies regulating conflict and assigning power to tribal elders (Ocobock 2017; Waller 2006). Gender added a further dimension to youth’s relative disempowerment. So, for example, in parts of East Africa, young women were even expected to speak differently—to demonstrate *heshima*—speaking softly and respectfully in the presence of (male) elders (Decker 2014b: 92).

Of course, as the volumes in this series have shown, premodern societies certainly did not always ignore or downplay the agency of the young vis-à-vis mature adults. Around the world youth remained conceptually contingent and took distinct local forms but in some times and places societies ascribed quite powerful and important roles to them. However, at the turn of the twentieth century adults began to redefine youth as a group in ways that were new. And in the decades that followed, the category of youth grew in visibility and emerged as a prominent trope of the modern. For example, it came to be judged capable of higher productive capacity, greater ideological obeisance, improvement through institutional training, and distinct forms of creativity. How did this concept achieve such seeming homogeneity and recognition as a stage of life, often defined in relation to the category of “adolescence?” How did it come to be so strongly associated with certain values? The twentieth century bore witness to a more extensive conceptualization of youth by more actors, including the young themselves, than any other era. While in earlier moments young people were certainly understood as such by those around them, it was during the twentieth century that experts in law and medicine sought to understand youth using the new tools of their professions. A wide variety of experts in medicine, psychology, psychiatry, and social work have offered various theories about youth development and the best ways for young people to transition to adulthood. In juvenile courts in a variety of locations, judges and advocates conceptualized when and how young people could be held responsible for their actions and how they should be punished or rehabilitated. In schools and universities, teachers and professors theorized about how best to encourage learning in youthful people, harnessing their advice and their teaching to particular stages of youthful development. Governmental bureaucracies administered mandatory birth registration programs and organized censuses, both of which allowed nation-states not only to count their youthful citizens
but also to designate, via chronological age, the temporal boundaries of youth: when it was thought to begin and end. And those same nation-states debated and instituted various gateways to adulthood, also based on chronological age, among them ages for military service, voting, drinking, driving, sex, marriage, and majority. Nation-states also relied on youth not just to fight their wars, but as symbols of race, nation, and regeneration.

Finally, youthful people themselves assembled in schools and playing fields, at parties and hostels, in dance halls and service organizations, and they developed cultures that while by no means entirely self-contained, had their own codes, mores, and expectations. As historians have demonstrated, youth have constituted themselves (see for instance Fass 1977). Modern young people policed the boundaries of who belonged and who did not, excluding not just those who did not belong by virtue of age or generation but also, like their adult elders, by race, gender, and class as well. This chapter engages the themes of work, education, politics, and youth culture to examine conceptual shifts in youth over the preceding century and down to the present day.

**BIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND ADOLESCENCE**

In the rapidly urbanizing world of 1900, youth’s socioeconomic profile became more distinct. Urban centers, integrated into global markets and linked by maritime and overland networks, grew rapidly by drawing in large numbers of predominantly young migrants seeking economic opportunities. Along the China coast, for example, “sojourners” took the circular route between their hometowns and Shanghai, Hong Kong, or other Eastern ports. Here, as elsewhere, the distance separating young workers of both sexes from their families increased (Amrith 2011; Warren 2003). Industry spread unevenly but had far-reaching impacts for young people with new technologies transforming work practices and making older forms of training superfluous. In areas of Germany where industrialization occurred rapidly, youth labor participation in the workforce increased by 260 percent (Linton 1993: 23). The rising demands of a more integrated world economy made youth more visible, especially so as opposition to child labor spread. Meanwhile, the application of new technologies fragmented economic production and reduced asymmetries in productivity between young and old, male and female. The result was increased economic independence of the young and the rising prevalence of girls in the workforce. In colonial Nairobi, for instance, young Haya women traveled to town to find work and relieve indebted rural households (Waller 2006: 91). In Japan a significant proportion of the 62 percent female factory labor force were young girls, and female youth became an important source of support for their families (Garon 1987: 13).
Young people’s mobility and their propensity to move into urban centers in search of opportunities for paid work turned them into a highly visible embodiment of the “shock of the new.” Streaming into cities, congregating, apparently deracinated, “on the streets” beyond the authority of their parents, pursuing supposedly ill-suited and unproductive forms of leisure and employment, “youth” seemed to represent all of the peril and promise of the modern (Pomfret 2004; Sleight 2013). This appeared especially so in respect of girls, who were becoming both more prevalent in public and in the workplace, and whose mastery of new technologies from the bicycle to the ocean liner was rendering them more mobile and productive than ever. Older social totalities and ceremonial or ritualistic markers did not vanish but the value of past experience and seniority now faced new challenges. Young people had become a visible social “problem” warranting careful management. In the face of this experts working in new fields of specialist knowledge endowed concepts of youth with modern socio-biological significance.

The essential attributes of youth as laborers had been acknowledged in certain places and times, as imperial systems sprawled across the globe. Recruiters of
CONCEPTS OF YOUTH

slaves and indentured laborers, and of “greenhorn” colonial administrators, ascribed attributes of resilience and energy to youth, especially young males, setting them apart. In the early twentieth century, physicians and physiologists, first in Europe and the US, then elsewhere, gave youth’s labor power new scientific legitimacy. In Europe, the civil engineer Charles Frémont collaborated with Etienne Jules Marey to create chronophotographs recording the relationship between worker and tools in the production process. Informed by these images, industrialists pursuing greater efficiency began to envisage human labor as a kind of “apparatus.” As Anson Rabinbach argued, a new “science of work” emerged in Europe (1990). But it did so not only in Europe. As awareness of Marey and Frémont’s work spread, in the United States Fredrick Taylor and others applied time-and-motion studies to the development of “Taylorist” systems of “scientific management.” In Republican China medical doctors such as Chen Yucang and Tan Sitong employed metaphors of the body as a closed system, or a “machine” (Dikötter 1995: 22). Studies positing the working body as a human motor, or “apparatus,” privileged youth on account of its associations with certain biomedical characteristics. These included “energy” and malleability, the ability to be molded and to adopt new working styles (Barker 2018, 83). Nineteenth-century views of youth as requiring a moral corrective to “loafing” tendencies gave way in the face of data reconfiguring it as essential to ensuring a stable workforce, akin to capital to be “invested” and liable to be “burnt out” by over-intellectualization. The youthful body assumed a central place in a competitive culture of work. Both for its adaptability and ability to withstand wear and tear, the youthful body came to be linked to economic success. Older ideas of youth as analogous to nature merged with those heralding it as an ungendered “motor” capable of vigorous, energetic activity (Rabinbach 1990: 147–9).

Demographers now discussed youth, both male and female, as a specific biological group and a special stock of “human matériel” within the finite mass of the population. The term gained new conceptual clarity as commentators used it to refer to a stage of life defined by age, with strict biological boundaries, in a context where improvements in health and life expectancy were redefining the limits of life’s final frontiers. Close conceptual links emerged between time and productivity at a moment when individual lifetimes were also growing gradually longer. Following Elie Metchnikoff, medical experts in Europe were redefining aging as a disease, and thus as potentially treatable (Scarre 2017: 34). In the 1920s in the USSR, “Biocosmists” or “immortalists” ventured that their revolutionary experiments might defer life’s finale—but medical experts fantasized not just about lengthening life but extending its most productive and vital phase, redefining youth as a new human norm (Krementsov 2014). In the following decades, medical treatises, beauty handbooks, and commercial culture elided health and youth. Companies created products promising reduced
fatigue, enhanced productivity, and the recovery of lost youth, and marketing campaigns to sell them at scale. As a craze for medico-scientific body fashioning swept the globe, youth emerged as a norm to be recaptured through surgical or cosmetic procedures, diets or exercise, fitting the individual body for modern success. But more than just the fate of individual bodies was at stake here. Progressive intellectuals and professionals linked the efficient use of youthful labor to larger social projects and the fates of races, nations, and civilizations.

As fields such as social science, medicine, biology, and psychology generated sharper distinctions between “childhood” and “adulthood,” they gave new conceptual coherence to “youth” as a socio-biological concept, with anxieties now crystallizing around the concept of “adolescence.” This classical term was rediscovered in the nineteenth century to describe elite male youth removed from labor markets for a longer phase of training. By the early 1900s medical experts confronting the perils of modernity repurposed it, casting it as a common biological stage, experienced irrespective of class and gender. One of the concept’s architects-in-chief was the American psychologist Granville Stanley Hall whose two-volume work, Adolescence, became a best seller (Hall 1904). Hall linked youth both to vulnerability and a protean capacity for change. Like many of his contemporaries Hall was influenced by recapitulation theory, which held that human evolution was the product of a longer phase of youth resulting in growth and greater adaptive flexibility. He contended that young people (like the nations to which they belonged) passed through a series of evolutionary stages. The progress of both was biological. During the “adolescent” stage, as outlined in the Introduction in this volume, physical change was linked to emotional disturbance and internal instability was given expression as “storm and stress.” In this perspective the adolescent was literally at a lower stage of evolutionary growth, closer to the irrational and animalistic, which explained why so many engaged in acts defying social convention. If internal psychological traits could explain external behaviors the adolescent’s potential for “deviant” behaviors reinforced understandings of it as a potential danger to itself and to society. In the modern era, a consensus therefore emerged that there was both something distinctive about youth as a stage of life that mandated a particular kind of attention in order to nurture it to adulthood, and the use of a variety of tools in the behavioral sciences—psychology, education, penology, sexology, and demography—to make that transition successful. Youth in many places thus entered modern times not just cleft along a binary of peril and promise but with new biological, legal, and psychological underpinnings. Across the twentieth century, developmental psychologists continued to regard youth as a time of transition and turmoil during which identity was set down.

In the early twentieth century the new knowledge generated around adolescence supported demands for age-specific surveillance and training (Hall 1904). In particular it gave scientific substance to claims for closer control over puberty, reproduction, and sexuality. Modernizing elites sexualized the
body, linking the individual with an imagined collective. Youthful sexuality appeared to be a force to be reckoned with. So, in China, for example, older social ethics eroded and in urban contexts a whole new sexual morality developed around the concept of love (Lee 2007). Globally, an emerging concern for adolescence connected with the greater medicalization of discourses of youth around sexuality, centering in particular upon girls’ bodies. While male working-class youth had long attracted opprobrium for threatening capital through theft or membership in gangs that appeared as disturbing parodies of the family, the deviancy of young women “on the street” had often been seen as primarily sexual (Dyhouse 2013). Girls’ labor productivity was now cast increasingly in terms of motherhood and this reflected the rising sense of the importance of their procreative powers to economies. Careless procreation seemed capable of undermining the quality of “races” and nations. Medical experts emphasized differences between male and female adolescence, allowing gender difference to be seen as biologically in-built. In this way, new forms of knowledge forged in the face of weakening social structures shored up older gender divisions.

Though new knowledge about youth spread rapidly across global networks it played out locally in distinctive ways. In a world still divided by empires, attitudes to race inflected concepts of adolescence, precisely because metropolitan and colonial spaces could be seen to form part of the same

FIGURE 1.2 A group of teenage schoolgirls in Juarez, Mexico, late 1980s. Photo by Mark Jay Goebel. Image courtesy of Getty Images/Alamy/Wikimedia Commons.
Western experts appealed to environmental determinism to explain variations in the age of onset of puberty (from ten or twelve in Africa to eighteen in colder northern contexts) and the nature of adolescence. Colonial governments tested categories of “juvenile,” “delinquent” (often synonymous) and “adolescent” upon young subjects, creating or extended age-specific institutions to incarcerate and reform them. However, as Satadru Sen has shown in the case of British India, one of the chief “products” of these reformatories and boarding houses was the modern discovery that youth in colonized settings was limited and precociously curtailed: a fact held to explain relative backwardness (Sen 2005). In places where phases of autonomy were less clear for women, colonial discourses asserted that there was no youth for girls, who simply went from being children to being wives. As G. Stanley Hall himself had put it, the “forcing, precocity, severity and overwork” common among the “adolescent races” stymied progress on a societal level (Hall 1904: 2, 649). Well into the twentieth century international agencies subscribed both to notions that racial-environmental factors explained the absence of youth and to infantilizing discourses that condemned vast swathes of the world’s population

**YOUTH AS A PEDAGOGICAL CONCEPT**

Schooling was a major factor in demarcating youth as a distinct stage of life. Over the course of the twentieth century in the United States, for instance, the percentage of young people, aged five to nineteen, who attended school increased exponentially, rising from 51 percent in 1900 to 75 percent in 1940. By the early 1990s, the percentage for whites and Blacks, boys and girls, was at 93 percent (Snyder 1993: 6). High school graduation rates increased from 9 percent of US seventeen year olds in the first decade of the twentieth century to 75 percent in the last decade of the same century (Snyder 1993: 55). In Japan, by the century’s end, a full 93 percent of its young people were graduating from high school (Brinton 1998: 11).

At the same time, the number of American young people who enrolled in college or university at the end of their time in high school also grew by leaps and bounds. These increases were true for young women as well as men, and for ethnic and racial minorities as well as white students (though in varying numbers) (Fass 1991; Snyder 1993: 65–66). Overall the percentage of US eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds who attended college or university over the course of the twentieth century rose from less than 2 percent to more than 50 percent (Snyder 1993: 77). At least 45 percent of young people in Australia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, and Portugal not only attend university but also graduate (OECD 2010: 18).

Anywhere the world over where larger numbers of young people were segregated in schools, the effects were manifold, extending well beyond pedagogical impacts. First and foremost, growing numbers of students in high schools and universities spent increased amounts of time surrounded by peers of their own age, developing a youth culture that was widely recognized both by youth themselves and by those around them as being distinct from childhood and adulthood. Of course there were variations between youth culture as it existed in college and in high school, between the experience of inner-city Latinx students in Los Angeles and rural white farm kids in Nebraska, but the overall effect was to inculcate a sense of sameness and shared experience among students in any given locale, which we discuss below.

The media attention to youth in school—both high school and college—also led young people to understand themselves as being similar to students in other locations, linked by their shared status as students. This was especially the case in the United States, which also exported its version of consumer-oriented student identity to markets across the globe. Magazines with mass markets,
which themselves included advertisements targeting this youthful demographic, swept across the nation beginning in the 1920s; increasingly young people who were able to consume the products advertised came to see themselves as fundamentally linked to others in their age bracket by virtue of habits of consumption. To be youthful was to dress in particular kinds of clothes, see certain movies, and participate in a consumer-oriented youth culture (Fass 1977; Mrozek 2019; Schildt and Siegfried 2006). None of this was confined to the United States. In 1920s and 1930s India, for instance, film star Sulochana influenced an entire generation of girls in the ways of romance, dress, and adornment (Ramamurthy 2008). In the same period in China, the modern girl, with her “painted face, bobbed or permed hair, fashionable qipao [dress], and high-heel shoes, was so widely adopted by women of diverse social groups, including high school and college students,” that by the 1930s, “it had become a passport to opportunity and a dress code of necessity for young female city dwellers,” in the words of historian Madeleine Y. Dong (2008: 196).

All of this, of course, was part and parcel of the growth of a consumer economy from the 1920s onwards. It was an economy that, in order to survive, targeted youthful consumers and made them believe that they had something in common with one another. In the United States, for instance, as a result of the sharp increase of births from 1945 to 1960 (the so-called “Baby Boom”), advertisers and manufacturers targeted youth even more aggressively beginning in the 1960s. In the words of historian Susan Douglas, “For kids born after World War II, the media’s influence was unprecedented. The living rooms, dens, and bedrooms of America became places where people’s primary activity was consuming the mass media in some form or other, and much of the media was geared to the fastest-growing market segment, baby boomers.” In Douglas’s estimation, this cultivated “a highly self-conscious sense of importance, difference, and even rebellion” (1994: 13–14). As retailers and advertisers have become ever more fine-grained in their targeting of demographics (tapping into more recent categorizations including “pre-teens” and “tweens”), associations with one’s age cohort have only become more pronounced in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Age grading of students also led to increased emphasis on the meanings of particular ages as being key to development. On average, students in the US and Canada all began schooling when they were five or six; they finished middle school or junior high around thirteen; and they graduated high school at seventeen to nineteen. These ages took on greater significance as larger swathes of the population fell into line with these educational markers (Chudacoff 1989). Even for those who did not graduate from high school, eighteen, which had been the de facto age for voluntary military service for two hundred years and the draft age since the Second World War, gradually took on the trappings of adulthood, so much so that by the later twentieth century, American states had reduced the age of majority to eighteen (from twenty-one), lowered the
voting age to eighteen (again, from twenty-one) and raised the marriageable age to eighteen (from different ages that varied by state) (de Schweinitz 2015; Syrett 2016). Age eighteen is, of course, arbitrary as a boundary. Young people are not necessarily any more or less mature at eighteen than at seventeen or nineteen. The point, however, is that linking a widespread cultural practice—attending and graduating high school—to a particular age, had imbued that age with new meanings. Eighteen had now come to seem like the beginning of adulthood, the transition in between childhood and adulthood lasting for young people's teenage years. Other nations embraced different ages, but no less arbitrarily. In Japan, for instance, thanks to laws about military conscription, twenty emerged as demarcating youth from adulthood, now celebrated annually on “Coming of Age Day,” as the Introduction in this volume explains. In part due to the influence of international organizations like the United Nations, and the United States’ influence within it, eighteen has come to seem the normative age of adulthood, but other nations retain other legal ages of majority, some of which also match cultural markers for coming of age.

If the overall effect of high school was to give chronological parameters to the period of youth—roughly thirteen to eighteen—there were still myriad ways in which actual young people might experience their youth as beginning prior to age thirteen or extending beyond age eighteen. It has long been the case that impoverished young people may well be expelled from childhood into youth earlier than their wealthier peers because they work at early ages—on farms, in factories, or by the later twentieth century in retail and service work. They may technically still be children, but their laboring for wages or in support of their families has thrust them into the responsibilities of youth sooner than usually happens for middle-class youth. By contrast, by the early twenty-first century, much hand-wringing is devoted to those young people who are said to be living a prolonged or extended adolescence, moving back in with their parents after graduating from college, delaying marriage and careers (Stetka 2017). While worries about this trend are relatively recent in North America, commentators have been observing the phenomenon in Italy and other countries for much longer, noting in particular youths’ tendency to live at home with their parents all the way until marriage, which itself is now sometimes delayed (Carrà, Lanz, and Tagliabue 2014: 235). While much of the rhetoric about this phenomenon is overblown, and some of the economic reality is a result of the Great Recession that began in 2008, an extended period of youthfulness was not at all uncommon in the nineteenth century. In other words, the period of youth has contracted and expanded depending on economic and cultural circumstances.

While the primary effect of educating large swathes of the population in age-graded schools has been cultural and social—young people have developed shared characteristics and they and those around them have come to see youthful people as a distinct demographic—in many places around the world teachers
and professors have also attempted to educate young people in particular ways as young people, hoping to mold youth into distinct kind of citizens. While the effects of these efforts are debatable, one of the best documented in the United States was the campaign for sex education, whose aims were to inculcate in young people an understanding of their own bodies as well as train them (depending on the era in which it was taught) variously to avoid sexually transmitted diseases or sex altogether, or to ready them for lives as husbands and wives. What the various forms of “sex education” had in common was the belief that young people were a particular demographic with bodies and minds in need of shaping and guidance. Without proper instruction, its practitioners believed, they were apt to go astray, which could result in masturbation, pregnancy, disease, homosexuality, or lifelong singledom (Moran 2000). Advocates for sex education, if not its actual teachers, were generally trained in contemporaneous theories of adolescence and human development and were also very much products of their time. Concerns about what was then called venereal disease, for instance, were particularly prevalent in the early twentieth century and the years after the First World War, whereas following the Second World War educators were mostly charged with instructing students in what were called “Marriage and Family Living” classes, which focused less on sex and more on how young men and women could develop into proper husbands and wives. While few studies of sex education have demonstrated causal relationships between curricula and young people’s ability to avoid pregnancy, much less be open and honest about desire and pleasure, debates about whether or not sex education is necessary—even for those who argue against it—rely on the baseline understanding that youth is a particular stage of life during which adolescents are apt to have sexual desires and need guidance. Even those who advocate for abstinence-only education still agree that young people as a group demand some sort of education about sex by virtue of their age. Consensus on this point owes as much to cognizance that youth have biologically arrived at puberty as it does to an understanding of youth as a stage of life during which those named by the category are not yet ready for marriage or other perquisites of adulthood.

YOUTH AND POLITICAL AGENCY

Youth was never simply modernity’s most diligent motor or malleable tutee. Contemporaries also invested it with a protean potential to surpass bounds, exceed limits and sweep what was present into the past. In a period marked by imperial rivalry, global war, and rising anti-imperialist sentiment, youth often figured within a powerful emancipatory-romantic frame as an instigator-in-chief of epochal change. One individual tempted by such reflections was the Chinese political thinker Liang Qichao. Exiled for his role in the “Hundred Days’ Reform” movement, Liang was wending his way to Hawai’i by boat
when he penned his famous “Ode to Young China,” published on Chinese New Year’s Day 1900 (February 10th). Liang’s ode, which he published in a self-edited periodical, Qingyi bao, took the form of a complaint that even the Japanese now referred to China as “old,” and the assertion that “this is not true, in my mind there is a young China!” (Song 2016: 74) Assuming the mantle of “the youth of young China,” Liang devoted his days to instigating a youth-led revival or “Enlightenment” spanning culture, politics, and art. Alongside him a new generation of adversaries of tradition—Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, Lu Xun—undertook to make their “ancient” nation modern in the name of youth through the “New Culture Movement.”

FIGURE 1.4 “Young women, wearing side-slit, ankle-length dresses, strolling along a city street, China,” 1937. Courtesy of Getty Images.
To reformers like them around the world, “youth” sounded alluringly enlightened and modern. It could be cast in opposition to old world superstition and “tradition.” It was mobile, independent, assertive, and iconoclastic. In the decades that followed, commentators in Asia—who often perceived the key to “catching up” with Europe and the United States to lie in mastery of “Western” technologies—cast youth, newborn into modernity, in a leadership role. Such emancipatory imaginings of youth in Asia, as elsewhere, often involved an engagement with concepts of youth drawn upon European and American revolutionary models. The revolutionary wave that swept the Euro-Atlantic world of the late eighteenth century aligned youth behind dreams of liberation. These ideas had long been influential among educated elites. What was different about the twentieth century was that elites began to associate youth with mass movements and programs for change.

In the years that followed, intellectuals pursuing nationalist, imperialist, fascist, and Marxist-Leninist projects used youth’s association with newness and malleability to ascribe to it a higher level of ideological value or fealty. So, for Liang and his friends, Mazzini’s “Programme for Young Italy” (1831) provided inspiration. Following the collapse of the Qing Imperial government in 1911, the European revolutionary image of youth echoed in the writings of men like Chen Duxiu, who declared in his journal Qingnian zazhi of 1915 that “Youth is like early spring ….” By 1919, Chen was openly advocating Marxist revolution and in the wake of the “May Fourth Movement” in Beijing he became one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Meanwhile, in Japan during the 1920s the poet Harukichi Shimoi looked to Mussolini’s fascist program for inspiration and emphasized the cultivation of youth (Hoffman 2015: 54–6).

Even as youth’s quantification by fields from endocrinology to psychology was reaching new heights, experts clung to the possibility that biological limits could be transcended. So, for example, in the 1920s Russian scientists strived to create a new Soviet society opposed to genetic theory since it suggested in-built limits. It was not only fascists but those seeking to implement Marxist-inspired revolutions who also made youth-led rejuvenation central to their programs between the wars. In the “Age of Extremes” (Hobsbawm 1994), youth’s traits suggested it might be controlled but also made it a source of (potentially limitless) moral improvement, through learning. The young thus made a ready target for revolutionaries (Gorsuch 2000). Indeed, these regimes identified youth not as merely a preparatory phase or conduit toward an upgraded adult maturity, but as an ideal, modern form of agency in and of itself—not as corrected adolescents, but a corrective force of nature (Bernstein 2017). Europe’s intensifying struggles against a sense of racial decline and degeneration led its own cultural creators to attack bourgeois culture by invoking the language and imagery of youth as change. These inclinations, which had been given expression earlier in art in the form of the jugendstil (or “Youth Style”) and in literature in the bildungsroman,
underpinned the rise of vibrant new models of youth organization. All mobilized youth as a sign of “health” and vigor in response to symptoms of urban “degeneration.” The most successful was Baden Powell’s Scouts, created in Britain in 1907, but others emerged in imperial Germany, France, and elsewhere. These organizations held that the best way of correcting “juvenile delinquency,” including elite forms (such as the morally degraded “bookworm”) was through the “return” to a healthy rural environment. And this proved persuasive enough even to win admirers in predominantly rural societies such as China and Russia. In the first half of the twentieth century youth organizations presented a model for binding the young into mass politics in the service of ideologically disparate projects. So in Russia, for example, in October 1918 Lenin’s Bolshevik revolutionaries created the Russian Communist Youth League and disbanded the Scouts founded earlier, in 1909, by Tsar Nicholas II. The Bolsheviks tasked the Young Pioneers established in May 1922 with fighting remnants of the “old” Russia and the imperialist West. Karl Marx had been convinced that education and work could elevate the morality of workers. Lenin (drawing upon Turgenev) was convinced that the young could be remolded into “new men” and “new women” capable of realizing communism. In power, the Bolsheviks developed communist universities for this very purpose, attracting thousands of young students from across the globe.

This tendency of young people to travel in modern times generated ideas of youth as a site of privileged mobility. Ironically, while young reformers dedicated themselves to building or (re)inscribing the imagined boundaries of their nations, they did so through serial crossings of the same, and by emphasizing mobility as the key to experiencing youth “correctly.” As intellectuals and social reformers converged around youth as a moment of opportunity to be realized en masse, vast new study-abroad schemes took shape (Walton 2010). Among Chinese intellectuals and reformers, Cai Yanpei, later the first Republican minister of Education, studied in Leipzig, Hu Shi in the US, Chen Duxiu, and Li Dazhao in Tokyo. Thousands of students went to France, including Deng Xiaoping, architect of China’s “Open Door” policy. The mobility of young people in modern times, traversing the world as migrants, travelers, or refugees, through the networks of Europe’s empires, helped to produce a shared identity based on age that connoted a time of travel, and the sense of existing at the leading edge of “the modern,” with all of its disorientations and disappointments.

In the decades that followed, youth symbolized new beginnings across a wide ideological range, from imperial expansion to religious conservatism, to anti-colonial nationalism, and more besides. Internationalist movements, reacting between the wars to the hardening of racial thinking, also latched onto youth. The United Nations that emerged from the wreckage of the war on October 24, 1945 invoked youth “for peace” in its first World Youth Assembly held in July 1970. Religious reformers in the Ottoman Empire and in Hindu contexts appealed to youth as a concept, a life stage, and a social body capable of delivering their own varieties of “rejuvenation.” Across the Middle East and India, in East and Central Africa, ideals of youth came to be closely bound up with religion in opposition to modern “rationality.” So, for instance, in the Ottoman lands following the secularizing “Young Turk Revolution” of 1908 the youthful delinquent became a heroic figure. In Cairo, the young writer Naguib Mahfuz misrecognized the nationalist-inspired 1919 Revolution as just the latest rowdy interlude led by local al-futuwwa, a form of roguish youthful Islamic masculinity (Jacob 2007: 689–712). In South Asia the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu organization, appropriated the uniform of the Boy Scouts and the organizational structure of the fascist Balilla and Avanguardisti (Casolari 2020).

Reflecting upon what he referred to as the modern “myth” of youth, the leftist philosopher Henri Lefebvre noted in his Introduction to Modernity that “there are elements which appear as a consequence of the old cosmological romanticism as developed by Rimbaud—pure and violent spontaneity” (2012: 159). And indeed, across the “short twentieth century” the tasks assigned to youth helped to mark the concept with associations of an aggressive masculine agency. While experts often portrayed adolescence as correctable, commentators cast
Youthful contributions as having a corrective (destructive) quality. While youth organizations taught girls subordinate domesticity, they encouraged young males to tap a transformative capacity to fight. The conflation of uniforms and soldiering stamped the concept with martial masculinity and transformed male youth, even in peacetime, into combatants-in-waiting. When youth became combatants in actual wars, as in the case of Sidney Lewis, the twelve-year-old who fought at the Somme in 1916, this involved crossing a threshold. For once youth were soldiers it was somewhat unclear if they were still “youth.” Still, the conflation of uniforms and soldiering with youth stamped martial masculinity with the image of youth and vice versa so that even today the term carries a distinctly masculine resonance.

This emphasis upon soldiers as hyper-masculine “youth” emerged in a century when the long-distance nature of warfare left civilians, including women and children, exposed to direct attacks. It also occurred, notably, as a counter-discourse to the effeminizing effects of more androgynous variants of girlhood. Distributed worldwide via print and film from the 1920s and 1930s, the “modern girl” was defined by her short hair and slim, efficient figure to the extent that she possessed a body with more masculine capabilities. Across the twentieth century some states promoted androgynous models of female youth. The military-style training in Europe, Japan, and the “British world” enclosed girls’ bodies in uniforms even as they anticipated the end result as healthy motherhood. Soviet athletes such as the gymnast Larissa Latynina, rose to prominence as representatives of the nation after the USSR’s admission to the Olympic Games in 1952. Meanwhile youth movements in the People’s Republic of China offered a riposte to the decadent “modeng xiaojie” (modern girl), but the ironic result was the strikingly masculinized form of the female Red Guard.

With the devastation of the Second World War, the wars of decolonization, and the onset of the Cold War, in many places the “youth” of the interwar era came to power. They retained an interest in youth’s conceptual viability as an unmediated essence and a kind of otherness on which new nations, or “third ways” forward, could be found. Far from being tarnished by its prewar associations, time and again youth emerged as central to projects claiming a new order of things. Even in postwar Europe youth shook off its associations with death and destruction to serve as a building block for the fostering of shared identities and new beginnings (Jobs 2017). And, in parts of the world delivered from imperialism, notably China, Russia, and Vietnam, youth’s conceptual significance in the postwar era as a driver of national rejuvenation through revolution scaled new heights.

A key problem, however, for the intergenerational persistence of youth as a political concept was that if it, as modernity’s essence, required and
represented a “permanent revolution,” how could youth-grown-old retain authority? By the time Chinese communism reached a generational watershed in 1957 the CCP’s first generation of leaders were in their sixties. Facing the devastating consequences of the “Hundred Flowers campaign” (1956–1957) and the Great Famine which killed tens of millions, and a crisis of succession, Mao Zedong accelerated social engineering to repulse “counter-revolutionary” forces, by summoning the supposedly purer agency of youthful Red Guards, as China lurched into the Cultural Revolution. For Cheng Yinghong, the conviction that shaped this catastrophe was that state-run social engineering could reshape human nature and that a moral and social improvement led by youth might be endless and unconfined (Cheng 2009). Having survived the consequences and the Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989, the Chinese Communist Party now confronts its third generational break with a “Chinese Dream,” conceived of quite specifically by its President Xi Jinping in terms of a “great rejuvenation.”

**YOUTH AS CULTURE**

Sociologists’ theorizations of youth culture are helpful in understanding how youth have constituted their own identity using specific age-related styles and behaviors. In *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*, Dick Hebdige posited that subcultures allowed their constituents to criticize a dominant societal standard, at the same time reaffirming their own values and beliefs (1979). By the early twentieth century, both in and out of school, young people had begun to develop youth subcultures with their own rules and values. These cultures encompassed the quotidian—popular clothing, mannerisms, and forms of speech, for instance. Aided by mass media that sought to cultivate young people as consumers and segregated with same-age peers, youth began to understand themselves as defined by their age and as being a class apart from those who were younger and older than they (Fass: 1977; Schrum: 2004). Youth cultures particularly encompassed changing mores around sex and its evolving relationship to marriage. In the United States, for instance, young people had developed two new courtship practices that differentiated them from prior generations and that, in one way or another, have shaped sexual relations between young people in the US ever since: treating and dating. In “treating,” which flourished alongside “walking out” among working-class young people beginning in the late nineteenth century, young women, who were disadvantaged in the wage labor market and often unable to pay for entertainment and amusement, exchanged sexual favors for a night on the town financed by young men. While young men were not guaranteed access to young women’s bodies at the end of the evening, most evidence indicates that
“treats” were quite transactional, with both parties and the cultures around them understanding the terms of the exchange (Clement 2006; Peiss 1983). In “dating,” which emerged among high school and college students in the early twentieth century, youth engaged in serial public social engagements, generally with different people each time (Bailey 1989; Modell 1983). These outings were often financed by young men and while dating increased opportunities for sexual experimentation short of intercourse (called petting), it was never assumed as with treating (Bailey 1989; Spurlock 2016). Prior to the advent of these practices, middle-class young people had courted one another, often in groups and sometimes with some sort of supervision or chaperonage. Most expected that there was unlikely to be a sexual component for courting couples until engagement, and perhaps not until marriage itself. This was less true for working-class youth, for whom respectability was not as tied to sexual purity and who were more likely to experiment sexually than their middle-class peers (Clement 2006).

Over the course of the twentieth century the practices of dating and treating and their descendants—“going steady,” “hanging out,” and “hooking up”—have been the predominant ways that North American young people (as

FIGURE 1.6 Teenage American couple holding hands during English class, 1957. Photo by Don Cravens/The LIFE Images Collection via Getty Images.
well as youth in countries influenced by American practices, such as Australia) have negotiated the practice of courtship and its relationship with sex. While we know that people of all ages have participated in these activities, it is also the case that they originated with young people and that they were formative in how youth have understood their sexuality. An increasing proportion of young people have chosen to have sex prior to marriage as the century wore on, what one US sociologist famously called “permissiveness with affection”—by which he meant that young women, especially, were more willing to be sexually intimate with young men in relationships bound by love, affection, and sometimes engagement (Reiss 1960: 144). By the early twenty-first century about 57 percent of American twelfth-graders have had sexual intercourse by the time they graduated (Guttmacher 2018). In France, about half of all teenagers have had sex by the age of seventeen (INED 2014). By contrast, in Mexico, only about 28 to 30 percent of youth (aged twelve to nineteen) have had intercourse, these lower rates largely explained by a higher value placed on female chastity and a greater propensity toward sexual guilt in Mexican culture (Espinosa-Hernández, Vasilenko, and Bámaca-Colbert 2016: 603). While comprehensive statistics are unavailable for the early twentieth century, it is clear that, in most places around the world, growing numbers of young men and women have chosen to have sex with each successive generation.

Sex has moved from being an activity that, at least in the popular imagination, was confined to marriage, to being a key marker of youth culture, meaning that young people have, over the course of the twentieth century, incorporated sex into the process of deciding their marital partners. As the age of first marriage, in the United States and elsewhere, has gone steadily upward over the same period (with a minor blip in the 1950s), many youth have separated sex from the pursuit of a husband or wife altogether, evaluating sex on its own terms and sometimes outside of dating relationships. While research on queer youth is, by comparison, in its infancy, some studies demonstrate that queer youth have also developed their own subcultures that also police acceptable standards for sexual permissiveness. Regardless, because marriage has only so recently become an option for same-sex couples—and is still unavailable in most of the world—almost everywhere queer sex has been, by definition, premarital. In many Western nations, larger numbers of youth are embracing a lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity earlier than in previous generations, and this has also meant experimenting with sex (Savin-Williams 2005). While researchers have determined that rates of first sexual intercourse do continue to vary based on religious affiliation, location, race, and ethnicity, as well as on sexual orientation, what unites young people who are otherwise differentiated by these identity categories is this presumption that youth is the period during which sexuality is first negotiated. Internally generated practices of courtship
are the ways that young people have made these decisions, regulated their peers, and justified the decisions that they have made. Courtship, broadly defined, and its relationship to sex has become a defining feature of modern youth cultures (Spurlock 2016: 137–40).

CONCLUSION

“Youth” emerged as a defining concept of modern times. States institutionalized age, through employment, education, leisure, and crime, and an array of experts drew the condition of youth more tightly together with the fate of the nation. Around the world, networked intellectuals and reformers linked the concept to opportunity, power, and the productive possibilities of “progress.” At the same time growing perceptions of youth as a scarce resource, “misdirected,” or as a highly visible social problem prompted investigations in new fields—pedagogy, biology, sociology, and psychology. These helped to focus attention upon “adolescence” in particular as a critical stage of life—a temporary but turbulent moment in an open-ended process of personal development.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries gerontocrat political leaders’ claims to lead national “rejuvenations” suggested that the boundaries of “youth” had again blurred. Though youth achieved a certain hegemonic status, embedded as it was in institutions, biomedical data, and pedagogical knowledge, it remained conceptually fragmented along lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, and urban-rural difference. Hence, “youth,” though always transitional, remained something to which girls could not as easily lay claim. Then again, for others in developed societies, after the end of the Cold War brought the collapse of communism and the acceleration of globalization, youth came with a heightened sense of risk and opportunity (Beck 1992; Farrar 2002; Giddens 1992). The bamboccioni or “boomerang generation” discussed by sociologists who lamented the extreme precariousness of youth, was conceived of in terms of an extended phase of dependence upon their families (Mayer 2018). Mature adults’ desires to achieve or retrieve youthfulness as an aspect of modern identity contributed to the blurring of its upper boundaries. Youth was something “mid-lifers” strove to recapture, floating relatively free of its chrono-biological markers. The concept blurred at its lower end too. Children’s consumer interests increasingly mirrored those of adults. Legally, there was also convergence, notably after the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) recognized “the child” as a full person with rights of her or his own. Youth and adulthood became less clearly demarcated by patterns of consumption, production, or age thresholds. Within and across societies divided by vast differentials of wealth a sense of youthful self-recognition vis-à-vis older generations in culture persisted thanks in part to the spread of
cheap technology, notably the smartphone. Connected with this was youth’s enduring ability to signify revolutionary potential. From Egypt’s revolutionary *shabāb al-thawra*, and other movements of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the “Revolution of Our Times” in Hong Kong in 2020, youth surged to the fore, demanding human rights and essential freedoms. Whilst these movements lasted they drew again upon tantalizing associations of youth with coherence, momentum, and transformative potential. However, as was so often the case in the period discussed in this chapter, the conceptual empowerment of youth was ephemeral and often translated in practice into experiences of frustration, fragmentation, and bitter disappointment.
INTRODUCTION

Since the late nineteenth century, young people across the globe have been defined by their relationship to spaces, ranging from homes and hospitals, to schools and streets. Parents, states, and corporations have all paid close attention to the spatial practices of young people, through attempting to control access or circumscribing permissible usage. While spaces have become sites of familial, state, and market intervention, spaces have also become, at least from the perspective of young people themselves, places of creativity and empowerment.

In this chapter, we engage critically with literature on youthful spaces and places, and the behaviors and attitudes of young people within them, from the end of the Great War to the present. In defining the age range of “youth,” we concur with David M. Pomfret and Nicholas Syrett that “the period of youth has contracted and expanded depending on economic and cultural circumstances” (see Chapter 1 in this volume). Thus, we employ a dynamic definition of youth which embraces middle childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood. Our focus is upon older youth but, as spaces like schools, hospitals, and playgrounds are designed to accommodate prepubertal children, it would be artificial to exclude them entirely from our analysis. The chapter is structured around the major types of physical environments frequented by youth. These are broken into four categories: domestic, public, institutional, and leisure. We analyze how scholars have researched youthful spaces and places across the globe and ask, what does it mean to spatialize the history of youth?
Since the “spatial turn” from the mid-1980s, historians have paid increased attention to the ways in which youth interact with their physical environments. At the interstices of history, geography, sociology, architecture, and urban planning, a growing body of research has traced the ways in which young people’s interactions with their physical environments have changed over time (Gaster 1992; Gutman and de Coninck-Smith 2008; Karsten 2006; Wridt 2004). In his account of the “youthscapes” of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Melbourne, Simon Sleight charts the ways in which youth fashioned landscapes of their own through playing, working, exploring, marching, and disobeying. He urges fellow historians to consider the ways in which age is spatialized (2013). Similarly, geographer Doreen Massey suggests that space is a category of analysis in understanding young people, both because youth cultures exhibit hybrid combinations of local and global influences, and because social identity among young people is often achieved through constructing and claiming space (1997). Indeed some, like sociologist Chris Jenks, have asserted that young people are:

peculiarly noticeable in relation to their setting … [C]hildren either occupy designated spaces, that is they are placed, as in nurseries or schools, or they are conspicuous by their inappropriate or precocious invasion of adult territory. Childhood, then, is that status of personhood which is by definition often in the wrong place.

(2005: 73)

Underpinning this interdisciplinary research is interaction between the ways in which adults imagine young people should engage with physical environments and the perspectives of youth seeking to exercise some spatial autonomy. Geographers ranging from Henri Lefebvre (1991) to Yi-Fu Tuan (1977) have shown that adults and young people alike can produce space. More specifically, if space can be produced through design or practice, then young people can make it—or at least make it their own. Furthermore, sociologist Kim Rasmussen created the useful distinction between children’s places—those that children find “important and meaningful”—and places for children—which adults create for them (Rasmussen 2004: 161). Sometimes these places overlap, but often they do not. As historian Roy Kozlovsky asserts, there is always a “tension between the intentions of authorities for children as they are inscribed in spaces such as playgrounds or schools, and how children, as legitimate social actors, perceive and appropriate them” (2015: 99). To account for this tension between youth precarity and authority, we employ the concepts of “space” and “place.” British geographer Tim Cresswell explains that:

Space, then, has been seen in distinction to place as a realm without meaning – as a “fact of life” which, like time produces the basic coordinates for human
life. When humans invest meaning in a portion of space and then become attached to it in some way (naming is one such way) it becomes a place. (Cresswell 2004: 10; see also Tuan 1977)

Stated differently, space is abstract and open to interpretation, while place is more concrete, created through the meanings that people ascribe to it and the experiences that derive from it.

In Australian historian Carla Pascoe Leahy’s formulation developed in relation to postwar Australian youngsters, space can be thought of as a matter of adult control, and place as youthful resistance (2011). This is not to argue that the concepts are mutually exclusive. Both places and spaces can be sites of intervention and outside pressures, not merely sites of autonomous development. Nevertheless, we find the distinction important to capture attempts to both design and reclaim, to order and disrupt, and to objectify and subjectify. Pascoe Leahy argues further that personal sources—such as oral histories, letters, and diaries—are important in capturing the place-attachment of historical subjects, whereas sources produced in the context of expert discourses—such as government reports, blueprints, maps, and planning schemes—are more likely to convey the spatial values of a location (2010). This chapter will explore spaces and places of youth across the past century. Although the chapter draws most from our regional specialties—the modern Middle East, Oceania, and Europe—we take a broader approach to space and place, one that is holistic, global, and multidisciplinary.

DOMESTIC SPACES AND PLACES

Domestic spaces are the first physical environment that a child knows intimately. French philosopher Gaston Bachelard wrote lyrically of the psychic significance of the home/s of youth, musing that “the house holds childhood motionless ‘in its arm’” (Bachelard 1994: 8). In psychoanalytic theory, dreaming of a house usually symbolizes the dreamer’s self. But as children grow into youth, a more ambivalent relationship with home often develops: houses are places of refuge and comfort, but also constraining spaces of parental control (and potentially state intervention through, for one, child welfare agencies) from which young people may desire to separate.

From the late Middle Ages, urban middle-class families began to treat the home as a private place of sanctuary, to adopt affectionate parent-child relations, and to view childhood as a period of relative vulnerability (Heywood 2013: 240). Domestic spaces became more sophisticated and their internal spaces more differentiated across the nineteenth century, including the emergence of rooms specifically for young people, like the nursery (Hamlett 2010). In
some industrialized Western economies where space is relatively ample—such as North America and Australia—houses have expanded since the mid-twentieth century (Adams and Van Slyck 2003). Both Canadian historian Annmarie Adams’s research into 1960s suburban homes in the US and Pascoe Leahy’s research into 1950s Australian homes found that house design reflects dominant understandings of family (and young people’s roles within it), but that individual families may follow and/or defy architectural expectations for the use of space. Both scholars use architectural plans, housing magazines, interviews, and photographs to understand the ways in which youth have utilized domestic places (Adams 1995a; Pascoe Leahy 2011, 2017a). In Pascoe Leahy’s research, architects and interior designers of the 1950s imagined domestic spaces where family recreation was integrated into multifunction communal areas and the mother could supervise her offspring from an efficient kitchen control center (Pascoe Leahy 2017a). Yet despite adult visions of supervision and multigenerational interaction, young people were often adept at creating domestic places of shelter and autonomy, be they in a private bedroom or an attic, cubby, treehouse, or hideaway (Cooper Marcus 1992; Pascoe Leahy 2011; Sobel 1990) (see Figure 2.1).

In addition, for young people the concept of “home” often encompasses the liminal areas immediately adjacent to their house, such as backyards, alleys, lanes, and streets. American-Canadian urban planning critic Jane Jacobs argued in the 1960s that streets needed to be understood as de facto playgrounds (Jacobs 1961). In Pascoe Leahy’s study of postwar Australian childhood, interviewee George recalled “We had a laneway on the side of our house, and there was a lane at the back as well … If we wanted to play cricket or ball … instead of going out on the nature strip or the road island there, we’d play at the back” (Pascoe Leahy 2011: 69). Such liminal or boundary places are experienced by young people as part of the domestic sphere because of their proximity to, and association with, the home.

From the mid-twentieth century, young people in industrialized countries were more likely to have their own bedroom, as private space came to be seen as central to psychological development. American historian Rebecca Friedman discovered that in 1918 Russia, women’s magazines advised that: “A child must occupy the absolute best room in the house … From a psychological perspective, sun in a child’s room is even more important … a dark room would cause sadness in the heart of a child” (2013: 263). The notion that a bedroom’s spatial qualities influence a young person’s emotional well-being was remarkably pervasive across the industrialized world throughout the twentieth century.

If these were the aspirations posed in mid-century domestic design in industrialized societies, Pascoe Leahy’s research suggests that the ideal of the private bedroom was only enjoyed by a small number of young people in more
privileged families. Her study found that young people living in an inner-city, working-class and culturally diverse neighborhood commonly shared bedrooms with siblings but did not experience this as a deprivation. George recalled that rooms were shared and had dual functions in his postwar home (such as his mother sleeping in what was the living room by day). “But you know, we didn’t seem to think it was crowded, because we didn’t think of it that way at all … We mainly used that to sleep. As far as activities, like playing, you went outside” (Pascoe Leahy 2011: 125).

The availability of personal space and the material affluence of one’s family has doubtless impacted upon the pastimes available to young people.
The well-off teenager in industrialized societies of the mid-twentieth century often had their own private bedroom. It became a sanctuary from the world and offered a spatial opportunity to express identity through posters, bedspreads, and other décor (Mitchell and Reid-Walsh 2002b; Reid 2017; Steele and Brown 1995). North American scholars of youth culture Claudia Mitchell and Jacqueline Reid-Walsh decode the meanings of teenage girls’ bedrooms in late 1990s magazines, arguing that while adolescent interior design is highly gendered, the bedroom is a place that offers the greatest scope for “children-in-control” and “less socially governed” expressions of youthful interaction with popular culture (2002b: 114, 118). As young people have retreated more often into private bedrooms, adult anxieties about what takes place behind closed doors have only risen (Reid 2017).

If home spaces are gendered, they are also racialized. In her study of apartheid-era South Africa, historian Rebecca Ginsburg found that Johannesburg’s suburban homes were spaces which replicated the wider geography of racial hierarchies. These middle-class homes and backyards served as miniaturized versions of the apartheid state, where white children were inculcated into the spatial racialization of their society through observing how Black South African domestic workers were segregated. Although domestic workers were emotionally intimate with white children due to their childcare duties, they were nevertheless relegated to small, dilapidated rooms at the furthest possible remove from the main house. As they aged, white youngsters became increasingly cognizant of the social messages underpinning such spatial layouts of the domestic sphere (Ginsburg 2008).

Not all domestic spaces for youth have expanded during the past century. For rapidly urbanizing societies with ballooning populations such as major cities in China, family life has largely moved from traditional courtyard houses into high-rise apartments, with children’s play and learning opportunities impacted by space restrictions, poor air quality, and limited unstructured time (Ekblad and Werne 1990; Naftali 2016: 10–13). In some high-density cities, architects and designers have developed ingenious solutions to the problems of limited domestic space. In Nordic countries, for example, furniture designs have adapted so that children’s furniture evolves with the child’s body (de Coninck-Smith 2014: 23–6).

Some domestic spaces explicitly destabilize the centrality of the family unit, such as the kibbutz in Israel (Lieblich 2010). First created in Palestine (later Israel) around 1910, kibbutz principles of communal living manifested into spatial arrangements whereby parents lived in small apartments and children lived and slept in “children’s houses” (Getz 2015: 23). Moreover, the people who saw working-class kibbutzim as “the nuclei of the future Jewish socialist commonwealth in Palestine,” and appropriated the land to realize this, were young Jewish settlers to Palestine (Lockman 1996: 174). While this case is
in some ways exceptional, given the global ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the idea of colonizers invoking age-related metaphors—a young nation (re)claiming an old space—to justify the seizure of space and place from others is not unique to Jewish settlement in Palestine. Rather, it is a feature of settler colonialism, past and present. More contemporary are cases of racial gentrification in cities across the Global South (Comelli et al. 2018). Regardless of context or case, communal living provides an interesting lens by which to discuss multiple and overlapping manifestations of youth and family, as well as categorically fluid spaces—those that are simultaneously domestic and public.

