INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

KŌSAKA Masataka

Foreword/Editorial Supervision
TADOKORO Masayuki

Translated by Carl Freire

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Note on the translation

The original Japanese version of the present work was published as a *shinsho* volume, an inexpensive paperback aimed at a general readership. Most books of this sort are published without citations and only minimal bibliographies. The translation team—project supervisor (and student of Professor Kōsaka) Professor Emeritus Tadokoro Masayuki of Keio University, translator Carl Freire, and translation checker Emily Shibata-Satō—made every effort to find any existing English versions of the passages cited by Professor Kōsaka. The endnotes that resulted from this effort are entirely new to this translation. This book follows the Hepburn system of romanization, with long vowels indicated by macrons. The tradition of placing the family name first has been followed for Japanese names.

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Foreword

When Kōsaka Masataka published this volume, he was still only a 32-year-old associate professor at Kyoto University. Yet, he had already become widely known as a member of a new generation of public intellectuals. An article he had written four years prior titled "Genjitsushugi-sha no heiwaron" (A Realist's View on Peace) had attracted much public notice. In it, he strongly criticized the argument for unarmed neutrality advocated by a prominent idealist author, not so much for its utopianism as for its dogmatic intellectual attitude, which did not allow for a flexible dialogue between means and goals. For more than three decades thereafter, Kōsaka remained actively engaged as a leading thinker in the heated debates over contemporary Japanese foreign policy issues until his rather premature death in 1996.

For many readers of this volume today, the Japanese intellectual mood of the 1960s must be hard to imagine. After the devastating defeat in World War II and the US Occupation that followed, politics in postwar Japan were the purview of conservatives but academic and journalistic circles were dominated by Marxists and progressive idealists. Although the two groups had different ideological foundations, they shared in common a strong objection to a Japanese postwar foreign policy that was based on an alliance with the US and accompanied by moderate rearmament.

Readers of this English translation may find it helpful to consider the parallels with the British intellectual mood after World War I.

Traumatized by the destructiveness of World War I, many British intellectuals who were socialized and educated in its aftermath sought alternatives to the traditional mode of conducting foreign policy based on the search for a balance of power. One way was Marxism, which gave a radical blueprint for achieving ultimate peace through communist revolution. This attracted many elite intellectuals of the day. During the interwar years, some would even go on to participate in the international communist movement by actively spying for Moscow, a tendency that would reach its apotheosis during World War II with the infamous Cambridge Five. The alternative way to escape power politics-based foreign policy was progressive idealism, which E. H. Carr later labeled utopianism. This replaced concern for the balance of power with a reliance on rational projects such as the League of Nations, international law, and disarmament as the means for achieving lasting peace. In interwar Britain, this thinking would even lead the Oxford Union debating society to famously renounce military action by declaring it would "under no circumstances fight for its King and Country."

In post–World War II Japan, progressive idealism and revolutionary Marxism all the more readily found common cause because of the fresh memories of oppressive militarism followed by a catastrophic war, spurred further by the postwar presence of US military bases that Japan now had to host as a US ally. It was within this intellectual topology that the author of this book was widely labeled a "hawk," a "rightwinger," or even a "reactionary." It is true that he dared to describe himself a "realist," a largely unpopular label in postwar Japan. Still, in reading this book, some may wonder if the author really was a realist. It is true that he never dismissed the importance of power or the role of military forces. But he also pays careful attention to the role of international institutions for the rational pursuit of interests. He even speaks

of norms and how they are created. It is obvious that his realism is not one that seeks to explain a complicated world through some parsimonious theoretical model that reduces international politics to power struggles. Rather, his realism lies in his appreciation of political prudence based on a recognition of the limitedness of human nature both in terms of intellectual and moral capability. While he values political wisdom based on a healthy skepticism, he also rejects cynical attitude that says one simply has to skillfully work one's way through the meandering trail that is power politics.

Although it is always difficult to translate nuances of the original text into a foreign language, it must be clear to readers that Kōsaka's approach is very far from "scientific" or even "academic." In fact, he always preferred accessible and informal ways of expressing his views over the use of technical jargon. This preference was particularly noticeable in his spoken Japanese. Speaking in a thick Kyoto accent, he offered sharp observations that were always presented in a plain language that was rich in nuance and humor. This intellectual style should be discernible in this volume as well. His approach was highly eclectic rather than theory-based. His insights were derived mainly from history and works by classical European political thinkers. This approach remained the same throughout his professional career. Despite his fluency in English and his varied international experiences including two years spent doing research at Harvard from 1960–1962, he was largely indifferent to the new theories about international relations that had been developed in North America. Rather than framing his arguments based on whatever abstract and formal theories were then current, he preferred instead to read and write about history while still actively commenting on the heated issues of the day.

It is also interesting to note that this book has been an exceptional

long-seller in Japan, having first been published in 1966 and subsequently in 2017 in a revised edition. To date about 174,000 copies have been produced across 56 different print runs. It is now widely regarded as a classic in its field. This suggests that, despite Kōsaka's unpopularity among the Japanese intelligentsia during a time of sharp ideological confrontation in postwar Japan, his position still had solid supporters not only in the small foreign policy community but also more broadly in Japanese society. As the influence of Marxism and progressivism gradually waned, his works have steadily become more widely accepted in what turned out to be his final years.

Kōsaka's situation is somewhat analogous to that of Raymond Aron's in French intellectual circles. Although the French author enjoyed a distinct reputation, he was no match for Jean-Paul Sartre in terms of popularity among French intellectuals in the Quartier Latin. It was only toward the end of Aron's life that his works became widely accepted, and it was only after his death and the end of the Cold War that his intellectual authority became firmly established.

Is this work that you hold in your hands, written more than 60 years ago by a young Japanese thinker of international politics, still relevant today? Many things have happened since then. The end of the Cold War. Globalization. The emergence of US unipolarity. The "War on Terror." And, above all, the revival of Great Power confrontations, as illustrated by China's aggressive behavior and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It is now abundantly clear that the rose-tinted post–Cold War era of Western triumphalism is over and liberal democracies now must face up to certain stark geopolitical realities that give us a feeling of déjà vu.

But if the message of this book still has any meaning, it is not because the geopolitical environment has reverted to what seems to

be another Cold War. Rather, it is because the tragic reality of the conditions in which humans live is unchanged. Namely, we humans, all coping with immensely different political, economic, and social conditions, still have to live together on this small planet despite an absence of the shared basic norms and institutions that would ensure our coexisting peacefully with decency and dignity.

War may be an incurable disease and eternal peace may be an impossible dream, but human beings must continue making efforts to solve these conundrums just the same. Kōsaka Masataka devoted his entire professional career to fighting against dogmatism of all types, whether it be revolutionary Marxism, utopian idealism, or ultra-nationalism. He chose to close this book by bringing up Chekhov's story about a physician attempting to treat an incurable patient. Summing up the lesson for international politics that he drew from that story, he wrote, "Although we cannot help but be skeptical, we must not despair." It is his challenge to everyone, and one that we must still meet today.

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Tadokoro Masayuki
September 2022

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Preface

Writing involves forming a clear position and developing a commitment to that position. I felt this to be particularly true when I was writing this book.

In the past, I wrote on my thoughts concerning specific issues in Japan's foreign and security policies. Of course, these thoughts were developed from my own basic way of thinking, which then became firm convictions through discussions with others. It would be fair to say that my thoughts on international politics have been shaped by that process. Still, as I once again thought about international politics in general while reconfirming basic points I had made earlier, it made me think more deeply about points that had been left vague. Since I ordinarily tend not to think in conceptual terms, that was a demanding process, but I have learned a lot from it.

For example, it is possible to lay out the pros and cons of possessing a military force in given situations without necessarily having to lay out one's own fundamental attitude towards it, because one can still comment about a current event by saying what one thinks is happening and what the results will be in a given situation. Observers have long employed the logic that "current conditions demand that we use armaments" and "military forces are a necessary evil." In contrast, by specifying our basic principles on peace and the use of military force, we will be compelled to not make excuses that are dependent on circumstances and instead be forced to clearly state our own position that

should be applicable in any situation.

The reader will discover that this book does not advocate any specific measures as a credible pathway to peace. Instead, it argues that no such thing exists. This does not change the fact that in this book I have made my own positions clear. Indeed, I take up and explore several specific measures for achieving peace. I have reached the conclusion that all of them are, in the end, inadequate, and that we should treat each of them with strong reservations rather than simply praise them.

When we talk about peace, we seem to think about it in the abstract. We pin our hopes on this abstract peace, and contrast that peace with our fears of the real world. Peace, however, does not exist in the abstract. Every instance of peace has required conditions attached to it. This places us in a difficult situation. But we have a duty to face up to the difficulties.

As I was writing this book, I reflected on the studies and debates I have joined, and what I have tried to say each time. These reflections have provided the framework for this book, but they have also highlighted certain inadequacies, which I have tried to correct.

This process also made me realize—much to my delight—that my research and ideas have been built upon certain unwavering principles, and I owe a debt of intellectual influences to many people. It is my pleasure to acknowledge them here. First, I am indebted to Hagihara Nobutoshi, Nagai Yōnosuke, and Tominaga Ken'ichi, who all have done so much for me through our many discussions in recent years. In particular, Mr. Hagihara taught me how deeply confused Japanese politicians were after World War I. Also, while writing this book I gleaned numerous ideas from actual examples of European diplomacy, and I need to express my deep gratitude to Taoka Ryōichi, who repeatedly advised me on the importance of research on European diplomatic

history ever since I finished my undergraduate studies. I am also indebted to Inoki Masamichi for developing my ability to look at historical sources from a variety of angles—including the angle of confirming the authenticity of the history that the materials portray—and to engage in free thoughts about those materials.

The list of people to whom I owe thanks is endless; it is one that I could even take back to my childhood. For example, I have been blessed by having had exceptional teachers from elementary school through senior high school. And I owe much to my father, Kōsaka Masaaki. Things he told me made me see Immanuel Kant as difficult, and stirred my interest in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I believe that the tastes I developed then remain with me today.

Finally, the fact that I had the chance to meet with George F. Kennan and have a friendly chat with him about Anton Chekhov is due to an invitation I received from Matsumoto Shigeharu, and I wish to express my thanks to him as well.

Kōsaka Masataka
August 1966

INTRODUCTION
Perspectives on the Problems of International Politics

"[R]eal civilization cannot exist in the absence of a certain play-element, for civilization presupposes limitation and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tendencies with the ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed within certain bounds freely accepted. Civilization will, in a sense, always be played according to certain rules, and true civilization will always demand fair play." Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture*, 1938[1]

I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

"Complex Mysteries"

"Complex mysteries" (*fukuzatsu kaiki*)—with this well-remembered phrase, then-prime minister Hiranuma Kiichirō and his cabinet resigned at the end of August 1939, following the news that Germany and the Soviet Union had entered into a Non-Aggression Pact (commonly known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). The fact that Germany, which with its strongly anti-communist ideology had served as the fortress protecting Europe from communism and had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan—now formed this alliance with its former arch enemy, threw both Japan's government and its people, neither of which were capable of understanding the world in terms of power politics, into a state of complete confusion.

At the risk of overstatement, the failure of Japan's prewar diplomacy manifests itself in the particular turn of phrase: "complex mysteries." It is a matter of course for international politics to comprise a bundle of complex mysteries. This is not particularly surprising, and it certainly would not amount to something that, for example, constitutes legitimate grounds for a cabinet to resign.

At that time, however, nearly every Japanese was baffled by the "complex mysteries" of international politics and had no idea what Japan as a nation should do. Consequently, the Japanese government could not devise an adequate response to cope with the vicissitudes of international politics of that time. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded,

the Japanese government initially made a knee-jerk attempt to approach Great Britain and the United States. However, this fell through in the face of a chilly response from the United States. Then in the wake of Germany's eye-opening victories in Europe, Japan vacillated and again sought to strengthen bilateral ties with Germany. Just one year after Berlin and Moscow launched their pact, Japan and Italy joined with Germany in signing the Tripartite Pact to create the Axis Powers.

Thus, the fact is that Japan, without any firm intentions one way or the other, had been swept up in developments without fully understanding what was happening, and this is one of major reasons why it stumbled into war.

Of course, the causes of the Pacific War, like those of any war, should not be oversimplified. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no doubt that the chief reason why Japan led itself into war is because it was unable to keep in check the two forces driving the nation in that direction: the distinctive character of Japan's military; and its social system, which made it unclear where ultimate responsibility lay. Nonetheless, it is also true that developments in international politics prior to World War II were highly complex, and the responsibility for engaging in war is not limited to the Japanese leaders who were mistaken in their forecasts.

Even Josef Stalin himself, so proficient a schemer, mistakenly thought that Adolf Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. But the fact is that when it came to deception, Hitler was a real genius. The dramatic changes then occurring throughout the world were what made such deceptions possible. Therefore, we should first acknowledge just how difficult it was to weather those changes.

Also, we would be wrong to think that the people who spoke about "complex mysteries" were simple and ignorant. That turn of phrase has

the flavor of a graybeard worldliness that deals with failure without assigning blame to any of the parties involved. Furthermore, turning to domestic power politics, "complex mysteries" presented Japanese politicians with a convenient opportunity to take advantage of how baffled people were by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and use that situation to make changes in domestic politics. For better or worse, Japanese politicians certainly didn't take a back seat to anyone when it came to political plotting. However, the undeniable fact is that Japan's politicians, whose approach to domestic politics is very much of a power-politics type, were incapable of adapting to that type of politics in the international arena.

Peculiar Perceptions of International Politics

This discrepancy is due to the difference in the assumptions that Japanese make when observing domestic politics in contrast to international politics. When people look at the world, they do not do so from a blank slate. They do not deal with issues free from their preconceived attitudes. People take notice of certain facts, and have assumptions that influence how they decide what those facts mean. Present realities are seen through the lenses of such assumptions.

However, people's assumptions regarding domestic politics and international politics clearly differ. They naturally expect the complex power struggles that unfold in domestic politics. They do not unpackage these assumptions even when they talk about law and justice. However, Japanese tend to see international politics through the lenses of assumptions that are simpler and more abstract. Naturally, such simpler assumptions get undercut by how international politics actually unfold. And as international politics develop people get confused and cannot adapt to what happens. "Complex mysteries" is indeed the

archetypical verbal description of this situation. International politics usually is regarded as a complex mystery. The reason why that is the case is because the people who observe such politics do so based on simplistic assumptions. The failure of prewar Japanese diplomacy was rooted in the gap between Japanese assumptions about international politics and the realities of how such politics actually played out.

As observers have often noted, no such gap existed during the Meiji period (1867–1912). In those days, Japanese politicians acted based on an acute awareness of power politics in international society. This is how a small country like Japan was able to survive the vicissitudes of power politics from the end of the nineteenth century through the start of the twentieth century.

That said, merely praising Meiji-period politicians and censuring as mediocre those who immediately followed them does not enable us to understand either the tragedy of the Pacific War or the difficulties of international politics. The changes that caused the difficulty occurred in international politics, not in the attitudes or behavior of Japanese politicians.

The Transformation of International Politics

The nature of international politics clearly was transformed after World War I. Put simply, following that conflict, states began to discuss the problems of international politics in terms of "peace."

When Japan joined international society in the mid-nineteenth century, naked and brazen power politics was the norm and it was so up until World War I. Each state tried to pursue its national interest by skillfully balancing powers. Wars were legitimate means of foreign policy. Major powers agreed on spheres of influence over, and at the expense of, small nations in the name of maintaining the balance of power.

It is not correct to assume that international politics at the time was merely an arena without any order, ruled only by violence. Nakae Chōmin, in his famous work *Sansuijin keirin mondō* (*A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government*), criticized such notions as "overthinking" (*karyo*). While international politics is, at its core, power politics (that is to say, a struggle for power), the struggle takes place under certain rules and within a certain framework. However, it is also a fact that international politics in the pre–World War I period took as their basic principles considerations of power and national interests.

In contrast, the Soviet Union and the United States—the two exemplars of the "new diplomacy" of the post–World War I period—applied different concepts and principles to their thinking about international politics and decisions about their behavior. Although Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson were the political leaders responsible for their respective countries, both clearly rejected power politics. Both called out to the general public in ideological language. Moreover, what they were saying was not mere propaganda. This was very confusing for those who had lived through the era when power politics were being pursued so nakedly.

Perhaps the diary of Privy Council member Itō Miyoji, published as *Suiusō nikki* (Diary of the Green-rain Villa), can give us a glimpse of how confusing the American "new diplomacy" was for Japanese politicians. The members of the Japanese government's ad hoc Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (Rinji Gaikō Chōsa-kai, commonly known as the Gaikō Chōsa-kai), established in 1917 to deal with the emerging situation in international politics after World War I, were unable to get an adequate grasp of this new international situation, although they did recognize that US diplomacy was disrupting the conventional pattern of international politics. An example of this bewilderment can

be seen in Itō's remarks in regard to the Siberian Intervention, namely, Japan's part in the joint intervention by the Allied Powers into the Russian Civil War after the revolution.

> *The fact is that there are fundamental differences in thinking between Japan and the United States.* [emphasis in the original] Therefore, it is of no surprise that there are differences in our respective attitudes. That said, these differences in thinking do not exist solely between Japan and the United States. They also exist between the United States and the Allied Powers. A short list would be:
>
> *First*, the United States is single-mindedly obsessed by the possibility of hurting Russian national sentiments.
>
> *Second*, due to that concern over Russian sentiments, Americans claim they cannot afford to devote any time to considering what is at stake in terms of their own national interests. (For now, we will set aside the question of what their true intentions are here.)
>
> *Third*, based on that attitude, the United States skillfully avoids labeling their dispatch of troops on Vladivostok as an "intervention," even though it is clearly an intervention of a sort.

However, the question was exactly how Japan was to cope with the new conditions of international politics. For example, people such as Shidehara Kijūrō, the noted early-twentieth century diplomat and later the prime minister of Japan, saw this new diplomacy on the part of the United States to be the diplomacy of peace and naively supported American initiatives as the basic guideline for Japanese foreign policy. But Shidehara did not fully realize that even though

I. The Transformation of the Struggle for Power

international politics was being discussed in terms of peace, this did not mean that power politics had come to an end. Also, he did not pay sufficient attention to the ideological implications of peace diplomacy.

Conversely, there were also those who tried to deal with this change in international politics as though it was no change from the power politics of the earlier age. As Itō Miyoji said, whatever one may call it, intervention is intervention. By no means was this an inappropriate way of looking at the situation. For military strength, after all, is the ultimate tool of international politics. However, the observers wound up ignoring the change in how that power was used.

Therefore, Japanese views of international politics split into two extreme schools of thought, with one group talking about peace and the other continuing to engage in power struggles.

Moreover, the Russian Revolution introduced an ideological element that obscured the distinction between international and domestic politics. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union had an ideology that called for solidarity among the workers of the world. At the same time, it positioned itself as the motherland of that ideology. This posed an extremely difficult problem in terms of the relationship between how other countries dealt with the Soviet Union as an independent state and how they dealt with the expansion of communism. Some tried to deal with the Soviet Union as a sovereign state, and accordingly treated it as a power in international politics, while others attempted to deal with it essentially as the proponent of an ideological movement. Japanese politicians saw communism as something that itself was inseparable from the Soviet Union. Thus, Japanese tended to attribute any Soviet moves to its ideology. This assumption was greatly shaken by the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact.

Where the Problem Lies

Although the basic conditions of the world changed considerably after World War I due to a strong pacifist sentiment and the rise of communist ideology, neither the Japanese people nor politicians possessed any intellectual framework that allowed them to correctly understand international politics. This divided Japanese national opinion and led to the coining of the phrase "complex mysteries" (*fukuzatsu kaiki*). Perhaps this shortcoming continues to exist even today. At the very least, the new circumstances of international politics that emerged after World War I still persist. Are we intellectually better prepared to understand international politics today? Is it possible that we are repeating the same mistakes by trying to interpret international politics through some simple schema, or by giving up on trying to understand international politics and merely talking about its "complex mysteries?"

I become apprehensive when I see issues such as power politics, peace movements, and ideology being discussed as if they were completely unrelated. People seem to think that aspirations toward peace have no connection with power politics. Furthermore, most people seem to think that ideology and peace movements are different matters altogether. However, the desires for peace that exist today are ideologically colored to some degree and are supported by one power or another.

This is because the aspirations for peace and one or another ideological worldview both aim toward achieving a certain kind of international order. The peace diplomacy of the United States is colored by *its specific ideology*. The reason communist ideology is attractive to people is related to the fact that it offers *one possible path* toward peace. Both sets of aspirations for peace are rooted in their respective ideologies. Until World War I, diplomats did not seek a universal order, but were satisfied with an incomplete international order provided by a balance

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of power. However, for various reasons, after that war they came to want a more firmly established order.

Still, one should expect that any order would be underpinned by a specific value system (ideology) and by specific powers. That is why power struggles arise in the quest for order.

Of course these new struggles differ from traditional ones. In conducting foreign policy, no country can ignore its own beliefs, which limit the scope of its actions. The current realities of international politics are not consistent with the nineteenth-century worldview that accepted the naked conduct of power politics. However, this does not mean that nations now eschew power politics in their practice of international politics. Power struggles take place in the form of questioning what sort of peace is being sought.

Accordingly, regardless of the subjective intent of the person raising such questions, talking about peace is inevitably connected to the struggle for power. What we can say is that our understanding of present-day international politics begins and ends with our understanding of its complexity.

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II. The Three Levels of International Politics

The Good Egg/Bad Egg Theory

The question of peace has always been perceived in an overly simplistic manner. Perhaps it is due to our intellectual laziness. The good egg/bad egg way of thinking posits that peace can be achieved by discovering the motives for a specific power's decision to go to war and then eliminating that motive or motives. This premise is a key reason why intellectual laziness exists even if we work hard on our ability to take action. Humans have adopted exactly the same attitudes since antiquity whenever they face a difficult situation. At such times, we look for the "bad egg"—someone or something to blame—and satisfy ourselves by punishing them.

This does away with the burden of hard thinking in two ways. First, it is clear and straightforward. Second, it allows people to live without having to make any changes. Needless to say, this approach does not actually solve any problems. The passion to eradicate bad eggs does, however, incite our fighting instincts and encourage us to take action. Outright conflict does break out occasionally between good and bad. Fighting is intoxicating because it leads us to believe that our problems will be solved through victories. It is also true that conflicts can solve problems to some extent by delivering societies a jolt.

This pattern of behavior has manifested itself repeatedly when the risk of war threatens us, and we wish to avoid it. This tendency is all the more apparent when we discuss the question of peace. This

is because the concept of peace is abstract and hard to grasp. In the eighteenth century, monarchs and nobility were cast in the role of bad actors. Wars were thought to arise at the caprice of such personages. This is expressed well by the following well-known anecdote of the time. François-Michel le Tellier, Marquis of Louvois and a minister of state to King Louis XIV, had built the Trianon palaces at Versailles for that monarch. However, the king did not like the shape of the windows. Accordingly, or so the story goes, as a way to turn Louis XIV's attention to other matters, Louvois started a war with Austria.

Whether this story is apocryphal or not is not the issue here. The fact is that this sort of anecdote is a good illustration of the general way of thinking in that era. This led people to think that having representatives of the people, who could restrict the authority of monarchs, would be the road to peace. A proposal made by the noted French thinker Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–1794) is a prime example. He was certain that the people loved peace, and he believed that wars would not occur if the will of the people was directly represented. In fact, he came up with a detailed procedure wherein, in the event of enemy attack, any declaration of war would have to be approved by the legislature while starting a war could only be approved by a newly elected legislature.

In the nineteenth century, the landed aristocrats and landowners were generally believed to be bad actors. It was widely believed then that peace would prevail with the introduction of free trade, which would eliminate barriers among nations. Furthermore, some people believed that peace would come if free trade, which had the potential to eliminate all barriers among nation-states, were comprehensively instituted. In fact, Richard Cobden (1804–1865), a leading figure in the free-trade movement, was convinced that it would produce peace

and prosperity for every nation. When he learned that Napoleon III had rejected complete free trade in his negotiations with the UK, he thought at first that the report was an error. He then even insisted on going to France in an attempt to persuade Napoleon III in person. This episode illustrates how sincerely he believed in free trade.

In the twentieth century, the roles of bad actors have been assigned one after another; after one was done away with another was created. Kaiser Wilhelm and Germany's militaristic system, Hitler and fascism, capitalism, and the new imperialism of communism have all been treated as bad eggs, and the self-avowed good eggs have fought wars with them. Wars of this century have been all the more intense and bloody because they have been regarded as ones between good and evil. Thus, one country after another has been branded as a bad egg. But since the good eggs that defeated the bad eggs turned out to have their own failings, the credibility of this Manichean way of thinking came to be questioned. Even so, this way of thinking is so deeply rooted in human nature, it continues to implicitly influence our attitudes toward questions of war and peace.

Simplifying the Problem

In addition to this Manichean "good egg/bad egg" attitude, we cannot ignore how the structure of international politics is oversimplified. Discourse on international peace is generally based on a surprisingly simple view of the structure of international politics. In this regard, the most typical view is that peace can be achieved by doing away with armaments. This thinking is grounded in the perception that states are in a staring contest with weapons in hand. If people did not think that way, then they would never be so certain that peace could be attained just by getting rid of weapons.

The idea that peace can be achieved through the United Nations likewise rests upon a similar understanding of current realities. It follows for some that it would be best if all countries gave up their military capabilities, created a world federation, and had that federation's police force maintain order. Such a way of thinking would be correct if each nation were simply a unit of power, and if international politics was an arena in which these units of power simply existed side by side.

However, the reality is that nations are not simple units of power. A nation is both a system of interests and of power. It is the most important unit for the economic activities of its population. Certainly, international trade is conducted across national borders and the household and the workplace are the most directly tied to people's lives. But it is the nation that provides the framework for these varied economic activities, including the flow of money and goods. It is also within the framework of the nation that economic plans are developed and economic policies are adopted for the welfare of its members.

Japan's prosperity is directly linked to the standard of living of Japanese people. In contrast, although the prosperity of the United States or China or Korea may actually be connected to how we Japanese live, the connection with the prosperity of each of those nations is incomparably smaller. Each nation comprises a system of interests that sometimes harmonize with and sometimes conflict with the interests of other nations. It is simply impossible to separate questions about international peace from the interests involved. We cannot argue about the problem of peace without considering the interest relationships among nations.

Moreover, nations also comprise systems of values along with systems of powers and interests. Each of us makes our own decisions and chooses how to live our lives. We can do so without causing chaos in a

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society because we are tied together by invisible threads such as shared patterns of behavior and systems of values. Institutions ranging from states to families are not sustainable without these invisible threads.

"Justice" Is Defined by Common Sense

Our patterns of behavior and value systems have been shaped by our histories. Thus, they are more deeply rooted in our identities than we normally realize. These are not universally shared but are distinct and different from country to country. Hence, what separates countries from each other are not arbitrarily drawn borders, but rather the differences in norms for behavior and value systems as embodied in language and customs. One could say in short that Japan, like every other country, has its own version of common sense.

Let me illustrate this with an example close at hand. When a Japanese person wants to urge someone to eat a dish that they have prepared, they often humbly say, "This might not be up to your expectations." An American, in contrast, more likely will directly say, "I worked hard cooking this, so please enjoy it." This is a hackneyed example on a trivial matter, so perhaps some readers will wonder what connection this has to international politics. The point is that it offers a tip-of-the-iceberg glimpse at the differences between what comprises social practices in Japan, where people usually do not strongly assert themselves, and such practices in the United States, where people often do.

This is why Japanese working abroad often become perplexed by the different assumptions about what is common sense. One sometimes hears Japanese talking about how they are not good at being assertive or at arguing by using logic and reasoning like non-Japanese do; in saying this they are talking about the same sort of issue that

arises in international politics. Put simply, Japanese find it easy to work in Japan; it is comfortable for them. That is largely because virtually all Japanese share the same versions of common sense and the same guidelines regarding behavior.

In a different vein, many examples can also be found around the world of people who have different versions of common sense but who have tried forcibly to create a nation, only to have their efforts fail. For example, before Singapore was split off from Malaysia, Malaysia had been a nation in which Malays and ethnic Chinese lived in roughly the same numbers. But relations between the two groups did not go well, resulting in the separation of Singapore. Regarding this, someone said: "It's only natural that relations between people who eat pork and people who do not would not go well." Chinese like to eat pork, as can be seen from a look at their cuisine. In contrast, Malays, as Muslims, are forbidden to eat pork. Eating or not eating the meat of the pig is a relatively trivial matter, and is an issue related to the Islamic precepts that ban that practice. However, setting aside the question of whether eating pork is right or wrong, Islam has a crucial impact in providing many people with behavioral norms and a value system (common sense). The overseas Chinese likewise live based on their own common sense, and this is extremely important to them. They cannot simply discard what they believe to be common sense.

Of course, common sense can change and it can be assimilated. However, when it suddenly changes due to external forces, the people affected will feel like their world is coming apart, like startled birds whose flock has been scattered in all directions. Thus, common sense regulates our daily behavior. Although we are normally unaware of it, it is extremely important. When thinking about actual international society, it is no overstatement to say that there is not just one common

sense, but many. The existence of varied languages is one manifestation of this.

To put it another way, there are many kinds of justice in international society. Therefore, when someone refers to justice in the international arena, they are merely referring to their version of justice. It is hardly unusual for one country to think itself just while being regarded as unjust from the point of view of another country. Here, too, it is possible for tensions and conflict to arise.

Each sovereign country comprises a system of power, a system of interests, and a system of values. Accordingly, relations among nations are complex ones in which these three levels of relations are intertwined. It is this complex interaction on these three levels that makes understanding the question of war and peace among nations difficult. Nevertheless, we have long focused on only one of them in any discussions about peace.

In this volume, I want to examine questions of war and peace by viewing the relationships among nations from the perspectives of power, interests, and justice. This approach will clarify challenges in each area and show us how they are related to one another. It will also provide us with some basic guidelines for understanding questions of war and peace as well as establish some fundamental assumptions for framing our views and attitudes regarding international politics.