Furthering this point that some spaces defy easy categorization, it is worth noting that for some youth, home is the street. Young people have represented a large proportion of the homeless in major cities across the twentieth century and by the early twenty-first century were thought to number in the tens to hundreds of millions worldwide (Embleton et al. 2016: 436). For these “street-involved” young people, categorical distinctions between public and domestic spaces, between private and collective spaces, and between safe and dangerous spaces, are inconsequential and difficult to maintain in their everyday lives.

PUBLIC SPACES AND PLACES

As the child becomes youth in physiological and psychological terms, more audacious and more mobile, they become more familiar with public spaces. These spaces, ranging from the crowded street to the open field, are perhaps more contentious for youth than domestic ones. This is not because adults are more present in public. Indeed, adults order, organize, and claim space as they do at home and young people respond through spatial strategies to create their own “sense of place.” The critical distinction, then, with public spaces is their state ownership (Pascoe Leahy 2011; Sleight 2013).

For thousands of years, public spaces have existed as zones for adults buying, selling, and meeting in areas ranging from Central America (such as Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital), to Europe (Rome, capital of the Holy Roman Empire), to Asia (Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid Empire). And while officials would monitor activities in these centers, what was new by the nineteenth century was the modern state and its devices—the census, the guillotine, and urban planning—to control these public spaces (Foucault 1979; Habermas 1989). One of the critical motivators for increasing state control has been the emancipatory potential of the so-called public sphere for an emerging category of people: youth. Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century young people across the world met in cafes, printing houses, and the street to discuss and experience their lives, loves, and futures. Young men and women also used such spaces to protest against the state (Baun 2021; Sleight 2013).
Although the state has used explicit force to control public space for the last century, including crackdowns, raids, and closures, there are more subtle forms of spatial regulation imposed in the post-Second World War period that are equally compelling. They include the growth of public housing, public transport, paved and sanitized streets, and public gardens and playgrounds (Lynch 1977). Beyond these state-sanctioned public spaces, sites like the street corner, open field, and sporting pitch have been twentieth-century places of youth-making for boys and girls alike (Hart 1979). As some of these spaces and places overlap with leisure (addressed in Chapter 4 in this volume), our discussion here is confined to youth politics and activism within public space.

In 1950s Australia, public spaces were constructed by adult experts such as architects and urban planners, whereas young people grew attached to places through strategies such as exploring, naming, and claiming (Pascoe Leahy 2010). One example of place-attachment is the creation of toponyms. As geographer Robin Moore argues, “when children invent their own toponyms (place names), it indicates a degree of proprietorship that can only happen when adult culture does not dominate the scene” (1986). Growing up in postwar Australia, one of Pascoe Leahy’s interviewees, Joan, remembered a pond in her local park where she and her siblings and friends “used to go yabbying [fishing] … We used to wade across to the island and have scraps of meat on string and jam tins for the yabbies.” They called this pond the “polio pool” for its filthy appearance; a reference to the polio epidemic afflicting Australians in the 1950s (Pascoe Leahy 2011: 65–7) (see Figure 2.2). Another evidence of connection to place is when young people form gangs to claim and control an area. Interviewee Livio recalled that territorial lines based upon geography and religion dissected his postwar neighborhood:

That’s … where the separations came. The ones that lived the Rathdowne Street end. The ones that lived Elizabeth Street end. The ones that lived at Canning Street end. All went to the same school. But once you walked out of school, they formed their own groups. And then there was a separation between the Catholics and the non-Catholics … You wouldn’t go in the Exhibition Gardens of a night-time. That’s where the fights would occur.

(Pascoe Leahy 2011: 64)

Another way that young people’s group identities take on spatial forms is through social movements. American historian Dylan Baun’s (2017, 2021) research into mid-twentieth-century Lebanon has explored the ways in which youth-centric social movements achieved popularity and political, social, and cultural power through their ability to produce and control public space. This project was sustained through different types of gatherings, including festivals, the playing of music or sports in public spaces, and marches. By design, most
of these gatherings demanded an audience, affording youth organizations a physical space to literally “practice their identity” and an ideological place for recruitment (2020: 20). In his memoir, Hisham Sharabi reflects on his engagement with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, a youth social club founded at the American University Beirut in the 1930s. Discussing a lecture series he attended in the 1940s, Sharabi commented that “[t]he atmosphere was saturated with a spirit I had never known” (Sharabi 2008: 50). Through his immersion in a place that felt “saturated” with the collective ethos of this diverse group (which included young women, men, and children, as shown in Figure 2.3), the young man joined the Syrian Social Nationalist Party soon after.

As many of the activities of these groups consisted of the public performance of youthful identities (including listening to music, playing sports, or going to the movies), these mostly middle-class movements in Lebanon and elsewhere were central to the development of youth culture. In other words, not only were the activities socializing young men and women, they also created public places for youth diversion and belonging. The colonial or early independence state did not always appreciate these sources of alternative belonging and experience, given that these groups explicitly and implicitly challenged the state’s claim over young citizens. Accordingly, the state often shut down their spaces, imprisoned their leaders, and publicly confronted them, whether in the form of newspaper censorship or direct police force. This was the case for the Kata’ib Organization, a youth movement in Lebanon led by Pierre Gemayel. In 1937, the French colonial government shut down its headquarters and prohibited its
members from meeting publicly in their khaki uniforms. When the Kata’ib’s male members came out in defiance of the ban, the French resorted to police brutality and Gemayel was jailed. Following protests against the European blockage of local youth activism, however, Gemayel was released. This only buttressed the myth of the Kata’ib’s authority over public space (Baun 2021; Dueck 2010).

State strategies to design and control the street have been implemented across the globe and have continued into the twenty-first century. As geographer Karen Malone explains: “A variety of regulatory policies and policing activities, such as surveillance, curfews, move-on and anti-congregation laws, have been introduced in cities around the world with the specific aim of restricting young people’s access to public space” (2001: 6–7). In the context of the American South in the 1890s, three decades after the Civil War, white elites enacted their own regulations. In Richmond, Virginia, men affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan erected monuments downtown to confederate generals, spatializing the white social order. These monuments also intimidated spatial engagement by African Americans—presumably including those most politically active youth (McInnis 2015).

In Australia, the place relationships of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander youth have paralleled broader processes of colonization. After British colonization in 1788, Indigenous connections to country were disrupted by forced removal from ancestral lands. In the twentieth century many Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander children were taken from their families and communities. Since the formal government apology to the “Stolen Generations,” many Indigenous youth have begun a process of working through their grief and sense of displacement as they reconnect with places sacred to their ancestors for generations (Heiss 2018).

But just because the state or its stakeholders “own” public spaces, does not mean they always monitor them effectively. Historian Ilham Khuri-Makdisi’s (2013) work on youthful performance cultures, such as the theater in turn of the twentieth-century Egypt, analyzes Ottoman and later Egyptian efforts to police these public spaces. Indeed, the state thought of these productions and their young producers (often leftists) as subversive. At the same time “whether it [the Ottoman or Egyptian state] chose to apply the law systematically and whether it could always do so is a different matter” (Khuri-Makdisi 2013: 77). Like youth clubs in Lebanon, young performers had laid claim to space and made it place, which often forced the state to cede ground.

If adults tried to limit youthful access to public spaces in some instances, they simultaneously worried about a perceived lack of youthful access to public spaces associated with nature. In many industrialized societies in the early twentieth century, summer camps were conceived of as opportunities to socialize young men and women through access to what were thought to be the healthy and wholesome properties of nature (van Slyck 2006). The Scouts and Girl Guides had a similar goal, but these organizations were also a means to subjugate peoples and races to European and North American hegemony—whether Indigenous peoples at home or colonized ones abroad (Alexander 2017; Honeck 2018; Wall 2005).

Despite enthusiastic youthful engagement with natural spaces of summer camps, and Scout and Guide activities, adults continued throughout the twentieth century to express concern about the declining access of urban young people to nature. This influenced some geographers and urban planners, particularly in the 1970s, to research how young people use physical environments and hence improve adult designs of cities, neighborhoods, and schools. In 1975, for example, the education colleges and schools of George Washington and Rutgers University, in conjunction with the US Forest Service, held a symposium entitled “Children, Nature, and the Urban Environment.” The 113 presentations made at the symposium addressed how “[u]rban children of today have become increasingly divorced from the natural environment,” which may have negative consequences for their “preparation for responsible citizenship” (United States Department of Agriculture 1977: iii). This became an ever-greater source of anxiety for adults in the industrialized world, leading to the diagnosis of “nature deficit disorder” among twenty-first-century children (Louv 2005).

Such concerns also served as the basis for research taken up by scholars such as Kevin Lynch (1977), Colin Ward (1978), and Roger Hart (1979), who
worked to contextualize the urban behaviors of youth. In particular, Lynch’s UNESCO-sponsored study of youthful spatial engagements involved interviews with adolescents in Argentina, Australia, Mexico, and Poland. Researchers interviewed teenagers, asking them to draw their local environments. While some responses differed, adolescents uniformly approved of places associated with “trees, friends, quiet, lack of traffic, small size and cleanliness” (Lynch 1977: 49). Places they disliked included “school, boring places, where they are under control or have no friends” (49). Geographer Louise Chawla returned to these sites in the 1990s, finding youthful preferences largely unchanged (2001: 18–19).

The research of this era can also be understood as part of a burgeoning child rights discourse. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) echoes this scholarship, stressing the “responsibility of the State Parties to uphold the child’s right to live in a safe, clean and healthy environment and to engage in free play leisure and recreation” (Malone 2009). This advocacy was not just a means to “save” children or intervene in their lives; it shaped global and local policy by offering youth a forum to voice their views on space and place. This scholarly activism, however, has not been paired with a call for a specific youth rights discourse, as preoccupations with saving children and fears of unbridled youth energy still abound.

Yet, it remains an open-ended question whether youth need adult encouragement. In the realm of urban activism, youth have been fighting against both state and private interests in our current neoliberal age. David Harvey (2008) argues the “right to the city” should be an individual human right, while multiple urban social movements across Global North and Global South occupy public space to realize this claim (Castells 1983). The recent Arab uprisings typify these trends. From Tunisia to Syria, the retreat of the state in providing access to welfare has not been paired with a decrease in police force provision or unemployment. In addition, according to the UN Development Programme (2016), the region has experienced a demographic “youth bulge,” where 60 percent of the population are children and youth. Economic, political, and demographic factors have then worked to fashion oppositional youth political movements that want, as their popular slogan declares, “the fall of the regime.” These young people, and those who lead them, are not only interested in public space, but the overthrow of the regimes that (mis)manage it.

**INSTITUTIONAL SPACES AND PLACES**

Institutional spaces in the twentieth century include schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions. Like others described in this chapter, these spaces embodied attempts to control young people by the state, churches, private corporations, and other powerful interests. Yet, in her study of destitute children of the
late Ottoman Empire, Nazan Maksudyan implores historians to foreground youthful agency when studying even those institutions specifically designed to control young bodies and minds (2014). Youth can make place even in those institutions that have historically been the most coercive.

Institutional spaces have changed markedly across the twentieth century, reflecting shifting understandings of what it means to be young and the capabilities of youth. The influence of the child-saving movement from the late nineteenth century meant that young people were progressively shepherded from workplaces—factories and farms—into schools, as they became seen as “economically worthless” but “emotionally priceless” (Zelizer 1985). As cultural ideals concerning the vulnerability of youth shifted, legislation followed suit, mandating compulsory education and prohibiting paid employment until a certain age. Nevertheless, this transition occurred unevenly and at different times in different parts of the world, with some youth in Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), for example, prioritizing work over education into the mid-twentieth century (Lord 2011).

School designs mirror changing pedagogical theories and have been studied as places to educate, to socialize, and to inculcate civic values (Burke and Grosvenor 2008; Harwood 2010; Olgata 2013). From the mid-nineteenth century, school design was “teacher-focused” and reflected the belief that cleanliness, air circulation, and adequate light improved learning (Willis 2017: 1). The belief in the importance of fresh air and natural light found architectural expression in the “open-air schools” that emerged across Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, originally designed to foster physical health but also believed to improve learning (Châtelet et al. 2003).

By contrast, in some countries the carceral design of schools was overt, whether in Egypt during the colonial period (Mitchell 1991) or in Soviet Russia during the early twentieth century (Kirschenbaum 2001). But even when educational spaces explicitly attempted to fashion youthful bodies and minds, such efforts were not always successful. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, government officials and teachers designed extracurricular study groups to keep young people off the streets outside school hours. But these Chinese youth of the 1960s eschewed formal study to roam the streets, play ball, or read comics. When asked to explain their non-attendance, students replied: “The after-school groups aren’t fun. We are always studying and there is nothing else to do. It’s much more fun to play in the streets” (Brzycki 2019: 294).

The extent to which school spaces can mold the young people who use them is also influenced by students’ multiple subject positions. Students and teachers interpret and inhabit pedagogical environments in different ways depending on cultural and socioeconomic background, gender, sexuality, and disability status. The racially discriminatory nature of school spaces is particularly apparent in settler-colonial societies founded upon Indigenous dispossession. In their
study of the ways in which Australian school design for Aboriginal children has reflected competing educational and assimilationist government policies, Julie McLeod and Sianan Healy encourage us to understand “school classrooms as racialized spaces” (2017: 144). This has been explicitly demonstrated through school segregation in North America. When British Columbian educational authorities attempted to racially segregate Chinese Canadians in 1922–1923, students responded by striking (Stanley 2011). Similarly, racially segregated US schools in the 1940–1950s provided a backdrop for dissenting youth to demonstrate their agency (Nakata 2008). More recently, schools in industrialized societies have become the battleground for activism around creating inclusive environments for transgender students, including the provision of unisex toilets (Gozlan 2017).

As environments in which private bodily functions are performed semi-publicly, public toilets are culturally transgressive spaces where the boundaries between filth and hygiene, gender and sexuality are blurred (Pascoe Leahy 2015). School toilets are often the first public place where girls must practice the demanding requirements of “menstrual etiquette”: the unspoken expectation that all evidence of menstruation be hidden (Laws 1990). In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, girls miss school while menstruating due to a lack of effective products and hygienic bathroom facilities. Provision of menstrual products and clean toilets has become the subject of international development efforts, problematized by critical menstruation scholar Chris Bobel (2019). Cultural disgust associated with menstruation has generated damaging practices of “period shaming” from Kenya to Nepal. Even in places where a range of disposable and reusable products and accessible facilities are available, girls expend considerable anxiety and effort masking menstruation (Vostral 2008).

School spaces also reflect and indoctrinate attitudes towards religion, politics, class, and culture. In postcolonial regions, such as West Africa, school spaces have symbolized the history of foreign intervention, as schools shifted from missionary projects in the nineteenth century to international development efforts in the twentieth (Uduku 2017: 175–6). In 1950s Australia, students remember that religious intolerance was expressed through sectarian taunts such as “Proddy dogs, jump like frogs, in and out of the water” and “Ring the bell, ring the bell, while the Catholics go to hell” (Pascoe Leahy 2011: 155). Such children’s folklore represented class and cultural prejudices as much as sectarian divides and mirror similar rhymes from the United Kingdom and the United States (Knapp and Knapp 1975; Opie and Opie 1959, 1969).

Specialized hospitals for children developed in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century with the rise of pediatrics as a medical discipline and an increasing belief that sick young people should be separated from sick
adults. Philanthropic women were behind the early push for separate children’s hospitals, as part of the “charitable landscape for children” that emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Gutman 2014: 3). The number of children’s hospitals in North America tripled between 1890 and 1920 (Sloane 2008: 47). Apart from an emphasis upon play and fresh air, children’s hospitals were spatially indistinguishable from general hospitals for much of the twentieth century (Adams 2008: 55–6). Since the 1980s, a gradual emphasis on the impact of environment upon healing resulted in more playful and welcoming children’s hospital architecture (Adams et al. 2009: 658). One sixteen-year-old Canadian approved of this mall-inspired atmosphere, explaining that “teenagers usually like to chill and stuff” (Adams et al. 2009: 664). Another enthused about the liberal use of glass windows, explaining that “you feel free, like you are outside but you are really inside” (Adams et al. 2009: 663).

The institutional environments most infamously associated today with suffering are the welfare institutions designed to provide non-familial “care” for young people. Following government inquiries in a number of countries including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, and Sweden (Sköld and Swain 2015), these institutions have become associated with revelations of abuse. But through this process, they have sometimes been reclaimed as heritage sites, such as the Welfare Museum in Denmark, which offers a forum for survivors’ stories of abuse and resilience (Rytter and Rasmussen 2015).

Welfare institutions have inculcated young people in a range of cultural ideals including religious notions of virtue and sacrifice; imperial understandings of racial hierarchies; socioeconomic inequalities and political indoctrination. In Chile, orphanages like the Casa de Huérfanos reproduced class inequality, channeling disadvantaged young people from its “care” into domestic or agricultural service (Milanich 2009). In colonial societies such as 1930s and 1940s Uganda, institutions like the Kumi Children’s Leper Home run by missionaries sought to instill “civilized” habits and loyalty to the British Empire (Vongsathorn 2015b: 58). In Stalinist-era Russia, parentless young people were sometimes committed to orphanages for reasons of incarceration as well as welfare, in an attempt to prevent “dangerous” political ideas from spreading (Kelly 2007: 237–9).

Welfare institutions were often designed for efficiency—to manage the practicalities of feeding, washing, and sleeping large numbers of young people. These cavernous spaces were the opposite of the intimate scale of a private home (see Figure 2.4). Institutional buildings for children in “care” had impressive exteriors which belied the impoverished treatment of young people within. In her discussion of place-based memories of institutionalized youth, Australian historian Shurlee Swain concedes that their designs overwhelmingly “served to
contain and constrain.” Nevertheless, young people found ingenious strategies for sneaking out, engaging in prohibited activities or creating private space in overwhelmingly communal environments (Swain 2015).

Partially in response to revelations of abuse of young people in “care” and also in recognition of the impersonal nature of large institutional spaces, many welfare institutions have sought to de-institutionalize such buildings from the late twentieth century. Twenty-first-century Japan, for example, has witnessed a concerted effort to reduce the scale of child welfare facilities to provide something closer to “house-hold like care” (katei-tekī yōgo) (Goldfarb 2018: 243).

Sometimes categorical distinctions between different types of spaces are difficult to maintain. Twenty-first-century children’s hospitals, for example, are now designed to incorporate characteristics associated with recreation such as exhibitions, playgrounds, and food outlets. Schools and welfare institutions schedule leisure time for the young people within their grounds, with teachers and welfare workers determining permissible times for play, relaxation, or socialization. Yet across these institutions of constraint and regulation, young people regularly signal their competence at place-making through practices such as producing graffiti on toilet doors, temporarily escaping institutional walls, and decorating hospital wards, school lockers, and institutional beds.

FIGURE 2.4 Karagozyan National Orphanage in Istanbul, 1920s. This orphanage was for Armenian children in the wake of the Armenian Genocide. Similar to the examples above and below, it was crowded, racialized, and an attempt at civilizing. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
LEISURE SPACES AND PLACES

Leisure spaces for youth have multiplied dramatically across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This is linked to the rise of mass consumption and “uniform time” since the second half of the nineteenth century, whereby the day became broken into work time (or school) and non-work (or leisure) time (Ogle 2015: 56–61). As shown in Chapter 4 in this volume, this transformation marked the lives of adults too. Despite adult attempts to control leisure time and space, youth and children are often uninterested in, and face less social pressure to conform to, standards of work/non-work, transforming any space into a place of leisure with relative ease. Sometimes spaces of leisure are formal, adult-designated spaces such as playgrounds, skate parks, camps, and shopping centers. At other times they are informal, interstitial, and possibly temporary sites claimed by youth in defiance of adult expectations. These can include a parking lot, an abandoned factory, and even digital spaces.

Perhaps the most notable examples of adult-created leisure spaces are playgrounds, which proliferated from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries across North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand in response to the concerns of urban planners and social reformers regarding youthful street-play (Cavallo 1981; de Coninck-Smith 1990; Gatley 2001; Goodman 1979; Pascoe Leahy 2017b). In Denmark, Herbert Spencer’s theories on good conduct were mobilized by educators to cordon young people into playgrounds, parks, and sandboxes, and away from “traditional play areas: the street, the gutter, and the vacant lot” (de Coninck-Smith 1990: 54). While the latter were unregulated, likely a site of place-making, the former worked to limit the free space of youth in the city.

While adults create playgrounds with specific intentions for their use, young people find ingenious methods to undermine such intentions. In addition, no space or place is temporally static. A single space can be used by diverse groups of youth at different times of day. Take a school playground, for example. During the day, school-aged children utilize play equipment during designated breaks from lessons. Once the final bell rings, the space may fill with the younger siblings of school students and their parents. Later, as these prepubescent youngsters go home for dinner and darkness falls, teenagers may occupy the same space. Lacking private domestic spaces and funds to access spaces of consumption, or perhaps wishing to engage in activities that adults deem inappropriate, these older youth claim “childhood spaces” as their own. For the nocturnal hours at least, young people can smoke, drink alcohol, take drugs, engage in sexual experimentation, practice graffiti, or simply hang out. In the morning, the only evidence of their night-time appropriation of place may be cigarette butts, beer cans, scrawled graffiti “tags,” or used condoms: puzzling artifacts of a half-glimpsed world of adolescent experiences to the children of the morning.
If youth temporarily colonize childhood spaces, they similarly invade adult-designated venues. Globally, young people have used cafes, bars, and pubs—sometimes illegally—as places to socialize, listen to music, and become intoxicated. In postwar Britain, working-class youth denoted their affiliations with “mainstream” or “alternative” youth cultures through listening to music and/or dancing at particular clubs and pubs (Kenny 2019). With a strong oral tradition of storytelling, coffeehouses were important institutions for youth in the Arab world since at least the eighteenth century (Sajdi 2013). In twentieth-century Egypt, historian Ziad Fahmy (2011) argues these places were not solely for leisure; they were central to the development of colloquial Egyptian nationalism, performed by young middle-class singers, playwrights, and actors, and consumed by the masses.

Shopping centers and malls have become increasingly popular spaces to buy items of youthful consumer culture (like clothing and music) or simply to spend time socializing. The former confirms this space as privately owned, adult-constructed, and designed to produce the capitalist exchanges that are necessary for its existence. The latter points to how young people can transform the shopping center into “their” place. Indeed, the growth in consumer-oriented spaces has offered youth new places to socialize outside the home at skate parks and video game arcades, like the one from Japan below (see Figure 2.5). But alongside this a discourse of juvenile delinquency has developed, with its connotations of youth “out of place”: transgressing spatial expectations and illegally marking spaces through practices like graffiti (Malone 2001: 6–7).

FIGURE 2.5 Young men playing video games at an arcade in Tokyo, 2017. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
In an effort to resist the expansion of “mass private space” during the early 2000s in Australia, some malls were designed for both public commercial activity and recreational community-building (White and Sutton 2001: 73). A decade later in Turkey, young men and women protested the removal of a park and trees (to make way for a shopping center), in what became known as the 2013 Gezi Park Protest (Odabaş and Reynolds-Stenson 2018). In the Australian example, cultivating an identity through consumption can be a place of adult infiltration and a place of youth empowerment. At the same time, as demonstrated in the Turkish example, youth may protest against what they perceive as soulless spaces of consumption in favor of places of long-standing leisure activity.

Despite occasions where youth have resisted changes to leisure places or practices, across many historical periods and regions young people have participated in broad consumptive and technological trends. Over the past century, youth have enjoyed rising access to technologies of mobility including bicycles, cars, and public transport (Barker et al. 2009). Of course, use of these technologies depends on one’s location and class, and can exclude young people with disabilities (Lindsay 2018). In places where mass production has worked to erode class and/or cultural distinctions based upon consumption, such as the postwar United States, transport like the car could also empower youth from diverse backgrounds. For African American youth, it served as an alternative to the segregated train—albeit not devoid of racism, as evidenced by police brutality against young African Americans in cars—and a springboard to demand “rights equal to those held by white travelers” (Rugh 2008: 91). For Latino/a youth, the customized lowrider car became a place for self-expression and resistance (Chappell 2013). And for American youth of multiple races and genders, the car serves as both a consumer space (playing music, eating food, watching drive-in movies) and a sexualized one (Bailey 1989).

Furthermore, until the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted the global travel industry in 2020, the growing affordability of international transport transformed youth mobility. Travel as a rite of passage moved from the preserve of the wealthy in the nineteenth century to a more common phenomenon in the twentieth and early twenty first centuries, underpinned by study-abroad initiatives and the phenomenon of backpacking as a mode of youthful adventuring. Richard Ivan Jobs argues that as backpacking exploded across postwar Europe, these “Backpack Ambassadors” integrated regions within Europe that had diverse cultural and political traditions (2017). The future significance of travel for youth remains to be seen, but such examples remind us that youth leisure is never inconsequential and always political, whether it is the product of adult designs or youthful performances.

Perhaps most significantly, young people’s knowledge of and contact with a range of places across the globe has escalated in line with the growth of
media and communication technologies. This interconnection, facilitated particularly through digital media, plays a focal role in current practices of leisure and place-making. Mediums include television, video games, computers, and smartphones, which are increasingly utilized by young people in private spaces within the home—notwithstanding the prevalence of the internet café in the Global South. The rise of virtual spaces means that young people can now access the world without ever leaving their bedrooms (Reid 2017).

In some respects, this retreat to the bedroom reinforces isolation and private space. Take the recent unboxing phenomenon, where child YouTube stars from around the world open toys in their homes, while other young people watch, often from their homes. While youth may participate in this leisure activity in groups, recent research has found that these videos do not encourage civic engagement, as the “only appeals are for an increase in the number of likes, comments on their videos and subscribers” (Pereira, Moura and Fillol 2018: 118). While such private leisure may be a response to the restriction of young people’s spatial freedoms in the street, technology can also connect diverse youth in multiple spaces (Malone 2001). For example, the aforementioned 2013 Gezi protest to preserve a public park connected digital and physical spaces and united youth-centric labor unions, queer activists, racial minorities, and even soccer clubs (Gürcan and Peker 2015). Also, to overemphasize youth isolation would be to discount the role of digital social activism, including the #BlackLivesMatter movement in the United States and the #BringBackOurGirls movement that began in Nigeria in response to abductions of schoolgirls (Earl and Kimport 2011). As with other categories of space and place, control and empowerment work in uneasy tension when investigating the ever-shifting frontiers of twenty-first-century youth leisure.

CONCLUSION

Twenty-first-century adults in the Global North often bemoan the lack of independent mobility and limited access to nature experienced by young people. While a valid concern, it is compounded by more basic issues in the Global South: rising youth unemployment in the face of shrinking state welfare. These crises that afflict young people today have both constricted youth “free time” and made unregulated spaces harder to come by. Nevertheless, youth of the past century have consistently shown that they can turn limited space—whether it be domestic, public, institutional, or leisure—into place.

Domestic space and place-making underwent significant transformations over the twentieth century, as house design reflected a move towards more affectionate parent-child relations, with “family rooms” designed to facilitate recreation for all household members. Despite parental attempts to supervise
and shape their offspring, young people have displayed aptitude at creating private places, whether they be in cramped urban apartments in China, sprawling suburban houses in the USA or semi-rural villages in Ghana. Mechanisms for state control of public spaces have grown more sophisticated over the past century, but young people have consistently carved out places for fashioning youth cultures, social identities, and political positions. In response to youthful memories of callousness and maltreatment, institutions such as orphanages, hospitals, and schools have increasingly attempted to transform cold, impersonal spaces into more home-like and intimate places. And as youth embraced leisure spaces like malls and skate parks, they also undermined adult design intentions by repurposing playgrounds, abandoned industrial sites, and vacant lots. Sometimes influenced by consumer trends and sometimes linked to illicit behaviors, such leisure places and practices always exhibit hybrid combinations of the local and the global, the formal and the vernacular. Ultimately all of the spaces and places discussed herein, and those that we could not include, intersect and overlap.

Physical environments are always subject to written and unwritten rules about who may use them and how. The key argument of this chapter is that whilst adults and the state consistently impose expectations and constraints upon young people’s use of spaces, young people are adept at discovering or modifying those environments to create places that suit their needs. These needs may serve liberating, autonomous ends, towards preparation for adult socialization, or represent a general resistance or reinforcement of the status quo. Nonetheless, these spaces, and the practices that constitute them, matter a great deal in the global history of young people since the twentieth century.

Perhaps the greatest shift in youthful spatial engagement over the past century has been an increasing alienation from nature, as urban spaces have expanded and wilderness areas grown more scarce. Although natural places feature prominently and vividly in young people’s place memories, such places are becoming harder to access in the early twenty-first century. More worryingly, the very existence of natural places is under threat from climate change, deforestation, waste, and pollution. As custodians of the planet’s future, children and youth have been outspoken advocates for stronger environmental protections, leading global climate strikes since 2019. The future of young people’s spatial interactions will be dramatically impacted by whether young activists like Ugandan Hilda Flavia Nakabuye, Indian Disha A. Ravi, and Swedish Greta Thunberg are successful in their pleas for adults to enact more sustainable ways of interacting with place.
INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the iconic Ivorian band Magic System released the anthem “Un Gaou à Paris,” which told the tale of a young guy from Abidjan and his journey to a cold and hostile Paris. The song’s opening lyrics, “Mon rêve c’était d’aller à Paris, Je n’savais pas ce qui m’attendait,” foreshadowed the hero’s misfortunes (Magic System 2001). In Paris, the youth would encounter nothing but individualism, immiseration, friendlessness, and police harassment. “Un Gaou” was a character that Magic System had made famous in the previous year’s megahit, *Premier Gaou* (2000). That infectious tune, which made all the playlists from Maputo to Marrakech, was a romantic morality tale featuring a young woman named Antou who disregarded her admirer until he became a famous radio star. The 2001 follow-up chronicle, “Un Gaou à Paris,” took a more somber turn and established Magic System as balladeers of a generation of dispossessed postcolonial African youth in diaspora. The poignancy of the young man’s tale rested on its overfamiliarity to the song’s international audiences. When the song played, those of us who identified with its sentiments danced because we were one with “un gaou” and we knew his Paris was everywhere. We danced for “un gaou,” or his female equivalent, who were out there—somewhere in the Global North trying their luck and seeking their fortunes within the cracks of society’s margins.

This chapter examines the histories underlying the parable of “Un Gaou à Paris.” What historical paths and forces drove the song’s protagonist into clandestine Paris? What can the survival strategies of dispossessed youth around
the world tell us about interactions between the histories of youth, labor, and education in the twentieth century? To answer these questions, I track shifts in the symbolism of youth, work, and education over the course of the twentieth century. Rather than hitching the sequencing of this account to standard global history transition points like the world wars or the era of decolonization, I focus on the interaction between economic systems and social and subjective ideas of individual value, and the ways in which these mediated, and were mediated by, the labor and educational prospects of young people. In this view, three turning points become important: the emergence of formal extractive economies and their doubles, informal economies; the institutionalization of mass education as part of a modernist package for national economic growth; and the global creep of neoliberalism that attended the late twentieth-century crises of capitalism. For the first phase, I focus on colonized youth and industrial mining across the African continent to illustrate the utility of youth in labor-hungry economies. For the second part, I focus on the mid-twentieth-century period when youth education became an important pillar of national development strategies for underdeveloped nation-states across Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. For the third section, I focus on the later twentieth century when technological advances had de-skilled formerly labor-intensive fields in Asia, Europe, and North America, thus diminishing youth labor and education as national priorities. Throughout my analysis, I draw attention to symbolic meanings of education, work, a concept of “realwork,” and to youth adaptations to changing circumstances. “Work,” Charles Tilly writes, “includes any human effort adding use value to goods and services” (2018: 22). Regardless of the nature of the activity, where it is performed, or how its performers feel about it, any human activity that adds value to goods and services constitutes work. “Realwork,” as I use it here, denotes regular waged employment in the formal economy. As Western-style capitalism and industrialization spread their logistical and conceptual imprints across the globe, wage work outside the home ascended to become realwork, diminishing the status of other forms of work. Agro-pastoral labor, peasant labor, and domestic labor became slotted into a kind of lower status non-work category.

Following Mamadou Diouf (2003), I argue that the twentieth century witnessed the revaluation of youth from being seen as assets of the nation to burdens on the state. Whereas in the early to mid-twentieth century, young people were valued as important to the economic ambitions of their states, by the end of the century national economies around the world had been restructured in ways that positioned young people and their needs as antagonistic to the wealth accumulation of states. This was a dark play on the career of Viviana Zelizer’s “priceless child” (Zelizer 1985). Sharp pivots in how youth was economically valued had impacts on social investments in education and on how young people would engage with, or disengage from, formal education.
systems. Not only did reversals in the economic valuation of youth occur across the twentieth century, but the reversals befell different parts of the world at different points in time, starting with the “developing” world and spreading to more industrialized countries as they slid into the post-industrial era. This revaluation simultaneously intensified and weakened the relationship between education and work, as well as the significance of education to young people who observed the ties between educational requirements and work becoming more situational than fixed. In the face of diminishing access to realwork for youth globally, and widening divides between the interests of youth and state bodies, the latter decades of the twentieth century found growing numbers of young people pursuing non-normative labor practices, such as self-marketing via social media or pursuing irregular transnational migration, in order to experience the work-derived sense of personal value that had been reliably available to earlier generations (Dunn 2015; Migration Data Portal 2020).

MINING YOUTH LABOR AND COLONIALISMS

By 1920, much of the world was bifurcated between colonial powers and aspiring colonizers on one side, and territories that were subject to their domination or aggression on the other. Across the Global South wars of colonial conquest in the previous century had transformed broad swathes of the world’s population and their home territories into founts of cheap natural resources and cheap labor. By the early twentieth century, the devastating military conquests of European, American, and Japanese imperial powers had pacified much of the planet into labor-hungry instruments of extractive capitalism. Even within industrialized imperial nations, structural hierarchies of race, class, caste, ethnic, religious, and sex difference ensured that internal others who were made to constitute the domestic laboring classes would be tasked with transforming colonial natural resources into much more lucrative manufactured commodities. In the first half of the twentieth century, when economic and political power were closely correlated with the extent and variety of territory under an imperial nation-state’s control, the availability of labor was the only limit on building national reputation. Within such contexts, youth labor was needed for economic growth and cultivated using various policy instruments. At this phase of colonial domination, however, youth were not developed or cultivated as individuals, even though youth labor as an abstracted concept was valued as an asset to growing colonial economic power.

During the First World War and for at least two decades after, the labor of young people in colonized territories played a significant role in underwriting the recovery and growth of European economies. In industrializing European colonies in Africa for example, fast-growing mining industries devoured young
male workers into the maw of closed mining compounds. In the southern Africa region between 1920 and 1938, the African labor population working in goldmines doubled from two hundred thousand to around four hundred thousand, many of them young men (Harms 2018). Young men from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Botswana were funneled by inter-colonial recruiting agencies into the holds of European-owned gold and diamond mines in South Africa. As mineral exploration and mineral discoveries spread into places like Zambia and the Belgian Congo, those colonies also evolved elaborate migrant labor systems that siphoned the labor of young men from their home communities and into the pockets of European mining companies. In the Kilo-Moto mines of the Belgian Congo, estimates are that through the 1930s and into the mid-1940s, about 35 percent of men in the region were always occupied in working for the colonial companies (Harms 2018). In contrast to women and older men, young men were targeted by the lucrative sectors of the industrial economy. Mining companies pressured colonial governments to impose tax policies that would force young men to leave their agricultural and pastoral communities in search of colonial employment.

FIGURE 3.1 Zulu workers at the De Beers diamond mines. © Universal History Archive/Getty Images, c. 1885.
THE LURE AND TYRANNY OF WAGEWORK

As cash economies became embedded over time, new factors beyond coercion also played a role in driving the massive growth of the mining labor numbers in parts of Africa. Young men sought out mine labor for the relatively quick returns they could realize relative to the pastoral and agricultural work that had previously been prevalent. By choosing how many sequential labor contracts to enter, young men stood to accumulate cash as individuals. Cash became important as a symbol of wealth in the high colonial period, and cash earnings gave young men new dimensions of independence from patriarchal homesteads in which wealth was generally correlated with seniority. By going into mine labor, some young men gained a new path to marriage, property, and establishing homesteads, a path that was at least potentially independent of the control of their elders.

In extractive colonial economies built on the large-scale commercial cultivation of agricultural products, similar processes were played out. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the tremendous labor needs of capitalist agriculture drove the enactment of labor and taxation policies that funneled young men and their labor power away from African communities and into the individualized employ of colonial merchants and companies. In Algeria, capitalist commercial agriculture specializing in the production of wheat and wine dominated the economy. Following the protracted fifty-year war of colonial conquest, half a million native Algerians were dispossessed of their lands, which were given instead to southern European settler colonists. At first, land deprivation, the labor needs of colonists, and artfully designed economic policies drove local people to seek work on settler farms. Political and economic interests dovetailed to ensure that the labor of Algerian farmers would be cheap and easy to obtain for large-scale European-owned commercial agriculture enterprises. But by the 1930s when wheat production became more mechanized, rendering 95 percent of the labor formerly performed by farmworkers redundant, young Algerians began migrating ever farther to gain access to work—beyond their villages, their cities, and ultimately beyond the North African region, until, like predecessors of Magic System’s hero, they were migrating in the hundreds of thousands to seek subsistence work in France (Harms 2018).

A clear side effect of the mass migration of young men’s labor from African communities into strongholds of colonial industrial power was that performing the burden of subsistence agricultural and pastoral labor for the survival of African communities fell largely to women, many of them also young. Colonial migrant labor policies not only targeted young men and their labor power but also actively restricted the mobility of young women. By mutual agreement of colonial state powers and local authorities, the labor and taxation laws designed to extract young male labor also provided for young women to remain...
contained in home areas, where they assumed a greater burden for providing for the subsistence needs of entire communities.

Across the Atlantic a very different history of labor migration was unfolding. In the United States, the period after 1920 saw the acceleration of a process of mass labor migration that had begun a few years earlier. The first and second Great Migrations found millions of Black Americans abandoning the southern United States—some to the West Coast, others to the Midwest, and most to the Northern industrial cities. This historic and demographically transformative migration process is understood as having been fueled by the yearning of individuals and families to escape subjection to “poverty and peonage … repression and lynchings … stagnant wages, and the daily violence and indignities of Jim Crow” (White, Bay, and Martin 2017). These mass migrations were also fueled by the search for better work and education, two concerns that were particularly relevant to young people’s lives and futures (Chatelain 2015).

**CAPITALIZING ON YOUTH VITALITY IN SERVICE TO THE NATION-STATE**

Across the early twentieth-century world, in tropical colonies and imperial strongholds, the utility of young bodies to the labor pool was clear but it had no direct relationship to formal education. The aftermath of the Second World War saw the rise of new development-focused states that sought to harness youth education and labor to the interests of national economic growth as well as national political consolidation. What is important to note is that by the mid-twentieth century, the youthful body itself had diminished in value to states; now, youth plus a certain amount of formal education was desired. The economic question was how much investment in youth education was sufficient to generate wealth for the state? The answer depended on how youth was imagined. Where political classes envisioned youth as vanguards of desired transformation, investments could be proportionally high. In places where ruling elites sought to perpetuate the status quo, the question of how much to invest in youth education was cynically reframed as “what is the minimum public investment that could be made to perpetuate the profitability of young people?” This was the case across much of Latin America, for example, where the expansion of mass education was a phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century. One explanation for its lateness, relative to Europe or North America, is that in the region’s majority rural states, which featured marked income inequality with wealth sharply split between an elite Creole minority and an Indigenous or Afro-descendant majority, political elites displayed resistance to investing in mass common education. It was not until the 1940s that the scale
of primary school provision and rates of primary school attendance across Latin America began to approach the patterns found in England or the northern United States (Frankema 2009). The point is that where national wealth, or at least the wealth of political elites, seemed to be sustainable without the need for investments in education or in other dimensions of human capital development, costly private education and sparsely distributed missionary education were the chief forms available and large-scale state funded mass education of youth was de-prioritized (Baker 1999; Dorius 2013). This was the case in tropical European colonies and in the racially stratified republics of Latin America.

Investing in youth education as a pillar of national development was a pronounced feature of postcolonial governance in the second half of the twentieth century. Education spending from the primary to tertiary levels was a priority for newly independent countries eager to catch up economically with the former imperial powers of Europe. In Africa, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed rapid educational expansion, albeit unevenly distributed across newly independent countries and within them, across different regions and demographic constituencies.

Gender differences in educational access were also a feature of the rapid expansion period that generally followed immediately after independence. As Camilla Cockerton notes, “Governments made particular efforts to improve

![A class at the University of Nigeria in Lagos, June 1961. Photo by Pix/Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images.](image)
school enrollments for girls. In the 1960s the percentage of girls aged six to eleven years enrolled in primary schools doubled from 17 to 35 percent compared with an increase from 46 to 63 percent for boys. The figures [subsequently] rose to 44 percent for girls and 74 percent for boys” (Cockerton 2004). While these numbers did fall drastically at the secondary level and even further at the tertiary level, the overall picture was of a push to get more youth educated as part of a multi-pronged strategy for achieving rapid national development.

Youth were not only subjects of mass education and national development initiatives. Youth were also agents of the same. In the quasi-militarist youth corps programs that sprang up in a number of countries during the second half of the twentieth century, young people were directly mobilized for national and transnational service as educators (Obadare 2010). In Nigeria for example, following a traumatic thirty-month period—July 1967 to January 1970—that saw an attempted secession, the internal displacement of millions, and a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of citizens, the government instituted a program of national reconciliation centered on educated youth. The program, known as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), was instituted to promote national rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation. Through the NYSC, sets of undergraduates representing a range of ethnic communities were to be mobilized for one year of national service outside of their home regions. The postwar government held many ambitions for the NYSC and devised many forms that youth service could take. These included rendering service in hospitals, on farms, with water-schemes, road construction, surveying and mapping, social and economic services, food storage and pest eradication, sports development, working in government departments, on development projects of local councils, and of course in the education sphere where youth could be mobilized to both build schools and to provide instruction in under-resourced communities (Obadare 2010).

A similar example comes from the Caribbean where following the six-year Cuban revolution that overthrew the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, pupils were called up in a massive 1961 national literacy campaign to serve as volunteer educators. About 250,000 young people answered the call, fanning out in trucks and trainloads from Havana throughout the rest of the country. The brigadistas, as the youth educators were called, taught literacy throughout the island but were concentrated in the countryside where illiteracy was endemic. The young teachers were mostly secondary school students. At least 40 percent of them were under eighteen during the alfabetización campaign, although some were much younger. Estimates are that seven hundred thousand people learned to read from the young brigadistas of the literacy campaign (Bhola 1984). Half of the brigadistas were young women, for whom this form of national service, undertaken away from the oversight of their conventional urban families, constituted an opportunity to participate in the ongoing Cuban
revolution and produced deep subjective transformations that led many to break with pre-existing societal norms (Murphy 2013).

Gender is important to consider in this history as it forms a primary axis of difference in determining the significance of education and work in relation to youth across the twentieth century. For example, the education of young women lagged far behind the formal education of young men into the mid-twentieth century as did rates of absorption of young women into regular wage work. But by the late twentieth century, the gender gap in education was largely closed (statistically speaking) and in some parts of the world inverted. This transformation in the world’s educated population went along with major transformations in the global workforce, such that informal and part-time work steadily came to surpass the availability of full-time work in global labor markets. In short, with historically high levels of female education and the widespread devaluation of labor over the second half of the twentieth century, women workers assumed greater proportions of the waged workforce, approaching the rates of male labor market participation in many places and surpassing them in a few (Heath and Jayachandran 2018; Ortiz-Ospina and Tzvetkova 2017; Shambaugh, Nunn, and Portman 2017).

The history of the Inanda Girls’ Seminary in South Africa provides a clear illustration of several dimensions of this confluence of gender, education, and labor. Inanda was founded as a Protestant missionary institution in the mid-nineteenth century to produce suitable wives for new African clerics; by the end of the twentieth century the school was embedded with transnational corporate networks as a source of educated and inexpensive female youth labor (Healy-Clancy 2013). Unlike its brother school, Adams College, Inanda persisted, and largely as an independent school, through the ascendance of the apartheid state, the rise of Black consciousness when schools around South Africa became battlegrounds in the resistance against the apartheid states’ Bantu education laws, and it even survived the end of apartheid when desegregation meant, along with other things, that schools like Inanda would lose their monopoly on attracting the brightest female students from the most well-to-do Black families. One of the strategies the school’s administration adopted to remain open and maintain their liberal arts curriculum was to form funding relationships with multinational corporations. In the 1970s, the opening of a secretarial school at Inanda was brokered by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, an Inanda parent who later rose to high political office in the Natal Province. During celebrations for the opening of the secretarial school, Buthelezi said: “Our women folk are miles ahead of our male population as in every sphere they seem to be taking to education as a duck takes to water” (Healy-Clancy 2013: 146). In apartheid South Africa, as Buthelezi noted, African girls took to schooling enthusiastically and in large numbers. Even though the professions open to them were limited to the less remunerative service sectors like teaching, nursing, and secretarial...
work, girls seized the opportunities that having a formal education afforded them. Funded through a collaboration of the South Africa branch of the multinational company IBM and the Department of Bantu Education, Inanda’s secretarial school provided a pipeline to realwork for its graduates and a moral laundry service for the multinational company that was profiteering from the apartheid system in South Africa.

Why did girls embrace schooling? Historians suggest that the question might be somewhat misstated, as it was not only the desire of girls for schooling or for professions that explains the proportions of girls who went to school. The state and the corporations also found it beneficial to have girls educated and working in the formal economy. As Meaghan Healy-Clancy writes, “White capitalists and homeland leaders looked to schooling to make separate development work—entailing growing opportunities in feminized professions” (Healy-Clancy 2013: 147). The feminization of educated workers was key. It is telling that in government crackdowns on anti-Bantu education protests, Adams College was closed as an independent private missionary school and brought under the government’s Bantu education regime, which was designed to limit the educational and work prospects of African students, while Inanda was allowed to continue as an independent missionary run institution.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, formal Western-style education was not necessary for most people to achieve material success. But by the second half of the century it was indispensable to securing “realwork,” responsibility, and status. Even within an apartheid state, by the 1960s and 1970s, education had become a powerful determinant of economic and social success for young women and young men, and of the ability of youth to successfully transition out of a stage of dependence on caretakers to become independent earners in industrial capitalist economies.

**YOUTH UNDER NEOLIBERALISM: DIVESTMENTS AND ADAPTATIONS**

The late twentieth century was characterized by a series of economic recessions: postcolonial states in Latin America and Africa were struck first, in the 1970s and 1980s. Nation-states across Africa experienced stagflation in these decades, diminution in export quantities and export prices from their largely monocrop economies, ballooning national debt burdens as countries borrowed heavily from private lenders, and the constriction of the state to follow IMF structural adjustment policy mandates. These changes in turn produced high rates of unemployment in the formal economy sector and governmental divestment from what had been ambitious mass education programs in the decade before (Hirsch and Lopes 2020). The African experience with neoliberalism
foreshadowed what would soon obtain elsewhere (Ferguson 2006). Recessions in Asia, Europe, and North America followed in the 1990s. Although there were many differences among affected states, in all cases their recessions showed a clear pattern to the interplay among youth, work, education, and the economy. Generally, the recessions saw the marginalization of youth from the formal economies where what labor protections were available were reserved for older workers while younger people were pushed into the informal, casual, irregular labor markets.

Japan, for instance, had established itself as the world’s second-largest economy by 1978. At its height, the Japanese economy featured an interventionist state pursuing rapid development, a network of large corporations employing thousands each year, and a culture of lifetime jobs for male breadwinners. Until the recession of the early 1990s, these features sustained a Japanese economy into which new younger workers were regularly integrated. The South Korean developmentalist state followed a similar model of economic planning combining state investments in education and in large corporations, which in turn provided lifelong careers of full-time employment to workers (Hamaaki, Hori, Maeda, and Murata 2012).

When the recessions hit, Japan and South Korea pursued various strategies to mitigate the damage to national wealth. Like many African and Latin American countries had before them, South Korea approached international financial institutions for loans. The loans came with structural adjustment conditions that resulted, among other things, in an immediate tripling of the unemployment rate from 2.5 percent to 8 percent between 1998 and 1999. In Japan, what became known as their “Lost Decades” also saw spikes in part-time employment and underemployment, concentrated among younger workers, as the proportion of full-time workers in the Japanese labor market dropped from 80 percent at the start of the crisis to just under 68 percent as the recession’s effects dragged on through the 2000s (Song 2012). New sociological categories like freeters or prekariato, referring to freelancers or a precarious labor class, entered the Japanese labor vocabulary, attesting to how widespread a disturbance the recession had wrought on the Japanese economy (Oberer 2016). In both Japan and South Korea, the tradition of lifetime corporate employment was dismantled and replaced with dualist systems in which employment protections were extended to workers with more seniority while short term, part-time, freelance employment became normative for younger workers (Song 2012). China, by contrast, had pursued an economic growth formula that relied on the cheap production of cheap products by cheap labor for a global mass market that was itself in financial decline. This model of state-directed growth was, paradoxically, best able to absorb young workers, albeit as an undervalued and flexible yet vital and educated labor pool (Cho and Apple 1998; Lukacs 2015).
One consistent strategy for addressing the recessions was that states liberalized their markets and loosened regulations that had been designed to protect their economies from external market fluctuations. Liberalization at the governance level tended to introduce new profit-generating interventions into the financial and economic sectors. The efficiencies that profit-making required—lowered outlays, cheaper resources, cheaper labor, lower costs to moving production systems—combined to reduce the quantity and quality of realwork that was available to the working-class, middle-class, and underclass majority of the world’s population. In contexts of work scarcity, young people were restricted access to stable, waged employment. The labor crises produced by late twentieth-century recessions and restructurings affected youth deeply. Ideologies of seniority and masculinity in which the male breadwinner was held up as a model of the productive contributor to society combined with other axes of social division and hierarchy such as race, religion, caste, and urbanity to affirm the entitlement of senior men of dominant backgrounds to holding the most regular, remunerative, and traditional forms of work. Youth, who had been the focus of human resource development efforts in the mid-twentieth century, were disenfranchised and left to their own devices to either triumph or fail at meeting the standards of successful productive social adulthood.

The abiding question remained how to harness the vitality of youth for the enrichment of the state. This question was complicated by the apparent disentangling of state interests and market interests. The more robust economies became located in companies and sectors rather than national systems. Efficiencies of production arising from globalization, digitization, and other factors made labor a hirer’s game. In the face of work scarcity, youth were sidelined in the labor market by more long-standing workers who sought to perpetuate their own access to work and the meanings of work that undergirded their identities as productive members of society.

In some wealthy countries, the marginalization of youth from the labor market manifested in the proliferation of training programs for less educated youth and internships and freelance jobs for better educated and higher skilled youth. Internships permitted access to youth labor, perpetuated the idea of one’s productive value being correlated with age, and fueled continuing investment by young people in the wage labor-based value system by holding out the promise that a young person might achieve the grand prize of realwork. There was a long interregnum imposed by industrialization and post-industrialization in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, through which work and education were decoupled and then placed in tension with each other (through the notion that one does not, or should not, work in the phase of education because pursuing education interferes with one’s ability to work). But the postmodern post-industrial economy reintroduced earlier ideas, particularly for young people, newly grounded in the pursuit of financial efficiency. The apprentice of
earlier eras, now appearing in the form of the intern, was a category of worker so strongly associated with youth that a film called *The Intern* was made, built completely on the wild idea of an elderly intern (Meyers 2015).

In many parts of the world—particularly across the Global South—the confluence of non-industrialization, economic liberalization, and vulnerability to the forces of globalization all came together with fundamental demographic shifts that saw youth emerging as the majority of national citizens. The insecurities bred by post-industrial economies threw into question the relationship between education and labor. Education and skills tailored to the knowledge economy became increasingly vital to accessing meaningful work. At the same time, the efficiencies of the postmodern economy dictated that most youth would not be able to acquire realwork and that they would need to forge new paths to identity formation which did not rely on mastering the role of the productive worker. Making the ideational transition in a changing economy was one of a number of responses that late twentieth-century youth could have. The shifting ground of the postmodern economy fueled the rise of a life stage dubbed “waithood” that scholars including Mozambican anthropologist Alcinda Honwana have discussed. “Waithood,” Honwana explains,

> describes a period of suspension in which young people are unable to attain the social markers of adulthood- find stable employment, marry and provide for their families, and contribute to society as full-fledged citizens. In this period of limbo, young people are no longer considered to be children in need of care, but are not yet social adults, capable of taking on the social responsibilities of adulthood.

(2013: 12)

In short, waithood is a kind of developmental purgatory: a life stage defined by tedium, anxiety, and a hopeless hopefulness, wherein one is perpetually in a state of yearning for full social adulthood. Most scholars agree with Honwana’s observation that waithood results from failed neoliberal economic policies, bad governance, political instability or political disenfranchisement, corruption, and the absence of civil liberties. The phenomenon of waithood was first acutely witnessed in various parts of the African continent, then the Middle East, and it is increasingly showing evidence in Europe and the Americas. The specific symptoms vary according to the society but in all places and cases, waithood lies at the intersection of a work-based social value system and an extractivist economy in which workers are practically expendable. Whether we are talking about the mechanized extraction of rare earth minerals for tech devices or the automated extraction of individuals’ metadata for technology companies, the fact is that the processes involved did not require the involvement of large numbers of workers.
The qualities of waithood most keenly observed by scholars were those qualities that served to reify youth as a masculine category. The attributes of waithood were consistently understood as the inability to “obtain work and become independent – to build, buy, or rent a house ... support their relatives, get married, establish families” (Honwana 2014: 28). These attributes constructed the normative social adult as an individual who was financially independent yet socially networked, who provided shelter and material support to dependent kin, and who established households that would be populated with their created family. This was a portrait of the patriarchal head of household who is a producer not a consumer in the household economy, a caretaker and not a dependent.

The phenomenon of waithood is tied to gendered expectations of financial independence. For much of the twentieth century when financial independence was a feature of both adulthood and masculinity, the failure to achieve it was more attributed to males than females. Sexual reproductive capacity was operationalized to define female adult value in the same ways that financial independence worked for definitions of male adult value. Indeed, female economic dependence was structurally built into socioeconomic systems through the imposition of barriers to the acquisition of realwork, the devaluation of realwork performed by women in the formal economy, the obfuscation of socially reproductive work performed largely by women outside the wage work system, and the moral condemnation of the pursuit of wealth by women. Nevertheless, the end of the twentieth century saw the convergence of the decline of realwork, the depression of its monetary value, and the normalization of female workers in formal economies. The rise of the female worker in the post-industrial economy, even with her depressed wages, promises to re-gender waithood, changing it from a masculine phenomenon to one that is truly a general experience of youth who ground their subjective value in their capacities to earn while yet experiencing structural frustration in their abilities to do so.

Besides being age-based and gendered, was waithood also classed? Was it more an experience of the frustrated working and middle classes than that of the underclass? A study of white working-class male youth in the northeast of England illustrates the role class played in the enduring purchase of work-based definitions of individual value. In Anoop Nayak’s comparative study, “Real Geordies,” a subgroup of young men descended from skilled industrial workers, and “Chavs,” another subgroup of young men whose ancestry featured casual laborers or multigenerational underemployment, were both by the 1990s redundant to a post-industrial regional economy centered on
Newcastle. While the Real Geordies were able to secure part-time work, enter training, and through other forms of irregular wage work get access to cash, Chavs were understood to be excluded even from that. Ethnographic studies among the youth found that even in the absence of formal wage work as a material point of differentiation between these two youth subcultures, they continued to regard each other as different in ways that were consistent with the logics of an industrial past (Nayak 2006). Put differently, Real Geordies continued to adhere to an idea of their subjectivities being defined by their capacity for productive work: they saw themselves as jobseekers, still in the market for realwork despite their protracted un- and underemployment, and the likelihood of the situation continuing. Real Geordies understood themselves as working class despite not really working. What became important then was an alternate grounding for working-class identity; it became defined negatively against an idea of the Chav which was classed, racialized, and as one writer put it, demonized (Jones 2011). The key here is that the ideology that held realwork to be the basis of individual social value, full social adulthood, and social success continued to exert a hold on the imagination even as the means of realizing this form of success became increasingly inaccessible.

What made some young people’s continuing attachment to realwork possible was the material support provided by their extended families. Nayak points out that “while the Real Geordies were moving towards uncertain futures they felt assured in the knowledge that they could continue to live at home, work in insecure jobs and maintain a commitment to ‘birds, booze and a fuckin’ nite oot once in a while!’” (Nayak 2006: 826). Family relationships and the economic stability of older generations in their kinship networks were key resources in enabling Real Geordies to inhabit uncertain protracted states of waithood. A rough demographic balance between older and younger generations has to also be understood as a factor in enabling this dynamic.

What happens in the case of fundamental demographic imbalance where there are so-called youth gluts and young people are not only redundant to the labor market but also and consequently formed as burdens on the economy and society at large? The scholarship on waithood has analyzed the structural forces that produce this experience as well as the creative ways in which individuals live within it. Adaptations to waithood are varied and contextually dependent. Some examples of adaptations include gigging, freelancing, taking internships, engaging in fraud and other forms of crime, and migration. New moral economies and new forms of sociality, affect, and respectability evolve from the mass experience of delayed social adulthood. Youth responses range from non-disruptive techniques like forming transactional relationships with older people or taking refuge in the alternate realities of the social media sphere, to highly disruptive techniques like organizing protests or even social revolution (Gilbert 2018; Honwana 2013; Smith 2006). Exodus also emerges as a tool for dealing
with waithood. Individuals could reject its hold by seeking to exit the physical space of waithood and moving into new spaces where life might be defined by something other than the suspension of full social adulthood.

To move, to escape, to migrate, to live. Migration as a path to social advancement has been a strategy of explorers, colonists, artists, and expats, who have all sought enhanced versions of themselves in new locations. It is now a path for youth throughout the globe who seek enhanced versions of themselves and their families in the modern world. Migration can mean different things. Youth strategies for navigating postmodern economies include moving into areas that were not traditionally acknowledged as providing productive work like the entertainment industry or the digital social media economy. Youth labor in non-traditional areas created new profits for companies, although maybe not for nation-states. Youth who are not paid workers in the new digital economies find that they are nonetheless invited to participate in them as entrepreneurial content creators. The growth in value of the digital economy, particularly its social media sector, is fueled by young people’s creative and affective productivity; they create and nurture communities using content that they create from their own bodies and lives. Content, cheaply or freely produced by young creators, is the primary retail good that digital economy corporations peddle to the public. Data on social media users is the primary wholesale good traded on the less visible but more lucrative business-to-business sector of

FIGURE 3.3 Lilly Singh at a promotional event organized by YouTube and Google for rising YouTube stars. Photo by Stephen Lovekin/Film Magic for YouTube, 2015.
the social media economy. As one class of highly educated youth is creating technologies whose value can only be increased through the cheap or free work of another class of youth, a third class of youth finds itself being marketed to through the mining of data on their own lives, bodies, and consumption habits (The Social Dilemma 2020).

The relationships that the world’s youth maintain to education and work vary according to the class positions of their kin network. Some continue to adhere to the male breadwinner model and expect for it to kick in in their own lives. Others who are less able to experience a subsidized waithood often abandon post-secondary education to find work by any means necessary. The wholesale rejection of capitalism was also a possible response to the postmodern economy. If one of the available political positions of young people was to begin criticizing capitalism and imagining personal value that is independent of achievement in formal education or securing regular work, for others, regular employment, or regular employment as a reward for educational achievement continued to be imagined as a viable ideal—simply one that was not available where they are. In order to reach this protected ideal and a desired version of the self, more intense strategies of migration, sometimes clandestine, exploited, or dangerous forms, were required (Andersson 2016; Heidbrink 2020). Examples of this youthful striving to escape the spaces of waithood and achieve traditional developmental advancement can be seen in the mass migrations of North and West African youth trying to get to Southern Europe, of Southern Europeans to Western Europe, South Asians and East Africans to the Middle East, East Asians to the Americas, Central and South Americans to North America and Southern Europe, Central Africans to Southern Africa, and on and on.

“UN GAOU À PARIS” REVISITED

To return to the hero of Magic System’s chronicle, “un gaou” arrived in Paris traveling the same path that many youths had traveled before him and that many more would travel afterwards. As the song’s protagonist relates, “j’étais pas le seul gaou o, on était beaucoup o …” (Magic System 2001). His itinerary charted a path from the space where realwork was absent to the space where realwork might still be found. His educational background was not important as it would have no bearing on his pursuit or attainment of realwork. The global spread of neoliberalism had created a widely dispersed archipelago of the spaces where realwork might be found within a vast ocean where realwork was largely absent (Ferguson 2006). For youth from North Africa to the Pacific Islands, Southern Europe to Central America, the spaces of realwork had figuratively and literally grown more difficult to access, requiring new itineraries, lengthier and more uncertain journeys fueled by longing for an inherited social ideal.
Youth, in its varied definitions, is a life stage where one moves, broadly speaking, from being an economic liability to the family and society to becoming an economic asset to the family and society. This is different from Zelizer’s observations of the transformations Western children underwent, from the late nineteenth century on, from having measurable economic value to priceless affective value (Zelizer 1985). The increased independence of youth is generally a function of physical and cognitive development. But it is important to keep in mind that this independence is not necessarily correlated with empowerment. Thus, a young person might be free to be disempowered. Experiencing decreased dependency on caretakers reflects not only the capacity of individual young people to care for themselves and others, but is also contingent upon individual young people attaining the opportunity to demonstrate their successful transition out of the stage of dependence and liability.

As the fluctuations of the twentieth century showed, transitioning from the status of dependent social child to that of productive social adult was not an inevitable process; it could be more or less achievable depending on the needs of a given economic system and the social norms that followed from it. In the twenty-first century, labor redundancy continues to be a side effect of the extractive economy. Workers have become more dispensable to industry and profit-making and the monetary value of being educated has dropped accordingly. For example, a secretarial position in South Africa that would have required secondary schooling and maybe a technical certificate in the 1960s would surely require a university degree in the 2000s. This transformation produced mass under- and unemployment at the same time as it produced spectacular wealth for the few. Technology and information-based industries capitalized on youth as producers, consumers, and data-rich products that can be mined for financial value. These industries held out the promise of a pathway to spectacular riches, and the attendant high status, for youth who were able to crack the new economy’s codes. Yet the function of education in all of this was increasingly unclear. In the biographies of young captains of technology, formal education was routinely derided as not only unnecessary for the attainment of high status, but even more as an obstacle to the full realization of youth’s productive potential.

POSTSCRIPT

In 2020, the world was struck by the Covid-19 pandemic. Government-mandated stay-at-home orders and social distancing protocols instituted to curb the spread of this highly contagious virus disrupted food supply systems, international travel, public transportation, health systems, economies, education systems, and labor markets. By the end of September 2020, the World Health Organization had recorded more than 34 million confirmed cases of...
infection worldwide. Of this number, 1,024,675 individuals had died from Covid-related illnesses. The scale of the pandemic and the suffering it produced had not been witnessed in living memory (World Health Organization 2020).

The individualized impacts of the pandemic varied widely depending on whether or not one was in a country with a strong pre-existing social safety net, where one was located within the socioeconomic hierarchies of a given country, whether or not one had pre-existing health issues, and also depended on one’s age. Around the world, from rich to poor nations, the pandemic put a halt to in-person schooling at all levels, replacing it in some countries with remote internet-based schooling, and in other places with nothing at all (World Bank 2020). For young people who were believed to be better able to weather the symptoms of Covid-19, the virus as such seemed to be less threatening to their futures than the strategies used for combating it. Youth who had been on the cusp of transitioning from students to workers were confronted with an indefinitely protracted period of labor uncertainty as national economies fell into recessions and depressions. Youth watched from their homes and through electronic devices as the space where real work was absent expanded, spreading over the spaces where it had previously been found.

The pandemic is a generation-making occurrence. Its effects on the interaction of youth, labor, and education in the modern age remain to be seen. In Tilly’s definition of work discussed earlier, he went on to note the particularity of such a definition, locating its foundation in a Eurocentric industrial capitalist system. “Prior to the twentieth century,” Tilly writes:

> a vast majority of the world’s workers performed the bulk of their work in other settings than salaried jobs as we know them today. Even today, over the world as a whole, most work takes place outside of regular jobs. Only a prejudice bred by Western capitalism and its industrial labor markets fixes on strenuous effort expended for monetary payment outside the home as “real work”, relegating other efforts to amusement, crime and mere housekeeping.

(Tilly and Tilly 2018: 22)

The value system that evolved out of the merger of Eurocentrism, capitalism, and industrial efficiency has held sway for much of the twentieth century but the pandemic has opened what the Indian writer and activist Arundhati Roy called a portal to new possibilities (2020). Will the rejection of Eurocentrism, the undisguisable effects of unrestrained capitalism, the hyper-efficiency of industrial production that renders human labor redundant, and the populist critique that the pandemic reignited in a new generation do more to end the dominant meaning of work in the modern world or to perpetuate it? Will the pandemic weaken or strengthen ties between Western-style education
and realwork? And will the impacts on youth of these pandemic times lead to reconsiderations of individualism, relationships, personal development, and productiveness that will reinstate or dislodge wage work from the center of how youth experience individual value? The near-future choices of young people around the world in economies where education had become a costly commercial good while its labor market value weakened over the latter decades of the twentieth century will reveal whether the cult of realwork retains its hold on the imagination of what is possible.
INTRODUCTION

The fluid meanings of leisure and play have been much debated by scholars. Both permeate the spaces of everyday life, shifting with time, place, and individual circumstances, defined by adults often blinded by moral anxieties as to how young people really live their lives. The easy judgments that adults make about play and leisure are inflected by their perceptions of age difference. Younger children’s play is commonly seen as having a “benign” and creative purpose, developing confidence and teaching about personal needs, emotions, and the needs of others (Nayak and Kehilly 2007: 7). Adolescents’ leisure activities, by contrast, more readily attract censure, as disquieting or threatening, despite their many continuities with younger children’s play. Adult attempts to lead play activities often mean that children cease to experience them as play, especially when unable to choose freely what they want to do. Indeed, when seen from young people’s perspectives rather than those of adults, most important are autonomy and choice in understanding how youth pursue play and leisure for their own sake, and “for their own reasons.”¹

This chapter defines leisure between 1920 and the early twenty-first century as activities in which young people choose freely to engage for personal and social satisfaction, once obligations such as employment, schooling, homework, and domestic tasks have been completed. It characterizes play as what young people do when they pursue their ideas and interests in their own ways through imaginary worlds, which often continue beyond childhood into the playful leisure of teenagers. Youth leisure, in the sense of distinctive interests associated
with adolescents, grew in line with modernization, industrialization, and the undermining of traditional time regimes by capitalist industry. Informal play and leisure remained important across the twentieth century, but this early ascendancy of commercial leisure activities in Western societies has meant that the scholarly literature on leisure and play was until recently largely defined by Western experiences, Western concepts, and male definitions. These were not challenged until the 1970s and 1980s by feminist researchers, and more recently by the trend towards transnational histories. Whilst this chapter cannot offer comprehensive global coverage, it does aim to move current perspectives beyond Western-dominated narratives by suggesting transnational contrasts and comparisons in how youth leisure and play transformed and mutated between c. 1920 and the early twenty-first century.

The hardening of distinctions between public and private, and paid work and non-paid activities, that accompanied industrialization in the West gave work and leisure relationality in which each derived “meaning from the other” (Glyptis 1989: 159). In the first half of the twentieth century, the “free time” of working-class youth in full-time jobs was largely defined by the strict time cultures of employment and the more informal routines of street and leisure culture. Free time for elite and middle-class youth was bounded by much longer periods of schooling, especially for boys, whose careers were considered more important than those of girls. The constraints of homework and “extracurricular” activities meant these young people had much less time (and indeed money) to spend on leisure than their working-class counterparts, although distinctive middle- and upper-class youth styles were emerging in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly among “modern girls” known as flappers, whose leisure activities attracted considerable disapproval, especially for transgressing gender boundaries.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, when most young people in the industrialized Western world started work in their early teens, the structure and discipline of work time reinforced leisure’s role as a channel for adolescent autonomy, independence and freer identities than were possible in the workplace. Postcolonial perspectives have, however, challenged established Western analyses (Fraser et al. 2017: 237), reminding scholars that societies of the Global “South” and “East” (such as China, Korea, and Japan), have traditionally not perceived leisure in the Western sense as “free time” for personal pleasure, and that in Southeast Asia the notion of “play” was an imported concept (Modi and Kamphorst 2018). Here, leisure has been seen as belonging to the group rather than the individual, conveying an economic and financial value whose significance persists, especially among poor populations (KyungHee Kim 2011). Languages in East and South Asia lacked a word whose meaning corresponded directly with the English term “leisure,” and its incorporation into these languages, albeit with differently inflected meanings,
suggests the power of globalization in the mid- to late twentieth century, when transnational flows of leisure and play patterns quickened. New networks of cultural circulation challenged the former dominance of the Global North, although “significant cultural variations” in the “meaning, content and value of ‘free’ time” in the “form of leisure” remain in these societies (Iwasaki 2007: 237).

An important characteristic of play and the leisure activities of youth in the twentieth century was their entanglement with consumer culture and the mass media, although young people also succeeded in fashioning their own responses to these forces. The chapter is hence structured into four main sections which consider the significance of these tensions and their articulation between c. 1920 and the early twenty-first century. It starts by considering youthful agency and continuities in play, a “youthscape” of creativity and innovation, collective activities, and solitude that evolved in (largely) independent spaces, often under the noses of adults (Sleight 2013). It then sets the context for the emergence and spread of a new leisure class of adolescents in the West, before turning to the adult anxieties and “moral panics” which attended these changes. Finally, it reflects on the ambivalent effects of inter-regional cultural flows of globalization, which connect the leisure practices and interests of so many young people across continents, yet also exclude millions at the margins of economic development.

**SHIFTING TECHNOLOGIES AND MATERIAL CULTURES**

The raising of the school leaving age, which played an important part in marking out children and adolescents from adults in many European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and North America in the first half of the twentieth century, brought new meanings to youth leisure, as the modern consumer economy reached ever deeper into the pre-adult years. The United States came early to extending the age of compulsory schooling, with significant cultural consequences. At the start of the 1919–1920 academic year, school enrollment for American fourteen to seventeen year olds stood at just 32.3 percent; by 1929–1930 it had reached 51.4 percent (Chudacoff 1989: 98), and by 1940 it had grown again, with 75 percent remaining in education until they were seventeen (Savage 2007a: 363). High school and college students hence fast became a significant demographic in the United States because most adolescents stayed on at co-educational institutions until their late teens. This prolonged age-based segregation in a physically distinct environment helped create new youth cultures and a novel term, “teenage,” to describe the distinctive social rules, customs, norms, and behaviors which resulted from corraling young people together in spaces away from work and family.
influence (Chudacoff 1989: 98–9). Mass consumer culture in the 1930s also led to new consumer patterns among working-class youth, especially older teens whose disposable income (Bäcklund and Lilja 2019; Moehling 2005) went further, as expectations of contributing to the family economy lessened (Benson 2007; Todd 2007). By the early 1940s, the American sociologist Talcott Parsons had coined another new name: “youth culture” to identify the distinctive leisure styles and values associated with these “teenagers” aged thirteen to eighteen (Parsons 1942).

Personal relationships remained key to experiences of play and leisure, but the consumption of toys, games, playthings, books and magazines, film, collectibles, music, and commercial entertainment created networks through which young people’s social and leisure relationships expanded and developed. Cinemas and dance halls became common in the wealthier countries of the Global North in the interwar years, when they became significant courtship venues for those in their teens, offering freedom from prying relatives and neighbors but also opportunities to rebel against cultural norms (Abra 2017; Langhamer 2000; Todd 2005). Rapid changes in communications technologies and networks in the early twentieth century also spread cinema culture, popular entertainment, and popular music across national borders, generating new forms of creative cultural mixing in many parts of the world. A nightlife culture of cabarets and dance halls developed internationally across South America, Southeast Asia, and the Dutch East Indies. Anglo-Indian jazz bands played in the British Raj, as did Chinese jazz bands in Shanghai (Chun et al. 2004: xv; Field 2010). Cuban music drew audiences in West and Central Africa, where it synthesized with local styles. Vibrant film and music industries emerged in Thailand (Wuttipong 2012) and India, whose output spread through Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Lockard 2020: 445).

Music became the lingua franca of modern youth and remained popular throughout the period, although in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries it increasingly vied with video games and social media, as television was redefined by video-streaming services and the ease of watching across a range of mobile devices. Global media culture infiltrated the content and form of play and youth leisure across the developed and developing world. In many parts of the Global North, traditional components of young people’s identity, such as class, family, community, or religion, were reshaped by a market-oriented youth culture of individualized and increasingly sexualized consumer identities (Barry and Martin 2016; Gill, Henwood, and McLean 2000; Gough, Hall, and Seymour-Smith 2014; McCabe and Ricciardelli 2004; Pope, Phillips, and Olivardia 2000).

Over the course of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the expansion of technology made its impact on young people’s leisure activities, and by extension the material culture of youth. Music became portable and
personal and easier to share with friends—through treasured objects such as the Walkman, Discman, and later the mp3 player and mobile phone (see Bickford 2012 for a case study of young teens and the material culture of mp3 players). Music still remained an important aspect of teen bedroom culture, however, in its creation of atmosphere and social space, as a signifier of cultural affiliation.
(Lincoln 2004) as well as through material culture—via posters and band T-shirts to evidence their owners’ particular tastes, for instance, and through records and music players to generate the music itself.

It has been common in Western culture for many middle-class children to experience strictly enforced spatial, emotional, and psychological boundaries, at school, in their bedrooms, in playgrounds overseen by adults, and elsewhere. Indeed, one expression of the specialness of the young (by virtue of their demographic minority, vulnerability, and dependency on adults) in late twentieth-century Western societies is that they have their own age-segregated spaces, stemming from ideas that in “civilized” societies children slept alone (psychologist John Watson, for example, noted as early as 1928 that co-sleeping stunted a child’s development in his book *Psychological Care of Infant and Child*). Differences to this viewpoint can be seen elsewhere (see Li 2009 for a Chinese case study).

Digital technologies and the growth of the internet from the late twentieth century created new markets and a “consumer-media” culture whose effects on childhood and youth have been profound in the Global North and South. Of increasing concern amongst many parents have been the tendencies for middle-class urban youth to spend more time in the private spaces of their bedrooms, to play computer games, watch personal TVs, and communicate via electronic means. For some youth in urban areas, digital hangouts have become preferable to those of the real world as safe physical spaces dwindle—either through loss of those spaces to development or from perception. Adults often fear for the loneliness and social isolation that individualistic activities such as gaming may confer upon young people, yet these activities also represent opportunities to promote interaction, connection, and feelings of belonging, one example being amongst geographically isolated rural youth, who can access new communities online. Social media and digital technologies are shaping new youth identities, whether on urban streets, in suburban bedrooms, or among Indigenous Australians in remote rural communities (Rice et al. 2016).

Over the past several decades, online leisure and electronic gaming have become core leisure activities among youth in high-density urban populations. South Korean youth, in “one of the most technologically saturated environments in the world,” were among the earliest youth populations to adapt to the digital world in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis that led millions of young people in their teens and twenties to take up competitive gaming and e-sports (Ok 2011: 337). South Korea was at the forefront of new media culture which by the turn of the twentieth century had made gaming a serious leisure activity among the young; indeed, it was the principal online practice of 44.6 percent of Korean youth (Ok 2011: 323). The new culture of online gaming, initially welcomed as a distraction from unemployment and a way of learning new skills, was subsequently identified with game addiction, serious interpersonal
problems, and delinquency. Nonetheless, it retains popularity, in public and private. The public face of Korean gaming includes huge gaming conventions, as well as socializing and dating in internet cafes or “PC bangs,” although solitary gaming has been most common. In 2005, 76 percent of Korean gamers reported that they played mostly at home, physically alone yet often digitally connected with like-minded communities across the globe.

Not all societies have yet been able—or indeed willing—to fully embrace the digital revolution in all its forms. Digital technologies in regions like Gujarat in India, while important and growing in significance, have nonetheless been slow to move the leisure lives and friendships of the young away from their traditional forms and patterns (Pathak-Shelat and DeShano 2014). Adults generally view computers and the internet as tools for work, and a means to economic opportunity; they perceive them as a distraction from studies when used for anything leisure-related, and are often heavily restricted by parents. Here, digital leisure activities therefore have deep symbolic value amongst youth, connected with high social and economic status.

Iconic amongst teen—and increasingly child—material culture of the early twenty-first century is the cell phone, a site of social media and gaming activities. Originally seen by many parents as a means to maintain communication with and promote safety for their offspring while monitoring their activities, the cell phone soon became a site of small rebellions against parents (“I didn’t hear
it ring”) and a disruption to power dynamics in classrooms, as well as a way to communicate privately with peers and facilitate social lives (see Ling and Haddon 2008). Cell phones quickly became objects of both display and leisure, with smartphones becoming additionally a source of online entertainment, gaming, photography, and filming.

**YOUTH AS CONSUMERS AND CREATORS**

Young people’s consumption of goods and services is hardly new. In the nineteenth century, working-class children and adolescents in industrialized nations such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States enjoyed a wide range of leisure-based commercial activities after work, on days off, and outside school hours (Davin 1996; Sleight 2013). The difference in the twentieth century was in scale, as consumer culture expanded and young people were recognized as a distinctive market. In the 1920s, cultural flows and novel visual technologies informed new gendered youth cultures, notably that of the physically active and carefree “flapper” or “modern girl” mentioned earlier. “The image of the modern girl knew virtually no boundaries” and emerged not only in North America and Europe, but in East and South Asia, Australasia, and Africa (Matera and Kent 2017: 27–8; Schrum 2004; Todd 2005). The styles and bold attitudes of the *modan guru* in Japan, the *modeng ziaojie* in China, and the *Kallege ladki* in India drew on local conventions but shared an independent consumer identity with “modern girls” across the world (Matera and Kent 2017: 27–8). Girls were traditionally expected to be more constrained than boys and their attempts to throw off stifling social and cultural expectations shocked many adults, who saw them as an affront to morals and national identity (Lewis 2009; Weinbaum et al. 2008). The “mega” (modern girl) of the Taisho Era (1912–1926) in Japan, for instance, was often reviled as insufficiently “Japanese,” for adopting the fashions, styles, and music of North America and Europe (Chatani 2015: 3). The modern girl, strongly associated with the rapidly developing mass consumer culture of cinema, fashion, and dancing, became an important emblem of modernity across continents, contesting the dominance of boys in the historiography of the teenager, as Kelly Schrum has observed (Alexander 1989; Schrum 2004; Todd 2005).

Youth’s iconic significance as a metaphor for futurity and social change increased after the First World War, largely in response to adult concerns about the need to regulate and direct leisure and play. Voluntary groups and the state endeavored to channel youth leisure time through youth organizations, sports groups, and cultural activities. In Germany, Andrew Donson has shown how teachers, youth leaders, and wartime youth literature helped enhance a new sense of consciousness and urgency to the youth politics of the interwar
years as students and politicized young workers used “free time” and space to develop their political passions and activism (2010). Membership of the youth wings of political parties, trade unions, and churches in other national contexts transformed leisure time into political and religious commitment, as Susan B. Whitney’s chapter on “Belief and Ideology” also suggests. Most of the young, however, juggled a smattering of commercial leisure activities with more informal and autonomous play and leisure interests, from home-based entertainment such as reading, playing cards, board games, and domestic hobbies, to pursuits outside the home such as sport and outdoor recreation, including rambling, hiking, and cycling, and religious social activities. Others were linked to organized youth groups, such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, whose activities very much reflected an ideal of healthy wholesome country youth abjuring the leisure temptations of urban life.

Both the Scouts and Guides, established before the First World War, were predicated on the desire to introduce the young to “rational” forms of recreation and promote national and imperial values (Alexander 2017; Honeck 2018). These ambitions extended far beyond the West, and their internationalist dimensions intensified after the Second World War. The considerable literature on the colonial histories of scouting reflects their success in connecting organizers and members with transnational and transcolonial flows of culture, yet also shows the various ways they were modified and adapted in local and regional contexts, as in Mexico, where scouting became a “tool of nation building” (Albarrán 2015: 55–8). In the 1940s and 1950s, during the Cold War, youth movements and young people in the United States were acknowledged as important international ambassadors. Jennifer Helgren’s work on citizenship and American girls highlights girls’ voices in these efforts (2017), although motivations for joining youth movements did not always match those of adult organizers. American Girl Scouts were not above placing their own enjoyment above international citizenship, for instance, when they misbehaved at the international Guide hostel in Mexico (Chatelain 2014). Young people remake their membership to their own preferences. In Malaya, for example, Jialin Christina Wu has shown how in introducing Indigenous girlhood to novel models of femininity, Guiding also created a space in which girls could express their desires for freedom and adventure (Wu 2016: 3).

Youth movements showed the value of youth friendships and connections in filling leisure time. Brian Sutton-Smith has noted that “the predominant nature of play throughout history has been play with others, not play with toys” (1986: 26). The importance of peer groups, and young people’s ability to create social spaces and landscapes that are distinctive to them and their activities—and, crucially, often free of adults—is therefore central to understanding their leisure activities. Such preference for autonomy was very clear during the Second World War, for example, when many urban areas in Europe changed
as a result of bombing raids, becoming more dangerous, but also opening up new spaces to explore and claim away from adult supervision. Bombed-out buildings offered young people new (and evolving) landscapes of freedom and risk, and a measure of independence not possible when confined to the home or to cramped air-raid shelters. The war offered many of the young a greater degree of autonomy, relief from parental anxieties, and the temptations of truancy and looting as well as newly unallocated places to play and explore. Amy Helen Bell notes how one teenager in wartime London recalled “what it had done for me was to fetch an excitement to my life, the bombed houses becoming dangerous playgrounds to be searched for anything that could be taken home as legitimate booty” (Bell 2017a: 93).

Other wars have, however, produced a different impact on the places young people use for their leisure. The recent Syrian conflict, for example, has created an environment that is far too volatile for outdoor play and leisure in many areas. Children have reacted creatively to this, such as in Damascus constructing the Land of Childhood, an underground playground housed in basements beneath the streets. For refugee youth, liminal spaces without access to the structure of regular education or work may be filled with whatever leisure activities that can be found to distract, fill empty time, and build a micro community (Waardenburg 2018).

Despite the encroachment of commercial leisure and continuing adult concerns about the state of youth in Western societies, young people create autonomous, spontaneous cultures outside adult supervision, innovating play and leisure with whatever is to hand. Their distinctive peer cultures based on “playlore” encompass oral traditions (chants, rhymes, jokes, nicknames, riddles, tongue-twisters, and songs), activities (such as clapping, dancing, skipping games, and handshakes), rituals (divination games, routines of victimization, initiation rituals, role-playing, and other uses of imagination), and carefully crafted dens and playthings (Davey et al. 2013: 40–1; Opie and Opie 1959; Tucker 2008: 22–42), and can be seen throughout the period covered by this chapter. Such activities and objects were picked up, modified, discarded, and resurrected by young people themselves, and transmitted within and between communities of youth as they played and talked together.

It took until the mid-twentieth century, however, for the activities associated with the significant oral culture of the young to get past the “triviality barrier” of adult perception (Sutton-Smith 1970), facilitated by studies of English playgrounds (Opie and Opie 1959), followed in the 1960s by Knapp’s work in the United States, and later collections of work by Australian researchers (Beed Davey et al. 2013: 41). Verbal play amongst the young has also been explored and documented—including via Kidspeak, a dictionary of Australian youth vernacular published in 2000—in studies which show how children
and teenagers are engaged social actors within their own worlds, capable of creativity and action without the direct intervention and oversight of adults.

Despite the pessimistic predictions of adults about their demise (Tucker 2008: 4–5), the unique play worlds of the young have continued to thrive and evolve into the early decades of the twenty-first century. Even in a world of television, the internet, and computer gaming, young people’s folklore persists, although worries about its near extinction have been expressed continuously for over a century (Bronner 1988: 12). Growing access to social media and websites such as YouTube may even represent new ways through which such traditions can be recorded, shared, discussed, and (perhaps) updated. Korean youth, mentioned earlier, have demonstrated considerable ingenuity in producing content, appropriating new media technologies, making up their own rules, and developing distinctive linguistic codes. Korean girls, in alternative online spaces, have created “communities of fantasy,” such as “Gwiyoni” internet novels, and participatory fandom culture. The media practices of Korean youth provide clues as to the direction that these changes may take through childhood and adolescence; they suggest that as culture moves from print-based to electronic and introduces new forms of participatory “digital storytelling,” there is potential not only for young people to tell stories of their own lives but also to engage with those ignored by the mainstream media (Ok 2011: 336).
ADULT ANXIETIES

Given how strongly young people were identified with the new consumer patterns and commercial leisure opportunities of the first half of the twentieth century, it is scarcely surprising that youth was the first group whose leisure attracted academic study. In the nineteenth century, adult anxieties about young people’s use of “free time” had led middle-class parents, social commentators, and educators in the West to construct commercial leisure as a social problem of youth, because of its negative influence and threat to adult authority (Sleight 2013). In the interwar years, the growth of developmental psychology influenced how the value of play was perceived, and ongoing adult intentions to regulate and manage it (Shapira 2017). Anglo-American children’s literature of the 1930s, for example, reflected the belief that the most desirable and unproblematic adolescent was the healthy, wholesome country youth who spent much of their time outdoors, themes reflected in novels such as Swallows and Amazons (1930) and much of Enid Blyton’s output, where adventurous and independent teenagers roam free—with minimal adult intervention—in the British countryside and coast. Emphases on childhood and adolescence as key developmental stages, pioneered by the American psychologist G. Stanley Hall, remained influential and also reinforced well-established concerns about young people’s susceptibility to unhealthy popular culture (see Finnane 1989 for discussions about the moral panics surrounding comics in some Western countries) and the dire consequences this presented for nationhood and citizenship if appropriate guidance was lacking (Drotter 1992; International Women’s Day Committee 1952; Wertham 1954).

North America and Western Europe underwent rapid economic growth after the Second World War—a “golden age” of prosperity whose demographic surge was known as the “baby boom.” The relative affluence of Western teenagers and their greater discretionary spending power helped give those in their teens a powerful identity as a social group in its own right (Miles 2000: 108); the term “teenager,” commonly used in the United States before the war, became recognizable across the world in the postwar period. This new consumerism led to an explosion in youth culture centered on appearance, goods, and specifically targeted services, which heightened visual and cultural differences. Leisure styles identified with experimentation, rebellion, and non-conformity encouraged adolescents to break further away from adult role models and leisure practices and create youth identities on their own terms. They were not passive consumers of commercial leisure, but active participants and drivers of cultural trends which set them apart from older generations and their peers, through striking appearances, very different music preferences, and novel cultural politics, as Andrew Ivaska’s study of 1960s Tanzania suggests. The largely middle-class American Beats and working-class British Teds of the 1950s (and counterparts,
such as the Halbstarkers of Germany and Austria, and the greaser-style blouson noir of France), were forerunners of still more spectacular youth styles in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, such as mods, punks, and goths. The “teenage delinquent” of the 1950s, symbol of a postwar “wild generation,” features in films such as Blackboard Jungle (1955), Rebel Without a Cause (1955), and The Wild One (1953)—the last banned by the British Board of Film Classification until 1967 because of how it might influence “impressionable” young audiences. No sooner had teenagers been “created” than they became a group to be feared through their difference and seemingly abundant unstructured time.

Youth’s adaptability, innovation, and resistance to adult control can be seen in other ways and in other places, as during the Cold War, when public and private spheres coalesced in promoting powerful ideological messages about idealized family life (May 2008). When American property developer Joseph Eichler planned his visually distinctive mid-century suburbs in California in the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, he intended each architect-designed home to accommodate families with children in highly prescribed ways. Annmarie Adams (1995) has shown how the kitchen stood as a “command centre” where the mother could maintain a watchful eye over her offspring while working, whether they were playing in the open-plan living area in front of her or in back gardens overlooked by large kitchen windows. The young often failed to comply, however, with such expectations, preferring to move their play to either the less-closely monitored area of the street, or to side gardens and garages where they enjoyed a degree of privacy from the adult gaze. In the postwar period, it was not uncommon to see adult-designed playgrounds sitting idle while children moved to spaces where they were freer from supervision and prescribed activities—to treehouses and dens, hidden natural spaces in parks and gardens, bike and bus shelters, and spaces created within adult-dominated spaces, such as the attic sanctuary accessible only to those small enough to wriggle in (Wilkie 2000: 110).

Young people’s relationship with leisure, and accompanying adult anxieties, made commercial leisure a persistent source of fear across the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Moral panics about youth focused on leisure because of its opportunities for adolescent autonomy. Popular leisure and entertainment often unnerved adults, and made many distrust young people’s relationship with consumption and the waves of cultural innovation which drove it. Adult anxieties about youth interests during the modern age were consistent, even if their targets were not. From concerns about gangster films in the 1930s, via attempts to ban horror and crime comics in the 1950s, to parental fears in the 1990s of gangsta-rap and violent video games (such as Mortal Kombat in 1993, the ongoing Grand Theft Auto franchise that began in 1998, and 18-certificate games such as the Call of Duty series), parental concern mapped onto technological innovation. In 1985, such anxieties led to the foundation of the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC) amongst a group of Washington mothers married to men with political influence. The group succeeded in introducing “Parental Advisory—Explicit Lyrics” stickers for music that it believed was harmful to young fans, which they referred to as “porn rock.” These labels did little to censor lyrics, however, as music producer Marc Weinstein noted: “it actually became a sales tool—it made it easier for teenagers to identify the cool stuff” (Silvers 2015).

Parental anxieties about protecting the young are of course subject to the filters of time, place, and gender; one parent may wish to restrict TV watching
or gaming to protect innocence or to promote outdoor activity, but another may encourage it as a teen entertained in the home is at least in theory safer than one out roaming a dangerous neighborhood (Pugh 2009). Indeed, some young people actively seek “emotional” outlets and relaxation and escape in leisure activities away from adult pressures and supervision. Australian research in the 2000s, which identified a widespread leisure need among adolescents to “retreat” away from such stresses in their bedrooms, in “the bush,” or on the beach, has been replicated in international studies (Abbot-Chapman and Robertson 2015). At its most extreme, some of the young have retreated semi-permanently into their bedrooms, largely eschewing social contact, a phenomenon common in Japan among male adolescents and young adults where it is known as hikikmori (Fraser et al. 2017: 246).

Increasingly from the mid-twentieth century in Western societies, adult beliefs about the importance of play in building young people’s independence and psychological well-being were subverted by concerns about their safety, which often led public play in urban areas and school playgrounds to be more closely policed and regulated. For younger children—whose play may be seen as developmentally important—such regulation was to guard the children from unseen threats. For teenagers, where the threat could be seen to come as much from the youth themselves as anything external, leisure surveillance had different overtones. In turn, less active and more sedentary play and leisure fueled adult anxieties about youthful health, fitness, and welfare, accentuated by the ever-increasing sexualization of popular culture, perceived to be eroding childhood. In the second half of the twentieth-century, boundaries between various phases of childhood, pre-adolescence, and adolescence became ever more diffuse. In parts of the Global North and the Global South, economic and social change, combined with increasing participation in tertiary education and the rising age of marriage, stretched the age range of adolescence into the twenties and thirties (Arnett 2004). Across the West, adults worried about their perceived inability to protect children’s “natural” innocence. With new cultural trends and consumer goods came parental fears of non-familial influences on young lives, whether through troublesome toys (Best 1998), sexualized song lyrics, or explicit films. New information and communication technologies made even the supervision of home-based leisure activities problematic (Springhall 1998a: 7).

By the early twenty-first century, relationships with paid labor were no longer the defining characteristic of many young people’s leisure around the world. Education was responsible for declining leisure time amongst many teens, particularly those from middle-class families. The pursuit of academic excellence and good exam results in increasingly economically insecure, anxious, and competitive societies produced many young people with over-scheduled time devoted to adult-mediated “enriching activities” at the expense
of play, physical activity, and unstructured leisure time with peers (see Chia 2009 for a case study of this effect on Singaporean youth). Among Indian youth, for example, economic uncertainties and growing aspirations to be part of a skilled globalized workforce have driven a parental mindset of “not being left behind” in educational stakes that prioritize studies above leisure pursuits (Pathak-Shelat and DeShano 2014: 990).

CULTURAL MOVEMENT AND MOBILITIES

Mobilities, inflected by personal preference and differences in social class, gender, and culture, have shaped youth experiences of leisure in diverse ways. For middle-class teenagers in nations such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the car became an important feature of leisure, especially from the 1950s. Often borrowed from parents, the automobile allowed access to urban entertainments and was also an important leisure space in its own right for unsupervised dating and drinking. The levels of discretionary spending noted earlier among the young also contributed considerable disparities in the experience and consumption of leisure, with the poorest most likely to be cut off from mainstream commercial leisure culture and significant groups of adolescents within Western societies, such as young
disabled people, excluded almost entirely (Hogg and Cavet 1995; Fullager and Owler 1998; Murray 2002).

In mid-twentieth-century Britain, where the car was less prominent in popular culture, the bicycle was important to the leisure of many working-class and lower-middle-class teenagers. When not being used to commute to school and jobs, it could be a means of accessing friends, urban leisure activities, and the countryside, or a sporting pursuit. Cycle speedway racing, for example, appeared in postwar bombsites, turning unclaimed land into makeshift racetracks until the late 1950s when they were mostly cleared away for redevelopment. The sport was a low-cost imitation of motorcycle speedway that drew big crowds of young, mostly working-class, spectators to see peers race modified cycles under homemade team colors. In 1949, the British newspaper *Daily Graphic* estimated that there were between thirty thousand and a hundred thousand teenage enthusiasts for the new craze (Ailes 2015).

From the 1930s through to the 1950s, middle-class adults in Western Europe voiced fears of cultural “invasion” and subversion by American popular culture, an often vociferous cultural anti-Americanism, largely ignored by the young fans of more relaxed American leisure values (Bailey 1999; Horn 2009: 1–3). By the 1980s and 1990s, however, the transcultural flow of new youth cultures across the Global North and South, assisted by internet and mobile technologies, reworked binaries of American imports versus “authentic” local culture. Cultural borders became more porous and gave different meanings to the international dissemination of American popular culture long identified with cultural imperialism. In Indonesia, for example, youth’s leisure practices contested the dominance of sex and alcohol in Western advertising, signaling a distinctive Muslim identity which focused on appearance, the consumption of fashion, regional celebrities, promenading shopping malls, and “snacking” (Hasan 2015; Nilan and Feixa 2006).

In the face of persisting adult anxieties, young people continued to build their own play worlds and autonomous, spontaneous cultures. Outdoor play in fields, forests, and the natural world remained important in rural areas and less densely urbanized societies, and on urban streets, where working-class youth, especially boys, retained considerable leisure autonomy. Nonetheless, although play and leisure opportunities expanded, the growth of the urban environment (and its perceived dangers) restricted many outdoor pursuits. The broader trend in many wealthier countries in the second half of the twentieth century was for play in the natural environment to reduce as the amount of time spent indoors—at home, in gardens, garages, and bedrooms—increased. bedrooms in particular became important to youngsters living in smaller homes without the attics, gardens, or other spaces that may be claimed by the young as small areas of territorial control and privacy (Mitchell and Reid-Walsh 2002a; also see Chapter 2 in this volume).
Global changes associated with urbanization and consumption continued to transform young people’s play and leisure lives in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as global marketing and brands were adapted to local conditions and values. Western youth leisure, characterized by the era of “mass culture” between the 1930s and mid-1950s, had changed. The subcultures and countercultures of the 1960s and 1970s were superseded in the 1980s by more heterogeneous “lifestyle tribes”; specialist scenes, sub-groups, and niche markets, bringing gender, ethnicity, and sexual difference much more to the fore. Inter-regional cultural flows of music styles from the Global South and other non-Western nations now more obviously infiltrated Western youth leisure, although musicians outside of the West had been producing their own sounds and subcultures for young audiences since at least the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Singaporean blues pioneers The Straydogs, formed in 1966). Asian musical styles became more widely consumed internationally. In Japan and South Korea, the distinctive music cultures of J-Pop and K-Pop and the androgynous images and styling associated with young male pop celebrities illustrated the power of social media to erode boundaries between male and female beauty and influenced youth leisure cultures across the wealthy economies of the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980s and 1990s. Pop idols known as Bishōnen or “beautiful youth boy” in Japan, and “flower men” in South Korea, exploited distinctive regional tropes, such as the manga and anime characters of popular leisure culture, notably the “beautiful boys” of “girls comics” or shōjo manga. The Kawaii or “cute culture” among teenage girls in Japan from the mid-1980s was similarly influential; its sexualized suggestions of lovability, shyness, and childlike innocence became a dominating influence in Japanese popular culture and contributed to popular street-styles such as Lolita and Decora which spread beyond Asia. Kawaii has been seen as female rebellion against a Confucian model of adulthood based on social responsibility and family and work obligations (Kinsella 1995: 242–3) but its ambiguous non-conformity echoes the dissent of the interwar modern girl, who similarly scorned stultifying social expectations for personal expression and pleasure.

By the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century, youth identities and innovative leisure practices were increasingly at the interface of real and virtual worlds. Video games bled into other popular youth genres, such as costume playing, originating in the science fiction conventions of 1930s America but reinvented in Japan in the mid-1980s as cosplay or kōsupure, with characters from manga and anime, science fiction, fantasy, films, television shows, and cartoons and a large infrastructure of conventions, conferences, and related merchandise. Japanese cosplay (dominated by anime and manga) crossed over into the characters of online gaming. It spread among teenagers and young adults across China and Southeast Asia, including the Philippines and Indonesia, and to Western audiences, helped by the popularity of manga in translation and Japanese videos (Fauziah and Aprilandini 2018; Peirson Smith 2013).
The late twentieth-century image of experiences shared across youth culture through global brands, and digital and online technologies was, however, deeply misleading. Disposable income had certainly enabled middle-class youth (and to a lesser extent, working-class youth) to engage with new cultural genres and greater variety of leisure venues. However, leisure time remained (and remains) limited among those who study or who work exceptionally long hours, while poor and working-class youth were (and remain) largely excluded from the high-tech products, services, and commercial leisure activities which their affluent counterparts enjoy because of cost (Fraser et al. 2017).

Globalization has exacerbated structural inequalities. Restructured labor markets increased inequities between the rich and poor in urban and rural areas, where large populations of children and young people are excluded or isolated from globalized youth culture. China and India host huge disparities in youth leisure and consumption. High poverty rates in Africa and in South and East Asia mean leisure experienced as “relative autonomy” by both genders is largely a phenomenon of middle-class urban youth, whose greater access to the internet, new technologies, and transport give more opportunities to enjoy sport, the cinema, and eating out. Better-off teenagers mingle and flirt in the secure mall environment even in relatively conservative societies such as Indonesia (Nilan 2016: 166–9). In urban India, the popularity of the shopping mall as a place to hang out has had an immense impact on relationships between the young, eroding traditional norms of gender interaction by allowing boys and girls to socialize. In poor rural communities, the young might be introduced to urban leisure opportunities—such as television, cell phones, and motorcycles—by migrant workers from the cities, but their play and leisure remains grounded in traditional patterns and the “local and home-based connections” of place (Fraser et al. 2017: 248), visiting friends, chatting, or spending time with family.