CHAPTER 1

ARMS AND PEACE

"You both insist on maintaining views that are poles apart . . . Your main ideas may seem as incompatible as ice and hot coals, but I think that you share a common disease—excessive anxiety. You have both seen the powerful nations of Europe maintaining a million strong soldiers, building ten million battleships, biting and grappling with each other, and coming frequently to wreak havoc on Asia. You have thus become overly concerned that these powerful Europeans will surely invade [us] someday, equipped with a hundred or a thousand battleships. This explains why you hold such extreme views." Nakae Chōmin, *Sansuijin keirin mondō* (*A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government*), 1887[2]

I. The Balance of Power

The Sources and Character of Balancing Strategies

United States president Woodrow Wilson, upon his return from Versailles after the end of World War I, told the American people that "the day we [have] left behind us . . . was a day of balances of power."[3] Setting aside whether his words correctly described reality, Wilson's remarks set the main agenda for international politics after the war.

In fact, a search was going on for something to replace the balance of power principle. The principle had been the core and guiding idea in diplomacy up to that time, but the experience of World War I had shown how completely inadequate it was. Consequently, not only idealistic thinkers and scholars, but also the so-called realists as well as diplomats began questioning its shortcomings. In fact, one could even say that there are hardly any texts on international politics today that do not bring up the problems associated with balance of power.

From the outset, the balance of power principle was adopted out of necessity. The idea emerged in Italy amid the confused circumstances of the start of the early modern period, when the medieval order had collapsed, and shared norms had disappeared. The ruthless methods proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) in *The Prince* (*Il Principe*) reflected the chaos that people of that time had to live through. In a situation where city-states recognized no form of higher authority nor laws that might restrain them, there existed no method for stabilizing conditions other than to find compromises between mutually

opposed desires and interests—and balances between mutually warring powers. The collapse of the medieval order eventually affected the whole of Europe and led to the emergence of similarly chaotic conditions. As a result, the notion of a balance of power spread throughout the continent. The religious conflicts that had driven Europe to the extremes of chaos in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries finally came to an end in the form of a balance among contesting powers.

This, too, was seen as common sense at the time. The idea of balance was applied not only to international politics but also to domestic politics. It was further applied in economics and medicine. Humans were thought to be healthy only when the organs that comprise their bodies were in balance. Meanwhile, for the economy to be out of balance meant that all manner of damage would result. And in politics, it was the balance of the many elements that comprise society that provided the foundations for a political structure, as expressed in Montesquieu's tripartite distribution of power, and the fundamental principle for the system of checks and balances in the United States Constitution. This concept of balance treated the diversity in human society, along with the competition and conflicts that this diversity stirred up, as natural and even desirable. At the same time, this concept was concerned with preventing a state of anarchy. Likewise, balance (of power) in international politics was expected to serve the dual purpose of maintaining the independence of all nations, and avoiding chaotic situations, particularly total war.

Thus, diplomats were charged with two missions: to actively pursue the interests of their own countries and to find a middle ground that avoided any fundamental destruction of international society. The word "diplomacy" first appeared at the start of the eighteenth century, and since that time "power" and "interests" have been clearly

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recognized as the two factors that guide how diplomacy is conducted. Interests are thought to determine what a foreign policy should promote, while power is thought to be that which allows a nation to achieve its interests. Therefore, in order to avoid any *tests of strength* that would inflict damage, it became necessary to correctly understand the intricately entangled interests and relationships between the various nations. This became the number one task for diplomacy. Thus, there were frequent debates over not confusing "true" interests with "superficial" ones while also arguing that "permanent" interests should not be sacrificed for "temporary" ones.

Diplomats were certainly not satisfied with the mechanical operations of the balance of power. However, they did not think it was possible to achieve order in international society by any means other than by the balance of power and interests.

For example, Charles-Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), came up with a proposal for achieving "perpetual peace," urging the creation of an international court to mediate between states. Responding to this, the diplomat and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) wrote, "I have seen something of the project of M. de St. Pierre, for maintaining a perpetual peace in Europe. I am reminded of a device in a cemetery, with the words: *Pax perpetua*; for the dead do not fight any longer: but the living are of another humor; and the most powerful do not respect tribunals at all."[4] Leibniz further went on, toward the end of the seventeenth century, to counter Saint-Pierre's proposal by compiling the world's first collection of treaties and public documents (*Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus*, 1693). He did so because he believed that, given the importance of power in international politics, it would be more effective to study each of the various specific agreements that had been reached based on power relationships,

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than to consider whatever laws or theory that might or might not apply to international politics in general. Thus, balance of power became the guiding principle for foreign policy just as modern international society came into being, and it continued to be so thereafter.

Flaws in the Balance of Power Principle

However, this principle was at best a means to an end, and little more than sound common sense. It could not guarantee peace without turmoil. To begin with, no one could clearly define what it meant for powers to be in balance. Power itself is nebulous and difficult to grasp. In fact, the problem of what power is had long vexed many scholars. For example, the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) spoke of it as follows:

> The greatness of an estate, in bulk and territory, doth fall under measure; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. The population may appear by musters; and the number and greatness of cities and towns by cards and maps. But yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation and true judgment concerning the power and forces of an estate.[5]

Turning to recent history, in the final stages of World War II, US strategists thought that it would be Great Britain and the Soviet Union that would oppose each other in postwar Europe. At the same time, as the war was coming to an end, US policymakers could not foresee that the UK would become completely exhausted after the war while the Soviet Union would become more powerful, even though both suffered heavy damage from the war. Thus, because the United States had

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misjudged the postwar power relationships it made the mistake of rapidly withdrawing its forces from Europe. Such errors are easy to make when evaluating power.

It is even more difficult to accurately gauge the relative power of nations in an alliance and to forecast just how reliable the alliance will be. This is because a given nation might suddenly make peace or even cooperate with a former enemy. Consider, for example, the situation in the mid-eighteenth century, when European powers had been warring both for possession of the New World and at the same time for pre-eminence and domination in Europe itself. Although during the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), Great Britain and Austria were allies fighting a French-Prussian alliance, these alliance relationships flipped during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), when France allied with Austria and Russia, while Great Britain helped Prussia. Moreover, when Great Britain accomplished its main objective of achieving dominance in the New World, it limited its involvement in the conflict and stopped providing Prussia with assistance, leaving Prussia on its own. Perhaps it was only natural that Frederick the Great (1712–1786), who lived during this era and spent his entire life manipulating the balance of power, wrote in his *Political Testament of 1752*, "Take good care not to place your trust in the number and good faith of your allies; count only on yourself; then you will never deceive yourself."

Examples of this sort are not limited to the eighteenth century. Great Britain allied itself with Japan during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)—though it did not actually take part in the fighting— and provided aid to Japan. But two years after that war, Britain joined with Russia to form the Anglo-Russian Entente. A similar shift was seen in the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact concluded on the eve of World War II, as discussed in the Introduction.

The difficulty in balancing power is more than just a matter of the difficulty of correctly gauging the power that exists. There are numerous factors in international politics that prevent accurate measurement of the balance of power. First, nations may talk about achieving balance, but they are actually trying to obtain a balance tilted in their favor. This is because if a nation has sufficiently greater power than its peers, any failures in calculation or action will not result in significant damage, thus making the more powerful nation feel all the more secure. Meanwhile opposing nations try to do the exact same thing to guarantee a favorable balance. Any balance favorable to one is unfavorable to the other, thus one of them will be dissatisfied with the actual balance of power. Accordingly, the cases in which a stable balance of power will be achieved are in fact very limited. Generally speaking, a stable balance can only be achieved when a nation with advantage does not abuse its advantage to establish a superior status while a nation with disadvantage does not dare challenge the status quo.

Furthermore, the motivation to gain "greater" power is not based solely on rational calculations. This is clear when we consider human psychology. As expressions such as "the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence" demonstrate, people tend to envy others. Similarly, nations tend to overestimate the military strength of other nations. On top of that, humans are quite insensitive when it comes to the threat they may pose to others while very suspicious of any aggressive intentions that others may have. British Nobel Prize-winning nuclear physicist Patrick M.S. Blackett referred to this as "moral asymmetry," and pointed out that such a danger is inherent in all strategies. Consequently, this created the idea that an opposing party will take whatever opportunity it has to attack us, and so we must prepare for that. In this respect, the strategies of the Soviet Union, the US, and

China all resemble one another to a surprising degree. The armaments held by other nations are seen as threats, while one's own weapons are seen merely as defensive tools to counter those threats.

Powers were also constantly overestimating the possibility of a surprise attack. For example, US strategists were greatly concerned that the Soviets might launch a first strike even if it meant losing a quarter of their own population, while forgetting that their own nation was capable of doing the same thing. Any attempts to achieve a balance of power pose the risk of an arms race. Every nation will expand its military capabilities to tilt the balance in its favor. Technological advances in particular have made it possible to upset the balance without ever having to set foot in another nation's territory. The intensity of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II is historically new. Such a flaw in balance of power thinking becomes particularly obvious in a crisis. People become unable to make dispassionate assessments and decisions or to see the full range of what is possible.

This is why those involved end up seeing the situation in black and white terms: one must either doggedly argue for one's own position, or step back and accept defeat. This is not a failure of the balance of power way of thinking per se but is rather a danger that underlies any way of thinking, especially when rigid opinions are held. It cannot be denied that emphasizing the role of power tends to lead people to think in terms of confrontation.

The Character of World War I

The outbreak of World War I seems to have been caused by the accumulated defects in the balance of power approach discussed thus far. Of the three sets of strained relationships in place on the eve of that

conflict, the first one, the uneasy relationship between France and Prussia, had existed ever since the 1870–1871 war between those two powers, while the other two unsettled relationships emerged out of a gradual accumulation of fears over states that had been newly increasing in strength. One of these was Great Britain's worries over Germany's sudden rise, which grew particularly strong after Germany began to build up its navy. The other was based on concerns held by Austria-Hungary and Prussia regarding the fact that Russia, a vast agricultural nation, was now industrializing. Austria-Hungary's worries in particular were reinforced by fears that its own multiethnic empire would be overthrown from below by nationalism in the Balkans.

Austria-Hungary, which was in the weakest position of all those powers, tried to take advantage of Archduke Ferdinand's assassination


Figure 1. Europe's Tense Relationships Prior to the Outbreak of World War I

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in order to restrict nationalist movements in the Balkans. This can be seen as black-or-white decision-making: either pull back or move ahead. Then Austria-Hungary made two miscalculations when it adopted a hardline stance. The first mistake—which Prussia also made—was to see Russia as having neither the will nor the ability to wage war. The second was to think that Great Britain was unlikely to participate in the conflict. Edward Goschen, London's ambassador to Berlin at that time, reported that the German government thought—to the very end—that Britain would remain neutral. Goschen also wrote that the French ambassador had criticized Britain's ambiguous stance, and he argued that the only way to prevent a general war would be for Great Britain to declare that it would stand and fight alongside Russia and France. It is clear from this that there were considerable doubts about what Britain's stance would be. It is safe to say that Austria-Hungary thought that it was time to push its position strongly, and that doing so would involve no risk. This thinking propelled Austria-Hungary into aggressive diplomacy. In fact, however, Russia showed that it had the will to fight, and it began preparing for war. When Prussia and Austria-Hungary responded by launching a preemptive strike, Great Britain entered the war.

Nobody expected or wished for World War I to happen, but it did. The war likewise developed in unexpected ways. Many thought that the war would be over within a matter of months. But in fact, it went on for several years. Forecasts about how much destruction would result from the fighting were also completely mistaken. The war struck a blow that was nearly fatal to European civilization. The huge scale of damage shook the raison d'être of the balance of power principle to its core. The idea of a balance of power, which was expected to serve the dual purpose of maintaining the independence of nations

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and preventing disorder, assumed that the costs of warfare would be limited. Not many considered absolute peace to be the goal of international politics.

For example, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) defined the state of nature as "the war of all against all," and he argued that great power, which he likened to a monstrous Leviathan, was the means to escape from this intolerable situation. However, he did not go so far as to apply this image of the state of nature to the international level. He did not see international society as an arena in which a war of all against all could occur even if there was no dominant power, and for that reason he did not see any need for supranational institutions. He reasoned that although struggles between individuals could result in the loss of life, struggles between nations would not result in the death of nations. There may be casualties and victims, but for the state as a whole this is a minor price to pay. At the same time, if the state forces the people to make more than minor sacrifices, they will not cooperate. Thus, Hobbes thought, so long as conflicts among nations were limited in scale they could gauge their mutual interests and find peace through compromises.

Similarly, Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), the famed specialist on international law, thought that a balance of power that guaranteed each nation's independence was desirable, given that conflicts among nations were limited. He saw this as giving a nation the ability to preserve its freedom, and for that reason he thought that a world government would not be necessary. Meanwhile, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689–1755), author of *The Spirit of the Laws*, spoke of international politics as a matter of unstable peace rather than as endless war.

The wars of the eighteenth century most certainly were limited ones. The power of governments was limited both in terms of raising

funds and mobilizing manpower. Soldiers were extremely valuable. Accordingly, it was desirable to wage war with a minimum of casualties. For example, the French general Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750), a leading military man of the eighteenth century, said "I am not in favour of giving battle, especially at the outset of a war. I am even convinced that a clever general can wage war all his life without having to fight one."[6] This is why wars were frequently likened to a game of chess. Both sides try to win by achieving the advantage through how they formed and maneuvered their armed forces. Once a side found itself in a disadvantageous position, it made more sense to quickly withdraw or accept defeat and pay appropriate compensation.

> A war was a game with its rules and its stakes . . . The loser paid, but a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head. They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop. It was for this reason that the great eighteenth-century theorists of warfare urged that neither justice, nor right, nor any of the great passions that move a people should ever be mixed up with war.[7]

If this is what war is, then the balance of power would have a good raison d'être as a principle that would allow nations to achieve their two objectives: maintain independence and avoid a chaotic international situation. However, the power of nations has grown over the course of modern history, and with it so have their destructive capabilities.

In particular, the technological developments that have accompanied the advance of industrial civilization since the nineteenth century have provided states with even more powerful weapons. At the same

time, industrial civilization has facilitated the organizing of the population, which has resulted in the expansion of both the human and material resources that a state can mobilize. It has become possible to incorporate the general public as soldiers, and to mobilize practically the entire population to support military action. World War I produced casualties on a scale unimaginable to what had been "common sense" before. The fact is each state was able to keep fighting for several years by continuing to spend astronomical amounts on their militaries. This also would have been inconceivable without the above-mentioned historical developments. The French statesman General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) accurately described the character of that war:

> The accumulation of changes that had taken place over many years suddenly appeared [as] one great change. Over the course of several generations, popular elections, compulsory education, industrialization and urbanization, newspapers, political parties, labor unions, and sports had nurtured a collective mentality. The mass movements and mechanization in which we have come to partake due to our modern way of life laid the groundwork for mass mobilization, and prepared people to withstand the sudden shock and cruelty that distinguishes a war of the populace. (*France and War*)

The result of this is that the costs of war—even for the victor—were far and away greater than its benefits. George F. Kennan was correct to have pointed out that if, in fact, during the early stages of a war one or the other warring parties would *accept the enemy's conditions as is*, that nation would suffer far less than by continuing the fight and achieving victory. At the start of the modern era, thinkers believed that states

would not be struck by any fatal blow in conflicts among them, and this assumption justified the quest for a balance of power. But now that premise has collapsed.

A Fully Mobilized People

Moreover, the fact that the costs of war had dramatically risen was not the only problem. In order to mobilize populations and get them to keep fighting, politicians began to appeal to the passions of the public. When Germany was tarred with the epithet "militarist," it struck back with "reactionary Russia," "decadent France," and "hypocritical Britain." "The war to end all wars" was bandied about as a slogan. These slogans unquestionably motivated people. However, as the eighteenth-century theorists of warfare had feared, it proved difficult to end a war that was being fought based on passions. Those passions caused World War I to drag on long enough to completely ruin several nations despite numerous attempts to negotiate peace. There was no room for the dispassionate calculation of interests.

World War I was hardly the only conflict to be driven by the passions of the masses. This is due to the nature of mass society, which is a major feature of our contemporary world. This poses enormous challenges to diplomacy, which in principle calls for a correct understanding of national interests and the actions guided by that understanding. Today's diplomats must do their work in an extremely difficult environment. For even if diplomats are able to reach reasonable compromises between opposing interests, they then need to worry whether the respective peoples of their countries will accept them. In many cases, a result that is appropriate from the perspective of national interests will end up being criticized because the populace has prejudices or a

mistaken understanding of the facts, and/or because of some ideology.

These days, the premise of peace based on the balance of power is being challenged. In particular, the emergence of nuclear weapons has greatly increased the cost of war. Now it is possible for a nation to be completely annihilated. At the same time, technological advances that facilitate public relations and propaganda efforts, combined with ideological competition, have made it impossible to strike deals based solely on the calculation of interests. In the past, military force could be brought to bear in the game of international politics without stirring too much alarm, but this undeniably is no longer the case. The effectiveness of using interest calculations to guide diplomacy has now come into question. Consequently, we have been in search of an alternative to the idea of seeking a balance of power.

II. Disarmament

Agreement in Theory but No Action in Practice

The most radical alternative for peace based on a balance in military power is peace without military power. This alternative envisages all nations disarming themselves completely and an international army being created to maintain global order. After the two world wars, disarmament became the central program for those focused on peace.

Of course, such ideas are hardly new. The dangers of having too many weapons and the need to do away with them is a problem that has vexed humanity for millennia. Even in the eighteenth century when nations having standing armies was the norm, the talk was of how to abolish those powerful forces.

Two works by a pair of eminent philosophers who wrote about peace at the end of the eighteenth century—the 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace" by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and the 1789 article "A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace" by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)—also proposed abolishing standing armies. Likewise, some one hundred years later—after a century that saw a dramatic increase in the destructive capability of weaponry due to the invention of the machine gun and improvements in explosives—writers began to issue forewarnings of the misery of wars to come. For example, the Polish writer Ivan. S. (Jan Gotlib) Bloch correctly prophesied in his 1896 work, *The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations,* how World War I would unfold:

At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt for ever. (p. xvi)

The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle . . . needle gun . . . smokeless powder . . . [and] higher explosives. (pp. xvii–xxiv)

The first thing every man will have to do . . . will be to dig a hole in the ground, and throw up as strong an earthen rampart as he can to shield him from the hail of bullets which will fill the air. . . . All digging work is slow work, and when you must dig a trench before you can make any advance, your progress is necessarily slow. Battles will last for days, and at the end it is very doubtful whether any decisive victory can be gained. (p. xxvii)

Every great State would in time of war be in the position of a besieged city, and the factor which always decides sieges is the factor which will decide the modern war. Your soldiers may fight as they please; the ultimate decision is in the hands of *famine*. (p. xlix)[8]

The warnings and proposals from these writers impressed everyone and won general approval. That said, by no means were these proposals implemented. However, they were at least taken up by politicians and even became the subject of debate among diplomats. For example, Czar Nicolas II of Russia (1868–1918) was moved by Bloch's work. He suggested that an international conference be held to discuss the peace question—the First Hague Conference of 1899—at which he argued for setting limits on armament. Attendees easily found accord over the

principle that setting limits on military spending was extremely desirable. However, when it came to implementing this idea, all they were able to do was to declare that they "might examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets."[9] Regardless of this declaration, each country's military spending continued to rise, and at the Second Hague Conference, held in 1907, they did nothing more than come to the same sort of agreement. A similar process occurred again after World War I, then again after World War II. Governments emphasized the necessity of disarmament, and declared the seriousness of their intent. However, they were not able to achieve concrete results. Very few disarmament efforts have come to pass, including even minor ones that might be expected to be easier and more realistic first steps on a path to complete disarmament.

In fact, there has always been a hint of complacency and hypocrisy in the attitudes of idealists in their disarmament proposals. Some have merely repeated these proposals simply because they were convinced that they were just, but they do not seriously reflect on why those efforts bear no fruit. Others, aware that such a feat is impossible, instead take the irresponsible and hypocritical approach of not venturing to express their opposition and instead let the realities of life prove that eliminating armaments is impossible. As a result, efforts to obtain peace without military power—in place of peace based on a balance of such power—have left behind a large and impressive record of proposals, agreements in principle, and remarkable attempts—but total failure in practice.

The Difficulties of Equitable Disarmament

This failure is unsurprising, for there are numerous obstacles to disarmament. In the first place, the criteria for "disarmament" need to be

in place. This may not be a problem if the goal is total disarmament, but given the impossibility of eliminating all weapons in a single stroke some sort of criteria—even if provisional—will be needed to regulate the process. Trying to set the ratios among the arsenals of various nations is even more difficult. The two arms-control conferences held between the two world wars demonstrate this well.

First, the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922) was one of the few successful examples of an attempt at arms reduction. Under its terms, Japan agreed to an inferior position in a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships compared to the United States and Great Britain, a decision that was criticized by Japanese hard-liners. In fact, however, this ratio was favorable to Japan. Considering the vast difference in the economic power of Japan and the United States at that time, if the race to build battleships had continued without the Washington Naval Treaty, either the gap between the United States and Japan would have grown even larger or Japan's economy would have collapsed. The United States, given its industrial strength, could easily have achieved a 5:1 ratio vs. Japan. (At the time, Japan was spending 7.72 percent of its national income on the military, while the United States was spending no more than 2.26 percent). Nonetheless, the United States decided to compromise on the 5:3 ratio. Katō Tomosaburō, Japan's navy minister and chief negotiator at the Washington conference, was quite aware of this fact and decided to accept the 5:5:3 ratio.

However, there were few in Japan who were as insightful and levelheaded as Katō. The average Japanese would look only at Japan's inferior ratio and end up indignant over the affront to their country's prestige. In this context, Japan's insistence on a 7:10 ratio at the London Naval Conference of 1930 was not the product of rational strategic calculation but rather the reflection of a vague sense of

dissatisfaction. One piece of evidence comes from a remark made by Matsudaira Tsuneo, Japan's ambassador to Great Britain, in preliminary talks with his US counterpart Charles G. Dawes, in which he told the latter, "Having the 5:5:3 ratio applied to non-battleships is not something we will be able to accept if we also take Japanese public opinion into account. Therefore, I am asking you before we formally meet to keep this in mind." It can be assumed that the Japanese Naval General Staff's strong and repeated unreasonable opposition to the London Naval Treaty was also due to this vague sense of dissatisfaction.

The greatest obstacle was how to evaluate all the various types of armament. It was still possible to achieve an agreement at the Washington Naval Conference because the ratio of capital ships was the only issue there. However, the London Naval Conference took into account all other types of vessels and made the task more difficult. This is because the countries involved all made claims for their various respective interests.

The same difficulty arose with arms-reduction negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. For example, in negotiations held since the mid-1950s, the biggest stumbling blocks have been how to assess US overseas bases, and the USSR's secrecy regarding military bases on its own territory. The fact that US bases encircle the Soviet Union gives the United States an advantage beyond a simple comparison of the sizes of their forces, in that it makes it more difficult for the Soviet Union to defend itself. However, the Soviet Union is not an open country, and it is easy for it to protect its military secrets. This not only gives it a military advantage, but also brings with it the psychological pressure that other countries experience from not knowing the USSR's true capabilities. For these reasons, both countries have overestimated one another's military advantages.

In June 1954, the Soviet government proposed to the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) that all countries remove their military bases from other countries, and since then has repeatedly made similar proposals. The following year, the Soviet Union returned full control of its base at Port Arthur (Lüshun) to China, and the next year transferred its base at Porkkaa Udd back to Finland. It took each of these opportunities to intensify its demands that the United States withdraw its own bases from other countries. One of the reasons why the Soviet Union decided to recognize non-aligned nations was because doing that would serve the purpose of promoting the Soviet policy of increasing the area of land around its territory with no US bases.

In response, at the July 1955 summit meeting of the "Big Four" powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—held in Geneva, Switzerland, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower made inspection, including his "Open Skies" proposal for aerial surveillance, the core of the nation's arms-reduction proposal. On October 11, 1961, US secretary of state Dean Rusk made it clear that the arms-reduction proposal that the US had submitted to the UN General Assembly at the end of September was premised on a control system being in place. He argued that while the Soviet Union might accept inspections in principle, they would do so only after the disarmament process had been completed. In his view, this would render the whole idea of controls and inspection meaningless.

Of course, the problem is that both the United States and the Soviet Union are demanding in the name of disarmament that the other party is the one that needs to cut back on its forces. Moreover, even if both are sincere about their desire for parity, it still leaves the delicate problem of evaluating such matters as secret bases and restricted territory.

Viewed in terms of overall military potential, if one side reduces its military force to a greater degree than the other side does, the effect will be to make the other side *stronger*. That, accordingly, can be easily understood as a result equivalent to one side having won the arms race. For example, if the Soviet Union allowed the United States to inspect its territory, the US could learn what the Soviet Union's true military strength was and this would therefore put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage. Conversely, if the two parties agreed only to eliminate US bases in foreign countries, the Soviet Union could reduce US superiority or perhaps even gain an advantage. In such ways, disarmament can change any existing balance of power.

The Ramifications for the Struggle for Power

Moreover, while individual disarmament efforts may not change a given balance of power on their own, they can still affect the overall struggle for power. This is another obstacle to achieving disarmament, because any restrictions or reductions of arms would be carried out based on existing levels. That in turn would lead to solidifying whatever power relationships that existed at that moment—that is to say, it would entrench whichever party happened to be more dominant in their place. Many of the reductions and restrictions on armament that have been achieved to date fall into that category. If the weaker party is unwilling to accept this status quo, disarmament will not take place.

This is the fundamental reason why the Baruch Plan failed. In March 1946, the United States proposed what came to be known as the Baruch Plan. Among the tremendous number of arms-reduction proposals after World War II, this one seemed to be the least self-serving. Although tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were then growing, the relationship had not yet settled into

what we now think of as the Cold War, and the United States was deeply anxious about just how destructive atomic bombs could be.

Accordingly, the United States offered to relinquish its nuclear monopoly and place its nuclear capabilities in the hands of a supranational organization. In exchange, this supranational organization—specifically, the erstwhile International Atomic Development Authority (IADA)—would have been given centralized authority to manage, monitor, and license all activities relating to atomic power, including nuclear fuel and related nuclear refinery facilities. Moreover, while this would be created under the umbrella of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States argued that UNSC members should not be allowed to exercise their veto to prevent the "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" that the Baruch Plan provided for dealing with violations. In exchange for those conditions, the Plan proposed that the United States would destroy its nuclear weapons and transfer serviceable nuclear materials to the control of this supranational organization. The United States made no mention of the Soviet Union's enormous ground forces when it offered this proposal. At that time, the United States was quickly demobilizing following World War II. Accordingly, when it came to standing military forces, the United States was overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Soviet Union, whose forces the US nuclear capability was meant to keep in check. Under such conditions, transferring US nuclear weapons to international control would only seem to put the US at a disadvantage. The impression it left was that the US was only seeking to transfer control of this horrifying weaponry that it had developed, without giving deep thought to the balance of military strength on the whole.

However, even when human beings do not think deeply enough, they do not forget their own interests. We protect our interests, even

unconsciously. The same could be said about the United States here. The Baruch Plan protected US national interests in two respects at the very least. For one, the plan was advantageous to the United States, due to how it entrenched the status quo of US superiority.

US superiority after the end of World War II took three forms. First, its ability to have its way in the United Nations was overwhelming. Second, the United States also had enormous industrial capacity to back that up. Added to this was the third form of superiority, the fact that United States had already developed nuclear weapons. Even if the nuclear weapons it already possessed were all destroyed, the United States would still have a monopoly on how to produce them. The Soviet Union, in contrast, would have faced a situation in which it would not be able to develop nuclear weapons, because such development would end up under the control of that supranational international organization. As a consequence, in terms of the crucial element of national power represented by *knowing how to make nuclear weapons*, the Soviet Union would have been put in a position inferior to that of the United States for a long time.

Thus, contrary to appearances, the Baruch Plan would function in a way that would entrench the reality of US superiority, and for that reason the Soviet Union came to oppose it. The Soviets bought time by dragging out the negotiations, during which they made a concentrated all-out effort to develop their own nuclear weapons. From the Soviets' viewpoint, such a tactic would not seem surprising.

Both the plan's underlying motive of entrenching the status quo and the resistance to the plan itself were made plain by the issue of a nuclear test ban. Halting nuclear testing unquestionably would have served to ease tensions. But viewed more realistically, it would have had the effect of freezing the development of nuclear weapons. Since

the late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union had come to think that a test ban would be in their respective interests by both stabilizing the nuclear stalemate between them and maintaining their nuclear monopoly. However, France and China began to develop their own nuclear weapons, and naturally neither of these countries would have agreed to a halt in testing that would have hindered them in that regard. France expressed its intent to oppose such a ban at the arms-control conferences, while China, which did not have a seat on the DCSC, vehemently protested to the Soviet Union regarding that issue. In autumn 1963, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States concluded the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and invited other nations around the world to sign, but neither France nor China agreed to do so.

Thus, whenever nations were talking about disarmament or arms limitations, they still always had the struggle for power in the backs of their minds. In short, disarmament is another aspect of power politics.

Controlling and Safeguarding Nuclear Weapons

The second point on which the Baruch Plan was favorable to the United States had to do with the control of nuclear weapons. The supranational body that would control all the world's nuclear power, and to which the United Sates would transfer its own, would largely be under US influence. Moreover, the United States would be destroying its nuclear weapons and transferring nuclear materials to that supranational organization only after it was created. Accordingly, even if control of a nation's nuclear capabilities were entrusted to an international organization whose members (including the US) lacked veto power, the United States would still be able to indirectly control those capabilities through that organization.