In the early twenty-first century, a comparative study based on fieldwork in the working-class district of Dennistoun in Glasgow and Yat Tung, a large public housing estate in Hong Kong, revealed precisely these material disparities in young people’s experiences of leisure and their global implications (Fraser et al. 2017). It was intended to update a similar comparative survey funded by UNICEF in the 1960s, by the pioneering social researcher, Pearl Jephcott (Fraser et al. 2017: 236). Dennistoun and Yat Tung, both lower income areas with high youth populations, provide compelling evidence of the impact that broader economic trends had on young people’s leisure as an increasingly precarious youth labor market inflected the meanings of “free time”; in Dennistoun, a young man described 90 percent of his “free time” as “work related and job hunting” (Fraser et al. 2017: 242). For young males especially, “free time” also involved alcohol consumption and playing football in local streets and parks, much like the adolescent street culture of their fathers and grandfathers, although they also retreated indoors to socialize online (Fraser et al. 2017: 248). Yat Tung’s leisure expectations and traditions differed; and lacked a similar
drinking culture. Young people’s economic value had traditionally been much higher in Yat Tung, as Jephcott revealed in the 1960s. Notions of “free time” were peripheral to these young people’s lives, high levels of adult supervision and expectations of family responsibility placing much greater emphasis on the values of “education,” “hard work,” and “self-reliance” than in Dennistoun (Fraser et al. 2017: 245). Yet if leisure in both urban districts was refracted by different histories and cultures, unemployment and underemployment had a similar impact.

Teenagers in Dennistoun and Yat Tung, facing similar feelings of powerlessness and exclusion from consumer culture, were part of a broader global phenomenon of disenfranchised youth known by the acronym NEETs (Not in Education, Employment or Training). The term originated with UK policymakers in the 1980s to describe a potentially “lost” generation of youth and was subsequently adopted by other national governments, experts, and academics, similarly disturbed by the social effects of youth unemployment and low wages (Mascherini et al. 2012). For unemployed and under-employed youth in deprived districts like Dennistoun and Yat Tung, an abundance of forced “free time” did not lead to the pleasures of global youth culture but was dominated by lack of money, local “home-based connections,” and a “deep-seated,” “place-based habitus” (Fraser et al. 2017: 248). Yet social, economic, and cultural exclusion from expensive commercial leisure does not mean disengagement from global consumption and leisure trends. Young people remain adaptive, adopting and adjusting global cultural forms to individual and local circumstances through cross-fertilization and cultural mixing, as in the spread of “hybrid” cultural forms such as bhangra and hip-hop. In Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and Kolkata (India), for example, young people have challenged mainstream cultural expectations by exploiting as “cool” aspects of Rasta, punk, hip-hop, and Bollywood (Beazley and Chakraborty 2008). Research in India and Indonesia also shows how marginalized youth adopt a “do-it-yourself” approach, using limited access to consumption to enhance prestige, identity, and the personal meanings of leisure through deviant behavior and their own “bodily styles” (Rodrigues and Smaill 2008: 199, 210–11); not unlike the alienated working-class punks of the de-industrializing Britain of the late 1970s and 1980s.

CONCLUSION

The period between 1920 and the early twenty-first century was one of great change and upheaval for the young, who acquired a more pronounced age-based identity, not least in the area of leisure and play. Over the course of around a hundred years, macro-scale changes (especially pronounced in the Global North) have included a move from long hours spent laboring to shorter
days in education, to increased disposable income, to greater mobility premised upon increasingly rapid transportation, and to technological innovation. These combined shifts have amplified the phenomenon of youth as a distinct and global social group with free time and the means to pursue leisure activities. Youth continue to consume fashion, music, technology, and the new in ways that most adults do not. Their popular culture continues to exacerbate adult anxieties and sense of distance from the expanding range of play and leisure options which globalization has spread among the young in the Global North and South, albeit distributed unevenly between classes and among the poor. Transnational flows of leisure and play patterns have quickened and shaped new networks of cultural circulation and challenged the former dominance of the Global North (Yoshitaka Iwasaki 2007). Rapid economic development in the Global South and East has led to the emergence of an urban middle-class youth with time and opportunities to engage in leisure. In the West, the transitions of post-industrial society in the 1980s and 1990s have been equally significant in subverting the meanings of leisure and time for the young unemployed and for cash-rich, time-poor earners.

In this ever-changing world, adult anxieties persist. Many parents remain alarmed by the internet, by new leisure technologies, and by digital and social media. The nature of children’s engagement is, however, complex, and rich imaginative and creative possibilities may also be underestimated as they connect with like-minded others for entertainment and across a range of social and political issues (Sibert and Laverick 2020: 1–5). Powerful youth protest movements such as the school strikes calling for climate action, which have inspired millions of students, suggest the potential of participatory media culture to reshape the public sphere (Soep 2014). Those movements’ creative political action illustrates the diverse meanings and possibilities that revolutionary leisure cultures offer the young. Online media worlds have the capacity to reshape youth agency and autonomy, although limitations imposed by factors such as poverty, disability, or lack of transport remain significant in cutting many young people off from the leisure cultures of their peers. The trends and activities of children’s play and youth leisure, inflected by gender, age, race, class, ethnicity, and place, defy easy generalization. What is clear is that teenagers—a term that came into existence during this period—remain a special category in many modern societies, combining much of the free time of childhood with some of the independence and autonomy of adulthood. The evolution of play and youth leisure across the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries provides unique insights into the shifting balance of power and dialogue between older and younger generations—a lens through which to observe the significance of play and leisure in young people’s lives and the challenges that many face in securing time and space to enjoy them (United Nations 2013: 11–13).
How young people feel—where and how they direct their desire, admiration, solidarity, gratitude, pity, love, anxiety, hatred, or anger, and what they are attached to or repulsed by—decisively influences the shape of the collective future. For that reason, young people’s emotions tend to be a site of intense political contestation. The history of youth in the twentieth century makes this abundantly clear. Convinced that intervention was of utmost importance to the future of society, different religious and political actors were anxious to shape the emotional capacities and comportment of young people according to their moral and political convictions as well as economic interests. Meanwhile, young people themselves variously—and more or less deliberately—adopted, adapted, and defied such emotional prescriptions and intrusions. Oftentimes, they invented their own emotional expressions and forms of behavior.

In a period of increasing global interaction and exchange, novel emotional norms and habits of feeling could sometimes travel from one community or place to another—a process spurred on by music, films, magazines, television, and other media. However, emotions were also eminently emplaced: shaped by local cultural customs and socioeconomic structures; fluctuating between discrete emotional clusters centered on the home, the streets, the classroom, and the workplace; and varying within and among countries. Emotions in all of these historical settings were tied to and helped sustain social distinctions of age, gender, race, class, and religion. Conversely, emotional ties and practices could also sometimes transgress and challenge such classifications.
Emotions are notoriously difficult to capture historically. They connect the body and the mind, the visceral and the reasoned, the individual and the collective. That the category of emotion is also subject to different and historically variable conceptions does not make the task any easier (Boddice 2019; Dixon 2003; Frevert 2011; Plamper 2012). Over the past decades, scholars have worked in creative ways to meet the challenge, employing various kinds of historical sources and borrowing from neighboring disciplines to come up with conceptual frameworks and analytical tools that allow us to approach these somewhat intangible phenomena.

Whereas some researchers conceive of emotions as a kind of discourse that might be studied through language (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990), others have insisted that the corporeal dimensions are better grasped if we examine how individuals or communities “labor” to manage emotions (Hochschild 1979, 2012) or if we approach emotions as something we do; that is, as a kind of embodied practice (Kounine 2017; Rosaldo 1984; Scheer 2012). Historians have explored the ways in which “emotionologies” (collective emotional standards) have been harnessed and changed over time (Stearns and Stearns 1985); how different “emotional regimes” have sought to regulate individual emotional comportment (Reddy 2001); and how unwritten rules of emotional conduct have varied across different “emotional communities” (Rosenwein 2002, 2010) or socio-material spaces within a given society (Gammerl 2012). Others have traced the evolution of specific emotions over time (Stearns 1990; Stearns and Haggerty 1991), or attended to the emotional dimensions of particular historical events, institutions, periods, or processes (Cancian and Gordon 1988; Eustace 2008; Haggis and Allen 2008; McLisky 2008). Although the history of emotions thus signals a reorientation of analytical attention rather than a new and unified theoretical paradigm, most scholars tend to agree with early thinkers in the field (Febvre 1941; Foucault 1971; Williams 1977) that, whether they are individual or collective, emotions are at least partially socially structured, culturally contingent, and hence subject to change over time.

The growing interest in emotions has also affected the historiography of youth in the twentieth century. Yet only recently have a growing number of researchers sought to develop systematic methodological considerations about how to approach the topic historically. This chapter draws on existing literature—both that which focuses primarily on emotions and that in which emotions are a peripheral theme—to outline some of the major issues pertaining to the history of youth and emotions in the twentieth century across a wide range of territories. Rather than advocating one particular methodology for tracing the intertwined histories of youth and emotions, the chapter offers examples of the plethora of approaches and themes in the field; it also identifies new and potentially fruitful research trajectories.
YOUTH AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTIONS

During the twentieth century, in multiple contexts around the world, different state and non-state actors attempted with greater or lesser success to regulate young people’s moral and emotional inclinations, hoping to win their allegiance to particular and often competing agendas (Vallgårda et al. 2015). Debates about and efforts to educate the emotions of youth played a role in the establishment and solidification of political systems and regimes including imperialism, Nazism, and communism, as well as in everyday power battles on a smaller scale.

The nature and aim of the endeavors varied over time and place according to local political and socioeconomic circumstances. In early twentieth-century South India, for instance, Danish Christian missionaries sought to shape the emotional dispositions of local youth by insisting on love and gentleness as a means of education in their schools and institutions. Their hope was that winning the hearts of young people and teaching them to love God would not only lead to individual personal salvation but also cultivate them into little missionaries in their own right. This, the missionaries believed, could eventually bring about a fundamental social, moral, and religious transformation of India from what they perceived to be a heathen and backward part of the world.
Much like missionaries and educators in other places, these conscious agents of social change were convinced that emotional attachment and commitment to a cause were inextricably intertwined (Vallgårda 2015b; see also Olsen 2014; Morrison 2015; Vongsathorn 2015a).

The emotional formation of youth was often interlinked with the promotion of overarching ideologies or forms of government and with projects of national or imperial consolidation. In different parts of the British Empire including England, Canada, and India, the making of good future citizens was a major concern among various groups of politicians, activists, and social commentators, and the molding of young people’s emotions was an abiding concern. This agenda was also adopted by the international Girl Guide movement, which invested considerable resources in training girls and young women not only for matrimony and motherhood—but also for citizenship. Importantly, a good citizen demonstrated happiness and cheerfulness in all areas of life—at home, at school, and in the workplace. Performing cheerfulness and engaging in the “happifying” of oneself and others, even under trying circumstances, became a “patriotic duty.” For girls and young women it was furthermore perceived to be a vital feminine skill necessary for building and maintaining a happy and harmonious home (Alexander 2017: 79–108).

In the United States, Boys State, a youth organization founded in 1935 by the American Legion to counter socialist groups such as the Young Pioneers, likewise recognized the importance of emotions to political devotion. The organization worked diligently with its members to foster “Americanism”: an intense and shared feeling of American patriotism. By doing so, the American Legion sought to kindle in the young men a deep and lasting loyalty to the American nation, its ideals and institutions while at the same time foreclosing any potential communist sympathies (Miller 2015).

At the other side of the political spectrum, in the aftermath of the Second World War in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), authorities—who were faced with the challenge of socially and politically integrating former Hitler Youth members into a new socialist society—similarly turned to the mobilization and regulation of emotions. Conceiving of young people as eminently malleable and of music as an effective tool of emotional education, socialist leaders used collective singing as a means to foster young people’s emotions such as joy, jolliness, optimism, and patriotism as well as enthusiasm toward socialist ideals. They were driven in this endeavor by the presumed connection between the structures of feeling in the young generation and the future of the socialist state (Brauer 2015; see also Brauer 2012; Plum 2015). As hinted at by these examples, efforts by different groups of adults to shape young people’s emotions were often motivated by anxieties about the susceptibility of young people to harmful influences, as much as by the desire to promote particular political ideals.
Young people’s emotions were also key to projects of social change in the aftermath of official decolonization in Africa and Asia in the second half of the century. In early postcolonial Tanzania, for example, politicians and other activists considered young people crucial to a project of strengthening national culture, a culture that was to be composed of a combination of “tribal” traditions and modernizing initiatives making Tanzania into a modern nation with an honored cultural heritage. The aim, as President Julius K. Nyerere phrased it in 1962, was to “regain our pride in OUR culture” (Ivaska 2011: 3). In the vision of Nyerere and many others, generating this collective feeling of pride that would foster cohesion and strength depended in part on reforming errant desires and Westernized practices among young people, particularly in the capital of Dar es Salaam. Hence, Tanzania in the 1960s saw several campaigns to ban soul music, bell-bottomed trousers, miniskirts, and similar supposedly decadent and immoral cultural practices.

While young people welcomed and actively partook in their own emotional formation, some found important ways to redirect such processes. As the century progressed, and especially during and after the 1968 youth rebellions, young people confronted everything from established political and patriarchal authority to conventional forms of intimacy, and emotions were quite often central to such struggles. Young people defiantly expressed their emotions and sexualities, claiming their right to display them according to their own
inclinations. In Sweden, for example, young adults challenged how sexual desire should be ordered and expressed. They experimented with non-monogamous sexuality and love as well as with same-sex liaisons, all the while insisting that such forms of sexuality should no longer be governed by feelings of isolation or shame. Yet, conflicting emotions sometimes resulted from such struggles, as it proved more difficult than first assumed to redefine ingrained emotional habits. Paradoxically, many young men and women experienced shame and guilt when they found themselves to be jealous of their promiscuous partners or unable to flaunt non-heteronormative sexuality in public (Florin 2017; Ryberg 2017).

Emotions such as frustration, disappointment, and indignation were also important operators in the challenges of young people to authorities or specific policies—as were solidarity and a sense of community (Ballah 2017). Whether young people gathered together to protest the Vietnam War (as they did in massive numbers across the globe during the 1960s and 1970s) or whether they sought to jointly contest the apartheid regime in South Africa or the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, the generation and channeling of collective emotions was of crucial importance. Singing, shouting, and marching were among the varied practices that young activists engaged in and which played an important part in mobilizing politically potent feelings. However, more research is needed on the tactics and practices of young people in encouraging, fostering, and directing collective emotions for political purposes in different social and geographical contexts.

Young people also formulated and communicated powerful emotions in written correspondence as a mode of political activity in different places. In the United States during the 1960s, many young people wrote letters to express solidarity and to try to build political friendships with Martin Luther King Jr. During the Selma to Montgomery voting rights marches in Alabama in 1965, for example, high school student Cheryl Dragotto wrote the civil rights leader a letter in which she declared: “I am so disappointed and angry at our country for the way Negroes are treated” (Berghel 2017: 442). In letters such as this one, Black and white youth articulated disappointment, anger, frustration, and sometimes shame at racist policies, at American political leaders’ failure to uphold democracy, and at the uneven distribution of political rights. The targeted expression of emotions in letters thus played into the process through which young people began to act as participatory political agents (Berghel 2017).

**EMOTIONS AND THE FAMILY**

In their daily lives young people in the twentieth century navigated many different socio-material spaces governed by varying degrees of intimacy and different codes of emotional conduct (Rosenwein 2002, 2010; Vallgårda et al. 2015;). While the shrewd historian can find emotions in nearly every social
context of the past, we often tend to think of the family as the most emotionally saturated space, and this was perhaps particularly true—at least ideologically—in the twentieth century. The family is a set of relationships characterized by “tense and tender ties” (Stoler 2001), by emotional intimacy, care, and control. Changing cultural standards of emotions also seep into and help modulate relationships between parents and their children, between siblings, as well as between more distant relations.

The ideal of the close-knit family tied together by the emotional glue of love and affection, which had emerged in the nineteenth century, became ever more dominant in many different parts of the world during the twentieth century (Bannerjee 2015; Coontz 2005; Faye Jakobsen and Løkke 1997). In Europe and North America, experts paid increasing attention to the regulation of emotional relationships between parents and their children. Mothers and fathers were to love their children, and parents were increasingly charged with the responsibility of ensuring their children’s happiness (Stearns 2010; Zelizer 1985). While the use of fear as an educational tool had long been out of vogue among middle-class observers, from the 1920s, experts increasingly advised parents to prevent and soothe fear in children rather than teach them bravery (Stearns and Haggerty 1991).

In tandem with these developments, jealousy between siblings also became increasingly problematized from the 1920s onward, particularly in the United States. Conceiving of jealousy as an all-consuming affect which might have horrific consequences, experts urged parents to be aware of and help prevent this destructive force in the relationships between their offspring. Precautions had to be taken early in children’s lives (or even before conception, through sensible birth spacing) in order to prevent the negative impact in adolescence and adulthood. Many parents presumably agreed with experts on the seriousness of the problem of sibling jealousy. In a 1955 edition of Parents Magazine, a woman confided that jealousy was “by far the most troublesome, the gravest issue” she had met in her “career as a mother” (quoted in Stearns 1990: 96).

Although the ideal of the emotionally harmonious family prevailed, a growing number of parents also decided to divorce in many countries—especially from the late 1960s onward. This meant that millions of young people experienced the breakdown of family relationships, something that became one of the most painful and emotionally composite processes in many young people’s lives. As the century wore on, experts became more interested in hearing children’s own perspectives on family issues and a rising number of outlets enabled young people to describe and debate their emotions in relation to divorce. In Danish youth magazines in the second half of the twentieth century, for example, young people articulated emotions such as loneliness, sorrow, anger, jealousy, a bad conscience, and tenderness—frequently echoing each other’s words and images as they sought to interpret and communicate their own emotional
experience. By doing this, they also helped generate a new emotional formation in which it was not only legitimate but also desirable, to discuss and share personal emotional difficulties related to family life in public. In 1999, one young anonymous writer described the agony stemming from the split of the family in the youth magazine *Mix*, emphasizing longing for his/her father and siblings: “I miss them all the time. I can’t stand it, and when I cry, they become upset, and when I cry when I am with my mom, she scolds me.” As this and many other youngsters described emotional difficulties, other young readers were invited to sympathize and interpret their own situation in relation to experiences portrayed in the magazines (quoted in Vallgårda & Rønsig Larsen 2021: 240; see also Vallgårda & Bjerre 2016).

Testimonies such as this one remind us that there is often a marked disconnect between cultural norms and emotional experiences. Aside from so-called “broken homes,” across the globe, children and youth also lived on the streets or grew up in assimilationist schools, carceral institutions, and orphanages. While many young people presumably established alternate emotional communities or forged family-like relationships as they grew up in such institutions (Søland 2015), others were subjected to both physical and emotional abuse. Children and young people, whether they were temporarily displaced from their families,
such as French working-class children and youth in summer camps (Downs 2002), or whether they were forcibly removed and displaced—such as the hundreds of thousands of Indigenous and mixed-race children taken away from their parents in Australia, the US, and Canada (Adams 1995b; Paisley 1999; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015a)—having to leave the familiar for the wholly unfamiliar. It entailed being subjected to entirely different emotional norms and practices from what they were accustomed to in their family setting. They thus had to grapple with what one might call an “emotional frontier,” namely the affective experience of having to navigate or master conflicting sets of emotional expectations (Vallgård and Olsen 2022).

EMOTIONS IN SCHOOL

During the twentieth century, young people whose families had the means and possibility to send them to school spent a substantial part of their youth in educational institutions. A distinct socio-material space, the school was the context of many and varied emotional experiences for young people: curiosity about the outcome of an experiment in chemistry class; excitement or dread about the next chapter in the history book; guilt at not having learnt the hymn by heart; embarrassment about not understanding the quadratic equation; or shame about failing one’s exam. In the schoolyard, during recess, young people experienced thrill at play and joy at comradeship, infatuation, and pain connected with romance, feelings of exclusion at being ostracized, and humiliation in the face of bullying—to name just a few emotional experiences, some of which might be felt simultaneously.

Intertwined with their formal intellectual and physical education, young people became subject to emotional formation in school. Changing and varied psychological theories, pedagogical visions, and teaching techniques helped structure the interactions and emotional practices. Beyond textbooks and other educational material, different rituals and traditions of collective singing could be powerful tools of emotional formation within the school. Swearing allegiance to the flag, standing up as the teacher entered the class, and singing national anthems or other emotionally potent songs all helped shape emotional relationships and propensities.

Moreover, the very architecture of the school helped frame the affective dispositions and behavior of the students, and many educators and designers worked actively to take advantage of this. From the 1910s in California to the mid-century in Illinois, advocates of Montessori pedagogy and other progressive educators were preoccupied with ensuring young people’s engagement by instilling emotional strength—not least with managing boredom. The physical landscape of the school, they believed, was central to achieving these goals.
Innovative classroom designs were meant to promote calmness and tranquility while counteracting restlessness and fatigue. However, although educators were convinced that the construction of a certain spatial framework could sustain a particular emotional formation, designing affective responses was hardly a straightforward task. Architects sometimes relied on dubious psychological theories in their designs aimed at evoking particular emotional responses, and automatic emotional effects of the physical environment could seldom be effectively predicted or manipulated. Young people tended to occupy spaces in ways completely different to the intended purpose, and their emotional response to physical surroundings often diverged substantially from what adults expected (Gutman et al. 2008; Hamlett 2015b; Kozlovsky 2010; Olsen 2015; Sobe 2018). Importantly, young people not only inhabit spaces constructed by adults but also forge their own spaces through imagination and creative material practices. Often unnoticed by adults, such informal spaces may be of great emotional importance to the young people themselves (Rasmussen 2004; Sleight 2013).

While some young people were undoubtedly bored in school, many others were denied the privilege of formal schooling, and this experience was also
connected with particular emotions. Some young people feared for their future without proper education. In Nigeria during the 1940s, several adolescent boys wrote letters to different male colonial authorities: to the commissioner of the colony; to the head of the British administration in Lagos; and to the colony welfare officer. Some boys and young men gave themselves up for adoption or requested assistance in finding a job. Others, however, asked for help to pay for their education or to get admission into prestigious schools. The communication of emotions was central to their pleading with the authorities, and they portrayed their agony articulately, presenting themselves as helpless without the support of their superiors, appealing to their kindness and sympathy. “Such phrases as ‘Oh help me I beseech you help a fatherless boy’, ‘Oh! Oh! My Lord my two knees are on the ground begging for help’, ‘Oh help a helpless boy, help!’, and ‘Ha Ha I am sorry for myself’ were all meant to make their feelings as realistic as possible” (Aderinto 2015b: 287; see also Lee 2009). Unfortunately, few of the boys were successful in their attempts; the colonial authorities usually did not respond to their letters. If going to school invited a wide span of emotions, not having the privilege of education could lead equally to desperation.

YOUTH, EMOTIONS, AND THE MEDIA

Codes of feeling are communicated, taught, and learnt by youth through many different channels. During the twentieth century, different kinds of mass media played an increasingly important role in these processes, as the number and reach of media expanded and young people were subjected to their influence (Strandgaard 2017).

The genre of juvenile literature grew substantially over the century and was a major factor in shaping young people’s emotions. Through heartrending stories and images of human misery, sin, grace, and salvation, early twentieth-century Christian literature in different languages invited young readers to feel compassion, pity, revulsion, and gratitude in morally appropriate ways (Gullestad 2007; Olsen 2014; Vallgårda 2014). Other kinds of juvenile literature conveyed less clear-cut moral messages, but presumably had no less of an emotional impact on their readers. International bestsellers, many of which are still being read all over the world, such as The Jungle Book (1894), Peter and Wendy (1911), The War of the Buttons (1912), and Pippi Longstocking (1945), described different emotional experiences and gave young readers the opportunity to learn how to feel—or temper feelings of—trust, empathy, pain, fear, bravery, and homesickness, to name just a few. The popular fictional stories functioned as a sort of emotional playground where children could try out familiar and unfamiliar feelings through mimetic learning, imitation, and identification with the different characters of the books (Frevert et al. 2014).
Films were another powerful medium for the dissemination of emotions in the twentieth century. Through moving images, narrative, dialogue, music, and sound effects, movies could exert tremendous influence on viewers. As young audiences entered movie theaters in growing numbers, they were exposed to new emotional figures and were invited to experience, albeit vicariously, a host of emotions and emotional styles. In 1930s and 1940s Britain, the impact of cinema on adolescents became a cause for concern among adult middle-class observers worried especially about the emotional impact on working-class youth, who were deemed particularly susceptible to such an influence. In the eyes of these adult observers, the movies, whose sensory effects were enhanced by Technicolor, risked stimulating excessive sentiment and immoral imagination. To boys and young men, however, “the cloaking effects of cinema darkness” became an “emotional refuge” in which they could confront orthodox and emotionally constraining notions of masculinity. Offering “mimetic learning,” movies such as the Hollywood film My Friend Flicka (1943) enabled the young male cinema-goer to try out softer feelings and tears, as he “imaginatively project[ed] his own emotions onto film characters’ feelings and situation,” thus enabling the development of a richer emotional life (Tebbutt 2022).

In Hindi cinema, the movie Zanjeer (1973) by contrast inaugurated the “angry young man film” (following British precedents) as a new and extremely popular genre. These action and revenge-themed films portrayed young male heroes who, stirred by righteous anger, confronted pressing social, economic, and political issues such as social injustice, corruption, and poverty. Reaching a mass audience, especially in urban India in the latter decades of the century, these films communicated a message that anger was acceptable and even virtuous in young men, at least insofar as it was properly directed and exercised under appropriate circumstances (Rajamani 2012).

Outside the movie theaters, young people were also exposed to films in classrooms and later of course on television. In 1920s Germany and the United States, health educators employed techniques of cinematography to educate students in schools. Informed by new developments within psychology and pedagogy that emphasized the importance of emotions to young people’s learning, the films worked to evoke and regulate particular emotions in the young audience in order thereby to motivate specific behaviors (including immunization) in relation to health and hygiene. Although health officials hoped that through the exposure to images of diseased body parts or stories of shameful individuals who had behaved immorally, the young audience would become emotionally invested in behaving responsibly, others feared that controlling the emotional reaction of the viewers was not without potential complications. Indeed, “if these films showed a reality that became too real, it was feared that the film would induce shock or even phobias and thus violate
the emotions of the audience, which would in turn have counterproductive effects on their behavior” (Laukötter 2016: 189). Attempting to manipulate young people’s emotions was, in other words, risky business.

This did not prevent adults in different parts of the world from engaging in such schemes, however. In mid-century Canada, for example, law enforcement officers used didactic pictures of child deaths and similarly “necropedagogic” films to warn children and youngsters about the dangers of automobile traffic and to teach them a sense of responsibility for their own safety on the urban streets. Despite the fact that psychologists and child experts advised against the use of fear as an educational tool, the safety campaign relied on the evocation and instrumentalization of fear in the young audience to get the message across (Myers 2015).

While such films constructed by adults for children and youth followed a one-way communication model, public media in many countries also made it possible for young people themselves to contribute to societal discourse on a number of issues. This afforded them the opportunity to articulate and describe their emotions—and emotional ideals—in public. In the early to mid-twentieth century, in the women’s pages of the Johannesburg-based daily newspaper Bantu World young school-educated Black Africans filled many pages with debates about sex, courtship, and not least love. For some contributors, true love emerged from Christian love; it was a natural force that endowed life with meaning. Some argued that the kinds of love that were to be the basis of marriage, had to be characterized by spiritual sympathy and deep affection, not just physical attraction and passion. This understanding of love resembled Victorian emotional ideals, which many of them had encountered through missionary schooling, and by reading European magazines, novels, and so on. But Christian and Victorian ideals also resonated with existing southern African emotional ethics, not least with regard to the ideal of modest and demure women in romance. Many therefore criticized the modern girls’ challenges to true love. These girls, the young writers proposed, corrupted true love and threatened the stability of marriages through irresponsible love affairs (Aderinto 2015a; Thomas 2009: 45–9).

Later in the century a spiraling number of youth magazines as well as radio and television programs in different parts of the world invited young readers, listeners, and viewers to contribute to the different outlets; quite often the interventions of these young people were focused precisely on discussing what kinds of emotional behavior were appropriate in which situations—and for young men and women, respectively. In that way, the media became a platform for the cultivation and communication of youthful emotional cultures, which sometimes mirrored adult agendas, but at other times diverged in distinct directions.
YOUTH, WAR, AND EMOTIONS

War is one of the most dramatic—and often traumatic—emotional experiences any person can encounter. In a century ravaged by war—bilateral wars, regional wars, colonial wars, world wars, civil wars, and the Cold War—millions of young people were affected by conflict in many direct and indirect ways. Wars in the twentieth century were fought largely by youth—and by extension they became casualties and commodities.

Young people were injured, orphaned, and displaced. They witnessed aerial bombardments and ground war. They were forced to participate as soldiers, and they were being used in macro-political battles. Such varied and violent experiences were associated with fear, anxiety, excitement, pain, grief, and many more emotions, often in chaotic combinations.

As soldiers in the trenches and on the battlefields, witnessing the death of comrades and sustaining injuries, many young men incurred tremendous emotional trauma during the First World War. However, for young British soldiers, the emotional experience of war was a complex and often contradictory one; it entailed fear and pain, but also lust for killing, exaltation in the moment of battle, and elation at survival. Young men’s letters and diaries testify to a disjuncture between their own gendered expectations of stoic behavior and their actual intense and sometimes tender emotional experiences. “For the young men of the war generation, schooled as many were in the Edwardian idea of the ‘stiff upper lip’, the gap between emotional experience and what was actually conscious to them, let alone what they felt they ought to communicate home, was large” (Roper 2010: 20). Struggling to come to terms with such internal conflicts, young men sought emotional support from their family. Although they were far from home, the family—and mothers in particular—played a tremendous role in the young men’s emotional sustenance and survival. The soldiers engaged in diligent letter exchanges with their mothers who not only offered them accounts of life at home and assurances of their love and support but also sent them familiar domestic objects as a testament to their maternal love (Roper 2010).

Decades later, young people were also implicated as perpetrators and victims in gruesome armed conflicts in East and West Africa, with deep and lasting trauma as a consequence. During the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991–2002), thousands of children and adolescents from marginalized and impoverished communities were recruited or forcibly enrolled as combatants by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). For these young people associated with RUF, emotional standards of terror and abuse became the new normal. Their everyday experience involved being submitted to, witnessing, and even being coerced to participate in, systematic acts of violence, rape, and other forms of sexual assault. As one former male child soldier put it in an interview after the war: “Most days were awful because the rebels did wicked things to
people. The beating of people, starvation, the systematic raping of young girls against their will and so on. I never thought I would survive their physical and emotional torture” (unnamed boy quoted in Denov 2010b: 794). Yet fright, abhorrence, and guilt lessened over time as the atrocities acquired an air of normality. A former female child soldier described this twisting of emotional disposition and reaction over time: “I didn’t have the mind to kill someone initially … but later on I enjoyed the wicked acts … I was responsible for killing anybody that was assigned to die” (Denov 2010b: 795). Despite or perhaps in part because of such “enjoyment,” the young people felt ashamed as well as lonely. After the war, moreover, former child soldiers struggled to cope not only with grief, guilt, and haunting memories of the horrors of the war but also with the intense stigmatization in Sierra Leonean society (Denov 2010b, 2010a; Rosen 2015).

Although the experiences of young soldiers were sometimes unthinkably traumatizing, the same was often true for young people who were not actively involved in violent acts, but who were also victims of war. In Europe, during the Second World War, Anne Frank and millions like her experienced discrimination, dislocation, and incarceration, as well as being sent to concentration camps and witnessing the incredible human atrocities and suffering that unfolded there. In other parts of the world, too, young people were victimized by war.

FIGURE 5.5 Comradery and care. American soldiers that were wounded during the First World War are recovering at the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, DC, 1918. © Wikimedia Commons.
During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Chinese children and youth were orphaned and displaced as a consequence of the Japanese invasion. Some of them experienced first-hand brutality and even killings of schoolmates or family members. These young people were not, however, left to deal with such emotional pain on their own. Viewing young war victims alternately as potential threats to social stability or as useful vehicles for national cohesion, the Nationalist government was bent on structuring these young people’s emotions. Experts advised that young people traumatized by war could grow into revengeful and angry adults and that it was of utmost importance that they were taught to love their new “family” (the Chinese nation), while directing their hostile emotions at the proper enemy (the Japanese). Agents of nationalist state-building thus used a variety of educational tools to channel the orphans’ rage while simultaneously developing an understanding of “the national-race” and a strong feeling of patriotism (Plum 2015).

Young people were targeted and used in a variety of ways during and after wars by being displaced, being configured as particular moral or emotional symbols, or being expected to perform important emotional labor in the relationships between either warring or allied nations or factions (Maksudyan 2019; Simonsen and Ericsson 2005; Vassiloudi and Theodorou 2012). During the Second World War, seventy thousand children and youth were relocated from Finland to Sweden and housed with temporary foster families whose language they usually did not speak. The official humanitarian purpose was to protect them from the tragedies of war and from the devastating physical as well as emotional effects it might have on them. Yet, as in many other such projects of relocating children and youth during twentieth-century wars, political rationalities and objectives were at least as important to the endeavor as officially avowed humanitarian ones. In this case, the young people were deployed as “commodities of compassion” in the Swedish politics of indemnification vis-à-vis Finland. Refusing to grant Finland military support against the Soviet threat, Sweden decided instead to welcome young Finnish people into the country at the same time as they were barring other politically less attractive refugees. This was a powerful strategic choice. Symbols of innocence and vulnerability, the children and young people were configured as carriers of emotional and moral values to which both countries could relate. One might expect the flow of transportees to be at its apex during times of heightened threat to Finnish children and youth, but this was not actually the case. The flow of displacements followed the needs for bilateral fraternization rather than the physical or emotional needs of the young people—and in spite of criticism from many Finns. As commodities of compassion, then, the young people were turned into “little bridges of trust” between two friendly nations whose relationship was otherwise fraught (Nehlin 2017).

Even if young people were frequently instrumentalized for macro-political purposes, they also often actively participated in the cultural and emotional
labor that sustained particular configurations of war. In Norway, a national essay competition for school students in 1946 gave young people the opportunity to share their own memories of wartime experiences and of their own roles. Young Norwegians portrayed the war as adventurous and themselves as both participatory and resistant social actors. They stressed the brutality of the war and they helped reproduce the strong patriotic narratives that dominated public discourse at the time. In doing so, young people themselves contributed significantly to the collective memory of the conflict (Schrumpf 2018).

The experience of war could also be exciting, titillating, and filled with a sense of freedom and empowerment. At times when everything that was regarded as normal had been uprooted, new social and emotional possibilities emerged and many young people seized these eagerly. These experiences were inherently situated, not just socially but also spatially (Gammerl 2012; Vallgårda 2015a). In English cities (such as London, Hull, and Birmingham) during and after the Second World War, young people experienced an urban landscape fundamentally reconfigured by war. They explored dangerous spaces such as unmonitored bombsites and ruined shops and homes and they spent time in air-raid shelters while the Luftwaffe was conducting bombing raids. Occupying and moving through such urban landscapes charred by war involved a host of mixed and murky emotions, including fear, anxiety, boredom, pain, excitement, and desire. It also granted children and adolescents a new sense of freedom and autonomy. In school essays

FIGURE 5.6 Mourning and indignation at a Palestinian funeral and protest, 1988. Courtesy of Getty Images.
recounting wartime experiences, young people “declared themselves to be brave, compassionate, hardworking, and resourceful” (Bell 2017a: 87). While war was a defining factor in millions of lives, its emotional significance for young people thus varied dramatically over time and place, from one war to the next, and depending upon how intimately they were affected by or involved in the conflict.

**GENDER, RACE, AND EMOTIONS**

Emotions are intimately tied to different kinds of social categorization and the hierarchies they sustain. Whether a person is expected to demonstrate bravery or humility, show solicitude or indifference, indicate a desire for protection or a desire to protect, feel shame or pride, or express anger or sorrow in different situations—these expectations depend almost entirely on their age, gender, social class, religious affiliation, ethnicity, and other social markers. Obviously someone racialized as Black does not have a different innate set of emotional capacities than someone racialized as white, nor are women naturally programmed to feel differently from men. Rather, changing social and cultural conventions ascribe different emotional tendencies to different social categories. Such expectations, which tend to be co-opted more or less successfully, are furthermore integral to the power dynamics that sustain a certain social order (Ahmed 2004; Haggis and Allen 2008; Stoler 1995, 2002).

The history of youth in the twentieth century illustrates this with clarity. In the Girl Guide movement, for example, emotional expectations neatly sustained a gendered and racialized hierarchy. Although “happifying” as mentioned earlier was supposedly a global female duty, Indian girls and women were not expected to be happy; rather the white, Christian Girl Guides were to consider it their mission to bring happiness and cheerfulness to their poor “heathen” sisters. Such prescriptions no doubt also encouraged the Girl Guides to feel a sense of superiority vis-à-vis their “heathen” sisters (Alexander 2017; Thorne 1999). In Danish juvenile missionary literature emotional education was similarly organized to harness and enhance a particular social order; through vivid and horrific stories of heathen depravity, Danish youth were taught to feel repulsion and horror toward heathen adults (particularly men), pity for “heathen” girls and boys, and gratitude for their own lucky station in life. Such emotional education was not merely a product of colonial hierarchies; it was a crucial part of the cultural labor that made colonialism appear justified and desirable (Vallgård 2014: 209–34).

In some situations, emotional practices more or less deliberately transgressed and helped rearrange social categorizations and the hierarchies they sustained. Young women demonstrating bravery or sexual desire might in some cases help reconfigure gendered expectations. Romantic relationships between young people with different class or religious backgrounds might challenge
rigid classifications as might intimate friendships that defied color lines (Gandhi 2006).

That social categories and the emotional expectations tied to them are human constructs made and remade through verbal and embodied practices also implies that they are historically contingent. During the first part of the twentieth century, for example, what it meant to be a young man was a matter of ongoing

FIGURE 5.7 Feeling like a woman? Young American women proudly posing in swimsuits and wearing their swimming competition medals, c. 1920. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
negotiation in many different places; how a young man could reasonably feel and communicate emotions changed markedly. While during the nineteenth century, American advice literature stressed that anger was an expected and even desirable masculine feeling, this changed a couple of decades into the twentieth century. By then, the intricate “Victorian scheme of gender distinctions” in children and young people’s emotional education was unraveled and restructured, and anger became increasingly problematized, even among young men. “The angry boy, once prized as a spirited lad demonstrating his defiance of sissy qualities, had become a family menace” (Stearns 1993: 36). Before and during the First World War in Britain, new forms of emotional intimacy also became increasingly acceptable among young men. The Boy Scout movement and the wartime experiences encouraged deep bonding between young men, and hence helped reconfigure the emotional parameters of masculinity. However, the extent to which these changes endured after the war is questionable (Bourke 1996).

Frequently young people actively sought to engage in emotional practices that would allow them to be recognized as members of a particular social category. Showing gentleness, modesty, and cheerfulness might, for example, be a way of presenting oneself as a proper young woman; while demonstrating patriotism could be a way of claiming national membership, and perhaps even redefine the boundaries of a particular national identity. Both of these issues were at stake in Japanese American (Nisei) youth culture in Second World War incarceration camps. Subjected as they were to extreme expressions of racism, Nisei youth shaped their dress, demeanor, and physical appearance, and worked hard to demonstrate happiness and a passionate patriotism in order to present themselves as proper Americans. They thereby sought to redefine who might count themselves American. As is often the case, however, these efforts aimed at inclusion hinged on specific exclusions. Incarceration camp publications thus pitted the patriotic Japanese American youth against the supposedly more racially suspect Black Americans. Race and gender classifications were thus upheld by a group of young “internal ‘others’” who sought to distinguish and relocate themselves within the multilayered and complex social hierarchical order in America. “Far from being ‘mere child’s play’, seemingly meaningless youthful pastimes were in fact imbued with mature messages and deep political desires” (McAndrew 2014: 60). The boundaries of particular social categories might be moved, but the dynamics of exclusion, and the consolidation of social hierarchies through emotional practices and configurations thus remained relatively stable.

**CONCLUSION**

As youth emerged unevenly across the globe as a distinct—and expanding—stage of life, so did the particular emotional forms associated with it. Indeed, the very category of youth was in part defined by its intense emotionality: by
the teenager’s mood swings and unreasonable emotional outbursts; by the freer emotional forms that young people allowed themselves in romantic relationships and friendships; at musical concerts; and at political gatherings among other common meeting places. The emotional cultures of youth were often connected to those of adults—sometimes because they mirrored broader societal agendas; at other times because they were made into specific targets of manipulation or because young people deliberately attempted to counteract what they perceived to be reactionary or old-fashioned emotional forms of their parents’ generation.

In the twentieth century, young people’s emotions were shaped by multiple relationships. New forms of interaction and feeling were propelled by macro-political transformations, by developments in psychology and the behavioral sciences, by leisure and the growing consumer culture, by new forms of social interaction and changing familial relationships, as well as by the advent of new technology and media. Some dynamics cut across time and place; others were essentially local.

Globally and locally, youth remained an internally differentiated category and emotional experiences were intricately intertwined with other historically contingent social classifications including race, gender, class, and religion. What were considered appropriate feelings depended upon belongings in any given context. But young people’s behavior also often defied emotional prescriptions and prohibitions associated with their particular position in a social hierarchy in ways that over time sometimes helped redefine social categorizations and hierarchies.

Accessing young people’s perspectives on, participation in, and contestation of broader changes in emotional cultures can be challenging. The challenge is even more pronounced when it concerns underprivileged and marginalized youth, an underrepresented group in historical archives and accounts. Yet, in studying the twentieth century and beyond, historians have a varied and vital corpus of sources to probe, and one that grows rapidly with the progression of the twenty-first century. The emotional expressions of young people can be traced in music and drawing, in the expanding media market, and in the writing by an ever-increasing number of literate young, as well as through oral history interviews.

The history of emotions offers historians of youth a variety of conceptual tools to utilize and develop, and the intersections between the two fields are proving to be a fertile research arena. Whether we study the emotional norms of youth, trace the patterns in their emotional practices, or examine the emotional formations in which they partook, paying attention to the history of emotions adds important new dimensions to our knowledge of the ideologies and experiences of youth in the past.
“I have seen many youth in this country who are not interested in getting married. Insects, birds and animals, all procreate, then why is the most superior species so reluctant to have children?” Vijayratna Majumdar’s Youvana Vigyan [The Science of Youth], published in Calcutta in 1923, reflected a highly local anxiety that India’s youth, in becoming Westernized—that is, by marrying later and later in life, putting material ambitions before duties towards family, and seeking sexual pleasure without matrimony—were failing to fulfill the duty of eugenic reproduction. Such public discourses on youth crisis—“an euphemism for adult panic over sexual and gender experimentation amongst the young”—gave expression to ill-defined anxieties regarding the onset of “modernity” in various parts of the world throughout the twentieth century (Najmabadi 2004: 379). Majumdar’s concerns, indeed, appear to be yet another iteration of the “public discourse of youth as threatening political and sexual subjects,” observed in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s (El Shakry 2011: 592). In other words, while a volume entirely dedicated to the “science of youth” might have been uncommon, in defining youth itself with respect to a suitable age for sexual activity, marriage and reproduction, and in evoking the authority of science to understand youth and youthfulness, Majumdar’s text exemplified the “scientific” scrutiny of youth as well as youthfulness that emerged as a global obsession in the 1920s.
Halfway across the world from Calcutta, a team of scientists comprising Serge Voronoff, a surgeon in Paris, Eugen Steinach, a physiologist from Vienna, and Harry Benjamin, an endocrinologist from New York, pondered the mysteries of youthfulness and claimed to have devised a surgical procedure for the restoration of youth to older men, and less often, to women. Voronoff’s surgical strategy involved the transplant of testes from a young chimpanzee into an older man; Steinach’s less dramatic method comprised a partial vasectomy (Alexander et al. 2020; Hirshbein 2000). Both approaches testify to the ways in which the very logic of rejuvenation had come to focus on sex glands and sex hormones in the early twentieth century, giving a material basis to the metaphoric connections between sex, youth, and youthfulness. The study and regulation of youth—whether understood as a demographic group, as by Majumdar, or as a quality, as by the group of rejuvenators—was a common obsession in the interwar years. What gave youth and youthfulness an epistemic unity around the world in the twentieth century, this chapter will suggest, was the constant reference to the scientific scrutiny of sex that is common in the two opening examples.

This chapter considers how “youth” and “sex” have become unthinkable without each other in the modern age. The term “youth” that conveyed a somewhat nebulous yet highly sexualized category in the early modern period was replaced, in one way, by a narrower understanding of youth as a stage of life, usually demarcated by specific chronological ages, in the modern era. In other words, “youth” came to be understood as an ascriptive category defined primarily with reference to chronological age, a transition that was made possible in part by the bureaucratic mechanisms of modern states that made records of age more precise and ubiquitous in the twentieth century. However, as this chapter will show, despite this transition, the term continued to function, first, as a crucial sexual category in the modern era, as evidenced by the quest for sexually charged quality of “youthfulness,” on the one hand, and by the frantic worldwide desire to regulate the sexual behavior of young people, on the other. Furthermore, while the term appears to have acquired a further gender-neutral quality in the era of postwar decolonization, “youth” remained a site for the contestation of gender roles in the twentieth century. In this era, as the history of global sex education indicates, young people became the prime targets for the dissemination of gender normativity. Conversely, youthful revolt—whether against conservative political policies or traditional familial norms—came to be expressed in the form of challenges to sexual norms and gender roles, as evidenced in calls for free love, radical sexual experimentation, and the quest for sexual and reproductive rights. Finally, even as the term appeared, on the surface, to signify an undefined quality rather than an embodied essence, modern discourses of youth and youthfulness—whether biomedical, aesthetic, or consumerist—remained obsessively focused on the
physical body. This chapter traces the fundamental conceptualization of youth in relation to discourses on gender, sexuality, and the body, by using a marginal example—Majumdar’s *Science of Youth*—as an exemplary text testifying to the epistemic unity that came to characterize “youth” in the modern age.

**SEXOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE HOMOGENIZATION OF YOUTH IN THE MODERN AGE**

While the celebration of youth and related efforts to conquer old age might appear to be a trans-historical phenomenon, the obsession with rejuvenation “as a particular set of medicocultural practices of self-fashioning and body enhancement is more recent.” This more specific understanding was also reflective of “broader shifts in the cultural semantics of youth,” and “predicated on the rejection of the Ancien Régime” in the French, American, and the Haitian revolutions that are understood, in many ways, to herald the onset of modernity (Alexander et al. 2020). Yet during no other period of time, perhaps, had “youth” been so extensively evoked as a cultural, political, and social category as in the twentieth century at a time of global wars, the rise of anti-colonial revolutionary youth movements in Asia and Africa, the formulation of new political ideologies, and the coming of age of new nations in the era of decolonization. The idea of youth—and the desire to mold those identifiable as youthful—animated the Soviet communists in the wake of the Great War, as explored by Susan B. Whitney in Chapter 7 of this volume. Young people also emerged as targets of action and symbols of potential for the German and Italian fascists in the interwar years, as they did in French efforts at revitalization during this time (Whitney 2009). Young people were important actors in the postcolonial reorganization of the relations between Britain and her empire, and symbolized the changing relations between the colonizer and the colonized, and captured the possibility of lateral solidarities and equal exchanges between them (Bailkin 2006). In India, youth emerged as the target of the colonial state’s dying attempts to create good imperial subjects as well as of the anti-colonial efforts to mobilize future national citizens (Topdar 2013). But, as Fabio Lanza suggests, problematizing the relationship between the massive presence of young people in these political events, on the one hand, and the rationalization of the political significance of these events through the discursive uses of “youth,” the “political category of ‘youth’ cannot be defined exclusively – or even primarily – by references to generational or sociological characteristics” (2012: 34). Youth “can refer to an idea or mystique, a group, an individual, a *stage of life*, or a cultural or political identity,” historians have argued (Whitney 2009). So what gave this term, in
each of these senses, a renewed appeal and salience around the world in the first decades of the twentieth century?

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the obsession with youth acquired a new quality in the wake of decolonization and the resultant overwriting of colonial governance by the international regulation of individual lives, or what scholars term the “global biopolitics of population” (Bashford 2006). Just as nineteenth-century scientific understandings of childhood had rationalized and drawn on colonial discourse (Castaneda 2002), the era of decolonization brought an unprecedented interest in the concept and demographic category of youth. While the child-in-need-of-rescue had long served as a metaphor for the civilizing mission in both colony and metropole, and while both “boy” and “girl” retained highly racialized significations well into the twentieth century, “youth” resonated differently: the salience of “youth” around the world tells us something about the time of modernity itself as “lateral and simultaneous, not stagist and evolutionary” (Weinbaum at al. 2008: 4). The attempted rearticulation of the British Empire as a “friendly interracial family” in the 1920s and 1930s gave especial prominence to transnational youth movements in this era (Alexander 2017). Youth as a social group seemed, at this moment, to signify the capacity to transcend national borders: a World Youth Peace Congress held in 1928 in the Netherlands brought together 150 young people claiming to represent thirty-two nations, united by their disillusionment with traditional politics in the aftermath of the Great War (Roy 2000: 151). The rise of the League of Nations further consolidated the comprehension of youth as a worldwide demographic category requiring special treatment. If these historical developments gave youth a new salience in the modern era, it was the sciences of sexology and psychology that have the category its new epistemic unity.