The United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly at the time that it thought it would retain for at least another five years, so it saw the proposal as fair. The Soviet Union, however, believed that all of its activities would be strictly monitored under any such international body while the US would preserve its nuclear monopoly, even if this was meant to be a transitional situation. As is often the case with political phenomena, there is no way of determining how long such a "transitional period" may last. It is understandable that the Soviet Union believed that to accept the Baruch Plan would mean accepting a system in which the United States would perpetuate its monopoly on atomic weapons. As the Soviet Union saw it, the Baruch Plan was control without disarmament.

Conversely, the Soviet Union in its "Gromyko Plan" led with prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This was to be followed with prohibitions on producing and stockpiling them, and then with destroying those weapons that had already been produced. However, it was natural for the US to be concerned that a secretive country like the Soviet Union—which does not allow the freedom of movement and expression—could build nuclear weapons in secret. This is why control arose as an issue with respect to disarmament. This is the third obstacle to eliminating or reducing armaments—one that had manifested itself repeatedly throughout the course of arms-reduction negotiations.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain—while not opposed to disarmament in principle—held the view that it would be naïve to both believe the pronouncements of other countries about reducing their armaments, and consequently to base the defense of their country on such pronouncements. The problem of control arose between the two world wars as well. France initially wanted to establish an inspection body, while Germany was opposed to controls without disarmament.

The dilemma that this problem presents has further deepened in the nuclear age. This is due to the enormous destructive capability of nuclear weapons. In particular, the development of rockets has made it possible to deliver nuclear weapons in an extremely short time. For that reason, the gains that could be achieved by violating such agreements have been extremely large. Without an effective controlling body, one or another country could potentially dominate the world if it still secretly possessed hundreds of nuclear bombs and missiles after every other country had eliminated theirs. In fact, just having had a nuclear weapon in the past may be enough, even if that country no longer has any. What matters is perception. Believing that someone is secretly developing nuclear weapons can be enough to disrupt the peace.

But conversely, for any country to be subjected to an inspection mechanism of some sort would be roughly the same as yielding to some form of disarmament, and that would weaken that country's position. As interwar Germany and the post–World War II Soviet Union argued, any disarmament prior to the creation of some controlling body would mean entrusting the security of one's own country to others.

Hobbesian Fear

Thus, we can see how in the event of any extreme scenario, the roots of disarmament contain the dilemma that British historian Herbert Butterfield labeled the "Hobbesian fear."[10] As Hobbes so brilliantly analyzed, people act out of fear when no authority exists to control their behavior. Butterfield detected the same sort of problem in the relations among nation-states.

The situation here is essentially that of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people who do not like each other are locked in a room, and each has a

pistol. Both parties know that they could avoid the worst-case scenario of killing one another by both throwing their pistols out the window. However, they don't know how to achieve this. If one party throws their pistol out the window first, the other party would still be safe if they decided to not throw out their own pistol, and so they might break the promise and keep it instead. If both parties promised to throw out their pistols at the same time but only one followed through and kept it, the party who didn't throw out their pistol would be vulnerable. It's also always possible that both parties might throw out a pistol but one still has another pistol hidden in their pocket. It's also always possible that neither has a pistol but one or both suspects that the other does. What's more, it is conceivable that the other person might still suspect the same sort of betrayal. Thus, while both parties might recognize that the best option would be to throw out their pistols, neither are willing to do so, and hence the situation remains uncertain.

Disarmament in essence involves the same sort of dilemma. Butterfield argued that this Hobbesian fear is what caused the failure of the efforts toward peace that humans in their wisdom had attempted up to that time. Disarmament has never been the sole objective for nations. Even if it were, such an objective would still be unachievable.

One shouldn't spend too much time mulling over such an overly simplified hypothetical scenario. Speculation ultimately is still merely speculation, and international politics cannot be reduced to the simple situation of two people with pistols. However, such speculations teach us an important lesson in that they direct our attention to the rationale that creates a correlation between mutual fear and the building up of armaments. We normally think of reason as something that stands in contrast to conflicts among humans. We think that reasoning will solve such problems. However, under the conditions that I postulated

above, in a situation in which two parties fear each other, human reasoning does not help us to escape the situation, but rather hinders such efforts. For while humans can predict the future, for that very reason we can also imagine a situation in which the opposing party has not thrown away their pistol even though we have. If humans were just a little simpler, it would be easy for us to throw away our pistols, and the conditions of Hobbesian fear would not arise. Unfortunately, however, thanks to our capacity for reasoning, we humans cannot be so simple.

In short, given their ability to predict possible futures, in situations where humans might fear one another—that is to say, when one party is capable of harming the other and has the intention to do so—they are unable to eliminate their fear of one another by simply eliminating their capacity to harm one another. We must not forget that having the ability to harm one another creates a fear of one another, and this hinders efforts to reduce the capabilities that are the source of those fears.

The idea that the main way to achieve peace is to eliminate armaments is based on the idea that armaments are fundamentally what produce tension and conflict, thus eliminating them would put an end to that tension and conflict. However, our discussion thus far shows that where strong political tensions exist, it is impossible to single-mindedly push forward on disarmament alone.

III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

The *Sansuijin keirin mondō* Dilemma

The American journalist and essayist Walter Lippmann once said that for the foreseeable future, humankind would be trapped in a limbo between unwinnable wars and unattainable peace. In short, he argued, between a war we could not win and a peace we could not attain. Lippmann experienced the first half of the twentieth century in its entirety, with all of its dramatic and enormous changes, and this is how he chose to depict the post–World War II world.

In all likelihood, he was correct. As we have already seen, given the essential nature of international society with coexisting sovereign states, it is impossible to single-mindedly carry out disarmament. That said, the development of nuclear weapons and the emergence of mass society has shaken balance of power as a guiding principle for diplomacy. However, we should not begin by overemphasizing how unprecedented the situation confronting us today is. In the past, when people were faced with a difficult situation, they too almost always asserted that it was without precedent. Most of the time, they were merely comforting themselves.

We should not overlook the fact that the eminent Japanese thinker Nakae Chōmin pointed out the same difficulties some eighty years ago. In his magnum opus *Sansuijin keirin mondō* (*A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government*), Nakae presents the arguments offered first by the Gentleman of Western Learning, who advocates

demilitarization, and then those of the Champion, who advocates preparing an arsenal sufficient to stave off the Western powers and to conquer weaker nations. These are then followed by the words of the illustrious Master Nankai:

> Mr. Gentleman's ideas derive from theoretical musing, both spoken and written, brewed in the minds of European scholars. But these points have not yet been put into practice in the world. They are like dazzlingly attractive clouds. Mr. Champion's ideas, on the other hand, are what ancient leaders actually put into practice once in a hundred or a thousand years. Through them, these leaders achieved their fame. But such ideas are no longer practical and have become mere tricks of political jugglers. Dazzling clouds show great promise for the future, but they can only be enjoyed from afar. Political machinations are a relic from the past rarely seen, and they are amusing only when we meet them in history books.[11]

Master Nankai's two visitors express disappointment at his critique of "peace without weapons" and "peace through power," judging it banal. "We've heard that Master's ideas are unusual," they tell him. "But if they are what you've just said, they're not at all unusual. Nowadays, even children and servants are familiar with them."[12] Master Nakai did not agree with the argument for demilitarization. He also did not approve of acquiring great power of the sort that one need not fear anyone. He said only, "[A] sound diplomatic policy is based on maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with every nation of the world, adopting a defensive strategy when it is absolutely necessary."[13] Of course, when it comes to summarizing the message of this eminent

III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

work, the point is not that sound diplomatic policy is banal. What is important is that the dilemma between peace without weapons and peace through power is nearly impossible to overcome. As a consequence, the people caught in this dilemma can make only the most trite responses, *no matter how much they agonize in their thinking*.

Moreover, this might be not a dilemma between the past and the future, either as depicted by Nakae Chōmin or as we might vaguely imagine today. This dilemma, which existed eighty years ago, still exists today, and it is likely to continue to exist in the foreseeable future. We might therefore conclude that this dilemma is inherent in international politics itself, rather than being something between the past and the future. We are not the only ones who are troubled by this problem. Everyone who has ever tried to deal seriously with international politics has had to address this problem. But the wisdom of those who came before us, which was a product of their own efforts to deal with international politics, can, at the very least, protect us from the intellectual arrogance and laziness that would otherwise have us ignore that wisdom as anachronistic.

With the development of nuclear weapons, whose destructive capability goes far beyond that of anything seen before, people have been driven to one of two extreme views: peace through power or peace by eliminating weapons. However, as the many dangers of peace through power and the infeasibility of peace without weapons became clear, based on a recognition of the difficulty of the problem and much intellectual brooding, a new way of thinking emerged.

Dulles' Doctrine of Massive Retaliation

John Foster Dulles' doctrine of massive retaliation is the representative example of the peace-through-power idea. It was based on a moralistic

view of international politics and a simplistic way of thinking about military power. Dulles viewed the communists who were challenging the United States as nothing other than pure evil, and he thought that power was the only means for preventing the influence of that evil from spreading. He believed that "power is the key to success in dealing with the Soviet leadership."[14] Because he had a simplistic belief in the enormous power of the atomic bomb, he concluded that the United States could halt any aggression by demonstrating its determination to use that power. From this he developed his doctrine of massive retaliation, and this led to brinksmanship.

However, it became clear that "peace through power" in reality meant a "balance of terror" or "peace through fear." "Balance of terror," a famous turn of phrase coined by Winston Churchill after the Soviet Union had developed its own nuclear weapons, captures the impossibility of the US and the Soviet Union fighting a war when any all-out conflict between the two would result in extraordinary destruction for both. That said, the fact is this was the case even before the Soviet Union had developed its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would have been able to almost completely destroy Europe with its conventional ground forces, because the US nuclear force at the end of the 1940s was not powerful enough to dictate the outcome of any war. Even if the US managed to win, Europe would still be completely destroyed. For that very reason, the UK and France desperately tried to constrain the US whenever it adopted a confrontational posture toward the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons made the balance of terror all the more complete. Subsequently, the levels of terror grew greater and greater as the United States and the Soviet Union increased their nuclear arsenals. However, a balance of terror is not

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something that always develops when certain conditions exist, and even not after those conditions have been satisfied.

First, each nuclear state must be aware that the damage from a total war will be far greater than whatever they might gain by defeating their opponent. At the same time, each must also feel confident that their opponent shares that belief. Each must also believe that their opponent will not attack them out of paranoia or behave irrationally. Moreover, this concern is based on the fear that if a nuclear-capable state's life-or-death interests were threatened and it launched an all-out attack, it could expect an all-out retaliation that would certainly include nuclear weapons. But these two conditions do not go together. This is to say, a nuclear state must be convinced that another will definitely *not* use such weapons outside of a worst-case scenario, but also that they *will* do so in such a scenario. Furthermore, it will by no means be clear as to whether a given scenario is actually a "worst-case scenario" or not.

Further criticisms of the balance of terror concept were put forth. One was based the idea of total unilateral disarmament, which stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from the massive-retaliation strategy. This is the simplest form of the idea of a peace without weapons. The people who hold this view see that it is impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons through treaties, and hence they argue that the United States and the Western camp should engage in unilateral disarmament. If that were to occur, then the Communist camp would have no choice but to follow along and reduce its armament as well.

The premise in such a case is that the opposite party has good intentions. Given that the fear comes from the fact that the two sides are confronting one another with weapons of enormous destructive potential, one might think that these weapons are the source of tension. Thus, if one side were to discard the weapons that are the source

of those fears, tensions would ease, and eventually the other party also might reduce its weapons.

This clearly is too simplistic. It completely ignores any possible intentions the other party might have to achieve dominance. It also ignores the possibility that the other party might take advantage of its nuclear monopoly through more subtle means without starting to disarm itself or launch a unilateral attack. In fact, there is a relatively large number of proponents of unilateral disarmament in the UK. They call for the UK to destroy its nuclear weapons and leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They might better be described as neutralists. If it was the US that took such steps, this would constitute genuine unilateral disarmament. However, there are hardly any proponents for such moves there.

Thus, we can see that neither the massive-retaliation strategy nor the doctrine of unilateral disarmament provides any satisfactory answer to the difficult question of how to maintain peace in the nuclear age. Theoretically speaking, both the massive-retaliation and unilateral-disarmament theories oversimplify the intentions of human beings and the roles of military power; both theories are deficient in that they fail to understand the complicated relationship between the two.

Mutual Self-Restraint in Arms

Once the futility of the massive-retaliation and unilateral-disarmament became clear, what gradually emerged was the idea of "arms control." Growing out of serious examinations of the complicated role of armaments in today's world, arms control focused on the correlation between military power and human intentions. At the same time, while bearing that correlation in mind, the idea of phased unilateral disarmament came into being. This aims to gradually achieve peace

without armaments, while also acknowledging to some degree the role that military power plays.

Arms control is based on two criticisms of the massive retaliation doctrine. The first is the realization that while the balance of terror may have made total war impossible, it does not prevent all types of military conflict. Limited wars and revolutionary conflicts remain possible. In fact, even after nuclear weapons appeared, conventional wars have been fought in various places (see Table 1). Relatively few of these conflicts have been interstate wars, but they still make up one-quarter of them, or a total of ten. The rest, whether civil or colonial wars, were fought within a single country. However, around ten or so of these conflicts involved significant outside influence. This means that interstate confrontations also took the form of civil wars. This is all the more evident if we include all the numerous coups d'état. For strategists like Henry Kissinger, how to handle limited wars of this sort in the nuclear age has been the primary focus of their theories on warfare. Their answer was to reaffirm the links between military affairs and politics, and to select types of military power appropriate to given political conditions.

In actual armed conflicts the use of force is inevitable. However, in such cases the role of nuclear weapons should be limited to deterring the opponent's own use of such weapons. Conventional forces must be the primary means for settling conflicts. International conflicts have never been settled through rational calculation and diplomacy alone. Rather, they have been settled by the belief that cooperation in one's own interest is linked to a fear of the consequences of stubborn behavior. Makers of the first criticism believe this remains the case.

The other criticism of the massive-retaliation doctrine came from those who highlighted the instability of the balance of terror from a

stark strategic perspective. The problem, they argued, was that not only had nuclear weapons become tremendously destructive, missiles had made it possible for both the US and the Soviet Union to strike one another in thirty minutes or less and this meant that launching a preemptive strike would present a notable advantage. In an article titled "The Delicate Balance of Terror," published in the January 1959 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the American strategic theorist Albert Wohlstetter raised this issue for the first time by pointing out that just having nuclear weapons was not enough to offer adequate deterrence. The following conditions would also have to be met, including "the ability (1) to survive enemy attacks, (2) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (3) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission, (4) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (5) to destroy the target in spite of any "passive" civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself."[15] However, these conditions did not exist at the start of the 1960s. Accordingly, warned Wohlstetter, there was danger of an accidental war occurring due either to one side or the other carrying out a preemptive strike that would lead to total war, or to a miscalculation based on the suspicion that the other party might launch such a strike.

Since then, people have talked about the problem of how to prevent a preemptive strike or sneak attack, and discussed what the best way is to achieve credible and stable deterrence. This was the genesis of arms control. It first acknowledges that disarmament by mutual agreement is impossible when international tensions are high. As we have seen earlier, disarmament without a control body is not feasible: it is hampered by the fear that you might be put at a disadvantage by disarming, or by the sense that the other party might betray you.

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Table 1. Major Post–World War II Conflicts

Location	Year(s)	Parties Involved	Type
Indonesia	1945–1947	Independence movement vs. Holland	×
China	1945–1949	Red Army vs. Nationalist Army	△
Indochina	1945–1954	Việt Minh vs. France	×
Greece	1946–1949	Government army vs. Communist guerillas	△*
Kashmir	1947–1949	India vs. Pakistan	○
Burma	1948	Government army vs. Communist guerillas and ethnic minorities	△*
Israel	1948–1949	Israel vs. Arab states	○
The Philippines	1948–1952	Government army vs. Hukbalahap movement	△*
Malaysia	1948–1954	Great Britain vs. Communist guerillas	△ (×)
The Koreas	1950–1953	UN Forces and South Korean army vs. North Korean and Chinese armies	○ (△)
Tibet	1950–1959	China vs. Tibet	○×
Kenya	1952–1953	Great Britain vs. the Mau Mau	×
Guatemala	1954	Guatemalan exiles and the United States vs. Government army	△*
Cyprus	1955–1959	Great Britain vs. the EOKA army	×
Suez	1956	Israel, Great Britain, and France vs. Egypt	○
Hungary	1956	Soviet Union vs. Hungarian revolutionary forces	△*
Algeria	1956–1962	National Liberation Front vs. France	×
Iraq	1958	Government army vs. Ethnic minorities	△
Cuba	1958–1959	Castro-allied forces vs. Government army	△
Laos	1959–present	Government army vs. Pathet Lao	△*
Himalayas	1959–1962	China vs. India	○
South Vietnam	1959–1973	United States and South Vietnam government vs. Viet Cong and North Vietnam	△*
Angola	1960	Portugal vs. Independence movement	×
Colombia	1960	Government army vs. Insurgents	△
Congo	1960–1962	Government army and UN forces vs. Insurgents	△
Cuba	1961	Government army vs. Cuban exiles and United States	△*
Goa	1961	India vs. Portugal	×
West Irian	1962	Indonesia vs. the Netherlands	○ (×)
Yemen	1962–1970	Government and Egypt vs. Royalists	△*
Algeria	1963	Algeria vs. Morocco	○
Malaysia	1963–1966	Great Britain and Malaysia vs. Indonesia	○
Congo	1964	Government army vs. Simba rebels	△
Dominican Republic	1965	Government army and United States vs. Insurgents	△*
Kashmir	1965	Pakistan vs. India	△
Indonesia	1965	Army vs. Communist Party	△*
Peru	1965–present	Government army vs. Insurgents, various movements	△

○: Conventional war among nations   △: Civil war   ×: Post-colonial war of independence
△*: Civil war with significant foreign-country involvement
(Trans. note: Select conflict types have been slightly revised. "Present" is as of the writing of this book.)

However, there is clear danger in a situation where states with enormous amounts of weapons that are engaged in an arms race confront one another. The arms control approach acknowledges that states have those weapons and seeks to reduce *the possibility that they will be used*, solving the problem by establishing or recovering trust in one another. Even without trust or goodwill, this approach might reduce the possibility that force will be used and such a reduction might even be a first step toward recovering trust. Accordingly, the best thing to do would be to make it clear that using arms will result in losses by both sides. It is also important to reduce the possibility of accidental war. Furthermore, outbreaks of unrestrained arms races must be kept in check. Such are the objectives of arms control.

The first step is to create invulnerable deterrence capabilities. This is accomplished by setting up early warning systems, strengthening command and control of armed forces, and ensuring that one's retaliatory capability can survive a preemptive strike by stationing missiles underground or at sea on Polaris missile submarines.

Thus, if a preemptive strike is not seen as offering an advantage, the possibility of carrying out a premeditated preemptive strike, or of war breaking out due to fears of such a strike, or of an accidental war occurring due to the need for rapid retaliation will disappear. Science fiction works depicting nuclear war often include a scenario in which one side interprets a blip on the radar screen as indicating a missile, causing that side to launch missiles aimed at the enemy's homeland, resulting in a total nuclear war. The reason for this is the urgency with which a critical decision must be made. If, however, our deterrence capability is invulnerable, we can take enough time to gather sufficient evidence to decide. Therefore, it will no longer be possible for an accidental war to break out.

Second, it is necessary for states to refrain from provoking others and raising tensions by arming themselves more than they need for deterrence. Examples of such moves would be to start large-scale civilian-defense preparations or to develop anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). The reason is because any such step would upset the balance achieved by the fact that both sides have deterrence capabilities. If one side built a large-scale civilian-defense system with enough bomb shelters that it could keep most of its people safe, that side would not have to worry about a nuclear strike from the opposite party. In short, it would upset the balance by rendering the other side's deterrence capabilities ineffective. Introducing ABMs would have similar effects. However, such steps would invite countermeasures, which could trigger an arms race or even encourage a suicidal preemptive strike. Such steps must not be taken.

Arms control can be undertaken unilaterally, as well as by mutual agreement. Even if one side acts unilaterally, there is still the expectation that the other party will reciprocate; if this does not happen, then the side that took the initiative will reconsider its position. Thus, it might be better to say that the first party's acts are based on a tacit understanding. The Soviet Union's declaration of a nuclear-testing moratorium 1958 would be a good example of this.

To push that principle even further, it would be possible for both sides to rid themselves of those portions of its arsenal that are not needed as a deterrent. The proponents of arms control say that such controls would also include disarmament. Even if tensions unfortunately increased and an armed conflict occurred, it would be possible to avoid total war through restraints on the use of weapons. Current US strategy as espoused by Robert S. McNamara is a good example of this thinking.

In international politics, when an armed conflict occurs, the countries involved will be forced to decide whether to use force to impose

their will or yield to their opponent's will. If one country has not managed to impose its will on its opponent after having used a certain amount of force, it must then decide whether to use more force or to accede to its opponent's will. However, if even greater force is still ineffective, or if it only results in greater damage to itself, then it will end up acceding to its opponent's demands.

This understanding about the relationship between the use of armed force and its effects is basic to current strategic theories, such as those of McNamara and of the French strategist André Beaufre. Based on this understanding, McNamara first came up with the idea of creating a versatile force—covering everything from an invulnerable nuclear-strike force to special warfare capabilities for dealing with guerilla wars—that would be able to respond to all situations and then, to the extent possible, segmenting the stages at which each level of force would be used.[16] This approach would make it possible to use whatever force was appropriate to the challenge that needed to be dealt with. Next, McNamara aimed to have a stronger force than any potential opponent at each of these stages. This would strengthen the US position, making it possible for the United States to prevent escalation by an opponent, and in a worst-case scenario would enable the United States to escalate on its own. The "option" that is the core concept of McNamara's strategy is no less than the attempt to have a wide-ranging capability to handle a variety of situations by always being ready to deter and to escalate.

To give a specific example, when the Soviet Union brought missiles into Cuba, the United States engaged in the limited use of force by blockading the island. The United States applied pressure by raising the possibility of escalation, i.e., the missile bases in Cuba would be attacked if the Soviet Union did not withdraw its weapons (see Figure 2).

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
Figure 2. The Cuba Example
The Soviet Union avoided the danger of escalation and yielded.
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Simultaneously, the United States preempted Soviet escalation through its overall military superiority, including the naval forces surrounding Cuba. This is why the Soviet Union had no choice but to yield.

In contrast, in the case of South Vietnam, the United States was unable to deal with the guerilla war when it limited its involvement to dispatching advisers to the South Vietnamese army. The United States did not wish to yield, and therefore it chose to escalate—that is, it deployed ground forces and launched airstrikes against the North. In this case, too, the total superiority of the United States prevented any escalation by its opponents.

However, this is not to say that the United States could escalate without limit, nor do so frivolously. There are tangible and intangible costs to any use of force, and those costs increase as escalation continues. Accordingly, the military power of both strong and weak countries must be evaluated in terms of the costs and effects of its use. Although to yield to one's opponent is a loss, the use of force also comes with

Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

losses, and those that come with escalation are even greater. However, the use of force might inflict even greater losses on the opponent than if that party were simply to yield, and those losses would be still greater in the event of escalation.

Accordingly, the least bad option will be chosen after having compared (1) the costs of yielding to the opponent, (2) the costs of the use of force and its expected effects, and (3) the costs of the use of force and its expected effects at the next stage. Thus, military power can be seen in this sense as a means by which you choose the least evil option.

Interactions between States in Confrontation

Viewed this way, it is evident that the approach of arms control, which assumes that two parties will use their forces carefully and practice self-restraint, is characterized by its focus on the correlation between armament and the intentions of one's opponent. Creating versatile capabilities and maintaining a stable and reliable retaliatory capability based on invulnerable deterrence represent two ways to create a system that enables the use of force with self-restraint. Both the construction and the use of armament should be decided by paying attention to the intentions of one's opponent. It is not enough for armament simply to be powerful. It must also be deployed in a way that will minimize the possibility that either side will use force. Even when the use of force becomes inevitable, such use must be kept to a minimum—the minimum level required to have the desired effect on one's opponent.

To achieve this, communications between rivals must be established. When a conflict unfortunately intensifies, there is a clear need to limit one's own objectives while encouraging one's opponent to accept one's objective however grudgingly. At the same time, even during an armed conflict, communications must be maintained with

III. Arms Control and Phased Unilateral Disarmament

one's opponent so as to facilitate concessions or compromise. If that is not accomplished, restricting the use of armament will not be very meaningful. Maintaining such communications is a matter of common sense, and quite conventional wisdom. It is widely known that from the moment the Russo-Japanese War began, Japan's leaders were already wondering how to end the war. They kept channels for negotiations open and made an effort to take advantage of any sign of a breakthrough. People laud them for this as a demonstration of their wisdom, but the fact is that it is just the way that traditional diplomacy was regularly conducted.

Thus, arms control is built upon two pillars: mutual self-restraint in armaments and keeping channels of communication open. In the aforementioned case of the Cuban blockade as well the United States exercised self-restraint in its use of military power and maintained adequate communications through exchanges of letters between US president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. This both prevented any miscalculations that could have led to war, and helped the two to reach a compromise.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the product of a Soviet attempt to change a balance of power that had been favorable to the US. After having foiled this attempt, Kennedy focused on stabilizing the balance with the Soviet Union. This led to the conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which prohibited the development of ABMs.

As noted earlier, if either side had developed an anti-ballistic missile the balance of terror would have been disrupted. However, once atmospheric testing became impossible as a result of the PTBT, the development of anti-ballistic missiles also became impossible. Tensions eased because both the United States and the Soviet Union

confirmed that neither had any intention to change the balance in their existing forces. The establishment of a direct phone connection between the United States and the Soviet Union made communications much easier. Although both sides still had nuclear weapons, the possibility of their use had been reduced. Thomas Schelling, a leading theorist on arms control, describes such control as comprising "all the forms of military cooperation among potential enemies,"[17] and states that thanks to the PTBT an arms control system had come into being. Thus, arms control had already had a significant effect.

Since arms control acknowledges the role of military power in international politics, possessing such power and using it appropriately is a necessary condition for maintaining peace. Thus, it amounts to "peace through power." And yet one could still say that it is underpinned by human wisdom in that it has a structure that encourages self-restraint in the use of that power.

China's Development of Nuclear Weapons

Though it might be somewhat softer, arms control has its limits as a form of peace through power. Its shortcomings cannot be overlooked in a world where nuclear weapons exist. First, it is a strategy best suited to an antagonistic bipolar system where two superpowers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, dominate all other nations. It stabilizes this status quo. The status quo is currently favorable to the US; thus, stabilization implies consolidating that balance in favor of the US. Earlier, we saw how reducing or restricting armament in reality serves to consolidate the status quo; arms control functions in the same way. In fact, the reason why tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were eased by arms control is that throughout the Cold War after World War II both parties have acknowledged the

futility and impossibilities of attempting to change the status quo, and the Soviet Union had given up on building up an advantageous position in that balance between these two nations.

Accordingly, when something challenges this peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, the status quo—which had been stabilized temporarily by arms control—could be disrupted by one or both expanding its military. The most realistic possibility now is that the United States might respond to China's development of nuclear weapons by trying to develop an ABM system. Given its strong suspicions of China, instead of acknowledging mutual deterrence the US might use its enormous economic power to create an ABM system. This would allow the US to maintain the situation in which it could launch a nuclear strike without any fear of Chinese retaliation. However, any US ABM system would pose a grave problem for the Soviet Union as well because it would render the Soviet deterrent ineffective. The Soviets probably would also attempt to develop similar weapons. There is sufficient risk of a renewed arms race. The problematic aspect of the balance of power—i.e., that any attempt by a country to preserve its advantage will generate instability—unsurprisingly is problematic for arms control, too.

In addition, even if the turmoil caused by China's possession of nuclear weapons is solved, some other country might also come to have them. As the number of nuclear states rises, instability also grows. As we have seen before, communications among nuclear states are indispensable for arms control. However, such communications become all the more complicated and difficult when the number of such states increases.

Despite all these challenges, there is no way to stop nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapon states lack the legitimacy to tell non-nuclear

states that they cannot go nuclear; all they can do is try to pressure them not to.

Second, arms control can create a precarious peace at best, which will be a serious problem in the long run. For one thing, arms control does not eliminate small-scale armed conflicts; furthermore—to be more precise—the more that the danger of an all-out nuclear war is reduced by arms control, the less concerned people might become about the risk of escalation in exercising force in limited wars. In fact, numerous limited wars have broken out since the end of World War II. How to reduce such conflicts will be a big issue for decades to come.

To address this, it has been suggested that the major powers stop dragging small countries into their confrontations, that weapons sales be banned, and that military assistance and alliances be forbidden. However, there are great difficulties when it comes to implementing such proposals in today's world, where nations are increasingly interdependent and where, aside from military relationships, economic and ideological influences also are at work. The efforts that a small country may take to balance pressure from one major power by turning to another for help cannot be denied. Thus, it is highly doubtful that limited wars can be eliminated through arms control.

The Psychological Dangers of Arms Control

More importantly, eliminating nuclear weapons is not the objective of arms control. The objective is to reduce the possibility of arms being used by treating deterrent capabilities as something meant to be reliable and stable. Hence, it does not fundamentally eliminate fear and doubt. As Schelling has said, the situation of two confronting parties each having deterrents sufficiently powerful to keep one another hostage resembles the hostage exchanges used in the past.[18] That is to say,

the situation is such that should total war break out the invulnerable deterrent capabilities of each side make it certain that each would suffer tremendous casualties; therefore, no matter how much enmity they may feel neither side can resort to total war. However, keeping one another hostage in this way may be the only way to keep the peace, but the problem is this is a peace full of fear and doubt. Social psychologist Erich Fromm has spoken of the long-term effects that such a peace has on human psychology. He argues that when the threat of destruction is constant, most humans will present certain neurotic symptoms including fear, hostility, and apathy. This leads to a disinterest in the values that we hold most dear, and turns us into savages with very advanced weaponry.