In the decolonizing world at large—from India to Egypt—social scientists believed “the threshold between childhood and adulthood was a perfect metaphor for the political and social transformation from colony to independent nation” (El Shakry 2011: 593). Indeed, these struggles of new nations were crucial even to transformations in European and American conceptions and experiences of youth after the Second World War (Pursley 2013: 162). Known by many names—yuva, jugend, qingchun, shabab, jeunesse—and serving as the focus of divergent political movements—young people were unified in their capacity to signify future potential and potency as agents of political and social change in multiple locations. Irrespective of age, youth referred to “particular attributes which included energy (physical) vigor, bravery, zeal, a broad outlook or ‘world-mindedness,’ desire for (national) renewal and change, purity of intent, but also passion, lack of self-control, a volatile temper, malleability, a tendency to violence, and impatience” (Roy 2000: 157).
In other words, just as youth indexed social and political anxieties, and was perceived as precarious and unstable (El Shakry 2011: 593), it was also the site of national and transnational governance, and the repository of future hope. Youth around the world came to be perceived as being in possession of a physical potency, as well as a volatile sexuality, that could be tamed and disciplined to serve the race, nation, and globe. This consistently contradictory understanding of youth as a volatile period of uncertainty and potential, of danger and promise, fully reflected the sexological and psychological discourse on adolescence and youth as liminal stages of life between the more distinct periods of childhood and adulthood that had emerged in the late nineteenth century, and remained in place in the century that followed. What was most distinctive about definitions and discourses of youth in the modern period, therefore, and what rendered it more homogeneous in distinct historical contexts in this era, was the proliferation of new disciplines that targeted young people as the object of study and the primary audience. The categories of youth and adolescence—so often used interchangeably in the scholarly works on the topic—came to be grounded in understandings of gender, sexuality, and the body in the modern period.

The understanding of “youth” as a sexually charged category was not, of course, novel to the twentieth century. Indeed, as the historian Afsaneh Najmabadi has shown, categories such as the *amrad* (young adolescent male) were conceptualized as objects of male desire in nineteenth-century Iran. Perceived neither as effeminate, nor as homosexual, *amrad* straddled the liminal space between boys and men. Perceived neither as potential victims of sexual abuse nor as fully matured men, these young, beardless men were a sexual category unto themselves, uniquely available for the sexual gaze and pleasure of older men (Najmabadi 2005). In Tokugawa Japan, as depicted in Figure 6.1, “youth” was likewise understood as an ascriptive trait peculiarly crafted at the nexus of age, gender norms, and sexual desirability. In this particular tradition of the “way of youths” (*shudo*), a widely acknowledged set of cultural conventions, male-male sexual desire was described in highly positive terms, but only if the male object of pursuit fell into the category of “youth” or *wakashu* (Pflugfelder 2012: 964). Once again, this same-sex desire did not define the individual: all males were thought to pass through the *wakashu* stage en route to manhood, and while not everyone in the category had to participate in a certain form of sexual relations, they were considered worthy of “esthetic appreciation and erotic pursuit by fellow males.” In other words, one’s entry into the ranks of youth was not marked solely by (chronological or biological) age, but also by sex, such that the “post-child, pre-adult category” of *wakashu* could be understood as a status produced along the age/gender nexus (Pflugfelder 2012: 968). But it was not only in other times and other places that youth remained a *sexual* classification: the new sciences rendered
youth into a category that was fundamentally sexualized around the world in the modern era.

While the “adolescent” was invented as a category by American educationalist G. Stanley Hall from the 1890s, by the 1920s, the adolescent—a term often used interchangeably with youth—had found its home around the globe as a discrete psychosexual subject marked by “storm and stress” (Hall 1904). Even as adolescence was perceived as “a collective temporality and a depoliticized individual interiority” (El Shakry 2011: 591), that is, a period of life common to all humanity and therefore a ground beyond politics, while “youth” emerged as the political category par excellence, the sexualized understanding of adolescence that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s permeated the understanding of youth as a political category.

FIGURE 6.1 Engawa no wakashu to onna. A young dandy and a woman on a veranda, Suzuki, Harunobu, 1725–1770 (image produced between 1767 and 1769), woodcut, 28.3 × 20.9 cm. This print depicts a young man and a young woman standing on a veranda, with a rooster and a hen nearby. Universal Images Group via Getty Images.
The understanding of youth as a time of sexual volatility and danger was further buttressed by the transnational regulation of age of consent laws in the 1920s and 1930s. Once again, questions of age difference and the sexual exploitation of young females (and young males) were not new to this period, and had informed, for instance, the moral panics of the 1880s and 1990s across the British Empire (Philippa Levine 2007). Debates over the age of consent had raged from India to Canada, and from Britain to Australia at the turn of the twentieth century. While nineteenth-century legislation was more squarely concerned with projects of child protection and fanned by panics about children and childhood in danger, twentieth-century laws in the United States brought an upward adjustment to ages of consent that drew a wedge between childhood on the one hand, and youth and adolescence, on the other (Robertson 2002). In India, and other colonial contexts, efforts undertaken by nationalist reformers and feminist activists to abolish practices such as child marriage served to buttress new boundaries between a period of “childhood” associated with sexual innocence, and youth, characterized as a period of sexual danger as well as sexual blossoming. (Pande 2020b). These efforts did not simply sort children from adults, using the need for sexual protection as the basis for this boundary-making, but also served to open up an in-between category: the psychosexual category of adolescent, or the more nebulously defined youth.

While age of consent regulation had long policed the moral and sexual borders between child and adult, during the interwar years efforts for the sexual protection of the young became more systematic and globalized. This occurred in the wake of concerns over cross-border trafficking and a rising discourse of humanitarianism. In one of the early humanitarian efforts undertaken by the League of Nations, its Child Welfare Committee (CWC) conducted an inquiry into the minimum ages of consent and marriages amongst member states to gauge how these laws affected the “moral protection of children” (Advisory Commission, League of Nations 1928). Regulation of the marital practices of youth was arguably an underlying aim. The CWC’s inquiry took for granted that the ages of consent and marriage “both aim at protecting young persons against their own imprudence” and extend “protection by fixing a limit of age under which young persons are legally considered to be immature or irresponsible,” thus defining both childhood and youth with regard to the criteria of sexual normativity (Advisory Commission, League of Nations 1928: 5). While the ages of consent and marriage varied in discrete national contexts (see Figure 6.2), in each location they were indexed to the cultural
TABLE 6.2 One page of tables compiled on the age of marriage and age of consent by the League of Nations, indicating the transnational regulation of youthful sexuality, and testifying to the constitution of "youth" with reference to sexual regulation around the globe. From Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People “The Age of Marriage and the Age of Consent.” Geneva: League of Nations, 1928.

In part as a response to the global accounting and cultural pulse-taking undertaken by the League of Nations, the minimum ages of consent were revised upwards in many locations (including the United States and India) during the 1920s and 1930s. The very logic of such laws showcases how children and youth are sexual categories in the foundational sense as described by Foucault; they function as the key figures upon which modern discourses of sexuality and norms of sexual behavior come to rest (Foucault 1980). More importantly, the higher ages of consent of the twentieth century served to drive a sharp wedge between the period of childhood and youth. When ages of consent were raised around the world in the 1920s and 1930s, judges and juries refused to extend the protection premised on the sexual innocence of children to teenagers whom they viewed as nubile and full of sexual potential; this distinction between children and pubescent girls both
drew on and served to further consolidate the new psychosexual category of the adolescent.

While girl victims were the primary targets of new legislation, laws against “gross indecency,” such as the Criminal Law Amendment of 1885 in Britain, also targeted the “expression of male lust that could corrupt and sexually exploit England’s youth”—and thus also served to redefine the youthful male—aged between fourteen to eighteen—as a creature to be protected from adult men (Funke 2013: 144). Twentieth-century adjustments to the age of consent in India, where the age was raised to thirteen and then fourteen in the 1920s—had an indirect effect on the understanding of male youth inasmuch as judges and juries hastened to protect young men from the new harsher laws that appeared to punish men “for doing what boys do,” or on the grounds that youthful males may not be fully cognizant of the consequences of their sexual actions (Pande 2013).

Just as the age of consent law tightened the borders between child and youth, so did new regulations on the age of marriage. The League’s 1927 inquiry consolidated and led to a further flurry of regulation which highlighted how the sexual regulation of youth came to serve as a common index of civilization in the twentieth century. The League’s inquiries also showcase the constitution of “youth” as a global demographic with reference to their sexual regulation in a global biopolitical regime. In India, the prominent Indian sociologist G.S. Ghurye urged Indians to accept the new marriage ages: “Most civilized nations prescribe age limits before which boys and girls cannot be married,” he wrote in 1934 and these usually varied from fourteen to eighteen (Ghurye 1934: 263). In Britain, pressure generated by the CWC’s transnational gaze hastened the passage of the Age of Marriages Bill (1929). Introducing his bill in the House of Lords to raise the minimum age of marriage in Britain to sixteen for both contracting parties, Lord Buckmaster insisted “what another country does is no guide whatever for what this country should do,” but nonetheless reminded the House that Turkey, “which we have not been taught to regard as a country very far advanced in these matters,” had a higher minimum age of marriage (fifteen) than Britain, and that Britain had an imperial responsibility to lead the way, especially with respect to India. As the sexual control of the young passed from their guardians to the state the category “youth” was sexualized even further as a group whose sexual vitality was to be preserved in the service of the nation.

While the quest to prevent “child marriages” has been the subject of extensive scholarship, new discourses on the legal regulation of marital unions also served to delineate the borders at the other end of the life cycle: separating youth, considered ripe for marriage, from the aged—perceived to be past their prime in this regard. In India, for instance, there were attempts to pass laws
restricting the marriages of “old” men: the Old Men’s Marriage with Young Girls Restraint Bill (1930) clarified that for the purposes of the bill, “Old Man means a male of 45 years and over, and Young Girl means a girl below 18 years of age” (Pande 2020b). While in India, such restriction on vast age differences in marriage were generated by a specific concern that young widows would be burdened with the restrictions enforced upon them by orthodox Hinduism, sexologists around the world appear to gave shared in broader concerns over age disparities in marriage. An article by an American sociologist and parapsychologist, Hornell Hart, appeared in the international journal Marriage Hygiene in 1935 and included a chart to predict marital happiness based on age at marriage of the bride and groom as well as the age difference between them. The chart clarified the emerging sexological consensus that the happiest marriages were best contracted between the ages of twenty-four and thirty-one for females, and from twenty-eight to thirty-six for males, as indicated by the region covered by “A” in the chart that accompanied his article (and which is reproduced in Figure 6.3 below). The regulation of the sexuality of youth, here as elsewhere, was tied up with the belief that this group held the key to the future, sometimes in literal terms: Hart took into consideration the production of progeny in the future, and highlighted the fact that fertility depended on age. If a woman married at twenty-two, she was likely to have three children, he estimated; at thirty-four, the probable number of children dropped to one (Hart 1935: 361–72).

The pathologization of vast age disparities in marriage and sex served to consolidate youth as the period for healthy sexuality. In a 1955 work from India, the popular sexologist Abul Hasanat recalled a (formulaic) concern common to various cultural contexts, describing an episode of a twenty-two-year-old male seduced by erotic stories narrated by an elderly lady. The reluctant youth was unable to consummate the affair, ejaculating prematurely on the two occasions when he found himself on the same bed with the seductress. This youth—whether a real or fictional “case study”—went on to read the works of Havelock Ellis and Marie Stopes, and thus realized that his “incompetency and impotency were mainly psychological” (Hasanat 1955) and his youth was thus restored. While children were to be protected from marriages, and “old men” were to be dissuaded from them, marriage was perceived as the solemn duty for youth. Emphasizing this in the Science of Youth, the author lamented the refusal of youth to marry: “The youth seem to believe that as soon as they marry, they would be flooded by offspring. Some ... think that the main aim of marriage—sexual satisfaction—can be fulfilled by other means—then why get tied up with marriage?” (Majumdar 1923: 2). Majumdar felt that proper sex education was the need of the hour, so that youth could be disabused of their false beliefs regarding childbirth, educated about the dangers of extramarital sex, and instructed about eugenic marriages designed to serve their race and nation.
Modern sex education helped to further consolidate “youth” as a stable, translatable, and universal stage of life distinct from childhood, and as a sexual category par excellence. In the United States, as Jeffrey Moran
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skillfully showcases, early twentieth-century sex educators responded to new understandings of adolescence to bracket off children—whose sexual innocence was to be protected—from teenagers to be educated about sex in explicit terms (2000). Indeed, the new secular, scientific model of sex education that arose in the 1920s, in offering general advice on ethical and appropriate conduct to young people around the world, helped to define young people with relation to their sexual conduct in an unprecedented way. These new models also helped to render universal the category of youth. In March 1928, a British delegation proposed to the League of Nations’ Advisory Committee of Traffic in Women and Protection of Children a need to introduce a universal scheme for “biological education” of the young, to supplement efforts to combat sexual degeneration through changes to legislation. The resolution included a plan for a transnational inquiry into the methods employed for disseminating sexual knowledge among young people around the globe, in order to consolidate and unify the local, piecemeal efforts into a worldwide wave of “sexual enlightenment” (Zimmerman 2015). While the League rejected the motion, and while there was widespread resistance to state-controlled sex education from France to Mexico, there were striking similarities in the age-stratified form of sex education that took hold around the globe. In the United States, as in India, children and youth learned about sex through lessons on the lower organisms, learning about the proverbial “birds and bees” before graduating to lessons on human reproduction. Around the world young people became the target of sex education that was crucial to the making of the “modern family,” the hygienic citizen, the strong race or nation; in India as in China, collective sexual anxieties fed into cultural and medical understandings of youth (Dikötter 1997; Frühstück 2003; Pande 2016; Zimmerman 2015).

The nineteenth-century tradition of moral education captured in the well-known “Sex and Self” series published by a US Lutheran minister, Sylvanus Stall, with titles such as What a Young Boy Ought to Know and What a Young Man Ought to Know, had blazed the trail in distinguishing between the types and degrees of sex knowledge intended for various stages of life (Olsen 2014: 150–1). If the presumed audience for the majority of such works, including Majumdar’s Science of Youth was male, popular sexology in the 1920s and 1930s targeted young women as well as men. Written by the British birth control activist and self-styled sexologist with eugenicist motivations, Marie Stopes, Married Love (1918), for instance, was the bestselling marriage manual in its time, eagerly read by men as well as women. The book also exemplifies the seemingly contradictory tone of such works on sex and marriage targeting youth: on the one hand, the publication was radical in terms of its frank discussion of the sexual needs of men as well as women; on the other hand, it was a conservative paean to heterosexual marriages. Beginning with the
much-quoted line “Every heart desires a mate,” the work saw marriage at the cornerstone of happy (adult?) lives, in a way that made youthful sexuality taboo if conducted outside of marriages, but also desirable as long as it had social sanction.

The simultaneous representation of youth as a repository for normative gender roles as well as their radical reconstitution is evident in works addressed to young women such as *Towards Womanhood* (1929), written by the Indian social reformer G. Sumati Bai, well known for her fiery attacks on gender inequality and child marriages, and for her radical critique of the entwinement of gender and caste inequalities. While advising that “it is sex that preserves and propogates the race-progeny; it is sex that creates in man that exuberance of spirit which bursts forth into art and music; it is sex that gives the impetus for grand achievements,” Sumati Bai nonetheless warned:

> But remember sex can also be destructive burning everything to ashes ... *when ill-used and given undue liberty*... Always strive to govern sex and never be a slave of it for then you can move heaven and earth, for such will be your power and this you can achieve only through *self-control*.

*(Sumati Bai 1929)*

Her approach reiterated the sexological common sense that sex was eminently natural—but also potentially dangerous—in youth. She discussed at some length the impact of masturbation on girls and women, and advised self-control “to combat self-abused sex perversion” (Sumati Bai 1929: 18–19). She also warned young women to choose friends by being mindful of their “characteristic traits and tendencies” and to watch out for “sex-inverts ... in whom the sex instinct is so perverted as to feel sensuous passion towards those of the same sex”:

> You cannot know a sex-invert at first sight, but as you become more and more intimate you will surely make her out. I cannot here for certain tell you as to how a sex-invert might proceed to make love to you. She might perhaps start by kissing and hugging ... The kiss of an invert is likely to be highly characteristic of passion and sensuousness. The danger with the latter is that she might not stop with kissing alone, but go on to obscene practices as meddling with your organs and thus contaminating your body and mind ...

*(Sumati Bai 1929)*

In providing simple instructions on “how a girl can consciously evolve to full womanhood to occupy a time-honoured place of Mother and Teacher of the Race” (Sumati Bai 1929: x), Sumati Bai ultimately conferred on the youthful woman the role of future wife and mother. For Bai, as for Stopes, happy marriages remained the desirable end for young women.
Sumati Bai also put forward a model of sex education organized along age-stratified lines that was popular around the globe. As per this schema, the very young were to receive indirect lessons on procreation in nature, through lessons about plants, and then about the “birds and bees” to satiate their natural curiosity; adolescents and youth were to be provided with biology lessons on puberty and reproduction in the human body; adults were to be offered a frank and dispassionate discussion of the sex act and sex hygiene to ensure conjugal bliss (Sumati Bai 1929: 15). Such analogies from the natural world were common in the transnational history of sex education (Carter 2007). Several of these works, in India as elsewhere, reiterated a global age-stratified schema of sex education, prescribing a course of studies for children, while bracketing off adolescence/youth as a distinct category and as a time for more explicit instruction in sex. In one such work published in India, the youngest children were to learn about sex in response to their “innocent questions” about chickens and eggs, cows and calves, or the flowering of plants. The adolescent phase, marked by “a development and appreciation of the sex instinct” and deemed as commencing at the age of eleven in India, called for greater information in order to prevent “the nervous disorders and mental aberrations” such as “melancholia, hysteria and similar neurotic conditions” that “perverse sex knowledge” had produced elsewhere in the world, and that left “a lasting legacy to the succeeding generation” (Krishan 1929: 6).

The concern for the sexual education of youth was echoed in the literature on brahmacharya—very broadly understood as a phase of studentship devoted to a celibate lifestyle—on the subcontinent. The era of modernity as one of epistemic convergence in the understanding of youth becomes evident in the attempt by Hindu sex educators to depict the fourfold division of the Hindu life cycle—of which the stage of brahmacharya was the first—in sexological terms akin to adolescence and youth, and as a universal “stage of life” that was experienced by every (secular, biological) body (Pande 2016). Besides using the schema of sex education to distinguish between children and youth as age-defined categories, these works also sought to inculcate sexual normativity and gender roles among young people.

Between the 1910s and 1940s sex education helped define bourgeois family patterns that conformed to a heteronormative ideal, and trained young people to reproduce normative patterns of sexual behavior, as the following examples from India, United States, South Africa, and Canada suggest. Interracial sex, masturbation, homosexuality, and even asexuality were perceived as examples of deviance. In India, new norms of age-appropriate sexuality and ideals of masculinity and youthfulness marginalized minority communities such as Muslims, who were depicted as hypersexual or otherwise deviant in reformist and sexological literature (Pande 2016). As Julian Carter has suggested of the
United States at the turn of the twentieth century, sex education contributed to a homogenization of whiteness and the dissemination of white values as sexual hygiene amongst children and youth (Carter 2007). In South Africa in the 1930s, young men and women of the white middle classes were likewise warned against masturbation in childhood and interracial sex in adulthood, such that they came to bear the burden of upholding both sexual and racial norms (Duff 2015).

In post-Second World War Canada, youth continued to be constituted with reference to sexual normativity; young people were not simply targets of sexual knowledge, but were also crucial to the construction of that knowledge. Sexual materials aimed at youth had much to say about young people; these texts also reveal how the category of youth shored up sexual norms and buttressed heteronormativity. In Canada, and elsewhere, young people were the first recipients of sexual regulation and the primary targets of morality campaigns. As they were seen to occupy a transitional, unstable position that made them vulnerable to “sex temptations,” they also emerged as symbols and agents in the sexual politics of the 1960s (Adams 1997). The trends unleashed in this period remained visible throughout the twentieth century. During morality campaigns in Argentina during the 1960s, a variety of experts and social organizations devoted themselves to analyzing the “problem of youth,” and regulating youthful sexuality for the service of the nation, in particular, to the extent that “to talk about youth in the early 1960s was to talk about sex, and vice versa: these categories were deeply intertwined” (Manzano 2005: 435). The borders between the various life stages were formalized with the “discovery” of adolescence in the twentieth century, as the modern sex educator aimed to satisfy, and thus to divert youthful curiosity away from, sexual excess towards sexual restraint. The specific forms of advice offered to young people helped to buttress the modern male/female and the hetero/homo binaries, and thus envisaged young people as the grounds for consolidating and disseminating normative sexuality in postwar Canada (Adams 1997). Throughout the 1960s, the formulaic evocation of “sex, drugs, rock and roll” highlighted the co-constitution, as it were, of sexual mores and youth, as young people emerged at the forefront of challenging norms.

The 1960s were marked by a resurgence of youth politics. In the well-known examples of North America and Western Europe, sex was a symbol—even a potent weapon—epitomized in the iconic image of John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s bed-in protesting the Vietnam War (see Figure 6.4). What is less well studied, perhaps, is the ways in which the youth had been called upon to question sexual norms in order to overhaul political structures and query cultural values in a wide range of geographical contexts. In a work that testifies to the emergence of youth as a sociological category—one
defined with reference to sexual habits as early as in the 1930s—a student being trained by G.S. Ghurye, the “father of Indian sociology,” seized upon sex and marriage to define the very notion of “youth” as well as to call on youth to revolt against conventional caste structures: “The attitude of the modern youth towards all established institutions in general and marriage in particular is changing throughout the world,” he wrote, and a study of changing attitudes, he concluded, could provide a clue to understanding the youth revolution (Merchant 1935: ix). In the 1960s, youth movements continued to challenge conventional sexual mores upheld by political and legal regimes, for these sexual mores were living examples of the traditional shackles of race, gender, class, or caste hierarchies. Youthful calls for “free love” were not only a challenge to traditional marriage laws that upheld marital monogamy but also a questioning of the anti-miscegenation laws that shored up racial segregation, and promoted heterosexuality as the norm. The “make love, not war” slogan of American youth protesting the
Vietnam War depicted marriage as tool of war and capitalism. The Stonewall uprising in New York City in 1969 was not only an exemplary account of a youth uprising for sexual rights, but by some accounts, the Stonewall Inn also operated as a community for gay youth rendered homeless by familial and institutional marginalization, further pointing further to the parallel histories of the quest for youth rights and sexual rights.

As the histories of these youth movements makes quite evident, “youth” itself was a flexible category that encompassed several age groups not only across distinct times and places, but often in the same time and place: the gender non-conforming teenager protesting at the Stonewall Inn in 1969, inhabited the group as comfortably as the twenty-nine-year-old John Lennon and thirty-seven-year-old Yoko Ono staging a bed-in at the Amsterdam Hilton Hotel in 1969. While the category thus had more to do with mystique, with performance, with an attitude towards the world, rather than with chronological or even biological age, the body paradoxically remained paramount in the sexualized understanding of youth in the modern era, as the next section shows.

EMBODYING YOUTH IN THE MODERN ERA

In *The Science of Youth*, Majumdar detailed the bodily changes that accompanied the onset of youth. Dating the onset of youvan to about fifteen or sixteen, Majumdar wrote that for males the body would “fill out.” When he was alone, naked, he would notice the growth of pubic hair, and even changes to his penis. Youthful experimentation with these newly prominent organs would lead to masturbation and ejaculation, but “little would the boy know that the white, thick substance on the floor now before him was the core substance of life.” Youwan was the springtime that completed the full blossoming, provided the body was not unnaturally ruined by unnatural organ-stimulation (Majumdar 1923: 37–8). The youthful woman was likewise identifiable by her bodily changes. But unlike in the nineteenth century, when the onset of puberty was largely perceived to signify the end of childhood and the beginning of a phase of sexual activity, medical experts in the twentieth century elaborated on the intervening phase of youth or adolescence. Majumdar himself was careful to detach the onset of “youthfulness” from the appearance of menstruation in females, and with a nod towards efforts to abolish child marriages in India, he insisted that menstruation did not signify readiness for marriage (86). Warning that precocious sexuality could lead to a loss of youthfulness, he wrote that just as a bush under the shadow of a tree cannot blossom even in springtime, girls and boys who abuse their bodies do not ever blossom into completeness. In men, the hair and beard remains scant; the bones do not harden. In women, the breasts
remain undeveloped, and their bodies weak (39). Repeating and translating for a new context the common sense with regard to normative gender roles in marriage articulated by the British “father of sexology,” Havelock Ellis, and its most prominent popularizer, Marie Stopes, Majumdar suggested that the male must educate himself on sexual matters, as it was he who was responsible for preserving his own youthfulness, as well as that of his young wife. As Ellis had put it: “The youth spontaneously becomes a man; but the maiden, as has been said, must be kissed into a woman.” Majumdar reiterated this with reference to a common Bengali understanding of “biyer jal” that “nurturesthe young bride as she unites with her husband, and as the body thrives with this joy of coupling, it blossoms to its full potential” (40). The regulation of sexual behavior was therefore considered crucial to youthful blossoming, as well as the preservation of youthfulness. The book’s concluding chapter on “securing youth” opined that spring and youvan (youth) were synonymous, and that proper education on sex and birth control, could lead to its preservation. Science of Youth summarized a common theme: that undisciplined sex was seen as the root cause of individual dysfunction and racial degeneration.

This fixation on the body—and the linking of individual sexual satisfaction with service to the nation—was also evident in the medicalized consumer products that promised to restore masculine strength, vigor, and the more nebulous phenomenon of “youthfulness” to males. In his study of advertisements for such products from India, historian Douglas Haynes clarifies that youth “indicated not only age, but ability to engage regularly in sexual intercourse …” (Haynes 2012: 800). Advertisements for sex tonics in the 1920s and 1930s, as he points out, such as one for the German tonic Okasa, promised to cure ashakti (weakness) and restore “youthfulness” in those experiencing premature aging, and both phrases had clear sexual connotations.

That the very quality of “youthfulness” was understood entirely in sexualized terms, inasmuch as it was a barely disguised euphemism for sexual vigor, is evident from the coeval discussions on surgical rejuvenation that occurred in the United States and Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The conflation of “youth” with masculinity and sexual virility was reflected in the scientific efforts towards the surgical rejuvenation of aging men (and the dermatological and cosmetic rejuvenation of women). In treating “old age as optional” (Hirshbein 2000: 286) the rejuvenators configured “youth” as a category that could be detached from chronological age and tied entirely to the body, and specifically to the sex glands. The rejuvenators worked within dominant sociocultural understandings of masculinity, reasoning that real men should work efficiently and that they could be identified through their sexual vitality, such that men lacking in youthfulness were also seen as feminized. The understanding of youth and youthfulness was also invariably sexualized, inasmuch as the essence not only of “sex” but also of the qualities of youth were regarded as residing
in the sex glands. Since disruptions in the sex glands as a consequence of aging were seen to lead to de-masculinization, and therapeutic surgery targeting the sex glands was understood to restore youth in men.

While this particular surgical understanding of youth as a quality regulated by the sex glands happened to be focused on males alone, the quest for bodily youthfulness, irrespective of chronological age, crossed gender lines. In fact, a perusal of advertisements of beauty products from the era underlines the overlapping concerns with youthfulness and sexuality. “There is a tint of youth in the touch of Pears,” an advertisement for the popular English brand of soap announced in 1907. Similarly, a marketing pitch from 1912 boasted that “youthful beauty will be untouched by advancing years” through the daily use of Pears’ Soap. The soap continued to be touted as a “natural way” of warding off wrinkles—that bodily sign of aging—for decades to come. A triptych of Pears’ Soap ads from the first decades of the twentieth century (see Figure 6.5) provides a fitting conclusion to this discussion on how sexual and gender normativity informed understandings of youth and youthfulness in the modern era.

The first advert reminds us of the way in which sexual desire (“to have a beau”) and gender normativity (“and to the bridal altar go”) characterized the “maiden” (a gendered synonym for youth in the English language). The second advert points us, again, to the idea of youthfulness as an amorphous quality that is nonetheless embodied inasmuch as wrinkles signify a waning of youth. The third—which pictures two young children/maidens—draws attention to the ubiquity of Pears’ Soap as a consumer product around the world, and also serves as a reminder of how consumerism and capitalism further served to homogenize ideas and norms of youth and youthfulness in the modern era. But beyond reminding us that youth may indeed only be skin deep, the advertisements help us ponder what is specifically modern about ideas and practices of youth and youthfulness in the period under consideration in this volume, as well as what is global about this history.

The obsession with youthfulness is well charted in the history of the category of the “Modern Girl”—a gendered variant of “youth” that also rose to prominence in the modern era (Weinbaum et al. 2008). In a volume considering the history of this figure, the historian Timothy Burke reminds us that modernity “references the history of particular political and economic institutions, social transformation, modes of personhood” (2008: 363). Burke suggests that the “Modern Girl”—as a construct and representation that nonetheless shapes the everyday life of human agents belonging to or aspiring to belong to that group—allows for a productive social form though which modernity itself can be considered. For Burke, the history of consumerism allows us to understand something about the socio-historical context that gave rise, seemingly simultaneously, to the figure of the “Modern Girl” around the world. Building on this thought, and understanding youth as
FIGURE 6.5 Three Pears’ Soap advertisements from (left to right) 1900, 1902 and 1910.
the ur-category of which the modern girl is a sub-type, this chapter has attempted to grapple with the epistemic unity in understandings of youth in the “modern era.” While tracing this epistemic unity to sexological understandings of youth that became globalized in the early twentieth century, this chapter has attempted to go beyond a diagnosis of simultaneity in global discourses of youth in uniquely sexualized terms by also highlighting the socio-historical contexts (such as the shared experiences of postwar decolonization, and the renewed consolidation of international law with the formation of the League of Nations) that shaped and disseminated particular ideas and practices of youth after the 1920s. It has not only sought to understand the polysemic significance and epistemic unity of the term in the post-1920s era but also why the very understanding of “modernity,” broadly defined, conjures up the qualities of freshness and virility, hope and strength that we associate with “youth.”

An epistemic unity in the understanding of youth does not mean a homogeneous definition of the term, whether understood as a demographic group or as a fleeting quality. Even in the contemporary moment, there is no universally agreed-upon international definition of the youthful age group. While the United Nations “defines ‘youth’ as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years” for purposes of gathering statistics on demography, education, employment, and health, this definition is in contradiction of Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which defines “children” as persons up to the age of eighteen. In other words, the borders between the child and the youth/adolescent continue to be porous, but, given the epistemic consensus on the relationship between youth and sex, these borders are most clearly articulated and comprehended with regard to sexual norms. Notwithstanding the historical shifts and contextual differences in understanding “youth” and “youthfulness” in the modern era, the globalization of disciplines such as sexology and the internationalization of the correlation drawn between age and consent in liberal juridical traditions have gone a long way towards creating “youth” as a global, sexual category. Just as youth is still seen as a stage of sexual danger, it also continues to be perceived as a quality embodied in smooth skin and easy erections, as current day advertisements daily remind us. Understandings of youth and youthfulness as foundationally sexual, invariably gendered, and obsessively focused on the body are still with us.
The twentieth century was marked by ideologically animated states that sought to remake human beings, transforming their beliefs, actions, and intimate relationships. Young people and concepts of youth lay at the heart of these initiatives. With little experience, the young were viewed by adults as malleable citizens who could be molded into devout followers and true believers. Youth were also thought to embrace radical programs readily and devote their prodigious energies to “great causes.” Time and again, adults intent on implementing—and countering—revolutionary projects attempted to harness youthful fervor, relying on the young to drive forward revolutions and extreme initiatives or to defend ideological agendas in the workplace, at home, or on the battlefield. Once in power, party-states targeted the young in the effort to fashion obedient populations and build enduring regimes. Governments reshaped educational systems, created age-specific youth organizations for after-school and after-work hours, and assigned the young symbolic significance. National armies and paramilitary organizations completed young men’s and, sometimes, young women’s training. Regardless of gender, the young were subjected to more intensive state-sponsored ideological formation and mobilization than adults. This phenomenon was a defining feature of the global twentieth century.

This chapter explores how concepts of youth were mobilized for political and religious purposes and how young people engaged with ideology and belief during the twentieth century. These questions are addressed with reference
to Sayaki Chatani’s Chapter 7 in the previous volume in this series, “Age of Empire.” The analysis here focuses primarily on Europe from 1917 to the end of the Cold War. During these years of intense ideological conflict, leaders of European states pioneered approaches to mobilizing the young on behalf of ideological projects that served as templates for leaders elsewhere. Though the analysis ranges widely, including a detailed discussion of Germany and sidelight assessments of North America and China, sustained attention is devoted at the outset to the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet youth model prevailed across Eastern Europe after the Second World War and inspired revolutionary regimes globally during the Cold War, state socialism shaped more young lives than any other twentieth-century political ideology. Communist regimes also merit special attention because of their approach to belief. Communist states simultaneously attacked organized religion, promoted science and technology, and offered communism as a substitute secular faith, one with its own dogmas, sacred figures, ceremonies, rituals, and confessional practices. Young people were centrally involved in these initiatives, just as they were pivotal to Christian anti-communism. Jewish youth also receive concerted attention in what follows. As extremist ideologies took root around them, their faith rendered them especially vulnerable.

The analysis suggests the complex ways that twentieth-century youth responded to ideological overtures. Historians writing in the last two decades have emphasized the manifold means through which twentieth-century youth sought to shape their own realities and construct their identities, regardless of the heavy-handedness of state ideologies and practices. Historians have also underlined how “youth” was often understood, at least in the first instance, to be male when deployed in the political realm. How gender conditioned youth’s relationship to ideology and belief will thus be a central concern of the chapter. But attributes beyond gender, especially class, religion, race, sexuality, and nationality, also affected both ideological overtures to youth and young people’s own responses. “Youth” was never a unified category, just as youth responses were always variable. At many points during the century, young people identified as age-based revolutionary vanguards and distinguished themselves through their enthusiasm for state-sponsored ideological offerings. Young men and women drove revolutionary initiatives and played vital roles in state machineries of war, terror, and mass murder. Yet not all young people were included in their country’s national projects, just as not all youth made state ideologies their own. Some young lives were defined by brutal mechanisms of exclusion, while others were notable for acts of resistance. In the final analysis, twentieth-century youth were at once objects and protagonists of revolutionary ideological mobilization, beneficiaries and enforcers of ideologically driven state policies, and victims and resisters.
Twentieth-century youth’s attraction to revolutionary activism and ideology was evident during Russia’s two revolutions in 1917. Young people greeted the February Revolution, which overthrew the tsarist autocracy and attacked the symbolic system undergirding its authority, with age-related enthusiasm. Testimonies of those who had been young in 1917 speak to the sense of excitement and joy sparked by revolutionary events (Neumann 2011: 41). Anna Litveiko, an eighteen-year-old young worker in Moscow in 1917, recalled: “Revolution seemed to be a wonderful holiday. We were happy. We felt like adults for the first time … we felt completely free” (Neumann 2011: 41). Young people, especially young male workers, delighted in smashing tsarist statues and committing acts of vandalism (Neumann 2011: 42). When political parties vied for support among newly enfranchised Russian men and women during the summer and fall of 1917, young male workers figured prominently among those supporting the Russian socialists known as Bolsheviks, whose radical demands appealed to the young (Neumann 2011: 30). Young male laborers joined the Red Guards in large numbers and fought on behalf of the Bolsheviks at critical revolutionary junctures, notably during the party’s seizure of power in October. In Moscow and Petrograd, over 40 percent of Red Guards were under the age of twenty-five (Gorsuch 2000: 49). Once the Provisional Government was overthrown in October, young people appeared especially susceptible to the utopianism then prevalent in Russia (Neumann 2011: 45).

Young people continued to provide crucial support for the revolutionary government after civil war broke out in 1918. Because so many Russian men had perished during the First World War, the Bolsheviks depended heavily on the young as they fought for the regime’s survival. Activists from the newly formed Communist Youth League, or Komsomol, distinguished themselves on the battlefield, prompting Bolshevik leaders to praise their revolutionary enthusiasm and military heroism. These accolades fueled the Young Communists’ conviction that they were the vanguard of the socialist revolution, a belief soon shared by socialist youths elsewhere in Europe who became radicalized during the strike movements and political unrest that swept across Europe between 1917 and 1920. As one young proponent of international communism declared in October 1920, “In all countries, whether in Europe or in the most backward regions of the world, youth is aware of its historic role and takes its place in the vanguard of the revolutionary movement” (Whitney 2009: 31).

After the conclusion of the Civil War in 1921, the Bolsheviks put the young at the heart of efforts to build a communist culture and society. Bolshevik leaders had little choice in the matter. After seven years of almost continuous warfare,
Soviet Russia was a youthful society. In 1926, approximately two-thirds of its citizens were under the age of thirty (Smith 2007: 80). Making children and youth into communists thus became a vital Bolshevik objective, just as youth’s development into new Soviet people became an important yardstick of Bolshevik success (Bernstein 2017: 2). Ideological formation occurred in schools, workplaces, and a trio of age-specific state-sponsored organizations: the Octobrists (for children aged seven to ten); the Young Pioneers (for those aged ten to fourteen); and the Komsomol (for the group from fourteen to twenty-three).

During the 1920s, Komsomol members best served the Bolshevik cause by transforming themselves into communists whose beliefs, behaviors, and everyday lives reflected Bolshevik teachings. Age-based revolutionary enthusiasm no longer corresponded to the communists’ strategic directions and was no longer tolerated. Instead, young people were encouraged to steep themselves in the new ways by studying propaganda materials, taking part in Komsomol activities, participating in interactive revolutionary theater or living in a youth commune, a popular practice during the Soviet Union’s economically difficult first decade (Gorsuch 2000: 41–79). It was through communal living that young people fashioned themselves most completely into new Soviet people. To be a communist meant, above all, acceptance of the primacy of the collective in all aspects of daily life. Nothing was to be held privately or kept for individual use, including money, clothing, household items, or even offspring. Close friendships and romantic relationships were frowned upon, as was the maintenance of family ties and loyalties. Even sleeping was best done communally. In the new communist society, ideology was to govern daily life and young people’s loyalties were to flow to the Bolshevik project and its leaders.

Bolshevism was a class-based ideology that had profound consequences for the young. Access to jobs, housing, education, and even justice depended on one’s social class as defined by state authorities. People classified as “workers” were advantaged, while those who had held privileged class positions in capitalist, tsarist Russia were labeled “social aliens” or “class enemies” and discriminated against, often harshly. Entire families ran afoul of the state and entire families suffered the consequences (Fitzpatrick and Lüdtke 2009: 285). Meanwhile, young people with “tainted” class backgrounds were encouraged to break ties with fathers and denounce them as “class enemies” (Hellbeck 2006: 194). In these circumstances, some youth ruptured relations with parents in order to join the Komsomol or reinvented themselves by assuming a more acceptable class identity.

Unlike fascists, communists were theoretically and rhetorically committed to women’s liberation. Yet this ideological commitment did not translate easily into lived experience or equal participation for young women within either
the Komsomol or the communist youth organizations that emerged in Europe after the creation of the Communist Youth International in 1919. Unlike adult communist parties, which usually established separate organizations for adult women, the communist youth organizations of the 1920s were mixed sex. But they never achieved gender neutrality, nor did youth leaders make this a priority. Instead, a masculine culture (Gorsuch 2000: 96) developed that prized virility, militarism, and martial values (Neumann 2011: 49–52). Older Komsomol activists carried guns, to the envy of younger members (Gorsuch 2000: 44–5).

In Western Europe, communist youth reveled in battling opponents in the streets. In Germany, young communists gave the Nazis their most celebrated youth martyr, fifteen-year-old Hitler Youth Herbert Norkus, who was pursued and fatally stabbed in January 1932. Young women were expected to participate in communist youth activism on male terms, and the model of revolutionary androgyny that prevailed during the 1920s and early 1930s alienated many young women (Whitney 2009: 72–9). Both the Komsomol and European communist youth organizations worked harder to attract and incorporate young women after 1935, but they did so by placing more emphasis on gender difference and young women’s future maternal roles (Bernstein 2017: 59–68).

Soviet communists’ militant atheism held special relevance for the young. Children and adolescents were prime targets of Bolshevik anti-religious education in schools and youth organizations, while Komsomol activists assumed leading roles in Bolshevik campaigns to replace religion and superstition with science and reason. Komsomol activists brought a confrontational style to the campaign to discredit organized religion. They disrupted church services and mocked and denounced Orthodox priests and rabbis during torchlight processions (Betts and Smith 2016: 7; Fitzpatrick and Lüdtke 2009: 273; Gorsuch 2000: 70).

These energetic attacks did not endear young activists to their elders, with the Komsomol’s anti-religious reputation becoming the main reason that parents in rural areas refused to let their children join the Komsomol during the 1920s (Gorsuch 2000: 71). Young communists remained at the forefront of anti-religious campaigns in the Soviet Union during the “cultural revolution” of the early 1930s, while Soviet citizens in their twenties and thirties predominated among those identifying as “non-believers” on the 1937 Soviet census (Betts and Smith 2016: 7).

Bolsheviks were not content simply to attack organized religion. In its place, communists provided an alternative belief system, one with its own dogmas, practices, rituals, holidays, confessional practices, and sacred figures. Although Soviet youth activists had little role in the formulation of Bolshevism, they assumed key roles in its dissemination, especially to children. By the mid-1920s, the Komsomol was responsible for ensuring that children’s books and
journals demonstrated what historian Catriona Kelly has termed “ideological rectitude” and for organizing children’s celebrations of Lenin after his death in 1924 (Kelly 2007: 73). By the mid-1930s, Stalin’s public image had become that of a “quasi-sacred” leader (Fitzpatrick 1999: 24) and he was venerated by Soviet children. The communists’ political faith affected young lives in jurisdictions run by communists elsewhere in Europe. In communist-controlled municipalities in the Paris region, families were encouraged to mark the stages in their children’s maturation with “red” versions of the religious rites of passage—such as baptism and confirmation—that had long structured European childhood and adolescence.

Despite the far-reaching nature of the Bolsheviks’ cultural and political agenda, their success in transforming the beliefs and behaviors of Soviet youth was relatively modest during the 1920s. This was partly attributable to the challenges facing the party, which inherited a system of primary education that was less developed than in Western and Central European countries. Only half the school-age population in the Soviet Union attended elementary school in the mid-1920s, with those who did staying, on average, only two to three years. Girls left school more quickly than boys and rural students attended for shorter periods than their urban counterparts (Smith 2007: 84). The Soviet Union
remained an overwhelmingly rural nation, and peasant youth fitted uneasily into a youth organization whose identity was built around the proletariat.

Young people were never passive recipients of Bolshevism. Instead, they shaped their own behaviors, styles, and identities, doing so in ways that often ran counter to communist ideology and teaching during the 1920s (Gorsuch 2000). Oppositional youth behaviors were most prevalent in Soviet cities, where the mixed economy exposed youth to cultural products and styles from the capitalist West. Hollywood films became conduits for new ideas about youthful femininity (Gorsuch 2008: 178). The Soviet “Modern Girl,” who rejected the Komsomol’s revolutionary androgyny in favor of flapper styles and the latest dances from New York and Paris, became the most symbolically charged example of youth cultural dissidence (Gorsuch 2008: 174, 176). She also exemplified a twentieth-century pattern: the young frequently expressed both dissent and identity through music, dance, and clothing.

**STALIN’S REVOLUTION**

The Bolsheviks again looked to the young to help drive revolutionary change under Stalin. In the late 1920s, the state spearheaded a forced-pace program of rapid industrialization. Under the First Five Year Plan (1928–1932), workers were exhorted to produce ever more, ever faster, regardless of any hardship they might face. Young workers were targeted by authorities for promotion into both higher education and elite positions in the economy (Fitzpatrick 1999: 85). The Bolsheviks also worked to establish an educational system that supported the demands of the new industrial economy. Huge gains were made in literacy and in the provision of primary and secondary education, with the number of students attending secondary school climbing from 3 million in the late 1920s to 18 million a decade later (Fitzpatrick 1999: 70). Simultaneously, the Komsomol’s role in monitoring university life increased.

Historians highlight the extent to which young people embraced the struggle to transform the Soviet Union into a modern industrial power capable of challenging Western capitalist countries. According to Sheila Fitzpatrick, memoirs “recall the idealism and optimism of the young, their belief that they were participants in a historic process of transformation, their enthusiasm for what was called ‘the building of socialism,’ the sense of adventure they brought to it, and their willingness (at least rhetorical) to go off as pioneers to distant construction sites like Magnitogorsk and Komsomolsk on the Amur” (1999: 68–9). Former Komsomol activists distinguished between their attitudes and those of their parents when reflecting on their younger selves (Fitzpatrick 1999: 37). As one recalled, neither he nor the young people around him had
any “anti-Soviet feelings” regardless of the staggering difficulties that they faced in their daily lives, including shortages of food and wildly substandard housing, usually in tents, barracks, caves, or flimsy wooden structures. He explained: “The atmosphere of undaunted struggle in a common cause – the completion of the factory – engaged our imagination, roused our enthusiasm, and drew us into a sort of front-line world where difficulties were overlooked or forgotten.” But, he continued, “it was only we, the younger generation, who accepted reality in this way. Our parents were full of muted but deep discontent” (Fitzpatrick 1999: 37).

Stories of working youth performing near-magical feats were featured in propaganda at home and abroad (Whitney 2009: 143). Some foreign youth were attracted to the sense of possibility on display in the new Soviet state, which contrasted starkly with the high rates of youth unemployment and generalized despair often evident in capitalist countries during the Great Depression. The American John Scott, who moved to the Soviet Union in 1932 at the age of twenty to help build socialism, was one of an estimated thirty-five thousand foreigners working in the Soviet Union at the height of industrialization (Mickenberg 2017: 12). In his memoir, Scott described witnessing “tens of thousands” of people working with “boundless enthusiasm” while also “enduring the most intense hardships” in the new industrial city of Magnitogorsk (1973, 1989: 5–6).

Young women participated centrally in Stalin’s industrial revolution because of the state’s decision to recruit 1.6 million women into the labor force and support them as industrial workers (Goldman 2002). To be sure, women continued to face resistance as they moved into positions and sectors of the economy traditionally dominated by men. Still, they accessed new industrial jobs and studied new subjects. In the process, many young women identified with Stalin’s revolution and the transformations it wrought. Raisa Orlova recalled of her youth during the 1930s: “Faster, faster toward the great goal, and there everything would begin in a genuine sense. It was both possible and necessary to alter everything: the streets, the houses, the cities, the social order, human souls” (Fitzpatrick 1999: 69).

The state-led campaign to reorganize Soviet agriculture around state-owned collective farms similarly privileged the Komsomol, whose rural membership was three times that of the adult party (Bernstein 2017: 25–6). Komsomol activists helped move peasants off their land and onto collective farms. Young communists educated and cajoled, but they also employed force in the effort to seize cows or grain hidden from authorities. Children too young for the Komsomol were posted in towers to watch over adults laboring in the fields and were instructed to be the “eyes and ears of the party inside the family” (Snyder 2010: 50). During the brutal collectivization campaign, some Komsomol members took the opportunity to enrich themselves or become despots in local
areas (Bernstein 2017: 29). Many others simply did as instructed, even if this meant enforcing Bolshevik policies that exacerbated human suffering.

The young numbered among the victims. Peasant children and adolescents perished alongside parents during the famine that left 3 million dead in Soviet Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. Sometimes, in fact, young children were killed and eaten by mothers and fathers desperate to stay alive (Snyder 2010: 50). Starving orphans were commonplace and they too died gruesome deaths. Yet these horrors did not seem to dent young communists’ belief in the new Soviet system. Lev Kopelev, born in 1914, recalled: “In the terrible spring of 1933 I saw people dying from hunger. I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue, still breathing, but with vacant, lifeless eyes. And corpses, corpses … I saw all this and did not go out of my mind or commit suicide … Nor did I lose my faith” (Merridale 2006: 32).

To be sure, not all communist youth identified as closely with Bolshevik aims and ideology as Kopelev. Scholars of youth movements underline the importance of gradations of belief and commitment among members. Even in authoritarian states, youth organizations relied on activists to drive campaigns and initiatives. Rank-and-file members took more passive roles, with some learning to speak the language of communism without making communist values and ideas their own. Activists were most likely to believe that their lives had been transformed by the revolutionary process. Young women had the most to gain and their remembrances sometimes reflect this. One explained: “Without the revolution I should have never left my village! I should have never learned to read and write. I’d have married at 15 like my mother, borne children, cooked and washed and worked in the fields all my life …” (Gorsuch 2000: 44).

Yet these kinds of personal transformations were rarely easy. Having studied diaries and other private writings, Jochen Hellbeck emphasized how hard young people worked to remake themselves according to Bolshevik ideas and values. Hellbeck highlighted the emotional satisfaction derived from hitching one’s life and identity to a totalizing revolutionary project such as Bolshevism. For Hellbeck, Bolshevik ideology functioned not as a fixed corpus of ideas, but rather as “a living and adaptive force” that assumed different forms as it worked within human beings to shape individual Soviet identities and subjectivities. Ideology came to life as it “activated” individuals (2006: 12–13).