Thus, even a stable balance of terror stills contains the danger that one side might eventually decide to use conventional nuclear weapons. Living for a long time with such fear and doubt is not healthy for the human spirit.

The dangers of arms control are vanishingly slight in the short-term, but as they build over time there is the potential for a major catastrophe to result. Furthermore, arms control does not contain the means for turning an uncertain peace into a stable one. Theoretically, arms control measures might include disarmament, but ridding the world of weapons is not its goal. Arms control proponents themselves admit that it does not have a well-defined ultimate objective. They argue that there is no way to solve the problems of war, peace, and international conflict in a single stroke, and that everlasting vigilance and determination will be needed to maintain peace at each stage of the reduction process, including after total reduction has been achieved. There is certainly much truth to this. However, without a clearly defined goal, even partial disarmament or tension-easing measures seem impossible.

We need not only to find our way through a world of uncertain peace, but also make that world better.

This leads to the issue of phased unilateral disarmament. Its proponents recognize that it is not useful to try to simply reduce arms in a politically tense international relationship. However, they argue, it would also be a mistake to take it for granted that the tensions and mistrust will be permanent. Undeniably, having weapons raises tensions and reducing them helps to relieve tensions. Disarmament does ease political tensions to some degree, or at least provides an opportunity to take steps in that direction. The more that tensions are eased, the greater the possibility of eliminating weapons. Proponents of phased unilateral disarmament thus argue that attempting to create such a virtuous cycle should be the fundamental objective of disarmament.

The Difficulty of Phased Unilateral Disarmament

These proponents criticize the traditional view that disarmament is only possible by mutual agreement. They argue that if one party takes unilateral steps to reduce weapons to a degree that it poses no danger to itself and the other party's response is favorable, the first party will be inclined to take a second step. This first stage is a symbolic one. The first party shows it is trying to ease tensions by declaring its new policy, ceasing to make hostile statements, and cooperating to avoid any accidental wars. If these measures succeed and tensions ease, both parties then remove any punitive restrictions on travel and trade they may have imposed, stand down their armed forces, and start making cutbacks on their conventional weapons. Finally, they reduce their nuclear stockpiles based on the principles of reciprocity and balance.

This is like a game or a strategy in that at each stage each party observes the impact each measure has on its counterpart while gradually disarming

in a way that does not leave it at a decisive disadvantage. The game calls for clearing numerous stages to achieve one's objective. The players refrain from rushing headlong toward the goal and use various means to try to influence the intentions (psychology) of their opponent. They observe their opponent's responses and come up with further measures. The process calls for cool calculation; it is not a matter of simple idealism. Aside from the fact that tension-easing measures are the only means for carrying out phased unilateral disarmament, the process for each party to try to change the other's mind is the same as it is for arms control. Both call for the same sequence of moves: first Party A takes a step, then Party B responds in kind, after which Party A takes a step based on Party B's response, and so on back and forth. It is an approach to disarmament that incorporates strategic thinking.

However, there is still the question of how far this more realistic approach to disarmament can go. The difficulties increase markedly when going from the second to third stages. Once again, it is unlikely that disarmament can be achieved without some kind of control mechanism. Both sides probably would agree to disarm once such a body was in place, since tension-easing measures would already have been pursued to create it. That said, getting the parties to agree on what sort of control mechanism is needed would not be easy. As already noted, one reason why the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan in 1946 was because they did not trust the control mechanism that was to be created. It is only natural that the Soviet Union would not trust any mechanism powerful enough to control disarmament whose principles were not consistent with its own. Moreover, numerous other guiding principles can be found throughout the world. Thus, this issue of what a control mechanism is and how it works must be addressed in order to achieve any truly meaningful disarmament.

Given the time that would be needed to create such a mechanism owing to the difficulties involved, there will be a transitional period where arms control will be the most realistic approach. Arms control overlaps considerably with phased unilateral disarmament, and teaches us various methods for coping with those times when tensions are sadly again on the rise. There is no guarantee that tension-easing measures will solve all conflicts. Tougher measures such as a limited use of force at times may be necessary. Therefore, states will need to be flexible and go back and forth between tension-easing measures and tougher ones while watching how their opponents respond. They will need to act wisely and aim at moderating and ultimately easing those tensions.

Certainly, as Schelling has argued, if humans have the ability to first reduce armaments and then perpetually avoid any future arms races, then it could be argued that they also have the ability to sustain a world with armaments without using them. Though the peace that arms control provides may be an uncertain one, that this peace can be achieved just by managing armaments is the best that can be expected. To single-mindedly emphasize ridding the world of armaments is meaningless and impossible. It is an extreme example, but even if all nuclear weapons could be destroyed, the possibility of nuclear war would not go away. Since we already know how to make such weapons, if any armed conflict broke out humans might make them again.

Of course, military power is dangerous, and, as with all forms of power, it is particularly so when it is not used wisely. It must be wielded with the greatest of care and with as much wisdom as possible. However, in the end it is not weapons that create tension—it is tension that makes weapons necessary. It is an inconvenient reality, but those tensions are not produced by some specific evil person or influence. It is we humans who are the source of tensions. To show

how this is the case, in the next chapter I will address the relationship between economic activities and international politics, and in particular the problems of trade and human interactions. At a glance these are unquestionably peaceful activities, but if we look closely we can find the very sources of tensions even within them.

Chapter 1: Arms and Peace

2

ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND PEACE

"The child's first tears are *prayers*, beware lest they become *commands*; he begins by asking for aid, he ends by demanding service. Thus from his own weakness, the source of his first consciousness of dependence, springs the later idea of rule and tyranny." (emphases added) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, 1762[19]

I. Economics and Power Politics

The Optimism over Free Trade

It has long been believed that economic exchange among nations is the most fundamental means for creating a peaceful world. This view remains widely accepted today. Nations are linked through four kinds of economic activity: foreign trade, international investment, international finance, and immigration. It is therefore assumed that if political factors could be ignored these activities would reach over borders to create links among national economies. In foreign trade, people would seek out the highest quality goods, and trade would ceaselessly grow. Both international investment and international finance are based on the quest for the most favorable conditions. Immigration is based on the quest for higher standards of living. It was thought that these activities would make people's lives richer and that, at the same time, conflict among nations would naturally disappear.

The eighteenth-century physiocrats were the first to develop this idea in a coherent fashion. They opposed the mercantilist policies that strictly limited trade between nations, and called for the unrestricted flow of goods. They argued that this would make nations more interdependent and lead to greater prosperity for all. Physiocrats saw all nations as sharing the same interests. In their view, there was nothing to be gained from territorial expansion, and once goods could flow freely there would be no need for war. They described their policies as "economic" ones, and distinguished them from the power politics of

the day. They believed their policies to be based on the "correct economic principles" of free trade. In the words of eighteenth-century theorist Nicolas Baudeau:

> The essence of power politics consists of divergence of interests; that of economic policy of unity of interests—the one leads to war, frustrations, destruction, the other to social integration, cooperation, and free and peaceful sharing of the fruits of work.[20]

Although Baudeau's near-contemporary the eminent Immanuel Kant did not see the connection between trade and peace in such simple terms, he did argue that trade could produce mutual benefits and thereby bring peoples closer together. Nature might urge people to separate themselves based on differences in language and religion, he said, but it would unite them based on "mutual self-interest" and specifically through the *spirit of commerce*.

> The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of peace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this purpose.[21]

As noted, in the early nineteenth century free trade was seen as providing the greatest hope for peace. It was believed that with free trade, any increase in the wealth of one nation would result in an increase

in the wealth of all nations. Free trade's proponents believed this so strongly that they remained confident it would be so even to the end of the nineteenth century when nations began to adopt protectionist policies. Anyone who had even a basic understanding of modern trade, they argued, should recognize that any nation that adopted protectionist policies would lose to those that did not.

Some still think the same today. Raymond Aron, who defines the present as the age of the industrial civilization, speaks of an imbalance between developed and undeveloped countries.

> [P]rogress made in one area may help with progress in another. Some people may find that surprising, but take Brazil for an example. The northeastern part of Brazil is desolate and undeveloped, but the state of São Paulo to the south is developed and relatively affluent. Now, does the northeast owe its poverty to the south? If the northeast develops, will São Paulo inevitably decline? Clearly, such is not the case.[22]

The idea that trade creates "mutual interests" is as old and as deeply rooted as ideas about disarmament.

The Twofold Function of the Wealth of Other Nations

However, as with arms reduction, the track record of free trade as a means for achieving peace is not a particularly encouraging one. Trade among nations never became free, and it did not create a peaceful world. Certainly, in the latter half of the nineteenth century both trade and international investment grew phenomenally. A considerable number of countries adopted free trade, and movement across borders became freer. Unquestionably, Europe in the nineteenth century was

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unprecedented for the openness of its economies and the freedom of movement for goods and peoples across borders.

However, not all nations adopted free trade. For example, the United States, which was seen as being like a part of Europe despite being located across the Atlantic, erected a high tariff wall against foreign goods though it did welcome foreign investment. Prussia likewise had been protectionist since the middle of the century, based on the theories of the talented and fiercely nationalistic economist Friedrich List (1789–1846). List believed that the goal of a national economy should not be to maximize exchangeable value or the total volume of products as measured in price terms for international trade. Rather, he believed the goal for a national economy should be broad development so that the nation's productive capabilities did not become distorted. The economic activities of individuals, meanwhile, could be focused on obtaining as much exchangeable value as possible through the division of labor. However, individuals and nations are different. Nations must prioritize unity and independence. Otherwise, there will be no security, welfare, progress, or culture for its constituent members. To satisfy these goals, he argued, a nation's industrial capacity must be developed in many sectors. In addition, although many countries had adopted free trade, it generated not only mutual interests but also mutual competition and antagonism. In fact, the revival of protectionism in the 1870s was brought about by such competition and antagonism. Economists had persuasively argued that increasing the wealth of one nation would eventually increase the wealth of all nations. However, neither politicians nor the person in the street found this argument easy to accept.

The difficulty lay in the fact that the scale and structure of a nation's economy are basic components of national power, and consequently

I. Economics and Power Politics

they strongly impact how international power politics play out. Generally speaking, wealth has a twofold function. Even a proponent of laissez-faire economics like Adam Smith (1723–1790) recognized this.

> The wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though *dangerous* in war and politics, is certainly *advantageous* in trade. In a state of hostility it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with that produce. (emphases added)[23]

This dual nature led Smith to criticize the mercantilist view that any gains made by other nations were a loss to one's own nation. This was surely correct in the historical context of the times. However, while the wealth of neighboring nations might be beneficial to one's own in times of peace, in wartime it might present a danger; so long as wars and the struggle for power play significant roles in international society, a nation cannot afford to simply welcome the wealth of its neighbors without being cautious.

As the term "Pax Britannica" suggests, for the half-century from the 1815 Congress of Vienna to the end of the 1870s, Great Britain was preeminent and led all other nations in its success with industrialization and its near-monopoly status in global economics. To take the example of steel production, which was regarded as an indicator of national power, from 1870 to 1874 Britain manufactured 6.4 million tons of steel every year on average. This amount far exceeded the 5.2 million tons of the combined total production of Germany, France,

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and the United States. Britain held similarly overwhelming dominance in the coal and cotton-spinning industries. It was literally the "world's factory." Furthermore, Britain provided capital to many other countries, and it had near-monopoly status in shipping as well.

Of course, wealth alone does not in itself furnish the power to dominate other nations. The fact is, during the peaceful first half of the nineteenth century Britain's wealth also benefited other nations. The crucial point here is that Britain made clever use of its economic dominance. Moreover, because it was a naval power with little in the way of ground forces, it did not pose a direct threat to other European countries. In addition, Britain had to import most goods. It always ran a trade deficit. This adverse trade balance was offset by the interest payments on its foreign investments and by income from the shipping industry as well as technology exports, which was based on the smooth flow of capital and afforded other nations enough economic opportunities of their own.

Nevertheless, Great Britain played the role of the world's factory while other states provided raw materials and food. This division of labor may have been economically advantageous to Britain, but it was politically satisfying to other countries from the perspectives of their status in international power politics and preserving national independence. The structure of the international economy at that time may have seen some degree of cooperation, but unquestionably other countries were highly dependent on Britain. Needless to say, such dependency can easily lead to the dependent nations being dominated.

Rousseau's Pessimism

Rousseau was critical of the optimistic view that economic exchange would create peace. His chief argument was based on that point. He

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pointed out that the human need for interdependence cannot be separated from the development of dominant-dependent relationships. In an impressionistic passage from *Emile*, he wrote the following:

> The child's first tears are *prayers*, beware lest they become *commands*; he begins by asking for aid, he ends by demanding service. Thus from his own weakness, the source of his first consciousness of dependence, springs the later idea of rule and tyranny. (emphases added)

Here, Rousseau is talking about children. Although he famously said, "A child is not a small adult," his observation still applies to humans in general. In short, there is no guarantee that the need humans have for other humans will create friendly relations between them. The same holds true when it comes to relations among nations. Increased interdependence often results in one nation being controlled by another.

Accordingly, the quest in international politics for each nation to achieve self-sufficiency arises from more than just a narrow understanding of its own circumstances; self-sufficiency is important for maintaining national independence. However, while every nation aspires to remain independent, they do not take the independence of other nations as seriously as they do their own. Also, it is difficult for any one nation to be completely self-sufficient. This was all the more so in the nineteenth century as industrialization steadily progressed. Thus, in its quest to free itself from dependence on the British economy, Germany attempted to quickly expand its own economic sphere by subordinating other countries. In essence, its prayers for self-sufficiency quickly led to command over others. Other nations also sought to expand their respective economic spheres of influence.

These quests to expand national economic spheres of influence led to international conflicts.

Industrialization and Power Politics

Just as Britain's industrialization ahead of other nations in the early nineteenth century had a significant impact on the structure of power politics, the industrialization of other European powers such as France and Germany in Britain's wake in the middle of the century likewise had a considerable impact of its own.

First, the growing power of a unified Germany based on its successful industrialization upset the existing balance of power on the continent. Neither the unification of Germany nor the growth of its power could have been possible without its successful industrialization. This is represented by the development of the railroad. When Italy became united in 1860 people had spoken of how the railways would sew up the peninsula's long boot, but that remark was all the more apropos with regard to Germany.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Germany was a confederation of numerous independent feudal principalities. Its subsequent unification was achieved thanks to the railways and the flourishing of economic exchange within Germany itself. Friedrich List, in fact, had stressed railway construction and was also one of the leading advocates of establishing the Zollverein (German Customs Union). History has proven his advocacy to have been correct.

But before German unification the European balance of power had been maintained by the fragmentation of the vast ethnically German population and its relative impoverishment. It is well known that then-Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859) had made serious efforts at the Congress of Vienna to keep Germany

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Table 2. Comparisons and Trends in the Volumes of Coal (top) and Pig Iron (bottom) Production (in millions of tons)

	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1914
Germany	12.0	34.0	59.0	89.0	149.0	222.0	277.0
	1.3	2.5	4.1	7.5	9.5	14.7	
Austria-Hungary	2.3	8.6	15.0	26.0	39.0	47.0	47.0
	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.5	2.0	2.0	
France	8.3	13.3	19.4	26.1	33.4	38.4	40.0
	0.9	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.7	4.0	4.6
Great Britain	81.0	112.0	149.0	184.0	228.0	268.0	292.0
	3.9	6.0	7.8	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.0
Russia	0.15	0.75	3.2	6.0	16.2	24.9	36.2
	0.40	0.4	0.9	2.9	3.0	3.6	
United States	3.4	10.0	64.9	143.0	244.0	356.0	455.0
	0.8	1.7	3.9	9.4	14.0	27.0	30.0

divided. What did happen, however, is that Germany did become unified and then became prosperous thanks to the hard work and outstanding organizational skills of the German people. This upset the European balance of power.

The development of railways also turned the geographical factors that had put Germany at a military disadvantage into an advantage. Previously, Germany's location in the center of Europe made defending its borders virtually impossible. Official German documents make it plain that border defense was a constant source of concern. However, the development of a railway network made it possible for Germany to dispatch its army quickly to anywhere along its borders. That not only made it possible for Germany to defend all of its borders, but also to attack along all of them. In other words, Germany had been transformed from a nation that any country could defeat into one that could take on all challengers and win.

Second, Europe's countries expanded to all corners of the world, overwhelmed all they encountered, and established dominance. Of course, Europe had already been expanding since the start of the

early-modern period. European dominance became decisive in the latter half of the nineteenth century once industrial civilization—as represented by the steamship and the railway—had been established. The 1853 arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry's so-called "black ships" in Japan, which left the latter with no choice but to open its borders, was symbolic. Japan had been able to keep the Westerners who had come there on sailing ships at the start of the seventeenth century at a distance by adopting a policy of seclusion, but this was no longer possible when their successors came by steamship.

Nations that had industrialized could boast of their overwhelming strength over those that had not. Furthermore, modern industrial civilization was extremely self-assertive. This assertiveness arose out of a cycle that began with the human desire to see visible progress, followed by the creation of an ideology of industrialism. The power of that ideology in turn stirred up the desire to achieve further improvements. Speaking of Europe's global expansion—that is to say, imperialism—Hans Kohn appears to have been correct in his observation, "Inequality in the level of civilization and civilizing energy are of the very essence of imperialism."[24]

Europeans were also confident that they were providing the world with their superior civilization. Critic of imperialism John Hobson made it plain just how widely held that belief was.

> So far, we have established two tentative principles. First, that all interference on the part of civilised white nations with "lower races" is not *primâ facie* illegitimate. Second, that such interference cannot safely be left to private enterprise of individual whites. If these principles be admitted, it follows that civilised Governments *may* undertake the political and economic control

of lower races—in a word, that the characteristic form of modern Imperialism is not under all conditions illegitimate.[25]

Thus, the two aforementioned changes can be seen as industrialization having caused power to expand in two directions, which in turn provoked all-out struggles for power. In short, industrialization caused power to expand both vertically and horizontally. It also made it possible for political power to mobilize domestic resources more effectively.

The Mobilization of the Masses Due to Industrialization

From a political perspective, these developments made it possible for more people to participate in politics, which then allowed states to mobilize their power. This caused a remarkable growth in the political power of states. Technology played a major role in this phenomenon.

The development of advanced technology—particularly in the areas of transportation and communications—made it easier for a state to govern. It therefore became possible to allow people to participate in politics while still governing them. Previously, mass participation in politics was technologically impossible. Any attempt to obtain mass participation likely would have resulted in uncontrollable chaos. Consequently, given these limitations on actual participation, most of the populace were in a political sense mere objects. Inasmuch as it is impossible to take advantage of a population's full potential through this form of political power, the power obtained can never be great.

Owing to the new technologies, it became possible to allow the entire nation to actively participate in politics while still maintaining order. Consequently, states were now in a position to fully mobilize the potential of the entire nation and dramatically increase their own political power. Hence, the processes of democratization and the

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expansion of political power have been inextricably linked. The German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) spoke of "the fundamental democratization of society." He saw participation in politics by people who had previously not done so and the expansion of political power as two sides of the same coin. From an economic perspective, this change was tantamount to establishing a national economy and expanding its importance; viewed in psychological terms, this can be seen as the growth of nationalism and the increased identification of the individual with the state.

The horizontal expansion of political power grew into the phenomenon of imperialism. Imperialism saw Europe extend its dominance over the world, and it also encouraged the quest to create even larger political units. As Kohn had observed, the nations of Europe were able to expand globally due to "differences in the levels of civilization and civilizing energy," and that was thought both to be *good* and also to be *necessary*. The 1860s was a period in which these imperialistic sensibilities grew stronger. The Italian unification (the Risorgimento), the reunification of the North and the South at the end of the Civil War in the United States, and the unification of Germany were important stimuli here. These developments were taken as evidence that large political units had become necessary.

What's more, the predictions made some thirty years earlier by French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) that the world of the future would be ruled by the two enormously powerful nations of the United States and Russia, have proven to have a ring of truth. For that reason, both scholars and politicians alike in Europe in the mid-1860s argued over and over that their countries needed to claim more colonies in order to avoid descending to "third-rate" status. This was the same whether one is discussing Britain, France,

or Germany. Such ideas were the driving force for the imperialistic advances of the late-nineteenth century.

Thus, the expansion of power that industrialization produced changed the structure of global power politics, and laid the groundwork for the further changes that led to the two world wars of the twentieth century. German historian Ludwig Dehio brilliantly described this process in his *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*. He observed that while Germany became a dominant player in Europe around 1890, in view of the development of the United States and Russia, Germany knew that this dominance was not destined to last. Accordingly, Germany wanted to turn the European power balance into a global one in which Germany would hold an important position. However, doing so would set Germany on a collision course with Great Britain and other powers.

World War I began under such circumstances. That war made the need for even larger political units all the more obvious. The outcomes of major wars would depend upon the economic power of the nations in conflict. When Germany was blockaded, it lost its ability to fight the United States and Great Britain, which were able to use resources from around the world. Accordingly, after World War I, each nation made frantic efforts to expand its respective sphere of influence. Germany attempted to create its *Lebensraum* ("living space"), while Japan worked to fashion a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This eventually brought about World War II.

Thus, rather than bring peace to the world, the interdependence produced by industrialization itself proved to be the cause of a major war.

The US and Soviet Spheres of Influence

The bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union that developed after World War II is the product of the long historical process described above. Both countries possess enormous amounts of territory and varied populations, both have been successful at integrating them, and both have great power. National income is another indicator of overall national capabilities. As of 1962, there was a marked difference between the United States, with a national income of US$450.3 billion, the Soviet Union at US$170 billion, and third-ranked West Germany at US$68.3 billion. That gap had been even greater immediately following World War II. In terms of military strength, both the United States and the Soviet Union, as victors of that conflict, had armed forces incomparably greater than those of any other nations. Hans Morgenthau, who coined the term "bipolarity," argued that the power of other nations had no influence on the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was in this sense that he used "bipolarity," which was certainly appropriate at least when it came to military strength.

The United States (and also Western Europe) and the Soviet Union reformed the political, economic, and social structures of the territories they occupied based on their respective sets of principles. It is well known that the Soviet Union imposed communism on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the United States similarly engaged in the democratization of Japan and West Germany and—in

concert with Great Britain—created systems more to its own liking in Italy and Greece. The situation was somewhat different when it came to France, but it is highly doubtful that France would have been able to create a system of any type that did not agree with American wishes. Of course, it would be incorrect to say that considerations of power politics were the only factor behind the reform of the systems in occupied territories; American idealism also played a role, as, for example we have experienced here in Japan. However, there is no doubt that these changes have implications for power politics.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin responded candidly at the Potsdam Conference to Western demands for free elections in Central and Eastern European countries by saying that freely chosen governments in any of these countries were likely to be anti-Soviet and that the USSR could not accept this. Similarly, Great Britain was worried that the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM) would gain control over Greece's political life and so it applied relentless pressure to prevent this. As was observed in retrospect, Great Britain's primary and most important interest was for the Greek government to stay friendly toward Britain. The people who shaped British policy toward Greece in the later years of World War II were convinced that an EAM government would not be friendly.

Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union put their respective blocs under the influence of their power. We should note however that these postwar spheres of influence differed in character from those that had come before, in that the strong did not exploit the weak through the naked use of force. This is the fundamental difference between the imperialism of the past and the US and Soviet spheres of influence of today.

Under the imperialism of the past, colonized territories were exploited by the colonizer. However, aside from one or two exceptions,

there has been no outright exploitation in the United States' and the Soviet Union's spheres of influence. Of course, at the end of World War II the Soviet Union exploited the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the form of reparations, and in its subsequent economic relations with those nations it clearly imposed on them conditions favorable to itself. For instance, it frequently engaged in trade at prices vastly at odds with the prevailing prices in international markets (for example, coal that sold for US$15 to US$16 per ton on the world market was exported from Poland to the Soviet Union for a mere US$1 per ton). For its part, US capital completely controlled and exploited the Cuban economy. US interests owned more than 90 percent of Cuba's telephone- and electric power-related businesses, 50 percent of its railways, 40 percent of Cuba's raw-sugar production, and nearly all of the island's livestock ranches and tourism facilities.

The End of Dominance and Dependence

However, the one-sided relationships described above would not be lasting ones unless they were backed by coercion applied through the actual use of force. Today the constraints on the use of military power are quite strong. For one thing, because the destructive capability of such force has become so great, the dangers of its actual use have likewise grown. This is not to say that it is impossible for any wars to be fought. Military power is still a source of leverage based on the possibility that it could be used, and in that sense, it remains a decisive factor in international politics. However, it cannot be denied that such force can no longer be wielded very easily.

Second, the power of public opinion in international politics has grown. I will later come back to why this is so and how such power functions, but in any case, it is an undeniable fact that the greater

importance of public opinion has constrained the use of military power. Of course, public opinion is not binding, but there is no mistaking that a nation will find no advantage in choosing to act contrary to public opinion.

After the Cuban Revolution occurred and Fidel Castro took a hardline stance toward the United States, the US could have applied various sorts of pressure on Cuba, but it could not take direct action to bring down the new Cuban government. The US was also worried that similar revolutions would occur throughout Central and South America, and it started to take the interests of those nations more seriously by working through the Alliance for Progress and similar initiatives. The Soviets adopted essentially the same stance toward Central and Eastern Europe. The exploitative approach that the Soviet Union used initially generated great dissatisfaction among those nations; that dissatisfaction was itself the biggest factor behind the crisis the Soviet bloc faced in Hungary in 1956. Even as it used considerable military force to put down the Hungarian Uprising, the Soviet Union vastly increased the loans it gave to Central and Eastern Europe (loans to the nations there for 1956 and 1957 totaled more than US$1.2 billion, which was more than the US$1.1 billion total for the previous decade). Furthermore, the Soviet Union allowed those nations to trade with developing countries and—together with Western Europe— assisted in their economic development. At the same time, the Soviets strived to achieve economic integration of the Eastern bloc through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).

Meanwhile, the elements of dominance and dependence in the relationships between the superpowers and the nations in their spheres of influence weakened and at times became almost invisible. Although the US and the Soviet Union still had the greater power and hence the

ability to weigh in and have their way, those relationships nonetheless took on a more cooperative tone.

This change was all the more apparent with regard to Western Europe. Generally speaking, by the mid-1950s Europe had recovered from the war and had started to develop economically. The European Economic Community (EEC)'s success at regional economic integration gave it a raw power not inferior to that of the US economy. Accordingly, both the United States and the Soviet Union realized that they would no longer be able to change the status quo through brute strength, and thus they put their confrontation on hold. Given that in terms of military strength Western Europe remained inferior by far to both the United States and the Soviet Union, it still had to rely on the United States for military support. However, the easing of tensions between the two superpowers reduced the region's need to rely on that support.

For these two reasons, Western Europeans have gradually been able to become more independent. NATO remains in place and discussions of all sorts continue. In other words, the character of the relations changed from one of dominance-dependence to one of cooperation. A similar change can be seen in the relationship between Japan and the United States. Likewise, as Romania's recent behavior shows, Central and Eastern Europeans are displaying greater independence in their relationship with the Soviet Union.

While notable, these changes are hardly surprising. To maintain a sphere of influence around itself for a long time, a superpower needs to keep its client nations within that sphere without resorting to naked force. To manage this, it needs those client nations to find the dependent relationship to be in their own interest.

This situation can be seen in all types of power-related phenomena. When a ruler uses naked force to gain power, he at first thinks only

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of pursuing his own interests. However, because that ruler wishes to remain in power, he finds he must look beyond the narrow pursuit of self-interest and provide those he rules with a portion of the gains. The same sort of natural law appears to have operated with respect to the postwar US and Soviet spheres of influence. These spheres as they exist today are not systems for exploitation based on brute force wielded by the strong against the weak. They are systems useful to the mutual interests of those involved. If anything, the fact is that the rulers have to share benefits with those who are ruled.

Raymond Aron has written as follows on this point.

> If one wants to prolong the pillage one must appropriate without payment, or at very low prices, the raw materials, producer goods, and manufactured goods of the conquered people. The Soviet rulers, imprisoned in an ideology in which they believe after a fashion, aimed, in instituting régimes modelled on that of Imperial Russia, to promote what they call socialism, and in any case, to establish a heavy industry and to develop natural and human resources. In the long run, the combination of these two undertakings—exploitation by the parent state and a high rate of investment—results in an intolerable reduction of the standard of living in the satellite states. Since 1956 the Soviet Union has been obliged to aid those countries which she has colonized. That domination is costly instead of being profitable is a new fact and derives from the conditions of industrial society. It cannot but influence international relations.
>
> Analogous phenomena, only even more pronounced, have appeared in the Western world. The hegemony exercised by the U.S.A. was at once reflected in unprecedented budgets for

foreign aid. Since the end of the Second World War, the European nations have expended in their colonies, empires, or overseas possessions, however one chooses to call them, as much or more than they have received from their American protector. . . . In this century the glory of governing has to be its own reward.[26]

Thus, if we do not recognize that the nature of spheres of influence has changed, it will not be possible to get a sense of how stable and strong the US and Soviet spheres are. For example, although Japan cannot make any moves that run explicitly counter to US wishes, it still does have some degree of influence to constrain US behavior. Even if their respective degrees of influence over one another differ, the relationship between these two nations is basically a cooperative one and useful to their mutual interests. The United States gains from bilateral cooperation, and so, too, does Japan.

Cooperation or Dependence?

As industrialization progresses, industries break up and diversify in complex ways. For that reason, the energy, raw materials, and equipment that those industries use likewise diversify. Similarly, demand also becomes more diverse. Producing all of this within the borders of one nation becomes impossible due to natural, economic, technological, and other conditions. Furthermore, there is no longer an economic advantage to using only domestic human and material resources. As a result, foreign trade grows in importance as industrialization progresses. In addition, increased industrialization makes mass production more profitable, meaning that markets must also expand.