Historians who specialize in youth have tended to see young people’s relationship to Bolshevik ideology somewhat differently. For Matthias Neumann, practice superseded ideology when it came to young people’s transformation into communists. Still, Neumann concedes, faith in communist ideology was strong among the young, even if knowledge of its finer points was often quite limited (2011: 50). Both he and Seth Bernstein demonstrate how communist ideology frequently combined with self-interest to transform
the young into fervent supporters of the Soviet regime. Komsomol members, a privileged minority in the Soviet Union for most of the 1930s, gained much from Bolshevik attempts to refashion the economy and revolutionize Soviet social, economic, and political life. This solidified their commitment to the regime, its ideology, and its leaders.

Bolshevik ideology appealed as well to young people from colonial and what Lenin referred to as “semi-colonial” settings in Soviet communism’s two formative decades. The Bolsheviks’ opposition to colonialism, which distinguished communists from other European political parties, attracted colonial students and young intellectuals who were exposed to it while living abroad. The global appeal of Bolshevik anti-imperialism among the young was also taken up by Sayaki Chatani in Chapter 7 of the previous volume in this series. The future Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh, who discovered Lenin’s analysis of imperialism while in France during the summer of 1920, advocated for membership in the Communist International at the French Communist Party’s founding congress in December 1920 (Goebel 2015: 180). The future Chinese communist leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping similarly first became involved in communist politics while studying in France in the early 1920s. These two men were not exceptions. Michael Goebel has recently highlighted the “extraordinary overrepresentation” of (male) students sent to work and study in France between 1919 and 1921 among those who later moved into top leadership positions in Chinese communism (2015: 123). Because of the students’ youth (most were between sixteen and twenty-five years of age), these early political experiences left “a lasting imprint” on their lives (Goebel 2015: 123).

After coming to power in 1949, Chinese communists adopted the Soviet model of youth ideological formation and mobilization and adapted it to their own purposes. Chinese communists established a Communist Youth League on the model of the Komsomol. It became a training ground for future leaders as its Soviet counterpart had. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao followed the Bolsheviks’ lead in harnessing young people’s radicalism and penchant for violence to his own purposes, encouraging students in 1966, “To Rebel is Justified.” Emboldened students of all ages rose up against teachers and other “class enemies,” often violently (Dikötter 2016: 77).

**YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC SETTINGS**

As communists worked to mobilize youth behind their version of socialism, adult leaders in democratic settings turned to youth movements to educate and form the young, often as part of the global and transnational struggle against communism. The youth movement, Mischa Honeck observes, was an easily
exportable and adaptable twentieth-century pedagogical innovation (2019: 3). With their membership oaths, anthems, ceremonies, and uniforms, youth movements could be enlisted to promote virtually any ideology or belief system and counted on to engage young women as well as young men, even if young men were usually the first targeted. Youth movements became a fixture across Europe and North America during the 1920s and 1930s, often extending as well to colonial settings.

Scouting proved the prototypical twentieth-century youth movement. Although it emerged as a response to turn-of-the-century challenges in the Anglo-American transatlantic world, it stood out for its transnational mobility and ideological flexibility (Honeck 2018). Scouting was exported globally and adapted locally after the First World War. In Chapter 7 of the previous volume in this series, Sayaka Chatani discusses how local colonial adaptations of Scout ideas could challenge imperial dominance in settings as varied as Ireland, India, and British-controlled Africa. Even the Bolsheviks’ Pioneers were patterned on the Scouts. Different national settings produced their own founders and thematic emphases. In the United States, the “boy-men” leading the Boy Scouts of America Americanized Robert Baden Powell’s handbook and movement (Honeck 2018). Out went the loyalty oath to the King and the exhortations to defend the British Empire, in came instruction in American patriotism and heightened emphasis on personal, moral, and sexual hygiene. In France, where political and ideological conflicts differed sharply from those in the Anglo-American world, the 1920s saw the emergence of Catholic, Protestant, secular, and Jewish scouting movements. In the French colony Algeria, Islamic scouting got underway in the mid-1930s.

Catholics viewed youth movements as essential to reaching vital constituencies in the post-1917 world. Soviet communism particularly worried Catholic leaders. According to Pope Pius XI, the threat posed by “Bolshevistic and atheistic communism ... exceeded in amplitude and violence anything yet experienced in the preceding persecutions launched against the Church” (Divini Redemptoris, 1937). The rise of the Soviet Union and of an international communist movement argued for new attention to the working class. Because young workers had less experience of opposing ideologies than adult workers and a greater willingness to embrace “noble causes,” they were viewed as particularly promising targets of Catholic counterrevolutionary overtures (Whitney 2009: 83, 90).

Not all working-class youth were irreligious. Those who counted among the faithful were enlisted to defend their faith in the streets, workplaces, and schoolyards of working-class neighborhoods. The case of Jean Millet, raised in a communist-controlled suburb of Paris, suggests how ideological and religious conflict could structure childhood and adolescence. Each afternoon, Millet’s
parish priest waited for him outside the school gates to monitor what his secular republican school had taught that day. But it was communists who were the Catholics’ real opponents. Millet remembered of the 1930s:

At school it was the war of the rings. We had rings graven with crosses, and the Communists, too, had rings, carved with the hammer and sickle … What marked me, throughout this entire period (1936–38), was the fact that, kid though I was, I had to declare my colors. I was a Christian in a red working-class district. It was obvious, it was written in my every act.

(Downs 2002: 243)

The Young Christian Worker movement, which emerged first in Belgium and then in France in the mid-1920s before spreading to other parts of Europe and North America, was designed to forge working-class youth activists who would defend the faith against godless communism and bring church teachings to irreligious and morally adrift young workers. This was a mission, clerics reasoned, that they themselves could not undertake given working-class anticlericalism. To appeal to young workers, clerics animating the movement devised a popular religiosity that pivoted around the Worker Christ. The most dedicated activists were offered a quasi-revolutionary role as twentieth-century apostles to the working class. Young priests, who often clashed with older parish priests suspicious of modern methods, served as spiritual advisors and teachers, underscoring the importance of adults to the era’s youth movements. In keeping with communist and fascist determination to engineer human beings, the movement aimed to create a New Catholic Working Man. This involved remaking the young worker “from head to toe” and reshaping his beliefs, ideas, values, and attitudes towards sexuality (Whitney 2009: 81, 100).

Although youth movements such as the Scouts and the Young Christian Workers began as single-sex movements of male adolescents, female branches soon followed. Single-sex movements for girls and young women responded in part to gender-specific concerns about young women’s roles in modern societies. They offered programs that blended conservative political ideologies and timeworn messages about young women’s future roles as mothers with modern opportunities for such things as activism, self-development, and travel and outdoor adventure. These were much appreciated by girls and young women, whose lives and educations were typically more circumscribed than those of their male counterparts. Even women who later became communists credited the female branch of the Young Christian Workers with teaching them how to think, take responsibility, and become social activists (Whitney 2009: 136). With what Kristine Alexander calls its own version of “conservative modernity,” the international Guiding movement attracted over a million members in more than forty countries and colonies by the end of the 1930s (2017: 9, 4).
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISTS

Fascists proved the communists’ fiercest and most determined foes until 1945, their attempts to refashion youth and their claims on the loyalty and allegiance of German young people more all-encompassing than the Bolsheviks’. Although it was Italian fascists who first harnessed the generational resentments of young men and established state-controlled organizations for children and adolescents, the efforts of German National Socialists, or Nazis, to mobilize youth ideologically had special significance for twentieth-century history.

To shape young men and boys into standard bearers for the Third Reich, the Nazis set about infusing their ideology throughout the educational sphere and consolidating control of young people’s after-school hours. After Hitler came to power in January 1933, the leaders of the Nazi youth organization, the Hitler Youth, undermined the numerous non-Nazi youth organizations, co-opting some and terrorizing others. Some youth leaders were murdered outright. Christian youth organizations were initially treated less harshly than political ones. By the mid-1930s, however, Nazi persecution of Catholic youth movements intensified. Catholic youth movements were dismantled and membership in the Hitler Youth reached 98.1 percent of the age-eligible population by 1939 (Kater 2004: 23; Ruff 2005: 28). This figure was considerably higher than in the Soviet Union, where the Komsomol only became a mass youth organization after 1938 (Bernstein 2017: 143).

Nazi ideology became the bedrock of teaching and learning in many subjects and the core concept within the Hitler Youth too. Nazi racial thinking was foundational. In Hitler’s view, races were manifestly unequal and engaged in constant struggle. Slavs and Africans were inferior to “Aryans,” but Jews, whom the Nazis defined in racialized, not religious, terms, posed the biggest threat because they worked through other forces, including Soviet communism, to subjugate Aryans. “Judeo-Bolshevism” and the “Jewish Bolshevik” became staples of Nazi propaganda.

Since ideological training was a prime function of the Hitler Youth, daily lessons were devoted to the Jewish “problem” (Kater 2004: 63). Hitler Youth were taught to identify Jews and to understand the causes of Jewish “inferiority”; members also watched anti-Semitic propaganda films and belted out anti-Semitic songs. Activists put their anti-Semitic knowledge into practice. They organized “public chases” of Germans accused of violating Nazi race laws by becoming romantically involved with Jews (Fitzpatrick and Lüdtke 2009: 274) and supervised Austrian Jews forced to scrub streets with either toothbrushes or their bare hands after the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 (Kater 2004: 64). Some Hitler Youth participated in the devastating attacks on German Jewish synagogues and businesses on November 8, 1938 (Kater 2004: 62). Youth’s embrace of ideological extremism was not restricted to the revolutionary left.
Gender difference was a core element of Nazism. A masculinized and militaristic movement, the Nazis privileged reshaping boys and young men. In both the Jungvolk, for boys aged ten to fourteen, and in the Hitler Youth, for those fourteen to eighteen, boys and male adolescents were militarized, sculpted into warriors for the Third Reich. Group sadism was encouraged and physical exercise and the practice of sport and war games were emphasized. Specialized units provided training in militarily useful skills such as flying, driving motorized vehicles, and horseback riding. Hitler Youth members were issued revolvers (Kater 2004: 31).

The situation was very different for female adolescents, whose primary adult function was to serve as helpmates to men and give birth to racially pure children. Within the League of German Girls, young women prepared their bodies for motherhood through frequent, although not overly strenuous, group exercise. They also learned how to select appropriate husbands. Physicians attached to the organization carefully monitored young women’s health for signs of overexertion and kept track of their prenatal potential (Kater 2004: 83). Individualism was actively discouraged in both the League and the Hitler Youth. Male and female adolescents were required to wear uniform clothes and regulation hairstyles. Nazi leaders who dismissed the cosmetics industry as “Jewish commerce” prohibited girls from wearing makeup, nail polish, or lipstick (Lower 2014: 25).

Nazi youth organizations, like other youth organizations, employed ceremony and mass spectacle to engage the young and reach them on an emotional level. A visit from Adolf Hitler generated special anticipation and excitement. Nazi youth organizations, similar to other youth movements, offered an “emancipatory dimension” by allowing young people to try on new identities, forge bonds, and socialize with peers. That parents often opposed their involvement only added to the appeal (Fitzpatrick and Lüdtke 2009: 272). Like the Komsomol, moreover, Nazi youth organizations offered the young an apparently significant role in a larger national project while also granting them autonomy and institutional power. Adolescents used their newfound power to stand up to teachers or turn their parents in to the authorities (Kater 2004: 38–9). Older members used staff cars to engage in road races, sometimes injuring passers-by (Kater 2004: 52). The mid-1930s witnessed, Robert Waite found, a steady increase in “teen promiscuity, sexual offenses, venereal diseases, and prosecutions of homosexual acts” (1998: 435). In 1936, nine hundred members of the League of German Girls returned home from the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg pregnant; only half the girls were sure of the father’s name (Kater 2004: 108).

As the above examples suggest, German youth, like their counterparts elsewhere, did not always comply with Nazi efforts to enforce ideological and behavioral uniformity. Dissent existed during the 1930s, but it was usually
expressed in a minor key. Some young people, including the future Nobel Prize-winning novelist Heinrich Böll, refused to join the Hitler Youth, while others quietly dropped out or became infrequent attenders. A tiny number sustained banned youth organizations in secret. Non-compliance was most common in predominantly Catholic areas, such as Bavaria, where priests retained moral authority and could be enlisted to support dissenting youth (Kater 2004: 24–5). By the late 1930s, listening to jazz and dancing to swing became prime ways for young people to register their discontent (Poiger 2000: 26). Generally, though, twenty-first-century historians stress the extent to which young people supported the regime and its ideology. In both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the young had become the age group that was most enthusiastic about their respective regimes (Fitzpatrick and Lüdtke 2009: 271).

Yet the new Germany, like the Soviet Union, was a national community and imaginary built on exclusion. Young people deemed racially inferior, including Jews, homosexuals, and the mentally and physically disabled, were singled out for harassment and persecution. Young German Jews suffered particularly during the 1930s. Students were physically separated from their “Aryan” peers in classrooms, barred from school events, forced to study anti-Semitic propaganda, and discriminated against in the awarding of grades and academic prizes. School became, according to Marion Kaplan, “a daily trial,” with the younger generation experiencing “a more drastic deterioration” in their daily lives than their parents’ generation (1999: 98, 94). Not surprisingly, Jewish youth over fourteen “left school in droves” after 1933 (Kaplan 1999: 98). Some enrolled in Jewish schools, whose enrollments soared. Others left school altogether.

Ostracized in schools and forbidden from joining Nazi organizations, Jewish adolescents flocked to Jewish youth organizations, whose membership swelled in the mid-1930s. By 1936, roughly 60 percent of German Jewish youth between the ages of twelve and twenty-five belonged to a Jewish youth movement (Kaplan 1999: 109). Jewish youth groups performed diverse functions. They provided peer support for young people navigating state-sponsored discrimination and harassment. They also provided a place where youth who were defined as Jewish by the state, sometimes to their surprise, could learn about Judaism and Jewish history, culture, and politics, including Zionism. This knowledge helped young people make sense of their predicament and options (Kaplan 1999: 112).

The Nazis’ persecution of Jews and the intensification of anti-Semitism elsewhere in Europe endowed Jewish youth movements with a new rationale and urgency, especially in France. By 1939, forty-seven Jewish youth movements were active in metropolitan France (Lee 2014: 35). Jewish scouting became a venue where young people could fashion a new French Jewish identity, one that challenged the assimilationist model long advocated by adult leaders. In
cooperation with the Austrian movement of Zionist Scouts, Hachomer Hatzaïr, French Scouts sang Hebrew songs, learnt Hasidic and Zionist folk dances, and earned badges in Judaica during the late 1930s (Lee 2014: 36–7).

Young people’s clashes with elders over how best to respond to the heightened anti-Semitism of the 1930s illustrate the mobility of twentieth-century youth. The young were more likely to advocate flight from Germany than their parents’ generation, and they were more likely to emigrate too. By 1939, 83 percent of German Jewish youth between sixteen and twenty-four had managed to leave Germany (Kaplan 1999: 118). In France, Jewish youth became the strongest supporters of Zionism, with immigrant and refugee youth the most enthusiastic (Lee 2014: 34). Young people’s willingness to register their dissent through emigration was evident at other points during the century. Two decades later, young people under twenty-five constituted half of the East Germans who fled west between 1952 and 1961 (Jobs 2019: 40). And in the twenty-first century, young men predominate among African migrants to Europe. Twentieth-century youth, Richard Jobs and David Pomfret remind us, were often more predisposed to “transnational mobility” than their elders, more willing to take their place in “global networks of migration” (2015: 7, 13).

FIGURE 7.2 Young German Jewish refugees arrive in London on the eve of war, August 30, 1939. Bettmann via Getty Images.
Ideology drove military and global conflict during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, with profound consequences for the young. By the mid-1930s, military training assumed heightened importance in young lives, especially in Germany and the Soviet Union. The Nazis’ militarization of youth worried observers across Europe, especially the young. A French student remembered, “war assumed the shape of a many-headed monster that threatened us all” (Whitney 2009: 185). The Guides intensified their emphasis on mass exercise in response to concerns over fitness programs in fascist countries (Alexander 2017: 150). Komsomol leaders stepped up their efforts, patterning the “Ready for Labor and Defense” program more closely on Nazi initiatives after 1937 (Bernstein 2017: 170). Soviet paramilitary activities were gender inclusive. By the time war broke out, Anna Krylova writes, the Komsomol and Soviet schools had instilled into young minds the idea that war would be their generation’s “unique historical test” (2010: 40).

The titanic struggle between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front tested young people and their ideological commitments. With few exceptions, young men who came of age under 1930s National Socialism and Soviet communism obeyed orders and served the state, however callously their bodies were used by commanders or however heinous the command. The Red Army, whose primary advantage lay in the sheer number of bodies available for mobilization, churned through millions of soldiers, the vast majority of whom were young. As one recalled, “They called us, they trained us, they killed us” (Merridale 2006: 4). By war’s end, 8 million Red Army soldiers had perished. For Soviet soldiers, Catherine Merridale observes, ideology “featured centrally” for they “had been shaped to see themselves not merely as citizens in uniform but as the self-conscious vanguard of a revolution, the spearhead of a just war” (2006: 16).

Ideology was arguably even more important to the Nazi war effort, and this had catastrophic consequences for Soviet soldiers and Jewish civilians living in Soviet-occupied territories. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, soldiers were instructed to murder Jews and captured Red Army political commissars. After the murder of Jews was systematized in 1942, the Germans continued their so-called “Final Solution” until 6 million Jews had been killed. The Germans’ approach to Soviet POWs was similarly conditioned by ideology. By war’s end, 3.3 million Soviet POWs, doubly denigrated by Nazi ideologues as “subhuman” Slavs and Bolsheviks, had died at the hands of their German captors. This represented 57 percent of those captured.

As the German war effort collapsed, the Nazis relied on ever-younger soldiers. Sixteen-year olds were drafted into military service starting in the fall of 1944. They were joined in Hitler Youth battalions by enthusiastic
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old volunteers (Stargardt 2007: 265). The teens were sent into battle with little training or equipment, clad in ill-fitting, handme-down uniforms (Stargardt 2007: 291) (see Figure 7.3). By the war’s final months, ragtag Hitler Youth battalions mainly held the Eastern Front (Kater 2004: 222). During the battle for Berlin, some boy soldiers slept at home and returned to the front the next morning with lunches packed by their mothers (Stargardt 2007: 290). Yet the teens fought bravely, even “fanatically,” in the eyes of American commanders (Stargardt 2007: 298). Those who succumbed to fright and shirked their duties were hanged, their lifeless bodies left to display hastily scrawled confessions of cowardice (Kater 2004: 190–1).

Total war also necessitated the involvement of young women. As Wendy Lower has demonstrated, roughly five hundred thousand young German women provided the bureaucratic infrastructure for the Nazis’ war and terror machineries, especially in the captured eastern territories marked for colonization (2014: 6–7). The young women mainly performed jobs that did not involve killing, but some German young women killed both Jews and disabled adults and children. Those young women who killed, Lower maintains, did so convinced that “their violent deeds were justified acts of revenge meted out to enemies of the Reich” and “expressions of loyalty” (2014: 4).

Consistent with communist ideology and propelled by necessity, the Soviet military effort incorporated young women more centrally. More than five
hundred thousand young women served in the Red Army’s regular troops and a further three hundred thousand young women served in combat and home-front antiaircraft formations (Krylova 2010: 3). These young women performed a range of combat duties, serving as machine and mortar gunners, snipers, artillery fighters, and combat pilots. The celebrated sniper Roza Shanina, pictured in Figure 7.4 with two fellow female snipers, killed fifty-nine enemy soldiers and commanded an all-female sniper unit before succumbing to wounds in January 1945, shortly before her twenty-first birthday. Young female soldiers also commanded their male counterparts (Krylova 2010: 10). By war’s end, young women made up more than 70 percent of Young Communist soldiers (Krylova 2010: 3).

Young people did not simply serve wartime governments but also played outsized roles in resistance movements across Nazi-occupied Europe. The average age of those who joined Charles de Gaulle in the Free French in 1940 was twenty-five; by 1943, the average age of new resisters had dropped to twenty-three (Rosbottom 2019: 12–13). On the Eastern Front, youth made up an estimated 60 to 80 percent of Soviet partisans (Fürst 2010: 50). Scholars have explained the preponderance of young resisters variously. Ronald C. Rosbottom argues that the young are more willing than other age groups to transform moral outrage into action (2019: 14). He also found that the
excitement of clandestine work appealed to young people (6). Circumstances also predisposed the young to take up resistance work. Without the responsibilities and possessions that accumulate in adulthood, they had less to lose. Because young men were the first to be conscripted, they acquired military experience that could be put to use in armed resistance struggle. Young men were typically the first drafted to labor on behalf of enemy war efforts. Some refused to serve and went underground. From there, armed resistance was often a logical next step (Whitney 2009: 248).

Ideological training and prior political activism similarly prepared the young to resist. Young communists of both sexes played important roles in resistance movements across Europe, and this enhanced their stature after the war. Explaining her own adherence to the Czechoslovak Communist Party as a young Jewish woman, Heda Kovály recalled how, in the concentration camps, communists “often behaved like beings of a higher order. Their idealism and party discipline gave them a strength and an endurance that the rest of us could not match. They were like well-trained soldiers in a crowd of children” (1986: 59–60).

By the late 1940s, military hostilities had given way to a new type of ideological conflict, the Cold War. As Cold War tensions structured global politics, young people remained prime targets of ideological formation and mobilization. Youth assumed new symbolic significance in ideological battles between communist East and capitalist West, with youth culture itself becoming a Cold War battleground (Poiger 2000). Governments instructed young men in new notions of masculinity and male citizenship (Fraser 2019; Poiger 2000), while young athletes and cultural figures were deployed for propaganda purposes at home and abroad. Youth movements were resurrected and adapted to postwar needs on both sides of the East/West divide. Catholics, communists, and Scouts all sought to demonstrate strength through international gatherings of youth, which were described variously as world youth days (Catholic), world youth festivals (communist), or world Scout jamborees. Regardless of ideology, adults celebrated the youth delegates as symbols of peace, hope, and transnational cooperation.

Important differences nonetheless existed. Across what became known as “Eastern Europe,” communist rulers oversaw the dissolution of non-communist youth organizations and the establishment of communist organizations patterned on the Komsomol and the Pioneers. The model of activist socialist childhood and youth developed in the Soviet Union took hold in Eastern Europe and in post-1949 China. Across Eastern Europe, children and adolescents donned uniforms, took loyalty oaths, raised money for international campaigns, and marched, this time ostensibly for peace (see Hensel 2004). Similarities in form and type of activism were sometimes more important than differences in ideology for the young people involved. Indeed, “hundreds of thousands” of young East
Germans transitioned seamlessly from the Hitler Youth to the communist Free German Youth (see Figure 7.5) after the war (McDougall 2008: 24).

Communists once again monopolized education and culture and attacked religion in the effort to raise socialist citizens. Science became a Cold War battleground, assuming a larger role in postwar communist imaginaries and popular education as a result. In the Soviet Union, leaders resurrected a militarized version of masculinity and endeavored to transmit it to the next generation (Fraser 2019). The Soviets’ stunning early successes in the space race, exemplified by Sputnik in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s space flight in 1961, generated pride in the Soviet system (Betts and Smith 2016: 13). In an era when youthful leaders in the United States, Cuba, and Egypt captured the world’s attention, Soviet authorities promoted the handsome, twenty-seven-year-old Gagarin as the dynamic young face of the Soviet system (Fraser 2019: 174–5). Within the Soviet Union, young women also drew inspiration from the example of the first woman in space, twenty-six-year-old Valentina Tereshkova, who spent almost three days in orbit in June 1963 (Sylvester 2019).

The young were politicized in the capitalist West as well. In Western-occupied Germany, American-led re-education efforts focused on the young
Weimar-era youth movements compatible with American approaches to democracy, including scouting, hosteling, and Christian youth organizations, were re-established. West German youth once again donned uniforms and marched in formation. It was all too reminiscent of prewar youth mobilization for American occupying authorities, who in 1948 criticized German youth organizations for living in the past (Ruff 2005: 61). In that exemplar of modernity, the United States, the man-boys leading the Boy Scouts of America positioned the Scouts at the front lines of the struggle against communism, with government officials financing their atomic-era civil defense efforts (Honeck 2018; Peacock 2014: 36–8). The Scouts, like their counterparts in Canada, went door to door distributing government civil defense brochures, sponsored information booths (see Figure 7.6), built and equipped bomb shelters, and demonstrated proper “duck and cover” responses to nuclear attack.

But the 1950s proved to be a false dawn, for the decade marked both the high point of youth’s ideological mobilization and the beginning of its decline (Jobs 2019: 38). In both the communist East and the capitalist West, the importance of political ideology and religious belief waned in young lives when faced with an emergent transnational youth culture based primarily in music, fashion,
and consumption. Young people turned increasingly to rock 'n' roll and to age-specific fashions and leisure activities to construct identities and associate with peers. In the process, ideology and religious faith declined in importance in the lives of the young. This development occurred first in the capitalist West, especially in the United States, where musicians, entrepreneurs, and designers created industries and consumer goods for the era’s new figure, the teenager. In country after country, adults watched with alarm as young people greeted young rock stars with frenzied adulation, donned blue jeans, and sported new hairstyles.

Consumerism and Western music reached the communist bloc. After the war, some Soviet youth embraced Western music denounced by communist leaders and created their own styles through dress (Fürst 2015: 240–1). By the late 1950s, consumption had become “a site of Cold War competition over the ‘good life’” and Soviet leaders increasingly linked the provision of consumer goods to claims of ideological superiority over the capitalist West (Gorsuch and Koenker 2013: 10–11). Communist states created socialist versions of the Western clothes, dances, and music attractive to the young, including blue jeans and the Vespa. In the Soviet Union, revolutionary youth became a thing of the past. In their place, Juliane Fürst argues, “consumption, subcultures, and shirking the system became the hallmarks of Soviet youth” (2010: 19).

Ideology had not lost all importance to and over the young. Student activists mobilized politically around the globe during the late 1960s, pushing some countries to the edge of revolution. Now, however, they rejected the ideological offerings of older, established parties and countries, especially the world’s two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Revolutionary impulses instead came from a new crop of leaders, such as a young Fidel Castro in Cuba and, especially, Mao in China (Lovell 2019). Third World cities such as Dar es Salaam became hubs of transnational exchange among young revolutionaries (Ivaska 2011: 126). In many ways, the formative models of youth’s ideological mobilization had run their course.

Yet patterns established during the twentieth century lived on after the demise of European communism and the end of the Cold War. The past echoes strongly in post-communist Russia, for instance, where President Putin established a youth movement, Nashi, that many see as a modern-day Komsomol. In 2014, Putin reached into the Stalinist past to resurrect the “Ready for Labor and Defense” program. After his attack on Ukraine in 2022, Putin tightened efforts to indoctrinate schoolchildren in pro-war propaganda and punish anti-war dissent in schools and universities. In China, the rising communist power of the twenty-first century, students are again deployed to monitor university life, with “student information officers” surveilling the ideological loyalties of professors as they had under Stalin and Mao (Hernandez 2019: A1, A12). Furthermore, within radical Islam, the so-called Islamic State has successfully recruited thousands of disaffected youths from Western Europe, North America, Russia, and the Middle East, transforming them into ruthless soldiers.
At the same time, early twenty-first century youth also stood out as fierce critics of reigning ideologies and projects. Young people were prominent among those who protested authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa during the “Arab Spring” in 2011 and challenged the excesses of American capitalism within the Occupy movement of the same year. Youth are in the forefront of those speaking out against the expansion of party-state power in China. At the end of 2019, students risked much to stage a protest at Shanghai’s Fudan University (Hernandez and Zhang 2019). This followed months of youth-led protests in Hong Kong. Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg, Time magazine’s “Person of the Year” for 2019, traveled the world extensively to berate leaders for failing to take meaningful action on global warming, inspiring students across the globe in the process. “No political ideology or economic structure,” she scolded world leaders gathered in Davos in 2020, “has been able to tackle the climate and environmental emergency.” Young people’s relationship to ideology and belief thus remains complex and multifaceted in the twenty-first century, with influential patterns from across the previous hundred years continuing to shape outlooks and activities.
“You are the renewal of life, nature that triumphs,” wrote the Spanish republican Alejandro Lerroux in 1906 to his younger comrades. “Young barbarians,” he exhorted them, “extinguish the miserable and decadent civilization of this wretched country, destroy all the temples and finish with their gods … enter into the humblest homes and raise legions of proletariats.” Thirty-seven years old when he composed that letter, Lerroux was himself a young politician, representative of the more radical republican strands, a man who had moved from Madrid to Barcelona to organize a youth-based party attuned to the novelties of mass politics. Six years later, however, in 1912, Lerroux was already attempting to set limits on the “young barbarians,” who were doing exactly what he had incited them to—destroying churches and mobilizing alongside the working classes (Culla i Clarà 2005: 55–9). This example tells of the ways in which agency and authority were often at stake when modern young people entered the political arena. Equally significant, it also indicates some of the many uses of “youth” as a political category in the twentieth century: it stood for renewal, creativity, and selflessness, and also for force and irrationalism.

This chapter explores the relationships between agency and authority by drawing on examples from Latin America and Western Europe, from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century. In the subfield of the history of youth, the concept of “agency” has been widely used in relation to young people’s choices, their capacity to act, and their resistance to adult-centered mandates and expectations. As some historians have recently argued, the concept has flaws: in certain hands it entails an a priori understanding regarding
resistance to different forms of cultural and political authority; it can suppose (at least implicitly) a binary model that pitches youth against adults; and in its monolithic application it fails to account for difference across historical settings (Alexander 2015; Gleason 2016). Prompted by those discussions, this chapter focuses on public political and politico-cultural experiences (not accounting for other milieus, such as family relations) and understands agency as the desire and capability for autonomy in terms of the repertoires of demands and actions that young people deployed throughout the twentieth century. As the example above suggests, these dynamics neither excluded “adults” nor stood in stark opposition to forms of authority. Moreover, in the process of becoming political and cultural actors, young people reproduced and created a wide range of intra-generational authority relations, based on class, gender, and regional differences.

The chapter first reconstructs the experience of the University Reform Movement that swept across Latin America in the 1920s, which the students represented as an anti-hierarchical youth revolt. Alongside generating the conditions for selfruled university systems in Argentina, Peru, and Cuba, the University Reform Movement also paved the way for increasing student involvement with politics both within and outside the universities, chiefly on the center and left of the political spectrum. With leftist politics, in Latin America and elsewhere, the rise of communism was largely based on youthful participation, associated with the more radicalized positions and willingness to “push forward” revolutionary activities (see the previous chapter in this volume, “Belief and Ideology”). This chapter next explores diverse experiences of state-sponsored organizations of youth. By drawing on the examples of fascist Italy and Peronist Argentina, I reconstruct the ways in which authoritarian regimes sought to mobilize (and often de-radicalize) youth, while creating the conditions for the political and cultural indoctrination of “new generations.” However, these state-sponsored organizations could not completely subsume young people’s agency. Furthermore, in 1940s and 1950s Argentina, the Peronist government authorized young people’s autonomy, as far as it related to experimentations with mass culture, while it also delegitimized youthful political mobilization.

I then assess the manifold ways in which agency and authority were at stake in the ferment of 1968. The massive involvement of young people in radical politics was perhaps the single most distinctive occurrence in the global political scenario of the 1960s. Youth came to epitomize a culture of contestation that questioned well-entrenched forms of authority in the political and cultural realms, as demonstrated in the two examples the chapter explores: Italy and Mexico. Albeit with rather different modalities and intensities, the governing elites embarked upon “authority-reconstitution” projects aimed at setting limits on both young people’s agency and, more prominently, to what youth as a
category came to signify in political and cultural terms. However, this chapter will demonstrate that young people in 1968 and beyond also produced forms of intra-generational authority linked with—among other issues—gender and sexuality. Finally, I will use hip-hop cultures in 1990s Latin America and late twentieth-century anti-corporate globalization movements to consider how young people’s more recent involvement in politico-cultural initiatives combined cultural, countercultural, and political activities and experiences with transnational resonances.

**IS THIS THE HOUR OF YOUTH?**

As the example of the Spanish “Young Barbarians” suggests, the political mobilization of youth intensified at the beginning of the twentieth century partially in relation to the rise of mass politics, its novel repertoires of action (from propaganda and street demonstrations to barricades and strikes), and its redefinitions of citizenship, which in most countries in Europe and the Americas involved the granting of voting rights to a larger segment of the male population. After the First World War, however, both the meanings of youth as a category and the significance of young people as actors changed dramatically all over the world. Redefined through association with the new age-based concept of “adolescence,” older Romantic ideas of youth as generous and uncorrupted gained ascendancy among intellectuals, political leaders, and young activists themselves. Youth, always linked to the future rather than the past, came to represent both the chance of reimagining the postwar world and of criticizing the sociopolitical and cultural elites who had led the world to ruins. Young people were endowed with a renewed sense of entitlement, which many appropriated when participating in the creation of new forms of political involvement that ultimately put issues of agency and authority at center stage.

The issue of who counted as “youth,” however, differed substantially according to geographical settings and political contexts. In most of early twentieth-century Latin America, for example, a tiny minority of the cohort central to my purposes here—male, middle-class university students, generally between eighteen and twenty-four years old—occupied the signifier of “youth” in the public arena, an occurrence that grew ever more significant as students delineated their political involvement and claimed the representation of an entire “generation” in the frame of the University Reform Movement. Launched in the Argentine province of Córdoba in 1918, the University Reform Movement initially had limited goals, such as curricular changes and transformations to the ways in which professors gained access to their positions. Backed by the new political scenario associated with the government of Hipólito Yrigoyen, Argentina’s first democratically elected president
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF YOUTH IN THE MODERN AGE

(1916), the Córdoba students called a strike to demand the inclusion of more professors into the decision-making processes at their university. Their initial alliance was with a group of professors understood by the students to be opposed to the clericalism that was thought to govern their university. Yet this alliance was soon broken, and with it the student strikers’ initial, quite modest, demands. After the failure of their moderate methods, the students followed a path towards radicalization. They broadened their repertoire of activities to include strikes, street demonstrations, barricades, and ultimately established further connections with students across the country and segments of the Argentinian labor movement (Bustelo 2018).

This process of radicalization was already palpable in the Manifesto Liminar, published in June 1918 and written by recent university graduate Deodoro Roca. Addressed to the “free men of America,” the Manifesto Liminar laid the foundation for the students’ vision for university reform, which included claims for autonomy, academic freedom, and student participation in university governance. This reform project was based on three central points. First, it postulated the idea of a ‘university demos’ that would be based on the equality of its members (professors, alumni, and students) and the exercise of internal democracy, which ideally would also function as the model for democracy at a broader societal level. Second, the project explicitly conceived of young people as agents of change, agents focused initially on universities, yet with ambitions to transform wider society. Finally, the manifesto called for

FIGURE 8.1 Student barricade, Córdoba, Argentina, 1918. Museo Casa de la Reforma Universitaria, Argentina.
the making of a “new American generation” and proclaimed that university students would be its vanguard (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios de Córdoba [1918] 2018).

The University Reform Movement contributed decisively to the articulation of youth as a political actor throughout Latin America, an actor initially shaped to oppose the authority—which the students deemed as authoritarianism—of their professors. As a movement, it had a continental scale, spreading quickly from Córdoba to the rest of Argentina and from there to Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico: a dissemination made possible through communication networks that spanned publications, congresses, and travel practices (Bergel and Martínez Mazzola 2010). During the 1920s, national student federations flourished across Latin America, sometimes becoming the battlegrounds for disputes within leftist and “progressive parties.” One such dispute involved the Cuban communist activist and student leader Julio Mella and the Peruvian Raúl Haya de la Torre. Haya de la Torre founded the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA, American Popular and Revolutionary Alliance) in 1926, positing that the student movement, as the ideological vanguard of the middle classes, should eventually lead the way towards democracy, a statement that Mella, aligned with most communist students and activists, questioned deeply (Melgar Bao 2013). Haya de la Torre’s conceptualization of the student movement and its role in the making of “national and popular” parties had some followers in the ensuing years. However, Latin American university students socialized in the framework of the Reform Movement more commonly engaged with (and nurtured the growth of) existing or new parties, fundamentally at the center and left of the political spectrum, as was the case with communism.

The global rise of communism was largely associated with youth. In a meeting held in Bern in 1915, for instance, several European socialist groups attempted to launch a socialist youth bureau and committed themselves to revolutionary socialism, internationalism, and antimilitarism. As Mathias Neumann (2017) has argued, this meeting helped pave the way for the creation, in 1919, of the Third International, aligned with the nascent Soviet experience. After the First World War, generational thought pervaded the socialist bloc as well, and youth came to embody the “uncorrupted vanguard” of the revolution, which functioned as a self-representation of youth groups as much as it was a representation upheld by older militants who wanted to pursue a more radical path. In fact, youth groups were instrumental in the founding of communist parties throughout the world. In Argentina and Spain, for example, youth groups split from reformist socialist parties in 1918 and 1921, respectively, and advocated for “pushing forward” the revolution along the lines of the Soviet experience.

At the same time, however, the association of youth with more radicalized political stances, whether left or right, was never total. Most student activists
who socialized in the University Reform Movement in Latin America, for example, supported so-called “reformist” parties (such as the Radical Civic Union in Argentina). However, in a context where youth was valued as a source of social and political regeneration and understood (positively or negatively) as a force pushing toward new political forms and social relations, its metaphorical, and, to a large extent, actual, positioning was radical. Many movements praised the radicalism of youth, and made extensive use of the language of “generational revolt.”

**BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND AGENCY**

In the two decades that followed the First World War, numerous youth organizations in Latin America and Western Europe sought to increase their autonomy from their parent parties. During the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939), for example, young people became protagonists of a dynamic rising politicization that cut across society at large. Membership in the Federación de Juventudes Socialistas (FJS, Federation of Socialist Youth), a group that attracted mostly working-class young men, grew exponentially from two thousand in 1929 to twenty thousand in 1934. In 1931 as part of its efforts to separate itself from the parent party, the Socialist Party, the FJS drafted a roster of demands that included lowering the voting age from twenty-five to twenty-one years old, setting limits on military service, and prohibiting minors under sixteen from engaging in paid work.

Between 1931 and 1933, when the Socialist Party integrated the ruling coalition, some of those demands were met, yet in late 1933 the elections that led Alejandro Lerroux and a center-right coalition to government marked a turning point in the ways of facing youth mobilization. Lerroux, who in 1906 had exhorted the “young barbarians” to destroy churches and property, was now in charge of a government that decreed the prohibition of political activity (from party affiliation to participation in street demonstrations) for those under sixteen, and required parental approval for those between sixteen and twenty-three years old. Young communists and socialists refused to accept the decree, and their alliance served as a platform for the first joint mobilizations of the two parties, foregrounding the large upheavals of 1934 (Souto Kustrín 2005: 102–13). The interplay between authority (and authoritarianism), and youthful political participation therefore represented a contested terrain, not only in Spain but also in fascist Italy and Peronist Argentina.

In 1920s and 1930s Italy, youth, as a category, and young people, as social and political actors, also played prominent roles. In contrast to the Soviet experience, where leaders and rank-and-files alike strove to reconcile languages of class and generation (Gorsuch 2000), fascist leaders emphatically represented
their movement as a “generational revolt.” As a movement and as a regime, fascism made use of generational rhetoric while it enlisted—at least firstly—urban and rural young men. As historian Luisa Passerini has pointed out, in fascist Italy youth operated as both a “metaphor” and an “instrument” that allowed for its identification with “force, fatality, and historical determination” (1996: 402). As had occurred with the Bolsheviks, fascism was also, initially, a movement composed mostly of young people.

University students were at the forefront. In late 1919, when the fascists first competed electorally and suffered a resounding defeat, Milan university students launched an organization named Avanguardie Studentesca (AS, Student Vanguard) with the goal of disseminating fascist ideology and tactics (chiefly paramilitary squads) in colleges and secondary schools. The organization rapidly spread in northern Italy, to the point that in late 1920 in many cities and towns the AS actually helped create and entrench fascism (La Rovere, 2003: 15–37). Meanwhile, in the southern regions the social composition was different. Following socialist attempts to seize rural properties after the First World War, landowning elites in southern Italy funded the creation of paramilitary groups. These were essentially youth squads which, like their northern student counterparts, exerted violence over leftist militants and activists.

The creation of the Fascist Party in 1921 entailed, among other things, disciplining the youth groups, starting with the dissolution of the AS and the organization of the Giuventù Universitaria Fascista (Fascist University Youth) and the Avanguardie Giovanile Fascista (Fascist Youth Vanguard), which young men from fifteen to eighteen years old joined. Both groups were structurally dependent on the Fascist Party, and their goal was to “educate” young people. As the vice-president of the party, Giuseppe Bastianini, stated in 1922 (right after the march on Rome), youth could no longer participate in politics: they needed first to incorporate the fascist principles of “tranquility, obedience, and respect for authority” (quoted in Ponzio 2015: 32).

Unlike the focus on “learning” employed by Lenin to signal the tasks of communist youth, beginning in the early 1920s and well into the 1940s, the fascists emphasized the verb “educate.” The consolidation of the fascist regime in 1926 also crystallized a structure for “educating” Italian children and youth: the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). Although its sections and denominations varied over time, the ONB enlisted children from eight to fourteen in groups named balilla (boys) and piccole italiane (girls, created in 1929), and from fifteen to eighteen years old, the Avanguardisti and the Giovanne Italiane (also created in 1929). Until 1939 membership was voluntary, although parents were subject to manifold pressures to enlist their children—which helps to explain why membership in the ONB increased from 2 million to 9 million members between 1930 and 1939 (Pasqualini 2015: 63).
Yet despite the ONB’s coercive recruitment tactics, it is also likely that many children and adolescents were genuinely attracted by the prospects of the activities they could perform, in a context where almost all youth organizations—with the exception of those linked to Catholic Action—had been dismantled. Physical education (and military training for the Avanguardisti), camping, and summer vacations figured prominently on the list of the ONB activities, which also included conferences and lectures, theater- and moviegoing, and a plethora of ritualistic demonstrations where children and adolescents were called to perform according to bodily, disciplined, militaristic values. All these configured a prime site for the fascist “aesthetization of politics” (Pasqualini 2015: 69).

In the early 1930s, youth once again came to the center of political attention in the frame of the conflicts between the fascist regime and the Catholic Church. After the signing of the Lateran Pact between the fascist government and the Vatican in 1929, conflicts again mounted, revolving largely around which institution had the authority to determine youth’s “moral formation.” These conflicts were punctuated by a resurgence of violent activities undertaken by a new cohort of young fascists. In exerting physical violence against their Catholic peers, they also aspired to reinvigorate the fascist revolutionary ethos
(Ponzio 2015). In this context, slogans such as “make space for the young” resonated in the political and cultural milieus. This contrasted with the fact that the fascist leadership was already in their late forties and fifties and still dominated by former squadristi from “the first hour.” It was only in late 1943, during the Second World War, that sixty-year-old Mussolini appointed twenty-eight-year-old Aldo Minussoni as general secretary of the party, thus again trying to connect the regime with the “myth of youth.”

While large portions of the Italian children and adolescents who participated in party- and state-sponsored organizations (albeit with different degrees of conviction, and for multiple reasons) might have supported fascist policies and initiatives throughout, many others did not. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, some young people advocated for recuperating the fascist “revolutionary ethos” while others joined the anti-fascist opposition. Between 1943 and 1946, for instance, Italian communist activists successfully organized a multi-party coalition, the Fronte della Gioventù (Youth Front). As Bruno Wanrooij has shown (1999), the Youth Front triggered many debates about the role of youth in fascism. Were successive cohorts of youth to be blamed for the fascist experience? Did the fascists “force” young people to adhere to their project? Could former young fascists integrate into a purportedly democratic political space? Communists, socialists, and Christian Democrats, both youth and adult alike, tried to answer those questions both before and after 1945. Those questions touched on pressing issues, as at the time they related to the evaluation of the so-called fascist “legacies.” These debates were also significant because they implicitly or explicitly involved issues of youth agency and authority.

Strikingly similar debates about youth, agency, and authority took place in mid-1950s Argentina, when a civilian and military coup d’état ended Juan Domingo Perón’s two first governments (1946–1955). Unlike fascism, Peronism did not build upon previous youth movements or use generational rhetoric. A prominent example of populist politics, Peronism was largely supported by industrial workers and represented a democratization of well-being epitomized by increased wages and the expansion of education, health, and housing programs. This socially egalitarian component of Perón’s populism, coupled with a political style that endorsed antagonism, generated a wide oppositional bloc that united most of the upper and middle classes and was represented in most political parties. University students were a fundamental piece of that oppositional bloc, chiefly those aligned to the ideas and practices of the University Reform Movement. By contrast, the expanded body of secondary school students—whose enrollment went from 217,000 students in 1946 to 467,000 in 1955 (Manzano 2014: 21)—was devoid of the political traditions that university students had, and it also included working-class adolescents. In 1953, the government created the Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios (UES, Secondary-School Students Union), while Perón endowed youth—by which he meant UES students—with the task of perpetuating “his” revolution.
The UES was, thus, a state-sponsored organization. By 1954, 52 percent of the students in public schools were affiliated to the UES, which was first and foremost oriented to the practice of sports (such as soccer for boys, and basketball and motorcycling for boys and girls) and to organize their free time, including free attendance to the movies and free vacations in seaside resorts. Although formally the UES had male and female sections, in actuality boys and girls intermingled on many occasions, and they did so in a milieu saturated by goods, fashion styles, and sounds from mass culture. The young Argentinians who belonged to the UES famously enjoyed themselves at state-sponsored parties where they drank Coke (a luxury for most workers at the time), wore the latest fashions, and danced to Caribbean and American rhythms—activities which, unlike in some other contexts, had the blessing of the country’s highest authority.

UES members were catapulted to the center stage of political attention, chiefly when a plethora of Catholic groups became strongholds of anti-Peronism. Both Catholic and non-Catholic opponents signaled what they perceived as a major evil associated with the UES: the risks of sexual promiscuity. The vicious relationship that they viewed as taking place between Perón and the youths corroded the basis of Argentina’s future, and for them it was crucial to eliminate Peronism. After the civilian and military coup d’état of 1955, a special committee of educators, psychologists, and sociologists evaluated the legacies of the Peronist experience as it related to youth. The committee concluded that Perón had “used the youth’s impetus for renewal” to question “all forms of authority and hierarchy,” which had resulted in “uncontrolled liberties”: in their view, young people’s agency should be restricted. Those “uncontrolled liberties” were, in their opinion, the bequest that Peronism left to youth and to Argentina’s future (Manzano 2014: 27).

The experience of the UES in Peronist Argentina provides an example, albeit possibly rather unique and extreme, of a state-sponsored organization that, at least rhetorically, favored youth agency in terms of cultural and social practices. The state still authorized them while it delegitimized and repressed the political mobilization of university students. The experience of the UES was also one of the last large state-sponsored organizations in Western Europe and Latin America (the exception being the Youth Front in Franco’s Spain, which lasted from 1937 to 1977). In the decades to come, youth agency, political and otherwise, intersected with authority in multiple ways.

AGAINST ALL FORMS OF AUTHORITY?

Between 1967 and 1969, at least one hundred cities across five continents were shaken by a wave of revolts: either as students or as workers, youth was the “age” of 1968. The conjuncture of 1968 was the result of a series of longer social, cultural, and political transformations, including in some countries
the coming of age of the “Baby Boomers” of the postwar and, in most, the sustained expansion of enrollments in secondary schools and universities and the acceleration of communications. With the last of these also came the dissemination of new sounds, ideas, goods, and aesthetics targeted to, and eventually made by, youth. In the late 1960s, a global cohort of young people questioned authority in multiple, often intersecting milieus: intergenerational relations; gender relations and sexuality; “high” and “low” culture; and especially politics. In this terrain, youthful challenges to political regimes and governments—such as the cases of Italy and Mexico, reconstructed below—went hand in hand with the challenges to the “old” left. Just as importantly, in theoretical and practical terms, most young activists in those two countries, as in many others worldwide, challenged the conception of politics as a separate sphere of life (and the domain of authorized and “mature” specialists) to endorse an all-encompassing understanding that often politicized a broad range of practices, from childrearing and music consumption to factory-plant relations and tourism. Those challenges were met by consistent and, in Mexico as a case in point, by dreadfully repressive projects aimed at reconstructing authority, carried out by states.

In the 1960s, students and young workers stood at the center of deep sociocultural transformations in both Mexico and Italy. Both countries had undergone rapid socioeconomic changes marked by swift prompt industrialization—and rural-to-urban migrations—as well as growth of per capita income, and the rise of the middle classes. As part of these structural dynamics as well as the efforts made by the ruling elites to revamp the educational systems, the secondary levels of education and university provision expanded. In Italy, the total enrollment in secondary schools doubled between 1959 and 1969, while in Mexico it grew four times between 1960 and 1970 (Ginsborg 1990: 299–300; Olivera 2013). An expanding minority of those who graduated from secondary schools went to the university level: in Italy, where major reforms in the university system had taken place in the early 1960s (including the abolishment of entrance examinations), the student body grew from 268,000 in 1960 to 450,000 in 1968, while in Mexico it rose from 70,000 in 1958 to 400,000 in 1968 (Ginsborg 1990: 300; Olivera 2013). In both countries, university facilities were hardly adequate to host growing student populations, most members of the teaching faculty did not hold full-time positions, academic methods were outdated, and systems of financial aid for students barely existed. It bears noting, however, that only a small percentage of the age group between fifteen and twenty-five attended secondary schools and universities: a vast majority of young women and men in Italy and Mexico were workers in the industrial and service sectors. In many respects, then, young people embodied and carried out the crucial aspects that made what the Mexican and Italian elites referred to equally as their economic miracles.
Either as workers or as students, urban youth in Italy and Mexico participated in cultural practices that were entirely made for and later produced by them, sometimes showcasing iconoclastic countercultural attitudes. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, for example, young Italians danced to the twist with star Rita Pavone, while young Mexicans enjoyed the *refritos* (Spanish covers of famous American songs) of Los Teen Tops, and on both sides of the Atlantic they could listen and dance to American rock & roll. By the mid-1960s, however, styles and attitudes started to change. In Milan, Rome, and Mexico City, droves of young men wore their hair longer and young women wore their skirts shorter while they engaged in the consumption and production of music first labeled as *beat*. In close connection with rock cultures, countercultural experiences flourished as the 1960s wore on. In Mexico, for example, both international travelers and domestic youth began a steady pilgrimage to sites such as Huautla de Jiménez, where they encountered landscapes and stories linked to Indigenous peoples and, most fundamentally, experimented with hallucinogenic drugs (Zolov 1999: 110–17).

In 1966 a group of young men in Milan created the journal, and movement, known as *Mondo Beat*, which entwined diverse cultural, aesthetic, and political traditions, ranging from anarchism to existentialism, and from “oriental” philosophy to the emerging anti-psychiatric movement. One editorial published in *Mondo Beat* in late 1967 further critiqued “those who speak of revolutions and class struggle without referring to everyday life.” In what became common sense among countercultural groups worldwide, *Mondo Beat* claimed that “without understanding what is subversive in love, and positive in the rejection of all constraints” those “old revolutionaries” were merely “filling up their mouths with a corpse” (quoted in Giachetti 1998: 30). In some respects, the youth associated with *Mondo Beat* and Mexican rockers and hippies had one thing in common: the will to “change themselves”—their minds, their everyday lives—as a precondition to changing the world.

The countercultural element was a central strand in the youth-based culture of contestation that came to a head in 1968. In Italy and Mexico—as in other parts of the world—this conjuncture followed a similar pattern: student groups initially mobilized around student-based agendas to then incorporate broader political demands. The students occupied public spaces and initiated new forms of collective action. Those initiatives triggered adverse reactions from political authorities, the police, and the media, reactions which helped intensify and radicalize “movements” that sought insistently to reach out to other social groups, particularly the working classes. These commonalities reveal the significance that youth, understood as a political and politico-cultural category, had acquired around the globe, as well as the ways in which governments, the media, and significant sections of society perceived the questioning of authority. Yet the differences between the Italian and Mexican 1968 also
speak to the possibilities of entwinement between countercultural and overtly political dissent, as well as to the abilities and willingness of the political elites to reconstitute what they interpreted as vanishing authority.

Italian students have been widely credited as the “initiators” of the European revolts of 1968. Between 1966 and 1967, student groups at the Universities of Trento and Pisa had already occupied their university buildings to make localized demands (the establishment of a sociology diploma in Trento, for example) and to protest against governmental attempts to pass nationwide university reform without taking into account the students’ voices. The protest against those attempts coalesced, at different geographical locations, with mobilizations against the Vietnam War which were sweeping across Europe and gave the student movements a common, anti-imperialist language. In the two years before 1968, mobilized university students across Italy also enforced deliberative forms that questioned the idea of political representation and endorsed direct democracy (Kurz and Tolomelli 2008).

Hence various organizational forms and repertoires of action were already set in motion prior to the sequence of student mobilization that started in November 1967 and ended in May 1968. Between December and February, the movement spread throughout the country and included not only university but also secondary school students. Over those months, university and school occupations became the rule, students participated in assemblies, and many
also held counter-courses, where they discussed academic and political issues not included in the official curricula. The movement reached a turning point in February 1968, with the occupation of the University of Rome. After police had evicted students from the university, the students met at the Piazza di Spagna and decided to “recapture” the School of Architecture, located in the gardens of Villa Borghese. There the police baton-charged them, and the students replied by setting alight vans and cars. Sixty-four policemen were hospitalized, and an unknown number of students were injured. The “Battle of Valle Giulia,” as it came to be known, represented a critical moment in terms of both students’ willingness to engage in direct action as well as in the ways that they were represented and perceived in the public arena.

In those intense months during which these students composed the visible face of the Italian 1968, the movement allowed for the intersection of challenges to different forms of authority—and it was perceived as such. The police, the government, and the university authorities became the most obvious targets of student rejection. In a much-more encompassing vein, though, many students expressed their criticism of the family as an institution that they viewed at the crossroads of Catholic morals, political conformism, and sociocultural oppression. Synthetizing that belief, one representative piece of graffiti simply read “I want to be an orphan” (Passerini 1996: 29). The criticism of the nuclear family stood at the center of efforts to revamp childrearing practices in a non-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical way. Yet the nuclear family was not the only institution deemed authoritarian: the “old Left,” and particularly the Communist Party, received a great share of criticism as well, accused of being hierarchical and of blocking, rather than facilitating, revolutionary dynamics. Those criticisms mounted as the movement unfolded, partially because the Communist Party was ambivalent in the face of the student revolts—while some members did recognize that many student groups were anti-capitalist, many others questioned their motives. Notably, the renowned poet and filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini composed a poem in which he spoke to the students: “You are cowardly, uncertain, and desperate / … when the other day, at Valle Giulia you fought / the police, / I can tell you I was on their side. / Because the police are the sons of the poor” (quoted in Ginsborg 1990: 307). Controversially, Pasolini argued that the policemen were the “authentic” proletarians, while he conceived of the mobilized youth as uncertain and desperate. The media deployed similar ideas of infantilism, racism, and irrationality in the making of a moral panic out of the mobilized students, whom the Corriere della Sera depicted as i cinesi (the Chinese), thus “conjuring the red menace and the yellow peril in one” (Lumley 1990: 73).

The mobilized students in Italy, especially those associated with the emergent extra-parliamentary left (which included, as the press exaggerated, many Maoist groups), never thought of themselves as a possible revolutionary
vanguard: in their minds, that was to be the role of the working classes. As the university-focused movement started to vanish, many students who had joined those extra-parliamentary groups went on to carry out agitation and organizational work in and around factory plants. The “Hot Autumn,” which spanned from the fall of 1968 to the fall of 1969, represented the pinnacle of the convergence between the youthful Italian left and the labor movement, signaling also the strength and the limits of the questioning of all forms of authority. Although articulated around labor-specific demands carried out by adult and mostly young workers, the movement also distilled broader anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical overtones expressed, for example, in a novel organizational structure centered on the factory councils; in the refusal of countenancing productivity as a measure for calibrating wage increases; and in the challenge to factory-plant authority structures. In July 1969, when the official trade union of the FIAT plant at Mirafiori in Turin called a strike to protest against the rise in the rent prices, thousands of rank-and-file workers went to the streets with their own slogan: “What do we want? Everything.” The slogan summarized the overarching nature of a movement, and of a conjuncture, in which “everything” was at stake.

Unlike their Italian counterparts, Mexican workers did not engage in any massive collective movement with the young students; indeed, rather the opposite was true, despite mobilized university students striving to build connections and achieve solidarity. The Mexican student movement underwent profound redefinitions throughout the 1960s, due partially to the changing social composition of the student body and to the ideological and political realignments that occurred in the wake of the Cuban revolution. This intensified the activism of groups on the left and the right, such as the so-called porras, which were youth cliques linked to the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party) dedicated to exerting violence against left-wing students in secondary schools and universities (Pensado 2013). Significantly, the Mexican “movement” of 1968 started on July 26th, with the convergence of two events: a tiny demonstration that leftist students held to commemorate another anniversary of the “July 26 Movement” (that is, Fidel Castro’s movement) and a demonstration organized by the students at the Polytechnic Institute to protest against the porras. As the writer Paco Taibo II (then a Maoist student of Political Science at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [UNAM]) recounted in his memoirs, while the first was a routine demonstration that leftist students held to commemorate another anniversary of the “July 26 Movement” (that is, Fidel Castro’s movement) and a demonstration organized by the students at the Polytechnic Institute to protest against the porras. As the writer Paco Taibo II (then a Maoist student of Political Science at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [UNAM]) recounted in his memoirs, while the first was a routine demonstration, the second constituted a real novelty as it incorporated, at first implicitly, a demand against the veiled repressive tactics of the governing party as well, more importantly, as a cohort of young people with scarce political training (1998: 24–5). Despite their differences, both demonstrations were suppressed by the state and, in the last week of July, the police sent hundreds of students to prison—including secondary school students...
who, in Taibo’s words, “had not read a single page of Lenin” (35). Ironically, president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, in a televised message, assured viewers that he had “a hand stretched out” towards the students, who in a large demonstration on July 31st carried signs in turn declaring that “The outstretched hand has a pistol in it” (quoted in Zolov 1999: 120) The stakes were high: Mexico was in the spotlight of international attention as it had been selected as the first non-European country to host the Summer Olympics, which were scheduled to start on October 12, 1968. This date energized all the actors involved in an escalating conflict.

In August and September 1968, the “movement,” as the students called it, extended geographically, diversified its tactics, and intensified its confrontational overtones, fundamentally targeting the Mexican government. Only two weeks after the initial police repression in Mexico City, 150 universities and schools all over the country experienced strike action, as students occupied buildings, and—as elsewhere in the world—participated in both street demonstrations and general assemblies. In that process, the students created the Comité Nacional de Huelga (CNH, National Strike Committee), formed by two dozen (all male) representatives, which claimed independence from parties and groups. Unlike their Italian (and also French and German) counterparts, the Mexican students did not advocate a distinctively radical political and social agenda. When the CNH finally agreed on an official petition, they listed six demands: freedom for all political prisoners, elimination of Article 145 of the Penal Code (used to fight “internal subversion”), abolition of the riot police, dismissal of Mexico City’s chief of police, indemnification for the victims of repression, and justice against those responsible for repression. These claims focused on the authoritarian nature of Mexican politics, and the students also claimed that all dialogue regarding these demands be made public. Needless to say, the government did not accept. As had happened in Italy, the media depicted the students as immature and extremists, and added a patriotic twist by blaming them for the “bad image” of Mexico abroad. The students tried hard to counter these criticisms: they organized, for example, “people-to-people brigades” that took their message (chiefly in the form of leaflets containing the six demands) to the streets, marketplaces, public transportation, and factory entrances.

As the Olympics approached, governmental attempts to restore “order” intensified to a dreadful finale. In mid-September 1968, the government sent the army to occupy the main UNAM campus and the Polytechnic Institute. Scores of students were sent into prison and others were forced to go underground (including members of the CNH, like Gustavo Guevara Nieblas). In a climate of rising fears and government reprisals, meetings and demonstrations recruited fewer and fewer participants, and the CNH representatives suspected (with good reason) that “the movement” had been infiltrated by government provocateurs. On October 1st, the army left the UNAM campus and remained at
the Polytechnic. The CNH called a sit-in on October 2nd to protest at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, in the neighborhood of Tlatelolco. As soon as the CNH representatives approached the microphone to address the crowd (estimated to have been ten thousand people), a helicopter began to circle overhead and two flares were dropped. Soon thereafter, army troops entered the Plaza and began to fire point-blank at the crowd, killing an estimated two hundred people—the exact figures are unknown to date, as the Mexican state refused to launch its own investigation (Allier Montaño 2009). The massacre of Tlatelolco, as it was soon named, represented the tragic end of the Mexican “movement.” It spoke of the authoritarianism of the Mexican government and of the *carte blanche* that a large segment of the Mexican population had bestowed upon it to restore the “order” and “authority principle” that the these university students had allegedly challenged (Pensado 2013).

In Italy and Mexico (as in other geographical settings), the youth involved in the mobilizations of 1968 reproduced and created their own forms of authority. Those related to gender relations figured prominently. The repertoires of action that the students valued the most (street demonstrations and forms of direct action, for example) implied the deployment of so-called masculine behaviors related to courage and physical aptitude. Moreover, the ability to speak publicly—in assemblies and gatherings—was also traditionally a male prerogative, one further associated with educated (and therefore middle- and

FIGURE 8.4 Students in a police van, Mexico City, 1968. Courtesy of Getty Images.
upper-class) men. As Lessie Jo Frazier and Deborah Cohen (2003) have shown, as the Mexican “movement” wore on, the majority of the male leadership went to prison and female activists became the ones occupying the streets, usually by participating in initiatives to gather solidarity with the prisoners. Hence, although the public spaces became feminized, the “closed” spaces of prisons were the places for male leadership. Some Mexican young women, and many others in Italy and elsewhere, started to reflect critically on that occurrence as they created their own forms of political and cultural involvement in a renewed feminism (Evans 2009). In their criticism of patriarchy, the young feminists of the late 1960s and early 1970s touched upon the ways in which their male generational peers, while questioning state power and eventually capitalism, continued to reproduce gender and sexual hierarchies.

**ACTING CULTURE AND POLITICS**

In many respects, the “failed revolutions” of 1968 represented the last episode of a century-long wave that put together radical political projects (whether right or, more generally, left) with young people in Western Europe and the Americas. Although revolutionary movements were not extemporaneous (the Sandinistas in Nicaragua continued to attract solidarity and sympathy in both continents throughout the 1980s, for example), the climate shifted more generally toward moderate options in formal politics, to a seemingly unstoppable retreat of young people from politics. In 1985, in one of the central activities that composed the UN-sanctioned “International Youth Year,” six hundred youth delegates from all over the world gathered in Barcelona and called on their peers to “commit themselves to the social good” and “actively participate.” The delegates had found that youth participation was all the more necessary in times of deep economic crisis, when youth unemployment rates skyrocketed, and when governments, “in developed and underdeveloped regions alike,” underfunded education, health, and housing programs (Congreso Mundial de la Juventud 1985: 1, 3). The consolidation of neoliberalism and a (then still-) new globalization was combined with the vanishing of revolutionary projects to produce the metaphorical figure of the market-oriented, technologically friendly, hedonist, and profoundly “disaffected” youth that captivated so much of the cultural production of the era (such as Douglas Coupland’s *Generation X*, published in 1991). That “disaffected” youth was depicted as not only devoid of political agency but also uninterested in confronting established sociocultural hierarchies and other forms of authority. As potent a trope as it was, the notion of a “disaffected”—apolitical and individualistic—youth ultimately obscured two other crucial dynamics: the politicization of many cultural practices as the examples of hip-hop in 1990s Latin America show—and the emergence of largely youth-based movements against neoliberal globalization.
One of the legacies of the mobilizations of 1968, then, was the collective realization that everyday life and cultural expressions were not “apolitical” but rather a crucial arena for thinking about, and enacting, politics. While in the 1960s rock music and other facets of youth (counter-) cultural expressions sometimes “competed” with programmatic political projects as venues for modeling youth experiences, expectations, and identities, in the last quarter of the twentieth century some youthful cultural expressions became sites for political organizing and debate in their own right. Hip-hop culture represents a telling example of this phenomenon.

After its beginnings in the inner cities of the United States in the late 1970s, linked with working-class African American youth, and its transmutations in the culture industries, the key expressions of hip-hop (DJ-ing, breakdancing, rapping, and producing graffiti, among other aspects) traveled quickly across the globe. Diversified and heterogeneous as it was, in the 1990s hip-hop culture had not lost its association with youth pushing back against poverty and racial discrimination and voicing the concerns of a “global hip-hop nation,” as some scholars suggested (Alim et al. 2009). In Latin America, young Cubans and Brazilians were among the first in developing large hip-hop cultures, albeit they did so under remarkably different conditions. Cuban rappers such as Primera Base or Amenaza, for example, were in closer connection with their American peers, chiefly with those enrolled in the so-called “underground” or “conscious” hip-hop trend that aimed at recreating a Black consciousness and politics.

Unlike their American and Brazilian counterparts, the emergence and transformations of Cuban hip-hop were mediated and sponsored through state institutions (including access to record companies, opening of public spaces for rapping, and—beginning in 1995—the organization of annual rap festivals). Hence, at the same time that a significant portion of Cuban youth found in hip-hop culture a platform for socializing outside “formal” politics and for voicing their criticism of the persistence—and reinforcement—of racial discrimination in a seemingly egalitarian country, the Cuban government showed a degree of cultural openness that allowed for the reconstruction of its legitimacy in a context marked by a profound economic crisis (Fernandes 2006). Meanwhile, Guatemalans were just ending a four-decade long process of counterinsurgent violence (one of the bloodiest on the continent) and starting difficult peace negotiations. In that framework, groups of Indigenous youth from the highlands started to embrace hip-hop, which they turned into a pedagogical and political tool. Counteracting state policies that favored ethnic and linguistic homogenization, these groups of young people found in the practice of rapping and rhyming a chance to introduce their generational peers to Indigenous languages—like Nahuatl. This movement was central to “Mayan revivalism,” an aesthetic, cultural, and political dynamic that peasant and urban working-class youth alike have endorsed for the past two decades (Bell 2017b).
At the same time that a plethora of youth groups in Latin American and other geographical settings embraced the aesthetic possibilities of transnational and mass-mediated hip-hop cultures to delineate their criticism of racial and social inequalities, many other groups were at the forefront of the movement against corporate globalization. In Western Europe and the Americas, many of these youths had been mobilized by the allure of the guerrilla Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), formally launched in Chiapas, Mexico, on January 1, 1994 to face the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Opposed to NAFTA and other agreements’ potential economic, social, and ecological impacts, the EZLN was, on the one hand, deeply embedded in local and national political and ethnic contradictions and, on the other hand, open to many interpretations, solidarities, and emulations. While indeed Chiapas became a site of pilgrimage for politicizing travelers from all over the Americas and Europe—both adult and young—the message that the EZLN delivered was heard and debated through a new network of social movements, increasingly connected via the internet (Rovira Sancho 2016).

The quest for autonomy, debates over new forms of colonialism and empire, the limits of formal democracies, the deepening of social inequalities, and the reign of corporate capital were at the center of the criticism of a new cohort of activists. This cohort went on to occupy global headlines in late November 1999, when about forty thousand people, mostly young women and men, organized a protest surrounding the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle. On November 30th, in the so-called “Battle of Seattle,”
the police fiercely repressed the protestors and the conveners decided to cancel the conference’s opening ceremony. For many youthful protestors, especially those associated with anarchist groups worldwide, Seattle represented an example to follow. In fact, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, many other conferences of world leaders were met with “counter-conferences” of the anti-corporate globalization movement, sometimes also named “alter-globalization” (Pleyers 2010).

Similar to other descriptors that aim to capture the fundamental traits of a social group, that for Generation X could only partially depict the experiences and expectations of young people in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Popularized in the early 1990s, Generation X would signal what was then perceived as a novelty: the retreat of young people in the North Atlantic from formal politics, and the allure of hedonism, consumerism, and individualism—all signs of young people’s lack of political, and other forms of, agency. Yet while the metaphor made inroads in popular culture and journalistic commentary, other dynamics were also underway: the politicization of cultural expressions (such as hip-hop culture) and the emergence of a multilayered network of social movements that occasionally went public and galvanized public attention. In the late twentieth century, the very existence of these forms of politico-cultural activism called into question the authority of media and social discourses about youth apathy and disaffection. Those questionings were even more prominent in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 2008, from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street, young women and men were, once again, key protagonists in a wave of protest that swept across the world. In practical terms, Millennials called into question the consensuses regarding the “end” of history and the concomitant impossibilities of social and political transformation.

CONCLUSIONS

The clusters of experiences reconstructed in this chapter offer different angles through which to untangle the interplay between agency and authority when youth—chiefly in, but not limited to, their role as students—came to occupy the political arena. First, some of these experiences contribute to understanding the issues related to autonomy and heteronomy regarding parties or coalitions. While in some instances young people created their own parties (like the Peruvian APRA), in others they either claimed further autonomy from their “parent” parties through mounting their own demands (like the Socialist Youth in 1930s Spain) or building autonomous movements that later joined with existing parties (as with many of the militants within the University Reform Movement). The relationships between autonomy and agency were thus not univocal, and are further complicated when contextualized within the long-term
panorama of leftist youth. The global rise of communism, the emergence of an extra-parliamentary left in 1968 Italy, and the creation of anti-corporate globalization movements, for example, relied heavily on youth mobilization, and were coded in generational terms. The positioning of youth as “radical” was not, however, an exclusively leftist occurrence: with its generational appeal and its cult of youth, fascism (especially in its phase as movement) also endorsed that understanding.

Second, the large state-sponsored organizations of youth in the twentieth century combined authority and agency. With its telling relationship to other state-sponsored youth organizations in the interwar period (including in Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain), fascism occupied a prominent place. Both in terms of its upmost goal (to educate the “new Italians”), its organizational structure, and the activities it promoted, the Opera Nazionale Balilla constituted a prime example of how an authoritarian regime attempted to instill discipline and respect for authority as the prime values among children and youth. As a project, though, it was never complete, fundamentally because the millions of children and adolescents enlisted only pseudo-voluntarily, and harbored their own motivations and expectations for socializing and entertaining themselves. Perhaps Perón learnt that lesson: when he created what would be one of the last large state-sponsored youth organizations in early 1950s Argentina, the goal was the opposite of the fascists: to facilitate, rather than curtail, young people’s experimentation and autonomy in the realm of mass culture. In doing so, Peronism helped politicize those interactions while at the same time delegitimize other forms of youth politics. This example touches succinctly on the myriad forms in which agency and authority were at play, even when the states “invested” themselves in heavily delineating the contours of young people’s experiences and expectations.

Finally, the experiences reconstructed in this chapter also expand our understanding of the ways in which young people created and reproduced intra-generational forms of authority. Even in the ferment of 1968, when many of the youth involved in the Italian and Mexican movements questioned multiple forms of authority (embedded in state institutions, capitalist relations, and the family, to mention a few), they recreated in practical ways hierarchies based on gender, sexuality, and class. In a self-reflective fashion, the emerging radical feminism and, later on, the anti-globalization movement grew concerned with the dismantling of those forms of authority.
Modern war drew together the lives of young people in unexpected and historically novel ways. The worlds of youth and armed conflict have intersected since ancient times, and the lives of millions of young people continue to be devastated by war. A key era for understanding the shock of the “modern” in modern warfare, however, is the Second World War (1937–1945)—a war in which the state transformed and made use of young people on an unprecedented scale. Those efforts represented the culmination of processes that began in the nineteenth century, including public education, military conscription, organized state labor, and youth life-writing. The lives of three such young people, Anne, Theodore, and Konstantin, offer a vantage point for seeing how these processes were becoming increasingly globalized.

All three were caught up in wartime state mechanisms of mass organization and mobilization, which resulted in the production and preservation of their personal records, now publicly available. Anne Frank, a German Jewish girl who perished in the concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen in the final months of the Second World War, ranks among the most famous war youths of her generation. Her diary, which Anne wrote while she and her family were in hiding in Nazi-occupied Amsterdam, has been translated and published in more than sixty languages. No such fate loomed for Theodore Petzold, a Boy Scout from New York who fervently supported his nation’s war effort after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Collecting scrap metal and salvaging old rubber, however, failed to satisfy the American teenager, who sated his thirst for heroic adventure reading about the exploits of young Konstantin Grigoyevich Konstantinov in a US scouting magazine. An underage
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Cossack soldier fighting on the Eastern Front, Konstantin had become the darling of the Soviet press. He had been wounded four times and allegedly killed more than seventy German soldiers (Boy’s Life 1943: 13; Frank 1952; Honeck 2019: 137–40).

Three fundamental challenges await the historian charged with the task of analyzing the documents left behind by Anne, Theodore, Konstantin, and countless other young people around the world who grew up in similar environments of violence. The first entails the very act of recovery: what does it mean to search these records for children’s voices from the past, and how does that pursuit change how we frame and understand these pasts? Until recently, historians have been hesitant (and some still are) to conceptualize young people as serious historical actors in their own right. One reason is that minors tend to produce fewer sources than adults. Fewer still wind up in archival collections that are traditionally the domain of powerful men, not to mention the countless documents, images, and objects that vanished in the chaos of war. The second obstacle is less methodological than epistemological in nature: what difference does it make to focus on young people? How can accessing the experiences of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century war youths advance our knowledge of modern war? These questions are not new, but neither have they been fully answered. For skeptics in the wider historical profession, young people remain of scant scholarly import, fixed in the dual roles of passive bystander and pitiful victim with little or no means of altering their status. Third, examining a particular period, such as the Second World War, must always involve the question of what makes that period specific, because war has upended young people’s lives throughout history.

As arduous as this journey may be, there are rewards to be reaped from revisiting modern war and political conflict through the lens of youth. Those laboring in the field can turn to a fast-growing historical scholarship for guidance. The literature spans numerous shelves: some works focus on particular wars, nations, and regions while others have a transnational or decidedly global scope (Honeck and Marten 2019; Kucherenko 2011; Maksudyan, 2019; Stargardt 2007). Theoretical reflections on the place of children and young people in history in general, which revolve mainly around questions of representation, identity, and agency, provide further orientation (Alexander 2012; Gleason 2016). Less common are discussions dealing with the empirical foundations of our topic—the diverse and still largely untapped source material available to historians who wish to better understand how youths were mobilized and mobilized themselves in an age of increasingly “total” wars. This, then, is the approach our chapter takes.

We argue that critically re-evaluating the sources left behind by young people in wars since the early 1900s, as well as by those with a special interest in them, can impart meaningful lessons first about what it meant to be young in
a century marred by mass, organized violence, and second how discourses and practices of youth impacted modern ways of war. The twentieth century was a period in which the totalization of warfare coincided with the rise of modern youth cultures fostered by new forms of youthful consumption and expression. Life-writing by youth was enabled by technological advances in paper making, the production of cheap writing implements, and rapidly rising literacies—not just in the West, but in the Soviet Union, China, and Japan as well. A plethora of personal documents and artifacts—diaries, letters, drawings, toys, pieces of clothing, postwar oral history, and memoirs—demonstrate a range of self-descriptions of what it meant to be young during mobilization and war, even as these accounts varied according to region, technology, age, class, gender, and the intensity of armed conflict.

The rapid growth of material made by youth, to be sure, was matched by the increase in adult-generated sources on youth, above all in the realms of expanding state and media infrastructures. Contrary to earlier periods, adolescents and children growing up in Eric Hobsbawm’s “Age of Extremes” tended to experience war within highly organized settings. Despite differences in ideology and culture, adult-led youth formations such as the Boy Scouts, the Girl Guides, the Hitler Youth, the Three Isms Youth Corps in China, the Greater Japan Youth Party, or the Soviet Komsomol all facilitated the social management and patriotic mobilization of young people in combatant nations.

Ideally, distinguishing between sources generated by young people and those created about young people—in other words, the difference between youth-as-project and youth-as-actor—can raise awareness of the conflicts and contradictions between adult-generated normative identities of childhood and youth, on the one hand, and the articulations of subjectivity by young people, on the other. These two formulations of “youth” are both constructions, exercising mutual influence on each other—adults solicited life-writing from youth to learn from them, and articulations by youth often materialized in response to the efforts of adult authorities to steer youth into “proper” directions. Thus, the motivations of youth and adult actors are not intrinsically at odds with one another, as Susan Miller stated, but move along a historically shifting continuum “from opposition to assent” (Miller 2016). The boons of an intertextual reading of these sources lie elsewhere: to make palpable youthful activities and agency in intergenerational contact zones, regardless of whether war youths socialized in different settings acted in accordance with their own ideals, with those of their elders, or both.

In keeping with the youth-as-project versus the youth-as-actors distinction, the following analysis cascades downward from sources generated in the context of adult-led youth movements to personal records left behind by individual youths. Our examples are taken from various parts of the modern world, with a particular emphasis on Europe, North America, and East Asia. While
this chapter is in no way comprehensive, we hope that the mosaic of voices and experiences presented here invites reflections on regional particularities and transnational connections, especially with regard to the efforts of young people to document their own histories in times of war. Youth and war became more global in the twentieth century, even as the ways in which young people experienced wars and remembered them later differed from place to place.

ORGANIZING YOUTH FOR WAR

Entertainment, fashion, music, sex, and non-conformity are common keywords used to describe the global evolution of modern youth cultures in the course of the twentieth century (Jobs and Pomfret 2015a). But focusing on movie theaters or dance halls tells only half the story at best. The “century of youth” (Mrozek 2017) was as much an outgrowth of uniforms, flags, and oaths, recited by millions of adolescents who spent a considerable part of their extracurricular time in adult-supervised organizations. Although many twentieth-century uniformed youth movements had peacetime roots, their techniques of disciplining young minds and bodies gained traction across borders while serving the wartime needs of different imperialist or nationalist regimes. Conceptualizing these organizations as collaborative rather than purely hierarchical networks, however, does not mean to portray them merely as extensions of modern state apparatuses that intervened in the lives of young people for the purpose of turning them into healthy and loyal citizens. The extent to which these organizations prompted youths to communicate their own visions of citizenship, service, and sacrifice in times of war, even as these visions were highly contingent upon when and where they were forged, deserves equal consideration.

There are two reasons why scholars should draw on sources from the domains of organized youth when examining young people's engagement with armed conflict in the age of the two world wars and beyond. The first one is the phenomenon’s globality. Already by the 1920s, some of the earliest initiatives—boy scouting and girl guiding in particular—had transcended the confines of Western imperial powers and started taking root in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Alexander 2017; Honeck 2018; Parsons 2004). Communist and fascist youth ventures, too, traveled across borders, planting their respective flags in places outside Europe (Mishler 1999; Mulready-Stone 2015). The fact that scouting and its ideological variations gained support in old empires, liberal democracies, revolutionary Russia, the new nationalist regimes of Europe, Asia, and Latin America as well as in anti-colonial movements invites global-comparative analysis. In nearly every major case, the creation of semi-military mass organizations geared to children and adolescents, whether run by state or civic actors, preceded the efforts of nation-states to marshal ever more material
and human resources, including their young, in geopolitical competitions over territory and influence.

Second, their proximity to the state made it possible for youth organizations to expand into gigantic repositories for documenting all sorts of youthful behavior and activity. In war this involved patriotic service ranging from home-front chores such as collecting scrap metals or supporting loan drives to premilitary training or actual soldiering. But the manuals, directives, and pamphlets filed in the records of these organizations are also strikingly concerned with monitoring and policing wayward youth, an idiom that has enjoyed a remarkable transnational career of its own. Anti-delinquency work became a wartime raison d’être for organization leaders—and the armies of educators and social workers affiliated with them—in distinct geographical and ideological contexts. Boy Scout authorities in the United States and Hitler Youth officials in Germany both sought to expand their mechanisms of social control by labeling unaccompanied youths with working mothers and absent fathers as leaning toward idleness, or worse, lawlessness. “At this time of unrest,” asserted the US Scout executive James E. West in January 1942 in a pamphlet circulated nationally, “youth needs the stabilizing influence of the Scout law” (Boy Scouts 1942). Similarly, one local commentator in Munich hoped in 1944 that the party faithful would form “a dam against vagabonding youngsters” who were roaming the city streets in growing numbers stealing food and running black markets (Kalb 2016: 20).

In addition to establishing hierarchies between “normal” and “abnormal,” “responsible” and “dangerous” youth, adult policies of recruiting youth into webs of discipline and service negotiated broader questions of which kind of young people were considered worthy auxiliaries, and which were not. State authorities never regimented all youths equally, and many were excluded or even persecuted based on their gender, nationality, class, religion, and race. Youth organizations left their mark on all these categories, but perhaps their most decisive intervention consisted of defining age-appropriate responsibilities for war youth, thus contributing to a longer historical process of arranging populations into distinct age groups. Age segmentation addressed competing urgencies—to shield young people from harm while at the same time calling on them to do their bit in ensuring the survival of their communities in times of crisis.

To be sure, the boundaries drawn and redrawn between childhood, youth, and adulthood in the wake of war could vary dramatically. At its lower echelons, youth was commonly separated from childhood by declaring the children—one’s own children, to be sure, and not the offspring of enemy nations—worthy of special protection. British evacuation schemes in anticipation of bombing raids after September 1939, which involved schoolchildren in urban areas up
to the age of fourteen, emphasized this distinction. Reports released by the British government, for example, glossed over the traumatic experience of family separations. Instead, they brandished images of laughing children and older Scouts and Guides providing logistical assistance (Gärtner 2012: 56–7). At youth’s upper strata, full military service usually marked the rite of passage to maturity and manhood, yet not necessarily to full citizenship. In the United States, it was not until the protests of young soldiers returning from Vietnam and students equipped with the slogan “Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Vote” gained momentum in the late 1960s that the Congress proposed and the states ratified the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971, which lowered the voting age nationally from twenty-one to eighteen years (de Schweinitz 2015).

Modern constructs of adolescence as a liminal developmental stage served to justify teenagers’ status as semi-essential actors in the war effort but also helped to maintain the semblance of normalcy and order in a world thrown into disarray. The Boy Scouts of America was just one among many youth organizations that codified this in-betweenness in a memorandum issued on the eve of the US entry into the Second World War. Service opportunities, the memo instructed, should be assigned according to “age and ability,” and “strenuous and responsible jobs” including first aid and rescue work should be limited to “Scouts 15 and older” (Boy Scouts 1940). Most societies espoused a gendered division of the kind of “defense training” suitable for boys and girls, whereas the question of when children were old enough to begin premilitary training could trigger intense controversy, even in neutral countries like Sweden (Larsson 2019). Age- and gender-appropriate mobilization upheld the veneer of civilization, which tended to dissolve more quickly in societies that suffered high military and civilian causalities and had to endure widespread destruction. The relative luxury of not having to fight a war in one’s own backyard, rather than ideological posturing, could make all the difference in how, and to what degree, young people were mobilized.

The deployment of underage soldiers is a case in point. Young people have fought and died on battlefields throughout history, yet it was not until the twentieth century—in part due to the spread of humanitarian advocacy—that attitudes toward child soldiers underwent a seismic normative shift (Rosen 2005). Still reeling from the carnage of the First World War, League of Nations delegates issued the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1924, which stated that children “must be the first to receive relief in times of distress” and “be protected against every form of exploitation” (Geneva Declaration 1924). Expanded versions of this declaration were passed by the United Nations in 1959 and again in 1989, in part because various combatants have violated the declaration’s spirit repeatedly.

Adult organizers were often complicit in offering up their charges as last-ditch weapons in their regimes’ struggle for survival. During the Battle of
Okinawa in 1945, local teenagers were drafted into front-line service in the hope of averting certain defeat. Of the approximately two thousand high school students—boys enlisted in the Blood and Iron Student Corps (Tekketsu kinnōtai) and girls as nurse-aides in the Himeyuri Student Corps—not more than half of them returned from the inferno alive (Ealey 2006: 1–3). Underage soldiering persists to this day, but so does the myth that this is largely a non-Western problem. This perception certainly owes much to the widespread use of child soldiers in the wars of decolonization and in asymmetrical conflicts marked by irregular warfare, guerrilla tactics, and the diminished importance of traditional interstate wars (Vautravers 2008). At the same time, recent estimates suggest that some three thousand adolescent boys took up arms in the Balkan Wars from 1991 to 1995, and UNICEF is currently investigating allegations that both sides in the conflict in eastern Ukraine are actively trying to involve minors in the fighting (Child Soldiers 2001; Shevchenko 2014).

The militarization of young people, to be sure, was by no means limited to hot wars. During the Cold War, youth organizers on both sides of the Iron Curtain staged civil defense drills that they found suitable for teenage boys or girls respectively. In Britain, Canada, and even more so in the United States,
Scouts simulated mock atomic strikes, rescuing people, administering first aid, and posing as casualties. Their Komsomol counterparts in the Eastern bloc went further still, many of whom were subject to mandatory premilitary training that included target shooting exercises and throwing replica grenades (Davis 2007; Peacock 2014). The prominence of “militainment” in modern consumer societies raises another set of questions about the viability of confining the historical study of war and youth to periods of actual warfare. From Chinese students playfully executing US “war criminals” in the 1950s to twenty-first-century teenagers chasing high scores in ego-shooter computer games, military play and toys have figured prominently in peacetime leisure activities, sometimes as part of conscious efforts of state authorities to foster a martial spirit in their young (Boretti 2019; Martino 2015).

From a conventional standpoint, the strengths and weaknesses of adult-generated sources on wartime youth seem obvious. Perusing official documents related to the dealings of state and non-state institutions can illuminate the contours of historically specific constructions of youth. It can highlight adult expectations imposed on young people, and it can draw attention to the responsibilities societies owe to their young in war. The dual character of war youth as a social body to be controlled and an allegory to be harnessed becomes palatable in modern wartime propaganda, which is replete with images of brutalized youngsters that sparked moral outrage and justified retributive violence. Such top-down accounts have met stronger criticism in recent years as historians of youth and childhood have more forcefully rejected the idea that adult claims to owning the concept of youth are somehow superior to what young people claim for themselves (Honeck 2018: 13–14). But before dismissing these sources as inimical to doing a bottom-up history of modern youth and war, there is a case to be made for reading them against the grain, that is looking for the fingerprints that actual youths, unwittingly or wittingly, left on the narratives crafted and disseminated by authorities for the purpose of official mobilization and social control.

Two constellations come to mind. Few things are more appalling to our modern sensibilities than underage soldiering, yet history is filled with children and adolescents answering their nation’s calls to arms. Motivated by the wish to escape material paucity, to leave behind the confines of a cramped childhood, or to experience adventure in faraway places, young people looked for opportunities to join the ranks of their country’s fighting forces with a zest that adults often found hard to understand, and sometimes even harder to contain. *The Bridge*, a West German anti-war movie of the late 1950s directed by the Austrian filmmaker Bernhard Wicki, is a powerful testament to the juvenile rush to war; its innocent fanaticism and deadly obliviousness to danger. The movie tells the story of a group of German high school students who are drafted into a local army unit in the closing days of the Second World War and ordered
to defend a strategically insignificant bridge against advancing US forces. Their misguided sense of heroism drives the students into battle with a superior enemy—even as their officers recognize the futility of further resistance—and ultimately to their death. The movie only echoed the experiences of a small segment of young males who perished in the furnace of total war. It also merely gestures at the multiple forms of manipulation, intimidation, and coercion exercised by state and military leaders that turned young people into killers. Nonetheless, the film is a forceful reminder of the self-propelling incentives that reside within underage peer cultures whose violent practices in war cannot be fully explained with reference to essentialist and ahistorical notions of youthful impressionability.

The capacity of young people to assert some degree of autonomy within adult-led movements persisted through the difficult transition from war to peace. If the symbolic equation of youth with patriotism seemed to make the former essential to the war effort, the fact that many cultures placed children and adolescents at the forefront of postwar narratives of peace and reconciliation seemed to give young people even greater leeway. Historians

FIGURE 9.3 US Private guarding a group of adolescent German POWs, April 1945. Courtesy of Getty Images.
have not failed to explore how representations of childhood suffering have fueled the rise of modern humanitarianism, starting with the antislavery and peace movements of the nineteenth century (Salvatici 2019). Another body of historical scholarship demonstrates how children and adolescents acted as “little diplomats” in the arena of twentieth-century international relations, from forging long-distance relationships with other youths through pen pal programs to engaging in conflict resolution scenarios in workshops organized by the United Nations (Helgren 2017).

Emboldened by his role as peacemaker, Charles Bartlett, a Boy Scout from North Carolina who attended an international Scout gathering in France in 1947, imagined a world not only without war but also without any religious or racial bigotry. “Why can’t it be that way everywhere?” Bartlett confided to his diary after mingling with youngsters from different parts of the globe. “There are not many places on earth where a white boy and a colored boy can look at the same songbook together and sing out in praise of God. It is a wonderful sight – more like a dream” (Bartlett 1947: 6). Teenagers like Bartlett may have acted in accordance with adult expectations, but they also used their position as junior partners in the remaking of global relations to envision a future that could go well beyond the reconstruction designs licensed by their leaders.

**RECORDING YOUTH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARCHIVE**

Despite some historians’ lamentation that young people did not record their history, in fact they left behind a significant record of their lives for us to analyze; this is partly because adults frequently asked them to do so. In addition to the local traditions of life-writing, at different times in each context from the late nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, adult authorities in Russia, China, Japan, and Britain encouraged, cajoled, and even forced young people to write diaries, essays, memoirs, and autobiographies as part of their education and socialization, because educators believed that self-motivation was essential for success in modern life (Greenhalgh 2014; Holmes 1991; Moore 2016; Piel, 2019; Saari 1990). The Chinese Scouts encouraged life-writing as a form of self-discipline, describing uses for pocket diaries and providing example diaries for emulation (Zhongguo Guomindang tongzijun 1929: 22; Zhang and Zhou 1933). Russian Komsomol youth wrote articles, diaries, letters, and later memoirs to inscribe their feelings of liberation, agency, and disillusionment with the Soviet system (Gorsuch 2000: 41–79). Chinese schools used their bulletins to publish young people’s self-narratives, and in some cases the local and mass media published exemplary accounts (Guo Hui 1932: introduction, 29/9/1931). While adults often encouraged life-writing as
a form of capturing the “childlike child” in all of their innocence (Frühstück 2017; Jones 2010), it did create the space in which young people could express themselves and have their views preserved in the historical record.

Teachers and parents functionalized life-writing in all countries engaged in total war mobilization. Japanese teachers used diaries, both in school time and during holidays, to help students practice and perfect composition skills. In Mochida Hidenori’s personal diary each page merely featured the seal of the teacher, Mr. Fujioka, indicating that it had been read, sometimes including the stamp “reviewed” (etsu), but occasionally also marks of “good” (ryō) or “superior” (yū; Mochida 1941: 10/4/1941). Still, teachers typically did not dictate this process directly; diaries were largely extracurricular tasks aimed at self-cultivation (Umano 1988: 7/11/1944). Tokyo 5th grader Kikukawa Takehiko described primary school evacuees gathered under a warm blanket (kotatsu) at the end of the day in January 1945, writing their personal diaries together without their teacher or dormitory mother (Kikukawa 1990: 6). In all of these contexts, adults endeavored to write model diaries for children and youth, sometimes posing as young people, other times using model entries from famous authors (Yu Dafu 1931: introduction; Zhang and Zhou 1933: introduction; Xu Xuwen 1932, 1933). The justification for composing these texts was sometimes political, but nearly invariably moral (for instance, in China, teaching juvenile subjects to avoid “evil” and “reach for the good”; Xiantoushi 1936: introduction). One of the major inspirations for ersatz self-writing was Enrico Bottini’s Italian nationalist Cuore (Heart 1886), an imitation of a youth’s personal record, which emerged during the turbulent years of Italian unification. Cheng Zheng’s later adaptation, Xin ai de jiaoyu, declared that he, as a boy, “opened the diary and began writing with war-like fever, writing as seriously as when I take an exam.” Life-writing in modern China encouraged an awareness of global events and leaders, but most of all the need for daily self-cultivation through writing (Cheng Zheng 1949: 16/8/1948). Because children were encouraged to imitate this style, differentiating the accounts of youth and those of adults mimicking “ideal” youth in published sources can be difficult; nevertheless, the consequence of teachers’ desire to capture childhood and youth in textual form is an invaluable archive of the language they developed to discuss wartime experiences.

Modern schools around the world also emphasized life-writing as composition exercise, to improve and expand a child’s literary skills; in many countries, this was conducted in religious schools (Foung 1937). Guided self-narrative quickly became a formalized component of education in the modern world, usually drawing on early modern precedents, aiming to encourage broad, interclass, and cross-gender participation in social movements as well as political and moral values (Zhang and Zhou 1933; Kitakami Peace Museum 1925).
We still have a poor understanding of the transnational dynamics behind the phenomenon of life-writing among modern youth. Nevertheless, a runaway train of transnational connections is not too difficult to construct, for example: schoolteachers in Japan conducted “diary inspections” (niki kensa) in the 1940s, which emerged in part from peer-reviewed military “field diaries” from the nineteenth century, which influenced Chinese Nationalist diary-writing practices in the 1920s, which in turn inspired Chinese education in the 1930s, which itself collided with Western religious schools’ use of confessional texts as a form of life-writing in treaty-port China, just as the political content of Russian schoolchildren’s writings was shaped by the Soviet system of political education, which also happened to be part of the Chinese military training system. Thus, the diaries of Soviet youth such as Mikhail Grigoyevich Rosanov not only influenced the writings of Russian youth but, in translation, Chinese as well.1 Examples of youth life-writing were published, translated, re-translated, swapped, sold, and circulated in libraries. Library cards still tucked in the back of regional Chinese libraries show that Russians were reading Chinese youth accounts into the postwar period. As Helen Roche described, school exchanges meant that students were constantly engaging with their peers in other countries, even between countries that were imminently going to war with each other like Nazi Germany and Great Britain; student exchange added to the cross-fertilization of pedagogical practice developed and executed by teaching staff (Roche 2013). Consequently, once life-writing became a part of the educational curriculum, it circulated vigorously throughout modern education systems up to and including the Second World War, producing a rich record of childhood and youth.

**LIFE-WRITING AS SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS**

Young people used their personal accounts to make sense of the adult world that they were preparing to join. One immediate impact of war on youth was to thrust upon them, in a dramatic fashion, an awareness of the machinations of this world. Although adolescence brought with it, in every national context, a curiosity about national governments, foreign armies, and global economic transformations, the combined phenomena of labor/military conscription, social mobilization, and attacks by enemy forces made the growth of social consciousness more rapid and acute than it might have otherwise been. Teachers encouraged these thoughts: teenagers like Chinese student Zhao Jinhua reflected on world leaders’ examples for their personal development including ideological opponents such as Stalin, Roosevelt, Hitler, Mussolini, and Gandhi (Zhao Jinhua 1940: 31/3/1939). Little children and teenagers had different perspectives on what the “world” was during the Second World War.
For children, a central preoccupation was food; while this might not be surprising during a time of rationing and privation, children wrote more about food than did teenagers or adults. Gender also did not affect this focus, even though the subject of food acquisition and preparation would later be gendered among adolescents. Even boys who did not generally write about food, like eleven-year-old London evacuee Ken Muers, still slipped in an occasional note in his war diary: “I ate a lot of pancakes and I nearly bust” (Muers 1941: 25/2/1941). Japanese primary schoolboy Kikukawa Takehiko kept a strict record of what he ate during his evacuation from Tokyo’s Toshima Ward to rural Nagano Prefecture during the transition from 4th to 5th grade. Kikukawa’s diary shows the reliance on miso-based soups, local produce, and preserved (pickled) vegetables that characterized the grim “bamboo shoot lifestyle” (take no ko seikatsu) remembered by adults in postwar Japan. A typical day in early 1945 for Kikukawa, as recorded in his diary, looked like this:

Vegetables, daikon miso soup, bok-choy, pickled vegetables, furikake … Lunch is boiled pumpkin, with bok-choy, and pickled vegetables … We all gathered around the kotatsu [heated table cover] and wrote letters when [we] got to have some beans and bread from Hiroshi’s mom. While we wrote, we also got some snacks (bread). Then we went to the hot springs, had dinner, which was vegetable and daikon miso soup, pickled bok-choy, and roasted soybean flour [kinako].

(Kikukawa 1990: 9)

Young girls, like boys in the same age cohort, initially recorded their daily diet because it was within the limited number of topics on which they could write. Li Dongsheng, a refugee from China’s eastern seaboard to inland Sichuan Province, described how her mother nagged her not to eat unhygienic foods such as pig’s feet and fried shrimp, or other sorts of snack food fried in oil (Li Dongsheng 1944: 6/10/1942). Trapped in Leningrad during the siege, but before mass starvation began, Nina Stotnik frequently wrote about food, rationing, bartering, and the small victories they could bring:

Dad went again with the neighbors to a nearby village to trade, but there is nothing to trade and he’ll surely come back empty-handed. Yes, they have nothing, being so close to the front. Before, dad got one liter of butter and some matches, nothing more … Yesterday I got some sausages. Oh, how happy we all were! Today we cut some and served it with cheese and tea for breakfast in the morning, but at night we’ll have tea without any bread. Oh well, I’m satisfied.

(Stotnik 2002: 25/11/1941)
The war brought many such “treats” that children celebrated in their personal accounts. Li Dongsheng was effusively happy when her mother brought home cookies, biscuits, and other goodies from the market, Patricia Donald took the time to record treats such as cakes and blackberries, and Umano Yōko noted how special even a boiled egg could be: “We had a boiled egg [each] for a side-dish. It had been such a long time that no one ate it, instead saving it to put on our bowl of rice for dinner” (Umano 1988: 8/9/1944). A blackberry pie, a nice cheese, or sweet rice mochi were not only immediate pleasures at a time of wartime scarcity, but also descriptive objects well within the linguistic capabilities of a young author.

Teenagers used personal accounts to locate themselves within a global context, particularly at a time when war was spreading quickly from one far-off place to another. In addition to recapitulating tales of famous anti-Japanese military mobilization efforts like the “Eight Hundred Warriors” (8-bai zhuangshi) who faced Shanghai’s invasion in 1937, Cheng Zheng’s diary reproduced putative tales of suffering and resistance meant to inspire Nationalist China’s youth:

In Shanghai, our people have suffered all kinds of indignities. They’re not allowed to raise the flag, and any form of patriotic expression is considered to be anti-Japanese. “Anti-Japanese Element” is an epithet that carries the death penalty … watching the flag fly high is like watching a loving mother raise her hands in prayer.

(Cheng Zheng 1949: 27/8/1948)

Young people in places as far-flung as Scotland’s Orkney Islands consumed news reports and personally identified with distant struggles; fifteen-year-old Bessie Skea wrote down what she deemed to be important news drawn from word-of-mouth reports, radio broadcasts, and broadsheets, and then thought through these titbits of information: “Finland is losing now. What on earth will happen when Russia wins? Will she attack Sweden?” (Skea 1939: 2/10/1939). When Osaka schoolgirl Mikawa Michiko was sent by her parents to relatives in the countryside in April 1945, she learned of the German surrender, and wrote her thoughts on this into a diary:

… I think Japan surely will have to endure a much more excruciating trial. The war situation may become grave on 8 June [1945]. I thought: no matter what happens, we (ware) must have confidence in the final victory, and each person shall acquit himself according to his duty (kakuji no bonbun wo hatasō).