For these reasons, the need for economic exchange grows as industrialization proceeds. Economic integration and regular dialogue are

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necessary for this to occur smoothly. In fact, pressed by such needs, the alliances of both the East and the West are gradually becoming more akin to systems of economic cooperation. Many no doubt already realize to some extent that economic cooperation may now be more important than military cooperation for alliances.

However, we cannot draw any optimistic conclusions about the general effect of the growth and changes in the nature of regional economic exchange. First, it should not be forgotten that exchange makes it easy to create dependence, and dependence easily produces control. This in fact has occurred within both the Soviet and US spheres of influence. Like it or not, in negotiations with superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union—or more generally speaking, between major and minor powers—the quality of a minor power's government appears to be of decisive importance when it comes to protecting the minor power's national interests. Both the Cuban regime of Fulgencio Batista and the Hungarian regime of Mátyás Rákosi failed to protect the interests of their respective peoples.

Naturally, given the qualitative differences in power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the ways in which the Cuban and Hungarian governments failed were somewhat different. The United States has not flexed its muscle through direct government intervention; rather, its power extends beyond its borders mainly through the activities of private entities and other organizations. Governments seek only the frameworks necessary for such activities—for example, maintaining property rights, preserving law and order, and the like. Consequently, the issue is whether the governments of minor powers are up to the task of protecting their national economies through such measures as taxing foreign investment, establishing tariffs, and rejecting irrational concessions.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has extended its power to other countries through the political means of manipulating its connections with local communist parties. Given that the economies of communist countries are highly regulated through planning, decisions about those economic plans are extremely important. Accordingly, for Soviet-bloc nations such as Hungary, the issue becomes one of whether the communist parties that rule those nations are loyal to Moscow or to their own people. Thus, although it takes somewhat different forms between the two blocs, what matters is whether or not there are governments that are trying to defend their own national interests.

At any rate, one must not forget that both the United States and the Soviet Union have some influence over how governments are organized in the countries within their respective spheres of influence. If nothing else, it is undeniable that any nation within either sphere of influence would find it impossible to adopt any system of government that differed from that of their respective superpower. I have already touched on how the United States and the Soviet Union had largely imposed their respective systems of government on the areas they occupied at the end of World War II. However, in 1956, Hungary crossed the Soviet Union's red line. When Hungary began to change its political regime, the Soviets staged a large-scale intervention and blocked the change. Similarly, the United States discreetly but effectively intervened in the Italian elections of 1948 through the threat of wielding its economic power. It also intervened in Central and South American countries to prevent them from going communist, as exemplified by its attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba and its dispatches of troops to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

However, both the United States and the Soviet Union can usually prevent the emergence of political regimes they find unacceptable

within their respective blocs without such blatant interventions because the relationship among the members of each bloc is useful to their shared interests. In fact, from the end of World War II to today, only three nations—Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Albania—have broken away from the US and Soviet spheres of influence. It should also be noted that each breakaway state has gone through great difficulties since their respective separations. In light of how much leverage the superpowers have on the nations within their respective blocs, one therefore cannot deny the possibility that the superpowers might use that leverage to dominate and even oppress. That may have been the case especially when the government of the minor power has rested on weak foundations and has been particularly frail.

The Struggle for Economic Integration

Second, such attempts at regional integration can lead to rivalry with other such attempts. The more successful one attempt at integration is, the greater the threat it inherently poses to those excluded from that group. Conversely, as in the case of the European Economic Community (EEC), the presence of a threat makes integration that much easier. The nations of Europe—particularly France and Germany—had frequently come into conflict, but the emergence of the common Soviet threat opened the door for them to embark on regional integration. Of course, it would be incorrect to criticize all forms of regional integration on that basis. The world is in many respects too large and too divided to achieve integration on a universal and global scale. Still, it is clear that there are limits to regional integration.

The connection between economic integration and cooperation on the one hand and their implications for power politics on the other is the primary issue for international politics today when it comes to

relations with developing countries. I have already discussed the US and Soviet spheres of influence. Once those superpowers had clearly defined the boundaries of their spheres, their interest shifted to the developing countries. Starting in roughly the mid-1950s, both the US and the Soviet Union began devoting much of their attention to the question of how such countries would develop. The superpowers spoke of the importance of providing those countries with models for development and in that connection began offering them economic assistance. The following table suggests how closely US and Soviet economic aid has been tied to political objectives.

That said, while both the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted to influence the construction of the economies in

Table 3. Primary Recipients of Aid from the United States and the Soviet Union and China

United States		Total: US$4.665 billion (1962)
Breakdown (distribution percent)	India	17.9%
	Pakistan	9.4%
	United Arab Republic (Egypt)	4.8%
	Chile	4.6%
	Brazil	4.3%
	South Korea	4.3%
	Turkey	4.1%
	South Vietnam	3.3%
	Mexico	3.1%
	Ghana	2.8%
	Yugoslavia	2.5%
	Congo	1.8%
Soviet Union and China		Total: US$1.25 billion (1954–1962)
Breakdown (distribution percent)	India	20.0%
	Egypt	15.9%
	Indonesia	12.1%
	Afghanistan	12.1%
	Cuba	8.1%
	Iraq	8.1%
	Syria	8.1%
	Ghana	4.0%

Source: Ichimura Shin'ichi, *Sekai no naka no Nihon keizai* [Japan's Economy in the World] (Tokyo: Chūōkōron-sha, 1965).

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developing countries, neither has turned to the use of actual force for that purpose. Accordingly, there has been no imminent threat of conflict between the two superpowers over economic development in such countries. In contrast, China's having stepped into the picture with its calls for popular uprisings and revolutions in developing countries may bring political tension back into the world. This shows that economic relations cannot be separated from power politics.

The US and Chinese stances toward developing countries are polar opposites. China sees these peoples as "oppressed" and wants them to besiege advanced countries through revolutions. For example, consider the comments of General Lin Biao, drawn from his experiences in China's guerilla war and applying them to the world situation:

> Looking at problems from a global perspective, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." . . . In a sense, today's global revolution presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.[27]

The striking thing here is that the US also uses this way of talking about "cities" and "villages," but the meaning assigned to it is completely the opposite. For the US, the advanced industrialized countries of North America and Europe are expected to transmit industrial civilization to the world's villages as the cities of old did to rural provinces. Communism is seen as a passing illness that can readily afflict society

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in the process of great change. Accordingly, the US believes it needs to preserve the stability of developing countries in ways that would allow them to industrialize without being impeded by that illness.

Thus, the United States and China view the great changes that are taking place in developing countries in contrary ways. Although how much of a difference this will make is as yet unclear, the manner in which development unfolds—an issue that currently is of great interest—unquestionably could become embroiled in the great struggle for power between the United States and China. Moreover, the Soviet Union is not disinterested, and the advanced industrialized powers of Western Europe have not lost interest in their former colonies.

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III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

The North-South Problem

These days, the greatest challenge to the stance that economic exchange will produce peace is the North-South problem, i.e., the enormous economic gap between advanced countries in the North and developing ones in the South. A quick look at national income data reveals that, in comparison with the nearly US$3,000 in income per year per capita for the United States, and around US$1,000 for the EEC nations, the average for countries in the "South"—i.e., Asia, Africa, and Latin America—is just slightly over US$100. Around one-third of the world's population consists of people in countries whose national incomes are US$100 or less per year. This enormous gap very much dims the optimistic view that an increase in the wealth of one nation produces increases in the wealth of others.

To a certain degree, this is an aftereffect of imperialism. Setting aside the question of whether imperial powers gained or lost from having colonies, there is no mistaking that at the very least those powers benefited far more than their colonies did. Moreover, as I will discuss later, colonial rule left grave, invisible wounds on the nations of Asia and Africa.

Basically, however, it would be better to think of this gap not as the product of intentional human behavior, but rather the result of a long historical process beyond human control. Civilization has not progressed in a uniform fashion in all parts of the world. On the contrary, at a time

when new technologies gave humans in western Europe great energy and new modes of transport that enabled them to move people rapidly, other parts of the world remained uncivilized or had stagnated for various reasons. This great gap is not one that can easily be closed even by humans of great wisdom and with the best of intentions. Whatever the reason, the fact is a gap does exist between the North and the South.

Furthermore, this is not a gap that will close naturally on its own by leaving it in the hands of economic exchange and the workings of the market. To the contrary, they make it more difficult to close the gap for reasons inherent in economic phenomena. When all is said and done, those who are economically stronger will have the advantage.

These days, the violent exploitation of the weak by the strong is rare. The Portuguese colony of Angola and places like South Africa and Rhodesia that are under a modified form of colonial rule are exceptional cases. Certainly, as Raymond Aron says, mutual benefits have become the more salient feature of economic exchanges. Even so, we cannot look to economic exchange with optimism. Even if we separate the struggle for power from economic exchange, the position of the economically stronger party remains unchanged: they will still have the advantage. For example, while major corporations and their smaller counterparts may compete in making exactly the same product, the reality remains that the smaller corporations stand no chance in such a contest. This is the same between nations. Thanks to artificial materials such as synthetic rubber, nylon, and plastics, the degree of dependence on raw materials has been declining. For that reason, even as the production of primary goods grows in developing countries, the demand for those goods does not grow at the same rate. Given that developing countries produce and export raw materials and other such primary commodities, they will see either a decline in the volume of their

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exports or a reduction in their export prices. In addition, price volatility for primary goods also puts developing countries at a disadvantage.

For these reasons, even if economic growth in advanced and developing countries does not come at one another's expense but rather is beneficial to both, it is still true that advanced countries are growing faster than developing ones. Taking the 1950s as an example, the rate of development for advanced nations was 2.7 percent per year on average, while it stood at 2.1 percent annually for Asian countries excluding Japan and China. This means that special efforts would be required to close the gap between advanced and developing countries. Such efforts might include providing assistance to developing countries and establishing a trade system that would help them to develop.

Economists such as Jan Tinbergen of the Netherlands and Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden have been arguing this point for years. Myrdal spoke of applying the principles of the welfare state beyond the boundaries of any single nation and of the need to create a "welfare world."[28] He said that while Karl Marx's prediction that society will divide into the few rich and the multitude of poor might have missed its mark when it came to societies within nations, on the much larger scale of the entire world it was possible to think that Marx's prediction might be gradually becoming a reality. The gap between the few rich and the multitude of poor is formidable and even continues to grow. For this reason, Myrdal says, the welfare state model that has been used for solving the problem of wealth and poverty in capitalist societies must be applied to the world as a whole.

That said, as Myrdal also acknowledges, a welfare world would be far more difficult to achieve than a welfare state. Welfare states developed within the framework of existing nation-states. However, no comparable framework exists upon which to build a welfare world.

Specifically, in the case of nation-states there were shared interests that could provide the foundations upon which to create a welfare state, and there were institutions for making such a state a reality based on an awareness of those common interests. On a global scale, though, even if there are shared interests, they are not recognized as such. No institutions exist for making those shared interests a reality.

The Issue of Self-Esteem

In this last case, the egoism of each nation creates difficulties for realizing global interests. People work because they want to become wealthy; they do not work for the sake of others. More precisely, people work to make themselves better off than others, and for that very reason no matter how wealthy they become they still want to become even wealthier.

This is the second point made by Rousseau in his criticism of the view that economic exchange would produce peace. Rousseau divided human appetites into self-love (*amour propre*) and self-esteem (*amour de soi*). Self-love is the spirit of attempting to preserve one's own life, and it is a natural good. It is interested only in the self, and therefore it will be satisfied solely by meeting its own requirements. However, humans also have a sense of self-esteem that leads them to compare themselves with other humans. Self-esteem is never satisfied; in fact, there is no way it can ever be fully satisfied. The only sentiment with which children are born is self-love. However, as a child expands his or her connections with other humans, the desire for self-esteem arises.

> Then the child becomes masterful, jealous, deceitful, and vindictive. If he is not compelled to obedience, when he does not see the usefulness of what he is told to do, he attributes it to caprice,

to an intention of tormenting him, and he rebels. If people give in to him, as soon as anything opposes him he regards it as rebellion, as a determination to resist him; he beats the chair or table for disobeying him.[29]

Unfortunately, people being what they are, nations operate based not on self-love but on self-esteem. Writing elsewhere, Rousseau described the source of the never-ending struggle for power among states as follows:

> The State . . . always feels weak as long as there are other states that are stronger than itself. Its security, its defence, demand that it try to appear more powerful than its neighbours . . . Its power thus being purely relative, the political body is forced to compare itself without stopping to know itself. It depends on its surroundings, and must take an interest in all that happens there. For it would seem useless simply to keep to oneself without having anything to gain or lose. Whether a state becomes small or great, weak or strong, depends on whether its neighbour expands or pulls back, adds to its forces or reduces them.[30]

Rousseau's discussion here about strength and weakness largely refers to military power, but it also applies to economic power—though the tensions the latter causes may be somewhat less serious. Still, it is economic competition that has perhaps become the primary focus in international politics for all nations since World War II. Egoism of this sort makes it difficult for us to provide assistance to developing countries.

That is to say, the fact that advanced countries are in fierce competition with one another has become an obstacle to assisting developing countries. In light of that competition, it would not be possible

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to provide assistance from an entirely humanitarian motivation. If we think in an abstract way about advanced and developing countries, it quickly becomes apparent that economic assistance is both necessary and desirable. For developing countries to become rich is not only necessary for reducing the gap between the rich and the poor and providing political stability; it is also desirable in that markets will expand. Certainly, there are mutual interests.

But when we think more concretely about how much assistance to offer and to whom, we can easily see that a nation would sustain losses if it offered ruinously larger amounts of assistance. Take Japan as an example. If we take into consideration the wealthier countries with which Japan is fiercely competing, we can see that its willingness to provide assistance of its own will be quite limited.

The same is true for all advanced countries. The actual scale of economic assistance has been limited to a level that does not damage the donor's own prospects for economic growth. Rather, it has been set to levels that are politically and economically useful to the donor's own interests. The total amount of assistance, too, has not grown as much as one might expect. The non-binding target of one percent of an advanced country's national income is a modest sum when it comes to what will meet the needs of developing countries. Yet, even that has not been met. Also, advanced countries prefer bilateral aid packages and pay little more than lip service when it comes to aid channeled through international organizations. The aid that is channeled through the United Nations does not amount to even five percent of the total assistance provided by the United States and the Soviet Union.

III. Egoism and Mutual Interests

Nationalistic Attitudes and Institutions

Furthermore, nation-states today find it easier to intellectually and emotionally understand and accept their own national interests over those they share with other nations. Thanks to advances in communications, we are inclined to believe that we are knowledgeable about international affairs and can view the situation from a broad international perspective. But the fact is, our views are colored to a surprising degree by our national prejudices. Today's welfare state has tightened the links between states and the populations they govern. Also, as Myrdal observes, the stronger a sense of national solidarity becomes, the more a sense of international solidarity weakens. Today's politics are based on the nation-state as their fundamental unit. This means the national interests of individual countries are reflected well but reflecting the interests of other nations and international perspectives is difficult.

This presents a great obstacle to changing the trade policies of advanced countries to ones that would be more favorable to developing countries. Repeated discussions have taken place on how changing economic policies, including those related to trade, would be far more effective than economic assistance when it comes to promoting economic progress in developing countries. At the first meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva from March through June of 1964, developing countries issued strong demands for mechanisms to expand trade. First, they argued, in relative terms, the scale of trade is far greater than that of aid. Foreign-currency earnings from exports by developing countries total approximately US$30 billion annually, while, in contrast, assistance and investments are merely one-quarter of that amount. Furthermore, international trade would provide greater direct stimulus to the industries of developing countries than aid would. Aid might be

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wasted, while international trade would certainly encourage industries to produce goods for commerce.

Accordingly, advanced countries need to import primary goods regularly from developing countries while offering assistance or financial facilities to cover risks resulting from price fluctuations. It is also necessary to expand consumption and to eliminate trade barriers, so that the export of primary goods will grow. Also important is purchasing manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the industries that developing countries are fostering.

Unfortunately, although the need for such sweeping changes in economic policies is widely recognized, the actual performance of the advanced countries has been even worse than their economic assistance. This is because this sort of change in policy requires institutional changes within the advanced nations themselves. For example, handing over the market for simple manufactured goods like shirts to developing countries would require keeping the dissatisfaction of workers producing the same goods in advanced countries in check by guaranteeing their livelihoods while retraining them for new jobs. This without question is likely to generate strong resistance and demand a major readjustment in economic policies. For these two reasons, changing trade policy is more difficult than simply increasing economic assistance. Thus, while the further development of developing countries may be in the common interest, it comes up against the stiff barrier of national egoism.

The Preconditions of Economic Development

However, even if advanced nations provide enough assistance and adjust their trade to match the needs of developing countries, that will not solve the North-South problem. Economic development is not

merely a problem of economics; first and foremost, the prerequisite for development is a mature society. Given the absence of such mature societies in the developing world today, societal changes need to happen together with or even prior to economic development. When economic development started to become a major issue a decade ago, it was optimistically assumed that merely supplying capital would lead to development. However, simply pumping money into developing countries often resulted in inflation or the building of iron mills and aluminum factories that had little direct impact on the lives of the people and failed to become a core of economic development.

Gradually, the complexities of economic development became better understood. For example, it was recognized that a nation's choice of the sector on which to concentrate its development efforts had to take multiple factors into consideration, including the size of the nation undergoing development, its resources, and its population. It was also realized that the level of the population's education was of great importance, and greater still was the stability and effectiveness of its government. Since the societal transformations that economic development requires are harsh and extreme, strong political power is indispensable to weathering the disruption that will result.

For a developing country to accumulate capital, its people will have to work even harder than ever. They will have to produce more goods, while at the same time maintain consumption at its current levels. That will call for a fundamental change in the attitudes of that nation's populace, and that process will be harsh. This is why the government must be a powerful one trusted by its people. If a primitive accumulation of capital were to occur in a society over an extremely long period of time, as it did in Western Europe—especially in Britain—this change would come about naturally. However, today's developing countries

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must develop quickly. Furthermore, since these countries are caught in a vicious cycle of poverty with their populations leading a hand-to-mouth existence, they must be aggressive about capital accumulation. That will require mobilizing tremendous political power.

For example, land reform has often been discussed as a necessary step for economic development. Land reform frees labor for development. Farmers in developing countries suffer low standards of living. The main reason is that too many farmers are working on small plots of land, which means that individual farmers are not productive enough. For that reason, even if the number of farmers on such densely populated arable lands is reduced, there would be no change to the amount of output obtained from the land. Thus, reducing the number of farmers would free up labor for manufacturing or for road and dam construction. If the remaining farmers who have now become more productive consume the results of that increased production themselves, they will not accumulate any capital. They would have to continue supplying foodstuffs to the new industrial workers. In other words, they would need to live frugally, even if they needed to be forced to do so. Otherwise, it will not be possible for that developing country to accumulate capital.

It is clear that land reform can provide an extremely effective means for achieving these changes in the composition of rural and industrial workforces. Land reform does not mean simply redistributing to the peasantry the land held by landowners, as that does not increase productivity. Rather, the intention of land reform is to accumulate capital through increasing agricultural productivity by grouping small plots of land into larger ones, diverting labor away from agriculture to other sectors, and forcing those who remain on the land to be frugal.

The collectivization that was carried out in communist countries is probably the most thoroughgoing method toward achieving the two

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goals of diverting labor and accumulating capital. It is well known that Stalin collectivized agriculture very aggressively in order to extract capital from farmers for industrialization. The people's communes in China had the same objective. Given the strong attachment that every human has to their traditional way of life, and also taking into account the strong resistance to change in the traditional institutions of land ownership due to how they are bound up with existing socio-political systems in general as well as the emotional attachments of farmers to their land, it is obvious that any attempt to achieve the above-mentioned goal would face vehement opposition. Collectivization of agriculture is an extremely harsh way to accumulate capital.

The Conundrum of State Formation

No matter how gently agricultural collectivization advances, it cannot avoid producing great social tensions. For that reason, any government seeking to collectivize must be able to mobilize sufficient power to overcome the challenges collectivization poses. However, it is unlikely that any developing country will have such a strong government because none is a nation-state as yet in the modern sense of the term. Some have only just been freed from colonial rule, while others did not even have states when they came under colonial rule. Their peoples are distinctly divided into several tribes or classes, and those peoples are not physically or psychologically attached to a single nation. Developing countries are still in the process of state formation.

The state formation process is an extremely difficult one that takes time. The process by which it unfolded in Europe, too, was a long and arduous journey. The process included central governments working to assimilate ethnic minorities, revolts by those minorities, and their suppression by those governments. There also were fierce conflicts

among feudal lords and monarchs, and these frequently led to revolts. Furthermore, because there were places where various ethnic groups lived among one another, it was not necessarily possible for a given ethnic group to build its own state, and so problems involving ethnic minorities regularly recurred.

The emerging countries of Asia and Africa now face the burden of having to quickly work their way through the time-consuming and difficult process that advanced countries have already experienced. Most of these developing countries lack effective states. Many of the borders between them are there simply because that they were drawn that way by former colonial masters. Some of these nations are merely a hodgepodge of different ethnic groups with no connections among them, while others are aggregations of groups traditionally hostile to one another whose acrimonious relationships may have been aggravated further through the manipulations of their colonial rulers. Moreover, the communication networks that ought to be a tool for state building are underdeveloped, and many of these states do not have a single, common language. Considering all these factors, state formation in developing countries is an extremely difficult undertaking. For that reason, it seems likely that developing countries will be beset by tensions and intermittent unrest for quite a long time.

When it comes to state building, the damage caused by imperialism is most evident. Imperialism destroyed the value systems of colonized peoples without offering any alternative. This is because a people's system of values—their beliefs, customs, and traditions—comprise the framework for interpreting the world. Therefore, imposing a value system nurtured in a completely different environment could never be sufficiently powerful to inspire the local populace. Rather, it would destroy the foundations of the local society and leave it deracinated.

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Exchanges between different civilizations may be to their mutual benefit, but that is true only when both sides assimilate elements of a different civilization by their own volition; the effects are purely negative if the values are imposed from the outside. Imperialism either completely destroyed or significantly damaged the nationhood of the colonized peoples.

This is how colonialism deprived the colonized peoples of their spirit of independence. This is what Mahatma Gandhi feared the most. At the court hearing held after he was arrested for his pro-independence activities, he said:

> I am satisfied that many Englishmen and Indian officials honestly believe that they are administering one of the best systems devised in the world and that India is making steady though slow progress. They do not know that a subtle but effective system of terrorism and an organized display of force on the one hand, and the deprivation of all powers of retaliation or self-defence on the other, have emasculated the people and induced in them the habit of simulation.[31]

His words remind us of the enormous handicap that developing countries face today in their efforts to build states. They also clarify what the fundamental problem of economic development is for them. From a purely material standpoint, colonies gained more from their empires than they lost. However, those gains did not give colonies the ability to develop by themselves; to the contrary, they destroyed that ability. Former colonies will never develop unless they can create the capacity to do so on their own.

Thus, the North-South problem is not easily solved. If it were just

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a matter like balancing the levels of water in two ponds by connecting them, then it would be simple. When thinking about disparities in wealth, the issue is not just how much wealth is at hand. Wealth is produced every day and is consumed every day. The problem is that the ability of individual nations to produce wealth is very different. Basically, only each nation can develop its own capacity to produce its own wealth. And this is a long process.

When we think about both advanced and developing countries in connection with the North-South problem, at first glance there seems to be a paradox. Namely, a state regulates economic life, which is one of the most important activities to human existence. In advanced countries, the problem is that the state is too strong, while in developing countries the problem is that it is too weak. This suggests that, while nationalism should not be allowed to go unchecked, developing countries undeniably need to have an effective state. In the absence of the system of values that a state provides, a nation's population will not be able to realize its full potential.

This is the fundamental reason why it is impossible to achieve peace by trying to establish a universal order, as I will explain in the next chapter.

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"Don't move without knowing where to put your foot next, and don't move without having sufficient stability to enable you to achieve exactly what should be the next step. One who is really serious in his determination to reach the top does not gamble by impatiently accepting bad footholds and poor grips." Dag Hammarskjöld, former secretary-general of the United Nations[32]

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The Dilemma of International Organizations

At present, international society lacks institutions that realize the common interest. This has created difficulties when it comes to making steady progress toward peace, whether the issue is disarmament or economic assistance. This is why international organizations matter. The basic condition of international politics is one of anarchy, since all sovereign states exist equally side by side. According to one view, to resolve this state of anarchy nations must transfer some or all of their sovereignty and create some sort of international federation.

Theoretically, such a development would be a natural one. And while the idea may date back to ancient times when all states were equally sovereign, it remains at the core of pacifist thought today. In fact, first the League of Nations and then the United Nations were created in succession after the two world wars of the twentieth century with proclamations that they would be followed by a brighter world without conflict.

In fact, however, given the excessive trust that has been placed in international institutions, we now see the unusual phenomenon that the criticisms of such organizations by thinkers from the past are being misinterpreted as approval. For example, though Rousseau was critical of the idea that peace could be achieved through international organizations, he has been seen as a proponent of them. This misunderstanding can be found in everything from college textbooks to high school

readers. Setting aside the reasons why, we are left with fact that the idea of peace being achieved through international organizations has yet to be properly tested.

The fact is, advocating ideas that have yet to be adequately considered theoretically remains a conspicuous weakness when it comes to any discussions about peace. In light of the failure of the League of Nations and what we have seen in the two decades-plus of the United Nations, few have any remaining naive expectations for international organizations. They know that the United Nations has only limited power. And yet, these largely uncritical expectations for international organizations as an ideal remain. It is simplistically thought that eternal peace will be upon us once some perfect international organization is created. That may be so. However, any idealism that does not seriously consider what possible obstacles might lie in the way and what the greatest shortcomings of such a peace might be is not so much a conviction as it is a vague yearning for some ideal.

Proposals for peace through international organizations were first formulated systematically during the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who has already been mentioned, and William Penn, the famous Quaker, were two noted proponents of such an idea. Both proposed establishing international organizations whose members would promise to not use force to solve conflicts, and that would punish violators. These were the archetypes of the pacifist thought that have since reappeared over and over.

Rousseau was attracted to Saint-Pierre's peace proposal, but at the same time he did not overlook its fundamental shortcomings. Rousseau's first point of criticism was that sovereign states would not approve of an international organization of the sort that Saint-Pierre proposed. The problem was not that states were somehow malevolent

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and would be unwilling to assent. Rather, the issue was the difference between the interests of international society as a whole and the interests of each state.

Even if states understand that peace would be guaranteed by an international organization, this would be in the general interest and not necessarily in the interests of individual states. However, the general interest is difficult to recognize because of its very generality. Because humans are ruled by their sense of self-esteem, they view their own interests in comparison with those of others; self-esteem is a far-stronger driver of human beings than is the general interest.

This led Rousseau to conclude that we have to think like the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, that if the sovereigns and their ministers are well-intentioned (and that is no certain thing), then they will easily discover a favorable opportunity to put this project into action. That is to say, Rousseau argued, in order to implement this project, the sum total of their individual interests should not be greater than that of their shared interests. Each nation should believe that the general welfare of all nations was greater than their individual interests. However, this would require many humans being wise enough to realize this and agreeing that it is in their interest; it is not something that could be produced by chance. But, in the absence of such spontaneous agreement, the remaining default position is the use of force; and then the question is no longer to persuade but to compel; not to write books but to raise armies.

In short, Rousseau was focused on the dilemmas that impede peace from being established. The structure of an international society where sovereign states stand side by side is what causes wars. Although an international organization is the only solution, it is exactly this structure that prevents the establishment of such an organization. Although

it may not be possible to solve this dilemma in a single stroke, it might be possible to resolve it at the end of a long historical process. Certainly, Rousseau might have depicted the difficulty of this problem too vividly and therefore too simplistically.

However, he was aware of another great difficulty and danger: as with all ideals, this one, too, could be used as a tool in the struggle for power. Rousseau used the second half of his essay "Judgement on Perpetual Peace" to illustrate how the ideal of an international organization had been used as such a tool, referring to the "Grand Design" of Henri IV of France that had served as a prototype for Saint-Pierre's plan.

Early in the seventeenth century, Henri IV, who had put a stop to the religious conflicts in France and established the French state, thought of uniting fifteen countries to create a European federation (the "Christian Commonwealth"). It was to be administered by sixty-some representatives from the participating countries, with each position open for reelection every three years.

This idea for an international organization was not just the product of abstract thinking; it was a plan for creating an international order for Europe after France had upended the Habsburgs' ambitions. Although the empire was in decline during Henri IV's time after its attempt to dominate the whole of Europe had suffered setbacks including the defeat of its Armada in the late sixteenth century, Habsburg Spain still remained the strongest state in Europe.

Henri IV stood opposed to that dynasty, and he came up with his Grand Design as a means for achieving a French hegemony over Europe. It is interesting that his Habsburg rivals mobilized Catholicism as a powerful ideology. The Grand Design could be seen as an ideology meant to counter this. Henri's foreign minister, Maximilien de Béthune, the Duke of Sully and a capable diplomat, twice went to

London, eventually leading Great Britain to conclude an alliance with France to relieve pressure from Spain. The other states that joined this alliance also sought to improve their respective individual interests. The German princes joined it in order to oppose Austrian influence; Sweden did so to win Pomerania; the Duke of Savoy did so to win Milan; and even the Vatican, leery of Spanish dominance, was promised the Kingdom of Naples as spoils of war. Henri IV prudently did not seek self-serving gains for France.

> However, this prudent monarch did not overlook the fact that he could gain more than other countries by not seeking anything for his own. Even if he could not get something for his country, if he could weaken just one other country stronger than his that would be enough for his country to become the strongest. It is clear that he exercised every precaution in order to achieve success, while he did not forget to take steps that would result in his dominance in the organization that he tried to create.[33]

That is the kind of international organization that can exist given the reality of international politics. This is why Rousseau left us with these ironic, if not cynical, words in his "A Lasting Peace" essay concerning Saint-Pierre's work.

> Beyond doubt, a lasting peace is, under present circumstances, a project ridiculous enough. But give us back Henri IV and Sully, and it will become once more a reasonable proposal. Or rather, while we admire so fair a project, let us console ourselves for its failure by the thought that it could only have been carried out by violent means from which humanity must needs shrink.[34]

Multiple Ideas of Justice

Immanuel Kant also raised the possibility of creating an international organization for ruling the world. Kant thought that the first dilemma Rousseau had pointed out would be resolved by long processes of history, but he acknowledged that the second shortcoming would remain. Kant was opposed to the idea of a supranational body that would have coercive powers; he argued rather for the necessity of having an international confederation that, by the nations involved voluntarily submitting to it, would create a legal status (*status juridicus*) among states. This is simply because Kant feared that some great power would attempt to subjugate the world and establish a tyranny under the pretense of creating an international state. Furthermore, Kant spoke plainly of how the situation would not be appealing even if this federation were to be established.

> The idea of international law presupposes the *separate* existence of a number of neighboring and independent states; and, although such a condition of things is in itself already a state of war . . . yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better than that all the states should be merged into one under a power which has gained the ascendency over its neighbors and gradually become a universal monarchy. For the wider the sphere of their jurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, when it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. (emphasis added)[35]

Thus, Rousseau and Kant drew on two reasons for their arguments that it would not only be impossible but also undesirable to have a peace based on an international organization that had enforcement capabilities. One

is that any attempt to establish such an organization would in fact lead to one powerful nation subjugating all the others. The other reason is that even if such an order were actually established, it would lack the rule of law, and on the contrary would invite anarchy. Although at first glance it might seem that these two reasons are separate matters, if we consider them more deeply we see that they both come down to the same point. The fact is order in international society cannot easily be achieved by simply concentrating all power into one organization.

As mentioned above, all forms of order comprise both a system of power and a system of values. This applies to nations, too; a nation does not simply define the scope or boundaries within which some central authority extends. The very fact that the members of a given nation share the same basic value system is what leads to the creation of order. If power is applied without a basic value system, the result will be either the tyranny that Kant describes or a state of anarchy. Only after people have been joined together by the invisible threads of shared patterns of behavior and value systems can they create nations and other institutions. However, this is not to say that order can be created just by nurturing a shared system of values. The fact is, the coercion that derives from authority and power is a necessity. More accurately, a shared value system will not be created without the coercive support that comes from power.

This is clear, too, if we consider the process of nation-state formation in Europe. One aspect of that was the process in which shared values took shape that were based on ethnic-group identity, language, culture, geography, history, customs, and the like. John Stuart Mill defined this as peoples "united among themselves by common sympathies . . . [who] desire to be under the same government, . . ."[36] Unquestionably, the development of those "common sympathies"

was indispensable to the process of forming a nation-state. However, as historical studies of this process have shown, both subjugation and assimilation by sovereign authority were major contributors to the formation of the nation-state. When we also consider legislative, administrative, and judicial systems, we must not forget that the mechanisms of one-man governments under kings gradually became the basis for nation-states. Thus, we can see that all types of political order are compound systems of authority and of values, and their formative processes are complex and extend over long periods during which those compounds are created.

And yet, the value system needed to provide such a foundation does not exist in international society. What do exist are the different value systems respective to each country. Not only do multiple sources of power stand side-by-side in international society, but so, too, do multiple systems of values and, accordingly, multiple ideas of what constitutes justice. Under such conditions, any attempt to concentrate power in a single place is certain to fail. Even if power could successfully be concentrated in one place without the backing of some shared concept of legitimacy, the result would be one country claiming legitimacy being dominated by another country also claiming legitimacy. Consequently, at least when viewed from the perspective of the country being dominated, the situation that results is tyranny.

Considering this reality, it is evident that the fact that sovereign states do not agree to the establishment of a powerful international organization is not due merely to simple egoism or to some malicious or foolish inability to accept the general interest. For example, avoiding total war is clearly in the general interest, and politicians today are aware of this fact. However, as we have already seen, the imperative of avoiding total war did not convince nations to disarm or to endorse

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the creation of a governing body to make sure that disarmament is effective. Even if nations of their own volition control arms, strive to reduce tensions, and reduce the dangers of total war, they will not agree to disarm under some control system. This is because whatever the control system might be, it will not embody a system of values of the sort to which all sovereign states involved would be able to entrust their fate. There is no such internationally shared idea of justice, and that is the core of the problem.

The Enforcement Capabilities of International Organizations

The actual history of international organizations supports these theoretical considerations. First, several unsuccessful attempts have already been made at creating an international organization with enforcement authority. For example, the League of Nations attempted to create a system for collective security. Article 11 of its Covenant provided: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League." Furthermore, Article 16 stated: "Should any Member of the League resort to war . . . it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League." Consequently, all members were compelled to participate if sanctions were imposed in response to an act contrary to those articles.

However, looking at the interpretive resolutions that were meant to further solidify these provisions, it is clear that in fact this collective security system did not exist. One resolution of 1921 provided, "The unilateral action of the defaulting State cannot create a state of war: it merely entitles the other Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to declare themselves in a state of War with the covenant-breaking State." This was followed by interpretative wording

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stating, "It is the duty of each Member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed." In other words, it was left up to each member of the League to decide if a breach had occurred.[37]

If a breach did take place, the member states were obliged to impose sanctions. However, they were free to determine for themselves whether a breach had occurred. This meant that such an obligation was merely nominal. As to the timing and method for imposing sanctions, the League's Council could only admonish the offender; thus, in the end, even carrying out sanctions was entrusted to each member state. As a matter of fact, when Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1935, the Assembly did urge that economic sanctions be imposed. However, member states were free to choose the actual method for doing that, and implementation was likewise voluntary, so that in the end the effectiveness of those sanctions was extremely weak.

Due to the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations was created with the aim of being an international organization with much-stronger authority. Its founders attributed the League's failure to maintain peace to its lack of enforcement capabilities. The founders of the United Nations adopted the principle of majority rule for its General Assembly instead of the League's model of unanimous consent. Also, the UN Security Council was given the power to enforce peace and security.

Specifically, the Security Council was given the power to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to decide on whatever measures would be taken in response (UN Charter, Article 39), based on a resolution approved by seven of its eleven constituent members, including the five permanent members. (Starting in 1965, approval by nine of its fifteen constituent

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members was required, again including the permanent five.) The UN Charter provides that decisions and recommendations are binding on its members. Furthermore, the Charter also states that the Security Council may take enforcement action to maintain international peace and security, and that armed forces may be made available to the Council through special agreements with member states (Articles 40 through 49). The UN's founders described the body as a "League of Nations with teeth," a turn of phrase that illustrates their intentions well.

However, insofar as enforcement is concerned, the provisions of the UN Charter have become almost a dead letter. Although in principle the Security Council is based on majority rule, in reality the five permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, France, and Britain—have veto powers. Consequently, these major powers have the ability with their respective votes to completely bury a resolution they believe to be contrary to their own interests.

As a result, the veto power itself has become an object of criticism. Such criticisms were particularly loud for several years after the UN was founded. Critics had argued that veto power would prevent the Security Council from functioning, and that it would be unable to carry out its responsibilities to "maintain international peace and security." In short, veto power amounted to an unfair prerogative of the great powers. However, it is wrong to assume that an international organization with enforcement capabilities can be established only if it has no veto power. The fact is, without veto power there would have been no United Nations.

This is evident if one reviews the process that led to the creation of the UN. During the August 1944 discussions of the draft UN Charter that took place at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the United States, the Soviet Union argued that resolutions of a Security Council

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would need to be endorsed by all of its permanent members. In particular, it argued, even if a resolution involved one or another of the permanent members, that member state would still have the right to vote.

Great Britain and the United States opposed this as unreasonable, but the Soviet Union would not change its position. As a result, no decision was made on Security Council voting methods at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. But at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, President Roosevelt acceded to the Soviet position. The result was the veto power as it currently stands. Without this, the Soviet Union would not have agreed to join the United Nations.

We can understand why a United Nations that lacked veto powers would have been unachievable if we remember the fate of the Baruch Plan. While the Plan's proposed control system might have been limited to those cases that involved international administration of nuclear power, nations signing on to it would not have had veto power. Moreover, the resulting organization would have had powerful authority over such matters as managing inspections. Such a body would truly have been an international organization with coercive powers. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union—which had argued so forcefully for creating veto power—would reject the proposed supranational organization for that reason. The fact is, the Soviet Union had an unshakeable distrust of Western Europe. Naturally, this distrust was mutual. Both sides had bitter memories of the aftermath of the Russian Revolution regarding such matters as post-revolution diplomacy, interventionist wars, the Munich Agreement, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

However, the roots of these feelings of mistrust unsurprisingly lay in the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the West and, accordingly, in their different ideas of justice. As is well known,

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ideological differences led to opposing views on the postwar settlement in Europe.

The countries of Western Europe believed in the legitimacy of a system based on freedom of speech and free elections. It would not be possible for them to recognize the communist regimes of the Central and Eastern European countries as legitimate governments. Meanwhile, from the Soviet perspective "bourgeois democracy" itself lacked legitimacy. It was therefore only natural that the Soviet Union in its minority position could not leave its fate in the hands of an international organization in which the majority of its members held a different concept of legitimacy. Still, even if the Soviet Union technically was in the minority, it thought of itself as representing "the people of the world" and accordingly it saw itself as being in the majority. Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative to the United Nations in the early 1950s, would argue on behalf of his government that the minorities in the United Nations from a public opinion perspective in fact accounted for a majority. The minorities in the United Nations are *the majority of the world's peoples* who wish for peace however many sacrifices it may require, who oppose warmongers, and who seek a means for guaranteeing peace throughout the world. However, he argued, in the United Nations there exists a majority who ignore the views of the minority. Consequently, he concluded, it is the duty of the minority to express their position in a way that the people who are outside of this place where the General Assembly meets can hear their true voices.

If the Soviet Union were to be true to its own beliefs, it would not have allowed itself to submit to a majority in the UN. Viewing this from the perspective that there are multiple ideas of justice, the nature of the United States' moves in the UN is undeniably that of power politics.

Although at first glance the Baruch Plan does not appear to have

been useful to US interests, US dominance would have been established if the Plan had been implemented. However, just as Rousseau had said with respect to Henri IV's Great Design, the United States, by not seeking anything for itself, could gain more than other countries could.

The Lessons of the Korean War

When the United States fought to repulse North Korea's attack, it justified its action as an enforcement measure taken by UN forces to repel aggression. When the Korean incident occurred in June 1950, the Security Council was able to pass a resolution only because the Soviet Union absented itself from that meeting. Formally, the result was military action undertaken by the United Nations, but in fact it was military assistance to South Korea provided by the US. Of the total military strength of the UN forces, the United States supplied 91 percent of the ground forces, 93 percent of the naval forces, and 99 percent of the air forces. The reins were handed to a commander appointed by the US government, and although nominally it was the United Nations Command, in fact responsibility for those forces was entrusted to the president of the United States. The United Nations had virtually no power to administer those forces.

In fact, it was due more to the United States' international superiority than to some resolution passed by the United Nations that it was possible to create these UN forces. Accordingly, calling them "UN forces" did little more than to lend legitimacy to the US military. In this case, too, the reality was that an international organization provided a means for one country to acquire hegemony in the real world.

Although this example was an extremely special and accidental one, it must be interpreted as providing an important, general lesson. In today's world where different values, interests, and powers

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compete with one another, any enforcement measures undertaken by a potential international organization—even when it is actually implemented—will have the character of justice that has been imposed by one of the competing parties.

In view of the specific conditions surrounding the United Nations at the time, the decision to send in UN forces and grant them the authority they had was justifiable. The UN recognized that North Korea had invaded the South, and a resolution was passed to recommend enforcement measures. The UN General Assembly had previously proposed the idea of holding an election covering the whole of Korea that would be monitored by the UN, and it was North Korea that rejected that idea. From that perspective, to put all of Korea, including areas north of the 38th parallel, under the control of UN forces would be a legitimate act. However, from the Soviet and Chinese perspectives, this was simply the unilateral imposition of America's will.

Measures with which one or another of the opposing groups within the UN dissents completely will come to be seen not as a UN action but rather as a unilateral action undertaken using the UN's name.

Some might criticize any attempts to generalize from the Korean incident. They argue that in those days the communist countries were always in the minority in the UN, but that the balance has since shifted in their favor. Thus, they claim, at the time the UN did not accurately reflect global opinion.

Does the United Nations today accurately represent global public opinion? Bluntly speaking, is it at all possible to build an international organization that truly reflects global public opinion? It is hard to answer, "Yes." Thus, we should keep in mind how the experience of the UN forces during the Korean incident offers us a lesson about the unavoidable dangers that will accompany attempts to equip any

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international organization realistically possible in today's world with enforcement capabilities.

Both theoretical and empirical studies show that establishing an international organization with enforcement capabilities is neither possible nor desirable. In reality, international organizations have developed in very different directions. For example, the League of Nations found Article 11 to be the most useful part of its Covenant for settling conflicts. The Covenant provided that "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations" if a war occurred or was threatening to occur, and that the League's Council could be convened at the request of any member of the League. This, to borrow from James Leslie Brierly, a scholar of international law, is based on the idea that statesmen should be allowed to practice their craft and act on their own discretion. It is plainly obvious that practically the same thing is taking place with respect to the United Nations.

The United Nations of today is by no means a powerless body. However, its power does not come from powers of enforcement as the drafters of the UN Charter had expected. What, then, is the power that the United Nations has?

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II. The Power of Public Opinion

The United Nations as a Forum

The power that the United Nations has needs to be critically analyzed in order to avoid another common mistake—that is, believing uncritically in the power of public opinion and making simplistic assumptions about how it functions. It is generally held that the UN has evolved into a forum centered on the shaping of international public opinion, with the General Assembly at its core, rather than becoming an enforcement mechanism centered on the Security Council. This view is not inaccurate. The character of the United Nations certainly has changed. Initially, political problems were frequently deliberated within the Security Council, but gradually the General Assembly became the venue for such debates. Also, the United Nations was initially dominated by the West, and the Soviet Union was always in the minority. However, as a result of numerous Asian and African nations joining the body, it has become a more neutral venue for debate. Once the People's Republic of China and the two Germanies are added as members, the United Nations will become even more complete as a forum. Especially for small countries, this has made the General Assembly an extremely important organization that provides them with opportunities to make their voices heard. That Indonesia lost much and gained nothing by withdrawing temporarily from the body in 1965 is good proof of this. (Indonesia rejoined in 1966.) Thus, through the deliberations that take place nearly year-round at the

United Nations, something that we might call "international public opinion" takes shape.

Perhaps more important is that through the debates in the General Assembly there emerge shared ways of seeing and evaluating matters—in short, a consensus. The debates over the need for disarmament, respect for human rights, and efforts to solve the North-South problem are examples of such attempts to build consensus. The debates do not directly produce results, but by laying the groundwork for reaching common understandings and establishing benchmarks for evaluating issues, they will be deeply meaningful in the long run. Any representative of a member state who seeks to assert their national interests would no longer be able to ridicule or object to any of the values agreed upon through these debates. To borrow the words of Philip C. Jessup, US representative to the United Nations, "[Y]ou cannot secure the sympathetic support of the General Assembly by ignoring moral values."[38] In addition, when it comes to more critical problems, too, public opinion expressed through the United Nations has played a considerable role. This has garnered great success in some cases, such as the Suez Crisis, while at other times, such as during the Hungarian Revolution, it has ended in complete failure. Its efficacy varies, but in most cases it has unmistakably had some role to play.

However, public opinion is not strong enough to keep the peace; it does not work that way. We must take care to avoid the all-too-common mistake that belief in the correctness and effectiveness of public opinion is somehow diametrically opposed to the belief that peace may be achieved through some international organization with enforcement capabilities. For example, Jeremy Bentham, who strongly believed in the power of public opinion, rejected the need for an international organization and advocated instead for setting up a court for

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arbitrating disputes. Moreover, he thought there was no need for some power to enforce the decisions of this court. He believed that if there was freedom of the press to publish the facts, the power of public opinion would enforce the decisions of the court. His optimism manifests itself clearly at the opening of his essay, "A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace" (1789):

> The object of the present Essay is . . . a plan for an universal and perpetual peace. The globe is the field of dominion to which the author aspires, the press the engine, and the only one he employs, . . .[39]

The founders of the League of Nations inherited Bentham's optimism. This is evident from the following words in the address that Lord Robert Cecil, one of the League's boosters, delivered at the opening of that assembly.

> It is quite true that by far the most powerful weapon at the command of the League of Nations is not the economic weapon or the material weapon or any other weapons of material force. By far the strongest weapon we have is the weapon of public opinion.[40]

As E. H. Carr contended in his masterwork, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939*, this deification of public opinion itself was a major factor that rendered diplomacy ineffective during the interwar period. We must therefore closely examine how public opinion functions, particularly international public opinion.

The Power of Public Opinion versus Actual Force

First, let's consider the efficacy of public opinion. Specifically, when a crisis occurs, to what extent can public opinion help to solve it? In some cases, public opinion alone has produced the solution. For example, the repeated debates in the General Assembly in the autumn of 1957 regarding the tensions along the border between Syria and Turkey led the Turkish army to end its troop build-up along that frontier. Likewise, in the 1958 border conflict between Sudan and Egypt, the fact that the Security Council deliberated the issue induced both countries to change their policies, and as a result the crisis abated. In contrast, however, there also have been cases in which public opinion as expressed through the United Nations has been completely ineffective. For example, despite the fierce censure to which the Soviet Union's actions were subjected when it intervened to suppress the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Moscow achieved its objective. Still further, between 1946 and 1963 the General Assembly passed twenty-eight resolutions demanding that South Africa's policy of apartheid be changed, but as of this writing they have had no effect.

The clearest conclusion that can be drawn from these examples is that, in the end, conflicts are solved based on whatever power relationship lies behind them. This can be readily understood if one compares the Hungarian uprising with the Suez Crisis that occurred almost simultaneously. The UN General Assembly adopted largely the same stance in both cases; however, although the Anglo-French forces ceased hostilities without achieving their objective in the Suez, in Hungary the Soviet Union was not restrained in any way by the negative opinions that were expressed at the UN. This is plainly due to the differences in power between the British and the French on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. In addition to the pressure exerted on them

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by international public opinion, Britain and France did not have sufficient power to withstand either the economic sanctions imposed by the United States or the strength of the US Sixth Fleet, nor could they stand up to Soviet threats of troop movements or hints that the USSR would use missiles. It was foreseen that if the military action in Egypt were to continue, and if actual force in one form or another were to be applied, Britain and France would be dealt a major blow.

In contrast, only the United States would have been capable of wielding the actual power to halt the Soviet Union from continuing the actions it took in Hungary—a nation within the Soviet sphere of influence—and the only means available to the US was total war. The crucial factor here is that the Soviet Union's conventional forces were vastly more powerful than those of any other country, as far as Central and Eastern Europe are concerned. Thus, it was not possible to apply pressure on the Soviet Union with only limited use of military force. It is also why the Hungarian crisis differed from the Cuban blockade of 1962 where such measures were possible. So long as the United States or any other country was not willing to risk total war with the Soviet Union, the text of any UN resolution could not help but wind up being futile in light of the lack of a determination to stop Soviet intervention. That is to say, in those cases where the power relationship is completely lopsided, public opinion will not be able to resolve the situation.

In fact, cases where the power of public opinion alone was able to resolve the situation—the tensions between Syria and Turkey, and the border conflict between Egypt and Sudan—were quite exceptional. Even with respect to the Suez Crisis, where, as I have already said, public opinion played a considerable role, this does not mean that public opinion alone is what resolved the issue. Deliberations in the United Nations cannot be an alternative to power politics backed by actual force.

The Two Functions of the United Nations

This is not to say that the United Nations and the role of public opinion expressed through that body are wholly futile. Assuredly, they have two important roles to play. The first is that the United Nations always provides a line for communications among states, especially between states that are in conflict with one another. In particular, this function has been useful for easing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, at the start of the 1950s, relations between these two superpowers were extremely poor. The Soviet Union continually absented itself from meetings of the Security Council and there was little communication between Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, given that China was not in the UN and had no diplomatic relations with the US, contact between these two nations was practically nonexistent. The fact that the Korean War was fought under those conditions made the crisis that much more severe.

Consequently, it was of immense significance that India adopted a policy of nonalignment and a stance of not supporting either bloc, and also that India made efforts to bring together other nonaligned countries and use the prestige of the United Nations to serve as an intermediary. India did not contribute militarily to the UN forces in the Korean War. It opposed their crossing the 38th parallel on September 30, 1950, and as those forces neared the Yalu River it warned that China would intervene if the advance continued. Likewise, after China did intervene, India called upon the advancing Chinese army not to cross that parallel and for the Chinese and North Korean forces to cease hostilities. On January 22, 1951, China used India as an intermediary to issue its proposed formula for a temporary cease-fire. India afterward continued its activities as a liaison linking the United States with China and the Soviet Union. The effectiveness of Indian

diplomacy cannot be known with precision, but there is no mistaking the fact that the existence of a line of communications through Delhi was one factor that made a cease-fire possible.

The activities of the United Nations during the Cuban crisis were all the more impressive. They created the opportunity that started negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. On October 24, 1962, after the US had blockaded Cuba and the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union seemed imminent, UN secretary-general U Thant proposed that the two superpowers begin discussions aimed at solving the problem. He called for a two-to-three-week moratorium on both the Soviet Union's arms shipments to Cuba and the US blockade of ships bound for Cuba. In response, the following day Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev welcomed U Thant's efforts and agreed to halt the arms shipments. This served as the trigger for negotiations. At first, there was a direct exchange of letters among US president John F. Kennedy, Khruschev, and U Thant, and then one between just Kennedy and Khruschev. The result was that the Soviet Union backed down and halted the arms shipments.

Of course, the substantive negotiations in this case were those that took place between the US and Soviet leaders. The power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world is what determined the results of those negotiations. More than anything else, what made Khruschev back down was the fact that the United States had superior military strength both locally and globally. Backed by that power, Kennedy maintained a resolute stance while leaving the way open for compromise. However, considering that without an intermediary they would not have been able to seize an opportunity for negotiations, it can readily be understood that the role played by U Thant and the United Nations was indeed crucial.

In addition, the role the UN played during the Cuban crisis went beyond simply providing an opportunity for negotiations. It created an overall atmosphere for seeking peace and created the possibility for the Soviet Union to make concessions. This in itself is the second major function played by the United Nations. Khruschev might well have pulled back Soviet transports bound for Cuba, but what made that backdown possible was that it took the form of responding to a call from the United Nations. Accordingly, he was able to do so while mostly saving face. When he accepted Kennedy's demand that the Soviet missiles be withdrawn, he was able to save face again by declaring that it was peace-loving global public opinion that had won the Cuban crisis. A similar development occurred in 1956, when Anglo-French forces jointly attacked Egypt. Great Britain was left isolated in the face of opposition from global public opinion and inevitably was forced to yield before pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, among others. However, Canadian foreign minister Lester B. Pearson's proposal to deploy UN peacekeepers to monitor a cease-fire made it easier for the Anglo-French forces to halt combat operations and withdraw.

The fact that calls for peace are being made through public opinion, and that such opinion is being expressed through an authoritative institution like the United Nations, has served greatly to keep the rhetoric used and goals demanded in check in times of crisis. Criticism cannot be lodged without the rationale that the peace has been disrupted, and moreover that in such cases the goal being sought will necessarily be the restoration of peace. That provides a broad framework for dealing with conflicts. Furthermore, given that the goal of conflict resolution is being pursued in the form of restoring the peace, even the side that makes concessions can find ways to make an "honorable retreat."

Sensitivity to Public Opinion

So, does that mean that public opinion is completely incapable of bending states to its will? It would clearly be a mistake to believe so. If public opinion had no power, it would theoretically be impossible to explain the important (if secondary) role that it plays. In fact, public debates on international problems are meaningful in the sense that they function as a means for applying pressure for resolving those problems. From the perspective of problem-solving, as many critics have pointed out, such public debates have only negative effects. A diplomatic negotiation is a transaction that calls for compromise between different positions. This is not easy to accomplish under public scrutiny. Although it is necessary for the parties involved in a given transaction not to adhere to their original positions, making any changes to them in public will be difficult. There will always be the strong temptation to criticize others rather than reach an agreement.

This is what led Hans Morgenthau to declare that diplomacy had degenerated into propaganda strategies. Many others, such as George Kennan and Winston Churchill, have argued that negotiations should be held in the traditional secrecy. We should note that the late UN secretary-general Dag Hammerskjöld also said the following:

> The best results of negotiation cannot be achieved in international life any more than in our private world in the full glare of publicity with current debate of all moves, unavoidable misunderstandings, inescapable freezing of positions due to considerations of prestige and the temptation to utilize public opinions as an element integrated into the negotiation itself.[41]

In fact, both open discussions and closed negotiations are used in combination in the UN today. Although open discussion lacks merit as a means for reaching agreements, it is recognized as an important way to carry out diplomacy. The pressure it creates is sufficiently effective to force member states to examine and solve whatever issues may be at hand. But the questions are: how strong is that pressure? And how does it function?

To think about this, we first need to explore an example in which public opinion could not play the role that people expected of it. Namely, was the censure of the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary expressed by international public opinion truly useless? Certainly, if we look at the situation from a narrow short-term perspective, public opinion critical of Moscow was of no use whatsoever. However, from a broader, long-term perspective, although the Soviets may have achieved their objective of suppressing the Hungarian Revolution, we can see that for that achievement they paid unseen costs. This is clear if one considers how Moscow's cruel suppression of that revolution served to completely disillusion those around the world who were sympathetic toward the Soviet Union; that move totally demolished any rosy images of the Soviets.

To have let the Hungarian Revolution take its course would have dealt the Soviet Union too great a blow. As has already been noted, the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe was in a state of confusion. The Hungarian Revolution not only overthrew an administration "friendly" to the Soviet Union, but the new government then announced it would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact to become a nonaligned state, and would adopt a multiparty system at home. That represented an attempt to do away with the two pillars of the Soviet sphere: being allied with Moscow and having a communist

regime. If the revolution had been allowed to follow its course, the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe would naturally have been influenced by it, and that development could have led to the collapse of the Soviet sphere. Of course, Moscow likely was aware that suppressing the Hungarian Revolution with military force would have its drawbacks; however, when compared to the grave costs that the collapse of its sphere of influence would present, the Soviet Union had to suppress that revolution, even if doing so had the disadvantage of drawing censure in the court of public opinion.

The same could be said about the United States' moves beginning in the spring of 1965 to intervene in Vietnam. This is not to say that the two situations are completely the same, but the US action resembles the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in several respects. Both were efforts to suppress a nationalist revolution. Not unexpectedly, public opinion on the whole has been critical of the United States. The US government itself knew that it would be criticized for intervening in South Vietnam. However, Washington seems to have judged that idly standing by while the South Vietnamese government was overthrown would have greater disadvantages than being the target of public criticism. This is why the United States intervened.

Thus, when the stakes are not too big, both the United States and the Soviet Union can be moved by the pressure of public opinion. The Soviet response to the Iran crisis of 1946 is an example. During World War II, for tactical reasons the Soviet Union had deployed troops in Iran. However, when the war ended the USSR made no moves to withdraw those forces. According to the Iranian government, Moscow was also high-handedly attempting to seize oil rights and was stirring up anti-government forces in the northern Azerbaijan region. This led the Iranian government to appeal to the UN Security Council in an

effort to solve these problems. Although the Security Council did not adopt any anti-Soviet resolution, Iran skillfully used the opportunity that these debates provided to pressure the Soviet Union and eventually succeeded in getting the Soviet troops to withdraw.

In addition, not all cases where the pressure of public opinion was ineffective can be explained solely by power relationships. For example, as of this writing the pressure of public opinion has not produced any results regarding the Republic of South Africa's policy of apartheid. This ineffectiveness cannot by any means be explained in terms of power relationships. South Africa was and is by no means a major power. However, Johannesburg is completely untroubled by how it is regarded by global public opinion. It has completely ignored the twenty-eight resolutions that have been passed up to 1966 concerning this matter. The same can be said about Portugal—which continues to rule Angola as a colony—and with respect to Rhodesia as well. Those nations are utterly insensitive to global public opinion, and for that reason they have been able to challenge that opinion despite being minor powers.

Thus, one factor when it comes to making public opinion effective is whether a given country respects public opinion. We could describe this as its *sensitivity to public opinion*. The primary factor for determining such sensitivity is the nature of a country's political regime. Clearly, those countries that recognize freedom of expression and allow their citizens to criticize the government will be much more sensitive than those that do not. Even during the Suez Crisis, Britain's Labour Party and many among the British public opposed the government's dispatch of troops. Even some members of the Conservative Party withdrew their support. Undeniably, all this put enormous pressure on the British government. In contrast, Moscow did not really need to worry

about domestic opposition. This difference, along with the difference between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in terms of national power, is of great significance.

However, it would be incorrect to isolate and emphasize the free-speech factor alone. Even freedom of expression does not guarantee that a nation will be highly sensitive to global public opinion. For example, the United States was severely criticized in the court of international public opinion for sending troops to the Dominican Republic. However, Washington continued its action without being constrained by negative international public opinion, and it achieved its objective of not allowing a radical government to be formed in that country. There was domestic opposition in the US as well, but the government was able to ignore it. Recognizing freedom of speech is a necessary condition for monitoring and constraining a government's actions, but that does not mean the government will always be constrained where there is free speech. This is because in today's mass societies where conformist attitudes are prevalent, freedom of expression may sometimes rally the people around the government's position and strengthen its power.

The fundamental reason why the United States and the Soviet Union have, despite their own great strength, been quite respectful of international public opinion probably lies in the fact that being subjected to negative public opinion would represent a great loss in the realm of power politics. Thus, we must ask in what ways the power politics of today differ from those of the past. This will also help us to more clearly define the significance of the United Nations.