(Mikawa 2002: 8)
Teenagers in all of the societies mentioned in this study took an interest in international affairs, making the war personal in their diaries and letters. “Germany has made a peace-offer to Britain—an insult—but Britain is not looking for peace on her terms,” fifteen-year-old Bessie Skea wrote in October 1939. “We will fight until Poland is restored. It will be a long, tough struggle, I’m afraid” (Skea 1939: 2/10/1939 and 22/3/1938). As a global consciousness took root in the imagination of teenagers, a hatred for unseen foreigners came to the level of explicit articulation: “We all secretly thought that we had a fatherland with a shining history,” wrote fifteen-year-old Chinese schoolgirl Guo Hui, “but I looked at the picture in our classroom that says, ‘Great China’ (Da Zhongguo) and in the end the condition of the world before me was too much. We all prayed for the return of [the historical Chinese general] Xue Rengui, but … I also wished that the gods would cause earthquakes that would destroy Osaka and Tokyo” (Guo Hui 1932: 30/9/1931).

In comparison with young children, adolescents developed a more complex understanding of how the adult world worked, and, regardless of its accuracy, their view inspired biting critiques in personal accounts. Even at a time of “total war” and “national unity,” teenagers were still disobedient, challenging, and acerbic. As Lena Mukhina put it in Leningrad:

How many have made declarations, so many loud words and speeches there were: Kiev and Leningrad are impregnable fortresses! The fascists will never set foot in the beautiful capital of Ukraine, or the northern pearl of our country, Leningrad. And well, today, on the radio these same people report: after many fierce battles, our troops have withdrawn from Kiev! What does this mean? Nobody understands.

(Mukhina 2011: 22/9/1941)

While young children might also write passages about “devilish” or “evil” enemy forces—or indeed “strict” or “cruel” adults in their own community—they rarely seemed to reflect much on these foes, and rather spent their energies describing food, friends, and games. In contrast, for teenagers a personal record was, among other things, a space to describe their relationship to the larger social world, which exposed contradictions and dangers into which that adult authorities forced them.

One area in which children and youth shared concerns during periods of warfare was the displacement they endured as evacuees and refugees. Contemporary observers noted that young people were forcibly removed from the systems that sustained them including those that supported their education. Removing children from home and school required adults to take responsibility for the conflicts that they had initiated—and this forced adults to make difficult
choices as a form of “help” and “care,” such as in 1939 when young Ethiopian
refugees were employed as laborers in Kenya (Sequeira 1939). Adult interventions
for children fleeing violence were often callous: eleven-year-old Albert Shaw was
left abandoned in a Lancaster school after his evacuation from Salford because he
failed to appear on a roster; it was only when a passer-by heard him crying in the
locked building that the police were summoned (Welshman 2010: 55–6). There
should have been little surprise about the inevitability of displacement for young
people, because they usually witnessed refugees directly before they joined their
ranks, as this schoolgirl’s diary entry on the refugees in Anhui reveals:

Oh my countrymen in flight, you have come to Huizhou through a forest of
rifles and a storm of bullets. You seek survival and to preserve your spirit,
running ragged day and night, crying due to your hungry stomachs. You say
that you are fleeing for your lives, and tears fall from your eyes. Oh weeping
refugees, the night is even more lonesome; it makes my heart ache and tears
me up inside.

(Peng Zheng 2005: 22/11/1937)

From 1943 in Japan, the government removed young men from their education
in order to sustain the armed forces, sometimes causing angst among family
members and friends. University student Hirai Kiyoshi was constantly
harangued by his mother to switch from humanities to a program that would
keep him out of the army. “She’s getting increasingly insistent,” he wrote in
his 1944 diary, “because I’m her only son whom she raised up and she doesn’t
want my life thrown away on the battlefield …” Before he died in the air raids
over Sendai, he added:

… she is just earnestly crying and begging me. She argued with me back
and forth, looking at the issue from every possible angle, in her effort to
persuade. At first she invited me to consider my future after university,
and her ideas only concerned the benefits [of such a degree], but now her
instincts are telling her that the war is after her son’s blood. Surely, she’s
foreseeing “death” in my future … In her heart she’s weeping and praying,
but on the surface she just smiles patiently, and I have to face my mother’s
sad face and plaintive cries … Mother, I know how you feel. But this era
and what we have been taught cannot permit me to heed your words. Please
forgive me, I am a bad son.

(Hirai 2002: 25)

Countless youth across the world were forced by adults to become soldiers,
evacuees, refugees, and orphans. Despite the rise of discourses that celebrate
young people as precious or invaluable for the future, adults’ efforts to secure their safety were woefully inadequate. Even as the Second World War drew to a close, Jewish families, including young children, awaiting safe harbors, could expect to confront “insuperable difficulties” in their escape due to dangerous conflicts and ineffective parliamentary procedures to secure their immigration (Dijour 1944–1945). Famously, Anne Frank was denied a visa for the United States that could have saved her just as millions of other young conscripts and refugees were trapped in war zones that imperiled their lives.

THE YOUNG PERSON’S WAR IN MEMORY

Memoirists of youth in wartime writing in the postwar period were forced to engage with the rapidly shifting terrain of public memorialization and collective memory. Discourses of the long postwar (from 1945 into the 1960s) in places like the People’s Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union were categorically different from those in Italy, West Germany, and Japan, because of the ongoing narratives of struggle against foreign imperialism; similarly, postcolonial countries like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, all had to contend with the long history of foreign occupation as well as the collective memorialization of war trauma and heroic resistance. For people who went through the war years, like Sumitani Kichitarō, communicating his childhood experience to Japanese children in the postwar era was almost impossible. He was wounded during an air raid on Tsuchizaki, in Japan’s northeast, and received visits from school groups wishing to listen to his war stories; when asked about these visits, Sumitani explained, “When I tell them about the shrapnel I took, or this or that, they’re not that attentive. They’re too little. So, I teach about it, but they just say, ‘Oh, OK’” (Sumitani 2011: 21). The incommensurability of experience is compounded by historical shifts in discourse, the receptivity of the audience, and ever-changing narratives about the past. While it is almost impossible to speak generically of a “youth experience” across all of these contexts, within each context there are even more significant divisions.

As indicated above, people who endured war as children saw the world very differently than those who had already entered adolescence. Consequently, primary school evacuees and those who went off to war are more divided than, for example, the conscripted youth of Russia, Germany, Britain, and China, who at least shared an experience of capture by the state, deployment abroad, combat, and conflicted homecomings. To begin with, those who were in the
countryside as evacuees might enjoy some pleasant times, despite the rest of the country being firebombed and suffering severe food shortages. In a roundtable published in 1995 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, three Tokyo evacuees reflected on their experiences:

We were 6th graders at the Sotode Primary School [in Sumida Ward, Tokyo], and we returned home to the city just one week before the [1945] firebombing of Tokyo began, which we witnessed. So, in one night at the student dormitory, we lost a lot of classmates. [Leaving in 1944] we of course missed our homes but, perhaps it was a sense of duty in our childlike hearts, we thought the adults were fighting the war so this was what needed to be done... Our memory of the war was that it was terrible, but we also had many fond memories of our evacuation to the countryside. Although it had millet in it, we still had rice to eat, and at bath time the farmers might even bring us sweet potatoes. We had sweets and toothpaste, had bug races in the sun, and thinking about it now, everyone is quite nostalgic.
These three memoirists returned to Tokyo when they were twelve years old, and spent the remainder of the war fleeing firebombing with their parents. Despite witnessing the destruction, dead bodies, and suffering all around them, they “never doubted, right until the end, that Japan would win the war” (Ishigura, Fujihara, and Sekiguchi 1995: 52–3).

In Britain, the division between those who went to the countryside, especially as private evacuations, and those who remained in the city, was also very sharp. Iris Miller reflected fondly on her days as a young evacuee:

Mrs. Henry was very kind to us. In her beautiful garden she had a large comfortable summerhouse known as “the dugout,” and there she would accommodate our family when they needed a respite from the war … We had a wonderful holiday with marvellous weather; it is a memory I treasure because I didn’t see my father again as he died the following April.

(Brown 2005: 41)

 Refugees in China and the Soviet Union, facing invasion by hostile land armies, were much more vulnerable, but even in these contexts memoirs featured happy memories of life in the countryside, escape from dirty cities, and reunions with family and friends in a safer environment (Barsobin et al. 1985; Kikukawa 1990; Levine 2006: 428–32; Li 1944).

In contrast, the youth who were mobilized by the state were thrust into the front lines, but they remembered the war years in some very similar ways across national borders. Japanese teenagers who were mobilized en masse, including as “kamikaze” pilots, and then abandoned in the early postwar period, spoke bitterly of their “lost youth.” In China, as well, volunteers for the Nationalist Party’s Youth Army (Qingnianjun) felt cast aside by a postwar government that was quickly collapsing under pressure from Mao Zedong’s Communist Party:

For the mobilisation of youth into the armed forces, we went without regret into the barracks and were trained to embrace personal sacrifice and study, enthusiastically joining the ranks! In the army, we received vigorous and strict military discipline so that we could strengthen the resistance against Japan and complete our revolutionary destiny to build a better China. After the Japanese surrender, we left the ranks quickly, each seeking his own path … Many of us in the Youth Army are men with great ambition and will … After demobilisation, do we carry on with our education? Should we seek employment? We must all decide right now!

(Liu Huanzhang and Zhang Zuojie 1946)
British youth were mistreated by the government during the war, especially if they were conscientious objectors or merely mobilized as coal miners out of a general draft lottery. One woman, who recalled bringing the “Bevin Boys” scraps of meat in bombed out Coventry, wrote that it was very wrong of [the government] to pick out those boys’ names because some of them were training ... they were just snatched out and put into the mines. They told that they were being just as much good in the mines as they would be fighting. They probably wouldn’t get hurt so much. They didn’t have much time off, they had to keep going.

(Ault n.d.)

Given that the labor conscripts in Britain were not recognized as part of the war effort until 1995, for most of their lives they felt as abandoned as their counterparts in Japan and China. For young people who harbored greater ambitions than temporary service in the armed forces or a coal mine, the war years were greatly different than those who merely endured it as evacuees in a rural hinterland. In this sense, age determined the memory of the war as much as or more than national identity, culture, class, or gender.

FIGURE 9.5 Two boys play and re-enact war games in Benghazi, Libya, 2011. Courtesy of Getty Images.
CONCLUSION

While superficially, the experiences of wartime youth are divided sharply by national culture, on closer inspection the articulation of personal histories from this period was formed by very similar, and global, historical processes. First, the mass organization of youth was a transnational phenomenon, whether by direct influence, such as the global growth of scouting movements, or by unintentional convergence, such as the fact that Japanese premodern youth groups (wakagumi) evolved independently into youth corps (seinendan) that combined localized public service with paramilitary exercises—just as the Scouts had in Britain and the United States or the Pioneers had in the Soviet Union. Second, while notions of “childhood” and “youth” were culturally constructed, the pressures of societies preparing for modern warfare produced similar outcomes, including for example youth labor mobilization. Third, the redefinition of “childhood” and “youth,” combined with the governmentality of “total war” regimes, meant that one unintended outcome of the state and social organization engagement with youth was a mass production of primary source documents by young people; in short, the “discovery” of childhood and youth opened up a new narrative terrain of being young, written by the young people themselves. Because the postwar public accepted the First and Second World Wars as significant events, they became centers of gravity for the preservation of historical documents, meaning that in many instances there is more information on being young in the Second World War than there is for the 1920s or the 1960s.

The era of total war, then—if we wish to call it that—accelerated pre-existing mechanisms for teaching young people how to capture their experience in handwritten texts, and these mechanisms went into a period of slow decline after 1945, perishing in the age of television and computing. Our continued fascination with the era, and the fact that many postwar governments stake their legitimacy on the war’s collective memory, mean that the youth of this era is unusually well documented. Only now, with the emergence of the internet and social media, has there been a comparable phenomenon of young people recording their life experiences on a mass scale, but the differences in media, dissemination, feedback, and genre require an entirely new methodology. Whether subsequent generations will feel that the documented experiences of young people who write blogs and Facebook posts are worth preserving for future historians of childhood and youth has yet to be determined. There is reason to assume, however, that the twenty-first-century heirs of Anne, Theodore, and Konstantin will leave at least as many digital footprints as physical ones.
Parents and guardians grown accustomed to traveling with young people may well recognize this commonplace, impatient, question. Hunkered down in the backseat of a car, gazing out of a train or airplane window, or scanning the horizon from the deck of a slow-moving ferry, such enquiry might elicit a wry smile by way of response: recognition of youthful restlessness and acknowledgment, perhaps, of previous journeys undertaken when the adults were younger, and roles were reversed. In this closing chapter of *A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age*—and across the final pages, moreover, of the six-volume series to which it offers a bookend—we use the notions of journeying and questioning to traverse and assess the contested terrain of “global history.”

The academic concepts of “youth” and “global history,” as this entire series demonstrates, have much in common, including a sense of possibility and excitement (always shadowed by anxiety and the awareness of risk) prompted by mobility and an expanding geographic range. Our purpose here is to grapple with the stakes involved in writing global histories of youth, and—like the young traveling companions mentioned above—to pose plain questions and prompt echoes of earlier discussions. Identifying broad patterns and cleavages as we proceed, the endpoint of our journey is not a particular place or a neat synthesis.

Instead, as we work with the implicit and explicit meanings of the chapter title, evaluate the risks and rewards of global history, weigh up previous attempts to
assess young people globally, seek to situate ourselves as scholars with relation to global ambitions and “glocal” realities, and ponder the potential of global approaches as teaching and learning tools, we shall endeavor to lay trails and place signposts, sketching out possible routes for the next phases of research on young people in the modern era. Mapping, of course, is not a neutral exercise. The marking out, naming, alteration, and claiming of terrain (academic and otherwise) is a hallmark of empire, and we strive to acknowledge and interrogate rather than reproduce the unequal power relations that continue to shape the lives of young people and the production of historical scholarship.

“ARE WE WHERE YET?” DEFINING GLOBAL HISTORY

Writing global history in the twenty-first century is an exciting, complex, and not-uncontroversial exercise. The subject of ongoing methodological and epistemological debate, it has been memorably described as “a field in search of its soul” and “a family at war with itself” (Ghobrial 2019: 1, 5). The conflict, soul-searching, and occasional hand-wringing that characterize much scholarship about global history stem in large part from the fact that it raises big questions about the balance between synthesis and specificity and about the role of place-based expertise in a discipline whose professional practitioners have, since the nineteenth century, generally approached their research, teaching, and hiring practices through the unquestioned framework of the territorial nation-state. These issues are especially urgent for the history of childhood and youth, an intellectually dynamic field whose potential, as Ishita Pande has written recently, continues to be limited by the historiographical dominance of perspectives based in Europe and North America and a “lingering blindness” to global history (Pande 2020a: 1304).

What exactly is global history? For Sebastian Conrad, author of the most engaging historiographical work on the subject to date, it “is both an object of study and a particular way of looking at history: it is both a process and a perspective, subject matter and methodology” (Conrad 2016: 11). Practitioners of global history think especially broadly about the phenomena they assess, evaluating the geographically diverse influences that have through time shaped the history of our planet and its inhabitants. Within this framework, ever-increasing interconnectedness is usually taken as a given, and attention is focused on circulations, networks, and exchange. The globalizing forces cultivating such entanglements are rarely championed in straightforward terms, yet the global approach possesses an “aspirational” aspect, nonetheless (de Vries 2019: 27). Like scholars working in the related fields of transnational history, oceanic histories, and histoire croisée, global historians do not necessarily attempt to
tell the history of the whole world, but they do endeavor to create composite
tapestries characterized by the intricate weaving of many threads and brought
 together with the aim of covering more and more of that world.

While some scholars seek to stretch their narrative threads very far and
very wide, global-history writing can also take place at a much smaller scale,
addressing single groups, cities, products, or events, or through a comparison
of case studies. Such approaches require equally “inspired comparative and
connective thinking” and here the very mode of analysis demarcates the output
as global (Drayton and Motadel 2018: 15). In considering global influences
operating at a smaller scale, some historians aim to avoid parochialism and
instead strive to illuminate the whole through a focus on the constituent part.
Done well, such approaches—to the global histories of London, of cotton, or
of the Vietnam War, just for instance—can take account of temporal sweep
alongside geographical spread. Whatever historical setting is selected as the
frame for analysis, past interconnection and relationality have clearly informed
present practice.

Global history as a paradigm is younger than global history as a process.
Although a select number of ambitious historians have adopted perspectives
construed as global for a considerable time, only since the 1990s has global
history gathered momentum as a self-conscious approach. As Giovanni Levi
reminds us, that decade witnessed “a globalization without [formal] political
control,” with upheavals occasioned by the end of the bipolar world, the
emergence of new sub-imperial centers shaped by neoliberalism and global
capitalism, enhanced (but fragmented) connectivity through the adoption of
new information technologies, new nationalisms, and a plethora of ethnic
conflicts (Levi 2019: 38).

The most urgent issues of the twenty-first-century world—including the
climate emergency, migration, and infectious disease—reveal the limits of
nation-based thinking in particularly devastating terms. Situating these issues
in a longer historical context is crucial. The late twentieth-century “birth”
of global history additionally needs to be seen as our discipline’s response to
the explosion of scholarship about globalization that took place across the
social sciences from the late 1980s onwards. The economic, political, and
cultural circuits, networks, and connections that so fascinated economists and
sociologists were, historians knew, not simply novel products of the changes
that followed decolonization and the end of the Cold War.

As understood and practiced from the late twentieth century onwards,
global history has also been encouraged and shaped by the possibilities of
communication and connection offered by (relatively) cheap air travel and the
internet. Over the past few decades, increasingly mobile academic scholars—
mostly from the industrialized West—have networked like never before,
comparing notes, hosting global forums and pondering global histories. Sensing a new milieu (albeit deploying varying terminology to describe it), a *Journal of World History* was founded in 1990, followed by prominent seminar series on global history, world history, research projects on globalization in history, and then, in 2006, by the initiation of the *Journal of Global History*. Global history books too numerous to note here went to press in quick succession, and continue to appear, supported by global history research centers. So it was that an approach to the past came to yield scholarly outputs that in turn deepened the methodology underpinning the whole enterprise—an apparently virtuous circle. Questioning voices, however, have started to wonder about what was lost as well as what was gained by this apparent “rush to the global.”

**“SHOULD WE TRAVEL?” THE POSSIBILITIES AND PERILS OF GLOBAL HISTORY**

Inspiring strong intellectual and affective reactions ranging from doubtful concern to excited hope, global history has been compared by French historian Pierre Grosser to an exuberant but difficult youth (Grosser 2011: 13). Debate about its relative merits makes for lively reading, and we offer here an appraisal of ongoing debates and some concise reflections about how we—along with our chapter authors—have responded to the challenges and promises held out by global history.

The potential positives of global approaches for historians of youth are manifold. Thinking globally challenges the long-standing dominance of national historiographical frameworks which—perhaps especially when it comes to questions about the lives and cultures of young people—can obscure more than they reveal. The late Sir Christopher Bayly, one of a number of imperial historians to have embraced the global turn, concurs: “global history, when done well, can explain connections and bring up valuable comparisons that would otherwise be invisible” (John 2007: 12).

As with the rebellious youth imagined by Grosser, global history challenges many beliefs and practices—seldom articulated over a century and a half of disciplinary training—that lie at the heart of the historical profession. While revealing the entangled and longer durée histories of our present hyper-networked world, the field’s insistence on questioning (why privilege the nation-state?) and on doing things differently (valuing breadth and comparison over deep knowledge of a single place) has sometimes been seen as unnecessarily bombastic and iconoclastic.

Critics of global history have also expressed their skepticism by focusing on what might be lost. Some scholars have cautioned that privileging connectivity and movement risks overlooking historical subjects whose lives did not traverse
national borders (Adelman 2017; Conrad 2016: 228). Have exceptional cases and mobile subjects crowded out more mundane, but no less important, experiences? Might “zooming out” (as opposed to looking closely at a single geographically bounded location) make it harder to recognize particularity and contingency? Scholars based in places with a relatively short tradition of nation-based-history writing have expressed another, not-unrelated concern; as the Australian historian Ann Curthoys puts it: “We’ve only started making national histories, and you want us to stop already?” (2003).

While on the one hand the geopolitical project of global history seeks to provincialize the Global North by bringing it into conversation with other parts of the world, a number of scholars are rightly concerned about Euro- and Anglo-centrism and the dominance of the English language. “It is hard not to conclude,” notes a deeply skeptical Jeremy Adelman, “that global history is another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues” (Adelman 2017). Sanjay Subrahmanyam agrees, noting the constant risk of “reproducing that old and familiar history of the ‘global,’ where it all begins in the Mediterranean, passes to the Atlantic, and eventually expands by means of concentric circles to the rest of the world” (Subrahmanyam 2007: 331). Digitization strategies can compound this problem: English-language primary and particularly secondary sources predominate, and are often overseen by Anglo-American corporations whose subscription costs are beyond the reach of many scholars and institutions, especially across the Global South. This unevenness in terms of production and access, like the blind spots and shortcuts created by archival digitization more generally, provides clear evidence of how “pattern[s] from the past … [can be] exacerbated by disparities in the present” (Putnam 2016: 389). Practices of reading and citation are important here, too: as South African historian Rebecca Swartz reminded us during a roundtable about writing global histories at the 2019 conference of the Society for the History of Children and Youth, scholars who live in and study the Global South are expected to be conversant with major works by historians of Western metropoles—who in turn are not penalized for failing to engage with insights from and about “other” parts of the world.

Questions of scale, scope, and the presence of people—flesh and bone historical subjects—in global history accounts have also been identified as areas of real concern. Assessments of macro-level forces, anonymous flows, and impersonal structures run the risk of obscuring individual historical actors and lived experiences. Many large-scale global analyses leave little room for contingency and individual agency, Conrad notes, “and all the more so when the time frames are huge”(2016: 158, 231). This alleged lack of granularity in tracing and explaining the diversity of individual human activity relates closely in turn to a final warning flag raised in front of onrushing globalists. It is summed up with concision by Felix Driver: “The question … is how to think globally
while not effacing the local” (2007: 322). For those attempting to write global history on a grand scale, this is indeed a significant quandary. Particularities can be missed in favor of abstracted patterns, the dynamic terrain of the past flattened out as time or space—or both—are refined into neat paragraphs. “Rookie mistakes,” to borrow Lara Putnam’s phrase, can follow, with place-based knowledge downgraded in favor of drive-through (or, worse, fly-in, fly-out) understandings generated by whistle-stop tours, keyword searches, and “side-glances” (Putnam 2016: 377). Perhaps micro-history can “save” global history, it has been proposed—a measure by which the overarching narratives of ardent globalists could be grounded in the less streamlined and more messy realities of everyday life in the past (de Vries 2019: 28; Ghobrial 2019: 21).

As sociocultural historians of youth, we are certainly not keen on circuits without subjects, or flows without feelings. Individual experiences and dispositions hence pepper the pages of what has with the present volume been a collective enterprise, drawing together expertise pertaining to six continents, and keeping in view the real-world historical settings known by young people. An oscillation between big and small has been encouraged throughout, and we have welcomed the isolation of broad historical patterns alongside attention to particularities. The notion of moving “towards” a global history strikes us as particularly apt—there are certainly advantages to be gained by deploying global perspectives of both the wide-angle and telescopic varieties outlined above. We urge incremental progress, however, together with switchbacks, rest stops, and detours, for this is complex and shifting terrain that needs to be explored with great care. In this enterprise we can benefit from an appraisal of previous efforts to write “globally” about historical subjects that overlap with our own: young people setting out, staying home and otherwise living through a century of continuity and change from around 1920 to the present.

GETTING OUR BEARINGS: MAPPING THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Nearly a decade ago, Akira Iriye suggested that focusing on particular age groups and generations—including youth—had the potential to offer promising new insights to transnational and global historians (2013: 70–1). Yet despite this recommendation and the obvious affinities that exist between the two fields, intersections between histories of young people and global history approaches have not to date been widespread. At the time of writing, the flagship Journal of Global History has published just two articles focused on youth and young people across some forty-five volumes (Pietsch 2010; Sobocińska 2017). So far as journal article outputs go, that ratio appears broadly representative of youth-centered scholarship engaging explicitly with global history paradigms. More
extensive foundations exist in terms of monographs and edited collections, most of which have tended to appraise children and childhood first before addressing the more capacious category of youth.

What might we learn from the scholarly reception accorded to these earlier globalizing endeavors by historians of young people? Published reviews have generally been supportive, but with some significant caveats. Evaluating, for instance, the foundational three-volume *Encyclopaedia of Children and Childhood in History and Society* (published in 2004 and edited by Paula Fass), Joe Austin found the overall quality of entries to be “excellent,” and welcomed “the interdisciplinary and global intentions” of the project. But he observed, nonetheless, that the majority of entries focused on United States and Western European social, cultural, and institutional history, and concluded that “the divisions between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ remain relatively intact” (Austin 2004). Other commentators wrote similarly, noting too central a focus on the United States and significant geographical gaps pertaining to the South American and African continents, as well as to Russia (Grant 2009: 742; 2005: 469).

Such criticisms surely say as much about the nature of encyclopedias as vestiges of Western enlightenment traditions for systematizing knowledge as they do about the global history of young people. One must also bear in mind that in the early 2000s there really were fewer qualified historians to compose entries on growing up for vast swathes of the globe. Even today, we readily acknowledge that all works of scholarship are essentially time capsules capturing, for good or ill, the diversity and depth of a field at any given moment. That said, Western-centrism is marked indeed in the 2004 *Encyclopaedia* and a final observation by Julia Grant bears repeating—“Historians of children and childhood,” she wrote, “pay much lip service these days to the importance of international, transnational, and comparative work. Many historians applaud the notion of comparative work but are afraid to actually do it … Clearly, it is time that we try to stretch ourselves beyond our national boundaries” (2005: 469). Stretching our analysis through multi-sited, transnational, or global approaches, while a critically important endeavor for historians of youth, can be a materially risky prospect, particularly for early career scholars. Expensive in terms of both resources and time, this kind of work can also be hard to fit within the national and continental frames that are still favored by many university hiring committees (Alexander 2018).

Several synthetic monographs by senior and popular historians epitomize the risks and rewards involved in doing this kind of work. For *Childhood in World History* (2006, 2011, 2017), Peter Stearns received deserved plaudits for his labors to draw attention to non-Western societies and to generate comparative perspectives that did not treat the industrialized West as the yardstick by which to measure. Yet as Anne-Lise Halvorsen pointed out, Stearns’s “broad-brush stroke approach” to world history rested heavily on
secondary sources, and his book lacked any in-text referencing to the array of leading experts distilled and consigned instead to the “further reading” sections (2010: 124). An unexplored tension between global history and world history is also apparent in *Childhood in World History*, with the author using the terms interchangeably, offering no methodological reflections (even in later editions) and seeming to assume, incorrectly, that a global history approach necessarily entails widespread geographical coverage alone (Stearns 2011: 7, 10; 2017: 8, 10). Similarly, Jon Savage’s lively and important book *Teenage: The Creation of Youth Culture* (2007b) also cut corners, reviewers found, tending to regard youth cultures in Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy as largely the same when viewed through the limited perspectives of consumption and protest (Heilbronner 2008: 579–80), and neglecting “issues of economic, political, urban and family change” in favor of “matters cultural” (Newburn 2007: 185).

The global, or at least the comparative, efforts of Fass, Stearns, and Savage were herculean, and it is apparent now that perhaps they had spread themselves too thin at various junctures. Yet while it is difficult (and in some cases perhaps not advisable) for historians of Western Europe and North America to attempt global coverage simply by mixing in examples from “other” distant locations, there remains much to be learned by juxtaposing histories of places that are usually studied separately. This approach lends itself particularly to collaborative work, as in the *Modern Girl around the World* project (Weinbaum et al. 2008), the edited volume *Girlhood: A Global History* (Helgren and Vasconcellos 2010), and the series of important chapters gathered together and introduced in *The Global History of Childhood Reader* (Morrison 2012). The geographical breadth represented by these studies is impressive, with essays about North America and Europe appearing alongside detailed studies of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Ottoman Empire, Palestine, and South Africa. At the same time, however, individual chapters in each of these books generally focus on single cities, countries, or regions, which ultimately leaves readers to identify patterns of similarity, difference, and connection (or lack thereof) for themselves.

Three significant collections published more recently feature valuable co-authored essays that move beyond this practice of juxtaposing different individual place- and nation-based case studies. Doing some conceptual heavy lifting and outlining areas for possible future work, these studies offer insights that are especially relevant to our collaborative journey toward a global history of young people in the modern age. Focusing mainly on adult-led youth movements during the Cold War era, Mischa Honeck and Gabriel Rosenberg have demonstrated the importance of “youth” as concept and as lived experience to the history of modern international relations, foreign policy, and formal and informal diplomacy (Honeck and Rosenberg 2014). Richard Ivan Jobs and
David M. Pomfret, meanwhile, use their introductory chapter in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century* to demonstrate how thinking about “global history in and between local contexts” can help historians understand the networks, practices, and experiences of mobility (and immobility) that led many modern young people to come to understand themselves as belonging to an age-defined group whose members were “especially transnational” (Jobs and Pomfret 2015b: 2, 7). Finally, Karen Vallgårda, Kristine Alexander, and Stephanie Olsen offer new concepts—“emotional formations” and “emotional frontiers”—to historians interested in grappling with the representations and experiences of young people in “a multicentred world, characterized by ambiguity and contradiction” and subject to global forces including imperialism, capitalism, mass migration, and war (Vallgårda, Alexander, and Olsen 2015: 14). Encouraging scholars to consider emotions and age in the construction of social hierarchies, Vallgårda, Alexander, and Olsen also suggest that historians of childhood and youth are especially well-positioned to think in global terms, drawing on their extensive experience in looking beyond state-based archives and in bringing a rigorous, creative, and questioning perspective to their disparate sources (2015: 14, 29).

The past five years have been characterized by a still more noticeable scholarly growth spurt, one that has seen the publication of multiple monographs that bring transnational, continental, transcolonial, and multi-sited analytical methods to bear on the lives and cultures of young people in different parts of the world during the early to mid-twentieth century (Alexander 2017; Helgren 2017; Honeck 2018; Jobs 2017; Pomfret 2015). Recent feature sections about generations and chronological age in the *American Historical Review* have also raised significant conceptual and historiographical questions that cross national and colonial boundaries, at the same time bringing the history of young people to the attention of a broader group of readers who might otherwise not seek out our work (Field and Syrett 2020; George et al. 2018).

While these high-profile publications highlight the analytical potential and global importance of young people, they also—like the historical scholarship on modern youth more generally—speak to a surprising dearth of youth-focused writing about the half-century after 1968. Social scientists and child and youth scholars on the other hand, have published extensively about the effects of global processes on young lives during this time period, and we believe that conducting historical research on recent decades and engaging more fully with work from other disciplines represents a promising avenue for historians of youth. Spinning the telescope around, it is of course possible to write a global history of young people in a single place (as outlined above), albeit it does help if that place is subject to many crosscurrents, each leaving in their wake ample archival evidence. Working from sociological and anthropological perspectives, cases in point have deployed global analytical frames to address contemporary

**SITUATING OURSELVES AND OUR TRAVELING COMPANIONS**

“Global histories,” Conrad reminds us, “are not written in a vacuum. Historians may cover the history of the whole world, but they do so from a specific location, and they write at a particular time, embedded in their own life-worlds” (2016: 162). As white scholars whose lived experience and research focuses mainly on Britain and its settler empire, we are acutely aware of the privileges and limitations that we have brought to our work on this volume. Institutional histories and contexts matter, too: King’s College London, where Simon is based, was founded in the 1820s with funds derived from Caribbean slavery, and the University of Lethbridge, where Kristine works, is a settler institution whose now-standard institutional land acknowledgment does little in material terms to address the fact that it occupies Blackfoot territory. The long-term patterns of extraction, exploitation, unevenness and exchange visible in our institutional histories have shaped our professional positions, and this book only exists because we—like most of our chapter authors—have stable employment, reliable library services, and access to travel and research funding.

Reflecting on what Pierre Nora calls “the link between the history you have made and the history that has made you” has therefore been a crucial part of the intellectual journey that has resulted in this volume ([originally 1987] 2014: 22). It is no coincidence that the bulk of global-history writing has to date occurred in those regions that have benefited most from globalization, and the wide-reaching legacies of colonialism and extractive capitalism that influenced the lives of our young historical subjects have also shaped the production of this book (Conrad 2016: 215). As editors, we first discussed this project over dinner in London in 2016, on the eve of the Children’s History Society conference—a conjuncture facilitated by patterns of professional mobility inevitably undergirded by national and racial privilege. We had both previously collaborated with scholars working in other national contexts, and were convinced that a similar approach would be the only way to do justice to the ambitious goals of the “Cultural History of Youth” series. The team of historians we assembled all had established international scholarly reputations, and their expertise ranged impressively across multiple languages and six continents. All, just as significantly, were willing and able to write in English and most were based at well-resourced universities in Western Europe and North America.
Our movement toward a global history of youth has benefited as much from the trails blazed by previous generations of scholars as from their occasional blind spots and wrong turns. During an era defined by militarized border policing and a pervasive and often deadly sense of border crisis, we have sought to push back against our field’s continued reliance on nation-based frameworks and against conventions and perspectives that focus primarily on Europe and North America. Questions of chronology and temporal scope are important here too, and this volume is both a recognition of and a preliminary attempt to address the urgent need, noted above, for historians of youth to pay more attention to the decades after 1968. Conscious of the uneven resource distribution that continues to shape academic labor and publishing around the world—a legacy of the extractive practices and power/reward structures of empire and global capitalism—our journey so far has only been possible through putting scholars with a broad range of thematic and geographical expertise in the driver’s seat.

This ambitious work requires self-reflexivity and cooperation, and we have cast our gaze forward and back while paying attention to forms of local life as well as the broader structures and forces that shape the landscape. A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age makes it clear that individual and collective experiences, like the local and global contexts that shaped them, were always already intertwined. Global histories of youth, we contend, need to foreground the aspirations, sensibilities, and experiences of young people, who—mobilized by empires, nation-states, political parties, corporations, and kin for ideological, biopolitical, and profit-making purposes—variously (and at different times) pushed against and worked within the structural constraints that shaped their lives. Violence, friction, obedience, and consent are all important forces in the history of modern youth, and this book traces how in bedrooms, laneways, shopping malls, classrooms, battlefields, farmers’ fields, and welfare and colonizing institutions, young people moved between the socially constructed life stages of “childhood” and “adulthood” by claiming, naming, and altering their identities and surroundings. Throughout the past century, youth on the move and their counterparts who stayed put shaped and were shaped by a broad range of global forces including imperialism, war, migration, decolonization, deindustrialization, neoliberalism, and—most recently—the Covid-19 pandemic.

While many young people left few marks on the conventional historical record, the chapters contained here use traces of individual and collective thoughts, emotions, voices, and actions to better understand how young people around the world imagined and sought to create new and self-consciously modern social orders between 1920 and 2020. Here we agree with Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne, whose book World Histories from Below insists that “rather than seeing the emergence of modernity as a gradual unfolding of liberty, rationality, and freedom,” it is more accurate to suggest that this
process and its uneven effects unfolded “in an irregular, unpredictable and lumpy manner” (Burton and Ballantyne 2016: 4).

A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age provides compelling evidence of this unevenness and unpredictability. Many chapters focus on moments of conflict and rupture, which are perhaps over-represented in records produced by modern states, experts, media commentators, and Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as in the ego-documents and recollections of young fighters, victims, revolutionaries, and protestors themselves. This side of the story favors intense emotion, generational self-awareness, and intergenerational conflict, as represented so clearly in the 1968 activist slogan “I want to be an orphan!” The excitement and fear incited by youth has also shaped adult behavior throughout the past century, and this book further reveals the extent to which the thoughts, feelings, and actions of parents, politicians, and professionals have been forged in reaction to young people’s sexuality, style, and use of space.

The intergenerational flashpoints and youthful acts of self-fashioning that punctuate this work demonstrate that the category of youth is always constructed relationally. They also make it clear that young lives, both globally and locally, need to be analyzed in intersectional terms. We must carefully consider, in other words, how age-based privileges and disadvantages intersected and overlapped with structural opportunities and constraints created by gender, class, race, and other social demarcations. W.E.B. DuBois’s prediction that “the problem of the twentieth century … [would be] the problem of the color-line,” a recognition of the still-unfolding global legacies of slavery and empire, anticipated many important facets of the youthful histories we offer here (DuBois [1915] 2015: 1). While some young people acquiesced to and perpetuated acts of intolerance and violence, others—often framing their interventions in the terms of intergenerational critique—sought to speak out in favor of racial justice. As Karen Vallgårda’s juxtaposition of the cases of youthful letter-writers from 1940s Nigeria and the 1960s United States in Chapter 5 makes clear, adult responses to these acts of self-assertion were inevitably shaped by racial and geopolitical power structures and hierarchies. In other words, while white correspondents like Cheryl Dragotto could often be assured of a response, other young letter-writers—especially if they were non-white and poor—were generally ignored by the white colonial officials to whom they addressed their demands.

What about the millions of modern youth whose individual voices are not represented in archival collections of letters and diaries? Conventional archives often fail to recognize the value of sources produced by young people, and the chapters in this volume demonstrate the importance of casting a wide evidentiary net, a net which—in additional to textual evidence—also draws together oral history, music, fashion, and material and digital culture. Careful
reading of non-textual sources like photographs can provide further vital information about young historical actors “whose ‘voice[s]’ may have been lost, but whose ‘experiences,’” as Josephine Hoegaerts and Stephanie Olsen have recently claimed, “we can at least partly come to know” (2021: 378). The journey toward a global history of youth chronicled in this book has sought to do exactly this: bridging the local and the global by tracing the representations and lived experiences of students, activists, workers, would-be workers, fighters, lovers, consumers, and producers.

BREAKING THE JOURNEY: GLOBAL FORCES AND “GLOCAL” FORMULATIONS

The following applied examples of the imbricated nature of the global and the local serve to illustrate our approach to the modern histories of youth and to showcase the potential benefits of transnational comparison. “Do you know how your children dress?,” asked an alarmist early 1990s Tokyo police graphic aimed at parents and teachers (White 1993: 165). Watch out, advised the brochure, for such shared and gender-specific attributes as sneakers or deck shoes, magnetic earrings, safety-pins, a “slovenly long skirt with unironed pleats,” rolled-up sleeves, oversized jackets, and intentional cigarette burns (added, it was noted, “to show toughness”). A little earlier and more than 9,000 km away, the authorities in Leipzig, East Germany, had also worked themselves into a lather regarding the youth in their midst. There the Stasi, the feared state secret police, produced a visual guide to youth subcultures in 1985 (Marshall 2019). Cohering among other groups around punks, skinheads, and “heavy’s” (fans of “extremely hard rock” music), Stasi agents sketched a gallery of purportedly “negative-decadent” youth types in order to help categorize those groups thought to exhibit destabilizing political outlooks and antisocial behaviors. Clothing and accessories featured prominently once more, listed alongside purported social interests and political views—“anarchist thoughts” for punks, and a slowly waning “hostile political attitude” for heavy metal fans (Brauer 2012).

Are these represented social types from the East or from the West? The answer, put simply, is “yes.” Candy tins and red T-shirts appear alongside Birkenstocks and black enamel shoes, consumption is paired with delinquency, and what our volume contributor Dylan Baun refers to as “global grammars” of youth reference the United States and Britain at the same time as accommodating, or chafing against, local difference (Baun 2021: 12–13, 42). Youth and young adulthood are simultaneously cast in these depictions as difference and as threat. Here internal “others” cut often-familiar figures of international impudence, radical or otherwise unkempt hairstyles and all. In these judicial documents, subcultural types are at once approximated and created.
Perceiving shifting global styles, boundaries, and blurred distinctions are important features of understanding modern youth. So too, inevitably, is the process of approximating and creating, albeit for far less nefarious reasons than those held in mind by state authorities in Japan and East Germany. With our discussion in this section, we have attempted to show just how intertwined modern cohorts of youth often were. Read through historical episodes and cultural renderings, the crosscurrents of modern youth cultures can be perceived. But across the century addressed by this book the international traffic has never been completely free flowing. Factors including the ease of information exchange, the attitudes of authorities (national as well as parental), relative wealth, ethnic status, and the scope for personal choice have manipulated currents. Hence there is no single overarching story of modern youth, but very many localized formulations of wider trends.

This is important for understandings of global history because only through collaboration, drawing on detailed engagement with particular places and their archives, is it wise to even attempt to make such an atlas of the past. “Glocal” studies—studies that bring together sophisticated understandings of historicized global forces with finer-grained knowledge of historical places—offer a productive fusion that can help to counterbalance tendencies for overarching generalizations, simplifications and shortcuts.

COMPLETING THE WORKSHEET: TEACHING THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF YOUTH

How can global thinking be put into practice in the lecture hall or seminar room, and integrated into university curriculum design? These can seem like daunting questions, especially when one considers that even survey courses framed around national questions too often represent the vital histories of young people only sporadically. Yet some rewarding answers sit directly before us, in the lives of our students. Those lives have been shaped in profound ways by the global themes and forces outlined in this book: through shifting concepts of what it means to be young; in the spaces and places young people experience; in their leisure and play; in their emotional range; in the ways that they inhabit their genders, sexualities, and bodies; in their beliefs and ideologies; in how they navigate authority and agency; and in how they know and respond to war and conflict. Students, Ann B. Waltner and Mary Jo Maynes further observe, are so often also themselves the products of former or ongoing global migrations, population movements that tether individuals and their families to constantly reconfigured oscillations of push and pull. In this way classrooms (or indeed the online discussion spaces of the 2020s) become “natural laboratories for the study of family dynamics
in a global-historical frame,” spaces of power “produced however indirectly by forces of world history” (Waltner and Maynes 2004: 85; Burton 2012: 35). And whether staying local or becoming international, students often bring increasingly global mindsets to teaching discussions, informed by the events that have marked their youth. Writing with an air of prescience in 2018, Richard Drayton and David Motadel teamed up to observe that today’s students “are profoundly conscious of the global character of many of our contemporary challenges – global warming, refugee crises, pandemics, war and terror, unemployment, and the deterritorialization of capital” (2018: 15). Casting such present-day concerns into global historical relief can lend the pursuit of history a captivating urgency and sense of significance.

If the world can be perceived in a grain of sand (to invoke poet William Blake), then perhaps global history is at least partly embodied in the student commencing undergraduate learning. How to do justice to their biography, to unlock the potential of students’ subjectivities, and to foster the forms of empathetic thinking across time and space that underpin all good historical writing, are issues that many historians grapple with. Antoinette Burton, for instance, suggests drawing on our own biographies as established scholars and asking students to do the same, having them compose their own “personal” global histories and encouraging students to see themselves as “the products of encounters with world-history forces – whether local, global, regional, national, or transnational – within a specific set of times and places.” Fostering an appreciation of what Burton calls “the pressure of historical time on their own histories” is an engaging place to start (Burton 2012: 23), reminding us of Pierre Nora’s urgings, introduced above, to draw on the link between the history that we produce and the history that has produced us.

Scholars of childhood and youth fortunate enough to offer specialist teaching on the history of young people in the modern era have conjured up a number of other approaches and techniques, some of which were elaborated at a virtual roundtable (overseen by the authors of the present chapter in 2021) on “Teaching Global Histories of Youth.” Dylan Baun, for instance, reflected on his “Youth Connections Project” which seeks to foster global intellectual exchange through collaborations between students in the Middle East and students in the United States, where Baun teaches. Students taking the “Being Young in the Modern Middle East” course are encouraged to explore their backgrounds through online conversations with overseas peers, to research and detail the factors that structure their lives, and to work together to present on such themes as anti-sectarian youth activism in Lebanon, coming of age abroad, or whatever else speaks directly to their experiences of navigating their life worlds. David Pomfret, by contrast, uses gamification activities to help his students reimagine—and move within—historical Hong Kong, a global melting
pot subject to long-standing and competing imperial aspirations. Software modeling packages including Sketchup, Unity, and Unreal (some of them freely available) allow Pomfret’s students to reinvent the past based on scholarly research and acquired technological savvy.

Barriers as well as open doors populate the landscape of global history teaching. During our roundtable, Valeria Manzano observed the challenges of finding sufficient historical sources in Spanish for her Argentinian students, noting further the necessity for students to conceive of simultaneously coexisting global timeframes, and to challenge the notions of “modernity” reproduced over and over again in secondary scholarship on the West. Dylan Baun also reflected on the need to have his students look past the global affinities fostered through initial conversations with overseas peers, and to address directly the structural differences—and their historical causes—between young lives in the United States and those in Lebanon and surrounding countries.

The challenges of convincing academic colleagues to “let youth in” to global or world history survey courses should also not be underestimated; encouraging them, as well as students, to regularize age as a central category alongside other social demarcations remains an ongoing project. Mirroring Burton’s comments about women’s history, too often youth can be invoked in survey courses with regard to popular culture alone, adding splashes of color rather than being threaded through with purpose to demonstrate their indispensability to understandings of the global past (Burton 2012: 38). We shall see if recent academic clarion calls for taking age seriously as a mode of historical analysis (Field and Syrett 2020), together with the increasing numbers of youth scholars currently rising through the historical profession, change this pattern in the coming years.

“ARE WE THERE YET?” LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD

In summer 2019, less than a year before the Covid-19 pandemic brought most of the world to a standstill, we organized a workshop for our chapter authors in Lethbridge, funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Recalling the in-person relationship-building and conversations that took place at this event now feels like remembering a different world. The changes wrought by lockdowns, travel restrictions, and mutating airborne pathogens had yet to be imagined, although we did know then that international academic travel was a troubling contributor to climate change resulting from carbon emissions.

The imagined road trip that has been the organizational analogy for this chapter also looks different when considered alongside the 2021 United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, which confirmed in explicit and devastating terms that we are in an intensifying climate emergency caused by human consumption of fossil fuels. Automobility, a key feature of youth culture in many places across the world from the 1920s to today, is in other words a primary cause of our current moment of environmental crisis. The broader global shifts of the contemporary Anthropocene era, as Carla Pascoe Leahy’s current research points out, are changing intergenerational relationships and individual young people’s thoughts about what adulthood might (or might not) look like. What is the value of studying youth in the past when the future of humanity—a concept that is so often conflated with the young—is under immediate threat?

We argue that this work is more important now than ever. Traveling, as scholars of “contact zones” and empire have written, changes you, and the years-long voyage that led to the production of this book has been punctuated by moments of clarity, confusion, and self-conscious shifts in perspective (Pratt 1992). Separately and together, the contributors to this volume have looked forward and back, near and far to produce a series of orienting and sometimes disorienting insights. We have followed, questioned, and disobeyed disciplinary signs and directions, working around, under, and through the fences and checkpoints constructed by national histories, scholarly conventions, and state-based archives. While following older maps and attempting to draw our own, we have reckoned with a century’s worth of sights and sounds including music, protests, reading, dancing, and traumatic moments of rupture caused by racism, forced migration, and armed conflict.

As introduced earlier, the economic historian Jan de Vries has correctly observed that global history is “an aspirational history, lacking an agreed methodology to achieve its goals, or even a master narrative, with which to arrange its provisional achievements” (de Vries 2019: 27). We see this aspiration and lack of methodological unity as in fact a useful quality, and hope that more historians of youth will come to situate and write about their subjects in broader global terms. Reading, listening, collaborating, and working in languages other than English will be important parts of the next stage of this journey, as will ongoing reflection on the unevenness of the material conditions that have shaped and continue to shape the lives of young people and the scholars who study them. We therefore advocate what theorist Matt Brim calls “queer ferrying”: the practice of working together to facilitate dynamic movement—the exchange and sharing of resources, lived experience, and expertise—between regions and institutions with vastly different histories and levels of material privilege. This “asymmetrical mode of field-building” acknowledges and seeks to undermine the hierarchies and status differences that can keep us apart—an undertaking that has been aided in the wake of
Covid-19 by the move to virtual conferences and talks (accessible from anywhere so long as a computer and working internet connection are available) (Brim 2020: 199). Global history hence pushes historians to think more deeply about the value of collaboration in the present. How refreshing, Christian De Vito avers, for historians “to reimagine their own work as a collaborative and translocal, rather than a competitive and hierarchical, endeavour” (De Vito 2019: 371). That there are potential sustainability benefits for the planet and for the historical profession is also surely to be welcomed (Gaynor et al. 2021; Sleight and Green 2019). We hope that the roadmap offered by A Cultural History of Youth in the Modern Age will prove useful to those continuing the movement towards a global history. Amendments to, supplements for, and file sharing of this collaboratively produced resource are most welcome, and especially so given the open access status of this book and all that it contains.
Chapter 4


Chapter 9

1 Rosanov’s diary was evidently popular because it was translated at least three times: 1) Shanghai Municipal Library: Xin Exuesheng riji [New Russian Student’s Diary] (Shanghai guanghua shuju, April 1929); 2) Nanjing Municipal Library: Xin Exuesheng riji [New Russian Student’s Diary] (Shanghai chunchao shuju, May 1929); 3) Nanjing Municipal Library: Su’e zhongxuesheng riji [A Soviet Russian Middle School Student’s Diary] (Shanghai: Beixin shuju, July 1929).
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