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The Change in Power Politics

The nature of power politics changed tremendously after World War II. The goal of previous power struggles had been to obtain more territory, but that is no longer the case. As is often said these days, power politics is now a struggle for hearts and minds. However, we should not dismissively think of this as little more than a propaganda competition. Rather, the struggle now is between two powers with different political ideologies who seek to increase the numbers of their "friends," i.e., other countries who share the same ideologies. Although using military force remains the ultimate option, the struggle usually takes place through displays of power and wealth meant to impress the peoples of other countries with how excellent their respective systems are.

This change in the character of the struggle for power has developed in parallel with the two-dimensional expansion of political power, a historical process that was laid out in Chapter 2. That is, in order to mobilize the potential of large numbers of people, nations must motivate their people to participate in politics. Simply ruling a passive populace is no way to make full use of that populace's potential. That, as Raymond Aron says, may come down to the distinguishing characteristic of industrial society:

> Enslavement in our times is no longer profitable. For labor to produce profits, it must be skilled, and for it to be skilled the

worker must be given a minimum of education. However, slaves cannot be taught without their acquiring a desire to escape from their slavery.[42]

Thus, in order to wield the power of the masses, it is necessary to control public opinion and capture their minds.

If enslavement at home is pointless, enslaving the people of other countries is all the more so. Another factor is at work here—that of nationalism. Nationalism is a recurring leitmotif in the history of the modern era. The principle of nationalism won victories in Europe in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century those victories extended to Asia and Africa. In the nineteenth century, Europe brought nationalism together with its civilization to the countries that it colonized in Asia and Africa. In short, the Europeans brought with them the seeds of that which would undermine their own colonial rule.

However, just as resistance to territorial expansionism grew more intense due to these changes in international politics, the historical processes that demanded the creation of even larger political units reduced the need to rule through military power. Economic power had become more important as a driver of public opinion. In classical international politics, the various sovereign states were politically and economically independent entities (this was what it meant to be a sovereign state). Military power was used sparingly to settle conflicts among sovereign states, and there was little communication. However, increased economic interdependence and more advanced means of communication made it possible to use economic relations and propaganda to manipulate public opinion in and the behavior of other countries. As pointed out by Kamiya Fuji, professor of international politics at Osaka City University, it would be safe to say that international

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politics now involves more than just the elite-to-elite relationships of the past. Namely, it also encompasses people-to-people diplomacy, or popular diplomacy (i.e., mass-to-mass relations), as well as what has been termed "diagonal diplomacy" (i.e., relations between the general populace of one nation and the elites of another). Schematically, international relations that had once been formed through contacts along a single, two-way channel are now taking shape across four such channels (see Figure 3). It is clear from developments such as the exchange of trade delegations and cultural envoys that international relations has become complex.

Thus, appealing to public opinion in international politics has also become an extremely important act of power politics. And yet, such appeals are not restricted to using reason as a means of persuasion. Nineteenth-century thinkers like Bentham could still believe public opinion to be something that was rational and logical, and for that reason they were able to believe that the strength of public opinion would guarantee peace. In fact, however, as the power of public opinion grew, people could not help but notice that it certainly was neither rational nor logical. This could be seen, for example, in how the term "prestige" started to be used more frequently from around the middle of the nineteenth century.


Figure 3. A Quadrangular Model of International Relations

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The great man of letters Thomas Carlyle scorned this new term "prestige" as a "bad newspaper word." For an Englishman who believed that a state's power was not something that should be flaunted, but rather should be naturally acknowledged by other people, there was certainly no mistaking that "prestige" amounted to a "corrupt journalistic term." However, the way history unfolded from the end of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century vividly demonstrated the necessity and effectiveness of flaunting that power.

In particular, Hitler's success delivered a crushing blow to those people who believed in the rationality of public opinion. Rational persuasion crumbled away in the face of Hitler's National Socialist movement, which hinged on displays of power and the use of symbols. At the end of the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud argued that human behavior was governed not by the conscious mind but rather by its irrational dimension, which he called the subconscious. In politics, sociologist Vilfredo Pareto said the most important factor was what he termed nonrational behavior as represented by myths. History has validated their theories.

The Policies of Prestige and the Policies of Systems

These days, countries keep their prestige in mind when contemplating their actions. For example, the first launch of an artificial satellite, Sputnik, boosted Soviet prestige to a remarkable degree. In contrast, the failure of Moscow's agricultural policies reduced it. Military power is not used only with objectives such as defeating an enemy or occupying its territory in mind, but rather with thoughts about one's own prestige. In October 1962, China battled with India in the two countries' border area. After defeating the Indian forces, the Chinese army voluntarily withdrew to within its border. Its objectives had been

to secure one or two crucial strategic points and to diminish India's prestige. The United States, throughout its Cold War with the Soviet Union, has continued to assert that it would defend West Berlin to the last, though such a stance is inexplicable from a military perspective. The explanation is not to be found in the securing of a route for people to flee from East Berlin to the West, either. The commitment to defend West Berlin was meant to express Washington's determination to not budge in the face of attempts to change the status quo in Europe by force. West Berlin was simply seen as providing the most dramatic setting for such a display. That the citizens of this isolated island of West Berlin did not yield to the pressures exerted on them surely helped to boost the prestige of the West.

That said, the Soviet Union likewise seems to have been fully aware of the symbolic meaning of West Berlin. It was for that reason that Moscow used a variety of methods to try to change that city's status. However, the citizens of West Berlin continued to stand firm, contrary to the prognostications of Soviet leaders, who soon wound up having to build a wall around the city. That represented a defeat for the USSR in the important game of prestige.

Alongside these competitions over prestige, the main form that today's power struggles take is for nations professing to uphold certain universal principles to seek to expand the area where those principles apply. Force is used today mainly for that purpose. In global politics today, the decision about which politico-economic system to adopt is by no means an entirely internal affair; rather, it is one that has a considerable impact on power relations among states as well.

Relations between nations that have different political and economic systems are inevitably far weaker than those between nations whose systems are the same. US power and Soviet power differ in both

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character and function. For one thing, US influence can be extended through several channels, while in the Soviet Union the Communist Party has near monopolistic control over a single channel. This springs from the fact that the United States is a pluralistic society, while Soviet society is under one-party rule. Specifically, the multilayered economic channels created in the US by various private enterprises are more effective, and so US hegemony has taken on an economic character. For the Soviet Union, in contrast, since this dominance is channeled through communications between communist parties, it will be very political in nature.

As a result, US power is unruly. Even if something is recognized as going against the national interest, it is difficult to control its exploitation by private enterprise. In the case of the Soviet Union, the government can act in such a way that all its efforts promote political objectives. However, the fact that there are multiple channels for projecting US power can work in the United States' favor when relations among its allies have soured; the Soviet side, in contrast, has only one channel through which to work.

This is clear if one compares Franco-US relations with Sino-Soviet ties. Franco-US relations may deteriorate on occasion but the relationship does not become adversarial because there are many unofficial channels alongside the official ones; any worsening in official ties can be offset by the strength of the unofficial ones. In contrast, with China and the Soviet Union, it seems that the lack of channels other than the official ones is what led to the collapse of the bilateral relationship. These examples illustrate well how US and Soviet power differ in both character and function.

In light of what has been said, it seems that having more countries that share the same systems gives each of the respective superpowers

greater scope for action. Viewing this more generally in terms of how the major powers relate to minor ones, it indicates that the major powers can extend their influence more deeply into those minor countries that share the same system than those which do not. Thus, rather than being an issue that is separate from power politics, ideological conflict is at their very core.

The United Nations as an Arena for Politics

If this is what power struggles are like today, it is clear that the United Nations provides an important arena for them. The UN is not a friendly forum where people set power politics aside and talk about peace. The member states engage in heated debates and strike deals based on cool-headed calculations of the national interests involved. International power politics today are conducted with the objective of seizing people's minds, and the United Nations provides one important stage for those efforts. However, this does not in any way subtract from the value of the UN. To the contrary, what prevents the UN from becoming useless is the very fact that it is not detached from power politics. Examples from history also prove this. The atmosphere in the League of Nations created after World War I was far and away more friendly. F. P. Walters, author of the retrospective *A History of the League of Nations*, an examination of that body's heyday in the 1920s, wrote that French foreign affairs minister Édouard Herriot and German chancellor Gustav Stresemann preferred the tranquil atmosphere of Geneva to domestic politics with its fierce back-and-forth struggles with opposition parties. The power struggles went endlessly on in other arenas during these years. As a result, as early as 1932 Winston Churchill found he had to criticize those politicians who kept referring to the words of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

I cannot recall any time when the gap between the kind of words which statesmen used and what was actually happening in many countries was so great as it is now.[43]

The atmosphere in the United Nations is very different. Just as the tranquil summer-retreat atmosphere of Geneva differs from that of bustling and crowded big-city New York, the UN is more worldly than its predecessor. Varied entanglements related to stakes, power, and ideas materialize there. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have made efforts to promote their positions in the UN, and they have attempted to use that body's authority accordingly. For example, during the first several years of the UN's existence, the United States submitted resolutions that the Soviet Union could not accept relating to the Greek and Berlin crises, forcing the Soviet Union to use its veto power, which focused criticism on the Soviets. The Soviet Union, too, seized opportunities such as the United States' 1961 proxy invasion of Cuba with Cuban exiles to criticize the US.

However, that such manipulations take place does not make the United Nations meaningless. Criticism predicated on appropriate reasons—Soviet aid to communist guerillas in Greece, for example, or US assistance to anti-Castro elements in Cuba—expressed in debates at the UN gave that criticism both rules and weight. The UN also has its harmonious side to go along with its confrontational one. If that were not the case, it would not be able to serve as a venue for politics. To begin, the arrangement provides a framework for examining problems. As has already been noted, when each member state argues its position, it cannot do so in a blatantly self-serving manner. It must assert itself in the name of international interests and peace. The fact that representatives of each nation are gathered together in

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one place and maintain regular discussions means that the UN facilitates communications among nations. In particular, when the General Assembly is in session, it becomes possible for the leaders and foreign ministers of all nations to gather in New York and to contact one another informally. That is useful for resolving conflicts. For example, in the autumn of 1961, when the United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Berlin, President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk held informal talks with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who was also sitting in the UN General Assembly at that time, which helped to prevent the crisis from deepening.

More important is the fact that the United Nations itself forms a distinctive space consisting of the member states' representatives and the UN's administrative staff. The UN Secretariat has a large staff working at jobs that include handling administrative tasks, collecting information, and creating materials that are accurate and neutral, to ensure that the organization operates smoothly. If we include the staff of the UN's various special agencies, the total number of people involved is considerable. The organization's role is not limited to dealing with conflicts. As nonpolitical links among member states increase, it organizes international cooperation through such bodies as UNESCO and the World Health Organization.

The work of the UN's administrative staff is indispensable in today's complex international society. They are truly international beings. They may come from different countries and have different customs and values, but they are deeply committed to their shared missions such as peacekeeping and promoting international cooperation. Through this, they learn how to work with colleagues who do not necessarily share the same customs and values.

The representatives of the member states dispatched to the United Nations do not share common ground to the same degree. Their duties, of course, are to argue for their countries' respective positions. However, over time even they develop a sense of collegiality by working together in this shared venue. They eventually become linked by the shared desire to solve problems peacefully within the UN framework rather than worsen them. The relationships among the representatives are not those of friends, but they still develop personal feelings that lead them to speak of each other with such familiar terms as "my dear friend," "my old rival," and "my dear old colleagues."

Adlai Stevenson, a US ambassador to the UN, is said to have gone through a difficult time due to being caught between the US position on the Vietnam War and his sense of mission as an ambassador. Before his sudden death, he was clearly exhausted. He was well-regarded as a representative to the UN because he was more than someone who merely represented the official US position.

However, the shared bonds in the United Nations remain stubbornly limited, and, in contrast, the differences in positions remain stubbornly immense. As with all venues for politics, the UN has aspects of both confrontation and harmony, but of the two confrontation holds the lion's share. This is the fundamental reason why the role of the UN has been limited to a passive one. When hostilities have occurred, although the UN has been able to bring them to an end, keep the conflict localized, and keep the hostile parties apart, it cannot undertake enforcement measures of its own accord to penalize the parties that have violated the UN Charter. Moreover, even if the UN manages to deescalate armed conflicts, it cannot solve problems or eliminate the root causes of a dispute.

The Cease-Fire Line

The various cease-fire lines that stretch out in places around the world are symbolic of the United Nations' roles and their limitations. All major armed conflicts since World War II have been brought under control through cease-fires. In one form or another, these have been monitored by the UN. However, the job of monitoring has not extended to settling any of these conflicts through the conclusion of lasting peace treaties. The prime example of this is the war between the Arab nations and the state of Israel created in Palestine. In 1947, the UN deliberated the opposing arguments of the Arab and Jewish peoples over the desire to create an independent country in Palestine. Various proposals were put forth, but the UN was unable to come up with a formula that would satisfy both parties. In the meantime, Israel acted on its own and declared its independence; simultaneously the surrounding Arab states attacked it. When Israel repulsed these attacks, the UN made efforts to arbitrate, and it managed to get both parties to agree to cease hostilities. The UN soon arranged for a cease-fire agreement, and a multinational team that included UN observers was set up to monitor its implementation. However, despite subsequent efforts, no permanent peace treaty has been concluded. To the contrary, what happened was that in 1956 Israel and a joint Anglo-French force attacked Egypt. During this crisis, again the UN took measures to end hostilities in a form that would reinstate the status quo ante and then sent UN peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire line.

The United Nations' record with respect to the Kashmir conflict is surprisingly similar. The contest between India and Pakistan over the possession of Kashmir—along with the desire of considerable numbers of Muslims in Kashmir who prefer affiliation with Islamabad over New Delhi—has to date given rise to two major bouts of hostilities.

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Both the 1947–1949 war and the conflict in the summer of 1965 were ones that involved hundreds of thousands of soldiers. In both instances, the United Nations succeeded in working out a cease-fire and then sending observers to monitor the cease-fire line.

However, when it came to the question of who had jurisdiction over Kashmir, the Indian and Pakistani claims were fundamentally at odds, and consequently all attempts at a resolution failed. Holding a referendum to establish jurisdiction would in effect be a complete acknowledgement of Pakistan's position on the issue, which in light of Kashmir's economic and military importance, India would not accept.

A similar historical legacy remains in Korea as well. The division of the peninsula into North and South began at the end of World War II when the Soviet Union occupied the former and the US occupied the latter. The two halves remain at odds, and the division continues to this day with no resolution of any sort in sight. The US and the countries of Western Europe have proposed holding free elections on the unification issue monitored by the UN, and some ten resolutions have been adopted to that effect to date. The Soviet Union and communist countries, however, are adamant that Korean unification must be accomplished based on an agreement between the two governments on the peninsula. Behind their stance are such factors as South Korea's larger population, which would favor it in any election, and the complete difference in views about political regimes.

With efforts to reach a political solution failing, North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) tried to achieve unification by force. The North Korean attempt failed. The UN forces led by the United States then attempted to do the same, but they, too, failed. Eventually, with the status quo ante largely restored and the fighting on the front at a deadlock, a cease-fire agreement was reached through

the efforts of a committee set up by the UN General Assembly for that purpose.

Thus, these three different cease-fire lines—between Israel and Egypt, Pakistan and India, and North and South Korea—symbolize the limits on the power of the United Nations.

The Limits on the Power of the United Nations

Having limited power is extremely unsatisfying. However, the development of the United Nations has not been based on attempts to expand that limited power. To the contrary, the UN's history seems to indicate that its development has been driven by using what power it has wisely while recognizing its limits.

The decisions of today's international organizations are effective only to the extent that the minority approves or tacitly accepts them. Attempts to go beyond that limitation and increase those organizations' powers have only produced adverse effects. The UN attempt to unify the Koreas failed because the Soviet Union and China countered it with force; it even created the risk of another world war.

Of course, the line between tacit approval and open opposition is a fine one. This is an extremely important point if we look at today's international organizations. The dispatch of UN forces in response to the 1960 Congo Crisis provides us with a good example of how fine that line can be.

Almost immediately after the Republic of the Congo was created as an independent country in June of 1960, an uprising rooted in anti-Belgian sentiment erupted. In response, Belgium dispatched paratroopers to protect its citizens in that country. The Congolese government asked the United Nations for military assistance to counter Belgium's "external aggression." The UN dispatched a force to restore

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law and order and to create a chance for the Belgian military to withdraw. Up to this point, the member countries of the UN were broadly in approval.

However, at that very time, mineral-rich Katanga Province, backed by Belgian capital, declared itself to be the independent State of Katanga. The Congo was thus now in a state of civil war. The Congolese government responded by asking for the support of UN forces, and, with that assistance, put down the Katanga uprising. This request was supported both by such radical African countries as Ghana and Guinea, and by members of the communist bloc, including the Soviet Union. But the capitalist countries opposed intervention in the Congo's internal dispute. In a sense, this was the opposite of what had occurred in Korea. The communist countries called for the UN forces to take action in the Congo, while the liberal countries stood opposed. We must also not overlook the facts operating behind this state of affairs: namely, the communist countries supported the radical regime of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo while the West rejected it. In any case, the UN forces did not take action to suppress the Katanga uprising. Naturally, Ghana and Guinea were angered, as was the Soviet Union. Moscow even said that it would send a volunteer army to help the Congolese government, though dispatching such a force in the face of US opposition was strategically impossible.

Shortly thereafter, Congolese president Joseph Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba on the grounds that he was drawing close to communism. In response, Lumumba sought to strip Kasa-Vubu of his authority, and the Congo fell into a state of total chaos. In the end, Lumumba was captured and brutally executed, and similar bloody encounters were repeated between supporters and opponents of the slain prime minister.

Under such conditions, fulfilling even the passive role of maintaining order in the country was extremely difficult for the UN forces. In particular, in a situation where there are competing claims for legitimacy among warring factions, the UN faces the tough question of deciding what sort of relationship it should have with each. In other words, the UN had no choice but to decide who represented the Congo.

The United Nations, which at first had limited its actions to just calling for the factions in the Congo to resolve their dispute, eventually recognized President Kasa-Vubu as legitimately representing the nation. After nearly one year of anarchy, a Congolese government was formed under Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. Based on that new government's decision to banish from the country Belgians and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel, political consultants, mercenaries, and the like, it suppressed and defeated the separatist Katanga forces that Britain and Belgium had backed.

Undeniably, the UN forces' efforts discouraged foreign intervention in the Congolese chaos. If the UN had just stood by, those African and European countries with stakes in the Congo would have actively intervened. In that case, the Congo would have become the setting for international conflict; there is no doubt that this in turn would have been reflected by other conflicts erupting elsewhere around Africa. In view of this, the UN forces served their peacekeeping purpose. However, the solution to the Congo Crisis was certainly unsatisfactory for radical African countries and the communist bloc. The UN's refusal to send forces to suppress the Katanga rebellion and its recognition of President Kasa-Vubu as the Congo's legitimate leader during the standoff within the country's government particularly stirred up Soviet distrust of UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld. Moscow proposed replacing the office of secretary-general with a three-person directorate

(the so-called "troika" system). It even refused to pay its assessed contributions for the UN forces dispatched to the Congo.

Furthermore, although the UN forces did not respond to Lumumba's bid to put down the Katanga uprising, they wound up fighting with the insurgents for the purpose of restoring order. This certainly was inconsistent behavior. It is true that acceding to Lumumba's initial request would have meant making an abrupt intervention in the Congo's internal affairs. This should not be seen as the same as unavoidably having to suppress the separatist Katanga uprising after a year and a half of attempts to settle the crisis through negotiations. Also, Lumumba was thrown out and killed due to intra-Congo rivalries; the UN forces were not responsible for the collapse of his regime. Probably it can be said that on each occasion the UN forces chose the best option available to them.

However, we must pay attention here to the fact that support for the UN forces, which most members states offered at the start, waned as time went by. On the other hand, as that support ebbed the authority of the UN forces expanded. They were initially dispatched against a backdrop of public opinion opposed to Belgium's intervention with paratroops in the Congo; they were sent to facilitate a withdrawal of those Belgian forces. That objective was clear and unopposed, but that was not the only problem afflicting the Congo.

On the one hand, the separatist movement in the Congo had been launched thanks to Belgian support, which was in effect an infiltration. On the other hand, divisions emerged within the Congolese government that can best be thought of as civil war pure and simple. When the UN forces were first put together, they were not given the mandate to deal with these two developments, neither the infiltration nor the civil war. It is open to question as to whether a UN force would have been

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put together if the infiltration and civil war had already begun without the open intervention by Belgian forces. Judging what constitutes an infiltration or a civil war requires having shared criteria for what makes a political regime legitimate. In today's world, there is no such thing.

It is difficult to determine if an infiltration is something that has started as a result of foreign influence or if it is indigenous. Regarding civil war, the problem rests in deciding which side represents the legitimate government. However, the UN forces that were dispatched under a different mandate to the Congo were obliged to step into this complicated situation in order to fulfill their objective of restoring order. Yet when they did so, their authority expanded. Naturally, with the change, the initially unanimous support of the member states for the UN force disappeared.

The Soviet Union and the radical African nations were dissatisfied with the measures taken by the United Nations, but they were not able to counter them with force as had occurred in Korea. It was for that reason that the UN forces in the Congo were eventually able to accomplish their mission of restoring order locally. However, it is undeniable that the limited support for those forces was something that reduced their prestige.

The UN Presence Formula

In contrast, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) that was organized during the Suez Crisis was the most successful example of such a UN dispatch, in that it had objectives that could be clearly defined. Namely, its mission was limited to protecting the cease-fire line set down following the withdrawal of the foreign forces that had invaded Egypt. Beyond that, their duties were nothing more than secondary, such as clearing waterways and overseeing exchanges of prisoners.

Both the dispatch of this UN force and its activities were premised on the agreement of the countries concerned, specifically the country that was to host them. The force's activities were based on the principles of respecting host nation sovereignty and not intervening in its internal affairs. That is, in regard to the force's functions, the emphasis was placed on its noncoercive nature. The international character of that force was ensured by putting it under the command of the secretary-general. Its impartiality was carefully maintained by bringing together forces from countries that were seen as neutral with respect to the conflict. As this fundamental character of the force suggests, the UN's Suez goals were limited to reinstating the status quo that existed prior to the incursion by the Anglo-French forces, and then to monitoring that reinstatement. Due to these limits, the UN's activities during the Suez Crisis were successful.

Thus, the past record shows that the United Nations is able only to localize and neutralize a conflict without being able to settle it. In Korea, its efforts to settle the conflict failed, while its efforts in Suez, where its objectives were limited, were successful. All that the UN can do is attempt to localize and neutralize disputes. Preventive diplomacy based on a UN presence—the organization's core function today—is grounded in recognizing this. It is an attempt to employ more broadly and as preemptively as possible the UN's capacity to localize a conflict. It was late secretary-general Hammarskjöld who coined the term "preventive diplomacy." According to his definition, the objective of preventive diplomacy is to prevent major powers from intervening by proxy through the UN when a local conflict erupts that would jeopardize international peace. The UN's intervention will take the form of some body or organization whose actual form will vary depending on the circumstances. The UN body will not necessarily be a military

force, but could also comprise mediators, an investigative team, a cease-fire monitoring group, or other type of person or group.

This formula has its origins in the UN's success during the Suez Crisis, and it came to be used preemptively and actively after the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. Since then, preventive diplomacy has been employed in such forms as the 1959 Subcommittee Established by Security Council Resolution 132 (1959) on the Laos Question, the 1960 Operation in the Congo, the 1962 Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian), the 1963 Yemen Observation Mission, and the 1964 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

Thus, although the United Nations cannot resolve a conflict, it can keep it from developing into an armed one. Should such an armed conflict occur, the UN can still help to neutralize and localize it to prevent it from escalating.

Of course, even just these limited functions cannot be performed in all cases. The Congo experience demonstrates just how difficult it is to prevent an internal conflict from being internationalized. As I have already said, most of the wars since World War II have been intranational conflicts, and potential future wars will be the same. It is difficult for the United Nations to intervene effectively in an exclusively internal conflict. In that sense, one could say that the sending of UN forces to Cyprus was an extremely important test case.

When the parties involved in an internal conflict are determined to continue fighting, in all likelihood the United Nations will be powerless. For example, there was no discussion about the possibility of sending UN forces at the time of the Algerian War. That conflict merely stirred up public opinion, which put pressure on France. Furthermore, the internal conflict in Algeria did not become international because France did not attack certain targets that were deemed off

limits despite being known as conduits for aid from outside parties. If France had attacked such areas, who can say what would have happened? In particular, when outside parties who are not seen as legitimate "infiltrate" into an internal conflict—as Belgium did with its support for the State of Katanga in the Congo—the problems that result will be extremely difficult.

However, if it is possible to find ways through such difficult situations, and if a local conflict is contained long enough, the underlying confrontation might eventually be resolved. In any case, there is no other way to accomplish this.

The Authority of the United Nations

To expect that the United Nations will have limits on the roles it plays is not just a matter of needing to be realistic. It is also necessary from the perspective of how the UN will develop in the future. This is because the UN's ability to localize conflicts is based on its authority. To take the UNEF in the Suez Crisis as an example, that unit was not a military force in the usual sense of the word. If one or another country attempted to break the agreement that was in place through brute force, the UNEF had neither the capacity nor mandate to repel the attempt. A UN force with barely 6,000 soldiers is not ready to engage in combat. UN forces have been permitted to use weapons only when absolutely necessary for self-defense. Those restrictions have applied to all UN forces except for the mission that was sent to the Congo.

Accordingly, it is little trouble to attack these units with armed force. However, despite their limited power and mandates, UN forces play a major role in guaranteeing agreements because the presence of such a force lends the *authority* of the United Nations to the agreement between the parties involved. Attacking UN forces is easy, but to

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challenge the authority of the UN by doing so would certainly draw fierce criticism, which could even lead to the actual use of force. Such considerations serve as major constraints on the parties involved.

Superficially, the way the Suez Crisis was settled seems no different from how it might have been worked out through traditional diplomatic negotiations. The parties involved endorsed a cease-fire and a return to the status quo that existed prior to the start of hostilities. The presence of UN forces was based on the consent of the countries involved. Israel rejected their presence, so they were deployed only on the Egyptian side.

However, the UN's authority was attached to this consent, and that did more than just guarantee the agreement. If there had been no guarantee, there is no saying whether there would have been any agreement at all. As has been said, diplomacy is based on the power of individual countries. Parliamentary diplomacy draws its influence from the more nuanced and ineffable power of international society. Challenging the existence of the United Nations would not be taken as the disdain for the power of any one country, but rather as disdain for the authority of international society as a whole.

However, what is authority? Unquestionably, it is subtle and difficult to grasp. Obviously, neither a majority obtained by manipulating the mechanisms of the UN nor any power wielded by such a majority constitutes actual authority. Nevertheless, some UN resolutions and actions are indeed backed by the institution's authority. Even among those matters that appear similar, there are some backed by such authority and others that are not. This nuanced and seemingly ineffable aspect to "authority" most likely can be attributed to the fact that authority is rooted in the multifaceted ways in which the objects and the subjects of that authority relate to one another.

III. The Significance of the United Nations

The word *authority* and the word *author* share the same root; if you have authority, people will go along with what you say. The utterances of someone seen as having authority regarding a certain matter carry greater weight than those of the average person. In this case, that authority is to a certain degree underpinned by the status of the person making that utterance. Whatever "authority" that may exist in human society has been institutionalized in the forms of universities, courts, and so forth. People heed the words of those who are associated with such institutions. Governments are the greatest examples; the difference between them and other institutions is that they are backed by compelling force.

However, from a different perspective, the reason why the masses go along with whatever those who are supposedly "in authority" say is because the masses simply accept the "fact" that those people have authority. "Authority" is wholly dependent on whether it is or is not accepted and acknowledged.

Accordingly, as Hannah Arendt, one of the prominent philosophers of our age, has said, authority is neither a matter of coercion nor of persuasion. It is something that perhaps lies in between. Force is used because people do not comply with authority. In other words, the very fact that actual force is used shows that authority has been lost. To put this in a present-day context, if a given country uses armed force to oppose a decision by the United Nations, and the UN must carry out that decision through the use of actual force, it can be assumed that the UN lacks sufficient authority to follow through. In contrast, a UN resolution that is passed with the agreement of the interested parties would have such authority. In international politics as pursued today, sovereign states are not prepared to comply with any decisions made by an international organization that are contrary to their own

wishes. They became UN member states of their own volition, and their compliance with UN decisions is likewise understood to be on that basis. Each member state has granted authority to the United Nations within those limits. Accordingly, it is within those limits that they comply with UN decisions.

That said, complying with authority is not the same as agreeing with it. From time to time, states may accept decisions with which they do not specifically agree. A small minority may be dissatisfied with one or another UN decision, but so long as they do not express their dissatisfaction by force the UN's authority may be somewhat damaged but will still remain substantially intact. Perhaps the actions of the UN forces in the Congo lay along this subtle boundary. The Soviet Union and radical African nation-states criticized the UN's activities in the Congo, but they did not try to change them by resorting to actual force. That is why the UN forces in the Congo were able to complete their missions. However, we must not forget that if authority is repeatedly impaired, in the end it will be lost.

Thus, the authority of the United Nations reflects the attitudes that its member states have toward the organization itself. Given that "authority" is something that is based on the reciprocal relationship between "having" it and "sensing" it, and at an international level between those nations who act as though they possess it and those who feel as though they are compelled by it, it is something that can only increase—even if only little by little—as time passes. With respect to the idea that creating the ideal international organization will produce peace, the following words of early-nineteenth-century British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh (Robert Stewart) remain as appropriate as ever:

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The Problem of a Universal Alliance for the Peace and Happiness of the world has always been one of speculation and of Hope but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but you may in practice approach towards it.[44]

Trying to settle issues by having an international organization whose purpose is to create peace is infeasible. Such an approach will collide with the same hard wall that the universalist modes for reaching peace we have examined here have encountered. Nations cannot simply abandon their own values and interests. If that is the case, then it could be that nations cannot act in ways meant to strengthen the authority of international organizations while protecting their own interests and values. Thus, having examined several universal modes of resolving issues, in the end we come back to the specific issue of how individual nations behave. What kind of nation could act toward the goal of creating a peaceful world?

CONCLUSION
The "Peaceful Nation" and the International Order

"Men, unfortunately, have not yet reached the point where they have no further occasion or motive for killing one another. If tolerance is born of doubt, let us teach everyone to doubt all the models and utopias, to challenge all the prophets of redemption and the heralds of catastrophe." Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, 1955[45]

I. International Society and Domestic Regimes

Imperialism

What is a peaceful state? The inquiry is hardly new. To the contrary, it's a long-standing one—and extremely fundamental. Since ancient times, when thinkers have grappled with the problem of peace, this issue has been central. The answers those thinkers reached have, in popularized forms, laid the foundations for how we think about peace. For example, criticisms about militaries were not expressions of the simplistic idea that peace would result if only militaries were eliminated; rather, they were meant as a caution that simply having a military could lead a nation toward militarism.

Since antiquity, there have always been concerns about those whose profession is to wage war. Such a profession requires leading a way of life that is very distinct from the norms of everyday life. The greatest concern has always been that the presence of such a militaristic group could transform the behavior of society as a whole, and lead it down the road of war.

However, today the most well-known theory about the relationship between peace and the nature of a national regime is that of imperialism, in its several variants. Of course, it is easy to criticize these theories, which attempt to generalize the lessons of history from the late-nineteenth century through the twentieth. Imperialism itself has now become an epithet used in political propaganda, as is evident from how political adversaries use "imperialist" as a pejorative against one another.

Nevertheless, imperialism remains relevant not because of how the word is bandied about, but rather because the concept itself provides us with a theoretical framework for explaining why states turn to expansionism.

As described in Chapter 2, the theories that attempted to draw general lessons from the wars of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be divided into two broad categories. One group comprises the economic theories that see the origins of imperialism in the flaws of capitalism. The other group comprises the sociological theories that see its origins in the social phenomena arising during the transition to industrial society. John A. Hobson (1858–1940) and Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) both expounded economic theories that are strikingly similar. Both saw the roots of imperialism in the inequitable distribution of wealth in a capitalist society. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of a minority, while the majority are left impoverished. Under capitalism, not all products can be sold, and not all capital can be invested. Critics of capitalism contend that the surplus goods and surplus capital necessarily seek outlets, and that therefore a capitalist society cannot avoid seeking to acquire colonies.

But there is one major difference between Hobson and Lenin. Lenin held that imperialism would inevitably develop under capitalism. Hobson, in contrast, believed that imperialism could be avoided. He did not believe that imperialism was a rational means of solving the problems of surplus products and surplus capital. He held that, because such surpluses result from the misdistribution of purchasing power, they had to be dealt with by expanding the domestic marketplace through economic reforms such as more equal distribution, the expansion of purchasing power, and elimination of excessive saving.

Sociological theories of imperialism came from Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) and Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929). They saw the roots

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of imperialism as lying in the stage when industrialization was still underway, when the holdovers from preindustrial society were connected to the technologies of industrial society.

Schumpeter did not see capitalism as aggressive or belligerent; to the contrary, he thought it was anti-imperialist. This was because if one looked at the modes of living under capitalism, it would be seen that the people who played leadership roles—the bourgeoisie, industrialists and financiers, intellectuals, lawyers, physicians, and the like—had jobs with no connection to war. Given that they compete among themselves, they could not avoid directing all their energies toward economic activities. Even the energy that had earlier been devoted to war would now need to be dedicated to labor. Naturally, those people would come to think of wars of conquest and foreign adventurism as burdensome obstacles. However, in capitalist society, the mechanisms for war that existed in the society that preceded it and the class that had been oriented toward war, in other words the nobility, still remained. These, Schumpeter argued, are what gave rise to imperialism.

Veblen, drawing on the same way of thinking, argued in 1900 that a combination of feudal morals, the power provided by modern technology, and military prowess gave birth first to Japanese imperialism and soon thereafter to German imperialism as well.

The prototypes for Schumpeter's and Veblen's way of thinking are to be found in the work of the nineteenth-century thinkers Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Both believed in the progress of human society. According to Comte, progress was leading human society from a theological and militaristic society, where the chief duty had been conquest, toward a scientific and industrial society, where the primary interest would be production. This transitional period of development would be one in which

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industry would be highly valued and protected primarily as a means of war. However, industrial society would ultimately become dominant, and all social relations would become guided by the terms of industry. At this point, Comte thought, industrial society would reject conquest and war, and would make production the only normal goal.

Both Schumpeter's and Veblen's theories remain true to a considerable degree. Veblen's theory certainly would seem to explain both world wars. Schumpeter's theory held that although the institutions that were created for waging war inevitably also cause wars, those institutions are inherently alien to modern industrial society. They will eventually be selected out as industrialization proceeds. While the latter part of this argument is doubtful in light of present-day realities, the former part is clearly correct. It also cannot be denied that the inequitable distribution of wealth and the surplus products and capital that the system generates were among the reasons for Western Europe expansionism. Neither Western Europe nor Japan were able to resolve the contradictions that arose from industrialization, and those selfsame contradictions became the driving force for imperialist expansionism.

However, even if this explains imperialism to a certain degree, it does not explain everything, let alone answer the question of what is a peaceful nation. These theories might have uncovered some of the fundamental reasons why nations turn to aggression, but they aren't the only reasons. Hence, even if those reasons are eliminated, it is still not certain that all nations will become peaceful. But in all likelihood, the theorists' optimism about industrialization led them to believe that peace would be achieved once the root causes of imperialism had been discovered and eliminated. They believed that all ideally industrialized societies would be peaceful. This is evident in Comte's and Spencer's thought. Hobson's thinking, too, was founded on the optimistic view

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that free economic exchange between nations would produce mutual benefits that would make war and conquest unnecessary, and hence produce peace.

Marxism, however, is not so simply optimistic; in particular, it takes an unforgiving view of capitalist society. Nonetheless, it is optimistic in its belief that a utopia will result after capitalism is overthrown. Raymond Aron calls this visionary optimism.

Hence, these thinkers did not examine the crucial problem of how exactly to control the power that industrialization provides. Rather, they sought to determine what exactly made a nation act aggressively. They thought that peace would result if that factor was renounced and eliminated.

This way of thinking led them to make an error in their logic. The factor that they point out certainly is one cause of war. However, to say that factor "A" causes war does not mean that all wars are caused by factor "A." This error is particularly conspicuous when it comes to popularized theories of imperialism. There is a danger that this blinkered optimism will only stir people's emotions to eliminate the specified causes of war, and will lead to war being fought in the name of peace. If the theories that see capitalism as the cause of war are applied simply and narrowly to our current world, it is clear that a war to eliminate capitalism as the cause of war would be waged.

A Spencerian optimism is at work when the American economic theorist Walt Rostow defines communism as the easily caught, fleeting illness of a society in transition from an old, traditional society to an industrial society. His emphatic assertion of the need to protect underdeveloped countries from that illness suggests that the United States would engage in a veritable holy war to do so.

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The Reality of a Peaceful Nation

Although it might be theoretically possible to work out a concept of a "peaceful" nation in complete isolation from international politics, if such a nation were placed amidst the fierce power struggles of international politics, the result may be very different from what is expected. In modern history, we have seen at least three instances of nations that initially declared themselves to be peaceful but, as they were caught up in international power struggles, turned into regular players no different from any other.

First, there is the example of the United States. It set out to be a new, peaceful nation, isolated from Europe which was the hotbed of power politics. The US was created by European immigrants; when they left Europe behind, they thought they had also left behind the bad habits of power politics. In fact, throughout the nineteenth century the US did not participate in the political wheeling and dealing of the European countries. Most Americans said that this was because their country had peaceful democratic institutions. However, as Alexis de Tocqueville acutely pointed out in *Democracy in America* (1835), the causation between democracy and isolation was the other way around. The US was able to survive with a weak central government and a weak standing army because it did not engage in international power politics. Eventually, however, as the US became embroiled in their maelstrom, it was forced to develop its capabilities to compete with other countries, and now the US has the most powerful military in the world. It would be premature to conclude from that fact alone that the US is bellicose, but nonetheless it is clearly wrong to see the American political regime as simply a peace-loving one.

The French Revolution that followed soon after the American one likewise dramatically transformed France's stance on foreign relations.

France was thought to have become peaceful thanks to the creation of a political regime in which decisions about peace and war would be made directly by its citizens. Their way of thinking was strongly colored by the eighteenth-century optimism that held that war was the province of kings and nobles and that if politics reflected the will of ordinary people there would be no wars. Title 6 of the French Constitution of 1791 gave voice to this optimism: "The French nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view of making conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any people."[46]

However, the moves to intervene in the French Revolution by nations with long-established regimes such as Austria and Prussia changed the situation completely. French politician Lazare Carnot (1753–1823) came up with the idea of conscription, and he called upon all citizens to help France achieve its war aims. The revolution that had been the first in history to reject war ended up becoming the first in history to produce a military draft. The counterargument that France likely would have remained peaceful internationally if foreign countries had not intervened is unconvincing. Although interventions do not always take such a conspicuous form, the fact remains that they occur. In any case, the French Revolution, partly because of the need to fight revolutionary wars, produced the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte, and Napoleon went on to launch an unprecedented war of conquest. The French citizens who had once rejected war were stirred up by Napoleon's conquests and now sang its praises.

The history of the twentieth-century Russian Revolution largely followed the same course. The Soviet Union, too, thought of itself as a regime of peace, as did many Marxists. However, whatever the character of a socialist regime may be in the abstract, real socialist regimes found themselves locked in fierce struggles with other countries. The

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Soviet Union had to survive wars of intervention. The need to sustain the war effort made the newly born dictatorial regime even more oppressive and drove the country into Stalinism. Stalin's foreign policy in actual fact was no different from those of other countries. In particular, his policies toward Eastern Europe at the end of World War II were much the same as those that had been pursued by the czar. Thus, the history of Soviet foreign policy unfolded in ways that disillusioned those who had sincerely believed that countries with socialist regimes were naturally peaceful. The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 were just the most notable of many disappointments. Here, as with the American and the French revolutions, it is wrong to argue that these "essentially peaceful regimes" were forced to become more belligerent due to conflicts with other countries. Conflicts are a fundamental element of international politics that can never be ignored when we discuss the question of peace. To say that a country can be a peaceful one if countries are not aggressive is the same thing as saying that peace can be achieved if there are no conflicts in international society. It is simply tautological.

Although the characters of the countries that comprise international society are important factors for determining the nature of that society, they are not independent factors. To the contrary, the nature of international society itself also influences the character of individual countries; it follows that the relationship between the international and the national is an interactive one. This can be readily understood if we consider the foreign policy that a country pursues when it is at peace and when it is being belligerent.

Under what sorts of international environments have the following two contrasting images of diplomacy developed? One—as suggested by seventeenth-century British politician Henry Wotton's definition

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that "an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth"—is that diplomacy is a matter of working out a strategy to achieve one's own objectives while duping the other party. The other conception rejects such methods and instead holds that the proper approach to diplomacy is to discover mutual interests.

Under what international conditions did the following two concepts of diplomacy emerge? The first pattern—what we might call stratagem-based diplomacy—was practiced by both the Byzantine Empire from late antiquity to the Middle Ages and the Italian city-states during the early years of the European international system. These were times of extreme chaos. The Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire—which was situated between the multiethnic Balkan Peninsula and the Near East, where Muslims were growing in power—lasted a thousand years after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The reasons for its longevity were its advanced civilization (the eastern areas of the Roman Empire in its dying days had a higher level of civilization than the western ones) and the fact that it had to call on both superb military technology and ruthless diplomatic skills. Conventional wisdom in the Eastern Roman Empire held that it was only natural to attack a foe who naively responded to a cease-fire proposal by carelessly relaxing their defenses. Diplomats handed out bribes, set neighboring countries against one another, and duped their enemies. Such techniques were later implemented in Italy where similar chaos reigned, and they were exploited ruthlessly there as well.

However, when the object of one's diplomacy is not necessarily an enemy, any gains made through deception will not be lasting ones. Lasting diplomatic relationships must be built on mutual interests. In light of this fact, European diplomacy shifted from the stratagem-based model to the second, more harmonious one. Of decisive

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importance here is the fact that while the Eastern Roman Empire's diplomatic partners represented different civilizations, the European states were linked through a shared civilization. This is crucial because under such conditions permanent interests are more important than temporary ones and therefore can be prioritized.

Thus, the international environment and the type of diplomacy that nations pursue are interrelated. Disorder in international politics requires stratagem-based diplomacy. However, such diplomacy can make a disordered situation worse and create a vicious cycle. Dictators have long used threats from abroad as an excuse to expand their power and maintain peace at home. Such expansions of power threaten other nations, forcing them to respond. This turns potential foreign threats into actual dangers, and leads the despot to expand their power further. Hence the cycle.

"Wickedness Comes from Weakness"

Accordingly, the fundamental issue for all the nations that make up international society becomes how to redirect this vicious cycle between the international political environment and the nature of the diplomacy of these nations from a bad direction to a good one. The domestic regime of each country may be the primary condition. However, as already discussed, both the optimistic view that peace will follow once that condition is satisfied, and the deterministic one that only a single type of regime satisfies that condition, must be firmly rejected. Eighteenth-century thinkers did not make these mistakes, and consequently they gave us crucial insights into what makes domestic regimes peaceful and international environments orderly.

Rousseau argued that world peace could be achieved only if all nations were independent and separate from one another with only

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limited interaction. Clearly, such an idealized state is unlikely in today's world. However, if we consider the dangers created by various interactions as we saw in Chapter 2, such as how the North-South problem will not be solved by integrating different nations but rather by restoring or sustaining their independence, then Rousseau's ideal world could indeed become a reality.

Also, as Chapters 1 and 3 showed, denying the sovereignty of nations cannot solve the problem of how to achieve peace among them. In other words, the most important conditions for having a peaceful nation are for it to solve its own problems at home and for it to not envy other nations. Rousseau says the following in *Emile*:

> All wickedness comes from weakness. The child is only naughty because he is weak; make him strong and he will be good; if we could do everything, we should never do wrong.[47]

Certainly, countries that cannot manage their own economies or protect their independence have always been sources of disorder and war despite their inability to actively do harm to others. This is true even today. Of course, isolated independence is out of the question today. However, countries can be independent even when they are interdependent.

That said, in order to maintain independence in an interdependent world, the power to protect independence must be restricted. Kant examined the conditions under which independence can be maintained while being interdependent. He set forth "The civil constitution of every state shall be *republican*" (emphasis added) as his First Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace.[48] Its purpose was to restrict the power of states. Just how important Kant considered this condition to be is obvious from his insistence that all states must be republican,

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though he did find it acceptable and even desirable for each nation to choose its own political institutions.

For Kant, republicanism is not about who holds power. In his usage, it is about the way that power is wielded and how governance is provided. For him, republicanism stood opposite to despotism. In a republican system, there are limits on how political power is wielded. He held the unique features of republicanism to be (1) a freedom prescribed by laws that protects the rights of the individual (without depending on a majority), (2) the separation of powers, and (3) representative institutions (associated with free elections). Setting aside the question of whether this would produce sufficient restraints on power, the key point is Kant distinguished democracy from republicanism. Kant was aware that a tyranny of the majority could arise under democratic governments. And he clearly had no naive optimism about how public opinion worked. The view that Kant had a blind belief in the power of public opinion arose later through mistaken and vulgarized interpretations of his analysis. As Chapter 3 made plain, the political regimes that make international organizations meaningful are not the ones where public opinion is powerful but rather where its power is regulated.

Viewed this way, our investigation in this book into three distinct attributes of nations can be summed up as providing us with the following lessons about what conditions make a peaceful nation. A peaceful nation must have military capabilities sufficient to preserve its independence, but it must not yield to militarism or lose control over those capabilities. From an economic perspective, neither a nation that is forced to submit to the domination of some other nation, nor a nation that dominates others, can be peaceful. Finally, political power must be limited. Lack of free speech, the tyranny of the majority, and

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fanatical devotion to one or another ideology must be rejected as they will make it extremely difficult to limit political power.

Such criteria unquestionably provide some guidelines for behavior. However, these are not enough. As already noted, satisfying these criteria in isolation from other relevant conditions is simply impossible. We still need to ask about how to survive under the disorderly international conditions that we face today.

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II. Coping with Reality

The Absence of International Norms

The disorderly state of international politics is a source of immense difficulties for all nations. That disorder cannot be attributed to the presence of a single, wicked nation, nor can it be explained by human moral degeneracy. It is a consequence of a weakening in the norms that rule the behavior of nations, which in turn causes confusion and mutual distrust.

Norms prevail under stable conditions. International law is the prime example. The question of whether "international law" actually qualifies as law has frequently been discussed. International law is not backed by enforcement power and is undeniably incomplete in nature. But it is also true that international law has served as a guideline for how states should behave.

Let's take the example of settling borders between nations, which is one of the most critical functions of international law. National borders serve as the foundation for the principle of non-interference, and as such have provided the basic framework for the behavior of nations in the modern international system. National borders define the scope of sovereign jurisdiction. The modern international system consists of sovereign states that have the power to exclusively control subjects in their respective territories. States are therefore not allowed to interfere in one another's internal affairs. National borders are the basic institution that sustains this principle of non-interference. So long as this principle holds, international power struggles will take the form of

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competition between states over territorial control. The results of these struggles are made manifest as new borders recognized by international treaty. A nation seeking to change recognized national borders would be seen as one that is expansionist. Any attempt to change particularly important borders represents a threat to other nations. Thus, fixing borders, coupled with the principle of non-interference, provides a framework for the power struggle among states.

The laws of war are another example. The laws are based on the idea that, while war itself may be an accepted instrument for the power struggles among states, the acts undertaken in those wars should be restricted. Neutrality as an institution is a notable example. By acknowledging that some nations have no direct involvement with a conflict and guaranteeing their rights and obligations, neutrality limits the scope of acts of war. If some nations avoid direct involvement in a war, they can retain the power to moderate the acts of the belligerents and prevent the conflict from ending in a one-sided victory.

Such rules are not guaranteed by enforcement powers. However, the rules are likely to be observed when breaking them would result in losses that would outweigh any possible gains. Thus, the laws of war came to generally serve as guidelines for state behavior.

These days, however, such rules are far removed from the reality of international politics. For that reason, it has become extremely difficult to accept and comply with these rules, and hence they have ceased to be effective guidelines for behavior. For example, it is impossible to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants when wars are fought through guerilla campaigns and missile exchanges. In this age of total war, the acts of belligerent parties are not easily constrained. Getting nations to follow the rules of war is extremely difficult when breaking them has come to offer so many benefits.

Some may still believe that the acts of war undertaken since World War II have in fact been largely regulated by international law. Even so, however, this raises the important question of whether or not it is enough to restrict the acts undertaken in a war while still accepting war itself as a legitimate means for carrying out power struggles. Perhaps the current approach is the correct one after all: all wars are illegal other than those for self-defense or those military actions provided for under the UN Charter. It is true that this would put many acts of war outside the rule of law. At present, however, there are no norms acceptable to all nations that, if they were adhered to, would ensure that peace would be preserved.

Furthermore, the combination of settling national borders and honoring the principle of non-interference can no longer serve as the institutional framework for containing international power struggles. This is because, strictly speaking, non-interference is impossible.

World War I demonstrated this in dramatic form. Germany lost despite having prevented enemy armies from entering its territory. One reason for this was an economic blockade. Today, the survival of every country depends on economic exchanges that are conducted beyond their borders. By manipulating economic relations, in particular by imposing an economic embargo, Germany's enemies could wield tremendous power without ever crossing its borders. Propaganda is another factor. In World War I, all the warring powers engaged in fierce propaganda warfare. While its primary objective was to fan nationalism at home, it also targeted the populations of enemy nations. In fact, British and French propaganda did have some impact on the German people.

In addition, the fundamental dilemma of international politics—the existence of different versions of legitimacy—manifested itself as a fierce conflict between two ideologies. With two competing versions

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of legitimacy, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs was made moot. Liberalism postulates the conditions for democratic legitimacy to be parliamentarism, free and confidential elections, majority rule, independence of the judiciary, freedom of speech and thought, and the like. Meanwhile, communism, in contrast, held that democracy is impossible so long as society is divided into one class that possesses the means of production and another class that lacks those means and instead has to sell its labor.

Accordingly, communism rejected the idea that an assembly or government chosen through elections represents the people; it regarded any government created on that basis as nothing more than democracy in form only. However, from a liberal perspective, communism does not meet the criteria for a democracy. Thus, with two conflicting ideas about legitimate political regimes, coupled with closed transnational communication, non-interference in the strictest sense of the word has become impossible in practice.

So long as different concepts of legitimacy are in fierce conflict, it is clear that any attempt to create shared rules for behavior will fail. Even if an attempt is made to outlaw war by working out a formula for peacefully settling conflicts, opinions will remain divided about what that formula for achieving peaceful settlements should be. Given that the concepts of legitimacy differ to begin with, views regarding what constitutes a civil war will likewise never be the same.

Thus, international law—which had laid out the guidelines for how nations should behave within the modern state system—has been shaken at its very foundations. It is extremely difficult for a nation to restrain its own behavior by trusting in the behavior of others. It is these factors and not the wickedness of one or another power that are the causes of disorder in international society today.

The Realist Position

Two kinds of approaches are taken to deal with the disorderly state of international society. One is to make *direct* attempts to bring order. When one or another great power is not involved, proponents of this approach seek to strengthen the United Nations and international law. However, such a solution is impossible because international society by its very nature is decentralized. I have already discussed how any attempts to expand the power of the United Nations would be neither desirable nor feasible. The same is true for international law.

Because international law is not backed with any enforcement capabilities, it is impossible to create any international law that goes beyond generally agreed principles. Even if such a law were created, it is certain that it would be violated. To borrow the words of Rousseau, this is an "inconceivable" project. Conversely, any attempts at enforcement backed by force wielded by one or another major power are conceivable. However, as already discussed, that would simply result in a modern-day Crusade.

Accordingly, the only thing possible would be to *indirectly* restore order. As I have already pointed out throughout this work, there is no single indirect means for accomplishing this, but rather many. Be that as it may, the typical approach involves the freezing of situations where powers and competing versions of justice are in conflict. This process starts by abandoning the attempt to eliminate the causes of the conflict. Conflicts in the present-day world occur because of competition between different versions of justice and a lack of rules to restrict the actions of nations. However, any attempts to directly eliminate the causes of these conflicts are either meaningless or simply exacerbate the disorder.

The realist approach tries to deal with existing conflicts among states as if they were simply power struggles. It is based on an awareness

that the current difficulties stem from the core nature of international politics today. Based on this appreciation of the difficulties involved, realists deliberately set aside the root of those difficulties, i.e., the conflict among the different versions of justice, and instead focus on measures aimed solely at dealing with the power struggles that have emerged from those conflicts. Realism is not content with just doing something about struggles for power. Its position is based on the awareness that not only is it impossible to solve the core difficulties directly in isolation from managing the power struggle aspect, but also that, if anything, it would be counterproductive.

In international politics, searching for the root causes of conflicts and trying to solve them leads only to endless debates and no solutions. It would be wiser to deliberately ignore what lies beneath the surface, focus only on the actual conflict, and concentrate one's efforts on dealing with it at that level.

This resembles symptomatic treatment in medical science. When physicians do not know the cause of an illness, or if they are unable to immediately eliminate the cause, they work to treat the symptoms. They do so because it is by no means easy to quickly discover the fundamental cause(s) for an abnormality in something as complex as the human body. Even if physicians can determine the cause(s), they are limited in what they can do to eliminate it/them. And even if they could eliminate the fundamental cause(s) of an abnormality, it is very much open to question as to whether doing so would have a net positive effect on the human body. In addition, it is possible that even if the fundamental cause(s) were eliminated, another abnormality might appear because of some other cause(s).

For these reasons, to physicians there are considerable justifications for relying on the symptomatic-treatment approach. Pushing a

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metaphor too far is usually dangerous, but this example of symptomatic treatment in medical practice offers hints about how to deal with problems in other areas.

In fact, freezing the status quo in the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union worked well, at least for the bilateral confrontation between the two. As already mentioned, when they found it impossible to change the front lines between their spheres of influence, tensions between the two gradually began to ease. Similar developments have taken place in the past, as illustrated by theorist of international law Emer de Vattel (1714–1767):

> A general truce, made for many years, differs from a peace in little else than in leaving the question which was the original ground of the war, still undecided. When two nations are weary of hostilities, and yet cannot agree on the point which constitutes the subject of their dispute, they generally have recourse to this kind of agreement. Thus, instead of peace, long truces only have usually been made between the Christians and the Turks, —sometimes from *a false spirit of religion*, at other times because neither party were willing to acknowledge the other as lawful owners of their respective possessions.[49] (emphasis added)

Based on similar thinking, Winston Churchill, at the start of the Cold War, advocated making efforts to permanently stabilize the borders between the two spheres of interests, saying:

> It is better to have a world united than a world divided; but it is also better to have a world divided, than a world destroyed. Nor does it follow that even in a world divided there should not

be equilibrium from which a further advance to unity might be attempted as the years pass by. Anything is better than this ceaseless degeneration of the heart of Europe.[50]

That said, freezing a struggle is but a first step. When it is done skillfully, it may prevent a vicious cycle developing between a deteriorating international environment and more conservative foreign policies. However, it cannot turn that cycle into a more virtuous one. To the contrary, measures to freeze the status quo can also trigger a vicious cycle if they are too dependent on a stratagem such as the containment policy. It is always necessary to remain focused on creating a more lasting international order to prevent this kind of misstep.

Addressing power struggles is little more than the first step for dealing with international conflicts. While managing the power struggles, there must always be the hope that managing those struggles will lead to an eventual solution to the root causes of the conflicts. Realism is not an exhortation for power politics made out of despair, but rather it is prudent political wisdom based on an appreciation of the difficulty of the problems at hand.

To further illustrate this point, let us take restoration of the status quo ante as a principle for settling every armed conflict. This principle has much in common in attitude with the approach of freezing the status quo. Adhering to it has practically become customary in the diplomatic space, including at the UN. It is unquestionably inadequate, in the sense that this approach does not eliminate the causes for why armed force may be used. And yet, the principle is adhered to because any attempt to remove those causes is expected to, if anything, make the situation worse. At the same time, it is hoped that this principle of restoring the status quo ante will gradually be established as a norm

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observed by the members of international society. In addition, adhering to this principle does not mean abandoning hope that some other means will be found to solve the causes of conflicts.

In sum, it is recognized that when managing power struggles, the efforts pursued must encourage the development of international norms. As should be clear from my discussion up to this point, the roles of international law and the UN should be appreciated for serving as the pumps and valves that power virtuous cycles developing between the international political environment and patterns of state behavior. At this juncture of history, however, neither is powerful enough for any nation to rely on them completely.

Consequently, the only way open is for each nation to work out international laws and strengthen the authority of the UN through their practices while protecting their own ideals and interests by themselves. When international law is not sufficiently binding and the authority of the UN is easily challenged, some state could make exorbitant gains by pursuing its goals through reprehensible means. However, this will clearly create a vicious cycle. Statesmen today are required to make choices in ways that will not spur a vicious cycle, and if possible that will promote a virtuous cycle in the pursuit of the national goals of their countries. This is the minimum moral imperative demanded even for realists who are driven primarily by power and interests.

Despair and Hope

It is by no means easy to act in the way described. Those who are directly engaged in international politics are frequently forced to choose between this minimum moral imperative and the demands of their national interests. For that reason, they who must directly deal in

international politics cannot help but be skeptical. Yet, they also must not disregard the moral imperative out of despair. This moral choice is a subtle one, but it is very consequential.

This moral dilemma has tormented humankind across the ages. For example, George Kennan had to frequently cope with this difficult choice as he planned US foreign policy during the Cold War. He had to somehow find a way to counter the Soviet Union, a great power with a completely different system of justice. It was utterly impossible to solve the root causes of this conflict, but it was equally impossible for him to avoid the challenge. For that reason, he did what he *could* while hoping that, someday, what could not be done *would become doable*.

In this context, I note that Kennan deeply appreciated the work of the writer and physician Anton Chekhov (1860–1904). He identified with Chekhov's depictions of persons who struggle in situations where they are forced to solve impossible problems. He particularly liked the 1898 short story, "A Doctor's Visit." The physician protagonist of this story sets out to visit a sick person at a factory. The patient is the daughter of the factory owner. She is afflicted with a psychologically induced heart ailment due to the grim atmosphere of the facility. It is an illness that he cannot cure. The physician cannot help but sense the limits of his powers.

Similar things do happen in international politics. In *American Diplomacy 1900–1950*, Kennan quoted historian Herbert Butterfield as follows:

> Behind the great conflicts of mankind is a terrible human predicament which lies at the heart of the story: . . . Contemporaries fail to see the predicament or refuse to recognize its genuineness so that our knowledge of it comes from later analysis.

It is only with the progress of historical science on a particular subject that men come really to recognize that there was a terrible knot almost beyond the ingenuity of man to untie.[51]

However, we must not stop hoping. In fact, we human beings often do not stop hoping even when there is no rational foundation for our hope. The physician in "A Doctor's Visit" knew he was helpless; but, at the request of the insomniac daughter, he nonetheless stayed the night at the house and talked with her.

> Your sleeplessness does you credit; in any case, it is a good sign. In reality, such a conversation as this between us now would have been unthinkable for our parents. At night they did not talk, but slept sound; we, our generation, sleep badly, are restless, but talk a great deal, and are always trying to settle whether we are right or not. For our children or grandchildren that question—whether they are right or not—will have been settled.[52]

War is perhaps an incurable disease. However, we must nonetheless continue making efforts toward treating it. In short, although we cannot help but be skeptical, we must not despair. This is the duty of physicians and diplomats, and of human beings.

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